Ademola Adediji

The Politicization of Ethnicity as Source of Conflict

The Nigerian Situation

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Acknowledgements

whom I did go on long rides just for me to take some time off. The time we spent together had been fun and really helped a lot.

Finally, I extend my gratitude to my family and friends from different parts of the world for their support and encouragement throughout my research project.

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
APC	Arewa Peoples Congress
BUK	Bayero University Kano
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DV	Dependent Variable
EFCC	Economic and Financial and Crimes Commission
FCC	Federal Character Commission
FNDIC	Federation of Niger Delta Ijaw Communities
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICPC	Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Ijaw National Youth Council
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
INTV	Intervening Variable
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IV	Independent Variable
JDA	Jasawa Development Association
LGA	Local Government Area
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MNCs	Multinational Corporations

MOSIEN	Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
NECON	National Electoral Commission of Nigeria
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPC	National Population of Nigeria
OPC	Oodua Peoples Congress
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOSAPG	UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
UNSTATS	United Nations Statistics Division
WBCSD	World Bank Council for Sustainable Development

1. Introduction

Conflicts have always been an integral part of the history of mankind. However, in the period from the onset of the 1990s up until the early 21st century, the paradigm shifted from a Cold War mindset of conflict between (blocs of) nations to intra-national and inter-ethnic conflict becoming the dominant mode of conflict. This development has given a new impetus to academic discourse as conflicts among ethnic groups within nations increasingly came to play a central role in world politics, thereby dominating the international scene.

Consequently, the increasing outbreaks of ethnic and religious conflicts in many parts of the world at the beginning of the 1990s offer some support to such paradigm shift, as the Civil War in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavian Federation led to thousands of deaths and destruction of property, in many instances resulting in genocide and ethnic cleansing from which these countries are still to recover.[1] Likewise, the resurgence of clashes in Somalia, the ethnic and religious divide in the former Republic of Sudan and the continual eruptions of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria lend some credence to this yet to be ascertained belief that the 21st century will be embroiled in a struggle involving ethnic and religious actors along certain faultlines.[2]

Thus far, it remains doubtful whether the uncertainties surrounding these unrests the world is experiencing in recent decades are, as reflected in the aforementioned deadly wars and conflicts, traceable to intolerance among various groups within particular political communities. Simultaneously, it can be observed that religious faiths are often used in many of these conflicts as instruments of division. However, irrespective of the role assigned to religion, it is readily apparent that the boundary line between religion and ethnicity is blurred

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1   Check Hermann, Tamar: "The Impermeable Identity Wall: The Study of Violent Conflicts by 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders'", in: Smyth, Marie/Robinson, Gillian [Eds.]: *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, United Nations Press/Pluto Press, Tokyo et al. 2001, p. 77-91 (79).

2   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa: "The Role and Function of Research in Divided Societies: The Case of Africa", in: Smyth, Marie/Robinson, Gillian [Eds.]: *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, United Nations Press/Pluto Press, Tokyo et al. 2001, p. 12-33.

in many of these internal conflicts, often denoting that both factors are often intertwined in conflict situations.

Religion, often identified by many scholars such as A. Tusicisny and M. Ross as an important factor in many conflict zones[3], is generally expected to consolidate relationships among mankind and, in so doing, contribute to peace and humanity within the human race, but, at the same time, religion is often at the root of the antagonism and opposition which precipitates bloodshed and the clash of cultures. In other words, many observers and authors such as T. Eriksen and A. Tabyshalieva believe that the contemporary conflicts experienced since the end of the Cold War are caused by ethnicity[4], a reason why the word 'ethnicity' is frequently used interchangeably for ethnic conflict on television news, in newspaper reports, and on political programs or in everyday conversation.[5]

Likewise in academic literature, authors such as E. Osaghae trace the source of contemporary conflicts to ethnicity, opining that "ethnicity is accepted as a problem to be managed rather than repressed, since repression only exacerbates conflicts."[6] Following this assertion would mean that current conflicts in many countries of the world could be attributed to the repression of ethnicity, thereby elevating the notion that ethnicity is the source of these conflicts. To determine whether ethnicity can truly be regarded as the cause of these conflicts, it is necessary to carry out a scientific inquiry, which is the central question of this research paper.

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3   Read Tusicisny, Andrej: "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?", in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 485-498. See Ross, H. Marc: "A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence", in: *Political Psychology*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1986, p. 426-469.
4   Check Eriksen, Hylland Thomas: *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, 2nd edition, Pluto Press, London et al. 2002. Compare Tabyshalieva, Anara: "Researching Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Central Asia", in: Smyth, Marie/Robinson, Gillian [Eds.]: *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, United Nations Press/Pluto Press, Tokyo et al. 2001, p. 130-147.
5   Read Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 1. It is assumed that "various events in different parts of the world in recent years have brought the problem of ethnicity to the centre of contemporary debate in the social and political sciences." Quote from ibid., p. 35.
6   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2001, op. cit., 27.

A. Assumption and Problem: Ethnicity as the Cause of Conflicts in Africa

Arguably, ethnicity has been and will continue to be a primary cause of African conflicts.[7] The formation of new nation-states at the time of independence was accompanied by an urgent demand for nation-building by the new African leaders who were already aware of the difficulty in transcending African ethnic, religious and regional loyalties.[8]

As a result, E. Osaghae emphasizes in that violent conflicts and civil wars erupt in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal because "the nation-state project was a monumental failure because a uni-nation model is incompatible with a divided multination situation."[9] Similarly, it is also argued that most developing countries are ethnically diverse and that ethnic diversity may lead to civil unrest, as observed in the following passage:

> Ethnic diversity may lead to increased civil strife. This perception is fostered both by some graphic individual scenes of inter-ethnic violence, and by an aggregate correlation: Africa has not only the highest ethnic diversity, but also the highest incidence of civil war. Potentially, this might account for the detrimental economic effects of diversity. In countries of traditional stability, ethnic conflict is becoming an increasing factor. In Kenya, ethnic tensions related to multi-party elections resulted in the deaths of 1,500 people between late 1991 and late 1993. Additional deaths have occurred in relation to the election in 1997, including post election recriminations against non-government voting areas in early January 1998. South Africa lost 14,000 citizens due to the racial and ethnic violence, which was part of transition to majority rule between 1990 and 1994.[10]

According to this, it is assumed that the outbreak of ethnic conflicts is increasing, even in countries which are traditionally regarded as stable and peaceful.[11] Therefore, in a nutshell, "ethnic conflicts have become the serious challenge of our times, which perhaps explains why ethnicity is seen as the reigning concept in African studies at present."[12]

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7   As mentioned above, it is generally assumed that the source of ethnic conflicts in African countries can be traced back to ethnicity, see Oyeniyi, Adeleye on the theme "Conflict and Violence in Africa: Causes, Sources and Types", written on 28 February 2011, and accessible electronically thus: http://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/02/conflict-and-violence-in-africa-causes-sources-and-types [26/08/213].
8   See ibid.
9   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2001, op. cit., p. 26.
10 See Osinubi, S. Tokunbo/Osinubi, S. Oladipupo: "Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Africa. The Nigerian Experience", in: *Journal of Social Science*, 12 (2), 2006, p. 101-114 (101).
11 The few examples of peaceful and stable countries, as mentioned in the text, are Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal where it is initially thought that violent conflicts, i.e. conflicts associated with ethnicity, will never exist. See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2001, op. cit., p. 26.
12 Osinubi, S. Tokunbo/Osinubi, S. Oladipupo, 2006, op. cit., p. 101.

Unlike many writers who use certain variables to explain the cause of ethnic conflicts in Africa, invoking factors such as religiosity, the scramble for resources, the elites' political struggle, the influence and operations of multinational oil companies and existing colonial structures to explain the reasons for the eruptions of the contemporary conflicts, the argument put forward in this research paper is that there is no correlation between ethnicity and conflicts. Rather, the politicization of ethnicity is perceived as the source of conflicts in many countries, specifically Nigeria.[13] Many other authors believe that the causes of the current conflicts in Nigeria and in many other African countries have their roots in the colonial administration by foreign officials, who attempted to homogenize heterogeneous communities into one single political entity.[14] In the situation of Nigeria, the following needs to be credited:

> In Nigeria, the colonial masters provided urban setting, which constitutes the cradle of contemporary ethnicity. The colonialist while pretending to carry out a mission of uniting the warring ethnic groups, consciously and systematically separated the various Nigerian people thereby creating a suitable atmosphere for conflict. With the heterogeneous nature of the country, the tendency of the various nationals is towards parochial consciousness at the expense of national consciousness.[15]

Contrary to the assumption that ethnicity causes conflicts, the problem faced by this research study is that no other work has carried out a critical scientific investigation on the meaning of ethnicity and applied this to the causes of conflicts, specifically to the contemporary violent ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. In other words, it remains unclear if ethnicity leads to or is the cause of conflicts and unless proven otherwise, the position taken in this dissertation is that this is not the case.

The reason Nigeria is used as an exemplary case study of intranational conflicts is due to the regular outbreaks of violent conflicts in the country in recent times, an argument bolstered by I. Albert's acknowledgement that "violent conflicts have been a regular feature of social life in many parts of Nigeria since the early 1990s."[16] On this note, this study argues that the phenomenon of ethnicity

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13   For example, it is emphasized that the current crisis confronting Nigeria is as a result of colonialism that set the stage for the contemporary ethnicity. See Osinubi, S. Tokunbo/Osinubi, S. Oladipupo, 2006, op. cit., p. 101.
14   Compare Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2001, op. cit., p. 18.
15   Osinubi, S. Tokunbo/Osinubi, S. Oladipupo, 2006, op. cit., p. 101.
16   Albert, O. Isaac: "The Role and Process of Action Research in the Management of Violent Community Conflicts in Nigeria", in: Smyth, Marie/Robinson, Gillian [Eds.]: *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, United Nations Press/Pluto Press, Tokyo et al. 2001, p. 106-129 (106).

is not synonymous with conflict, a thesis which leads to the development of the hypothesis of this work:

Hypothesis: Ethnicity does not lead to or is not the cause of conflict, unless politicized.

Beside the major question of this work, a range of further questions which are significant in order to test this hypothesis are stated below:

Research questions: On which basis does the politicization of ethnicity occur, who politicizes ethnicity, why and how is ethnicity politicized and what are the consequences of the politicization of ethnicity? In addition, the question "why is ethnicity politicized?" is taken to mean the same as "which functions do the politicization of ethnicity fulfill?" in this context.

That having been said, a brief account of the Nigerian situation will be discussed next.

B. An Overview of the Nigerian Situation

Nigeria is the single most populous black African country, with approximately 162.471 million inhabitants,[17] one reason why it is often described as the giant and the hope of Africa.[18] However, this most populous African country "is a very highly complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious polity, with a diversity of cultural groups, having some 395 ethnic groups."[19]

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[17]   The figure of the population of Nigeria is obtained from the United Nations Statistics Division of 2011, a UN Data retrievable under the following homepage: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pocketbook/PDF/2013/Nigeria.pdf [18/08/2014]. However, the exact population of Nigeria is unknown and it usually a controversial issue. For example, the figure posted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States estimates the population of Nigeria in 2014 to stand at 177,155,754 million. Information retrieved from the following website: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html [18/08/2014].

[18]   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa: *Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence*, Hurst, London 1998, p. ix.

[19]   Danfulani, H.D. Umar: "The Jos Peace Conference and the Indigene/Settler Question in Nigerian Politics", 2006, p. 1-25 (1), Leiden/University of Jos under the homepage: http://www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/paper-danfulani.pdf [15/04/2014].

With the country's population almost equally divided between Christians and Muslims,[20] and currently representing the fifth largest Muslim country in the world,[21] "Nigeria has been wracked by periodic episodes of violence for decades."[22] Consequently, Nigeria can be described as a deeply divided society where important political matters are intensely and fiercely contested along the lines of complex religious, ethnic and regional cleavages throughout the country.[23] Furthermore, inter-communal crises break out frequently and, "for decades, communities in various parts of the country have fought, often violently, for political and economic control.[24]

Having been a former colony of Great Britain until 1960 when it gained its independence, Nigeria, aside from the experience of a bloody Civil War from 1967 to 1970,[25] has been confronted since the beginning of the 1990s with regular occurrences of violent conflicts attributed to religious and ethnic influences and sentiments. These contemporary conflict situations are compatible with C. Mitchell's forecast that "there is much evidence that many disputes in the 1990s and beyond will be protracted, intranational conflicts."[26] In view of this, U. Ikpe opines that "conflicts of various kinds in Nigeria have often been attributed to

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20   In a report published on 7 October 2009, it is indicated that Nigeria, with approximately 50% of the country's population known to be Muslims, has the sixth largest number of Muslims worldwide. Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project on the theme "Mapping the Global Muslim Population", electronically obtainable from the following homepage: http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population [01/03/2013].

21   The 2012 report of Pew Research even positioned Nigeria as the fifth largest Muslim country worldwide. After Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Nigeria ranks fifth on the list of the ten countries with the largest number of Muslims in a report published on 18 December 2012, as viewable electronically on the website thus: http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-muslim [10/05/2014].

22   Citation from a report written in the Time by Meg Handley entitled "The Violence in Nigeria: What's Behind the Conflict?", published electronically on 10 March 2010, on the homepage: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1971010,00.html#ixzz2d6iL0f5U [12/07/2012].

23   Read Smyth, Marie/Robinson, Gillian [Eds.]: *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, United Nations Press/Pluto Press, Tokyo et al. 2001.

24   See the publication of Human Rights Watch on Nigeria: "Jos: A City Torn Apart", in: *Human* Rights Watch, Vol. 13, no. 9 (A), December 2001, p. 1-26 (4). Retrievable electronically thus: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1201_1.pdf [12/09/2013].

25   Compare Cronjé, Suzanne: *The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-1970*, Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1972.

26   Mitchell, R. Christopher: "Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolution", in: Richard D. Lambert [Ed.]: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 518, November 1991, p. 23-38 (25).

ethnicity. For instance, communal clashes, electoral violence and so on have all been rooted in ethnicity."[27]

 With an increasing rate of conflicts resulting from issues related to ethnicity, especially the crises generated by ethno-religious factors in which thousands of people are killed and thousands more displaced in regular intervals,[28] the Nigerian state is haunted by different types of conflicts and according to I. Osaretin, the most critical and "the most prominent of these conflicts are those that have pitted Muslims against Christians in a dangerous convergence of religion, ethnicity and politics."[29] This leads A. Omede to analyze the current Nigerian crises thus:

> The Nigerian nation has on daily basis experience [sic] an upsurge of activities that threatens and endangers its national security. Kidnappings, arms proliferation, armed robberies, drug and human trafficking and violence associated with ethnic, religious and political conflicts are among these threats. Recently however, a new dimension of bomb blasts, occurring on a daily basis, is a major focus of attention in Nigeria's security analysis.[30]

This is by no means to conclude that Nigeria, though ethnically and religiously a fractured state, is an impoverished country, with scarcity of resources leading to these conflicts that are associated with ethnicity. Having passed through six successful and a number of other failed military coups, three abortive transitions to democracy and the country relapsing into violent protracted conflicts on a daily basis, a sizable sum of more than \$400 billion revenue from the oil industry since the early 1970s is being wasted, a possible reason why the Nigerian "economy underperforms, and the great majority of citizens have benefited little. More effective institution-building is imperative."[31]

 Yet, it is unclear if ethnicity is the source of the current conflicts in Nigeria. In spite of this situation, there is an acknowledgement of the actuality of the phenomenon of *ethnicity*, ethnic consciousness and other related concepts, a de-

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27 Ikpe, B. Ukana: "The Patrimonial State and Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria", in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, May 2009, p. 679-697 (679).

28 See Human Rights Watch on Nigeria, 2001, op. cit., p. 1-26.

29 Osaretin, Idahosa: "Ethno Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria: The Case of Jos, Plateau State", in: *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2013, p. 349-360 (349).

30 Omede, A.J.: "Nigeria: "Analyzing the Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration", in: *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2011, p. 90-102 (91).

31 See International Crisis Group in the African Report (No. 113) written on 19 July 2006 with the title "Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty", p. 1-38 (preface). Retrievable under the following website: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/Nigeria%20Want%20in%20the%20Midst%20of%20Plenty.ashx [21/05/2013].

velopment that prompts the search for new means and concepts aimed at handling conflict situations.[32]

Investigating Nigeria as the empirical case study of this dissertation, a comparative analysis based on the Jos conflicts and the Warri crisis will be carried out, using the argument that ethnicity, as a phenomenon, is not the cause of conflicts. Therefore, as far as ethnicity is comprehended in this research study as a social construct which is situational, changeable or modifiable, there is growing need to conduct a research work in order to clarify that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts. This position constitutes the purpose of this research study, that is, to examine the concepts of ethnicity, conflicts and politicization as well as to determine whether the notion of *ethnicity*, in its raw form, leads to conflicts.

C. Significance of the Research Study

The 20th century has experienced a number of theoretical approaches developed by numerous authors and theoreticians in order to attenuate, confront and stem the eruption, intensification and proliferation of violent ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world, especially on the African continent.

In spite of this, there has been a relapse of many ethnic conflicts, with new cases of conflicts, which have ethnic and religious overtones, being reported almost on daily basis in recent times, beginning with the last decade of the 20th century. With this development, there is urgent need for the reappraisal of existing conflict theories, by either introducing a complementary theory to the established ones or the adoption of a new approach to conflict theory altogether in order to meet the challenges of the modern era.

As indicated in the introduction to this work, this approach to the politicization of ethnicity as the source of conflicts, using Nigeria as an empirical case study, will combine two theoretical models so as to enable a paradigm shift in the methods used to counteract the so-called recurrent conflicts, known as protracted conflicts, and confront the emergence of new ones, mainly conflicts which have ethnic and religious connotations. On this basis, as will be discussed subsequently in the work, the *instrumentalist approach of ethnicity* by F. Barth and *the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity* by G. Schlee will be deployed complementarily in order to examine the social science explanation of ethnicity through a new political scientific perspective.

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32   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2001, op. cit., p. 27.

With the application of G. Schlee's method of decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, concentrating primarily on clan conflicts in northeast Africa and strongly linking clan issues with ethnicity within the scope of his analysis, this research study on the politicization of ethnicity combines G. Schlee's method with F. Barth's instrumentalist approach to investigate the source of the contemporary ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, a country known for regular outbreaks of violent ethnic unrests. This is to ensure that new mechanisms of conflict resolution and reconciliation, as forms of preventive actions, are developed to counteract further outbursts of recurring ethnic conflicts.

In addition, applying both methods on the data generated from field research in Nigeria will contribute substantially in the search for answers to the question of ethnicity, specifically, regarding the *drawing of ethnic boundary lines* in conflict zones. Furthermore, contrary to conventional methods, which are yet to be effective and offer lasting solutions, combining the methods of G. Schlee and F. Barth opens a new dimension in the search for the development of appropriate methods in handling conflicts associated with ethnicity and religion.

However, this is not to declare that this approach offers a permanent solution to the challenges and problems of ethnic conflicts, but it will establish a new paradigm for the study of conflicts, in this way contributing to and enriching the field of conflict theory.

D. The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation comprises six chapters, with each chapter consisting of different subsections, including the introductory chapter and the concluding part of the study. The second, third, fourth and the fifth chapters are conceived to address the problems identified in this work and, with emphasis placed on the investigation of the assumption that ethnicity is the source of conflicts, the research work attempts, to the greatest extent possible, to examine and clarify if ethnicity causes conflicts, unless politicized, by reflecting and testing its central hypothesis on the case study of the investigation, namely Nigeria, specifically the Jos conflicts and the Warri crisis.

The second chapter will focus on the clarification of terminology such as ethnicity, politicization as well as the synthesis of both phenomena, i.e. the politicization of ethnicity. Having stated and analyzed the current range of arguments of the aforementioned concepts, the investigation intends to reveal that

ethnicity is a social construct which, however, does not lead to conflicts, except if politicized by certain individuals. Such circumstances may lead to conflict since politicization revolves around the struggle for power and its demonstration and consolidation.

The third chapter lays out the conceptual framework of this research work, introducing two complimentary theories to examine the question whether ethnicity causes conflicts. Applying the instrumentalist approach and the theory of identity and difference, it will be shown that ethnicity is a social construct, thereby, not the cause of conflicts, unless under certain circumstances in which ethnicity becomes politicized by certain individuals or actors. The theories will also establish that ethnic boundary lines are blurred. Therefore, ethnicity is not a fixed phenomenon, but rather a tool socially constructed by individuals for deployment in uncertain times during which ethnicity is subject to politicization, for instance, in the course of political activities.

Addressing the question of how politicized ethnicity may lead to conflict, the instrumentalist approach, which conceptualizes ethnicity as a social construct and a social phenomenon, depicts conflicts as occurring whenever competing self-centered individuals in a multi-ethnic society circumstantially find it useful in the pursuit of personal objectives to mobilize their respective clientele by deploying distinguishing factors such as communality, language, religion, race or homeland territory to construct dividing lines. As indicated, ethnicity becomes a potential which may be used for divisive purposes, hence it may lead to conflicts in certain contexts, if politicized.

The method of decision theory of identity and difference attempts to identify the individuals involved in the deployment of the aforementioned distinctive factors and to determine why, how and on which basis these actors are able to use these factors in the construction of an enemy image. In addition, this method will stipulate that actors or individuals act rationally in the process of politicized ethnicity as they form alliances, dissolve alliances or switch allegiance during negotiations. However, actors' actions are governed by certain principles, referred to as: 1) social structures and their cognitive representations (e.g. language, religion, culture); 2) politics of inclusion and exclusion; 3) economy of group size and social position.

The fourth chapter will focus on the conceptualization, definition and analysis of the term *conflict* and the description of the different types of conflicts as well as review, examine and test the five different variables, namely: colonialism, religiosity, resource curse, political elites and the activities of multinational oil firms which are presented by numerous authors within the framework of the

current state of research as possible causes of conflict. The purpose of the review is to state, having investigated and tested all the aforementioned variables, that these are necessary, but do not constitute sufficient conditions as the cause of conflict.

Using the instrumentalist approach and the method of identity and difference in ethnicity, the fifth chapter will attempt to illustrate the historical background of Nigeria and analyze the three largest ethnic groups out of the 250 that constitute the country. The investigation intends to reveal, with respect to the review of current literature, empirical findings and, based on the interviews conducted in the conflict zones of Jos and Warri, that ethnicity within the context of these conflicts is a socially constructed phenomenon.

Based on field research carried out in both conflict regions, specifically in the last twenty years (1990-2010), the study is designed to buttress the argument that ethnicity, in spite of the differences in language, religion and culture, does not lead to conflicts, unless politicized. Certain individuals and actors who politicize ethnicity are identified, how these individuals use factors like religious, cultural and language differences to mobilize followers when instigating conflicts are described and it is also shown that these conflicts erupt during election times or when it involves the distribution of certain resources.

The sixth chapter presents the conclusion, prospect and the recommendation suggested by this research. Within the scope of this concluding part, this research paper proposes measures which can be introduced into the Nigerian polity in order to curb the danger of an imminent state collapse which is looming considering the current political situation of the country. With regard to the generalizability of this research, new areas for further scientific inquiries are suggested. In the recommendation, the ongoing religious and ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world are discussed, especially the crises in multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries such as Libya, Iraq and Syria.

E. Methodology

This dissertation is designed to examine, among other questions, if ethnicity leads to conflicts unless being politicized. In other words, the research is centered on how the politicization of ethnicity leads to outbreaks of conflicts in Nigeria.

Therefore, the purpose of this section is to discuss the study's methodology and design. Firstly, the design encompasses a process of extensive inquiry by

conducting fieldwork into particular conflict areas affected by the continual out-
break of conflicts in order to gather first-hand information. Such an undertaking
is what R. Singleton et al. describe as field research which "is essentially a mat-
ter of immersing oneself in a naturally occurring (rather than a "staged") sets of
events in order to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation."[33]

Secondly, the design comprises a review and examination of existing data
on the causes of conflicts, using certain variables such as colonialism, resource
curse and rentier state theory etc. as test variables to investigate the possible
causes of conflicts and compare the data to the hypothesis of this work.

In addition, within the scope of this research study, this section will outline
the review of secondary literature undertaken, using certain available data such
as the Constitution of Nigeria and several reports published by various commis-
sions of inquiry on the causes of conflicts, in order to ensure a better under-
standing of the conflict situation. With conflict as an important focus of this
study, the samples used are purposefully drawn and the persons interviewed are
chosen with a special focus on individuals from different ethnic groups who are
directly involved in the conflicts and other people who share their expertise on
the causes of the contemporary conflicts in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the description of the methodology, the population, sample,
data collection process, instrumentation, data analysis and variables as well as
the study's reliability and validity will be discussed subsequently.

Research Methodology

This research study is primarily a qualitative study on how the politicization of
ethnicity leads to conflict in Nigeria. In order to carry out this task, according to
J. Smith, the most significant foundation of any research study is its methodol-
ogy.[34] This implies that the process through which a research is carried out de-
pends on and is depicted through its methodology.[35]

On this basis, this section intends to discuss the methodology and the design
used in this research study as well as to make inquiries towards finding answers
to the research questions of this investigation, which are as follows: On which

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33   See Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret: *Approaches to Social Re-
      search*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford 1993, p. 12.
34   See Smith, Joel: "A Methodology for the Twenty-First Century Sociology", in: *Social
      Forces*, Vol. 70, No. 1, September 1991, p. 1-17 (10).
35   See ibid., p. 10.

basis does the politicization of ethnicity occur, who politicizes ethnicity, why and how is ethnicity politicized and what are the consequences of the politicization of ethnicity?

In order to answer the aforementioned research questions, multiple approaches will be used, most especially the qualitative research methodology with a fieldwork approach. Furthermore, this study is conducted in various stages and with the sole aim of ensuring that the research questions are answered, the subsequent methodological approaches are applied:

1) A theory based approach

2) A review of relevant literature

3) Multiple and comparative case studies

4) The usage of semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals chosen from different ethnic groups in various locations within Nigeria

5) Nonprobability sampling

The most important characteristic of research design lies in its logic of inference, irrespective of the method used to carry out a scientific investigation. By that, G. King et al. assert that research design is about "how to pose questions and fashion scholarly research to make valid descriptive and causal inferences."[36] Therefore, in spite of the methodological style applied, either qualitative or quantitative analysis, the intention, according to G. King et al., is to produce the logic of inference, the aim of science which R. Singleton et al. refer to as the form of logical structure of knowledge.[37]

On a general basis, there are two types of studies which can be distinguished in style, one is qualitative and the other is quantitative.[38] A quantitative study is one that is based on the use of numbers and statistical methods: "It tends to be based on numerical measurements of specific aspects of phenomena; it abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or to test causal hypotheses."[39] A qualitative research, on the other hand, consists of various ap-

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36   King, Gary et al.: *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton University Press, Princeton/New Jersey 1994, p. 3.

37   See Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 18.

38   See King, Gary et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 3-27. It is further emphasized that any style of quantitative analysis relies on measurements and analyses that can be replicable, that means, open to scrutiny by other researchers. See Ibid.

39   Ibid., p. 3.

proaches, however, according to G. King et al.'s definition, none of these approaches use numerical measurements.[40]

Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, a qualitative method is used to carry out the investigation. A qualitative approach is applied as it is useful for the following purposes: description, interpretation, verification and evaluation.[41] By means of this method, extensive data collected through specific observations from the field, including audio interviews and photographs as well as other documents such as various newspaper reports pertaining to the inquiry will be evaluated in the work.[42] J. Smith claims that data cannot be understood without being integrated in a context because the data collected are observed in a course of circumstances or events in time.[43] Therefore, all the reports from the interviewees are identified in the text, mainly in the empirical analysis of the conflict zones, where necessary. In situations where the identification of the interview participants could place them in danger, the name of the interviewee is omitted.

In view of this, the case study approach is used and the selected sampling of the participants for the interviews will be discussed as this methodological chapter progresses. But, beforehand, the following section will explain the importance of a theoretically based investigation for this scientific work.

Theoretical Basis

The introduction and reflection of theories in scientific works are important to answer questions and give an account of empirical generalizations as a whole.[44] Moreover, in line with G. King et al.'s declaration that "the development of a theory is often presented as the first step of research",[45] for the purpose of this dissertation, there are two theoretical models deployed to carry out the analysis of the hypothesis of this research study.

According to R. Yin, the use of a theory helps to delimit the inquiry of a case study for the purpose of effective design.[46] Based on the author's argument,

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40   See ibid., p. 4.
41   Read more on this in Leedy, D. Paul/Ormrod, E. Jeanne: *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 10th edition, Pearson, Boston et al. 2013, p. 140.
42   For further readings on the usage of a case study approach in the work of P. Leedy and J. Ormrod, see ibid., p. 140-141.
43   See Smith, Joel, 1991, op. cit., p. 5.
44   See Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 23
45   See King, Gary et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 19.
46   See Yin, K. Robert: *Applications of Case Study Research*, 2nd edition, Sage Publications, London et al. 2003, p. 6.

the following two theories are relevant methods used in carrying out the investigation on issues concerning ethnicity and the roles politics plays therein: The first one is referred to as the instrumentalist approach and the second theory is known as the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity. Both theories are applied complementarily in this thesis in order to test the internal, external and constructed validity of the hypothesis in the empirical part of the study[47] and, on this basis, to make valid inferences as to why or for which purpose violent conflicts erupt.

However, choosing a qualitative method and a comparative case study approach with the intention of exploring the hypothesis towards finding answers to the research questions raised earlier on makes this research an inductive analysis[48] and an exploratory research.[49] Therefore, the first part of the theoretical framework will consist of the clarification of specific concepts such as *ethnicity* and *politicization* as well as the phenomenon of *the politicization of ethnicity* to ascertain that ethnicity, as a notion, is not the cause of conflicts until it is politicized.

Variables

There are three variables identified within the context of the topic of this dissertation. In view of the hypothesis of the research study, using a qualitative method and a fieldwork approach to test and infer valid predictions about the hypothesis, one can see that without a scientific approach to analyze and describe the subject matter, it is uncertain, with respect to G. King et al., if we would ever be able to falsify our descriptive hypotheses or provide proof for our conclusions.[50]

In order to answer the research questions precisely, the following types of variables identified in the hypothesis of this work are as follows: Independent

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47   The internal validity is a kind of research study which shows the extent to which the design and the data it generates enable the researcher to arrive at a cause-effect and other linkages existing in the data. On the contrary, external validity focuses on a research study in which its results can be used for other situations outside the project for which it was initially developed. In other words, it means the extent at which the conclusions reached can be generalized and, on that basis, applied to other contexts. See Leedy, D. Paul/Ormrod, E. Jeanne, 2013, op. cit., p. 101-104.

48   On inductive reasoning or method, see ibid., p. 18-19.

49   See King, Gary et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 91. Furthermore, it is explained in the exploratory case study that field research and data gathering are carried out prior to the final definition of research questions and hypotheses. See Yin, K. Robert, 2003, op. cit., p. 6.

50   See King, Gary et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 38.

variable (IV), dependent variable (DV) and intervening variable (Intv). Within the context of this research study, ethnicity is the *Independent Variable*, conflict is the *Dependent Variable* and politicization is the *Intervening Variable*.

In a nutshell, this research study explores these variables in order to cement the argument that if any variation of the dependent variable arises, then it is influenced by certain other variables, commonly called independent variables.[51] In view of the theme of this dissertation, there is a supposed cause and effect, reflected through how the independent variable may manipulate the dependent variable. As a result of this interaction between the dependent and the independent variable in this study, the third variable is responsible for this interaction within the scope of this dissertation's hypothesis.[52] Therefore, part of the investigation is to find out how and if the influence of *politicization* on the phenomenon of *ethnicity* leads to *conflicts*. More about the fieldwork and the case study will be explained further in the next step.

Comparative Case Studies and Unit of Analysis

This dissertation applies a *multiple case-studies* approach on a comparative basis since there is a comparison made between two conflict situations. This implies, in the words of R. Yin, that the method of multiple-case studies denotes the usage of more than one case within the same study.[53] Since two cases are compared, with respect to how the politicization of ethnicity evokes conflicts, the pattern of the case study applied is basically a multiple-case approach, but of a comparative analysis. As a result, the usage of multiple approaches is discernible. That is why this type of case study, based on comparative perspectives from two conflict cases emanating from different geographical locations, qualifies the research study as comparative, irrespective of the fact that both conflict cases are located within the same geographical entity, Nigeria.

That being said, it is important to state the unit of analysis of this work, namely: *ethnic conflicts*. With that in mind, the empirical investigation of this research study focuses on two particular crisis situations in different regions of Nigeria, meaning conflicts which occurred in these two regions within the time frame of between 1990 and 2010, therefore covering a period of 20 years.

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51   Compare Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 72-74.
52   See ibid., p. 74.
53   See Yin, K. Robert, 2003, op. cit., p. 5.

Furthermore, this unit of analysis is intentionally selected to describe, analyze and compare the reasons for the outbreaks of conflicts in Jos and Warri. However, this is by no means to underestimate the significance and role of religion in certain conflict situations. By extension, it is certainly not to regard all the conflicts in Nigeria as religiously motivated, a more compelling reason for a comparative case study to be carried out on these two conflict situations since this thesis examines and attempts to test the phenomenon of *the politicization of ethnicity* as the root cause of conflicts.

The choice of the above stated contemporary ethnic conflicts for this research is made in view of the recurring outbreaks of ethnic and religious clashes in Jos, Plateau State, and the resource conflicts in Warri, Delta State, in recent times. Having said that, the genesis of both conflict situations can be traced to different sources, however this study intends to test its hypothesis on both crisis situations in order to determine the reasons for the eruption of these conflicts under scrutiny so as to infer predictions either compatible with or antagonistic to the hypothesis. Beyond exploring the hypothesis of this work on two protracted ethnic conflicts, involving different ethnic groups in two different places and regions, the projection of one conflict situation as ethno-religious and the other as a resource conflict, at least on the surface, enables the internal, external and constructed validity of the hypothesis to either be confirmed or falsified.

With the application of a qualitative approach, interviews on how politicized ethnicity leads to conflicts in Nigeria were conducted in the city of Jos and Warri Township between January 2011 and January 2013. Within these two years, the writer of this thesis travelled to the conflict zones four times for the purpose of conducting fieldwork for the investigation, spending up to nine months on location altogether. One of the reasons for the conduct of the research on a two month basis approximately, at a time, was the unpredictable security situation in the conflict zones. Further information on the security situation and the experiences that accompanied the research will be recounted later in the sections dealing with the sampling process and data collection.

Jos is a city located in the northern region of Nigeria and Warri is an oil city situated in the South. Based on these two comparative case studies, on the one hand, the Jos conflict will be explored, placing a special focus on the ethno-religious crisis confronting the city. In the same vein, the Warri crisis, a resource conflict in the southern region of Nigeria, will be investigated so as to test the variables, especially how politicization intervenes between ethnicity and conflict in the contemporary violent conflicts between various ethnic groups. In so doing, efforts will be made to identify the actors involved in the ongoing conflicts,

the purpose of politicizing ethnicity and how ethnicity is politicized as well as working out comparisons between both conflict situations.

However, since religion plays a role in the Jos conflicts, other interviews were carried out in other locations with the intention of acquiring information on the perception and introduction of Islamic Sharia in some northern states in Nigeria, for example, there are interviews that were conducted in the city of Kano and Abuja. The choice of a qualitative method used in this investigation is compatible with the view presented by G. King et al. that "such work has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method"[54], as this allows for an extensive account of particular events to be considered.

Nonprobability Sampling: Purposive and Convenience Sampling Designs

Whenever a sampling design is mentioned in field research, such as the one carried out in this investigation, it is important to state that it refers to the process by which individuals, groups, locations etc. were selected for possible interviews and observations.[55] So "sampling designs are generally divided into two broad classes: probability and nonprobability".[56] While probability sampling concentrates on the process of random selection at some stage in a research, nonprobability sampling denotes a process of case selection other than random selection.[57]

During the course of carrying out the field research for this study, certain kinds of nonprobability sampling designs were applied. By and large, a nonprobability sampling is that which is suitable for situations in which very few cases are included in the sample.[58] In certain circumstances and in some societies, as experienced in some occasions during research, where certain individuals or institutions refused to cooperate in an inquiry or to grant interviews, "the researcher must either accept a nonprobability method of case selection or abandon the study altogether."[59]

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54   King, Gary et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 4.
55   Compare Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 143.
56   Ibid.
57   See ibid., p. 143-178. See also Kerlinger, N. Fred: *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 2nd edition, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London et al. 1973, 129.
58   Compare Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 159.
59   Ibid.

For the samples drawn for the interviews conducted in this research study, the method of *purposive sampling* was used. However, in some situations, another type of sampling, known as *convenience sampling*,[60] was applied. Deploying a purposive sampling, as R. Single et al. term it, the units and the number of interviews as well as the persons selected for the interviews depend on the researcher's ability to make appropriate decisions on these issues.[61]

Similarly, P. Leedy and J. Ormrod are of the view that people are chosen with regard to *purposive sampling* for a particular purpose and the rationale behind this decision can only be explained by the investigator.[62] As a result, many individuals selected for the sampling and the people with whom interviews are conducted are intentionally chosen by the interviewer in order to gain insight into some specific issues. That is why F. Kerlinger asserts that a purposive sampling is "characterized by the use of judgement and a deliberate effort to obtain representative samples by including presumably typical areas or groups in the sample."[63]

Altogether, there are 22 respondents to the interviews conducted on both the Jos conflicts and Warri crisis. Of the 22 interviews conducted, two sessions were aborted for security reasons so that only 20 of the overall number of interviews were successfully taped and transcribed. These are in-depth interviews,[64] also known as unstructured interviews, with the sole aim of ensuring that respondents answer the relevant research questions extensively which are, by and large, related to the research problem. The interviews are basically face-to-face types and, in certain instances, are conducted in semi-structured form so as to encourage respondents to talk freely about the topic in order to obtain comprehensive information on the subject matter.[65] All the interviews were conducted

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60   *Convenience Sampling* can be understood as a form of sampling in which the researcher just selects a required number of cases which are conveniently available at that point in time as samples. That is why convenience sampling is also synonymously referred to as haphazard, fortuitous or accidental sampling. See ibid., p. 159-160. On more about convenience or accidental sampling, F. Kerlinger's work can be consulted. Kerlinger, N. Fred, 1973, op. cit., p. 129.

61   Read Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 160.

62   Check Leedy, D. Paul/Ormrod, E. Jeanne, 2013, op. cit., p. 215.

63   Kerlinger, N. Fred, 1973, op. cit., p. 129.

64   Read Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 316-320. Similarly, the description of in-depth interviews or unstructured interviews can be found in the work of P. Leedy and J. Ormrod. Check Leedy, D. Paul/Ormrod, E. Jeanne, 2013, op. cit., p. 154.

65   Face-to-face interviews enable the researcher to establish a rapport with potential candidates for the interviews and, on that basis, get their cooperation. A semistructured interview is a kind where "the researcher may follow the standard questions with one or more individual tailored questions to get clarification or probe a person's reasoning." Ibid., p. 190.

in quiet places such as the residents of the respondents, offices, and other quiet places in order to avoid any distraction or interruption during the interviews.

One advantage of unstructured interviews, as experienced in this research, is that the interviewer can always control the process of the interviews whenever respondents start drifting away from answering the research questions. In these types of situations, the researcher is able to repeat that particular question again and bring the respondent back on course before moving on to other questions.

On the field, an average interview conducted had a duration of one hour and, in some circumstances, respondents spent more time in order to answer to all the relevant questions and issues raised during the interviews. Also, the interviews were carried out in six various locations in Nigeria with the purpose of generating data on the aforementioned conflicts from broader perspectives. The places where the interviews were conducted are: Lagos, Kano, Abuja, Jos, Warri and Abraka.

Regarding the sampling of this investigation, individuals were selected without any consideration given to age, gender or academic achievements. Often, on different occasions, especially while in Jos and Kano, respondents were chosen spontaneously, using the method of *convenience sampling*. For instance, on two occasions, the researcher spotted two female students from a distance in an Islamic Sharia state, Kano, one of them was about to board a taxi and the other while she was taking a stroll on campus. What made them stand out as especially interesting interview partners was that they were not wearing veils, meaning their heads were not covered with a scarf or a piece of cloth, a rare sight in Kano. On these two occasions, the method of *convenience sampling* was used as I simply ran up to meet with both females and seek their audience for possible interviews regarding issues concerning the subject matter of this dissertation, for example, questions relating to the Islamic religion and if the introduction of Islamic Sharia has had effects on the women in matters concerning civil and criminal laws in Kano since its adoption in the year 2000.

In addition, while in Kano, five other female students were approached at Bayero University Kano (BUK) for possible interviews but they declined to be interviewed. On this occasion and almost in all of the interviews conducted, it was only possible to use one form of field research known as *participant observation*, as it is compulsory to identify oneself in order to secure the consent of

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Furthermore, two semistructured forms of interviews were conducted in Warri because two of the respondents requested to see the questions in advance.

the interview partners.[66] Therefore, in such a situation as the one experienced at Bayero University in Kano, the researcher was compelled to interact with these female students on campus and identify myself as a researcher and on which topic I would like to interview them. Otherwise, as observed and warned beforehand, the chances of interacting with females publicly in a conservative environment such as that of Kano are slim and the situation is fearful. At that point in time, despite identifying myself, the only one of the five female students approached for possible interviews who signaled any kind of cooperation failed to show up on the scheduled date.

   Apart from my use of the participant observational method, introducing myself first to the female students as a researcher in order to start a conversation as the only means at that point in time to establish a contact, starting a communication with the opposite sex was difficult. That being said, the choice of a convenience form of nonprobability sampling design, while making a decision to approach the female students, was intentional. In spite of the refusal to grant interviews, these female students on campus that very day began speaking freely within a matter of minutes. So, carrying out fieldwork in a place like Kano, especially conducting interviews with prospective females in a conservative setting may become a risky adventure because of gender segregation supported by Sharia laws currently in place in Kano.

Data Collection: Experiences during Field Research

During the process of data collection in the field, the researcher was confronted and challenged in certain circumstances due to the security situation in the country. The security challenges are often indescribable, from encounters with soldiers and policemen at a number of roadblocks to issues and anxieties related to attacks by suspected armed robbers while still on the highway until late when returning from the field because there was no option left. As a result, it is important to mention a few of these circumstances where the researcher encountered such situations.

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66   For further information about the form of field research based on participant observation, see Newman, M. David: *Sociology: Exploring the Architecture of Everyday Life*, 4th edition, Pine Forge Press, London et al. 2002, p. 67-68.

On the Warri Crisis

To buttress some of the arguments raised on the reasons for the conflict situations, especially the so-called resource conflicts in the Niger Delta Warri Township, observations of some sites were carried out to get first-hand information on the effects of environmental degradation in some oil producing communities, specifically on issues concerning gas flaring by multinational oil companies and pollution of the rivers caused by oil spillages from leaked, rusted and vandalized pipelines.

By this, the investigator was able to experience and see the effects of political and economic marginalization of the people in the region and its consequences, for instance, matters concerning poverty, aggression, militancy and corruption involving the political elites. Pictures of some polluted sites and gas flaring were taken in Oghara and Ovade Ogharefe, a place where a company known as Pan Ocean Oil Company, a subsidiary of Halliburton, as the villagers assume, operates and flares gas unrestrictedly.

It was a difficult situation in which to conduct interviews with representatives of the oil companies as a security guard at Pan Ocean Oil Company in Ovade instructed the writer of this thesis to contact the head office in Lagos in order to make appointments for interviews. Police officers and soldiers from the Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Army are assigned to look after the facilities of Pan Ocean for safety reasons. On arriving at the village, Ovade, where the oil Company is located, the lack of infrastructural facilities was evident. Accompanied by two persons from the nearby village, Oghara, to assist with the observation, we were warned to avoid any attempt to conduct interviews for fear of militants.

As the empirical part of this research work will highlight, militants in the Niger Delta are attacking oil companies, kidnapping expatriates in the oil industry and demanding ransom for their release. However, the militants also attack police officers and soldiers because they are perceived as agents of the Federal Government of Nigeria in as much as the Federal government is held accountable for the plight of the Niger Deltans in matters concerning to the impoverishment, marginalization and the environmental degradation of the region.

In Oghara, near Ovade, both in close proximity to Warri, Delta State, where there is an ongoing ethnic crisis, a river, known as River Ethiope, was observed from a boat I rented in order to capture some of the oil polluted sites found there. According to information from the villagers of Oghara, River Ethiope is often polluted due to oil spills from pipelines so that fishermen are, on several

occasions, not able to carry out their daily activities. Also, during instances of oil spills on the river, some divers are hindered from performing their duties. These divers, as observed and photographed, are men who dive deep into River Ethiope to bring out sand in buckets which they sell as building material to contractors and construction companies.

Owing to the activities of the militants, with respect to the vandalization of pipelines, my two assistants and I used motor bikes to inspect some current sites and ongoing projects by the Federal Government and the multinational oil companies. At these sites, the researcher took photographs of oil pipelines, especially pictures of how these pipelines are intentionally currently placed deep in the ground as a way to prevent potential saboteurs from viewing and getting hold of or vandalizing the pipelines. This is one of the new measures introduced by stakeholders in the oil industry to prevent further damages to onshore pipelines and, thereby, preventing the contamination of lands caused whenever crude oil gushes out of the vandalized pipelines and pollutes the ground.

During all these trips, I was constantly in fear of the unknown. Often, the camera was hidden in order to conceal the identity of the researcher. Having assistants from the region to accompany me while carrying out such fieldwork was important because they were aware of certain dangers and warnings were issued immediately when necessary. For instance, while on the sailing boat through River Ethiope, a naval base was located along the bank of the river and soldiers were posted at certain locations to inspect any suspicious boat and people in the boats sailing through. On one occasion, our boat was stopped and we were questioned. Referring to the researcher, one of the soldiers asked: Who is this man and what is he doing with a big professional camera on this river?

Taking a look at these fierce looking men in military uniform got the writer of this thesis scared because anything is possible. Immediately, having realized the danger he was exposed to upon the sighting of such a camera, the researcher, from that point on, understood the risk of openly taking pictures in such situations. In view of the danger surrounding this one particular circumstance, the two helpers or assistants, who were indigenes of Oghara, simply informed the military men that the researcher of this thesis was an environmental scientist who was investigating the effects of oil pollution on the plants and trees as well as the nature of the river. Having responded in this way to the soldiers, we were allowed to continue on our journey. One can see the importance of concealing one's identity in delicate situations. It is not only in Delta State where I found myself in dangerous situations: the fieldwork carried out on the Jos conflicts

will shed more light on the risks attached to such undertakings in the next section.

On Jos Conflicts

The interviews conducted in Kano were for the purpose of gathering information on Muslim vs. Christian relationships as a way to gain basic knowledge and facts which will be understood better in the chapter dealing with the analysis on the Jos conflicts. In addition, a federal state like Kano represents one of the core Islamic Sharia states in Nigeria and many of the Muslim minorities residing in Jos are originally from there, a reason why this state is frequently mentioned in the reports published by several commissions of inquiry set up to find out the reasons for the continuous outbreaks of conflicts in Jos. With this in mind, the interviews conducted on the Jos conflicts started with Kano as I was not only able to collect information about the importance of ethnicity and religion in this Muslim state but also to observe its society before travelling to Jos.

As a matter of fact, according to D. Newman, a fieldwork approach carried out in the form of participant observation is a "type of field research [that] is time consuming and can conduct only a limited number of interviews and can observe only a limited number of people."[67] On this basis, in Kano, interviews are conducted with individuals involving both men and women. In one situation, having contacted some lecturers at Bayero University as a means to arrange for an appointment for possible interviews with two female lecturers, the Head of Department of that institute advised and encouraged me to come on a day when all the lecturers would be assembled for a meeting in order to conduct a group interview while many of them were present. Indeed, the researcher was given a warm welcome and a group interview took place. Such kind of interview conducted with a group of lecturers, about eight in number, at Bayero University Kano is known in the field of qualitative inquiry as a focus group.[68] During this group interview, burning issues like religiosity and the rights of women within the confinement of Islamic Sharia were raised.

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67   Newman, M. David, 2002, op. cit., p. 68.

68   Focus groups are described as collective conversations or group interviews. Such a group
      interview may have a small or large group of people. See Kamberelis, George/Dimitriadis,
      Greg: "Focus Groups: Strategic Articulations of Pedagogy, Politics, and Inquiry", in:
      Denzin, K. Norman/Lincoln, S. Yvonnas [Eds.]: *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Re-
      search*, 3rd edition, Sage Publications, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi 2005, p. 887-
      907 (887).

At the same time, inquiries were made concerning the introduction of Islamic Sharia in Kano and other core northern Muslim states as well as the compatibility of Islamic Sharia with the Federal Constitution of Nigeria, with respect to religious freedom, freedom of association and expression etc. It is discernible that conducting an interview on the basis of focus groups allows the opinions of respondents in the group to be captured through the face-to-face interactions between the researcher and the respondents during the group interview since the themes discussed are strategically focused on certain information that are important to the researcher.[69]

Furthermore, my experience, having worked as an intern in 2010 at the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention and Mass Atrocities (OSAPG) in New York, helped me gain more insight into the crisis situations in both Jos and the Niger Delta. Having the opportunity while at the United Nations to work on the Jos conflicts and participate in conferences and meetings concerning the unrest in the Niger Delta Region, the researcher was able to meet with some representatives of Civil Society Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations invited to brief the UN System on the reasons for the conflict situations in Jos and the Niger Delta. As observed, being present at these events enabled the researcher to establish personal contacts with some of the speakers from Nigeria who are experts on relevant themes and some of them are included in the respondents interviewed while carrying out this fieldwork.

In Jos, the situation is a delicate one. My first experience while in Jos was that the taxi driver hired to drive the researcher to the University Guest House in Dogon Dutse, a neighborhood in Jos where the guest house is located, stopped along the way and declined to drive towards the direction of the neighborhood. Due to the language barrier, as the driver did not speak fluent English and was unable to answer the question posed concerning the exact location of the University Guest House, I became restless because of the driver's refusal to drive beyond where he parked the taxi, which was in front of a different hotel bearing another name as inscribed on the hotel's signboard. It was while the writer started asking passersby about the location of the University Guest House that the situation became clear. A passerby simply talked to the hired taxi driver in Hausa language and the response indicated his apprehension of driving into a Christian neighborhood for fear of being killed.

Having explained the situation to the researcher, it became clear that, in reality, Jos city is divided into Christian and Muslim territories and adherents of both religions do not trespass for fear of *disappearing*, a word commonly used

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69   See ibid., p. 899.

for anyone that is found in a wrong place at a wrong time. Thereafter, another taxi driver, a Christian, was able to drive the researcher to the University Hotel at Dogon Dutse. From that moment on, the researcher was on alert for fear of the unknown. However, in spite of the danger and insecurity, many interviews were conducted in Jos and one math student at the University of Jos, whose ethnic origin is Anaguta and who is one of the interviewees on the ethnic conflicts in Jos, gave an insightful piece of advice to the researcher regarding the "No Go Areas"[70] in Jos and, on few occasions, offered his assistance during the researcher's stay in Jos. In view of this, there is a limitation to the number of sampling cases for selection in Jos as it became a risky adventure to undertake. Based on the fear factor, as well as limited resources and time, some potential respondents from certain ethnic groups involved in the conflicts were difficult to reach or contact in view of the sensitivity of the research topic and the situation on ground.

Use of Existing Data and Review of Literature

Throughout the analysis of this dissertation, sources of existing data obtained from public documents such as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Reports of Several Commissions of Inquiry on the causes of the Jos conflicts are used. Additional sources of data by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and several publications by the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention and Mass Atrocities, New York, are integrated into the work as well. Other data were acquired from mass media like newspapers, e.g. Vanguard, BBC, Allafrica.com, Guardian, and research journals, focusing on topics like conflicts, democracy, bad governance, corruption and environmental problems in Africa, specifically Nigeria.

A review of the current research studies on the reasons for the outbreaks of conflicts is undertaken, using five variables to test some potential reasons pos-

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70   "No Go Areas" are places where the religious background of a person plays a significant role. As a Christian, one must avoid being found, present or passing by some Muslim communities for fear of being attacked or killed. The same goes for any Muslim, avoiding certain Christian territories is the only way to be spared whenever conflicts break out. This implies that wherever you find yourself or where you are at the time violent conflicts erupt in Jos is very important for your survival, as your religious faith is decisive in whether you are attacked or spared. Apart from belonging to one religious faith or the other, one's ethnicity is certainly very important as well.

ited by a number of authors as the root causes of conflicts in Nigeria. These variables are as follows: colonialism, resource curse thesis/rentier theory, activities of multinational oil companies, political elites and religiosity. Furthermore, in order to answer one of the research questions relating to whether the term *ethnic groups* is a fixed phenomenon and not subject to transformations and changes, the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, become operationalized, using secondary literature to conduct the investigation. By this, the research study intends to argue that the boundaries of ethnic groups shift and therefore can be drawn arbitrarily.

Triangulation

An appropriate method, which is compatible with the qualitative analysis, is the logic of triangulation, an approach which depends on multiple sources of data collection as a means to carry out an investigation or examine a particular hypothesis.[71]

In this regard, as R. Singleton et al. acknowledge in their work, triangulation denotes a word social scientists, over time, borrowed from the field of navigation in order to aid in the description of how the application of multiple methods for a research question can improve the capacity of an investigator to focus on the necessary or desired answers and information.[72] As a result, the analysis carried out so far with this methodology illustrates that multiple approaches are deployed during the fieldwork to investigate the subject matter. Triangulation, to put it another way, denotes the methods used to carry out the investigation of this dissertation, which are comprised of the following: in-depth interviews, participant observation, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, nonprobability sampling in form of purposive and convenient samplings, comparative analysis based on two case studies, a theory based approach and focus groups.

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71   Read about triangulation in Leedy, D. Paul/Ormrod, E. Jeanne, 2013, op. cit., p. 102.
72   Read Singleton, A. Royce/Straits, C. Bruce/Straits, M. Margaret, 1993, op. cit., p. 390. Additionally, "in social research, the logic of triangulation applies to situations in which two or more dissimilar measuring instruments or approaches are used." Ibid., p. 392.

Instrumentation and its Importance

When referring to instrumentation, the focus is on the instruments available to the researcher for the collection of his information on the field. This study applies specific instruments to ascertain reliability, validity and conformity during the various stages of the research work, especially the interviews and observations.

Based on the open-ended questions employed for the interviews, the respondents were able to answer the questions freely in their own words. As R. Singleton et al. explain, the result of open-ended questions reveal respondents' logic processes and the wide range of information they possess as well as the intensity of their opinions and feelings.[73] Furthermore, the authenticity of a given research depends by and large on the ways and manners through which the data are collected. Having said that, some of the instruments used in this research study are as follows:

Internet: It was not only used to search for research books, articles, newspaper reports and to explore the data base at the beginning of this study on the current state of research about the politicization of ethnicity as the source of conflicts generally, and specifically on Nigeria.

Computer/laptop: Besides that the laptop was used throughout the period during which this dissertation was written, it served as one of the major instruments applied in the field to store the interviews conducted and save photographs taken during field research. Therefore, it served as an important backup for the information obtained from other electronic devices.

Recording equipment: While the interviews were conducted, the writer used two audio recording devices and his mobile phone, which also possesses a voice recorder, to record the perspectives and opinions of the interviewees to the subject matter. All three appliances were used simultaneously to avoid the loss of data in case any of the recording equipment developed faults due to low/dead batteries or any unforeseeable problems.

Camera: Two cameras were used to carry out the field research. My experience while in the field is that in using a professional camera to take pictures with the interviewees or, in some situations, take personal pictures of the interviewees based on their consent, the researcher is perceived as a serious researcher and often commended on a few occasions for the quality and the sophistication of the equipment brought to the field. Some of those comments

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73   See ibid., p. 283-284.

were often made about the cameras and the recording devices, by academics. The importance is that the interviewees indicated readiness and paid good attention. A professional camera is also useful for the purpose of capturing sites or places from a far distance, especially areas which involve certain danger such as the aforementioned situations in Warri, Ovade and Oghara at the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. However, a big camera can become a problem when security officers, policemen etc. spot such a device. That is why the researcher of this thesis used his small camera, the second camera, which is a compact one to avoid attracting unnecessary attention.

Writing materials: Pencils, pen and paper were used to take notes during the interviews, for instance, to write down a question or if someone wanted to pose a follow-up question during an interview. These writing materials were also used during the observation because names of places, sites and companies were written down for subsequent use in the research. Additionally, one important use of these writing materials was that one generally wants to pronounce the name of the interviewees correctly at the beginning of the recording, hence the reason to write down their names correctly and rehearse if certain names were difficult to pronounce because some interviewees may have been sensitive to their names not being pronounced correctly.

Transcription: After the end of the fieldwork, the researcher handed over a copy of the recorded interviews to a professional, who transcribed all the taped voices of the 20 respondents' recorded interviews, from which about 290 pages in transcribed form were obtained before being integrated into the empirical part of the dissertation.

2. The Politicization of Ethnicity: Clarification and Analysis of Key Concepts

The first section of this research paper will state, explain and analyze the theoretical groundwork of the politicization of ethnicity. Based on the importance of the key concepts in this work, certain terms will be examined and discussed.

First of all, the meaning and development of the term *ethnicity* will be investigated and depicted in the first chapter. Especially in the first chapter, it will be stated etymologically that ethnicity as a concept originates from the term *ethnos*, which denotes a different meaning from the understanding of the notion of ethnicity in contemporary social science.

Secondly, the scientific conceptualization of the term *ethnicity* will be analyzed and clarified. Hereby, readers can perceive the difference between general usage of the concept and its scientific connotation.

Furthermore, certain key concepts that are relevant to the study of ethnicity will be evaluated and stated. It is important to clarify such concepts and their association with the term 'ethnicity' because they are usually confused with the notion of ethnicity.

In addition, the term politicization, which plays an important role in the study of ethnicity, will be analyzed in relation to the term *politics* in this dissertation. The analysis will highlight the importance of playing politics in a political environment and the effects this may have in a multi-ethnic society.

2.1 General Explanation and Etymological Analysis of the Term 'Ethnicity'

Many people, including scholars and international political observers, opined that *ethnicity* as a phenomenon would disappear in the 21st century, especially after the end of the *Cold War*, but the reverse has been the case. Whenever *ethnicity* is used as a word in conversations and discussions it is understood in par-

ticular as a reference to ethnic conflicts.[74] The association of conflict with ethnicity arose due to the differences in languages, ethnic origins, complexions and religious affiliations which result in conflicts. Moreover, parallels are drawn in some academic research and literature between ethnic communities and their identities in relation to conflicts.[75]

However, its etymological understanding distinguishes it from the general usage. This section of the research thesis will elaborate on the origin of the term *ethnicity* and how its meaning and usage have changed over many centuries since its inception.

The explanation of ethnicity and its understanding in contemporary social science studies will be examined. The work done and books written by numerous social scientists and authors from other disciplines on the subject matter and other similar concepts will be used to investigate, analyze and explain the concept of *ethnicity* in order to differentiate the non-scientific meanings associated with it from its academic connotations and applications.

H. Reading is of the view that ethnicity refers to the membership of a particular ethnic group. This means it denotes the sense of belonging to a people.[76] The understanding of ethnicity from H. Reading introduces a new perspective to the concept from the meanings associated with it above, as conflict-laden. It is important at this stage to search out the etymological development of this concept in order to understand how it originated and what it meant at its inception and how it is used in modern social science theory.

There are other social scientists like J. Hutchinson and A. Smith who believe that ethnicity first surfaced as a term in English language in the 1950s. However, they explain in their essay volume entitled *Ethnicity* that they were not certain about the meaning of the word at the time it was first coined.[77] Nonetheless, both authors make an assertion on the roots of ethnicity as a concept and its historical development before its introduction into the English language in

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74   Compare Cornell, Stephen/Hartmann, Douglas: *Ethnicity and Race, Making Identities in a Changing World*, Sage Publications, London et al. 1998, p. 1-4.

75   Check the introductory section of the works of Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.]: "Introduction"; in: Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.]: *Ethnicity,* Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1996, p. 1-14 (1).

76   See Reading, F. Hugo: *A Dictionary of the Social Science*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London et al. 1977, p. 79.

77   J. Hutchinson and A. Smith attributed many meanings to the concept of 'ethnicity'. It was described as the essence of an ethnic group or the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group. However, they were not sure about the exact time it was introduced as a social science concept. For more details, see Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 4. Also read Onions, T. Charles [Ed.]: *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1966, p. 329.

the 1950s as follows: "The term 'ethnicity' is, quite clearly, a derivative of the much older term and more commonly used adjective 'ethnic' which in the English language goes back to the Middle Ages."[78]

In spite of the root concept dating back to the Middle Ages, D. Gulranik treats ethnicity as a phenomenon that cannot be referred to as an independent term because it derives its meaning from the much older term known as *ethnic*.[79] One can argue from the perspective of D. Gulranik that an affix is added to ethnic to form a new word, carrying a new meaning. In this case, the suffix -*ity* is added in order to derive from the original word the new term 'ethnicity'. The question that arises is whether both concepts 'ethnic' and 'ethnicity' convey the same meaning.[80]

D. Gulranik describes the term 'ethnic' etymologically as an adjective which is referred to in the Middle English as 'ethnik', in old Greek 'ethnikos', and in Latin 'ethnicus', meaning "pagan".[81] He cited further that the Greek 'ethnikos' entails the connotation which, when translated, means "national", "gentile". However, it is noted that 'ethnikos', on the other hand, is derived from the Greek noun 'ethnos', which means "nation or people". An additional explanation in his work shows that ethnos in its plural form 'ta ethne' means nations or peoples. However, a religious connotation is given to 'ta ethne' regarding the reference made about non-Jews who are referred to in the New Testament as the gentile Christians—whose religious practice is described as unethical at that period.[82]

One can discern from the last statement that Christians, who were known as pagans, were excluded as part of a people referred to as Jews. Finally in D. Gulranik's etymological explanation, he describes 'ethnic' as a character:

> Designating or of any of the basic groups or divisions of mankind or of a heterogeneous population, as distinguished by customs, characteristics, language, common history, etc. […] a member of an ethnic group, esp. a member of a minority or nationality group that is part of a larger community.[83]

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78   Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 4.
79   See Gulranik, B. David: *Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language*, 2nd edition, Simon and Schuster, New York 1982, p. 481.
80   Compare Tonkin, Elisabeth/McDonald, Maryon/Chapman, Malcolm: "History and Ethnicity"; in: Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.]: *Ethnicity,* Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1996, p. 18-24 (19).
81   See Gulranik, B. David, 1982, op. cit., p. 481.
82   Ibid. The meaning given to 'ethnic', which is derived from 'ethnos', describes it as disposed characteristics and distinguishing attitudes. Ibid.
83   Ibid.

It can be viewed from the above description of ethnic that the author introduced a new dimension to his explanation with his reference to divisions of mankind in a heterogeneous population based on the differences in customs, language or common history.[84] What is not yet discernible is whether these differences lead or could lead to conflicts, especially when the notion of the existence of "a minority or nationality" within a larger community is considered.

Other authors, whose work is of importance to the etymological understanding of the concept 'ethnic', are S. Cornell and D. Hartmann. They represent the same view as D. Gulranik about the history of *ethnics* since they believe that its root can be traced back to the Greek word 'ethnos'. But they distinguish their own perception from that one of D. Gulranik's by their assertion that their reference is not based on the people as a political unit but to the unity of persons of common blood or descent.[85] They elaborate more on how the Greek adjective 'ethnikos' entered Latin as 'ethnicus', "referring to heathens, those "others" who did not share the dominant faith."[86] It is this meaning that 'ethnic' carried when it was first introduced into the English Language:

> In English, 'ethnic' referred to someone who was neither Christian nor Jew—in other words, a pagan or heathen. The matter of belief is less important in this usage than the drawing of a boundary. 'Ethnic' clearly referred to others, to those who were not 'us'.[87]

When one considers the meaning of 'ethnic' according to the views of S. Cornell and D. Hartmann in the previous citation one can declare that there is a clear separation among these peoples living within a larger society, irrespective of the differences of their religious practices. Although they live side by side in this society, they do not live together as they refer to one another as "others" and not "us".

It is important to note that the meaning of 'ethnic' continues to change in the beginning of the 20th century since its religious connotation disappeared and its reference to the idea of ethnics, meaning "others, those who are not us", prevailed. However, there is an alteration of its meaning in the second half of the same century as the new concept 'ethnicity' replaced 'ethnic' and at the same time changed its primary meaning. From then onward, ethnicity has been conceptualized as not only defining "others" but everyone, including ourselves.[88]

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84   See ibid.
85   See Cornell, Stephen/Hartmann, Douglas, 1998, op. cit., p. 16.
86   Ibid.
87   Ibid.
88   See ibid.

Another position taken by A. Smith and J. Hutchison on what all the usages attached to 'ethnic', 'ethnos', and 'ta ethne' have in common is the idea of a particular number of people or animals who share the same cultural or biological characteristics and who live and act in concert.[89] They state further that these usages are applied to describe other peoples, who belong to some groups unlike one's own. Therefore, they are of the view that "this dichotomy between a non-ethnic 'us' and ethnic 'others' has continued to dog the concepts in the fields of ethnicity and nationalism."[90] One significant view put forward by both authors in their study of ethnicity is the linguistic aspect of ethnicity which plays an important role regarding different meanings of the concepts pertaining to various eras. They express it thus:

> We find it reproduced in the ways in which the Latin *natio* was applied to distant, barbarian peoples, whereas the Roman term for themselves was populous. We find it also in the English and the American (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) tendency to reserve the term 'nation' for themselves and 'ethnic' for immigrant peoples, as in the frequently used term 'ethnic minorities'.[91]

It can be emphasized, based on the different notions, understandings and analyses of the word 'ethnic' and its etymological development into 'ethnicity' that, on the one hand, it refers to peoples within a particular society that distinguish and dissociate themselves from one another because of the differences in language, religious practice, customs etc. On the other hand, ethnicity, as a modern term, emerged to refer to all (everyone) irrespective of the differences in tradition, religion and language that may exist among the peoples of a given society.

Concerning the views and perspectives of the authors, one can argue that ethnicity as a phenomenon is not the cause of conflicts after thorough examination of its etymological development. Therefore, there is no evidence in respect of the association of ethnicity in its general sense as the source of conflicts of any kind. However, with regard to the meaning of the concept and its association with violence and armed conflicts, one cannot be certain unless a scientific study is carried out. Therefore, the following chapter will deal with the academic definition of 'ethnicity'. The difference between its scientific use and analyses from its general view will be stated. The notion of ethnicity as the source of conflicts will be reexamined as well.

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89   Reference to Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 4.
90   Ibid., p. 4.
91   Ibid., p. 4-5.

2.2 The Emergence and Analysis of the Scientific Definition of *Ethnicity*

It is a difficult task to discuss and deal with the concept, meaning and definition of ethnicity without a focus on the historical background of the term. Nonetheless, in this chapter, the concept's definition will undergo an analysis in order to derive a scientific definition that will suit and be applicable to this research work.

The works of numerous authors and scientists will be used to examine the different kinds of definitions of the term 'ethnicity', if there is any ascribed to it. Based on the meaning of 'ethnic' and its role in the manner ethnic groups perceive themselves in the previous section, it is asserted that ethnicity is introduced to merge the divisions among people. However, one may think about what exactly is meant when ethnicity is referred to as a concept and the circumstances surrounding its emergence in the first place which warrant some authors to assign it the integrative role they claim it plays in ethnic pluralistic societies.

On the one hand, E. Orywal and K. Hackstein assert that ethnicity, as a phenomenon, was first used in the Anglo-American region in the 1960s to describe the emergence and continuation of ethnic identities at a time modern nation-states were at the edge of their manifestation and consolidation.[92] Both authors explain that the motivation behind the scientific research into the study of ethnicity is linked with the question raised on the failure of the "Melting Pot Idea", a concept introduced to overcome the formidable ethnic identities in favor of a national U.S. American identity.[93]

On the other hand, the focus on ethnicity as a field of study is not limited only to the issue of ethnic identity. It is intended to widen its scope on the high level of revitalized ethnic identities in the so-called post-colonial states and the rise in inter-ethnic conflicts both in Third World countries and the industrialized nations.[94] It is stated that what are often referred to as *ethnic groups* require redefinition in order to grasp ethnicity as a phenomenon and also to understand the reasons responsible for the failure of the integration with respect to the con-

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92 See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina: "Ethnizität: Die Konstruktion ethnischer Wirklichkeiten", in: Schweizer, Thomas/Schweizer, Margaret/Kokot, Waltraud [Eds.]: *Handbuch der Ethnologie*, Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin 1993, p. 593-609 (593). The English translation of the title reads thus: Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina: "Ethnicity: The Construction of Ethnic Realities", in: Thomas Schweizer, Margaret Schweizer, Waltraud Kokot [Eds.], Handbook of Ethnology, Berlin 1993, p. 593-609.

93 Ibid., p. 593.

94 Ibid., p. 593.

cept of nationalism.[95] The reference to ethnic group implies that there cannot be any definition of ethnicity unless the definition of the phenomenon 'ethnic groups' is first reexamined and redefined.

Nevertheless, the analysis in this section is dedicated to the term 'ethnicity' and not ethnic groups, although both terms are intertwined in much of the literature. The meaning and definition of concepts such as nation, tribe, ethnocentrism, class, race and identity will be clarified in another chapter as they are not synonyms or replacements for ethnicity. Contrary to the view on ethnicity presented so far, J. Krieger et al. emphasize that the existence and emergence of ethnicity cannot be associated with the colonial experience of some countries or as a result of the kinds of conflicts that exist before the colonial period:

> The worldwide existence of ethnicity suggests it is not the result of some barbarous heritage peculiar to any group of people, or the consequence of the precolonial pattern of conflict between members of different ethnic groups within the same political society or state. It is a social phenomenon involving relations among individuals and is influenced by several factors.[96]

It is essential to know the exact definition of the phenomenon 'ethnicity' in order to understand whether the argument of its association with conflicts, especially violent conflicts caused by religious or ethnic differences, can be justified. Moreover, it is important for this research to secure the most suitable definition of the term *ethnicity* as it forms the basis from which other aspects of the research can be understood better. Any failure to capture its meaning and its operation in relation to outbreaks of violent struggles and clashes will leave the readers in the dark.

Therefore, the remaining part of this chapter will concentrate on the analysis of the scientific notion of ethnicity. The focus will be on the definition of the concept and its role in societies. It is important to state that any analysis and meaning of ethnicity under the scientific notion of the subject matter will not be considered separately without reflecting back the term to 'ethnic' since it is the etymological foundation of ethnicity. Therefore, this section will deduce from the conclusion of the previous chapter under this research work focusing on the general explanation and etymological development of ethnicity:

– That it exists in multi-ethnic or poly-ethnic societies with less reference to the importance of religion and ethnic background.

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95   Integration in this sense means the "Melting Pot Idea" in the United States. Ibid., p. 593.
96   Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.]: *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford 1993, p. 281.

- – That ethnicity defines not only "others" but also everyone, including one's own group

- – That the term 'ethnic' from which ethnicity is etymologically derived initially described ethnic groups (minorities) that practice religions (foreign and purportedly unethical) from that of the dominant ethnic group(s) within a larger society.

- – That the understanding of *ethnic* changed and took on different meanings over the course of many centuries to the introduction of ethnicity as a modern term that includes everyone.

The difficult aspects which these conclusions do not consider are why and how people view one another as "others" and not "us" without considering the fact that the meaning of ethnicity can equally change in the same way the meaning of ethnic, from which ethnicity originates, varies from time to time. One underlying factor is that ethnicity is substituted by other concepts at times but the original meaning it denotes is recurrent. This argument finds its validity when one considers the statement by S. Cornell and D. Hartmann on ethnicity:

> It was not supposed to be this way. Ethnicity was expected to disappear as a force to be reckoned with in the 20th century. The latter half of the century, by numerous accounts, was supposed to see the end—or certainly a dramatic attenuation—of ethnic and racial ties. As the century wore on, these and other seemingly parochial and even premodern attachments were expected to decline as bases of human consciousness and action, being replaced by other, more comprehensive identities linked to the vast changes shaping the world.[97]

By this, one can argue that there are ambivalent and contradictory views in reference to the meanings of ethnicity stipulated in the literature used so far. This means the concept of ethnicity can be viewed from two different angles, as stated below:

- – That ethnicity as a phenomenon represents a unifying factor in multi-ethnic societies.

- – That ethnicity is used as a term to represent the existence of different ethnic groups with diverse cultures, languages and religions in a society.

The second position treats ethnicity as a divisive element in poly-ethnic societies. It is, however, questionable to imply that ethnicity is the cause of conflicts due to the existence of diversity of religions and traditions. Nonetheless, all the assertions and emphases made cannot be analyzed and challenged without ex-

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97   Compare Cornell, Stephen/Hartmann, Douglas, 1998, op. cit., p. 4.

amining the scientific notion of ethnicity properly because it is what forms the basis of this research.

In the inquiry of J. Krieger et al. into the meaning of the phenomenon, they are of the view that ethnicity is associated with contacts between cultural-linguistic communal groups within societies and characterized by cultural prejudice and social discrimination.[98] There is a sharp difference in the work of Joel Krieger et al. about the description of ethnicity. The issue of cultural prejudice is one of the characteristics of ethnicity treated so far, but the issue of social discrimination is new. Nevertheless, it is essential to understand why peoples are socially discriminated against.

They further maintain their position in their investigation of the concept of ethnicity that under the characteristics of cultural prejudice and social discrimination lie the feelings of pride in the in-group, common consciousness and identity of the group and the exclusiveness of its members.[99] It can be viewed from this point of view that identity, as a term, needs to be grasped in order to analyze the in-depth meaning of ethnicity. However, the issues of identity and its understanding will be discussed in the following section because what is most salient at this juncture is the definition of ethnicity, its meaning and link to conflicts.

Another scientist worth mentioning due to his relentless work on the subject matter is T. Eriksen. He opines in his study that ethnicity is created and recreated.[100] He depicts ethnicity as a phenomenon which emerges and is made relevant in terms of social situations and encounters, and by people's ways of coping with the demands and challenges of life.[101] However, it is not clear if this means that some people are socially discriminated against by others because of the social situations they face at a particular time and what these situations or challenges are. Equally, it is not indicated if the situations and challenges lead to conflict and the role ethnicity plays in this. It can be seen at this stage that the notions of ethnicity being created and recreated are not sufficient and unable to define ethnicity and capture ethnicity as a form of conflict.

E. Orywal and K. Hackstein define ethnicity as the process of stipulating ethnic boundaries and distinctions in the form of "self" and specific ascription of "other" traditions as foreign.[102] But their definition does not accomplish this

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98   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 280.
99   Ibid., p. 280.
100   Compare Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p 1.
101   Ibid., p. 1.
102   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 599. The German version reads: "Ethnizität ist der Prozeß der ethnischen Abgrenzung in Form der Selbst- und Fremd-zuschreibung spezifischer Traditionen." Ibid., p. 599.

task as it restates the notion of "us" and "others" which numerous authors already reflect in this research work. It can be noted that the expectation of this work to achieve the exact scientific definition of the term as the cause of conflicts in ethnic pluralistic societies is not yet fulfilled.

One important shift from the work done so far is the emphasis made by J. Krieger et al. and D. Bell that ethnicity as a social phenomenon is subjected to change and its form, place and role in society may alter.[103] J. Krieger et al. opine that ethnicity's links with other social phenomena such as politics, religions and class relations may change and thereby pose new questions. They maintain that:

> Ethnicity hardly exists in a pure form. It is always closely associated with political, juridical, religious and other views and forms of interaction which constitute important ingredients of the ethnic phenomenon.[104]

By this, they believe that ethnicity finds expression in political domination, economic exploitation, and psychological oppression.[105] One can understand from the perspectives of J. Krieger et al. that ethnicity can cause conflicts based on the factors they expressed.

As already mentioned, ethnicity is the composition and concentration of many ethnic groups with diverse cultures in a particular society and, therefore, there is a possibility of the existence of unrest, dissatisfaction and quarrels which may escalate as a result of the factors illustrated earlier on by J. Krieger et al., namely: economic exploitation, political domination and economic repression. But, there is no definition of ethnicity by J. Krieger et al. to support this claim and there is no description of how such discontent due to the domination of one ethnic group against the other(s) can lead to conflicts.

D. Bell takes a step further in his assertion that *class* cuts across ethnic lines in a multi-ethnic society[106] and according to him, ethnicity sometimes becomes congruent with *class* in a bipolar situation in which there are two ethnic groups and one of them is economically dominant and the other ethnic group feels economically exploited.[107] But, ethnicity can cut across class lines when members of the different ethnic groups are both in the economic majority and economic minority. However, in a situation where class issues become attenuated because

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103   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 280. See also Bell, Daniel: "Ethnicity and Social Change", in: Glazer, Nathan/Moynihan, P. Daniel [Eds.]: *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge et al. 1975, p. 140-174.
104   Krieger, Joel et al. [Ed.], 1993, op. cit., p. 280.
105   Compare ibid., p. 281.
106   Compare Bell, Daniel, 1975, op. cit., p. 168.
107   Ibid.

communal questions are more apparent, then the ethnic bond becomes more important.[108]

Furthermore, he opines, similarly to the argument of J. Krieger et al., that "ethnicity provides a tangible set of common identification—in language, food, music, names—when other social roles become more abstract and impersonal."[109] Ethnicity can also play the role of a means of claiming a place for oneself when competing for the values of society is to be realized politically.[110] This implies that ethnicity can be used as an instrument to achieve political goals in a society where other ethnic groups are competing for the same interests as well.

Therefore, as a result of the arguments by both J. Krieger et al. and D. Bell, conflict emerges when ethnic groups compete to gain access to political and economic values. What both decline to do is to state the definition of ethnicity in order to clarify their claims. If ethnicity is understood by many of the authors as a way to achieve both economic and political goals, then it is fluid and unfixed, and thereby changes from one situation to the other. Hence, ethnicity as a concept based on this argument, is indefinable.

For his part, O. Nnoli conceives ethnicity in his analysis as a social phenomenon which contains some levels of interaction among the dominant ethnic groups in a society:

> […] ethnicity is conceived as a social phenomenon associated with some forms of interaction between the largest possible cultural-linguistic communal groups (ethnic groups) within political societies such as nation states. It arises when relations between ethnic groups are competitive rather than co-operative. It is characterized by cultural prejudice and socio-economic and political discrimination. Underlying these characteristics are feelings of pride in the in-group (ethnocentrism), a common consciousness and identity of the group, the exclusiveness of its members.[111]

The question on the existence and recognition of the minority comes to the fore based on O. Nnoli's assertion that ethnicity constitutes a form of communication which exists only among the largest cultural-linguistic ethnic groups within a political environment. R. Schermerhorn is of the view that the "dominant group signifies that collectivity within a society which has preeminent authority to function both as guardians and sustainers of the controlling value system, as prime allocators of rewards in the society."[112] As a result, it is unclear what

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108   Ibid.
109   Bell, Daniel, 1975, op. cit., p. 169.
110   See ibid., p. 169.
111   Nnoli, Okwudiba: *Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria*, Ashgate, Aldershot et al. 1995, p. 1.
112   Schermerhorn, Richard: "Ethnicity and Minority Groups", in: Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.]: *Ethnicity,* Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 1996, p. 15-18 (17).

happens when one group feels itself exclusive in relation to others and if such feelings of pride which may affect the relationships or the communications between these groups can lead to controversy among the groups. One is led to wonder if such a controversy can be related to violent disputes and under what arrangements the dominant groups award themselves both functions of being the guardians and sustainers of value system as well as being the prime allocators of rewards in a society. What about if the reverse is the case, a situation in which the minorities take over these functions from the majority? These are so many uncertainties and questionable circumstances which are not clear when one concurs with the definition of ethnicity as stated in this research thesis.

In reflecting N. Glazer and D. Moynihan's work, they are of the view that the definitions of ethnicity are: 1) The condition of belonging to a particular ethnic group; 2) Ethnic pride.[113]

Both authors further claim that the concept of ethnicity is still shifting.[114] It can be seen that the first definition shows the objective condition while the latter is subjective. However, based on the issue of pride which is assigned to the term *ethnic*, both authors decline to align with the second definition because they opine that it is a repetition of what the older term *ethnic group* denotes.[115] They doubt if a single term such as 'ethnicity' can be used to describe different kinds of conflicts which occur as a result of the differences among various ethnic groups. They argue that the phenomenon of difference seems to be encountered everywhere but somehow varies in magnitude and intensity. However, they ask the following question:

> Would it not be better to describe such varied phenomena as linguistic, national, religious, tribal, racial, and the like, depending on their nature?" Would it not be better to separate the very different problems of old nations from those of the new? of the developed world from those of the developing? of heterogeneous empires from homogeneous nation-states? Are these not, in truth, age-old human characteristics and sentiments, expressing themselves, perhaps, in new settings, but in themselves nothing new?[116]

From the above, one may presume that any answer found to those questions can only be in the affirmative. However, the answer to the questions found by both authors is in the negative. Both writers believe that there is something new to the concept of *ethnicity*. They are of the view that the importance of ethnicity is

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113   Glazer, Nathan/Moynihan, P. Daniel: "Introduction", in: Glazer, Nathan/Moynihan, P. Daniel [Eds.]: *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge et al. 1975, p. 1-26 (1).

114   See ibid., p. 1.

115   See ibid., p. 1-26.

116   See ibid., p. 2.

to highlight the similarities among ethnic groups despite the apparent existence of their differences. There is something new to ethnicity rather than applying it as merely widening the meaning of the term *ethnic groups*, because according to N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, ethnicity "refer[s] not only to subgroups, to minorities, but to all the groups of a society characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to their culture and descent […]."[117] Both authors believe that the extension of its meaning to include everyone depicts that ethnicity is adding something new.

Therefore, ethnicity is understood as the continual expansion of an 'ethnic group', i.e. "from minority and marginal subgroups at the edges of society⸺groups expected to assimilate, to disappear, to continue as survivals, exotic or troublesome⸺to major elements of a society."[118] As a result of the argument mentioned above, ethnicity claims the existence of homogeneity in a culturally, religiously, linguistically multifaceted society. Therefore, it is questionable if one can create a homogeneous society from a heterogeneous environment based on these points of differences. So far, none of the explanations and definitions of ethnicity found and stated correlates to the definition of ethnicity as the source of conflicts or which indicates that it causes conflicts or describes conflict as a synonym for ethnicity which this thesis is searching for. This implies that there is the necessity to research more on how differences among diverse ethnic groups, which is part of what ethnicity denotes as a term, result in conflicts.

T. Parsons' contribution to the study of ethnicity can be used to summarize the attempted explanations and definitions of the concept by numerous writers in this research. He opines the following in his work on the subject matter as follows:

> It seems to be generally agreed that what we call ethnicity is a primary focus of group identity, that is, the organization of plural persons into distinctive groups and, second, of solidarity and the loyalties of individual members to such groups. It is, however, an extraordinary elusive concept and very difficult to define in any precise way.[119]

On the basis of the explanations, analyses, and definitions of the concept 'ethnicity' by all the works examined, one can argue that there is lack of sufficient evidence to characterize it as the roots of conflicts. However, it is necessary to clarify certain terminologies which many authors deploy in their respective literatures in order to comprehend the resemblances and the differences those terms

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117   Ibid., p. 4.
118   Ibid., p. 5.
119   Parsons, Talcott: "Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change and Ethnicity", in: Glazer, Nathan/Moynihan, P. Daniel [Eds.]: *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge et al. 1975, p. 53-83 (53).

have with ethnicity. It cannot be ascertained if some terms, related to ethnicity, do not contribute in one way or the other to the eruption of conflicts until they are researched because readers can understandably mistake them for ethnicity.

For example, L. Fawcett discusses religion and ethnicity in the introductory part of his work just as N. Glazer and D. Moynihan as well as S. Cornell and D. Hartmann make the concept of identity an issue in explaining ethnicity. The same can be said of T. Eriksen, who attempts to utilize concepts such as nation, race, ethnic groups etc. within the context of ethnicity and nationalism. A. Lentz goes as far as addressing ethnicity and power as a structure and process of ethnic differentiation in relation to social exclusion in a capitalist system while O. Nnoli discusses ethnocentrism as a feeling of pride of the in-group.[120] Therefore, it is pertinent to examine and analyse what influence and consequences all the above mentioned terminologies have on ethnicity and how they all relate to violent struggles in the next section.

2.3 Concept Analyses: Distinction of Specific Terminologies about Ethnicity

This part of the research paper will attempt to clarify certain terminologies which are crucial to the study of ethnicity. Concepts such as ethnocentrism, racism, nation(alism), tribalism, ethnic groups and identity as well and power appear regularly whenever the concept of ethnicity is addressed in many work. Therefore, it is of importance to this research to explain what these terms mean and the relevance of their associations to this thesis.

Although the efforts made in the previous chapter were unable to deliver an appropriate definition of ethnicity that is specifically related to conflicts, however, the meaning of ethnicity attained in previous chapters will be utilized to analyze and compare these various concepts that appear in much of the literature in regard to the study of ethnicity. In addition to that, it is important to state that

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120   See Fawcett, Liz: *Religion, Ethnicity and Social Change*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2000. Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit.; Horowitz, L. Donald: "Ethnic Identity", in: Glazer, Nathan/Moynihan, P. Daniel [Eds.]: *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge et al. 1975, p. 111-140; Lentz, Astrid: *Ethnizität und Macht, Ethnische Differenzierung als Struktur und Prozeß sozialer Schließung im Kapitalismus*, PapyRossa Verlags GmbH, Cologne 1995; Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick: *Humanity: An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, 6th edition, Thomson Learning/Wadsworth, Belmont et al. 2003, p. 345-372. See Nnoli, Okwudiba: *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu 1978.

the relevance and contributions of these concepts to conflict outbreaks in socie-
ties will be examined.

2.3.1 Ethnic Groups

Ethnic groups play important roles whenever ethnicity is referred to because
they make up subsections or subsystems more or less distinct from the rest of
the population in each society.[121] However, it is questionable when one refers to
ethnic groups as a synonym for ethnicity if the concept of ethnicity is described
with respect to all ethnic groups that exist within a society. As a matter of fact,
both terms are used interchangeably in some academic works. This may confuse
readers if the concept *ethnic groups* is not explained, clarified and differentiated
from ethnicity.

Having explained and defined ethnicity in the previous analyses, it is impor-
tant to define and understand the concept of ethnic groups in order to discern the
differences which persist between both terms. R. Schermerhorn describes ethnic
group in his own view as follows:

> An ethnic group is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative
> common ancestry. Memories of shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more
> symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic
> elements are: kinship patterns, physical congruity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious af-
> filiation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any
> combination of these.[122]

Although the definition stated above is declared as a widely acceptable one
among scholars, some authors are still doubtful of the general acceptability and
validity of this definition.[123] They believe that the French word *ethnie*, which
means 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic community', plays an important role in the
definition of ethnic group. In their view, any definition of *ethnic group* will
remain problematic because there is lack of agreed stipulative or ostensive
definition.[124] 'Ethnic', as an English language adjective, is derived from the
Greek 'ethnos', as discussed under the etymology of ethnicity, and was used to
refer to minorities whose practice of a different religion is described as non-
Christian or as pagan, hence characterized as strange and foreign within the
context of the religious and the cultural practice of the ethnic majority.

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121   Schermerhorn, Richard, 1996, op. cit., p. 17.
122   Ibid., p. 17.
123   See Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 3-14
124   Ibid., p. 4.

As a result, a dichotomy of a non-ethnic "us" and ethnic "others" is created. The prevalence of this dichotomy in the contemporary study of the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism can be traced back to that time.[125] However, it is doubtful if the assertion *ethnic*, used in describing the existence of ethnic groups in a society, may always lead to cultural fragmentation and polarization and it is unclear what a negative connotation of *ethnic* may have for ethnicity as a concept. B. Hettne, in his study, expresses this view regarding the influence of ethnic on ethnicity: "Ethnicity is necessarily an elusive concept, since the type of identity usually referred to as 'ethnic' can be manipulated for political purposes and thereby transformed."[126]

But it is questionable to imply that ethnicity can only be understood negatively, even if the explanation given depicts it as describing all ethnic groups in a society, thereby viewing it positively.

O. Nnoli opines that ethnicity can only be analyzed based on the existence of interaction among ethnic groups. Furthermore, he is of the view that this interaction may generate ethnicity because ethnic groups "are social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries."[127] In addition to that, he represents the position that ethnic groups as social formations may not be homogeneous entities due to minor linguistic and cultural differences which may exist within a particular ethnic group, establishing the basis for the delineation of sub-ethnic systems.[128] This position seems controversial because it gives room for other ethnic groups to break away even further into smaller groups allowing other different features of such groups to become relevant.

An example of this can be seen in the formation of sub-ethnic groups within a large ethnic group because of the dialects spoken by such sub-ethnic groups, even though everyone speaks the same language. In this sense, however, it is doubtful if a dialect, as marker of a linguistic difference, can lead to the establishment of a different ethnic identity within an ethnic group and it is unclear when such a linguistic difference can lead to 'us' and 'them' within a large ethnic group. J. Peoples and G. Bailey explain that "an individual's ethnic group

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125   The Greek term ethnos survives in French as *ethnie*, meaning 'ethnic community' or 'ethnic group'. One understands the preference for the use of *ethnie* rather than ethnic groups in the research work of both J. Hutchinson and A. Smith. Ibid., p. 4-5.
126   Hettne, Björn: "Ethnicity and Development: An Elusive Relationship", in: Dwyer, Denis/ Drakakis-Smith, David [Eds.]: *Ethnicity and Development, Geographical Perspectives*, John Wiley & Sons, New York et al. 1996, p. 15-44 (17).
127   Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1995, op. cit., p. 1. He states further that the relevant communal factors may be culture, language or both. See ibid., p. 1.
128   See ibid., p. 1.

identity seldom is absolute."[129] This means that ethnic groups are fluid and situational just in the way ethnicity is defined in the last chapter. Both scientists assert that all peoples, not just minority populations, possess an ethnic group identity.[130]

One sees that the phenomenon of identity plays an important role in defining and explaining the concept of ethnic groups. The notion whether different ethnic groups ascribe to themselves specific identities based on certain characteristics which distinguish them from others or not can be understood based on the following meaning of ethnic groups by J. Peoples and G. Bailey:

> In essence, an ethnic group is a named social category of people based on perceptions of shared social experience or ancestry. Members of the ethnic group see themselves as sharing cultural traditions and history that distinguish them from other groups.[131]

From the above, one perceives that common cultural traditions and history are the characteristics which distinguish an ethnic group from the other, but it is not clearly stated in the citation above whether ethnic groups (insiders) assign themselves with these specific features of identity or others (outsiders) ascribe these characteristics to them.

J. Peoples and G. Bailey's argument states that members of ethnic groups perceive themselves as having the same history and sharing the same cultural traditions. However, the manner one views oneself may be different from how one is viewed by others. It is a matter of subjectivity and objectivity. The same argument is buttressed by S. Cornell and D. Hartmann, who assert that "although an ethnic group is self-consciously ethnic, its self-consciousness often has its source in outsiders."[132] In the same line of argument, they further stress that "the identity that others assign to us can be a powerful force in shaping our own self-conception."[133] Furthermore, they stress that an ethnic group cannot exist in isolation, but rather its existence has meaning only in context that involve others. This means it exists in a collection of peoples of which it is only a part. However, an ethnic population does not necessarily constitute the minority. It is possible for an ethnic group to be numerically or politically dominant in one state and be a minority in others.[134] But in view of the argument on the meaning of ethnic groups in relation to ethnicity so far analyzed, one can argue that most of the authors represent similar positions. The issue of common cultur-

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129   Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 346.
130   Ibid., p. 346.
131   Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 346.
132   Compare Cornell, Stephen/Hartmann, Douglas, 1998, op. cit., p. 20.
133   Ibid., p. 20.
134   See ibid., p. 20.

al traditions and perceived historical backgrounds is emphasized strongly in determining the meaning of ethnic groups.

M. Marger supports the same argument, however, though not without a slight difference to other authors, which makes his assertions enriching for this research paper. He declares that "basically, ethnic groups are groups within a larger society that display a unique set of cultural traits."[135] In his reference to the work of the sociologist M. Tumin, he defines an ethnic group in the following way: "A social group, which, within a larger cultural and social system, claims or is accorded special status in terms of a complex of traits (ethnic traits) which it exhibits or is believed to exhibit".[136] In concordance with the work of M. Marger, other scholars such as J. Hutchinson, A. Smith, J. Peoples and G. Bailey also emphasize that different ethnic boundary markers of ethnic groups exist.[137] In addition, J. Peoples and G. Bailey classify ethnic groups into two main categories, namely: 1) National 2) Sub-national.

From their perspective, on the one hand, the national ethnic group is a group with a feeling of homeland, which may be a geographical region over which they possess exclusive rights. Essential in this explanation is the assumption of an inherent right to political autonomy and self-determination.[138] On the other hand, the sub-national ethnic group lacks the feelings of distinct and separate homeland with the rights associated to separate political sovereignty and self-determination. A sub-national ethnic group is a dependent and politically subordinate division of a nationality.[139]

It may be argued that the distinction between the two types of ethnic groups stated above revolves around political rights and power and one is led to wonder if these can be a source of ethnic conflicts, which means if the ethnic group that constitutes the majority deprives the minority equal political participation within the context of national and subnational ethnic groups and what the political implications are. J. Peoples and G. Bailey respond to these questions as follows:

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135   Marger, N. Martin: *Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives*, 2nd edition, Wadsworth, Belmont 1991, p. 12. See Barth, Fredrik: "Introduction", in: Barth, Fredrik [Ed.]: *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Johansen and Nielsen Boktrykkeri, Oslo 1969, p. 1-38.
136   Ibid., p. 12.
137   Compare ibid., p. 12-16; See also Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 348-349. See also the work of Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 6-7.
138   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 350.
139   See ibid.

> […] the demands of subnational groups for equal rights and treatment have long been a source of conflict. But the demands of nationalities for independence and sovereignty in a region carved out of an existing country create a political time bomb.[140]

The outbreak of violence is one of the consequences of political activities among ethnic groups. However, political themes will not be treated in this section. It is a topic of its own that is reserved for treatment later in this research. Having made mention earlier of the existence of different markers of ethnic boundaries by scholars, it is important to state and discuss these in order to avoid any deviation into other relevant fields of research as just experienced.

As already stated, M. Marger, J. Hutchinson, and A. Smith as well as J. Peoples and G. Bailey represent the same position on the existence of the ethnic marker boundaries. It is important to note that what J. Peoples and G. Bailey refer to as *ethnic markers boundaries* in their work is termed the *fundamental features of cultural traits of ethnic groups* in the work of M. Marger whereas J. Hutchinson and A. Smith refer to them as the *varying degrees of ethnies*, a word which serves as a replacement for ethnic groups as already discussed.

Ethnic boundary markers are essential not only to identify members from one another, but are also useful in demonstrating identity and distinguishing oneself from non-members. One marker may prove insufficient to differentiate members of a particular ethnic group from all other groups because a marker that may distinguish one ethnic group from the second may fail to distinguish it from the third.[141] That is why the combinations of markers are used. Some of these markers are discussed as follows:

1) A common proper name: A common name is important as a marker in order to identify oneself with a particular community and to express the essence of the community.[142] J. Peoples and G. Bailey use the term 'Language' to refer to the same marker. They believe that a person's native language is the primary indicator of ethnic group identity.[143] But, common name and language may appear worrisome and inadequate as markers because the same name may be in use by another ethnic group somewhere else within the same country. The same can be said of a language as a marker because a common language may be spoken by two different ethnic groups populations that do not have the same identity.[144]

2) A myth of common ancestry: This is based on a myth rather than a fact. This includes a myth based on the idea of a common origin in time and space

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140   See ibid.
141   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 348.
142   See Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 6-7.
143   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 348.
144   See ibid.

which gives the ethnic group a sense of kinship.[145] This marker can also be termed a sense of community. M. Marger opines that a sense of community among members exists when ethnic groups display a kind of consciousness or awareness of close association. This can play the role of a social-psychological referent in creating a sense of peoplehood. He is of the view that this provides a "we" feeling among the members. He shares the same view on the notion of common ancestry that is based on a myth.[146]

3) Shared historical memories: This marker is viewed on the presence of shared memories of a common past.

4) Elements of common culture: This marker includes religion, customs and language.[147] However, the practice of a particular religion, as in the case of language as discussed above, may cut across ethnic lines. Therefore, religious affiliation is not always an indicator of ethnic affiliation.[148]

5) A link with a homeland: This does not refer to a physical geographical location that is occupied by an ethnic group. Rather the attachment to the ancestral land can play a symbolic role like the diaspora peoples' memory of and holding on to their place of origin.[149] On the contrary, M. Marger uses the concept of 'Territoriality'. However, this is not stated as an imaginary place, but rather a physical occupation of a definable territory by an ethnic group where they maintain or aspire to a certain degree of political autonomy. He calls it "nations within nations".[150]

6) Ascribed membership: It is believed that ethnic membership as a marker can only be acquired through birth and is therefore not subject to change, although one may change ethnic affiliation by changing one's name or other outward signs of an ethnic group or by denying one's membership. However, it is extremely difficult to divest oneself completely of one's ethnic heritage.[151]

Apart from the markers of ethnic boundaries which are listed and explained above, it is important to note that there exist other ethnic boundaries markers which are not outlined above. J. Peoples and G. Bailey make reference to a wide variety of cultural traits of ethnic groups which, due to space, cannot all be discussed in this work. One significant aspect of ethnic groups is that they are not stable groupings and as people vanish and move between ethnic groups, they be-

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145   See Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 7.
146   Compare Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 13.
147   See Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 7.
148   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 348.
149   See Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 7.
150   See Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 16.
151   See ibid., p. 17.

come fluid and new ones come into existence.[152] A population or social gathering may be an ethnic category due to the ethnic identity assigned to it by outsiders. As soon as that identity becomes subjective, meaning immediately that population perceives itself in ethnic terms, at times as a response to the identity outsiders ascribe to it, it becomes an ethnic group.[153] This implies that the ethnic identity others assign to us establishes an ethnic category. Our claim and grip on that identity makes us an ethnic group.[154]

S. Cornell and D. Hartmann refer to the work of the German sociologist Max Weber *Economy and Society* which gives the following definition of ethnic groups:

> We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration.[155]

According to both authors, Weber's definition depicts that it is of no importance whether or not an objective blood group relationship exists,[156] whereas the assumption of a common descent is the basic determinant of the existence of an ethnic group in Weber's claim.

J. Peoples and D. Hartmann's work refers to physical characteristics as one of the makers of ethnic boundaries.[157] Based on this, it is doubtful if a black African with his or her own cultural background can be in same ethnic group as an African American just because they are both dark-complexioned. Therefore, it is not clear if all markers of ethnic boundaries mentioned earlier on are based on assumption and it is interesting to see how some of these questions that emerge will be answered in subsequent explanation and clarifications of other relevant and related terms to this research topic. What will this mean for concepts such as race and nation? The next segment will highlight more on the influence and consequences of this notion of assumption.

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152   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 349.
153   Compare Cornell, Stephen/Hartmann, Douglas, 1998, op. cit., p. 20-21.
154   See ibid., 20.
155   Ibid., p. 16.
156   See ibid.
157   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 348.

2.3.2 Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is a term frequently used in the study of ethnicity. What is ethnocentrism? S. Cornell and D. Hartmann refer to it in relation to ethnic identity as follows:

> Ethnocentrism—a belief in the normality and superiority of one's own people and their ways of doing things—is a common aspect of ethnic identity but is generally less virulent than the assumption of inherent, biologically based inferiority and superiority typically attached to race.[138]

An aspect of this definition is related to race but so far as race, as a concept, is not defined and explained, the concept of race will not yet be dealt with. What is most significant about the definition of ethnocentrism given above is the belief in the normality and superiority of one's own people. If ethnocentrism is practiced by one ethnic group which only exists in relation to other ethnic groups and ethnic groups, on the other hand, are founded on assumed common characteristics, it is questionable how an ethnocentric character can be a belief if what establishes the groups is based on assumption.

Based on this, it is doubtful if this "we" attitude of an ethnic group with its subjective attribution of supremacy over others may lead to the dominance of other groups since ethnic groups exist only in a context that involves others, denoting they do not live in isolation. M. Marger characterizes the "we" feeling of ethnic groups as a process that leads naturally to ethnocentrism.[159] He focuses further on the tendency to judge other groups by one's own standards and values. It is, however, not clear how far this claim of supremacy over others may lead to the outbreaks of conflicts.

Considering the impacts of ethnocentrism, it is vital to study what the term "others" means in relation to "us" because all the segments of analyses and discussion so far has revolved around the dichotomized "us" and "others", bearing in mind that this "others" is bound to take the burden of an ethnocentric character of an ethnic group, which is the in-group.[160] What is the other? S. Spencer describes the "other" in various ways: "The simple answer is 'not self'; in other words an alien subjectivity, a being who exhibits characteristics notably dif-

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138   Cornell, Stephan/Hartmann, Douglas, 1998, op. cit., p. 30-31.
159   See Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 14-15.
160   M. Marger presents one's own group as the in-group in his work on ethnocentrism. He states further in his explanation that an ethnocentric group views its ways as correct and natural and the ways of other groups, which he refers to as out-groups, odd, immoral and unnatural. See. ibid., p. 15.

ferent from our own, whether gender, race, class, custom and behavior."[161] In addition to his remarks, the 'other' exists as a metaphysical concept rather than as a genuine entity.[162] The characterization of the "other" in S. Spencer's perception as metaphysical qualifies it to be understood as indefinable and its existence, therefore, is based on assumption.

This implies that the "other" cannot be comprehended and this makes it strange and "foreign". Therefore, to regard the "other" as artificial, meaning fake, is to refuse it. Whenever these rules of "we" that an ethnocentric group lays down in a society as measures to check the behavior of the so-called "others" exist, then "it affirms qualities and characteristics that a group sees as normal as the rules by which they live."[163] And if these rules become legally institutionalized, then "it gains official and legal status and those breaking the rules are portrayed as 'criminals', 'insane', 'deviants' and 'anti-social'."[164]

Therefore, one may observe that the concept of the "other" in the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic groups as well as in ethnocentrism is construed in order to marginalize anything which stands contrary to one's own beliefs and cultures in a social system.[165] The influence of the term 'ethnic' can be observed in analyzing ethnocentrism because an ethnocentric group constructs the "other". It is not merely having the belief of being superior over the "other". Therefore, in poly-ethnic societies, ethnocentrism may serve as the basis for the creation of a sense of group solidarity and the fostering of cohesion within the group. However, it may serve also as a basis of conflicts between different groups.[166] The assertion that groups which constitute the "other" are not constant[167] means that the creation of "others" is utilized to achieve different goals at different times. S. Spencer makes the following statement on the difference that the construction of "others" represents:

> [...] the manner in which the aspects of difference that are constructed as problematic, or popularly, as 'moral panic' change over time and between nations [...]. The construction of a group as 'other' depends on the social and historical character of a nation and is parasitic on

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161   Spencer, Stephen: *Race and Ethnicity*, Routledge, London 2006, p. 8.
162   See ibid.
163   See ibid.
164   Ibid.
165   Stephen Spencer indicates in his work that the construction of the "others", which stands synonymously for the marginalized groups or underclass, is often associated with racial or ethnic groups. See ibid. For further information about the history of the construction of the "others", see Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 57-65. The citation is obtainable in the dissertation of A. Lentz; see ibid.
166   See Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 15.
167   See Spencer, Stephen, 2006, op. cit., p. 11.

developments in science, social theory and belief systems that function to create an identity (which is) a sense of nation.[168]

Contrary to the negative perception of ethnocentrism illustrated above, O. Nnoli assesses the phenomenon differently from the work of other authors. In his observation, he notes the positive aspects of ethnocentrism as the construction of "others" is absent in his definition of the concept:

> Ethnocentrism is attitudinal in form and perceptual in content. It represents the subjective dimension of ethnic behaviour. The members of a group are ethnocentric when they are proud of it and consequently are inward-looking. Their attachment to pride in group reflects their ethnocentrism. Its attributes are limited to beliefs, group identity, parochial orientation and group pride.[169]

Despite his neutrality in his perception of ethnocentrism, the elements of ethnocentrism which he differentiates in his definition into four main areas, namely belief, group identity, parochial orientation and group pride, may be subjected to manipulation against "others" in order to achieve specific goals.

According to J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, in alignment with the view presented by O. Nnoli, ethnocentrism can "have a collective historical referent, as the sense of uniqueness, centrality, and virtue of an *ethnie* in relations with other *ethnies*."[170] Despite the aspects of ethnocentrism which both authors indicate, it is still believed that it is often used on an individual or interpersonal level synonymously, for disdain of the stranger, who in this case is the "other".[171]

2.3.3 Race

Many authors refer to 'race' as a form of ethnicity because both terms *race* and *ethnicity* are often confused by many writers. Other scientists observe the definition of race controversially as a concept, especially when one views the role racism plays therein. Nevertheless, race is not tantamount to ethnicity. Despite some similarities which may be found between both terms, there are many differences as well.

For the purpose of clarity, the concept of race will be defined. J. Macionis defines race in the following statement: "A race is a socially constructed category composed of people who share biologically transmitted traits that members

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168   Ibid., p. 11.
169   Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1978, op. cit., p. 6.
170   Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 5.
171   See ibid.

of a society consider important."[172] He observes also that people may be classified based on their physical characteristics such as skin color, facial features and body shape. In addition to that, he discovers that racial categories cite some biological elements, but he believes that race is a socially constructed concept.[173] Based on J. Macionis' perception of race as a social construct, one can argue that these biological categories are emphasized upon because people consider some physical characteristics important.

However, another concept of race which is termed racism cannot be neglected at this point. J. Krieger et al. reveal that the role of racism is insignificant in the early study of race.[174] He notes that racism is a recent concept and its usage is linked to the rise of Nazism in Germany. The idea of racial superiority began to be practiced when the Nazi regime seized power and introduced its racial ideology. And the term *racism* is used to refer "to ideas which defined some racial or ethnic groups as superior and others as inferior."[175] This denotes that racism which rests its ideology on the physical or biological characteristics of peoples as illustrated in the definition of race is promoted as a policy of a regime in government. J. Krieger et al. claim that the first usage of the term is purportedly published in the book of Ruth Benedict, entitled *Race and Racism*, in 1942. With respect to the book, racism is defined as "the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority."[176]

One perceives that the definition of race with regard to R. Benedict's book indicates that the abilities of a person are based on the inherent endowment which in turn is dependent on the physical characteristics of the person. M. Marger characterizes race in his research as one of the most misunderstood, abused and dangerous concepts in the modern world.[177] He is of the view that scholars and social scientists who are supposed to understand the manipulative characteristics of the concept of race are the ones who, to a great extent, passionately apply it.[178] He finds that the concepts of race can arouse emotions such as hate, fear, loyalty, pride, and prejudice. He indicates that race as a concept is used to justify injustices and mistreatments of humans by other humans.[179]

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172   Macionis, J. John: *Society, The Basics*, 7th edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 2004, p. 271.
173   See ibid., p. 271-272.
174   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 765.
175   See ibid.
176   See ibid.
177   See Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 18.
178   See ibid., p. 18.
179   See ibid., p. 19.

What is not clarified so far is if the definition of race itself foments troubles which may result in conflicts because one can consider the following biological meaning of race from M. Marger as neutral: "The essential biological meaning of race is a population of humans classified on the basis of certain hereditary characteristics that differentiate them from other human groups."[180]

From this statement, one can argue that the classification of peoples based on hereditary features may not necessarily lead to injustice, discrimination and conflicts etc., however, the categorization of these peoples based on their physical features, as mentioned in the explanation of J. Macionis earlier on, can be inciting. Such a categorization is made possible because the term 'race' consists of both social and biological meanings, and therefore can be manipulated by people.[181]

The history of race can be traced back to the ancient civilizations and it is applied to "describe a wide variety of human categories, including people of a particular skin color (the Caucasian "race"), religion (the Jewish "race"), nationality (the British "race") and even the entire human species (the human "race")."[182] It is noted that the old meaning accorded to the notion of race is harmless until the last two centuries when the usage and the understanding of the term start affecting the relations of people. The term is not consistently applied and it means different things to different people.[183]

The complexity in understanding race and in defining it is being attested to by the explanations and definitions of the concept so far. This difficulty can be attributed to the slippery nature of the concept of race.[184] According to some questions put forward by S. Cornell and D. Hartmann:

> What about race, are races ethnic groups? Consider Black Americans. Certainly many people consider them a race or at least a part of one. How so? If they are a race, are they not an ethnic group? Could they be both?[185]

According to the above, both authors state that one has to understand the definition of race before one can be in a position to give answers to these questions. According to them, a race is a genetically distinct sub-population of a given species. However, they argue that the perception of race biologically based on ge-

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180   Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 19.
181   For more on racism and the social and biological meaning of race, see Marger N., Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 18-36.
182   Ibid., p. 19.
183   Ibid.
184   See Cornell, Stephan/Hartmann, Douglas, 1998, op. cit., p. 21.
185   Ibid.

netic differences renders it insignificant because genetic differences among human groups are not consistent.[186]

Furthermore, they view the issue setting boundaries between races critically because there is no certainty about the number of races that exist. The following quotation cites the irregularity in the number of races that numerous scholars in different disciplines of study indicated several decades ago in their various works:

> Linnaeus had found four human races; Blumenbach had five, Cuvier had three; John Hunter had seven; Burke had sixty-three; Pickering had eleven; Virey had two "species," each containing three races; Haeckel had thirty-six; Huxley had four; Topinard had nineteen under three headings; Desmoulins had sixteen "species"; Deniker had seventeen races and thirty types.[187]

By this, one can see the inconsistencies in the different works on the number of races. Placing people into racial categories based on the genetic and physical characteristics is complex because humans, irrespective of their physical traits, can interbreed. "If genes of different human groups were not interchangeable, the idea of race as a biological concept might have some useful meaning."[188]

Therefore, one can perceive that human races are defined mainly by being classified on the basis of physical and observable anatomical traits without any regard for internal and blood traits. One can argue that none of the sets of both internal and external characteristics can be applied consistently to determine the differences in human groups.[189]

T. Eriksen represents the same position because he believes that race as a concept contains a dubious descriptive value,[190] "moreover, attempts to clearly categorize humans have proved futile, because differences among individuals of the same group (or "racial type") are often greater than those found between groups."[191] As a result, especially concerning the issue of ethnicity, one can argue that race, designating a group of people, can be used to distinctively mark people off as the "other", meaning they are different from "us". One can see that the "concepts of race can nevertheless be relevant to the extent that they inform people's actions; at this level, race exists as a cultural construct, whether it has a 'biological' reality or not […]."[192] That is why race relations cannot be distin-

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186   Compare ibid.
187   Ibid., p. 21.
188   Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 20.
189   See ibid., p. 20-21.
190   See Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 5.
191   Marger, N. Martin, 1991, op. cit., p. 20.
192   Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 5.

guished from the study of ethnicity or ethnic relations because race relations can be viewed as a special case of ethnicity.

But for the purpose of distinguishing race from ethnicity, it can be argued that race refers to the categorization of people, while ethnicity is involved with the depiction of group identification as it refers to all and not just "us" or "others".[193] But the role of the concept of ethnic in ethnicity enables both the inclusion and exclusion of people. Therefore, ethnicity can still be manipulated for economic and political gains just as the role and the meaning of race may be altered to denote the ideology of racism in creating "us" and the "others".

2.3.4 Nation

There are many ways to portray the concept of a nation given the historical event that gave birth to the term. One of such is to describe a nation as a race and as a people.[194] It is doubtful if such a description is sufficient to explain the notion of nation after the clarification of race in the previous chapter. Considering the meaning of race, one can claim that such a description of the term 'nation' is narrowly viewed. However, further explanations show that the plural form of the concept, *nations*, has another meaning. On the one hand, it refers to heathens and gentiles. On the other hand, it is applied to denote the peoples of the earth.[195] What is the relevance of this finding for the notion of nation?

The similarity which the concepts of both 'nation' and 'ethnicity' have in common can be identified through their religious associations and connotations because, etymologically, 'ethnicity' originates from 'ethnic', a word that classifies peoples as heathen or pagans. But, it is debatable to claim that a nation which creates categories of people in the form of "we" and "others" is tantamount to ethnicity. That is why the answer to this question requires the definition of the term *nation*. In many literatures, scholars make reference more to the concept of nationalism than dealing with nations. Therefore, the search for the definition of nation will begin by analyzing the phenomenon of nationalism. Nationalism refers to the expressed desire of a people to establish and maintain a self-governing political entity."[196] In addition to that, E. Gellner states that

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193   Ibid.
194   Compare Onions, T. Charles [Ed.]: *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, Oxford
        University Press, Oxford 1966, p. 603.
195   See ibid.
196   Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 34.

"nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."[197] As a result, T. Eriksen contends that nationalism can be viewed as a movement or as a sentiment in terms of certain principles.[198] In view of this position, the importance of a political movement within the context of nationalism cannot be denied. In C. Scherrer's view, an ethnic group or an indigenous people may be viewed as a nationality.[199] If nationalism is based on ethnic ties, then ethnicity may be equivalent to nationalism. However, there is need for more clarification. To understand more about the concept of nation leads to J. Krieger et al.'s emphasis on the origins of the ideology of nationalism:

> [...] a secularization of political thought generated by the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, to the egalitarian implications of liberalism, and to the conceptions of republicanism and citizenship popularized by the upheavals of the American and French revolutions.[200]

Having associated nationalism with politics and based on J. Krieger et al.'s position in the above given definition, one may argue that political effectiveness and popular support are preconditions for the success of nationalism.[201] That means the aim of nationalism is to re-create a sentiment of coherence, wholeness and continuity with the past and stand in opposition to alienation between individual and society which modernity brings. One can say that nation is a product of this nationalist ideology or nationalism.[202] However, these explanations do not further the definition of the concept of nation. C. Scherrer enumerates certain characteristics of nation(s) or nationalities which represent a definition of nation:

1) it constitutes a distinct space of communication and interaction, that is it is able to form or maintain a public sphere of its own

2) it has a particular mode of production and life identifiable with it, and is able to reproduce it

3) it has some form of political organization

4) it has settled on an identifiable area of land or demarcated territory

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197   Gellner, Ernest: *Nations and Nationalism*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1983, p. 1.
198   See Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 98.
199   See Scherrer, P. Christian: *Structural Prevention of Ethnic Violence*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002, p. 6.
200   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 614.
201   Ibid., p. 103-104.
202   Ibid., p. 104.

5) it is distinctive, that is its members identify themselves or are identified by others as members of this particular community.[203]

Furthermore, the author notes that "an ethno-national community that possesses some crucial attributes, all these attributes, develops a distinct collective identity; it could, in political contention, invoke the international legal principle of self determination."[204]

C. Scherrer, in another work *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence*, posits that the concept of nation is a European idea.[205] In addition, he applies other words as synonyms for nation such as *nation-state* and *modern state*.[206] He argues that this European idea of a nation-state is a reality that spread on a world scale because this idea of the concept of nation is perceived as modern beyond its Eurocentric signification.[207] However, he is of the view that the debate about nationhood, nationalism and nation-state persists because the process of assimilation and military subjugation in the creation of a homogeneous ethnic substrate of nations remains mostly unaccomplished in the so-called Third World Countries where the formation of a homogeneous ethnic basis for nation-state is still an illusion.[208] The question is whether it is possible, with respect to the analyses of C. Scherrer, to rectify the difficulties that may be encountered in exporting a European idea of a nation into other parts of the world. According to this assumption, it is doubtful if the problems of the sentiments or the feelings of a mass movement of people with different ethnic identities based on cultural, linguistic and religious differences can be rectified in order to fulfill the characteristics towards the formation of a nation. In response to such uncertainty, C. Scherrer's investigation is stated as follows:

> Regarding the impact of the idea of (a) nation-state on the political organization and statehood elsewhere we may only speak of (in) framework of asymmetrical relationships of power. The proliferation of stereotypical integration forms of modern nation-state outside Europe began with military force and was imposed by violent means.[209]

One can perceive the use of coercive force in forming nation-states in countries with diverse ethnic identities. It is, nevertheless, unclear whether the use of external force can help create nations, for example, the use of colonialism in Asia

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203   Scherrer, P. Christian, 2002, op. cit., p. 6-7.
204   Ibid., p. 7.
205   Scherrer, P. Christian: *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights and Multilateral Regimes*, Ashgate, Aldershot et al. 2003, p. 16.
206   Ibid., p. 16.
207   See ibid.
208   See ibid.
209   Ibid., p. 11.

and Africa. C. Scherrer believes "colonialism failed to end the existence of several social formations. However, it succeeded in modifying statehood of indigenous forms."[210] This may denote that the feelings of nationalism come from within, as it becomes clear from the last statement that external influence like colonialism cannot achieve the idea and spirit of nationalism.

Moreover, Europe, where the idea of European nationalism was useful in the formation of nation-states, was turned into a killing field and it was the main theater of the World Wars. It is estimated that almost a hundred million people died in European tribal wars as victims of ethnic cleansing.[211] As a result, it remains unclear whether the concept of the 'nation' emerges only through violent struggle or is also realizable through dialogue and consensus. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of the following preconditions is essential in the making of nation-states:

1) A nation with a potentially unified ethnic base

2) An often violent process of unification, which results in ethno-cultural homogenization

3) A demarcated and limited territory

4) Ideally geographical and ethnic boundaries are congruent

5) A national bourgeoisie and a political will to struggle for so-called national interests (allegedly not identical with class interests)

6) The claim of national sovereignty, as usage of the collective key principle of freedom, directed against the predominance of supranational religious beliefs

7) The element of formal equality of all members of an imagined nation, independent of real equity and divorced from the exploitation of farmers and workers.[212]

In how far these conditions are fulfilled in Third World Countries will be examined in the empirical part of this research work.

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210   Scherrer, P. Christian, 2003, op. cit., p. 11.
211   See ibid., p. 10.
212   Ibid.

2.3.5 Identity

When referring to the term identity, it foregrounds the concept of "self" and it may be on the individual, class, ethnic or the national level.[213] It is important to clarify this concept because it plays a central role in this research topic. It can be seen under different topics analyzed so far that certain aspects of the term 'identity' are mentioned, mostly in relation to either ethnic or cultural as well as religious identities. At times, identity is referred to as an image.[214] But one may not be able to determine what it means unless the meaning and definition of identity is stated and what it means in inter-ethnic relationship classification. G. Taylor and S. Spencer define the notion of identity in the following quotation:

> Identity is a work in progress, a negotiated space between ourselves and others; constantly being re-appraised and very much linked to the circulation of cultural meanings in a society. Furthermore identity is intensively political. There are constant efforts to escape, fix or perpetuate images and meanings of others. These transformations are apparent in every domain, and the relationships between these constructions reflect and reinforce power relations.[215]

One can discern from this assertion that the term 'identity' is not permanent. It may be argued that identity is situational in nature because it can play different roles in different situations. Based on this, can one claim that identity is a construct? What does this mean for a society that consists of different ethnic groups? It is emphasized further that identity possesses the potential for exclusion as it can serve as points of commonality and identification.[216]

G. Taylor and S. Spencer argue that, on the one hand, identity is a term which embodies our sense of uniqueness as individual beings and as members of groups that share the same values and beliefs. On the other hand, it can be conceived in an intensely political sense in which the emergence of competing voices is allowed in demanding space and recognition of fragile and often elusive and unspoken recognition.[217] Furthermore, he asserts that identity is a complicated concept which is examined when challenged with uncertainty and comes to mind as soon as one becomes unsure of where one belongs.[218]

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213   Taylor, Gary/Spencer, Steve: "Introduction", in: Taylor, Gary/Spencer, Steve [Eds.]: *Social Identities, Multidisciplinary Approaches*, Taylor and Francis Group/Routledge, New York 2004, p. 1-13 (2-3).
214   See Spencer, Stephen, 2006, op. cit., p. 26.
215   Taylor, Gary/Spencer, Steve, 2004, op. cit., p. 4.
216   See Spencer, Stephen, 2006, op. cit., p. 26.
217   See Taylor, Gary/Spencer, Steve, 2004, op. cit., p. 1.
218   See ibid.

The question is whether one views oneself as a single entity and as part of a larger society. In response to such a question, G. Taylor and S. Spencer, in reference to I. Craib, assert that "it is possible for us to be both the single unified self and plural selves simultaneously."[219] Regarding to our previous analyses in relation to the ethnic 'us' and 'others', this argument here will imply that one can be part of 'us' and at the same time be part of 'others'. However, in ethnic diverse societies in which there are differences in culture, religion and language, it is unclear if it is feasible to have one person as a single unitary self and as plural selves. G. Taylor and S. Spencer argue that such a question revolves around the phenomenon of ethnic identity and this question has to be answered within that context. Hence, they note that since identity is not a fixed notion, human beings monitor their self-presentations and, as a result, individual and collective identity is open to reassessment.[220] Therefore, ethnic identity in terms of categories such as black, brown or white, which are physical traits used to differentiate human beings, fall within political and social boundary markers rather than in iconic signs representing actual categories which function to exclude or unite.[221]

In his work *Race and Ethnicity*, S. Spencer perceives identity construction based on physical traits such as whiteness and blackness as a result of the accumulation of imagery of metaphors associated with these colors. He supports the argument that identity construction based on the categories mentioned above is possible because of the potential for exclusion which identity as a concept possesses.[222] The analyses so far show that ethnic identity is a charged political field. In addition, T. Eriksen's response to the question concerning the functions of identities is given within the context of ethnic identity as follows:

> Ethnic identity becomes crucially important the moment it is perceived as being under threat. Since ethnicity is an aspect of relationship, the importance of boundaries may thus be said to be conditional on the pressure exerted on them. On the other hand, […] expressions of ethnic identities may also be regarded as […] symbolic tools in political struggles.[223]

2.3.6 Tribalism

Various concepts similar to the concept of tribalism are already applied in this research work. What constitutes the difference between ethnicity, ethnic groups,

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219   Ibid., p. 2.
220   See ibid.
221   See ibid.
222   See Spencer, Stephen, 2006, op. cit., p. 26.
223   Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 34.

ethnocentrism and tribalism is thus for an open question. Ethnicity, at times, is even understood as tribalism or one may think that an ethnic group or an ethnocentric group is what tribalism, as a concept, denotes.

Moreover, many authors use the term *tribalism* in matters concerning ethnic conflicts in Africa.[224] It is reported that Western scholars underrate the existence of tribalism in Africa whereas African intellectuals, on the contrary, believe that the usage of tribalism, as a term, reflects the common European or colonially derived stereotypes about Africa.[225] Based on the two different views on the subject matter, one can perceive the controversy on the use of the term *tribalism*. However, since the 1970s, African social scientists have disengaged themselves from the use of tribalism as a concept, even though the word is still used in the West. J. Krieger et al. go on to explain why African scholars object to the use of the term *tribalism*: "This is partly a subjective reaction against Eurocentric ideological supposition that, sociologically speaking, everything African is tribal."[226]

The question remains why the usage of this term is rejected by African authors and what the reason for the controversy is. This leads us to the next questions: When one refers to tribes, does it mean ethnic groups? What is tribalism?

These are questions that need to be answered in order to reexamine and clarify the controversy which the concept of tribalism generates. However, it is important first to understand what is meant by tribes. J. Peoples and G. Bailey explain the term as a formally organized institution which unites scattered or spread residential communities and establish greater cohesiveness among the groups in the society as well as enable a more united response to external threats.[227]

Both authors add that these institutions are called *sodalitie*s and that *sodalities* appear in various forms. They may be in form of kin groups such as clans and lineages or they may be based on non-kinship entities such as age groups or voluntary associations. Irrespective of their nature, *sodalities* unify dispersed communities into political units.[228] It is believed that these tribally organized societies consist of formalized political offices with institutional powers. Despite the existence of these institutions and powers of office holders, however, the

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224   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 918.
225   See ibid.
226   Ibid.
227   See Peoples, James/Bailey, Garrick, 2003, op. cit., p. 237.
228   See ibid.

leadership still depends partly on the persuasive skills of individuals because these societies are mostly egalitarian.[229]

Based on the meaning of the term *tribes* stated above, one cannot perceive why African scholars denounce its use. Regarding the explanation given on the notion of the term so far, tribes denote political units, especially when organized in an egalitarian way. It can be argued that there is no derogatory statement when one reevaluates the definition of tribes as noted already. Nonetheless, further inquiry can be made on the reason why the definition and the explanation of the term *tribes* may mislead, such as the uproar among African social scientists.

J. Krieger et al. trace the historical background of the term *tribalism* to the Greek and Roman antiquity which ends in Europe. Karl Marx, according to J. Krieger et al., is the first person that makes a reference to the "German Tribes". The definition of tribes stated by J. Krieger et al. reads thus:

> According to this classical view, tribes were supposed to represent a particular stage of human development characterized by the existence of self-contained, autonomous groups based on kinship or principles of consanguinity and practicing subsistence economy.[230]

Thereby, the controversy surrounding the notion of tribe is yet unclear. Whether the experience of colonization has an influence on why African societies are still being pointed to as tribes is not yet feasible.

In furtherance of the classical perspective of the term *tribe*, noted in the quotation given above, J. Krieger et al. dismiss the notion of "self-containment" based on its historical rarity in ancient societies.[231] Their view is that tribes form political and economic organizations in which there is neither any record of subjugation to external influences or reliance on external exchanges. But, as they note, internal authorities like chiefs and elders are recognized. T. Eriksen, along the same line of argument as J. Krieger et al., states the following:

> When we talk of tribes we implicitly introduce a sharp, qualitative distinction between ourselves and the people we study; the distinction generally corresponds to the distinction between modern and traditional or so-called primitive societies.[232]

Furthermore, he explains that the objection to the use of the term *tribes* by African scholars depends on the manner in which African societies are classified as tribes. Unlike the European countries which are perceived as modern, African societies, in this sense, denote traditional and primitive societies.

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229   See ibid.
230   Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 918.
231   See ibid., p. 918.
232   Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, 2002, op. cit., p. 10.

According to this argument, one can see the dichotomy created by many scholars as the categorization into "us" and "others" is recreated with the notion of tribe. J. Krieger et al. report that the images of Africa presented by the European evolutionists are based on predispositions which are confirmed through their reports of the images of Africa as the Dark Continent.[233] If the application of the concept of tribe in Africa is flawed from the outset, then the concept of tribalism cannot produce a new image, but rather can only uphold the original misconceptions or deceits.[234]

As a result, the term *tribalism* cannot distinguish between national and ethnic conflicts in the modern context. It is suggested by J. Krieger et al. that if the concept of tribalism needs to be applied, then it can only be used within the context of modern African political and economic exigencies with regard only to post-colonial urban areas.[235]

2.3.7 Assessment of Ethnicity and Other Relevant Concepts

It is important to assess the research carried out so far on the definition, explanation and analyses of the term *ethnicity* and other relevant concepts through a brief summary of the work on a chapter to chapter basis. Firstly, ethnicity generally denotes the sense of belonging to a people or the membership of a particular ethnic group. However, based on the etymological analysis of the concept of ethnicity, ethnicity originates from a different word, an adjective referred to as 'ethnic', in the Middle Ages.

'Ethnic' as a concept, which is similarly derived from other Greek and Latin words, refers to a *nation* or *gentiles*, which at that period is used to denote any other religion not tantamount to Christianity or Judaism. From that point of view, any group of people who practices a different religion is subjected to exclusion and marginalization since such practices are designated as strange or foreign.

Moreover, the analysis links such exclusion and separation in an ethnic heterogeneous society to the concept of 'ethnic' which stands for groupings of different ethnic groups in a society as "us" and the "others". Therefore, with ethnic as a concept that influenced the term 'ethnicity', it is thus believed that any negative perception of ethnicity as a term is as a result of the concept of ethnic

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233   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 918.
234   See ibid., p. 918.
235   See ibid., p. 919.

embedded in it. As a consequence, ethnicity, as a term describing the existence of heterogeneous ethnic groups in a society based on the differences in culture, language and origin, and a term representing everyone without exception, irrespective of the purported differences, becomes a concept due to the influence of 'ethnic', that separates ethnic groups into "us" and "others". It is made clear, concerning the general usage of ethnicity as a concept, that the term 'ethnicity' is not synonymous with conflicts and it is not the cause of conflict.

Secondly, according to the explanation of the scientific notion of ethnicity in the second chapter, it is asserted that the emergence of ethnicity is related to and is not explicable without considering the historical developments surrounding it. Despite its emergence in relation to the failure of the Melting Pot Idea, which was a concept developed to fortify further a U.S.-American identity, ethnicity as a phenomenon is meant to address, as a scientific field, the rise in inter-ethnic conflicts both in the industrialized countries and in the former colonial states.

Despite some objections raised to the study of ethnicity within the context of conflicts based on the colonial experience of the so-called Post-Colonial states, it is asserted that the link between ethnicity and conflicts cannot be proven unless the definition of ethnicity is given. One important finding on ethnicity is that it is to be viewed from two different angles; while the first is viewed positively, the other contains a negative perspective. The positive aspect of ethnicity is its role as a phenomenon that represents a unifying factor in a multi-ethnic society. The somewhat negative side deals with ethnicity as a term that represents the existence of different ethnic groups with diverse cultures, languages, and religions in a society.

Based on the analysis, the latter is described as purportedly negative because it denotes ethnicity as a phenomenon that exploits the differences in ethnic groups to separate them. However, it is emphasized that cultural prejudice among ethnic groups is prevalent, resulting in discrimination of one ethnic group against another due to feelings of pride in the in-group. It is noted also that the so-called feelings of pride in the in-group are made possible by a common consciousness, identity and exclusivity of its members. In the long run, ethnicity is defined as the process of fixing ethnic boundaries and distinctions in the form of "self" and ascribing "others" with certain characteristics that cause them to be excluded from the mainstream. According to these findings, ethnicity is noted to be a social phenomenon subjected to change and it is explained that the form, place and role of the term 'ethnicity' in a society may shift. As a result, it is recognized that ethnicity does not exist in a pure form. Ethnicity's

bond with other social phenomena such as religion, politics and class relations makes it a malleable concept. As a result, ethnicity as a notion is unfixed and is subjected to the notion of continuity, therefore making it susceptible to change from situation to situation. The consequence, based on these features of the term 'ethnicity', is that it is manipulable and can be a means of realizing economic and political goals.

Other concepts such as 'identity', 'ethnocentrism', 'nation', 'race', 'ethnic groups' and 'tribalism' are described, defined and analyzed. One of the main reasons to treat these concepts separately in relation to the term 'ethnicity' is that they are and may continue to be mistakenly confused in their usages for ethnicity. It is also noted in the work that some authors apply some of the concepts as synonyms to replace the concept of ethnicity. However, based on the knowledge gathered so far on all the concepts mentioned earlier, none of them are tantamount to the concept of ethnicity. However, ethnic groups, as is found in the research, form the subunits and subsections of 'ethnicity' and without the presence of ethnic groups in a society, the notion of ethnicity would be non-existent. However, the analysis finds that 'ethnic group' as a concept, like *ethnicity*, is under the influence of 'ethnic', which renders its meaning negatively as the formation of "us" and the "others".

The same can be said of the remaining concepts. In view of the similarities that all these concepts display and their relations to the notion of ethnicity, they, with the exception of tribalism, are all grouped together in the remaining part of this assessment.

With reference to the analysis in the research done so far, the concepts of 'ethnocentrism', 'nation', 'race' and 'identity' represent phenomena which are used to exclude or marginalize ethnic groups based on the presence and influence of the term *ethnic* in all of them, which categorizes people into "us" and the "others". On this note, they are all concepts that engender metaphysical rather than genuine unity. Because they are all in one way or another intertwined with the notion of identity, they may all be reflected in terms of class, on an ethnic and national level. Furthermore, since identity as a concept is intensively political and connects with all other concepts, as noted earlier, the phenomena of 'ethnocentrism', 'nation', 'race' and 'identity' are all social constructs.

On the other hand, the exception of 'tribalism' to all other concepts is based on the controversy that is attached to it in the research. The definition of the term *tribalism* is identified as a unifying phenomenon rather than as a separating notion. Unlike the other concepts already mentioned, which are noted for the categorization and separation of people into "us" and "others", *tribalism* is de-

scribed as a form of politically organized units, referred to as *sodalities*, which is in the form of organized institution that attempts to regroup scattered communities. The persons representing these authorities while performing their duties relate with other members of their societies in egalitarian ways. This notion of tribalism makes it different from other concepts because its real sense is to unite in comparison with the other concepts that are described as creating "us" and "others", thereby excluding and marginalizing them. The only controversy attached to its usage occurs between the African elites and European writers.

It is believed by many African writers that tribalism as a concept is used derogatorily to describe African societies as dependent, uncivilized and old-fashioned in terms of the existence and recognition given to kinships, kings and traditional chiefs in comparison to European countries that are perceived and presented by European writers with images such as modernity, civilization, literacy et cetera. Despite the fact that the meaning, definition and explanation of tribalism as a concept is uncontroversial, the concept is rendered, based on the controversy, as exhibiting the characteristics of the ethnic in ethnicity in (re)-creating "us" and "others".

2.4 Politicization: Conceptualization and Clarification of Concept

The term 'politicization' plays a key role in how political power on different governmental levels in a society is attained. However, it may be difficult to grasp, explain and analyze the notion of politicization without an initial explanation of the concept of *politics* and its relevance to *politicization*.

Therefore, this section will highlight some of the keywords that seem indispensable when the terminology 'politicization' is examined in this research work. Concepts such as 'power', 'state', 'pluralism and 'rhetoric' are terms that may need clarification and definition in order to reach a thorough understanding of politicization. These terms will be examined in relation to *politics* and *politicization*.

However, irrespective of the difficulties encountered within the framework of the analysis carried out at illustrating the exact definition of the subject matter in the following sections, as will be reiterated afterwards, the concept of politicization depicts the aim of the control of the state authority or the geographical area when the elites struggle and strive to acquire political power or are able to

influence political decisions.[236] This, nevertheless, does not depict 'politicization' as negative or positive. In addition, the analysis will portray the problems which the concept of politicization may generate in a politically charged multi-ethnic environment.

The next sections under this particular chapter will attempt to find adequate definitions of the concepts 'politicization' and 'the politicization of ethnicity' which are acceptable within the context of this investigation and also highlight the elements therein while attempting to establish a precise definition of the concepts. The functions which the politicization of ethnicity has in a society will be examined and outlined.

2.4.1 The Study and Definition of Politics

Etymologically, in reference to H. Kunst et al., the concept of politics is derived from the ancient Greek word *politeia* which originally means the lifestyle of a society.[237] However, the lifestyle of a society does not indicate a political lifestyle. It can also mean an economic, a social, or religious way of life.

H. Kunst et al. explain further that the term *politeia*, in reference to politics, specifically means the participation of citizens in the *polis* including the rights of the citizens. The authors further state that the citizens have access to participation and rights based on their origin which are acquired automatically by birth or conferred on a person.[238] Therefore, the concept of politics can generally be understood as a phenomenon referring to the *polis*, a community.[239]

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236   The meaning of the politicization asserted above in the text is stated by the writer of this research thesis who, despite the difficulty in finding a specific scientific definition, comes to a conclusion, based on the research and analysis carried out, that politicization revolves around power struggle and preservation in a political society, therefore, politicization aims at the control or retention of this power.

237   The term 'polis' denotes a political community. For more information, see Kunst, Hermann et al. [Eds.]: *Evangelisches Staatslexikon*, Kreuz-Verlag, Stuttgart/Berlin 1966, p. 1855.

238   See ibid.

239   H. Kunst et al. trace the concept of politics back to ancient philosophers like Aristotle whose occidental works on *politics* are related to practical philosophy. This means that politics, during that period, corresponded to the philosophy of ethics. At that time, practical philosophy, alongside politics, was comprised of the teachings of ethics and economics. Ethics, in this sense, means traditional behavior of individuals and economics on household. See Kunst, Hermann et al. [Eds.], 1966, op. cit., p. 1855. Contrary to the assertion of H. Kunst et al., K. Palonen emphasizes that it was during the eighteenth century that attempts were made to inject new ideas into the concept of politics. He maintains that the old discipline of politics is split into the disciplines of ethics, economics and politics. Read more in Palonen, Kari: "Two Concepts of Politics, Conceptual History and Present Contro-

Based on the assertion by H. Kunst et al., 'politics' can be described as the involvement of people and the rights of the people in a political community. One important point in their analysis is the link between the ancient and the contemporary notion of politics with respect to the classification of people and individuals within a political community.

In reference to classification, the issue of dividing people into different classes within a particular political society may denote that some individuals enjoy different rights and privileges in such a political setup. Differences among people in a political community may raise questions about this asymmetric relationship among the people in relation to various rights and participation enjoyed in such a political environment. One may perceive, based on the notion of classification, that there is need for a clear conceptualization of politics.

However, before clarifying the concept of politics, it is important to emphasize the works of many scholars, especially philosophers from ancient times up until the Middle Ages and the modern period, who contributed to and dominated the discourse on the concept of politics. Among them is Aristotle whose ancient works on politics, which fall within the context of traditional practical philosophy, envision the roles and behavior of each individual within a political community. H. Kunst et al., in reference to Aristotle, further state the conditions that need to be met in order for each individual to live a happy life and the conditions to be fulfilled by individuals within a given political environment towards achieving and upholding public welfare.[240]

In K. Palonen's study of the different concepts of the subject matter, the author represents the view that 'politics' originates from the ancient term *Tà politika* which is initially translated to *politics* before it, in turn, refers to a discipline that engages with issues and questions that relate to the polis.[241] Regarding the ancient connotation of the concept of politics, K. Palonen gives the following argument:

> Within the 'art' version of the discipline of politics that followed the *phronesis* of Aristotle, the adjective *politic* refers to 'cunningness', as the French (*fin, adroit, prudent*) and German (*klug, listig, schlau*) terms refer to the quality of a person, which could also concern the private sphere.[242]

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versies", in: *Distinktion, Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory,* No. 12, 2006, p. 11-25 (13).

240   See Kunst, Hermann et al. [Eds.], 1966, op. cit., p. 1855.

241   It is explained further that the question of "what is politics or what is political" does not gain relevance within the concept of politics during the Aristotelian period. See Palonen, Kari, 2006, op. cit., p. 12.

242   Palonen, Kari, 2006, op. cit., p. 13. Some of the words in the original quote are in italics.

According to H. Reading, the term 'politics' can be defined as the struggle for power and the authoritative allocation of values.[243] In addition to H. Reading's definition, 'politics' is described as an activity or an action in the name of the state or government.[244]

Furthermore, 'politics', in a scientific sense, is the study of governmental behavior.[245] In furtherance of the definition from H. Reading given above, E.-O. Czempiel, with respect to the definition of D. Easton, toes the same line of argument. He understands the term 'politics' as the authorized organ that is legitimized through a political system to take responsibility for the distribution or allocation of values within a society.[246]

However, a critical aspect of such an explanation of politics rests on the perception of its broadness and imprecision in order to distinguish it from other organs that may also be established authoritatively through religious and cultural instances.[247] At the same time, politics, as the authorized allocation of values, is viewed as narrowly conceptualized because the description excludes unauthorized bodies like economic actors who are also involved in the allocation of values in a society.[248]

In consideration of the assertions made earlier on the meaning and definition of politics as a term, one can argue that these values, as stated in the analysis of E.-O. Czempiel, requires further clarification because they may be misunderstood for the rights, roles and privileges of people in a society. E.-O. Czempiel identifies and notes specific areas which are primarily relevant and essential, if not exclusive, to the existence of a society and its political system through which the allocation of values become politically relevant as follows: Security, economic prosperity and authority.[249] In order to consolidate these three areas mentioned above, the political system, with its authorized organ, is not sufficient on its own and therefore requires power.

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243   See Reading, F. Hugo, 1977, op. cit., p. 154.
244   See ibid.
245   See ibid.
246   The original definition comes from D. Easton, see Easton, David: *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey 1965. The same definition is also referenced by E.-O. Czempiel. For further reading, see Czempiel, Ernst-Otto: "Die Disziplin „Internationale Beziehungen" und die Bestimmung ihres Gegenstandes", in: Knapp, Manfred/Krell, Gert: *Einführung in die Internationale Politik,* R. Oldenbourg Verlag (4. überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage), München/Wien 2004, p. 2-28 (6).
247   See ibid., p. 6.
248   See ibid.
249   Compare ibid.

So, in reference to the analysis and explanation given so far, one can define the concept of politics as an effective authority that uses the mode of power through which the allocation of values in the areas of security, welfare and leadership or sovereignty is enforced by the political system or by a society's actors within that society as a unit and on the international stage.[250] A.E. Leftwich represents the same position as E.-O. Czempiel in terms of what politics, as a term, means.[251] In his own view, many questions remain unanswered and some of these questions need to be answered when one examines the concept of politics:

> To what activities in the world does the term 'politics' refer? Are these found in all societies, past and present, or only some? If only some, what then is distinctive about them and the activities in them which we call politics? Is politics, moreover, found at all levels in such societies, that is in all groups and institutions within them? Or is it only found in some spheres, for instance those concerned with 'government' or the legitimate exercise of force? That is to say, is politics only found in the 'public' sphere and not the 'private'? And, if so, how do we really distinguish between the two and where is the line drawn?[252]

However, other authors go further to assign additional roles to the terminology. The concept of politics, as J. Briggs examines it, narrowly "refers to activity with respect to the state, to 'Politics and Institutions'."[253] Also J. Schwarzmantel and J. Briggs include additional definitions on the notion of politics as follows:

> [...] politics deals with relations of power and that it is fundamentally concerned with one central political institution, the state.[254] The [...] definition refers to politics and conflict and this relates more to political awareness as it is a much broader definition. Under this second definition, wherever you have a dispute or conflict then politics comes into play, over the allocation of scarce resources, or over whether money should be spent upon defense or upon welfare.[255]

From all the explanations and definitions given so far, one can argue that 'politics' is engaged with disagreements or reconciliation of disagreements as well as conflict resolution. According to the second definition from the quotation given above, J. Briggs is of the opinion that the activity of politics originates from the fundamental human problem of diversity.[256] As many scholars claim, 'politics' is an activity because it deals with conflicts and disagreements in the society and it is inevitable that these do not or will not exist.[257] Therefore, arguably, 'poli-

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250   See ibid.
251   See Leftwich, Adrian: *What is Politics*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1984, p. 1.
252   Ibid.
253   Briggs, E. Jacqueline: *Strikes in Politicization*, Ashgate, Aldershot et al. 1998, p. 35.
254   Schwarzmantel, J. John: *Structure of Power: An Introduction to Politics*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1987, p. 1.
255   See Briggs, E. Jacqueline, 1998, op. cit., p. 35.
256   See ibid., p. 36.
257   See ibid.

tics' is a holistic phenomenon because "we simply cannot manage without it."[258] J. Briggs, emphasizing the broad conceptualization of politics, opines that it is about power relationships.[259]

Finally, on the study of the term *politics* and its explanation in this research and, according to K. Palonen, whose illustration on two pillars of the concept denotes it as a *sphere or as an activity*,[260] J. Briggs sees the term 'politics' as a power-structured relationship, an arrangement whereby one group of persons is dominated by another. Along the same line of argument, J. Schwarzmantel continues by saying that "politics exists in any context where there is a structure of power and struggle for power in an attempt to gain or maintain leadership posi-

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258   See ibid.

259   J. Briggs, in accordance with the work of K. Millet with the title *Sexual Politics*, describes politics from the gender perspective as the sexual division of labor. Based on this argument, if one speaks of politics as concerning power relationships, then, sexual politics are power relationships. See ibid., p. 36. Also, J. Schwarzmantel refers to sexual politics as a kind of politics which depicts the domination of men over women or an attempt to change this relation. See Schwarzmantel, J. John, 1987, op. cit., p. 2.

260   K. Palonen's investigation of the concept of politics on the one hand as a sphere and on the other hand as an activity presents the views that the notion of politics in two separate fields emerges as a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. He describes the difference between the sphere and activity concepts of politics based on the opposition between the use of spatial and temporal metaphors in the conceptualization of the fluid phenomenon of politics. He observes that the sphere notion of politics is when one approaches politics as a spatial phenomenon. However, its proponents aim to stabilize and regulate its use.

He states in his work further that in the older literature the sphere of politics used to be described through the use of simple metaphors like the sector, field, domain or realm of politics. However, as from the twentieth century, the usage took on abstract figures such as theatrical metaphors of arena, stage or scene. Additionally, as he asserts, the English term 'public' and 'political' were perceived as synonymous in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and then politics became identified with the public sphere. However, the more governments' activities expand, the more the term 'public' becomes more complicated and the harder it is to distinguish its boundary lines from politics. For more on this, see Palonen, Kari, 2006, op. cit., p. 14-17.

On the other hand, when one considers politics *as an activity*, K. Palonen states that it is something that is not visible to the bare eye, which means it must always be interpreted as politics. Some of the earlier thinkers of politics as an activity are Carl v. Clausewitz and Alexis de Tocqueville. According to these thinkers, the different topoi for the thematization of politics as an activity became more systematic and less simultaneous after politics, to a certain extent, became democratized and parliamentarized despite its different emphases in Britain, France and Germany. It is also observed that one of the key topoi for referring to politics in performative terms lies in the power to persuade and this serves as an indispensable aspect of the understanding of parliamentary and electoral practices. Based on this persuasive ability, the rhetorical aspect of politics is emphasized. K. Palonen, in reference to George Catlin, describes 'a political man' as someone who attempts to direct the wills of others. See ibid., p. 17-20.

tions."[261] The same point of view is shown by K. Palonen who cites H. Morgenthau's three types of politics as follows: "The lust for power manifests itself as the desire to maintain the range of one's own person with regard to others, to increase it or to demonstrate it."[262]

The next section will attempt to address the concepts of 'power' and 'politics', the significance of power in politics and will also examine whether the concept of power is synonymous or interdependent with the notion of politics.

2.4.2 The Essence of Power in Politics

When one makes reference to the term 'power', there are many synonyms that can be associated with it such as domination, hegemony and legitimacy. Therefore, this implies that power constitutes the means to control others.[263] As it is demonstrated in the last chapter, one can argue that the existence of state institutions is based on the power to claim and establish legitimacy. Therefore, one can argue that politics is not viable without power.

As a result, H. Kunst et al., with regard to H. Morgenthau, opine that politics revolves around power, its acquisition, its maintenance, distribution and loss. 'Politics', in their observation, is established on the conduct of a polity that has its base on the acquisition of power.[264] Aside from the assertion of H. Kunst et al., M. Rilley posits power as a social force that exists in a process of violence, through the barrel of the gun when it occurs through coercion, and which can be derived through the acceptance that some people have the right to make binding decisions for all. And, in this sense, one can view 'power' through the ability to persuade someone or a group of people to follow one's command.[265]

However, 'power' can be understood from other perspectives as well. J. Krieger et al.'s concept of power is conceived from different perspectives. On the one hand, he describes 'power' as the ability to attain what is needed and to

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261   Schwarzmantel, J. John, 1987, op. cit., p. 2.
262   Palonen, Kari, 2006, op. cit., p. 18. Other authors also attribute it to the notion of politics. Among them is Max Weber who refers to *politics* as a struggle over power sharing. Another thinker on the notion of politics whose work is based on the subject matter is the German Carl Schmitt. In Carl Schmitt's work *Unterscheidung zwischen Freund und Feind*, meaning the difference between friend and foe, he is of the view that "the adherence of one's enemies and friends is decided from above […]." See ibid, p. 18-19.
263   See Riley, Michael: *Power, Politics and Voting Behaviour: An Introduction to the Sociology of Politics*, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London et al. 1988, p. 17.
264   See Kunst, Hermann et al. [Eds.], 1966, op. cit., p. 1856.
265   See Riley, Michael, 1988, op. cit., p. 17.

produce the desired change.[266] As he believes, the change 'power' brings may be in different forms. *Power* may be reinforced by the means or instruments of power like tools, machines, weapons, communications, purchasing power or the ability to persuade, etc. But, on the other hand, it may also take the form of a change in beliefs, knowledge or technological know-how. On the long run, the desired result generated by the concept of power may result in a change in laws or institutions.[267]

One can see that, based on the explanations given so far, power can take different forms in view of its manifestation. However, it is important to note that power can create or destroy. So, it may be used positively or negatively. Based on this explanation, J. Krieger et al. assert that destructive power entails costs while constructive power is beneficial.[268] Furthermore, the author mentions three varieties of *power* as follows:

– Force or threat power: This refers to the power used over the people. Instances of this can be seen when a criminal is imprisoned or executed for the offence committed or if a city or the base of an enemy is bombed. In this sense, force is associated with threat power.

– Economic power: It is stated by J. Krieger et al. that economic power plays an essential role for the threat power as it is used to develop threat power. Therefore, it can be perceived that economic resources or power determine the military capabilities of a country or a society. The economic power of a society or a nation is measured by aggregates like gross national product or gross world product. However, there are differences between the economic power(s) of individuals, groups and nations.

– Integrative power: This form of power takes on many forms and it is perceived to be the dominant form of power. It can be described as the power of legitimacy, loyalty, identity, affection and community. Under this understanding of power, for example, economic power or threat power cannot be effective without legitimacy. Also, threats without legitimacy cannot be effective.[269]

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266   Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 739.
267   Ibid., p. 739.
268   J. Krieger et al. further state that destructive power is generally justified with the argument that the advantages outstrip the disadvantages which implies that the benefits exceed the cost. See ibid., p. 739.
269   See ibid., p. 738-740.

Another means to conceptualize *power* is to perceive it from a pluralist or rather from a democratic point of view whereby power is dispersed among a wide range of groups and bodies. Instances cited within the context of power, in this sense, are the powers possessed by voters, pressure groups and political parties, judges and civil servants. For this division of power among different groups, M. Riley opines that "no-one has too much".[270] However, contrary to the view posited regarding the equal possession of power in a democratic setting, it can be argued that power is claimed, centralized, potentially compelling and it includes passive rather than active political participation by the masses.[271]

The same position is held in the work of H. Reading whose assertion on the concept of power is stated as follows: 1) the ability to control the actions of others; 2) unauthorized ability to control the actions of others; 3) illegitimate influence; 4) the production of intended effects; 5) the ability to produce effects; 6) an authority of specified scope attached to an office.[272] In view of this definition, it can be argued that 'power' can both be legitimate and illegitimate depending on the acceptance of the authority that claims it.

B. Dobratz et al. believe that power is ubiquitous and can be used in different ways. As they claim, "certainly we all have experienced power in some way, perhaps the influence of a friend who cajoles and pushes us to go to a political meeting, or the force of a mugger who confronts us, taking an iPod at gunpoint."[273] Furthermore, the authors cite the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber as the forefathers who laid the foundations for defining 'power'.

On the one hand, as B. Dobratz et al. explain, "Marx established that economic structures like corporations, owners of capital, and more immediately, the boss represent societal sources of power."[274] Contrary to the position of Marx on the other hand, Weber also views the presence of power in non-economic contexts: "For Weber, power was rooted in formalized social systems such as organizations or bureaucracies, as well as in social institutions such as religion and law."[275] In Weber's definition of power in relation to politics, as explained by B. Dobratz et al., it is "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own

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270   See Riley, Michael, 1988, op. cit., p. 17.
271   See ibid.
272   Reading, F. Hugo, 1977, op. cit., p. 158.
273   Dobratz, A. Betty/Waldner, K. Lisa/Buzzel, Timothy: *Power, Politics, and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, Allyn and Bacon, Boston 2012, p. 2.
274   See ibid.
275   Ibid.

will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action."[276]

If power can be attained illegally or used illegitimately, some of the questions that arise may concern who is allowed to wield power, what kind of power and on whom the power is used. On this note, it is uncertain whether it is the authority, in the form of a government, the state or society at large.

D. Pickles notes that the words *government* and *state* are used interchangeably. She states that both words are not synonymous and are not the only organs that are entitled to use power.[277] Furthermore, she states that governments exist in communities and expounds as follows on places where a group or groups of people live:

> [I]t is perfectly possible to conceive of communities—primitive, nomadic tribes, for example—which are not "States" in the sense of which Great Britain and the United States of America are States, but which have government in the sense of accepted rules of conduct, by which law and order are maintained.[278]

Based on the understanding of maintenance of rule and order, she claims that government exists anywhere and any place where family exists. So, it is believed that in as far as family exists anywhere in human societies government is already in place.[279]

Another author who investigates the concept of power is M. Haugaard. In his work, he explains 'power' as an attempt to define and analyze democracy thus:

> If we take it that democracy is a set of political institutions essentially intended towards political equality then the issue which must be looked at is: what is meant by the political sphere? In other words, what is it that the democratic theorist seeks to distribute equally? The answer is that it is power which democracies should distribute equally.[280]

From the above, M. Haugaard's argument becomes debatable if one thinks about power as an abstract phenomenon that cannot be quantified. Emphasizing this, it is questionable if power can be allocated equally, even in a democratic constellation, when it is defined as a means to control others. Moreover, one may consider whether manipulation is not also about power or the ability to con-

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276   Ibid.
277   See Pickles, Dorothy: *Introduction to Politics*, Sylvan Press, London 1951, p. 34.
278   Ibid., p. 34.
279   See ibid., p. 34-35.
280   Haugaard, Mark: *The Constitution of Power. A Theoretical Analysis of Power, Knowledge and Structure*, Manchester University Press, Manchester/New York 1997, p. 9. More about the concept of power, see Kunz, Barbara: "Hans J. Morgenthau's Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power", in: *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 10 (2), 2010, p. 189-208.

trol others. In this manner, it is uncertain if manipulation is not synonymous with power.

T. Van Dijk, on manipulation as a form of social power abuse, defines manipulation as illegitimate domination which is a confirmation of social inequality. According to his claim, he believes that "discursively, manipulation generally involves the usual forms and formats of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing Our good things, and emphasizing Their bad things."[281] Therefore, within the context of the concept of power, manipulation can be used. The analysis so far shows that there is no equal distribution of power because some rule over others.

Based on the analysis of T. Van Dijk, manipulation serves the best interests of the dominant groups against the interests of the dominated groups and it implies power abuse. That being said, it is important to state that manipulation, as a notion, takes place by text and talk and human beings are controlled or exploited through the manipulation of their minds. As a consequence, the author believes that since manipulation takes place in interactive talk or communication, it involves mental tampering and denotes power and power abuse.[282]

In view of this, it can be argued that the phenomenon of manipulation and its practice are not only based on power alone, but can also be described as power abuse or illegal domination. If manipulation of others occurs through talks, texts, opinion articles, parliamentary debates, text books, scientific articles and the internet, then the manipulators need access to and control of such public discourse. However, since the power to control and access public discourse depends on and constitutes the power of the dominating groups, one can say that public discourse is the means of the social reproduction of such power.[283]

Therefore, one may argue that manipulation exists in interactive conversations or communications which is capable of changing people's minds, beliefs, knowledge, opinions and ideology which in turn control their actions.[284] However, the use and importance of rhetoric cannot be underestimated or overlooked in manipulation. It can be argued that rhetoric, as an element of political strategies, is part and parcel of the concept of manipulation. In order to buttress this argument, A. Roberson concurs with the same on the power of 'rhetoric' thus:

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281 Van Dijk, A. Teun: "Discourse and Manipulation", in: *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 17 (3), 2006, p. 359-383 (359).
282 See ibid., p. 360. T. Van Dijk defines manipulation etymologically as moving things by one's hands. Compare ibid.
283 See Van Dijk, A. Teun, 2006, op. cit., p. 362.
284 See ibid., p. 365.

> Rhetoric is the art of using language as a symbolic means, so as to persuade or influence humans who by nature respond to symbols in order to induce some sort of social control, that is, desirable political outcomes […].[285]

Consequently, even in a democratic setup, one can perceive that domination, in accordance with the following quotation, is based on the power of the dominant groups in relation to the dominated groups in every society:

> A further analysis of domination, defined as power abuse, requires special access to, or control over, scarce social resources. One of these resources is preferential access to the mass media and public discourse, a resource shared by member of 'symbolic' elites, such as politicians, journalists, scholars, writers, teachers, and so on […].[286]

Therefore, it can be argued that manipulation, as a form of power demonstration and acquisition, is illegitimate in a democratic society since it is a reproduction of inequality.

2.4.3 Politicization: Definition and Explanation of the Concept

The term *politicization*, as observed in the introduction to this section, has its origin in the concept of politics. However, despite its intertwined features and functions within the domain of 'politics', it is slightly different from the notion of politics in the way it operates.

   Moreover, it is important first to address the question of what 'politicization' means before other aspects of the term can be analyzed. Similar to the concept of politics, politicization is examined and described as a phenomenon with the following features:

1) the acquisition of political character by a *group, institution or activity*;

2) the acquisition by an individual of political interests and activities; and

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285   Roberson, B. Agneza: "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milosevic and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflicts", in: *Treaties and Documents*, No. 52, 2007, p. 269-284 (270). The author posits in addition to the subject matter that public persons have always used the power in the course of their populist strategies to influence people by arousing their emotions which can sometimes result in violent conflicts. And in relation to the phenomenon of politics, rhetoric can be used in political languages as an instrument to produce conflict and consensus and as well cause both empowerment and marginalization. For more on different types of rhetoric, see ibid., p. 270.

286   Van Dijk, A. Teun, 2006, op. cit., p. 362.

3) characteristic of behavior aimed at acquisition or preservation of pow-er.[287]

From the description of politicization given above, it can be argued that the ac-tivities aimed at attaining political character vary and its relevance to power and politics is depicted with respect to the acquisition and preservation of power.

The word *political*, as applied in conjunction with the term 'politicization' from the quotation, is what K. Palonen alludes to in her study as *politics* and *the political*. On the one hand, in response to the question of what constitutes the political, she portends that *la politique*, as she calls *politics*, consists of struggles between politicians and parties in elections. On the other hand, in reference to *le politique* as *political*, she asserts that parliaments and government are supposed to surpass this level of political struggle and be more engaged in something 'deeper' and more stable that can be termed 'the political'.[288] Apart from that, in reference to C. Mouffe, *the political* is taken to mean the degrees of antagonism which can be understood to be the basics of human societies.[289]

Therefore, based on the analyses performed so far on the concepts of the *political* and *politics* and their influence on *politicization*, one can argue that the notion of politicization is both a struggle to attain political power and also, as J. Briggs puts it: "there are inherent difficulties in trying to come up with a mea-sure of politicization"[290] and it is suggested that politicization is not fixed and, therefore, cannot be concretely defined because it is in a continuum.

Furthermore, the same argument can be elucidated when one reflects on the explanation accorded *le politique* and *la politique*. It is argued that the idea of political stabilization and political deepening is developed in order to attenuate the political struggle that is created while striving for political power.[291] Based on this, politicization can be described as a continuous political struggle. More-over, emphases are placed on the various degrees of politicization as a concept through which one can state categorically that *politicization* is a process that is in progress.

But, it would be unimaginable to discuss the concept of politicization with-out referring to the notions of politics and power associated with it.[292] At the

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287   See Reading, F. Hugo, 1977, op. cit., p. 154.
288   See Palonen, Kari, 2006, op. cit., p. 16.
289   See ibid.
290   Briggs, E. Jacqueline, 1998, op. cit., p. 37.
291   See Palonen, Kari, 2006, op. cit., p. 16.
292   Additionally, M. Haugaard discusses power in relation to democracy in the first four chapters of his book with the title *The Constitution of Power* as already cited earlier on. In

same time, it remains unclear why politics is a central factor in the phenomenon of politicization. Or, arguably, it may be because politics is about power in as far as politicization revolves around the struggle with political activities in order to gain access to power. Still, it becomes doubtful whether all the three above-mentioned terms are interwoven and, at the same time, it is not explicitly stated why democracy is linked to politicization.[293] Many of these uncertainties will find their answers as the research progresses and further work is carried out in explaining 'politicization'.

J. Skorupska, in this respect, envisions *politics* and *the political* in her study from a theoretical point of view.[294] In what one can arguably refer to as an ongoing process of politicization with regard to the argument that ensued between W. Collonny, J. Rawls and B. Honig, she asserts the following on politics:

> [I]f we are to live together freely and without coercion our relations with one another must be governed by principles we have authored or could imagine ourselves authoring. However, if we live in societies characterized by irreducible ideological pluralism it is very hard to see how this is possible. Politics appears to offer a solution to this problem because it can be thought of as a practice that produces answers to the question of what to do even in the face of persistent disagreement, and, more importantly, because it can be contrasted with force.[295]

In view of the role politics plays in the work of J. Skorupska, it is debatable if one can assert that pluralism depicts democracy and if the use of force through politics can be conceived of as a form of power.[296] The same author offers a response that can be understood as an answer to this question based on the argument that politics involves group activities concerned with making decisions collectively.[297]

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　　　　his remarks, he defines democracy as a set of intended political institutions which are important for political equality. See Haugaard, Mark, 1997, op. cit., p. 9.

293　　J. Briggs also deals in her work on politicization within the context of a democratic set-up. See Briggs, E. Jacqueline, 1998, op. cit.

294　　Skorupska, Julia: "Liberal Dilemmas and the Concept of Politics", in: *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13 (3), October 2008, p. 297-320.

295　　Skorupska, Julia, 2008, op. cit., p. 300.

296　　Pluralism can be used as a synonym for 'plural society'. Plural society or Pluralism denotes a society that consists of a variety of communities. Many societies are pluralistic, but these terms refer to nation-states or confederacies that are made up of clearly distinct social groups. The major problem facing such states is the development of a common will and such states are confronted with the task of maintaining order and providing for self-defense. Major contentious issues in such societies range from the nature of sovereignty and nationality to the relationship between church and state. See Mitchell, G. Duncan [Ed.]: *A New Dictionary of Sociology*, Routledge/Kegan Paul, London et al. 1979, p. 142-143.

297　　See Skorupska, Julia, 2008, op. cit., p. 303.

However, M. Haugaard, in reference to C. Wright Mills, posits a different view of the collective decision-making as an equal distribution of power.[298] He asserts that power, in relation to democracy, even when coming from the bottom up as at the local level, is never evenly shared. He identifies a top-down process in which a group of elites dominates the entire society in decision making.[299] Reflecting back on the concept of politicization and the involvement in political activities as well as the struggle for and acquisition of power, it is not certain if it is only the elites, few individuals, that strive or struggle to attain power and thereby dominate politics. One may raise questions such as on what basis this can be related to politicization, what the attributes of politicization are and on which level politicization takes place.

In response, there is a need to resort back to the concept of politicization because additional definitions conceive the concept of politicization as an overt intervention into public political arena so as to change or alter the content of the rules and regulations within a political organization and in a wider society.[300] However, it is controversial if politicization, in this regard, means the struggle for power and the acquisition of political power to change the rules of the game for one's own benefit. Hence, it is unclear whether politicization represents, if based on the domination and acquisition of the structures of power, the dichotomization of the society into a dominant group and a dominated group as discussed earlier on.

One can perceive from all the analyses, based on the questions that are posed on the concept of politicization, that there is need for further clarification of the term. In order to avoid the request for broader explanation and further interrogation of the term *politicization*, with respect to plural societies and democ-

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298   See Haugaard, Mark, 1997, op. cit., p. 10.

299   See ibid., p. 10-11. Furthermore, he notes the argument of Wright Mills in his work who reveals that the United States may appear democratic but, that in practice it is not democratic because of the existence of elites. In addition to that, it is claimed that these elites constitute a group at both the national and the local level who consist of about four hundred people at the upper echelon of the economic, political, and military hierarchies. As he maintains, based on the control of power by this single elite, all decisions that matter are made by them. See ibid. p. 11.

300   This definition of the concept of politicization essentially paraphrases the definition given by Robert Reiner in the work of E.M. McLeay within the context of how the police force influences British policy in the United Kingdom. This definition is used because it shows how power can be manipulated with the aim of changing the rules and how politicization as a concept is applied. This article depicts how the police force is able to avoid policies related to their operations being put to public debate because some information is withheld as it is classified as extremely confidential. For more information, see McLeay, E.M.: "Defining Policies and the Political Agenda", in: *Political Studies*, Vol. 38 (4), 1990, p. 620-637 (623).

racy, a further investigation of the subject matter will be addressed in the next chapter so as to give a detailed analysis from different perspectives. However, it is important to reflect on the claim made by J. Briggs that 'politicization' is a continual process.

2.4.3.1 The Concepts of Politicization and Democracy

As already observed in the previous section, politicization as a term, its clarification and study, cannot be isolated from the concepts of politics and power. However, another notion which plays an important role in the works of many authors and theorists that deal with analyzing and clarifying 'politicization' can be referred to as 'pluralization' or 'democracy'.[301]

One may find it difficult to characterize pluralism as democracy because a plural society is not necessarily a democratic society. At the same time, it is possible that a society that is ethnically homogenous may be confronted by sub-ethnic problems, for example, clan conflicts etc. So, from this point of view, the argument in this research is that every democratic society is a pluralistic community. B. Dobratz et al. indicate that any pluralist interpretation of society and politics has its key focus on the relationship between the political system and democracy.[302] In addition, they believe that pluralism denotes some maldistribution or inequality of economic resources among the people within that society but that the perceived inequities can be balanced. By this, with respect to the democratic structures, it is not explicitly clear whether a reform or correction of inequity can be achieved through the process of politicization.

What is *democracy* and what implications may it have on the concept of politicization which is central to the investigation in this research? *Democracy*, as defined by B. Dobratz et al., is a "political system in which the opportunity to participate in decisions is widely shared among all adult citizens".[303]

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301   Democracy, in contrast to pluralism as explained in the footnotes of the last chapter, is a system whereby there exists a popular control of those in power. See Riley, Michael, 1988, op. cit., p. 16.

302   See Dobratz, A. Betty/Walker, K. Lisa/Buzzel, Timothy, 2012, op. cit., p. 117.

303   Dobratz, A. Betty/Walker, K. Lisa/Buzzel, Timothy, 2012, op. cit., p. 47. The authors discuss the different types of democracy in their work. They explain what is meant by direct democracy, representative democracy and liberal democracy. For more on this topic, see ibid., p. 47-50. Also see Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 220-227. M. Riley also stipulates that democracy gives the basic rights to assemble, criticize and to vote freely without any hindrance by the authorities, to allow minority opinions and free elections. See Riley, Michael, 1988, op. cit., p. 15-16.

In addition, it is important to state that democracy, just like the concept of politicization, exists on a continuum, however, unlike 'politicization', it can be defined. This is depicted thus: "[D]emocracy is a process that can be undone and often involves serious conflicts between parties, including state social control agents such as the police."[304] This assertion implies that democracy, whose attributes are the correction of imbalances, inequalities and inequities among the people, can also be used to cause conflicts, which, conversely, constitutes the violation of the same democratic principles.[305]

Having explained what is meant by democracy, the next section will examine the effects of politicization in a democratic system in which divergent group interests persist and the consequences if groups with different interests struggle to attain political power.

2.4.3.2 The Effects of Politicization in Pluralistic Societies

Having gone through different explanations on various aspects of the concept 'politicization' in previous chapters, it is important to state that a concrete definition of the term has not yet been stated. However, some facts, based on the investigation carried out in the last chapters, have emerged on the subject matter. For instance, 'politicization', as a notion, is not a fixed phenomenon and therefore cannot be sufficiently defined. Also, it is found that the difficulties encountered in defining 'politicization' emerge due to its fluidity.

Nonetheless, the research illustrates that the concept of politicization revolves around politics which, in turn, involves the struggle for or the acquisition and preservation of political power. The description shows different aspects of politicization which are essential in grasping the concept, especially when certain parameters, which are referred to as aspects of politicization, are measured. It is useful, in regard to this research work, to examine the effects that 'politicization', based on the knowledge acquired so far, may have on a pluralistic society where many interests or ethnic groups struggle to attain political power.

M. Rong is one of the scholars who attempt to explain the impact of 'politicization' in a multi-ethnic society:

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304   Dobratz, A. Betty/Walker, K. Lisa/Buzzel, Timothy, 2012, op. cit., p. 48.
305   See ibid.

> In many of the countries with multiple ethnic groups, conflicts of interests and culture are in general very carefully monitored and attempts are made to keep them from threatening state unity or social stability.[306]

From this point of view, 'politicization', in reference to the existence of many ethnic groups in a society with divergent interests, constitutes a threat to the stability of the state. But, if a state's unity is threatened by the demands coming from different ethnic quarters, the failure of the state to cater to the needs of all ethnic groups can lead to agitation and disunity. In consideration of this, it is uncertain if states with fragile democratic institutions can withstand such pressures without breaking apart.

M. Rong continues along the same line of argument in his response to the numerous challenges that 'politicization' poses to pluralistic societies in the following statement:

> If politicization causes any social contradictions brought about by social development and changes, such as ethnic contradictions, to turn into intractable political demands of a collective nature (whether those of classes, races, ethnic groups, religious groups, or of specific interest groups), these may evolve into disastrous incidents of mass violence.[307]

Despite the challenges which may be encountered when a multi-ethnic society is politicized, as posited in the quotation above, J. Skorupska observes that politics, if well developed, can provide solutions to these problems because it stands in contrast to coercion. She opines that it is a way of settling disagreements.[308] In addition to the role of politics in reducing the threats to the stability of the state, E. Frazer and K. Hutchings take the position that the notion of politics is centered on a certain political community and on the necessity and legitimacy of the use of violence against threats to the stability of the political community, nation, or state.[309]

However, it is doubtful if the demand or expression of dissatisfaction from certain ethnic quarters in a political community can be regarded as threats, for example, if a group of people within the political community or the state reacts to its being excluded from political participation. In view of this, it cannot be ascertained whether a political community may revert to the use of physical force or violence, in consideration of E. Frazer and K. Hutchings' position, which is

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306   Rong, Ma: "The 'Politicization' and 'Culturization' of Ethnic Groups", in: *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 42, No. 4, Summer 2010, p. 31-45 (31).
307   Ibid., p. 39.
308   See Skorupska, Julia, 2008, op. cit., p. 298.
309   See Frazer, Elizabeth/Hutchings, Kimberly: "Virtuous Violence and the Politics of State-craft in Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Weber", in: *Political Studies*, Vol. 59 (1), 2011, p. 57-73 (58). It is essential to understand that both authors draw their arguments from the writings of Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Weber. See ibid., p. 58.

aimed at the restoration of order in the maintenance of territorial domination in cases of violent ethnic political demands or struggles such as the instance of ethnic exclusion mentioned above. That is why it is uncertain if such use of physical force by the state on its own people is justifiable within the concept of politicization.

L. Jenkins, within the context of the negative application of politicization as a derogatory term, imagines a different role of politics from the one stated above by E. Frazer and K. Hutchings. She indicates that politics is not meant to be used in a definite spatial domain or form of conduct which may lead to a particular kind of politics and impede others. She states thus:

> From this, it is possible to see that a strategy of politicization, in its broadest sense, entails exposing and questioning what is taken for granted, perceived to be necessary, permanent, invariable, morally or politically obligatory and essential.[310]

As she understands, politicization helps to reveal and contribute towards openness, autonomy and contingency.[311] Can the instance of the excluded group cited above be termed politicization because the group is agitating for participation in the political community and by so doing exposes and raises questions regarding the status quo? If so, can it be argued that the group's political awareness of its exclusion leads to changes in its behavior? This further implies that the process of politicization impels the capacities of human beings to choose to act and change the current order under which they are marginalized. The same argument on the concept of politicization is put forward by L. Jenkins as follows:

> When we question the inevitability of processes previously left to the benign stewardship of fate, and bring them once more under human influence and design, we expand politics'. Therefore, a (contested) field of inquiry and possibilities is opened and the capacity exists for things to be different. Thus politicization can be described as what Owen (2002) called the freeing of our captivity from a picture or perspective.[312]

Therefore, in contrast to the role assigned to the phenomenon of politicization by L. Jenkins, one can argue that the term 'politicization', besides its characteristics as the struggle for and the preservation of power, opens up the political arena for disagreement. Hence, since 'politicization' constitutes a political act, it involves dissonance, resistance, conflict and struggle, which are all characteris-

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310   Jenkins, Laura: "The Difference Genealogy Makes: Strategies for Politicization or How to Extend Capacities for Autonomy", in: *Political Studies*, Vol. 59 (1), 2011, p. 156-174 (159).
311   See ibid., p. 159.
312   See Jenkins, Laura, 2011, op. cit., p. 160.

tics of politics.[313] As the analysis has shown so far, 'politicization', in a plural society, constitutes a threat to the stability and the existence of a state.

With the use of genealogy, a mode of politicization which is a particular form of critique that uses historical materials to unearth the truth about how people became what they are and what they must become, politicization can be described as a struggle for autonomy.[314] And in a multi-ethnic society, "a process of politicization would reveal ambiguities that might include identity/difference, normal/abnormal, guilt/innocence and monism/plurality."[315] Based on that, one can argue that genealogy is a necessary means through which to politicize and pluralize.[316] Aside from that, the objective of politicization is to confront domination in a situation whereby power relations are locked in a stalemate without allowing for any imagination of an alternative.[317]

The question is *who* politicizes and *who* are the people that control power when they politicize? Attempts to respond to these questions will be made in the following section.

2.4.4 Synthesis of Terminologies: The Politicization of Ethnicity

Having devoted many chapters to describe, explain and define the concepts of ethnicity and, to some extent, politicization in this research paper, it is important at this juncture to synthesize both terminologies because they are a vital part of the theoretical part of this work. This chapter will make use of the works and evaluations of many authors who are engaged in the study of the concept of politicization of ethnicity in different situations across many countries of the world to analyze, explain and define the subject matter.[318] Also, attempts will be made to address some of the lingering questions from the previous chapters concern-

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313   See Skorupska, Julia, 2008, op. cit., p. 299.
314   Jenkins, Laura, 2011, op. cit., p. 164.
315   Ibid., p. 165.
316   See ibid.
317   See ibid.
318   The meaning of the politicization of ethnicity given in this chapter is credited to the writer of this thesis. He comes to such a conclusion based on the research and analysis carried out and in view of the fact that ethnicity depicts the existence of many ethnic groups in a given environment and politicization revolves around power struggle and preservation in a political society. In addition, it is argued that politicization of ethnicity aims at the control or retention of this power by one ethnic group or the other in a politically charged multi-ethnic environment.

ing certain questions such as: *who* politicizes and *why* politicize and, in this case, *why* is ethnicity politicized?

2.4.4.1 The Politicization of Ethnicity: Explanation of its Emergence and Use

According to the definition and explanation of ethnicity already examined, it is asserted that ethnicity creates a dichotomy of "them" and "us" in a society. It is, however, found that the concept of ethnicity, contrary to its general negative perception and application, is not synonymous with ethnic conflict.

But, in contrast to ethnicity, which represents the existence of many ethnic groups in a given environment, politicization revolves around power struggle and preservation in a political society. Considering the meaning of these two concepts, it can be argued that the 'politicization of ethnicity' can lead to conflict if different ethnic groups within a particular environment strive to control, dominate, and preserve powers. Despite the logical explanation accorded to these two terms as a trigger for conflicts when combined, one cannot rule out the possibility that the concept of the politicization of ethnicity can carry another meaning until it is examined. Therefore, there is a need for additional analysis.

K. Kindelberger, in her article, notes that the 'politicization of ethnicity' has been gaining momentum for some years within the spectrum of both national and international conflicts. At the same time, as she observes, ethnic politicization is perceived to be a global phenomenon that is highly acknowledged in the field of social science.[319] In this regard, ethnicity is, in relation to sociopolitical developments, an instrument of political resources which is specifically used as a means of mobilization to fight for power and is also employed during power distributional struggles.[320] So, ethno-political conflicts erupt as a result of this struggle for power which may constitute a great challenge to the internal

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[319] See Kindelberger, Kilian: "Editorial", in: *Welttrends*, No. 38, Spring 2003, p. 9-10. The German version is as follows:
"Im Themenschwerpunkt widmet sich das WT-Frühjahrsheft 2003 einer Entwicklung, die in den letzten Jahren in nationalen wie auch in internationalen Konflikten dramatisch an Bedeutung gewonnen hat. Es geht um die Politisierung ethnischer Gruppenzugehörigkeit. Dieses Phänomen findet auch in den sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen immer stärkere Beachtung." Ibid., p. 9-10.

[320] See ibid., p. 9-10. The German version reads: "Ethnizität wird in engster Verknüpfung mit soziopolitischen Entwicklungen als politische Ressource instrumentalisiert; sie wird ganz bewusst und gezielt als Mittel der Mobilisierung in Macht- und Verteilungskämpfen genutzt." Ibid., p. 10.

stability of many countries, particularly in Africa.[321] R. Tetzlaff, in his study on ethnic politicization, stresses that the role and the importance of culture in political activities have not been given the deserved consideration in the study of ethnic politicization for years.[322] He explains that the 'politicization of ethnicity', as a phenomenon, is perceived to have existed in the pre-modern period and was expected to disappear as time passed, especially within the context of urbanization, industrialization and educational advancement along with improvement in community and national consciousness. However, even in postmodern and postcolonial societies, 'the politicization of ethnicity' continues to occur in form of ethnic consciousness, an ethno-religious worldview, or ethnic driven behavior by individuals and political parties which are displayed during times of stress and crises.[323] Hence, when individuals feel insecure, especially in times of social instability, they seek self-assurance, identity and self-assertion to uphold their position and distinguish themselves from others. Through this, they are able to maintain a boundary in order to keep away potential or real competitors and rivals.[324]

The same view is presented in the analysis of J. Rothschild who purports that the process of modernization was initially expected to eliminate ethnic differences that are at the root of ethnic conflicts, but that the contrary is, however, the result.[325] However, as M. Stukenberg notes, the process of modernization

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321   See ibid., p. 10.
322   Tetzlaff, Rainer: "Politisierte Ethnizität als Kehrseite politischer Partizipation in unsicheren Zeiten. Erfahrung aus Afrika", in: *WeltTrends*, No. 38, Spring 2003, p. 11-30 (11). The English version of the same article written in German by Rainer Tetzlaff can be translated as "The Ethnic Politicization as a Reverse of Political Participation in Uncertain Times".
323   See ibid., p. 11. The German version reads as follows: "Man ging von der Erwartung aus, dass ‚vormoderne' Verhaltensweise im Laufe von Urbanisierung, Alphabetisierung und Industrialisierung verschwinden und höchstens einem nationalen Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein Platz machen würden." Ibid..
324   See ibid.
325   See Rothschild, Joseph: *Ethnopolitics. A Conceptual Framework*, Colombia University Press, New York 1981, p. 1-66. Also another author whose work presents the same argument and reflects the position of J. Rothschild, with respect to the subject matter, is M. Stukenberg, see Stukenberg, Marla: *Der Sikh-Konflikt: Eine Fallstudie zur Politisierung ethnischer Identität*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1995, p. 21. The original German version reads:
      "Entgegen einer früher verbreiteten Annahme, der Modernisierungsprozeß schleife ethnische Unterschiede ab, vertrete ich daher die These Joseph Rothschilds, daß der Modernisierungsprozeß in paradoxer Weise durch die mit ihm verbundenen Erwartungen, Strukturen und Identitätsmuster vielmehr zur Wahrscheinlichkeit ethnischer Konflikte beiträgt: Der Modernisierungsprozeß ist mit der Erwartung verknüpft, daß er soziale Unterschiede abbaue und zu Wohlstand und wachsender Mobilität beitrage; er wird jedoch in Staaten wirksam, die noch von sozialer Ungleichheit geprägt sind und ist in manchen Fällen nicht in der

with its expectations, structures and models of identity instead sharpens ethnic differences and probably contributes more to ethnic clashes. Nevertheless, it is believed that modernization is effective in the eradication of social inequality in some countries but fails to address the established traditional structures in other countries despite its achievements in delegitimizing these traditional structures.[326]

One can see that politicization and ethnicity are so intertwined that whenever ethnic conflicts and clashes occur, they are mostly associated with politics. In A. Thomson's approach, according to his study on politics, ethnicity is ubiquitous and he states that where there is ethnicity, there is politics.[327] In the subsequent, he advances the notion that ethnicity, as a phenomenon, can be used as a tool which can mobilize people in stating political demands:

> No state is socially homogenous. Social cleavage produces conflicting interests everywhere. In each country, different issues act as the primary point of mobilization. Nationalism, class, religion, and ideology are all favored rallying cries gathering individuals together, enabling them to make their political demands to the state, and to society as a whole. Ethnicity, too, could be a common tool enabling groups to aggregate demands.[328]

A different view is presented by D. Heuer-Vogel, who posits that the importance of ethnicity in politics is overestimated. She assumes that the existence of different ethnic groups in a society is already an important factor because it is a trigger for conflicts.[329]

Lage, diese traditionellen Strukturen zu überwinden, obwohl er sie gleichzeitig delegitimiert." Ibid., p. 21.

326   See ibid. Furthermore, it is believed that social differences often coincide with ethnic based differences since the distribution of power and work in traditional structures is, most of the time, hierarchically organized along ethnic lines.

327   See Thomson, Alex: *An Introduction to African Politics*, Taylor and Francis Group/Routledge, London 2000, p. 62. His analysis in this book is centered mostly on the situation and effects of politicized ethnicity in African countries as the title of the book suggests. One of the reasons he gives for the importance of ethnicity as a tool which is often used in politics to mobilize people is portrayed as the consequence of colonization. He believes, however, that the role of ethnicity in political and economic development of African countries contributes to the setbacks experienced by the African continent after the post-colonial period. In furtherance of that argument, he notes that it is not only in Africa that ethnic mobilization is found during political competition. And as he says, "no state is devoid of influence. Notions of ethnicity and nationalism during the Second World War, for example, tore Europe apart in the middle of the twentieth century." See ibid., p. 57. The Balkans is another example where ethnic mobilization for political goals caused serious devastation in the 1990s. See ibid.

328   See Thomson, Alex, 2000, op. cit., p. 62.

329   See Heuer-Vogel, Daniela: *Die Politisierung ethnischer Identitäten im internationalen Staatensystem. Muslime unter chinesischer Herrschaft*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2000, p. 30. The translated title of D. Heuer-Vogel's dissertation is "The Politicization of Ethnic Identity in International System of States: Muslims under the Chinese Authority."

Therefore, D. Heuer-Vogel claims in her thesis that most of the conflicts that are classified as ethnic conflicts cannot be perceived as such because the reason is not based on the ethnic heterogeneity of such societies, but rather it can be located in other conflict factors.[330] However, she maintains that there are other reasons responsible for the politicization and mobilization of ethnic self-consciousness and the sense of belonging it produces. In her opinion, some of these reasons could be socio-economic, political and cultural discrimination of one ethnic group by another ethnic group which, in most cases, represent the state.[331]

Another author whose work is based on the African continent in relation to politicized ethnicity is D. Rothschild. According to his work, ethnicity plays an important role in the discussion of politics in an ethnic pluralistic society. From his own point of view, the concept of ethnic groups, which he uses synonymously with the term *ethnicity*, can both be viewed in a positive and a negative light.[332]

According to his argument, on the one hand, ethnic groups can be a creative force and, in this sense, they play a positive role. Creativity, in this regard, refers to the provision of material benefits and the fulfillment of inexplicable desires such as esteem and a sense of identity and purpose. He believes that "it is normal for people to mobilize in an effort to gain organizational, ideological, political, and economic power."[333] He foresees no conflicts as long as the rules set out in political competitions are given due respect and the right of participation of the opponents are accepted.[334]

On the other hand, however, ethnicity can be just as much a highly destructive force as "acute tensions can be unleashed as groups struggle over territory,

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The original German version reads: "Die Bedeutung von Ethnizität für die Politik ist nicht etwa deshalb so hoch einzuschätzen, weil das Vorhandensein verschiedener ethnischer Gruppen innerhalb einer Gesellschaft generell als konfliktauslösender Faktor zu bewerten ist." Ibid., p. 30.

330   See ibid., p. 30. The original German version reads: "Statt dessen lautet die Arbeitshypothesen, dass die Ursache vieler Konflikte, die als ethnische Konflikte eingeordnet werden, nicht die ethnische Heterogenität an sich selbst, sondern dass andere Konfliktfaktoren erst zu ihrer Ethnisierung führen." Ibid., p. 30.

331   See ibid., p. 30. The German version is as follows: "Für die Politisierung und Mobilisierung des Zugehörigkeitsbewußtseins zu einer ethnischen Gruppe gibt es [...] vielerlei Gründe, z.B. die sozioökonomische, politische und kulturelle Benachteiligung einer ethnischen Gruppe durch eine andere, die in vielen Fällen den Staat repräsentiert." Ibid., p. 30.

332   See Rothschild, Donald: *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC 1997, p. vii (Foreword).

333   Ibid., p. vii.

334   See ibid.

cultural survival, and physical existence".[335] The same problem can be experienced if one group controls the state and its institutions while others are excluded from influential positions. In this case, the consequences can range from deep resentment to hostility.[336]

In contradistinction to the position of D. Rothschild and based on the analysis performed so far on the meaning and use of both terms *ethnicity* and *politicization*, it is arguably the politicization of ethnicity which causes the eruption of conflicts in a multi-ethnic society and not simply the force of the existence of ethnic groups, as he asserts. It is when these groups strive for power by all means in a politically charged environment that distinctions and marginalization, based on language, religious, cultural differences etc. are manifested in order to create "Us" and "Others". The same argument, with emphasis on violent conflicts, is put forward by A. Roberson as follows:

> Through the process of politicization, the psycho-cultural power of ethnicity can be turned into a source of hatred and stereotyping that can be ultimately mobilized into a confrontational form of nationalism. In these cases, the politicization of ethnicity can result in violent outcomes, i.e., ethnopolitical conflict.[337]

Despite the aforementioned argument that the politicization of ethnicity may result in ethnic conflicts, it is questionable to claim, with respect to the assumption that the formation and importance of ethnic groups is akin to modernization in terms of the creation of nation and nation states, that the absence of nationalism among different ethnic groups which produces the popular support as a requisite for nationhood (as explained in chapter 2.3.4), is responsible for politicized ethnicity. Otherwise, it is unclear why different ethnic groups may agitate for their own autonomy or self-rule.

M. Stukenberg opines that, with regard to the uncertainties expressed, the concept of an imaginary ethnicity is constructed since only rarely is any nation ethnically homogeneous.[338] She believes that the prevalent different ethnic nationalities can be organized into a single modern state which has its root in the ideology of an ethnic homogeneous nation.[339] Therefore, one can see that the in-

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335 Ibid.
336 See ibid., p. vii. Some examples of the worst cases, in terms of the destructive force of ethnicity, are Apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda and civil war in Sudan. See ibid., p. vii.
337 Roberson, B. Agneza, 2007, op. cit., p. 270.
338 See Stukenberg, Marla, op. cit., 1995, p. 24. The German version reads: "Da kaum eine Nation eine homogene ethnische Basis vorweisen kann, wird fiktive Ethnizität erzeugt, um die herum sich der jeweilige Nationalismus organisieren kann." Ibid.
339 See ibid. The German version reads: "Der moderne Staat wird somit auf die ideologische Basis einer ethnisch homogenen Nation gestellt." Ibid.

stitutionalization of a modern state is based on a "myth" which is charged politically. In this regard, the politicization of ethnicity may cause ethnic fragmentation and internal destabilization due to persistent agitation for self-rule by numerous ethnic groups through the creation of new "nations" within an existing state.[340]

As a result, M. Stukenberg observes that the sovereignty of such a state can be threatened within the international system through external aggression and internally through disintegration. It is emphasized that the most effective means to overcome these challenges is through the development of a strong national consciousness or nationalism. By this, the state can overcome the problem of its heterogeneity internally and confront any potential external aggressor.[341]

Further attempts will be undertaken in the following section to shed more light on the conceptualization of the phenomenon the *politicization of ethnicity*.

2.4.4.2 The Politicization of Ethnicity: Definition and Description

In view of the explanations given in the previous sections, it is uncertain if there is any other means through which one can accurately capture, qualify and attempt to define such a concept as the politicization of ethnicity. As a consequence, the question presents itself whether *politicized* ethnicity may be linked to conflicts despite diverse positions represented by different scholars that ethnicity is one of the causes of conflicts. Equally, the synthesis of both terms, *politicization* and *ethnicity*, may enable a thorough study of the new concept. As a result, one may argue that the politicization of ethnicity in any modern society, if unchecked, can polarize, destabilize, delegitimize and disintegrate the political arena and political power of a state.

However, it is not yet clear how the politicization of ethnicity can be in use without its definition firmly stated despite the insight given on the rise of the phenomenon in the previous section. In much of the literature, ethno-political

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340   See ibid., p. 20. The German version reads: "Die politisierten ethnischen Gruppen erheben dabei in der Regel ebenfalls den Anspruch, ,Nation' zu sein, um auf dieser Grundlage die Forderung eines separaten Staates zu legitimieren." Ibid., p. 20.

341   See ibid., p. 24-25. The German version reads:
"Die innere Logik dieses Prozesses liegt in der potentiellen doppelten Bedrohung des souveränen Staates innerhalb des internationalen Systems durch äußere Agression und innere Desintegration. Das wirksamste Mittel, dieser Existenzbedrohung zu begegnen, ist die Entwicklung eines starken ,Nationalbewusstseins' oder ,Nationalgefühls', das den Staat nach innen über seine faktische Heterogenität hinweg integriert und nach außen gegen potentielle ,fremde' Aggressoren stabilisiert." Ibid., p. 24-25.

conflicts are used interchangeably with politicized ethnicity. In "The Politicization and Culturalization of Ethnic Groups", M. Rong observes how conflicts of interest and culture in countries with multi-ethnic groups constitute potential threats to the unity and existence of the state. Even the title of the article depicts the role of culture as an instrument of politics.[342] Similarly, J. Rothschild toes the same line of argument as he states the following:

> [P]oliticized ethnicity has become the crucial principle of political legitimation and delegitimation of systems, states, regimes, and governments and at the same time has also become an effective instrument for pressing mundane interests in society's competition for power, status, and wealth.[343]

From the above, it is not at issue whether politicians, government representatives, religious or ethnic leaders constitute the so-called "ethnic entrepreneurs" that form the forces behind politicized ethnicity to achieve personal goals.

J. Rothschild also posits additionally that both scholars and politicians lay great emphasis on democratic principles like freedom of association, freedom of press, people's emancipation and human rights etc.[344] By this, they desire respect for diversity and pluralism of their society and demand less government interference in people's lives within the context of a free liberal economy, therefore, they tend to lend their support for social autonomy and ethnic self-determination. With this emphasis, however, one may argue that scholars and politicians, in realizing these core ideas, practically use the political nature of ethnicity in order to further their own political career in terms of social interests and power struggles.[345] Hence, this implies that the politicization of ethnicity may be viewed from the perspective of a *zero-sum game* situation.

On this basis, J. Rothschild defines the politicization of ethnicity as a means through which ethnic distinctions are highlighted and then exploited by ethnic leaders in order to achieve their political goals.[346] One can see that it is not the demand for democratic values which stir up ethnic sentiments that threaten the existence of a multi-ethnic society, but rather the means by which certain individuals such as scholars, politicians and ethnic leaders benefit from ethnic differences through its politicization in order to achieve their own personal goals.

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342   See Rong, Ma, 2010, op. cit., p. 38-39.
343   Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 2.
344   This assertion from J. Rothschild is stated in the work of M. Rong. See Rong, Ma, 2010, op. cit., p. 38-39.
345   See ibid.
346   See Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 2-3. J. Rothschild's definition of politicized ethnicity, as stated in the analysis, is also used by R. Agneza. See Roberson, B. Agneza, 2007, op. cit., p. 270.

Furthermore, with respect to J. Rothschild's opinion, the roles multinational corporations (MNCs) play in the politicization of ethnicity cannot be underestimated and need to be examined.[347] Moreover, multinational firms are engaged in what can be termed as "political interplay" with the governments of the host countries in which they are incorporated. Their demand for participation in their host countries is among the contemporary challenges that pose potential threats to the legitimacy of the states and the political system altogether.[348]

S. Riedel believes that what can be conceptualized as the politicization of ethnicity lies in the subjective view of a cultural nation that is based on the process of an increasing ethnic consciousness in the fate of a particular community.[349] In addition, in the affected so-called cultural nations, it is about reverting to their cultural roots at all costs in order to effect changes of the existing state structures and participate in political power or to take exclusive control of the authority of a particular area.[350]

However, she admits that the goals pursued by politicized ethnicity undermines any peaceful coexistence and is often associated with the use of force as a legal means to achieve the goal of ethnic self-determination or to overcome any other ethnic adversary.[351] Furthermore, she reinforces the role of religion and language in the process of politicized ethnicity and how they are applied as instruments of legitimization to lay claim to power.[352] In this context, she reiterates the attempts made since the mid-seventies of the 20th century on the process

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347   See Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 17-19.
348   See ibid.
349   See Riedel, Sabine: "Die Politisierung von Ethnizität in Transformationsgesellschaften. Das Beispiel Südeuropa", in: *WeltTrends*, No. 38, Spring 2003, p. 61-74 (61). The title of her work can be translated as "The Politicization of Ethnicity in Transformation Societies". And the original German version of her assertion reads: "Was aus der subjektiven Sicht der Kulturnation als Prozeß der Bewußtwerdung ihrer ethnischen Schicksalsgemeinschaft verstanden wird, kann aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht als Politisierung von Ethnizität beschrieben werden." Ibid., p. 61.
350   See ibid, p. 61-62. The original German version reads: "Denn es geht der betreffenden Kulturnation bei der Rückbesinnung auf ihre kulturellen Wurzeln in jedem Fall um die Veränderung bestehender staatlicher Strukturen und die Teilhabe an der politischen Macht oder gar um die Alleinherrschaft auf einem bestimmten Gebiet." Ibid., p. 61-62.
351   See ibid. p. 62. The German translation reads: "Diesem Ziel zu erreichen wird nicht selten das friedliche Zusammenleben untergeordnet und der Einsatz von Gewalt als legitimes Mittel erachtet, entweder die eigene ethnische Bestimmung zu erreichen oder sie gegenüber ethnischen Feindbildern zu behaupten." Ibid., p. 62.
352   See ibid., p. 63. The German version reads: "Diese Festellung wird Anhand der beiden Faktoren Religion und Sprache erläutert, die in der Krisenregion […] bis heute zur Legitimation politischer Ansprüche eingesetzt werden." Ibid., p. 63.

of resacralization through the pressure by different groups and movements representing the three monotheistic world religions, namely Christianity, Islam and Judaism, to reverse, ease and, if possible, to abandon secularism.[353]

As explained so far, religion, cultural and language differences serve as important tools in the politicization of ethnicity. It may be argued that the politicization of ethnicity is the use of these factors that constitute differences ("us" and "others"), especially in a multi-ethnic society, by ethnic entrepreneurs to achieve their own selfish interests.

R. Tetzlaff deviates from just explaining and defining politicization. He also concentrates on how the process of the politicization of ethnicity works and how ethnicity leads to its politicization.[354] According to the author, understanding *ethnicity* facilitates the conception of its politicization. In his view, anyone that wants to use ethnicity politically for manipulative purposes in a society needs to find loopholes that serve as openings through which tribal allure can be inserted in order to be successful. Besides, he opines that it is the common people that so greatly desire the so-called traditional or cultural values in times of rapid social change.[355]

Furthermore, he asserts that ethnicity, based on its overlapping features with and its definition through the notion of 'family groups', is ascribed a collective identity. On top of that, the way one positions oneself determines the criteria that are used in terms of self-ascription when setting external boundaries in form of "us" and "others". Although these criteria that are used for self-ascription vary and can undergo changes, they dominate other criteria that can also be used for ascription. In this regard, R. Tetzlaff maintains that the concept of ethnicity is more developed than that of a nation as one can perceive a gap between the national authority and "exclusive" citizenship.[356]

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353 See ibid., p. 63. The German version reads:
"Mitte der 70er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts setzte sich weltweit ein Prozeß der Re-Sakralisierung ein, der nach Gilles Kepel als eine Reaktion auf die Krise der Moderne verstanden werden kann: „Verschiedene Akteure und Bewegungen aller drei monotheistischen Weltreligionen—Christentum, Islam und Judentum—strebten seitdem danach, die Trennung von Kirche und Staat zu lockern oder gegebenenfalls aufzugeben." Ibid., p. 63.

354 See Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 14. The German version reads: „Wer auch immer Ethnizität politisch gebrauchen will, muss in der manipulierenden Gemeinschaft Ansatzpunkte finden, um den ‚tribalistischen' Köder dort mit Erfolg festmachen zu können." Ibid., p. 14.

355 See ibid. The original German version reads: „Und außerdem sind es oft „die einfachen Leute, die einen großen Bedarf an sogenannten traditionellen Werten in einer Zeit rapiden sozialen Wandels hatten." Ibid.

356 See ibid., p. 15. The German version reads as follows:

So, one can describe ethnicity as the consciousness of belonging to an exclusive group which is experienced through contacts and interactions with other people or societies and activated when boundaries are drawn. S. Emde agrees too that, with regard to her study on politicized ethnicity, ethnicity, first and foremost, has its root in people's consciousness.[357] And exclusivity, in this sense, is usually used in a patronage system as a rational behavior which, as others perceive it, is associated with corruption.[358] Furthermore, this process is in progress whenever these acts of self-privilege and exclusion of others take place in the minds of people and are transmitted or mediated through traditional socialization which produce and cultivate certain world views.

More importantly, with respect to J. Krieger et al., the socioeconomic and political atmosphere become more and more charged the more ethnic consciousness increases and consequently results in ethnic hostility, loyalty, and identification which are passed on to successive generations through the family, press, public, and private conversations.[359] J. Rothschild highlights the readiness of politicians to use any exclusivist categorization of people for political goals.[360] But it is not until this consciousness is used violently in times of social unrest and becomes politically instrumentalized by power-hungry entrepreneurs or party leaders for personal goals that one can speak of politicized ethnicity.[361] At

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"Mit dem Berliner Soziologen und Ethnologen Georg Elwert kann Ethnie als ‚familienübergreifende und familienerfassende Gruppe' definiert werden, die sich selbst eine (exklusive) kollektive Identität zuspricht […]. Bei dieser Selbstverortung sind die Zuschreibungskriterien, die die Außengrenzen setzen, wandelbar. Sie beanspruchen jedoch Dominanz gegenüber anderen Zuordungskriterien. ‚Der Begriff der Ethnie, wie ihn eine gegenüber dem ‚völkischen' Alltagsverständnis dissidente Sozialanthropologe verwendet (Mühlmann 1965, Barth 1969), ist weiter als der der Nation. Es fehlen der Bezug zu einer Zentralinstanz und das Element exklusiver ‚Staatsbürgerschaft'." Ibid.

357   See Emde, Sina: "Feared Rumours and Rumours of Fear: The Politicization of Ethnicity during the Fiji Coup in May 2000", in: *Oceania*, Vol. 75 (4), 2005, p. 387-402 (387).

358   See Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 15. The German version reads: "Ethnizität meint also vor allem das Bewusstsein, zu einer *exklusiven* Gruppe zu gehören, das im Umgang mit anderen Menschen und Gemeinschaften erfahren und durch Grenzziehung aktualisiert wird. Exklusivität wird gewöhnlich von Vetternwirtschaft als rationale Verhaltensform und von Korruption (in den Augen anderer) begleitet." Ibid.

359   See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 283.

360   See Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 33.

361   See Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 15. The German version reads: "Dieser doppelte kognitive Akt der Selbstprivilegierung und der Ausgrenzung Anderer geht zunächst in den Köpfen und Herzen von Menschen vor sich und wird durch traditionelle Sozialisation vermittelt, die bestimmte Weltbilder produziert und kultiviert. Aber, erst wenn dieses Bewußtsein von machthungrigen ‚Unternehmern' oder Parteiführern politisch für eigennützige Zwecke instrumentalisiert wird, kommt es zur politisierten Ethnizität, die sich in sozialen Stresssituationen gewaltsam zu entladen pflegt […]." Ibid.

this juncture, one can perceive that ethnicity is politicized for certain purposes by certain people in the society.

However, rather than going into the discussion of the roles played or the functions fulfilled by the politicization of ethnicity, which will be devoted to the next section, M. Rong's view on the potential crisis which may confront states that experience politicized ethnicity is as follows:

> If politicization causes any social contradictions brought about by social developments and changes, such as ethnic contradictions, to turn into intractable political demands of collective nature (whether those of classes, races, ethnic groups, religious groups, or of specific interest groups), these may evolve into disastrous incidents of mass violence. Such violence will undermine existing social order, systems, and behavioral standards; it will damage economic operations and worsen interpersonal relations—all of which will cause considerable harm to society's vitality, whether the ultimate is a successful revolution, or the restitution of old systems, or outside forces taking control.[362]

One can identify that politicized ethnicity may not only lead to the outbreak of conflicts, but rather the magnitude of harm it can inflict on a society can potentially spark mass violence which can end up in a revolution. As a result, the politicization of ethnicity as a phenomenon poses a danger to the stability and existence of a country. And, in the long run, it can jeopardize peace and order between the neighboring states. Another example of the consequences of the politicization of ethnicity can range from human rights violations, to crimes against humanity and genocide as in the Rwandan case in 1994 and in former Yugoslavia in 1992.[363]

2.4.4.3 Functions of the Politicization of Ethnicity

There is an indication, in consideration of the knowledge acquired so far, that political elites, religious leaders, scholars and multinational firms are engaged in the politicization of ethnicity. However, people do not involve themselves in such an enterprise just for the sake of it if there are no advantages to be derived from it and potential benefits to be reaped from politicized ethnicity.

In view of this, this section will concentrate specifically on the functions of the politicization of ethnicity in order to expound on the roles it plays for certain

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362   Rong, Ma, 2010, op. cit., p. 39.
363   Küçükcan, Talip: *Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion*, Athenaeum Press, Aldershot/Brookfield et al. 1999, p. 36. Also Roberson, B. Agneza, 2007, op. cit., p. 269-284. For more information on the genocide in Rwanda, see Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 24-25.

people in the society. This, in turn, will explain the reason why ethnicity is so susceptible to politicization. It is important to state that the general conception of the role politicized ethnicity plays in a particular society, as discussed earlier in one way or the other, is that it is mostly based on the acquisition of resources which can be in material or in symbolic form(s). In relation to that, the major function fulfilled by the politicization of ethnicity, as shown in previous sections of this research work, is concentrated on the acquisition, participation and preservation of political power. C. Schetter points out other functions which the politicization of ethnicity fulfills in a society thus:

– Claim over political resources: This particular function of the politicization of ethnicity involves the actions of an ethnic category aimed at demanding its autonomy, specific rights or proportional representation in a particular government of a state. An example of this can be seen when an ethnic group uses weapons to fight for its freedom and self-rule.

– Claim over economic resources: This is an act that is carried out when an ethnic group struggles to gain an additional market share or state benefits etc. An example of this function of politicized ethnicity can be seen when an ethnic group specifically buys only from the members of its own ethnic group.

– Demand for social resources: This is a practice that is aimed at belonging to or joining an ethnic group as a member in which one feels understood and appreciated. This rests on the active exercise of particular customs that uplifts the traditions of an ethnic group. Examples can be seen when people only marry within their own ethnic group or when people intentionally wear particular attires which are typically identified with an ethnic group.

– Right to psychological resources: A function of politicized ethnicity that targets the idolization of one's ethnic group through which one's own weaknesses are covered up. An example of this behavior is demonstrated when prejudices and stereotypes which affect other ethnic groups are created and spread while one's own ethnic group is highly exalted at the same time.[364]

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364   The English translation given above on the functions of the politicization of ethnicity is the individual effort made by the writer of this thesis. The original work is written in German by C. Schetter. More information, see Schetter, Conrad: *Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afganistan*, Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin 2003, p. 64-65. The title of the book, when

It is important also to note that all these four functions can be subsumed as material and symbolic resources.[365]

2.4.5 Intermediate Assessment on Politicization and the Politicization of Ethnicity

Various sections within this chapter analyze concepts such as *politics*, *power*, *state*, *pluralism*, *politicization* and a synthesis of the phenomena *politicization* and *ethnicity* is carried out. It is found in the research that, first and foremost,

translated into English, reads: "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Afghanistan". The German version of the functions of the politicization of ethnicity reads thus:

"*Beanspruchung politischer Ressourcen*: Handlungen, die darauf abzielen, dass ethnische Kategorie politische Autonomie, spezifische Rechte oder eine proportionale Vertretung in der Regierung erhält. Ein Beispiel für Ethnizität wäre demnach, mit der Waffe in der Hand für die Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung der Ethnie zu kämpfen;

Beanspruchung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen: Handlungen, die darauf zielen, dass eine Ethnie bestimmte Markanteile, staatliche Zuschüsse etc. erhält. Ein Beispiel für Ethnizität wäre demnach, gezielt nur bei Mitgliedern der gleichen Kategorie einzukaufen;

Beanspruchung sozialer Ressourcen; Handlungen, die darauf abzielen, Mitglied einer ethnischen Gruppe zu sein, in der man sich verstanden und aufgehoben fühlt. Die aktive Ausübung bestimmter, zu Traditionen erhobener Bräuche der ethnischen Kategorie kann damit selbst als Ethnizität verstanden werden. Beispiele für Ethnizität wären demnach, nur innerhalb der ethnischen Kategorie zu heiraten oder intendiert nur Kleidung zu tragen, die für die ethnische Gruppe typisch ist;

Beansprüchung psychischer Ressourcen: Handlungen, die darauf abzielen, durch die Überhöhung der eigenen Ethnie die eigene Schwäche zu überspielen. Ein Beispiel für Ethnizität wäre die Schaffung und Verbreitung von Vorurteilen und Stereotypen, die andere Ethnie betreffen, bei einer gleichzeitigen Überhöhung der eigenen Ethnie." Ibid., p. 64-65.

365 Compare Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 16. The German title of this book can be translated into English as "Ethnicity and Power"; although C. Schetter often emphasizes the concept of ethnicity in his work, as can be seen when he states the functions that the politicization of ethnicity fulfills. Based on the analysis of the concept of ethnicity in this research work, as already examined earlier on, it is, however, found, in contrast to C. Schetter, that ethnicity does not lead to conflicts until it is politicized. In reference to these facts, the functions are classified as the politicization of ethnicity and not ethnicity as stated by C. Schetter. Moreover, C. Schetter opines that ethnicity is not a fixed phenomenon in so far as it varies in its intensity. That is why authors variably refer to ethnicity in some particular circumstances as weak and in others as strong. The most important point, however, is that ethnicity can be used as a political instrument. Based on this development, one may speak of the politicization of ethnicity. See Schetter, Conrad: Berlin 2003, p. 65. The German version reads:

"Ethnizität bildet jedoch keine konstante Größe, da sie in ihrer Intensität variiert, so dass man von schwacher oder starker Ethnizität sprechen kann, die zudem innerhalb einer Gruppe unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägt sein kann. Ethnizität kann überdies als politisches Instrument eingesetzt werden. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um eine Politisierung der Ethnizität." Ibid., p. 65.

the term *politics* needs to be clarified in order to examine and clarify the concept of politicization.

From the analysis performed, there are different definitions of politics. Some authors understand the concept as a mere political community and some other scholars describe it as the struggle for power. Furthermore, it is stated within the framework of the research that 'politics' refers to the state and state institutions. Other social scientists also equate politics with conflicts. Additionally, whenever there are conflicts or disputes, politics come into play. In this sense, politics revolves around the structures of power, and power struggles during an attempt to gain or maintain positions. So, in this research, it becomes clear that politics is a holistic phenomenon because no society can manage without it.

However, while the detailed study on the concept of politics is carried out, it is observed, based on the definition of the notion *politics*, that it can be grasped as the authorized organ that possesses the legitimacy for the allocation of resources in a political society. Despite this function of politics, it requires power in order for it to carry out its function of distributing resources. As a result of that, the importance of power, as a concept, becomes reinforced. In addition, it is noted that the existence of a society depends, with respect to the allocation of resources, on three important valuable resources, namely: security, economic prosperity and authority. In this sense, politics, in order to carry out and uphold its functions, requires power. This implies that power constitutes the means to control others. The research, again, makes some remarks about three different types of *power* which are stated as follows: *Force or threat power; Economic power*; and *Integrative power.* This signifies that power is divergent. That denotes, from a democratic perspective, that power is dispersed among a wide range of groups and bodies in a political environment.

However, as is evidenced in the research, it is not often consistent that the majority possesses the power because, as already explained in the previous chapters, political power, which is meant to be concentrated in the hands of all from a pluralist point of view, can be manipulated and become an instrument of the few at the expense of the masses. What this means is that power can be concentrated in the hands of few individuals. Based on this, many social scientists make reference to illegal or illegitimate attainment of power. Having said that, it is also acknowledged in the analysis that manipulation, as form of social power abuse, constitutes an illegitimate domination which is a confirmation of social inequality. The essence of rhetoric in power manipulations is indicated in the re-

search as well. In short, rhetoric is described as a political strategy that is part and parcel of manipulation.

Thus the definition and clarification of politics, power, rhetoric and manipulation leads to the understanding of the notion of power and its different varieties so as to able to identify and classify the concept of politicization. Nonetheless, the origin of the concept of 'politicization' is rooted in the phenomenon of politics. In spite of that, further investigation into the concept of politicization reveals that its features and functions are intertwined within the spectrum of 'politics'.

Consequently, 'politicization' is either described as the acquisition of political capital by a group, institution or activity, as an acquisition by an individual of political interests and activities or as the characteristics of behavior which aim at acquisition and preservation of power. Based on that, it is observed that the notion of politicization is a struggle to attain political powers. Irrespective of the description attributed to 'politicization', it is admitted that 'politicization' is a continual process because its feature of attaining political power is a continual struggle. But J. Briggs, regardless of her difficulty in understanding the term 'politicization', believes that the concept is not quantifiable since it exists in a continuum.

Furthermore, this study attempts to address the difficulty 'politicization' may pose to multi-ethnic society since the concept revolves around the struggle for power or the acquisition and the preservation of political power or political activities. In this regard, it is posited in this research that 'politicization' poses a threat to the existence of a political community insofar as many interests or ethnic groups struggle to attain political power. Beside these previous findings, the work identifies other interest groups, apart from ethnic groups, such as the roles of multinational companies in the politicizing processes which endanger or threaten the existence of a state.

Having examined the term 'politicization' and other concepts such as 'power', 'politics', and 'rhetorics' which are associated with it, this research study investigates the synthesis of both *politicization* and *ethnicity* within the context of the *politicization of ethnicity*. First of all, it is explained that *politicization of ethnicity* creates a dichotomy in the form of "them" and "us" which may lead to conflicts if different ethnic groups at the same time aspire to control, demonstrate and preserve political powers.

The findings show that ethnicity can be used as a political instrument and as a means of mobilization to fight for power. In consideration of this point, the importance of power, as a concept, is once again highlighted. Concerning this

matter, it is shown in this research that politicized ethnicity serves as a crucial principle of political legitimation and delegitimation of systems, regimes and governments. It also serves as an effective instrument for pressing common interests whenever a society is confronted with different groups that compete for power, status and wealth. Among the groups which are responsible for the politicization of ethnicity are politicians, government representatives, religious or ethnic leaders and, as already mentioned, multinational corporations when they are engaged in what is known as 'political interplay' with the governments of their host countries.

However, it should be remarked that the roles some of these actors play in the politicization of ethnicity differ from one country to the other. All the same, the findings testify that politicized ethnicity can polarize, destabilize and disintegrate the political arena and the political power of a state. In addition, it is made known that demands for democratic values do not gear up ethnic sentiments which endanger the existence of a multi-ethnic society, but rather it is the means by which ethnic leaders, politicians etc., through the politicization of ethnicity, use the advantages of ethnic differences for polarization or in order to achieve their own personal objectives in form of material and symbolic resources.

It is emphasized that some of the tools used in the politicization of ethnicity are religious, cultural and linguistic differences. In terms of the process of politicized ethnicity, it is understood that actors are able to politicize ethnicity because the notion of ethnicity is ascribed to a collective identity. This implies that the manner in which one positions oneself determines the criteria which are applied in relation to self-ascription during the process in which one establishes external boundaries in form of "us" and "others". It is also found that the criteria used for self-ascription are predominant in relation to other criteria and when the so-called principle of *exclusivity* is deep-rooted in the consciousness of people, boundaries are drawn with respect to "them" and "us".

Furthermore, exclusivity, to this effect, is often applied rationally in a patronage system irrespective of the fact that others perceive it differently because they associate it with corruption. That notwithstanding, it is not until this conscious exclusivity is politically used as an instrument by corrupt actors or hungry entrepreneurs for the actualization of personal goals that one can talk of politicized ethnicity.

Finally, the research equally examines the functions of the politicization of ethnicity and it is shown by many authors that politicized ethnicity, as already observed and explained in the analysis, can fulfill the following functions: claim

over political resources; claim over economic resources; demand for social resources; the right to psychological resources. According to all the findings and analysis carried out under this chapter, it can be argued in terms of the position of this research work that mere ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts, but rather conflicts erupt when ethnicity is politicized by actors for personal gains. Certain questions of this study, namely who politicizes and why and how politicized ethnicity occurs, are partially responded to in the work, however, more answers will be found when the case study of this investigation is presented.

Nevertheless, since the politicization of ethnicity vary from one country to the other, as previously disclosed and hitherto discussed in this research paper, the empirical case study of this paper, Nigeria, will address some other questions yet to be answered.

3. Conceptual Framework: Theoretical Perspectives

It is important when analyzing such a theme as the politicization of ethnicity to examine how this phenomenon is linked to the outbreak of conflicts. At the same time, it is also essential to analyze the theoretical background of this research study in order to facilitate an easier understanding of the empirical analysis afterwards. For this reason, this chapter will focus on two theoretical approaches of ethnicity, instrumentalism and primordialism, which will be used as guidelines in testing and analyzing the empirical case study.

Within the theoretical framework of this chapter, the focus will be on the instrumentalist approach, however, the method of primordialism, in its entirety, will not be dismissed because, as will be indicated as this chapter progresses, neither of those theoretical approaches are adequate on their own to investigate ethnic identity, ethnic groups, ethnicity and its politicization or ethnic conflicts. As a result, this research work proposes to adapt both approaches.

In addition, another theory, known as the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, is introduced in order to complement the instrumentalist approach. Developing such a theoretical model for this research work is important in order to examine and explain the grey areas related to ethnic conflicts and to analyze certain areas and aspects which the instrumentalist approach, within the context of politicized ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, cannot sufficiently investigate. Based on this, the decision theory of identity and difference is introduced so as to complement instrumentalism and not to depose it.

This chapter, which discusses the concept of ethnic conflict, stresses that there are two theoretical perspectives to the concept of ethnicity, one, known as primordialism, is described as fixed and the other, referred to as instrumentalism, as flexible. However, describing these two theories of ethnicity as fixed or flexible is by no means to denote ethnicity as negative or positive.[366] With

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366   See Bayar, Murat: "Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity", in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 9, 2009, p. 1639-1657. In this work, primordialism, as a theoretical approach of ethnicity, is characterized by the following assumptions:

"[P]rimordialism suggests that ethnicity (a) is constructed around sociologically known similarities, especially around kinship, (b) can be assumed as fixed once it is constructed,

numerous theorists from the two schools of thought dominant in the theoretical field of ethnicity, primordial and instrumentalist approaches, nevertheless, the perspective of instrumentalism will be mainly applied in this investigation.

The method *instrumentalism*, which is relevant and forms the basis for this work, means that ethnicity can be depicted as a social construct, which denotes that ethnicity is situational.[367] So, instrumentalism, in this sense, means that individuals possess multiple ethnic identities and, therefore, ethnic groups are constructed and reconstructed as long as individual identifications swing.[368] M. Collett links conflicts among ethnic identities from the instrumentalist point of view as follows: 'The instrumentalist argument is a linear approach that assumes the preexistence of ethnic identities and then seeks to explain the emergence and animosity and violent conflicts between them'.[369] D. Brown, with regard to the instrumentalist position on the eruption of ethnic conflicts, is of the view that:

> From this instrumentalist perspective, then, ethnic conflict occurs where competing self-interested elites find it useful to mobilize their respective clientele along communal lines of language, religion, race, or homeland territory. Consequently, the calls for ethnic autonomy should be understood as essentially bargaining demands for increased access to state patronage.[370]

However, it is pertinent to note that different authors make reference to the method of instrumentalism in diverse manners, so the term will be applied interchangeably in this work with other terms such as situationalism, mobilizationism, constructivism and circumstantialism. Despite attempts by theorists to present new ideas and perceptions through the approaches *circumstancialism* and *constructivism* in order to supplant instrumentalism, these efforts fail to introduce new themes to the subject matter, but rather reproduce the same argument as the instrumentalist approach. Therefore, it is important to note here that the themes mentioned above replicate the instrumentalist approach, for example, the following captures this:

(c) is solidified by violent out-group conflict and/or mass literacy and (d) has an overpowering impact on behaviour, because humans attribute an ineffable significance to their assumed kinship ties." Ibid., p. 1643.

367   See Barth, Fredrik: "Introduction", in: Barth, Fredrik [Ed.]: *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1969, p. 9-38.

368   See Bayar, Murat, 2009, op. cit., p. 1643.

369   Collett, Moya: "Ivorian Identity Constructions: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Prelude to Civil War", in: *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2006, p. 613-629 (617).

370   Brown, David: "Why Independence? The Instrumental and Ideological Dimensions of Nationalism", in: *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 3-4, 2004, p. 277-296 (281).

> The assertion that material interests underlie ethnic identification is central to instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity. However, recent approaches—circumstantialism and constructivism—refine instrumentalism, addressing posited shortcomings, including an examination of the contexts and conditions in which interests and identities are expressed and constructed. Nevertheless, these later approaches explicitly or implicitly reproduce instrumentalism's basic material premise.[371]

However, as already hinted, it is important to note here that instrumentalism is not the only approach within the theoretical framework of this research study, but rather it will be combined with another approach called within the context of this work as *identity and difference in ethnicity*. The latter approach is used and included in order to complement instrumentalism.[372]

In as far as this research work investigates the *politicization of ethnicity* based on the assumption that ethnicity, as a concept, is not synonymous with conflicts and is not the cause of conflicts until it is politicized,[373] the theoretical orientation is, in accordance with the perception of instrumentalism, that ethnicity is situational and, therefore, a social construct. Nonetheless, the contribution of primordialism, as a theoretical orientation, will be highlighted when need be in order to substantiate instrumentalism. The next section will continue to shed more light on the subject matter.

3.1 Examining the Theory of Ethnicity: The Perspective of Instrumentalism

With regard to the two aspects of the theory of ethnicity, it will be argued in this section that "theories of ethnicity display variety and diversity in their explanations of ethnic phenomena."[374] Instrumentalism, which may also be referred to as situationalism, is a theoretical direction of ethnicity that rests on the belief that ethnicity is a rational response to social, economic and cultural instances or conditions.[375] In this respect, ethnicity is understood to be used as an instrument in certain situational conditions and, by that fact, cannot be described as a fixed

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371   Hempel, Lynn: "What's It Worth to You? The Questionable Values of Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnic Identification", in: *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 3-4, 2004, p. 253-275 (253).

372   Schlee, Günther: *How Enemies Are Made: Towards A Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts*, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford 2008.

373   J. Rothschild opines that "ethnicity is a plastic, variegated, and originally ascriptive train that, in certain historical and socioeconomic circumstances, is readily politicized. Such futile circumstances abound in modern and transitional (modernizing) societies." For more on this, see Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 1.

374   Küçükcan, Talip, 1999, op. cit., p. 38-39.

375   See ibid., p. 41.

phenomenon.[376] So, on this note, it can be argued that ethnicity swings and, therefore, is malleable.

The same argument is supported in the work of J. McKay, with regard to a series of questions posed by N. Glazer und D. Moynihan, on why ethnicity persists in certain societies, why ethnicity is used as a vehicle for political mobilization, and why ethnic self-assertion and ethnic conflicts have been on the increase in the last twenty years.[377] Based on the two polar types of ethnicity which are primordial and instrumental in character, the latter is also believed to be circumstantial: "In the primordial case, men are divided due to 'deep' historical and experiential factors. In the situational case, ethnic cleavages arise because of 'specific and immediate circumstances' […]."[378]

T. Küçükcan, in reference to J. McKay and M. Banks, views ethnicity too from an instrumentalist point of view. He states his argument as follows:

> [R]enewed ethnic tension and conflict are not the result of any primordial need to belong, but are due to conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political and material resources'. The situational view, also referred to as the instrumentalist approach, tends to regard ethnicity 'either as a position or outlook that is adopted to achieve some specific end or to see it as the outcome of a set of particular historical and social circumstances. That is, ethnicity is adopted by 'choice' […].[379]

From the above, one can perceive that T. Küçükcan, in spite of his argument in favor of the instrumentalist approach, also makes reference to primordialism. The references to the primordial aspects of ethnicity show that certain features of ethnicity are fixed and cannot be entirely neglected. Otherwise, it may remain doubtful how certain categories of primordial characteristics, generally believed to be acquired, such as religious value system, language, racial belonging, ethnic ties and territory can be explained. On the contrary, it may become unclear when one realizes that all these factors mentioned above are man-made phenomena and unnatural as argued by the opponents of primordialism.

Moreover, T. Küçükcan's assertion that the possibility of giving support and assistance to kin and individuals based on ethnic affiliation is deeply rooted and

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376   See ibid., p. 41.
377   See McKay, James: "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena", in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, October 1982, p. 395-420 (396).
378   Ibid., p. 396.
379   Küçükcan, Talip, 1999, op. cit., p. 41. The first part of the quote is from the work of J. McKay, see McKay, James, 1982, op. cit., p. 399. The second part of the quote is credited to M. Banks. For more information, see Banks, Marcus: *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions*, Routledge, London 1996, p. 185.

shows that ethnicity is not naturally created.[380] As a result of that argument, P. Van den Berghe emphasizes that what is "deeply rooted" originates from a particular point in time which makes it a social phenomenon constructed by certain people.[381] The practice of such ties after a period of time, for example after hundreds of years, can be perceived as normal. Being normal, however, does not necessarily imply its naturalness. In this regard, the essence of ethnicity in this sense may be circumstantially determined.

I. Große asserts from a constructivist approach that ethnicity, as a concept, can generally be depicted as "a group of its own", that is, a social category which is still yet to determine its own social action. Furthermore, she opines that ethnicity, as a factor of social mobilization, can be used as an instrument for the establishment of imagined communities. With regard to this, ethnicity may be constructed to the advantage of a particular ethnic group just as ethnic groups establish themselves in order to make demands for different political objectives which, among others, are also related to the idea of a nation.[382]

That is why one can state that the concepts of ethnic groups and ethnic identity play important roles in the theoretical approach of ethnicity. However, having analyzed and clarified both concepts in chapter 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 respectively, no more time will be devoted to describing both concepts again. Rather, the findings and knowledge gained through the analysis of both concepts will be drawn upon. Both the concepts of identity and ethnic groups are not fixed, but are fluid and can be manipulated for political purposes. They depict the dichotomy of a non-ethnic "us" and ethnic "others" and the notion of identity, which constitutes a reflection of "self", is embedded in the concept of ethnic groups and thus entails the exclusion of others.

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380   See Küçükcan, Talip, 1999, op. cit., p. 40.

381   See Van den Berghe, L. Pierre: *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, Praeger Publishers, New York et al. 1987, p. 261. In addition, the author is one of the proponents of the argument that ethnicity cannot just be situational, but also primordial, an argument P. Van den Berghe asserts thus: "ethnicity is both primordial and situational." Ibid., p. 261.

382   See Große, Ines: "Ethnizität und Zuwanderung in Deutschland", in: *WeltTrends*, No. 38, Spring 2003, p. 75-87 (78). The translation of the title of Große's article in English is: "Ethnicity and Immigration in Germany". The original German version reads:
"Beim Ethnizitätskonzept handelt es sich um ein allgemeines Konzept, das seiner Bedeutung nach zunächst eine ‚Gruppe an sich', eine soziale Kategorie ist, die noch kein soziales Handeln konstituiert; Ethnizität bietet aber über ethnische Mobilisierung die ‚Chance' für die ‚Entstehung vorgestellter Gemeinschaften'. Sie kann als Ressource zum Vorteil bestimmter Gruppen benutzt, außerhalb ethnischer Gruppierungen oder im Rückverweis auf sie konstruiert werden, so wie ethnische Gruppe sich bilden können oder gebildet werden, um unterschiedliche politische Zielvorstellungen (u.a. auch auf Nationen bezogen) zu befördern [...]." Ibid., p. 78.

In view of this, what are the implications for the concept of ethnic groups? With respect to the role 'identity' plays in 'ethnic groups', ethnic identity becomes a charged political field. And in as far as ethnic groups are based on markers such as language, myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of common culture, ascribed membership, etc., the phenomenon rests on boundaries which are fluid, situational and can be manipulated in political struggles.

T. Küçükcan concurs with this argument, according to his instrumentalist approach, as he characterizes 'ethnic groups' as a category of people with certain interests that vary in their cultural patterns. He observes ethnic groups as "interest groups" and he assumes that ethnic organizations, as he calls ethnic groups, may be established to promote or defend some ethnic interests of political, economic, religious or cultural nature.[383] In pursuit of these goals, exclusion is the deciding factor of ethnicity that is applied in terms of rejection or recognition of any "other" person.[384] That is why L. Fawcett believes that ethnicity is a malleable social construct because it encompasses an aspect of identity which fulfils a profound need for many people.[385]

In M. Kebede's attempts to distinguish between the two theories of ethnicity, namely *primordialism* and *instrumentalism*, he introduces the third approach of ethnicity theory already known as the *constructivist* method.[386] Contrary to the primordialists' advocacy for the break-up of postcolonial African states if ethnic identities reach the peak of animosity, his work focuses more on postcolonial states in Africa that are challenged by ethnic conflicts. He believes that the instrumentalists' approach of institutionalizing ethnicity may be the solution.[387] Within the framework of instrumentalist theoretical approach of ethnicity, M. Kebede states the following:

> Their position is called instrumentalist because it grasps ethnicity as a social construct that emphasizes the sharing of cultural, linguistic characteristics—sometimes of kinship roots—for the purpose of group mobilization in competition for resources.[388]

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383   Küçükcan, Talip, 1999, op. cit., p. 42.
384   See Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 14. The German version reads: "Exklusivität sei das entscheidende Merkmal von Ethnizität, das über Anerkennung und Ablehnung des Einzeln entscheidet." Ibid.
385   See Fawcett, Liz, 2000, op. cit., p. 3.
386   See Kebede, Messay: "Directing Ethnicity toward Modernity", in: *Social Theory and Practice: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 27 (2), 2001, p. 265-284.
387   See ibid., p. 265-266.
388   Ibid., p. 268.

Despite his criticism of instrumentalism which in his opinion combines some primordial characteristics of affective elements such as emotions and loyalties of human beings, his idea of constructivism, which perceives ethnicity as constructed rather than given, is also embedded in the instrumentalist approach of ethnicity. As a result, the author agrees that both *instrumentalism and constructivism*, as theoretical methods of ethnicity, operate in a similar manner and, hence, are the same.[389]

The description of ethnicity as occasionally situational or a construct as well as circumstantial in nature is in line with the theory of instrumentalism. M. Kebede's new paradigm, referred to as *constructivism*, is an attempt to incorporate an instrumentalist solution to the problem of ethnic conflicts by institutionalizing ethnicity which will generate a social condition that is important to the rapid modernization of African societies.[390] As the author further emphasizes, "the provision of institutional outlets for ethnic grievances significantly reduces tensions and conflicts, thereby furthering peace and stability, which is a primary prerequisite for development."[391] In view of this institutionalization of ethnicity that is proposed by the instrumentalist' approach, one can argue that M. Kebede's method is tantamount to democratization: "[T]he recognition of ethnicity is a strong incentive to social change, obvious as it is that the institutionalization of pluralism requires a profound democratization of the state."[392]

When one inquires if ethnic competition, established as a consequence of modernization and the so-called democratization, might not promote the pursuits of politics as a zero-sum game, M. Kebede's response again advances further arguments against his proposal of ethnic institutionalization:

> In effect, ethnicity had its start in the centralized administration of colonialism and its divisive policy. The African ruling elite have only intensified the centralizing and divisive mechanisms inherited from the colonial administration. They have thus fashioned 'a patrimonial system of authority' intent on excluding competitors and rewarding followers. Ethnicity or ethno-nationalism is born of protests against this exclusion, for the purpose of controlling the political resources of the state. It is essentially an elite-driven ideology that aims at mobilizing social groups in the name of solidarity around perceived or imagined commonalities such as language, religion, and so on. The masses participate in this redefinition because they think it can promote their interest too.[393]

It is important from an instrumentalist perspective of ethnicity, especially within the African context, that there exists a more strategic importance to ethnicity.

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389   See ibid.
390   See ibid., 275.
391   Ibid.
392   Ibid., p. 274.
393   Ibid., p. 272.

This means that the predominance of political power over economic positions in African societies cannot be ignored:

> So primacy goes to political power, to 'the ability to control and manage a state administra-
> tion.' Put otherwise, the predominance of the political exhibits the operation of a social system
> in which in-built mechanisms reward followers by the exclusion of competitors.[394]

It can be argued that the capture of state power signals the only way through which discriminated or excluded groups can overcome the structures of margin-alization and claim primacy for their interests, not merely common interest or equality with other groups.[395] The belief that the inclusion of ethnicity in politi-cal life as a condition for the democratization and modernization of African so-cieties may be used to subdue ethnic conflicts in African countries like Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire is yet to be proven as a sufficient factor to suppress ethnic conflicts.[396] Moreover, ethnic conflicts that later resulted in a full blown Civil War in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002[397] and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in Kenya in 2007/2008[398] may call into question the effectiveness of the institutionalization of ethnicity which M. Kebede's instrumentalist approach suggests. However, according to his suggested instrumentalist method, in as far ethnicity is per-ceived as constructed and the persistence of ethnic preferences understood as the cause of social inequalities, then it can be argued that ethnicity can be managed through institutional mechanisms:

> [The instrumentalist approach] argues that ethnic conflicts can be transformed into peaceful
> forms of competition if they find appropriate institutional arrangements. In this way, the break-
> up of African states is rendered significantly less attractive.[399]

Despite the arguments put forward in view of institutionalizing ethnicity in or-der to confront the menace of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, M. Kebede still em-phasizes the possibility of peaceful partition.[400] This denotes that states may col-

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394   Ibid., p. 273. For more information regarding the quote in a quote, as stated above, see
         Clapham, Christopher, *Liberia and Sierra Leone*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
         1976, p. 21.
395   See Kebede, Messay, 2001, op. cit., p. 274.
396   See ibid., p. 267.
397   The evidence that the civil war broke out in Côte d'Ivoire is shown in the following work:
         Collett, Moya, 2006, op. cit., p. 613-629.
398   Lynch, Gabrielle: "Courting the Kalenjin: The Failure of Dynasticism and the Strength of
         the ODM Wave in Kenya's Rift Valley Province", in: *African Affairs*, 107/429, 2008, p.
         541-568.
399   Kebede, Messay, 2001, op. cit., p. 268-269.
400   In M. Kebede's statement, in spite of much decentralization, electoral incentives and coali-
         tions, preferences to less privileged ethnic groups in public sector employment and other
         areas, and so on to alleviate ethnic pressures and conflicts, these methods may be

lapse in view of the persistence of ethno-nationalism, the effects of which in-
strumentalism may not be adequate to find a solution to in the modern era. The
implication of institutionalizing ethnicity as a possibility to douse the tension
which may arise among ethnic groups while competing for resources is "pos-
sible under the authority of a unified state, so that the proposal to share power is
at best likely to drift toward a non-competitive arrangement, a co-existence of
ethnic elites."[401]

In so far as ethnicity revolves around gaining access to resources and realiz-
ing particular interests, it is about the drawing of boundaries, ethnic group
boundaries. In view of this, the next section will argue that ethnic boundaries are
not fixed, but rather artificially drawn and constructed.

3.2 Ethnicity: A Social Construct

The analysis in this section will deal with and perceive the theory of ethnicity
from a situationalist approach in the sense that it involves the drawing of bound-
aries between two or more ethnic groups. However, when boundaries are men-
tioned, it is not clearly stated if these refer to national borders of a country in
relation to other neighboring countries or the boundaries that exist between the
states of a federating unit. If this question corresponds to the concept of ethnic-
ity from an instrumentalist perspective, this may mean physical boundaries that
are erected or artificial boundaries set up in the minds of people for the estab-
lishment of "us" and "others". Based on the works of numerous authors, this
chapter will reinforce the argument, in conformity with the instrumentalist
method of ethnicity, that ethnic group boundaries are constructed.

Many authors cite the works of F. Barth in relation to ethnic identity and
ethnic boundaries. For example, in contrast to the primordial approach of ethnic-
ity, F. Barth stipulates that ethnic boundaries are socially constructed within a
given society.[402] This implies that ethnicity is not a naturally given phenome-

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inadequate to respond to expectations, especially if the redefinition has reached the stage of
ethno-nationalism. See ibid., p. 274-275.

401   Ibid., p. 280.
402   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 593-609. The English translation
       of this essay is "Ethnicity: The Construction of Ethnic Realities". The authors refer to F.
       Barth as someone who introduces a new dimension to the discussion of ethnicity in the
       1960s with his work called *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. The German version reads:
       "Der Wegbereiter für ein konzeptionelles Umdenken und eine Neudefinition des Begriffs
       der ethnischen Gruppe war F. Barth (1969) mit seinem Konzept der ‚ethnischen Grenzen'.
       Die entscheidende Frage Barths war nicht mehr die nach den objektiven Merkmalen

non, but rather a situational one whose boundaries can be drawn arbitrarily to serve certain purposes in different situations. These artificially created ethnic boundaries, though fluid, are mainly defined in cultural terms.

G. Schlee and K. Werner assert that ethnicity under the instrumentalist approach strongly emanates from an individual's calculated plot. With respect to this, they believe that ethnicity, as a construct, is used as an instrument for the realization of certain interests by the political elites as a collective or by particular individuals whose ethnic membership switches in a context-sensitive manner.[403] In order to buttress this argument, C. Young describes ethnicity as a weapon which can be used in pursuit of collective advantage.[404] That ethnicity, from an instrumentalist perspective, is employed to achieve certain goals, has already been mentioned, however the process of switching ethnic membership arbitrarily and in a context-sensitive manner is newly introduced to this debate. Along this line of argument, the primordialist[405] supposition of ethnicity as a natural phenomenon cannot be sufficiently proven.

In furtherance of this argument, both authors opine that ethnicity and cultures are not congruent because of the existence of interests that force actors to downplay or deny perceived cultural differences among a particular ethnic group in order to reinforce collective action. At the same time, a new ethnic group may, in pursuit of particular interests, further be constructed as an opposition to other groups of the same ethnic group due to the existence of minimal differences.[406] With regard to this, it can be argued that the switching of an eth-

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ethnischer Gruppen, sondern die Frage nach dem Entstehen und Weiterbestehen von ethnischen Grenzen." Ibid. p. 594.-595.

403   See Schlee, Günther/Werner, Karin: „Inklusion und Exklusion: Die Dynamik von Grenz- ziehungen im Spannungsfeld von Markt, Staat und Ethnizität", in: Schlee, Günther/Werner, Karin [Eds.]: *Inklusion and Exklusion, Die Dynamik von Grenzziehungen im Spannungsfeld von Markt, Staat und Ethnizität*, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, Cologne 1996, p. 9-36 (18). The English translation of the title of the essay is "Inclusion and Exclusion: The Dynamics of the Drawing of Boundary Lines in the Context of the Existing Tension in the Market Place, the State and Ethnicity". And the original German version of the paraphrased statement reads: "[…] gilt Ethnizität im instrumentalistischen Ansatz als interessengeleitete Kon- struktion entweder von politischen Führern (Patterson 1975) in Bezug auf ein Kollektiv oder von einzelnen Individuen, die ihre ethnische Zugehörigkeit kontext-sensibel „swit- chen" (Roosens 1989)." Ibid., p. 18.

404   Young, Crawford: "The Temple of Ethnicity", in: *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1983, p. 652-662 (660).

405   Primordialists perceive ethnicity as a deep-rooted phenomenon that exists outside the con- scious realm of human life. Furthermore, they hold that ethnicity is not determined by ex- ternal and circumstantial forces, but by attachments that are internalized. From this per- spective, ethnicity, in reference to primordialism, is a permanent and fundamental aspect of human identity. See Küçükcan, Talip, 1999, op. cit., p. 38.

406   See Schlee, Günther/Werner, Karin (Eds.), 1996, op. cit., p. 18. The German version reads:

nic membership exists. G. Elwert observes ethnicity as a clientele network, a "we group" and a moral ethnicity established to facilitate the exclusion of others in competition for resources:

> In competition over new resources it may be of advantage to create a clientele's network [sic] designed as a "we group". Moral ethnicity appears if behavior seen as antisocial is felt as a personal threat. Then, one option is to create a social form imagined as a community but framed as an organization which excludes the immoral ones and unites the moral ones.[407]

According to the analysis of ethnicity as a social construct, the drawing of the boundary lines depends on the benefits that can be accrued by a particular ethnic group. That is why it can be argued that ethnicity may only be understood from an instrumentalist point of view. The notion of switching of one's ethnic membership to another, which is practiced arbitrarily, depicts a rapid change from one frame of reference to another. For example, as G. Elwert continues:

> A class movement may become a nationalist one, a nationalist movement transforms itself into a religious mobilization, or a religious network redefines itself as a class movement. Switching processes easily escape scientific treatment because they 'change the department'—from religious to social, to political studies and vice versa.[408]

In accordance to the switching process of ethnicity described as a social construction, he states that neither ethnic groups nor nations constitute a natural order.[409] J. McKay purports that ethnicity constitutes the point of origin, is a magnet of loyalty and an identification as well as of importance in the way humans group themselves.[410]

Then again, if ethnicity is described as an instrument to achieve political and economic goals by certain ethnic groups, then it can be argued that such people do not acknowledge any other loyalty that extends outside of what they are familiar with. Alternatively, when considering the primordial factors of ethnicity, ethnic bounds are created with regard to primordial attachments to kin,

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"Während in der Bristol-Schule ‚Ethnien' und ‚Kulturen' noch als weitgehend deckungsgleich beschrieben wurden, ist es auch einer solchen intstrumentalistischen Perspektive natürlich viel interessanter, das Augenmerk auf jene Fälle zu richten, in denen eine solche Kongruenz nicht gegeben ist, da es Interessen gibt, die es geraten erscheinen lassen, zur Stärkung gemeinsamer Aktion vorhandene kulturelle Unterschiede herunterzuspielen oder zu leugnen. Andererseits kann jedoch, einem Partikularinteresse gehorchend, aus minimalen Differenzen ein ethnischer Gegensatz konstruiert werden, dem dann zumeist auch noch ein ehrwürdiges Alter zugesprochen wird." Ibid., p. 18.

407   Elwert, Georg: "Switching Identity Discourses: Primordial Emotions and the Social Construction of We-Groups", in: Schlee, Günther [Ed.]: *Imagined Differences: Hatred and Construction of Identity*, Lit Verlag, Münster/Hamburg/London 2002, p. 33-54 (35).
408   See ibid., p. 35.
409   See ibid., p. 35.
410   See McKay, James, 1982, op. cit., p. 396.

territory and religion which are characterized by "'a state of intense and com-
prehensive solidarity', 'coerciveness', 'ineffable significance', 'fervor and pas-
sion', and 'sacredness.'"[411] In view of this argument, no interest of any kind,
whether political or economic, can break intractable primordial attachments.[412]

However, one may question the dynamics of ethnic affiliation when ethnic
groups in certain instances switch and take sides with other ethnic groups as if
they were a unit irrespective of some recognized cultural or religious differences
among them, a condition referred to as an *ethnic game*.[413] In this sense, the ma-
nipulation of certain features of ethnicity such as religion, culture, race, and kin-
ship takes place in order to create a division of "us" and "others" when ethnic
groups shift their allegiance, known as switching. Contrary to the primordialist
position, A. Lentz sees a dynamic perspective of ethnicity, which claims that
when ethnic groups emerge they are subject to transformation, a condition under
which major ethnic units can disintegrate or disappear fully.[414]

This perception is based on the essentialist approach of ethnicity credited to
A. Smith which was predominant before the instrumentalist approach gained
relevance with its introduction by F. Barth in the 1960s.[415] According to the es-
sentialist method of ethnicity, ethnic groups share particular characteristics such
as myths, histories, cultures, an association with a specific territory and a feeling
of solidarity that distinguishes them from other ethnic groups.[416] It is stated that
this feeling of solidarity is as a result of the devotion to certain symbolic, cogni-
tive and normative elements of the group based on its practices or traditions,
emotions and attitudes which distinguish it from other groups.[417] The organiza-
tion of an ethnic group rests on some conditions:

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411   Ibid., p. 396.
412   Ibid., p. 396. The work of T. Smith raises questions about the claim of the instrumentalist
       approach to ethnicity which concentrates its argument on political and economic factors
       that underrate the emotional power of ethnic bonds while overstating the influence of
       material resources on human behavior. See ibid., p. 400.
413   See ibid., p. 399. For more information about ethnic game, see Van den Berghe, L. Pierre:
       "Ethnic Pluralism in Industrial Societies: A Special Case?", in: *Ethnicity*, Vol. 3, No. 3,
       1976, p. 242-255.
414   See Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 25. The German version reads: "Im Gegensatz zu
       primordialistischen Bestimmungen von Ethnie geht Smith von einem dynamischen Kon-
       zept aus, demgemäß Ethnien entstehen, sich wandeln, in größeren Einheiten auflösen oder
       sogar ganz verschwinden." Ibid., p. 25.
415   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 594-595.
416   See Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 25. For more information, see ibid.
417   See ibid. The German version reads: "Dieser Solidaritätssinn folge aus der Hinwendung zu
       den symbolischen, kognitiven und normativen Elementen der Gruppe, den Praktiken und
       Sitten, den Gefühlen und Haltungen, die sie von anderen Gruppen unterscheiden." Ibid.

- – Localism: which binds an ethnic group to a certain location,

- – Nostalgia: the clamor for the restoration of the past time,

- – Religion: the existence of an organized religious community,

- – Dispute: the existence of violent or bellicose controversy.[418]

Despite the importance of the aforementioned factors that solidify and distinguish one ethnic group from others, A. Lentz stresses that ethnicity originates as a result of cultural differences from which an ethnic group may emerge or be constructed.[419]

He is of the view that the essentialist approach corresponds to the instrumentalist method of ethnicity. Apart from her emphasis that ethnicity is constructed, it can be argued that ethnicity emerges as the outcome of a specific symbolic construction and not as a manifestation of some inexplicable emotions.[420] Therefore, ethnicity, based on specific criteria on which it rests as used by A. Smith, is subjective.

Subjectivity, in this regard, denotes any activity by some actors through which certain people are perceived and, based on this, grouped together as members of the same ethnic group. However, perception is not tantamount to reality because the same method employed by these actors to form an ethnic group can be applied again to form another ethnic group from the existing one. The objective features of ethnicity such as language, origin, religion etc. to determine the constitution of an ethnic group is what E. Orywal and K. Hackstein refer to, in their work, as a stopgap.[421] So, in the long run, one can claim that

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418   See ibid., p. 25. The German version reads: "Als Bedingungen ethnischer Organisation gelten: die Bindung an einen Ort („Localism") und das Verlangen nach einer verlorenen Vergangenheit („nostalgia"), die Existenz einer organisierten religiösen Gemeinschaft und kriegerischer Auseinandersetzung." Ibid., p. 25.

419   See ibid., p. 265. The German version reads: "So wichtig diese Faktoren sind, Ausgangspunkt ist die kulturelle Differenz." Ibid., p. 25.

420   See ibid., p. 26. The German version reads: "Ethnizität erscheint nicht als Folge einer spezifischen symbolischen Konstruktion und nicht als Ausdruck irgendwelcher unerklärlicher Gefühle." Ibid., p. 26.

421   Stopgap is used as a way out of the essentialist approach of ethnicity to justify the classifycation of an ethnic group based on some objective criteria like language, origin or religion. However, these factors cannot be used as yardsticks to consider what constitutes an ethnic group. As the authors maintain, these factors are the point of focus in determining what constitutes an ethnic group from the personal point of view of the actors making that decision. Other factors may be used as well as the actor making that choice focuses on these factors. Therefore, the classification of an ethnic group, based on this argument, cannot be objective rather subjective. See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 594. The German version reads:

these actions are motivated by certain goals pursued by ethnic entrepreneurs. The next sections will attempt, on the basis of certain factors of analysis, to argue that ethnicity is not a fixed phenomenon, but rather that it swings and can be used from an instrumentalist perspective, for the furtherance of particular interests by ethnic actors.

3.2.1 The Social Boundaries of Ethnicity

According to F. Barth, as shown earlier, ethnic boundaries are part and parcel of the process of ethnicity. It is doubtful that these boundaries mean the distinctions between one ethnic group and the "other" ethnic groups in a society. Similarly, it is not yet clear if the shift or the maintenance of ethnic boundaries result in ethnic conflicts.

Relevant questions are posed in the work of E. Tiryakian about why some boundaries between ethnic groups shift and thereby result in conflicts while some remain peaceful.[422] The author raises questions regarding the rationale behind the essentialist perspective of ethnicity on the "elephant (or, perhaps, gorilla) that is 'ethnic conflict'."[423] E. Tiryakian comments on the assertion by S. Fenton as follows:

> Fenton argues for the need of a global comparative analysis to understand why some boundaries between ethnic groups become ones of serious conflict while others do not. He rejects the essentialist argument that there is a one-to-one correlation of ethnicity and culture, an intrinsic 'ethnicity' given by its culture, which is at the heart of ethnic conflicts.[424]

In spite of the fact that E. Tiryakian believes that ethnic identities are not fixed,[425] however, he claims that ethnic mobilization is a response and not the

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"Ausgehend von einer reichhaltigen Anzahl von Stammesmonographien, in denen die untersuchten Gruppen anhand objektiver Merkmale, wie beispielsweise Sprache und Abstammung, als ethnische Gruppen definiert wurden, hatten sich bis in die 60er Jahre—und zum Teil noch darüber hinaus—in der sozial- und kulturanthropologischen Forschung ein essentialistisches Verständnis von Ethnien etabliert. Ohne den Fokus der Akteure die notwendige Bedeutung beizumessen, wurden objektiv nachvollziehbare Unterschiede oder Gemeinsamkeiten von Gruppen klassifiziert. Eine derartige Bestimmung von Gruppen erbrachte jedoch aufgrund der Vielfältigkeit von Klassifikationsmerkmalen wiederum nur Ausprägungen." Ibid., p. 594.

422   See Tiryakian, Edward: "Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts", in: *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 45 (3-4), 2004, p. 147-159 (151).

423   See ibid., p. 151.

424   See ibid.

425   See ibid.

primary cause of the destabilization or the crises of nation states.[426] Despite S. Fenton's opposition to the essentialist approach and his effort to decouple the parity between ethnicity and culture which the essentialists propose, he fails to offer a new theoretical approach of ethnicity and the reason for the outbreaks of ethnic conflicts. Hence, in view of his approach, the question of what ethnic boundaries portray remains unanswered.

E. Orywal and K. Hackstein opine that instrumentalism depicts ethnic identity as situational because of its appeal to common characteristics which, in turn, depends on the situation that members of a group find themselves in at the time ethnic boundaries are determined and negotiated. Likewise, in both authors' view, ethnic identities are not fixed. As a result, the definition of identity and ethnic groups is dynamic.[427]

From this point of view, ethnicity is used as an instrument because ethnic boundaries can be drawn according to the condition of the groups involved in the process of boundary negotiation. Since the issue of ethnic boundaries encompasses economic and political relevance, its determination may be important for the existence and survival of ethnic entities in a given environment. Therefore, it can be argued that the negotiating process depends on a cost-benefit analysis upon which actors base their judgment. Nonetheless, negotiating ethnic boundaries can open gaps for manipulation and ethnicity can be used as an instrument by certain actors/elites.

Due to several references made to F. Barth whenever the instrumentalist approach is discussed, as indicated earlier regarding the work of F. Barth on instrumentalism, it is important at this juncture to examine his work on "ethnic boundaries". What determines these boundaries and how boundaries are drawn? In other words, what are his suggestions regarding the instrumentalist approach of ethnicity?

In view of whether ethnic boundaries are established and maintained between ethnic groups as a consequence of limited interactions, F. Barth assumes that people or ethnic groups of different cultures maintain their distinct cultures based on social and geographical isolation:

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426   See ibid.
427   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 595. The German version reads: "Der Begriff der situativen Identität […] betont, dass der Rekurs auf gemeinsame Merkmale von der Situation abhängig ist, in der sich die Mitglieder der Gruppen zum Zeitpunkt des Bestimmens und Aushandeln ethnischer Grenzen befinden. Dem Determinismus der Primordialisten, die ethnische Gruppen als weitgehend stabile und klar abgrenzbare Einheiten sahen, wurde von den Situationalisten die Idee einer flexiblen, kontextabhängigen Grenzziehung, und damit die Idee einer dynamischen Definition von Identität und ethnischer Gruppe entgegenhalten." See ibid., p. 595-596.

> […] it is clear that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them. In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life history.[428]

He emphasizes that anywhere ethnic groups are dichotomized as "us" and "others", one senses that stable and important social relations exist across the boundaries of the dichotomized groups. However, he argues that cultural differences can persist despite interaction, interdependence and contact among ethnic groups.[429] So, it can be seen that ethnic boundaries are drawn arbitrarily in order to fulfill specific purposes and not as a result of cultural distinctions.

In spite of this argument, there is need for further analysis in view of the claims by F. Barth on ethnic boundaries, especially on the author's method in dealing with the subject matter. He claims in his work that "ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristics of organizing interaction between themselves."[430]

It is doubtful if separation between different ethnic groups may lead to the drawing of ethnic boundaries. If ascriptions and identification, which serve as the deciding terms in this assertion, are foundational for the determination of ethnic boundaries, then one can posit that the existence of any boundary based on these terms is artificial. The argument rests on the analysis made so far which describes the term 'identity' as unfixed, fluid, and the ascription of people with certain features as subjective. In the next section, the work of F. Barth will be discussed in more detail, particularly in regard to ethnic boundaries.

3.2.2 Determinants of Ethnic Groups: Ethnic Boundaries and Ethnicity

According to the analysis in the preceding sections, it is found that ethnic boundaries are determined situationally and ethnicity, in this regard, serves the purpose of excluding others. Some of the roles which the drawing of ethnic boundaries plays are analyzed in the work of J. McKay, in line with S. Deshen, who believes there are different kinds of ethnicity, namely: marital ethnicity, political ethnicity and cultural ethnicity. J. McKay is of the view that ethnicity, in

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428   Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 9-10.
429   See ibid., p. 10.
430   See ibid., p. 10.

this sense, "can 'operate, or be more prominent, in different situations, individually and at times simultaneously'."[431]

Since ethnic groups are the forces behind the drawing of boundaries, it is important to examine how F. Barth, whose instrumentalist approach is essential to this work, depicts and defines the phenomenon 'ethnic groups'. According to his work, an ethnic group:

1) is largely biologically self-perpetuating,

2) shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms,

3) makes up a field of communication and interaction, and

4) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.[432]

From the definition given above, certain features of ethnic groups require analysis and additional explanation. The author, F. Barth, makes enquiries on one major characteristic of what constitutes an ethnic group. His emphasis of an ethnic group sharing a common culture is what he perceives as a problematic definitional feature of ethnic group.[433] His concentration on the analysis of the cultural aspect, as a definitional characteristic, is divided into different sections out of which some which are important for this research work will be mentioned in the subsequent section: ethnic groups as a culture bearing unit, ethnic groups as an organization type, the boundaries of ethnic groups, poly-ethnic social systems, associations of identities and value systems and interdependence of ethnic groups[434].

431 See McKay, James, 1982, op. cit., p. 403. The different kinds of ethnicity, as reflected in the citation by J. McKay, are identified by S. Deshen in his work on studies of Israel society which can be seen in: Deshen, Shlomo: "Political Ethnicity and Cultural Ethnicity in Israeli During the 1960s", in: Kraus, Ernest [Ed.]: *Migration, Ethnicity and Community*, New Brunswick/London 1980, p. 117-146 (119).
432 Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 10-11.
433 See ibid., p. 11-12.
434 See ibid., p. 9-38.

3.2.2.1 Understanding Ethnic Groups as a Culture Bearing Unit

F. Barth's position on the culture bearing-feature of ethnic groups can have far-reaching implications because it requires that one identifies and distinguishes ethnic groups according to the morphological characteristics of the cultures which they are the bearers.

In this regard, as F. Barth believes, one classifies persons and local groups as members of an ethnic group according to their display of particular traits of culture.[435] However, as already argued, actors' classification of people based on certain criteria, i.e. the exhibition of specific traits of a particular culture, is subjective because it corresponds to the criteria which these actors personally perceive as important. If differences between ethnic groups are centered upon differences in traits shown by the respective groups, can one then use these traits to ascertain existing cultural differences? F. Barth's position, in response to this question, is that the historical provenance of any assemblage of cultural traits is diverse and there can be cultural growth and change as well because, at times, certain cultural items are borrowed from other cultures. When one considers the following statement in an essay of H. Eidheim, then the role culture plays in defining an *ethnic group* is subject to scrutiny:

> [P]eople themselves apparently have no difficulties in ascribing ethnic membership, i.e. we might find a high degree of 'homogeneity' (rather insignificant distribution of objective traits) but still indications of ethnic diversity […].[436]

In addition, he observes that in order to examine the social organization of how ethnic boundaries are maintained, objective traits are needed. However, as he asserts, traits can be dubious.[437] Therefore, based on this argument, the relationship between *ethnic group* and *culture* remains unproven.

3.2.2.2 Examining Ethnic Groups as an Organizational Type

In consideration of social effectiveness of a group, *ethnic groups* are referred to as a form of social organization. This argument is related to the fourth definitional characteristic of ethnic groups (cited in section 3.2.2) which stipulates that

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435   See ibid., p. 12.
436   Eidheim, Harald: "When Ethnic Identity is a Social Stigma", in: Barth, Fredrik [Ed.]: *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1969, p. 39-57 (39).
437   See ibid, p. 39.

an *ethnic group* has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others. This is based on self-ascription and the ascription by others. The following statement emphasizes this further:

> A categorical ascription is an ethnic ascription when it classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background. To the extent that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction, they form ethnic groups in this organizational sense.[438]

By this, E. Orywal and K. Hackstein posit that ethnic boundaries persist because a categorical ascription is based on ethnic identities which are only established in the process of interaction between structurally similar ethnic groups.[439] In addition, specific characteristics are selected through which boundaries of ethnic groups' membership are constructed. This, however, depends on the situation during interaction.[440] So, whenever ethnic boundaries are drawn, it is used as the deciding factor in the formation of ethnic groups which is depicted in the form of inclusion and exclusion among demographic groups.[441] The same position is supported by A. Lentz, who believes that cultural differences are not necessarily fundamental to the formation of ethnic groups, but rather they constitute a "resource" which is used under certain conditions, as a distinguishing mark upon which boundaries are drawn.[442]

In view of this analysis, one can argue that, despite the recognition that ethnic categories consider cultural differences, there is no one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences.[443] The characteristics which are considered do not correlate with the sum of objective differences, rather only those that actors individually perceive as significant.[444] In accordance with this argument, it can be stated that some cultural features are applied

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438   See ibid., p. 13-14.
439   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 594-595. The German version reads: "Grundlegend war dabei die Überlegung, dass sich ethnische Identitäten nur in einem Interaktionsprozess mit anderen, ähnlich strukturierten Gruppen bilden. Je nach Interaktionssituation werden spezifische Merkmale subjektiv selektiert und mit ihnen Grenzen der ethnischen Zugehörigkeit konstruiert." Ibid., p. 594-595.
440   See ibid., p. 595.
441   See ibid., p. 595. The German version reads: "Für die Bestimmung von ethnischen Gruppen war nach Barth nur die Tatsachen entscheidend, dass ethnische Grenzen in Form der Inklusion und Exklusion von Bevölkerungsgruppen gezogen werden." Ibid., p. 595.
442   See Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 31. The German version reads: "[K]ulturelle Unterschiede [führen] nicht (notwendig) zu ethnischer Gruppenbildung, vielmehr stellen sie eine ‚Ressource' dar, die unter bestimmten […] Bedingungen als Markierung zur Abgrenzung herangezogen werden können." Ibid., p. 29.
443   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 14.
444   See ibid.

by actors as signals and emblems of differences while others are ignored, and in some situations pertaining to relationships, sharp differences are trivialized and denied.[445]

Therefore, one can argue that ascription, as a definitional feature of *ethnic groups*, creates dichotomies between groups in a society which can be used arbitrarily by actors. So, as J. McKay claims, categorical ascription, in reference to the fluidity and variability of ethnic identities and relationships in the formation of ethnic groups, is used as a rational and calculated response to certain possibilities and opportunities.[446]

P. Van den Berghe elucidates that the application of ethnic symbols in order to gain access to political and economic resources constitutes an 'ethnic game' being played in nearly all multi-ethnic societies.[447] The implication of this assertion is that overt signals or signs which serve as diacritical characteristics for people to discern identity such as dress, language, house-form and general style or basic value orientations in form of standards of morality and excellence upon which performance is assessed do not necessarily establish the objective differences between social groups.[448]

Most important in the process of the drawing of boundaries are the differences which actors, under certain conditions, perceive as significant. From this point of view, ethnic groups are formed as a result of the process of self-ascription and ascription by others.[449]

3.2.2.3 Analysis of the Boundaries of Ethnic Groups

F. Barth does not refer to the cultural aspect of ethnic boundaries in his study, but rather his major point of concentration is the social boundaries of ethnic groups. It is important to note that, in contrast to the assertion that the phenomenon 'ethnic group' is associated with the occupation of a particular site or an imagined territory, continuity and constant maintenance are more paramount.

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445   See ibid.
446   See McKay, James, 1982, op. cit., p. 399.
447   See Van den Berghe, L. Pierre, 1976, op. cit., p. 242-255.
448   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 14.
449   See Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 30-31. The German version reads: "Nicht die objektiven Differenzen zwischen sozialen Gruppen an sich sind für diesen Abgrenzungsprozeß ausschlaggebend, sondern die Unterschiede, die von den Akteuren in gegebenen Bedingungen für signifikant gehalten werden." Ibid., p. 30-31.

F. Barth opines that the most important aspect of the social boundaries is their maintenance:

> Ethnic groups are not merely or necessarily based on the occupation of exclusive territories; and the different ways in which they are maintained, not only by a once-and-for-all recruitment but by continual expression and validation, need to be analyzed.[450]

Taking the above into account, it is doubtful how an ethnic group can sustain its boundaries while in interaction with other ethnic groups. F. Barth responds in the following assertion: "If a group maintains its identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signaling membership and exclusion."[451]

I. Große stipulates in her study that the process of ethnic ascription itself constitutes part of the identity negotiation in certain societal situations.[452] Aside from the common features, ethnic groups are defined primarily through the drawing of boundaries and the maintenance of the boundaries. In this regard, as the author continues, the drawing of ethnic boundaries can be seen as an essential part that determines the groups and not the cultural stuff which it encloses.[453] This claim denotes that ethnic boundaries are not fixed because identity, on which ethnic boundaries rest, is negotiated and this negotiation is not determined by the cultural aspect which may be subject to influence as a result of the interaction that takes place between one ethnic group and the other. However, based on the influence of culture in the determination of ethnic boundaries, one can argue that other criteria are used when ethnic boundaries are drawn.

So, what are these criteria which gain more importance than cultural materials in the drawing of ethnic boundaries? Or can it be that there are certain criteria which are used as A. Bariagaber cites in his work: "The reconstruction of […] identity provides an interesting case of the way that certain symbols are selected, manipulated, and even constructed by elites in their struggle against others."[454] A. Bariagaber reinforces the argument about the fluidity of identity.

450 Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 15.
451 Ibid., p. 15.
452 See Große, Ines, 2003, op. cit., p. 77. The German version reads: "Der Umgang mit ethnischen Zuordnungen ist in bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Situationen selbst Teil der Identitätsarbeit." Ibid., p. 77.
453 See ibid., p. 77. The German version reads: "Neben gemeinsamen Merkmalen definieren sich ethnische Gruppen vor allem durch Grenzziehung und Aufrechterhaltung der Grenze: Aus dieser Perspektive werden ethnische Grenzziehung zum wesentlischen Kern, die die Gruppe bestimmen, nicht das kulturelle Material, das sie einschließen […]." Ibid., p. 77.
454 Bariagaber, Assefaw: "The Politics of Cultural Pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trajectories of Ethnicity and Constitutional Experiments", in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 6, November 1998, p. 1056-1073 (1063).

One can see that identity represents a critical step in self-definition and the construction of self.[455] However, one aspect of A. Bariagaber's perspectives which depicts a radical change to the instrumentalist approach is stated as follows:

> Thus, by the selective manipulations of primordial elements and linking it with the recent past, […] elites were simultaneously able to mobilize their co-ethnics and to prevent the formation of a potentially powerful grand coalition of other ethnic groups.[456]

From the above, one can argue that ethnic boundaries, although viewed from an instrumentalist approach in this research, can be manipulated by certain individuals/elites through the use of certain primordial elements. The change and the new method to the instrumentalist approach at this juncture is the combination of both primordialism and instrumentalism in order to emphasize the theory of ethnicity.

In view of this, E. Orywal and K. Hackstein underscore this new approach in their study. They believe that the modern method on the theory of ethnicity will prevail over the instrumentalist approach which dominated in the 1960s.[457] According to both authors, the modern research studies concentrate on primordial characteristics which are selected depending on the situation. As a result, primordialism is reintegrated into the modern theory of ethnicity, however, in combination with the situational or instrumentalist approach, as both approaches form elements in the theory of ethnicity, especially in the drawing of ethnic boundary lines.[458]

In continuation of the argument on the maintenance of ethnic boundaries, it is found that the criteria used, with regard to the argument by A. Bariagaber, are based on certain symbols which can be drawn from selected primordial elements. F. Barth points out that ethnic boundaries canalize social life: This involves a continual complex organization of behavior and social relations, the most important, in terms of the boundaries of ethnic groups, is that "the identifi-

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455   See ibid., p. 1063.
456   Ibid., p. 1063.
457   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 596. The German version reads: "In der heutigen Forschung hat sich weitgehend die Erkenntnis durchgesetzt, dass auch primordiale Merkmale in Abhängigkeit von der Situation selektiert werden. Sie sind somit ebenfalls Bestandteil ethnischer Grenzziehungen." Ibid., p. 596.
458   See ibid., p. 596. It is further stated by both authors that political science, as a discipline, specifically regards the instrumentalist approach as an aspect of ethnic identity that is enforced towards the realization of personal goals. The German version reads: "[W]obei vor allem in politikwissenschaftlichen Arbeiten (vgl. J. Blaschke 1987) dem Aspekt der Instrumentalisierung von ethnischer Identität zur Durchsetzung von Interessen besondere Beachtung geschenkt wird." Ibid., p. 596.

cation of other persons as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement."[459]

On the one hand, regarding the identification of a fellow member, F. Barth assumes that the two are basically playing the same game and this implies that both can expand their social relations to cover other sectors and domains of activity.[460] On the other hand, if one perceives limitations on shared understandings and differences in the criteria set out for judgement of value and performance in a person's behavior, one dichotomizes him or her as 'other', a stranger and a member of another ethnic group. Consequently, there is a restriction of interaction to areas of assumed common understanding and mutual interest.[461]

One can see that the perception of someone as member of one's ethnic group or as a member of another ethnic group during the process of identification is based on certain behaviors in a social relation which constitutes an ethnic game being played in almost all multi-ethnic societies.[462] From this perspective, ethnic identities are retained and emphasized as an opportunity to achieve political, economic and social goals.[463]

The same position is stressed by L. Hempel who reveals that individuals, when they perceive their own interests to be advanced by group membership, are more likely to consciously identify themselves with others in the group. So, collectively, this provides the solidarity needed to organize and mobilize ethnic groups.[464]

Furthermore, F. Barth, in opposition to the argument concerning the persistence of ethnic boundaries as an ethnic game in order to realize certain goals, provides insight on the reason why cultural differences may persist between ethnic groups. It should be expected that the differences in the cultures of ethnic groups that interact with one another will be reduced during the course of time.[465] However, the question of why these cultural differences are preserved cannot be seen from the perspective of identification processes. The structures of interaction are responsible for persistent cultural differences, whose organizational mode comprises a systematic set of rules that govern inter-ethnic social

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459   Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 15.
460   See ibid.
461   See ibid.
462   See McKay, James, 1982, op. cit., p. 399.
463   See ibid., p. 399.
464   See Hempel, Lynn: "Reexamining Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnic Identification within a Comparable Context", Conference Paper – American Sociological Association, Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 2005, p. 1-22 (1).
465   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 15-16.

encounters.[466] In this regard, what is made relevant during the process of inter-action in any social relation and in all organized social life is prescribed.[467] That is why when ethnic groups agree on these rules, the codes and values through which they interact are limited only to particular social situations.

But, this position cannot be upheld when one examines M. Collett's argument which contradicts the prescribed structures that govern ethnic inter-action. In her opinion, the group which an individual identifies with is based on perception rather than objectivity. The boundaries of ethnic identity do not rest on pre-given rules, but are defined in terms of the 'other'.[468] Therefore, on the boundaries of ethnic groups, one can assert that ethnic groups serve as interest groups through which ethnicity is used as an effective strategy. F. Barth postu-lates that the structural process which guides interaction can be understood with-in the framework of ethnicity in terms of a symbolic medium through which the interests of individuals are organized, defended, and pursued.[469] That is why the so-called proscribed rules, when agreed upon by the ethnic groups involved in interactions, stabilize social relations in so far as the areas of interest that are po-tentially confrontational are avoided.

Nonetheless, the maintenance of such social relations cannot be permanent, especially in times of political and economic competition in a modern nation-state. And for this reason it is questionable if such proscribed rules and regula-tions may be understood in relation to the constitutional principles of a modern nation.

3.2.2.4 The Case of a Poly-Ethnic Social System

A poly-ethnic social system can be referred to, in reference to F. Barth, as a va-riety of sectors of articulation and separation in a multi-ethnic society. However, the author is critical of simultaneously using the term *plural society* as a label for a poly-ethnic social system which entails different social and cultural forms. The same view is presented in the work of R. Jenkins who treats ethnic bound-aries, especially in newly decolonized states, within the topic "Myths of Plural-ism". Pluralism is defined as the institutional incorporation of different ethnic

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466   See ibid., p. 16.
467   See ibid.
468   See Collett, Moya, 2006, op. cit., p. 617-618.
469   See Hempel, Lynn, 2005, op. cit., p. 2.

groups or collectivities into one societal or state system.[470] Furthermore, he observes that former colonial states, in spite of their recognition by the international community as independent states, do not resemble what can be called a nation:

> [T]he creation, by the European powers, of colonies or other dependent territories—and, later, emergent new states—whose internationally recognized boundaries bore little or no resemblance to the local spatial arrangements of ethnic identity or cultural continuity and discontinuity. As such, they lacked the clear-cut homogeneous national identities which at that time still seemed to characterize the established states of the old world.[471]

Despite the establishment of the notion of *states*, ethnic boundaries among diverse ethnic groups that make up these so-called nations deserve special attention and cannot be ignored. In this regard, the lack of a new analytical model on the subject matter is criticized by both R. Jenkins and F. Barth.[472] What is of importance to F. Barth in view of poly-ethnic social system is the prevalent ethnic identity of different groups. He describes it thus:

> Common to all these systems is the principle that ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to play, and the partners he may choose for different kinds of transactions. In order words, regarded as status, ethnic identity is superordinate to most other statuses, and defines the permissible constellations of statuses, or social personalities, which an individual with that identity may assume.[473]

If, first and foremost, an individual identifies him or herself with his or her ethnic group, then this may result in conflicts with other ethnic groups when competing for political and economic resources. In this sense, ethnic identity can be used by certain individuals/leaders manipulatively in the pursuit of their own goals. Therefore, the position of F. Barth and the assertion of R. Jenkins can be maintained because pluralism in an ethnic heterogeneous society, if ethnic identity of individuals plays a dominant role, does not denote a conflict-free environment.

R. Jenkins distinguishes three types of pluralism in his work because he is of the opinion that the term is used loosely as a descriptive notion for labeling all multi-ethnic societies. These are *cultural pluralism, social pluralism and structural pluralism*. In addition to that, one can distinguish between the three types:

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470   See Jenkins, Richard: *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Exploration*, Sage Publications, London et al. 1997, p. 26.
471   See ibid., p. 25.
472   See ibid. p. 25. Read also Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 16.
473   Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 17.

- *Cultural pluralism*, on the one hand, describes a society that is comprised of different ethnic groups. However, these are not used as yardsticks nor are they relevant in a political sense as requirements for citizenship.

- *Social pluralism*, on the other hand, also denotes a situation in which ethnicity has its relevance in terms of political organization. But it does not affect the right to claim citizenship, though it is useful in the incorporation of individual members into the state.

- *Structural pluralism*, contrary to both cultural and social pluralism, can be described as a situation in a society in which ethnic identity directly affects citizenship and the incorporation of collectivities into full membership of the state.[474]

M. Rong, however, highlights the influence of ethnic groups and ethnic identities in a modern society. He believes that, in a modern society, a nation is expected to show characteristics of a stable political environment. However, "by comparison, ethnic groups gradually de-emphasize the political patina."[475] Furthermore, he asserts that the differences of members of different ethnic groups from diverse cultural backgrounds can be reduced if there are increasing exchanges among these ethnic groups. In this respect, M. Rong claims that members of one ethnic group undergo a process of assimilation by other ethnic groups.

Based on M. Rong's explanation, ethnic identity's super-ordination, absolutism and command which feature in F. Barth's work no longer pose a constraint to the cultural integration of ethnic groups through the process of assimilation in a poly-ethnic society.[476] He puts this as follows:

> Moreover, all ethnic groups, as subjects of one and the same political entity (nation), must abide by the country's traditional moral principles and ethical standards and by the country's constitution and laws, which means carrying out the duties of the country's citizens and at the same time enjoying the rights of citizenship. In this respect, there can be no ambiguity.[477]

If cultural and ethnic identities do not play significant roles in a plural society, it is unclear why conflicts persist among ethnic groups and the reason for the agitations by some ethnic groups who demand for the establishment of their own nations within the existing one in a plural society is yet to be understood. For

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474   For more information on all the three types of pluralism, see Jenkins, Richard, 1997, op. cit., p. 26.
475   Rong, Ma, 2010, op. cit., p. 39-40.
476   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 16.
477   Rong, Ma, 2010, op. cit., p. 40.

this reason, the importance and dominance of ethnic identity in a multi-ethnic society cannot be ignored, as F. Barth portrays below:

> The constraints on a person's behavior which spring from his ethnic identity thus tend to be absolute and, in complex poly-ethnic societies, quite comprehensive; and the component moral and social conventions are made further resistant to change by being joined in stereotyped clusters as characteristics of one single identity.[478]

According to this assertion, one can see that nation-states are subjected to conflicts of interest among the ethnic groups involved which may escalate into real conflicts. Hereby, the existence and maintenance of peace and order of a plural society may become threatened.

Furthermore, on the one hand, the formation of particular interests by one ethnic group or another in such a multi-ethnic society can be avoided if a government guarantees all the rights of its subjects, irrespective of their membership in a particular ethnic group. Thereby, the rights of being citizens of the country are guaranteed if the government avoids perceiving them as political groups which deserve certain independence.

But, on the other hand, M. Rong discusses the tendency toward the culturalization of inter-ethnic rivalries and the management of ethnic sentiments which may occur in some countries and not in others.[479] In addition, it is unclear whether the government of a poly-ethnic state, where inter-ethnic tensions exist and are prevalent, is responsible for this state of affairs. These are some of the doubts which may come to mind when considering the persistence and danger of ethnic identity in a multi-ethnic society. Within this context, ethnic revival, as ethnicity is sometimes referred to, is a major form of cleavage in modern societies.[480]

Therefore, when ethnic identity plays a dominant role in what characterizes an ethnic group, the following position held by E. Cashmore regarding ethnic groups becomes clear: "The ethnic group, then, is a cultural phenomenon, even though it is based originally on a common perception and experience of unfavorable material circumstances."[481] And I. Große believes that whenever an eth-

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478   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 16.
479   It is believed that some Western industrial nations are able to control inter-ethnic problems through the provision of good governance. See Rong, Ma, 2010, op. cit., p. 40.
480   Cashmore, E. Elias: *Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations*, 2nd edition, Routledge, London 1984, p. 101.
481   See ibid., p. 98.

nic group maintains its identity in interaction with other ethnic groups, it signi-
fies a form of exclusion of these others.[482]

3.2.2.5 Re-examining the Associations of Identities and Value Standards

It is questionable, based on ethnic boundaries and the maintenance of these
boundaries, to group different ethnic groups from diverse cultural backgrounds
together as a single entity. Therefore, it is important to observe how interaction
in such a setup can function without resulting in conflict and how many differ-
ent ethnic groups may interact.

   F. Barth, who examines this aspect, emphasizes some basic conditions that
are to be met in order to guarantee the co-existence of people from diverse eth-
nic backgrounds.[483] In the first place, it is important to make an enquiry about
what triggers the emergence of ethnic distinctions with regard to cultural differ-
ences in an area. In his response, F. Barth illustrates two necessary criteria: 1)
the categorization of population sectors into exclusive and imperative status cat-
egories. 2) the acceptance of the principle that standards applied to one such cat-
egory can be different from those applied to another.[484]

   This implies that when people or ethnic groups are categorized, they are
then assigned specific value standards. Thereby, one can argue that whenever
people are categorized it denotes inclusion and exclusion. All the same, the cri-
teria set out in determining how ethnic differences persist are not helpful in ex-
plaining how they emerge. It is noted that the wider the differences among eth-
nic groups in relation to their value orientations, the more restricted ethnic inter-
actions become.[485] It is uncertain whether it can result in conflict in a society if
the categorization of ethnic groups according to certain value orientations,
means more resources, exclusive rights and privileges for some ethnic groups
while others are denied the same treatment.

   In view of this, it is unclear what may happen in this case to ethnic minori-
ties and majorities within a given society, especially if one considers the argu-
ment from F. Barth that the behaviors of groups are channeled towards these

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482   See Große, Ines, 2003, op. cit., p. 77. The German version reads: "Wenn eine Gruppe ihre
      Identität während der Interaktion mit anderen aufrecht erhält, dann heißt dies, dass die Kri-
      terien der Mitgliedschaft und Formen, diese und auch den Ausschluss aus der Gruppe zu
      bekunden, entwickelt wurden." Ibid., p. 77.
483   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op cit., p. 17.
484   See ibid., p. 17-18.
485   See ibid., p. 18.

value orientations. That implies that any behavior of an individual in such an environment which is perceived as contrary to roles and values assigned to him or her, based on his or her value orientations, will be sanctioned in order to deter and prevent change of identity.[486]

In regard to these questions and the dichotomization of ethnic groups into categories, co-existence may become difficult, if not impossible, when issues such as the distribution of political and material resources are involved in a multi-ethnic society. In addition to the inequality among ethnic groups through dichotomization and categorization, F. Barth is of the following view:

> Where social identities are organized and allocated by such principles, there will thus be a tendency towards canalization and standardization of interaction and the emergence of boundaries which maintain and generate ethnic diversity within larger, encompassing social systems.[487]

When value standards and social identities are constructed which create boundaries that can be detrimental to interactions, it is questionable if social identity construction can exist and be effective without being related to the characteristics which invoke the notion of identity. In this regard, G. Schlee and K. Werner assume that identity cannot be constructed without using some of these materials in so far as identity construction is based on perceived cultural attributes and undeniably existing language differences. However, there are a wide range of possibilities to select from and assess differences in terms of identity construction depending on one's aim during the process of inclusion and exclusion.[488] It can be seen that if differences are to be created, switching is not necessary. Nevertheless, G. Elwert opines that identity construction requires materials such as an accepted code and clear markers: "The code may be: religion, ethnicity, local group, kinship."[489]

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486   See ibid.
487   See ibid.
488   See Schlee, Günther/Werner, Karin [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 15. The German version reads: "Konstruktion nämlich erfolgt nicht aus dem Nichts, sondern sie braucht Material. 'Und wie im Bauwesen gebraucht man auch bei der Konstruktion sozialer Identitäten vorzugsweise lokale Materialien.' […] Wesentlich häufiger aber werden diese Identitätskonstrukte, die ja nicht gerne auf jede Plausibilität verzichten, mit bereits bestehenden Konstruktionen und deren Realitätsgehalten verknüpft: Man beruft sich auf beobachtbare kulturelle Merkmale und unleugbar vorhandene Sprachunterschiede. Eine Fülle von Optionen haben solche Konstruktionen bei Auswahl und Bewertung der Unterschiede. So kann man um nur die Extreme andeuten, Dialektunterschiede entweder vollständig leugnen oder aber zu einem Sprachunterschied, der ganz unterschiedliche Wesenheiten und Geisteswelten impliziert, hochstilisieren, je nach dem, ob man eine inklusive oder eine exklusive Argumentationsstrategie verfolgt […]." Ibid,. p. 15.
489   Elwert, Georg, 2002, op. cit., p. 37.

Despite the sanctions an individual of an ethnic group may be subjected to in order to prevent him or her from switching or performing roles that are contrary to his or her value orientations, as already mentioned, it can be argued that "the dynamics of maintaining and reshaping boundaries, of defining values and institutions as core ones is the product of tensions within the socio-political context."[490]

3.2.2.6 Interdependence of Ethnic Groups

As observed and analyzed in previous sections on ethnic boundaries and their maintenance, the possibility that different ethnic groups can exist interdependently whether economically, politically, culturally, or socially seems slim. However, F. Birth presents the interdependence of ethnic groups in a way that deserves close attention and analysis, and further notes in his work that there exists a positive bond which connects different ethnic groups in a wider social system. Nonetheless, this so-called bond depends on how ethnic groups complement one another which, in turn, is tied to some of their cultural features.[491]

In F. Barth's view, complementarity can produce interdependence that enables interrelations to take place, whereas in areas where there is an absence of complementarity there is no interaction. But when there is interaction, then reference to ethnic identity is avoided. From this point of view, one can argue that ethnic identity may hinder interaction. It can be asked at this juncture what F. Barth means by the term complementarity[492] because it is unclear whether ethnic groups compensate for one another's weaknesses. If 'ethnic identity', which is described as a constraint on an individual's behavior and thus important in drawing ethnic boundaries, is predominant in a society, it is doubtful whether the inability of one ethnic group can be compensated for by another ethnic group in a particular kind of complementarity that allows interdependence to take place. And if interdependence exists, it is uncertain if the notion of ethnic identity that creates dichotomies in the form of "us" and "others" in a society permit interrelations and interactions to flourish without any hindrance.

Further observations in F. Barth's analysis show that "social systems differ greatly in the extent to which ethnic identity, as an imperative status, constrains

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490   See ibid., p. 37.
491   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 18.
492   See ibid., p. 18.

the person in the variety of statuses and roles he may assume."[493] One can perceive under certain social systems that ethnic identity's constrictive features regarding the roles and behavior of a person may be limited. This is an indication that there are exceptional cases in which the constraining power of 'ethnic identity' becomes ineffective. Yet it remains unclear how ethnic boundaries are maintained under such situations. And also, in consideration of the complementarity and interdependence among ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society, it is not clear how boundaries of ethnic groups may be maintained in view of these wide relevant value differences and multiple constraints on status combination and social participation.

F. Barth proposes three methods through which the maintenance of boundaries can be upheld: 1) the complexity is based on the existence of important, complementary cultural differences; 2) these differences must be generally standardized within the ethnic group, i.e. the status-cluster or social person of every member of a group must be highly stereotyped, so that inter-ethnic interaction can be based on ethnic identities; 3) the cultural characteristics of each ethnic group must be stable, so that the complementarity, on which the system rests, can persist in the face of a close inter-ethnic contact.[494]

Arguably, 'ethnic identity', with regard to the aforementioned mechanisms for the maintenance of boundaries, persists through the creation of "self" and "others" despite the existence of extensive relations and interactions among the ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society. Hence, it prevents the erosion and failure of the established boundaries during interactions among numerous ethnic groups. This implies that an ethnic group, in spite of the awareness of existing differences with others, acknowledges the importance of the complementarity principle which enforces interactions.

At the same time, how a change in the situation of one ethnic group by which complementarity and interdependence lose their significance can lead to a conflict in a process of interaction is not stated. Another scenario posited by A. Lentz is as follows:

> Ethnic pluralism implies an internal complexity with more or less unstable boundaries in respect to questions of dominance. These can lead to harsh forms of exploitation and resentment, when awareness of differences outweights [sic] the sense of belonging between members of separate strata.[495]

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493   See ibid., p. 19.
494   See ibid., p. 19.
495   See Lentz, Astrid, 1995, op. cit., p. 31.

According to A. Lentz, interdependence does not provide a sufficient argument for upholding the bond that connects ethnic groups and thereby stabilizes their social relations. The persistence of 'ethnic identity' in multi-ethnic societies may postulate a threat to the existence of such nations.

Although interdependence among ethnic groups is found in a plural society where two or more ethnic groups co-exist and complement one another in a social system, the preservation of ethnic boundaries which distinguishes the cultural, linguistic and religious identities of the respective ethnic groups can, however, not be ignored. Also, it is doubtful if the existence of ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic nation or state rests on mutual understanding and consensus of these culturally and linguistically distinct ethnic groups.

Equally, it is uncertain if the notion of 'ethnic identity' that can potentially hinder peaceful co-existence would still prevail in a country where ethnic groups voluntarily decide to live together. In view of this, the co-existence of several ethnic groups or the existence of multi-ethnic societies remains uncertain unless such a co-existence occurs because these numerous ethnic groups are forced together.

In an attempt to find adequate answers to these uncertainties, T. Eriksen, in reference to S. Furnivall, states the following:

> [Furnivall's] basic assumption was that these 'plural' societies were composed of groups which were socially and culturally discrete, which were integrated through economic symbiosis (or, in contemporary terms, through mutual interdependence) and the political domination of one group (i.e. colonial régime); but which were otherwise socially discrete as well as being distinctive in matters of language, religion and customs.[496]

T. Eriksen further maintains that there is an absence of shared values in such societies as he believes that the groups are amalgamated in a pseudo-mechanical way thorough the external political forces.[497] In addition, he characterizes societies where such forced integration of distinct groups exists as colonies: "These societies were potentially deeply divided according to [Furnivall's] theory, and the "ethnic" unrest which has time and again surfaced in some former colonies thus seems to confirm [his] theory."[498]

It is understood in the analysis that the so-called bond that connects different ethnic groups together in a multi-ethnic society can be described as artificial.

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496   Eriksen, Thomas Hylland: *Us and Them in Modern Societies: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Mauritius, Trinidad and Beyond*, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo 1992, p. 166. The statement in the text is written by S. Furnivall. For further readings, see Furnivall, J. Sydenham: *Colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1948.
497   See Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 1992, op. cit., p. 166.
498   Ibid.

Furthermore, along the same line of argument, the emergence of interdependence and complementarity among ethnic groups cannot be perpetual since co-existence is not based on mutual understanding, but rather on the decision of the respective ethnic groups in a coerced multi-ethnic society to manage the existing differences or to live side by side or to complement each other. Therefore, one can argue that 'ethnic identity', which is marked by the drawing of ethnic boundaries, prevails due to the absence of a mutual agreement on co-existence.

This raises questions with regard to modern societies, for example, Western industrialized countries, whose populace is also characterized by cultural, linguistic and religious differences. It is debatable if there is any given time-frame in which ethnic groups make decisions to live peacefully with one another in a given political, social and economic environment and how such nations manage their ethnic differences. T. Eriksen stipulates the following argument in response to the questions:

> If the focus of investigation is on the ethnic boundary which keeps ethnic groups discrete, as Barth […] has fruitfully suggested it ought to be, then one is still led to regard the total system as a 'unit of disparate parts', even if the analysis chiefly deals with the contact between members of different ethnic categories.[499]

One can perceive that no society can be characterized as integrative, because "every modern society is to some extent pluralistic; that is to say, it is socially and culturally differentiated."[500] So, the term *society* is itself contradictory in the way it is used because no multi-ethnic nation constitutes a society since its ethnic groups are culturally and socially distant from one another.[501] Therefore, all nations can be described as multi-ethnic, however the historical aspect of the emergence of these nations is significant for the maintenance of peace and order and how these nations manage ethnic differences is significant in this research. In as far as all countries are pluralistic, one can emphasize that the drawing of ethnic boundaries is a point of commonality.

Nonetheless, the roles of certain individuals or elites in stabilizing or manipulating ethnic diversity while in pursuit of political and economic resources are significant with respect to the construction of a national identity and consciousness. The subsequent sections will examine the second theory applied in this research, the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, which is used to complement the instrumentalist approach.

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499   Ibid., p. 166.
500   Ibid., p. 165.
501   See ibid., p. 165.

3.2.3 The Theoretical Aspect of Identity and Difference in Ethnicity

Aside from the primordialists' method and the instrumentalists' approach to ethnicity, it is important to examine the reasons why ethnic boundary lines are drawn in multi-ethnic countries so as to state and analyze the role of the notion of *identity and difference* in ethnicity.[502]

The theoretical perspective *of identity and difference* in ethnicity draws on the work of G. Schlee.[503] G. Schlee's method, as applied in this research, is to complement the instrumentalist approach which forms the theoretical basis of this research's theoretical background. Also, the method of *identity and difference* underpins the argument that human beings, in pursuit of and towards the realization of certain goals, behave in a rational manner.

G. Schlee, who attempts to depict how enemies are created, is of the view that 'ethnicity' can be perceived as a constant and a recurrent factor which, after a period of time, can generate conflicts.[504] Based on his emphasis and the role his method of *identity and difference* plays in complementing the instrumentalist approach, one can argue that certain actors/individuals tend to manipulate 'ethnicity' through the politics of inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups in a given environment in order to acquire material and political resources. Consequently, conflicts may erupt after a prolonged practice of the politics of inclusion and exclusion.

Therefore, if 'ethnicity' denotes a process of stipulating the lines of ethnic boundary in the form *self* and *others* based on specific traditions,[505] then the phenomenon *identity and difference* is used to dichotomize between "us" and "them". However, one can elucidate that the actors' *identity and difference*, in this sense, becomes significant and is encompassed within the framework of *cost-benefit calculations*.

In spite of that, it is important to clarify the theoretical position of G. Schlee and his approach towards the construction of the theory of ethnicity. It is in sync with the approach of this research work which is based on the assumption that ethnicity, in accordance with the analyses carried out in previous sections, is not the cause of conflicts unless it is politicized. The next sections will shed more light on this.

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502   The theoretical approach of identity and difference in ethnicity is based on the analysis and
       work of the social anthropologist G. Schlee, see Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit.
503   See ibid., p. 4.
504   See ibid.
505   See Orywal, Erwin/Hackstein, Katharina, 1993, op. cit., p. 593-609 (599).

3.2.3.1 Objections to and Illustrations of Ethnicity as the Source of Conflicts

G. Schlee maintains that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts, and goes on to argue this along with reference to six points of analysis. The six points will be presented in more detail in the following section.

One cannot refer to ethnicity as the source of conflicts without a thorough investigation of what characterizes the term 'ethnicity'. Based on this, G. Schlee's assertion that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts is based on the analyses and findings which he posits in line with the following six points on ethnicity:

1) Cultural differences, i.e. ethnicities, are the cause of ethnic conflicts.

2) The clash of different cultures reflects ancient, inherited and deeply root-ed oppositions.

3) Ethnicity is universal; that means every human belongs to an ethnic group.

4) Ethnicity is ascriptive; that means, as a rule, one cannot change one's ethnic affiliation.

5) A people is a community of shared descent.

6) Ethnic groups are territorial. They strive for a united territory and, even-tually, for national sovereignty.[506]

Henceforth, in reference to the points cited above through which G. Schlee but-tresses his argument to falsify the propositions and the general assumptions that ethnicity leads to conflicts, it is necessary for each argument to undergo further analysis and clarification.

A. Cultural Differences, i.e., Ethnicities Are the Cause of Ethnic Conflicts

G. Schlee, in affirming his position on the impact of ethnicity in conflicts re-volving around cultural differences, asserts that cultural differences may fulfill a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the eruption of conflicts.[507] The au-thor states that cultural differences, as the root of conflicts, can be acknowl-

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506   Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 4.
507   See ibid.

edged if the extent of the difference between the conflicting parties is reflective
of and can be quantified with the intensity of the conflicts. In addition, he notes,
in his observation of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia that the degree of exist-
ing differences between diverse ethnic groups cannot account for the outbreak
of the conflicts or their intensity. [508] His observation in the case of former
Yugoslavia, as an example, is presented as follows:

> As is the general belief, oppositions originating in the Middle Ages have broken out once
> more, and indeed the Serbs refer to the Battle of Kosovo Polje and identify modern Muslims as
> their then enemies. Ancient ethnic oppositions, only temporarily suppressed by a communist
> regime, have been said to collide. But, if ethnicity is a form of social identity, then it is fixed by
> definitions of self and other. That means nobody can have an ethnic affiliation which is un-
> known either to themselves or to others. Ethnicity cannot exist unless people are aware of it. [509]

With this, the writer provides further evidence of the dynamic feature of the
term 'ethnicity' and it is stated repeatedly that 'ethnicity' exists only in relation
to the "other". As a result, one can see that this analysis is congruent with the
position of this research study, namely that ethnicity is not the cause of con-
flicts, unless politicized. He emphasizes that the repressive nature of former
Yugoslav Republic leaders, which at that time was under the influence of the
Soviet Union, contributed to the preservation of the awareness or consciousness
of ethnic affiliation of the respective ethnic groups.

Consequently, ethnic identification became deeply manifested in the minds
of their ethnic groups.[510] It is stressed that attempts by the elites in the enforce-
ment of ethnic identity, manipulatively setting ethnic groups against one another
in former Yugoslavia, were initially rejected by the people as "many thousands
demonstrated in the streets of Sarajevo to support the preservation of their
multi-cultural community."[511] However, many of the demonstrators were killed
by government forces and everyone was, thereafter, compelled to choose an eth-
nic identification. Consequently, the creation of dichotomies, with regard to
raising the awareness of the differences among the ethnic groups, thus became
relevant:

> To be a 'Yugoslav' could not protect one from being killed or exiled as a 'Croat', 'Serb',
> 'Muslim', or, in a later phase, as a 'Kosovo Albanian'; in order to escape this fate one had to
> join together with those presented as one's own kind according to the ethnic principle—a
> development called 'becoming hostages of the militias' […]. [512]

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508   See ibid.
509   Ibid.
510   See ibid., p. 5.
511   Ibid.
512   Ibid.

Cultural distinctions, with regard to language differences, make clearer that the degree of linguistic differences between the ethnic groups in Bosnia was not significant because they all spoke Serbo-Croatian, despite slight variations. On the contrary, Slovenia is notably a different Slavic language in comparison with Serbo-Croatian, but the level of violence that engulfed the former Yugoslavia during the separation process of its federating units cannot be equated with the level of their differences if examined linguistically:

> […] it is striking that the linguistically clearly distinct Slovenians managed to secede comparatively peacefully from the federal state of Yugoslavia, whereas, among the linguistically hardly distinguishable Serbs, Croats, and Muslims of Bosnia, atrocities took place on a scale which had be believed to be no longer possible in Europe.[513]

In view of cultural differences, one can argue that ethnicity, i.e. language differences, is not a yardstick which determines the cause of conflicts, unless these differences are highlighted by ethnic entrepreneurs and elites.

A similar position is seen in the work of M. Collett in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. She agrees that "the creation of politically relevant identity is not based on any historical period but is constantly evolving in line with changing socio-economic grievances."[514] M. Collett, in her study of the circumstances that led to the Civil War in Côte d'Ivoire, doubts the claim that ethnic identities may have been politicized for economic reasons through elites' manipulation.[515] However, by this doubt, M. Collett's position contradicts the position of Van Dirk who maintains that manipulation implies the control of people's minds which means that people's beliefs such as knowledge, views and ideologies may influence their actions.[516] The significance of ethnic identification in the case of Yugoslavia can be traced back to the manipulative attitudes of the elites/ethnic entrepreneurs and the role of Slobodan Milosevic[517] in raising the ethnic awareness of the Serbs within the context of their relations to other ethnic groups.[518]

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513   See ibid., p. 5.
514   See Collett, Moya, 2006, op. cit., p. 628.
515   See ibid., p. 628.
516   See Van Dijk, A. Teun, 2006, op. cit., p. 365.
517   Slobodan Milosevic was a former acting head of state and the first of his kind to be charged with and tried by an international tribunal of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law, including genocide. He was the Serbian leader and then the President of Yugoslavia in 1990, at a time the country experienced the bloodiest wars in post-Second World War Europe, as hundreds of thousands of people were killed and misplaced by the Wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. See Roberson, B. Agneza, 2007, op. cit., p. 268-284.
518   See ibid.

Another example of where mere cultural differences cannot be perceived as the cause of conflicts is the case of the collapsed state of Somalia. If one believes that ethnicity, in terms of cultural differences, is the cause of conflicts, then the process that led to state collapse in Somalia does not point to ethnicity as a factor. Somalia was and is among very few countries, if not the only country in Africa, whose population is culturally, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous.[519] Somalia is, in spite of its cultural homogeneity, ravaged by clan and sub-clan conflicts which, consequently, led to its failure or collapse as a state. Therefore, "cultural homogeneity is not a guarantor of peaceful co-existence."[520] R. Tetzlaff notes that, in spite of the absence of any correlation between ethnicity and conflicts, the influence and the role of the *politicization of ethnicity* in conflicts, with respect to socio-economic conditions, cannot be ignored.[521]

B. Clash of Different Cultures Reflects Ancient, Inherited, Deeply Rooted Oppositions

It is debatable, with respect to the definition of ethnicity as a process that illustrates the arbitrary drawing of ethnic boundaries lines through the ascription of "self" and "others", that ethnicity is about the pursuit of certain interests.

Therefore, the reflection of ancient or deeply rooted oppositions in ethnic conflicts may not necessarily be sufficiently proven because ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but rather are constantly redefined. As G. Schlee opines, "the border between 'us'—the 'we'—and the 'other' is constantly being renegotiated."[522] The assertion that the clash of cultures reflects the reanimation of ancient, medieval and deeply rooted opposition between ethnic groups in a given

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519   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 6. The same argument can also be found in Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 11. The English translation: "The ethnic politicization as a reverse of political participation in uncertain times." The paraphrased version of the argument written in German that cultural differences do not lead to conflicts and that there is, therefore, no correlation between conflicts and ethnicity reads: "Dass aber nicht das Kriterium ethnischer Vielfalt an sich, sondern eher schon ethnische Dominanz einer Gruppe in Konkurrenz zu vielen anderen kleineren Ethnien konfliktträchtig ist […]." Ibid., p. 17.

520   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 6.

521   See Tetzlaff, Rainer, 2003, op. cit., p. 16. The German version reads: „Einen Determinismus zwischen Ethnizität und [Konflikt] gibt es offensichtlich nicht, was aber nicht bedeutet, dass in sozio-ökonomisch bedingten Konfliktfällen die *Politisierung von Ethnizität* nicht eine häufige Erscheinung wäre und zur Intensivierung von Kriegen erheblich beitragen kann." Ibid.

522   Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 6.

environment denotes ethnicity as a fixed phenomenon and reinforces the pri-
mordialist's claim. Although neither primordialism nor instrumentalism is dis-
cussed at this point, it is important to state that ethnic conflicts, in terms of eth-
nic differences that are based on nationalism, tend to resort back to ancient op-
position and distinctions.[523] For example, the Kalenjin in Kenya is an existing
ethnic group although the root of this ethnic group is not traceable earlier than
colonial times. G. Schlee agrees in his work that the elderly people are not
aware of the existence of the Kalenjin at any time before colonialism:

> However once the old people of today never knew they were Kalenjin. Although, the history of
> the Kalenjin cannot be traced back further than colonial times, and although originally only the
> educated knew how the European linguists drew dialect boundaries and defined ethnic groups
> and families, today the existence of the Kalenjin as an ethnic group, even highly politicized
> one, is beyond doubt.[524]

Accordingly, ethnicity, as a reflection of cultural clashes associated with per-
ceived historical oppositions, is a colonial construction. The same can be said of
the situation which led to the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. In this case, as M.
Collett argues, ethnicity is not based on reflected or deeply rooted ethnic antag-
onism, but rather opposition emerges due to economic competition and conse-
quently, "it is this that has defined the boundaries and the patterns of inclusion
of various political communities."[525] It is highlighted by M. Collett that the
labeling of identities which, in the long run, created the dichotomies prior to and
during the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, is not based on old animosities between
the opposing or conflicting groups but it is an invention of colonialism.[526] The
recourse to old myths and the reconstruction of the past in order to revive ethnic
identity, which may occur during an ongoing process of nationalism and the
agitation for self-rule by an ethnic group, can be traced back to the handiwork of
ethnic actors/ elite groups in order to mobilize followers. Such was the situation
that gave way to the establishment of the Eritrean state from Ethiopia in early
1990s. A. Bariagaber explains as follows:

> In its quest to mobilize the people of Tigray, the TPLF employed many tactics. First, it stressed
> the Tigrayan character of Axum—the seat of ancient 'Ethiopian' civilization and the origin of
> the Tigrigna and Amharic script; second, it emphasized the repeated Ethiopian victories over
> Egyptian, Mahdist and Italian forces in the latter half of the nineteenth century were essentially
> Tigrayan endeavors […].[527]

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523   See ibid., p. 6.
524   Ibid., p. 7.
525   Collett, Moya, 2006, op. cit., p. 617-618.
526   See ibid., p. 618.
527   Bariagaber, Assefaw, 1998, op. cit., p. 1062.

One can argue that reconstruction of myths, as used in the example above, is used to instigate communal action in order to help negotiate identity.[528] So, ethnicity, in regard to the clash of different cultures, is not dependent on any revival of ancient conflicts among ethnic groups. It is within the spectrum of nationalism that reference to ancient myths, as venerable references to historical roots, become important.[529] So, regarding the claim that that the re-emergence of ancient ethnic clashes is suppressed by external forces, for example, the experience of colonialism and communist regimes such as the former Soviet Union, the contrary is the case. In such circumstances, it can be argued that ethnic identities are created, reinforced and, enforced by external forces.

C. Universality of Ethnicity

Contrary to the assertion of the universality of ethnicity and its purported assumption stipulating that every human being belongs to an ethnic group, C. Brettell observes that the term 'ethnicity' is fluid and situational.[530] Furthermore, she states that "ethnicity could be constructed in specific social contexts, and often […] in order to achieve certain ends."[531] In a similar argument, G. Schlee asserts:

> In pre-colonial Africa it could be observed that a given group with a self-chosen name would regard the villages a little to the east or a little to the west as still affiliated to its own group: two or three villages further away, however, the inhabitants would be perceived as foreign. Changing the point of reference and switching to one or of the neighboring villages, we find out that this group considers itself as the centre of distribution of similar features.[532]

As a result, one can argue that ethnic groups do not possess outside boundaries that are fixed in as far as the term 'ethnicity' depicts changes and swings along the lines of ethnic boundaries between 'us' and 'others'.[533] As long as the phenomenon of ethnicity displays arbitrary shifting of borders, one can claim that it remains a continuous process. In addition to that, in so far as terms such as 'identity' and 'ethnic groups' are fluid, the phenomenon of ethnicity cannot be

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528   See ibid., p. 1056-1073.
529   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 7.
530   Brettell, B. Caroline: "Introduction: Race, Ethnicity, and the Construction of Immigrant Identities", in: Brettell, B. Caroline. [Ed.], in: *Constructing Borders/Crossing Boundaries: Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration*, Lexington Books, New York et al. 2007, p. 1-30 (11).
531   Ibid., p. 11.
532   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 7.
533   See ibid.

regarded as universal. In view of the proposition by G. Schlee regarding the universality of the subject matter, "ethnicity frequently only emerged as a result of colonial administration, when districts were divided according to the tribes allegedly settled there."[534]

On this note, ethnicity cannot be ascribed to any natural or universal structural principle of humanity.[535] Therefore, one can argue that 'ethnicity', in view of the fluidity of ethnic boundaries, is a social construct and in as far as ethnic boundaries are arbitrarily drawn, one cannot claim any fixity. Nonetheless, whenever ethnicity is referred to as fixed, in terms of ethnic boundary lines, then it is under political influence which enables the creation of similarities and differences in the form of a non-ethnic 'us' and ethnic 'others'. In this way, ethnic actors apply sentiments through which boundaries are drawn in order to distinguish themselves from other actors while in pursuit of certain interests.

D. Ethnicity Is Ascriptive

The claim that ethnicity is ascriptive implies a rule which determines that one cannot change one's ethnic affiliation. But it is questionable, considering the assertion that ethnicity ascribes 'us' and 'them' to create boundary lines between ethnic groups, to claim that a change of a person's ethnic affiliation is irreversible, which implies that *ethnic identity* is not subject to change.

G. Haaland's observation highlights the determinants in the change of identities between the ethnic groups Baggara and Fur in western Sudan.[536] The author expounds on the ethnic affiliation occurring between both ethnic groups as follows: "Through the nomadization process individuals are thus sloughed off from Fur local communities and eventually incorporated into Baggara communities."[537] He points out that the ethnic group Fur is sedentary while that of Baggara is nomadic in nature. In spite of the fact that the identities of Fur and Baggara are associated with different value standards with respect to the evaluation of goods and activities, one may perceive that the ethnic boundaries be-

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534   Ibid.
535   See ibid., p. 7.
536   See Haaland, Gunnar: "Economic Determinants in Ethnic Processes", in: Barth, Fredrik (Ed.): *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Johansen and Nielsen Boktrykkeri, Oslo 1969, p. 58-73 (69-70).
537   Ibid., p. 67-68. The author believes that "the articulation of *Fur* and *Baggara* is thus mainly based on the complementarity of goods and services connected with their different subsistence patterns."Ibid., p. 65. Emphasis in original.

tween both ethnic groups are loose. Despite the cultural distinctions between both ethnic groups, with respect to ways of life, subsistence patterns, overt cultural features such as language, house type, weapons, and standards for evaluation of performance, it is important to state that changes in ethnic identity take place between the sedentary Fur and the Baggara nomads on the basis of economic determinants.[538]

The following assertion clarifies the changes which occur in the identity of a nomadized Fur from an economic perspective: 'A successful economic career among the *Fur* thus starts in the village and leads to nomadic migrations within the *Fur* area, and finally ends up with the long rainy season migrations to the *Baggara* area.'[539] Hence, one can see that a Fur, whose intention is to accumulate capital through cattle rearing, takes a nomadic style of living by migrating out of the Fur area in order to attach himself to the camp of Arabic speaking nomads. The consequence of his action may be that his children grow up learning Arabic and find spouses in the Baggara communities.[540] In view of this process of nomadization that some Fur people undergo, their descendants will not learn the Fur culture and this may result in a disappearing line in local Fur genealogies.[541]

The question which may arise is if the Baggara do not draw lines of ethnic boundaries in order to distinguish themselves from the Fur nomads. One notes that a Fur who establishes himself as a nomad is characterized by several socio-cultural traits which differentiate him from a sedentary Fur. As a result, one can observe from a cultural perspective regarding the relationships between marriage partners that there exists a greater resemblance between the nomadized Fur and the Baggara than between the nomadized and sedentary Fur.[542]

In addition, one may discern that ecological conditions make it possible for a Fur who keeps cattle and wants to acquire a greater economic advantage from it to become nomadized. G. Haaland emphasizes that there are no diacritica that

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[538]   See ibid., p. 59. Both the Baggara and the Fur are Muslims. In reference to religious affiliation, they interact on ritual occasions. Ibid., p. 59. There is a form of interdependence which takes place between the Baggara and the Fur. It is stipulated that in the market place they provide complementary goods. While the Baggara supply milk and livestock as nomads, the Fur supply agricultural products of which millet is of significance to the Baggara. One can see another form of interaction between both ethnic groups. See ibid., p. 59.

[539]   Ibid., p. 64-65.

[540]   See ibid., p. 65.

[541]   See ibid., p. 65.

[542]   It is further asserted that if one considers social forms as a criterion for the changes in identity that takes place, one can argue that the family structure of a nomadized Fur changes his or her identity automatically to Baggara as soon as such a nomadized Fur adopts Baggara ideas about marriage. See ibid., p. 65.

distinguish a nomadized Fur identity from that of the Baggara. Furthermore, it is through linguistic differences by which one may observe that the daily conversation is Fur and not Arabic and, by that, one can distinguish between them.[543] In line with this, the author states as follows:

> By their inventory of objective traits, these nomadized *Fur* therefore can neither be classified unambiguously as *Fur* nor as *Baggara*. They seem to be persons in an intermediate position exhibiting traits associated with both of these ethnic groups, and if these traits are the basis for classification one is led to see them as constituting a transitional category.[544]

This, however, raises the question of how the Fur identify themselves and how they are identified by others. One can perceive in view of the categorical dichotomization that a nomadized Fur is expected to behave like a Baggara and a person who pursues and practices nomadic subsistence categorized as a Baggara. Nonetheless, being a former sedentary Fur, his or her interaction with the farmers in the Fur communities makes communication easier. The fact that a nomadized Fur sees himself or herself as Fur and not as Baggara is of no significance, although the nomadized Fur becomes accepted again as a member of a local Fur community if he fails as a nomad despite the fact that nomadism is an irreversible choice.[545] Therefore, with regard to the case of so-called irreversible nomadism, the argument that ethnicity and ethnic identities are irreversible notions becomes questionable. Certain changes in ethnic identities which occur between the Fur and Baggara are reflected in the following statement:

> Nomadized *Fur* may therefore be regarded by other *Baggara* as inferior, but this means they are inferior as *Baggara*, not that they are an inferior ethnic group. The inclusion of successful *Fur* nomads in *Baggara* camps and their marriages with members of *Baggara* tribes are facts that validate this assertion.[546]

One can see from this perspective that the role performance of a nomadized Fur is what is judged and not his or her ethnic origin. In view of this, changes in ethnic identity occur in line with the argument that ethnicity is fluid and not static. That ethnicity is irreversible, in reference to the example of the Fur and the Baggara, cannot be proven. G. Schlee also opines that ethnic affiliation can help adjust to the new surroundings and in consideration of such a factor ethnicity can be changed.[547] Despite the changes of identity, G. Haaland is of the opinion that political situations may present a different picture of the relationship between the Baggara and the Fur:

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543 See ibid., p. 68.
544 Ibid.
545 See ibid.
546 Ibid., p. 71.
547 See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 8.

> In situations characterized by inter-ethnic tensions and warfare, the restrictions on change of identity would be radically different from what they are in the present situation where peace is maintained by the central administration […].[548]

The proposition that ethnicity is ascriptive becomes discernible within the context of the nomadized Fur by the sedentary Fur in reference to the irreversible status of a nomadized Fur. However, how this differentiation can cause conflict or determine the drawing of ethnic boundaries lines is not stated. Having said that, as indicated above, it is not clarified how political situations can influence the drawing of ethnic boundaries between the nomadized Fur, Baggara and sedentary Fur.

E. A People Is a Community of Shared Descent

The assertion that an ethnic group constitutes a community of shared descent essentially depends on the identity of the people involved. However, the influence of political aspects in the identity formation of a particular ethnic group deserves attention.

G. Schlee and E. Watson claim, in consideration of the role of political identity, that there are different ways through which people claim the same identity while some people still distinguish themselves further due to slight ideological differences or political views.[549] According to G. Schlee, one can see that identification with someone can be narrower or wider depending on the conditions whether or not it is beneficial for a person or a group of people to define wider identities that they share with others.[550] Therefore, "the connections between ethnic boundaries of descent groups are rather loose."[551] It is possible that, though not proven unless empirically researched on a case-to-case basis, the surroundings in which one intermarries are smaller than one's ethnic group as it can comprise elements from other ethnic groups.[552]

On this basis, one cannot claim that a community or an ethnic group is made of people from the same descent. Therefore, J. Hutchinson and A. Smith

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548   See Haaland, Gunnar, 1969, op. cit., p. 72.
549   See Schlee, Günther: "Introduction", in: Schlee, Günther/Watson, E. Elizabeth [Eds.]: *Changing Identification and Alliances in North-East Africa*, Vol. 2, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford 2009, p. 1-13 (1).
550   See ibid., p. 1.
551   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 8.
552   See ibid., p. 8.

explain that the idea of ethnic group as a community of common origin in time and space is a myth which gives an ethnic group a sense of kinship.[553]

F. Ethnic Groups Are Territorial

The claim that ethnic groups are territorial and they, as a result, strive to establish a united territory for a national sovereignty is doubtful,[554] because any demand by an ethnic group for the creation of its own nation may result in the nullification of this assertion. At the same time, there is no evidence so far to support the assumption that the demand for national sovereignty leads to ethnic conflicts.

Therefore, in consideration of the assumption that ethnic groups struggle to create their own nation which may lead to the eruption of ethnic conflicts in a multi-ethnic state, it is not certain why there is no threat to nationhood in some countries in which the demands for the formation of ethnic groups' identity persist while the situation in others where similar demands are made by ethnic groups frequently escalate into violence. G. Schlee responds to some of these uncertainties in the following argument:

> The territorial state, particularly the so-called nation state, is an especially modern development originating in Western Europe. It does not represent a universal development trend. In many places, it is only an external structure imposed on an entirely different set of popular self-identifications.[555]

If one concurs that the concept of the nation or nation-state is alien to some countries outside Western Europe, for example in the decolonized states in Africa and Latin America, it cannot be ascertained that the lack of ethnic homogeneity in these states is responsible for the outbreaks of ethnic conflicts because the example of Somalia, as discussed earlier, is a case that stand counter to such a thesis and moreover very few countries in the world are truly ethnically homogeneous.[556] So, one may raise questions on how some of these countries manage their ethnic groups in order to stem the demand for the creation of nations within a nation. Despite the fact that the most difficult form of political advancement is the creation of nation-states, a problem that persists until the present time in many countries, it is disputable that national consciousness can

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553   See Hutchinson, John/Smith, D. Anthony [Eds.], 1996, op. cit., p. 7.
554   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 9.
555   See ibid.
556   See ibid.

be developed among numerous ethnic groups and, through that, prevent the out-
breaks of conflicts among ethnic groups or conflicts between ethnic groups and
the state. G. Schlee, in response to these doubts, believes that national cohesion
can be derived thus:

> In by far the majority of cases the problem is to deal with difference below organizational level
> of a 'nation'. Often this is done by territorial or other group privileges, by ethnic specialization
> in occupational niches (thereby avoiding competition but introducing discrimination), and pro-
> tection of minorities, etc.[557]

If territorial privileges are given priority by ethnic specialization in occupational
niches which can be used as tool in avoiding competition, however, with respect
to this argument, it is yet to be clarified how peace can be maintained in situa-
tions where one ethnic group occupying a particular niche endowed more with
natural resources like crude oil, gold, diamonds, etc. than the other ethnic
groups.

F. Barth, in his analysis of ethnic boundaries from an ecological perspec-
tive, postulates the argument about the occupations of niches by ethnic groups
with regard to the interdependence of these ethnic groups.[558] In as far as inter-
dependence of ethnic groups is not necessarily a guarantee towards the advance-
ment of a national consciousness in a multi-ethnic nation, the absence of compe-
tition may not as well. In order to guarantee peace, the writer postulates certain
scenarios that may exist where two or more ethnic groups interact as follows:

> 1) They may occupy clearly distinct niches in the natural environment and be in minimal com-
> petition for resources. In this case, their interdependence will be limited despite co-residence in
> the area, and the articulation will tend to be mainly through trade, and perhaps in a ceremonial-
> ritual sector.

> 2) They may monopolize separate territories, in which case they are in competition for re-
> sources and their articulation will involve politics along the border, and possibly other sectors.

> 3) They may provide important goods and services for each other, i.e. occupy reciprocal and
> therefore different niches but in close interdependence. If they do not articulate very closely in
> the political sector, this entails a classical symbiotic situation and a variety of possible fields of
> articulation. If they also compete and accommodate through differential monopolization of the
> means of production, this entails a close political and economic articulation, with open possi-
> bilities for other forms of articulation and interdependence as well.[559]

As F. Barth points out, the scenarios stated above can be maintained in terms of
stable situations. It is possible that one group displaces the other in a situation

557   Compare ibid.
558   See Barth, Fredrik, 1969, op. cit., p. 19.
559   See ibid., p. 19-20.

where two or more groups are in partial competition within the same niche[560] and if this scenario exists within the context of modern nation-states, as J. Rothschild asserts, then conflicts may erupt as a result:

> [M]odern states have sought to base their legitimacy on democratic claims and have simultaneously purported to be, or striven to become, nation-states expressing and enhancing specific national cultures. These pretensions and claims immediately posed the problems of ethnic assimilation, acculturation, discrimination, and rights: and ethnic response to the pretensions and claims led to many political upheavals, boundary changes, and inter-state tensions.[561]

Contrary to the position presented by J. Rothschild, G. Schlee maintains that in dealing with differences of ethnic groups in a nation-state, individuals can be granted rights and obligations by the political system irrespective of whether individuals belong to one ethnic group or the other that make up the system.[562]

C. Brettell argues that the concept of ethnicity stresses the boundaries between 'us' and 'others', however, she questions who defines the boundaries if an emphasis on forging internal solidarity, contrasting solidarity, or both is given priority.[563] In addition, she claims that actors are free to construct particular identities in certain situations, but that their choices are restricted by the larger society within which they operate.[564]

Although C. Brettell also portrays ethnicity as a variable, manipulative and by definition unfixed and changing,[565] nevertheless, it can be argued that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts but rather a phenomenon that emerges or attains new shapes and functions in the course of conflicts.[566] Therefore, one can argue that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts until it is politicized. It is observed that the six propositions, especially the first one pointing to cultural differences as the cause of conflicts, display certain flaws, which G. Schlee summarizes as follows:

> The popular theory disregards both micro-level identity changes through which people acquire new group affiliations, and the historical dimension, i.e. larger-scale changes over a longer period, including changes in the cultural content of a given identity, changes in social group boundaries defining an identity, and changes in a given identity's role in broader cultural and economic contexts.[567]

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560   See ibid., p. 20.
561   See Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 42.
562   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 9.
563   See Brettell, B. Caroline, 2007, op. cit., p. 12.
564   See ibid.
565   See ibid.
566   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 9.
567   See ibid., p. 9-10.

The author dismisses the cultural differences along with the other five propositions as the cause of conflicts. In his opinion, with respect to the drawing of ethnic boundary lines, the limitation of competition among numerous ethnic groups constitutes one of the possibilities through which the co-existence of diverse ethnic groups can be managed. He believes that famous theories about ethnic conflicts and the clash of cultures such as the work of E. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", which is critically based on S. Huntington's position in *The Clash of Civilizations*,[568] lack appropriateness, and hence ought to be ignored.[569] Any theory which capitalizes on cultural diversities is to be examined thoroughly as it may signify differences that are used as raw material for political rhetoric.[570] In spite of that, the question of *who opposes who in a conflict situation* is posed within the theoretical framework of identity and difference. In order to analyze his theoretical work, some criteria will be examined in the next section.

3.2.3.2 Theoretical Basis: The Theory of Identity and Difference in Ethnicity

Having briefly stated the theoretical basis of this research in previous chapters, it is of importance to examine and analyze the question of social identification and affiliation in this section. This is not to dispute the instrumentalist approach which regards ethnicity within the context of contested resources, but rather to integrate and complement it.

The application of the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity is important in so far it aids in the identification of the actors involved in conflict situations. That means, it aims at identifying actors, either individuals or organizations, responsible for the politicization of ethnicity to instigate conflicts.

G. Schlee shifts his focus with respect to this complementary theory on violent conflicts and the factors that determine the course of such conflicts. Therefore, one may perceive the essentiality of identity and differences as key terms in his method which he describes as follows:

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568   Said, W. Edward: "The Clash of Ignorance", in: *The Nation,* Vol. 273 (12), 2001, p. 11-13. In this essay, E. Said criticizes S. Huntington not on his assertion that "the great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural", but rather in reference to Huntington's analysis in *The Clash of Civilizations* in which he dichotomizes the world into the superior-civilized industrialized Christian world and the traditional-uncivilized Muslim "other". See ibid., p. 11-13.

569   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 10.

570   See ibid., p. 12.

> I wish to shift my accent from the objects to the subjects of violent conflict. My main concern is the question of social identification and affiliation. According to which characteristics do people group into complex social structures? By which characteristics do they distinguish between friends and enemies? By what criteria do they form alliances or coalitions?[571]

One can see some parallels to the proposition of this research work regarding the question of who politicizes ethnicity and how it is politicized. Although, unless the second part of this thesis, which is the empirical aspect, is taken into consideration, one may not be able to give appropriate answers to the questions. Moreover, in a conflict, it is important to understand that questions such as 'who with whom?' and 'who against whom?' cannot be ignored.[572] Despite the fact that the central focus is shifted, the role ethnicity plays in determining the actors politicizing ethnicity during the course of conflicts cannot be overemphasized.

It is understood that the identities of actors change during conflicts and this process does not concern the resources being pursued or contested among the ethnic groups or individuals that represent the respective ethnic groups, but rather who these groups or the individuals that represent them are. In view of this, the question of identity is significant in recognizing the actors involved. The following gives more insight on the construction of identity:

> Taking narrower or broader criteria of the same general category to alter the inclusiveness of the intended collective identification is one way to formulate identities of different scope. Another way to do this is by changing the category of criteria. If one wants to enlarge one's group definition in a conceptual space in which religious commonality is perceived as more widespread than shared linguistic features, one might change from a linguistic group definition to a religious one.[573]

Hence, the influence of switching in the way people change from one category of criteria to the other in order to include or exclude certain people determines who is with 'us' and who is the 'other'. As a result, R. Cohen acknowledges that the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic group play significant roles in identity changes:

> I would define ethnicity as a series of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. The process of assigning persons to groups is both subjective and objective, carried out by self and others, and depends on what diacritics are used to define membership. Ethnic groups are then those widest scaled subjectively utilized modes of identification used in interactions among and between groups.[574]

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571   Ibid., p. 13.
572   See ibid.
573   See Schlee, Günther, 2009, op. cit., p. 2.
574   Cohen, Ronald: "Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology", in: *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 7, 1978, p. 379-403 (385, 387).

Based on this account, it can be seen that without ethnic groups the notion of ethnicity cannot be applied in the process of identification with respect to who belongs and who can be excluded. In addition, ethnic identity denotes a process through which persons are assigned to one ethnic group or the other. This implies that ethnic boundaries are created, maintained, and changed,[575] swinging to reflect the needs of the ethnic actors/elites.

However, with regard to the importance of identity and difference in the theory of ethnicity by G. Schlee, ethnic boundaries are drawn based on what the author portrays as a form of identification processes shaped by cost-benefit calculations and social structures.[576] Therefore, one can argue that the question of how lines are drawn in conflict situations is not easy to determine and cannot be overestimated. G. Schlee is of the same opinion: "We know little about the patterns of identification and the ways in which people group themselves, form alliances and break up and regroup themselves in conflict situations."[577] Thereby, the importance of advantages and disadvantages in joining a group in a conflict situation or breaking up an alliance is paramount in the process of identification.

Irrespective of the material interests that may be achieved when one considers why one group forms an alliance with another group or groups against another, it is doubtful whether the formation of groups depends only on economic interests. At this juncture, the reason why an enemy's image is constructed remains unclear. This may imply that in any given environment, for example, in a nation, people with diverse languages, religions, customs, etc. can co-exist in harmony if there is no pursuit of economic or political interests whatsoever that can lead to the construction of the 'other' through categorization and exclusion. Moreover, the issue at hand deals with violent conflicts which produce casualties of different magnitudes depending on the types of weapons used and the interests in contestation. Also, it is elucidated that the actions of individuals belonging to a certain ethnic group can consciously or unconsciously implicate and drag the other members of a certain ethnic group, as a collective, into a conflict against their will. On this basis, one tends to ask whether the risks are worth it because G. Schlee believes that ethnic groups join one another to form an alliance against perceived opponent(s) or adversaries.[578]

However, it is important to mention that there are reasons why people take sides in a violent conflict, based on concepts and categories. In this sense, the

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575   See Schlee, Günther, 2009, op. cit., p. 156.
576   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 14.
577   Ibid., p. 14.
578   See ibid., p. 15.

manner in which people classify themselves and others is systematic in nature and applies a certain logic and plausibility structure.[579] The following citation gives more insight:

> [O]ne also needs a plausible claim to an identity or a plausible reason for rejecting it. If plausible alternatives are lacking, one might be forced by one's own logic and the expectations of others to join the fight on a given side. The other type of reason concerns the advantages and disadvantages that may arise from such identifications and such decision to take sides: in other words with costs and benefits of taking sides.[580]

This reveals that the extent to which the concept of identity may be deployed is an indication of the numerous ways in which people reason with respect to their identities and the changes that occur. However, whenever people change their identity for one reason or another, actors replace categories to fit their own needs.[581] So, "these needs often have to do with the size of a group or alliance: one either seeks a wider alliance or tries to keep others out, to exclude them from sharing in certain benefits."[582] One can assume that people act rationally since it is a matter of the costs and benefits when taking certain actions. Based on this view, if people group and re-group themselves, then there is a particular reason for doing so. The notion of rationality is mentioned in several occasions regarding what may trigger the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs. But is rationality a useful concept? As the author stipulates, rationality can be approached from different perspectives:

> Rationality comes in several ways as humans aggregate into larger units. One may try to join a group for specific reasons. Such an attempt may be rejected on equally rational grounds. A group may increase its homogeneity and the consistency of its aims and strategies by excluding dissidents. Or, alternatively, in the process of accommodating new members it may modify its self-description and aims.[583]

As a result, membership in one ethnic group is not necessarily compelling if a member perceives his belonging to that ethnic group as disadvantageous in certain situations.

From the above, the socioeconomic forces undergird decisions of belonging or not belonging. But it may be difficult to perceive the decision of an ethnic group membership either from social or economic reasons. In response to this uncertainty, G. Schlee is of the view that when people make a choice about their ethnic group, it is done purposefully for specific reasons:

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579   See ibid.
580   Ibid.
581   See ibid.
582   See ibid., p. 15.
583   See ibid.

> People reason about the group boundaries they draw, they invent or select ancestors, and they classify languages and dialects in order to show that these boundaries make particular sense in precisely the way they have been drawn. Smaller units thus delineated are part of larger units, so we find system of categories and taxonomies.[584]

Considering this, on the one hand, it is not the primordial sentiments that are crucial in the creation of 'us' and 'others', but rather actors who dichotomize and there is no limitation to the extent to which one can associate or dissociate oneself from others.

However, on the other hand, if ethnicity's moral authority and its demand for member-loyalty are highly dependent on primordial characteristics such as language, religion and kinship, then it may be impossible for members to change their ethnic membership and, thereby, draw their own boundaries. Therefore, it is uncertain if ethnic conflicts erupt based on primordial ties such as cultural commitment, religion and kinship or on perceived ethnic inequalities in terms of access to political, economic, educational and administrative resources.[585] It is claimed by J. Rothschild that a favored ethnic group can become militant when it perceives its domination to be threatened by others.[586] As a result, one may understand why two or more ethnic groups may join together and form an ad hoc alliance in order to confront or fight the perceived enemy which, in a multi-ethnic society, may be the dominant ethnic group. Similarly, the change of partners in the course of conflicts occurs because of the benefits which actors seek in making such moves. Also, in certain circumstances, the decision to support one group in violent conflicts against the other may be beyond one's control. Therefore, one can understand the flexibility and fluidity in creating identities.

R. Cohen stresses the same point in his argument about the processes of inclusion and exclusion based on a range of 'nesting dichotomizations'.[587] It is stated further by C. Brettell that "somewhat contrary to Barth, that ethnic group boundaries, rather than being stable and continuous, are 'multiple and overlapping sets of ascriptive loyalties that make for multiple identities'."[588] Still along the same line of argument, she maintains that "depending on the context, individuals will invoke one or more of these nested identities or social locations."[589]

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584   See ibid.
585   See Rothschild, Joseph, 1981, op. cit., p. 38-39.
586   See ibid., p. 39.
587   Cohen, Ronald, 1978, op. cit., p. 387.
588   Brettell, B. Caroline, 2007, op. cit., p. 10.
589   Ibid.

According to S. Castle and J. Miller, ethnicity gains its importance socially and politically "when it is linked to processes of boundary drawing between dominant groups and minorities."[590] Nonetheless, such boundaries can also be drawn between ethnic minorities as well depending on the parameters upon which they are drawn.[591] More on this is in the next section.

3.2.3.3 Further Theory of Ethnicity: Decision Theory of Identity and Differences

This research, especially this particular chapter, analyzing the theoretical background, has mentioned a number of times that ethnic groups decide to draw their boundaries in relation to other ethnic groups based on the cost and benefits of such undertakings. In addition, it is highlighted that identity formations among ethnic groups occur in different ways and manners depending on the yardsticks to which actors attach importance when these particular identities are constructed.

Nevertheless, it is essential to state that some of the factors that are significant in constructing identities vary. Despite the significance of individual's rationality, the consideration of cost and benefits in conflicts is of utmost importance and is given the highest priority. Based on these cost-benefit factors, ethnic groups decide on the so-called *options of identification* in the following manner: *'Who with whom forms an alliance and against whom'?* This is what G. Schlee refers to as a decision theory which deals with conditions under which diverse types of identification are given preferences such as 'who takes whose side in a conflict'.[592]

However, it is important to state that the empirical part of this study will clarify how identities, in political situations, are constructed to achieve some goals and dismantled again after realizing the goals. G. Schlee, in order to depict and analyze the decision theory of identification, introduces and systematizes his theoretical framework into three different categories which are also interconnected, as illustrated below:

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590   Castles, Stephen/Miller, J. Mark: *The Age of Migration*, 3rd edition, Guilford Press, New York 2003, p. 35.
591   See Brettell, B. Caroline, 2007, op. cit., p. 11.
592   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 22.

A. Social Structures and their Cognitive Representations

It is important to note that the semantic aspects of identity concepts are signifi-
cant to social structures and their cognitive identifications. The following argu-
ment indicates the relevance of languages based on the influence of semantic
distinction in the decisions that actors make during the processes of group for-
mation:

> People identify themselves and others using criteria such as language, religion, descent, and
> other dimensions of identification. The identity concepts found in these different domains, for
> example ethnonyms, names of languages or religious communities, are not isolated words but
> form semantic fields. They are parts of taxonomies and defined by contrasts and equivalencies
> with each other.[593]

From the above, one can see that humans socially identify themselves on the
basis of criteria such as language, religion, ancestry and other dimensions of
identification. Based on these categories, the implication is that people distin-
guish in the form of 'us' and 'others'. Nonetheless, one may perceive that many
possibilities are available to create new identities or even construct enemies in
form of the 'other'. In view of this, partners can always be changed regarding on
whether one opts for a narrower or a wider identification. Besides, since the de-
cision to enlarge or downsize an ethnic group depends on cost-benefit consid-
erations, one can argue that identities, in this sense, leave room for manipula-
tion.

    Along the same line of argument, G. Elwert asserts that ethnic names, speci-
fic types of music, traditional norms, etc., embody the inventory which groups
may draw upon so as to construct their boundaries and their identities.[594] Irre-
spective of that claim, G. Schlee opines that "social identities cannot be made at
will, because they have to be plausible to others."[595] In this case, although se-
mantic domains can hinder the fluidity in creating and arbitrary changing of
identities because it is subject to plausibility, it cannot, however, prevent its oc-
currence.

    Furthermore, the author postulates that there is a limit to which identities
can be manipulated. Identity, as already explained, is a concept that is fluid and
can be constructed randomly, however, it is not explained how one can restrict
its manipulation. One important aspect which the author discerns as a limitation
to changes and manipulation of identities is the systemic logic of semantic do-

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593   See ibid., p. 25.
594   See Elwert, Georg, 2002, op. cit., p. 38.
595   See Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 25.

mains and social conventions.[596] But does this mean that changes of identity can be restrained in view of the weight given to semantic domains and customs as potential limitations to the manipulation of identities? If that is the case, it is unclear how people can construct and manipulate identities in political scenes. Consequently, it is not ascertained if manipulation and changes of identities are non-existent with regard to politicized ethnicity.

When one examines another of G. Schlee's analyses, the process of identity may be understood from another point of view, based on the belief that "successful identity politics requires the means of inclusion and means of exclusion, and the capacity to switch from one of these discourses to the other."[597] Considering this, it can be argued that semantic domains and social conventions can limit the change and manipulation of identities, however, they cannot hinder it permanently.

O. Nnoli is of the view that ethnic identities can change: "This tendency for ethnic groups to change and the lack of homogeneity in the ethnic groups suggest that individual dynamic is an essential element of ethnicity"[598] Therefore, the empirical part of this study will clarify whether some of these claims can be proven.

B. The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion

What strikes whenever the term *politics* is considered as a factor that is significant within the theoretical framework of the decision theory of identification in ethnicity is that power, manipulation, and the sharing of particular resources may be involved. Since the politics of inclusion and exclusion is important in the formation of groups, one can argue that the size of the group is a determinant in the distribution of the resources available.

In addition, in as far as actors think rationally, they construct identities towards the realization of certain goals upon which the decision on the group size becomes important: "Within the range of identification, special attention has to be attributed to the size of the groups or categories circumscribed by alternative identity concepts."[599]

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596   See ibid., p. 25.
597   See Schlee, Günther, 2009, op. cit., p. 1.
598   Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1995, op. cit., p. 10.
599   Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 25.

Based on this assertion, it can be argued that ethnic groups, in respect to the pursuit of both symbolic and material resources, can be further subdivided into small groups or grouped into larger groups. However, in view of the distribution of the resources at stake, ethnic groups may strengthen themselves through the incorporation of other ethnic groups for the sake of expansion while in pursuit of that goal. But once the aim is achieved, they can opt for a smaller group in order to have a larger share of the resources. The argument of G. Schlee supports this claim thus:

> Group size may only be a first and rough approximation to [sic] strength, which may be the real issue. Not all allies count alike. Mere calculations of size may be modified by considerations of economic power, organizational ability, cultural prestige or military capability.[600]

That this decision may lead to conflicts or result in the reluctance of the excluded groups in future alliance formation may vary from one country to another and, therefore, depends on the conflict situation of the countries and societies under investigation.

Although actors opt for wider or narrower identities, depending on the situation they find themselves, as mentioned, it is vital to state at this juncture that widening or narrowing group identities, in reference to the categories that actors find important at that point in time, can occur within the same language group. In this sense, actors can opt for a narrower identity formation by categorizing people of the same linguistic ethnic group further through dialects. This argument can be read in the work of G. Schlee as follows:

> One can opt for wider or narrower identities within the same dimension (e.g., within the linguistic dimension one can put the emphasis on panslavism or, more narrowly, on being a Croatian-speaker; within the religious dimension one can identify with Christianity as a whole or with just one small elect sect, etc.), or one can change from one dimension to another (e.g., from a linguistically based ethno-nationalism to a religious identification, if the latter offers the wider alliance, or excludes people one wants to keep out).[601]

Arguably, it is hereby shown that there are numerous ways through which particular identities can be constructed, therefore the argument of G. Elwert may be acceptable because it depicts the dynamics and flexibility in shaping and reshaping boundaries of ethnic groups.[602] His view on the role *switching*, as a process, plays in drawing ethnic boundary lines is stated as follows:

> The dynamics of maintaining or reshaping boundaries, of defining values and institutions as core ones is the product of tensions within the socio-political context. This is valid whether the

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600   Ibid., p. 25.
601   Ibid., p. 25.
602   See Elwert, Georg, 2002, op. cit., p. 37.

"identity" sought for is the ideologized sentiment of value ascription or the definable charac-
teristic of real or invented cultural traits.[603]

It can be deduced from the above that identity is fluid in the sense that groups or
individuals of an ethnic group may simultaneously belong to other different ref-
erence groups depending on the opportunity of situations that may require stres-
sing one or the other of these affiliations as their true one.[604]

Furthermore, it is asserted by G. Schlee that "on the level of larger groups
and their interactions, only some members actively engage in identity dis-
courses."[605] Moreover, there are fewer people involved in identity manipulation
and who are successful in being able to widen or narrow the group memberships
or inter-group alliances.[606] As a result, it is important to identify and distinguish
between the people that change identities and the ones that are affected by these
changes.[607] The third category will be examined next.

C. The Economics of Group Size and Social Position

Although the issue of cost and benefits in narrowing or widening identifications
has already been discussed, the implications for the ethnic groups involved in
terms of who gains and who loses has not yet been analyzed. It is important to
note that such an enterprise, with regard to the costs and benefits of either en-
larging the group or reducing it, is undertaken in order to gain access to power
and prestige.

In addition, while some actors gain access to resources, others lose access to
the same resources at the same time. One can argue that the economics of group
size and social position deals with the distribution of resources and the politics
involved. G. Schlee indicates this as follows:

Narrower or wider identifications and those which imply differential access to power and pres-
tige have to be analyzed in terms of costs and benefits to those who make decisions about them
and to those who are affected by such decisions. To single out the dimension of size: a wide
alliance may be useful in obtaining certain benefits, but narrower definitions might be pre-
ferred when it comes to sharing these same benefits.[608]

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603   Ibid., p. 37.
604   See ibid., p. 39.
605   Schlee, Günther, 2008, op. cit., p. 25.
606   See ibid., p. 25-26.
607   See ibid., p. 26.
608   Ibid.

How members of a group who are excluded in sharing the benefits meant for all react to such a marginalization varies from one country to the other. At the same time, how people are included and later excluded when, according to G. Schlee, the 'distribution of the booty' takes place will be investigated empirically because exclusion in this sense can play a significant role in the outbreak of conflicts.

Having discussed the two theoretical approaches in the last two important chapters, the following section will emphasize the relevance of the two methods applied.

3.2.3.4 Relevance of Two Approaches: Instrumentalist and Decision Theories

The combination of the instrumentalist approach of ethnicity and the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity indicates that both theories complement each other according to the theoretical framework of this research.

On the one hand, instrumentalism can be described as an objective theory, as its positions concern viewing ethnicity as an instrument of mobilization of forces, based on membership of certain symbols like religion, culture, language etc., by ethnic actors for manipulative purposes while in pursuits of personal goals. Therefore, it can be observed that the objective of this manipulative or politicized ethnicity may be political, material and symbolic resources, a development that shows that, whichever way, it all depends on resources. As a result, ethnicity from an instrumentalist/situationist point of view is personal and, therefore, objective in so far as the objectives of actors politicizing ethnicity are geared towards the attainment of resources. Nevertheless, from all indication in the analysis, this theory alone is not sufficient to analyze the politicization of ethnicity and produce adequate solutions in order to reduce, prevent and eradicate the problems associated with politicized ethnicity.

On the other hand, the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity is understood in the research study as a subjective theory. This denotes that how and why groups form alliances against another group or groups is of paramount importance to this theoretical approach, which implies also that there is a reason why people construct an image of the enemy. And, since the perceived enemies, as analyzed in the study, do not exist by nature, but are, moreover, constructed, then the way in which ethnic groups join forces and form alliances in order to confront their perceived enemy or adversary is important, which, over and above, shows that the manner of "who with whom against whom" is vital to this

theory. This method underscores the importance of ethnic affiliation and iden-
tification within the framework of this theory and, therefore, it is subjective be-
cause the questions of how ethnic groups are formed are raised. This denotes
that the subjects or the identities of the individuals, groups or people involved in
the conflicts are significant to the research study.

As a result, it is established within the theoretical framework of this re-
search that both theories are complementary to each other since one is objective
and the other subjective. Hence, they are, in their combination, sufficient in rec-
tifying the inadequacies encountered by just one theory (either the instrumental-
ist approach or the decision theory). However, it is unclear if the decision theory
of identity and difference in ethnicity is inadequate to deal with the issue of re-
sources at stake, whose attainment is the reason ethnic actors politicize ethnic-
ity.

But, first and foremost, the issue of how ethnic groups establish an alliance
or alliances in order to fight against another ethnic group or groups is of impor-
tance. That is why, aside from the complementary role of the decision theory, it
is also an extension of the instrumentalist approach. On these grounds, G.
Schlee acknowledges that little is known about the patterns of identification and
the ways in which people group themselves and form alliances or the way these
groups break up and re-group themselves in conflict situations.

From the perspectives of both theories, some of the questions in this re-
search such as *who* politicizes ethnicity, *why* and *how* ethnicity is politicized
will be examined and addressed. In regard to the issue of *who* politicizes ethnic-
ity, which is acknowledged as subjective, the theory of identity and difference
will be adequate to address it. Whereby, when the *why* question is raised, which
is the reason for politicizing ethnicity, the instrumentalist approach is sufficient
because the goals or resources which are to be attained or acquired by the actors
will be determined and mentioned.

Another factor essential to this work is that the combination of both theories
is a new dimension which opens the possibility of finding a new approach in
dealing with politicized ethnicity since ethnic conflicts recur and, in this respect,
no contemporary theory has been fully adequate and equipped in tackling the
conflicts, be they ethnic or religious, which are a result of politicized ethnicity.

Therefore, this particular research thesis will undertake the integration and
combination of both theories since this can only serve as a contribution and an
enrichment towards the furtherance of social science approaches in handling and
dealing with the analysis of conflicts and, possibly, in finding a lasting solution
to ethnic and religious conflicts. Regarding the empirical study of this investiga-

tion, linking both theories as a new theoretical dimension is an attempt in finding appropriate answers to questions of how boundary lines of ethnic groups are drawn in conflict zones.

In addition, linking both theories is also useful towards the revision of conventional theories, which until the present have proven unsuccessful at finding lasting solutions to the continual outbreaks of ethnic conflicts.

3.2.3.5 Intermediate Assessment: Two Theoretical Models

The intermediate assessment of the two theoretical models is paramount to assess the analysis carried out with regard to the theoretical framework of this research study. The two theories examined in this work are the instrumentalist method and the decision of theory of identity and difference in ethnicity.

In addition, it was indicated first that the theoretical choice of this work is instrumentalism. The second choice, which is the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, was chosen in order to complement the instrumentalist approach. Having mentioned that, it is noted in the analysis that instrumentalism was first introduced into the theory of ethnicity towards the end of 1960s by F. Barth in his famous work *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: Social Organization of Culture Difference*.

On the one hand, according to the first theoretical analysis carried out, there are two approaches, based on the two schools of thought, which initially dominated the field of ethnicity. These are primordialism and instrumentalism. It is found that despite the application of the instrumentalist approach, many research works point out that the theory of instrumentalism is no means purely separated from primordialism because, as indicated in this study, the former shares some of the features of primordialism.

In spite of that, the research goes on to treat the position of instrumentalism in relation to ethnicity. Instrumentalism, as investigated and found, posits that ethnicity is a rational response to social, economic and cultural conditions. Based on that, as emphasized here, ethnicity, according to the theory of instrumentalism, is used as an instrument in certain social conditions. Therefore, ethnicity cannot be described as a fixed phenomenon.

Another factor, in reference to J. McKay, is to find out why ethnicity persists, why it is used as a vehicle of political mobilization and why ethnic self-assertion and conflicts have been on the increase in recent years. His study shows that while people are divided due to deep historical and experiential factor in

primordialism, instrumentalism posits that ethnic cleavages arise because of specific and immediate circumstances.

However, in spite of the answers to those questions, social scientists such as T. Küçükcan opine from an instrumentalist perspective that renewed ethnic tension and conflicts are not the result of any primordial need, but instead that they are conscious attempts by individuals and groups in mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to gain access to social, political and material resources. To this effect, as authors such as T. Küçükcan accentuate, the principle of exclusivity is applied. He asserts within the context of the instrumentalist method that exclusivity, while in pursuit of certain goals, is applied so as to reject or recognize any "other" person. Consequently, ethnicity encompasses concepts such as 'identity' and 'ethnic groups' which regard ethnicity as a social construct.

Another important author whose work on instrumentalism is elucidated in this thesis is M. Kebede. In his findings, he admits that ethnicity, with respect to both primordialist and instrumentalist approaches, cannot prevent the problems associated with ethnic conflicts. On this ground, he advocates for a third method of approach to ethnicity which he refers to as constructivism. However, his advocacy for a constructivist method was short-lived, as both constructivist and instrumentalist approaches are the same, they represent the same stance which shows that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts. Nevertheless, in order to stem the evils of ethnicity, the modernization of the concept of *ethnicity* is required. Hence, the institutionalization of ethnicity is proposed by M. Kebede as a means to prevent the rise of a zero-sum game politics in the pursuit of political power. To this effect, it is expected that the institutionalization of ethnicity in a democratic setup will attenuate ethnic rivalry while in competition for resources.

And, in the long run, the so-called institutionalization of ethnicity, which is recommended within the theoretical framework of instrumentalism/constructivism as canvassed by M. Kebede, may be, as a theoretical proposal of ethnicity, inadequate in eradicating the politicization of ethnicity and preventing a democratic society that is plagued by ethnic conflicts from a possible collapse. Moreover, most of the works on instrumentalism written by a number of authors such as J. Rothschild, R. Tetzlaff, T. Küçükcan, T. Eriksen, J. McKay, G. Elwert, E. Tiryakian, I. Große, L. Fawcett, M. Kebede, and a host of others, which are used within the theoretical context of this research, postulate that ethnicity is not synonymous with conflicts and does not lead to conflicts. This evidence buttresses the position of this paper that ethnicity only leads to conflicts when politicized.

Furthermore, the research shows more on the situational/instrumentalist method in terms of the drawing of boundaries between two or more ethnic

groups as articulated by F. Barth. In this regard, it is found out that the bound-
aries of ethnic groups are drawn arbitrarily and resolved that ethnic boundaries,
in reference to ethnicity, are socially constructed.

Another factor that occurs within the context of ethnicity, in addition to the
analysis already carried out, can be grasped as a process of *switching*. Switching
occurs and can be conceptualized within the ambit of the arbitrary drawing of
boundaries. In this respect, as noticed in this research, switching represents what
can be termed 'a change of department' or 'transformation'. That is why ethnic
boundaries, when drawn arbitrarily, can be redefined randomly from religious to
social or from political to economic tone and vice versa. Many social scientists
also refer to switching as an *ethnic game*. On these grounds, as F. Barth stipu-
lates, ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but rather depend on the survival of ethnic
entities in a given social environment. In continuation of the latter, the drawing
of ethnic boundary lines depends on the condition of the ethnic groups involved
in the process of boundary negotiations. However, it is asserted that gaps are
opened for manipulation when negotiating ethnic boundaries, a situation which
implies that, as explained in this research, ethnicity can be deployed as an in-
strument by actors.

Other factors considered and analyzed in the research, in reference to F.
Barth's instrumentalism, raise questions such as whether ethnic boundaries
automatically mean exclusion and how ethnic boundaries are maintained. Ac-
cording to F. Barth, some of the criteria used when defining how ethnic bound-
aries shift or are determined are as follows: ethnic groups as a culture-bearing
unit; ethnic groups as an organizational type; boundaries of ethnic groups, poly-
ethnic social systems; association of identities and value standards; and, inter-
dependence of ethnic groups.

However, irrespective of many aspects and elements of ethnicity that the in-
strumentalist method refers to, it is shown that the instrumentalist approach does
not single-handedly prove adequate in holistically capturing the numerous chal-
lenges and in solving the problems caused by the politicization of ethnicity. The
difficulty in finding an adequate approach leads to the second theory which is
used as a complementary method to instrumentalism.

The decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity: The decision
theory is proposed by G. Schlee in his work *How Enemies Are Made: Towards
a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts*. He depicts, in this theory, how elites
manipulate ethnicity through the politics of inclusion and exclusion in a political
society in order to acquire material and political resources. As emphasized in
this thesis, it is the consequence of a long practice of the politics of inclusion

and exclusion that produces violent conflicts. These conflicts eventually either take on a religious or an ethnic dimension. In addition, it is argued that, in relation to both *instrumentalist* and *decision theories*, if ethnicity denotes a process of drawing the lines of ethnic boundaries in the form of *self* and *others*, then the notion of identity and difference is also used to dichotomize between "us" and "others". Moreover, it is expounded in the study that actors, based on the decision theory, operate within the context of cost-benefit calculations.

To this extent, in reference to G. Schlee, certain parameters are tested to show that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts unless politicized. From this view, within the framework of the decision theory of ethnicity which describes actors as rational entrepreneurs operating on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation, the question of "who with whom against whom" in conflict situations is not only raised, but also given special attention. This rests on the explanation of social identification and affiliation among ethnic groups, referring to the factors which people use to distinguish between friend and foe and on what criteria are alliances or coalitions formed against the enemy.

Furthermore, it is believed that, as demonstrated while dealing with the theoretical approaches of this research, enemies are constructed and, as a result, cannot be a natural phenomenon. The same method is favored by G. Schlee within the context of *how enemies are made*. In this regard, it is argued that, in accordance with the position of C. Brettell, ethnicity only becomes socially and politically meaningful when it is connected or attached to the process of boundary lines between the dominant groups and minorities. And, finally, as examined in this research, it is revealed that to weigh and make a decision on the costs and benefits in conflict situations is of utmost importance and it is therefore given the highest priority.

Therefore, with respect to the cost-benefit calculation, ethnic groups consider different options of identification in the following way: Who with whom forms an alliance against whom? This is what G. Schlee refers to as the decision theory. The author, however, applies three different categories to systematize his theoretical approach thus: Social structures and their cognitive representation; the politics of inclusion and exclusions, and, the economics of group size and social position.

Regarding the combination of the instrumentalist approach and the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, this study concludes that this theoretical background is more adequate not only to analyse the case of Nigeria in the empirical part of the research work, but also as a promising theoretical method for future studies and as a contribution towards finding lasting solutions

to the problems of politicized ethnicity and its consequences which are confronting, ravaging, and almost tearing apart the aforementioned country and other countries with similar conditions. Thereby, political science, which heretofore has viewed ethnicity from an instrumentalist approach only, becomes strengthened and better equipped with respect to the integration of decision theory.

4. Empirical Analysis: The Politicization of Ethnicity as the Cause of Conflicts

The empirical part, which can also be understood as the analytical aspect of this research, will essentially deal with the application of the theoretical background of this research study, as analyzed in the first part of this research enterprise, on the case study for Nigeria. However, during the course of this empirical section, it is not only cases of conflict situations in relation to Nigeria that will be explored and illustrated, but rather many conflict scenarios in different of parts of Africa as well as in other parts of the world will be mentioned and examined within the framework of these violent conflicts.

Meanwhile, before any analysis on the main empirical example begins, it is important to introduce the concept of *conflict* as a dependent variable in this study. Therefore, starting the analysis with an introduction to the terminology will facilitate an easy understanding of the conflict scenarios that will follow thereafter.

4.1 Description and Definition of Conflicts

Finding a precise definition of the term *conflict* is no easy task. There are a number of social scientists such as E.-O. Czempiel, who, while attempting to define the notion of conflict, digress to other phenomena which, although related to the subject matter, concentrate partially on the possible outcomes of conflicts. E.-O. Czempiel believes it is important to speak of a societal value such as *peace* when the term *conflict* is referred to. So, in order to achieve peace during the course of a conflict, there is need for 'justice' and 'freedom'.

Therefore, he understands *peace*, within the framework of the international system, as a process pattern in which justice means an increase in the equality of chances for the personal development of each individual. Therefore, violence, as

a constraint to individual freedom, declines.[609] In other words, as he claims, *peace* is characterized by increasing social justice and decreasing instances of violence. With *peace* as a phenomenon mentioned in contrast to *conflict*, it can be argued that one of the functions of *conflict* is to attain *peace*. The failure to define the concept *conflict*, as E.-O. Czempiel admits, lies in the difficulty and problems he confronts in identifying the necessary different types of *conflicts* and being able to distinguish from the boundary of conflict-free zones.[610] Despite his inability to formulate his own definition of the term *conflict*, he relies on the definition proposed by K. Boulding, who defines *conflict* as follows:

> Conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are *aware* of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party *wishes* to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.[611]

One may be tempted to ask if the actors' mere perception of incompatibilities in their positions during situations of competition already constitutes a conflict. One can see that there is a similar aspect to E.-O. Czempiel's assertion, as already stated, that locating the boundary between conflicts and non-conflict situations can pose a problem.

Nonetheless, K. Boulding opines that the important words in his definition of conflict are *aware* and *wishes* which are philosophically explosive.[612] It is pertinent to note that both words *aware and wishes* are useful, in relation to conflict, when competition exists. For some scholars, competition on its own is already classified as a conflict.[613] Such a view is put forward in the work of K.

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609   More about the notions *peace* and *conflict* from E.-O. Czempiel can be read with the German title Czempiel, Ernst-Otto: "Friede und Konflikt in den internationalen Beziehungen", in: Haftendorn, Helga [Ed.]: *Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gegenstand und Methode der internationalen Beziehungen*, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg 1975, p. 89-114 (89-90). The title of the essay can be translated into English as: "Peace and Conflict in International Relations, Subject and Method of International Relations". The German original version of the quotation: "[E]s richtet sich auf den Frieden, verstanden als Prozeßmuster des internationalen Systems, in dem die Gerechtigkeit als Gleichheit der Entfaltungschancen des Einzelnen zunimmt und die Gewalt als Einschränkung seiner Freiheit sich mindert." Ibid.

610   Ibid., p. 90.

611   Boulding, E. Kenneth: *Conflict and Defense. A General Theory*, Harper and Brothers, New York 1962, p. 5. Italics in original. The same definition is given in German by E.-O. Czempiel. Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 1975, op. cit., p. 89-92.

612   See Bouilding, E. Kenneth, 1962, op. cit., p. 5.

613   W. Link discusses in his work that E.-O. Czempiel's understanding denotes an extension of K. Boulding's definition of the conflict concept. However, as W. Link observes, E.-O. Czempiel's analysis treats conflict and competition as equal terms. See Link, Werner: "Überlegung zum Begriff ‚Konflikt' in den internationalen Beziehungen – Versuch der Be-

Boulding when he remarks that social scientists like R. Dahrendorf understand and freely apply the term *conflict* in their works to contests, competitions, disputes, tensions and perceived clashes among social forces.[614] To what extent conflict, scientifically, can be used is shown by W. Link who, pointing to the analysis of K. Boulding, acknowledges that in order to define the term *conflict*, there is a necessity to distinguish between the concepts of *conflict and competition*. In this respect, conflict is terminologically understood and treated as a narrower concept of the much broader concept *competition*.[615]

In addition to that, according to M. Deutsch, there is a possibility of an eruption of conflicts whenever there is contact and visibility of difference.[616] Furthermore, he notes that a very crucial factor which contributes to the emergence of disagreement between individuals or groups is the possibility of interaction taking place.[617] This means people who live in isolation may not be engaged in social interaction which may lead to any discord. So, he, in alignment with the work of R. Williams, shows that the conditions which are necessary for conflict to erupt involve 'visibility' and 'competition' in a contact situation.[618]

Therefore, in E.-O. Czempiel's criticism of K. Boulding's conflict definition, very limited social relationships qualify as non-competitive in as far as competition is grasped as an attempt to impose one's position on others.[619] However, E.-O. Czempiel doubts the emphasis, with respect to A. Rapoport, on debates, games and fights as basic forms of conflicts despite the fact that they are also characterized by situations in which one person attempts to outclass or

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griffsklärung", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 20. Jhrg., 1979, p. 33-50 (34). The English translation reads as follows:
"Reflections on the Concept of Conflict in International Relations – Attempt to Clarify the Concept". The original German version of the paraphrased argument reads: "Ernst-Otto Czempiel hat neuerdings an diese Konfliktdefinition angeknüpft und sie erweitert, indem er Konflikt mit Wettbewerb gleichsetzt." Ibid., p. 34.

614 Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert: *Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory*, Sage Publications, London et al. 1980, p. 8-9.
615 See Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 33. The original German quotation from the paraphrased argument is as followed:
"Die beste Anknüpfungsmöglichkeit für eine Klärung scheint mir in der Erörterung von Kenneth E. Boulding vorhanden zu sein. Er geht davon aus, dass Wettbewerb und Konflikt begrifflich voneinander zu unterscheiden sind—und zwar in dem Sinne, dass „Konflikt" ein Unterbegriff des breiteren Begriffs „Wettbewerb" ist." Ibid.
616 See Deutsch, Morton: "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences", in: Väyrynen, Raimo [Ed.]: *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, International Social Science Council, London et al. 1991, p. 26-57 (29).
617 See ibid., p. 29.
618 See ibid., p. 29.
619 See Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 1975, op. cit., p. 91.

depose the other and win.[620] His doubt originates in this statement credited to A. Rapoport in his work:

> The whole argument rested on a notion that human conflicts were predominantly manifestations of debates, and that violent conflicts, including wars, were, to paraphrase Clausewitz's grim comment, continuations of debates by other means.[621]

This would imply that any existing difference(s) between two or more positions which are represented by two or more people or between groups of people constitute conflicts.[622] What is significant in this analysis is that any reference to conflict involves more than one person. In other words, what can be called a conflict comprises at least two parties.[623] However, E.-O. Czempiel's contribution to the works on conflict, as W. Link stresses, deviates decisively from the definition by K. Boulding as he understands the notion of conflict as a special case in a competition based on two criteria: awareness of the incompatibilities in the positions of at least two actors and the actions determined by the actors involved towards realizing their wishes.[624]

Whether only one person/party can be involved in a conflict is another aspect to which H. Blalock refers in his work. He believes that the phenomenon of conflict contains ambiguities in that it can point to various forms of incompatibilities and inconsistencies. In view of the analysis so far, it can be asserted, on the one hand, that conflict generally refers to a situation involving two parties. However, on the other hand, there are internalized conflicts which occur within

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620   See ibid., p. 91.
621   Rapoport, Anatol: *Fights, Games, and Debates*, University of Michigan Press, New York 1960, foreword (vii-viii). The writer states two positions in reference to the quotation as cited in the text. He emphasizes how far conflicts or violent conflicts serve as the manifestation of debates and their continuation by other means. In this respect, he raises two objections to the citation as thus: "First, it seems improbable that science can alleviate conflicts by settling debates in areas outside its specific jurisdiction. Second, it appears that not all conflicts are results of clashes between incompatible assertions." For more on the arguments, see in the foreword to the literature by A. Rapoport cited above.
622   See Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 1975, op. cit., p. 91.
623   It is important to state that, according to K. Boulding, two or more parties must be involved in a situation in order to classify it as a conflict. See Boulding, E. Kenneth, 1962, op. cit., p. 2.
624   See Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 34. The original German version of the two criteria employed by E.-O. Czempiel in analyzing the term *conflicts* reads thus:
        "Mit dieser Ausweitung des Konfliktbegriffes weicht Czempiel entscheidend von Bouldings Definition ab, die mit Hilfe der beiden Kriterien des Bewußtseins von der Unvereinbarkeit der Positionen und des handlungsbestimmenden Realisierungswunsches Konflikt als Spezialfall des Wettbewerbs begreift." Ibid.

a single individual. These kinds of conflicts are based on value conflicts and conflicts of interests which may not necessarily possess behavioral outcomes.[625]

Having mentioned the differences among groups which may result in a conflict, M. Deutsch acknowledges that the categorization of people into groups based on any distinguishing characteristic tends to give rise to the exaggeration of the perceived differences between each category. "Although [one may believe that] the perception of difference between self and other, between the ingroup (one's group) and the outgroup, is a necessary condition for conflict, it is not sufficient."[626] If the definition of conflict by K. Boulding is reviewed again as a more specific kind of conflict which may be destructive, then one can talk of a social conflict. L. Coser defines social conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals".[627] One can distinguish between this definition and the one noted from K. Boulding in the sense that resources, status and power are being contested here for which one party may be ready to inflict harm on the other, if need be, in order to secure the resources whereas the definition of K. Boulding stipulates only the parties' awareness of their incompatible wishes and positions.

However, the aims of the actors or how the actors will proceed despite the awareness of their incompatibilities is not further explained. Therefore, it can be claimed that the definition of social conflict, as provided above by L. Coser, is a furtherance of the K. Boulding's definition of the term *conflict*. That is why E.-O. Czempiel's problem lies in his belief that there is no conflict-free relationship, but rather different objectives and intensities or modes of solutions in view of the different positions of the parties. According to him, what constitutes a conflict is blurred since the level of the conflict can only be measured on a continuum based on the intensities and resources applied which, in relation to the purpose, decide the conflict.[628]

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625 Although conflicts within individuals or internalized conflicts are not important for this work, however, it is worth mentioning. For more information on this topic, see Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert, 1980, op. cit., p. 10.

626 Deutsch, Morton, 1991, op. cit., p. 29.

627 Coser, A. Lewis: *The Functions of Social Conflict*, The Free Press, New York 1956, p. 8.

628 See Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 1975, op. cit., p. 91. The German version of the indirect citation reads:
    "Der Problemakzent kommt jetzt auf die Klassifikation und die Abstufung zu liegen; entscheidend ist aber, dass das sonst nicht lösbare Problem der Abgrenzung zwischen Konflikthaltigen und Konfliktfreien beseitigt worden ist. Es gibt praktisch keine konfliktfreie Beziehung, es gibt nur unterschiedliche Gegenstände, Intensitäten und Regelungs- bzw. Lösungsmodi von Positionsdifferenzen. Sind gesellschaftliche Beziehungen immer Konfliktbeziehung, so lassen sie sich in erster Linie nach dem Austragungsmodus in Verbin-

H. Blalock stresses that conflicts cannot yet be talked of in the real sense because, as he demonstrates, the term *conflict* only applies for "actual or threatened exchanges of negative sanctions".[629] In the long run, the author concurs with E.-O. Czempiel's position who believes that there exists some degree of conflict unavoidably inherent in all social interactions.[630] On this basis, K. Boulding argues that conflict, as a social phenomenon, cannot be evaluated in terms of good or bad, however, as he believes, "in a given situation, we may have too much or too little conflict, or the amount may just be right."[631] In a wider sense, further analysis will be carried out on the phenomenon of conflict and its definition, especially the meaning of what is known as actual and potential conflicts, in the next section.

4.1.1 Potential and Actual Conflicts: Further Analysis of Conflict Definition

Having provided a definition of the term *conflict* and an analysis of the positions of different scholars and authors in relation to the subject matter in the previous section, it may still not be certain whether the definition given by K. Boulding is sufficient to determine what determines a conflict between two or more parties.

In this regard, this section will scrutinize many attempts by a number of social scientists to give an acceptable scientific definition of conflict taking certain parameters into consideration. All the same, the appropriate definition of conflict for this work, which will be held up as the yardstick in measuring other definitions, is credited to two of the works by K. Singer which are interlinked, summarized and defined by W. Link as follows:

> [Conflict is] a critical state of tension occasioned by the presence of mutually incompatible tendencies within an organismic whole the functional continuity or structural integrity of which is thereby threatened.[632]

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dung mit dem Konfliktgegenstand, also dem Bezug der Differenzen, klassifizieren und bewerten." Ibid., p. 91.

629   Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert, 1980, op. cit., p. 10.
630   See ibid., p. 10.
631   Boulding, E. Kenneth, 1962, op. cit., p. 305.
632   This original definition of conflict by K. Singer is cited also in the work of W. Link. Ibid., p. 48.
        One of the works by K. Singer introduces the definition given above and forms the basis of the analysis carried out by W. Link on the phenomenon of conflict found in Singer, Kurt: "The Meaning of Conflict", in: *The AustralAsian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIL, No. 3, December 1949, p. 145-170 (168-170).

Therefore, based on the above, one might claim that a situation where the mere awareness or perception of differences in the position taken between two or more actors is not yet destructive may be inadequate for the definition of conflict. It is expected that conflict reveals a more aggressive or even an exterminating character.

To this effect, the work of F. Pfetsch depicts the notion of conflict in opposition to cooperation so as to clarify the concept of conflict further. He believes that both terms *conflict* and *cooperation* are generally understood as antonyms because the term *conflict* signalizes enmity while cooperation represents friendship.[633] Therefore, the connotation given to the notion of conflict by F. Pfetsch implies a negative conceptualization of the terminology since it denotes animosity or hostility. Hence, the author's position is contrary to the stance put forward by E.-O. Czempiel in the previous section of this analysis which conceives of *peace* as one of the aims or functions of conflict.

An approach which accentuates another perspective in the understanding of the term *conflict* is stated by R. Väyrynen thus: "The functions of conflicts include the takeover or preservation of power, the maintenance of internal cohesion and external expansion."[634] With the introduction of *power* into the concept of conflict, one might raise questions on the views of some writers whose comprehension rests on the assumption that "a conflict exists when two or more parties have opposed views about how some social situation should be organized."[635] It can be argued that what a social situation means is too passive for the clarification of conflict in such a statement. In contrast, as cited above, conflict revolves around powerful groups and actors who tend to dominate and exploit others and, in such situations, conflict may be the only means through which the dominated or subordinated parties free themselves from such dominance.[636] Considering all these assumptions and conceptualizations again underscores the following statement from K. Boulding:

633   Pfetsch, R. Frank: *Internationale Politik*, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Cologne et al. 1994, p. 212.

634   Väyrynen, Raimo: "To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts", in: Väyrynen, Raimo [Ed.]: *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, International Social Science Council, London et al. 1991, p. 1-25 (1).

635   Nicholson, Michael: "Negotiation, Agreement and Conflict Resolution: The Role of Rational Approaches and their Criticism", in: Väyrynen, Raimo [Ed.]: *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, International Social Science Council, London et al. 1991, p. 57-78 (59).

636   See Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert, 1980, op. cit., preface (viii). The same view is also held by M. Deutsch. See Deutsch, Morton, 1991, op. cit., p. 31. The same position is coherent with K.

> Conflict is an activity that is found almost everywhere. It is found throughout the biological world, where the conflict both of individuals and of species is an important part of the picture. It is found everywhere in the world of man […].[637]

In addition, despite the fact that conflicts may be destructive or constructive, the author emphasizes that conflict constitutes one of the most essential sources of dramatic interest as the absence of conflict is often associated with a dull and featureless existence. As a result of this, it is explained that the institution of games and sports are evidence of situations that create tension for humans despite the fact that these are artificially created conflicts.[638]

Again, reflecting on the assertion credited to K. Boulding by W. Link in the last section, both games and sports can arguably be regarded as competition and since a competition is not looked upon as a conflict, then games and sports cannot be qualified as conflicts in the terminological sense. To buttress that argument, K. Boulding reiterates that competition is a much broader term than conflict and, as he maintains, all cases of conflict involve competition, but not all cases of competition involve conflict.[639] This is further explained in the following statement by the author:

> Similarly, the world of man is so complex that many individuals and groups may be in a competition and yet be quite unaware of it. Even where people are aware of the potential conflict, there may be no actual conflict if there is no desire on the part of one party to occupy a region of its behavior of space from which it is excluded by the other.[640]

Within the context stated above, the author distinguishes between an actual conflict and a potential conflict.

The same view is presented by W. Link who concludes that mere competition does not denote a conflict in a real sense. In addition, he agrees with K. Boulding's position that when two parties are aware of the incompatibilities of their positions in a competition, there is a potential conflict.[641] J. Burton reinforces the argument as he equates competition with potential conflict and also notes that "competition and potential conflict exist in both material terms (as

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Boulding who, in reference to Hegel and Marx, stresses that conflict may serve as an instrument of change and progress. See Boulding, E. Kenneth, 1962, op. cit., p. 307.
637   Ibid., p. 1.
638   See ibid., p. 306.
639   See ibid., p. 4.
640   Ibid., p. 5.
641   See Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 34. The original German text reads as follows: "Genauer gesagt: Wenn zwei Parteien sich der Unvereinbarkeit ihrer Wettbewerbspositionen bewußt sind, ist ein potentieller Konflikt vorhanden; wenn beide Parteien den (erkennbaren) Wunsch haben, eine als unvereinbar angesehene Position einzunehmen, handelt es sich um einen aktuellen Konflikt." Ibid., p. 34.

distributional issues) and in non-material terms (as a matter of attitudes)."[642] He argues further that material conflicts are based on conflicts of interest and non-material conflicts with value conflicts.[643] However, what can be grasped as an actual conflict is a situation in which both parties wish (perceptibly) to occupy the same position despite the awareness of their incompatibilities in occupying that one position.[644] If one observes all the definitions presented so far, irrespective of whether the actors involved in a social relationship are aware of their differences or if these differences condition their actions, it can be argued that the removal of antagonistic or opposing positions between the parties may mean an end to any perceived conflict.

In this regard, both E.-O. Czempiel's and K. Boulding's criteria, such as *competition* and *awareness*, may be necessary conditions, but hardly sufficient in defining the concept of *conflict*. The only definition which, according to K. Singer, seems sufficient in conceptualizing *conflict* refers to it as a critical state of a stress or stress process caused by the occurrence of (perceived) mutually incompatible tendencies of actors in a broad interaction unit and which, through that, threaten their organization and structure. The author states in his work thus:

> We are with good reason accustomed to speak of conflicts between individuals, between collective entities, between motives in the individual mind, between elements of a civilization (e.g., religion and art), between cosmic agencies, God and Devil; we may thus speak of inter-individual, inter-group, inter-cultural, inter-mundane conflicts if the relations of the striving parties to the wholes of which they are a part are to be disregarded; or of intra-group, intra-oecumenical, intra-cultural, intra-cosmic conflicts if strike between the two parties affects strongly the integrating unit.[645]

Therefore, one can understand that the conceptualization of conflict by the writer assigns it to certain cases where the existence of collision becomes a threat to the stability and viability of the integrating unit.[646] K. Singer's incompatible tendencies reiterate the so-called awareness and the decisive action on differences of positions in a competition, as reflected in both E.-O. Czempiel's and K. Boulding's understanding of conflict, whose implications are too minor and in-

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642   Gillwald, Katrin: "Conflict and Needs Research", in: Burton, John [Ed.]: *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, Macmillan Press, London et al. 1990, p. 115-124 (120).
643   See ibid, p. 120-121.
644   See Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 34.
645   Singer, Kurt, 1949, op. cit., p. 169. The German definition of conflict by W. Link, in reference to K. Singer, is stated thus:
      "Konflikt ist ein kritischer Spannungszustand bzw. Spannungsprozess, der durch das Auftreten miteinander (oder unvereinbar erscheinender) Tendenzen in einer (die Akteure) umfassenden (Interaktions-)Einheit verursacht wird und dadurch deren Organisation und Struktur bedroht." Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 35.
646   See Singer, Kurt, 1949, op. cit., p. 169.

significant in order to be qualified as a conflict. However, for K. Singer, conflict is to be defined "as a critical tension in an organismic field induced by hormic incompatibilities. 'Critical' here refers to the danger of disruption and disorganization of an organismic whole [...]."[647] To this effect, it can be argued that such a situation signifies a manifestation of competition through which a potential conflict is visible.

Similar to the position of K. Singer, W. Link also notes that the critical condition that must be fulfilled before one can speak of a conflict is that the tensions become so critical that, whether actual or potential, the involved actors' integrative unit is seriously affected. As he further notes, K. Singer's definition considers, in addition to the criteria proposed by K. Boulding, the effects of the competition on the current cohesion of the relationship as a unit. As observed, the tensions may be critical if the structure of the relationship's cohesion is affected, especially when they become a threat to destroy or disorganize the whole integrating unit of the parties in dispute.[648]

An example can be seen in a football match final between two teams. One can discern that the football match is a competition that produces certain tensions between the two teams involved since each team wants to win the cup. The match is governed by rules and regulations administered by the referee of the match. And that both teams wish to win the cup is evidence of the incompatibility of their wishes which both teams are aware of since the cup can only be won by a team. In as far as there is no escalation of tension when the rules and regulations are respected, this only constitutes a *potential conflict*.

However, if one of the teams, sensing that it is about to lose the match, begins to threaten the other team, then one can speak of an *actual conflict*. Above all, if that threat becomes so critical and the situation escalates to the level that one team starts to harm the other by using dangerous weapons, then it is no longer a threat, according to the definition of conflict by K. Singer, but rather a conflict as the threat affects not only the disruption of the match but also destroys the entire structure of the game in terms of its rules and regulations. Consequently, the investigation reveals that tensions predominate in a competition

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647   Ibid., p. 170.
648   The original German text of the argument, as presented by W. Link, is stated thus:
        "Singer berücksichtigt in seiner Konfliktdefinitiion also zusätzlich zu den Kriterien Bouldings die (potentiellen oder aktuellen) Wirkungen des Wettbewerbs auf den jeweiligen Beziehungszusammenhang (organismic whole, integrating unit, organisation, structure, configuration). Spannungen werden „kritisch", wenn und indem sie sich auf die Struktur des Beziehungszusammenhanges auswirken (können), insbesondere wenn sie zur Gefahr der Zerstörung oder Desorganisation des die streitenden Parteien übergreifenden Ganzen werden." Ibid., p. 36.

whereas one cannot refer to such a situation as a conflict unless the tensions become critical, as cited above.

Considering the cohesion of the relationship as an integrative unit, the analysis enables the classification of diverse conflict situations:

– World conflict: when the threat of tension on the cohesion of the relationship in the international system as a whole unit is critical;

– Regional conflict: when the tensions threatening the cohesion of the relationship in a region become critical;

– Functional/Sectoral conflict: these types of conflict can be classified as political, economic, cultural or ideological conflicts etc. when the tensions on the cohesion of the relationship become critical.[649]

The next section will deal with deep-rooted conflicts, a kind of conflict known as such because of the violence involved and its prolongation before any solution is found to stem it.

4.1.2 Deep-Rooted Conflict: Understanding and Explanation of the Phenomenon

Having analyzed and treated the definition of conflict in the last section with the conclusion that conflict as a phenomenon is destructive in nature, one can argue that the analysis carried out in that segment depicts conflict as a violent escalation of threats.

However, it should be noted that the types of conflicts observed in previous sections do not yet encompass the types of violent conflicts which will be scrutinized in the subsequent chapters of this study. That is why this section will deal with the types of conflicts which one may term as chronic conflicts and which can also be classified as elongated, protracted or even deep-rooted conflicts because they involve fierce battle and recur in regular intervals. Such conflicts persist so long because there seems to be no solution to them. In this way, R. Väyrynen believes that violence is involved when one discusses real conflicts because she assumes in her study of conflicts that violence is linked to a broad economic, political and social perspective: 'More often violence is, however, an instrument intended to produce desired political effects. Such an instrumental

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649   See ibid., p. 36-37.

view may define violence as a means of communication or as a method of destruction.'[650] C. Mitchell treats both deep-rooted and protracted conflicts as synonyms. He gives the description of deep-rooted conflicts as follows:

> The phenomena under scrutiny […] are intranational conflicts, occurring—and recurring—between human communities and involving organized physical violence as a strategy for pursuing interests and achieving goals. Such conflicts are deep-rooted, in that they arise from values and needs—identity, security, recognition—that are difficult to satisfy in any final sense and that give rise to goals that, given conditions of scarcity, appear to be wholly irreconcilable with the goals of others. They are protracted in that they recur over long periods of time. They may, under certain circumstances, be ameliorated or suppressed so that they appear to have been finally resolved, only to emerge in slightly different forms when historical circumstances change.[651]

As indicated in the content of the citation, one can see similarities in the role assigned to violence in a conflict by both R. Väyrynen and C. Mitchell. In addition, a deep-rooted conflict is a protracted one in the sense that its recurrence is guaranteed. According to J. Burton, deep-rooted conflicts can even occur as violent conflicts which exist between nations and communities within nations as a result of the preservations of cultures, human values and needs.[652] Understanding a deep-rooted conflict in this manner is what C. Mitchell illustrates as the inevitability of the violence, the intransigence of the parties as well as the intractability of the issues which denote problems that occur frequently within societies and international community. These findings imply that a deep-rooted conflict is always violent and cannot be solved. While the analysis of this work concentrates on the description and definition of a deep-rooted conflict, topics such as conflict resolution will not be addressed due to limited time and space.[653]

In as far as a deep-rooted conflict cannot be confined to a particular sphere, so far as it also occurs in the international community, it can be argued that deep-rooted conflicts are ubiquitous as they may occur within a nation, a community etc. Thus, J. Burton assumes that deep-rooted conflicts occur on all social levels thus:

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650 Väyrynen, Raimo, 1991, op. cit., p. 2.
651 Mitchell, R. Christopher, 1991, op. cit., p. 25.
652 See Burton, W. John: *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York et al. 1987, p. 3.
653 It is stated by J. Burton that deep-rooted conflicts cannot be reconciled by an external authority, such as court or any other powerful country. Consequently, these kinds of endless conflicts are known to be violent because they involve deep feelings, values and needs which can only be contained by imprisonment and political or military pressure since they recur from time to time. Nonetheless, the containment of such conflicts is not a resolution of the conflicts, but it rather makes the conflicts protracted. See ibid.

> They occur in the social relationships of the family and of the work place. Furthermore, most modern societies are multi-cultural and or multi-ethnic. Most have problems of poverty and plenty. Most have problems of inequality of opportunity. Most have problems of frustration and lack of participation and identity. Most, as a consequence, have high levels of alienation, leading to conflict situations of many kinds that affect the whole society and, indirectly the world society.[654]

Based on this explanation given for deep-rooted conflicts, the problems identified as the causes of deep-rooted problems are issues affecting all human societies. But, one may refer to these kinds of conflicts as social conflicts since they emerge due to the needs and the desire to get these needs fulfilled. J. Burton, in his clarification of the notion known as deep-rooted conflict, offers the following conceptualization of the term:

> Deep-rooted conflict includes cases of conflict with authorities between authorities, and among persons and groups within societies. It involves cases of conflicts that arise out of demands on individuals to make certain adjustments in behavior that are unacceptable and, probably are beyond human tolerance and capabilities.[655]

Despite the fact that the definition by J. Burton given above can be criticized for lack of clarity in comparison with other definitions used so far, the author cites many instances of deep-rooted conflicts to make his position clear. Some of these are shown as follows:

> Symptoms of deep-rooted conflict—and these are merely symptoms—include hostage taking, illegal strikes, public protest movements, ethnic violence, terrorism, gang warfare, and many other forms of intractable opposition to authorities at one social level or another.[656]

Also, K. Gillwald, citing the same definition of deep-rooted conflicts as J. Burton, expands on this explanation of the phenomenon of deep-rooted further as a conflict of needs.[657] H. Blalock, in continuation of J. Burton's claim, opines that conflict may emerge not only due to competition over value resources, but also due to other factors as the writer admits that conflicts arise at times as a result of the mental state such as anger, hatred, distrust, negative stereotypes, retaliation etc.[658] However, a specific deep-rooted conflict which is relevant for the analysis of this work is cited by C. Mitchell in the following statement:

> (1) protracted, deep-rooted conflicts occur within the territorial and jurisdictional boundaries of polities, and (2) a common form of protracted conflict involves ethnolinguistic communities, or ethnonationalities, in contention with other such communities. Under these circumstances, one

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654   Ibid.
655   Burton, W. John: *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1990, p. 15.
656   Ibid.
657   See Gillwald, Katrin, 1990, op. cit., p. 115.
658   See Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert, 1980, op. cit., p. 9.

such community frequently controls the national decision-making and conflict-managing systems and is thus the political incumbent.[659]

The author demonstrates further that not all protracted conflicts are confined within the boundaries of one nation-state as the experience of colonialism shows in relation to the drawing of boundaries by the former colonial states.[660] It is also found that deep-rooted conflicts, especially the ones on ethno-linguistic and ethno-national differences, emerge as the dominating and prevailing type of conflict in the 1990s and beyond. These kinds of conflicts are typical for multi-ethnic societies, a view expressed by R. Gurr in the work of C. Mitchell thus:

> Gurr recently noted that many of the 168 states in the modern world are 'mosaics of distinct peoples whose identities may or may not be accepted by those who hold state power' and where significant conflict over minority rights does or could exist.[661]

Such ethno-national conflicts are based on the struggles to defend and promote identity of diverse ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious communities. This implies that it is contrary to wars raging within the internal regime over the control of state power and, through that, access to the underlying economic and social system.[662] It is asserted that the African continent has been the common site for the eruptions of such conflicts since the 1990s. This assumption rests on the belief that ethno-religious conflicts, also known as intra-state conflicts, are pervasive and the causes can be deduced from a combination of different factors. The research carried out by *Conflict Trend* shows that:

> Intra-state conflicts have been the predominant type of conflict in the recent years with a combination of "identity" and "distribution" being the key powerful elements. Imbalances in the distribution of economic, political and social resources coupled with the mobilization of groups around commonalities and sometimes differences of language, race, and religion, readily increases the potential for conflict. The persistence of this type of conflict on the African continent has created more avenues for opportunistic leaders and has increased the difficulty in attempting to manage these conflicts.[663]

In concluding the analysis on deep-rooted conflicts, it can be argued, in view of the aforementioned works, that such conflicts recur and are often violent. Therefore, examining K. Singer's definition of conflict, as evidenced in the work of W. Link, would show that there are significant features which make it distinct

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659   Mitchell, R. Christopher, 1991, op. cit., p. 24.
660   See ibid.
661   Ibid., p. 25.
662   See ibid.
663   The quotation is cited in the research carried out by the magazine *Accord*, a civil society organization based in South Africa on the topic *Peace Keeping in Africa* under the supervision of the editor Gounden, Vasu: "Editorial", in: *Peace Keeping in Africa*, *Conflict Trend*, Issue 3, 2006, p. 2-3 (2).

from other definitions such as that from K. Boulding. The consideration of the organization and structure of the relationship as a whole, whose cohesion is threatened by the critical tensions occasioned by the position differences of two actors involved in a competition, makes it, in W. Link's view, a definition sufficiently proven.[664] The subsequent chapters will examine different types of conflicts.

4.2 Types of Conflicts as an Essential Field of Study

The focus of this segment, within the framework of conflict analysis, is to depict different types of conflicts and discuss the origins of the various types. In order to distinguish and enable a clear description, the various types of conflicts will be classified into three categories.

The first category is classified as international conflict (also called world conflict), regional conflict and domestic or national conflict. The second category involves the types of conflicts which are specifically relevant and important for this work. These types of conflicts can be classified as political, ideological, cultural, ethnic, religious and economical as well as social conflicts. The third category reflects the various types of conflicts discussed in the second category. However, under this third category, the types of conflicts classed into this group are racial discrimination, military coups as well a kind of conflict which may occur in a football match charged with tension.

W. Link illustrates his classification and differentiation of conflicts by postulating that the relationship cohesion of the integrative unit is decisive for his classification of the different types of conflicts. This is further expounded on within the context of the third criterion in terms of the organization and structure introduced into his work with respect to K. Singer's definition, as already stated in previous sections. In this regard, the consideration of the relationship cohesion enables a classification based on the integrative unit: when it involves the cohesion of the relationship in the international system or world of states as an aggregate, then it is a matter relating to world conflict; if it is a region, then it

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664   See Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 36. W. Link, in his conviction of K. Singer's conflict definition, believes that the definition clearly distinguishes between a conflict situation from a competition or a contest which are the criteria used by K. Boulding to conceptualize the term *conflict*. The original German text of the argument postulated by W. Link reads thus: "Darin scheint mir in der Tat das hinreichende Kriterium zu liegen, das zusammen mit den beiden notwendigen Kriterien Bouldings eine sinnvolle und empirisch braubare Abgrenzung zwischen Konflikt und Wettbewerb bzw. Wettkampf ermöglicht." Ibid., p. 36.

will be referred to as a regional conflict. However, if the tension is critical to the relationship cohesion involving different kinds of sectors, then one can classify these as political, economical, cultural and ideological conflicts.[665]

The next section will deal with the explanation and analysis of the second category of conflicts mentioned above as this is not only relevant to this work but also essential for the investigation of the conflict situation in Nigeria. Hence, political, social, ethnic and environmental conflicts will be examined in order to elucidate on some of the important types of conflicts in the second category that will be observed, reflected and assessed in the Nigerian case in the course of this thesis.

4.2.1 Political Conflict

With the role politics play in conflicts altogether, one can summarize and group all the different types of conflicts in the second and third categories as political conflicts. So, in order to place emphasis on these kinds of conflicts, it is necessary to first of all understand and define the phenomenon referred to as "political conflict".

Although different actors use various kinds of methods to illustrate a political conflict, this type of conflict, however, may be identified in the sense that diverse parties or actors involved use distinct kinds of approaches to achieve different goals. In spite of some identical features visible in several types of conflicts, there are also differences which may be discerned with respect to the causes and dynamics of these various types of conflicts regardless of the fact that the targeted goals may overlap. Therefore, there are also certain features which are indicators of political conflicts within and between states.

Accordingly, it may be stressed both in the international and national system of states that there are certain conflicts of interests which focus on national values like territorial autonomy, national purpose, the decision over the control

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665   The original German text of the paraphrased comment in the work of W. Link is as follows: "Die Berücksichtigung des Beziehungszusammenhanges (der integrierenden Einheit) er-möglicht eine Klassifikation nach der „integrierenden Einheit": ist der Beziehungszusam-menhang das Internationale System oder (anders ausgedrückt) die Staatenwelt als Gesamt-heit, so handelt es sich um eine Weltkonflikt; ist er die Region, so handelt es sich um einen regionalen Konflikt usw. Wird die Spannung für einen sektoralen bzw. funktionalen Bezie-hungszusammeng kritisch, so kann man nach politischen, ökonomischen, kulturellen und ideologischen Konflikten klassifizieren. Für die empirische Analyse ist diese Unterschei-dung von größer Wichtigkeit". Link, Werner, 1979, op. cit., p. 37.

of the state apparatuses, which also includes internal rivalry between groups over who belongs to the sovereign state. All these imply features which denote the authority of a state. In this sense, at least, one group must participate in the organization of state power since government appears as the defender of the national values. Consequently, the existence of the government must either be threatened, the existence of its territorial integrity questioned or the existence or the cohesion of the people residing within this national territory threatened. Therefore, international conflicts refer first and foremost to territories, colonial possessions/national independence and to its international position of power and resources; intra-state conflicts refer to ethnic, religious or regional autonomy, the type of regime as well as the power of its position within its national federation.[666]

It can be asserted that a political conflict contains features of the other types of conflicts to a large extent. That is why it is illustrated through the analysis of political conflicts which encompass other types of conflicts such as intra-national conflicts which may occur in form of ethnic, religious, territorial and power conflicts. Similar to international conflicts, intra-national conflicts also deal with the possible capture of territories, resources and power. Arguably, this implies that the factors which may trigger an international conflict can also induce intra-national conflicts.

Furthermore, what R. Väyrynen refers to as social conflicts can equally be conceived of as political conflicts in so far as they involve the acquisition of territories, resources and power. The author posits further that territoriality is a socially constructed phenomenon which rests on the question of who controls whom and why:[667]

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666   The arguments about the features of a political conflict as stated above are taken from the work written in German by F. Pfetsch and further translated into English as stated above in the work. This can be read as follows:

"Im internationalen wie nationalen Staatensytem beziehen sich Interessengegensätze auf nationale Werte wie territoriale Unabhängigkeit, nationale Bestimmung, Verfügung über das Entscheidungsmonopol (wounter auch innerstaatliche Rivalitäten zwischen Gruppen um die Macht im Staaten gehören), d.h. allgemein auf die Merkmale, die einen Staat kennzeichnen. Dies impliziert, dass auf mindestens einer Seite die organisierte Staatsmacht beteiligt sein muss […], denn die Regierung tritt als Verteidiger der nationalen Werte auf. Es muß also entweder die Regierung in ihrer Existenz gefährdet sein, die territoriale Integrität in Frage gestellt sein oder die im Staatsgebiet lebende Bevölkerung, ihre Existenz und Zusammengehörigkeit bedroht sein. Internationale Konflikte beziehen sich vor allem auf die Territorien, Kolonialbesitz/nationale Unabhängigkeit, internationale Machtpositionen sowie auf Ressourcen; innerstaatliche Konflikte auf ethnische, religiöse oder regionale Autonomie, den Regimecharakter sowie auf Machtpositionen im nationalen Verband." Pfetsch, R. Frank, 1994, op. cit., p. 214.

667   See Väyrynen, Raimo, 1991, op. cit., p. 13.

> Territoriality means, first of all, that (a) actors are classified by geographical areas divided by boundaries, (b) these distinguishing classifications are communicated to other actors, and (c) the access to delineated territories is controlled and the control is enforced […].[668]

It can be seen from this definition that the actors distinguish themselves by drawing boundaries and assure that the boundaries of their territories are not violated by the so-called others. In addition, F. Pfetsch observes additional features of political conflicts in order to make a clear distinction from insignificant kinds of conflict situations. In his view, one can characterize a conflict as political if conflicts of interests between two or more parties last for a long period of time. This means that the issue of duration of a conflict is of paramount importance. He holds the view that the so-called conflicts of interests in this sense must cover a long range in order to include other groups of people who may be directly or indirectly involved. [669]

C. Rohloff represents another viewpoint in the way he distinguishes a social conflict from a political one. From a narrow perspective, he conceives political conflict as a type of conflict that can be distinguished from various other types such as economic and social conflicts as it deals with questions concerning national sovereignties.[670] Hence, the question of national sovereignty is of importance to political conflict and it corresponds to the territorial boundaries mentioned earlier. So, it can be argued that the economic discontent of one ethnic group within a multi-ethnic society can lead to the outbreak of conflicts.

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668   Ibid., p. 13.
669   However, various military coups or kingdoms cannot be counted as part of political conflicts because it does not take so long before a change of the elites takes place. See Pfetsch, R. Frank, 1994, op. cit., p. 214. The original German comment:
        "Um eine weitere Abgrenzung gegenüber unerblichen Konfliktgegenständen vorzunehmen, nehmen wir als Kriterien ferner hinzu: Interessegegensätze müssen mit einer bestimmten Dauer ausgetragen werden; damit sind die meisten Staatsstreiche oder Putsche ausgeschlossen, die nur ein paar Stunden dauern und im allgemeinen nur einen Elitenwechsel bedeuten. Die Interessengegensätze müssen eine bestimme Reichweite besitzen, d.h. weite Bevölkerungskreise mit einbeziehen; damit sind terroristische Anschläge oder Attentate ausgeschlossen, die nur von einer begrenzten Zahl von Personen begangen werden und nicht das Gesamtgefüge staatlicher Existenz gefährden." Ibid., p. 214.
670   Rohloff, Christoph: "Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Befunde der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung", in: Maria Behrens [Ed.]: *Globalisierung als politische Herausforderung, Global Governance zwischen Utopie und Realität*, Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 141-164 (146) . The title of the essay can be translated into English as *Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings in Peace and Conflict Studies* with Maria Behrens as the editor in the literature entitled *Global Governance as a Political Challenge: Global Governance between Utopia and Reality*. The German text is as follows: "Politische Konflikte im engeren Sinne, wie sie im Folgenden verstanden werden, unterscheiden sich von sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Konflikten insofern, als Fragen der nationalen Souveränität berührt werden." Ibid., p. 146.

Moreover, secession and demand for autonomy by an ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society can as well, with regard to the agitation for a separate territorial allocation within a nation, threaten the sovereignty of a country. Still on topic of different types of conflicts, the next section will examine and describe the type referred to as a social conflict.

4.2.2 Social Conflict

The focus of this analysis will be on social conflicts despite the fact that such conflicts can be embedded within the framework of political conflicts. However, the phenomenon of social conflicts will be examined as an independent type of conflicts within the context of this investigation. The emphasis specifically on social conflict will attempt to examine its meaning and focus on its definition in order to distinguish it from other types of conflicts.

H. Blalock, within the framework of his conceptualization of the term *conflict*, explores some definitions by other social scientists to explain the phenomenon of social conflicts. One of these writers is J. Himes, who understands social conflict in terms of "purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources, and other scarce values."[671] This definition of social conflict indicates a sharp difference from the notion of political conflicts examined in the previous chapter. L. Kriesberg, while reviewing the work of J. Burton, explains that social conflicts are conflicts of needs, which he considers an integral part of human beings which are genetically inherent.[672]

He assumes that needs drive the behavior of human beings. These needs are based on security, recognition, stimulation, rationality, control and distributive justice. Therefore, failure in any society to fulfill these needs may become potential avenues for the eruption of social conflicts, deviance and alienation.[673] In some cases, the so-called human needs can be associated with what A. Peñas refers to, in regard to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) docu-

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671   Himes, S. Joseph: *Conflict and Conflict Management*, University of Georgia Press, Athens 1980, p. 14. The same definition is in the analysis of Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert, 1980, op. cit., p. 9.
672   See Kriesberg, Louis: "Book Review: 'Conflict: Resolution and Prevention' by John Burton", in: *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1991, p. 573-574 (573).
673   See ibid, p. 573.

ments, as 'human security'.[674] He believes that to achieve this human security means a direct and an indirect elimination of violence in the daily lives of individuals. To this effect, the concept of human security, according to the reports of UNDP, includes seven dimensions, namely: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.[675]

In an extension of the aforementioned human security concept, a precise and concrete definition is thus given:

> Indeed, the African Union (AU) Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact establishes in Article 1, Subsection K that: 'Human security means the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development.'[676]

It is doubtful if the failure to fulfill all the human needs listed above automatically instigates the eruption of social conflicts. If human security remains unfulfilled, as is the case in many countries, it is questionable if this will necessarily lead to deep-rooted conflicts since, according to C. Mitchell, the latter also deals with conflicts which occur as a result of values, needs, and scarcity of resources.[677]

He emphasizes further that a polity, dominated by majority ethnic groups in which minority communities are marginalized, may lead to a protracted conflict whereby deviant behaviors of the minorities will be perceived as disruptive and disloyal. However, it is important when dealing with social conflicts to find out how such deviant attitudes by minorities are reacted to by the authority which can lead to the deliberate introduction of sanctions on both the part of the minority and the government as H. Blalock states in his work:

> By social conflict, we shall mean the intentional mutual exchange of negative sanctions, or punitive behaviors, by two or more parties, which may be individuals, corporate actors, or more loosely knit quasi-groups.[678]

The author places emphasis on four important components which are destruction, intentions, the involved parties as well as the imposition of sanctions

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674   See Peñas, S. Andrés: "Rethinking Peace and Security in Africa: ECOWAS, A Human Security Regime?", in: Gounden, Vasu: *Peace-Keeping in Africa*, *Conflict Trend*, Issue 3, 2010, p. 3-10 (4).
675   See ibid., p. 4
676   Ibid., p. 6.
677   See Mitchell, R. Christopher, 1991, op. cit., p. 24.
678   Blalock, Jr., M. Hubert, 1980, op. cit., p. 7.

against one another. In view of this, it can be argued that the meaning of social conflicts is not different from K. Singer's conflict definition as illustrated by W. Link in the previous analysis. This implies that the intentions of two parties are involved in a competition, despite the awareness of their differences in position, constituting an evocation of critical tensions. One can see that the critical tensions already involve the thoughts of both parties to impose sanctions on each other. That is the reason one can claim, according to these findings, identifiable similarities exist between the works of both W. Link and H. Blalock. In view of the violence that social conflicts demonstrate, the introduction of L. Coser's view on social conflicts becomes significant for the analysis as the contents therein sharpens the perceived propensity towards violence by the involved parties. He understands social conflict "to mean a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals."[679]

L. Coser's view reinforces the argument put forward while explaining that for political conflicts violence is embedded in the approaches taken by the conflict parties. The conflicting parties attempt to neutralize, eliminate or wound their opponent(s) and, hence, violence is used whenever the actors decide to enforce their demands and participation in the distribution of scarce resources.

4.2.3 Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflicts are among the most important components of intra-national or domestic conflicts because of the role religion plays, as an example of an ideology and a form of political conflicts, in articulating ethnic discontent.[680] Minority conflicts based on the demand for autonomy and secession are characterized by C. Rohloff as partial aspects of ethnic conflicts. The writer observes that there are still quite a number of conflicts based on power struggles about the distribution of revenue in resource-rich countries such as Nigeria and Sierra

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679 Coser, A. Lewis, 1956, op. cit., p. 8.
680 Domestic conflicts can be described as conflicts which occur within a state or a country. Political, ethnic and social conflicts can be classified under the term *internal conflicts*. Furthermore, C. Mitchel portrays an internal conflict within the context of the label "intra-national conflicts". He describes domestic conflicts as kind of conflict in which organized violence recurs among groups of people from diverse ethnic backgrounds in regular intervals. In addition, the author emphasizes that the use of violence is a strategy to pursue and realize certain goals. It is noticed that he makes use of other labels such as 'protracted conflicts' or 'deep-rooted conflicts' to designate ethnic conflicts. See Mitchell, R. Christopher, 1991, op. cit., p. 23.

Leone as well as conflicts fueled by demand for autonomy and secession. The boundaries between these kinds of conflicts are often blurred and can only be clearly distinguished by the parties involved in the conflict.[681]

On these grounds, it is significant to observe the type of conflict in these countries with heterogeneous ethnic groups who are involved in one conflict or the other due to the struggle for the participation in the distribution of resources or in order to achieve political power. According to C. Mitchell, this type of conflict may be referred to as protracted.[682] Another study carried out by G. Krämer points to the politicization of religion as a driving force in conflicts and her research also finds that the conflation of both religious and ethnic conflicts is common in many multi-ethnic societies.[683] She continues in her argument that the politicization of religion is not only existent in Islam but also in non-Muslim communities which are often organized in reaction to the formation and activation of politicized Islamic religious groups.

Nevertheless, ethnic conflicts in pluralistic societies can be viewed as a developmental challenge in many developing countries. It can be argued that many Third World countries, especially former colonial states, are confronted with numerous crises since the attainment of independence, some of which can be described as identity as well as penetration crises.[684] J. Burton identifies these crises as follows:

> Ethnic conflicts are being treated in sixty or so countries, where boundaries have been drawn as a result of colonialism or conquest, as though the individual can be coerced to accept majority rule which denies ethnic or cultural identity. Majority rule and power sharing (which is still majority rule) are legitimized by the label 'democracy'.[685]

He observes further in his research that the label *democracy* is an ideological misinterpretation which constitutes the source of protracted conflicts in many multi-ethnic societies.[686] The imposition of democratic principles is what B.

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681 See Rohloff, Christoph, 2005, op. cit., p. 148. The original German text of the argument reads: "Noch immer gibt es zahlreichen Machtkonflikte um ressourcenreichen Staatspfründen, etwa in Nigeria und Sierra Leone, sowie Autonomie und Sezessionskonflikte, die häufig miteinader vermischt und nur aus der Sicht der jeweiligen Konfliktparteien unterscheidbar sind." Ibid., p. 148.

682 See Mitchell, R. Christopher, 1991, op. cit., p. 24.

683 The author claims that many countries, mostly in the so-called Third World, are threatened by both religious and ethnic cleavages. See Krämer, Gudrun: "Macht und Allmacht: Die Konfliktlage im Nahen Osten", in: Senghass, Dieter [Ed.]: *Regionalkonflikte in der Dritten Welt: Autonomie und Fremdbestimmung*, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1989, p. 149-166 (154).

684 See Moser, Beat: *Ethnischer Konflikt und Grenzkriege*, Diessenhofen 1983, p. 23. The English translation of the title is *Ethnic Conflict and Boundary Wars*.

685 Burton, W. John, 1990, op. cit., p. 40.

686 See Moser, Beat, 1983, op. cit., p. 26

Moser describes as the controversy surrounding the eruption of ethnic conflicts in some Third World countries that are driven more or less by interventions influenced by external forces.[687]

J. Burton similarly alleges that major powers in the global society still operate within the scope of traditional assumption which gives the impression that they can coerce other nations into behaving in specific manners.[688] He further criticizes that these kinds of traditional views of the world form the approaches adopted by these great powers in their fight against terrorism, in competition with other economic and political systems and towards weak countries that prefer the establishment of alternative political systems. So, one can argue that such external influences may contribute to the outbreak of ethnic conflicts or exacerbate an existing one.

Thus, ethnic conflicts, in view of the violence involved, surpass other forms of internal conflicts by far. The reason for this can be traced back to the question on the right to self-determination which makes any possibility for compromise impossible since diverse ethnic groups posit incompatible views.[689]

To this effect, B. Moser describes an ethnic conflict as a dispute between linguistic, religious and racial groups or between these groups and the central government of a country.[690] The same phenomenon is what L. Coser notes in another instance as conflict of boundaries in his study which shows that:

> Conflict sets boundaries between groups within a social system by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of separateness, thus establishing the identity of groups within the system.[691]

This brings the issue of identity to the forefront of an ethnic conflict. Within the framework of ethnic conflict analysis, it can be argued that societies which are split by ethnic fragmentation reflect persisting identity struggles of certain groups of people who perceive themselves as mono-ethnic or integrated.[692] That is why it must be noted that most of the contemporary active armed conflicts in the world are being fought within states.[693] Furthermore, the next section will

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687   See ibid.
688   See Burton, W. John, 1990, op. cit., p. 40.
689   Moser, Beat, 1983, op. cit., p. 26-28.
690   Ibid., p. 26. The original German text of B. Moser reads: "Darunter sind Auseinandersetzungen zwischen linguistischen, religiösen oder rassischen Gruppen und zwischen diesen und der zentralregierung eines Landes zu verstehen." Ibid., p.26.
691   Coser, A. Lewis, 1956, op. cit., p. 34.
692   See Burton, W. John, 1990, op. cit., p. 138.
693   See Harbom, Lotta/Wallensteen, Peter: "Armed Conflicts and its International Dimensions, 1946-2004", in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 5, 2005, p. 623-635.

shed light on another type of conflict characterized by environmental problems, hence referred to as environmental conflicts.

4.2.4 Environmental Conflicts

Environmental conflict is a specific type of conflict which is not often mentioned in the literature since many scholars omit conflicts caused by grievances from environmental damage and degradation to peoples and communities in many parts of the world.

It can be asserted, without undermining the influence of environmental conflict, which is significant in many contemporary conflicts, that distinguishing environmentally invoked crises from other types of conflicts may prove hard as the boundaries are often blurred along the line of ethnic and resource conflicts: "environmental issues may be tightly interwoven with social, economic, political, ethnic and religious disputes."[694]

At the same time, an environmental conflict, like its ethnic counterpart, can be linked to or supported by international actors who may equally qualify it as an international conflict. Notwithstanding, environmental degradation and conflicts are becoming increasingly notable in many parts of the world because its effects are not just limited to a particular region but may have long-lasting global consequences for mankind. The following statement by M. Renner et al. acknowledges the importance of environmental issues:

> […] the international system—with its sovereign nation states, military alliances and market relations in the world economy—is increasingly affected by environmental issues. Environmental degradation is a new force shaping governmental policies and international relations, […] in a negative sense (tensions over resource depletion or degradation) […].[695]

The authors further posit that the struggle over access and control of resources such as water, land, diamonds, gold, oil etc. has been at the root cause of tension and conflicts since the history of mankind and the establishment of the system of nation states. As a result, they assert that "considering the large-scale damage to the environment now apparent on a global basis, it should be obvious that the potential for conflict is enormous."[696] Such conflicts may be conducted by legal,

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694   Renner, Michael et al.: "International Conflict and Environmental Degradation", in: Väyrynen, Raimo [Ed.]: *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, International Social Science Council, London et al. 1991, p. 108-128 (120).
695   Ibid., p. 108.
696   Ibid., p. 118.

military, diplomatic and economic means. It is pertinent to state that a military solution to an environmental conflict cannot restore the ecological effects or resource depletion of a particular area.[697]

Having already mentioned that the occurrence of an environmental conflict may be intertwined with other types of conflicts such as ethnic conflict, one can argue that the migration of refugees from one place to another for safety reasons whenever a conflict erupts may have adverse effects on the environmental condition due to overpopulation.[698] In view of the population increase in a particular peaceful area because of refugees, as J. Burton surmises, there are other inconspicuous phenomena which, as a byproduct of such changes, affect the exponential quality of said environment. For example, loss of personal and group identity as well as increased numbers of socially alienated persons are factors which may aggravate conflicts.[699] In addition, water, as a natural resource, can trigger an environmental conflict when it becomes a scarce essential commodity due to high population density, as can be seen in the following scenario:

> Transboundary environmental degradation poses a new type of interstate conflict—one in which its nature, its conduct and, therefore, its resolution are different from traditional conflicts. This conflict transformation has two dimensions. One concerns divisible resources, that is, resources that have traditionally been the object of struggles over access and control among different actors. Water is perhaps the best illustration. Water disputes are still characterized by competing demands, but added to the quantity aspect of it now is the issue of quality. There is no point in controlling a severely polluted or degraded resource. The second dimension of the transformational concerns indivisible resources such as air and the entire natural support system that sustains human life on earth.[700]

This implies that any potential pressure on the use of water due to increase in population of a particular area may have adverse effects on the environment to the extent that water may become scarce or even totally exhausted. This can lead to conflicts since the natural environment is not immune to external pressure.

Another important point is that environmental degradation or pollution is not limited by human-drawn physical boundaries as the security of the country in which they occur is not only affected, but also the security of others. As a result, the analysis of climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions may

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697   See ibid., p. 119.
698   A research on how refugee population migration may cause or aggravate conflicts is shown in the following work: Raleigh, Clionadh: "The Search for Safety: The Effects of Conflicts, Poverty and Ecological Influences on Migration in the Developing World", in: *Journal of Global Environment Change, Part A: Human and Policy Dimensions*, Vol. 21, 2011, p. 82-93 (86-90).
699   See Burton, W. John, 1990, op. cit., p. 54.
700   See Renner, Michael et al., 1991, op. cit., p. 120.

have wide-ranging effects in countries which contribute less to environmental pollution. As evidenced in a study on the effects of climate change in the future, it is asserted that climate change, with respect to global warming, will increase civil war. As a result of this, the expected meaningful engagement, which is so pertinent for political and economic stability as well as economic development and peace in Africa, may be discouraged.[701]

4.2.5. Intermediate Assessment: The Definition, Description and Types of Conflicts

Having examined attempts to define and describe conflict by numerous authors and social scientists such as E.-O. Czempiel, W. Link, H. Blalock, K. Boulding, K. Singer, R. Dahrendorf etc., reveals that the positions taken by various authors in defining the concept *conflicts* are either contradictory or complementary.

For instance, the efforts made by E.-O. Czempiel to define the term *conflict* indicate certain complications as he is not able to specify what constitutes the phenomenon of conflict or indicate a situation that can be referred to as conflict. According to the analysis carried out, these complexities arise because E.-O. Czempiel is unable to state precisely what degree of tension constitutes a conflict on a fluid continuum between conflict and non-conflict zones. In fact, according to E.-O. Czempiel's analysis, every social relationship among and between human beings can be characterized as a conflict situation. However, this study shows that E.-O. Czempiel's analysis places a great focus on the notion of peace as an antidote to conflict. Consequently, E.-O. Czempiel's understanding of peace means the equality of chances for the personal development of every individual and a decline of violent acts. Thereby, peace enables an increase in social justice and instances of violence to decrease.

On the other hand, in what can be viewed as a complementing work on E.-O. Czempiel's analysis, K. Boulding concurs that though every human relationship may signal an element of conflict, however, his research distinguishes what he terms "potential or actual conflicts", a situation in which two parties, groups or individuals are in a competition. As a result of the antagonistic nature of the parties involved in a competition, R. Dahrendorf applies the term *conflict*

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701   See Sutton, A. Alexandra et al.: "Does Warming Increase the Risk of Civil War in Africa", in: *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)*, Vol. 107, No. 25 (E102 – author reply E103), June 2010.

unreservedly for contests, disputes, tensions and perceived clashes among social forces.

In this regard, W. Link suggests the need to distinguish between the concepts *conflict* and *competition* in defining the term *conflict*. However, what is most important for conflicts to erupt in social interactions are contacts and visibility of difference. So, it can be argued that if two parties or individuals decide to engage each other in a competition, the potential for conflict arises. However, if two parties compete for a mutually exclusive objective, then one can speak of *actual conflict*. In view of the phenomena *potential and actual conflicts*, it is made clear in the analysis that the words "awareness" and "wishes" play a significant role and are philosophically explosive in relation to the term *conflict*.

On top of that, the awareness of incompatibilities in the positions taken by at least two actors and the actions determined towards realizing certain goals are essential in any conflict situation. That is why the analysis shows that the perception of differences between self and other in a competition constitutes a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the outbreak of conflicts. All in all, competition cannot be necessarily be used as a synonym for conflict until it becomes destructive, which is described as a social conflict. So, as the investigation shows, social conflict has to do with the struggle over values, claims to scarce power and resources in which the intentions of opponents are to neutralize, injure and eliminate their rivals. One can see that conflict depicts a critical level of tension generated by mutually incompatible tendencies that threaten the structure and the organization of the integrating unit. Therefore, in every social interaction, there exists a degree of conflicts.

In addition, the thesis examines *deep-rooted conflict* in order to differentiate it from a general notion of conflict. Based on evidence shown in the analysis, deep-rooted conflicts are also referred to as chronic, protracted or elongated conflicts as they are characterized by fierce battles which recur on a regular basis.

Also, deep-rooted conflicts persist for a long period of time before they subside because there is often no solution in sight. So violence, as part and parcel of deep-rooted conflicts, is deployed as an instrument to produce the intended political effects. One example of such conflicts are intranational conflicts, which occur repeatedly between human communities and in which organized physical violence, as a means towards the pursuits of particular interests and attainment of goals, is deployed. Moreover, this thesis identifies deep-rooted conflicts as

crises that arise due to values and needs, issues of identity, security and recognition which are often difficult to reconcile.

Finally, there are three categories of conflicts mentioned in this work: international, regional and domestic conflicts. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the second and third categories are reassigned to different types of conflicts treated within the context of this investigation. These are ethnic, political, social and environmental conflicts.

4.3 Literature Review: Current Research on the Causes of Conflicts in Nigeria

There are many dissertations, scientific articles, essays and monographs by numerous authors and social scientists with special focus on the causes or sources of conflicts in Africa. Among those recent works which are worthy of mention are R. Robbins, N. Orji, O. Egbe, O. Nnoli, J. Asuni and B. Umez. Furthermore, the investigation of the International Crisis Group and a host of other research on the subject matter will be mentioned and used analytically in subsequent sections.[702]

Despite the fact that many of these scientists refer to similar reasons as the source of these conflicts, and in some cases violent conflicts in Africa, this research will focus on Nigeria as the empirical focus of the dissertation. Nigeria is chosen as a case study because it is not only the most populous country in Africa, but it also comprises the highest number of ethnic groups in a single African country with its existence threatened by instability which emanate from ethnic, religious, social, environmental and resource conflicts:

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702   See Robbins, H. Richard: *Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism*, 5th edition, Prentice Hall, Boston et al. 2011. See Orji, Nkwachukwu: *Power-Sharing: The Elements of Continuity in Nigerian Politics*, Dissertation, Central European University, Budapest 2008, http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/pphorn01.pdf [02/05/2013]; Egbe, D.J. Olawari: "Oil Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Dislocations in Oil Fence-Line Communities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria", in: *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2012, p. 594-618. Read Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1995, op. cit. See Umez, N. Bedford: *The Tragedy of a Value System in Nigeria: Theories and Solutions*, International Scholars Publications, London et al. 1999. A policy briefing in the publication of the *International Crisis Group* (Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide) on the topic "Nigeria: Ogoni Land after Shell", Africa Briefing, No. 54, Dakar/Abuja/Brussels, 18 September 2008. See also Asuni, B. Judith: "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", in: *Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations*, New York 2009, p. 1-29.

> Nigeria is a deeply divided society with several lines of social divisions and bases of group identification. These lines of division reflect on the number of ethnic and regional groups that make up the country. It was commonly assumed that Nigeria is segmented into about 250 ethnic groups until one Nigerian social anthropologist revealed that there are 374 ethnic groups in Nigeria.[703]

In addition, the population of the country which, according to a 2009 UN report, is estimated at 154.729 million[704] shows, according to K. Meier, that one in every six Africans is a Nigerian.[705] Yet it is important to state that "in Nigeria, the exact number of ethnic groups is not known."[706] Another reason for choosing Nigeria as a case study is that the writer of this thesis believes that many types of conflicts that bedevil most African countries can be identified in Nigeria. As B. Umez illustrates: "[…] it should be noted that the situations explored in it are similarly obtainable in many other African nations. As such, the presentations here will be quite useful for other African nations."[707] That being said, it is pertinent to note that it may prove difficult to use one nation to represent and describe the situations in all African countries. However, studying the situations in Nigeria in many ways accords it the status of a typical African country. By this, according to B. Umez, Nigeria is a former colonial country similar to many African countries and the attainment of its political independence occurred at a time when most of the other African countries also achieved independence.[708] In spite of these similarities to other African countries, what makes the Nigerian case unique is the number of its ethnic groups, its population and the crises associated with its diversity of over 250 ethnic groups, which constitute a threat to its independence. In B. Umez's opinion "Nigeria is faced with the task of welding into a nation a variety of different people with different ethnic groupings and languages."[709]

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703 Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2008, op. cit., p. 9.
704 A UN website which shows the figure of Nigeria's population, as cited above in this thesis, was published in 2009 and retrievable electronically under the following homepage: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Nigeria [08/01/2013].
705 Scott Pegg makes reference to the publication of Oxford Journal School of African Economies with respect to the review of the work "The House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria" by K. Maier. In this work, K. Maier cites the importance Nigeria in Africa and the challenges a failed state in Nigeria may pose to the entire continent. Also, therein, he refers to Nigeria as the tenth most populous nation in the world. Pegg, Scott: "Review Work: 'The House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria' by Karl Maier", in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 100, Issue 400, 2000, p. 506-507. The review is also accessible under the following website: http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/100/400/506.full.pdf+html [18/12/2012].
706 Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1995, op. cit., p. 26.
707 Umez, N. Bedford, 1999, op. cit., p. 1.
708 See ibid., p. 1-20.
709 Ibid., p. 2.

A. Mustapha, who examines different dynamics of the conflicts in Nigeria, explains that, apart from the perceived conflicts between the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria, there are also several inter-actions between the three ethnic groups as a unit and the other numerous ethnic minorities on the other hand which contributes to the crises the country faces. He describes the situation thus:

> The interplay between this tripodal ethnic structure on the one hand, and administrative divisions and communal identities on the other hand, have led to eight major cleavages in Nigerian political life (Mustapha, 1986). The most important of those cleavages are the cleavages (1) between the three majority groups, (2) between the three majority ethnic groups on the one hand and the 350 odd minority ethnic groups on the other hand, (3) between the north and south, each consisting of three geo-political zones and (4) between different religious affiliations. Some of these cleavages overlap, for example, the southeast zone overlaps with Igbo ethnicity and Christian religious affiliation.[710]

It is not only the constellation of different ethnic and diverse religious affiliations that influence the outburst or exacerbation of conflicts in Nigeria, but other factors such as resource distribution, in terms of the oil and gas production, and the existence of other minerals resources in Nigeria. I. Ogundiya expounds Nigeria's wealth with respect to the availability of many natural resources which are of great importance internationally:

> Nigeria, created out of motley of nationalities and ethnic groups, is today Africa's wealthiest country. It is equally the most highly peopled, one of the largest in terms of territory […] and potentially, one of the world most vibrant economies. Paradoxically, it is also one of the most mismanaged, crisis-ridden and one of the most politically unstable systems on the continent. Since its attainment of independent nationhood in 1960, Nigeria's political landscape had been plagued by political instability.[711]

With regard to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources such as oil and gas production in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, J. Asuni submits in her work, among other factors, that issues like inter-ethnic cleavages also affect the peace and stability in the Niger Delta region. However, in spite of the complicated ethnic relationship among the inhabitants of the region, who constitute minorities within the Nigerian federation, there is a similar sense of grievance as

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710   Mustapha, R. Abdul: "Institutionalizing Ethnic Representation: How Effective is Affirmative Action in Nigeria?", in: *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2009, p. 561-576 (562). Furthermore, it may be difficult to state exactly the number of ethnic groups Nigeria is made up of because one may arrive at different numbers depending on the criteria one applies. However, A. Mustapha notes that it can range between 250 and 400 ethnic groups. In addition, these ethnic groups can be classified into three ethnic majorities which are numerically and politically strong and the other ethnic minorities which may comprise around over 250 ethnic groups who feel more or less economically and politically marginalized. See ibid., p. 562.

711   Ogundiya, S. Ilufoye: "The Cycle of Legitimacy Crisis in Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration", in: *Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2009, p. 129-142 (129).

they are united in the fight against the exploitation and negligence of their region. She lists some of the following reasons for the grievances of the Niger Delta people thus:

> For decades, moreover, the oil industry exploited the area and in the process polluted the riverine environment, wiping out the traditional livelihoods of fishing and farming, but providing few jobs in return.[712]

Based on these findings, the importance of Nigeria as a case study of any analysis on conflict-related issues with regard to the aforementioned ethnic crises and resource conflicts cannot be overstated. In view of that, D. Amaraegbu identifies the root causes of the Nigerian situation as follows:

> Politics in Nigeria is largely defined by contending patron-client arrangement operating along ethno-religious lines and characterized by complex social interests. The route to political power in Nigeria is fraught with corruption and the nation has failed to address the most destructive form of corruption—the corrupt process of acquiring power.[713]

Regardless of the fact that the reasons for the outbreak of conflicts in one country may differ from those in others, the analysis will show some overlapping causes which are both relevant for the conflicts in Nigeria as well for other conflicts in other parts of Africa and the world at large. In view of the current studies, the extensive research and the voluminous work already carried out in regard to the causes of conflicts, this thesis will make use of specific works and publications to pinpoint some relevant causes of conflict in Nigeria. Common among the variables that are given utmost priority as the causes of conflict in this investigation are colonialism, decades of military rule, poor elites' political leadership, the oil curse, religiosity, activities of multinational oil companies and the clash of identities.

Nevertheless, within the framework of this dissertation, it is pertinent to state that all of the variables listed above may play significant roles in conflicts and are, therefore, identified as possible causes of conflicts. However, until investigated, it is uncertain if they constitute the direct causes of conflicts. Hence, the following sections will attempt to establish at the end of the investigation whether the aforesaid variables are responsible or whether they are necessary but do not create sufficient conditions for the outbreaks of contemporary conflicts in Nigeria.

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712   Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 5-6.

713   Amaraegbu, Declan: "Political Leadership and Politics of Anti-Corruption Project in Nigeria (1999-2009)", in: *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2011, p. 184-199 (184).

Having ascertained that a lot of investigation has been carried out by numerous authors on the subject matter, it is important to present and explain different viewpoints in some of the respective literature with which attempts are made to examine and clarify the causes of conflicts in Nigeria. Some of these authors whose works on conflicts will be examined are A. Adebajo, R. Ngomba-Roth, J. Nwankwo and K. Panter-Brick.[714] Although these authors present different opinions about the causes of conflict in Nigeria, there is significant overlap in some of the perspectives that the writers present in their works.

Despite the fact that all the variables under consideration do play significant roles on the subject matter since they may serve as triggers for the outbreaks of conflicts, however, this study represents the position that it is the politicization of ethnicity that deploys all the aforementioned variables as instruments to foment conflicts. That is why, within the context of this research, some of these variables mentioned above will be explored and analyzed further below. Therefore, the following sections will attempt to review the different perspectives presented in the literature and examine to what extent they contribute towards explaining the sources of conflicts in Nigeria.

4.3.1 The Experience of Colonialism as the Cause of Conflicts

As already mentioned, there are many reasons considered as the causes of conflicts in Nigeria: Social scientists like A. Adebajo opine that the colonial experience of some African countries, including Nigeria, presents an important cause of the continual outbreaks of conflicts, especially the contemporary conflicts on the continent.

It is important to examine the notion of imperialism when dealing with the concept of colonialism as both phenomena are intertwined and may be misunderstood because both terms are generally associated with economic backwardness, educational inadequacy and social problems, which may have a negative impact on contemporary conflict situations in Africa. S. Ocheni and B. Nwankwo define colonialism as follows:

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714   See Adebajo, Adekeye: *The Curse of Berlin, Africa After the Cold War*, Columbia University Press, New York 2010. See also Ngomba-Roth, Rose: *Multinational Companies and Conflicts in Africa: The Case of the Niger Delta-Nigeria*, Lit Verlag, Hamburg 2007. See Nwankwo, O. Josephat: *Ethnical Challenges of Authority in a Pluralistic Society: The Nigerian Example*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1998; Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.]: *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, Frank Cass, London 1978.

> Colonialism is the direct and overall domination of one country by another on the basis of state power being in the hands of a foreign power (For example, the direct and overall domination of Nigeria by Britain between 1900-1960). The first objective of colonialism is political domination. Its second objective is to make possible the exploitation of the colonized country.[715]

M. Muiu conceptualizes imperialism as "the economic, cultural and political domination or control of one country or the group of people by others in ways assumed at the expense of the latter."[716] The author states further that imperialism is born out of the difficulties experienced in Europe and the colonization of Africa is proffered as a solution to the difficulties faced in industrialized Europe in terms of market expansion, relocation of excess population and the search for cheap labor.[717]

However, M. Muiu hints that, for the colonized or indigenous people, the challenges of colonialism have a long term effect on the colonized people and its consequences are still felt:

> Imperialism changes the status quo of the invaded country. It is arrogant because it is based on the belief that the dominating group is culturally and racially superior. Imperialism is totalitarian since it rules every aspect of life: economic, political and social.[718]

Furthermore, he shows that the nature of imperialism in the occupied regions is tantamount to characterizing it as an imposition of a system that is based on violence. Imperialism is dynamic as it changes depending on the circumstances it faces.[719] However, for imperialism to be established, it is necessary to create an image of the 'Other'. In the case of Africa, with regard to imperialism, M. Muiu writes:

> Africa's enormous wealth in natural and human resources—such as gold, prime agricultural land, and especially people who could be used as slave labor on European plantations demanded that Europeans create an ideology that dehumanized Africans. Explorers, geographers,

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715   Ocheni, Stephen/Nwankwo, C. Basil: "Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa", in: *Cross-Cultural Communication*, Vol. 8 (3), 2012, p. 46-54 (46).

716   Muiu, Wa Mueni: "'Civilization' on Trial: The Colonial and Postcolonial State in Africa", in: *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, 2008, p. 73-94 (78).

717   See ibid., p.78. The same argument can be found in the work of Ulrich Paula who gives an account on the problems industrialized Europe confronted in the second half of the 19th century. Some of the problems were overpopulation, economic decline and competitive behavior among European nations. See Pallua, Ulrich: *Eurocentrism, Racism, Colonialism in the Victorian and Edwardian Age*, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2006, p. 230.

718   See Muiu, Wa Mueni, 2008, op. cit., p. 78. It is further noted that the experience of excess population posed a threat to the industrialized nations of Europe, hence the expansion outside the natural boundaries formed part of the plans encapsulated in imperialism to find a way of resettling some of the these people in the colonies. This resettlement enabled capitalism to expand to other areas of the world, i.e., to the so-called Third World. See ibid., p. 78.

719   See ibid., p. 78.

scientists, missionaries, and political, economic and military leaders engaged in the construction of the African as the 'other'.[720]

In addition, U. Pallua asserts that there was conviction on the part of the British colonizer that they belonged to the leading race in regard to morality, religion, technology and racial relations. As a result of this notion of racial superiority, the exploitation of Africans and their cultural heritage was initiated.[721]

In spite of the fact that colonialism is of greater relevance to this thesis, the phenomenon of imperialism is by no means to be ignored when attempting to clarify the concept of colonialism. In this regard, U. Pallua believes that "in essence, colonialism is the continuation of imperialism by other means."[722]

In the same vein, S. Ocheni and B. Nwankwo posit that the phenomenon of colonialism qualifies as the direct form of imperialism because all colonialism is imperialism, but not all imperialism is colonialism.[723] As a result, authors such as A. Porter are of the opinion that imperialism is a perennial and recurrent phenomenon.[724]

Similarly, E. Boehmer emphasizes that one of the most significant features of colonialist politics is that the "European self-projection was its representation of the people who inhabited the lands they claimed: the natives, the colonized."[725] By this, D. Spurr asserts that the creation of an image of the "Other" as performed by European colonialists against the subjects of the African colonies is to pave the way for their control and subordination:

> The very process by which one culture subordinates another begins in the act of naming and leaving unnamed, of marking on an unknown territory the lines of division and uniformity, of boundary and continuity.[726]

M. Muiu argues that the construction of images of the colonized people projects their cultures as uncivilized and inferior. Hence the justification of the introduction of colonialism is based on the view that it is a mission by the superior races, the European colonialists, to civilize the people in Africa.[727] However, the main purpose is hidden, masked by the disguise which was to extract raw materials from the African continent and the use of African laborers and markets for

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720   Ibid., p. 75.
721   See Pallua, Ulrich, 2006, op. cit., p. 228.
722   Ibid., p. 79.
723   See Ocheni, Stephen/Nwankwo, C. Basil, 2012, op. cit., p. 46.
724   See Porter, Andrew: *European Imperialism, 1860-1914*, Macmillan, London 1994, p. 6.
725   Boehmer, Elleke: *Colonial and Postcolonial Literature*, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 1995, p. 79.
726   Spurr, David: *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration*, Duke University Press, Durham/London 1993, p. 4.
727   See Muiu, Wa Mueni, 2008, op. cit., p. 80.

European products.[728] According to his findings, one might conclude that colonialism is based on violence and corruption. For the purpose of the civilizing mission, which is allegedly centered on racism, missionaries used religion as an instrument of oppression:

> In the native 'other' missionaries first dehumanized Africans, then embraced them as "inferior". They presented Africa as both dangerous and exotic. Missionaries were effective because they mentally prepared Africans to accept colonial rule.[729]

He stresses that the missionaries preached about heaven but emphasized tribal identities, creating ethnic identities where they did not exist.[730] U. Pallua explains that colonialism left devastating effects on the indigenous cultures in the colonies as it caused suffering and destruction while hiding under the pretense of teaching the colonized moral and ethnic principles.[731] As part of the destructive experience of colonialism which can still be perceived in contemporary former colonies in Africa as it refashions household relations, education and economy, M. Muiu depicts how the same ethnic groups were divided into different countries and a single ethnic group split under the control of different European powers during the colonial rule:

> As a result people were divided between two or more countries; for example the Somali people were divided between two or more countries; Italy (Somalia), France (Djibouti) and Ethiopia (Ogaden). The Makonde of East Africa were in (German then British) Tanganyika and in Portuguese Mozambique. The Mandika of West Africa were included in the French system, but others were in British Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Many Hausa were in British Nigeria, while others were in French Niger. The Kingdom of Congo was divided between the Belgians, the French and the Portuguese.[732]

He opines that these divisions resulted in the loss of power and increased disunity among Africans.[733] For the first decade of the 21st century, A. Adebajo assumes that the colonial partition of the African societies and, thereafter, the amalgamation process of people from diverse cultural, ethnical and religious backgrounds into a single national entity can be emphasized as the cause for all current forms of conflicts on the continent:

> The partition of the continent unleashed unprecedented changes in African societies: political, economic, cultural, and psychological. This overview of those changes pays particular attention to their implications for the problems of security and governance over that period of 110 years.

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728   See ibid., p. 80.
729   Ibid., p. 81.
730   Ibid., p. 84.
731   See Pallua, Ulrich, 2006, op. cit., p. 35.
732   See Muiu, Wa Mueni, 2008, op. cit., p. 82-83.
733   See ibid., p. 83.

> As the new Millennium unfolds, Africa consists of some fifty-four countries. Partly because of this fragmentation, at least a third of independent Africa has experienced large-scale political violence or war. This does not include those countries that had relatively bloodless military coups d'état or occasional assassinations.[734]

He maintains that "most of the political violence in Africa concerns ethnic, racial, religious, national, or ideological boundaries."[735] It may be legitimate to question why many countries, especially Nigeria, are still confronted with conflicts despite the active experience of colonialism that ended over 50 years ago. However, Ethiopia and Liberia, two countries which were not colonized, are still both confronted with similar conflicts to those faced by the former colonial states,[736] a factor demonstrating that colonialism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the outbreaks of conflicts.

P. Child and P. Williams, in reference to Frantz Fanon, believe that "colonization is not simply concerned with controlling a population; it takes the history of the colonized and then 'distorts, disfigures and destroys it'."[737] This description highlights the destructive feature of colonialism in Africa. Along the same line of thought, G. Je'adayibe notes that colonialism is the cause of ethnic conflicts in the following sense:

> Colonialism in Africa as a whole has often been identified in sowing the seed for ethnic conflicts. Colonialists are held to have manipulated and played one group against the other in order to promote mutual antagonisms among African peoples […]. Colonialism portioned Africa and created artificial states and boundaries without regard to ethnic peculiarities and divergent historical and cultural forms.[738]

Following this argument, colonialism is posited as the root of ethnic conflict in Africa. These authors further stressed that the colonialists were able to manipulate and stir up one ethnic group against the other. According to this explanation, it is not clearly indicated how ethnic groups are manipulated and for what reason. It is argued at the same time that the partition of Africa enables artificial states and boundaries to be created regardless of ethnic and cultural distinctions.

Although the theory of instrumentalism in this research conforms to arbitrary drawing of ethnic boundaries, however, it is stipulated in regard to the in-

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734 Adebajo, Adekeye, 2010, op. cit., p. xii.
735 See ibid, p. xiii.
736 Adekson, J. Bayo: "Ethnicity and Army Recruitment in Colonial Plural Societies", in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1979, p. 151-165 (151).
737 Childs, Peter/Williams, Patrick: *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory*, Routledge, London et al. 1997, p. 209.
738 Je'adayibe, D. Gwamna: "Religious Conflicts and Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria", in: Falola, Toyin/Okpeh Ochayi, Jr., Okpeh [Eds.]: *Population Movements, Conflicts, and Displacements in Nigeria*, African World Press, Asmara 2008, p. 155-177 (159).

strumentalist approach that this is carried out by ethnic actors in order to acquire specific resources. On the contrary, the reason for the colonialists' creation of such boundaries cannot be ascertained from the quotation and its correlation to conflicts is not clearly analyzed either. But one can see that the effects of colonialism form a core aspect of African societies.

Nonetheless, it is doubtful if years of colonial experience can single-handedly explain why, since attaining political independence, many African countries are still incapable of erasing these so-called colonial experiences whose aftermath still, as many scientists believe, bedevil many countries on the continent.

As evidenced in the writings of A. Mazrui, Africa is not the only continent where colonial exploitation, both economically and politically, was experienced but also Asia and Latin America:

> The Third World is basically tri-continental with Latin America to the West, Asia to the East, and Africa in the middle. The bonds between Africa and Asia include the experience of racial humiliation as non-white people. The bonds between Africa and Latin America include the experience of exploitation. Latin America is to the United States what Africa has been to western Europe, an Arena of penetration and control by a colossus of the North. [739]

However, the reason why most of the current lingering crises, ranging from ethnic, religious, political and economic conflicts, still persist in Africa and most importantly Nigeria is unclear. A. Mazrui believes, in his response, that "there is the burden of fragmentation in Latin America comparable to that in Africa, though not as acute."[740] Along the same line of argument, P. Ahluwalia and P. Nursey-Bray state that:

> The history of Africa is, of course, one of cultural oppression on a major scale. Nowhere else was the oppression so comprehensive, so savaged. African history was denied or appropriated; African culture belittled; the status and standing of Africans as human beings was called into question. [741]

Considering contemporary crises in Nigeria, it is questionable if one can trace the origin of these conflicts back to the consequences of colonialism. In view of the fact that one may perceive the conflicts in Nigeria as multidimensional, ranging from religious to ethnic and economic to political dimensions, it is uncertain that the experience of British colonialism is solely to blame for these

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739   Mazrui, A. Ali: *The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis*, Cambridge University Press, London et al. 1980, p. xi.
740   Ibid., p. xi.
741   Ahluwalia, Pal/Nursey-Bay, Paul: "Introduction", in: Ahluwalia, Pal/Nursey-Bay, Paul [Eds.]: *Post-Colonialism, Culture and Identity in Africa*, Nova Science Publishers, New York 1997, p. 1-10 (2).

present predicaments. In terms of political conflicts, it is asserted that during colonialism "Europeans destroyed African institutions of authority and government and have left a major political gap."[742] This implies that the pre-colonial peaceful coexistence among numerous ethnic groups, the values and collective responsibilities of traditional social life are eradicated and replaced by artificial systems from Europe.[743]

Also, the dichotomization of Nigeria into a Christian south and a Muslim north is, in view of the present conflicts, socially constructed. Moreover, one cannot overlook that a large number of people, often characterized as pagans, are worshippers of traditional religions living across both the northern and the southern regions of the country.

According to A. Mazrui, the origin of contemporary conflicts experienced in the country can be traced back to the introduction of indirect rule in Nigeria by the British. Indirect rule is based on the implementation of the principle and legacy laid down by E. Burke. Within the framework of Burkean doctrine in a colonial setting, the following can be noted:

> The British were going to use the native institutions for imperial control, and were going to ensure in northern Nigeria that the people were neither entirely pushed nor at once pressured into turning their back on their own antiquity. A colonial doctrine was born within the wedlock of Burkean philosophy and Nigerian Islam.[744]

On the contrary, different regional habitation, coupled with religious and traditional differences between diverse ethnic groups, either from the northern or the southern part of the country, cannot by itself lead to violent conflicts. It is the manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs/actors and, in this sense, the colonialists that produces these differences.

Consequently, A. Mazrui posits the same view as J. McKay, based on the *divide and rule policy* of the colonialists: "what all this […] amounts to is a deepening of ethnic consciousness as a result of the impact of Islam among the Hausa and Christianity among the Ibo."[745] So, one can describe the colonialists, according to the analysis of J. McKay, as ethnic manipulators because they attempt to use the policy of *divide and rule* to gain access to material resources which is the mandate, among others, colonialism is set to achieve. B. Umez[746] concurrently states that "the colonial masters […] exploited Africa's valuable

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742   Mazrui, A. Ali, 1980, op. cit., p. 7.
743   See ibid., p. 7
744   Ibid., p. xi.
745   Ibid., p. 100.
746   See McKay, James, op. cit., p. 406.

minerals (e.g. gold, topaz, and uranium) for the development of their home countries."[747]

He states that boundaries in African countries, which were colonial inventions, hamper Africa in such a way that traditional ethnic groups of diverse languages, cultures, and histories are converted to warring parties.[748] This repercussion of colonialism, as experienced in Nigeria, is what the author refers to as the colonial legacy.[749]

P. Ahluwalia and P. Nursey-Bray postulate in their work that the presence of colonialism, even after years of independence, can still be felt in contemporary Africa. In their opinion, the colonialist culture cannot disappear because it is not only about the physical control of a particular area of land, but rather the long-term psychological effects it has on the people subjected to colonial domination:

> Post-colonialism, colonialism and empire are not just a matter of territorial occupation, but of consciousness, how the colonial subject is constructed both in the mind of the subject culture and of the hegemonic culture.[750]

One can see from this argument that it is not ethnicity that, despite its representation of cultural, linguistic and religious distinctiveness and boundaries among different ethnic groups, leads to conflicts. Based on this analysis, these conflicts occur because of the boundary consciousness which is deeply rooted in the minds of the colonized people. Thus, it is not the *physical boundary* that continues to pervade post-colonial Nigeria. Hence, "the African subject re-imagines itself by confirming the very porous borders of Africa as a discourse of geography, history, culture, nation and identity."[751]

J. Duke also considers the slow level of development one of the reasons for the conflicts experienced continually in Nigeria. He believes that the slow pace of advancement has its roots in colonialism:

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747   Umez, N. Bedford, 1999, op. cit., p. 3.
748   See ibid.
749   See ibid.
750   Ahluwalia, Pal/Nursey-Bay, Paul, "Introduction", 1997, op. cit., p. 3-4.
751   See Ashcroft, Bill: "Globalism, Post-Colonialism and African Studies", in: Ahluwalia, Pal/ Nursey-Bay, Paul [Eds.]: *Post-Colonialism, Culture and Identity in Africa*, Nova Science Publishers, New York 1997, p. 11-26 (23).

> […] the slow development of 'home-grown' management principles and practices in Nigeria [can be traced back] to the effects of internal conflicts that were generated by the policies of colonialism up to mid-20th century.[752]

Conversely, one could ask if the current economic conditions in these countries are responsible for the continued occurrence of internal conflicts. Does this mean that ethnic groups that practice different religions are engaged in violent conflicts because of the scarce resources that they apparently jostle for? Must the eruption of ethnic and religious conflicts in a particular country, Nigeria for instance, always be based on the scramble and struggle for resources? And why are these resources scarce? All these are crucial questions on the role of colonialism in the distribution of resources that will be examined in the course of this analysis.

Colonialism is understood to be one of the most important factors hindering economic and political development in the so-called post-colonial states. Still, one may find it hard to imagine how colonialism can be identified as an obstacle to progress in these former colonized countries to the extent that people fight and kill one another over ethnic and religious differences. With regard to a number of questions raised at the end of this section, it may be difficult to comprehend why resources become scarce if these former colonial countries possess natural resources such as crude oil, gold, diamonds, uranium etc. As is widely known, these resources are required and in some cases seriously needed for industrial growth that can facilitate economic progress.

On the one hand, one could be led to believe that African countries are politically liberated in view of the attainment of independence in the middle of 20th century as A. Gromyko points out: "Positive consequences of the liquidation of the colonial system, the emergence of more than 50 independent states, have changed the status and the role of Africa in international affairs."[753]

On the other hand, considering the underdevelopment and conflicts confronting Nigeria and other African countries continually, one might question whether independence is actually a benefit to the people of Africa. As A. Gromyko affirms:

> […] an impressive appearance on the international arena has not liberated African countries from the hardships of economic and social development created to a large extent by the colo-

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752   Duke, Joe: "The Impact of Colonialism on the Development of Management in Nigeria", in: *International Journal of Business and Management*, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 2010, p. 65-75 (65).
753   Gromyko, A. Anatoly: "Some Global Problems and Africa", in: Rathmann, Lothar et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Africa's Path to a Peaceful Future*, Special Issue on Asia, Africa and Latin America, No. 16, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 36-40 (36).

nial past and the predatory policies pursued by Western monopolies. The question of reconstructing the whole system of economic relations of the African countries with the industrially developed capitalist states has become particularly urgent. The fact is that African countries still remain a subsystem within the world of capitalist economy and have to call for aid with private capital and the governments of states where it reigns as they themselves do not possess the necessary funds, technology and trained personnel. For African countries the effect of this assistance is ankle-high but it puts them knee-deep in trouble.[754]

The same point is emphasized by B. Ashcroft as he highlights the existence of the dichotomy between Africa and Europe. He observes that Africa is constructed and characterized as a subsystem short of economic capital. This implies that the African continent exists in the periphery while Europe is regarded as the other continent where capital reigns. This binary opposition is what A. Ogunsanya and B. Ashcroft describe as metropolitan centers and peripheries:

> For centuries, Africa has represented the other of Europe. Indeed, the homogenization implicit in the term "Africa" exists precisely to signify the concept of Europe's other. Surrounding that term is the penumbral space of prejudice and stereotyping by which the various projects of European imperialism can justify and explain several centuries of annexation.[755]

By this, it is stressed that the perceived economic deprivation of Africans can be viewed as the effect of colonial exploitation. Another aspect which dominates many of the works on colonialism is the link to economic conditions as the cause of the present backwardness experienced by the African continent. For example, A. Mazrui ties colonialism with economic retrogression:

> From Africa's point of view, the first danger of the depletion of resources is tied up with problems of dependency and underdevelopment. Africa is not in adequate control of its own resources. Indeed, the net beneficiaries of Africa's resources lie outside the African continent. Many of its mineral resources help to industrialize the rest of the world without necessarily improving the African condition itself.[756]

Without further findings, the above comment reveals that the African continent is not at peace with itself. Therefore, it can be inferred that what is not at peace is in conflict. However, the recurring argument that the depletion of African resources automatically constitutes the outbreaks of conflict is questionable even if Africa itself is not in proper control of its own resources. Furthermore, the ambiguity in A. Mazrui's assertion that the resources of Africa are used for the industrialization of the world does not imply that the facilitation of the so-called

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754   Ibid., p. 36.

755   Ashcroft, Bill, 1997, op. cit., p. 11. For more on what is understood as metropolitan centers, see Ogunsanya, Alaba: "Africa's Balkanization and the Road of the Future", in: Rathmann, Lothar et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Africa's Path to a Peaceful Future*, Special Issue on Asia, Africa and Latin America, No. 16, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 82-84 (82).

756   Mazrui, A. Ali, 1980, op. cit., p. 114.

resources that are being depleted is only carried out by people outside Africa. It is pertinent to note that Africa is divided in itself, something A. Mazrui indirectly points out: "it is not enough that Africa should find the will to be peaceful with itself; it is also vital that Africa should play a part in pacifying the world."[757]

It is unclear how Africa can be involved in the advocacy of peace worldwide if there is an ongoing depletion of the continent's resources in the form of neo-colonialism which, as alleged, former colonial powers are still perpetuating. R. Rotberg observes certain effects of resource scarcity in Africa which occur as a result of colonialism:

> Millions of Africans today are severely malnourished, and many more, perhaps 100 million or more, would eat better if they could. In Africa there is widespread caloric deprivation, seasonal hunger and perennial hunger […].[758]

Most of the authors point to a correlation between colonialism and economic retardation with poverty as one of the effects. The only author, whose work directly stipulates that colonialism fuels conflict, is J. Duke, although his focus in his research is more on the impacts of colonialism on the development of indigenous management's principles and skills which have enormous influence on the productivity of a country.[759] In his own view, contrary to the facilitation in the development of domestic capabilities and management principles in Nigeria, the structures established by colonialism create internal conflicts which deter the development of indigenous management capacities and also hinder and complicate any attempts to harmonize the already existing cultural and religious diversity in the Nigerian society.[760] Furthermore, "these conflicts had negatively affected the attitude of the local people within the social, economic and political institutions of society."[761]

Therefore, as a solution, J. Duke maintains that the growth of local institutions, whether political, economic or social institutions in Africa, depends on earlier indigenous management practices which preceded colonialism.[762] Based on the scenario given by the author as the cause of conflicts in Nigeria, it is not yet clearly indicated how colonialism causes conflicts. J. Duke acknowledges in

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757   Ibid., p. p. 113
758   Rotberg, I. Robert [Ed.]: "Introduction", in: *Imperialism, Colonialism, and Hunger: East and Central Africa*, Lexington Books, Lexington et al. 1982, p. xi.
759   Duke, Joe, 2010, op. cit., p. 65-75.
760   See ibid., p. 65-75.
761   Ibid.
762   See ibid.

his work that the aftermath of colonialism may be understood as the cause of conflicts:

> Colonialism arguably therefore informed the fundamental culture of modern Nigerian organizations—especially in the way they are organized and operated, and also how the human elements within such settings behave in the process of achieving organizational objective.[763]

This view neither shows nor states how conflicts emerge or what constitutes conflicts: If conflict is to be interpreted in such a way that the organizational objective the human elements strive to attain is in disharmony, then there is a missing link as this is not indicated above. Nonetheless, despite all the issues raised within the framework of colonialism as the source of conflicts, I. Ogundiya argues that the causes of the recurrent outbreaks of ethnic and religious conflicts cannot be traced back to the experience of colonialism which ended more than five decades ago:

> While the factor of colonial heritage is highly appreciated, it is certainly inadequate. [Ogundiya] contends that 'from its inception the state under colonialism was designed to be a welfare state as it was geared towards serving the interest of international capitalist state than ensuring the development of the national society.'[764]

Regardless of the influence of colonialism on Africa, I. Ogundiya suggests that caution needs to be exercised in order not to overstress its impact. Colonialism may, as the cause of conflicts in Nigeria, constitute a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the source of the recurrent eruption of conflicts.

Irrespective of the fact that colonialism, as a factor, plays a significant role in the formation of Nigeria as a country, it does by no means give an adequate explanation to the present conflicts challenging the country. In I. Ogundiya's opinion, the legitimacy crisis in Africa is the problem confronting the continent:

> One of the prevailing problems dominating the Nigerian political landscape is how to find a non-coercive basis for securing and maintaining the loyalty of citizens of the authority of the state. This has been the source of the country's seeming insoluble instability.[765]

Furthermore, he believes that the foundation of legitimacy issues in Africa can be traced back to the legacy of colonialism and its attendant evils. Although, he provides additional reasons in his essay on the legitimacy crisis in Nigeria, his reason is yet to be adequately proven with respect to the outbreaks of conflicts.[766]

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763   Ibid.
764   Ogundiya, S. Ilufoye, 2009, op. cit., p. 134.
765   Ibid., p. 129.
766   There are many theoretical approaches which are used in the essay of I. Ogundiya as reasons for the problems of legitimacy in Nigeria. For example, in reference to S.M. Lipset, I.

Another contrary opinion, represented by R. Williams, rejects the notion that colonialism is responsible for the contemporary crisis in Africa either in terms of the outbreaks of conflicts or on the economic crisis:

> Chabal and Daloz leave no doubt that Africa's crisis is one of 'modernity deeply rooted in the deep history of societies in which it is taking place' […]. Colonialism did leave its imprint: Without a doubt, imperial rulers did divide the continent. They certainly did disturb, or even destroy, the existing socio-political communities' […]. Nonetheless they reject the notion that colonialism was decisive in shaping these societies in this direction: 'the time has long passed when we, Westerners had to expiate the colonial crime of our forefathers' […].[767]

However, the role of colonialism in liberalizing African economies suits the interests of and benefits the metropolitan or former colonialist economies. A. Phillips explains the rise of contemporary African conflicts as occurring within the context of political and economic liberalization of Africa which early colonization of the continent gives way to.[768] For this reason, C. Young thinks that the African state system, when its origin is historically investigated, is more arbitrarily and externally determined than that of any other continent.[769] As a result, C. Young further lays out that some systems of African states, which can be described as an entity called *nation*, exist only in the social imaginary, that is, in terms of the sense of territorial attachment to that particular colonial partition.[770]

Despite all the explanation given so far on colonialism, its effects on and association with the source of conflicts in Nigeria, it is pertinent to search further within the context of the economic liberalization of African countries made possible by colonialism because some certain aspects are mentioned as the reason for the economic underdevelopment of Africa. This economic argument is buttressed by C. Young as he opines that "conjuncture doubtlessly plays its part; so

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Ogundiya posits that the legitimacy crisis is a crisis of change. This means a change from tradition to modernity. And "secondly, loss of legitimacy, according to Lipset, usually occurs when a political system no longer has the capacity to provide adequate access to the political process for new social groups arising from below." Ibid., p. 130. In order to digress from the colonial point of view, all these arguments buttressed in the text above are not sufficient to proof that colonialism is the source of conflicts. For more information on the legitimacy crisis, see Ogundiya's work. See ibid., p. 129-142.

767   Reno, Williams: "Africa Works: The Political Instrumentalization of Disorder. The Criminalization of the State in Africa", Book Review, in: *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2003, 38 (1), p. 90-95 (91).

768   See Phillips, O. Adedotun: "The World, Europe and the Social Sciences", in: *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 44 (1), 1992, p. 141-146.

769   See Young, M. Crawford: "Revisiting Nationalism and Ethnicity in Africa", in: *James S. Coleman Memorial Lecture Series*, James Coleman African Studies Center, UC Los Angeles International Institute, 2004, p. 1-17 (6). Website available as follows: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/28h0r4sr [26/07/2012].

770   See ibid., p. 6.

dispiriting are the economic circumstances confronting most African States that the self-confidence exuded by an earlier discourse has vanished."[771] This will be examined in further detail in the next section.

4.3.2 Colonialism: Neocolonialism and Economic Conditions

As already mentioned on a number of occasions in the last section, colonialism's effect on the present economic liberalization of the African continent cannot be overstated.

According to O. Nnoli, imperialism, which is often used interchangeably with colonialism, denotes the rules of the powerful monopolies and trusts as well as cartels controlled by the financial oligarchies of different European countries with the purpose of consistent reduction of the market competition.[772] This illustration characterizes the early period of capitalism. In the case of Africa, O. Nnoli stated that imperialism, in combination with the above mentioned features, controls the local apparatus of the state.[773] For example, he acknowledges the effect of colonialism or imperialism on the financial system of Africa as follows:

> The financial oligarchies organized production to satisfy their needs for profit and accumulation as well as to remedy the deficiencies in their production processes at home. Apart from the use of military conquest, African resistance to this material reorganization and political domination of their societies was attacked from two angles. The one was material, the other ideological.[774]

Despite the changes in the market system of Africa, which hitherto influence the production system, it can hardly be imagined that a system established about a century ago can be attributed to the current upheavals on the continent, especially in Nigeria.

According to O. Nnoli, the compelling nature of the colonial government that forcefully subjected the Africans to participate in foreign economic activities was motivated by profit, but it was a system alien to the locals.[775] Therefore, it is important to mention within the framework of the colonialists' profit motive that exploitation, forced labor, taxation and the creation of artificial scarcity, coupled with huge surpluses during situations of severe economic depression,

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771   Ibid, p. 5.
772   See Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1978, op. cit., p. 1.
773   See ibid.
774   Quote from ibid.
775   See ibid.

were introduced to Africa.[776] The question whether colonialism, in the form of imperialism described above, still persists in Africa up to the present is responded to by P. Ahluwalia and P. Nursey-Bray in the following quotation:

> What has occurred can be seen as a cultural parallel to neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism, as explained by Kwame Nkrumah, indicated the continuing economic influence and predominance of the colonial powers after the achievement of formal political independence.[777]

It is emphasized that the economic exploitation of Africa is ongoing despite the decolonization of all African countries, a system often described as neo-colonialism. Therefore, neo-colonialism signifies the continuation of colonialism in economic form. That means, in continuation of the argument, it is believed that multinational companies are involved in the perpetration of economic exploitation:

> It was control exercised through transnational corporations and international agencies and representatives. […] As with neo-colonialism in the area of economic independence, it indicates that, despite political independence, cultural autonomy has yet to be secured.[778]

The above statement gives another insight into the subject matter because "the mechanisms of control have shifted also in the post independence era."[779] In addition, the authors highlight the movement from direct economic and political control to an indirect one, which as they believe, is forced into the former colonies through the effects of investments in private corporations.[780] In illustrating the neo-colonialism phenomenon, both P. Ahluwalia and P. Nursey-Bay explain that, according to Frantz Fanon and Edward Said, "this ideology of domination, by which the history and culture of the colonized is denied, corresponds to the very real domination of the colonial power in the material sense."[781]

There is a correlation between economic underdevelopment and colonialism which is practiced in its current form of neo-colonialism. This implies, according to O. Nnoli, that there is an artificial economic retardation which leads to the continual scarcity of goods, whether agricultural products or other material resources.[782] So, it can be argued that Africa may be perceived as poor because of

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776   See ibid.
777   Ahluwalia, Pal/Nursey-Bay, Paul, "Introduction", 1997, op. cit., p. 4.
778   See ibid.
779   Quote from ibid.
780   See ibid, p. 4-5.
781   Ahluwalia, Pal/Nursey-Bay, Paul: "Frantz Fanon and Edward Said: Decolonization and the Search for Identity", in: Ahluwalia, Pal/Nursey-Bay, Paul [Eds.]: *Post-Colonialism, Culture and Identity in Africa*, Nova Science Publishers, New York 1997, p. 27-47 (29).
782   See [Nnoli, Okwudiba]: "Colonialism in 100 Years After", in: Rathmann, Lothar et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Africa's Path to a Peaceful Future*, Special Issue on Asia, Africa and Latin America, No. 16, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 72-76.

the forceful liberalization of its economies which are geared towards the enrichment of Europe. This, in the long run, results in the poor African condition and rich European state as A. Phillips writes:

> The strong wind of political and economic liberalism blowing round the world have, however, been accompanied by a countervailing movement towards a new kind of international dictatorship. […] Yet another disturbance feature of the cross-roads at which the world now seems to be standing, is the widening gap between the rich and poor nations. [783]

This point further buttresses the argument that African economic condition is artificially created. In addition, other important examples of the so-called agencies of neo-colonialists are the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose roles A. Phillips underscores in his work. From A. Phillips' perspective, these international institutions are used as instruments of neo-colonialism or neo-liberalism, designed to impoverish the underdeveloped countries under which African countries are categorized:

> Thus, under the direction of the IMF/World Bank, most poor countries today are implementing programmes of structural economic adjustment or economic reorganization. The policy components of the programmes are virtually the same for all poor countries concerned, namely: heavy and continuous devaluation/depreciation of currency, removal of subsidies, trade liberalization, reduction of the scope of government and emphasis on the market system. [784]

Furthermore, he states that the introduction and implementation of the World Bank/IMF policies by the poor countries aggravate the economic hardship experienced in these countries: "The truth today is that a decade of Structural Adjustment Programmes in most poor countries has not so far led to their economic salvation." [785] By implication, the standard of living in most of these poor countries presently constitutes about two thirds the level achieved in the 1970s. [786]

Repeatedly, as analyzed in the previous section, the allegation that colonialism is currently practiced through neo-colonialism in the name of free market enterprises or liberalism is attested to by A. Mazrui, who alleges that the present types of economic domination or, as he calls it, imperialism are carried out by those who possess and control the means of production. [787] He purports further that this economic exploitation is at times practiced through the medium of transnational corporations with their tentacles in different parts of the world. [788]

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783   Phillips, O. Adedotun, 1992, op. cit., p. 141.
784   Ibid., p. 143.
785   Ibid.
786   See ibid.
787   See Mazrui, A. Ali, 1980, op. cit., p. 88.
788   See ibid., p. 88.

Similarly, K. Makamure gives the following argument about the continuous economic subjugation of Africa by the former colonial powers:

> The neo-colonial nature of African statehood (what others call 'flag independence') has ensured that the real operative bourgeois class in Africa is the foreign international bourgeoisie of the transnational corporations […].[789]

In this view, Africa is continuously plundered economically. At the same time, the roles of the multinational companies in perpetuating neo-colonial policies in Africa should not be underestimated.

A report carried out by a think-tank charged by the African Union to investigate the activities of multinational companies in Africa, headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki raises accusations against their activities. One of the accusations is that 1.5 trillion dollars are illicitly transferred out of Africa yearly by these multinational corporations to developed countries.[790] This, according to the report, contributes to the underdevelopment of Africa because these illegal transfers mean "draining hard currency reserves from the continent, stimulating inflation, reducing tax collection and deepening income gaps."[791]

However, irrespective of the correlation between exploitation and poverty, there are no indices of how these activities of the neo-colonialists automatically lead directly to the eruption of conflicts. Equally, it is unclear whether the multinationals are involved in the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria in spite of the fact that, as observed in the theoretical part of this thesis, multinational companies or transnational corporations are identified as actors involved in the politicization of ethnicity in certain countries. However, in order to clarify certain doubts, the activities of these multinational firms and how they are carried out will be investigated in subsequent chapters.

Meanwhile, as a way to examine what are referred to as multinational companies and what their activities are in some countries where they operate, the

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789   Makamure, Kempton: "The Question of Democracy and the Current Political Crisis in Africa", in: Rathmann, Lothar et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Africa's Path to a Peaceful Future*, Special Issue on Asia, Africa and Latin America, No. 16, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 149-152 (149).

790   See report from the Press Release of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa published in 2012 under the topic "Report blames multinationals for illicitly transferring most of the \$1.5 trillion made in Africa each year". Obtainable electronically thus: http://www1.uneca.org/ArticleDetail/tabid/3018/ArticleId/1671/Report-blames-multinationals-for-illicitly-transferring-most-of-the-1-5-trillion-made-in-Africa-each-year.aspx [27/01/2013].

791   Quote from ibid.

next section will be devoted to reviewing whether these companies intentionally or unintentionally fuel conflicts in those countries where they operate.

4.4 Multinational Corporations: The Act of Exploitation in Africa

The correlation between multinational corporations (MNCs) and neo-colonialism is depicted in the previous section of this research work. Therefore, the necessity to examine and analyze the activities of these international firms will give further insight into the exploitation in Africa,[792] hence the focus of this section.

In view of the relationship between the activities of the multinational firms and the policies of the former colonialists, as explained in previous sections, it is necessary to examine and determine if the eruptions of conflicts are attributable to these firms. Moreover, it may be productive for this research to uncover whether the activities of these corporations are carried out independently from whatever policies the industrialized nations pursue, that is, the export of economic liberalism to the Third World Countries.

Meanwhile, before any further research can be carried out, it is pertinent to first define what is meant by multinational corporations. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) report, there are different perspectives to be considered when defining MNCs,[793] depending on some factors such as the definition, activities, size, geographical distribution, industrial structures and ownership patterns of the world economy.[794] In view of these factors, the report gives the following definition of MNCs:

> The term 'multinational' signifies that the activities of the corporation or enterprise involve more than one nation. Certain minimum qualifying criteria are often used in respect of the type of activity or the importance of the foreign component in the total activity. The activity in question may refer to assets, sales, production, employment, or profits of foreign branches and affiliates.[795]

Furthermore, it can be identified from the clarification of the definition that an oversea branch constitutes a part of an enterprise that operates abroad while an

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792 Multinational corporations are at times interchangeably referred to as international corporations or transnational companies and multinationals as well as multinational enterprises.
793 See report of the *UN DESA* United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in New York from 1973 on the topic "Multinational Corporations in World Development" on the following homepage: http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e73iia11a.pdf [28/01/2013].
794 See ibid., (preface).
795 Ibid., p. 1-70 (4).

affiliate denotes an enterprise which is under effective control by a parent company.[796] This affiliate may be a subsidiary or an associate, which means that the parent company may either control the majority or possess at least 25 percent of the voting rights when it is a subsidiary or control at least 10 percent of the voting rights if it is an associate.[797] No matter how MNCs are perceived, the report emphasizes that any corporation operating with one or more branches or affiliates overseas and supposedly involved in any of the activities outlined above qualifies as multinational.[798]

Nevertheless, there are certain controversies surrounding the increasing activities of MNCs abroad which are allegedly perceived as home-country-oriented. As a result, the UN report suggests that labels such as *international* or *transnational* are preferable to multinational.[799] In as far as MNCs are engaged within the framework of international economic activities, it is pertinent to understand that these corporations operate under the pretext of globalization. That is why J. Scholte opines that if globalization is conceptualized as the internationalization of business enterprises, then the term may denote a growth of transactions and interdependence between countries.[800]

Therefore, "from this perspective, a more global world is one where more messages, ideas, merchandise, money, investments, pollutants and people cross borders between national-states-territorial units."[801] Within the context of globalization, the author acknowledges four notions which are relevant to understanding MNCs in this work: Globalization as internationalization; globalization as liberalization; globalization as universalization; and globalization as westernization.[802]

Therefore, MNCs can be described as "firms that by definition do business across international borders."[803] However, if globalization enables MNCs to establish affiliates abroad and globalization is equated with westernization, as shown above, then there may be conflicts of interests between Westerners and

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796   See ibid,. p. 3-4.
797   See ibid., p. 3-4.
798   See ibid., p. 4.
799   See ibid., p. 4.
800   See Scholte, A. Jan: "Symposium for the World Economy: Conceptualizing Globalization: Defining Globalization", in: *The World Economy*, Vol. 31 (11), 2008, p. 1471-1502 (1473-1474).
801   See ibid., p. 1473-1474.
802   See ibid., p. 1473.
803   Hejazi, Walid: "The Regional Nature of MNE Activities and the Gravity Model", in: Rugman, M. Alan [Ed.]: *Regional Aspects of Multinationality and Performance, Research in Global Strategic Management*, Vol. 13, Elsevier, Amsterdam 2007, p. 85-109 (88).

the overseas affiliates which operate within the territorial confinement of other countries, for example in Africa, due to cultural differences.

As the "the economic definition [of MNCs] emphasizes the ability of owners and their managerial agents in one country to control the operations in foreign countries"[804], the question of the nationality of these MNCs is of importance because decisions made by the parent companies may influence the operational procedures of their affiliates located overseas which, again, may evoke tensions in the host countries due to incompatibilities of cultural values.[805] So the nationality question may determine the regulation of the relationship between the home countries and host countries.[806] That is why the UN DESA report shows that some activities of MNCs may lead to conflicts in some countries, hence the necessity to examine and mediate in such situations:

> The divergence in objectives between nation-states and multinational corporations, compounded by social and cultural factors, often creates tensions. Multinational corporations, through the variety of options available to them, can encroach at times upon national sovereignty by undermining the ability of nation-states to pursue their national and international objectives. Moreover, there are conflicts of interest regarding participation in decision-making and the equitable division of benefits between multinational corporations and host as well as home countries.[807]

In view of the findings on the description and definition of MNCs so far, J. Onoh toes the same line and argues for a broader conceptualization of MNCs:

> Multinationals, transnationals or international financial conglomerates are large firms which are characterized by large capital outlay, abundance of technological know-how, a variety of technical and managerial manpower and efficiency in the pursuit of profit. In the developing economies of Africa, Asia and Latin America, where the spirit of nationalism is still very much alive, multinationals are regarded as the agents of neocolonialism whose sole objective is to exploit the resources of the developing economies to the advantage of their native countries.[808]

According to Onoh's definition, matters which may create tensions are highlighted because developing countries perceive the MNCs as instruments of for-

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804   See a report on the definition and activities of MNCs entitled "Multinational Corporations", accessible on the following website:
       http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/bkogut/files/Chapter_in_smelser-Baltes_2001.pdf
       [28/01/2013].
805   See Ramamurti, Ravi/Hashai, Niron: "Introduction: Research on the FDI and MNEs in a Changing World", in: Ramamurti, Ravi/Hashai, Niron [Eds.]: *The Future of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Enterprise*, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley et al. 2011, p. 1-19 (13).
806   See ibid., p. 13.
807   See the report of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in New York from 1973 on the topic "Multinational Corporations in World Development" on the following homepage: http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e73iia11a.pdf [28/01/2013].
808   Onoh, J.K., 1983, op. cit., p. 1.

mer colonial powers which are being used to reinvigorate economic suppression. A similar view is presented in the work of J. Scholte:

> The study of Global Politics need not differ substantially from traditional International Politics, global culture is equivalent to international culture, and so on. Globalization-as-internationalization gives the comforting message that the new can be wholly understood in terms of the familiar. Indeed, most accounts of globalization-as-internationalization stress that contemporary trends are replaying earlier historical scenarios.[809]

Therefore, one may argue that the MNCs in many of the countries, especially in former colonial states, are viewed with skepticism because of the states of origin where the majority of these companies emerge from. In terms of the origin of the MNCs, H. Perlmutter opines that ethnocentric attitudes are prevalent among the executives and senior workers of MNCs. This raises the question of nationality as many of the MNCs operating in developing countries originate from the industrialized countries, i.e. the former colonial powers. H. Perlmutter notes that what is multinational in name denotes the opposite: "Too often, what is called "the multinational" view is really a screen for ethnocentrism. Foreign affiliate managers, in order to succeed, take on traits and behavior of the ruling nationality."[810] In consideration of these factors, one can argue that finding a concrete definition of multinational corporations may be difficult, a fact which corresponds to the observation of a report that multinational corporations may be defined economically, politically and sociologically.[811]

As observed in the theoretical part of this thesis, the multinational companies, while attempting to influence the policies of their host countries, end up politicizing ethnicity. This point will be investigated in subsequent chapters of this research since this section deals with how and whether the activities of multinational companies can lead to the outbreak of conflicts.

In R. Robbins' observation, multilateral financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank represent multinational institutions as well as international corporations within the context of this research work. These institutions operate to open up international markets to corporations and to compel countries, especially in the Third World such as Africa, to abolish their social, environmental and labor reforms.[812]

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809   Scholte, A. Jan, 2008, op. cit., p. 1474.
810   Perlmutter, V. Howard: "The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation", in: *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Vol. 4 (1), 1969, p. 9-18 (17).
811   See the report on the definition and activities of MNCs entitled "Multinational Corporations", 28/01/2013, op. cit.
812   See Robbins, H. Richard, 2011, op. cit., p. 95.

One can discern a contradiction between the activities of the financial and multilateral institutions and the notion of nation states. If nation states are, with respect to R. Robbins, "expressions of pre-existing cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic, or historical features shared by people who make up or would make a state",[813] then any external influence in terms of financial, environmental and social can lead to a distortion of a nation. No matter how the case may be, it is important to investigate the activities of specific multilateral corporations so as to elucidate some of their operations which are intended to undermine peace and stability in some countries like Nigeria and some activities of these firms which, whether intentionally or inadvertently, lead to large-scale violence and protracted conflicts.

4.4.1 Multinational Corporations: Advent and Roles in the 20th and 21st Century

There are many works of research which portray the activities of the multilateral corporations as the cause of conflicts in Africa: some of the authors whose works are relevant and will be used in order to carry out the analysis in this section are R. Ngomba-Roth, H. Perlmutter, B. Naanen, O. Egbe, Y. Aharoni and R. Ramamurti as well as other writers who will be mentioned in the course of this analysis.[814]

Despite the fact that a chapter will be devoted to the operations of oil companies in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, which will investigate whether their activities aggravate or influence both ethnic and resource conflicts in the region, the importance of multinational corporations in conflicts generally will be examined first.

In the explanation given in the work of R. Ngomba-Roth, multinational corporations, by definition, operate in more than one country.[815] However, she be-

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813   Ibid., p. 101.
814   See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit.; Perlmutter, V. Howard, 1969, op. cit., p. 9-18. See Naanen, Ben: "Review: 'Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy' by Ken Saro Wiwa", in: *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1991, p. 536-539; also Egbe, D.J. Olawari: "Oil Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Dislocations in Oil Fence-Line Communities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria", in: *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in Social Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2012, p. 594-618. See Aharoni, Yair/Ramamurti, Ravi: "The Internationalization of Multinationals", in: Boddewyn, J. Jean [Ed.]: *Research in Global Strategic Management, International Business Scholarship: AIB Fellows on the First 50 Years and Beyond*, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley et al. 2008, p. 177-201.
815   See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 87.

lieves that the definition of multinational corporations may be stated from multi-faceted perspectives. This multifacetedness is based on structures, ownership, management and strategy of what can be described as multinational firms.[816] As a result, she opines that the description of multinational companies can be understood from many angles.[817] On the one hand, a firm becomes multinational only if the headquarters or the parent company is effectively owned by nationals of two or more countries. The examples of Shell and Unilever are given, which are, as the R. Ngomba-Roth explains, controlled by British and Dutch interests.[818] However, in view of the ownership test, it is emphasized that very few multinationals are, in the true sense of the name, multinational. On the other hand, companies can be described as multinationals whenever the managerial positions of the parent companies are controlled by citizens of several countries.[819]

H. Perlmutter defines multinational corporations as follows: "This is evidenced in the legalistic definition of a multinational enterprise as a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership."[820] One might emphasize that this is not broad enough to encompass the full definition of multinationals.

Depending on the angle or parameters used, many explanations for the actions of these firms can be found with the objective of maximizing profits as the ultimate goal of transnational companies. R. Ngomba-Roth further describes an MNC as a parent company that:

– engages in foreign production through its affiliates located in several countries,

– exercises direct control over the policies of its affiliates,

– implement business strategies in production, marketing, finance and staffing that transcend national boundaries (geocentric). In other words, MNCs exhibit little loyalty to the country in which they are incorporated. But they can carry out some developmental activities in the communities in which they operate in order to polish their image/corporate identity

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816   See ibid., p. 87. The same features of multinational corporations are stated by H. Perlmutter in his work. See Perlmutter, V. Howard, 1969, op. cit., p. 10.

817   See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 87.

818   See ibid., p. 87-88.

819   See ibid. Within the context of multinational corporations, according to Ngomba-Roth, managers at the headquarters of such firms are mostly nationals of that corporation's home country. See ibid., p. 88.

820   Perlmutter, V. Howard, 1969, op. cit., p. 13.

(corporate identity includes amongst others the company's image/identity, culture, personality, structure, presence, philosophy, behavior and competence) especially when they are criticized of human rights abuses like the case of Shell Petroleum industry in Nigeria and the Ogoni crisis of 1995 in the Niger Delta.[821]

In addition, the author insinuates that the greater the degree of multinationality of a corporation, the greater its effects will be on the host country and home-nation states as well as other institutions.[822] One can recognize that MNCs may or indeed do function as a link between the host countries and the parent countries of such MNCs. The implication is that MNCs can be used as an instrument by the parent country in order to foster certain economic and political policies on the host countries.

On this basis, one might argue in view of the observations made on the operations of these MNCs that the influence they exercise indirectly on the economic and political policies of their host countries can trigger conflicts. However, such conflicts may be indirectly and unintentionally caused by MNCs since policies made by government officials of certain countries, which are influenced by and beneficial to multinational firms, may become a source of conflicts between the government of the host country and its citizens. As a result of that, R. Ngomba-Roth declares that multinational firms or transnational corporations may be viewed as the strongest of NGOs in the field of international relations.[823] Moreover, there is an indication which is indicated in the works of B. Naanen and that of O. Egbe that Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) and other big multinational oil companies are responsible for human rights abuses in the Niger Delta.[824]

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821 Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 88. The citation credited to R. Ngomba-Roth is originally written by F. Roots. For more information, see the following work: Root, R. Franklin: *Entry Strategies for International Markets*, Lexington Books et al., New York 1994. However, H. Perlmutter acknowledges two hypotheses because he believes that the multi-nationality of any firm stands on the two theories: The first theory rests on the position that the level of multi-nationality of a firm is positively related to its long term viability. The second position rests on the proposition that multinational companies are new types of institutions which have industrial social architecture appropriate for twentieth century. It is believed that multinationals, based on the second position, can be used not only to shape the world order but also to exercise a constructive impact on the nation-state. See Perlmutter, V. Howard, 1969, op. cit., p. 10.

822 See ibid., p. 11.

823 See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 88.

824 See Naanen, Ben, 1991, op. cit., p. 536-539. Also Egbe, D.J. Olawari, 2012, op. cit., p. 594-618.

Therefore, it is of vital interest for this research to figure out which of Shell's activities lead to such allegations. But, it is pertinent to state that there is not yet any indication that MNCs cause conflicts despite the insinuation by R. Ngomba-Roth that MNCs exhibit little loyalty to the host country where they operate. The question why MNCs possess such a high degree of influence and weight in the twentieth and the twenty-first century is answered thus:

> This is because they are concern [sic] with economic meaning, the production and distribution of goods and services. Almost ¾ of the world's trade and industrial production is carried out by TNC. As concerns the third world countries and Africa in particular, these TNCs control almost all of their productions.[825]

This shows the crucial role played by MNCs/TNCs (Transnational Corporations) in Africa and the economic weight and political influence such companies possess in developing countries.

Similarly, Y. Aharoni and R. Ramamurti argue in an essay on the internationalization of multinationals that there has been a rapid rise in the importance and influence of multinational enterprises in the global economy, especially since the end of the Second World War.[826] In this respect, it is reported that the inflow of global foreign direct investment (FDI) grew from an already huge sum of $40 billion dollars yearly in 1980s to $1.4 trillion dollars in 2000.[827] On top of this, despite some changes witnessed at times in terms of economic recessions and recoveries, a steady growth of these international corporations can be observed.[828]

Furthermore, they argued that multinational corporations may politicize ethnicity while their representatives attempt to either influence governmental policies of their host countries or to maximize profits at the expense of the local community where they operate, which can be discerned from the following statement:

> Since the 1980s, new views of the MNE took hold, as governments substituted regulation and intervention with greater scope for free markets and competition. The welfare state and the state-owned national champion lost their lure, while private entrepreneurs became the new darlings of policy makers. In one country to the other, failure came to be regarded as a worse evil than market failure. Deregulation, privatization and competition became the major slogans everywhere.[829]

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825   See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 88-89.
826   See Aharoni, Yair/Ramamurti, Ravi, 2008, op. cit., p. 177-201 (179).
827   See ibid., p. 179.
828   See ibid., p. 177-201.
829   Ibid., p. 192.

It is further elucidated that the presence of MNCs in many countries and the instance with which rich or western countries advocate free markets and international openness lead to resistance on the part of poorer countries.[830] This resistance can be understood from the point of view that multinationals, regardless of differences in the norms and cultures of their host countries, continue to be guided by the policies and cultures of their home countries.[831]

However, the authors fail to articulate explicitly the effects of the activities of multinational corporations in developing countries such as in Africa despite a brief illustration of the adverse effects of the activities of multinational corporations in some countries evidenced in the following remark:

> […] the risks such as loss of national sovereignty, tax evasion through transfer pricing, 'crowding out' of local private enterprise, sub-optimal technology choices or other negative spillovers in the host economy.[832]

One can perceive similarities between what is described as contemporary exploitation of Africa through neo-colonialism perpetuated by multinational corporations with the colonial subjugation, as indicated in the previous section. H.-U. Walter exposes how efforts are made towards intensifying neo-colonial exploitation directly and indirectly in Africa:

> This is, for example, done by means of capital export, expansion of equal trade, merciless dictation of prices, the system of transfer prices, the imposition of artificially increased rates of interests, foreign exchange rate manipulation, shameless plundering of natural resources of the developing countries and enticing away their qualified personnel, flight of capital and smuggle, boycott, "sanctions" as a form of reactionary protectionism and many other things.[833]

In view of this finding, the question that may be raised is how independent or sovereign countries can be infiltrated and afflicted with such economic harm and suffering. According to H.-U. Walter and K. Makamure, the response is not far-fetched: Both authors allege that in as far as these MNCs are in a position to infiltrate and influence the economies of the host countries' policies, which have

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830   See ibid., p.193.
831   See ibid, p. 194. However, it is stipulated by R. Ngomba-Roth as well as Y. Aharoni and R. Ramamurti that the collapse of the Soviet Union, its dwindling powers and influence as from 1990s gives room in silencing the critics of trade liberalization, the increased influence of the private sector and the rapid growth of MNEs. Read Aharoni, Yair/Ramamurti, Ravi, 2008, op. cit., p. 192. See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 89.
832   See Aharoni, Yair/Ramamurti, Ravi, 2008, op. cit., p. 192
833   Walter, Hans-Ulrich: "Some Main Features of Neocolonialism Today", in: Rathmann, Lothar et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Africa's Path to a Peaceful Future*, Special Issue on Asia, Africa and Latin America, No. 16, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 100-102 (100).

adverse effects on the economies of these so-called Third World countries, the loss of political control and exploitation of the latter will continue.[834]

Moreover, in a situation where the multinationals control almost all the productive capacities in developing countries, Africa is at the mercy of the MNCs and these countries will remain exploited. The same argument is put forward by A. Mazrui, who believes that the current waves of economic exploitation are perpetuated by those who control the means of production, who at times carry out their activities of economic sabotage through the medium of multinational corporations.[835]

Considering this win-lose situation, there is a necessity for further investigation into the activities of the multinationals and how these affect Africa, most especially Nigeria, in the following section.

4.4.2 Multinational Firms and Conflict: Failure of Social Corporate Responsibility

It is the view put forward in this section that the importance attached to and the adequate implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) may create a platform for communication and may also help pacify conflicts resulting from the tensions in the relationship between the host communities and oil MNCs as a result of the latter's activities in particular regions of the world. In addition, it will be discussed whether the disregard for CSR by these oil firms in certain countries such as Nigeria can be traced back to the source of conflicts in this region.

M. Blowfield and J. Frynas illustrate both the old and the new definitions of CSR in line with the position of World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD):

> Initially (1998), [the WBCSD] referred to CSR as 'the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large'. But that definition was later changed (2002) to 'the commitment of business to contribute to sus-

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834   See ibid., p. 100. Also, Makamure, Kempton: "The Question of Democracy and the Current Political Crisis in Africa", in: Rathmann, Lothar et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Africa's Path to a Peaceful Future*, Special Issue on Asia, Africa and Latin America, No. 16, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 149-152 (149).

835   See Mazrui, A. Ali, 1980, op. cit., p. 88.

tainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve the quality of life'.[836]

With regard to the contents of the definitions noted above, one could argue that conflicts may be avoided if MNCs abide by CSR rules. In view of this, it may be questionable to raise the allegation that multinational oil companies are responsible for the outbreaks of conflicts without any specific evidence to support such claim. Yet, with regard to the MNCs, in terms of their exploitation of resources like crude oil, many authors and scholars criticize them for the environmental depletion and degradation of the territories in which they operate as they do not adhere to their CSR in such regions or fully carry out their duties in accordance with the terms of CSR in areas where the necessity of its application is acknowledged by the MNCs.[837]

Among the scholars who have contributed to the ongoing work on conflicts in which multinational corporations are directly or indirectly involved and dragged into conflicts or are at least blamed as one of the conflict parties, are R. Ngomba-Roth, O. Egbe, N. Idemudia, J. Frynas, N. Bassey, J. Asuni, and M. Watts.[838]

R. Ngomba-Roth believes that, irrespective of the primary activities of the MNCs which is global profit-making and the maximization of profit in their role as a business outfit, such international business ventures are designed equally to influence, if not control, the policies of their host countries. That means the business strategies of MNCs are organized in such a way that they transcend national boundaries and, therefore, represent the interests of their home countries.[839] Furthermore, she cites the Ogoni crisis in the oil producing Niger Delta

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836   Blowfield, Michael/Frynas, G. Jedrzej: "Setting New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World", in: *Internal Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)*, Vol. 81, No. 3, 2005, p. 499-513 (501).

837   Corporate Social Responsibility is also referred to as CSR in this work.

838   See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit. Also read Frynas, G. Jedrzej: "Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta", in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 100, No. 398, 2001, p. 27-54; Idemudia, Nwafiokun: "Rethinking the Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in the Nigerian Oil Conflict: The Limits of CSR", in: *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 22, No. 1/2, 2010, p. 833-845. See Nnimmo Bassey's testimony before the United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law in the following homepage: http://www.eraction.org/publications/presentations/senate_testimony_24_09_2008.pdf [16/08/2012]. See Asuni, B. Judith in her Special Report (229) on the crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria with the title "Blood Oil in the Niger Delta", published by the United States Institute of Peace (August 2009). Available as follows: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/blood_oil_nigerdelta.pdf [6/12/2012]. See Watts, J. Michael: "Blood Oil: The Anatomy of a Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta, Nigeria", in: *Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2008, p. 18-38.

839   See Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 88.

region of Nigeria as an example of a place where allegations of human rights abuses are directed towards Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC).[840]

C. Obi lists some of the accusations directed at the oil MNCs by the inhabitants of the Niger Delta regions ranging from several complaints of exploitation of the region by the MNCs through seizure of lands to grievous exposure to both oil pollution and environmental degradation associated with oil-drilling activities.[841] In that regard, L. Dam doubts if oil MNCs, as for-profit business outfits, are concerned about the impacts of environmental hazards on the people of the territory where they carry out their operations. His Pollution Haven Hypothesis indicates that MNCs prefer to move their production sites to countries with poor or no environmental and social standards.[842] A. Ikelegbe names one of the reasons for the rage of the Niger Delta populace against the MNCs as follows:

> Nigeria's oil belt, the Niger Delta region is embroiled in resistance against the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies. The region is generally restive, with pockets of insurrection and armed rebellion. Decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and state neglect has created impoverished, marginalized and exploited citizenry which after more than decades produced a resistance of which the youth has been a vanguard.[843]

Another instance of a protest against an MNC which R. Ngomba-Roth reports in her work is the case of the occupation of the Escravos Island oil terminal belonging to Chevron Texaco by about 150 women in 2001, issuing the threat of taking off their clothes if their demands, which are stated as follows, are not met:

> Armed with food and cooking pots, the women wanted jobs for their husbands and sons, and better facilities in communities close to Escravos, which remained poor in spite of the wealth created by oil extraction.[844]

As a result of such a situation, the writer toes the same line as other observers such as the Human Rights Watch organizations and NGOs that oil companies are partially responsible for the outbreaks of conflicts in the region where they operate.

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840   See ibid.
841   Read Obi, Cyril: "Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-related Conflicts", in: *African Development*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, 2009, p. 103-128 (106).
842   See Dam, Lammertjan/Scholtens, Bert: "The Curse of the Haven: The Impact of Multinational Enterprise on Environmental Regulation", in: *Journal of Ecological Economics*, 78, 2012, p. 148-156 (148).
843   See Ikelegbe, Augustine: "The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria", in: *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 14 (2), 2005, p. 208-234 (208).
844   Ngomba-Roth, Rose, 2007, op. cit., p. 110.

Further in her criticism, she opines that the MNCs not only possess both technical and human resources, but also the financial capacity to be more actively engaged in resolving conflicts in their host communities.[845] In her views "the multinational companies on their part do not respect deals signed with locals and or do not carry out basic development projects which should benefit the oil producing communities."[846]

The non-governmental organization "Brot für die Welt" which is a sister organization of the Protestant Charitable Organization in Germany reports that oil exploitation and gas production never lead to any long-lasting and sustainable development, but rather lead in most cases to human rights violation, militarization, wars, impoverishment of the host communities and ecological catastrophes.[847] With regard to the conflict-inducing nature of oil exploitation and gas production, one might understand why oil MNCs need to adhere to CSR in order to avert conflicts in the regions where they operate.

N. Idemudia asserts in line with the positions of J. Berman and V. Haufler that, under the framework of CSR, MNCs are dragged into conflict cases because their activities exacerbate armed conflicts and there is a need for their participation in conflict prevention and resolution.[848] He further notes:

The demand for active business involvement in the issues of peace and conflict rests on the idea that companies are inevitably a part of the local context in which they operate and, when a particular context involves conflicts, the company becomes part of that conflict.[849]

In this regard, one may argue that oil MNCs are consciously or unconsciously involved in creating or exacerbating conflicts in the regions where they operate because of the nature and sensitivity of such territories in terms of the conditions under which their inhabitants live.

S. Omotola investigated the health challenges gas flaring and oil spillages may have on the host communities in the Nigerian Niger Delta in light of reports of oil spillages by the oil firms operating in the area. The reports show that between 1976 and 1999 approximately 3,000 oil spill incidents occurred. This implies that roughly 2 million barrels of oil were in the same time-frame spilled

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845   See ibid, p. 308.
846   Ibid., p. 310.
847   See the report produced by *Brot für die Welt* entitled "Erdöl und Menschenrechte" (Crude Oil and Human Rights Violation) published in 2002 under the following website: http://www.gesichter-afrikas.de/pdf/erdoel-und-menschenrechte.pdf [09/12/2012].
848   See Idemudia, Nwafiokun, 2010, op. cit., p. 834.
849   Ibid., p. 834.

into the country's terrestrial, coastal and offshore marine environment.[850] Apart from the occurrences of oil spillages, the author emphasizes that gas flaring in the Niger Delta region is a recurrent problem with devastating effects on the environment, especially the degradation of the air:

> In 1991 when Nigeria's gross gas production was 31,5000,000 standard cubic feet (sfc), about 24,240,000 of it were flared. This amounts to about 78% of gross gas production. This is unnecessarily high in comparative terms. For example, it was 21, 20, 19 and 4% in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Algeria during the same period respectively. By 1995, 76.79% of gross gas production in Nigeria was flared into the air. Consequently, about 30 to 35 million tons of carbon dioxide and an estimated 12 million tons/year of methane, which is very damaging to the environment, are emitted into the atmosphere.[851]

With regard to the allegation of environmental contamination in Nigeria presumably caused by the oil operators, one might expect that the implementation of CSR could solve some of the problems between the MNCs and the host communities caused by the frustration and anger of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta and their confrontation of the oil firms. It is for this reason that A. Bagaji et al. represent the view, in line with the position of A. Mähler, that discontent in the Niger Delta will continue as a result of unfulfilled promises of compensation.[852]

Going by the dissatisfaction in the region, it is either the case that the CSR is not well implemented or recognized as obligatory by the MNCs. Human Rights Watch (HRW) supports the enactment of CSR by the oil firms for the following reason:

> […] corporations have a long fundamental responsibility to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their activities do not lead to human rights abuses whether in the immediate environs of their facilities or in nearby communities and become complicit in human rights violation when they fail to do so.[853]

In addition, within the scope of the implementation of CSR, Human Rights Watch warns that oil companies need to judiciously spend the money they give out to local communities so that this again will not generate conflicts.[854] How-

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850   See Omotola, J. Shola: "The Next Gulf? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising Tension in the Niger Delta", in: *Accord, Occasional Papers Series*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2003, p. 1-31 (10).

851   Ibid., p. 10

852   See Bagaji, S.Y. Ali et al.: "Explaining the Violent Conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Is the Rentier State Theory and the Resource Curse Thesis Relevant?", in: *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2011, p. 34-43 (37).

853   Human Rights Watch: "Nigeria – The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend", Vol. 14, No. 7(A), October 2002, p. 1-39 (30). Available online under the website: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria3/nigerdelta.pdf [13/12/2012].

854   See ibid., p. 29.

ever, the organization criticizes the effort of the oil companies in resolving cri-
ses emanating from environmental degradation in the region. Despite the ac-
knowledgment that MNCs operate in a difficult environment in the Niger Delta,
"oil companies are also seen to have failed to give back anything to the Delta for
what they have taken out and are often a more accessible—and responsive—tar-
get for protest than the government."[855]

In another analysis of the grievances directed at the MNCs as a result of the
environmental pollution of the region, the peaceful protest of the early 1990s
against the MNCs became violent due to their lax response, producing a number
of militant youth groups.[856] It is estimated that about 25,000 trained militants
operate in creeks, each collecting a huge monthly salary which is above what an
average Nigerian graduate worker earns. M. Watts furthermore asserts that, for
these militants, oil companies no longer possess any license to operate.[857] He
continues that "Ken Saro-Wiwa, the pipe-smoking writer equipped with the
power of the pen, has now been replaced by the figure of the masked militant
armed with the ubiquitous Kalashnikov […]."[858]

At this juncture, one may question the character of the representatives of the
MNCs for having allowed this situation to escalate to this extent in spite of the
availability of CSR which, if applied properly, could prevent such violence. In
another work by M. Watts, he accuses the MNCs of being part of the conflicts in
the first place:

> Corporate social responsibility on the ground typically appears as a raft of unfinished commu-
> nity projects all of which have contributed to festering resentments among the youth. Environ-
> mental Impact Assessments are rarely made public and the record on spills and compensation
> is deplorable. The companies have always thrived on a policy of divide and rule. There [sic]
> are only too happy to invoke national sovereignty when pressures are placed on them to im-
> prove their human rights or social responsibility records; and yet they are equally content to
> operate in a military or militarized authoritarian environment in which they could get away
> with just about anything.[859]

He believes that Nigeria, as a model of a peaceful and prosperous oil producing
country, is a failure with respect to the pronouncement of one local leader in

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855   Ibid., p. 29.
856   See Watts, J. Michael, 2008, op. cit., p. 24.
857   Ibid.
858   Ibid.
859   Watts, J. Michael: "Crude Politics: Life and Death on the Nigerian Oil Fields", in: *Working
       Papers on Economy of Violence*, No. 25, 2009, p. 1-27 (20). Furthermore, the author ob-
       serves that oil companies are deeply rooted in corruption as they cut deals with the local
       chiefs, some of which are not residing in their communities and not responsible to their
       people. See ibid., p. 20.

Mongolia after the discovery of oil in that country: We do not want to become another Nigeria.[860]

One can argue that CSR, if adopted at all by the MNCs in Nigeria, is a complete failure considering the level of protest and violence directed at these oil companies in the Niger Delta. CSR may be applied as a conflict resolution strategy in order to facilitate a communication forum between the host communities and the MNCs. However, since the CSR concept is based on responsibility, ethical and moral practices as the name implies, it may be contradictory to the policies used by business enterprises such as MNCs:

> Given the cost that is often associated with CSR practices, oil MNCs continually choose profitability over making meaningful contributions to conflict prevention that might incur cost not compensated for in profit.[861]

As a result, on the one hand, M. Blowfield and J. Frynas make clear that managers of these companies find it difficult to deal with issues and incorporate certain policies into their business practices, which encompass corporate governance, environmental management corporate philanthropy, stakeholder management, labor rights and community development.[862] On the other hand, both authors attempt to clarify the problem which they identify in the adoption and implementation of CSR by these companies wherever necessary. On this note, they admit that there is a distinguishing characteristic of CSR which is the voluntary nature of the initiatives to be undertaken by such companies anywhere they are operational.[863] Therefore, this makes it difficult to impose it on the MNCs or to penalize these companies when they fail to adhere to it.

Based on these findings, one can see that the voluntary approach to CSR renders it ineffective in the case of the Niger Delta since "at the same time, the ethical concerns of business managers differ among nations, and managers in multinational companies can find themselves juggling the perhaps contrary expectations of their local and head offices."[864] M. Blowfield and J. Frynas asserted too that CSR differ from one country to the next as the ones in developing economies are different from the ones required in industrialized countries. In this regard, there is no coherent principle in the formulation and implementation of CSR that is binding throughout the world.[865]

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860   See ibid, p. 17.
861   Idemudia, Nwafiokun, 2010, op. cit., p. 838.
862   See Blowfield, Michael/Frynas, G. Jedrzej, 2005, op. cit., p. 501.
863   See ibid., p. 502.
864   Ibid. p. 502.
865   See ibid., p. 499-513.

This is by no means to undermine the roles of MNCs, such as in the case of Nigeria, towards effective introduction of CSR from a top-to-bottom approach in order to tackle the perceived weak governance experienced in the country in terms how to deal with the grievances of the host communities. This position is underpinned by certain World Bank staffers upon the perception of ineffective legislations in some countries with weak policies: "World Bank staff, for example, have argued that CSR can be a useful step on the way to better national legislation in countries that have failed to enforce the laws."[866]

A. Bagaji et al. also assert that in as far as oil MNCs are profit-driven in their operational practices they will not bother with environmental pollution and those bearing the brunt of their activities.[867] A. Bagaji et al. and A. Mähler state in line with the works of S. Omotola and U. Engel that these lukewarm attitudes by Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) contribute to violent conflicts in a number of ways:

> For example, oil companies carry part of the blame for the environmental pollution caused by oil production. Nevertheless, the Nigerian government is to bear the entire blame for not ensuring compliance to standards that will ensure the protection of nature and human beings. Furthermore, the MNOCs have indirectly contributed to the increased militarization of the conflicts and the garrisoning of the Niger Delta, by requesting the Nigerian government to provide security services, even when civil protests were still mainly peaceful […]. In addition, the oil companies also make use of private security services, whose notion about the Niger Delta communities is that of saboteurs, terrorists and criminals, hence the orientation and approaches of security services is brutality.[868]

In addition to the factors that trigger conflicts in the Niger Delta, A. Mähler emphasizes that, in reference to a study carried out by the International Crisis Group, some of the MNCs also provide monetary assistance to certain militants in order to pacify them. She is of the view that in the short term such financial aid may reduce violence, but that it will empower the militants all the more in the long run.[869]

As a consequence of the indifference of the MNCs to the environmental pollution and dilapidated state of the Niger Delta region, S. Omotola states that one of the reasons for the increasing radicalization and militarization is the formation of different ethnic militant groups which compete with the state's mono-

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866   Ibid., p. 503.
867   See Bagaji, S. Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 37.
868   Ibid., p. 37-38. See Mähler, Annegret: "Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil Violence Link in the Niger Delta", in: *German Institute of Global and Area Studies – Working Papers*, No. 120, 2010, p. 1-38 (20).
869   See ibid., p. 20.

poly on the instruments of force in the region.[870] She assumes that inhabitants of the region do not perceive any difference between MNCs and the Nigerian government which provide the oil firms with security personnel:

> […] what the region has experienced so far is the collusion of two players—oil companies and the Nigerian state—against the oil-bearing communities. The line of demarcation between the oil trans-nationals and the Nigerian state has become increasingly blurred.

Due to the ongoing dispute and armed conflicts in the Niger Delta, it is reported that "the Niger Delta has now become a haven for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which the militias have put to use on different occasions."[871] In addition, the author illustrates that some of the grievances stated by the militant groups can be seen in "several cases of outright seizure of oil wells, kidnapping of oil workers and hostage takings."[872] Regarding other factors that trigger conflicts, the next chapter will attempt to clarify the assumption of a "resource curse" as the source of conflicts.

4.5 Resource Curse: The Source of Conflicts

Natural resources can be found in many countries of the world and the importance attached to these resources may be immense with regard to the role these resources may play in the economic prosperity and stability of some countries. Also, on the other hand, natural resources such as gold in Ghana, diamonds in Sierra Leone and Liberia, crude oil in Nigeria, coltan deposit in the Democratic Republic of Congo and numerous other natural resources in many other African countries have been linked to conflicts. So, in such situations, these resources, which are supposed to be blessings to the inhabitants of the countries where they are available, are currently perceived or labelled as the causes of conflicts in many of these state. As N. Horsfield describes:

> Persistent underdevelopment and a plethora of so called 'resource wars' across Africa in recent decades, has led to the establishment of a body of literature pertaining to the existence of a 'resource curse', which postulates that natural resource abundance significantly increases the prevalence, intensity and duration of violent conflict and restricts development.[873]

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870   See Omotola, J. Shola, 2003, op. cit., p. 5
871   Ibid., p. 13-14.
872   Ibid., p. 14.
873   Horsfield, Natasha: "Debating the 'Curse' of Resources: The Case of Nigeria", in: *Polis Journal*, Vol. 5, Summer 2011, p. 1-38 (4).

It may be debatable whether the presence and exploration of natural resources in a particular country can generate conflicts because there are numerous authors and social scientists in favor of the position that conflicts, with regard to the resource curse hypothesis, erupt due to the availability and exploration of natural resources. More on this will be examined in the following sections.

4.5.1 The Cause of Conflicts: Examining the Resource Curse/Rentier State Theory

Among the scholars and social scientists in this field whose works reflect the *resource curse* hypothesis are P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, I. De Soysa, A. Ikelegbe, A. Mähler, L. Dam and B. Scholtens and A. Bagaji.[874] Also, certain other works which are very important to the subject matter were written by J. Ejobowah, K. Bjorvatn, J. Onoh, I. Gary and T. Karl as well as a host of others, whose names and works will be mentioned during the course of the analysis.[875]

It is argued by the aforementioned authors that the resource curse and rentier state phenomena are probable causes of conflicts. However, some of these authors apply their hypotheses to the likely reasons that generate conflicts generally, many of which are tested to the conflicts in the African continent, but are yet to be studied specifically in the Nigerian case. In view of the position of this work, which is incongruent with the findings of most of the authors that deal with the resource curse thesis and rentier state theory, it can be stated that cur-

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874 See Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke: "On Economic Causes of Civil War", in: *Centre for Study of African Economies, Oxford University and World Bank*, Oxford Economic Papers 50, 1998, p. 563-573. Read De Soysa, Indra: "Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-1999", in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 4, Special Issue on Civil War in Developing Countries, July 2002, p. 395-416. See Ikelegbe, Augustine, 2005, op. cit., p. 208-234. Read Mähler, Annegret, 2010, op. cit., p. 1-38. See Dam, Lammertjan/Scholtens, Bert, 2012, op. cit., p. 148-156. Read also Bagaji, S. Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 34-43. See Ejobowah, B. John: "Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria", in: *Africa Today*, Vol. 47 (1), 2000, p. 28-47. Compare Bjorvatn, Kjetil et al.: "On Resource Curse and Power Balance: Evidence from oil-Rich Countries", in: *World Development*, Vol. 40, No. 7, 2012, p. 1308-1316. See the work of the following author, Mikesell, F. Raymond: "Explaining the Resource Curse, With Special Reference to Mineral-Exporting Countries", in: *Resource Policy*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1997, p. 191-199. Read Onoh, J.K.: *The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1983. Check Gary, Ian/Karl, T. Lynn: *Bottom of the barrel: Africa's oil boom and the poor*, Baltimore/USA 2003.

875 See Ejobowah, B. John, 2000, op. cit., p. 28-47. Compare Bjorvatn, Kjetil et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 1308-1316; see Onoh, J.K., 1983, op. cit. Check Gary, Ian/Karl, T. Lynn, 2003, op. cit.

rent conflicts in Africa and especially Nigeria can neither be traced to the availability of natural resources nor the income from such resources. In order to lend further support to this argument, however, more studies and analyses on the subject matter need to be carried out.

It is important to understand what the assumptions undergirding the resource curse thesis or the rentier state theory mean before one can either reject or accept the assumptions therein. A. Mähler, K. Bjorvatn et al. and A. Bagaji et al. present both the positions of resource curse hypothesis and rentier state theory in their individual works. However, none of them, at the end of their respective analyses, express the opinion that both schools of thoughts are the only factors capable of explaining the cause of conflict.

A. Mähler argues that the concept of rentier state can be traced back to the work of H. Mahdavy, which is centered on pre-revolutionary Iran. Furthermore, she asserts, in reference to the expansion of the notion by authors such as H. Beblawi and G. Luciani, that a rentier state is a country in which at least 40 percent of all government revenue is derived from economic rents.[876] The problems of rentier state theory, she maintains, can be perceived from two sequential angles: The first is economic inefficiency and the second, as a result of the first, is the hindrance of socioeconomic development.[877] Politically therefore, the effects of the rentier state with crude oil rents, as an example, can go as far as playing a stabilizing role for authoritarian rule. According to A. Mähler, based on empirical findings, rentier state theory can be applied universally. She posits further that there is linkage between oil rents and authoritarianism based on the following assumptions:

> Firstly, it is presumed that oil rents foster the formation of stabilizing patronage networks, widespread clientelism, and essistentialistic distribution policies, all of which lessen the pressure from the population to democratize and may additionally result in the depoliticization of the society.

> Secondly, the abundance of revenues generated by the oil sector means that national rulers do note [sic] need to tax populations. This again may disburden the political elite of demands from the population for political participation and accountability on the part of the elites.[878]

One can discern that there is no direct relationship between resource rent such as oil revenues and conflicts from the explanation given above. This is also supported by A. Mähler who believes that "the rentier state theory does not focus

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876   She states that "these rents can be defined as 'the excess over the return to capital, Land, and labor when these factors of production are put to their next best use'." Mähler, Annegret, 2010, op. cit., p. 7.
877   See ibid., p. 7.
878   Ibid., p. 7.

primarily on violence, but rather on the stability of authoritarian rule."[879] The assumption that resource wealth can be used by authoritarian rulers to foment violence on their subjects in terms of political repression is not sufficient to prove that the availability of resources is the cause of conflicts.

The resource curse thesis, on the other hand, constitutes another theoretical debate on natural resources as the source of conflicts. It is emphasized, according to A. Mähler, that the resource curse thesis is a follow-up to the rentier state theory.[880] Under this assumption, many authors represent the position that resource wealth is linked to poor economic growth and other economic hindrances such as the effects of the Dutch disease as well as a woeful economic performance by the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. It is posited, with respect to the Dutch disease factor, that countries affected by the resource curse are incapable of diversifying their economies and therefore vulnerable towards external shocks.[881] Another aspect of the resource curse thesis that is of utmost importance to this research is its focus on the links between natural resources and violent conflicts.

P. Collier and A. Hoeffler present many empirical data in order to investigate the position that civil wars have economic causes. Civil wars in this context can be understood as a form of violent conflict.[882] However, in their study, four variables are tested in order to carry out their research. These variables are: initial income, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the amount of natural resources and initial population size. The authors believe that the variables are significant and strong determinants with respect to the duration of civil wars.[883] The latter point implies that the four variables can instigate the outbreak of civil wars. One important finding in their analysis is stated:

> War occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to the costs. Both authors propose that in part these will be determined by distributional considerations: a government which rewards its supporters by exploiting a section of the population will increase the incentive for rebellion.[884]

Nonetheless, despite the failure of the authors to deal with the distributional aspect of violent conflicts, on which the theory of identity and difference in this thesis focuses, they place more emphasis on the incentive for conflict in their es-

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879   Ibid., p. 7.
880   See ibid., p. 7-8.
881   See ibid., p. 8.
882   See Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke, 1998, op. cit., p. 563.
883   See ibid.
884   Quote from ibid.

say.[885] Tantamount to the position of this paper, the findings of both authors do not reflect the availability of natural resources such as oil as the cause of conflicts. This is buttressed in the following statement: "The effect of natural resources is non-monotonic. The possession of natural resources initially increases the duration and the risk of civil war but then reduces it."[886]

In view of this, one can argue, as both authors emphasize, that natural resources have effects on the prolongation and the risk of conflicts but it is by no means the cause. They assert that the cause of conflicts in Africa is not a result of its ethno-linguistic fractionalization rather than its poverty.[887]

The same argument is put forth by I. Gary and L. Karl in regard to the resource curse hypothesis as they stipulate that the resource known as oil itself cannot be the source of underdevelopment which, in view of this research paper, is capable of causing conflicts: "This means that the underlying development problems around petroleum are not inherent in the resource itself—oil is merely a thick, viscous black substance."[888] One can argue that countries whose basic economic revenue is dependent on the export of oil belong to the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian and the most conflict-affected states in the contemporary world situation.[889]

However, as illustrated in the work of A. Mähler and the essay by P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, there is an assumption that resource-dependent countries are prone to experience internal stability and violent conflicts more than non-resource dependent countries.[890] The authors observe that the hypothesis of resource curse, in view of the increasing violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta region in the second half of the 1990s, "cannot be explained without considering the crucial impact of various non-resource-specific factors and the inherent dynamism of certain causal mechanisms."[891]

K. Bjorvatn et al. opine that countries affected by a resource curse, as opposed to rent-seeking, can be described as being tied to a mechanism that links

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885   The analysis shows that the main goals of rebellion are either to capture the state or to secede from it. See ibid., p. 563-564. Civil war is described as a form of violence or conflict in which one of the primary actors is identified as the national government in power when the hostility starts. Also, civil war, in the way the authors understand it, means both actors are able to inflict deaths upon each other. See ibid., p. 567.

886   Ibid., p. 568.

887   See ibid., p. 571.

888   Gary, Ian/Karl, T. Lynn, 2003, op. cit., p. 18.

889   See ibid., p. 18.

890   See Mähler, Annegret, 2010, op. cit., p. 8. See also Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke, 1998, op. cit., p. 569.

891   Mähler, Annegret, 2010, op. cit., p. 11.

high resource wealth to low economic performance. The authors present the fol-
lowing position in their essay:

> […] natural resource rents divert entrepreneurial talent from productive activities to low-pro-
> ductive rent-seeking activities. [R. Torvik] concludes that the fall of income due to this re-al-
> location of entrepreneurs may outweigh the benefits of natural resource rents. [It] also builds a
> model of rent-seeking, where ethnic groups compete for a share of the resource wealth.[892]

In view of this, it can be argued that high resource rents may lead to the retarda-
tion of potential entrepreneurial skills in rent-seeking states and kick-start power
struggle among different political fractions in a particular society. That is why
K. Bjorvatn et al. maintain that political balance of power, in a situation of high
resource rents, may lead to extreme rent wastefulness due to the intensification
of competition for power.[893]

In the long run, their findings for both the Middle East and North Africa do
not reflect the resource curse or rent-seeking theory as the cause of conflicts.
Therefore, one can argue that resource curse hypothesis and rentier state theory
cannot sufficiently be used in order to explain that resources or rent income are
directly linked to conflicts. Crude oil, as an example of resource curse and an
important factor in conflicts, will be discussed in the next section.

4.5.2 Oil Curse as the Cause of Conflicts: The Example of Nigeria

Crude oil as a natural resource can be used as an example of how the resource
curse may occur in countries where oil is a dominant source of revenue. Despite
slight differences observable between the works of I. Gary and L. Karl, L. Dam
and B. Scholtens, N. Bassey and a host of others whose names were already
mentioned in previous sections, this section will focus on and examine crude oil
as a type of resource which is assumed to be the cause of conflicts.

I. Gary and L. Karl argue that oil, as a material resource itself, cannot lead
to the outbreaks of conflicts; rather other factors, which are connected to and
closely related to oil, are at the root of current conflicts in Nigeria. However,
this argument cannot be upheld unless certain analyses and investigations are
carried out. Although the phenomenon of the oil curse may be seen in many
countries on the African continent, the Nigerian situation will be treated in de-
tail. This is because Nigeria is an example of a country confronted with contem-

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892   Bjorvatn, Kjetil et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 1308.
893   See ibid., p. 1308-1316;

porary oil-related conflicts in Africa. I. Gary and L. Karl highlight the status of oil states in Africa thus:

> Oil is a natural resource owned by all Africans. Nevertheless, as this report describes, many aspects of the oil industry in Africa are concealed or shrouded in mystery: key facts about oil are often treated as state secrets. Thus, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to track how much money is being generated or how these revenues are spent. Transparency depends on multinational oil companies publishing what they pay and on governments revealing what they spend.[894]

Irrespective of the fact that oil as a resource is again linked to the activities of the multinational corporations in I. Gary and L. Karl's work, this section will limit its focus to oil as a factor in conflicts, since a lot of analysis on multinational companies was already presented in previous sections. As both authors explain, many sub-Saharan African countries are in the midst of oil boom, which is expected to be a source of opportunity for many of these countries, but many, if not all, of these countries experience woeful economic underdevelopment:

> But, in most countries, petrodollars have not helped developing countries to reduce poverty; indeed, the presence of oil has exacerbated poverty. In Nigeria, for example, which has received over $300 billion in oil revenues over the last 25 years, per capita income is less than $1 a day. Surprisingly, Nigeria has performed worse, in terms of basic social indicators, than sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and much worse than other regions of the developing world. This is an example of what has been called the "paradox of plenty."[895]

One can perceive the Nigerian case as an example of the oil curse phenomenon. Nevertheless, despite all indicators pointing to underdevelopment and poverty, oil is yet to be understood as the cause of the current conflicts in Nigeria. For example, I. Gary and L. Karl mention a number of cases in their work where oil wealth enables the gap between the rich and the poor in oil-rich countries to be maintained. They believe that oil-dependent exporting countries perform, in economic terms, below average in contrast to what is expected of them in view of their oil riches: "when taken as a group, oil "rich" less developed countries dependent on oil exports have seen the living standards of their populations drop—and drop dramatically."[896]

However, their work on the oil curse depicts how oil dependence affects development in a number of ways, namely:

– Oil booms raise expectations and increase appetites for spending

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894   Gary, Ian/Karl, T. Lynn, 2003, op. cit., p. 1.
895   See ibid., p. 5.
896   See ibid., p. 18.

- Governments dramatically increase public spending based on unrealistic revenue expectations

- Booms decrease the quality of public spending and encourage rent-seeking

- The vitality of oil prices hinders growth, wealth distribution and poverty alleviation

- Booms encourage the loss of fiscal control and inflation, further hampering growth, equity and the alleviation of poverty

- Foreign debt grows faster in oil-exporting countries, mortgaging the future

- Non-oil productive activities, like manufacturing and agriculture, are adversely affected by the oil sector in a phenomenon called the "Dutch disease"

- Petrol dollars replace more stable and sustainable revenue streams, exacerbating the problems of development, transparency and accountability.[897]

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897 See ibid., 22-23. Similar effects of the oil curse in oil-dependent exporting countries are painted by other authors who deal with the same subject matter with different theoretical instruments in various works. For example, L. Dam and B. Scholtens discuss the linkage between environmental pollution in resource-rich countries and the resource curse. They maintain that some multinational corporations are eager to carry out their activities in resource-rich countries with weak environmental regulations. Consequently, as they examine too, based on their pollution haven hypothesis and the resource curse, there is the problem of underdevelopment in resource-rich countries where environmental degradation is not checked. They use a data set with 5 indicators to carry out their study in both oil rich and oil poor countries which are as follows: regulatory quality, government effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability, and voice and accountability. The indicators are used to check if countries with abundant natural resources, especially oil, are likely to be affected by the resource/oil curse and at the same time be a place of pollution havens. One of their findings is that less environmental responsible multinational firms probably operate in countries with weak environmental regulation. Another finding is that multinational firms with weak environmental standards more often operate in resource-rich countries where also the pollution haven effect is stronger. See Dam, Lammertjan/Scholtens, Bert, 2012, op. cit., p. 148-156. One question which springs to mind is if one can describe such oil multinational companies, also known as oil super majors, like Shell, Exxon-Mobil etc. as companies that are less responsible if one considers their operations in a place like Nigeria and the environmental pollution and degradation going on there? For more about oil spills and the environmental degradation in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria coupled with the crisis which engulf the region, see the testimony of N. Bassey before the United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, 2008, op. cit.

Despite the oil-related factors which aggravate conflicts in oil rich countries, many of the works treated so far do not explicitly declare that oil directly causes conflicts. This implies that other factors, as already mentioned earlier on, may be attributed to the root causes of the conflicts. Some of the roots of conflicts can be been seen in the gap between expectations and woeful economic achievement of oil-exporting countries which, as one scholar believes, can have politically explosive implications.[898] In this case, it is asserted that the governments in oil-producing countries channel the resources, known as petrol dollars, to their relatives and family, friends, military and political supporters, social class, and ethnic or religious groups.[899]

Based on this assertion, C. Obi refers to neopatrimonialism in his study as one of the causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The writer, with respect to neopatrimonialism, postulates that African political elites disregard the authority of the state and pursue their personal goals, which, as a result, produces conflicts, state failure and violence.[900] Meanwhile, whenever the governments of the so-called oil-dependent exporting countries fail to yield to the demands of their populace, in terms of improving their living standards, they resort to the use of repression to keep themselves in power.[901]

On the other hand, as I. Gary and L. Karl argue, the fights over oil revenue, an argument which other authors like C. Obi underscore, may become the reason for ratcheting up the level of pre-existing conflict in a society. However, as they further maintain, oil can be a reason for starting wars:

> Fight over oil revenues becomes the reason for ratcheting up the level of pre-existing conflict in a society, and oil may even become the very rationale for starting wars. This is especially true as economies move into decline. Petroleum revenues are also a central mechanism for prolonging violent conflict and only rarely a catalyst for resolution. Think, for example, of Sudan, Algeria, the Republic of Congo, Indonesia (Aceh, Nigeria, Iraq, Chechnya and Yemen).[902]

The position taken by I. Gary and L. Karl on oil as a reason for starting wars/conflicts, though not explicitly declared as the cause, is addressed by C. Obi who argues that the roots of war in Africa are complex and are attributed to more than one cause. From his own point of view, the effects of globalization on

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898   See Gary, Ian/Karl, T. Lynn, 2003, op. cit., p. 23.
899   See ibid., p. 23.
900   See Obi, Cyril, 2009, p. 103-128 (108). C. Obi's view is stated in reference to two works written by P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz. For more information, see Chabal, Patrick/Daloz, Jean-Pascal: *Culture Troubles: Politics and Interpretation of Meaning*, Hurst, London 2006; Chabal, Patrick/Daloz, Jean-Pascal: *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, The International African Institute and James Currey, Oxford 1999.
901   See Gary, Ian/Karl, T. Lynn, 2003, op. cit., p. 23.
902   See ibid, p. 24.

the structural weaknesses of the continent, war economies, neo-patrimonial and cultural explanations, and the resource curse are all approaches that partially offer important perspectives in the understanding of conflicts in Africa.[903] The author cites the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia as wars which can be viewed from a complex combination of historical, political, economic and deep-seated crisis.[904]

If one examines the work of J. Ejobowah, then one arrives at a different picture about the causes of the current violent crisis in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. According to him, the problem with Nigeria is the structure of the existing federal revenue allocation which, he argues, marginalizes the inhabitants of the oil region: "In sum, the conflict over oil resources is all about the denial of the people of the Niger Delta of their right to self-determination through states that were created for them in the last three decades."[905]

From his perspective, one can see that the root of the violent crisis is not based on oil, but rather can be traced back to problems relating to the political structures of the country established a couple of years ago. The same view is presented by A. Bagaji et al. who trace the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region to the institutionalized legal political structures of the country which, in the long run, exclude and deprive the populace of the oil region, who are minority ethnic groups in Nigeria, from the ownership of the mineral deposits in their region. A. Bagaji et al. explain this thus:

> [...] in consonance with the assumptions of the rentier state theory of the state and the resource-curse thesis, a combination of immediate causal factors, which are predominantly oil oriented grievances are the initial motives for the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta.[906]

They further claim, as already emphasized by other scholars, that weak political institutions and corruption enable a wide participation of various groups in oil bunkering and illicit trade in weapons. Among the groups mentioned are international actors making significant profits from their involvement in such operations in weapons, which offer these groups the opportunity to have a share of the so-called "national cake".[907]

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903   See Obi, Cyril, 2009, op. cit., p. 112.
904   See ibid., p. 112.
905   Ejobowah, B. John, 2000, op. cit., p. 28-47 (43).
906   Read also Bagaji, S. Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 34-43.
907   See ibid., p. 41. "National cake" is what Nigerians use to describe the revenues accrued from the sales of crude oil. It is ironically used to depict the level of corruption in the oil industry involving the costested Nigerian revenue formula. This also comprises how the petrodollars are distributed among the three tiers of government and how the elites are involved in benefitting illegally from the sale of oil to the detriment of the masses.

Another very important insight on the conflicts in the Niger Delta is given by A. Ikelegbe in a position closely related to the greed phenomenon as the source of recurrent violent conflicts in Nigeria, a view reflected in the works of I. Soya and J. Asuni.[908] All the aforementioned three scholars opine that the activities of the militant groups in the Niger Delta led and continue to lead to the recurrent violent conflicts in the region despite some genuine demands for a fairer share of the oil resources by some communities. In the description of the situation by A. Ikelegbe, "an illegal, criminal, informal and underground economy exists in the Niger Delta, which has been engaged in resistance against the political economy of oil in Nigeria since the early 1960s."[909]

Nevertheless, he thinks that the emergence of the greed and violence economy can be traced back to the 1990s at the earliest and, again, to the time since 2000.[910] Some of the groups and people identified as being involved in the exploitation of resource opportunities, as he puts it, are retired and still serving public officials, top political and business elites within and outside the region.[911] Moreover, he continues, rebels, warlords strive for the control of the oil resources through external commercial networks, illegal trading and violence.[912]

He contributes further to the argument that, in reference to S. Ellis, violence, as in the previous case of war-torn Liberia, can be used as a form of business instead of its use as an instrument to seek genuine agitation and change based on ideological or ethnic interests.[913]

I. Soysa, on the other hand, represents a different position as she stresses that although oil may not be directly linked to conflicts, the importance of oil in generating these conflicts cannot be overlooked. She believes that conflict can be generated through the scarcity of natural resources in two primary ways: 1) the resource scarcity motivates elites to take possession of resources while they marginalize powerless groups or the poor in the process; 2) the indirect effect of

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908   See Ikelegbe, Augustine, 2005, op. cit., p. 208-234. Also Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 1-29. And see De Soysa, Indra, 2002, op. cit., p. 395-416.

909   Ikelegbe, Augustine, 2005, op. cit., p. 229. The political economy of oil, according to A. Ikelegbe, means "greed for economic gains or what is termed as economies of war is the primary drive or motivation for resistance and war." Ibid., p. 210.

910   See ibid., p. 229.

911   See ibid.

912   See ibid.

913   See ibid., p. 210. Furthermore, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, as A. Ikelegbe asserts, based on the works of D. Keen, various factions struggle for the control of the diamond mines in order to enrich themselves personally. See ibid., p. 210.

this scarcity on the economic and social innovation is a restraint on a society's ability to be inventive.[914]

A similar view is represented by C. Obi who attempts to prove that oil is at the root of violent conflicts in these states. In his opinion, conflict is embedded within the struggle of ethnic minority groups in their quest for local autonomy and control of their natural resources with the case of crude oil as an example.[915] While he investigates the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, he wonders how a country rich in oil and gas and that generates billions of dollars annually can become an example of poverty and conflicts. To C. Obi, oil is not directly responsible for the conflicts in the Niger Delta if the contents of the following statement are considered:

> The increased militarization of the region and the strategies of some of the armed groups designed to apply more pressure on the Nigerian government to accede to demands for resource control and negotiate the release of certain political leaders, who are considered sympathetic to the cause of the militants, from detention has further fuelled the intractability of the conflict.[916]

From the above, it is made clear that a lot is at stake when politicians are involved in cases relating to the control of resources in a conflict zone. In the aforementioned quotation, resources are used as instruments to attain political goals. On this note, C. Obi opines that oil cannot sufficiently be proven to be the cause of the conflicts in view of the important roles other factors play within the spectrum of the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta.[917] For example, there are militants groups linked to local politicians and elites which are in the business of kidnapping foreign oil workers or relations of prominent people such as business people or traditional rulers. To this effect, demand for payments from oil companies and local authorities in exchange for the release of the kidnapped people is widespread.[918]

Therefore, whichever way one perceives the conflicts in the Niger Delta region, oil invariably features as an important factor. However, this argument is not sufficient to prove that the natural resource, crude oil, is directly responsible for the outbreak of conflicts. Other factors generating conflicts in the Niger Delta are indirectly linked to oil; for instance, C. Obi refers to oil as the genesis of the region's problems:

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914   See De Soysa, Indra, 2002, op. cit., p. 404.
915   See Obi, Cyril, 2009, op. cit., p. 103.
916   Ibid., p. 105.
917   See ibid.
918   See ibid.

> Oil pollution, extreme poverty, high levels of unemployment, pollution, perceived discrimina-
> tory employment practices against locals by oil companies, socioeconomic and political mar-
> ginalization as well as neglect by successive administrations constitute the main grievances
> against the oil companies and the government.[919]

One can see that all the complaints are consequences of oil related issues within the spectrum of oil and gas exploration. It is further argued that an increase in the net income of oil revenues or earnings from oil exports will mean feeding more on corrupt activities and wasteful expenses rather than deepening democratic institutions, with regard to the effect of rentier state theory,[920] a claim that further underpins the interwoven features of the oil curse and rentier state theory.

In this respect, R. Mikesell portrays the prevalence and impact of greed in terms of the instability and violence experienced by the phenomenon of oil curse in oil dependent exporting countries. Nonetheless, he suggests that the existence of greed cannot be used as any single explanation for the phenomenon of resource curse.[921] In his opinion, no economy can grow if necessary policy conditions for internal growth like free trade, incentives for investment, technological development and stable prices are not put in place.[922]

Contrary to the thesis on the resource/oil curse which is widely applied to explain the underdevelopment of oil-dependent exporting countries like Nigeria, it is evident in R. Mikesell's work that Nigeria is among many other mineral/oil-exporting states that perform below expectation. Therefore, aside from the Nigerian experience, it can be safely assumed that the reliance on the export of a primary commodity may not necessarily lead to a resource curse experience. For example, primary commodity export is often used as a starting point or an initial

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919   Ibid., p. 106. It is shown further in the work of C. Obi that the complaints about exclusion
        by the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region, who are ethnic minority groups within the
        larger Nigerian Federation, have a long history. On the one hand, in the view of these mi-
        norities, "they are being 'cheated' out of a fair share of oil revenues because they are politi-
        cally marginalized by a federal government dominated by bigger (non-oil producing ethnic
        groups) […]." See ibid, p. 106. In addition, they represent the position that the large ethnic
        groups connive with foreign oil multinationals to exploit their region, grab their lands and
        expose them to oil pollution and environmental degradation. On the other hand, the govern-
        ment perceives the protest by the oil communities and armed militias as acts of economic
        sabotage to the main source of national revenue and, therefore, as a threat to national secu-
        rity and the well-being of the country. This situation is viewed thus: "Since Nigeria is an
        oil-dependent nation, with oil accounting for over 80 percent of national revenues and 95
        percent of foreign exchange earnings, any act capable of resulting in the disruption of oil
        production is perceived a threat to the survival and wellbeing of the country." See ibid 107.
920   See ibid., 113.
921   See Mikesell, F. Raymond, 1997, op. cit., p. 198-199.
922   See ibid., p. 199.

stimulus for countries to develop their manufacturing sector. For instance, many of the current industrialized countries initially relied on the foreign exchange income from the exports of primary commodities to kick-start their manufacturing sector. Although there are some states like Singapore and South Korea which serve as examples of countries that were able to develop their manufacturing industry without having to depend on the exportation of primary commodities, thereby avoiding the discussion about the so-called oil or resource curse.[923]

So, with regard to natural resources as a possible cause of conflicts, I. Soysa opines that a lot of complex factors need to be considered when one attempts to find the causes of violent conflicts. Apart from the role of oil or other natural resources as the possible reasons for the outbreak of conflicts, the author places emphasis on a factor such as grievances in her critique:

> The focus on difference, which is a natural function of the 'enemy-image', is an especial feature of political contests and violence. In such situations, cultural differences in particular may come to be overemphasized in games of 'us versus them', even though the participants in disputes rarely speak with one voice.[924]

Contrary to I. Soysa's claim, it is doubtful if one can always equate grievance to the creation of difference. Despite her statement that cultural distinction is unrelated to the objective truth as a factor that causes conflicts, it can be argued that cultural differences can be instrumentalized by ethnic entrepreneurs to construct an identity of "us" and "others". This is congruent with the analysis carried out earlier which stipulates that identity, as a phenomenon, oscillates, and therefore it is not constant and can be manipulated.

Another point made by I. Soysa, while attempting to debunk P. Collier's and A. Hoeffler's position on the oil/resource curse, is the attempt to use the "clash of civilizations" put forward by S. Huntington, in association with the oil curse thesis, to portray the cause of violent conflicts. She states that "since a large proportion of oil-producing countries happen to be Islamic states, some might question whether it is really Islam's militarism that is driving the result […]."[925] Taking this factor into consideration, she signals that dependence on natural resources such as oil can be perceived as a reflection of civilizational attitudes, a scenario associated with Islamic states. However, such a claim is surely baseless since many countries that are not Islamic or dominated only by Muslims such as the example of Nigeria still witness violent conflicts, problems associated with crude oil. As the investigation on Nigeria will show in subsequent

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923   See ibid. p. 198.
924   De Soysa, Indra, 2002, op. cit., p. 396.
925   See ibid., p. 399.

chapters, some of the factors underlying the violent conflicts experienced in the Niger Delta oil region are not related to the clash of civilizations despite attempts by some writers and politicians to depict it that way.[926]

Therefore, in consideration of the analysis performed so far, it becomes clear that oil is not necessarily the cause of violent conflict in Nigeria despite some evidence exhibiting certain triggers of the conflicts as closely related to the availability of oil resources. And, according to the "clash of civilizations" perspective referenced above as a possible cause of the violent conflicts, a chapter at a later stage in this work will shed light on the lingering conflicts and their causes in the Niger Delta region and determine the significance of cultural, religious and linguistic differences therein. That being said, the next section will attempt to examine the roles the elites, known as the so-called big men or strong men, play towards the outbreaks of contemporary violent conflicts.

4.6 Outbreaks of Conflicts: The Instigation of the Elites

Having looked first at colonialism and at the activities of the multinational firms and in the previous section on the resource curse as the causes of conflict without any sufficient proof to support these factors as the source of conflicts, this chapter will deal with the position that sees the *elites* as the cause of conflicts in Africa and most especially Nigeria.

Many writers suggest that the elites are responsible for the factors that lead to the outbreak of conflicts.[927] In some cases, these elites are described as un-

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926   For more on the clash of civilizations theory, see Huntington, P. Samuel: "The Clash of Civilizations", in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, p. 22-49. See Huntington, P. Samuel: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York et al. 2003.

927   Some of the authors who postulate the contemporary conflicts in Nigeria and Africa in general as the consequences of the activities of the so-called elites (big men, strong men, Godfathers) are as follows: Campbell, John: *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York et al. 2011; Orji, Nkwachukwu: *Power-Sharing: The Element of Continuity in Nigerian Politics*, Dissertation, Central European University, Budapest 2008. See Brunner, Markus: "Nigeria: Politische Herrschaft zwischen Militär- und Zivilregierungen", in: Grau, Inge/Mährdel, Christian/Schicho, Walter [Hrsg.]: *Afrika: Geschichte und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Promedia, Wien 2000, p. 277-297. The same elites' destruction of Kenya can be seen in the work of Axel Harneit-Sievers. See Harneit-Sievers, Axel: "Kenia: Wahlen und Eskalation der Gewalt", in: *German Institute of Global and Area Studies Focus, Institut für Afrika-Studien*, No. 1, 2008, p. 1-8. Also Kopsieker, Fritz/Kraume, Sophie: "Kenia auf dem Weg zurück zur Bananenrepublik? Lektionen und Aussichten nach vier Jahren Kibaki-Regierung", in: *Internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Referat für Afrika, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, 2006, p. 1-9.

touchable, strong men, big men and/or the so-called Godfathers who are capable of orchestrating violent conflicts.[928] J. Campbell links the activities of the *ogas*, a term used to describe the influential people in the Nigerian sense, with the underdevelopment of the country.[929] Although his work lacks a theoretical basis since it is written for non-specialist readers, the book manages to identify some important factors that contribute to the decline of peace and stability in Africa's most populated country and that drive Nigeria towards state failure. This will be discussed further in the following chapters.

4.6.1 The Position of the Elites in Nigeria

All the aforementioned writers pinpoint certain elite groups in Nigeria who are directly and indirectly involved in the affairs of the country and who are responsible for the current economic and political turbulence affecting the country.

In identifying the military as part of the elites that ruin the prospects of an economic buoyant and stable political Nigeria, J. Campbell maintains that "Nigerians and the diplomatic community failed to see that military governance was creating an increasingly ubiquitous culture of corruption."[930] While referring to Nigeria as a poor country and postulating the structural challenges of governance, he observes that:

> In terms of usual measurements of income, Nigerians are very poor, with wealth from oil concentrated among a miniscule number of ogas or 'big men'. […] Nigeria is run by competing and co-operating elites supported by their patron-client networks, ethnic interests, big business, and the military.[931]

However, with respect to the nepotistic structures described above, which are based on patron-client networks, it cannot be easily claimed that there is a direct link between nepotism and conflict or that nepotism causes conflicts. But, as a result of the effects of nepotism, one can discern a system which is politically incapable of addressing the country's challenges, hence the continued marginalization of non-elites. With regard to the process of alienation, there is a dichoto-

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928   See ibid.
929   J. Campbell served as a U.S. Department of State foreign service officer in Nigeria from 1988 to 1999 before he became the United States of America's Ambassador to Nigeria from 2004 to 2007 (36 months). See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 183. The ogas is used synonymously for "Big Men" in the Nigerian context. For more about the word *ogas*, see ibid., p. 24-28.
930   Ibid., p. xxi.
931   Ibid., p. xiv.

my of elites and non-elites which is evidence of a(n) "us" and "others" when the acquisition of certain resources are at stake. J. Campbell, in congruence with the subject matter, notes: "With honorable exceptions, Nigerian elite behavior is too often self-interested, lacks a national focus, looks almost solely for short-term advantage and is distorted by competition for oil wealth."[932] Moreover, he further observes, "whether military or civilian in form, the government reflects the paralysis of the country's fragmented elites."[933] Another point of view which is of significance in the work of J. Campbell is the association between violence and religion which is a common occurrence in Nigeria. As he states it, there is a split in Nigeria between Christians and Muslims which is a similar situation found in many other African countries close to the border of the Sahel such as the Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Sudan. In all these countries, including Nigeria, the southern parts are dominated by Christians and the northern parts by Muslims.[934]

However, as he notes, "both religions are militant, and the explosive expansion of Christianity in the North contributes to destabilizing the Islamic political and social status quo."[935] For this reason he asserts that religion, as an institution, foments crisis itself. To this effect, however, it is left to be determined how the elites create a situation of "us" and "others" in relation to the patron-client system and are able to politicize ethnicity as well as instrumentalize religion to cause conflicts. This point is adduced by J. Campbell who indicates that conflicts erupt due to the following: "Popular alienation and fragmented establishment [which] has contributed to Nigeria becoming one of the most religious and, at the same time, one of the most violent countries in the world."[936] Despite J. Campbell's link between religion and conflicts as well as several indirect references to the processes of politicized ethnicity, there is yet to be a sufficient argument *per se* on how the elites, i.e. the "ogas", cause conflicts.

Along similar lines of argument, M. Brunner asserts, in his essay on political authority between military and civilian governments, that there is no real distinction in the goals pursued by both military and civilian politicians in Nigeria.[937] He further argues that both during civilian and military administrations, military officers and civilian politicians aimed at legal and extralegal access to the country's resources which, in the case of Nigeria since the end of the 1960s,

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932   Ibid., p. xiv-xv.
933   Ibid., p. xv.
934   See ibid., p. xiv.
935   Ibid., p. xiv.
936   Ibid., p. xv.
937   See Brunner, Markus, 2000, op. cit., p. 278.

are concentrated on the revenues accrued from crude oil sales.[938] The Nigerian military, in his argument, was strengthened during the postcolonial period to become the dominant actor in the absence of competition. With regard to the activities of both the military and civilian elites, which hinder the political and economic development of Nigeria, M. Brunner asserts that the political system is based on networks and fractions dominated by *strong men*.[939]

He elucidates, in reference to J.-F. Bayart, that in view of the competition that may be growing at the grassroots level, these networks are flexible and there is enough room for cooperation or reciprocal assimilation of the elites.[940] On this basis, M. Brunner argues that politics in Nigeria is decided by a small elite group which appears in alternate constellations, however, which, over time, is remarkably consistent.[941] Therefore, anytime there is a change of people at the top, as M. Brunner reveals, there is no real difference in terms of the replacements. These small elite groups in form of civilian politicians dominate the political scene under civilian governments.

He illustrates further how many military men, after being sacked in the downsizing process of the Nigerian Army at the end of the Civil War in 1970, joined the elite groups during the Second Republic.[942] While the political scene in the First Republic was dominated by politicians and bureaucrats from the era of British colonial rule, the military coups of 1966 and the civil war thereafter enabled military men from the ethnic minorities, mostly from the northern part of the country, to occupy important positions.[943]

Despite the domination of the political fields in Nigeria by both military and civilian politicians, there is no positive influence on the socio-economic devel-

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938   See ibid., p. 278. The German version:
       "Das Ziel des Strebens von Militärs und zivilen Politikern gleichermaßen ist der Staat mit seinen legalen und illegalen Zugriffsmöglichkeiten auf die Ressourcen des Landes, im Falle Nigerias seit Ende der sechziger Jahren fast ausschliesslich die Einkünfte aus dem Erdölexport. Dieser Staat ist in der postkolonialen Phase—mangels Konkurrenten und aufgrund der kolonialen Politik—zum alles dominierenden sozialen Akteur geworden." Ibid, p. 278.
939   See ibid., p. 278. The German version:
       "Eine weitere Gemeinsamkeit betrifft die Funktionsweise des politischen Systems, die auf Netzwerken und Fraktionen beruht, welche von politischen Entrepreneuren (oder strong men) dominiert werden und das Bild eines rhizomatischen Staates […] ergeben. Diese Netzwerke sind durchaus flexibel, und während an der Basis die Konkurrenz betont wird, besteht an der Spitze viel Raum für Kooperation bzw. die reziproke Assimilation der Eliten […]." Ibid., p. 278.
940   See ibid.
941   See ibid.
942   The Second Republic existed between 1979 and 1983. For more information, see ibid., p. 276-297.
943   See ibid.

opment of the country as these so-called elites are all involved in corruption and patronage networks. K. Panter-Brick perceives the manner by which the Nigerian military elites operate in the following manner:

> What may be said of the poor, cannot be said of the military, and especially of an army which has grown 20 fold, tasted power, enjoyed unrestricted access to the means of satisfying its own corporate and personal interests, and which might consider itself the guarantor of good behavior on the part of those who take over the reins of office.[944]

Nonetheless, while citing a slight difference between the military and the civilian governments, M. Brunner depicts how the political elites and the head of the networks and fractions usually attempt to mobilize the populace in order to influence a particular political situation.

Furthermore, as he posits, this strategy, which is often promising, is applied constantly as a rational means during periods of party competitions to mobilize the populace through ethnic criteria, often made possible by the existence of many ethnic identities coupled with strong cross-cutting cleavages in Nigeria.[945] How and which ethnic mobilizations occur in Nigeria at different times and occasions will be depicted in subsequent chapters.

The author also opines that it is not only during political elections in Nigeria that violent conflicts erupt as a result of ethnic mobilization, but also during diverse military regimes when ethnic mobilization is suppressed.[946] At the same time, direct physical violence, which is related to power struggle, dominated certain periods of military administrations, instances that caused the eruption of political and social unrests carried out indirectly through gun violence and by the deployment of private armies and militias.[947] Examples of how security officers in the Nigerian Police Force and Military, through the abuse of state power and authority, personally enriched themselves, looted markets and collected tolls represent instances of the violence that M. Brunner refers to.[948] In spite of

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944   Panter-Brick, Keith: "Introduction", in: Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.]: *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, Frank Cass, London 1978, p. 1-10 (9).

945   See Brunner, Markus, 2000, op. cit., p. 279.

946   The German version: "Während der diversen Militärregime trat ethnische Mobilisierung aus offensichlichen Gründen in den Hintergrund, es dominierten direkten, auch gewalttätigeren Machtbeziehung." Ibid., p. 279.

947   See ibid., p. 279. The German version: "Gemeint ist damit zuallererst die Selbstverständlichkeit, mit der politische und soziale Konflikte mittels Waffengewalt und des Einsatzes von Privatarmeen und Milizen ausgetragen werden." Ibid., p. 279.

948   See ibid., p. 279. Also, both M. Brunner and J. Campbell represent the same position in the sense that there has been no generational change in the caliber of people, meaning the principal players, in the country's leadership since the end of the civil war. In the German quotation, M. Brunner asserts the following: "Bei den zivilen Eliten dominiert hingegen weitgehend personelle Kontinuität. So waren etwa viele der jetzt bereits älteren Politiker ent-

this, it is as yet unclear how such activities can directly be linked to the outbreaks of conflicts and the correlation between the abuse of power and contemporary conflicts in Nigeria is yet to be stated.

Despite the initial argument in the work of M. Brunner that the elites, both military and civilians, are responsible for the current political situation in Nigeria, it is not explicitly stated that elites directly cause conflicts. Moreover, during the course of his arguments, he deviates from the subject matter as he understands the Nigerian experience of colonialism as the root cause of the asymmetric elite educational and social development, which is the reason for the absence of a national consciousness on the part of the elites.[949] As already observed, colonialism is a necessary, but not a sufficient explanatory factor for the outbreak of conflicts. As a result of this explanation, the linkage between the elites' ethnic fragmentation and violence does not necessarily become clear.

Therefore, M. Brunner's thesis is insufficient as proof for the outbreak of conflicts. Regardless, the roles elites play in conflict situations of other African countries will be investigated further in the following sections.

4.6.2 The Position of Elites in other African Countries

It is frequently cited that elites are often directly responsible for the outbreak of violent conflicts in different African countries which runs counter to the position posited in this thesis that it is when certain individuals politicize ethnicity that conflicts are generated. That is why it is important to examine the activities of the elites which, on a number of occasions, especially in certain political situations, may be responsible for the outbreak of unrests and violent conflicts.

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weder in der Ersten oder Zweiten Republik oder während diverser Militärdiktaturen aktiv." Ibid., p. 278. See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 1.

949   Ibid., p. 280. The German version:
"Die ‚paradoxe Erbschaft der Kolonialherrschaft '[…] entsprach völlig den Herrschafts-erfordernissen der Kolonialmacht und bestand darin, dass die Briten zwar die politische Einheit Nigeria schufen (inklusive der für sie wichtigen Infrastruktur wie die einheitliche Verwaltungssprache, das Transportsystem, die Währung etc.), diese aber nicht als Einheit regierten, sondern regionale und ethnische Antagonismen im großen Stil förderten (zwischen Norden und Süden sowie zwischen den verschiedenen Ethnien, von denen viele selbst erst im Zuge der Etablierung der Kolonialherrschaft in ihrer damaligen Form entstanden sind […]. Diese getrennte Entwicklung verschärfte die bestehende politischen und sozialen Unterschiede zwischen den Regionen, und auch das völlige Fehlen landesweit zugänglicher tertiärer Erziehungsinstitutionen trug dazu bei, dass innerhalb der Elite kein Nationalbewußtsein entstehen konnte." Ibid., p. 280.

Referring to Nigeria by M. Brunner's depiction of the political situation in Nigerian since independence, A. Harneit-Sievers also posits the same argument on the political tension after the 2007 presidential election in Kenya which, as a trigger, set off the outbreak of violent conflicts based on the existing social, political and ethnic disparities.[950] Nevertheless, as he maintains, the tension which occurred as a result of the aforementioned disparities need not necessarily have led to the outburst of violent conflicts if political actors had not capitalized on them as instruments of division.[951] It is further noted in the case of Kenya that, over the course of time, the escalation of violence and ethnic polarization reached its peak to the extent that it is assigned a high level of importance in Kenya, a situation that makes it difficult to limit the causes of the tension to political reasons only.[952]

However, similarly to the position of M. Brunner, A. Harneit-Sievers traces the outburst of violent conflicts in Kenia and other countries in Africa to colonialism which enables the integration of formerly independent and heterogeneous regions and adjoins diverse ethnic groups into one single territorial state. He believes that ethnic polarization in Kenya existed long before it was re-animated and revitalized by the charged political atmosphere and tension of the last decade.[953] With regard to the activities of the elites as the reason behind the

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950   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2008, op. cit., p. 1-8.
951   Ibid., p. 4.
952   See Ibid., p. 4. The German version:
        "Der massive Ausbruch von Gewalt in Kenia ist nicht allein durch das umstrittene Wahl-ergebnis zu erklären. Dieses bildete nur den Auslöser für das Aufbrechen weiter reichender Spannungen, die aus sozialen, politischen und ethnischen Disparitäten in Kenia herrührten und von politischen Akteuren instrumentalisiert wurden. Allerdings haben die Eskalation der Gewalt und die ethnische Polarisierung inzwischen eine Eigendynamik entwickelt, die politisch immer schwerer einzugrenzen erscheint." Ibid., p. 4.
953   Ethnic polarization or ethnicity in Kenya, which has been responsible for the deaths of many people, can be traced back to the issues of land scarcity and the politics of land distribution during the colonial era and after Kenya's attainment of political independence. It is observed by A. Harneit-Sievers that the main interests in terms of land acquisition by the colonial administrators were centered around Nairobi, a territory inhabited mainly by the Kikuyu, comprising 22 percent of the whole Kenyan population, the largest of the 40 different ethnic groups in Kenya. It is emphasized further that the Kikuyu were, apart from their land being confiscated by the British, sidelined from the modernization and economic development. The Mau Mau riot against colonialism in the 1950s occurred as a protest by the Kikuyu land owners against the British settlers and Kikuyu landowners who collaborated with and were loyalists of the British officials. The same ethnic polarization continued after the political independence of Kenya when the Kenya government repurchased the land from the British settlers and started redistributing it among African farmers. However, the new Kenyan elites allocated to themselves most of the landed properties during redistribution and resettled peasant farmers, especially Kikuyu and members of other ethnic groups like the Luyas from Western Kenya, to the former farms of the settlers and into territories

outbreak of conflicts, F. Kopsieker and S. Kraume opine that the newly attained dimension of corruption cases along with the state's brutal assault and infringement on the rights of its populace are responsible for the outburst of conflicts in Kenya.[954]

Furthermore, both scholars asserted that the elites are deeply involved in patronage networks which, in the long run, lead to abuse of authority, impunity and have negative effects on the affairs of government in Kenya. For example, as they maintain, Kenya's head of state, Kibaki, while performing his function, is involved in and often operates the Big-Man networks.[955] This implies that the head of state is an accomplice to nepotism practiced by the elites whose consequences may range from lack of leadership to power struggle, disregard of the rule of law and the absence of checks and balances as well as corruption. As a result, all the promised reforms guaranteeing political freedom, economic development, sound education and health policies as well as constitutional reforms still remain mirages. As the authors observe, the elites, especially the economic elites, are mainly from the Kikuyu enclave who, amidst criticism from members of other ethnic groups, contributes to social and regional disparities, political imbalance, loss of land, corruption and delay of the constitutional reforms.[956]

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which were not densely populated like the Rift Valley where the ethnic group known as the Kalenjin, many of them pastoralists, lived. This perspective explained the decade-long feelings of marginalization against the new settlers and the local Kalenjin population in Rift Valley by the elites. Coupled with these feelings of exclusion is the problem of land scarcity among the local population. As a result of this historical development, one can discern that from the onset the political and economic structures of independent Kenya were characterized by a certain dimension of ethnicity. From that point of view, based on their population size, their economic resources, their political advantage and their role during the fight for independence, it can be understood why the Kikuyu are in strategic positions in the political scenes which they use in order to strengthen and expand their economic position. Nevertheless, the important positions occupied mostly by the Kikuyu in independent Kenya can be viewed as a point of conflict between the Kikuyu and other large ethnic groups and other ethnic minorities. For more on ethnic polarization in Kenya, see Harneit-Sievers, Axel, p. 1-8.

954   Kopsieker, Fritz/Kraume, Sophie, 2006, op. cit., p. 1-9.
955   Ibid., p. 1-2. The German version: "So erschöpft sich die Rolle des Regierungschefs in der Bedienung des Big-Man-Klischees, welches Kibaki mit väterlichen Habitus ausfüllt, und damit in der gewollten oder ungewollten Komplizenschaft mit Non-Performern und Ganoven." Ibid., p. 1-2.
956   See Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2008, op. cit., p. 1. The German version:
       "Eine politisch vermittelte Übergangslösung mit einer Machtteilung könnte die gewaltsam ausgetragenen Konflikten deeskalieren und elementare Voraussetzungen schaffen, um die Grundprobleme des Landes anzugehen: soziale und regionale Disparitäten, politischen Ungleichgewichte, Landlosigkeit, Korruption und eine überfällige Verfassungsreform."
       Ibid., p. 1.

However, it is still not claimed by any of the authors that the activities of the elites are responsible for the political and economic stagnation of the country or for the outbreaks of violent conflicts in Kenya. What is examined in the work of A. Harneit-Sievers is the indirect link between politics and ethnicity because, as the author repeatedly envisages, the contested results of the elections were a trigger for the escalation of the violence. Besides that, he reiterates that the matters surrounding the outbreak of the conflicts can be seen as the consequences of deep-rooted social, political and ethnic inequality.[957]

Therefore, conflicts or violent conflicts erupt not merely because of the outcomes of some political elections, but rather as a result of long and deep-rooted sentiments. These entrenched disparities caused by years of social, political and economic imbalances, as the examples of Kenya and Nigeria show, are recurrently triggered, most often in election periods when politics, power and resources are contested among various interest or ethnic groups. Political elites are responsible for the activities which trigger conflicts because of their position and influence as they are able to exploit the existing political, social and ethnic differences, especially in a multi-ethnic society, to mobilize their respective ethnic or religious groups against one another. This situation is what D. Kohnert refers to in his write-up as the politics of xenophobia.[958] In his view, hostility can occur between members of different ethnic groups or between citizens of one nation against foreigners residing in their country. The author explains that violent conflicts, through which fear and aggression against the perceived strangers are stirred up and instances in which reactions to or defenses of this *otherness* play a role, are on the increase in Africa and other places.[959]

So, regarding the activities of the elites, one can argue that they pursue social-political exclusionist strategies in order to marginalize certain people perceived as the other(s) in the distribution of resources. Such exclusion may trigger the outbreak of conflicts both in Nigeria and Kenya where patronage networks, as observed earlier, are described as institutionalized. The same condition is discernible in the former Republic of Sudan. The dichotomization of the country into superior Northern Sudanese Arab descendants on the one hand and

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957   Ibid., p. 1. The German version: "Das umstrittene Wahlergebnis ist nur der Auslöser für die Eskalation der Gewalt. Diese resultiert vielmehr aus tief greifenden sozialen, politischen und ethnischen Disparitäten." Ibid., p. 1.

958   Kohnert, Dirk: "Editorial: The Politics of Xenophobia", in: *Afrika Spectrum*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2005, p. 175-179.

959   See ibid., p. 175. The original German version: "Gewaltsame Konflikte, in denen Ängste und Aggressionen gegen Fremde geschürt werden und die Abwehr dieser Andersartigen eine wesentliche Rolle spielt, nehmen wieder zu, in Afrika und anderswo." Ibid., p. 175.

inferior non-Arab Black African Southern Sudanese on the other hand and the probable "attempted segregation often lead to an increase, rather than a decline, in conflict."[960]

Concerning the dichotomization of Sudan into North and South before the split, which, for a long period of time, was a source of conflict in what may be characterized as a combination of linguistic, religious, economic and racial conflicts, the roles of the elites cannot be overemphasized.[961] H. Sharkey emphasizes in her reports, based on this so-called North-South dichotomy in the former Sudan Republic, the application of a century long process of the gradual *Arabization* of Northern Sudan, known as *ta'rib*.[962] Whenever any question about the roles of the elites, with respect to the Arabization policy, is asked, H. Sharkey's response shows what the policy was designed for in the first place as follows:

> After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of 1898, British colonial policies favored a narrow elite from within these 'Arab' communities. Members of this elite went on to develop a conception of a self-consciously Sudanese Arabic national identity, in the process adapting the term 'Sudanese' *(sudani)*, which derived from an Arabic word for blackness and previously had servile connotations. At decolonization in the 1950s, these nationalists [elites] turned *ta'rib*, into an

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960   See Johnson, H. Douglas: "Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement?", in: *African Affairs*, 107/462, 2007, p. 1-19. Ibid, p. 5. This quotation is used in reference to what was known as *dar rights* before Sudan was split into Sudan and South Sudan. At that time, within the context of the general management of inter-tribal boundaries, crises tended to erupt whenever one of the Arab descendants known as Mahdist Hurm made attempts to apply some sections of their cultural land rights to lay claim of a particular land in a territory where the use of land overlapped between the Arabs and the Black Dinka ethnic groups. D. Johnson explains this thus:
"The principle of tribal lands in the northern Sudan was embodied in the tribal *dar* ('homeland' or territory). A tribal *dar* represented a common resource and entitled the group, through its leaders, to manage the resources of that territory for their own benefit, to exclude others from either its seasonal use or permanent settlement, or to grant others temporary access. Where use of the same territory overlapped between an Arab group applying *dar* rights and a non-Arab group where *dar* rights did not hold—as, for instance, between the Reizegat Arabs of Darfur and the Malwal Dinka of Bahr el-Ghazal [...]." Ibid., p. 4-5.
One can understand that exclusion or exclusionist strategies which may lead to the politics of xenophobia, as the work of D. Kohnert indicates, can invoke conflicts and it is often about resources or its distribution. For more about mass murders and assassinations between the Ngok and the Misseriya Arabs while fighting for ownership in the grazing areas, see ibid., p. 1-19.

961   See Sharkey, Heather J.: "Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race", in: *African Affairs*, 107/412, 2008, p. 21-43 (25). As a result of *ta'rib*'s imposition in Sudan, it is concluded that the spread of Islam forms part and parcel of the Arabization policy which the Southern Sudanese rejected and converting to Christianity is used as a way of resisting a regime that trumpets Islamic religion.

962   See ibid., p. 21-23.

official policy that sought to propagate Arabic quickly throughout a territory where scores of languages were spoken.[963]

Consequently, the imposition of one language, in this case Arabic, by the ruling elite on peoples of other ethnic origins led to conflicts because certain people were excluded. According to H. Sharkey, the reason why the imposition and propagation of a particular language spoken by one particular ethnic group in a multi-ethnic and linguistic society may evoke conflicts is thus:

> Far from spreading Arabness, Arabization policy sharpened non-Arab and, in some cases, self-consciously 'African' (implying culturally pluralist) identities. Arabization policy accompanied, in some quarters, the growth of an ideology of Arab cultural and racial supremacy that is now most evident in Darfur.[964]

Furthermore, it is highlighted in her work that the introduction and the imposition of the Arabization policy reinforced the will of many Northern Sudanese to become Arabs.[965] However, as observed further, the policy provoked hostility and resistance on the part of the Southern Sudanese with devastating consequences, as the following demonstrates: "at the same time, the policy of ta'rib has contributed to Sudan's woeful history of civil strife, in Southern Sudan from the 1950s and more recently, from 2003, in Darfur."[966] In the long run, the consequences of such an undertaking by the Northern elites in a place like Sudan is that many non-Arab Southern Sudanese perceive Northern Sudanese Arab elites as outsiders, enemies, colonizers and usurpers.[967] This is concurrent with the politics of xenophobia described in the work of D. Kohnert, as indicated earlier.

Another country where the elites may be responsible for the outbreak of conflicts and wars, with respect to the construction and politicization of ethnicity, is Côte d'Ivoire. In Côte d'Ivoire, the construction of a North-South dichotomy was witnessed just as in the case of Sudan described above. As in the other countries previously mentioned, the elites were involved in framing the importance of ethnic identity in a charged political atmosphere. To a large extent, the work of M. Collett highlights how political elites construct, capitalize and

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963   Ibid., p. 21.
964   Ibid. Despite the motivation geared up by the elites through the introduction of *ta'rib*, the Arabization policy, the following is noted:
"For the 'Arabs' at least, they are not completely sure of what and who they are. In Sudan, they are 'Arabs', but in the Arab world they are seen as mongrels who hardly deserve that name. They desperately strive for recognition of their 'Arab' status by other Arabs, who tend to look down on them—even using for them the dreaded name of *abd* (slave) that they use for those more black than they are." Ibid.
965   See ibid.
966   Ibid.
967   See ibid., p. 42.

manipulate the North-South dichotomy through long-standing differences of group identification in the country to gain access to political and economic resources.[968] She gives an account of the reason why ethnic identity manipulation is significant in politics thus:

> [...] the meaning of ethnic identity was transformed as social and economic grievances led to conflict between political groupings. This approach accords individual Ivoirians more responsibility for determining the boundaries of ethnic and nationalist exclusion, and for participating in the ensuing violent conflict.[969]

The construction of ethnic division in Côte d'Ivoire, which the terminology known as *Ivorite* denotes, is used to determine who to include or exclude in the country's political space. The term *Ivorite* is what D. Kohnert describes as the elites exclusionist political strategy to exclude others in political elections, thereby, marginalizing them politically and economically.[970]

On these grounds, it can be argued that the instrumentalist approach and the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity as well as the elites' involvement in the construction of identity which, in most cases, leads to the outbreak of conflicts, shows evidence of the politicization of ethnicity. This underlines the argument that ethnicity, as a phenomenon, does not lead to conflict unless politicized. Furthermore, the instrumentalist method is reinforced by the argument that the elites resort to and instrumentalize existing differences among diverse ethnic groups within a geographical political space, producing conflicts in order to fulfill their personal ambitions. In as far as there are long-standing differences among ethnic groups based on language, religion, culture etc., which may serve as instruments of manipulation for ethnic entrepreneurs and indicate primordial ties, then primordialism, as an approach to ethnicity, cannot be dismissed in its entirety. At the same time, the theory of identity and difference is highlighted in the analysis with regard to the approach—who with whom against whom—an expression of who belongs and can be included or who is perceived as a stranger and must be excluded.

Finally, in this section, it has become evident that it is not the elites' general activities while striving for resources and power, as has been argued in some cases, which lead directly to conflicts. Rather it is when the elites politicize ethnicity such as in the case of former Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, as already indicated earlier on, that conflicts erupt. Therefore, how actors

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968   See Collett, Moya, 2006, op. cit., p. 613-629.
969   Ibid., p. 613.
970   See Kohnert, Dirk, 2005, op. cit., p. 176. The German version reads: "Ob Ivoirité oder Togolité, nationale Exklusionsstrategien als Mittel der Politik finden willfährige Nachahmer überall, in Afrika und anderswo." Ibid., p. 176.

fuel conflicts on the basis of ethnicity and how conflicts, with respect to the aforementioned countries, turned out to become full blown civil wars, will further be closely examined in subsequent sections.

4.7 The Genesis of Conflicts: Religious Antagonism as an Important Factor

It is important to note that this section will, with respect to the roles religion plays in multi-religious and multi-ethnic countries, focus solely on a Christian-Muslim divide. The analysis will examine whether religion is the source of conflicts or if certain actors and ethnic entrepreneurs use religion as an instrument to generate conflicts whenever they mobilize their respective followers to stir up religious sentiments while these leaders pursue political or economic objectives.

Religion, as a social phenomenon, plays significant roles in many contemporary societies and, as many authors believe, it is a very important mobilizing factor in creating either political or social tensions in many parts of the world in modern times. Therefore, it is necessary to determine what religion means and how it may be conceived by many people to the extent that it commands followership of sheer magnitude, its effects extending to certain forms of violence and becoming, in some cases, the source of genocidal attacks, leading to thousands of human deaths.

Karl Marx, in his criticism of religion, questions the rationale behind religion as he argues that religion is created by man and not vice versa.[971] He conceives religion thus:

> Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man—state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification.[972]

With respect to this conception of religion according to Karl Marx, it can be argued that human societies may not be able to avoid being religious and the roles assigned to religion both in past times and contemporary period are significant.

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971   Karl Marx defines and criticizes religion in one of his works written between December 1843 and January 1884 and published in the German and French (Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher) Year book 7 and 8 in Paris. It can be viewed on the following homepage: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm [13/02/2013].

972   Ibid.

That is why many conflicts with religious connotations are referred to as religious conflicts. When one proceeds to examine further expressions of Karl Marx on the subject matter, a link between religion and conflict is feasible, as the following shows:

> It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.[973]

By this, one sees that there is a struggle in religious activities, but it remains unclear whether the aforementioned struggle is akin to violence. Nonetheless, "protest against real suffering" as indicated above may be linked to a violent struggle which may take place within a person, an individual, or between one person and another. However, it can be deduced that human beings may be suppressed or pursued because of their religious beliefs and, equally, it is the same religion which consoles the suppressed people of their sufferings. Therefore, one can argue that certain people may not be able to relinquish religion in as much it is the only thing that gives them comfort during times of trials.

In the study carried out by M. Balkanlioğlu on the correlation between religion and violence in societies and whether religion is the cause of conflicts, he emphasizes that:

> […] neither religion nor the role of religion has disappeared as predicted. Furthermore, it has been influencing not only the minds of individuals but shapes the social, political, economic, etc. structures in the world including violence, as well.[974]

Arguably, there is a connection between violence and religion in the sense that religion may produce conflicts. This is by no means to claim that conflicts occur only because of religious clashes since, according to M. Ross, "it is difficult to conceive of a human community where there is no conflict among the members or between persons in the community and outsiders."[975] However, the author maintains that the degree to which violence is experienced physically in conflict

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973   Ibid.
974   Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet: "Does Religion Bring More Conflict Than Peace? A Survey of Americans' Attitudes Toward Religion and Conflict", in: *International Journal of Human Sciences*, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2012, p. 712-724 (714).
975   Ross, H. Marc, 1986, op. cit., p. 427.

situations varies from one society to the other,[976] yet in M. Balkanlioğlu's view there is a linkage between religion and conflict.[977]

With respect to religion as a variable in conflict situations, M. Ross's study on the role psycho-cultural inclination plays in a society shows that the aggregate level of conflict in a society is implanted deeply during early learning experiences, a process that becomes important for the creation of images in the form of self and others.[978] Arguably, this process, as a result, determines the level of conflict generally in a society.

However, despite the fact that psycho-cultural tendency may instigate conflicts, it does not identify specifically whom one is engaged in an argument or contest with or determine whom one fights with:

> But if psychocultural dispositions lead to a propensity to engage in open conflict, they do not determine very precisely who argues, contests, and fights with whom. Here the structural features of the social, economic, and political system determine the people with whom one cooperates and with whom one fights, meaning whether they are within one's society, in another society, or both.[979]

Going forward by accepting the variable *religion* as a psycho-cultural element which is significant during one's learning experiences may imply that religious conflicts occur because religion teaches one to be engaged in conflict. In this sense, examining the contents of M. Ross's argument implies that religion is interlinked with the social, economic and political system of a particular people and, as a result, determines with whom to cooperate with or whom to fight against. Therefore, it becomes a deciding factor in identifying who is a friend and who is an enemy. That is why M. Balkanlioğlu states that "as a result, religion is the reflection of society and it is [a] very effective phenomenon for every society."[980] This implies that religion, being an effective phenomenon, can be used as an instrument in a society for positive or negative aims.

A similar argument is presented by S. Huntington, who predicts that the source of future conflicts among human kind will either be economical, cultural, or political. In his work entitled *The Clash of Civilizations*, he purports that the source of future conflicts, both on internal and international scenes, will be cultural, that is, propelled partly by contradictory religious civilizations. S. Huntington claims this by saying:

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976   See ibid., p. 428.
977   See Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 714.
978   See Ross, H. Marc, 1986, op. cit., p. 428.
979   Ibid.
980   Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 714.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflicts in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural […]. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world.[981]

In addition, he points out different certain civilizations which may be the source of these future conflicts whenever interactions take place between them: "These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization."[982]

Although his emphasis on civilizations is not centered on religion *per se*, but rather on culture, his religious connotations in defining cultures cannot be overlooked as the line of demarcation between the aforementioned cultural civilizations and religion appears to be blurred. A similar position is presented by A. Tusicisny who criticizes and finds S. Huntington's understanding of civilization as a concept questionable:

He lacks a clear definition of civilization. He does not explain how and why different cultural factors (especially religion, ethnicity, and language) form a civilization, nor why there are exactly nine major civilizations. Why is there a fault line between the Western and Orthodox civilizations and not between Catholics and Protestants?[983]

It may be difficult to conceptualize the notion of civilization using S. Huntington's parameters as there are numerous criteria involved which are as ambiguous as the number of civilizations itself. Irrespective of that, A. Tusicisny opines that the predominant criterion in S. Huntington's work appears to be religion.[984]

For instance, Islam, Hinduism and Slavic-Orthodox tradition can be understood from a religious point of view whereas Western, Latin American, Japanese and Confucian civilization may be perceived as both ideologies and ways of life. Concerning African civilization, one may see this within the framework of African traditional religious views which may at the same time be perceived in terms of the latter's influence on an African way of life. Yet, how far an African civilization is to be embedded in a traditional African view is questionable and requires further research. So, if religion constitutes the object of civili-

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981   Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 22.
982   Ibid., p. 25.
983   Tusicisny, Andrej, 2004, op. cit., p. 487. It is important to view the conceptualization of civilization by S. Huntington:
       "A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people." Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 24.
984   See Tusicisny, Andrej, 2004, op. cit., p. 488.

zations within the context of this study, it is important to observe the following in S. Huntington's work:

> […] differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. […] The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations.[985]

These differences can be observed in the ways people view the relationships between God and man, the individual and the group, citizen and the state, and between parents and children as well as husband and wife. The same differences are discernible in the distinguishing manner in which the importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy are conceptualized and understood.[986] Still on the same line of analysis, the next section will attempt to highlight cases of violence involving the use of religion.

4.7.1 Religions and Religious Interactions in Conflicts

The relationships and interactions among many religions, especially Christianity and Islam, historically and currently in many countries are of an antagonistic nature, but it is by no means to say that all countries experience religious conflicts. Nevertheless, if one examines the current violent crises in many regions of the world and applies S. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, using religion as a yardstick, then it becomes doubtful if one may nullify his assumption in view of the violence resulting from religious contradictions in many countries through which thousands of lives are lost daily.

Nonetheless, it may be difficult to paint the contemporary wars against Islamic terrorism being carried out in Afghanistan and elsewhere by the United States of America and its allies as religious conflicts irrespective of the fact that these wars are waged based on binary religious oppositions, as the following statement illustrates:

> Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following Al-Qaeda's attacks against the USA in 2001 seem to correspond with the suggested vision of insuperable civilizational cleavage. The theory was given wide media coverage, and the possibility of the clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations was discussed by world leaders.[987]

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985   Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 25.
986   See ibid.
987   Tusicisny, Andrej, 2004, op. cit., p. 485.

Classifying such wars as ones induced by Western and Islamic civilizations reveals that other factors are more significant in the clashes than just the mere occurrence of interactions between contradictory values based on Western and Islamic worldviews. It is evident in S. Huntington's thesis that his *Clash of Civilizations* can be viewed from two angles, from micro and macro perspectives:

> The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote particular political and religious values.[988]

One can see from the two perspectives presented above that the wars on terror cannot only be viewed and analyzed as religious confrontations, as there are other factors encapsulated therein such as the struggle for and control of power and resources as well as the imposition of one's own values on others. This means that these wars and confrontations can occur among groups within a state and between nations on the international scenes.

Interestingly, J. Haynes shows in his study that the significance of religion in conflicts cannot be underestimated.[989] He further observes that religion is a major source of identity for millions of people in the world and it is believed that in recent decades religious hatred and differences are responsible for previous and current conflicts in developing countries.[990] From his point of view, contrary to the opinion of many authors, there is a link between religious faiths and violence or conflicts:

> Although religious believers would normally regard their chosen religious expressions as both benevolent and inspiring, religious faiths are sometimes linked to violence and conflict both between and within religious groups (or at least entities with a religious veneer, for example, various armed groups around the world, such as al-Qaeda, which claim religious justification for their activities).[991]

That is why S. Huntington opines that "as people define their identity in […] religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion."[992]

The issue of identity in religiosity is a very crucial factor in most conflicts that are referred to as religious based ones. P. Korner et al. believe that religion

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988   Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 29.
989   See Haynes, Jeffrey: "Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia", in: *Common Wealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009, p. 52-75 (52).
990   See ibid., p. 52.
991   Ibid., p. 52-53.
992   Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 29.

contains particular aspects with respect to conflict, one of which can be linked to the kind of bloody confrontations between Christians and Muslims in Europe and the Middle East or between Hindus and Muslims in India that have occurred for centuries. As a result, they argue that religion can be linked to wars and violence.[993] The reason why members of different religious faiths antagonize each other is because every religion, whether Islam, Christianity or Judaism, claims supremacy over all other religions. On this basis, every religion claims exclusivity and, therefore, considers itself superior to all other religions. J. Haynes cites instances of where religious supremacy and intolerance may become problematic:

> Examples include the 'religions of the book'—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—because each faith claims authority that emanates principally from sacred texts, actually, similar texts. Such exclusivist truth claims can be a serious challenge to religious toleration and diversity, essential to our co-existence in a globalised world, and make conflict more likely.[994]

One can see that matters concerning the struggle for recognition, control of resources and power are the contested avenues which may instigate different religious faiths and groups to be engaged in violent confrontations and conflicts. From a similar point of view, it is doubtful if mere differences in religious faiths and affiliations can lead to conflicts and if politics, which is frequently about power and resources, cannot be seen as the cause of the antagonism and enmity often described as religious conflicts.

At this juncture, it remains questionable to assert that religious conflicts erupt as a result of attempts by the West to spread democratic values and liberal policies globally in order to retain its military power and foster its economic interests, perceived by other nations, most especially Muslim countries, as an aggressive imposition of religious and ideological principles on them and their values. Such an assumption would represent S. Huntington's views when he states that "differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues,

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993   See Körner, Peter et al.: "Kriegsursache oder Friedensressource? Religion in afrikanischen Gewaltkonflikten", in: *German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)*, No. 2, 2009, p. 1-8 (1). Translated, this means: "Cause of War or Instrument of Peace? Religion in African Violent Conflicts". The German version reads:
      "Religion hat in Bezug auf Konflikt grundsätzlich hat einen ambivalenten Charakter: Wie blutige Konfrontationen zwischen Christen und Muslimen in Europa und dem Nahen Osten oder zwischen Hindus und Muslimen auf dem indischen Subkontinent, zum Teil seit Jahrhunderten, zeigen, wird Religion […] mit Krieg und Gewalt in Verbindung gebracht." Ibid, p. 1.
994   Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 54.

ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment."[995]

The assertion that religious beliefs may influence the worldview of one's policy, political inclination and shape one's identity is by no means to regard the alleged propagation of economical and ideological interests of the West as a revival of conflict along the faultlines between Western and Islamic civilizations,[996] dating back almost about 1,300 years, as the reason for the periodical resurgence of the contemporary conflicts within nations and between nations.[997] On the contrary, J. Haynes stresses that religion plays an important role in the struggle between proponents of democracy and liberal economic values and anti-liberal policies. He opines that while the "Christian" West embraces and believes in widening liberal democratic principles, the Islamic countries or the Muslim World, especially the "Arab East", tend to form movements against liberal democratic norms.[998]

Representing a different position, E. Said is of the view that "labels like Islam and the West mislead and confuse the mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality."[999] In his criticism, he laments how a line can just be drawn arbitrarily between the forces of good and evil or separate good from bad when referring to Islam and Christianity, positions which cannot be explicitly demarcated in an interconnected and globalizing world:

> A unilateral decision made to draw lines in the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate terrorism and, in […] nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely, doesn't make the supposed entities any easier to see; rather, it speaks to how much simpler it is to make bellicose statements for the purpose of mobilizing collective passions than to reflect, examine, sort out what it is we are dealing with in reality, the interconnectedness of innumerable lives, "ours" as well as "theirs".[1000]

Some of the reasons at the root of the tension believed to be religious conflicts may be a matter of susceptibilities and suspicion based on the fear of being dominated as observed by J. Haynes:

> Religious leaders may try to make use of the following susceptibilities. First, domination strategies of identity politics may seek to harness real or perceived 'ethnic-cultural' and 'cultural-

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995   Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 29.
996   See Holenstein, Anne-Marie: "Role and Significance of Religion and Spirituality in Development Co-Operation, A Reflection and Working Paper", in: *Published by Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation*, 2005, p. 1-38 (12).
997   See Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 31.
998   Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 55. The same view is also stated in the work of S. Huntington. Read Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 32.
999   Said, W. Edward, 2001, op. cit., p. 11-13 (12).
1000   Ibid., p. 13.

religious' differences. Second, misused religious motivation can inform terrorist activities, including that associated with al-Qaeda.[1001]

With respect to the abuse of religion and its use as an instrument of violence, A.-M. Holenstein discusses the power of interests that are predominant in religious conflicts, an argument that indicates the manipulation of religion for certain purposes:

> Power interests of any color make use of these susceptibilities:
>
> – Ethnic-cultural and cultural-religious differences can easily be harnessed for the domination strategies of identity politics.
>
> – Misused religious motivation is experiencing a renaissance in current terrorist activities.
>
> – Leaders of fundamentalist movements lay claim to a single and absolutist religious interpretation at the cost of all others, and they link their interpretation to political power objectives.[1002]

Most prominent in many works on tension and violent unrests between religions are the ones written on binary opposition, which depicts the relationship between Christians and Muslims, Western and Arab nations as conflictual. What is most crucial in some of these works is that Islam is characterized as a violent religion, devoid of tolerance and acceptance of other religions. Such remarks are made in the works of authors like S. Huntington, J. Haynes and M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos.[1003]

In a similar manner, J. Harnischfeger explains that Islam and "the introduction of Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims over territory in which the will of Muslims reigns supreme."[1004] Arguing from this perspective means that "from Asia to Africa, conversions are now a burning topic, and too often their analysis hardly avoids confusion between the use of terrorist violence, "internal" jihad, and the expansion of Islam."[1005] There is no evidence whatsoever as yet to support any current expansion of Islam in the world or describing Islam as a "religious terror", which is akin to describing Islam as a religion of violence despite certain questionable activities carried out by some Muslim extremists in

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1001   Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 53-54.
1002   Holenstein, Anne-Marie, 2005, op. cit., p.11.
1003   See Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine: "Conversion to Islam and Modernity in Nigeria: A View from the Underworld", in: *Africa Today*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2008, p. 71-87. See also Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 22-49. See Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 53-75.
1004   Harnischfeger, Johannes: "Sharia and the Control over Territory: Conflicts between 'Settlers' and 'Indigenes' in Nigeria", in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 103, No. 412, 2004, p. 431-452 (431).
1005   See Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 72.

the name of Islam. This perception of the Islamic religion induces M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos to raise specific questions on the subject matter:

> So what do we mean by an expansion of Islam? Are we talking about the form—a spatial and demographic development through globalization, the Internet, Muslim diaspora(s), and international migrations? Or are we talking about the substance—the radicalization and the politicization of a religion?[1006]

In continuation of his argument on Islamophobic tendencies, M. Balkanlioğlu points out that it is wrong, if not irrelevant, to identify Abrahamic religions with violence and equate them with terror.[1007] The author maintains that it is not allowed to kill innocent people in God's name according to both Islamic and Christian religious teachings.[1008]

One can see that religious resurgence, as a significant security threats to nations and the international community, is not specific and restricted to only one religion, Islam. As the revival of Islam is ongoing, so is the reawakening of Christian evangelical and protestant churches globally, especially in the USA and on the African continent.[1009] Accordingly, J. Haynes argues that religious revival and its associated conflicts are not only restricted to Islam:

> Currently, in many countries, religion seems to be an important source of basic value orientations; and this may have social and/or political connotations. But does this amount to a global religious 'resurgence'? The 'resurgence' is said to be manifested by a global revival of religious ideas and movements, not confined to one faith nor a discrete set of countries.[1010]

An instance of religious extremism is the attack allegedly carried out by a Norwegian in 2011 against Muslims, claiming many lives. A crime committed by a Christian against Muslims and a terrorist attack, which is classified as an act of religious fundamentalism, is rarely labeled as terrorism or treated as such.[1011]

1006   See Ibid., p. 72.
1007   See Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 716. Examples of Abrahamic religions are what J. Haynes describes as religions of the book, namely: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. See Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 54.
1008   See Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 716-717.
1009   See Read Haynes, Jeffrey: "Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century: Conflict or Co-operation?", Review Article, in: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2006, p. 535-541 (536). See also Marshall, Ruth: "Power in the Name of Jesus", in: *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 18, No. 52, 1991, p. 21-37. The transformation and spread of Christianity on the African continent is also acknowledged in: Bediako, Kwame: "African and Christianity on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: The Religious Dimension", in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 395, 2000, p. 303-323.
1010   See Haynes, Jeffrey, 2006, op. cit., p. 538.
1011   New York Times reports a case of religious fundamentalism in Norway involving a Norwegian right wing extremist killing about 77 Muslims in July 2011 with the argument that he is trying to keep Norway safe from Islamic colonization: "Mr. Breivik has said that the killings were committed in self-defense to combat what he has called the 'Islamic coloniza-

Clashes of different religious faiths are not only prevalent between followers of Islam and Christianity, but similar conflicts are experienced among other religions as well. M. Nussbaum discusses and depicts the clashes between Hindus and Muslims in India on a number of cases, which resulted in thousands of deaths:

> In the days that followed, wave upon wave of violence swept through the state. The attackers were Hindus, many of them highly politicized, shouting Hindu-right slogans, such as 'Jai Sri Ram' (a religious invocation wrenched from its original devotional and peaceful meaning) and 'Jai Sri Hanuman' (a monkey god portrayed by the right as aggressive), along with 'Kill, Destroy!', 'Slaughter!' There is copious evidence that the violent retaliation was planned by Hindu extremist organizations before the precipitating event. No one was spared: young children were burned along with their families. Particularly striking was the number of women who were raped, mutilated, in some cases tortured with large metal objects, and then set on fire. Over the course of several weeks, approximately 2000 Muslims were killed. Approximately one-half of the dead were women. Children were killed with their parents; fetuses were ripped from the bellies of pregnant women to be tossed into the fire.[1012]

In view of the violence and killings of these Muslims, M. Nussbaum reports that the police officers at the national, state and the local communities were given orders not to get involved or intervene in order to stop the killings. As the report indicates, religious hatred was orchestrated by politicians and, in this case, by a chief Minister who was re-elected on an Islamophobic platform.[1013] So, without being specific to any single religious faith, religion in general, as M. Juergensmeyer argues in his work, is in one way or the other connected to violence:

> Religion seems to be connected with violence virtually everywhere. […] religious violence has erupted among right-wing Christians in the United States, angry Muslims in South Asia, and indigenous religious communities in Africa and Indonesia. Like the Activities of Osama Bin Laden, the individuals involved in these activities have also relied on religion to provide political identities and give license to vengeful ideologies.[1014]

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tion' of Europe." An updated report from 24 August 2012, is accessible on the following homepage: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/anders_behring_breivik/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Breivik&st=cse [20/02/2013].

1012 Nussbaum, C. Martha: "The Clash Within: Democracy and the Hindu Right", in: *Journal of Human Development*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008, p. 357-375 (358). A. Appadurai gives his own insight about the religious crisis between the two dominant religious faiths in India, Hinduism and Islam, and how this contributes to the tension and cross-border conflicts between India and Pakistan. In this sense, one may perceive India, on the one hand, as a country where Hinduism dominates and, on the other hand, Pakistan as an Islamic nation. Read more in Appadurai, Arjun: *Fear of Small Numbers, An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, Duke University Press, Durham/London 2006, p. 92-113.

1013 See Nussbaum, C. Martha, 2008, op. cit., p. 358.

1014 Juergensmeyer, Mark: *Terror in the Mind of God, The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, University of California Press, Berkeley et al. 2000, p. xi (Preface).

With regard to this, M. Basedau et al. show in their study that "religious overtones in armed conflict do not necessarily depend on religious politicization. Rather, elites must convince believers to engage in specific behavior."[1015] That is why contemporary conflicts which are classified as having religious significance are identified as a part of a culture of violence because there are indications of religious myths to instigate some fundamentalist believers to kill and maim people as well as destroy their property.[1016]

However, it is important to note that such incidences, despite their religious connotation and coloration, are not representative of religious violence *per se*. Reflecting on crime committed for religious motives and the conceptualization of religion by A. Altinordu, then, the reason for the outbreaks of religious violence cannot solely be explained on perceived religious differences. The rationale behind these atrocities can only be explained from the perspective of politicized ethnicity:

> While religion is always already embedded in political relations, the specific way religion comes into play in politics may change over time, often with crucial implications for the society in question. […] For lack of a better term, I will call this process "the politicization of religion."[1017]

The author, having tested the importance of religion in conflicts and the link between religion and conflicts in numerous instances where religion is believed to be the reason for the destruction of lives and properties, he concludes that:

> […] religion may be related in complex ways to various other sources and types of intergroup hostility and violence, including economic competition, political conflict (both national and international), and wars.[1018]

The above presents further evidence to buttress the argument that what may be referred to as religious motivated violence and conflicts occur in association with many other factors aside from the religious connotation given to it. With regard to whether religion, as a factor, plays an essential role in a conflict, M. Basedau et al. admit that "sometimes religion may count more, in other circumstances it may count less."[1019]

1015   See Basedau, Matthias et al.: "Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa", in: *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23, 2011, p. 752-779 (755).

1016   Da Silva, Anthony: "Book Review: 'Terror in the Mind of God'", in: *Theological Studies*, Vol. 61, Issue 4, 2000, p. 779-780 (779).

1017   Altinordu, Ates: "The Politicization of Religion: Political Catholicism and Political Islam in Comparative Perspective", in: *Politics and Society*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2010, p. 517-551 (519).

1018   Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 721-722.

1019   Basedau, Matthias et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 754.

Nevertheless, contrary to the link between religion and conflict or religious hatred and differences, which are major issues observable within the framework of the current studies on conflicts, authors such as M. Basedau et al., A.-M. Holenstein and J. Haynes consider religion a positive and significant institution in any society as they believe that religion can also be used as an agent of conflict resolution and peace-building.[1020]

Furthermore, it is evident that many instances cited on religious clashes and hatred in various analyses are either centered on Muslims as victims of violence or Islam as a religion of violence, thereby, linking Islam to violent conflicts. As a result, it almost seems as if one is being steered to ask questions about the Islamic religion and the tenets of its teachings which could make some observers view the role of Islam in a negative light. More on this will be examined further in the following section.

4.7.2 Significance of Religion and Religious Conflicts on the African Continent

The African continent is not an island standing on its own but an important region in the world where religion plays a significant role in the political, social and economic dimensions of daily life. Examining the different traditions of religions, be it Christianity, Islam or African traditional religions, K. Amanor notes that religion is an essential fact of life on the continent.[1021]

Most of the countries in Sub-Sahara Africa are historically home to a number of African traditional religions. In view of this historical background on religion in Africa, the question arises why and how there are often reported cases of religious violence and clashes, involving Muslims and Christians in several countries in contemporary Africa. What happened to the traditional African religions? An attempt to answer to this question requires certain historical facts because the deterioration of the significance of African traditional religions in the current African affairs dates back to the colonial period.

In order to avoid any renewed analysis on colonialism, it is important to mention one of the reasons why African traditional religions suffer setbacks, to the point of irrelevance, in contemporary Africa:

1020   See ibid., p. 754. See also Holenstein, Anne-Marie, 2005, op. cit., p.10. Read Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 52-75.
1021   See Amanor, J.D. Kwabena: "Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches in Ghana and the African Culture: Confrontation or Compromise?", in: *Journal of Pentecostal Theology*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2009, p. 123-140.

> Colonialism as an historical epoch set in motion various fundamental changes in Nigeria [and in many other African countries], not least the de-legitimation of traditional religions, thereafter castigated as 'paganism', and the rapid implantation of Christianity. These developments have led to the evolution of political strains and conflicts between Nigerian proponents of the two rival universal religions that the Middle East has offered to the world.[1022]

As the author suggests, the attack on indigenous religions is made possible because part of the colonial strategy, within the context of the "civilizing mission", was to eliminate the ways of life of Africans who did not conform to Christian values. Practices and symbols of the traditional religions, involving the worshipping of idols and deities, were removed from their sacred sites with the argument that they were demonic.

That these so-called devilish sculptures of the gods resurfaced in European museums is not the argument, but rather "so active was the attack on indigenous beliefs and ceremonies that in a few decades most practitioners could no longer publicly admit their adhesion to the religion of their ancestors."[1023] Currently, the situation of African traditional religious worshippers, commonly denigrated as pagans, is no different. As K. Amanor observes, there are many forms of Charismatic and Pentecostal churches presently in Africa with many of them in confrontation with the proponents and promoters of African culture.[1024] This current trend is witnessed in many African countries, with Ghana used as a representative example of here:

> Pentecostal Churches in Ghana have had a long-standing confrontation with promoters of the African culture. This confrontation has intensified since the 1970s when the latter, more radical 'charismatic' derivative emerged on the Christian scene. The antagonism has mainly been due to the formers' demonization of the African cultural heritage and the latter's veneration of that heritage.[1025]

As pointed out further, the demonization and rejection of African traditional religions by the Pentecostals persist because of the perceived animistic rituals

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1022   Ibrahim, Jibrin: "Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria", in: *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1991, p. 115-139 (116).

1023   Ibid., p. 116. This is by no means to neglect the conflicts that ensued between the missionaries and colonialists with particular set of African traditional religious worshippers who perceived the advent of Christianity as a threat to the existence and survival of African traditional religions. For example, in Ghana, a number of religious clashes were reported between the Christian missionaries and the local people with many lives lost since the advent of Christianity. See Amanor, J.D. Kwabena, 2009, op. cit., p. 130-131.

1024   In the work of K. Amanor, Charismatic and Pentecostal churches are described as follows: "Churches described as Pentecostal or Charismatic now defy any rigid categorization since a whole range of churches, which emphasize the continuous reality of the power and manifestations of the Holy Spirit in church life qualify to be described as Pentecostal or Charismatic." Ibid., p. 124.

1025   Ibid., p. 126.

associated with the African culture, practices that stand in opposition to the born again Christian principles of a total break from the past that the Pentecostals encourage.[1026] In a similar manner, religious conflicts are witnessed on the African continent based on the alleged traditional religions' penetration and Africanization of both Christianity and Islam.[1027]

According to findings, part of the challenges to the existence and survival of African religions are the aggressive approaches of certain Islamic and Christian fundamentalist movements in a number of African countries which aim at reducing the significance of the traditional religions to the barest minimum, if not outrightly expunge them from the continent. K. Amanor asserts the following on the subject matter: "The conflict has mainly involved Africans who are against what, in their view, constitutes an attempt by Christianity [and Islam] to supplant the African traditional faith."[1028] Along the same line of argument, M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos notes the challenges faced by the expansion of Islam and Christianity in some African countries thus:

> In Africa South of the Sahara, at least, we have no scientific measurement of the progression of Islam. For instance, there is no reliable data to confirm that the number of Muslims is growing faster than the whole population. Even if the Sahel records some of the highest fertility rates in the world, we see that Christianity, especially Pentecostalism, is also expanding in regions where it directly confronts Islam-the Nigerian Middle Belt, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Centrafrique, and Southern Sudan. Despite significant differences, the preaching activities of born-again Christians reveal similarities with Muslim fundamentalists. […] Paradoxically, Islam in the Sahel is now perceived by many Africans as a tool of repression when compared to Christianity, which was the oppressor's religion during the European colonization.[1029]

The concern about Islam, as shown above, focuses on the experience of forced Islamization witnessed in countries such as South Sudan (formerly the southern region of the Republic of Sudan) where many followers of traditional African religions converted to Christianity in order to maintain their identity against Muslim intruders.[1030]

In addition, it is pertinent to state that the aforesaid conversion to Christianity is not only dependent on forced Islamization, but also due to discontentment of the people with the old traditional religions and also because of the incentives like the provision of education and humanitarian assistance offered by Christian churches.[1031] This is not to claim that the number of Muslims is on the decrease

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1026   See ibid., p. 130.
1027   Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 73.
1028   Amanor, J.D. Kwabena, 2009, op. cit., p. 124.
1029   Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 73.
1030   See ibid.
1031   See ibid.

in present day Africa, but the rate at which the percentage of Christians is grow-
ing is much higher. The following statement gives more insight on the current
Christian-Muslim expansion in Africa:

> Today, postcolonial Africa is altogether different. Since independence, space is getting stabi-
> lized. The proportion of Muslims has risen in countries like Senegal, Mali, or Burkina Faso,
> but the percentage of Christians is growing in Southern Sudan, Central Nigeria, the Republic of
> Benin, Kenya, and Botswana. As the reservoir of traditional religions followers is becoming
> smaller, nothing proves that conversion to Islam continues so quickly.[1032]

From another point of view, it can be argued that the expansion of both Chris-
tianity and Islam on the African continent is responsible for the decline of tradi-
tional religions as both of these religions, Christianity and Islam, recruit new
members either by force, persuasion, or through conviction.

It is important to note that Christianity and Islam are in competition in sub-
Saharan Africa to the extent that clashes occur in several parts of the continent
between adherents of both religions. It is uncertain why these religious faiths,
which may be perceived as alien to the continent, could become so powerful
that people are ready to kill or be killed because of their allegiance to either of
them. One major reason that religion is a powerful tool which can instigate peo-
ple to carry out actions, even if violently, against the perceived "Other", the un-
believers, is stated by M. Verkuyten and J. Thijs in the following manner:

> Religious belief is not so much about personal preferences or social conventions, but rather
> about convictions. It is concerned with the moral good and divine truth that is difficult to re-
> concile with moral and epistemic diversity. The observant believer believes that he or she is
> right and will find it difficult to have positive feelings toward nonbelievers who implicitly
> challenge his or her religious life.[1033]

Therefore, one can argue that religious belief, as experienced often in Islam and
Christianity, may invoke intolerance against the so-called animists or pagans
and against followers of other religions different from one's own religious faith.
As a consequence, Muslims may not tolerate Christians and vice versa, as ad-
herents of both religions also do not tolerate African religions. In this regard, the
role of religion for each individual is a matter of identification which may have
consequences for anyone who is perceived as an outsider.

The analysis of A. Essien acknowledges that "in the name of religion the
most ignominious acts that are against Human Rights has [sic] been perpe-

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1032   Ibid., p. 73-74.
1033   Verkuyten, Maykel/Thijs, Jochem: "Religious Group Relations among Christians, Muslims
        and Nonreligious Early Adolescents in the Netherlands", in: *Journal of Early Adolescence*,
        Vol. 30, No. 1, 2010, p. 27-49 (31).

trated."[1034] So identity is a very important factor when referring to religious conflicts because religion, as a phenomenon and a social construct, allows the identification of who belongs and who does not.[1035] As evident in the work of D. Agbiboa, the so-called religious conflicts may not be religiously induced:

> Conflicts motivated by religious identity have the reputation of being among the most intractable, given the often absolutist views to which they are tied. While adherence to belief systems can help to develop a sense of belonging and purpose, it can easily lead to intolerance, discrimination, and violent actions. Yet "religious conflicts" need not be about religion or religious conversion, and indeed usually have nonreligious causes.[1036]

Apart from the issue of identity as a factor in religiously induced conflicts, M. Basedau et al. identify a link between religion and conflict, a position that can be considered only under the purview of the mobilization thesis which the authors propose: "Certain religious structures such as parallel ethnic and religious identities or changing religious demographics are prone to mobilization in politics; once politicized, violent conflict becomes likelier."[1037] According to this, there is a link established between politics and religion, and the politicization of religion as the causes of religiously motivated violence. Otherwise, it would be difficult to grasp why lives are lost in the name of religion, properties destroyed, human rights violated and crimes against humanity committed. On this note, specific examples of religious crises where crimes are committed and human rights violated will be discussed next.

4.7.3 Religious Crises: Shedding of Blood, Killings and Terrorism in God's Name

Many countries in different parts of the world periodically experience one form of violence or another. As observed by M. Ross, "it is difficult to conceive of a human community where there is no conflict among the members or between persons in the community and outsiders."[1038] However, it is inconceivable to describe killings, terrorism and genocide as religious acts, especially when the te-

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1034   Essien, A. Anthonia: "Proliferation of Churches: A Leeway to Commercialization of Religion", in: *European Journal of Scientific Research*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2010, p. 642-650 (644).

1035   See Agbiboa, E. Daniel: "Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria", in: *Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2013, p. 3-30 (8).

1036   Ibid., p. 9.

1037   Basedau, Matthias et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 753.

1038   Ross, H. Marc, 1986, op. cit., p. 427.

nets of all religions are supposedly the proclamation and teachings of love, peace, good neighborliness and kindness.[1039]

That is why, with respect to all religion, any part of religious teachings preaching violence and mandating people to maim, kill and destroy human lives in the name of religion is highly dubious. M. Juergensmeyer cites many instances of religious motivated violent acts in his work:

> The French, for example, have dealt with subway bombs planted by Algerian Islamic activists, the British with exploding trucks and buses ignited by Irish Catholic nationalists, and the Japanese with nerve gas placed in Tokyo subways by members of a Hindu-Buddhist sect. In India, residents of Delhi have experienced car bombings by both Sikh and Kashmir separatists, in Sri Lanka whole sections of the city of Colombo have been destroyed both by Tamils and by Sinhalese militants, Egyptians have been forced to live with militant Islamic attacks in coffeehouses and riverboats, Algerians have lost entire villages to savage attacks perpetrated allegedly by supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front, and Israelis and Palestinians have confronted the deadly deeds of both Jewish and Muslim extremists.[1040]

He further emphasizes that these attacks are motivated by religion.[1041] It is uncertain if there is a part in any religion which preaches violence, especially when it involves killings, loss of lives and destruction of properties belonging to people who worship other religions.

For clarification purposes, it is important at this junction to examine certain aspects of the so-called universal religions, with specific reference to matters concerning crimes and atrocities committed in the name of God. In as far as this research is concerned, as indicated in the introductory part of this section, the observation will be limited only to Christianity and Islam because they represent the major universal religions and are chosen to be scrutinized in line with the holy books, the Bible and Quran, and, therein, references to violent acts which may claim human lives.

On this note, according to the Old Testament in the Bible, in Exodus 20:13: "You shall not murder".[1042] A similar message is found in the New Testament, in Matthew 5:21: "'Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgement'."[1043]

1039   See Xavier, N.S.: *The Two Faces of Religion: A Psychiatrist's View*, Theological Publications, St. Peter's Seminary, Bangalore 1989, p. vii.
1040   Juergensmeyer, Mark, 2000, op. cit., p. 4.
1041   See ibid., p. 4.
1042   Exodus, chapter 20:13, accessible in *The Holy Bible, New International Version, Containing the Old Testament and the New Testament*, International Bible Society, Bangkok et al. 1973, 1978, 1984, p. 67.
1043   Matthew, chapter 5:21, ibid, p. 838.

As to Islam, the content of the Quran is not different from that of the Bible, in terms of the unlawful killings and violent actions against people perceived as non-believers. This is illustrated as follows:

> [H]e who kills a soul unless it be (in legal punishment) for murder or for causing disorder and corruption on the earth will be as if he had killed all humankind; he who saves a life will be as if he had saved the lives of all humankind.[1044]

Therefore, it is debatable why people are still being killed or are ready to kill/die in the name of religion since it is explicitly stated in the passages of both the so-called holy books that it is not permissible to kill in God's name. Having underscored the religious commandments on the subject matter, one raises the question if there are other reasons why religious killings happen despite the fact that these are not allowed according to the tenets of Islam and Christianity.

Religious violence may occur for other reasons and the perpetrators may have other intentions that are totally different from what the holy books stipulate as guidelines for their adherents. Otherwise, it is as yet inexplicable why certain people are killed because of their religious faiths since most contemporary societies are multi-religious. In all modern societies, it is difficult for a particular religion, out of a number of religions in co-existence, to become dominant.

Similarly, R. Brock assumes that any society which displays a multi-religious setting in the public sphere fulfils a necessary condition for the practice of a fully free exercise of democracy: "Allowing greater presence of religions in the public sphere is one way to break the deadlock between the secular left and the religious right."[1045] Conversely, a societal setting for religious freedom, a democratic country, for instance, may not necessary mean a peaceful environment if A. Altinordu's assertion is considered:

1044   Part 6, Sûrah 5:32 from the Quran by Ünal, Ali: *The QUR'ĀN with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English*, The Light, New Jersey 2008, p. 241. However, there are a lot of passages in the Quran which one can perceive as not only militant but also supporting violence, especially against Christians and unbelievers. This can be seen in the Quran such as Sûrah 8: 59-60 with the following statement:
"59. And let not those who disbelieve ever think that they can outdo the believers, or otherwise escape Our punishment. They can never frustrate Our will. 60. And in (Believers:) make ready against them whatever you can of force and horses assigned (for war), that thereby you may dismay the enemies of God and your enemies and others beside them, of whom (and the nature of whose enmity) you be unaware." Ibid., p. 379.

1045   Brock, N. Rita: "The Fiction of Church and State Separation: A Proposal for Greater Freedom of Religion", in: *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 70, No. 4, 2002, p. 855-861 (858).

> Constitutions that allow a broad scope of religious freedom, governments sympathetic toward a religious presence in the public realm, or significant overlaps between the goals of religious and state actors create a favorable political environment for religious revivals.[1046]

Accordingly, it is understandable that any multi-religious society can pose a challenge for a politically organized environment if different political actors belong to various religions with distinctive values which may be incompatible from one religion to the other. In this situation, religious revivals may reinvigorate rivalry:

> Religious revivals also build the cultural and organizational capacity required for successful politicization. They bolster religious collective identity, gradually transforming it from a diffuse identity that may become relevant in selective occasions to a more coherent and salient one that has the potential to become the basis for collective action.[1047]
>
> [As a consequence, in terms of violence, religious] revivals [may] further lead to a significant increase in the social influence of religious authorities, who thus acquire the ability to mobilize the religious community.[1048]

Despite the rivalry and potential for violence of a religious revival in a multi-religious society, the situation may not advance to the extent that it produces this magnitude of violence, killings and terrorism which may result in hundreds if not thousands of deaths. Nevertheless, it can be argued that any platform for religious revival with "an effective organizational basis is a significant source from which the cadres of the religious party will be drawn and is crucial for effective voter mobilization."[1049]

Furthermore, since religion is strongly linked to identity, any religious revival can reconstitute the influence of religious authority which may enable religious actors to use the existing cultural and organizational capacity at their disposal to politicize religion.[1050] On this note, one can argue that without a religious revival it is impossible to create a major party on a religious platform. Therefore, in any given political society where religious revivals resurface and where a major party, associated with a particular religion, gains prominence, this may threaten the existence and survival of secularism and the interests and identities of religious minorities. This implies that any relative significance of religion in politics can lead to the politicization of religion, a development which may have adverse effects on the peace and stability of that society:

> Social groups and political actors informed by culturally entrenched discourses against the given religious movement interpret religious revivals as threats to their identities and interests.

1046   Altinordu, Ates, 2010, op. cit., p. 522.
1047   Ibid.
1048   Ibid.
1049   Ibid., p. 523.
1050   See ibid., p. 523.

> For these groups, the increasing public presence of religious symbols and practices is a sign of the rising social influence of religious authorities and the ascendance of the social groups associated with the revival. If these threatened constituencies control a considerable degree of social and political power, the result is extensive social counter-mobilization and state repression.[1051]

Therefore, it becomes evident that conflicts may erupt in the name of religion in a religiously/politically charged environment, although the actual reason for the eruption of unrests may be due to existing rivalry among actors/individuals while in pursuit of political power and resources. In J. Haynes' research about what leads to religious conflicts, or if religion is ever to be perceived as the reason for the outbreaks of armed conflicts, he comes up with the following findings:

> For example, a group with a belief that their religion is inherently superior to all others would regard others with different religious beliefs as essentially inferior. If such a group believed that it was going to be the victim of attack from another group, they would most likely seek to defend themselves. Fearing physical attack, the group may act preemptively to prevent the feared attack, thus threatening the other side.[1052]

Based on this, it is not yet clear if one can advance the argument that religion causes conflicts. At the same time, the roles of religion in a society remain questionable, especially, when religion is linked to violence and if "understanding the role of religion in the present also requires revisiting the past—considering, for instance, the resonances of the words 'crusade' and 'mission'."[1053]

With regard to phenomena like crusades and missions, there are specific connotations to them which may be associated with acts of violence. The reason for that is not far-fetched, for instance, Nigeria, Fiji, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, UK and India and Pakistan on a state level are some Commonwealth countries in which world religious faiths are represented, but which are confronted with religious tensions and conflicts traceable to issues concerning ethnicity, culture, class, power and wealth.[1054] It is also important to note that some of the aforementioned countries define themselves either as secular, Christian or Muslim states.[1055]

Revisiting terminologies such as 'crusade' and 'mission' when referring to these religions may mean from the onset that these religions aim to outstrip or

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1051   Ibid., p. 523.
1052   Read Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 57.
1053   Barringer, A. Terry: "'Editorial: Not Peace but a Sword?': Religion, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Commonwealth and Beyond", in: *Round-Table-London-Commonwealth Quarterly*, No. 382, 2005, p. 521-524 (522).
1054   See ibid., p. 522.
1055   See ibid., p. 522.

eliminate each other when it comes to gaining relevance and power in countries where they are all represented. Arguably, on this basis, the reason for the eruption of so-called religious clashes is interconnected with factors such as ethnicity, power, resources etc.

As A. Essien expounds, "in the history of humanity, religion has been experienced as one of the easy and ready tools that can be manipulated for diversified intentions and purposes."[1056] In addition to the manipulative factor, he also acknowledges that "in various ways, religion has been used as a tool for politicization and violence. [Thus] it has been a very common experience to politicize religion."[1057]

However, M. Basedau et al. show in their findings, with regard to the question whether there is a probability of religious diversity resulting in armed conflicts, that no link can be established between the existence of religious pluralism and violent conflicts.[1058] Nonetheless, one may disregard the authors' view that religion is not the sole factor for the outbreaks of conflicts, but instead, that the combination of "diverse religious identities, similar to ethnic and other social identities, form a group identity and can result in escalating inter-group dynamics"[1059] and increase the potential for violence. The argument can be further strengthened in the sense that religious identities are linked to a particular religious ideology with specific shared values and norms which are perceived as legitimized by a transcendental power or supernatural being and, thereby, non-negotiable and uncompromising.[1060]

Moreover, M. Basedau et al. assert that any world view about religious identity and ideology offers a possibility for violent actions by religious actors or even extremists:

> […] religious extremists may demand that non-believers and adherents to different religious traditions have to be converted by force, and heretics may have to be punished. Conflicts over the role of religion in society or the state are likely to emerge between different religious groups, especially if the religion in question claims universal validity.[1061]

In view of the above, whenever religion is politicized, the risk of instigating the outbreaks of conflicts is high and such conflicts may be misconceived as religiously motivated, even when the actual reasons for the crisis may be socio-eco-

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1056   Essien, A. Anthonia, 2010, op. cit., p. 643.
1057   Ibid., p. 643.
1058   See Basedau, Matthias et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 754-755.
1059   See ibid., p. 754.
1060   See ibid., p. 754.
1061   Ibid.

nomic and political in nature.[1062] That is why R. Marshall opines that religion serves as a flexible instrument in the struggle for the control of power in national politics:

> It is true that presenting national politics in terms of religious conflict may be a powerful avenue of mobilization for the community, as can be seen from the tendency to view relations of domination and subordination in terms of spiritual warfare.[1063]

That being said, if a state practices democracy, a condition where the state authorities and religious bodies are expected to exist as two separate entities, the question arises why and how religion may be so significant that it often results in violent clashes and bloody conflicts during religious interaction. For instance, it is not yet understandable why a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country like Nigeria is a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).[1064] It may also be debatable if the country's membership in this religious body is understood as the politicization of religion with dramatic consequences such as ethnic and religious clashes the way D. Agbiboa discusses below:

> Individually and (or) collectively, the disparate and often warring ethno-religious groups in Nigeria subscribe to a model of conduct that elevates ethnicity and religion over and above the broader interests of the nation. Time and again, post-independence efforts at nation building have been stifled by Nigeria's complex ethno-religious configuration. Today, as during the colonial era, the search for a true national identity in Nigeria remains elusive. In fact, the only time when Nigerians share a sense of national identity is when the national football team—fondly known as the "Super Eagles"—is having a match.[1065]

Conflicts described as religious clashes are so pervasive and devastating for the country that A. Essien indicates: "In Nigeria, political violence has been given

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1062   See ibid.

1063   Marshall, Ruth, 1991, op. cit., p. 35.

1064   Nigeria experiences religious conflicts to the point that such conflicts are now to be perceived as protracted conflicts. As observed above in the text, one may not understand why Nigeria, a multi-religious country, is registered as a member of an organization in which only countries which describe themselves as Islamic States become members. As E. Osaghae believes, the issue of religion is politicized in Nigeria and as a matter of fact the country is dichotomized into "us" and "others", in terms of Muslim-Christian division, which has escalated since the membership of Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). As a result, Christians view the absorption of the country into the OIC as an attempt to transform the country into an Islamic state. It is also shown that Nigeria became a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference at a time when the ruling elites (during the Babangida military regime) of the country were Muslims and belonged to the Hausa-Fulani Muslim ethnic group, the dominant and the largest ethnic group in northern Nigeria. See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 225-227. Also see Marshall, Ruth, 1991, op. cit., p. 35.

1065   Agbiboa, E. Daniel, 2013, op. cit., p. 4.

religious overtone and countless lives have been destroyed."[1066] In this regard, it becomes apparent that these conflicts are not about religion *per se*, but rather about politics. Religion, in such a context, refers to a prism by which adherents of different religious faiths perceive and interact with one another.[1067]

In D. Agbiboa's argument, it is acknowledged that "by creating its sets of values, meanings, structures, and worldviews, religion significantly defines how people perceive themselves and others."[1068] Therefore, in view of the contestation and struggle for power in a country like Nigeria, this can have serious consequences:

> In a deeply religious country like Nigeria, religion is undeniably at the core of social interaction. To be sure, the role of religion as a legitimizer of power has serious implications for a pluralist country like Nigeria. This derives from the views of the dominant religious groups in the country who see God as the source and summit of power.[1069]

This may be the reason why Nigeria, as mentioned above, is confronted by religious crises since it still struggles with developing a unified national identity where religious compromise, with respect to nation building, is yet to be reached. It is doubtful if peace and stability can be achieved in multi-religious countries where canons of human rights are based on religious norms. In this sense, A.-M. Holenstein believes that:

> Advocates of universal human rights claim, however, that human rights can never be validated exclusively on religious grounds but rather that their universality is derived directly from the value and dignity of every single person.[1070]

On account of this, A.-M. Holenstein is able to differentiate between a secular order and secularization processes. In her view, a secular order of a state predetermines a non-religious society.[1071] That may imply that it enables religious pluralism to coexist in one state, which means religion is strictly separated from the state. However, such separation of powers is not recognized in the political theology of the Islamic *Umma*.[1072]

From the above, it follows that a potential controversy and incompatibility of ideas between adherents of diverse religions can arise in a multi-religious democratic set-up where the mode of separation of power between states and religion is practiced and a human rights canon is based on religion. Issues con-

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1066   Essien, A. Anthonia, 2010, op. cit., p. 643.
1067   See Agbiboa, E. Daniel, 2013, op. cit., p. 20.
1068   Ibid.
1069   Ibid.
1070   Holenstein, Anne-Marie, 2005, op. cit., p. 15.
1071   See ibid., p. 13.
1072   See ibid., p. 13.

cerning ideas about gender relations may be controversial between Muslims and Christians, for instance, gender issues, with reference to the principles guiding the roles of women and men in relationships, family, politics, socially etc., may become problematic as Islam and Christianity have different understanding and answers to gender questions.[1073]

If a country is almost evenly divided demographically between Christians and Muslims in a religiously pluralistic society and religion is given a top priority, as the determinant of the principles guiding its understanding of human rights, then there is a potential for the outbreak of conflicts in as far as this involves the control of political power and resources:

> Religion and religiously shaped communities tend to fence themselves off against the outside and to make a distinction between their followers as believers, converted and chosen people, and those outside as unbelievers. On the inside they produce differentiating symbolism as well, for example between priesthood and laity, men and women etc. These distinctions can influence conceptions about different levels of human dignity and human rights conferred on or denied to individuals and groups.[1074]

However, it is important to make clear that, irrespective of the role religion may play in a society, regimes and governments as well as authorities in all countries are obliged to protect human rights:

> Peace, freedom, justice, solidarity, human dignity and the guarantee of human rights are the highest value concepts that are [to be] found [everywhere] without exception. However, whether these are consistently based on a worldly, secular view or on an explicitly religious-transcendent one, they all share the opinion that the "rightness" of, for example, human rights or solidarity as ultimate reasons for our action cannot be judged objectively.[1075]

As a result, one can argue that conflict may erupt in a pluralist country where religion plays the role of a power legitimizer and where the political power is highly contested between Muslims and Christians. D. Agbiboa foresees the consequences a situation like that may have for a country such as Nigeria:

> To be sure, the role of religion as a legitimizer of power has serious implications for a pluralist country like Nigeria. This derives from the views of the dominant religious groups in the country who see God as the source and summit of power. This perception of power leads to the contestation for political leadership along religious lines.[1076]

By this, the fear of being dominated becomes the order of the day as one religion attempts to outstrip the other in the contestation for recognition which,

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1073   See ibid., p. 19. Muslims perceive a model of separation of state and religion as a secular order norm which is centered on Western Christian values. See ibid., p. 13.
1074   Ibid., p. 15.
1075   Ibid., p. 18.
1076   Agbiboa, E. Daniel, 2013, op. cit., p. 20.

hitherto, implies the accessibility of political power and resources. D. Agbiboa shows that religion is so entrenched in almost all aspects of life in the country that its significance in contemporary Nigeria cannot be separated from the power of the state:

> The inseparable link between religion and social life creates deep suspicion when it is perceived that one religious group is dominating the political affairs of the country. Members of different religious groups want their religion to dominate the affairs of the country. The struggle for ascendancy and control puts Christianity and Islam at dagger-drawn opposition—one that has colored the history of Nigeria since independence.[1077]

It is debatable whether secularism, which is inherent in democracy, and Western democracies have a common cultural heritage[1078] because their fundamental principles can be contested against and rejected by Muslims and adherents of other religions in a multi-religious society as long as they perceive that Christian values are embedded and enshrined in democratic norms. The rejection of the so-called Christian Democracy, with respect to secularism, is at the root of the contemporary conflicts in many African countries. Apart from Nigeria, M. Basedau et al. account for Muslim-Christian conflicts in many other African countries like Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia as well as in Sudan, where Sudanese ethnic differences often result simultaneously in a Christian-Muslim divide.[1079]

B. Møller's argument against the assumption of Muslim-Christian divide as the reason for the eruption of conflicts, reveals that religion was once used during colonialism by the colonized to fight and repel the colonialists in a number of former colonies, but that the roots of the conflicts in most of the contemporary African countries are not about religion *per se*, rather than other factors:

> Whereas religion played a role in the struggle against colonialism in Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania, since independence religion is only found to have been the decisive factor in the conflict in Sudan, whereas seemingly religious conflicts in other of the region's states really been about something else, either nationalism or politics pure and simple. Even in Sudan, the North-South conflict contains a number of other elements than religion, e.g. a struggle over resources, against marginalization and for democracy and political rights, while the conflict in Darfur has virtually nothing to do with religion, pitting two groups of Muslims against each other.[1080]

What is most significant in the above is that religion is manipulated in order to attain other goals, than falsifying the notion that religious conflicts in Africa, which are based on a Muslim-Christian divide, represent a clash of civilizations

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1077   Ibid., p. 21.
1078   Holenstein, Anne-Marie, 2005, op. cit., p. 13.
1079   See Basedau, Matthias et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 756.
1080   Møller, Bjørn: "Religion and Conflict in Africa: With a Special Focus on East Africa", in: *Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report*, 2006 (6), p. 1-140 (6-7).

as reflected in the work of S. Huntington.[1081] However, it is not conceivable why clashes take place between Islam and Christianity in Africa in as much as both religions are imported and, therefore, alien to the continent. For more clarification of religious conflicts on African soil, the following section will provide further analysis.

4.7.4 Proxy Religious Conflicts in Africa

The advent of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa is associated with the arrival of European Christian missionaries and colonialism, whereby the origin of Islam on the continent can be traced back to the encounters with the Arabs centuries ago.[1082]

However, contrary to the perception of many authors that Africa is devoid of any history of existing religion until the arrival of Christianity, J. Ibrahim offers a different version of the historical background of African religiosity:

> Since African societies had developed deeply rooted cosmologies before the arrival of Islam and Christianity, the new religions did not find a tabula rasa. Hence the emergence of an often conflictual syncretism, because despite complementaries at the cultural level, the theological point of departure of the two universal religions is the rejection of polytheism.[1083]

As observed in this comment, leaders of both Islam and Christianity regularly denied and rejected any existence of African traditional religions since their arrival to the African continent despite the fact that these African religions constitute the basis or origin of African traditions. As indicated, the so-called religious conflicts emerged due to Islam's and Christianity's repudiation of African religious polytheism. In spite of that, in contemporary Africa, the practice of Christianity and Islam is co-opted into the African religious ways of life. Hereby, it is evident that there still exist many adherents of traditional African religions still exist on the continent, even among both Muslims and Christians:

> This dialectic is often resolved in real life by formal declarations of allegiance to Islam or Christianity to satisfy the new theology, while continuing to practice various ancestral rites to satisfy the old culture.[1084]

It is believed by B. Møller that it is the failure of the newly established religions, Christianity and Islam, to fulfill the spiritual and material needs of the Africans

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1081   See Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 22-49.
1082   See Møller, Bjørn, 2006, op. cit., p. 11.
1083   Ibrahim, Jibrin, 1991, op. cit., p. 120.
1084   Ibid., p. 120.

which prompted many Africans, despite their identification with one of the universal religions, to maintain the practicing of their ancestors' religions:

> Traditional religion is thus a factor to be reckoned with, both in times of peace and war. A possible explanation of its attraction in times of peace is that it has something significant to contribute to the lives of the African population, either by offering convincing explanations of what might otherwise seem opaque or of offering promising avenues for addressing problems, or indeed both.[1085]

From another perspective, if Islam and Christianity are foreign religions, then it becomes questionable that religious conflicts are persistent and pervasive in places like Nigeria, Somalia and Mali. In most cases, the occurrence of clashes between adherents of Islam and Christianity are not necessary about issues involving Africans, but rather about the constant clashes between the Western idea of secularism and democracy and Islam which, based on the Islam's incompatibility with and refusal of secularism and democracy, are on the increase. Otherwise, it becomes a difficult task to explain the rationale behind religious fundamentalism and terrorism which currently claim hundreds and thousands of lives in many parts of the world.

On the one hand, referring to religious fundamentalism and terrorism, M. Juergensmeyer is of the opinion that "terrorism has more frequently been associated with violence committed by disenfranchised groups deliberately attempting to gain a shred of power or influence."[1086] What is most important is the act of terrorism which often claims a lot of lives and the reason why terrorism is described as a political strategy which occurs through the use of violence by a particular group in order to achieve political goals.[1087] Therefore, on this basis, it may be argued that religious terrorism is the use of a covert violence to attain political aims.

On the other hand, M. Marty and S. Appleby describe religious fundamentalism as a new phenomenon of the 20th century and as a tendency based on a habit of mind discovered among religious communities and actively embodied in certain representative individuals and movements.[1088] In their view, it denotes a strategy or a set of strategies through which disappointed and vexed believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identities and distinguish themselves as a

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1085   Møller, Bjørn, 2006, op. cit., p. 15.
1086   Juergensmeyer, Mark, 2000, op. cit., p. 5.
1087   See ibid., 122.
1088   See Marty, E. Martin/Appleby, R. Scott: "Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Scandalous Code, Defiant Society", in: Marty, E. Martin/Appleby, R. Scott [Eds.]: *Fundamentalism and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education*, The Fundamentalism Project, Vol. 2, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London 1993, p. 1-19 (3).

group.[1089] This happens when "feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, these believers fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past."[1090] One can see religious motives in the following sense:

> These retrieved "fundamentals" are refined, modified and sanctioned in a spirit of pragmatism: they are to serve as a bulwark against the encroachment of outsiders who threaten to draw the believers into a syncretistic, areligious, or irreligious cultural milieu. […] Religious identity thus renewed becomes the exclusive and absolute basis for a re-created political and social order that is oriented to the future rather than the past. Selecting elements of tradition and modernity, fundamentals seek to remake the world in the service of a dual commitment to the unfolding eschatological drama (by retuning all things in the submission of to the divine) and to self-preservation (by neutralizing the threatening "other"). […] Boundaries are set, the enemy identified, converts sought, and institutions created and sustained in pursuit of a comprehensive reconstruction of society.[1091]

J. Peel agrees that fundamentalism in Africa is not only limited to a particular religion as it may encompass both Muslims and Christians. In addition, with respect to Islam, its members may range from lower-class groups to a more learned advocate group practising a rigorous and purified Islam.[1092] Regarding Christianity, he notes thus:

> As in Christianity 'fundamentalism' mostly means the wave of neo-Pentecostal or Charismatic churches and the so-called 'ministries' that have burgeoned since the early 1970s—colloquially known as 'born-agains'.[1093]

Revisiting the question of secularism, the behaviors of fundamentalists in a multi-religious society are confrontational, often times violent and intolerant of religious freedom, particularly in a country such as Nigeria, a country with a demography showing a society almost evenly divided between Christians and

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1089   See ibid., p. 3.
1090   Ibid.
1091   Ibid.
1092   See Peel, J.D.Y.: "Reviewed Article: The Politicization of Religion in Nigeria: Three Studies", in: Africa: *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1996, p. 607-611 (611).
1093   Ibid., p. 611. Also, R. Marshall describes what are referred to as born-again Christians and the origin of these churches thus:
         "The mass of believers see themselves as part of a unique, international movement whose identity and unity is aggressively promoted to those who are outside. The emergence in the late 1980s of organizations such as the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, which speaks nationally for all 'born-again' Christians and has rapidly become the most powerful voice in the Christian Association of Nigeria (an interdenominational organization representing the interests of the Christian population to the federal and state governments), and the organization of forums and conferences constitute attempts to institutionalize this sense of community." Marshall, Ruth, 1991, op. cit., p. 23.

Muslims,[1094] which indicates a suitable condition used by fundamentalists to target and neutralize the religious "other" including anyone perceived as antagonists/opponents or enemies.

Without making any distinction between moderate Muslims or Islamic fundamentalists, one may be quick to prejudge and conclude that the roots of religious conflicts in many parts of the world can only be associated with Islamism:

> [...] Islamism is first and foremost a violent political reaction to Muslim authoritarian regimes and their allies in the West: in this view, the use of religion as a protest movement is certainly an old phenomenon. Some authors even argue that Islam is deeply entrenched in politics.[1095]

If Islam is a religion of peace, then it is to be distinguished from Islamism which is associated with violence, otherwise Islam would be tantamount to fundamentalism. Another issue that is still unclear is if fundamentalism and Islamism lead to religious terrorism. Considering the following may give more insight on religious clashes in Africa, which may as well be perceived as proxy religious clashes:

> The same argument goes for Islamic reform movements when it comes to 'internal' conversion, the reassertion of belonging to an 'original' faith. On the one hand, fundamentalism is very conservative; on the other, it's an answer to the challenges of modernity. It all depends on how it's understood.[1096]

This finding about Islamic fundamentalism and its challenges when confronted with modernity shows that there is an antagonism between the conceptualization of Islamic ideas and the practice of secularism in as far as separation between religion and state, inherent in modern democracy, is purported to be a Western invention. Understanding religious conflicts in this sense enables readers to discern the so-called religious conflicts in Africa, with reference to the struggle between Christianity and Islam, revolving around political power and resources in the form of civilizational clashes. "Eventually, our impression that fundamentalism is expanding might be a result of the 'crystallization' of politics around religious issues."[1097]

In spite of the role politics plays in religious matters, M. Basedau et al. explain the eruption of violence based on religious identities as a result of changing religious demographics which are prone to mobilizational purposes for political activities.[1098] In this sense, the fear of being dominated by one religious

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1094   See Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op cit., p. 72.
1095   Ibid., p. 74.
1096   Ibid., p. 74.
1097   Ibid., p. 75.
1098   See Basedau, Matthias et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 753.

group or another during the struggle for the dominance of the political sphere may become a trigger for conflicts. Whether this fear can instigate religious fundamentalism is yet to be determined as this will be tested specifically on the current Nigerian religious tensions and terrorism in subsequent chapters. A common and crucial factor related to religious fundamentalism is the perception that they, fundamentalists, are under threat and "in such a context, fundamentalists' 'defense of religion' can develop into social or political offensives with domestic and/or international ramifications."[1099]

Despite the link between Christianity and fundamentalism, Islam is often the religion which is, as is generally perceived, more frequently manipulated by its adherents who use violence in the pursuit of certain goals. Often the reaction of some Muslims after a terrorist attack is carried out in the name of Islam is that Islam is described as a religion of peace. This is acknowledged in M. Juergensmeyer's analysis:

> Like all religions, Islam occasionally allows for force while stressing that the main spiritual goal is one of nonviolence and peace. The Qur'an contains a proscription very much like the biblical injunction "Thou shalt not kill." […] The very name Islam is cognate to *salam*, the word for peace, and like the Hebrew word *Shalom*, to which it is related, it implies a vision of social harmony and spiritual repose.[1100]

The author affirms further that "for this reason, Muslim activists have often reasserted their belief in Islamic nonviolence before defending their use of force."[1101]

On this note, J. Haynes distinguishes three forms of contemporary conflicts associated with religion, namely: religious terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and the contentious issues with regard to the *Clash of Civilizations*.[1102]

Contrary to J. Hayne's position, most problems linked to failed states, as experienced in certain parts of the world, most especially in developing countries, are responsible for religious terrorism. Nevertheless, the writer of this research thesis would argue that all the conflicts that erupt within a national state, with reference to the clashes of civilizations, religious terrorism and fundamentalism

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1099   Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 54.
1100   Juergensmeyer, Mark, 2000, op. cit., p. 79.
1101   Ibid., p. 79. M. Juergensmeyer opines that religion is used more often, though sometimes combined with other factors, as the primary motivation responsible for the incitement of terrorist acts. See ibid., p. 6.
1102   See Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 54. For more information on the analysis involving religious terrorism, see Juergensmeyer, Mark, 2000, op. cit. Also on religious fundamentalism, see Marty, E. Martin/Appleby, R. Scott [Eds.], 1993, op. cit. The third identified type of religious conflicts is focused on in *The Clash of Civilizations* by Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 22-49.

in a multi-religious society, are traceable to the failed state syndrome.[1103] When a failing or failed state perceives the potential for religious fundamentalism and it fails or is incapable of dealing with it, then religious fundamentalism may advance into religious terrorism. All things being equal, if religious terrorism cannot be nipped in the bud, it can be referred to as a struggle over the attainment of resources and political power, camouflaged under the banner of a *Clash of Civilizations*.

Such is the global debate on the current situation in many countries, as will be seen for the case of Nigeria (in chapter 5), regarding the ongoing dispute over the role of religion, a situation that raise questions on the legitimacy of the consensus over the practice of liberal democracy.[1104] Meanwhile, it is important to note that the dispute is not over the faultlines between the major world religions, rather about the separation between state and religion, known also as secularism.[1105] As J. Harnischfeger acknowledges, the conflicts surrounding the introduction of Sharia by some Muslims in Nigeria is a way to protest a perceived imposed Western democratic secularism:

> Despite their diversity, people have to see themselves as a political unit that deliberates on common issues and decides them on behalf of all its members. However, in religiously divided societies, the idea of an overarching democratic community fades, and its decisions lose legitimacy. How can the state ensure that Muslims, Christians and agnostics feel bound to majority decisions? An open debate and common decisions are only possible if political institutions are not framed by principles which derive from one of the rival religions, to the exclusion of others.[1106]

Therefore, in Nigeria, Christians perceive the introduction of Sharia as a threat inimical to the existence and survival of the nation. They believe that "Sharia

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1103   A failed state in the manner it is used in the text means governments which are unable to secure the lives and properties of their citizens. In addition, it can also mean a country which is on the brink of collapse without any indication that the government of such a country can stop or hinder the breakdown of law and order. However, it is important to note that there are many steps before the actual collapse or state failure of a country takes place. The government may be weak, which means it is not able to provide the basic infrastructure for its citizenry or the government may be vulnerable when its institutions are not well consolidated in order to repel attacks from adversaries. Eventually, a failing national government which passes through all these steps is conditioned to become a failed state. So, state collapse, which means failed state, is a long term degenerative affliction. Read more in Rotberg, I. Robert: *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford 2004.

1104   See Harnischfeger, Johannes: *Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria*, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York 2008, p. 19.

1105   See ibid., p. 19. Furthermore, "in Nigeria the debate about secularism has taken a similar turn. A growing number of Christians see the exclusion of religion from politics as a mistake […]." Ibid, p. 18.

1106   Ibid., p. 22.

politicians have broken a religious compromise that had held the multi-faith country together since independence."[1107]

According to the analysis and findings in this investigation, it becomes more evident that religion is a tool used by political or religious entrepreneurs to politicize ethnicity while in pursuits of economic, political or symbolic resources. Equally, it is made clearer that religion can be used as an instrument of mobilization in order to instigate conflicts. As a result, the role religion plays contemporarily in conflict situations, as the current Nigerian experience shows, will be examined from the beginning of the next chapter.

4.8 Conclusion of the Current Research on the Causes of Conflicts in Nigeria

The previous chapters dealt with the current research on the causes of the conflicts, using Nigeria as a case study to represent Africa. On the one hand, it is shown in the research that Nigeria was chosen due to its huge population, with over 250 ethnic groups, as it is the country with the largest number of population on the African continent, with one in every five or six Africans being a Nigerian. On the other hand, the investigation indicates that Nigeria is opted for as the empirical focus of this research for being a former colonial state with similar colonial experiences to other former African colonies and in view of the dynamic nature and different kinds of conflicts bedeviling this most populous African country. Thereby, it is observed that most of the conflicts experienced in different parts of Africa are identified and present in Nigeria, ranging from ethno-religious crises to unrests caused by issues regarding the distribution of resources emanating from the exploration and exploitation of natural resources like crude oil and gas.

Having examined the causes of conflicts in Africa, especially the source of the contemporary conflicts in Nigeria, using certain variables to conduct the investigation, it is found out that all the variables under consideration, as the possible causes of conflicts, are proven to be necessary factors, however, they are insufficient by themselves as the sole causes of contemporary conflicts in Nigeria. The variables used in carrying out the investigation are: colonialism, activities of multinational oil companies (MNOCs), the thesis of an oil curse, activities of political elites and religiosity.

1107   Ibid., p. 221.

Firstly, with respect to the experiences of colonialism, it is emphasized in the investigation that, irrespective of the fact that colonialism constitutes direct and overall domination of one country by another on the basis of state power being in the hands of a foreign power, colonialism, at the end of the inquiry, is by no means the main reason for the outbreaks of the contemporary conflicts in Nigeria. Therefore, colonialism, in view of its impacts through imperialism/neo-colonialism and its effects on the economic, political, cultural and psychological structures of Africa, does not provide an adequate explanation as the cause of the present conflicts challenging the country. Therefore, the experience of colonialism is found out to be necessary, but provides a condition insufficient as the source of the current conflicts.

Secondly, the study examined the activities of the multinational companies (MNCs) as the possible cause of conflicts. However, based on the analysis carried out on the subject matter, it is made clear that the activities of the MNCs, regarded as agents of neo-colonialism with the sole objective of exploiting the resources of developing countries to the advantage of the industrialized nations, may create tensions in the host countries where they are operational. In spite of the link between the host nations and the native countries of the MNCs as well as the use of the influence cultivated by these MNCs as instruments to enforce certain economic policies on the host countries which may trigger conflicts, it is revealed that conflicts cannot directly be linked to the activities of the MNCs. On this note, it is shown that MNCs are dragged into the existing conflicts in as much as MNCs' activities exacerbate armed conflicts. Devoid of any proof to ascertain that MNCs are directly responsible for conflicts, the argument provides insufficient conditions for the eruption of conflicts.

Thirdly, the resource curse thesis and rentier state hypothesis were tested as probable sources of conflicts on the African continent, specifically on Nigeria, however, there is no conclusive evidence at the end of the investigation to establish it either as the major cause of conflicts. Although, on the one hand, it is observed that the rentier state theory is responsible for economic inefficiency and, thereby, hinders socio-economic development, this situation does not directly lead to the outbreaks of conflicts. On the other hand, having discovered that the resource curse hypothesis, for instance oil rents, plays an essential role in the formation of patronage networks and widespread clientelism which are factors that obstruct the democratization process, it is also noted that rentier state theory is not primarily focused on violence. Similarly, the resource curse hypothesis cannot single-handedly explain violence without considering the impact of other non-resource-specific factors and the inherent dynamism of certain causal

mechanisms. As a result, the analysis finds that neither phenomena can be proven sufficiently as the causes of conflicts.

Furthermore, as a variable, the elites' activities are scrutinized with respect to the cause of conflicts, nonetheless, in spite of the evidence which describe the elites as Godfathers and untouchable strongmen/bigmen who orchestrate conflicts, it is illustrated that the activities of these "ogas", another word for the strongmen in the Nigerian context, can only be linked to the underdevelopment of the country. Furthermore, the study indicates that though the elites' established nepotism is based on clientelistic networks, nevertheless, there is no direct association between nepotism and conflict. Despite the allegations made against both the military officers and politicians in Nigeria, as being responsible for the looting of the country's resources and for the political situation, there is yet to be any clear explanation found linking violence or conflicts to the elites. In view of this, the elites, as a variable for the eruption of conflicts, cannot be sufficiently proven. That being said, it becomes evident in the work that it is not the elite's general activities which, while struggling for economic and political resources, lead directly to conflicts. Instead, in tandem with the position of this research, it is when these elites politicize ethnicity that conflicts occur.

Finally, in this study, religiosity was tested in order to verify if it is the reason for the outbreaks of conflicts in Nigeria, especially whenever certain actors/ethnic entrepreneurs deploy religion as an instrument to generate conflicts. Having examined the correlation between religion and violence, it is indicated that religion is not only limited to influencing the minds of individuals, but it also molds the social, economic, political and economic structures in the world, including violence. However, it is made clear that religion is created by man and not vice versa. Thereby, religion becomes a major source of identity for many people worldwide and it is the hatred and differences generated by religion that are responsible for the current unrest in developing countries. With respect to different religions, whether Christianity, Islam or Judaism, each religion claims supremacy over all other religions. The analysis proves that religious conflicts are not about religion *per se*, rather about politics. Therefore, religion on its own is insufficient as the source of conflicts without referring to other factors which enable the dichotomization of "us" versus "them", a situation that generates conflicts.

5. Introduction: The Dynamics of the Politicization of Ethnicity in Nigeria

This chapter will place the focus of its analysis on the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria. In order to carry out this task, the chapter is divided into different sections which will highlight on the problems of politicized ethnicity within the perspectives of ethnic formations in Nigeria, paying special attention to the three largest ethnic groups that constitute, numerically, the major ethnic groups in the country.

Further sections will pinpoint and elucidate certain elements such as religiosity, military intervention in politics and federal structures as factors of analysis which will reinforce the arguments that indicate conditions and processes that enable the politicization of ethnicity to occur within the context of Nigeria. However, first and foremost, before any investigation on the aforementioned factors of analysis is pursued, the beginning of this chapter will briefly indicate specific conflict situations that are associated with the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria. Thereafter, a general overview of the history of Nigeria will be presented so as to give the reader the background information about the origin of the country.

Reflecting on the hypothesis of this thesis within the framework of this chapter, which stipulates that ethnicity does not lead to conflict unless politicized, this study will carry out the analysis, reflecting consistently on the questions of this research which are as follows: On which basis does the politicization of ethnicity occur, who politicizes ethnicity, why and how is ethnicity politicized and what are the consequences of the politicization of ethnicity?

In order to respond to the questions stated above, the concluding sections of this chapter will concentrate mainly on two conflict zones through which actors that politicize ethnicity are identified. Herein, how and why these actors are involved in the politicization of ethnicity as well as the consequences of their actions will be investigated and explained.

The theoretical scope and setting used in this study, the instrumentalist approach of F. Barth and the method of identity and difference in ethnicity of G. Schlee, will henceforth be applied to and be reflected on in further analysis,

observation and investigation that will be carried out in subsequent sections. This implies that the intended inquiry into the contemporary conflicts in Nigeria will be carried out along the guiding principles of the theoretical framework applied in this research study.

The two major conflicts identified within the spectrum of this research analysis can be referred to as 1) identity-based conflict, and 2) resource-based conflict.[1108] These conflicts are not only identified as the major conflicts in Nigeria by the researcher, but they also correspond to the contents of the numerous interviews carried out in Nigeria in the course of this research. The results of the fieldwork in the form of recorded interviews in different places such as Kano, Abuja, Jos and Lagos as well as photographs of resource-related conflicts snapped at Warri will be used to support and buttress certain arguments and specific assumptions made during the course of the analysis within the context of this chapter.

Therefore, on the one hand, the main example of a so-called identity-based conflict in this study will be the recurrent outbreaks of ethno-religious crises in Jos, the capital of Plateau State. These identity-based conflicts, centered on ethnic and religious differences, may be perceived as protracted conflicts in Jos and its environs between the Hausa Fulani ethnic hegemony, who are predominantly Muslims, and the indigenous ethnic groups in Plateau State, on the other side, who are predominantly Christians. As will be shown in the course of the analysis, in view of the numerous works written on the Jos conflicts such as newspaper reports, scientific articles, and monographs as well as the interviews by the researcher,[1109] etc., the reason for the outbreak of conflicts in Jos is mainly a question of the ownership of Jos.

Contrary to the perspectives of many scholars and authors, who view the Jos conflicts and any kind of conflict of this nature as resource-based conflicts, the writer decides to refer to the Jos conflicts, irrespective of the resources at stake and the indisputable struggle over certain resources such as land or political positions, as ethno-religious crises, in order to differentiate them from the aforementioned second conflict, the resource-based conflicts, which will be ana-

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1108   On the one hand, identity based conflicts within the framework of this research are violent crises which are understood to be related to ethno-religious factors, for example, the Jos conflicts. On the other hand, resource-based conflicts are violent unrests that are principally fought between different actors involved in the acquisition of certain resources. An example of this is the Warri Crisis in the Niger Delta which involves different actors antagonizing one another, ranging from inter-ethnic conflicts to militant groups confronting the multinational oil companies operating in the region etc.

1109   These are the interviews conducted by the author of this research thesis during fieldwork.

lyzed based on a particular type of resource or resources directly at the center of contention. Therefore, the researcher of this work simultaneously argues against many writers, social scientists and authors who are proponents of the assumption that all conflicts must be about the struggle, contention and fight for resources.

The second type of conflict in Nigeria, on the other hand, as already indicated, is the above mentioned resource-based conflicts, which concentrates on and brings the Warri crises into the focus of this investigation. Warri, a very important city in Delta State and one of the major oil producing states in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria at large is also riddled by diverse conflicts with reasons for their eruptions ranging from the problem of ethnicity, environmental devastation through oil spills and gas flaring, economic marginalization of the region and the perceived unequal distribution of the oil and gas resources. These kinds of conflicts are referred to, for the purpose of this research work, as resource-based conflicts in order to emphasize the existence of crude oil and gas resources as important and significant natural resources in this region which enable the occurrence of other types of conflicts. In this sense, it will be made clear that all other factors contributing to the conflicts are centered on the oil and gas resources.

Nonetheless, it is pertinent to explain, describe and investigate the historical background of the Nigerian state before the analyses on the two conflict dimensions can be focused on, examined and analyzed. Hence, the beginning of this case study will first concentrate on the history of Nigeria and themes which directly or indirectly contribute to the contemporary conflicts that confront the country and, thereby, highlight topics such as the approximate number of ethnic groups that constitute Nigeria, the role of colonialism and military interventions in the political sphere, with regard to the crystallization of numerous ethnic groups into modern "Nigeria" and its political systems. In addition, the federal system of government, as practiced in the country, will be highlighted and examined in order to figure out how this factor contributes to the current conflicts in the country.

Thereafter, the Jos conflicts and Warri crises will be investigated so as to identify similarities and differences in both types of conflict. This will not only enable the readers and policy makers to understand the remote and immediate causes of the conflicts, but also allow insight into the challenges in order to fathom possible solutions to the confrontations and visualize the consequences these challenges pose or may pose for the existence and survival of Nigeria and towards sustaining peace and the security of the West African sub-region and

Africa in general. Questions such as the capacity of the Nigerian government in handling and dealing with any form of conflict, the effects of corruption and bad governance as well as the role of religion on the eruption of conflicts will be thematized. Furthermore, any feasible role or intervention of the United Nations in situations where the Nigerian government fails, is incapacitated, unwilling or unable to secure and protect the lives and properties of its citizens, will be raised and highlighted.

Having said all that, the next section will give a brief account of the current situation of Nigeria and indicate, with respect to comments and arguments by scholars and published by conflict NGOs that the problems of politicized ethnicity within the context of contemporary conflicts confronting the country, if not challenged, may lead to state failure. Thus, the next segment will show the importance of investigating the historical background of Nigeria in order to grasp the situation of the country.

5.1 Instances of the Current Instabilities in Nigeria

This section will make use of remarks made by writers and NGOs that Nigeria, in view of the recurrent ethno-religious and resource-related conflicts, does not fulfill the requirements of and, therefore, cannot be qualified as a nation. Some of the arguments put forward by numerous scholars such as historians and other social scientists indicate different perspectives which are already used to examine and analyze the conflict situations in the country.

Many works have been written by scholars on the history of Nigeria, its conflicts and the peculiarity of this African country among other African nations and other multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries around the world. Nigeria, because of its religious and ethnic diversity, experiences conflicts and violent crises, which are frequently perceived as ethno-religious conflicts. However, it is unclear to many observers if the factors that motivate or underline the outbreaks of the conflicts cannot be traced to other reasons, rather than using religious and ethnic explanations to justify the violence. Therefore, this section will focus on and examine the history of Nigeria, its demography and issues which may be directly or indirectly responsible for or influence the occurrence of violent crises and as well highlight factors associated with contemporary conflicts in the country.

C. Nzeh states that "since the existence of this nation Nigeria, it has not been easy to hold her as or call her a united nation for it does not pass the clas-

sical definition of a nation."[1110] With respect to that, it is important to uncover the reasons that hinder Nigeria from evolving as or into a nation if, as the afore-mentioned authors observe, it is perceived as a leader and a model for other African countries. Thus, the reports that reflect on the situation of the most populated African country do not emphasize its development as a nation, but rather highlight the increasing ethnic violence and religious conflicts, as the following stipulates:

> For a couple of weeks now, it has been a ding-dong affair between members of the Boko Haram, the Islamic sect that abhors western education and has made Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, a killing field, and members of the Joint Military Task Force, JTF, deployed by the federal government to quell the insurgency in this North Eastern state. Daily, the soldiers are being killed while the peace keepers in turn raid their hideouts, killing many of them. On Tuesday, July 19, as the peace keepers patrolled the town, a gang of men suddenly threw bombs at their van about 7.40 p.m.[1111]

Another report by the International Crisis Group on the situation in Nigeria shows that the country is not at peace:

> Attacks since December 2005, including a spate of oil worker kidnappings, have at times forced oil production shutdowns of up to 800,000 barrels per day, threatening Nigerian government plans to nearly double production to four million barrels a day by 2010. Only some of those production losses have been offset by recent offshore developments. Two companies with foreign shareholders signalled in August 2006 that they would be withdrawing from the Niger Delta due to security concerns. The most potent weapon in the militants' arsenal is the growing anger among the region's twenty million inhabitants. In more than seven years of civilian rule, functionaries at the local, state and federal levels are perceived to have failed to deliver tangible economic benefits for impoverished residents.[1112]

W. Morris-Halle's remarks on Nigeria depict the situation of the country in the following statement:

1110 Nzeh, C.O. Casimir: *From Clash to Dialogue of Religions: A Socio-Ethical Analysis of the Christian-Islamic Tension in a Pluralistic Nigeria*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al. 2002, p. 25.

1111 A report on one of the ongoing crises in Nigeria which was published by *Newswatch Magazine* on 28 July 2011, accessible on the 1 September 2011, under the title "The Boko Haram Killings", was written by I. Ibrahim. It is also important to note that Boko Haram was already declared by as a terrorist group in a report published by the *Vanguard* on 13 November 2013. This can be read under the title "US Declares Boko Haram as a Terror Group", a report accessible in the following homepage: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/11/us-declares-boko-haram-terror-group [07/02/2014].

1112 The citation is obtained from the report on the oil crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria by the *International Crisis Group, Africa Report, No .118,* published on the 28 September 2006, under the title "Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis", p. 1-34 (ii). The report is accessible on the following website: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/westafrica/nigeria/Fuelling%20the%20Niger%20Delta%20Crisis.ashx [10/04/2013.].

> Nigeria, Africa's colossus, is an enigma. What is it, and what does it want to be: a unified nation or a collection of autonomous, balkanized states? […] Since independence, Nigeria has been haunted by the belief of many political observers, in and outside the country, and by the events of which have occurred over the past […] years that perhaps Nigeria is a merely a geographical expression, a historical accident.[1113]

One can deduce from the remarks of W. Morris-Halle that there are problems and many unanswered questions about the condition of the country. Nigeria is the most populous African country and it is described by E. Osaghae as the "Giant and Hope of Africa"[1114] While W. Morris-Halle acknowledges that "Nigeria is a natural leader and role model for the rest of Africa, because of its size, its resources, and the talents of its people."[1115] It is, however, questionable if the country is playing its leading role on the African continent when one considers B. Umez's characterization of the country:

> Numerous scholars, political observers, and ordinary people have commented often with anger, frustration, and disappointment, on the current problems of development in Nigeria. It is now obvious that the Giant of Africa is on the verge of colossal failure. The nation (which once was the green pasture of its neighboring countries) is in great ruin. The people are currently living in a City of Destruction—a dying nation—and, as such, have generally given up hope.[1116]

As a result, irrespective of the number of writers and scholars who, for so long, have been dedicated and engaged in analyzing the challenges of the Nigerian state due to recurrent occurrences of killings, violations of human rights, discrimination, tribalism and alleged unjust socio-economic structures,[1117] it is doubtful if one can describe Nigeria as nation. This tempts M. Chukwuma to ask the following questions in his work:

> […] who are really Nigerians? Are they a people? Is Nigeria really a nation? Or is it only a name for a geographical entity? Is there anything homogeneous in the heterogeneous Nigeria? How heterogeneous or how homogeneous is Nigeria?[1118]

So, in view of the characteristics of what constitutes a nation, a description of Nigeria as a nation becomes doubtful. According to the analysis and clarification of the concept *ethnicity*, the mere existence of heterogeneous ethnic groups in a given society neither implies nor is equivalent to conflicts, rather the con-

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1113   Morris-Halle, Walter: *Conflict and Harmony in Multi-Ethnic Societies: An International Perspective*, Peter Lang, New York et al. 1996, p. 191.
1114   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. ix (Preface).
1115   Morris-Halle, Walter, op. cit., p. 199.
1116   See Umez, N. Bedford, 1999, op. cit., p. 1.
1117   See Nzeh, C.O. Casimir, 2002, op. cit., p. 21.
1118   Chukwuma, Michael: *Nigerian Politics and the Role of Religion: An Analysis of the Role of Religion in Nigerian Politics at the Early Stages of National Integration*, (Dissertation Bonn), Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn 1985, p. 19.

cept only depicts the existence of two or more ethnic groups in a particular society in which cultural, religious and linguistic etc. differences are emphasized. Therefore, the mere presence of numerous ethnic groups may not be responsible for the outbreak of conflicts in Nigeria and it is unsure and yet to be proven whether such a situation may induce or even condition conflicts of any kind.

Many authors use different approaches while searching for a solution to the problem of protracted conflicts existing in this African country, for example, works such as that by T. Falola view the source of contemporary conflicts in Nigeria from an historical perspective while B. Umez links it to the prevalent value system in the country. I. Sarafa believes a legitimacy crisis is confronting the country which, in the long run, will result in conflicts and W. Morris-Halle understands the recurrent crisis from the dimension of an artificially created country whose ethnic groups are culturally diverse.[1119] C. Nzeh and J. Harnischfeger discuss the challenges in Nigeria from a religious perspective and reiterate the incompatibility between advocates of secularism, on the one hand, in the form of separation of state and religion, and, on the other hand, adherents of strict Islamic laws, Sharia, who demand the practice of Islamic laws through which they wish to be governed.

In view of the recurring conflicts in Nigeria, the writer of this research thesis is of the opinion that all these different perspectives may contribute in one way or the other towards finding the reasons for the repeated outbreak of conflicts, but that none of these will prove to be adequate or sufficient in getting to the roots of the violent crises. The next section will shed more light on the history of the country.

5.2 The Historical Background of Nigeria

As announced in the previous sections, this part will be divided into different subsections that illustrate and analyze the historical background of Nigeria. Therein, the composition of the three largest ethnic groups in the country will be mentioned and investigated as a means to underscore the argument that ethnicity is not a constant phenomenon, but rather a continuous process in as far as ethnic groups, among themselves and in relation to other ethnic groups, draw and re-

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1119   Falola, Toyin: *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, Rochester University Press, Rochester 1998; Umez, N. Bedford, 1999, op. cit.; Ogundiya, S. Ilufoye, 2009, op. cit., p. 129-142; Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 191-218; Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit.; Nzeh, C.O. Casimir, 2002, op. cit.

draw their boundary lines based on specific conditions, interests and the perception of the so-called "Other". On this basis, the amalgamation of various ethnic groups into one country, Nigeria, under British colonial dispensation, will be explained and the consequences of this will be highlighted.

Modern Nigeria, a former British colony, attained its independence in 1960.[1120] The country is located in the western half of Africa, to the south of the Sahara desert.[1121] It is one of many former African colonies, however, it is by far the largest country in Africa in terms of population as it is currently estimated to have about 167 million inhabitants,[1122] with J. Herskovits noting that "one African in four is a Nigerian"[1123] and K. Meier stating that the huge population of Nigeria is a sufficient reason for the international media and Western governments not to ignore the country, otherwise, a deteriorating condition in Nigeria may have dire consequences:

> A veteran African correspondent, Karl Meier opens his book by noting that the international media and Western governments ignore Nigeria at their own peril. The tenth most populous country in the world, Nigeria is home to one in six Africans.[1124]

1120   See Falola, Toyin, 1998, op. cit., p. 2.
1121   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 37. The author further describes Nigeria thus: "She occupies an area of 923, 773 square kilometers bounded on the West by the Republic of Benin, and on the North by the Republic of Niger and Chad, while on the east by the Republic of Cameron. The southern end of Nigeria is watered by the Atlantic Ocean, on the North of the Gulf of Guinea." Ibid., p. 37.
1122   The exact population is a matter of controversy. According to a report published by the daily Newspaper *AllAfrica* on 26/10/2011, the United Nations (UN) is worried about the population growth of Nigeria which is shown as rising steadily: "At the current annual growth rate of 3 per cent, the United Nations projection is that in 20 years time Nigeria's population could reach a staggering 300 million from the present estimate of close to 160 million. In fact Nigeria is today rated among the fastest growing countries of the world." The report is electronically accessible with the title "Nigeria: The Population Time Bomb", and is retrievable under the following homepage: http://allafrica.com/stories/2011_10260753.html [cited on 10/04/2013]; A similar report is published on 27/10/2011 by a Nigerian daily newspaper known as *The Guardian* under the title "Nigeria's Population hits 167 million mark". One can see now that the Nigerian population figures differ in these two sources. W. Morris-Halle notes that "just how many there actually are has always been a matter of political controversy." Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 193.
1123   Herskovits, Jean: "Democracy in Nigeria", in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 2, 1979, p. 314-335 (314). A similar view about the size of the population of Nigeria can be read in the work of J. Krieger. See Krieger, Joel et al. [Eds.], 1993, op. cit., p. 639.
1124   Scott Pegg makes reference to the publication of Oxford Journal School of African Economies with respect to the review of the work "The House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria" by Karl Meier, *African Affairs*, Vol. 100, Issue 400, 2000, p. 506-507. It is accessible on the following website: http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/100/400/506.full.pdf+html [18/12/2012].

The country is pluralistic as it is religiously and ethnically diverse.[1125] Its population is heterogeneous because it is comprised of over 250 ethnic groups with over 400 different languages. Despite the fact that the number of ethnic groups cannot be specifically ascertained[1126], J. Nwankwo discusses the existence of pluralism in the country thus:

> Nigeria is pluralistic, not only in her ethnic composition which ethnology puts at well over 250, but also in linguistic diversity which is estimated as well over 400 linguistic groups. Taken as a nation, diversity does not elude Nigeria. A nation with three indigenous national languages, with English as the fourth could not be less linguistically pluralistic.[1127]

Similarly, it is a multi-religious country: "Religiously, Nigeria is pluralistic. She constitutes a struggling ground for such incompatible religions as Christianity, Islam and African traditional religions."[1128]

This is not to state that many other former colonial countries in sub-Saharan Africa do not exhibit ethnic and religious diversity in their population, "nevertheless Nigeria is worthy of special attention because of its size, its population and its other sources of economic and political power"[1129] and due to its contemporary ethno-religious and resource conflicts which pose serious challenges to the survival of the country.

It is neither the size of the Nigerian population nor the number of ethnic groups or the religious pluralism which trigger conflicts, but, as W. Morris-Halle puts it:

> [...] Nigeria's basic problem of political integration has been to create a nation out of its vast multiplicity of ethnic groups: to attain unity despite diversity. Hindering this task, however, is the failure of the country's leaders and its peoples to engender, within themselves, a sense of national identity and national unity.[1130]

A comparable remark is made by B. Umez about the difficulty of the Nigerian state: "That is, Nigeria is faced with the task of welding into a nation a variety of different people with different ethnic groupings and languages."[1131]

As already hinted of, Nigeria is a former British colony that gained its independence in 1960, around the same time many other former African colonies became independent. The name of the country, given to the geographical terri-

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1125   See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 15.
1126   See Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1995, op. cit., p. 26.
1127   Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 15. Similarly, B. Umez also mentions the existence of the same number of ethnic groups in Nigeria. See Umez, N. Bedford, 1999, op. cit., p. 1.
1128   See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 15.
1129   Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 193.
1130   Ibid., p. 192-193.
1131   Umez, N. Bedford, 1999, op. cit., p. 2.

tory known as modern Nigeria, was coined by Flora Shaw and Margery Perham, two women who had close relationships with the erstwhile British administrator of Nigeria, Lord Frederick Lugard, and influenced the development of British colonial policy in Nigeria.[1132] However, as much of the literature indicates, Flora Shaw first named the country "Nigeria"[1133] prior to the amalgamation of northern and the southern region in 1914.[1134]

Apart from the fact that the two separate territories joined together to form the contemporary Nigerian state, E. Osaghae describes the pre-colonial situation of the various ethnic groups thus:

> Before it—indeed, before the advent of colonial conquest and rule—there was no Nigeria, and the likelihood that a state like it could have evolved was quite remote. What existed in the period before the establishment of colonial rule was a motley of diverse groups whose histories and interactions, interlaced as they were by external influences—principally trade with Europeans and with the Arab world—had nevertheless crystallized in three clearly discernible regional formations by the end of the nineteenth century.[1135]

Politically, at the dawn of independence, there were three large and dominant ethnic groups out of over 250 others in Nigeria: These three were the Hausa Fulani in the northern region, the Yoruba in the southwest and the Igbo (also known as Ibo) in the southeast.

Apart from these three, the other ethnic groups constitute ethnic minorities that are scattered across all the three existing regions of the country upon independence.[1136] This is not to denote that the minorities are weak or subsumed by the largest ethnic groups, but to indicate that Nigeria is not a country made up of only three ethnic groups as often presented at the first glance or as assumed, for instance, if one considers this remark made by J. Nwankwo:

> We will embark on a piecemeal presentation of the three major tribes or linguistic groups in Nigeria whose existence as language groups eventually coincide with their nominal nomenclature as a people or as ethnic entities.[1137]

1132   Read Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 217.
1133   See ibid., p. 205. According to C. Nzeh, "it is said that the name "Nigeria" was the brainchild of Flora Shaw who later became the wife of Sir Frederick Lugard (later Lord Lugard) the first British governor of Nigeria. Flora coined out the word in 1897 in an article for the 'Time Newspaper' in London." See also Nzeh, C.O. Casimir, 2002, op. cit., p. 28 (footnote 22).
1134   See ibid, p. 19. It is noted that the two regions of the country were ruled as protectorates of the British colonial masters before the amalgamation took place in 1914. See ibid., p. 25.
1135   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 2.
1136   See Morris-Halle, 1996, op. cit., p. 202-203.
1137   Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 21. Flora Shawn, who later became the wife of Frederick Lugard, was a journalist for the London Times, whereas Margery Perham was a

Due to protest against the domination by one of the major ethnic groups over some ethnic minorities, a fourth region was created in 1963, referred to as the Midwest region, the same year Nigeria was declared as a republic.[1138] This is proof that ethnic minorities may resist the domination by ethnic groups constituting the majority and, therefore, cannot be perceived as weak.

The main ethnic minority groups in the eastern region of Nigeria, just to name a few, are the Ijaw, the Ibibio, the Efik, the Annang, the Kalabari etc. who are all within the domain of where the Igbo are the dominant ethnic group.[1139] To the south-west where the Yoruba constitute the majority, there are non-Yoruba ethnic groups like the Urhobo, the Isoko, the Edo and some Igbo as well.[1140] In the northern region, where the Hausa-Fulani dominate, there are the ethnic minorities of the so-called pagan groups in the middle Belt region of contemporary Nigeria such as the Igala, the Tiv, the Kanuri, the Birom, the Nupe, the Idoma, the Jaba, the Sura, the Igbira and other smaller ones.[1141] H. Kifordu estimates that 50% of the Nigerian population are Muslim with the majority of them living in the northern part of the country and 40% Christians found mainly in the south while only 10% of the entire population are followers of traditional beliefs.[1142]

One can understand that Nigeria is portrayed a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society, but this is not to say that ethnicity, with respect to its description as a mere characterization of a plural society, is the cause of the conflicts as T. Falola suggests:

> Nigeria, one of the largest and most important countries in the third world, has been in the news in the last fifteen years as a major African theater of religious violence and aggression, as have Sudan and Algeria. A religious divide separates Christians and Muslims, and long-standing intra-religious and conflicts further divide the people. The imperfect distribution of adherents to Islam and Christianity is complicated by ethnic differences: the north (with the exception of central Nigeria, known as the Middle Belt) is predominantly Muslim, and the southeast is predominantly Christian. It is only southwestern Nigeria where both religions are equally represented. In a polity that is already fragile and on the brink of collapse, religious trouble at this moment presents a great threat. The institutionalization of religious violence and the aggressive competition for dominance by Islam and Christianity continue to have a negative impact on the Nigerian nation.[1143]

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student of Nigerian political development, upon which she, after a lot of writings, became a professor in Oxford University. See ibid., p. 217.

1138   See Kifordu, A. Henry: "Ethnic Politics, Political Elite, and Regime Change in Nigeria", in: *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011, p. 427-450 (430).

1139   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 2-3.

1140   See ibid., p. 2-3.

1141   View Chukwuma, Michael, op. cit., p. 41.

1142   See Kifordu, A. Henry, 2011, op. cit., p. 430.

1143   Falola, Toyin, 1998, op. cit., p. 1.

If, according to the theory of this work, ethnicity is not the problem of Nigeria, then one may question how such a pluralistic country may avoid violence with respect to the control of political power and the distribution of resources.

In view of this, one may argue that politics is an option which may invoke conflicts amongst peoples with such diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. But politics alone cannot trigger such violence, it requires other divisive elements such as ethnic and religious differences in order to be effective and set off conflicts. In as much as ethnicity is not the factor that induces the eruption of conflicts, this may then imply that it is when numerous ethnic groups are involved in the politics of "who gets what and why" that ethnicity becomes politicized and may result into conflicts. So, viewing this proposition as the cause of conflicts corresponds to the position of this investigation despite the fact that it is yet to be determined how ethnicity, in reference to the diverse ethnic and religious groups, is politicized. If there was no geopolitical space called Nigeria, such occurrences of conflicts may be absent:

> The British colonial administration that administratively set apart the three main constituent regions in Nigeria, the north, the west and the east, laid the foundation for separate political development and ethnicity in Nigeria. The different regions, led by their dominant ethnic groups—Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Igbo in the east—perceived each other with mistrust and suspicion and doggedly guarded against any form of socioeconomic and political domination and marginalization by any of the constituent regions.[1144]

Contrary to the position of M. Chukwuma's and J. Nwankwo's description of the country as a nation, it may be argued that Nigeria qualifies as an artificial entity because it is not created by the will of the diverse ethnic groups, but through the expedient acts of the British colonial administration, i.e., by external forces.[1145] By then, one of the founding fathers of modern Nigeria, Obafemi Awolowo, a former Yoruba politician, once described the country thus:

> Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are English, Welsh, or French. The word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.[1146]

A similar expression found its way into the country's history when the late Ahmadu Bello, a former politician and northern leader, referred to the country

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1144   M. Chukwuma is of the view that though Nigeria is made up of many independent ethnic entities, it can still not be denoted as an artificial entity. See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 25. Also J. Nwankwo perceives Nigeria in her work as a nation. See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., 26.

1145   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 1.

1146   Awolowo, Obafemi: *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, Faber and Faber, London 1947, p. 47-48.

as the mistake of 1914, a statement, which hitherto traces the error back to the decision by the British colonial powers to merge the North and the South whose ethnic groups share little commonalities.[1147] It is important to note that such a remark was made because of the dissatisfaction of the people with respect to the inadequacies of power and resource allocation in the country.

In view of the statements made by these two former politicians, it is notable that Nigeria's existence is not based on the decision of the people rather the boundaries are drawn by outsiders, the British colonialists.[1148] This notwithstanding, it is by no means to allege that the drawing of artificial boundaries is solely responsible for the outbreaks of contemporary conflicts. Therefore, if ethnicity is politicized in Nigeria to the extent that conflicts erupt, O. Nnoli surmises that the struggle for political power and resources within a political environment by diverse numerous ethnic groups may be responsible:

> Ethnic group access to state or lack of it is an important element in ethnic politics. If minority ethnic groups are denied commensurate access as dictated by the size of their population and their contribution to national wealth, their dissatisfaction is likely to lead to increased ethnic tension.[1149]

So one can argue that one of the processes leading to the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria can be traced back to colonialism and the following statement illustrates how the colonialists, as actors, perpetuated ethnic division into "us" and "others" in Nigeria:

> [The Europeans] introduced the capitalist mode of production, a congruent colonial capitalist state, which held the people under subjection, mediated between the classes through up by capitalism, between the pre-capitalist and capitalist social forces, and between the local and foreign social forces. In the process, it exerted a contradictory set of influences on the people. At one time it divided them into competitive hostile groups. At the other times, it united them into a community of common consciousness. The difference lies in the level of the community that was affected. For example, at the national level, fierce competition was promoted between the Igbo and the Hausa and within both groups, integrative and divisive forces were unleashed.[1150]

Ethnicity, in this sense, as politicized by the colonialists, was responsible for ethnic rivalry which results into ethnic conflicts. Therefore, ethnicity, from an instrumentalist perspective, was introduced in Nigeria as a means for the British colonialists to achieve economic and political goals:

> Colonialism brought these disparate geo-political entities together in a new nation for political, administrative and economic purposes. Thus emerged the ethnically diverse society of Nigeria

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1147   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 1.
1148   Diamond, Larry: *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic*, Syracuse University Press, New York 2003, p. 21.
1149   Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1995, op. cit., p. 6.
1150   Ibid., p. 37.

with the corollary inter-ethnic relations, particularly of exploitation resulting in struggles and conflicts. The Nigerian ethnically diverse society has witnessed several cultural units involved in the building of alliances and various strategies in the struggle for limited resources in the state.[1151]

Building of alliances among the ethnic groups as a device to gain access to scarce resources of the state underscores the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity because ethnic groups do not possess permanent boundaries, but shift their boundaries during negotiations with other ethnic groups in order to realize their goals.

Having mentioned the introduction of capitalism into the country, which enabled politicized ethnicity to take its root in a multi-ethnic Nigeria, J. Amzat and O. Olutayo opine that conflicts may erupt as "quest for social equity is contradictory to the development of capitalism itself."[1152] They argue further that the development of industrial capitalism demands the use of cheap raw materials such as iron, coal, labor and agricultural products which are not available in Europe.[1153] From this vantage point, it can be argued that the capitalist system is based on the exploitation of both environmental and natural resources as well as social and economic exploitation of "Others".[1154]

Therefore, ethnicity, when politicized in this way, places the Nigerians on the one side and the British colonialists on the other side, hence the division into "them" and "us". It is reported by A. Ojie that the colonial style of politics, which emphasized the differences among various ethnic groups by politicizing these differences, was inherited upon after independence by certain Nigerian elites who continue on the same path as the colonialist:

> The problem of political repression stands out distinctly among others. This was a colonial inheritance. Colonial rule was the antithesis of democracy, premised on the usurpation of self-determination. At independence, our leaders retained and reinforced this style of politics. Politics of power struggle unmediated by legitimacy norms became the vogue. The people were disenfranchised, and the alienated political class turned to the use of coercion to retain power.[1155]

1151   Ojie, E. Andrew/Ewhrudjakpor, Christian: "Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies in Nigeria", in: *Anthropologist*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, p. 7-14 (8). In addition, the author notes that ethnicity in Nigeria is a vehicle towards obtaining an ethnic group's fair share of the national cake, a situation which crystallizes into conflicts that undermine the sustainability of socio-political development in Nigeria. See ibid., p. 8.

1152   Amzat, Jimoh/Olutayo, A. Olarenwaju: "Nigeria, Capitalism and the Question of Equity", in: *Anthropologist*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2009, p. 239-246 (239).

1153   See ibid.

1154   See ibid.

1155   Ojie, E. Andrew: "Democracy, Ethnicity and the Problem of Extrajudicial Killing in Nigeria", in: *Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2006, p. 546-569 (554).

After the attainment of independence, a group of individuals, commonly referred to as leaders, politicized ethnicity while struggling to maintain political power by every means and, thereby, instigated conflicts in Nigeria. Lamenting the issue of politicizing the existing differences among various ethnic groups as the reasons for conflicts, J. Herskovits admits thus:

> This diversity has brought agonies of growth to Nigeria. After receiving its independence in 1960, the civilian government broke down in the middle of the decade in conflicts among the three major groups over the distribution of power and resources in which the Hausa-dominated Northern Region and Ibo-dominated Eastern Region first formed a coalition against the largely Yoruba Western Region.[1156]

It should be perceived that despite the cultural and religious differences between the Hausa Fulani in the northern region and the Ibo in the eastern part, they were once able to form an alliance against the Yoruba in the Western region. Thereby, according to the instrumentalist approach, it can be argued that ethnicity is only politicized when it involves achieving political, economic and symbolic resources. This is another piece of evidence to prove that ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but can be negotiated when it serves certain purposes for the actors involved.

Similarly, the method of identity and difference is reflected in this alliance scenario which stipulates that "who with whom" and "who against whom" is about how to attain certain objectives. It is revealed in this case that the Ibo and the Hausa Fulani agreed to form an alliance against the Yoruba. Hereby, one can discern that in a pluralistic society such as in the case of a former colony such as Nigeria, the issue of identifying with one ethnic group or the other is a matter of cost-benefit calculations, a consideration which enables *switching* to take place.

A. Ojie and C. Ewhrudjakpor observe that although there are many faultlines among the different ethnic groups in Nigeria, identification changes occur in the struggle to gain the political power at the center:

> The problems are multi-dimensional. It takes a combination of antidotes to penetrate its deep seated fabrics. The primary cause of the sociopolitical and economic instability in Nigeria is the issue of resource agglomeration and distribution at the centre.[1157]

How such an alliance may be dissolved and a new one formed, with respect to how identities change in a politics of inclusion and exclusion, will be examined in subsequent sections of this chapter.

There are specific disparities between the northern and the southern region which, before the amalgamation of 1914, were administratively managed sepa-

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1156   Herskovits, Jean, 1979, op. cit., p. 314-335 (315).
1157   Ojie, E. Andrew/Ewhrudjakpor, Christian, 2009, op. cit., p. 14.

rately by the British colonial officials. Despite the integration of both regions which currently constitute modern Nigeria, the colonialists, with respect to the politics of "divide and rule", reinforced the differences among the various ethnic groups through the dichotomization of Nigeria into North and South. A. Otite and N. Umukoro illustrate the application and effects of the divide and rule policy thus:

> During the colonial era, the British practiced an organization style of 'divide and rule' in which they ruled the people. This system did nothing to correct the divisive barriers that existed between the various ethnic groups relating to ethnicity, religion and class. Rather, these elements were reinforced and used as instruments, by the colonialists, to gain competitive advantages in the new political order. These advantages allowed them to fulfill their economic desires to exploit Nigeria's collective resources and to dominate Nigeria in the governing process, without any commitment to building up the ideals of democracy or respect for human rights in the nation. During the colonial and post colonial periods in Nigeria, the dividing categories of ethnicity, religion and class became intense and hardened.[1158]

For instance, from this "divide and rule politics" point of view, it can be asserted that the British colonialist introduced asymmetric developments educationally, politically, socially etc. between the northern and the southern regions in order to deepen the already existing differences.

The politics of "divide and rule", which can also be referred to in its Latin version as *divide et impera*, represents attempts by the British colonialists to hinder any understanding and possible integration of various ethnic groups, for example, in Nigeria.[1159] The consequences of these actions can be seen as part and parcel of the contemporary conflicts confronting the country. Instances of such actions are noted in the study by E. Osaghae who asserts that the British colonialists intentionally ensured the absence of contact during the colonial occupation of Nigeria between the Southern region and its Northern counterpart, which were amalgamated in 1914. As a result, both regions of the country developed during the course of decades as different entities politically, culturally, educationally and religiously, as he illustrates below:

> Furthermore, while Southern politicians and nationalists had gained considerable experience being members of the central legislative council, their Northern counterparts did not sit in this council until 1947 when the principle of regional representation was introduced by the Richards Constitution [a colonial constitution]. That was when Northern and Southern politicians met for the first time as citizens of the same country which had been amalgamated in

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1158   Otite, Atare/Umukoro, Daniel: "Money Politics, Political Culture of Godfatherism and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria – Lessons from the 2007 Gubernatorial Election in Edo States", in: *Africana*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010, p. 65-79 (69).

1159   Compare Nnoli, Obwudisha [sic]: "Colonialism 100 Years After", in: Lothar Rathmann et al. [Eds.]: *Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Africa's Path to A Peaceful Future*, Berlin 1985, p. 72-76 (72-73).

1914. Afraid that their educational and political headstart gave the Southerners an advantage that could easily be translated into political domination after independence, nationalists from the North refused to agree to self-government in 1953 when Southern parties sponsored a motion to that effect.[1160]

The educational aspect considered by the Northerners, as mentioned above, is understandable because of educational disparities between the northern and the southern regions, as the following captures: "The wide gap also extended to tertiary education: in 1950, while Southern graduates and professionals with university degrees ran into scores of hundreds, there was only one Northern University graduate."[1161] Meanwhile, it is pertinent to understand that, irrespective of the attitude of the British colonialists in allowing asymmetric developments in both regions, the Northern leaders were reported to have been in agreement with these arrangements as they opposed any Western influence that may have effects on their religion, culture and powers, as O. Nnoli narrates below:

> […] an alliance was struck between the emirs and British which bound the former more closely to their new masters and rallied them to British cause in return for a guarantee of non-interference with Moslem religion, the fundamental ideological basis of emirate power, and consolidating and, in some cases extending this power.[1162]

L. Diamond also explains that, linguistically and religiously, Christianity and the English language, as the official language, was intensely promoted in Southern Nigeria, whereas in the North, the British administrators ruled using the Hausa language in order to preserve the regions' social structures and cultural institutions.[1163]

1160   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 6.
1161   Ibid., p. 5. Furthermore, it is important to note that the Emirs, religious elites, who were the political and administrative leaders in core Muslim North signed agreements with the British colonialists that would hinder the Christian Missionaries from introducing Western education and culture as well as religion into the Muslim territories. Thereby, the emirs asserted that their powers would not be questioned in the long run if their subjects were not enlightened through Western education. See Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1978, op. cit., p. 114. E. Osaghae even believes that Lord Lugard signed an agreement with the emirs not to introduce or allow Western education and religion into the Northern territories. He is also of this view in his analysis as he offers the following observation:
        "[…] the two parts of the new state continued to develop along different lines. This has been attributed mainly to the attitudes of a few diehard British administrators in the north who were determined to keep the region apart from the 'corrupt South'. To this end the entry of Southerners to the North was kept in check through policies like that which vested ownership of land in the region in government hands and prohibited freehold titles (by contrast, traditional practices of land were retained in the South), and the practice of settling 'strangers', who were mostly Southern and Christian, apart from the Muslim indigenes in major towns and cities." Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 4-5.
1162   Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1978, op. cit., p. 114.
1163   See Diamond, Larry, 2003, op. cit., p. 26.

To this effect, one can imagine what consequences such disparities may have for political competition and socio-economic factors such as employment in the public service, or admission into government owned secondary and tertiary institutions after the decolonization period.[1164] In view of this gap witnessed between the North and South, it can be argued that a common national identity, integration, oneness and unity were certain to fail after the attainment of the country's independence, the aftermath of this problem being described by L. Diamond thus:

> Because of this huge disparity, and the migration of more highly educated Igbos to Northern cities, Northerners were poorly positioned to benefit from the move toward Nigerianization of the Civil Service that began in 1948. In subsequent years, the predominance of Southern Nigerians in promotions stirred Northern apprehension that Southerners would come to dominate the Civil Service, even in their own region.[1165]

Based on this situation, it was unclear what this artificially created constellation meant for the disparities that were taken over into the independent and post-independent Nigeria. In many of the aspects observed within the context of differences which exist between the North and South after Nigeria's attainment of self-rule in 1960, it can be argued that the country was prepared for socio-economic tensions.

The question of how the British colonialists, who are already identified as actors that politicized ethnicity, can be perceived in view of the way they applied *divide and rule politics* to create differences among various ethnic groups in Nigeria is answered to by the aforementioned factors. Accordingly, the initial dichotomization of Nigeria into North and South, as already examined, and the further demarcation of the country into three regional governments under the colonial Constitution of 1954, close to the time of independence, shows that each region was organized to protect its own interests, as explained thus:

> The majority of regionalism was discrimination against non-indigenes, especially in regional public service employment, but it also involved intense rivalry among the regions to outdo each other in socio-economic development, maximize their shares of the federation's resources, and control federal power.[1166]

As seen above, it can be argued that, in reference to the competition already established, the issue of intolerance and discrimination would be subsequently elevated in the political and democratic set-up of the regions. That being said, it is essential to point out that, as discussed earlier on, the three ethnic groups and

1164   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 5.
1165   Diamond, Larry, 2003, op. cit., p. 27.
1166   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 9.

power blocs, in terms of regional arrangements and structures, constitute the dominant ethnic groups in the country with regard to the size of their population. However, the marginalization of ethnic minorities by the ethnic majorities in their respective region is a cause for concern, as illustrated in the following statement:

> References to the 'South', usually in contradistinction to the North, do not mean that the South is monolithic or more united than the North (more or less the same thing can be said of the 'North'). The major cleavages in the South, which were reinforced by the marked differences in the levels of socio-economic development among the groups, were between the Igbos (Eastern region) and Yorubas (Western region), and between these major groups and the minorities in the regions.[1167]

On these grounds, how ethnic cleavages, in the post-independence periods, are displayed in form of "us" and "others", with respect to the numerous schisms and division lines, such as the North-South dichotomization, North-South East, and North-South West as well as South West-South East, will be illustrated and investigated. Despite the constraints, regarding the time frame of this research study, which is to examine the political events leading to the contemporary conflicts, beginning from 1990s up till 2010, certain historical occurrences within the context of the subject matter will be investigated.

On this note, the analysis of the ongoing Jos and Niger Delta (Warri crisis) conflicts will highlight "the fear of being dominated syndrome" within the context of minority-majority rivalry and the existing competition and struggle among the ethnic minorities inhabiting the country within the framework of the current conflicts in subsequent sections.

But, first and foremost, the next section will focus on the three important ethnic groups with the largest population in the Nigerian landscape, examining their religious, cultural and linguistic differences as well the political implications of this diversity. This will attempt to explain how ethnicity is politicized and who the groups and actors responsible for the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria are.

5.3 Historical Overview of the Three Largest Ethnic Groups

This section will highlight the cultural, linguistic and religious differences among various ethnic groups, especially the three largest ones, which highlight the Nigerian ethnic diversity and its implications for the distribution of political

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1167   Ibid., p. 9.

powers and resources in the country as an avenue for conflicts. Moreover, these three ethnic groups, namely the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and the Igbo, together constitute more than two-thirds of the overall population of the country.[1168] It is estimated that, in reference to the information provided in October 2011 on the population distribution of ethnic groups, Nigeria has approximately 167 million people, divided among the three largest ethnic groups as follows: Hausa-Fulani (Hausa 21% and Fulani 10% respectively), Yoruba (21%), and Igbo (18%).[1169]

   In view of the various ethnic groups which make up the country, the issue of identity is important in order to examine the diversity of the traditional political structures of the three main ethnic groups, especially in the pre-colonial period, and the importance of religion as well as its influence on the worldviews of some of these ethnic groups. Further analysis will be carried out within the context of the diverse social and structural differences among the ethnic groups which may become potential avenues for conflicts whenever ethnic consciousness and mobilization are accorded priorities during political struggle. The following section will present and examine the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria.

5.3.1 The Hausa-Fulani Ethnic Group

The Hausa-Fulani, as an ethnic group, is often referred to as the Hausa-Fulani hegemony because, historically, it consists of two different ethnic groups. The Hausa are distinct from the Fulani in that, originally, they were worshippers of traditional religions, referred to as the so-called pagans, whereas the Fulani were Muslims. However, it is important to note that both ethnic groups were able to accommodate and to assimilate each other during the course of recent centuries.[1170]

   The Hausa constitute the largest ethnic group in northern Nigeria, but due to the conquest and systematic destruction of written records by their Fulani coun-

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1168   See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 26.
1169   Current information about the population distribution of Nigeria provided by the German Federal Foreign Office (October 2012), retrievable under the following homepage: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes_Ueber sichtsseiten/Nigeria_node.html [20/04/2013].
1170   See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 26-27. He states that Islam was the activating force among the Hausa, otherwise, the African traditional religion, which was the original way for Africans to maintain a relationship with God, played a crucial role in the lives of the Hausa ethnic group. See ibid., p. 29.

terparts, there is no documented evidence to trace back Hausa history since their conquest. J. Nwankwo explains that "the mixture was so radical that some authors now prefer to speak of Hausa Fulani ethnic group instead of Hausa alone."[1171] Irrespective of the religious mixture in the Hausa territories, he explains that Islam, though accepted and adopted by the Hausa, was applied as a basic instrument to instigate general propaganda.[1172]

Historically, the Fulani were nomads who traveled around sub-Saharan Africa and, in doing so, also arrived in Hausa territories in northern Nigeria where they lived peacefully with the Hausa to the extent that they intermarried.[1173] The acceptance of the Fulani by the Hausa is based on their common faith, rooted in Islam. M. Chukwuma observes that the Fulani, through the acceptance and influence of the Islamic religion in the Hausa region, "by the end of the 18th century had gained enough grounds among the Hausas that they could condemn any leader or king for contravening the Islamic law."[1174] Considering the aforesaid acceptance of Islam, if not its imposition at that time, which enabled the Islamic religion to be spread wide in contemporary northern Nigeria, J. Coleman believes, however, that Islam, as experienced currently as a source of religious conflicts, is by no means conservative:

> Islam was firmly established in northern Nigeria by the end of the fifteenth century, and its effects were profound. Although Islam, like Catholicism, is not necessarily conservative, the political elite which emerged in northern Nigeria used certain interpretations of Islam to impose centralized government and rigid class hierarchy and to inculcate habits and attitudes of political difference and subordination.[1175]

As a result of the incursion and conquest by the Jihadists led by Othman dan Fodio, a known Fulani Islamic cleric and warrior, over the Hausa kingdoms in 1804 and the conversion of the Hausa thereafter, M. Chukwuma explains why contemporary Hausa territories are almost in their entirety Islamic thus: "It was the 'zeal to purify the Islamic religion' that led the Fulani, Othman dan Fodio, to start his jihad in June 1804."[1176]

During this religious cleansing, allegations such as exploitative activities, oppression and lax attitudes in incorporating Islamic teachings into the administrative principles as well as accusations of allowing the influence of the tradi-

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1171   Ibid., p. 27
1172   See ibid., p. 29.
1173   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 104.
1174   Ibid., p. 105.
1175   Coleman, S. James: *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, University of California Press, Los Angeles and Berkeley 1965, p. 39.
1176   Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 106.

tional religions to remain were made against the Hausa kings and leaders.[1177] If one cast doubts on the identity of an ethnic group as a fixed one and wonders how a symbiotic relationship can develop between the Hausa and the Fulani, F. Salamone gives the following response:

> Ethnic boundaries are permeable, and people, sometimes singly and sometimes in groups, cross them. In general they do so either to maximize their opportunities or to minimize perceived threats. There are a number of reasons why receiving groups allow outsiders to become members. While each situation needs empirical observation to explain all the relevant variables, the recipient group normally perceives the addition of new members as an advantage in coping with socio-cultural problems.[1178]

It can be argued from the quotation presented above, in reference to the decision theory of identity and difference that the application of group size is of importance as reflected in the statement. This is a proof that identity changes.

According to this theoretical assumption, people decide to enlarge their membership based on the cost-benefits calculation, especially if this decision will be of advantage to them. Thereby, it is important to note that the presence of the Fulani in the Hausa territories enabled the Hausa States in the northern region like Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, Bauchi etc. to witness a rapid rise in power over other rival groups.[1179] So, through the Islamization of the Hausa, the Fulani were able to gain influential positions as they were perceived theologically, spiritually and politically as teachers and assistants.[1180] That is why, in modern Nigeria, it is difficult to refer to one of this ethnic group without referring to the other, which implies that, henceforth, the depiction of these initially two distinct ethnic groups as one entity as they are regarded as in an alliance, namely: the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.

In the first place, before the advent of colonialism or the current Nigerian state, the Hausa-Fulani administratively, religiously and politically were known

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1177   See ibid., p. 106. The following is also reported:
        "The arrival of Islam brought the socio-political structure that was highly Islamic. This Islamization was enhanced extensively by the multiple holy wars carried out in succession against the infidels by any flimsy justification by the Muslims. Islam quickly became the uniting force among the Northern Hausas with the Emir at the helm of affairs." Ibid., Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 28.

1178   Salamone, Frank: "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic Identity Change and Its Implications for the Study of Ethnic Pluralism and Stratification", in: *Journal of International African Institute*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1975, p. 410-424 (410). Read also Salamone, Frank: *Gods and Goods in Africa: Persistence and Change in the Fulani Jihad in 19th Century Hausaland*, PhD Thesis, Montreal 1976, p. 98.

1179   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 104. J. Nwankwo gives an account of the Hausa; see Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 26-27.

1180   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 104-105.

for the practice of a centralized system of government entrenched in the Islamic religion:

> The organization of the social life was completely islamicentric or theocentric including the understanding of authority and political participation. […] They thus helped to create a certain sense of solidarity in faith and practice as well as pious and unreserved obedience to the will of Allah as it is enshrined in the Quran, in Sharia and as it is interpreted by the religio-political elite.[1181]

From the above, with respect to the instrumentalist method, one can see that religion, in this case Islam, is used as an instrument for political objectives. This is evidenced, as indicated earlier, by the Fulani's ability to ascend to important positions in the Hausa territories by the introduction of the Islamic religion to the Hausa.

Equally, through the symbiotic relationship which exists between the two ethnic groups, the *Hausa* and *Fulani*, one can argue that, according to the theory of identity and difference, ethnic group identity is not fixed, but rather changeable. To this end, one acknowledges that, with respect to the categories of social structures and their cognitive representations (shown under chapter 3.2.3.3), group formations are possible when people self-identify using criteria such as language, descent, religion etc. This allows the inclusion and exclusion of people to take place.

Likewise, the politics of inclusion and exclusion (as discussed in chapter 3.2.3.3) can also be reflected on the transition of the Hausa-Fulani into a hegemonic ethnic group as the increase in the population size and strength becomes an advantage, as one ethnic entity, in overcoming their ethnic rivalries and adversaries in the region. For instance, M. Chukwuma states that following the arrival, settlement and assimilation of the Fulani, "their presence witnessed the rise in the powers of the Hausa states over their rival ethnic groups of the Kanem-Bornu Empire."[1182] Thereby, in reference to the decision theory that actors think rationally, one can argue that identity can be constructed towards the realization of certain goals upon which decision based on the group size is paramount.

That being said, it is important to note that there are over 100 other ethnic minority groups co-existing in northern Nigeria with the Hausa-Fulani. This is not to say that the hegemonic influence of the Hausa-Fulani is not one of the reasons for the outbreak of conflicts in the region when one considers how W. Morris-Halle tells it:

1181 See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 30.
1182 Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 104.

> While in the north, in addition to the Hausa and the Fulani, there were at least 100 other ethnic languages and dialect groups which were highly regarded by other Africans for their resistance to Hausa-Fulani hegemony.[1183]

E. Osaghae elaborates on the emergence of an Islamic formation and influence by the Hausa-Fulani which has effects on intergroup relations with reference to the scores of other non-Muslim minorities before and during colonial rule as well as in the post-independence period:

> First, by establishing Muslim groups and adherents as the 'core' of an emergent Northern formation, it pushed to the periphery the non-Islamic segments who were also numerically inferior. […] Under British rule, appointees of the Caliphate and Emirates were imposed as rulers on the non-Muslim groups in pursuance of the indirect rule policy. Second, by attaining the most advanced form of political, administrative and military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate including its Emirates, which for the British were the hallmarks of African civilization, the 'core' North was easily accepted by the colonizers as the model whose superior civilization was to be extended, if possible by force, over the rest of what later became Nigeria.[1184]

Taking this statement, it can be argued that another division into "us" and "others" was artificially created by the British colonialists. The promotion of the Hausa-Fulani as a power bloc and symbol of African civilization, from an instrumentalist approach, is a form of politicized ethnicity which plays an important role in contemporary conflicts in Nigeria.

Having mentioned that there are many ethnic minority groups inhabiting the northern region of Nigeria who, ethnically, are not Hausa-Fulani and who, as indicated earlier, fought (and still fight today: Jos being an example) against the domination of the Hausa-Fulani, however, it is understood from the above that their resistance was subdued under the colonial rule as these minorities were subjugated and placed under the control of the emirs.[1185] Arguably, this may be the reason why many ethnic minorities in the North, if not all, speak the Hausa language. Correspondingly, the writer of this research thesis found out during his field work carried out in Jos, Plateau State, in 2011, that the indigenous ethnic groups in Jos and its environs, namely: Afizere, Berom, Anaguta, just to name a few, speak the Hausa language. The response to the question about why these minorities speak the Hausa language is summarized as follows:

1183   Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 203.
1184   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 2.
1185   See also Chukwuma, Michael, op. cit., p. 110. It is important to note that, according to M. Chukwuma, the emirs controlled or were the head of their respective emirates, whereby all the emirates, aggregately, used to be controlled by the Sultan of Sokoto. So, as the emirs were the spiritual leaders of their emirates, the Sultan of Sokoto was the overall spiritual and political leader of all the emirates under the Hausa-Fulani hegemony. See ibid., p. 100-110.

> There are dozens of languages spoken in Plateau State, marking it out from the predominantly Hausa-speaking areas further north—although, being the regional *lingua franca* of northern Nigeria, Hausa is also widely spoken on the Plateau.[1186]

More on this will be reflected on in the chapter dealing with the analysis of the Jos conflicts. However, in consideration of this, one answer or reason may be traced to the fact that the Hausa-Fulani are accustomed to a centralized system of government since the pattern of governance practiced since time immemorial was not altered or changed until the end of colonial rule.

On the one hand, it may be argued, based on the assumption that most of all the people in the North speak the Hausa language, that the Hausa-Fulani misinterpret the spread of the Hausa language as a symbol of power, whereas, on the other hand, the minority groups may have a different perception of their ability to communicate in Hausa. By this, as will be demonstrated in the analysis on the Jos conflict, one may argue that the command of a common language by two or more different ethnic groups is not a condition for ethnic homogeneity. It is whenever politics, in terms of resources to be distributed, is involved and the dichotomization of "us" and the "other" occurs that ethnicity becomes a tool which can easily be politicized by actors and individuals to instigate conflicts.

5.3.2 The Yoruba Ethnic Group

The Yoruba ethnic group is, numerically, one of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria and according to the demographic data presented in the introductory part of this section, the Yoruba rank second to the Hausa-Fulani as an ethnic entity.

Territorially, the Yoruba are situated in the south western region of Nigeria and all the tribes that make up the Yoruba ethnic group speak the same language, referred to as Yoruba, despite the presence of various dialects.[1187] Therefore, one can see that the language name corresponds to the name of the ethnic group. T. Falola, in reference to the historical background of the ethno-characteristics of the Yoruba, points out the following:

> The interactions among the various Yoruba polities during the precolonial period continue to have relevance in modern politics. The Yoruba did not build one political kingdom or empire, but the various sub-units had strong contacts with one another. The factors that promoted the

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1186   Higazi, Adam: "The Jos Crisis: A Recurrent Nigerian Tragedy", in: *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Discussion Paper*, No. 9, January 2011, p. 1-34 (3-4). Document available online: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07812.pdf [03/01/2014].

1187   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 2.

contacts in the past (for peace and war) have been activated in the modern era to build a pan-Yoruba consciousness.[1188]

From this point of view, one can assert that ethnic identity changes because, whenever the historical origin of an ethnic group is subjected to controversy, it is an indication that, even if less of a proof, ethnic identity changes do/did occur during the course of centuries.

Similar to the political structure of the Hausa-Fulani, it is noted that the Yoruba possessed a traditional system of hierarchical order in the pre-colonial period.[1189] Before the arrival of the colonialists, the contemporary Yoruba ethnic group was organized and settled in a place called Oyo which, though afterwards growing to become an Empire, was founded by one of the Yoruba kings:

> The foundation of Oyo, which later became an Empire, has been attributed to the defeat which Orayan suffered in his military expedition. After the defeat, Orayan settled in Oyo instead of coming back to his shrine at Ile-Ife to avoid the shame associated with his defeat.[1190]

From the history of the Yoruba, as shown above, one can understand that there are two significant locations which are of importance to the Yoruba. In this sense, it is not only Oyo, but also a town called Ile-Ife that formed the cultural center of the former Oyo Empire: nevertheless, Ile-Ife is known to be the first area of settlement of the Yoruba.[1191]

Considering the military adventures mentioned in the quotation, it is further highlighted that the Yoruba, as an ethnic entity, displayed such developed military skills to the extent that their capability enabled them to conquer many kingdoms which were subsequently brought under the control of the old Oyo Empire.[1192] However, with respect to L. Diamond, an important point to be made when one considers the account of the Yoruba history is that, initially, there was no permanent or fixed ethnic identity known or referred to as Yoruba, which im-

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1188   Falola, Toyin: "Ethnicity and the Yoruba Politics: The Past in the Yoruba Present", in: Bruce et al. [Eds.]: *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, James Currey/Ohio University Press, Ohio 2004, p. 148-165 (150). Also, as M. Chukwuma notes, the origin of the Yoruba ethnic group is controversial among ethnologists, sociologists and archaeologists, all of whom assert their own version of the historical origin of the group from different perspectives. However, the author explains that the more convincing version of the history recognizes that the Yoruba originated from Egypt based on the argument that the discoveries of specific carvings on stones at Ile-Ife were similar to some carvings of Upper Egypt. Some other similarities were found as well which lent some credence that most probably the Yoruba originated from Egypt. See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 112-113.

1189   See ibid., p. 114.

1190   See ibid., p. 114.

1191   See ibid., p. 113.

1192   See Diamond, Larry, 2003, op. cit., p. 21-22.

plies that the Yoruba ethnic group, in its current form, can be traced back as an aggregate of different territories separated by boundaries:

> While there were various Yoruba groups in the past, each with its own political authority and boundary, in the context of contemporary politics, it is convenient for the political class to occasionally forget this in the agenda of forging a Yoruba 'nation' in a strong enough position to compete with the other equally large and viable 'nations'.[1193]

With such an assumption that many sub-units made up what can be referred to as contemporary Yoruba, then it can be argued from an instrumentalist point of view that ethnic groups boundaries are drawn and redrawn based on negotiations.

Moreover, T. Falola emphasizes Yoruba sub-ethnic units such as Egba, Ijebu and Ekiti as part of the independent pre-colonial political units which existed before the contemporary Yoruba ethnic identity,[1194] as currently known, was constructed. The following assertion of the author lays claim to this identity change:

> To treat the Yoruba-speaking areas as a unit can be justified only on the basis of cultural and linguistic similarities. These similarities have been further promoted by modern politicians who talk of a common historical experience, and the emergence of a standard Yoruba language. Yoruba land was never a single socio-political unit.[1195]

Arguably, the decision theory of identity and difference can equally be applied to the Yoruba history because the function of group size is determinant in order to withstand pressure and repel adversaries when in competition for resources.

In spite of the slight differences among the sub-groups, the common factors which bound these Yoruba sub-units together were language and the expansion of dynastic leaders whose common origins are traced back to Ile-Ife.[1196] Based on this, similar to the history of the Hausa-Fulani in this respect, one can argue that ethnic identity swings and can be constructed and reconstructed. That is why one may compare the significance of Oyo, as a place, and the role played by the Oba of Oyo in the former Oyo Empire to that of Sokoto during the Hausa-Fulani Empire, in which the Sultan of Sokoto, as the overall head of the emirs in the emirates, controlled the entire Hausa-Fulani kingdom in the North.

However, there is a distinction in the role assigned to religion in both kingdoms because Ile-Ife was known as the religious site for the Yoruba, whereas Oyo represented the administrative center of the empire, a situation which de-

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1193   Falola, Toyin, 2004, op. cit., p. 1-151.
1194   See ibid., p. 151.
1195   Ibid., p. 151.
1196   See ibid., p. 151.

picts a decentralizing trend of the old Oyo Empire.[1197] Contrary to this decentralized system, the Sultan of Sokoto's role and function as the spiritual, administrative and political leader in the former Hausa-Fulani Emirate reveals the system as a centralized one. In addition, apart from the fact that the Yoruba region encompasses the present Yoruba ethnic group, it also consists of a single territory which descendants of all these ethnic sub-units that form the current Yoruba identity occupy.

Having mentioned that the political structures of the Yoruba are hierarchically organized, the King, who is called the Oba in the Yoruba language and referred to as, with respect to his title, the *Alafin*, is the head of the old Oyo Empire. However, it is important to state that, unlike the absolute power of the Hausa-Fulani Emir/Sultan, the Alafin of Oyo is surrounded and supported while carrying out his functions by seven traditional advisers or chiefs, known as the Oyo-Mesi.[1198] These traditional chiefs are responsible and in the position to check the King in case of any potential abuse of power. Therefore, one can argue that the Oba is not absolutist within the context of the former Oyo Empire because a system of checks and balances is put in place in order to restrain the king from any abuse of power and misbehavior. M. Chukwuma postulates the powers of the Oba of Oyo, (the Alafin), as follows:

> The Oyo-Mesi also assisted the Alafin in his administrative and judicial functions. One of them, the "Basorun", acted like the prime minister. These councellors, not only supervised the bureaucratic functions of the empire, but also remained a political check which stopped any tyranneous attempt of Alafin. This showed that Alafin in Oyo empire cannot be said to have enjoyed an absolute autocratic power.[1199]

On this note, any Alafin who overstepped while performing his functions or abused his position was being forced to resign and commit suicide.[1200] Such a political and administrative organization shows how the political system of the old Oyo Empire distinguished itself from that of the centralized system of the Hausa-Fulani emirate. Unlike the emirate where the Islamic religion was a commonality for identity construction, the Oyo Empire's common identity factor of the various Yoruba sub-units was, aside the Yoruba language, the historical collective place of origin, *Ile-Ife*, as all the descendants of Oduduwa, the name assigned to the founder of Ile-Ife, were expected to be able to trace their origin back to him and Ile-Ife.[1201] All the major kingdoms within the Yoruba Empire

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1197   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 112-113.
1198   See ibid., p. 118.
1199   Ibid., p. 119.
1200   See ibid., p. 118.
1201   See Falola, Toyin, 2004, op. cit., p. 153.

which are believed to have been part of these sub-units in the 18th century are comprised of the Oyo, the Ketu, the Ijebu, the Ibadan, the Ilesha, the Ife, the Ilorin and the Ekiti.[1202]

From another point of view, T. Falola alleges that the rallying point for the sub-units as members of the same ancestor, Oduduwa, and children of the same ethnic group from Ile-Ife, is a myth which the political power class employed in order to consolidate "the link between the ruling class and to prevent, as much as possible, the emergence of a counter-hegemonic force which could destroy the dynasties and royal families."[1203] In addition, such a myth is upheld in order to retain ownership of land and territories.[1204] One can see again here that the formation of ethnic groups, in this sense, is all about gaining access to and controlling of resources.

However, this is not to imply that Islam and Christianity are not promoted in Yoruba land because, as is already shown, Christianity was introduced by the colonialists into the Southern region and by the European missionaries before and during colonialism. With regard to Islam, which is part and parcel of the contemporary Yoruba religious identity, it is still unclear how Islam penetrated into the current Yoruba region of Nigeria when one considers that the Yoruba kingdom, with respect to their aforementioned strong military establishment, were able to stop the expansionist tendency of the Hausa-Fulani Empire into their territories.[1205]

In continuation of this line of thought, A. Burns explains in order to clarify the question on the advent of Islam into the Yoruba territories/land that the crisis involving the distrust among the Oyo Mesi councilors and the power struggle between some of the traditional chiefs and the Alafin is believed to have been the reason for the decrease of the central authority and eventual destabilization of the Oyo Empire. This situation culminated when one of the Yoruba sub-units, known as Ilorin, whose Oba, Afonja, formed an alliance with the Hausa-Fulani to wage a war against the Oyo Empire. Having defeated the Oyo Empire, Afonja, the Oba of Ilorin, whose army was formed mostly from his Hausa-Fulani neighbors, was eliminated afterwards. Afonja was killed by the Hausa-Fulani in order to take over Ilorin and expand the territory as part of the Northern emirate under the control of the Sultan of Sokoto.[1206] It is observed that a friend of Afonja, referred to as Alimi, a Muslim Malam, who, on the invitation

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1202   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 117.
1203   Falola, Toyin, 2004, op. cit., p. 153-154.
1204   See ibid., p. 154.
1205   See Diamond, Larry, 2003, op. cit., p. 21-22.
1206   See Burns, Alan: *The History of Nigeria*, Allen and Unwin, London 1972.

of Afonja, found his way to Ilorin in order to assist as a priest and later appointed the Emir of Ilorin, contributed to the elimination of Afonja, therefore, to the relegation of Yoruba Oba in Ilorin until present-day Nigeria.[1207] As a result, "with the Yoruba of Ilorin coming under the Islamic authority of the Muslim Hausa/Fulani Empire, the Islamic religion gradually found its way into the political life of the Yoruba."[1208]

Irrespective of the penetration of Islam into the Yoruba territories, J. Nwankwo contends that one can see the separation of religion from the political sphere in the Yoruba kingdom. This is buttressed by the argument that Ile-Ife, the ancestral home of the Yoruba, represents the religious location, headed by the king Oni of Ife, whereas Oyo represents the political and administrative site of the Yoruba kingdom where the king Alafin symbolizes power and authority of the Yoruba people. Therefore, this resembles a kind of separation of powers or even a reflection of modern secularism (separation between religion and state).[1209] Furthermore, J. Nwankwo notes that "the spiritual dynamism of the Yorubas, coupled with their political expansionism, enhanced their rapid spread far and wide in the west of Africa."[1210]

Aside from that, E. Osaghae believes that the decline of the Yoruba Empire was caused by inter-group rivalry and the infiltration of the Hausa-Fulani through the jihad wars into the Yoruba territory. However, additional factors are considered as part of the reasons which weakened the kingdom:

> By the end of the nineteenth century, […] the region witnessed internecine wars, mostly among the Yorubas, which were marked by the emergence of new states and political alliances (Ijebu, Ibadan, the Egba confederation and Ekiti *parapo*, among others, rose to prominence at this time). The wars and crises in the West were instigated and fuelled by the meddling of Fulani Jihadists whose sphere of influence spread to Oyo and other northernmost part of the West, and European traders and colonialists who, particularly since the era of the slave trade, pursued manipulative and divisionist strategies to gain trade advantages and retain political-cum-military control in the region.[1211]

In spite of the pressures from different sides that finally led to the decreasing power of the old Oyo Empire, E. Osaghae assumes that "in terms of political organization, the groups in the West ranked next to the centralized theocracies of the Islamized parts of the north."[1212]

1207   See ibid.
1208   Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 124.
1209   See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 32-24.
1210   Ibid., p. 33.
1211   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 3.
1212   Ibid., p. 3.

With respect to the decision theory of identity and difference, it is evident that, in view of the alliance between Afonja and the Hausa-Fulani fighters as well as the circumstances leading to the death of Afonja, one can argue that alliances were formed and dissolved when the resources acquired were to be distributed. The theory gains credence with regard to the importance of group size for the attainment of particular goals and a possible politics of inclusion and exclusion which may be introduced after the resources are acquired.

However, the formation of an alliance between Afonja and members of another ethnic group, in this case the Hausa-Fulani, against his own linguistic and regional ethnic group is another proof that ethnic boundaries are drawn arbitrarily for the purpose of achieving certain political, material and symbolic resources. The dethronement of Afonja, the annexation of Ilorin and the enthronement of Alimi, a Muslim Malam from the Hausa-Fulani emirate, as the Emir of Ilorin, as already described, is an indication of how ethnic identity can oscillate. That is the reason, prior to the attainment of independence, for the objection raised by the Hausa-Fulani to the demand for the restoration of Ilorin back to the control of Yoruba South West region, a political battle which is still part of the unresolved contemporary political conflicts in Nigeria.[1213] Therefore, both instrumentalism and decision theory are applicable and reflective of the phenomenon of ethnic groups and ethnicity.

As indicated above, it can be argued that, irrespective of certain similarities such as the hierarchical political structure perceived between the Hausa-Fulani Kingdom and the Oyo Empire by the Yoruba, both ethnic groups can be portrayed as distinct regional powers from different perspectives. For example, religion, which plays an important factor in the formation of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, is of little significance to the Yoruba as myths are used in the construction of the Yoruba ethnic identity. Herein, for the Yoruba ethnic sub-units, common heritage of their ancestors in Ile-Ife and a common language are the conditions for identifying oneself as a Yoruba.

Based on the observation in the analysis, it will be shown how these structural differences, in terms of various political, religious and administrative worldviews between the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani, were manifested in Nigeria's post-independence period and in the current conflicts that confront the country. Nevertheless, before any further analysis is carried out, the Igbo ethnic group, which is one of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria and the remaining one to be discussed, will be given attention in the next section.

1213   See ibid., p. 6.

5.3.3 The Igbo Ethnic Group

Having indicated in the previous sections that the Igbo ethnic group (also known as Ibo) is, besides the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba, the third largest ethnic group in Nigeria, it is pertinent to study how the Igbo conceive themselves as an ethnic entity and whether such an ethnic formation, known as Igbo identity in modern Nigeria, can trace its existence as far back as the pre-colonial time.

The name Igbo is assumed to have a Sudanic ancestry of an African tribal title, which means a people[1214] and, from another point of view, it is suggested that the name Ibo, which is synonymous with *Igbo*, has its origin from the Igbo people themselves as it was used derogatorily by the riverine Igbo (Oru) against their other fellow Igbo in the hinterland.[1215] At the same time, when one makes references to Igbo, as an ethnic group, it is essential to note that, according to J. Coleman, there are approximately 30 Igbo sub-tribes, 69 Clans and about 500 autonomous villages or villages groups in Igbo land.[1216] That is why it is of importance to find out if the current Igbo, as an ethnic group, present themselves as a unified entity in contemporary Nigeria and whether they are represented outwardly too within the Nigerian political landscape as one people speaking with one voice.

Unlike the centralized political system of the Hausa-Fulani and the semi-centralized one of the Yoruba, the Igbo lack a centralized political system.[1217] It is illustrated that traditionally, the Igbo did not constitute a centralized, but rather a decentralized political system. That is why it is common in Igbo land to place emphasis on such sub-units as the Owerri Igbo, the North Eastern Igbo, Cross River Igbo, Western Igbo and Onitsha Igbo.[1218] Some differences, with respect to distinct political structures found in Igbo land, are identified by M. Chukwuma as follows:

> Some section of the Igbo who owe their origin to the Igala and Benin people took along with them the political culture of their "mother ethnic groups" who had the monarchial system. This system was different from the political system of the other Igbo. The Onitsha Igbo, who are typically example of the Niger Igbo, traced their origin to Benin. They believe that their ancestor, Chima, and his relations migrated eastwards from Benin. The presence of different ranges

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1214   See Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 35.
1215   See ibid., p. 34.
1216   See Coleman, S. James, 1965, op. cit., p. 30.
1217   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 125.
1218   See ibid, p. 125-126.

of Igbo peoples between the Edo of Benin area and the Onitsha Igbo seemed to confirm this migration claim of the Onitsha Igbo.[1219]

According to the above, there are different conceptualizations of political culture among the various Igbo ethnic sub-units and, according to E. Osaghae, the Eastern region of Nigeria, which is where the Igbo are situated, displays a proliferation of segmentary, non-centralized and autonomous city-states.[1220] The only exceptions, as already indicated earlier on, are the Onitsha people. E. Osaghae states his views thus:

> With the notable exception of the Onitsha, who traced their origins from Benin, the preponderant Igbo sub-groups whose members spoke dialects of a generic Igbo language and therefore had the potential of large-scale political organization failed to evolve any major centralized political system.[1221]

Therefore, the Igbo can be distinguished in their political and overall decentralized systems from the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba. In addition, in Igbo land, there is an absence of a hierarchical power structure like that found in the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba kingdoms.

Yet, one may wonder how such a region was ruled in the pre-colonial period if some of the sub-units of the Igbo have different political worldviews as they attach themselves to and associate with the systems practiced by their original ancestors who, by migration, settled and established themselves in Igbo territories. It is questionable if having such different political worldviews means that a sub-unit like that of the Onitsha Igbo will not accept any directive from or subject themselves to the wish of other Igbo groups. J. Nwankwo examines the decentralized structures among the diverse Igbo groups and surmises that:

> This vivid description of the Igbo man shows him in his true image as egalitarian, ambitious, competitive and audacious. Coupled with this, is the Igbo man's spirit of communality which tends to identify him as individual in society. This community atmosphere involves active participation of all the members of the community, whether in religious, moral, social, economic or political spheres.[1222]

Igbo land, as portrayed above by J. Nwankwo, displays an absence of a centralized authority which determines the political affairs of all the Igbo groups.

1219   See ibid., p. 127. It is to be understood that the Onitsha Igbo have a king, called the Obi of Onitsha, a political structure similar to that of the Yoruba in the sense that Obi's powers correspond to that of the Oba in Yoruba land and the Onitsha political structure was in so far centralized like that of the Yoruba under the Alafin of Oyo as the Obi was also checked from any abusive use of power by a group consisting of six powerful subordinates or advisers. For further readings, see ibid., p. 127.

1220   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 3.

1221   Ibid.

1222   Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 26-27

Drawing from the quotation, however, one can perceive that community allegiance and the fulfillment of community duties by each individual is of utmost importance.

Among all the Igbo sub-units, M. Chukwuma emphasizes that it is only the Onitsha Igbo which possesses hierarchical political institutions that are centrally controlled under the authority of the Obi—a structure similar to that of a king/Oba in Yoruba land in the old Oyo Empire.[1223] Nevertheless, the author notes that the conferral of political power on the Obi is by no means the transfer of religious authority to him.[1224] In view of the fact that the political administration of the Onitsha Igbo does not represent the overall patterns of all Igbo ethnic sub-units, one can perceive the existence of a decentralized nature of the various Igbo territories.

Irrespective of the distinctive features of some Igbo sub-units acknowledged through the historical origin of their ancestors, M. Chukwuma observes one similarity that applies to all Igbo ethnic group sub-units in his analysis thus: "Inspite [sic] of whatever differences in origins that might have existed among the Igbo peoples, they shared a common political consciousness of their individuality."[1225] By this, except the Onitsha Igbo, one may understand the reason why there is a belief in a common concept in many Igbo communities, known as the so-called Ummuna, which plays a significant role in the Igbo social organization and political structure with regard to local and kinship groupings.[1226] This implies that "the Ummuna structure is basically a social unit to which one directly belongs from birth or by adoption."[1227] Based on this understanding of Ummuna, J. Nwankwo elaborates further on its meaning and the implication of the concept thus:

> The individual acquires his identity through this Ummuna group; not out of independence on them, rather by seeing himself as an individuated member of a corporate body. A body in which personhood could be said to be articulated in, but which even though at the same time so closely associated to the individual, is not identical with his personhood. It is also the bedrock

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1223   See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 127.
1224   See ibid., p. 128.
1225   Ibid., p. 134.
1226   See ibid., p. 127. See also Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 3. Furthermore, M. Chukwuma suggests, based on his observation of the Niger Igbo, especially the Onitsha Igbo, that their self-perception and perception of the other Igbo depict a clear differentiation from the mainstream Igbo. For example, the Onitsha Igbo describe the other Igbo as "son of the Igbo". See Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 132 (footnote 72). Read also Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 3.
1227   Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 38.

of the Igbo concept of individualism and communalism. The individual operates as a free entity within the context of Ummuna.[1228]

The conceptualization of Ummuna does not imply that there were no leaders in Igbo land as it is important to acknowledge that each group or family is under the control of the moral authority of the lineage's group head, referred to as Okpara.[1229] In spite of the power of Okpara, the lineage's leader, "each lineage is totally independent, sovereign and autonomous in its internal administration, and each person has a voice in the affairs of the society."[1230]

M. Chukwuma's illustration of the majority of Igbo land allows one to identify certain important differences between the Hausa-Fulani emirates and the Yoruba Empire where any decision made by the Sultan or the Alafin was binding to all the subjects. But in Igbo land, as shown above, the village, and not the entire Igbo territory, represented the highest political institution.[1231] With regard to that, each individual (male) perceive himself as responsible for his destiny and actions. As a result, every man was simultaneously assumed to be his own head, leader and chief. Nonetheless, on the one hand, each person was under the command of *Ala* through the ancestors who distribute equal rights and equal brotherhood to all Igbo.[1232] But, on the other hand, the eldest of the families, in this sense, the Okparas, the lineage's heads, replicated the ancestors and were respected and recognized within the families that constitute the lineages.[1233]

According to such an understanding of family structures, with regard to the authority and power assigned to the Okparas, one recognizes that the village, established through the congregation of different lineages, was the most important political institution in Igbo land.[1234] Therefore, any modern conception and perception of one Igbo identity, according to the historical background of this ethnic group, is non-existent. So, unlike in the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba, power is not concentrated under the authority of one person.

In view of this, M. Chukwuma posits that the political structure of the Igbo may be perceived as gerontocratic in nature since emphasis was laid on the importance of age in social, religious and political structures. For example, only

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1228 Ibid., p. 38.
1229 It is important to note that many family units join together to form a lineage. See ibid., p. 38.
1230 Ibid., p. 39. It is further noted that the first male child of every family, based on birthright, is the Okpara of the family. For further readings, see Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 40.
1231 See ibid., p. 39.
1232 See ibid.
1233 See ibid.
1234 See Coleman, S. James, 1965, op. cit., p. 30.

the Okpara, the eldest of a family, could become the political head of that par-
ticular family and this shows that age is of significance in the Igbo tradition, as
the author further describes:

> In whatever stage within the political structure, places were always created for the existence of
> "Council of Elders". The role of the different age-groups was of great importance in the deci-
> sion-making process of the Igbo village politics.[1235]

However, age was not the only factor used as a condition in order to ascend to
positions of power, but other factors such as personal achievement in the form
of affluence, personality which was based on, for instance, power of speech,
honesty, boldness, intellectuality etc., could also be the determining factors that
may be considered in order to assume such power of authority in Igbo land.[1236]
M. Chukwuma expounds this:

> In very many cases, only those people who were able to accredit themselves with some person-
> al achievement were allowed to sit in council with elders. It was mostly the rich Igbo, or men
> of great honor and achievement that could afford the expenses of "taking a title". The taking of
> a title was seen as a social and political elevation of one's status. But, in traditional Igbo soci-
> ety, only people of moral integrity were allowed to take titles.[1237]

Another important element in the Igbo pre-colonial tradition was religion. Un-
like the Hausa-Fulani, however, somewhat similar to the separated role of reli-
gion and politics in the Yoruba tradition, religion in Igbo land displayed a de-
centralizing trend in Igbo politics. It is illustrated that, on the one hand, each
Igbo perceives himself as a religious phenomenon in as far as each individual in
this community is of the belief that he possesses in him a personal divineness,
which is referred to as *chi*.[1238] Therefore, the expectation is that, politically, the
role of any individual in the Igbo society is guided by his chi. On the other hand,
the Okpara, who is the political leader of a family is equally the religious head
of that particular family. However, when religion is mentioned within the con-
text of Igbo tradition, Islam and Christianity are not meant or referred to, but
rather traditional religions, as M. Chukwuma highlights the limited role of reli-
gion in the following statement:

> The role of religion in the Igbo politics was most conspicuous in the judicial system. The spir-
> its of the dead ancestors, the priests of the shrines and the elders who were believed to be
> nearest to the ancestors, formed the court of last jurisdiction. It was with the use of religion and
> the belief in the supreme deity "Chukwu", that the Aros used to displace the village courts of
> the elders, whereby the Aro Chukwu Oracle became for most Igbo the last court of appeal. The

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1235   Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 140.
1236   See ibid., p. 141.
1237   Ibid., p. 141.
1238   See ibid., p. 145.

> Arochukwu was the Oracle only central organ which succeeded in unifying almost all Igbo political societies into a juridical-political people.[1239]

However, this central role of unifying all Igbo communities assigned to Arochukwu does not by any standard denote any interruption in the political nature of Igbo traditional systems in which individualism is of utmost importance.[1240] Therefore, the assertion by E. Osaghae that Arochukwu, a name described in E. Osaghae's analysis as "long juju" or "masquerade", "attempted to exert political and religious overlordship over several Igbo sub-groups"[1241] remains unverified as it is contradictory to the spirit of individualism in Igbo land based on the analysis carried out so far.

According to the formation of different Igbo sub-groups existing side by side, it is perceptible that the pre-colonial Igbo traditions exhibited the decentralization of authority and power. The Onitsha Igbo, which has a different political understanding, makes it clear that there was no single Igbo ethnic group identity, but rather many identities of several Igbo ethnic sub-groups. The movements of people from one place to the other, for example, the Onitsha Igbo, signalize that ethnic identity is neither a constant nor a fixed phenomenon, but rather it swings and, is therefore, subject to change. Similarly, the significance of individualism, as observed in the discussion, shows a clear demarcation between the centralized power under one authority of the Hausa-Fulani and the semi-centralized authority in Yoruba land. In this case, every individual (male) perceives himself as an authority and even a spiritual being within the context of the Igbo tradition. Individualism, as such, is not in existence in either of the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani kingdoms.

One can argue that, in view of the findings and analyses on the three largest ethnic groups, it is unlikely that a country like that of Nigeria may exist without any external influence and, in this case, its formation by the British colonialists which forced the amalgamation of diverse ethnic groups that have different conceptualizations about the role of politics, power and religion in their respective traditional territories.[1242] When considering the differences among these three largest ethnic groups, one understands the complexity that may emerge in the formation of a country with more than 250 ethnic groups and the difficulties such a country may experience when attempts are made towards constructing a

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1239   Ibid., p. 146.
1240   See ibid., p. 146.
1241   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 3.
1242   See ibid., p. 3-4.

nation. J. Nwankwo summarizes these perceived fundamental differences among various ethnic groups in Nigeria as follows:

1) The multitudinous ethnic entities that constitutes [sic] today's Nigeria were basically, psychologically, politically, sociologically, ethically, religiously and culturally diversified.

2) That through the conquest of Islam, the North became organized in an Islamic fashion, with central authorities of semi-independent Emirs with a centre of locus as the Emir of Kano. That the Yorubas had already a long-standing culture of hierarchical nature centered on the age-old system of Oba kingship. That in Igboland, the concept of a central authority prior to the advent of the Europeans was a mirage and the people were traditionally and endemically democratic.[1243]

Nonetheless, with respect to the illustration of major differences among the ethnic groups, one can argue that these so-called distinctions, despite being emphasized do not necessarily imply the outbreak of conflicts. In addition, it is undoubted that these perceived differences may be a precondition for the occurrence of conflicts, but, they do not on their own lead to or denote conflicts. In accordance with the position of this research work, questions concerning "who politicizes ethnicity and how ethnicity is politicized" are of significance to the outbreaks of conflicts in Nigeria and these questions will be applied when discussing and analyzing the source of conflicts in subsequent sections. The question of how diversity evokes conflicts among various ethnic groups in Nigeria and some of the fault lines which exist between and among these ethnic groups after the attainment of independence in 1960 will be highlighted by using specific factors of analysis in the following section.

5.4 The Source of Conflicts: Federalism, Military Intervention and Religiosity

After the analysis on the historical background of the three largest ethnic groups, there are numerous factors which can be examined as the source of conflicts in Nigeria, however, this section will concentrate on and investigate only the three most important factors which are fundamental, as points of analysis, within the framework of this research study.

These three factors play significant roles in how ethnicity is politicized within Nigeria and one of the three factors considered in this work is federalism which, as many authors believe, is an essential factor when one views the issue

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1243   Nwankwo, O. Josephat, 1998, op. cit., p. 47.

of ethnicity and politics in contemporary conflicts in Africa's most populous country.

Secondly, another aspect to be examined is the military intervention in politics, although the military force will not be observed or analyzed as an independent factor, but rather within the context of the establishment of federalism in Nigeria. In this sense, the intervention of soldiers in the political process of Nigeria after the attainment of independence in 1960 will be discussed as well as how ethnicity, as a tool, is used by some of the so-called military elites to politicize ethnicity.

Lastly, the issue of religiosity, which is a contending point of conflict in the Nigerian state as its significance relatively depends on the roles and importance attached to it by various ethnic groups in different regions of the country, will be approached.

R. Suberu depicts the present state of Nigerian federalism in his observation of the origin of the country's federal structure by first tracing its beginnings back to the colonial period:

> Nigeria's present geographical boundaries were established in 1914 with the amalgamation of the two contiguous British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. The aim was to ensure the financial viability of the British colonial project through the economic unification of the relatively poor but larger northern protectorate with its more prosperous southern neighbor. The amalgamation did not, therefore, engender genuine integration among the disparate communities encompassed within Nigeria's artificial boundaries. Rather, rising ethnic and regional antagonisms within the new Nigerian state necessitated the progressive decentralization of the polity, leading ultimately in 1954 to the establishment of a three region federal system, which survived into independence in 1960.[1244]

From this point of view it can be argued that federalism in Nigeria is established on three regional governments, which implies, where the three largest ethnic groups, as discussed earlier, constitute the majority within their respective regions. In addition, such a federal structure, as introduced by the British for their own interests, can be perceived, first and foremost, as an artificial construction of federalism because, based on the instrumentalist approach, the politicization of ethnicity is set in motion by this arrangement. A federal arrangement, in this sense, is used as an instrument to usher in so-called neo-colonialism. In view of the decision theory of ethnicity and difference, ethnic identity, which is an important factor in contemporary Nigeria of over 250 ethnic groups, is engaged in matters concerning the drawing of boundaries and redrawing of boundaries. All

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1244   Suberu, T. Rotimi: "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience", in: Turton, David [Ed.]: *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, James Currey et al., Oxford 2006, p. 65-92 (68).

these factors regarding the British establishment of federalism are indications of "self" and "others" with respect to the distribution of political powers and the resources in post-independence Nigeria.

In view of this background, it is understandable that the colonial government's establishment of a three regional federal structure highlights the dichotomization of the country into the majority "us" and the minority "them", as D. Turton asserts:

> At the time of independence, in 1960, Nigeria had a tripartite federal structure, which gave regional autonomy to the country's three largest ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region, the Igbo in the Eastern Region and the Yoruba in the Western Region. This arrangement gave overwhelming political dominance to the Northern region, which contained over half of the country's population and two-thirds of its territory.[1245]

Due to further agitation, protests against marginalization and demand for autonomy as well as the political crisis instigated by the minority ethnic groups in the federation afterwards, the fourth region, known as the Mid-West Region, was formed in 1962. Thereby, a new region, carved out of the former Western Region where the Yoruba ethnic group originally dominated, set in a re-organization, with regard to the drawing and redrawing of ethnic boundaries, of the political and economic affairs of the country.[1246]

From the onset of federalism in Nigeria, the next section will investigate and highlight the factor federalism in the post-independence period and the conflicts arising from it.

5.4.1 Federalism in Nigeria

A federal system of governance is to ensure equity, fairness and justice in an ethnic and religiously pluralistic country such as Nigeria, however, this concept of federalism is understood to be one of the most contentious issues generating conflicts in Nigeria.[1247] On the question of what the contemporary concept of federalism means, W. Ricker defines it thus:

1245   Turton, David: "Introduction", in: Turton, David [Ed.]: *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, James Currey et al., Oxford 2006, p. 1-31 (6).
1246   See Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 203.
1247   Harneit-Sievers, Axel: "Nigeria after the Presidential Elections. Report of a Conference in Bonn", in: *Afrika Spectrum*, Vol. 33, Issue 3, 1998, p. 351-358 (354).

> Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.[1248]

According to the statement, there is a division of power taking place among the tiers of government mentioned. As the central government has certain fields of competence, so there are equally specific powers assigned to the regional governments through which both arms of government carry out their activities without one stepping on, violating or hindering the other.

That being said, federalism is introduced in order to ensure peace in certain societies where there are multiple ethnic groups with diverse cultural, religious, linguistic backgrounds, a reason why A. Lijphart posits that "federalism tends to be used in two kinds of countries: relatively large countries and plural societies."[1249] W. Riker notes that the adoption of federalism is a constitutional negotiation which takes place among politicians and the aims of which are based on military and diplomatic defense or aggression. However, some conditions are set out when politicians bargain for the adoption or extension of federalism which, as W. Riker explains, are important:

1) A desire on the part of the politicians who offer the bargain to expand their territorial control by peaceful means, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggrandizement.

2) A willingness on the part of politicians who accept the bargain to give up independence for the sake of the union either because they desire protection from an external threat or because they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the federation.[1250]

Furthermore, W. Riker, denouncing the aforesaid political function or condition, goes on to include other functions of federalism such as social and economic aspects because of his view that maintaining only a political meaning in understanding the condition for the adoption of federalism is too narrow and reductionist in nature.[1251]

Based on this explanation, especially the essence of the federal structure in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society like Nigeria, it is expected that lingering problems such as the emergence of artificial boundaries, rising ethnic and religious antagonism among the over 250 ethnic groups will be solved. Contrary

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1248 Riker, H. William: "Federalism", in: Greenstein, I. Fred/Polsby, W. Nelson [Eds.]: *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 5, *Governmental Institutions and Processes*, Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts et al. 1975, p. 93-172 (101).

1249 Lijphart, Arend: *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1999, p. 195.

1250 Riker, H. William, 1975, op. cit., p. 114.

1251 See ibid., p. 114.

to this expectation and in consideration of the statement credited to the International Crisis Group, one may perceive and question the essence of the concept of federalism which, though expected to usher in peace, however, is turned into a contending point of conflicts that it is initially expected to hinder:

> Nigeria's federal system and politics are deeply flawed, contributing to rising violence that threatens to destabilize one of Africa's leading countries. Failing to encourage genuine power sharing, they have sparked dangerous rivalries between the centre and the 36 states over revenue from the country's oil and other natural resources; promoted no-holds-barred struggles between interests groups to capture the state and its attendant wealth; and facilitated the emergence of violent ethnic militias, while politicians play on and exacerbate inter-communal tensions to cover up their corruption. The government has been quick to brand many of the symptoms, especially the rise of militancy, as simple criminality to be dealt with by more police and more troops. But unless it engages with the underlying issues of resource control, equal rights, power sharing and accountability, Nigeria will face an internal crisis of increasing proportions.[1252]

From the above, it can be argued that Nigeria's federalism, in as far as resource distribution and political resources are concerned, evokes conflicts. In addition, having emphasized the importance of negotiations and bargaining attitudes as conditions for the adoption of a federal system, Nigeria's federalism, from the onset, lacks the necessary political condition in order to sort out the division and distribution of economic, political and social resources among various ethnic groups in the Nigerian federation.

Irrespective of the introduction of the federal concept by the colonialists when the country attained independence in 1960, it is not yet clear why Nigerian politicians and leaders who, after many decades of modifying this federal structure, are yet to come up with a relative compromise agreed upon by most of the ethnic groups as a solution. Otherwise, one continues to question why federalism is still a contentious point of conflicts in the country. In R. Suberu's illustration, Nigerian federalism can be viewed from two perspectives because, on the one hand, it has so far been successful as it is able to hold the various ethnic groups, referred to in his work as sovereign units, together:

> The Nigerian federation is contemporary Africa's largest and longest experiment in the use of federal institutions to manage cultural-territorial pluralism and conflict. The federation is historically disaggregative in that it was formed by the devolution of a formally unitary polity

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1252 International Crisis Group, written on 25/10/2006, with the title "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", electronically retrievable under the following homepage: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/Nigerias%20Faltering%20Federal%20Experiment [03/05/2013].

rather than by the coming together of sovereign units. It is territorially and ethnically fragmented […].[1253]

But, on the other hand, Nigeria's federal structure is all along modified and altered by numerous individuals, groups and leaders, especially the military elites, to the extent that further modification, especially the creation of new states, is demanded by numerous ethnic groups who still feel dominated, short-changed, excluded or marginalized within the Nigerian state.[1254]

As a result, it is pertinent to examine the causes of this dissatisfaction and to investigate why Nigerian politicians and so-called leaders/elites are unable to come up with a satisfactory federal structure acceptable to all. These are some of the issues which the following section will focus on and address.

5.4.2 Federalism: The Instrument of the Nigerian Military Elites

With respect to the Nigerian federal system, one may raise questions about the existing structure of the federation in terms of the manner in which it has been modified in recent decades, since the attainment of independence, and by whom.

In view of the introduction of a federal structure based on three regions in 1954, which, as already indicated, favored the dominant Northern Hausa-Fulani as they constitute the largest ethnic group, not only in the North, but also in a region with the largest population in Nigeria. V. Bennett and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene opine that, as a result, the beneficiaries of these structures (the Hausa-Fulani) were determined to maintain the status quo and, if necessary, fight in order to preserve the already existing structures from any changes.[1255] Consequently, the first attempt to introduce a unitary system of government during the first military rule headed by a Southerner in 1966, six years into independence and self-rule by Nigerian political leaders, was objected to and resisted by the Northerners who viewed such changes as a threat from the South.[1256]

1253   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 65. As emphasized further by R. Suberu, Nigeria at independence in 1960 started off with a unitary system of government with three regions and the fourth region created in 1963. This arrangement was made in order to stem down the possibility of ethnic conflicts that may arise in the political landscape of Nigeria after the attainment of independence in 1960. See ibid., p. 65-92.

1254   See ibid.

1255   See Bennett, P. Valerie, Kirk-Greene A.H.M.: "Back to the Barracks: A Decade of Marking Time", in: Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.]: *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, Frank Cass, London 1978, p. 13-26 (15).

1256   See ibid., p. 15.

Following this occurrence, it can be argued that the dichotomization of the country into South and North, which started during the colonial regime, continued after the attainment of independence. A similar analysis is carried out by D. Turton, who explains that the failed attempt made by certain Southern elites to reform the federal structure, also perceived as the cause of the Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970, may be viewed as the reason for the dissolution of the four regions and the creation of federal states:

> In 1967, steps were taken to undermine the Hausa-Fulani hegemony by redrawing the boundaries between the federal units to create a twelve-state structure, six in the north and six in the south. This came too late, however, to prevent the attempted secession of the Igbo-dominated Eastern Region, as the Republic of Biafra, which was only prevented by the Nigerian Civil War in (1967-70). [1257]

Irrespective of the introduction of the federal state governments, as alternatives to regional structures, there continue to be persistent demands for further restructuring as a solution to the problems bedeviling the nation. [1258] But, one wonders if it is possible to create 250 states from 250 ethnic groups and if the creation of new states is truly the solution to the dissatisfaction among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Moreover, as D. Turton cites in his work, apart from the initial 12 states, "seven additional states were created in 1976, bringing the total to nineteen. This was increased to thirty in 1991 and thirty six in 1996." [1259] One might argue that the creation of more states in Nigeria depicts signs of disunity and dissatisfaction of certain Nigerian ethnic groups, a position R.T. Akinyele underscores in his analysis: "In Nigeria, state creation was originally conceived as a solution to the problems of ethnic minority groups […]." [1260] However, different ethnic stakeholders still clamor for the restructuring of the federation, a persistent problem which a former military Head of State illustrates below:

> According to him, the present arrangement has brought about series of role conflicts between the central government and the federating units. There is too much power concentration at the centre, thus weakening the comparative abilities of the federating units at generating wealth for their constituents. [1261]

1257   Turton, David, 2006, op. cit., p. 6.
1258   See Suberu, T. Rotimi: "The Struggle for New States in Nigeria, 1976-1990", in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 361, October 1991, p. 499-522 (519).
1259   See Turton, David, 2006, op. cit., p. 6.
1260   Akinyele, R.T.: "States Creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in Retrospect", Review, in: *African Studies Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2, September 1996, p. 71-94 (71).
1261   Report published by a Nigerian Magazine, known as *Newswatch Magazine*, on 1 February 2012 with the title "Nigeria's Threatened Federation", viewed electronically on 29 February 2012.

By this, it is made clear that the creation of additional states is being used to mitigate the domination of the three largest ethnic groups over the minorities and their control of the central government, as initially experienced during the practice of regional federal structures, until 1966. Therefore, with this new arrangement, it was expected that the minorities may be pacified and, by this, the tension caused by the alleged marginalization of the ethnic minorities may be reduced, as D. Turton emphasizes in the following statement:

> This meant, among other things, that they were less able to threaten the authority of the central government. Fourteen of the thirty-six federal subunits, furthermore, are ethnically heterogeneous states, under the control of smaller 'ethnic minorities', which have thus been given a larger political voice in federal affairs.[1262]

R. Suberu believes that the challenges of ethnic discontentment are not about federalism, but rather the crisis associated therewith arising from the way Nigerian federalism is shaped and practiced. Furthermore, the federal structure in Nigeria is alleged to be flawed, especially after the creation of states in 1967 and above, as there are certain fiscal, structural and constitutional centralization initiated by Nigeria's politicized soldier.[1263] For example, state and local governments, which are the federating units and the second as well as the third arms of governments to the federal government, are continually relegated in terms of their diminished relevance in the federation and their fiscal dependence on the federal government. In view of that, it remains doubtful if one can maintain referring to such a system as federalism. This loss of power and capacity in the so-called Nigerian federation is what E. Osagie refers to as the reduction of state powers of Nigerian federalism:

> Nigerian states have almost completely lost their autonomy. [Over the years, both local and state governments] have witnessed unprecedented reductions in states' powers. The entrenchment of local government autonomy and the loss of some state powers to local authorities, the reduction of states' financial powers and their share of the Federation Account […].[1264]

In addition, it is pertinent to indicate, so as to avoid digressing into other themes, the role of the military in the advent of such a federal system which undermines the powers and independence of the states and local governments, as guaranteed in a federal structure, and to investigate if and how this situation generates conflicts.

1262   Turton, David, 2006, op. cit., p. 6.
1263   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 68.
1264   Osaghae, E. Eghosa: "The Status of State Governments in Nigeria's Federalism", in: *Publius: The State of American Federalism*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1991-1992, Summer 1992, p. 181-200 (181).

As demonstrated in the analysis on the maintenance of current Nigerian federalism, it is emphasized that a federal structure underlines a philosophy in which "sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and its constituent units, creating what is called federation […]."[1265] To sum up, based on the analysis carried out so far, federalism is characterized by non-centralization of authority, which implies the decentralization of power.[1266] Therefore, it is contradictory to note, based on the practice of Nigerian federalism, that the autonomy of the states and local governments is being eroded by the federal government.

Irrespective of the integrating role federalism plays in unifying the various ethnic units, which the country is comprised of, U. Inamete is of the view that this same federalism will, for a long period of time, be the source of destabilization in the Nigerian state. Some of the current problems which the author stresses are stated thus:

> The factors that have made various Nigerian governments, both military and civilian, maintain federalism, continue to have impacts on the Nigerian polity. Their impacts will continue in the foreseeable future. As noted above, these factors are ethnicity, religion, the economy, the local government systems, the military, the federal character principle, federal fiscal policy, and the issue of states creation.[1267]

The contemporary Nigerian federal formation, as is currently practiced, has its genesis in a wide range of modifications and changes that can be traced back to occurrences during the course of recent decades, especially after independence, which, as R. Suberu observes, can be viewed from about five different angles:

– The first Nigerian democratic republic, from 1960 to 1966, inherited from the British colonial administration with political institutions that resembled a Western parliamentary federal structure shaped by three (to

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1265   Adesopo, Ayo: "Re-Examining the Failing Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations and Sustenance of Nigerian Federation", in: *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 7, No. 10, October 2011, p. 107-121 (108). As emphasized further, he notes that, in alignment with the position of R.A. Dunmoye that the division of power between the regions and the government at the centre is constitutionally so enshrined that each tier of government can carry out its duties conferred upon it by the Constitution to the greatest extent possible without interference and hindrance from the others. In this case, each tier is financially independent of the other. Additionally, the second division rests on the pillar that constituent states, not the federal or central government, are responsible for social services such as health care, education and social welfare. See ibid., p. 108.

1266   See ibid., p. 109.

1267   Inamete, B. Ufot: "Federalism in Nigeria", in: *Round Table*, Vol. 80 (318), 1991, p. 191-207.

four in 1963) large territorial regions which are constitutionally strong, though unequal, regions.

–   The fall of the First Republic in 1966 enabled the first experience of military rule, 1966-1979, and the abolishment of the existing federal regional structures by the introduction of twelve states in 1967 and 19 states in 1976. With this, the process of fiscal and constitutional centralization emerges.

–   The second Nigerian democratic republic, 1979-1983, is established on a structure of moderate institutions, however, a resemblance of the restructuring carried out by the military between 1966-1979, but an introduction of an American form of a Presidential system with a strong federal executive and a nationwide unified local government system as well as a centralized legislative power which makes it possible for the federal government to intervene in all issues viewed as of public importance.

–   With the collapse of the Second Republic in 1983, the second era of military men in power begins which lasts until 1999. Within this period, the extension of centralizing powers in the Nigerian polity is experienced and new states are created, increasing the number of states to thirty six by 1996. During this time, the military stopped the political activities by its annulment of results of the attempted presidential elections in 1993 and, thereby, discontinued by cancelling the proposed Third Republic.

–   The Fourth Nigerian Republic begins in 1999, until the present, with its inception based on the occurrences leading to the discontinuation of third Nigerian republic and an updated modified version of the 1979 Constitution for the second republic.[1268]

From the above, one can argue that the centralization of the federal structures in Nigeria, as currently practiced, was shaped mostly by the Nigerian military. Irrespective of the abolishment of the four federal regions and the introduction of a federal state structure in 1967, many observers and analysts viewed this process as a national service by a group of military elites in the first military regime (1967-1976) in order to salvage the country from collapse. Thereafter, as R. Suberu notes, all other restructuring exercises and alterations, with respect to the constitutional framework of the federal arrangement practiced in Nigeria, are illegitimate and artificially carried out:

1268   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 68-69.

But, partly because they did not face the type of monumental challenges to Nigerian unity that confronted their military predecessor, the second generation of politicized soldiers in Nigeria governed in a complacent, corrupt and institutionally destructive manner, severely compounding many of the pathologies already inherent in Nigeria's centralized, oil-fueled, multi-state federalism.[1269]

Furthermore, as seen from above, it can be emphasized that the Nigerian soldiers were responsible for the destruction of federalism in Nigeria within the period between 1984 and 1999 as the creation of additional states during the aforementioned period was politically carried out as a way by the military to engender for itself some political legitimacy from certain ethnic sections of the country, mainly the minorities.[1270] Arguably, by implication, this process of artificial creation of states is the reason for the current economic and political crisis, which R. Suberu's analysis points to: "Largely designed to generate some political legitimacy for the military, the multiplication of new financially dependent and inefficient jurisdictions was a recipe for hyper-centralization."[1271] Such centralization of powers through the proliferation of states is aimed to weaken the constituent units, which means that the weaker and less viable the states become, the stronger and more powerful the center emerges.[1272] Another reason for the creation of states is that "statehood has, in fact, been an important factor in the allocation of a wider range of opportunities in the Nigerian federation."[1273] Otherwise, one might imagine that the elites/leaders exploited federalism, as an instrument, with respect to states' creation, to politicize ethnicity. In response, R. Suberu opines that, for instance, the principle of a federal character, one of the parameters used in the allocation of resources to the states and a core constitutional article since 1979, is employed to determine:

[T]he representation of every state in crucial federal institutions and positions, and also prescribes an important role for the states in the election of the president and the formation of political parties. Socio-economically, the federal character principle has been widely interpreted as prescribing equality between the states of the federation in the distribution and utilization of

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1269   Ibid., p. 71.
1270   See ibid. The creation of new unviable states, as from 1984 to 1996, constitutes an exercise that is economically costly for the country: "The most destructive policy involved the politically motivated and economically costly proliferation of constituent state administrations, which increased from nineteen to twenty-one in 1987, thirty in 1991, and thirty-six in 1996". Ibid. It is important to note that the continued agitation for further fragmentation and reorganization of the federation is still intense and unyielding. See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 1991, op. cit., p. 519.
1271   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 71.
1272   See ibid.
1273   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 1991, op. cit., p. 500.

federal development projects, including the location of, and admission of candidates into, federal educational institutions.[1274]

Moreover, the reasons which allow for the continued centralization of the Nigerian federal structure, irrespective of whether the alleged manipulation of processes are deliberate or not, can be viewed from two perspectives, which K. Panter-Brick considers thus:

> First to be noted is the impact of wealth from oil. The oil industry has become by far the greatest single source of public revenue. It is moreover located mainly in two of the States or offshore […]. Thus the only national custodian of the oil revenues—for Nigeria as a whole—is the federal government. The only way in which the other states, and the vast majority of the population, can share in the revenue from oil is through action taken by the central authority.[1275]

One of the consequences of relying solely on revenues from the sale of oil to finance the activities of the state is the abandonment of other sectors such as agriculture which, initially, geared the economic structures of the regions.[1276]

That being said, by extension, until the revenue allocation formula, which is dependent as from 1970s and beyond on crude oil/gas sales, is reformed in order to bridge the gap between the oil-producing states and the non-oil producing states, the monolithic economic base will continue to be a contentious issue in as far resources are accrued and distributed herefrom in a centralized manner. In view of these developments, a practice which is still in operation in contemporary Nigeria is that most of the revenues from the sales of oil is collected by the federal government and redistributed to the state governments, partially on equal basis and partly based on the proportion of the population.[1277]

1274   Ibid., p. 501.
1275   Panter-Brick, Keith: "Introduction", in: Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.], 1978, op. cit., p. 9. With respect to the oil revenue which aids the centralization policy in Nigeria, K. Ogbonnia states the following in the abstract of this work: "Nigeria is the world's 6th largest producer of crude oil and strategically important to the continued development of Africa. Developing a vibrant system that fosters effective solutions to long-term problems could have a positive impact on the country and the African continent." Ogbonnia, S. Ken: *The Political Party System and Effective Leadership in Nigeria: A Contingency Approach*, (Dissertation, Texas), Walden University, Texas, USA 2007, p. 1-170. Dissertation is electronically retrievable under the following link: http://search.proquest.com/docview/304764033 [04/05/2013].
1276   Initially, before the dissolution of the four regions and the introduction of the derivation principle in the distribution of resources in Nigeria, K. Panter-Brick explains that the four regions could be perceived as self-sufficient, however, the "change is epitomized by the marked departure from the rule of derivation, whereby revenues are apportioned to the areas in which they originate." Panter-Brick, Keith: "Introduction", in: Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.], 1978, op. cit., p. 3.
1277   See ibid., p. 7.

Therefore, given the role of the central authority, in this case the federal government, one can argue that the centralization of resources in Nigeria, with respect to the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity of various ethnic groups, contributes to the intensity of the struggle for the control of the center. Thereby, the control of the federal government becomes a zero-sum game for all ethnic groups, as A. Okolie indicates:

> With an analysis of the construction of ethno-political identities in Nigeria, [it can be shown that] ethnic identities in postcolonial, multicultural societies are often constructed by the state and the elites that control it and use state power for accumulation and to maintain distributional inequities.[1278]

The Nigerian situation is further compounded with a structure of federal arrangement that is based on a federal character principle[1279], which implies that since "one region contained more than half of the total population of the country and easily translated its numerical strength into electoral support and, hence, political dominance"[1280], it automatically controlled the center of power. On this ground, in view of the dominance of a particular ethnic group controlling the military regimes which are responsible for processes of state creation,[1281] R. Suberu raises allegations of manipulation and lack of transparency in terms of the number of states created and how they were created. In his view, it favored one particular ethnic section of the country and one religious group:

> Nigeria's federal character was also severely assaulted by the sectional (specifically northern Muslim) domination of and conduct of all the four military administrations that ruled the country during the 1984-99 era.[1282]

Therefore, the suspicion and the fear of being marginalized by one ethnic group (the Hausa-Fulani northern Muslims) from one section of the country contributes to the dissatisfaction perceived by the other two major ethnic groups and

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1278   Okolie, C. Andrew: "The Appropriation of Difference: State and the Construction of Ethnic Identities in Nigeria", in: *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2003, p. 67-92 (67).

1279   N. Orji says the following about the federal character principle in Nigeria: "The federal character principle ensures that each state of Nigeria is considered in the selection and recruitment into government agencies while zoning is an informal arrangement in which the states in Nigeria are aggregated into zones or regions for the purpose of allocating offices." See Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2008, op. cit., p. 32.

1280   Yahaya, D. Ali: "The Creation of States", in: Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.]: *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, Frank Cass, London 1978, p. 201-223 (211).

1281   The importance of statehood, in this sense, is shown to be an essential factor in the distribution of resources with respect to the allocation of various kinds of social opportunities within the context of the Nigerian federation. See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 1991, op. cit., p. 500.

1282   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 68-69.

the numerous ethnic minorities in the southern as well as in the northern regions. This discontent in the polity is, according to R. Suberu, illustrated below:

> The excesses of the northern-dominated military provoked a bitter southern-based campaign for a power shift from north to south, for decentralization and restructuring of the federation and for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to debate and decide the desirability and modalities of Nigeria's existence as a multi-ethnic political community.[1283]

Further agitations in view of a demand for the restructuring of the country can be viewed on many fronts as the leaders/elites of the country were able to fall back on their ethnic origin in order to solicit for support when in competition with other ethnic groups as a means to attain certain resources. A similar position can be seen in the analysis of K. Panter-Brick:

> […] Nigerian's certainly believe that the critical support is more often that of elite or rather of elite groups. It is their aggregate or consolidated support, exchanged for public employment, patronage and the opportunity to prosper as a class which is most likely to be the decisive factor.[1284]

As a result, the Nigerian masses can be perceived to operate within the context of their ethnic backgrounds with respect to the way they render assistance to their leaders/elites who they regard as their representatives when in competition over the acquisition of political goods or material and symbolic resources. By implication and "given that intense political competition by the ethno-regional elite groups is a major source of instability in Nigeria"[1285], one can argue from an instrumentalist stand point that conflicts ensue in view of the manner in which the elites monopolize power in order to attain and distribute resources to their ethnic groups within the context of nepotism as well as to maintain political power by all means possible.

In addition, it may also be argued that "these processes ensure that the top political offices are shared among Nigeria's ethno regional elite groups",[1286] as a majority of citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin or affiliation, live in poverty. Therefore, it is clear that the center of political power is dominated by certain individuals from various ethnic groups who, through the patronage system, not only use their positions to reward their supporters from their own ethnic groups, but also use this power to construct and stir up discontent among peoples from various constituencies, especially in times when these so-called leaders/elites feel neglected and marginalized from positions of power.

1283   Ibid., p. 71
1284   Panter-Brick, Keith: "Introduction", in: Panter-Brick, Keith [Ed.], 1978, op. cit., p. 6-7.
1285   Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2008, op. cit., p. 15.
1286   Ibid., p. 32.

In this regard, J. Goldstone opines that "in order for popular discontent or distress to create large-scale conflicts, there must be some elite leadership to mobilize popular groups and to create linkages between them."[1287] According to this assertion, one can argue that ethnicity does not lead to conflict, unless it is politicized. In this sense, ethnic awareness, in terms of constructed ethnic differences, is appropriated by certain actors, usually the so-called leaders, in order for the dichotomization of "us" and "them" to occur, a situation that often leads to the outbreak of violent conflicts.

This whole analyses show that the military elites and leaders of various regimes dominated by the Northern Muslim majority, the Hausa-Fulani in the period from 1984 to 1999, were responsible for the centralization of the federal structures in Nigeria, a process which not only institutionalized, but also politicized ethnicity and, consequently, leads contemporarily to "the manipulation of ethnic conflicts, and more recently, the appearance of quasi-private militias attached to particular fractions or individual strongmen […]."[1288] Some of the effects of such undertakings, as witnessed in the favoritism of certain ethnic groups from a particular region of the federation, undermine the fundamental principles of federalism which results to bad governance and reflects a centralized patron-client type of political system as well as "portend a widening breach in the politics of Nigerian society and of armed factional splits in Nigerian's army."[1289] Such a scenario reflects and depicts a process of politicized ethnicity as indicated in the theoretical part of this thesis.

Furthermore, R. Williams indicates other challenges faced with regard to the military involvement in the politicization of ethnicity:

> This leaves Nigeria's military rulers and their civilian politician associates inherently incapable of dealing with basic political issues that, if left unresolved, threaten Nigeria's unified existence. These include, for example, recognition of minority rights. Unable to delegate authority or resources for fear that critics will use them to organize against the regime, the military manipulates patronage to pit groups against one another. This encourages local politicians to mobilize followers to demand patronage from the central government or protest that others are more favored. Federalism of this sort is the institutional framework of a centralized national patronage system. True fiscal self-reliance and administrative delegation are incompatible with the president's need to dominate resources and exercise personal control over who receives access to opportunity.[1290]

1287   Goldstone, A. Jack: "Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2002, p. 1-21 (8).

1288   See Reno, Williams: "Crisis and (No) Reform in Nigeria's Politics", in: *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 1, April 1999, p. 105-124 (106).

1289   Ibid., p. 106.

1290   Ibid., p. 108.

According to this, one can argue that the organization of federalism in Nigeria, in view of the power of the presidency, enables a platform for the politicization of ethnicity to take place. With respect to instrumentalism, one can understand that such a situation in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society may lead to conflicts when ethnic groups scramble for access to the same resources.

Having acknowledged that the centralization of power, which, in this case, is concentrated in the presidency where the issue of resource distribution is determined and the decision of who gets what and how becomes an avenue of a zero-sum game among various ethnic groups, one can argue based on the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity that the Nigerian military can be identified as one of the actors responsible for the construction of the dichotomized "us" and "others". However, the divisions in the polity caused by the "military federalism" can be perceived from different conflicting fronts and fault lines which A. Mustapha conceives as cleavages below:

> The most important of those cleavages are the cleavages (1) between the three majority groups, (2) between the three majority ethnic groups on the one hand and the 350 odd minority ethnic groups on the other hand, (3) between the north and south, each consisting of three geo-political zones and (4) between different religious affiliations. Some of these cleavages overlap, for example, the southeast zone overlaps with Igbo ethnicity and Christian religious affiliation.[1291]

From the above, it is conceivable according to the decision theory that both ethnic and religious divisions are avenues which ethnic entrepreneurs (actors/leaders) from various ethnic backgrounds exploit as an instrument to arouse sentiments in order to mobilize their followers against any perceived sense of exclusion and marginalization.

According to A. Adesopo, the military intervention into politics is responsible for the centralization of powers by the federal government to the detriment of the states and local governments:

> The entry of the military into politics in 1966 marked the beginning of post-independence centralization of the country's political and administrative system by putting in place the famous Decrees 1 and 34 (of 1966) to liquidate [the] Nigerian Federation and giving rise to a "new Federation' characterized by greater centralization and consolidation of the national authority. By implication, Nigeria became a unitary state in Federal disguise […], and from which Nigeria is yet to recover. This is often traced partly to what obtains in the military where the relationship is always hierarchical in nature.[1292]

Having noted the military's incursion into the political scene, it begins to become clear why and how conflicts arise from such an arrangement. Repeatedly, with respect to the question of how certain military elites or actors are able to al-

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1291   Mustapha, R. Abdul, 2009, op. cit., p. 562.
1292   See Adesopo, Ayo, 2011, op. cit., p. 109.

ter the structures of the Nigerian state in such a hierarchical manner, A. Phillips, in response, highlights the over-centralization of Nigerian federalism by the military elites.[1293] He illustrates that the country was ruled roughly two-thirds of the time since independence under military dictatorships. And, as he further points out, the current federal arrangement is flawed due to the monolithic command structure of the military which enables a firm control of the state and local governments in comparison to civilian administrations.[1294]

That is why A. Adesopo, in addition to his allegation of the military centralizing trend of Nigerian federalism, raises certain questions which are important to the Nigerian state: To what extent has economic or fiscal power been centralized, what are the implications of the centralization for Nigerian Federation and what alternative fiscal arrangement(s) can be suggested?[1295]

As other scholars such as J. Mackintosh and A. Harneit-Sievers bring up, with respect to the consequences of the hyper-centralization of Nigerian federalism,[1296] the type of politics played under the Nigerian federal arrangement rests its focus on access to and distribution of the centrally distributed wealth, rather than its production.[1297] On this ground, J. Mackintosh accentuates the conflicts which may arise from a centralized federal system as currently practiced in Nigeria:

> Within the Federation there has been a continuous struggle for power using institutions which though imported from Britain, have been developed and operated in an entirely African manner. The hard work and determination put into this struggle is explained by the tremendous importance of political power in an underdeveloped country. To win an election means that you, your village, tribe or region obtains all the top posts, the lucrative contracts, roads are tarred, scholarships are provided, wells are dug, and new forms of industry introduced. To lose is to surrender not only the good things but many of the necessities of life.[1298]

In view of this argument put forward above, it is uncertain if Nigeria can survive under the present federal arrangement when one considers the question posed by W. Reno about the crisis bedeviling the country.[1299] He believes that the military's intervention in politics undermines the military's institutional develop-

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1293   See Phillips, O. Adedotun: "Institutional Reform in Nigeria", in: *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1991, p. 229-232 (231).
1294   See ibid., p. 231.
1295   See Adesopo, Ayo, 2011, op. cit., p. 109.
1296   See Harneit-Sievers, Axel: "Review: 'Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria' by Rotimi T. Suberu", in: *Africa Today*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2002, p. 138-140 (139).
1297   See ibid., p. 139. Also accessed through internet sources on 23/10/2012 in the work Mackintosh, P. John: "The Struggle for Power in Nigeria", in: *Transition*, No. 22, 1965, p. 21-25 (22).
1298   Ibid., p. 22.
1299   See Reno, Williams, 1999, op. cit., p. 105-124.

ment and professionalism. Having said that, he opines that the "alleged coup plots, intra-military bombings, the manipulation of ethnic conflicts"[1300] pose threats to the existence of the country. At the same time, the allocation of resources which is guaranteed by the division of powers among the recognized tiers of government, according to the quotation above by J. Mackintosh, is non-existent as political powers and resources are already centralized by the military.

As a result, as A. Harneit-Sievers explains, the struggle for the domination of the centrally concentrated resources under the control of the federal government is responsible for the zero-sum game in the distributive structure that characterizes Nigerian politics.[1301]

According to the theoretical background of this thesis, one can perceive that the military elites/actors, not the military as an institution of its own, contribute towards the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria. The following section will focus more specifically on the crises and conflicts which arise as a result of the demands and requests towards the reform of the Nigerian federal structures as a way to accommodate marginalized ethnic minorities in order to strengthen the principles of equity, justice and fairness in the Nigerian nation.

5.4.3. Elites and Federalism: Ethnic Minority and Federal Character Principle

This section will study the role certain actors, in this case the military elites in collaboration with their civilian counterparts, play in the establishment of a federal structure which, purposefully or unintentionally, results in various competing demands and conflicts in the Nigerian state.

It has already been emphasized in preceding sections how certain ethnic groups through prolonged military intervention and rule, perceived in the Nigerian polity in its ethnic sense as the retention of power by the Hausa-Fulani, dominate the center of power and, thereby, intentionally or inadvertently distort the political or rather the democratization process of Nigeria. With the long military hold on power, the political process and secularism have not been steadily developed, but rather have become avenues from which conflicts with ethnic and religious connotations emanate. Irrespective of attempts by various military regimes to modify and reform the federal structures in order to meet the yearnings of the numerous ethnic groups as well as prepare the country for a demo-

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1300   See ibid., p. 106.
1301   See Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2002, op. cit., p. 138-140.

cratic dispensation, it is observed that the current ethnic and religious crisis in the country exists as a result of prolonged military rule.

However, it is important to stipulate the definition of democracy which was demanded during the long period of military administration as a solution to the country's problems:

> Democracy is a form of governance in which the supreme power or authority in a society is vested in the people and that power is exercised by the people directly or indirectly through an institutionalized system of representation involving periodically held free and fair elections.[1302]

R. Dahl highlights the importance of certain requirements or criteria in order for a democracy to persist and through which democracy can be measured, as summarized thus: 1) the right to vote; 2) the right to be elected; 3) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 4) elections that are free and fair; 5) freedom of association; 6) freedom of expression; 7) alternative sources of information; 8) institutions for making public policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences.[1303]

If democracy, as shown above, means the government of the people for the people and by the people,[1304] it is unclear what the effects of a long period of military regimes may pose to Nigerian federalism in the course of developing democratic institutions in the country since the attainment of independence.

Furthermore, S. Nolutshungu believes that the most important aspect of democracy is consent, which means the extent to which the citizens are ready to submit to authority with respect to the reciprocal relationships that exist between the state and individuals and the state's authority legitimized by the will of the people which translate into force through free and fair electoral processes.[1305] But, contrary to the notion of democratic rule, it is made known, as shown in the previous section, that the intervention of the military actors/elites in the coun-

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1302   Ejie, A.E.: "Democracy, Ethnicity, and the Problem of Extrajudicial Killing in Nigeria", in: *Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2006, p. 546-569 (547). The original definition of *democracy* cited in the text is from *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985 ed.*

1303   See Dahl, A. Robert: *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London 1971, p. 2-3.

1304   See Lijphart, Arend, 1999, op. cit., p. 49.

1305   See Nolutshungu, C. Sam: "Fragments of Democracy: Reflections on Class and Politics in Nigeria", in: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1990, p. 86-115 (86). It is further asserted that the reciprocal recognition of the rights of individuals and the obligations of the state, that means between the rulers and the ruled, are supposed to be embodied in institutions and procedures which are broadly regarded as upholding those principles. See ibid., p. 86.

try's political landscape since independence far outstrips the short period the country is ever able to experience democratic dispensation.[1306]

The aforesaid long period of military intervention and rule in the political development of Nigeria is not, however, to be used as a single factor responsible for the instability and challenges the country faces. As a result, this section will analyze some of the current challenges confronting the country, for instance, the minority question within the context of the federal structure and the role the introduction of the Federal Character Principle plays in finding an amicable solution to the crises of resource distribution. According to the report of the International Crisis Group, a Federal Character Principle can be understood thus:

> The constitution enshrines a "federal character" principle, a type of quota which seeks to balance the apportionment of political positions, jobs and other government benefits evenly among Nigeria's many peoples […].[1307]

However, the report highlights one of the constraints hampering the effectiveness of this Federal Character Principle which "is distorted by a second principle, that of indigeneity, which makes the right to such benefits dependent upon where an individual's parents and grandparents were born."[1308] That is why N. Nwosu is of the view that the background of Nigeria's conflicts can be perceived from an economic perspective with respect to the distribution of resources. He describes it as follows:

> […] Nigerian politics has centered mainly on the struggle for power between the various factions of the country's ruling elite. This struggle is usually noticed among the different segments of the civilian political elite. It also occurs between the civilian and the military elite. At times, it is intra military. This struggle for power often leads to various scenario [sic] that have occurred in Nigerian politics.[1309]

With this in mind, one can argue, based on the instrumentalist approach, that the reasons for the outbreaks of conflicts in Nigeria may be seen as arising in the struggle for the attainment of resources by different ethnic stakeholders. The restrictions imposed upon the acquisition of these resources by the aforementioned constitutional "indigeneity clause" provide another platform for manipulation by certain individuals and actors, who use this avenue for the mobilization of followership in order to destabilize the polity.

1306   See ibid., p. 86-115.
1307   International Crisis Group, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. i (preface).
1308   See ibid. p. i (preface).
1309   Nwosu, I. Nereus: "Thirty Six Independence in Nigeria: The Political Balance Sheet", in: *Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell'Istituto italiano per l'Africae l'Oriente*, Vol. 55, No. 2000, p. 155-166 (152).

Corresponding to the instrumentalist view, for example, the illustration of N. Nwosu describes, in reference to acquisition of resources, the extent to which the leaders struggle for political power in order to gain access to scarce resources:

> It is on this premise that different individuals at the corridor of political power use their position to see that distribution of the national resources go the way they want it. Because of this, there is often struggle for power among both the civilian and the military political elite in Nigeria over who will control the government of the country so as to have access to state patronages.[1310]

Within the context of a zero-sum game, one can argue, whether it involves the military elites or their civilian counterparts, the aim in this "game" is to neutralize anyone perceived as a political adversary by appealing to ethnic sentiments that often result in conflicts. Such acts and processes constitute the politicization of ethnicity, as one can observe from this point of view that, irrespective of the existence of various ethnic groups within the federation, the perception of ethnic groups' differences remains dormant until certain political, military or religious leaders and actors are able to construct and activate these differences, thus causing conflicts. N. Nwosu contends with this line of argument below:

> It is in the bid to outwit each other that several colorations are given to the struggle for power by various political factions so as to gain the sympathy of the different primordial groups that constitute the Nigerian domestic public.[1311]

Based on this, one can argue that, in a politically charged environment where resources are distributed among ethnic stakeholders, the person or ethnic group that dominates the center of political power and who, at the same time, possesses the rhetorical ability to convince others to follow in his footsteps or understand his actions gains the highest share of the resources.[1312]

Consequently, Nigerian federalism, a mechanism which is introduced to curb the domination of the polity by a particular ethnic group, ensures equity and access to public goods and privileges among all ethnic groups within the federation when in competition for resources.[1313] In spite of the fact that the federal system practiced in Nigeria was designed to regulate the distribution of scarce resources, it failed to tackle the challenges it was meant for and, therefore, does not function effectively.[1314] As a result, politics has become a struggle

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1310   Ibid., p. 153.
1311   Ibid.
1312   See ibid.
1313   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa: "State, Constitutionalism, and the Management of Ethnicity in Africa", in: *African and Asian Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, 2005, p. 83-105 (85).
1314   Mackintosh, P. John, 1965, op. cit., p. 21.

and, therefore, a zero-sum game. This is why the aim of every ethnic group is to capture and retain political power by all means available.

One can see that the military elites are responsible for the dissatisfaction caused by the federal structures practiced in Nigeria. These practices by the military depict the politicization of ethnicity through the modification of certain aspects of the federal structure in order to favor one ethnic group and one region in a multi-ethnic society at the expense of others. The plans for the processes leading to states' creation in Nigeria, especially for the period between 1984 and 1999, are introduced by various military regimes. However, it is pertinent to understand that these military regimes were dominated by the Hausa-Fulani Northern Muslims, a situation which makes these processes suspicious in terms of manipulation and still contestable in contemporary Nigeria.[1315]

In view of this development, one might question the functionality of democracy under which a constitutional federal structure is devoid of and lacks unanimous consent by the Nigerian people since all restructuring and modifications of Nigerian federalism were construed and implemented by military administrations. Furthermore, it cannot be known whether the military's alteration of the federal structures in Nigeria is deliberately carried out and manipulated. But it is important to note that the Nigerian people are sidelined and excluded by the introduction of this federal arrangement since it is a process which is of utmost importance to the peaceful co-existence of various ethnic groups in the country. E. Osaghae describes the situation in Nigeria as follows:

> In Nigeria, where the federal system was thoroughly diminished by prolonged military rule, the politically expedient acts that were devised to keep the state from disintegration, such as power 'shift' from the dominant north to the south and the various steps that were taken to appease the Niger Delta minorities, did not get constitutional translation. Meanwhile, the sustained clamor for *true* federation, including greater resource control by oil-bearing states and other aggrieved groups, remained largely unheeded.[1316]

1315   R. Suberu believes that the four military administrations which ruled from 1984 to 1999 are responsible for the flaws and ineffectiveness of the Federal Character Principle. See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 68-69. He also explains the dominance of certain ethnic groups in the Nigerian military formation as follows:
"These factors include the ethnically preferential recruitment practices implemented by the colonial authorities, different ethno-regional attitudes and incentives and, more critically, the displacement of southern Igbo officers from the military in the aftermath of the 1967-70 ethno-military coups and civil war. In essence, Nigeria's longest-serving (1966-75) military head of state during the first era of military rule (1966-79) was a northern Christian, while of four successive head of state during the second phase of military rule (1984-1999) were northern Muslims." Ibid., p. 89.

1316   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2005, op. cit., p. 105.

Under this circumstance, the Nigerian federation arguably constitutes a source of conflicts among the various ethnic groups that make up the federation. As a result, E. Osaghae asserts that there is the continued demand for power re-arrangement, equity and fairness and the redistribution of resources in Nigeria and he elucidates that "this was the nature of the clamor and sometimes violent demands for power-sharing, minority rights, self-determination, decentralization and resource redistribution"[1317], all of which raise questions on the existing structures of the federal arrangement since the beginning of the 1990s.[1318] Such discontentment among the Nigerian populace poses a challenge to the federal system adopted in the country as many ethnic groups believe that it is manipulated by some section of the country in order to practice "exclusionary and hegemonic modes of state politics."[1319] However, the people now "demanded new agendas for constitution-making"[1320] processes which will be based on negotiations, debates and concessions to the all aggrieved people, all Nigerians.

It can be foreseen that the crisis will continue to persist in the country in as far as the control of political power becomes a do or die affair among the diverse ethnic groups, a situation which the following elucidates:

> Indeed, the state has functioned as (or been perceived to function as) an instrument of ethnic domination and exclusion in several countries. It is as such that the state lacks the relative autonomy required to enhance its capacity to manage internal conflicts. This lack of relative autonomy underlies the prevalence of personal authoritarian rule, patron-client and neo-patrimonial modes of political support and legitimacy, and the informalization and instrumentalization of politics […].[1321]

Based on the argument that the Hausa-Fulani northern Muslims represent a majority of the military elites/actors and, by that, were in control of the military regimes that created additional states during the period 1984-1999, one can see that, "of course, efforts by ethnically defined privileged power-holders to retain the status quo by all means, including military intervention (Nigeria) and exclusivist constitutional orders"[1322] express a source of concern in terms of the ongoing tension and conflicts. This perception often leads to the fear of being dominated aroused between various ethnic groups in the country, which Y. Crawford perceives as ethnic diversity, an instrument of division utilized by

1317   Ibid., p. 91.
1318   Ibid.
1319   Ibid.
1320   Ibid.
1321   Ibid., p. 84. The quotation is stated in the work of E. Osaghae, however, the source of the argument is taken from the analysis of P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, see Chabal, Patrick/ Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 1999, op. cit.
1322   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2005, op. cit., p. 87.

ethnic entrepreneurs to make a country ungovernable whenever ethnicity is politicized.[1323]

Within the framework of Y. Crawford's analysis, one can argue that dictatorships such as the military regimes, in the case of Nigeria, repress the politicization of ethnicity for a particular period when in power, however, in a democratic stage where political activities are in progress, ethnicity is a tool exploited by political actors to destabilize the polity, an action that can endanger the survival of any country. He buttresses his perception in the following statement:

> The crucial query was whether ethnic diversity would make new states ungovernable. The first response was to contain and repress ethnicity through the imposition of single party systems. The first three independence decades of single-party authoritarianism drove ethnicity into the shadows, but entirely failed to eradicate its mobilizing potential. The widespread though uneven democratization surge of the 1990s revealed that ethnicity was alive and well, often shaping political alignments and finding public expression.[1324]

It is not clear whether the manipulation by the elites, especially certain inciting comments made by both local and national elites, often charge up the polity and lead to conflicts. But one cannot refer to conflicts within the framework of this research study, with respect to outbreaks of both religious and ethnic conflicts, without giving consideration to the roles played by the political actors/elites therein. On this basis, N. Orji gives the following view about the problematic of politicized ethnicity in Nigeria:

> Although the Nigerian political elite developed along five distinct ethno-regional lines, they are drawn together by two major linkages—the North-South and majority-minority divisions, depending on whether the issue at stake is office distribution, revenue allocation or state creation. With regards to the issue of office distribution, the contest is usually between the Northern elite (a coalition of North and Middle Belt elite) and Southern elite (an alliance of Yoruba, Igbo, and Niger Delta elites).[1325]

The question of who the elites are who are responsible for the decision-making has become an issue of debate since the attainment of independence, but, in consideration of the ethnic formation of Nigeria which comprises about 250 ethnic groups, one can easily imagine who the elites are, whose activities involve the decision-making process and who also are responsible for the politicization of ethnicity within the context of the contestation for political power and the distribution of resources within the federation. M. Burton and J. Higley describe elites as follows:

1323   See Young, M. Crawford, 2004, op. cit., p. 6-7.
1324   Ibid., p. 6-7.
1325   Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2008, op. cit., p. 9.

> Political elites are the several thousand persons who hold top positions in large or otherwise powerful organizations and movements and who participate in or directly influence national political decision-making. They include not only the familiar 'power elite' triumvirate of top business, government, and military leaders, but also top position holders in parties, professional associations, trade unions, media, interest groups, religious, and other powerful and hierarchically structured organizations and sociopolitical movements.[1326]

With this in mind, one can argue that the definition of elites, as stated above, encompasses and identifies most of the actors involved, with regard to the historical background of Nigeria, in the political process of the country.[1327] Equally, with the definition of elites stated above, one can assert that all elites may qualify as *political* elites. Nonetheless, the particular actors and individuals involved within the context of politicized ethnicity in Nigeria are yet to be named explicitly as these will be examined afterwards in the analysis of the Jos and the Niger Delta Warri conflicts.

However, N. Orji conceives the elites in Nigeria from another point of view, in contrast to the conventional majority-minority elites,[1328] the Nigerian elites can be from the dominant *and* marginal political elite groups. In view of Nigerian politics, in terms of ethnic groups, he believes that the marginal elite groups are the ones who are numerically inferior compared with the three largest ethnic groups (the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and the Igbo).[1329] In his study, he is of the view that conflicts break out whenever these ethnic minorities are not acknowledged in and involved with power sharing process in Nigeria, which implies that conflicts are constructed by the elites in matters regarding the distribution of political positions and sharing of resources:

> In this context, the Northern, Yoruba, and Igbo elites constitute the dominant elite group, while the Niger Delta and Middle Belt elites are the marginal elite group. The relationship between the dominant and marginal elite groups plays out vividly in the area of territorial and fiscal power-sharing […].[1330]

1326   Burton, Michael/Higley, John: "The Study of Political Elite Transformations", in: *International Review Sociology*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2001, p. 181-199 (182).

1327   This is by no means to state that all actors or elites involved the in the political process and decision-making in Nigeria are identified by this definition. For instance, multinational oil companies, as will be shown in the analysis of the Warri crisis in the Niger Delta, are part and parcel of the actors engaged in the political decision-making process of the country.

1328   Majority-minority elite groups, in this sense, refer to the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria and the over 250 other ethnic minorities. This means the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo on the one hand and, on the other hand, the other numerous ethnic minorities. See Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2008, op. cit., p. 35-37.

1329   See Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2008, op. cit., p. 1-229.

1330   See ibid., p. 36.

Considering this factor, it is emphasized that, since independence, the marginal elite groups, on the one hand, have exploited the avenue of state creation and revenue allocation arrangements to gain more resources from the center into their territories, whereas the dominant ethnic groups, on the other hand, further take advantage of their historical dominance, also using the processes of state creation and revenue allocation arrangements, as instruments in order to maintain as well as to maximize their share of the national resources into their domains. Therefore, "in other words, both the dominant and marginal elite groups have an interest in using state creation and revenue allocation arrangements to advance or redress their political fortunes."[1331]

One can argue that, according to the instrumentalist approach, the eruption of conflicts, with respect to either the ethnic majority domination of resources or the discontentment of the minorities, evinces the manipulation of the elites when in competition for the distribution of scarce resources. Also, from the perspective of the decision theory of identity and difference, one can argue that any conflict which may arise from such an arrangement can be perceived from the standpoint of a majority versus minority conflict, which creates a dichotomization of "self" and "others". A. Ojie and C. Ewhrudjakpor opine that such a process corresponds to the politicization of ethnicity, which may be the decisive factor in the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria:

> The issue of power and the hedonistic predisposition to rule on the part of elite elements, the interaction between power and material reward are crucial factors for understanding the causes of ethnic nationalism and conflict in Nigeria. The elite as the holders of pre-eminent positions in society manipulate the non-elite in their attempt to optimize their assets to gain maximum resources. They achieve this through their actions and utterances.[1332]

These occurrences surrounding the issue of political power and the distribution of resources in Nigeria enable the ongoing rivalry among diverse ethnic groups in the country as well as providing a platform for ethnicity to be politicized, which, in the Nigerian situation, is a threat to the existence of the country. Based on the analysis conducted so far, E. Osaghae portrays the condition of Nigeria from the following point of view:

> Of all the claims that rival those of the state—to autonomy, self-determination, and loyalty of citizens—none, it can be argued, threatens its existence as much as those made by ethnic groups. In this case, obviously, the ethnicity of reference is *politicized ethnicity*, which involves mobilization (or counter-mobilization), demands, and political action by members of ethnic groups in furtherance of constitutive ethnic interests. Politicized ethnicity can take sev-

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1331   Ibid., p. 36-37.
1332   Ojie, E. Andrew/Ewhrudjakpor, Christian, 2009, op. cit., p. 9.

eral forms, ranging from demand and struggle for independent statehood to those for protection of language and culture, local political autonomy, and other group rights.[1333]

From the above, with regard to the functionality of federalism in Nigeria, one can argue that the existing federal arrangement in the country is a political mechanism through which ethnic interests are protected since the fiscal policy is unitary and not federal, a situation which hinders the effectiveness of the Federal Character Principle.[1334] Otherwise, how can one discuss peace, stability and development in a society such as Nigeria with respect to the application of its Federal Character policy in making appointments and selecting people for offices and political positions? It can be argued that such policy is short of merit in as far as the Indigeneity Clause, as will be seen below, constrains any Nigerian from securing a job and students from gaining admission into tertiary institutions in any part of the country without being marginalized.[1335] In the same vein, E. Osaghae critically examines one of the sources of politicized ethnicity with respect to the instrument of indigeneity for political elites in Nigeria and its implication:

> In Nigeria, for example, the definition of citizenship on the basis of the indigeneity principle, which defines the individual in terms of the *indigenous* ethnic group to which either or both parents belong (see provisions on citizenship by birth in the 1999 constitution and all constitutions since 1979), has sustained the hierarchical and discriminatory system of ethnic relations that dates back to colonial times. Also, contestations over citizenship arising from the exclusionary redefinitions by new power-holders, leading to loss of citizenship by members of groups to which opposition elements belong, have had serious consequences for ethnic relations, including civil war.[1336]

Regarding this, one can argue that ethnic politics is elevated in Nigeria to such an extent that, based on the aforementioned configuration of ethnic groups in the Nigerian federation, E. Osaghae is of the opinion that ethnic mobilization is a consequence of marginalization resulting from the perceived unjust distribution of resources.[1337] Due to this, the International Crisis Group highlights in its report prevalent cases of discrimination against non-indigenes in all existing 36 states which often lead to inter-communal and sectarian conflicts. For example,

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1333   See Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2005, op. cit., p. 84.
1334   See Jinadu, L. Adele: "The Constitutional Situation of the Nigerian States", in: *Publius*, Vol. 12, No. 1, *State Constitutional Design in Federal Systems*, 1982, p. 155-185 (158-159).
1335   See Olugbade, Kolade: "The Nigerian State and the Quest for a Stable Polity", in: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1992, p. 293-316 (295).
1336   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2005, op. cit., p. 86.
1337   See ibid., p. 84-85.

as will be analyzed in detail at a later point, the Jos conflict is an instance of such a conflict with devastating consequences, as the report shows:

> The result is widespread discrimination against non-indigenes in the 36 states and sharp inter-communal conflict. In Plateau State, for example, recurrent clashes since 2001 between "indigene" and "settler" communities competing over political appointments and government services have left thousands dead and many more thousands displaced.[1338]

The report further emphasizes that the reason for these conflicts can be attributed to "the deep sense of alienation felt by diverse groups throughout the country [which] has fuelled the rise in ethnic identity politics, ethnic militias [etc.]."[1339] Furthermore, ethnic divisions in the form of militancy, secessionism and fundamentalism which threaten the existence of the country have been experienced in the country in recent years:

> In twelve northern states, disputes over the application of Islamic law (Sharia). The militias demand ethnic rather than national loyalty. Some, such as the Movement for Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), seek secession from Nigeria. Others, like the O'odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) and the Bakassi Boys, operate as security outfits, including for state governments, and are responsible for human rights abuses that have left hundreds dead.[1340]

This lends credence to E. Osaghae's position, who propounds that the present situation sees Nigeria teetering on the brink of collapse because "when the demands of ethnicity are of the anti-system variety—autonomy, self-determination, secession, and independent statehood"[1341], then it poses a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the state authority and threatens its existence.[1342]

O. Nkolika characterizes the forces threatening the survival of the state as an important matter which is aggravated to the extent that it is currently a dilemma for the Nigerian masses, as it concerns the issue of loyalty to the state or loyalty to the in-group movement established and known in contemporary Nigeria as ethnic militias.[1343] As the author portrays, Nigeria has been at a crossroad since independence, struggling with the pluralistic nationalities it contains with-

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1338   *International Crisis Group*, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. i (preface).
1339   Ibid., p. i (preface).
1340   Ibid. p. i. (preface).
1341   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 2005, op. cit., p. 85.
1342   See ibid, p. 85.
1343   See Nkolika, E. Obianyo: "Citizenship and Ethnic Militia Politics in Nigeria – Marginalization or Identity Question? – The Case of MASSOB", in: *Paper Presentation at the 3rd Global Conference on Pluralism Inclusion and Citizenship, 18th/19th November 2007*, Salzburg/Austria, p. 1-11. Electronically accessible under the following homepage: http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ati/diversity/pluralism/pl3/Obianyo%20paper.pdf [20/05/2013].

in it for the loyalty and allegiance of its citizens.[1344] The reasons are attributable to a number of factors, among which are the colonial origin of the Nigerian state, ethnicity and exclusionist politics of the hegemonic ruling elite in post-in-dependence Nigeria. However, in recent years, O. Nkolika indicates that there is a perceived heightening, resurgence and escalation of identity politics in the country, a situation which may be understood in J. Campbell's description of his essay "Nigeria's Battle for Stability".[1345] O. Nkolika classifies the situation as follows:

> The current trend manifests not just through the 'ethnicization' of party politics and electoral politics but through a civil cum military outfits known as ethnic militias. These militias and separatist movements not only challenge the authority of the Nigerian state as the only body with legal or legitimate control of instruments of coercion but detracts from it the loyalty and obedience that should accrue to it from her citizens. Thus the Nigerian citizens are torn be-tween loyalty to the Nigerian State and loyalty to the in-group movements manifesting today as ethnic militias. Forced to choose between the two, loyalty to the primordial group supersedes loyalty to the Nigerian state. To many Nigerians, Nigeria is still kept together by what each group feels it can still get from it in the accumulation process and not by virtue of any legal or psychological identification with its aspirations and goals as a nation. Thus where and when any group's access to this accumulation process is denied or curtailed, a phenomenon popular-ly known in Nigeria as marginalization, the group threatens to secede. The situation is true of all the ethnic groups and movements in Nigeria. For instance the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) representing the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group threatened to secede when Chief Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba was denied his mandate as the winner of the 1993 presidential elec-tion, the various movements in the Niger Delta, namely, Movement For the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw National Council, (INC), Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Egbesu Youths also threatened to secede if they were not allowed to control the resources in their area or get larger share of the oil revenue; and likewise the Move-ment for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) representing the Igbo Nation want the state of Biafra because of feeling of exclusion from the socio-economic and political mainstream of the Nigerian state. In other words, all these groups at one time or the other demanded separate existence from Nigeria as a result of marginalization from state power, economic control and social provisioning.[1346]

1344   See ibid., p. 1.

1345   J. Campbell opines that the genesis of Nigeria's problem can be traced to an embedded sys-tem of institutionalized corruption which enables public money to be channeled into the pockets of some few Nigerians, known as the so-called "big men". As a result, the country accounts for some of the worst income inequality and social statistics on the African conti-nent. Yet, the political elites are not concerned or do not show the will to introduce any re-form of the system:
        "Politics are intense and often violent because they are suffused with a winner takes-all mentality. Patron-client networks control politicians and the political system, and those within the networks get access to the few available jobs and social services. Hence, the political economy favors personal relationships over institutions. Not surprisingly, national sentiment is declining in favor of religious and ethnic identity—and animosity." Campbell, John: "Nigeria's Battle for Stability", in: *National Interest*, No. 118, 2012, p. 31-39 (32)

1346   See Nkolika, E. Obianyo, 2007, op. cit., p. 1.

The only group identified by O. Nkolika devoid of complaints with respect to marginalization or threatening to secede from the Nigerian state, is the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), a group representing the interest of the North. The reason for its non-protesting attitude to the status quo is because "the north has been in control of political power in Nigeria for the greater part of the existence of the Nigerian state."[1347] As the analysis progresses, one may see within the framework of this research thesis how the APC and the Northern Muslim Majority are reacting to the loss of political power since the return to a democratic dispensation since 1999. This will indicate that what holds the various ethnic groups in contemporary Nigeria together, as an entity, is the acquisition of state power and rents accrued or generated from it.

Similarly, many authors such as J. Campbell, O. Nkolika, A. Afigbo, R. Suberu, A. Phillips, A. Bangura and A. Mustapha as well as reports by research institutes like the International Crisis Group observe that the cause of civil unrest in the Nigerian state can be traced to the problem surrounding the over-centralization of the country's resources and powers in one arm of government and the struggle to capture this center of government in order to administer its power to one's own uses and needs.[1348]

Such a development is what R. Suberu refers to earlier on as federalism in unitary disguise, a pattern which can be regarded as a military-facilitated multi-state federalism which, on the one side, is effective in stemming the potential of disintegrative ethnic conflicts and on the other side, however, produces contradictions and tensions of its own.[1349] This is an outcome of the evolution of "democratic deficits in a federal system that is driven by the reallocation of centrally collected oil revenues and intensely troubled by ethno-distributive pres-

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1347   Ibid., p. 1.
1348   See Nkolika, E. Obianyo, 2007, op. cit., p. 1-11. See Mustapha, R. Abdul: "Reviewed Work: 'The National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria'", in: *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 37, 1986, p. 81-96. See also Mustapha, R. Abdul, 2009, op. cit., p. 561-576; Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 65-92. Compare Langer, Arnim et al.: "Diversity and Discord: Ethnicity, Horizontal inequalities and Conflict in Ghana and Nigeria", in: *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 21, 2009, p. 477-482. More also in Phillips, O. Adedotun: "Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues", in: *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 21, Fall 1991, p. 103-111. Check Bangura, K. Abdul: Nigeria: "Reviewed Essay: Historical Treaties on Contours of Power", in: *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 2001, p. 301-311. See Afigbo, E. Adiele: "Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State", in: *Publius. The Journal of Federalism* 21, fall, 1991, p. 13-29.
1349   See Suberu, T. Rotimi: "Reinventing the Architecture of Nigerian Federalism", in: *Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 1, 2005, p. 139-154 (144).

sures",[1350] which, as a result, continually lead to agitations and demands for the creation of new states.[1351] That is why, irrespective of the current 36 states in the country, R. Suberu observes that there are more requests or demands for the creation of new states than ever before, but that "the greater the number of groups granted 'statehood', the greater the demands of minorities within these states for [new] statehood."[1352]

Despite the fact that the military elites which rule the country after the war introduced a federal façade which, on a continued basis, gave more power to the center at the expense of the constituent units,[1353] M. Brunner opines that one cannot make any difference between the military and the civilian elites because they are both politicians and strongmen who, in the same way, use legal and illegal means to plunder the resources of the state for their own personal goals.[1354]

H. Bienen posits the same line of argument as he believes that the boundary between civilians and military personnel swings and shifts arbitrarily in the course of time within a particular society.[1355] At the same time, it is possible to perceive different boundaries, meaning different positions, for various actors in and out of the military forces at a certain time and in a particular place. So, "we do not know in advance that it matters if military personnel perform political and decision-making roles in a society",[1356] therefore, it can be argued that the boundaries between civilian and military elites are blurred.[1357]

Having mentioned all of this so far, one can argue that the collaboration of both the military and the civilian elites enables the centralization of powers in such a hierarchical structure as in Nigeria. Moreover, the recommendations with respect to the modification and alteration of the 1979 and subsequent Constitutions are, beforehand, deliberated upon by constitutional drafting committees, mainly politicians, civilians and respected academicians, whose opinion are earlier sought by the military before any changes are carried out by the military thereafter. Based on this, whether military or civilian elites, the fundamental

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1350   Ibid., p. 140.
1351   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 1991, op. cit., p. 499-522.
1352   See Kamal, Youssef: "Book Review: 'Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria' by Rotimi T. Suberu", in: *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2002, p. 432-433 (433).
1353   See *International Crisis Group*, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. 2.
1354   See Brunner, Markus, 2000, op. cit., p. 277-297.
1355   See Bienen, Henry: "Armed Forces and National Modernization", in: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1983, p. 1-16 (8).
1356   Ibid., p. 8.
1357   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 198. The author notes that the military elites are not alone while carrying out their activities, but work hand in hand with their civilian allies. See ibid., p. 82.

problems with the Nigerian federalism, which make room for ethnic actors to politicize ethnicity, as R. Suberu indicates, are stated below:

> First, federalism in Nigeria is subverted by de facto hypercentralization, as resource distribution devolves top-down from the center. Second, politics within Nigeria's federal order focuses on access to and distribution of the centrally distributed wealth, rather than on its production. In effect, the Nigerian state has become a pseudofederal central arena, where struggles for shares of the 'national cake' dominate all other considerations and actions.[1358]

From the above, it is evident from an instrumentalist view that the politicization of ethnicity, which occurs whenever there is a perceived feeling of marginalization by the elites of one ethnic group or the other, is about the attainment of political power and, through it, access to resources which often leads to the outbreak of conflicts.[1359] Also, the decision theory of identity and difference depicts, when applied to the analysis, the dichotomization of "us" and "others", which categorizes, in this instance, both the civilian and military elites on the one side and the masses, the Nigerian people, on the other. However, having a single Northern ethnic group, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim, dominating and altering the federal structures in favor of strengthening the Northern hegemony illustrates another case of dichotomization into the Hausa-Fulani on the one hand and all other ethnic groups, the rest of the country, on the other.

Furthermore, the issue of religion is brought to the forefront of the argument in as far as the Hausa-Fulani, as indicated earlier on, are predominantly Muslims. This introduces a new dimension of religious categorization into "us Muslims" and "they Christians", another faultline, which becomes another avenue for the elites to politicize. Based on all these aforementioned factors, it is foreseeable how and why the country is sliding into the instrumentalist construction of various dividing lines which can simply be summarized ethnically, religiously and territorially as the majority against the minorities. These factors prompt the International Crisis Group to illustrate the situation of Nigeria thus:

> The country's history since independence suggests, however, that the politicization of ethnicity and religion and factional mobilization along these same lines is a direct by-product of the monopolization of power and assets by ruling elites eager to avoid open and fair competition. With Nigeria's emergence as a major oil producer, pervasive patron-client networks have developed at all levels of government. Federalism has permitted entitlements to be spread more widely across society but it has in turn fuelled a proliferation of state and local institutions that

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1358   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2002, op. cit., p. 138-140 (139).
1359   A. Harneit-Sievers represents the opinion that, based on the allocation of resources which are mostly channeled through the principle of equity, requests for more states are endless and often the result is that the new state which is carved out of the old one ends up receiving more resources than the original or predecessor state where the new one is created from. See Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 1998, op. cit., p. 351-358.

have made governance fragmentary and unwieldy. Unable to obtain their fair share of the country's wealth, most citizens have been left with two choices: fatalistic resignation or greater identification with alternative hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion or other factional identities.[1360]

Considering the charged atmosphere in the country, it is unclear if it is not at risk of fragmentation which may not occur peacefully. Many observers believe that there is a need for the reform of federalism in order to restructure the federation.

However, it is questionable how the constituent units, the states, can be granted autonomy when many of these states are not viable to generate their own revenues,[1361] but rather depend on the allocation distributed to them by the Federal Government that is solely generated from the sales of crude oil.[1362] Having said that, it will be important to examine how the effect of this tension may reflect on the ongoing religious conflicts in Nigeria. So far religion, as a variable, is one of the instruments identified in this research work that is exploited by the actors/elites while politicizing ethnicity in order to destabilize the polity. The next section will clarify how religion is currently being considered as one of the reasons for the outbreak of conflicts in Nigeria.

5.5 Religious Divide and the Escalation of Conflicts in Nigeria

This section will stress the importance of religion and its significance for the ongoing conflicts in the country, especially the two major world religions, namely: Islam and Christianity. In addition, emphasis will be placed on the interaction between religion and ethnicity and how both are intertwined in the case of Nigeria. In essence, religion and religious identity will be explored as a rallying point of mobilization for ethnic actors and as a very important tool in the process of politicized ethnicity which often results in violent conflicts.

Furthermore, the advent of religious extremism, with respect to the terrorist organization commonly known as Boko Haram will be investigated in order to understand its origin, structures, objectives and demands as well as the consequences of the activities of this group for the Nigerian state. On top of this, this section will attempt to determine whether only domestic or international actors are involved in the ongoing onslaught by Boko Haram against the Nigerian

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1360   See the report from the *International Crisis Group,* 2006, "Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty", op. cit., p. 1-38 (preface).
1361   See Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 1998, op. cit., p. 354.
1362   See Adesopo, Ayo, 2011, op. cit., p. 107-121.

state. Thereby, it will become clear if these so-called religious conflicts can be understood within the context of a global religious war.

Within the theoretical framework of F. Barth's instrumentalism and G. Schlee's theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, it will be shown that religion is used as an instrument of politicized ethnicity by certain actors while in pursuit of political power and material resources, a situation that leads to violent conflicts with devastating consequences.

It is been observed in recent years that religious differences are known to be a source of tension and crises which occur continually in Nigeria and hence conflicts associated with religion have been on the increase in the course of recent decades. It is not clear why religion may become an instrument of division used by certain elites to maim, destroy properties and kill innocent people in a multi-religious country such as Nigeria. In order to clarify this uncertainty about the role of religion in conflicts, this research thesis concentrates on how ethnicity is politicized, with emphasis on specific instruments of politicization which ethnic entrepreneurs deploy to awaken the ethnic consciousness of diverse ethnic groups as a means to highlight the existing differences, which often result in violent conflicts.

One of these instruments is religion and, as L. Fawcett explains, what is most striking in understanding the phenomenon of religion is its appeal to arouse the emotionality rather than the rationality of our nature.[1363] In her observation, religion and ethnicity go hand in hand and where there are ethnic conflicts,[1364] especially in a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society like Nigeria, the probability that religion will play a significant role is high. Therefore, it is important at his juncture to focus on the role religion, as an instrument of conflicts, plays and how it is being applied by ethnic and religious actors to highlight the faultline within the context of power acquisition, resource distribution and assertion of ethnic hegemony in a multi-ethnic Nigeria.

In retrospect, it can be assumed that, contrary to the objective of the centralization of power to foster unity within the framework of the Nigerian federal structure, the opposite is the result. According to A. Smith, one of the most powerful elements and forces being instrumentalized in various regions of the country endangering peace and security is religious extremism.[1365] J. Peel observes that "the pervasiveness of religion—i.e. of Muslim or Christian identi-

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1363   See Fawcett, Liz, 2000, op. cit., p. 1.
1364   See ibid.
1365   See Smith, M. Adam: "Fractured Federalism: Nigeria's Lessons for Today's Nation Builders in Iraq", in: *The Round Table*, Vol. 94, No. 1, 2005, p. 129-144 (134).

ty—as a source of communal and political conflict is now a constant pre-occupation in Nigeria […].”[1366] Under other circumstances, it would be questionable how certain occurrences could take place such as fighting and killing for religious causes as members of Boko Haram[1367] perpetrate human rights abuses according to a report written by the Nigerian newspaper *Vanguard*:

> 'You should … persevere with the difficult situation the struggle for the entrenchment of an Islamic system puts you in and seek reward from God by supporting it.' The document also restated claims that the group, blamed for more than 200 deaths already this year, does not target civilians. 'We have on several occasions explained the categories of people we attack and they include: government officials, government security agents, Christians loyal to CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) and whoever collaborates in arresting or killing us even if he is a Muslim,' the document said.[1368]

In the words of A. Ojie and C. Ewhrudjakpor, if ethnic conflicts are typically characterized by struggles and wars of subordination, rebellion or hegemony, then these kinds of conflicts can also be termed struggles for autonomy and freedom from exploitation by small groups from large groups.[1369]

Based on this, it can be argued that the activities of Boko Haram, in view of the various groups they target for extermination, represent an extreme, radical or militant and fundamentalist form of ethnic conflict in as far as it displays the construction and dichotomization of “us” Muslims and “them” Christians.[1370] Conversely, however, regarding the dichotomization of so-called religious conflicts into Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, it can be observed from the statement credited to Boko Haram that any Muslim, who is against their goals, is also a target.[1371]

But the aforementioned explanations are not by any means to suggest that only Muslims are fundamentalists or that fundamentalism is only extant in Islam, as represented by certain section of Muslims like the Boko Haram sect,

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1366   Peel, J.D.Y., 1996, op.cit., p. 607-611 (607).
1367   Boko Haram can be classified as a Nigerian terrorist organization whose members, by violent means, are making attempts to impose a strict version of Islam while they kill and destroy properties with the aim of Islamizing Nigeria. The name, Boko Haram, means western education or civilization is forbidden. See the newspaper *Vanguard*, published on 29 January 2012, with the title *Boko Haram seeks support through leaflets in Kano*. The report is retrievable under the following homepage: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/boko-haram-seeks-support-through-leaflets-in-kano [24/05/2013].
1368   Ibid.
1369   See Ojie, E. Andrew/Ewhrudjakpor, Christian, 2009, op. cit., p. 7.
1370   See Fawcett, Liz, 2000, op. cit., p. 2.
1371   Boko Haram is characterized as a terrorist group because it is widely reported that both Nigerian and the United States governments recognize this group, based on its activities, as such. See “US Declares Boko Haram as a Terror Group”, accessible online as follows: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/11/us-declares-boko-haram-terror-group [07/02/2014].

because Nigerian Christians are also observed not to be less mild than their Muslim counterparts with respect to fundamentalism. Hence, it can be argued that both Islam and Christianity contain forms of religious radicalism which are extremely destructive to the social and political cohesion of the country.[1372]

A. Smith admits in his analysis that "sectarian violence and abuse, fuelled by mullahs and priests alike, has become a common part of Nigerian life",[1373] a condition which may press readers and people following the situation in the country to question the practicability of Nigerian federalism and the durability of the country's existence. One has to wonder how religion is accorded such a role in the lives of most Nigerians that it is currently a factor which threatens the survival of the country. The Nigerian condition opens up a lot of questions:

– What is the genesis of religious conflicts in Nigeria?

– What is the respective composition of Christians and Muslims in the country?

– Is there any correlation between the number of adherents of both religions with respect to ethnic groups and regions?

– Who are the actors involved in instrumentalizing religiosity?

– Does the federal structure practiced in the country contribute in any way to religious conflicts?

These important questions will be examined and highlighted in the following section.

5.5.1 The Genesis of Religious Conflicts in Nigeria

In consideration of the recurrent conflicts involving Muslims fighting Christians in Nigeria, one can doubt if the religious crises that confront the country at regular intervals might not be grasped as proxy conflicts within the framework of what S. Huntington refers to as the "the clash of civilizations" in his work.[1374]

1372 Kwaja, Chris: "Book Review: 'Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World' by John N. Paden", in: *Journal of Global Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 188-192.

1373 Smith, M. Adam, 2005, op. cit., p. 134.

1374 Part of the analysis in *The Clash of Civilizations* shows that in the new phase of politics there will be antagonisms between and among cultures:

Otherwise, it is unclear why there are occurrences of constant clashes between Christians and Muslims which result in hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths every year.

Also, it is dubious that the rationale behind the outbreak of violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria is a result of religious clashes in Europe or in the Middle East. In the same way, it becomes difficult to explain the following scenario which, as A. Smith believes, is part of the religious problems in Nigeria: "Immediately after 11 September a huge crowd gathered in the northern city of Kano to celebrate the attacks; the mêlée that ensued claimed many lives."[1375] If the separation between ethnic conflicts and religious clashes in Nigeria is examined, it can be argued that the boundary lines are often blurred as they are drawn and redrawn arbitrarily by actors. This makes it more difficult to ascertain what constitutes the difference in the boundaries between ethnic and religious conflicts in the country as the analysis of C. Kwaja indicates: "over the last year, Nigeria continued to experience incidents of violent communal conflict along religious and ethnic lines, which are often intertwined."[1376]

In view of this development, J. Campbell opines that elites use religious rivalries to advance their own personal agenda as "shared religious identity, especially Christian [sic], can be a means of forging political alliances among numerous small ethnic groups in the Middle Belt and the North."[1377] As a matter of fact, it is important to examine the religious composition of Nigeria in order to understand how religion is accorded such significance in all spheres of the country. According to J. Campbell, both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria are highly religious.[1378] But, in consideration of M. Chukwuma's work, there are doubts expressed on the level of religiosity in Nigeria as he reminds that "the people who inhabited the territories of Nigeria until the incursion of Islam and Christianity had all practiced the traditional religion."[1379] This leads us again to reflect, as already examined at the beginning of chapter 5, on the various roles of religion in the political, organizational and administrative conceptualization of

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"The greatest divisions among humankind and dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations." Huntington, P. Samuel, 1993, op. cit., p. 22-49.

1375   Smith, M. Adam, 2005, op. cit., p. 134.
1376   Kwaja, Chris, 2010, op. cit., p. 188-192 (190).
1377   See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 45.
1378   See ibid. The book *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink* by J. Campbell discusses religiosity in Nigeria.
1379   Chukwuma, Michael, 1985, op. cit., p. 389.

societies of the three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and the Igbo, during the pre-colonial period.

Based on this different understanding of the roles accorded to religion in a country of more than 250 ethnic groups, it can be argued that religion offers a tangible instrument for ethnic entrepreneurs in the construction of identity, coupled with ethnic differences, which results in the outbreak of the so-called religious conflicts in Nigeria. J. Campbell admits that the opportunities religion, as an instrument, offers "Christian leaders, like their Muslim counterparts, do not hesitate to cultivate political links to their advantage, and vice versa."[1380] So, in most of the conflicts which have ethnic coloration, religion is frequently instrumentalized by the actors. Considering the threat of religion to the existence of Nigeria, C. Kwaja states the following:

> […] with a population of over 140 million people, its being the most populous country in Africa, the fourth largest member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), has the six largest number of Muslims in the world, it is the only country with an approximate balance between its Muslim and Christian population. Above all, its ethno-linguistic and religious diversity makes it one of the most complex countries in the world.[1381]

Therefore, it is questionable, with respect to the religious diversity of the Nigerian society, to acknowledge Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as it may exemplify an indication of politicized ethnicity in Nigeria. However, it is essential to understand the religious composition of the country so as to enable the readers to examine how Islam, Christianity and traditional religions are distributed among the Nigerian populace. R. Suberu points out the following:

> The Yoruba are religiously bi-communal because they are almost evenly distributed between Muslim and Christian adherents. However, data about Nigeria's ethnic and religious demography are notoriously contentious. This contentiousness is linked to actual and perceived politico-sectional manipulation of census figures which are widely used for constituency demarcation, administrative reorganizations and revenue allocations in Nigeria. To reduce this contentiousness, both the 1991 census and the proposed 2005-06 census have excluded ethnic and religious question. Nonetheless, it is generally estimated that approximately 50 percent of the Nigerian population is Muslim and more than 40 percent is Christian, with the remainder practicing different forms of traditional indigenous religions.[1382]

W. Morris-Halle argues that contemporary conflicts in the country are not a result of the religious pluralism and affiliation of the people in the country since

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1380   See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 50.
1381   Kwaja, Chris, 2010, op. cit., p. 188. The same data about the religious distribution among the Nigerian masses is stated by W. Morris-Halle. See Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 212.
1382   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2006, op. cit., p. 88-89.

the outbreak of religious conflicts is concentrated mainly in Northern Nigeria. He states this thus:

> The north is overwhelmingly Muslim; the southwest and southeast have been strongly influenced by Christianity, [however] the religious carnage has usually taken place in Northern Nigeria and rarely, if ever, in the south. This suggests that religious animosity may result in an eventual division of a country that was stitched together, for the convenience of the British, along sectarian lines. Nigeria is not alone in having to face this dreadful dilemma, for Muslim/Christian cleavage in Sub-Saharan Africa has played an essential role in the distrust of fellow citizens between northern Muslims and southern Christians […].[1383]

From the above, one can argue that religiously, from the onset of colonial amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 until the attainment of independence in 1960, the Nigerian state is an artificial construct. Nonetheless, the dichotomization of Nigeria into Northern Muslims and Southern Christians also denotes an instrument of division along religious lines. It is indicated, as learned from the citation, that the Yoruba are evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and, in view of that, one can assert that religion is used as an instrument by certain actors, while politicizing ethnicity, to draw boundaries along religious lines.

The same can be said of the Northern population in which most of the ethnic minorities in the north are either slightly more Christian in some states or almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims in others.[1384] From this point of view, H. Bienen cites the following to buttress the aforementioned religious composition of the north:

> But the states of what has been called the Middle Belt of the Northern Region are very mixed with respect to the Muslim proportion of their populations, running from 12 percent in Benue to 25 percent and 34 percent for Plateau and Gongola to 75 percent for Kwara. Some of the northern heartlands states, such as Niger and Kaduna, are less than 60 percent Muslim, although the latter contains Muslim political and civil service elites that are among the most powerful in Nigeria.[1385]

Going by this, with respect to the earlier position of W. Morris-Halle that religious clashes are confined to the north, it can be argued that any religious categorization of Nigeria into Muslim North and Christian South is a construct used

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1383   Morris-Halle, Walter, 1996, op. cit., p. 212.
1384   David Dickson's special report on the situation in Nigeria is published by the *United States Institute of Peace* with the topic "Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda" in 2005 (p. 1-12). Electronically retrievable under the following homepage: http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15057/1/Political%20Islam%20in%20Sub%20Saharan%20Africa%20The%20Need%20for%20a%20New%20Research%20and%20Diplomatic%20Agenda.pdf? [26/05/2013].
1385   Bienen, Henry: "Religion, Legitimacy, and Conflict in Nigeria", in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 483, 1986, p. 50-60 (52).

as a plot by certain elite groups in the north to establish an alliance with the ethnic minorities in the region.

From an instrumentalist approach, the issue of a single Muslim North, in reference to the current conflicts confronting many parts of the Northern regions along religious lines, constitutes mere rhetoric which, by no means, denotes a peaceful, if any, alliance.[1386] From the position of the decision theory of identity and difference, it is discernible that alliances may be formed based on commonality such as language, religion etc. and also dissolved since symbolic and material interests are factors which determine whether to identify with or dissociate oneself from one ethnic group or the other. That is why it remains uncertain if contemporary conflicts in Northern Nigeria erupt as a result of alliance dissolution or not. This religious alliance, referred to rhetorically as One North, is used, according to H. Bienen, to gain political legitimacy:

> Nigeria has not evolved political formulas that explicitly allow religion or religious authorities to define legitimacy. There have, however, been struggles carried out in religious terms over constitutional mechanisms for adjudicating conflict. Religion also has been an element in the conflict between ethnic-language groups. Finally, religion provides a language, a set of values, and institutions through which groups struggle and over which groups contend, both within and between religious communities. It has been necessary for northern leaders to stress Islam in order to maintain northern unity. However, Islam itself has worked to intensify fissures opened up by social and economic change in Nigeria. Islam in Nigeria continues to be contentious in both domestic and foreign policy.[1387]

Therefore, one can see that religion, in this case Islam, may be used to achieve or to further political objectives for some ethnic or religious groups within a country, in respect to the view laid out by R. Myers:

> The question remains, what people and what ideology control the power of the state? The difficulty of resolving the question is compounded by the fact that no concept of the state is value free; the values inherent in the prevailing concept of the state determine the parameters of political, social, and cultural engagement within a society. Religions often have a great deal to say about what values are incorporated into such a concept of the state, religions most often attempt to assure that those values are compatible with their own priorities for this world.[1388]

Accordingly, religion is arguably used by certain elites to achieve political power and material as well as symbolic resources in Nigeria. Series of questions are relevant in order to clarify the notion that religious conflicts exist in Northern Nigeria.

1386   This will be highlighted when the analysis of Jos conflicts is treated at a later point.
1387   Bienen, Henry, 1986, op. cit., p. 50.
1388   Myers, J. Robert: "Religion and State: The struggle for Legitimacy and Power", in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 483 (1), January 1986, [p.1-209] p. 9-11 (10). Viewed on 14/05/2013 and accessible electronically under the following homepage: http://ann.sagepub.com/content/483/1/9.full.pdf+html [26/05/2013].

Also, with regard to the activities of the terrorist organization, Boko Haram, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, it is important to inquire about the following: Who are the groups fighting in name of religion?; Who is fighting against whom and for what purpose are they fighting?; What kind of organization is Boko Haram and which ethnic group or religious group do they represent?; How is the Nigerian government reacting to the activities of Boko Haram and what are the consequences of escalated religious tension for the country? The following section will take up these questions and attempt to answer them.

5.5.2 Introduction of Sharia: Political Debate, Controversy and Conflicts

Having started with religious confrontations between adherents of Islam and Christianity in previous sections, this segment will emphasize that the so-called religious conflict is motivated by the actors striving towards the realization of political goals and material resources, a situation which implies that religion is not the contentious issue at stake. Therefore, the analysis will point out that the conflicts are as a result of the politicization of ethnicity in which religion, used as an instrument, is deployed.

In recent decades, the introduction of Sharia is turned to be a controversial matter between the predominantly northern Muslim and the predominantly southern Christian, however, it is important to note that the outbreak of religious crises is, until currently, limited to the northern part of Nigeria, a situation which depicts that there are many Christians residing in the same so-called Muslim northern part of the country.[1389]

Contrary to these insinuations about the North-South dichotomy when it involves religious controversy and conflicts,[1390] it can be argued that, irrespective of the North-South problems on issues concerning Sharia and secularism, religious conflicts per se often occur between the Christian minorities against the Muslim majority, who both constitute the original inhabitants of the north.[1391]

1389   See Ostien, Philip: "Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria", published in 2009: http://www.sharia-in-africa.net/media/publications/ethno-religious-conflict-in-Jos-Nigeria/Ostien_Jos.pdf [27/05/2013].

1390   See Marc-Antoine P. de Montclos studies the conflict in Nigeria on the basis of a North-South dichotomy which may make the general analysis of these so-called religious conflicts one-sided. The author's observations begin thus: "Marred by frequent religious confrontations between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South, Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent […]." Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 72.

1391   For more about the Jos Conflicts which, on the one hand, involves the indigenous ethnic groups such as the predominantly Berom, the Anaguta, the Afizere etc. Christians and, on

Having shown that there is more to the religious conflicts in Nigeria, it is important to understand how Islamic radicalism and extremism is established in Nigeria in light of "the widely accepted estimate of at least 13,500 deaths from religious or ethnic conflicts since the ostensible restoration of civilian rule in 1999."[1392] Some of the reasons which are responsible for the eruption of conflicts are cited below by J. Campbell:

> To cite only a few examples: mobs burned some forty churches in Maiduguri in February 2006, ostensibly because of outrage over the "Danish cartoons" allegedly disrespectful of the Prophet. Many Christians were killed, and a Catholic priest's legs were broken so he could not escape before he was "necklaced"—a common form of vigilante murder where tire is placed around the victim's neck, filled with gasoline, and ignited.[1393]

It is important to ask when and how the Nigerian situation degenerated to the extent that such human rights abuses and violations are freely committed in the name of religion. J. Seul, in response, believes that religion is never the reason for the outbreaks of religious conflicts or its cause as such conflicts can be perceived from the perspective of the struggle inherent in the allocation of resources. The author states his view on the role of religion thus:

> […] rather, for many, it still provides the most secure basis for the maintenance of a positively regarded social identity, and it frequently supplies the fault line along which group identity and resource competition occurs. Nonetheless, when conflict involving one or more religious groups does occur, the combatants may be emboldened by a sense of religiously defined identity and purpose, and their traditions may provide a fund of symbolic, moral, institutional, and other resources that can be used to mobilize the group and legitimate its cause.[1394]

Nonetheless, this is not to assert automatically that all religions resort to conflicts in order to achieve their objectives as there are many religious traditions in which members, followers or adherents are encouraged to shun any violent form of conflict.[1395] This is not to deny, however, that the existence of conflicts between religious groups may be caused by material factors and social dynamics that can incite and fuel violence.

Consequently, D. Agbiboa illustrates in his work that any crisis motivated by diverse religious beliefs and their associated religious identities usually result into protracted conflicts, such as the author discusses thus:

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the other hand, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, see Orji, Nkwachukwu: "Faith-Based Aid to People Affected by Conflict in Jos, Nigeria: An Analysis of the Role of Christian and Muslim Organizations", in: *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2011, p. 473-492.

1392   See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 44.
1393   Ibid., p. 44.
1394   Seul, R. Jeffrey: "'Ours Is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict", in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1999, p. 553-569 (564).
1395   See ibid,. p. 564.

> Conflicts motivated by religious identity have the reputation of being among the most intractable, given the often absolutist views to which they are tied. While adherence to belief systems can help to develop a sense of belonging and purpose, it can easily lead to intolerance, discrimination, and violent actions. Yet 'religious conflicts' need not be about religion or religious conversion, and indeed usually have nonreligious causes. They are so called because this is the unifying and mobilizing identity.[1396]

That is why it is believed that in contemporary modern states, religion is often part of the problem if not solely the cause of conflicts in as far as there is an interaction between religion and conflict.[1397] In this respect, A. Essien assumes that in different manners, religion is used as an instrument of politicization and violence, therefore "it has been a very common experience to politicize religion. In Nigeria, political violence has been given [a] religious overtone and countless lives have been destroyed."[1398] However, such an argument may prompt the need to examine the alleged exterminations of Igbo in the northern part of the country as it is not clear if such acts of violence can be described as ethnically or religiously motivated because religious identity is frequently politicized to commit other atrocities. Such difficulty can be encountered in conflicts in which it is difficult to clearly discern if it is ethnically or religiously influenced since the interpretation of an ethnically motivated conflict as a religious one allows many writers such as D. Agbiboa to perceive the violence unleashed on the Igbo prior and during the civil war, 1967-1970, as ethnically motivated. Through a political mobilization based on ethnicity, the writer elucidates that "during the 3-year fratricidal war, ethnic vengeance and violence against the Igbo ethnic group was launched."[1399]

At that time there were reports of attacks on the Igbo and the destruction of their properties as well as the massacres carried out against them by Northern Soldiers, who were bent on ending the Igbo supremacy in the military.[1400] With the reported crisis between the Northerners and the Igbo on the one hand and the massacres against the Igbo by Northern soldiers on the other hand, it is questionable to refer to this kind of a conflict as ethnically or religiously motivated. D. Agbiboa believes that it depends on how people perceive themselves and are perceived by others in so far this is a matter of identity, which swings, is fluid and subjected to transformation:

1396   Agbiboa, E. Daniel, 2013, op. cit., p. 9.
1397   See Balkanlıoğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 714.
1398   Essien, A. Anthonia, 2010, op. cit., p. 643.
1399   Agbiboa, E. Daniel, op. cit., p. 16.
1400   See ibid., p. 16-17. It is reported at the end of the civil war that up to about two million Igbo, also known as Biafrans because of the secession aim, died from what D. Agbiboa refers to as pogrom. See ibid., p. 17.

> This definition captures the way people view themselves in Nigeria, where identity is defined
> by affiliation with religious and ethnic groups rather than the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, it is
> falsely assumed by many that a Hausa person, by virtue of ethnicity, is a Muslim. Similarly, it
> is assumed that every Igbo person is a Christian. This link between religion and ethnicity holds
> serious implications for religious converts in Nigeria.[1401]

Thus, it becomes uncertain when and how conflicts, which are ethnically fueled, begin to be perceived and interpreted as religiously induced. It is by no means clearly stated that ethnicity and religion are intertwined and both play significant roles in contemporary conflicts in Nigeria.

However, it is not understandable why and how religion is accorded roles in the current conflicts bedeviling the country since religion is significant in the co-existence of diverse ethnic groups in the Nigerian polity. From another point of view, it is uncertain when the religious situation in the country degenerated to the extent that a radical Islamic group, Boko Haram, could commit human rights abuses and genocidal acts such as the bombings of the United Nations building in 2011. Boko Haram defends its attack against the United Nations, claiming that the UN is an Umbrella for the Western allies against the Muslim world. This is explained below in detail:

> On August 26, 2011, a suicide bomber drove a vehicle borne improvised explosive device
> (VBIED) into the United Nations (U.N.) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, killing 23 people and
> injuring more than 80 others. Responsibility for the bombing, one of the deadliest in the United
> Nations' history, was claimed by Boko Haram, an Islamist religious sect turned insurgent
> group based in the predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria. While this attack occurred inside
> Nigerian borders, it was the first time Boko Haram had targeted an international, non-Nigerian
> entity.[1402]

Regarding the advent of violent religious conflicts in Nigeria, which currently threaten the survival of the country, D. Dickson opines that the beginning of "the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria following independence

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1401 Ibid., p. 19.
1402 This quotation is obtained from the report of the United States House of Representatives, which was presented by the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on 30 November 2011 on the activities of the terrorist organization in Nigeria, known as Boko Haram, under the theme "BOKO HARAM: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland", p. 1-28 (1). The report is retrievable under the following homepage: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Boko%20Haram-%20Emerging%20Threat%20to%20the%20US%20Homeland.pdf [28/05/2013]. This above stated citation in the report by the U.S. House Subcommittee is also partially drawn from the online edition of BBC News, reported under the heading "Nigeria UN Bomb: Video of 'Boko Haram Bomber' Released" published on 18/09/2011, available through the website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14964554 [28/05/2013].

was influenced by an infusion of Saudi-educated scholars who challenged less austere versions of Islam."[1403]

He further observes that Islamic fundamentalism was given a boost as the country returned to a democracy in 1999 after a long military rule, dominated mostly by Northern Muslim elites. These Northern Muslims, as a reaction to the election of Obasanjo in 1999, a born-again Christian president from the South, began to experience a decline in political powers and influences. M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos presents the same line of argument with respect to the loss of power by the Northern Muslim military establishment thus:

> The elections of 2003 then exacerbated religious issues again by confronting President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba "born-again," and Mohammed Buhari, a former Hausa dictator, who was supportive of a stricter Sharia. […] In such a context, it is interesting to note that Islam attracts gangsters, warlords, or radical opponents who contest the Christian establishment in the South.[1404]

From another viewpoint, the author believes that religious radicalism in the polity of Nigeria emerged due to the long-time transnational relationship which exists between the Northern Nigeria's largely Muslim Hausa-Fulani to the Middle Eastern centers of learning and West African Sufi-brotherhood.[1405] At the same time "the British colonialism bolstered northern Nigeria's control of political Islamists"[1406] and it is believed that traditional Islamic clans who are the elites, who formed the basis of a Northern party prior to independence, were able to effectively exclude Westernized intellectuals and secularized non-Muslims.[1407]

It is, however, doubtful whether the loss of power by the aforementioned Northern elites is responsible for the rise of the terrorist organization in Nigeria. Regarding that, J. Campbell is of the view that Boko Haram, though initially an indigenous reaction and uprising by a poverty-stricken Northern Muslims against perceived alienation and marginalization due to official corruption in the country, has now evolved into a dangerous terrorist organization with international networks.[1408] He asserts as follows:

> One serious specter, however, still haunts the country—the expansion of the Islamic "terrorist group" Boko Haram, with its global connections. Hence, Nigeria's security challenge has be-

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1403   David Dickson's special report on the situation in Nigeria, *United States Institute of Peace*, 2005, op. cit., p. 7.
1404   Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 77.
1405   See ibid.
1406   Ibid.
1407   See ibid.
1408   See Campbell, John, 2012, op. cit., p. 31.

come internationalized, and Westerners grappling with Islamist movements need to keep a sharp eye on that situation.[1409]

Based on the position of M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos, the radicalization of Islam in Nigeria can be traced back to "how the Islamization of the North thus went hand in hand with the Christianization of the South."[1410] Therefore, in his observation, "both Islam and Christianity got politicized."[1411]

In view of the aforementioned politicization of religion, one can argue that religion plays a role in so far there is the perception existing in certain Muslim groups in the northern section that losing the grip of power and allowing a Southerner to assume the important position of the President, especially if the person is a Christian, implies the introduction of an exclusivist politics against the Northern Muslims. This fear of being dominated exists generally between Christians and Muslims in the country as the long military rule, once dominated by the Northern Muslims, evokes the fear of being marginalized in retribution by their Southern Christian counterparts. This fear may be grasped when the following statement by M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos is considered:

> [The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)] tried-in vain-to reunify the ethnic communities of the South under the aegis of a Christian Democratic Party. It opposed the Islamization of Nigeria and discrimination against Christians by the (Muslim) junta that was governing the country.[1412]

The fear displayed by the Christians was heightened as a result of the enrollment of Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 under the military government of General Badamosi Babangida, another plot to marginalize the Southerners which E. Osaghae's work depicts below:

> Under Babangida, religion became politicized to an unprecedented degree. It all started with his decision in 1986 to register Nigeria as a full member of the Organization of Islamic Countries OIC (in which the country had all along maintained an observer status). The regime had stirred a hornet's nest. Christians, through the Christian association of Nigeria (CAN) and other bodies, alleged that there was a grand design to transform the country into a Muslim state and from that point of view onwards most actions, policies and appointments of government at every level were seen through the lens of religion. The lens also extended to dress, food, and the balance of religious propagation in educational institutions; allocation of air time on radio and television; a fair balance between Muslim and Christian public holidays; and the religious composition of the armed forces.[1413]

1409   Ibid., p. 31.
1410   Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 77.
1411   Ibid.
1412   Ibid.
1413   Osaghae, E. Eghosa, 1998, op. cit., p. 249-250. C. Chinedu explains that the position of General Babangida to solely decide on behalf of the country, a multi-religious country, in joining the OIC was met with protests both from Christians and non-Christians. See Nzeh,

Consequently, one can observe an ongoing conspiracy based on religious motifs and as this comes to the forefront of the Nigerian political landscape, it becomes a religious zero-sum game in the sharing of political powers and the distribution of resources in Nigeria, a condition which is evidenced of a charged atmosphere and deteriorating situation of the country, according to A. Harneit-Sievers:

> In effect, political competition in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has exacerbated the numerous lines of regional, ethnic, and religious conflict, and more political violence threatens to arise during the 2003 elections. Nigeria installed a federal political system to contain and manage this variety of conflicts, but by 2002, the federal order once again is barely working.[1414]

The author maintains that what gave rise to the current ethno-religious crisis is the resumption of party politics in the country which is controlled by the so-called, also in the words of J. Campbell and M. Brunner, strong/big men.[1415] This is shown as follows:

> At the same time, the realities of party politics remain much the same as in earlier periods of civilian rule: "politics" in Nigeria continues to be largely a competition among personalities, rather than programs and visions; it continues to be a playground for numerous big men (and a few big women), many of whom regard political engagement primarily as an investment that will pay off after electoral success.[1416]

It can be argued based on the instrumentalist approach that the so-called religious crises in Nigeria are shadow conflicts because conflicts erupt when the elites are in competitive situations which involve the distribution of resources. Hereby, religion is used as a tool to mobilize followers in order to attain resources. The decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity can be reflected in the country's contemporary conflicts in as far as religion is used as a point of identification to mobilize members in order to increase the size of the group, since the larger the group in number, the better the chances to overcome the perceived opponent or adversary.

C.O. Casimir, 2002, op. cit., p. 128. The enrollment of Nigeria as member of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 is reported to have been secretly carried out by the then Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida. With Nigeria's membership in OIC perfected, it was argued that Federal Government's support for Sharia courts is hereby legitimized. See Bediako, Kwame, 2000, op. cit., p. 318. However, from another perspective, J. Haynes asserts that although the OIC membership is carried out in secrecy by Babangida, however, the primary motive in enrolling Nigeria as a member of this Islamic organization is done for economic advantages and purposes. See Haynes, Jeffrey, 2009, op. cit., p. 61.

1414   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2002, op. cit., p. 139.
1415   See ibid., p. 139. The same position is represented by M. Brunner who refers to both military and civilians as strong men who dominate political arena and control the affairs of the county. See Brunner, Markus, 2000, op. cit., p. 277-297. J. Campbell toes the same line of argument in his work. See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit.
1416   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2002, op. cit., p. 139.

Having mentioned the introduction of the Federal Character Principle earlier in the context of the constitutional arrangement of the country, injected into the constitution in 1979,[1417] it might be considered that the Nigerian Constitution would then go a long way in regulating a fair distribution of resources in the country as a way to reflect its ethnic pluralism. However, R. Suberu emphasizes that the military regimes, which ruled the country from 1984 to 1999 through manipulation and exclusivist policies, rendered the operation of this Federal Character Principle ineffective. This is shown thus:

> The second phase of military rule (1984-1999) not only continued the centralization of the first era of autocracy, including an expansion in the number of states from 19 to 36, but also witnessed some of the worst pathologies of military rule. This era was especially notorious for the entrenchment of the capricious personal rule of the military head of state; the shift from the inclusive ethnic policies of the first era of military rule to ethno-religious manipulation and exclusion; the prohibition of judicial review of the governments conduct; the political and fiscal emasculation of the sub-national governments; and the degradation of the military's own democratization programs, including the abortion of a transition to the Third Republic following the annulment of civilian presidential election results in 1993.[1418]

Being that the suspicion in the relationship between Christians and Muslims in the country was and is high,[1419] however, the Federal Character Principle is yet to be able to solve the problem of politicized ethnicity in the dichotomized form of a Christian South and a Muslim North despite the fact that such a configuration of the country is a construct since there are a sizeable number of Muslims in the South and there is also a considerable presence of Christian minorities in the North.[1420]

Meanwhile, J. Campbell asserts that the country's problem, which leads to the politicization of ethnicity, cannot be seen from a Christian-Muslim dichotomization. Rather, from the perspective of patron-client networks, politicians control the political system which is dominated by the strongmen who get access within these networks to the few available jobs and social services.[1421] As a result, the system favors relationships over institutions and the ongoing decline in national sentiments favors religious and ethnic identity with its embedded

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1417   By the introduction of the Federal Character Principle into the Nigerian Constitution in 1979, it was expected that this principle will guide fair balance with respect to ethnic representation in government and its agencies so that no sectional or ethnic groups would become dominant. See Mustapha, R. Abdul, 2009, op. cit., p. 567.
1418   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2005, op. cit., p. 139-154 (141).
1419   John Campbell toes the same line of argument in his work. See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 43.
1420   See Bangura, K. Abdul, 2001, op. cit., p. 305.
1421   See Campbell, John, 2012, op. cit., p. 32.

animosity.[1422] That is why "a major decisive factor was the overwhelming size of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani-dominated Northern region, which encompassed 54 percent of the country's population and territory"[1423] is consistently a source of suspicion, if not conflict, for both the religious and ethnic groups in the country.

Based on the existing suspicions, the majority of the decisions involving the sharing of resources and political positions in the country leads to allegations of marginalization by one group or the other, one religious group or the other and one region or the other.

R. Suberu examines this situation as one of the reasons leading to the escalation of crisis in the country because "this fueled allegations of northern political domination among other Nigerian groups, including the Yoruba and Ibo majority communities in the Western and Eastern regions, respectively."[1424] As a result of the alleged Northern dominance of governmental institutions and the Northern region being predominantly Muslim, religious connotations often accompany such perceived ethnic dominance.[1425] There are several factors responsible for this development, some of which were already stated, however, it is important to acknowledge that, irrespective of the imperfect distribution of followers of Islam and Christianity, the situation is made more complicated by ethnic differences.

Moreover, aside from the British colonial construction of the Nigerian state in which diverse ethnic groups, cultures and religions were grouped under a single political entity, the activities of the elites in promoting religious differences while in competition for resources is of importance to the current waves of religious division in the country. All these aforementioned factors depict the politicization of ethnicity as follows:

> Finally, power-hungry individuals employed (and continue to employ) religion as a stepping stone to power and political legitimacy. Since the mid-seventies, politicians have urged their followers to vote along religious lines. Other religion-inspired activities during the 1970s included the realignment of political parties along politico-religious lines. In the 1980s and

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1422   See ibid., p. 32.
1423   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2005, op. cit., p. 142.
1424   Ibid., p. 142.
1425   It is essential to emphasize that there are a lot of prejudices in the way adherents of Islam and Christianity perceive each other in Nigeria, as Christians view Muslims as backward though enjoying a demographic advantage based on polygamy practices allowed by Islam, while the Muslims also believe that Christians are corrupt, aggressive, lack integrity and are dishonest in their business practices. In addition, they are also both suspicious of each other as "each believes that the other receives massive financial assistance from abroad. Muslims fear Christians are bankrolled by American evangelicals and Christians cite Saudi, and more recently, Iranian money allegedly flowing to Muslim foundations and charities." Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 43.

1990s, riots and outright political violence, claiming thousands of lives, were instigated by these politicians.[1426]

With respect to the above, one can argue that the activities of the elites are responsible for the religious fault lines persisting in the country which often come to the forefront in times of political activities which Nigeria's return to democratic politics as from 1999 indicate.

After the retreat of military dictatorial elites from the Nigerian polity and Nigeria's return to democratic politics in 1999, having a Southern born-again Christian as president, there was a resurgence of religious tension in the country as twelve of the Northern Muslim states decided to use a loophole in the Nigerian constitution through the introduction, or rather the imposition of Sharia, the code of Islamic law into criminal domain.[1427] Referring to Sharia issues in some northern part of Nigeria as a reintroduction, resurgence or revival of Islam is buttressed by the argument that it, again, signaled the recurrence of tensions witnessed over the interpretations of the Islamic religion since the nineteenth century when Jihad was used to create the vast Sokoto Caliphate by Usman Dan Fodio. Repeatedly, attempts were made in the 1950s by the Northern regional power to spread Islam to central Nigeria, an effort which was bitterly resisted at that time.[1428]

The reintroduction of Sharia in twelve Northern states, from an instrumentalist approach, denotes religion either as an instrument to destabilize the democratic government run by a southern Christian of Yoruba origin or used by certain political elites to legitimize their political ambitions. The main reason behind the adoption of Sharia immediately after the return to democratic politics is still unknown, but many observers have different views on the subject matter. R. Suberu sees the reason for the introduction of Sharia thus:

> Following Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999, 12 northern Muslim states adopted legislation extending the scope of Islamic Shari'a law from personal and civil matters into the criminal domain. Although the Shari'a question has been prominent in Nigeria's constitutional politics since the late seventies, the full-fledged extension of Islamic law into the criminal justice system was unprecedented in the country's post-independence experience. Instigated by the

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1426   See Bangura, K. Abdul: Nigeria, 2001, op. cit., p. 305.
1427   See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 44. Also see Harneit-Sievers, Axel: "Encounters and No-Go Areas in the Nigerian Debate about Sharia: Report on the Conference 'Comparative Perspectives on Sharia in Nigeria' Jos (Nigeria), 15-17 January 2004", in: *Afrika Spectrum*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2003, p. 415-420. O. Kalu discusses the identified loophole in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which the 12 Northern states made use of in order to introduce the Sharia system. See Kalu, U. Ogbu: "Safiyya and Adamah: Punishing Adultery with Sharia Stones in Twenty-First-Century Nigeria", in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 102, Issue 408, 2003, p. 389-408.
1428   See Bangura, K. Abdul, 2001, op. cit., p. 305.

populist Governor Ahmad Sani of Zamfara State, the establishment of Islamic penal law en-
tailed the codification of several harsh sanctions, including flogging for drinking, amputation
for theft, and stoning for adultery. The expanded Shari'a system, its Muslim proponents
claimed, would satisfy popular pressure for comprehensive application of Shari'a in the Mus-
lim north. It would apply strictly to Muslims and consenting non-Muslims only, promote feder-
alist states' rights and legal pluralism, fulfill existing constitutional provisions regarding the
competence of the states to establish and prescribe the jurisdictions of Islamic courts, promote
the efficiency and accessibility of the criminal justice sector, redress Muslims' marginalization
under the country's British-oriented legal system, provide a panacea to secular corruption and
permissiveness, and ultimately contribute to national unity and democratic stability.[1429]

Therefore, having mentioned the British colonial policy as inimical to Islam in
the quotation, it can be argued that the introduction of Sharia is a direct protest
against the democratic principles which the Sharia proponents view as encour-
aging secular corruption and endangering democratic stability. In addition, it is
argued by R. Suberu that the application of Sharia laws to Muslims offers an al-
ternative to the Western form of justice system.[1430]

However, contrary to the position of Sharia proponents, it is questionable
how Sharia will enhance democratic stability when section 10 of the Nigerian
constitution stipulates that "the Government of the Federation or of a State shall
not adopt any religion as State Religion."[1431] Based on this, it is uncertain if the
application of Sharia, contrary to the constitution, can contribute to national uni-
ty as envisaged by the proponents of Sharia.

In another development, R. Suberu illustrates the re-emergence of the con-
troversy over the strict interpretation of Islam in the northern Muslim state of
Zamfara through the evolution of Sharia and its reintroduction and expansion
into Islamic criminal law.[1432] He explains that several factors can be seen as rea-
sons which contribute to the reintroduction of Sharia, as a contentious issue, into
the Nigerian political development, as the following shows:

These include the federation's competitive and contested religious demographics (with a pre-
sumed Muslim majority or plurality existing alongside a numerically equivalent or significant
Christian population), the general coincidence of religious, ethnic and regional cleavages in the
country, historic regional socio-economic and political inequalities (pitting a demographically
dominant north against a more modernised south), the relative weakness of non-sectarian bases
of socio-political affiliation or mobilisation, relatively fragile political institutions, and a highly
prized state apparatus. In essence, the Sharia issue has become a marker and driver not only of

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1429   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2005, op. cit., p. 144.
1430   See Suberu, T. Rotimi: "Religion and Institutions: Federalism and the Management of Con-
        flicts over Sharia in Nigeria", in: *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 21, No. 4,
        2009, p. 547-560 (549).
1431   The 1999 *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, electronically retrievable thus:
        http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
        [29/05/2013].
1432   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2009, op. cit., p. 548-549.

Muslim-Christian conflict, but also of North-South, inter-ethnic, majority-minority and centre-states socio-economic and political competition in the Nigerian federation.[1433]

In whichever way the application of Sharia is perceived, many writers view this move by certain sections of the Muslim north as a political ploy to truncate the democratization process of the country since it is fundamentally unconstitutional and constitutes an abuse of fundamental human rights of the minorities as well as engineering the outbreak of sectarian violence and disunity.[1434] It is questionable how the country can be described as peaceful in consideration of the attempts to introduce the Sharia principle into states inhabited by both Christians and Muslims such as the case of Kaduna, a state inhabited by and divided between Muslims and Christians, as R. Suberu elucidates below:

> Plans to extend Shari'a in the religiously volatile northern state of Kaduna led to bloody clashes that claimed some 2,000 lives in 2000. However, the government of Kaduna eventually crafted a benign compromise version of Islamic law implementation that eased the tensions between its Muslim and Christian communities. Rather than destroy Nigeria's nascent federal democracy, the "Shari'a bomb" was more or less defused by the multi-state, federal democratic institutional structure.[1435]

As a result of the timing and factors surrounding the revival of religious conflicts, in view of the application of Sharia, many observers regard this Islamic resurgence as a political Sharia or political Islam.[1436] This can be observed in the fact that certain northern federal states dominated by Muslims such as Adamawa, Kogi, Nasarawa and Kwara decline to follow the footsteps of the Islamic Sharia advocating states.[1437] This action from these states is "thereby charting a politico-religious course independent of the Sharia-implementing northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani states."[1438]

With respect to the constitution of Nigeria which explicitly forbids the adoption of religion either by the states of the federation or by the federal government, the question is how this contradiction, in view of the adoption and application of Sharia, can be ironed out between these 12 states and the federal

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1433   Ibid., p. 549.
1434   Ibid.
1435   Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2005, op. cit., p. 145.
1436   See David Dickson's special report on the situation in Nigeria, *United States Institute of Peace*, 2005, op. cit., p. 7.
1437   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2005, op. cit., p. 145. The other Muslim groups in the Southern region of the country, notably among the Yoruba, are reported to have distanced themselves from the radicalization of Islam in the Northern states that introduced Sharia. R. Suberu explains thus: "There are also no official Shari'a courts in the six Yoruba southwestern states, where Muslims, who constitute at least half of the Yoruba population, have traditionally practiced their faith with legendary moderation." See ibid.
1438   Ibid.

government in as far as the proponents of Sharia decline to recognize any south-ern Christian as the president of the country.[1439]

From the aforementioned scenario, if northern Muslims perceive a South-erner or a southern Christian president as a threat to the northern Muslim power block, whose hold on power extends any other ethnic or religious group in the country, then it can be argued that the reintroduction of Sharia into criminal law in these 12 states denotes the manipulation, politicization and instrumentaliza-tion of religion.[1440]

Moreover, the military reforms carried out by the former southern born-again Christian president at his resumption of office in 1999 were viewed skep-tically as a conspiratorial approach designed specifically against certain northern elites, hence the use of the Islamic religion in order to politicize ethnicity, which R. Suberu refers to as politically motivated.[1441] The circumstances which may constitute the reasons leading to the introduction of Sharia can be seen in the work of P. Lyma and S. Morrison as follows:

> The winner of the ensuing elections was General Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner and born-again Christian. Obasanjo proceeded to purge the military of politically oriented officers-the majority of whom were northern Muslims. He also instituted a program to investigate past cor-ruption and bring perpetrators to justice. Politically, militarily, and economically, northerners felt their influence decline. Soon, a northern governor decided to challenge Obasanjo by intro-ducing Islamic criminal law (shari'a) in his state. No one anticipated the tremendous popularity of this move. Shari'a offered a sense of hope to people faced with rising crime and increasing instability. Within a few months it had been adopted in 12 of Nigeria's 36 states.[1442]

Consequently, one can argue that the decreasing power and influence of the northern Muslims may have caused the so-called northern elites, after being a major actor in the center of power and playing a dominant role in government through various military regimes for about forty years, to feel alienated and des-perate who in turn responded by instrumentalizing religion in order to destabi-lize the polity.[1443] By applying the instrumentalization of religious fundamental-ism, the northern governing elites believed that the propagation of Sharia could be seen "as a byproduct of Nigerian Muslims' desire to reassert their political

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1439   See Campbell, John, 2012, op. cit., p. 31.
1440   M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos refers to the contemporary expansion of Islam through forced conversion by means of terrorist violence or internal jihad in Africa. This can be seen within the context of Nigeria's introduction of Sharia as well. See Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 72.
1441   See Suberu, T. Rotimi, 2005, op. cit., p. 145.
1442   Lyman, N. Princeton/Morrison, J. Stephen: "The Terrorist Threat in Africa", in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. Vol. 33, No. 1, 2004, p. 75-86 (79).
1443   See David Dickson's special report on the situation in Nigeria, *United States Institute of Peace*, 2005, op. cit., p. 7.

prerogative in response to what they feared was a newfound southern Christian political hegemony."[1444]

Furthermore, J. Harnischfeger presents the resurgence of Sharia in 1999 as a threat to the development of the nascent democracy newly reintroduced in the same year as the conflicts which ensued, to this day, endanger the peace and stability of the country,[1445] especially in consideration of the fact that "debates about this religious project are seen, by followers of Islam, as an internal affair in which interference of infidels is not appreciated."[1446]

Having mentioned the reintroduction of Sharia in criminal acts, it is not the resurgence of fundamentalism *per se*, but rather how it was introduced in the first place by the former Zamfara State governor in what many people observe as sheer political populism that polarized the whole country, especially between Muslims and Christians.

O. Kalu describes the events which allowed for the resurgences of religious fundamentalism in northern Muslim states in the following statement:

> In 1999, Nigerian politics buzzed with activity following the return of democratic, civilian elections after years of military rule. In one of the northern states, Zamfara, one of the candidates, allegedly strapped for campaign funds, creatively turned his campaign strategy into a populist religious enterprise. He promised that, if elected to Government House, he would provide security and amenities, and reform the state by first reforming the morals of the society through the application of the sharia laws. It may sound like political opportunism, but he struck a chord among the masses who felt that their poor conditions were a result of the ethics of the rich, who had abandoned the dictates of Islam, ignored the sharia and garnered wealth without due concern for the poor. The disinherited rural and urban poor and the unemployed, as well as students at universities and polytechnics, had nursed years of anger against their fellow Muslims, the Federal Government and Christians from the south.[1447]

As observed in the quotation above, the instrumentalization of religion based on the revival of Islamic fundamentalism can be accorded a significant role in the process leading to this controversy. As shown, the aspiring governor, Ahmed Sanni Yarima, who was strapped of resources during his campaign to occupy the seat of power in Zamfara state, decided to play a religious game, intertwined also with ethnic contents (ethnic card), as a manipulative factor from an instrumentalist point of view to attain political resources.[1448] It is important to inquire

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1444   Ibid., p. 8.
1445   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 431.
1446   Ibid., p. 431.
1447   Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 389-390. It is important to note that the first 7 words of the quotation are capitalized.
1448   It is reported that Yarima's successor, Abdulazeez Abubakar Yari, capitalized on the Sharia's legacy of his predecessor, Yarima, to contest the gubernatorial seat. In Yari's words: "The Governor-elect said that all the social vices that were fought and eliminated by the

about what enables a religious loophole which is used in this context for political purposes. O. Kalu, in continuation of the reasons already brought in the quotation, stipulates that poverty, corruption, lack of rule of law and dishonest among politicians, etc. constitute all the factors which the masses perceive as contrary to Islamic core values, as the author illustrates below:

> A restoration of the religious imperatives of Islam would cure the moral ills of society. So, the politician's promise, in spite of his hidden or actual agenda, was the message that people wanted to hear. During periods of intense social suffering, people tend to accept solutions that are delivered with certainty and with divine insurance, messages that urge a return to things that worked in the past.[1449]

Going by this, it can be argued that the socio-economic condition of the people offers a possibility or an avenue which politicians exploit in order to achieve their own aims and, thus, the resurgence of Sharia in the Nigerian political arena can, in this way, be examined from the aforementioned perspective. One important factor to be observed is that the acquisition of power in political scenes allowed the chance for dissatisfaction to be voiced and, irrespective of whether the outcome was viewed positively or negatively, "the return to democracy offered many opportunities that would have been impossible under dictatorial military dispensations."[1450]

However, further reasons for the introduction of Islamic radicalism, in terms of the introduction of Sharia into criminal law, can be seen within the framework of the traditional rivalry among some Muslim groups currently inhabiting different states in the northern region. The centuries old rivalry flames up continually between the Hausa-Fulani hegemony on the one hand and the Kanuri ethnic group on the other hand with the source of this competition revolving around the interpretation and application of Islamic core values in society.

According to J. Campbell, the Kanuri live and are the dominant ethnic group in the present Borno state where they co-exist with other smaller minority ethnic groups subordinate to the Sultanate of Borno, led by Shehu, who, within the Muslim north, is second to the Sultan of Sokoto, the head of the Sokoto caliphate.[1451] Based in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, the Kanuri reside

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former governor through the introduction of Sharia law have since 2007 found their way back to the state due to the laxity on the part of the incumbent governor." More details in the report published by the newspaper African Examiner from May 16, 2011, with the topic "I will Govern Zamfara State with Sharia Law, Governor-Elect". Electronically available as follows: http://africanexaminer.com/zam0516 [31/05/2013].

1449   Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 390.
1450   Ibid., p. 390.
1451   See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 46.

in a territory on the edge of the Sahara with an Islamic tradition that is one of the oldest in West Africa.

Having mentioned the importance of Borno earlier (see chapter 5.3.1), it is essential to note that the Jihad War led by Dan Fodio under the Sokoto Caliphate failed to conquer Borno. This implies that Borno state and the Kanuri people, though Muslims, were exempted from the control of the Sultan of Sokoto and they maintain this autonomy even in contemporary Nigeria. J. Campbell presents certain information about the Kanuri and their influence in the north within the circle of Muslims thus:

> Despite the Shehu's moderate form of Islam, Borno's close proximity to the Sahara makes it open to more radical influences from Sudan and Chad. Boundaries are porous, and legitimate trade and smuggling is the economic lifeblood of the region. Borno Imams and malams (Islamic teachers) may train in Khartoum and move back and forth with ease. The Madi tradition of radical, eschatological Islam associated with Sudan is also found in Borno. The so-called Nigerian Taliban began its operations there and seems to draw on some Mahdi and other Sahelian indigenous traditions, rather than on Middle Eastern or South Asian influences. Despite its name, it appears to have no connection with the Afghan Taliban. Maiduguri was also the headquarters of the anti-Western, antimodern Islamic sect Boko Haram and is the home of preachers who regularly denounce the United States. Historically, Sokoto and Borno have been rivals, traces of which persist till today.[1452]

It is emphasized that both the Sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu are hierarchically significant among the northern Muslims since the Islamic traditional rulers under the control of both the Sultan and the Shehu are very influential within the region. For example, in matters concerning the provision of justice and arbitration of disputes beyond the formal Western justice system, "together, the courts of the Sultan and the Shehu are as close to a 'mainstream' Islamic establishment as there is in Nigeria."[1453] They both focus on strengthening the Islamic education and the traditional political process in a way to reduce the collapse of the values system and falling social conditions and standards in the North.[1454]

Consequently, with respect to the location of the Kanuri people in the Borno territory, the advent and the activities of Boko Haram from that region can be attributed to certain reasons which the following capture:

> The [current] wave of reform buffeting Northern Islam generally seeks to restore Koranic rigor and eliminate indigenous African elements as well as Western influence. Some of its practitioners are attracted to violence; others simply withdraw from mainstream society. But both

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1452   See ibid., p. 46.
1453   Ibid., p. 46.
1454   See ibid., p. 46-47.

manifestations are antithetical in style to the sophisticated, compromise-based governance of the sultan and other traditional rulers.[1455]

It is reported that the major target is the secular government in Abuja, although there are certain hostilities displayed against the United States,[1456] however, this can be viewed within the context of the rejection shown towards secularism and Western democracy. The hostility may be as a result of a noticeable rise in religious and social prominence of the so-called Charismatic or Pentecostal Christian movement in Nigeria and the perceived link between these churches and their brethren in the United States and Great Britain.[1457] Moreover, apart from the fact that northern Muslims assess the current Nigerian Constitution as a colonial construct which they perceive as a ploy to undermine Islam,[1458] it is also believed that the "'Clash of Fundamentalism' induced by the insurgence of Pentecostal and Charismatic forces in Islamic strongholds,"[1459] can be named as a potential reason for the revival of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria.

In reiteration of how this form of Islam can be accommodated within the framework of the Nigerian Constitution, especially the reintroduction of Sharia penal code as from 1999, J. Ogbu elucidates that the controversies surrounding Sharia are not new to Nigeria as this issue has been persistent and recurrent since the country's attainment of political independence in 1960.[1460] That is why every constitutional review exercise leads to fierce arguments and public debate over the attempt to extend the scope of Sharia.[1461] Historically, according to A. Christelow, the colonialists refused to engage any matter involving the extension of Sharia beyond civil matters and personal laws as the application of Islamic law in criminal matters was perceived as an impediment of progress.[1462]

1455   Ibid., p. 48.
1456   See ibid., p. 48.
1457   See Marshall, Ruth, 1991, op. cit., p. 21-22.
1458   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 221-249. Some of the grievances emphasized by some Muslim elites, with respect to the practice of a constitutional framework based on a secular order, portrayed the Nigerian Constitution as exclusivist in as far as it upholds the separation between the state and religion. They feel that a Constitution based on a European traditional system favors Christians at the expense of Muslims. That is why the following is observed in the work of J. Harnischfeger: "Why should Muslims feel bound by a legal order based on European notions of justice." See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 433.
1459   Kalu, U. Ogbu: "Sharia and Islam in Nigerian Pentecostal Rhetoric, 1970-2003", in: *The Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2004, p. 242-261 (242).
1460   See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 391. The same argument is stated in the report of the *International Crisis Group*, 2006, "Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty", op. cit., p. 24.
1461   See ibid., p. 391.
1462   See Christelow, Allan: "Islamic Law and Judicial Practice: An Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002, p. 185-204.

On top of that, O. Kalu shows in his work that the limitation of the Sharia's extension to areas such as criminal law in the north was carried over into the constitution immediately after independence:

> The constitution of the modern nation enshrined this rump, including the provision for appellate courts. All efforts to enlarge the purview of the sharia were stoutly resisted as discordant with the prevalent English common law; the posture that Nigeria was a secular state; the smell of northern domination and the particularity of Islam; and the safety of non-Muslims living in the northern region.[1463]

That is why H. Bienen depicts the debates over the adoption and application of Islamic law, the Sharia, into the Nigerian constitution as the most contentious, controversial, divisive national dispute and a recurrent point of conflicts in all constitutional reform attempts made in the country since independence.[1464]

This is often about the demand for constitutional recognition of Islamic law at the federal or state level through the creation of state and federal sharia courts as this issue poses challenges between the elites with different regional and religious backgrounds.[1465] It is important to note that matters concerning Islamic law are a reflection of many other issues in the country which are played out in this area, for instance agitations and controversies surrounding the nature of the Nigerian federal structure, the centralization of power in the federal government and the relationship between the North and South as well as the marginalization of minorities by the ethnic majorities.[1466] This is discernible in the arguments which ensued and the dissatisfaction of many Northern representatives during the 1979 Constitutional Drafting Committee process, which H. Bienen cites below:

> In the debate over whether an Islamic court should have constitutional status in Nigeria, some members of the northern intelligentsia argued that for a Muslim to live in a secular state would be an "abomination." Northern delegates to the Constitutional Drafting Committee argued that Muslims must have their cases adjudicated under Islamic personal law and that this meant giving sharia a federal status by appointing Muslims to the Supreme Court and stipulating that only such judges should preside over cases involving sharia. Northern delegates remained unified on this issue. Their demands implied recognition of Islam as a state religion, an idea southerners never have accepted and would not accept. If the issue could not have been resolved, the military would not have been able to turn power back to civilians in 1979. Thus a compromise was reached in the Constitutional Drafting Committee via a proposal for a federal sharia Court of Appeal, but the compromise was rejected by southerners when debate moved to the Constituent Assembly.[1467]

1463   See Kalu, O. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 391.
1464   See Bienen, Henry, 1986, op. cit., p. 51.
1465   See ibid.
1466   See ibid.
1467   Ibid.

The author highlights the disagreement that ensued between the northern and the southern delegates/representatives at the end of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, a situation in which the enraged northern delegates boycotted the meeting temporarily, however, a compromise was reached eventually through which Sharia courts were allowed to be established at the level of a Court of Appeal at the state, but not at the federal level.[1468]

Based on this, it may be asserted that the ensuing and ongoing arguments over the recognition of Sharia courts at either the state or federal level, as shown by H. Bienen, are about identity formation which involves declaring the Nigerian state a secular one or a mixture of both a secular and an Islamic state. With the role religion assumes in the country from both Christians' and Muslims' perspectives, it remains not only unclear how such a state may be constructed, but also how such a state may be identified.

Writers such as O. Kalu explain that the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism can be viewed from an international dimension, that means, the tie between the Nigerian Northern Muslims and the Arab world.[1469] This relationship is developed in order to reduce the influence of Western cultures in Nigeria and their penetration and infiltration into the Northern region. In this sense, Islam projects Christianity as an instrument of Western influence, an established conspiracy theory in the Muslim North which enables an enemy image to be constructed.[1470]

Therefore, the gap between the North and the South is becoming wider and needs to be bridged, in terms of Western education, in the sense that the Southerners have an edge and, in terms of democracy, a weapon which the Southerners possess and, hence, a condition that drives some Northern Muslims to strengthen their alliance with the Muslim world. O. Kalu illustrates the influence and assistance of certain Islamic countries towards the furtherance of Quranic schools and education in Nigeria thus:

> [O]thers sought to bridge the gap between the north and south in Western education *(madrassa)*; some forged deep contacts with patrons from Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and especially Saudi Arabia. Commercial relationships, banking, membership in the highly politicised OPEC and Organization of Islamic Countries cemented the obvious efforts to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state. The linkage of Islamic radical politics to international Arab geopolitics is a crucial dimension that explains the rhetoric, funding, and strategies, especially the diatribe against real or perceived Western cultural influence and its modernity project.[1471]

1468   See ibid.
1469   See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2004, op. cit., p. 249.
1470   See ibid., p. 248.
1471   Ibid., p. 248. Italics in original.

Having stated the efforts at establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria, it was believed, according to O. Kalu, that the enactment of Sharia in 1999 would serve as a clarion call for all Muslims to unite and mobilize against what they perceived as "public enemy", actions which signal the attempts to actualize and practice one's rights according to freedom of religion. Therefore, after the return to democratic rule in 1999, the political situation changed:

> It was possible for populist politicians to mobilize against the wealthy Muslims and tap into the radicalism of either students or almajiris[1472] [in order to achieve their aims since] "the 'new breed' politicians lacked restraint, discipline, and redemptive social goals."[1473]

With regard to the constitutional provision guiding the application of Sharia into criminal law, keeping in mind that the possibility for the inclusion of Sharia is already provided for in the 1979 constitution, the only difference which the re-enactment of Sharia displays can be seen in a single shift, however a major one. By this, the current breed of rulers reintroduced the purview of Sharia to cover criminal processes which also makes the invocation of harsh punishment possible.[1474]

Considering the context of the 1979 Constitution, it is not permissible to extend Sharia into criminal law as this is contrary to the canon of human rights as enshrined in the United Nations Human Rights Declaration, to which Nigeria is a signatory. However, it is important at this junction to understand that, according to the analysis of O. Kalu, "unbeknown to many, the military dictator, General Sanni Abacha, had made changes in the constitution of 1999 that created loopholes for the enactment of sharia in the north".[1475] This new development is the cause of the current challenges, in terms of the interpretation of the Nigerian Constitution, as the former Governor of Zamfara state, Yerima, identified and exploited this loophole to extend Sharia into the criminal law.[1476]

Similarly, the changes and modifications carried out by the dictator, General Abacha, were devoid of any constitutional agreement or consensus by the numerous ethnic groups co-existing in the country. From this point of view, the re-enactment and extension of Sharia into criminal law can be declared illegal in as

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1472 Ibid., p. 248-249. The *almajiris* are described as unemployed followers of malams and their activities involve begging, stealing and participating in riots. That is why they are used as thugs by politicians. It is also stated that, from 1980 upwards, the combined forces of the almajiris, radical students and unemployed youth in the north, at a time when Islam is used to cause violence, have endangered public peace and security in the region and the country at large. See ibid., 248.

1473 Ibid., p. 249.

1474 See ibid., p. 249.

1475 See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 392.

1476 See ibid., p. 391-392.

far as the clause of the constitution states that such a change requires ratification by the National Assembly which superseded that of the state's House of Assembly. O. Kalu summarizes this thus:

> The constitution sought to restrict State Houses further by privileging the supremacy of the National Assembly whose laws were to prevail over state laws (Art. 4: 5). This was with an eye to the provisions on freedom of religion, freedom of association and fundamental human rights.[1477]

Apart from the fear of domination which the introduction of the Sharia penal code raises among the country's non-Muslims and Christian populations, the other major line of division concerns the conceptualization of human rights within the framework of the Sharia interpretation and its consequences for a secular state like Nigeria. As evident in the following statement, in reference to J. Paden, "Nigeria is not a Muslim state in Africa, but a multi-religious country that operates under a secular constitution that serves as a bridge between Muslims and Christians […]."[1478]

That is why observers believe that both proponents and opponents of Sharia cannot compromise in matters involving the interpretation of fundamental human rights because "what constitutes the right to a lifestyle demanded by God for one side, is a violation of the Nigerian constitution and accepted human rights standards for the other",[1479] a very serious point of conflict that will be discussed briefly in the next section.

5.5.2.1 Sharia Controversy: Constitutional Secularism and Human Rights

In continuation of the contentious disagreements causing the dividing lines between the adherents of Islamic religious principles and those of secular constitutional laws introduced at the concluding part of the last section, this section will expatiate on the controversy generated by the differences between the Islamic legal code—the Sharia—and secular laws with regard to issues relating to fundamental human rights. In addition, instances of how human rights are being violated in Nigeria will be illustrated and examples cited.

It is questionable to believe that one religion is superior to another, especially in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country where, on the one hand, a particular religion is assigned to a specific ethnicity and, on the other hand, there are

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1477   Ibid., p. 392.
1478   Kwaja, Chris, 2010, op. cit., p. 188.
1479   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2003, op. cit., p. 415.

multiple ethnic groups which are comprised of adherents of Islam, Christianity and African traditional religions. On this basis, one may think that what holds an amalgam of diverse ethnic and religious groups together within a political community are the principles of secularism and secularity, as these may be the only factors that can relegate the significance of competing religious factions in the struggle to monopolize political power at both the states and federal levels.[1480]

Moreover, the expectation is that the principle of a "common good" for all citizens is of utmost importance and requires the highest priority in comparison to all other factors such as the imposition of a specific religion, recognized as a state religion and representing a particular interest, which may be instrumentalized towards the acquisition, control and monopolization of the country's power apparatus. As a way out of such predicament, the recognition of a constitution which guarantees the rights of all citizens, irrespective of religious, gender, ethnic differences etc., is vital. J. Harnischfeger toes the same line of argument which he states below:

> As ideas about justice and human dignity diverge greatly, it becomes difficult to formulate and realize ideas of the public good. What binds Christians, Muslims and irreligious people together is not much more than the common interest in ensuring that everybody can realize his or her own ideas of a good life.[1481]

However, in the instance of Nigeria, the opposite is the case as religious groups, especially adherents of Islam and Christianity, are engaged in a power struggle using disctinct conceptualizations of religious norms and ideologies to construct the state's authority.

As a result, the exploitation of political power to impose or enforce a religious vision and ideology on a multi-religious country is questionable. In a situation such as that of Nigeria, "however, the whole trajectory African politics—military rule, despotic government, nepotism—has led to neglect of the significance of constitutions […]."[1482] Despite the harm done to the constitutional pillar of the country, the introduction of the Sharia is in a way defining the "political self-determination in religious terms and excluding others from determining central aspects of public legislation, Muslims redefine the *demos* that is entitled to rule."[1483] So, this can be perceived as a process of politicized ethnicity that

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1480 Secularity, in this sense, denotes the neutrality of the state government towards religious communities whereas secularism, on the other hand, is the attempt to resist any religious influence politically and make it harmless as far as possible in a country. See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 19-20.
1481 See ibid., p. 21.
1482 Kamal, Youssef, 2002, op. cit., p. 432-434 (432).
1483 Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 431.

causes conflicts in Nigeria. J. Harnischfeger observes the circumstances surrounding the Sharia controversies and its effects on the Nigerian polity as follows:

> Introducing Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims over territory in which the will of Muslims reigns supreme. This has led to violent conflicts, especially in parts of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, where Muslim 'settlers' from the north, most of them Hausa and Fulani, have clashed with indigenous ethnic groups which are largely Christian and 'traditionalist'. The call for Sharia is popular among the migrants, as it provides them with a divine mission: they have to assume supremacy over the local non-Muslim population in order to shape public institutions according to what they see as the will of God. The 'indigenes', however, have little interest in a religious confrontation. As 'sons of the soil', they want to defend their ancestral land against 'foreign tribes'; they therefore emphasize ethnic, not religious, antagonisms.[1484]

This characterization of the resurgence of the Sharia in Nigeria is common in religiously divided societies where the idea of democratic community fades and the legitimacy of its decision-making process is no more binding.[1485] It can be argued from the above that religion is applied as means to exclude others from political power and the state's resources.

Consequently, it is doubtful under these circumstances how Christians and Muslims as well as non-believers can live and co-exist together under the same polity as the current situation shows that the existence and protection of the Fundamental Human Rights of everyone, which are guaranteed under the constitution, as the United Nations stipulates, are being trampled upon and violated:

> Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Universal human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law lays down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.[1486]

In view of the quotation given above, it is uncertain how one can explain any law which is discriminatory against women in the 21st century, as the following on the reintroduction of the Sharia stipulates:

> Among jurists there is little doubt that the new penal codes and other Sharia (by)laws violate several constitutional principles. Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women, are not given equal rights. And draconian punishments like stoning or crucifixion are to be seen as torture, or

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1484   Ibid.
1485   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 22.
1486   This declaration of Human Rights, which the Nigerian government is to uphold, is available on the homepage of the United Nations as follows:
        http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx [03/06/2013].

at least as inhuman degrading treatment which is banned by section 34(1) of the Constitution.[1487]

In view of section 34(1) in the Nigerian constitution, the followings are stipulated:

> Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly⸺
>
> (a) no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment;
> (b) no person shall he held in slavery or servitude; and
> (c) no person shall be required to perform forced of compulsory labour.[1488]

O. Kalu observes that the same women and masses, who demand the introduction of the Sharia with the belief that it will help them legally, socially and economically since they are rest assured that living under Islamic laws will safeguard them from arbitrary abuse of justice, are the ones targeted by these Islamic laws.[1489] But, prior to the extension of the Sharia into criminal law in 1999, Zamfara's state governor-elect Yerima "promised that the restoration of the sharia was the cure for the malaise and the hope for the future for both his state and the rest of Islamized northern Nigeria."[1490] G. Bashri underscores the high expectation by the northern Muslims, especially women, about the application of these new legal frameworks and how they will safeguard them:

> Sharia ethics prescribe a humane and nonexploitative relationship among social groups. Women believe that sharia laws protect the rights of women in a predominantly patriarchal culture in matters over divorce and rights to land and property.[1491]

Having raised the hopes of certain northern Muslims, with regard to the Sharia, it becomes questionable that the same Islamic law, supposedly shaped to protect minorities by issuing justice without preferential treatment or discrimination, is allegedly used not only to discriminate against women, but also to destabilize the polity.

Otherwise, how can the case of a woman who is sentenced to death through stoning by a Sharia court as a punishment for having involved in an extra-marital sexual relationship be explained, a verdict rendered in the case of 35 year-old Safiyya Hussein and her daughter in the northern Sokoto state, where the Sharia

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1487 Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 432-433.
1488 Quote obtained from the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available online on the website: http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria. htm [29/05/2013].
1489 See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2004, op. cit., p. 249.
1490 Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 392.
1491 Bashri, Ghazali: *Nigeria and Shari'ah: Aspirations and Apprehensions*, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester 1994.

is in practice.[1492] In view of the fact that the man, Yakubu Abubakar, accused to be responsible for her pregnancy, denied his involvement in having any sexual relationship with her, Safiyya would have required four witnesses to testify to the sexual act between her and Y. Abubakar. Failing to do so, she was liable for committing an adulterous offence punishable under the Sharia penal code by the death sentence. Y. Abubakar, fully aware of the insufficiency of this legal system and the implications of confessing and admitting to the offence, denied having any sexual relations with Safiyya. O. Kalu elucidates thus: "He utilized the provision in the sharia legal system that stipulates that one can only be guilty if he confesses and if four witnesses testify that they saw the offence when it was committed."[1493]

Eventually, in spite of Hussein's insistence on his blame, Y. Abubakar, the man allegedly responsible for her pregnancy, was acquitted for lack of evidence.[1494] Owing to the international attention the case aroused and the pressure generated on the Nigerian government by the international community on the perceived injustice, she was released under the prerogative of mercy.[1495] In spite of her release, such an application of Islamic laws on gender issues opens up an avenue for debates about the fate of minorities, in this case women, whose legal rights are subjected to controversy under Sharia laws.

Furthermore, O. Kalu explains that there are other areas where punishments meted out according to the Sharia penal code violate the aforementioned UN Human Rights Declaration and contravene the Nigerian Constitution. For instance, torturing people and subjecting them to degrading or inhuman treatment are regarded as violations:

1492   See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 394. More about this case can be read thus:
       "Two years after her divorce from Yusuf S. of Birni Kware, she developed a casual romantic relationship with a farmer and fisherman, Yakubu Abubakar. From all indications, the enticement included the occasional gifts of small amounts of money and a promise of marriage. She was not keen on the marriage offer but needed the occasional gifts because she lived in abject poverty, had the custody of four children, and lived with her aged parents and a brother who is a fisherman. After four encounters, she became pregnant and delivered a beautiful daughter, Adamah, an adorable child with aquiline features. Saffiya has a brother who belongs to the fanatical, pro-orthodox *izalatu* ('Jamatu Izalat al Bidt's a wa Iqamat as Sunnah'), a movement that opposes innovation and strives to guard against loss of religious faith. While she was pregnant, this brother reported to the local Sharia Implementation Committee (such committees sprouted at the prospect of encoding the sharia) that his elder sister was pregnant. The Implementation Committee charged her at the Lower Sharia court, which quickly disclaimed any competence, realizing that the case involved *zina* (adultery) and capital punishment." Ibid., p. 394.
1493   Ibid., p. 395.
1494   See ibid., p. 395.
1495   Ibid., p. 389.

> The Zamfara codes created new sections on capital punishment, prescribing the death penalty for murder (*Qisasi*), and made provisions (*huddi*) on theft and adultery (*zina*) and rape that included severance of limbs and death by stoning (*rajmi*), where the penal code under the First Republic had prescribed fifty lashes. The new codes failed to provide for adequate preconditions before such severe *huddi* could be applied.[1496]

It can be seen that in a country governed by a republican constitution, there are different ideas regarding the conceptualization of justice and human dignity.[1497] In reference to the resurgence of Islamic Sharia law, through which the rights of people are based on faith, J. Harnischfeger posits that any allegation of exclusion by minorities, such as women or children or any dissenting views voiced against the violation of their constitutional rights, qualifies as repression.[1498] N. Obianyo argues that politics in Nigeria is so religionized that citizens are already divided into two worlds, namely: the Christians and the Muslims.[1499]

Consequently, it can be argued that the prospects of the consolidation of democratic institutions in a nation like Nigeria are ever more uncertain under the current situation "because the rise of ethnic and religious self-determination groups aggravates the uncivil character of Nigerian society."[1500] Taking A.-M. Holenstein's suggestion of the existence of both secularization processes and secular order into account, the Nigerian case may be distinguishable from the approach of a universalistic political theology of the Islamic Ummah,[1501] and as such "incompatibility with our [Western] model of separation does not rule out an understanding of democracy and tolerance […]."[1502] But, if the observation of O. Kalu is considered, then "Sharia is a prescriptive divine law rather than an existentialist ethic and does not permit the relativist, liberal theology of Christians."[1503]

Based on this, J. Harnischfeger asserts that the Western liberal conception of equality before the law, which the Nigerian Constitution is obliged to uphold, is different from or non-existent in the way many Muslims understand a divine-

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1496   Ibid., p. 392.
1497   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 21.
1498   See ibid.
1499   Nkolika, E. Obianyo: "Behind the Curtains of State Power: Religious Groups and the Struggle for Ascendancy in Nigerian Public Institutions – A Critical Appraisal", in: *Africa Development*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, 2010, p. 141-164 (143).
1500   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 25.
1501   J. Harnischfeger asserts that "the *umma*, as it was conceived in the canonical texts, is a politically-constituted community. Sunni jurists never justified in principle the separation of state and religion." Ibid, p. 222-223. Italics in original.
1502   Holenstein, Anne-Marie, 2005, op. cit., p. 13.
1503   Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2004, op. cit., p. 243.

ly laid-down principle of a hierarchy between men and women, believers and infidels since such conceptions are based on religious conditions.[1504]

From such a point of view, O. Kalu reveals how the resurgence of Sharia and its extension into criminal law is one of the reasons for the eruption of contemporary conflicts in Nigeria as this implies the creation of a new nation based on religious laws within an already existing country ruled by a republican constitution, a case yet unresolved as the author emphasizes below:

> The sharia controversy rocked the foundations of the Nigerian polity, threatening its nascent democracy. Initially it was presumed to be only a constitutional problem, but the actual application of the *huddi* aroused international concern. The nation watched in disbelief as the sharia legal system started to operate like a guillotine, cutting off the hand of one Bello Jangedi, who had stolen two bicycles in Zamfara. Other such punishments followed with dizzying regularity, ignoring all protests. The global community mounted enormous pressure on the Nigerian government to overturn such verdicts.[1505]

As a result, it can be argued that, with regard to the democratic process in Nigeria, there is a need for a common rule that is binding to all parties and which everyone sees as just and fair. However, it must be acknowledged that the possibility of reaching an agreement further decreases as some of the actors/elites bind themselves to their separate religious laws.[1506]

In addition, A. Essien stresses that if Nigeria is conceived as a place open to the practice of all kinds of religious movements,[1507] then, according to D. Agbiboa, members of different religious groups will always be in a struggle to dominate the affairs of the country.[1508] This denotes a competition in order to attain ascendancy and control, a condition, which characterizes the manner through which Christianity and Islam are in direct opposition to each other in the Nigerian polity.[1509] Subsequently, having a situation whereby the country is split into a Muslim North and a Christian South, M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos opines that "the Islamization of the North thus went hand in hand with the Christianization of the South. Both Islam and Christianity got politicized."[1510] One of the consequences of the instrumentalization of religion during the process of politicized ethnicity is that the religious battle lines are drawn as J. Harnischfeger discusses:

1504   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 26.
1505   Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 393.
1506   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 25.
1507   See Essien, A. Anthonia, 2010, op. cit., p. 642.
1508   See Agbiboa, E. Daniel, 2013, op. cit., p. 21.
1509   See ibid., p. 21.
1510   Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2008, op. cit., p. 77.

> Since the federal government did not prevent the implementation of Sharia, the country has been split into spheres with widely divergent legal systems. In Zamfara State, which was the first to return to indigenous forms of justice, visitors were greeted by signboards informing them that the rule of the constitution had been suspended: 'God's Law Is Supreme'.[1511]

It is not only in Zamfara state where the constitutional provisions governing the country are contravened. It is also reported that in Kaduna state, where Muslims are slightly more than non-Muslims, the territories governed by the Sharia are limited only to certain local governments where Muslims reside.[1512] The current circumstance regarding the condition of statehood in Nigeria shows the country as a fragile state because the concept of nationhood is overshadowed by particularistic interests if the following statement by D. Agbiboa is anything to go by:

> Individually and (or) collectively, the disparate and often warring ethno-religious groups in Nigeria subscribe to a model of conduct that elevates ethnicity and religion over and above the broader interests of the nation.[1513]

With respect to developing a national identity, the situation has degenerated to the extent that "in fact, the only time when Nigerians share a sense of national identity is when the national football team—fondly known as the 'Super Eagles'—is having a match".[1514] However, based on the instrumentalist position that identity swings, one can argue that the possibility of being able to have a sense of nationhood in a football match, the only time the nation creates the image identity of the opponent as a common enemy, is a sign that a national identity can be constructed if the elites are interested. Nonetheless, both N. Orji and D. Agbiboa posit that both Christians and Muslims once, as a unified force, pursued their liberation from the decades of abusive and oppressive military regimes because, then, "both Muslims and Christians had a common enemy to fight."[1515] Therefore, based on the aforementioned power struggle between both religious groups, N. Orji illustrates that this is an artificial creation of enmity by the political elites while in pursuits of resources:

> The immediate purpose of heightening the discord between Christians and Muslims is to create artificial unity within each religion as internal conflicts are subsumed in order to intensify the

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1511   Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 433. Part of the quote in which it is cited that God's Law is supreme, see Maier, Karl: *This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria*, Public Affairs, New York 2000.
1512   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 433.
1513   Agbiboa, E. Daniel, 2013, op. cit., p. 4.
1514   Ibid., p. 4.
1515   Ibid., p. 22.

struggle against the external enemy. This kind of strategy is promoted by political entrepreneurs who hope to gain dividends from religiously consolidated constituencies.[1516]

Considering that both Christians and Muslims are involved in using religion within the clientelistic structure of Nigerian politics in order to gain access to resources,[1517] it can be argued that the fear of being dominated, a major syndrome contributing to the perceptual attitudes leading to intolerance and religious conflicts, can be traced to the current religious crisis bedeviling the Nigerian state.

J. Campbell asserts that there is a perception by Muslims that Christianity is spreading throughout the country, a situation which may lead to Christians outnumbering Muslims. He highlights it thus:

> Some speculate that Christianity has, in fact, spread to the point of becoming the majority religion across the country—and many Muslims fear they are right. In fact, precise data is lacking on the percentage of the population that adheres to one or the other of the two religions. A notable scholar of African Christianity cites statistics showing Christians in 2000 at 46 percent of the population with Muslims at 44 percent.[1518]

Taking the above into consideration, A. Christelow assumes that the reenactment of the Sharia penal code in 12 northern states can be seen as a political and legal reaction to the socio-economic crisis confronting the country and cannot either be interpreted as a move towards the secession of certain parts of the country based on religious motives or conceived as a challenge to the Nigerian federal constitution and the unity of the country.[1519] This is not to deemphasize that religion may be politicized in a societal setting where politics is unable to fulfil its legitimate social functions and provide the orientation upon which a just and fair society is built.[1520] So, whenever the failure of politics is observed, P. Jenkins claims that religion can offer itself as an alternative basis of identities and social traditions.[1521]

At this juncture, it is essential to raise questions on the response of Southerners and Christians, as a reaction to the ongoing Islamic fundamentalism in

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1516   Orji, Nkwachukwu: "Faith-Based Aid to People Affected by Conflict in Jos, Nigeria: An Analysis of the Role of Christian and Muslim Organizations", in: *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2010, p. 473-492 (477).

1517   See Campbell, John, 2011, op. cit., p. 50.

1518   Ibid., p. 50-51.

1519   See Christelow, Allan, 2002, op. cit., p. 198. O. Kalu assumes as well that the reintroduction of the Sharia penal code in the Nigerian polity is a result of socio-economic crises such as poverty, unemployment, corruption and lack of an efficient justice system. See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 390.

1520   See Holenstein, Anne-Marie, 2005, op. cit., p. 14.

1521   See Jenkins, Philip: "The Next Christianity", in: *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 290 (3), 2002, p. 53-64.

certain parts of the northern region which threatens the co-existence of the country. H. Bienen examines the activities of the southern Christians as follows:

> So far, though, the impact of Christianity in Nigeria has been less directly consequential for the struggle for political legitimacy and control of authoritative roles at central and state levels than has been the impact of Islam.[1522]

Irrespective of the fact that there exist ethnic militias throughout the southern region, as already shown earlier on, one can argue that the struggle against perceived political and economic marginalization by certain so-called militant groups such as the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) cannot be identified as a religious movement.[1523] The same can be said about other numerous ethnic militias such as Nigeria Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in the Niger Delta region fighting both the governments and multi-national oil companies, the vigilante group Bakassi Boys, or the secession campaign of the Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the south-east because, irrespective of their illegal activities like kidnapping, extra-judicial killings, smuggling and oil bunkering etc., all their activities are by no means carried out in the name of religion, but rather possess an ethnic character.[1524]

On a similar note, J. Harnischfeger observes that the aforementioned ethnic militias or vigilante groups in the southern region do not fight in the name of religion and Southerners, altogether, reject to be associated with religious struggles.[1525] Based on this, H. Bienen maintains the following: "The overt manipulation of religious symbols both to justify the rule of elites and to challenge that rule has been a manipulation of Islamic values and symbols more than Christian ones."[1526]

However, unless investigated, it cannot be conclusively proven that religion has no role in the struggle by the aforesaid ethnic militias. With respect to H. Bienen, certain symbols embedded in the linguistic features of ethnic groups, i.e. "religion may provide a language, a set of values, and institutions through which groups struggle and over which groups contend, both within and between religious communities."[1527]

Another aspect which is critical in order to examine the religious resurgence of the Islamic Sharia penal code is the reaction of the government towards curb-

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1522   Bienen, Henry, 1986, op. cit., p. 60.
1523   See *International Crisis Group*, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. 15-20.
1524   See ibid., p. 15-20.
1525   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 434.
1526   Bienen, Henry, 1986, op. cit., p. 60.
1527   Ibid.

ing the alleged illegal behavior of the Sharia state governors in the northern re-
gion. A. Omede describes the situation of the country since the reintroduction of
Sharia law, its aftermath and the conflicts which hereby engulf the country:

> The foundation for this […] predicates on the series of violent activities that Nigeria has had to
> contend with since the advent of democratic rule in the period 1999 to date (2011). During this
> period, there have been several incidence of violent politically motivated ethno-religious unrest
> notably in and around Jos (Plateau state), Nassarawa and Benue and series of bomb blasts
> targeting state institutions and innocent bystanders in the Northeastern region of the coun-
> try.[1528]

Giving an account of the response to the revival of Sharia penal code since
1999, the Nigerian government is still unable to tackle the constitutional chal-
lenges this poses for the unity and survival of the country. O. Kalu believes that
the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, elected in the same year as the resur-
gence of Sharia occured (1999), was not only unwilling to confront it, but he
was also hampered by his awareness of the force of religion in fomenting crisis
whenever instrumentalized.[1529] He further explains that as a Yoruba by ethnicity
and a southern Christian from a different political party, any step or action taken
by Obasanjo would have been construed and interpreted as partisan, anti-Islam
and anti-north.[1530]

    As a reaction to the question of how the issue of Sharia would be dealt with,
in reference to the constitutional controversy it would evoke, former president
Obasanjo opined that the resurgence of the Islamic criminal law is a political
one which will fizzle out.[1531] It is reported that the Minister of Justice under
president Obasanjo, with regard to Hussein's death sentence and the internation-
al anger it generated, sent a letter to sensitize the Sharia governors on the uncon-
stitutionality and the consequence of their actions on the polity. Furthermore, his
declaration that a stoning would not take place in 21st century Nigeria was per-
ceived as an infuriating and a provocative statement by certain northern Mus-
lims.[1532] The President of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria, in re-
sponse, questioned the legality of the Nigerian Constitution thus:

> Why should Muslims feel bound by a legal order based on European notions of justice? 'The
> constitution [says] that the cutting off of hands goes against human rights. The question we

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1528   Omede, A.J., 2011, op. cit., p. 90-91.
1529   See Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2003, op. cit., p. 393.
1530   Ibid., p. 392. Also a similar argument is stated in the report of the *International Crisis
       Group*, 2006, "Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty", op. cit., p. 26.
1531   See Christelow, Allan, 2002, op. cit., p. 197.
1532   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 433.

Muslims are asking them is who laid down these human rights? We have never been consulted.[1533]

Meanwhile, the federal government, under the presidency of Obasanjo, was hesitant to take the Sharia states before the Supreme Court over the constitutional violation of the Sharia penal code for the following reasons:

> The current accommodation is fragile, while the Federal Government merely 'muddles through' in avoiding final decisions (eg., by the Supreme Court) that, perhaps, would favour one side and may thus provoke violent reactions from the other.[1534]

Accordingly, it can be argued that a judicial decision by the Supreme Court would have not settled the dispute because the constitution is not acknowledged or recognized by certain groups, thereby, not respected as the common basis through which the relationship between religious communities are organized.[1535] According to the leader of the Supreme Council for Sharia, "any attempt to force these constitutional principles upon them would only widen the rift between Christians and Muslims"[1536] and may lead to war if Muslims are hindered from living according to their faith and laws.[1537]

Owing to the federal government's inaction towards stopping the violation of the constitutional rights of its citizens and the breach of the fundamental human rights that contravenes the supremacy of the constitution, which politicians swear to abide by themselves and to protect and uphold it while taking their oath of office, A. Omede examines the consequences of this inaction thus:

> The influx and proliferation of small and light weapons has also impacted on the high level of insecurity currently being witnessed in Nigeria today. The vacuum created by government inability to secure lives and properties has led to cycle of insecurity/security dilemma in which every man looks after his/her own security. The pursuit of individual security had not only led to the search of weapons of protection against armed robbers and hoodlums, it had also resulted in the pursuit of the types of weapons with the most delivery capacity (fire-power) that will match the aggressors "fire-for-fire".[1538]

The inability of the federal government to take a stand leads to further violation of the constitutional provision through the emergence of the so-called "Hisbah Guards, Muslim volunteer groups organized by the governments of Sharia states and charged with enforcing that law, [which] operate as pseudo-militias."[1539]

1533   Ibid.
1534   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2003, op. cit., p. 415.
1535   See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 433.
1536   Ibid.
1537   See the *News Magazine* (Lagos, Nigeria), published on 25 September 2000, p. 52.
1538   Omede, A.J., 2011, op. cit., p. 94.
1539   See *International Crisis Group*, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. 17.

The formation of a security apparatus to enforce obedience to Sharia principles and laws contradicts section 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as explicitly stated below:

> There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.[1540]

Based on the above stated constitutional arrangement for the establishment of a police force stated above, the Nigerian Police Force is the only organ empowered to enforce peace and security in Nigeria, such Hisbah Guards are illegal. There can only be the Nigerian Police Force, therefore, the Sharia militia represents a duplication of the Police duty which is in contravention of the constitution. It is indicated that "in states such as Kano and Zamfara, the Hisbah groups, operating under the governors, began widespread campaigns of harassment against ordinary citizens."[1541] This is evident of how religion is used as an instrument of repression, especially during election times, to attain personal goals. It is clear that the country is battling with legitimacy crises, state failure, endemic corruption, and human rights abuses and violations, some of the factors which currently place the country at the edge of collapse.

Irrespective of the contemporary conflict situation in the country, it is uncertain if the advent of Boko Haram can be traced back to or linked to the resurgence of the Sharia with its associated crises. In spite of that, the current activities of the terrorist organization, Boko Haram, requires further investigation in order to pinpoint the aims and objectives of the group. Consequently, the next section will carry out a brief overview of the historical background of this dreaded group and elucidate on it shortly.

1540   Section 214 (1) of the 1999 *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* is obtainable under the following homepage: http://www.nigerialaw.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepub licOfNigeria.htm#ArmedForcesOfTheFederation [06/06/2013].

1541   See *International Crisis Group*, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. 17. The activities of the Hisbah group involve the following:
"They have seized thousands of motorbikes ("okadas") from male taxi drivers who, they claimed, transport female passengers in violation of the dictate that non-related men and women should not travel together. They have thus deprived many men of their livelihoods and women of cheap transport." Ibid., p. 17.

5.5.2.2 Overview: The Politics of Terror and Islamization Process of Boko Haram

As indicated earlier, part of this research study's intent is to look deeper into the activities of the organization Boko Haram and focus further on some of its activities such as its radicalization and onslaught on both innocent civilians and governmental security agents as well as the destruction of property. In addition, this thesis will assess some of the doctrines of Boko Haram and give an account of its evolution into a terrorist organization. Despite all the atrocities linked to the group, as will be demonstrated in the analysis, the work will argue that the origin, objectives and activities of the terrorist group can be viewed from the perspective of politicized ethnicity.

The killings and the destruction of property, which revolve around the controversy surrounding the Zamfara's state introduction of a Sharia penal code in 1999 and its spread into 11 other northern states of the federation, may not necessarily be responsible for the founding and activities of Boko Haram. However, taking into consideration that the same Boko Haram is accountable for the deaths of Muslims, non-Muslims and/or Christians alike in the country, then the main objectives of this group become questionable if part of its goals is the Islamization of the northern region and, subsequently, the whole of Nigeria.[1542] In order to understand these objectives, A. Omede illustrates some of the activities of this group which cause tension and threaten the fragile link that binds the country's diverse ethnic groups, non-Muslims and Christians across different regions of the federation:

> Recently however, a new dimension of bomb blasts, occurring on a daily basis, is a major focus of attention in Nigeria's security analysis. The Boko-Haram Islamic militant sect (literarily translated as Western education is bad), has been fingered as the perpetrators of the bomb explosions.[1543]

That is why it is important at this point to examine the meaning of Boko Haram, its members and its objectives. The formation of the group can be investigated from different perspectives and many observers voice various opinions about the group's existence and radicalization. According to one of the views on the

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1542   See Maiangwa, Benjamin/Uzodike, O. Ufo: "Report: The Changing Dynamics of Boko Haram Terrorism", in: *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, 31/07/2012, p. 1-6 (2). Viewed electronically on 13/02/2012 and retrievable through the website: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/7/31/20127316843815734The%20Changing%20Dynamics%20of%20Boko%20Haram%20Terrorism.pdf [08/06/2013].

1543   Omede, A.J., 2011, op. cit., p. 90.

history of Boko Haram, the following report focuses on its origin, membership and aims thus:

> Nigeria's militant Islamist group Boko Haram-which has caused havoc in Africa's most populous country through a wave of bombings-is fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state. Its followers are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase which says: 'Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors'. Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it 'haram', or forbidden, for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. This includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education. Boko Haram regards the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers, even when the country had a Muslim president. Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed after his arrest. The group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'.[1544]

From the above, it can be argued that the group is contesting the secularism and the democratic dispensation in Nigeria. What Boko Haram is fighting for, in essence, is the creation of an Islamic state.

Therefore, it is doubtful if the resurgence of the Sharia penal code in the 12 northern states in 1999, at a time when democratic activities resumed, can be linked to the formation of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, because Muslim politicians who participate in the democratic process are targets for elimination as well. It is explained that the sect was founded by Abubakar Lawan at the University of Maiduguri, initially known by the name Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'ah, but the original name of the sect was changed on many occasions. For example, the names range from Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, the Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram, to the current one: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad.[1545]

According to the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, the change of names by the same sect repeatedly shows that identity swings. As this thesis progresses, the analysis will show how the objectives and operations of this group, Boko Haram, undergo changes. For instance, the attacks of the sect are not only directed at northern Muslim politicians and northern Muslims, but also

1544   The observation in the quotation above on the origin and objectives of Boko Haram is reported by *BBC News Africa* under the theme "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists", published on 11 January 2011 and electronically retrieved on 22 June 2011. The full report is obtainable through the following website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501 [08/06/2013]. A similar point of view about the genesis of Boko Haram is posited by the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 30/11/2011, under the topic "BOKO HARAM: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland", p. 6.
1545   See Onuoha, O. Freedom: "Boko-Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect", in: *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, 19/2/2012, p. 1-6 (2). Viewed electronically on 13/02/2012 and retrievable through the website: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/2/29/2012229113341793734BOKO%20HARAM%20NIGERIAS%20EXTREMIST%20ISLAMIC%20SECT.pdf [08/06/2013].

churches are targeted for attacks in recent times. Thereby, Boko Haram's new objectives and targets not only indicate "its strategic re-direction and focus but also of its desire to implement its own variant of shari'ah law by inflaming religious animosities and violence in Nigeria."[1546]

Nonetheless, the report by the United States House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence expresses doubts on the exact origin of Boko Haram as it shows uncertainty with respect to the genesis of the group in its report:[1547]

> Though the origins of Boko Haram are murky, the group was not founded as a violent insurgency bent on overthrowing the Nigerian government. Founded in the mid-1990s as a religious study group, Boko Haram did not begin to transform into the insurgent group it is today until a young and charismatic Nigerian civil service employee named Mohammed Yusuf assumed control.[1548]

T. Johnson asserts that the Islamic sect Boko Haram, having been founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the northeastern state of Borno, aims at making Nigeria an Islamic state in order to enable the implementation of criminal Sharia courts throughout the country.[1549] What is most striking in T. Johnson's analysis of Boko Haram is that there is not any specific reason attached to the formation of this sect. On the one hand, he opined that the primary reason for the revolt and attacks on government institutions is as a result of dissatisfaction. This ranges from the purported abusive attitudes of the government's security forces, corruption, crisis between the Muslim north and the Christian south to the widening gap and disparity in regional economies to the detriment of an impoverished and discontented Muslim north.[1550]

In spite of this, it is uncertain if economic dissatisfaction can influence and turn a group such as Boko Haram to delegitimize a democratic system and demand the withdrawal of all Muslims from participating in such a government based on the alleged condition of the country, which Human Rights Watch describes below:

> Corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria that it has turned public service for many into a kind of criminal enterprise. Graft has fueled political violence, denied millions of Nigerians access to

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1546   See Maiangwa, Benjamin/Uzodike, O. Ufo: "Report: The Changing Dynamics of Boko Haram Terrorism", in: *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, 2012, p. 2.

1547   See House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 30/11/2011, under the theme "BOKO HARAM: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland", p. 6.

1548   Ibid., p. 6.

1549   The report is published by T. Johnson under the theme "Boko Haram", updated on 27 December 2011. Electronically available as follows: http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739 [08/06/2013].

1550   See ibid.

even the most basic health and education services, and reinforced police abuses and other widespread patterns of human rights violations.[1551]

Yet, as shown, since the rise of Boko Haram and its continuous onslaught against anyone who criticizes the sect's stance and objectives, more Muslims have been killed than Christians.[1552]

On the other hand, T. Johnson remarks that the northern elites may be accountable for the establishment of the sect in the first place because of the foreseen threat of losing political power, i.e. the presidency, to a Southerner.[1553] According to the author, the northern elites believed that, in the long run, the consequence would be losing the grip on the oil reserves located in the southern part of the country which have been controlled up until the present primarily by certain northern elites.[1554] The current zero-sum-game politics between the northern and the southern elites is about the division and control of the oil wealth in the Niger Delta. It is stated by Human Rights Watch that this oil wealth has for the most part been controlled by the northern Muslims until recent times when this northern dominance was contested by the activities of the militant groups in the Niger Delta, who clamor for a larger share of their region's wealth.[1555]

From this point of view, it can be argued that the northern Muslim elites were responsible for the formation of Boko Haram which they used to destabilize the Nigerian government whenever political powers shifted to the south. Moreover, in 1999, when a southern Christian, Olusegun Obasanjo, was elected president of the country, there are allegations that the Sharia penal code controversy was reintroduced as a political ploy, a weapon by the Hausa-Fulani to destabilize the government of Obasanjo in order to continue the hold on power. This is noted by J. Harnischfeger below:

> With the transition to democracy in 1999, power has shifted to the south, and Christians assumed that leaders of the Hausa-Fulani, Nigeria's largest ethnic conglomerate, who dominated Nigerian politics since independence, are using religion to put pressure on the Obasanjo government [...].[1556]

1551   Human Rights Watch: "Corruption on Trial?", published on 5 August 2011, and accessible under the following homepage: http://www.hrw.org/node/101018/section/2 [08/06/2013].
1552   See the report by T. Johnson under the theme "Boko Haram", updated on 27 December 2011.
1553   See ibid.
1554   See ibid.
1555   See ibid.
1556   Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 434.

According to his analysis of the origin of Boko Haram, it is unclear what the sect stands for and whether it honestly pursues the purification of Islam as its leaders claim or if it is used as a tool to instrumentalize the Islamic religion for political reasons.

As indicated above, Boko Haram may be used as a tool by certain northern elites in the process of politicizing ethnicity in order to gain access to both political powers and material resources. In view of the fact that northern Muslims leaders have had a majority stake in holding on to power and in the dominance of the Nigerian polity since independence, it is not clear why the constitutional arrangement of the country is currently in dispute. A. Harneit-Sievers describes the situation thus:

> Religious leaders and intellectuals from both sides of the Nigerian Sharia divide can easily make 'secularism' the bogeyman: Muslims see it as a Western and Christian concept; Christians equate 'secular' with 'anti-religious', miss an appropriate ethical foundation of society, and want to see Nigeria defined as a 'multi-religious' state instead.[1557]

In consideration of the current capability of the Boko Haram sect and its international dimension,[1558] it can be argued that the sect is either used as an instrument by some northern Muslim elites or that it originated as a result of state failure.[1559] Also, the emergence and evolution of the sect may also be understood within the context of the global jihad, which was initiated by September 11, 2001, attack of the World Trade Centre in New York.[1560] Equally, the exact number of members of Boko Haram remains uncertain, however, it is disclosed by F. Onuoha that it draws its followers from across the 19 states of the northern region and even from beyond the Nigerian boarders in other neighboring countries such as Niger Republic, Chad and Sudan.[1561] F. Onuoha also indicated that "its members are mainly disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and former Almajiris."[1562] The problem of extremism in northern Nigeria is not that many

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1557   Harneit-Sievers, Axel, 2003, op. cit., p. 416.
1558   Apart from the attack Boko Haram launched on the United Nations building inside the Nigerian capital city, Abuja, J. Campbell discusses the sect's global expansion and connection with a wide range of networks with other Islamic terrorists groups that prove that Boko Haram is international. See Campbell, John, 2012, op. cit., p. 31.
1559   State failure means, in this sense, the alleged corruption, lack of the rule of law, election rigging and the collapse of moral values altogether, all of these factors which are not limited only to the democratic governments in Nigeria, but were also endemic during the military regimes.
1560   More on the terrorist attack of the World Trade Center in New York can be read in Balkanlioğlu, A. Mehmet, 2012, op. cit., p. 712-724.
1561   See Onuoha, O. Freedom, 2012, *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, op. cit., p. 2.
1562   Ibid., p. 2. The phenomenon of what is known as Almajiri, one of the groups that make up the members of Boko Haram, is seen as synonymous with street children. This is described

countries such as Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Libya and Pakistan financially assist with the building of mosques and Islamic schools, but rather these countries simultaneously export their worldviews, grounded in traditional or orthodox Islam, to be taught in Islamic schools and preached in mosques in the northern region.[1563] Moreover, reports show that many of the Islamic scholars and clerics are trained in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with the expectation that, upon their return to Nigeria, they will promote and transfer their knowledge based on politico-religious ideology that preaches hatred and violence against non-Muslims.[1564]

Therefore, if, hypothetically, Boko Haram was invented and nurtured as a weapon against Southerners who, since the return to partisan politics as from 1999, controlled the political landscape of the country, then it can be argued that this terrorist group currently operates beyond the control of the northern elites that established it initially. Due to the wide range of its membership recruitment, which extends beyond the borders of Nigeria, the roots of its financial support become uncertain. If Boko Haram is fighting against injustice and poverty, it is doubtful if the Islamization of the country, which it pursues, could not lead to further escalation of the crisis in a multi-religious country such as Nigeria. Otherwise, it is questionable on which moral basis the following can be explained:

> In 2004 it established a base called 'Afghanistan' in Kanamma village in northern Yobe State. The activities of the sect became more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the group. On 21 September 2004 members attacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition. It maintained in-

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as a popular old practice through which children are sent away by their parents to live and study under renowned Islamic teachers in some cities in the northern region of Nigeria. Furthermore, it is illustrated that:
"These Almajiris live and study in very appalling conditions, thereby making them vulnerable to recruitment into extremist sects like the Boko Haram and Kala Kato, largely through indoctrination. As of 2010, Nigeria hosts about 9.5 million Almajiris, with over 80 per cent concentrated in northern Nigeria. Beside Almajiris that form the bulk of its foot soldiers, the sect also has as members some well-educated, wealthy and influential people such as university lecturers, business contractors and politicians who are the major financiers. Recently, the sect added bank robbery to its sources of funds for meeting different needs: helping the less privileged; sustaining the widows of those that died in the Jihad; giving alms to the poor and needy (Zakat); and for the prosecution of Jihad, among others." Ibid., p. 2-3.

1563 See Annual Report published in 2011 by *the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom*, p. 98-109 (103). Report downloaded on 24 February 2012 and accessible electronically under the following homepage:
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/book%20with%20cover%20for%20web.pdf [09/06/2013].

1564 See ibid., p. 103.

termittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe States until July 2009 when it provoked a major anti-government revolt in Nigeria.[1565]

It is further asserted that the fighting is spreading across five other northern states with over 1000 deaths.[1566] With the arrest and execution of the sect leader Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian police, an action which many local, national and international media described in various reports as a recurrence of extrajudicial killings, a new era of human rights violation and abuse by the Nigerian police set in. As a result of the execution of Yusuf by the Nigerian Police, the radicalization of the sect and the sophistication of its operations changed in an unprecedented way. This is characterized thus:

> Since the July 2009 revolt, the sect has evolved from a group that waged poorly planned open confrontation with state security forces to one that increasingly uses improvised explosive devices, guerrilla warfare, targeted assassination, and suicide bombings in its violent campaign.[1567]

In recent years, the attacks were no longer just limited to the government's security forces, but Boko Haram also issues regular threats to Southerners and Christians alike to vacate the northern region as it plans to rid the northern region of unbelievers, the infidels as it terms them. Thereby, the group attempts to create fears of a possible ethno-religious cleansing in the minds of the people.[1568] With this, it is evident that the implication of the activities of Boko Haram constitutes gross human rights violations, as described below:

> An obvious implication is the destruction of human lives. Other costs include internal displacement of people, wanton destruction of property, fracturing of family structure, discouraging of local and foreign investment, and damage to the country's image, among others.[1569]

The current evolution of the sect's operations includes suicide bombings and other violent tactics: "for instance, a series of coordinated gun assaults and sui-

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1565   See Onuoha, O. Freedom, 2012, *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, p. 3.
1566   See ibid., p. 3.
1567   Ibid., p. 4. It is explained also that:
         "[…] recent attacks are more coordinated and sophisticated, and are authorized by an 18-member Shura, led by its new spiritual leader, Imam Abubakar Shekau. Attacks have focused largely on state security forces—police, soldiers, civil defence, and prison wardens, among others—and to a lesser extent on centers of worship, community and religious leaders, politicians, and other civilians who they consider as 'enemies'. However, the attack on the United Nations building at Nigeria's capital city, Abuja, on 26 August 2011 marked a departure from Boko Haram's traditional target set of government facilities and indeed signposts the possibility of a change in target selection in the future." Ibid., p. 4.
1568   Ibid., p. 4.
1569   Ibid.

cide bombing attacks by the sect on 20 January 2012 in the city of Kano, the capital of Kano state, killed at least 211 people."[1570]

Thereafter, reports relay that, after having staged its first suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on the police headquarters in Abuja, the Federal Capital, in 2011, other suicide bombings carried out by the sect number at least six, with a huge death toll.[1571] Thus, in view of what citizens confront on daily basis, the question of the secularity of the country will continue to generate debates and conflicts which not only project a bad image of the country in the comity of nations, but may also lead to its collapse. B. Maiangwa and U. Uzodike conceive of this thus:

> The mention of Nigeria anywhere in the world increasingly stirs up images of poverty, crime, ethno-religious violence, and terrorism. Indeed, these ascriptions, especially perennial Boko Haram terrorism, serve as a seam that interminably threatens to tear at the core of Nigeria's stability, unity and prosperity as a nation.[1572]

According to this position, it can be argued according to the instrumentalist approach that the insurgency of Boko Haram and their aim towards Islamizing a multi-religious country such as Nigeria denotes the instrumentalization of religion in order to acquire political powers and resources for certain Muslims. Moreover, to acknowledge a religion as a state religion, Islam in this case, incapacitates the notion of secularism with which the state authority should be characterized since a secular state guarantees the neutrality of the state vis-a-vis the patronization of a particular religion.[1573]

So, having an Islamic state would mean to gain influence and use the coercive instruments of the state to marginalize others, a new condition which implies that non-Muslims, Christians and adherents of traditional religions alike are excluded from holding political office. That is why "state laws must not be determined by doctrines of any of the faiths, otherwise they could not be recognized by all citizens."[1574] With this analysis, one can see that religion can be deployed as an instrument to construct and create an artificial crisis in order to gain access to political and material resources. According to the instrumentalist approach, conflicts based on ethnic and religious differences are not real, but

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1570   Ibid.
1571   See ibid.
1572   See Maiangwa, Benjamin/Uzodike, O. Ufo, 2012, *Al Jazeera Center for Studies,* p. 2.
1573   J. Harnischfeger explains that Christians in Nigeria view Sharia politicians and advocates breaking away from the compromise that hold the multi-religious Nigeria together when they decide to introduce Sharia into criminal law in 1999.1573 See Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, op. cit., p. 220-249.
1574   Ibid., p. 222.

rather are politicized by the elites while in pursuit of personal goals. This is a position which N. Obianyo represents thus:

> It argues that religion, like ethnicity, serves as instrument for the acquisition of state power, public positions and resources, and consequently as an instrument of exclusion and inclusion in the quest for ascendancy among contestants for state power and public positions.[1575]

The same can be said of the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity which, based on the above, denotes that religion is used to increase the group size as a means to overcome the perceived adversaries in as far as it all depends on the creation, or rather the projection, of an enemy image.[1576]

As this approach emphasizes, it is about "who with whom against whom", in this sense, the northern Muslims' antagonism of a secular authority can be portrayed from the perspective of appealing to other Muslim groups, for example the Yoruba Muslims, in order to establish an alliance based on the Islamic religious identity and solidarity. However, as a matter of fact, these same Yoruba Muslims define themselves, first and foremost, as Yoruba before religion plays any role. Arguably, this may be a ploy to weaken the ethnic group solidarity among the Yoruba. Meanwhile, a successful accommodation of the Yoruba Muslims, according to the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, does not denote a permanent friendship on equal terms. The reason is that there may be a further categorization and exclusion in terms of other factors after that first goal which, attained under the auspices of one Muslim community and solidarity, has been achieved.

Therefore, it can be stated that there is either a permanent enemy or a permanent friend since it is about interests and the means for the realization of those interests. Hence, it can be argued that identity swings in so far it is based on interests and, in as far as interests change/swing, the lines which determine the boundaries of ethnic groups' identities are drawn arbitrarily, are therefore dynamic and subjected to changes. Evidently, ethnic groups are not fixed, but are continually either growing or shrinking in size as precipitated by transformations or modification processes.[1577]

1575 Nkolika, E. Obianyo, 2010, op. cit., p. 141.
1576 Enemies, in this respect, are referred to as the Christians, especially Southern Christians, who are pro Western democracy and proponents of secular constitutional framework. D. Dickson asserts the following with regard to the exclusionist politics of Sharia in Nigeria: "To the governing elite, however, the spread of *sharia* was also a byproduct of Nigerian Muslims' desire to reassert their political prerogative in response to what they feared was a newfound southern Christian political hegemony." David Dickson's special report on the situation in Nigeria, *United States Institute of Peace*, 2005, op. cit., p. 8.
1577 Enlargement or decrease means, in this sense, that since an ethnic group identity is not a fixed phenomenon, but rather a dynamic one, there are possibilities of enlarging the group

By this, in view of the various transformations of the terror group Boko Haram in recent years, with regard to the changes effected on it through the different names given to the group, its change of attack strategies and its connection beyond the borders of Nigeria, a new situation, transforming Boko Haram from a local to an international terrorist group network, then, it can be argued that identity swings.

According to instrumentalism, conflicts based on ethnic and religious differences are not real, but are, moreover, politicized by the elites in pursuit of personal goals. Thereby, religious and ethnic sentiments are strongly emphasized as instruments of exclusion and inclusion among contestants to outsmart one another while vying for public positions or in competition to attain economic resources.[1578] Therefore, O. Kalu emphasizes that "in constructing a historical portrait of Islamic presence in Nigeria, periodization is crucial because the face of Islam has changed through time."[1579]

Furthermore, through the application of the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, the various aspects in reference to the composition of the membership of the group become discernible as the findings point to the recruitments of Boko Haram's members as extending as far as outside the Nigerian borders into certain neighboring countries such as Chad, Sudan, the Niger Republic etc. Such a recruitment process is additional proof that the boundaries of ethnic groups are not fixed, but rather subjected to changes.

The influence of some Islamic countries identified in the analysis such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya on the Islamic ideology of Boko Haram, which hitherto shaped and altered the identity of the group, is another factor for consideration. Such an analysis highlights both the educational and financial assistance rendered to Muslims in the northern region of the country, which arguably, as already pointed to earlier on, influences the religious worldviews of some northern Muslims and their rejection of the existing secular constitutional framework and the democratic institutions in the country. That is why T. Falola is prompted to state that "Nigeria is not isolated from world politics, the Islamic

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by using particular criteria such as religion, language or territorial solidarity in enlarging the group when pursuing certain interests by ethnic actors. When the goals are achieved, however, the ethnic group can be reduced in size as well when it concerns the distribution of booty as people tend to prefer a smaller group in order to share a more considerable portion of the booty with a smaller group than to sharing with a larger group.

1578   See Nkolika, E. Obianyo, 2010, op. cit., p. 141.
1579   Kalu, U. Ogbu, 2004, op. cit., p. 244. Furthermore, it is explained that "Islam in Nigeria is a part of the trans-Saharan movement of the religion that developed after it captured the Maghrib in the seventh century." Ibid., p. 204.

world, or other external influences."[1580] Irrespective of Boko Haram's transformation, it can be argued based on the instrumentalist approach that contemporary conflicts in Nigeria are artificially constructed by the elites because it is about the quest for political power and material resources as well as symbolic goods.

The next sections will examine two conflict zones applied as case studies in this research work and, therein, explore the process of politicized ethnicity and specifically efforts will be made towards identifying the actors that politicize ethnicity, how and why ethnicity is politicized as well as highlighting the consequences of such undertakings. Additionally, relevant factors used in the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria, for instance, issues revolving around religion as instrument of politicized ethnicity, will be investigated.

5.6 Case Studies: Introduction of Contemporary Jos Conflicts and Warri Crises

This section will concentrate on different versions of the current conflicts in Nigeria which will be exemplified from two diverse aspects of conflicts. The first one will focus on the Jos conflicts and examine how ethnicity is politicized as well as observe therein how the instrumentalization of religion is significant to the continuing outbreak of what can be termed as "protracted conflicts" in Jos, Plateau State.

As will be shown in the analysis, the Jos conflicts occur between the so-called indigenous ethnic groups on the one hand such as the Berom, the Afizere, the Anaguta etc. and members of the majority Hausa-Fulani Muslim ethnic group on the other hand. It is important to emphasize in this research study that ethnicity, within the context of the Jos conflicts from the beginning of the 1990s, is not a sufficient condition to explain the cause of the current conflicts in Jos, but rather the accentuation of ethnic politics based on perceived ethnic differences, referred to in this research work as the politicization of ethnicity, can be traced to the roots of the conflicts.

It will be highlighted further from both the theoretical perspectives of the instrumentalist approach and the method of identity and difference in ethnicity that it is during the struggle for the acquisition of resources with its inherent political involvement that the elites of ethnic groups use distinctions, by elevating the existing religious and ethnic differences, to gain access to resources which

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1580   Falola, Toyin, 1998, op. cit., p. 14.

eventually leads to the outbreak of conflicts. In the case of Jos, the analysis will demonstrate how the creation of the Jos North local government in 1991 by the former military administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida led to and aggravated ethnic discontentment among the indigenous ethnic groups who feel or perceive certain attempts made by the so-called Hausa-Fulani Muslim minority settlers towards accessing resources in Plateau state, a situation which arouse the fear of being dominated by the latter. In addition, the role of religion in this conflict will also be illustrated.

Having mentioned the Jos conflict, the Warri crisis is another, the second conflict, which will be illustrated as an example of how ethnicity is politicized in Nigeria. Unlike the Jos conflicts, the reason behind the outbreak of the Warri crises directly involves the distribution of resources. Warri, an important town at the heart of the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, is in-habited by different ethnic minority groups such as the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, the Ijaw, the Kwale etc., which, among one another, struggle to gain access to the proceeds from oil and gas resources in their region.

As a result, this study will discuss the impact and influence of the activities of the multinational oil companies on the eruption of conflicts in the region and also examine the events which led to the formation and multiplication of mili-tant groups in the Niger Delta region whose early activities at the beginning of the 1990s involved peaceful demand from both the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies for a fair share of the resources generated in the re-gion.

However, in contemporary Nigeria, some of these militant groups are en-gaged in illegal operations such as kidnappings, killings and robberies, oil bun-kering and other illegitimate acquisitions of weapons which not only affect the production and export of crude oil, but also threaten the existence of Nigeria, whose monolithic economic base depends on oil exploration activities and the sale of oil.

Moreover, the investigation will encompass the political and economic mar-ginalization of these Niger Delta ethnic minorities within the Nigerian state and the importance of the resources such as oil for the survival of the country as well as the environmental hazards the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region are sub-jected and exposed to with regard to the effects of gas flaring, oil leakages caused by rusty pipelines or pipeline vandalism perpetrated by exasperated mili-tant groups in the region.

Similar to the Jos conflicts, the research will show how the advent and ag-gravation of the oil-related conflicts among the ethnic minorities in Warri can be

traced back to the creation of a local government in Warri township. Furthermore, within the scope of analysis on the Warri crisis, inquiries will be made into the environmental hazards experienced by the people of the oil producing Niger Delta region as a result of the operations of the multinational oil companies and the region's neglect by the Nigerian government, which, in consideration of its aftermath, led to the foundation of a peaceful civil society group spearheaded by the erstwhile human rights and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Subsequently, the evolvement of peaceful protests into militancy and the proliferation of militant groups in the Niger Delta region, whose current activities threaten the existence of the country, will be examined.

The analysis of both the Jos and the Warri conflicts will be carried out, among other factors, using the interviews conducted in the conflict ridden-communities of Jos and Warri as well as integrating further interviews conducted in the Muslim city of Kano and the capital city of Nigeria, Abuja, in the periods covering 2011-2012. The discussion of both conflicts will reflect the views and arguments of numerous writers, experts and community leaders interviewed during the fieldwork whose opinions and claims on the subject matter are relevant for a detailed analysis of the aforementioned conflicts. The Jos conflicts, as will be examined in the subsequent chapter and sections, shall exemplify how ethnicity is politicized in Nigeria.

5.6.1 The Example of Politicized Ethnicity: The Jos Conflicts

There have been a series of conflicts confronting the capital city of Plateau State since the early 1990s without the Nigerian authorities at the state and federal levels being able to find lasting solutions to the recurrent conflicts. Numerous writers and Western media houses often label these recurrent Jos crises as conflicts over the struggle for scarce lands,[1581] but at times also described as religious or ethnic conflicts.[1582]

Contrary to these reports, this research intends to demonstrate that the Jos clashes, which, over time, have become protracted conflicts, are caused when

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[1581] Some international media outlets describe the Jos conflicts as a struggle for land. See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 29.

[1582] It is stated that "'the ethnic and or the religious dimensions of the conflict have subsequently been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement, inequality, and other practical fears are the root causes'", see Kwaja, Chris: "Nigeria's Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict", in: *Africa Security Brief: A Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, No. 14, July 2011, p. 1-8 (2).

ethnicity is politicized by certain ethnic actors and individuals. As indicated at the end of the previous section, this chapter will examine the Jos conflicts with an attempt made to expose the actors responsible for the politicization of ethnic differences and to indicate the basis on which religious faultlines are used in mobilizing their respective followers to foment trouble.

In addition, during the course of this investigation, subsequent sections will enable readers to understand whether the mere notion of ethnicity may lead to conflicts, if not politicized, as well as why and in which ways actors politicize ethnicity which, deliberately or inadvertently, may result in the eruption of violent conflicts. The time-frame under investigation is concentrated on the conflicts occurring between 1990 and 2010. Themes such as political marginalization involving indigenes vs. settlers within the context of contemporary constitutional crisis and debates will be examined, used, and shown in order to examine the Jos crisis.

Jos, a cosmopolitan city situated in the northern region of Nigeria, is the capital of Plateau State which is the country's twelfth largest state.[1583] Plateau State, once described as the home of peace and tourism and the best endowed state, is populated by about 50 different smaller ethnic groups, which constitute minority ethnic groups in the largely Hausa-Fulani Muslim dominated northern region of Nigeria.[1584]

[1583]   See *International Crisis Group, Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, African Report* on the topic "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (1): The Jos Crisis", no. 196, published on 17 December 2012, p. 1-38 (1). It has been mentioned that there are numerous ethnic minority groups inhabiting the northern part of Nigeria along with the Hausa-Fulani Muslim majority, however the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere, although qualify as ethnic minorities in the wider northern region of Nigeria, together constitute the largest ethnic bloc in Plateau State. See ibid, p. 1-38. J. Kraus states that Plateau State, from an administrative point of view, belongs to part of the North-Central Zone, which is one of the six geopolitical zones of which Nigeria is made up. Beside Abuja, the seat of power and federal capital of Nigeria, the zone referred to as North Central encompasses other states such as Benue, Nassarawa, Niger, Kogi, Kwara and Plateau. In addition to that, it is essential to understand that these aforementioned states, historically, were part of the Northern Region that existed during the colonial period. However, the regional system was abolished in 1967/and Nigeria was divided into federal states. Because of the regional structure which the country practiced initially, as J. Kraus argues, many northerners still perceive Plateau state and other current North Central states as part and parcel of the north. See Krause, Jana: "A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria", in: *Working Paper, Geneva Declaration*, published in Switzerland by the Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 1-68 (17).

[1584]   Ibid., p. 1. In view of the Jos conflicts, both the Plateau State and the Federal Government have set up Fact Finding Commissions on a number of occasions, in the form of Commissions of Inquiry, to investigate the immediate and more remote causes of the Jos conflicts and make recommendations towards finding a lasting solution to these recurrent or protract-

However, the city of Jos, since early 1990s, has been confronted and ravaged by numerous conflicts between the so-called indigenous ethnic groups of the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere on the one hand and the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group on the other, with devastating effects on the populace as the following statement by C. Kwaja indicates:

> Communal clashes across ethnic and religious faultlines in and around the city of Jos in central Nigeria have claimed thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of others, and fostered a climate of instability throughout the surrounding region.[1585]

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ed conflicts. Some of these Commissions of Inquiry, among others, are known or referred to as follows: Niki Tobi: White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs, September 2002, published by R2k on 31 August 2011: http://r2knigeria.org/PDF/NikkiTobbiReportWhitepaper.pdf [15/12/2013]; Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau Peace Conference, 2004 (18th August – 21st September 2004), published by R2k on 22 September 2011: http://r2knigeria.org/PDF/Plateau Resolve.pdf [10/10/2013]; Fiberesima: White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of 12 April 1994 in Jos Metropolis, September 2004, published by R2k on 31 August 2011: http://r2knigeria.org/PDF/FIBERESIMAWHITEPAPERRE PORT.pdf [14/12/2013]; Bola Ajibola: Plateau State Judicial Commission of Inquiry Main Report, Vol. 1. White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs, posted by Sahara Reporters on 26 January, 2012: http://saharareporters.com/sites/default/files/Plateau%20State%20Judicial%20Com mission%20of%20Inquiry%20Main%20Report%20Vol.1.pdf [26/06/2013]; Report of Chief Solomon Lar Presidential Advisory Committee on the Jos Crisis, published by R2k on 31 August 2011: http://r2knigeria.org/PDF/CHIEFSOLOMONLARPRESIDENTIAL ADVISORYCOMMITEEREPORTONJOSCRISIS.pdf [10/12/2013]. In addition, there is a vast amount of literature on the Jos conflicts, written by many authors who examine these conflicts from different perspectives. Some of these writers whose works will be used in this research study include: Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 1-42; see Best, G. Shedrack [Ed.]: "Religion and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria", in: *Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies*, University of Jos, John Archers, Ibadan 2011; Adesoji, A. Abimbola: "Indigeneship and Citizenship in Nigeria: Myth and Reality", in: *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 9, March 2009, p. 151-165; Onoja, Adoyi: "Reassessing Post Conflict Security in Jos-Plateau: The Option of Citizen's Watch", in: *Afro Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Quarter IV, 2010, p. 1-15. See Human Rights Watch on Nigeria, 2001, "Jos: A City Torn Apart",, op. cit., p. 1-26; Mustapha, R. Abdul: "Transformation of Minority Identities in Post-Colonial Nigeria", in: *Queen Elizabeth House-Working Paper Series*, Vol. 09, August 1997, p. 1-25; Danfulani, H.D. Umar, 2006, "The Jos Peace Conference and the Indigene/Settler Question in Nigerian Politics", op. cit., p. 1-27; Orji, Nkwachukwu, 2011, op. cit., p. 473-492. More in Human Rights Watch: "'They Do Not Own This Place'": Government Discrimination Against "Non-Indigenes" in Nigeria", in: *Human Rights Watch*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (A), April 2006, p. 1-64. Though already mentioned and used in this work, check Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, op. cit., p. 431-452; Blench, Roger: "The Transformation of Conflict between Pastoralists and Cultivators in Nigeria", in: *Online Paper in Press for a Special Issue of the Journal Africa*, Cambridge, September 2013, p. 1-12, available online thus: http://www.rogerblench.info/ Conflict/ Herder-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf [15/04/2014].

1585   Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 1.

In defense of the position represented above, C. Kwaja asserts that the Jos conflicts, though usually characterized as inter-religious and inter-ethnic between the mostly Christian ethnic groups of the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere, and the predominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslims, cannot be grasped through a religious and ethnic lens. He conceives these conflicts as identity conflicts based on socially constructed stereotypes manipulated to instill violent clashes:

> They veil deeper institutional factors within Nigerian law that are abused and exploited to deny citizens access to resources, basic rights, and participation in political processes—factors that, left unaddressed, have the potential to trigger violence across the country.[1586]

R. Blench, expanding C. Kwaja's perspective on the subject matter, shows an example in Plateau State of how ethnic groups struggled to outstrip each other while in political competition over the control of local governments, especially between pastoralists and farmers, in order to gain access to the river, which consequently increased the frequency of conflicts. He describes this thus:

> Increasing political control of LGs by representatives of farming populations has meant pressure both to invade land reserved for grazing and to exclude pastoralists from high productivity areas. In Nigeria, in particular, this conflict has now been subsumed into a broader dichotomy of religion and disputes over access to resources are now framed in religious terms. Increasing availability of modern weapons has increased the intensity and violence of these disputes.[1587]

Irrespective of the diverse points of view through which the Jos conflicts are examined by various writers, it is important to note that human lives are lost on a daily basis and properties worth millions of dollars destroyed since the advent of these conflicts at the beginning of the 1990s.

In view of these conflicts, there are a number of fact-finding committees, in the form of Commissions of Inquiry established periodically to investigate both the immediate and remote causes of the Jos conflicts. However, both the Plateau State and Federal Governments have failed to date either to advance the publication and implementation of the reports of these Commissions or show any seriousness in carrying out the recommendations contained therein so as to curb and/or permanently solve the recurrent ethnic clashes in Jos.[1588] Without mincing words, within the scope of the time-frame of the conflicts under scrutiny, it

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1586   Ibid., p. 2.
1587   Blench, Roger, 2013, op. cit., p. 1-12 (Introduction). Taking note of the conflicts in Plateau State generally, "there have been two main zones of conflict in Plateau State over the past decade (2001-2010): on the Jos proper—the highlands—and beneath the plateau escarpment on the lowland plains." However, this research study concentrates on the Jos conflicts, the Jos Plateau proper, which is the highlands." See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 14.
1588   Some of the Committees, known commonly as Commissions of Inquiries, established by both the State Government and Federal Government are listed under footnote 1584.

can be argued that mere ethnicity is not the cause of the conflicts, until politicized, and religion is instrumentalized to enable the dichotomization of "us" and "others", which causes the eruption of the Jos conflicts.

As already indicated, the dichotomization of the religious "us" and "other" was possible since the main two conflicting parties predominantly belong to two world religions, namely: Christianity and Islam. Moreover, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are predominantly Muslims and the Jos indigenous ethnic groups of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere are mostly Christians.[1589]

That being said, the following section will deal with the theme of settler vs. indigene syndrome as the root of conflicts in Jos because the Hausa-Fulani are perceived as settlers whereas the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere, among other smaller ethnic groups in Jos, view themselves as indigenes, the "sons of the soil".[1590] What consequences this dichotomization and, with it, the drawing of ethnic boundaries may have for the peaceful co-existence of an ethnically pluralistic Nigeria will be examined next.

5.6.1.1 The Genesis and Construction of the Indigene/Settler Dichotomy

Having acknowledged the issue of indigene vs. settler controversy as an avenue for the dichotomization of ethnic groups into "us" and "others", through the drawing of ethnic boundaries, this section will trace back the root of the connotation of many conflicts in Nigeria as ethno-religious, especially in Jos, to the categorization and marginalization of many ethnic groups as a result of the indigene vs. settler controversy.

That being said, it is important to note that thousands of lives are lost yearly due to the clashes arising from the indigene/settler dichotomy, a factor used within the context of the politicization of ethnicity by the elites and which often erupts into violent conflicts, as shown by the report of Human Rights Watch: "Since the end of military rule in 1999 alone, some ten thousand Nigerians have lost their lives in several hundred separate clashes along ethnic, religious and other intercommunal lines."[1591]

1589   Read Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 18. This is not to say that there are no any other ethnic groups in Jos or Plateau State in general as there are also the ethnic groups of the Yoruba, the Igbo etc. See ibid., p. 1-68.
1590   See ibid., p. 1-68.
1591   Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 32.

It is often reported that the main reasons for the genesis of these tensions and clashes have their roots in religious extremism and radicalism, poverty, the struggle over increasingly scarce land and other resources as well as in the indigeneity issue, combined with other factors that are used as avenues by the elites/actors during the process of the politicization of ethnicity.[1592] As a result, interethnic or inter-communal relationships are strained, which enables a situation that instigates violent conflicts.[1593]

In retrospect, the indigene/settler syndrome, a phenomenon in the Nigerian political terrain that can be described as discriminatory practices, was widely applied to anyone, any group(s) of people and ethnic groups perceived as foreigners, outsiders or settlers in their particular place of residence, irrespective of the fact that they were citizens of Nigeria.[1594] In other words, one can argue that the idea of indigeneship, a term commonly used for the host communities, is used to create and maintain a gap between one's own community and that of the settler or migrant communities. The effect is, in a way, to create a distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes for particular reasons which are stated thus:

> Many Nigerians have long believed that some sort of distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes is necessary in at least some cases, primarily as way for smaller communities to preserve their culture and traditions—against the pressures of migration from other parts of the country.
> Most concretely, many Nigerian communities use the distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes as a way of demarcating the boundaries between who are eligible to hold chieftaincy titles in a particular place, and participate in traditional institutions of governance more generally, and those who are not.[1595]

By this, it can be argued that indigeneship rights supersede the rights of being a Nigerian citizen in as far as one can only enjoy his/her citizenship's rights based on being an indigene of a particular local government in a state within the territory of Nigeria. That portrays a condition whereby one's citizenship is dependent on being an indigene of a particular local government. In this way, it is understood, according to the instrumentalist approach, that ethnic boundaries are

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1592   See ibid.
1593   See ibid.
1594   Human Rights Watch observes that the British colonial administration first introduced the division of indigenes/settlers as a formal distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes. Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 10. D. Bach, more so, indicates according to the Native Law of 1954 that non-indigenes or strangers are persons or "any Native who is not a member of the native community living in the area of its authority." Quotation from Bach, Daniel: "Indigeneity, Ethnicity and Federalism", in: Diamond, Larry/Kirk-Greene, Anthony/Oyediran, Oyeleye: *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida*, Lynne Rienner, London 1997, p. 333-349 (338).
1595   Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 10.

drawn arbitrarily with respect to the indigene/settler controversy in order to exclude the perceived "others" from having access to certain resources. In fact, a claim to indigeneship gains relevance at the local levels of governance in Nigeria because it gives one access to "the distribution of jobs, scholarships and other resources among the groups recognized as indigenes in different localities within a given state."[1596]

On the basis of the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, one can assert that non-indigenes do not belong and are excluded by the claimers of indigeneship rights as this involves political, material and symbolic resources. So, for "whatever reasons, the idea that non-indigenes have no right to demand the benefits of full citizenship is now so deeply ingrained in Nigerian political thinking […]."[1597]

C. Kwaja states that "in Nigeria, indigenes are 'original inhabitants' of a local government area, or members of those ethnic groups that trace their lineage back to the area."[1598] As a consequence, the political relevance of indigeneship is to be acknowledged because, in practice, the classification is applied to denote the inclusion of particular persons, those who "belong" to a particular locality and those who are allowed, as citizens, to participate in politics, own land, obtain a job, or be admitted to a school.[1599] This, again, gives credence to the theory of instrumentalism that ethnicity is a construct and is deployed when resources are at stake.

At this juncture, it is important to inquire after the definition of indigeneship in the context of the Nigerian Constitution in order to ascertain whether it is synonymous with the word "citizenship" or if it in fact contradicts the principle of citizenship which every Nigerian is entitled to, irrespective of where they may reside within the country's territories. By virtue of the Nigerian Constitution, the following articles establish the rights of a Nigerian citizen:

42.

(1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person:

(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the government, to disabilities or restric-

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1596   Ibid., p. 10.
1597   Ibid., p. 14. It is not only at the local level of governance that indigeneship is used to demarcate the line between who belongs and who is to be excluded, but rather the same problem is in existence nationwide as "discrimination against non-indigenes is also seen as being part of a high-stakes competition against the other groups for political influence and resources at the national level." Ibid., p. 14.
1598   Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 2.
1599   See Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 1-64.

tions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions are not made subject […].

(2) No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth.

43. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria.[1600]

With what is enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, as stated above, it is questionable and contradictory that any Nigerian, depending on where he or she resides in any part of country, can be discriminated against through exclusionist policies exercised by the application of indigeneship rights by the same constitution. In view of this development, the report of Human Rights Watch indicates the following:

Policies that deny Nigerians equal access to employment and educational opportunities solely because they belong to a community whose origins are said to lie in some other part of Nigeria stand in open violation of these guarantees.[1601]

However, the definition of indigeneship is not explicitly stated in the same vein as that of citizenship in the Nigerian Constitution. That implies that indigeneship is stated therein, however, not clearly defined so that it becomes a construct manipulated arbitrarily by ethnic and religious entrepreneurs in order to mobilize members when drawing ethnic boundaries. Therefore, there are no regulations and fixed rules to determine who the indigene of a particular community is, a situation which enables loopholes that actors/elites or individuals can instrumentalize based on specific objective (perceptible) criteria of differences used in the construction of an enemy image while in pursuit of personal agendas. This denotes a process of politicized ethnicity, as ethnic boundary lines are drawn randomly by certain actors, invoking objective criteria such as religion, ethnic background, language etc., which are subjectively chosen as deemed fit.

The issue of how indigeneship may be manipulated can be seen in the constitutionally backed Federal Character Principle,[1602] a quota system inserted into the 1979 Nigerian Constitution to ensure a balance of political representation/

1600   The definition and description of citizenship according to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is: http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm [18/04/2014].

1601   Ibid., p. 59. In addition, Philip Ostien emphasizes that "every Nigerian has the full rights of indigenes in one small locality, one ethnic enclave, and only the more partial rights in every other place." Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 3.

1602   The notion of the *Federal Character Principle* was already discussed in chapter 5.4.3 in detail.

power and access to resources among all Nigerian ethnic groups.[1603] However, it is important to note that this Federal Character Principle is coupled with an indigeneship clause. Based on this indigeneship clause, one can only evoke one's citizenships rights, as P. Ostien rightly puts it, from the day "the word—indigene entered Nigeria's constitution in 1979, when the phrase—belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria was used in the definition of citizenship"[1604], according to paragraph 25(1)(a) of the Nigerian Constitution: "every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria".[1605]

Having entered the indigeneship clause into the 1979 Nigerian Constitution for the first time, further constitutional negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s enabled the expansion of the Federal Character Principle all the more with its indigeneship clause. With the establishment and empowerment of the Federal Character Commission (FCC), an institution charged with the introduction of regulations that define indigeneship, in 1996,[1606] the paragraphs of the FCC stipulate the following:

> 10. (1) An indigene of a local Government means a person
>
> i. either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents was or is an indigene of the local Government concerned; or
>
> ii Who is accepted as an indigene by the Local Government[1607]

Additionally, the FCC provides, as a condition in paragraph 10(2) of its mandate, that "an indigene of a state shall be a person who is an indigene of one Local Government in that state."[1608] The only condition in order not to be disqualified is "that no person shall claim to more than one state […]."[1609]

1603   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 4.
1604   Ibid., p. 4.
1605   See the respective article or paragraph 25(1)(a) on the homepage of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution: http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm [18/04/2014].
1606   The Federal Character Commission (FCC) was created in 1996 and retained in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution according to which the country is governed up till the present. See Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 9.
1607   The Federal Character Commission Establishing Act No 34 of 1996 with regard to the definition of indigenship is available on the homepage: http://www.federalcharacter.gov.ng/guidingprinciplesdef.php [18/04/2013]. Also available online thus: http://www.placng.org/new/laws/F7.pdf [12/10/2014].
1608   Ibid.
1609   Ibid.

A. Adesoji suggests, by extension, that the evidence of belonging to a particular indigenous group of a local government in a state represents, in a broader sense, the membership of a local ethnic and linguistic community.[1610] Also, in order to show the evidence of belonging to such a local ethnic group, it is mandatory to be in possession of a letter of indigeneity, known as an indigeneity certificate or "Certificate of Origin".[1611] The problem herein is that the right to issue indigeneship certificates rests with the local authority, the local government from which one or one's parents, according to the definition of indigeneity indicated above, originates. Therefore, as the FCC thus directs, the issuance of indigeneity certificates rests in the hands of local authorities:

> These bodies accept the authority of local officials to issue the certificates to constituents whom officials deem qualifies—a practice that first originated in the 1960s. This authority dramatically elevates the importance of and competition over districting and local elections.[1612]

Therewith, C. Kwaja alerts that "elected officials, in turn, have strong incentive to use the certificates as a tool to consolidate local ethnic majorities."[1613] In view of the conflicts which arise due to the politics of inclusion and exclusion, with regard to the issuance of these so-called indigeneship certificates, there are allegations launched against many local officials of "stirring tensions, supporting violent actors, and perpetuating the selective distribution of indigeneship certificates"[1614] because, in the author's words, "defining indigeneship is extraordinarily arbitrary."[1615] In essence, the importance of the possession of an indigene-

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1610   Read Adesoji, A. Abimbola, 2009, op. cit., p. 158.
1611   Compare Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 3. Furthermore, to buttress the statement with respect to indigeneship certificates, he also illustrates that "The Nigerian constitution, adopted in 1999, and the Federal Character Commission, a statory body established to ensure equity in the distribution of resources and political power in the country, recognize the validity of indigeneship certificates." Ibid., p. 3. Human Rights Watch also gives an account of the importance and issuance of indigeneity certificates in its report. Read more in Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 20.
1612   See Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 3.
1613   Ibid., p. 3. Also Human Rights Watch presents the same view in its report on the issuance of indigeneity certificate and which authority or persons are by law allowed to carry out this function as follows: "Local Government throughout Nigeria issue "certificates of indigeneity" to people who are indigenes of their jurisdictions." See Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 20.
1614   Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 3.
1615   Ibid., p. 3. A. Higazi explains that there is no clear set of criteria as conditions to be fulfilled in order to obtain an indigeneity certificate, therefore, the system is ambiguous. See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 10. Additionally, the report of Human Rights Watch emphasizes that "state governments generally fail to articulate any objective sets of criteria that should be used by local officials in determining whether a person is an indigene of their community." Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 20. Arguably, an indigene certificate,

ship certificate is the only way to prove that one belongs to an area of a local government in Nigeria as shown thus:

> These certificates serve as documentary proof that the bearer is an indigene of the area of the local government that issues them. Possession of such a certificate is in fact the only way for a Nigerian to prove that he or she is an indigene of his or her community, and a Nigerian who does not have an indigeneity certificate will be treated as a non-indigene in his or her formal interactions with all levels of government.[1616]

In continuation, it is noted that any Nigerian who is not in possession or cannot present this certificate of indigeneity from a local government in Nigeria qualifies as an indigene of nowhere.[1617]

Based on the instrumentalist approach, the drawing of ethnic boundary lines, with regard to indigeneity certificates, can be seen as a process of politicized ethnicity as the discrimination experienced from being labeled "a non-indigene" deprives people access to resources. Arguably, ethnicity, is this sense, enables the dichotomization of "us", the indigenes, and the "others", the non-indigenes, settlers or foreigners. By this development, "an increasing number of Nigerians find themselves trapped in this category of stateless non-indigenes."[1618]

Over and above, in view of the importance of this indigeneity certificate, one can argue that "in the end, the fighting is about access to resources controlled by the federal, state and local governments, through which 80% of Nigeria's GDP flows."[1619] That is why the struggle and conflict over resources that arise and may arise when certain people residing in an area or in a local government for a number of years or whose parents migrated to that particular area and settled there permanently centuries ago are denied certificates of indigeneity.[1620]

The consequences of being denied indigeneity certificates results in sharp differences, intergroup inequalities, intercommunal animosity and social fragmentation[1621] as experience shows in many states of Nigeria such as in Plateau State between the settlers, the so-called Hausa-Fulani Muslims, and the indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta.

A similar situation is observed in Kaduna state between numerous Christian minority ethnic groups in Kaduna South and the Hausa-Fulani Muslims in

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in essence, is a construct that can be used to express tribal and ethnic distinctions. See ibid., p. 19.
1616   Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 20.
1617   Compare ibid., p. 20.
1618   Ibid., p. 20.
1619   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 3.
1620   Read Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 1-64.
1621   See Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 1-8.

Kaduna North.[1622] With religious issues being another dividing line between the conflict parties, it will become evident in subsequent sections that the lines of ethnic and religious boundaries are blurred and until certain actors politicize these differences, conflicts do not occur. Nigeria's constitution exposes its weakness in its divided or dual concept of citizenship which constitutes an awkward marriage of group rights and individual rights. With these indigeneity certificates, group rights supersede individual rights, meaning the rights of ethnic groups, especially indigenes, over those of citizens.[1623] Indigeneity rights, as injected into in the Nigerian Constitution, are a factor used for the politicization of ethnicity as they dichotomize between "us" and "others" through which, in certain circumstances such as when ethnic groups compete for resources, it can be applied to construct an enemy image, a situation which often leads to violent unrests as the Jos conflicts show.

In Nigeria, a country where the public sector is the largest employer of labor, the discriminatory policies confronted by many, if not all, non-indigenes, cut across the whole federation and a person, with the status of a non-indigene/ settler, is disenfranchised politically, economically and socially marginalized, and relegated to the category of second-class citizen in his or her country.[1624] The indigene/settler dichotomy, as the underlying and main problem, snowballs into violent conflicts in Jos which the following explains: "Tensions between ethnic groups rooted in the allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights have amalgamated into an explosive mix."[1625]

More importantly, on the basis of political discrimination and exclusion, the next section will examine the Jos conflicts and depict how the indigene/settler dichotomy and controversy is reflected in the once peaceful state.

1622   It is shown in many parts of Nigeria, especially in the North Central, referred to as the Middle-Belt region, that "the country is also divided along religious lines, with the boundaries between Muslim and Christian often overlapping with some of the most important ethnic and cultural divides." Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 1-64. In addition, the Christian minorities in the Middle-Belt of the northern region are characterized by a historical tradition of resistance to subjugation and conquest, oppression and common slave raids by the more powerful Hausa-Fulani Muslim majority of the northern region. See ibid, p. 7.

1623   See Adesoji, A. Abimbola, 2009, op. cit., p. 158.

1624   Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 20. Apart from indigenes, "everyone else, no matter how long they or their families have lived in the place they call home, is and always will be a non-indigene." Ibid., p. 1. In addition, as a non-indigene, one is denied scholarships, admissions to both state and federal universities in most cases or charged higher fees than the indigenes, excluded from political participation and his or her communities may even be denied the provision of basic infrastructures. See ibid., p. 1.

1625   Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 9.

5.6.1.2 The Jos Conflicts and Issues Revolving Around the Indigeneity Controversy

This section will investigate the Jos conflicts and show how they are as a result of the politicization of ethnicity by certain ethnic and religious leaders.

In addition, this thesis will argue that the advent of the ongoing conflict can be traced back to the struggle for political domination and control of a local government in Jos. This will be put simply as the struggle about the ownership of Jos, on the one hand, between the indigenous ethnic groups of the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere (BBA), who are predominantly Christians, and their Hausa-Fulani counterpart, on the other hand, who are predominantly Muslims.[1626] Yet, it is not in dispute that both conflicting parties have a sizable number of Christians and Muslims respectively[1627], therefore, it is questionable to assign religious overtones to the conflicts, as the following report of the Human Rights Watch demonstrates:

> In reality, the conflict was more political and economic than religious. It stemmed from a long standing battle for control of political power and economic rivalry between different ethnic groups, between those labeled "indigenous" or "non-indigenous" inhabitants of the area.[1628]

That being said, there are a number of fact-finding commissions, referred to as Commissions of Inquiry, set up by both the State and Federal Governments to investigate the Jos conflicts since the first outbreak of the crises in early 1990s, especially since 1994.[1629] However, the worst occurrence of clashes, for which

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1626   See Onoja, Adoyi, 2010, op. cit., p. 4. It is important to note that the indigenous ethnic groups are not only Christians, but also adherents of traditional religions. See ibid., p. 4. The Hausa/Fulani are usually referred to as such irrespective of the fact that they are two separate ethnic entities, however, the dominant culture is Hausa and the Fulani are already absorbed into it. See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 2.

1627   To emphasize that the indigenous populations not only comprise Christians and worshipers of traditional religions, but also a small percentage of indigenous Muslims as well as Hausa-Fulani Muslims with a sizable Christian number. For more information, see in Ambe-Uva, N. Terhemba: "Identity Politics and the Jos crisis: Evidence, Lessons, and Challenges of Good Governance", in: *African Journal of History and Culture* (AJHC), Vol. 2 (3), 2010, p. 42-52. For the same purpose, see the publication of Human Rights Watch on Nigeria, 2001, op. cit., p. 1-26.

1628   Ibid., p. 2.

1629   As already mentioned in the last section, C. Kwaja gives details in his work in a tabular form about the number of clashes experienced in Jos, starting from 1994 to 2010. See Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 4-5. Also, U.H.D. Danfulani gives the same account regarding the beginning of the crisis in Jos. See Danfulani, U.H.D. Umar, 2006, op. cit., p. 3.

different Commissions of Inquiry were set up to investigate the causes, are re-
ported to have been in 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2010.[1630]

Irrespective of the number of these investigative panels, the report of the
2008 Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry, established to unearth the rea-
sons leading to the Jos conflicts of 28 November 2008, will be given priority in
order to highlight how the indigeneity/settler controversy became a tool for po-
liticization by both religious and ethnic actors to mobilize their respective fol-
lowers, resulting in violent conflicts with devastating consequences.[1631] Al-
though some of the reports of the other Commissions of Inquiry will be cited oc-
casionally since the issues contained in most of the reports as the remote causes
of the conflict are similar, nevertheless, it will be expressed in this research that
the inability of the government to implement those initial recommendations
contained in the previous reports of 1994, 2001 and 2004 is partially responsible
for the outbreak of the 28 November 2008 conflicts in Jos. The report of Prince
Bola Ajibola's Commission of Inquiry acknowledges this below:

> As earlier indicated, prior to the civil Unrest of 28th November, 2008, there has been [sic] cri-
> ses in Jos notable among which were the civil Unrests of 12th April, 1994, and that of 7th Sep-
> tember, 2001 for which the Plateau State Government set up the Justices Fiberesima and Niki
> Tobi Commissions to investigate the respective civil Unrests.[1632]

The origin of the clashes in the city of Jos, after experiencing series of conflicts
in the last two decades without any future peaceful co-existence in sight, can be
traced back to 1991 when the then Military Head of State, General Ibrahim
Babangida, embarked on the creation of new local governments in Nigeria by
the 1991 Decree No. 2.[1633] On this basis, Jos is divided from its initial one Jos
local government into two local government areas, namely: Jos North and Jos
South local government areas.[1634]

The problem with these newly created local governments is perceived as a
redrawing of ethnic boundaries, creating a new political equation with conse-
quences for the local indigenous ethnic groups as this could potentially cost

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1630   See ibid., p. 5. Details of these Commissions of Inquiry are listed under footnote 1584.
1631   J. Krause indicates that "tensions among the ethnic groups along the indigene-settler divide
       have long characterized inter-communal relations in Plateau State". Krause, Jana, 2011, op.
       cit., p. 22.
1632   Page 55 in the report of *Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry* on the 28 November
       2008 Jos Conflict cites this non-implementation of previous reports as one of the main
       causes of this unrest.
1633   See ibid., p. 74.
1634   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 8. P. Ostien shows that the third one, Jos East LGA, is
       also later mostly carved out from Jos South. See ibid, p. 8-9.

them, politically, the loss of Jos North.[1635] This new development is observed as follows:

> Within this new Jos North, in particular, the local peoples were no longer so predominant, most of them living with less admixture of other ethnic groups in Jos South; in elections to city-wide offices in Jos North, therefore, other groups like the Hausas, might now expect to win. This in fact is believed by the Plateau indigenes to have been the exact purpose for which Jos North was created: to give the Hausa community of Jos a LGA they could control.[1636]

Hence, the indigenous groups believe that the construction and drawing of local governments such as that of Jos North represented an intended ethnic conspiracy by the former Military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, to exclude the indigenous ethnic groups of the BBA from Jos North Local Government Area and, at their expense, to give exclusive control to the Hausa/Fulani Muslims. With this, it was perceived that the creation of Jos North Local Government was carried out in order to favor the Hausa/Fulani community.[1637] One can argue in view of the instrumentalist approach that the politicization of ethnicity was carried out through the above-mentioned redrawing of ethnic boundaries which led to the dichotomization of "us" and the ethnic "other".

Based on political calculations, the construction of ethnic difference in Jos was made possible as the indigenous tribes of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere are pitted against the Hausa/Fulani who were perceived as settlers.[1638] So, according to the indigenous ethnic groups, with the support of other smaller indigenous ethnic groups within the state, any local government in Plateau State, especially Jos, could not be controlled by outsiders/settlers and needed to be defended, if required, by force.[1639]

Beyond ethnicity, it is noted by P. Ostien, with respect to another factor of difference, that "besides the honor of ethnicity, the honor of religion is also there to be defended, also by violence if necessary."[1640] Therefore, within the purview of the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, one can argue that the enemy image is constructed along both religious and ethnic lines, having centered on and overlapping with the indigene/settler dichotomization. As the report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry indicates, "since the crea-

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1635   See ibid., p. 9 .
1636   Ibid., p. 9.
1637   See ibid., p. 9.
1638   See ibid., p. 2.
1639   Ibid., p. 2.
1640   Ibid., p. 3.

tion of North Local Government in the manner it was created, Jos has not known peace."[1641]

In view of the ethnic and religious composition of the so-called indigenes and settlers, it is about "who with whom against whom" when it comes to the issue of resources, because otherwise, as reported, both conflict parties had co-existed for many years despite perceived ethnic and religious differences. The perceived primordial sentiment is never recorded as the reason for any sort of violent conflicts until the political construction and redrawing of artificial ethnic boundaries occurred, as O. Samuel, C. Kwaja, and A. Olofu-Adeoye explain thus:

> Jos, the capital of Plateau state in North Central Nigeria has witnessed one of the most violent conflicts ties to issues of ethno-religious identity, citizenship and indigeneity. From 1994 to 2010, Jos has increasingly experienced mass violence, which culminated in the wanton destruction of lives, properties and the informal and unofficial partitioning of the city along ethnic and religious faultlines.[1642]

Going from there, it is important to note, with respect to the indigeneship clause, one of the conditions which qualifies one to be an indigene is the acceptance of being recognized by the local government itself as an indigene of that particular local government, implying a form of affirmation declared by said local government through the issuance of an indigeneity certificate.[1643]

Therefore, in view of this, local governments are constitutionally endowed with the right to determine who their indigenes are, either by denial or acceptance of said person whose application was already tendered before said local government, as an indigene of their local government. On this basis, "whoever controls the local government controls the issuance of indigene certificates."[1644]

Under such an arrangement, the struggle and competition over who controls a local government among diverse ethnic groups become understandable, though not without limitation with regard to the indigene clause, as ethnic groups vying for the control of any local government are to be qualified as indigenes.

1641   Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, p. 80.
1642   Samuel, Obadiah/Kwaja, Chris/Olofu-Adeoye, Angela: "The Challenges of Post Conflict Partitioning of Contested Cities in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Jos North LGA", in: Best, G. Shedrack [Ed.]: *Religion and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria,* Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies, University of Jos, John Archers, Ibadan 2011, p. 181-195 (182).
1643   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 7.
1644   Ibid., p. 7.

So, with respect to the Jos North Local Government Area, the only problem with this newly created local government lies in its perceived construction as an avenue to favor one ethnic group, based on the same religious identity the former Military Head of State shared with the Hausa community in Jos, known as the Jasawa, at the expense of the indigenous population. In a way, as the indigenes understand it, this is a possibility to channel resources accrued from the centrally generated revenue by the Federal Government to the Jasawa.[1645]

From this point of view, it can be argued that the ownership of Jos and control of Jos North Local Government form the basis for these conflicts which are expressed and aggravated through the notion of indigeneity, in spite of the fact that there is a year-long, even decade-long, history of social confrontations and inequalities between linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups.[1646] Accordingly, it is observed that being labeled as non-indigenes is synonymous to being settlers, visitors or foreigners, which may carry certain penalties, depending on the situation, but causing permanent disadvantage:

> As such, those perceived to be settlers can face opposition and discrimination in aspects of life that require dealing with state officials or bureaucracies: at the political level, this has an impact on appointments in the civil service and government, and on who contests for elections within the ruling PDP in Plateau State (which is controlled by 'indigenes').[1647]

In continuation of the above, it is claimed that "in some instances, these individuals have had their indigene status retracted, as happened to some of the Muslims in Jos and Yelwa at different points in the 1990s".[1648] In one of the interviews conducted in Jos, the respondent, who happened to be a Hausa by ethnic group affiliation, lamented the following:

> I was born here in Jos so I am definitely familiar with all that is happening here. I view the crisis chiefly as an offshoot of ethnicity and tribalism: the sentiments that are accrued from these. There is a religious connotation to it as well. What I understand is that we the settlers in Jos, the Hausa people, in Jos North, have found ourselves in Jos North for more than 100 years. Some people call themselves indigenes and say that we are not originally from here. We have been denied our rights in the areas of education and job opportunities: these two things rank top among the challenges we are facing. We are denied admission into higher institutions. I can assure you that there is no single Hausa-Fulani person who works with Plateau State government.[1649]

1645   Jasawa is a name used to describe and distinguish the Hausa population in Jos and the ones in other parts of the northern region. "The term Jasawa is also used for political representation for the Hausas in Jos." Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 18. And within the city of Jos, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani constitute the majority. See ibid., p. 19.

1646   See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 10.

1647   Ibid., p. 11.

1648   Ibid., p. 11.

1649   Interview conducted with Aminu Alisu, a Hausa, in Jos on 11 August 2011.

In a similar statement in another interview, with respect to the subject matter, the respondent, I. Zabadi, describes Jos as a cosmopolitan city in which all ethnic groups in Nigeria are represented, therefore, a miniature version of Nigeria. However, he is of the view that conflict is inherent in the human nature and that once in a while conflicts may occur. He believes that the cause of the Jos conflicts can be attributed to competition and struggle for scarce resources. He captures this opinion below:

> Once in a while in history, there were crises. I think there was a bloody clash sometime in late 1940s between the Hausas and the Igbos, the Hausas attacked the Igbos. The basic thing is economic, competition for scarce resources and who is getting the upper hand and who is not is at the root of the conflicts in Jos.[1650]

In continuation of this statement, the interviewee, I. Zabadi, who is the head of the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies at the National Defence College in Abuja/Nigeria, emphasizes further that religion is brought into the whole conflict because of the different religious affiliation of the conflict parties:

> Therefore, what we have seen is that those that have been referred to as the Hausa-Fulanis are Muslims. The worst part is that the natives whether they are Beroms, Afizeres or the Anagutas, also for most part are Christians. So when this competition boils over into conflict and violence, it could easily give the picture of Muslims fighting Christians. And in any case, the Jos conflict itself has also attracted supporters from outside and within Nigeria: Muslims would support Muslims and so on. This to me is logical in the sense that when refugees and displaced persons are produced, people go to those they have affinities with, whether on religious or ethnic grounds.[1651]

From the above, one can argue based on the instrumentalist method that ethnicity is not the cause of these present conflicts, until it is used as an instrument by certain individuals in pursuit of personal goals. In addition, the instrumentalist method shows that ethnicity is politicized in times of scarcity of resources when ethnic groups struggle to neutralize one another.

Also, based on the theory of identity and difference, one can argue that "who with whom against whom" is reflected in this conflict in as much people from outside the conflict zones, as stated in the above citation, lend their hands in support of their religious and ethnic brethren with whom they share certain affinities which are either in religion or ethnicity.

The Hausa-Fulani respondent, A. Alisu, concurs with the view of I. Zabadi while responding as follows to the question during an interview with him:

1650	Interview conducted with Dr. Istifanus S. Zabadi in Abuja on 8 August 2011.
1651	Ibid.

> **Question:** Is it true that there are sympathizers from other states who come to sympathize with Muslims after the crisis?
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> **Answer by Aminu:** Yes, now, they have to. Looking at the level of destruction caused by the crises, they have to come and sympathize. Even the Christians have to come and sympathize with their people. However, it is not to fight as some people claim, but to sympathize.[1652]

Therefore, it remains unclear to which extent the sympathizers, whether Muslims or Christians, come into Jos to support the so-called indigenes and settlers who happen to be either mostly Christians or predominantly Muslims.

In order to examine the trigger for the current Jos conflicts since the creation of Jos North Local Government in 1991, the next section will be comprised of certain periods, especially during election times, when the politicization of ethnicity tended to be reignited. Attempts will be made to capture the actors involved and how, in this case, religion is used as an instrument of mobilization, which often ends in violent clashes between the conflict parties. Most importantly, the examples of politicized ethnicity in Jos will repeatedly be reflected through the lens of indigene vs. settler controversies and conflicts that arise mostly during election periods, but with grievous consequences.

5.6.1.3 The 1994 Jos North Local Government Elections: Indigene vs. Settlers

The views represented in many of the interviews conducted on the Jos Conflicts are similar as many represent the view that the competition for elected positions and the material resources associated therewith are at the source of these clashes. As a result, the indigeneity vs. settler constitutional controversy provides an impetus towards triggering conflicts between the indigenous Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere and the Hausa-Fulani settlers.

Reiterating the history of the creation of Jos North Local Government in 1991, which, in the way it is carved and constructed, is in favor of the Hausa-Fulani settlers in Jos, having the largest concentration of its people there, the indigenous ethnic groups protested this stratification of the city, however this fall on deaf ears as the Head of State at the time ignored all the protests.[1653]

1652   Interview conducted with Aminu Alisu, a Hausa businessman, in Jos on 11 August 2011.

1653   This position is laid out in the memorandum submitted by the Berom Elders Council before the Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry into the Jos Conflicts of 28 November 2008. Therein, the Berom leaders allege that, prior to the creation of Jos North Local Government Area the way it is now carved, they wrote a letter to the Military Governor of Plateau State at the time on the 23 January 1989, and another letter to the former Military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, requesting the creation of Jos Metropolitan Local Government Area out of the former Jos Local Government. In this letter, as stated further, they de-

P. Ostien elucidates that the pattern by which Jos North and Jos South Local Government Areas were carved out of the former Jos Local Government enabled the artificial reconstruction of the city and redrawing of ethnic boundary lines with the consequences of having the ethnic majority turned into ethnic minority.[1654] On this basis, on the one hand, the Hausa-Fulani, formerly a minority in Jos, now constitute the majority in Jos North Local Government, with its headquarters located in the largely Hausa-Fulani populated areas of Jos. On the other hand, the area where the indigenous population forms the majority, the Jos South Local Government Area, is carved out so that the headquarters are located in Bukuru, 15 kilometers away from Jos.[1655]

The indigenous ethnic groups, sensing a form of patronage activity and manipulation in the way they were systematically carved out of Jos North Local Government, the seat of their cherished traditional institution "Gbong Gwom", felt deprived of their rights to claim ownership of Jos. The creation of the Jos North Local Government is described by the Berom Elders Council thus:

> Jos North Local Government Area was created by the General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) administration in 1991 in clear negation of the wished and demands of the indigenes. The design of the Hausa/Fulani was to carve out the indigenous groups and so claim the LGA as their own. Despite protest to Dodan Barracks, Babangida did not botch [sic]. This is the most unnatural Local Government ever created as it cuts Du district Chiefdom into two without regard to traditional institutions; it has amorphomous [sic] boundaries, with the State Secretariat and the Governor's Office in Jos South LGA and not in the supposed State Headquarters, Jos North.[1656]

By this, as indicated in the allegation, the creation of Jos North Local Government Area has an implication for the traditional seat of power and affects the symbol of the traditional institution of the indigenous populations.

Therefore, it can be seen that the domination of the aforesaid local government by people regarded as setters/non-indigenes in an area where the traditional seat of power, in the heart of Jos where the palace of the Gbong Gwom of Jos

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manded that the areas which the new Metropolitan Local Government, if created, must encompass are Vwang, Karu, Du, Gyel, and Gwong Districts, which are located in the former Jos Local Government. See Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, p. 74. On the other side, the Hausa/Fulani also wrote a letter on 28 January 1989, to the former Head of State, General Babangida, requesting the creation of an additional local government out of the initial Jos Local Government, however, they wanted their own created in a different form from the one campaigned for by the Berom Elders Council. See ibid., p. 74-75.

1654   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 8-9.
1655   See ibid., p. 8-9.
1656   Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit., p. 77-78.

is located, invoked conflicts.[1657] Hence, it can be argued that the struggle for the ownership of Jos denotes also the defense of the symbolic resources from the perspective of the indigenous ethnic groups so far it involves the seat of the traditional king of the indigenous people.

According to P. Ostien, from the point of view of the Hausa/Fulani, the creation of Jos North Local Government was justly carried out and could not have been done otherwise since they were in majority and could control the political power, an argument coming from the so-called settlers as observed in the following:

> For their part, the Jos Hausas say they are only seeking a fair share of the benefits that should accrue to them by virtue of their citizenship of Nigeria and the long-standing existence of their community in Jos. They say they have acquired their own cultural identity among other communities of Hausa: wherever their ancestors may have come from, they themselves are now "Jasawa": this is not only claimed locally but ascribed elsewhere in the north. Among other things this means that for some of them (how many is not clear) it is difficult or impossible to get indigene certificates from any LGA.[1658]

Having stated what the implications for the control of any local government means for the issuance of indigeneity certificates, the first crisis witnessed in Jos can be traced back to 1991, directly after the creation of Jos North Local Government. It is reported that the winner of the election to the chairmanship of Jos North, as expected, was a Jasawa, Samai'ila Mohammed.[1659] Thereafter, in a situation already feared, it was alleged that the newly elected Jasawa chairman of Jos North began to issuing indigene certificates from his control of Jos North Local Government to other Jasawa and appointed other Jasawa to key positions despite vocal complaints by the indigenes.[1660]

After the chairmanship of Samaila Mohammed ended abruptly as a result of the military take-over of government by General Sani Abacha in November of 1993, another northern Muslim, though a Kanuri by tribe and born in Kano, was appointed to head the Jos North Local Council. At the same time, Abacha appointed a new Military Governor to man the affairs of Plateau State, Col. Mohammed Mana, another northern Muslim from Adamawa State. Upon this development, the military governors throughout the federation appointed five

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1657   See International Crisis Group, 2012, op. cit., p. 9. See *International Crisis Group*: African Report on the topic "Curbing Violence in Nigeria, (1): The Jos Crisis", 2012, op. cit., p. 1.
1658   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 9.
1659   See ibid., p. 11.
1660   See ibid., p. 11. P. Ostien admits in his work that Samaila Mohammed, a Jasawa and the new chairman of Jos North, issued indigene certificates not only to the Jasawa, but also freely to the indigenous ethnic groups of the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere as well. See ibid., p. 11.

person "caretaker committees" to take over the affairs of all the local governments. The new situation, with respect to the Jos conflicts, marked the beginning of the crises as the Military Governor, Col. Mana, in early 1994, appointed Alhaji Aminu Mato, a Jasawa, as the chairman of Jos North caretaker committee. The appointment of Aminu Mato sparked a violent reaction and outbreaks of communal violence,[1661] with the subsequent consequences shown thus: "Mato was not acceptable to the Jos indigenes. On 5 April 1994 they staged a protest at Government House in Jos, against his appointment or indeed the appointment of any Jasawa as chairman." Both P. Ostien and the report of the International Crisis Group on the Jos conflicts explain that Alhaji Mato, in view of the protests and his rejection by the indigenous population, was stopped from being sworn into office on 8 April 1994.[1662] Following the prevention of Alhaji Mato's resumption of office, the counter-reaction by the Hausa/Fulani to this development is indicated thus:

> At a meeting the same evening, the president of the Jasawa Development Association (JDA) and the Plateau State chairman of the Butchers' Association mobilized their members to protest perceived discrimination against their community by the state government.[1663]

In addition to these protests from both sides, "Hausa-Fulani youths clashed with their BBA counterparts."[1664] After these clashes, it was reported that "at least four people were killed and key public properties destroyed".[1665]

However, as P. Ostien recalls, one important development since this episode is that Alhaji Mato, the designated Jasawa appointee, was never allowed to assume office and the chairmanship of Jos North was never again held by a Jasawa person,[1666] even in spite of tensions and conflicts reported over other public appointments made in 1996 and 1998.[1667]

The doubts and skepticism nurtured by the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere on the political ambitions of the Hausa-Fulani towards Jos is based on

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1661   See ibid., p. 8-12.
1662   See International Crisis Group, 2012, op. cit., p. 9-10. A similar argument is also presented in Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 11-12.
1663   International Crisis Group 2012, op. cit., p. 8.
1664   Ibid., p. 9.
1665   Ibid., p. 10.
1666   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 11-12.
1667   See Human Rights Watch on Nigeria, 2001, op. cit., p. 5. From 1994 to 1996, local government elections were held in Jos North Local Government with another Jasawa, Muktar Mohammed, being declared the winner. However, his qualification was challenged by the election tribunal and it was revealed that the chairman of Jos North possessed other indigeneity certificates from many local governments in other Northern states, citing different birthdates. So, after only a few months in office, he was removed. For more details, see Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 12 (footnote 11).

the view that they are not the only non-indigene groups in Jos as there are the Yoruba, the Igbo, and the people from the South-South region, many of whom migrated into Jos at the same time as the Hausa-Fulani or even earlier, own properties, are wealthy as well as having contributed so much to the community, in spite of the fact that they are also excluded from the benefits of indigeneity like the Hausa-Fulani.[1668] The indigenous populations believe that "although there are many settler groups in Jos, the city's problem is a Jasawa problem."[1669]

Therefore, the question raised is why these other settlers did not either fight for the political control of Jos or seek indigeneity certificates by force, a reason why suspicion is part and parcel of the conflict, "moreover the Hausa language and Hausa culture have shown strong powers of assimilation threatening to other groups."[1670] Thereby, the perception of the Hausa-Fulani by the indigenes can be understood, as P. Ostien captures:

> They felt themselves superior to the indigenes, whom they viewed as 'primitive'; they did not integrate with them or adopt local customs; often they were disrespectful. In some parts of Plateau settler Hausas were even given power by the British to rule over the indigenes, thus accomplishing a principal aim of the Jihad by other means [...].[1671]

Having acknowledged this, it can be argued that the roots of the conflicts, which begin with the creation of Jos North in 1991 and still plague the city, can be traced back to the historical animosity, control and subjugation of the indigenous by the Hausa-Fulani as well as the indigenous population's suspicion and fear of the Islamic jihad's expansion by these so-called settlers.

From this point of view, it can be argued that, historically, passive conflicts resentment existed which reignited during political periods, especially as of the 1990s. E. Dauda, an Anaguta by tribe, expresses his view in an interview on the hostility which arose as a result of the creation of Jos North Local Government by the former military government, which, according to a common belief by the indigenes, was carved out in order to favor the Hausa-Fulani:

> Yes. They [Berom, Anaguta, Afizere] perceived it as if there was a game plan that was about to take place. When it all happened, they at first couldn't contest it as it was under military rulership. The people didn't have the strength to resist the military, which created a little problem then. But later on life continued. Then around 2001, during democracy, crisis erupted. Hausa-Fulanis felt that they are the majority in Jos-North Local Government. They felt they should be given a king here in Jos North. But in Jos North, Jos South and Jos East we have a king called "Gbong Gwom". Now the Hausa-Fulanis want to have their own king which would bear the title of an "Emir". But you know that here in Jos North, other ethnic groups have their repre-

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1668   See ibid., p. 10.
1669   Ibid., p. 11.
1670   Ibid., p. 8.
1671   Ibid., p. 8.

sentatives (leaders). Like the Igbos have their Eze; the Yorubas, the Itsekiris and all these tribes have their leaders. So, if there is anything, those leaders represent them. The Hausa community also has a representative but they do not want representation at that low level, they want a leader which would rule them just as it is found in the northern part of the country, an Emir, which they have been agitating for. People [the indigenes] in Jos North began to sense that these people were overstepping their boundary. That started the enmity between the indigenes and the Hausa-Fulanis.[1672]

With this in mind, it can be argued that ethnicity, despite primordial ties to kin and kinship, does not lead to conflicts, until the instrumentalist method is brought into play which depicts that it is when these dormant primordial ties are activated and instrumentalized in political activities by certain actors while in competition for political powers, material, and symbolic resources that conflicts erupt. This way, the actors may use objective criteria such as ethnic background, religious and linguistic differences to draw ethnic boundaries as the situation of the Jasawa settlers and the indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta captures in the current Jos conflicts.

The theory of identity and difference is reflected in the Jos conflicts in the sense that whenever a northern Muslim is at the helm of affairs, be it the Plateau State Governor or the Nigerian President, he shows solidarity with the Jasawa Jos on the condition of sharing either the same ethnic or religious background. An example of this is the creation of Jos North Local Government Area in favor of the Jasawa as its establishment was designed to exclude the indigenous ethnic groups from the control of Jos, which indirectly enabled the control of this local government to be exclusively in the hand of the Jasawa in order to control the issuance of indigeneity certificates to the Jasawa and other people as they wish.

By the same logic, ethnicity is politicized by the former Nigerian Head of State, General Babangida, as well as other notable persons and military officers in key positions such the Col. Mana, the former Military Governor. Others identified in the process of politicized ethnicity are the Jasawa Development Association as well as other elites, actors and leaders involved in the drawing of ethnic boundaries and the dichotomization of "us" and "others" between the Jasawa and the indigenous ethnic groups.[1673] Further activities of other actors/elites engaged in the process of politicizing ethnicity will be substantiated in the subse-

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1672 An interview conducted with Emmanuel Dauda in Jos, Plateau State on 11 August 2011.
1673 Prior to the restoration of democratic civilian rule as from 1999, various military governments that ruled Nigeria introduced policies that divided the country along religious and ethnic lines. This position is presented thus:
       "In 1999, a new democratic dispensation was enthroned in Nigeria following a period of prolonged of [sic] military rule spanning a period of 20 years between the early 80's and 1999, several policies embarked upon by the military junta saw many Nigerians being marginalized and alienated from the state." Quotation in Omede, A.J., 2011, op. cit., p. 93.

quent chapters. Hence, the next section will concentrate on the change in the dynamics of the Jos conflicts between the Jasawa and the Berom, the Afizere, and the Anaguta, especially the escalation of violence as from 2001 and the cause of the 28 November 2008, Jos conflicts and on how religion is deployed for mobilization purposes.

5.6.1.4 The Return to Democracy and the Redrawing of Ethnic Boundaries

The escalation of violence in Jos has taken on a new dimension since the beginning of the new millennium, especially since the return to democratic activities in 1999, when the indigenes, based on numerical power, were able to win the Plateau State Governorship election.[1674] Under the new arrangement, where a democratic Plateau State Government fell under the control of the indigenes, it would be assumed that ethnic identity boundaries would have been newly redrawn, redefined and reconstructed. However, in this case, ethnic boundaries could not be drawn without using certain factors, known as stopgaps, such as language, religion and ethnicity to dichotomize between "us" and "ethnic others".

Therefore, this section will focus on and examine the redrawing of these ethnic boundaries, how and if this was achieved as well as the actors involved in the process and along which fault lines it was carried out. In other words, the argument in this section will express how the politicization of ethnicity corresponds to the redrawing of ethnic boundaries and what factors are exploited for the escalation of the clashes and can be viewed as the root of the conflicts of September 2001 and 28 November 2008.

It is important to note that the initial crisis that sparked the one in 2001 and another in 2004 as well as in 2008 signaled a turning point in the indigene vs. settler crisis.[1675] This is evident in the escalation of violent clashes between indi-

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1674   It is indicated by Human Rights Watch that "politics under post-1998 civilian administrations have provided opportunities for 'indigenous' elites in Plateau to gain power, but not for 'settlers'. Policies of exclusion and discrimination by the state government, combined with restive and politically assertive Muslim groups, are what have generated violence since 2001." Quotation in Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 16-17. The study shows that as from 1999, when the political space opened, political power shifted in the state and was held by indigene Christians who are in the majority, while the non-indigenes Muslims in Jos became marginalized politically. See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 12.

1675   This dynamic in the conflict witnessed in 2001 was unprecedented because of the mass killings reported. See International Crisis Group, 2012, op. cit., p. 11.

genes and settlers in which more than 53 thousand were reported dead within three years of sectarian violence that engulfed the entire Plateau State.[1676]

From all indications and evidence available, irrespective of linguistic, ethnic and religious differences, all these ethnic groups co-existed for decades. Therefore, it can be argued that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts, until it is politicized, as many cases of arbitrary reconstruction and redrawing of ethnic boundary lines occured which, intentionally or inadvertently, altered the political equation for the parties involved, resulting in conflicts.

In spite of that, what caused these conflicts to intensify as from 2001 was either the result of renewed adjustments of ethnic boundary lines and their consequences for the political equations or connected to the return to democratic rule in 1999, as reflected through repeated outbreak of conflicts in September 2001 and November 2008.

One of the events leading to the September 2001 Jos Crisis can be traced back to preceding years, 1994 and 1999, bearing in mind that all the military governors of Plateau State until 1999 were Hausa-Fulani Muslims who, from a position of authority, then prevailed on all caretaker chairmen of Jos North, despite being indigenes, to continue the issuance of indigeneity certificates to the Jasawa.[1677]

However, with the election of Plateau State governor, Joshua Dariye, a Christian indigene, there was a change to the previous ethnic and religious cards.[1678] In addition, with a series of regional elections taking place throughout the federation, a new chairman, a Christian and an indigene, Frank Bagudu Tardy, was elected to control the affairs of Jos North Local Government.[1679] With an indigene at the helm of affairs, as reports have it, "the issuance of in-

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1676 A report by a government committee offering the first official death toll of the crisis, published on 10 August 2004: http://www.irinnews.org/report/51641/nigeria-plateau-state-violence-claimed-53-000-lives-report [11/07/2013]. Other writers disagree with the number of casualties mentioned in the text. They assume that this figure is on the high side and exaggerated. Considering the work of C. Kwaja and the figure quoted in his work based on the number of conflicts outlined, one can see a huge gap. The same doubt is expressed in many other works, but it is believed that the exact number of people killed is difficult to estimate. See Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 1-8. See also Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 16-18.

1677 See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 12-13. See also the report of International Crisis Group, 2012, op. cit., p. 10-11.

1678 See ibid., p. 10-11.

1679 It is argued that "since the Hausa-Fulani, as the most populous group within the LGA, is likely to win free elections, the strategy of the BBA-dominated authorities in the state has been to either manipulate polls or, where possible, avoid or delay holding them." International Crisis Group, 2012, op. cit., p. 11.

digene certificates from Jos North to Jasawa is completely stopped."[1680] There-
by, the Jasawa and other settlers became excluded from participation in the state
and local governments and the advantages derived therefrom.

But the immediate cause of the September 2001 unrest was a further attempt
by the indigenes to exclude another Jasawa from being appointed by an agency
of the federal government as the National Poverty Eradication Programme
(NAPEDP) Coordinator for Jos North Local Government, a situation that degen-
erated into crisis.[1681] Citing the 1991 constitution, the indigenes were of the
view that appointed positions should be dependent on representation defined
within the scope of the federal character principle that is based on indigene-
ship.[1682] Hence, they demanded that "non-indigenes should desist from making
frivolous demands on issues that are not their heritage, but the exclusive pre-
serve of the indigenes […]."[1683]

Thereafter, P. Ostien reveals that "within Jos, controversy, insults, threats,
and tensions escalate throughout August and finally exploding into violence on
7 September."[1684] The pressure, anger and frustration, which eventually trig-
gered the afore-mentioned crisis, can be traced back to early September 2001,
when an indigenous female Christian was attacked. Accused of disrupting Fri-
day Muslim prayers, while passing through a blocked street near a mosque, in
an area referred to as Kongo Russia, the situation degenerated into ethnic
clashes with religious paroles. This is relayed in the memorandum submitted to
the Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry established by the State government to in-
vestigate the immediate and more remote causes of unrest:

> On the faithful day, 7th September, 2001, after the usual roads were closed by some of our
> members, a lady who was later identified as Miss Rhoda Haruna who live at or near Tudun
> Fera/Congo Road which areas [sic] are very close to the Mosque came and insisted on passing
> through the area closed. She had earlier on passed through the same road as a result of conces-
> sion given to her by members of the Aid group on duty. When she was prevented from passing
> on the third occasion because her act was perceived as unnecessary provocation and coupled

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1680   Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 13.
1681   See ibid., p. 13.
1682   See ibid., p. 16.
1683   Ibid., p. 16.
1684   Ibid., p. 13. In addition, the following captures the build-up of the said tension in Jos: "The
        appointment was made by the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo: hence a south-
        ern (Yoruba) Christian naming a Jasawa to the federal position related to Jos. The person
        named, in July 2001, was Muktar Mohammed. Once again the indigenes set their faces
        against it." Quotation in Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 13. It is pertinent to note that
        Muktar Mohammed was first elected as the Chairman of Jos North Local Government be-
        tween 1994 and 1996 before his chairmanship was declared null and void for having many
        indigene certificates from other northern states as well as giving false information. See
        ibid., p. 12 (footnote 11).

> with the fact that prayers was [sic] about to start, she went back. While the prayer was going on[,] some people in T-shirts descended upon the Muslims worshipers with matchetes [sic], bows and arrows, sticks and other dangerous weapons. Some were carrying petrol in gallons. The Muslims were dispersed and the attackers destroyed part of the mosque, part of the house of Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi and some vehicles belonging to the Muslims. Some muslims [sic] were killed while others escaped with injuries.[1685]

Contrary to the above, the accused gave another account of the story about her ordeal the said day.[1686] Irrespective of the accusation and counter accusation on who was at fault and who was responsible for the first attack, it can be observed that the reasons for the eruption of the September 2001 conflict are clouded in doubt because the trigger for this very conflict is in no way proportionate to the level of destruction experienced.

With the intensification of these conflicts in 2001 by both groups, injecting a new dynamic into the already charged atmosphere,[1687] it is observed that, within one week of violent conflicts and killings by militants and youths from both conflict parties, over 1000 people were reported killed and thousands displaced.[1688] Not even places of worship were spared as mosques, churches, schools, shops, homes and vehicles were extensively damaged in several parts of the state.[1689]

According to the September 2001 incident report by the International Crisis Group, three major differences to the 1994 clashes are identified: 1) For the first time, religious or sectarian rhetoric and identity was extensively made use of, 2) the magnitude of the killings was more significant as weapons such as guns were freely used, 3) and the crisis also spread to other parts of the state.[1690] Similar to the 1994 crisis, another panel of inquiry was set up to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the September 2001 violence and make recom-

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1685   Whitepaper on the report of the Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the civil disturbances in Jos and its environs, September 2002, op. cit., p. 11.

1686   She admitted to passing through the footpath for Pedestrians and cyclists, while the road was blocked on that fateful day, for Juma'at prayers. However, she rejects the claim that she was either stopped or molested by ununiformed Aid Group workers in spite of their presence at the time she first passed through. She narrates further that the trouble started while on her way back to work after her lunch break. See ibid., p. 12.

1687   It is observed that the Jos unrest of 2001 marks the beginning of a number of clashes and outbreaks of communal violence in Jos and in other places in Plateau State. It is recorded that the crisis continued in 2001, 2002 and 2004 with heavy casualties reported on both sides. See the report of International Crisis Group, 2012, op. cit.

1688   Citation in ibid., p. 11.

1689   Compare ibid.

1690   See ibid., p. 11.

mendations towards solving it, the Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry, however, its report was never implemented.[1691]

Unlike the September 2001 violent unrests, the reason for the outbreak of violence during the 28 November 2008 crisis is directly linked to political activities, the chairmanship election conducted for the disputed Jos North Local Government Area and allegations of manipulation of the election results leveled against the indigenes by the Hausa-Fulani non-indigenes.[1692] A. Gambo portrays the reason for the outbreak of the aforementioned conflict thus: "In 2008, during the Local Government elections in Plateau State, even before the results were announced, the Hausa-Fulani had organized protests which turned into violence at the end of the day."[1693] Again, the consequence of this confrontation between the indigenes and the settlers was that "killings were committed by both sides, houses and other properties destroyed in the affected areas and churches and mosques were burned down.[1694]

The Justice Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry set up by the Plateau State government to find out the major remote and immediate causes of unrests of the 28 and 29 November 2008, identifies the following reasons as the causes of the dispute:

> 1. Ownership of Jos; 2. indigeneship issue; 3. non-implementation of previous reports; 4. Delineation of electoral wards; 5. inciting and provocative publications; 6. creation of Jos North Local Government; 7. allegation of expansionist tendencies; 8. quest for economic dominance of Jos North by the Hausa-Fulani; 9. influx of people into Jos; 9. unemployment and poverty; 10. blockage of roads during hours of worship; 11. illegal proliferation of arms, weapons and use of military uniforms; 12. political marginalization; 13. social issues.[1695]

1691   After the 1994 crisis, a fact-finding mission was set up by the name of Justice Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry" and a whitepaper on the report produced, but the recommendations made by the commission was never implemented. See the whitepaper on the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the riots of 12 April 1994, in Jos Metropolis. In addition, see the white paper on the report of the Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry established to investigate the Jos violence of September 2001.

1692   See Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 19.

1693   He said that many people were killed during that protests. The interviewee, however, believes that the Jos conflict is more of a resource-based conflict. "And all these are down to some factors. One is the issue of land. Two, the issue of distribution of political resource; distribution of political offices, appointments and other social benefits like scholarship, admission into higher institutions and all that." Quotation from the interview conducted with Dr. Audu N. Gambo in Jos on 11 August 2011.

1694   See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 20.

1695   All these above-mentioned immediate and remote causes are documented in the report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit.

In order to discuss some these factors, they will be subsumed into six contentious matters so as to better examine the ongoing Jos conflicts, namely: indigenes/settlers controversy or ownership struggle, economic inequalities, political disparities, youth unemployment and lack of education, the instrumentalization and abuse of religion, elite manipulation. These issues, due to lack of space, will be discussed together.

Historically, the indigene/settler controversy revolved around the ownership of Jos. Having established through various Commissions of Inquiry the truth about the ownership of Jos, the report of the Prince Ajibola Commission of Inquiry upheld the earlier declaration by both the Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry and that of the Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry that contrary to the Hausa-Fulani ownership claims to Jos, the Berom, the Anaguta, and the Afizere were the founders and owners of Jos town and either the Hausa-Fulani or the Jasawa own Jos.[1696] This was expected to put to rest the perception of the Jasawa that they were the founders of Jos and owned it, therefore, were entitled to take control of Jos LGA.[1697] In an interview, A. Aminu, a Hausa-Fulani man, presents the following view:

> Going back to history, Jos has been ruled by fourteen kings, a large percentage by Hausas, only three are not. That is the issue. One must be aggrieved when given birth to in a place and is being referred to as an alien. It makes one to feel bad. And we are all Nigerians. And indigenes of Plateau State in other parts of Nigerian enjoy employment benefits unlike they have been treating us here.[1698]

1696　See ibid., p. 49.

1697　It is argued that "many Jasawa believe they founded Jos, an idea that underpins their sense of entitlement to a greater role in the administration of Jos North LGA where they are concentrated, and explains their bitterness at being excluded as 'settlers'." Quote from the report of the QHE Working-Paper on the topic: "A Decade of Fear and Violence: Ethno-Religious Conflicts on the Jos Plateau, Nigeria", in: *University of Oxford Development Research and Project Centre*, Policy Brief, No. 3, February 2013, available online: http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/nrn-pb03.pdf [10/03/2014].

1698　Interview conducted with Aminu Alisu, a Hausa man, in Jos on the 11 August 2011. In addition to this, history has it that the Hausa-Fulani migrated to Jos for different reasons that included employment, commerce. See the report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit., p. 36. Also it is established by another study that:

　　"A legacy of tin mining in the colonial period is the descendants of labourers forcefully recruited from other parts of northern provinces inhabited by the Hausa, Kanuri, Nupe, and others. Jos city developed on the back of the tin mining industry, principally as a place of trade […], the Hausa people who migrated to what is now metropolitan Jos were from urban commercial centers like Kano and Bauchi." Quoted from "A Decade of Fear and Violence: Ethno-Religious Conflicts on the Jos Plateau, Nigeria", 2013, op. cit.

　　Istifanus S. Zabadi gives a similar reason as to the origin of the so-called non-indigenes in Jos and he goes further that the mining activities during the colonial period not only at-

Contrary to this perception that non-indigenes enjoy benefits in other places in the north, the position of a female interviewee in Kano gives a different view about the indigene vs. settler controversy in Kano State, as stated thus:

> Looking at those people, that is, the Hausas, they are the type who don't really value other tribes and they use religion as a cover up. Anytime there is crisis, even the Muslims from other tribes equally find a means of escape. So it is not totally about religion, but also about ethnicity. Religion is but a cover up. If Muslims could run for their dear lives just because they are not indigenes of Kano State, that means it's not really a religious issue.[1699]

Another interviewee, Saleh Dauda, believes that the crisis in Jos is not about ownership *per se*, but rather about the structure of the Nigerian State:

> The Nigerian state is the easiest way to riches and splendor, and the people struggle at all cost to capture political power. And in their bid to achieve that objective, they normally appeal to their ethnic constituency for support. The struggle is for power: struggle to access resources or money by few elites.[1700]

Going by this, he is of the view that "whenever there are elections in Nigeria for political posts, it is then that the elites wake up this sentiment. People became conscious of their ethnic groups. It is becoming 'we versus they'."[1701] On the question about the elites' manipulation of the election that resulted in the 28/29 November 2008 Jos conflicts, A. Gambo states that the two variables often used as convenient tools to mobilize support for the two groups are ethnicity and religion.[1702] Corresponding to his position that religion is instrumentalized for mobilization purposes, the report of the Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry highlights how Muslims deployed them below:

> By the grace of Allah, Jos North cannot be rigged. Come to think of it, was there election somewhere that was won and not announced? When it became apparent that we had won and they had to announce, did they not cancel the elections? For your information, this upcoming election cannot be cancelled and by force, we shall win Allah willing. Look, we are Muslims, over eighty percent of the people of Jos North are Muslims. We are not Christians. Do you think we shall vote a Christian to lead us in Jos North?[1703]

In a similar manner, the interview A. Alisu assumes that Hausa Muslims constitute sixty-five percent in Jos North, more than the indigenous people and, on

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tracted the Hausa-Fulanis, but also Yorubas, Igbos and other tribes. Interview conducted with Dr. Zabadi in Abuja on 8 August 2011.

1699   Interview conducted with Otura A. Barkisu in Kano on 4 August 2011.
1700   Interview in Abuja with Professor Saleh Dauda on 8 August 2011.
1701   Ibid.
1702   This is possible because the Muslims are predominantly Hausa and the indigenous groups predominantly Christians. Interview conducted with Dr. Audu N. Gambo in Jos on 11 August 2011.
1703   Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit., p. 68.

this basis, any election conducted in Jos North LGA in which the Hausa-Fulani do not win is almost certainly manipulated.[1704] On another note, the Bola Aji-bola report indicates the use of incendiary religious slogans and rhetoric for mo-bilization purposes such as the one by the Islamic Revolutionary Network: "'[…] All concern [sic] Muslims must rise up to stop this evil plans [sic] against Islam in the State-----in-sha Allah we shall win over them this time around, we shall go forth (Jihad)'."[1705] In another remark, the report captures a similar senti-ment:

> No compromise, no going back. Allah will punish us if we compromise on issues of Jos North Local Government Area … in-sha Allah, we shall win over them this time around. We shall go forth (Jihad) Quran 3:39. 9:73.[1706]

It was further reported that mosques were used as 'control towers' and mobiliza-tion areas where orders were given to armed Hausa youths.[1707] In the interview with Aisha Abdul Ismail, an expert on Sharia and Islamic politics, her view of the Jos conflict and the religious connotation given to conflicts between ethnic minorities and majorities in northern region altogether is misleading:

> Maybe I will start by saying you mentioned that there are conflicts that are ethnic and religious. I will prefer to say that that there are conflicts which are so-named and whose causative factors are wrongly placed at the door of religion and ethnicity. I think that politics is the culprit be-cause people are using the religious or ethnic card to manipulate the people because those are sentiments, those are values, those are very close to the heart of the people and sometimes as soon as you talk about ethnicity or as soon as you talk about, especially religion, people tend to sometimes lose their objectivity. So, politicians have seen that and they are using that card and it has never failed them. So, actually, I will not say that most of these conflicts are actually reli-gious or ethnic but it is mostly political.[1708]

In the same vein, Otura Barkisu, a female student and a Christian residing in the Muslim city of Kano, represents the position that the roots of the Jos conflicts can only be traced back to the ethnocentric attitudes of the Hausa-Fulani:

> [T]he major problem of the Hausas is that they believe their culture is superior to others. I think the issue of Jos/Plateau highlights this fact: the crisis is still about superiority, they claim they should be the ones ruling Jos. That is just their problem.[1709]

In regard to this, using the instrumentalist method of ethnicity, it can be argued that the process of politicizing ethnicity deployed in the Jos conflicts by the

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1704   Interview conducted with Aminu Alisu, a Hausa man, in Jos on 11 August 2011.
1705   Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit., p. 69.
1706   Ibid., p. 84.
1707   See ibid., p. 199-200.
1708   Interview conducted with Dr. Aisha Abdul Ismail in Kano on 5 August 2011.
1709   Interview conducted with Otura A. Barkisu in Kano on 4 August 2011.

elites is geared towards the control and consolidation of political power and attainment of resources by both the indigenous elites as well as the elites of the so-called settlers. Ethnic boundaries are constructed in religious terms in order to construct an enemy image, hence the Hausa's description of the indigenous ethnic groups as "infidels" who, therefore constitute the un-Islamic "other". Religion, manipulated as an instrument of mobilization, "animates the Muslims, from whom cries of 'Jihad!' and 'Allahu Akbar!' can be heard when the battle rages in the streets of Jos."[1710]

Likewise, "the Plateau indigenes now also march under the banner of Christianity."[1711] In the same manner of constructing an enemy image, the "other", the indigenous ethnic groups are able to characterize the Hausa-Fulani as agents of Jihadist movements, who are bent on Islamizing Jos, Plateau State and all of Nigeria, using this prospect to instill fear in the minds of the indigenes.[1712]

Based on memories of slave-raiding and injustices experienced by the indigenes at the hands of Hausa-Fulani Muslims in the past,[1713] their indigenous elites draw on the historical myth of their resistance to the invasion of the Hausa-Fulani. Such a myth is drawn upon in order to awaken and mobilize their brethren against what is perceived as another Jihadist invasion by the Hausa-Fulani,[1714] reflected in the introduction of Sharia in twelve northern states in 1999.[1715] The following depicts the fear of Islamization deployed as a tool to politicize ethnicity in Jos:

> Since the mid-1960s and the Islamization campaign launched by the premier of the Northern Region, the Christian indigenous groups have developed a fear of 'Islamization'. The term has become a label liberally attached to anything to do with the Jasawa.[1716]

Hence, it becomes apparent that such a deployment of fear among the indigenes creates an avenue for the Plateau elites at both local and state as well as the ward levels to control and consolidate their power, thereby excluding other groups based on religion and ethnicity.[1717] Aside from the political elites, A. Higazi observes that politically religious leaders command a considerate level of influence on the attitudes of their congregations in mosques and churches.[1718] To

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1710   Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 8.
1711   Ibid., p. 8.
1712   See Blench, Roger, 2013, op. cit., p. 1-12.
1713   See ibid., p. 1-12.
1714   Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 23.
1715   See Blench, Roger, 2013, op. cit., p. 8.
1716   Quoted from QHE: "A Decade of Fear and Violence", 2013, op. cit.
1717   See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 16-19.
1718   See ibid., p. 19.

a large extent, the influence of the media as instruments of politicized ethnicity in Jos cannot be underestimated. One of the allegations made against a former Commissioner of Police in Plateau State, Gregory Anyantin, was that he, whether deliberately or unintentionally, announced that indigenous Christians were being attacked by some Muslim youths. It is reported that such a statement incited the Christian indigenes and the role of the media in polarizing the populace became a subject of scrutiny, as the following portrays:

> Muslims claim that after the police commissioner had made this statement PRTV broadcast it every 30 minutes, including throughout Monday, accompanied by Bob Marley's lyrics 'Get up stand up, stand up for your rights'.[1719]

In another account, a group of Christians mobilized youths to wreak havoc on the perceived enemy by using such slogans, blowing whistles and asking people to "come out and fight for Jesus", signaling the instrumentalization of religion during the process of politicized ethnicity.[1720]

On this note, it is important to state that the unrest is limited not only to the indigenous Christians and Hausa-Fulani Muslims, but also extends to all other ethnic groups such as the Igbos and Yoruba who are equally settlers in Jos. They are all dragged into the conflicts, as illustrated below:

> Mostly you find out that these people from other ethnic backgrounds outside Plateau State are neutral. They support neither the indigenous people nor the Hausa-Fulanis. But the Hausa-Fulanis started attacking these people, the Christians who have their businesses in Muslim dominated areas, this provoked others, most especially the Igbos, Yorubas and the Itsekiris. That was what caused them to start supporting the indigenous people.[1721]

According to the theory of identity and difference in ethnicity by G. Schlee, it can be seen here that supporting one group or the other depends on the cost and benefit from such a move. Based on a rational calculation, it can be argued that alliances are formed, a point which can be deduced from the above in the case of the Yoruba, Itsekiri and Igbo joining in the fight along with the indigenous people against the Hausa-Fulani. At the same time, there are a number of indigenous Muslims in Plateau State who can be viewed from two angles: Those indigenous Muslim converts that make an effort to distinguish themselves from fluent Hausa-speakers and lifelong Muslims and those ones that are culturally assimilated Hausa, which denotes being politically aligned with the Jasawa.[1722] An example of this is cited thus:

1719   Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 25.
1720   See ibid., p. 24.
1721   An interview conducted with Emmanuel Dauda in Jos, Plateau State on 11 August 2011.
1722   Compare Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 20.

> For instance, a small minority of Beroms are Muslims. Some of them have distinctly "Hausa-ised", adopting not only the Hausa language but Hausa names, dress, and other cultural practices; they tend to side with the Jasawa. But a number of other Berom Muslims are asserting or reasserting their Berom identities and culture, not accepting that to be a Hausa is the only way to be a Muslim. They want to be Berom Muslims, as there are Yoruba Muslims and Kanuri Muslims and a lot of others beside the Hausas. They tend to side with their fellow Beroms in the indigene-settler controversies in Jos.[1723]

Based on the instrumentalist approach of F. Barth, one can argue that ethnic identity is not a fixed phenomenon, but that ethnic identity swings. According to G. Schlee's theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, it is confirmed by the many identity formations being established according to the quotation that humans socially identify themselves on the basis of criteria such as language, religion, ancestry and other dimensions of belonging. In this way, one can argue that ethnicity on its own is not the cause of the Jos conflicts, unless politicized. Ethnicity, as indicated above, does either prohibit indigenous people from their religious conversion to Islam or influence their decision with respect to identifying with the Hausa-Fulani based on religious affiliation alone. Therefore, the lines of ethnic boundaries are blurred. A. Gambo, an expert on conflict management and peace studies, reinforced the same argument in his interview:

> The issue of faith is not as easy as we think. Sometimes, you cannot explain certain actions that are derived from one's faith. Really, I can tell you in Wase, in the conflict between the Hausa-Fulani and Tarok people. Those Tarok people that got converted to Islam fought their kit and kin during the conflict because they see themselves as belonging to the other faith. They were the ones leading the Hausa-Fulani to the Christians there. It is the same thing in Jos.[1724]

Furthermore, on the question whether the indigenous Muslims were attacked during the crises because they tend to be perceived by both conflict parties as traitors, E. Dauda, an Anaguta by ethnic affiliation, acknowledges that Jos is divided into Christian and Muslim territories, however, Berom Muslims are perceived as Hausa sympathizers and are asked by the indigenous Christians to either convert to Christianity or live outside their Christian communities, as they are perceived as traitors: "So, if anything should happen, they would not look at the ethnic backgrounds and may attack their very own ethnic relations. So they

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1723   Ibid., p. 20. Furthermore, it is shown in the work of P. Ostien that the Jasawa disrespect those Muslim Beroms that assert their Berom identities and side with their fellow Beroms in the Jos conflicts. The Hausa degrade them by labeling them "tubabbu", which means converts or new to Islam, or even "munafiki", meaning hypocrites or traitors. See ibid., p. 20.

1724   Interview conducted with Dr. Audu N. Gambo in Jos on 11 August 2011. The interviewee is a Christian Tarok, a small ethnic group from Wase Local Government of Plateau State.

had to make a choice."[1725] To a large extent, as the interviewee expresses, religious affiliations play a significant role in the ongoing Jos conflicts:

> So you find out that even some of the Yorubas, some Muslims from Kwara and places like Kogi, were likewise warned: the indigenous people wanted to attack them on the basis of religion but elders pleaded that they shouldn't be touched. They were told to practice Christianity if they wanted to stay and if not, they should relocate. Some of them left Plateau State.[1726]

A. Higazi relates such an incident in 2010 when "in the settlements that were attacked, all Muslims were targeted: Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and even Berom Muslims."[1727]

At the same time, it is understood that before an image of a common enemy regarding the Hausa-Fulani was constructed, the indigenous ethnic groups used to be engaged in power struggles as the Anaguta and the Afizere usually complained of political discrimination and marginalization experienced in the hands of the Berom. The administration of the current Governor, Jonah Jang, is often accused of having an ethnic Berom agenda.[1728] This is reflected in the interview conducted with A. Gambo in Jos, where he laments thus:

> See what is happening in Plateau State. We have a governor who is a Birom man. A Minister representing the state is another Birom lady. The attorney General is a Birom man. Chief of Staff is a Birom man. What makes you think that other people do not have that level of consciousness and do not understand the fact that they are being discriminated against.[1729]

In order to buttress the argument put forward above, the interview with E. Dauda, raising the question if there are already inter-ethnic problems among the indigenes in Jos, reveals that the fight against a common enemy is what currently unites the indigenous ethnic groups, as he understands:

> Presently there is a gap between these ethnic groups. But you know the Anagutas, the Biroms and the Afizeres are right now coming together as one body in order to fight what they perceive as foreigners coming to rule over them.[1730]

This implies that when the aim of defeating the common enemy is achieved, the old animosities may resume as human beings, according to G. Schlee's theory of identity and difference in ethnicity emphasizes, are inclined towards the construction of an image of the enemy. Furthermore, as he maintains, the deployment of the perceptible or objective criteria necessary to draw the lines of ethnic boundaries is subjective, i.e. what the ethnic actors deem important when di-

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1725   An interview conducted with Emmanuel Dauda in Jos, Plateau State on 8 August 2011.
1726   Ibid.
1727   See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 16-19.
1728   See ibid., p 16.
1729   Interview conducted with Dr. Audu N. Gambo in Jos on 11 August 2011.
1730   Interview conducted with Emmanuel Dauda in Jos, Plateau State on 11 August 2011.

chotomizing between "us" and "others" while in pursuit of certain interests and goals.[1731] An instance of this is the Afizere swinging ethnic identity, taking sides and forming an alliance with the Hausa-Fulani against the Berom and the Anaguta during the 27 November 2008 Jos North Local Government chairmanship election.[1732] Such a dynamic in the way people form and dissolve alliances displays an example of G. Schlee's theory, which indicates that "who with whom and against whom" in a conflict situation boils down to the realization of political and material resources.

In order to address the manipulation of differences by the elites, having identified the former Military Head of State, General Babangida, and other military officers, for example the former Military Governor of Plateau State, as responsible for the artificial construction of Jos North LGA and appointment of their own candidates to important political positions based on religious and ethnic ties, which sparked off the drawing of ethnic boundaries,[1733] it is still unclear who the other actors that politicize ethnicity in the Jos conflicts are. In spite of the challenges faced in identifying the perpetrators involved in instigating the conflicts,[1734] there may be other actors who are indirectly manipulating and thereby politicizing ethnicity by providing the necessary financial means and weapons through which the perpetrators carry out their attacks.

Despite many commissions of inquiry set up to carry out an investigation on the causes of and the persons behind these conflicts, as Human Rights Watch reveals, "it has proved more difficult to confirm the identity of their political sponsors—the individuals who are paying and arming these young men to attack their opponents."[1735] The challenge in identifying those that politicize ethnicity in the Jos case is attributed to the lack of recognized groups or militia with a clear structure or any individual and/or organization claiming to be responsible

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1731   The same view is expressed by J. Krause. It is believed "if it were not for the Hausa-Fulani as a common enemy, the Berom, Anaguta, and the Afizere would be fighting among themselves over the ownership of Jos and privileges." Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 27.

1732   A report shows that "the Afizere had sided with the Jasawa in the lead-up to the 2008 local elections against People's Democratic Party." Citation in Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 27. See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 28. In the research carried out by J. Krause, it is stated that "after Jang assumed office, Afizeres complained that he intended to 'chase them out to Bauchi' […]." Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., 27.

1733   See QEHWPS, "A Decade of Fear and Violence, 2013, op. cit. In addition, see Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 1-34.

1734   See the report of Human Rights Watch: "Revenge in the Name of Religion: The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano States", Vol. 17, No. 8 (A), May 2005, p. 1-86 (6-7). For more information, see: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0505.pdf [28/08/2013].

1735   Quote from ibid., p. 6-7.

for the killings.[1736] Since many organizations that represent political, economic, social and religious/ethnic interest groups do not openly advocate violence, "there are no formal or identifiable clearly armed groups who maintain their presence in the periods between the fighting".[1737] That is why the insight gained from G. Schlee's theory of identity and difference in ethnicity and F. Barth's instrumentalist approach may be deployed so as to identify these actors.

Within the scope of these theoretical approaches, Islamic organizations such as the one mentioned in the report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry, for example, the leaders of Youth Groups, as well as religious leaders such as Imams and Pastors identified in the report, or such as politicians like Hon. Nazifi Yusuf, identified in the report for numerous inciting and provocative statements, can be investigated as some of the people politicizing ethnicity and polarizing Jos along religious and ethnic faultlines. The commission's report indicates that Hon. Nazifi Yusuf makes the following remarks before the official announcement of the results of the 27 November 2008 Jos North LGA election in telephone conversation:

> Hon. Nazifi raised an alarm using a telephone call and said "ku fito!, ku fito! Arna sun ci zabe!" meaning "come out! The infidels have won the election!. He said so more than ten times, "ku fito, ku fito, ku fito! Ku fito an gama damu" meaning "come out, come out, come out, come out, we are finished, they have won". It was after these phone calls that we witnessed people coming out, the next I could see was smoke every where […].[1738]

In such statement, using religious connotations, it is discernible that religion is dragged into the conflicts and it is being used as an instrument to label the indigenes as infidels, a statement implying the "other". This is not to say that the Hausa-Fulani, based on religious similarity, perceive all Muslims as fellow adherents of Islam. Just as the Yoruba Muslims are attacked by fellow Hausa-Fulani Muslims, so do the indigenous Muslims become susceptible to attacks from both the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the indigenous Christians that share the same ethnicity with these indigenous Muslims. The commission's report illustrates it as follows:

> Hausa Muslims do not trust the indigene Muslims saying we are betrayers of faith. That whenever something is being discussed, may be to kill the Christians, we are the ones that leaked it out to them because we live with the Christians. And the Christians on the other hand suspect

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1736   Ibid., p. 6.
1737   Ibid., p. 6.
1738   Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, p. 26.

us indigene Muslims to be hiding information from them. So they kill us for no just cause on most occasions, we the indigene Muslims don't know what happens, they kill us.[1739]

From the above, going by G. Schlee's theory, one can see different patterns of identification being established and many possibilities that are available in conflict situations when constructing an image of the enemy. In this respect, such a line of action is helpful in identifying elites/individuals, groups and organizations involved in the politicization of ethnicity. Since religious, ancestral and language differences are used to dichotomize between "us" and "others", then, ethnonyms[1740] may also be deployed towards identifying the actors, for instance:

[The leaders of] several faith-based organizations—Christian and Muslim alike—and many youth groups such as the Berom Youth Movement, Anaguta Youth Movement, Afizere Youth Movement, and Jasawa Development Associations have played key roles in spreading exclusionary ideologies and violence.[1741]

On account of this, with respect to the instrumentalist approach, one can argue that all the groups mentioned above aim towards the realization of certain goals/ resources which they attempt to achieve through the neutralization and elimination of the "other". That is why certain comments and documents credited to individuals and groups cite enough evidence for the arrest and prosecution of the individuals and associations involved, for example, the ones signed by Alhaji S. Mohammed and Mallam Idris Abdul dated 11 May 2002:

1739   Ibid., p. 32. Furthermore, the commission's report shows the following:
        "'Amazingly, many individuals, who were practicing Muslims, but not of Hausa/Fulani origin were also targeted for attack. For example, there are credible oral accounts which speak of some Yoruba-speaking residents of Nasarawa Gwong area of Jos (who are Muslims) being brutally attacked and molested. A few of them were even reported to have been killed'." Ibid., p. 31.
        Also, the same report explains that:
        "[O]ne cannot also give the Unrest an exclusive ethnic interpretation because just as some Muslims were attacked by their fellow Muslims, as in the case of Yoruba Muslims who were not spared by the Hausa/Fulani Muslims, some of the indigenes were attacked by their fellow indigenes such as the case of Alhaji Umaru Chowhe Miango an indigene of Plateau State who was attacked by his fellow indigenes also from Plateau State." Quote from ibid., p. 31.
1740   Because of the importance of ethnonyms in identity formations, it is noted that "the contested history of Jos also finds expression in a trend among the indigenes to rename areas and streets to erase the Hausa legacy although most people in Jos speak Hausa fluently." Krause, Jana, 2011, op. cit., p. 24.
1741   Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 6. For example, certain officers of the Jasawa Development Association are identified as already involved in the conflicts of 12 April 1994, however, without being prosecuted as all initial reports of the commissions of inquiry were never implemented. See Report of Prince Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit., p. 56.

[A] document emanating from 'Supreme Council for the Actualisation of Sharia in Nigeria'. The document is a clarion call upon all Muslims in Nigeria to make financial contributions towards a take over and islamization of Jos.[1742]

As a result, Christian churches, indigenous organizations and politicians such as the state executive governor spread the fear of an Islamization tendency of the Hausa-Fulani non-indigenes in Jos. Demanding the creation of a district for the Hausa community in Jos, over which an Hausa chief would be appointed to rule, raised the suspicion of the indigenes that the plan was to install an Emir in Jos.[1743] Governor Jang's directive, similar to the notification given by the topmost traditional ruler/king in Plateau State (*Gbong Gwom Jos*) and the one made by Plateau State's government, was to refuse selling or allocating landed properties to the Hausa.[1744]

In spite of the fact that the governor of Plateau State, Jonah Jang, rejected all demands forwarded to him by the Hausa, he emerged as the elected governor of the state without the votes of the Hausa Jasawa.[1745] Determined to alter the status quo concerning Jos North, the governor, as of 2007, can be perceived to have been involved in the politicization of ethnicity. Relevant in his resumption of office, for example, was the relocation of Jos North LGA headquarters, ini-

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1742   Ibid., p. 241.

1743   P. Ostien outlines some of the demands by the Hausa Council of Ulama which, comprised of the political leaders of the Hausas, controls the direction in which the Hausa cast their vote in any election, however, the former governorship aspirant of Plateau State in 2003, Jonah Jang, refused to give any promises to the Jasawa. On the question of creating a district for the Hausa, who are seeking recognition, Jang insisted that the Hausa do not own any land in Jos as all the land belongs to the Beroms. Asking about how they, Jasawa, would benefit from Jang's government if they support him, he told them that he would not make any promise, but that he would give the Jasawa a sense of belonging if they voted for him. See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 22-28. The same report outlines further demands by the Hausa-Fulani which go as far as the request towards having Jang choose a Muslim Jasawa as his deputy governor. It is important to understand that the request of the Jasawa for a district of their own means carving a particular area created from eight wards inhabited predominantly by the Jasawa Muslims and overseen by a district head with the title of chief. See ibid., p. 22-23. Another investigation elucidates the fear of the indigenous ethnic groups as follows: "Creating a Fulani emirate in Jos will mean that there will now be two traditional rulers in a single domain since the Gbong Gwom Jos, a Berom, is recognised as the paramount traditional ruler of the city!" See the report of A.K. Adebayo, published online by Saharareporters (15 August 2012) on the topic "Jonathan, Nigerians Beware of Jos! – The Intricacies of a Murderous Conflict!" available online thus: http://saharareporters.com/article/jonathan-nigerians-beware-jos-intricacies-murderous-conflict [26/06/2013].

1744   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 23.

1745   Reports have it that the Jasawa were not convinced by Jang's response and did not vote for him in the 2003 governorship election. As the Jasawa realized that Jang would not yield to any of their demands, they cast their votes for a Muslim candidate. See ibid., p. 23.

tially situated in a majority Hausa-Jasawa area, close to the central mosque in the center of Jos, to a new place which is not dominated by the Hausa-Jasawa. Another point to be made is his intention to build a big church to compete with the central mosque of the Jasawa. By this development, one can see that "the Hausa presence, the Hausa access, are much more reduced; the headquarters no longer so much belongs to them."[1746]

Currently, the Beroms are claiming the ownership of the land where the central mosque is located, an area predominantly occupied by the Jasawa. For both ethnic groups, the removal or the maintenance of the central mosque is symbolic as a sign of recognition and presence: "The Hausas say the land never belonged to the Beroms; the Hausas occupied it when it belonged to nobody. Beroms say the land was sold to them, to the Hausas […]."[1747]

As mentioned earlier, youths are used by politicians on both sides of conflict parties to inflict harm and damage on each other, as the commission's report shows:

> The report […] reveals how politicians trained and armed youths as thugs, use them and later dump them meanwhile these dangerous youths have since taken a life of their own and are now unleashing violence on innocent citizens and of course will be easily available at a small fee in any part of Nigeria at the behest of corrupt and desperate political and religious "entrepreneurs". The Plateau Patriots quoted Weekly Trust as stating that the youths have become really dangerous and are spread all over Northern Nigeria. They are known as sara-suka (hack and stab) in Bauchi, Yan Kalare in Gombe, Yan daba in Kano, Ecomog in Borno, Kauraye in Kaduna and Katsina States and Area Boys in Sokoto. These armed youth are often dehumanised, callous and often under the influence of drugs. They can do anything.[1748]

With this in mind, it is understood that there are widespread killings and "there were also allegations, by both sides, of 'fake soldiers'—men in military uni-

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1746   Ibid,. 25. What is most crucial about the governor is the manner he swings from one party to the other towards the realization of his ambition, becoming the governor of Plateau State. In 2003, he runs for the governorship election on the platform of a party identified to be a Muslim party, but in 2007, he changes his allegiance and runs as the candidate of another party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP). "So, Jang switched parties: he joined the All Nigeria People's Party, the ANPP, the party of Muhammadu Buhari for president, the "northern" party: Jang was the ANPP candidate for governor of Plateau State in 2003." Quote from ibid., p. 22. However, in 2007, Jang switched back to the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). For more information, see ibid., p. 22-28.

1747   Ibid., p. 25. Supported overwhelmingly by both the Muslim and Christian indigenes in Jos as well as settlers from elsewhere, the governor was determined to chase out the Jasawa Muslims out of Jos North Local Government. See ibid., p. 26

1748   Report by the Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the Jos Conflict of 28 November 2008, op. cit., p. 108.

forms with weapons, but directly assisting one side or the other and entering houses to kill people."[1749]

On the one hand, this is a situation whereby the sitting president, being a northern Muslim, sympathizes with the Jasawa Muslims and the governor of Plateau State, a Christian indigene, takes sides with the indigenous population, on the other hand, one can acknowledge the politicization of the conflicts and the dichotomization of "us" and the "others" occurring between the federal and the state governments.[1750] It is observed that in mid-2010, and in 2011, at the time the fieldwork for this research was carried out, violence and silent killings of individuals were pervasive in Jos and its environs.[1751] Thereby, one can emphasize that a complete polarization of Jos along ethnic and religious lines is demonstrated as churches advocate that the indigenous Christians are to vote exclusively for Christians and the Jasawa ask their people to vote for Muslim candidates only in both local and national elections.[1752]

Many reports of the numerous commissions of inquiry established to provide recommendations on how to curb the outbreaks of these conflicts are yet to be implemented and are already being politicized as the following illustrates:

> Immediately after the crisis, President Yar'adua appeared in several ways to side with the Jasawa against Jang and the Plateau indigenes. When Yar'adua appointed his committee of inquiry, the Plateau indigenes said it would be biased against them and they would not appear before it. When Jang appointed his committee of inquiry, the Jasawa said it would be biased against them and they would not appear before it. Jang filed a lawsuit challenging Yar'adua's right to appoint a committee to investigate a dispute to which he is a party. Although both committees have proceeded with their work, each has received evidence essentially from only one side. Little good is likely to come from this process. Lesser committees appointed by the senate, by the House of Representatives, and by the Plateau State House of Assembly have faced similar problems and will also make little impact. Each side's accusations against the other will live on, neither proven nor disproven; nothing will be resolved, no one's opinions will change, no one except perhaps a few of the foot soldiers will be prosecuted.[1753]

1749   The Christians accused the Muslims of hiring mercenaries from neighboring countries like Chad, Nigeria and the other Muslim north. See Higazi, Adam, 2011, op. cit., p. 21. Due to the violence, "many of the killings in Plateau were carried out in very cruel ways and in some instances the bodies of the victims were mutilated." See ibid., p. 20.

1750   One can see that the so-called political elites, politicians, are mostly accused of provoking inter-ethnic crisis by the irresponsible application of indigeneity-related rhetoric as a way to exploit the already charged ethnic tensions while in pursuit of their own political goals. See Human Rights Watch, 2006, op. cit., p. 34.

1751   The same story is written about by A. Higazi. See ibid., p. 20.

1752   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 30. R. Blench believes that the "Increasing availability of modern weapons has increased the intensity and violence of these disputes." Blench, Roger, 2013, op. cit., p. 1-12 (summary).

1753   See Ostien, Philip, 2009, op. cit., p. 34.

Furthermore, the Nigerian Police and the Armed Forces called to the conflict zones to stop the killings and destruction of properties are said to be dragged into the conflicts, with different warring factions preferring one or the other: "Accusations of bias, extra-judicial killings, the condoning of atrocities, and even the arming of combatants have been made against both the army and the police."[1754] With the accusations of biased attitudes against the security forces and endless numbers of commissions of inquiries established to investigate the Jos conflicts, one can see that any attempt made towards resolving the Jos conflicts is automatically politicized.[1755]

One of the consequences of the politicization of ethnicity in the Jos conflicts, apart from the allegation of political participation in the marginalization of one group by the other, is that the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the indigenous Christians currently isolate each other. This involves repeated efforts to dispossess each other of the market and business monopoly in form of patronizing different markets where each group carries out its daily business activities without involving the other. That implies, Christians buying from markets belonging to the indigenous people and the Hausa-Fulani from the ones belonging to their fellow Muslim ethnic group.[1756]

Having examined how the politicization of ethnicity, through the creation of Jos North Local Government Area in 1991, led to the redrawing and construction of new ethnic boundary lines and the renewal of ethnic tension/animosity it generated as well as the thousands of deaths recorded in Jos, Plateau State, the

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1754   QEHWPS, "A Decade of Fear and Violence", 2013, op. cit.
1755   See Kwaja, Chris, 2011, op. cit., p. 6. It is further emphasized that many of the commissions set up in recent times invited witnesses in order to obtain testimonies from them, however, some of the commissions are reported as having been ignored by one conflict party or the other so that they did not obtain testimonies from both conflict parties, and were rather one-sided. See ibid, p. 1-8. It must be mentioned that it is not only in Jos that the kind of conflict seen can be experienced. In Kano, non-indigenes are referred to as settlers, strangers etc. For further information, read Adesoji, A. Abimbola, 2009, op. cit., p. 151-165.
1756   During the fieldwork of this thesis in Jos, there was at that time an ongoing conspiracy in Jos which generated fear among the indigenous people as rumors were widely spread that the Hausa-Fulani Muslims contaminated foodstuffs by injecting poisonous substances into the food products purchased from them by the indigenous people. As often alleged by way of rumors, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims presumably intended to exterminate the indigenous population, thereby taking over their land from them. This fear prompted the Christians to boycott the food markets once dominated by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, a new development which enabled the indigenous people to dabble in the food product markets, competing side-by-side with the Hausa-Fulani Muslims. In 2011, while in Jos, the writer of this thesis wanted to buy an orange from a Hausa-Fulani trader in Jos, however, he was warned by one man, an Anaguta by ethnic origin, not to do so because the Hausa-Fulani poison the products sold to other ethnic groups in Jos and its environs.

next chapter will investigate the second type of conflict, represented by the Warri Crisis. Within the spectrum of the Warri Crisis, similarities and differences to the Jos conflicts will be reflected on during the analysis, however, the investigation will be carried out based on the research questions of this work, meaning: Does ethnicity lead to conflict? Who politicizes ethnicity? How and why is ethnicity politicized?

5.6.2 The Example of Politicized Ethnicity: The Warri Crisis

The Warri crisis can be examined within the context of the wider ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta,[1757] especially, since the beginning of the 1990s.[1758] Within the spectrum of the inter-ethnic conflicts in Warri town, the investigation will highlight how ethnic conflict is constructed by certain individuals/elites and groups in order to destabilize the polity, thereby, distracting the attention of the state security services while these actors are in pursuits of their illegal acquisition of resources, mainly accrued from oil. That implies, without having deep knowledge of the issue at stake, Warri conflicts may seem on the surface and be described by some writers as ethnic conflicts. However, such an observation fails to recognize the issue at hand, that is, the struggle for the acquisition of oil related resources.[1759]

1757   Warri, referred to as times as a town or a city, is not the capital of Delta State; however, it is a prominent city with proven reserves of crude oil and gas, and therefore, an important place in its own right.

1758   The Niger Delta of Nigeria, at times interchangeably referred to as South South region, can be described thus:
        "The South-South zone consists of the following states, moving from east to west: Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, and Edo. The term "Niger Delta" generally refers to these states but is sometimes also used to include Imo, Abia, and Ondo States as they are also oil producers, albeit minor ones. The core Niger Delta consists of Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta States." Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 5.
        The International Crisis Group reports that the Niger Delta region, an area known for swamps, rivers and tropical forests, is made up of about 20 million residents. See the report of the International Crisis Group, 2006, "Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis", op. cit., p. 1-34 (1).

1759   B. Omitola traces the roots of the Warri crisis and the large Niger Delta conflicts as a result of the contestation and struggle for the control of political powers in the state within the ruling elites when in pursuit of the attainment of economic goods. Read Omitola, O. Bolaji: "The Struggle for the Nigerian Soul: Niger Delta Debacle", in: *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2012, p. 252-270 (258).

Placing a focus on the research questions and theoretical methods of this work, this chapter and subsequent sections will examine the violent contest for the ownership of Warri. In connection with that, the thesis will investigate the role which the name of the traditional institution, somewhat akin to the Jos situation, plays in the struggle among the ethnic groups inhabiting Warri, namely: the Ijaw, the Urhobo and the Itsekiri. Although the Urhobo are not primarily involved in the contemporary Warri conflict, as this is principally between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri, it will however be demonstrated that they, although subsequently having been dragged into the crisis, sympathize with and are ally with the Ijaw in the fight against the Itsekiri.

It will be emphasized within the context of the Warri crisis that the so-called Ijaw-Itsekiri conflicts erupted as a result of the politicization of ethnicity. According to the information and observations made during fieldwork in a town called Oghara, a place close to Warri, Delta State, it is notable that many Itsekiri are married to both the Urhobo and Ijaw, and vice versa. Therefore, it would be expected that these ethnic groups co-exist peacefully in Warri and its environs.[1760] In an interview with an Itsekiri youth leader, I. Dorsu, who was/is involved in the socio-political struggle for the betterment of his people, underscores the importance attached to marrying outside the same ethnic group by the Itsekiri:

> Like for us Itsekiris, if your blood domiciles majorly in the Itsekiri tribe, or fully Itsekiri, we have some questions to ask. This is because from the olden days practice, it is going out to intermarry across Nigeria that makes you a true Itsekiri, and that's for traditional reasons which I would not be able to go into. Our forefathers attached many values to marrying outside your tribe. In fact, products of such marriages are preferable to products of intra-marriage.[1761]

Hence, similar to the case of Jos, it will be illustrated within the context of the Warri crisis that ethnic boundary lines are blurred and ethnic group identity swings. That is why the crisis can be traced to the contestation for resources through which ethnic differences are highlighted and boundaries arbitrarily drawn in order to dichotomize between "us" and "others", as the Warri crisis demonstrates. This implies that the Warri crisis is characterized by a struggle for

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1760   It is commonly the case among the Itsekiris that anyone who does not have Urhobo blood in him/her is regarded as a slave, which implies that such a person is not a true Itsekiri as it is believed that all Itsekiris are intermarried with other ethnic groups, especially the Urhobo. Hence, one can see the level of intermarriages and ethnic mixture. See Ejoor, A. David: *The Origin of Urhobo Nation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, revised edition, Frank Akpo Nigeria Enterprise, Warri 2011, p. 25.

1761   Interview conducted in Warri with the Itsekiri Youth Leader, Isaac Dorsu, on 18 June 2012.

resources, but the battle is fought through the politicization of ethnicity, there-
fore, inadvertently and erroneously denoting ethnic conflicts.

Warri, a city rich in oil in Delta State, is located in the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria,[1762] also known as the South South region from an administrative point
of view, cohabited predominantly by the Itsekiris, the Ijaws and the Urhobos.[1763]
The impression gained from the opinion of F. Anijobaye, an Ijaw by ethnic
background, is that before the introduction of politics, as practiced currently, all
these ethnic groups lived and grew up together in harmony, especially in Warri
area.[1764] As a result, it may seem unclear why the current ethnic disharmony,
discontent and disagreement can lead to violent clashes, leading to the loss of
lives and destruction of property as armed youth groups of the warring ethnic
groups unleash untold hardships on each other. The following demonstrates the
level of the casualties recorded: "Up to two hundred people were reported to
have been killed in raids by ethnic Ijaw and Itsekiri militia on areas inhabited by
members of the other ethnic group."[1765]

1762   N. Ngboawaji emphasizes that Delta State was a part of the old Western region of Nigeria
       from 1963-1976. However, Delta State was created in 1991 as an autonomous federal entity
       out of the defunct Bendel state (1976-1991). See Ngboawaji, D. Nte: "The Nigerian State,
       Legitimacy Crisis and Communal Conflicts: A Review of Warri Crises in Nigeria", in:
       Journal of International Diversity, No. 3, 2010, p. 86-112 (97).
1763   Apart from a number of interviews conducted by the writer of this thesis with a certain
       number of people on the Warri crisis during his fieldwork in Warri and its environs in
       2011/2012, other secondary literature and works which will be used towards the investiga-
       tion of the Warri Crisis are as follows: See Bagaji, S. Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 34-43;
       Duquet, Nils: "Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons
       from the Niger Delta", in: *International Studies Perspectives*, 10, 2009, p. 169-185;
       Murphy, N. Martin: "Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters", in: *Orbis*, Vol. 57, No. 3,
       2013, p. 424-437. See also Human Rights Watch: "The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence", in:
       Human Rights Watch, Vol. 15, No.18 (A), 2003, p. 1-30; Ikelegbe, Augustine: "The
       Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria", in: *African and Asian
       Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, p. 23-56; Badmus, A. Isiaka: "Oil the Guns and Gunning the
       Oil: Oil Violence, Arms Proliferation and the Destruction of Nigeria's Niger Delta", in:
       Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, p. 323-363;
       Ayomike, S.O. Johnson: *Warri: A Focus on the Itesekiri*, Dorrance, Pittsburg 2009; Ifeka,
       Caroline: "Conflict, Complicity and Confusion: Unravelling Empowerment Struggles in
       Nigeria after the Return to 'Democracy'", in: *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.
       27, No. 83, March 2000, p. 115-123; Ukeje, Charles/Adebanwi, Wale: "Ethno-Nationalist
       Claims in Southern Nigeria: Insights from Yoruba and Ijaw Nationalisms Since the 1990s",
       in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, p. 563-591; Osaghae, E. Eghosa: "Reg-
       ulating Conflicts in Nigeria", in: *Peace Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2002, p. 217-224; Eku-
       maoko, C. Egwu: "The Amnesty Question in Post Conflict Niger Delta and Peace Build-
       ing", in: *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review* (OMAN Chapter), Vol. 2,
       No. 10, 2013, p. 1-12.
1764   Interview conducted with Famous Ofurogiri Anijobaye on 20/06/2012 in Warri.
1765   Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 5.

In spite of the historical animosity, long pre-existing the advent of the country called Nigeria, the Ijaw/Urhobo vs. Itsekiri animosity had never escalated to the dire level illustrated by experiences since the beginning of the 1990s. Many authors and organizations such as N. Ngboawaji, J. Asuni, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group[1766] as well as some of the people and ethnic leaders interviewed during the fieldwork trace the major root cause of the current Ijaw-Itsekiri crises and violent struggle to the creation of a new local government in Warri by the former military head of State, General Sani Abacha. Thus, it can be argued that "the legacy of the junta-era generals continues to inflict a steady toll on national unity."[1767]

According to the theory of identity and difference, it can be argued that the military, in this case, is responsible for the Warri Crisis in as far as such exercises involving the creation of local governments, as witnessed also in the case of Jos, denote another construction and redrawing of ethnic boundary lines between the Itsekiris, the Ijaw and the Urhobo in Warri. N. Ngboawaji gives the following account of this:

> On October 1, 1996, crises erupted following the creation of more local government councils and the location of headquarters of Warri South West Local Government. Since then, the state has known no peace, as several communities that had lived together in harmony for centuries are currently engaged in bloody hostilities.[1768]

The reason for the outbreaks of these conflicts, according to the instrumentalist approach, which is in line with the position of I. Zabadi, is attributable to pursuit of material and political resources:

> The Niger Delta crisis is a resource conflict, not a conflict between ethnic groups. Looking back, the creation of a Local Government Headquarters brought two ethnic groups, the Ijaws and the Itsekiris to fight each other. That matter however has been subsumed by the greater issues of the resources of the Niger Delta, especially oil, with the people there actually bringing up issues about their underdevelopment.[1769]

1766   For further reasons for the Warri crisis, see Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 1-29; Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 1-30; International Crisis Group, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. 1-34. Also the same position is aired in the numerous interviews carried out in Delta State between 2011 and 2012, some of which as follows: Interview with Major General (Rtd.) David A. Ejoor in Warri on 19/06/2012; Interview conducted with Famous Ofurogiri Anijobaye in Warri on 20/06/2012 in Warri; Interview with Isaac Dorsu in Warri on 18/06/2012. In the interview with Isaac O. Jemide in Warri on 13/01/2012; Interview with Judith B. Asuni in Lagos on 31/07/2011; Interview with Atare Otite in Abraka, Delta State, on 21/06/2012.
1767   International Crisis Group, 2006, "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment", op. cit., p. 1.
1768   See Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 100.
1769   Interview conducted with Istifanus S. Zabadi in Abuja on 8 August 2011.

From the above, according to the instrumentalist method, it can be argued that ethnicity is politicized by certain individuals or groups in order to stir up artificial conflicts while they pursue economic resources derived from oil. Consequently, the Itsekiri vs. Ijaw violent crisis can be understood to be a byproduct of this struggle for material resources and not primarily ethnicity. In spite of the fact that decades long ethnic acrimony has existed between these ethnic groups, nonetheless, these were conflicts devoid of violence.

Therefore, it can be argued that the connotation of these conflicts between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri in ethnic terms, involving the Urhobo,[1770] is constructed through the politicization of ethnicity, implying the arbitrary drawing of ethnic boundary lines by certain actors. Attempts will be made to identify who these actors are and examine how they politicize ethnicity in Warri in the next section.

5.6.2.1 The Genesis and Dynamics of the Current Itsekiri – Ijaw Ethnic Crisis

The main contested issue revolving around the Warri crisis focuses on the claim of ownership of Warri by the three different indigenous ethnic groups of the town, namely: the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Urhobo.

The focus of this section is to illustrate the reason(s) for the regular outbreak of the conflicts, primarily between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri, but the analysis will shed light on how and why the third ethnic group, the Urhobo, are either involved in or dragged into it.[1771] In accordance with the position of this research, it will be explained that ethnicity is not the cause of the current conflicts until it is politicized. Moreover, the analysis will demonstrate that the conflict is not merely about ethnicity or the presence of the three ethnic groups in Warri, but rather that the issue at stake is about the struggle for political, material and symbolic resources. The effect of the struggle that leads to "such cleavage, for instance, is the ferocious and recurring interethnic and intercommunity conflicts",[1772] which revolve around the resistance put up due to the concerns raised

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1770   C. Ifeka underscores the alliance between the Ijaw and the Urhobo in her work as she describes the Urhobo as the traditional allies of the Ijaw. See Ifeka, Caroline, 2000, op. cit., p. 119.

1771   In the interview with Judith B. Asuni, who is involved in the disarmament process in the Niger Delta region, she asserts that the aforementioned ethnic groups, namely the Urhobo, Ijaw and the Itsekiri are all involved in the Warri crisis. Furthermore, she states that Warri crisis is resource based, which implies that the whole claim about the ownership of Warri is largely on the control of resources. Views from the interview conducted with Judith B. Asuni in Lagos on 31 July 2011.

1772   See also Bagaji, S.Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 38

and fear nurtured by the minority ethnic group (Itsekiri) of potentially being overruled, outnumbered and marginalized by the larger ethnic groups of the Ijaw and the Urhobo.[1773] Despite the fact that innocent people from each of these warring ethnic groups are victims of the violent agitations, it is stated that the Itsekiri, as the smallest of all, are by far the main victims that suffer the most loss of lives and destruction of property at the hands of the Ijaw militia.[1774]

That being said, it is pertinent to explore the genesis of the Warri conflicts and, thereby, examine the demographic constellation of the three ethnic groups in Warri. Human Rights Watch illustrates it thus:

> Warri itself, the largest town (though not the capital) of Delta State, is claimed as their homeland by three ethnic groups: the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, and the Ijaw. The Itsekiri, a small ethnic group of a few hundred thousand people whose language is related to Yoruba (one of Nigeria's largest ethnic groups), also live in villages spread out along the Benin and Escravos Rivers into the mangrove forest riverine areas towards the Atlantic. The Urhobo, a much larger group numbering some millions related to the Edo-speaking people of Benin City, live in Warri town and to the north, on land. To the south and east, also in the swampy riverine areas, are members of the Western Ijaw, part of perhaps ten million-strong Ijaw ethnic group, the largest of the Niger Delta, spread out over several states.[1775]

The conflicts between the aforementioned ethnic minority groups in Warri cannot be understood as disputes occurring between the so-called strangers and indigenes such as in Jos. "Unlike most studies on ethnicity in Nigeria that have focused on relations between so-called 'natives' and 'strangers'"[1776], the Warri crises are to be conceptualized as conflicts among indigenous people and not between indigenes and non-indigenes/settlers.

This Warri crisis, as mentioned earlier, is in essence all about "three indigenous ethnic groups have been engaged in conflicts over ownership of lands, political representation, chieftaincies and socio-economic opportunities in both cases."[1777] As will become evident further in the course of the analysis, it can be seen that everything boils down to political discords involving the "institutionalization of politics of non-inclusion and construction of indigeneity and home-

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1773   See ibid., p. 38. For the sake of this research, the main focus of the violent crisis is between the Ijaw and the Itsekiris, hence the description of the conflicts as an Ijaw-Itsekiri crisis. Nonetheless, situations in which the Urhobo team up with the Ijaw against the Itsekiri will be highlighted during the analysis.

1774   Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 2.

1775   Citation from ibid., p. 3.

1776   Ukiho, Ukowa: "Between 'Senior Brother' and 'Overlord': Competing Versions of Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Conflict in Calabar and Warri, Nigeria", in: *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 21 (4), 2009, p. 495-506 (496).

1777   Ibid., p. 496.

land discourses […]."[1778] Bearing in mind that Warri is an important hub for the trafficking and proliferation of small arms and weapons within the Niger Delta region, the intensity at which such conflicts may be sought is not to be underestimated.[1779]

The conflicts, which I. Badmus describes as the display of ethnic nationalism and ethnic politics,[1780] can be traced back to the location and relocation of the headquarters of a local government in Warri, the South West Local Government Area. Initially, the headquarter of this local government was supposed to be situated in a territory dominated by the Ijaw, but it was moved afterwards to a new area dominated by the Itsekiri. The origin of the crisis is summarized below:

> Under the military, especially during the authoritarian rule of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, more Local Government Areas were created. In 1997, crisis erupted in Warri, a town in Delta state between ethnic Ijaw and the Itsekiri over the newly created Warri South Local Government Area. The Ijaw/Itsekiri ethnic clashes, rooted in the relocation of the headquarters of the newly created Warri South Local Government from Ogbe-Ijoh to Ogidigben, resulted in many deaths, displacement and property worth millions of naira destroyed.[1781]

Although the ownership dispute in Warri is not a new phenomenon as this can be traced as far back as 1952 and generating heated debates among the inhabiting ethnic groups, the current conflicts, especially since the 1990s, have been carried out in violent form.[1782] Going by the history of these conflicts surrounding the ownership of Warri, the following is stated:

> Both Ijaw and Urhobo see the current dispensation in the state, in which Itsekiri dominate government structures in the three Warri local government areas (LGAs), Warri North, Warri South, and Warri South West, as unfair. They complain that this dominance means that the Itsekiri and their traditional leader, the Olu of Warri (itself a contested title, having been changed in 1952 from the Olu of Itsekiri) benefit disproportionately from government resources—both at the level of government contracts and appointments, and, for example when it comes to obtaining 'certificates of origin' in order to obtain government bursaries for higher institutions.[1783]

Hence, having in mind the importance of certificates of indigeneity discussed earlier for the Jos conflict, one can understand the kind of exclusive politics the so-called indigenous ethnic minorities of Warri practice against one another, as U. Ukiho notes:

1778   Ibid., p. 495.
1779   Compare Duquet, Nils, 2009, op. cit., p. 177.
1780   For more information, see Badmus, A. Isiaka, 2010, op. cit., p. 323-363.
1781   Ibid., p. 228.
1782   See Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 4.
1783   Quote from ibid., p. 4. It is important to note too that Warri is a town/city in Delta State, and Delta was created by the Babangida military administration in 1991. See ibid., p. 3-4.

> The Itsekiri took advantage of their dominant position to impose the Itsekiri language as the Council's language of business, forcing the Ijaw and Urhobo to boycott its activities. With this boycott, the all-Itsekiri body is alleged to have influenced the location of social amenities in Itsekiri areas, non-issuance of local government certificates of origin to Ijaw and Urhobo [...].[1784]

For this reason, it is evident that the indigeneity clause is deployed in almost all parts of the country as an instrument of exclusion, used against the "other", the strangers. In this case, indigeneity is used among indigenous ethnic groups, implying a zero-sum game. Therefore, the issue of "homeland", as emphasized by I. Jemide, is understood within the context of the indigeneity clause in the constitution because, for him, this constitutes the only way by which the participation of ethnic minorities can be guaranteed:

> What is wrong with creating states on the basis of homeland? Don't tell me we should not practice ethnicity. It is pretence and sheer waste of time to say we should neglect ethnicity. Nigeria exists on the basis of ethnicity and every ethnic group should be recognized and given their due share.[1785]

Furthermore, I. Jemide, a retired lawyer and an important representative of the Itsekiri, emphasizes the fear of the Itsekiri from being outnumbered and marginalized by the numerical superiority of the Urhobo and Ijaw in Warri. He explains it in the interview thus:

> In Warri division, this homeland of the Itsekiri people, only the Itsekiri people can contest election into national assembly. If you want to contest election, go to your homeland. Don't use your majority to take position here.[1786]

The same view is presented in an interview with F. Anijobaye, an Ijaw by ethnic background, who holds a position similar to that of I. Jemide. When asked why there is acrimony between the Itsekiri and Ijaw despite the fact that they are known for living peacefully with each other, he considers politics to be the cause of the problems: "Politics as practiced here is a way of the dominant tribe trying to subdue the other tribe under it. So, therefore, the fear of being dominated is the cause of the crisis."[1787]

Furthermore, F. Anijobaye, a civil servant of Ijaw origin, believes that people take advantage of politics to emphasize their ethnicity for their own benefit:

1784   Ukiho, Ukowa: "From "Pirates" to "Militants": A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta", in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 106, No. 425, 2007, p. 587-610 (596-597).
1785   Interview with Isaac O. Jemide in Warri on 13/01/2012
1786   Ibid.
1787   Interview conducted with Famous Ofurogiri Anijobaye in Warri on 20/06/2012.

> Initially, ethnic acrimony was there but it was not as overblown as when politics was intro-
> duced. People take advantage of politics to construct who their friends are and who not, like
> saying, this is not our friend, if they are allowed, they will dominate and subdue us. Like other
> tribes now see the Itsekiri as people they can use, as paupers. So, they use power as a way of
> trying to dominate their environment thereby coming into conflict with their neighbours.[1788]

Having understood the game of numbers being played by the numerical superi-
ority of the Urhobo and the Ijaw, the Itsekiri made use of all the powers at their
disposal, using the links and contacts of the government to appropriate some
land that was not originally theirs. In spite of all the politics involved, the inter-
viewee laments that the issue behind the conflicts is about the ownership of land
because "some people feel that they have more oil, like the Itsekiris. So, the
Ijaws and the Itsekiri tend to fight over the ownership of those lands because of
oil. All community conflict was because of oil."[1789]

From an instrumentalist perspective, ethnicity is politicized through the at-
tempts made towards capturing political power in order to gain access to politi-
cal resources in the Warri case. Subsequently, exclusionist politics is applied in
order to seize and maintain political power to the detriments of other ethnic
groups. As is noted, the control of government structures implies having access
to benefits, especially extensive contacts with the oil companies operating in
Warri and the Niger Delta at large, a situation that gives way to the award of
valuable contracts.[1790] That is why A. Ikelegbe declares that "oil has in fact
transformed the face of Nigerian politics and the struggles for power"[1791] and,
furthermore, the following is elucidated:

> Oil has spawned a huge maze of patrimonial networks, clientelism and patronage based on pri-
> mordialism, identity and class. It has generated intense struggles by primordial, intra class and
> factional groups for power and resources and immense discontents, identity mobilization, con-
> flicts and instability.[1792]

It is understood that the original location of the headquarters of Warri South
West Local Government Area was in an Ijaw territory, so as to yield to the de-
mands of the Ijaw and the Urhobo for the creation of new local governments in
order to be represented.[1793] But, contrary to the expectation of the Ijaw, the an-
nouncement made about the location of the headquarters of the aforesaid local
government moved it to an Itsekiri area. This is stated thus:

1788   Ibid.
1789   Ibid.
1790   See Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 4.
1791   Ikelegbe, Augustine, 2006, op. cit., p. 31.
1792   Ibid., p. 31.
1793   See Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 4.

> An Ijaw expectation based on official statements that the local government headquarters would be in Ogbe-Ijoh, an Ijaw town, was disappointed when the location published in the federal government gazette turned out to be in Ogidigben, an Itsekiri area.[1794]

As reported, this arbitrary drawing of ethnic boundary lines, which enables the domination of political positions and, through that, access to economic resources by one ethnic group, the minority among all three, is arguably the immediate root of the ongoing crisis in which thousands of lives are lost.

Another development relating to the conflicts between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri dating back decades, but also involving the Urhobo, is the change of the name of the traditional title of the Itsekiri king, from Olu of Itsekiri to Olu of Warri, meaning the king of Warri.[1795] Consequently, accepting this new title is tantamount to accepting the Itsekiri as the owner of Warri, a situation that is being resisted and still contested in the courts of law until the present day by both the Urhobo and the Ijaw.[1796] The importance of this title for the Itsekiri, or any ethnic group known as the owner of Warri, is the remuneration which can be generated from the oil companies, as the following shows:

> [R]oyalties from multinational oil firms make the 'Oluship' stool lucrative as whoever is in charge can use the position to transfer development structures to his ethnic group at the expense of others, as the case would show when, the Olu of Warri influenced the LGA capital from Ogbe-Ijoh to Ogidigben which started the crisis.[1797]

Given the fact that the historical roots of these three ethnic groups will not be considered within the scope of the conflicts under investigation, which is limited to the beginning of the 1990s, one important factor to be mentioned is the disproval of the assumption that the aforementioned ethnic groups constitute separate entities based on linguistic and cultural differences.

Taking the example of the works presented to the writer of this research study by two prominent leaders interviewed during his fieldwork in Warri, it will be emphasized that ethnic group identity is not a fixed phenomenon and the lines of ethnic boundaries are blurred: on the one hand, representing the Urhobo, D. Ejoor with the work *The Origin of Urhobo Nation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* and I. Jemide, on the other hand, representing the Itsekiri with the work *Warri: A Focus on the Itsekiri.* In the works, insights are given, dating back centuries, about the origin and migration of all the ethnic groups involved in this

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1794   Citation from ibid., p. 4.
1795   Olu, in this context, simply means the title given to a king, which identifies the king of a particular area.
1796   Compare Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 99. Read more about the history of the old animosity which is believed to be a carry over into the ongoing crisis. See ibid., p. 86-112
1797   Quote from ibid., p. 100.

current conflict. It is important to note that both D. Ejoor and I. Jemide make references to intermarriages occurring between all the ethnic groups.[1798] Considering the history of the migration and the intermarriages that occurred between the aforementioned ethnic groups, it can be argued that ethnic groups do not possess fixed identities, but rather that identity swings.

Conflicts arise when politics is involved, so that ethnic boundary lines are drawn. According to the emphasis of I. Jemide and D. Ejoor that some Urhobos bear Itsekiri names and any Itsekiri without Urhobo blood is considered an outcast,[1799] it can be asserted that these groups are ethnically intertwined. Otherwise, D. Ejoor would not assert the following in his work:

> The Itsekiri people have lived with the Urhobo people in Warri and Oghara since the era of slave trade. They intermarry and share similar customs and culture. These two groups are only divided in politics but united in other aspects of life. They are like the proverbial head and hands. An Urhobo adage has it that 'the hands are not comfortable at sleep without the head'. The Urhobo people living in Oghara bear itsekiri names and so also the itsekiri people bear Urhobo names. They can best be described as the teeth and tongue, they quarrel, but are yet inseparable.[1800]

Therefore, ethnicity, arguably a malleable phenomenon, is politicized in order to gain access to resources in the politically charged Warri. That is why the contemporary conflict is described as a manipulation deliberately engineered by both the Delta State government and the Federal government:

> In particular, the Federal and Delta State Local Government Creation exercise caused severe infraction to the law by mishandling the location of Local Government headquarters which resulted in fuelling the inter-ethnic wars we have in Warri area of Delta State. Local Governments and their headquarters are not created by mere announcements, they must be recorded in official Federal government Gazettes.[1801]

J. Asuni, an expert on conflict management with a lot of experience on the Niger Delta conflict, believes that the military government uses the creation of local governments to extend its stay in power:

1798	See Ejoor, A. David, 2011, op. cit., p. 25. See also the book in which I. Jemide is a co-author, see Ayomike, S.O. Johnson, 2009, op. cit., p. xxxiii.
1799	See ibid.
1800	Ejoor, A. David, 2011, op. cit., p. 56-56. Also, the writer of this work was at Oghara and he was made to understand that both the Urhobo and Itsekiri are intermarried. An example cited was a former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori, whose parents are Urhobo and Itsekiri respectively.
1801	See Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 105.

> And you think to yourself that nobody could be stupid enough to create a local government and move its location several times. I think somewhere the military leaders were looking for reasons to continue in office, so they purposely created a conflict.[1802]

That is why I. Dorsu, an Itsekiri Youth Leader, believes that the crisis between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri has to do with political restructuring, a claim that is acknowledged during an interview with the author of this work:

> Mark it, none of the ethnic groups has the power to create Local Governments. It was during the military rule. So, for somebody to attribute the crisis to the creation of Local Government is very wrong. As a researcher, I challenge you to go and look for that gazette. The creation of Warri South West Local Government, with headquarters in Ogidigben, is still in the gazette, nothing has changed. But because we have our brother Ibori, who wants popularity at all cost, he used his own power to pronounce that he was moving the headquarters from Ogidigben to Ogbijo. That was what led to the serious crisis. But in the gazette, the pronouncements are still there. Those are federal matters, it is the prerogative of the federal government and not the state government.[1803]

Having the headquarters of South West LGA initially located within the Ijaw territories, namely: Gbaramotu, Ogbe-Ijoh and Diebiri, all without the inclusion of any Itsekiri region and the headquarters sited in Ogbe-Ijoh, the local government is comprised of ten electoral wards, which are mapped out with 150 registration centers exclusively for the Ijaw.[1804] But, with the 1996/1997 registration exercises for voters that year in all local governments in the entire federation, including Warri South West LGA, it is indicated that only Ijaw emerged as winners for both the chairmanship of the South West LGA and all the ten councilors of the conducted elections, sworn in by the former military administrator of Delta State, Col. J.D. Dungs (rtd.).[1805]

However, trouble started after a period of time as South West LGA headquarters was moved from the Ijaw territory, Ogbe-Ijoh, to an Itsekiri dominated area, Ogidigben. Not only that, three additional Itsekiri wards, known as Orere, Ugborodo and Madangho, formerly under another Warri local government, Warri North LGA, were included as part of Warri South West LGA, increasing the wards after redistricting to thirteen.[1806] Simply by this fresh drawing of borders, undue tension was mounted, but crisis was yet to erupt as the Ijaw realized and grew to depend on their numerical strength, having the highest

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1802   Interview conducted with Judith B. Asuni in Lagos, Nigeria, on 31 July 2011.
1803   Interview conducted in Warri with the Itsekiri Youth Leader, Isaac Dorsu, on 18 June 2012. James Ibori, as mentioned by I. Dorsu in the quotation, is a former Delta State governor who is currently serving prison terms in the United Kingdom for fraud and allegation of money laundering.
1804   See Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 100.
1805   See ibid.
1806   See ibid.

number of people in that local government and far outnumbering the Itsekiris.[1807] Thus, in 1998, with the commencement of another registration drive and accreditation of voters for the newly designed South West LGA, with 13 wards, the national electoral commission, known as NECON, announced the postponement of the registration for Warri South West LGA due to perceived tension in the so-called flash-point areas.[1808]

Under that local government, both the Ijaw's and Itsekiri's non-participation in voter registration is largely due to the Warri crisis. However, in the 1998/1999 local government elections and other elections, the electoral commission was alleged to have been responsible for the manipulation of elections, which have the Itsekiri returned as winners of all the elections conducted in South West LGA[1809] For example, Itsekiri emerge as the chairman, vice chairman, and councilors to administer Warri South West LGA in elections conducted without the use of legal voter's registration.

> It is an accepted criterion all over the world that the basis for the creation and delineation of electoral wards/registration unit/polling centers is population and land mass including perhaps public institutions of the area. It is an obvious fact that Ijaws of Gbaramatu, Ogbe-Ijoh, Isaba, and Diebiri kingdoms in Warri South West L.G.A. has [sic] a population well over that of the Itsekiris.[1810]

Furthermore, according to the figures from the National Population Commission of Nigeria, the Ijaws, in a 1991 census, carried over into 2001, have a population of 43,088 as compared with the Itsekiri number put at 25,196. In addition, "the landmass of the Ijaws in the LGA is more than 70% while that of the Itsekiri is less than 30%."[1811]

Therefore, by implication, viewing this as an injustice meted out to them, crisis sparked off as the Ijaw declared that "the majority is supposed to form the government; here the minorities are always heading the helms of affairs with the majority not represented."[1812] Although the crisis was mainly between the Ijaw

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1807   See ibid.
1808   See ibid.
1809   See ibid., p. 101. The reasons given by the Itsekiri for their unavailability to participate in the 1998 voter registration is that they were scattered as refugees in different places outside Delta State because of the Warri crises, a situation that arose due to the fact that all their towns and villages were already destroyed. See ibid., p. 101.
1810   Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 101.
1811   Ibid.
1812   Ibid. It is important to note that, currently, the headquarters of said local government has been transferred back to Ogbe-Ijoh, where it was originally situated. In spite of that, the crisis continues since the perceived injustice is yet to be rectified, as the following shows: "But the Itsekiris with a population of 25,196 have six electoral wards as against the Ijaws with a population of 43,088 with four wards. The average member [sic: number] of regis-

and the Itsekiri, however, the Urhobo, the supposedly traditional allies of the Ijaw, teamed up with the Ijaw and were subsequently dragged into the conflicts against the Itsekiri.

According to the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity by G. Schlee, one can see evidence of two ethnic groups against one, meaning the alliance of the Ijaw and Urhobo against the Itsekiri. Equally, such an alliance occurred between both groups in order to fight against the perceived injustice committed against them, matters relating to political marginalization and economic exclusion by the Itsekiri.

From the instrumentalist approach, whether politically, economically or symbolically, the conflict is about the struggle to acquire resources. Even the objection to the title of Olu of Warri raised by the Ijaw and Urhobo was to debar the Itsekiri, the minority ethnic group out of the three, from extending their rule and domination over the numerically larger ethnic groups of the Ijaw and Urhobo, a case which too revolves around ownership of and access to resources. Furthermore, going by the instrumentalist approach of F. Barth, the consequences of the current discord between the ethnic groups, ignited in 1997, were due to the arbitrary drawing of ethnic boundaries. One can argue that it is about the ethnic domination of Warri and the control of political power as well as the struggle over access to resources. Human Rights Watch captures this below:

> Violence has regularly erupted in the region since then, leading to clamp-downs by the authorities. In October 2008, a curfew was declared in Warri town by the new military administrator, Navy Walter Feghabor, after at least five people were shot dead in clashes between Ijaws and Itsekiris and a large number of houses set on fire. Violence nevertheless continued, in Warri town and in the surrounding creeks, with attacks on leaders of each community. Oil exports were reduced by several thousand barrels a day for several weeks.[1813]

Repeatedly, as reported, serious violence broke out continually and the fighting intensified in 1999 as the country's democracy was restored from a military to a civilian administration. With this, a new dynamic to the conflict set in: "in an around Warri, when new local government officials were due to be sworn in for the contested local government area created in 1997."[1814]

Although "in September 1999, the Delta State Assembly passed a bill moving the Warri South West local government headquarters from Ogidigben to Ogbe-Ijoh"[1815], intense fighting still continued in which hundreds of people

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tration unit/pooling centres for the Itsekiris is 26, while that of the Ijaws is 16. In terms of percentage of both ethnic groups in the LGA the Ijaws 63.1%, while the Itsekiris have 36.9%." Ibid., p. 101.

1813   See Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit., p. 5.
1814   Ibid.
1815   Ibid.

were killed, oil installations in the region were destroyed, and the production of oil disrupted.[1816]

On the question about the identity of these people representing the different ethnic groups involved in the Warri crisis and who the groups are that unleash violence on each other, J. Asuni believes that the Warri crisis, though based on long decades of ethnic rivalry, is intertwined, influenced and compounded by other factors, as she puts below:

> Here, three ethnic groups—the Urhobos, the Itsekiris, and the Ijaws—were already engaged in a deadly struggle for the right to win contracts, rent, and employment from the local oil companies. Rival ethnic groups armed and trained the militants and set them loose on their enemies. Often, money given in good faith by oil companies to local communities for development projects was spent on weapons for their quasi military forces instead, further escalating tensions.[1817]

By this, a new dimension to the Warri crisis can be deduced from above as oil companies are mentioned and dragged into the crisis. From the statement by J. Asuni, it is yet unclear whether multinational oil companies are involved in the Warri crisis or deliberately fueling it, however, it is emphasized by J. Asuni that the financial assistance given to local groups by the these oil companies for development projects is used to acquire weapons, which the militia of these ethnic groups use to carry out violence against each other.

As a result, it is important to identify the leaders of these ethnic groups who engage the multinational oil companies and are recipients of the financial aid. In order to find out if these oil companies were forcefully dragged into the conflict by other actors, thereby, qualifying them as important actors that politicize ethnicity or if they become inadvertently involved during the course of the Warri crisis, the following section will, among other things, attempt to ascertain who arms these militants and examine the origin and role of militancy within the framework of the Warri crisis.

5.6.2.2 Warri Crisis: The Origin of Militancy and Role of Militant Leaders

Having mentioned that the Warri crisis needs to be investigated within the purview of the Niger Delta armed struggle against the multinational oil companies

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1816   See ibid., p. 5. Also see Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 11.
1817   See ibid.

(MNOCs)[1818] and the Nigerian Federal Government, it will be argued in this section that, in spite of the agelong ethnic rivalry initially between the Urhobo and the Itsekiri on the ownership of Warri,[1819] the current violent crisis, mainly between Ijaw and Itsekiri, is compounded and hijacked by the ongoing operations of Niger Delta militants.

The Niger Delta, rich in oil and gas, is the backbone of Nigeria's economy. Crude oil, first discovered in large and commercial quantity in Nigeria's Niger Delta in 1956, gained its relevance through its exploration as from 1958.[1820] Due to this oil production, Niger Delta is often described as the honey land of the country as the region's oil production, especially since the 1970s, has been the mainstay of the national economy.[1821] However, for decades, the region has remained underdeveloped, neglected and left to its own mercy while its inhabitants suffer the consequences of oil exploration, environmental degradation, political and economic exclusion. N. Duquet states the situation as follows:

> The Nigerian oil industry, located primarily in the Niger Delta, generates an enourmous stream of revenues. Yet these revenues have not benefited the local population. Despite the promise of oil wealth, decades of oil production in the Niger Delta have left a legacy of socio-economic underdevelopment, a lack of basic infrastructure, environmental degradation, mounting ethno-communal tensions, and widespread corruption.[1822]

It is within the scope of this perceived injustice by the indigenes of the Niger Delta region, especially Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers States, that "these environmental damages and associated grievances represent a permanent source of discontent and mistrust on the part of the Niger Delta's population towards the government."[1823]

Similarly, from the perspective of N. Duquet, the marginalization of the people in the Niger Delta metamorphosed after a period of time to agony and

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1818 From now onward, the abbreviation "MNOCs", meaning multinational oil companies, will be applied in order to save space.

1819 Human Rights Watch indicates that the question over and dispute and rivalry on the ownership of Warri has its origin dating back to decades. See Human Rights Watch, "The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence", 2003, op. cit., p. 3.

1820 See Ekumaoko, C. Egwu, 2013, op. cit., p. 2.

1821 See ibid., p. 1. See also Bagaji, S.Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 34.

1822 Duquet, Nils, 2009, op. cit., p. 169. I. Badmus emphasizes on the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta region in the following manner:
"The environmental degradation and the destruction of the region can be attributed to bad oil production practices by the MNOCs. Gas and oil pipelines are badly laid above ground all over the Niger Delta's villages without constant maintenance by the oil companies. Most of the time, these pipelines explode while oil leaks into the soil and water interfering with local subsistence economies, sustainable livelihoods and causing environmental degradation as well as ecosystem decline." Badmus, A. Isiaka, 2010, op. cit., p. 335.

1823 Bagaji, S.Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 37.

anger with devastating consequences for the region, the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian government, as the following shows:

> Over time, non-violent protest by disenfranchised communities against oil company operations developed into a low-intensity intrastate conflict with a complex myriad of armed groups sabotaging the oil installations, fighting federal government security forces, and fighting each other for the control of oil revenues.[1824]

Nonetheless, the reaction of the government and the MNOCs, implying the response of the government and these multinational oil companies to the grievances underlying these conflicts, included military repression, suppression, subjugation, mishandling of the whole situation, dehumanizing and maltreatment of the demonstrators, as they were referred to as "militants".[1825] Furthermore, one can see that the reaction of the federal government and the MNOCs shows clearly that the issue was a security crisis, and not as one of underdevelopment and marginalization.[1826] In view of this, E. Ekumaoko stresses the following:

> This explains the reason why the state has often used military confrontation against the poor and innocent people of the region. It equally offers reason why the state has restricted her attention to issues like; communal activities against oil companies, militant activities, murder of the state security personnel, destruction of oil facilities, hostage taking and murder of oil workers among others. This further explains why the Nigerian state has christened these people 'vandals', 'criminals', 'saboteurs', 'murders', 'miscreants', 'militants'.[1827]

In view of this, one can argue from the above that at its root the conflict is about protest against marginalization, repression and environmental degradation. Contrary to the perception of the situation by the Niger Delta people, the federal government, in cooperation with the MNOCs, constructs an image of the demonstrators as the enemy, a reason why the people are labelled as saboteurs and criminals.

According to both the F. Barth's instrumentalist approach and the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity by G. Schlee, one can argue, on the one hand, that a dichotomization of "us" the good, which implies the authority of a legitimized government, and, on the other hand, the characterization of the illegal "other", also meaning, the construction of image of the demonstrators as the enemy is performed here.

Furthermore, the characterization of the illegal "other" allows the repression of the Niger Deltan people to be carried out by the federal government, a situa-

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1824   Duquet, Nils, 2009, op. cit., p. 169.
1825   See Ekumaoko, C. Egwu, 2013, op. cit., p. 3.
1826   See Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 86-112.
1827   Ekumaoko, C. Egwu, 2013, op. cit., p. 3.

tion that further jeopardizes peace and polarizes the region. According to
J. Asuni, the situation in the Niger Delta can be described thus:

> While ethnic cleavages are intense in the Niger Delta, its inhabitants are united by a sense of
> grievance about the exploitation and neglect of their region. The federal government virtually
> ignored the Niger Delta during the 1990s, leaving development in the hands of the oil com-
> panies in an era when corporate social responsibility meant little. The federal government in
> 1979 established the oil deposits as a national asset, taking away any local ownership or con-
> trol.[1828]

That being said, according to the decision theory of identity and difference by
G. Schlee, there are series of nesting dichotomies possible when it comes to
identity formations with respect to "who with whom against whom" in a conflict
situation.

On this basis, in spite of the ethnic differences existent in the Niger Delta,
the people of the region are able to unite, identify and fight the common ene-
mies, which they perceive as the federal government and the MNOCs. This
gives credence to G. Schlee's theory again that whenever people change their
identity for some reason or the other, actors replace categories to fit their own
needs.[1829]

Hereby, it becomes evident again that ethnicity is not the cause of conflicts
as far as these diverse ethnic groups can unite, mobilize and rally round one an-
other, using a common slogan as ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta for a com-
mon cause: Resisting and fighting their maltreatment at the hands of the federal
government controlled by the ethnic majority in Nigeria and the environmental
pollution caused by the MNOCs. That is why N. Ngboawaji states that "there-
fore, state violence or repression in alliance with oil companies against ethnic
groups of the state has been a distinguishing mark of the intervention of the state
in conflicts in Delta State."[1830]

Furthermore, as the process of politicized ethnicity transforms and aggra-
vates the situation into militarized antagonism, the initial peaceful protests once
led by an environmental activist, the late Ken Saro Wiwa, who was the founder

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1828   Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit.,
        p. 6. The author cites how the oil industry causes considerable environmental degradation
        through the exploration of crude oil in the region without commensurate benefits to the
        inhabitants of the region: "For decades, moreover, the oil industry exploited the area and in
        the process polluted the riverine environment, wiping out the traditional livelihoods of fish-
        ing and farming, but providing few jobs in return." Quote in ibid., p. 6.
1829   It can be understood that in such a situation, the ethnic minorities of the Itsekiri, Urhobo
        and Ijaw are set to join forces to fight the common enemy as they see themselves as mi-
        norities of the Niger Delta fighting against injustice perpetrated in their region by other eth-
        nic groups from outside the region.
1830   Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 107.

of the nonviolent Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990 and leader of the campaign against the environmental hazards caused by the multinational oil companies and the neglect of the region by the federal government at the beginning of 1990s,[1831] exposed the nature of environmental destruction and plight of the people who bear the brunt of the environmental devastation to the outside world.[1832] So, "the Delta Region, rich in oil, remains rich in resentment."[1833] Threatened by these campaigns targeted against the federal government and MNOCs, the former military head of state and dictator, General Sani Abacha, in collaboration with the MNOCs, directed to have Ken Saro Wiwa, including eight of his collaborators, to be arrested and executed in 1995.[1834]

Consequently, following the execution which caused both local and international outrage, and witnessing this violent reaction of the Nigerian government, the protests took on a different dimension and the once-peaceful demonstrations descended into violence. As reported by many writers, the number of militants at a time in the region was between 26,000 and 50,000.[1835] With the beginning of these violent protests, it is important to point out that the Ijaw ethnic group, being at the forefront of these armed groups opposing the federal government and the MNOCs, confronted and attacked the Itsekiri.[1836] The reason for this is not hard to understand because armed militancy in the Niger Delta region, with Warri as the second most important oil city and coupled with the ongoing agitations over the ownership issue between the Ijaws/Urhobo and Itsekiri,[1837] J. Asuni highlights that the aggrieved ethnic group of the Ijaw, at the forefront of the armed struggle, changed the course of the fight in Warri and redirected it against the Itsekiri:

1831   See Murphy, N. Martin, 2013, op. cit., p. 429. See Badmus, A. Isiaka, 2010, op. cit., p. 339. Check Ifeka, Caroline, 2000, op. cit., p. 118.

1832   A. Bagaji et al. explain that the Nigeria Delta region still experiences militarized conflicts and demands for autonomy. See Bagaji, S.Y. Ali et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 35.

1833   See also Murphy, N. Martin, 2013, op. cit., p. 426.

1834   Compare Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 5. See also Murphy, N. Martin, 2013, op. cit.

1835   See ibid., p. 430.

1836   See Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 17.

1837   See Ngboawaji, D. Nte, 2010, op. cit., p. 99.

> At that time, the Ijaws perceived that the Itsekiris were the main beneficiaries of government and oil company employment and contracts, having taken advantage of their favored status during the colonial era.[1838]

F. Anijobaye, from another point of view, purports that militancy in Warri and in the Niger Delta generally is caused by agitation for resource control and the indifference of the MNOCs to the (infra)structural underdevelopment of the area: "In fact, the multinationals should be held responsible for this not the federal government and if the multinationals have been playing their roles, militancy would not have been like that."[1839]

In a position that cannot be independently fact-checked by the writer of this thesis, the interviewee, F. Anijobaye, stated that the Ijaw/Itsekiri crisis enables militancy to take place in the region. He presents his position below:

> When the crisis is somewhere and there is importation of arms at the end of the crisis, where do you think those arms will go? So, there are now arms free for use everywhere and add this to other dimension, I will say the crisis gave rise to militancy.[1840]

Along the same line, in an interview with the Secretary of the Itsekiri National Youth Foundation, I. Dorsu presents the same view as he believes that the genesis of the Ijaw/Itsekiri crisis, though based on mere suspicion, can be seen as the root of militancy:

> We [Itsekiri] refused to call ourselves militants till date. Do not forget that the Niger Delta crisis emanated from suspicion against the Itsekiris and because the Urhobos, as a tribe, have always suspected the Itsekiris, it moved on from suspicion to full blown crisis for which the Itsekiris had to acquire arms.
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> [...] This is because the politicians were actually behind these boys, politicians from the Ijaw and Urhobo ethnic groups. They acquired arms and gave them [to the youths] in order to achieve their political aims, which then led to the real gun battle. We the Itsekiris on discovery had to acquire arms as well. When the Amnesty program came, the oil companies resumed, started bringing in their expatriates. Of course, the arms were not fully surrendered. So they migrated from the Ijaw/Itsekiri ethnic problems. As they noticed the presence of the expatriates and multinational oil workers in the creeks, they started kidnapping for ransom. The phase of the conflicts had changed from the ethnic crisis to kidnapping when they noticed the resumption of oil activities by the oil companies. They made more money and acquired more dangerous arms.[1841]

In confirmation of his argument, the following is stated in his criticism of the MNOCs:

1838   Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 17.
1839   Interview conducted with Famous Ofurogiri Anijobaye in Warri on 20/06/2012 in Warri.
1840   Ibid.
1841   Interview conducted in Warri with the Itsekiri Youth Leader, Isaac Dorsu, on 18/06/2012.

> These multinationals have taken advantage of us because they have some agents among us, whom they are either paying or are satisfied with. Who in Nigeria knows the exact quantum of oil that is exported by Chevron or Shell? Nobody, not even the government, I am saying these multinationals, apart from paying taxes, should take their corporate social responsibility serious [sic]. But, I do not know if in the course of your research you will find time to go into the creeks so that you now match what you see from the site of these multinational companies to the villages around where you have these multinational oil companies. In fact, you will cry.[1842]

J. Asuni concurs that the environmental pollution is a serious matter as a result of the occurrence of open flaring of gas and oil spillages, however, the worst part of the industry is that companies try to "play a fast one" on the inhabitants of the region by getting some community leaders to cooperate with them.[1843] The position of A. Otite is no different from that of J. Asuni stated an interview:

> I think the multinational corporations in the oil-producing communities are not being fair too. You hear of divide and rule policy that they try to bring to place. Sometimes you feel it is cheaper to get one or two persons to be satisfied than to satisfy the whole community.[1844]

However, on the origins of the armed militancy in the Niger Delta, J. Asuni posits that no clear boundary exists between the current Warri crisis and militancy because of the manner in which groups form alliances and dissolve alliances at will. Equally, the aims of some of these militant groups are not clearly defined as some of them swing their allegiances, form new groups with new demands.[1845] The swinging of identity among the groups indicates that the original peaceful protests set out by Ken Saro Wiwa and his colleagues have already been hijacked by certain actors, some of which are politicians, soldiers and leaders of militant groups in the Niger Delta,[1846] in order to pursue personal goals. Her position is stated thus:

1842   Ibid.
1843   Interview with Judith B. Asuni in Lagos on 31 July 2011.
1844   Interview with Atare Otite in Abraka, Delta State, on 21 June 2012.
1845   Compare Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit.
1846   In her view, the origin of armed militancy can be traced back to different factors, especially in the 1990s, ranging from peaceful protests to violent demonstrations against the government, from which gangs and politicians, most of them former members of the confraternities in higher institutions of learning in the Niger Delta region, commonly known as a cult, hired these cult group members as political thugs, sponsored and armed them with dangerous weapons to neutralize political opponents. From there on, with these weapons still within the reach of these thugs after political elections, these youths deviated and joined different militant groups, thereby venturing into drug dealings in order to attain resources and sustain themselves financially. As the drug trade stopped being lucrative, they moved into other illicit activities such as oil bunkering, kidnapping and subsequently staging attacks on oil installations and facilities of MNOCs. See Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 8-10. In addition, the following is explained by J. Asuni:

> Armed groups originally set up to fight interethnic wars often ended up working for criminals. Some provided security for oil bunkering gangs, while others operated as mercenaries, carrying out acts of political violence for well-connected officials. For example, the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Delta State saw ethnic armed groups intervene in a contest between Itsekiri and Urhobo candidates, while armed Ijaw groups crossed state boundaries to partake in political violence in Bayelsa State.[1847]

Furthermore, she maintains that, at times, ethnic unrest is artificially created by criminals operating in the region, for example in Warri, in order to carry out their illegal activities:

> Sometimes the interethnic warfare provided a convenient cover for illicit activities. Bunkerers established armed groups to stir up ethnic discord, creating an atmosphere of chaos that diverted attention from their operations.[1848]

In order to clarify how these militants acquire arms, J. Asuni posits that "the arms came in exchange for the oil."[1849]

From D. Ejoor's point of view, "militancy from the Niger Delta was purely caused by the Federal Government [because] they were stealing the oil and the boys wanted their products to be in their own home."[1850] On the question about whether the problems of deprivation and neglect as well as environmental devastation cannot be solved politically instead of taking up arms, he responded thus: "What would you ask the boys to do? What can they do? Are they politicians? You are coming to my home to take my property."[1851]

Regarding the criticism directed against the oil companies for not taking their corporate social responsibility seriously and mitigating the hazards caused by gas flaring and oil spillages experienced by the inhabitants of the region, D. Ejoor opines that "[MNOCs] are here for business, looking for their money. What have they got to do with the building of Nigeria?"[1852] Furthermore, it is the inability of the government to diversify the monotonous Nigerian economy that causes disaffection and violent conflicts in the region.[1853] On the question

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"The heavy militarization of the Delta combined with corrupt soldiers' attempts to muscle in on armed groups' criminal activities has thus encouraged the militants to embark on a recruiting drive and expand their arsenal. Both sides in the conflict feed off each other, adding further to the instability. Caught in the crossfire are the communities of the Niger Delta, which find themselves terrorized from both sides." Ibid. p. 14.

1847   Ibid.
1848   Ibid.
1849   Interview with Judith B. Asuni in Lagos on 31 July 2011.
1850   Interview with Major General (Rtd.) David A. Ejoor in Warri on 19/06/2012.
1851   Ibid.
1852   Ibid.
1853   See ibid.

whether MNOCs contribute to the aggravation of ethnic politics, with respect to the Warri crisis, I. Jemide is of the following opinion:

> Yes, to a limited degree. Sometimes they take decision that creates ethnic misunderstanding without doing their own work properly sometimes. They will create the impression that a piece of land belongs to A when it doesn't really belong to A. And that creates crisis. Sometimes militancy encourages illegitimate competition. They oppress with militancy and we say if that's what you want we give you on our own too. Sometimes, they now bring conflict between people they have wrongly recognized and the true owners. Sometimes the issues go to court or become real armed conflict. But if you understand that these people [MNOCs] are not here free of charge, they are here for business.[1854]

According to this position, the federal government is to be held responsible for the problem of militancy and attitude of the MNOCs to the environmental problem in the region because of corrupt practices:

> The Federal Government is not holding the oil companies firmly to be accountable because of corruption and 'I don't care attitude'. The people who are sharing the money from this oil region don't feel the impact of the oil. Some people in Abuja don't know how this area is like. So when you talk about oil spillage, they don't understand. Let it be business as usual. There is no system in place which ensures accountability on this issue of oil spillage. There must be some punishment and fast reaction by the Federal Government. FG should have an effective system where they can come and say 'Shell, hold it'. There must be the law that imposes heavy fine for spillages, as they are trying to do for flaring of gas. Mainly, I hold the Federal Government responsible because they are not living up to their responsibility.[1855]

I. Dorsu agrees with I. Jemide's position as he asserts that "in terms of minimizing these crises, policies must be put in place to regulate the relationship between the multinationals and their host communities."[1856]

In consideration of the analysis on the Warri crisis and its influence as well as the genesis of militancy in the Niger Delta, J. Asuni suggests that, on the one hand, the existence of ethnic tension allows for intense competition for jobs and

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1854   However, I. Jemide believes that the oil companies are not in any way at the root of the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta, which he explains thus:
        "No, no, no, the truth is they don't have that obligation. In pure law, they come, acquire a piece of land, they pay surface right as your law demands. Before they operate you give them a licence by the federal government. And remember today that the federal government gets a higher percentage of what they produce as they are in partnership. So, the oil companies say: What do you want from us? We pay government and tax. What would we give our sharehold? We are not here for charity. They say that they don't have money to spend as they have paid the government." Interview with Isaac O. Jemide in Warri on 13/01/2012.

1855   Ibid.

1856   Interview conducted in Warri with Isaac Dorsu on 18 June 2012.

other social benefits from the oil industry to thrive.[1857] But, on the other hand, such an environment creates room for the following:

> But they also created fertile ground for ambitious activists, criminals, and corrupt politicians to exploit these tensions for their own purposes leading to the formation of present day armed militia and the proliferation of criminal activities associated with the oil industry that has sustained them.[1858]

With this development, it can be argued that the Warri ethnic unrest enables a new dynamic and a deviation from the initial struggle for the emancipation of the region to take place:

> Many of the divisions in Delta were along ethnic lines, and the state's armed groups emerged out of these rivalries. In the 1990s, the most important group originated from the Ijaw community, where youth leaders formed the Federation of Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC). The FNDIC spoke of Ijaw self-determination in the Warri region and declared the oil companies and federal government its enemies.[1859]

However, it is admitted that many of the current militant groups, contrary to the claim of fighting for the liberation of the region, were mainly established in order to carry out illegal oil activities, which extends to oil smuggling, known as bunkering, and illegal arms trade among other things, as J. Asuni notes:

> […] the armed groups of the Niger Delta began to search out new sources of illicit gain. Given its local abundance, petroleum was an obvious attraction. Gangs began stealing crude oil by either hacking into the pipeline directly or by tapping the wellhead, removing the structure at the top (called the Christmas tree), and attaching a hose to siphon off the oil. From there, the oil was placed on small barges and taken out to sea, where it was loaded onto large ships lurking out of sight of the authorities. In return for their oil, the bunkerers would receive money and weapons. The scale of this illicit trade was enormous. From an early stage, senior military and political figures took a lead role in bunkering, and a highly sophisticated international trade developed, often coordinated by foreigners, particularly from Lebanon and Russia. A carefully structured system of bribes ensured that officials and community leaders at all levels of the operation allowed the oil to pass by undisturbed. While the evidence suggests that oil workers were initially enlisted to help with bunkering, it did not take long for the armed groups to gain the technical expertise necessary in order to take the entire process in-house.[1860]

Hence, one can argue, according to the instrumentalist approach, that ethnicity is politicized in order for certain actors such as the leaders of militant groups, e.g. FNDIC, to engage in illegal oil bunkering and other illicit activities concerning arms smuggle and sales. In this sense, it can be asserted that ethnic conflicts in Warri, often artificially manipulated, erupt as a result of politicized eth-

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1857   See Asuni, B. Judith, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta", 2009, op. cit., p. 11.
1858   Quote from ibid., p. 11.
1859   Ibid., p. 16-17.
1860   Ibid., p. 10.

nicity through the handiwork of politicians and militant groups in the town and its environs so as to divert attention from the ongoing illicit activities.

At the same time, the Ijaw/Itsekiri crisis is not about ethnic differences *per se*, generally speaking conflicts break out whenever these ethnic groups compete over certain contested resources such as royalties and other financial gains from the oil companies, jobs opportunities and land matters. Apart from the politicians that hire the militants for the purpose of eliminating political opponents during elections, it can be seen that multinational oil companies apply the politics of "divide and rule" to continue their business activities, thereby, putting the ethnic groups, including the youths and the traditional leaders, to be at loggerheads, polarizing the Warri crisis as an instrument of politicization along ethnic lines.[1861] Hereby, one can discern that the MNOCs politicize ethnicity directly and the environmental pollution caused by oil spillages and gas flaring allows militancy to flourish, therefore, they can also be held indirectly responsible for the crisis.

In view of the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, it can be argued that a wide range of actors are involved in the illegal activities taking place in Warri and the Niger Delta region. From the above, it is revealed that politicians, military men, foreign criminals from Russia and Lebanon, community and traditional leaders, officials from the government, militant leaders, oil workers and, occasionally, the involvement of multinational oil companies allow smuggling and oil bunkering to thrive, a situation that contributes to and adversely affects the Warri crisis.

1861   See Ifeka, Caroline, 2000, op. cit., p. 115-123.

6. General Conclusion

This dissertation, based on both the theoretical and the empirical sections, consisting of various sections and several subsections, explored two types of conflict in Nigeria to investigate the position taken that ethnicity does not lead to conflicts, unless politicized. Having discussed this basis of argumentation in most of the chapters in the dissertation, this conclusion will proceed with the argument used in the research study that conflicts are not the result of mere display of ethnicity. Rather, it will be maintained that conflicts occur only when ethnic differences are politicized by certain individuals and actors.

With the research study designed to treat the problems identified at the outset, placing a focus on the investigation of the assumption or statement that ethnicity is the cause of conflicts in Nigeria, the hypothesis of the study is explored empirically, based on a qualitative analysis, to carry out a comparative inquiry into the Jos conflicts and the Warri crisis as the case study of this dissertation. The introduction presented a brief overview of the Nigerian situation and the dissertation's research questions as well as the significance and the methodology of the research study. As part of the research questions explored to carry out the investigation, emphases were placed on whether ethnicity is synonymous with conflict, or if the politicization of ethnicity leads to conflicts, how and for what reason is ethnicity politicized and who is behind the politicization of ethnicity.

Reflecting on the research questions, the second chapter focused on the clarification of ethnicity, as a concept, with respect to the etymological understanding and the scientific notion of the word. According to the analysis carried out, it was revealed that the general usage of the term "ethnicity" differs from its etymological understanding. Similarly, it is found that the etymological notion of ethnicity distinguishes it from its scientific conceptualization in the contemporary social sciences. While the general usage of ethnicity equates it with conflicts, the etymological development of the term "ethnicity" associates it with a much older term known as "ethnic", meaning "others", "those who are not 'us'." Most important is the dichotomization between a non-ethnic 'us' and ethnic 'others' which continues to be embedded in the concept of *ethnicity* up until

now. In spite of this dichotomization, it is explained in the dissertation that ethnicity, contrary to its association with conflicts, describes peoples within a particular society that distinguish and dissociate themselves from one another based on the objective perception of linguistic, religious, cultural and other differences in as far as the phenomenon of ethnicity swings.

That being said, the phenomenon of *ethnicity* was introduced as a field of study in the social science to investigate the high rate of conflicts relating to the resuscitation of ethnic identities in the former colonies. It is within the scope of this that ethnicity is conceptualized as the process of determining ethnic boundaries and distinction in the form of "self" and specific ascription of "other" traditions as foreign. The analysis illustrates that the composition and concentration of numerous ethnic groups with diverse traditions in a given society may engender discontentment and unrests in the case of any existence of imbalance or asymmetric disorganization among the ethnic groups as a result of economic exploitation and political repression.

In spite of this, it became evident in the research that a wider expansion of the concept of ethnicity extends its meaning to encompass everyone, all ethnic groups in a society or nation. Besides, having described ethnicity as a social construct, other concepts such as 'identity', 'ethnic groups', 'ethnocentrism', 'race', 'nation' and 'tribalism' are also social constructs which are all conditioned to politicization, a situation that can induce conflicts.

Still in chapter two, a similar analysis of the concept 'politicization' is conducted in order to explain what this means for conflict situations. On this note, it is highlighted in the work that the term 'politicization' cannot be conceptualized without an initial clarification of the concept 'politics'. In addition, the study shows that in order to understand politicization within the framework of the term 'politics', certain key terms such as 'power', 'rhetoric', 'pluralism' need to be investigated and depicted. In the long run, the study describes politicization as aimed at the control of state authority, the control of a particular geographical territory or a process whenever certain individuals strive to acquire political power or are involved in activities that influence political decisions.

While the research attempted to explore the etymological background of the concept 'politicization', the term 'politics' is conceived as the legitimate organ authorized in a political system to take charge of the distribution or allocation of values within a society. Moreover, in order for politics to be effective, power plays an important role therein. Identifying the phenomenon of power within the concept of politics, it is shown that power constitutes the means to control others. Hence, politics is not viable without power in as far as politics revolves

around power, its attainment, maintenance, distribution and loss. That being said, the process of politicization is operationalized in an ethnic pluralistic society and, as the study indicates, this can generate conflicts whenever many interests groups or ethnic groups struggle to attain political power. Furthermore, politicization, irrespective of its depiction as having features which are related to the control of power, is part of a political act involving dissonance, resistance, conflict and struggle, all of which are characteristics of politics.

Furthermore, a synthesis of both concepts 'politicization' and 'ethnicity' was conducted in order to test the hypothesis of this investigation. Based on the conceptualization of the phenomenon of the politicization of ethnicity, it was found that ethnicity is deployed as a political resource in relation to socio-political developments, specifically used as a means of mobilization to fight for political power and exploited in the struggle for power distribution. In summary, ethnicity is politicized whenever certain individuals or groups feel insecure, particularly during periods of social instability they seek for self-assurance, identity and self-assertion to maintain their position by distinguishing themselves from others, a way to maintain a boundary in order to ward off potential or real competitors and rivals.

In spite of this development, it is not discernible in the work that struggles for power distribution and mobilization for power struggle are akin to conflicts. Nevertheless, the politicization of ethnicity is observed as a means by which certain individuals or ethnic leaders may highlight and exploit ethnic distinctions in specific situations to achieve their goals, the reason why the politicization of ethnicity is viewed as a zero-sum game situation.

Accordingly, the politicization of ethnicity, if uncontrolled, may lead to the outbreak of conflicts. As belonging to the actors who politicize ethnicity, politicians, scholars, ethnic and religious leaders as well as multinational corporations are identified. With respect to multinational corporations, they are implicated in the process of politicized ethnicity as they are involved in what is termed "political interplay" with the governments of the countries in which they operate. Seeking for participation in their respective host countries, they become potential threats to the legitimacy and sovereignty of the states where they are operating as they strive to influence the policies of those states to their favor, thereby, become indirectly engaged in a power struggle.

In view of this, the research showed that both concepts 'politicization' and 'ethnicity' are so intertwined that whenever ethnic conflict erupts, it is mostly associated with politics. As part of the instruments used to politicize ethnicity, the study points to differences perceived through factors like language, culture

and religion, especially the usage of the three monotheistic religions of the world, namely Islam, Christianity and Judaism, for manipulative purposes.

In addition, the functions which are fulfilled whenever ethnicity is politicized are as follows: Claim of political resources; Claim of economic resources; Demand for social resources; Right to psychological resources.

With respect to the theoretical background of this work, the third chapter concentrates on two theoretical perspectives of ethnicity to carry out the investigation with regard to questions such as why and how ethnicity is politicized. Based on these two theoretical models, the research deployed the instrumentalist approach of ethnicity by F. Barth and the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity by G. Schlee in a complementary manner to examine and explain the politicization of ethnicity.

On the one hand, the first theory, the instrumentalist approach, highlights the importance of politicized ethnicity in that the term 'ethnicity' is conceived as a social construct which is deployed in certain periods, meaning it is situational or circumstantial, when certain individuals strive for and pursue specific goals, usually towards the attainment of symbolic, economic and political resources. In all of this, the instrumentalist approach attempts to underscore the argument that the lines of ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but rather vary and are modifiable to the interests at stake, and are thereby drawn arbitrarily.

The instrumentalist approach, having been introduced to displace the initial dominant theory of ethnicity, the primordial approach until the early 1960s, was unable either to replace or to eradicate primordialism in its entirety. The reason being that instrumentalism relies on certain primordial features, referred to as *stopgap*, such as language, culture, religion, kinship etc., which certain actors/ individuals highlight and deploy as objective differential traits between and among ethnic groups to politicize ethnicity.

The research study introduces other terms which are synonymous with instrumentalism and operate in a similar way. Such terms are situationalism, mobilizationism, constructivism and circumstantialism. What all these concepts have in common with instrumentalism, as a theoretical direction within the study of ethnicity, is that they all rest on the belief that ethnicity is a rational response to social, political and economic instability, situations which enable the deployment of ethnicity to be perceived as a social construct. With the roles that ethnic identity and ethnic groups play when conceptualizing ethnicity, investigations show that the concept of ethnicity is not a fixed phenomenon, but rather that it swings and is changeable. Therefore, it is vulnerable and can be manipulated for political purposes.

On this basis, ethnicity depicts the dichotomy of a non-ethnic 'us' and ethnic 'others' in as far as identity, which replicates the notion of self, is embedded in the concept of ethnic groups and, as a result, conditions the exclusion of others. More importantly, the investigation found out that individuals maintain multiple identities during the process of identification, a behavior known as an ethnic game played out in specific social relations, which are commonly found in contemporary multi-ethnic societies.

On the other hand, the second theoretical approach applied in this research work, which is the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, was adjoined to play a complementary role to the instrumentalist approach as it is significant for the identification of the actors that politicize ethnicity in conflict situations. This method maintains the position that actors behave rationally when striving towards the attainment and in pursuit of specific goals.

That being said, the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity accentuates how enemies are created, an action that uses ethnicity as a constant and recurrent factor which, over time, may generate conflicts. It was suggested in the analysis that the construction of an image of the enemy denotes the manipulation of ethnicity by individuals or actors through the politics of inclusion and exclusion to gain access to material and political resources. With regard to this, actions by actors are based on cost-benefit calculations. By and large, decision theory was employed to serve a complementary role in order to identify individuals that politicize and the manner in which they politicize ethnicity, meaning how these actors construct an image of the enemy by the following means: "Who with whom forms an alliance against whom?"

In doing so, attempts were made to emphasize that the identities of actors swing during conflict situations, a phenomenon referred to as 'switching', which is not primarily about the resources at stake, but rather places the focus on the individuals involved in the process of politicized ethnicity. In order to understand why groups form alliances and dissolve alliances at will and which diverse types of identification are given priority when pertaining to 'who takes whose sides in a conflict', three specific criteria frequently applied in political situations for identity constructions are stated, namely: "Social structures and their cognitive representation, the politics of inclusion and exclusion and the economics of groups size and social position."

With the beginning of the fourth chapter, the empirical part of the research work commenced, placing its focus on the outbreak of conflicts in Africa, with particular emphasis on the ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. Having conducted research on the reasons for the eruption of conflicts, this thesis deemed it impor-

tant to define and explain the term 'conflict' as well as to outline and carry out certain analyses on the different types of conflicts.

Based on the conceptualization of conflict, it is pointed out that the definition of conflict is a difficult task in so far as there are different grades of conflict which cannot easily be distinguished from the perspective of conflict-free zones. Nonetheless, conflict is understood to be a situation of competition between two or more parties that are aware of and possess incompatible wishes. With respect to the importance of "wishes" and "awareness" when referring to the notion of conflict, other terms such as competition, contests, disputes, tensions and clashes are often alternatively applied to conflict situations as they are paramount when examining the concept of conflict.

Equally, it was emphasized that for any occurrence of conflict, there tend to be contact and visibility of difference. On this basis, fights, games and debates are conceived as basic forms of the phenomenon 'conflict'. Furthermore, attempts were made to distinguish between *potential* and *actual* conflicts in order to depict certain degrees of conflict scenarios. This may begin as a disagreement and progress to a critical state of tension as a result of incompatible wishes between two or more parties.

Thereby, regarding the dichotomization of ethnicity into an ethnic "us" and ethnic "others", it was observed that the difference between "self" and "other" and between "in-group" and "out-group" constitutes a necessary factor, but it is not a sufficient condition for conflict. In short, it is noted that the term 'conflict' reveals a more aggressive and exterminatory character. In consideration of the analysis as a whole, it was asserted that what constitutes a conflict and distinguishes the line of a conflict zone from a non-conflict zone is blurred as this is only measurable on a continuum based on its intensity and resources deployed which, in relation to the purpose, become decisive for the outbreak of conflicts.

In addition, the work places emphasis on a particular kind of conflict, one characterized by its prolonged nature and extensive use of violence, a phenomenon referred to as a deep-rooted or protracted conflict. Furthermore, the diverse types of conflicts described and examined were primarily classified into three distinct categories: 1) international, 2) regional, 3) national conflicts. In view of the relevance and the category of conflicts involved in this analysis, this research study concentrates on conflicts that fall within the scope of the second and third categories. While the second category was classified as conflicts that possess political, ideological, ethnic, religious and economic backgrounds, the third category contains the types of conflicts which occur as a result of racial discrimination, military coups or as a consequence of a charged atmosphere and

tension. Furthermore, the focus of the dissertation was placed on four certain types of conflicts, namely: political, social, ethnic, and environmental conflicts.

That having being said, still in chapter 4, five variables were examined and tested in the context of literature reviews with respect to the current state of research on the reasons for the outbreaks of conflicts, with particular emphasis on ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. Based on the works and perspectives offered by many authors who contributed towards the search for the causes of conflicts in different parts of the world, an in-depth investigation was conducted on the causes of conflicts in Nigeria, regarding the following variables: 'Colonialism', 'Multinational Corporations (MNCs)', 'Resource Curse/Rentier State Thesis', 'Elites' and 'Religiosity'.

Besides, prior to the commencement of the analysis based on the aforementioned variables, a brief historical account of the challenges facing Nigeria was provided, with special emphasis on the contemporary conflicts confronting the country. Thereafter, having first examined the role of colonial enterprises, dating back to more than 50 years, the investigation revealed that, irrespective of certain colonial structures still in existence in the country, colonialism is not the cause of the current ethnic crisis. Hence, colonialism is regarded as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for the outbreak of conflicts.

Secondly, the roles of multinational corporations, especially, the multinational oil corporations and multinational financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were put into focus. In spite of the fact that the representatives of these multinational oil companies and financial institutions influence the politics of the host-countries on a number of occasions, engaging in activities that often benefit these corporations and institutions at the expense of the citizens of the host countries, it was observed in the analysis that these activities do not necessarily directly lead to the outbreak of conflicts.

The third variable, resource curse and rentier state thesis, stipulates that countries that generate their incomes through the production and sale of natural resources find it difficult to be democratized and, therefore, do not experience economic and political stability. Based on the research carried out on the consequences of a state authority's repression of its populace, it was found that there are a wide range of options available to dictators to hold on to power due to the revenue generated from natural resources, a situation that puts dictators in a position to be financially independent and unaccountable to the people. On this basis, the analysis cited the example of countries such as Norway which, in spite of its oil wealth, is a democratic and stable country, an instance that is contrary

to the assumption of the resource curse/rentier state thesis. Therefore, as became evident, natural resources may not necessarily induce conflicts as the case of a democratically and economically stable Norway shows.

Furthermore, the variable 'the activities of the elites' was engaged in the research work as a reason for the conflicts in Nigeria. However, having examined this variable, it was learned from the analysis that the mere activities of the elites cannot lead to the outbreak of conflicts. Identifying military elites and civilian politicians, commonly referred to as big or strong men during the course of the analysis, as the dominant forces of the clientelistic structures and patronage networks established by competing and co-operating elites both during military regimes and civilian administrations, it became evident that Nigeria is run by elites, assisted through patron-client networks, from the military and big business elites who are influenced by ethnic interests. As a result, the Nigerian masses are impoverished as the wealth of the country, generated from oil and gas revenues, is competed for and concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites. In spite of the self-centered elite behavior, their lack of national focus and the dichotomization of the country into an ethnic "us" and "others", meaning the very few rich members of the elite and the poor and marginalized masses, there is no proof tracing the roots of the contemporary conflicts in Nigeria to the elites' acquisition of wealth.

Last but not the least, within the scope of the current research review on the source of conflicts in Nigeria, the variable 'religiosity' was examined in order to assess the roles religious faiths play towards the outburst of conflicts. Concentrating on two world religions, Islam and Christianity, to conduct the inquiry, certain important passages in both the Bible and Quran were cited to highlight the peaceful role of religion in any given society. With special emphasis on punishments for killings in the name of God, as found in the holy books, this research study concluded that it is not religion *per se* that accounts for the outbreak of conflicts, but rather that violent conflicts emerge whenever certain individuals and actors instrumentalize religion and manipulate religious passages with the aim of mobilizing religious adherents to foment troubles in the name of God. Hence, some sections of the analysis examine the link between religiosity and conflict, treating such themes as religious radicalism, extremism and terrorism. In spite of all this, the findings regard religiosity as a necessary factor, but it is not proven to be a sufficient condition for the outbreak of the contemporary Nigerian conflicts. The outbreak of conflicts occurs whenever certain actors and individuals deploy religion in the process of politicized ethnicity.

The fifth chapter of the dissertation focused on two major conflict zones in Nigeria to examine the hypothesis of the research study. Applying the instrumentalist approach and the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, a brief account of the current conflicts confronting the country was given. With respect to the recurring outbreaks of the so-called identity-based and resource-based conflicts, findings revealed that the politicization of ethnicity is the reason for the outbreaks of the violent conflicts ravaging the country.

In this respect, reflecting on the research questions as the guiding principles and citing the examples of the Jos conflicts and Warri crises in Nigeria to conduct the investigation, the major question about the significance of ethnicity in conflict matters was introduced at the onset of that chapter in order to ascertain, first and foremost, the fluidity of the phenomenon of ethnic groups. On this basis, it was found that there are occurrences of various transformational processes in the historical evolution of the three largest ethnic groups at one time or the other. Having made inquiries into the origin and the development of the current three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria, namely the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo, the analysis addressed the doubts cast on the 'purity' of ethnic groups. Citing the historical backgrounds of the aforementioned ethnic groups as examples, it was affirmed that no ethnic entity remains intact without being intermixed with other ethnic groups in the course of time. The evidence generated in the analysis on the three ethnic groups mentioned above gives credence to the argument that ethnic group identity is not a permanent phenomenon, but rather constructed and in a state of flux. Hence, ethnic boundaries are permeable and the lines of ethnic boundaries are drawn arbitrarily, depending on prevalent interests.

What was more important during the investigation of the aforesaid three largest ethnic groups was the role assigned to religion in their social and political worldviews as well as their economic structures, a reason why religion is a significant conflict and destabilizing factor that is frequently instrumentalized by numerous ethnic actors. In spite of the fact that, as investigation revealed, the original inhabitants in the northern and southern regions were once pagans and adherents of various traditional religions, the research findings capture the ongoing conflicts as a result of the struggle for political and religious dominance revolving around the attainment of material and symbolic resources. The importation and the advent of both Islam and Christianity into the current Nigerian territory occurred during the course of the previous centuries, with the introduction of Islam in the northern part of Nigeria dating back to two centuries.

However, the advent of the present-day Islamic religion, as a political tool and cause of conflicts, has its root in the migration and incursion of the Fulani nomads into Hausa territory. Despite the assimilation and intermarriages between the Fulani migrants and sedentary Hausa, the Islamic Jihad War waged by the Fulani at the beginning of the 19th century was geared towards the purification of Islam in the Hausa territories. Putting the advent of the Christian religion into context, it was illustrated that the origin of Christianity in Nigeria happened in conjunction with the arrival of European missionaries and colonialists in the southern part of the country, a region dominated by the ethnic groups of the Yoruba and Igbo as well as inhabited by other ethnic minorities.

Furthermore, still in chapter 5, three points of analysis were deployed as sources of the contemporary conflicts in the post-independence Nigeria, namely: federalism, military incursion into politics and religiosity. Firstly, the federal system in practice since independence is a factor of discontentment consistently applied for the politicization of ethnicity, a factor that continually leads to the outbreak of the so-called ethnic and religious conflicts. The establishment of a federal structure by the colonialists, based on a tri-regional formation upon independence led to the three largest ethnic groups contending to neutralize one another while struggling to take control of political power and gain access to resources at the expense of ethnic minorities. Consequently, in spite of the abolition and replacement of the three regional governments by federal states, which currently stand at 36 in number, the practice of federalism is depicted as zero-sum game among all ethnic groups in Nigeria. On this basis, any ruling ethnic group attempts to marginalize the others, circumstances that lead to the outbreak of conflicts.

Secondly, the military intervention in the political process is, on many occasions, postulated as another source of conflicts in Nigeria. Reiterating the current practice of federalism in the country, the research indicated that the hierarchical and centralized dynamics of the federal system in the country serve to concentrate a major stake of political powers and economic resources largely under the control of the federal government at the cost of the sub-units, i.e. the states. It was highlighted that such an organization of federalism, with respect to the over-centralization of powers and resources at the center, was gradually and systematically inserted by the Nigerian military elites from a particular section of the country during the long years of military coups and misrule. As a result, the country is regularly challenged by outbursts of fierce contests for the control of political powers among various ethnic groups which, for instance, occurred during civilian administrations. That is why there are waves of demands for the

creation of additional states and local governments by numerous ethnic groups, who feel dominated, short-changed and marginalized within the Nigerian federation, scenarios that have further contributed to the outbreak of conflicts in the last two decades. Therefore, the artificial creation of financially unviable and dependent states by various military regimes in order to pacify discontented ethnic groups was responsible for the over-centralization of Nigeria's federal system. All this led to economic and political crises and results in frequent outbreak of violent conflicts which highlight ethnic and religious disagreements.

Thirdly and lastly, religiosity, another factor exploited by certain individuals and leaders to politicize ethnicity, was examined in the research, concentrating mainly on the existing binary opposition and the current conflicts between two major world religions, namely Islam and Christianity. Additionally, exploring the interaction and interdependence between religion and ethnicity, emphasis was placed on the exploitation of religious identity as a rallying point for mobilization and a tool employed during the politicization of ethnicity, actions which often result in the outbreak of violent conflicts. The phenomenon of religion, according to the findings, possesses an appeal which can be deployed to arouse the emotionality rather than the rationality of human nature.

Focusing on the role of religion as an instrument for the construction of certain dividing lines that engender conflicts, the analysis illustrated how actors exploit religion within the context of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Nigeria whenever in struggle to attain political power, allocation of resources and assertion of ethnic hegemony. On this note, the lines of demarcation between religion and ethnicity are blurred. Hence the admission that in most of the conflicts which have an ethnic connotation, religion often plays a crucial role. For example, with the demographic composition of Nigeria which is approximately balanced between its Muslim and Christian populations, its membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is a contentious issue in the country and a dividing line constructed and often instrumentalized by actors to politicize ethnicity. Dichotomizing between the predominantly Muslim north and the majority Christian south to draw ethnic boundary lines, politicians made use of the slogan "one north" rhetorically to construct an ethnic identity and score political gains.

Within the scope of religious extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism in Nigeria, this research examined the recurring religious conflicts confronting the country as a form of globalized proxy conflicts between Christians and Muslims under the pretext of *The Clash of Civilizations*. Thereby, exemplifying Nigeria as a hotbed for religious conflicts, it was shown that the kind of Islamism and

Christianity practiced in the country contains certain forms of religious radicalism that are destructive to national cohesion as well as to the peace and stability of the country. An instance of radicalism investigated is the resurgence of Islamic Sharia and its introduction as a penal code in twelve northern states of Nigeria. This development evoked embittered and embattled controversy between Christians and Muslims, especially on the legitimacy of the country's constitution, often leading to thousands of deaths and destruction of property.

Contextualizing religious terrorism in Nigeria, the activities of the terrorist group Boko Haram, meaning: "Western education is forbidden", were delved into within the framework of the contemporary conflicts in the country. With little known about this group initially and in view of the increasing concerns raised on gross allegations of human rights abuses, crimes against humanity and other atrocities committed on innocent people daily, especially women, this thesis made inquiries into the group's identity, its structures and objectives, membership and financial backing.

Moreover, identifying the origin of Boko Haram, also known as the Nigerian Taliban, as a reaction to and uprising against the increasing rate of poverty in the Muslim north allegedly caused by marginalization and corruption of the elites, it was explained that the group evolved from being a non-threatening religious sect into a dangerous terrorist organization with links to other international terrorist networks. This is an argument which indicates that ethnic identity is not static, but rather fluctuates.

In the Muslim north, with many of its Islamic religious clerics and teachers educated in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran, it was emphasized that there is additional financial aid emanating from these countries to build mosques and Islamic schools for the purpose of promoting Islamism and politico-ideologies that preach hatred as well as aiding and abetting violent attacks against non-Muslims. Hence, there are scores of foot soldiers and unemployed youths at the mercy of this terrorist group's recruitment tactics, as these young boys are already taught, infused and influenced by the most radical form of Islam. Correspondingly, it is revealed that Boko Haram's recruitment of its members is not only limited to the borders of Nigeria, but extends as far as other neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. With its ideology drawn from the Sudanese Madi tradition, Boko Haram advocates a radical and eschatological Islam which is anti-Western and anti-modern with preachers frequently denouncing the United States.

Exploring the Jos conflicts and the Warri crises in Nigeria as examples for the politicization of ethnicity as the source of conflicts between 1990 and 2010,

this research study emphasized that these conflicts occur whenever ethnic politics, based on perceived ethnic and religious differences, are exploited by certain ethnic entrepreneurs, politicians, and religious leaders to attain political, material, and symbolic resources. More importantly, research findings and observation as well as the numerous interviews conducted in the field reveal that mere ethnicity is not the cause of the contemporary conflicts, as the ethnic groups involved in the conflict have coexisted for decades despite religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences. Rather, the current violent conflicts in Jos, since the beginning of the 1990s, frequently broke out as a result of the then Nigerian Military Heads of State's creation of the Jos North Local Government Area in 1991. This action is viewed by the indigenous ethnic groups as an attempt by the head of the military government to favor the Hausa-Fulani, who are regarded as settlers on the basis of a common religious identity in Islam. On the surface, the main issue in the conflict is believed to be about the ownership of Jos, though the main reasons for the outbreak of the conflicts can be traced to other factors.

In consideration of the reasons for these conflicts revolving around access to resources and the struggle for the control of political power, which involve pitting the indigenous ethnic groups against the settlers, religious faiths are exploited as factors of exclusion and inclusion. On the one side, the indigenous ethnic groups of the Berom, the Afizere, and the Anaguta are Christians and the Hausa-Fulani migrants/settlers, on the other side, are Muslims. Nonetheless, the roots of the contemporary conflicts, specifically the unrests occuring since the beginning of the 1990s, can be traced back to the activities of politicians and religious leaders as well as business elites belonging to the two distinct warring parties. Constructing an image of the enemy by using various religious slogans to dichotomize between "we Muslims" and "they Christians" in election periods, the elites strongly emphasize perceived ethnic and religious differences which leads to civil unrest.

It is made known that ethnicity, in terms of religious, linguistic and cultural differences, is not the only avenue exploited for politicization. Another factor deployed by political elites and certain individuals to politicize ethnicity is the issue of the "Indigeneity Clause" inserted into the Nigerian Constitution by military elites. By the introduction of the indigeneity clause, the constitution makes the possession and presentation of a certificate of indigeneity from a local government in the country mandatory as a way to show proof of Nigerian citizenship. This indigeneity certificate is compulsory in order to benefit from all the advantages attached to citizenship such as government scholarships, admission to higher institutions, or employment in government ministries, etc. However,

the same constitution fails to define indigeneity and set out objective criteria to be fulfilled in order to attain indigeneity certificates, hence a loophole for politicians throughout the country to politicize it through the practice of exclusionist politics.

Regarding Jos, the issuance of indigeneship certificates only to specific people on the principle of common religion, origin, language and other perceived objective criteria, is widely practiced. As a result of this politics of exclusion, a situation arises through which actors reinforce the dichotomization of the city of Jos into "Us Christian Indigenes" and "Them Muslim Settlers". Thus, the study shows that the Jos conflict is a combination of religious and ethnic colorations.

In comparison, the second conflict examined in the research study is the Warri crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Primarily involved in the conflicts are the ethnic groups of the Ijaw and Itsekiri. However, the inclusion of the Urhobo, as the third party to the conflict, is in so far essential to the research work as the Urhobo is an important ally to the Ijaw in the fight against the Itsekiri. Based on research findings, the Urhobo and the Itsekiri were embroiled in a conflict over the ownership of Warri town for decades. So, the conflict is about access to and the distribution of resources accrued from crude oil, but the elites capitalize on the existing ethnic differences, e.g. the creation of a local government in Warri, as avenues to politicize ethnicity by constructing and redrawing ethnic boundaries.

With the initial non-violent agitation by the inhabitants of the Niger Delta oil region, who once peacefully protested against their marginalization by successive military regimes and tried to warn the multinational oil companies of the effects of oil spills, gas flaring and the overall environmental degradation of the region on the health of the people, the subsequent conflicts that eventually engulfed the region were accompanied by militarization and the advent of militancy. This situation encompasses the beginning of the conflicts in the oil city, Warri. Meanwhile, findings exposed the involvement of many factions and collaboration with external actors within the scope of the analysis carried out on the Warri crisis. Identified in the research are various chains of actors, ranging from several illegal cooperations and collaborations between certain non-governmental and governmental actors. These actors include politicians, military and naval officers as well as external actors from countries such as Russia, Lebanon and Israel, who are all engaged in the illegal smuggling of crude oil, known as bunkering, sales of weapons/drugs and other illicit activities such as the kidnapping of expatriate workers to extort ransom.

The analysis carried out in the dissertation on the Jos conflicts and the Warri crisis established as proven that conflicts do not erupt as a result of perceived distinctions based on the mere display of certain objective traits between ethnic groups. On the contrary, the current violent ethnic conflicts in Jos and Warri are constructed by certain ethnic, business and religious elites as identified in the research work. The evidence from both conflict zones points out that ethnic boundary lines are constructed, drawn and redrawn to create an image of the enemy. Based on this, with respect to the research's internal validity, ethnicity is not found to be the cause of conflicts, unless it is politicized. That being said, this is not to affirm that the outcome of this investigation is to be generalized and extended to other conflicts similarly influenced by ethnic and religious sentiments until specific scientific inquiries are carried out.

A. Prospects

In consideration of the various conflict situations in Nigeria, the potential for a peaceful and prosperous as well as conflict-free country in the near future depends on the attitudes and activities of the political elites, especially, the current group(s) of politicians, towards the provision of an environment enabling the rule of law to prevail.

To begin with, the federal system of government presently practiced in the country, through which enormous state resources and political powers are centralized in the hands of the Federal Government and under the control of the presidency, will continue to destabilize the polity in as far as multiple ethnic groups struggle, in a zero-sum game, to occupy this office. On this basis, Nigerian Federalism, supposedly envisaged to stabilize the polity, will continue to be utilized as a way to gain access to both economic and political resources at the expense of and to the detriment of the rest of the population. This will heighten the fear of being dominated by one major ethnic group or the other and by ethnic minorities or religious groups, scenarios that will often foment crisis and violent conflicts so far as certain ethnic groups feel marginalized by the ruling ethnic group. It is through such feelings of insecurity and exclusion that religion will continue to be exploited as an instrument of division, leading to clashes between Muslims and Christians and also pitting one ethnic group against the other. The spill-over effects of such clashes may continue to spark renewed outbreaks of violent conflicts in the already charged atmospheres in both Jos and Warri. As the relationships between the warring parties become more strained

and the destabilization of peace is dependent on slight occurrences of unrest in other parts of the country, any further deterioration of the fragile situation will erupt in violence.

With widened educational disparities between the northern and the southern regions, the attraction to Islamic extremism and terrorism may continue to be on an upward trend among the impoverished youths in the north as long as political and religious elites determine to keep the Muslim youth population in perpetual darkness. In this way, the only means available to these youths will be enroll-ment in Islamic schools and the pursuit of Islamic studies, thereby, learning to detest Western education and democracy as the enemy of progress, justice, equality and fairness. Such a development may further strengthen Islamic ex-tremism and fundamentalism, upon which terrorist groups from within and out-side the country may capitalize to recruit members and spread the ideology of hatred and violence against anyone perceived as ungodly.

Similarly, provided the dividends offered by democracy remain a mirage to most people and corrupt practices linger on as the political elites continue to breed poverty, insecurity, impunity, lack of infrastructure etc., the Nigerian state will witness a surge in the proliferation of other terrorist organizations in north-ern Muslim territories and aggressive activities of the militant groups in the southern region may follow suit. Such circumstances may not only signal the total collapse of the Nigerian state, but also aggravate ethnic acrimony, which may lead the country to the brink of another civil war.

On this note, apart from the sad experiences of the violence unleashed in certain parts of the country on innocent citizens by the terrorist group Boko Haram, there is a growing tendency for the establishment of a strong link be-tween Nigerian-bred terrorist groups and international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without attempts made by the Nigerian government to stabilize the situation through a general improvement in the welfare of the people and its battered image, there is the po-tential for a massive destabilization of the northern region. Such a scenario may force more moderate Islamic scholars in the north to switch their positions and sympathize with religious extremists and terrorists. A development like that may encourage further violent attacks and targeted ethnic cleansing solely against northern Christians, northern ethnic minorities and southerners residing in the north on ethnic and religious grounds.

On the Jos conflicts, if selections to key Federal Government appointed po-sitions at the federal level are not strictly limited to the indigenous ethnic groups in Jos and Plateau State in general, as set out by the Federal Character Principle

and the Indigeneity Clause,[1862] the inclusion of the so-called non-indigenes will continue to trigger violence. This may worsen the existing animosity and fighting between the indigenous ethnic groups of the Berom, the Anaguta and the Afizere and the Hausa-Fulani settlers as the conflict parties adopt new measures to eliminate one another.

Along this line of religious and ethnic polarization by certain individuals and leaders, the terrorist organization Boko Haram, already responsible for a number of suicide bombings in Jos, may further strengthen their ties with the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and commit unprecedented atrocities on the indigenous ethnic groups on a level equatable only to crimes against humanity. The same applies to the indigenous ethnic groups as they will resist any attempt favorable to the Hausa-Fulani in matters related to politics in Jos through all means available. Until the restoration of the rule of law in the Nigerian state and the subsequent expunging of the "Indigeneity Clause" from the constitution, there is a slim chance of any solution to the Jos conflicts in sight and any goal towards the attainment of permanent peace in Jos will remain a mirage.

In general, with the growing religious intolerance and polarizations induced by ethnic and religious leaders as well as politicians across the country, there is a potential for the ongoing terrorism to assume levels which may be beyond the control of the current government that is already faced with difficulties in curtailing the activities of Boko Haram. With such a development, the threat of state collapse will become imminent and hopes for the survival of the country will be dashed. This position about the threat of terrorism to statehood corresponds to the statement of U.S. President Barack Obama while on a visit to South Africa, as he made the following remarks: "Terrorism is more likely to succeed in countries that are not delivering for their people and where there are areas of conflict and underlying frustrations that have not been adequately dealt with", he said.[1863]

On the Warri crisis, future failures by the government at all levels to deal with issues concerning corruption, impunity and indiscipline will aggravate the ongoing bunkering of the national asset, crude oil, which from time to time affects the income of the Nigerian state. In as much as the Federal Government is

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1862   See chapter 5.4.2 on the application of the Federal Character Principle.
1863   CNN International Edition on 29 June 2013, reported by Tom Watkins, electronically available: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/29/world/africa/south-africa-obama-5-things [02/11/2013]. The same report is also available under the topic "Remarks by President Obama at Young African Leaders Initiative Town Hall", published by the *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/29/remarks-president-obama-young-african-leaders-initiative-town-hall [3/11/2013)].

unable or unwilling to identify, apprehend, and punish members of the security forces and civilian counterparts as well as militants groups engaged in illicit activities such as oil smuggling, kidnappings and vandalization of pipelines, there will be a continuation of this trade as it is lucrative for the parties involved.

Similarly, without the government crushing these cartels, security will deteriorate and poverty worsen and, with time, the legitimacy of the government in securing lives and property will dwindle if not be totally lost. In such circumstances, there can be no solution to the Warri crisis as the situation there is linked to the Niger Delta crisis altogether. In as much as resources available to the government are shrinking and with increasing ethnic discontentment and acrimony, there will be more unemployed youths ready to be recruited as militants, based on ethnic partisanship, and deployed in the illegal oil and drug trade as well as the sale of weapon. With a further rise in the illegal trade, revolving around the bunkering of crude oil, more ethnic conflicts will be enflamed around the Warri areas and the destabilization of the region will increase.

Finally, if efforts on the part of the government fail to make the multinational oil companies take responsibility for many years of environmental degradation caused by oil leakages and spills from rusted pipelines as well pollution by gas flaring, the livelihood of the people will continue to be lost and the standard of living will degenerate. At the same time, without any commensurable compensation paid to the affected communities and fines levied against these international oil companies to ensure adherence to environmental standards, as enforced in other parts of the world, the inhabitants of the region will continue to be enraged. Such a situation, rather than calming the continued tension in the region, particularly in Warri, will instead aggravate the existing conflicts.

B. Recommendations

In order to avert the collapse of the Nigerian state, it is henceforth mandatory for the international community, especially the United States and the United Nations, to unequivocally demand the conduct of free and transparent elections at all levels of political office as a way to safeguard the nascent democratic processes in the country.

Efforts towards the consolidation of democratic institutions in Nigeria will need to include granting total independence to three critical, but important, agencies of government such as the anti-corruption agencies, i.e. the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices

Commission (ICPC) as well as the Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) without any political influence or interference in their operations.

With strong institutions, a political culture can thus gradually develop and evolve to implement the much-needed efforts required to stem and eliminate impunity, corruption and lack of rule of law in the Nigerian political landscape. Therefore, the Nigerian state can become a place where people can seek redress in a court of law without fear of prejudice or subversion of justice. Without a change in the country's political terrain, the requests by many observers such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and other notable international and national critics to expunge the Indigeneity Clause from the Nigerian Constitution in order to guarantee equal rights, justice and fairness to every Nigerian will only exacerbate the conflicts. This will worsen the existing charged atmosphere between the numerous ethnic minorities and the three largest ethnic majorities in the struggle for the control of political power by all means. This is by no means to assert that the Indigeneity Clause, with all the discriminatory and exclusivity policies attached to it, is not to be erased from the constitution, but this is strictly to be carried out after the restoration of the rule of law in the country.

By and large, the enforceability of the rule of law will, as a general trend, stem the further rise of religious terrorism in the country when effective and applied appropriately as a way to check the excesses of politicians, by banning individuals and religious elites that conflate religion and politics. The sacredness of the country's secularism is undebatable and must not be compromised.

Just as there is currently a decreasing trend in the importation of crude oil from the biggest importer of Nigerian crude, the United States of America, a new development that may serve as a warning to the elites' attitudinal orientation to a monolithic economic culture and indifference to the diversification of the economic structures of the country, the European Union member states could potentially follow suit. This may, in the long run, increase accountability, transparency and instigate the top-down economic reforms required in the country. Also, such a development may usher in a new era of engagement with respect to the activities of the multinational oil firms in matters related to the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta region, which may positively impact the political situation of the country. It is important to note that a prosperous and stable Nigeria will have a domino effect on the West African subregion and Africa at large.

With the current conflict situation in Jos, it is recommended that the engagement of a neutral and recognized international organization on a long-term basis, the United Nations for instance, as an important and impartial mediator in the Jos conflicts, will aid in healing the wounds of those who are directly or indirectly victimized by the violence. In consideration of the ongoing occasional containment of the violent conflicts in Jos, the engagement and presence of such an international organization is pertinent in order to increase pressure on the Nigerian government to identify and apprehend the real perpetrators of the violence, no matter who they are and how influential and highly placed in society. This is to ensure that they are brought before the court of law and appropriate punishments are handed out to them. Having the perpetrators punished is, in a way, a means to heal the wounds of the victims. Nonetheless, this recommendation is in no way to undermine the ongoing involvement of a United Nations organ, the UNDP, in collaboration with the Nigerian Army regarding the Jos conflicts, but rather an admonition to increase the level of engagement there.

In consideration of the Warri crisis, a conflict that is affiliated with and integrated within the context of the crisis in the oil rich Niger Delta region, there is a need for a direct engagement of the United States Government in order to reduce the level of tension not only in Nigeria, but overall in the Gulf of Guinea. To stem and stop the bunkering of crude oil and other illegal activities taking place in the Niger Delta region, a deployment of military personnel from the United States to guard and secure the Gulf of Guinea is required. Taking such action will increase the pressure on the Nigerian Government to assume its responsibility by being committed to the challenges facing the inhabitants of the region. With the caliber of top officials, politicians, and external actors involved in the bunkering of crude oil and the supply of weapons to militants towards the destabilization of the region, the inability of the Nigerian government to confront these challenges is not to question the capacity of the Nigerian security forces. So, it is not about the competence of the Nigerian Navy, the Air Force and the Nigerian Army to take up these challenges, but rather the lack of political will by the political elites.

Specifically on the Warri crisis, the individuals and politicians who exploit ethnic differences to foment crises must be identified and arrested in order to forestall future outbreaks of violent conflicts in the town. However, it is believed that solving the Niger Delta crisis altogether will put an end to the Warri crisis, a reason to apply a holistic approach to face the ongoing challenges in the the region once and for all.

Furthermore, with respect to the causes of conflict, there are new scientific fields yet unexplored, most specifically in many multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies which are battle grounds for the contemporary ethno-religious unrest. In this regard, it is pertinent to study the impact which democratic processes may have on these countries, focusing to a great extent on the question whether the imposition of democratic values may lead to conflicts or not, especially if the introduction of democracy emanates from or is conditioned by external forces. Such scenarios are discernible in the current ethno-religious conflicts in Syria and Iraq where the terrorist group, the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), is waging war on the Iraqi and Syrian governments with the purpose of creating an Islamic State. It is important when making scientific inquiries into such themes to identify the number of actors, groups and factions that are engaged in the conflicts in order to find out their aims, organizational structures, financial backing and support from external actors, such as the present situations in both Iraq and Syria demonstrate. For the purpose of a research study on Iraq and Syria, especially for the identification of various actors involved in the conflicts, the writer recommends the usage of the theory of instrumentalism in combination with the decision theory of identity and difference in ethnicity, as applied in this dissertation.

A similar situation is currently occurring in Libya, where many warring factions are engaged in violent conflicts for the control of the state apparatus. Without mincing words, most of these countries are multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies and the question is not whether democratic values can be imbibed in such societal settings in the long run, but the important question remains if democracy can be imposed on such countries by external actors and the consequences of such an undertaking.

Another area of study, recommendable for further inquiries, is the field of so-called identity-based conflicts. Thereby, it is essential to widen the investigation and determine, without any recourse to material resources beneath the occurrences of conflicts, why actors, people, or a group of people often decide to distance and dissociate themselves from another ethnic group or groups. This could be a study concentrating on an exploratory phenomenon devoid of resources or resource acquisition, but rather focusing primarily on identity as the potential reason for such actions.

For further enquiries on the generalizability of the thesis of this dissertation, one important country to explore is the former Republic of Sudan because of the conflicts therein involving the construction of various dividing lines based on racism, tribalism and ethnocentrism. The new state, South Sudan, having broken

away from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, is again embroiled in inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts within its own borders. According to the theory put forward in this work, depicting the process of how the image of an enemy is constructed and identifying the actors involved, it becomes feasible that the former enemy has vanished with the formation of South Sudan. That implies that the dichotomization of the previous conflicts through the construction of North vs. South no longer occurs. However, with increasing reports of inter-ethnic conflicts in the new state, it is of importance to conduct research on the construction of a new image of the enemy. Thereby, the research may concentrate on the identification of the actors involved, for what reasons and how the current image of the enemy is constructed.

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