European Approaches to International Relations Theory

A house with many mansions

Jörg Friedrichs

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European Approaches to International Relations Theory

A well-established community of American scholars has long dominated the discipline of International Relations. Recently, however, certain strands of continental theorizing are being introduced into the mainstream.

The book offers a critical examination of European approaches to International Relations theory, suggesting practical ways of challenging mainstream thought. Jörg Friedrichs presents a detailed sociological analysis of knowledge production in existing European IR communities, namely France, Italy and Scandinavia. He also discusses a selection of European schools and approaches.

The book introduces European approaches to IR theory and bears witness to their potential importance. At the same time, it sets an agenda for the progressive development of a 'Eurodiscipline' of IR studies. It will be of interest to scholars worldwide.

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Series editor's preface

It has become almost a cliché to argue that during the course of the twentieth century the study of International Relations developed into a quintessentially American discipline. Although the Department of International Politics in the University of Wales at Aberystwyth claims, with some justification, to be the first institution to be given a specific brief to study IR, from the perspective of the prevailing historiography of the discipline, this fact can only be treated as a quaint anomaly. What any serious survey reveals is that the study of IR, certainly after the Second World War, came to be dominated by scholars who operated within academic institutions located inside the borders of the United States.

On the face if it, this might not seem to be a particularly significant or revealing insight. After all, most research, in most disciplines, is carried out within the United States. It is simply a fact of life that during the course of the twentieth century the USA was able to devote more resources to research than any other country in the world. As a consequence, it was able to establish the necessary critical mass in large numbers of fields to set the research agenda and to be at the cutting edge of research developments. This general assessment, however, has always been more valid in the natural sciences than in the arts and social sciences, where nationally oriented research agendas were already deeply entrenched before the start of the twentieth century and where indigenous national researchers still often have natural advantages over outsiders.

It might seem self-evident, therefore, that International Relations, of all subjects, should be able to hold its own against the intellectual dominance of the USA. All states occupy a unique position within the international system and might be expected to have a distinctive research agenda that represents their particular perspective on International Relations. In fact, there is remarkably little general understanding of how IR is studied around the world, and so it is hardly surprising that there has been so little progress made in developing cross-national research frameworks for thinking about IR and to challenge the theories of IR that emanate from the USA.

There is, nevertheless, a good, albeit obvious, reason why researchers who study International Relations outside of the USA are often sensitive about the dominance of Americans within their discipline; it is because their subject matter is also dominated by the USA. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had become the

most powerful country in the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the USA exerted exceptional influence over developments in IR across the globe. And at the start of the twenty-first century it is now being argued that not since the Roman Empire has one state possessed such a power advantage over all other states in the system. To have this hegemonic state determining what and how IR should be studied has obvious dangers for the USA as well as for everyone else. In particular, there is the danger that Americans will fail to appreciate how non-Americans view the world. From this perspective, it can be argued that the study of IR has a very important and distinctive role to play. There is no other subject where it is so crucial that there should be researchers outside of the USA working in the discipline, and that they not only have a voice, but also that their voice can be heard within the USA. This book makes a very important contribution to understanding why it is necessary to encourage the development of a pluralistic approach to the study of IR and how such an approach can be promoted.

The focus of this book is on the study of IR in Europe. It identifies a strategy that will ensure not only that members of the different European schools of thought communicate more effectively with each other, but also that American academics will listen to what Europeans have to say. Of course, it is not possible to focus on more than a handful of states, but Jörg Friedrichs has chosen his cases with care to demonstrate that there are competing ways of operating on the periphery of a discipline that is dominated by the USA. He shows that although IR scholars in Italy and France have responded in very different ways, neither have had any significant influence on American academics nor on their European counterparts. As a consequence, their contributions have been marginalized. By contrast, the Nordic countries and the English school are shown to have adopted divergent strategies that have succeeded in having an impact in both Europe and the USA. Friedrichs argues that is important for all the European schools of thought to build on these approaches, thereby encouraging much more dialogue amongst the Europeans themselves, as well as diversifying the voices that will be heard in the USA.

The assumption in this book is not that the views of American academics are erroneous, but that they too often gravitate to opposite extremes of the spectrum. Although American constructivists are frequently seen to be attempting to span the divide between these positions, their approach is considered by Friedrichs to be incoherent. There is, therefore, a space within the US discipline that could be colonized by the Europeans. Friedrichs recognizes that there are many other voices that need to be heard. But if the divergent European schools of IR could find effective ways of projecting their voices within Europe and across the Atlantic to the USA, then others could follow a similar strategy.

Richard Little

Preface

The fulcrum of this book is the assumption that European approaches to International Relations (IR) theory are broadly neglected to the detriment of the discipline as a whole. At least to a certain extent this is due to the linguistic barriers between the communities of IR scholars on the European continent, which continues to be an impediment to a sustained intellectual exchange among theoretical schools and approaches. At the same time it is the preponderance of (Anglo-)American theoretical approaches that detracts attention from an adequate appreciation of European contributions. Nevertheless, this does not mean that European scholars are passive adepts of the American mainstream in their actual research practice. To the contrary, European approaches offer an innovative potential that can and should be used to the benefit of the discipline as a whole.

My book wants to support European scholars in their effort to transcend linguistic and organizational barriers, formulate original theoretical contributions, and thereby secure an adequate place within the discipline as a whole. At the same time, the book is also directed to those IR scholars in the United States and in other parts of the world who want to be better informed about European approaches to International Relations theory.

In the first place, the study offers a critical examination of western European approaches to IR theory. When talking about International Relations theory, I mean the fabric of competing approaches that try to represent in abstract terms the principles that organize political interaction between and beyond national territories. A regional approach to IR theory is not uncontroversial since the evolution of the discipline is often implicitly identified with the epistemic ideal of capturing the one and only 'truth' about international relations. It is obvious that, in this vision of scientific progress, there is little or no room for regional perspectives such as 'European approaches to International Relations theory'. However, the idea of objective social scientific truth is naive in the face of both the historical contingency and the man-made nature of social reality.

A possible alternative to the naive vision of scientific progress towards the one and only 'truth' consists in telling the history of the discipline as driven by a succession of 'great debates' (realism vs. idealism, positivism vs. traditionalism, inter-paradigm debate, rationalism vs. reflectivism, etc.). At first glance this offers a good remedy against the pitfalls of the blue-eyed belief in social scientific progress.

However, as is frequently the case with the history of ideas, the debate-driven account of the discipline's history tends to privilege those positions that are firmly established at any moment. More often than not, it is assumed that the 'losers' of theoretical debates are determined not by accident but in an evolutionary selection process that leaves victorious those theoretical approaches which dovetail better with the academic and socio-political situation at the time. The alternatives to the dominant theoretical approaches thereby tend to be pushed into the background.

It is easy to see that both the ideal of scientific progress as an approximation towards truth and the standard account of disciplinary history as a succession of great debates are variants of the 'Whig approach' to historiography (Butterfield 1931). Both versions are detrimental to possible theoretical alternatives which otherwise could offer an important source of conceptual innovation. To rescue the potentialities of less prominent theoretical contributions that all too often are neglected, I have chosen a third approach beyond the optimistic vision of scientific progress and the standard account of disciplinary history. The approach adopted in the present study consists in the critical examination of knowledge production.

I assume that we are all working in a discipline where a well-established community of American scholars constitutes the intellectual core. The American core is surrounded by several layers of less influential communities of scholars in other parts of the world; or in other words: there is a situation of intellectual hegemony exercised by the American core of the discipline. It is inherent in the logic of such a hegemonic constellation that the peripheries cannot help but somehow reflect their marginal position *vis-à-vis* the centre. In the face of American preponderance, different academic peripheries have chosen different developmental strategies to cope with the fundamental fact of life of American intellectual hegemony. As we shall see, all these different developmental strategies are intrinsically linked with the way theoretical knowledge is being produced.

One strategy to cope with American intellectual hegemony has been to pursue academic self-reliance, i.e. to dissociate the national community of scholars from the American core. French IR is a typical example of this strategy. The opposite way, resigned marginality, has been taken by those academic peripheries who accept that they are at the fringes of the discipline. Italian IR is a typical case in point. A third strategy consists in multi-level research cooperation, i.e. the pooling of academic resources at different organizational levels in order to create a more vibrant arena for research competition and a larger body of resonance for theoretical contributions coming from the peripheries. IR scholars from the Nordic countries have been relatively successful with this strategy.

In the first part of this book I undertake a comparative study of knowledge production by the International Relations communities in France, Italy, and the Nordic countries. The comparison between academic self-reliance in France, resigned marginality in Italy, and multi-level research cooperation in the Nordic countries will make it possible to better understand how theoretical knowledge about international relations is actually produced in different European IR communities. The epistemic objective of this exercise is to learn something about

appropriate strategies for European scholars to establish their specific theoretical approaches within the discipline as a whole. Relying on a critical comparison of the French, Italian and Nordic contributions to International Relations theory, I argue that multi-level research cooperation is the best strategy for European IR to cope with American intellectual hegemony. Whereas academic self-reliance and resigned marginality have led to disappointing results in France and Italy, Nordic scholars have been relatively successful in making a substantive contribution and thereby challenging the intellectual hegemony of American IR. Accordingly, I suggest that massive and diversified cooperation among European scholars is the best way to reassert Europe's intellectual autonomy *vis-à-vis* American IR.

After the comparison of knowledge production in the French, Italian, and Nordic IR communities, the second part of the book offers another critical comparison. It confronts two possible ways for European scholars to make their voices heard in the international arena of the discipline. The underlying assumption is that the quest for a theoretical 'third way' is indeed a clever strategy for intellectual peripheries to overcome their dependency from the American core. The reason for this is that theoretical debates in American IR seem to have an intrinsic tendency towards dichotomous cleavages. However, it makes a huge difference whether a theoretical third way aims at the establishment of an autonomous vantage point, or whether it is designed to put its adherents in touch with the mainstream. To make this point I examine two different attempts to establish a theoretical third way. Thus, both the English school and the constructivist middle ground have tried to go beyond dichotomous simplifications, but in a fairly different manner. Whereas the English school has chosen a strategy of equidistance from the binary oppositions that are so typical of the American mainstream, middle-ground constructivism has taken a strategy of rapprochement away from reflective approaches and towards the positivist mainstream. Drawing on a comparison between the English school and middle-ground constructivism, I suggest that, at least heuristically, the former strategy is more fruitful than the latter.

The third part of the book suggests theoretical reconstruction as a route towards theoretical innovation and as an appropriate genre for the production of International Relations theory. To illustrate what I mean by 'theoretical reconstruction', the technique is applied in the final Chapter about new medievalism. The proposed genre is introduced by a concrete example, i.e. a reflection on new medievalism as a possible solution to the paradoxes of globalization and fragmentation in a world of nation states. Theoretical reconstruction is a problem-driven epistemic device that tries to engage disparate traditions into a fictitious dialogue. It thereby offers a possibility for the individual scholar to put to good use the theoretical stock constituted by non-hegemonic approaches to International Relations theory. The aim of such a fictitious dialogue is to find novel responses to conceptual and theoretical challenges. In the present situation of theoretical disarray, there is a desperate need for a new kind of scholarship that might help to find innovative ways out of the conceptual labyrinth.

Every single part of the book is designed to sustain a practical suggestion to scholars in scientific peripheries as to how to challenge intellectual hegemony. Taken

together, the three suggestions amount to an agenda for the development of a more autonomous 'Eurodiscipline' of International Relations. The three suggestions may be read as a sort of roadmap for the piecemeal 'de-Americanization' and simultaneous 'Europeanization' of International Relations in Europe. Of course there is nothing wrong with American IR as long as it is identified as such and does not aspire to represent IR studies *tout court*. Nevertheless, it is neither forbidden nor illegitimate for scholars in scientific peripheries to challenge intellectual hegemony.

The seven chapters are all arranged to support the abovementioned agenda. At the same time, every chapter is written in such a manner as to be readable by and on its own. The discussion begins with an introductory chapter that discusses why and to what extent IR is still an American social science (Chapter 1). Then I go directly to discussing European approaches, thereby sounding out the prospects for the construction of a theoretically innovative 'Eurodiscipline'. I then proceed to outline, chapter by chapter, the dramaturgical roadmap of the book.

The first part ('developmental pathways') is organized along geographical lines and deals with different developmental strategies that have been adopted by different European communities of IR scholars. As I have already argued, in the face of the strong preponderance of American scholarship French IR represents the ambitious quest for national emancipation via academic self-reliance (Chapter 2). Italian IR represents the frustrated attempt of a weak periphery to become directly connected to the centre, which eventually has led to a situation of resigned marginality (Chapter 3). Nordic IR, by contrast, has successfully taken the path of multi-level research cooperation. Nordic scholars are working closely together with scholars from other countries and regions, while at the same time maintaining their distinct national research orientations. By this strategy, the Nordic network of IR scholars has managed to break the vicious circle of intellectual marginality. Over the last forty years, Nordic IR has become a *quantité non négligeable* within the discipline as a whole (Chapter 4). So the first suggestion for the construction of a more autonomous Eurodiscipline of International Relations runs like this: the Nordic model of multi-level research cooperation is the most promising developmental pathway for intellectual emancipation *vis-à-vis* the American core.

The second part ('triangular reasoning') transcends the 'geographical box' of the first three chapters and is set up according to a formal criterion. It deals with one of the most typical features of the western European (semi)peripheries, i.e. the permanent construction and deconstruction of a 'third way' in International Relations theory. Thus, the international society approach of the English school has been trying to go beyond familiar dichotomies by constructing a sort of conceptual equidistance from 'realism' and 'idealism' (Chapter 5). By contrast, the constructivist middle ground of the last few years looks rather like an attempt to escape from the post-positivist ghetto in order to become co-opted by the mainstream (Chapter 6). The fundamental difference between these two approaches to triangulation becomes evident from a critical comparison of the English school's theorizing about international society and social constructivist theorizing about European integration. The comparative analysis of these two bodies of literature suggests that the English school has relied on a method of equidistance that is

heuristically more fruitful than the method of rapprochement pursued by middle-ground constructivism. It would be most welcome if future attempts of constructing a 'third way' could keep this important difference within consideration. This is my second suggestion for the construction of an intellectually more autonomous 'Eurodiscipline'.

The third part ('theoretical reconstruction') represents an attempt to work creatively with the theoretical material discussed in the preceding chapters. I am firmly convinced that the field's present situation of theoretical disarray requires some innovative answers to the perennial and/or novel puzzles of the discipline. In a sort of theoretical collage – which I call 'theoretical reconstruction' – I engage different theoretical contributions by both European and American scholars into a fictitious dialogue. To illustrate what I mean by theoretical reconstruction, I show that the concept of 'new medievalism' can provide an interesting theoretical response to the antinomies of globalization and fragmentation (Chapter 7). If the proposed reconstructive genre of scholarship becomes a template for the treatment of other conceptual challenges, that may generate innovative impulses for the theoretical development of the discipline as a whole. This is particularly important if it is true that the discipline has been impoverished by the boredom associated with decades of research practice dominated by the positivist mainstream. In the face of these challenges, European approaches are in a particularly good position to fertilize the field by the immense diversity of intellectual traditions – which is my third and final argument.

Acknowledgements

1 International Relations

Still an American social science?

To those familiar with the academic sociology of the discipline, the title of the present Chapter sounds like an evergreen. Echoing the headline of Stanley Hoffmann's famous article 'An American social science: International Relations' (1977), over the last ten years as many as three publications have been entitled 'International Relations: still an American social science?' (Kahler 1993; S. Smith 2000a; Crawford and Jarvis 2001). Since the 1950s, when Alfred Grosser posed the provocative question whether International Relations was becoming an 'American specialty' (1956), the classification of the discipline as an American social science has come to be accepted by an increasing majority of scholars all over the world. Of course, this did not prevent a critical minority of scholars from waging fierce emancipation struggles against what they perceived to be intellectual oppression by American hegemony and American ethnocentrism (Booth 1979; Gareau 1981, 1982, 1983; Alker and Biersteker 1984; Krippendorff 1987). Others have criticized the idea of an American hegemony over the discipline as a distorting image which is part of the problem rather than part of the solution (S. Smith 1987; Jørgensen 2000; Groom and Mandaville 2001). In the face of these controversies, some scholars tried to expose the status of IR as an American social science to empirical scrutiny (Holsti 1985; Goldmann 1995; Wæver 1998a).

There is obviously no conclusive answer at hand whether or not International Relations is still an American social science. Nevertheless, the present chapter tries to clarify at least some points of contention. In the first section I collect empirical evidence that there is indeed an American hegemony over the discipline as a whole. The comparative analysis of citation patterns in IR textbooks shows a structural bias in the pattern of intellectual communications with the American community of scholars at the centre. Accordingly the American hegemony over the discipline may be described in terms of structural preponderance. The second section goes beyond the comparative analysis of citation patterns and deals with the social production and reproduction of American hegemony. Given the conversion of the field into an 'American social science' in the late 1940s and early 1950s, I examine three stabilizers of American hegemony for the years to come: the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, and the sheer size of American IR. In the third section I examine the ways by which the hegemony of the American

mainstream is socially constructed by International Relations scholars. From a brief discussion of the field's historiography it becomes evident that the prevailing self-image of International Relations as an American social science is itself an important stabilizer of American hegemony.

Does the intellectual hegemony exercised by the American mainstream require a merciless emancipation struggle on the part of the academic peripheries? As I point out in the fourth section, things are not that simple. At least from the standpoint of the European semi-peripheries, intellectual hegemony is not necessarily and not exclusively a bad thing. In order not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, it is paramount for European IR communities to develop a somewhat more sophisticated strategy than simply to rage against intellectual imperialism. In the fifth section of the chapter, I suggest that the best way for European scholars to serve their interests would be to (re)invent International Relations after their own image. In so far as the myth of an erratic US hegemony over the discipline is not independent from the phenomenon that it is supposed to describe, European scholars should strive to overcome the tales that textbooks tell about the identity of the discipline as an American social science. They should become more aware of the factually existing European approaches to International Relations theory and revisit the standard account of disciplinary historiography. In a certain sense, International Relations is as much an American social science as IR scholars behave and view each other as American social scientists. As an alternative, in the conclusion of the chapter I provide some outlines of a strategy for the western European communities of IR scholars to overcome their status as dependent academic peripheries.

Intellectual hegemony as structural bias

When determining whether and to what extent International Relations is an American social science, one can detect asymmetries in the patterns of scholarly 'production' (prevalently in the USA) and 'consumption' (prevalently elsewhere). This route was taken in the mid-1980s by the Canadian scholar Kalevi Holsti, who relied on statistical evidence to demonstrate the worldwide intellectual hegemony of American IR (1985).

The starting point of Holsti's analysis is an ideal-typical distinction between an international community of scholars and a discipline organized on hierarchical communication as two possible patterns of intra-disciplinary intellectual exchange. The model of an international community of scholars 'would include at least two related characteristics: (1) professional communication between researchers residing in different and separate political jurisdictions; and (2) a reasonably symmetrical pattern of "production" and "consumption" of theories, ideas, concepts, methods, and data between members of the community'; by contrast, a discipline organized on hierarchical patterns of communication 'would be characterized by a few producers and many imitators and consumers, with knowledge flowing mostly downward from centre(s) to peripheries' (Holsti 1985: 203). Needless to say, neither of the two models can be found in its purest form in

the real world of academic communications. Notwithstanding, it is probably fair to say that Mathematics is a good approximation to an international community of scholars, whereas Social Science in general and International Relations in particular come dangerously close to a discipline organized on hierarchical communication.

> Hierarchy seems to be a hallmark of international politics and theory. Most of the mutually acknowledged literature has been produced by scholars from only two of more than 155 countries: the United States and Great Britain. There is, in brief, a British–American intellectual condominium.
>
> (Holsti 1985: 103)

To substantiate the hypothesis of a British–American intellectual condominium, Holsti analyzed the reference sections in a rather diversified sample of textbooks. On the basis of this statistical body of evidence, Holsti drew a picture of centre–periphery relationships between the American and (although to a much lesser extent) British International Relations community on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. According to the picture painted by Holsti, there was a dominant American core, a declining British semi-periphery, and a galaxy of dependent academic peripheries. The peripheries were importing their theoretical wisdom mainly from the centre, whereas in the 'British–American intellectual condominium' there was hardly any awareness of what was going on in the peripheries. A substantive intellectual exchange among the peripheries was not taking place.

As may be seen from Figure 1.1, American textbooks before 1981 were almost exclusively reliant on domestic scholarship. In all other cases, with the exception of Japan and India, by contrast, references to domestic scholarship were less frequent than references to authors from the USA. Even British authors relied more heavily on literature from the USA than from the UK. Communications in IR did indeed resemble a pattern of centre–periphery relationships: penetrated peripheries gravitating around a relatively self-sufficient centre, obsequious to the centre and poorly related to each other. The authors of American textbooks were importing hardly any scholarship from abroad. By contrast, textbooks in the peripheries were strongly dependent on scholarship from the United States. In hardly any cases was there a significant exchange of scholarship from one periphery to the other. The only significant difference among the peripheries consisted in the varying degree of self-sufficiency: relatively high in the cases of Japan and India, medium in the cases of Great Britain and France, and low in the cases of Korea, Canada, and Australia (Figure 1.1).

Incidentally, it would have been more accurate had Holsti diagnosed a straight-forward American hegemony rather than a British-American condominium. The assumption of a British-American condominium is hardly confirmed by the statistical evidence: the British share in American textbooks is 7 per cent, whereas the American share in British textbooks is 54 per cent. To be sure, Steve Smith has observed that

Figure 1.1 Citation patterns in IR textbooks (before 1981, in per cent).

Source: Holsti 1985.

> [t]he UK IR profession has a very ambiguous relationship with the devel-
> opment of a European IR community. On the one hand, there are those who
> want to create a counter-hegemonic IR in Europe; on the other, there are
> those who do not want to go down this road precisely because it threatens
> the cohesion of the Anglo-American intellectual tradition by involving other
> very different intellectual communities and traditions. . . . Just as UK foreign
> policy-makers face choices about the UK's relationship with Europe and the
> US, so, in an interesting twist of fate, does the UK's IR community.
>
> (S. Smith 2000a: 298, 300)

But be that as it may, Holsti's empirical findings from the mid-1980s do not provide
any clear and conclusive evidence that British and American IR are on an equal
footing in the direction of the field.[1]

It is interesting to ask what direction the communication patterns have been
moving in more recent years. Although a close examination of that question would
go beyond the scope of the present study, it is nevertheless revealing to look at the
reference sections of a limited sample of more recent European textbooks.[2]

As may be seen from the statistical evidence presented in Figure 1.2, in the
early 1990s the big European IR communities became more reliant on their own
scholarly production. British, French and German textbooks were referring in the
first place to domestic scholarship. Literature from the USA had become less
predominant; scholarship from the UK was playing a significant and maybe even
increasing role in France and in Germany; references to other peripheries, by

Figure 1.2 Citation patterns in European IR textbooks (1988–95, in per cent).

Source: own research.[3]

contrast, were still the exception rather than the rule (amounting in no case to more than 14 per cent).

By the 1990s the large European IR communities had apparently reached the critical mass necessary for them to rely mainly on their own production. Nevertheless this hardly increased the intellectual exchange among different IR peripheries. In so far as European textbooks quote foreign scholarship at all, it is almost exclusively American – and to a lesser extent British – scholarship that they quote. This suggests that there is still a significant centre–periphery relationship between American IR and its European counterparts, even if it is true that the citation patterns in British, French and German textbooks have grown increasingly parochial.[4]

Despite the apparent trend towards parochialism, the statistical record suggests that the intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream is still upheld by a set of centre–periphery relationships. But what is a centre–periphery relationship? In spatial terms a centre can be defined as a 'privileged location within a territory'. By logical extension, centre–periphery relationships are

> a spatial archetype in which the periphery is subordinate to the authority of the centre. Within this archetype the centre represents the seat of authority, and the periphery those geographical locations at the furthest distance from the centre, but still within the territory controlled from the latter.
> (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 2, 6; cf. Rokkan *et al.* 1987;
> Flora *et al.* 1999: 108–21)

One proviso is in order right from the outset: intellectual hegemony is at least as much a social as a geographical phenomenon. Due to its obvious superfi- ciality, the spatial understanding of centre and periphery can only serve as a first

Figure 1.3 Centre–periphery relationships in academic IR.

Source: adapted from Galtung 1971: 84.

approximation and must be refined to fit the specificities of intellectual hegemony in an academic discipline.

For the purposes of this study, centre–periphery relationships are better represented in terms of Galtung's famous structural theory of imperialism (cf. Figure 1.3). The theory distinguishes between an imperialist centre and a plurality of dependent peripheries. Internally, the centre is subdivided into a 'centre of the centre' and a 'periphery of the centre'. In the same way, the peripheries are subdivided into a 'centre of the periphery' and a 'periphery of the periphery'. Galtung claims that the 'centre of the centre' maintains intense and mutually advantageous bilateral relationships with the 'centres of the peripheries', whereas the 'periphery of the centre' and the 'peripheries of the peripheries' tend to be cut off from each other despite the potential harmony of their interests.[5] It is easy to see what this would mean for the asymmetrical relationships within the IR discipline: In most countries of the peripheries a significant minority of leading scholars is closely collaborating with the American mainstream, whereas the rest of the discipline tends to be cut off from other academic peripheries – i.e. both from the academic periphery within the United States and from the academic peripheries in other countries.

Supposing that such a centre–periphery configuration is really in place in an intellectual field, we would indeed expect a structural bias in communications as diagnosed by Kalevi Holsti for the academic discipline of International Relations (1985: 145): 'The pattern of scholarly exchange is such that a core generates the vast majority of work in international theory, peripheries "consume" that work, but the core remains very poorly informed about the activities of scholars in the

peripheries'. Although it is probably fair to say that the European communities of IR scholars are, strictly speaking, semi-peripheries rather than peripheries (Giesen 1995: 142), we should observe something like the following pattern of professional communication:

1   The transactions among European IR (semi-)peripheries are negligible in comparison with their consumption of literature from the United States.
2   The transactions within one and the same European (semi-)periphery tend to be less intense than the consumption of Anglo-American literature.
3   The transactions of European (semi-)peripheries with academic peripheries in other parts of the world (USA, Eastern Europe, Latin America, etc.) are broadly negligible.

And indeed, despite the recent trend of the three largest European IR communities towards a certain degree of national parochialism, the above characterization of centre–periphery relationships is broadly consistent with statistical evidence.

The production and reproduction of hegemony

Although the comparative analysis of citation patterns in the reference sections of textbooks does allow the detection of some trends over time, it has clear limitations. Thus, mainstream literature is over-represented due to the introductory character of textbooks. Since the most basic target group of textbooks is university students at the undergraduate level, literature in languages other than either the vernacular or English is less likely to be cited here than elsewhere. Moreover the analysis of citation patterns in textbooks tells a lot about patterns in the consumption, but little about patterns in the production of scholarship. This is problematic since intellectual hegemony is reflected not only in the way theoretical knowledge is consumed in the peripheries, but also in the way it is produced in the centre and elsewhere. Accordingly, statistical analysis cannot be more than a first approximation to the phenomenon of intellectual hegemony. For a full understanding of how intellectual hegemony operates, it will be necessary to go beyond the analysis of citation patterns.

Without providing any hard evidence, a fierce critic of the behaviourist mainstream of the 1970s castigated International Relations as being 'as American as apple pie' (Gareau 1981: 779). Thirty years later, a British scholar once again used a gastronomic metaphor to characterize the parochialism of American social science.

IR is an American discipline in the sense in which Coca-Cola is an American drink and McDonald's hamburgers are American beef patties; although lots of people in the rest of the world 'do' IR, it is American IR that, for the most part, they are doing, just as McDonald's are American burgers, even when ingredients, cooks and consumers are all drawn from another continent. As with a McDonald's franchise, the relevant standards are set in the United

> States in accordance with prevailing American notions of what constitutes scholarly work in the field. Put more precisely, the field itself is largely delimited by the American understanding of IR – one is only 'doing' IR, as opposed to some other intellectual activity, if one is addressing problems recognised as such by the American discipline, and/or employing modes of reasoning recognised as appropriate in the United States – which is not to say that the American profession speaks with one voice; it is orthodox IR to which I refer here, and there are many minority voices in the United States who can be found in opposition to orthodoxy.
>
> (Brown 2001: 203–4)[6]

Fortunately, on the preponderance of American IR there is no shortage of qualitative reflections going beyond gastronomic metaphors. Thus, Stanley Hoffmann (1977) has given a series of far-reaching explanations why International Relations has become an 'American social science' after the Second World War.[7] According to Hoffmann, the take-off of American IR after the Second World War is the outcome of a unique convergence of research interests and political circumstances. After the traumatic experience of the war, American scholars – to say nothing of European refugees such as Arnold Wolfers, Hans Morgenthau, and John Herz – were intrigued with the phenomenon of international power. At the same time, US decision-makers were in need of a theoretical underpinning of the strong focus on power and interest in Cold War politics. Apart from this unique convergence of research interests and political circumstances, the quick take-off of American IR is also explained by the coincidence of intellectual predispositions on the one hand, and institutional opportunities on the other. The drift of the young discipline towards social science, as it were, was favoured by America's firm belief in problem-solving and 'applied enlightenment', while there was a remarkable permeability for political decision-makers to become scholars and vice versa.[8] Last but not least, the flexibility of American academia and the availability of generous research funding allowed the young discipline a quick institutional set-up.

Hoffmann's is primarily an account of the emergence of American hegemony in the field of International Relations. Whether one feels comfortable with this story or not, it does not satisfactorily account for the resilience of American hegemony over the last half-century. To make sense not only of the initial production but also of the successive reproduction of the American intellectual hegemony, it is necessary to analyze the factors that constantly produce and reproduce the asymmetrical patterns of intra-disciplinary communication. And indeed, one can easily identify the following three stabilizers of the American hegemony over the discipline: the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, and the sheer size of the American IR community.[9]

To state the obvious, hardly any study about international affairs ever has an impact at the international level if it is not written in English or translated into English. This may have important consequences in so far as the use of any language privileges a certain pattern of thought, a specific culture, and a particular way of constructing truth (Groom 1994). Nevertheless, the impact of the English language

as an instrument of intellectual hegemony should not be overstated: it is possible to make good use of English without being over-conditioned by the linguistic medium. More than any other language, English has become neutralized with regard to the specific culture and/or patterns of thought in the mother country, so much so that one may even speculate whether, in addition to British and American English, a new branch of global and/or European English is in the making. But be that as it may: in contrast to philosophy and poetry, in the social sciences there is no doubt that the costs of reformulating one's own thoughts in a different language are exceeded by the benefits of English as a lingua franca. And in any event there is an elegant way to circumvent the problems associated with the language bias, namely to have, first, a debate in the vernacular and then to feed the results of this debate into the English editorial market. An example of this strategy is the sustained debate about communicative rationality in the German *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, which was made accessible to the international audience five years later via an article in *International Organization* (Risse 2000; cf. also p. 147).

More importantly, the access of a book to the international academic audience is channelled by the American and British book market with its specific criteria of editorial selection. The editorial boards of the leading American and British reviews and publishing houses control the access of scientific articles and books to the international audience. The more a book or article fits into normal American or British patterns of theorizing and research, the more likely it is to reach an international target group. If a contribution does not agree with the way how scholarship is normally 'done' in the United States or Great Britain, it is in danger of being sorted out in the process of editorial lectureship or peer review. It is clear that the selection criteria of the American and British book market put a premium on the preventive adaptation of scholarship to American and/or British standards of recognition. Moreover, it seems rather intuitive that this amounts to a powerful transmis-sion belt of the American intellectual hegemony over the discipline (cf. Goldmann 1995).

By contrast, one should be careful not to overstate the attraction exercised on scholars in the peripheries by the sheer size of the International Relations community in the United States.[10] Of course it is not implausible to assume that the sheer size of American IR is an important stabilizer of the American intellectual hegemony over the discipline. As it were, there is something like a gravitational field around the centre of the discipline which is perceived by scholars in the peripheries as a 'matter of getting on the American bandwagon or nowhere' (Olson and Groom 1991: 139). However, there are serious doubts whether the attraction of American IR is really the consequence of its overwhelming size. In so far as the last decades have seen a clear quantitative growth of International Relations communities in other parts of the world, a gravitational model would predict a decrease in American hegemony. But despite the relative loss of manpower, the leadership of American IR continues unbroken. 'On the basis of institutional development and research infrastructure, international relations no longer is an American social science. On the important dimension of theoretical hegemony, however, reports of American decline have been overstated' (Kahler 1993: 412).

More than twenty-five years after the publication of Stanley Hoffmann's famous essay (1977) it is legitimate to ask whether and to what extent IR is still an American social science. The fall of the Iron Curtain not only has left the USA as an uncertain giant in search of a new global mission; it has also posed serious doubts on the leading IR theories, which were formulated by American authors and which for such a long time have dominated the discipline. The structural realism of Kenneth Waltz (1979), with its firm belief in bipolar stability, has been challenged by the collapse of the Soviet empire (Kratochwil 1993; Grunberg and Risse-Kappen 1992). The peaceful end of the Cold War has plunged still another influential variant of neorealism into trouble, namely the theory of hegemonic war, which predicted that sooner or later there was going to be an inevitable clash among the superpowers (Gilpin 1981). Nevertheless, most specialists agree that the intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream is still a fact of life for International Relations scholars all over the world (Wæver 1998a; S. Smith 2000a; Crawford and Jarvis 2001).

The considerable resilience of American hegemony to historical and institutional change suggests that it is not so much the sheer amount of scholars or the irrefutable soundness of theories that cements the preponderance of American IR. The intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream has more to do with how scholarship in the peripheries is oriented according to the image of the dominant mainstream in the centre. In a certain sense, the theoretical and methodological commonsense in the centre becomes 'standard' for the theoretical and methodological production all over the discipline. Therefore, an appropriate analysis of the American intellectual hegemony over the discipline requires still another refinement beyond what has been discussed until now. Indeed, it doesn't take an Antonio Gramsci to see that the way intellectual hegemony is produced and reproduced (and eventually challenged) tends to be far more subtle than has been discussed in the last two sections (cf. Bocock 1986). This is not to deny that asymmetrical citation patterns, the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, and the sheer size of the American IR community play an important role as stabilizers of the American hegemony over the discipline. Nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary to go beyond the analysis of these relatively superficial mechanisms to understand the essence of intellectual hegemony.

The social construction of hegemony

To anticipate the main argument of this section: at the end of the day, American hegemony over the discipline should be seen as a social rather than as a brute fact. This is so because the dominant self-understanding of the discipline as an American social science is more of a social construction than an objective truth.

Unfortunately, International Relations scholars do not often declare their own understanding of the intellectual asymmetries that run across the discipline in an explicit way. Due to this eloquent silence, which is itself a corollary of intellectual hegemony, the dominant self-understanding of the discipline is very difficult to nail down analytically (but see Rosenau 1993; S. Smith 1995). To circumvent this

problem I have chosen a somewhat indirect approach, analyzing how the discipline normally represents its own history (cf. Banks 1984; S. Smith 1987; Wæver 1997a; Kahler 1997).

In its most simple and popular form, the history of IR is usually narrated as the alternation of periods with a dominant approach (eras), and periods with two or more theoretical or methodological approaches struggling against each other (great debates). This narrative may be called the standard account of disciplinary history. It will turn out, first, that the standard account of disciplinary history is revealing of the dominant self-understanding of the discipline as an American social science, and, second, that the stickiness of the standard account is another important stabilizer of the American hegemony over the discipline (cf. Table 1.1).

According to the standard account of disciplinary history, International Relations was founded after the First World War by British and American liberals in search of a remedy against the horrors of industrial warfare. The halcyon days of liberal internationalism came to an end when the League of Nations began to shipwreck in the face of harsh political realities. Given the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, the Italian assault on Ethiopia, and Nazi aggression in the Second World War, liberal internationalism came increasingly under fire from realist thinkers such as Edward Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. Eventually it transpired that realism had a better grasp of the dreadfulness of power politics than liberal internationalism (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948).

After the Second World War, the era of liberal internationalism was followed by an era of victorious realism. Stressing the centrality of power and interest in the international realm, realism became the new commonsense of the discipline and helped to legitimize the practice of American Cold War politics. Whoever dared to challenge the tenets of realism became liable to suspicion of being an incorrigible utopian dreamer. But when the paroxysm of the Cold War slowly began to diminish, a new generation of mostly American scholars asked for more scientific

Table 1.1 'Eras' and 'great debates' in IR

1920s–1930s	era	liberal internationalism
1930s–1940s	great debate	realism ↔ liberalism
1940s–1950s	era	victorious realism
1950s–1960s	great debate	traditionalism ↔ positivism
1960s–1970s	era	positivism
mid-1970s	great debate	realism ↔ liberalism ↔ Marxism
1980s	era	paradigmatic pluralism
1990s	great debate	rationalism ↔ constructivism ↔ reflectivism

rigour and less ideological commitment. This intellectual contest became known as the second great debate of the discipline, which eventually led to the professionalization of IR scholars and to the entrance of International Relations into the era of positive science. The ethos of the new mainstream consisted in a quest for the accumulation of rigorous laws of international behaviour, thereby emulating the hard core of positive science such as Newtonian physics and neoclassical economics.

At least by its partisans, positivism and behavioural science were believed to be a genuinely new stage in the evolution of the field. But although the participants to the second debate where confident that the argument was about important issues of theoretical and ontological substance (Bull 1966a; Kaplan 1966; Lijphart 1974), it quickly became apparent that the dispute was about method rather than substance (Knorr and Rosenau 1969). Finally, when the methodological smokescreen began to come down, it became clear that realism had merely gone underground. Positive science had left the basic tenets of classical realism unchallenged, and indeed there were important continuities with the old theoretical commonsense. This could easily be shown for the three fundamental tenets of classical realism: namely state-centrism, international anarchy, and the rational pursuit of national interest (Vasquez 1983; cf. 1998). It was only in the 1970s that the core assumptions of classical realism were seriously challenged. The old theoretical commonsense came under increasing pressure from its liberal and Marxist contenders, which claimed to have more appropriate answers to the current policy concerns, namely economic interdependence and under-development.

After a while, the dispute between (neo)realists, (neo)liberals and (neo)Marxists was labelled as IR's third debate, or 'inter-paradigm debate', and the discipline was supposed to have entered into the era of paradigmatic pluralism (Rosenau 1982: 3; Banks 1984: 14–18; Holsti 1985: 1–101). During the 1980s, (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism and (neo)Marxism were thought by many scholars to constitute an exhaustive triad of incommensurable and complementary theoretical orientations. If that had really been the case, the succession of eras and great debates would have come to an end. International Relations would have continued forever as a conversation between paradigmatically distinct but equally legitimate theoretical orientations. But it soon became clear that there is no end to history, not even in the discipline of International Relations (cf. Wæver 1996a). With the reprisal of the Cold War in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, there was a movement back to realist orthodoxy. Structural realism undertook a re-launch of the basic assumptions of classical realism, while trying to comply with the fundamental claims of positive science (Waltz 1979).

Once again, this fuelled the debate whether realism had ever ceased to be the dominant paradigm of the discipline (Alker and Biersteker 1984; Holsti 1985). With the wisdom of hindsight, some critics even interpreted the inter-paradigm debate as an act of 'Marcusian repressive tolerance': in order not to lose its predominance as the discipline's hegemonic paradigm, realism had co-opted liberalism and Marxism as junior partners in the direction of the field (S. Smith 1995: 18–21).

After the second spring of the realist paradigm and after its merger with neoliberal institutionalism during the 1980s, the 1990s have seen a fourth great debate which engaged the broad meta-theoretical orientations of rationalism, constructivism, and reflectivism (Wæver 1996a; cf. Lapid 1989). More recently, the reflectivist challenge to rationalism is being slowly pushed aside, and the debate tends to be reduced to a conversation between enlightened rationalists on the one hand, and their friendly constructivist critics on the other (Katzenstein *et al.* 1998; cf. Chapter 6).

The above picture of disciplinary historiography has been painted with a fairly broad brush. It is the standard account of disciplinary historiography and does not represent the personal view of the author. Nevertheless, the picture is certainly helpful to understand how the logic of 'eras' and 'great debates' has coalesced into a powerful account to support the dominant self-understanding of the discipline as an American social science. To put it in the words of Brian Schmidt,

> disciplinary history in international relations, like many of the other social sciences, is closely aligned with the purposes of legitimation and critique; that is, history has been cast to support or undermine a particular rendition of the current or desired state of the discipline.
>
> (Schmidt 1994: 351)

In intellectual as well as in political historiography, there is a constant temptation of writing history in the reverse, of producing a 'Whig interpretation of history' (Butterfield 1931). Stories about 'eras' and 'great debates' are frequently myths invented by the self-proclaimed victors. At the same time, disciplinary history has an important validation function for contemporary intellectual practice (Wilson 1998). As a matter of course this does not come without a price, for the potentialities of alternative traditions are nipped in the bud by the hegemonic understanding of the past.

If one feels uncomfortable with this state of affairs, one will be tempted to deconstruct the dominant historiography of the discipline in order to open up new intellectual possibilities (Schmidt 1994, 1998, 2002; Dunne 1998a; Dunne *et al.* 1999; cf. Gunnell 1986, 1991). As a radical de-constructivist would argue, disciplinary origins are always myths to be unmasked by the critical genealogist (Foucault 1987). Against this, it may be objected that the deconstruction of one interpretation of history is not necessarily a move towards a better version. From the revisionist standpoint, a more promising alternative than the mere deconstruction of foundational myths is therefore the historical (re)contextualization of theoretical approaches and the (re)construction of alternative pasts to compete with the standard account of disciplinary historiography (cf. Kahler 1997; Holden 1998). Although it is at least in part a question of temperament which of these alternatives one may chose, it is not by accident that I have taken the second route in the present study. As long as there are no tangible alternatives, the mere deconstruction of 'false' knowledge can and will not lead to a theoretical take-off.[11]

But be that as it may, the standard account of the field's evolution runs almost exclusively along the inner divisions and re-compositions of American IR. By contrast, it does not do justice to the development of International Relations theory in other parts of the world. Although many non-American scholars, together with most of their American colleagues, formally accept the historiography of the discipline as a succession of 'eras' and 'great debates', the standard version of disciplinary history fails to account for most of the *real* cleavages in most of the *real* communities of International Relations scholars – whether in the United States or elsewhere. Steve Smith (1995) has shown that there is indeed a plurality of different self-understandings of the discipline in different sectors of the academic world.

This is particularly true if one looks beyond western Europe, where the standard account of disciplinary history is disregarded by many research reports. Take for example the research reports about the specificities of international studies in particular countries such as Russia, Japan, China, or the Czech Republic (Sergounin 2001; Bacon and Inoguchi 2001; G. Chan 1999; Geeraerts and Jing 2001; Drulák and Druláková 2000). It is even possible to speculate about the viability of a non-western perspective on international affairs, but it would be hard if somebody wanted to write a full-blown state of the art account of non-western IR (cf. Puchala 1997; S. Chan *et al.* 2001; C. S. Jones 2003; *Global Society* 17 (2) 2003 (special issue)).[12]

As Knud Erik Jørgensen (2000) has shown, in western Europe the historiography of the discipline as a succession of 'eras' and 'great debates' is particularly inappropriate to capture the evolution of the field. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when realism became predominant in the United States, the power politics tradition had just been discredited in Germany and Italy. In the 1960s and 1970s, when behaviourism loomed large in American IR, it tended to be completely ignored in France, stoutly opposed in Great Britain, and hotly debated in Germany. In the 1980s, when structural realism and rational choice set the tone in the United States, neither of the two was particularly successful in western Europe. Even in the 1990s, when postmodernism spilled over from Paris to the other side of the Pond, the movement was not so influential in most of continental Europe (and even in French IR).

On the other hand, Peace Research has been much more important in Scandinavia, Germany and the Netherlands than in the United States. In the mainstream of American IR, there is no parallel to the British tradition of thorough historical investigation into the development of international society. In France, Italy, Spain and Portugal there is a vigorous tradition of conceiving International Relations as a legal subdiscipline, an attitude which in the USA was almost completely liquidated by political realism a half-century ago. In short, the practice of IR theory on the European continent is radically different from the lip-service that is paid to American social science. The standard account of disciplinary history does not satisfactorily account for the evolution of the field in western Europe (Jørgensen 2000).

Due to its particular fit with the inner divisions and with the self-understanding

of the American mainstream, the standard account of disciplinary history is an important stabilizer of American intellectual hegemony. It helps produce and reproduce not only the image but also the reality of International Relations as an American social science. To be sure, the standard account is reconcilable with the self-understanding of a small fraction of scholars in the peripheries. However, it clearly contradicts the research practice of the great majority of scholars who do not comply with the theoretical vision of the American mainstream. Not only does the latter group include the great majority of scholars in virtually all West European countries, it also includes a numerous group of dissident scholars in the United States (Apunen 1993a; Groom 1994; Jørgensen 2000; Groom and Mandaville 2001).

To summarise: the International Relations discipline is characterized by an asymmetrical pattern of professional communication, with the American community of scholars at the core. There are three important stabilizers to uphold this pattern: the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, and the sheer size of American IR. Another important factor for the reproduction of American intellectual hegemony is the standard account of disciplinary history. While the first three factors are firmly engrained in the institutional infrastructure of the discipline, the standard account of disciplinary history works as a powerful social construction. It supports the dominant self-image of IR as an American social science and thereby contributes to the production and reproduction of American intellectual hegemony over the discipline as a whole. As a result, alternative theoretical approaches tend to be marginalized both in the American centre of the discipline and in its European and non-European peripheries.

Is it a good thing? Is it a bad thing?

If it is true that American intellectual hegemony over the International Relations discipline is at least in part socially constructed, one should not be too much surprised to find here some of the paradoxes that are typical of social constructions in general. Social constructions are notoriously contingent on intersubjective beliefs that may be blatantly wrong according to external standards of recognition, but still we all acknowledge that it may be more difficult to challenge a social prejudice than to split an atomic nucleus. In a way, the same paradox is also observed with regard to the predominant self-understanding of IR as an American social science.

On the one hand, it is clear that the succession of 'eras' and 'grand debates' is inappropriate to account for the evolution of the discipline in other parts of the world, whether in western Europe or elsewhere (Goldmann 1995). Indeed, there are serious doubts as to whether the study of international relations in Europe has ever been anything like a proxy of American IR. Already twenty years ago it appeared astounding to some 'how incredibly bad the history of the American version of the discipline serves as a model for describing the discipline's evolution and contemporary status in western Europe' (Gareau 1981: 791). In the words of Knud Erik Jørgensen,

> it is necessary to make a distinction between, on the one hand, IR as taught
> to continental students and, on the other hand, IR-scholars' own research
> practice. It may well be that students are told the well-known stories about
> 'Great Debates' or 'Paradigms' (see most textbook introductions to IR, written
> in continental languages). But their teachers do not do (research) as they
> preach. It seems to me that their research practice and their engagement in
> scholarly debates constitute a very different but largely untold story.
>
> (Jørgensen 2000: 31)

As a matter of fact, it can be easily demonstrated that the predominant self-
understanding of the discipline as an American social science is not in line with
the research practice of many European scholars (Groom and Mandaville
2001).

On the other hand, however, the story about 'eras' and 'grand debates' is
constitutive for the self-understanding of IR scholars all over the western world. In
so far as the story is the most popular account for the evolution of the field not only
in the USA but also in Europe and elsewhere, it has an important social function
to perform. Not without reason, the image of American IR as the intellectual core
of the discipline continues to be accepted by many European as well as American
scholars (e.g. Wæver 1998a; Vennesson 1998; S. Smith 2000a; Crawford and Jarvis
2001). The reason is that IR, as a tremendously divided discipline, is obviously
in desperate need of foundational myths. As a result, the standard account of
disciplinary history is as difficult to eradicate as other foundational myths. Even
the ritualistic contestation of the tale tends to enhance its value as a catalyst for the
construction of social identities among scholars. Errors have their advantages. And
an attempt to deconstruct the standard account of disciplinary history can be played
down as just another squabble over the appropriateness of 'science as usual', which
perfectly fits the narrative scheme of 'eras' and 'grand debates'

If one takes the social nature of intellectual hegemony seriously, it would
therefore be too simple to interpret the placement of the whole discipline under
the umbrella of the American mainstream as an instance of 'alienation' or 'false
consciousness'. Of course it is tempting to deplore the failure of European periph-
eries to recognize their 'objective interests' and to wage a fierce 'emancipation
struggle' against 'intellectual imperialism'. But these temptations notwithstanding,
such a radical scheme of intellectual emancipation would be cheap revolution-
ary talk. European scholars should be careful not to throw the baby out with the
bathwater. It is simply not true that hegemony is necessarily and always a bad
thing. As the theory of hegemonic stability shows, hegemony can yield important
advantages both to the peripheries and to the centre: only recall that the original
meaning of the word 'hegemony' is 'leadership'. And as the practice of many
emancipation struggles has shown, anti-hegemonic upheavals are often more
detrimental to the peripheries themselves than to the hegemonic core. This must
be particularly true for the western European communities of IR scholars, since
they are thriving semi-peripheries rather than depressed peripheries (Giesen 1995:
142).[13]

In short, before suggesting a radical remedy against the negative effects of hegemony one should definitely know something about the costs and benefits of a specific set of core–periphery relationships. To fulfill this task, let us now discuss in some detail the balance sheet, so to speak, of American hegemony over the discipline.

First, the debit side: it can be demonstrated that many American scholars have a rather limited worldview, especially when it comes to teaching undergraduates or writing textbooks, and parochialism is one of the most obvious liabilities associated with American social science (Nossal 2001). Another problem with American social science is its tendency to distort important aspects of political reality. Thus, the current American mainstream is characterized by a rational-choice mode of reasoning and an instrumentalist view of the state as a problem-solving device (Brown 2001). In so far as many parts of the world from Russia to Venezuela and from Iraq to Afghanistan do not correspond to this image, the mainstream is insufficiently equipped to grasp what is happening in the 'grey zones' of international disorder. Moreover, the mainstream tends to ignore those theoretical approaches that do not fit into the dominant self-understandings of the discipline. It is detrimental to the discipline as a whole that alternatives to the theoretical state of affairs are systematically pushed aside (cf. S. Smith 1995). To be sure, the United States is not only the Mecca of the mainstream but also the Medina of critical and reflective approaches. One of the most appealing aspects of American hegemony is that the discipline is at least as pluralistic in the USA as in other parts of the world (Porter 2001). Nevertheless, the hegemonic position of the American mainstream is not altered by the mere existence of dissident voices from within.[14]

Second, the credit side: the preponderance of the American mainstream is helpful to maintain a certain degree of coherence in a highly fragmented discipline.[15] As long as IR is in a state of theoretical profusion or even disarray, there are clear advantages to maintaining the notion of a theoretical mainstream against which to measure dissident voices (cf. Holsti 1993). Moreover, there is a fit between the intellectual hegemony of American IR and the realities of power politics. The USA is the one and only country with the capacity to project power on a truly global scale; it seems natural for American IR to set the intellectual agenda about international power as well. In addition to that, the strength of American IR is an important source of legitimacy for weak university departments in the peripheries. In most countries of the European Continent, for example, the establishment of IR as a social science was due to an emulation effect: 'If the Americans have it, we must also have it'. Even today, the reference to American social science helps to legitimize the very existence – and funding – of these departments. And last but not least, it is reasonable to assume that individual scholars and academic communities, as well as football players and their teams, have a natural interest to play in the first rather than the second league. There is a broad consensus that American IR is the place where the action is, and in a certain sense IR scholars in the peripheries are simply serving their real or perceived interests when paying tribute to American social science.

Inventing a 'Eurodiscipline'

At the end of the day, the hegemony of the American mainstream over the discipline has both costs and benefits. On the one hand it leads to painful distortions in the research practice and self-understanding of IR scholars. On the other hand it performs an important function in stabilizing the professional identity of scholars. In the face of this and similar dilemmas, an all-or-nothing emancipation struggle against American social science will not do the trick, at least for scholars in the western European semi-peripheries. If the latter want to mitigate the distorting effects of hegemony without cutting into their own flesh, they will have to develop a more sophisticated strategy than simply to rage against hegemony. The present study will argue that, at least in principle, this can be done. Indeed the primary goal of this book is to prepare the ground for an intellectually more buoyant European branch of IR theory.

Of course this is not to deny that other peripheries in the field are more marginalized than the western European communities of IR scholars. In comparison to the situation in Latin America or Eastern Europe, to say nothing of the situation in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and the Asian-Pacific, the western European IR communities are definitely privileged. It must be clarified, however, that the scope of this study does not go as far as to prepare the ground for a 'non-hegemonical discipline' (S. Smith 1987; cf. 1993, 1994). What is at issue in this study are essentially the following two things: first, to provide the building blocks for a new narrative about disciplinary history which shall do more justice to the evolution of the field in western Europe; and, second, to suggest viable strategies for the piecemeal development of a more vibrant 'Eurodiscipline' of International Relations.

At this point it might be objected that there is only *one* IR discipline and that, concomitantly, there can be no European approaches to IR theory. Such an objection is relatively easy to reject. What about the fact that in Europe there is a plurality of national research traditions, which have been a topic in the state-of-the-art literature for more than sixty years (e.g. Zimmern 1939; Ford Foundation 1976; Dyer and Mangasarian 1989; Jørgensen and Knudsen 2004)? On the face of it, the research practice of European scholars is much more influential and variegated than the prevalent understanding of the discipline as an American social science would suggest.

This circumstance is illustrated by Table 1.2, which gives a synoptic overview of eight theoretical approaches and nine sub-fields of the discipline. The table is based on the article 'Hegemony and autonomy in IR: the continental experience' by Groom and Mandaville (2001: 155–8), who conclude that American scholars take the lead in four approaches and four sub-fields, whereas European scholars are ahead in three approaches and five sub-fields. In the final analysis, this is not a bad record for European IR scholars. Of course there may be strong disagreement with regard to almost any single detail in the list, and of course it must be admitted that the result depends very much on the debatable inclusion of British IR into the European phalanx of IR communities. But be that as it may, the table

Table 1.2 Approaches and sub-fields

Realism	USA, UK
Neorealism	USA (Waltz, Keohane, Krasner)
Pluralist approaches	UK (Burton, Mitrany), USA (Deutsch, Rosenau)
Structural theories	Latin America
Historical sociology	UK (Michael Mann)
Integration theory	USA (Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg)
Post-modernism	USA, Finland
Critical theory	Europe, USA
Normative theory	UK, USA
International organization	UK, USA vs. continental legal tradition
Conflict research	Scandinavia, Netherlands, Germany, France, GB
International political economy	UK (Susan Strange), Latin America
Strategic studies	USA, UK, Australia; France (Gallois, Beaufre, Debray)
Political geography	France
Foreign policy analysis	USA
Feminist approaches	USA
Environmental politics	USA, Europe

Source: Groom and Mandaville 2001: 155–8.

shows that it would certainly be a mistake to deny altogether the existence and/or relevance of European approaches to IR theory.

Table 1.2 suggests that European approaches to IR theory are more than just a desideratum – they are a matter of reality. Nevertheless, a moment of reflection is enough to realize that there is not a series of European approaches to IR theory at the Continental level, but a variety of mostly nation-centred approaches with European scholars at the centre. Most European scholars are still embedded into national academic and cultural environments, and concomitantly there is no such thing as a European community of IR scholars. Concerning the future, one cannot presume that all the national communities will be wrapped up into a community of scholars at the Continental level. Nor can one presume, with regard to theoretical substance, that all the different approaches and sub-fields will ever coagulate into a unified European approach to IR theory. Taken alone, the existence of European approaches at the national level does not prove anything about the existence and/or viability of a Continental European IR discipline at the regional level. In a word, it is problematic to aggregate the different intellectual environments within which European IR scholars operate into a joint IR community.[16]

Nevertheless, there are at least two good reasons to start talking about a 'Eurodiscipline' of IR. The first reason is that the institutional infrastructure for an IR discipline at the European level is already in the making. The most important institutional catalyst of a European IR discipline is the 'Standing Group on International Relations' (SGIR), which was established at the beginning of the 1990s under the umbrella of the European Consortium for Political Research.[17] Since then, the Standing Group has sponsored four pan-European IR conferences at the universities of Heidelberg, Paris, Vienna, and Canterbury, with hundreds of

participants. Moreover, the SGIR performs as the publisher of the *European Journal of International Relations*, which has become one of Europe's leading IR journals (Carlsnaes 1995; Kratochwil 2000). The second reason to start talking about a nascent 'Eurodiscipline' is its strategic potential for intellectual emancipation. As we have seen, the myth of an erratic US hegemony over the discipline is part and parcel of the phenomenon that it is supposed to describe. The belief in the hegemony of American IR, whether true or not, shapes the self-understanding of American as well as non-American scholars and streamlines their research orientations according to the standards of the mainstream. Quite obviously, it is almost impossible to contest hegemony successfully as long as you define yourself according to the hegemon's standards of recognition. Against this state of affairs, the notion of a 'Eurodiscipline' is a viable strategy to challenge the dominant self-understanding of the discipline as an American social science.

To have potential for true intellectual emancipation, such an alternative vision will have to do more justice to the evolution of the field in western Europe than the standard account of disciplinary history with its bias towards American social science. As we have seen, the most fundamental problem with the standard account is that a majority of scholars in Europe and elsewhere accept it as authoritative even if they are de facto pursuing a broad range of research agendas that have little to do with American Social Science. To offer an alternative, the nascent Eurodiscipline of IR will have to be based, among other things, on a revised account of disciplinary history. To illustrate this point, it will be interesting to have a brief look at three different views concerning the prehistory of academic IR.

1   IR is treated as a *creatio ex nihilo*. For example, C. K. Webster claimed in the early 1920s that before the First World War there was no ordered and scientific body of knowledge about international relations (as quoted in Brown 2001: 205). If one accepts this, it appears as fairly natural that the English and American founders of the discipline exercise some sort of intellectual hegemony.

2   The discipline is represented as having some famous ancestors but no direct antecedents. After the Second World War, realists invoked Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes as the seminal fathers of the discipline. If one accepts this, IR has a remote affinity with some dead white males from Europe, but there is no direct link with traditions of international thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

3   Europe's intellectual traditions are taken more seriously. For example, one can re-connect the discipline with German thinkers from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as Kant, Hegel and Treitschke (cf. Olson and Groom 1991; Wæver 1997a). This kind of revisionism would make of IR a legitimate child of European social and political thought, and American hegemony over the discipline would appear to be less of a natural thing.

It is easy to see that each of the three versions of disciplinary prehistory has a bearing on the professional self-understanding of IR scholars. The revisionist

account of disciplinary pre-history is a potential challenge to the intellectual hegemony of American social science.

A fortiori, American hegemony would be greatly challenged by a revisionist account of disciplinary historiography more in general. As we have already seen, in western Europe the dominant self-understanding of IR as an American social science is particularly inappropriate. Accordingly, from the European standpoint there are especially good reasons for the construction of a revisionist account. For example, in Great Britain there is a powerful tradition of placing IR at the intersection of international law and diplomatic history. Most prominently, though not exclusively, this is the position of the so-called 'English school' (cf. Chapter 5). In France and in the Mediterranean countries, there is a vigorous tradition of conceiving IR as a subdiscipline of International Law (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). The list could be extended, but the important point is that 'defining IR as a social science automatically skews our purview so as to define the field in a way that stresses US dominance of the discipline' (S. Smith 1987). Although it would be foolish to deny the achievements of American social science, a Eurodiscipline of IR theory should strive to correct these and similar biases.

This is probably the right moment to lay bare some normative concerns that are guiding my enquiry; normative concerns which are, of course, subjectively biased. On the one hand I am convinced that European scholars should try to overcome American parochialism; on the other hand I do not think that they should aspire for a sort of pan-European counter-parochialism; instead, the 'Eurodiscipline' should become a confederation of national and regional communities of scholars maintaining their links with colleagues in other parts of the world. Moreover it seems clear to me that the reduction of IR theory to a small number of 'paradigms' is neither adequate nor desirable for a region such as western Europe with all its cultural and intellectual diversity. When dealing with European approaches to IR theory, one should therefore avoid reducing complexity to such a degree as to define only one or two leading paradigms. Finally, I believe that a Eurodiscipline of IR studies should be historically and theoretically as self-conscious as possible. In an ideal world, every branch of research should be able to explain where it comes from, what it is supposed to be good for, and whether it is reaching for knowledge, problem solving, emancipation, and/or something else.

Conclusion

To some readers the idea of a 'Eurodiscipline' of IR will sound like a contradiction in terms. If IR is about world politics, how can it aspire to anything short of a global discipline? If there are really national or regional approaches to IR theory, what else can they reflect if not an attitude of parochialism in the epitome of a cosmopolitan discipline? But as reasonable as these objections may sound from the ideal vantage point of a truly global discipline, it is abundantly clear that IR is de facto far from being a global endeavour. The American core of the discipline conceals a unique penchant for parochialism behind a supposedly cosmopolitan façade. If we accept that IR has been an American social science for the last fifty

years, the idea of European – or Latin American, or Chinese – approaches to IR theory should not be treated as anathema. Given the fact of American intellectual hegemony, it is not illegitimate if scholars from the peripheries try some sort of 'intellectual jujitsu', turning the shortcomings of the centre into strengths of the peripheries (Jönsson 1993a).

According to the prevailing self-understanding of the discipline, IR was constituted as a liberal, Anglo-American intellectual condominium after the First World War. After the Second World War, the field was transformed into an American social science. This is reflected in the historiographic representations the discipline is used to give of itself, namely in introductory textbooks. Nevertheless, a great deal of research practice is fairly remote from the self-understanding of IR as an American social science. This arouses the suspicion that the belief in American hegemony is part and parcel of the phenomenon that it is supposed to describe. Even if one admits that hegemony is not necessarily and not always a bad thing, there are good reasons from the standpoint of western European IR scholars to challenge American hegemony by bringing European approaches to the fore. Accordingly, a revisionist self-understanding should be an integral part of the future Eurodiscipline.

We are now in a position to give a tentative answer to the crunch question whether IR is still an American social science or not. Somewhat disappointingly, the answer is 'yes and no': 'yes', if one looks at asymmetries in the patterns of scholarly communications, the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, the sheer size of American IR, and the predominant self-understanding of the discipline; 'no', if one looks at large sectors of the field in Europe and elsewhere, where IR tends to be neither American nor a social science in the conventional meaning of the word. In the final analysis there is no objective and ideologically neutral answer to the question whether IR is an American social science or not – even if it is clear that American social science is deeply ingrained both in the institutional outlook of the discipline and in the world political environment within which IR scholars are bound to operate.

From the western European standpoint, the formation of a Eurodiscipline of IR is desirable as a counterpoise to the American intellectual hegemony. But in so far as hegemony has also an important social function, Europeans are well advised to challenge American hegemony in a positive rather than in a negative way. To further that end, in the present book I suggest three strategic devices for the development of a European community of IR scholars. Although the outline of the book has already been elucidated in the preface, this is probably the right moment to provide once more a brief outline of the single parts and chapters.

In the first part (Chapters 2–4) I show that it is nothing new for European IR peripheries to 'cope' with their marginal position *vis-à-vis* the American centre. Thus, French scholars have been trying for fifty years to escape from intellectual marginality via a strategy of academic self-reliance; Italian scholars have tended towards the resigned acceptance of American hegemony; and Nordic scholars have pooled their intellectual resources at the regional level. It will be helpful to draw the appropriate lessons from the different experiences made by the French, Italian

and Nordic community of IR scholars. When comparing the relative success of the three developmental strategies, the 'Nordic network' of regional research cooperation has been far more successful than French and Italian IR in 'coping' with the American hegemony. This would suggest that an emergent 'Eurodiscipline' of IR should emulate as much as possible the outstanding success of the Nordic network.

In the second part (Chapters 5–6) I discuss the epistemic strategy of constructing a 'third way' beyond the binary oppositions that are so typical of American social science.[18] The standard account of disciplinary history discussed in the present chapter shows that American IR is indeed distinguished by a bias towards binary oppositions. Thus, the first two great debates were constructed as fierce combat between mutually exclusive positions where everybody had to take a stance, and even the triadic inter-paradigm debate of the 1970s and the more recent triangular debate between rationalism, constructivism and reflectivism degenerated into binary oppositions.[19] In the face of this American bias towards binary oppositions, it is natural for the academic peripheries to increase their intellectual leeway by exploiting the internal contradictions of the centre. 'Triangular reasoning' is therefore an obvious strategy for academic peripheries to make the break from intellectual hegemony. However there are two fundamentally different ways of doing this. First, it is possible to establish an independent vantage point beyond binary oppositions and Manichean struggles. Second, one can use the label of a 'via media' as a device to become a recognized interlocutor of the mainstream. Either strategy has its advantages as well as its disadvantages, but the latter seems to be heuristically more fruitful. The pros and cons are discussed in the two chapters about the international society approach and social constructivism.

In the third part (Chapter 7) I try to show how European IR could use its potential for theoretical innovation. Due to the linguistic diversity of the continent and due to the mutual isolation of dependent peripheries, European scholars have formulated many approaches to IR theory that are poorly related to each other. As long as each academic periphery defines itself with reference to the centre, the peripheries are not likely to pay adequate attention to each other's theoretical achievements. But even if an intellectual exchange among the peripheries is somewhat difficult to achieve in the real world, nothing should prevent the individual scholar from engaging the existing European approaches to IR theory into a fictitious dialogue with each other and with other relevant approaches, whether from the USA or elsewhere. It is sufficient to raise a relevant theoretical puzzle that cannot be solved by conventional approaches; and then to show that a creative blend of less conventional approaches from the peripheries leads closer to a solution. To elucidate what I mean by this heuristic method, which I call 'theoretical reconstruction', I provide a concrete example in the chapter about new medievalism.

Part I

Developmental pathways

The next three chapters deal with the specificities of IR theory in the academic environment of two European countries and one European (sub)region. France, Italy and the Nordic countries have been chosen for case studies about different modes of knowledge production. This is not an arbitrary choice in that French, Italian and Nordic academia represent three fundamentally different strategies to cope with the fundamental fact of life for *all* European IR peripheries, i.e. their marginal position *vis-à-vis* the American intellectual core. The objective of the next three chapters is to arrive inductively at some clues as to what could be the most appropriate strategy for the European IR peripheries, and for the nascent 'Eurodiscipline' as a whole, to overcome their marginal position *vis-à-vis* American social science.

The three case studies are deliberately chosen in such a way as to allow some inferences about what, given American hegemony over the discipline, are the winning and losing strategies to challenge that hegemony. The reader should therefore try to keep in mind the following question: what are the most promising strategies to produce theoretical knowledge in such a way that it can contribute to, or compete with, the American mainstream of IR theory?

Let me briefly justify the selection of France, Italy and the Nordic countries for my case studies. As a German, I decided not choose German IR, despite its obvious relevance (see Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel 1980; Czempiel 1986; Albrecht 1987; Mangasarian 1989; Rittberger and Hummel 1990; Rittberger 1993; Hellmann 1994; Zürn 1994; Hellmann *et al.* 2003; Humrich 2004), the main reason being that I would lack the impartiality required for a critical assessment. Moreover, the German IR community cannot be reduced to an ideal-typical way of knowledge production – it is a hybrid. Nor did I choose the UK since there is a very special and idiosyncratic relationship between British and American IR, which would make it difficult to draw any inferences from the British case. In any event British IR is dealt with in the fifth chapter, albeit with a special focus on the international society approach of the English school. Of course it would have been possible to choose Spain instead of Italy, and of course it would have been interesting to tell something about IR theory in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and elsewhere.

But be that as it may: French, Italian and Nordic IR are particularly interesting in the way they represent ideal-typical ways of coping with intellectual hegemony. Moreover, it is uncontroversial that the French, Italian and Nordic IR communities are among the most important ones in western Europe. And, with due apologies for the omission of some clearly relevant literature, it can be argued that a methodologically conscious and in-depth comparison of knowledge production in three different academic environments is more than has been offered by any other book about European IR (e.g. Ford Foundation 1976; Dyer and Mangasarian 1989; Jørgensen and Knudsen 2004).

As has been already observed in the first chapter, the common ground of comparison is provided by the fact that all European IR communities stand in a centre–periphery relationship to the American mainstream. American intellectual hegemony is an unalterable fact of life for the academic communities of IR scholars that have spread over the capitalist world after the Second World War. Ever since IR was converted into a social science in the late 1940s, the American community of scholars has been standing at the centre of the discipline. It is in the very nature of such a constellation that the academic peripheries cannot help but try to tackle somehow their own marginal position. Given the relative isolation of the peripheries from one another, which is a typical corollary of the centre–periphery constellation, it is not surprising that different peripheries have been trying different solutions to this fundamental problem. Each of these different coping strategies may be understood as a specific response to the fundamental fact of life mentioned above, namely the preponderance of American social science in the discipline as a whole.

To illustrate this point one may distinguish between three developmental strategies: academic self-reliance, resigned marginality, and multilevel research cooperation. These developmental strategies may be exemplified by the trajectories taken by the French, Italian, and Nordic communities of IR scholars. French scholars have tried a strategy of academic self-reliance in order to escape from their marginal position; Italian scholars have tended towards the resigned acceptance of their own marginal position; and Nordic scholars have increased their voice by pooling their intellectual resources via a strategy of multi-level research cooperation. To put it in a nutshell: France represents the ideal type of self-reliant academic periphery, Italy that of a subordinated periphery, and Scandinavia that of an integrated periphery.

This can be spelt out by means of a comparison between the specificities of knowledge production in French, Italian, and Nordic IR.

1   In France (Chapter 2) leading scholars have deliberately opted for academic self-reliance in the face of American intellectual hegemony. Concomitantly the French IR community has been increasingly isolated from the American core, with French scholarship centred on a small number of leading institutes in Paris. Over the last years, French scholars have begun to consider the results of this strategy as largely unsatisfactory. Most recently, a certain rapprochement of French IR towards theoretical developments in other parts

of the world may be observed. All in all it is probably fair to say that French academic self-reliance is a failed strategy to cope with American intellectual hegemony.

2   In Italy (Chapter 3) IR scholars have been oscillating between two different but related strategies. Sometimes they were trying to link up directly with the American core, but when frustrated in this endeavour they turned towards the protected domain of domestic academia. Due to their numerical weakness and internal fragmentation, the visibility of Italian scholars is relatively meagre both at the international and at the domestic level. Italian scholars have generally failed to make themselves heard beyond the narrow circuit of Italian academic life. It therefore seems appropriate to consider the Italian community of IR scholars as a truly marginal academic periphery.

3   In the Nordic region (Chapter 4) the national communities of IR scholars in Sweden, Denmark and Norway have tried a strategy of multi-level research cooperation, sometimes including scholars from Finland and, although to a much lesser extent, Iceland. The pooling of academic resources has provided them with the critical mass necessary to become visible at the international level and to gain access to the discipline via the centre. In more recent years, Nordic scholars have diversified their networking activities to include research cooperation with scholars from western Europe and from other parts of the world. The 'Nordic network' of multi-level research cooperation is a uniquely successful integrated periphery.

To sum up: all European IR peripheries have had to grapple somehow with American intellectual hegemony. Despite this common point of departure, different communities of scholars have taken different developmental pathways in different European countries. In an ideal-typical way the French, Italian and Nordic communities of scholars represent three fundamentally different ways of coping with the centre–periphery constellation in the IR discipline. French scholars have chosen the arduous strategy of academic self-reliance, the Italians have experienced the hardships of running a marginal periphery, whereas their Nordic counterparts have embarked on the path of multi-level research cooperation. When compared with the evolution in France and Italy, the development of IR theory in the Nordic region stands out as a success story. Whereas the French and Italian strategies did not generate a visible challenge to American intellectual hegemony, Nordic IR has become an influential research community by means of cooperating within a complex network of intellectual exchange. Nordic IR scholars are both more integrated among each other and more open to external cooperation than most of their continental counterparts. Although Nordic scholars do not neglect their national academic market either, they frequently use English as a lingua franca to reach a broader international audience. Moreover, they are constantly cooperating with scholars from other regions of the world, whether from the United States, Great Britain, western Europe, from the Baltic Sea Region, Russia, or the Third World. As the strategy pursued by the Nordic colleagues is the only one to have led to visible success, scholars from other European countries

should follow that example as closely as possible. It is true that many continental IR communities will have a hard time in pursuing this strategy. Nevertheless, regional research cooperation is likely to be the only advisable strategy for European IR scholars in the face of American intellectual hegemony.

Furthermore, regional research cooperation is an advisable strategy at the pan-European level. Following the Nordic model, European IR scholars should try to construct a 'Eurodiscipline' of IR – not so much in order to deny, but rather to transcend American intellectual hegemony and the narrow boundaries of national academic environments. It comes as little surprise that Nordic scholars are among the leading figures in the crystallization of such an integrated Eurodiscipline of IR. However, it is encouraging to note that more and more scholars from other European countries are joining this intellectual movement.

2 International Relations theory in France

Three generations of Parisian intellectual pride

Any discussion of French IR theory has to begin with one preliminary question: is it more appropriate to talk about a nationally French or a linguistically francophone community of IR scholars?[1] While the first approach is limited to IR theory from the French Republic's territory, the second approach would include at least the French-speaking parts of Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada.[2] Ineluctably, the selection of either approach has profound repercussions on the emerging picture. Thus, to presuppose a linguistically francophone discipline will lead to the idea of a far less centralized and much more variegated IR community than to presuppose a nationally French discipline. If we had no prior understanding of how the French IR community is organized, there would be no way of deciding in advance which perspective is more appropriate. But fortunately, the object of our inquiry is not approached without some phenomenological pre-understanding. It is striking to the outside observer how centralized and how inward-looking the French community of IR scholars happens to be. And indeed, French IR scholars notoriously gravitate around four or five leading institutes, all located in Paris, where the most influential scholarly work is done. Although scholarship from abroad is occasionally discussed in research articles and IR textbooks, the theoretical agenda is set by a handful of professors at the leading Parisian universities and institutes.[3] Therefore, the notorious *concentration Parisienne* simultaneously tends to unite French IR scholars internally and to separate them from external influence.

Apparently, the inward-looking character of the French IR community has two important consequences. First, the French IR discipline is at a greater distance from the Anglo-American mainstream than any other Continental European community of scholars (Lyons 1982; Hopmann 1994; Holden 1998: 19–22; Wæver 1998a; Constantin 1999; Groom 2002). Second, this distance is reciprocated both by the Anglo-American mainstream and by most of the Continental European communities of International Relation scholars. With few exceptions, IR scholarship from France tends to be ignored abroad. Probably the only French scholar known to the broader international public is the late Raymond Aron (1962), one of the godfathers of realism in the 1960s, who has been popularized in the United States by his Franco-American disciple Stanley Hoffmann. The work of this non-American author served to refute the allegation that realism was primarily an American perspective on world politics (cf. Giesen 1995). Other

outstanding figures of French IR theory that did not have such a legitimizing function for the American mainstream, such as Pierre Renouvin and Marcel Merle, were hardly known abroad. Only in the 1990s was Bertrand Badie discovered as a French representative of the 'reflective' approach to IR theory (cf. Leander 1997).

The French tendency towards academic self-encapsulation has its roots in the national history of IR as an academic discipline. Until the end of the Second World War, there was no autonomous field of IR studies in France, although international organization was part of the legal training of the public service, and diplomatic history was considered an aspect of political history. Only after the end of the War was IR constituted as an independent area of academic studies. At the beginning, some scholars were confident that French expertise, with its solid roots in diplomatic history and international law, was better equipped than Anglo-American social science to build up a coherent IR theory (Duroselle 1952). But other scholars soon became aware that IR was about to become, as it was called, 'une spécialité Américaine' (Grosser 1956). To counter this trend, the French IR discipline simply lacked the capacity to influence the theoretical agenda at the international level. As a consequence, French scholars began to feel that they had no choice but to remain on the sidelines of a theoretical agenda set by their Anglo-Saxon colleagues.[4]

Formally, French IR was established as a subdiscipline of Political Science during the academic reforms of the 1960s (Wæver 1998a). Nevertheless, only few French IR scholars opted for Political Science to guide their scholarly production. The large majority continued to borrow their theoretical wisdom from the established academic backgrounds of International Law and Diplomatic History. At least partially, this has remained so. Many French IR scholars continue to employ the methods and accepted norms of the discipline in which they have developed. Due to the continuing preponderance of the legal tradition and diplomatic history, the bulk of French IR has always been surprisingly atheoretical and largely state-centric (Groom 1994). As a matter of fact, many of the discipline's so-called 'great debates' have not taken place in France. In the 1940s and 1950s, French scholars were not substantially engaged in the theoretical feud between realism and utopianism that upset their American colleagues. In the 1960s and 1970s, IR scholars from France were hardly affected by the wave of positivist methods that swept over America and parts of western Europe. And in the 1980s, structural neorealism was known to most French IR students only as a matter of hearsay (Smouts 1987).

In summary: there is something idiosyncratic about the French IR community. Theoretical and methodological trends from abroad are relegated to occasional *tours d'horizon* in research reports and textbooks. In the meantime, French scholars are struggling to define their own, parochial research agenda. Or, to use a metaphor from modernization theory: since their work generally is not in line with the predominant international theoretical and methodological standards, French scholars maximize their influence in the protected domain of the national academic market. In the face of an academic world 'market' structured by the

American core, the French (semi)periphery has opted for the developmental path of self-reliance. This particular state of affairs is the main reason why I am dealing with the nationally French (and not the linguistically francophone) community of IR scholars. French IR theory is understood as IR theory in France, leaving aside contributions by French-speaking authors from Canada, Belgium and Switzerland.

In opting for this statist delimitation of the French IR community, I dissociate myself from the path taken by Klaus-Gerd Giesen (1995). Undoubtedly Giesen gives a suggestive account of the French IR discipline as a linguistically francophone community of scholars. His article is probably the best available account of French IR, and I therefore feel obliged to explain why I nevertheless did not choose to take his tack. Giesen's review of francophone IR theory includes contributions from the French-speaking parts of Canada, Belgium and Switzerland. The delimitation of the French IR community along linguistic lines allows him to tell the history of French IR theory as the successive crystallization of three fundamentally distinct epistemological traditions rooted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: positivism, encyclopedianism, and historical sociology. At the end of his article, Giesen suggests that this theoretical trinity is based on three 'fundamental, incompatible and possibly insurmountable epistemological categories', which eventually might prove useful in the analysis of other systems of knowledge production (pp. 163–4).

Alas, these are bold aspirations! But the fundamental question is whether Giesen's account lives up to an appropriate representation of French IR theory. To begin with, Giesen himself admits the deeply rooted structural differences among the academic cultures in different countries of the *francophonie*. While IR scholarship in France and Belgium is linked by a secular tradition to diplomatic history and international law, the IR discipline in Quebec and Switzerland is an offspring of Social Science (pp. 144–5). Correspondingly, in Switzerland and Canada there are at least some scholars open to social scientific endeavours such as behaviourism or game theory. By contrast, most of their French (and, to a lesser degree, Belgian) colleagues never became acquainted with such fashionable gimmickry. In the absence of any national representative from the French Republic, Giesen's category of positivism is virtually monopolized by scholars from Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium.[5]

Due to its lumping together of distinct academic traditions, Giesen's trinity of positivism, encyclopedianism and historical sociology is blind to national idiosyncrasies like the French abstention from positivism. This should be enough to demonstrate that Giesen's classification of French IR scholarship according to these three, and only three, epistemological approaches is problematic. Indeed, Giesen himself admits that French IR theory comprises some theoretical orientations such as neo-Marxism, theories of regulation and critical theory, which cannot be captured within his own framework (p. 144).

The present examination of French IR theory is deeply indebted to Giesen, from whom it has drawn much inspiration. Nevertheless I will strive to give an account of IR theory in France more tailor-made to the specific situation of

academic IR in the French republic. Moreover, I consciously limit myself to grand theorizing about the principles that organize political interaction between and beyond national territories. Accordingly I do not focus on middle-range theories or area studies, which admittedly do also play an important role in French IR. The contributions discussed in this chapter are all related to ambitious epistemological projects, namely methodological empiricism, *histoire nouvelle*, historical sociology, Marxism, neo-Marxism, and postmodernist deconstruction.

Three generations of French IR theory

Despite its erratic outlook, the French IR community is far from being homogenous. To the contrary, French IR is fragmented into a set of particular approaches, schools or even 'sects'. As a narrative device, I will tell the history of French IR theory as the succession of three generations of scholarship. This is not to say that I intend to write a kind of intellectual (hi)story for its own sake. On the contrary, I look at French IR from the ideal vantage point of a truly international discipline that should transcend parochial perspectives rather than stick to national idiosyncrasies. I argue that the self-chosen isolation and compartmentalization of French IR theory is detrimental both to the French IR community, which is in danger of becoming a somewhat incestuous intellectual enterprise, and to the other communities of IR scholars, which are precluded from the possibility of a fertile dialogue by a whole bundle of autonomous approaches to IR theory.

To emphasise the point, I give a narrative history of French IR theory as the succession of three generations of IR scholars after the Second World War. The first generation is broadly characterized by the predominance of two academic traditions: International Law and Diplomatic History. Although these two traditions cover the bulk of scholarly production in the 1950s, one should not forget to mention *études stratégiques*, *polémologie* and *géopolitique* to complete the picture.[6] Furthermore, there is a particular French tradition of area studies that may be related to the country's colonial past. Each of the traditions mentioned corresponds with a set of methodological assumptions that broadly determine the outcome of scientific research. This leads to an implicit theoretical bias of even the most empirical work. All the same, the implicit theoretical bias is usually not explicitly specified. This creates the idea of objective, empirical and descriptive scholarship that tells things just 'how they are'. But that is obviously an illusion, since an approach that denies its own theoretical foundations is the last to escape from theoretical prejudice (Merle 1983). In this chapter, the first wave of French IR scholarship will be referred to as 'a-theoretical research' because of its alleged autonomy from theoretical affiliations.

The picture is profoundly changed by the second generation of French IR scholarship. The great challenge of the 1960s consisted in the constitution of IR as an autonomous discipline within Social Science. The recognition of IR as a social science was accompanied by attempts to raise the intellectual standing of the discipline by a more profound sociological theorization. Highly influential in France and abroad, Raymond Aron tried to develop IR towards Social Science.

Some of Aron's followers moved on to an even more ambitious quest for systems theory, while other scholars tried to constitute Third World studies on a theoretical base, mostly inspired by Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of political economy. In short: since the 1960s, social (and to a minor extent socialist) theory has become the dominant approach in French IR theory. The quest for an autonomous IR discipline still continues in the 1990s, although the promises of general theory have not been fulfilled. To compensate for this default, there is now a proliferation of encyclopedic accounts that try to classify and possibly reconcile disparate IR theories, whether compatible or not (Giesen 1995).[7]

In the meantime, a third generation of French IR theory has been maturing in the 1990s. Although in the home-country of Lyotard, Foucault and Baudrillard paradoxically there is hardly any direct influence of postmodernist epistemology on IR, a principled critique against theoretical foundationalism began to be formulated. There is today an increasing concern with social identity in the work of scholars like Bertrand Badie, Marie-Claude Smouts, and Zaki Laïdi. However, only the latter accepts for himself the label of being a postmodernist. Therefore, it may be somewhat premature to speak of post-theory as a third generation of French IR scholarship. The phenomenon is rather new, and it is still uncertain whether it will lead to a collective enterprise. However, there is a notorious trend towards reflective approaches in different western IR communities and across all human sciences. This may lead to the prediction that post-theory is the likely direction into which an increasing part of the French IR community is going to move.

Having said this, the next three sections of the chapter are dedicated to a detailed account of the three generations mentioned (a-theoretical scholarship, social theory, and post-theory). The picture is complicated by the fact that, as in real life, no generation simply dies out when the next one is growing. As a result, today there is a situation of complex and sometimes contradicting theoretical and methodological orientations in French IR: post-theory is slowly reaching maturity, while social theory and even a-theoretical scholarship continue to attract their followers.

The first generation: a-theoretical research

As in other countries, it was only after the Second World War that IR was established as an autonomous area of investigation in France. Diplomatic history and international law were the two principal sources of early IR scholarship, supplemented by geopolitics, strategic studies, war studies and area studies. Today, IR is established as a subdiscipline of Political Science at several French universities and research institutes. Nevertheless, diplomatic history and international law have never ceased to exercise a strong influence on the French IR discipline. Even today, an infinity of work can be attributed to one of the two traditional 'camps'. In particular, there is abundant production concerning contemporary international history and formal international organizations (Thérien 1993).

International law and diplomatic history

From an epistemological perspective, IR scholarship in the legal tradition and in the tradition of Diplomatic History is often problematic. The tradition of International Law frequently leads to the mere description of international institutions without any explicit recourse to theory (Thérien 1993: 504; for a more positive assessment Smouts 1987). In a similar way, scholarship in the tradition of Diplomatic History frequently gives a more or less detailed account of 'how it happened', without any systematic effort to detect regularities. In a word, both traditions are frequently characterized by the absence of a self-conscious theory and methodology. This lack of an explicit theoretical concern has been duly labelled as the 'empirico-descriptive approach' – that is, scholars are unaware of the contingent character of their own theoretical equipment and conceive of their epistemological object as something 'out there' that may be observed and described without referring to any conceptual approach (Merle 1983: 413). In most cases, the implicit background theory of such scholarship is derived from the traditions of International Law and/or Diplomatic History. In other cases, the theoretical assumptions come from somewhere else, whether from geopolitics, strategic studies, political economy or anthropology. The problem with this sort of scholarship is that the choice for a specific tradition of research is not indifferent. 'There is no research worthy of that name that does not depart from some place or a priori' (Merle 1983: 414).

To cite an example from the tradition of International History, Charles Zorgbibe, one of France's most prominent IR scholars, begins his narrative about the history of international relations from 1918 through to recent days without any theoretical introduction; the work consists in four volumes that give a chronological account of events (Zorgbibe 1994–5).[8] Let us add another example from the tradition of International Public Law. In the preface to his book *Institutions des relations internationales*, Claude-Albert Colliard (1985: viii), in opposing the idea of a peaceful world of international institutions to the concept of an eternal anarchy of international relations, made the following claim: 'The present study is based upon international reality such as it exists today, and places itself under the banner of realism. It struggles to present and describe a real world.'

Contrary to its pretensions, scholarship that follows the empirico-descriptive approach does not escape from its underlying theoretical and epistemological assumptions. Usually, however, it does not become clear against which theory or epistemology the outcome has to be assessed, since the basic assumptions are not specified. This makes the debate between scholars from competing theoretical traditions even more difficult. As a result, scholars who work according to the empirico-descriptive approach have a tendency to seclude themselves in highly idiosyncratic schools. At the level of the broader scientific community, this creates an environment of almost incommensurable academic sub-cultures that, in the final analysis, additionally contribute to theoretical poverty and epistemological agnosticism.

The Annales School

It is particularly surprising that, despite the strong rooting of French IR in diplomatic history, there has been hardly any spillover from advanced theories of history to the theory of international relations. This is certainly not what one would expect in the country of the *École des Annales* and *Histoire Nouvelle* (cf. Burke 1990). As a matter of fact, there is only one important exception to this rule. Coming from the tradition of diplomatic history, Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle made an interesting attempt to transcend the limits of a-theoretical scholarship. In their influential *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*, both authors tried to use their immense historical knowledge to overcome the limitations of incidental history (Renouvin and Duroselle 1964, 4th edn 1991). For that purpose, they formulated some general propositions about the interaction between the 'deep forces' of history and the activities of statesmen.

The first part of the book, written by Pierre Renouvin, broadens the framework of diplomatic history by introducing the concept of deep forces (*forces profondes*). Under the heading of deep forces, Renouvin discusses a panoply of structural and cultural factors that operate at the national, transnational and sub-national level. These forces are geographic conditions and demographic movements, economic and financial interests, national sentiment and collective mentality. The deep forces are supposed to frame the behaviour of governments in international politics (Renouvin and Duroselle 1964, 4th edn 1991: 2). Such a concept of historical deep forces does indeed transcend diplomatic history with its state-centric focus on executive politics. The second part of the book, written by Renouvin's disciple, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, is dedicated to the question of how the individual statesman (*homme d'état*), being partially driven by the deep forces and partially trying to control them, tries to come to a decision that is intended to serve whatever he conceives as being the national interest.

As a possible alternative to both general theory and a-theoretical scholarship, this inductive–deductive approach based on history is highly attractive. But unfortunately, the project was never completed. In his book *Tout empire périra: une vision théorique des relations internationales*, Duroselle defected from the project and turned back to incidental history with its bias against theoretical abstractions (Duroselle 1981). In particular, Duroselle gave up the concept of historical deep forces. Instead, he turned back to an intuitive way of theoretical abduction based on the historical event as the raw material for careful generalization. The science of international relations, under such circumstances, can only be empirical.

> The object matter of international relations is not the recurring phenomenon, frequently experimental, but the event, that means a phenomenon that involves one or more persons, located in time and absolutely unique. . . . Those who oppose the history of events to another, more noble history that deals with some other thing, prove throughout that they did not think much about human evolution. I propose to banish this horrible word that does not

mean anything. History is made but of events. Those who believe to be able to escape from the event, are generally victims of a dangerous mistake.

<div align="right">(Duroselle 1979: 110, 122; cf. Friedländer and Molnár 1981)[9]</div>

The second generation: social and socialist theory

The demand for a social theory of international relations began as early as 1952, in a bright and lucid *aperçu* written by Jacques Vernant (1987). However, it was only ten years later, with the appearance of Raymond Aron's monumental book *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, that this claim was translated into action (1962). Since then, the quest for a sociological theory of international relations has become the most characteristic feature of the French community of IR scholars. In a certain way, the sociology of international relations can indeed be seen as the French answer to the Anglo-American quest for general theory (Roche 1994a, 1994b). Almost forty years after its appearance Raymond Aron's *Peace and War* is still the constitutive text for a large part of French IR. Therefore, some reflections about the foundations of Aron's social theory of international relations are in order.

Raymond Aron: historical sociology between theory and the event

According to Raymond Aron, historical sociology is 'an indispensable intermediary between theory and the event' (1962: 26; cf. Roche 1994a). In other words, a social theory of international relations has to be equidistant both from general theory and from a-theoretical historical scholarship. There is a gulf between the formal quantitative models applied in macroeconomics and natural science, and the contextual models of qualitative conceptualization in social science (Aron 1967). Moreover, there is a large rift between the naive conception of history as an inventory for cumulative knowledge about events, and historical sociology as an ambitious epistemological project (Frost 1997). Deeply rooted in the philosophy of history, Aron's IR theory amounts to a tightrope walk between the historian's resignation in the face of the contingent event, and the scientist's pursuit of absolute theoretical knowledge.

> By plunging sociological analysis back into history, Aron prevents his theoretical analysis from becoming too deterministic and abstract; and by stepping back from the historical landscape, Aron also avoids the mistake of claiming that international relations display no recurrent patterns of behaviour.
>
> <div align="right">(Frost 1997: 159)</div>

In Raymond Aron's vision, historical sociology shall reveal the intelligible texture of international relations, transcending the pure accumulation of raw events but stopping short of the deterministic rationalizations of an absolutist philosophy of history and an a-historical understanding of positive science.[10] Unsurprisingly,

Aron sustains the conceptualization of the state system as a plurality of intrinsically unequal and freely interacting political entities. This can be directed against the assumption of a structural straitjacket *à la* Kenneth Waltz. 'Contrary to Waltz, Aron is more than willing to be "reductionist" in his approach in order to remain close to the political texture of international behaviour' (Frost 1997: 156).[11]

In spite of this methodological self-limitation, historical sociology is supposed to constitute a unified field of IR theory. In his own words, Aron tries to understand 'the implicit logic of relations between politically organized collectivities', i.e. between states (Aron 1962: 9). In the tradition of Thomas Hobbes, international politics is seen as a sphere of inter-state anarchy; in the tradition of Max Weber, the state is seen as holding the monopoly of the legitimate use of international violence; and in the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, the pervasiveness of conflict and war between states is seen as the constitutive feature of international politics (Aron 1967: 843, 845; 1976).

All in all, the state as a unit of analysis is at the centre of Aron's theoretical focus. In some instances, however, Aron's view of international relations goes far beyond these limits. Aron does recognize the transformational impact of industrial society on warfare and on the likelihood of war (Aron 1959); he acknowledges the importance of economy, ideology and culture for the understanding of international relations; he takes upon himself the task of providing practical wisdom to the 'soldier' and the 'diplomat' for their diplomatic–strategic activities; sometimes it seems as if he wanted to integrate all relevant aspects of international life into one universal discourse. Particularly in his last work, Aron explicitly undertook to broaden his earlier methodological focus (1984; cf. Merle 1984b).

All this is familiar from the work of classical realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948) or Henry Kissinger (1979, 1983). And indeed, Raymond Aron shares with the school of classical realism its rejection of naive moralism, its focus on national security, and the rejection of behaviourist methods;[12] he also shares the classical realist pleading for a morality of prudence to support rational statecraft. Nevertheless, if Aron may be called a classical realist, his sociology of international relations amounts to a revised version of realism. For example, Aron explicitly criticizes the realist notion of an 'objective' national interest (cf. Mahoney 1992: 91–110). His historical sociology of international relations is deeply rooted in a vision of historical philosophy and political history that goes far beyond the typical obsession of classical realists with *raison d'état* and *realpolitik* (Hoffmann 1985; Frost 1997).

Marcel Merle: historical sociology as an inherently expansive task

In the wake of Raymond Aron's *oeuvre*, the sociology of international relations was adopted by leading scholars of the French IR community. The most famous representative of this continuity is Marcel Merle, who tried to introduce systems theory into the framework of international sociology. In his first important book

Merle tried to reformulate the sociological approach to international relations in a more systematic way (1974, 4th edn 1988).

Merle does not follow his mentor in his theoretical focus on diplomatic–strategic relationships between states. Instead, he sets out to suggest an all-embracing model of international society. Accordingly, IR is defined in the broadest possible sense as dealing with 'all flows that cross boundaries or tend to cross boundaries', and systems analysis is proposed as the appropriate framework to integrate anything that is deemed to be relevant (1974, 4th edn 1988: 94, 449–535). According to Merle, systemic analysis should embrace all kinds of actors and factors and any transaction in any issue area that falls under the broad definition of IR mentioned above. Consequently, international relations is conceptualized as a closed system composed of heterogeneous elements and lacking adequate regulation. Apart from nation states, an infinity of sub-national, international and transnational actors are taken into consideration.[13]

Merle's systemic approach to international sociology contains the staggering promise of embracing anything that deals with transactions across – and even beyond – boundaries (cf. 1996). But unfortunately, the pretension to encompass all that is relevant strongly limits the explanatory power of his approach. A theory that wants to be nearly as complex as reality itself can at best give a more or less adequate account of that reality, but probably not even that. It is hardly surprising that, apart from lip service paid by his disciples, there have been hardly any attempts to apply Merle's social theory of international relations, nor have there been any other serious attempts to elaborate a formalized scientific systems theory of international sociology.[14]

Socialist theory: theory for practice

In general, social theories of international relations are characterized by a certain acceptance of the international status quo, or at least by a pretended normative neutrality of the scholar towards his epistemological object. The scholar oscillates between an attitude of disinterested contemplation and an occasional claim to provide a framework for the legitimization and illumination of good political practice. Unsurprisingly, this attitude of resigned complicity with 'the soldier and the diplomat' has provoked a profound unease from the quarter of those committed to some more radical political project. In particular Marxists and neo-Marxists were deeply dissatisfied with a social theory of international relations that confined itself to the contemplation or, in the best case, illumination of political practice. Instead, these leftist scholars postulated a socialist theory explicitly committed to change and emancipation. From the 1970s onward, in France there have been numerous attempts to build such a politically engaged theory of international relations.

The pioneer of politically engaged French IR theory is Pierre-François Gonidec, who made an interesting attempt to introduce the political ideology of orthodox Soviet Marxism-Leninism into the study of international relations (1974, 2nd edn 1977). But in the mid-1970s the problems with Marxism were already too obvious

for most French intellectuals. This is probably the main reason why, in spite of its coherence, Gonidec's blend of Marxism-Leninism with political realism did not inspire any sustainable theoretical enterprise.

The difficulty of maintaining a credible Marxist theory under the banner of Communism contributed to the conversion of some politically engaged leftist IR scholars to neo-Marxism. Instead of the conflict between capitalism and socialism, these scholars opposed the industrialized North and the Third World. Instead of the military management of the East–West conflict, the analytical focus shifted to the economic mechanisms of the North–South conflict that perpetuated the marginal position of the developing world. And instead of the classical Marxist concern with the working class, the nations of the Third World were identified as the primary victims of capitalist exploitation to be redeemed from suppression. During the 1970s, a variety of works by French and francophone economic theorists were dedicated to the study of the North–South conflict (Emmanuel 1969; Palloix 1971; Amin 1973). Edmond Jouve was among the first of many authors to apply neo-Marxist notions like *néo-impérialisme*, *échange inégal*, *développement inégal* and *développement du sous-développement* to the study of international relations proper (1976, 1979).

Having lost its status as a colonial power, France maintained a special relationship with compliant regimes in the Third World and particularly in Africa.[15] At the same time, the critics from the left maintained their own sentimental ties of solidarity with the victims of colonialism, particularly when the latter subscribed to socialist ideology. In this context, the antagonism of the North and the South was somehow associated with the classical Marxist antagonism of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The nations of the southern periphery were seen as a kind of new proletariat, as the victims of exploitation by the capitalist metropoly. Against this, the ideological framework of historical dialectics predicted the emancipation of the developing world from domination by the core. As a consequence, the French Third World movement (*tiers-mondisme*) was initially characterized by a sort of eschatological hope for redemption.[16]

However, the neo-Marxist approach to IR theory was never coherent at the empirical level. In particular, the relevant actors and factors of the North–South conflict were not clearly identified:

- Different forces were held responsible for the exploitation of the South, e.g. the transnational capitalist bourgeoisie and state monopoly capitalism.
- Different instruments were deemed to produce and reproduce the suppression of the Third World, e.g. transnational corporations and western imperialism.
- There was no consensus on how the metropolies related to one another, whether by hyper-imperialism *à la* Kautsky or by an irreconcilable antagonism *à la* Lenin.
- Different protagonists of emancipation were identified, e.g. national liberation movements and Leninist avant-garde parties.
- Different states were said to be the natural allies of the Third World, e.g. the Soviet Union and Maoist China.

Today it has become commonplace that *tiers-mondisme* is in deep trouble (Lacoste 1985). After the internal differentiation of developing countries into different groups, there is no monolithic Third World any longer. After the failure of the so-called New International Economic Order, there is no immediate prospect of deliverance any more. It is therefore quite understandable that the bulk of French Third-World studies has shifted from optimism to resignation and despair. But while the old neo-Marxist pamphlet is dead, in France you can still find the periodic '*j'accuse*' in the editorial of the *monde diplomatique*. After all, who can deny that up to now the end of communism and other utopias has not led to an end of exploitation and to a sensibly more just world order (cf. Gonidec 1996)? 'The Third World does exist, but it is not that simple' (Lacoste 1985).

The third generation: post-theory

As already mentioned, France is widely known as the Mecca of postmodernist thinkers such as Foucault, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Derrida. As a matter of fact, French postmodernism has influenced part of the Anglo-American mainstream of international relations theory. But surprisingly, this is not mirrored in the mother-country of postmodernist thought. In the French IR discipline, postmodernism was widely disregarded up until quite recently. The first French contributions to IR scholarship that can be classified as 'reflective' in a broad sense date from the early 1990s.[17]

Zaki Laïdi: postmodernity as a crisis of sense

It is indeed revealing to follow the intellectual trajectory of the only French IR scholar who patently presents himself as a postmodernist. Zaki Laïdi began his career with studies about the relationship between the superpowers and the states of the Third World, focusing on mutual perceptions and patterns of inter-action (1979, 1984, 1986, 1989); it was only after 1989 that Laïdi became a convert to postmodernism (1992, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000). Before that date, his work was distinguished by a clear and intelligible narrative; since then, it is characterized by an opaque and hermetic language. Laïdi claims that, after the end of enlightenment, nothing remains as it used to be. The end of the Cold War has dissolved the link between the exercise of power and the production of 'sense'; globalization has led to a new experience of condensed space and accelerated world-time (*temps mondial*); the end of modernity has produced the fiction of a timeless present; the crisis of western universalism, finally, has unchained the conflicting claims raised by multiple identities.

 These are interesting assertions, but there is a problem with the relatively esoteric way Laïdi makes them. They may be true, but we cannot know. It may very well be that there is a crisis of sense and a crisis of time, space and identity. But unfortunately Laïdi fails to tell us what exactly has to be the case for his assertions to be confirmed. Moreover, he does not specify the exact dimensions of the crisis, nor does he suggest what can be done about it.

Bertrand Badie: post-theory as a theoretical project

Laïdi is not the only French scholar dealing with the crisis of western universalism. Bertrand Badie, a relative newcomer to the IR discipline from the field of political sociology, makes very similar arguments. But, unlike Laïdi, Badie does it in a very clear and intelligible way, relying on comparative method and nurtured by empirical evidence.

Badie began his academic career as a historical sociologist specializing in political culture. Subsequently, he made his way from comparative politics to the study of international relations proper (Leander 1997). In his early work *Sociologie de l'état*, Badie dealt with the historically contingent character of political culture: since western states have had different trajectories from feudalism to the modern state, there is a range of political cultures that goes from the bureaucratic state in France to the primacy of civil society in Great Britain (Badie and Birnbaum 1979). Later on, this comparative focus was expanded to include the specific features of statehood in the Muslim world; in particular, Badie (1983) examined how Islamic societies did and did not adopt and adapt values, norms and behavioural rules from western societies. Giving an impressive piece of comparative historical genealogy, Badie points out the different roots of the oriental and occidental conception of politics (1986, 1992). In the Muslim world, the genuine way of dealing with politics in the community of the faithful (*umma*) has been distorted by the long hegemony of the western model of modern statehood. However, with the crisis of western universalism there is an increasing reassertion of the original Islamic tradition of communitarian political culture. The end of western hegemony may lead either to intercultural conflict and disorder or to an interesting dialogue between civilizations. To enhance the prospects of an inter-civilizational dialogue, Badie calls for the acceptance of alternative forms of modernity beyond the western concept.

Together with Marie-Claude Smouts, Bertrand Badie wrote an IR textbook (1992). In this book, Badie and Smouts try to integrate the aspects of culture and identity into the French tradition of international sociology. In the age of globalization and multiple identities, the crisis of the nation state becomes more and more apparent. The paradigm of the nation state is no more sufficient to account for the ruptures and re-compositions in the international realm. In the first place, globalization displaces the nation state as the protagonist of politics at the global level. In the second place, the reassertion of particular identities and the return of religion and culture into politics erodes the nation state as the locus of its citizens' ultimate loyalty. Due to the introduction of culture and history, IR theory's constitutive assumption of state-centrism comes under scrutiny, and the discourse about international relations is broadened to aspects of identity that transcend the western concept of the nation state. The interdisciplinary approach of Badie and Smouts goes far beyond the traditions of both realism and liberalism.

The most important conceptual concern of Badie and Smouts (1992: 215–25) is to overcome the specific notion of universalism that manifests itself in the principle of modern statehood. This focus on the particular (*penser la différence*)

associates the two authors with notoriously postmodernist thinkers. Nevertheless, Badie and Smouts (1992: 237) take their distance from postmodernism: 'this picture is not a "deconstruction" of the world by authors caught in a fashionable post-structuralism'.

Despite this caveat against postmodernism, there are clearly some points in common. For example, it is fair to say about the two authors that their deconstruction of modern statehood does not suggest a compelling reconstruction of international politics (Roche 1993). The inadequacy of reconstruction in comparison to deconstruction is even more manifest in Badie's important books about the crisis of territoriality and sovereignty (1995, 1999; cf. Badie and Smouts 1996, esp. Bigo 1996b). The principle of territorial sovereignty has been constitutive for the interstate system for hundreds of years, but today it is coming under pressure from two sides. First, globalization makes the principle of territoriality ever more obsolete; second, overlapping claims for cultural, religious and ethnic identity overstress the capacity of the territorial state to provide order. The diagnosis of territorial decomposition leads Badie to dire prophecies for the future. Unfortunately, however, a compelling deconstruction does not lead to a convincing theoretical reconstruction.

But is this really so surprising? If Badie's diagnosis of national and international fragmentation is correct, the re-composition of the fragments is a painful enterprise that cannot be accomplished overnight. A similar defense can be raised against the charge that Badie's work is theoretically incoherent. If the time of universalism really has come to an end, we cannot expect a consistent IR theory to emerge overnight. In the best case, we can expect an account that allows us to see the emerging world in a way that transcends obsolete images. This is exactly what Badie tries to offer in his latest book about human rights diplomacy, which he posits between ethics and the will for power (2002).

It is true that Badie's work is still in the French tradition of the historical sociology of international relations, founded by Raymond Aron. But, unlike Aron, Badie rejects a higher-level theory of the international system and assumes a plurality of actors and rationalities (2001a; cf. 2001b). For that reason, his work is best seen as a contribution to 'critical' or 'reflective' writing: Badie abandons mono-causal explanations and general theory; instead, he tries to introduce an approach that is historically and culturally more sensitive (Leander 1997: 158–9). As a newcomer to IR, Badie contributes to the debate by introducing new concepts and new ideas. Accordingly, he draws on literature from different disciplines and different national provenance.[18]

Bertrand Badie simply does not want to propose a new, alternative corpus of general theory.

> If any actor has multiple identities with reference to different, not necessarily compatible, and dynamic cultural contexts and if the choice of how to define the self, at any particular moment in time, is the outcome of a complex strategy, there can be no general theory.
>
> (Leander 1997: 165)

On the other hand, however, and contrary to the great majority of postmodernist writing, Badie does presuppose that it is possible to communicate between cultural codes in order to make sense of cultural and political developments at the global and at the local level. Thereby, post-theory is becoming a new theoretical project.

IR theory in other domains

Up until now, the assessment has been limited to the discussion of those contributions that meet the following set of criteria: in addition to their common provenance from the nationally French IR community, all contributions that have been considered are (a) original interventions and not primarily encyclopedic treatments of other contributions; (b) about grand theorizing rather than small and middle-range theorizing; and (c) closely linked to the academic field of IR. It is quite obvious that, to a greater or lesser degree, the relaxation of any of these qualifications would lead to a different appraisal.

For example, we might relax the first condition and include encyclopedic accounts. To give an example, Klaus-Gerd Giesen's discussion of Anglo-American theories of international ethics is at an enormously high theoretical level and certainly deserves to be mentioned (Giesen 1992; cf. 1993). The book has the declared purpose of raising the French discussion about international ethics to the level of the Anglo-American debate. In the same vein, one could discuss an important volume about the new generation of IR studies, published under the aegis of Marie-Claude Smouts (1998). The volume comprises a series of brilliant deconstructions, namely regarding the concepts of territoriality and temporality, nationalism and the state system. In addition, the book contains a series of excellent research reports that connect French scholarship with the literature from abroad, mainly from the United States. The volume can be rightly cherished as the manifesto of the new generation of French IR scholars, where the new look of the discipline in France is presented: a sociology of international relations, mixing IR with anthropology, sociology, and political science. But in spite of their programmatic value, encyclopedic accounts are not original in the sense that they would contribute substantially new ideas to IR theory.[19] Although such publications are clearly important and do give important stimuli, they were deliberately not considered in this survey because of their lack of substantive theoretical innovation.

When talking about international studies in France, it is impossible not to mention two important new journals: *Cultures et Conflits* and *Critique Internationale*.[20] Both journals combine a high level of intellect with a multidisciplinary approach; both journals sometimes publish contributions by foreign scholars, mostly but not exclusively from the United States; and both journals go beyond the conventional divisions of international relations theory. But despite this innovative approach to research practice, there are very few contributions that directly and primarily tackle fundamental questions related to grand theorizing (e.g. Rouban 1998; Hibou 1998). To be sure, the two journals with their firm footing both in IR and

in comparative political sociology are a clear sign that things are changing fast. Moreover, *Cultures et Conflits* and *Critique Internationale* clearly go beyond the traditional parochialism of the French IR community.[21] After two generations of self-chosen isolation, French IR is at last beginning to reconnect to the international debate, although it remains to be seen whether this will translate into a new theoretical take-off (up until now, there is no book which might take the place of *Peace and War*, written forty years ago by Raymond Aron). But be that as it may, the contributions to the two journals were considered only in so far as they made some substantive contributions to grand theorizing about IR.

Similarly, this chapter has *not* included contributions from French public intellectuals. This may well be deplored, since the most attractive feature of French IR lies in the fact that current issues of world politics are frequently discussed in the general public at a high intellectual level. Nevertheless, this was a price that had to be paid in order to capture as precisely as possible the developments within the *academic* community of French IR scholars. For the same reason, the survey did not include recent scholarship in the field of geopolitics. Certainly, there are impressive encyclopedias (Lacoste 1993; Chauprade and Thual 1999) and monographs about geopolitics (Gallois 1990; Lacoste 1997) and new geography (Durand *et al.* 1992). But since both geopolitics and new geography are explicitly designed as alternatives to IR, they were not considered here.

The best example of what has been sacrificed by the focus on academic IR is the philosopher Pierre Hassner, an outstanding figure in French intellectual life. Over more than three and a half decades, Pierre Hassner has written essays and given interviews about important aspects of international life, such as nuclear weapons, totalitarianism and nationalism. As a liberal moralist and in a similar vein to his mentor Raymond Aron, Hassner has always confronted these depressing topics with a grain of hope for the future (1995a). Take for instance Hassner's diagnostic statement concerning the long-term historical change in world politics, formulated in an interview with *Le Monde*:

> Nous entrons dans un nouveau Moyen Age qui, pour les uns, est porteur d'universalité et de flexibilité, de multiplication féconde des types d'appartenance et d'allégeance, et donc d'ouverture et de tolérance, pour les autres, de guerres de religion, de bandes armées, de mendiants et de pirates, bref d'anarchie et de conflits permanents.[22]

> (Hassner 1992)

One year later Alain Minc, another French public intellectual, fleshed out only the negative part of this prophecy in a book about the 'new Middle Ages' (1993), leaving aside the positive aspects of Hassner's dictum. In a similar way, Jean-Marie Guéhenno has made gloomy predictions about the imminent end of freedom and democracy (1993). Undeniably such contributions are highly relevant to IR theory, and I will return to them in my final chapter about new medievalism (Chapter 7). In this context it would have been certainly interesting to follow the threads of these and similar public debates (Bigo and Haine 1996). But unfortunately that

would have led us too much astray from the main topic of the present survey, which was French academic IR.

Conclusion

The French community of IR scholars has, for a long time, existed at the margins of a discipline that is notoriously dominated by an American intellectual core. This self-marginalization is in line with a general tendency of political science in France, where entire sectors of national academia work without any reference to the international 'market' (Leca 1982: 670). Most contributions by French IR scholars are hardly connected with the theoretical debates that have intrigued, and are still intriguing, IR scholars in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, French theorizing about international relations is interesting at least under the following aspects:

1   Although Renouvin's and Duroselle's attempt to apply the *École des Annales* to the study of diplomatic history has not been brought to an end, outside France there has been another prominent application of the *Annales* school to IR theory, namely Wallerstein's 'world systems theory' (1974–89). Renouvin and Duroselle's important book from 1964 provides a good starting-point for the critical assessment of Wallerstein's approach.
2   The sociology of international relations is *the* specifically French approach to IR theory. Even Badie and Smouts (1992) are still working within the framework of a *sociologie de la scène internationale*. Moreover, Aron's (1962) and Merle's (1974) attempts to construct a historical sociology of IR are interesting in the context of other, non-French efforts towards social theory such as the international society approach of the English school (cf. Chapter 5).
3   Bertrand Badie's contribution to the post-theory of international relations is highly relevant for a better understanding of the present world-political configuration. Badie proposes an interesting synthesis of historical sociology, comparative politics, and international relations. This is particularly helpful for the theoretical conceptualization of macro-historical long-term change (see Chapter 7).

When taking into account the sheer numerical size of the French IR community, this is a relatively meagre result. However, one disclaimer is due: as we have seen in the last section, the result is very much conditioned by the fact that only academic IR theory has been considered in the present examination. When limited to grand theorizing by members of the academic community of IR scholars from the French Republic, the balance sheet is relatively disappointing. If we include theoretical debates from other domains, the picture looks much better.

There has also been a series of truly interesting developments in academic IR such as the *Annales* school, historical sociology, and post-theory. Nevertheless it is fair to say that, after three generations of Parisian intellectual pride, the

inward-looking character of the French IR community is increasingly becoming a liability. In so far as intellectual exchange is an important engine of theoretical growth, it is very desirable that the recent efforts by some scholars, who cautiously try to open up the academic milieu of French IR to the external environment, shall be crowned by success.

3 International Relations theory in Italy

Between academic parochialism and intellectual adjustment

A striking feature of the Italian IR community is its propensity towards critical self-reflection. The first research reports about Italian IR appeared within two years after the establishment of the first academic chairs (Silj 1976; Istituto di studi nordamericani 1977); the 1980s saw as many as four articles about the study of international relations in Italy (Bonanate 1984, 1990; Papisca 1984; Attinà 1987); after a certain break during the 1990s, when only one miscellaneous article was published (Bonanate 1995), there is now again a topical 'state of the art' (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a; cf. 2002b). To complete the picture there are surveys about the surrounding disciplines, namely Political Science (Bobbio 1986; Graziano 1991; Pasquino 1990; Morlino 1991), International History (Di Nolfo 1990), International Political Economy (Panizza 1990), Strategic Studies (Ilari 2002), and International Law (Cassese 1990). Due to the abundance of existing literature about Italian IR and its academic context, it is relatively easy to draw a broad picture of the past and present vicissitudes of the discipline. On the other hand, the frequency and intensity of critical self-reflection is surprising if one takes into account the relative novelty of Italian IR, which was founded in 1968/9, and the small number of professional scholars, who amount to approximately twenty-five persons. Even more striking about the available research surveys, past and present, is their defeatist note. Italian IR is generally seen in a marginal position, both *vis-à-vis* the international establishment and within the context of Italian Political Science.

The present research report broadly concurs with this view, while trying to find out the reasons why Italian IR appears to be so strongly marginal. The basic idea is that Italian IR may be duly understood as a marginal periphery *vis-à-vis* the American intellectual core.

There will be more evidence for this assertion submitted in the course of the examination, but it is certainly emblematic that there is now an excellent manual in Italian, co-authored by five Italian and five American scholars (Ikenberry and Parsi 2001a, 2001b). Imagine how unlikely it would be the other way round: to have a textbook for American university students co-authored by American and Italian scholars.[1] Moreover, it is revealing that no other European scholars, not even from Great Britain, were called in to participate in the endeavour. This obviously does not impair the quality of the textbook, but it is clearly indicative of

the type of centre–periphery relationship within which the Italian IR discipline is located. It will be interesting to further investigate the causes and effects of this centre–periphery relationship.

The first section of the chapter contains a concise outline of the historical evolution and present situation of Italian IR, although it is not the principal aim of this survey to dwell on the general situation of the discipline. From the second section onwards, the focus will be on the substantial contributions to IR theory that were made over the last ten or fifteen years by Italian scholars. For the purposes of this research report, the scope of Italian IR theory is defined in fairly restrictive terms. The examination is limited to the discussion of contributions which fulfill the following three criteria: they must be relatively recent; they must stem from the academic field of IR in Italy; and they must offer a substantial contribution to grand theorizing about the principles that organize political interaction between and beyond national territories. Arguably this narrow understanding of IR theory is somewhat problematic in the case of Italy, where the most interesting contributions to IR theory are frequently formulated far from academic IR. Whether or not recognized by the academic community, interesting debates are often taking place in the shape of discussions among public intellectuals, political philosophers, international lawyers, political activists etc. Therefore the final section of the chapter will complete the picture by portraying some of the theoretical debates that are going on beyond the boundaries of Italian IR as an academic discipline.

The evolution of Italian IR

The institutionalization of Italian IR reaches back to the academic year of 1968/9, when the first course about International Relations was taught at the University of Florence. In 1975, the first chairs of the newly founded discipline were established and the first three ordinary IR professors had tenure.[2] More than twenty-five years later, there are six ordinary professors, seven associated professors, and six researchers teaching IR at Italian universities. And even this rather limited numerical increase has taken place mainly over the last years (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a: 126–7).[3]

Four years after millennium's turn, Italian IR has still not yet reached full institutionalization in the academic milieu of the country, and it is probably premature to speak about a quantitative or qualitative take-off. A variety of reasons have been invoked to explain the failure of Italian IR to become firmly established in the academic environment. According to most observers, there is a series of 'confining conditions', i.e. internal and external constraints, which are frustrating the hopes placed in a 'revolutionary breakthrough'.[4]

To begin with, deeply rooted aspects of Italian political culture were made responsible for the failure of Italian IR to become firmly established. Luigi Bonanate (1984: 61–5, 1990: 14–19) and Antonio Papisca (1984; Papisca and Mascia 1997: 10–11) deplore a certain backwardness of Italian political life, namely a lack of internationalist culture. The Italian public is charged with a

presumed lack of interest in international affairs and a failure to appreciate the international dimension, both at the global level and in the domestic arena. In the words of one author, 'the congenital sensibility of Italian culture for international problems is very scarce' (Papisca 1984). Although this would explain a lack of interest on the part of the Italian public, it is almost impossible to assess the validity of this verdict, at least as long as it is formulated in such generic terms. On the other hand, it may very well be that the categorical disqualification of Italian society as parochial is little more than a sweeping prejudice (Isernia 1996, 2000). As a matter of fact, both the Italian left and the Catholic centre have a long tradition of internationalist commitment, from the Euro-communism of the old PCI to the ecumenism associated with the Catholic Church. Curiously, the stagnation of Italian IR has not only been explained by the absence of an internationalist culture in Italy, but also in the diametrically opposite way by an excess of internationalist commitment: until the end of the Cold War, the development of the discipline had been hampered by the tense climate of political and ideological confrontation between Catholicism and Marxism (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a: 128; cf. Morlino 1991: 96–7).

In view of these inconsistencies, it seems advisable to turn to more tangible factors. Thus, Gianfranco Pasquino has insisted on the fact that Italy, at least during the Cold War, was 'a country without a foreign policy' (Pasquino 1977). As a matter of fact, Italian foreign policy was almost completely subordinated to the Atlantic Alliance (Santoro 1991). According to the so-called 'Law of Pasquino and Hoffmann', the more dynamic a state's foreign policy, the better the career opportunities for IR scholars (Pasquino 1977: 27; Hoffmann 1977; Bonanate 1984: 62–3). In this optic, Cold War Italy was not a favourable place for the development of a vibrant IR community. This hypothesis has a certain plausibility, but its formulation as a law might be somewhat too deterministic. As a matter of fact, the original formulation of the theorem was much more subtle. According to Pasquino (1977: 32), Italy's Atlantic turn in 1947 was 'a completely intentional renouncement' that served for a specific purpose of domestic politics. By embedding Italy into the Atlantic Alliance, it became possible 'to discriminate drastically between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" parties and, as it were, to distinguish between legitimate designs of international politics on the one hand, and those infected by suspects of violated national interest on the other'. Or, in other words: the Atlantic turn in Italy served to push the national consensus towards the centre-right and to exclude the pro-Soviet Communist Party from the political establishment. In this specific political environment, a strong academic IR discipline might have questioned the fundamental taboo on which the edifice of the political system in Italy had been built. Pasquino's thesis helps to explain why the demand for an ideologically disinterested political science of IR was so limited in post-war Italy. And although the initial constraints on the development of an independent IR discipline have been invalidated with the end of the Cold War and particularly with the demise of the old political establishment, the original faintness of the discipline may still have its repercussions on the present situation of academic IR.

As a further explanation for the marginal position of IR in Italian academia, it has been pointed out that the familiarity with the English language is not very developed in Italy, neither among university students nor in the broader public (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a: 130–1). This so-called 'linguistic barrier' renders it difficult, if not impossible, for Italian IR students to have access to the debates in the English-speaking world. Thereby translations of IR 'classics' into Italian language acquire an enormous importance, which leads to a certain scholasticism. Moreover, Italian scholars find themselves in a dilemma whether to write in Italian and address the national public, thereby excluding their work from the international discussion, or to have their works published in English, thereby becoming inaccessible to most of the national audience. It is easy to see that this amounts to a serious handicap for the qualitative evolution of Italian IR.

What is more, the discipline has had a hard time in gaining policy relevance and access to public funding, since the practitioners of Italian foreign policy show relatively little interest in academic IR. On the few occasions where scientific expertise is requested at all, decision-makers usually prefer the advice of research institutes, whereas academic IR has little chance to satisfy the highly policy-oriented needs of the foreign policy establishment (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a). Only in the 1990s, things were beginning to change. In particular, the renewed emphasis on geopolitics and the success of *Limes*, the Italian review of geopolitics, has shown that there is an increasing public interest in international affairs. If academic IR has failed to gain from this renewed interest, this is presumably due to a more general gulf between theory building and policy-application in Italian academic and political life (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a: 129–30; cf. Lepgold 1998). But although this sounds plausible as an explanation for the failure of Italian IR to become more policy relevant, there is a serious problem with the circular and almost tautological nature of this explanation. How are we ever to establish whether the scarcity of financial resources is the reason or rather the consequence of the limited success of Italian IR as an academic discipline? And how can we ever know whether the gulf between 'theory' and 'practice' is the cause or rather the effect of academia's failure to provide stimulating inputs into ongoing foreign policy debates?

Another constraint for the take-off of Italian IR has to do with the academic environment. In Italy as well as in other European countries, the political science of international relations had to fight a sort of 'liberation war' against the established traditions of International Law and Diplomatic History (Silj 1976; Bonanate 1990: 17). The traumatic memory of the time when IR had to assert itself against the resistance of International Law, Diplomatic History, Philosophy of History, and sometimes even against Political Science, may have contributed to the self-encapsulation of Italian IR. Moreover, in the Italian case the emancipation struggle was aggravated by the following three circumstances: first, Political Science had to fight for its own rehabilitation after the fascist interplay and therefore could not support IR as much as in other European countries (Morlino 1991), and it was not without support from American social science that IR finally struck roots in Italy during the late 1960s (Gareau 1981). Second, Italian IR had

to compete with the 'History of Contracts' (*Storia dei Trattati*), a subdiscipline of Political Science that was – and still is today – taught at most of the important Italian universities. Third, the 'liberation struggle' of Italian IR was additionally complicated by the presence of a strong Hegelian tradition of philosophical history, most prominently represented by Benedetto Croce.

Although it would be difficult to assesses the relative strength of the above-mentioned explanations, it may be attributed to the cumulative effect of these 'confining conditions' (lack of public interest in international affairs, deliberate exclusion from the political debate, limited familiarity with the English language, policy irrelevance and lack of funding, the traumatic experience of the so-called 'liberation war') that Italian IR suffers from such a severe lack of 'critical mass', influence and visibility both abroad and in the country itself. There seems to be a general pattern of relative openness towards the American centre on the one hand, and relative closure towards other European IR communities on the other: 'Every scholar continues to consider himself an interlocutor of the US American colleague and not of the other Europeans' (Bonanate 1990: 19). This appraisal is even radicalized in a more recent research report: 'It is more common to see joint research projects between Italian university centres (and researchers) and foreign counterparts than similar projects linking various Italian institutions to each other' (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a: 130). As a result, virtually every single Italian scholar has a unique profile that is radically distinct from that of his colleagues.

On the one hand, Italian IR is wide open towards American IR. On the other hand, it is relatively closed towards other European IR communities. Apparently, there is even a lack of communication amongst scholars from different Italian universities, which leads to a strong internal fragmentation. This brings us back to the leitmotif of this chapter: the status of Italian IR as a marginal academic periphery. To summarise, it is sufficient to recall, in structural and transactional terms, what it means to be a periphery (cf. Galtung 1971; Holsti 1985: 145).

1   Marginality: communications with the centre are clearly more important for the periphery than are communications with the periphery for the centre.
2   Penetration: communications with other peripheries are negligible in comparison with the density and intensity of communications with the centre.
3   Fragmentation: communications within the periphery are less dense and intense than the density and intensity of communications between the periphery and the centre.

In so far as these three characterizations are applicable, Italian IR is indeed a typical academic periphery. This is clearly reflected in the self-perception of scholars: 'We are very weak in university and research. Who knows how much we will still have to go to school in America or Great Britain to keep up' (Cerutti 2000: 15).

Schools and paradigms

There are many possible ways to classify Italian contributions to IR theory. Probably the best classification, however, is still to assign the authors and their contributions to the well-known 'boxes' of the inter-paradigm debate. Thus, when reviewing Italian IR fifteen years ago, Fulvio Attinà (1987, 1989: 25–51) distinguished the following paradigmatic orientations: the Hobbesian or anarchy paradigm, the Grotian or community paradigm, and the transnational or pluralist paradigm.[5] Italian scholars were distributed in the following way over the three paradigms: Luigi Bonanate and Carlo Santoro were assigned to the realist, Fulvio Attinà to the Grotian, and Antonio Papisca to the transnational paradigm. One year later, Luigi Bonanate (1990: 41–6) had taken up the taxonomy, adding Umberto Gori to the transnational paradigm.

It is certainly not by accident that in this taxonomy we encounter exactly those five persons who held tenure as IR professors in 1990, the year when Bonanate's research report was published. It is indeed striking how much the division resembles the typical pattern of *lottizzazione* (compartmentalization), which is so familiar from Italian politics and administration. According to that scheme, academic IR is represented as a coalition of *correnti ideologiche*, each of them institutionalized by one or two professors and their respective departments. Of course, a sympathetic observer of Italian IR might object that this is just a nasty distortion of the honourable competition between intellectual orientations. But be that as it may, I would argue that the 'boxes' of the inter-paradigm debate are still today useful as a narrative device, in that they help establish a certain degree of conceptual order in the highly fragmented scene of Italian IR theory.

It is therefore possible to read the present section of the chapter as an update to the research reports by Fulvio Attinà (1987) and Luigi Bonanate (1990). I take the taxonomy proposed by these two authors as a starting point for my own narrative, however with the following modifications: first, I do not identify every single author with one and only one 'paradigm'; instead, I consider the possibility of one author moving back and forth from one school of thought to another. Second, my survey is not confined to ordinary professors; *any* author from *any* Italian IR department is admitted, inasmuch as his scholarship offers a substantial contribution to IR theory.[6] Third, I would propose some terminological modifications: the expression 'paradigm' is generally avoided, the 'transnational paradigm' is renamed 'liberalism', and a residual box of 'dissenters' is introduced.[7] Last but not least, the main focus of the review is on the literature of the last fifteen years; this limitation is

Table 3.1 Categorization of Italian IR theory according to Attinà and Bonanate

Realism	Grotianism	Transnationalism
Luigi Bonanate	Fulvio Attinà	Antonio Papisca
Carlo M. Santoro		Umberto Gori

Sources: Attinà 1987; Bonanate 1990.

Table 3.2 Categorization of Italian IR theory as applied in this chapter

Realism	Grotianism	Liberalism	The 'dissenters'
Cesa (1987, 1989, 1994)	Attinà (1989)	Papisca and Mascia (1997)	Santoro (1998, 1999)
Bozzo and Simon-Belli (2000a, 2000b)	Colombo (1999)	Attinà (1999)	Parsi (1995, 1998)
Santoro (1987, 1991)		Panebianco (1997)	
Bonanate (1986b), Bonanate *et al.* (1997)		Bonanate (1992, 1994, 2001)	

justified by the fact that there are already many research reports about the early years of Italian IR.

Realist approaches

'Is anybody still a realist?' (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). In Italy, the answer to this question is clearly affirmative. One might even go so far as to say that realism in general, and classical realism in particular, is still the predominant school of thought in Italian IR (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a: 121–3). To illustrate this point, a brief discussion of two relatively young Italian IR scholars, Marco Cesa and Luciano Bozzo, is revealing. Marco Cesa's entire scholarly production gravitates around realism. His work ranges from an apologetic history of the balance of power (1987) to an area study in terms of power politics (1989), and from the interpretation of Thucydides as a realist (1994) to the exegesis of Kenneth Waltz (1998). Despite the excellent scholarly elaboration of these works, however, Marco Cesa has generally no aspiration to be innovative in the field of IR theory (1990, 1995).

The opposite is true for Luciano Bozzo, who advocates a heavily modified version of realism (Bozzo and Simon-Belli 2000a). Taking classical realism as a starting point, Bozzo tries to integrate the whole gamut of revised realism. Thus, Bozzo appreciates Kenneth Waltz's and Robert Gilpin's neorealism, acknowledges Robert Keohane's neoliberal institutionalism, embraces the structural realism of Buzan, Jones and Little, and cherishes a further revision of realism proposed by Glenn Snyder. The *mélange* is additionally blended with Thomas Saaty's policy-oriented decision-making theory (Bozzo and Simon-Belli 1997, 2000b). Needless to say that, at least from a methodological standpoint, the result is a hybrid rather than a systematic theory – despite the alleged practical applicability and the predictive outlook of this 'model'.[8]

Another author who is conventionally attributed to the realist school of thought is Carlo Maria Santoro. Among other things, Santoro has written a book about the making of American hegemony during the Second World War (1987), and he

has pleaded for the harmonization of Italian foreign policy with the 'real' geo-strategic position of the country as a medium-sized power (1991). After the end of the Cold War, Santoro has moved over from foreign policy analysis in a broadly realist vein to a more radical form of geopolitics. It is probably fair to say that his more recent publications (1998, 1999) are rather distant from the tenets of classical realism.[9] Since they largely defy categorization within the 'boxes' of the inter-paradigm debate, Santoro's more recent contributions will be discussed further below under the heading of 'the dissenters'.

An author of doubtful affiliation is Luigi Bonanate, who shows a strong ency-clopedic interest in the topic of war (1998). As in the case of Carlo Maria Santoro, his attribution to the realist school of thought is true only for a rather small part of Bonanate's recent scholarly production. Together with two junior researchers, Bonanate analyzed hegemonic war cycles and the successive arrangements of international order (Bonanate *et al.* 1997; cf. Bonanate 1986b). The modern history from the early sixteenth century to the end of the Cold War is interpreted as the succession of four cycles of constitutive wars with their subsequent international orders. The fulcrum of this macro-historical account is the concept of 'constitutive war', i.e. a war that is so incisive that it is, at the same time, the end of an old and the beginning of a new international order. The winner of such a war is in the possession of 'constituent power', i.e. able to determine the rules of the game for the subsequent post-war international order. In short: the victor of a constitutive war is in the position to impose an international order favourable to himself and based on a constitutive inequality. This hegemonic order works for a while, but then it begins to decline and is, after a series of adjustments and episodic warfare, swept away by the next overall constitutive war. Any international order is based on some constitutive inequality and works until there is a new constitutive war. In this optic, the formal equality suggested by concepts such as anarchy, sovereignty, or power equilibrium is a chimera. Peace and order arise from war and disorder; anarchy and hierarchy are just the two sides of one and the same coin.[10]

Grotian approaches

In the abovementioned book about constitutive wars and modern international order (Bonanate *et al.* 1997), the authors pay strong attention to the fact that there is a minimum of respect for the rules of the game even under formal anarchy. To a certain extent, this preoccupation with international order and the rules of the game suggests the attribution of the book to the Grotian rather than to the Hobbesian or realist school of thought. Other works by the same author (Bonanate 1992, 1994, 2001), however, are closer to liberalism and will be discussed in the next paragraph dedicated to the liberal approaches to IR theory. It would seem that the work of this very prolific and diverse writer falls between different schools of thought and therefore defies categorization.

While the theoretical affiliation of Bonanate remains somewhat uncertain, at least one Italian IR scholar has explicitly declared himself to be a representative

of the Grotian or international society approach: Fulvio Attinà (1987). This is particularly evident in the book about contemporary international politics (1989; cf. 1998). In the introduction to this book, Attinà draws heavily on the English school tradition about the expansion of the European international society over the last 500 years (Bull and Watson 1984; Watson and Bull 1987; cf. Chapter 5). There is a theoretical stress on rules, norms and institutions, which leads to a partial rejection of realism. Instead of the 'discourse of anarchy', the author clearly prefers the language of International Organization and Regime Theory as a more adequate vocabulary for the analysis of international politics. Peaceful change is explicitly taken into consideration as a possibility for the mitigation of the Cold War international system. After these theoretical apertures, however, the rest of the book (pp. 100–284) is somewhat disappointing, since the historical outline strongly resembles conventional wisdom about the Cold War and does not sensibly go beyond the usual stress on political and military power. Accordingly one may question, apart from theoretical consciousness-raising, the value added of the book in comparison to more extensive and less theoretically ambitious works on contemporary international history (e.g. Di Nolfo 2000, 2002).

After the end of the Cold war, Italian IR scholars largely abandoned the 'Grotian' approach to IR theory. Attinà himself is now closer to moderate liberalism (cf. the section below), despite his sympathy for the international society approach of the so-called English school (cf. Chapter 5). Only once in more recent years has the Grotian framework suddenly popped up in an exegetic piece about the European roots of the modern world order, as reconstructed from the theoretical work of Raymond Aron, Martin Wight and Carl Schmitt (Colombo 1999).[11]

Liberal approaches

Since the early 1980s, Italian IR has experienced sporadic theorizing about interdependence and international democracy (Carnevali 1982; Papisca 1986). But despite the transnationalist inclinations of some scholars, it is often maintained that in Italy there is no such thing as liberal IR theory. Allegedly there is an unbroken predominance of realism among Italian IR scholars (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a). In Italy, it is said, international politics is mostly understood as 'politics among nations', i.e. among states. But is this really true? In recent years, I would argue, there are ever more publications that test and apply liberal premises. To illustrate this point, the present section deals with Antonio Papisca and Marco Mascia's book, *International Relations in the Era of Interdependence and Human Rights* (1997) and with Fulvio Attinà's introduction into *The Global Political System* (1999). Furthermore, I give an outline of Angelo Panebianco's book, *Democracies and Power Politics* (1997) and Luigi Bonanate's writings, *Ethics and International Politics* (1992; cf. 1994).

The most radical figure of liberal IR theory in Italy is Antonio Papisca, who is an outright idealist. The positions of this scholar become most evident from his textbook, *International Relations in the Era of Interdependence and Human Rights*, published

together with Marco Mascia (1997). The book has a clear utopian imprint, which is mirrored by the use of a panoply of familiar terms and concepts, such as: 'new world order', 'global governance', 'multilateralism', 'collective security', 'human rights', 'world society', 'transnationalism', 'international democracy', 'global peace', 'regional and international integration', 'peaceful change', 'complex interdependence', 'international regimes', 'pan-human security', 'sustainable statehood'.[12] The authors pronounce a strong aversion to 'lofty' theorizing in favour of a policy-oriented agenda 'for ordinary people'. In this optic, IR has the historical mission to pave the way from the 'old' international system of states to the 'new' pan-human community of states and peoples. It becomes 'the science of peace building', i.e. a therapeutic device with the declared mission of breeding 'new brains' and fostering 'international culture' (p. 39).

The flipside of these utopian hopes is despair about the present state of international affairs: 'The system of inter-state relations . . . is fundamentally criminal. I don't say immoral or evil, I say criminal, even cancerous: in short, a pathological feature of the observed object, not a subjective perception of the observer' (p. 37). The apparent oscillation of the two authors between celebration and despair raises the question how the bleak 'criminological approach' suggested by Papisca and Mascia can ever be reconciled with the optimistic 'human-centric paradigm' advocated by the same authors. With all due respect for cosmopolitan democracy and transnational society, if international reality is really as criminal as the authors maintain, it is difficult to figure out where the raw material for a human-centric world should come from.

Recently, another Italian IR scholar has tried to move beyond the state-centric paradigm of classical realism. Fulvio Attinà's textbook, *The Global Political System* (1999) is consistently oriented towards the ongoing transformation of world politics. The main stress of the analysis is on the advent of globalization and the extrapolation of possible future developments. In the face of this challenge the book aims at a new theoretical framework, building mainly on George Modelski's speculations about hegemonic cycles (Modelski 1987; Modelski and Thompson 1996; cf. also Goldstein 1988). Thus, the five centuries of modern history are divided into cycles of 125 years each, which are subdivided into the following four stages: agenda-setting (25 years), coalition formation (25 years), macro-decision (25 years), and execution (50 years).

Attinà suggests that the world is presently moving from the first to the second stage of a new cycle, i.e. from agenda setting (1973–2000) to coalition formation (2000–2026). This would mean that, after the end of the East–West conflict and after the advent of transnationalism and globalization as the new world political agendas, we are about to experience the formation of new global divisions (2026–2050) which will ultimately lead to the triumph of one power block, and to a subsequent era of hegemonic order (2050–2100). It remains to be seen whether there will be a hegemonic war, as has been always the case in the past, or whether the 'end of Westphalia' leads to an end of international politics as conflictive interaction among states. If the latter is the case, the world might come to see a new era of peaceful cooperation and equally peaceful competition, i.e. an era of

post-hegemonic global governance. Obviously, the problem with these predictions is that they are not only highly deterministic but also highly speculative. Looking for regularities in world history is not far removed from reading leaves in a tea-cup. Attinà may be a bit too confident when he concludes his book with the following words: 'The theoretical and methodological equipment for the adequate interpretation of change are already at disposition or in way of elaboration' (p. 239).

Although a political scientist and no international relations scholar in the strictly institutional sense of the word, Angelo Panebianco (1992, 1997) has made an important contribution to the dissemination of liberal approaches to IR theory in Italy. The epistemic strategy of this author is to draw lessons from liberal IR theory, while at the same time declaring himself sympathetic to political realism. The blend of liberalism and realism is particularly evident in Panebianco's book about the nexus between democracy and power politics (1997).[13] Since it is one of the most ambitious publications in the field of Italian IR theory, the book is certainly worth a brief outline.

The volume begins with a discussion of the two predominant schools of thought on the relationship between democracy and international politics, i.e. realism/neorealism on the one hand, and liberalism/neoliberalism on the other. In continuation, the author reviews the rich empirical literature contributed by other social scientists. In particular, this includes a discussion about the impact of democratic regimes on foreign policy, and a discussion of the literature about 'democratic peace'. The rest of the book is dedicated to the comparative study of 'real' democracies in their 'real' international environment. In a series of empirical case studies, the foreign policies of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy are examined. After these empirical cases which cover the whole era of the Cold War, the book ends with an attempt to draw some theoretical conclusions. Avoiding the risk of falsification, the author shows himself very careful and disappointingly trivial at this point: 'Both the realist and the liberal thesis are partly right and partly wrong' (p. 256). Despite the balanced nature of this formula, realism is granted higher credit. Accordingly, the prospects of systemic change after the end of the Cold War are seen as rather limited: democratic peace is considered unlikely in the form of *pax universalis*, and only slightly more likely in the form of *pax occidentalis*.

The relative triviality of these results may raise some perplexities about the theoretical value added by the book, which is a good example of the soft spot many Italian scholars have for 'scholasticism'. An immense space is dedicated to the exegesis of classical authors and to the evaluation of work by other scholars; there is also a certain energy spent for the elaboration of an own theoretical and methodological framework; but when it comes to the application of that framework, the analysis relies primarily on common-sense knowledge and pre-existing accounts; only scant attention is dedicated to drawing conclusions and deriving hypotheses.[14]

Whereas Panebianco's book has shown that a certain evaluative overkill may lead to the pitfalls of scholasticism, the absence of an adequate sense of theoretical

tradition can blind an author's eyes for important continuities. This quickly becomes clear when discussing Luigi Bonanate's work about international ethics, especially his *Ethics and International Politics* (1992) and his subsequent book, *The Duties of States* (1994). Bonanate's main thesis is that a moral theory of international relations is possible, in as much as states are de facto obliged to respect substantive moral duties. This thesis rests on the assumption that, after the end of the Cold War, the old concepts of interest, sovereignty and anarchy have lost their meaning, and that the radical distinction between domestic and international politics ceases to be applicable.

Even national identity has, at least in part, lost its legitimizing force. In the new international environment at millennium's turn, the innate and inalienable equality of individuals comes to the fore. According to the famous liberal mantra, all men are equal anywhere, independently of race, gender, culture, class, nationality and citizenship. That means that there is no moral reason why states' obligation towards individuals should stop at national borders. States have to respect duties not only *vis-à-vis* other states but towards all individuals wherever they live. They must take into account the external effects of their actions, both on foreign states and on foreign individuals. It can no longer be accepted as a moral argument that violations of human rights are happening far away. The old principle of national sovereignty must be overcome in order to achieve perpetual peace. Territorial states are called upon to confine themselves to the organization of social justice at home and to the worldwide redistribution of welfare. In such an optic, international democracy and international citizenship are becoming obvious *desiderata* (cf. Bonanate 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002).

These demands are certainly shocking to some. How can one be so rude, in the name of a global ethics about which nobody knows the feasibility, with the venerable principles that have preserved at least a minimal order for centuries? To understand this recklessness, it is important to note that Luigi Bonanate's propositions about international ethics take their leave from a sort of moralist outcry. It is considered as intolerable that states usually *do* treat human beings differently, depending on whether they live inside or outside their national jurisdiction. Against this, a rationalist attack is waged in the name of theoretical coherence and moral correctness. Although these are interesting arguments, nevertheless there remains some doubt whether Bonate is not simply reinventing the wheel of the 'old' utopian liberalism. Is it really necessary to write a 'propaedeutic' investigation into international ethics, when almost everything has already been said extensively by classic liberal thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, and Norman Angell?

The dissenters

Up to now, Italian IR theory has been discussed in terms of only three schools of thought: Realism, Grotianism, and Liberalism. Obviously, such a narrow categorization is not able to do justice to the work of every single Italian IR scholar. In Italy as well as elsewhere, there is a group of free thinkers (*liberi pensatori*) who

defy categorization. In the context of the present survey, these free thinkers are labelled as 'the dissenters'. Depending on how one wants to look at it, it can be considered either as slander or as a compliment to find oneself in this category. In fact, the non-conformity label can be interpreted as an expression of being either a 'freak' or a 'character'.

The first to be discussed under this rubric is Carlo Maria Santoro. When reading Santoro's earlier works (cf. pp. 53–4), it becomes questionable whether he has ever been a realist in the conventional sense of the word. A closer reading suggests that for this particular author being a 'realist' has been from the beginning a convenient mimicry for the construction of geopolitical scenarios, sometimes even conspiracy theories (1987, 1988). After the end of the Cold War, Santoro explicitly shifted from realism to an idiosyncratic form of geopolitics (1997). In this perspective, the end of bipolarity has brought about the end of ideology *tout court*, including western ideologies about globalization and global governance (1999).

After the end of enlightenment, as it were, we are living in a world without a centre. Despairing about the credibility of any available IR theory, therefore, Santoro reopens Pandora's box of geopolitics. The familiar principles of enlightenment are replaced with the no less familiar dichotomies of right-wing German thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger (Santoro 1998). In the final analysis, Santoro strives to relaunch geopolitics as a challenge to the United States as the only remaining superpower. Globalization and global governance are largely denounced as a camouflage of America's surreptitious aspirations for hegemony. Against this, Santoro calls for the reconstruction of Europe as the 'heart' of the Occident. The European peninsula, and not the North American continent, is seen as the genuine 'other' to mankind's oriental origins on the Asian land mass. By the way, it is rather obvious that, whatever one may think about globalization *à la* liberal American, the usual criticism against geopolitics can also be waged against Santoro's approach.[15]

Another provocative author is Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, who offers a series of original reflections about ongoing long-term changes at the present historical juncture. His small book about *Democracy and Market* (1995) approaches fundamental questions of the international political economy. In particular, the book provides a stimulating analysis of the complex relationship between politics and economics, which are treated as two distinct forms of organizational rationality. By embedding the economy in the institutional framework of the democratic welfare state, the western democracies of the post-war period have been quite successful in establishing a sort of equilibrium between the state and the market. However, the price of embedded liberalism was the creation of bad citizens, i.e. passive recipients of public services. After the end of the Cold War, the advance of the transnational economy and the crisis of the democratic welfare state have endangered this post-war arrangement. The incapacity of the welfare state to satisfy the demands of its citizens in the age of globalization has lead to a crisis of political legitimacy, since people are accustomed to measure politics prevalently in terms of social welfare. This leads to an increasing tension between the state and the market, if not to an outright 'reduction of the logic of politics to the logic of

economy' (Ashley 1983: 472). The economy is making inroads into the realm of politics, and a new equilibrium between the state and the market is demanded.

At the same time, there is an important normative problem with the crisis of the democratic welfare state. Up to now, democratic citizenship and sovereign statehood have virtually always gone together, and it is difficult to imagine the two as separated. The only logical way out of this dilemma, which would consist in the internationalization of democracy and citizenship, is not easily accessible in the absence of a global Leviathan. Nevertheless, it is not completely naive to hope for the gradual emergence of international citizenship. This might happen both at the level of optimal areas of economic convergence and shared democratic values (such as the EU) and, as far as possible, also at the global level.

These reflections are further developed in another book by the same author, which is dedicated to the analysis of long-term change at the present historical juncture, i.e. after the crisis of sovereign statehood (Parsi 1998). The security overlay of the Cold War, as it were, led to a temporary limitation (or even suspension) of national sovereignty, which in the western world was compensated by the interventionism of the democratic welfare state. In the states of the Third World, by contrast, the compensation consisted in a formalistic insistence on legal sovereignty. After the end of the Cold War the security overlay ended as well, but the imperatives of an increasingly global economy undermine both the democratic welfare state in the West and the legal phantom state in the South. Although sovereignty was formally set free for a moment, it immediately became obvious that national sovereignty was no longer viable:

> The nation state seems to emerge from the long freeze experienced during the Cold War. But while becoming aware of the real or apparent advent of this unexpected spring, the state is realizing that it has to reckon with a 'reality' that, frequently considered an alternative to political reality, has secretly and vigorously grown in the shadow of bipolarity, only to find itself in a position of absolute advantage at the moment when the dissolution of the bipolar system begins to grant it a wide and diversified leeway: that is, the reality of the global economy.
>
> (Parsi 1998: 90–1)[16]

These observations led to a series of thought-provoking reflections about the possibility of global governance. Who is going to provide the institutional infrastructure on which the global economy depends? Who has the legitimacy and who is prepared to fulfill this task? If the economy shall be embedded, the institutional infrastructure has to come from somewhere, whether from the state, from the economic actors themselves, from a global polity, or from an emergent global civil society. However, the territorial state is in a crisis since the mobility of footloose capital threatens the welfare state with its immobile system of rights and duties; the 'daily referendum' of markets cannot itself provide a sufficient substitute, since it is not clear how economic actors could ever overcome their obvious lack of enlightened self-interest and collective-action capacity. The state is

in a crisis and the market is unable to take over its functions. On the other hand, world government is not a realistic option either, and the legitimacy of global civil society has clear limits in its lack of democratic accountability. In the face of this dilemma, a redefinition of the state and its role *vis-à-vis* the economy and civil society is urgently needed. Neither the democratic welfare state nor the concept of 'national interest' are viable any more. Apart from the familiar problems with the old concept of national interests, there is now an obvious schism between national interests on the one hand, and the common interests of mankind on the other. This dilemma is becoming ever more salient in the face of urgent global problems, and therefore a new concept of 'enlightened' national interest becomes necessary for the survival of mankind.

It is clear that to believe in the possibility of a solution to these problems amounts to a leap of faith. It is all but certain that procedural democracy is apt for a reformulation of national interests reconcilable with the common interests of mankind. In sum, the theoretical problems with 'enlightened' national interest are obvious, but so is the practical relevance of the concept.

IR theory in other domains

It is clear from the above picture that realism and liberalism are the dominant theoretical orientations in Italian IR. Some realists sail under the flag of classical realism (Cesa), others are more inclined towards neorealism (Bozzo), whereas still others try to challenge or refine the realist framework in a sympathetic way (Panebianco). Over the last ten or fifteen years, the realist school of thought is heavily challenged by liberalism, which is divided among utopian idealists (Papisca, Bonanate) and optimistic realists (Attinà [1999], Panebianco). Outside the theoretical spectrum constituted by realism and liberalism, there are no consolidated 'schools' of IR theory in Italy. The idea of a possible Grotian alternative has proven ephemeral (Attinà [1989]), geopolitics continues to lead a life at the margins of the academic establishment (Santoro), and the most original young Italian IR scholar is treated rather as an *enfant terrible* than as a shooting star (Parsi). There is no Marxist IR theory within Italian academia, nor has the so-called 'Italian school' of new Gramscians any representative in the ranks of Italian IR.[17] In a similar way, constructivist and reflectivist approaches to IR theory are conspicuous by their absence, although this is slowly beginning to change (Bonanate *et al.* 1989; Stocchetti 1994, 1995; Cerutti and D'Andrea 2000; Donatucci 2000; Bonanate 2000b; Monteleone 2000).

All in all, it is probably fair to say that the examination of academic IR theory in Italy hardly leads to less disappointing results than the French case (Chapter 2). Moreover, it is quite embarrassing that in Italy the most relevant debates about international relations usually take place far off the beaten tracks of academic IR. The contributions to these debates are often more stimulating than most of the work by professional IR scholars.

To illustrate this, I give a short inventory of substantive contributions to IR theory put forward in other domains.[18] First, federalism. It is rather surprising that

there are no professional IR scholars in Italy with a theoretical interest in the issue of federalism, with the partial exception of Antonio Papisca.[19] In spite of this absence, the Italian debate about federalism is of special theoretical interest. Because of federalism's sweeping critique of the sovereign nation state, which for its part is constitutive of the modern system of international relations (Bobbio 1991a), federalism provides a sort of alternative to conventional IR theory. In Italy, the federalist movement can look back to a venerable tradition, from the 'father' of Italian unity Giuseppe Mazzini to the anti-fascist Resistance movement and to the actual debate about post-modern federalism (Albertini 1993; Pistone 1992, 1996; Carnevali 1996). In the hall of fame of Italian federalism, Altiero Spinelli (1907–86) certainly deserves the most prominent place. Spinelli, an unorthodox Marxist and founder of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, wrote in 1941, while in exile, the famous *Manifesto di Ventotene*, one of the constitutive texts of European federalism in the post-war epoch (Spinelli 1991; Spinelli and Rossi 1988; cf. Paolini 1990).

Second, idealism. Federalism is not necessarily confined to schemes of regional integration (Albertini 1999). Indeed, in Italy there is a political philosopher who understands federalism as a blueprint for global and local coexistence in times of post-modernity (Carnevali 1996). Others are interested in federalism primarily as a catalyst on the way to supranational identity and cosmopolitan democracy (Cerutti 1993, 1996: 29–41; Archibugi 1998). This leads to the more general observation that in Italy idealism is by far less on the defensive in the broader debate than in the closed world of academic IR departments. In Italian public life, there is a sort of idealist phalanx that is, as a matter of course, constantly attacked by the partisans of realism and realpolitik. A leading figure among the Italian intellectuals, the leftist liberal Norberto Bobbio, was at the same time the spearhead of this 'idealist' phalanx and the preferred target of 'realist' attacks (Bobbio 1997 [1979], 1989, 1991b; Bonanate 1986a; Telò 1999). In recent years, the late Bobbio partly modified his initial Cold War pacifism, especially on the occasion of the second Gulf War. But precisely this reconsideration in the name of 'peace through law' was to provoke the most furious polemics on the part of Italy's self-proclaimed realists (Zolo 1995, 1998).[20]

Third, pragmatic realism. When talking about realism it Italy, it seems useful to distinguish between 'academic realists', who are mostly political philosophers, and 'pragmatic realists', who are frequently close to the military and to the Ministry of Defence. Academic realists, on the one hand, are caught in a polemic and apologetic debate with their 'idealist' counterparts. Pragmatic realists, on the other, are much less worried with theoretical scruples. Thus, to one author it takes hardly four pages to deconstruct the 'ideology' of humanitarianism (Caracciolo 2000). Another author constructs an all-or-nothing dichotomy between the *military* instrument of peace enforcement on the one hand, i.e. resolute military action without political control, and the *political* instrument of observer missions without military support on the other (Cappelli 1999). Most prominently, the army general Carlo Jean is an exponent of geopolitics as a sort of empirically nurtured and concept-based heuristics to establish and define the national interest. In General

Jean's optic, the act of 'finding' – and then enacting – the national interest can produce a reinforcement of national power (Jean 1995, 1996).[21]

Fourth, dogmatic realism. In Italy, there are two outstanding political philosophers defending the tenets of realism. One of them, Pier Paolo Portinaro, has formulated an apology of political realism in the face of idealist designs for supranational politics (1993; cf. 1999).[22] This author does not shrink from assuming the character mask of the realist 'bastard' who disenchants utopian 'beautiful souls' and teaches them the nasty 'facts of life'. Portinaro rejects virtually all concepts that are dear to idealists, such as collective security, global democracy, multicultural global civil society, etc. The best of all possible worlds is the world of institutional muddling through, and good politics is the art of problem solving in the sense of reaching the best possible collective outcome. The voluntary coordination of state action is the only realistic remedy against the perverse effects of international relations as a system of actors. This is not very far from the predicament of Danilo Zolo, another political philosopher adhering to the tenets of realism (1995, 1998, 2000). Deeply influenced by Carl Schmitt and the ethologists Konrad Lorenz and Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeld, Zolo urges an acceptance of war as a legitimate and indispensable instrument of conflict resolution. According to Zolo, it is counterproductive to banish war and international violence, and the best thing one can do is to search for corrective measures and functional equivalents to war.

Conclusion

While academic IR scholars from Italy have had a limited resonance in the public, the most relevant debates about international issues are led by engaged individuals such as the late Altiero Spinelli, public intellectuals such as the late Norberto Bobbio, army generals such as Carlo Jean, and political philosophers such as Portinaro and Zolo.

These debates are mostly characterized by a considerable degree of intellectual sophistication, which makes it difficult to understand why academic IR scholars have kept so much to the sidelines. It is quite embarrassing that the general debate about international issues in Italy is significantly more vibrant than the debates within the academic community of IR scholars. Moreover, it is truly bewildering to see that debates about international issues in Italy continue to reflect the opposition of blue-eyed idealism versus hard-nosed realism, familiar to the IR scholar from the 'first debate' of the late 1940s. The Manichean struggle between idealism and realism appears to be so deeply engrained in the country's public discourse that one wonders whether it will ever come to an end. At least in part, this polemic overkill is a possible explanation why academic IR scholars preferred to abstain from public debates. In the Italian political culture there seems to be a premium on radical opinions, and it is understandable that people who define themselves as social scientists avoid getting too much involved. On the other hand, however, political philosophers and political scientists *did* substantially contribute to these discussions – so why not the IR scholars as well?

The somewhat disappointing performance of Italian IR must be understood as a result of the particular way Italian IR scholars have dealt with their marginal position both in the national and international academic environment. As outlined in the first chapter, this may be illustrated by a comparison between the developmental trajectories of Italian, French and Nordic IR. Whereas the French IR community, with its strategy of intellectual self-reliance, did not fare much better than its Italian counterpart, the considerable success of Nordic IR, which is discussed in the next chapter, shows that a community of scholars actually *can* escape from its status as a marginal periphery. The secret of this success consists in the fact that scholars in Sweden, Denmark, Norway (and, although to a lesser extent, Finland) have embarked on a strategy of multi-level research cooperation, increasing their internal cohesion at the national and at the regional level while at the same time diversifying interdisciplinary and cross-national connections. It is probably true that the incentive structure of Italian academia is not very conducive to the Nordic scheme of multi-level research cooperation. Nevertheless, the latter might be the only winning strategy to overcome the precarious status of Continental IR communities at the margins of American social science.

4   International Relations theory in the Nordic countries

From fragmentation to multi-level research cooperation

The present chapter is about IR theory in the Nordic countries, i.e. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and, although to a much lesser extent, Iceland. A special focus is on the three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway), which are clearly more interconnected than the two other Nordic countries. This chapter deals primarily with books and articles that have been published since the early 1990s, when the last comprehensive survey about Scandinavian IR appeared (Jönsson 1993a).[1] I argue that, at least if compared with the evolution of the discipline in other European countries, the development of IR theory in the Nordic countries stands out as a success story. The Nordic communities of IR scholars have been fairly successful in overcoming their marginal position *vis-à-vis* American IR. When comparing the trajectory of IR studies in the Nordic countries with developments in countries like France and Italy, it would be hard not to acknowledge that the 'Nordic Network' has fared better than either French or Italian IR in challenging the intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream. To make this point, I shall provide a tentative explanation for the relative success of Nordic IR in comparison to other European IR communities.

My survey of Nordic IR theory is based on the following two criteria of evaluation:

1   In so far as individual scholars and scientific communities in the academic periphery have a strong interest in joining the discussions going on in the centre, the success of an academic community can be measured by its ability to gain access to the discipline via the centre.
2   Since it would be naive to assume that *successful* scholarship is necessarily also *good* scholarship, the excellence of an academic community must be measured by its capacity to provide original contributions to ongoing debates and to set qualitatively innovative issues on the research agenda.

Only if both of these criteria are fulfilled, can the 'Nordic network' be considered a model to be emulated by other European IR peripheries.

The first section of the chapter deals primarily with the first criterion. I argue that the success of Nordic IR has very much to do with the particular way in which scholars from the Nordic countries share their knowledge with one another and

with scholars from other parts of the world, particularly from the United States. To substantiate this claim, I provide a broad-brush picture of the institutional history of Nordic IR. In particular, I show that Nordic IR has developed from a situation of national fragmentation towards massive research cooperation both at the regional level and beyond. The result of this strategy has been the piecemeal emergence of an increasingly diversified 'Nordic network' of IR scholars. This has gone hand in hand with a pooling of intellectual resources and the relative opening of the Nordic IR community, which in turn created the critical mass and density of intellectual transactions necessary to challenge the hegemony of American IR. Today, Nordic IR is a truly integrated academic community with distinctive national subcommunities and with connections to virtually all other relevant communities of scholars all over the world.

In the second section I turn from academic sociology to more substantive issues. As I have argued above, there is no compelling reason why the success of Nordic IR in overcoming its marginal position *vis-à-vis* American IR should be mirrored by the substantive quality of the Scandinavians' scholarly production. Although Nordic scholars have undoubtedly gained access to big editorial markets and to the inner circles of discursive power, taken alone this is not yet a guarantee for the quality of their intellectual work. There is no a priori reason why success at the level of academic sociology should translate into intellectual vibrancy. Accordingly, it would be impossible to render justice to Nordic IR theory without assessing the substantive quality of scholarly production. To fulfill this task, it will be necessary to critically assess a variety of substantive contributions to IR theory by Nordic authors. Only if it turns out, as a result of this critical examination, that Nordic IR is both well connected to the Anglo-American centre *and* providing innovative scholarship, can it be regarded as a model to be emulated by other IR communities.

In the conclusion to the chapter, I return to the ideal-typical comparison between the French strategy of academic self-reliance, the Italian strategy of resigned marginality, and the Nordic strategy of multi-level research cooperation as three different developmental pathways for academic peripheries to cope with the intellectual hegemony of American IR. The comparison suggests that Nordic IR can indeed be regarded as a model for other IR peripheries on the European continent. What is more: the Nordic penchant for multi-level research cooperation is likely to be *the* winning strategy for the embryonic 'Eurodiscipline' of IR, which might become a powerhouse of innovative theorizing and a real match for the American core.

Multi-level research cooperation

Today, Nordic IR scholars dispose of a variety of attractive outlets for their academic production. As a matter of fact, many Nordics have gained access to the academic world market by getting their books and articles published by English and American editors (Goldmann 1995). At the same time, a generation of mostly younger Scandinavians is networking with scholars from other European

IR as an 'American Social Science' (in English)
The emergent 'Eurodiscipline' of IR (mainly in English)
Regional research cooperation among the Nordic countries (mainly in English)
The domestic audience (in the vernacular)

Figure 4.1 Outlets for the production of Nordic IR scholars.

countries to create an integrated European community of IR scholars (Jönsson 1993a: 160). Scholars from the Nordic countries meet at region-wide conferences and publish their essays in Nordic reviews, namely *Cooperation and Conflict*, the *Journal of Peace Research*, and *Scandinavian Political Studies*. At the same time, Nordic scholars have kept their national academic markets. In short, Nordic IR scholars are operating and cooperating at several distinct levels simultaneously (Figure 4.1).[2]

By this arrangement, Nordic scholars are players in a sort of 'multi-level game' of academic relations. This is a comfortable situation in so far as their position at the intersection of the different layers yields them clear benefits. Nordic scholars gain visibility at the international level, they benefit in terms of intellectual diversity and independence, and they can permit themselves the luxury of shifting from one editorial outlet to the other, which is favourable to their professional detachment. Certainly, all this would be much more difficult to achieve for their continental colleagues from, say, France or Italy. But as for the Nordic scholars: how has this comfortable placement at the intersection of various academic communities come about? What is the secret behind the organizational success of Nordic scholars in comparison to their Continental colleagues? And what lessons can be learned from the Nordic network for the progressive development of other academic peripheries, namely in Europe? To provide an answer to these questions, in the remainder of this section I will depict how Nordic IR has been evolving towards multi-level research cooperation over the last forty years.

To begin with, both the academic discipline of IR and the competing field of Peace Research were established somewhat earlier in the Nordic countries than in many countries of the Continent. In Sweden, Denmark and Norway, IR and Peace Research were institutionalized already in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Taking into account the common period of origin in the three countries, one might expect the first generation of Scandinavian scholars to have immediately formed a network of research cooperation all over the region. However, this has not been the case. On the contrary, the first IR chairs in the Scandinavian countries were created by political decisions at the national level, pursuing a variety of national research agendas.[3]

In Sweden, the predominant approaches were foreign policy analysis, comparative politics and security studies, complemented by an extraordinary preoccupation with the importance of international order and international norms (Andrén 1964, 1966; Petersson 1964; Goldmann 1969, 1971). In Denmark, where IR had an important function in the context of secondary school education, there was a focus on diplomatic history, security studies and area expertise (Pedersen 1966, 1970; Bjøl 1966). In Norway, the focus was on national security, international organizations, developing countries, and the problems of regional integration (Ørvik 1965). Every country, if not every research institute and university department, had its own research profile and its own ideas regarding the appropriate subject matter and methodology of the newly founded discipline. As a result, regional research cooperation among Nordic scholars may have seemed relatively unlikely for the future.

The apparent fragmentation of early Nordic IR should not, however, obscure the fact that most contributions fell broadly within the behaviourist mainstream of the time. Especially in Sweden and Norway, IR scholars and Social Science departments were positively inclined towards behavioural science (Anckar 1987, 1991b; cf. Mathisen 1963). In the words of Dag Anckar (1991a: 241), the behavioural wave 'swept through Nordic political science in the late 1950s and early 1960s', i.e. exactly at the time when the first chairs for IR were established. Although the venerable traditions of International Law, Diplomatic History, Political Philosophy and, in Sweden and Finland, Geopolitics continued to inform the research interests of many scholars, positivist methodology provided a most welcome reason for writing off the mother disciplines as unscientific. This may be regarded as a strategy of intellectual emancipation. At the same time, the initial affinity between Nordic and American Social Science is probably the main explanation why Nordic IR scholars were able to become so quickly 'true mainstream pushing older traditions back to protosciences' (Apunen 1993a: 2). Although there were some exceptions to the rule – such as the Francophile professor Erling Bjøl in Denmark and the historical outlook of IR studies in the same country – Nordic authors widely accepted the trend-setting function of 'American Social Science'.

[This goes primarily for the academic study of IR. The evolution of Peace and Conflict Research is a different story and deserves a succinct parenthesis. The normative commitment to cooperation and peace stands in partial opposition to the positivist postulate of value neutrality. This is not to deny that at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) there has always been a focus on empirical research which is perfectly compatible with positive science. However, the commitment of Peace Research to positivism was somewhat less evident at the universities of Gothenburg, Lund, and Oslo. The International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway has been committed from the beginning to 'Critical Peace Research', which by definition is not satisfied with describing the world as it is. The institute was founded in 1959 by Johan Galtung, who became famous by his normative imprint and the hardly falsifiable ideas of structural violence and imperialism (1969, 1971).[4] In other words: Peace Research is characterized by an agenda that stands in partial opposition to the positivist

mainstream of IR in the 1960s and 1970s (Rytövuori-Apunen 1990). Moreover, Peace Research is clearly *not* an Anglo-American social science. As a matter of fact, American and British researchers are comparatively less numerous and less strong in the field than Nordic and Continental European scholars, who enjoy a leading position. Particularly in Sweden and Norway, government support went rather into Peace and Conflict Research than into the academic study of IR. As a result, Nordic peace research is rather a centre of its own than a periphery of American social science. And indeed there has been a steadily growing and never interrupted cooperation among Peace Researchers from the Nordic region and from other parts of the world (Olson and Groom 1991: 140). Finally, Nordic Peace Research is mostly carried out at independent research institutes.[5] Although there are some university departments dealing with Peace and Conflict Research, the relative separation of Peace Research from the academic study of IR has maintained a certain distance between Peace Researchers and IR scholars. Although Peace Research has come closer to IR over the last few years, it is probably fair to say that it still stands in a certain opposition to the academic study of IR (cf. Møller 2001).]

Let us now return to the gist of this chapter, which is the academic study of IR theory. As discussed, the first chairs in the Nordic countries were established around 1960 by political decisions at the national level. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the young Nordic IR communities initially showed the typical characteristics of marginal peripheries. On the one hand, the young Nordic IR communities were characterized by penetration, i.e. intense and one-sided dependence of the peripheries on the core; on the other hand, they suffered from fragmentation, i.e. scarce integration among and even within the peripheries (Galtung 1971; cf. Väyrynen *et al.* 1988; Jönsson 1993a: 160). This was mirrored by the fact that IR scholars from the Nordic countries were eager to absorb the latest developments of American IR. At the same time, the primary addressee of their scholarly production was the domestic audience of their respective countries. Accordingly, most of the time they turned to their domestic audience in the Nordic languages, while only sometimes using English to address a more international audience (Pesonen 1966: 6). In pursuing this two-tack strategy, the embryonic IR communities in the Nordic countries largely bypassed the regional level of research cooperation.

This is somewhat astonishing if one takes a closer look at the specificities of political discourse and political practice in the Nordic countries, where the idea of regional cooperation has a long history. Most prominently, the Nordic Council has been working since 1952 as a catalyst for regional cooperation. Although the Nordic Council never had too much influence on concrete policy choices, its activities included regional coordination in the fields of culture and science. Given the social and political aims of the Nordic Council, what could have been more obvious than to coordinate research activities in Social and Political Science? And which field of Social and Political Science could have had more strategic importance for regional research cooperation than IR? It seems that it was only a matter of time for a 'Nordic network' of IR scholarship to be constituted.

Consistent with these considerations, the Nordic Council began in the mid-1960s to promote research cooperation among Nordic Political Scientists in general. Most notably, the yearbook *Scandinavian Political Studies* has been published since 1966 by the political science associations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Pesonen 1966).[6] Focusing on Comparative Politics, a series of Nordic conferences was taking place to further the development of strong networks of regional research cooperation. In 1978, when political cooperation among the Nordic countries was already in decline after the accession of Denmark to the European Community, political scientists agreed on the foundation of a Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA). In the same year, *Scandinavian Political Studies* (SPS) was converted from a yearbook into a quarterly. It was expected that the newly founded NOPSA and the SPS quarterly would trigger off a new wave of Nordic research cooperation (Rokkan 1978). And indeed, the SPS quarterly became one of the most important editorial outlets for Nordic political scientists.

Efforts to foster Nordic cooperation were not limited to political science in general. Similar efforts were also taking place in the fields of IR proper, including Peace Research (Nordisk Udvalg 1965). After several years of tough negotiations, the Nordic Council of Ministers finally agreed in February 1966 on the establishment of the Nordic Cooperation Committee to further research in International Politics including Peace and Conflict Research (Lange 1997). From 1986 known under the acronym NORDSAM, the Cooperation Committee supported and disseminated information about Nordic research on international affairs. Moreover, NORDSAM arranged conferences and seminars with the aim of increasing cooperation among Nordic IR scholars and, most importantly, published an influential IR journal at the regional level, *Cooperation and Conflict*. The journal served as a regional forum and as an important editorial outlet for contributions by Nordic authors, using English as a lingua franca. In addition, NORDSAM had a modest fund for research support, which was particularly useful for encouraging young researchers to meet each other and for financing the participation of Nordic scholars in international conferences (Jönsson and Sundelius 1988: 12). Together, these financial and institutional opportunities created a strong incentive for regional research cooperation among Nordic IR scholars from the late 1960s onwards.

As already stated, a first setback to regional research cooperation among Nordic IR scholars came when Denmark joined the European Community in 1973 and began to shift its resources away from the NORDPLUS student exchange programme towards the western European ERASMUS programme. Nevertheless, cooperation among Nordic IR scholars continued for the time being, and the apogee of Nordic research cooperation was reached at the beginning of the 1980s. When the Nordic Council began to reduce the funding of joint research projects, however, the decline of research cooperation rapidly set in. Probably the most fateful consequence of this financial drain was the paralysis of the quarterly *Cooperation and Conflict* in the late 1980s. The demise of the Cooperation Committee and the crisis of its journal culminated in the formal dissolution of NORDSAM, decided in 1990 by the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, in the meantime

Nordic research cooperation had developed a momentum of its own. Nordic scholars continued to cultivate informal contacts and to meet at the fringes of conferences. In 1991, a group of scholars founded a new membership-based organization, the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA) (Sundelius 1994). Since then, NISA has been arranging regular Nordic conferences and periodic graduate student training workshops. The association is explicitly committed to continuing the networking activities that were previously facilitated by NORDSAM. Most importantly, the review *Cooperation and Conflict* survived the dissolution of NORDSAM and was rescued by a private publisher. Today, NISA lives in an interesting symbiosis with the publisher of its journal for whom it also provides the subscription base.

To be sure, the heydays of Nordic research cooperation in the early 1980s are over now. Nevertheless, the formal and informal collaboration among Nordic IR scholars is well alive. In the meantime, Nordic scholars have considerably diversified their networking activities. Apart from the conventions organized by the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA), scholars from the Nordic countries frequently gather at the conventions of other associations, such as the American International Studies Association (ISA), the British International Science Association (BISA), and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) with its Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR). In addition to that, the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence is an important point of reference for IR scholars from the Nordic countries. These manifold institutional opportunities provide an important incentive for Nordic IR scholars to practice multi-level research cooperation. In short, 'a fruitful network pattern of concentric circles is emerging, with Scandinavian cooperation as a stepping-stone to European and, finally, global contacts' (Jönsson 1993a: 160).

The reorientation of Nordic IR scholars from regional towards multi-level research cooperation is probably also due to the fact that the Nordic model is in decline as a foreign policy instrument, whereas European integration has become increasingly important for the Nordic countries (Mouritzen 1995; Patomäki 2000). As a result, continental IR is now an increasingly interesting target for Nordic IR students and scholars alike. Ever more students from the Nordic countries are participating in the ERASMUS student exchange programme, thereby becoming acquainted with the academic study of international relations in the countries of the European Union (Nygren 1996). This scheme of student exchange is paralleled by intellectual exchange between Nordic scholars and their colleagues from other parts of Europe, and a series of important volumes (co)edited by Scandinavians bears witness to the recent trend towards research cooperation at the pan-European level (Allan and Goldmann 1992; Carlsnaes and Smith 1994; Clark and Neumann 1996; Neumann and Wæver 1997; Jørgensen 1997a; Christiansen *et al.* 1999, 2nd edn. 2001; Mozaffari 2002). Thanks to its particular strategy of regional research cooperation, the Nordic community of IR scholars has developed from a cluster of internally fragmented, marginal academic peripheries into a uniquely successful 'Nordic network' of multi-level research cooperation.

Over time this has led to a situation where, at least for Nordic IR scholars, academic recognition follows on from publication at the international level. Arguably the habit of networking and the tradition of writing in English, which can both be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, were the necessary conditions for Nordic IR to develop from a plurality of closed academic communities into an open and integrated academic society.

The substance of scholarly production

The placement of the Nordic IR communities at the centre of a complex network of multi-level research cooperation has certainly left its imprint on the theoretical and methodological orientation of the authors concerned. Indeed, the networking of Nordic authors in the field of IR research has been accompanied by a clear diversification of their theoretical and methodological orientations. It is striking that Nordic authors frequently place themselves at the intersection between different disciplines and research traditions. To cite only a few examples from the last fifteen years, Nordic IR theory has 'met' Marxian political economy (Ougaard 1990), social anthropology (Eriksen and Neumann 1993), comparative historical sociology (M. Hall 1999), and post-Soviet studies (Pursiainen 2000).

As has been argued in the introduction to this chapter, however, there is no logical reason why intellectual diversity and research cooperation must lead to innovative theoretical approaches. Accordingly, it will be necessary to dedicate a section to the critical evaluation of substantive scholarship by Nordic authors. This is not an end in itself. On the contrary, it will help us answer the question whether or not multi-level research cooperation should be emulated by other IR communities. In order to give a tentative answer to that question, Nordic contributions will be analyzed in relation to intellectual movements beyond the Nordic region. Only if it can be demonstrated that Nordic authors are making a tangible contribution to these debates, and only if there is a link between intellectual diversity and the substantive quality of scholarship, will it be plausible to regard multi-level research cooperation as a model for the development of the discipline in other academic peripheries, namely on the European continent.

This leads us to the fundamental question whether there are any substantive and/or stylistic specificities of Nordic IR scholarship at all. In the important article 'International politics: Scandinavian identity amidst American hegemony', Christer Jönsson (1993a) has singled out the comparative advantages of the Scandinavian communities of IR scholars *vis-à-vis* the American mainstream. In Jönsson's view Scandinavian scholars are less obsessed with political relationships among great powers, and more disposed to include subnational actors into their analytical framework. What is more they are generalists rather than specialists, and less involved in policy advice than their American colleagues. As a result they are more inclined to embed their scholarship in the broader context of history and political science. Or, in the words of Ole Wæver:

> What distinguishes the Scandinavian School is first of all a commitment to weak theory: neither the over-ambitious American grand theory and/or raw empiricism, nor the English middle-range theory and/or historical studies. . . . This comes close to the Americans in focusing on a limited number of factors, and close to the British in staying away from the overall general theory of foreign policy.
>
> (Wæver 1994: 251; cf. 1990a; White 1999)

On the one hand, in these assessments the American mainstream is taken as the immutable point of reference for Scandinavian scholarship; on the other hand, Scandinavian scholarship is presented as a corrective to some flaws of the American mainstream. To support this view, Jönsson adduces a series of success stories in the fields of foreign policy analysis, negotiation studies, and research on international cooperation, 'areas where the Scandinavians' relative success can be accounted for by their capability to capitalize on the comparative advantages identified' (1993a: 149). In this optic, the most important forte of Scandinavian generalists consists in their ability to bridge-build and in the formulation of innovative middle-range theories. Thereby, the dominance of American IR is bypassed, and the weakness of the centre is turned into an advantage for the periphery. Whereas American IR is in an identity crisis after the end of the Cold War, it is said, Scandinavian scholars are fully entitled to abandon their inferiority complex. 'Not being bound by a parochial agenda or perspective, Scandinavian researchers have gained a reputation as active participants in the international scholarly discourse' (Jönsson 1993a: 158). Although it is difficult to imagine that Nordics are completely free from parochialism, Nordic IR can indeed be seen within certain limits as a corrective to the limitations of the American mainstream.

However, it is important to note that the focus of Jönsson's article is almost exclusively on empirical research within the traditions of behaviourism and positivism. Indeed, behavioural science and positivist methodology have never been fully abandoned by Nordic IR and maintain a couple of strongholds, particularly in Norway and Sweden (Anckar 1991a: 258; Jørgensen 2000: 16). To cite just one prominent example, the study of small state behaviour and the paradoxical 'power of the weak' has always been and is still an important issue in Nordic scholarship (Brundtland and Schou 1971; Petersen 1977; Lindell and Persson 1986; Mouritzen 1988, 1994; Ólafsson 1998; cf. also Bjøl 1968; Armstrup 1976). But although behavioural science is still a useful starting point for a survey about Nordic IR, over the 1990s behaviourism and positive science have more and more eroded and come to be only part of the story. Over the last ten or fifteen years, there has been a revival of a more critical stance that poses an explicit challenge to positive and behavioural science. Mostly under the banner of post-positivism, this critical movement has gained much influence in Nordic IR.

In line with these considerations, the present section starts with a discussion of moderate scientific revisionism, then turns to more radical scientific revolutionism, and finally discusses the Copenhagen school of security studies, which is the most

prominent example of Nordic post-positivism and has become something like the flagship of Scandinavian IR on the continent. Since Jönsson's research report about Scandinavian IR dates from the early 1990s, the literature discussed is primarily from the last ten or fifteen years. The focus is on scholarly production from the Scandinavian countries, i.e. Sweden, Denmark and Norway, sometimes including Finland. It is rather obvious that this survey cannot render full justice to Nordic IR theory in all its ramifications. Therefore, the chapter is limited to the identification of some carefully selected theoretical and methodological trends and does not aim at reviewing Nordic IR theory in its entirety.

At this point, a series of further limitations of this research report have to be mentioned. First, and in accordance with the general outline of this book, the focus is on contributions to grand theorizing about the principles that organize political interaction between and beyond national territories. Second, the focus is on literature written in English. This is not to deny that there are interesting contributions in the vernacular languages as well, and some of them will be explicitly mentioned. But since the primary interest of this chapter is directed towards Nordic IR as a regionally integrated academic community, the focus is on literature in the English lingua franca. Third, I will not go very much into detail when discussing individual authors and their contributions; this is justifiable precisely because most of the literature is written in English and therefore easily accessible to anybody.

Scientific revisionism

The sympathetic critique and further development of existing approaches is a sort of cottage industry among Nordic scholars. They frequently strive to expand the frontier of science by exposing the approaches of their American colleagues to a friendly critique, and by correcting some of their flaws and biases.

A typical example of this moderate kind of scientific revisionism is the work of Hans Mouritzen from Denmark. Mouritzen has taken the empirical phenomenon of Finlandization and adaptive politics as a starting point, analyzing in particular the acquiescence of Denmark and Sweden *vis-à-vis* Germany in the national-socialist era (Mouritzen 1988; for adaptive politics see Rosenau 1981; Petersen 1977). The Nordic Quisling regimes nicely illustrate the fact that small and middle-sized states are more concerned with their strategic environment than with the international system as a whole. If this is true, the Waltzian assumption of the units being directly constrained by the system is inadequate to account for the behaviour of small states and middle-sized powers (cf. Waltz 1979). In so far as state behaviour is less determined by the balance of power in the international system than by the threats and incentives in the strategic environment, structural realism has to be corrected. The recognition that states are located in a salient strategic environment leads to the recognition of a division between the operational mode of the international system and the observable behaviour of its units (Mouritzen 1997b; cf. Walt 1987). In other words, if states are spatially immobile and power wanes with distance, the external behaviour of states is heavily

dependent on the contingencies of their geographical location in the international system (Mouritzen 1998a).

These are fairly simple insights. But despite their limited scope, they have inspired a theoretically informed research programme that combines the theory of adaptive politics with historical knowledge and area expertise, thereby correcting important flaws of structural realism (Mouritzen 1995, 1997a, 1998b; Mouritzen *et al.* 1996). Taking into account the relevance of the theoretical and empirical results of this research programme, Mouritzen's cautious reformulation of structural realism has clearly demonstrated its innovative potential.

In other cases, by contrast, the friendly critique of the mainstream comes dangerously close to carrying coals to Newcastle. This is observable, for example, when Nordic authors are 'introducing' democracy as an independent variable (Goldmann 1986; Sørensen 1993), or when they are 'assessing' the logic of internationalism and internationalization as a factor in world politics (Goldmann 1994, 1997, 2001, 2002). This kind of scholarship may indeed lead to interesting empirical and conceptual findings, but it is questionable whether it poses any tangible challenge to the routine of positive science. On the other hand, moderate scientific reformism can be extremely relevant in the context of ongoing theoretical debates. For example, the discussion of unequal development and different forms of statehood is of enormous theoretical relevance in the context of both the debate about globalization and the discussion whether and to what extent states are like units (Holm and Sørensen 1995; Holm 2001; Sørensen 2001). In a similar way, it is clearly important to study the impact of nationalism and regionalism on international politics (Hettne *et al.* 1998, 2000).

It turns out that, from a heuristic standpoint, moderate scientific reformism has both its positive and its negative aspects. But be that as it may, moderate reformism has for a long time attained programmatic status among Scandinavian authors (Sørensen 1991, 1998). It is probably fair to say that the traditional mainstream of Scandinavian IR scholars is committed to the correction of some carefully selected flaws of structural realism and liberal institutionalism, without thereby challenging the fundamental tenets of positive science.

In contrast to this moderate version of scientific reformism, however, Nordic authors have also embarked on more radical endeavours. Although 'radical reformism' sounds like a contradiction in terms, academic practice has shown that the friendly critique of 'science as usual' does not necessarily stop at the factual boundaries of positive science.

For example, a group of Swedish authors from the University of Lund have tried for many years to give a theoretical and methodological input that clearly goes beyond the tenets of positive science. Under the direction of Christer Jönsson, they have applied cognitive approaches and role theory to foreign policy analysis and to the study of regimes (Jönsson 1982, 1993b; Westerlund 1987); they have proposed the introduction of organization theory and network analysis into the study of international organization and cooperation (Jönsson 1986, 1993c; cf. 1987); they have tried to introduce the historical, symbolic and cognitive analysis of communication and signalling as a complement to conventional bargaining

theory (Jönsson 1990, 1991, 2000; Aggestam and Jönsson 1997; Jönsson and Tallberg 1998; Jönsson and Aggestam 1999). Although these proposals are clearly going beyond the ontological reach of positive science, the authors carefully avoid a definitive rupture with the terminology and practice of conventional scholarship (cf. also Midgaard 1980; Stern and Sundelius 1997; Underdal 1998). Oddly enough, the liaison of a positivist epistemology with a post-positivist ontology does not prevent these authors from staying within the 'broad church' of normal science (cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986).

Another case of 'radical reformism' is provided by the Swedish scholar Walter Carlsnaes, who in his early years embarked on a long detour on the concept of ideology (1981, 1986). Nevertheless, this detour did not prevent Carlsnaes from conducting fairly conventional foreign policy analysis (1988). Later on, his reflections on the utility of the agency-structure perspective for foreign policy analysis culminated in the claim that 'this re-conceptualization can incorporate not only (a) certain rationality assumptions of action, (b) psychological-cognitive explanatory approaches, and (c) the role, broadly speaking, of situational-structural factors, but also (d) an institutional perspective combined with (e) comparative study analysis' (1992: 245; cf. 1993; Patomäki 1996). Of course, in the context of a case study it is indeed feasible to design a narrative that is compatible with all these claims (e.g. Knudsen 1994). But it is impossible to do this in a theoretically coherent way, and Carlsnaes himself ironically refers to his own framework as the 'casserole approach' (1994: 282). The framework has become so large and all-encompassing that there is no clear focus any more, and it is an open question how this should be compatible with classical foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, Carlsnaes does not overtly renounce the claim that his reflections are reconcilable with the tenets of positive science.

Altogether, the contributions discussed under the heading of scientific reformism are trying to expand the frontiers of science without trying to inflict a mortal blow to the mainstream. Quite obviously, different authors have pursued this strategy in a more or less radical, more or less coherent, and more or less innovative way. In any event, scientific revisionism constitutes a crucial genre of Nordic IR scholarship, and there is no doubt that this has led to a variety of highly appreciable contributions.

Scientific revolutionism

Over the last decade it has become evident that behaviourism, if it were ever, has ceased to be the dominant approach in Nordic Political Science (Jørgensen 2000: 16). Quite different from the United States, rational choice is at best one among many approaches to Political Science in the Nordic countries and cannot aspire for a hegemonic position (Nannestad 1993). Or, in other words: Nordic IR scholarship today is certainly not a proxy of what is – or used to be – the American mainstream. Nordic scholars are well integrated into the current theoretical and methodological debates that are going on in other parts of the world, especially in the UK and Continental Europe. An increasing faction of mostly younger Nordic

IR scholars is explicitly and deliberately moving beyond whatever they perceive to be the positivist mainstream.

The debate was opened at the beginning of the 1990s by a fierce opponent of post-positivism, who published a furious article against the postmodernist challenge to conventional IR studies (Sørensen 1991). At that time the article did not licit a response, and only five years later was the Nordic debate about post-positivism formally initiated by a sharp invective written by a Norwegian professor against what he perceived to be postmodernist infiltration into the discipline (Østerud 1996). In defence of a presumed standard of 'serious' scholarship, postmodernism was heavily attacked as 'foggy', 'lofty', 'muddy' and 'elusive'. Soon after, the pamphlet hat its response from a young scholar who tried to defend postmodernism against that caricature (Patomäki 1997; cf. S. Smith 1997); the response was in its turn rebuffed by the instigator of the debate (Østerud 1997a). At the same time, the debate was also conducted at a somewhat more sophisticated intellectual level in Norwegian (Østerud 1997b; Neumann and Stamnes 1997; Friis 1997; Mjøset 1997).

Due to its Manichean nature, this debate was not entirely free from intellectual aridity. Nevertheless, it did generate some interesting reflections at a high level of sophistication, both in a more commonsensical (Goldmann 1996; Malnes 1997) and in a more post-positivist mood (Neumann 2001a; Neumann and Ulriksen 2001; Patomäki 2002). In the meantime, Nordic authors have produced an interesting body of post-positivist literature on a variety of issues. Many Nordic post-positivists belong to the younger generation and define themselves in opposition to whatever they perceive to be 'mainstream'. Despite their common disapproval of positive science, however, these authors clearly do not form a homogeneous group. In what follows, I try to review the post-positivist literature produced by Nordic IR scholars in its own right, without paying too much attention to either internal feuds among different sects or to the ritualistic demarcation of post-positivism against the mainstream.[7]

The individual contributions to this literature can be located along a spectrum that goes from intellectual detachment to political commitment. At one end of the spectrum there is the genealogical critique and deconstruction of abstract concepts such as sovereignty, international society, and statehood (Bartelson 1995a, 1996, 1998, 2001). Further down the line, we find studies about the relationship between self-other relations and the emergent security order in post-Cold War Europe (Tunander 1995a, 1995b, 1997). At the other extreme, some authors have lent their voices to political projects of identity formation, namely the construction of a 'New Hansa' around the Baltic Sea, and the 'Barents Euro-Arctic Region' (Joenniemi 1993, 1995, 1997; Wæver 1997c; Tunander 1995a: 115–36; Hønneland 1998; Jukarainen 1999; Neumann 2002; for an ironic response to 'Barents bullshit', see Nilson 1997).

Over many years, the preoccupation with concepts such as identity and culture has been the most common feature of the Nordic post-positivist movement (Eriksen and Neumann 1993). Among this literature, there is a series of interesting attempts to re-examine history in order to gain fresh insights into the world-

political process. Thus, Erik Ringmar (1996a) has dealt with the ontological status of the state as a collective self embedded in a complex texture of narratives people construct to make sense of the world.[8] The same author (1996b) has also provided an identity-driven explanation for Sweden's decision to join the Thirty Years' War. According to his explanation, the Swedes did not go to war in defense of their national interest, whether real or perceived, but rather to establish their collective identity in the first place. This historical study serves to bring home the typically post-positivist argument that identities are logically and ontologically prior to interests (cf. Neumann 1997b).[9]

In a similar vein, Iver Neumann has contributed some reflections about international relations as self/other relations (Neumann 1996a, 1996b, 1999; cf. Eriksen 1992, 1993, 1995; Harle 2000). The stress of these studies lies on European identity politics at the local, national, and continental level. In a series of historical case studies, Neumann has analyzed the construction of 'the East' as Europe's constitutive other. These case studies comprise, among many other things, the persistent exclusion of the Ottoman Empire from the European society of states and the secular discrimination against Russia as 'backward' and 'barbarian'.

It is interesting to note that the tidal wave of identity studies, which swept over the Nordic region in the early and mid-1990s, has been ebbing away over the last years. Of course it is not easy to speculate about the reasons for such academic trends. Nevertheless, the decline of identity studies may be related to the fact that something like Heisenberg's law applies also to self/other relations. As long as you do not focus on social identity you know that it is there; but as soon as you try to fix it with your observational tools, it is gone. As a result, part of the new generation of Nordic IR scholars is moving away from the elusive quest for social identity. It is probably fair to say that some of these scholars have already entered the phase 'after post-positivism' (e.g. Rasmussen 2000). Another possible route out of the identity trap is to study the causal impact of ideas, for example by applying image theory to foreign policy analysis (Elgström 2000a, 2000b). When the pendulum of identity studies swings back, the return towards scientific revisionism is an obvious fallback position. In the meantime, however, it must be admitted that some post-positivist research on collective identity is still going on, mostly combined with a focus on policy relevance (e.g. Neumann 2001b).

In any case, the post-positivist branch of Nordic IR scholarship has not been limited to the study of collective identity. Particularly in the field of European integration, there is another consolidated branch of post-positivist literature by Nordic authors.[10] On the one hand, this comes in the shape of the meta-theoretical critique of existing approaches (Wind 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001; Ojanen 1998). On the other hand, deconstruction is complemented by attempts to launch a new theoretical agenda of reflectivist and/or constructivist approaches to European governance (Jørgensen 1997a, 1997b; Ekengren 1998, 2002; Christiansen *et al.* 1999). Although these attempts are mostly on a high level of abstraction, there have been also some empirical case studies applying social constructivism (Marcussen 1999a, 1999b, 2000). Especially at the level of the member states' attitude towards

European integration, some scholars have tried the practical application of discourse analysis (Holm 1993, 1997; Larsen 1997a, 1999; Hansen and Wæver 2002). This has been extended to the European Union as a whole (Larsen 2000). There is also an interesting book about European governance as a new form of deliberative democracy (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Whereas the tidal wave of post-positivist studies about social identity is ebbing away, the constructivist approach to European integration is increasingly in vogue (cf. Chapter 6).

Constructivist security studies

The so-called 'Copenhagen school' of security studies around Bary Buzan and Ole Wæver, who used to be affiliated to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, is clearly the most renowned flagship of Scandinavian post-positivism. Especially in the late 1990s, the Copenhagen school has unleashed a veritable stream of review articles, polemical debates, and critical reflections (McSweeney 1996; Buzan and Wæver 1997; Buzan 1997; Ceyhan 1998; Huysmans 1998; Wæver 1999a; Monteleone 2000; Hansen 2000).

Building on Buzan's expanded agenda for security studies (1983, 2nd edn 1991), the authors of the Copenhagen school are committed to a 'holistic' view of security. After the end of the Cold War, they argue, it is becoming increasingly futile to limit the concept of security to the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Indeed, the political use of the security discourse can be observed in an increasingly broad range of sectors from the economy to the environment (Stern 1995). Especially in the so-called societal sector, the state is often bypassed when it comes to defending collective identity against external threats. The Danish referendum against the Maastricht treaty and the Swiss abstention from European integration are two cases in point. At the same time, European integration is seen by many as a protective umbrella against the nightmares of European history, from ethnic nationalism to militaristic power politics. But be that as it may, after the end of the Cold War the questions of 'security for whom' and 'security from what' are ever more frequently asked, especially in Europe. Taking these debates as a starting point, Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen school has laid his focus on the European security agenda (Wæver *et al.* 1993; Wæver 1996c, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 2000, 2002; Flockhart and Wæver 1998).[11]

Apart from dealing with real problems in time and space, the authors of the Copenhagen school try themselves in more abstract theoretical generalizations about security all over the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors. In a deliberately tautological manner, 'securitization' is defined as the move whereby an issue is defined as a security issue. Whenever a social group has come to agree that 'if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)', the problem concerned has been transformed into a security issue. In other words: the transformation of something into a security issue is the result of a specific socio-linguistic practice, called 'securitization' or 'the security speech act'. Securitization is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the

game and gives legitimacy to the use of extreme measures in order to tackle an issue (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 23–36).[12]

For the *ex post* evaluation of security politics, such an approach provides an interesting framework of analysis (e.g. Wagnsson 2000). However if one imagines that the security speech act became the operational definition of security in the real world, an important safeguard against the uncontrolled proliferation of brinkmanship would be lost. As a matter of fact, the Copenhagen approach to security studies is deliberately blind to questions of true or false, right or wrong. If securitization is a socio-linguistic practice that may concern *any* referent object, there is no conceptual space left for an evaluation of the appropriateness of *particular* security speech acts. If Basque terrorists, for example, feel threatened in their societal identity by the existence of the Madrid central government, the Copenhagen school prima facie does not provide any framework to establish whether this is justified or not.

If security claims are treated in such an indiscriminate fashion, there is no inherent limit to the expansion of the security discourse towards ever more sectors, referent objects and threats. This is not to deny that, at least to a certain extent, the security discourse as a social and political practice may actually work like that. Extremists frequently *do* raise their claims in terms of societal security. Nevertheless, conceptualizing security as nothing else but the outcome of a socio-linguistic practice is problematic because of the potentially dangerous consequences (Eriksson 1999). As everybody knows, and as the authors of the Copenhagen school recognize, whenever an issue is lifted to the urgency of a security threat, normal democratic procedure is in danger of being overruled. Substantive assumptions about what does and does not qualify as a security issue are therefore indispensable for the maintenance of order both at the domestic and at the international level.

To be sure, the authors of the Copenhagen school might defend themselves. For example, they might object that to point out that a security concern is often simply a decision to take something to a level where it will become safe from criticism and discussion is an extremely critical observation in itself, paving the way for a disclosure of the trick. However, the Copenhagen school does not seem to be very much engaged in this sort of critical disclosure. In any case, the Copenhageners have not come up with any guidelines for distinguishing between serious threats, which deserve a certain immunity from democratic control and debate, and other problems that do not deserve this treatment. Therefore, it is at the very least correct to say that the Copenhagen school is not fulfilling its own critical potential.[13]

In a nutshell: For obvious reasons of political commonsense substantial barriers against an uncontrolled proliferation of the security agenda should be treated as an integral part of the security discourse itself. If it makes sense at all to view security as a socio-linguistic practice, it is certainly not sufficient to consider security claims as the outcome of a speech act. After all, concrete security claims are always embedded in a broader set of discursive practices and language games that constitute the very conditions for their meaningfulness. This is not to belittle

the important role of the Copenhagen school for the intellectual development of security analysis. However, 'securitization' is at least as susceptible to normative and methodological bias as any other approach to security studies. If whatever counts as a security issue for the parties involved is also seen as a security issue by the external observer, this will further enhance the narcissism of identity politics.

At least in part this is recognized by Ole Wæver, who is personally very fond of 'desecuritization' as a strategy to achieve stability and peace (1998c, 1998d, 1999a; Lautsen and Wæver 2000); but from the theoretical point of view, that may not be enough. To curb the dreadful logic of the *Ausnahmezustand*, scholars have the social responsibility to uphold reasonably pragmatic and instrumental ways of dealing with security problems, whether military or not.

The residual box

Of course there is much interesting work by Nordic authors that does not fit neatly into my categorial framework of scientific reformism, scientific revolutionism, and constructivist security studies. For reasons of intellectual honesty, it is therefore imperative to open up a small 'residual box' for Nordic contributions to IR theory that defy classification.

* Although not a typical pastime for Nordic scholars, there are some philosophical reflections on international theory and some investigations into the history of ideas (Knutsen 1992; Malnes 1993, 1994; Bartelson 1995b; 2001; Behnke 2000). This is particularly true for Finnish scholars, who seem to have a penchant for the history of ideas (Kanerva and Palonen 1987; Harle 1990, 1998, 2000; Apunen 1993b).
* In Tampere, Finland, a variety of unconventional approaches have been tried out in a semiotic circle around Osmo Apunen and his wife, Helena Rytövuori-Apunen. Until now, however, the editorial output of this theoretical laboratory has been limited to grey literature published by the Department of Political Science at the University of Tampere.
* One should also mention an interesting historical inquiry into twentieth-century world order concepts (Rasmussen 2000; cf. the 2nd part of Knutsen 1999), an attempt to reconcile structural realism with the theory of European integration (Wivel 2000), and attempts to reintroduce English-school concepts such as 'standard of civilization' and 'international society' (e.g. Jackson and Sørensen 1999; Mozaffari 2001a, 2001b; Knudsen 2003).[14]
* In the field of the international political economy, there is, among other things, an extraordinarily lucid textbook about development theory (Martinussen 1997), an interesting article about neo-mercantilism (Hettne 1993), and a passionate case for the introduction of a Tobin Tax on financial transactions (Patomäki 2001).

Conclusion

After this *tour d'horizon* it has now become possible to assess the achievements of Nordic IR theory. In its development and performance, Nordic IR theory seems to be a success story. As has been shown in the first section, Nordic scholars have successfully generated an environment of multi-level research cooperation that grants them, at the same time, access to and critical distance from the American core of the discipline. Moreover, they are constantly engaged in a diversified network of intellectual exchange with scholars from the European continent and other parts of the world. This success at the level of scientific networking goes hand in hand with a considerable intellectual vibrancy of scholarly production. As has been shown in the second section, Nordic scholars are protagonists both in the moderate correction of the mainstream and in the postmodernist quest for more radical theoretical alternatives. Taking into account the relative paucity of authors, which have never exceeded the number of researchers at five or six large American universities, both the theoretical diversity and the intellectual vibrancy of Nordic IR theory is indeed impressive.

This leads us back to the question whether the long march of Nordic scholars towards multi-level research cooperation is something which scholars from other European IR communities should emulate. To answer that question, one has to clarify in the first place what the possible alternatives to multi-level research cooperation are. Thus, I have discussed the French quest for academic self-reliance (Chapter 2) and the Italian acceptance of intellectual marginality (Chapter 3) as two further strategies of coping with marginality *vis-à-vis* the American core of the discipline. Although the present examination cannot conclusively *prove* the point that Nordic IR is better organized than other European IR communities, it seems reasonable to suggest that, in comparison with the Nordic model of multi-level research cooperation, neither French nor Italian IR has been particularly successful in overcoming its marginal position *vis-à-vis* the American core. What is more: with regard to theoretical substance, Nordic scholars seem to have produced more relevant contributions than most of their continental colleagues, at least according to the standards of current theoretical debates at the international level.

In fact, the incentive structure of academia in many European countries renders multi-level research cooperation an almost unattainable option to scholars from these countries. Engagement in transnational networking activities may be much less rewarding to French and Italian scholars than to their colleagues from the Nordic countries. Moreover, in some Continental European countries the scarce familiarity with English constrains the space for an autonomous choice between the three options for knowledge production discussed in this study. But in so far as academic scholars are ultimately the masters of their own strategic choices, it is reasonable to suggest that the Nordic model of multi-level research cooperation is the winning strategy to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream.

Last but not least, multi-level research cooperation is very desirable from the vantage point of an embryonic 'Eurodiscipline' of IR. If IR is really to become a

sustainable and vibrant intellectual enterprise at the pan-European level, it will be crucial to overcome the encapsulation in parochial institutions and the impermeability of national academic traditions. As the present survey of the Nordic network suggests, multi-level research cooperation is highly conducive both to the originality of theoretical approaches and to the development of an integrated community of IR scholars.

Part II

Triangular reasoning

After the critical exploration of three territorially based European IR communities, the time has come to leave the 'geographical box' and to shift the focus of attention to issues that cut across territorially based academic peripheries. The underlying assumption is that *all* academic peripheries of IR scholars are confronted with an intellectual culture in the core of the discipline that has a strong inclination towards binary oppositions. In such an environment, an obvious strategy of intellectual self-assertion is to reach out for a 'third way' beyond the binary oppositions that are so typical of the American mainstream. Not only is this true about the scientific peripheries in Europe and elsewhere, but also about non-mainstream IR theory in the USA.

The schools and approaches discussed in the next two chapters should not be over-identified with any specific mode of knowledge production as outlined in the last three chapters. Although the English school does still have its geographical epicentre in England, it has recently come to be part of the conceptual armoury of IR theory virtually anywhere, especially in western Europe (Chapter 5). And the constructivist middle ground has become so strong in the United States that it is considered by some as part and parcel of the new American mainstream. As a matter of fact the constructivist middle ground has a tendency to become itself party to one of the typical binary oppositions of mainstream American IR theory (Chapter 6).

As has been shown in the first chapter, the first two great debates in the IR discipline were constructed as Manichean struggles between mutually exclusive approaches. In the first debate, realism versus liberalism, European émigrés like Morgenthau and Wolfers performed as the victorious challengers of the old utopian-liberal consensus, importing the prudential imprint of *raison d'état* and realpolitik to the American academic environment. In the second great debate, traditionalism versus behaviourism, historically and legally inclined scholars with a base in England were challenging American social science.

Initially the third great debate was constructed as a theoretical triangle where (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism were challenged by (neo)Marxist approaches, which had their geographical centre in Latin America. When Marxism became weaker in the late 1980s, however, the mainstream could shift to a friendly juxtaposition of (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism, the so-called 'neo-neo synthesis'.

Against this flirt between realist and liberal approaches, the fourth great debate of the 1990s began as just another monumental struggle: positivism versus post-positivism. Later on, it was converted into a theoretical triangle with the advent of the social constructivist 'middle ground'. More recently, post-positivism tends to fall by the wayside, whereby the struggle is once again reduced to a friendly juxtaposition, this time between positivists and their social constructivist critics.

If one takes into account the soft spot of the American mainstream for binary oppositions, it comes as little surprise that, over the last two or three decades, many European scholars have been reaching out for a sort of theoretical 'third way'. From the 1960s to the 1980s this was done by fostering critical peace research and (neo)Marxism, and in the 1990s by championing the post-positivist challenge to the so-called neo-neo synthesis. Now that the fourth debate has turned into a theoretical triangle comprising positivism, constructivism, and post-positivism, it is hardly surprising that many former European post-positivists are found in the constructivist 'middle ground'.

Of course, Europeans are not the only ones to exploit the soft spot of the American mainstream for binary oppositions. The same could be said, for instance, of Latin American IR in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, there is an academic periphery even *within* American academia, which is eager to 'seize the middle ground' between – or beyond? – the extremes.

This should not obscure the fact that triangular reasoning is problematic due to meta-theoretical considerations. The logic of triangular reasoning is elegantly defined by Hannah Arendt (1972: 12) as 'the careful enumeration of, usually, three 'options' – A, B, C – whereby A and C represent the opposite extremes and B the "logical" middle-of-the-road "solution" of the problem'. In the opinion of Arendt,

> the fallacy of such thinking begins with forcing the choices into mutually exclusive dilemmas; reality never presents us with anything so neat as premises for logical conclusions. The kind of thinking that presents both A and C as undesirable, therefore settles on B, hardly serves any other purpose than to divert the mind and blunt the judgment for the multitude of real possibilities.
>
> (Arendt 1972: 12)

Considering that this presumes the possibility of a direct access to reality, it seems reasonable to conclude that the logic of triangular reasoning is problematic from the ideal vantage point of a relentless truth-seeker.

These reservations notwithstanding, triangular reasoning willy-nilly belongs to the arsenal of modern political theory and academic politics. Although there is indeed a constant danger that triangular reasoning may contribute to the reproduction of the very same binary oppositions that it reputedly wants to transcend, Hanna Arendt's verdict is too categorical under the prosaic circumstances of real-world academia. From a more realistic standpoint of academic sociology and academic politics, there is indeed good reason why triangular reasoning may be justified. When the reduction of diversity to extreme opposites is a constitutive

feature of the dominant discourse, the introduction of a third way to transcend these opposites is a good strategy for opening up space for new possibilities. Under no circumstances should the transition from a diptych to a triptych be under-estimated as a theoretical achievement. In the particular case of European IR, triangular reasoning is an attractive device to challenge the hegemony of the American mainstream. Nevertheless, it will ultimately depend on the particular way a theoretical third way is constructed, in a specific case, whether the epistemic strategy of triangular reasoning is justifiable (or not) on meta-theoretical grounds.

In scientific practice, there are two fundamentally different approaches to the construction of a theoretical 'third way'. Either one may set out to establish an independent vantage point beyond the binary oppositions that are prevailing in a theoretical debate. Or one may use the strategy of triangular reasoning as a convenient device to make oneself recognized by the mainstream as a legitimate interlocutor. It is obvious that, depending on the particular epistemic interests of a scholar, either strategy has its advantages as well as its disadvantages. However, this should not obscure the fact that there is a huge qualitative difference between the strategy of equidistance on the one hand, and the strategy of rapprochement on the other. In order to assess the specific advantages and disadvantages of either strategy, the next two chapters will discuss two concrete cases of triangular reasoning, namely the international society approach of the English school (Chapter 5) and the theoretical contribution of the so-called constructivist 'middle ground' to the theory of European integration (Chapter 6).

In the next chapter I will discuss the attempt by the English school to establish a third way to transcend the sterile opposition of disenchanted realism versus utopian liberalism. Although Martin Wight and Hedley Bull's three perspectives have been polemically criticized as 'stopping points, not starting points' (R. E. Jones 1981: 167), I argue that the English school is not only committed to the elaboration of a third way to transcend both realism and liberalism. It does also offer the possibility of construing a vantage point *beyond* all three of the approaches, which means that any of the three can be exposed to a critique from the remaining two. Since the extreme points of the triangle formed by realism, rationalism, and revolutionism are construed as equidistant, the international society approach is helpful to carve out the intellectual space for a theoretical and normative conversation between different ways of approaching international politics (Jackson 1995).

This is very different from the epistemic strategy chosen by the so-called constructivist 'middle ground', which is discussed in Chapter 6. It is the declared aim of the middle ground to build a bridge across the chasm that separates dominant positivism from its post-positivist challengers (Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Wendt 1999). This is to be accomplished by the combination of a post-positivist ontology with a positivist epistemology, and by the formulation of empirically testable constructivist research programmes. Social constructivism is thereby positioned for conversation with the dominant mainstream without cutting the umbilical cord with the post-positivist challengers of that mainstream. To assess these claims I draw a comparison between the contribution of the constructivist

middle ground to the theory of European integration on the one hand, and the contribution of more radical approaches to social constructivism on the other. It transpires that the strategic rapprochement of middle-ground constructivism towards positive science is not only problematic for meta-theoretical reasons, but also inferior to the alternative of combining more radical forms of social constructivism with a pragmatist stance on scientific method.

In the final analysis it will be up to the predilections and idiosyncrasies of the individual reader to judge the advantages and disadvantages of either strategy of triangular reasoning. Nevertheless the two case studies discussed in this book seem to tip the balance in favour of the strategy of equidistance, chosen by the international society approach of the English school, and against the strategy of rapprochement chosen by middle-ground constructivists.

5 Third way or via media?
The international society
approach of the English school

The 'International society approach', which is frequently also referred to as the 'English school', has its geographical origin in the academic culture of England and Great Britain. Nevertheless, both the term 'International society approach' and 'English school' are somewhat unsuited to characterize the body of literature which the present chapter is all about. First, in the UK there are prominent IR scholars outside the English school, such as Steve Smith at the University of Aberystwyth, Chris Brown at the London School of Economics, or Mervyn Frost at the University of Kent at Canterbury. Second, there have always been members and supporters of the English school outside Great Britain, such as Hedley Bull in Australia. This is even more true for the recent attempt to 'reconvene the English school' which includes, among others, scholars from North America, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Australia (Dunne 1998b: 16, n. 56). In the second half of the 1990s the ideas of the English school have made their way even to China (Zhang 2003). Third, there are many British scholars who are theorizing about international society but do not belong to the English school as an academic formation, such as Evan Luard (1976, 1990), Fred Halliday (1992, 1994), and the contributors to a volume co-edited by David Mapel and Terry Nardin (1998).

For all these reasons, the denomination of 'British mainstream IR' or 'British institutionalism' could maybe provide a reasonable alternative to 'English school' and 'international society approach' (Suganami 1983, 2001). But be that as it may, for matters of convenience I shall stick to the more familiar terms. Moreover, for reasons of stylistic variation the two established expressions, 'English school' and 'international society approach', are applied almost interchangeably. Aside from terminology and the fact that the English school is the UK's most renowned academic trademark in the field of IR theory, I shall now reflect on why the international society approach is relevant in the context of an academic sociology of knowledge production in European IR theory.

First and foremost, the international society approach of the English school is characterized by a set of shared theoretical assumptions and a common scholarly *esprit de corps*. Moreover, it has been successful in carving out a theoretical space beyond the two most powerful ideologies of IR theory, namely realism and liberalism. To further this end, the international society approach has made good use of analytical categories that are derived from the traditions of International

History, Political Philosophy and International Law. Thereby it has become possible to transcend the well-known conceptual oppositions of 'power politics' versus 'perpetual peace', 'national interest' versus 'one world', and 'national sovereignty' versus 'global interdependence'. By overcoming these dichotomies, the English school has established an independent vantage point beyond realism and liberalism. In relation to the Machiavellian approach, i.e. realism, and to the Kantian approach, i.e. liberalism, the Grotian approach of the English school is constructed both as a 'third way' and as a 'via media'. In other words: the international society approach is trying to keep equidistant from both realism and liberalism at the same time. This makes it possible to do more justice to historical evidence and to international events in the real world (Wight 1987, 1991; Bull 1966b, 1976, 1990).

   It seems reasonable to assume that the English school as an academic fund has its roots in some typically British way of 'doing' IR. Although its 'Britishness' is certainly not the only important feature of the English school, the present chapter therefore starts with a section about IR theory in Great Britain in general. This short excursus will be helpful to understand the academic context wherein the international society approach was initially embedded. The second section of the chapter presents the English school and its conceptual universe. To that end, I embark on a concise exploration of the most central theoretical terms, from 'sovereign statehood' to the 'state system' and from 'international society' to 'world society'. The third section provides a critical evaluation of the international society approach and its capacity to account for historical change. In the fourth section, the English school is presented as an academic formation. This does also imply an approximate answer to the question of theoretical substance: What is it, apart from the conceptual core of international society, that is shared by all authors of the English school? Finally, the fifth section is about recent attempts to 'reconvene the English school'.

   The chapter ends with an assessment of the English school's potential for fertilizing the field of current IR theory, laying particular stress on the international society approach as providing both a 'third way' beyond the broad theoretical orientations of realism and liberalism and, at the same time, a 'via media' that is able to engage realism, rationalism and liberalism in a theoretical conversation that leads beyond the limitations of any single approach.

International Relations theory in Great Britain

The British IR community is by far the largest in Europe. In addition to its size, British IR has two more comparative advantages: first, English is the lingua franca of the discipline; this facilitates intellectual exchange with the American centre of scholarly production and favours the worldwide circulation of British publications without the effort of translation. Second, there is a remarkable convergence of Great Britain and the USA with regard to foreign policy orientation ('special relationship'); in both countries there is a clear ideological inclination towards liberal capitalism. The three factors mentioned – size of the IR community, use of

the English language, ideological convergence – make it possible that mutual reception of British and US research literature takes place to a much greater extent than among Continental IR communities. Furthermore, there is considerable fluctuation between the American and the British IR communities, namely between ISA and BISA (Strange 1995). American scholars are as much at home in British universities as are British scholars in American universities. As a result, one should expect a certain similarity between the two IR communities with regard to theoretical orientation and research design.

This expectation, however, is not fulfilled. Despite the similarities, there are notorious differences between the two countries with regard to power capabilities and ideas about appropriate foreign political behaviour, which have a direct impact both on academic culture and intellectual climate.

> The United States, as a world power, has to respond to world problems in a way not demanded of Britain. This clearly results in a managerial view of international relations; world problems require management, thereby opening the door for the use of techniques that have served US business so well. For Britain, its history, combined with its current status, produces an altogether different form of behaviour, stressing the importance of mediation and negotiation, forms of interaction that fit in with the view of international relations as an art.
>
> (S. Smith 1985: 54)

While in the USA IR is viewed as a social science, in Great Britain there is a strong resistance to that orientation and a persistent inclination of IR towards its founding disciplines: Political Philosophy, International Law, and, last but not least, International History; and while in the USA there is a certain fluctuation between the political and the academic establishment, in Great Britain academics tend to be much more distant from the political stage. After an initial phase of Anglo-American convergence with broadly similar frameworks during the discipline's utopian period in the inter-war period, an increasing division between the two dominant IR communities was felt in the 1950s and 1960s.

Since then, the similarities and differences in the study of IR in the United States and Great Britain have been repeatedly discussed (Bull 1966a; Kaplan 1966; George 1976; S. Smith 1985; Lyons 1986; Dunn 1987; Hill 1987; S. Smith 2000a). The assessment reaches from the affirmation of a fundamentally distinctive British way of doing IR to the declassification of the controversies between British and American IR scholars as 'family squabbles' (R. E. Jones 1981: 7).

Most prominently, the methodological debate of the 1960s opposed British traditionalism to American behaviourism. Or, in other words, the debate was represented as a fundamental cleavage between two mutually exclusive methodological orientations: a British ideographic orientation focusing on uniqueness, history, and wisdom, versus an American nomothetic orientation, focusing on generalization, theory, and science (Bull 1966a; Kaplan 1966). In the most generic formula, the controversy could even be reduced to an opposition between the

'extraordinary arrogance' of the American approach and 'the humility of the European scholar facing the immensity of his subject' (Northedge 1976: 21).[1] But when things had calmed down a bit, it soon became clear that the quarrel had been less about theory than about methodological issues. In any case, it turned out that the contraposition of the British and American IR communities was not a question of black and white (Dunn 1987).[2]

It might be debatable whether there are any real differences, either stylistic or substantive, between British and American IR. After all, the construction of difference might also be instrumental for the self-delimitation of British IR scholarship. The affirmation of a specifically British way of doing IR might be little more than a strategic move towards the social construction of identity. The strategy appears to be rather simple and consists in defining American scientism as an 'other', opposing it to the 'classical' approach of British IR. By this, the negation of American social science might have become constitutive for the self-affirmation of British IR. And indeed, there is no a priori answer to the question to what extent British IR is a result of academic politics, and to what extent it is the expression of substantial differences in comparison to American IR.

But be that as it may, what seems to matter most is not so much a binary opposition between an American and a British way of 'doing' IR. Rather, what matters is 'how we qualify "American" when we describe assumptions. Do we mean "scientific Americans", "Realist Americans", "German Americans", "World Order Americans"?' (Dunn 1987: 76).

After all, both British and American IR are far from being monolithic. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that a specific British identity of IR theory has emerged by demarcation from a perceived American approach, however that American approach is to be understood. And it is basically due to this 'creative misunderstanding' that today a British voice is fully consolidated in the IR discipline, whereas the communities of IR scholars on the European continent continue to struggle to define their identity (cf. S. Smith 2000a). At least to the external observer, British IR seems to stand on its own, and much may be learned from that about possible ways of constructing academic communities, and ultimately challenging intellectual hegemony.

The conceptual universe of the English school

For more than thirty years, the international society approach has been the most prominent network of IR scholars in Great Britain and, for that reason, was broadly identified as the 'English school'. But in spite of this label, there is no agreement about the extension, nature and very existence of the alleged 'school'. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the school, whatever its extension and nature, has ever represented the bulk of British IR production. As has been already observed, the term 'international society approach' is equally misleading inasmuch as the study of international society is neither an exclusive domain of the English school, nor is it exclusively British. Nevertheless, and bearing in mind the extraordinary

prominence of contributions from the English school, it will be worth the effort to bracket these reservations for a moment.

The present section is dedicated to the following two topics: first, a short and highly preliminary portrait of the English school as an academic formation; second, a schematic presentation of the conceptual universe of the English school. By this, it will become sufficiently clear that the concept of international society is indeed the theoretical centrepiece of the English school.

It has been pointed out that, at least in its beginnings, the English school was the fruit of the prolonged collective enterprise of a specific body: the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (Watson 1990: 99; Dunne 1998b: 89–135). This Rockefeller-funded body was 'a group of scholars and practitioners who for some twenty-five years (1959–84) met under the chairmanship first of Herbert Butterfield, then of Martin Wight, then of Adam Watson and lastly of Hedley Bull' (Watson 1992: 2).[3] It is interesting to note that here was an affinity of many members of the Committee to the London School of Economics (R. E. Jones 1981). The group convened to discuss questions of common interest, centring around the seeming paradox of order: how is it possible that, in the face of international anarchy and power politics, we *do* experience a considerable degree of order and rule-compliance in international relations? Top of the Committee's agenda was the perceived historical reality of international systems and international societies. The attraction of this pair of concepts was primarily due to the fact that the notion of international society promised a solution to the mentioned paradox of order: most states, most of the time, do comply with international norms because their leaders feel committed to the shared values and common institutions of an international society, which go beyond the scope of a mere international system of sovereign and mutually independent nation states.

The talks in the British Committee on International Politics were the starting point for a series of significant contributions, most prominently Martin Wight's important papers about international theory, western values, the balance of power, and state systems in history (Wight 1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1977a, esp. 1997b; cf. Nicholson 1981). Other important contributions came from Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Bull 1966b, 1977; Bull and Watson 1984). Running parallel with the meetings of the Committee and after its closure, a series of further significant contributions have come from other members of the English school, such as Charles Manning, John Vincent, Robert Jackson, and others (Manning 1962; Vincent 1974, 1986; Gong 1984; James 1986; Mayall 1990; Watson 1992; Jackson 1995, 2000; Buzan and Little 2000).

Although the number of contributions has been steadily increasing, and although there is a considerable divergence in detail and in terminology, the international society approach may be evaluated as a collective theoretical enterprise. As a matter of fact, it is possible to trace a brief overview of what seem to be, more or less, the shared assumptions. The following description relies on the most influential version of the international society approach, given by Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Wight 1977a; Bull 1977; Bull and Watson 1984;

Watson 1987, 1990, 1992). Other versions may vary, but the very possibility of variation is enabled by a shared conceptual universe. This conceptual universe is made up of four fundamental building blocks: 'sovereign states' forming a 'state system' and/or an 'international society' which is interdependent with, but also distinct from, a 'world society'.

The core concept of the international society approach is the classical notion of sovereignty. Sovereign states are defined as independent political authorities that recognize no superior. Of course sovereignty is a heavily contested concept, and it is hardly surprising that the definition just mentioned has been seriously attacked from various sides. But whether one wants to accept it or not, it forms the common basis of the international society approach. If sovereign states, forced by the pressures of economic and strategic interests to take account of each other, interact and convene, tacitly or explicitly, to accept some rules of convenience, we are entitled to speak of a states system.

> Where states are in regular contact with one another, and where in addition there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other, there we may speak of their forming a system.
>
> (Bull 1977: 10)

Historically speaking, the most common case of a state system consists in clusters of states that share a certain cultural homogeneity, which finds its expression in common values and institutions. At least, this is said to be the case for the European state system after the peace of Westphalia, the system of ancient Greek city-states, the Hellenistic Kingdoms, and the system of Warring States in ancient China (Wight 1977b). For such a constellation, we may use the term 'international society'.

> A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.
>
> (Bull 1977: 13)

This understanding of international society is what classical writers had in mind when referring to the European state system.[4] Drawing on the distinction by a famous German sociologist, it is worth pointing out that, despite the term 'international society', the concept is closer to the notion of community (*gemeinschaft*), whereas the concept of an international system is closer to the notion of society (*gesellschaft*) (Tönnies [1887] (1988); cf. Buzan 1993).

In addition to their interest in state systems and international societies, the authors of the English school inherited from their liberal predecessors the notion of 'world society', constituted by individuals and non-state organizations.

However, it is true that the theoretical fulcrum of the English school is the idea of an 'international society', constituted by states or their ruling elites. Concomitantly, the concept of 'world society' has been somewhat neglected. But in more recent years, there has been some concern about the relationship between international society and world society. Indeed one can argue that a dense web of social exchanges across borders can provide the common culture that is a fundamental prerequisite for a state system to become an international society (Peterson 1992; Wæver 1992: 104–7; Buzan 1993; Linklater, 1996; Wæver 1998b). Against this, however, one can forcefully object that transnational relations may also undermine national sovereignty, and by that the very basis of international society (Bull 1977). This disagreement about the relationship between 'international society' and 'world society' is one of the most interesting controversies going on within the English school (cf. Little 1998).[5]

To sum up: the international society approach is constituted by a view on international relations as a system of actions with 'sovereign states' as the basic units of analysis. As soon as there is sufficient interaction and a minimum of mutual recognition among the units, they form a 'system of states'. If a system of states is pervaded by a common culture and shared values, it is likely to transform itself into an 'international society'. The parallel existence of a 'world society' is either a pre-condition or a threat to international society.

The question of change

From the above discussion of the conceptual universe of the international society approach, it should have become apparent that the English school has its roots in International History, International Law and Social Theory. The most promising feature of this multidisciplinary outlook is that the English school is able to provide a dynamic vision of historical, legal and social change. As a matter of fact, the international society approach usually goes along with some notion of change over time. This is particularly attractive in the present world political situation, when the inappropriateness of familiar concepts such as national interest and sovereign equality is generally felt. Let us therefore briefly discuss the important question of how historical change can be addressed within the framework of the English school.

Basically, the international society approach allows three reasonable ways of conceptualizing historical change in international relations:

1   There is the possibility of a steady evolution from primordial anarchy towards order, combined with the expansion of a civilized core towards the periphery. As a general key to world history, this possibility is mostly sorted out by the authors of the international society approach, as the European states system is supposed to be only one among a variety of state systems in history. On the other hand, however, it is precisely the European states system which has evolved into a type of worldwide international society. This has led some authors of the English school to the temptation of reading the modern state

system as a sort of *telos* in international history (Bull and Watson 1984; Watson 1992).

2   There is the possibility of oscillation. The organization of the international system, according to the historical conceptualization of Adam Watson, has been moving along an organizational spectrum that goes from full independence, passing through hegemony and dominion, to unconditional empire (Watson 1990). Political history is supposed to swing like a pendulum between the two extremes of sovereign equality and formal empire. This implies that international societies frequently derive their cohesiveness either from the rejection of an imperial past or from the fear of an imperial future.

3   Political history may also be seen as a succession of hegemonies. In this optic, international society is suspect of being little more than an informal manner of organizing rule, maintaining an appearance of legitimacy by leaving to weaker states the illusion of national sovereignty (cf. Gallagher and Robinson 1953). In this view, which is relatively underdeveloped in the English school, international society would be interpreted as an alternative to other possibilities of organizing hegemony, such as empire and suzerainty. For the future, it might indeed be very interesting to develop such a Gramscian reading of international society.[6]

In any case, the international society approach aims at grasping long-term and large-scale international transformations by a sort of holistic vision. The interest in historical change is not limited to the evolution of international society. Hedley Bull's book *The Anarchical Society* contains some thought-provoking speculations about alternative paths to world order beyond the Westphalian state system (Bull 1977: 223–305). In Chapter 7 I will dwell on one of the world-order scenarios discussed by Bull, namely new medievalism. But even if one leaves aside these speculations about long-term macro-sociological change, the historical, legal and sociological dimensions of the international society approach allow for the formulation of a theoretical alternative not only to classical realism and liberalism, but *a fortiori* to structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism (Little 1985, 2003). The international society approach of the English school represents the desire to build a theory of IR that shall transcend the pitfalls of the mutually exclusive approaches that are usually invoked. Whether and to what extent the English school has really been able to fulfill this promise will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

The English school as an academic formation

The existence of a distinctive international society approach is by now a matter of evidence, and 'the importance these theorists attach to the idea that states form a society, to a considerable extent unites them and at the same time distinguishes them from other approaches to the study of international relations' (Wilson 1989: 55). Nevertheless, the existence of a theoretical framework common to a group of British scholars does not prove the existence of a corporate 'English school of

international relations' (R. E. Jones 1981), or 'British mainstream IR' (Suganami 1983), or 'British institutionalism' (Suganami 2001).

Indeed, one author has bluntly denied the existence of the English school altogether (Grader 1988). And even among those who do assume the existence of an English school, there is no agreement about who exactly belongs to it. The first scholar to give a list of putative members nominated Charles Manning and Martin Wight as the leading figures, and Hedley Bull, Michael Donelan, Frederick Northedge and Robert Purnell as their followers (R. E. Jones 1981).[7] The next took Charles Manning, Allan James, Frederick Northedge and Hedley Bull onto the list (Suganami 1983). A third included John Vincent, Gerrit Gong and James Mayall (Wilson 1989), while still another added Adam Watson (Rengger 1996b), and so on. Not even among the alleged members of the English school themselves is there a clear agreement about who does and doesn't belong to the School. Some scholars have explicitly recognized their affiliation with the English school (e.g. Vincent 1986: 69; Watson 1990: 99), whereas others have not. In sum, there is widespread confusion regarding the exact boundaries, if not the very existence, of the English school as an academic formation.

But whatever the exact boundaries of the group, the label 'English school' is a widespread brand name for that part of the British community of IR scholars that is most renowned on the European continent. Frequently, the English school is literally equated with the British way of 'doing' IR. Bearing in mind the obvious presence of the English school in the minds of contemporary IR scholars, it seems reasonable to accept the existence of the English school as a social fact. This notwithstanding, it is somewhat difficult to establish the theoretical substance shared by all of its members – apart from the international society approach. There has been a vehement discussion about this topic (R. E. Jones 1981; Suganami 1983; Wilson 1989; Buzan 2001; Suganami 2002), and it is worth the effort to give an inventory of the common features shared by all or almost all English school authors.

As has already been observed in the antepenultimate section, it can be established with relative certainty that the international society approach is the theoretical centrepiece of the English school. Furthermore, virtually all authors of the school are inclined towards a classical approach to international studies, i.e. towards 'a humane rather than a scientific approach' (George 1976: 35). In combination with the international society approach, the classical approach to international studies has doubtlessly helped to constitute the English school as an academic formation. It must be kept in mind, however, that the so-called classical approach is not a unique feature of the English school. As a matter of fact, the formal distinction between 'traditionalism' and 'science' has often been used in a much more generic way for the delimitation of British and American IR (see pp. 90–2).

The difficulty lies in determining what else, besides the core concept of international society and the classical approach, are the characteristic features of the English school. For example, it is frequently maintained that the English school aims at a holistic understanding of IR as the totality of interactions among states.

However, this is a corollary of the international society approach, rather than an independent, constitutive feature of the school. In a similar way, the affinity of the English school to international history and to political philosophy is sometimes mentioned as a common characteristic. And indeed, the reasons for the international status quo are sought in world history or in the history of ideas, rather than deduced from supposedly self-evident principles like 'international anarchy' or the 'security dilemma'. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the affinity to history and philosophy is a corollary of the classical approach to international studies, rather than a distinctive characteristic of the English school.[8]

Apparently it is not so easy to establish the common substantive features of the alleged 'school', apart from the core concept of international society and the classical approach to international studies. At any rate, the English school is characterized by an extraordinary awareness of the moral implications of both international theory and practice (Bull 2000 [1984]; Vincent 1974, 1986; cf. Wheeler 1992; Neumann 1997a). This goes hand in hand with the adoption of the so-called Grotian tradition, which rejects both the Machiavellian assumption of the necessarily conflictive nature of international relations and the Kantian assumption about the possibility of a cosmopolitan order. The middle position between the Machiavellian and the Kantian approach to IR theory is indeed another distinctive feature of the English school (Wight 1987, 1991; Bull 1966b, 1976, 1990).

To summarize:

1   The concept of international society is the theoretical centrepiece of the English school;
2   Virtually all authors of the school are inclined towards the classical approach to international studies;
3   The international society approach leads to a holistic understanding of international relations;
4   The adoption of a classical approach leads to an inclination towards international history and political philosophy;
5   Moreover, the English school is extraordinarily aware of the moral implications of international theory and practice;
6   the Grotian tradition of the English school represents a via media between the realist idea of international anarchy and the utopian imperative of cosmopolitan order.

Additionally, it seems fair to make the following observation:

7   More often than not, the English school is characterized by a certain conservative bias, as may be seen, among other things, from the importance given to statesmen's inter-subjective convictions and shared beliefs.

Reconvene the English school?

In the heydays of the English school from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the international society approach was sometimes charged with a neglect of the theoretical developments in the mainstream. In fact, the English school has been little concerned with neorealism, neoliberalism, regime theory, and the like. However, there are certain perplexities whether the accusation of theoretical sterility has ever done justice to the English school. There is little evidence that Hedley Bull and his entourage have ever intended to provide conclusive answers to the explanative puzzles that were occupying the Continental and American IR scholarship of their time. Rather, they seem to have been committed to making historical and sociological sense of international phenomena, using a language and an analytical framework designed to grasp the genesis and organization of international relations as a form of human activity.

> Theory in the sense of predictive laws is ruled out, but theory in the sense of an organizing concept which acts as the basis for the selection of what constitutes relevant facts and how a narrative shall be constructed is possible.
>
> (George 1976: 34)

But be that as it may, it is not illegitimate to judge the fertility of the international society approach according to external theoretical standards. This was done with particular fervour in the early 1990s, when scholars sympathetic to the English school began to assess its theoretical potentialities.

To illustrate, I will discuss two evaluative essays, one by Ole Wæver and the other by Barry Buzan. Both try to evaluate the potentialities of the international society approach, and both are in favour of a synthesis of the international society approach with other theoretical efforts. Ole Wæver (1992) is particularly attracted to the international society approach by the fact that it holds a promise of overcoming the well-known dichotomies between realism and liberalism on the one hand, and between the historical and the structural approach to IR theory on the other. Consequently, he makes a plea for opening the international society approach in three directions: towards the interest of American scholars in international regimes, towards the post-positivist insight into the importance of language, and towards historically focused investigations on political theory and international law. To his own disappointment, Wæver detects in the international society approach a prevalence of 'repetition and reconfirmation rather than challenge and innovation'. Nevertheless, he positively appraises its potential for further theoretical progress and synthesis.

Barry Buzan (1993) takes a similar tack. Although he deplores that international society is better developed as a historical than as a theoretical concept, he nevertheless affirms its potential usefulness as an analytical tool. To further this end, Buzan discusses, refines and partly modifies international society as a theoretical concept. In particular, he tries to show that the concept is not incompatible with

regime theory and, especially, structural neorealism. Buzan sketches how both a state system and an international society may evolve out of the logic of anarchy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not true that a shared culture is a necessary antecedent to international society. Quite the opposite, common culture and international society may also develop in a process of mutual reinforcement. At the end of the article, Buzan proposes a research agenda that should fit together the basic assumptions of the international society approach with structural realism and regime theory.[9]

In the early and mid-1990s, Ole Wæver (1992), Barry Buzan (1993) and Richard Little (1995) were exploring how the international society approach is related to the dominant theoretical approaches of the 1980s, namely neorealism, neoliberalism and regime theory (cf. also Evans and Wilson 1992; Hasenclever *et al.* 1997; Little 2003; Molloy 2003; Copeland 2003). Along with this renewed theoretical interest, the English school has experienced a kind of revival since the 1990s. There has been a considerable interest not only in the work of particular authors (Miller and Vincent 1990; Wheeler 1992; Neumann 1997a; Alderson and Hurrell 2000; Suganami 2001; I. Hall 2002; Sharp 2003), but also in the English school as a theoretical approach (Dunne 1995, 1998b; Fawn and Larkins 1996; Linklater 1996; Epp 1998; Roberson 1998; Knudsen 2000; Makinda 2000; Little 2000, 2003; Buzan 2001). There is now even a textbook written from the perspective of the international society approach (Jackson and Sørensen 1999).

This 'phase of renewed creativity' (Wæver 1998b) began in the early 1990s with a special issue of *Millennium* (23/3, 1992) and culminated in a provocative and Internet-based attempt to 'reconvene the English school', launched by Buzan, Little and Wæver (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool). Since then, the 'movement' has led to a stream of articles, conference papers, and, although to a much lesser extent, monographic studies. At the Pan-European Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in Canterbury in September 2001, for example, there were as many as nine panels about the English school. The theoretical ambitions raised by the reconvention of the English school are relatively high. In the eyes of Barry Buzan (2001), for instance, the reconvention of the English school should trigger a revival of grand theorizing about international relations.

The current boom of the English school does not simply consist in a proliferation of panel meetings, theoretical reappraisals, and secondary literature. The 're-convenors' of the English school have produced by now some first-hand substantive contributions to the debate about international society (*inter alia* the monographic studies Jackson 2000; Buzan and Little 2000; Wheeler 2000b; Keene 2002; Buzan 2004). These contributions are typically designed to set the theoretical insights of the 'old' English school in relation to more recent challenges and innovations.

At the same time, the international society approach has been reinterpreted in the context of reflectivist and constructivist attempts to challenge the positivist mainstream of the discipline. The classical and conservative approach of the English school has now begun to 'meet' fashionable and iconoclastic approaches

of the post-positivist camp. Apart from the sheer quantity of scholarly production, this is the most surprising feature about the present revival.

Many reflectivist papers about the English school were presented at a variety of IR conferences, but only few have been published in prominent places (e.g. Epp 1998). The 'meeting' of the English school with reflectivism might turn out to be a good liaison for the latter, in that post-positivism has much to gain from the encounter in terms of maturity. The decrepit English school, which seems to be in a desperate need for a second spring, may also feel attracted. Nevertheless, the coupling together of such strange bedfellows does not come without a certain price for the international society approach of the English school. While it is natural that post-positivists, with the exception of some social constructivists, are skeptical about the quest for general theory, the English school can be understood as an endeavour to 'work out a general theory covering the range of relations between political entities' (Watson 1990: 109). This aspect of the international society approach is in danger of falling by the wayside if post-positivism begins to set the tone. In the worst case, the curtailment of conventional theorizing may even lead to a deformation of the English school as a whole. For instance, the empirically inclined author Frederick Northedge was purged from the influential bibliography provided by Buzan on the Internet, although previously he used to be considered a full member of the English school.[10]

While the quest for general theory and the empiricist wing of the English school are truncated by the encounter with post-positivism, the reflectivist and constructivist deans of the 'new English school' lay stress on a more relativist strand of the international society approach. This is justified as far as the international society approach, at least to a certain extent, provides a basis for such a reinterpretation. Social constructivists are very pleased, for example, to quote the following statement by Edward Carr: 'There is a world community for the reason (and for no other), that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community' (Carr 1946: 162). Of course, this implies that Carr is co-opted into the English school as a founding father (Dunne 1998b: 23–46), together with Charles Manning (Suganami 1983, 2001). In line with this slightly idiosyncratic interpretation of Carr and Manning, the 'new English school' emphasizes the social construction of both international systems and international society by mutual recognition and cultural norms that are shared by statesmen at the inter-subjective level.

Building on the relativist strand of the English school, some authors even go as far as to propose an overall constructivist reading of the English school (Dunne 1995, 1998b; Rengger 1996b; Der Derian 1996; R. B. J. Jones 1998; for a critique: Wæver 1999b; Rengger 2000b: 71–99). International society is (re)interpreted by one author as 'an imagined community with an existence in the life worlds of statesmen' (Neumann 1997a: 40). Accordingly it can be studied in ethnological and social-psychological terms. Among other things, such an understanding of the international society approach could allow a return to the path of grand theory, which may have been somewhat prematurely abandoned by the constructivist and reflectivist branch of the 'new English school'.

Conclusion

Whatever one may think about recent attempts to 'reconvene' the English school, it is fair to say that the recent boom of the international society approach deserves the predicate of 'renewed creativity' (Wæver 1998b). In the past, the international society approach of the English school was frequently accused of British parochialism and scholastic sterility. Today, neither of these accusations is any longer valid. On the one hand, the English school has become internationalized. It currently includes scholars from North America, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Greece, Australia, and so on (cf. Dunne 1998b: 16, n. 56). On the other hand, the English school has successfully transcended its own orthodoxy. Virtually everything is now open to discussion within the framework, up to the interesting question of whether international society can be 'green' (Jackson 1996).

At the same time the English school is 'meeting' other areas of theoretical interest. To quote just two examples, there is an article about the possibility of an encounter between the international society approach and the theory of European integration (Diez and Whitman 2002), and another article about the pertinence of Hedley Bull's theorizing for global governance (Makinda 2002). At present the greatest risk is not so much scholastic sterility but rather the not-so-remote possibility that the English school may lose its distinctiveness as a theoretical approach. If anything can be maintained under the banner of the English school, then there is a danger that the English school will be little more than a cartel of scholars that belong to the same scientific network. The routinely reverence to some canonic founding fathers, especially Wight and Bull, may be less than what is needed to constitute a 'school' in the proper sense of the word.

These perplexities notwithstanding, the fundamental point in the context of this study is that the English school does indeed have a potential for fertilizing the field of IR, as the 're-convenors' of the English school claim. Here are some arguments that this is the case.

The theoretical framework of the English school has a unique potential to provide normative guidance to the practitioner of international politics. The international society approach does recognize that fundamental value conflicts can occur in political practice. To give just two prominent examples, Hedley Bull stated that there is a dilemma of international order versus cosmopolitan justice (1977, 2000), and John Vincent identified an analogous dilemma in the principle of sovereign equality versus the protection of human rights (1986, 1974). The virulence of these dilemmas becomes particularly evident if one thinks about the moral problems related to humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 1992, 2000b; Wheeler and Morris 1996; Knudsen 2003; cf. Bellamy 2003). From the Gulf War to the intervention in Somalia and peace enforcement in Bosnia, decision-makers have been facing difficult trade-offs between at least three sets of important values (Jackson 1995): first, decision-makers try to serve what they perceive to be the national interest of their state; second, they take into account the collective interests of international society, which includes among other things the preservation of

regional stability and respect for the principle of sovereign equality; and third, at least some decision-makers do feel sometimes committed to substantive liberal values such as international justice and human rights.

As the authors of the English school would readily recognize, there is no a priori solution to these value conflicts. It depends on historical as well as situational circumstances whether a statesman will give precedence to the realist values of national interest, to the pluralist values of international society, or to the solidarist values of international justice. In any case, according to the understanding of the English school it is one of the noblest tasks of the IR scholar to carve out a conceptual space where ready-made answers are transcended, and where the deliberation of fundamental normative questions becomes possible.

Or, in other words, the international society approach is designed to offer a theoretical 'third way' that shall go beyond the pitfalls of either shortsighted realism or blue-eyed liberalism. This is intimately related to what Ole Wæver (1998b) has irreverently called the 'three R triptych', i.e. the trinity of realism *à la* Machiavelli, rationalism *à la* Grotius, and revolutionism *à la* Kant (Wight 1987, 1991; Bull 1966b, 1976, 1990; Jackson and Sørensen 1999). Along with Machiavellian realism and Kantian revolutionism, Grotian rationalism establishes a 'third way' of looking at international politics. This is helpful not only to transcend the familiar oppositions between classical realism and classical liberalism, but also the wheeling and dealing among neorealists and neoliberals. And indeed, the English school transcends the narrow obsession of many realists with national interest by introducing the notion of international society, while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of unrealistic dreams of world society and perpetual peace.

At the same time, the international society approach can also be used as a neutral vantage point from which to observe the relative strengths and weaknesses of both realism and liberalism, while at the same time generating its own propositions about the organization of international life. This means that the English school is not only committed to the elaboration of a theoretical 'third way' beyond realism and liberalism. It does also offer the possibility of constructing a neutral vantage point beyond all three of the approaches. Despite the fact that there is obviously a certain affinity of the English school with the Grotian approach, the three approaches (realism, rationalism, revolutionism) are actually constructed as equidistant. That means that any of the three may be exposed to a critique from the remaining two. For example, the values of international society can be criticized from the standpoint of national self-interest and cosmopolitan justice. The same holds true for national interest and cosmopolitan justice: either can be exposed to an analogous critique from the remaining two standpoints. Or, in other words, the approach of the English school can be understood as an ongoing dialogue among three fundamentally distinct ways to approach international politics.

The English school is non-trivial in the sense that it helps to transcend the trivium formed by realism, rationalism and revolutionism. As long as a scholar is not too much committed to any single of the three approaches, Wight and Bull's *via media* will put him/her in a position to give a reasonably neutral assessment of

the theoretical and moral implications in a broad range of concrete situations. The case of humanitarian intervention, which has just been discussed, is only one among a variety of possible examples. Of course it is important to note that such a *via media* presupposes a considerable degree of intellectual aloofness on the part of the individual scholar. Moreover, the corner points of Wight and Bull's equilateral triangle may be somewhat outdated in the face of more recent theoretical developments, from liberal institutionalism to social constructivism and post-positivism. At any rate, international thought has always been much too multifarious to be comprehended in its entirety by a theoretical triptych like the one of the English school (Bartelson 1996). But if one takes the theoretical quest for a *via media* for what it actually is, namely an epistemic strategy to transcend extreme simplifications, one will find much to learn in the English school.

6 Middle ground or halfway house?

Social constructivism and the theory of European integration

The most influential state of the art of the IR discipline in recent years (Katzenstein *et al.* 1998) has identified the theoretical contest between rationalism and social constructivism as the paramount theoretical split at the millennium's turn. Conspicuous by its absence, post-positivism is the implicit third party to this opposition (Lapid 1989; cf. Wæver 1996a). Social constructivism has been fairly successful over the past few years in establishing itself in the so-called 'middle ground' between rationalism and post-positivism, thereby becoming part of the new theoretical commonsense of the mainstream (Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Wendt 1999) – so much so that it has by now become possible to ignore post-positivism as a sort of troublemaker in the otherwise constructive dialogue between rationalism and social constructivism (cf. S. Smith 2000a, 2001). Nevertheless it is unlikely in the long run that social constructivists will be able to dispense with the spectre of post-positivism. A bogeyman may be necessary for them to strengthen their alliance with the mainstream.[1]

What is really going on behind the façade of social constructivism as a theoretical 'third way' beyond rationalism and post-positivism, is a sneak rapprochement towards the mainstream and a corresponding estrangement from the post-positivist challenge to that mainstream (please see the footnote on terminology).[2]

In the present chapter I do the following two things: in the first section I argue that 'middle-ground constructivism' is indeed pursuing the strategy outlined above; in this connection I also address the fundamental theoretical problem with the so-called 'middle ground', which is the simultaneous adoption of a positivist epistemology and a post-positivist ontology. From the second section onwards I assess the attempts of social constructivists to set up a theoretically informed research programme about European integration. All in all it is legitimate to read this chapter as a critical survey of the social constructivist contribution to European integration theory.

In the second section I take the 1999 special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP), entitled *The Social Construction of Europe*, as a paradigmatic case of middle-ground constructivism (Christiansen *et al.* 1999; 2nd edn 2001). In my endeavour to give a critical assessment of the social constructivist contribution to the theory of European integration, the JEPP special issue will be used as a sort of 'crash-test dummy'. This procedure has enjoyed great popularity in the discipline

ever since the fierce debate about Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), and it is applied exclusively to books that deserve a high level of attention. Accordingly, such treatment comes as near to a compliment as it is distant from slander. On the other hand, however, one obviously cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. I therefore feel obliged to apologize to the contributors of *The Social Construction of Europe* in the not-too-unlikely event that some among them may feel that I have over-interpreted their work (cf. Eco 1992).

In the third section I demonstrate that there is much more to constructivist theorizing about European integration than is admitted by middle-ground constructivists. It is simply not true that, before the appearance of the JEPP special issue, the social construction of Europe 'ha[d] not received any systematic attention from constructivist scholars' (Christiansen *et al.* 1999: 528). On the contrary, the awareness that Europe is a 'world of our making' is absolutely not new, and it is easy to invent a 'proto-constructivist' tradition around the leitmotif of Europe as a man-made social and political construct. Such an invented tradition would start with the genealogy of Europe as a geographic and cultural concept; it would continue with early theoretical approaches about European integration on the trails of Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch; it would emphasize the longstanding preoccupation of federalist politicians with the construction of European identity; it would point out that, simultaneously with the end of the Cold War, the Brussels approach to European integration has been challenged by a variety of attempts to redefine the cultural and geographic identity of Europe; and it would finally reveal that the early and mid-1990s saw a whole series of interesting reflections about European identity produced by IR scholars. If constructed in this way, 'proto-constructivist' theorizing has been paving the way towards a truly constructivist approach to European integration theory.

The fourth section is dedicated to the emergence of a constructivist approach in the narrower sense of the term. I show that, in continuation of the 'proto-constructivist' tradition, the mid-1990s saw a boom of explicitly social constructivist contributions to European integration theory. The first of these contributions was broadly in line with the more general post-positivist critique against the mainstream and tried to open the possibility of a radically new way of theorizing European integration. This challenge to the mainstream in integration theory has not been abandoned after the appearance of the JEPP special issue. A brief survey of more recent contributions to the field of EU studies (1998–2002) confirms that social constructivism remains a diverse source of both ontological *and* epistemological challenges to positive science. In so far as only a minority of the constructivist contributions follows the pattern of empirical research envisaged by the so-called 'middle ground', the latter is only part of the story.

As a result of my evaluative considerations, I conclude that the ambitious aspirations of the constructivist middle ground should be somewhat relaxed. Social constructivists would be well advised to ground the study of European integration not so much on the positivist idea that European integration is a test case for the validation or falsification of theoretical approaches, but rather on the pragmatist insight that European integration is a contested ground where different

theoretical approaches are competing for the most convincing account of an empirical domain.

Seizing the middle ground

To understand the development of the constructivist middle ground, it is useful to recall the attempts of the late 1980s and early 1990s to challenge the materialist ontology and rationalist epistemology of the positivist mainstream (Lapid 1989). At that time, post-positivism was understood, and understood itself, as a common phalanx of reflective approaches against the longstanding hegemony of positivism in Political Science (Wæver 1996a). Metaphorically speaking, post-positivists were the barbarians *ante portas*. When it came to making inroads into the Empire of positive science, there was no operational separation between different barbarian hordes such as postmodernists, critical theorists, and feminists. Accordingly, social constructivists were seen, and saw themselves, as just one among many other post-positivist squadrons (S. Smith 1995). Later on, however, one faction of the constructivist horde (let's say, the Visigoths) applied for Roman citizenship. They were assigned a good piece of land at the frontier of the Empire, while the other faction (let's say, the Ostrogoths) persisted in their relentless assault on the capital. Needless to say that the rapprochement of the Visigoth settlers towards the Roman Empire led to an increasing estrangement of the 'Visigoth' middle-ground constructivists from their 'Ostrogoth' tribesmen.

The development of middle-ground constructivism can be reconstructed in a way that strongly resembles this curious episode from the Great Migration. In the debate between positivists and post-positivists, one of the criticisms most frequently raised against the latter was their apparent inability to formulate empirical research programmes, i.e. their failure to be socialized according to the established standards of positive science. In particular, positivists criticized that reflective approaches (as post-positivism was sometimes called) were not suitable to be empirically 'tested' against 'reality'. A weaker version of this criticism deplored the lack of middle-range research programmes within which the explanatory power of reflective approaches could be demonstrated. Or, in other words, dominant positivism was urging the post-positivist challengers to accept its terms of recognition, either by specifying testable hypotheses or by deploying rival research programmes. Most prominently, the following exhortation was directed in the late 1980s to the totality of reflective approaches, including social constructivism:

> Until the reflective scholars or others sympathetic to their arguments have delineated a research programme and shown in particular studies that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly or implicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic premises.
>
> (Keohane 1988: 392)

Reacting to this and similar exhortations, many social constructivists were driven by a desire to leave the post-positivist ghetto and to get in touch with the mainstream. While the more radical constructivists remained firmly within the post-positivist camp, their revisionist comrades began with the formulation of 'reflective research programmes' (Adler and Haas 1992; Wendt 1992; cf. already Giddens 1984; Wendt 1987). A few years later, the first constructivists declared that they were post-positivists no more.

In a programmatic article, Emmanuel Adler (1997) recommended to his fellow constructivists a land grab for new areas of empirical investigation. According to the suggestive title of his article, constructivists should 'seize the middle ground' between positivism and post-positivism, keeping equidistant from both of these approaches in two respects: *ontologically*, constructivists should work on the assumption of a material substratum of social reality while insisting that social facts are under-determined by that base; they should position themselves somewhere between materialism and idealism (cf. Searle 1995: 149–228); *epistemologically*, constructivists should work on the assumption that social reality is intersubjective; they should position themselves somewhere between the Humean idea of causality on the one hand, and contextual interpretation on the other.

By these recommendations, Adler was suggesting that a moderate version of social constructivism could work as a bridge across the gulf that was separating positivism on the one hand, and post-positivism on the other. The underlying idea was that social constructivism could enter into competition with the positivist mainstream, while at the same time maintaining its umbilical cord with social ontology and reflective epistemology. To live up to this promise, constructivism would generate empirical research programmes, albeit not according to the same standards of evaluation as those of positive science. Although it is not completely clear how this should have worked in practice, it seems that Adler's recommendations amounted to a carefully designed strategy to establish social constructivism as a 'third way' beyond the mutually exclusive approaches of positivism and post-positivism.

However things turned out very differently. Only one year after the appearance of Adler's essay, Jeffrey Checkel (1998) made further concessions to the rationalist vision of science. Declaring his eagerness to get into conversation with the mainstream (p. 348), Checkel claimed that social constructivism was sharing its epistemological assumptions with positivism, while differing only with regard to ontology. 'It is important to note that constructivists do not reject science or causal explanation; their quarrel with mainstream theories is ontological, not epistemological' (p. 327).[3]

A similar marriage between positivist epistemology and post-positivist ontology is consummated by Alexander Wendt (1998, 1999: 90–1, 2000). To bridge the gap between constructivism and the mainstream, Wendt follows Checkel in calling for the generation of constructivist middle-range theories and research programmes.

These research programmes are thought to be characterized by an explicit empirical orientation and a positivist research design: 'The missing element is substantive, middle-range theory, which would provide constructivists with a set

(or better, competing sets) of research questions and hypotheses that could be tested in various cross-national and longitudinal studies' (Checkel 1998: 342; cf. Wendt 1999: 4; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001).

Since then, middle-ground constructivism is trying to challenge positivism on its own epistemological turf. The goal is to show by the very means of rationalist epistemology that materialist ontology is too narrow. In practice this comes down to the generation of empirical research programmes in order to demonstrate that ideas, rules, norms and institutions matter. As far as middle-ground constructivists have managed to be co-opted into the mainstream of the discipline, it must be admitted that they were successful with that strategy. But does that mean that their strategy is also sound from a theoretical standpoint? As long as fifteen years ago, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie (1986) have pointed out that it is not. According to these two authors, a built-in divide between an intersubjective ontology and a positivist epistemology cannot but be detrimental to a theoretical approach. This is necessarily so, since reflexivity and intersubjectivity frustrate the formulation of objective causal laws.

Let us follow constructivists for a moment in assuming that social reality relies on human reflection and shared understandings. In so far as this implies an element of choice, it will be futile to look for the immutable causal laws of social action. On the contrary, social scientists will have to interpret the reasons of the actors in their contingent social and cognitive context. When the contextual interpretation and understanding of *reasons* replaces the investigation of *causes*, however, the epistemological standards of positivism, namely empirical verification and falsification, lose their meaning (Hollis and Smith 1990). In short, the tenets of rationalist epistemology become problematic as soon as there is no immutable external 'reality' against which to 'test' law-like propositions. If somebody wants to overcome materialist ontology, he will also have to be critical about rationalist epistemology. Conversely, if somebody wants to stick to rationalist epistemology, he will have to stick to materialist ontology as well. There is good reason to be skeptical about constructivist 'research programmes', at least in so far as they claim to be in line with rationalist epistemology.

Strictly speaking, the social ontology of constructivism cannot be reconciled with rationalist epistemology. Due to its failure to recognize this simple truth, middle-ground constructivism is in danger of missing the fundamental point that social reality is constituted by intersubjective social practices (Kratochwil 1989). For example, when we encounter on a banknote the statement 'This note is legal tender for all debts public and private', understanding the meaning of this statement does not involve checking this assertion against the facts of reality. No scrounging around for empirical evidence will help us in understanding the meaning of this declaration, as it is not at all an assertion for which empirical evidence could provide adequate backing (Kratochwil 2001).

Of course, this is not to deny that there are borderline cases where social reality is sufficiently fixed to allow for the empirical testing of hypotheses and where the logical form of causal laws is adequate to the description of regularities in behaviour. For example, in a well-defined set of shared understandings and

expectations (e.g. in the queue of a supermarket's checkout counter), the actors will behave in an empirically predictable way. We may 'come down on the side of Kant in agreeing that causality can be established because we accept the notion of causality a priori, not because we can observe it happening' (Matlary 1997: 204).

This sounds reasonable (cf. also Kurki 2002). One does not have to assume that the testing of causal hypotheses is completely and under all circumstances invalidated by constructivism. What has to be rejected is that hypothesis testing can be conclusive in the social realm, as this presupposes that the social world can be exhaustively divided into two states ('is' or 'is not'). But as we can easily show in both social science and cultural analysis, most problems belong to a third class ('not decidable'). That means that the bivalence principle of logic is of little help here, and that we have to scrounge around for criteria that would give us a handle on the differential 'weight' of evidence rather than to insist on refutation or corroboration.[4] In any case, the burden of proof should always lie with a research programme claiming that causal laws are applicable within a particular domain (Collin 1997: 14–16). At least from a truly constructivist standpoint, it is unacceptable to *presume* causality as rationalist epistemology does.

Be that as it may, and without going any deeper into these rather arcane deliberations, it is easy to understand why many social constructivists feel attracted by the positivist invitation to demonstrate the empirical validity of their truth claims. As we have seen, the fundamental idea is that social constructivism should be tested within the scope of middle-range research programmes and that, if constructivism passes a sufficient number of these tests, positivism will be refuted 'on its own empirical soil' (Glarbo 1999: 650). This sounds appealing to many, and the dominant strategy of the 'middle ground' over the last years has indeed consisted in the accommodation to rationalist epistemology.

But alas, the marriage of social ontology and rationalist epistemology is impossible for the meta-theoretical reasons mentioned above. This impossibility notwithstanding, the liaison between positivists and constructivists is consummated. This seems paradoxical. The reason is that the formulation of constructivist research programmes is suggestive as an academic strategy (Price and Reus-Smit 1998). In order to gain scientific recognition, social theories are expected first to establish a domain of application, and then to show that their predictions are confirmed, or at least not broadly disconfirmed, within that empirical domain. Before the academic tribunal, the perceived correspondence between theoretical propositions and empirical evidence is held to be the touchstone for scientific validity. Social constructivists can hardly escape from the imperative to prove the empirical validity of their truth claims, unless they are prepared to pay the prize of being marginalized together with their old post-positivist fellows. Conversely, they will gain scientific prestige if they can show that an empirical domain such as European integration is best explained in constructivist terms. If they want to become respected interlocutors of the mainstream and to be competitive in the academic arena, constructivists can hardly afford to stay apart from competition with other approaches for empirical hunting grounds.

Thanks to the formulation of empirical research programmes, whether theoretically viable or not, middle-ground constructivism has ultimately succeeded in being recognized by the mainstream (Katzenstein *et al.* 1998). Thereby they could leave the post-positivist ghetto and enter into conversation with the mainstream. This amounts to a considerable success, meta-theoretical problems notwithstanding. In any event, it would be foolish to deny that constructivism – whether middle ground or not – has generated a series of truly interesting empirical contributions.[5] Nevertheless the success of middle-ground constructivism as an academic strategy should not obscure the fact that there are serious problems with the amalgamation of a rationalist epistemology with a social ontology.[6]

A constructivist research programme

The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the evaluation of a particular area of constructivist research, namely recent contributions to the theory of European integration made by – mostly European – social constructivists. As a starting point and for the sake of maximum clarity, it will be useful to make a distinction between middle-ground constructivism on the one hand, and more radical constructivism on the other. Whereas the former sees European integration as a test case for social constructivism (Are the predictions of constructivism confirmed or disconfirmed by the empirical evidence?), the latter sees it as a contested area where constructivism has to compete against other theoretical approaches (Which theory can provide the most convincing account for which body of evidence?). Underlying either of the two approaches, there is a different understanding of what social constructivism is all about. In the first case, constructivism is seen as an ontological challenge to positivism, but on a common epistemological ground (middle-ground constructivism). In the second case, constructivism is seen as posing a fundamental challenge to both materialist ontology and rationalist epistemology (radical constructivism).

As a starting point the present section deals with the most outstanding contribution of middle-ground constructivism to the field of European integration, which is the 1999 special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP). The issue was edited by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener under the title *The Social Construction of Europe* (1999, 2nd edn 2001).[7] In the introduction, the editors of the JEPP special issue call for the establishment of

Table 6.1 Difference between middle-ground and radical constructivism

Middle-ground constructivism	Only ontological challenge to positivism (different ontology, same epistemology)	European integration as a test case
Radical constructivism	Radical challenge to positivism (different ontology, different epistemology)	European integration as a contested ground

a social constructivist research programme concerning European integration. The editors explicitly dissociate themselves from more radical theoretical approaches in order to be better prepared for the positivist challenge. They raise claim to a middle ground between positivism and post-positivism, and they follow Adler, Checkel and Wendt in declaring that they want to 'combine a positivist position with an intersubjective ontology' (p. 534).[8]

To locate their own research programme about European integration in relation to positivism and post-positivism, Christiansen *et al.* make a distinction that is analogous to the distinction between middle-ground constructivism and radical constructivism introduced above: 'Sociological constructivism' is said to be interested in explanation and empirical research, whereas 'Wittgensteinian constructivism' is said to be more inclined to contextual understanding and discourse analysis (pp. 535, 543). The former assumes the existence of a material world and wants to study the impact of ideas in that world. The latter is agnostic about whether there can be any direct knowledge about reality, since the world we live in is constituted by contextual meaning and since human experience is inseparable from its semantic constitution by language. Truth is a property of language, and there are no extra-linguistic coordinates against which to 'test' theoretical propositions (cf. Zehfuß 1998). Having made this distinction Christiansen *et al.* declare their predilection for sociological constructivism, i.e. for the middle ground.

According to the editors of the JEPP special issue, the fundamental contribution of middle-ground constructivism to the theory of European integration consists in its social ontology. Social ontology comprises many constitutive elements of human interaction, such as rules and norms, language and discourse, identity and ideas. The theoretical promise is considerable: due to the social ontology of social constructivism it will be easier to account for the ongoing process of long-term political and social change in the emergent Euro-polity. But, *nota bene*, all this regards only ontology. Concerning epistemology, the editors accept the positivist idea of 'testing' theories.[9] It is due to this liaison of social ontology with rationalist epistemology that the introduction to the JEPP special issue can be read as a manifesto for the application of middle-ground constructivism to the empirical field of European integration.

Not all of the contributions to the volume follow the programmatic outlook given in the introduction: let us briefly review the substantive contributions to the JEPP special issue (at least those written from an IR background).[10] Some contributions seem to be compatible with the quest for empirical testability. Thus, Jeffrey Checkel (pp. 545–60) argues that institutions are crucial for the diffusion of norms via social learning and socialization. European institutions provide a locus for the formulation of policy options that, given certain conditions at the nation-state level, can help to transform identities, interests and preferences. In a word, European institutions are intervening variables. Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse *et al.* (pp. 614–33) analyze how political elites in different member states have given or failed to give a European flavour to pre-existing nation-state identities; they argue that shifts in nation-state identities occur at critical junctures when the

political environment is receptive to new kinds of social identity and self-categorization. In short, the causal arrow is inverted.

Other contributions appear to be more difficult to reconcile with the idea of empirically falsifiable research programmes. For example, Rey Koslowski (pp. 561–78) points out that constructivism may help to better understand the EU as a federal polity. Generated by legal integration, the *acquis communautaire* is one among several institutional features that can be analyzed as the unintended outcome of an ongoing process towards a federal constitution. Kenneth Glarbo (pp. 634–51) uses insights from phenomenology and symbolic interactionism to reconstruct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU in social constructivist terms; in particular he shows how national diplomats have come to take their fellow diplomats into account in an increasingly multilateral and routine fashion. Intersubjectivity seems to be looming large here.

Still other contributors use a version of discourse analysis that is clearly incompatible with positivist epistemology. Thomas Diez (pp. 598–613) deals with the importance of language and discourse in the constitution of the various and competing concepts held by citizens, politicians and academics about Europe. His concern with the constitutive role of language clearly goes beyond the scope of middle-ground constructivism. Ben Rosamond (pp. 652–68) examines the role of the globalization discourse in the process of European policy formulation; as he shows, globalization is frequently used as an external threat to legitimize further regulation at the community level; at the same time, globalization is also used to justify regional market liberalization as an option without alternative. In short, the globalization discourse and European policy formation are co-constitutive. It is easy to see that the contributions by Diez and Rosamond are falling outside the framework of middle-ground constructivism.

All in all, the JEPP special issue falls short of its aspiration to formulate a full-fledged social constructivist research programme about European integration. This is emphasized in the critical response at the end of the issue, written by Andrew Moravcsik (1999).[11] As an adherent to positivism, Moravcsik warmly welcomes the spirit of self-criticism shown by the new generation of middle-ground constructivists. In particular he praises their commitment to empirical disconfirmation. But then he goes on to complain that constructivist scholars do not live up to their own methodological standards. 'Hardly a single claim in this volume is formulated or tested in such a way that it could, even in principle, be declared empirically invalid' (p. 670).[12] In particular, Moravcsik criticizes social constructivists' soft spot for meta-theorizing as having distracted them from the only element which is, according to him, 'truly essential to social science: the vulnerability of conjectures to some sort of empirical disconfirmation' (p. 679). Instead of metatheoretical escapades, Moravcsik calls for further operationalization: 'In a social scientific debate, this is the minimum that proponents of a new theory owe those who have already derived and tested mid-range theories' (p. 675).

One JEPP issue later, we find a response to Moravcsik's criticisms in an article written by Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener (1999). Risse and Wiener try to defend

the middle ground's endeavour of accepting rationalist epistemology in order to demonstrate the suitability of social ontology on positivism's own empirical soil. They apologize for not (yet) being able to live up to their promises; they admit that the social ontology of constructivism creates problems with the deduction of hypotheses; and they resort to the argument that constructivism is a metatheoretical approach. As a metatheoretical approach, constructivism is as unsuitable for empirical testing as any other metatheoretical approach, including rational choice. In so far as it is possible to derive testable hypotheses from constructivism, the method of confirmation must replace the method of disconfirmation: 'We cannot "test" rational choice against constructivism, but we can evaluate empirically the conditions under which sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism offers a better explanation of the effects of norms than rationalist institutionalism' (p. 778). Both the methodological standards and the empirical aspirations of middle-ground constructivism must be considerably lowered.[13]

These seem to be reasonable qualifications. If Europe is seen as a socially constructed entity, there is no empirical reality against which to test theoretical propositions concerning European integration. And what exactly is meant by 'testing'? It is indeed hardly irrelevant whether one wishes to pursue the method of confirmation or the method of falsification. If one measures the middle ground's research programme about European integration against its own methodological standards, it is clear that, as long as it is a truly constructivist programme, it cannot live up to its methodological promises. Risse and Wiener's response to Moravcsik's criticisms contains an honest recognition of what such a programme can and cannot do. In the final analysis, social constructivists would be well advised to give up the plan of defeating rationalists on their own epistemological soil (cf. Merlingen 1999).

Proto-constructivism

The awareness that Europe is a 'world of our making' is not new. Throughout the history of the continent as a geographical and cultural entity, the concept of 'Europe' has posed severe problems of delimitation. From a glance at a geographical map it becomes immediately clear that, especially in the eastern part of the continent, it is not self-evident where to draw Europe's geophysical boundaries. '[F]rom a geographer's point of view, Europe has come under the continents like Pilatus into the credo' (Isensee 1993: 104). What is more, geography does not pose the only problem of delimitation. There is as well an intriguing divergence over time and space in the construction of the continent's ideational boundaries. Whether Hellenic freedom against Persian tyranny, piety and faith against heresy, modern science and reason against primitive superstition, or civilization and progress against barbarism – there is a variety of self-delimitations of Europe in history (Wilson and van der Dussen 1995). It is impossible not to recognize the fact that the boundaries of Europe are geographically and conceptually both contested and contingent (Hobsbawm 1997; Jönsson *et al.* 2000).

Despite the lack of clear and compelling conceptual and geographical boundaries, however, there is a common denominator of virtually all delimitations of Europe in history. As the German historian Josef Isensee has observed,

> Europeans have always determined the essence of Europe. This is the fundamental difference between the notion of Europe and the notion of other continents: Europe defines itself, whereas the other parts of the world are defined by Europe. Europe, and only Europe, disposes of the competence for definition. Europe is the vantage point of the subject that sees the world through its perceptions, measurements, and categorizations, covers the world with the net of its categories, and subdues the world to its categories. . . . Europe is an invention of Europeans. . . . There is no such thing as a Europe *per se*, there is only a Europe as it appears in the volition and thought of Europeans.
>
> (Isensee 1993: 113)

In modern history there has been only one exception to this rule. After the Second World War the ideological and political divisions of the Cold War rendered European identity subordinated to the antagonism between East and West. For more than forty years the Iron Curtain constrained and predetermined any viable European self-understanding. Only those countries that were located to the west of the Berlin Wall could permit themselves to pursue (western) European unification. And even in the West the political project of European integration appeared to be not so much a utopian vision but rather the reflection of hard political realities. The first generation of western European political leaders after the Second World War, such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi, felt a necessity to overcome the divisions of the past in order to gain the future. Only a strong and unified Europe, deeply ingrained in the western alliance, seemed able to preserve a certain autonomy of the western European states *vis-à-vis* the dual threat of Soviet aggression and American hegemony. For the first time in modern history, then, (western) Europe's geopolitical and ideational boundaries were determined from outside, i.e. by the international environment.

With the end of the Cold War this situation dramatically changed. The delimitation of Europe once more became a contested issue. As a starting signal, Mikhail Gorbachev launched in the late 1980s the rhetoric of the 'Common House of Europe' (Schirmer 1993). The routine of equating Europe with western Europe was challenged, and the claim of the EC to the exclusive representation of European integration was questioned. This had two effects: first, it brought the issue of Europe's geographical and ideational boundaries back to the fore; second, the use of metaphors such as the 'Common House of Europe' made clear that Europe is not a naturally given entity. If it is true that Europe has been constructed in a historically contingent way, then it is also true that, at least in principle, Europe may be reconstructed in a host of different ways. As a result the proper delimitation of Europe once again became a matter of discussion in the early 1990s.

This trend was reinforced by the European Union's legitimacy crisis in the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty, when the limitations of the Monnet method based on the so-called 'permissive consensus' became apparent. Since then, a substantial part of the national electorates is not disposed any more to accept whatever politics comes from 'Brussels', and the periodical *Eurobarometer* shows that public opinion about European integration increasingly depends on utilitarian assessments (Immerfall and Sobisch 1997). Despite some efforts in Brussels to promote identity politics, the European Union has so far failed to activate a spontaneous affective identification (Laffan 1996).[14] More than ever before, there is a delicate and precarious balance between local, national and European identities. The geographical and ideational boundaries of the continent are politicized.

It is hardly surprising that the renewed interest in the boundaries of Europe was reflected in Political Science. Since the early 1990s, there has been an increasing academic interest in how the ideational boundaries of Europe are constantly drawn and redrawn. Especially in IR and Comparative Politics many scholars have come to recognize the fact that Europe, as well as the nation state, is an 'imagined community' that belongs to a 'world of our making' (cf. Anderson 1983; Onuf 1989). Constructivist scholars stress that European integration is linked to intersubjective ideas and social institutions. As a transformative process European integration is suited substantively to reshape the identities, interests and behaviour of the EU member states and their citizens. Thanks to its theoretical outlook, constructivism offers indeed a promising conceptual toolbox for the explanation of a transformative process such as European integration. The most important feature of constructivism is its intersubjective epistemology and its social ontology, consisting in identity and ideas, norms and institutions, language and discourse. It becomes possible to analyze European integration as a complex process of social change that otherwise could hardly be disentangled.

When initially applied to the study of European integration, this framework directed the attention of scholars to a bundle of questions related to the permanent construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of social identity.

- How are the boundaries drawn between Europe and the rest of the world? Can European identity peacefully coexist with national identities, or is a zero-sum trade-off between national and European identity unavoidable?
- Is it possible to derive European identity from a stock of cultural, religious and constitutional heritage such as Roman law, Greek science, Christian theology, Renaissance humanity, and Enlightenment rationality?
- Or is it inevitable to constitute 'us' in opposition to 'them', and 'friend' in opposition to 'enemy'? Does Europe need some barbarian adversaries in order to become discernible as a political and cultural point of reference?
- To whom is the emergence of a strong European identity desirable? What are its preconditions? What can be done at the political, social and cultural level to foster or hamper the formation of European identity?

Many of these questions are given treatment in an article written by Anthony Smith (1992; cf. 1990, 1993). The article deals with the relationship between European identity and national identities, analyzing the prospects for the development of a genuine European identity. As a point of departure, Smith makes an ideal-typical distinction between two types of modern national identity. One is based on the liberal traditions of civic culture and civil society, whereas the other draws on romantic ideas of ethnic descent and cultural ties rooted in a pre-modern past. Smith argues that the first ('western') model is less exclusive and more compatible with peaceful coexistence than the second ('eastern') one. This leads him to the prediction that, first, European identity is less problematic in an environment of liberal rather than ethnic nationalism; second, European identity is disadvantaged when competing with the latter, because it lacks the powerful myths of a pre-modern past; third, this poses severe limitations to identity politics. In order to be appealing, European identity would have to be more than just an outgrowth of cosmopolitan culture. To solve these problems, Smith suggests an understanding of Europe as a family of different but similar cultures, applying Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblance'.

Despite a declaration in favour of multiple identity, Smith expresses strong reservations as to whether it is practically feasible to have collective cultural identity without the exclusion of significant others like the Japanese economy or immigrants from the Third World (pp. 75–6). These and similar reservations are shared by Iver Neumann and Jennifer Welsh (1991), who provide a historical case study on how 'the Turk' has been constitutive for European identity in modern history. According to these two authors, significant 'others' are often created as the external antagonists against whom social identity is mobilized and therefore play an important role in the production of cultural homogeneity and in the consolidation of group cohesiveness. But even if it is true that the social practice of exclusion is constitutive to European identity, in the end the pragmatic interest in an accommodation with 'the Turk' is mostly carrying the day.[15]

Michael Smith (1996) has brought such reasoning about the social practices of inclusion and exclusion into a wider and more systematic context. In an interesting article he reflects on the role of geopolitical, institutional, transactional and cultural boundaries for the construction of European identity. The analytical distinction between a 'politics of exclusion' and a 'politics of inclusion' helps to show how the practice of European identities has shifted at least in part from the maintenance of clear-cut boundaries towards their continual redrawing (cf. Habermas 1992; Ruggie 1993).

Ole Wæver (1995 [=1993]: 203–10) has proposed a tentative solution to the mentioned dilemma between a 'politics of exclusion' and a 'politics of inclusion'. In the first place, he follows Anthony Smith's analytical distinction between a typically French model of the 'civic state nation' on the one hand, and a typically German model of the 'organic people nation' on the other.[16] In the second place, he states a practical dilemma for collective identity formation in Europe: cultural nationalism may be outdated in the face of a political economy becoming more and more global, but both the cultural amnesia of cosmopolitanism and the

post-modernist multiplication of identities may not be viable in the face of the emotional desire for meaning and belonging. As a remedy, Wæver proposes a decoupling of the two ideal types of collective identity.

> The civic tradition goes European, while the cultural tradition becomes even more national (or regional) to an extent where it de-couples itself from questions of politics and becomes more a matter of culture-politics. State and society become less closely linked, and we become Euro-state citizens while still belonging to our older culture-nations.
>
> (Wæver 1995: 209)[17]

Such a dissociation of civic and cultural identity may avoid the pitfalls of (obsolete) one-track nationalist identity as well as (unfeasible) post-modern multiplication of identities and the (undesirable) amnesia of cosmopolitan culture.[18]

All of the contributions discussed until now (A. Smith 1992; Neumann and Welsh 1992; M. Smith 1996; Wæver 1995) are dealing with social identity, but none of the authors explicitly declares himself to be affiliated with social constructivism. Therefore one may call these contributions 'proto-constructivist'. The same label also applies to a series of other contributions to European integration theory since the late 1950s. In general, proto-constructivism is constructivism *avant la lettre*. It is characterized by an inherent vicinity to the tenets of social constructivism, either by virtue of a social ontology and/or a reflective epistemology.

To begin with, early scholarship about European integration had a focus on the constitutive role of social identity formation (cf. E. Haas 2001). Although disconfirmed by the realities of their time, Karl Deutsch *et al.* (1957) and Ernst Haas (1964) were speculating about a shift in elite identifications and mass allegiances from the national to the European level. More recently there has been a revival of the concept of a European 'security community' in the tracks of Karl Deutsch (Adler and Barnett 1998). In addition there is a certain concern with the role of epistemic communities and social learning in the process of international policy formation, which has been applied to the field of EU studies in a book by Markus Jachtenfuchs (1996; cf. P. Haas 1990, 1992b).[19]

In the meantime, legal scholars have been dealing for a long time with the role of formal and informal rules in the constitutionalization of European governance. Most prominently, Joseph Weiler (1999) has written a series of articles about the judicial (self)empowerment of the European Court of Justice.[20] It is interesting for political scientists to reflect about the impact of legal process on the construction of Europe (Wind 2000, 2001). Moreover it is interesting to observe the relevance of legal reasoning and rule-governed behaviour in how European integration has been shaped by the progressive development of the *acquis communautaire* (Wind 1996; Wiener 1998a).

Another relevant body of literature is the debate about communicative rationality, inspired by the social philosophy of Jürgen Habermas (1981, 1992; cf. Elster 1998). Beginning with an article written by Harald Müller (1994), a debate about communicative rationality was held between 1994 and 1997 in the German

Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen. When everything was said and done, Thomas Risse (2000) wrote an article for *International Organization* to communicate the results of this debate to the English-speaking audience. After initial claims that the theory of communicative action should be applied to the study of European integration (Jachtenfuchs 1995: 127; Risse-Kappen 1996), this desideratum was put into action by a series of reflections about 'integration through deliberation', i.e. a new form of transnational democratic governance beyond the nation state model (Joerges and Neyer 1998; Schmalz-Bruns 1999; Joerges 2000; Eriksen and Fossum 2000).

Even if most of the scholars mentioned in this section did not explicitly declare their adherence to social constructivism, their contributions are among the building blocks for the development of a constructivist approach towards European integration. 'Proto-constructivism' contains most of the ingredients necessary for the elaboration of a truly constructivist framework.

Varieties of constructivism

After the treatment of 'proto-constructivism', let us now turn back to the examination of explicitly social constructivist contributions. Thanks to the literature discussed in the last section, social constructivists do not have to start from zero when theorizing about European integration. On the contrary, 'proto-constructivism' is a starting point and a source of inspiration for more explicitly constructivist approaches. Nevertheless it would be unfair to say that the application of social constructivism to the theory of European integration is only 'old wine in new bottles'. Social constructivism as an epistemic project goes beyond the questions addressed in the proto-constructivist literature mentioned above. What is really new about the constructivist approach to European integration theory is the conscious way in which the social construction of Europe is approached. As the author of this essay understands it, social constructivism is an epistemic project that points to more than just the simple recognition that norms, ideas and collective identities are important in political theory and in political practice. On the contrary, the advent of social constructivism amounts to a radical problem shift from positive science towards the question of *how* social reality is constructed.

In the field of EU studies, the mid and late 1990s have seen a number of contributions that were explicitly formulated in constructivist terms. The first wave of constructivist contributions to the theory of European integration was launched from the post-positivist camp. This is particularly true of Thomas Diez's article 'Post-modernity and European integration' (1996 [cf. 1995]).[21] Like many other post-positivists, Diez is critical of the nation-state model, which he sees as oppressive and totalitarian because it tends to standardize identity via the exercise of discursive power. As a remedy, he celebrates European integration as a post-modernist reconstruction of the 'sovereignty–governmentality matrix'. Inasmuch as the EU goes beyond the traditional practices of territorial statehood, it must be embraced as a possible alternative to the modern state.

With this ideal image in mind, the author tries to deconstruct the dominant political discourse about Europe as a replication of the nation state at the continental level and declares himself committed to some radical alternative. By the deconstruction of more conventional ideas about Europe, Diez wants to create room for new constructions and reconstructions of Europe. In particular, the vision of Europe as a trans-territorial network is supposed to lead the way towards a *gestalt* shift in the direction of new and less violent forms of social identity. In a nutshell, the author wants to create horizons that make it easier to do justice to one's responsibility *vis-à-vis* the 'other'.

Accordingly, Diez declares himself committed to the project of Europe as a network of many worlds cooperating in the one world (or at least in the one Europe). The project of Europe as a new type of multilayered polity is opposed to the conventional idea of the 'United States of Europe'. Against this, Diez calls for building a Europe of regions, invoking the principle of subsidiarity. The author explicitly declares himself to be a radical, i.e. reflective and post-positivist, social constructivist. Correspondingly, Thomas Diez shows himself agnostic about the possibility of referring to an extra-discursive reality in order to raise truth claims. When applied to EU studies, this means that the fundamental questions do not relate to the one truth but rather to the different ways in which the EU is constructed by different actors.[22]

A variety of sometimes more, sometimes less radical versions of social constructivism can also be seen at work in the volume *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, edited by Knud Erik Jørgensen (1997a; cf. 1997b). In the introduction, the editor refers to familiar criticisms raised against post-positivism, namely the missing suitability of post-positivism for the formulation of empirical research programmes. Against this, Jørgensen states that post-positivism is 'clearly compatible with the design of research programmes', and that 'reflective scholars who wish to conduct theoretically informed empirical research on European governance cannot allow themselves the luxury of a comfortable, postmodernist position' (p. 7). It is the declared aim of the volume to reconcile constructivist theorizing with empirical methodology. Regardless of this broad orientation, however, several articles in the volume do not point to the envisaged direction. Among them there are at least two contributions where discourse analysis looms large: one author analyses the development of the British discourse about European integration (Larsen 1997b; cf. 1997a), while another author does basically the same for France (Holm 1997).[23]

Despite these lapses into a supposedly comfortable postmodernist position, in the epilogue of the volume we again find a call for the development of a reflective research programme on European governance. Under the banner of ontological realism, Janne Haaland Matlary (1997) takes her distance from radical constructivism and postulates a sort of material substratum for social reality. Although she does express strong reservations against positivism, she nevertheless calls for the formulation of empirical generalizations or 'laws'. This amounts to a rapprochement of human science (interpretive approach, intersubjectivity, contextual understanding) towards positive science. This rapprochement is

accompanied by a parallel dissociation from post-positivism. On the one hand, we observe a vector towards positive science. On the other hand, social constructivism is supposed to float freely between positivism and post-positivism. Although formally still sailing under the flag of reflectivism, *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* (Jørgensen 1997a) already prefigures the epistemic strategy of middle-ground constructivism outlined in *The Social Construction of Europe* (Christiansen *et al.* 1999; 2nd edn 2001).

The JEPP special issue and the theoretical problems with the strategy of middle-ground constructivism have been discussed in the 'Proto-Constuctivism' section. It is not necessary to return to these issues in the present context. In any case, it has become clear from the discussion of proto-constructivist and radical-constructivist contributions that there is more to the social construction of Europe than is recognized by middle-ground constructivists. It is simply not true that the social construction of Europe 'has not received any systematic attention from constructivist scholars' before the appearance of the JEPP special issue (Christiansen *et al.* 1999: 528). We have discussed not only the proto-constructivist contributions by A. Smith (1992), Neumann and Welsh (1991), Wæver (1995), and M. Smith (1996), but also the radical-constructivist contributions by Diez (1995, 1996), Larsen (1997a, 1997b), and U. Holm (1997). Even from within the constructivist middle ground, there was at least one systematic study before the appearance of the JEPP special issue (Jachtenfuchs 1996).

As a result it turns out that the so-called constructivist 'middle ground' has no legitimate monopoly on constructivist theorizing about European integration. This is confirmed by an assessment of more recent constructivist contributions to the field of EU studies. These contributions are highly diverse, with only a minority following the pattern of empirical research envisaged by the so-called 'middle ground'. Without going much into detail, this becomes evident from a short, and certainly incomplete, inventory of constructivist contributions to European integration theory published after 1998.

Some of these contributions do have a positivist outlook. For example, this is true for a study about how the EU has been constituted as a global actor in different policy areas (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). The quest for empirical applicability is also evident in constructivist studies about the European Monetary Union (Marcussen 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Risse *et al.* 1999a; Risse 2003). One may add a research project about the nationalization of European identity (Marcussen *et al.* 1999; Marcussen and Roscher 2000; Cowles *et al.* 2001), a book about different national approaches to European institution building (Jachtenfuchs 2002), and a study about the causal role of ideas at the origins of the EU (Parsons 2002). All these contributions are compatible with the epistemic strategy of middle-ground constructivism, i.e. they combine a social ontology with a rationalist epistemology (cf. also Jupille *et al.* 2003).

Other contributions are explicitly going beyond the limits of positivist epistemology. This holds true for an essay about the eastward enlargement of the EU (Fierke and Wiener 1999). There is a variety of analyses about how Europe is reflected in the discourse about national identity in different European countries

(Wæver 1998d, 1998f; Hansen and Wæver 2002; Diez 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Larsen 1999; Græger *et al.* 2002), and at the level of the European Union as a whole (Larsen 2000). There is also a constructivist study about the *acquis communautaire* with regard to European citizenship (Wiener 1998b), and a book about the implications of legal integration for IR theory (Wind 2000; cf. 2001). One may add an essay about EU treaty reform (Christiansen and Jørgensen 1999) and another essay about the social construction of the *acquis communautaire* (Jørgensen 1999).[24]

Conclusion

If one looks at international theory in the 1990s and 2000s, diversity is reduced by three strategies. Scholars at the positivist end of the spectrum represent the theoretical debates in the discipline as a friendly conversation between enlightened positivists and moderate constructivists; post-positivists tend to be excluded (Katzenstein *et al.* 1998; Sørensen 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Pollack 2001). Scholars at the post-positivist end of the spectrum represent international theory as a battlefield where post-positivist approaches should be united in their opposition to the mainstream; the attempt of middle-ground constructivists to bridge the gulf between positivism and post-positivism is seen as a treason of the common cause (S. Smith 2000b, 2001). Nevertheless, middle-ground constructivists offer themselves as a third party to transcend the mutually exclusive theoretical claims of positivism and post-positivism; they promise to offer a workable compromise position between the extremes (Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Wendt 1999).

This seems to be a sort of intellectual game that has more to do with academic turf-wars than with finding the right answers to the right questions (Peterson 2001; Verdun 2003; cf. Puchala 1972; Risse-Kappen 1996). It derives its appeal from the fact that the debates in the IR discipline are still gravitating around positivism as the theoretical 'zero point'. The ontological and epistemological stakes are tremendously high.

> If constructivism and rationalism are indeed emerging as the defining poles of international relations theory, . . . then we must necessarily fall back on careful, empirical testing of rationalist and constructivist hypotheses as the ultimate, and indeed the only, standard of what constitutes 'good work', and what constitutes support for one or the other approach.
>
> (Pollack 2001: 236)

It is easy to see that this would mean 'game over' for post-positivist attempts to challenge the theoretical mainstream.

In this chapter I have taken full part in that game. Over the last twenty pages I have been opposing *ad nauseam* the positivist establishment against post-positivism, with the constructivist middle ground between the fronts. At the same time, I have also subverted that game by laying bare its utmost absurdity. Now the moment has come to stop playing the game. I suggest that, in the final analysis, it might

have been unwise for social constructivists to play the game in the first place. If you can't win one game, why not play another? Why not simply ignore the opposition of positivism versus post-positivism and take a more pragmatist stance?

This can easily be done. Arguably, social constructivism can be reconciled with scientific pragmatism much better than with positivism.[25] A refusal to play the academic game outlined above would not be tantamount to the end of reasonable truth claims (Haas and Haas 2002). On the contrary, instead of taking positivism as the gravitational centre of the discipline, constructivists can choose a pragmatist stance towards metatheory. Even if European integration is not considered to be a test case for the empirical validity of positivism as opposed to constructivism, nothing prevents constructivists from seeing European integration as a contested ground to which different theoretical approaches raise their claims. In such an optic, the main dispute is whether or not it is reasonable to contend that important aspects of European integration are, or are not, better explained by constructivism than by other approaches.

That is not so far from what positivist and post-positivist scholars actually *do* in their work, even if they don't say so. For example, we may bracket the methodological claims made in the preface to Andrew Moravcsik's *Choice for Europe* (1998) and look at what the author actually *does* in his case studies about EU treaty reform. It turns out that Moravcsik derives competing predictions from different theoretical approaches to European integration. Then he confronts these predictions with a theoretically informed account of the development of the EU from Messina to Maastricht. The results are then given in the following form:

1   In the phase of preference formation, it is rather economic than geopolitical interests that determine the formulation of national bargaining positions.
2   In the phase of interstate bargaining, it is rather asymmetrical interdependence than supranational authority to determine the outcome.
3   When it comes to institutional choice, it is rather the enlightened interest of nation-states in the credibility of their mutual commitments than federalist ideology or centralized technocratic management what prompts nation states to delegate or pool decision-making competence at the supranational level.

This is a far cry from rigorous corroboration or falsification. European integration is treated as a storehouse of historical evidence to which different theoretical approaches raise competing claims. In a specific empirical setting, the differential legitimacy of these claims is examined. This opens a perspective for inter-theoretical competition. Nothing prevents alternative theoretical perspectives, such as constructivism, from raising competing claims. It is not so difficult, for example, to show that in Moravcsik's book there is an implicit bias. The author exclusively analyses grand bargains, i.e. intergovernmental conferences, while neglecting other aspects of European integration, such as the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Against this, social constructivists can point out that, in the valleys between the mountain peaks of intergovernmental conferences, Europe is far less intergovernmental than Moravcsik assumes (Jørgensen 1999; Bretherton and

Vogler 1999; Wind 2000, 2001; Greve and Jørgensen 2002). Moreover, it can be shown that Moravcsik's idea of a purely endogenous interest formulation at the domestic level is flawed. European integration has an impact on how national interests are defined and how identity is construed in the member states (Larsen 1997a, 1999; Wæver 1998d; Diez 1999a, 2001).

Social science can be understood by analogy to a court of justice where competing truth claims are weighed against each other (Kratochwil 2001). Social science may also be understood by analogy to *condottieri* warfare, where mercenary troops try to circumvent each other according to professional stratagems, sometimes shedding blood but never shattering the enemy completely. Nobody ever loses the whole war, but everybody knows when a battle is lost.[26] In this optic, European integration may be understood as an arena where hypotheses derived from competing theoretical frameworks are applied. European integration should not be seen as a test case for the validity of universally applicable theoretical truth claims. Rather, it should be understood as a contested ground where constructivism has to compete with other theoretical frameworks for the most plausible account of an empirical domain. If social constructivists can show that their theorizing allows the explanation of relevant aspects of European integration that could not be explained as convincingly by other approaches, their framework must be welcomed as a legitimate and valuable contribution to the theory of European integration. European integration may not be a test case in the positivistic sense, but it certainly is a contested area where empirical evidence should be used to settle the truth claims raised by competing theoretical approaches.

Part III

Theoretical reconstruction

Until now the examination has been concerned with knowledge production in territorially based academic communities (Part I) and epistemic strategies of issue-related 'schools' and approaches (Part II). It has turned out that the 'Nordic network' of multi-level research cooperation is better equipped than the Continental European communities of IR scholars to resonate in the international arena of the discipline. With regard to epistemic strategies to challenge the binary oppositions that are so typical of American IR, it seems that the 'strategy of equidistance' is superior to the 'strategy of rapprochement'.

The problem with these two insights, however, is that their realization is largely beyond the reach of the individual scholar. It would certainly take a huge effort to change the deeply engrained Italian and French academic cultures. In a similar way, to establish a theoretical third way usually requires a whole intellectual movement. So what can the individual scholar do, if he does not want to wait till kingdom come, to gain from the intellectual diversity of European IR?

I would argue that this is much simpler than it might seem. If you have the ingredients, you can do the cooking. European approaches to IR theory provide a valuable stock from which to draw innovative theoretical insights. They are worthwhile due to the diversity of theoretical traditions that can be activated to say something new and thereby fertilize the field. Of course it would be possible to effect this via another metatheoretical diatribe. However, at this point of my investigation I choose a different strategy. The book has already brought to the fore so many theoretical achievements from so many European countries that it has become possible to 'do it' here and now. Or, in other words: instead of outlining the principles for writing a cookbook, I will use the available ingredients to demonstrate what I understand by 'good cuisine'. I am going to use only the best ingredients, whether from the United States or from Europe or from elsewhere, and I will try to show that the selective use of European approaches makes it possible to prepare something more tasty and more nutritive than the customary theoretical junk food.

According to this outlook, the third and last part of my book consists of only one essay. It contains a chapter about 'The meaning of new medievalism', which is an exercise in theoretical reconstruction. The attentive reader will see many of the substantive contributions to IR theory discussed in the course of the book resurface

in a new context. All these different theoretical approaches will be brought into a fictitious dialogue with one another and with American approaches. This is in order to resolve a current problem of the discipline: namely, the challenge to find an adequate diagnosis of the perceived long-time historical transformation at millennium's turn. As a point of departure, the apparent contradictions between globalization, fragmentation and sovereign statehood are analyzed. Neither conventional IR theory nor the discourse about globalization seems able to account for these contradictions. As a conceptual alternative, the notion of 'new medievalism' is introduced.

For diagnostic purposes, medievalism is defined as 'a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims'. In this optic, the 'old' Middle Ages were characterized by a highly fragmented and decentralized network of sociopolitical relationships, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. In an analogous way, the neo-medieval world is characterized by a complicated web of societal identities, held together by the antagonistic organizational claims of the nation-state system and the transnational market economy. New medievalism provides a conceptual synthesis that will hopefully help to transcend some of the deadlocks of current IR theory and give a better grasp of historical change in the present conjuncture.

The chapter entitled 'The meaning of new medievalism' stands as an example for a whole new genre of IR scholarship, which I would call 'theoretical reconstruction'. Nothing should prevent IR scholars from posing whatever theoretical puzzle interests them, and from trying to find innovative solutions by arranging a fictitious conversation among theoretical voices. What is at stake is a new culture of scientific argument that is both critical and problem-oriented. The floor should be kept open to contributions from all parts of the world, from the United States to Latin America and from Eastern Europe to the Asian-Pacific, but western European approaches to IR theory arguably have much to offer to such an ongoing dialogue among theoretical voices.

7   The meaning of new medievalism

An exercise in theoretical reconstruction

More than forty years ago, in a climate of acute superpower competition, the classical realist author Arnold Wolfers made the following observation.[1]

> There is no medieval theory on the subject of international relations properly speaking, because under what has been called the theory of universal community, political activity within European Christendom was not conceived in terms of a dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy; theoretically, relations between pope and emperor and between feudal kings were expected to follow the same rules and moral principles as those between kings and subordinate feudal lords, or between kings and their subjects. . . . Even today it is not fantastic to speak of recent changes within the international arena as pointing toward a kind of 'new medievalism'. The trend would seem to be toward complexities that blur the dividing lines between domestic and foreign policy. We are faced once again with double loyalties and overlapping realms of power.
>
> (Wolfers 1962: 241–2)

This statement contains an appealing promise. At least potentially, understanding the Middle Ages can offer a background for the diagnostic of macro-historical change in the present. Taking into account the historical context of the Cold War, it is hardly surprising that, after a very brief discussion, Wolfers came to the conclusion that medieval theory did not satisfactorily account for what was going on in international politics. And indeed, from a realist standpoint, the notion of a medievalist international relations theory is a contradiction in terms, since international politics presumes the existence of the modern state system. Nevertheless, 'new medievalism' is introduced by Arnold Wolfers as a possible starting point for the conceptual reformulation of world politics at some future time.

Since 1962, the concept of new medievalism has led the quiet life of a sleeping beauty. It was reconsidered, refined and again dismissed by Hedley Bull in the mid-1970s (Bull 1977; cf. also Vacca 1971; Eco *et al.* 1973; Eco 1977), after which it was largely abandoned. Only recently has the concept again attracted some figures in public writing (Hassner 1992; Riva and Ventura 1992; Minc 1993;

Kaplan 1994; Cardini and Lerner 2001). At the same time, some IR scholars have begun to speculate about the possibility of a neomedieval world order (Held 1991: 222–7, 1995: 137–40; Tanaka 1996; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996: 30–1; Linklater 1998; Cerny 1998; Kobrin 1999; Rengger 2000; Gilpin 2001; cf. Friedrichs 2001). But in so far as all of these speculations make a rather impressionistic use of the neomedieval analogy, it seems fair to say that the meaning of new medievalism has never been thoroughly explored (but see Friedrichs 2001, 2004).

In this chapter, I set out to revisit new medievalism as a macro-analytical tool and to show its suitability for the reconceptualization of world politics 'after Westphalia'. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, it is commonplace that the present historical juncture poses a profound challenge to conventional wisdom about international relations. This broadly shared sentiment makes it plausible to reach out for new analytical frameworks and vocabularies in order to capture the ongoing transformation of world politics. One possible site for such a new framework is the powerful discourse about 'globalization'. Another one might be the conceptual map provided by new medievalism.

Since there is an inherent competition between conventional IR theory, 'globalization', and 'new medievalism', it will not be out of place to explain why I deem both conventional IR theory and the discourse about globalization insufficient to fully account for the present historical transformation. After this brief and preliminary excursus in the first two sections, in section number three I come to the main part of the essay, i.e. the conceptual exploration of new medievalism. In the fourth section, I offer an analysis of the concept's normative corollaries for the proper relationship between the realms of politics, economics, and civil society. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of new medievalism and an assessment of its consequences for the fundamental values shared by most of us, such as democracy, human rights, and personal autonomy.

At the heart of the essay there is a heuristic claim, an epistemic aim, and a normative concern. The heuristic claim is that it will be much easier to understand the dynamics of the post-international world when turning to the dynamics of the pre-international world. The good news about such a detour 'back to the future' is that it will help us avoid the Scylla of lofty postmodernism; the bad news, however, is that it may bring us close to the Charybdis of myopic historicism. In order to prevent the latter, I deliberately choose a creative use of the medieval world. With due apologies to the connoisseurs of medieval history, I do not aim at a deep phenomenological understanding of the Middle Ages (see Hall and Kratochwil 1993). In the context of the present conceptual Odyssey the neomedieval analogy is just that: a device to overcome the conceptual blindness we are all more or less victims of due to the powerful mental habits of the modern mindset.

The epistemic aim of the essay is to reach a deeper understanding of the ongoing reconfiguration of world politics. The concept of new medievalism will be helpful for the development of analytical categories to further this end. This brings me to

my normative concern. I make no bones about the fact that I feel uncomfortable with the discourse about globalization, which threatens to colonize the realms of both politics and society. Against the hegemony of the globalization discourse, the theoretical concept of new medievalism is supposed to provide an embryonic alternative.

The triple dilemma of IR theory

Over the last ten years or so, in the disciplines of IR and International Political Economy there has been much talk about globalization and fragmentation in a world of nation states. As a matter of fact, there is an observable trend towards more regional integration and interdependence at the global level; at the same time, there is a countervailing trend towards the emergence and re-emergence of regional, national and subnational divisions; and in spite of these divergent tendencies, the modern state system is surprisingly resilient to erosion by supra-national, transnational and subnational challenges; the Leviathan is somewhat exhausted, but not dying (Scholte 1997).

The heralds of globalization in public writing and social science claim that national sovereignty is growing more and more elusive. From their point of view, the state is on the retreat, reactive to global forces that it is unable to control any more. The diffusion of new technologies, particularly in the fields of production, capital mobility, and communications, has led to a global convergence in patterns of production, trade, finance, and consumerism. At the same time, globalization creates constraints that undermine the autonomy of the nation state to act as the protagonist rather than the executor of its own fate (Strange 1988).

Simultaneously and rather paradoxically, attentive observers of cultural diversity point to the opposite trend, i.e. fragmentation and decomposition. Regardless of territorial jurisdictions, regional and subnational communities are permanently constituted and reconstituted along ethnic, cultural and religious lines. New allegiances become dominant and challenge the nation state's traditional monopoly of legitimate political action in the international sphere (Badie and Smouts 1992). Consequently, the international system of sovereign nation states is in a deep crisis, torn by alternative splits, whether modern, pre-modern, or postmodern.

However, there happens to be no viable alternative to the problem-solving capacity of the nation state in crucial realms of social life, namely the provision of political peace and social order within national borders, and the organization of collective action within and beyond national territories. Moreover, it is factually untrue that the nation-state system is vanishing because of globalization and fragmentation. When considered from an empirical perspective, the modern state system is moving in two opposite directions simultaneously; towards global integration on the one hand and towards local fragmentation on the other. At the same time, however, there is no hard empirical evidence for the imminent demise of the state.[2]

As far as I can see, no available theory is suited to give a balanced account of the trend towards simultaneous globalization and fragmentation in a continuing

world of nation states. This amounts to a tantalizing paradox, one we may call 'the triple dilemma of current IR theory': when talking about globalization, one is in danger of being blind to the opposite trend of fragmentation; when shifting to the discourse about fragmentation, one can hardly grasp the evidence of globalization; and both the discourse about globalization and the discourse about fragmentation are blind to the fact that the nation-state system continues to monopolize the lion's share of legitimate action in world politics; however, when returning to the familiar discourse about sovereign statehood, one becomes unable to capture the evidence of either globalization or fragmentation.

The following quotation by the French IR scholar Pierre Hassner is emblematic of the outlined theoretical dilemma:[3]

> Peace or War? Utopia or nightmare? Global solidarity or tribal conflict? Nationalism triumphant or the crisis of the nation-state? Progress on civil rights or persecution of minorities? New world order or new anarchy? There seems to be no end to the fundamental dilemmas and anguished questions provoked by the post-Cold War world. One is almost tempted to turn to the language of myth and fairy tale. Perhaps we should blame the witches and bad fairies that made their wishes over the cradle of the latest born of the international systems. Perhaps the prince has been turned into a monster and will never recover his original form. Perhaps the fall of the Soviet empire has torn a hole in the heavens and in the ground underfoot, allowing us to glimpse through the ruins of the postwar structures both the shining prospect of a global community and the swarming menace of unrestrained violence.
>
> (Hassner 1995b: 335)

There is a desperate need for the IR discipline to find an adequate theoretical response to these questions. It becomes more and more intolerable that, after the end of the Cold War and in the face of global integration and local fragmentation, the discipline is still meandering between:

- the traditional state-centric approach to international relations that was predominant in IR as an academic discipline during the last fifty years;
- the discourse about globalization, according to which nation states are being eroded by the unifying forces of economic, technological and societal transformations;
- the discourse about fragmentation, according to which nation states are being eroded by the (re)emergence of cleavages along ethnic, cultural and religious lines.

Each of the three perspectives does capture an important part of reality, while failing to account for other fundamental aspects of international life.

If we really want to overcome the triple dilemma of current IR theory, we will have to tackle the crunch question of how it is possible to reconcile the three perspectives, or at least to give a balanced account of the reality of globalization

and fragmentation in a world of nation states. In this essay, I suggest that the advent of globalization, the progressive fragmentation of society, and the resilience of the nation-state system are all part of one and the same story. It is an obvious intellectual challenge to make sense of the trend towards simultaneous globalization and fragmentation in a world of nation states. However, I contend that precisely the temptation to pose this trend as an existential trilemma is, in the final analysis, a product of the modern *forma mentis*. We have so much difficulty in imagining a post-international world precisely because we are still captive to the modern a priori that a coherent order cannot be organized if not from exactly one organizing principle.

The limitations of the globalization discourse

Probably the most awkward aspect of the outlined theoretical and empirical deadlock is the trend toward simultaneous globalization and fragmentation, a trend that appears to be incompatible with, or incomprehensible in terms of, existing theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, there are some globalization theorists who claim to have overcome the dilemma under the heading of 'uneven globalization'.[4]

In this optic, fragmentation is a backward-looking reaction to globalization in an environment of eroding nation states. Globalization is interpreted as the expression of a secular trend towards integration, whereas fragmentation is seen as a paradoxical reaction against that trend (Holm and Sorensen 1995; Jung 1998; Forschungsgruppe 1996; Zürn 1998: 256–309). By the construction of a causal chain that leads from globalization to the erosion of the nation state, and from there to the reaffirmation of anachronistic identifications, the resurgence of ethnic, cultural, local and religious cleavages is degraded to the ontological rank of a contingent epiphenomenon (cf. even Luhmann 1997: 806–12). In the final analysis, this seems to imply an imperturbable creed in the power of modernization and progress.[5] But at least to the detached observer, notions of irreversible progress are readily disconfirmed by developments that point in the opposite direction. Such counter-evidence should not be prematurely dismissed. The a priori conviction that one body of evidence (globalization) represents a secular trend, whereas the other (fragmentation) corresponds only to a contingent reaction, is ultimately based on an ontological prejudice. If one does not want to subscribe to this prejudice, one has to recognize that the theory of uneven globalization does not provide a convincing solution to the theoretical dilemma of globalization and fragmentation.

This leads to a more general reserve against the globalization discourse, namely against the inherent tendency of 'globalization' to assimilate the spheres of politics and society into the conceptual sphere of the economy. As a matter of fact, there is a broad consensus that the economy is the engine of globalization, whether operating directly as the capitalist world system (Immanuel Wallerstein) or via a variety of causal chains, e.g. technological progress and transnational society (James Rosenau). It does not change very much to read globalization as a response

to the global risks of modernity (Ulrich Beck) or as the diffusion of the western mode of consumption (McDonaldization), as long as the economy remains the engine that produces these effects. In the final analysis, it happens to be almost always the economy that makes globalization go. Concomitantly, it is fair to say that the globalization discourse is inherently economistic.[6]

This may not be a problem for globalization as an analytical vocabulary for the description of some aspects of historical change (Clark 1997). However, the globalization discourse usually does not stop here. It frequently claims explicitly or implicitly to be an overall framework for a coherent narrative about ongoing long-term transformations. And it is easy to see that, as an overall historical narrative, the globalization discourse does make inroads into the realms of politics and society. For example, globalization is said to induce the transnationalization of the nation state (Robert Cox), whereas the reaffirmation of local particularities is downplayed as an expression of 'uneven globalization' (see above) or 'glocalization' (Roland Robertson). Laying aside for a moment the question of internal theoretical consistency, it is obvious that by such inroads the economistic globalization discourse reduces the practical and conceptual autonomy of politics and society. Or, to use a slightly hackneyed expression of Critical Theory: the 'economy' threatens to colonize both 'society' and 'politics'.

If we really want to get out of the labyrinth, however, it is of little avail to substitute the primacy of politics with the primacy of the economy, as the globalization discourse does. Therefore, I agree with critical theorists and postmodernists that we should be careful not to privilege one discourse over the other. Nevertheless, the familiar answers of critical theory and postmodernism are somewhat too remote from experience to provide a viable alternative. In order to hark back to my speculations about the current transformation of world affairs as being due to something that doubtlessly pre-exists in the collective consciousness of the western world, it will therefore not be pointless to turn to the Middle Ages as a world which was neither anarchic nor organized around one, and only one, discursive and organizational centre. The Middle Ages certainly knew its major crises (such as Black Death, the Hundred Years' War and the papal schism of the fourteenth century), but the system indisputably lasted for centuries. This will make it somewhat more difficult to dismiss my speculations as unrealistic or utopian. It will be explored whether from the recognition of medievalism as a possible 'state of the world' we can draw some insights to better understand the incipient post-international configuration of our present time.

New medievalism: towards a conceptual synthesis

From a metatheoretical point of view, there are at least three ways of avoiding the deadlock between state-centric approaches on the one hand, and globalization and fragmentation on the other:

1   Political history: we may widen our horizon, diachronically, beyond the emergence of the western state system. In this optic, the Westphalian order of

sovereign states is a historically unique anomaly which had a beginning, and which will also have an end. This expansion of perspective can help us to become more detached from the illusion that the modern state system is the only possible inter-polity order. History is full of alternative ordering principles such as empires, leagues of city-states, theocracies, and so on.[7]

2　Functional differentiation: we may accept the hypothesis that, synchronically, there is a plurality of competing organizational logics pervading world society. For example, there may be one logic of international political relations and another logic of transnational economic relations. If we deem it necessary, the account may be broadened to include a logic of the legal system, a logic of science, of symbolic reproduction, etc. The interplay between these organizational logics allows for the explanation of the paradoxes of the modern world as the outcome of interfering social systems generated by functional differentiation (Luhmann 1971, 1997).[8]

3　Historical genealogy: we may combine the first and the second approach outlined above. In such a perspective, the competing organizational logics are interpreted as trans-epochal historical forces. The international order of a given epoch is interpreted as a particular arrangement of distinctive organizational logics. This leads us to a multifaceted genealogy of global reality in which the modern state system is one of many possible transitory configurations, characterized by the hegemonic position of international political relations.[9]

In this chapter I locate the emergent post-international world within such a historical genealogy. I suggest that the primacy of political relations between sovereign nation states may be coming to an end, leaving space to a less homogeneous configuration. The claim of the state system to the monopoly of legitimate political action in the international realm is progressively challenged by the transnational market economy. At the same time, the sphere of symbolic reproduction is breaking free from the state. Both in western and non-western societies, the individual's allegiances are increasingly directed towards social groups other than the state. All this creates a situation of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, which are held together by the competing universal claims of the nation-state system on the one hand, and the transnational market economy on the other.

There may be some doubts whether such a system is viable. In order to dissipate such doubts right from the outset, I will elaborate my representation of the post-international world in analogy to a historical configuration that has indisputably worked: the Middle Ages in western Christendom between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. This will allow the dissipation of the apparent contradictions between state-centrism, globalization and fragmentation on a higher level, and to incorporate the three perspectives into one overarching narrative.

I will begin with a brief characterization of new medievalism in its conventional signification. The concept was defined in the mid-1970s by Hedley Bull as 'a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty'. An intuitive problem with

this definition is that the system it describes would be bound to be unstable. In historical reality, however, the Middle Ages were not as unstable as we might expect, and the sociopolitical fragmentation of medieval times was balanced by the dual universalism of the Empire and the Church. This observation leads us to a redefinition of medievalism as 'a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims'. This redefinition is aimed at adapting the concept of new medievalism to the analytical needs of contemporary IR theory. Subsequently, I try to identify the functional equivalent to the medieval dualism of the Empire and the Church in contemporary world politics. And indeed, it turns out that the nation-state system and the transnational market economy are powerful organizational patterns with universalistic aspirations that operate as an effective counter-balance to the centrifugal effects of social fragmentation. This will help to understand how and why in the emergent post-international world, as in its medieval counterpart, there is a certain degree of stability and coherence despite the absence of one encompassing organizational principle.

Defining new medievalism

In the 1970s, Hedley Bull (1977: 254–5, 264–76) in his book *The Anarchical Society* speculated about alternatives to the modern state system and considered new medievalism as one possible path towards a new world order. In order to avoid fashionable concept-dropping and superficial application, it will be worthwhile to recall briefly the meaning of the concept as it was formulated in what was to become the *locus classicus* for any further reference:

> It is . . . conceivable that sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by a world government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above. The universal political order of Western Christendom represents an alternative to the system of states. . . . All authority in medieval Christendom was thought to derive ultimately from God and the political system was basically theocratic. It might therefore seem fanciful to contemplate a return to the medieval model, but it is not fanciful to imagine that there might develop a modern and secular counterpart of it that embodies its central characteristic: a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty.
>
> (Bull 1977: 254)

According to Bull's characterization, the organizational form of the medieval world was a 'system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty'.[10] For a neomedieval system this would mean that the supremacy of the nation state should

become more and more elusive. But are we really moving towards the emergence of such a post-international system? In order to establish whether the modern nation-state system is moving towards new medievalism or not, Bull proposed the following criteria of evaluation:

1   the regional integration of states;
2   the disintegration of some states;
3   the restoration of private international violence;
4   the emergence of transnational organizations;
5   the technological unification of the world.

After thorough examination, Bull came to the conclusion that, at least in the 1970s, there were certain trends but no sufficient evidence for the emergence of new medievalism (pp. 264–75).

In the changed international environment of our present time, however, this appraisal should be reassessed. In particular, we observe that (1) there is more regional integration, both in Europe and elsewhere; especially the EU resembles a dynamic multilayer system in which national sovereignty becomes increasingly elusive;[11] (2) there are more and more examples of disintegrating states; as a matter of fact, it can be rather cumbersome to determine who is sovereign in every single fragment of Afghanistan, Somalia, and so on; (3) there is a re-emergence of private international violence in the shape of organized crime, terrorism, and private mercenary troops;[12] (4) there is a proliferation and increasing significance of non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and other trans-national entities; (5) particularly in the developed world, we observe a progressive technological unification, especially in the area of information technologies. In a word: according to Bull's criteria of evaluation, at millennium's turn there is impressive evidence that the world is moving towards new medievalism.[13]

We are now in a position to embed, at least preliminarily, the concept of old and new medievalism into a broader historical narrative.[14] The old medieval order in western Christendom, understood as a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, worked for centuries in a precarious coexistence with other forms of political order, especially in eastern Christendom and the Islamic world (Wight 1977b). Subsequently, early modern rationalization led to a reorganization of political order in the western world and to the progressive evolution of the nation-state system.[15] In that system, sovereign nation states claimed to hold the monopoly of legitimate political action *vis-à-vis* other actors. From the beginning of modernity to decolonization, the system of sovereign nation states expanded territorially over the globe and displaced all competing conceptions of political order (Bull and Watson 1984). However, in the changed environment of the contemporary world, the hegemonic claim posed by the nation-state system is again problematic. Older conceptions of political order along ethnic, cultural and religious lines begin to re-emerge, particularly in the periphery but also in the western world. The international system is moving towards new medievalism, i.e. back to a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties.

What implications does this have for the prospects of a peaceful world? Hedley Bull ultimately rejects new medievalism as an attractive path to world order, since 'there is no assurance that it would prove more orderly than the states system, rather than less. . . . [I]f it were anything like the precedent of western Christendom, it would contain more ubiquitous and continuous violence and insecurity than does the modern states system' (Bull 1977: 255). In a similar vein, the French author Bertrand Badie (1995: 256) sees the nation-state system as torn between the contradicting forces of globalization and fragmentation, either resisting or leaving space to a new world disorder. In his provocative article 'The coming anarchy', the American author Robert Kaplan (1994) tells a nightmare of the world going back to the Dark Ages. This author confronts us with a horror scenario of postmodernity as the return to a pre-Westphalian state of violence and disorder, at best mitigated by some cozy strongholds of communitarian neighbourhood. Another horror scenario is found in Alain Minc's bestseller *Le nouveau moyen âge* (1993; cf. Guéhenno 1993). With little hesitation, Minc (pp. 67, 203) uses the Middle Ages as a synonym for disorder. 'The new Middle Ages, like the old ones, correspond to a mobile world without a centre, where nothing is definitively fixed'. The new Middle Ages are depicted as a return to the Dark Ages, when reason had not yet illuminated mankind and life was brutish and nasty.[16]

Fortunately, one does not have to know much about history to realize that such an equation of the Middle Ages with the Hobbesian state of nature is factually wrong. Remember that in the Middle Ages, in addition to the centrifugal forces, there was a strong countervailing tendency of ecclesiastical and secular universalism that generated a considerable degree of systemic cohesiveness. It is simply mistaken to oppose medieval disorder and violence to an alleged modern world order. What about such *modern* experiences as total warfare and mutual assured destruction? It is a sad truism that disorder and violence have walked along with history, and at present there are no signs that violence and disorder are going to disappear. The all-or-nothing dichotomy between modern order and medieval chaos is deeply flawed, since it implies the ontological prejudice of taking the sovereign nation state for the only possible guarantor of order.

As Bull himself (1977: 256) recognizes, 'our view of possible alternatives to the states system should take into account the limitation of our own imagination and our own inability to transcend past experience'. As a matter of fact, it is a gross simplification to elaborate a concept of medievalism that ignores the fundamental unity of the medieval world. Although Bull explicitly recognizes this unity, his definition of medievalism as a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties focuses too much on fragmentation. In reality, medieval order was not only fragmented into a decentralized plurality of authorities and allegiances; as a counterpoise to these centrifugal forces, the social system was held together by Christian universalism, embodied by the Pope as 'the rock upon which the Church is constructed, entitled to bind and to solve all things in heaven and on earth' (Matthew 16: 18–19; cf. Ullmann 1961, 1970). From the eleventh century onwards, ecclesiastical universalism was supplemented by a competing form of secular universalism, embodied by the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (cf.

Osiander 2001). Moreover, in medieval society both the Catholic clergy and feudal nobility formed trans-territorial classes that helped to preserve a certain degree of uniformity across the system, although this uniformity had little to do with the centralization of the territorial state that was later to come (Spruyt 1994a: 34–57).

In accordance with the described constellation, I propose a revised definition: 'A medievalist system is a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims'.[17] This revised definition of the concept leads to a different appraisal of new medievalism. If medieval order is to have an analogy in contemporary world politics, the emergent post-international system will not only be characterized by a certain decline of the nation state as the constitutive unit of world politics; at the same time, some functional equivalent to the ecclesiastical and secular universalism of the Middle Ages shall hold the system together. If we succeed in identifying such a functional equivalent, we will not only improve the analogy, but also free ourselves from the nightmare of the world going back to the Dark Ages. In the next two subsections, I will search for the functional equivalents of medieval universalism in the post-international world. I start from a brief discussion of the homogenizing role of the nation state, which is particularistic in content but universalistic in form. After that, I discuss the transnational market economy as another institutional form that generates a considerable degree of uniformity within the world system. In synthesis, I argue that the competing universal aspirations of the nation-state system and the transnational market economy can be paralleled with the dualism of secular and ecclesiastical universalism in the Middle Ages.

Political universalism: the nation state system

The specific version of world systems theory developed by the so-called Stanford Group, which gravitates around John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas and Francisco Ramirez, gives a possible explanation of why, in spite of the centrifugal tendencies mentioned above, states actually do behave in a surprisingly similar manner (Finnemore 1996b). In their own words, Meyer *et al.* (1997: 145) are trying to 'account for a world whose societies, organized as nation-states, are structurally similar in many unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly similar ways'.

At first glance, it is indeed surprising how much even the most disparate countries, say the United States and Côte d'Ivoire, resemble each other, especially in formal terms: both of them have a president, a parliament, an army, a constitution with a human rights chapter, and an educational system with compulsory school attendance; both are sovereign members to the United Nations and other international organizations; both collect statistical data and contribute to the UN System of National Accounts; both conceive of themselves as purposive, self-interested actors, differentiated from other states only by their endowment with power capabilities, socioeconomic development, and cultural traditions (McNeely 1995).

It is rather obvious that the formal attributes mentioned above (human rights, compulsory school attendance, etc.) tend to be rather elusive in the case of many

developing states. But nevertheless, these attributes are constitutive for the international standing of Côte d'Ivoire as well as for that of the United States. It may very well be that many of the formal attributes mentioned above stand in no relation with the functional requirements of a developing state. It may very well be that Côte d'Ivoire pays a tremendous price for the mere appearance of being a state *comme il faut*. Notwithstanding, in the modern world there can hardly be found any state that shrinks from paying this tribute. Even revolutionary states like Libya or Iran do not get along without fulfilling the basic criteria of modern statehood.

Apparently there is some standardizing force at work. And this standardizing force cannot be reducible to the concept of rational actorhood, because 'the structuration of the nation-state greatly exceeds any functional requirements of society, especially in peripheral countries' (Meyer *et al.* 1997: 156). What is the reason why many states, even against their domestic functional requirements, pay the price of this legal and bureaucratic mimicry?[18] The answer to that puzzle is that nation states are more or less exogenously constructed entities: many defining features of the contemporary nation state derive from global models constructed and propagated through the world cultural process. At the level of the world polity, there are some diffuse general models or scripts that are constitutive to how the many individuals who engage in state formation and policy formulation define the national interests of their respective states (Finnemore 1996a; cf. Meyer and Rowan 1983). Whether they know it or not, these individuals are far from being rational, self-directed actors; rather, they enact a general model or script that conveys legitimacy to their self-understanding as political actors.

The sociological locus of the exogenous construction of the nation state is a class of political functionaries in national and international bureaucracies and international non-governmental organizations (Boli and Thomas 1999). These bureaucracies are supported by a transnational community of knowledge-based intellectuals or, in a term coined by Peter Haas, epistemic communities (P. Haas 1992a; Adler and Haas 1992). Together, political functionaries and epistemic communities produce, enact and reproduce an image of development, efficiency and rational actorhood that creates the illusion of the sovereign nation state as the privileged locus of independent and self-interested action in the international realm.

The concept of the institutionalization of world models, developed by the Stanford group, is interesting to our topic because it helps to explain why the international system, in spite of the disintegrating forces from various sides, continues to be fundamentally cohesive. The social construction and reproduction of the sovereign nation state at the level of the world polity induces a considerable amount of convergence among the actors in the international system, just as the social ethos of feudalism did in the Middle Ages.[19]

To sum up: the institutionalization of world models is a functional equivalent to the role of feudalism in the medieval world. It helps to create like units of political action. Of course, in modern times there is no direct equivalent to the Emperor or the King as the source of feudal legitimacy in the medieval world. However, both

today and in the Middle Ages there is a strong pattern of shared expectations of how legitimate political actors have to be disposed, which legitimate goals they will seek, and what is the legitimate way for them to behave.

Economic universalism: the transnational market economy

As has been argued above, in the Middle Ages there was a competition between two interdependent forms of universalism: *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. The emergent post-international world, in a similar fashion, is characterized by a competition between two organizational principles: the nation-state system and the world market economy. Both the nation-state system and the world market economy are made up of competing entities with universal aspirations, namely states and corporations. Or, to borrow a concise term coined by Susan Strange: *Rival States, Rival Firms* (Stopford *et al.* 1991; Strange 1992).

While nation states are the principal actors in the modern state system, corporations constitute the transnational market economy. Competing and cooperating on a bilateral and multilateral basis, TNCs have gained step by step an important share of power over production and finance at the global level. The allocation of production and finance is increasingly determined by private actors, not by the states. Thereby, transnational corporations have come to play an important role in world politics. Thus strengthened, TNCs are now disrupting the embedded liberalism compromise of the post-war era (Ruggie 1998a; cf. Polanyi 1944). If liberalism becomes disembedded, this leads to a much more competitive environment where the nation-state system and transnational market forces raise mutually exclusive claims for determining the rules of the game in the world political process.[20]

A transnational capitalist class of bankers, businessmen, scientists, media tycoons and so on are claiming to promote the principle of efficient allocation by the market, while at the same time pursuing particularistic aims (Strange 1998). As a social formation, the transnational managerial class is shaped by a set of broadly shared beliefs: the belief in the superiority of the market over central planning, the belief in the invisible hand that reconciles greed with social welfare, and the belief in the possible convergence of market forces with sustainable development. It is an open question to what extent the transnational capitalist class is already characterized by a specific form of class-consciousness (Pijl 1989, 1998). But be that as it may, managers in transnational corporations, decision makers at the IMF and IBRD, administrators at the WTO and OECD are involved in a universal project of regulating human relationships through the supposedly impersonal forces of the market.

This is not to deny that national patterns in the conduct of transnational corporations may endure, especially in the industrial sector (Pauly and Reich 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001). However, any global player in the world market has to adhere, at least rhetorically, to the fundamental tenets of the free-trade doctrine, although his actual behaviour may very well contradict the principles of liberal *laissez faire*. And even if industrial TNCs may still be rooted in national cultures,

financial capital is floating ever more unrestrictedly over the globe (Strange 1986; Andreff 1996). Furthermore, the transnational managerial class is supported in the formulation and maintenance of its liberal creed by a broad knowledge-based intellectual elite of economists, technocrats, and public writers.

In the present context, it is crucially important to emphasize the ideological overtones of the free-trade discourse, which become apparent when comparing words and deeds of global players in the transnational market economy (Korten 1995). For example, strategic alliances and intra-firm trade run counter to the liberal principle of unrestricted market competition. Moreover, free trade is often invoked for items that are commodities only in a very limited sense, such as jobs or intellectual property rights. This trend towards the commodification of ever more realms of human life is far from ideologically neutral (Polanyi 1944). A further example of the ideological character of the free-trade doctrine is the ongoing use of the Riccardian argument of comparative advantages. Although it can be demonstrated that the free movement of capital and labour undermines the logic of comparative advantage (Daly and Goodland 1994), the argument nevertheless continues to be invoked for the justification of liberal free trade.

The ideational basis of both the nation-state system and the world market economy is socially constructed. As we have seen, the nation state is rooted in the common world-view of a national and international bureaucratic class; in a similar way, the transnational economy can rely on the shared ideological beliefs of the managerial class. The world market economy is shaped by a socially constructed ideological pattern of market competition, whereas the nation-state system is constituted by the ideology of sovereign statehood. Thus, both the nation-state system and the world market economy can be interpreted as competing but interdependent (and anyway co-existent) hegemonic projects. In other words, the emergent post-international scene is characterized by a dyad of competing, sometimes cooperating and sometimes conflicting, organizational principles: international relations between nation states and transnational relations between corporations in the world market economy.

Let us now compare the role of the managerial class in the world market economy with the role of the clergy in the Middle Ages. The medieval clergy was characterized by a high degree of social and spatial mobility, just like the transnational managerial class in the late twentieth century. The medieval clergy was split by a permanent struggle of theological orthodoxy against manifold forms of heresy; in a similar vein, the econocrats of the late twentieth century are united by the orthodoxy of (neo)liberal *laissez faire*, although there are incorrigible heretic sects like isolationists or interventionists. There is excommunication from financial markets for stubborn states, just as there was excommunication from Christendom for reluctant secular rulers in the Middle Ages. There is a contest between the world market economy and the nation-state system for supremacy in the international sphere, just as there was a contest for supremacy between the Church and the Empire in the Middle Ages. Both the transnational managerial class and the medieval clergy have often raised the claim to outdo their political counterparts, arguing that they are better equipped to satisfy the fundamental needs of human

beings. Although today there is no functional equivalent to the Pope, the world market economy can be interpreted as an avatar of medieval ecclesiastic universalism.[21]

At last, we have come to an end of this conceptual Odyssey. We began our journey from the theoretical confusion engendered by the triple dilemma of globalization and fragmentation in a world of nation states. It transpired that conventional wisdom derived from IR theory, as well as the discourse on globalization, is insufficiently equipped to tackle this triple dilemma. As a possible way out of this trap, we considered the notion of new medievalism. However, the original definition of medievalism as a 'system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty' (Bull 1977: 254) proved somewhat too narrow. This definition neglects the unifying forces that gave to the medieval world its coherence. In order to adjust this bias, I have proposed a revised definition of medievalism as a 'system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims'. Subsequently, the neomedieval analogy was fleshed out by integrating two strands of theorizing: the Stanford group's constructivist explanation for the resilience of the state system, and some notions from International Political Economy. Thereby, we arrived at a revised notion of new medievalism which is, hopefully, superior to the intuitive understanding usually given to the term.

In my understanding, the Middle Ages were characterized by a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. In an analogous way, new medievalism can be understood as a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the nation-state system and the transnational market economy. In such a neomedieval world order, there are three spheres of action constantly interacting, each according to its own logic: the nation-state system, the transnational market economy, and society understood as a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties. There is indeed a striking similarity between the contemporary form of dyadic universalism (i.e. the competing and sometimes conflicting duality of the international state system and the transnational market economy) on the one hand, and the hegemonic conflict between the Empire and the Church in the Middle Ages on the other. For the sake of maximum clarity, a synoptic matrix will provide the schematic representation of the neomedieval analogy (Table 7.1).[22]

Normative implications

When conceiving of world politics as the interaction of the three distinct but interdependent realms of international politics, transnational economics, and civil society, it should not escape our notice that each of the three spheres represents a fundamentally distinct form of legitimacy.[23]

- The nation state is the only authority entitled to convey popular legitimacy to collective decisions at the international level. At least in principle, no TNC,

Table 7.1 Synoptic comparison of medievalism old and new

The Middle Ages were characterized by a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalties. These centrifugal forces were held together by two interdependent forms of universalism: the Empire with its claim for political legitimacy, and the Church with its more transcendental claims (*imperium* vs. *sacerdotium*).	Today we are experiencing the re-emergence of overlapping authority and multiple loyalties. These centrifugal forces are held together by two interdependent forms of universalism: the State with its claim for sovereign actorhood, and the world market economy with its claims for superior efficiency.
The social locus of secular universalism in the Middle Ages was formed by the dominant class of feudal aristocracy.	The social locus of modern political universalism is formed by an international class of policymakers and bureaucrats.
The social locus of religious universalism was the Catholic clergy. As a social class, the Catholic clergy was characterized by an extraordinary degree of spatial and social mobility.	The social locus of economic universalism is the transnational managerial class. The transnational managerial class is characterized by an extraordinary degree of spatial and social mobility.
Religious universalism was mostly supported by Catholic theology. Although to a lesser degree, even secular universalism had its organic intellectuals like Dante, Ockham, and Marsiglio.	The nation-state system and the transnational market economy are supported each by a knowledge-based elite, or epistemic community, of organic intellectuals and public writers.
Religious and secular universalism raised competing claims to supremacy. However, in the end neither of the two prevailed. Both Empire and Church declined, and the modern nation-state system emerged.	Economic and political universalism raise competing claims to supremacy. For the time being, it is unclear both how long this contest is going to last and which of the two (if any) is going to prevail.

  no NGO, and no religious movement can ever claim to speak for the people
  as nation states can.[24]
- The transnational market economy derives its legitimacy from the claim to
  superior efficiency. In the present ideological environment, it is increasingly
  difficult to deny that the market is more suitable for the allocation of certain
  values than the state.
- Societal actors derive their legitimacy from the promotion of substantial
  values. Whether human rights or sustainable development, whether class
  emancipation or Islamic values: no actor can easily dismiss these claims, if
  backed by sufficiently strong societal forces.

By their distinctive corporate nature, the nation-state system and the transna-
tional market economy implicitly raise antagonistic claims to how the organizing
principles of world politics should look like. Since neither is in a position to prevail,
they will be permanently forced to compete and to cooperate. Within this frame-
work, the fragments that make up society enjoy considerable freedom of action.

Whether individuals or associations, and whether acting at the regional, national or transnational level, societal actors increasingly succeed in eluding the control of the state apparatus. Some of them raise claim to substantive values such as human rights or true religion, and try to influence the outcome of the world political process. World politics becomes the virtual place where the competing claims of the three realms (politics, market, society) intersect.

If the neomedieval constellation is to work properly, it is absolutely crucial that each of the three realms should 'stick to its guns' and defend the legitimate claims of its own logic of action against the intrusions of the rival spheres. Of course, this is not to say that any of the three is ever going to prevail. Quite the contrary, new medievalism is characterized by the absence of any undisputed supremacy. That means that there is a permanent relationship of cooperative antagonism (or antagonistic cooperation) among the three realms. Each sphere has constantly to rebuff its rivals' attempts to invade its autonomous sphere of action.

- Societal actors have to be vigilant both against totalitarian claims that may be raised by some states, and against the colonization of their life-world by the market forces.
- Economic actors cannot allow themselves to be used for political aims in an instrumental way, nor can they be committed to societal values that run counter to the logic of the market.
- Political actors have to consolidate and to defend their collective action capacity against the particularistic concerns of societal actors and the organized interests of the economy.

The apparent symmetry suggested by this list requires the following two reservations: first, societal actors are not of the same kind as economic and political actors. Whereas the latter typically represent a distinct organizational logic, i.e. the authoritative versus the decentralized allocation of values, societal actors derive their legitimacy from the promotion of substantial values. Second, the unparalleled success of the globalization discourse is a strong indicator that, in the present situation, the weights are not evenly distributed. Economic reasoning is making inroads into the realms of politics and society, rather than the other way round.[25]

All the more, politics and society should be careful not to become assimilated by the economic discourse, and encroachments from the market should be rebuffed. Under no circumstance may the market be allowed to supplant either political or societal dynamics. States should not allow 'the reduction of the logic of politics to the logic of the economy' (Ashley 1983: 472; Parsi 1995). This would imply that states can hardly renounce from the claim for their traditional monopoly of legitimate political action in the international realm. To do so would seem to be somewhat 'out of character', although it may sometimes be advisable to leave the initiative to other actors who are better suited to solve certain problems. It is important to keep this in mind since, especially in the present constellation, political regulation continues to be indispensable both at the national and international level. A fragmented society and a disembedded market are in particular

need of an institutional framework that, at least for the time being, only the state can provide.

Conclusion

Hopefully, the neomedieval analogy will prove to be a creative and innovative device for further reflections about order in the post-international world, helping to overcome the 'tyranny of the concepts' (Bull 1977: 267).[26] To borrow a formulation coined by John Ruggie (1993: 144), I have been trying to 'search for a vocabulary . . . by means of which we can start to ask systematic questions about the possibility of fundamental international transformation today'. It is obvious that this is a pretty ambitious enterprise. If I have succeeded in giving at least some approximate indications on how such a vocabulary may look like, the essay was worth the effort.

As any theoretical artefact, new medievalism has particular strengths and weaknesses:

- We are now better equipped to solve the triple dilemma of current IR theory. Cutting across the conventional levels of analysis, the neomedieval analogy provides a framework in which, at the same time, there is conceptual space for the evidence of globalization, of fragmentation, and of nation states.[27]
- In the real world, new medievalism is a viable alternative to the primacy of either the state or the economy. Despite the competing claims of the Empire and the Church, in the Middle Ages there was a certain degree of order for centuries. Thereby, apocalyptic fears of imminent disorder can be smoothed. At least in principle, cultural pluralism is not necessarily linked with anarchy, nor is universalism with a global super-Leviathan.
- The neomedieval analogy provides a meta-narrative *in nucleo*. As such, the concept is hardly falsifiable. However, it would be unfair to regard this as a weakness. As a matter of fact, the same criticism can be raised against any other meta-narrative, such as the discourse about modernization and progress.
- Finally, I subscribe to the caveat that 'it is not possible, by definition, to foresee political forms that are not foreseeable. . . . Our view of possible alternatives to the states system should take into account the limitations of our own imagination and our own inability to transcend past experience' (Bull 1977: 256).

Obviously, the concept of new medievalism is not value-neutral, no more than any other concept of order. It has certain advantages in that it better accounts for certain anomalies of current IR theory and transcends certain limitations of modernity's mental habit; at the same time, however, the concept has also clear implications with regard to the fundamental values shared by most of us, such as democracy, human rights and personal autonomy.

First: if a neomedieval order is really in the making, there are tantalizing problems for the democratic legal state (*Rechtsstaat*). If the state is only one source of legitimacy among other sources, democracy and accountability come under stress (Held 1991). When national autonomy is under pressure, who will take over the guarantee of such fundamental democratic achievements as effective participation, adequate knowledge, control over the agenda, equal vote, and social inclusiveness? Who will monitor the implementation of binding human rights standards? It seems rather doubtful whether the market or private associations can ever fully take over these functions, once they are abandoned by the state. However, nothing in the concept of new medievalism suggests that this should happen. On the contrary, new medievalism is also about preserving and recovering a proper space for political action. All those values whose pursuit cannot be adopted by the economy or by societal actors clearly fall under the vested domain of the state.[28]

Another problem regards the proper place for the individual. How much space would the social pluralism of a neomedieval order lend to personal freedom and autonomy? This is intimately linked to the philosophical concern with the good life. It is an open question whether in a neomedieval world the individual would enjoy more or less personal freedom than in modernity. In the worst case, mankind might just be moving from the iron cage of necessity to the padded cell of interchangeable identities.[29] At any rate, it is important to emphasize that new medievalism is not tantamount to 'anything goes'. Remember that neomedieval order is held together by the competing claims of the market economy and the bureaucratic state. It seems reasonable to hope that, at least in relative terms, social pluralism in combination with dual universalism will lend rather more than less space to personal freedom and autonomy.

Finally, there is a third set of fundamental questions: are the two competing organizational logics of state and market really sufficient to guarantee cohesion in the face of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties? What about those functional systems that are not mentioned in our depiction of new medievalism, such as law, science, technology, etc.?[30] Which role do they play in the creation of generally accepted notions of legitimacy? Admittedly, these questions and preoccupations have not been addressed in this chapter, at least not explicitly (but see Friedrichs 2004). The concept of new medievalism does indeed warrant further investigation regarding its normative, conceptual and ethical implications.

Epilogue

In this book I have presented three arguments concerning knowledge production in academic peripheries and with hindsight to the construction of a 'Eurodiscipline' of IR. Every part of the book has been designed to sustain one of the three arguments.

The first argument, concerning academic sociology, deals with scientific communities at the national (France, Italy) and cross-national level (Scandinavia). Having analyzed the French attempt to reach academic self-reliance and the Italian experience with resigned marginality, it would seem that the Nordic model of multi-level research networking is the winning strategy as to how to overcome American intellectual hegemony and construct an intellectually more vibrant and more autonomous Eurodiscipline.

The second argument, concerning academic politics, deals with the way in which approaches from academic peripheries can be related to the theoretical mainstream in the centre. I argue that the quest for a theoretical third way is congenial for European scholars to challenge the American intellectual hegemony. But when it comes to the formulation of third ways to transcend the binary oppositions that are so typical of American IR, the strategy of equidistance is superior to the strategy of rapprochement.

The third argument, concerning heuristic strategies, deals with the elaboration of theoretical tools. The argument is directed towards the purpose of intellectual innovation and suggests that conceptual exploration should be a top priority in the present situation of theoretical disarray. To further this end, the individual scholar may use the proposed genre of theoretical reconstruction as a device to engage American, European, and other approaches to IR theory into a fictitious dialogue.

Taken together, the three arguments amount to a practical agenda for the piecemeal construction of a more autonomous 'Eurodiscipline' of IR. In lieu of a conclusion, let me spell out the essentials of this agenda in some more detail.

To begin with, there are two alternative conclusions to be drawn from the superiority of the Nordic model of multi-level research cooperation. On the one hand, one might be tempted to conclude that the national communities of Continental European IR scholars should try to enhance at all levels their

networking activities in order to become as similar as possible to their Nordic counterparts. On the other hand, one could also conclude that European scholars should emulate the Nordic model at the pan-European but not necessarily at the national level.

The former option is hardly practicable in the face of different organizational modes and intellectual styles (Galtung 1981). French and Italian IR may be simply too hierarchical, and the French and Italian mandarins may be simply too authoritarian, to create anything similar to the Nordic network of multi-level research cooperation. Nevertheless, it would be over-pessimistic to conclude that there is no regional research cooperation as long as European IR does not follow at all levels the egalitarian model of Nordic academia. Even if we assume that the openness shown by the Nordic network is the best possible strategy to overcome intellectual marginality, research cooperation at the pan-European level is still a second-best option.

The more hierarchical communities of IR scholars such as in France and Italy will tend to choose a more elitist mode of cooperation. This means that the top dogs of the national academic establishments will perform as gatekeepers to channel the exchange of theoretical achievements. The Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) offers a forum for such an elitist strategy. Another case of elitist cooperation is the German debate about communicative rationality in the international realm. Beginning with an article written by Harald Müller (1994), this highly interesting but rather esoteric debate about the social philosophy of Jürgen Habermas was conducted from 1994 to 1997 in the German *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*. When everything was said and done, Thomas Risse (2000) wrote an article for *International Organization* to communicate the results to the English-speaking audience.

Networking activities are not necessarily egalitarian, nor is it always necessary to conduct theoretical debates from the outset in English. What is necessary, however, is that somebody takes upon himself the role of the communicator. Moreover, local/national debates must be 'connectable' to the European/international level (on 'connectability', see Luhmann 1996: 168–9, 258–9, 391–2, 494, 590). This may be accomplished in a variety of different ways, so that European IR can continue to be a house with many mansions. A loose but persistent coordination among different partner communities is sufficient to inject theoretical innovation into the discipline and thereby to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream.

To be sure, many scholars pursue goals other than just saying interesting things and/or challenging the dominant discourse. The epistemic strategy of the constructivist middle ground illustrates this point. As has been argued in the fifth chapter, middle-ground constructivism pursues a strategy of rapprochement that is aimed at mounting the theoretical bandwagon rather than providing an alternative to the mainstream. From the viewpoint of the individual scholar there may be a variety of good reasons to pursue this strategy. However, one should not expect middle-ground constructivism to revolutionize the discipline's theoretical

equipment. In the best case middle-ground constructivists are co-opted by the mainstream, which may have the long-term effect of broadening the commonsense of what counts as a valid argument.

This will sound disappointing to those European scholars who really want to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the American mainstream. Fortunately the example of the English school shows that it is possible to offer an alternative to the mainstream by transcending the binary oppositions that are constitutive of how theory is usually done in the centre. The strategy of equidistance is a good one for European IR scholars to challenge the mainstream, while at the same time maintaining the 'connectability' of theoretical innovations to the dominant discourse.

Unfortunately the institutional and intellectual inertia of academic life is often tremendous. In the face of this, some stakeholders of academic debates may be too impatient to wait until their deans get connected to the Eurodiscipline or otherwise embark on a course of multi-level research cooperation. For similar reasons, to wait for the establishment of sound intellectual third ways beyond the binary oppositions of the American mainstream might mean to wait till kingdom come. But what can the individual scholar do to encourage the Europeanization of the discipline? How is it possible for him or her to take advantage of the theoretical diversity of European approaches to IR theory?

The answer to these questions is a familiar refrain from the 1960s: *Just do it!* At least in principle anybody is free to utilize European approaches for the purpose of theoretical reconstruction. In the present situation of theoretical disarray, there is a variety of issue-related puzzles that cannot be solved relying on conventional wisdom. Scholars like Rosenau and Ruggie have been trying for decades to expand the frontiers of what can be reasonably said in international theory. In so far as it is true that European approaches offer a high potential for theoretical cross-fertilization, it is up to European scholars themselves to amalgamate these approaches with one another and with approaches from other parts of the world.

Taken together, the Nordic model of multi-level research cooperation, the equidistance strategy of triangulation, and theoretical reconstruction provide an agenda for how to develop a Eurodiscipline and thereby fertilize the field of international theory. If European approaches to international relations theory become a real match for the American mainstream, at the end of the day the whole discipline will benefit from it.

It is worth recalling that, as has been argued in the first chapter, the preponderance of American IR is not necessarily and not always a bad thing. But be that as it may, this is the moment to break the circle of my inquiry and to pronounce a sort of *ceterum censeo*. As Richard Ashley noted more than twenty years ago (1983), the rational-choice orientation of American social science does not come without a price for the intellectual diversity of the discipline. This was said at a time when the debate about 'interdependence' was looming large in American IR. Now that 'global governance' is considered to be the political answer to the economic imperatives of globalization, Ashley's admonition is as much to the

point as ever before. Like 'interdependence' in the 1970s, 'international' and 'global governance' in the 1990s and 2000s is by and large a manifestation of anti-economistic economism.

For reasons that have to do with the present geo-economic conjuncture, the logic of politics tends to be reduced to the logic of the market. Accordingly, politics is mostly understood as dependent on the laws of the market. This triple economism (in the terminology of Ashley: 'variable economism', embedded in 'logical economism', embedded in 'historical economism') is detrimental both to the autonomy of politics as a sphere of action and to politics as a social science. On the other hand, the militarization of international politics under the leadership of only one power does not offer an attractive alternative. This is the *real* challenge for IR theory at millennium's turn. European approaches are especially valuable in so far as they open a variety of ways that may lead out of the traps of an increasingly impoverished and one-dimensional view of politics.

Notes

1 International Relations: still an American social science?

1 For more about the relationship between British and American IR, see pp. 90–2.
2 To ensure the comparability of data, the analysis has been kept as close as possible to the analytic procedure employed by Holsti (1985: 104–5). Whereas the latter refers to literature from seven countries before 1981, I have analyzed the citation patterns in a small sample of British, French and German textbooks between 1988 and 1995 (for the statistical documentation of the results see the appendix in the next footnote).
3 According to the procedure employed by Holsti (1985: 104–5), the following textbooks have been examined: G. Stern 1995; Halliday 1994; Braillard and Djalili 1988; Moreau Defarges 1990; Albrecht 1992; Pfetsch 1994; Panebianco 1992. The first of the tables inserted on p. 151 contains the results in absolute numbers; the second table contains the results in percentages.
4 This development has been predicted as far back as 1985 by Kalevi Holsti (p. 127): 'The overall trend appears to be flowing in the direction toward greater parochialism, away from the model of reasonably symmetrical communication among an international community of scholars.'
5 According to Galtung's theory, the relationships of the 'centre of the centre' with the 'peripheries of the peripheries', and of the 'periphery of the centre' with the 'centre of the periphery' can be neglected.
6 These observations are not devoid of awkward British humour, and they are clearly formulated in an impressionistic and deliberately unscientific way. Nevertheless, Brown's claims are not completely impossible to substantiate. As the author himself convincingly argues, the current American mainstream is characterized by a rational-choice mode of reasoning and an instrumentalist view of the state as a problem-solving device (cf. McKay 1991 with regard to Political Science more in general).
7 On the origins of American social science, see Crick 1959; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Seidelman and Harpham 1985; Ross 1991; Gunnell 1993.
8 For a comparative study about the theory–praxis nexus in foreign policy-making, see Girard *et al.*, 1994.
9 Another obvious stabilizer is the fact that, especially in the peripheries, patterns of professional socialization and patronage tend to perpetuate the self-encapsulation of national academic cultures.
10 According to the relevant Internet sources (August 2003), ISA can count with more than 3000 members, mostly from the United States; BISA has more than 900 members mostly from Great Britain; the IR section of the German Association of Political Science (DVPW) has approximately 300 names in its research directory; the ECPR-related Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) has approximately 350 names on the list; for the Association Française de Science Politique (AFSP) and the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA) there is no data available on the Internet.

Citation patterns (1988–95) in absolute numbers

	Nationality of author	References to own	References to USA	References to UK	References to European	References to other	Rest	Absolute number of references
Stern 1995	British	59.5	32.16	59.5	2	7.33	0	101
Halliday 1994	British	174.5	128	174.5	40.5	21.5	31.5	396
Albrecht 1992	German	61	27.5	11.5	6	3	0	109
Pfetsch 1994	German	94.5	72.66	20.83	18	19	13	238
Braillard 1988	French	9	8	6	4	3	0	30
Moreau 1990	French	42	29	6	1	2	1	81
Panebianco 1992	Italian	17.5	77.5	14	10	2	0	121

Citation patterns (1988–95) in percentages

	Nationality of author	References to own	References to USA	References to UK	References to European	References to other	Rest	Absolute number of references
Stern 1995	British	58.9	31.8	58.9	2.0	7.3	0	6
Halliday 1994	British	44.1	32.3	44.1	10.2	5.4	7.8	24
Average		51.5	32.1	51.5	6.1	6.4	3.9	15
Albrecht 1992	German	56.0	25.2	10.6	5.5	2.8	0	10
Pfetsch 1994	German	39.7	30.5	8.8	7.6	8.0	5.5	19
Average		47.9	27.9	9.7	6.5	5.4	2.8	14.5
Braillard 1988	French	30.0	26.7	20.0	13.3	10.0	0	7
Moreau 1990	French	51.9	35.8	7.4	1.3	2.5	1.2	6
Average		41.0	31.3	13.7	7.3	6.3	0.6	6.5
Panebianco 1992	Italian	14.5	64.0	11.6	8.3	1.7	0	8

11 As Tim Dunne (1998a: 360) reminds us, for the disciplinary history of IR 'the one certainty is that we can no longer expect the mirror of history to provide us with an adequate representation of how the field developed and why it remains divided'.
12 Although non-western perspectives on international affairs deserve a thorough exploration, the present study is limited to the field's evolution in western Europe.
13 Even if one dislikes structural hegemony because of its distorting effects: once a set of core–periphery relationships is institutionalized, there are often some effects of path dependency which make it less advisable to disrupt the hegemonic chains than to carry on with subordination (and anyway: before undergoing such a drastic cure it is advisable to make sure that one's own state of health is sufficiently robust to bear the treatment).
14 As has been noted above, there is no inherent contradiction between the exercise of hegemony and the internal sub-division of the centre into a 'centre of the centre' and a 'periphery of the centre' (cf. Galtung 1971).
15 In a similar way, the desperate need of the discipline for theoretical anchorage explains at least in part the longevity of the realist 'paradigm' (Guzzini 1998).
16 The same could be said of American IR, which is fragmented into a variety of intellectual environments as well.
17 See http://www.sgir.org. On European cooperation in the Social Sciences more in general, see Michel 1993.
18 This has nothing to do with recent attempts to construct a 'third way' between free market ideology and the welfare state (Giddens 1998, 2000, 2001).
19 The inter-paradigm debate was quickly abandoned in favour of a duel between the neorealist champions and their neoliberal contenders. In a similar way, the debate between rationalism, constructivism and reflectivism is now being converted into a competition between enlightened rationalists and their friendly constructivist critics. En route, there seems to be a certain trend over time from Manichean struggles (first and second debate) towards chivalrous jousting (third and fourth debate).

2 International Relations theory in France

1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as 'IR Theory in France' in the *Journal of International Relations and Development* 4 (2), pp. 118–37, © 2001 Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre of International Relations. The chapter is reprinted with permission.
2 Due to material limitations there are hardly any contributions to IR theory from francophone Africa, maybe with the exception of the Forum du Tiers Monde in Dakar, Senegal (Giesen 1995: 142). However, one should not forget the decisive contribution made to neo-Marxist International Political Economy by scholars from the African *francophonie* (Emmanuel 1969; Amin 1973).
3 In particular, Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI), Institut d'Études Politiques (IEP, Sciences Po), Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) with Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI).
4 In the terminology of Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 28–30) it is therefore appropriate to call French IR a 'failed-centre periphery'.
5 Only the French polemologist Gaston Bouthoul, in the 1970s, applied statistical methods to understand the phenomenon of war, quite similar to David Singer's Correlates of War Project (Bouthoul 1973; Bouthoul and Carrère 1976); cf. also the behaviourist outlook proposed by Steinert 1986.
6 Strategic studies: Beaufre 1963, 1964, 1966; Poirier 1977, 1982, 1987, 1996. Polemology: Bouthoul 1973; Bouthoul and Carrère 1976. Geopolitics: Lacoste 1976; Thual 1995; Lévy 2001; *Hérodote: Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique* (published since 1976).
7 Cf. for example Philippe Moreau Defarges (1987, 1990), who tries to internalize into IR anything from geopolitics to diplomacy and from foreign politics to globalization.

8 Charles Zorgbibe is the author of one of the most influential French IR textbooks (1975, 5th edn 1994).

9 Interestingly, the second edition of Duroselle's book from 1992 is theoretically much more ambitious and carries the sub-title *Théorie des relations internationales*.

10 Throughout his lifetime, Aron defended the contingency of the event and the freedom of agency against absolutist philosophical systems like those of Hegel and Marx (for an intellectual biography and for a good summary and discussion of Aron's *Peace and War*, see Colquhoun 1986 (especially 2nd vol., pp. 164–97).

11 For the neorealist critique, see Waltz 1979: 61–4. For an earlier behaviourist critique, see Young 1969.

12 To the behaviourist's despair, the influence of Raymond Aron is one of the most important factors to have impeded the application of 'scientific' methods to IR studies in France (Luterbacher 1985).

13 Merle does not hesitate to go down to the substate level and discuss the influence of political parties, public opinion, pressure groups etc. on foreign policy making (1988: 319–58; cf. 1984a; about the conceptual weaknesses of the concept of the state as a unitary actor, see Merle 1986).

14 As far as I can see, the only major exception to this rule was a doctoral thesis sponsored by Raymond Aron in the 1970s, which tentatively dealt with formal models of systems theory and game theory (Deriennic 1977).

15 This special relationship is mirrored by the fact that in French area studies, the study of the South is possibly even more developed than the study of the North (Smouts 1987; cf. Adda and Smouts 1989).

16 The identification with the *Damnés de la terre* (Fanon 1961) brought about a certain 'sacralization' of the Third World. From the emancipation of the Third World, some authors expected nothing less than the deliverance of the entire human race (cf. Jouve 1976, 1979, 1983, 1988; cf. on a more cautious note 1992). This is in part explained by the fact that in the French language there is an intended automatic association of the '*Tiers Monde*' with the '*Tiers État*' of the French revolution (Lacoste 1985: 68–72).

17 An exception is perhaps Delahaye's attempt to apply semiotics to IR theory (1977).

18 On the other hand, there are some astonishing omissions of relevant literature from the field of IR (Roche 1993).

19 Less importantly, perhaps, but still worth noting: Giesen has taught at only a few French universities before moving to Germany.

20 *Cultures et Conflits* is edited by the Institut National de Sciences Politiques (www. conflits.org); *Critique Internationale* is edited by Didier Bigo from CERI, Paris (http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/critique/criti.htm).

21 For one of the few examples of a (French-Swiss-British-North American) joint venture, see Girard 1994.

22 'We are entering into a new Middle Ages, which for some people means the advent of universality and flexibility, a fertile multiplication of belongings and allegiances, and thus openness and tolerance; for other people, it means religious wars, armed gangs, beggars and privateers, in short anarchy and permanent conflict' (my translation).

3 International Relations theory in Italy

1 The closest to such a joint venture is a recent book about religion in international relations (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003, with involvement of European authors) and another book on the security implications of 11 September (Parsi 2003).

2 Umberto Gori (Florence), Antonio Papisca (Catania), Luigi Bonanate (Torino).

3 Ordinary professors: Attinà, Bonanate, Gori, Papisca, Santoro, Panebianco. Associated professors: Bardi, Bozzo, Caffarena, Carnevali, Cesa, Natalicchi, Revelli. Researchers: Armao, Clementi, Colombo, Longo, Mascia, Parsi.

4 About 'confining conditions' and 'revolutionary breakthroughs' cf. Kirchheimer 1965.

5   The fourth approach, i.e. the Marxist or 'economic paradigm', is largely absent from Italian IR with the partial exception of Carnevali (1982; cf. the reflections in Bobbio 1981).

6   Angelo Panebianco is incorporated as an informal member into the Italian IR community, although he is not an IR scholar in the strict institutional sense.

7   The application of Kuhn's terminology is notoriously problematic in the realm of Social Science (see Guzzini 1998).

8   Bozzo is a disciple of Umberto Gori, who has been working for more than thirty years on a formalized model that is based on cybernetic systems analysis and designed for prevision and decision, i.e. for the scientific advice and support of decision-making in contingent situations of risk and uncertainty (Gori 1969, 1980, 1996, 2000; Bruschi *et al.* 1973). Following Gori's predicaments, Bozzo and Simon-Belli (1997, 2000a, 2000b) have tried the practical application of their framework in empirical case studies. Simon-Belli has also written an introduction to IR theories that mirrors his eclectic predilections (2002).

9   For a realist analysis about the problematic future of the Atlantic alliance after the end of the Cold War, see Colombo 1994.

10   This interpretative model is quite familiar from the theory of hegemonic cycles (e.g. Gilpin 1981; Wallerstein 1974–89), even if it does not reach the phenomenological density of, say, Ludwig Dehio (1996 [1948]).

11   For an historical analysis in the tradition of the English school, see Ragionieri 2000.

12   About the concept of sustainable statehood, see Papisca 1994.

13   For a similar piece on the nexus between free trade and the level of international conflict, see Andreatta 1999.

14   These comments are not meant as a sweeping verdict against Italian 'scholasticism'. The excellent quality of both empirical analysis and theoretical synthesis in Panebianco's book is the best proof that, at least in some cases, 'scholasticism' is able to bring about appreciable results.

15   The details of Santoro's geopolitical speculations (1998, 1999) concerning the radicalization and advance of sea-power (Oceania), the retreat of land-power (Eurasia), and the crisis of the peninsular principle (Rimlands) are particularly opaque and have therefore been left aside. In any event, Santoro's main source seems to be the distinction made by Carl Schmitt between Land and Sea, Behemoth and Leviathan (1981 [1942], 1974; cf. Portinaro 1982: 161–215).

16   This is complemented by a neo-Marxist reading of the Cold War compromise between market and politics:

> In retrospective, our life during the long period of the Cold War looks like a war economy, even if the war has never been fought. Only few years ago, the very same 'markets', which now appear to be absolutely determined to impose their 'rigor', were ready to accept their return on investment to be 'curtailed' with the precise and underlying aim of contributing to the fight against the expansion of communism.
>
> (Parsi 1998: 183)

17   For the 'new Gramscians', see the articles by Burnham 1991; Gill 1993b; Germain and Kenny 1998; Bieler and Morton 2001. Of particular interest are the contributions by Cox (1986, 1987), Rapkin (1990), Gill (1990, 1993a), and Pijl (1998); for the reception of Gramsci in Europe and America, see Hobsbawm 1995; for a brilliant (though non-Gramscian) treatise about hegemonic theory, see Colombo 1997.

18   I have to apologise for the sketchy nature of this inventory. However, a more detailed discussion would lead far beyond the subject matter of the present review.

19   This is not to deny the existence of some (mainly factual) scholarship about European integration (e.g. Attinà 1992; Mascia 2001).

20 Another interesting figure is the professional diplomat Roberto Toscano, who relies on Emmanuel Levinas to construct international ethics (Toscano 2000).

21 Together with Lucio Caracciolo, Carlo Jean is among the founders of *Limes*, the Italian review for geopolitics. Limes was founded in 1993 and seeks to combine expertise about international conflicts with policy oriented analysis. Due to a rather aggressive marketing strategy, Limes is widely read among interested laymen in Italy (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a; cf. http://www.limesonline.com/doc/navigation/, accessed 11 February 2004).

22 Another interesting book by Portinaro (1986) offers a phenomenology of the 'third party' in political relations: *defensor pacis* (Leviathan), *tertius inter partes* (neutral), *tertius super partes* (mediator), *terzo introvabile* (absence of world government). The treatise is imbued with political realism, but at the same time draws in a creative way on the domestic analogy and thereby transcends the inside/outside-dichotomy.

4 International Relations theory in the Nordic countries

1 Cf. for Sweden: Jönsson and Sundelius 1988; Hydén *et al.* 2002: 115–21; Angstrom *et al.* 2003; for Norway: Underdal 1997: 314–20; Neumann and Ulriksen 2001; for Finland: Väyrynen *et al.* 1988; Apunen and Aaltola 2000; Holsti *et al.* 2002.

2 The picture could be made even more complicated by mentioning Nordic research cooperation with Eastern Europe, the Baltic Sea area, the Third World, etc.

3 Peace Research Institute Oslo 1959 (Galtung), University of Stockholm 1962 (Andrén), University of Aarhus 1963 (Bjøl), University of Oslo 1963 (Ørvik), University of Copenhagen 1966 (Pedersen).

4 This did not prevent Critical Peace Research from claiming scientific rigour (Galtung 1967; Holm 1975; for empiricist 'tests' of Galtung's theory, see Gidengil 1978; Wiberg 1992).

5 Most prominently the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).

6 The first and the last issue of the yearbook (No. 1 and No. 12) contain a 'state of the art' of Political Science in the Nordic countries.

7 The apparent cleavages between the 'establishment' and its 'contenders' are often misleading. As we have seen in the last section, there are scholars in the realm of 'normal science' who de facto go far beyond the tenets of positivism. On the other hand, there are scholars in the post-positivist camp who, at least sometimes, make fairly conventional arguments despite their declared non-conformist predilections (e.g. Neumann 1995, 1996c).

8 Although the Swede Erik Ringmar is working and publishing in Great Britain rather than in Scandinavia, he is mentioned here because of his Nordic roots and the influence of his work on Nordic identity studies.

9 For an article about identity-defining practices in the speeches reported by Thucydides, see Jansson 1997.

10 Already in the 1970s and 1980s the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter (1971a, 1971b) was renowned for his modified version of (neo)functionalism.

11 There is now a forthcoming textbook on regional security complexes more in general (Buzan and Wæver 2003).

12 At the root of this concept lies language philosophy, namely the speech act theory by the British philosopher John Austin (1962; cf. already Midgaard 1980).

13 I owe this observation to Tonny Brems Knudsen.

14 One might also mention a book with fairly extravagant speculations about war cycles (Petersen 1999).

5　Third way or via media?

1　The debate between traditionalism and behaviourism is also known as IR' second great debate (see pp. 11–12).
2　Not only in the red-brick universities have there been British partisans of IR as a social science. One of the founding fathers of mathematical methods in international studies, L. F. Richardson, was of British origin (Olson and Onuf 1985: 14; Nicholson 1985: 56–70).
3　An extended list of the participants to the conventions of the committee can be found in Roberson 1998: 2.
4　Cf. for example Arnold Heeren's definition of '*Staatensystem*' as 'the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests' (cited in Wight 1977a: 22).
5　The notion of international society is rebuffed from a radically cosmopolitan perspective (Shaw 1996), whereas communitarians tend to be more sympathetic (Rengger 1996a). In the famous Hagey lectures, Hedley Bull partially revised his own preferential treatment of order to the detriment of justice (2000 [1984]; cf. Wheeler 1992; Epp 1998; on order and justice see more recently Foot *et al.* 2003).
6　Cf. *The Empire of Civil Society* by Justin Rosenberg (1994).
7　Jones's article reads as a fierce polemic against the 'LSE group', which formed the core of the alleged English school. It is rather amusing to see that, contrary to the author's intentions, the article worked as a catalyst for the establishment of the English school's corporate identity (cf. Grader 1988: 29–30). The label proved to be so successful that subsequent polemics, as much as Roy Jones's invective, ended up contributing to the further consolidation of the school.
8　On the other hand, Fred Halliday (1994) criticizes the English school for an old-fashioned focus on diplomatic history and the history of ideas, and a neglect of economic and social history.
9　Barry Buzan (1996) also analyzed the security implications of the international society approach, disaggregating international society into functional sectors and concentric circles of integration.
10　http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool (accessed 12 February 2004).

6　Middle ground or halfway house?

1　About constructivism in philosophy: Berger and Luckmann 1966; Searle 1995; in social science: Collin 1997; Kratochwil 2001; in IR: Onuf 1989; Kubálková *et al.* 1998; Ruggie 1998b; Guzzini 2000; Fierke and Jørgensen 2001; Zehfuß 2002; in EU studies: Cederman 2001.
2　A preliminary note on terminology: 'Positivism' is used as the term for theoretical approaches that combine a rationalist epistemology with a materialist ontology; 'post-positivism' is used as the term for approaches that combine a reflective epistemology with a social ontology (sometimes I follow the custom of using the term 'reflectivism' as a synonym for post-positivism). Since I believe that genuine social constructivism is originally a post-positivist approach, 'middle-ground constructivism' is used as a term to indicate the attempts by some social constructivists to come to terms with positivism by combining a social ontology with a rationalist epistemology.
3　This is difficult to reconcile with the claim, made in the course of the same essay, that social constructivism challenges the methodological individualism and materialism of the mainstream.
4　I owe this observation to Friedrich Kratochwil.
5　To give just a small series of examples from two areas of research: (a) international norms diffusion and norms internalization: Cortell and Davis 1996, 2000; Finnemore

1996a; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse *et al.* 1999b; Checkel 1997, 1999a; Cowles *et al.* 2001; Thomas 2001; (b) security studies: Johnston 1995; Katzenstein 1996a, 1996b; Kier 1997; Adler and Barnett 1998; cf. Bigo 1996a, 2000; Finnemore 2003.

6 In any event it should not be forgotten that there are more radical social constructivists (such as Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, Thomas Diez, *et al.*) who never took an active part in the 'seizure' of the middle ground.

7 The JEPP special issue contains ten contributions by sixteen contributors, most of them from European universities: five from Scandinavia, four from the UK, four from Italy (all from the EUI in Florence), two from the USA, and one from Germany.

8 This is contradicted on pp. 533–4, where constructivism is opposed to positivism on both ontological and epistemological grounds.

9 The verification or falsification of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism by European integration was a hotly contested issue in the aftermath of the Cold War (cf. the debate around Mearsheimer's article 'Back to The Future' in *International Security* 15/1990). When it was undeniable that European integration proceeded with unbroken intensity, the neorealist Grieco (1993: 329–35) recognized that the recent trajectory of European integration posed a severe challenge to his theory (cf. Keohane 1993).

10 The contribution by Jo Shaw (pp. 579–97) is written from a perspective of International Law.

11 For a response from a post-positivist perspective, see S. Smith 1999.

12 Only Checkel's article is partly spared from this criticism (Moravcsik 1999: 673).

13 Nevertheless, Risse and Wiener maintain that Checkel's research project about the internalization of EU-related ideas and norms at the nation-state level is empirically testable. The same is said about Risse's hypothesis that changes in national ideas about European integration occur at critical junctures.

14 Even before Maastricht, federalists such as Altiero Spinelli have pursued the political project of constructing a European identity beyond the nation state (Spinelli 1991); in 1973, the heads of state of the EC adopted in Copenhagen a *Déclaration sur l'identité Européenne* (Delahaye 1979); moreover, the Brussels administration has made deliberate efforts over several decades in the field of identity politics, from the introduction of the European flag to academic exchange programmes for university students (M. Smith 1996).

15 This can also be observed today, when the integration of Turkey into the EU is a hotly contested issue, with 'realpolitik' arguments in favour and cultural arguments against the admission of Turkey into the 'club'.

16 For a more fine-grained picture from the standpoint of historical sociology, see Münch 1993.

17 This suggestion is not so much a result of scientific reasoning but rather an exercise in the deliberate design, or even engineering, of collective identity. On the one hand, Wæver is aware of the resilience of national political communities, and that there are competing but powerful 'projects' of Europe in Germany, France and Russia (1990b, 1995: 181–93, 1998f). On the other hand, he is surprisingly confident that social practice can follow the artificial identity design of public intellectuals. This is particularly clear in his call for the constitution of a 'new Hansa' around the Baltic Sea (1995: 195–202). Wæver advocates the construction of a new trans-border-region in Northern Europe, composed by a dense network of business, political and cultural contacts. Such trans-border-regions are supposed to canalize separatist claims and to foster peace and development in Europe (see also on p. 77).

18 It must be emphasized, however, that the denationalization of social identity may activate the 'securitization' of cultural identity (cf. pp. 79–81). Wæver *et al.* have dealt extensively with the potentially disrupting effects of perceived threats to national identity and their adverse effect on European integration (1993). Against this, however, Wæver (1996c, 1998c, 1998e, 2000) has also shown that European integration may be

seen as a condition for peace. In this optic, the EU becomes a bulwark against the spectre of an unhappy past: 'If we do not continue to foster integration and prevent fragmentation, the continent will fall back into disaster' (Buzan *et al*. 1998: 176–89).

19 French political scientists have been using for several decades the term '*la construction Européenne*' when referring to European integration (e.g. Delahaye 1979).

20 For an insider's account with regard to the self-empowerment of the ECJ, see Judge Mancini's article 'The making of a constitution for Europe' (1991).

21 Another example for post-positivist constructivism is the explorative paper 'Europe towards a post-Hobbesian order? A constructivist theory of European integration', written by Marlene Wind (1996).

22 Interestingly, Diez had to defend himself not against a positivist critique but rather against the attacks by a fellow constructivist who missed in his manifesto the formulation of an empirical research programme (Börzel 1997; Diez 1998).

23 Whereas most contributions do not strictly fulfil the requirements of the title (they are either not reflective or not about European governance), only four can be subsumed without further reservations under the heading of the book, namely the contributions by Christiansen, Larsen, Holm, and Matlary.

24 In addition to that, there is a qualitative content analysis about normative ideas about legitimate European political order among German, French and British political parties that somewhat falls outside the conventional distinction of positivist versus post-positivist methodologies (Jachtenfuchs *et al*. 1998).

25 On pragmatism, see Diesing 1991: 75–103.

26 I owe this analogy to Osmo Apunen.

7 The meaning of new medievalism

1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as 'The meaning of new medievalism' in the *European Journal of International Relations*, © 2001 Sage Publicatons Ltd. The chapter is reprinted with permission.

2 This appears somewhat counter-intuitive. According to conventional wisdom one would expect the nation state either to reassert itself, to disintegrate into parochial identities, or to evaporate into a unified world.

3 In Europe, where integration (especially in the West) and the re-emergence of nationalism (especially in the East) are simultaneous phenomena, the dilemma is probably felt even stronger than in the United Sates.

4 With regard to globalization my discussion is limited to sketchy remarks. For a more extended discussion, see Hirst and Thompson 1996; Beck 1998 [2000]; Parsi 1998; Clark 1999; Mittelman 2000; Hay and Marsh 2000; Held and McGrew 2000.

5 Today, the universalistic claims of modernity have become problematic even, and particularly, within the context of a sociology of modernity (Wagner 1994).

6 There are some few – and debatable – exceptions to this rule, such as the potentially globalizing effect of the threat posed to mankind by nuclear weapons (cf. Cerutti 1993).

7 The international society approach of the English school can be further developed to allow such a revised historical narrative (Buzan 1993; Buzan and Little 2000; cf. also Spruyt 1994a, 1994b; Cox *et al*. 2001).

8 Inspiration may be drawn, for example, from Susan Strange's (1988) concept of four interdependent international structures: security, production, finance, and knowledge.

9 To construct a multifaceted genealogy of international order, theoretical insight may be drawn from the debate on state–society relationships (Polanyi 1944; Rosenberg 1994; Ruggie 1998a).

10 Please note that the neomedieval analogy is purely *relational*, without implying any *essential* affinity between the Middle Ages and neomedieval order.

11 Cf. Bull 1977: 266; Evers 1994; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996. About new

medievalism in Europe, see Wilde 1994, 1996; Schmitter 1996; Wæver 1996b, 1997b; Hoenicke Moore 2002.

12 Strange 1996: 110–2. The state monopoly of international violence is relatively recent and has never been an exact reflection of reality (Thomson 1994).

13 For episodic evidence, see Cerny 1998; Kobrin 1999.

14 Cf. Badie and Birnbaum 1979; Badie 1983, 1986, 1992, 1995, 1999; Poggi 1990; Badie and Smouts 1992; Spruyt 1994a, 1994b; for an alternative account from the perspective of Marxist political economy, see Teschke 1998, 2002, 2003.

15 For the transformation from the medieval order to the modern state system, see Ruggie 1993; Spruyt 1994a: 34–57, 1994b; cf. Hinsley 1966.

16 Cf. already Miller 1959; Vacca 1971; Eco *et al.* 1973; Eco 1977; for a critique of these and similar bleak scenarios, see Bigo and Haine 1996.

17 This conception of medieval order can be ultimately traced back to the legal theory of Otto von Gierke (1881, 1987).

18 Many peripheral countries, especially in Africa, suffer from neopatrimonialism, i.e. the incorporation of social practices such as clientelism and so-called prebendalism into the formal superstructure of bureaucratic institutions. From this perspective, the sovereignty of many developing states is a legal fiction rather than political reality (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1990, 1992; Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62).

19 John Meyer (1987) explicitly parallels the political functionaries of the world polity with the feudal aristocracy of the Middle Ages. In times of globalization, members of the world polity might indeed begin to understand themselves as a cosmopolitan elite *beyond* the state. If that is the case, and if the new role model is successfully transmitted to national elites, this will have consequences that are difficult to assess in all their ramifications (Pijl 1998).

20 The concept of diplomacy can no longer be confined to what professional diplomats do. From an international political economy perspective, interstate diplomacy is replaced by a triangular scheme: states negotiating with states, firms negotiating with firms, and firms negotiating with states (Strange 1988; Stopford *et al.* 1991). This 'triangular diplomacy' imposes decision-making roles on corporate managers that are essentially political rather than economic (Strange 1998: 153–4, 1997).

21 For further details about the 'credo of competitiveness', see Group of Lisbon 1995: 95–6.

22 The analogy should not be overstressed. There is neither an analogy to the Pope in the world market economy, nor to the Emperor in the nation-state system; the medieval system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties was largely based on legal and spatial concepts, while the neomedieval system is rather based on links of culture and identity. It should be remembered once more that the concept of new medievalism is based upon a *relational* analogy and not upon an *essentialist* comparison.

23 For a more general treatise about different forms of power, see Poggi 2001.

24 This is not to deny that the ruling elite will always be tempted to abuse its mandate.

25 Cf. the pamphlets by Viviane Forrester (1996, 2000).

26 According to Hedley Bull (1977: 275) we are 'intellectually imprisoned by the theory of the states system', and 'a time may come when the anomalies and irregularities are so glaring that an alternative theory, better able to take account of these realities, will come to dominate the field.'

27 Cf. the epistemological principle of 'saving the appearances' (Duhem 1908).

28 Possibly, but not necessarily, one could come to similar conclusions as David Held (1995: 207), who calls for the political project of 'cosmopolitan democracy'.

29 At least in this regard the postmodernist overlap of multiple identities is diametrically opposed to the *cosmos* of the Middle Ages where (almost) everyone had his or her 'proper' place.

30 When compared to more ambitious macro-sociological accounts such as autopoietic multi-systems theory (Luhmann 1997; Teubner 1993, 1997), there are obvious and deliberate limitations in medievalism as to the number and autonomy of systemic components.

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