



QUEENSHIP AND POWER

YOLANDE OF ARAGON
(1381-1442) FAMILY
AND POWER

The Reverse of the Tapestry

Zita Eva Rohr



QUEENSHIP AND POWER

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


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


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MAP



Territories and pretensions of the second house of Anjou during the tenure of Yolande of Aragon (1400-1442)



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Fifteen years (not out) is a considerable innings to devote to initial research into a long dead and largely forgotten, elite, white Christian woman—Yolande of Aragon. Non-obsessives have asked, on more than one occasion, why on earth would I bother with such a one as Yolande? I have no definitive response, except to say that I find her, and the times in which she lived, intriguing and frustrating in equal measure. Churchill held that the farther back one looked, the further forward one could see; the lives and times of stateswomen (and politicians of both genders) of the turbulent pre- and early modern periods have a lot to tell us about how we might address the gifts and challenges of our own constantly evolving “modern” lives. Whatever my original motivation in undertaking research into this intriguing period of human endeavor, a time of great change and inter/intra-national conflict, I have learnt much concerning Yolande and her times but I have emerged with more questions than answers. All to the good, for it seems that I have only just embarked upon my journey—a journey during which I have already become indebted to my supervisors, mentors, colleagues, institutions, archivists, librarians, dear friends of long standing, and, most especially, to my long suffering (and oft bewildered) family. The debt continues to accumulate.

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I set out on my personal *chemin de long étude* with my doctoral thesis, “L’Envers de la tapisserie: The Œuvre of Yolande d’Aragon. A Study of Queenship, Power and Authority in Late Mediæval France” (The University of New England, Armidale, NSW, 2009), achieved with the generous support, invaluable advice, and gentle admonishments of my supervisors, Mr. Jim Nicholls and Professor Chris Gossip. Along the often unforgiving and dusty *camino* to enlightenment, the pilgrim sought and received succor in the form of generous

mentoring and continuing friendship from Theresa Earenfight (Seattle University), Dawn Bratsch-Prince (Iowa State), and Núria Silleras-Fernández (University of Colorado at Boulder). Núria, in particular, has gently coaxed me into pulling this book together in a timely fashion. Carole Levin and Charles Beem (the editors of this series) have been likewise supportive and invariably encouraging. Kristin Purdy (History Editor at Palgrave Macmillan) has been enthusiastic, constructive, and kind throughout the process of bringing this book to press. Engaged, prompt, efficient, and patient, Chelsea Morgan (Production Manager at Palgrave Macmillan) has been of invaluable assistance. My colleagues in the Department of History at The University of Sydney have been an ongoing source of support and inspiration—particularly Professor Andrew Fitzmaurice, who has encouraged and advised me on a constant and meaningful basis. More recently, the inauguration of the Royal Studies Network has afforded me the riches of consistent scholarly exchange and friendship. While I have close ties to many members of the RSN, I must acknowledge the especial care, assistance, scholarly companionship, and friendship of its founder, Ellie (Elena) Woodacre (The University of Winchester). The oyster shell of sound research requires some well-targeted grit; Tracy Adams (University of Auckland) is the very welcome grit in mine. I am grateful indeed for her friendship and the fruitful exchanges and collaborations we have shared in recent times, enriching my thinking in no small measure.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó (Barcelona)
AD BdR	Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseille and Aix- en-Provence)
ADH	Archives Départementales de l'Hérault (Montpellier)
ADLA	Archives Départementales de Loire-Atlantique (Nantes)
AMdL	Archives Municipales de Lyon (Lyon)
AN	Archives Nationales de France (Paris)
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris)
RSD	<i>Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis</i>



GENEALOGICAL TABLES



INTRODUCTION

To avoid stumbling into anachronism and wandering into the realms of subjective irrelevance, queenship research requires careful contextualization. I have striven to do this in the light of constantly evolving feminist, women's, and gender history studies—endeavoring to apply a critical (but never cynical) eye to postmodern intellectual constructs that do not always stand up to objective scrutiny when examining complex issues of gender and the theme of women and power in the medieval and early modern periods.

A generation ago, Barbara Newman made some interesting observations regarding some of the pitfalls inherent in a hermetically sealed feminist approach to the Middle Ages. She posited that the second wave feminist critic in particular accepted certain clearly articulated ethical principles informing not only political views, but also cultural theories and an approach to reading. Newman explained that the first of these “insists that women’s experience, women’s history and women’s writings are inherently worthy of our attention and respect” and that this leads to a “hermeneutics of empathy.” She argued that the “feminist critical principle, recognizes that our experience has been severely constrained under patriarchy, and our history and literature unjustly suppressed.” This “critique of the patriarchy” informs a “hermeneutics of suspicion”—the second of Newman’s principles, and the antithesis of her first.¹ Newman went further, positing that we should not necessarily “reject objectivity as a patriarchal concept,” and that we ought not indulge ourselves by privileging personal experience, feminist sensitivity, or subjectivity to the point where we become unwilling “to apply our finely honed suspicion to our own intellectual constructs as well.”² Newman believed that there are three “besetting sins” that have the potential to undermine feminist historiography: the “temptation to idealize, the temptation to pity, and the temptation to blame.” The temptation to pity, she explained, arises from a need to identify feminist precursors to “transform our foresters into feminist role models” such as Hildegard von Bingen, Joan of Arc, Christine de Pizan, and others. These medieval women are not “prototype[s] of the New Age woman: interested in female

autonomy, criticism of male power structures, ecology, holistic health, [females in frontline combat roles], versatile self-expression, and so forth.⁷³ Newman pointed out that women who do not fit neatly into “criteria for our role models” become easy targets for feminist pity; this enterprise is firmly anchored to “the recognition that as women we have collectively been the victims of the patriarchy, *semper ubique, et ab omnibus*”⁷⁴ (at all times, in all places, by everyone). Such feminist pity makes victims of women in the past who would be horrified to be so characterized and who would have rejected utterly such a characterization—especially when “coupled with one of our most pervasive cultural dogmas, the idea that free sexual expression is essential to human fulfillment.”⁷⁵ Intimately bound to the temptation to pity is the temptation to blame—for it is another negative judgment of historical female realities. For Newman, this “blame-game” “regards the women in question as complicit in their own victimization and sees every missed opportunity to rebel as an implicit betrayal.”⁷⁶ It is generally deployed “to discuss women’s collusion with oppressive structures and ideologies” with barely, if ever, a thought given to examining the lives of women in the context of the times in which they lived. Opprobrium is directed likewise at “female writers who acquiesced in the prevailing gender ideology of their times and failed to articulate a feminist critique, or who (like Christine de Pizan and Anne of France) based their critiques on ethical and religious principles that are no longer acceptable to the modern historian.”⁷⁷

More recently, Theresa Earenfight attests that such approaches “blind(s) us to the diversity of life in the past.”⁷⁸ Jacqueline Murray reminds us that “Bynum has observed that [there is] no such thing as *the* medieval attitude to women.”⁷⁹ Caroline Walker Bynum’s words here are of even greater interest once they are restored to the context of her deeper reflections regarding gender, the human body, and medieval religion: “Men’s understanding of women’s piety and their own has certain specific characteristics not necessarily generalizable as ‘medieval religion.’ There is no such thing as the *homo religiosus* and no such thing as *the* medieval attitude to women.”⁸⁰ All of which is to say that, resting upon the work of this distinguished scholarly sorority, the study of queenship must be contextualized and firmly anchored to a study of the institution of rulership, turning “us back towards questions about men as well as women. The study of gender is the study of how roles and possibilities are conceptualized; it is a study of one hundred per cent, not fifty-one per cent, of the human race.”⁸¹

Earenfight writes that “women were not rigidly defined by extremes of power and powerlessness because the relational dynamic between men and women depended upon social rank, age, marital status and economic resources” and that queens formed an unusual elite among women.¹² It was unusual to rid a monarchy of its queen unless she failed to produce a male heir and, in any case, such an eventuality might not put a queen necessarily at risk.¹³ Queens acquired power and exercised authority as wives, mothers, sisters, and aunts, and as tutors and guardians (natural governors), through their personal piety and patronage and by becoming the subjects of literary or visual arts.¹⁴ Queens with access to extensive personal and family networks could, and did, exercise considerable political authority to great effect; but, like their successful male counterparts, they needed to have a talent for the game and substantial intellectual dexterity and stamina.

At the genesis of my research some 15 years ago, Earenfight’s words and ideas, in particular, were a scholarly lifeline to a debutante who had begun to feel anxious that all was not as it should be in matters of queenship research and the study of medieval women and power. What I had begun to unearth regarding Yolande of Aragon, her foremothers, her contemporaries, and her descendants simply did not gel with the assumptions made by some feminist scholars, inspired perhaps by Marion Facinger, who proposed that, from the twelfth century onward, royal women were essentially relegated to the domestic arena as a result of the development of primogeniture and the re-establishment of the dowry.¹⁵ Facinger’s reading does not take sufficiently into account that the domestic sphere of royal and aristocratic families was a locus of power and authority for women intelligent and canny enough to make effective political use of it.

More than half a century ago, Marc Bloch made the important observation that medieval power structures were anchored in the domestic orbit of the dynastic family and princely household.¹⁶ Women, most frequently wives and mothers, often found themselves taking center stage in very public networks of political power—and they managed this while fulfilling traditional feminine “household” expectations. This shocked no one for, as Kimberly LoPrete asserts, “The dynamic interplay between the life-cycles of dynastic families and the domestic base of their power assured that, throughout the Middle Ages, the number of women exercising lordly authority at any one time was consistently high.”¹⁷ We must change the existing paradigm regarding such women and move beyond the idea of exceptionalism. Recent conference presentations and papers have argued that the notion of

exceptionalism is anachronistic and inaccurate; we must move on. For the ambitious, canny, and intelligent political woman, such privileged proximity to the inner circle of *regalis potestas* (royal power) functioned as backstage and front of house “access all areas” pass.

Natalie Zemon Davis suggests that we should be more attentive to how sex roles might shape a political career.¹⁸ Her thinking dovetails with the theoretical position I have chosen to adopt; she is firm in her belief that “we should be interested in the history of both men and women... our goal is to understand the significance of the *sexes*, of gender groups in the historical past... our goal is to explain why sex roles were sometimes tightly prescribed and sometimes fluid, sometimes markedly asymmetrical and sometimes more even.”¹⁹ Monarchy is a gendered institution but no successful king or queen has ruled in a vacuum—all needed supporting institutions to succeed and prosper. We should consider queenship and kingship therefore as complementary, sometimes symbiotic, institutions and this demands that we drop the creaky tendency to study powerful and successful kings and queens in isolation. It is better to study kingdoms and dynasties and kings and queens together, examining them in terms of cooperative rulerships (and sometimes uncooperative, antagonistic ones). Study of both sexes, in the context of their lived experience, would “help promote a rethinking of some of the central issues faced by historians.”²⁰

The central pertinent issue to my research is the nature of power—a theme of primordial interest in any analysis of the political career of Yolande of Aragon and the women of her natal and marital houses. Davis asserts that “power can lodge in dangerous nooks and crannies... It can be informal, unpredictable, unaccountable, frittered away, or saved for important occasions.”²¹ This is no truer than in the nature of the power wielded by Yolande of Aragon—originating in the example of her foremothers and blossoming in the activities and responsibilities, respectively, of her granddaughters, Marguerite and Yolande of Anjou, and her great-granddaughter, Anne of France, and finding its antithesis in the ramshackle states-womanship of her contemporary, Isabeau of Bavaria.

This book is about family and power. Essentially, all monarchies and ruling dynasties are about family, and the ways in which family and familial connections are used to attain sovereignty and buttress power and influence. While kings are most frequently analyzed and considered according to their deeds and efficacies, in their roles as monarchs they are rarely thought of as husbands and fathers, effectively rendering them “de-gendered”—neutered masculine pinnacles

of the political institution they represent.²² By way of contrast, their queens—consorts and “vessels” of dynastic succession, social cohesion, and territorial security and expansion (via their connections to their extended natal families)—are usually adduced of according to their gendered roles as wives, mothers, grandmothers, daughters, sisters, aunts, cousins, and widows.²³ Depending upon their respective levels of education, intellect, self-awareness, and political dexterity, queens-consort, in particular, frequently used and strategically manipulated gendered expectations of their roles to further their personal access to authority, power, and influence. Elizabeth I, that most successful of queens-regnant, was acutely aware of the pitfalls attached to her sex, fashioning herself as a prince with the “heart and stomach of a king” even as she acknowledged that she “may have the body of a weak and feeble woman”—a conscious act of “en-gendering.”²⁴ What she had, in common with successful rulers of both sexes, was a keen intellect and a visceral understanding that, to be a successful monarch or consort, one needed to understand how one was perceived by one’s subjects and opponents and self-fashion accordingly—on *her* terms.

In penning her *Enseignements* for her only surviving child, Suzanne of Bourbon, Anne of France—Yolande of Aragon’s great-granddaughter and likewise a woman of astonishing pre-Machiavellian political insight—demonstrated her acute understanding of the need for a royal woman to self-fashion for the successful acquisition and maintenance of power and authority. Although some still hold that “Anne was no Christine de Pizan” and that her book is “conventional” and “an instructional book in the genre of the mirror for princes,”²⁵ such assessments fail to pick up on Anne’s subtle and astute transformation of Christine’s circumspect notion of “*juste ypocrisie*”; Anne’s advice to Suzanne was born of successful political undertaking, which demanded that she neutralize her male opponents by manipulating patriarchal expectations of gender. Masquerading as a mother’s *mirror* for a princess, Anne of France’s *Enseignements* is actually a revolutionary political text, ignored for the most part by non-specialists, and largely absent from the canon of early modern political thought. Anne took up Christine de Pizan’s theme of “*juste ypocrisie*” and subtly ran with it in her *Enseignements*, wherein the princess is instructed to “act against all her natural inclination to be honest” but only to further the greater good of her House and her subjects. Even the most general readership has a nodding acquaintance with Machiavelli; yet, few outside the scholarly community know of the political career and abiding influence of Anne of France

(1461–1522), daughter of a king (Louis XI) and guardian and unofficial regent of her younger brother (Charles VIII) during his minority and absence on campaign in Italy. Anne's *Enseignements* should be read as the culmination and articulation of lived female political experience over a number of generations of her maternal and paternal dynasties in Aragon and France as well as her practical ideas on the education and preparation of young women—and men—for political life.²⁶ Anne of France and her dynastic foremothers, including Elionor of Sicily, Yolande of Flanders, Marie of France, Violant of Bar, Yolande of Aragon, and Marie of Anjou, all “walked the walk”—they were canny and articulate political animals; Anne’s “talk,” her political treatise, grew out of generations of combined dynastic female lived experience. In keeping with her matrilineal heritage, Anne was a woman fiercely devoted to the practical realities of governing, and the manipulation of gendered expectations to buttress and expand her power and authorities.

Anne anticipates Machiavelli's principle that “no one really knows who you are”—and that therein lies exploitable advantage. Anne wrote her *Enseignements* (c. 1503–4) well before Machiavelli addressed his extended *curriculum vitae* and very practical, hard-won advice to his Prince (c. 1513). With her *Enseignements* to her daughter Suzanne, Anne eases the passage from innocence to experience, informing the 12-year-old duchess of Bourbon's transition from political debutante to empowered stateswoman. Anne of France's (re)fashioning of virtues, which allows a princess to obtain and maintain power, anticipates Machiavelli's conviction that politics has nothing to do with traditional virtue and everything to do with the exercise of power, and that, in the right hands, from power comes the ability to do good. Like her great-granddaughter's treatise, the theme of family and gendered power is the golden thread woven into the “conventional” surface narrative of the tapestry of Yolande's political life.

Henri Martin evaluates Yolande of Aragon's contribution to the history of France in these terms:

Everything points to crediting the very significant and valuable influence of the mother of the queen, the dowager Yolande of Aragon. For France, this astute Spaniard, with less ado and with manifest authority, appears to have almost resurrected Blanche of Castile.²⁷

Martin's is an interesting observation if we recall Christine de Pizan's 1405 urging to the queen of France, Isabeau of Bavaria, that, for the good of France, she look to Blanche of Castile as her role model and

manifest *un cuer d'homme* (a heart of a man) to relieve the misery of the Valois dynasty and its wretched subjects.²⁸ In 1408, Jean II Juvénal des Ursins compared Isabeau, Queen of France's potential authority to rule in the "absences" of Charles VI to the precedent established by Blanche of Castile.²⁹ Notwithstanding some revisionist posturing of recent literary scholarship to render pure and pristine Isabeau's "black legend," the outcomes of her tenure as queen of France point uncomfortably to the fact that, when compared to political career of Yolande of Aragon, Isabeau was not up to the task envisioned and championed for her by Christine and Juvénal des Ursins. Isabeau's lack of political stamina and strategic pragmatism, combined with her ill-preparedness to surmount obstacles, speaks volumes when we compare her haphazard deeds and short-term influence to the hard-won authority and power wielded by Yolande of Aragon, who, like Isabeau, was obliged to toil away for some four decades in the same unhappy circumstances. Yolande's support and actions to preserve her son-in-law Charles VII's sovereignty ensured the survival and success of the Valois dynasty—something Isabeau was unable to achieve. The queen of France appears to have caved in to Burgundy's coercion and England's intimidation, alienating the unalienable French crown and bartering her daughter (Yolande of Aragon's goddaughter), Catherine, to Henry V of England, in exchange for her personal security and a modest pension. Yolande of Aragon refused to capitulate to the hand fate had dealt her marital house in the fractured political climate of France and at the early death of her husband, Louis II of Anjou, King of Jerusalem and Sicily, in 1417. Instead, she manifested an active and consistent involvement in the political, military, and diplomatic affairs of France from the time of her son-in-law's, the dauphin Charles of Ponthieu's, declared regency in 1418 until her death in 1442—a period of almost 25 years.

The choice of a tapestry allusion for the title of this work is deliberate. The miraculously extant and meticulously restored *Tapiserie de l'Apocalypse* was commissioned by Yolande of Aragon's father-in-law, Louis I of Anjou, and completed c. 1382–3, coinciding with the birth and first years of Yolande, *infanta* of Aragon, the woman who fought to retain his Angevin legacy and played a leading role in the recovery of France during the closing stages of the Hundred Years War. The *Apocalypse* tapestry series, Louis's *beau tapis*—a monumental opus depicting the destruction of Babylon and the creation of a new Jerusalem—probably appealed both to Louis I's artistic, political, and religious sensibilities, and his sense of history; he was crowned king of Jerusalem and Sicily by Clement VI in Avignon on

February 22, 1382.³⁰ In December 1400, the series served as a magnificent backdrop for the marriage of the king and new queen of Jerusalem–Sicily, Louis II of Anjou and Yolande of Aragon. Bertran Boysset, an eyewitness and chronicler of the spectacle, described the impression made upon him by the *Apocalypse* tapestry and hangings: “*En non es homs, que pogues escrieure ni recontar la valor, la beutat, la noblesa d’aquelos draps* (No one could write, or recount the value, beauty and nobility of these tissues . . .).”³¹ By the end of this book, it is my hope that the reader might be able to make an informed assessment as to the “*valor*,” “*beutat*,” and “*noblesa*” of Yolande of Aragon’s warp and weft. As she lay dying on November 12, 1442, Yolande willed the *Apocalypse* tapestry and the responsibility to work toward the maintenance of her Angevin legacy to her elder surviving son, René of Anjou, King of Jerusalem–Sicily.³² While he did not, in the end, manage to conserve the entirety of Yolande’s legacy intact, René did preserve the tapestry series in good estate and ensured it was securely held, moving it to Baugé with considerable care in 1476 to remove it from the path of his acquisitive nephew, Louis XI.³³

The idea of slipping behind the tapestry stems from a desire to discover what was really going on and how victory was achieved during this troubled period of France’s history. After a long passage of time, the reverse of a tapestry is more simon-pure and vibrant than the image originally crafted for the beholder. The reverse of a tapestry reveals the intricacies of design—the texture and beauty of its interwoven schema, where the threads of decisions and actions were woven and knotted together to achieve the public narrative of victory; it is where the real work was done. Just as a completed tapestry results from a concerted team effort by artist, dyer, and weaver, no one person can be singled out as the sole architect of the re-conquest of France. Yolande of Aragon, however, played an important part in its reunification and recovery and, with this book, I seek to unpick the extent to which she was involved.

Dawn Bratsch-Prince has observed to me that feminist historians have drawn attention to this “messiness” (the complexity) of history that is often drummed out of traditional or prescribed historical narratives. With this in mind, the history of women, frequently pieced together from fragmentary evidence and gleaned from between the lines, is more effectively presented from the “underside” or the “reverse” of the tapestry. All true tapestries are mirror images: they are woven reverse-side uppermost, facing the weaver. My decade-and-a-half research into the deeds of Yolande of Aragon has led me inevitably to the reverse of the tapestry; extant documentary evidence and

works she commissioned bear witness to Yolande of Aragon, master *tisserande* (weaver), Queen of Jerusalem–Sicily, patiently and prudently working toward the creation of a new Jerusalem in France from the rubble of its Babylon. Her contemporary, Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, expresses well the virtue of patience in overcoming tribulation:

Patience is a lady of observance and modesty, serious with a firm and stable countenance, battles and storms move her not, instead she remains always steadfast and composed.³⁴

Prudence aside, patience was perhaps Yolande's greatest virtue and strength, underscoring all of her actions and strategies. It enabled her to continue with her strategies despite the many storms she weathered, underwriting her eventual success in securing the throne of France for her son-in-law and her marital house's future. That her surviving eldest son, René, was unable to fill her shoes, allowing her grandson Louis XI a relatively free hand to possess hard-won Angevin territories, should not detract from Yolande's effective stateswomanship.

Yolande of Aragon is mentioned *en passant* by many historians and scholars of the closing stages of the Hundred Years War. In studies of the second house of Anjou, Good King René of Anjou, Charles VII, and Joan of Arc, Yolande is acknowledged as having been shrewd and intelligent, an *éminence grise* who facilitated political, military, and diplomatic advantage for her marital house, and for France. However, until this book, no scholar has attempted an examination and analysis of her activities in detail and in the broader context of her time. A few scattered masters dissertations, some scholarly papers, journal articles, popular histories, and novels have appeared from time to time, but these concentrate largely on isolated aspects of her undertakings, her children, or, if she is the point of focus, fall into the category of the hagiographic portrait or purposive and/or unsupported wishful thinking.

For any scholar, the unpicking and restoration of Yolande's woven narrative in the context of a wider background of European geopolitics, religion, and warfare is a difficult and ambitious undertaking. Given the diversity of its players and theaters, attention to the narrative chronology of Yolande's epoch was conceived of as the most effective means by which to avoid confusion and undue repetition for the reader. However, as Craig Taylor put it when commenting upon my earlier research, important themes—such as Yolande's unwavering commitment to her family's best interests; her unquestionable piety;

her gradually emerging public power and authority; and her durable influence over private and public politics, notably, her involvement with the well-titled Joan of Arc story—are not cast aside in this study. These themes and their variations are at the core of Yolande’s activities and they surface frequently here as her narrative unfolds.

The book examines the ways in which Yolande of Aragon employed her royal “dignities,” her queenship and her antecedents, fitting these to her fluid contexts and multilayered responsibilities, to exercise power, influence, and authority. While authority reposing in a queen or elite woman is always an enticing idea to run to earth, it is perhaps power and influence that is of greater interest because, for me at least, it is a marker of effectiveness in undertaking. Michel Foucault reasoned that “power is neither given or exchanged, or recovered, but rather exercised (...), it exists only in action.”³⁵ Power, therefore, is a force; it is not tangible and exists only when utilized, while authority is officially constituted, securing obedience and conformity through a hierarchical chain of command.³⁶ Within the constraints of modern publishing, I have striven to weave together as detailed and complex a political history as possible—one that is written from the perspective of a queen-consort.

Some might find that, with this offering, I have centered on context to the detriment of detailed prosecution of a theoretical argument. To those readers, I plead only that I have had to prioritize multiple competing demands informing Yolande of Aragon’s complex political narrative. A close examination of this enigmatic stateswoman’s career reveals that context *is* pretty much everything; without it, much of her activity loses its importance and erodes it of meaning. I have attempted, therefore, to ensure that as rich a context as possible, the complicated and time-worn tapestry of people and events I have considered, emerges from these pages. Of inestimable importance to my research is the methodological tool of network analysis, unravelling and mending the schema by which the many fibers of Yolande’s tapestry weave together. If we are to come to some sort of a conclusion regarding Yolande’s queenship and her implication or otherwise in Charles VII’s eventual “victory,” in the absence of an unbroken trail of parchment, Yolande’s diverse and intersecting familial, religious, and sociopolitical networks must be pulled apart and examined. To run these networks to earth, a variety of sources has been consulted, including household accounts, letters (of which almost none of Yolande’s own have been preserved), mandates, ordinances, and treaties, as well as the work of historians,

chroniclers, chancellors, poets, secretaries, money-men, and at least one pope. Although some of this wealth of information from varied sources might appear, at first reading, to be peripheral, I have determined to build a picture of the times as well as the lives and links of the principal players connected to Yolande of Aragon and her political activities. This book is but the first step on a long path to retrieving the life of yet another enigmatic and influential pre-modern stateswoman.



CHAPTER I

INFANTA OF ARAGON: FAMILY MATTERS

Politics, war and administration seemed to be the natural vocations of women in her family.¹

Born in Zaragoza on August 11, 1381, Yolande of Aragon was the eldest and only surviving child of the marriage of Joan I and Violant of Bar. Her mother, Violant, was the daughter of Robert I, Duke of Bar, and Marie of France, the granddaughter of Jean II *le Bon*, King of France, the niece of Charles V of France, and the cousin of Charles VI of France.² Of Yolande's early life, we know little; of her public persona as duchess of Anjou and queen of Jerusalem and Sicily, I will uncover more as this study progresses. I have pieced together fragments of her early life by referring to her mother's considerable extant correspondence, revealing what is known about the court of Aragon, its systems of administration, its religious and spiritual affiliations, and the careers and personalities of her father, Joan I, and her mother, Violant of Bar.

In 1387 with the accession of Joan I, known variously as *el Caçador* (the Hunter); *el Amador de la Gentilesa* (Lover of elegance), *afrancesat* ("Frenchified"); and, by the end of his reign, *el Descurat* (the Negligent), the kingdom of France found a firm friend and powerful ally on the Iberian Peninsula.³ The French princess, Violant of Bar, Queen-consort of Aragon, was a vital and durable player before, during, and beyond Joan I's relatively brief reign; Violant's political career, cultural interests and innovations, her dynastic maneuverings, and their influence upon Yolande of Aragon's political life, are examined here and in later chapters; they are the golden thread that runs through the rich tapestry of Yolande's political and cultural life.

Marital Politics: A Game of Thrones

Violant's enterprising uncle Louis I, Duke of Anjou, explored several political marital alliances for both his sons, and the marriage of his elder son, Louis, was carefully framed by the context of his Italian aspirations. Having been adopted by Giovanna I of Naples in 1380, Clement VII urged Louis I to neutralize his potential rivals by strategically marrying his elder son to block their advance. By 1381, a flurry of diplomatic activity was underway to ensure strategic alliances for both his sons. In November 1381, three months after the birth of Yolande of Aragon, Louis I contemplated marrying his two sons to two daughters of Joan, Duke of Girona, *primogènit* of Aragon, and his niece, the duchess of Girona, Violant (Yolande) of Bar. Yolande had an elder half-sister—six-year-old Joana Daroca—the only surviving child of her father's first consummated marriage to Mata of Armagnac.⁴

Louis I of Anjou had great expectations regarding the extended kingdom of Naples, but insular Sicily was under the influence of the powerful crown of Aragon–Catalonia. Allying Anjou with Aragon in marriage was a better option than tackling Aragon head-on in armed combat for suzerainty over Naples–Sicily. To demonstrate the importance and attractiveness of these kingdoms to wider French interests, by February 1382, the original marital project had been modified, with the 14-year-old king of France, Charles VI (in place of Louis II of Anjou), and the younger son of Louis I of Anjou, Charles of Tarente, put forward as prospective suitors for Joana and Yolande. At the time of this modification to the marital negotiations between France and Aragon, and having left for Naples, Louis I of Anjou continued to shadow Charles VI as regent even as he attained his majority.⁵ Louis was of a mind to cement a durable Aragonese alliance for France and Anjou to serve his own interests, engaged as he was in an acrimonious struggle for ascendancy at his nephew's court with his ambitious younger brothers—the dukes of Berry and Burgundy.

Notwithstanding Louis's machinations with Aragon, from the time of his adoption by Giovanna, he felt a justifiable and urgent imperative to find and cement a solid ally on the Italian peninsula. Concurrent with his negotiations with Aragon (and the plan to betroth the young king of France, Charles VI, to one of the daughters of Aragon), in March 1382, Louis sought to promise his younger son, Charles, to a daughter of Barnabò Visconti, Lord of Milan.⁶ This project was modified in very short order (from the Tuesday to

the Sunday of the same week), with his elder son and heir, Louis, taking the place of Charles as a candidate for the hand of Lucia Visconti. Le Fèvre records that on Sunday, March 13, Barnabò agreed to furnish 2000 lances for six months; to defy Charles of Durazzo; and to dispatch his son and his banner with *Monseigneur* [Louis I], his good friend, thereby clearing the path for him and his men. Le Fèvre documents that he duly “*seillé une procuration à l’evêque d’Agen sur le mariage* (sealed a proxy to the bishop of Agen [Simon of Cramaud, champion of Clement VII and counselor to Jean, Duke of Berry] for the marriage).”⁷ By letters dated from Angers on May 6, 1384, seven-year-old Louis II of Anjou, Duke of Calabria, ratified a diplomatic exchange between Anjou and Milan and dispatched a ring to his fiancée, Lucia, in the expectation of their wedding once both had achieved the appropriate age.⁸ On October 8, 1384, following the death of Louis I in Italy, Regnauld Bresille returned from Milan, having achieved his mission to cement Louis II’s betrothal to Lucia Visconti.⁹ Clement VII counseled Marie, Queen-dowager of Sicily, who was hard-pressed to force Provence to her obedience, to nudge the Milanese into finalizing their contractual agreement.¹⁰ With the arrest and assassination of Bernabò Visconti on May 6, 1385, silence reigned over the betrothal of Louis II to Lucia Visconti.¹¹ In July 1385, Marie’s brother-in-law, Jean of Berry, put forward an alternative possibility: to betroth Louis II to Valentina, daughter of the count of Vertus, Giangaleazzo Visconti, who had removed his uncle Bernabò from their co-lordship of Milan.¹² In the event, a more prestigious candidate, Louis, Count of Valois, brother of Charles VI (his former betrothal with Katalin, heiress-presumptive of Hungary, having fallen through due to her death in May 1378), swiftly undermined this possibility for the second house of Anjou.¹³

Despite subsequent marital foxiness, according to Louis I’s chancellor, Jean Le Fèvre, there was something tangible to be gained by Anjou and Aragon both, from February 1382 to the death of Louis I in 1384: “ (...) by this [marriage] a vessel of those that Aragon had armed for the conquest of the island of Sicily was to be put at the disposal of my lord of Anjou for Naples and, for his part, his lordship would assist [Aragon] with armed soldiers for the conquest of the island; by virtue of this marriage my Lord Anjou would receive a sum of money.”¹⁴ Between 1378 and 1384, Pere IV of Aragon had busily rallied expeditionary forces for the conquest of Sicily, but his appointed lieutenant for the fractious island kingdom, his younger son, Martí, had been in no hurry to take up his fight. The Angevin–Aragonese alliance should be considered in the context of the respective projects

of the parties to the 1382 agreement. The Aragonese chronicler Zurita touches upon the precautionary measures undertaken by Louis I to secure Naples for the second house of Anjou: “With no prospect of salvation other than Louis I of Anjou, whom she had adopted as her son with the hope of his succession to her kingdom; this prince came to her aid provided with a great army; and before his departure he was crowned and anointed king of Sicily by pope Clement in Avignon who gave him investiture of the kingdom.”¹⁵ No flies on Louis or, indeed, on the king of Aragon, Pere IV. That Louis I had a role to play in Aragon’s trans-Mediterranean ambitions is striking and highlights his strategy to cement an alliance with Aragon—a potential aggressor—to further Anjou’s aspirations for Naples–Sicily. Marital negotiations between Anjou and Aragon meandered somewhat until 1387, the year Yolande of Aragon’s father ascended the throne. From the beginning of Joan I and Violant of Bar’s reign, it was clear that their international and diplomatic focus largely shifted back toward France; Pere had aligned himself clearly to his Sicilian ambitions from the time of his marriage to his third wife, Elionor of Sicily, in 1349. While Pere had pursued a policy of energetic neutrality regarding the Schism, Joan and Violant threw their influence and their networks behind the Avignon pope, Clement VII. It is in this context that the reinvigorated relationship between Aragon and France should be examined and, with it, the re-energized marriage negotiations between the second house of Anjou and Aragon.

On April 21, 1387, two ambassadors arrived in Barcelona from France to conclude a treaty of coalition and alliance, expressed in temporal language and divided into several distinct chapters. Under the terms of the proposed league: (1) the king of Aragon would promise to be a true, sincere, and faithful friend to the king of France; (2) Aragon would forbid any of its subjects from making war, violence, or insult on France; (3) Aragon would not offer asylum to any enemies, rebels, and traitors of France, but rather, once such persons were detected, Aragon would inform France of these hostile elements, excepting if there was no proof or manifestation of their alleged treachery; and (4) Aragon would assist France, when it was in its power to do so, either by making available ten galleys at its own expense or ensure that these were kept on standby, and France would do likewise except that, rather than galleys, it would undertake to furnish Aragon with an equivalent force of lances and men-at-arms.¹⁶ Despite France’s rush to cement a coalition with the new monarchs of Aragon, Marie of Blois-Penthièvre was reluctant to place all her eggs in the one marital basket, given the duplicitous maneuverings

of her brothers-in-law, Berry and Burgundy, at the French court. In 1387, she explored options other than Aragon to secure the futures of her sons. In May 1387, very much in the vein of Pere IV of Aragon's Sicilian play of 1378–80 (when he sought to marry his recently widowed elder son, Joan, to his granddaughter, Maria of Sicily), Marie conceived of a project to betroth Louis II to Giovanna, daughter of Charles of Durazzo, enemy of his father, Louis I.¹⁷ Louis would have nothing of the scheme, and his mother was obliged to look elsewhere in the light of Aragon's momentary unresponsiveness. It is a subtle irony that Giovanna of Durazzo would succeed her brother Ladislaus as Giovanna II, Queen of Naples, and that she eventually adopted Louis III of Anjou as her son and designated heir. Had Louis II agreed to his mother's project of May 1387, he might have ensured trouble-free possession of the kingdom of Naples for the second house of Anjou and preserved its considerable treasury and assets for the benefit of his descendants. Subsequent events, however, perhaps demonstrate that Giovanna II of Naples was not cut from the same cloth as Yolande of Aragon.

On June 2, 1387, Marie's envoys returned from Barcelona, where they had been sent once again to treat the marriage of Louis II with "*la fille du Roy d'Arragon nommée Yolant*" (the daughter of the king of Aragon, named Yolande).¹⁸ On August 29, 1387, Marie's busy chancellor, Le Fèvre, appeared in Roquemaure to discuss yet another marital proposition with the cardinal-archbishop of Embrun, Michel Etienne de L'Isle: "*un nouvel traité de mariage du Roy Loys à la fille du conte de Saint Pol*" (a new marital treaty between King Louis and the daughter of the Count of St Pol).¹⁹ At the urging of Louis II's interested uncles, Berry and Burgundy, Robert of Dreux and Olivier Dussolier were sent as envoys to Aragon to renegotiate the marital alliance with Yolande. To get things moving, Marie of Blois-Penthièvre, in the company for her sons, left Avignon for France on January 28, 1388, to seek the help of her sons' cousin, Charles VI, in the uncompleted matter of Louis II's betrothal to Yolande, *infanta* of Aragon; Charles VI received his aunt with great warmth and encouragement.²⁰ Eventually, letters between Aragon and Anjou were exchanged in Avignon in March 1388. Le Fèvre handed letters to Angevin ambassadors charged with concluding the agreement; they represented two levels of authority—one absolute and the other requiring the consent of the king of France, Berry, and Burgundy before validation of the contract could proceed. Le Fèvre records that on May 26, 1388, among other matters, the king of France replied to *Madame* that the offers made by Joan

I were paltry whereas his demands were excessive. Concurrent with these negotiations, Queen Violant had been unable to grant a request made of her by Charles VI and his queen, Isabeau; they had petitioned Aragon for the supply of ten galleys in accordance with the arrangements set down in their February 1387 coalition agreement. In response to France's petition, Violant responded with an exquisitely diplomatic letter sent from Barcelona, under her secret seal, dated April 18, 1388, informing Charles VI that, for legitimate reason,²¹ at that moment, Aragon was unable to supply the requisite equipped galleys that could be spared for France's exclusive use. She did, however, soften her message, urging Charles to write again with his request [later] in spring or early summer: "send a letter to us, at that time, with your request on this score as well as other matters pertaining to your honor and our house, further correspondence on this matter would be welcome; [and would mitigate] your displeasure at our response to your request—the galleys are expensive to produce but with further negotiation we should be able to fulfil your request."²² Notwithstanding the lack of galleys forthcoming, France conceded that if Joan I agreed to apportion 200,000 francs to his daughter, Yolande, the marriage could proceed.²³

Le Fèvre duly reported this exchange to *Madame* on September 1, 1388, in Roquemaure. Also present were Marie's envoys, Robert de Dreux and Raymon Bernard, dispatched to give *Madame's* assent for Clement VII to add his weight with his personal ambassadors to her embassy.²⁴ Marie's renewed interest in Aragon did not keep the enthusiastic cardinal of Embrun down for long; on September 5, he and the cardinal of Saluces, Amédée of Saluces, nephew of Clement VII, beetled along to request an audience with Marie, the objective of which was to put forward an alternate marital project, this time to betroth her younger son, Charles of Tarente, to Jeanne, daughter of the Count of Saint Pol. Le Fèvre reports that Marie graciously consented to hear them out.²⁵

Louis II of Anjou, King of Sicily and of Jerusalem

Proactive, targeted and sustained diplomacy ensured Louis II of Anjou's positive reception in Naples to take up his hereditary claim, and Aragon's ambitions for dominion over Sicily–Naples were a major sticking point in his progress to the Neapolitan throne. In 1390, papal, Angevin, and French envoys descended and swarmed upon Aragon to establish a formal betrothal in 1390 between *la infanta doña Violante y el rey Luis* (the princess, Lady Yolande, and King

Louis).²⁶ To bookend this strategic geopolitical alliance between Aragon and the young king of Jerusalem–Sicily, Louis II of Anjou, another alliance was finalized—the marriage treaty with the junior Aragonese branch ruling Sicily on behalf of “*la reina doña María de Sicilia y el conde de Ejérica hijo del infante don Martín duque de Momblanc casase con la reina doña María de Sicilia*” (the Lady, Queen Maria of Sicily and the Count of Ejérica, son of Martí, Duke of Momblanc).²⁷ This dynastic carving up of the two Sicilies—peninsular Naples and insular Sicily—was designed to benefit both parties and to stifle the ambitions of 14-year-old Ladislaus of Durazzo, successor to Charles III of Durazzo, resident in Naples and the beneficiary of an undeniable positional advantage. Zurita describes “*la manera que recibieron al duque de Anjous en Nápoles*” (how the duke of Anjou was received in Naples), confirming that Louis II had “impressed the kingdom with the quality of his army, as is recorded in the annals, arriving in the month of December of that year [1390], and was received as king with great solemnity and celebration.”²⁸ Louis II had “arrived” in Naples at the head of an impressive fleet of Provençal origin backed up by the attentive guardianship of his mother, Marie of Blois-Penthièvre.²⁹

The skilful government of Cardinal Pierre de Thury, Clement VII’s legate to the courts of France and Naples, combined with a decisive victory achieved in Pouilles in April 1392, the conquests of Amalfi and Ravello, and the submission of a significant quantity of Calabrian barons, assured victory for Louis II of Anjou. The young king of Sicily’s conquest must have made quite an impression; Louis II, Duke of Bourbon, maternal uncle of Charles VI, announced his intention to come personally to the aid of his nephew, Louis II of Anjou, at the head of a sizeable expeditionary force. Unfortunately for Louis in Naples, with the first episode of madness suffered by Charles VI in August 1392, and despite the best exertions of Clement VII on his behalf during the first seven months of 1393 to get Bourbon’s forces deployed, the French project stayed on the drawing board.³⁰ More bad news arrived for the teenaged king of Sicily with the death of his protector, Clement VII, on September 16, 1394. Clement’s successor, the Aragonese Pedro Martínez de Luna, Pope Benedict XIII, was tepid in his support of Louis II, even as his Roman rival, Boniface IX, was proactive in his support of Louis’s opponent, Ladislaus. The wheel of fortune turned abruptly against Louis, and his hard-won victory gradually soured into bitter defeat. Having been received in Naples with “great solemnity and celebration” in 1390, the young king of Sicily eventually found himself more or less under siege in his Neapolitan kingdom. Departing for Pouilles to put

down a revolt, Louis learned that a large number of his adherents, led by the powerful Sanseverino clan, had, in his absence, transferred their loyalties to Ladislaus. Ladislaus entered Naples in triumph on July 10, 1399, and a discouraged Louis II abandoned his kingdom to return to his prosperous counties of Provence-Forcalquier.³¹

This template of victory followed by abandonment is one Louis II, Yolande of Aragon, and their two eldest sons would encounter repeatedly as they fought for Neapolitan sovereignty.³² For 16 years—from the time of his father's death in 1384 until 1400—Louis, seconded by his mother, had endeavored to realize the Angevin project of expansion and dominion in Italy. Louis needed to salvage something from the wreckage of the ambitions he shared with his father. Having refused to consider the quick-fix solution of a marital alliance with a daughter of the house of Durazzo, Louis II moved to conclude his marriage to Yolande of Aragon—a princess linked to impressively powerful networks of alliance and tangible support. For the second house of Anjou, the Aragonese marriage would sustain the diverse politics and ambition of its enterprise.

Notwithstanding Aragon's promise to France, the 200,000-franc dowry was never fully realized. The document of renunciation of Yolande's hereditary rights in the line of Aragonese succession was established on October 12, 1400, just prior to her departure for her marriage and coronation ceremonies held on December 1 and 2; she later withdrew her renunciation on the grounds of non-payment of the promised dowry to claim rights over the throne of Aragon for herself and for her descendants.³³

Like his cousin, Charles VI of France, Louis II of Anjou benefited greatly from the intervention and assistance periodically forthcoming from Joan I and Violant of Bar. Zurita testifies to concrete help obtained from Aragon to bolster Louis's Italian campaign again in 1393: "The king of Sicily [Martí the Younger] assisted in Naples, as the king of Aragon had resolved [to aid his son-in-law]. In this year [1393], when things were needed in Sicily, the Duke of Momblanc and his son, Martí, King of Sicily, helped Louis, King of Naples, with about four very well-armed galleys."³⁴

Even with advance solid assistance forthcoming from Aragon, Louis II (and the French crown) had to clear several more hurdles before his marriage to Yolande of Aragon was solemnized on December 2, 1400. The marriage agreement between Aragon and Anjou was a rocky road to travel for Violant of Bar, Queen of Aragon, and Marie of Blois-Penthièvre, Queen-dowager of Sicily and Jerusalem. As discussed, it was first mooted in November 1381,

a few short months after the birth of Yolande of Aragon, and it was not finalized on paper until 1392. This was a busy year for Violant of Bar and an *annus horribilis* for the kingdom of France; she managed to secure Anjou for Yolande on May 25, 1392, and Foix for her stepdaughter, Joana Daroca on June 4, with Zurita assuring us that the betrothal of Yolande of Aragon to King Louis of Sicily was solemnized *con gran fiesta* in Barcelona. In France, Charles VI suffered his first episode of madness in the summer of 1392 while in hot and intemperate pursuit of the Breton “noble bandit” Pierre de Craon, who had attempted to assassinate his constable, Olivier of Clisson.³⁵ Although Violant might have felt that her marital projects had been achieved, she was to experience several significant setbacks before her only child could be dispatched to her intended.

Notwithstanding that a legitimate betrothal existed between Aragon and Anjou-France, Yolande of Aragon was sought by England, with Richard II sounding out an alliance with Aragon in 1394. For pragmatic foreign policy motives, England wanted an alliance that would strengthen its position against France. Richard’s embassy departed England in March 1394 to solicit a betrothal between Yolande, *infanta* of Aragon, and the widower-king of England; for a time, it seemed possible that Yolande might become queen of England.³⁶ Conscious of the reaction of her French family, Violant of Bar stalled the English, informing them that she was required to seek the consent of her cousin, Charles VI. The French crown responded in no uncertain terms that she should not, under any circumstance, contemplate the procuration of such a marital alliance because England was France’s enemy.³⁷ The English initiative set the cat among the French pigeons and Angevin feathers flying; a durable rapprochement with Aragon was essential to bookend the existing alliance between France and Castile for both the second house of Anjou’s Mediterranean interests and to place a diplomatic and geopolitical wedge between England and Aragon.³⁸ Paris reacted to the English mission by proposing Isabelle of France as an alternate bride for Richard II.³⁹ Isabelle was the six-year-old daughter of Charles VI and Isabeau of Bavaria; rather than standing idly aside while Aragon signed an alliance with England, Charles VI prudently leap-frogged the proposal, positioning Isabelle as a bride for Richard II.⁴⁰ However, the Angevin–Aragonese alliance was not settled due to escalating political turmoil in the final months of the reign of Yolande’s father, his unexpected and tragic death on May 19, 1396, and the ascension of his brother, Martí I; the geopolitical winds shifted significantly, leaving France out in the cold, to the benefit of England.

The events leading to the 1398 subtraction of obedience from the Avignon papacy and the ensuing political turmoil were messes Louis II had to confront in 1399. His lieutenant-mother, Marie of Blois-Penthievre, had had little choice but to fall in line with the actions of the French crown and its policy of *via cessionis*, which called for the simultaneous resignations of both popes to put an end to the Schism.⁴¹ Had Marie chosen to do otherwise, she would have been in conflict with her powerful brothers-in-law, Berry and Burgundy, who largely called the shots during the frequent “absences” of Charles VI.⁴² The fluid geopolitical situation in the western Mediterranean, and with the reality that Aragon’s royal policy was no longer pro-French as it had been during the reign of Joan I and Violant of Bar, meant that Anjou found itself in choppy political waters.⁴³ This tectonic shift presented a potential impediment to Louis II’s long-anticipated alliance with Yolande of Aragon, which Anjou needed to protect if it were to have a hope of securing its Neapolitan inheritance. Problems had first arisen in 1394–6 when Richard II of England had sought the hand of Yolande. France had an unambiguous interest in maintaining its alliance with Aragon; Charles VI’s and Louis II’s envoys were dispatched to Aragon to make certain that the marriage would proceed in the face of a possible alliance between Aragon and England. Both Anjou and France had had a right to be concerned. On May 5, 1396 (14 days *before* the death of her father), in Torrella de Montgríu, the 15-year-old Yolande of Aragon announced crisply that she had no intention of honoring the betrothal agreement to which she had prematurely consented in the presence of the king of Sicily’s representatives when she was 11; she added that, if the knight sent by the king of France or any other person intended to twist her words in the opposite direction to that which she intended, she had taken the advance precaution of insisting that minutes be taken to record her exact words and those of her family.⁴⁴ The final words of her declaration hint at the possibility of sharp political play on the part of parents, Joan and especially Violant, who “was prepared to go to great lengths to advance her child’s interests” and for whom the prospect of being the mother of the queen of England would have held undeniable political advantage.⁴⁵ Notwithstanding the momentary deep repugnance she pretended at the prospect of marrying an enemy of her natal kingdom, Yolande (or rather, Aragon) eventually agreed to wed the king of Sicily, who disguised himself as a bystander to catch a first glimpse of her as she arrived in Montpellier to make the journey through Provence to Arles, where they were married on December 2, 1400.⁴⁶

Yolande, *Infanta* of Aragon, Queen of Sicily and of Jerusalem

Yolande of Aragon was a singular woman; a princess of Aragon, her contemporaries naturally lauded her beauty but she proved to be intelligent and gifted, dedicated to the causes of her family and, later, to those of France, upon whose fortunes hers ultimately depended. Michel Pintoin describes the first impression of her upon the court of France in January 1401 in these terms:

In the month of January [sic], in the city of Arles, Louis, King of Sicily married Madame Yolande, daughter of the late king of Aragon, and the daughter of the illustrious duke of Bar [Violant of Bar]. This princess captivated everyone by her rare beauty, by the loveliness of her face, by the air of dignity that radiated from her entire being. She was, quite simply, a veritable treasure of graces. According to the wise, nature had taken delight in making her and had showered her with all perfection; the only thing lacking was that she had not been made immortal. I will not attempt to describe her attractions here; suffice it to say that no other woman merits comparison with her.⁴⁷

Yolande's parents, her aunt, and her uncle had greatly influenced the development of her character and personality; however, it would be a mistake not to take into account the influence of the "spirit and force" of her Aragonese grandfather, Pere IV—though he only survived her birth by about six years. Pere IV was a force of nature as much as he was an ambitious and imperially minded king of Aragon–Catalonia. Perhaps, the earliest example of Pere's determined character is most clearly expressed in his self-coronation at the age of 16 in 1336. Pere was strategically conscious of the import of his action, having precedent in the self-coronation of his father, Alfons IV, in 1328 as well as the subsequent self-coronation undertaken by Alfonso XI of Castile in 1332. Pere determined to place the crown of Aragon upon his own head without the participation of the officiating high clergy; he even refused to allow his bishops to adjust the crown once he had placed it upon his own head. Jaume Aurell and Marta Serrano-Coll explain:

The ceremony had two essential elements: unction and coronation. The king had no objection to letting the archbishop take the lead in administering the unction, considered a sacrament and proper to the spiritual and sacred sphere. But he demanded that the archbishop desist in his desire also to be involved at the moment of coronation, which belonged to the temporal sphere.⁴⁸

After a good deal of energetic debate in the vestry (which delayed the ceremony considerably) between a determined teenaged Pere and the venerable royal advisor and archbishop of Zaragoza, Pero López de Luna y Ximénez de Urrea, and after initially being coerced into capitulation by the combined weight of assembled ecclesiastics and lesser advisers, Pere crowned himself “consolidating a tradition for the future.”⁴⁹ Aurell and Serrano-Coll observe that this early act of calculated defiance, coupled with Pere’s subsequent activities to reinforce his power on the basis of his self-coronation, underscores his “singular ability to strengthen his authority by many different means, highlighting his moral energy in contrast with his corporal weakness and his particular and conscious use of writing to increase the administrative efficiency of his extensive kingdom.”⁵⁰ Pere’s account of his self-coronation, including the swither that proceeded it in the sacristy, is contained in the chronicle composed by him in collaboration with Bernat Dezcoll.⁵¹ Both Pere’s sons, Joan and Martí, continued their father’s act of self-coronation, reinforcing the “tradition” inaugurated by their grandfather, Alfons IV *el Begnigne*, and emphasized by Pere *el Cerimoniós*.⁵² Pere’s new coronation ceremonial was also included in his lengthy document of household and court regulations;⁵³ his act of self-coronation is at its center, but he complemented it with a shorter ceremonial for queens of Aragon, instructing how queens should be consecrated and how they should be crowned by [the hands of] their husband-kings: *De la manera con los reyes d’Aragó se faran consagrar e los reys d’Aragó les coronaran* (Of the Manner in Which the Queens of Aragon Are Consecrated and the Kings of Aragon Crown Them). From her king, the queen is given the crown, the scepter, the pommel, and the ring, known as the *medicus*, placed by him on the fourth finger of her right hand.⁵⁴ In the beautiful accompanying miniature, Pere is shown placing the crown upon the head of his fourth consort, Sibil·la de Fortià.⁵⁵ Her grandfather’s template for securing and maintaining power was one Yolande of Aragon deployed throughout her political career. Like her grandfather Pere’s, Yolande’s political career would be characterized by ceremony, “subtlety and astuteness.”⁵⁶

There had been many changes in the way the administration of power functioned in the crown of Aragon from the early thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries, and these transformations were a direct result of its expansionist vision—particularly during the long reigns of Jaume I *el Conqueridor* (1213–76) and Pere IV (1336–87). These ambitious monarchs maximized the effectiveness of their respective administrations to realize their aspirations and retain

their acquisitions. In pursuit of multiple sovereignties, these powerful rulers expanded their domains from Aragon into Catalonia, seizing control over small portions of southern France, enabling the annexation of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, southern Italy, Corsica, and areas of Murcia.⁵⁷ Such dramatic territorial expansion across the Mediterranean basin demanded a reformation of their administrative structures from a transitory and *ad hoc* system to a semi-professional organized hierarchy of advisers and court officials. According to Marta VanLandingham, the climax of this transformation occurred during the busy and authoritarian reign of Yolande of Aragon's grandfather, Pere IV. Early in his reign, he realized that if his court were to support his ambitions for Aragon, orally transmitted boundaries of office could no longer be tolerated. He codified instructions and fixed the responsibilities and duties of his servants and advisers in written policy documents.⁵⁸ Aragonese bureaucracy was born giving more control to rulers who exploited their greater authority to codify binding statutes governing the conduct of court officers.⁵⁹ Pere's increased administrative centralization and an expanded professional bureaucracy did not lessen the power and authority of successive Aragonese queens-consort; rather, it ensured that Aragon's far-flung and culturally diverse territories remained under the control of the Crown.

The administration of the papal curia, itself based upon the Roman model, served as an effective template for the centralization of an efficient and successful bureaucracy. The kingdom of Sicily, which would play an important part in expanding Aragonese influence and territory, was an anomaly when compared to other western administrations of the period. Roger II, the Norman king of Sicily (1130–54), governed his dominions from his capital, Palermo, with the help of an efficient and centralized system of bureaucracy—a form he had adapted from his Muslim predecessors.⁶⁰ Later, in the thirteenth century, Friedrich II Hohenstaufen (1198–1250) found that, of all his empire, his rule was more effective in Sicily than elsewhere. In 1282, Sicily was annexed to Aragon, the dynasty's claim arising from the 1262 marriage of Pere III *el Gran* to Konstanze (Constança) Hohnestaufen, Friedrich II's granddaughter and nominal heiress to Sicily—a claim not recognized by the papacy.⁶¹

Constança's claim to her Sicilian inheritance was a serendipitous development in Aragon's policy of trans-Mediterranean expansionism. Conscious he needed an efficient system in place to serve and consolidate his future holdings and fund his expansionist dreams, Pere III reinforced his authority at home and strengthened his

financial resources. By 1282, Pere had achieved the desired effect, relieving Charles I of Anjou of his island kingdom, having first taken care to conspire against Charles with his enemies in surrounding regions. This defeat became known as the Sicilian Vespers. Ever defiant, and having defeated the papal crusade launched against him, Pere III divided his territories among his sons at the time of his death in 1285. The mainland territories and Mallorca were left to his eldest son, Alfons III *el Liberal*, while the kingdom of Sicily devolved to his second son, Jaume. When Alfons died in 1291, Jaume returned to Aragon and reigned as Jaume II *el Just*, leaving his younger brother Frederico to govern Sicily as his viceroy. Aragon's relationship with the papacy deteriorated over the Sicilian question, with Jaume attempting to restore papal sovereignty over Sicily in return for peace, Corsica, and Sardinia. Frederico rejected his brother's initiative; and his Sicilian subjects opposed Jaume's move. Frederico's branch of the Aragonese–Catalan dynasty retained Sicily throughout much of the fourteenth century despite southern Italy's reconsolidation under Angevin rule.⁶²

In common with his great adversaries the Angevins, Pere *el Gran* and his sons found their newly established trans-Mediterranean territories difficult to retain.⁶³ Pere understood well the pressing need to consolidate his powerbase and assure regional loyalty in all of this far-flung domains; he required an efficient and highly evolved form of authority to ensure that financial and military might were controlled from a central administrative capital. VanLandingham explains: "Sicily embodied the very model of medieval centralization and bureaucracy and the power they could proffer."⁶⁴ Sicily was the jumping-off point for Pere's "global" ambitions, and it provided him with a readymade template for governing his nascent empire. Sicily fulfilled the same function for the house of Aragon–Catalonia as Provence would for the second house of Anjou. Exiles from Angevin rule in Sicily—able jurists and other specialist professionals—helped Pere III and Constança convert treasury procedures to the Sicilian model and implement other important innovations.⁶⁵ Not only were administrative reforms necessary to hold together the diverse federation of states the kingdom of Aragon would become, but strong dynastic continuity too had a role to play. Dynastic potency, with the help of a highly organized system of administration, was the best way to unite territories that had little in common apart from the identity of the ruler. Both Aragon and Anjou believed that their sovereignties reposed, in part, upon the idea of lordship over territories devolved from individual inheritances and conquests, reinforced by strategic

marital alliances. And, both Aragon and Anjou II were blessed in the qualities of their respective queens-consort.

The same obstacles that confronted Marie of Blois-Penthièvre in her efforts to conquer Provence and centralize Angevin authority for her sons also caused concern for Aragon.⁶⁶ Recalcitrant, powerful local nobles and wealthy urban communities jealously guarded lucrative franchises and privileges, particularly in Catalonia and Valencia. Urban communities had to be addressed individually and brought to heel, and a system of micromanagement and mountains of documentation were generated in an attempt to ensure the legality and durability of treaties, alliances, and agreements. With this explosion of documentation, reform was instigated following the Sicilian model discussed earlier—a necessary adjunct to durable authority. With the expansion of territory came additional problems of control and management. Added to this was the fact that the business of government became too complex to remain the sole responsibility of the king. Advisers were summoned and councils formed to deal with the weighty issues of the day. These assemblies included responsibilities relating to the administration of justice for the king's subjects—an obsession of medieval court propagandists who emphasized that this was a king's primary role.

VanLandingham articulates the idea that, during the thirteen and fourteenth centuries, the Aragonese-Catalan dynasty consciously adapted and manipulated precepts of Roman law, imported Sicilian administrative innovations, and incorporated contemporary political ideas to increase the effectiveness and the depth of its authority.⁶⁷ The ruling house understood that, by rationalizing the ways in which its courts functioned, it could accumulate resources and strategically deploy them to further its expansionist vision. Its innovative arsenal was progressive and pragmatic; it created or imported new executive positions, codified and ameliorated its administrative procedures, professionalized its staff, and promoted the legitimacy of its kingship in chronicles, policies of conduct, and sumptuous ceremony. Notwithstanding these transformations, the kings of Aragon and their advisers were not backward in manipulating highly conservative aspects of privilege and tradition.⁶⁸ *All* their activity combined to strengthen their prestige and power. Religious observance at court served to signal to those with more worldly ambitions that kingship reposed upon spiritual belief and an unswerving faith in God, reinforcing the idea of kingship held by the grace of God. This interpretation of kingship was not contingent upon the personality and exigencies of an individual sovereign, whose public and private

self was held to be inseparable, which not infrequently was all to the good.

This was the administrative and bureaucratic environment in which Yolande of Aragon grew to maturity. The aspects and characteristics outlined here were integrated deliberately into her personal style of governing during her lieutenancies, vicereignty, and extended regency. Yolande assimilated many of the ceremonial traditions of her natal land to enhance her prestige and that of her son-in-law Charles VII as he struggled to regain his throne and reputation after the disastrous fallout from the Treaty of Troyes signed by his birth mother, Isabeau of Bavaria, in 1420. As the public and private self of kingship was held to be inseparable, Charles's personal weaknesses and failings were mitigated by his *Bonne-mère*, Yolande of Aragon, who emphasized his positional advantage, his positive qualities, and glossed over his flaws.⁶⁹ In this as in other things, to understand better her later career, it is worthwhile to shed light upon the importance of Franciscan observant spirituality to the ruling dynasty of Aragon.

The Influence and Legacy of Francis, Poor Man of Assisi

Franciscans of all three orders, as well as a marked preference for Observant spirituality and practice, were at the forefront of Yolande of Aragon's upbringing as well as her tenure as queen of Jerusalem and Sicily. She had the templates—in this case, religious—of the spiritual preferences and practices of her grandfather, father, and mother, and her uncle Martí and his consort, María de Luna, who ruled Aragon during Yolande's crucial late-teenage years.⁷⁰ Of particular interest to Yolande's later political life is the influence of Franciscan counselors at the courts of Pere IV, Joan I, and Martí I.⁷¹ One influential Franciscan, Francesc Eiximenis, lauded the virtues adorning Yolande's aunt, María de Luna, in a letter to Prince Martí, absent in Sicily, governing the island for his brother Joan I: "Lord, the lady duchess humbly recommends herself to your grace, be aware Lord that she lives in a manner becoming a woman of excellent virtue, a wife of a great lord, very honestly and decently, and so presents herself before God and men."⁷²

Núria Silleras-Fernández describes María as "a queen who exemplified to perfection the ideal Eiximenis Christian lady; a good ruler and counselor to her husband, pious and liberal."⁷³ Silleras-Fernández observes that, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Franciscans,

given their close ties to the Crown, were able to prioritize the reform of their order and that “Francesc Eiximenis boosted the effort to promote Franciscan observance, which sought to return the order to Saint Francis’s primitive vigor and austerity in strict compliance with the Rule.”⁷⁴ Eiximenis is important to any consideration of the formative influences of Yolande of Aragon. Not only did he serve all three monarchs under consideration here (Pere IV, Joan I, and Martí I), he maintained cordial relations with their wives, including Violant of Bar, of whom he frequently disapproved because of her “frivolity” and French “innovations.”⁷⁵ Eiximenis relates that French songs could be heard throughout the day in Violant’s court; he took a particularly dim view of his queen’s innovations and pre-occupations, especially the manifest pleasure she derived from secular poetry, literature, and music. In his c. 1395–6 work, *Lo Libre de les Dones*, in a chapter ostensibly concerned with the visit of French noblewomen to the court of Robert and Sança of Naples, having conceded that it is right for women to learn to read, Eiximenis covertly takes Violant to task, criticizing French women for their worldliness and their excessive ways.⁷⁶ Although Eiximenis concedes that kissing and embracing are customary greetings in France and England, he holds that they ought not be allowed to infect and find favor in the royal courts of Aragon–Catalonia–Valencia and certainly not with the wealthy bourgeoisie of the kingdom who had copied the new fashions and comportment introduced by Violant of Bar.⁷⁷ Notwithstanding Eiximenis’s disapproval, Violant had considerable and authentic relationships with Franciscans of all three orders, with many of her advisers and counselors drawn from their ranks, particularly, but not exclusively, in support of her machinations during the succession dispute arising from Martí I’s death in 1410.⁷⁸ The crown of Aragon’s preference for Observant Franciscanism is not the only point raised by Silleras-Fernández that weighs upon the spiritual leanings of the adult Yolande of Aragon; like her parents, Martí and María included particular Franciscans as their most trusted political counselors:

In short, Martí, the Humane and Ecclesiastic, and Queen María de Luna shared common inclinations and interests, which they combined with undeniable religious devotion and they held Franciscans in high esteem, drawing inspiration, support and counsel from them. (...) they were indisputably influential figures of their time: they exceeded their religious and spiritual calling becoming valuable political counselors.⁷⁹

This clearly influenced Yolande: roughly one third (32%) of the members of her advisory council were ecclesiastics, of whom almost two-thirds were professionally trained (62.5%) in laws (both canonical and civil), theology, and jurisprudence, which was a much greater percentage than that of her predecessor Marie of Blois-Penthièvre (23.30%); an increased percentage upon her husband Louis II of Anjou (17.64%); and far in excess of her son, Louis III (14.28%), who preferred the nobility and third parties, only one of whom was a professionally trained doctor in *utriusque juris* (civil and canon law).⁸⁰ With the 1336 accession of Pere IV, Aragon strengthened its practice of taking a judicial offensive in cementing crown sovereignty and authority—something mirrored in the composition and professionalism of Yolande’s advisory council.⁸¹ The cavernous difference between mother and son lies in the reality that Yolande was obliged to buttress Angevin sovereignty; to govern; to administer justice; to ensure a steady stream of funds to her treasury; and to conduct subtle diplomacy, whereas Louis III’s principal priorities lay in cementing noble alliances and fighting for his sovereignty. Angevin embassies, such as the one dispatched to Pisa in 1409 by Louis II and Yolande, in particular, demonstrate the clear translation of theoretical university excellence into refined political undertaking via a strong engagement in worldly affairs.⁸² A clear accent upon professionalism was *de rigueur* for the king and queen of Sicily, especially once it became obvious that Charles VI’s condition would likely become irremediable. His incapacity to govern opened up pitfalls and possibilities for the couple to surmount and exploit, particularly from 1404, when Louis II’s political star waxed ascendant, reaching its apex with Yolande’s independent political career from 1417–42. While Yolande’s preferences were solidly Observant, her husband, Louis II, also demonstrated Franciscan leanings influenced by his mother, Marie (whose father, Charles of Blois, was a beatified Franciscan tertiary), and his father, Louis I, who had championed the campaign for his father-in-law’s beatification. Louis II’s godmother, Jeanne-Marie de Maillé, was another revered and beatified Franciscan tertiary with close ties to Marie of Blois-Penthièvre.⁸³ In keeping with her natal traditions, Yolande exercised a pragmatically strategic form of pious patronage, sponsoring Franciscan houses and encouraging her influential female entourage to do likewise.⁸⁴ This is not to suggest that this practice was limited to the house of Aragon; Anjou, Laval, Brittany, Bourbon, and Burgundy all evinced a preference for Franciscan spirituality. It is rather Yolande’s evident skill at utilizing Franciscan networks for a precise political and diplomatic purpose and its extent, influenced

by her natal dynasty and enriched serendipitously by the leanings of her marital house, that warrants attention.⁸⁵

Francis of Assisi had covered much territory and impressed many—and Aragon was no exception. The Poor Man of Assisi's sojourn in Spain, in the early part of the thirteenth century, marked a turning point in the astonishing growth of his order. That both the Crown and the burgeoning merchant class rapidly took up with the Order of the Friars Minor allowed it to implant itself in all major urban communities. Jill Webster's study *Els Menorets* reconstructs the early years of the Franciscan order in the realms of Aragon. She emphasizes their rapid rise as trusted emissaries, ambassadors, spiritual advisers, and cultural leaders. That they interacted with all levels of society and with all creeds—Jews, Muslims, and Christians—helped them to navigate a complex late medieval world.⁸⁶

Spirituality was an integral part of daily existence and religion was intimately bound to politics. When states flourished, so did religious orders, and larger mendicant orders such as the Franciscans and the Dominicans took hold firmly in Aragon during prosperous reigns from Jaume I to Pere III. The friars of these orders and, later, the Carmelites and Augustinians took to the road and were seen everywhere, traveling in pairs and preaching along the way.⁸⁷ That the Franciscans journeyed so extensively did not escape the attention of Aragon's kings. Despite undeniable prosperity, life in the realms of Aragon, particularly during the expansionist reigns of Pere III and Pere IV and their successors, Joan I and Martí I, was an intricate tapestry of victory over lesser states underscored by social conflict. Social discord provided a canvas against which mendicants could preach their message of social harmony and, very quickly, the friars became not only propagators of the faith, but promulgators of royal policy. The mobility and discretion of the mendicants allowed them to travel unhindered between states, bearing messages between family members, keeping indispensable lines of communication open between Christian royal houses. In times of deepening conflict, they were often the only messengers to get through. Apart from bearing greetings or secret business on a sovereign's behalf, Franciscans, in particular, fulfilled another important function: they were passive propagandists for the institution of kingship without ever threatening the sovereignty of individual monarchs. They gave a spiritual seal of approval to royal policy; in Aragon, they stressed the religious nature of the *Reconquista*, the defeat of the Moors, and the gradual Christian expansion of Iberia, thereby endorsing Aragon's policy of territorial expansion.⁸⁸

Another factor ensuring the spread of Franciscanism was that the friars managed to relate not only to the poor, but also to the proliferating mercantile class in urban communities. This is particularly well illustrated by the example of Eiximenis. Born to a wealthy urban Valencian family in 1383, Eiximenis penned a manual of guidance for the magistrates of the city of Valencia.⁸⁹ In a moment of hubris recorded in 1385, Eiximenis predicted that the monarchy and feudal lordship would shortly disappear as hegemonic forms of government.⁹⁰ Yolande of Aragon's father, Joan, Duke of Girona, wrote to Eiximenis's personal mentor, Pere Dartes, urging him to convince Eiximenis to reconsider his ideas regarding the role of kings and Christian kingdoms.⁹¹ Joan demanded that Eiximenis, if he had established his conclusion based upon "the art of astronomy" and given that he was an influential astrologer, he should immediately inform King Pere regarding the "requirements of divine providence."⁹² Eiximenis's specific motivation appears to have been the defense of Valencian civic autonomy against the authoritarian tendencies of the Crown—this despite the fact that Pere IV and his House were his patrons of long standing.

Notwithstanding such occasional differences of opinion, Franciscans warranted royal policy and cared for the spiritual needs of a class that depended upon the successful implementation of sovereign authority and endeavor.⁹³ A relatively stable political climate contributed to a productive economic environment. The mendicant orders were the direct beneficiaries of bourgeois prosperity and influence, attaining for themselves unprecedented authority and influence by the end of the thirteenth century; Webster cites several examples that clearly illustrate the importance of Franciscans, particularly to the crown of Aragon. When Crown or princely territories were geographically and culturally dispersed, discrete and discreetly trustworthy brokers, such as the Franciscans, were an indispensable adjunct to the armory of royal endeavor. Documents preserved in the Aragon Crown Archives signal just how heavily the Crown relied upon religious orders to undertake tasks only tenuously connected with the orders' spiritual mission. Reliable emissaries were of capital importance to the count-kings who had reconquered lands from the Muslims and needed to enhance their contact with diverse regions such as Sicily, Sardinia, and Mallorca.⁹⁴ Traditional secular ambassadors could not have fulfilled this need. Envoys were required who, by the very nature of their spiritual undertaking, appeared to be disinterested politically and materially from the monarch. Mobility and discretion were necessary to guarantee that messages were relayed

confidentially and swiftly. In times of conflict and uncertainty, this facility was an absolute necessity. When kingdoms fractured, nobles divided into self-interested factions and clans, which were, by their very nature, fleeting and uncertain networks of influence and ascendancy. Franciscans had no demonstrable territorial aspirations; they could not trade and they were, by their rule, forbidden personal wealth, titles, or goods. Such mendicants were an available pool of loyal royal servants, no threat to sovereign authority, theoretically willing, and able to undertake missions with no thought for individual personal gain.

St. Louis IX, King of France, is discussed frequently in relation to the tertiaries and the Franciscans—as is his sister St. Isabelle of France.⁹⁵ Their great-nephew, St. Louis of Toulouse, was of primordial importance to the spirituality and political aspirations of all three Angevin houses and the house of Aragon.⁹⁶ Webster asserts that, by 1348, in the realms of the crown of Aragon, disciples of Francis were not only to be found in the Friars Minor, the Poor Clares, and the tertiaries, but also in trade and charitable guilds and confraternities. This bound Franciscans ever closer to the economy of Aragon, thanks to their close links to the merchant and trade classes. Franciscans were the single most effective tool for the countings of Barcelona in their quest to consolidate and enshrine their sovereignty. Economically, politically, and philosophically, the mendicant orders were indispensable to the success of Aragonese royal enterprise; they preached the need to consolidate alliances between classes and states and emphasized and assured dynastic endeavor in a variety of ways. In Aragon, Franciscans (and, to a lesser extent, the Dominicans) were accepted as skillful intermediaries, devoted to the monarchs and all their subjects in both temporal and spiritual matters, managing to carve out a place for themselves on the Iberian Peninsula.⁹⁷ Yolande of Aragon accorded her devotion to the Observants considerable prominence, including it in her natal baggage when she married Louis II of Anjou in 1400.

Joan I and Queen Violant of Bar: A Meeting of Two Like Minds

Joan I, whose reign Bisson asserts was half over before it had officially begun, succeeded his father, Pere IV, in 1387.⁹⁸ By the age of 13, Joan was his father's lieutenant general and, at 14, he was drafted to oversee the trial and execution of his tutor (and Pere's advisor and *Gran Privat* [Great Favorite]), Bernat II de Cabrera, known as the "Great

Counselor,” expelled from court at the urging of Queen Elionor, who had replaced him in Pere’s confidence.⁹⁹ Elionor exploited Pere’s baronial conflict in Valencia to rid herself of Pere’s “counselor and courtier” by “manipulating the jealousy of Pere’s uncles and cousins.”¹⁰⁰ Elionor bombarded her son Joan with letters under her secret seal, informing him crisply that “the justice of Cabrera’s death be carried out” without any further legal “pussy-footing” about.¹⁰¹ Cabrera was well aware of the danger posed to him by Pere’s well-educated and politically ambitious third wife—a woman more than ready and capable of dominating the king and his government—viewing her “as his most powerful rival who would stop at nothing to persecute him.”¹⁰² As Joan approached his majority, Pere soon found it difficult to control his self-sufficient son; clearly, the apple had not fallen far from the tree. That Joan had overseen the trial and carried out the execution of his personal tutor, and his periodic involvement in the war between his father and Pedro I of Castile, exacerbated an already difficult father–son relationship. King at the age of 36, Joan I took less meticulous interest in the affairs of state than had Pere. Joan was educated in the fashionably courtly mold, which accorded perfectly with his personality and literary and musical inclinations. He could speak, read, and write fluently and elegantly in several languages and delighted in composing vernacular poetry and setting it to music. He was obsessive and passionate about hunting, practicing it to an elite level.¹⁰³ Joan has been much criticized for such less than serious occupations, but to do so arbitrarily would be to miss the point of his quite serious devotion to patronage and the flowering of humanism within the realms of Aragon, which was, in large part, due to his inclinations and priorities.¹⁰⁴

At the time of her marriage to Joan, Duke of Girona, Violant of Bar was 15 years of age and the polar opposite of Joan’s previous consort—the restrained and self-effacing Mata of Armagnac.¹⁰⁵ However, Violant had no greater success than her predecessor Mata had had in the area of childbearing; she too was unable to produce a surviving male heir for the throne of Aragon. Only her eldest child, baptized Violant, survived.¹⁰⁶ Violant of Bar was pampered, vivacious, and ambitious and, soon after her arrival in Aragon, threatening the prestige of her step-mother-in-law, Queen Sibil·la de Fortià. It is indeed an irony that Pere’s high nobility and his sons, Joan and Martí, welcomed the presence of Sibil·la de Fortià while she was Pere’s mistress, but once the king moved to make an “honest” royal woman of her, she was openly derided by her stepsons, their wives, and the kingdom’s high aristocracy. For Joan, Martí, and their half-sister, Joana,

to do homage to Sibil·la was an insult to the memory of their mothers, Elionor of Sicily and Maria of Navarre, and a threat to their inheritance.¹⁰⁷ From their point of view, the marriage was bad enough, but the prospect that the old king might sire additional legitimate heirs with his younger and captivating fourth wife was a danger too great to be ignored. The *entente cordiale* between Pere's adult children and Sibil·la morphed into distrust, a lack of respect, and loathing. Sibil·la de Fortià was not a woman of royal lineage nor yet recruited from the ranks of the aristocracy; she was, instead, the beautiful but unlettered daughter of modest nobility, the acknowledged and well-liked mistress of the king before her elevation to his queen-consort. The credendum held that queens were to be cultivated, sophisticated, and of virtuous repute, bringing to their king-husbands considerable dowries, and their unions were conceived to seal important political alliances.¹⁰⁸ The 1377 marriage of Pere IV and Sibil·la de Fortià ticked none of these boxes. Pere organized a glittering coronation for his new queen in 1381; given Sibil·la's fragile queenly *fama*, Pere took care to emphasize her legitimacy as his consort.¹⁰⁹ A formal queen's coronation, uncommon in the crown of Aragon, was a proactive means by which to communicate Sibil·la's title and newly dignified position, confirming her legitimate authority as a queen of Aragon.¹¹⁰

Violant, with the full assent of her Francophile husband, Duke Joan, established a princely court *à la française*, introducing sumptuous dress, jewelry, banquets, and balls. The duchy of Girona became an apanage in the style of those in her native France. For this, she was criticized by her contemporary detractors as well as by nineteenth- and some twentieth-century historians who took their lead from the critics of her day. Although Violant's strategy of shining her magnificence, culture, education, and refined sensibilities at Sibil·la, both to undermine her *fama* and to strengthen her own personal credenda for active queenship, was effective, things did not always go to plan. Histories fashion Violant as a virile and aberrant queen whose forceful personality and political activity are combined with the received personality of her husband—the weak, sickly, and effeminate Joan I of Aragon, *amador de la gentilesa*. Much of this bad press is based upon court intrigue, gossip, and the politically motivated criticism of the *cortes/corts* intentionally designed to shed a poor light on the couple by their opponents and critics.¹¹¹ However much Violant of Bar efficaciously self-fashioned, she was not immune to political problems—first arising from the ire of her father-in-law who opposed her marriage to Joan, and later from the *cortes/corts*, which played upon the Pere's negative posturing to undermine her proactive consortship. Moreover,

public opinion in the latter decades of the fourteenth century cast a jaundiced eye over the conduct of the Aragonese royal family much as it would in France during the first decades of the fifteenth century.¹¹²

Joan I did not share the unsettled and ambitious character of Pere, who had been forever intriguing to further his aspirations in Iberia and abroad.¹¹³ Joan's health was compromised and Bisson suggests that his fragile health, probably epilepsy (coupled with mild hypochondria and a slight superstitious bent), persisted into his personal reign. In an attempt to ameliorate his condition, there was a constant stream of physicians and learned doctors (and astrologers) to the court of Joan I, including Moors, Jews, and experts from Paris, Sicily, and Avignon.¹¹⁴ For a time, Violant renounced her lavish existence, making at least two barefoot pilgrimages to the Benedictine Abadia de Santa María de Montserrat, with Joan struggling to do likewise to commend himself to the Virgin (Black Madonna) of Montserrat.¹¹⁵ Both Joan and Violant believed fervently in the efficacy of the Montserratine Virgin's compassion; Joan was held to be the "most Montserratine of the Catalan kings" and Violant was so deeply impressed by Madonna de Montserrat that she held the Virgin to be her special protectress.¹¹⁶ Bratsch-Prince has studied an impressive portion of the massive archive of Violant's correspondence still extant in the Aragon Crown Archives, asserting that: "Joan's illnesses are a constant theme in Violant's missives," and "judging from the scope of their correspondence, it appears that Joan allowed his wife a substantial role in government and charged her with his business during his absences. Violant's active participation in political matters was not solely the whim of a weak ruler; rather it was the likely result of Joan's sickly constitution and frequent illnesses or 'accidents.'"¹¹⁷

In view of Joan's fragile health and Violant's renunciation of splendor, the initial reaction to Joan's succession upon the death of his authoritarian father in 1387 was relatively conciliatory.¹¹⁸ When the crown of Aragon passed to Joan and Violant in 1387, the court and households they had inherited, while extravagant and luxurious, were prosperous and efficient. This was due largely to a rising tide of commercial prosperity, which led to an influx of art and industry from distant realms and the demanding fastidiousness of Pere's rule. During the reign of Joan I and Violant, the court and royal households reached an apex of pomp and refinement, but they also inherited simmering discontent, which they managed to aggravate with their courtly inclinations. At first, Joan acted swiftly to establish his claim; he pledged to defend Catalan franchises and, in March

1387, received homages in Barcelona. He convoked the great *cortes* at Monzón in November 1388—the first and last of his personal rule. The urban deputies present pressed for such exigent administrative reform that Joan I was obliged to reserve his judgment to enable him to formulate a considered political response. Joan was unable to give a determination and soon found himself in a situation where new uprisings in Sardinia and a threatened incursion into Roussillon by Bernard VII of Armagnac constrained him to loiter in attendance of a *cortes* resolved to reorganize the royal households and reform the judicial system.¹¹⁹ It would be facile to infer that the defiant stance of the *cortes* was merely a reaction to Pere's violent and authoritarian reign. This was not the only trigger for the attitude of the *cortes* as there had already been considerable dissent expressed regarding Joan's devotion to hunting and perceived personal extravagance. Rather than displaying his sovereign anger, which would have been at least an indication of the strength of his resolve, Joan merely vented his impatience and threatened to dissolve the assembly, which only served to unify the dissatisfied.¹²⁰ It was Violant, his 24-year-old queen-mediatrix, who put forward the necessary compromise proposals on judicial reform, heading off political chaos. The impasse had dragged on for several months and, by December 1389, all Joan had managed to demonstrate was that he had not inherited his father's parliamentary ability.¹²¹

Notwithstanding his difficulties with the *cortes* in 1388–89, Joan was not without diplomacy or leadership qualities. His father had had great plans for trans-Mediterranean hegemony; Joan had a different sense of Mediterranean symmetry, possibly more pragmatic in its understanding of the actual political situation. Given his French connections, it was more realistic for Joan to aspire to an alliance with France rather than with Castile or England, especially if one considers the consequences of Pere's actions in Castile.¹²² The failure of Bernard VII's offensive in support of his brother Jean's claims to the inheritance of Mallorca was because it probably made no more sense to the French than it did to the Catalans. Nevertheless, Joan acted decisively by sending his brother Martí in command of a defensive force to head off Armagnac's Gascons, who discreetly withdrew. From the earliest days of his rule, Joan was obliged to confront the issue of the Schism—a political conflict in which his father had scrupulously avoided taking sides. Joan immersed himself in the opinions and advice of a council of jurists and theologians before pronouncing himself in favor of the Avignon pontiff, Clement VII. Joan calmed the frontier dispute with Navarre, signing a treaty in

1388, and reconciled his domains with the aspirations of the second house of Anjou in relation to Naples, negotiating through the pontifical court in Avignon. The settlement was ratified by the betrothal of his daughter, the *infanta* Violant, to Louis II of Anjou.

One of the deepest concerns of his reign was an outbreak of violence against the Jews of the kingdom. It originated in Seville in 1390, fanned by the fanatical preaching of the anti-Semitic, Ferrand Martinez, archdeacon of Écija, progressing via Castile to the Aragonese territory of Valencia, with massacres soon after in Mallorca and Barcelona.¹²³ The explosion of violence in Aragon was exacerbated by the apocalyptic preaching of “celebrity” friars such as Vicens Ferrer, Violant’s Dominican confessor, and Francesc Eiximenis, who disapproved not infrequently of Violant and Joan’s “transgressions.”¹²⁴ In general, Jews were tolerated by kings, Franciscans, the higher ranks of the clergy, and the aristocracy, but there was a clear divide between the attitudes of the highest echelons of society and the lower orders, often massively in debt, destitute, and on the lookout for someone to blame. Like his predecessors, Joan protected the Jews and drew upon their services as required.¹²⁵ From Zaragoza, he denounced the slaughter and ordered that Jews everywhere be protected. Again, Violant of Bar’s mediation skills were called upon, and she entered into conciliation and arbitration, writing against the forced conversions of Jews and urging ships’ captains to ensure that their men not become involved in the violence.¹²⁶

Joan might have endured fragile health and a shaky political climate, but his mind was active. A noted bibliophile and an avid collector of rare and unusual art, Joan had no contemporary peer save Violant’s uncle, Jean *le Magnifique*, Duke of Berry. The kingly court of Joan and Violant was one of the most intellectually rich of the period.¹²⁷ Violant’s unwilling father-in-law too had been a noted enthusiast of literature and music, and it is in the orbit of his royal patronage of literary translation that humanist leanings first appeared in Iberia.¹²⁸ Pere’s policy of literary translation was a vital component of his mission to consolidate royal authority, developing a sense of national unity within a dispersed kingdom and encouraging imperial expansion and Aragonese influence across the Mediterranean and over the Pyrenees.¹²⁹ Pere’s close relationship with Violant’s uncle, Charles V—a visionary who understood the political and not merely the aesthetic value of an established royal library—ignited a spirit of nationalism and a natural competitive streak in the bibliophile Pere.¹³⁰

Books, Learning, and Making Music with Their Friends

Despite Pere's earlier cultural patronage, it was through Violant of Bar that the Francophile Joan transformed his ducal and royal courts to sites of cultural refinement never before achieved in the realms of the medieval crown of Aragon. Although many historians have criticized Joan and Violant for their cultural innovations, Silleras-Fernández asserts that "Violant was at bottom an educated woman who took great interest in court culture and politics. Maintaining a magnificent court was regarded as a necessary aspect of contemporary kingship, and France had come to be seen as [the] model of monarchical innovation. It was neither unnatural nor unreasonable for a king to aspire to emulate French style."¹³¹ Pere IV had believed that emulating the bibliophile preferences of Charles V was an elegant solution to increase dynastic political prestige.¹³² The difference between father and son appears to have been that Joan did not view cultural activity primarily as a way to enforce and emphasize his authority and political machinations; he evinced a genuine desire to involve himself in cultural innovation for its own sake. This is not to suggest that Joan and Violant did not understand the reach that such patronage might facilitate or that it was a precision instrument to be deployed in emphasizing political power. Violant, in particular, understood that patronage in both the literary and spiritual domains was an essential *atout* in molding her queenly image and manipulating external perceptions; Joan and Violant demonstrably enjoyed immersing themselves in cultural and artistic innovation and practice.¹³³ Ramon Menéndez Pidal tells us that the court of Joan and Violant reached the apogee of its brilliance during the winter of 1392–93.¹³⁴

Terence Scully, in his analysis of the *Chansonnier* Chantilly manuscript, Musée Condé 564, asserts that this manuscript, in French hands from the early fifteenth century, was originally written and copied for the courts of Aragon and Foix.¹³⁵ Scully believes its actual origins "are almost certainly to be found at the court of the kings of Aragon, specifically Joan I... [commissioned by] Joan around 1390." This collection is unique because of the breadth of musical styles encompassed by it.¹³⁶ Even before his ascension to the throne, Joan's court was remarkable across Europe for the place accorded to music, both instrumental and vocal, and to dance and poetry. Joan was very interested and skilled in the craft of composition, spending heavily

to encourage innovation in the very best forms of contemporary music.¹³⁷ His marriage to Violant in 1380 paved the way for a remarkably French tone that colored *all* of the cultural activity at Joan's court, and she features importantly in the content of the *Chansonnier* collection—both overtly, in two wedding pieces, and obliquely, in an acrostic in another two of the pieces.¹³⁸ Scully believes that the *Chansonnier* made its way north to France around the time of Yolande of Aragon's marriage to Louis II of Anjou in 1400. In terms of the cost of its production, research, and labor involved, the *Chansonnier* was not merely “a pretty gilded testimonial to its owner's taste and discretionary wealth.”¹³⁹ It was an important work intended for use as a reference source; its commissioner “wanted his musicians to have a good, carefully executed selection of French polyphonic art songs.”¹⁴⁰ With its journey to France in c. 1400, the *Chansonnier* represents a clear example of cultural interchange to and from France and Aragon and back again.¹⁴¹

Scully agrees largely with Gilbert Reaney regarding the Aragonese origin of the manuscript.¹⁴² Since Scully put forward his secondary thesis that the main scribe of the Chantilly codex was a Catalan, musicologists such as Maricarmen Gómez [Maria del Carmen Gómez Mutané] have argued that this long-accepted view regarding the scribe can now be put to rest, more or less. Yolanda Plumley—a musicologist and reader in medieval music and culture—in supporting Gómez's view on the matter of the scribe, goes beyond her [Gómez's] thesis, refuting any intimate link between the *Chansonnier* and Aragon. Gómez argues that the *Chansonnier* clearly had its origins in Aragon at the court of Joan and Violant.¹⁴³ Plumley's stance ignores the historical backdrop to the period under examination. For example, Plumley posits either Louis I of Anjou, Jean of Berry, or Philippe of Burgundy as key linkages to the manuscript, arguing that the *Chansonnier* is a prime example of the patronage of French princes. It is an interesting proposition but if, as she points out, the manuscript's influences date back to the 1380s, then Louis I of Anjou, while often in the south, was far too busy with his expansionist plans and regency responsibilities to be making (or even commissioning) music with his friends, and he was dead by 1384.

This period, however, marks the arrival, marriage, and the genesis of Violant of Bar's cultural ascendancy in Aragon. Violant of Bar, therefore—a French princess and avid patron of the arts and literature—is, indeed, a prime example of the “patronage of French princes” to which Plumley alludes but ignores. Jason Stoessel believes that “the manuscript [Chantilly codex] marks a foreign eclecticism that favours

French cultural tendencies prevalent at the time and the location [no earlier than 1395 and no later than 1415] of the production of the manuscript.” French style and taste was *de rigueur* in Aragon during the reigns of Pere IV and his sons, especially at the courts of Joan and Violant (something for which they were/are much criticized). Stoessel suggests that the codex either originated in Milan at the court of Giangaleazzo Visconti or, more generally, around Florence and Tuscany (due to transcription errors that point to a non-native French speaker, an Italian scribe who might have been working from an oral transmission rather than copying from an original). Stoessel and others believe that the manuscript made its way into France via Florentine or Milanese banking exiles washing around French courts from the late fourteenth to early fifteenth centuries. This is insufficient explanation for the many points of reference within the codex to both Joan and Violant and *their* close familial and intimate sociocultural networks. Given its Italian territories and interests, Aragon most certainly had bureaucrats, officers, and servants of Sicilian/Italian origin working for the Crown. It is Violant of Bar (rather than her uncles or other outriders) who is to be found at the center of the web of influences characterizing the Chantilly codex; I base my conviction upon a historical perspective and the geopolitical context of Aragon buttressed by nuanced observations put forward by musicologists Scully, Reany, Gómez, and Stoessel.

Although proud and faithful to her familial houses of Bar and Valois and conscious of her double descentance from the house of Capet, Violant of Bar acquired quickly the preferences and loyalties of her marital house. In very short order, she made the transformation from the covert and restrained model of French consort-ship and queenship, becoming the very essence of a visible and proactive Iberian royal wife. Violant’s meticulously constructed identity—one founded upon a subtle understanding of her origins and natal heritage as well as whom she aspired to become—functioned as a perfected symbiosis of time(ing) and place, enabling her to self-fashion to great strategic effectiveness.¹⁴⁴ By the time she was queen of Aragon, Violant had mastered the subtleties of Catalan as well as Aragonese, with most of her Iberian and European correspondence being conducted in these two tongues or Latin, and French. The letters that she wrote, dictated, read, or had read show that she maintained more than just lines of polite banter with her correspondents; Violant’s epistolary is literary, political, and diplomatic; it is strategically employed to construct her image, reinforcing her power, and purpose-built to maintain close relations during a time of itinerancy and distance.¹⁴⁵

Like Joan, Violant was highly skilled in the arts of hunting, falconry, horsemanship, and the breeding, training, and keeping of greyhounds. She shared her love of these with her frequent correspondent, Gaston Fébus, “Lord of the Pyrenees.”¹⁴⁶ But it was her attachment to the poetical and musical works of Guillaume Machaut that set Catalan literature aflame with innovation; in this, she had great support from Joan—a talented amateur musician, poet, and collector of rare and unusual instruments.¹⁴⁷ When Violant was seven years old, her mother, Marie of France, had received Machaut at the palace of Bar-le-Duc in 1371. Violant completed her literary and cultural education in Paris with her uncles, Charles V and the dukes of Anjou, Bourbon, Berry, and Burgundy. She diffused Machaut to a ready audience in Catalonia; Joan, while still Duke of Girona, six months after his marriage to Violant in October 1380, wrote to his mother-in-law, Marie of France, requesting Machaut’s manuscript.¹⁴⁸ Violant received other French poets at her court, but it was Machaut who would have the most durable influence.¹⁴⁹ While drinking deeply of Machaut’s influence, Catalan poetry maintained the form and language style of Provençal troubadour lyric.¹⁵⁰ In 1393, Joan founded a “literary academy”—the *Consistori de la Gaya Sciència de Barcelona*—and the poetry that flowed from it shows clear evidence of troubadour influence.¹⁵¹ Riquer confirms that Joan believed in the curative and miraculous properties of the “Gay Science.”¹⁵² Joan asserted that the Gay Science could make the rude erudite (*rudes erudit*), excite the inert (*inertes excitat*), draw out the occulted (*occulta elicit*), and lighten the darkness (*obscura lucidat*).¹⁵³ On February 20, 1393, in Valencia, Joan founded his annual *la festa de la Gaya Sciència* to honor the Virgin and to be celebrated each Annunciation or the Sunday following. Joan set down what was to be required of the festival judges: they were to ensure that the entries to the festival were to be “gay and joyful” and defined by “inventive science” (*gaya vel gaudiosa, et alio nomine inveniendi sciencie*).¹⁵⁴ Baudot alerts our attention to Violant’s own natal traditions of the “*gaie science*”; her Barrois ancestors from the thirteenth century had added the “*chapel de fleurs*” of the troubadours to their sovereign coronets.¹⁵⁵

Music was an integral part of court culture for Violant and Joan. Joan’s appointed yet reluctant Franciscan confessor until 1384,¹⁵⁶ Francesc Eiximenis, relates disapprovingly that French songs could be heard throughout the day in Violant’s court. Her secretary, Bernat Metge, reminisces warmly that the queen, who could speak such diverse languages (*diverses lengatges*), could recall many songs and new rhymes (*molte cançons e novas rimades*) and could recite the

works of troubadours (*dits de trobadors*).¹⁵⁷ Her court was a meeting place for both Provençal and Catalan troubadours and, during Joan's reign, their court poets grew in number from 8 to 12: French and Flemish poets, composers of polyphony, motets, ballads, rondeaux, and virelays traveled to the courts of Girona and Aragon. Joan and Violant's minstrels were Catalan, French, Flemish, German, Castilian, English, and Moors; during Lent, they dispatched them on sabbatical to schools in Flanders or Germany to learn new airs on their instruments.¹⁵⁸ It was in this rich and fertile intellectual and cultural environment that Yolande of Aragon grew into the formidable princess she was to become.¹⁵⁹ One occasion, so involved did Yolande become in music, poetry, farces, and entertainments that her personal seal was pickpocketed brazenly during a spirited performance at her Angers castle:

On June 27, 1409, Yvonne Coyrant, a soldier employed at the castle of Angers, went inside and reported, and said that, on Sunday, 23rd day of the said month, being at the said castle, where many [troubadour] poetries or farces were being held in the presence of Queen Yolande and her people, that while she was watching the performances, the sleeve of her gown was slit, sliced from beneath by thieves; who took roughly 10 sous and her seal [from her pocket], made in her name and her arms. And for this, many quittances and letters could be passed off under her seal in her name. These matters above recorded and witnessed by the masters present (...) and me – Birtra.¹⁶⁰

Decline and a Fall

During the closing stages of Joan I's reign, troubles accumulated for him. The death of Clement VII in 1394 brought about the election of the Aragonese Pedro Martínez de Luna to the Avignon See. He took the name Benedict XIII and, while his election was not initially problematic for Joan, foreign complications soon arose from it. France was soon looking for a way out,¹⁶¹ and urged Joan to comply with its initiative to subtract obedience from Avignon. Moreover, Joan and Violant were harried by claims of misgovernment and allegations that court favorites were mismanaging the royal estate and finances, with both Barcelona and Valencia asserting their franchises had been undermined. Joan sank deeper into a quagmire of debt but shied away from confronting his hostile *cortes* for assistance. Joan's reign was in a downward spiral, and it is no exaggeration to suggest that it was in dangerous free fall. Barcelona city councilors accused members of both the king and queen's households of assembling

foreign mercenaries near Avignon. The allegations “were irrefutably confirmed on 17 May, 1396 when news arrived that troops were massing near Avignon. With this news, the magnitude of the crisis facing the Crown became dramatically apparent.”¹⁶² There had been a persistent perception that the royal couple and their familiars were extravagant and wasteful. Councilors of all of the kingdom’s largest cities complained about “the suspicious and corrupt behaviour of their royal advisers, whom they accused of compromising royal authority, contravening the laws of the land, squandering, misappropriating and embezzling the funds of the royal patrimony.”¹⁶³ If the odor of corruption and mismanagement was not enough, the “deal-breaker” was the developing situation just beyond the papal city of Avignon.¹⁶⁴

Joan and Violant went into defensive mode, in chess terms, a fortress strategy; while Joan was alive, he and Violant were the ruling monarchs. King and queen determined to travel to Catalonia to calm their Catalan subjects. Their fortress play, however, did not come off. On May 19, 1396, having left Torrella de Montgríu (22 km east of Girona) en route to Girona, Joan, *el Caçador* chased down his last stag. The official story is that Joan, the enthusiastic huntsman, in hot pursuit of his quarry, galloped away from his small traveling party into thick forest. Alone, he fell from his horse, possibly as a result of a stroke or heart attack.¹⁶⁵ There were no witnesses present and Joan did not receive extreme unction.¹⁶⁶ Riquer suggests that the king’s death was not accidental; Joan had outlived his usefulness even to his most corrupt hangers-on. His traveling companions insisted that the death was an accident, yet the stench of regicide lingered. Riquer theorizes further that Joan’s accident might well have been a suicide.¹⁶⁷

Few of Joan I’s contemporaries appear to have had much sympathy for his leanings to art and refinement; he was often accused of living an idle and carefree life, leaving the business of government to his wife. Notwithstanding such judgments, Joan’s character emerges clearly from his voluminous preserved correspondence, much of it addressed to his *cara companyona* (dear companion), Queen Violant. She shared his passions and preoccupations, including his mania for hunting. Although his early political career as his father’s, Pere’s, lieutenant-general was full and proactive, his personal reign was largely reactive. He seemed not to be aware or did not care that change was in the air, particularly in relation to his *cortes*, which had formulated a new conception of public order and the sovereign’s authority and duty. He was too devoted to the royal estate and his diverse cultural pursuits to grasp the incompatibility of his way of life and the

new aspirations of his subjects. By the end of his reign, he had lost touch and had become vulnerable because he mistook criticism for disloyalty. Joan I had inherited a problematic federation of domains and dependencies from Pere IV, and his ambition and rule was not that of his father. Joan I resolved to secure the Pyrenean frontiers of his realm and seems to have ignored the rest of his domains apart from insular Sicily where his brother Martí and nephew, Martí the Younger, governed in his name. It might be asserted that that he never outgrew his duchy of Girona, having failed to understand the real problems facing his kingdom, rising above the ordinary only in his love for erudition and culture.¹⁶⁸

During the proscription following Joan's death, his secretary Bernat Metge was gaoled along with others loyal to him. Metge's opus, *Lo Somni*, written during his incarceration in 1399 to win him to the good graces of the new king and queen, Martí I *l'Humà* (the Humane), initially called *l'Eclesiàstic* (the Ecclesiastic), and, María de Luna, is a work of literary art and a masterly humanist political defense of Metge's loyalty to the late king rendered in allegorical style. It not only emphasizes Joan's exquisite culture and learning but also his humanity; it is *the* trailblazing work of Catalan vernacular humanism.¹⁶⁹

Violant of Bar, queen-dowager, was reluctant to cede her queenly authority upon Joan's sudden death. Zurita records that Violant insisted she was pregnant for some time after his death.¹⁷⁰ Her sister-in-law, María de Luna, was confronted with the dilemma of the queen-dowager refusing to cede her authority to the new monarch's lieutenant. Joan's successor, Martí I, was delayed in Sicily, where he had been governing for Joan; he could not leave the island until he handed over its government to his son, Martí the Younger. Violant eventually stood aside; she was destined to live through the reigns of Martí I, Ferran I, *el Just*, and Alfons V, *el Magnànim*. She would witness and, from time to time, intervene in the bitter rivalry between Alfons and her grandson, Louis III of Anjou, in the struggle for Naples–Sicily. She died in 1431.

Martí I was king of Aragon at the time of Yolande of Aragon's marriage to Louis II of Anjou in 1400. Unlike his brother, Joan, he was more responsive to the changing climate of his rule. Like his brother, his health was unreliable and, like his brother, he was fortunate in his choice of consort; María de Luna was capable, energetic, and able to deal with persistent factional disputes. Martí was more quietly pious than his father or brother, deeply immersed in the teachings of Vicens Ferrer, and an avowed defender of churches

and the pope. He was more complex in his devotions, his piety having a political and humanist edge, enabling him like few before him to inspire his people. He understood how to honor specific groups of subjects without alienating the others. His political successes were diluted by the need to balance baronial and oligarchic privilege. Bisson concludes that Martí's worst failure was to die the last of his dynastic line.¹⁷¹

Goodbye to All That

With the death of Joan I in 1396, Violant of Bar threw her not inconsiderable energies and attention into the meticulous preparation of her only remaining child, the *infanta* Yolande, for queenship. We have evidence of Violant's profound understanding of the responsibilities and opportunities afforded by queenship, not only in extant narratives of her political activity but also, more importantly, in her own words preserved in the Aragon Crown Archives. One of the most remarkable of these documents is the *proemi* or prologue to the nine articles of compromise reform 24-year-old Queen Violant drew up to break the deadlock between Joan and his *cortes* on June 28, 1389.¹⁷² José Coroleu y Juglada and José Pella y Forgas praise Violant's ability and intervention, acknowledging that she "with such opportune discretion knew how to play the role of peacemaker between the pride of her effeminate husband and the jealous arrogance of the Cortes, and by doing so saved the public peace at the same time as the royal marriage bed."¹⁷³ In her *proemi*, Violant compares her action to "Augusta," Livia Drusilia, consort of Emperor Augustus. Bratsch-Prince explains that Violant "conjures up an image of the queen humbling herself before the king," with prayerful hands and on bended knee forced to mediate between the king and his subjects for the good and the honor of the kingdom. Violant pleads with the king "to open the door of his kindness," stating that the "republic" can "remain in prosperity and notable defense" only if each estate understands its role and fulfills its responsibility within the boundaries of its constituency. For Violant, the Crown is the symbol of power and authority, and it is her duty "to maintain the peace and the stability" of the kingdom by her intercession and mediation. Queen Violant establishes her place in the structure of regal power and authority she outlines, unashamedly and publicly "wielding considerable influence with the king through whom she acknowledges she receives power and validation for herself."¹⁷⁴

More than 30 years after her *proemi* and some 25 years after the death of Joan I, *la reyna Yolant* reiterated the responsibilities and nature of queenship in a letter, dated May 6, 1421, to her “niece,” María of Castile (consort of Alfons V), in the interests of her grandson, King Louis III of Naples.¹⁷⁵ In one of her most intelligent and studied missives,¹⁷⁶ Violant, Queen-dowager of Aragon, summons up a queen’s responsibility to intercede and mediate with the king in times of trouble. She beseeches María, Queen-lieutenant of Aragon, to influence her “nephew” the king to drop his pretensions to the peninsular kingdom of Naples—Giovanna II of Naples had precipitously “adopted” Alfons in 1421 expressly to halt Anjou’s advance.¹⁷⁷ While we know nothing of María’s reaction to her “aunt’s” missive, Alfons stiffened his resolve to seize the Angevin kingdom of Naples and, in 1442, with Yolande failing physically and her son René militarily ineffective, he succeeded in his enterprise. That said, Violant’s letter to the new-minted lieutenant-queen, María of Castile, bore fruit; María proved herself to be a tireless worker for peace and concord¹⁷⁸—another example illustrative of the strong tradition of the queen-mediatrix and, according to Violant, a practice adorning all queens of Aragon.¹⁷⁹ Violant was conscious of the need to remain personally relevant to “avoid the disaster of political irrelevance.” She had only one remaining child, a daughter, and she went to considerable effort to ensure that all understood that she was the mother of Yolande, Queen of Jerusalem and Sicily, and the concerned and involved grandmother of Louis III of Anjou, legitimate inheritor of the kingdom of Naples. *La reyna Yolant*, Queen-dowager of Aragon, cast herself as “the connection between Aragon and Anjou” thereby “keeping alive the memory of her husband,” the wellspring of her former power and influence, and “aligning it with his male descendants,” Louis III, René, and Charles of Anjou.¹⁸⁰

Yolande of Aragon ripened and matured in the warm sun of rich intellectual, spiritual, and cultural refinement, which characterized her parents’ and uncle’s courts. For Jean Juvénal II des Ursins, she was “*la fille du roy d’Arragon, nommée Iolan, qui estoit une des plus belles creatures qu’on peust point veoir*” (the daughter of the king of Aragon, called Yolande, one of the most beautiful creatures one would ever see).¹⁸¹ Yolande’s mother was politically proactive within the ductile boundaries of late medieval Iberian queenship, having a strong hand in the government of the kingdom of Aragon, while her father, Joan I, seemed content to occupy himself with cultural and sporting pursuits. Her uncle, Martí I, was perhaps a more impressive king than her father had been, but he too needed to rely upon the talents and

energy of his consort, María de Luna, due to his absences and ill-health.

Yolande of Aragon did not leave her native kingdom until she was almost 20. While a mature age for a princess of her time, this was in keeping with the advice of Eiximenis who held that girls should not marry until the age of 18 and boys 22. Not only had she absorbed valuable lessons from her mother, Violant, she had more than adequate time to observe her aunt's, María de Luna's, model of queenship at close quarters, probably reading or hearing stories of her paternal grandmother, Elionor of Sicily (who had raised and so greatly influenced the young María de Luna),¹⁸² as well as those of her gifted and lettered maternal grandmother, Marie of France.¹⁸³ All three kinswomen were key players in the governments of their respective husbands and managed to escape strident criticism, unlike Violant, who might have been less than cautious in some of her dealings and insufficiently circumspect in the eyes of her opportunistic detractors. Yolande of Aragon distilled and synthesized the examples and templates of her foremothers and the teachings of Eiximenis to great effect, creating her own model of proactive non-regnant queenship. By the time of her marriage, Yolande had had much exposure to the business of government and the phenomenon of hard-pressed, absent, or reluctant kings, unable or disinclined to involve themselves in the larger political issues of their rule. Otherwise occupied, ill, absent, or incapable, these men needed the involvement of their queens in order to govern effectively. Yolande of Aragon had been well primed for the next phase of her life.



CHAPTER 2

NO WOMAN MERITS COMPARISON WITH HER

*cum ejus forma quasi omnium aliarum precelleret speciem mulierum*¹

Tracy Adams refers to the house of Anjou-Valois as “fierce Armagnacs”; more accurately, they were “fierce Angevins,” dedicated to the survival and expansion of their House, whose interests dovetailed generally with those of the house of France and, specifically, with those of their son-in-law, Charles of Ponthieu, later Charles VII.² Alliances were pragmatically and meticulously established and discarded or retained, according to their efficacy in securing the fortunes of the second house of Anjou.

Yolande of Aragon’s natal influences prepared her for the role of consort to the king of Jerusalem–Naples, Louis II of Anjou, and the much anticipated union of the houses of Barcelona and Anjou-Valois had been long in the making. Yolande’s wedding and coronation, and its context within the beleaguered and fractured political situation in France arising from the madness of Charles VI, the Schism, and England’s ambition to seize sovereignty from France’s disarray, are essential to understanding Yolande’s political career. While Yolande was well equipped by her mother’s and aunt’s immediate examples of proactive and effective consortship, she might not have been prepared for the phenomenon of an intermittently mad and “absent” sovereign king—despite her own father’s poor physical health, mild hypochondria, and his bouts of epilepsy.³ The well-documented “absences” of Charles VI opened doors to power for the house of Anjou-Valois and complicated its aspirations for dominion over Naples–Sicily—aspirations significantly buttressed by Louis II of Anjou’s marriage to Yolande of Aragon.

Rings and Crowns and Things

Eyewitness Bertran Boysset describes Yolande of Aragon's wedding and coronation in Arles at the cathedral of Saint-Trophime on December 2, 1400.⁴ Escorted from Perpignan in mid-November by her brother-in-law Charles, Prince of Tarente, and her third cousin, Joan I, Count of Prades and seneschal of Catalonia,⁵ Yolande arrived in Arles on December 1, halting to exchange her traveling kit for the vestments and crown of a queen. She paused to honor the relics of Saint Trophime and, in the presence of the archbishop of Marseille, she mounted an elegantly adorned charger beneath a canopy bearing "*las armas del rey Lois e de la reina novela, e de las armas de sicutat d'Arle*" (the arms of King Louis, her own royal arms, the new queen's, and those of the city of Arles)⁶, and entered the city "*avec grand honneur*," proceeding to the archbishop's palace where the court had been hung with ship's sails and the great tapestry of the *Apocalypse* in anticipation of Yolande's first meeting as *la Regina novela* (the new queen) with Marie of Blois-Penthièvre, henceforth *madama la Regina vieilha* (the old queen). The prince, the count, and the new queen entered the palace and there found the old queen, and her distinguished entourage of ladies [whereby]:

Seeing her mother-in-law, the old queen, the new queen curtsayed deeply and reverently; and Madame, the old Queen, received her with great honour, embracing her and kissing her, making a brief welcome to all the others who had accompanied the new Queen.⁷

On the second day of December 1400, King Louis married *madama Violant sa molher* (Lady Yolande, his wife), *la regina novela*, in the cathedral of Saint Trophime where the great tapestry of the *Apocalypse* had been installed, officiated by the cardinal of Albano, *camerlengo* (papal chamberlain), and assisted by distinguished prelates and a gathering of great lords.⁸ Boysset records the details of the *festas*, which continued for some 14 days, highlighting the massed assembly of important personages drawn from all three estates who attended, and the sumptuous gifts they presented to their *regina novela, madama Violant*. Boysset's words give a clear impression of the importance of stage-managed ritual to this long-anticipated event. Clearly, Yolande of Aragon was every inch Pere IV's granddaughter when it came to being ceremonious and, like him, she took "pride in [her] divine and dynastic destiny and [her] public obligation."⁹ After the *festas*, Joan of Prades (soon-to-be Constable of Aragon), took his leave of King Louis II and Queen Yolande to visit the pope

in Avignon and Charles VI in “France.” The wedding was an occasion for rejoicing between the Angevin princes and their Provençal subjects and allies. Reynaud makes the point that Louis II of Anjou was never again to find himself in such trouble-free and sympathetic circumstances.¹⁰ Yolande’s coronation was central to the ceremonials and is of considerable importance in understanding the status of kings and queens of Naples–Sicily.¹¹

Yolande’s coronation conformed to the one revised by Robert I of Naples in 1309. It is of interest here because, in Robert’s worldview, Neapolitan kings and queens were a category apart in the spiritual sphere and in the distinctive nature of Neapolitan queenly authority. Neapolitan coronations copied the *ordines* (rituals) and liturgy of imperial enthronement and painstakingly adapted them to exalt the figure of the pope as monarch, allowing the temporal power’s (Robert’s) subjection to him to be displayed in relief. The Neapolitan state as papal vassal was transformed into a model of world order; the pontifical theocracy meant that, in the pyramid of power, the kings and queens of Naples ranked *above* other sovereigns. With this exalted ranking flowed distinctive spiritual advantages due to their proximity to the *supreme hierarch*. Robert managed to transform a weakness—obedience to papal authority—into strength by emphasizing and ritualizing his (and his queen’s) propinquity to the pope;¹² Angevin kings and queens considered themselves to be sacred in the most literal sense.¹³ Robert’s strategy of foregrounding his close ties to the papacy diverged dramatically from Pere IV’s, which erased the ecclesiastical element from the moment of coronation.¹⁴ Of course, Pere was not beholden to the papacy for his kingdom as was most certainly the case for Robert I of Naples. With a little retouching, Robert’s coronation text of 1309 was followed for the coronation of Louis II in 1389 and Yolande’s in 1400.¹⁵ The “queening” ceremony requires a little explanation; unlike the crowning of queens-consort in France and elsewhere, both the kings and the queens of Naples–Sicily were anointed with the sacred unction during the “vénéable sacrament.”¹⁶ Robert reworked both his coronation and his queen’s so they resembled both imperial and ecclesiastical enthronements;¹⁷ by virtue of his coronation, Robert became a cardinal *honoris causa*.¹⁸ During her coronation, Robert’s queen was accorded the same consideration as the king; his innovation overturned the received traditions of the pontifical court as well as other queening ceremonies in western Christendom. Yolande of Aragon’s coronation on her wedding day followed Robert’s *ordines* for the coronation of Queen Sança.

The wedding and delayed coronation of Isabeau of Bavaria—close contemporary and sometime rival of Yolande of Aragon—diverges markedly from the crowning of the new queen of Sicily in 1400. Of secondary interest is Pintoin’s comparatively lackluster description of Isabeau’s first appearance in France in 1385 and the impression she made upon the young king who, having viewed several portraits of eligible princesses, “chose Madame Isabelle of Bavaria, aged 14 years, finding her far superior to the others in grace and beauty.”¹⁹ Arrangements were made to present Elizabeth of Bavaria-Ingolstadt to the king in Amiens; he was very pleased with his choice, and there married her without delay, without contract, and without dowry:

And, on the same day the marriage was celebrated to the great satisfaction of the French. It would be perhaps tiresome, and contrary to the code of brevity to which I pledge, to recount all the details of the celebration’s magnificence; the heralds and jesters have, I believe, sufficiently covered this. I will say, however, that the occasion lacked nothing appropriate to royal majesty. The king departed three days afterwards, leaving the queen in the charge of the duchess of Orleans and the count of Eu, both of whom were of a mature age.²⁰

Pintoin broke his pledge to his “code of brevity” in recounting the first impression Yolande of Aragon made upon the court of France in February 1401.²¹

Not much is known of the first 14 years of Isabeau’s life and, had she not made such a spectacular match, she might have remained a minor genealogical footnote in the annals of the Wittelsbach clan. It was only with her marriage to Charles VI that Bavarian chroniclers started to take an interest in her: the Benedictine monks of either St. Ulrich and St. Afra’s Abbey, Augsburg or St. Emmeran’s, the Imperial Abbey of Ratisbon (Regensburg), henceforth describe her as being endowed with “perfect virtue, remarkable beauty, graceful manners and most elegant morals.” Isabeau had sufficient Latin to read her Hours, the Lives of the Saints, and the chronicled deeds of her ancestors, but her favored reading was of epic poems written in Bavarian, strong on the honor of the ducal court and exalting the virtues of womanhood. Isabeau benefited from none of the formative advantages enjoyed by Yolande of Aragon, rendering her ill-prepared for the turns of fortune’s wheel that lay ahead of her. There seems to be little or no evidence that she had received any solid education in the responsibilities of the management of a princely household, let alone the government of an important duchy, much less a kingdom. Her mother, Taddea Visconti, died when she was 11, and there

is no evidence as to any exemplary factual foremother or actual kinswoman from whom the young Isabeau might have drawn example or comfort.²²

Although Isabeau issued from a noble and ancient race of German princes renowned for its bravery, will, intelligence, and ambition,²³ the strain seems to have petered out by the time it had arrived at Isabeau's father, Stephan III. From 1375, Stephan was co-duke of Bavaria with his brothers Johann II and Friedrich. By 1392, Johann, tired of his brothers' profligacy, parceled them off onto two minor portions of the duchy;²⁴ both Stephan and Friedrich married Barnabò Visconti's daughters: Stephen married Taddea Visconti and Friedrich's second wife was Maddalena Visconti. Stephan, in particular, spent vast sums underwriting the activities and upkeep of his expensive court. By the time of his marriage to Taddea Visconti, Stephan had incurred massive debt as a result of his extravagant fantasies, and he must have met the marital overtures of the tyrant of Milan, Bernabò Visconti, with alacrity and relief.²⁵ Isabeau's maternal line, the Visconti, had a colorful reputation; its issue held to be grasping, deceitful, and remorseless and, reportedly, Taddea's father, Barnabò, was greedy, completely consumed by his intemperate ambitions, with an insatiable appetite for debauchery and a criminal capacity to stop at nothing in order to add to his hoard.²⁶ This Visconti line formed a stark contrast with the normally gallant and restrained sons of Wittelsbach.²⁷ By his extraordinary devotion to luxury and leisure, Stephan III, Duke of Bavaria, was a worthy match for Taddea Visconti, of whom it is said that she could not conceive of nobility without external magnificence and display.²⁸ These were the parents and antecedents of Isabeau of Bavaria, who, although literate, appears to have had no training or understanding of what might be required of her once she had made a suitable marriage; this was to prove her undoing.²⁹ Moreover, while Isabeau was proud of her natal house's connection to her namesake, St. Elizabeth of Hungary, she appears to have been disinclined or unable to integrate her distinguished foremother's, Elizabeth's, example into her own style of queenship.³⁰

It has been asserted that the coronation of Isabeau, Queen of France, was an elaborate set piece conceived to reassure the public that she was not a threat to the king's sovereignty, the legitimate "vessel" of dynastic continuity, and to emphasize her role as an accessible mediator between the king and his people.³¹ Isabeau's inaugural triumphal entry into Paris to herald her coronation ceremony was conducted on August 22, 1389, three years after her very hasty marriage

to the teenaged Charles VI in Amiens on July 17, 1385.³² By the time of her coronation and first official entry into Paris, Isabeau had been in and out of the capital on various occasions and had presented Charles VI with two children, Charles (b. 25/09/1386 d. 28/12/1386) and Jeanne (b. 14/06/1388), with Isabelle well and truly on the way.³³ There was a pressing imperative to reinforce Isabeau's queenly *fama*; at the time of Isabeau's delayed coronation on August 22, Charles VI's younger brother, Louis of Orleans, had recently married the dazzling Valentina Visconti, daughter of Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, and Isabelle of France.³⁴ Valentina was Isabeau's second cousin, and the queen disliked her.³⁵ Perhaps the appearance of his brother, the ambitious and popular duke of Orleans, and his newly minted beautiful, cultured, and lettered duchess, Valentina, prompted Charles VI to organize Isabeau's official entry and coronation. Whatever the motivation at that specific moment, Pintoin gives an account of proceedings, noting that the act of coronation conformed to the ordinary principles as recorded in the authentic texts of the abbey church of St-Denys, *Du sacre des rois et des reines*.³⁶ Although Isabeau's coronation was pulled from the leaves of the St-Denys coronation primer and ticked the boxes for most Valois queens,³⁷ there is little evidence to suggest that it had drawn upon the very detailed political and spiritual innovations put in place by Charles V for the coronation of his queen (and Charles VI's mother), Jeanne of Bourbon.³⁸ Both Pintoin and Froissart go into considerable detail regarding Isabeau's big event; however, their focus is on the pomp and party aspect of proceedings rather than upon the solemn dignity of the act of coronation.

Violant of Bar and her daughter, Yolande of Aragon, were fluent in several languages, the crown of Aragon being a multilingual conglomerate of territories; however, the ill-equipped and poorly tutored Isabeau appears not to have grasped even the rudiments of French in the three-year interval from her marriage to her coronation.³⁹ Françoise Autrand relates that, in the aftermath of the gift-giving and ceremonials of Isabeau's coronation and her combined official entry with Valentina Visconti, while both Charles VI and Valentina, who had been meticulously brought up by her grandmother, Bianca of Savoy, spoke graciously to thank the assembled bourgeoisie and people of Paris for their gifts and good wishes, Isabeau reportedly remained silent.⁴⁰ The wedding and coronation of Yolande, *infanta* of Aragon, was a distinct departure from the apparent afterthought of Isabeau of Bavaria's coronation. Although Yolande had married a cadet prince of the house of Valois, Louis II, Duke of Anjou, her husband held titular

rights over the kingdoms of Naples and Jerusalem, an appellation, which, by virtue of his very specifically devised coronation, placed him spiritually above other European monarchs.

Malais au Palais (Malice in the Palace)

To understand the political turmoil waiting in the wings of the destiny of Yolande of Aragon, we should assess the political and ecclesiastical realities facing the kingdom of France from the time of her marriage in 1400 to the premature death of Louis II of Anjou in 1417. Louis's activities are examined in the context of these realities to ascertain the degree to which Yolande might have acted independently to ensure her marital family's enterprise.

In 1399, Henry of Lancaster seized the throne of England and proclaimed himself Henry IV. He deposed his cousin, Richard II, throwing him into prison, where he was later murdered—the first casualty of the gathering storm between the houses of York and Lancaster. Henry's son, Henry of Montmouth, later Henry V, would cause a good deal of harm to the interests of France once he ascended his father's throne in 1413. In the early days of Charles VI's rule, the royal uncles, Jean of Berry and Philippe of Burgundy, had jockeyed for ascendancy over the young king's senior uncle and regent, Louis I of Anjou. On the death of Louis I in 1384, competition between the remaining paternal uncles intensified, with Philippe of Burgundy becoming more powerful and dangerously ambitious. Only Charles VI's maternal uncles, Louis II the Good, Duke of Bourbon, and Violant of Bar's father, Robert I, Duke of Bar, had Charles's (and his subjects') best interests at heart. Philippe's policies and love of ostentation sucked the royal treasury dry, leading to popular uprisings in both France and Flanders. Likewise, Jean of Berry was not averse to helping himself to the kingdom's finances and assets to fund his magnificent collections and extravagant living. By 1388, the 20-year-old Charles VI managed to sideline the pair, and hopes were high for a stable reign that would fill the void left by the death of his father, Charles V, in 1380. Charles VI recalled the trusted circle of advisers, known to their detractors as the *Marmousets* or *petits gens* (grotesque “monkeys” by reason of their humble origins), bequeathed to him by his father. Then, Charles made his younger brother, Louis, his closest confidant.⁴¹

In the summer of 1392, while pursuing the fugitive Pierre de Craon, who had tried to assassinate the constable of France, Olivier de Clisson, Charles VI suffered the first episode of the madness that would plague him and his kingdom for the entirety of his reign.⁴²

His insanity was recurrent and intense, forcing him to absent himself from government for extended periods during his long reign. This presented a “blue-sky” opportunity for Philippe of Burgundy to reenter active political life at Charles’s court and reclaim his ascendancy over Charles, his government, his subjects, and his possessions. However, Philippe had to reckon with a new and active challenger who was the beneficiary of a distinct positional advantage—his nephew, the king’s younger brother, Louis of Orleans. The charismatic and attractive younger duke was popular and presented the chief impediment to Philippe’s projects. With the death of Philippe in 1404, his son Jean, Duke of Nevers, known as *sans Peur* (the Fearless), succeeded to his father’s titles, continuing the quarrel with his popular and personable cousin, Louis of Orleans.⁴³

Jean of Burgundy ingratiated himself with Charles VI’s subjects by bombarding them with Burgundian propaganda, fashioning himself as an advocate of administrative and fiscal reform. His dispute with Louis of Orleans, however, soon degenerated into an overt struggle for ascendancy over Charles’s sovereignty. Louis’s initial popularity and favor foundered because of his perceived extravagance, nourished by Burgundian gossip and propaganda; after almost four years of unresolved conflict between the cousins—with Burgundy outmaneuvered politically by Orleans on the royal council—the duke of Burgundy seized the initiative, having Louis butchered by his henchmen in 1407.⁴⁴ Shocked by his actions, and fearing reprisals, his cousin, Louis II of Anjou, and his uncle, Jean of Berry, forced Burgundy to vacate his seat on the royal council and leave Paris. Nevertheless, Jean the Fearless was too powerful and ambitious to stay away from court indefinitely; he commissioned an apologia delivered by a theologian attached to his House, Jean Petit, justifying his actions on the grounds that Orleans had been a tyrant and a heretic and claiming that he had performed a public service by arranging for his cousin’s removal.

The 1408 *Justification* was Burgundy’s most fearless work of propaganda defending the murder of the “criminal” Duke of Orleans. Burgundy’s people raked together all the bits and pieces of rumor and innuendo dating from Valentina Visconti’s (in)voluntary exile in 1396 and the political events of 1405–6, blending them with biblical and antique references to produce sophisticated propaganda—rhetoric Charity Cannon Willard points out “was not too far behind his Italian contemporaries.”⁴⁵ It was not merely the text of the *Justification* that provided propaganda value but also its context and delivery. In the immediate aftermath of Orleans’s assassination, his distressed and exiled widow, Valentina, journeyed to Paris in the company of

strategically selected children in her care, including her youngest son, Jean, the three-year-old count of Angoulême, and her daughter-in-law and the new duchess of Orleans, Isabelle of France (the king's daughter, once widowed by the murder of her first husband, Richard II of England). They were chosen for maximum impact in a calculated plea for justice to the king, and many, including the queen and the dauphin, tried to block the reading of Burgundy's *Justification*. Burgundy outplayed Valentina in the visual propaganda stakes by adopting a "shock and awe" offensive position, arriving in Paris at the head of an impressive force of arms as if to conquer the kingdom. His bellicose offensive and the *Justification* left a sour taste in the mouths of many; and the queen departed Paris with the dauphin at the earliest possible moment.⁴⁶

Sensing the danger of civil disturbance due to Burgundy's popularity with the Parisian bourgeoisie, Charles VI and his council accepted Burgundy's argument despite the prominent voices of protest raised against it. The king fetched the queen and dauphin back to Paris and, within days of their return, issued letters of remission pardoning Burgundy. The reality of the situation was that the king was more often "absent" than not and, on those occasions when he was in possession of his wits and his government, he was too easily manipulated by the presence of the all-powerful Burgundy and his allies. Alliances were not always clearly delineated and were often mutable. Louis II of Anjou typifies this, having concerns of his own to address in Provence-Forcalquier, Anjou-Maine, and Naples, where his great rival, Ladislaus of Durazzo, was king by right of possession, occupying Rome and forcing the pope, Gregory XII, to surrender the city to him.

Thrown together by the calamity of Louis's murder, at Valentina's request, Isabeau pushed for an allocution to be read against Burgundy's crimes. It was read in September 1408 by Jean Juvénal II des Ursins, Valentina and her children having prostrated themselves at the feet of the king to plead for justice and a chance to refute Burgundy's *Justification* in detail. Consent was granted and the refutation delivered, but Valentina died on December 4, 1408, exhausted by her struggle and without achieving justice for her husband's murder.⁴⁷ His burden lightened considerably, Burgundy persevered with his propaganda and scandal mongering. In 1409, another of his creatures, the king's secretary, the Burgundian appointed Pierre Salmon, presented his *Réponses à Charles VI et lamentation au roi sur son état*.⁴⁸ The objective of this piece of literary propaganda was to "suggest that Orleans had dabbled in magic in order to maintain his power over his

brother, the king”—a creative recycling of the evil spell rumor criticized by Pintoin in 1396 and mentioned above.⁴⁹

The death of Louis of Orleans solved nothing; the rivalry continued between Burgundy and the supporters of the Orleanist faction, headed by the teenaged Charles, Duke of Orleans. After a short-lived truce between the factions in 1410, by 1411 the conflict degenerated into open civil war, only adding to the problems of France—burdened as it was by a frequently deranged monarch and its continuing struggle against the English. Charles of Orleans's intemperate and martial father-in-law, Bernard VII of Armagnac, gained prominence with the Orleanists following the marriage of his daughter Bonne to Charles of Orleans in 1410. In November 1411, the Armagnacs tried to take Paris, but were defeated at St-Cloud by Burgundy with the aid of English mercenaries. To further his own plans, Henry IV was ready to consider alliances with either side of the civil conflict and, by May 1412, he had agreed to an alliance with the Armagnacs. In August, the Armagnacs called a truce with the Burgundians; it was not to endure and, by January 1413, the Estates of northern France refused to grant taxes, demanding immediate governmental reform.⁵⁰ The call for reform spread southward and the opportunistic Burgundy, self-fashioned as the standard-bearer for governmental and political reform, allied himself with the butchers, skimmers, and guildsmen of Paris.

Following Estates convoked on April 28, 1413, the “Cabochiens”—a political faction largely made up of small tradespeople and members of the butchers' and skimmers' guilds opposed to supposed ruinous government fiscal practices and court extravagance, led by Simon Lecoustellier, known as Caboche—rioted in Paris and stormed the Bastille.⁵¹ They had Burgundy's undeclared support and that of adventurers and opportunists such as Elyon de Jacquville, members of the University of Paris such as Pierre Cauchon, and merchants such as Jean de Troyes.⁵² Caboche whipped the Parisian mob into a frenzy and they rebelled, storming the royal residence of the dauphin and seizing control of the city. On May 11 and 12, prisoners were taken, including the queen's brother, Ludwig of Bavaria. A government-sponsored commission had been working on a reform agenda for some months, the objective of which was to ensure a flow of revenue back to the king's treasury and to prohibit future erosion of the kingdom's finances and resources. A royal ordinance dated May 25, 1413, later to be known as the *Ordonnance cabochienne*, provoked a reign of terror, during which Caboche styled himself bailiff of Paris. At the request of the rebels, Charles VI convened a *lit de*

justice in parlement on May 26 and 27, where an incomplete draft of governmental reforms was published. Caboché expended his influence to prevent conciliation between the two opposing political factions. The rebels were soon out of control and a simple instinct for self-preservation on the part of the people of Paris, coupled with the king's willingness to negotiate with the Armagnacs, allowed them to rid themselves of the revolutionaries they had originally supported. So utterly out of control were the rebels that the university withdrew its support for a radical reform agenda.⁵³

Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, at that time a rising star in the field of advocacy and a gifted speaker in *parlement*, suggested to Burgundy that he withdraw his support from the rebels. Burgundy refused to surrender the immediate political advancement afforded by being allied to what he perceived to be the winning side. A courageous decision because the king, the queen, her brother, the dauphin (Burgundy's son-in-law), and Burgundy's own family connections were besieged by the rebels. Burgundy probably counted upon the dauphin Louis's "visible preoccupation with pleasure" and "specific moral failings" undermining his determined participation in the business of governing during the "absences" of his father, Charles VI.⁵⁴ Avid for power but lacking the diplomatic skill of his father in dealing with political adversaries, Burgundy sought to be king of France in all but name. His refusal to agree to Juvénal des Ursin's proposal was a grave miscalculation: with the turn in the tide of support for the rebels, the underestimated dauphin rose to the challenge, liberating the captives by early spring. By August 4, 1413, the Armagnacs had regained control of Paris and the retribution began. Burgundy could not be guaranteed his personal safety, even within the confines of his private residence. At court, his peers and cousins refused to allow his participation in government and he was forced to flee the capital, fearing reprisals from his energized 16-year-old son-in-law, the dauphin Louis.⁵⁵ The reputation and image Burgundy had so meticulously reestablished in the wake of the murder of his cousin, Louis of Orleans, was shredded by his involvement with Caboché's rebels. The Armagnacs were ascendant, but the political conflict with their Burgundian cousins continued unabated and unresolved.

By May 1414, a determined Duke of Burgundy had formed a covert yet solid alliance with Henry V of England, with the Armagnacs conducting the primary defense of France against the aspirations of the English. The civil war in France became the subplot to the increasingly greater conflict with England. The Armagnacs attacked Burgundy in August 1414 and, by February 23, 1415, Burgundy agreed to a truce.

In August 1415, Henry V, having first secured the mute acquiescence of Burgundy, seized the initiative, making his anticipated invasion of northern France. In September, Harfleur fell to Henry and, on October 25, 1415, France suffered devastating losses at the battle of Agincourt. The flower of French nobility was cut down, imprisoned, and in disarray—its leaders had been massacred or captured and taken to London to be held for exorbitant ransom or indefinitely, as was the case for Charles of Orleans. Satisfied with the impact and progress he had made in the achievement of his objectives, Henry withdrew to England in November 1415 where he would remain until August 1, 1417, when he invaded Normandy. With the head of the Orleanist–Armagnac faction a prisoner in London, leadership fell to his intemperate father-in-law, Bernard VII of Armagnac.

A Unity of Purpose within a Fractured State of Affairs

The early part of the Angevin–Aragonese marriage was preoccupied with the consolidation of its holdings and the reestablishment of alliances with the Church and Crown. Louis II had sent his cousin Jacques II, Count of la Marche, of the junior branch of the Bourbons, to secure and consolidate what he could for Angevin interests in Italy, planning for the day when he could attempt to regain his kingdom.⁵⁶ Back in Provence and France, Louis II dealt with the negative effects of his mother's subtraction of obedience from the Angevin papacy in 1398. She had had little choice, enduring extreme pressure from Burgundy and Berry who had directed Robert Cordelier and Tristan du Bos to threaten her with the Crown's displeasure should she choose not to comply.⁵⁷ The Provençaux restored their obedience to Avignon unofficially around May 1401; Provence was again uneasy, and the situation confused as various parties sought to stake their respective claims. Contemporaneously, there had been a tentative rapprochement between the dukes of Burgundy and Orleans—one having taken up the cause of Rome and the other of Avignon. Provence wanted to re-establish its official support for Avignon, its Estates approaching Louis II with a plea for restitution on April 25, 1401.⁵⁸ The 1398 initiative was to have ended the Schism by a simultaneous abdication of both popes. The Estates emphasized that the strategy had failed; neither pontiff had stood aside, with significant negative fallout resulting from the 1398 vote.⁵⁹

Louis II had consciously adopted an inscrutable air of neutrality on the issue of the 1398 ordinance. However, his silence on the issue associated him with his mother's decision, and supporters of

Avignon read in Louis's defeat a judgment from above. The treachery of his once great ally Sanseverino, the loss of Tarente (his younger brother's inheritance), and the conquest of his kingdom by his competitor Ladislaus came together for some as a chastisement from God. Aragon and Avignon offered their assistance but, for a time, Louis II remained steadfastly noncommittal.

By September 1401, Louis II had informed Avignon of his intention to grant the plea of his Estates. In November 1401, Louis detailed his younger brother Charles to meet with Benedict XIII to smooth the way for a restoration of obedience. Louis II appeared in Avignon on August 27, 1402, offering his services to Avignon, and was again invested with Naples–Sicily.⁶⁰

Once the news of the restitution of obedience to Avignon reached Paris, Burgundy and Berry made their feelings known. Burgundy dispatched two eminent messengers to an assembly in Avignon declaring that his nephew, the king of Sicily, had behaved with unconscionable levity and that his example would not be followed by either Charles VI, King of France, or Enrique III, King of Castile. Louis II countered, responding that he had acted in good faith, having loitered in attendance of Charles VI's decision for some 18 months.⁶¹ Louis's initiative left the way open for his cousin, Louis of Orleans, to work toward the re-establishment of the Crown's obedience to Avignon. Marie of Blois-Penthièvre probably found herself in uncomfortable circumstances; her son had restored allegiance to Avignon, nullifying her previous reluctant stand and calling into question the position of the Crown. Louis's motivation was certainly multilayered: he needed the ecclesiastical and financial support of Avignon to achieve his conquest in Italy; his Provençal subjects favored the resident pontiff; and the Avignon pope was a familial connection of María de Luna, Queen of Aragon, consort of Yolande's uncle, Martí I. Perhaps Louis believed that, given Charles VI's incapacity to rule independently for any extended period, his younger brother, Louis of Orleans, who favored Benedict, would be ascendant. Taken as a whole, these circumstances worked together to inform an expedient restoration of obedience to Avignon.

An alliance with Louis of Orleans would have been a delicate proposition for Louis II. Both princes had Italian interests, which they sought to exploit to their respective advantages, and these were not always complementary. In marrying Valentina Visconti, Louis of Orleans came into possession of Asti. He had cast his eye more than once over the southern kingdom of Naples, inherited by Louis II in 1384.⁶² Had Louis of Orleans's original betrothal

to Katalin of Hungary eventuated, he would have ruled over the extended kingdoms of Hungary and could have moved to incorporate the entirety of Naples–Sicily under his sovereignty. Sigismund of Luxembourg married Katalin's second sister, Mária, and ruled the kingdoms of Hungary beyond Mária's death in 1395, becoming king of the Romans (Germans) in 1410 and Holy Roman Emperor in 1433. Louis of Orleans had only visited his Italian states in February and March of 1391, while Louis II was on his own campaign in Naples and when both princes were still in their teens. In 1393–4, Clement VII mooted a project to grant Louis of Orleans feudal rights over the kingdom of Adria—the central Italian papal states. This would have presented an interesting geopolitical prospect for the Angevins, in light of the territory they held in Piedmont abutting the dower lands of Valentina Visconti and the kingdom of Adria to the south. A little further south still lay the kingdom of Naples. The scenario, however, remained hypothetical, never having been achieved due to the intriguing of Isabeau of Bavaria and the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti in 1402.⁶³

In 1401 and 1402, as Louis II prepared to restore obedience to the Avignon papacy, Louis of Orleans was struggling to control royal policy in the “absence” of his brother, Charles VI. The hostility between Orleans and Burgundy climaxed in 1401, a truce being organized between the two in January 1402. It was not to hold and, by 1403, Louis of Orleans resolved to depart for Lombardy to put down a crisis that had arisen in his territories. It has been suggested by Valois that he was trying to smooth the way for Benedict's return to Rome, the understanding being that Avignon would invest him with the imperial crown of Holy Roman Emperor. All parties to the plan, however, decided to abandon the project while Orleans was in Avignon in 1404.⁶⁴ In light of such machinations, his marital connections, the position of Provence, and his Italian aspirations, Louis II perhaps felt it prudent to restore obedience to Avignon and ally himself, at least for the time being, with Louis of Orleans—the ambitious younger brother of a king who was frequently *non compos mentis*.

The conflict arising from the Burgundian desire to maintain loyalty to Rome, and Orleans's quest to restore obedience to Avignon, added fuel to the deeply entrenched power struggle between the two powerful princes. By the time Philippe of Burgundy died unexpectedly in April 1404, their mutual hatred was visceral. Burgundy's death had not only removed the most politically astute of the royal uncles, it also neutralized the most effective opponent of Benedict at the French court.⁶⁵ Orleans's influence at court intensified and would

have known no limit had it not been that the feud was bequeathed to Philippe's ambitious son and successor, Louis's avid and resentful cousin, Jean sans Peur. Restitution of obedience was achieved with letters and proclamations published in June 1404, with *parlement* registering the policy on June 19, confirming its adherence to Avignon just as it had reinforced the doctrine of subtraction on December 29, 1403.⁶⁶ In light of this, and with his increasing political influence and visible involvement on the royal council as a mediator-at-large of court conflict, Louis II might have believed that his political star was rising—welcome respite for a prince forced to walk away in defeat from his Neapolitan realm in 1399.

The Schism itself was no nearer resolution. Various embassies to Rome had not shifted the Roman pretender, Boniface IX. The position of Benedict remained fragile and illusory despite France's promises. Valois concludes that it was the destiny of the Avignon papacy to count upon armed propaganda and the cooperation of the royal house of France, only to be frequently disappointed at the eleventh hour. Orleans accommodated Avignon, but often found his plans thwarted by his brother Charles's brief and sporadic returns to sanity, and the influence of Burgundy. Having arranged for the venerable royal uncle, Louis II of Bourbon, to march upon Italy in 1405 to support Benedict's intention to bring about an end to the Schism in his favor, Orleans was forced to back down; Charles VI decreed that he could not countenance the prolonged absence of Bourbon from the royal council.⁶⁷ Louis II was nominated to replace Bourbon with a respectable force of arms but, at the last moment, he too was recalled to court at the instigation of Isabeau of Bavaria and Orleans in the name of the "absent" king.⁶⁸ This recall was precipitated by Orleans's and Isabeau's "abduction" of the royal children, including the dauphin and dauphine (Burgundy's daughter), and its thwarting by Burgundy at the head of (over)armed troops in August 1405.⁶⁹ Louis II was summoned as an objective mediator to sort out yet another conflict between the cousins. This pattern was repeated *ad nauseam*, leaving Benedict and France caught in the middle of the Valois dynasty's power struggle—fragile and easy prey for an ambitious foreigner.

The year 1405 was extremely trying for the people of France. Charles VI's intermittent madness had destabilized the kingdom, allowing the ambitions and excesses of his closest relatives to boil over. Pintoin asserts that abuse of power and privilege was undermining the political edifice.⁷⁰ Orleans, having dropped his Italian maneuverings following the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti, focused

his energy on the business of government during his brother's regular absences.⁷¹ Moreover, this "Prince Charming" had managed to divert the unfortunate queen from her unhappy position as consort of a mad king, with courtly amusements, literary pastimes, music, balls, and good humor. Orleans and Isabeau, brother and wife of the king, established a close and mutually supportive platonic companionship. With the death of Philippe of Burgundy on April 27, 1404, Orleans probably believed he had clean air to pursue his ambitions and build a political role for himself in the government of his unfortunate brother's kingdom. Enter Jean sans Peur; Philippe's death had left his son with eye-watering debts; an empire of territorial holdings that could only be sustained by recourse to the royal treasury; intemperate ambition underscored by a deep-seated sense of entitlement; and a visceral hatred for his cousin, Louis. However, Jean had not inherited his father's charm, political finesse, or skill in diplomacy. Isabeau did not warm to him; he was just another cousin of the king—not his venerable uncle Philippe, her defunct sponsor and "protector." Jean was denied his father's crown pensions and his dignity at court and, in an increasingly fractured government, the stage was set for conflict.

Things came to a head for Isabeau and Orleans in 1405; rumors circulated that they were playing fast and loose with the treasury, that Isabeau had had lost control over the moral standards of her household, and that she was neglecting the king's children. Their echo is found in a sermon noted by Pintoin, preached to the king and queen on Ascension 1405 by Jacques Legrand, Charles VI's official court preacher from 1400—a humanist with a moralistic purpose whose patron was Louis of Orleans, not Burgundy.⁷² Pintoin states that he has a duty to document that the "lively discontent of the kingdom was excited by the extreme carelessness with which the queen and the duke governed the realm during the illness of the king." The people had not desisted from condemning the pair publicly for their lack of regard for the king, his family, and subjects, desiring only to enrich themselves to the detriment of all. Opinion held that the king's wife and his only brother had forgotten convention and their obligations, becoming objects of scandal within France and the laughing stock of foreign nations.⁷³

Recorded by Pintoin, this snapshot of public opinion and rumor is followed by Legrand's exhortatory against the queen's comportment in the presence of assembled dignities, churchmen, university men, and bureaucrats: "Lady Venus alone reigns over your court, drunkenness and debauchery follow in procession after her, transforming

night into day in the midst of the most decadent dancing; these contemptible and poisonous flunkies, who continually infest your court, corrupt morals and weaken hearts.” Adams posits that this “sermon was simply a perfectly ordinary one of the type routinely preached at court and that its core complaint was in fact the unsuccessful war against the English”⁷⁴. However, 1400–1405 was not a highly charged phase in France’s continuing resistance against Henry IV, who had to contend with the Welsh Revolt (1400–15) led by Owain Glyn Dŵr, crowned prince of Wales by his supporters in January 1404, and his alliance with France against “Henry of Lancaster” was sealed in June 1404. Hodges refers to 1405 as the “year of the French” in Wales.⁷⁵ Legrand also criticized the fashions of Isabeau’s household, Pintoin commenting that the queen was the chief instigator of the luxury of dress at the French court, something for which Legrand reproached her saying, “Everywhere, noble queen, people speak of such disorderliness and of many others that dishonour your court. If you do not believe me, disguise yourself in the clothes of a poor woman and walk the streets of the city, you will hear for yourself what ‘everyone says’.”⁷⁶ Isabeau was not amused, which rather puts paid to Adams’s assertion that Legrand’s “sermon was simply a perfectly ordinary one of the type routinely preached at court,” Pintoin observing that, “these words were far from pleasing to the queen.”⁷⁷ The king, “on the other hand, evinced a great deal of satisfaction”; Charles was keen to hear more of what Legrand had to say.⁷⁸ Pintoin relates that it was said that, not only were the queen and Orleans busy with the raising of revenue for their own consumption to the detriment of France, but also that the same people dared to accuse the pair of neglecting the royal children. The king was “*forte irrité*” (greatly angered) at this, and called for the dauphin so that he might hear the truth from his son’s own lips. Tenderly, he asked the boy how long it had been since he had received his mother’s hugs and kisses; the dauphin replied that it had been three months. Pintoin assures us that the king was greatly affected by the child’s response and publicly resolved to put the matter to a council of the princes, notably the king of Sicily, Louis II of Anjou; Charles III, King of Navarre, and the dukes of Berry and Bourbon.⁷⁹

It was not merely Legrand who called attention to “fashion crimes” in Isabeau’s household; Eustache Deschamps, Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, Philippe de Mézières, and Christine de Pizan all picked up on this theme: Deschamps alludes to headdresses with “*cornes comme font des limas*” (horns such as those pushed out by slugs). Juvénal des Ursins did not hold back his disapproval: “The ladies and damsels

lived in great and excessive states (with) marvellous horns, long and large (...) having on each side two great wings so huge that when they wished to pass through doorways they needed to turn sideways and crouch or they would be unable to pass through; very displeasing to 'right-thinking' people." Philippe de Mézières (a close connection of Christine de Pizan)⁸⁰ counseled the queen to sort out her life and live "without ostentation, without pride, without great expense and without flamboyant livery." Commissioned by Philippe of Burgundy to write his late brother's biography, Christine de Pizan fashioned a detailed "mirror" of Charles V's consort, Jeanne of Bourbon, and her court: accompanied by "ladies and damsels in great quantity, from all neighbourhoods, honest, honourable and well chastised (as required) otherwise they had no place (in the queen's court), and all dressed appropriately, each according to their function, corresponding to the dignity of the occasion."⁸¹ Christine consciously seeks to inspire greater reserve in her queen, hinting perhaps that Queen Isabeau, "*vray miroir des dames*" (authentic mirror for the ladies), had failed in her obligation to educate and had, instead, corrupted the young women of her household.⁸²

Isabeau's flamboyance indicated a pattern of behavior, a "known fact" upon which to construct rumor and establish the foundation propaganda that would weaken her authority and influence. Before his entry to center stage of French politics, Jean of Burgundy ensured that rumors and innuendo concerning Isabeau and Orleans had circulated around the taverns and streets of Paris. Burgundy timed his first appearance at court to coincide with the moment that the political credit of Orleans and Isabeau was at its lowest. Richard Vaughan observes that Jean prepared his backdrop skillfully to step into the role of the leader of an organized opposition to the unpopular government of Isabeau and Orleans. He projected the image of a clean skin with a program of constitutional reform and fiscal rectitude to combat the perception of high taxes and wastage that had so upset the king's subjects.⁸³ The propaganda was effective and durable: in the minds of many, Isabeau was written off as a political lightweight, irresponsible in the face of her duty to king and kingdom, preoccupied by pleasure, and a neglectful mother, while Orleans was cast as the ambitious, tyrannical, and grasping younger brother of an unfortunate king. Against this negative image, Burgundy spun his web of self-serving positive propaganda, holding up the mirror of his own virtue to reflect his "pristine" image back at the ones he had tarnished. He was the "reform-minded" prince ready to serve his king to the benefit of all. It was very effective spin rendered durable

because its message was repeated in variety of media: tavern and market gossip, letter-writing initiatives, political pamphlets such as the *Songe Véritable* (The True Dream), and a stream of public justifications and complaints pronounced before the court, in parliament, and at the university by spokesmen reliant upon Jean's patronage.⁸⁴ In the *Songe*, a cast of identifiable officers and servants in the service of Charles VI are named and shamed, accused of having impoverished the king and his people; mention of Burgundy is noticeably absent.⁸⁵ Like his father, Philippe, Jean was a master at the game of rumor and propaganda; he always ensured that others did the talking for him, only appearing center stage once it had been dressed for his conquest.⁸⁶ Pierre Champion and Paul de Thoisy describe Jean thus: "Whereas he played at popularity, shaking hands, including the executioner's, he was damned to deny, to force his hirelings to justify his actions by attacking (his victims)."⁸⁷

"Defence Lies in Being Well Armed and Having Good Allies"⁸⁸

Between April 1407 and the murder of Louis of Orleans on November 23, 1407, Louis II of Anjou had tried to mediate between the princes, striving to draw as much advantage as possible for his own ambitions, especially those to do with the reconquest of his Neapolitan inheritance. Angevin Italian dreaming was a ruinous financial undertaking and a political, ecclesiastical, and diplomatic labyrinth. Although Marie of Blois-Penthièvre had managed to leave Angevin finances in better shape than she had found them, Louis II was required to secure funding and political alliances to underwrite his Italian ambitions. By far, the richest prince of the realm was his cousin, Burgundy. Louis II needed venture capital and Burgundy needed influential allies on the royal council. While Burgundy's duchy was the more ancient and Jean was better resourced in a multitude of ways, the conciliatory Louis II of Anjou, King of Jerusalem and Sicily, had legitimate title to a kingdom and the dignities and luster that only a crown such as his could confer. A marriage alliance was attractive to both parties because it guaranteed liquidity for Louis II and strategic influence at court for the often isolated Burgundy. Eight weeks before Burgundy moved decisively to rid himself of Orleans, the provost of Paris drew up a betrothal deed of mutual undertaking between four-year-old Louis III of Anjou and 15-year-old Catherine, daughter of the Duke of Burgundy and his duchess, Marguerite of Bavaria.⁸⁹ The agreement was negotiated by Berry, and "the gathering and solemnization

[of the said marriage would take place] before the end of May forthcoming.”⁹⁰ The infant Louis received the domains and title of Count of Guise, adding this to his existing appellation, Duke of Calabria. The financial windfall to Louis II was destined to underwrite future Neapolitan campaigns, and Burgundy was satisfied that Catherine might one day become queen of Jerusalem and Sicily. It probably seemed to Burgundy that the influential king and queen of Jerusalem and Sicily were in his pocket. Burgundy had earlier betrothed his daughter Marguerite to the dauphin Louis, but his future son-in-law was still only ten years old and not in a position to be the useful “chessman” he would become in 1412, when Jean’s power would be at its height.⁹¹ By the end of 1407, only one major obstacle remained for Burgundy: his intractable and potent cousin, Louis of Orleans. With Louis II for the moment favoring him, Burgundy moved against the king’s brother—the only remaining impediment between himself and the throne. Burgundy’s assassination of Orleans was decisive and its consequences far-reaching.

According to Pintoin, the initial reaction of Burgundy’s newly minted ally—the king of Sicily—was deep shock and sincere distress for the fate of Orleans and the future of his cousin Burgundy and that of the kingdom of France. The day after the assassination, Burgundy was sufficiently bullish to present himself to *parlement*, whereupon members of the royal family refused him entry. Rather than melting away, Burgundy gave vent to his irritation promising to reenter *parlement* despite his detractors. He flounced back to Flanders, with many condemning him as a criminal deserving of the full and combined wrath of God and man. Given the political reality of Burgundy’s position, devising a suitable punishment would have been a complex undertaking. He was the doyen of the royal peers of France, the richest lord of the realm, and his daughter Marguerite was engaged to the dauphin Louis. The princes offered Burgundy a chance to clear himself without prejudice before a public audience, if he agreed to hand over the perpetrators of the crime. He refused, and Louis II and Berry were sent by the king to Amiens to negotiate with him. Bourbon was instructed to take part in the mission, but petitioned the king to allow him to return to his domains, having lost heart, so affected was he by the murder of one royal nephew by another. Pintoin attests that “the ignominious death of his beloved nephew was for him [Bourbon] a terrible blow, and he repeated, it is said, many times that he could no longer endure the sight of the author of so black a treachery.”⁹² After ten days of polite negotiation and mutual courtesy, Louis II and Berry convinced Burgundy to appear in Paris on the king’s orders to explain

himself. Notwithstanding the desires of his sovereign, Burgundy refused to emerge from his stronghold without an accompanying force of arms. He agreed to return to the capital on the condition that: "the gates of Paris would not be guarded by military force, such that he and his men might enter into Paris at liberty; he wanted to enter Paris not as an enemy of the city or of the king but rather as a friend desirous of peace."⁹³ As discussed earlier in this chapter, Burgundy staged his appearance immediately after the arrival of the bereaved duchess of Orleans, Valentina Visconti. Having stopped at Saint-Denys to render his devotions, Burgundy "arrived in Paris and made his entry arrayed for war, to the great astonishment of all, as if he were poised to seize some great victory over the kingdom's enemies... the bourgeoisie received him with honour and alacrity."⁹⁴

Despite the audacity of the crime, it seems to have fulfilled Burgundy's expectations; he was ascendant by the spring of 1408. He had stunned everyone by reentering Paris bristling with arms and colors. His exculpation was delivered to a distinguished and captive audience including the ten-year-old dauphin; the king of Sicily; the dukes of Berry, Bar, Brittany, and Lorraine; the rector of the University of Paris; and numerous barons, counts, and prominent citizens. Intimate members of the king's and queen's families attempted to block the reading of Burgundy's *Justification*, but were unable to stop it. The king pardoned Burgundy and issued letters of remission, warning him to be wary of those who would seek to entrap him and exact punitive justice. Burgundy replied that he feared no one as he now enjoyed the protection of the king's majesty. So flattered was Charles VI by his cousin's response that he removed the position of admiral of France from Clignet de Brabant, one of Orleans's most zealous partisans, bestowing the position upon Burgundian loyalist Charles of Châtillon, Lord of Dampierre.⁹⁵

On the first day of the new year, April 15, 1408, Pintoin relates the birth of an *enfant monstrueux* in the diocese of Le Mans, deep in Angevin territory. She was born without arms or legs and the chronicler notes, "The wise and experienced regard this marvel as a portent of great misfortune."⁹⁶ 1408 was to prove a year of *grands malheurs* for Louis II, the Church, and France. Given what had occurred in the short interval from the date of the betrothal agreement between Anjou and Burgundy the previous October, the *solempnacion* of the marriage originally set for May 1408 was postponed, but the contract was not canceled despite the enormity of Burgundy's crime. Louis II, at this stage at least, was reluctant to cede the considerable financial advantage underwriting the alliance. Given the unprecedented

events in the wake of Burgundy's *apologia de tyrannicide* and the king's unilateral pardoning of Burgundy, the king and queen of Sicily would have been wise to adopt a waiting brief; against the odds, Burgundy had insinuated himself back onto the royal council.

The Schism continued to grind on, and France was still divided both ecclesiastically and politically. In 1408, Benedict occupied himself publishing bulls, which were soon condemned by Rome; France prosecuted a neutral stance in the extended conflict. The king's daughter, Marie of France, took the veil and departed for the aristocratic Dominican convent of Poissy in the company of Christine de Pizan's daughter, Marie du Castel.⁹⁷

As discussed, in September 1408, the refutation was pronounced against Burgundy's *Justification*, and the tide started to turn slowly against him⁹⁸ Present were the Dukes of Berry, Bourbon, and Brittany. Juvénel des Ursins argued that the reins of government should be handed to Isabeau and the young dauphin during the king's absences, citing Blanche of Castile, mother of St. Louis IX, as an example to be followed. Valentina and her children threw themselves to the ground demanding justice and an opportunity to refute Burgundy's assertions. This was granted and the refutation was undertaken by the Benedictine abbot of Saint-Fiacre, Master Serisy.⁹⁹ Nothing concrete came of this. Many royal councils were convened, chaired by Isabeau, the kings of Sicily and Navarre,¹⁰⁰ and attended by princes of the blood who nurtured an implacable resentment against Burgundy and his actions. They moved to isolate him, "without regard to the royal letters of reconciliation and pardon that had been accorded him, resolving to summon men-at-arms from all parts [of the kingdom] to pursue him from the realm as an enemy of the State. This unaccustomed state of affairs inspired terror and dread in the hearts of the bourgeoisie."¹⁰¹ The initiative did little to calm troubled political waters and, by the middle of October 1408, Isabeau moved to fortify her position and punish disloyalty.¹⁰²

If we take Pontois cautiously at his word and refer to Louis's household accounts for the period, the king of Sicily was again urging all parties to calm themselves, simultaneously attempting to broker a stay in the hostilities. He had little success; Burgundy set to subjugating several of the king's northern domains, and civil strife ensued. As news of Burgundy's victories reached Paris, the queen, the kings of Sicily and Navarre, and the dukes of Bourbon and Berry resolved to take the necessary steps to pull the best possible solution out of miserable circumstances. The Treaty of Chartres, executed on March 9, 1409, was looked to as the solution to the ruinous civil

conflict threatening to tear France apart. It was largely the work of the royal council, which had met in secret. Accommodation having been achieved by July 1409, Louis made plans to leave for Italy, first addressing the uncomfortable proposition of negotiations with Amadeus VIII of Savoy regarding disputed territories in Provence—the festering sore between the two states bequeathed to him by his father.¹⁰³

In Their Own Interests

Keeping a watchful eye upon their personal fortunes and aspirations, the king and queen of Sicily had striven to arrive at some sort of peaceful equilibrium between the Orleanists and Burgundy. Between the years 1405 and 1409, as civil conflict deepened in the kingdom of France, Louis II frequently attended the royal council in Paris, joining Yolande, who resided mainly in Tarascon and Aix-en-Provence, when the opportunity arose. Yolande gave birth to her third child, René, in Angers in January 1409 when Louis was deeply involved with the security of Charles VI, the royal family, and the wider kingdom.¹⁰⁴ By February 21, however, Louis had returned to Angers, where Yolande and their growing brood were in residence until December 26, 1409. In preparation for another assault upon Naples, Louis journeyed south to Provence, departing in early spring and arriving in Tarascon on May 5, 1409.¹⁰⁵ At the end of December 1409, Yolande was in Paris awaiting Louis's return from Pisa en route from Rome.¹⁰⁶ On January 6, 1410, he entered Paris to attend the royal council and to hold further negotiations with Burgundy regarding the betrothal of their children.¹⁰⁷ Louis and Yolande returned to Angers on February 9, where they stayed until the end of the month. While there, on February 14, 1410, Louis officially accorded lieutenant-generalcy to Yolande with full powers.¹⁰⁸

By the time news of his great rival Ladislaus's defeat at the hands of a force led by Tanneguy du Châtel had reached him in March 1410, Louis II was impatient to lead the campaign against his Neapolitan nemesis. Châtel was directed to situate himself outside Rome to secure safe passage for Alexander V, ensuring that he would be received in pacific circumstances. Following the Council of Pisa and the election of Alexander V, Louis was desperate to depart for Pisa to make certain he was once again invested with Naples.¹⁰⁹ Châtel amassed a great show of force, taking the battle up to Ladislaus, whom he defeated and forced to flee. The pope was free to enter Rome and was urged to do so without delay.¹¹⁰ Louis quit Anjou

for Italy on March 12, stopping off in Gien to meet with the king of Navarre and the duke of Bourbon to ease their apprehensions regarding Burgundy.¹¹¹ Yolande accompanied him as far as Gien, where they celebrated Easter, returning by river to Angers between April 1 and 4.¹¹² Louis arrived on the Italian peninsula in May, but by September 3, 1410, following a revolt in Genoa at the same time as successes in the papal states, having imposed Angevin authority over the district of Saint-Peter in Rome itself, he departed for Provence to gather further forces and money. On the death of Alexander V on May 3, 1410, a new pope, John XXIII, was enthroned on Easter Sunday, April 12, 1411, with the support of the king of Sicily.¹¹³

Louis scored a decisive victory over Ladislaus during Holy Week 1411. Pinton joyously reports the event, heaping praise upon the illustrious king of Sicily, emphasizing that the cardinals had unanimously conferred the title of “principal champion et protector of the holy Church” upon Louis once he had escorted John XXIII to Rome.¹¹⁴ The pope presented him with the standard of the church, urging him to bring the battle right up to Ladislaus, which he achieved at Roccasecca, sending Ladislaus’s captured standards to Rome as proof of his great victory. Rome proclaimed, “*Vivat summus pontifex et victor rex Sicilie Ludovicus*” (Long live the sovereign pontiff and the victorious King Louis of Sicily)!¹¹⁵ John XXIII supported Louis’s campaign against the pretensions of Ladislaus until Louis decided to walk away from his Italian victories in August 1411.¹¹⁶ Louis could have taken possession of his entire kingdom had he chosen to exploit his victory at Roccasecca. He seemed, however, disinclined to push on; the fracturing of his alliances with Florence by December 1410, Florence’s new alliance with Ladislaus, troubles in France, the ill-health of his men, his own compromised health, a scarcity of money and supplies, and the strident demands of his captains allowed Ladislaus the time he needed to regroup and reinforce his troops.¹¹⁷ Léonard agrees that with this stunning victory over Ladislaus, Louis was, at long last, in a position to claim his kingdom in its entirety, yet he unaccountably gave the enemy time to regroup. However, I disagree with him that it was Louis’s weakness of character that prevented him from exploiting the Roccasecca victory. Too many negative factors mitigated against his pushing on, particularly the ruinous cost of the Italian campaign and the physical toll it exacted upon the French Angevins, in general, and Louis, in particular. The political situation in France was out of control, with Orleans, Burgundy, Berry, and now Armagnac at continual loggerheads with no relief in sight. Burgundy had approached the English for support and the situation showed no

signs of improvement.¹¹⁸ Disillusioned and exhausted, Louis departed Italy for France. Pinton comments that while some claimed that the king of Sicily had only returned to Paris on January 11, 1412, to raise the funds to relieve his debts, many rejoiced at his return in the hope that he might be able to mediate and broker some form of accommodation between Orleans and Burgundy.¹¹⁹

The period 1410–11 was extremely troubled for France, and very exacting personally for Anjou. On January 31, 1410, letters were exchanged between the Anjou and Burgundy, fixing another date for the marriage of their children long deferred by the events of 1407. Louis needed to ensure continued financial support from his cousin. New dates were set for the ceremonies and new financial clauses added to strengthen the agreement.¹²⁰ Burgundy rewarded Louis for his continued loyalty, ensuring he received the required financial subsidy from the royal treasury to keep up his Italian mission. To seal the agreement a crown decorated with precious stones was handed to Anjou by Burgundy on March 19, 1410, in Gien-sur-Loire where Yolande received the guardianship of 18-year-old Catherine of Burgundy. From May 31, 1410, Louis of Anjou, child-Duke of Calabria, was mooted as a possible successor to the throne of Aragon. While all these Angevin happenings occupied the attention of Louis II and Yolande of Aragon, Berry and Burgundy were again in conflict over the guardianship of the 13-year-old dauphin Louis of Guyenne, and the government of the kingdom during Charles VI's insufficiencies.

Yolande remained in Angers until 1410, later making her way south to Provence with her children, arriving in Aix on January 6, 1411. Once in residence, she was obliged to calm her subjects.¹²¹ A group of nobles, remnants of the *union d'Aix*,¹²² sought to draw advantage out of a situation that had Louis occupied in Italy, with Yolande busy in her northern domains. The pacification of Provence was a work in progress for Yolande just as it had been for her mother-in-law and for her husband. The territory required an attentive Angevin presence; any departure from this policy of direct contact with the sovereign lord or lady inevitably led to dissent.¹²³ There was also the small matter of the Aragonese succession to keep Yolande engaged; her uncle, Martí I, died on May 31, 1410, with no legitimate heirs, the last of his line.¹²⁴ Lecoy de la Marche asserts that Yolande, having calmed the *liguistes*, crossed the Pyrenees to assume her rights in favor of her son, Louis III.¹²⁵ Her determination to act personally is confirmed by Zurita who states that on February 7, 1411, when the Aragonese *parlamento* was trying to negotiate a treaty with Catalonia (destabilized in the wake of Martí's death), Yolande planned to enter

the province, not only with her own retinue of ambassadors but also with those of Charles VI.¹²⁶

On August 9, 1411, Louis and Yolande were reunited in Marseille.¹²⁷ They remained in the south until Louis left Tarascon for Paris via Avignon to raise additional sums to discharge the debt accumulated by his Italian campaign. Yolande spent Christmas with her children in Tarascon, leaving for Anjou at the end of December.¹²⁸ Louis did not attempt another expedition to Naples. He turned his attention to his French and Provençal domains, and the conflict between his uncles and cousins, to see if something positive might be salvaged from the wreckage of the kingdom. In February 1412, Louis concluded an agreement of mutual understanding with the Orleans faction at Angers, reiterating their mutual support and loyalty to the king and dauphin and pledging reciprocal support for one another should their respective territories be threatened by invaders.¹²⁹ Louis made his entry into Paris on January 11, 1412, where he remained in talks with all interested parties, including Isabeau and the king.¹³⁰ On April 20, Louis was authorized to attack his neighbor, the count of Alençon, obtaining blanket authority to conquer Alençon's domains.¹³¹ In 1412, while Louis was involved in his martial pursuits, Yolande gave birth to their fourth child, a daughter named Yolande. The exact date and place is not known, but Yolande traveled south to Provence in 1412, and she was back in Saumur by December 10.¹³² The English ravaged Anjou during the summer of 1412 while Louis was occupied fighting for the king (and in his own territorial interests) and Yolande was absent from Anjou in Provence.

Since he had returned from Italy in 1411, Louis II traversed a political minefield, having regained his prominence on the royal council, cementing his alliance with Burgundy. On the advice of Burgundy, Charles VI moved against his uncles Berry and Bourbon and his cousin Alençon, deposing the constable, Charles I of Albret. Louis joined the fight on what he probably perceived to be the winning side. After the siege of Bourges, many tried to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the parties for the good of the kingdom. Negotiations proved successful and the Auxerre treaty was ratified by the dauphin, in the absence of his father, on August 22, 1412, with Louis, King of Jerusalem and Sicily, seated at his side on the dais.¹³³ The other princes of the blood, including Burgundy and the king's uncles, were seated in strict hierarchical order below the dauphin and Louis II. The treaty had been formulated, in part, to reflect the interests of the king and queen of Sicily whose domains in Anjou-Maine had been threatened by an invasion by the duke of

Clarence in 1412, and Orleans needed Louis's support on the royal council. By March 1413, Louis appeared to be contemplating a fall-back position were he to withdraw his support from the increasingly powerful and ambitious Burgundy, who, during the course of 1412, had finalized the marriage of his eldest daughter Marguerite to the 15-year-old dauphin Louis. With the Treaty of Auxerre signed by the dauphin, Orleanists became increasingly restless and Burgundians bolder and self-assured. Louis agreed to a meeting in Angers with Burgundy's rivals, the dukes of Brittany and Orleans, with whom he had already formed certain understandings as well as with Alençon, all three fearful that, in meeting together, they would jeopardize the conditions set down in the Treaty of Auxerre.¹³⁴

The political climate turned definitively against Burgundy with the fallout arising from the Cabochien uprising of 1413, with the Orleanists' star rising by early August of that year. On August 10, 1413, Charles VI issued a telling edict, *Littera accordii dominorum de francia de prosapia Regia*, an agreement between the great princes of the realm directing them to unite in the interests of the kingdom. It was promulgated contemporaneously with the setting aside of the *Ordonnance cabochienne* by both the university and other seekers of governmental reform in the wake of the terror occasioned by the insurgents, most of whom were Burgundian partisans.¹³⁵ The *Littera accordii dominorum* mentions all the great princes, with the king of Sicily repeatedly named as the principal and most loyal advisor to the king while Berry and Burgundy are exhorted to unify behind the king's cause. This forms a very interesting snapshot of the political moment in early August 1413 just as the rebellion was falling apart and the Orleanists had retaken Paris, eager to exact retribution from the Burgundians. Another instructive document of the period, taken from the same series, is the *actes des cabochiens contre la famille royale* published in letters patent-dated September 18, 1413.¹³⁶ This document details the crimes of lèse-majesté committed against members of the royal family and goes into the minutiae of the actions of the rebels and their supporters. Although it lists the names of the principal members of the royal family and of the accused, Burgundy is not mentioned. He again withdrew in disgrace to his northern territories to lick his wounds, and the Orleanists took control of the government and of Paris.

Subsequent actions of Louis and Yolande would have far-reaching consequences for their House, firmly establishing their credentials as the Crown's most loyal allies. By November 1413, their choice was clear: Anjou-Provence's future lay with France and their allegiance

would be to the monarchy, not Burgundy. Anjou's rupture with Burgundy was as complex in its motivations as had been its original alliance with him. Pintoin records a probable secondary motivation for the rift between the two Houses: in the heat of the Cabochien rebellion "They [the princes of the blood] protested moreover that they [the rebels] had arrested his Grace, the Duke of Bar [Edward III, Yolande of Aragon's cousin] the cousin of the king, whom they still held prisoner, in contempt of the rights of all lords of the royal house... which distressed the said princes in general, and the King and Queen of Sicily in particular, who demanded and required his immediate release and that of his Lordship Bavaria, brother of the queen, their very formidable lady..."¹³⁷ Having obtained a proclamation from Charles VI regarding the guilt of the principal rebels, the Orleanists and the king of Sicily (who was still at pains to *appear* neutral) set about restoring their people to high offices vacated by Burgundy's men.¹³⁸ Burgundy was exonerated of involvement in the uprising and the rebels were found to have been acting alone, "His royal majesty... was convinced that certain people, led astray by the spirit of rebellion, had given themselves up guilty of lèse-majesté,... without any doubt, guilt should *not* be attributed to the suggestions or the advice of the Burgundy or to any other prince of the blood, since the shame of it had principally rebounded upon them..."¹³⁹

Notwithstanding the official narrative, Burgundy was shamed and lost control of the royal council and the capital in the wake of the rebellion. The duke of Brittany, Jean V, threatened to leave Paris, not having been accorded due respect by the Orleanists.¹⁴⁰ At the last moment, the king of Sicily intervened to calm the royal council, appearing neutral, mediating in the interests of the kingdom and its government. However, far from calming the princes, Louis set the cat among the pigeons with a move he would regret until the end of his days. In planning a reception to pacify the dukes of Brittany and Orleans, he made the decision to split publicly with Burgundy. Pintoin records Louis's actions: "At this juncture, this same king [Louis II], to the great astonishment of all, consented to the marriage of his son with the daughter of the Duke of Brittany, despite the engagement he had earlier made with the Duke of Burgundy, and returned to the said duke the daughter who had been staying with her fiancé for the past three years. This breach of promise, which would have appeared inexcusable to eyes of the most insensitive and crude of men, ignited an implacable hatred between them [Anjou and Burgundy]."¹⁴¹ The king of Sicily having, at least for the immediate term, set his Italian

ambitions to one side, no longer needed Burgundy's investment and, under the circumstances, Louis might have viewed Burgundy as a spent force. There was a determined strategy in play; according to her household accounts, in October 1413, Yolande of Aragon requisitioned funds from her treasurer to journey to Paris.¹⁴² With the king of Sicily the dominant force on the royal council, and in light of the ruptured engagement with Burgundy in favor of the new ally Brittany, the queen of Sicily journeyed to Paris to participate in the unfolding of events.

By November 16, Burgundy had complained to the king of "multiple frivolous and imaginary grievances," but his missives had achieved nothing in their purpose to "diminish the animosity of the princes towards him; that which most 'topped off' his [Burgundy's] displeasure was that, all his appointments having been deprived of their offices at court, they [the other princes] had dared to deprive the Lord of Dampierre, his vassal, of the office of admiral of France, which had been promised to him by election, granting his position instead to his lordship, Clignet de Brabant."¹⁴³ On November 20, 1413, a devastated 21-year-old Catherine of Burgundy (her fiancé Louis was still only ten) was escorted with great solemnity and ceremony back to her father by the king and queen of Sicily's officers as far as the town of Beauvais. She was met in Amiens and conducted home to Lille, where she was greeted by her father who, according to Monstrelet, "was greatly troubled by this event, and for this reason conceived a great hatred towards the said King of Sicily, which would endure for the rest of their lives."¹⁴⁴ There seems to have been one rule for Jean the Fearless and another for everyone else; he glossed over the fact that the house of Burgundy had committed a similar breach of promise while he was the 14-year-old duke of Nevers. Jean had been betrothed to Catherine of France, the seven-year old daughter of his late uncle, Charles V. In about 1385, with Jean having attained his legal maturity and Catherine still a child, the engagement was ruptured by Jean's father, Philippe, and Jean married Marguerite of Bavaria-Straubing, consolidating and underwriting Burgundy's political and strategic position in the Low Countries.

Louis and Yolande moved to forge a solid alliance with Brittany, who would be an asset at court and whose lands formed a western buffer to theirs in the event of a serious English invasion, long anticipated and now more likely with the ascension of Henry V. Alençon was brought back into the fold after a period in the political wilderness because of his rebellion against the authority of the Crown, his county forming an additional buffer to the north of Anjou-Maine.

The king and queen of Sicily moved to cement relations with the house of France; and it was for this reason that Yolande had been waiting at Marcoussis on the outskirts of Paris. On December 18, 1413, while the king was once again at the mercy of his illness, the youngest surviving son of France, Charles of Ponthieu, was affianced to Marie, elder daughter of the king and queen of Sicily. The betrothal took place at the Louvre in the presence of Queen Isabeau; the king and queen of Jerusalem and Sicily; the dukes of Guyenne (the dauphin Louis) and Orleans; and the counts of Vertus (Philippe of Orleans), Eu (Charles of Artois, lieutenant for the king in Normandy and Guyenne and governor of Paris); and Armagnac.¹⁴⁵ The timing of these betrothal negotiations is of interest as are the locations where they were held. The negotiations between the two queens opened at Marcoussis (a residence owned by Isabeau's brother, Ludwig of Bavaria) on October 21, 1413, one month before Catherine of Burgundy was sent back to her father. Yolande sensed the danger of isolating their influential and vengeful former ally Burgundy, and took the initiative to position her marital house strategically within the fortifications of the house of France where Burgundy had managed to out-marry and, for a time, outflank Anjou.¹⁴⁶ At the time of his betrothal to Marie of Anjou, Charles of Ponthieu was the third in line to the throne—the very spare heir to the shaky kingdom of France. His elder brothers, Louis and Jean, had married into the Burgundian faction, but they had not yet produced any heirs. Whatever the long-term strategy, Isabeau's household accounts show that she received Yolande, the godmother of Catherine of France, with great dignity and ceremony, and the two queens hammered out the terms of agreement together.¹⁴⁷ As soon as possible after the solemnization of the betrothal, weighed down with gifts from Isabeau, Yolande quit Paris for Marcoussis and thence to Angers in the company of the young count and countess of Ponthieu.¹⁴⁸

Burgundy was again on the march and threatening to enter Paris with a force of arms, but he was met with determined resistance by his cousins and uncles in the name of the king. On February 13, 1414, the king published an extended edict against Burgundy, drawing attention to the crimes he had committed since the murder of Louis of Orleans.¹⁴⁹ On August 6, 1414, the king of Sicily's great rival Ladislaus died, leaving his sister Giovanna II in the company of Louis's cousin, Jacques de la Marche, whom she later married, enabling him to occupy part of the throne long aspired to by Louis.¹⁵⁰ Louis was too ill to intervene in the politics of Naples. Valois cites evidence that, despite his illness and or his inability to act directly,

Louis nevertheless arranged from the autumn of 1414 to allow Pierre Bonhomme a free hand to pursue Angevin benefit in Italy.¹⁵¹ Even if Louis had let Naples slide, it was prudent to keep his hopes alive, should his health and the political situation in France improve. He had the Council of Constance to consider, for which he and Yolande needed to prepare an embassy, and the royal council was once more moving toward establishing some form of peace with Burgundy. An accord was signed on October 16, 1414.¹⁵²

The Gathering Storm

France had other troubles. Adopting a more placatory attitude than his late father and thereby mopping up the last vestiges of the Glynd Dŵr Rising on his borderlands, Henry V prepared to invade France, simultaneously offering peacefully to clear the path to his rightful “inheritance” by marrying Catherine, the daughter of Charles VI and Isabeau of Bavaria and goddaughter of Yolande of Aragon.¹⁵³ Henry had been courted by both sides during the disputes between the warring French princes. In their lack of unity, the princes made France easy picking for a bright young English king with initiative, charisma, and political deftness. He sent his senior herald to the French court on April 7, 1415, with a proposition to unite the two kingdoms by marriage rather than by force, requesting the restitution of the rights held by virtue of his lineage. Henry had taken a keen interest in France’s political landscape from 1413. With the Orleanists and the Burgundians in constant conflict from the time of the murder of the Duke of Orleans, Henry probably decided that, in the face of Burgundy’s neutrality toward the threat of an English invasion, the spring of 1415 was the ideal opportunity to launch his French campaign. The phony war and its attendant negotiations continued into the summer of 1415, with respective embassies moving to and fro between London and Paris. Patience exhausted, Henry V demanded the hand of Catherine and his rights to the throne of France.¹⁵⁴ France stood its ground, Henry invaded Normandy, and the real war began. This might have been expected to sweep aside the petty aspirations of the homegrown princes, but it did not. Burgundy remained aloof, while raising a considerable force of arms in Burgundy, Savoy, and Lorraine, no doubt with an eye to ally himself with the potential victor just as he had during the Cabochien rebellion.¹⁵⁵

The king of Sicily progressively fell victim to the illness, which would carry him off in less than two years; however, he traveled to his county of Provence, where Yolande and the count and countess

of Ponthieu had been keeping court and maintaining an essential Angevin presence.¹⁵⁶ Louis inaugurated his *parlement de Provence*—an additional governance instrument to buttress their frequent absence from territory.¹⁵⁷ He and Yolande returned north with their children in September 1415 to await the outcome of the expected English invasion, passing through Orleans on their way to Anjou-Maine.¹⁵⁸ Both Charles of Ponthieu and his father-in-law, the king of Sicily, attended the emergency royal council convoked by the king in Rouen on October 20, 1415. This was the future Charles VII's first formal foray in the world of politics and government; he was 12 years old and his two elder brothers were still very much alive. He witnessed firsthand the spectacle of a monarchy in turmoil and a kingdom in crisis. Louis and Charles journeyed to Le Mans and Angers, joining Yolande and the family just in time to wait out the Agincourt disaster.¹⁵⁹

Post-Agincourt, with nothing much to lose and a good deal to gain, Burgundy ravaged the kingdom; he refused to discipline his army, despite orders from Charles VI to do so.¹⁶⁰ The king and the princes reentered Paris in despair on November 25, 1415. With them was the ailing Louis and his son-in-law, Charles of Ponthieu, who had been accorded the distinguished office of captain of the fortress of Vincennes. Politically speaking, this was an important appointment, because the fortified château served as a royal residence for both the king and the queen.¹⁶¹ Bernard VII of Armagnac was created constable, and the bloodshed intensified. Captured at Agincourt with his younger brother, Jean of Angoulême, Charles of Orleans was a prisoner of the English; Henry V refused to exchange him for ransom, deeming him too influential a leader of the opposition forces in France. Charles would not be released until 1440.¹⁶² Monstrelet records that Burgundy assembled a great army to enter Paris, and that the king of Sicily, ill and in bad odor with Burgundy over the ruptured betrothal, departed Paris for Angers, only pausing to warn the royal council of his cousin's malign intentions.¹⁶³ Charles of Ponthieu had preceded him to Angers.¹⁶⁴

Burgundy's son-in-law, the dauphin Louis, fell ill with dysentery and died on December 18, 1415, without issue, depriving Marguerite of Burgundy of her status of dauphine and bringing Charles of Ponthieu and the second house of Anjou one step closer to the throne. The new dauphin, 17-year-old Jean, Duke of Touraine, married to Burgundy's niece, Jacoba (Jacqueline) of Hainaut, daughter of his great ally the count of Hainaut, was recalled to the capital to assist in the government of the realm.¹⁶⁵ Willem II of Bavaria, Count of Hainhaut, who exercised effective guardianship over the

new dauphin, declared that he would not return the dauphin Jean to the capital unless Burgundy too was welcomed back. Events accelerated for the king and queen of Sicily when their uncle, Jean of Berry, died on June 15, 1416. Despite his debilitating illness, possibly bladder cancer, which had moved from the chronic to the acute and critical phases, Louis was forced to reenter the political arena for two reasons: the rapidly evolving status of his son-in-law, 13-year-old Charles of Ponthieu, who was created captain-general of Paris (a post left vacant by Berry's death), and Burgundy's potential readmittance to the royal council through the offices of his brother-in-law, the count of Hainaut. Charles of Ponthieu needed a solid political guardian and mentor, and the king of Sicily was the obvious choice for the post:

The king, the queen, his lordship Guise, his lordship René departed Angers to go to Paris from the said place of Angers. His lord and ladyship of Ponthieu, his lordship Charles and her ladyship Yolande [the younger daughter of Anjou] with many people and servants of the king and the queen.¹⁶⁶

This extract from Yolande's household witnesses Anjou-Valois descending upon the capital in full retinue. The political career of Charles of Ponthieu was about to be launched. With the death of Berry and with Burgundy cooling his heels in the political wilderness, the king of Sicily prepared himself to take on an even greater role on the royal council. On July 16, 1416, Charles was created duke of Touraine by his father, Charles VI, and with this honor came the responsibility of becoming one of the dozen royal peers of France.¹⁶⁷ Isabeau continued to hold a position of authority in the government during Charles VI's absences, with Armagnac, for the moment, keeping Burgundy at Bay. The queen moved to cement the loyalties of Armagnac and the provost of Paris, Tanneguy du Châtel (Anjou's loyal retainer), with gifts and pensions, simultaneously playing a clandestine and dangerous double game, making overtures to Burgundy. This was natural in the circumstances; he had effective control of the dauphin Jean via his brother-in-law, Willem II of Bavaria, Count of Hainaut and Isabeau's cousin. Emboldened by this and Louis II's rapidly deteriorating health, Burgundy gave covert encouragement to Henry V's plans for continued invasion while his own men ravaged the north of the kingdom.¹⁶⁸

The dauphin Jean was forced to wait for the best part of the year before commencing his journey to Paris in November 1416. The royal

council had consistently repulsed Burgundy's attempts to reenter the capital and take his place on the council. The king of Sicily exercised unquestioned full public authority during this period, which allowed him to exert preponderant influence over the affairs of Paris and the wider kingdom.¹⁶⁹ He chaired meetings of the royal council for the king with his youthful son-in-law by his side, occupying the place of his elder brother, the dauphin Jean, who was kept at bay beyond the capital. This put many offside who believed that, although Louis II was eloquent and skillful, he had no aspiration other than to enrich himself with a steady revenue stream flowing from royal taxes to live high on the public purse, considerably beyond his royal station, and overpaid his army for the protection of cities and towns while they committed every sort of excess and disorder.¹⁷⁰ On December 25, 1416, Hainaut gave in to his cousin Isabeau's pleadings, agreeing to return the dauphin to Paris. The dauphin never made it to the capital, however, dying in Compiègne on April 5, 1417, from an agonizing aural fistula. He too had died without issue. The usual rumors of an Armagnac poisoning were circulated, but rapidly discounted.¹⁷¹ Charles of Ponthieu was created dauphin on April 13, 1417, and, with his elevation, Anjou was dealt an unexpected dynastic trump card and a grave political responsibility to fulfill. The kingdom could not have been in a worse state of misery: its king was mad, its queen lacked political dexterity, its government was divided, and its heir to the throne was 14 years old.¹⁷²

By the time Charles became dauphin, the king of Sicily was terminally ill. He returned to his château in Angers, well resourced by Charles VI, intending to mount an offensive against Burgundy in the interests of the Crown. The civil strife between Armagnac and Burgundy deepened and the threat of another English invasion was imminent. The Crown petitioned for assistance from all corners of its realm, while Burgundy continued to attract loyalty from many of the kingdom's cities and towns. Brittany had been in negotiation with Burgundy and Hainaut since January 1417, at the express command of the king, who had temporarily regained control of both his wits and his government; however, civil strife descended into a battleground of opposing outlaws and highwaymen; Henry V seized the opportunity for further conquest.

Louis II, King of Jerusalem and Sicily, died in Angers on April 29, 1417. He might have slipped away with a deep sigh of relief, given Burgundy was on the point of mounting an open offensive against him—the last remaining effective impediment between himself and

the throne. Louis died leaving a vast fortune and largely unfinished political business to his queen, Yolande of Aragon, and his heirs.¹⁷³

Louis's relatively short life was characterized by interminable political struggle. He had constantly surveyed and subdued potential discontent in Provence to underwrite his sovereignty and to stage his Italian campaigns. During his final visit to Provence in 1415, he decreed that the county should remain independent from France, creating a *parlement* based in Aix on August 14, 1415. However, he needed to court the political support of his uncles and cousins in France¹⁷⁴, and he had to assure the support and loyalty of successive popes and anti-popes. Anjou and Maine were frequently threatened and endured attack by the English, forcing him to forge strong dynastic ties with other princes of the blood.

After Agincourt, with the political landscape in France denuded of many of its key players, Louis became a crucial figure on the royal council, mediating and attempting to chart troubled political waters and heal the wounds of the ruling dynasty upon which his House depended. With the death of Berry in 1416, Louis found himself effectively cast into the role of king of France as well as king of Sicily, often in residence at royal palaces haunted by the phantom presence of Charles VI still very much alive but "absent." It was the king of Sicily rather than Charles VI who escorted Sigismund, King-Emperor of the "Romans" (Germany), to Saint-Denis during his official visit to Paris in March 1416.¹⁷⁵ Louis was enough of a threat to Burgundy that, in Holy Week 1416, a plot to assassinate him, Yolande, and Berry was uncovered and thwarted by Tanneguy du Châtel. Louis's authority and his true potential for political greatness reached its zenith in the last years of his personal reign, despite Burgundy's best attempts to bring him down or have him killed. While he retired from his final Italian campaign victorious yet disillusioned, he never forsook his titular kingdom. He was obliged frequently to curb his personal ambitions, and it must have been hard for him not to have been able to draw advantage from the death of Ladislaus of Durazzo in 1414. With the rupture of the betrothal deed in 1413, Louis made an implacable enemy in Burgundy, allying himself instead with his powerful neighbor Brittany and the Crown. The king of Sicily was one of the more conscientious of the princes of the blood, one who understood that the best future for his dynasty lay in the independent survival of the kingdom of France.

During the totality of Louis's extended absences from their holdings, whether in Provence or assisting the royal court in its various

dealings with Burgundy and the other princes, Yolande had taken in hand the administration of their farflung territories and assets. In keeping with her upbringing in Aragon–Catalonia, with Louis’s departure for Italy in the wake of the Treaty of Chartres, her lieutenant-generalcy and vice-regal authority acquired official and legal status. From the time of their highly orchestrated nuptials and Yolande’s very particular coronation in the royal city of Arles in 1400, their partnership had been an alliance of two political equals. This was confirmed officially by Louis when he designated Yolande his vice-regent; she was “Lady” of their joint domains by virtue of her coronation at the time of their wedding.¹⁷⁶ Yolande was henceforth *la regina novela*, stepping into the role vouchsafed up to that point by Marie of Blois–Penthièvre, *la regina vielha*. Just as the marriage of Robert the Wise of Naples to Sança of Mallorca–Sicily was designed to unite his Naples to her Mallorca–Sicily, Anjou–Valois and Aragon engineered Louis’s and Yolande’s nuptials to keep his options open to (re)conquer Jerusalem–Naples, peninsular Sicily, and to emphasize Aragon–Catalonia’s sovereignty over the insular kingdom of Sicily.

Accordingly, when Louis decided that the time was right to absent himself for an indefinite period to reattempt a conquest of Naples, everything was in place to hand over officially the reins of power and authority to his vice-regent, Queen Yolande, in detailed letters written from Angers, dated February 14, 1410:

[To our] very beloved companion, the queen of the said kingdom, duchess and countess of the said duchy and counties [we give] total control of justice and of finances, with full power and authority to remit and pardon all crimes, offences and evil and to extend any advantage within our conferment to appoint and institute all officers in our said lands... of whatsoever estate, authority and power they might possess and to dismiss remove from and disappoint those who hold office and to forgive those, install or otherwise command according to her will... and also... power and authority to convoke the three estates of our said lands to assemble... to sell, invest, alienate and transfer our baronies, castles, lands and possessions and such as well and all in the manner as she sees fit...¹⁷⁷

The authority delegated to the queen of Sicily was all-embracing and unequivocal. Yolande’s eldest son, Louis III, would confer the same authority and liberty of action upon her during his prolonged absence in Italy from 1423 onward, specifically naming her his vice-roy. Yolande of Aragon did not merely exercise hypothetical authority in her husband’s name. In 1410, while Louis II was traversing

northern Italy on his way south to Naples, Yolande quit Angers and hastened to Aix to quell a rebellion by indigenous nobles who had sought to draw advantage from the absence of their sovereign lord and lady. At the age of 36, politically astute, diplomatically sensitive, and remarkably intelligent, Yolande of Aragon embarked upon her personal reign. Although well-primed by the example and political activity of her mother, Violant of Bar, in the realms of Aragon as well as her own active partnership in the affairs of Anjou–Maine–Provence, Naples–Sicily, and France, the newly widowed Yolande was to confront a baptism of fire.



CHAPTER 3

YOLANS REGINA SICILIAE

Mater nostra,¹ mater potentissima²

When Louis II died on April 29, 1417, after years of chronic illness, Yolande, unlike her mother and Christine de Pizan, was well-prepared for widowhood. Yolande was accustomed to exercising ducal and princely authority during her husband's absences and illnesses. Louis had officially delegated lieutenant-generalcy to Yolande on February 14, 1410, and headed south to claim Naples, leaving her in full control of their holdings.³ He knew and acknowledged that she was more than equal to the task; in his official letters, Louis cites [son] "*sens... [sa] bonne discrecion, [sa] tres grant loyaulté, obeissance et parfait amour [et sa capacité à] garder noz diz pays dopressions [et] a tenir noz diz sugiez en bonne et vraye obeissance*" (her sense, her good discretion, her very great loyalty, obedience and perfect love and her capacity to guard our said territories against oppressions and to hold our said subjects in good and true obedience).⁴ Yolande demonstrated all these qualities during Louis's absence in Italy, forced to defend Provence successively against the Genoese and her Aragonese relatives. In the case of the Genoese, arriving to attack the coast of Toulon, she organized a naval offensive, which sank many invading vessels in Hyères harbor. The Aragonese sought to invade Provence on the pretext of supporting the besieged anti-pope, Benedict XIII, resident in Aragon. Yolande dispatched her seneschal, Pierre IV d'Acigné, who ambushed the Aragonese landing force not far from Port de Bouc, taking many of them prisoner.⁵ She was required to subdue anew certain Provençal nobles, remnants of the *ligue d'Aix*, who sought to profit from Louis's absence to support the pretensions of his competitor, Ladislaus of Durazzo.

In the wake of her uncle's, Martí I's, death without a legitimate or nominated heir on May 31, 1410, Yolande occupied herself with the

succession in her natal kingdom of Aragon. Violant of Bar, Queen-dowager of Aragon, had sent a detailed missive to her from Pedralbes dated April 26, 1410. In this long and explicit letter, Violant castigates her daughter and son-in-law for not defending their legitimate claim to the throne of Aragon more energetically. Violant believed Yolande and Louis had an obligation to fight for the Aragonese crown. Although Yolande had renounced her place in the succession in October 1400 shortly before her wedding, the agreed compensation was never fully realized; Violant could not understand therefore why the couple had made so little effort in this respect. With her pungent yet elegant letter, Violant aims to shake them out of their geopolitical stupor. Her argumentation is centered steadfastly upon the importance of the family ties that bound Yolande and her progeny to her natal throne.⁶

Violant got things moving; by October 1410, a considerable combined embassy supporting the claims of Anjou to the throne of Aragon was being organized in a triangular effort between Paris, Provence, and Violant's headquarters in Aragon. Burgundy had a clear interest in the initiative; his daughter Catherine was betrothed to the claimant, Louis III of Anjou. Like chess pieces, the child-duke of Calabria and Catherine of Burgundy were moved strategically to reside in Narbonne, accompanied by Antoine, Duke of Brabant, Burgundy's brother.⁷ The episodically "absent" Charles VI; Charles III, King of Navarre; and Jean, Duke of Berry, strongly supported Anjou's claim.⁸ Lecoy de la Marche asserts that Yolande, having calmed the *liguistes* in Provence, crossed the Pyrenees to assume her eldest son's rights to the succession.⁹ That such an initiative was proposed is confirmed by Zurita, who records that by February 11, 1411, while the Aragonese *parlamento* was concluding treaty negotiations with Catalonia (which had again destabilized in the wake of Martí's death), Yolande intended to enter the province at the head not only of her own embassy, but also Charles VI's, demonstrating that France supported Yolande's claim to the Aragonese throne.¹⁰ The Aragonese *parlamento* took Yolande's intentions and France's seriously, fearing for the stability and unity of the kingdom should she mobilize support from Catalonia to reinforce her claim. Politically re-energized, her mother, *la reina doña Violante de Aragón* became more aggressive in her support of Anjou's claim. This too is acknowledged by Zurita's subsequent narrative of events concerning the truce of Catalonia: "*Amonestación a la reina de de Aragón y al conde Urgel y jura del parlamento.*" (Warnings to the queen of Aragon and the count of Urgel sworn by *parlamento*). She and her fierce competitor, Jaume II, Count

of Urgel, were both so zealous in pushing their respective claims to the throne that *parlamento* judged them to be seditionists.¹¹ Violant's political nemesis in this struggle was the *infanta* Isabella of Aragon, daughter of Pere IV and his fourth wife, Sibilla de Fortià. Isabella was born before this marriage but was later legitimized. She had been given in marriage to Jaume II, Count of Urgel, by Martí I in 1405. On the death of his only son and heir, Martí the Younger,¹² Martí I appointed Jaume his lieutenant-governor of all Aragon's realms. However, by late 1409, Jaume was out of favor with Martí, who vacillated between legitimizing his grandson, Federico of Sicily, and nominating his grandnephew, Louis III, Duke of Calabria, as his heir-designate. Violant refused to accept that Jaume might be considered heir-designate to the throne of Aragon; lobbying against him in the wake of the death of Martí the Younger in 1409 and challenging him unrelentingly during the interregnum.¹³ Violant became the influential self-appointed leader of a francophile party made up of minor Catalan nobles, all of whom were avowed enemies of Jaume. If Martí's young widow, Margarida de Prades, and the majority of Catalan nobles were pro-Jaume, the Centelle faction in Valencia and Urrea in Aragon, allied to Violant's great favorite, the archbishop of Zaragoza, García Fernández de Heredia, held out against Jaume. Violant's plans and ambitions stalled with the killing of her high-ranking ecclesiastical ally and friend on June 1, 1411. His murder had been planned to make a political point, coinciding with the first anniversary of the death of King Martí, by the leader of Jaume's faction, Antonio de Luna y de Xérica, who was subsequently excommunicated for his actions, irreparably damaging Jaume's standing and cause.¹⁴

To the point of exasperating *parlamento*, Violant of Bar strove indefatigably to place her grandson, Louis III of Anjou, on the throne of Aragon. She, like Yolande and Louis II, knew that it was not just the throne of Aragon (the kingdom of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia) that was at stake, but also unextinguished rights over the kingdom of Mallorca (the Balearic Islands of Mallorca, Minorca, and Ibiza), Sardinia, and Sicily (including Malta). Sovereignty over the western Mediterranean was the prize for second house of Anjou, and Queen-dowager Violant hungered for the restoration of the lost political relevancy and power that the status of regent could return to her as guardian *in situ* of a seven-year-old Angevin king of Aragon and his 18-year-old consort. The objective was worth the fight, given Anjou's strategic possession of Provence-Forcalquier and their claims to Naples, where, contemporaneously, Louis II had engineered some

impressive victories; it looked possible that he might take possession of his titular realm. Had Violant and Yolande secured Aragon and the western Mediterranean for Louis III, the Angevins would have possessed a massive and powerful kingdom and strategic empire, stretching from their hereditary northern French duchies into their lucrative counties of Provence-Forcalquier and beyond, to Iberia and Italy. Moreover, control of the western Mediterranean and its accompanying vast treasury would have enabled Anjou to contemplate an attempt to fulfill their aspirations to become kings and queens of Jerusalem in more than just name. Yolande had a good deal of assistance from her mother; Violant's tenacity in Barcelona and Catalonia triggered *parlamento's* missives to Yolande, urging her to behave according to princely practice and not stir up further dissent by arriving precipitously in Catalonia bristling with ambassadors and men-at-arms. Although Yolande, her mother, and Charles VI's ambassadors strove mightily to achieve this ambitious Angevin project, their attempts to claim the throne of Aragon ended in disappointment. The Caspe Compromise, steered by the Valencian Dominican friar, Vicens Ferrer, Violant's confessor from 1391 to 1395, found in favor of her nephew, Ferran of Antequera de Trastámara, *infant* of Castile, the younger son of Joan and Martí's sister Elionor of Aragon and Juan I of Castile. Yolande's cousin, Ferran I *el Just i l'Honest*, was proclaimed king of Aragon by Vicens Ferrer on June 28, 1412.

While the question of the Aragonese succession had demanded much of Yolande's attention, her principal concerns were her husband's Louis's, Italian venture, Provençal unity and security, the malaise within the kingdom of France, and the English threat to her northern Angevin domains.¹⁵ That Yolande, and not merely Louis II, was of concern to their ambitious cousin, Burgundy, is without question. He had assessed her capacities and network of connections, coming to the conclusion that she in no way resembled the unpredictable, yet malleable, Isabeau of Bavaria. Unlike Yolande of Aragon and his avowed enemy, the house of Anjou, with Isabeau, accommodation on his terms was a feasible outcome. Although Isabeau was not endowed with Yolande's political acumen, she had a clear positional advantage; she held the regency and, despite her many shortcomings, she was a seasoned political opportunist. Burgundy recognized a fellow traveler in the upstaged queen of France, but this does not mean that he had not, from time to time, considered eliminating her as he had his rival Louis of Orleans in 1407. Isabeau was included in a plot to assassinate both Yolande and Louis II in 1416—a time when Burgundy was shut out of government.

Sigismund of Luxembourg, King of Germany and Hungary, eventually Holy Roman Emperor, arrived in Paris prior to Holy Week 1416, where he was received with great ceremony by the king, Berry, and Louis, Cardinal-Duke of Bar. The purpose of his visit was the union of Mother Church, split as it was by the continuing Schism. Sigismund offered to do what he could for the king and his kingdom, and he departed on the Wednesday prior to Easter, escorted as far as Saint-Denys par “*le roy Louis, le duc de Berry et le cardinal de Bar.*” Sigismund was accompanied by the Duke of Milan, Filippo Maria Visconti, uncle of the captive Charles, Duke of Orleans.¹⁶ From Saint-Denys, Sigismund proceeded to London, where he sided with Henry V against the French.¹⁷ Sigismund’s decision occurred unhelpfully at a time when the royal council steered by Louis II was attempting to come to a negotiated peace treaty with England. Sigismund’s determination was in keeping with his will to force the Council of Constance to adopt his program to end the Schism.¹⁸ Following Sigismund’s departure from France, Burgundy’s ambitious intrigue to rid himself of his troublesome adversaries was uncovered by loyal Angevin retainer and provost of Paris, Tanneguy du Châtel; Monstrelet gives a detailed account of the plot.¹⁹

An almost identical version exists in Le Févre’s *Chronique*, but his version tends to fill in details omitted by Monstrelet. Le Févre’s account gives Yolande’s presence during the political climate of 1416 greater contextual prominence. Louis II had been ill for some time, and Burgundy might have been heartened that he would not survive for very much longer. Berry was about 76 years old, and would be dead by June 15, 1416;²⁰ Yolande had played an exponentially visible role in the affairs of Anjou–Maine–Provence–Naples and those of France. Le Févre’s version attests to the direct implication of the duke of Burgundy in the 1416 plot.²¹ His account makes no mention of Isabeau and the king, just the Angevins and Berry. Since 1415, the proactive Angevin provost of Paris had become an obstacle in the path of Burgundy’s ambitions, with Yolande herself developing into a real threat to his projects; both had to be removed. Both Burgundian chroniclers highlight either the duke of Burgundy’s influence (Monstrelet) or direct implication (Le Févre) in the conspiracy and the importance of Yolande’s elimination in the greater scheme of things. The plot was discovered in time, and the plotters punished.²² Its existence underscores the discontent and desperation of Burgundy and his supporters. Both chronicles demonstrate that, with the elimination of Louis II, Berry, Yolande, and their officers and allies, Burgundy’s path to the throne would

have been cleared. Charles of Ponthieu was not yet dauphin, but he was edging closer to the title and enjoying increased status, thanks to the efforts of Louis II and the Council to keep both the dauphin Jean, Duke of Touraine, and Burgundy out of Paris and away from the king. While the plotters intended to kill Yolande and her officers immediately (and perhaps Isabeau of Bavaria), they wanted to humiliate publicly both Louis II and Berry as madmen before putting them to death. Burgundy's exile became more entrenched in the wake of Easter 1416 and, with the death of Berry on June 15, 1416, Louis II held the king's authority in all but name. But Louis was acutely ill, with less than a year to live, and had his own onerous responsibilities and aspirations to fulfill.²³ Burgundy reacted to his heightened isolation, amassing an expeditionary force aimed at unseating Anjou from his position of authority, attracting towns to his cause, determined to reclaim his place on the royal council. Charles VI retaliated, ordering and financing a defensive army commanded and controlled by Louis to thwart Burgundy's newest initiative. Louis died before the anticipated confrontation with his cousin Burgundy could take place.²⁴

The king of Sicily and Jerusalem's final wishes exhorted his widow Yolande to protect the joint inheritance of their children and to work toward a lasting rapprochement with Jean V, Duke of Brittany, whom he believed held the key to a lasting peace between the princes. Louis was convinced that, once unified, the princes would drive the English out of France. To his children and his son-in-law, the newly minted dauphin Charles, he commended a policy of reconciliation and unity. His testament explicitly names Yolande his universal and principal executor, sole tutor and guardian of their children, directing Louis III, the new duke of Anjou, and his siblings to obey Yolande in all things and to honor her until their deaths.²⁵ At the time of Louis's death, Charles of Ponthieu had only just claimed the title and status of dauphin and government over the Dauphiné.²⁶ In the weeks leading to his death, Louis continued to counsel his son-in-law and direct and order his affairs. In his final hours, the Angevin clan, including the dauphin, gathered at Louis's bedside, where it is reported that he embraced his 14-year-old son-in-law several times before expiring, exhorting him never to trust the duke of Burgundy but, nonetheless, to devote all his energies and means to ensuring that he remained on good terms with him. He states in his final testament that he could forgive Burgundy his "accumulated grim and bitter malevolence" toward him and expressed the wish that he would reciprocate.²⁷

Cuer d'omme (Heart of a man)²⁸

Since June 1417, the adolescent heir to the uneasy kingdom of France had held authority as lieutenant-general during the “absences” of his father.²⁹ This authority was confirmed by letters issued by Charles VI on November 6, 1417, which state unequivocally that the dauphin Charles’s lieutenancy annulled all other lieutenancies—specifically, the one enjoyed by Isabeau since Charles VI’s 1403 ordinance as well as those claimed by any other of the princes of the blood.³⁰ Isabeau, in particular, appears to have been unwilling to relinquish her lieutenancy; the Dauphin Charles had come of age well before the death of his brother, Jean of Touraine. This was the reason behind his father’s letters and Isabeau’s “exile” from the political center. With the death of Louis II, the dauphin’s position was fragile and fraught with danger; “*pour le mort duquel, celui dauphin fut fort affoibli de conseil et d’aide*” (with the death of whom [Louis II], this dauphin was very weakened in terms of counsel and aid). Yolande was left alone to guide the destiny of her son-in-law and her marital house. Henceforth, like Christine de Pizan and her mother, Violant of Bar, Yolande was “*seulete sui et seulete vueil estre*” (Alone I am, and alone I wish to be).³¹ Her husband was dead, the dukes of Orleans and Bourbon were prisoners of the English, and Armagnac, the mercurial constable of France, would be dead in a little over a year. She had the contested kingdom of Naples–Sicily to consider as well as duchies and counties in northern and southern France, much of which was under constant threat from ongoing civil turbulence and the Anglo-French conflict. Yolande was equal to the task because she was a woman whose maternal vigilance enabled her to divide her many responsibilities without weakening her effectiveness.³² Like Louis, Yolande knew that, to protect her children’s rights, heritage, and futures, her only hope was to ally herself firmly to the French crown. She needed to emphasize the authority and prestige of the dauphin and come to an agreement with the duke of Brittany to broker a durable peace with their cousin Burgundy, working to expel the English from the kingdom, in general, and her territories in Anjou–Maine, in particular. Yolande needed to administer all her northern domains and the outlying and lucrative counties of Provence–Forcalquier in the south. She foregrounded her elder son’s claim to Naples, writing to her cousin Sigismund and dispatching an embassy of jurists to him to deliver her message reiterating Louis III’s claim in the immediate aftermath of his father’s death.³³ Violant of Bar’s earlier contact with her first cousin, Sigismund of Luxembourg, paved the way for Yolande’s own epistolary exertions

on her son's behalf. Yolande reinvigorated ancient agreements, last signed in 1406, which had lapsed since the reign of her uncle, Martí I, between her natal house, her marital house, and, on this occasion, the dauphin Charles, lieutenant-general for France; the tripartite treaty established between her cousin, Alfons V, Louis III of Anjou, and the dauphin Charles was signed in Barcelona on October 4, 1417.³⁴

Yolande dissolved Louis II's household; his courtiers were no longer provided with pensions, instead becoming retainers of the regent and her household. Although her husband had left her a vast treasury, expenses were cut to an absolute minimum and severe accounting standards were imposed—in stark contrast to the actions of Isabeau of Bavaria once she was granted unfettered access to the royal treasury to mitigate against the prolonged and random absences of her husband the king. Yolande's accounts, held by the master of the *chambre aux deniers* (Money Chamber), Jean Porcher (or Porchier), were regularly recorded and audited.³⁵ Contemporaneously with Yolande's administrative and accounting activities, Violant of Bar started a legal proceeding in *parlement* against her younger brother, Louis, Cardinal-Duke of Bar, to reclaim a portion of her Barrois inheritance.³⁶ In Provence, collections were made and ambassadors arrived in Anjou–Maine to express their condolences, and present their good wishes to their new sovereign-lord, Louis III, and his regent.³⁷ On August 25, 1417, Yolande received delegates from her Provençal Estates with representatives from her Estates in Angers. She granted their requests, confirmed their existing liberties and franchises, and pledged a revision and reform of taxes and charges relating to death duties, which for years had forced inheritors unable to pay crippling imposts to abandon their legacies.³⁸ Privileges were restored and new ones inaugurated. Yolande paid particular attention to the administration of justice, creating the post of *juge-mage* (chief judge), re-establishing seneschalcies, lowering taxes, suppressing the practice of bribery and fiscal coercion, and forbade foreigners (non-Provençaux) from occupying posts of administrative responsibility. She concerned herself with the poor as well as the well-being of her southern subjects, and prevented the *dardanarii* (monopolists) profiting from food shortages.³⁹ With her pragmatic measures, conscious of the need to appease Provence to ensure the success of the family enterprise, Yolande won the hearts and minds of her Provençal subjects and assured, in the absence of her presence, a peaceful atmosphere in her southern counties.

Yolande was not content merely to calm and appease her southern subjects during her extended lieutenantcies. She appended the considerable county of Baux to her holdings following the death of

its final *dame régnante*, Alix des Baux, on October 7, 1426. Yolande directed her youngest son and southern lieutenant, Charles of Anjou, to order their seneschal, Tristan de la Jaille, to seize the county by force, which he did, laying siege and taking possession of the fortress and its domains on February 21, 1427.⁴⁰ In 1419, she repurchased Berre from Nicolas Ruffi, Count of Cotrone and Catanzaro, along with his other dependencies of Alanson, Istre, and Martiques. Lunel, annexed by Louis I, was left to her by its final overlord, Arnaud Baile, likewise in 1419.⁴¹ After protracted and bitter negotiation, Yolande ceded Nice to Amadeus VIII, Count of Savoy.⁴² After the death of Louis II, Amadeus believed he could capitalize upon Louis III's minority status. This was a grave misinterpretation of Yolande's capacities, as most accounts of her career agree that she was a "*maîtresse femme*" (masterful woman), her grandson, the dauphin Louis, in the spirit of Christine de Pizan, described her as possessing a "*coeur d'homme en corps de femme*" (heart of a man in the body of a woman).⁴³ Yolande was able to engineer treaty extensions from Amadeus, allowing her to buy time and space to delay the inevitable.⁴⁴ An interminable correspondence emerges from this period, including an exchange of memoranda⁴⁵ and an exhaustive debate pertaining to the legitimacy of arguments raised by both sides.⁴⁶ The double objectives of this exchange were to fix Savoy's rights over Nice without unduly prejudicing Anjou-Provence and to repay the debt owed by the Angevins to the Savoyards dating from the time of Louis I of Anjou's dealings with Amadeus VI. Yolande's concerns in the wake of Louis II's death mirror those of her predecessor, Marie of Blois-Penthièvre, but Yolande did not have Marie's crushing debt to surmount. However, she had to consider the security and the authority of the dauphin Charles. Moreover, there was considerable unfinished Provençal business with which they needed to deal, but Yolande and Louis III had to wait until the autumn of 1419 before making a personal appearance in their southern territories.

*“ayant une bonne mere et vertueuse Princesse fut
agité de beaucoup de guerres domestiques par les
Princes de son temps”⁴⁷*

When he became dauphin, Charles of Ponthieu was living with his mother, Isabeau, his sister Catherine, and his fiancée, Marie of Anjou, in the fortified castle of Vincennes of which he was captain.⁴⁸ The king, having briefly regained his senses, was taken to Vincennes by

Angevin loyalist Tanneguy du Châtel, whence he and the dauphin were returned to Paris. On April 17, 1417, the queen, cloistered with her ladies but accused again of presiding over a disordered household,⁴⁹ wrote to the king and queen of Sicily seeking their protection and aid.⁵⁰ With Louis on his deathbed, they were in no position to address Isabeau's pleadings; Isabeau was dispatched to Blois on April 18 by order of the provost, issued in the name of the king. From there, Isabeau was sent onward to Tours and into effective exile, from where she sought Burgundy's assistance and guaranteed his return to power.⁵¹

Shortly after the death of Louis II, Charles made a brief trip to Paris to be invested with the duchy of Berry and the county of Poitou, which had passed to him with the death of his elder brother, Jean of Touraine. Yolande accompanied Charles on his journey, speedily returning him to the safety of Anjou. She seems to have felt it necessary to remove him from both the influence of the constable of France, Bernard VII of Armagnac (ostensibly an ally, he was violent, unstable, and often irresponsibly precipitous), and Isabeau.⁵² With Louis II no longer a stabilizing authority over members of the royal council where he had functioned as a shield between Armagnac and Isabeau, Armagnac took advantage of the unchecked power that had fallen to him. Burgundy continued to force obedience in the north and northwestern territories abutting Yolande's domains. His victories, according to Pintoin and his "*gens sages*" (wise folk), had intoxicated the duke to a point where his ambition knew no bounds and had caused him to behave as if he were invested with the royal authority.⁵³ Yolande needed a strong northern ally to act as a bulwark against the invader and as an intermediary and potential mentor for the young and untried dauphin in her keeping. Her gaze fell upon Jean V, Duke of Brittany. Jean V's relations and allegiances were complex. He was married to the dauphin's sister, Jeanne of France, and was Burgundy's cousin. Philippe of Burgundy had been guardian of Jean and Arthur after the death of their father, Jean IV, and the remarriage of their mother, and the boys had grown up with Jean sans Peur at the Burgundian court. Their mother, Jeanne of Navarre, was queen-consort of England to Henry IV from 1403 until his death in 1413; Henry V of England was, therefore, Brittany's step-brother. Jean V's ties lay with France, Burgundy, and England, where his mother continued to live as queen-dowager and where his younger brother Arthur de Richemont had been held since Agincourt. Jean's duchy abutted Anjou–Maine, and Brittany oscillated between all parties, attempting to draw advantage or, at the very least, safety from each; he needed to protect himself and his subjects from external ravages.

For Yolande, he held the prospect of an alliance that would serve to protect her domains, and help her son-in-law ascend the throne of France. Brittany provided a western buffer against the English who had made a series of successful incursions into the northern parts of Maine. With his contacts in England and with powerful Burgundy his cousin, it was imperative for Yolande to accommodate Jean V to find a way into the minds of her adversaries: on the one hand, a foreign invader with designs upon Anjou–Maine and, on the other, her implacable enemy and cousin Burgundy who would have liked nothing better than to destroy her and her marital house. Brittany and Yolande had an established correspondence, and he had attended memorial services and offices for Louis II; he was purpose-built to be both a political guardian for the teenaged dauphin and an auxiliary for her personal projects and responsibilities. Documents published in the *Lettres et mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne*, help to construct a clear picture of his movements and shifting allegiances, and his close contact with Yolande. Before the death of Louis II on February 18, 1417, a treaty of alliance had been drafted between Brittany and Burgundy stating that both parties would uphold the sovereignty of the king and dauphin (Jean of Touraine), and hints that any alliance with the English would be counter to the Crown's best interests. This was initiated at a time when Burgundy was locked out of Paris and removed from the seat of power, the royal council.⁵⁴

At the beginning of July 1417, Jean V visited Yolande in Angers to offer his condolences, and two important treaties were established. The first was signed on July 2, 1417, between Jean, his brother Arthur (still prisoner of the English), and the 14-year-old dauphin Charles, "*lieutenant-general du roi et le conseil estant à Angers*" (lieutenant-general of the king and the council being in Angers).⁵⁵ The following day, in the same place, the second treaty—a formal marriage agreement between "Louis, Duke of Anjou, eldest son and universal heir of my late very renowned lord, Prince of noble memory, Louis and our very dear and very loved daughter and cousin Isabelle, elder daughter of us, Jean, Duke of Brittany," was signed by Brittany and "Yolande, by the grace of God, Queen of Jerusalem and of Sicily, Duchess of Anjou, Countess of Maine, etcetera." This alliance confirmed the volte-face that had so shocked royal circles in the wake of the Cabochien rebellion of 1413, when Louis II broke his promise to Burgundy to wed his heir to Catherine of Burgundy. It not only solidified a political alliance, long-hoped for by the Angevins, but also brought Yolande financial advantage once proclaimed. In addition to the dowry promised by Brittany, the king of France pledged a further 40,000

francs, “To the benefit of this marriage, the contracting parties would undertake to pursue the recovery [of France].”⁵⁶ Yolande had achieved an important part of the pledge she had made to her dying husband: to work toward a durable alliance with Brittany that might facilitate an eventual rapprochement with the house of Burgundy and assist in the unification and recovery of the kingdom.

On November 10, 1417, in a rare moment of lucidity, Charles VI signed letters authorizing Yolande to negotiate with Henry V to protect her northern domains from English invasion. Although Brittany acted as her intermediary, her officials played a direct role in the negotiations. The evidence for this is contained in records compiled by Rymer; safe conducts for Brittany were issued by Henry on November 10 and 16, with letters proclaiming talks and a treaty drawn up in Brittany’s name on October 27 and November 16. A “*De Treugis cum Regina Jerusalem, ad Infantiam & in persona Ducis Britanniae, concordatis*” (A treaty between [Henry V] and the Queen of Jerusalem and her minor son and agreed to in person by the Duke of Brittany) is dated November 17, 1417, from the royal castle of Alençon in Normandy.⁵⁷ The treaty was to hold until Michaelmas next, September 29, 1418.⁵⁸ In various treaties resulting from these maneuverings, Yolande is referred to by Henry V as his “*Excellentissima & praeclarissima Domina, Yoland, Jerusalem Cecilia & Regina*” (Excellent and illustrious Lady, Yolande, Queen of Jerusalem and Sicily).⁵⁹ Safe conducts were issued *pro Gentibus Reginae Jerusalem* (for the Queen of Jerusalem’s “nation”) dated November 22, 1417, with those *pro Gentibus Ducis Britanniae* (for the Duke of Brittany’s “nation”). A further *Conveniando Cum Nunciis Yolandae Reginae Jerosolyme* (conduct for meetings with Yolande, Queen of Jerusalem’s ambassadors) was accorded by Henry on March 7, 1418, from Bayeux with a *Pro Reformatione Treugarum cum Regina Cecilia* (conduct for the reformation of the truce with the Queen of Sicily) dated May 20, 1418, from Caen, demonstrating that, while Brittany acted as one of her representatives to Henry’s court, Yolande dispatched her own negotiators to him to ensure the best possible outcome for her. Moreover, she made sure that the dauphin had a voice in negotiations with Henry V—in almost every instance of a mention of Yolande and the duke of Brittany for this period, Rymer records a similar embassy from the court of the dauphin Charles—a court and chancellery populated and overseen by Angevin loyalists and officers. As Yolande’s original 1417 treaty with Henry of England moved beyond its “use by” date—Michaelmas 1418—further safe conducts were issued on October 14, 1418, *pro secretario Reginae Ceciliae* for Yolande’s secretary, Guiot de Presby, and an interesting

embassy consisting of Regnault of Chartres, Archbishop of Reims; the bishop of Evreux (Paul Capronica, his predecessor, Guillaume V de Cantiers, having been slaughtered by Burgundians in Paris on June 12, 1418); and Henri of Chaumont, Archdeacon of Evreux.⁶⁰

Although Henry pursued his ambitions for the conquest of France from 1415 to 1420,⁶¹ his focus was upon Normandy and the imperative to seize a series of fortified positions in western Normandy to guard against an effective French counterattack should the princes unify. If Henry held this line, he could force western Normandy to his obedience and secure a firm stronghold from which to stage further offensives, pushing forward first to Rouen and later to Paris. This strategy had nudged Anjou into a state of enforced neutrality. It was probably for this reason that he had agreed to accommodate Yolande and stay out of Anjou for the time being, as evidenced by the initial treaty with Yolande signed in November 1417. Brittany, who had opened the way for the tripartite agreement, ensured that Anjou–Maine and Brittany were preserved from the worst ravages of the war and that the English occupation of Normandy stopped at a line drawn through Bellême, Alençon, Argentan, and Domfront heavily fortified by English garrisons scattered about in numerous châteaux along the edges of Maine. None of this is to suggest that Yolande’s territories in Maine were quarantined from English assault. Undisciplined troops, motivated by personal gain, made numerous incursions over the line of demarcation into areas such as Fresnay, Sillé-le-Guillaume, and Thorigné, ten kilometers south of Sainte-Suzanne. Border areas were pillaged continually, and the invader made attempts from 1417 onward to take Le Mans by surprise attack.⁶²

Rymer’s records evince no less than nine safe conducts, treaty negotiations, and agreements between November 1417 and July 1419,⁶³ when marital negotiations between Henry V and Charles VI for Yolande’s goddaughter, Catherine of France, solidified contemporaneously with Yolande’s final preparations for her delayed departure for her southern counties of Provence-Forcalquier.⁶⁴ Henry V was keen to ensure that the treaties between himself and “the most exalted Lady, Yolande, Queen of Sicily, and her firstborn son Louis” were respected, naming Sir Roland Leyntale and John Holand to treat for the redress of infractions, should they occur. Henry instructed his knight and his lawyer to negotiate on the basis of the available facts and to come to an agreeable position with Yolande’s ambassadors and commissioners. Henry states that the treaties, “since recently, to the honor of God and to the avoidance of shedding Christian blood,”

had been negotiated with and agreed to by “the most exalted Lady, Yolande, Queen of Sicily, and her firstborn son Louis.” Moreover, he ensured that Leyntale, bailiff of Rouen, publish “the details of these extraordinary truces, forbidding and abstaining from wars of this kind, throughout your bailiwick, where you see an expedient, proclaim it publicly on our behalf, those things are firmly observed and bound to, making certain, without any attempt to the contrary. And this, for our honour and diligence, are to be by no means omitted to be done.”⁶⁵ These treaties indicate Yolande’s diligence in safeguarding her frontiers and assets and those of her son-in-law, Charles. She moved quickly to ally Brittany to her house to act as her initial intermediary with his stepbrother, Henry V. Yolande had had no time to dwell upon the death of Louis II or to mourn him extravagantly and indulgently. Instead, her attention was firmly fixed upon the living, her house and her young family, which depended upon her ability to think clearly and to act decisively and proactively as she cleared the way to head south to her Provençal territories to dispatch Louis III on the first stage of his Neapolitan adventure.

A Strategic Eye on the “*Real*” Prize

In keeping with her Iberian origins and customary practice, Yolande’s attention was not merely upon the political and diplomatic aspects of dynastic consolidation. This period of frenetic Yolandan activity also witnessed a good deal of spiritual and religious undertaking; piety and patronage were at the core of her unified strategy to underwrite Angevin sovereignty.⁶⁶ Yolande found fellow travelers in Brittany and his duchess, Jeanne of France, elder sister of the dauphin Charles. Elizabeth L’Estrange has made a groundbreaking study of Yolande’s “situational eye” and her pragmatic objectives in commissioning the manuscript known as *The Fitzwilliam Hours* in the wake of Louis II death.⁶⁷ In lockstep with the practices of her natal house of Aragon, Yolande buttressed her authority through targeted literary and religious patronage.⁶⁸

The houses of Aragon and Anjou showed a striking preference for Franciscan Observant spirituality; however, I do not argue that Franciscans were the only religious to find themselves at the “high table” of influence and activity at these courts. St. Vicens Ferrer, the celebrated Valencian Dominican missionary and logician, was once Violant of Bar, queen of Aragon’s, confessor. He was called to her service in Salamanca in 1391, remaining with her until 1395.⁶⁹ Violant’s saintly confessor walked with both Dominic and Francis at

his shoulder. In 1398, while defending the anti-pope Benedict XIII's primacy in Avignon, Vicens Ferrer contracted a severe fever during which he had a vision of Jesus accompanied by Dominic and Francis; the fever broke immediately and Vicens was cured, resolving henceforth to take to the road and preach penitence in preparation for the coming of the Antichrist. His mission lasted for some 21 years.⁷⁰

In 1417, Brittany dispatched three letters to Vicens Ferrer, "by which he prayed the preacher would deign to come to Brittany to instruct him, and the people of his lands, in the Catholic faith." This is of significance because, in 1415, Vicens had met with the great Clarissan reformer Colette of Corbie in Besançon.⁷¹ The Council of Constance had sat since November 14, 1414, and Colette was impatient to have news that the rule she had received from Benedict XIII was confirmed. In 1417, Vicens and Colette sent a joint letter urging that the Schism be brought to an immediate conclusion.⁷² Colette played an important part in bringing about an end to the Schism and in the recovery of France, and I will touch upon aspects of her Observant Franciscan spirituality and politico-spiritual mission in the following chapter. It is very possible that Vicens Ferrer, Violant of Bar's Valencian Dominican confessor, brought Yolande of Aragon and Colette of Corbie together.⁷³ Through the offices of Marguerite of Bavaria, Duchess of Burgundy, Colette formed an intense spiritual and political relationship with Marie of Berry, Duchess of Bourbon, daughter of Jean of Berry and Jeanne of Armagnac. Jean I, Duke of Bourbon, had been taken prisoner at Agincourt with Charles of Orleans; Yolande had a very close and fruitful political partnership with various branches of the houses of Bourbon and Orleans. While Yolande was excluded, publicly at least, from the inner circle of Burgundian networks, she used her political, cultural, and spiritual networks with Brittany, Bourbon, and Orleans to great effect, and was not averse to playing one off against the other as need and opportunity arose.

Brittany's missives were delivered to Ferrer in Le Puy-en-Velay in January 1417, in Bourges at the beginning of December 1417, and, finally, in Tours in late December 1417. When the first letter was sent, Louis II of Anjou, though terminally ill, was alive and very involved in the affairs of France and, by the time of the receipt of the final letter in January 1418, some eight months after his death, Ferrer was resident in Yolande's northern capital, Angers.⁷⁴ All of the cities mentioned above were located within Yolande's or the dauphin Charles's orbits of influence. The missives were sent at a time when Ferrer was crisscrossing their joint domains: Le Puy in

Languedoc, where Charles was lieutenant for his father, abutting Provence (Yolande's territory) and Bourges in Berry—one of the dauphin's prerogatives. Ferrer agreed to Brittany's petitions, arriving in his duchy in February 1418. His journey ended in Vannes, where he fell gravely ill. Jeanne, Duchess of Brittany, rushed to his bedside. Ferrer died on April 5, 1419, and his body was inhumed in the cathedral of Saint-Pierre in Vannes, where his relics are still venerated.⁷⁵

Like Blanche of Castile, Yolande achieved a great deal in a relatively short time, both politically and diplomatically, in her primary objectives to safeguard her house's sovereignty and prerogatives as well as the positions of her minor children and the dauphin. Things remained relatively stable on the treaty front between Brittany, Yolande, the dauphin, and Burgundy until late-spring 1418, when Burgundy usurped power, upsetting the balance of authority on the royal council in Paris hitherto anchored firmly in an Armagnac–Angevin alliance. From Louis's death on April 29, 1417, until Burgundy's sacking of Paris on May 29, 1418, Yolande held the line for her own interests and those of her son-in-law, the dauphin Charles.

Despite her strenuous efforts on multiple fronts, Burgundy continued to ravage the kingdom and attract towns to his cause.⁷⁶ Pintoin records that "the Duke of Burgundy, not content with having attracted certain important cities, which report directly to the crown, to his party with his insinuating letters and deceptive promises, prepared himself to march upon Paris as he had pledged in an oath. He believed it would be good to win Beauvais over to his cause with similar promises." The royal council placed Paris on high alert and fortified strategic Norman cities in preparation for the arrival of the Burgundians and their English allies. This new reality fed much of the furious diplomatic effort between Yolande's "nation" and the court of Henry V discussed earlier. In addition to his various hearts and mind campaigns and martial activities, Burgundy was busy charming Isabeau to his cause. When Armagnac and Châtel exiled her to Tours, with senior Angevins otherwise occupied, Burgundy perceived an opportunity ripe for exploitation, making overtures to Isabeau who hitherto had harbored animosity toward the assassin of Louis of Orleans, fearing him because of his tacit consent to have her killed along with the Angevins and Berry in Easter Week 1416. While Yolande had been industrious in her activities to safeguard her children and her son-in-law Charles, his birth mother, Isabeau, chose instead to prioritize her personal position and safety, compromising

her husband's fragile sovereignty, and "white-anting" her son's, the dauphin's, authority as his lieutenant-general and regent during his father's.⁷⁷ The Berry Herald records that on the second of November 1417, Burgundy arrived:

At the Abbey of Marmoutier near Tours, where he had come from Chartres [journeying] day and night, and within the said "moustier" found the Queen, who had commanded him; she wanted to go with him because of the vexation caused to her by the count of Armagnac, certain other officers of the king, and my lord the Dauphin... [who] had denigrated the said Queen. And by the will (of the inhabitants) the city of Tours gave him [Burgundy] the obedience of the city... And shortly afterwards he left, taking up his route directly to Joigny accompanied by the Queen and Madam Katherine, daughter of the King and Queen.⁷⁸

The Herald continues his account, detailing the capture of the "*conte d'Armignac et le president du provence, nommé messier Jehan Louvet*" amongst others, accused by Isabeau and Burgundy of having helped themselves to the royal treasury.⁷⁹ With Isabeau, Burgundy found a way back after years in the political wilderness. With the death of Louis II and with the dauphin in his minority, he was free to exploit Isabeau's insecurities and Armagnac's boneheadedness. In exiling and disaffecting Isabeau, Armagnac had left the door open for Burgundy to strike a decisive blow for unfettered authority and power. No surprise that Yolande had made strategic overtures to Brittany to protect her labyrinthine interests and assets.

The Herald gives a vivid description of events leading to the overthrow of the Armagnac ascendancy in Paris. He relates how the dauphin, resident in Paris, fled to Melun in the company of Châtel, his men-at-arms, Louvet, Robert le Maçon, and "*moult aultres gens de grand état*" (many other people of high estate), who had smuggled the heir to the throne of France out of Paris, leaving behind Yolande's daughter, the dauphine Marie. Loyal forces gathered around Charles, including Pierre de Rieux, Marshal of France, Arnault Guilhem, Lord of Barbazan, and other noble captains.⁸⁰ Fifteen-year-old Charles was moved to Bourges.⁸¹ Others (and their assets) were caught up in the expulsion of the Armagnac party; Monstrelet records that: "likewise seized were the cardinals of Bar and San-Marco, the archbishop of Reims and all their horses; but at the pleading of the bishop of Paris, because they had counseled for peace, they were released and all their rings returned to them."⁸² On Wednesday morning following the taking of Paris, Rieux, Barbazan, and Châtel, with a military

asset of some 1,600 elite combatants, entered Paris by the Saint-Antoine gate with the intention of subjugating and reconquering the capital. One of the parties went to the king's residence, the Hotel de Saint-Pôl, and entered it secretly, planning to remove the king from Burgundy's control. However, Burgundy had anticipated their plan, moving Charles VI to more fortified quarters in the Louvre the day before. A skirmish broke out, and Barbazan and Châtel, realizing that their cause was lost and that the situation had turned against them, dragged a number of men inside the Bastille Saint-Antoine; and left, some to Meaux in Brie, others to Corbeil, to Melun, and places obedient to them.⁸³

The aim of this Armagnac–Angevin counteroffensive was to gain possession of the king and retake Paris, should circumstances allow. It was not a rescue operation designed to liberate the dauphine. Yolande might have felt that her elder daughter was secure enough in Bourbon's Parisian residence, prioritizing the security of the dauphin and the custody of the king as a strategy to neutralize Burgundy and Isabeau to leave them empty-handed politically. Protected by the Bourbons, the dauphine was returned to her mother and the dauphin by the effective offices of Yolande's negotiator-in-chief, the duke of Brittany.⁸⁴ Burgundy moved Charles VI, Isabeau, and their daughter Catherine to Troyes. On June 29, 1418, the dauphin reaffirmed his lieutenant-generalcy during the "absences" of his father declaring his intention to defend the kingdom against Burgundy. Two weeks later, armed with a letter from the dauphin to the councilors of Lyon, Jean Caille, *élu* of Lyon, informed them that Charles was determined to free his father's kingdom of internal conflicts brought about by the combined Anglo-Burgundian menace. Before proceeding "to put an end to this painful conflict,"⁸⁵ the dauphin awaited the counsel of those he had summoned to his presence: "we shall delay until we have had the counsel of our mother-in-law, the Queen of Sicily, brothers-in-law and cousins the Dukes of Brittany, Anjou and Alençon, who will assemble in our presence inside the sixth day of next month with many other lords I have commanded to come to me."⁸⁶

Brittany was involved with all parties, proving an excellent intermediary for Yolande and the dauphin.⁸⁷ Monstrelet's record gives us detail of the return of the dauphine:

At this same time, by the consent of the king, the queen and the duke of Burgundy, the wife of the dauphin, who had found herself in Paris at the time of its taking, was honourably returned as far as

Anjou, and with her departure all her rings were restored to her so that the dauphin would be more inclined towards peace, and return to the king his father, but nothing came of this because those who governed him would not have suffered this to happen, knowing that if he was to return there they would be relieved of their positions and administration.⁸⁸

Charles did not return to Paris upon the safe return of Marie of Anjou; instead, in the autumn of 1418, with guidance and funding forthcoming from Yolande, he set up an alternate judicial and deliberative instrument of royal government, a *parlement de Paris* in exile, based in the city of Poitiers. By letters dated September 21, 1418, citing Burgundy's treachery in the 1418 Paris uprising, he also established a *chambre des comptes* in Bourges.⁸⁹ Despite Burgundy's best efforts to annihilate the dauphinists and neutralize Angevin influence, they had managed to evade him and set up a rival government in Poitiers. Burgundy countered on November 13, 1418, issuing letters in the king's name, confirming the Treaty of Saint-Maure-des-Fossés, revoking Charles's authority as lieutenant-general, and denouncing Robert le Maçon, Jean Louvet, and Ramon Raguier as suspect counselors to the dauphin's cause. All three were loyal Angevin servants: le Maçon was a counselor to Louis II of Anjou in 1407, passing into the service of Isabeau as her chancellor in 1416 and then to Yolande/Charles where he stayed; Louvet had been Louis II's man in Provence and counselor; and Raguier was successively notary and secretary to Charles VI, master of his *chambre des deniers*, master of "*requêtes, préposés à l'administration des finances*" (petitions, appointed for the administration of finances) for the king, queen, and duke of Aquitaine and Guyenne (the dauphin Louis), moving into the service of the house of Anjou between 1415 and 1418. Burgundy strove mightily to unseat powerful Angevin counselors, in general, and to neutralize Yolande's influence over Charles, in particular. Raguier was a particularly satisfying target, having controlled royal finances during the post-Caboche period when Burgundy's access to the royal treasury had been stymied by Louis II. By the summer of 1418, the political situation in France had deteriorated dangerously, and the teetering government in Paris was sucked into a maelstrom of violence. Yolande of Aragon, Queen of Jerusalem–Sicily, Aragon, Valencia, and Mallorca, refused to accede to Isabeau and Burgundy's demands to return the dauphin to his father's fractured court. A citation attributed to Jehan Bourdigné frames well how Yolande's mind

might have been working; in it, she fashions an Isabeau reflective of the gossip that had circulated about her since 1405:

To a woman endowed with a lover, [who] has no need for a child. He [Charles] has not been nurtured in this place [the court of Anjou] to this point to allow him to pass away like his brothers [Louis and Jean, successive dauphins], or to be rendered mad like his father, or at the very least to be made English like you. I shall keep him mine, come and take him if you dare.⁹⁰

That such a *lettre de défi* was dispatched by Yolande to Isabeau is moot; Yolande and Charles's actions support the idea that there was a clear-headed political and diplomatic strategy in play. Isabeau had gone over to Burgundy, who had stood by while Henry V overran northern France; this tallies with Yolande's charge that Isabeau would "*le faissiez Anglois comme vous*" (make him English like you). Bear in mind too that Isabeau was negotiating with Henry V to marry her daughter Catherine to him; Catherine was Yolande's goddaughter. Yolande's "maternal" defiance was not fully repaid until the serendipitous appearance of Joan of Arc more than a decade later. With the dauphin having re-declared himself regent on December 26, and an alternative *parlement* spearheaded by her allies and retainers established in Poitiers, the English invasion, for the moment, more or less held at bay thanks to strategic and timely diplomatic efforts undertaken with Henry V, Yolande made ready for her departure south. Provence-Forcalquier had been too long deprived of the presence of its countess-queen, and its young count-king, Louis III, was impatient to depart and fight for his Neapolitan kingdom. Yolande did not, as is sometimes claimed, flee her northern duchy in the face of imminent English invasion.⁹¹

There was, however, one more loose end to tie off before Yolande could devote her energies to the aspirations of her primogenit Louis, and her lucrative southern domains. Yolande moved to persuade her maternal uncle Louis, Cardinal-duke of Bar, to adopt as his heir her younger son, ten-year-old René. A treaty was established to this effect on March 20, 1419. One the same day, René was affianced to Isabelle, sole heiress to Charles II, Duke of Lorraine. On August 13, 1419, Louis of Bar settled fiscalities accorded René the marquisate of Pont-à-Mousson. This was a dynastic masterstroke on Yolande's part, evidence of her increasingly visible political genius. As well as reclaiming part of her mother's heritage, she maneuvered successfully to place an obstacle in the path of her political

nemesis Burgundy and his allies, who coveted Bar and whose ally in the region was the formidable Charles II of Lorraine.⁹² The charters ceding the duchy of Bar to René of Anjou demonstrate that mother and daughter achieved total victory over the harried cardinal-duce.⁹³ Violant of Bar had started to apply pressure to Louis of Bar in 1417, her only surviving brother post-Agincourt and one with whom she had had indifferent relations. Violant based her challenge upon her rights to the duchy as the firstborn of the family.⁹⁴ She claimed the financial benefit, and her daughter Yolande assumed control of Bar in her son's name by right of inheritance, securing a future strong voice in the duchy of Lorraine through René's marriage to Isabelle. The betrothal of René to Isabelle put an end to secular rivalries that had plagued Bar and was probably welcomed by Charles II of Lorraine, uneasy that Isabelle's inheritance might be contested by her male cousins if she did not have a consort capable of defending it.⁹⁵ Lorraine was not only threatened potentially by the succession pretensions of Isabelle's cousin, Antoine of Vaudémont, but also by those marital of Isabeau of Bavaria's nephew, Ludwig *der Hockrige* (the Hunchback) of Bavaria-Ingolsadt, and Henry V's brother, John, Duke of Bedford. Although nominally master of Bar in his own right until he moved under the protection of his father-in-law, Charles II of Lorraine, in October 1420, René remained under Yolande's guardianship for his county of Guise until January 1424.⁹⁶ The skillful political maneuver negotiated by Yolande with Louis of Bar and Charles II of Lorraine was designed to guarantee the succession and tranquility of both eastern duchies and to give Anjou a presence in the east of France, abutting the Empire held by Yolande's cousins, the house of Luxembourg. It would later cause René intense concern; Charles II had not reckoned sufficiently upon the determination of his ambitious nephew, Antoine of Vaudémont.

Matters in the northwest and east settled, Yolande attended to the dispatch of Louis III to his peninsular kingdom of Naples-Sicily. The timing of his departure was informed by several external factors, the first of which was the retreat of Jacques II de la Marche from Naples, where he had occupied the throne as consort of Giovanna II since 1415 in direct conflict with the interests of Anjou. Giovanna had accorded Jacques the title, prince of Tarente, but he had styled himself king of Naples, to the ire of his Angevin relatives. Louis II had left Jacques as his lieutenant and representative in the peninsular kingdom during his absence, and the city of Tarente pledged Louis its homage and loyalty to this junior Bourbon proxy. Louis forgave Jacques in his final testament but recorded that this pardon was without prejudice to

the rights of Louis III and his successors. After four years of marital disharmony and the indignation of the indigenous nobility, Jacques was chased out of Naples in 1419 on the eve of Louis III's departure from Provence.⁹⁷ Another external factor influencing the timing of Yolande's departure south was the surrender of Nice to Amadeus VIII, Duke of Savoy, in payment for the aid his grandfather had given Louis I on his Italian campaign, cauterizing the political wound that had been festering over the question of Nice since 1388. Yolande needed his goodwill and influence to smooth the path for Louis III's Italian campaign. In yielding Nice to Savoy, Yolande took the most pragmatic option available to her—accommodating him for the greater good. The "*dédition*" (surrender) of Nice was settled with her Estates after her arrival in Provence in the autumn of 1419.⁹⁸

The final external factor was that the immediate threat of an English invasion into greater Anjou had receded, thanks to negotiations undertaken with Henry on the death of Louis II. This interpretation is at odds with Reynaud's repeated assertion that Yolande "fled" Anjou–Maine in the autumn of 1419 to escape an imminent English invasion. Had this been Yolande's motivation, she would have most certainly stayed in Provence during the period 1424–8, when the English threat to her northern territories was greater; the regent Bedford created himself duke of Anjou in 1424 following his victory at Verneuil on August 17, 1424. Yolande returned to Anjou–Maine in the summer of 1423 just prior to the birth of her grandson, the future Louis XI, on July 3, 1423, becoming more deeply involved in the politics, warfare, and welfare of her besieged son-in-law and his kingdom. Her primary purpose in 1419 was to reinforce and reinstate (where necessary) Angevin authority in Provence and launch and underwrite her elder son's Italian venture.⁹⁹ These diverse factors came together in the spring and summer of 1419 and informed Yolande's departure south. She had corresponded with her cousin, Sigismund—less in the hope of his enthusiastic support for Louis III than to request that he not be obstructed. Yolande's household accounts record that "on the last day of June 1419, the said lady being in Bourges, took up her route to her land of Provence."¹⁰⁰ Having established René in Bar-Lorraine, she left Charles and Marie, dauphin and dauphine, in Bourges, in the company of trusted servants and counselors (some worthy, others not). She took with her Louis III and her youngest children, Charles and Yolande, adding the wise precaution of leaving her "*ame et feal*" (loved and loyal) counselor and "*maistre de nostre chambre aux deniers*" (master of our Money

Chamber), Jehan Porchier, in Anjou–Maine to take charge of her finances during her absence in Provence.¹⁰¹

Yolande and Louis III arrived in Provence in September 1419, and their first act was to convoke their Estates, where they reaffirmed the confirmation of communal franchises established in Angers in August 1417.¹⁰² Having achieved this satisfactory outcome, the Estates granted Louis 30,000 florins in recognition of his succession as their sovereign lord. They ratified the ceding of Nice; Yolande and Louis accepted the *fait accompli*, abandoning Nice and territory situated along the left bank of the Var to Savoy.¹⁰³ Yolande signed the long-anticipated treaty on October 5, 1419, ringing in a new era of “*pax, concordie et bonne amitié*” (peace, concord and good friendship).¹⁰⁴ Yolande and Louis ceded significant rights over the region of Nice to Savoy, and Amadeus VIII renounced the debt owed to him, receiving 15,000 florins from the pope in compensation. Yolande ratified the treaty on October 26, 1419, but Louis, confirming his majority in 1423, tried in vain not to recognize it.¹⁰⁵ Both parties to the final agreement made respective arrangements regarding frontier and maritime security. Amadeus modified his pecuniary claims, and Yolande accepted and ratified the loss of Nice, Vintimille, and Barcelonnette.¹⁰⁶ Genoa and Provence forgot their old rivalries, uniting and promising to block their enemies from gaining access to their ports. The Genoese pledged six galleys to Louis in return for permission to obtain flour, wine, and other supplies from Provence—supplies which in the past had been denied them. All was designed to hasten Louis’s departure for Italy; Yolande followed the template established by Louis I and Louis II in their Italian campaigns.¹⁰⁷

Despite their tripartite agreement of 1417, Yolande still feared reprisals from her Aragonese cousins. That she had put to one side Angevin aspirations for insular Sicily, ruled by Aragon, is evidenced by treaties signed with Genoa in 1417. Two years later, on October 12, 1419, Yolande and Louis dispatched their ambassadors to Genoa to negotiate a firm peace. Likewise apprehensive about Aragon, the doge of Genoa, Tomaso Campofregoso, and the lord of Genoa and duke of Milan, Filippo-Maria Visconti, signed a pact with Anjou on November 20, 1419. Visconti pledged to preserve Provençal liberties and those of other Angevin subjects, demanding in exchange that, in the event of an attack upon Genoa, the Angevins promise to protect his domains from Livorno to Monaco. Free trade was sanctioned between the parties, according to established customs and rights. With these agreements put in place by his mother, Louis’s

route to Italy and his peninsular realm was opened to him by sea and across the alpine duchy of Savoy. Giovanna II still occupied the throne of Naples, but her conduct and haphazard rule had led to a revolt. Martin V was so incensed by her delinquent sovereignty that he resolved to combat her with all the authority and power at his disposal. He summoned Louis to Rome with the intention of investing him with peninsular Naples–Sicily.¹⁰⁸ To the overtures of Martin V were added those of Neapolitan nobles.¹⁰⁹ But before Louis could act upon these favorable circumstances, money was required—and vast quantities of it. Yolande again approached her Provençal Estates, convoking them in Arles on February 25, 1420. The 100,000 florins that were put at her disposal expressly for the benefit of her son Louis were harvested from taxes principally levied on merchandise and produce.¹¹⁰ Fortified by this subsidy and the Genoese galleys, Louis set sail for his kingdom via the papal court in Rome.¹¹¹ On August 15, 1420, Louis arrived outside his capital, Naples—a city still ruled by Giovanna II. Giovanna, sensing the tide had turned against her, petitioned the help of Yolande’s cousin, Alfons V of Aragon, promising to adopt him as heir should he defend her against the Angevins. The stage was set for a reprise of Louis I’s Italian campaign; Louis III’s battles had just begun.

I turn again explicitly to the theme of political motherhood across generations and *sans frontières* with the voyage to Provence of Violant of Bar in 1420.¹¹² Upon being widowed unexpectedly in 1396, far from withdrawing from politics, Yolande’s mother remained an avid spectator and an active participant. In 1420, on the pretext of visiting her widowed daughter and the grandchildren, Violant departed Aragon in the company of Mossén Galceran de Sentmenat i de Peguera (her chamberlain and deputy-general of Catalonia), journeying by sea from the port of Blanes to Provence on June 1, 1420.¹¹³ Violant had a firm geopolitical and dynastic objective embedded within her love for her only daughter and grandchildren. She was “an astute politician aware of the landscape of Mediterranean politics... It is highly unlikely that she was driven to make the long journey to Provence solely by the longing to see her family.”¹¹⁴ Her journey was planned meticulously for six months prior to her departure; she had to raise funds and procure safe passage. Her letters for this period reflect her shrewd business credentials; she plans carefully, leaving the supervision and management of her lands and rents to her most trustworthy servants, emphasizing the requirement that they “protect her possessions, vassals and land, in her physical absence.”¹¹⁵ Bratsch-Prince observes that Violant “had worked excessively hard to bring this trip

about, writing numerous letters to her officials and kin in the hope of gathering sufficient funds for the journey... while in Provence she is drawn—or more likely, willingly immerses herself—into the political turmoil surrounding the claims of both Alfons V of Aragon and Louis III d'Anjou to the kingdom of Naples.¹¹⁶ Back in Barcelona by May 3, 1421—“her political nerve reactivated”—Violant tried in vain to convince Alfons V and his queen, María of Castile, of the legitimacy of the Angevin claim.¹¹⁷

While Yolande had been making diligent preparations for the realization of Louis's claims, and consolidating her authority in Provence, her son-in-law, Charles, became embroiled in the assassination of their mutual antagonist, Jean of Burgundy. Many have interpreted this murder as a simple revenge killing for Burgundy's sponsoring of the assassination of Orleans in 1407. However, 1407 was not the only account to be settled. It might also be read as long-delayed retribution for the various plots and intrigues attempted by Jean sans Peur to unseat Angevin authority in 1413–7, whereby he had systematically tried to eliminate Louis II, Yolande, and their various retainers and allies, as well as his attempts to bribe and recruit their most loyal and effective servants.¹¹⁸ The inertia resulting from the Saint-Maure treaty impasse was an opportunity for vengeance and account-settling. Vaughan observes that, in the end, one of Burgundy's own favored strategies, political assassination, undid him.¹¹⁹

The situation immediately following the murder was unclear on all sides. Everyone, including Henry V, who had been loitering with intent (particularly since the stalling of matrimonial negotiations between himself, Isabeau, the dauphin's ambassadors, and the defunct Jean of Burgundy during the period May 30 to June 30, 1419),¹²⁰ sought to draw advantage from this stunning new development. Given Henry's determination to profit from the assassination, coupled with the dowager-duchess Marguerite's determination to avenge her husband and Philippe's imperative to draw political security and personal gain from the changed circumstances, it is unlikely that the dauphin could have realistically expected to win Burgundy to his cause.¹²¹ Breton archives reveal that Brittany sought to keep all channels of communication open in the immediate aftermath of Montereau. He dispatched representatives and men-at-arms to Paris and Troyes to communicate with Burgundy and the king, and to Anjou-Maine, Berry, and Touraine to parley with the dauphin and Yolande's senior advisers and counselors. Henry V jockeyed for position; he had the ideal trigger to force an unlawful disinheritance

of Charles by his father and finalize his long hoped for marriage to Catherine of France.¹²²

Isabeau invited the English “leopard” into the royal house of France, dispatching a missive from Troyes dated September 20, 1419: “*A très hault et puissant Prince nostre cousin Henry, par la grace de Dieu, roy d’Angleterre [from] Ysabel, par icelle meisme grace royne de France, [with] paix and affection de parfaite concorde et union.*” (To the most high and powerful Prince, our cousin Henry, by the grace of God, king of England from Isabeau, by this same grace queen of France, with the peace and affection of perfect concord and union).¹²³ The dauphin’s disinheritance was a political act, and a formal ceremony—a *lit-de-justice*¹²⁴—was convoked in the name of a largely “absent” Charles VI by Isabeau on December 23, 1420. Henry V, sharing the “king’s bench” with Charles VI and Burgundy, was officially styled “heir and regent of France.”¹²⁵ The disinherited dauphin was 17 years old, his dauphine 16. He had been abandoned by his birth mother, Isabeau, for political expediency, a pension, and personal security, and by his cousin, Burgundy, for political opportunism.

France’s *Bonne-mère*

The Berry Herald records that, by the time of his sister Catherine’s nuptials in Troyes, the dauphin had departed for the Languedoc to force it to his obedience. The territory shared borders with Aragon, Foix, the Dauphiné, and Provence—where Yolande was in residence. This Charles achieved, driving his former lieutenant-governor Jean I, Count of Foix-Grailly,¹²⁶ out of Languedoc with the assistance of Jean IV, Count of Armagnac, and “many other great lords of the kingdom as well as Scots, newly arrived in France. . . . Then, my said lord the dauphin returned to his lands of Berry and Touraine, leaving his governor, my lord Charles of Bourbon, who besieged and took Béziers.”¹²⁷ The proximity of Languedoc to Provence merits mention; at this moment, Yolande, ably seconded by her mother, Violant of Bar, was in Provence preparing the way for Louis III’s imminent departure. It is not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that there might have been a meeting or, at the very least, epistolary traffic, between the dauphin and his *Bonne-mère*, particularly if one considers the presence of Scots troops newly arrived in southern France and Henry V’s reaction to this development. The Herald again:

In 1420, the king of England and the duke of Burgundy departed Troyes, taking the king of Scotland with him, who was a prisoner of

the king of England, they took him with them with the intention that the Scots, who had sided with the dauphin, would change sides and not take up arms against them; but they did nothing for their king, and well-served my said lord, the dauphin, as shall be revealed.¹²⁸

While James I of Scotland was prisoner of the English for some 18 years, he received an excellent upbringing and cultured education, developing a respect for English governance and Henry V, an aptitude and talent for poetry and music, and great skill in sporting pursuits. He was used by Henry V in his army to compromise Scots troops successively in the service of Charles VI and the dauphin.¹²⁹ It is no surprise, therefore, that the Scots did nothing for their king, choosing instead to ally with the cause of the dauphin. What happened shortly afterward at Baugé, in Yolande's county of Anjou, with the active participation of these Scots, testifies to her collaboration with Scotland to protect her interests and those of her son-in-law, to whose interest Angevin aspirations were irrevocably linked. The Baugé victory halted effective progress of the English invasion into greater Anjou.¹³⁰ The Herald notes the names of the protagonists and details of the Baugé victory¹³¹—a rare triumph until the lifting of the siege of Orleans in May 1429. The Herald's account of the Baugé victory records that the dauphin did not participate; it was a victory achieved by the combined Angevin–Manceaux–Scots force, able and well-positioned to capitalize upon the precipitous actions of Thomas of Lancaster, Duke of Clarence.¹³² It was a morale booster, organized by Yolande and conforming to her established and continuing practice of intervening in the affairs of France when it defended or enhanced Angevin assets. Reynaud agrees that, notwithstanding Yolande's absence from her northern territories, she was never out of touch.¹³³ She was well-served and could rely upon the loyalty of her officers in the *chambre des comptes d'Angers* as well as her Angevin and Manceaux knights, victorious at Baugé. Yolande divided her attention and prioritized her energies to address every aspect of her family's "commonwealth." Yolande "attacked or counterattacked on three fronts: the defence or enlargement of her territories; reconciliation and enhancement of relations with old adversaries, and the preparation [and financing] of her son's Italian expedition."¹³⁴

The dauphin and dauphine were married in Bourges, not without ceremony, on April 22, 1422.¹³⁵ Just before this event, important papers and letters arrived in Angers at Yolande's *chambre de comptes*, dispatched by her secretary in Provence, Jean Micaël. They are were written on large white parchments, and sealed with the seals of both

the *Royne de Sicile et du Roy son filz*. There was an official letter confirming the marriage of the king of Sicily to Isabelle, the daughter of the duke of Brittany, and another sealed by both Yolande and Louis III granting authority to their council to mortgage assets such as their castles and fortresses in Anjou–Maine to underwrite the conquest of the peninsular kingdom of Sicily.¹³⁶ The first missive demonstrates that Yolande, notwithstanding the Treaty of Troyes and the Anglo–Burgundian–Breton pact, had not given up on her carefully constructed Angevin–Breton alliance. Family was at the forefront of her activities, and she was much occupied with the raising of finance, Louis III having returned from his visit to Rome in 1420. He was in Tarascon on January 21, 1421, and again in Aix-en-Provence by February 22, 1422. Although Yolande was not in constant contact with her *chambre des comptes* in Angers, in February 1422, Jean, Sire of Fontaines, arrived in Yolande’s northern capital with letters from her naming him lieutenant-general for Anjou–Maine in matters pertaining to the wars in those territories.¹³⁷ Fontaines, captain of Maine, had distinguished himself at Baugé and voyaged south to Yolande’s court during the interim.

While physically absent from territories, Yolande was never isolated from her far-flung domains. She worked to protect her assets and interests until the situation in France yielded an opportunity for her to reenter the larger political sphere. When circumstances appeared to have conspired against her son-in-law’s progress to his throne, fate intervened in a spectacular fashion. On August 22, 1422, Henry V died, leaving his nine-month-old son heir to his double-kingdom and, on October 21, Charles VI of France followed him to the crypt. The heirs to the kingdom of France were the dispossessed dauphin Charles and his nephew, the infant Henry VI of England. And, with the arrival of Charles’s firstborn in July 1423, at the time of Charles VI’s death, an Angevin–Valois heir to throne of France was on the way. The situation required all the patience, persistence, and pragmatism Yolande could muster. On April 4, 1423, the tripartite alliance between England, Burgundy, and Brittany was renewed in Arras and reinforced with betrothals. John, Duke of Bedford, and regent of France for Henry VI, married Anne of Burgundy, and the recently liberated Arthur de Richemont, younger brother of Brittany, married Marguerite of Burgundy, widow of the dauphin, Louis of Guyenne. Anjou again found itself out-married and, for the moment, out in the cold. However, things would shortly be on the move for the queen of Jerusalem and Sicily and her downtrodden son-in-law.

per ben e pacifficacion de son rialme (for the Good and
Pacification of his Kingdom)

With more than enough to occupy her in Provence, Yolande resolved to answer a summons from her son-in-law, Charles. On January 12, 1423, three months after the death of Charles VI, Yolande convoked her Estates for January 30 in Aix-en-Provence to prepare for the departure of *la reyna de Jerusalem et Sicilia, comtessa de Provensa* for France.¹³⁸ Her letters state that “because his highness, the king of France has written to us and affectionately prays that, for the good and pacification of his kingdom, we go to him, for this reason we intend to so do.”¹³⁹ Charles recalled her to ensure the “*ben e pacifficacion*” of his kingdom—a kingdom once more within his reach due to the deaths, in quick succession, of his rival Henry V and his father Charles VI. Louis III had reached an accommodation with the Visconti in Italy, and Yolande ensured that during his absence in Italy and hers in France, an Angevin presence, however youthful, would be maintained in Provence; she designated her nine-year-old son, Charles of Anjou, her lieutenant-general in her absence.

Yolande left Provence on June 26, 1423, and from Rome on July 1, en route to Naples and Aversa, Louis III conferred the viceroyalty upon her. This is the first time a viceroyalty had been accorded a queen—to a woman who had shouldered the official burdens of lieutenant-generalcy for her husband from 1410. The powers she held from 1423 were identical to those she had held since 1410; both were absolute, only the appellation had changed. However, as Elena Woodacre and others point out, the changed appellation is of great significance because the title, viceroy, rather than lieutenant-general, grew out of an imperative for a viceroy to wield unimpeachable sovereign authority in the absence of the king in situations where loyalty was mutable, and the political landscape fragile and complex.¹⁴⁰ It is highly probable that, advised by her mother, Violant of Bar, Yolande herself put forward the trail blazing initiative to modify the appellation to enhance the gravitas of her preexisting position. Assuming the viceroyalty, Yolande had only recently bid farewell to her mother, Violant—the politically active queen-dowager of Aragon—with whom she had spent a year in Provence.¹⁴¹ Jesús Lalinde Abadía examines and compares both positions and the ways in which they operated in the late medieval crown of Aragon, revealing that Yolande’s uncle, Martí I of Aragon, first deployed the appellation, appointing Hug d’Anglesola (d. 1399) his viceroy in the kingdom of Mallorca. Anglesola was known to Yolande: he had been majordomo

and counselor to her grandfather, Pere IV; the *gran privat* (eminent favorite) of both her parents; and quickly claimed by her aunt, María de Luna, as her minister and military advisor, during Foix's attempts to seize the throne during Martí's absence in Sicily. With his elevation to viceroy, Hug was one of the nine worthies who processed with Martí I to his coronation.

The act ratifying Yolande's vicereignty was presented as a logical progression from the "*gouvernement et bail finiz qu'elle avoit paravant*" (the concluded administration and authority that she had earlier held).¹⁴² Louis had attained his majority in 1421 (his sixteenth year), and his investiture of Yolande lauded her virtues, reminding all of her long experience in affairs of state, of her exercise of *potestas* (power and ability) during the lifetime of his father, and emphasizing her skilled management of their joint affairs since his death. Louis foregrounded the benefits his mother had accorded him since his adolescence, reiterating her absolute authority to rule in his name as she had done since his father's death.¹⁴³

Yolande arrived in Angers in July 1423, first stopping in Bourges where her daughter was on the point of giving birth to her first child. Louis of France was born on July 3, 1423, and was sponsored the following day at his baptism by his godparents Jean II, Duke of Alençon; Martin Gouges de Charpaigne, bishop of Clermont and chancellor of France; and Catherine de L'Isle Bouchard, Countess of Tonnerre and Marie of Anjou's favored lady-in-waiting.¹⁴⁴ Yolande's joy at the birth of her grandson Louis was short-lived; the English were menacing the frontiers of her duchy and Charles's army was shredded outside Cravant on July 31, 1423. Yolande initiated the organization of military initiatives in 1423; she directed troops to confront William de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk, entrenched in Segré. She then returned to sit on a royal council held at Selles in Berry in March 1424.¹⁴⁵

However, France was not Yolande's only concern. By November 20, 1423, in the absence of both Louis III and Yolande from Provence, her cousin and adversary Alfons V of Aragon invaded and sacked Marseille—a disaster of immense proportions.¹⁴⁶ The city was almost completely annihilated in retribution for its Angevin loyalties, Alfons having been excluded from Naples by the initiatives of Louis III and Giovanna II, supported by the papacy. Alfons's main grievance was that Giovanna had revoked her calculated 1421 adoption of him (for his ingratitude and rebellion) in favor of Louis III, who presented himself to her on September 14, 1423, in Aversa.¹⁴⁷ Estates in Aix were convoked by Charles of Anjou for December 12 to raise an army for the defense of the coastline in the wake of the

sacking of Marseille by Alfons during Yolande's absence "by mandate of the glorious and illustrious Lord Charles, monseigneur the brother of the said king our lord, and *viceroy of the stated counties in the absence of the serene illustrious princess, our Lady Yolande*, by the grace of God Queen, Duchess and Countess of the realms."¹⁴⁸

Notwithstanding this crisis, Yolande had opened negotiations with her nemesis Burgundy via her covert embassies.¹⁴⁹ Remember, Burgundy had declared Anjou its perpetual enemy in 1413, refusing to enter into open talks, and the assassination of Philippe's father in 1419 had only made matters worse. However, during the spring or summer of 1423, Yolande entered into secret talks with Burgundy, sending one of her Franciscan envoys to him, who responded to her overtures using the same method of exchange. On June 30, 1423, Philippe directed his treasurer to pay "*messire*" Jean de la Villette, priest, 11 livres 5 sous tournois "to go to the queen of Sicily," carrying closed letters from him for "*aucunes choses secretes*" (certain secret things) with a further payment drawn around August 31, 1423, to an equerry who received 150 francs "to go at the duke's command on a certain secret voyage [to Yolande, Queen of Sicily], which greatly touched upon him personally, and about which no further declaration was made."¹⁵⁰

Since the death of Henry V and the accession of Charles following the death of Charles VI, Martin V had been at the heart of an intense diplomatic push directed at Burgundy involving Savoy, Brittany, and Anjou, attempting to broker peace and secure the throne for Charles VII.¹⁵¹ This is the context of Charles's recall of Yolande "*per bene pacificatione de son ryalme*." Yolande's new ally, Amadeus VIII of Savoy, had always been sympathetic to the cause of France, and subsequently to the Charles VII's claim. Savoy started to negotiate with his nephew Burgundy in January 1423; Philippe seems to have evinced less hostility toward Charles as a result. However, Burgundy was still too close to Bedford, too linked into English policy to lend an ear to his wisest counselors.¹⁵² By November 1423, Yolande was pleading Charles's cause to Brittany in Nantes. Yolande's November interventions bore fruit; Eugène Cosneau draws our attention to the disembarkation of fresh Scots troops in Brittany's ports in February 1424, destined for Charles VII, asserting that Richard of Brittany had entered into an alliance with Charles VII, the kings of Castile and Scotland, the dukes of Savoy and Milan, and many of the high French nobility.¹⁵³

Vallet holds that this treaty was Charles VII's first great diplomatic coup.¹⁵⁴ However, a close examination of its protagonists yields the names of Louis III of Anjou¹⁵⁵ and Charles of Orleans.

As discussed, Louis III and Yolande established an accord with Milan 1419, and Charles of Orleans's lamented mother was Valentina Visconti, sister of Filippo-Maria, Duke of Milan. The February 26, 1424 act, arising from negotiations with Milan undertaken by the abbot of St-Antoine-de-Viennois on Charles's behalf, stipulates that the proposed comprehensive agreement concerned both offensive and defensive measures for the mutual protection of all concerned, namely, Filippo-Maria Visconti; Charles VII; James I of Scotland (negotiated by his regent, Murdoch Stewart, Duke of Albany); Juan II of Castile; Louis III, René of Anjou and Charles of Maine; Charles of Orleans and his younger brother Jean, the Count of Angoulême; Jean I, Duke of Bourbon, and his son Charles, Count of Clermont; Jean II, Duke of Alençon; Jean IV, Count of Armagnac; Richard of Brittany; Charles II, Lord of Albret and Count of Dreux; Giovanna II of Naples (adoptive mother of Louis III); Amadeus VIII; Jean-Jacques Palaeologue, Marquess of Montferrat; Francesco Foscari, Doge of Venice; Niccolò III d'Est, Marquess of Ferrara; and Francesco I Gonzaga, Marquess of Mantua. Most of these signatories were connected to Yolande's persistent diplomatic activity since Louis II's death. Given Charles VII's inertia, combined with the self-interest of his personal familiars, it is hard to sustain the idea of Charles undertaking lengthy negotiations with such varied geopolitical players, independently and autonomously. This is all the more unlikely if one notes the weight of Angevins, and their networks of existing alliances, singled out as parties to the agreement.¹⁵⁶ Beaucourt holds firm to the idea that new and overt negotiations were accomplished under the auspices of Savoy—Yolande's newly acquired diplomatic strategist and “canary in the mine,” particularly in matters concerning his nephew, Philippe of Burgundy.¹⁵⁷ The February agreement concluded at the Castello Visconteo in Abbiategrasso near Milan, Yolande journeyed to Brittany's capital, Nantes, with Charles's chancellor, Martin Gouges, bishop of Clermont, and other members of his embassy to negotiate what would become known as the Treaty of Nantes. Charles did not participate in the talks, but again, her efforts were reinforced by the timely intervention and supplementary mediation of Savoy. Although never ratified, the Treaty of Nantes, drafted on May 18, 1424, is compelling evidence of Yolande's determination to establish a lasting accord between France's princes and is deserving of further study in comparison with the 1435 Treaty of Arras.¹⁵⁸ The objective of this treaty was to organize a durable accommodation between Charles VII and Burgundy. Item IX highlights the mediators and custodians of this peace project:

Item: To hold resolutely and securely to the things stated above, and other wise things for the said peace, it was discussed and advised that Messeigneurs and the Lady, the Queen of Sicily, and the Duke of Brittany, who are the mediators of the said peace, and the Duke of Savoy, or two of them, will be its custodians with the consent of the [other] parties.¹⁵⁹

In the final portion of the treaty, a task is proposed expressly for Charles VII by Brittany:

Item: and moreover, Mgr. Brittany beseeches and asks that the king's pleasure should be to make all-inclusive peace throughout his kingdom, by making such offers to the English, according to God and reason, that they might be content. To which the king's ambassadors responded that while they did not at present have the authority to enter into such a matter, they would willingly report it to the king.¹⁶⁰

Had this ambitious project been realized, involving all parties as well as the pope, civil conflict might have ceased as early as 1424. There would have been no call for Joan of Arc, and France could have anticipated an end to hostilities well in advance of the Treaty of Arras in 1435. But the failure of the Treaty of Nantes, and the subsequent debacle in August 1424 at Verneuil, put paid to a timely end to France's misery.

On June 21, a month after the drafting of the Treaty of Nantes, Bedford (at the urging of Burgundy) officially styled himself duke of Anjou and count of Maine.¹⁶¹ Burgundy was not ready to agree to peace with Charles VII, hedging his bets with the winning side—Bedford's—while seeking to exact some residual advantage from the Montereau murder. He might have believed that he had arrived at a thrifty solution to the problem of neutralizing Anjou and its support for Charles. The Angevin–Mançeaux–Scots victory at Baugé in 1421 had borne witness to the revitalized influence of Anjou. Moreover, Yolande's return from Provence in 1423 at her son-in-law's summons for the "*ben et pacifficacion of his kingdom*" and her plan to ratify the Treaty of Nantes in 1424 might have obliged Philippe to manipulate the formidable Bedford into a position where he could most effectively challenge her authority and efficacy. Evidently, Philippe did not share his father Jean's stomach for murder and regicide; Bedford's response to Yolande's diplomatic maneuvers to establish the Nantes agreement was to create himself duke of Anjou and count of Maine, arming himself with his nephew's, Henry VI's, authority to conquer and subdue Yolande's territories. The threat to Yolande

and her domains by June 1424 was real and present, with Bedford victorious at Verneuil in August 1424 and, later that year, master of Maine.¹⁶² However, she did not flinch and flee south to Provence in the face of English invasion. Instead, she resolved to stay and fight for her territories, but she needed vast amounts of money, strong and powerful allies with impeccable connections, and, above all, continued access to her antagonist, Burgundy. Yolande imposed higher taxes upon her steadfast Angevin subjects to pay for repairs to damage caused by English raiding parties. She created conditions favorable for an increase in commercial activity in Anjou, augmenting the three existing faculties at the University of Angers (Theology, Medicine, and Arts) and inaugurated two new faculties: Canon and Civil Laws.¹⁶³ This initiative aimed to counterbalance the influence of the University of Paris, which at that time was subject to the Anglo–Burgundian ascendancy north of the Loire.¹⁶⁴ She attended to the commercial, academic/scholarly health and reputation of her duchy so that it remained dynamic and prestigious, delivering an uninterrupted revenue stream to defend against the aspirations of the invader. Then she initiated what was to prove to be a *coup de maître* of diplomacy and (eventual) conciliation.

The Queen and Her Constable

Yolande summoned her son-in-law to Angers, where he was received with scrupulous dignity and ceremony, on October 16, 1424. There she orchestrated a meeting between Charles and Arthur de Richemont, younger brother of the duke of Brittany. Richemont's allegiance to England and his brother-in-law Burgundy had cooled;¹⁶⁵ Yolande would have learned this from her mutable ally and erstwhile champion, Brittany.¹⁶⁶ Yolande recruited Richemont to the post of constable of France, and the detail of this breakthrough in Angevin–Breton relations is fortunately still available to us.¹⁶⁷ The document demonstrates that Charles and his familiars had little if anything to do with either the negotiations with Brittany or with the achievement and celebration of Richemont's detachment from the Anglo-Burgundians. Charles arrived with ceremony for a discussion with his *Bonne-mère* on the Thursday, met with Richemont on the Friday, and departed for nearby Pont-de-Sée on the Saturday, having first made concessions to Brittany regarding payments and ceding Touraine to Anjou (Yolande) in lieu of payments for debts accrued.¹⁶⁸ Charles left it to Yolande to fête their newest acquisition on the Sunday in the company of her trusted allies, the count of Vendôme and Pierre II

of Amboise, Viscount of Thouars. Burgundy had not blocked this appointment, and his sister, Marguerite of Burgundy, had encouraged her new husband to accept this high office. Hope for peace ran high as a result of Brittany's and Yolande's reinvigorated mediation. Less than a month later, on November 13, an accord was established in Vannes to conclude the betrothal of Louis III of Anjou and Isabelle of Brittany, wherein Charles officially alienated control of the duchy of Touraine to Yolande excepting the city and castellany of Chinon, held by the duchess of Guyenne, Marguerite of Burgundy.¹⁶⁹ A further welcome financial settlement in favor of Anjou was established by Jean V the following day.¹⁷⁰ On paper at least, Yolande had snatched a timely victory from the jaws of a soul-destroying setback; she realigned herself with Brittany and purchased proven military muscle in Richemont, underwriting the deal with the promise of Touraine extracted from her son-in-law, and sealed the accord in finalizing the long-anticipated Angevin–Breton betrothal.

Despite Charles's inertia and his favorites' resistance, together Yolande and Richemont supplanted his more nefarious and controversial familiars. On March 7, 1425, an imposing ceremony unfolded on a meadow in Chinon. The king, surrounded by his entire court and, in particular, Louis of Bourbon, Count of Vendôme; the chancellor, Martin Gouges; the archbishops of Reims and Sens, the bishop of Angers, the marshal of Sévérac, and Savoyard envoys, presented Richemont with the constable's sword.¹⁷¹ Richemont's authority was now second only to the king's and, in matters pertaining to war, nothing could be decided without first seeking his advice. He was a pivotal member of the "*plus étroit et secret conseil du roi*" (the most intimate and secret council of the king).¹⁷² Yolande had considered carefully the advantages Richemont would bring to her and Charles: he was well-born and well-connected, having close dynastic ties within numerous royal houses: Savoy, Burgundy, Orleans, Alençon, Bourbon, and England. Through Richemont, Yolande could count upon the frequent support and continued influence of Jean V.

From the time of his appointment, Richemont set a pattern of activity that he would follow until his withdrawal from Charles's active service around 1450; he worked to reorganize the army, pursued the war against the English, kept channels of communication open between Brittany, Burgundy, and Savoy, and strove to thwart the intrigues of Charles's changing and challenging procession of favorites, resisting wherever possible their intrigues against him, trying to remove the king from their influence, reminding Charles of his duties and responsibilities, wherever possible placing him at the

head of his troops, and fortifying Charles's authority at every opportunity. First officer of the crown, Richemont, rather than the chancellor of France,¹⁷³ fulfilled the role of "prime-minister," not limiting himself to heading Charles's armed forces. Apart from the martial aspect, this is the work Yolande had undertaken in Charles's interests since the time of Louis II's death.¹⁷⁴ Richemont was allied firmly with Yolande once she created him Charles's constable, and I have argued elsewhere that he remained loyal to Yolande and her political program up to the time of her death and, indeed, beyond it.¹⁷⁵ Vale and others have posited that Richemont's allegiances were far from solid and only reflected his desire to bolster his personal standing and well-being. Warner appears to base her position regarding Richemont solely upon statements contained in the Burgundian-inclined *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*.¹⁷⁶

Richemont's task was to prove difficult and exacting. While he was busy raising capital and troops in Brittany and pushing Brittany to negotiate with Burgundy, Charles's favorite labored to unseat him. Emboldened by his position within Charles's entourage, Jean Louvet challenged not only Richemont's authority but Yolande's as well. By March 1425, he had audaciously sidelined counselors such as Chancellor Martin Gouges; Jean of Comborn, Lord of Treignac; Bernard of Armagnac, Count of Pardiac; and Jean of Torsay, master of crossbowmen, who were working with Richemont toward a settlement with Burgundy. Louvet proclaimed Richemont the enemy of the king and an obstacle to peace, initiating talks with Bedford, whom Richemont had been attempting to cut off from French politics. Louvet enticed mobs of foreign mercenaries to Poitiers, raised taxes, enriched his personal fortune, and incited Charles to revolt against his own constable. This is evidenced by a series of letters dated June 1425 from Richemont, Brittany, Yolande, and Regnault of Chartres to the loyal city of Lyon.¹⁷⁷ Yolande and Richemont reacted to Louvet's transgressions swiftly and decisively. By the second half of April 1425, Yolande had installed herself at Charles's side in Poitiers, and Richemont had marched on to Bourges, when Louvet slipped away to Poitiers.¹⁷⁸ The letter-writing campaign initiated by Richemont and Yolande against Louvet was a resounding triumph. Not only did Bourges, Tours, and Lyon fall in behind Richemont, but it mobilized the nobility from Poitou, Berry, Auvergne, and Brittany—all of whom held for Richemont against individuals "*de bas et petit lieu*" (of low and small station) who had clustered opportunistically around Charles.¹⁷⁹ This campaign to remove Louvet is at odds with Reynaud's brave assertion that "the king of France is always

sovereign. He could apply pressure to impeach an officer as Charles VII did to his mother-in-law, Yolande of Aragon.¹⁸⁰ It is difficult to see why Yolande needed to be forced to remove her wayward officer Louvet from Charles's entourage—he was blocking her access to Charles. The Berry Herald confirms that Charles did not force his *Bonne-mère* to remove Louvet: “the Queen of Sicily, the Queen of France's mother, was displeased that the said president governed and that he wanted to fly so high.”¹⁸¹ On May 30, 1425, Tours confirmed that its citizens would “*obéiront à la royne de Sicile, duchesse de Touraine et, par consequent, à Mgr. le connestable,*” (obey the Queen of Sicily, Duchesse of Touraine, and, as a consequence, Mgr. the Constable).¹⁸² The triumvirate of Yolande, Richemont, and Regnault of Chartres deployed the force of public opinion and the threat of military reprisal, exhorting loyal towns to continue their resistance against Louvet's faction. Yolande wrote to Tours several times to instruct them not to open their gates to the king or his officers while Louvet continued to enjoy his protection.¹⁸³

As a result of this unified campaign, one of the more self-aware members of Charles's entourage broke ranks: Châtel approached Yolande and Richemont and stated that he did not wish to undermine negotiations with Burgundy by his continued presence in Charles's retinue.¹⁸⁴ Châtel facilitated Yolande's access to Charles and convinced other recalcitrant favorites to leave his court. Dignity intact, he withdrew to Provence, accepting the post of seneschal of Beaucaire—a position and benefit he would occupy until his death.¹⁸⁵ In Poitiers, on July 12, 1424, a *Littera revocationis contra dominum de Mirandol* (letter of abrogation against Louvet, Lord of Eygalières, [Theys, Fallavier and] Mirandol), dated July 5, expelling Louvet and other favorites, was published in *parlement*. The document brings Charles to heel, emphasizing Yolande's ascendancy over him: “and, on this [matter] requested the good advice and counsel of our very dear and well loved mother, the queen of Jerusalem and of Sicily.”¹⁸⁶ Throughout the month of July, Charles, Yolande, and Richemont, his brother (Richard, Count of Etampes), and his brother-in-law (the Count of Clermont) held important council meetings. Charles wrote to his loyal subjects between July 25 and August 1, informing them of latest developments and assuring them that while all was “*en bonne union et concorde*” (in good union and agreement), he needed the presence of the princes of the blood and other counselors, “*preudhommes et loyaux*” (wise and loyal men).¹⁸⁷ For the time being, Yolande and Richemont had rid themselves of troublemakers and were determined to unite all three estates in support of an offensive against the

multiple ills of the kingdom. They continued their negotiations for a peace settlement with Burgundy, dispatching their respective embassies to Savoy in the wake of those earlier sent by Richemont.¹⁸⁸

The war with English continued unabated, with funds, more than troops, in short supply. Since the English victory at Verneuil, Bedford had become obsessed with the possession of Anjou–Maine, and it was to these Angevin domains that he directed his best captains and the bulk of his resources. His plan was to surround Maine strategically, maintain watch over Brittany, and keep lines of communication between Rouen and Paris open and clear.¹⁸⁹ Yolande, Richemont, and Brittany had wasted valuable time in ridding themselves of Louvet and his fellow travelers and were unable to react quickly enough when Salisbury laid siege to Le Mans in July 1425.¹⁹⁰ The troops they did manage to assemble were posted to garrisons sprinkled along the borders of Anjou, but not having been paid, they proved to be of little use.¹⁹¹ While Richemont and Brittany continued to make peace overtures to Brittany, the English overran Maine. With things becoming desperate in France as well as in Anjou–Maine, and in the wake of a general call to arms addressed to his loyal vassals by Charles VII, on February 18, 1426, Yolande wrote to her eldest son, Louis III, to recall him from Naples.¹⁹² One can only speculate upon Louis's reaction in the face of this summons. Having made a triumphal entry into Naples supported by Giovanna II's forces, he was in possession of Calabria and, notwithstanding Giovanna's vagaries, making an important contribution to the government of his titular kingdom. Louis wrote to his mother instructing her that she would have to raise capital to finance his return to France;¹⁹³ there is no evidence that Louis heeded his mother's call. It seems more plausible to suggest that he decided to defend his position in Naples and his adoptive mother's sovereignty.

Throughout this period, there is a good deal of archival evidence to support the idea that the primary triumvirate consisting of Yolande, Brittany, and Richemont, so patiently established by the queen of Sicily, strove to redress the political situation and defend their joint territories against the English and keep lines of communication open with Burgundy.¹⁹⁴ Yolande, with the help of Richemont, endeavored to surround Charles with advisers likely to advance her pragmatic politics and projects. Some of their choices were unlucky ones; cunning individuals who curried favor with Charles attempted to sublimate Yolande's will in order to enrich themselves from Charles's treasury and exploit his authority to grant them favors. Richemont was called upon more than once by Yolande to take firm,

often ruthless, measures to redress the situation; this was in addition to his heavy martial responsibilities and his sustained efforts to turn his brother away from England and urge Burgundy to negotiate. Charles's favorite, Georges de la Trémoille, proved adept at isolating Yolande and exiling Richemont to seize power for himself. As far as adversaries within their own camp went, he was the most durable and recalcitrant, the greatest irony being that they themselves placed him in a position of authority in July 1427. Never an astute politician, Richemont suggested that Charles needed a favorite who would allow him (Richemont) to continue his military projects and ensure that Yolande's political diplomacy could progress unhindered by court intrigues. The constable supported the appointment of Trémoille, long an acquaintance of his and convinced of his loyalty to their cause, stressing that Georges's brother, Jean, was well positioned in Burgundy's court to assist them in their unfinished negotiations.¹⁹⁵ Vale makes the point that Richemont and Yolande probably believed that Trémoille would prove "a valuable instrument of reconciliation" between Charles and Burgundy.¹⁹⁶ What Richemont did not consider was Trémoille's well-established pattern of allegiance shifting and his singular ambition to carve out an unassailable position of prestige and influence commensurate with his great wealth.¹⁹⁷ It would take a near miracle to dilute Georges's hold over Charles and Yolande's direct involvement to remove him. Trémoille exploited Charles's animosity toward his constable, and moved decisively to destabilize Yolande's influence over her son-in-law. Richemont lost the government of Berry to Trémoille, and a civil war between the two opposing protagonists erupted in the midst of the continuing English invasion. Charles's court split into two irreconcilable factions. Richemont had the support of Yolande, the counts of Clermont, La Marche, Armagnac, and Pardiac, and others, but Trémoille had the king, and whoever had the king in their camp held real authority. Trémoille quickly attracted keen partisans such as Regnault of Chartres, his stepbrother, Guillaume of Albret, and Raoul of Gaucourt.¹⁹⁸ Yolande's constable was cast as a rebel both by his king and the English, with whom his brother Brittany was once more allied.

However, extant documents preserved in Breton archives do not paint a portrait of a firm friend of the English. This is perhaps because Brittany's duchess, Jeanne of France, was affectionate toward her younger brother, Charles VII, and supportive of his cause. While Brittany continued to pay lip service to Bedford to protect his territories, he was, without doubt, helping Charles's

cause and making plans with Charles of Orleans—still prisoner of the English but an interested bystander in France’s affairs.¹⁹⁹ From his exile, the constable continued his negotiations with Savoy, Brittany, and Burgundy, with Savoy moving to renew his treaty with Charles and Burgundy on November 26, 1427. Brittany’s stance was defensive and pragmatic. Richemont was successful during this period as he sought to relieve sieges and hamper English progress into Orleans and greater Anjou. He was unable, however, to concentrate his attention and efforts as the conflict with Trémoille, who had taken advantage of Brittany’s “alliance” with Bedford, deepened. Trémoille argued to Charles that given they had the services of the hero of the battle of Montargis, Jean, Bastard of Orleans,²⁰⁰ the loss of whom would have opened the Loire to Bedford, they no longer needed the services of the constable. That Richemont had been the strategist and commander behind the victory, forced to sell a coronet to pay their troops and keep up the advance on Montargis, was conveniently glossed over by Trémoille. So too was the fact that the constable himself had delegated the Bastard and Etienne de Vignolles (La Hire) to lead the expedition. Much as would be the case of the lifting of the siege of Orleans in May 1429, they took the English besiegers by surprise, slipping into Montargis with a convoy of livestock and supplies destined for the hungry inhabitants, who seconded the efforts of their liberators. The English were routed from Montargis on September 7, 1427, having lost many men, abandoning equipment, supplies, and artillery.²⁰¹ In 1429, Joan of Arc would arrive at Orleans at the head of a convoy of supplies and livestock, “miraculously” slipping unchallenged into the besieged city, to scatter the English, who, in their disorderly flight, also left supplies and artillery behind. Post-Montargis, Trémoille spans Brittany’s breaking of the Treaty of Saumur, taking advantage of Yolande’s absence from royal council from July 3, 1427, when she was obliged to quit France to travel to Provence.²⁰²

Yolande’s household accounts testify to her absence from Charles’s court at this time.²⁰³ I posit the probable motive for her departure south at this critical political juncture by referring to the extant record of her Estates, where it is noted that, in June 1423, Yolande left Provence, leaving her youngest son, nine-year-old Charles of Anjou, as her symbolic presence and “viceroy” in her southern counties. Yolande was recalled in the spring of 1427 to add weight to an initiative to constitute a reinvigorated “*ligue*” to defend the territory against Aragon. The evidence for this is preserved in the records of her Estates convoked in Aix-en-Provence for February 1427 and again

in June, where it was decided that representatives write to Yolande to solicit her personal intervention. Estates had been convoked by her youngest son in some panic, and proper procedures had not been entirely respected. The June Estates in Provence were followed up by further Estates convoked for October 1427 in Salerno by Louis III. The Salerno Estates were called together to receive ambassadors from the Aixoise Estates held in the preceding June. Estates were convoked again in Aix for June 1428 to hear reports from ambassadors returning from Salerno. The ambassadors had once more requested confirmation of Provençal privileges. Charles of Anjou was still only 14 years old and Yolande's cousins, the Aragonese, were again menacing the Provençal coast. Although Charles of Anjou had been under the active guardianship of some of her most trusted officials, taken as a whole and conforming to an established pattern, unblocking political impasses and the shoring up of loyalties and mutual support must have been the reason for Yolande's precipitous presence in Provence during 1427 and 1428.²⁰⁴

In her absence, Trémoille redoubled his efforts to rid himself of Richemont, persuading the king that the constable and his allies were rebels and ought to be treated as such. He adopted the same approach used by Richemont in 1425–6 to rid himself of Louvet and his fellow travelers by ensuring that towns and garrisons were closed to them.²⁰⁵ Trémoille would not have ventured this far had Yolande been present. The constable had the support of Anjou, Bourbon, Orleans, Armagnac-Pardiac, the Scots constable, John Stewart of Darnley, Marshal Boussac, and most of the high nobility, but he could not launch an attack upon Trémoille without appearing to be in rebellion against the king. The English were waiting in the wings for Richemont to drop his guard and allow them a free hand to achieve their long-desired conquest of Anjou–Maine, in the absence of its viceroy, Yolande. Unable to bring the fight to Trémoille and in the absence of his patroness, Richemont was exiled from court, deprived of his pension, and unable to fulfill the duties of his office. Trémoille did not allow Richemont to depart the scene with dignity, instead pursuing him with all means at his disposal. Richemont tried to parley with Charles through his personal intermediaries. The constable maintained frequent contact with his allies—Yolande, La Marche, Clermont, and Armagnac-Pardiac—who had gathered troops at Chinon in December to resist further offensives from Trémoille. In January 1428, Richemont joined his wife, Marguerite, at Chinon, her court adjoining Charles's own, the duchess well positioned to assist her banished husband.²⁰⁶

The constable relaunched his 1425 strategy. With the support of his allies Clermont and Pardiac, he addressed a detailed manifesto to *parlement* in Poitiers and loyal cities and garrisons. They pledged to remove Trémoille from his position of influence to remediate the kingdom's woes, and demanded the support of *parlement* and loyal places in this venture. Poitiers did not respond immediately.²⁰⁷ Lyon, steadfastly loyal to the constable until the problems with Trémoille, replied that it could only obey the orders of the king. Tours, in the absence of its duchess, Yolande, received orders from the king not to admit Richemont or his allies.²⁰⁸ In desperation, Richemont sought out Yolande, newly returned from Provence, who appears to have suggested that they wait for a more strategic and opportune moment to present itself before moving against Trémoille.²⁰⁹ Trémoille fortified his position against the constable's retribution and the intervention of the queen of Sicily, isolating Yolande as far as possible from direct contact and influence over Charles. Trémoille won the malleable and interested loyalty of powerful allies such as Raoul of Gaucourt, whom he dispatched to Poitou to occupy Richemont's military attention; Jean II, Duke of Alençon, in desperate financial straits, because of the crippling ransom he had raised to secure his release from the English; the count of Foix; and Regnault of Chartres.

Despite his fall from grace, Richemont and his supporters continued to look for ways to regain Charles's favor. Notwithstanding his influence over the king, Trémoille was very unpopular. The exiles capitalized upon this by convoking General Estates—assemblies that were continuously postponed by Charles and his favorite. Richemont had found the ideal trigger for this move with news that Bedford had recalled Salisbury from England with fresh troops in preparation for a siege planned for Orleans. With Yolande absent in Provence early in 1428, Bedford had anticipated a definitive push into Anjou–Maine, but his project was overruled by his parliament, which decided that Orleans was of more strategic importance in their struggle for dominion over the entirety of France. Bedford had been exercised by the need to remove Yolande from her position of influence since the signing of the Treaty of Nantes in 1424. According to Michael Jones, “early in 1428 Bedford had made preparations for an invasion of Anjou in an attempt to break the resistance of Charles VII's regime... The regent planned to strike against the Angevin powerbase of Yolanda of Aragon, the French king's mother-in-law and a fervent supporter of his cause.”²¹⁰ The diversion to Orleans represented only momentary respite for Yolande: if it fell, Anjou–Maine would be lost to Bedford. Princely unity was the theme of the Estates

called for by Richemont, and Cosneau believes that Richemont was galvanized into action by Yolande in the understanding that the time had come to make a concerted effort to shake off the shackles of Trémoille's influence.²¹¹

Richemont and his influential supporters addressed a solemn memorandum to Charles, pleading that he re-establish princely unity as a matter of urgency to bring an end to civil strife. They put forward a scheme to invest Yolande, Queen of Jerusalem and Sicily, with the necessary executive authority to safeguard the security of the kingdom and its subjects. They demanded that Estates be called immediately to Poitiers so that all would have an opportunity to speak freely and be guaranteed immunity from violence and oppression:

Regarding the assurance to maintain stability and to guard and observe it securely, at least for the period to be recommended, concluded and notified by the king and his said estates. And, if it pleased the king, he should immediately commit the exercise of the said guarantee to the queen of Sicily, his mother, and those whom the said queen would call upon to advise the king's council, her own counsel and those of the lords and otherwise, [and] should the outcome of their deliberation, advice and guidance not be observed faithfully, for the time advised by the king's pleasure, considering the present extreme necessity, it would seem that the king by his grace and human justice, must from this moment issue letters as to the perfect observation of the said assurance, for the specified time, and afterwards the said guarantee is to be exercised particularly by the said lady, with the counsel of those mentioned above, specifically conferred upon her for the allotted time, such that from now the authority of the king and his lords, might be used by the will and edict of the king, by mutual agreement, to the benefit of his sovereignty and the public good.²¹²

Trémoille would not have allowed such a project to advance for it would have placed Yolande back on top. He knew that Yolande provided the intellectual dexterity and patience to plan such an offensive while her lieutenant Richemont provided military muscle and the supplementary dynastic connections necessary to advance her interests and move her diplomacy forward. To keep Richemont busy, Trémoille ensured that Gaucourt kept hostilities alive in Poitou. Such was the prestige of the queen of Sicily that Charles convoked his Estates in Poitiers for July 18, 1428, but he did nothing to ensure that this assembly immediately went ahead. With the postponement of the Estates, Richemont and his faction took the initiative and seized control of Bourges. Trémoille stumbled upon their intentions

and sent letters in Charles's name, ordering entry be refused to Richemont and his allies. Bourges agreed, but when Clermont and Pardiac appeared, royal officers opened the city gates to them. The counts assembled representatives of the three estates and outlined their purpose and intention to work for the good of the king and his subjects.²¹³ Clermont and Pardiac achieved majority support for their plan, and they summoned Richemont. Trémoille, realizing the threat to his position by this latest development, hastily assembled troops and arrived at Bourges with the king in tow. Richemont was delayed by Gaucourt in Poitou and had to take a lengthy detour to make his way to Bourges. Trémoille took advantage of the delay by attempting to negotiate with Clermont and Pardiac, arguing that, without Richemont's assistance, they would be held to siege by the king's forces. He pointed out that their actions were playing into the hands of the English who were preparing to besiege Orleans.²¹⁴ Vale contends that Richemont's activities at this time, his "rebellion," "were more a product of the dispute which had raged between the families of Montfort and Penthièvre over their claims to Brittany than a result of Charles's 'mismanagement' of the kingdom [and] that it was yet another instance of the constable's pursuit of self-interest under the cloak of the 'public weal.'"²¹⁵ Yolande would not have allowed herself to become embroiled with Brittany's family feud to the detriment of Charles's and her own interests. Although she supported Jean V in his conflicts with the Penthièvres from time to time, this was only when it moved her own projects forward; Vale is courageous in his observation that France's situation in 1428 was not so terribly dire.²¹⁶

The counts agreed to halt their activities, and were granted (along with Richemont) letters of remission dated July 17, 1428.²¹⁷ On July 22, Charles re-convoked the General Estates, "*toutes excusations cessantes*" (all excuses suspended), to be assembled in Yolande's duchy of Tours on September 10. They were convoked expressly to discuss the pressing affairs of the realm and that "*il est bien entendu que chacun aura franche liberté de dire tout ce qui bon lui semblera*" (it was well understood that all would be at liberty to speak as they saw fit).²¹⁸ Yolande's faction, having been overruled on proposed Poitiers Estates, achieved the desired outcome with the convoking of Estates in her city of Tours. The letters patent were ratified with the involvement of Alençon (son-in-law of Charles of Orleans), Clermont, Pardiac, and a host of notables drawn from Yolande's faction. The Bourges tentative achieved some concrete results, indicating perhaps that Trémoille was not, in fact, as powerful as he believed himself to be. In the context of the

English advance and a depleted treasury, even Trémoille must have felt that it was time to call the Estates together. All was not well in Yolande's territories; the English captured Laval²¹⁹ and recaptured Le Mans,²²⁰ from where the newly arrived Salisbury commenced his campaign for Orleans, seizing surrounding towns and villages. *The Chronique de la Pucelle* records that, before Salisbury's departure from England, the objective of his mission "came to the attention of the duke of Orleans, prisoner in England, he entreated the said count not to make any war upon his lands or his subjects, given that he was a prisoner and could not defend himself; it was said that he promised and granted his request."²²¹ Drawing advantage from English victories and French disunity, Burgundy's ally, Jean of Luxembourg, captured Champagne.

Although Estates had been summoned to Tours, they were moved to Chinon because the English had taken Meung and Beaugency. These Estates were truly representative, unified at last in the common desire to repel the English invaders. A subsidy of 400,000 livres was voted, stipulating that it was accorded to "*résister aux Anglois,*" and defend Orleans in the absence of its lord.²²² There were notable absences from these Estates (Richemont, Clermont, and Pardiac), and the Estates invited the absentees to unify "*en cette extrémité, autour de la bannière royale*" (in this emergency, around the royal banner).²²³ They also demanded political, fiscal, and judicial reform to address the disarray in Charles's court presided over by Trémoille. The Estates presented their concerns to Charles on November 11, 1428.²²⁴ As Yolande and Richemont had likewise pleaded, the deputies implored Charles to gather around him all the princes and lords of the blood "by all possible ways and means"; to make peace with Burgundy "by all possible good means... and find a way to join and unite them to his sovereignty"; and to "persuade to come before him in good love and obedience and to his service, the Constable and, to do this, gratify him to continue the embassies and treaties that have been initiated."²²⁵ The "*demandes et remonstrances*" (requests and protests) put to the king by his Estates on November 11 tally with letters written by *parlement* to Richemont, Clermont, and Pardiac on November 2, seeking help to defend Orleans.²²⁶

Public opinion was on the side of Yolande, Richemont, and their disciples. The constable had not been inactive since Salisbury laid siege to Orleans on October 12, 1428. While the Estates gathered in Chinon, he paid a visit to his brother Brittany. Making ready to serve his king, Richemont made out his will (from Redon on October 24) in favor of his nephew, Pierre II of Brittany, Count of Guingamp.²²⁷

Trémoille, however, kept up hostilities in Poitou in an effort to delay the constable's reappearance. Richemont was obliged to watch from the sidelines as his nephew, Alençon; his brother-in-law, Clermont; Scots constable, John Stewart of Darnley; Boussac; Culant; the Bastard of Orleans; and La Hire were ordered to defend Orleans. The French were defeated by Fastolf at Rouvray on February 12, 1429—a defeat that came to be known as the *Journée des Harens*²²⁸—and, as a result, an utterly dispirited Charles VII determined to withdraw to the Dauphiné or into exile in Spain or Scotland. France was in disarray, its monarch had lost hope, and a miracle would be required to unify the kingdom to repel the English. With her constable effectively neutralized and cooling his heels, Yolande of Aragon, Queen of Jerusalem and Sicily, was to occupy herself with its realization.



CHAPTER 4

THE ART OF PRUDENCE

Sapiens vincit virtute fortunam

(The wise conquer fortune through virtue)¹

The previous chapter described France's situation at the close of 1428. For Yolande of Aragon, circumstances were just as serious, if not more pressing; to avoid the annihilation of her House's fortunes, she needed to regain her influence over her son-in-law and ensure that the army and loyal territories reunified under his banner. With Richemont effectively outlawed by Trémoille and Charles VII temporarily out of her reach, a shock tactic was required.

Yolande was not unschooled in the use of religious symbolism and patronage to reinforce her authority and power.² Her commissioning of manuscripts such as the *Fitzwilliam Hours* and her influence in the commissioning of the *Roban Hours* testifies to her understanding that patronage and the deployment of personal spiritual practices and piety were precision instruments of power. L'Estrange describes in minute detail Yolande's "situational eye" in framing her spiritual and literary patronage.³ I believe that what L'Estrange refers to as Yolande's "situational eye" or, in my terms here, her "contextual eye" was the determining factor in her pragmatic and targeted patronage of Joan of Arc. Yolande was acutely aware of Charles's state of mind and nocturnal spiritual exhortations for salvation. Beaucourt cites an image of Charles's mental state in 1428, as sketched out by the sixteenth-century Burgundian chronicler Guillaume Paradin. If it is to be believed, Charles felt that there was only one way out of his "existential" darkness:

And it would be no wonder if God had pitied this poor afflicted king,
in whom great frustration and temptation had so removed God's

spirit, that finding himself in such distress, witnessed him get up from his bed at night, dressed in his nightshirt, on his knees, praying to God, his eyes bathed in tears,⁴ recognizing that help and aid could not come to him but from Almighty God and the Lord of Hosts who exalts the humble and humbles the proud.⁵

France was in political darkness and the spiritual aspect of its condition was always bubbling away beneath the surface narrative. Transcendent lambency was what Charles craved, a guiding light from above, one that might redeem him from the political morass in which he found himself. If France needed “the help and aid which could only come from Almighty God and the Lord of Hosts who exalts the humble and humbles the proud,” it materialized in the most humble form of all—a pious country maiden from the eastern reaches of the kingdom, Bar-Lorraine, where René of Anjou had been established by his grandmother and mother some ten years before.⁶ In the period leading to the close of 1428, Yolande had deployed most of the political and diplomatic weaponry in her arsenal, with varying degrees of success and durability. When hope was extinguished, she was able to call forth a miracle of biblical proportions; serendipity brought Yolande and Joan together. France’s misery warranted Joan’s acceptance, and Yolande’s connections and spiritual practices eased her path.⁷

Yolande was held in regard not only by reason of her political acumen, her consummate diplomacy, and her fine intellect, she was also renowned for her deep and authentic piety. I have discussed the importance of and the role played by the friars minor in the realms of Aragon. Yolande’s devotion to Franciscans was practiced throughout her life, witnessed by her very personal association with the Cordeliers of Angers and by significant donations to their establishment. Luce concludes that the Angers establishment became the center of pious Franciscan propaganda.⁸ One of their number, her confessor, Guillaume Heraud, recorded a deposition given by Yolande on December 29, 1415—one she troubled to record in her own hand.⁹ It was destined to support the beatification of Jeanne-Marie de Maillé, her husband Louis II’s godmother.¹⁰

Luce details the way in which Yolande and her most aristocratic and influential *privadas* (preferred ladies-in-waiting) exercised their spirituality in an active way.¹¹ In addition to their respective Franciscan connections, the identities of Yolande’s spiritual companions merit mention due to their intricate and intersecting networks of status and influence: Jeanne Laval-Tinéniac, Lady of Châtillon¹²

(widow, respectively, of Bertrand du Guesclin, Constable of France, and Guy de Laval XII, Lord of Vitré, governor of Brittany), who, in 1396, established a convent of Cordeliers in Laval; Marie of Montalis, Lady of Montjean, who founded a convent of Observant friars minor in Cholet;¹³ and another Jeanne-Marie de Maillé,¹⁴ who, in 1428, inaugurated a third convent of Observants, approximately 45 kilometers from Poitiers. Moreover, the family connections of Yolande's *privadas* intersected with Angevin networks of political patronage as allies and vassals. With the work of these aristocratic lay benefactors guided by Yolande, the legacy of Jeanne Marie de Maillé and the active spirituality of Colette of Corbie, the heightened mysticism of the Poor Man of Assisi underwent a renaissance of sorts, igniting the spiritual practice of many who came under its influence. By the time Joan of Arc was attentive to her voices and planning her mission, Maine, Anjou, Poitou, and Touraine hosted, at the very least, six convents of Franciscan Observants in Laval, Bressuire, Cholet, Amboise, Fontenay-le-Comte, and the one founded by Jeanne Marie de Maillé outside Poitiers. All these convents were established and nourished by Yolande or the ladies of her household. The Cholet convent, founded in 1406, was considered the mother house of all the *Minori Observanti* convents established in France. In 1414, Yolande's maternal uncle, the cardinal-duke of Bar, established a Franciscan house in Varennes in the diocese of Reims. In the years immediately prior to or after Joan's appearance, Colettine houses in Moulins, Aigue-Perse, Castres, and Le Puy were jointly inaugurated by the houses of Bourbon and Laval and Colette of Corbie. To round off this discussion of a particularly Angevin-networked devotion to Franciscans, in 1431 René of Anjou facilitated Clarissan reforms to a monastery established in 1420 at Pont-à-Mousson.¹⁵ Support of Franciscan orders was not unique to the house of Anjou. Burgundy—first, through the offices of Blanche of Burgundy, Countess of Savoy (d. 1348) and, later, Marguerite of Bavaria, Duchess of Burgundy (d. 1423)—became closely linked to Colette of Corbie. Nancy Bradley Warren argues that

Saint Colette was mobilised in [a] politicized propagandist fashion by Jean sans Peur, duke of Burgundy. In 1414, after an unsuccessful Burgundian attempt to retake Paris, outright civil war resumed between Armagnac and Burgundian forces. The Armagnacs enjoyed a string of military success throughout the spring and summer of 1414; Jean's duchess Margaret and their children were reportedly menaced at Dijon and Rouvres by enemy soldiers. In June of this turbulent summer, perhaps partially in recompense for Colette's intercessory

prayers that reportedly helped save Margaret and the Burgundian heirs (and perhaps to gain support in an important time at a time when his power was in jeopardy), that Jean granted to Colette, who already through her lifetime had a reputation for sanctity and enjoyed considerable local popularity, a disused arsenal at Poligny to found and order of her convent there.¹⁶

It is worthwhile to recall the context of this Burgundian initiative; Jeanne Marie de Maillé died in April 1414 and the inquest into her sanctity was initiated in Tours very soon afterward. Perhaps Burgundy, through the offices of Duchess Marguerite, had tumbled upon a handy local foil to the Angevins' saintly godmother, Jeanne-Marie de Maillé. Burgundy was still smoldering over the return of his daughter Catherine by Louis II, and emasculated by the king of Sicily's ascendancy and burgeoning hegemony on the royal council. Warren stresses the idea that "[the Burgundians]... rode the rising tide of [Colette's] cult, tapping into her popularity to cultivate goodwill for themselves among the townspeople – a goal in which the House of Burgundy was perennially interested."¹⁷

Apart from an inherent preference for Observance, there was a further very strong political motivation for this flurry of Franciscan inauguration by Yolande and her networks during the early part of her personal reign: the kingdom of Naples, where Franciscans had always played a leading role.¹⁸ First, Benedict XIII and, later, at the time of Constance, Martin V protected the rights of *Observanti*, who sought various reforms to their existing structure. It was Martin V who confirmed Louis III's pretensions over Naples, ensuring that he was the adopted son and heir by Giovanna II on June 21, 1423. Neapolitan Franciscans employed every tactic in their preaching armory to ensure that Alfons V of Aragon would not emerge victorious in the peninsular kingdom. Bernadino da Siena (the Apostle of Italy),¹⁹ Giovanni da Capistrano, and Matheo Cimarra were all Observants who undertook a crusade of predictions aimed at undermining Aragon and favoring Anjou. Bernardino preached that the Holy Name of Jesus be invoked against the Anti-Christ. The popularity of this new manifestation of Christian devotion quickly spread. Bernardino's disciples, Capistrano and Cimarra, added an important modification of their own design to his message: the Holy Name of Mary. The two names were henceforth joined in Franciscan devotions, and new convents sprang up in Sicily dedicated to Santa-Maria-de-Jesus. Having survived charges of heterodoxy, Franciscan mendicants, newly inspired by Bernadino's victory over his detractors—the Hermits of Saint Augustine and the

Dominicans—took to the road from June 1427 to propagate devotion to the names of Jesus and Mary.²⁰ Sigeric, archbishop of Canterbury's map of the pilgrim route from Canterbury to Rome in 990, a route still in use in 1429, shows it passes by Joan's home ground.²¹ Franciscan mendicants, newly inspired by Bernardino's vindication, would have traversed Domremy-Greux and its environs, spreading the gospel of the need to venerate the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary. The mantra Jesus–Maria was repeated by Joan of Arc in her missives, on her standards, and in her spiritual observance.

Puella terrificatos,²² or Franciscain Pallas-Athena?²³

Whole forests have been sacrificed to the enigma and *gestes* of the Maid. This is exceptional if one considers that her active “career” spanned barely 15 months from its genesis in the marches of Lorraine and Bar to her capture in Compiègne. Although Joan of Arc made an undeniable impact upon the fortunes of Charles VII, prudence and objectivity demand that her activities and influence recover a degree of contextual perspective. By way of contrast to Joan's short but brilliant career, Yolande of Aragon's personal influence and active stateswomanship endured more than four decades. Hope had been exhausted by the time of Joan's felicitous arrival at Chinon in March 1429. The English were poised to overrun loyalist France, and Charles's nobles were tearing each other apart over petty disputes and personal advantage. Charles was considering exile to either Spain or Scotland, and he no longer rode at the head of his troops with the archangel Michael at his shoulder as he had done early in his dauphinage. His most loyal and effective generals were bogged down in Orleans and his constable was in disgrace, waiting for an opportune moment to reenter the fray. Charles's grand chamberlain Trémoille seemed disinclined to rally troops to his cause, occupying himself instead with court intrigues and the enlargement of his considerable fortune; French morale had reached an all-time low.

In his *Commentarii*, Pius II records France's disarray, its disunity of purpose and lack of morale, which precipitated and informed Joan's appearance. The most interesting part of his lengthy recollection of her mission is his final observation that he cannot affirm whether Joan's mission was a divine work or one of human invention: “*Divinum opus an humanum inventum fuerit difficile affirmaverim*” (Whether her career was a miracle of Heaven or a device of men I should find it hard to say).²⁴ Patrick Gilli claims that Pius's comments concerning

Joan indicate his Italian “gallophobie.”²⁵ Although Gilli makes some valid arguments concerning Pius’s (lack of) appreciation of Charles VII and his successors, I am not so confident that Pius’s observations regarding Joan’s mission can be so easily dismissed. Florence Cragg posits that while Pius’s account “is uneven and impressionistic . . . inaccurate in certain details, Pius writes [of Joan] with a critical detachment mixed with admiration and wonder.” The events Pius records “took place only a few years before he himself went to France as a secretary of Cardinal Albergati; [and that] the rehabilitation of Joan . . . occurred in the pontificate of his predecessor, Calixtus III.”²⁶ His “gallophobia” notwithstanding, Pius II, the humanist, historian, and reformed rake, no doubt had his reasons.²⁷ He was, by all accounts, pragmatic, worldly, and no sufferer of fools. Pius might have been channeling the opinion of Jean II Jouffroy, bishop of Arras, later his cardinal of Santi Silvestro e Martino ai Monti and abbot of Saint-Denys, who, in defending Burgundy’s reputation in 1459, had this to say about Joan’s emergence:

A pretended miracle burst forth, skilfully proclaimed and rashly credited. One must conclude that someone important exploited with talent the tactic of employing this young girl to galvanize downtrodden and impotent hearts. There is nothing of the miraculous in any of this . . . as Caesar opined, rumor swiftly becomes proven fact. It is of little utility to attempt to disprove this tissue of muddled historical falsehoods.²⁸

Of secondary interest is that Jouffroy acted as Yolande’s grandson, Louis XI’s negotiator in Rome in matters concerning the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges and Anjou–Lorraine’s unextinguished claim to the kingdom of Naples.

Joan’s family was neither excessively rich nor destitute, and this allowed it to stay in contact with both the prosperous and the needy. Through their various connections and relatively elevated social position, the Arcs had dealings with people of every estate and were well informed as to the progress of the war and France’s misery. The major thoroughfare traversing Domremy followed an ancient Roman route between Langres and Verdun, passing not only through Domremy but also through Neufchâteau, Vaucouleurs, Void, Commercy, and Saint-Mihel. Many travelers made use of this well-established highway, including pilgrims of all estates—notably Colette of Corbie, the great Clarissan reformer—as she traveled between her houses in Flanders and those she had established in greater Burgundy.²⁹ Given the location of the Arc residence, much of this diverse traffic would

have passed by its threshold. The Arcs lived along one of the most frequented thoroughfares in the east of the kingdom and would have been remarkably well informed of happenings in every sphere of life far beyond the confines of Domremy. Joan benefited from a relatively comfortable childhood, informed by piety in the Franciscan tradition absorbed through the influence of her mother and her mother's familial connections.³⁰ The Fourth Lateran Council convened in November 1215 by Innocent III, issued a capital decree *omnis ultrisque sexus*, which demanded that all the faithful, having attained the age of discretion, were obliged to participate in the sacrament of penitence at least once a year. Trial testimonies make it clear that, for Joan, confession, penitence, and communion were regular spiritual nourishments, not annual obligations. An inclination for frequent confession and communion is characteristic of Franciscan piety, and Nullification trial documents reveal the depth of Joan's Franciscan sympathies and connections.³¹

Joan witnessed the first of her apparitions, Saint Michael, in the summer of 1425 when Yolande and Richemont had just managed to regain their influence over Charles.³² The first vision coincided with an impressive victory at Mont Saint-Michel. The importance of this rare French victory should not be underestimated; news of it was greeted throughout loyalist France with much the same level of rejoicing as would the lifting of the siege of Orleans in May 1429. An English victory would have crowned its conquest of Normandy and totally demoralized Charles's supporters. Yolande's personal chaplain, Frère Raphaël, influenced the development of the cult of Saint Michael in the wake of this French victory.³³ From the second half of the Hundred Years War, Saint Michael was adopted by the house of Valois as its personal patron and protector, as much a political symbol as a religious one. Saint Michael was the commander of the celestial militia and the French crown was at war with England, partisan of the militant dragon-slayer Saint George since the fourteenth century, and particularly venerated by Henry V and his family during the fifteenth.³⁴ From the end of the fourteenth century, pilgrimages to Mont Saint-Michel had steadily grown in prestige and importance.³⁵ Since the English had taken possession of Saint-Denis, France's royal abbey, and the *oriflamme* in 1419, Charles had directed his prayers for salvation to his chosen celestial intermediary, Saint Michael, painting the image of the archangel on his standards.³⁶ There is also to be considered the October 1422 "miracle" of La Rochelle where Charles was spared a mere ten days before the death of his father Charles VI, when the storey upon which he was

presiding collapsed, killing and maiming many of the assembled. Charles was pulled from the rubble relatively unharmed. A miracle was proclaimed and Charles decreed that a mass be celebrated each October 11 at Mont Saint-Michel in gratitude for his miraculous survival. Charles became the idol of his loyal subjects, and news of the miracle would have reached Domremy by early 1423. It is hardly surprising therefore that Saint Michael materialized to the adolescent Joan as her celestial guide and mentor.³⁷

For a little over two years, from the summer of 1425 until the autumn of 1427, Joan's voices maintained a relatively unhurried discourse with her, urging her to be a good, obedient, and devout daughter and to prepare herself to serve her Creator and her king.³⁸ This period of measured seraphic guidance coincided with a period of comparable calm beyond Domremy. In Joan's part of the world, René of Anjou's struggles in the continuing war of succession over the duchies of Bar and Lorraine had reached a period of tranquil stalemate. On January 13, 1425, Charles II of Lorraine reaffirmed his intention to designate his daughter Isabelle and her husband René of Anjou his universal heirs, disabusing his nephew Antoine of Lorraine, Count of Vaudémont and Sire of Joinville,³⁹ of any remaining illusions he might have held concerning his expectations. Charles II added insult to Antoine's injury by inviting him to renounce his pretensions to the Lorraine succession.⁴⁰ Vaudémont played for time, suggesting that he could make no such affirmation until he had consulted his lords and friends, to receive their counsel. His lords and friends were the dukes of Burgundy and Bedford; the implied threat in his response would have been palpable to the duke of Lorraine, who responded by sending a third missive to his nephew and commanding his forces to stand ready for hostilities.⁴¹ Contemporaneously, Robert of Baudricourt became a companion-in-arms and friend of René of Anjou. They agreed that any attack on one was a personal attack on the other and reacted accordingly.⁴² This should be recognized as a primary political and personal connection between the fountainhead of Joan's mission and Yolande of Aragon's intricate networks. Joan's father too shared a link with his overlord Baudricourt by virtue of his position as *doyen* (senior representative) of Domremy. Baudricourt, captain of Vaucouleurs and friend of René of Anjou, would dispatch Joan to Chinon and into the queen of Jerusalem and Sicily's welcoming embrace. As the situation worsened at home and in Orleans, Joan's voices started to become more insistent and strident. Their instructions developed a precision hitherto not experienced by the young visionary. They instructed

her to seek out Baudricourt, René of Anjou's comrade-in-arms, and demand that he organize an armed escort to accompany her to Charles to unify his army and place him firmly on the throne. The persistence of her voices, by this stage, appearing at her side two or three times per week, coupled with Antoine de Vergy's determination to seize Vaucouleurs for the Anglo-Burgundians, and with its surrounding islands of loyalist partisans such as Domremy-Greux, pushed Joan to resort to covert means by which to put her plans into action. She sought the help of an elder cousin by marriage, Durand Lassois, who lived in Burey-le-Petit, a tiny village near Vaucouleurs.

Without rehearsing details of Joan's first encounters with Baudricourt around mid-May 1428,⁴³ at the time of her first appearance, Baudricourt could allow himself a little levity in dismissing her summarily.⁴⁴ Vaucouleurs was, for the moment, safe from the Anglo-Burgundians who had turned their attentions elsewhere. Money was short on their side, and they could ill-afford to spread themselves too thinly. A few days before Joan's initial appearance, Baudricourt had left his troops in the service of René of Anjou.⁴⁵ Disillusioned, but defiant and determined, Joan's plans were put on hold while the people of Domremy sought refuge in Neufchâteau during the second half of July 1428 when Vergy initiated a second expedition against Vaucouleurs. Joan's fortnight stay in Neufchâteau was the turning point in the launching of her mission, what follows below represents the broad strokes of her politico-religious journey.

The Neufchâteau Cordeliers enjoyed patronage from the rich and powerful of the region. Their monastery was founded in the middle years of the thirteenth century by Mathieu II, Duke of Lorraine. Marguerite de Joinville, mother of Antoine of Vaudémont (René of Anjou's great rival), Charles II, Duke of Lorraine (René's father-in-law and Antoine's uncle) and Pierre V of Bourlémont, Lord of Domremy and Greux, had all endowed the monastery—one which operated as the heart and hub for Neufchâteau, where assemblies of the bourgeoisie were held in its chapter house.⁴⁶ The friars of Neufchâteau were fervent supporters of Charles VII and, like Yolande's network of Cordeliers in Anjou and those in Tours, they were remarkably proactive in disseminating propaganda to advance his cause.⁴⁷ Luce outlines their most effective practices, uncovered during his research into a register found in the *Chambre des comptes de Bar*. The Neufchâteau Cordeliers made a habit of living in perpetual contact with the people of the town, never passing up an opportunity to be out and about when things were happening, whether sacred or profane. The notes in the register deal specifically with the sale of

pious keepsakes; crucifixes, images of Francis, and, probably, monograms of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.⁴⁸ At the time of loyalist France's great misery, these Franciscans appear to have been conscious of an ideal opportunity to reinforce a particularly Franciscan devotion to Jesus and Mary. Contact with these Cordeliers probably cemented Joan's belief in her-soon-to-be-realized religious and patriotic undertaking. They would have boosted her morale and her faith; with their contacts all over the kingdom and beyond it, including at Yolande's courts⁴⁹ and the courts of Bar-Lorraine, Franciscans smoothed the way for Joan and established the foundation propaganda for her legend.

Misery multiplied in Domremy-Greux upon the Arcs' return from Neufchâteau. The urge for Joan to act must have become irresistible, her voices ever more insistent, the prospect of delivering France an intoxicating ideal ripe for commission. Yet, Joan seemed to be under instructions not to undertake her mission until a "heaven-sent" moment on the religious calendar had arrived. Perhaps the Neufchâteau Cordeliers had counseled her to wait; one cannot know for certain. It does seem, however, that her subsequent actions were more organized and coherent. She did not attempt to visit Vaucouleurs again until early 1429. It was a propitious moment: Orleans was under siege, with the English threatening Anjou-Maine as never before; Baudricourt, though neutralized by Vaudémont, still clung to Vaucouleurs; and Lent was fast approaching.

Joan reappeared in Vaucouleurs in early January 1429—a time when Baudricourt feared an offensive from his Anglo-Burgundian rivals, and was more than ever in need of the continued support of René of Anjou, who was himself finding himself more tightly wedged, largely as a result of his multiple allegiances. He was duke of Bar, heir *jure uxoris* to the duchy of Lorraine, and Yolande of Aragon's son, carrying loyalty to his sovereign Charles VII—his brother-in-law and childhood companion. Despite their struggles against Vaudémont, Bar and Lorraine had been obliged to swear allegiance to Burgundy and, by extension, to Henry VI. Bedford had been pressing René to swear fealty to Henry VI for his territories in Bar. René avoided confronting this issue until late 1428, when calls from Bedford became more strident.⁵⁰ The epistolary traffic between René and Baudricourt (who needed his armed support), René and his father-in-law, Charles II of Lorraine, and René and his uncle Louis, Cardinal-duke of Bar, must have been unrelenting as they all sought to draw the best outcome from an unstable political situation. If one adds the near certainty that René maintained

epistolary contact with his mother Yolande, it would be disingenuous to suggest that any of these players would have been unaware of Joan's reappearance in Vaucouleurs and of her intention to set out for Chinon as soon as possible.

In his deteriorating situation, Baudricourt sought advice from René of Anjou and subsequently modified his attitude toward Joan. Tisset confirms that Baudricourt "was in regular contact with Louis, Cardinal of Bar, and René of Anjou, Duke of Bar."⁵¹ Tisset, however, does not reflect upon a probable connection between Joan–Baudricourt–René–Yolande. Although there are no extant missives to support this connection, what happened next is suggestive; Joan was summoned to Nancy to appear before the duke of Lorraine, Anglo-Burgundian partisan and René's father-in-law, ostensibly to offer a "cure" for his ailments.⁵² Someone close to the duke must have petitioned him to receive Joan and, in all probability, that someone would have been René of Anjou—informed of the young visionary by his friend and ally, Baudricourt. René attended the interview with Louis of Bar.⁵³ René had left his garrison position at Saint-Mihel at the end of January 1429 to join Charles II in Nancy. On the eve of his departure, he sent a letter to Baudricourt.⁵⁴ Joan later admitted that, during her interview with Charles II, she did not emphasize her mission but requested that he grant leave to his "son" René to accompany her to Chinon, promising in return that she would pray for his good health.⁵⁵ Charles II did not grant her request, sending her on her way with a safe conduct, a horse, and a handful of coins to defray the cost of her visit.⁵⁶

The currency of Joan's myth was growing; she had spent time with the Neufchâteau Cordeliers, reappearing before Lent in Vaucouleurs, her insistence to be heard all the more urgent. Baudricourt verified her spiritual credentials during a visit, satisfying himself, yet departing without committing himself either way. At the time of her convocation to Nancy, and in anticipation of an imminent departure for France, Joan was preparing for a pilgrimage to a site dedicated to Saint Nicholas—patron of Lorraine, travelers, pilgrims and children.⁵⁷ Given that the king's brother-in-law René, the cardinal of Bar, and the duke of Lorraine had all consented to an audience with Joan, Baudricourt might have been advised to take Joan's claims seriously. Lent had begun and Joan's impatience to leave could not be suppressed. Unable to contain herself any longer, on February 12, the day of the massive defeat near Orleans that came to be known as "*la journée des Harengs*,"⁵⁸ Joan sought out Baudricourt, stressing that Orleans's only hope lay with her.⁵⁹

A deposition unearthed by Quicherat, recorded by an eyewitness to Joan's arrival in Chinon, the mayor of La Rochelle Hugues Guibert, describes the habit or uniform assembled for her.⁶⁰ His description describing the colors selected for Joan's traveling kit reflect an Angevin preference for gray and black. René of Anjou's household officers and archers were monochromatically liveried in shades of black, gray, and white. Françoise Piponnier has this to say about the "uniform" of the second house of Anjou: "For all personnel who fulfilled the many varied functions in his service, the king [René] regularly furnished the same type of clothing; robes of black and above all grey, frequently extending his generosity to occasional servants or to foreigners."⁶¹ Given the closeness of Baudricourt and René, one might argue that Joan fell into the category of "occasional servant" to the Angevin House of Bar. Baudricourt sent Joan on her way on February 23, 1429.⁶² To reach Chinon, the travelers had to traverse Anglo-Burgundian territory; therefore, travel was mostly undertaken by night. Their first stop, some 50 kilometers from Vaucouleurs, was the abbey of Saint-Urbain-lez-Joinville, where its abbot, Arnoult d'Aunoy, a relative of Baudricourt, had been alerted to their arrival.⁶³ The only other extended stop on the 11-day journey was in the duchy of Touraine at Saint-Catherine-de-Fierbois, where Joan reportedly heard three masses in one day and wrote to Charles VII requesting permission to enter Chinon, on the understanding that she had a great many things to tell him, promising that she would be able to recognize him from a crowd of others.⁶⁴

Toward a New Jerusalem: Saints, Swords, and Sacrifice

The duchess of Touraine was Yolande of Aragon.⁶⁵ At Saint-Catherine-de-Fierbois, Joan entered Angevin territory and the protection of the "*royne de Jherusalem et de Sécille*." Like many of her time, the young visionary was probably in awe of the mystical associations of Jerusalem and the heroes of the Crusades with the house of Anjou.⁶⁶ The Angevins were fiercely proud of their association with the kingdom of Jerusalem, and Yolande had added the prestigious arms to the posthumous shield of her father-in-law, Louis I of Anjou, in 1425 when she was reinforcing her power base in Charles's court.⁶⁷ From 1425 onwards, in cementing her ascendancy and spiritual purity at Charles's court, Yolande was consciously proactive and concerned with emphasizing the cachet of her titles, associations, and multilayered familial connections—none more existentially significant and desirable than "*royne de Jherusalem et de Sécille*."⁶⁸

While a merely titular association such as this might seem odd to us, it is of great significance to Yolande's life and times. Yolande's parents possessed exquisite copies of *Mandeville's Travels*,⁶⁹ the central theme of which was that "as both the central site of salvation history and the eschatological end of the Christian cosmos, the city of Jerusalem [in *Mandeville's Travels*] prompts a holistic conception of the world in textual space."⁷⁰ For Mandeville, "Jerusalem presents a synecdoche of the world at large. It both figures as an actual place and as the potentiality of an actuality that cannot be achieved."⁷¹ For Yolande, with her interest in the Apocalypse of St. John (with its message of the creation of a new Jerusalem from the rubble of Babylon) testified to by the images in the *Fitzwilliam Hours*, which she commissioned⁷² and the great tapestry of the *Apocalypse*, which came to her upon the death of her husband, the association with Jerusalem on her arms and seals was a potent adjunct to her established prestige as an *infanta* of Aragon and a princess of France. Of further interest to Yolande's history is that *Mandeville's Travels* was a source for the magnificent *L'Atlas Català*, wherein Jerusalem is charted likewise at the center of the world. The *Atlas* was commissioned by Yolande's father Joan, Duke of Girona, later king of Aragon, at the request of the king of France to whom he offered it as a gift.⁷³ This gift appears to have coincided with his marriage to Violant of Bar, entering into the collection of Charles V in 1380.⁷⁴ Moreover, Violant brought a copy of *Mandeville's Travels* to Aragon in her wedding trousseau in 1380—a gift from her cultured and literary mother, Marie of France.⁷⁵ Associations with Jerusalem and the idea of "*beata stirps*," a holy lineage, was all part of the program of propaganda essential to the achievement and maintenance of power and authority. Adherence to this abstraction was something the houses of Aragon and the contemporaneous houses of Anjou had in common.⁷⁶ So too was the imperative to emphasize the place of saintly dynastic women in a queenly house.⁷⁷

Joan of Arc's spirituality was very much influenced not only by her mother and priestly uncle, but more specifically by Franciscan Observants whom she had ample opportunity to encounter throughout the years of her adolescence, and once her mission had commenced. Yolande's spiritual preferences, those of her children and connections, interlocked with Joan's, rendering Yolande's support for her inevitable once the usual checks and balances were made. Yolande understood that unity was the key to France's survival and her house's future; Joan was purpose-built to unify Charles's subjects against the English invader. From the time of Alain Chartier's 1422

Quadrilogue Invectif,⁷⁸ when the three ladies “*Clergé*,” “*Noblesse*,” and “*Paysannerie*” were exhorted by the misery of the fourth, “*La France*,” to put aside their quarrels and petty grievances and unite to resist the invader, Franciscans and Carmelites had tramped the countryside preaching this particular message of solidarity and resistance, later adding a deep veneration for the names and images of Jesus and Mary. To enhance and invigorate their message of salvation, many preachers cited the prophecies of Merlin, focusing upon the upcoming salvation to be delivered by a maiden from the “*bois chesnu*” (oak wood) on the frontiers of Lorraine. These prophecies were invoked by Joan before her departure for Chinon. From the time of his father’s death, Charles VII had been praying feverishly for a miracle and deliverance, testified to by his frequent pilgrimages to Le Puy and elsewhere. Charles’s wife Marie and *Bonne-mère* Yolande had tilled and prepared the ground by the time of Joan’s appearance. They had received letters from René of Anjou citing the appearance of a “*bergerette extraordinaire*” (remarkable shepherdess),⁷⁹ originating from the marches of Lorraine; all that was required of Charles was that he stand firm and prepare himself for the coming miracle.

Joan was not groomed from childhood to become a “secret emissary” of the house of Anjou. Rather, my sense is that Yolande was extremely adept and strategic at pulling positives out of largely negative circumstances, and that she possessed an acutely developed “situational eye” when it came to patronage—whether it was political, cultural, and/or religious.⁸⁰ Joan, a subject of her son René and his father-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, appeared out of nowhere, convinced that France’s salvation could only be achieved by her with the guidance of her celestial interlocutors. Her narrative was constructed out of the hopes of Charles VII’s desperate subjects by an intricate network of Franciscan supporters stretching from the east of the kingdom to Yolande’s Cordeliers in Anjou. Charles VII had given up hope, French morale was almost nonexistent, and something extraordinary was required to stem the downward spiral and inevitable defeat at the hands of Bedford and Burgundy. Like Philippe Contamine, I entertain a degree of skepticism as to the depth of support for Joan forthcoming from Yolande and the house of Anjou. For Contamine, Yolande’s contribution was “*modeste et épisodique*.”⁸¹ While Yolande might not have been the instigator of Joan’s mission, it does not follow that she did not welcome her appearance and smooth her path. Patronage of Joan suited Yolande’s political and strategic agenda, at least until Joan started to interfere in the politics and diplomacy of bringing the war to an end.

Three days after Joan's arrival in Chinon, she was summoned to Charles's presence. No simple retainer escorted Joan to the waiting assembly: she was introduced by Yolande's vassal and loyal ally, Louis I, Count of Vendôme.⁸² Joan picked out Charles VII from a crowd of onlookers, verifying her first claim.⁸³ This had the hoped-for impact upon Charles and those willing to believe in Joan's good intentions. Notwithstanding her positive reception, prudence demanded that Joan be thoroughly examined.⁸⁴ Joan was arrayed in male attire, so her sex and claims to virginity needed to be verified. This was performed under the watchful eye of Yolande, assisted by Jeanne de Preully, wife of Raoul de Gaucourt, governor of Orleans, and Jeanne de Mortemer, wife of Robert le Maçon, Yolande's lieutenant in the absence of Richemont.⁸⁵ Yolande reported the findings of this intimate investigation into Joan's physical credentials to the royal council.⁸⁶ The deliberations and investigations into Joan's bona fides moved to Poitiers⁸⁷ and, after some 15 days, Joan received a favorable outcome and was allocated a very specific task.⁸⁸

Rather than a military command, Joan was to be placed at the head of an armed escort of supplies destined for Orleans.⁸⁹ This was a realistic proposition for there was no shortage of able generals. There was, however, a paucity of morale, unity, and fresh produce. Added to the equation was Trémoille's general lack of enthusiasm for Joan's mission and Regnault of Chartres's view that they proceed with caution. Their resistance did not appear to have disconcerted Yolande and might have suited her. On or around March 24, Charles and Joan left Poitiers bound for Chinon.⁹⁰ Her legend was not yet in full flower, but, for some 15 days, Poitiers had become increasingly excited by Joan and her mission. Although she had not achieved a single material victory, she had already rallied and unified Charles's subjects. Yolande's patronage of her newest protégée had been well-targeted. Joan's departure from Poitiers, given by the ocular witness to the historian Jean Bouchet, bears this out.⁹¹ The *Chronique de la Pucelle's* account backs up Bouchet's understanding of Joan's departure from Poitiers and the impression she made upon the assembled Poitevins.⁹²

Joan left Charles in Chinon and moved on to Yolande's temporary headquarters in Tours, hostilities having forced the queen of Jerusalem to decamp provisionally from Angers-Saumur. Her Tourangeux subjects had petitioned her protection against Ferrando of Seville, leader of a Spanish band of mercenaries who had been pillaging the region. She sold her plate and paid him half the ransom demanded of 2,500 gold crowns for his cooperation, on the understanding that he would

lend his support to the besieged in Orleans. Yolande then turned her attention to the preparation of the supply and reinforcement convoys destined for Orleans.⁹³

While Yolande was thus occupied, Charles set about equipping his martial visionary with banners, standards, armor, and horses; he also ordered that a battle sword be prepared for her. Bonnie Wheeler observes that “swords identify, authorize and authenticate medieval warriors in fact and legend.”⁹⁴ Joan declared that she had been instructed by her voices to seek out a very particular sword buried behind the altar of the sanctuary chapel at Saint-Catherine-de-Fierbois. Her armorer was dispatched to Fierbois with a letter from Joan addressed to the guardians of the pilgrimage site, a deeply venerated sanctuary, where newly liberated men-at-arms deposited their armor and swords in thanks for their freedom.⁹⁵ It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that there would have been no shortage of suitable swords with venerable associations in the keeping of the sanctuary. Furthermore, Saint-Catherine-de-Fierbois was the staging point for several contemporary miracles on or around the time of Joan’s appearance.⁹⁶

Joan’s Rouen judges were very interested in her stay at Saint-Catherine-de-Fierbois, and the subsequent retrieval of the sword from behind its altar.⁹⁷ Joan and her voices/counsel understood the emblematic cachet of a sword with provenance and/or mythical and spiritual associations. It was not only the mythical sword, but also its scabbard that was said to have powers of healing; injuries stemming from blood loss could not kill its bearer. Joan subsequently confirmed that she had at least three scabbards—two ceremonial and one strong and practical.⁹⁸ At the time of the retrieval of Joan’s sword, a rumor was in circulation that it was the sword of Charles Martel who, in a moment of macro-historical consequence, halted the Islamic conquest of western Europe on a battlefield between Poitiers and Tours on October 7, 732. Joan was in Tours when she sent for the Fierbois sword. Charles Martel was the grandfather of Charlemagne (owner of the legendary sword *Joyeuse*), who secured Europe for Christianity by the cross and the sword. What better pedigree could a weapon possess? Others held that the sword had actually belonged to Louis of Orleans, assassinated by Jean sans Peur in 1407; and the house of Orleans had a special place in Joan’s heart and prayers.⁹⁹ Yolande had spent more than a decade emphasizing her son-in-law’s legitimacy to rule, citing their dynastic links to St. Louis of France and Charlemagne. Joan invoked both names in her

pleas to Charles to accept her credentials.¹⁰⁰ The Fierbois sword was just another feature of a legend actively propagated regarding Joan and Charles. The sword made perfect sense and meshed very neatly indeed with the indispensable public relations aspect, some would say spin-doctoring, of Yolande's patronage, ably seconded by her Franciscan beneficiaries.

A further clue as to Yolande's thinking might be discerned in the invocation and occurrences of Saint Catherine herself. I mentioned earlier that Violant of Bar's baptismal name was actually Catherine, but that she was universally referred to as Yolande/Violant.¹⁰¹ Saint Catherine was Violant's patron, who she revered deeply, commanding at least one exquisite *portapau* ("peace-carrier") of Saint Catherine chased in gold and silver and studded with precious gems.¹⁰² The *Fitzwilliam Hours*, most likely produced between 1415 and 1418 at Yolande's commission,¹⁰³ contains a folio depicting a princess or young queen being presented to the Virgin by her patroness Saint Catherine.¹⁰⁴ The clothing of the young woman was altered after 1442, adding the livery and arms of Isabel Stuart.¹⁰⁵ It is reasonable to posit that the kneeling princess was either Yolande of Aragon as a young woman or her daughter, Yolande of Anjou, to whom she gifted the manuscript upon her marriage to the heir of Brittany in 1431. In keeping with the preferences of her mother whose name she shared, Saint Catherine was probably one of Yolande's spiritual patrons. In 1401, newly arrived in France, Yolande of Aragon stood as godmother to Catherine of France, youngest daughter of Charles VI and Isabeau of France.¹⁰⁶ A subsequent illumination in the manuscript portrays a woman in black, either a widow or a nun, kneeling before an altar.¹⁰⁷ It has been suggested that this is the "widow of Anjou," Yolande of Aragon. It appears much later than the Saint Catherine illumination, perhaps suggesting some degree of continuity in the minds of the commissioner and the Rohan workshop. Michael Camille's thesis is that the Saint Catherine figure on f° 20r was painted over an original figure of Saint Radegund, who features strongly in other sections of the *Fitzwilliam Hours*. Saint Radegund was important to Yolande; not least because she was also known by the variant Saint Aragon.¹⁰⁸ While, in all probability, Yolande's patron at her birth was Saint Catherine, by the time of the commissioning of the *Fitzwilliam Hours* (c. 1417), the widowed Yolande, with responsibility for the dauphin as well as her own children, might have felt that Saint Radegund/Aragone, patroness-queen-protector of the Franks, had more to offer her in terms of spiritual succor—a template for the next phase of her life (both familial and political)—and

as an asset to boost her secular prestige and authority. Significantly, Radegund was obsessed with Jerusalem, repeatedly sending her servants there in her quest for authentic holy relics, notably the first piece of the True Cross to make its way to Europe.¹⁰⁹ The Saint Catherine figure is shown presenting a young queen/princess to the Virgin, this is consistent with a narrative that speaks of a young woman being presented by her patroness to the Mother of the Savior. Saint Radegund, on the other hand, functions well as a patroness for a mature queen-widow of Jerusalem-Sicily with multiple responsibilities and expectations. In 1425, the first daughter born to Charles VII and Marie of Anjou was baptized Radegund (d. 1444); the next two daughters born to them were baptized, respectively, Catherine (d. 1446) and Yolande (d. 1478).¹¹⁰ At the time of Radegund of France's birth in 1425, Charles VII's *Bonne-mère*, his own queen-patroness Radegund/Aragone, had been striving in his interests for over ten years.

The Saint-Catherine-de-Fierbois sword raised suspicions in the minds of Joan's Rouen judges, who sought to determine whether it held magical/heretical qualities for Joan and whether she herself had blessed it or had it blessed. Perhaps they should have emphasized instead its existence as a propaganda tool for Joan's patrons and supporters for, like most other fifteenth-century politicians and advocates, they were well acquainted with the effective deployment of rumor, propaganda, and "spin-doctoring."¹¹¹ Letters and "*bulletins d'information*" widely circulated by Charles's chancellery before the lifting of the siege of Orleans round out the official aspect of a concerted information offensive to "sell" Joan's credentials as a metaphysical/spiritual complement to the military campaign to unify and liberate France. This officially sanctioned public relations enterprise consisted of the findings of the Poitiers inquest, Joan's "*lettre de défi*" to the English and an anonymous poem in Latin lauding Joan's bona fides and vocation, presenting her as "the white Maid sent by God."¹¹² The Italian merchant Pancrazio Giustiniani wrote a letter in May 1429 recounting that Joan had so effectively withstood the interrogation of the theological masters in Poitiers that, in the eyes of many knights, she was undoubtedly "*una altra santa Caterina che sia vegnuda in tera*". (another Saint Catherine come to earth).¹¹³ Cordier observes that the public information campaign regarding Joan infiltrated the kingdom and beyond to an astonishing degree, citing evidence from, among other places, Brittany, the Dauphiné, Tournai, Strasbourg, Mayence, and German sources uncovered by Lefèvre-Pontalis.¹¹⁴ Such propaganda was essential; the whole purpose of the

“Pucelle” phenomenon was to rally support, unify, and lift morale on the French side and demoralize the English invaders and their allies on the other. Charles’s foreseen victory demanded unity and the approbation of God. In 1415, Henry V had claimed that his victories against France were a clear judgment on France’s sins. In the *Mistère du Siège d’Orléans*, the character Dieu states that France’s misery is a “*malediction celeste/pour leur vie faulse et debonneste/es François principalement;/et vueil que on les admoneste/que pugniz seront grandement!*” (a celestial malediction/for their false and dishonest life/and principally the French;/and willed it that they be admonished: that they be greatly punished!).¹¹⁵ Not only was Joan’s mission intended to unify Charles’s subjects, it focused upon legitimizing Charles’s rule.¹¹⁶ Life in medieval Christendom was saturated with religious representations; no action or thing, regardless of how ordinary it might be, was immune to the constant attempt to assign a faith connection to it.¹¹⁷ For Joan and Yolande’s contemporaries, it was all about faith; disbelief was frequently suspended, especially in times of crisis, as *quid pro quo* for longed-for salvation.

The news of Joan’s imminent appearance in Orléans most certainly reached the ears of Yolande’s uncle, the aging cardinal of Bar. Ever conscious of his tenuous sovereignty, and fearing for René’s inheritance, he sent letters to René’s chancellery at the beginning of May to confirm an agreement between Bar-Lorraine, rendering homage and obedience to Bedford for the county of Guise.¹¹⁸ Bedford, later issuing a list of lords loyal to Henry VI, names René of Anjou, with the bitter observation that his loyalty was distinguished by his prompt infidelity whenever circumstances presented themselves for a return to Charles’s cause.¹¹⁹

The legend was in place, the costume and props were prepared; Yolande was in Blois with Alençon overseeing and financing final preparations for the supply/reinforcement convoy destined to raise the siege and morale of Orléans. There was no particular urgency for supplies because the English hold over Orléans was perforated; people were able to come and go from the city, if not entirely at their leisure, then with no great hardship. They might have been bored with their daily bread, but they were not starving. The convoy had not been assembled hastily as a result of Joan’s appearance, it had been long in the planning, and it formed part of the hearts and minds campaign of which Joan was to be standard bearer. Alençon’s testimony confirms this; both he and Dunois (the Bastard of Orléans) agree that they had been instructed by Charles to join Yolande in Blois

to prepare the supply convoy for its imminent departure.¹²⁰ Yolande had funded and prepared the convoy; the great lords and officers of the crown—most her vassals and allies¹²¹—were assembled in Blois to lead it and Joan of Orleans. The convoy strategy used for the liberation of Orleans is identical to the one deployed by Richemont in the liberation of Montargis in 1427 and discussed earlier.¹²²

*“Ab aliquo qui plus saperet”*¹²³ (Cannier than the Rest)

Joan of Arc has been lauded for liberating Orleans militarily, but her actual achievement was to win the hearts and minds of her own people, unifying them beneath her standard and, therefore, Charles’s, rather than personally routing the English from Orleans. Despite the forced absence of Richemont, Charles’s generals were equal to the task of raising the siege once the necessary conditions were in place. It was hoped that the victory would attract the attention of Burgundy, tempting him to uncouple his destiny from Bedford’s and reopen negotiations with Charles. In the absence of the duke of Orleans, Charles’s generals and the city of Orleans had been in contact with Burgundy to solicit his support against the English. This is in keeping with the strategy of negotiation that had been ongoing for many years between Charles-Yolande and Burgundy with the support of their intermediaries Brittany and Savoy. Poton de Xantrailles, one of the Bastard’s lieutenants, accompanied by representatives of the Orleans’s bourgeoisie, sought out Burgundy and Jean of Luxembourg, returning to Orleans around April 17, 1429.¹²⁴ Xantrailles succeeded in his mission as recorded in the *Journal du Siege d’Orléans*:

On this occasion, he [Burgundy] sent his trumpet with the ambassadors, who by his authority commanded all those in his obedience from his lands and cities, who were engaged in the siege, that they go and depart, and no longer cause harm in any manner to those of Orleans.¹²⁵

Burgundy, who was at the time *“pas content”* with Bedford, called off his troops, leaving the English at a critical numerical disadvantage.¹²⁶ To a preexisting strategy of military action, furious diplomatic activity, and Burgundy’s volte-face were added celestial intervention and divine legitimization of Charles’s right to his throne. Under such circumstances, Joan and the generals could not have failed.

We need to identify who was in control of this operation and who was there to rally the faithful behind one unifying banner. Joan

was not given the command; she was ignorant of the route to be taken from Blois to Orleans. Charles's lieutenant was the Bastard of Orleans, the duke of Orleans's half-brother, and he worked closely with an able and trusted war cabinet whose meetings were held without Joan's participation. Joan only participated at one royal council meeting on July 10, 1429, during the siege of Troyes, and it was Yolande's stalwart Robert le Maçon who suggested Joan be called into the meeting to give her "advice." By way of contrast, Yolande was mentioned as being present as an official and primary "*conseiller*" during a minimum of 28 trimestres. Gaussin attests:

The presence of women on Council was something exceptional; two out of 282 [named], and again, for one of these as we have seen, Joan of Arc, it consists of a single presence. The other female 'counselor' was Yolande of Anjou, Duchess of Anjou, mother-in-law of the king; an authentic counselor. An exception which does not prevent the affirmation that, at this period in France, officially at least, women did not fulfil a political role.¹²⁷

The description of Joan's triumphant entry into Orleans contains all the elements of a well-staged spectacle fashioned to draw maximum value from the reaction of its witnesses.¹²⁸ This was not the discreet but much anticipated arrival of a new general, but rather, as the *Journal du siège* expresses it, her appearance affected those present so profoundly that they might have been in the presence of "*Dieu descend[ur] entre eulx*" (God descended among them). The twenty-first-century skeptic in me reads Joan as a *dea ex machina*—a plot device that suddenly resolves an apparently insoluble problem. The "Joan effect" surpassed all expectations—she did not arrive alone but in the company of their great general (and son of Louis of Orleans), the Bastard of Orleans. She was met at the treasurer's mansion "*à très grant joye*" (with very great joy) by her brothers and Vaucouleurs companions. She was arrayed in full martial regalia including spurs and mail—an un-knighted knight and an un-beatified saint. Their fearless adversaries were passively observing events, despite the fact that Joan's procession with its accompanying great torches must have attracted much interest both inside and outside the city walls. From the hands of Yolande of Aragon, Joan was delivered to the Bastard of Orleans and into the care of the duke of Orleans's treasurer—one of his highest-ranking servants. Joan was an ambulant *oriflamme*¹²⁹ of inestimable value.¹³⁰ This is not how Joan perceived herself; she believed most assuredly that she was France's only hope of victory,

God's chosen military envoy. Cordier makes the well-established point that Joan was largely excluded from the deliberations of the Bastard's war cabinet.¹³¹ Cordier elaborates by positing that, while Joan was omnipresent on the field of battle, her actions were precipitated by her emotions, her natural impulsiveness, underscored by "*une impavidité étonnante chez une jeune fille*" (an astonishing fearlessness in a young girl),¹³² which had an undeniable impact upon the morale and courage of her party. Joan inoculated Charles's forces against fear and pessimism and established herself as France's new *oriflamme*. Mathieu Thomassin claims that "*Aucunes fois [Joan] l'appeloit "Tauriflambe"*" (On certain occasions Joan referred to Charles as the "oriflamme").¹³³ Clearly, Charles's potential as an *oriflamme* for his demoralized subjects had burnt out well before Joan's appearance, and it was for this reason that she was vital to his cause. By May 8, 1429, the English had been shamed and driven from Orleans, and Joan's "sign" witnessed. Joan departed the city to seek out her "*gentil dauphin*" in Yolande's city of Tours.¹³⁴

Windecke does not specify other participants in his description of this post-Orleans encounter between Charles and Joan. Yolande was last heard of in Blois; Orleans achieved, she probably returned to her temporary capital Tours. Blois, a possession of the duke of Orleans, was quite close to Tours, and Yolande traveled to and from the cities as required. From the moment of Joan's "home-coming," all parties started to take her credentials as a leader more seriously. While the approach to her nascent leadership was still marked by prudence, Joan started to play a more active role than had been hitherto envisaged. She was no longer merely a spiritual mascot; she had started to attract the constituency of the most powerful captains and generals of the realm. Windecke describes the decision of the royal council regarding its next move; Yolande, Joan, and God carried the day. Alençon and others wanted to liberate territories to the north from English occupation. But, with the spiritual and political capital accrued from the raising of the siege of Orleans, it was decided that Joan would lead Charles to Reims to have him crowned and anointed.¹³⁵ This was not mere gesture; Burgundy's support for the English had wobbled in Orleans and English morale had plunged, providing a tiny chink of opportunity for the wise to exploit. In the interest of a long-anticipated negotiated peace with Burgundy, for which Yolande had striven since her return from Provence in the summer of 1423, symbolic credit arising from a coronation in Reims on the heels of the Orleans victory was worth pursuing. The campaign for

the Loire and the march to Reims was initiated by a string of easy successes for Charles. Richemont gathered together his closest allies and readied himself to reenter the scene. Gruel reports the presence of many troops drawn from Yolande's garrisons, perhaps suggesting that she and Brittany had decided that it was time for the constable to reappear.¹³⁶ Richemont had followed Joan's progress along the Loire; on June 15, Charles's forces took the bridge at Meung and lay siege to Beaugency, and it is here that Richemont determined to intercept her and plead for a return to the king's good graces.¹³⁷ His request was refused by Charles, and a messenger sent to communicate his response to his constable. The messenger, however, was one of Yolande's vassals, Bertrand la Jaille, son of Tristan IV la Jaille, who had been one of Yolande's most trusted counselors and personal envoys. He capitulated in the face of Richemont's determination and goodwill.¹³⁸

Richemont stood his ground while Trémoille quit Chinon to seek refuge in his city of Sully, taking the wise precaution of ensuring Charles accompanied him. Trémoille must have suspected Yolande's hand in Richemont's reappearance, and he had countered by dispatching one of her vassals to head off the constable.¹³⁹ His plan, however, backfired, for it seems that Jaille read the situation from Richemont's perspective. His son, Pierre de la Jaille, was Richemont's squire at the time, eventually moving into the service of René of Anjou. Trémoille's tactic of sending one of Yolande's own to head off her constable and humiliate her did not succeed; he did not take into account sufficiently the family networks embedded in her patronage of loyal vassals and allies. It was an absurd state of affairs for all concerned; Joan and Alençon had received orders to stop Richemont rejoining Charles's army¹⁴⁰—an ironic situation given he was Charles's constable and, therefore, commander-in-chief of all his forces. Joan accommodated Yolande's military stalwart.¹⁴¹ Cosneau makes the point that Richemont's strength of arms was too great an advantage to ignore in the wider scheme of things, and he was welcomed back into the fold by Charles's generals on June 16, 1429. The *Chronique de la Pucelle*, most likely penned by Jean Juvénal II des Ursins around 1456, describes a very formal reunification of Richemont with Charles's army, implying that Joan had the power of a royal pardon, which might or might not have been the case.¹⁴² Perhaps Yolande, Richemont, and their allies were testing the limits of Joan's influence over Charles. Joan obliged the lords present to affix their seals to Richemont's oath of fealty,¹⁴³ in direct

contradiction to Trémoille's position. Yolande's party unified, with Trémoille, for the moment, in defensive mode decamping to Sully until he could devise and implement a counterstrategy to neutralize Richemont and suppress Yolande's influence over Charles. Many have alluded to Yolande's authority over Charles and the role she played in the recovery of France. The "unscientific" but frequently apposite Jules Michelet had this to say about the origin, recruitment, quality, and relatively modest circumstances of Charles's most effective counselors:

Now, if one wishes to know who secured their positions [as counselors], whose influence rendered him obedient to their counsel, one finds, if I am not mistaken, it was a woman, his mother-in-law, Yolande of Anjou. From the start of this reign, we see her prowess, it was she who welcomed the Maid, it was with her, on one occasion, that the duke of Alençon agreed on the preparations for the campaign. This influence, balanced by that of [Charles's] favorites, seems to have been unrivaled.¹⁴⁴

Trémoille was right to fear Yolande's reinvigorated ascendancy over her son-in-law. If we believe Juvénal des Ursins, Gruel, and others, Yolande and her allies became more visible and proactive with Joan's appearance. With Charles momentarily in the thrall of his celestial intermediary, all that Trémoille could hope to achieve was to distance Richemont and Yolande from victories in the Loire campaign and the march to Reims for Charles's coronation, underpinning his efforts with a strategy to undermine Joan's standing and credibility as soon as the occasion presented itself. Richemont, Joan, and the royal army turned their attention to Beaugency-Meung, where they emerged victorious over the English,¹⁴⁵ who in this defeat not only lost their strategic positions, but also their reputation as invincible adversaries—their confidence in their superiority and prestige, which in the past had been the source of their courage.¹⁴⁶ This was the real strength of Joan's mission: her ability to rally the French, simultaneously demoralizing the English. It would seal her fate at the hands of her enemies, who would show her to be fallible, besmirching her character, and diminishing her achievements with the odor of heresy.

In the wake of this victory, Trémoille kept Charles firmly sequestered in Sully, working to undermine Richemont's participation. Joan, Alençon, and other powerful lords sought an audience with Charles at Sully where they implored him to bring back his constable. They

met with stony refusal; Charles and Trémoille wanted nothing to do with Richemont.¹⁴⁷ Trémoille succeeded in overthrowing the will of Charles's army to accept Richemont's return and temporarily quarantined Yolande's influence by isolating her military auxiliary.¹⁴⁸ Gruel's account includes the claim that Charles would rather refuse his crown than take Richemont back. This might have convinced the constable (and Yolande) to swallow his pride for the greater good of the kingdom. Having succeeded in removing Richemont from the march to Reims, "*dont il fut très grant dommage pour le roy et son royaume*" (which was a great loss for the king and his kingdom),¹⁴⁹ Trémoille threw his support behind the march to Reims and was confident enough to ensure that neither Yolande nor Charles's queen, Marie of Anjou, pregnant with Catherine of France, participated in the coronation, citing the dangers of the campaign. Both queens had intended to attend, the *Journal du Siège* recording that the admiral of France, Louis de Culant, presented himself to the queen because he and many others were under the impression that he would escort her to the coronation. They departed for Gien where councils were held, which concluded that the king would send Marie back to Bourges.¹⁵⁰ The Berry Herald posits that Trémoille had blocked the participation of Richemont, his allies, and others because "Trémoille feared that they would assume control of the king or otherwise displease him."¹⁵¹ Trémoille seems not to have considered the possibility that René of Anjou would appear at Reims, and probably believed that Charles of Anjou was too young or too preoccupied with affairs in Provence, in the absence of Yolande, to be a credible threat to his influence.¹⁵²

Charles of Anjou had convoked Provençal estates for May–June 1429 in the face of Aragon's continued territorial and maritime threats. Yolande, while very deeply implicated in the affairs of France, still concerned herself with the defense of Provence-Forcalquier. Notwithstanding this, it is likely that funds raised for the defense of Provence were funneled north for the defense of France during Joan's mission, "*par mandamant de la reyna, nostra sobeyrana dama*" (by order of the queen, our sovereign lady).¹⁵³ In May–June 1429, Charles of Anjou was sent north to France at his mother's behest, funded by the generosity of her Provençal subjects. Zurita confirms that France petitioned the help of Aragon during this period: "*del socorro que se pidió al rey por el rey de Francia; y las condiciones con que se le ofrecía*" (help requested of the king by the king of France; and the conditions in which it is offered).¹⁵⁴ This assistance was nominally for the defense of Normandy and Guyenne, where Richemont had gained traction

against Bedford.¹⁵⁵ Aragon agreed to help in return for the honoring of Aragonese claims over Carcassonne, Belcaire, and Montpellier. These territories abutted Provence-Forcalquier; Zurita names Jorge de La Tramulla (Georges de La Trémoille) in the negotiations. Provence-Forcalquier would have been well aware that, once Alfons V had control of these territories, they would face the resumption of aggression by Aragon. Trémoille would have encouraged such mischief-making against the interests of Yolande of Aragon—his potent adversary on the royal council. She must have found herself in an extremely uncomfortable position—welcoming Aragon’s assistance in support of her son-in-law’s struggle to regain his kingdom while fearing reprisals from her cousin and eldest son’s nemesis, Alfons.

At around the same time, Bedford felt it politic to restate the terms of the Treaty of Troyes and buttress Burgundy’s loyalty. A piece of political theater was staged in Paris on July 15, 1429, for the benefit of Burgundy and a population discomfited by Joan’s victories.¹⁵⁶ Burgundy pledged a significant fighting force to Bedford’s cause, but was unable to deliver it because his Flemish and northern Picard subjects flatly refused to serve their duke “*hors de leur pays*” (beyond their borders) and against French forces, in accordance with a strict observance of feudal law.¹⁵⁷ Troyes and Châlons, having received Burgundy’s instructions, resisted Charles, refusing him immediate entry.¹⁵⁸ Charles’s council was divided and the march to Reims was in danger of falling apart when the name of the Franciscan Frère Richard is invoked by the *Journal du Siège* and, in almost the same breath, Robert le Maçon’s, in an attempt to move the march forward.¹⁵⁹ When morale teetered and determination wavered, Angevin loyalist Robert le Maçon was on hand to play the “Joan card,” ensuring that her credibility, mystique, and the spectacle she provided would rally flagging commitment. Joan unified Charles’s troops and impressed her adversaries with her dazzling performance. As for Frère Richard, he appeared rather conveniently in Troyes; he had been present in Orleans prior to Joan’s arrival,¹⁶⁰ having decamped hastily from Paris at the end of 1429 due to concerns regarding his allegiances and the huge popularity of his sermons. Apparently, he was not an entirely respectable religious: “*ce fust ung très bon preudhomme, mais il estoit venu sorcier*” (he was a very good worthy man, but he became an enchanter).¹⁶¹ When Charles encountered difficulties with its city officials, Richard reappeared in Troyes. Richard was delegated by the bourgeoisie to meet with Joan and to exorcise her if necessary. For her part, Joan took Richard *cum grano salis*, diminishing his importance during her Rouen testimony.¹⁶² Whatever her personal feelings regarding Richard, Joan “held

her nose” and allowed him to lead them into Troyes and to act as her messenger to the bourgeoisie of Châlons.¹⁶³

While Bedford was maneuvering in various ways to halt Charles’s progress to his coronation,¹⁶⁴ Charles’s army pushed on, encountering little resistance once Joan came into view at the head of an impressive entourage from cities and towns nominally loyal to Burgundy and Bedford.¹⁶⁵ Bedford and Burgundy were unable to move sufficient forces to block Charles’s entry into Reims, but their envoys, the lords of Chastillon, Saveuse, and L’Isle-Adam, did their best, arriving with an impressive escort prior to Charles’s arrival in an attempt to forestall him.¹⁶⁶ Before Joan’s appearance, Charles had all but given up hope of ever ruling his kingdom. Joan was the catalyst to ensure the success of the greater enterprise: Yolande’s masterplan to establish Charles as France’s rightful king. Yolande had groomed her son-in-law for this from his adolescence, championing Joan in no small measure, to buttress his credentials as a credible sovereign after the unhappy rule of his father, Charles VI. Joan had placed Charles firmly on the route to his coronation. He had emerged victorious thanks to well-targeted diplomacy in the wake of a string of unexpected military successes—largely a result of Joan’s presence—proving himself worthy of his subjects’ support.¹⁶⁷ The moment for which Yolande had worked finally arrived: the legitimization of her son-in-law as king of France. Although she and Marie were excluded from the coronation, the *Journal du Siège* suggests René of Anjou’s direct participation.¹⁶⁸ Irrespective of the presence or absence of Angevin princes, Yolande and Marie probably took satisfaction from the description of events contained in a “*lettre des trois gentilshommes angevins [Pierre I de Beauvau (Yolande’s seneschal), Moréal and Lussé] A la royne et à la royne de Secile, nos souveraines et très redoutées dames*,” dated July 17, 1429, from Reims on the evening of Charles’s coronation.¹⁶⁹

Whether Louis III of Anjou was present or not is of little importance; that he had been recalled by Yolande in the face of the massive (and ruinous) investment and diplomacy expended by his mother to underwrite his Italian campaign demonstrates her determination to guarantee Charles’s throne and secure her grandson Louis’s inheritance; for her, this was a family undertaking. Yolande, Richemont, and Marie might have been sidelined by Trémoille, but René of Anjou definitively reentered Charles’s party at the time of his coronation.¹⁷⁰ Having spent the early days of July with his father-in-law, Charles II in Metz, René energetically renounced his contractual allegiance to the Anglo-Burgundians 15 days after Charles’s coronation.¹⁷¹ By this act, René tied himself to his brother-in-law’s destiny. It was a decision that

would not be without consequences for him in his struggles against Vaudémont. René returned to assist his mother, sister, and brothers in their combined familial push to ensure that Charles VII was recognized as the rightful sovereign of France. Joan wanted Charles's army to turn its attention to the liberation of Paris, but, post-coronation, pragmatic heads in Charles's party reopened negotiations with Burgundy.

Charles's progress through the Loire and his coronation in Reims got things moving for France's cause—stirring up emotions and reactions in both camps. Propaganda burgeoned on all sides, with many of Joan's contemporaries believing that her appearance could only be described in terms of paranormal phenomena.¹⁷² For loyalists she was "*l'Angélique*," inspired by God and His Mother. In a stinging missive dated August 7, Bedford denies Charles's legitimacy to rule accusing him of using shameful methods to secure his victories and coronation, which seduced and abused the ignorant. Bedford excoriates Charles for his association with superstitious and reprehensible individuals such as "*une femme desordonnée et diffamée, estant en habit d'homme et de gouvernement dissolu*" (a woman of disorderly and infamous life, dressed in man's clothes, and of immoral conduct), and a Franciscan "*frère mendicant, apostate et sédicioeux*," (apostate and seditious mendicant friar)—both of whom, according to Holy Scripture, are abominable to God.¹⁷³ Bedford was keen to secure her capture to neutralize her charisma, impact, and influence. For the moment, however, she was of value to Charles's cause and protected by him and his *Bonne-mère*. This despite Trémoille's best efforts to undermine her influence over Charles, and Regnault of Chartres's deep suspicion of her motives and connections. The balance between military action and furious diplomatic activity defined the conduct of the Hundred Years War. Yolande's ventures in both of these areas have been discussed in earlier chapters, particularly, diplomacy—a sometimes short-lived strategy but a cost-effective way to achieve a positive outcome or, at the very least, allow time to regroup forces and streamline strategies. Then as now, wars were expensive undertakings to be avoided wherever possible. Many commentators and chroniclers of Joan's eventual capture at Compiègne have laid the blame for inaction firmly at the feet of Trémoille and Regnault of Chartres. However, Yolande's preferred strategic option was to arrive at an understanding with Burgundy, to work to detach him from Bedford's cause through the intermediary of third parties such as Brittany and Savoy. While Trémoille's objective was to stall Joan's progress and with it Angevin influence, Yolande probably believed it politic not to object too strenuously while others (regardless of their

motivations) attempted reconciliation with Burgundy. Perhaps she felt it viable to exploit Trémoille's rancor against Joan while simultaneously supporting her efforts, through the active involvement of her sons René and Charles in her military campaigns. Yolande pragmatically adopted a watching brief; her younger sons had thrown their effort behind the military objective to liberate France, which she had, in part, funded from her own resources, but if diplomacy succeeded, so much the better for Anjou.

Notwithstanding the unlikelihood of a swift and peaceful settlement, Philippe of Burgundy sent his ambassadors to Reims to take soundings and to outline conditions under which an agreement might be contemplated. The ambassadors returned to their duke carrying another letter from Joan; she made the same request as the Bastard's ambassadors had successfully made prior to the raising of the siege of Orleans.¹⁷⁴ On the wave of optimism created by the coronation, it might have been believed that Paris could fall as easily as Orleans once Burgundy's support for Bedford had been removed. Burgundy knew that with the coronation came greater prestige for Charles as a legitimized sovereign. Philippe cannily grasped that all options needed to be kept alive, and it would have suited him to keep Charles dangling on the prospect of a durable peace after years of conflict. With Trémoille's brother, Jean, Burgundy's grand-master and grand-chamberlain, and Georges himself once attached to the house of Burgundy,¹⁷⁵ Philippe might have felt he had a foot in both camps. At this time, to all intents and purposes, the brothers Trémoille directed negotiations with Burgundy rather than the Anjou–Brittany–Savoy bloc, as had been the case in the recent past.

Joan remained skeptical of progress in negotiations, and on August 5 she responded to the Reimois who had sent to her, detailing their anxieties.¹⁷⁶ Joan's opinion and the fall-back position of Charles's chancellor, Regnault of Chartres, is laid bare in this missive. Charles's negotiators were pushing for a settlement while Burgundy hedged his bets and bought time, awaiting Bedford's next move. Bedford sent his abrasive letter to Charles regarding the coronation, making his position abundantly clear.¹⁷⁷ A fortnight's truce was accepted by both parties, with Burgundy's negotiators going so far as to promise to hand Paris to Charles upon the expiration of the truce. The fortnight truce expired and Paris still held for Bedford–Burgundy. Yolande's connections and Savoy were implicated in the continuing peace negotiations with Burgundy—the strategic trump card, played hard for by both sides.¹⁷⁸ Burgundy's ambassadors set up in Compiègne for talks with Charles's representatives—René of Anjou; the counts of Clermont and

Vendôme; Charles II, Sire of Albret (Trémoille's half-brother but an ally of Richemont); Regnault of Chartres; Robert of Rouvres, bishop of Séz; Trémoille; Christophe d'Harcourt, seneschal of Maine; the Bastard; Robert le Maçon; Gaucourt; and generals La Hire and Xantrailles. Of these, 7 of the 13 were Yolande's faithful; the Bastard had grown up in her household and supported her strategies; and Gaucourt's spouse, Jeanne de Preully,¹⁷⁹ was part of Yolande's household and he was Charles of Orleans's governor. Despite Trémoille's strenuous efforts to exile Yolande from the center of power, she maintained a directive voice within Charles's inner circle. Unfortunately for Joan, peace negotiations initiated with Burgundy would lead nowhere except to her eventual capture. Peace for their time was not the outcome of the Compiègne talks, but rather an extension to the existing truce for a period of four months from August 28, 1429, to Christmas, with Burgundy ensuring that Charles would be constrained from attacking Paris.¹⁸⁰ Bedford continued his bellicose stance, but did not engage directly with Charles's army, which divided into three forces: the first under the command of Alençon and Vendôme; the second under the captaincy of René of Anjou; and the third with Charles of Bourbon¹⁸¹ and Trémoille at its head. Charles's army emerged victorious and invigorated from a series of skirmishes—so much so that even Trémoille wanted a share in the glory.¹⁸² Joan was impatient to push ahead and, by August 23, accompanied by Alençon, she embarked upon a series of sallies, positioning herself closer to Paris in prelude to a definitive attack.¹⁸³ Inferior numbers and the possibility that Richemont's forces were present around Senlis determined Bedford to decamp for lower Normandy, where Richemont had been taking the offensive up to English-held positions, causing alarm.¹⁸⁴ On the day Joan arrived at Saint-Denys, Bedford left, leaving his chancellor, Louis of Luxembourg, in control of Paris, with Burgundy dispatching 400 men-at-arms and a considerable number of noblemen under the control of Marshal L'Isle d'Adam to support the defense of Paris.¹⁸⁵

Still involved in diplomacy, but placing an equal wager on the eventual outcome of the extended truce, perhaps even stress-testing the durability of Burgundy's allegiance to Bedford, Yolande's allies and Charles's army took the assault up to the boulevards of Paris.¹⁸⁶ The *Chronique de la Pucelle* makes mention of the crusading standard on the English side and the defenders' high-visibility along the walls of the Saint-Honoré gate where they deployed a mass display of standards as a visual riposte to Joan's colors.¹⁸⁷ While Alençon and Bourbon moved to redeploy and reinforce their cannons and culverins, Joan made a grave miscalculation.¹⁸⁸ She had wanted to keep up

the assault but night had fallen and she was injured—a morale booster for the English, but the French, not wanting to risk the safety of their sentient *oriflamme*, fetched her out of harm's way, protesting vigorously as she was carried to safety.¹⁸⁹ Hopeful of a positive result, the French, having retired to La Chapelle, planned to continue their assault the following day. Trémoille counseled against continuing the assault, while Burgundy dispatched a herald to remind Charles of the undertakings he had made to keep their truce until Christmas. Charles called off the Paris offensive and sounded the retreat.¹⁹⁰

Joan intended to push on regardless of her king's order.¹⁹¹ Cagny's account lays no specific charge of blame for Joan's failure at the feet of Trémoille and Regnault of Chartres; he details the context informing the retreat from Paris. It was René of Anjou and Charles of Bourbon who delivered the order to pull back to Saint-Denys and, while some might argue that this could have been a manifestation of Trémoille's desire to belittle the Angevins and their allies, it might also be read as a signal to Joan from the king, Yolande, and the royal council to take the order seriously. Cagny asserts that Charles's council met "*ouquel plusieurs oppinions furent dictes*" (during which several opinions were expressed), demonstrating that the debate might have been lively and that the council had not merely capitulated to Trémoille's will. From July to September 1429, Charles's council included at various times: Charles d'Albret; Alençon; René of Anjou; the sire of Argenton, Charles of Bourbon; Regnault; Culant; the sire of Cucé; Gaucourt; Gravelle; Harcourt; Trémoille; Guy de Laval; Robert le Maçon; Jean of Rochechouart, sire of Montmart; the sire of Mareuil; the sire of Montjean; Etienne of Montmoret; the Bastard; Gilles de Rais; Rouvres; the bishop of Orleans; the bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne; Jean of Sarrebrucke; Saint-Sévère; Jean Tudert; and the count of Vendôme.¹⁹² It not known which of these participated in the meetings described by Cagny, but while Trémoille might have been hard to contradict, there were other advisers with a voice from diverse backgrounds, including many associated with Yolande and Richemont. Joan was forced to fall in behind the decision to retreat from Paris, depositing with regret her armor before an image of the Virgin and relics at the abbey of Saint-Denys. In Cagny's words, "*Et ainssi fut le vouloir de la Pucelle et l'armée du roy rompue*" (And so was ruptured the goodwill between the Maid and the king's army).¹⁹³ Joan lost the support and companionship of her *beau-duc*, Alençon, who turned his attention northward.¹⁹⁴ He entered the service of Brittany and Yolande in an initiative to push Bedford out of their border territories. Alençon wanted Joan's presence to ensure

that the forces that had rallied behind her standard would fight for him on this new front. There was no way the dominant powers would allow for the possibility that Alençon and Joan might join forces with Richemont.¹⁹⁵ We should not discount the further possibility that both Alençon and Joan had become “loose cannons”: Joan because of her passionate commitment to the liberation of France on her terms, and Alençon in his own interests.¹⁹⁶ René of Anjou, in the company of his mentor, Barbazan (governor-general of Champagne for Charles VII), left to chase the English out of Champagne, later to be joined by the René’s staunch ally, Baudricourt.¹⁹⁷

Bedford continued to shower Burgundy with gifts and titles, naming him lieutenant-general in France for Henry VI, which gave him the guard and government of Paris and most English territories in France.¹⁹⁸ Joan simmered at the duplicity of Burgundy and her enforced inaction. She informed the visionary, Catherine de la Rochelle, whom she held to be a fraud, that there was nothing to be achieved in presenting herself to the duke of Burgundy to make peace, because she knew that peace could only be achieved at the point of a lance.¹⁹⁹ What is most intriguing about this exchange is that Catherine seems to have been put in Joan’s path by the ubiquitous Frère Richard, who had many interesting connections—including Angevin ones. Catherine employed a rather limp argument in her attempt to dissuade Joan from mounting an assault upon Charité-sur-Loire—that it was far too cold to contemplate such an offensive.²⁰⁰ Catherine was all for negotiation with Burgundy despite his rather patchy record on this front.

Trémoille dispatched Joan to Charité-sur-Loire to lay siege to it. The project foundered, collapsing into the medieval equivalent of a guerrilla offensive once the greater force had failed. According to Jean d’Aulon’s testimony, Joan appeared confused and disoriented.²⁰¹ Although Charité-sur-Loire was the beginning of the end for Joan, her mission had started to unravel outside Paris on the Feast of the Virgin, September 8, 1429. Joan returned to Charles, who offered her ennoblement, transmissible by both female and male lines. The official decree of this late-medieval equivalent of a “golden parachute” was co-signed by Trémoille and Yolande’s man, Robert le Maçon.²⁰² Joan was unmoved and aspired to further military glories while Burgundy resisted Charles’s overtures, having all but received the French crown from Bedford in return for his loyalty. Compiègne refused to capitulate to Bedford and Burgundy though they had reinforced and regrouped their forces following Charles’s departure from Paris. On May 6, 1430, Charles conceded he had been duped

by Burgundy, and the royal caravan moved to Compiègne to fortify it against the Anglo-Burgundians who were besieging it.²⁰³ Joan's return to military activity was met with trepidation in Paris and by the English. According to Georges Chastellain, however, her own party was overjoyed.²⁰⁴ Charles's *angélique* savior was soon to fall into the hands of the English—something she feared more than anything else. Joan displayed her valor and commitment to Charles up to and beyond her capture at Compiègne.²⁰⁵ Once captured, some sought to distance themselves from her by smearing her reputation and diminishing her piety. Joan was relinquished into eager English hands and her fate as a prized political prisoner to be tried in an ecclesiastical court and executed by secular authorities was sealed. Contemporary Anglo-Burgundian sources (c. 1430) outline proceedings in the case against the woman Joan, commonly known as La Pucelle:

The superior ordinance placed the woman sometimes called Joan who is commonly named Puella between the limits and borders of the dioceses and jurisdictions of our aforesaid bishop [Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Beauvais] for imprisoned military men arrested and captured. A true report was well-known in places, which is thoroughly appropriate to this woman forgetful of that grace that belongs to the female sex, of the steep descent into vagrant shame, of complete female shame, oblivious to a disgraceful habit fitting to the manly sex, disastrously and monstrously disgraceful to have, and as mentioned here above her presumption was being challenged, in agreement with and towards the Catholic faith.²⁰⁶

Abandoned by her party, Joan was martyred for her cause, her beliefs, and, above all, for her success in unifying Charles's army and undermining the morale of the English fighting man. Her reported final words were the recitation of the Holy Name of Jesus for whom she had lived and died. For Pius II, Joan's mission "is a phenomenon that deserved to be recorded, although after-ages are likely to regard it more with wonder than credulity."²⁰⁷

I have touched upon the networks and synergies that almost certainly led Joan to the queen of Jerusalem and Sicily. This chapter has outlined the ways in which these networks, the imperatives of the kingdom of France and the house of Anjou, ensured Yolande of Aragon's patronage of Joan and, to some extent, her protection of the young visionary from the eastern reaches of her son-in-law's realm. What was Yolande's pragmatic position in the face of Joan's decline and fall, and what, if anything, had Joan's crusade set in train?



CHAPTER 5

*EN LA FORET DE LONGUE ATTENTE:** RECOVERY AND REFORM

Joan and her supporters knew what would happen were she captured. For Bedford, Joan was initially, “a woman of disorderly and infamous life, dressed in men’s clothes, and of immoral conduct,”¹ and later, after her trial and execution, a “*Disciple and lyme of the Feende*,”² rightly punished for her transgressions and those of her party. Although there is no evidence attesting to Yolande’s reaction to Joan’s capture, trial, and execution, judging from her established pattern of behavior, she was a woman more than naturally in tune with the tide of events and the temperature of the people, refining her strategies to accommodate whatever direction the wind blew. With Richmont’s exile, Yolande continued to work toward unity; with Joan eliminated and pilloried, she resorted to other means to advance her projects, and her next responsibilities and hurdles would be still more challenging.

Even before Joan’s capture, Yolande had turned her attention to lower Normandy, where Richemont was campaigning against Bedford, and oversee, from a remove, the progress of René, Barbazan, and Baudricourt in Champagne. René was moving east with his allies under the leadership of his military chaperone, Barbazan, to test Burgundy’s authority and resources.³ Monstrelet relates that, after Joan’s trial and execution, loyalist France was bloodied but not broken, describing how Barbazan sealed Charles’s domination in Champagne replacing the Burgundian Antoine de Vergy as its governor.⁴ Joan’s epic, what had preceded it, and what followed it was a game of political brinksmanship, with the belligerents seizing the moral high ground in relation to their respective sovereigns’ rights to rule. Both sides strove mightily to retain or woo Burgundy to their opposing factions, exemplified by the letter Bedford sent to

Burgundy in eight-year-old Henry VI's name following Joan's execution.⁵ In this lengthy missive, Bedford flatters Burgundy, pounding home his message that theirs was the just and noble enterprise and that they alone were the true champions of the Church and guardians of the faithful in France; only their continued alliance would ensure France's salvation. Joan had been examined, "gently admonished," judged, and shown mercy by Church and university, but she had fallen back into sin and temptation, and legitimately dispatched to secular authorities who determined she be put to the pyre.⁶ Bedford's letter was copied and published widely to warn and correct the errors of those who had believed in *ladite Pucelle*.⁷

Gathering Threads, Pulling Strings

The tactic of divine intervention in the affairs of France—one that had delivered so much to Charles's party—was terminated and besmirched by Bedford, and Yolande was left to salvage something from the wreckage of Joan's accomplishments. She needed to shore up alliances, underwrite and oversee her sons' military exploits, and rid herself of Trémoille to recall Richemont to her service. Yolande had entered her fiftieth year and, like Charles of Orleans, she had been sequestered for decades "*en la forêt de Longue Attente*" (biding her time in a dark wood).

Yolande's most immediate concern was René, whose destiny was soon to be realized. By the third week of June 1431, he was in Varennes at the bedside of his ailing grand-uncle Louis, Cardinal of Bar, who died on June 23.⁸ Eventually securing Bar intact, René was faced with the death of his redoubtable father-in-law, Charles II of Lorraine; Yolande's early political maneuverings in the east of the kingdom had been realized. However, her initiatives created difficulties for René with Burgundy, Vergy, and Vaudémont, who had long had him in their sights. To the end of his life, Charles II persisted in his alliance with Burgundy, but René had broken formally with Bedford and Burgundy in the fortnight following Charles VII's coronation. Much in the manner of René's father, Louis II of Anjou, Charles II implored René never to move against Burgundy and his possessions if he wanted to live an untroubled and distinguished life, because his earthly salvation and happiness lay in friendship with his neighbors—the Burgundians.⁹ It was all very well for René's father-in-law to point out the advisability of harmonious relations with Burgundy, but Burgundy was the adversary of René's natal house and his brother-in-law, the king. Although René was duke of Bar

and of Lorraine, he was an Angevin prince whose house was bound inextricably to Charles VII's destiny. René could not contemplate re-allying himself with the Anglo-Burgundians—an alliance that had always presented him with headaches. Yolande had allotted his portion upon her return from Provence in the summer of 1423. Profiting from René's absence, Vaudémont resurfaced in René's capital, Nancy, in March 1431 bristling with the arms of Lorraine and the company of his supporters. Vaudémont's newest push for recognition as the rightful duke of Lorraine was provoked by the baptism of René and Isabelle of Lorraine's first-born son, Jean, who was styled heir-presumptive to the duchies of Bar and Lorraine.¹⁰ René's supporters stood their ground, and Vaudémont swore that he would soon be their duke.¹¹ The gauntlet had been thrown, and René was in no doubt as to the fragility of his position; Vaudémont refused to do homage for territory in Bar over which René held dominion; René declared war on April 14, 1431.¹²

In May 1431, as Joan was being prepared for execution by Bedford, René hurried to Yolande's capital Tours to seek the assistance of his brother-in-law, Charles VII, who had already deployed the bailiff of Vermandois to support René in his struggles against Vaudémont.¹³ Charles was as good as his word; he accorded René's request by detailing Barbazan to back René with armed force. Antoine de Vaudémont took René's lead and gathered together forces, which were joined in Joinville by supplementary Burgundian troops. They advanced toward Vaudémont and Nancy, devastating Bar and burning villages in their path. In Vosges, they received word that René and Barbazan had amassed an expeditionary force, and they prepared for coming confrontation. The Berry Herald records that René was well positioned for victory, but the "hot-heads" in his contingent overrode Barbazan's sage and experienced counsel not to give up their strategic position for the sake of a paltry victory over Vaudémont's inferior force.¹⁴ On July 2, 1431, at the Battle of Bulgnéville,¹⁵ René managed to snatch defeat from victory in the war for succession over Lorraine.¹⁶ Two days after this massive reversal in Anjou-Bar-Lorraine's prospects, Violant of Bar, Queen-dowager of Aragon, died in Barcelona. Yolande's politically active and exacting mother, who had done so much to prepare and support her daughter, was gone.¹⁷ René was a prisoner of Burgundy, who would not release him without penalty; and Yolande and her daughter-in-law, Isabelle of Lorraine, had to struggle hard for his release.¹⁸ With the death of Barbazan, Charles VII lost one of his most valuable military assets and his governor in Champagne.¹⁹ The Bulgnéville debacle was a strategic success for

Vaudémont and Burgundy, removing René and his loyalist influence in Bar-Lorraine and stalling Charles's ascendancy in Champagne. Even after his release, René found his authority and prestige as duke of Bar-Lorraine irreversibly diminished. Lecoy de la Marche posits that "this conflict was enlarged considerably by the number and quality of the allies on both sides; France's struggle against the Anglo-Burgundians continued in a new form."²⁰

Bar-Lorraine was not Yolande's only concern; she had Louis III in Naples to consider. On February 4, 1430, three months before Joan's capture, Louis was embedded in Italy, where, in the absence of Alfons V from Sicily and the deaths of powerful generals da Montone and Constable Sforza, power in Naples had fallen to Giovanna II's favorite, Gianni Caracciolo. He sought to distance from Naples the only other real contender for authority, Louis, appointing him captain-general of Calabria.²¹ Moreover, since Anjou turned away from Burgundy in 1413, Louis had been promised to Isabelle of Brittany; but, by February 4, 1431, one or the other party to the betrothal had cooled or had let things slide. Brittany sought to clarify matters or withdraw from the agreement by testing the temperature of Louis's enthusiasm for the match. Brittany's high-ranking envoys—Roland of St. Pou, his chamberlain and Grand Falconer, and Jehan Doguet, his "attorney-general" (*procureur-général*) and seneschal of Moncoutour and Guingamp were sent:

To the duke of Savoy to negotiate the marriage of his highness the count [François of Brittany] with [Marguerite],²² daughter of the said duke, and from there to Rome to the pope to assign my said Lord, two "dismes" [tenth parts of revenue] and treat other matters, and thence to the king of Sicily in Italy to sound out his intentions concerning his marriage to madam Isabelle of Brittany.²³

By October 1, 1431, François's sister, Isabelle, was preparing for a marriage, but not to Louis.²⁴ A document dated December 2, 1431, describes a significant raise in status for a son of the house of Laval. On the same day, Guy de Laval was accorded 50,000 gold crowns on the occasion of his marriage to Isabelle of Brittany.²⁵ Guy was the grandson of Jeanne of Laval-Tinéac, Lady of Châtillon, and Yolande of Aragon's influential *privada*. Members of the Laval clan were counselors of long standing to the house of Anjou. No account remains as to why the Breton-Angevin betrothal was dissolved, but the document verifying that Brittany had taken care to send his ambassadors to Italy to test Louis's commitment to Brittany as well as his own

French territories would suggest that Louis was likely to spend the rest of his reign in Italy and Provence—geopolitically closer to Savoy than its counterpart Brittany. Given the bellicose pretensions of his relatives, the Penthièvres, Jean needed an able and devoted son-in-law *in situ* as an effective auxiliary to his own efforts and those of his heir, François. Brittany increased Guy's rank, treasury, and territorial holdings to fashion him into a husband of appropriate rank for the daughter of a duke and a princess of France.

Breton archives reveal the activities and whereabouts of people important to this period. A letter dated February 22, 1431, demonstrates that Richemont was part of his brother's council, witnessing documents with his niece's new husband, the count of Laval.²⁶ The document that precedes it was established between Trémoille and Jean V; it is a mandate signifying the dispatch of Breton hostages to Chinon in advance of Trémoille's visit to Brittany.²⁷ Richemont was installed at his brother's court in the company of Guy, the duke's son-in-law, while Trémoille prepared to journey into hostile territory.²⁸ From the evidence of the conditions demanded and received, Trémoille did not wish to be ambushed by Richemont in unsympathetic places. The embassy headed by Trémoille was sumptuously arrayed, and he was accompanied by the warrior Xantrailles; Yolande's Robert le Maçon; and Guillaume, sire of Argenton and the dauphin Louis's tutor.²⁹ They halted at Champtocé in the arrondissement of Angers, on the frontier of Anjou and Brittany, to confer with Jean V and Laval. It was agreed that Guy would support Charles's forces by covering the border territory of Anjou and Maine, the cost to be met by Brittany.³⁰ Whether the issue of Richemont's return was discussed is not recorded but, upon his return to Charles waiting in Yolande's favored capital, Saumur, Trémoille reinvigorated his offensive against the forces and territory of the exiled constable. Audaciously in Charles's name, Trémoille confiscated dower territories from Richemont's wife, the duchess of Guyenne; moved the court to Poitiers from Saumur; and arrested Richemont's and Yolande's loyal allies—Louis of Amboise, Antoine of Vivonne, and André of Beaumont³¹—successfully prosecuting them for the crime of *lèse-majesté*. Vivonne and Beaumont were decapitated and Amboise's lands and revenues confiscated.³² This was Trémoille's response to the reemergence of Yolande's influence and initiatives to return Richemont from the political wilderness; Yolande turned to Brittany for assistance.

Despite the abrogation of Louis III's betrothal to Isabelle of Brittany, Yolande did not let her ties with Brittany disintegrate, and

in this she was to once again prove herself more pragmatic and prudent than her elder son. She, more than Louis III, remained constant to the task bequeathed to them by Louis II—to work toward a lasting rapprochement with Brittany, who held the key to the reestablishment of unity between the great houses of France and to France’s ultimate salvation.³³ On March 14, 1431, a significant document was established at Redon, barely three weeks after the departure of Trémoille in the company of Guy of Laval; a “*contrat du mariage entre François de Bretagne et Yolande d’Anjou*” (a marriage contract between François of Brittany and Yolande of Anjou). Maneuverings had taken place to terminate the negotiations between Brittany and Savoy for the hand of Marguerite of Savoy. They were not, however, without rancor on the part of Louis III:

And by virtue of this treaty, and engagement of marriage, it is affirmed, negotiated and promised that if any displeasure or ill-will exists on the part of the said queen or the king her son and other children, for the cause and occasion of the marriage made by Madam Isabelle of Brittany, elder daughter of my said lord of Brittany, to my lord of Laval, towards the said lord of Laval or others because of this, all is regretted, effaced, cleared away and reversed, and in being satisfied, without remorse or displeasure, flinch from taking against the said lord of Laval or his line, or others because of this, and in giving the said queen and king their letters, contiguous with the form contained in the minutes of these matters, and which have been given on behalf of the my said lord, the duke, the said letters will be conveyed on the day of the said nuptials with the agreed allocation.³⁴

The unabridged document emphasizes the strength of past affiliations and the constancy of the alliance between Yolande and Jean V. Reynaud claims that it was Louis in defiance of Yolande’s will, rather than Brittany, who had torn up the marriage agreement officially negotiated between the two houses in 1424, positing that the rupture of the engagement is proof of the fact that “*la déchirure de la tissu familial [entre Yolande et Louis III] est sensible à cette date de 1431*” (the rending of the family fabric [between Yolande and Louis] is palpable from 1431).³⁵ However, even a cursory examination of the 1431 contract above stipulates that it expunges any lingering ill-feeling and smoldering discontent on *Louis’s* part arising from Isabelle of Brittany’s marriage to Guy XIV of Laval. Louis did not breach his promise; Reynaud pretends that the dissolution of the 1424 agreement caused a falling out between mother and son, citing as her proof Louis’s ire at the betrothal of his younger sister, Yolande of Anjou, to

François, heir-presumptive of Brittany. Instead, Louis was matched with and betrothed to Marguerite of Savoy, who had been sounded out for François of Brittany—a pragmatic solution for all concerned. Reynaud errs in positing that “*en 1431, au detriment du mariage Breton et contre la volonté de Yolande, il opte pour l’union avec Marguerite de Savoie*” (in 1431, to the detriment of the Breton marriage, and against the will of Yolande, he opted for a union with Marguerite of Savoy).³⁶ Reynaud overlooks that Marguerite was put forward first for as a dynastic match for François of Brittany. Someone needed to work to “uncouple” that couple before Louis could proceed with his very desirable Savoyard union. One doubts it was primarily Pierre de Beauvau “*procureur du roi*” (king’s attorney); it is more likely that Yolande and Brittany had negotiated this solution. Although Pierre de Beauvau might have acted as Louis’s attorney in his betrothal arrangements, he was Yolande’s “man” of long standing in both Anjou–Maine and Provence–Forcalquier.³⁷ Despite the solid outcome, the road to it must have been a bumpy ride for Yolande and Brittany; in letters from Consenza in Calabria and San Marco in Lamis, Louis revoked his proxy from the canon of Le Mans to negotiate the marriages of his sister, Yolande, to François of Brittany, and his youngest brother, Charles of Anjou, to Marguerite,³⁸ daughter of Alain IX, Count of Rohan, expressing his disapproval in the strongest of terms.³⁹ Louis had other plans for his younger siblings, particularly Charles, whose proposed match might not deliver much in terms of political gain for his Italian ambitions.⁴⁰ Reynaud believes that Louis’s actions indicate that “*malgré son éloignement, [Louis] marque son opposition à la politique matrimoniale de sa mere, et sa volonté d’être le seul maître des décisions*” (despite being far removed, Louis signaled his opposition to his mother’s marital politics and his will to be the sole master of decisions).⁴¹ This might have been the theoretical case, but it was Yolande who was burdened with keeping the fortunes of Anjou healthy for the benefit of all its dependents. Reynaud herself observes that, from 1419, “*Louis III ne vit plus que pour sa politique italienne*” (Louis III lived only for his Italian strategy) and that, from 1431, “*quoi qu’il en soit, la principauté a désormais deux têtes*” (whatever the case might be, henceforth, the principality had two heads).⁴² It had but one operational head; the other had abandoned it to pursue his Italian ambitions.

Louis might have felt strongly about this newest Breton alliance; however, he did not revoke Yolande’s viceroyalty in favor of either of his brothers, and the preexisting Savoyard goodwill established by Yolande in 1419 was reinforced by Louis’s betrothal to the 12-year-old Marguerite of Savoy, bringing renewed diplomatic advantage to

Yolande and her son-in-law, Charles VII.⁴³ Yolande would not have been against a Savoyard union for her primogenit. She had striven for years to keep channels of negotiation open between Anjou and Savoy with the surrender of Nice to Savoy and the mediation of Jean V. This essential conduit was established and maintained in preparation for Louis's Italian campaign, and to seek a mediated solution with Burgundy to end civil discord in France. Contrary to Reynaud's reading, an Angevin–Savoyard alliance and, by extension, an arm's-length Angevin–Burgundian accommodation represented an advantage to Yolande's diplomatic arsenal, not to mention the financial windfall⁴⁴ it brought to Louis's Italian venture, taking pressure off stretched Angevin fiscal resources. During 1431, calm returned to Provence, with treaties established between the county and Aragon, negotiated concurrently with Louis's betrothal to Marguerite of Savoy by Pierre de Beauvau, with the assistance of his brother Bertrand, Louis de Bouliers, and Jordan Brès—Angevin-Provençaux retainers all, long in the service of Louis II, Yolande, Charles VII, and Louis III.⁴⁵ This all took place while Joan of Arc was being groomed by an ecclesiastical court for her execution at the hands of secular authorities. Yolande and her loyalists had managed to repair frayed relations between Anjou and Brittany. In Brittany, Richemont was in attendance at his brother's court, indicating that time was drawing closer for his reappearance on the political scene. That Trémoille had requested detailed written assurances from Jean before his visit in February suggests that Georges was losing his hold over Charles and was sensitive to the renaissance of Yolande's influence over her son-in-law. By the second week of April 1431, René had issued his official declaration of war against the Vaudémont and was on his way to Tours to seek aid, while Louis was fulfilling his obligations as captain-general of Calabria and, like his predecessors, cooling his heels on the frontiers of his titular realm. Busy and interesting times for *la royne de Sicile*.

By the end of April, Brittany had directed Trémoille to place a number of Brittany's men-at-arms at the king's service, specifying that the force would stand by on the borderlands of Anjou and Maine in accordance with the undertaking made between the duke, represented by Guy de Laval, and Trémoille.⁴⁶ Brittany might have believed that he had Trémoille in a position where he could manipulate him to the will of the exiled constable and Yolande. Given Georges's animosity toward Yolande and Richemont, it is difficult to envisage that a significant rapprochement had taken place. Examination of the composition of Charles's council might assist. From the first trimester

of 1431, an interesting pattern emerges; each record of participants includes a steadily increasing number of Angevins and their officers and allies, reflecting the intentions of Charles's ordinance established in Poitiers and dated June 12, 1426.⁴⁷ This document marks the constitution of 19-member council, the primary advisor of which was Yolande, supported by a significant number of specialist professionally skilled counselors (9 out of 19), buttressed by four ecclesiastics, and balanced with a mixture of "*illustres*" (venerables) and men of modest origins.⁴⁸ The trigger for the 1426 ordinance is given as "the great and urgent necessity that is the supply and maintenance of our war and its conduct, and other great expenses and contingencies constantly arising for us."⁴⁹ Since 1427, under Georges's hegemony, little had budged politically; Yolande, therefore, set to patiently rebuilding her powerbase on the council, simultaneously reinforcing her influence with Brittany. By 1431, she was residing in Angers-Saumur,⁵⁰ with Brittany specifying that Laval's forces were to stand ready on the marches of Anjou-Maine. Little by little, Yolande reset the agenda with Trémoille shunting between Charles and Brittany. Notwithstanding his ability to dominate Charles, Georges knew that he had taken an enormous risk with the execution of Yolande's and Richemont's allies; on the eve of the executions, he had extracted letters of remission from Charles, absolving him of all past wrongdoing, ensuring that he would be out of judicial reach for current and future actions.⁵¹ This is not the strategy of a man confident of his continued influence over the king. Although Trémoille and his wife were still gorging themselves with royal favors and acquisitions funded by the royal estate,⁵² for the astute and avid Georges, the writing on the wall was becoming increasingly legible.⁵³

All Yolande's busy preoccupations and maneuverings occurred during the time of Joan of Arc's extended incarceration, trial, and execution. It is probable that the "abandonment" of Joan by Yolande and Charles was, from their point of view and in the context of the times, entirely consistent; Joan was a casualty of a war that had spluttered on for over five generations. If they were to salvage something out of the leavings of her mission and their years of struggle, they needed to push on, employing every strategy at their disposal, regardless of individual cost, while Trémoille continued his policy of doing what was best for Trémoille.

Having successfully married her daughter to Brittany's heir-apparent, Yolande returned from Nantes to Saumur in early August 1431, where Charles was in residence.⁵⁴ She resolved to broker reconciliation between the king and his constable, but her timing was

inauspicious, with war once more raging between Trémoille and Richemont in Poitou and Saintonge.⁵⁵ Neither gained the upper hand, and France continued to suffer. Apart from the recovery of Louviers from the English in October 1431, civil strife favored the cause of the invader. It was due largely to the activities of Trémoille that the English, who had suffered severe setbacks during Joan's campaigns, recovered their positions. Despite Trémoille's influence, Yolande managed the restitution of property confiscated from Richemont, which only inflamed Georges, who increased his offensive against the constable by launching an attack against Marans.⁵⁶ Richemont was recalled by his brother to assist in a matter concerning Alençon, who was holding Brittany's chancellor, Jehan de Malestroit, hostage, acting on the advice and under the protection of Trémoille, who had promised Alençon advantage and assistance in the recovery of his lost territories.⁵⁷ Jehan de Malestroit had been sent by Jean on an embassy to Charles to negotiate the return of the constable to the king's good graces; Yolande had seconded these negotiations.⁵⁸ The hostage-taking would have been a clear message from Trémoille, who was flexing his muscles at Yolande and Brittany, and distracting Richemont with the liberation of the Breton chancellor and skirmishes in Marans.⁵⁹

With Alençon claiming the support of Charles VII,⁶⁰ and Jean having repeatedly exhorted his nephew to release his chancellor to no avail,⁶¹ Brittany called for assistance from Bedford, who greeted his overtures with alacrity, valuing the prospect of another alliance with Jean V, and sending him forces in December 1431.⁶² An absurd situation arose wherein Richemont and Laval found themselves supported by Bedford against their cousin Alençon, who was supported by Trémoille, Gaucourt, and the Bastard of Orleans. It is rendered more ludicrous if one recalls that besieged in Pouancé with the constable's nephew were Richemont's sister, Marie of Brittany (Alençon's mother), and wife, Jeanne of Orleans (Duchess of Alençon, on the point of giving birth), daughter of Bedford's prisoner, Charles of Orleans. Despite Trémoille's anarchic tactics, Richemont managed to head off potential dynastic catastrophe by negotiating a settlement and reconciliation between Alençon and Brittany.⁶³

The next step was to thrash out another treaty between Brittany, Richemont, and Charles VII and, for once, Trémoille appeared reluctant to intervene, putting his energies instead toward negotiating with Burgundy. The key to a lasting agreement between the princes and the Montfort clan lay with retaining Richemont. Yolande was unshakeable in her belief that Richemont was essential to the success

of her projects and to the liberation of France. She was not alone; Bedford and Burgundy likewise understood the pivotal value of their former ally. Bedford would have almost ransomed his nephew's kingdom to retain Brittany and Burgundy in his camp and, should he lure Richemont and his younger brother Richard, Count of Etampes,⁶⁴ to his side, his prestige would have been strengthened—both in England and in France. Burgundy advised Bedford to do his utmost to woo Richemont, Richard, and their subjects to their cause, removing their support and efficacy from Charles VII.⁶⁵ Contact between Bedford and Brittany is confirmed by an exchange of letters and the traffic of their respective ambassadors.⁶⁶

Bedford had a plan which, had it been executed, would have been the ruin of Yolande and Charles. Richemont was to be offered the post of constable for Henry VI, given title to numerous domains, and a vast army to force Charles into exile in Languedoc and cut him off from support.⁶⁷ The “admonition” addressed to Burgundy outlines initiatives to alienate Touraine⁶⁸ to Richemont as well as vast territories controlled by Trémoille.⁶⁹ Little wonder that Trémoille had prioritized contact with his brother Jean, reopening negotiations with Burgundy through him, and little wonder that, rather than waiting to see if Richemont displayed avidity, vengeance, and ambition equal to his own, he sought to negotiate a little with his nemesis Richemont and his brother, Brittany.⁷⁰ Georges's possessions were under threat from the man he had pursued ceaselessly since the late 1420s—a man whose value and tenacity he had underestimated. Yolande, Brittany, and the Bastard of Orleans responded to Bedford's challenge by calling for talks, establishing a treaty between Brittany, Richemont, and Charles VII, specifying that the towns and fortresses of Gien, Montargis, and Dun-le-Roi, confiscated by Trémoille, were returned to Richemont.⁷¹ The treaty favoring Richemont's interests was established at Redon on March 25, 1432, underscoring his value and emphasizing the imperative to keep him out of the Bedford–Burgundy camp. It must be read with care if one is to understand the importance of Yolande's role during its negotiation and her close arrangement with Brittany, seconded by the Bastard of Orleans—her not infrequent collaborator (and the primary general in Richemont's absence). In ratifying this treaty, Jean V added:

And [it] is our intention that the very high and formidable princess and our very dear and very beloved lady and sister, the queen of Sicily, and our very dear and very beloved nephew, the duke of Alençon,

son-in-law the count of Laval, and brother-in-law [Charles VII], and nephews the counts of Armagnac⁷² and of Pardiac,⁷³ our allies, shall be included in this undertaking.⁷⁴

On paper, a small victory had been won and a form of unity and insurance reestablished. The war, however, continued with Brittany not definitively detached from Burgundy and Bedford,⁷⁵ and Trémoille still a malign presence on Charles's council. Although Brittany was still allied with Burgundy, a determined and mature relationship between Brittany and Charles VII was established, based and reliant upon Yolande's patient diplomacy and mediation. A memorandum dictated by Brittany's treasurer, Guinot, dated June 21, 1432, records a payment mandated to "Prigent VII de Coëtivy, sent by the duke from Redon to the king's commissioners in Angers, regarding Jehan de la Roche and others, to clear them from garrisons abutting Brittany's lands."⁷⁶

The Breton archives evidence that Charles was frequently in residence in Angers under Yolande's attentive gaze. Trémoille fell back upon his default response to Yolande's resurgent influence, setting the mercenary Rodrigo Villandrando loose upon her northern domains.⁷⁷ Trémoille's initiative resulted in Charles's forces, led by Villandrando, attacking the domains of his *Bonne-mère*. Family rose to the challenge, and Villandrando was overwhelmed by the forces of Charles of Anjou under the command of his lieutenant, Jean V de Beuil, at Pont-de-Cé.⁷⁸ Defeated, Villandrando turned his attention to Yolande's duchy of Touraine. Part of Trémoille's scheme was to detach Villandrando from the company of Richemont's allies, La Marche and Pardiac, to block the return of the constable. Cosneau posits that the Castilian probably had orders from Trémoille to attack Brittany as well, citing Ms. Fr. 11542 (entry date, September 1432), which confirms that Brittany dispatched an envoy to Angers to request help from Yolande and Charles of Anjou.⁷⁹ From Touraine, Villandrando focused his gaze upon the Languedoc, attacking the count of Foix—another of Richemont's allies. For his efforts, Trémoille appointed Villandrando counselor and chamberlain to Charles VII.⁸⁰ Trémoille continued his campaign against Yolande and Richemont, raising forces necessary to combat their influence, but he could not or would not ensure that sufficient troops were deployed to defend against continuing English offensives. Montargis⁸¹ fell into English hands, and it was probably this loss more than any other of Georges's lapses that informed his singular fall from grace and power:

The lord of Trémoille, who held the government of this kingdom, hearing the news of the loss of Montargis was greatly vexed, notwithstanding his tardy dispatch, for which the people of France were disgruntled with him... The loss of Montargis was why the lord of Trémoille was driven out of the government.⁸²

Trémoille's days were numbered; Richemont was poised to reappear. On November 14, 1432, an event occurred favorable to the campaign to detach Burgundy from Bedford: Anne of Burgundy, Bedford's wife and Burgundy's sister, died in childbirth in Paris, taking a still-born son with her to the grave.⁸³ With Charles of Anjou assuming a more visible role in the affairs of the kingdom, Anjou sensed change in the wind.⁸⁴

Rome moved to bring about a lasting solution to the Hundred Years War. Like his predecessor Martin V, Eugene IV sought to gather the belligerents at the conference table, opening talks in Auxerre in July 1432.⁸⁵ Savoy reprised his role of mediator and pacifier-in-chief while Richemont and Brittany kept lines of communication open between their side and Burgundy-Bedford. With Savoy's mediation, they pulled together a peace proposal, with Breton embassies arriving in Auxerre in November 1432. Although a definitive peace was not achieved, the idea of reconciliation between Charles VII and Burgundy advanced. Trémoille continued to cause difficulties for everyone; an initiative was prepared to remove him once and for all. In preparation for his removal, Brittany, Richemont, and Savoy stacked Charles's council with "*leurs gens pour le conseiller et aider*" (their people to counsel and help the king) to advance the fight against Bedford and establish a durable peace throughout the realm.⁸⁶ This burst of activity occurred during the first trimester of 1433 at a time when Burgundy, though content to work with the other French princes to advance a peaceful outcome, was still not of a mind to detach himself from Bedford. However, on April 20, 1433, Bedford overstepped their friendship by marrying Jacqueline of Luxembourg, daughter of Burgundy's vassal, Pierre I, Count of Saint-Pol, without seeking Burgundy's assent.⁸⁷ Burgundy was extremely vexed by this development. Henry Beaufort, Cardinal of Winchester, tried to reconcile the parties in Saint-Omer,⁸⁸ but neither wanted to be seen to be making the first move. Richemont tried to profit from the Anglo-Burgundian discord, but was blocked by Trémoille who reinitiated his military offensive against him. The time had arrived for Georges's departure.

Jean de Beuil, Pierre of Amboise, Coëtivy, Gaucourt, and Pierre de Brézé joined forces to oust Trémoille, having first sought the assent of Yolande, Richemont, and Charles of Anjou. Given Charles VII's rancor toward him, Richemont stayed well away from his wife's city of Chinon where Charles's court was in residence. Sources record Richemont in Partenay on June 22, 1433.⁸⁹ Trémoille probably believed that Gaucourt, captain of Chinon, and his lieutenant, Olivier Frétard, were above suspicion, and it is this more than anything else that ensured the success of the plot. The identities of the other co-conspirators would have set Georges's alarm bells ringing; all were defined by their Angevin–Breton loyalties and networks. The Berry Herald records the removal of Trémoille and the installation of Charles of Anjou to the post of royal favorite, describing Charles's anxiety and the calming effect of his queen, Marie of Anjou, who pacified him:

The King became very frightened and disturbed when he heard what was going on; the Queen reassured him. Henceforth my lord Charles of Anjou prevailed and entered into government [through the influence of the Queen].⁹⁰

The removal of Trémoille left the way clear for those who could and would work toward the liberation of France.⁹¹ Burgundy sent ambassadors to London to convince Henry VI's government that it either should act to assure the loyalty of its French princes with promises of substantial cash and territorial reward or come to a peaceful settlement with Charles VII, offering to work with Savoy to arrive at a viable and palatable outcome. On July 7, 1433, Winchester urged Burgundy to "to continue to address the business between the dukes of Savoy and Brittany and the count of Richemont, and to do his utmost for the good of the king."⁹² From August to October 1433, Charles VII convoked his Estates in Tours, commanding the archbishop of Reims and chancellor of France, Regnault of Chartres, in the presence of all three estates, to announce that he disavowed his former colleague the favorite, and that Beuil, Coëtivy, and Brézé, who had seized Trémoille, had been received by him in good grace. This proclamation was made in the presence of Charles of Anjou and the three Angevin loyalists, all of whom remained in great influence and authority with the king.⁹³

Cosneau contends: "In short, it was Yolande who took over the management of the government; it was understood that this was the beginning of a new era and that the worst days had passed."⁹⁴ For

Beaucourt: "Thanks to God, the reign of intriguers and traitors was at an end; Charles VII finally belonged to himself... Henceforth, he was surrounded by honest and devoted servants."⁹⁵ With the Langue d'oïl estates held in her city of Tours in the autumn of 1433, Yolande emerged from the gloom of her personal *fôret de longue attente*. The job was not yet complete, but some of the greatest obstacles had fallen away with the death of Anne of Burgundy, Duchess of Bedford, in November 1432 and the banishment of Trémoille in June 1433. It remained to be seen whether Burgundy could be untied from Bedford and the English driven from France. The fall of Trémoille and the installation of her youngest son, Charles of Anjou, as the king's principal counselor and friend did not solve all Yolande's immediate concerns; however, it did allow her to bring Richemont out into the open and back into the fold as her auxiliary and military mainstay. With Richemont came exiled companions such as Pardiac and La Fayette,⁹⁶ who played a leading role in the liberation of France. As always and for both sides of the conflict, Richemont and Brittany held the key to a successful resolution. War continued relatively unabated, and Richemont did not make haste to his king's side. He preferred to bide his time and attend the funerary rites of Brittany's wife and Charles's sister, Jeanne of France, who had worked hard for unity between the warring parties.⁹⁷ His next move was to attend conferences planned for October in Calais, to be mediated by the still captive Charles of Orleans and to include Yolande, Charles of Anjou, Brittany, Richard of Brittany, and Alençon.⁹⁸ Safe conducts were issued on the same day and the talks were expected to advance, but despite Brittany's best efforts, the Calais meetings were postponed and not held until much later.⁹⁹

Yolande's second son was caught up in the continuing struggle for succession in Bar-Lorraine, and still very much at the mercy of Burgundy's vicissitudes. René's position was weak and he was forced to agree to a compromise, whereby he pledged to solve his dilemma amicably rather than by force. On November 23, 1432, he directed his officers to negotiate the best possible terms in his name and, shortly thereafter, he presented himself to Burgundy in Flanders to plead his case. On February 13, 1433, an accommodation was reached, based upon the betrothal of his eldest surviving daughter, Yolande of Anjou,¹⁰⁰ to Ferry, eldest son of Antoine de Vaudémont. Four-year-old Yolande was given into the care of her future father-in-law.¹⁰¹ René would find that in his future son-in-law he had a strong champion, but it appeared that he had allowed Vaudémont to strengthen his claims over Lorraine. René had found a way to coexist with his

competitors, and relations in the east thawed considerably. He managed to arrive at a solution to his problems with his erstwhile gaoler,¹⁰² Jean of Luxembourg, who had taken his county of Guise by force. On February 23, 1433, in Bohain, Luxembourg paid René compensation for the loss of his county, and another betrothal agreement was drafted to seal an alliance between René's younger daughter, three-year-old Marguerite of Anjou and Pierre of Luxembourg, son of Jean of Luxembourg's brother, the count of St-Pôl.¹⁰³

René's actions in adversity mirror Yolande's pragmatism: avoidance of armed combat wherever possible (a financially crippling and uncertain strategy); negotiation through the intermediary of trusted envoys and allies; personal negotiation as required; reinforcement of agreements with betrothal alliances; and, whenever possible (and above all), maintain a steady flow of cash and assets into the family firm's coffers. Yolande was adept at pulling advantage from seemingly hopeless circumstances. René would demonstrate that, while his situation was seldom rosy, he too knew when to cut his losses and advance to negotiate a sustainable outcome.¹⁰⁴ Displaying the same dignity in adversity as his mother projected, René returned to Bar to mop up after his earlier losses. The engagement of Yolande of Anjou and Ferry of Vaudémont was celebrated in Bar on July 1, 1433,¹⁰⁵ and while France might have read René's accommodation with Burgundy and Vaudémont as capitulation to the enemy, it was a timely strategy because Burgundy was becoming disenchanted with his former brother-in-law Bedford, and making subtle overtures to Charles VII. René acted as a primary conduit in preliminary communications regarding peace between the two belligerent courts.

Early in 1434, René visited his mother in Provence, to seek her counsel and to spend time with Charles VII, who was residing in neighboring Dauphiné. While his objective was to seek more military and financial aid, he had interesting developments to report to his brother-in-law; Burgundy had begun to make positive noises regarding an end to the years of conflict between loyalist France and Burgundy. Although Burgundy refused to negotiate without Bedford's inclusion, his disposition to negotiate was manifest. René returned to his duchy charged with the task of sounding Burgundy out on the granting of safe conducts for Charles's envoys—Regnault of Chartres, the Bastard of Orleans, and Yolande's seneschal for Maine, Christophe d'Harcourt, and others—to open serious discussions on his behalf. René forwarded Charles's request to Dijon, but it was formally refused, Burgundy reiterating the need to include England in any talks but pointing to the possibility of trying again

once the delayed Calais negotiations had played out.¹⁰⁶ Rather than accepting Charles's invitation to participate at the Calais talks, René traveled to Chambéry—the Savoyard capital—to participate in a diplomatically significant wedding. His mission demonstrates the way in which Anjou's political networks and personal relationships were deployed to advance its political imperatives. René's attendance was the outcome of a triangular effort steered from Provence, Yolande coordinating from Provence with the assistance and counsel of Charles in the Dauphiné and Louis III in Naples.

Louis's bride, Marguerite of Savoy, was to be in Chambéry to attend the wedding of her elder brother, Louis, Count of Geneva, to Anne of Lusignan, daughter of the king of Cyprus.¹⁰⁷ Anne's mother was Charlotte of Bourbon, sister of the omnipresent Jacques II de la Marche. Repenting of his earlier actions in Naples, and situated at the epicenter of the Franciscan reform movement with close ties to Colette of Corbie, Jacques had become a useful auxiliary within Yolande's wider Franciscan networks and Colette had open access to both parties in France's civil conflict. The Chambéry wedding offers intriguing possibilities in relation to informal and clandestine networks engaged in political, diplomatic, and ecclesiastical lobbying directed at healing the rift between France and Burgundy.¹⁰⁸ Jean Le Févre furnishes the specifics of "the princes, lords, ladies and damsels who attended; and of the splendor and merrymaking of the said festivities."¹⁰⁹ The attendees and their places in the hierarchy at the Chambéry wedding are of considerable interest. Accompanying the party of the groom Louis, Count of Geneva (Burgundy's cousin), were Burgundy, Savoy (the groom's father and Burgundy's uncle) and René of Anjou, Johann of Cleves (Burgundy's cousin), Jean of Nevers (Burgundy's cousin), Philippe of Savoy (Burgundy's cousin), Louis and Jean, princes of Orange (whose allegiances shunted between Burgundy and France), Johann, Count of Freiburg (brother-in-law of the princes of Orange), Ludovico I, Marquess of Saluzzo (influential due to his studied neutrality and independence from Savoy's territories in Piedmont), Christophe d'Harcourt (Norman by origin but an Angevin loyalist and seneschal of Maine for Yolande; counselor, chamberlain, and diplomat in the service of Charles VII), and many great lords of Burgundy, Savoy, and elsewhere.¹¹⁰

The bride was accompanied by two knights, and welcomed by Burgundy and René who walked her to the entrance of the castle's chapel, where she was greeted by many great ladies and damsels, knights, and equerries. She was received by 14-year-old Marguerite of Savoy, sister of the groom, sister-in-law of René, and young queen

of Sicily; Yolande's *privada*, Jeanne de Preuilly, Lady of Gaucourt,¹¹¹ and numerous other ladies and damsels. The bride was paraded ceremoniously into the chapel by Burgundy and René. After the sacrament, the bride was led into her wedding breakfast by both men, and the trio was placed at the high table with the groom, Hugues Lancelot de Lusignan, Cardinal of Cyprus (the bride's uncle), Marguerite of Savoy, Johann of Cleves, and Jean of Nevers with Christophe d'Harcourt, the duke of Savoy, and the lady of Gaucourt and others seated at the third table.¹¹² Dancing followed feasting, and two of the pairings are worth considering: "*y eult grant noblesse . . . chevaliers [escuiers], dames et damoiselles qui danssèrent deux à deux, dont le duc [Burgundy], et la dame de Gaucourt, furent premiers, le duc de Bar et la dame de [la] Ric.*"¹¹³ René's dance partner was from the distinguished noble Calabrian family, the Ruffi/Ruffo, *comtes della Rica*, who had made their way with Giovanna I in 1346 to Provence, where they had remained. Grants of territory in Provence made by Giovanna in compensation for losses they had suffered in Naples–Sicily were confirmed by Louis I of Anjou by letters dated March 25, 1382. Henceforth, the counts of Roux de la Ric¹¹⁴ were loyal and devoted allies and officers of the Provençal second house of Anjou. Yolande's *privada* led the dance with Burgundy while René partnered one of Anjou–Provence's most loyal ladies.

Celebrations and talks continued the following day: seated at the high table for dinner were the cardinal of Cyprus; Marguerite, Queen of Sicily, Burgundy, the bride, René, Johann of Cleves, and Jean of Nevers with the other guests seated as before. During two days of continual celebration, opportunities arose to discuss many issues; Savoy, Harcourt, Jeanne de Preuilly, Yolande's new daughter-in-law, Marguerite, and René were in constant contact with Burgundy. Throughout his account of the Savoyard gathering, Le Févre emphasizes that René's position was subordinate only to Burgundy. On the third day, the wedding party gathered together to hear mass, after which all gathered for dinner as before—apart from Burgundy and Savoy, who dined in their private rooms¹¹⁵—to confer uninterrupted regarding what had been raised by their respective interlocutors. While Burgundy had been in the company of René, Jeanne de Preuilly and Marguerite of Savoy, the duke of Savoy had spent time with Yolande's Manceau seneschal, Harcourt. At the close of festivities, Burgundy and René departed together. Le Févre describes the occasion in considerable detail, claiming he had done so "*pour la beauté d'icelle*" (for the beauty of it). It is probable that he was not merely recording the "beauty of it" in his extended description of

events¹¹⁶—sensing perhaps that something larger was at stake, an encounter between opposing factions hosted by their “pacific” mediator, Savoy, on “neutral” territory—“*sans tournoy et joust, [une] feste, aussi belle que on pouvoit veoir*” (without tournament or joust, a celebration as beautiful as ever was seen).¹¹⁷

Yolande’s negotiations with Savoy regarding the surrender of Nice had commenced in earnest following the death of Louis II. Louis III’s marriage to Marguerite of Savoy facilitated René’s “co-starring” role with a supporting cast of Angevin loyalists at the Savoyard nuptials. In the absence of open talks with Burgundy, a coordinated strategy, planned between Yolande in Provence and Charles VII in the Dauphiné, and seconded by Louis III in Naples, pushed for progress toward peace at the Chambéry gathering. With Trémoille out of the picture, Yolande operated openly and in concert with her son-in-law. René’s attended Chambéry following Burgundy’s refusal to issue safe conducts to Regnault of Chartres, the Bastard of Orleans, and Harcourt. Yolande’s man, Harcourt, René’s diplomatic adviser for this occasion, was the only one of the three refused a safe conduct to be welcomed in Chambéry as escort to Yolande’s *privada*, Jeanne de Preully.

Eugene IV and Martin V had worked likewise to resolve the conflict between the warring princes with Eugene’s legate, Niccolò Albergati, Cardinal-priest of Santa Croce in Jerusalem, instigating a campaign with indefatigable zeal exhorting Charles VII, Henry VI, and Burgundy to meet and talk. Conferences in Auxerre were inaugurated in July 1432, with Burgundy seen to be making an effort, releasing René on licence (April 6, 1431); concluding treaties with the count of Clermont and Charles VII (September 8 and 24, 1431, and December 13, 1431); and writing to Henry VI (December 29, 1431) to coax him to the negotiating table.¹¹⁸ Savoy reprised his mediation with Burgundy more approachable but refusing to advance openly without Bedford’s participation. By the time talks were inaugurated in Auxerre in November 1432, the seed had been planted, but nothing had yet pushed through the top soil. Yolande, Richemont, and Brittany husbanded the fragile ground Auxerre had cleared, and their efforts opened the way to Arras.¹¹⁹ Evidence of their contact is preserved in documents collected in *Lettres et mandements*. They record them making plans and consolidating its strategies “*pour certain causes et affaires secrez*” (particular reasons and secret business), plans which involved funding Charles of Anjou with 11,000 livres from Brittany’s treasury. The documents show that Brittany’s chancellor, Jean de Malestroit,¹²⁰ and no mere functionary, traveled to

Yolande in Angers, emphasizing her authority and the serious intent of the Breton embassy dispatched to her.

In the context of the “particular reasons and secret business” testified to by the Breton archives, the Chambéry wedding takes on great significance; it cannot be regarded just as “a celebration as beautiful as was ever seen,” but rather an opportunity occasioning furious, if covert, diplomatic activity and targeted politicking. Lecoy de la Marche reinforces this assertion confirming that René, accompanied by Harcourt, arrived in Chambéry before Burgundy and that René’s first initiative was to seek out Savoy to solicit his advice as to how best to proceed.¹²¹ Le Févre’s account hints at an orchestrated strategy to insert René at Burgundy’s side on every occasion apart from Burgundy and Savoy’s Tuesday evening “retreat” when they dined together unobtrusively in their private apartments. Following the wedding breakfast, René could not lead the dance with Burgundy; this fell instead to Yolande’s lady-in-waiting, Jeanne de Preuilly.

Charles hunkered down in Vienne from April to June 1434, where Estates for the Languedoc and Dauphiné were assembled to underwrite the reinvigorated drive toward France’s liberation. This assembly followed René’s attendance in Chambéry and Richemont’s military initiatives, supported by Alençon and the Bastard of Orleans. Those present in Vienne illuminate intricate networks of Angevin influence exploited by Yolande and her allies, with the Berry Herald singling out the cardinals of Cyprus and Arles attention.¹²² The cardinal of Cyprus, Hugues de Lusignan, arrived with Yolande’s most prominent Provençal churchman, Louis Aleman, archbishop of Arles, adding further weight to the importance of Chambéry in diplomatic and political terms.¹²³ Significant others included the count of Clermont; the count of Foix; Richemont; and 14-year-old Marguerite of Savoy, accompanied by an impressive escort of knights, equerries, ladies, and damsels as well as the marquess of Saluzzo and the count of Villars, Lord of La Roche.¹²⁴ Charles welcomed the entourage with great warmth and, after supper, the [young] queen of Sicily, Marguerite of Savoy, curtsied to Charles and they danced together “*longuement*” (for a long time) whereupon they took wine and spices together, served by Clermont and Richemont. Marguerite requested Charles’s leave to depart the following day for the Rhône and Avignon with her vassals to prepare her departure for Naples–Sicily.¹²⁵ This passage is important because it records the return of Richemont and his allies to Charles’s court. It also preserves Marguerite of Savoy’s part in the march toward peace; Lecoy de la Marche claims that she had arrived in Vienne

one month after events in Chambéry specifically to communicate to Charles and Yolande her uncle Burgundy's disposition to negotiate.¹²⁶ The Herald's account concludes with Marguerite continuing from Avignon to the Angevin castle of Tarascon, whose rebuilding and refurbishment was newly accomplished by Yolande, bolstering the prestige of Anjou in Provence-Forcalquier.¹²⁷ Marguerite was received with great ceremony by the governor of Provence, Pierre de Beauvau, who dispatched her to Louis III in Italy, where he died within three months of their first meeting.¹²⁸

Yolande does not appear in this section of the Herald's account; however, we know that she was in Provence immediately prior to the Chambéry wedding, where she received her son René. From the Herald's account of Marguerite's journey to her husband in Italy, one of Yolande's many preoccupations was to prepare for her daughter-in-law's arrival and raise more funds for Louis's continuing campaign in Naples, where he was heir-in-waiting to Giovanna II.¹²⁹ Yolande's presence in Provence during this period should put paid to Reynaud's generalization that "[l]a déchirure du tissu familial est sensible à cette date."¹³⁰ Yolande's deputies dispatched Marguerite to Naples while she continued to underwrite Louis's campaign; in every way, Yolande continued to work for the interests of Louis and their house. Once preparations in Provence had been finalized, Yolande hastened north to Vienne, where she met with her archbishop, Louis Aleman, and the cardinal of Cyprus—just in time to welcome her newest daughter-in-law, Marguerite of Savoy, and witness the return of her constable to Charles's favor. Her crucial presence in Vienne is confirmed by Mss. Fr. 25710 n°s 81–85, 20877 n° 4, and 20385 n° 1. Yolande's household accounts detail her movements and outgoings during this critical period in the progress toward peace between Burgundy and France.¹³¹ Both she and Charles of Anjou were the king's attentive confederates in preliminaries to peace talks in Arras.¹³² Others present during this critical three-month period include: Charles of Bourbon, Richemont, the Bastard of Orleans, La Fayette, Gaucourt, Culant, Harcourt, Hugues de Noyers, Alençon, Jean de Beuil, Coëtivy, Graille, Gilles de Raïs, Etienne Bernard (treasurer of Anjou), and the archbishop of Toulouse.¹³³

While plans were being made and meetings held in Vienne, Yolande's second cousin, Sigismund, King of the Germans, while attempting to remain above the fray in the war of succession in Lorraine, approached Burgundy on René's behalf. Burgundy had overplayed his political hand, refusing to do homage to Sigismund for territories he held in fief from the Empire.¹³⁴ Sigismund responded

by inserting himself into the Anjou–Vaudémont dispute, convoking the belligerents to appear before his tribunal on April 4, 1434. René sought restitution of his title, Duke of Lorraine, while Antoine, count of Vaudémont, demanded investiture with the ducal title from their mutual overlord. They were instructed to present themselves to the Council deliberating in Basle.¹³⁵ Safe conducts were issued from Basle and Sigismund’s chancellery for the disputants and their entourages.¹³⁶ On April 24, 1434, Sigismund delivered his decision in Basle Cathedral: sovereignty of Lorraine was René’s by right of his marriage to its heiress Isabelle, without prejudicing existing comital rights held by Vaudémont.¹³⁷ René pledged allegiance to Sigismund and was reinvested with the duchy of Lorraine.¹³⁸ Vaudémont withdrew and submitted his appeal and protest in writing.¹³⁹ The imperial ruling was a calculated affront to Burgundy, a veiled threat from his overlord Sigismund. There was no question of Burgundy moving against the Empire, so he reacted by demanding the immediate surrender of René though he had custody of René’s infant sons. Burgundy refused all appeals from Isabelle of Lorraine and the bishop of Metz, reclaiming his prerogative as René’s gaoler. René, having pledged obedience to Burgundy, capitulated and reentered a further two years in captivity while Philippe, against all pledges, held René’s sons hostage for a further year.¹⁴⁰ The goodwill established at Chambéry between Burgundy and René sank without a trace, and Isabelle needed to shore up their duchies and guarantee the support of their allies in René’s absence. By adopting passive observer status in the wake of René’s reincarceration, Yolande and Charles VII forfeited René’s liberty to the greater good, allowing peace negotiations to continue unhindered.

Having recovered the collaboration of Richemont, who had been assisting René prior to his reimprisonment,¹⁴¹ Yolande was struck by personal and political tragedy with the sudden death of Louis III from malaria in November 1434.¹⁴² Her eldest son was dead without issue and his successor, René, was Burgundy’s prisoner. However, Richemont was back in the political fold and Charles of Anjou was the king’s favorite, assisted ably by an increasing number of Angevin officers and loyal allies on the king’s council.¹⁴³ Yolande had an excellent lieutenant in the east in Isabelle of Lorraine and, despite Burgundy’s maneuver against René, the belligerents were edging closer to peace, thanks to the combined mediation of Savoy, Basle, and the pope. Giovanna II had reaffirmed her adoption of Louis III in June 1433, and Alfons V of Aragon turned his immediate attention away from Naples to await developments.¹⁴⁴ Anjou had played well

in contracting a marriage with Savoy; in the wake of Louis's death, Savoy dispatched a diplomatic representative to Naples to secure the kingdom for his daughter Marguerite, whom he had instructed to remain in her titular realm.¹⁴⁵ Savoy would have had his own interests in mind; however, Marguerite's presence was essential to maintain Angevin-Valois continuity in the kingdom until help arrived.

Negotiations with Burgundy continued, with Philippe signing an initial pact with his brother-in-law Bourbon on December 4, 1434, largely the result of Richemont's return to Charles's favor and Brittany's support of France's cause.¹⁴⁶ Another conference was agreed to in Nevers aimed at reaching a definitive position on a peace proposal. All parties, including Brittany, Savoy, the pope and his council, implored Burgundy to advance the cause of peace; on December 27, 1434, Burgundian ambassadors advised the pope's council that their master had assented to its petitions. Le Févre records that the reconciliation between Burgundy and Bourbon took place in Nevers to great celebration and festivity in the company of the constable and representatives of the great and good.¹⁴⁷ René had been sacrificed to the greater good, Le Févre reporting: "Afterwards, it was decided that a day would be held in the city of Arras, on Saint John next forthcoming [June 24], for the peace of the kingdom of France between the king, Charles VII, and the duke [of Burgundy]."¹⁴⁸ It fell to Brittany to backfill negotiations and promises to England,¹⁴⁹ but on January 20, 1435, talks in preparation for Arras were opened, attended by Richemont, Regnault of Chartres, and Harcourt representing Charles and Yolande. The Burgundian-Bourbonais peace was countersigned by Richemont on February 5 and by two other princes on the following day;¹⁵⁰ the prospect for durable peace had advanced. Richemont's efforts were seconded by the duke and duchess of Bourbon.¹⁵¹ Vendôme, Yolande's dedicated ally, parleyed with Brittany, and July 1, 1435, was decided upon as the date whereupon Charles VII would make "reasonable offers" in Arras to his nephew, the king of England, with further conferences to follow.¹⁵²

On February 2, 1435, Giovanna II of Naples died. René was henceforth in possession of the duchies of Bar-Lorraine; the counties of Provence-Forcalquier, the duchy of Anjou; the county of Maine; and the kingdom of Naples-Sicily-Jerusalem (this last, titular). The problem was that he was Burgundy's prisoner and unable to appear in Naples to take possession of his inheritance. Rather than extending René a degree of indulgence, Burgundy tightened his stranglehold over this newest king of Sicily, dispatching René to the fortified garrison of Bracon.¹⁵³ Neapolitan envoys sent to René in captivity and

to Isabelle emphasized the dangers inherent in a delayed appearance in Naples. It was no small thing that Savoy had insisted Marguerite remain in Naples for, as Léonard observes, with René's incarceration, Savoy believed that it fell to him to represent the French dynasty in the face of its Aragonese competitor who was standing by on the island of Sicily, preparing his forces for a new campaign and reasserting his influence with the Neapolitan nobility.¹⁵⁴ René did not want his kingdom to slip through his fingers for want of his personal liberty. Unable to undercut the projects of Alfons in person, he dispatched Isabelle to their peninsular kingdom. Again, the Angevin family strategy emerged: Marie of Blois-Penthièvre, Yolande, and Isabelle of Lorraine assumed control for their husbands and/or sons, with full powers for war and peace. René bestowed full executive and military authority upon Isabelle from Dijon on June 14, 1435. She prepared herself for this new challenge, leaving her daughter, Marguerite of Anjou, in Yolande's care.¹⁵⁵ Marguerite remained with Yolande to the very last days of her grandmother's life; there was no better training ground and political mentor for a future queen of a divided England. Notwithstanding her latest responsibility, Yolande continued her preparations for Arras.¹⁵⁶

Despite the urgency of Arras, Yolande needed to ensure papal approval for René's rights over Naples. She had worked on Rome since 1431 (the establishment of the Council of Basle) for a variety of reasons, including, but not exclusively toward a peace settlement for France. Despite Giovanna II's testamentary declaration, Eugene IV, successor to Martin V, did not think that Naples should pass automatically to René, Louis III's heir and successor. Yolande employed her considerable mediation skills ably seconded by Savoy, the cardinal of Cyprus and her bishop of Arles, in her negotiations with Burgundy and for Basle. She was an old hand in the struggle for Naples and understood well the imperative of consistent good relations with the papacy. En route to Naples in 1434, Marguerite made a courtesy call to Eugene IV's legate in Avignon—the Franciscan cardinal of Foix, Pierre de Grailly. For Vallet, “in the interests of Charles VII and for her own Italian states, Yolande of Aragon needed the pope. She handled Eugene IV with care.”¹⁵⁷ The importance of good relations with the papacy is visible in the heightened Angevin activity at Basle (1431–49). Given the strengthened power of Angevins at Charles's court during this period, they exercised their considerable influence over the king in their support of the papacy.¹⁵⁸ Taking Heribert Müller's lead,¹⁵⁹ Ohnesborg asserts that “it was for the cause of Naples and to support his brother-in-law René of Anjou

that Charles VII departed from his habitual proconciliar stance.¹⁶⁰ With Yolande's unified diplomatic strategy buttressing her cause, Isabelle of Lorraine took leave of her mother-in-law in Anjou with an offensive in mind.¹⁶¹ The latest queen of Sicily was armed with the combined support of Charles VII, Yolande in Touraine–Anjou–Maine–Provence, and those who held authority in her absence from Bar-Lorraine.¹⁶²

Back in France, there was unanimity in displeasure toward Burgundy for his treatment of René, but all understood the importance of working together toward a larger endgame: lasting peace with Burgundy. It is for this that René would find himself partially sidelined in the settlement arising from Arras. Jocelyne Dickenson confirms that Yolande sent no mere observers to Arras; her personal envoys were associated with the official French embassy, and with those of the king of Sicily (René) and Alençon.¹⁶³ Basle was represented by the cardinal of Cyprus, who was one of the earliest involved in establishing the Arras negotiations, and who had met with René, Marguerite, and Yolande on many occasions prior to and immediately after Chambéry. Savoy did not send an envoy, having retired to Ripaille to begin his life as a pious hermit. Calmet indicates that, as well as negotiating for peace, representatives of Yolande, Isabelle, and Charles VII were charged expressly with the task of ensuring that René was not completely excluded from the final outcome and, if possible, to persuade Burgundy to release him.¹⁶⁴ Reconciliation was in the air and, despite the withdrawal of England, a peace settlement unifying the French princes was to be read into the record at Saint-Vaast Cathedral on September 21, 1435.¹⁶⁵ However, at the eleventh hour, Burgundy submitted a written amendment demanding that René, Duke of Lorraine, be excluded from the treaty.¹⁶⁶ Having come so far on the road to peace, neither Charles nor Yolande wanted to stall the peace process by demanding René, Duke of Lorraine's, inclusion. René, Duke of Lorraine, was sacrificed again to the greater good,¹⁶⁷ in the hope that the Lorraine question might be renegotiated once Burgundy's attitude softened. Since the death of Louis III, René had carried the title Duke of Anjou, and it was in this capacity that he was included in the final peace.¹⁶⁸

Tying Off the Knots, Trimming the Threads

Barely a month after the signing of the Treaty, Chartier details the organization of an embassy to plead Burgundy for René's release.¹⁶⁹ Richemont stayed behind in Reims to attend to military

and judicial matters¹⁷⁰ while influential others such as Bourbon, Vendôme, Harcourt, La Fayette, and Regnault of Chartres attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate René's release. Burgundy's demands were exorbitant, and talks were dissolved.¹⁷¹ At Yolande's request, Charles VII continued to defend René's eastern territories. René's Bar-Lorraine counselors had exhorted Yolande to intervene on their behalf for help against mercenaries who were ravaging the territories in the absence of Isabelle and René. Lecoy de la Marche cites a letter to Yolande from the counselors evoking "her high authority and her love for her son . . . and, after God, putting all their confidence in her."¹⁷² Richemont was dispatched to deal with insurgencies in Bar-Lorraine.¹⁷³

Despite Arras, conflict continued, generated by the English and discontented officers of Charles VII. Charles's most frequently consulted and trusted counselors from the time of Arras were Charles of Anjou; Vendôme; Pardiac; the archbishop of Toulouse; the bishop of Clermont, Martin de Charpaignes; the bishop of Maguelonne, Robert de Rouvres; the bishop of Maillesais, Thibaut de Lucé; Harcourt; Chaumont; the Beuils; Brézé; and Coëtivy.¹⁷⁴ All bore allegiance to Yolande and Richemont and, those left out in the cold such as Charles, Duke of Bourbon, formed a *ligue* of the discontented. Under the leadership of Bourbon, the vexatious aggrieved met in Angers on June 8, 1437. Bourbon had attracted Alençon, Brittany, and the recently liberated René of Anjou¹⁷⁵ to his cause. Bourbon had been heavily implicated in René's release;¹⁷⁶ René had sealed their alliance betrothing his son and heir Jean, Duke of Calabria, to Marie of Bourbon.¹⁷⁷ Bourbon's brother-in-law, the Castilian Rodrigo Villandrando, threw his weight behind the *ligue*. Why René was involved to such an extent with his new ally Bourbon, who was determined to usurp the authority of René's brother, Charles of Anjou, is unclear, particularly considering the support generally forthcoming from Charles VII, Yolande, and Richemont. To advance his Italian campaign, he might have sought greater influence at Charles's court by usurping his younger brother from his position as the king's favorite.¹⁷⁸

The *ligue* failed in its attempt to usurp Charles of Anjou; Villandrando was driven out and banished by king and Charles of Anjou,¹⁷⁹ Bourbon was humiliated, his allies withdrew chastened, and René was brought to heel.¹⁸⁰ The English started to experience real political and military setbacks with Richemont increasingly gaining the upper hand. After 15 long years in the wilderness of his aspirations, Charles VII materialized at the head of his troops

at the siege of Montereau, armed and on the offensive,¹⁸¹ firmly reestablished as France's *auriflambe*. Having won his spurs, Charles VII headed for his capital in triumph.¹⁸² He made his ceremonial and solemn entry on November 12, 1437. Yolande's work on Charles's behalf was almost achieved. The Berry Herald testifies to the solid wall of Angevin presence surrounding Charles VII.¹⁸³ Yolande's son-in-law and grandson had finally arrived, escorted by her youngest son, their allies, and Constable Richemont. Long years had been spent loitering in the dark wood of France's misery, the peace had yet to be won, and vital reforms initiated, but Yolande's contribution to Charles's victory is difficult to deny. Charles VII left Paris on December 3, 1437, bound for Orleans and Bourges with the intention of drafting major reforms particularly targeted at the reorganization the Gallican Church,¹⁸⁴ monetary and taxation amendments, and army reform. Picot, in his history of the General Estates, makes this observation:

Little by little, the king's council began to fill with men of the highest merit: at the side of Constable Richemont and Pierre de Brézé, sat the Bureau brothers, Cousinot, Chevalier and, above them, governing them with his great knowledge, Jacques Coeur, who managed the royal finances commendably... suffice to say that, from 1433 to 1439 all public services were reorganized completely.¹⁸⁵

Picot agrees that, once Trémoille was removed, Charles's council became professionalized under Yolande's watch, taking on the essential characteristics of her councils and *chambres des comptes* in Anjou-Provence.¹⁸⁶ Post-Trémoille, Yolande's influence over Charles and on his royal council was preponderant and vital to the cause of civil peace and governmental reform. Not only was Charles of Anjou the king's favored counselor and trusted friend, handpicked and strategically placed allies and retainers such as Richemont, Brézé, Richard of Brittany, the Bastard of Orleans, Xantrilles, the brothers Bureau, and Jacques Coeur were unified in bringing her protracted campaign to its realization. With Bedford's death and Burgundy's detachment from Henry's cause, domestic problems in England, and Charles's victories in France, Henry VI finally petitioned Charles VII for talks. Long-delayed conferences were convened near Calais on June 9, 1439,¹⁸⁷ with Charles of Orleans acting as ambassador with leading lights from Charles's side and Isabel of Portugal, Duchess of Burgundy,¹⁸⁸ and Chancellor Nicolas Rolin¹⁸⁹ acting for Burgundy, with illustrious English lords and ecclesiastics, including Winchester,

involved in the proceedings. Charles of Orleans secured his freedom, but England refused to proceed further, not having obtained satisfaction on the question of Normandy.¹⁹⁰

In October 1439, Charles VII convened his Estates in Orleans; they were co-presided by Yolande.¹⁹¹ The Berry Herald records that “many beautiful matters were proclaimed, very eruditely and wisely, in the presence of the king, and the queen of Sicily and representatives of the kingdom there present.”¹⁹² After extensive consultation with interested parties and advice from his *Bonne-mère*, a far-reaching edict on army reform and a permanent system of taxation to underwrite a professional royal army were proclaimed on November 2, 1439.¹⁹³ This indissoluble decree was targeted at great lords such as Burgundy and his lesser partisans such as Vaudémont who had been able to start and sustain a war of succession in Lorraine against René of Anjou, as well as renegades like Trémoille who had caused hardship for loyal officers like Richemont and La Fayette, and mercenaries and bandits of Villandrando’s ilk, who, while essential in some ways to Charles’s victory, left a trail of devastation in their wake. The crippling cost of ending incursions and the prolongation of war and hardship were things with which Yolande was only too familiar. Picot observes that the edict ensured the suppression of the nobles’ most cherished immunities.¹⁹⁴ The permanent system of taxation to underwrite the king’s sole prerogative to police and defend the kingdom put an end to fiscal abuse by favorites such as Giac, Louvet, and Trémoille.¹⁹⁵

When assessing this 1439 document, one should compare it to a c. 1425 document I have discussed elsewhere:¹⁹⁶ an anonymous *Advis* addressed to Yolande of Aragon, “mother of the king.” To engage with the process of recovery, the author of the *Advis* turns to Yolande of Aragon, Queen of Jerusalem and Sicily, *Bonne-mère* of the king, the preeminent member of his council.¹⁹⁷ The *Advis* is most interesting because it articulates many of the precise reforms undertaken by Charles VII and Yolande of Aragon during the period 1438–9. However, its central ideas and origins reach back even farther into Yolande’s childhood and adolescence to a time when her Aragonese natal house’s influential Franciscan adviser, Francesc Eiximenis, developed his political ideas on government with authority as an office and duty, in treatises such as his *Dotzè llibre de regiment dels prínceps e de comunitats apellat crestià*.¹⁹⁸ In *Dotzè II*, Eiximenis posits eight essential concerns for the attention of the prince, presaging many suggestions contained in the anonymous *Advis*.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, the central thesis of *Advis* reposes upon many of the ideas expressed by

reform-minded writers such as Yolande's and Charles's secretary (ambassador, humanist thinker and practitioner), Alain Chartier, in works such as his *Quadriologue Invectif*.²⁰⁰ Perhaps the most fascinating feature of the *Advis* is that, while it discusses all manner of reforms, and implores the king's mother to act as an intermediary on behalf of an extensive reform agenda, the word "reform" is never mentioned—perhaps a response to Jean sans Peur's strategic propaganda and cynical self-fashioning from 1404 to 1419 as "the" reform-minded prince whose sole concern was the good of the people.²⁰¹

In assessing the influence of the *Advis* upon the 1439 reforms, one must recall that, in Aragon, Yolande's natal home, the centralization of military, fiscal, and regal authority had been initiated by her ancestor Pere III in the thirteenth century; to her, such a system might have seemed tried and true rather than a new French innovation.²⁰² The Orleans's Estates were Yolande's last official and public involvement in the affairs of France. While Charles VII was 36 years old at the time of these Estates, far from being removed from the affairs of state, Yolande emerges as his primary advisor and guarantor of his sovereignty, co-presiding the assembly. These Estates were the last of Charles's long reign; henceforth, from the issuing of the 1439 edict, the king alone could tax the contributables—he no longer required the annual or extraordinary deliberation and consent of his Estates. Yolande, schooled by her mother, Violant of Bar, had sound practical knowledge of fiscally and politically hostile Estates and *cortes/corts* and the best strategies with which to deal with them.²⁰³

Yolande had emerged from the gloom of her dark forest into the light of France's new day, managing the metamorphosis of her son-in-law Charles from *le petit roi de Bourges* into the first manifestation of an absolute monarch of a unified France. Despite the continued presence of the English, the task Yolande had set for herself upon her return from Provence in the summer of 1423 had been accomplished. She had employed diplomacy, political brinkmanship, military force, and celestial intervention to achieve her ends. Her female descendants and family were to remain at the forefront of affairs—notably, her granddaughter Marguerite of Anjou and her great-granddaughter, Anne of France. Yolande retired to Saumur, where she died aged 61 on November 14, 1442. Her final testament bears witness to her sojourn in *le forêt de longue attente*—an extended stay wherein she was obliged to underwrite Louis III's Italian venture, protect her territories and possessions, and support her son-in-law Charles in his struggle to take back the throne of France, efforts that combined to dissipate the vast fortune bequeathed to her by her husband Louis

II in 1417.²⁰⁴ From Montauban in February 1443, Charles VII recognized her contribution by alienating the lands and titles of Gien, Saint-Maixent, Chizé, and Civray to name a few, to his brother-in-law and favorite, Charles of Anjou.²⁰⁵

Her grandson, the dauphin Louis, later Louis XI, in whose future interests she had largely directed her exertions since the summer of 1423, observed that she had the “*cuier d’homme en corps de femme*” (the heart of a man in the body of a woman). Of his own daughter Anne, *Madame la Grande*, Dame de Beaujeu and Duchess of Bourbon, his anointed yet unofficial regent, Louis said she was “*moins folle femme du monde, car de sage je n’en sais point*” (The least foolish woman in the world, because I know of no wise ones). To this “least foolish of women,” he entrusted the care and education of the dauphin Charles, handing her the responsibility to govern France, if not the title regent. To protect Anne against the sort of baronial and dynastic attack faced by Blanche of Castile in the wake of Louis VIII’s death during Louis IX’s minority, Louis XI appointed Anne’s husband lieutenant-general and accorded the couple joint guardianship of Charles VIII. Lacking the label, Anne was, nonetheless, recognized as the controlling authority of the young king, the finances of his state, and the power of the realm.²⁰⁶ Anne was her father’s daughter and every inch her great-grandmother’s natural successor. Brantôme, whose grandmother had regaled him with firsthand accounts of *Madame la Grande*, said of Anne that “*Elle gouverna si sagement et vertueusement que [she was held to be] ung des grands roys de France*” (she governed so wisely and virtuously that she was held to be one of the great kings of France).²⁰⁷ Anne’s advice to her daughter Suzanne could have just as easily originated from the hand of Yolande:

Widowed women cannot offer too many prayers, fasts or alms because devotion should be their principal occupation. When it comes to the government of their lands and affairs *they must depend only upon themselves*; when it comes to sovereignty, *they must not cede power to anyone . . . govern wisely without getting a bad name for yourself.*²⁰⁸

This prudent “article of faith” was Yolande’s gold standard, one that, in combination with her seemingly inexhaustible patience, contributed to the recovery and restoration of France, to the great benefit of her heirs, successors, and their subjects.²⁰⁹



CONCLUSION

This study concludes with the death of Yolande in November 1442. It has examined the verso of the tapestry of her life and times as well as the foundation sketches of her immediate predecessors, whose activities were essential to its composition, influencing her actions and decisions. What is telling about Yolande is that she managed to transform radically the original design sketch drafted for her—sovereignty over the kingdoms of Naples–Sicily–Jerusalem—to include the recovery and reform of the kingdom of France, ensuring that her son-in-law, grandson, and their descendants would rule France, if not in the end maintaining direct Angevin control over Anjou–Maine–Provence and Bar-Lorraine;¹ the prize her descendants received was far richer than the one first designed for them.

Pintoin described Yolande as having an “air of dignity that radiated from her entire being,” and this quality of dignity through adversity, patience, and prudence, combined with her unimpeachable piety and morality meant that none of her adversaries were able to criticize her or weave propaganda to undermine her persona, unlike the cases of her contemporaries Isabeau of Bavaria and Giovanna II of Naples. Yolande’s widowhood provided her with additional dignity and she wisely sought never to remarry. This too gave Yolande an additional aura of power; her authority reposed first upon her very particular coronation at the time of her marriage in 1400, then her official lieutenant-generalcy of 1410, and, later, the viceroyalty conferred upon her by her son, Louis III, in 1423. These authorities enabled her to manipulate power and influence in all areas of princely endeavor: political, diplomatic, judicial, military, and spiritual. Her authorities were of unlimited duration, though, in theory, only to be exercised in the absences of her husband and son. In maintaining and husbanding these, Yolande presaged and probably informed the advice of her great-granddaughter Anne of France to her daughter Suzanne: “When it comes to the government of their lands and their affairs, they [widows] must depend only upon themselves; when it comes to sovereignty, they must not cede power to anyone.”²

Yolande's personal qualities and incisive political assiduity contributed to the success of her enterprise; however, it must be remembered that much of this had been cultivated with care by her upbringing in Aragon and her mother's attentive influence. Moreover, Yolande witnessed firsthand the political and diplomatic actions of her mother, Violant, Queen of Aragon, and her aunt, Queen María de Luna. Yolande did not leave her natal kingdom until the relatively mature age of 20—unusual for a princess of her time, and this too would have assisted her in her responses to the many difficulties she was to overcome during the fractured and dysfunctional reign of the unfortunate Charles VI of France. Following the death of her husband, Yolande adhered to his testimonial advice that she work toward a lasting rapprochement with the house of Brittany as a means by which to unify the princely houses of France and drag the house of Burgundy out of its alliance with England and back into the fold. Establishing durable relations with Brittany was one of her first initiatives and, probably, the aspect of her political undertaking to which she devoted the better part of her considerable energies. Her recruitment of Richemont to the post of constable was a masterstroke and, although his appointment was not an easy or untroubled one, he remained faithful to her and to Charles VII in spite of the latter's attempts and those of his perfidious favorite, Trémoille, to distance him from the inner circle of power and influence.³ Without Richemont, his ties, and networks, Yolande's projects might have stalled. They deployed their respective networks of influence to bring their joint endeavors to fruition, and both were untiring in their efforts despite the many obstacles thrown in their way. There is, too, the importance of Franciscan spirituality to Yolande's story; the Friars Minor benefited her by their ability to interact with all estates of society, their vast networks of spiritual influence, and their characteristic mobility and discretion—a mobility and discretion that allowed them to traverse kingdoms and beyond their borders. They were the original *agents sans frontières*; their spiritual credentials allowed them to breach barriers of hostility, enabling them to deliver messages and disseminate policy. This is particularly relevant to any understanding of the spread of Joan of Arc's legend and the genesis of her apogee.

All of the above would have been of little account had not a series of casual, rather than causal, events occurred.⁴ The most notable of these are (1) Charles becoming dauphin (he was only third in line to the throne when he was engaged to Marie of Anjou). The deaths of the dauphins Louis and Jean in quick succession without heirs

gifted the Angevins even greater access to prestige and proximity to authority as well as power and influence; (2) the death of Henry V and Charles VI within weeks of one another in 1422, and the minority of Henry VI (only nine months of age), opened a window of opportunity for Charles and Anjou to regain power after the debacle of Montereau and the Treaty of Troyes, which had disinherited him; and (3) the appearance of the young visionary, Joan of Arc, from the “oak wood” in the eastern reaches of the kingdom, where René of Anjou was duke of Bar and heir-designate, with his wife Isabelle, to the duchy of Lorraine. This is not to diminish the achievements of Yolande of Aragon but rather to record that serendipity had a part to play in the endgame of her political oeuvre. A lesser princess might not have had the wit, aptitude, or political intelligence to use these opportunities to greatest effect; a combination of her personal virtues, her patience, and meticulous planning, and, very occasionally, fate ensured the successful outcome of her enterprise.

In the course of this study, having examined the “reverse of the tapestry” and followed the essential threads and knots of its lineal complexity to their origins, it seems that every stitch was placed by hand (occasionally guided by fate)—more often than not, by the hand of Yolande of Aragon. To borrow the words of Boysset, Yolande’s actions and achievements prove the “*valor*,” “*beutat*,” and “*noblesa*” of her warp and weft. This princess of Aragon and France enabled the creation of a complex design on an enormous scale that reverberated long after her death. Her woven narrative is distributed over the entire surface of this period of history, reinforcing the idea that venturing behind the tapestry is often more instructive than merely contenting ourselves with the image commissioned for public view.



NOTE ON TRANSLATION, MANUSCRIPTS, AND USAGE

Except where specified, all translations and paraphrasings are my own.

Manuscripts and sources listed in the Select Bibliography constitute a useful selection of those I have researched and consulted online or in situ. Others are listed in notes for the assistance of readers, should they wish to consult sources more widely.

On the question of names, it is rarely possible to be entirely consistent, particularly when many of the people inhabiting this book neither remained or operated in monolingual environments or contexts, nor were tied to any single linguistic or cultural tradition. For example, I have used Jean of Burgundy instead of John of Burgundy because, when used alongside names such as Jean Gerson, Jehan Porcher et al., “John” would appear the more inconsistent—likewise for names such as Philippe, Antoine et al., “Of” rather than “de” is used when the appellation refers to a territory. Isabeau of Bavaria, rather than Elizabeth, has been used because she is well known and most commonly referred to as Isabeau. Joan of Arc has been used instead of Jeanne or Jehanne because she is most commonly referred to as Joan in English. I have striven to respect other first names in their original or regional linguistic forms—Giovanna for the queens of Naples; Pere, Joan, and Martí for the kings of Aragon, following their numberings as kings of Aragon (as they are more commonly known, rather than the more geopolitically accurate title of kings of Catalunya-Aragó). While Yolande of Aragon was known as Violant/Violante in her natal kingdom, to avoid confusion with her mother Violant (Yolande) of Bar, and in keeping with the name by which she is best known in France and elsewhere, she is determinedly Yolande of Aragon in this study. Place names are used in the most commonly employed versions today—Girona (in Catalonia), but Rome instead of Roma.



NOTES

Introduction

1. Barbara Newman, "On the Ethics of Feminist Historiography," *Exemplaria*, 2 (2) (October 1990), 702–6, 702.
2. Ibid. For a discussion of the ways in which the "fetishism of experience" and the "priority of 'feeling,'" "experience" and "individual subjectivity" fed into the decline of Second Wave Feminism, I refer the reader to James Panton's unpublished conference paper, "The Politics of Experience: Second Wave Feminism and the Unmediated Society," Political Studies Association Conference, April 5–8, 2004, University of Lincoln, UK, 4–6, 9–13, 16.
3. Newman, "On the Ethics," 703.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 704.
7. Ibid. Cf. Kathleen Casey, "The Cheshire Cat: Reconstructing the Experience of Medieval Women," in Berenice Carroll, ed., *Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and Critical Essays*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976, 224–49, 245. Newman quotes a passage from Casey to illustrate her point; observing that Casey blames women, in general, and educated women, in particular, for choosing "in certain crucial respects to affirm rather than deny traditional values, the strategic area of role recruitment and role replacement." Cf. Sister Prudence Allen R. S. M., *The Concept of Woman V. 2: The Early Humanist Reformation, 1250–1500*, Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002, 537–658, esp. 620, wherein she refutes Casey's thesis. Allen makes some interesting observations in her insightful analysis of Christine de Pizan and her writing; "In identifying the city of the ladies with the city of God, Christine demonstrates that her city of ladies is generic for all humanity. Each 'she' represents men and women whose lives are full of wisdom and virtue, and who live in a society dedicated to the common good (...) the city portrayed in Christine's text also acts like a spiritual mother of all men and women who find their home there... Mary personifies the characteristics of a mother and a ruling Queen in active governing and exercising dominion over those in her care" (641–42).
8. Theresa Earenfight, "Queenship, Politics and Government in the Medieval Crown of Aragón: The Lieutenancy of María of Castile, 1420–3 and 1432–53," doctoral thesis, Fordham University, 1997, 43.
9. Jacqueline Murray, "Thinking about Gender," in Jennifer Carpenter and Sally-Beth Maclean, eds, *The Power of the Weak, Studies on Medieval Women*, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995, 2.

10. Caroline Walker Bynum, "In Praise of Fragments: History in the Comic Mode," in *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion*, New York: Zone Books, 1991, 17.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Theresa Earenfight, "Without the Persona of the Prince: Kings, Queens and the Idea of Monarchy in Late Medieval Europe," *Gender and History* 19 (1) (April 2007), 1–21, 5.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. Marion F. Facinger, "A Study of Medieval Queenship: Capetian France, 987–1237," *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 5 (1968), 3–48.
16. Kimberley A. LoPrete, "Gendering Viragos: Medieval Perceptions of Powerful Women" in Christine Meek and Catherine Lawless, eds, *Victims or Viragos? (Studies on Medieval and Early Modern Women 4)*, Dublin and Portland OR: Four Courts Press, 2005, 17–38, 18. LoPrete cites Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, trans. L. A. Manyon, 2 vols (Chicago, 1961), first French edition 1940.
17. LoPrete, "Gendering Viragos," 19.
18. Natalie Zemon Davis, "'Women's History' in Transition: The European Case," *Feminist Studies*, 3 (3/4) (Spring-Summer, 1976), 83–103, 84.
19. *Ibid.*, 90.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Davis, "Women's History," 90.
22. Theresa Earenfight, *Queenship in Medieval Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, 22.
23. *Ibid.*, 25.
24. Cf. Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King. Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power*, 2nd edition, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, xiv, xvii, 1–2, 121–48.
25. *Ibid.*, 203.
26. Cf. Zita Rohr, "Rocking the Cradle and Ruling the World: Reflections Upon Queens' Households in Late Medieval and Early Modern Aragon and France," in T. Earenfight, ed., *New Perspectives on Elite and Royal Households in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, forthcoming 2016.
27. Henri Martin, *Histoire de France depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'en 1789*, 17 Vols, Paris: Furne, 1855–60, VI, 321. My paraphrasing.
28. Glynnis M. Cropp, "Les personnages féminins tirés de l'histoire de la France dans le 'Livre de la Cité des Dames'," in L. Dulac and B. Ribémont, eds, *Une femme de Lettres au Moyen Age: Études autour de Christine de Pizan*, Orléans: Paradigme, 1995, 195–208, 197, 201. Cf. Karen Green, "Isabeau de Bavière and the Political Philosophy of Christine de Pizan," *Historical Reflections* 32/1 (2006), 247–72, 258, 267–8.
29. Michel Pintoin, M. L. Bellaguet trans and ed., and Bernard Guenée ed., *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380–1422* (hereafter *RSD*), 3 Vols, Paris: Editions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1994, 2, XXXIX, xvii, 90–1.
30. René Planchenault, *L'Apocalypse d'Angers*, Paris: Caisse Nationale des Monuments Historiques et des Sites, 1966, 18.

31. BNF Ms. Fr. 5728, f° 35v; Franz Ehrle ed., “Die Chronik des Garoscus de Ulmoisca Veteri und Bertrand Boysses (1365–1415),” in *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, Freiburg: Herder’sche Verlagshandlung, 1900, 311–420, 359.
32. AN P 1334/17 n° 5.
33. Albert Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René. Sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires*, 2 Vols [Paris: Honoré Champion, 1875]; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1969, II, 112.
34. Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, Peter S. Lewis ed. *Ecrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins*, 3 Vols, Paris: Librairie C. Klincksiek, 1978–1993, I, 388. In a chronicle traditionally attributed to Juvénal des Ursins (the subject of spirited debate), the writer describes Yolande of Aragon as being “*une des belles creatures qu’on peut point voir*” (One of the most beautiful creatures that one could ever see). Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, Jean Alexandre Buchon ed., *Choix de chroniques et mémoires sur l’histoire de France. Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France (...)*, Paris: Mairet et Fournier, 1841, 410.
35. Michel Foucault, Colin Gordon et al eds. and trans., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–77*, New York: Pantheon, 1980, 89–90.
36. Theresa Earenfight ed., *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, xiii–xxviii, xviii–xix. Cf. Leonard Krieger, “The Idea of Authority in the West,” *American Historical Review*, 82 (2) (1977), 249–70.

I *Infanta* of Aragon: Family Matters

1. John Joseph Bagley, *Margaret of Anjou, Queen of England*, London: Herbert Jenkins, 1948, 26. Marguerite of Anjou was Yolande of Aragon’s granddaughter, second daughter of René of Anjou and Isabelle of Lorraine. Isabelle was forced by circumstances (the death of Louis III of Anjou in Naples and the imprisonment of René by Philippe the Good, Duke of Burgundy) to leave Marguerite in the care of Yolande, from 1435 to 1442, during her crucial formative years from age 5 to 12.
2. Violant of Bar had a close and affectionate relationship with her stepdaughter, Joana, who was born in 1375. When Violant married Joan, she was 15 and Joana was four years old; Violant’s relationship with Joana might be conceived as sisterly as much as it was maternal. Bratsch-Prince asserts that “Joana was always treated by Violant as if she were her own flesh and blood, and their warm relations were mutual if we are to judge by their correspondence.” Dawn Bratsch-Prince, “A Queen’s Task: Violant de Bar and the Experience of Royal Motherhood in Fourteenth Century Aragon,” *La Corónica*, 27 (1) (1998), 21–34, 26.
3. Joan I succeeded his father, Pere IV, on January 6, 1387, and died unexpectedly as a result of a dubious hunting accident on May 19, 1396.
4. Cf. Àurea Lucinda Javierre i Mur, *Mata d’Armanyac, duquessa de Girona*, Barcelona: R. Dalmau, 1967. Mata’s correspondence, preserved in the Aragon Crown Archives (ACA), has been neither studied nor edited. Dawn Bratsch-Prince, “Pawn or Player? Violant of Bar and the Game of

- Matrimonial Politics in the Crown of Aragon (1380–1396),” in Eukene Lacarra Lanz ed., *Marriage, Love and Sexuality in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Oxford: Routledge, 2002, 59–89, 86 n. 3.
5. According to his chancellor, Jean Le Fèvre, Louis I quit France for Italy on June 13, 1382. Jean Le Fèvre, H. Moranvillé ed., *Journal de Jean Le Fèvre, Evêque de Chartres, Chancelier des rois de Sicile Louis I et Louis II d'Anjou*, Tome 1 (unique volume published) Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1887, 3.
 6. *Ibid.*, 25. Cf. Marcelle-Renée Reynaud, *Le Temps de Princes, Louis II and Louis III d'Anjou-Provence 1384–1434*, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000, 36.
 7. Lefèvre, *Journal*, 26.
 8. AN P 1334/18, n° 57.
 9. Lefèvre, *Journal*, 55.
 10. *Ibid.*, 104.
 11. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 37.
 12. Lefèvre, *Journal*, 142.
 13. *Ibid.*, 139, and Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 37. Cf. Noël Valois, “Le Projet du mariage entre Louis de France et Catherine de Hongrie et le voyage de l'Empereur Charles IV à Paris,” *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France* (janvier 1893), 209–23.
 14. Lefèvre, *Journal*, 20.
 15. Jerónimo Zurita, Angel López ed., *Anales de Aragón de Jerónimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona d'Aragón*, 9 Vols, Zaragoza: Institucion ‘Fernando el Católica’ C.S.I.C., 1977–1985, IV, X. xxxii, 680.
 16. ACA Reg. 2012, f 65–68 v. Cited by Jaume Riera i Sans, *Pierre de Craon a Catalunya*, Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau, 1976, 5–6.
 17. “In the presence of Caroli and of G. le Tort [acting] as notaries, King Louis said to his mother that he would not consent to the treaty she had drawn up in his name, a marriage to the daughter of Charles of Durazzo, but would contradict it, stating that it would not be well done to be married to the daughter of a traitor and demanded that the charter or instrument be [nullified]. Madame the Queen promised him that she would ‘no longer hold to the [proposed] treaty,’ and, as to this article, would revoke all powers extended to the arbiters... forbidding that he and the others to continue negotiating the said article of marriage, and no longer treat it or the charter.” Le Fèvre, *Journal*, 351–2.
 18. *Ibid.*, 352.
 19. The count of Saint Pol was Walleran II of Luxembourg, and his daughter, Jeanne, was the half-sister of Richard II, King of England.
 20. Françoise Arlot, “Dans la tourmente du XVe siècle Marie de Blois, comtesse de Provence et reine de Naples (2),” *Provence historique*, 56 (224) (avril-mai-juin 2006), 155–94, 168, 170; and Le Fèvre, *Journal*, 526.
 21. Joan and Violant faced turbulent times with municipal representatives, which would come to a head during the great *cortes* of Monzón convened in November 1388.
 22. ACA reg. 2056, f° 101 r. Cited by Riera i Sans, *Pierre de Craon*, 6–8. In the early part of his reign, Joan was incapacitated with debilitating health problems (believed to stem from his epilepsy and its accompanying mild hypochondria) held by some to be the result of his stepmother, queen-dowager Sibil·la de Fortià’s sorcery.

23. Le Fèvre, *Journal*, 526–7. Regarding the galleys requested by France, Queen Violant kept her word to her “*molt car e molt amat costi*” (her most dear, and most beloved cousin) Charles VI, sending him her galleys between March and August 1389, to defend his kingdom against the English. ACA Reg. 1959, f° 2r. Cited by Claire Ponsich, “Violant de Bar (1365–1431). Ses Liens et réseaux de relations par la sang et l’alliance,” in Marcel Faure, ed., *Reines et princesses au Moyen-Age*, 2 Vols, Montpellier: Publications de l’Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3, 2001, I, 233–76, 271.
24. Le Fèvre, *Journal*, 390.
25. *Ibid.*, 391. Jeanne married Antoine, Duke of Brabant, brother of Jean *sans Peur*, Duke of Burgundy, in 1401. Jeanne of Saint Pol died in 1407, and Antoine, Duke of Brabant, died at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415. They left two sons, Jean IV, Duke of Brabant (d. 1427), and Philippe of Saint Pol, Duke of Brabant (d. 1430). In an attempt to block the rise of his cousin, Philippe, Duke of Burgundy, Philippe of Saint Pol negotiated a betrothal agreement with Yolande of Aragon on behalf of her younger daughter, Yolande of Anjou, in 1430. Philippe, Duke of Brabant, died before this could be achieved, and Yolande of Anjou married François I (later duke) of Brittany in 1431. They had one son, Renaud, Count of Montfort, who died young, and Yolande of Anjou died in 1440, two years before Francis succeeded his father (Jean V) as duke of Brittany.
26. Zurita, *Anales*, IV, X, xlv, 742.
27. Pere IV had initiated this marriage; his granddaughter, Yolande of Aragon, would do likewise by commencing betrothal negotiations with England for her granddaughter, Marguerite of Anjou, who married Henry VI in 1444.
28. Zurita, *Anales*, IV, xxlv, 742.
29. Emile-Guillaume Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, 478.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.* Cf. *RSD*, I, XX, xxi, 749.
32. The Neapolitan “disease” would not die out with the passing of Yolande of Aragon’s second son, René of Anjou, in July 1480. Yolande and Louis II’s great-grandson, Charles VIII of France, son of Louis XI, dreamt of victory in Naples–Sicily. Having freed himself from his elder sister Anne of France’s measured guardianship, Charles VIII marched on Italy, expelling the sitting monarch, Alfonso II of Naples, in February 1495. By the summer of 1495, his Italian allies having turned against him, Charles found himself ejected from Naples. He tried to rebuild his army and reinvigorate his Italian venture, but died in 1498. His successor Louis XII claimed Naples in 1502 in a power-sharing arrangement with Spain but, eventually, his armies were driven from Milan in 1513. François I had his own Italian wars with which to contend; the final phase was played out between 1542 and 1546. France finally gave up its Italian territories and ambitions when Henri II signed the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis with Elizabeth I on April 2, 1559, and with Felipe II of Spain the following day.
33. Zurita, *Anales*, IV, X, lxxii, 858. Cf. Vendrell Gallostra, *Violante de Bar*, Barcelona: Reial Acadèmia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona, 1992, 72, 176–81 [ACA C, reg. 2055, f° 66–66 v° and ff° 69–71].
34. Zurita, *Anales*, IV, X, lii, 772.

35. *Ibid.*, 768.
36. Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI*, Paris: Fayard, 1986, 339.
37. *Ibid.*, 790. Cf. Bratsch-Prince, "Pawn or Player?"
38. In addition to shutting the English out of Spain, the French sought to benefit from the maritime resources and expertise of these two powerful Iberian kingdoms.
39. Autrand, *Charles VI*, 339. The king of Castile was Enrique III, son of Juan I of Castile and Elionor of Aragon (sister of Joan I of Aragon). Enrique won several impressive naval victories against the English. Elionor's marriage on June 18, 1375, to Juan of Castile was negotiated by her father, Pere IV, as part of peace arrangements undertaken in 1374 and 1375.
40. Cf. Alain Marchandisse, "Philippe de Mézières et son Epistre au roi Richart," *Le Moyen Age*, 116 (2010), 605–23, 618–19. Moreover, despite her erroneous statement concerning Aragonese policy toward the competing papacies during the reign of Joan I and Violant of Bar, "Aragon like England, supported the Roman pope" (310) consult Anne Curry, "War or Peace? Philippe de Mézières, Richard II and Anglo-French Diplomacy," in Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Kiril Petrov, eds, *Philippe de Mezières and His Age*, Leiden and Boston: Brill 2012, 295–320, 309–12, 315–18; Philippe de Mézières, G. W. Coopland trans., *Letter to King Richard II: a plea made in 1395 for peace between England and France*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1975; and British Library Ms. Royal 20 B VI, "Philippe de Mézières, Epistre au roi Richart 1395."
41. The Crown's initiative to bring an end to the Schism was accepted by the Council of Paris in 1398 with the Universities of Toulouse and Avignon dissenting. This was a very uncomfortable position for the second house of Anjou because it owed its legitimacy as kings and queens of Sicily and Jerusalem in no small measure to the Avignon papacy; Clement VII crowned Louis II, king of Sicily in 1389, heir to the throne ceded to Louis I by Giovanna I and Avignon in 1382. In May 1403, an edict was published restituting obedience to Avignon pope, Benedict XIII. Louis, Duke of Orleans (Charles VI's ambitious younger brother and great competitor of Philippe, Duke of Burgundy) was the protagonist of this volte-face.
42. Cf. Howard Kaminsky, "The Politics of France's Subtraction of Obedience from Pope Benedict XIII, 27 July 1398," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 115 (1971), 366–97, 366; Noël Valois, *La France et Le Grand Schisme d'Occident*, 4 Vols, Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1896–1902; Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhanlung, 1967, 164–7, 229 n. 1, 233–4.
43. ACA C, reg. 2343, ff° 78v–79v, a letter dated August 25, 1396 from María de Luna to Richard II of England, outlining the foreign policy shift from France to England, dispatched following the death of Joan I and well in advance of King Martí's return from Sicily. Cited by Silleras-Fernández, *Power, Piety and Patronage in Late Medieval Queenship: Maria de Luna*, New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 54, 181 n. 35.
44. BNF, Ms. Latin, Collection Lorraine 26, ff 17–18, also cited by Albert Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René. Sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires*, 2 Vols [Paris: Honoré Champion, 1875]; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1969, I, 24–5. Lecoy de la Marche incorrectly observes that this declaration was motivated by the new king, Martí I. France had requested that Joan and Violant withdraw their support from the Avignon pope,

- something that he could not countenance in the context of the concurrent political crisis rapidly unraveling his sovereignty. See note following.
45. J. J. N. Palmer, "The Background to Richard II's Marriage to Isabel of France (1396)," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XLIV, 109 (May 1971) 1–17, 5–8, and 13–16. Although Palmer's analysis of the situation is clear and well argued, he is inaccurate regarding certain dates, ages, and personalities. For Joan's detailed reactions to France's requests, consult the text of his letters to Violant de Bar from Torrella de Montgrú, dated April 24 and 25, 1395 [ACA CRD Joan I, caja 7, N^os 991–2] in Jeanne Vielliard and Robert Avezou, "Lettres originales de Charles VI conservées aux Archives de la Couronne d'Aragon à Barcelone," *Bibliothèque de l'école de chartes*, XCVII (1936), 317–73, 329 n. 2–330. Cf. Joan's initial response to Charles VI dated April 10 [ACA reg. 1968, 24^v, catalan] in Jeanne Vielliard and Léon Mirot, "Inventaire des lettres des rois d'Aragon à Charles VI et à la cour de France conservées aux Archives de la Couronne d'Aragon à Barcelone," *Bibliothèque de l'école de chartes*, CIII (1942), 99–150, 127, n. 105, cited by Palmer 6–7.
 46. BNF Ms. Latin 17332, cited by Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, 25.
 47. *RSD*, 1, I, xxi, 773.
 48. Jaume Aurell and Marta Serrano-Coll, "The Self-Coronation of Peter the Ceremonious (1336): Historical, Liturgical and Iconographical Representations," *Speculum, A Journal of Medieval Studies*, 89 (1) (January 2014), 66–95, 66–7; Jaume Aurell, "Strategies of Self-fashioning: Iberian Kings' Self-coronations," in Laura Delbrugge, ed., *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015, 18–45.
 49. Aurell and Serrano-Coll, "The Self-Coronation," 66–7.
 50. *Ibid.*
 51. Pierre IV, Bernat Dezcoll and Amédée Pagès eds, *Chronique Catalane de Pierre IV d'Aragon III de Catalogne dit le Cérémonieux ou del Punyalet*, Toulouse: Edouard Privat; Paris: Henri Didier, 1942, 8–12, 74–5. For an English translation consult, *Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), Chronicle*, 2 Vols, Mary Hillgarth trans. and J. N. Hillgarth ed., Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980, I: 194–7.
 52. Bonifacio Palacios Martín, *La coronación los reyes de Aragón, 1204–1410: Aportación al estudio de las estructuras medievales*, Valencia: Anubar, 1975, 269–76. Aurell and Serrano-Coll suggest we consult Palacios, "El Ceremonial," in Vicente de Vera, ed., *Ceremonial de consagración y coronación de los reyes de Aragón, 2: Transcripción y estudios*, Zaragoza: Centro de Documentación Bibliográfica Aragonesa, 1992, 104–33 where Palacios proves it was Alfons IV (Pere IV's father) who introduced the act of self-coronation to Aragon, disproving the earlier assertions made by Percy Ernst Schramm, *Der König von Frankreich: Das Wesen der Monarchie vom 9. zum 16. Jahrhundert. Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte des abendländischen Staates*, 2nd edition, 2 vols. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1960, and relied upon by Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 326. Aurell and Serrano-Coll, "The Self-Coronation," 71, 73.
 53. Cf. Germán Navarro Espinach, "Consejeros influyentes y personas de confianza en el entorno cortesano de los reyes de Aragón (Siglos XIII–XV)," in

- Ángel Sesma Muñoz, ed., *La Corona de Aragón en el centro de su historia 1208–1458: La Monarquía aragonesa y los reinos de la Corona*, Zaragoza: Gobierno de Aragón, 2008, 129–79, 144–56, esp. 150–4.
54. Aurell and Serrano-Coll, “The Self-Coronation,” 93 n. 74.
 55. Madrid, Fundación Lázaro Galdiano, Ms. Reg. 14425, f^o 35v and Paris BNF Ms. Espagnol 99, f^o 147r. *Ordinacions de la Casa i Court*, 266–74; Palacios, *Estudio histórico de las Ordenaciones*, 87. Cited by Aurell and Serrano-Coll, “Peter the Ceremonious,” 77–8; 85–6; 92–3. Although they were afforded sacramental anointing because Pere had placed “crowning” at the center of the ceremony, the queens of Aragon, rather than being queens by the grace of God, were queens by the grace of their husband-kings.
 56. *Ibid.*, 75. Cf. Zita Rohr, “Not Lost in Translation: Aragonese Court Culture on Tour (1400–1480),” in Elena Woodacre, ed., *Queenship in the Mediterranean: Negotiating the Role of the Queen in the Medieval and Early Modern Eras*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 145–68.
 57. Marta VanLandingham, *Transforming the State: King Court and Political Culture in the Realms of Aragon (1213–1387)*, Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2002, 6–7.
 58. *Ibid.*, 1. Cf. Francisco M. Gimeno, Daniel Gonzalbo and Josep Trenchs eds, *Ordinacions de la Casa i Cort de Pere el Ceremoniós*, Valencia: Universitat de València, 2009.
 59. The consequences of the first large sweep of the plague through the dominions of the crown of Aragon illustrate Pere IV’s close attention to his administrative sector, which was hard hit by the epidemic; replacing his officials was of primordial concern to the king. See Randal P. Garza, *Understanding Plague: The Medical and Imaginative Texts of Medieval Spain*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008, 34–6; and Amada López de Menese, “Documentos acerca de la peste negra en los dominios de la corona de Aragón,” *Estudios de edad media de la corona de Aragón*, 6 (1956), 291–448, 12–13, where she reproduces a letter from Pere IV [Document 13: ACA reg. 960, fol. 43 v] expressing his concerns.
 60. VanLandingham, *Transforming the State*, 8–9.
 61. *Ibid.* Pere III of Aragon was Yolande of Aragon’s paternal great-great-great-grandfather.
 62. *Ibid.*, 9.
 63. Cf. Zita Rohr, “On the Road Again: The Semi-Nomadic Career of Yolande of Aragon (1400–1439),” in Felicitas Schmieider and Marianne O’Doherty, eds, *Travels and Mobilities in the Middle Ages: From the Atlantic to the Black Sea*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2015, 215–44.
 64. VanLandingham, *Transforming the State*, 10.
 65. *Ibid.*
 66. Cf. Françoise Arlot, “Dans la tourmente du XIVE siècle: Marie de Blois, comtesse de Provence et reine de Naples (1),” *Provence Historique*, 56 (223) (jan-fév-mars 2006), 53–89, esp. 80–9; and “Dans la tourmente du XIVE siècle: Marie de Blois, comtesse de Provence et reine de Naples (2),” *Provence Historique*, 56 (224) (avr-mai-juin 2006), 155–94.
 67. *Ibid.*, 195–7. Cf. Núria Silleras-Fernández, “Negocios Familiares: Relaciones e Intercambios entre las cortes de Sicilia y Aragón (1392–1410),” in *La Mediterrània de la Corona d’Aragó, Siegles XIII-XIV & VIII Centenari de la Sentencia Arbitral de Torrellás. XVIII Congrés Internacional d’Història de*

- la Corona d'Aragó*, Valencia: 2004, 511–22 for a detailed analysis of the relationship and links between Sicily's *cortes* and those in Aragon during Martí of Aragon's vice-regency of Sicily for his brother Joan I and later during his reign as Martí I of Aragon.
68. Cf. Thomas S. Barton, *Contested Treasure. Jews and Authority in the Crown of Aragon*, University Park PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015, esp. 4–10, 16–21, 55–82, 120–61.
 69. Cf. Zita Rohr, "The Practice of Political Motherhood in Late Medieval France: Yolande of Aragon, *Bonne-Mère* of France," in Sean McGlynn and Elena Woodacre, eds, *Image, Perception and Monarchy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 23–47.
 70. Cf. Núria Silleras-Fernández, "La connexió franciscana: Franciscanisme i monarquia a la Corona d'Aragó en temps de Martí I (1396–1410)," in Jacint Duran i Boada, ed., *Vos sou Sant Senyor Déu Unic Franciscanisme i Islam Journades D'Estudis Franciscans 2001*, Barcelona: Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, 2002, 155–78.
 71. David John Viera, "Francisc Eiximenis and the Royal House of Aragon: A mutual dependence," *Catalan Review*, III (2) (1989), 183–9, 187.
 72. Antoni Rubió Lluch, Albert Balcells and Albert Hauf eds, *Documents per a la Història de la cultura catalane medieval*, 2 Vols, Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2000, II, 403. Cited by Silleras-Fernández, "La connexió franciscana," 169.
 73. *Ibid.* Cf. Núria Silleras-Fernández, *Chariots of Ladies: Francisc Eiximenis and the Court Culture of Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
 74. Silleras-Fernández, "La connexió franciscana," 170.
 75. "The relationship he maintained with the three monarchs he served, Pere the Ceremonious and his sons Joan I and Martí I, and their respective wives, was very cordial." *Ibid.*, 168.
 76. Francisc Eiximenis, *Lo Libre de les Dones*, Frank Naccarato ed., Barcelona: Curial Edicions Catalanes, 1981, 1:44, 74–6. Cf. Núria Silleras-Fernández, "Paradoxes humanistes: Els escrits de Francisc Eiximenis i de Bernat Metge i la seva recepció a la Baixa Edat Mitjana i el Renaixement," *eHumanista/IVITRA*, I (2012), 154–67, www.ehumanista.ucsb.edu/eHumanista%20IVITRA/Volume%201/pdf/9%20ehumanista.ivitra.silleras.definitivo.pdf. Consulted on November 15, 2013; Cf. Silleras-Fernández, *Chariots of Ladies*, 44–9.
 77. Until such practices were legislated against by the powerful and conservative Valencian *jurats*. Andrés Ivars, "El escritor Fr. Francisco Eximénez en Valencia (1383–1408)" *Archivo Ibero-Americano XXV* (1926), 5–48, 289–333; 39–44. David J. Viera, "Francisc Eiximenis, Courtly Love and the *De Amore* (I-II)," *Romance Quarterly*, 34 (3) (1987), 311–16, 316.
 78. Cf. Gallostra, *Violante de Bar*.
 79. Silleras-Fernández, "La connexió franciscana," 178. Cf. Jaume Riera i Sans, *Francisc Eiximenis i La Casa Reial: Diplomataris (1373–1409)*, Girona: Institut de Llengua i Cultura Catalans Universitat de Girona, 2010; Cf. Jill R. Webster, "Francisc Eiximenis on Royal Officials: A View of Fourteenth Century Aragon," *Medieval Studies*, 31 (1969), 239–49.
 80. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 134.

81. Cf. Donald J. Kay, "Rebellion on Trial: The Aragonese *Unión* and Its Uneasy Connection to Royal Law, 1265–1301," *The Journal of Legal History* 18 (1997), 30–43; and his "The 'Treasons' of Bernat de Cabrera: Government, Law and the Individual in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon," *Mediaevistik*, 13 (2000), 39–55, 44.
82. Hélène Millet, *Le Concile de Pise. Qui travaillait à l'union de l'Église d'Occident en 1409?*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2010; esp. "La Culture des clercs Angevins et Provençaux envoyés au concile de Pise (1409)," 347–382, 360.
83. Cf. André Vauchez, "Influences Franciscains et réseaux aristocratiques dans le Val de Loire: autour de la bienheureuse Jeanne-Marie de Maillé (1331–1414)," in André Vauchez ed., *Mouvements franciscains et société française XIIIe–XXe siècles*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1984, 95–106.
84. This will be discussed in chapter 4.
85. Cf. Silleras-Fernández, *Power, Piety and Patronage*, 115–38.
86. Jill R. Webster, *Els Menorets, The Franciscans in the Realms of Aragon from St Francis to the Black Death*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1993.
87. *Ibid.*, 3–4.
88. *Ibid.*, 5.
89. Francesc Eiximenis, *Regiment de la cosa pública*, Daniel de Molins de Rei ed., Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1927, esp. 124–5, 127–8. Cf. Jill R. Webster, *La societat catalana al segle XIV*, 2nd edition, Barcelona: Edicions 62 (1967) 1980.
90. Francesc Eiximenis, *Crestiá: dotzè llibre o Tractat de regiment dels prínceps e de comunitats*, Valencia: Lambert Palmart, 1484. Although Eiximenis wrote this encyclopedic work in 1385 during the reign of Pere IV, it was not actually published until 1484 in Valencia.
91. Josep Torras i Bages, *La tradició catalana*, Barcelona: Edicions 62 (1892) 1981, 298–9. He cites Josep Coroleu as his source ed., *Documents historichs catalans del segle XIV: Colecció de cartas familiars corresponents als regnats de Pere el Punyalet y Johan I*, Barcelona: 1889. Both these sources are cited by Joan-Anton Sánchez de Juan, "Civitas et Urbs: The Idea of the City and the Historical Imagination of Urban Governance in Spain, 19th and 20th Centuries," doctoral thesis, European University Institute Florence, Italy, 2001, 1–2.
92. Lola Badía states that "presumably Eiximenis did not complete the *Crestiá* as planned," and that the two massive tomes of *Dotzè* were kept in Valencia's municipal hall where they were available for public consultation. Lola Badía's entry, "Eiximenis, Francesc," in *Medieval Iberia. An Encyclopedia*, E. Michael Gerli, New York: Routledge, 2003, 298. Silleras-Fernández has since confirmed Eiximenis's swift rewriting of the passage in her *Chariots of the Ladies*, 44.
93. Cf. Paolo Evangelisti, *I Francescani e la costruzione di uno Stato: Linguaggi politici, valori, identitari, progetti di governo in area catalano-aragonese*, Padua: Editrici Francescane, 2006. Evangelisti posits that, based upon his readings of various Franciscan thinkers, for them, Francis of Assisi was "*il miglior esperto del governo dominativo*" (the greatest expert at power politics) [they had ever seen].
94. Webster, *Els Menorets* 165, 192–3.
95. For "sacred monarchy" see Sean L. Field, *Isabelle of France: Capetian Sanctity and Franciscan Identity in the Thirteenth Century*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006; cf. Agnès of Harcourt, abbess of Longchamp,

- Sean L. Field ed. and trans., *The Writings of Agnès of Harcourt: The Life of Isabelle of France and the Letter on Louis IX and Longchamp*, Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.
96. The Neapolitan first house of Anjou-Capet, the Anjou-Valois second house of Anjou, and the Hungarian Angevin dynasty all venerated and claimed St. Louis of Toulouse for their own (his mother, Mária of Hungary, was the daughter of the Árpáadian king of Hungary, István [Stephen] V, his great aunt was Saint Erzsébet [Elizabeth] of Hungary, and his paternal great-uncle was St. Louis XI of France). Louis's family pushed hard for his canonization and prestigious elevation to dynastic saint. Aragon likewise had an interest in St Louis of Toulouse; Yolande of Aragon's cousin, Alfons V, removed Louis's relics from her loyal city of Marseille during his 1423 retreat from Naples, and re-housed them in his cathedral in Valence, where they are still to be found.
 97. *Ibid.*, 299.
 98. Thomas N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 121.
 99. Tasis i Marca, *Pere*, 139. Cf. Kagay, "The 'Treasons' of Bernat de Cabrera"; and his "Poetry in the Dock: the Court Culture of Joan I on Trial (1396–1398)," *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians*, 22 (2001), 48–99, 51.
 100. *Ibid.* Cf. Alejandro Martínez Giralt, "L'agitat retir monàstic del viscomte Bernat II de Cabrera," *Quaderns de la Selva*, 20 (2008), 43–59, 44; Vegeu Manuel de Bofarull, "Proseco contra Bernardo de Cabrera. Mandado formar por el rey don Pedro IV," 1, Dins: *Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [CDACA]*, 42 Vols, 32, Barcelona: Imprenta del Archivo, 1867; Juan B. Bitges, *La muerte de D. Bernardo de Cabrera, consejero del rey D. Pedro de Aragón (1364)*, Madrid: Sucerores de Rivadeneyra, 1911; and also Donald J. Kagay, "The 'Treasons' of Bernat de Cabrera". Cited by Giralt, 44 n. 1.
 101. *CDACA*, 34, 263–4, 268, 270–3.
 102. Pere III of Catalonia, *Chronicle*, 2, 556–8; Pierre IV, *Chronique catalane*, 377–9; Juan Blas Sitges y Grifoll, *La Muerte de D. Bernardo de Cabrera, consejero del rey D. Pedro IV de Aragón (1364)*, Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1911, 4.
 103. Cf. Rohr, "Not Lost in Translation" 145–68; 145, 148–9 for Joan I's court culture, patronage and preferences.
 104. *Ibid.*
 105. Mata's offspring, apart from Joana Daroca, died during their first year of life: Jaume b. June 23, 1374 d. 1374; Joana Daroca b. October 1375 d. July 23, 1407; Joan b. July 23, 1376 and d. July 1376; Alfons b. September 9, 1377 and d. end of September 1377; and Elionor b. July 14, 1378 and died shortly afterwards. Mata of Armagnac died on October 23, 1378. Javierre i Mur, *Mata D'Armanyac*, 15–16.
 106. Violant (Yolande) b. August 11, 1381 d. November 14, 1442; Jaume *el "bereu"* (the heir) b. March 1384 d. 1388; a premature son, Carlos, b. and d. in May of 1386; Fernando b. in March 1389 lived for only seven months; Pedro b. in January 1394 barely survived four months; and Joana de Perpinya b. January 1396 survived eight months. ACA, reg. 2053, f° 96r; ACA reg. 2056, f° 108; ACA reg. 2054, f° 101; and ACA reg. 1818, f° 75v. Cited by Dawn Bratsch-Prince, *Violante de Bar (1365–1431)*, Madrid: Ediciones del Orto, 2000, 25, 62–6. Bratsch-Prince refers us to José Coroleu, *Documents històrics catalans del segle XIV. Colecció de cartes familiars*, Barcelona: Imprenta La Renaixensa, 1889, 353, 354, 348.

107. Núria Silleras-Fernández, “Money Isn’t Everything: Concubinage, Class and the Rise and Fall of Sibil·la de Fortià, Queen of Aragon (1377–87)”, in *Women and Wealth in Late Medieval Europe*, ed., Theresa Earenfight, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 67–88, 72–3
- Pere and Sibil·la had a daughter, Isabella, before their marriage in 1377 (1376–1424) whom the king later legitimized. She married Jaume II *el Dissortat* (the Unfortunate), Count of Urgell. As the most senior legitimate agnate, Jaume expected to be Martí I’s successor in the event he produced no surviving legitimate male heir. Jaume was passed over during the succession predicament following Martí’s death in 1410. Cf. Raphaela Averkorn, “La Participation des femmes nobles au pouvoir au bas Moyen Age: L’Exemple des reines et princesses de Castille et d’Aragon,” Marcel Faure ed., *Reines et princesses au Moyen Age. Actes du cinquième colloque international de Montpellier Université Paul-Valéry (24–27 novembre 1999)* 2 Vols. Montpellier: Les Cahiers du C.R.I.S.I.M.A., 2001, 1, 215–32, 228–31. Averkorn points out that Elionor was not beautiful, but she was a political prize, very wealthy, and endowed with shrewd political sensibilities—the opposite of Sibil·la de Fortià. Averkorn cites Ramón Gubern ed., *Epistolari de Pere III*, Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1955, 1, 101–4, n. 11; and Raphaela Averkorn “Les Nobles sont-ils toujours beaux? Quelques remarques sur les descriptions des personages dans les chroniques médiévales de la Péninsule Ibérique,” Jean Arrouye ed., *Le Beau et le laid au Moyen Age*, Aix-en-Provence: Centre univervistaire d’études et de recherches médiévales d’Aix, 2000, 27–44, 36.
108. Silleras-Fernández, “Money Isn’t Everything,” 67.
109. See earlier, this chapter for Pere’s ceremonial for queens and the miniatures commissioned to illustrate his text. For an analysis of *fama* (renown, good name, reputation) consult Thelma Fenster, *Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe*, ed. Thelma Fenster & Daniel Lord Smail, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2003; and Claude Gauvard, “La Fama, une parole fondatrice,” *Médiévales*, 24 (printemps 1993), 5–13.
110. See above this chapter, for Aragonese queens’ crowning by the hands of their husband-kings.
111. I have used *cortes/corts* in this instance as I refer to the totality of the crown of Aragon’s “General Estates.” “Cortes” refers to its Aragonese and Sicilian versions, while “corts” is the more accurate descriptor of its Catalonian and Valencian counterparts. Cf. Zita Rohr “True Lies and Strange Mirrors: The uses and abuses of rumor, propaganda and innuendo during the closing stages of the Hundred Years War,” Zita Rohr and Lisa Benz St John eds, *Queenship, Reputation and Gendered Power in the Medieval and Early Modern West* New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, expected 2016; Dawn Bratsch-Prince, “The Politics of Self-Representation in the Letters of Violant of Bar (1365–1431),” *Medieval Encounters*, 12 (1) (2006), 2–25, 2–3, for a detailed discussion of and sources for the origins of Violant’s “black legend” and María del Carmen García Herrero, “El Entorno Femenino de los Reyes de Aragón,” in Ángel Sesma Muñoz, ed., *La Corona de Aragón en el centro de su historia 1208–1458: La Monarquía aragonesa y los reinos de la Corona*, Zaragoza: Gobierno de Aragón, 2008, 327–50, regarding the renown and high esteem with which certain Aragonese queens (including Violant of

- Bar, 327–9) were held for their capacity to negotiate, pacify, and mediate in diverse and complex situations of conflict; and Averkorn, “*La participation des femmes nobles au pouvoir.*”
112. Zita Rohr, “Lessons for my Daughter: Self-fashioning Stateswomanship in the Late Medieval Crown of Aragon” in Laura Delbrugge, ed., *Self-fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Leiden and Boston: Brill Press, 2015, 46–78.
 113. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, 122.
 114. Cf. Michael A. Ryan, *A Kingdom of Stargazers: Astrology and Authority in the Late Medieval Crown of Aragon*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011; and, as Damian Smith suggests, for a more balanced and accurate analysis, which takes into account the normative and legitimate practice of astrology at the courts of Aragon consult Johannes Vincke, *Zur Vorgeschichte der Spanischen Inquisition: Die Inquisition in Aragon, Katalonien, Mallorca und Valencia während des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts*, Bonn: Hanstein, 1941. Damian Smith, “Review Article,” *Speculum*, 89 (1) (January 2014), 242–3. Yolande’s personal interest in the stars is testified to by her Franciscan confessor, Nicolás Sacosta, who received his doctorate at Cambridge and was appointed provincial to the friars minor of Aragon. He probably followed Yolande to Provence on her marriage to Louis II as her confessor and advisor. He was created bishop of Sisteron in 1404 by Benedict XIII. His 1414 obituary recorded that he was “Catalan by nationality, originally from Mallorca, consummate master in theology, perfectly versed in astronomy and all the sciences.” Joseph-Hyacinthe Albanès ed., *Gallia christiana novissima. Histoire des Archevêchés, Evêchés et Abbayes de France*, 7 Vols, 1: *Aix, Apt, Fréjus, Gap, Riez et Sisteron*, Montbéliard: Société Anonyme d’Imprimerie Montbéliardaise, 1899, 47 col. 738.
 115. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, 122; ACA reg. 2053, f 7v cited by Bratsch-Prince, *Violante de Bar*, 68 and 29, n. 11.
 116. Anselm Maria Albareda, Josep Massot i Mutaner ed., *Historia de Montserrat*, Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2010, 291, 297–8; Paul M. Norris, “Patronage and Piety: Montserrat and the Royal House of Medieval Catalonia-Aragon,” *Mirator* (October 2000), 1–15, 7–8.
 117. Dawn Bratsch-Prince, *La vida y epistolario de Violante de Bar (1365–1431) duquesa de Gerona y reina de Aragón*, 9; unpublished translation notes generously made available to me by her.
 118. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, 122.
 119. Bernard VII of Armagnac was the first cousin of Joan’s deceased wife, Mata of Armagnac.
 120. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, 123
 121. *Ibid.*
 122. Cf. Tasis i Marca, *Pere el Ceremoniós i els seus fills*, Barcelona: Vincens-Vives, 1962, “La crisi peninsular,” 63–101.
 123. Leon Poliakov, *The History of Anti-Semitism*, 2, Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003, 156–7. Cf. Henry Charles Lea, “Ferrand Martinez and the Massacres of 1391,” *American Historical Review*, 1 (2) (January 1896), 209–19; Philippe Wolff, “The 1391 Pogrom in Spain. Social Crisis or Not?” *Past and Present*, 50 (February 1971), 4–18, 6 & 17; and David Nirenberg, “Une Société face à l’altérité,” *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 62 (4) (2007), 755–90.

124. Cf. Tasis i Marca, *Pere el Ceremoniós*, 181–4; Bratsch-Prince, *Violante de Bar*, 32–3; David J. Viera, “Sant Vicent Ferrer, Francesc Eiximenis, i el pogrom de 1391,” in Karl I. Kobbervig, Arseni, Pacheco, and Josep Massot i Muntaner, eds, *Actes del siè colloqui d’estudis catalans a Nord-Amèrica Vancouver 1990*, Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1992, 244–54, 253. Viera discusses Eiximenis’s softening attitude toward the Jews in his later writings, explaining that, in later years, Eiximenis shifted his position, in part, as a response to pressure from Joan I and Violant, who protected the Jews; the events and violence of the 1391 pogrom; his own increased emphasis on devotion, the ascetic, and the mystical in his writings; and his fervent hope to convert Jews. Eiximenis believed that the year 1400 would ring in the apocalypse, and was preparing for the ultimate conversion of the Jews. David J. Viera, “The Evolution of Francesc Eiximenis’s Attitudes Toward Judaism,” in Susan E. Meyers, Steven J. MacMichael, eds, *The Friars and Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, Leiden: Brill, 2004, 147–60, 147, 158–9.
125. Barton, *Contested Treasure*, 169–70, 204, 243 n. 18–19.
126. Wolff, “The 1391 Pogrom,” 17. Cf. Jaume Riera i Sans, “Los tumultos contra las juderías de la Corona de Aragón,” *Cuadernos de historia, Anexos de la Revista ‘Hispania’*, VII (1977), 217–25.
127. Tasis i Marca, *Pere el Ceremoniós*, 174–9.
128. Cf. Rohr, “Not Lost in Translation”; Dawn Ellen Prince, “Vernacular Translation in the Fourteenth Century Crown of Aragon: Bruno Latini’s *Li livres dou tresor*,” *Translation and the Transmission of Culture Between 1300 and 1600*, Jeanette Beer and Kenneth Lloyd-Jones eds, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1995, 55–90, 55.
129. Antoni Rubió i Lluch, “La cultura catalana en el regnat de Pere III,” *Estudis Universitaris Catalans* 8 (1914), 219–47, 221, Bratsch-Prince, *Violante de Bar*, 32–3.
130. Ibid. Cf. Françoise Autrand, “La culture d’un roi: livres et amis de Charles V,” *Perspectives Médiévales*, 21 (1995), 99–106 and “Les livres des hommes de pouvoir: de la pratique à la culture écrite au temps de Charles V,” *Pratiques de la culture écrite en France au XVe siècle: Actes du Colloque International du CNRS Paris, 16–18 mai 1992*, Monique Ornato and Nicole Pons eds, Louvain-la-neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Etudes Médiévales, 1995, 193–204. Cf. Rohr “Not Lost in Translation,” 146–8.
131. Ibid., 44.
132. Charles V and his brothers Louis I of Anjou, King of Naples and Jerusalem (but known as the king of Sicily, 1339–1384); Jean the Magnificent of Berry (1340–1416) and Philippe the Bold of Burgundy (1342–1404) were the powerful and influential uncles of Violant of Bar. The royal library of Charles V contained some thousand volumes. Cf. Léopold Delisle *Recherches sur la librairie de Charles V*, 2 Vols, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1907; and Patrick M. de Winter, *La Bibliothèque de Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne (1364–1404)*, Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985.
133. Cf. Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de Peña, “Mecenas, trovadores, bibliófilos y cronistas: los reyes d’Aragón del *Casal de Barcelona* y la sabiduría (1162–1410),” *Revista Chilena de Estudios Medievales*, 2 (julio-diciembre 2012), 81–120, 82–5, 92–4, 106–7, 109–10, 115 (for Joan I) and 104–5 (for Violant of Bar).
134. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, ed., *Historia de España. Tomo XIV España Cristiana, Crisis de la Reconquista, Luchas Cíviles*, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1966, 546–47.

135. Terence Scully, "French Songs in Aragon: The Place of Origin of the *Chansonnier* Chantilly, Musée Condé 564," in Keith Busby & Erik Kooper, eds, *Courtly Literature and Context. Selected Papers from the 5th Triennial Congress of the International Courtly Literature Society, Dalfsen, The Netherlands, 9–16 August, 1986*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company: 1990, 509–21. Cf. Terence Scully, *French secular music: manuscript Chantilly, Musée Condé 564. Polyphonic Music of the Fourteenth Century (PMFC), Vols 18–19*, Monaco: Editions de l'Oiseau-Lyre, c. 1981–82; Maricarmen Gómez, "French Songs in Aragon de Terence Scully revisé," Yolanda Plumley and Anne Stone eds, *A Late Medieval Songbook and its Context: New Perspectives on the Chantilly Codex (Bibliothèque du Château de Chantilly Ms. 564)*, Turhout: Brepols, 2010, 245–61; Maricarmen Gómez, *La música en la casa real catalano-aragonesa durante los años 1336–1432. Vol I, Historia y documentos*, Barcelona: A. Bosch, 1979; idem "Musique dans les chapelles de la maison royale d'Aragon," *Musica Disciplina*, 38 (1984) 67–86; idem "La musique à la maison royale de Navarre à la fin du Moyen-Age et le chanter Johan Robert," *Musica Disciplina*, 41 (1987), 109–51, esp. 145–6; Gilles Dulong and Agathe Sultan, "Nouvelles lectures des chansons notes dans le Codex Chantilly," *New Perspectives on the Chantilly Codex*, 96–114; Yolanda Plumley, "An "Episode in the South"? Ars Subtilior and the Patronage of French Princes," *Early Music History*, 22 (2003), 103–68; and Jason Stoessel, "The Captive Scribe: The context and culture of scribal and notational process in the music of the ars subtilior," unpublished doctoral thesis, University of New England, Armidale Australia, 2002, esp. Chapter 2, "A source made in Italy: Observations of scribal process and filiation in Codex Chantilly," 24–92, esp. 46.
136. Menéndez Pidal, *Historia*, 510.
137. *Ibid.*, 511–12.
138. Scully, "French Songs in Aragon". These pieces are ballads 24 and 80. The acrostic spells out '*Catheline la royne d'amours*'; Yolande (Violant) of Bar is the Catherine in question. Baptized Catherine, the eldest of the 11 children of Robert of Bar and Marie of France, Yolande of Bar acquired the name Yolande by familiar use, a forename long associated with the women of the house of Bar. Before her marriage, Catherine was the name by which she was known in official documents. St Catherine was an important patron of the Valois dynasty. Cf. Bonnie Young, "A Jewel of St. Catherine", in "The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin", 24, 10 (June 1966), 316–24, 319. Roca cites a letter from Joan to the Cardinal of Aragon, requesting dispensation so that his marriage might take place during Lent, in which he names her Catherine, clarifying that she will be known as Violant: "... *car l'avi de de Bar, a la qual ell nomena Caterina, essent axí que li diuen Violant...*" Joseph Maria Roca, *Johan I d'Aragó*, Barcelona: Memorias de la Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona, 1929, 95. Cf. Josep Sanabre i Sanromà, "Les noces del primogènit Joan d'Aragó amb la duquesa de Bar I el Cisma d'Occident, in *Oc: setmanari de literatura, arts, ciències, esports: organe dels Païres d'Oc: Auvernha, gasconha, Lengadoc, Lemozin, Provensa, Catalonha amb Valencia & Balears*, VIe annada (1929) num. 118 (Sept.), 4; num. 120 (Oct.), 12–13; num. 121 (Nov.), 9–11; num. 122 (Dec.), 11. Cf. Gómez, "French Songs in Aragon de Terence Scully revisé," 246–50. Gómez seems to support many of Scully's assertions on this subject if not his case for a Catalan scribe.
139. Scully, *op. cit.*, 518.

140. Ibid.
141. Scully believes that the work was commissioned and produced between 1392 and 1396, a period which covers the marriage of Joan's elder daughter by his marriage to Mata of Armagnac, Joana Daroca, to Mathieu, Count of Foix up to the time of Joan's death in 1396.
142. Gilbert Reaney, "The Manuscript Chantilly, Musée Condé 1047," *Musica Disciplina*, 8 (1954), 59–113: "this original manuscript came not from the North but from the territories of Foix and Aragon in the South-West," 82, and "it is clear that both music and texts were intended mainly for the Francophile courts of the Aragon princes, in particular... John I, king of Aragon," Reaney, *Manuscripts of Polyphonic Music c. 1320–1400, Répertoire international des sources musicales*, 2, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, 1966, 129. However, Reaney mistakenly attributes the wedding song, *Passerose de beauté*, to Jean of Valois's 1386 "marriage" to the eight-year old Catherine of Valois (b. 1378 d. 1388; daughter of Charles V and Jeanne of Bourbon, who died giving birth to her) rather than to the wedding of Joan and Violant who married in 1380. Jean of Valois carried the title Count of Montpensier, and was son of Jean the Magnificent, Duke of Berry, Violant's uncle. Reaney, "The Manuscript Chantilly," 76–7.
143. Maricarmen Gómez Mutané, "Trebor en Aragon y Navarra," *Cuadernos del CEMYR: Institutio des Estudios Medievales y Renacentistas de la Universidad de La Laguna*, 17 (2009), 113–24, esp. 119–22.
144. Cf. Rohr "Lessons for my Daughter".
145. Cf. Claire Ponsich, "Des lettres, le livre et les arts dans les relations vers 1388–1389 de Violant de Bar et de Gaston Fébus," in Valérie Fasseur ed., *Froissart à la cour de Béarn. L'écrivain, les arts et le pouvoir*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2009, 277–304, 278–9; *The Ferrell-Vogüé Machaut Manuscript DIAMM Facsimiles N° 5*, 2 Vols, Lawrence Earp, Domenic Leo and Carla Shapreau eds, Oxford: DIAMM Publications, 2015; Bratsch-Prince, "The Politics of Self-Representation"; Ponsich, "Violant de Bar (1365–1431). Ses liens et réseaux"; Ponsich, "Un témoignage de la Culture en Cerdagne, la correspondance de Violant de Bar (1380–1431)," *Etudes Roussillonnaises, Revue d'Histoire et d'Archéologie Méditerranéennes*, 3ème série, XXXI (2005), 147–93; Ponsich, "La Correspondance de Yolande de Bar, reine veuve d'Aragon: une source sur Benoît XIII et le concile de 1408," *Etudes Roussillonnaises*, XXIV (2009), 93–105.
146. Cf. Ponsich, "Des lettres, le livre et les arts"; Plumley, "Citation, allusion et portrait du Prince: peinture, parole et musique," *Froissart à la cour de Béarn*, 321–37; and Richard Vernier, *Lord of the Pyrenees: Gaston Fébus, Count of Foix (1331–1391)*, Woodbridge, UK and Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2008.
147. Cf. Amédée (Amadeu) Pagès, *La poésie française en Catalogne du XIII^e siècle à la fin du XV^e siècle*, Toulouse and Paris: Privat-Didier, 1936.
148. Ponsich, "Des lettres, le livre et les arts," 285; Antoni Rubió i Lluch, *Documents per l'història de la cultura catalana mig-èval*, 2 Vols, Barcelona: Institut Estudis Catalans, 1908–21, I, 238 and 225.
149. Cf. Lawrence Earp, *Guillaume de Machaut: A Guide to Research*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1995; for Violant of Bar, 29–30, 59–61 and 75–84; and for the Chantilly Codex, *passim*.
150. Ibid. Cf. Antonio Cortijo Ocaña, "Women's role in the creation of literature in Catalonia at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century," *La Corónica: A Journal of medieval Spanish Language and*

- Literature*, 27 (1) (1998), 7–20; and Maricarmen Gómez Mutané, “Trebor en Aragón y Navarra,” *Cuadernos del CEMYR: Institutio des Estudios Medievales y Renacentistas de la Universidad de La Laguna*, 17 (2009), 113–24, esp. 119–22.
151. Robert Archer, “Tradition, Genre, Ethics and Politics in Ausiàs March’s *maldit*,” *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, LXVI (3) (July 1991), 371–92, 376.
 152. Martí de Riquer, *Història de la Literatura Catalana*, Vol. 1, Barcelona: Edicions Ariel, 1964, 565.
 153. ACA reg. 1924, ff° 149–50. Cf. Roger Boase, *The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love: A Critical Study of European Scholarship*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977, 54 n. 12.
 154. Riquer, *Història de la Literatura Catalana*, 567.
 155. Jules Baudot, “La ‘Gaie Science’ dans le Barrois” in *Les princesses Yolande les ducs de Bar de la famille de Valois: Première Partie; Mélusine*, Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1900, 99–120, 107.
 156. David J. Viera, “Francesc Eiximenis’s Dissension with the Royal House of Aragón,” *Journal of Medieval History*, 22 (3) (1996), 249–61, 258; Antoni Riera i Melis, “Francesc Eiximenis (c. 1330–1409): El Context, L’Obra i els Manuscrits,” in Riera i Melis, ed., *Francesc Eiximenis (c. 1330–1409): el context i l’obra d’un gran pensador català medieval*, Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 2015, 9–34, 12.
 157. Ponsich, “Des lettres, le livre et les arts,” 285.
 158. *Ibid.*
 159. Silleras-Fernández states that because Eiximenis believed the ducal couple to be frivolous, in 1384 he politely declined Joan’s invitation that he continue in the post of their confessor. Silleras-Fernández, *Chariots of the Ladies*, 31. For the education, cultural and political pursuits of noble and royal Iberian women and girls consult Maria del Mar Graña Cid ed., *Las Sabias Mujeres: Educación, Saber y Autoría (Siglos III–XVII)*, Madrid: Asociación Cultural Al-Mudayna, 1995, especially the chapter focusing upon the library of Violant of Bar; Isabel de Riquer, “Los Libros de Violante de Bar,” 161–74, where much is made of the fact that, as well as owning books, Violant loaned and borrowed books to and from members of royal and princely houses, including her own in France. For the cultural influence of Joan upon his daughters, Joana and Yolande, consult Antoni Rubió i Lluch, “Joan I Humanista i el primer període de l’humanisme català,” *Etudis Universitaris Catalans* 10 (1917–18), 1–116.
 160. AN P 1334/4, f° 98v. Cited by Auguste Lecoy de la Marche, *Extraits des comptes et mémoriaux du roi René pour servir à l’histoire des arts au Xve siècle*, Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1873, 323.
 161. See above regarding *via cessionis*.
 162. Nuría Silleras-Fernández, “Widowhood and Deception: Ambiguities of Queenship in [the] Late Medieval Crown of Aragón,” Mark Crane, Richard Raiswell and Margaret Reeves eds, *Shell Games: Studies in Scams, Frauds and Deceits (1300–1650)*, Toronto, ON: Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2004, 185–207, 189.
 163. *Ibid.*
 164. One thousand mercenaries mustering at Villeneuve-lèz-Avignon, keen to enter Catalonia. Silleras-Fernández, *Power, Piety and Patronage*, 39.
 165. Rafael Tasis i Marca, *Joan I, El Rei Caçador i Músic*, Barcelona: Editorial Aedos, 1959, 281.

166. Silleras-Fernández, “Widowhood and Deception,” 189.
167. Martí de Riquer, *Història de la literatura catalana* 11 Vols, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, II, 398, cited by Silleras-Fernández, *Power, Piety and Patronage*, 39 & nn. 9 & 11. Consult Menéndez Pidal, *Historia*, XIV, 557–66 for the Lombardy financier, Luquí Scarampo, sent to Avignon by Joan and Violant to negotiate Yolande’s marriage to Louis II of Anjou. Scarampo might have been acting on his own initiative in the raising of mercenary troops forming outside Avignon. In a redoubling of her epistolary activity to Benedict XIII and the Archbishop of Zaragoza, García Fernández de Heredia, Violant assures the archbishop of Zaragoza that Joan is informed of goings on, dismissing the threat of foreign mercenaries as slander put about by the councilors of Barcelona who care little about the cost of such columnies, and sounds out Benedict XIII as to the attitude of Barcelona councilors Arnau Destorrent and the cardinal of Pamplona, Martín de Zalba. See Bernat Metge, Martí de Riquer ed. and trans., *Obras de Bernat Metge*, Barcelona: Facultat de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Barcelona, 1959, 99–102 and notes.
168. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, 122.
169. Bernat Metge, Lola Badia ed., *Lo Somni*, Barcelona: Quaderns Crema, 1999; and Bernat Metge, Antonio Cortijo Ocaña and Elisabeth Lagresa trans., *The Dream of Bernat Metge/ Del Somni D'en Bernat Metge*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2013.
170. Zurita, *Anales*, IV, X.lvi, 791–4; X.lvii, 796–7. Cf. Silleras-Fernández, “Widowhood and Deception,” 190–4; Zita Rohr, “Playing the Catalan: Motherhood, Authority and Power in Late Medieval Aragon and France,” in Elena Woodacre and Carey Fleiner, eds, *Motherhood, Ambition and Authority in the Pre Modern Period II: Defining and Redefining the Image of the “Good” and “Bad” Mother*, New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, expected 2016.
171. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, 139–40.
172. For a modern version of the Catalan text see Rafael Tasis i Marca, *Joan I. El Rei Caçador I Músic*, Barcelona: Editorial Aedos, 1959, 164–5. For an English translation see Dawn Bratsch-Prince, “‘Abs les mans junctes e genolls en terra [with prayerful hands and on bended knee]: Intercession and the Notion of Queenship in Late Medieval Catalonia,” *Catalan Review: International Journal of Catalan Culture*, 20 (1) (2006), 221–8, 222–3. Cf. Ponsich, “Un témoignage,” 172; idem “De la parole d’apaisement au reproche. Un glissement rhétorique du conseil ou l’engagement politique d’une reine d’Aragon?,” *Cahiers d’Etudes Hispaniques Médiévales*, 31 (2008), 81–117, 97–8.
173. José Coroleu y Juglada and José Pella y Forgas, *Las cortes catalanas. Estudio jurídico y comparativo de su organización*, 2nd edition, Barcelona: Imprenta de la Revista Histórica Latina, 1876, 406. Cited by Bratsch-Prince, “Abs les mans,” 214–15.
174. *Ibid.*, 215–16.
175. ACA reg. 2052, f° 106r; Bratsch-Prince, “Abs les mans,” 223–5.
176. Herrero, “El Entorno Femenino,” 327.
177. Bratsch-Prince, “Abs les mans,” 214–15.
178. Cf. María del Carmen García Herrero, “María de Castilla, reina de Aragón (1416–1451): La mediación incansable,” *e-Spania* [Online], 20 février 2015, URL: <http://e-spania.revues.org/24120> Consulted August 22, 2015.

179. Herrero, "El Entorno Femenino," 329.
180. Bratsch-Prince, "Abs les mans," 217.
181. Jean II Juvénel des Ursins, Denys Godefroy ed., *Histoire de Charles VI Roy de France et des choses mémorables advenuës durant 42 années de son Regne depuis 1380 jusques à 1422*, Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1653, 144.
182. Núria Silleras-Fernández, "Spirit and Force: Politics, Public and Private in the Reign of Maria de Luna (1396–1406)," in Theresa Earenfight ed., *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, 78–90, 80. For Eiximenis's specific teachings for women and on marriage, refer to Silleras-Fernández, *Chariots of Ladies*, 4–7, 59–62, 85–95.
183. Yolande's maternal grandmother, Marie of France, died on October 15, 1404, almost four years after Yolande arrived in France to great ceremony. Cf. Jules Baudot, *Les Princesses Yolande*, 45–73, 121–88; Jean d'Arras, Louis Stouff ed., *Mélusine, roman du XIV siècle* [Dijon: Publications de l'Université de Dijon, 1932]; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints 1974; Jean d'Arras, Donald Maddox, Sara Sturm-Maddox trans. *Melusine; or the Noble History of Lusignan* and eds, University Park PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2012; and Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm-Maddox eds, *Melusine of Lusignan: Founding Fiction in Late Medieval France*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996.

2 No Woman Merits Comparison with Her

1. "With her being superior to all other species of women." These are the words used by Pintoin to describe the impression made by Yolande of Aragon upon the court of France in February 1401. *RSD*, I, I, xxi, 773.
2. "Only one son, Charles, remained, but he was married to Marie of Anjou, and, as we have seen, the Anjous were fierce Armagnacs." Tracy Adams, *The Life and Afterlife of Isabeau of Bavaria*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 201.
3. None of which appear, however, to have impeded his mania for the very physical sport of hunting.
4. BNF Ms. Fr. 5728, ff° 35–7. Cf. Francesco Novati, "Le Livre de Raisons de Bertran Boysset d'après le Ms. Des Trinitaires d'Arles actuellement conservé à Gênes," *Romania*, 21 (1892), 528–56 and 22 (1893), 90–126; Pierre Portet, *Bertrand Boysset, la vie et les oeuvres techniques d'arpenteur médiéval (1355–1416)* 2 Vols, Paris: Editions le Manuscrits, 2004–5 and Portet, "Une expertise en Carmargue en 1405. Bertrand Boysset et le bornage du *vallatus vetus*," *Etudes Roussillonaises, Revue d'Histoire et d'Archéologie Méditerranéennes*, XXVI (2013–2014), 79–94.
5. Joan I of Prades was the son of Prince Pere of Aragon and Anjou and Joana of Foix, and the grandson of Jaume II (second son of Pere III *le Gran* of Aragon and Constança of Sicily) and Bianca of Naples. Joan was unhappily married to Sanxa Ximenis d'Arenós to whom Eiximenis dedicated his *Llibre de les dones*.

Núria Silleras-Fernández, *Chariots of Ladies: Francesc Eiximenis and the Court Culture of Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015, 59–97.

6. BNF Ms. Fr. 5728, f° 36 v°.
7. BNF Ms. Fr. 5728, f° 37.
8. BNF Ms. Fr. 5728 f° 37 v°.
9. Thomas N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 119. Regarding the importance and authority of the position of constable in medieval Aragon consult Jill R. Webster, "Francesc Eiximenis on Royal Officials: A View of Fourteenth Century Aragon," *Mediaeval Studies*, 31 (1969), 239–49, 241–2.
10. Marcelle-Renée Reynaud, *Le Temps de Princes, Louis II and Louis III d'Anjou-Provence 1384–1434*, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000, 36.
11. On All Saints 1389, Clement VII anointed him with great solemnity in Avignon with Louis's cousin, Charles VI, in attendance. *RSD*, I, X, ix, 623–31.
12. Jean-Paul Boyer, "Sacre et théocratie. Le cas des rois de Sicile Charles II (1289) et Robert (1309)," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, LXXXIX (2) (1995), 193–248, 195.
13. Jean-Paul Boyer, "La 'foi monarchique': royaume de Sicile et Provence (mi-XIIIe-mi-XIVe siècles)," in *Le formes della propaganda politica nel Due e nel Trecento. Relazioni tenute al convegno internazionale di Trieste (2–5 marzo 1993)*, Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1994, 85–110, 89.
14. See previous chapter.
15. When he was 12 years old. At his coronation, Louis II was accorded his crown by the pope while his cousin, Charles VI of France, read from the Gospels: "*Item, dis l'evangeli lo rey de Fransa.*" Boyssset, *Chronique*, 341–2.
16. G. Del Guidice, *Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I d'Angiò e di Carlo II d'Angiò*, I, Naples: 1863, XXXIII, 88, cited by Boyer, "Sacre et théocratie," 217.
17. Cf. Caroline Bruzelius, "Queen Sancia of Naples and the Convent Church of Sta. Chiara in Naples," *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, 40 (1995), 69–100; Lucas Wadding, *Annales minorum, seu Trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum*, 25 Vols, Quaracchi bei Florenz: ohne Verlag 1931–4, 6, 1931; and Ronald G. Musto, "Queen Sancia of Naples (1286–1345) and the Spiritual Franciscans," in Julius Kirschner and Suzanne F. Wemple, eds, *Women of the Middle Ages: Essays in honor of John H. Mundy*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1985, 179–214.
18. Boyer, "Sacre et théocratie," 217.
19. *RSD*, I, VI, v, 358–9. Some scholars claim that Pintoin's lukewarm appreciation of Isabeau (and his criticism of her) stems from the fact that his pen belonged to the dukes of Burgundy. If this were the case, one would expect the Monk's description of Isabeau to be laudatory and florid at some point in his chronicle. She was Philippe of Burgundy's candidate for the post of queen of France. Moreover, Pintoin is highly critical of Jean of Burgundy and his unchecked ambitions, particularly from 1407. Bernard Guenée holds that Pintoin was a diligent chronicler who, while making no claim to clinical objectivity, had a close relation and faithful to facts and events, and was keen to understand the "whys" of happenings and the people involved: "his work is the beautiful fruit of a perfect symbiosis between a man and a place." Guenée, "Preface," *RSD*, I, lxix.
20. *RSD*, I, VI, vi, 361.
21. *Ibid.*, I, XXI, vii, 773.

22. Johann Adlzreiter von Tettenweis, *Annalium Boicæ gentis partes III*, Francofurti as Moenum: J. F. Gleditsch, 1710, 2nd part, Bk. VI, Col. 114. Cited by Marcel Thibault, *Isabeau de Bavière, reine de France. La Jeunesse, 1370–1405*, Paris: Perrin, 1903, 22. *Ibid.*, 24. Cf. Sigmund Reizler, *Geschichte Baierns*, Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1899, t. II, 553.
23. Thibault, *Isabeau de Bavière*, 5.
24. They were the lesser territories of Bavaria-Ingolstadt and Bavaria-Munich; Johann kept the lion's share, Bavaria-Landshut.
25. Taddea and Stephan were married around the end of 1366 or the beginning of 1367, the date is uncertain; Stephan's father, Stephan II, received Taddea's dowry of some 100,000 gold ducats by power of attorney dated April 10, 1367. Thibault, *Isabeau de Bavière*, 15.
26. *Ibid.*, 16. In this, Barnabò far exceeded the capacities of his equally ambitious brothers, Matteo and Galeazzo.
27. Despite their unbridled ambition and greed, the Visconti revered Dante and were patrons of Petrarch, decorating their residences with the finest works of art that money could buy. *Ibid.*, 17.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville) asserts that, from 1387 (two years after her marriage to Charles VI), Isabeau traveled with a wooden chest, worked over in leather, designed to carry her portable library. It carried both *livres* (religious and pious works in Latin to be used during offices, and a book of Hours for her own personal devotions) as well as a collection of *romans* (romances and books of secular instruction written in French or languages other than Latin). Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), *La Bibliothèque d'Isabeau de Bavière*, Paris: J. Techener, Libraire, 1858, 5. Froissart tells us that she had natural good sense, and was fitted out with the appropriate doctrine, *Chroniques* Bk. II, Ch. CCXXVI. There is sparse mention of Isabeau's reading activities and personal library prior to 1387.
30. For St. Elizabeth, and the idea of sanctity and lineage consult André Vauchez, "Beata Stirps: sainteté et lignage en Occident aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles," in *Famille et parenté dans l'Occident médiéval. Actes du colloque de Paris (6–8 juin 1974)*, Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1977, 397–406; and Gabór Klaniczay, "The Cinderella Effect: Late Medieval Female Sainthood in Central Europe and Italy," *East Central Europe*, Vols 20–23, part 1 (1993–1996), 51–68.
31. Adams, *The Life and Afterlife*, 106.
32. *RSD* Vol. 1, Bk. X, Ch. VII, 611–15. Cf. Jean Froissart, *Chroniques livres III & IV*, Peter Ainsworth and Alberto Varvaro eds, Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2004, 348–65, and Vol. 1, Bk. VI, Ch. 5, 360–61.
33. Isabelle was born on November 9, 1389. The child-queen consort of Richard II of England, who upon Richard's death married Charles of Orleans.
34. Louis and Valentina were married on August 17, 1389, in Melun, having been betrothed since January 1387. When Louis was two years old, he was betrothed to Katalin of Anjou, the four-year-old heiress-presumptive of Nagy Lajos I (Louis I the Great), King of Hungary. Louis and Katalin would have reigned over either Hungary or Poland, and would have received Louis the Great's titular claim to the kingdom of Naples and the county of Provence. This plan was put together by the kings of Hungary and France in an attempt to relieve their childless cousin Giovanna I of her kingdom

- of Naples. Katalin died in 1378, but Louis of Orleans never lost his ambition for sovereignty. He remained eager for a kingdom to call his own (much as Charles I of Anjou, brother of the saint-king Louis IX, had been). For Isabeau, Valentina carried the sins of her father.
35. Valentina's father removed his uncle (and Isabeau's grandfather), the tyrant Barnabò Visconti, from his shared position of Lord of Milan. Bernabò was poisoned (probably on the orders of Giangaleazzo) in December 1385 soon after his capture and imprisonment in the Castle of Trezzo. Isabeau of Bavaria married Charles VI on July 17, 1385. Cf. Tracy Adams, "Valentina Visconti, Charles VI, and the Politics of Witchcraft," *Parergon*, 30 (2) (2013), 11–32, 22–4.
 36. *RSD*, 615.
 37. The exercise of indirect power—for the queen was neither the equal of her king nor did she have any place in the succession; direct influence in politics possible when acting as regent in the absence or death of the king; the duty to act as mediator and intercessor; the legitimization of offspring born to the royal union; and an emphasis upon piety and high moral and spiritual status etcetera.
 38. Claire Sherman Richter, "The Queen in Charles V's 'Coronation Book': Jeanne de Bourbon and the 'Ordo ad reginam benedicenda,'" *Viator Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 8 (1977), 255–98.
 39. Murielle Gaude-Ferragu, *La Reine au Moyen Âge: Le pouvoir au féminin XIVe-XVe siècle*, Paris: Tallandier, 2014, 38.
 40. Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI*, Paris: Fayard, 1986, 238.
 41. Tracy Adams, *Christine de Pizan and the Fight for France*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014, 32–3.
 42. Pierre de Craon was a thorn in the side of many. Marie of Blois-Penthièvre had had dealings with him during Louis I's final Neapolitan campaign; Louis had sent to her for urgent funds, which she raised and entrusted to the care of their cousin Pierre. On his return journey to Naples, Pierre stopped off in Venice, where he reveled in luxury for many days before receiving news of Louis's death, returning to Paris at the head of a sumptuous escort. *RSD*, I, I, v, 341. Froissart chronicles a charge brought against Pierre de Craon by Marie of Blois-Penthièvre, a woman he describes as being "*une dame de moult grant diligence*" (a lady of very great diligence). Jean Froissart, *Chroniques. Livres III et IV*, Peter Ainsworth and Alberto Varvano eds, Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2004, Ch. 49, Bk iv, 540–4. The charges sought the restitution of territories and the repayment of 100,000 francs. Froissart tells of the hunt for Pierre de Craon and Charles VI's first bout of madness in Ch. 46, Bk iv, 524–5.
 43. Adams, *Christine de Pizan and the Fight*, 97–145.
 44. For a detailed analysis of the circumstances, implications, and repercussions of this assassination and the one which followed it in 1419, see Bernard Guenée, *Un Meurtre, une société: l'assassinat du duc d'Orléans 23 novembre 1407*, Paris: Gallimard, 1992.
 45. Such as Coluccio Salutati's work dating from 1400, *De tyranno* wherein he makes the claim that "just as the individual has the right to defend himself and his property, the citizens have a right to defend their state against the usurper who undertakes to seize the power." Berthold L. Ullman, *The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati*, Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1963, 32–4 cited by

- Willard, "The Manuscript of Jean Petit's Justification: some Burgundian propaganda methods of the early fifteenth century," *Studi Francesci*, 13 (1969) 271–80, 273 and 278.
46. *RSD*, 2, XXVIII, xxxv, 766–7.
 47. *Ibid.*, xxxiii, 748–53, xxxiv, 752–66, xxxv, 766–7; and XXIX, xvii, 91–129.
 48. BNF Ms. Fr. 23279; Pierre Salmon, Georges-Adrien Crapelet ed., *Les Demandes fait par le roi Charles VI touchant son état et le gouvernement de sa personne, avec les réponses de Pierre Salmon*, Paris: Imprimerie Crapelet, 1833.
 49. *Ibid.* Cf. *RSD*, 1, XVI, xx, 404–7; and Adams, "Valentina Visconti, Charles VI, and the Politics of Witchcraft". Regarding Salmon as a Burgundian partisan embedded in Charles VI's court see Pierre-Charles Levesque, "Notice du livre de Pierre Salmon" in *Supplément de Froissart, Collections des chroniques nationales françaises*, XV, Jean Alexandre C. Buchon ed., Paris: Verdrière Carez, 1826, i–xxix, esp. xiii; Brigitte Roux, *Les Dialogues de Salmon et Charles VI: images, pouvoir et enjeux politiques*, Geneva: Droz, 1998, 25; Guenée, *Un Meurtre*, 201–15, esp. 213; and Emily J. Hutchinson, "Pour le bien du Roy et de son royaume: Burgundian Propaganda under John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy (1405–1419)," doctoral thesis, University of York, 2006, 104, who likewise considers these sources.
 50. See chapters 1 and 5 for Joan I and Violant of Bar's similar struggles with their *cortes*.
 51. Adams, *Christine de Pizan and the Fight*, 151–2.
 52. Pierre Cauchon is best remembered as the chief prosecutor and persecutor of Joan of Arc during her trial and execution in Rouen (1430–1), but he features in other landmark occasions such as the draftings of the 1413 ordonnance dite cabochienne and the Treaty of Troyes (1420), and his attendance at the Council of Constance (1414–18).
 53. Cf. Alfred Coville, *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413*, Paris: Hachette, 1888; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI 1392–1420*, New York: AMS, 1986; and Michael Alan Sizer, "Making Revolution Medieval: Revolt and Political Culture in Late Medieval Paris," doctoral thesis, University of Minnesota, 2008, esp. 285, 620, 630, 702, 703, 706, 712.
 54. Cf. Angus J; Kennedy, "Christine de Pizan, Blasphemy, and the Dauphin, Louis de Guyenne," *Medium Ævum*, LXXXIII, 1 (2014), 104–20, 111–4.
 55. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, 134–5.
 56. Fifteen years later, Jacques betrayed Louis II's interests and challenged his sovereignty by marrying Ladislaus of Durazzo's sister and successor, Giovanna II, on August 10, 1415. Rather than style himself Prince of Tarente and Duke of Calabria—the legitimate titles carried by the consort of the Queen of Naples—with the assent of Giovanna, Jacques styled himself King of Naples, Hungary, Jerusalem, Sicily, Dalmatia, Croatia, Rania, Serbia, Galicia, Lodomeria, and Bulgaria, Count of Provence-Forcalquier and Piedmont. Understandably, Louis II viewed this a significant betrayal. Jacques attempted to seize Giovanna's sovereignty, locking her in her apartments, but she was released by Neapolitan nobles and Jacques was cast into prison and forced to abandon his royal titles. Jacques was later released, returning to France to seek Anjou's forgiveness and transformed himself politically and spiritually, taking up the habit of a Franciscan

- friar. He died in the company of the Cordeliers of Besançon in 1438. Cf. Alessandro Cutolo, *Giovanna II: La Tempestuosa vita di una regina di Napoli*, Novara: Geografico de Agostini, 1968; and Arturo Bascetta, *Joanna II La Nova: Giovanna d'Angiò di Durazzo*, AB Edizioni, 2009.
57. Noël Valois, *La France et Le Grand Schisme d'Occident*, 4 Vols, Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1896–1902; Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhanlung, 1967, III, 238 and n. 4.
 58. Gérard Gouiran and Michel Hébert eds, *Le Livre de "Potentia" des états de Provence 1391–1523*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1997, 208–9: 22, 27a, XIII; and Michel Hébert ed., *Regeste des états de Provence 1347–1480*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2007, 178.
 59. Valois, *La France et le Grand Schisme*, III, 239 n. 1.
 60. *Ibid.*, 273.
 61. *Ibid.*, 274 and n. 1.
 62. Cf. Noël Valois, "Le Projet du mariage entre Louis de France et Catherine de Hongrie et le voyage de l'Empereur Charles IV à Paris," *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France* (janvier 1893), 209–23.
 63. See above, previous chapter.
 64. Albert de Circourt, "Le duc Louis d'Orléans, frère de Charles VI: ses entreprises au dehors du royaume," *Revue des questions historiques*, XLII (1887) 5–67; XLV (1889) 70–127; and XLVI (1890), 91–68.
 65. Valois, *La France et le Grand Schisme*, III, 367.
 66. *Ibid.*
 67. *RSD*, 2, III, xxv, 218–19.
 68. Valois, *La France et le Grand Schisme*, III, 409–10 and 410 n. 1. There is a pressing extant autograph note supporting this supposition dated August 25, 1405, from the Duke of Orleans to Louis II, King of Sicily, requesting that he return immediately and with all haste to Melun, without passing through Paris en route. A letter dated the same day was sent to the King of Castile, Enrique III, by Olivier de Mauny. Benedict appears to have been left out of this communication loop for, on August 29, he was still in anticipation of the imminent arrival of Louis II.
 69. Nicolas de Baye, Alexandre Tuetey ed., *Journal de Nicolas de Baye, Greffier de Paris 1400–1417*, 2 Vols, Paris: Renouard, 1885, T. I, 137, 139; *RSD*, 2, XXVI, xiii, 290–97; Léon Mirot, "L'Enlèvement du dauphin et le premier conflit entre Jean sans Peur et Louis d'Orléans (1405)," *Revue des questions historiques*, XCV (1914) 329–55 and XCVI (1914), 47–88, 369–414, esp. 396–7.
 70. *RSD*, 2, XXVI, vii, 273.
 71. On September 2 1402, from a fever.
 72. Evencio Beltran, "Jacques Le Grand O.E.S.A. Sa Vie et son œuvre," *Augustiniana*, 24 (1974), 132–60 & 387–414. Cf. Mark Vessey ed. *A Companion to Augustine*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2015, 473–4; Tracy Adams, "Louis of Orleans, Isabeau of Bavaria and the Burgundian Propaganda Machine 1392–1407," in Martijn Icks and Eric Shiraev eds, *Character Assassination Throughout the Ages*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 121–34, 126.
 73. *RSD*, vii, 266–9.
 74. Adams, *The Life and Afterlife*, 135.
 75. Geoffrey Hodges, *Owain Glyn Dwr and the War of Independence in the Welsh Borders*, Almeley: Logaston Press, 1995.

- 76 RSD., vii, 269.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., 271.
79. Ibid., 289–91.
80. Zita Rohr, “Lessons for my Daughter: Self-fashioning *Stateswomanship* in the Late Medieval Crown of Aragon,” in Delbrugge, Laura, ed., *Self-fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill Press, 2015, 105–6.
81. Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, Denys Godefroy ed., *Histoire de Charles VI*, Paris: 1653, 336; Mathilde Laigle, *Livre de Trois Vertus de Christine de Pisan et son milieu historique et littéraire*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, 109–11; Dora M. Bell, *Etude sur le Songe du Viel Pelerin de Philippe de Mézières*, Geneva: E. Droz, 1955, 164 and Christine de Pizan, Suzanne Solente ed., *Le Livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1938–40, I, 56–7. Cf. Thierry Lassabatère and Miren Lacassagne eds, *Eustache Deschamps. Témoin et modèle. Littéraire et société politique (XIVe-XVIe siècles)*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris, 2008. Philippe de Mézières, *Le Songe du vieil pelerin* BNF Ms. Fr. 22542, f° 300. Cf. Philippe de Mézières, G. W. Coopland ed., London: Cambridge University Press, 2009 reprint of 1969 edition.
82. Rohr, “Lessons for my Daughter,” 105–6.
83. Richard Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005, 31.
84. Anonymous, Henri Moranvillé ed., *Le Songe Véritable. Pamphlet politique d'un parisien du XVe siècle*, Paris: 1891.
85. Thelma Fenster, “Ways of Knowing in the *Songe véritable* and Christine de Pizan’s *Livre de l’Advison de Cristine*,” in Rebecca Dixon et al, eds, *Poetry, Knowledge and Community in Late Medieval France*, Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2008, 202–14, 203.
86. Barthélemy Amédée Poquet du Haut-Jussé, “Jean sans Peur, son but, sa method,” *Annales de Bourgogne*, XIV (1942), 181–96, cited by Willard, “The Manuscript of Jean Petit’s Justification,” 271.
87. Pierre Champion and Paul de Thoisy, *Bourgogne, France-Angleterre au traité de Troyes*, Paris: Editions Balzac, 1943, 174–5, cited by Willard, 271. Cf. Zita Rohr, “True Lies and Strange Mirrors: The uses and abuses of rumor, propaganda and innuendo during the closing stages of the Hundred Years War” in Zita Rohr and Lisa Benz St John, eds, *Queenship, Reputation and Gendered Power in the Medieval and Early Modern West*, New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, expected 2016.
88. Niccolò Machiavelli, George Bull trans., *The Prince*, London: Penguin Books, 2003, Ch. XIX, 59.
89. There appears to be some dissent concerning Catherine of Burgundy’s date of birth, Richard Vaughan giving her year of birth as 1399, others settling on 1391–2. Guenée holds that at the time of Catherine’s betrothal to Louis III of Anjou, she was 15 years old to his four. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 245, 247; and Guenée, *Un Meurtre*, 266 and position 36 on the genealogical table given at the end of the volume.
90. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 39; and RSD, 2, XXXI, iv, 315.
91. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 93.
92. RSD, 2, XXXVIII, xxxi, 743.
93. Ibid., 744–5.

94. Ibid., 754–5.
95. Ibid., 767.
96. Ibid., 2, XXIX, i, 3. Deformities in children were regarded generally as celestial judgement: “*Et si tesmoigne l’Escripture/Que boms de membre contre-fais/Et sa pensée meffais/plains de pectiez et plains de vices* (And, as Scripture witnesses/That humans with misshapen limbs/their evil thought is/replete with sin and full of vice).” Eustace Morel dit Deschamps, Marquis de Queux de Saint-Hilaire and Gaston Raynaud eds, *Œuvres complètes*, 11 Vols., Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1878–1903, IX ‘Le miroir de mariage,’ XXIV ‘Cy moustre que c’est pou de gloire d’avoir enfans difformés,’ 81.
97. Laigle, *Le Livre des trois vertus*, 31, 124. Cf. Adams, *CdP and the Fight for France*, 59–60.
98. *RSD*, 2, XXIX, xvii, 91.
99. Ibid., 93–129.
100. Charles II, the Good.
101. *RSD*, 2, XXIX, xix, 137.
102. Ibid., xxiii, 181–2.
103. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 61.
104. Cf. *RSD passim* for entries regarding Louis II’s frequent presence on the royal council and by the king’s side throughout this period.
105. AD BdR B 614.
106. Boysset, *Chronique*, 386.
107. AN P 1334/18, f° 66.
108. AD BdR B 9 ff°184–5.
109. Emile-Guillaume Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, 480.
110. *RSD*, 2, XXXI, I, 311.
111. Ibid., 317.
112. AN KK 243, f° 17.
113. Cf. Jason Stoessel, “The Angevin Struggle for the Kingdom of Naples (c. 1378–1411) and the Politics of Repertoire in Mod A: New Hypotheses,” *Journal of Musical Research Online*, 5 (2014), 1–28; and John Nádas, “Secular Courts during the Period of the Great Schism: Documentation in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano,” in Maria Antolini Bianca, Teresa M. Gialdroni and Annunziato Pugliese eds, *E facciam doçi canti: Studi in onore di Agostino Ziino in occasione del suo 65° compleanno*, Lucca: Libreria Musicale Italiana, 2003, 183–206. Cited by Stoessel.
114. Stoessel, “The Angevin Struggle,” 5–9, 14–16, 20, 22–4.
115. *RSD*, 2, XXXII, I, 396.
116. Léonard, *Les Angevins*, 481.
117. Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, IV, 136 n. 4.
118. Léonard, *Les Angevins*, 481; *RSD*, 2, XXXII, xxi, 475+.
119. *RSD*, 2, XXXII, xl, 591.
120. AN P 1334/18, n° 63.
121. Cf. Reynaud, *Le temps*, 167; and Hébert, *Regeste*, 207–8.
122. The *Union (ligue) d’Aix* was a confederation of Provençal towns and communes formed in 1382 to support the pretensions of Charles of Durazzo against those of Louis I of Anjou. It was defeated (following the murder of Charles of Durazzo in Hungary in February 1386) allowing the second house of Anjou to take possession of the counties of Provence-Forcalquier. Louis

- II of Anjou made his official entry into the counties on October 21, 1387. Cf. Geneviève Xhayet, "Partisans et adversaires de Louis d'Anjou pendant la guerre de l'Union d'Aix," in *Provence Historique*, 40, 162 (1990), 403–27.
123. Cf. Zita Rohr, "On the Road Again," 216–19, 226–8. For a discussion on the Iberian "particularity" of "*gobierno presencial*" (face-to-face government) and the ways in which the second house of Anjou incorporated this to ensure territorial stability and sovereignty.
 124. ACA Reg. 2055, ff° 26–8: in this eloquent and extensive letter, Violant of Bar castigates her daughter, Yolande of Aragon, with *punyent* (pungency) for not defending her dynastic claim to the throne of Aragon with greater energy.
 125. Albert Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René, Sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires*, 2 Vols, Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1969 [Paris: Honoré Champion, 1875], T. I, 28.
 126. Jerónimo Zurita and Angel López, ed., *Anales de Aragón de Jerónimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona d'Aragón*, 9 Vols, Zaragoza: Institucion 'Fernando el Católica C.S.I.C., 1977–1985, 5, Ch. XI, xi, 39–41 and XI, xxv, 78–9. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, 29. Yolande preserved many domains in Aragon, inherited from her mother, Violant (d. 1431), which she by turn willed to her daughter, Marie of Anjou, in recognition of her obedience and daughterly tenderness: "*castra et loca de Borgia et de Magallono, in regno Aragonie situa...*," ANJ 880, n°2. Alfons V took possession of these, and Charles VII too sought to reclaim them in his wife's name in 1451. Alfons ignored his request. ANJ 917, n° 1.
 127. AN KK 243, f° 19v°
 128. AN KK 243, f° 20.
 129. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 168.
 130. Cf. *RSD* 2, XXXII, xxi, 475–89 for the escalation of the Orleans-Burgundy conflict. Louis and Yolande might have believed that it was more prudent to protect their real assets rather than chase titular holdings. Louis II entered Paris accompanied by 100 men-at-arms. *RSD*, 2, XXXII, xl, 591; and XXXIII, xxi, 709; Juvénal Des Ursins, *Histoire de Ch. VI*, 474.
 131. *RSD*, 2, XXXIII, iii, 635.
 132. AN KK 243, f° 22 v.
 133. *RSD*, 2, XXXIII, xxi, 709.
 134. *Ibid.*, 2, XXXIII, xxxiii and xxxiv, 769–71.
 135. ADH, série A1, ff° 329v–334v.
 136. ADH, série A1, ff° 334v–339v.
 137. *RSD*, 3, XXXIV, xxvii, 105.
 138. *Ibid.*, 149.
 139. *Ibid.*, 153.
 140. In English sources, this duke of Brittany is known as Jean/John VI but in France and, more importantly, Brittany, he is Jean V *le Sage* and Yann V *ar Fur*, respectively. This stems from the Breton War of Succession. He refers to himself as Jean V, his collected correspondence published/edited by René Blanchard, *Archives de Bretagne, recueil des actes, de chroniques et de documents historiques rares ou inédits, lettres et mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne (vols IV-VIII)*, Nantes Vincent Forest & Emile, 1889–95.
 141. *RSD*, 3, XXXIV, xxxv, 161.
 142. AN KK 243, f° 13.

143. *RSD*, 3, XXXIV, xliii, 211 and 221.
144. Enguerran de Monstrelet, Louis Douët-D'Arcq ed., *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400–1444*, 6 Vols, Paris: Chez Mme Ve de Jules Renouard, 1857–1862, 2. (1858), CXII ‘Comment le roy Loys de Cécile renvoya la fille du duc de Bourgogne,’ 414–6. Having been proposed successively as a bride for Louis III of Anjou and Henry V of England, the unhappy Catherine, who appears not to have settled back into life at the court of Burgundy, died in Ghent the year following her return from the courts of Anjou-Provence.
145. *RSD* 3, XXXIV, xlvi, 231. Cf. Yolande’s household accounts; AN KK 243 f° 13
146. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, T. 1, 29–31.
147. Patrick Van Kerrebrouck, Christophe Brun, and Christian de Mérindol, eds, *Nouvelle Histoire généalogique de l’auguste Maison de France Vol. III: Les Valois*, Villeneuve d’Ascq, P. Van Kerrebrouck, 1990.
148. On January 9, 1414. AN KK 243, ff° 23–4; AN KK 48 f° 79. Cf. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), *Histoire de Charles VII et son époque (1403–1461)* 3 Vols, Paris: Vve J. Renouard, 1862–3, 1, 11–3.
149. *RSD*, 3, XXXIV, xlix, 249–71.
150. See note 56 above for the implications and outcome of this marriage.
151. *RSD*, 3, XXXV, xxiv, 383; Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, T. IV, 252–3, Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 349.
152. Valois, op. cit. 383 and 389. The first session of the Council of Constance was held on November 16, 1414, the second on March 2, 1415.
153. The Hundred Years War had its origins in the claim to throne made by Edward III in 1337 that he was the most legitimate direct descendant of Philippe IV through his mother, Isabelle of France (daughter of Philippe IV). Edward had used this as a reason to refuse to do homage for Guyenne to Philippe VI (the first Valois monarch, whose legitimacy to rule Edward questioned). Cf. Craig Taylor ed., *Debating the Hundred Years War: Pour ce que plusieurs (la loi Salique) and the declaration of the trow and dewe title of Henrie VIII*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Malcolm Graham Allan Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy 1250–1340*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1996.
154. *RSD*, 3, XXXVI, iv, 523.
155. Charles VI, or rather the royal council, refused Burgundy’s overtures of cooperation. In light of events previous, this was unsurprising, particularly as the Orleanists had regained control of the royal council.
156. Hébert, *Regeste*, 209–19; Rohr, “On the Road Again”.
157. August 14, 1415. AD BdR B 9 ff° 306–7.
158. AN KK 243 ff° 45 v–46.
159. Both Monstrelet and Pintoin give detailed accounts of the Battle of Agincourt. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 3, 103–29; *RSD* 3, XXXVI, viii–x, 553–71.
160. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 3, 130–2; 132–4; *RSD*, 3, XXXVI, viii–xii, 553–81 and for the conduct of Burgundy’s troops post-Agincourt 582–7.
161. Cf. Philippe Contamine, “Vincennes et Charles VII” in Jean Chapelot and Elisabeth Lalou eds, *Vincennes aux origines de l’état moderne. Actes du colloque scientifique sur “Les Capétiens et Vincennes au Moyen Age,”* Paris: Presses de l’Ecole normale supérieure, 1996, 305–17.

162. Upon Charles's capture, the bibliophile Yolande of Aragon lost no time in arranging for his entire library and literary collection to be entrusted to her personal care for safekeeping. Cf. Pearl Kibre, "The Intellectual Interests Reflected in the Libraries of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 7, 3 (June 1946), 257–97, 270–1. A full inventory of the collection was carried out prior to its removal to Angers in 1417, and another was undertaken in 1427 when Charles of Orleans considered selling part of the collection to finance a possible ransom. AN K 534, cited by Léopold Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale*, Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1868, 1, 105–10; Antoine Le Roux de Lincy, *La Bibliothèque de Charles d'Orléans à son château de Blois en 1427*, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1843; Gilbert Ouy, *La librairie des frères captifs: les manuscrits de Charles d'Orléans et Jean d'Angoulême*, Turhout: Brepols, 2007.
163. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 128–9.
164. AN KK 243, f° 47. Charles arrived in Angers on December 1 and Louis II on December 20.
165. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 3, 131.
166. AN KK 243, f° 47.
167. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race*, X, Louis-Guillaume de Vilevault and Louis George Oudard Feudrix de Bréquigny eds, Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1763, 371.
168. Vallet, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 20.
169. Alfred Coville, *La Vie intellectuelle dans les domaines d'Anjou-Provence de 1380 à 1435* [Paris: E. Droz, 1941]; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1974, 32.
170. *RSD*, 3, XXXVII, ix, 51; Michel Félibien, Guy-Alexis Lobineau ed., *Histoire de la ville de Paris*, 5 Vols, Paris: G. Desprez, 1725, III, 545;
171. *RSD*, 3, XXXVII, xi, 59–61; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 173, 203–5.
172. *Ordonnances*, X, 404.
173. *RSD*, 3, XXXVIII, iv, 77.
174. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 170.
175. *Ibid.*, 168.
176. *Ibid.*, 111; Boyer, "Sacre et théocratie," 565.
177. AD BdR B 9, ff°134–9, cited by Marcelle-Renée Reynaud, "L'Absence du prince: Un Problème de gouvernement de la deuxième maison d'Anjou-Provence (ca 1384–ca 1434)," in *Etat, Société et Spiritualité du XIème au XXème siècles. Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur René Fedou*, René Fedou ed., Lyon: Centre d'histoire et d'analyse politiques de l'Université Jean Moulin, 1990, 49–57, 53–4.

3 Yolans Regina Siciliae

1. This is how Charles VII refers to Yolande in most of his official acts and letters—in his early years as dauphin and his later rulership up until the time of her death and beyond. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race*, 22 Vols, Louis-Guillaume Vilevault and Louis-Georges-Oudard Feudrix de Bréquigny, eds, Paris: Impr. Royale, 1724–1814–1849, X–XIV.
2. Her son, Louis III of Anjou, in according her the viceroyalty in 1423, refers to Yolande exercising "*potestas*" (power and ability).

3. AN P 1334/4, f° 107 v, cited by Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René, Sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires*, 2 Vols, Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1969 [Paris: Honoré Champion, 1875], I, 28 n. 2.
4. AD BdR, B 9, ff° 184–5, cited by Reynaud, *Le Temps de Princes, Louis II and Louis III d'Anjou-Provence 1384–1434*, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000, 173.
5. Emile Camau, *La Provence à travers les siècles*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1930, 112.
6. ACA reg. 2055, ff° 26r–28. Cf. Francesca Vendrell Gallostra, *Violant de Bar y el Compromiso de Caspe*, Barcelona: Reial Academia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona, 1992, 131–4. I thank and acknowledge the generosity of Dawn Bratsch-Prince, who made her transcription of this document available to me during my doctoral research, and for her subsequent generous insights and observations.
7. Vendrell Gallostra, *Violant de Bar*, 83.
8. *Ibid.*, 80–8, for details of the embassy and an exposition of Violant's layered strategy.
9. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 29.
10. Jerónimo Zurita and López, Angel ed., *Anales de Aragón de Jerónimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona d'Aragón*, 9 Vols, Zaragoza: Institucion 'Fernando el Católica C.S.I.C.', 1977–1985, 5, XL. xxv, 79.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Martí *el Jove* died of malaria on July 25, 1409, at Casteddu (Cagliari), the administrative capital of Sardinia, shortly after his victory at the Battle of Sanluri on June 30.
13. Cf. Claire Ponsich, “Violant de Bar (1365–1431). Ses Liens et réseaux de relations par la sang et l'alliance,” in Marcel Faure, ed., *Reines et princesses au Moyen-Age*, 2 Vols, Montpellier: Publications de l'Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3, 2001, 261 n. 3 and 267 n. 3.
14. Cf. Vendrell Gallostra, *Violant de Bar*, 100–7.
15. In some of these enterprises, Yolande would receive further assistance from her politically engaged and energetically proactive mother, Violant of Bar.
16. Jean le Fèvre, Seigneur de Saint-Remy, *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre, Seigneur de Saint-Remy*, 2 Vols, François Morand, ed., Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1876–1881, I, 277–8. Le Fèvre's chronicle, written c. 1463–1465, follows Monstrelet's *Chronique* faithfully, if not so drily, until events of 1428. For events from 1428 to 1436, Le Fèvre's voice takes over chronicling events from a time when he was very active in the service of Philippe III, Duke of Burgundy—both soldiering and negotiating on his behalf, not merely a recorder of events. Cf. L. M. E. Dupont, “Notice sur Lefebvre de Saint-Remy, chroniqueur du XVe siècle,” in *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France*, 2, N° 1 (1835), 1–26, 4.
17. Cf. Attila Bárány, “Les Relations bourguignonnes-hongrois sous le règne du roi Sigismond,” in Jean-Luc Fray and Tivadar Gorilovics, eds, *Regards croisés. Recherches en lettres et en Histoire, France et Hongrie. Actes du colloque de Clermont-Ferrand de septembre 2001*, Debrecen: Kossuth Egyetemi Kiado-Debreceni et Presses Universitaires de Blaise Pascal, 2003, 52–63, esp. 56–9, 61.

18. "Sigismund's Paris negotiations ended in failure. The Armagnacs refused to conclude a peace and Sigismund suffered many injustices. The French did not keep their word, they were hypocrites, and Sigismund also believed the image of French duplicity spread by the English." Bárány, "Les Relations," 58.
19. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), ed., *Chronique de la Pucelle ou Chronique de Cousinot, suivie de la Chronique normande de P. Cochon*, Paris: Adolphe Delahays, 1859, 160–1; and Enguerran de Monstrelet and Louis Douët-D'Arcq, ed., *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400–1444*, 6 Vols, Paris: Chez Mme Ve de Jules Renouard, 1857–1862, 3, 139–40.
20. Françoise Lehout, "Mort et funérailles du duc de Berri (juin 1416)," in *Bibliothèque de l'école de chartes*, Tome 114 (1956), 76–96, 77–9.
21. Le Févre, *Chronique*, 1, 286–90.
22. ANJJ 169 Trésor de chartes (Charles VI, 1415–1416), numéro 217.
23. Yolande's cousin, the new king of Aragon, Alfons V, appears to have been kept very well informed regarding the declining health of his competitor in Naples, Louis II of Anjou, by his Catalan ambassador to Jean of Berry, Ramon de Caldés. Cf. Francisco de Bofarull y Sans, "Antiguos y nuevos datos referentes al bibliófilo francés Juan de Francia, duque de Berry," in *Revista de ciencias históricas*, Tome V (1887), 22–60 esp. doc. viii "Cartas 1 and 2 of Ramon de Caldés," which contains the items "Enfermedad de Luis II d'Anjou" and "Estado grave de Luis II d'Anjou," 56–60.
24. RSD, 3, XXXVIII, iv, 77.
25. AN P 1334/17: "The lord testator intends and orders that the said Queen, joined to him, shall be guardian and administratrix, as master of their children until they possess their temporal age [majority] for legitimate and exclusive government, she shall have custody, ownership and management of their possessions, and [I want] noone else to interfere with their government and administration without the express will of the Queen."
26. Charles was created dauphin on April 13, 1417. Louis II died on April 29, 1417.
27. AN P 1334/17: "The said lord testator, in so much as he can, counsels and proposes that the duke of Burgundy make his peace with him, and might indulge him by forgiving him in so much as is possible. The testator could forget the injuries occasioned [by the duke] against him if that person forfeited his accumulated grim and bitter malevolence."
28. Cf. Helen Swift, "'Pourquoy appellerions nous ces choses diferentes, qu'une heure, un moment, un mouvement peuvent rendre du tout semblables?': Representing Gender Identity In the Late Medieval French *Querelle des femmes*," in Elizabeth L'Estrange and Alison More, eds, *Representing Medieval Genders and Sexualities in Europe. Construction, Transformation, and Subversion, 600–1530*, Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011, 89–106, 92.
29. *Ordonnances*, X, 416–17.
30. *Ibid.*, 424–6.
31. Christine de Pizan, "Seulete sui" the eleventh ballad from her *Cent ballades*. Christine de Pisan and Kenneth Varty, eds, *Christine de Pisan's Ballades, Rondeaux and Virelais: An Anthology*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1965, 7.

32. Beaucourt du Fresne, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 6 Vols and 1 Album of Plates, Paris: A. Picard, 1881–1891, I, 59.
33. Violant met with Sigismund in 1408 in Perpignan. She commended her chaplain to him in the lead-up to the Council of Constance in a letter dated October 16, 1416. ACA reg. 2034 f° 57 v°. Cf. Claire Ponsich, “Trois princesses et la renommée d’une lignée, les trois Yolande (1325–1442),” *Bulletin de la Société Agricole, Scientifique et Littéraire des Pyrénées-Orientales*, CIX (2002), 251–90, 271–2; Marcelle-Renée Reyanud, “Noblesse et pouvoir dans la principauté d’Anjou-Provence sous Louis II et Louis III (1384–1434),” in Noël Coulet and Jean-Michel Matz, eds, *La Noblesse dans les territoires angevins à la fin du Moyen Age*, Paris: Ecole Française de Rome, 2000, 303–13, 306. Yolande met with her cousin during his visit to Paris just before Easter 1416.
34. “*de la concordia que el rey tomó con la reina doña Violante, madre del rey Luis el III de Nápoles*,” Zurita, *Anales*, V, 487–90, “*Liga entra el rey [de Aragón] ny el rey Luis y el delfín de Francia*”; the detail of this “liga” is to assist with and ensure Louis III’s “pacific possession” of Naples (489). Alfons V ignored this agreement once Giovanna II adopted him in 1421, prompting an immediate epistolary reaction from Violant de Bar to his lieutenant-queen, María of Castile.
35. AN KK 243 and KK 244.
36. See below.
37. Hébert, “Aix-en-Provence, c. juin 15–27 1417,” *Regeste des états de Provence 1347–1480*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2007, 220–31.
38. Jean-Pierre Papon, *Histoire générale de Provence*, 4 Vols, Paris: Chez Moutard, 1776–1786, T. 3 (1784), 320. For the ambassadors’ report to the Provençal estates consult Hébert, *Regeste*, “Aix-en-Provence, Oct. 1417,” 232–4.
39. AD BdR, B 271 and B 272.
40. Cf. Louis Paulet, *Les Baux et Castillon: Histoire des communes des Baux, du Paradou, de Maussane et de Mouriès*, Arles: Culture provençale et méridionale, 1987 [Reprint of Saint-Remy de Provence edition, 1902].
41. AN P 1351 *Le fonds de la chambre des Comptes—Maine*, ff° 668–9.
42. AN J 847 f° 14. *Trésor des chartes—Provence- droits du roi comme comte de Provence 1416–1532*. Cf. Marcelle-Renée Reynaud, “La Maison d’Anjou-Provence et la perte de Nice (1380–1419),” in 1388, *La Dédiction de Nice à la Savoie. Actes du colloque international de Nice (septembre 1988)*, Rosine Cleyet-Michaud et al., eds., Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1990, 259–67, 263.
43. Jehanne d’Orliac, *Yolande d’Anjou la reine de quatre royaumes*, Paris: Plon, 1933, 129, 248. “*Et pour resister a tous les autres enuis se a chief en vault venir, qu’elle pregne cuer d’omme, c’est assavoir constant, fort et sage*” (And to resist all other troubles she had to become a leader, she took the heart of a man, to wit, constant, strong and wise); Christine de Pizan, Charity Cannon Willard, and Eric Hicks, eds, *Le Livre des trois Vertus*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1989, 3ème parti vi, 191–2.
44. Reynaud, “La Maison d’Anjou-Provence et la perte de Nice (1380–1419),” in Cleyet-Michaud, Rosine et al., eds, 1388, *La Dédiction de Nice à la Savoie. Actes du colloque international de Nice (septembre 1988)*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1990, 263.
45. ANJ 291.

46. Marie José, *La Maison de Savoie. Amedée VII le duc qui devint pape*, Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1962, 216–18.
47. “And it is that the king, Saint Louis, who at the beginning of his reign, conformed to the present [Charles VII], coming to the Crown at the age of fourteen, having a good mother and virtuous Princess [in Blanche of Castile/Yolande of Aragon], was agitated by many domestic wars initiated by the Princes of his time.” Godefroy compares the reigns of Saint Louis of France and Charles VII, emphasizing the presence of their respective “bonne-mères” and the roles they fulfilled at the turbulent commencements of their reigns. Théodore Godefroy and Denys Godefroy, eds., *Le Ceremonial françois, contenant les ceremonies observés en France*, 2 Vols, Paris: S. Cramoisy & G. Cramoisy, 1649, 2, 570.
48. *RSD*, 3, XXXVIII, ii, 72–3.
49. *Ibid.*, 70–3.
50. KK 49 f°53. Adams frames Isabeau’s exile from government and political relevance as an “Armagnac imprisonment.” Tracy Adams, *Christine de Pizan and the Fight for France*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014, 153; Adams, *The Life and Afterlife of Isabeau of Bavaria*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 32, 33–5. It is more probable that she was politically sidelined for refusing to cede her lieutenancy to the Dauphin Charles. Isabeau was not held in a dungeon, but rather in suitable apartments, accompanied by a queenly entourage to serve, divert, and comfort her.
51. *RSD*, 3, XXXVIII, ii–iv, 70–9.
52. When it came to Armagnac, Yolande would have known precisely with whom she was dealing; the beginning of her father’s reign was marked by Armagnac’s threatened mercenary incursion into his Roussillon territories. See chapter 1.
53. *RSD*, 3, XXXVIII, v, 78–81. 80–1.
54. René Blanchard, ed., *Archives de Bretagne. Recueil des actes, de chroniques et de documents historiques rares ou inédits publié par la Société des bibliophiles Bretons et d’histoire de Bretagne, Tomes IV–VIII: Lettres et mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne*, Nantes: Société des bibliophiles de Bretagne, 1889–1895, V (1890), 211–2. Henceforth *Lettres et mandements*.
55. *Ibid.*, 216–7.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Thomas Rymer, *Fœdera, conventiones, literæ et cujusunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliæ*, 20 Vols, London: J. Tonson, 1704–1732, IX (1727–1729), 506, 511–16.
58. The Feast of the Archangels, coinciding with the autumnal equinox—traditionally, the time when accounting would be settled and issued by estate managers for the year.
59. Rymer, *Fœdera*, 588–9, 624, 659. Yolande would not have been unknown in English circles, not least because she had been considered seriously as a potential second bride for Richard II as late as 1396. See chapter 1.
60. *Ibid.*, 624.
61. The Treaty of Troyes signed in 1421 changed circumstances decidedly in Henry’s favour.
62. André Bouton, *Le Maine, histoire économique et sociale, XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles*, Le Mans: Monnoyer [A. Bouton], 1970, 44. Bouton cites Archives

- Départementales de la Sarthe G 664; *Cartulaire du chapitre royal de Saint-Pierre-de-la-Cour, au Mans*, Samuel Menjot d'Elbenne and Louis J. Denis eds, Le Mans: Société des archives historiques du Maine, 1903–1907, 1910, CLI (1418–1419); cf. Robert Triger, *Une Forteresse de Maine pendant l'occupation anglaise. Fresnay-le-Vicomte de 1417 à 1450*, Mamers: G. Fleury et A. Dangin, 1886.
63. *Ibid.*, 773–4.
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. *Ibid.*, 692: *De Treugis cum Regina Sicilia proclamandis*, February 16, 1419; and 699–700: *De Tractando cum Regina Sicilia*.
 66. See chapter 1 regarding patronage and piety in the crown of Aragon.
 67. Elizabeth L'Estrange, *Holy Motherhood: Gender, Dynasty and Visual Culture in the Later Middle Ages*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008.
 68. See chapter 4.
 69. Ferrer was summoned by Benedict XIII in 1395 to fulfil the post of his personal chaplain, penitencier (to hear confession, administer penance, and give absolution), and theological advisor. He held this post from December 31, 1395 to July 5, 1398. Cf. Bernard Montagnes, “La Guérison miraculeuse et l’investiture prophétique de Vincent Ferrer au couvent des prêcheurs d’Avignon (3 octobre 1398),” in Hervé Aliquot and Bernard Guillemain, eds, *Avignon au Moyen Âge: Textes et documents*, Avignon: Aubanel, 1988, 193–8, 193.
 70. Pierre-Henri-Fages, *Notes et documents de l’histoire de Saint Vincent Ferrer*, 2 Vols, Paris: Picard 1905, 1, 220–1; and Montagnes, “La Guérison miraculeuse.” Cf. Laura Ackerman Smoller, *The Saint and the Chopped-Up Baby: The Cult of Saint Vincent Ferrer in Medieval & Early Modern Europe*, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2014, 133–4. Frère Richard, a leading Franciscan participant in the preaching of Joan of Arc’s legend, was Ferrer’s pupil.
 71. Colette’s mission was both evangelical and highly political. Cf. Nancy Bradley Warren, “Monastic Politics: St Colette of Corbie, Franciscan Reform and the House of Burgundy,” in Rita Copeland, David Lawton, and Wendy Scase, eds, *New Medieval Literatures 5*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 203–28; Elisabeth Lopez, *Culture and sainteté. Colette de Corbie (1381–1447)*, Saint-Etienne: Publications de l’Université de Saint-Etienne, 1994.
 72. It was delivered to the Council by the archbishop of Besançon, Thibaud de Rougemont.
 73. Philippe de Forceville, *Saint Colette de Corbie et son alliance avec Yolande d’Anjou “Reine des Quatre Royaumes,”* Paris: Editions A. et J. Picard, 1958, 26. Cf. Nancy Bradley Warren, *Women of God and Arms: Female Spirituality and Political Conflict 1380–1600*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, 19–20, 183 n. 24.
 74. *Lettres et mandements*, V, 227 n. 1.
 75. Vicente Justiniano Antist, “La vida e historia del apostólico predicador Sant Vicente Ferre, Valenciano, de la Orden de Santo Domingo,” in José de Garganta and Vicente Forcada, eds, *Biografía y escritos de San Vicente Ferrer*, Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1956, 94–334, 257–60. Cf. Smoller, *The Saint and the Chopped-Up Baby*, 10, 22, 23, 26.
 76. *RSD*, XXXVIII, viii, 86–91.

77. See above. Cf. *Ordonnances* X, 416–17, 424–6.
78. Gilles-Jacques Le Bouvier dit Berry, Henri Courteault, Léonce Celier et al., eds., *Les Chroniques du Roy Charles VII par Gilles Le Bouvier dit le Hérault Berry*, Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1979, 82–3.
79. *Ibid.*, 82. Louis II of Anjou had appointed Jean Louvet the president of his “*parlement*,” more correctly his “*chambre des comptes et aydes*,” in his southern capital Aix in March 1415. One of Louis II’s councilors, Louvet, would cause considerable headaches for Yolande, who eventually exiled him. Louvet had received 1,000 livres from Isabeau on September 29, 1416. AN KK 47, f° 13; cited by the Berry Herald’s modern editors. *Ibid.*, n. 4.
80. Cf. Jean Cambon, *Arnaud Guilhem, un héros oublié, seigneur de Barbazon*, Tarbes: Société Académique de Haute-Pyrénées, 1981, 24, 70–7, 86.
81. *Ibid.*, 86–8.
82. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 1, CXCVI, 433.
83. *Ibid.*, 434.
84. The Berry Herald, *Les chroniques*, 88; and Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 1, CCVI, 444.
85. Malcolm Vale, *Charles VII*, London: Eyre Methuen, 1974, 27.
86. Archives de Lyon AA 22, f° 20 dated from Bourges on June 13, and signed by Yolande’s former secretary and ambassador, Alain Chartier; cited by Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, 1, 98–101, 100–1. Charles’s letter gives details the taking of Paris and subsequent massacres. Cf. Archives de Lyon AA 84 for the text of Jean Caillés fervent letter to the councilors (which followed the dauphin’s missive), written from Bourges on June 15, 1418, reinforces Charles’s account as well as his “*cuer*,” (heart) honesty, and goodwill. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, 1, 439–41.
87. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 89 and n. 3. The Breton captain left in charge of the city of Troyes by Burgundy was Charles Labbé. The dauphin purchased the surrender of Troyes for 14,000 livres paid to Labbé on January 2, 1419. Labbé passed into the service of the dauphin later that year.
88. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 1, CCVI, 444.
89. *Ordonnances*, X, 477. On September 18, 1418, three days before the establishment of Charles’s rival *parlement*, a treaty of alliance between Brittany and Burgundy was signed at Saint-Maure-des-Fossés. Breton archives show that, by October 12, Jean V was in Saumur with Yolande, and then in Angers immediately afterwards. On December 4, he was sending presents to unspecified parties in Navarre and Spain. With the support of Navarre and Southern France, the dauphin Charles declared himself regent of France on December 26, 1418. *Lettres et mandements*, V, 242–3.
90. d’Orliac, *Yolande d’Anjou*, 56. I have been unable to locate this citation in Bourdigné to date, it could be a pseudo-citation or an apocryphal statement contained in a forgotten or destroyed archive; there was considerable archival loss during World War II. Jehanne d’Orliac (Anne Marie Jeanne LaPorte) wrote Yolande’s biography in 1933. I hope to excavate Orliac’s personal archive of manuscripts, letters, unpublished writings, and documents to attempt to determine her sources and her thinking. She bequeathed them in 1975 to the Archives Départementales d’Indre-et-Loire, Sous-série 75J Fonds Jehanne D’Orliac.

91. Reynaud fixates on this interpretation of Yolande's actions. See her *Le Temps de Princes*, and "La Maison d'Anjou-Provence et la perte de Nice (1380–1419)," 263.
92. In the wake of the Paris riots, which saw the Armagnacs overthrown, Isabeau named Charles II constable of France in 1418. He was not keen to take up the post, however, soon decamping to his duchy.
93. "Documents sur les débuts de René d'Anjou, dans les duchés de Lorraine et de Bar (1419–1431): Cession du Duché de Bar à René d'Anjou par le Cardinal duc Louis," in *Annuaire de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de la Lorraine*, XXXIX, Metz: Les Arts Graphiques, 1930, 4–6; Cf. Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France, Collection Godefroy, Ms Godefroy 340 f° 49 "Don du duché de Bar par Louis, cardinal, duc de Bar et marquis de Pont à René d'Anjou, comte de Guise, 1419"; and Ms Godefroy 348 f° 188 "Don de Duché de Bar et du marquisat de Pont par Louis cardinal de Bar, à René d'Anjou, 13 août 1419." Cf. Christophe Rivière, "Les Structures politiques et administratives du duché de Lorraine sous Charles II (1390–1431): un exemple de résistance à l'acculturation?," in *Hypothèse*, 2000/1 (3), 151–7, 163–5; and for reforms to administrative functions and accounting procedures (according to the template of his mother Yolande's initiatives) inaugurated by René of Anjou from 1450 (expanded and concluded by his grandson, René II of Anjou, who spent his youth at the courts of René senior in Angers and Provence) consult Hélène Schneider, "Aspects de la gestion des finances du duché de Lorraine à la fin du Moyen-Age," in *Annales de l'Est*, 1 (1998), 19–50, 20–1.
94. Dawn Bratsch-Prince, *La vida y epistolario de Violant de Bar (1365–1431) duquesa de Gerona y reina de Aragón* (unpublished translation notes), 15. Cf. Ponsich, "Trois Princesses," 287. Ponsich cites Archives Départementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, Fond lorrain dit de Vienne, 3 F 436 (Bar: Cartulaire I (XIVe–XVIIe siècles), ff° 67–76.
95. This observation is made by Robert Parisot in a paper given at the Faculté des lettres de Nancy in 1921, cited in *Annuaire de la Société d'Histoire et Archéologie de la Lorraine*, 1930, 2.
96. *Ibid.*, 11.
97. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 34, and AN P 1344/17 item 47.
98. Cf. Cleyet-Michaud, 1388 *La Dédiction de Nice*.
99. Cf. Zita Rohr, "On the Road Again: The Semi-Nomadic career of Yolande of Aragon (1400–1439)," in Felicitas Schmieder and Marianne O'Doherty, eds, *Travels and Mobilities in the Middle Ages: From the Atlantic to the Black Sea*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2015.
100. AN KK 243 f° 60.
101. AN KK 243 attachment to f° 66.
102. See above. Cf. Gouiran and Hébert, *Livre de "Potentia" des états de Provence 1391–1523*, pièce 23, Aix-en-Provence, 4 septembre 1419, 212–27; and Hébert, *Regeste*, Aix en Provence, septembre 1419, *Regeste des états de Provence 1347–1480*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2007, 234–9.
103. Reynaud, "La Maison d'Anjou-Provence," 263–4.
104. AD BdR B 10, f° 49 r° and v° and B 636. Cited by Reynaud, "La Maison d'Anjou-Provence," 264.
105. José, *La Maison de Savoie*, 217.
106. Reynaud, "La Maison d'Anjou-Provence," 265.

107. Camau, *La Provence*, 114.
108. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 50.
109. Papon, *Histoire générale de Provence*, III, 323–6.
110. Hébert, *Regeste*, 239–4, 241–8; and Gouiran and Hébert, *Potentia*, pièce 24, 227–37.
111. Le Févre, *Chronique*, II, 16–17. I have chosen this reference for, as Morand remarks, unlike Monstrelet, whom Le Févre assiduously copies for this episode, Le Févre, in describing Yolande's dispatching of Louis to Rome, chooses to suppress the phrase “*non pas sans soupîrer du cuer*” (not without her heart sighing). Morand notes that Georges Chastellain, in his version of events, adds the observation that Yolande sent Louis on his way, “*à larmes et soupîrs, comme les mères font*” (with tears and sighs as mothers do) with Wavrin following Le Févre's lead in firmly treading the objective path concerning Yolande's maternal solicitude.
112. Dawn Bratsch-Prince, “Vós, que sabets que és amor de infants’: A Queen's Journey to Provence (1420–21),” unpublished conference paper, IMC Leeds, University of Leeds UK, July 2010.
113. In 1419 Galceran de Sentmenat was deputy-general of Catalonia; Violant of Bar, while removed from the centre of power by 1419, was not a spent force. Cf. Alfons Puigarnau i Torelló, “Meurte o iconoclastia en la Catalunya medieval,” in Jaume Aurell i Cardona and Julia Pavón, eds, *Ante la meurte: actitudes, espacios y formas en la España medieval*, Barañain: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2002, 197–214.
114. Bratsch-Prince, “Vós, que sabets que és amor de infants,” 2.
115. *Ibid.*, 6–7. Bratsch-Prince cites ACA reg. 2052, f° 103 v° (May 1420).
116. Bratsch-Prince, *La vida y epistolario*, 17. Cf. Her *Violante de Bar (1365–1431)*, 41 for this discussion in Spanish.
117. *Ibid.* Consult ACA reg. 2052, f° 106 for the letter from Violant to María of Castile dated May 6, 1421. Violant reminds María that she had a duty to mediate and ensure that Alfons honored the agreement signed with Yolande and Louis in October 1417 regarding Naples–Sicily. See earlier, this chapter.
118. Vale, *Charles VII*, 28; BNF Ms. Fr. 5061, f° 16 v; and Bernard Guenée, *Un Meurtre, une société: l'assassinat du duc d'Orléans 23 novembre 1407*, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 236.
119. Richard Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005, 330.
120. *Ibid.*, 270–3. See earlier, this chapter. Henry V left Melun empty handed and frustrated in his attempts to marry Catherine and thereby control France, which had been ongoing since March 1413.
121. Cf. Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Le Meurtre de Montereau*, Paris: Victor Palmé, 1868, 38–43; Guenée, *Un Meurtre*, 285–6; James Laidlaw, “Alain Chartier and the Art of Crisis Management,” in Christopher Allmand, *War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000, 37–53; Nicole Pons, “Intellectual Patterns and Affective reactions in Defence of the Dauphin Charles, 1419–1422,” in Christopher Allmand, ed., *War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000, 54–69; Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI*, Paris: Fayard, 1986, 584–6.

122. Cf. Fanny Cosandey, “De lance en quenouille. La place de la reine dans l’État moderne (XIVe–XVIIe siècles),” *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 52e année, no. 4 (July–August 1997), 806–9.
123. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, I, 186–9. According to Beaucourt a contemporary copy of this letter is located in Moreau 1425, pièce 86, and that Henry’s reaction to Isabeau’s overture was swift. On September 24, he gave his ambassadors the power to negotiate the conclusion of treaties and a final peace with his “cousin de France” and to enter into negotiations with the people of Paris. Rymer, *Fœdera* IV, III, 133.
124. The “bed of justice” or King’s Bench—a special session of *parlement*, presided over by the king to register royal edicts.
125. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, I, 217–18. Cf. Vale, *Charles VII*, 31.
126. Jean subsequently allied himself with the English, becoming Henry V’s lieutenant-governor for the same territories of Languedoc and Guyenne on March 3, 1421. Upon the death of Henry V, Jean again switched his allegiance to France retaining his position of lieutenant-governor.
127. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 93–4.
128. *Ibid.*, 94–5.
129. Michael Lynch, *Scotland: A New History*, London: Pimlico, 1992, 134–5, 141, 141–2.
130. Although this did not quarantine Anjou from English raiding parties, the damage was controllable. Maine, however, was not to find itself in such fortunate circumstances. Cf. Michel Duchein, “L’Ecosse dans la guerre de Cent Ans,” in Jean Kerhervé and Albert Rigaudière, *Finances, pouvoirs et mémoires. Mélanges offerts à Jean Favier*, Brest: Fayard, 1999, 279–300.
131. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 99–102.
132. He was the second son of Henry IV, younger brother of Henry V. He was killed at Baugé on March 21, 1421.
133. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 173–4.
134. *Ibid.*, 173. My paraphrasing.
135. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, I, 234–6; and Marcel Thibault, *La Jeunesse de Louis XI*, Paris: Perrinet et Cie., 1907, 32. Both cite as a primary source the account by Aliénor de Poitiers, “*Les Honneurs de la Cour. Traité sur l’étiquette et les cérémonies des cours de Bourgogne et de France*,” in Jean-Baptiste La Curne de Sainte-Palaye ed., *Les Mémoires sur l’ancienne chevalerie; considérée comme un établissement politique et militaire*, 3 Tomes. Paris: Duchesne 1759–81, I, 306, T. II, 171–282, 194–5.
136. AN P 1334/4 f° 145 v. Also cited by Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 174.
137. AN P 1334/4, f° 144 v, and Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 174.
138. Archives Communales de Toulon AA 4 (12 janvier 1423) cited by Hébert, *Regeste*, 268.
139. Hébert, *Regeste*, 269.
140. Elena Woodacre, “The Impact of Marital and Family Relationships on the Reigns of the Queens Regnant of Navarre (1274–1517),” Nikolas Jaspert and Ana Echevarria Arsuaga, eds, *La alteridad en el ejercicio del poder femenino en las cortes Ibéricas*, Madrid: Monográfico Anuario de Estudios Medievales, forthcoming 2016. Álvaro Adot Lerga, Orígenes del virreinato de Navarra (1479–1486), “Príncipe de Viana,” 258 (2013), 601–35.
141. Hug d’Anglesola is referred to variously as ‘*lo virrey en lo Regne de Mallorques*,’ ‘*lo visrey*,’ or more often, ‘*lo vizrey*.’ Jesús Lalinde Abadía, “Virreyes y lugartenientes en la Corona de Aragón,” in *Cuadernos de Historia de España* (Beunos

- Aires), XXXI–XXXII (1960), 98–172, 98, 130, 147 n. 99 and, for subsequent instances of Marti's use of the appellation, 138 n. 84, 147 n. 99, 151 n. 106, 152, 156, 168. My gratitude to Elena Woodacre for reminding me of this source. Cf. Theresa Earenfight, *The King's Other Body. Maria of Castile and the Crown of Aragon*, Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2010, 131–44, esp. 138–9.
142. AN P 1334/1, ff^o 45–6. Also cited by Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 176.
143. Ibid.
144. Patrick van Kerrebrouck, Christophe Brun, and Christian de Mérindol, eds, *Nouvelle Histoire généalogique de l'auguste Maison de France Vol. III: Les Valois*, Villeneuve d'Ascq, P. Van Kerrebrouck, 1990, 145.
145. "On Thursday August 26 1423 Yolande, Queen of Jerusalem and Sicily, Duchess of Anjou arrived in Angers having come from Provence and Bourges. On Thursday March 9 1424 Queen Yolande left Angers to go to Selles to the king at his grand council." AN P 1334/4, ff^o 149–150. Cited by Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 42–3.
146. Cf. Raoul Busquet, *Histoire de Marseille*, Paris: Editions Laffont and Lafitte, 1998, 141–5.
147. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 50. For the instrument of adoption dated September 14, 1423, consult II, 213–16. Lecoy de la Marche gives the reference as Archivio di Napoli, *Pergamene regie camere*. I, 29. On September 30, 1943, three retreating German sappers set fire to archives which had been moved for safe-keeping to the Villa Montesano near San Paolo Belsito, 25 km north of Naples. Cf. Charles Perrat, "Les Archives de l'Etat de Naples et l'histoire de France," in *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et belles-lettres*, 89, 3 (1945), 321–33. For the valiant yet incomplete reconstruction of the lost archive consult Isabella Orefice, "Una fonte inedita per la ricostruzione angioina. Il registre di Luigi III d'Angiò per gli anni 1423–1434," in *Atti dell' Accademia Pontaniana*, n.s. XXV (1976), 7–16.
148. Archives Communales de Barjols AA 43 n^o4. Cited by Hébert, *Regeste*, 278–88, 279. My emphasis.
149. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, II, 352–3 n. 1.
150. Jean de la Villette might have been a connection of Philippe de la Villette (d. 1418), abbot of St-Denys (1398–1418) who, while an "Armagnac," was approved at his election by the Duke of Burgundy, Philippe le Hardi. Philippe de la Villette had a brother Jacques who served the interests of Louis, Duke of Orleans. Jacques de la Villette was canon of Amiens and a loyal follower of Jean Gerson. 'Le 30 juin, le duc faisait payer II l. 5 s. tourn. à messire Jean de la Villette, prêtre, "pour aller devers la Roynie de Sezille porter les lettres closes de luy pour aucunes choses secretes." Quatrième compte de Guy Guibaut, Archives de la Côte-d'Or B 1622, f^o 191. 'C'est peut-être à ces relations qu'il faut rattacher la mission donnée par le duc (à Paris, vers le 31 août 1423) à un écuyer nommé Dignadam, qui reçut 150 fr. "pour aler de par lui en certain voyage secret qui grandement lui touchoit, dont il n'en vault autre déclaration estre faite." Cinquième compte de Guy Guibaut, Archives du Nord B 1929, f^o 63. Cited by Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 353 n. 1.
151. Ibid., 318–29.
152. Ibid., 329.
153. Eugène Cosneau, *Le Connétable Richemont (Artur de Bretagne 1393–1458)*, Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1886, 75–6.

154. Vallet, *Histoire de Charles VII et son époque (1403–1461)*, 3 Vols, Paris: Vve J. Renouard, 1862–1863, I, 392–3.
155. Yolande was his viceroy with full authority to act in his name and their interests.
156. BNF Ms. Fr. 5053, ff° 132, 135, 137.
157. Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 353.
158. *Ibid.*, 353–6. The document known as the “Traictié de Nantes” was brought to light by Beaucourt. He discovered it in the Turin Archives. It is held today in Archivio di stato di Torino, inventario n°18, *pezzo 27*—“Materie politiche per rapporto all'estero—Trattati per lo più di trattati stipulati dallo Stato sabaudo con la Francia ed il Delfinato [Treaties concluded by the state of Savoy with various foreign powers; particularly highlighted are conventions and treaties concluded with France and the Delphinat]”—12 Bundles, (1245–1489). Beaucourt paraphrased it, but did not reproduce it in its original. A copy of the more complete text can be found in *Lettres et mandements*, VI, 127–9.
159. *Ibid.*, 128.
160. *Ibid.*
161. ANJJ 172, n° 518 (*Trésor de chartes; Charles VI et Henry VI, roi d'Angleterre* [675 numéros], 1420 et 1422–24).
162. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 40.
163. *Ibid.*, 41. He cites ANJJ 213, n° 5; K 186 (*Etablissements religieux: Généralités de Tours*)—Yolande held the title Duchess of Touraine from 1424, liasse 17 (privilèges—8 pièces) n° 3; Charles confirmed and expanded these privileges from Amboise in May 1433, endorsing the two new faculties of Canon and Civil Law. Cf. *Ordonnances XIII*, 186–7: “*quam dilectissima Mater nostre Yolans Regina Sicilie* etc. (. . . our dearest Mother Yolande Queen of Sicily . . .).” Pope Eugene IV officially recognized the university in 1432. Cf. Marcel Fournier, *Les Statuts et privilèges des universités françaises depuis leur fondation jusqu'en 1789* 4 Vols, Paris: Larose et Forcel, 1890–1894, I, 377–86, 390–9. Cf. Jean-Michel Matz, “Les Moines et le droit. Enquête sur la culture juridique dans les abbayes du diocèse d'Angers à la fin du Moyen Âge,” in *Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l'Ouest*, 112–21 (2005), 85–100; and Yves Denéchère and Jean-Michel Matz, eds, *Histoire de l'Université d'Angers*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012.
164. *Ibid.*, 46–7. Matz errs in his claim that the addition of the faculties at Angers, at the time the only university in western France, were a 1432–1433 response by Eugene IV and Charles VII to threats to the prestige of Angers, and coincided with the inauguration of faculties at the Universities of Poitiers (1431), Caen-Basse Normandy (1432–1437), created by John, Duke of Bedford, regent for Henry VI, and confirmed by Charles VII following his reconquest of the province in 1452) and Nantes (1460). Although Eugene IV and Charles VII ratified the new faculties at Angers in 1432/3, the faculties themselves were established at Yolande's behest in 1424.
165. Eugène Cosneau, *Le Connétable Richemont (Artur de Bretagne 1393–1458)*, Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1886, 78–9.
166. Richemont married Marguerite of Burgundy on October 10, 1423. He had been “paroled” from English detention in 1420 by his stepbrother Henry V, and Henry had been gratified by Richemont's efforts to coerce his brother Brittany to sign the Treaty of Troyes. Richemont had originally

- sided with the Armagnacs but having obtained his release from Henry V by giving certain undertakings, he sided with the Anglo-Burgundians. Like his brother Jean, Richemont was required to navigate delicate familial and political alliances to draw something positive from very volatile circumstances.
167. AN P1334/4, f° 150 v°.
168. *Lettres et mandements*, VI, 135.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., 134–5.
171. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 90–1.
172. Gabriel Daniel, *Histoire de la milice française . . . jusqu'à la fin du règne de Louis le Grand* 2 Vols, Paris: Vve. Saugrain et P. Prault, 1728, I, 173.
173. At the urging of Louvet, Regnault of Chartres was appointed by Charles in March 1424, Gouges was reinstated until 1428, when Regnault was elevated again to the position. Cf. Joseph-Nicolas Guyot and Philippe-Antoine Merlin, eds, *Traité des droits, fonctions, franchises, exemptions, prerogatives et privilèges annexes en France (. . .)* 4 Vols, Paris: Chez Visse, 1786–88, 4. 197; Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 89–91; and Vale, *Charles VII*, 38–9.
174. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 94.
175. Zita Eva Rohr, unpublished doctoral thesis, “L’Envers de la tapisserie. The Œuvre of Yolande d’Aragon: A Study of Queenship, Power and Authority in Late Mediæval France,” University of New England Armidale, Australia, 2007, 204 n. 160, 216 n. 202.
176. Vale, *Charles VII*, 53–4, 119; *Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris (1405–1449)*, Colette Beaune, ed. Paris: Librairie générale française, 1990; Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc. The Image of Female Heroism*, London: Vintage, 1981, 38–9. Cf. Colette Beaune, “La Rumeur dans le *Journal* d’un Bourgeois de Paris,” in Michel Balard, ed., *La Circulation des nouvelles au Moyen-Age: XXIVe Congrès de la S.H.M.E.S. (Avignon, juin 1993)*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1994, 191–203, 191. Warner’s references are sloppy and inaccurate, and she does not take sufficiently into account the position and prejudices of the Burgundian cleric (attached to the entourage of Isabeau of Bavaria) who kept the *Journal*.
177. Richemont: June 2 from Bourges; Regnault: June 2 from Poitiers; Yolande: June 13 from Poitiers; and Brittany June 14 from Nantes. J-P Gauthier, “Lettres inédites du Connétable Artur de Richemont et autres grands personnages, aux conseillers et habitants de la ville de Lyon (1),” in *La Revue du lyonnais*, série 2, 19 (1859), 323–43, 327–35.
178. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, II, 92 n. 4.
179. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 101.
180. Reynaud, “La Noblesse pouvoir dans la principauté d’Anjou-Provence sous Louis II et Louis III (1384–1434),” in Noël Coulet and Jean-Michel Matz eds, *La Noblesse dans les territoires angevins à la fin du Moyen-Age*, Paris: Ecole Française de Rome, 2000, *Noblesse dans les territoires angevins* 303–13, 310.
181. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 121–2.
182. AMdL *Registres des délibérations de Lyon*, III f° 34–34 v°. Cited by Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, II, 92–3.
183. Ibid.
184. Guillaume Gruel, Achille Le Vavas seur, ed., *Chronique d’Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne (1393–1458)*, Paris: Renouard, 1890, 38–9.

185. When Charles VII died in July 1461, Châtel held the the dignities of “premier escuier de corps et master d’escuierie (first equerry and Master of the Horse [stables]).” Cf. Gaston du Fresne de Baucourt, “Extraits du compte des obsèques de Charles VII,” in *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de France*, II: 2 (1864), 178–98.
186. AN X/1a 9190, f° 76–7 v°.
187. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 105.
188. Gauthier, “Lettres inédites,” 334.
189. ANJJ 173 ff° 130 v°, 190 v° & 192.
190. “Et par ce debat et division se perdit le Mans.” (And by this debate and division, Le Mans was lost). The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 122.
191. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 108.
192. BNF Ms. Fr. 27183 (pièces originales 669) and ADLA E 10, liasse (cassette 4) Fr. 20417 n° 3. Cited by Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 117 n. 1. Charles wrote to his *généraux de finances* in Languedoc on the same day. Auguste Vallet, “Notices et extraits de chartes et de manuscrits appartenant au British Museum de Londres,” in *Bibliothèque de l’Ecole de Chartes*, VIII (1847), 110–47, 140–1.
193. AN P 1354/2, n° 859 cited by Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 50.
194. The bulk of it is compiled in *Lettres et mandements*, collected in the *Ordonnances* or extant in the AN. Cf. Rohr, “L’Envers de la tapisserie,” 207–27.
195. Georges’s brother, Jean de la Trémoille, was Grand-Master and Grand-Chamberlain to Philippe, Duke of Burgundy, as he had been for his father, Jean *sans Peur*.
196. Vale, *Charles VII*, 39.
197. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 140–2.
198. *Ibid.*, 145.
199. *Lettres et mandements*, IV, 210, 213. Until the birth of Yolande’s grandson, Louis of France, Charles of Orleans was second in line to the throne of France. It is for this reason that Henry V had stipulated that he was not to be released unless he agreed to allow England to take the throne of France. The English held Charles of Orleans to be an impressively intelligent, politically astute, and charismatic adversary compared to Charles VII, whom they had had “disinherited” by the Treaty of Troyes. Michael K. Jones, “‘Gardez mon corps, sauvez mon terre’—Immunity from War and the Lands of a Captive Knight: the Siege of Orleans (1428–9) Revisited,” in Mary-Jo Arne d., *Charles d’Orléans in England 1415–1440*, Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2000, 9–28, 12–13.
200. The Bastard of Orleans grew to maturity in Yolande’s household, having been betrothed to Jean Louvet’s daughter in 1413 around the time Marie of Anjou was engaged to Charles of Ponthieu. With the banishment of Louvet in 1425, the Bastard followed his father-in-law to Provence. He reappeared at Richemont’s insistence soon afterwards. Cf. The Berry Herald, 121–2; and Baucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, I, 236.
201. Le Févre, *Chronique*, II, 131; Vallet, *La Chronique de la Pucelle*, 202.
202. She had returned by July 1428. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), *Charles VII, roi de France et ses conseillers 1403–1461*, Paris: Dumoulin, 1859, “juillet-sept. 1427–juillet-sept. 1428.”
203. AN KK 243, f° 63: “*Dudit mois de juillet mil CCCCXXVII [dépense] . . . pour le voyage de ladite dame [Yolande] en sais pais de prouence.*” Cf. AN KK 243, f° 63.

204. Hébert, *Regeste*, 289–98, 299–306, 307–15, 316–17; esp. 301, 305, 308, 317. Cf. Rohr, “On the Road Again.”
205. Gruel, *Chronique*, 61.
206. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 153–5. Trémoille moved against Marguerite’s positional advantage, forcing her to choose between her husband and her continued presence in Chinon. Gruel, *Chronique*, 64. She refused and withdrew from Chinon to Parthenay under the protection of Scottish forces, her itinerary including a sojourn in Saumur—Yolande’s favored northern residence. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 157.
207. *Parlement* eventually responded to Richemont and his allies on November 2, 1428. See following discussion.
208. BNF Ms. Fr. 21302 “Copie des registres du parlement séant à Poitiers, Tours, Châlons et Pontoise 1418–1594,” dated January 14, 1427 (o.s.). Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 155; Beaucourt, *Histoire*, 156–7, 159–60.
209. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 156.
210. Jones, “‘Gardez mon corps’,” 20.
211. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 158.
212. AN P 1388/3, n° 114 bis. “Projet de convocation des Etats-Généraux à Poitiers (projet qui met Yolande à la tête de tout en 1428, avant le 27 juillet 1428)” . Transcribed by Cosneau *Le Connétable*, 534–7. Cf. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), “Mémoire sur les institutions de Charles VII,” in *Bibliothèque de l’Ecole de Chartes*, XXXIII (1872), 5–118, 36–7.
213. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 159.
214. BNF Ms. Fr. 4488, f° 209.
215. Vale, *Charles VII*, 53–4.
216. *Ibid.*, 54–5.
217. AN P 1358/2, n° 574. Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 161.
218. *Ibid.* Cf. Georges Picot, *Histoire des Etats Généraux considérés au point de vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de France de 1355 à 1614*, 4 Vols [Paris: Hachette, 1872] Geneva: Mégariotis Reprints, 1979, I, 312.
219. Situated on the threshold of Brittany and on the borders of Normandy and Anjou. Its sovereign lady, Anne of Laval mother of Guy XIV of Laval, was the daughter of one of Yolande’s closest familiars. See following chapter. Cf. Malcolm Walsby, *The Counts of Laval: Culture, Patronage and Religion in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century France*, Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007, 14, 18, 20, 23–7, 30–2, 55, 57, 76, 117, 121, 153, 156.
220. Vallet, *La Chronique de la Pucelle*, 251–2.
221. *Ibid.*, 256. Cf. Auguste Vallet de Viriville, “Documents inédits pour servir à la biographie de Jean, bâtard d’Orléans, comte de Dunois et de Longueville,” in *Le Cabinet Historique*, III, n° 1 (July 1857), 108.
222. Georges Picot, *Histoire des Etats Généraux considérés au point de vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de France de 1355 à 1614*, 4 Vols [Paris: Hachette, 1872] Geneva: Mégariotis Reprints, 1979, I, 313.
223. *Ibid.*
224. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 162–3.
225. BNF Ms. Latin 9177 ff° 268, 271, 272v°, 273 (*Pièces copiées dans différents dépôts de Languedoc 1151–1700*); and the extract from the Archives de la hôtel de ville de Montpellier cited by Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 537.
226. BNF Ms. Fr. 21302 (*Copie des registres du Parlement séant à Poitiers, Tours, Châlons et Pontoise 1418–1594*), likewise cited by Cosneau 163 n. 1.

227. ADLA E 24–8. Cited by Cosneau as Archives de la Loire-Inférieure cassette 9, E 24, 163–4, 164 n. 1.
 228. ANJJ 177, f° 78 v°; Cosneau 164 n. 7.

4 The Art of Prudence

1. Cf. Karl Alfred Blüher, “Les Origins antiques d’un ‘art de prudence’ chez Baltasar Gracián,” *Astérian* 3 (2005): 301–23, 322–3; and Peter Stacey, *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 101.
2. See chapters 1 and 3.
3. L’Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*, 28. Cf. Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press [1972], reprint 1986: 31–2, 38–9, 48–56, 87.
4. Cf. Piroska Nagy, *Le Don des larmes au Moyen Age: un instrument spirituel en quête d’institution Ve–XIIIe siècles*, Paris: Albin Michel, 2000; and Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, eds, *Politiques des émotions au Moyen Age*, Florence: Sismel, 2010.
5. Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, “Le Caractère de Charles VII,” *Revue des Questions Historiques*, IX, I (juillet 1870): 347–406, 383 n. 2. He cites Guillaume Paradin, *Annales de Bourgogne par Guillaume Paradin de Cuyseaulx*, Lyon: Antoine Gryphius, 1566, 703.
6. See previous chapter.
7. For a detailed discussion regarding Joan’s origins, connections, and the genesis of her mission, see Rohr, “L’Envers de la tapisserie,” 246–52.
8. Siméon Luce, *Jeanne d’Arc à Domremy: recherches critiques sur les origines de la mission de la Pucelle*, 2nd ed., Paris: Hachette et cie, 1887, ccxxx.
9. Pierre Janvier, *La Bienheureuse Jeanne-Marie de Maillé, Baronne de Sillé*, Paris: Albert Larcher, 1888, 208–9.
10. “Capvt VII, 71–2: Regina Siciliae & aliae mulieres testes auditaē,” in Jean Bolland, Godefried Henschen, and Daniel Van Paperbroeck, eds, *Acta Sanctorum Martii . . . 3 Vols*, Antwerpe: Jacob Van Meurs, 1643–1794, 1668, III, 761–64. Cf. Thérèse Griguer, “La Sainteté en Touraine au XVe siècle (La Vie et le procès de canonisation de Jeanne-Marie Maillé),” *Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l’Ouest*, 91, 1 (1984): 27–37; and André Vauchez, “Influences franciscaines et réseaux aristocratiques dans le Val de Loire: autour de la bienheureuse Jeanne-Marie de Maillé (1331–1414),” in Vauchez, André ed., *Mouvements franciscains et société française XIIIe–XXe siècles*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1984, 95–106.
11. Luce, *Jeanne d’Arc à Domremy*, ccxxxi–ii. Cf. Dawn Bratsch-Prince, “The Royal “privada” in Late Fourteenth Century Iberia: A Woman’s Path to Privilege, Power, . . . and Persecution,” unpublished conference paper CMRS-Conference 2007: *Power*, Collingwood College, Durham University, July, 13–16 2007; and Zita Rohr, “Lessons for My Daughter: Self-fashioning *Stateswoman*ship in the Late Medieval Crown of Aragon,” in Laura Delbrugge, ed., *Self-fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill Press, 2015.
12. She was the grandmother of Guy XIV of Laval and André of Laval (their mother was Anne of Laval, their father was Jean of Montfort, known as

- Guy XIII of Laval), who joined Joan's army in June 1429. The Laval, like the cadet branch of the Bourbons, were crucial allies and vassals of the house of Anjou. Cf. Walsby, *The Counts of Laval*, 14, 18.
13. Most likely a dependency of the Abbey of Notre-Dame-de-Belle-Fontaine, south of Angers, about ten kilometers from Cholet.
 14. This Jeanne-Marie de Maillé was married to Thibault of Laval, Lord of Loué. Their children were Guy of Laval, seneschal of Anjou, Thibault of Laval, Lord of Saint-Aubin, Marie of Laval, Jean of Laval, Lord of Bree, and Jeanne de Laval.
 15. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, ccxxxv.
 16. Warren, "Monastic Politics," 204.
 17. *Ibid.*, 223–4.
 18. See earlier chapters.
 19. Greatly admired and supported in his canonization process by René of Anjou.
 20. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, ccxliii.
 21. Francis Peabody Magoun Jr., "The Rome of Two Northern Pilgrims: Archbishop Sigeric of Canterbury and Abbot Nikolas of Munkathvera," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 33, N° 4 (October 1940), 267–89; G. B. Cao, "Il viaggio in Italia di un pellegrino inglese nel 1344," in *Bolletino della società geografica italiano*, VI, IV (1927), 476–96; for the *Via Francigena* (Frankish Way) consult Debra J. Birch, *Pilgrimage to Rome in the Middle Ages: Continuity and Change*, Woodbridge, Suffolk and Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 1998, 43–48.
 22. Rymer, *Fœdera*. William Templeton Waugh demonstrates that this is a confection of Rymer's making. Waugh argues that Joan was far from a terrifying maid, and she did not make as deep an impression upon her English contemporaries as has been claimed (based upon Rymer's addition). Although she caused English desertions and fear in France, in England she was regarded as a common "garden variety" witch who, once captured, was robbed of her powers. W. T. Waugh, "Joan of Arc in English Sources of the Fifteenth Century," in J. G. Edwards, V. H. Galbraith, E. F. Jacob, eds, *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, Manchester: 1933, 387–99.
 23. Pallas-Athena is the pagan virgin goddess of wisdom and defensive warfare (and incidentally the patron of weaving, spinning and needlework, agricultural tools, and invention). She emerged from the head of her father Zeus a fully formed young woman, clothed in armor—although a few accounts deny her a womb. If one reads between the lines of Pius's account, some certainly believed that Joan sprang from someone's head, likewise fully formed.
 24. Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pius II), Luigi Totario, ed., *I commentarii* 2 Vols, Milan: Adelphi Edizioni, 1984, I, 1110; and Florence A. Cragg, trans. and Leona C. Gabel, ed., *The Secret Memoirs of a Renaissance Pope: The "Commentaries" of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, Pius II*, London: The Folio Society, 1988, 201.
 25. Patrick Gilli, "Les Eléments pour une histoire de la gallophobie italienne à la Renaissance: Pie II et la nation Française," in *Mélanges de L'Ecole française de Rome. Moyen-Age, Temps Modernes*, 106, 1 (1994), 275–311, 304–8.
 26. She is perplexed, however, that "Pius did not write more authoritatively and more accurately of a case that so interested him." Cragg, *The Secret Memoirs*, 195 n.

27. Pius II was vexed by Charles VII's 1438 Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, limiting Rome's administrative influence over the independence of the French Church. It was revoked by Louis XI, but reinstated when Pius supported Aragon's claim to peninsular Naples.
28. My paraphrasing based upon the French and Latin renderings in Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Ayroles, *La Vraie Jeanne d'Arc*, 5 Vols, Paris: Gaume et Cie., 1890–1902, III, 537–8 (Pièce 'L') 641–2. Pius held Jouffroy in high regard saying of him: “*judicio omnium doctus, suo doctissimus*” (sage according to others, very wise in his own judgment). Ayroles, III, 537. Cf. Larissa Juliet Taylor, “Joan of Arc, the Papacy, and the Church (1429–1920),” *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 98, N° 2 (April 2012): 217–40, 238; and Deborah A. Fraioli, *Joan of Arc. The Early Debate*, Woodbridge, Suffolk and Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 2000, 187.
29. It is possible that Joan and Colette encountered one another in the autumn of 1429, once Joan's mission was underway. Philippe Contamine, Olivier Bouzy, and Xavier Hélarly, *Jeanne d'Arc: Histoire et Dictionnaire*, Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 2012, 636.
30. Cf. Elsa Sené, “Histoire de la maison natale de Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy,” in *Bulletin de l'Association des amis du Centre Jeanne-d'Arc*, 20, 1996, 63–76; Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, xxv–xxvii, xxviii, xxxii–iii, xxxiv–v, xxxvii–viii, xlvii–viii, xciii–iv, cxcix; Earnest de Bouteiller and G. de Baux, *Nouvelle Recherches sur la famille de Jeanne d'Arc, enquêtes inédites, généalogie*, Paris: Claudin, 1879, 9–10, 21; Félix Léonard, *Dictionnaire topographique du département de la Meuse: comprenant le nom des lieux anciens et modernes*, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1872, x; Jules Quicherat, “Supplément aux témoignages contemporains sur Jeanne d'Arc et *La Chronique des Cordeliers de Paris*,” in *La Revue Historique*, XIX (mai-août 1882): 60–83, 72.
31. Paul Doncoeur and Yvonne Lanhers, *Documents et recherches relatifs à Jeanne la Pucelle. Tome V: la réhabilitation de Jeanne la Pucelle, la rédaction épiscopale du procès de 1455–1456*, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961, 150.
32. Jules Quicherat, *Aperçus nouveaux sur l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc*, Paris: J. Renouard et Cie, 1950, 48–9; Doncoeur and Lanhers, *Documents et recherches relatifs*, V, 116–17.
33. He would participate in the examining body at Chinon and Poitiers organized to investigate Joan's credentials in 1429. Vauchez, “Influences franciscaines,” 102.
34. Samantha Riches, *St George: Hero, Martyr, Myth*, Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing, 2000, 111.
35. Brigitte Bédos-Rezak, “Idéologie royale, ambitions princières et rivalités politiques d'après le témoignage des sceaux (France 1380–1461),” in *La “France Anglaise” au Moyen Age. Actes du 111^e Congrès national des sociétés savantes (Poitiers 1986)*, Paris: Editions du C.T.H.S., 1988, I, 483–511, 506–7.
36. This is confirmed by his household accounts for 1419 and 1421. AN KK 53 f° 21v° and 85v°, f° 161. Cited by Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, xcv–xcvi, 74–5.
37. Quicherat muses on the trigger for Joan's first vision in the summer of 1425, which coincided with Yolande's sponsorship of Richemont—a time of relative optimism in greater France. Quicherat, *Aperçus nouveaux*, I. Cf. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, lxxv–lxxxiv, lxxxix–cxx, esp. xcii–xciii, cxlv; and Siméon Luce, *Chronique du Saint-Michel (1343–1468)*, 2 Vols, Paris: Firmin Didot, 1883.

38. Pierre Tisset and Yvonne Lanhers, *Procès de Condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, 3 Vols, Paris: C. Klincksiek, 1960, T. I, 65.
39. And by his marriage to Marie d'Harcourt in 1416, Count of Aumale and Baron of Elbeuf.
40. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, cli.
41. *Ibid.*, clii.
42. *Ibid.*, clv.
43. These are recounted *ad nauseam* in numerous studies and biographies based, more or less, on primary evidence preserved from Joan's trials. I have discussed this in exhaustive detail elsewhere, notably Rohr, "L'Envers de la tapisserie," 259–60.
44. Vallet, *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 272.
45. Archives Départementales de Meurthe-en-Moselle, B 1141 *Chambre des comptes* f° 190 v°. Cited as Archives de la Meuse by Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, clxv-vi-iv, 209.
46. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, clxxvii–viii, 60.
47. Siméon Luce, "Jeanne d'Arc et les orders mendians," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, XLV (mai 1881): 65–103, 67–71.
48. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy* clxxviii–ix, 258–9.
49. Luce, "Jeanne d'Arc et les orders mendians," 69–70.
50. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, clxxxix.
51. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, II, 48 n. 2. Baudricourt is named one of René's executors. AD BdR B 205 *Comes Provinciae*, f° 90. Cf. Henri Bataille, "Qui était Baudricourt?," *Revue lorraine populaire*, 9, 51 (1983), 184–8.
52. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, II, 50–1.
53. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, cxcvii.
54. *Ibid.*, and 236–7.
55. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, I, 49.
56. *Ibid.*
57. While Quicherat held for Saint-Nicolas-de-Brixey, Tisset affirms that most others hold for St-Nicolas-de-Port. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, II, 50–3.
58. The defeat almost completely deflated French morale. The French commanders were Charles of Bourbon, Count of Clermont and Yolande's youngest son, 15-year-old Charles of Anjou. Clermont had engineered an almost foolproof strategy to ambush the English supply convoy, but the Scots constable, John Stewart of Darnley, disregarded Clermont's instructions and was butchered along with most of his Scots troops. Clermont tried in vain to rescue the situation from the Scots debacle, but was unable to do so. Thomas Basin, Charles Samaran, trans. and ed., *Histoire de Charles VII*, 2 Vols, 2nd ed., Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964–1965, I, 125.
59. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, ccix.
60. Jules Quicherat, "Relation inédite sur Jeanne d'Arc," *Revue Historique*, VI (mai-août 1887): 329–44, 336.
61. Françoise Piponnier, *Costume et vie sociale. La cour d'Anjou XIVe-XVe siècles*, Paris; La Hay: Mouton and Co, 1970, 212–13, 291–2.
62. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, I, 50 and II, 54.
63. On his mother's side, according to Emile Jolibois, *La Haute-Marne ancienne et moderne, dictionnaire géographique, statistique, historique et biographique de ce département . . .*, Chaumont: Imprimerie de Vve; Miot-Dadant, 1858, 472. Cited by Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy*, ccxi–xii.

64. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, I, 76.
65. Archives Municipales de Tours, *Délibérations*, III, f° 9. See previous chapter.
66. Cf. Claudia Olk, "The Poetics of Jerusalem in *Mandeville's Travels*," in Annette Hoffman and Gerhard Wolf, eds, *Jerusalem as Narrative Space. Erzählraum Jerusalem*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012, 211–30; and Alan V. Murray, ed., *From Clermont to Jerusalem. The Crusades and Crusader Societies 1095–1500*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998.
67. See previous chapter. Christian de Mérindol, "L'Imaginaire du pouvoir à la fin du Moyen Âge, les prétentions royales," in Joël Blanchard et Philippe Contamine, eds, *Représentations, Pouvoir et royauté à la fin du Moyen Âge. Actes du colloque organisé par l'Université du Maine les 25 et 26 mars 1994*, Paris: Picard, 1995, 65–92, 66–7.
68. It was at this time that Charles VII and Marie of Anjou welcomed their first daughter into the world. They named her Radegund.
69. The most accessible version of *Mandeville's Travels* is Sir John Mandeville, Michael C. Seymour, ed., *The Egerton Version of Mandeville's Travels*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
70. Olk, "The Poetics of Jerusalem," 212.
71. *Ibid.*, 230.
72. Cf. L'Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*.
73. BNF Espagnol 30; and *L'Atlas Català de Cresques Abraham. Primera edició en el sis-cents aniversari de la seva realització*, Lluís Mercadé i Nubiola, ed., Barcelona: Diàfora, 1975.
74. <http://expositions.bnf.fr/ciel/catalan/index.htm> Consulted November 11, 2014.
75. Cf. Isabel de Riquer, "Los Libros de Violante de Bar," in Maria del Mar Graña Cid, ed., *Las Sabias Mujeres: Educación, Saber y Autoría (Siglos III-XVII)*, Madrid: Asociación Cultural Al-Mudayna, 1995, 164.
76. Francesca Español Bertrán, "La *beata stirps* en la Corona de Aragón. Santa Isabel de Hungría y San Luis de Toloso, culto e iconografía," in Francesca Español Bertrán and Francesc Fité i Llevot, eds, *Hagiografía peninsular en els segles medievals*, Lleida: Edicions de la Universitat de Lleida, 2008, 135–68.
77. L'Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*, 116–33.
78. After studying at the University of Paris, Alain Chartier served Yolande of Aragon as secretary from 1409, entering into the service of the dauphin as diplomat, notary, and secretary in 1417. Alain Chartier, Florence Bouchet trans. and ed., *Le Quadriologue Invectif*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 2002, 7–8.
79. D'Orliac, *Yolande d'Anjou*, 159.
80. L'Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*, 25–43.
81. Philippe Contamine, "Jeanne d'Arc de Chinon à Paris: l'action militaire, le jeu politique," in *De Jeanne d'Arc aux Guerres d'Italie: figures, images et problèmes du XV^e siècle*, Orleans-Caen: Paradigme, 1994, 77–83, 78. Cf. Philippe Contamine, "Yolande d'Aragon et Jeanne d'Arc: l'improbable rencontre de deux parcours politiques," in Éric Bousmar, Jonathan Dumont, Alain Marchandisse et Bertrand Schnerb, eds, *Femmes de pouvoir, femmes politiques durant les derniers siècles du Moyen Âge et au cours de la première Renaissance*, Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2012, 11–30.
82. Louis I Bourbon-La Marche, Count of Vendôme, was Grand Chamberlain of France in 1408 and Grand Master of France in 1413. In 1424, he married

- Jeanne of Laval, daughter of Anne of Laval and granddaughter of Jeanne of Laval-Tinténiaç (one of Yolande's *privadas* and co-patrons discussed earlier).
83. Vallet (de Viriville), *La Chronique de la Pucelle*, 273–4.
 84. *Ibid.*
 85. Deposition of Jean Pasquerel, Doncoeur and Lanhers, *Documents et recherches relatifs à Jeanne la Pucelle*, V, 216–17.
 86. Deposition of Jean d'Aulon. *Ibid.*, 298.
 87. The seat of Charles's *parlement* and university, and sanctuary for his most skilled and erudite clerics and lawyers.
 88. *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 277. Cf. Rohr, "L'Envers de la tapisserie," 278–81, for details of other connections to Yolande's servants during Joan's stay in Chinon and Poitiers.
 89. Vallet, *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 277.
 90. Vallet (de Viriville), *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 61.
 91. Jean Bouchet, *Les Annales d'Aquitaine, faits et gestes en sommaire des roys de France, de l'Angleterre et pais Naples et Milan . . .*, Poitiers: E. de Marnef, 1557, 64. Bouchet's witness was very old indeed having attained his century, according to the historian's reckoning.
 92. Vallet (de Viriville), *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 278.
 93. Archives Municipales de la Tours Ms. s fr. 2342 f^o45. Cited by Vallet, *Histoire de Charles*, II, 63.
 94. Bonnie Wheeler, "Joan of Arc's Sword in the Stone," in Bonnie Wheeler and Charles T. Wood, eds, *Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc*, New York and London: Garland, 1996, xi–xvi, xi.
 95. Pierre Champion, *Procès de Condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, 2 Vols, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1921, II, 363 n. 138.
 96. Cf. Yves Chauvin, ed., *Livres des miracles de Sainte-Catherine-de-Fierbois (1375–1470)*, Poitiers: Société des Archives historiques de Poitou, 1976; Jean-Jacques Bourassé, *Livre des miracles de madame sainte Katherine de Fierbois en Touraine, 1375–1446. Publiés d'après un manuscrit de la Bibliothèque impériale par M. l'abbé J.-J. Bourassé*, Tours: A. Mame, 1858; Anatole France, *Vie de Jeanne d'Arc*, Paris: C. Lévy, 1908, 2 Vols; reprint, Paris: Editions Alive, 1999, III; Philippe Durand, "Les Du (Chastel) pendant une tranche de la guerre de Cent Ans," in *Amphitrite*, Vol. 7 (1974), 10–25; and Michael Jones, "Bon Bretons et Bon Francoys: The Language and Meaning of Treason in Later Medieval France," in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fifth series, 32 (1982), 91–112.
 97. Tisset and Lanhers, *Procès de Condamnation*, II, 75–6.
 98. *Ibid.*
 99. *Ibid.*, I, 44–54. Cf. Jones, "Gardez mon corps, sauvez ma terre," 9, 10, 25. Charles of Orleans appears not to have been particularly moved by Joan's mission. Although he directed the Orleanais to stand the cost of robes to be purchased for Joan, he did not refer to her in his poetry. Enid McLeod, *Charles of Orleans. Prince and Poet*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1969, 175, 324.
 100. Vallet, *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 274–5.
 101. Roca cites a letter from Joan, Duke of Girona, to the Cardinal of Aragon, requesting dispensation so that his marriage might take place during Lent, in which he names her Catherine, clarifying that she will be known as Violant: "*car l'avi de de Bar, a la qual ell nomena Caterina, essent axí que li*

- diuen Violant.*” Joseph Maria Roca, *Joban I d’Aragó*, Barcelona: Memorias de la Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona, 1929, 95. Cf. Josep Sanabre i Sanromà, “Les noces del primogènit Joan d’Aragó amb la duquessa de Bar I el Cisma d’Occident,” in *Oc: setmanari de literatura, arts, ciències, esports: organe dels Païzes d’Oc: Auvernha, gasconha, Lengadoc, Lemozin, Provensa, Catalonha amb Valencia & Balears*, *V* Ie annada (1929) 118 (Sept.), 4; 120 (Oct.), 12–13; 121 (Nov.), 9–11; 122 (Dec.), 11.
102. Joan-Francesc Ainaud i Escudero, “Dos portapaus de cap al 1400: el de Pere d’Urgell i el de Violant de Bar,” in *Butlletí del Museu Nacional d’Art de Catalunya*, 2 (1994), 127–43, 137–43; and Francesca Español Bertrán, “Santa Catalina,” *Maravillas de la España Medieval. Tesoro Sagrada y Monarquía*, Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2001, 269–88.
 103. Michael Camille, “The Illustrated Manuscripts of Guillaume de Deguileville’s ‘Pèlerinages’ 1330–1426,” unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 1985, 227–8, 228 n. 36; Anne-Marie Legaré, “La Réception du *Pèlerinage de Vie humaine* de Guillaume de Digulleville dans le milieu angevin d’après les sources et les manuscrits conservés,” in Sophie Cassanges-Brouquet and others, eds, *Religion et mentalités au Moyen Âge. Mélanges en honneur d’Hervé Martin*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2003, 543–52, 545; and Richard K. Emmerson, “‘A Large Order of the Whole’: Intertextuality in the Hours of Isabella Stuart,” in *Studies in Iconography*, 28 (2007), 53–99. Cited by L’Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*.
 104. *The Fitzwilliam Hours*, Cambridge, The Fitzwilliam Museum, Ms. 62, f° 20r, reproduced by L’Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*, Plate 7, 122–3.
 105. The year of Yolande of Aragon’s death and the remarriage of her son-in-law François I, Duke of Brittany, to Isabella Stuart of Scotland (following the death of his first wife Yolande of Anjou in 1440).
 106. Catherine married Henry V who fathered the infant-king, Henry VI of England, Charles VII’s nephew and competitor for the throne of France.
 107. *The Fitzwilliam Hours*, Cambridge, The Fitzwilliam Museum, Ms. 62, f° 140r, included by L’Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*, 117.
 108. Camille, “The Illustrated Manuscripts,” 228. Cited by L’Estrange, *Holy Motherhood*, 122.
 109. Cf. Cynthia Hahn, “Collector and Saint: Queen Rade Gund and Devotion to the Relic of the True Cross,” *Word and Image* 22, 3 (2006), 268–74.
 110. Subsequent daughters were given the names Marguerite, Jeanne, Marie, and Madeleine. The veneration of the penitent sinner Marie-Madeleine (Mary Magdalen) had a tradition with deep roots in both the Aragonese and Angevin dynasties: “*a lo largo de los siglos XIV y XV los Anjou patrocinarán el culto a santa María Magdalena como expresión de la piedad dinástica*” (throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Anjou sponsored the veneration of St. Mary Magdalen as an expression of dynastic piety). Bertran, “*La beata stirps en la Corona de Aragón*,” 159–60. She cites Katherine Ludwig Jansen, *The Making of the Magdalen. Preaching and Popular Devotion in the Later Middle Ages*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000, 307–32. None were given the name Isabeau, Isabelle or Elisabeth. Charles Cawley, “*Medieval Lands: A Prosopography of Medieval and European Noble and Royal Families*,” Foundation for Medieval Genealogy (<http://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/CAPET.htm#>). Consulted March 15, 2015. Louis XI, however, did name one of his illegitimate daughters by Marguerite de Sassege, Isabeau. *Ibid.*

111. Cf. Ian C. Sharman, *Thomas Langley, "The" First Spin Doctor (c. 1363–1437): A Political Biography of the Fifteenth Century's Greatest Statesman*, England: Dovecote-Renaissance, 1999. Cf. Zita Rohr, "True Lies and Strange Mirrors: The uses and abuses of rumor, propaganda and innuendo during the closing stages of the Hundred Years War" in Zita Rohr and Lisa Benz St John, eds, *Queenship, Reputation and Gendered Power in the Medieval and Early Modern West*, New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, expected 2016.
112. Jacques Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc: son personnalité, son rôle*, Paris: La Table Ronde, 1948, 175. Cordier refers to the chronicle of Eberhard Windecke, Germain Lefèvre-Pontalis, ed., *Les Sources Allemandes de l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc. Eberhard Windecke*, Paris: Albert Fointemoing, 1901, and the Trial Documents to support his case.
113. "Copia de una letera manda el nobel homo ser Pangrati Zustignan ady x de marzo da Bruzia a so pare miser Marcho Zustignan, rezevuda ady xvij de zugno: dixe in questa forma" (copy of a letter sent from Bourges on May 10 by the nobleman sire Pancrazio Giustiniani to his father Marco Giustiniani, received June 18), in *Chronique d'Antonio Morosini. Extraits relatifs à l'histoire de France, publiée pour la Société de l'histoire de France*, 4 Vols, Germain Lefèvre-Pontalis and Léon Dore, eds. and trans., Paris: H. Laurens, 1898–1902, I, 969–75 (f° 501–502). Cf. Hélyary, "Saint Catherine," in Contamine and Hélyary, *Jeanne d'Arc: Histoire et Dictionnaire*, Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 2012, 595–7, 597.
114. Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 175.
115. *Le Mistere du Siege d'Orleans*, Vicky L. Hamblin, ed., Geneva: Droz, 2002, 308, ll. 6996–7000. Cf. Georges Peyronnet, "L'Etrange Rencontre d'un conquérant dévot et d'un prédicteur messenger de paix: Henri V d'Angleterre et Saint Vincent Ferrier (1418)," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 87, 3–4 (1992): 663–81.
116. The object of Joan's Rouen trial was to prove that she had misled the gullible and to delegitimize Charles's coronation by disavowing her spiritual credentials.
117. Johan Huizinga and Julia Bastin, trans., *Le Déclin du Moyen Age [L'Automne du Moyen-Age]*, Paris: Editions Payot, 2002, 137.
118. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 72.
119. Joseph Stevenson, ed., *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France During the Reign of Henry the Sixth King of England*, 3 Vols, London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green 1861–1864, II, ii, 530.
120. Doncoeur and Lanhers, *Documents et recherches relatifs V*, 212; and Pierre Duparc, *Procès en nullité de la condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, 3 Vols, Paris: Librairie C. Klincksiek, 1977–1986, I, 317–18.
121. Culant, Bousac, Ambroise de Loré (one of Yolande's Manceaux knights), and Gilles de Raïs were all connected to Yolande. In 1422, Yolande exercised her right of guardianship over her vassal Gilles de Laval, Lord of Retz or Raïs. She had the use of two-thirds of the revenue of his lands. AN P 1334/1, f° 144 cited by Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 75. At the time of Gilles's appearance in Blois, he would have been recently liberated from Yolande's guardianship.
122. See previous chapter.
123. Piccolomini (Pius II), *I commentarii*, I, 1110.
124. *Journal du Siège d'Orléans 1428–1431. Augmenté de plusieurs documents notamment des comptes de ville 1429–1431*, Paul Charpentier and Charles Cuissard,

- eds, Orleans: H. Herliusan, 1896, 69. The oldest extant manuscript is dated 1472. In the absence of its duke, Charles of Orleans, it was probably commissioned by municipal leaders to record this moment in the city's history to preserve it in its archive. It covers events from the start of the siege on October 12, 1428, to the end of September 1429, and was completed around 1467 by the notary Pierre [Soudan] Soudan whose father participated in the defense of Orleans. Craig Taylor, ed., *Joan of Arc La Pucelle*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006, 356. Cf. Claude Desama, "Jeanne d'Arc et la diplomatie de Charles VII: l'ambassade française auprès de Philippe le Bon en 1429," *Annales de Bourgogne*, 40 (1968): 290–9.
125. *Journal du Siège d'Orléans*, 69.
126. *Ibid.*, 70. The English had a maximum of 5,000 men at their disposal, with only 3,000 of that number battle-ready. The French had a force of approximately 5,600 battle-ready men, to which another 3,000 were added from Blois on April 29 and May 4, 1429. Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 138.
127. Pierre-Roger Gausin, "Les conseillers de Charles VII (1418–1461). Essai de politologie historique," *Francia—Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte*, vol. 10 (1982): 67–130, 93.
128. *Journal du Siège d'Orléans*, 74–8.
129. "The *oriflamme* legend, also referred to as the ensign, banner or heraldic flag of Saint-Denis . . . was supposed to have accompanied Charlemagne during his professed voyage to Jerusalem . . . In the minds of the people of the Middle Ages the *oriflamme* was linked irrefutably to the memory of Charlemagne." Philippe Contamine, *Des Pouvoirs en France 1300–1500*, Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure, 1992, 50.
130. *Journal du Siège d'Orléans*, 74–8.
131. Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 167.
132. *Ibid.*
133. "La registre delphinal de Mathieu Thomassin," in Quicherat *Procès—IV*, ch. II 303–13.
134. Germain Lefèvre-Pontalis, ed., *Les Sources allemandes de l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc*. Eberhard Windecke, Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1903, 177.
135. *Ibid.*
136. Gruel, *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont*, 69.
137. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 167.
138. Gruel, *Chronique*, 70.
139. Cf. René Achille Joseph de Brisay, *La Maison de la Jaille avec tables généalogiques* (. . .), Paris: Honoré Champion, 1910.
140. Henri Wallon, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 2 Vols, Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1875, I, 196.
141. Gruel, *Chronique*, 70–2,
142. *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 304–5. Cf. René Planchenault, "La Chronique de la Pucelle," in *Bibliothèque de l'École de Chartes*, XCIII (1932), 55–104.
143. *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 305.
144. Jules Michelet and Claude Mettra, ed., *Histoire de France*, 18 Vols, Geneva: Edito-Service, 1987, IV, 26.
145. On June 18, 1429.
146. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 172.
147. Their rejection of Richemont and the negative response to this decision is expressed in verse by Martial d'Auvergne. Martial D'Auvergne, *Les poésies de Martial de Paris dit D'Auvergne—Les Vigilles de la mort du Roy Charles VII*, 2 Vols, Paris: Imprimerie d'Antoine Urbain Coustelier, 1724, I, 103.

148. Gruel, *Chronique*, 74.
149. Jean Chartier, Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), eds, *Chronique de Charles VII roi de France*, 3 Vols, Paris: P. Jannet, 1888, I, 89.
150. *Journal du Siège*, 107. Karen Green proposes an (other) original hypothesis, attempting to build the case that, rather than exiling herself to the royal abbey of Poissy in 1418, where her daughter had entered holy orders with Marie of France (on September 8, 1397), Christine de Pizan was actually enjoying the company of the queen of France and her mother the queen of Sicily in “safe” territories, and that it was from this privileged position that she penned her final work—the *Ditié de Jébanne d’Arc*. An intriguing possibility founded upon historical overreach and unconvincing “evidence” combined with purposive wishful thinking. Green, “Was Christine de Pizan at Poissy 1418–1429?,” *Medium Ævum*, LXXXIII, 1 (2014), 91–105, 96–9.
151. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 138–9.
152. Cf. Hébert, *Regeste*, 318–19 and Gouiran and Hébert, *Potentia*, 249–60 for details of Estates convoked for May 25, 1429, to June 11, 1429, the motif of which was the “*Défense du pays contre la menace aragonaise*.”
153. Gouiran and Hébert, *Potentia*, 258–60.
154. Zurita, *Anales*, V, 692.
155. Richemont’s wife, Marguerite of Burgundy was Duchess of Guyenne from her first marriage to the dauphin Louis of Guyenne.
156. *Journal d’un Bourgeois de Paris 1405–1449*, Alexandre Tuetey, ed., Paris: H. Champion, 1881, 241–2.
157. Vallet, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 105.
158. *Journal di siège*, 109–10.
159. *Ibid.*, 110–11.
160. And later for a period of 33 days in 1430 on or around Holy Week. Some of his sojourn was spent in the company of Marie of Anjou. *Journal du Siège*, 236, 238, 242.
161. *Mémoires de Jean Rogier, prévôt de l’échevinage de Reims, règne du roi Charles VII*, Edouard de Barthélemy, ed., Reims: Paul Giret, 1875. According to Quicherat, Rogier vouchsafed vital and precious information regarding Joan’s and Charles’s voyage to Reims. Although he was not a contemporary of Joan (d. 1637), he meticulously assembled and recorded invaluable documentation, which no longer survives. Rogier’s *Mémoires* are built upon a firm foundation of Joan’s and Charles’s letters, written military orders and directives, and municipal deliberations and correspondence from the city of Troyes and Châlons-sur-Marne. Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 284, 290. Richard was banned from preaching in Poitiers in March 1431. Henri Couget, *Jeanne d’Arc devant Paris*, Paris: Editions Spes, 1925, 129–48.
162. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, II, 94–5.
163. Rogier in Quicherat, IV, 290.
164. Including a letter-writing campaign with his ally Burgundy to towns along Charles’s route. Wallon, *Jeanne d’Arc*, I, 227–8.
165. *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 319.
166. Rogier in Quicherat, IV, 294.
167. *Ibid.*, 284–99.
168. *Journal du Siège*, 113.
169. Quicherat, *Procès*, V, 127–30.
170. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 72; Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 23, 77, 185; and Vallet (de Viriville), *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 99.

171. ANJ 582, N° 33.
172. Cf. Colette Beaune, "Prophétie et propagande: le sacre de Charles VII," in Myriam Yardeni, ed., *Idéologie et propagande en France*, Paris: Picard, 1987, 62–73; and Colette Beaune, Nicole Lemaître. "Prophétie et politique dans la France du Midi au XVe siècle," *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome. Moyen-Age, Temps modernes*, 102, 2 (1990): 597–616.
173. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, IV, lxx, 340–4, 341; and Taylor's translation, Taylor, *Joan of Arc*, 120. Cf. Andrew Brown, "Charisma and Routine: Shaping the Memory of Brother Richard and Joan of Arc," in *Religions*, 3 (2012), 1162–79; and Siméon Luce, "Deux Documents inédits relatifs à Frère Richard et Jeanne d'Arc," in *Revue politique et littéraire. Revue Bleue*, XLIX (janvier au juin, 1892), 201–4.
174. Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 126–7.
175. Jean-Baptiste-Pierre Courcelles, *Généalogie de la Maison de la Trémoille*.
176. Pierre Joseph Varin, *Archives administratives de la ville de Reims: collection de pièces inédites pouvant servir à l'histoire des institutions dans l'intérieur de la cité*, Paris: Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1840–1852, 1844, Statuts I, 596. Reproduced by Quicherat, *Procès*, V, 139–40, cited by Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 262.
177. See discussion above. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, IV, lxx, 340–4, 341; and Taylor's translation, Taylor, *Joan of Arc*, 120.
178. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, IV, 348, 613.
179. Jeanne's father, Gilles de Preuilly, had been a stalwart of Louis of Orleans; he too fell foul of Jean of Burgundy.
180. *Chronique des Cordeliers de Paris*, in Quicherat, "Supplément aux témoignages contemporains," 77.
181. Count of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis, Duke of Bourbon from 1434. He was married to Burgundy's sister, Agnès of Burgundy, maintaining a truce with his brother-in-law and nominal enemy. He eventually persuaded his brother-in-law to uncouple himself from the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, and would represent Charles VII in 1435 at negotiations leading to the Treaty of Arras.
182. *Journal du Siège*, 120–2.
183. *Ibid.*, 126.
184. ANJJ 174, N° 339 cited by Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 175.
185. *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 332.
186. *Ibid.*, 331–2, *Chronique Normande*, in Vallet (de Viriville), *Chronique de la Pucelle . . . suivie de la Chronique Normande*, 459–60.
187. Cf. Rohr, "The Reverse of the Tapestry," 303–4, 316–17. *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 331–2.
188. *Ibid.*, 333.
189. *Chronique de Perceval de Cagny*, in Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 27.
190. *Chronique Normande*, 460–1. Cf. Charles de Beaurepaire, "Notice sur Pierre Cochon, auteur de la *Chronique normande*," *Précis de l'Académie de Rouen*, 1859–1860, 299–331.
191. *Chronique de Perceval de Cagny*, in Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 27–29.
192. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), *Charles VII, roi de France et ses conseillers*, Paris: Dumouin, 1857 and his "Mémoire sur les institutions de Charles VII," *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole de Chartes*, 33 (1872): 5–118. "Mémoire sur les institutions de Charles VII" and Gaussin, "Les conseillers de Charles VII," for an analytical and statistical study of the composition of Charles's council.
193. *Chronique de Perceval de Cagny*, in Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 29.

194. Ibid., 29–30.
 195. Ibid., 30.
 196. Alençon was later to embroil himself in rebellious and treasonous activities, only narrowly escaping execution for the crime of lèse-majesté.
 197. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 77.
 198. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 176.
 199. Tisset, *Procès de Condamnation*, II, 100.
 200. Ibid. This exchange appears to have taken place around November 1429.
 201. Doncoeur and Lanhers, *Documents et recherches*, V, 305.
 202. Quicherat, *Procès*, V, 150–3.
 203. The Berry Herald, *Chroniques*, 143–4.
 204. Georges Chastellain in Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 442.
 205. Cagny describes Joan's capture in some detail. *Chronique de Perceval de Cagny*, in Quicherat, *Procès*, IV, 32–4.
 206. My transcription of the Latin original. British Library Ms. Add 30583 f° 2, *Procès criminel faite à Jeanne d'Arc de Vaulcouleur, vulgairement appelée La Pucelle Jeanne es Années 1430 et 1431* dated c. 1430. There is later version contained in BL Add 30584 (c. 1456). It was copied into BNF nouv. acq. fr. 7151 (Brienne 180), collated from assorted manuscripts on January 15, 1652. BL Ms. 30583 was transferred to the British Library by the BNF in 1878. Tisset mentions these manuscripts in *Procès de Condamnation*, I, xxvii–xxviii as does Quicherat in *Procès*, V, 400. Cf. Paul-Marie Bondonio, "Inventaire de la collection Bauffremont à la Bibliothèque nationale," *Bibliothèque de l'École de Chartes*, T. 92 (1931): 70–120, 70–4, 77, 83, 90, 93–4.
 207. Cragg's translation, *Secret Memoirs*, 201.

5 *En la Foret de Longue Attente*: Recovery and Reform

*"Ballade CV, Charles d'Orléans, Pierre Champion ed., *Charles d'Orléans: Poésies*, 2 Vols, 4th Edition, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1966, I, 65.

1. Enguerran de Monstrelet, Louis Douët-D'Arcq ed., *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400–1444*, 6 Vols, Paris: Chez Mme Ve de Jules Renouard, 1857–1862, IV, lxxv, 340–4, 341; and Taylor's translation, Taylor, *Joan of Arc*, 120. See chapter 4.
2. Thomas Rymer, *Fœdera, conventiones, literæ et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliæ*, 20 Vols, London: J. Tonson, 1704–1732, X, 408.
3. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, IV, 385–6.
4. Ibid., 440–2.
5. Ibid., 442–7.
6. Ibid., 446.
7. Ibid., 447.
8. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René Sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires*, 2 Vols, Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1969 [Paris: Honoré Champion, 1875], I, 78–9.
9. Georges Chastellain, Kervyn de Lettenhove and Joseph-Bruno-Marie Constantin eds, *Cœuvres de Georges Chastellain* [8 Vols, Brussels: Heusner, 1863–1866] Geneva: Slatkin, 1971 (4 Vols) II, 43. See chapter 3.
10. Louis-François de Villeneuve-Bargemont, *L'Histoire de René d'Anjou, roi de Naples, duc de Lorraine, Cte de Provence*, 3 Vols, Paris: J. J. Blaise, 1825, I, 116–17.

11. Dom Augustin Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, 7 Vols, Paris: Editions du Palais-Royal, 1973, II, 767.
12. Archives Départementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, B 690, n° 137. Cf. *Annuaire de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de la Lorraine*, XXXIX (1930): 18–9.
13. BNF, Ms. Lorraine 68, f° 229. Cited by Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 83.
14. The Berry Herald, *Chroniques*, 147–8.
15. July 2, 1431.
16. Martial D'Auvergne, *Les poésies de Martial de Paris dit D'Auvergne—Les Vigilles de la mort du Roy Charles VII*, 2 Vols, Paris: Imprimerie d'Antoine Urbain Coustelier, 1724, I, 130–1.
17. Dawn Bratsch-Prince, *Violante de Bar (1365–1431)*, Madrid: Editiones del Orto, 2000, 9.
18. Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, II, 775. BNF Ms. Lorraine 238, n°4. Yolande soon discovered that, in her daughter-in-law, she had an excellent lieutenant.
19. BNF Ms. Lorraine, 238, n° 2.
20. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 83–4.
21. Emile-Guillaume Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, 486.
22. This could only be Marguerite of Savoy because her sister Marie was married to Filippo-Maria Visconti, and their eldest sister, Bonne, had died the previous year. In the end, Louis III of Anjou married Marguerite of Savoy, and Yolande of Anjou married François of Brittany.
23. *Lettres et mandements*, VI, 270. BNF Ms. Fr. 11542 f° 6.
24. *Ibid.*, 285.
25. *Ibid.*, 287–8. ADLA E 180–7, Liasse (cass. 76).
26. *Ibid.*, 292.
27. *Ibid.*, 291.
28. *Ibid.*, 292.
29. Eugène Cosneau, *Le Connétable Richemont (Artur de Bretagne 1393–1458)*, Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1886, 180.
30. BNF Ms. Fr. 11542, f° 24.
31. In March 1431.
32. On May 8, 1431, the second anniversary of the lifting of the siege of Orleans. Once Trémoille had been removed and neutralized, Yolande and Charles of Anjou restored Amboise's assets. Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 181–3.
33. AN P 1334/17.
34. *Lettres et mandements*, VI, 295–8. Archives Départementales de Loire-Atlantique E 10 (1417–1437) Liasse (cass. 4); P 1334/18 n° 80.
35. Marcelle-Renée Reynaud, *Le Temps de Princes, Louis II and Louis III d'Anjou-Provence 1384–1434*, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000, 43.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Yolande appointed Pierre de Beauvau tutor to Charles VII during his minority, and he was one of Louis II's executors in 1417. With Tanneguy du Châtel, Beauvau spirited the dauphin Charles out of Paris in 1418. He served on Charles's council in 1419. He traveled south with Yolande and Louis III later in 1419 and was seneschal of Anjou–Provence from 1426 to 1435, acting as Yolande's lieutenant-general in Provence during her absence. He was also governor of Anjou–Maine and captain of the city of Angers, defending

- it against English incursions. He represented both Louis III and Charles VII in betrothal negotiations between Anjou and Savoy. Louis Moréri, *Le Grand Dictionnaire historique ou le mélange curieux de l'histoire*, 10 Vols, Paris: Les libraires associés, 1759; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1995, 2, 158.
38. Marguerite of Rohan married Jean II of Orleans, Count of Angoulême, in 1449 following his release from English captivity in 1444.
 39. Yolande of Anjou's marriage to François of Brittany went ahead with an exchange of hostages to ensure against Louis's ire. AN P 1334/18, n° 81; AD BdR B II, 62–64; BNF Ms. Fr. 3907, n° 21. Cited by Reynaud in *Le Temps*, 43.
 40. Louis III had a future Italian match in mind for Charles, and his viceroy Yolande might well have been persuaded by his project. See note below.
 41. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 43. Reynaud might have drilled more deeply into her assertion to uncover that Louis arranged strategically for his youngest brother Charles to marry to Cobella Ruffo, daughter of Carlo Ruffo and Ceccarella Sanseverino, of the distinguished Neapolitan house of Calabria. According to Louis's final testament, Charles's union to Cobella was decided in 1434 with one son born, Jean-Louis-Marin. Both mother and child died of plague in 1435. Cf. Michelle M. Hamilton, *Beyond Faith: Belief, Morality and Memory in a Fifteenth-Century Judeo-Iberian Manuscript*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, 225. Yolande and Charles negotiated a string unrealized betrothals with Marie, daughter of Jean IV, Count of Armagnac (December 1436) who married Jean II, Duke of Alençon in 1437; Elizabeth von Wittelsbach (second cousin of Isabeau of Bavaria), daughter of Ernst I, Duke of Bavaria-Munich, and Elisabethta Visconti (1437) who married Hesso, Landgrave of Leiningen in 1440; and Marie, the seven-year-old daughter of Arnulf, Duke of Guelders (October 1441), who married James II of Scotland in 1449. In May 1444, Charles married Isabelle of Luxembourg, daughter of Pierre I of Luxembourg, Count of St-Pôl, and Marguerite of Baux (Naples–Provence) in Angers. While there is some preference toward alliances serving Anjou's Neapolitan interests, Charles (and Yolande) cast his politico-marital net wide. Cf. Kerrebrouck, *Les Valois*, 319, n. 16. Cf. Anselme de Sainte-Marie, *Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France* (. . .), 3rd edition, Amsterdam: Chez Les Frères Chatelain, 1713, 117.
 42. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 43.
 43. Georges Chapiet and Dominique Labarre de Raillicourt, *Les Alliances matrimoniales entre les Maisons de France et de Savoie*, Aurillac: Imprimerie Moderne—U.S.H.A., 1973, 19–20.
 44. Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 44.
 45. *Ibid.*, 182.
 46. *Lettres et mandements*, VI, 305.
 47. *Ordonnances*, XIII, 117–19. Cf. Vallet (de Viriville), *Charles VII roi de France et ses conseillers*; and Pierre-Roger Gausin, “Les conseillers de Charles VII (1418–1461). Essai de politologie historique,” *Francia—Forschungen zur west-europäischen Geschichte*, vol. 10 (1982): 67–130, 93.
 48. Gausin, “Conseillers de Charles VII,” 75–7.
 49. *Ordonnances*, XIII, 117.
 50. *Lettres et mandements*, VI, 298.
 51. AN JJ 177 n° 180. Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 182 n. 2.
 52. *Ibid.*

53. Cf. Laurent Vissière, "Georges de la Trémoille et la naissance du parti angevin," in Jean-Michel Matz and Noël-Yves Tonnere, eds, *René d'Anjou (1409–1480). Pouvoirs et gouvernement*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011, 15–30 esp. 27–30.
54. BNF Ms. Fr. 11542, f° 13.
55. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 184.
56. *Ibid.*, 185.
57. *Ibid.*
58. BNF Ms. Fr. 11542, f° 13.
59. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 186.
60. This is supported by a document, dated March 28, 1432, describing an agreement between Alençon, Brittany, and the bishop of Nantes, chancellor of Brittany, on the subject of injuries occasioned by Alençon to Jehan de Malestroit. Auguste Vallet de Viriville, *Notice des archives de M. le marquis du Hallay-Coëtquen*, Paris: Mme. Vve. Dondey-Dupré, 1851, 51–60, esp. 54–5.
61. *Lettres et mandements*, VII, 9; BNF Ms. Fr. 11542, f° 16.
62. *Lettres et mandements*, VII, 8. Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 186–7.
63. Cf. Vallet de Viriville, *Notice des archives*, 51–60.
64. Richard of Brittany married Marguerite of Orleans, sister of Charles of Orleans.
65. BNF Ms. Fr. 1278, f° 46, v°. Cited by Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 189.
66. *Lettres et mandements*, VIII, 10, 12, 17.
67. BNF Ms. 1278 ff° 47–8.
68. The Angevin duchy controlled by Yolande.
69. 'Avertissement' au duc de Bourgogne, pour le pousser à la guerre contre le roi de France" ("Admonition" to the duke of Burgundy, to push him to war against the king of France). Zita Eva Rohr, unpublished doctoral thesis, "L'Envers de la tapisserie. The Œuvre of Yolande d'Aragon: A Study of Queenship, Power and Authority in Late Mediæval France," University of New England Armidale, Australia, 2007, 347, & Appendix 2, doc. 7. Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 539–41.
70. *Ibid.*, 190.
71. ANJ 245, n° 2, *Lettres et mandements*, VIII, 17–20, 18.
72. Blanche of Brittany, died c. 1419, was married to Jean IV, Count of Armagnac.
73. Bernard VIII of Armagnac, Count of Pardiac, married Éléonore of Bourbon (d. 1471), Duchess of Nemours and Countess of La Marche in 1429. She was the daughter of Jacques II, Count of La Marche (d. 1438), consort of Giovanna II of Naples (1415–19).
74. ANJ 245, n° 1. Cited by Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 541–5.
75. BNF Ms. Fr. 11542 f° 22. *Lettres et mandements*, VII, 18. Cf. Jules-Henri Geslin de Bourgogne and Anatole de Barthélémy, *Anciens Evêchés de Bretagne. Histoire et monuments*, 6 Vols, Paris: Dumoulin, 1855–1879, III, 1864, 318–31, 318, 329.
76. BNF Ms. Fr. 11542, f° 20 published in *Lettres et mandements*, VII, 30.
77. Cf. Jules Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando, l'un des combattants pour l'indépendance française au XV^e siècle*, Paris: Hachette, 1879. Rodrigue was the brother-in-law of Charles of Bourbon, Count of Clermont, and lieutenant-general for Charles VII in Languedoc, Guyenne, Dauphiné, Bourbon, and Forez.

78. Family connectedness, a family “firm” or “commonwealth,” is paramount in any consideration of the employees and vassals of royal and élite households. Jean V de Beuil belonged to an illustrious Tourangeau family established within the confines of Maine, and his father and uncle, Pierre, distinguished themselves in the war against the English. Another of his uncles (and his guardian upon the death of his father), Hardouin de Beuil, was bishop of Angers until his death in 1439. On October 26, 1430, Jean V de Beuil, captain of Sablé, made a pledge of loyalty and obedience to Yolande (Lady of Sablé) and her children. Michel Féliben and Guy-Alexis Lobineau eds, *Histoire de la ville de Paris composée par D. Michel Féliben, revue, augmentée et mise au jour par D. Guy-Alexis Lobineau*, 5 Vols, Paris: Chez Guillaume Deprez etc, 1725, V, 549; Jean de Beuil, Camille Favre and Léon Lecestre eds, *Le Jouvencel par Jean de Beuil*, 2 Vols, Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1888; Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1996; and Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 198.
79. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 197 n. 6.
80. *Ibid.*, 198.
81. See above regarding the French victory at Montargis prior to the appearance of Joan of Arc.
82. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 156.
83. George Edward Cokayne and Vicary Gibbs eds, *The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom etc.*, 4 Vols, London: The Saint Catherine Press Limited, 1910–16, II (1912), 72.
84. Ms. Fr. 11542, f° 23; *Lettres et mandements*, VII, 42.
85. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 196.
86. *Ibid.*
87. *The Complete Peerage*, II, 72. See note 43 above, Charles of Anjou married Jacquette’s younger sister Isabelle in 1444. Jacquette married in secret, for the second time, to Richard Woodville (c. 1436/7), and the Woodvilles would become close confidants of Henry VI and his queen, Marguerite of Anjou. Their firstborn, Elizabeth Woodville, became queen-consort to Edward IV.
88. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 199.
89. BNF Ms. Fr. 8819, f° 56.
90. The Berry Herald, *Les Chroniques*, 156–7.
91. Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 6 Vols and 1 Album of Plates, Paris: A. Picard, 1881–1891, II, 291.
92. Joseph Stevenson, ed., *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France During the Reign of Henry the Sixth King of England*, 3 Vols, London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green 1861–1864, II/I, 227–9.
93. Jean Chartier Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), ed., *Chronique de Charles VII roi de France*, 3 Vols, Paris: P. Jannet, 1888, I, 171.
94. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 203 and n. 1.
95. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, II, 298–9. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 303 n. 3.
96. BNF Ms. Fr. 25710.
97. She died on September 20, 1433.
98. Rymer, *Fœdera*, X, 555–61. “*Regina Cecilia*” appears first in this long document listing those to be involved in negotiations intended to conclude with the liberation of Charles of Orleans. She is followed by “*Karolus ejus filius*” (her son, Charles of Anjou); “*Dux Brittanie*” (Jean V); Arthurus and Richardus de Dux Brittanie (Richemont and Richard of Étampes) et al.

99. The Calais round of conferences were eventually convened on June 9, 1439. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 206.
100. René's firstborn child, a daughter, Isabelle, died young.
101. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, 100–1.
102. In 1430, he had been Joan of Arc's gaoler prior to her handover to the English, for which he received 10,000 livres tournois.
103. AN P 1334/5, f° 154.
104. Cf. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, V, 49 regarding the Bohain outcome.
105. AN KK 1123, f° 17 v°.
106. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 105–6.
107. The union of Anne and Louis would produce a daughter, Charlotte of Savoy, who would become queen-consort of Louis XI, Yolande's grandson—the child she was determined would succeed as king of France from her return to France from Provence in 1423. The dauphin Louis's first wife was the Scots princess, Margaret Stuart (d. 1445).
108. Rohr, "L'Envers de la Tapisserie," 358–61.
109. Jean le Févre, Seigneur de Saint-Remy, *Chronique de Jean le Févre, Seigneur de Saint-Remy*, 2 Vols, François Morand, ed., Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1876–1881, II, 287–97, 287. It was held on February 7, 1434 (n.s.).
110. *Ibid.*, 288.
111. Jeanne de Preuilly, wife of Raoul de Gaucourt, and Jeanne de Mortemer, wife of Robert le Maçon, Yolande's ladies-in-waiting, participated in the verification of Joan of Arc's gender and virginity in 1429. See previous chapter.
112. Le Févre, *Chronique*, 290.
113. *Ibid.*, 292.
114. Artefeuil [Louis Ventré ?], Jean-Baptiste de Capris de Beauvezer eds, *Histoire héroïque et universelle de la noblesse de Provence*, 3 Vols, Avignon: F. Seguin, 1776–86, I, 341–3.
115. Le Févre, *Chronique*, 295.
116. The description runs for some ten pages, attesting to the impact and probable importance of the event. By way of comparison, the earlier marriage of Isabella of Portugal to Burgundy on January 7, 1430, runs for 12 pages.
117. Le Févre, *Chronique*, 297.
118. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 195–6.
119. *Lettres et mandements*, VII, 60.
120. Cf. Pierre Thomas-LaCroix, "Jean de Malestroit, chancelier du duc Jean V," in *Bulletin de la société archéologique et historique de Nantes et de Loire Atlantique*, CXV (1978), 135–93.
121. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 106–7.
122. The Berry Herald, *Chroniques*, 160.
123. Louis Aleman (d. 1450) was created archbishop of Arles in December 1423, and, in 1426, was promoted to the office of cardinal-priest of Santa Cecilia in Trastevere (Rome). He presided over the Council of Basle in 1438 and had an illustrious career as an ecclesiastical and papal diplomat. He was beatified by Clement VII (Giulio de' Medici) in 1527. Heribert Müller, *Die Franzosen, Frankreich und das Basler Konzil*, 2 Vols, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schönigh, 1990, II, 973. Cf. Pierre Saxi, *Pontificium arelatense, seu Historia primatum sanctae arelatensis ecclesiae, cum indice reum politicarum Galliae ac*

- Provinciae tempore uniuscujusque primatis, authore Petro Saxio*, Arles: Aquis Sextiis, 1629.
124. Philippe IV de Lévis, Count of Villars, Baron de la Roche, etc. François-Alexandre Aubert de La Chesnaye Des Bois and Jacques Badier, *Dictionnaire de la noblesse, contenant les généalogies, l'histoire et la chronologie des familles nobles de France...*, 15 Vols, Paris: La Vve Duchesne, 1770–1786 [1774], VIII, 674.
 125. The Berry Herald, *Chroniques*, 161.
 126. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 107. The Vienne episode is also recorded by Monstrelet, *Chronique*, V, 89.
 127. Louis II commissioned the rebuilding of the château in 1400, the year of his marriage to Yolande. Cf. Sylvia Pressouyre, Le Château de Tarascon, *Congrès archéologique de France CXXLe session: Avignon et Comtat-Venaissin* (1963), 221–43; and Françoise Robin, “Le château de Tarascon et les premiers ducs d’Anjou: défense et vie de cour (1400–1430),” in Jean-Marie Cauchies and Jacqueline Guisset eds, *Du métier des armes à la vie de cour, de la forteresse au château de séjour: Familles et demeures aux XIVe-XVIe siècles. Actes du colloque international organisé au Château fort d’Ecaussinnes-Lalaing*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2005, 157–66.
 128. The Berry Herald, *Chroniques*, 161–2. For Estates convened following the death of Louis III on November 12, 1434, consult Hébert Michel ed., *Regeste des états de Provence 1347–1480*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2007, 323.
 129. Léonard, *Les Angevins*, 487, 488; Michel Hébert, “Dons et entrées solennelles au XVe siècle: Marguerite de Savoie [1434] et Jean d’Anjou [1443],” *Provence Historique. De Provence et d’ailleurs. Mélanges offerts à Noël Coulet*, 49 (1999): 267–81, 271–7. For prior financial allocations and arrangements made for Louis’s betrothal to Marguerite in 1432 consult Gouiran & Hébert, *Potentia*, 261–74 and Hébert, *Regeste*, 320–2.
 130. See above.
 131. AN KK 244 f° 28 commences with entries for March 1433 with f° 29 v° concluding with entries for April 1435.
 132. Auguste Vallet, *Histoire de Charles VII et son époque (1403–1461)*, 3 Vols, Paris: Vve J. Renouard, 1862–63, II, 308.
 133. Cf. Auguste Vallet (de Viriville), *Charles VII, roi de France et ses conseillers 1403–1461*, Paris: Dumoulin, 1859.; and Claude Devic, Joseph Vaisette and Alexandre Du Mège eds, *Histoire générale de Languedoc, avec des notes et les pièces justificatives...*, [5 Vols, Paris: J. Vincent, 1730–45], 10 Vols, Toulouse: J – B Paya, 1840–46, VIII, 454.
 134. Urbain Plancher, *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne, avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives...*, 4 Vols, Dijon: Louis-Nicolas Frantin, 1739–81, IV, 187.
 135. ANJ 932, n° 7.
 136. ANJ 932, n° s 2 & 8.
 137. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 109.
 138. ANJ 932, n° 9.
 139. AN KK 1125, f° 669 v°.
 140. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 109–11.
 141. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 215–16.

142. Various dates are given for his death: November 15 by Léonard, who seems to have taken his dating from François Clement, Charles Clémencet, and Nicolas Viton de Saint-Allais ed., *L'Art de vérifier les dates des faits historiques, des chartes, des chroniques et autres anciens monuments...*, 19 Vols, Paris:10, r. de la Vrillière 1818–19, XVIII, 345; November 12 is given by BNF Ms. Lat. 17332; November 14 by BNF Ms. Lat. 1156a, f° 1. Cf. Marcelle-Renée Reynaud, “Foi et politique: autour de la mort des princes d’Anjou-Provence (environ 1383 – environ 1480),” *Provence Historique*, 143 (1986), 21–43, 21.
143. Cf. Gaussin, “Conseillers.” See Picot’s comments.
144. Léonard, *Les Angevins*, 486. Cf. Earenfight, *The King’s Other Body. María of Castile and the Crown of Aragon*, Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2010, 70–7.
145. Léonard, *Les Angevins*, 487.
146. Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 154 n. 1.
147. Le Févre, *Chronique*, II, 303–4.
148. Ibid.
149. *Lettres et mandements*, VIII, 5–6 & 11–2.
150. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 218. He cites Marcel Canat de Chizy, *Documents inédits pour servir à l’histoire de Bourgogne...*, Chalon-sur-Saône: Imprimerie de Dejussieu, 1863, 361.
151. Agnès of Burgundy, Philippe of Burgundy’s sister, held strong Franciscan sympathies and was an avid correspondent of Colette of Corbie. Charles of Bourbon distinguished himself in Charles VII’s army in the war against the Anglo-Burgundians. Agnès was of inestimable value in keeping lines of communication open between Burgundy and Bourbon during the difficult years post-Montereau. Her female spiritual network intersected with Yolande’s wider network of Franciscan spirituality and enterprise and demands further research. Cf. Elisabeth Lopez, *Culture and sainteté. Colette de Corbie (1381–1447)*, Saint-Etienne: Publications de l’Université de Saint-Etienne, 1994, 261, 262.
152. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 219.
153. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 113. René was returned to Dijon by June 1435.
154. Léonard, *Les Angevins*, 487.
155. She also left Agnès Sorel in Yolande’s household who passed into the service of the queen, Marie of Anjou, upon her mother’s death. Agnès did not become the king’s mistress until 1444—two years after Yolande’s death. Michelet observes that, once Yolande had put Agnès into Charles’s path, her influence “seemed without rival from the moment the old queen [Yolande] gave her son-in-law a mistress.” Michelet continues: “The king’s mother-in-law, Yolande of Aragon likewise the mother-in-law of Isabelle of Lorraine, had the mind of a man; these women designed to ensure that Charles VII was in permanent lockstep with the interests of the house of Anjou-Lorraine. They presented this gentle creature to the king as his mistress, to the great satisfaction of the queen, who willed at all cost that La Trémouille [banished from court before Agnès’s arrival, but still managing to create minor disturbances from his enforced exile] and other favorites were removed from the king. The elderly Yolande clearly spoke through Agnès and without doubt she had a hand in everything that was done.

- More canny than virtuous, she welcomed equally the two girls who arrived so opportunely from Lorraine, Joan of Arc and Agnès, the saint and the mistress, who both, each in their own way, served the king and the kingdom." Michelet, *Le Moyen Âge*, 810.
156. AN K 504, n° 1, f° 32 v°. These three fragments of René's accounts (from 1442 to 1445 in 35 folios) record funds allocated by his treasurer "to dress Mme Marguerite for the arrival of the Emperor's ambassadors in Saumur and Angers." Marguerite was still living with her grandmother in Anjou in September 1442. Yolande died on November 14, 1442.
157. Vallet, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 310, 459.
158. Christof Ohnesorge, "Les ambitions et l'échec de la seconde maison d'Anjou," in Noël-Yves Tonnere, Elisabeth Verry eds, *Les Princes angevins du XIIIe au XVe siècle, un destin européen*, Rennes; Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2003, 265–76, 270.
159. Heribert Müller, "Etre Conciliateur à l'époque conciliaire. Les Anjou et la cour royale face au concile de Bâle (1431–1449)," in Françoise Autrand, Claude Gauvard & Jean-Marie Moeglin eds, *Saint-Denis et la royauté. Etudes offertes à Bernard Guenée*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, 757–70, esp. 757–60, 763–70.
160. Ohnesorge, "Les ambitions," 270.
161. Marion Chaigne-Legouy, "Reine 'ordinaire,' reine 'extraordinaire': la place de Jeanne de Laval et d'Isabelle de Lorraine dans le gouvernement de René d'Anjou," in Matz, Jean-Michel et Tonnerre, Noël-Yves, eds, *René d'Anjou (1409–1480). Pouvoirs et gouvernement*, Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2011, 77–101, esp. 82–91.
162. Cf. Hébert, *Regeste*, 324–38.
163. Jocelyne Gledhill Dickenson, *The Congress of Arras 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955], New York: Biblio and Tannen 1972, 11–2, 230; BNF Ms. Fr. 5044, f° 18r–18v, 18r. Cited by Dickenson, 230–2. Reynaud makes the courageous observation that the house of Anjou was absent from the Treaty of Arras ("*Néanmoins, la Maison d'Anjou est absente du couronnement de Charles VII et du traité d'Arras*"). Reynaud, *Le Temps*, 182.
164. Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, II, 793.
165. Bedford died in Chantereine near Rouen on September 14, 1435, just prior to the establishment of the Treaty of Arras.
166. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 115–8.
167. BNF Ms. Lat. 1502, f° 13.
168. Jean Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII*, I, 194–204, esp. 203–4.
169. *Ibid.*, 215.
170. *Ibid.*, 215–17.
171. BNF Ms. Lorraine 238 n° s 16 & 17; AN KK 1125, f° 671.
172. BNF Ms. Lorraine 8, n° 45 dated March 10, 1436. Cited by Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 119.
173. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 259–60.
174. Vallet, *Charles VII et ses conseillers*, 17; Gaussin, "Conseillers," 103.
175. René was freed by an act dated February 7, 1437. Cf. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, I, 120–30, 125.
176. Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII*, I, 232–3.

177. Ibid., 233.
178. Cf. Cosneau, *Le Connétable*, 269–70 n. 7, for his views on the matter, and Lecoy de Marche *Le Roi René*, I, 130–1, for his defense of René's actions
179. Perceval de Cagny, Henri Moranvillé ed., *Chroniques de Perceval de Cagny*, Paris: H. Laurens, 1902, 233–5.
180. Ibid., 237.
181. Ibid., 240–4.
182. Vallet, *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 383.
183. The Berry Herald, *Chronique*, 192.
184. On July 7, 1438, Charles promulgated the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. His council had declared itself neutral in the dispute between Eugene IV and Basle, adopting most of Basle's reforms and modifications relative to France's needs. What Charles legislated was for the right of the civil authority to intervene in Church affairs; the recognition of Basle was formal but the monarch would decide on the validity of the Basle decisions, ecclesiastical appointments, and levies, refusing to capitulate to the pope when such recognition ran counter to the interests of France.
185. Georges Picot, *des Etats Généraux considérés au point de vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de France de 1355 à 1614*, 4 Vols [Paris: Hachette, 1872], Geneva: Mégariotis Reprints, 1979, I, 323–4.
186. Discussed in earlier chapters.
187. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, V, 403–4; Vallet (de Viriville), *Histoire de Charles VII*, II, 400.
188. Cf. Monique Sommé, *Isabelle de Portugal, duchesse de Bourgogne: une femme de pouvoir au XVe siècle*, Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1998; and *La Correspondance d'Isabelle de Portugal, duchesse de Bourgogne (1430–1471)*, Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2009.
189. Cf. Marie-Thérèse Berthier and John-Thomas Sweeney, *Le Chancelier Rolin (1376–1462). Ambition, pouvoir et fortune en Bourgogne*, Précý-sous-Thil: Editions de l'Armançon, 1998.
190. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, V, 403–4.
191. The Berry Herald, *Chroniques*, 204–8.
192. Ibid., 208.
193. *Ordonnances*, XIII, 306–13.
194. Picot, *Histoire des Etats*, I, 330. He refers specifically to articles 21–22 of the edict.
195. *Ordonnances*, XIII, 313, Article 44.
196. Zita Rohr, "The Practice of Political Motherhood in Late Medieval France: Yolande of Aragon, *Bonne-Mère* of France," in McGlynn, Sean and Woodacre, Elena eds, *Image, Perception and Monarchy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 40–6.
197. Jean-Patrice Boudet, "Pour commencer bonne maniere de gouverner ledit royaume: Un miroir du prince du XVe siècle: l'avis à Yolande d'Aragon," in Frédérique Lachaud and Lydwine Scordia eds, *Le prince au miroir de la littérature politique de l'Antiquité aux Lumières* Mont-Saint-Aignan: Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2007, 277–96, 280. Cf. Jean-Patrice Boudet and Elsa Sené, "L'avis à Yolande d'Aragon: un miroir au prince du temps de Charles VII," *Cabiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes. Journal of Medieval and Humanistic Studies*, Frédérique Lachaud and Lydwine

- Scordia eds, *Au-delà des miroirs: la littérature politique dans la France de Charles VI et Charles VII*, XXIV (2012): 51–84.
198. Cf. Núria Silleras-Fernández, *Chariot of Ladies: Francesc Eiximenis and the Court Culture of Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015., 44, 103, 110; Flocel Sabaté Curull, “El temps de Francesc Eiximenis. Les estructures econòmiques, socials i polítiques de la Corona d’Aragó a la segona meitat del segle XIV,” Antoni Riera i Melis ed., *Francesc Eiximenis (c. 1330–1409): el context I l’obra d’un gran pensador català medieval*, Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 2015, 79–166; and Teresa Vinyoles i Mireia Comas, “Lo libre de les dones” (same volume), 267–88.
199. Francesc Eiximenis, *Dotzè llibre del Crestià II*, 2 vols, Curt Wittlin et al eds, Girona: Col·legi Universitari de Girona, 1986, t. 1, ch. 493, 59. Cf. Jean-Pierre Barraqué, “Les Idées politiques de Francesc Eiximenis,” *Le Moyen Age*, 2008/3, CXIV, 531–556 and David J. Viera and Jordi Piqué, “Francesc Eiximenis i els reis medieval de França,” *Actes del Dotzè Col·loqui Internacional de Llengua i Literatura Catalanes Volum II*, Barcelona: Abadia de Montserrat, 2003, 23–30.
200. All of which leads me to wonder if, in the context of her power and influence consolidation in the mid-1420s, Yolande of Aragon commissioned the *Advis* from one of the gifted writers within her sphere of influence. This would certainly be in keeping with the Aragonese practices and preferences of her parents, Joan and Violant, and her aunt and uncle Martí and María. Cf. Silleras-Fernández, *Chariots of Ladies*, 35–41, 44–9. I have, however, no concrete proof to support such an enticing possibility.
201. Alain Chartier, *Le Quadrilogue Invectif*. Cf. Claude Gauvard, “Christine de Pizan et ses contemporains: l’engagement politique des écrivains dans le royaume de France aux XIVe et XVe siècles,” in B. Ribémont et L. Dulac eds, *Une femme de lettres au Moyen âge: études autour de Christine de Pizan*, Orléans: Paradigme, 1995, 105–28, 115–20. Contamine points out that the really remarkable thing about Chartier’s work, and the *Advis*, is the total absence of the ‘R’ word: reform. Even in the political writings of Jean II Juvénal des Ursins, the occurrence of the word “reform” is strictly circumscribed. Philippe Contamine, *Des Pouvoirs en France 1300–1500*, Paris: Presses de L’Ecole Normale Supérieure, 1992, 46.
202. See above for observations regarding the influence and writings of Francesc Eiximenis; cf. Silleras-Fernández, *Chariot of Ladies*.
203. Refer to the discussion in chapter 1 regarding the great *cortes* of Monzón (1388–9) convoked by Yolande’s father, Joan I, and “salvaged” by her mother, Violant.
204. AN P 1334/17, f° 52.
205. AN P 2531, f° 215.
206. Anne of France, Sharon L. Jansen trans. and ed., *Anne of France: Lessons For My Daughter*, Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004, 4. Cf. Paul Pélicier, *Essai sur le gouvernement de la Dame de Beaujeu 1483–1491* [Chartres: Imprimerie Edouard Garnier, 1882], Marseille: Lafitte Reprints, 1983.
207. Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme, *Œuvres complètes du seigneur de Brantôme . . .*, 7 Vols, Paris: Foucault, 1822–23, V, 205–11, 205.
208. My emphasis. Anne of France, *Lessons*, 64. Cf. Anne of France, Tatiana Clavier and Eliane Viennot eds, *Enseignements à sa fille suivis de l’Histoire du*

- siège de Brest*, Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Etienne, 2006, 87.
209. Cf. Zita Eva Rohr, "Lessons For My Daughter: Self-fashioning *Stateswomanship* in the Late Medieval Crown of Aragon," in Delbrugge, Laura, ed., *Self-fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill Press, 2015.

Conclusion

1. With the deaths of her sons, Charles (d. 1472) and René (d. 1480), these heritages were subsumed into the crown of France by her acquisitive grandson, Louis XI. Lorraine slipped from René's control following the rout at Bulgnéville in 1431.
2. Anne of France, Sharon L. Jansen trans. and ed., *Anne of France: Lessons For My Daughter*, Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004, 64.
3. Cf. Zita Eva Rohr, unpublished doctoral thesis, "L'Envers de la tapisserie. The Œuvre of Yolande d'Aragon: A Study of Queenship, Power and Authority in Late Mediæval France," University of New England Armidale, Australia, 2007, 388 n. 10.
4. Cf. John Buchan, *The Casual and the Causal in History. The Rede Lecture 1929*, Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1929.



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