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in transition*

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
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# *The Mediterranean city in transition*

*Social change  
and urban development*

LILA LEONTIDOU

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*Dedicated  
to my parents,  
Jason and Aphrodite*

The term 'spontaneity' can be variously defined, for the phenomenon to which it refers is many-sided... It may be said that spontaneity is therefore characteristic of the 'history of the subaltern classes', and indeed of their most marginal and peripheral elements; these have not achieved any consciousness of the class 'for itself', and consequently it never occurs to them that their history might have some possible importance, that there might be some value in leaving documentary evidence of it.

...

There exists a scholastic and academic historico-political outlook which sees as real and worthwhile only such movements of revolt as are one hundred per cent conscious, i.e. movements that are governed by plans worked out in advance to the last detail or in line with abstract theory (which comes to the same thing). But reality produces a wealth of the most bizarre combinations. It is up to the theoretician to unravel these in order to discover fresh proof of his theory, to 'translate' into theoretical language the elements of historical life. It is not reality which should be expected to conform to the abstract schema. This will never happen, and hence this conception is nothing but an expression of passivity.

Antonio Gramsci (1971 edn: 196, 200)

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## *Preface*

Though research presented here spans more than a decade, the book was actually written during 1985–8, as I was becoming distant from a long career in planning. Reflections on the type of our acquired urban models and their impact on a non-receptive society, spontaneous and speculative, pointed to the necessity for emancipation from Anglo-American geography. I was becoming convinced that an alternative urban development theory should be explored, not only for the Third World, as in my previous works, but also for the Mediterranean European city. The major encouragement for such a project was provided by those Greek professors of architecture, surveying, planning and engineering who actively supported my entrance into academia in 1985. I am deeply grateful for their confidence in me during a crucial period of my life.

The book was written on the occasion of a Senior Fellowship at the former Center for Metropolitan Planning and Research of the Johns Hopkins University (1986), and of a grant awarded by the Empirikion Foundation of Greece for the study of industrial growth and decline in Greek metropolitan regions (1987). I would like to acknowledge my gratitude for these awards. Besides research completed in the 1980s, this book incorporates some material from my Ph.D. thesis (parts of chapters 4, 6), submitted to the University of London, London School of Economics and Political Science (1981). I wish to thank again Emrys Jones for years of stimulating and patient supervision and subsequent continuous friendly encouragement; and Brian Robson for his support and constructive interventions from the time when he appeared as my external examiner until the final manuscript of this book was submitted.

Three comparative projects have been an invaluable source of ideas and concrete knowledge. Insight offered by the project on Population and Development in Southern Europe of the United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (1985–7), and especially by its director, the late Joseph van den Boomen, is gratefully acknowledged. The comparative project on social class structuration, flickering at the National Centre of Social Research in Athens since 1985, has also been an invaluable source of stimulation. Special thanks are due to its director, Constantine Tsoucalas,

for critical, constructive and reassuring discussions of various drafts of this work. A third comparative OECD project on Mediterranean Europe (1984) was also helpful. I wish to thank Nicos Mouzelis in connection with it, and acknowledge his valuable suggestions, especially on theoretical aspects of this work. I am also grateful to Derek Gregory for his advice especially during the final stages of this book. These scholars, with opinions often different from my own, may not, however, have salvaged the work from its shortcomings, for which I alone am responsible.

The research procedure was facilitated by the kind assistance offered by the staff of the Athens libraries of the National Centre of Social Research, Center of Planning and Economic Research, National Statistical Service of Greece, the Gennadeion, and the former Athens Center of Ekistics. I am also grateful to the staff of the LSE Library at the London University, the Library of Congress in Washington, and the Johns Hopkins University library in Baltimore. Help for the production of a readable book was offered by Gillian Law, whose patience and expertise in text editing is gratefully appreciated. I am also indebted to Maria Zioga for drafting the maps and diagrams with her renowned professional skill. Last but not least, I wish to thank Ashton-Tate for Framework II. Intelligent floppy disks provided material help and a lot of that proverbial continuous support, solace and self-effacement.



## *Abbreviations*

ACE	Athens Center of Ekistics
AGA	Association of Greek Architects
AID	Agency for International Development
AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
AOEK	Autonomous Workers' Housing Organization
CBD	Central Business District
CP	Communist Party
CPER (earlier CER)	Center for Planning and Economic Research
DEPOS	Public Corporation for Urban Development and Housing
EAM	National Liberation Front
EC	European Community
ECE (UN)	Economic Commission for Europe (of the United Nations)
EDA	United Democratic Left
EEAM	Workers' EAM
EEC	European Economic Community
ELAS	National Popular Liberation Army
EKTE	National Mortgage Bank of Greece
ELKEPA	Hellenic Centre of Productivity
EMOKA, OAOM, IMEO, SCET	Initials of Greek and French consultants' offices for Planning and Development
EPA	Operation Urban Reconstruction ( <i>sic</i> )
ERE	National Radical Union
ESAK	Unitary Syndicalist Antidictatorial Movement (of KKE)
ETVA	Hellenic Bank for Industrial Development
FGI	Federation of Greek Industrialists
GSEE	General Confederation of Greek Workers
HP	Industrial horsepower
HUCO	Human Community Project of the ACE
ICAP	Investment Capital (market research institute)
ILO	International Labour Office
IOVE	Institute of Economic and Industrial Research
KKE	Communist Party of Greece
LD	Legislative Decree

LQ	Location Quotient
MNE	Ministry of National Economy
NCSR (EKKE in Greek)	National Centre of Social Research
NICs	Newly Industrializing Countries
NSSG (SGG before war)	National Statistical Service of Greece
OAED	Organization for Labour Force Employment
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano
PERPA	Environmental Pollution Control Project of the YHOP
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano
RD	Royal Decree
RSC	Refugee Settlement Commission
SIC	Standard Industrial Classification
SGG (NSSG after wars)	Statistique Générale de la Grèce
SUNIA (formerly UNIA)	Sindacato Unitario Nazionale degli Inquilini e Assegnatari
TCG	Technical Chamber of Greece
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency
YHOP (later YPEHODE)	Ministry of Planning, Housing and the Environment

## *Introduction*

At the crossroads of three worlds – capitalist core, periphery and socialist Europe – Greece will surprise the historian with its antinomies, contradictions and abrupt transitions, when its history is finally recorded. I do not mean the familiar history of political events, the State or the dominant classes, which amount to the same thing; but that of the urban subordinate classes, which continue to be underestimated as an object for research. Most of the issues discussed in this book are unrecorded in Greek historiography; the population constituting its focus has remained hidden; and the period of popular spontaneity and creativity has passed irretrievably, leaving a gap in research, which contrasts with its lasting imprint on the structure of Greater Athens (the capital of Greece), Salonica, and other Greek cities.

Important differences among the three broad geo-political regions in Europe are revealed through socio-geographical analysis. Leaving aside the socialist countries, the contrast between North and South will be stressed here. There is a delicate point which renders Greece a crucial case study in such a project. As the country belongs to the eastern of Braudel's (1966) 'two Mediterraneans', it has been deprived of autonomous development during medieval times, and continuity has been interrupted in its history by Ottoman occupation. 'To claim that the considerable obstacles between the two halves of the Mediterranean effectively separate them from each other would be to profess a form of geographical determinism, extreme, but not altogether mistaken' (Braudel 1966: 134). The cleavage between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires intensified in the sixteenth century, but gradually lessened from the nineteenth century. Unlike its Southern European neighbours who have in the past, as core societies, colonized the Third World, Greece has been in many ways close to peripheries: a long period of its modern history was spent under Ottoman rule, and then under British and US neocolonial domination. In the postwar period, as it passed from peripheral to semiperipheral status in the world economy, however, it became more like the rest of the Mediterranean societies, and developed certain important differences from Northern Europe. Interdependent development of these societies is reflected especially in the massive postwar

waves of emigration to the North, and in urban development patterns. It is on the latter that this book focuses.

Cities of the North, mostly cold and disciplined, contrast with the light, heat and spontaneity of Southern cities and the corresponding popular attitudes. Mediterranean labouring people have their own ways of opposing capitalism and confronting poverty and exploitation. They travel, escape from the countryside and invade the cities, emigrate, then return, and somehow they manage to survive in dignity. Their internationalism long before the present century was stressed by Braudel (1966: 312): 'There was proverbially and probably literally a Florentine in every corner of the world.' Poverty does not prevent the Mediterranean labouring people from becoming creative in their everyday lives. Spontaneous alternative cultures have usually been ignored until they culminated in political strife, *coups d'état* and political passivity but also civil wars. Some of their everyday manifestations like informality, community life and socializing, song and football attendance, or mutual aid and illegal building, meet the indifference and scorn of marxists, even the CPs of their own countries, and are taken advantage of by the State. Creativity and spontaneity thus oscillate on the verge between opposition and cooptation.


The familiar theories of Marx and Engels, especially of the latter, on the relationship of social classes with the city and urban growth often seem irrelevant within Mediterranean histories. Despite their internationalism, the seers of the labour movement reinforced 'the deeply entrenched tendency to read history from the vantage-point of the West' (Giddens 1981: 3). After all, productivism and economism have been devised on the basis of Northern experience. For the cities of the South, the relevant intellectual is Gramsci. It is not coincidental that he stressed reproduction alongside production, politics and ideology, civil society and the State rather than economics, regional consciousness alongside trade unionism, popular spontaneity along with the Party; or that, while in prison, he chose to refer to marxism cryptically as 'the philosophy of praxis' (Hoare and Smith 1971) rather than 'historical materialism'. The paramount importance of human agency and struggles was obviously derived from his own experience in interwar Italy.

Contemporary historical research has accepted that there has not been one unique model of transition from feudalism to capitalism. The multiplicity of forms, rates and ways of transition becomes especially evident in Southern Europe. In the Mediterranean, capitalism arrived with a different timing, but also with a different face, and encountered several specific forms of popular resistance as an everyday practice. The theory model proposed here has to be sensitive in these specificities, without

explaining them away as 'cultural particularities'. It has to venture generalizations *within* the Southern European context rather than fragment the Mediterranean experience in the eclectic manner to which positivist geography has accustomed us. We are not dealing with 'exceptions' to certain 'regularities' prescribed in Anglo-American geography. The model attempts a synthesis of some critical materialist aspects of contemporary marxist as well as ecological theory with Gramsci's contribution in the study of civil society, culture, subjectivity and spontaneity.

Despite their different historical backgrounds until the late nineteenth century, the countries of Southern Europe have shared certain geo-political and socio-economic characteristics and a level of economic development after the wars, which render them comparable. Italy (though the most developed), Spain, Portugal and Greece can be set against the rest of Europe *as a group* – Mediterranean or Southern Europe. The two descriptions will be used interchangeably. We are concerned with Braudel's (1966: 232) 'true' Mediterranean, delimited by the olive tree but not the palmgroves (Europe, not Africa; fig. 1.1), including Portugal, despite its Atlantic coast. The most striking similarities among Southern cities mostly stem from the coexistence of 'modernity' and informality (not 'tradition'), on many levels: as their class structure approaches the pattern of late capitalism, self-employment remains widespread; managers and executives coexist with artisans, shopkeepers and free labourers; in the location of economic activity, as CBDs are rebuilt with modern office blocks, mixed land uses predominate; in housing allocation, as modern apartment blocks spring up, self-built neighbourhoods continue to mushroom; in urban development, several private and public, customary and irregular (illegal or informal) strategies coexist and affect the systems of production and reproduction. A 'scheme of social polarity' such as Toennie's model of *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft*, as adopted by Allum (1973) for the study of Naples, is indeed appropriate. It contrasts a social formation based on feeling, personal relationships and the sharing of private lives, with one founded on interest, impersonal relationships and the sharing of external life (Allum 1973: 5).

The image of a 'developing world' evoked by Mediterranean Europe rests on such aspects of society, on urban morphology, and on the colonial and cultural associations with Latin America, as well as Africa, which have exerted reciprocal influences among urban cultures, as well as emigration, the reproduction of the informal economy, and socio-political aspects like the instability of parliamentarism and the experience of authoritarianism and military dictatorships (Giner 1984). Fascism swept Italy throughout the interwar period, and authoritarian rule lasted from then until the 1970s in



*Figure 1.1* Braudel's 'true' Mediterranean and its important cities. Mediterranean Europe defined by the northern limits of the olive tree (dotted line, adapted from Braudel 1966: 232), and large cities most frequently mentioned in the book.

the case of the Iberian countries, and with intervals of foreign occupation (1941-4), civil war (1946-9) and 'restricted democracy' (1949-67) in Greece (Diamandouros 1986: 549). European and non-European trajectories mingle in the latter's urban history, and for a long period Athens has invited comparisons with the peripheral world (chapter 2).

Mediterranean urban histories have presented 'a wealth of the most bizarre combinations' (Gramsci 1971 edn: 200). With great insensitivity, however, urban phenomena which recur in Greece and all over the semiperipheral world are usually considered as residual, culturally specific, even traditional or 'precapitalist', destined to converge, sooner or later, with Western patterns. There are two themes against such views in this book: an effort to explain these diverging trajectories of urban development and restructuring in the course and logic of their own process of capitalist transformation; and a critique of the insensitivity of current social geography to the experience of the peripheral and semiperipheral world.

In the study of urban development, it is still believed that popular peripheral settlements belong to a residual mode of land colonization, which will inevitably be swept away with capitalist expansion. Like peripheral cities, Athens and Rome have sometimes been considered as 'preindustrial' (White 1984: 161) or 'dual'. Arguments in favour of such an analysis have been well elaborated in Latin American and Asian studies. They include a view of internal migrants as peasants 'ruralizing' the cities (McGee 1971; essays in Hauser ed. 1961); the power of social, ethnic or religious groups to impose their ways of life on society at large (Berry and Rees 1969), and to create a 'reverse equilibrium' in urban growth (Alonso 1964); the practice of traditional subsistence agriculture on the urban fringe (Roberts 1978); the presence of populations marginal to capitalism. Views about 'dualism' have already been subject to doubt (Worsley 1984), despite the frequent occurrence of these phenomena in the poorer section of the peripheral world. The critique is justified.

Spontaneous urban development through popular land colonization has constituted a widespread, recurring phenomenon in cities which are basically capitalist. The theoretical question posed in this book concerns the relationships which create this pattern of urban development, and the exploration of the forces reproducing and undermining it. The central hypothesis is that spontaneous urban expansion is not a precapitalist remnant, nor a manifestation of residual peasant modes of land allocation. It has emerged with capitalist development and has been 'functional' to it – up to a point, at least, which will be specified historically and economically for the case of Greece. This issue can only be investigated through intensive research, where processes are observed to unfold in one city. The

paradigmatic case study is Athens, the capital of Greece. It is compared with the rest of the Mediterranean capitals on the basis of secondary material for the latter, but explanation of urban development relies on its own particular history. The questions posed require the exploration of processes of social and spatial change during transitional periods in this history, rather than urban 'structures' or 'patterns'.

The book thus focuses on crucial periods of transition. It spans the 1948–81 period of Greek urban history (with frequent references to the years before and after this), a period of rapid capitalist transformation especially under conservative (or even military) rule. In this broader period, one turning point which affected urban development patterns in a radical manner is investigated in depth. After the introduction of the theoretical framework, concepts and basic research hypotheses in the context of current urban theory and the schematic presentation of the uniqueness of Mediterranean cities (chapter 1), a first transition in the urban history of twentieth-century Athens is rediscovered and interpreted in chapter 2: the passage from working-class landlessness to popular land control and spontaneous urban development as capitalism rose to dominance in the interwar period. However, this first crucial decade of socio-spatial transformation, the 1920s, is not discussed at length, because it constitutes only a background for the examination of subsequent Greek urban development rather than a typical Mediterranean transition.

The focus of the book is on the second turning-point in the Greek urban history, the 1970s. Chapter 3 explores social transformation in the context of postwar economic development, by discussing the political economy of Greece within the Mediterranean region and the nature of urban social class structuration. The ways in which spontaneous urban development was reproduced in postwar Athens, the social geography of the city, and especially the role of the proletariat in urban land colonization, are studied in chapter 4. Trends of industrial and urban restructuring, however (chapter 5), along with State intervention, worked towards the erosion of popular control of peripheral urban land. This most recent transition, and the consequent urban restructuring, is presented and explained in chapter 6. The final chapter 7, which draws together the discussion of Greater Athens in the context of comparative urban theory, locates this city in a crucial position for the formulation of a more systematic approach to Mediterranean urban development and restructuring.



# I

## *Spontaneous urban development: in search of a theory for the Mediterranean city*

But *how* these developments unfolded, what was the causal nexus among them, we shall only learn when we make out the interplay among them by focusing upon *a* city specifically in all its uniqueness.

Oscar Handlin (1963: 22)

Uneven development in urban space has been reproduced all over the world. Space has always been stratified in the history of capitalism and the working class confined to residual land, lacking in basic urban services. However, this is the only universal statement that can be made about capitalist cities. The question is, why space was stratified in different ways in history and among various geographical regions. A study of urban development as the result of class-specific patterns of collective consumption and appropriation of urban space thus differs from one of distributions as approached in traditional and positivist geography. This book focuses on the social forces which have reproduced a spontaneous urban development pattern throughout the Mediterranean, and on its recent transformation through planning and class struggle.

Rather than 'structures' or 'patterns', transition, change, restructuring and development are explored, as produced by human agency rather than by personified State agencies or the impersonal forces of the market. Spontaneous urban movements and informal activities, which have usually been neutralized in social studies, are focused upon. 'Misery' has been stressed by sociologists, while planners and political scientists tend to moralize: 'Unlike the cities of northern and northwestern Europe, Rome cannot build upon historical habits of civic pride, discipline and enterprise' (Fried 1973: 40). By contrast, we will here try to learn from this lack of discipline, and to combine the recurring urban particularities into an intelligible, and it is to be hoped systematic, theory of urban development and transition. It is interesting how systematic a pattern tends to appear with comparative research, which has figured as an idiosyncrasy when only one of these cities was focused upon. Relevant concepts are greatly needed, and will be elaborated at this point.

### 1.1 The uniqueness of Mediterranean urban geographies

#### 1.1.1 *A note on the growth and development of the large cities*

Urban development and urban growth are wide-encompassing concepts. They can involve various scales of reference, from urbanization to intra-urban expansion. Most geographers have used the concepts in one of two alternative ways. Some study urban population growth at the national level, urbanization, the structure of the settlement network and the relationships among cities (Robson 1973). Some focus on population growth at the metropolitan or intra-urban level, and study the growth, expansion and interrelationships between urban core, rings and suburbs (Van den Berg et al. 1982). Both orientations are within our scope. Urban development as urban expansion will be interpreted through an investigation of the social classes controlling it; urban growth as 'urbanization' constitutes one of the most crucial elements which explain urban development thus defined.

A rich corpus of literature has familiarized us with urban development in Northern Europe and the USA. Historians and geographers have investigated urban change during the transition to capitalism, the urban network and the structure of large cities, the conditions of the proletariat in the dawn of industrialization; sociologists, planners and geographers have studied economic development accompanied by the rise of incomes, changes in life styles, industrial decentralization, the movement to the suburbs and recent counterurbanization trends. In other words, processes of urban development in advanced societies constitute recurrent themes in geography, urban history and the social sciences more generally. This is not so for the peripheral capitalist world. Even in the 1980s, 'not the least significant point in which Western cities differ from those in the rest of the world is our own familiarity with them and the amount of information which is available about them' (Jones 1966: 52).

The gap in information includes Southern Europe. Comparative urban studies have even occasionally excluded these countries from the map of Europe, for lack of data (Van den Berg et al. 1982). Unfortunately, this is not only a matter of empirical evidence: the gap in research has also affected urban theory. The concepts devised for Anglo-American cities apply to a limited set of cases of advanced capitalism. Since Mediterranean countries, as colonizers, are largely responsible for ecological patterns in many Third World cities, it is surprising how little they have been studied. Here, regional rather than urban development has attracted most attention, while urban studies, apart from a few valuable monographs, have focused on the history of past centuries or descriptive expositions. Postwar intra-urban differ-

entiation and change is the least documented, apart from some static urban ecologies. There is a paucity of explanatory studies on the social class aspects of the process of urban development.

It has been contended that 'the history of the Mediterranean is the history of its cities' (Giner 1984). These are among the oldest cities in Europe, many dating from ancient times, while many Northern cities developed only after the end of the Middle Ages. During the sixteenth century, no other region in the world had such a developed urban network, 'where town followed town in endless strings, punctuated by great cities' (Braudel 1966: 278). They were even overpopulated agglomerations, which rose and fell in the course of history. In Caesar's Rome, 400,000 people were jammed into no more than 15 square miles inside the walls (Fried 1973: 11). When Rome lost its capital status, as the papacy moved to Avignon, its population dropped, and reached the 400,000 level again only in the late nineteenth century. In the sixteenth century it was overtaken by Naples, Cairo, but especially Constantinople, *the City* (Polis), dominant in the urban network after the glory of Rome had dimmed. Constantinople was inhabited by 700,000 souls in the sixteenth century, double the population of Paris. 'Naples and Constantinople were the two most densely populated cities in the Mediterranean, urban monsters, monumental parasites. It was not until later that London and Paris emerged as great cities' (Braudel 1966: 345). In 1800 only three European cities had a population of over half a million: Paris, London and Constantinople. Rome, along with Genoa, Milan, Naples and Palermo, had by then passed the population level of 100,000, while Madrid, Barcelona and Lisbon passed it by 1850 (De Vries 1984).

Mediterranean Europe is characterized by relatively new capital cities. When the glorious city states lost their glamour, they surrendered capital status to 'artificial' capitals. 'The story of the Mediterranean has often been determined by the triumph of one route, one city, over another route and another city, even in the sixteenth century, when the city states seemed to be losing ground to empires and territorial states' (Braudel 1966: 273). If we go back in history, Athens is encountered as the dominant city in classical times, then Constantinople represents the glory of Byzantium, and finally Rome rises as the centre of a large empire. Later, the archipelago became Venetian and Genovese (Braudel 1966: 115-16, 123). The Ottoman empire was the first territorial state to establish itself as a major power (Braudel 1966: 345), but Ankara became the capital of Turkey only in 1923. Athens was declared a capital in 1834, after Greek independence, Rome in 1870, after the unification of Italy, but Madrid much earlier. It supplanted Valladolid in 1560, then yielded first place to it again, and finally came into

its own under Philip IV in the seventeenth century (Braudel 1966: 344, 351-2). For Lisbon, the dividing line between past and present was not political decision but natural disaster – the 1755 earthquake and the tidal wave that crashed ashore, devastating the city.

After the mid-nineteenth century, when the walls of the old cities were pulled down, the modern metropolis arose. The term 'metropolises' is avoided here, if only for the sake of the past of these 'cities'. Mediterranean European countries have evidenced striking similarities in their urbanization model since the two world wars, ranging from population levels of their capital cities to more structural aspects. By 1971 Rome, Madrid and Athens, as well as Barcelona, had between 2.6 and 3.5 million inhabitants. Although nationwide rates of growth were uniformly moderate, at the 1% level, the three capital cities grew with the same rapid annual rates in 1951-71: 2.8%, 3.3% and 3% respectively. The second or third largest cities were less dynamic; only Salonica grew by 3.1% annually in 1951-71, but on a smaller population basis (chapter 3). Demographically, Rome, Madrid and Athens are all new cities. The native-born population of Rome dropped from 47% in 1921 to 20% in the 1960s (Fried 1973: 82-3). They also expanded rapidly, and without planning. The area of Rome was 58 square miles in 1940 but had doubled by 1966 (Fried 1973: 2). These capital cities are therefore usually accused of 'overurbanization', 'parasitism', speculation and lack of planning. Such stereotypes emanate from their comparison with Northern European urban development patterns.

### 1.1.2 *Spatial patterns and building activity*

A familiar example of research on peripheries revolving around Western concepts (and surnames) has its sociological roots in the 1930s, when Hansen (1934) first applied 'Chicago school' theories to Latin American towns. Urban growth in peripheral capitalism has been said to conform to an *inverse-Burgess* spatial pattern (cf. also Schnore 1965). In contrast to Western cities, it has been claimed, the rich tend to live in the centre and the poor on the periphery. By focusing on this matter of spatial distributions, some researchers have insisted on evolutionary theories claiming that Third World cities are 'preindustrial' on their way to convergence with those of advanced capitalism (Sjoberg 1960: 321-40).

Though theories of dualism and convergence have recently been criticized, no alternative has been elaborated for cities of peripheral capitalism. The focus of this study on a set of European cities which evidence the *inverse-Burgess* urban pattern has a relative advantage as an argument against such theories: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek cities have long passed the

'preindustrial' stage. These cities therefore stand as effective counter-arguments against evolutionary urban theory, and can enrich human geography with a variety of histories and modes of capitalist development, leading to alternative urban development models.

The inverse-Burgess spatial pattern characterizes large metropolitan cities throughout Mediterranean Europe, with few exceptions. Social class levels usually correlate with the land-rent and density gradients. The bourgeoisie is represented in the centre and the working class in the periphery. Around the CBD, where 'the newly dominant structures of banks and insurance companies, the large headquarters of industry, and the huge international hotels all keep well away from old landmarks like churches, town halls, and palaces' (Lichtenberger 1976: 95), residential areas of the affluent classes develop.

In Italy social rank has been found to be low in the *suburbi* and still lower in Agro Romano on the urban fringe of Rome (Fried 1973: 94), and highest in the old city centre of Rome, declining somewhat in the early twentieth-century suburbs (McElrath 1962: 389-90). In Venice the social status of central districts is increasing rapidly because of out-migration of the working classes (Costa et al. 1980: 404). In Turin, a central high-status area coexists with old slums north of the centre, but the most extensive working-class areas are on the northern and southern outskirts, where council houses have been built, separated from the rest of the city by industrial plants and rural areas (Laganà et al. 1982). In Spain, the areas of the earliest nineteenth-century suburban expansion of the *ensanche*, on the north of the centre of Barcelona, are still inhabited by affluent social classes (Ferrás 1977a). In Madrid, central areas and inner nineteenth-century suburbs have the highest socio-economic status (Abrahamson and Johnson 1974: 526-7). In Lisbon, various social classes live in the centre in close proximity but different subdistricts, but the current tendency is for an increase in the proportion of the middle classes (Gaspar 1976: 131-5). Sometimes bourgeois and middle-class districts radiate from the centre to a sector along the 'garden suburbs', initiated in the 1920s in both Rome (Regni and Sennato 1973: 922) and Athens (chapter 2). The northern and western sectors of Rome are inhabited by higher-income groups than the eastern ones, where shanty towns grow among factories, railway yards and the cemetery (Fried 1973: 93-5). The Turin bourgeoisie, concentrated in the central city and on the hills, has apparently been repelled by industrial concentrations (White 1984: 164-5; Warnes 1973). Madrid, by contrast, presents a concentric zone distribution with no evidence to support a sector theory of urban development (Abrahamson and Johnson 1974: 527).

The proletariat inhabits all areas of the city, but usually concentrates in

the urban periphery. Central slums do exist, such as the area around the Via Roma in Naples (Allum 1973), Trastevere, Ponte, Parione, etc. in Rome (Fried 1973: 93), Alfama in Lisbon, Sant Cugat del R c and Barrio Chino in Barcelona (Ferr s 1977a), where artisans have mostly concentrated since the nineteenth century. They are increasingly displaced through urban renewal programmes and creeping gentrification (Ferr s 1977b: 193-4). Peripheral shanty towns and *grands ensembles*, by contrast, are still growing, as will be stressed in the following pages. Working-class distribution shows a positive correlation with industrial concentrations.

This pattern is not the only systematic difference between Mediterranean urban morphology and that of Anglo-American cities. The other important difference is the diversity of spatial distributions. A patchwork of economic activity and social classes throughout the urban fabric, with a few but important exceptions, contrasts with zoning of economic activity and segregation of social classes in the North. Southern European working-class communities are somewhat mixed socially, while the more affluent social classes tend to cluster together and exclude other social groups from their own particular areas. This contrasts with Anglo-American social geography, where working-class areas tend to be the most segregated and socially homogenous.

This mixture of middle and working classes is due, among other factors, to alternatives to community segregation, which are not met in the North. The most widespread is *vertical differentiation*. It would be misleading to call this 'segregation' (as in White 1984: 156), because it constitutes its antithesis. With the exception of some slum areas and modern housing districts, the middle and working classes live together in vertically stratified apartment blocks, the working class and service labourers in lower floors, the wealthier on top floors and in penthouses.<sup>1</sup> In Rome, segregation was near absolute in either the *rioni* (centre) or the *quartieri* (first ring), with a few exceptions (Fried 1973: 93-4). The Naples central areas seem to be the most colourful, especially since this city has virtually no peripheral shanty towns: 'On the ground floor of these palaces and tenements are found the famous *bassi* in which the poorer families live; the upper classes inhabit the upper floors of the same buildings. This cohabitation accounts for the ideological unity of all social groups' (Allum 1973: 59), a feature also commented upon by Gramsci (1949: 95-6).

<sup>1</sup> For other alternatives to neighbourhood segregation, see White 1984: 156. More rare alternatives are segregation between the front and the back of residential buildings, or overcrowding in similar buildings. The latter was found in nineteenth-century Milan, where there was little difference between the housing of middle classes, of the petty bourgeoisie and the artisans. All of them lived in two- or three-storey houses. 'Economic distinctions made themselves felt through subdivision of houses and overcrowding' (Lyttleton 1979: 253).

The location of economic activity provides us with another contrast. In Northern cities the process of economic rationalization and planning is expressed, in urban space, in the rather neat organization of economic activity in specialized zones located according to the land-rent gradient. The structure is produced by competition in the market, facilitated by planning and institutionalized by zoning by-laws (Jones 1965: 265; 1966: 61-9). In Southern cities, by contrast, the polarized economic structure makes for a disorderly urban tissue, a patchwork of economic activity, to borrow Alonso's (1964: 167) reference to peripheral urban morphology. Retail and artisan establishments, kiosks and workshops of the informal economy are scattered in small local centres, along roads and in residential areas. The pattern is either haphazard or reminiscent of the workshop structure of the preindustrial city, but is very modern indeed, and reproduced in the course of capitalist development. In fact, in the centre of Milan it was not until after the 1880s that segregation between business and residential quarters completely disappeared (Lyttleton 1979: 250). Vertical differentiation of urban functions (as well as social classes) is common, and single land-use zoning is rare in Mediterranean cities: a significant proportion of urban land serves multiple purposes. Many buildings have commercial, administrative or industrial uses at ground level and residences in their upper storeys.

The intermixture of social classes, of residence with economic activity, as well as the inverse-Burgess spatial pattern, is both a cause and an effect of the proximity of workplace and residence throughout the Mediterranean. Journeys to work are kept short for all social classes, and allow for prolonged lunch breaks, during which people return home. In the informal sector, proximity of workplace and residence is strengthened by the dispersal of workplaces throughout the urban fabric, by the creation of workshops and offices on the ground floors of residential buildings, and by home work itself. Quite often, the middle classes live in the building that houses their offices and studios.

Mixed land uses and vertical differentiation can be largely attributed to the proliferation of the multi-storey apartment building, which apparently originated in the Italian cities of the Renaissance and gradually spread to Europe in a very complicated historical process starting in the sixteenth century in France and Austria (Lichtenberger 1970: 53-8; 1976: 88-90). After 1920, apartment houses built in Rome were of the *palazzina* type, and single-family houses for the middle classes were becoming a rarity. The economic recession of the 1930s and the Second World War created a grave housing shortage throughout Southern Europe, which was not overcome by public housing construction, but by a buoyant, artificially boosted private sector. The intensification of building in height and the proliferation of the

multi-storey apartment block throughout continental Europe has been attributed to rising prices of land and construction, which rendered the single-family house inaccessible even to the middle classes (Lichtenberger 1976: 90). This interpretation, however, is undermined by the impressive size of the working-class owner-built sector. Single-family popular houses mushroomed despite the provision of *grands ensembles* at low cost in the urban periphery (for example, in Barcelona), as will be detailed below.

The multi-storey apartment building allows for mixed land uses, vertical differentiation, overcrowding in poorer tenements and spaciousness in middle-class areas. Throughout Mediterranean Europe today the city is compact, built with high densities in central areas.<sup>2</sup> This usually means that middle-class neighbourhoods 'tend to be as densely packed, traffic jammed, and unserved as the districts of the poor' (Fried 1973: 99). This is one of the reasons why, after many decades of rapid urbanization, Mediterranean cities have undergone important and contradictory transformations since the 1970s, which will probably intensify following the recent inclusion of Southern Europe into the EEC and the ongoing shift in its place in the world economy. The impact of these changes on urban development remained indirect during the transitional period of the 1970s, as will be shown in the next chapters (5, 7). A number of concepts for the study of such changes will be introduced at this point.

## 1.2 The analysis of urban development: a conceptual framework

Visible spatial patterns, as outlined above, actually conceal complex interactions. Cities are not distinguished systematically by spatial distributions alone. After all, every European or US city has its central areas where the wealthy traditionally live; and every peripheral city has its wealthy suburbs and pockets of poverty in the inner city. By stressing spatial distributions rather than social relations, the urban growth theory rooted in human ecology becomes vulnerable to criticism, which it often does not deserve (section 1.3.1). In this book a city type is explored which conforms neither to that of Northern and Eastern Europe, nor to that of the USA or the Third World.

<sup>2</sup> In Rome, green spaces declined from 2.8 m<sup>2</sup> per capita in 1925 to 2.2 in 1940, 1.7 in 1957, 1.5 in 1964 (Fried 1973: 35). Peak population densities in Barcelona in 1945 were 1,361 persons per hectare. In Italy in 1951 there were peak densities of 825 persons per hectare in Naples, 348 in Turin, 442 in Venice, 698 in Rome, 607 in Palermo, 791 in Genoa (White 1984: 32-3, 48, 53).



1.2.1 *Definitions and perspectives on urban development*

A departure from the common approaches to urban development is proposed here through the concept of land and housing *allocation*. Rather than distributions, which are but an image, we focus on a social relationship. The interaction of social classes with space, city and land should be explored through the modes of land allocation, while spatial distributions and tenure patterns, which will certainly be examined, should be considered as the visible and quantifiable outcome of the former. What actually differentiates urban development patterns in capitalist cities is not spatial distribution but land control according to social class, and, more specifically, the land rights of popular strata and the working class, who present the widest variety of adaptations and spatial patterns. Different mechanisms of land allocation – the ‘market’, ‘community’, ‘state’, ‘social’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘popular’, or what will be defined as an ‘informal’ mode of allocation – produce a variety of adaptations, tenure categories, locational and density patterns.

In order to study urban transformation, traditional geography has used the polar distinction between preindustrial/industrial or precapitalist/capitalist cities, and the concomitant polar opposites of *social* allocation of land in the precapitalist, and *economic* allocation in the capitalist city, or alternatively the ‘community’ and the ‘market’ modes of land and housing allocation. The polarity has been adopted in urban studies, but the Sjoberg (1960) model has been criticized with respect to its spatial analysis and exclusive emphasis on politics (Vance 1971; Robson 1973: 8–9). It has been established that the precapitalist city consisted of a multi-nucleated urban space, where economic (trade and skill) considerations played an important role. In any case, in traditional societies land had symbolic, power and use values, not exchange value. The commodification of property in capitalism radically changed urban patterns.

These two types of land and housing allocation are basically ‘ideal-type’ models in the Weberian sense, i.e. general, abstract and exclusive formulations inspired by F. Toennies’ distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (Allum 1973: 4–6). In concrete capitalist cities the market presents many variations, and coexists with other modes of housing and land allocation. The distinction between ‘mode of production’ and ‘social formation’ is useful for a relevant conceptualization. Marxists use the former concept, ‘Marx’s theoretical object, his central concept and coherent whole’ (Vilar 1973: 76), to refer to an abstract and formal object; the concept of

social formation comprises several modes – and also forms – of production, in a specific articulation... In several social formations, we find the dominance of one

mode of production, which produces complex effects of dissolution and conservation on the other modes of production and which gives these societies their overall character (feudal, capitalist, etc). (Poulantzas 1975: 22)

In the urban sphere, modes of production are related to urban types, which are purely theoretical constructs useful for classification. Social formations can be related to *urban formations*, i.e. articulations of economic, material, political and social forces from various urban types, combinations of objective elements and class practices changing in the course of history. Dominant and subordinate modes of land allocation have coexisted in various ways and with various intensities in different urban formations.

In fact, the market is the *dominant* mode of land allocation in capitalist urban formations. Uniformity of land allocation has usually been posited through the concept of *competition* on the basis of the rent-paying ability of social classes. A different bid-rent curve has been attributed to each class, which is a function of rent versus distance from the city centre. According to standard urban theory, commuting was costly for the poor, while the rich could afford to bear this cost and preferred to live in the healthier peripheral suburbs. 'Bid-rent curves of the wealthier will be flatter than those of the man of lower income. Therefore, the poor will tend to central locations on expensive land and the rich to cheaper land in the periphery' (Alonso 1960: 115). During the interwar period Hoyt (1937) developed the theory of the filtering-down process, according to which the wealthy take the best land and new houses, leaving their old homes to the poorer members of the community. The theory seems to have responded to the necessity of explaining a classic paradox: namely, that competition on the basis of rent-paying ability arranged groups in urban space contrary to expectations. 'There is... a paradox in American cities: the poor live near the center, on expensive land, and the rich on the periphery, on cheap land' (Alonso 1960: 107).

Peripheral cities *do not* share in this paradox: 'a high degree of correlation is found between the price of land and the socioeconomic class residing on it' (Amato 1970: 454). Despite this, convoluted variants of urban theory have always been proposed for the Third World. These can be countered even if we remain within mainstream views: the land-rent gradient arranges social groups just as expected in cities of peripheral societies where the inverse-Burgess pattern predominates; the classic 'paradox' or urban theory is thus automatically resolved.

The two contrasting patterns are quite simple to understand. Whereas in Anglo-American cities high land prices in the centre have resulted in popular overcrowding in small, subdivided dwellings, with the middle classes

spreading in suburbs of expansive single-family houses with large gardens, the mainland European, and especially Mediterranean, solution has been the opposite: because of high land prices, only the rich can afford large central apartments despite high rents (Claval 1981). The poor have been excluded to the periphery. The main focus of this book is the exploration of socio-cultural forces leading to this pattern, as well as the forces which tend to overthrow it and work towards the emergence of a new model.

Competition and rent-paying ability in the allocation of urban land are only one part of the story. Alongside the market, the dominant mode of land allocation, there usually emerge *subordinate* modes operating within the former's confines, with its rules imposed on them, but partially evading these rules. Their emergence is not a departure or distortion of capitalism, but one of its inherent, systematic characteristics necessary to resolve contradictions created by the dominant mode of land and housing allocation (Leontidou 1985a). In a class society two or more modes compete or struggle on every level – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological – despite the predominance of one.

The proletariat constitutes a class hardly ever housed along the lines of a single mode of land and housing allocation. The dominant classes usually own land, and choose their residential space relatively unrestricted by material constraints. By contrast, the location and tenure patterns of the working class are constrained by a series of objective forces, which result in the emergence of a great variety of relationships to land, and produce the least homogeneous housing conditions. Such variations make the proletariat perhaps the *most crucial class* in any study of urban development, or even urban geography more generally. In addition, contrary to traditional research focusing almost exclusively on work conditions as an influence on labour consciousness, the spatiality of working-class experience can be introduced through the study of their relationship to urban land. The workers' lives are constantly influenced by the city as a material context, as well as class relations. Their adaptations and practices, their mobilizations and consciousness, cannot be understood unless all such elements are examined in the course of explanation. The forces which explain working-class land allocation patterns are, ultimately, an articulation of forces comprising the urban economy and society, the system of production, distribution and consumption. A history of the working class in the city therefore constitutes in essence a comprehensive 'urban history' of the city in question.

After these conceptualizations, the study of the relationship of social classes with urban land should entail two objects for explanation, which correspond to the distinction between behaviour and action (Schutz 1974):

(a) *adaptation*, i.e. why classes adapt in a specific way within the dominant mode of land allocation, and (b) what is the logic of the emergence of subordinate modes, their reproduction, generalization, transformation or decline – which involves questions of social action and popular *creativity*. Only the former issue has attracted attention in current urban theory. The latter has remained in relative obscurity. Urban geographies of Southern societies can be understood by a shift of focus to the latter issue.

The operational concept used here for the multitude of variations of spatial and tenure patterns is that of *distributive groupings*, i.e. forms of *control* over housing and land.<sup>3</sup> The concept is class-specific and therefore narrower than the 'housing sectors' or 'submarkets' as segments of the housing market, and more appropriate than the concept of 'housing classes' which is too liberal, and even confusing, in the use of the concept of class.<sup>4</sup> A working-class distributive grouping (e.g. slum tenants) may coexist, within a certain housing sector, with a different middle-class distributive grouping (e.g. slum landlords). These groupings, along with the sectors themselves, often grow or decline or become transformed in the course of urban history. Once a housing sector is constituted by the practices of a class, it can become institutionalized and directed to broader class categories, or undergo transformations which alter its original class character. Distributive groupings are the visible and quantifiable outcome of the forces of the allocation of urban residential land. They are described by:

- (a) their location with respect to the city centre and the workplaces; the concepts of *centrality* and the *employment linkage* refer to the two respective locations; the latter, introduced by Vance (1966), refers to the degree of proximity of residences and workplaces, as well as their relationships;
- (b) the amount of land they occupy – hence, population *densities*;
- (c) *tenure* category.

The theoretical model proposed here centres on the interplay of two sets of forces. The adaptation of social classes to the dominant mode of land allocation is a type of behaviour which can be attributed, to a large extent, to material conditions, to the *objective* ecological context; but it is *human*

<sup>3</sup> The concept was introduced by Giddens (1973: 109) for the study of proximate structuration, and is extended here to refer to social groupings originating in the sphere of consumption of residential land.

<sup>4</sup> The term 'housing classes' was first introduced by Rex and Moore (1967), and has since created some considerable debate (cf. Saunders 1984). The concept is closer to Dahrendorf and the ecologists' concept of competing groups than to Weber, as posited by Rex and Moore. The term 'housing sector' is used in housing economics, along with 'submarkets' as distinct segments of the housing market depending mainly on tenure, housing production and economic factors.

agency as expressed in social action, class practices, cultures and ideology around the city which explains creativity, i.e. the emergence, persistence, transformation or decline of subordinate modes. The model is thus based on the well-established pairings objective/subjective, base/superstructure, community/society as proposed by marxists and ecologists. Although the dialectic interrelation between the two levels is often underplayed in both approaches, the model proposed here attempts to explore it and can thus be taken as an extended comment on the controversy between determinism and cultural specificity in human ecology and social geography (Jones 1965). However, it is not a 'possibilist', but an action model. It is based on the interplay of material conditions and human agency in creating urban restructuring. Mode of production, environment and population pressures alone do not determine urban structure; they exert pressures towards certain modes. The final outcome is a social product, formed through culture and social class practices. On the other hand, social classes and their cultures are not structured in a vacuum. Their nature and relationships in specific historical conjunctures depend on the articulation of modes of production and objective forces in the urban formation.

#### *1.2.2 Urban informality and illegal settlements*

Informality permeates many spheres of urban life in the Mediterranean. Peripheral and semiperipheral capitalism 'is a system which imposes on the urban poor solutions for working, housing, health, etc., which are frequently informal' (Oliven 1979: 31; cf. also Leeds 1969). They are excluded from the city both as producers and as inhabitants, though not as consumers (Roberts 1978: 138), through informalization processes.

This book focuses on cities where informality is related to urban development and expansion. The large Mediterranean cities are encircled by suburban communities created by popular initiative. The frontier of urban expansion is determined by popular land colonization and illegal building, and precarious owner-occupation is the rule. This mode of land allocation is very rare in advanced capitalism, where the dominant classes have determined the frontier of urban growth from a very early period. In the Mediterranean, as in peripheries, the proletariat and the urban poor live outside the 'official' norms of the middle-class city (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 306). These settlements are the most neglected in comparative urban studies. They are excluded both from comparisons among Third World cities, (e.g. comparative tables in Karpat 1976: 13-14), and from European research, where views are coloured somewhat by Northern stereotypes: 'the compassion that today spares from demolition

the thousands of illegally built homes that cover the Roman suburban landscape' (Fried 1973: 107) is puzzling to Anglo-American researchers.

Yet peripheral shanty-towns are a widespread and almost systematic feature – *bairros clandestinos* in Portugal, *viviendas marginales* in Spain, *borghetti* and *borgate* in Italy, *afthereta* in Greece, and a little further afield, *gececondus* in Turkey (chapter 7). They have usually been interpreted as a manifestation of the housing crisis (articles in Wynn ed. 1984b). Such a crisis, however, has never created land colonization on the urban fringe by low-income populations in Northern cities. Many of these settlements cannot even be classified as slums because houses are solidly built and well kept, at least after the first stage of their development. There are, of course, destitute areas with shack dwellings. The mushrooming of these settlements, however, provides a stark contrast to the familiar arrangements of Northern cities: the industrial estate, Engels' 'landless proletariat', the central slum familiar from Chicago ecology, the suburb. These simply have not taken root in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, Southern European cities have much in common with popular colonization of the urban fringe in cities of the peripheral world. 'The shanty town is the most distinctive feature of the Latin American city and its most urgent problem' (Jones 1966: 51).

Unauthorized settlements in Mediterranean cities have been based on illegal use, not illegal occupation, of land. Houses are built on land illegally subdivided into plots, but duly sold to the settlers by petty or large landowners. This land is specified as 'agricultural' by urban plans, and is illegally used for residential purposes. As in most Mediterranean cities, 'property rights have been respected in Rome, but not public land use regulations' (Fried 1973: 271). Illegality thus lies in the contravention of zoning laws and building codes. After the purchase of the plot a shack is erected, sometimes at night, and the family moves into it immediately, so as to establish its right to it as a home and escape immediate demolition in accordance with relevant legislation. Squatting in the form of occupation of empty property in the inner city, also familiar in the North,<sup>5</sup> as well as sporadic occupations of unoccupied public housing by shanty dwellers, and related practices, does occur in several Southern cities. As this is related to the housing crisis rather than urban development, however, it will not be of central concern in this study. Peripheral squatting in the form of land

<sup>5</sup> Squatters' movements are not unknown in Northern Europe and America as a form of protest. The homeless have squatted in vacant properties in London and Amsterdam, and immigrants are in the forefront of the movement of empty house occupation in German cities (Castles and Kosack 1973). Such cases, however, usually relate to marginal groups and intellectuals, and cannot be compared with Third World squatting, which has become a widespread endemic characteristic of urban growth and involves the majority of workers and popular strata.

occupation by individuals, groups or cooperatives, according to the familiar Third World model also generalized in Turkish cities, has appeared only exceptionally in Athens and Lisbon.

Among Abrams' (1964: 21-2) nine types of squatters, then, the 'speculative squatter' and the 'semi-squatter' have appeared in the Mediterranean process of illegal building. This distinction does not *a priori* dissociate the Mediterranean from peripheral societies. Several types of peripheral settlements are found in the Third World, and squatting is usually a practice of poorer populations (Abrams 1964; chapter 4). Economic development and the rise of incomes in Southern Europe, as well as the practices of fringe speculators, are reasons why squatting gives way to semi-squatting. These are variations *within* the peripheral-capitalist city type, and can by no means be compared with the present-day low-income suburbia in European and US cities, where both housing production and land allocation are integrated in the generalized market and operate exclusively according to its rules (chapter 8).

The nature of squatting as a mode of land and housing allocation has been discussed only indirectly in Third World studies. It is interesting that, despite the fact that the Third World city is often considered to be 'precapitalist', squatting has rarely been considered a 'precapitalist' mode by its students. Even researchers stressing 'power' and cultural particularism have studied it in the framework of competitive bidding for land (Alonso 1964) within the market (Berry and Rees 1969). Among the most interesting are its early conceptualizations as 'a form of petty capitalist ownership' or a 'secondary housing market' (Leeds 1969), and the view that the squatting process emanates from the 'popular' sector of the economy as opposed to the 'public' or 'private' sectors (Turner and Herz 1969). This is an especially useful distinction. Since it develops within a framework of competition for the use of land, questions of land rent and of property, semi-squatting must be seen as a submarket subordinate to the dominant market, yet also creating its own rules of operation. It should not be considered as a 'precapitalist' mode of housing production, isolated from modern-capitalist relations (chapter 4). Rather it should be characterized as an *informal* mode.

In fact, social theory had difficulty in understanding peripheral capitalist social formations until the concept of the informal sector was introduced by Hart (1971). Gradually during the 1970s dualistic theories stressing stagnation, tradition and 'residual' social classes were rejected. The informal economy was considered as an integral part of the capitalist system and its functioning development, as well as the class structure of peripheries. Its study soon spread to core societies, resulting in an increasing interaction between social research of underdeveloped and advanced societies (section

1.4.1). In earlier studies, small-scale activities were stressed; in recent research, however, undeclared activities and illegal practices have come to the forefront. A most urgent question now is how broad the concept must be. Is it 'shadow' activities we are interested in, or do we include the 'lighter' side of the informal sector? Is this sector exclusively connected with the 'black economy', 'para-economy', illegality, usury, crime? Or, should we devise other concepts to describe these activities? This depends on our research interests and the use (rather than the meaning) of the concept. If it is capital and spatial restructuring we are interested in, the 'lighter' side of the informal sector should concern us. This is the case in this book. The informal economy should not by definition include only illegal activities escaping State control, because the several forms and variations of State intervention in capitalist social formations would render the concept useless for comparative research: activities stigmatized as illegal in one social formation could be perfectly legal in another one. Illegality actually refers to institutionalization and the political process, while the informal sector is a socio-economic formation.

The inhabitants of Mediterranean cities have always manifested ingenuity in the development of the lighter side of the informal sector as well as social polyvalence (multiple employment: Tsoucalas 1986). 'This many-sidedness was a long-established rule; to engage in several activities was a sensible way of spreading risks' (Braudel 1966: 320). The free labourer, the putting-out worker, the self-employed artisan or the shopkeeper, the family entrepreneur and the pedlar, are the most familiar figures in Mediterranean cities (Leontidou 1977). Urban economies are polarized into a formal sector of large, modern enterprises, and a constantly growing small-scale unstable sector of small shops, artisans and 'free' labourers. A vivid account of polarization is provided by Allum's (1973: 28-9, 40) description of 'the Two Naples'. An economic and a socio-spatial division between 'giant' and 'dwarf' enterprises, city areas and the slum economy in the *casbah*, persisting in the central district of Naples, indicates a polarized society. The informal economy, along with family ties and the wide distribution of small property, assumes the role which organized systems of social insurance play in other European countries. It provides some security to popular strata, but also sustains a large number of the population in subsistence activities. This, along with income sharing processes among members of extended families, reduces income but also acts as a buffer to open unemployment.

In squatting and owner-built housing, the concept of household work strategies (Pahl 1985; Tsoucalas 1986) is relevant. Self-built housing is related to 'domestic self-provisioning' and 'reciprocal work outside the household but in the locality' (Pahl 1985: 247-50). Labour in illegal



settlements is sometimes personal, sometimes contractual – in which case expensive shadow wage labour is hired in order to complete the shack overnight – and at other times is simply a favour for a friend, neighbour or relative (communal work: Pahl 1985: 259). Building by mutual aid and extending the house by personal labour does not only save money. It can be maintained that ‘deskilling in the formal sector is matched by re-skilling in informal work’ (Pahl 1985: 249).

Semi-squatting is also informal because of its incomplete integration in urban capitalism as a secondary land market and mode of housing production. It locates on land identified by the market mechanism as unfit for habitation (Jones 1964: 420). In squatting, ‘a Ricardian law operates to consume the less and less desirable sites until the most unaccessible or most precarious ones signal the saturation point of the settlement’ (Ray 1969: 39). Semi-squatting combines petty capitalism and popular allocation of a quasi-cooperative type. The process of land colonization is not clearly individual: despite the fact that each family buys its own plot, informal networks operate for information and mutual aid (chapter 4). This incomplete integration in the market does not necessarily render the informal economy an alternative to capitalism (Pahl 1985: 246). It *may* be, but this should be posed as an independent question.

### 1.3 The material context of urban development

While ‘functionalist, mechanical, and pseudo-biological metaphors for human and social history’ are being rejected (Scott and Storper 1986: 10), certain aspects of the theories of human ecology retain their freshness and vigour in urban studies. Following the conceptualizations discussed above, basic *objective* axes diversifying core from peripheral cities will be explored first through an ecological perspective. Besides influencing urban restructuring, they set limits and exert pressures for the adaptation of the working class in the dominant mode of land allocation, but are related to contradictions leading to the emergence of subordinate modes. Socio-cultural forces in urban restructuring, which explain the emergence and transformations of subordinate modes, will be introduced in the next section.

#### 1.3.1 The ‘ecological complex’ revisited

Although for a very long time ‘few disciplines have been so dependent on a particular theoretical school as urban sociology has been on the Chicago school’ (Castells 1976b: 36), the theoretical implications of human ecology

have not been explored adequately. Criticisms abound, but are often misguided (Saunders 1986: 66–71). There are two crucial points which, if eliminated, can make human ecology a potent theory for urban analysis. One is its tendency for transhistorical generalization, and the other is determinism, where it is explicitly stated that material conditions, irrespective of class struggle, can lead to certain outcomes. These *can* be relativized with a dialectic view, leaving us with a materialist conception of urban history, where technology, space and locality set limits and create conditions for human action and are, in turn, shaped by it.

In reconstituting some of the elements of this highly underestimated approach (if not discipline) for the study of urban restructuring, it here becomes apparent that human ecology provides a materialist urban sociology ('determinist', 'social Darwinist', etc., according to its various critics), since it stresses spatial-economic forces of social organization. 'Without subscribing to environmental determinism, one can acknowledge that environment performs enabling and constraining functions' (Lubove 1967: 661). In human ecology the dynamic relationships between social groups and the city have been inventively conceptualized through the ecological processes (adaptation, segregation, invasion, succession, filtering-down, etc.), and the 'ecological complex' as presented below. The contrast between dominant and subordinate modes of land allocation in capitalist cities (section 1.2.1) owes much to this materialist tradition. The concept of dominance has been widely used by both human ecologists and marxists,<sup>6</sup> to point to 'influents' and modes which control, condition and circumscribe the operation of other structures or modes (Hawley 1950; Park et al. 1967 edn). The emergence of subordinate modes is considered as a systematic occurrence within the dominant mode, but the latter may at any time be toppled by class struggle, according to marxists; the human ecologists were more deterministic (and more Durkheimian) in their ontological assumptions about equilibrium and human nature, stressing social stability,

<sup>6</sup> A parallel between human ecology and marxist sociology may be discerned, since both Hawley and Marx emphasize the primacy of material production and elaborate a composite concept for systems of social relations. The connection may be startling at first sight, especially because Marx avoids transhistorical generalizations. In discussing Hawley's (1950) 'cardinal assumptions' concerning the conditions of material life, Saunders (1986: 72–3) also refers to the affinity of marxism and human ecology but does not follow it up; in the rest of his analysis he points to relationships of human ecology with Durkheimian sociology (Saunders 1986: 53–66). In fact, the analogy cannot be taken too far. Human ecology visualizes different trajectories from those in marxist studies; its ontology and philosophy have a strong Durkheimian streak; in the case of marxism, transhistorical generalizations are avoided; social struggles take a primacy in place of equilibrium; economic determinism rather than environmental conditioning can be discerned, especially in Marx's later works, which underplay the dialectic interrelation and the role of superstructure in social transformation.

consensus, subordination or adaptation rather than struggle between dominant and subordinate modes. The ecological system, however, is by no means static, though it has a tendency towards equilibrium. The tension between individual freedom and social control, as well as competition, was recognized in human ecology, and destabilization (social disorganization) was thought to result in a renewed outburst of competition, and to cyclical evolutionary processes leading to a 'higher' stage of adaptation (Saunders 1986: 58).

Since human ecology is concerned with collective adaptations, questions of individual values and motivations have no place within it.<sup>7</sup> Social organization and urban structure and growth, and the differentiation of cities in these respects, have been explained by a finite set of objective elements, which comprised a system, a social or *ecological complex*.<sup>8</sup> Duncan's and Schnore's (1959) famous POET consisted of Population, Organization, Environment and Technology. This set of elements was thought to shape 'the residential distribution of socioeconomic strata' (Schnore 1965: 379), but also social organization at large. Adopting a marxist (but inherently ecological) perspective, Castells (1976a: 154-62) uses the composite concept of the 'urban system', whose main elements are production (of goods, services and information), consumption (social appropriation of the product - housing facilities), exchange (transport, communications) and management and control (planning institutions).

If the 'ecological complex' is viewed as historically produced and changing through time, transhistorical, general principles such as those found in human ecology can be avoided. On the other hand, concepts as composite as the 'ecological complex' or, for that matter, the 'mode of production', are substituted in our theoretical model for a more detailed set

<sup>7</sup> Hawley 1950 (for a critique, Robson 1969: 23; Saunders 1986: 79). Hawley's predecessors, however, were more ambiguous about this. McKenzie (in Park et al. 1967 edn: 64-5) specified 'mobility and purpose' as the main differences between human and plant communities, stressing the role of culture. Park distinguished between 'community' (the biotic level of social life) and 'society' (the cultural one) and wrote that 'ecology is concerned with communities rather than societies though it is not easy to distinguish between them' (Park 1952: 251).

<sup>8</sup> This is one of its names, found in Duncan and Schnore (1959). Others are Park's (1952: 158) 'social complex' consisting of four elements: population, artefact (technological culture), custom and beliefs (non-material culture), and natural resources of the habitat; Quinn's (1940) reference to economic base and economic and cultural factors (private ownership and control of property, freedom of competition) as determinant for urban patterns; Ogburn's (1950) emphasis on technology, especially transport. We can venture to relate Park's 'social complex', Hawley's 'cardinal assumptions' (which justify his 'ecological principles'; Hawley 1950) and Duncan and Schnore's (1959) 'ecological complex' (see below) to Marx's 'mode of production'. Both sides use a composite concept to emphasize the primacy of material production or objective elements in the explanation of social organization.

of factors. In other words, they are decomposed and examined in their historically specific configurations, variations, interactions and articulation. It is with these considerations that three basic 'objective' axes for the structuring of our explanatory model have been isolated here:

- (a) Material production as reflected in *industrial restructuring* (Duncan and Schnore's Organization and Technology, Quinn's Economic Base, Castells' Production, and aspects of Marx's Mode of Production) through technological innovation and social change;
- (b) *Urbanization* and population mobility (Park's, Duncan and Schnore's Population), especially as regards its intensity and timing in relation to industrialization.
- (c) *The city as a material context*, consisting of the physical and built environment, or 'nature' transformed by labour, but also destroyed or polluted by the expansion of capitalism (Duncan and Schnore's Environment, Park's Resources of the Habitat). Capitalism in the production of space has its technological aspects (Park's Artefact, Duncan and Schnore's Technology, Ogburn's Technology, Castells' Exchange, Mumford's Transport); it also has its organizational aspects (Park's Custom and Beliefs, Quinn's Cultural Factors, Castells' Management).

The historical specificity of the 'ecological complex' approach proposed here will be illustrated as the urban history of Greece is discussed. In the following section, examples of variations of material elements in the urban histories of core and peripheral societies will be outlined. Specific concepts for the analysis in subsequent chapters will thus be introduced.

### 1.3.2 *Industrial restructuring and urbanization*

Technological change, improvement in production processes and improvement in communications largely 'cause' urban restructuring, but are, in turn, caused by it. 'Technological change remains largely an historical puzzle' (Scott and Storper 1986: 10), and as such it will be approached here: no attempt at its interpretation will be made. The different timing of industrialization and urbanization in core and peripheral societies and their interdependence is responsible for important differences in their urban structures. There has been no unique path of transition to capitalism in Europe, but the British trajectory through 'manufacture' to 'machinofacture' has been the most adequately studied (Gregory 1982). The location of workplaces seems to have been so crucial throughout this long period, that it was able to decentralize or centralize the settlement network (Robson

1973). The emergent industry initially followed energy sources, raw material and transport routes rather than labour. The 'doubly centralizing tendency of capitalism' (Marx 1961 edn: 574–652) – of capital and population – was revealed after the introduction of coal, which created industrial concentrations (also Engels 1969 edn: 64–5).

Industrialization also caused population concentration within the early capitalist city. For the unskilled worker, 'all that lay beyond a tiny circle of personal acquaintance or walking distance was darkness' (Hobsbawm 1984: 137). Later on, casual labourers and the early proletariat were dependent on proximity to the workplace and clung to central locations: the wretched, overcrowded working-class quarters and the image of the landless proletariat of Manchester as painted by Engels were largely due to the central location of factories.<sup>9</sup> Industrial concentrations in the inner city also accelerated the filtering-down process. As rapid urbanization created a mounting demand for urban space, the outward movement of the bourgeoisie was speeded up. The more central housing stock was thus vacated, subdivided and filtered down to poorer groups.

Technological change and the market thus made the early capitalist cities 'self-contained employment areas' (Robson 1973: 13). Industrialists and the State reinforced the direct relationship between industrialization and urbanization. As labour became a commodity to be bought and sold in the market, the State has all too often treated housing and land allocation as a means of manipulation of the labour market in the interests of industrial capital. High labour mobility in nineteenth-century cities must be attributed, among other factors, to the housing tenure structure. The housing market of privately rented accommodation, with a few exceptions, lasted until the expansion of local authority housing after 1919, which resulted in the rapid rise of owner-occupiers (Robson 1973: 97). Engels (1887) showed much insight into such forces in urban structure. In his discussion of industrial estates he was the first to stress the interests of industrialists in labour immobility, which would afford the former monopolistic powers, and their strategy to bring about dependence by tying workers, as owner-occupiers, in one location.

Since the 1950s, oligopolistic control has led to a 'monopoly capital'

<sup>9</sup> The Chicago ecologists were criticized for overestimating the significance of central location for the early working classes: it was later shown that industry, not the CBD as such, was the most important determinant of working-class location (Carroll 1952; cf. also Saunders 1986: 66). The early proletariat actually sought proximity to industrial concentrations. Workers and casual labourers in London usually clung to central locations and struggled to remain there, since industry catering for the market, as well as casual job opportunities, concentrated in the inner city (Stedman Jones 1971). In other cities, where factories located near railroads and rivers, the workers lived closest to their jobs at a distance from the CBD.

phase, in which competition no longer prevails. The new monopolistic mode of regulation, which, following Gramsci's intuition, we call fordism, encouraged the expansion of the market and the growth of popular consumption (Lipietz 1986: 26; Scott and Storper 1986: 8). A long period of industrial restructuring and decentralization began, and major population shifts were effected by large-scale planning of working-class estates, as well as institutional arrangements, attracting labour where shortages occurred. Fordism as a mode of capital accumulation reached its limits by the end of the 1960s, and a crisis arose during the following years. With present processes of industrial restructuring towards flexible accumulation, the relationship between urbanization and industrialization is severed as capital becomes more mobile, productive decomposition takes place and the exploitation of cheap and biddable labourers is sought in other regions, provinces and nations (chapter 5). A gradual redefinition of the international core and periphery is under way.

If the contemporary world has not entered into its 'post-industrial' phase and continues to be stubbornly organized around processes of industrial commodity production (Scott and Storper 1986: vii), this is even more true of the peripheral world: the internationalization of socio-economic relationships in the 1970s means that US and European companies locate their production overseas, to low-wage countries, transforming the structure of the peripheral world, and causing the emergence of NICs (Scott and Storper 1986: 3-5). The centre of the world economy moves from one country to another. The 'core' used to be a city, then a nation, now probably several countries (Wallerstein 1979; Lipietz 1985). Nor has the periphery ever been homogenous or fixed. The redistribution of the world economy and exchange between NICs and peripheries is now creating a new division within the periphery (Lipietz 1985).

In the old international division of labour, peripheries were exporters of raw materials, outlets for products, then outlets for capital investment, and always a pool of labour power. Rather than an industrial revolution, the *penetration of capitalism*, especially British capitalism, was effected in Latin America after independence by the spatial expansion of railway networks, public utilities and trans-oceanic transport in 1880-1920. As urban markets were reinforced, the extent of *primacy* in the urban system increased without any industrial development.<sup>10</sup> The few large neocolonial cities (usually the capital) were the *comprador* centres of export economies.

Industrialization did not speed up until the twentieth century. The relative

<sup>10</sup> Hardoy 1975: 47-8; Cardoso 1975: 170. By 1930 Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba figured among the world's most urbanized countries, with 'primate' urban systems (Hardoy 1975: 50; Portes and Walton 1976: 7-25).

isolation of Latin American economies during the interwar years led to the process known as *substitutive industrialization*. With the depression of the 1930s, populist regimes inaugurated import-substitution policies. After their initial success, their failure became evident during the 1960s (Lipietz 1986: 28–9) – a fact which may have caused the critique of evolutionary theories and Frank's (1971) alternative theory about the 'development of under-development', i.e. the widening of the gap between core and periphery.<sup>11</sup> In this process, industry was from the outset light and market-oriented.

Light industry was attracted by concentrations of consumers, labour power and the external economies of the dense urban agglomerations (Furtado 1970: 82–6). Although an important relationship thus developed between population growth and industrial concentration, centripetal urbanization was not created by industrialization. A process known as *urbanization without industrialization* affected peripheral economies. 'It is the hope of work, not its availability, that causes the flood of migrants' (Jones 1964: 420). The main source of employment for the rapidly increasing labour force was not the formal capitalist sector, but the informal or unstable or peripheral circuit, a low-productivity, unprotected sector, where small enterprises were constantly reproduced and marginal activities emerged (Jolly et al. eds. 1973; Santos 1979; section 1.4.1).

On the intra-urban level, the availability of cheap mass transport, which had improved since the years of capitalist penetration, tended to decentralize both industry and the working class. The production structure involved the workers in questions of land *tenure* rather than *location* (Leontidou 1985a): given work instability and underemployment, the urban popular strata sought precarious owner-occupation for the avoidance of regular rent payments as well as long-term security. It was inappropriate for them to seek proximity to any particular workplace which could, anyway, change in a very short period.

The Third World nations, however, have gone beyond their initial roles as cheap labour depots and are developing more complex patterns of industrialization (Scott and Storper 1986: 9). During the 1960s, besides the old horizontal division of labour between sectors, a second vertical division became possible. The production process was divided into three levels: conception and engineering; qualified manufacturing requiring skilled workers; and deskilled execution and assembly. The possibility of separating

<sup>11</sup> Economists such as A. Emmanuel (1973, 1974), Furtado (1970), Frank (1971), Amin (1974), Wallerstein (1979) and many others have attacked an earlier school of analysis which stressed the 'diffusion' of capitalism and 'convergence' between periphery and core. They pointed out that underdevelopment is reproduced by capitalism through dependence, or direct export of surplus, or unequal exchange. For a good summary exposition of the debate, cf. Worsley 1984: 183. For a dissenting view, see Warren (1980).

the three levels geographically emerged (Massey 1984: 70–1), first in internal regions of the core, then to the immediate external periphery (Spain, Korea, Mexico), then further out. A succession of regimes of accumulation in peripheries<sup>12</sup> then created a reshuffling of the world economy, and industrialization occurred in underdeveloped countries where the internal market could play a significant role. In the 1970s, after evolutionary theories, the dogma of inevitable ‘development of underdevelopment’ was dealt a blow by industrialization in the periphery, and theorists focused on endogenous development and local class relations.<sup>13</sup>

Mediterranean Europe stands between the two contrasting models of core and peripheral societies. From a conceptual point of view, the concept of the *semiperiphery* is relevant here.<sup>14</sup> It refers to place in the world economy (intermediate world regions between core and periphery), economic structure (contradictions of late industrialization) and socio-political development. This concept, which is rather ill-defined and inelegant, will be used here interchangeably with NIC. Southern European NICs do not include Italy, as the most developed among them and the earliest EEC member in the region. However, the Mezzogiorno is an underdeveloped area, and some Italian cities are comparable with those of the NICs. The social and economic patterns of Rome are those of southern rather than northern Italian cities, and Lazio has been placed in the 1950s within the jurisdiction of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Fried 1973: 73, 75).

‘To some economists, Rome is a classic study in urbanization without industrialization’ (Fried 1973: 108). And Rome is not the only Southern city which gives this opportunity. Mediterranean urbanization has been discussed with little direct reference to industry (section 1.1.1), because it is

<sup>12</sup> Lipietz 1986: 30–1, who speaks first of bloody taylorization, with strong rates of exploitation, then during the 1970s of peripheral fordism in NICs with a large middle class and experienced labour force. Still, the majority of qualified employment positions remain in the core.

<sup>13</sup> Scott and Storper 1986: 10. ‘Dependence and underdevelopment’ theories were criticized, first by Warren (1980), who supported ongoing industrialization in the Third World as multinational corporations expand, then by Cardoso, Faletto and others stressing imbalances, including the informal sector, in economic development (Mouzelis 1985), and then by the theorists of capitalist regulation stressing relations of domination, and placing methodological priority on the study of each social formation together with its external linkages (Aglietta 1982; Lipietz 1986).

<sup>14</sup> As used by Wallerstein to refer to the more developed part of the Third World. Countries specified as semiperipheries by Wallerstein (1979: 100), however, have shifted their place in the world economy, and NICs are emerging (see above). This, and other difficulties in the use of the concept (Mouzelis 1985), make it somewhat awkward. It should also be noted that the integration of Mediterranean countries in the world system as semiperipheries during the postwar period has not evolved from one single historical trajectory. Greece differs from its neighbours especially in that the latter fell from core to semiperipheral status in the world economy, while Greece rose from a peripheral one.



usually not caused by industry. Even in Milan, 'the city created the factories, not the factories the city' (Lyttleton 1979: 261). Industry followed rather than created urban concentrations, in sharp contrast to the case of Northern Europe. Besides economic forces, industrialization was barred by political ones. In some Mediterranean cities, such as Rome, the dominant classes discouraged industrialization in order to avoid the restless proletariat (Fried 1973: 21). Despite the rise of capitalism through the concentration of business firms as early as the sixteenth century (Braudel 1966: 444-5), modern industry arrived late in the Mediterranean.

Among the four countries, only Greece experienced a period of capitalist penetration (chapter 2). Marx recognized the first centres of capitalist production in northern Italian cities during the fourteenth and fifteenth century, but also various instances of primitive accumulation in Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France and England (Paschos 1981: 222-4). According to Braudel (1966: 437), 'pre-industry' developed in Italy as a response to the decline in trade in the sixteenth century, especially during the period 1520-40. 'Industry flourished most in cities far from the sea, cities that were prevented by their position from fulfilling all the functions of communication centres, in Lucca... Milan, Como, or Florence herself' (Braudel 1966: 322). Handicraft also flourished in the isolated Greek mountain villages under Ottoman rule (chapter 2), but in general manufacturing in the Levant was in the hands of Christians and Jews in Constantinople and Salonica (Braudel 1966: 436). The early Mediterranean industry conformed to the pattern of the *Verlagssystem*, the putting-out system.<sup>15</sup> Industrial labour was especially mobile at the time. 'Over long distances and short, a mobile labour force was constantly responding to variations in demand' (Braudel 1966: 434). Italian industry located outside the city walls. These rural industries never attained the importance they had acquired in England or Northern Europe, and were never combined in a whole group of rural centres. Moreover, by the beginning of the seventeenth and until the nineteenth century, industry was moving out to small towns and villages rather than into big cities (Braudel 1966: 429-30). The Mezzogiorno experienced an industrial renaissance at the time. Urban industry tended to settle on the outskirts of big cities. The new industrial enterprises in nineteenth-century Milan found in the suburbs a cheaper and more abundant labour force, low land values, room to expand and easier access to railways (Lyttleton 1979: 256). The industrial colonies about

<sup>15</sup> Where the merchant, entrepreneur or *Verleger* puts out to the artisan the material to be worked on for a salary. This system struck a blow against the guilds, the Italian *arti* and the Spanish *gremios*, and benefited the merchant class (Braudel 1966: 431). It led to the concentration and expansion of industry in Segovia, Córdoba, Toledo, Venice and Genoa.

100 km outside Barcelona (Ametlla, Merula, Pons, Viladimiu) perpetuate forms of paternalistic capitalism prevalent at the beginning of the century, though their vitality is menaced today (Remica 1977: 184).

The countries of Southern Europe were integrated in the international market at the second half of the nineteenth century, but did not undergo an industrial revolution then. They gradually declined and fell from core to semiperipheral status in the world economy (Wallerstein 1979: 100). Production was especially disrupted during the recessions since the 1920s, with the civil war in Spain (1939–9) and Greece (1945–8), and the Second World War in Italy. Economic development speeded up after the wars, but the four countries remained the ‘proletarian nations’ of Europe, exporting their surplus labour to the North (chapter 3). The Italian ‘economic miracle’ is the best known.<sup>16</sup> Though based on earlier foundations, it was realized during the 1950s in the north of the country. The Greek and the Portuguese ‘miracles’ in the 1960s were no less significant. The two countries developed through the internationalization of their economies, which opened up to foreign investment and trade flows during the 1960s (chapter 3). The European NICs fared well even during the prolonged oil-induced crises until the beginning of the 1980s (chapter 3), though Portugal did have to face a deepening economic crisis after 1974, aggravated by the return of destitute settlers from the African colonies (Lewis and Williams 1987).

Economic development was everywhere combined with emigration, rapid urbanization, a regional problem and uncontrolled exploitation of the labour force (chapter 3). Even in Italy industrialization involved a process of economic polarization and regional inequality. Industry grew around cities which were already large, causing regional polarization. Urban marginality, however, was much less evident than in Third World cities, principally because of the legacy of emigration to Northern Europe: the political economy of the Mediterranean region has been greatly shaped by the export of its surplus labour to advanced countries. Emigration was thus a crucial axis for differentiation, not only from Northern Europe but also from the peripheral world (chapter 3).

### 1.3.3 *The city as a material context*

A relative independence of the urban built environment from industrial restructuring and urbanization processes is posited here. Rather than a

<sup>16</sup> Fordist models and norms took off in Italy after 1945 with the help of the USA, but not in Latin America, despite US help (Lipietz 1986: 30). It has been maintained that a distance has developed since then between the economy of Italy (central fordism) and the rest of the Southern countries (peripheral fordism; Lipietz 1985).

historical treatment, however, which will be attempted in subsequent chapters, an elaboration of concepts is appropriate at this stage. As already pointed out, the city as a material context consists of the natural and built environment which changes because of *technological* change and *organizational* change, related with cultural and institutional aspects of the social formation. Technological aspects of the built environment include housing and utility production in the city, and transport, or the 'technological destruction of distance' (Handlin 1963: 3). None of them is purely technological, since even transport requires organization for widespread application; however, they are connected with material development and affect urban restructuring. The ecologists' emphasis on technology echoes Marx and Engels, as well as 'urbanologists' such as L. Mumford, H. G. Wells and M. M. Webber who saw urban changes as consequences of technological development and particularly improvements in communications (Robson 1973: 8). Their approach has been reformulated by urban historians such as Lubove, Handlin, Lampard, and others (Callow ed. 1973).

One of the crucial characteristics of capitalism, according to Marx, was the commodification of property (the full alienability of property), and the eradication of the relationship of wage-labour to the earth (land, soil; Giddens 1981: 81). For the study of the city as a material context, however, this is only a point of departure. Land and housing first entered the generalized market, but then came to be produced, like other commodities. The study of land and housing allocation is a rather delicate matter from a conceptual point of view, because simple commodity production here cannot be characterized as 'precapitalist' (chapter 4). Moreover, the identification of the dominant land allocation mechanism as 'the market' does not thereby relieve the analyst of the responsibility to examine in a concrete fashion the nature of market relationships which pertain within it. There is a great variety of competing actors, institutions and terms of competition. Technological aspects of the market, such as the type, the availability and the cost of the factors of the production of housing and infrastructure (land, building materials, labour) affect rates of building and relevant shortages. However, organizational aspects such as the structure of competition, in turn related to planning systems and urban landownership patterns, are often more crucial. This set of independent, though closely interrelated, variables also changed rapidly after the wars. The structure of competition relates to the possible set of actors operating in the urban market (Form 1954; Harvey 1973: 163-6), as well as the relationships (the terms of competition) among them. The scale and regulations governing the relationships among actors characterize a market as 'competitive' (free,

generalized), or closely regulated (by legislation and planning), or 'monopolistic' (highly organized and usually under the control of large-scale finance capital), or 'dual' (monopolistic/competitive or capitalist/simple commodity or formal/informal). Urban analysis has mostly focused on the transitions from the community to the market, and from the competitive to the monopolistic market.<sup>17</sup> Both of these transitions concern the cities of advanced capitalism. Dualism, by contrast, is usual in peripheries, but infrequently touched upon. This, along with the great diversity of the market and urban landownership patterns in Mediterranean cities, compels us to leave historical exposition to chapter 7.

The lack of land use control in Mediterranean Europe has been stressed repeatedly. Urban planning seems to have faded in history,<sup>18</sup> and today ranges from the municipal socialism of Bologna to the free-market or unplanned urban development in the cities of Portugal and Greece (Wynn ed. 1984a; White 1984: 29). Throughout the region, however, a speculative real estate market is at work, which is usually dual, combined with an informal land and housing sub-market (chapter 4). Illegality is all-pervasive, involves all social groups and is conducive to the development of popular spontaneous urban movements.

Technological and organizational aspects of the land market define its exact nature. Different markets have different segregative effects, and can affect urban structure and growth relatively independently from industrial structure and urbanization. In this, urban landownership patterns play an important role. Variations include narrow or widespread ownership of land, i.e. concentration or fragmentation of ownership, and can be attributed partly to the concentration/fragmentation of wealth, and partly to institutional means to control and safeguard the ownership of land, such as registration systems, laws on property rights and inheritance, and land-use restrictions. These patterns emerge historically and change as cultures around the land question are transformed (chapter 7). The great diversity of

<sup>17</sup> For example, Massey and Catalano 1978; Harvey 1973. As the scale of the enterprise was enlarged in all economic sectors after the wars, housing and land transactions were permeated by large-scale capital: organized developers, building corporations and credit institutions changed the terms of competition in the market; finance capital penetrated the property and urban development sectors; new methods of building took construction further from the age of handicraft; and state intervention with zoning regulations reinforced the tendency of the economy towards spatial functional organization (Jones 1966: 61-9; 1965: 265; Massey and Catalano 1978). Thus emerged a monopolistic market in the rather orderly, closely regulated Anglo-American city.

<sup>18</sup> Building control regulations were common during the medieval period, and expropriatory powers were used for a variety of purposes in the Mediterranean (Wynn ed. 1984a; White 1984: 10). For a most interesting account of Roman planning since the nineteenth century, the conflicting proposals of plans and the various interests involved, see Fried (1973). Later developments are amply illustrated in Wynn ed. 1984a.

landownership patterns in Mediterranean cities, and the absence of separation between industrial and landed capital in their history, will be studied in detail (chapters 2, 7).

Finally, the fear of environmental determinism has led to growing underestimation of the role of the physical environment in urban restructuring, which is inappropriate for the case of the Mediterranean. 'At the heart of this human unit... there should be a source of physical unity, a climate, which has imposed its uniformity on both landscape and ways of life' (Braudel 1966: 231). One example is the facilitation of outdoor life, and consequently the habitability of shanties, in countries with a mild climate. Such aspects, however, constitute a somewhat fixed background, and will not be explored any further. Other aspects of the environment are reshaped by the incorporation of human labour (Parsons ed. 1977; Sayer 1979). The exploitation of the environment through technology has resulted in environmental pollution, which has profoundly influenced Mediterranean urban expansion patterns recently, by speeding up the flight to the suburbs (chapters 6, 7).

#### **1.4 Popular initiative in urban development: a set of hypotheses**

The most influential critique against the 'ecological complex' stressed its determinism.<sup>19</sup> In fact, 'ultimately it is with man's behaviour we are dealing, and... it is society that makes the pattern we are trying to discover' (Jones 1966: 142). The first prerequisite in the study of urban society is the exploration of the nature of social classes and their practices around land allocation. Discussion of social classes in connection with the Greek case (chapter 3) has been a necessary choice, because of the complicated issues involved in a more general and inclusive discussion in the context of the voluminous literature on contemporary class theory. Some necessary conceptualizations and the presentation of our research hypotheses conclude this chapter.

##### **1.4.1 *Class theory, the informal sector and urban analysis: basic concepts***

Relations of production, forms of exploitation and class solidarity have varied in different social formations, particularly when the opposition between core and periphery is considered. It is therefore difficult to 'define'

<sup>19</sup> Jones 1965: conclusions; Saunders 1986: ch. 2. Urban historians have contrasted their own approach to that of human ecologists on the basis of the 'respective weight assigned to subjective, attitudinal variables' (Lubove 1967: 667).

any class. A long debate has developed among marxist sociologists about the possibility of objectively defining classes, and of specifying the process whereby economic classes become social classes. Social geography, which has to locate social classes in space, and often on maps, also has to seek a degree of abstraction and has been influenced by works stressing an objective or structural definition of class (e.g. Poulantzas 1975; Wright 1978).<sup>20</sup> An additional reason for this has been the dependence on classifications of already existing census material, which have, unfortunately, remained insensitive to historical transformation, complexity and variations. In general, therefore, the geographical theorizing of class seems to have passed from the nominalism of American stratification theory to structural marxism before it arrived at the dialectical relationships and spatiality of structuration theory (Giddens 1981).

The 'blank spots' in class theory can be largely attributed to social change itself. By observing classes through history, basic transformations can be discerned, which require modifications of initial definitions. This is especially true of the proletariat. Its conditions in early capitalism were greatly transformed through working-class struggles and effective unionization, as well as industrial restructuring and the rise of the service sector. The number of manual labourers decreased. Theories appeared about the 'embourgeoisement' of the working class and the growth of the 'aristocracy of labour' among them (Giddens 1973; Hobsbawm 1984). One of the most difficult issues of modern class theory became the distinction between the working class and the 'new' petty bourgeoisie, or otherwise 'the constantly growing number of the middle classes, those who stand between the workman on the one hand and the capitalist and the landlord on the other' (Gough 1972: 70).

Poulantzas seems to have been one of the first to attack this question within marxist class theory, inspired from the labour theory of value and the distinction between *productive* and *unproductive* labour. This is not the place to take part in the voluminous controversy.<sup>21</sup> It will be bypassed

<sup>20</sup> Poulantzas (1975: 16) rejects the formulations 'class-in-itself' (Hegel) and 'class-for-itself' (Lukács 1971), and seems to have resolved, in his mind, the significant controversy around objectivity and subjectivity at a stroke through the concept of the structural determination of classes: 'every objective class place in the productive process is necessarily characterized by effects on the structural determination of this class in all aspects, i.e. also by a specific place of this class in the political and ideological relations of the social division of labour'. This reduces the sensitivity of his analysis to socio-historical variations of social movements, and can lead him to theories on 'false consciousness'.

<sup>21</sup> Two viewpoints have developed around these concepts, both laying claim to supporting evidence in Marx (Gough 1972: 69). One denies any theoretical or practical correlations of this distinction with social classes (Harvey 1982: 105); the other viewpoint identifies productive workers with the working class. Gramsci (1971 edn: 13) criticizes this view as vulgarized during his period.

(though certainly not resolved) by the use of 'production' and 'services' in place of 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour. According to Marx, workers in production – manufacturing, construction and transport industries (Gough 1972; Wright 1978: 54) – can be considered as labour exchanged with capital to produce surplus value directly, and are thus productive labourers. Those in circulation (commerce) and services, by contrast, are paid out of revenue, exchanged with revenue, supported out of surplus value, and hence unproductive labourers (Gough 1972: 47, 51–7).

The proletariat emerged late in the Mediterranean, since industry also arrived late. The liberalization of the political system, and the introduction of parliamentary institutions before industrialization, meant the absence of any intense social struggles by the working class. A weak bourgeoisie then managed to exclude the working class from autonomous participation in the political system until the present century (Archer and Giner eds. 1971; Diamandouros 1986: 548). These societies can by no means be approached through standard class analysis for another reason: the proliferation of independent labourers and small manufacturing firms for a long period in their history.

The question as to the nature of the proletariat in polarized societies, and as to its relationship with informal-sector workers and marginal populations, has attracted a lot of attention in Third World studies (Santos 1979; Lloyd 1982). Research in advanced capitalism soon became affected too.<sup>22</sup> A population which 'turns back the clock of the industrial revolution' (Lloyd 1982: 54) was in a way resurrected in advanced capitalist societies, despite the expectations of the marxist tradition for proletarianization. The convergence between core and peripheral studies in informalization, especially during the 1980s, seems to constitute a major problem. Though a new paradigm arising in social research should certainly be welcomed, it would be insensitive to history and overtly formalistic if it failed to stress variations among world regions, and especially core and periphery. If the proletarianization thesis has been put in doubt in the long run for the capitalist core, it remains true that salary- and wage-earners have increased to over 80% of the labour force of advanced societies, and independent labourers have decreased. Parallels should *not* be drawn between New York, regions of Italy and Latin America. Third World informalization has

<sup>22</sup> Recently the countries of the core have rediscovered the informal sector, 'shadow' wage labour and the 'hidden' or 'black' economy in their past, but also in the present. Stedman Jones' (1971) work on Victorian London demonstrated the predominance of casual labourers. Their re-emergence has usually been attributed to the economic crisis of the 1970s, or related to new technology, flexible accumulation and changes in the labour process. Changes in circulation also have an impact, such as the imposition of VAT which results in under-declaring activities (Pahl 1985: 245–7). Cf. also Robson (1988: 92).

been an ongoing process involving both urban and rural areas, and differs in many respects from that in core societies. It was instituted long before the economic crisis of the 1970s or the introduction of flexible accumulation. The growth of the informal economy in peripheries has been manifested in the past in underemployment, disguised unemployment, the mushrooming of small establishments and 'penny capitalists'. Subcontracting, putting-out systems, labouring at home under various piece-rate arrangements, multiple employment, part-time employment and self-employment are still as widespread as wage labour. A large percentage of the population (not just minorities) is thus vulnerable to the economic ups and downs, but also creates a flexible labour market helping these economies to survive crises. The reproduction of the informal economy and the independent labourer is a long-entrenched fact in popular experience and consciousness in peripheral and semiperipheral societies. Disposable free labour has never reached such proportions, or been reproduced for such a long period, or affected so widespread a population, as in the Third World city. The core/periphery distinction should therefore remain dominant in class analysis even after the introduction of the concept of the 'informal sector'.

Mediterranean Europe again stands in the middle, because of its sizeable informal sector on the one hand, and the reduction of 'masses' through emigration to the North on the other. The 'black economy' has by no means been rare in its history. But its inhabitants have been ingenious in developing the 'lighter' side of the informal sector. Its prolonged presence and its recent transformation, especially during the last decades of industrial restructuring (chapter 5), is a very delicate issue for research in the structure of these societies standing between core and periphery.

In marxist terms, the definition of the informal sector involves not one, but three interrelated models of production: direct subsistence, petty commodity production and exchange, and capitalist production, either backward or advanced, which includes two sub-forms: small enterprises employing unprotected wage labour, and disguised wage workers hired by larger firms under subcontracting arrangements (Portes 1983: 161). Though some informal activities are apparently partly outside the capitalist mode of production, others are closely articulated and complementary with the formal sector within a single capitalist economy, through connections such as subcontracting between firms and networks of individuals or small enterprises. A final urgent question is therefore the distinction between two types of informalization: the *traditional* and the *modern* one. The former is related to peripheral social formations and is less articulated with the formal sector than the latter, which emanates from flexible accumulation, technological innovation and new production processes following industrial



Table 1.1 *Dependent labourers within a fourfold matrix*

	Formal economy	Informal economy
Workers in production <sup>a</sup>	Industrial proletariat	Casual proletariat
Workers in services <sup>b</sup>	New petty bourgeoisie	Petty service labour

<sup>a</sup> In secondary sector, transport and communications.

<sup>b</sup> In tertiary and quaternary sector (commerce, services).

Source: Adapted from Leontidou 1985a: 541.

restructuring. In available data matrices, both types of informalization appear as industrial decomposition – the fall of the average plant size – and the growth of self-employment. The question of their separate analysis will be posed again in concrete terms for the case of Greece (chapter 5).

For the analysis of polarized social formations, it has been proposed elsewhere to avoid the derogatory and imprecise concept of the ‘masses’ for informal-sector workers and to refer to them, together with other dependent labourers, as the *popular strata*, distinguished into sub-groupings through adoption of a fourfold scheme (table 1.1) based on the productive/unproductive and formal/informal economy axes. No doubt the scheme is rather crude, especially as the formal economy is increasingly altered in the course of flexible accumulation through subcontracting and putting-out work, which creates enclaves of informality within it. Nevertheless, it provides a terminology as a point of departure for the investigation which follows.

#### 1.4.2 *Types of popular cultures and the concept of spontaneity*

Urban development is created by human action and social class practices. Land allocation cannot be explained by way of the ‘ecological complex’ alone. It is a creation of human agency, a social product, relating to class cultures, which are always being transformed. The seers of the labour movement after Engels connected the emergent proletariat with landlessness. In considering this a ‘regularity’ and a necessary condition for the articulation of working-class consciousness, Engels took for granted a specific class structure and class practices in relation to the land question. At the same time, however, his contribution was pathsetting (Harvey 1973: 132–3, 142–3) for three reasons which are basic in the context of the following study. First, he departed somewhat from the productivism of orthodox marxism, since he spoke of the importance of the reproduction

processes in class consciousness (chapter 7). Second, his was the earliest formulation of the relationship of workers *as a class* with urban land and the housing question. And third, he drew attention to land allocation, especially property, rather than spatial distributions, for class relations and the class struggle: he stressed landlessness rather than centrality.

However, in the light of peripheral urban development, Engels should be criticized on three grounds. First, he views the city from the angle of the conjuncture of early industrial capitalism, where a class of landlords existed independently of industrialists, and the State intervened to resolve their conflict. He thus forecloses the nature of the bourgeoisie, landownership patterns and alternative institutions (Leontidou 1985a). Second, Engels' experience with reform movements of his own time would not allow him to discuss reform or control of urban land as won by popular struggle: he referred to property paternalistically allotted by State and bourgeois initiative alone. He also spoke of property acquired *within* capitalism, accepting its institutional framework, and disregarded property acquired *despite* and in conflict with this framework. Popular property in peripheral societies is exactly of the latter type. Land allocation is subordinate to the market, but does not conform to its rules. Land and housing are acquired according to popular customs and in conflict with official laws for land use, building codes and other institutional arrangements.

In general, Marx and Engels underplayed the significance of geography and ecology in human association (Parsons ed. 1977), as well as the importance of struggles in the sphere of reproduction. The aspatial character of marxist conceptions of class has been criticized recently (Walker 1985: 165–8), and the incorporation of space into the process of class formation itself was proposed through Giddens' (1981) structuration theory. A key for such a development is offered by Gramsci (1971 edn). In studying a Mediterranean society between the wars, Gramsci rejected the crude materialism and economism of the Third International, which derived political phenomena from economic processes, and contributed a suggestive dialectical analysis of culture, ideology and politics (Paschos 1981: 34–9). His work is just being discovered in spatial analysis, both urban (Allum 1973; Leontidou 1985a) and regional (for a bibliography, cf. Hadjimichalis 1987: 36–9). In fact, Gramsci was especially sensitive to the specificity of locality and territory in social class structuration, and reopened questions like working-class exploitation at place or residence, the importance of consumption and reproduction, the dialectic of class and regional factors, and the city–country relationships as class relationships (Hoare and Smith 1971: xx, xxvi).

Following Gramsci's rationale, we recognize that spatial arrangements do

not emanate from 'preferences' or an unlimited set of 'individual values', as posited by possibilist geography. Cultures around the city are collective, develop and are transformed historically. In capitalism, the market is the dominant mode of land allocation as well as the manifestation of a *dominant culture*. It is surrounded by a legitimizing ideology which saturates society and constitutes the limit of common sense (Williams 1973a). Far from being a mere manipulation of opinion, the dominant culture is organized and lived, it becomes laws, constitutions, theories. It is Gramsci's *hegemony*. (Mouffe 1979; Anderson 1977). Hegemony is not static, since it depends on the social process of incorporation. The effective dominant culture is made and remade, continually active and adjusting, and can accommodate and tolerate several alternative meanings and values. 'Hegemony implies class struggles and has no meaning apart from them... It has nothing in common with consensus history and represents its antithesis – a way of defining the historical content of class struggle during times of apparent social quiescence' (Genovese, quoted by Thompson 1978a; 163). Hegemony is a form of domination at the level of civil society, while direct domination or command is exercised through the State and juridical government (Gramsci 1971 edn: 12). The working class may give its consent to the general direction of the dominant groups. The State apparatus 'legally' enforces discipline or coercive power on those groups that do not consent, either actively or passively (Gramsci 1971 edn: 12).

After they reach a level of class awareness, however, the subordinate classes may juxtapose their own models to the hegemony of the dominant classes and struggle to achieve their survival on every level – economic, cultural, social, ideological. These *subordinate cultures* may be *emergent*, that is, born by a new class coming to consciousness, or *residual*, a remnant of past social formations. Cultures around land can be analysed with these categories (Leontidou 1985a). Although the distinction between dominant and subordinate modes of land and housing allocation (section 1.2.1) does imply the notion of class cultures, however, the correspondence is not the obvious one. The market, with its organizational aspects, is geared to the dominant classes of the community. The basic elements of this dominant culture can be found in the characteristics of the 'market'. They are based on the value of possessiveness, competition and economic exploitation, that is, exploitation of land and improvements thereon for profit. Subordinate modes, however, may well reflect the attitude of the dominant classes over land and the 'problems' of the urban proletariat, their articulation of a form of hegemony functional for the system. Alternatively, they may reflect subordinate popular cultures striving to survive by the organized action of labouring people caught in a period of transition or of intense class struggle

(chapter 7). It is the task of historical research to specify what they actually reflect.

According to European Marxists drawing on Engels, labour consciousness is born in the city. In place of Wirth's (1938) analysis about the presumed high level of anonymity in large agglomerations, types of environment are considered to influence class formation through the visibility and the tangible experience of class relationships. Engels developed his concept of the resident bourgeoisie to account (in part) for the differing reactions of workers in Manchester and Birmingham (Foster 1968). The type of the urban settlement is crucial in Foster's (1974) comparison of working-class cultures in three English towns. In his classic study, Duveau (1946) links working-class cultures with types and sizes of towns. Thernstrom (1969, 1971) suggests the importance of permanence of class membership in one setting for the promotion of proletarian consciousness. Lockwood (1966) relates types of environments with working-class images of society. Giddens (1973) develops the concept of distributive groupings used here, as an important force in 'proximate' class structuration. Gregory (1982) observes socio-spatial differentiation among working-class fractions (croppers and shearmen, spinners, weavers) as the labour process is transformed in Yorkshire. Walker (1985: 85) points to spatial contiguity and the traditions of place-bound groups as important bases for class structuration, with the class consciousness of coal miners as an example.

These interactions of social classes with the environment and the city are very important, though subtle and indirect. In peripheral societies urban experience becomes direct and essential, as land questions come to the fore and affect popular consciousness. The labouring people dynamically and creatively invade the urban sphere, and land colonization counterbalances the contradictions of peripheral industrialization. Researchers agree over the positive aspects of squatting as a protection of informal-sector workers against insecurity in the labour market – the avoidance of rent payments in the present and the channelling of savings into a shelter for the future. As already pointed out (section 1.3.2), they stress the importance of tenure, not location near the city centre, because of the frequent use of residence as a workshop and the reliance of petty entrepreneurs on local markets (Abrams 1964: 109; McGee 1971; Frank 1966). Moreover, they speak of a massive urban social movement: 'problems of urban life acquire an importance beyond those of work itself' (Frank 1966: 224); 'the workers' consumption demands are felt less as individual economic pressures in the market place than as the political objectives of a class' (Bonilla 1964: 193); 'for the poor, urban land distribution is as vital a political issue as rural land reform' (Ray 1969: 42–3). The struggles between urban landlords and tenants are often

more decisive than those between employers and wage-earners in the cities of Latin America (Leontidou 1985a) Southeast Asia (Evers 1984) and Africa (Simon 1989). Ownership, control and rights in urban land and housing (the essential means for social reproduction) are frequently more crucial than work experience.

This constitutes an important axis of differentiation between core and peripheral cities. By turning to the basic distinction between behaviour and action, it can be pointed out that subordinate classes can be adaptive or creative. In the early capitalist city, where urbanization followed industrialization, the workplace (the factory) was the locus of creativity, alternative cultures and oppositional politics. Hence, Marx's productivism and the contempt for urban issues in early industrializing countries. It is not fortuitous that this exclusive emphasis has been relativized by Gramsci: in countries where industrialization arrived after urbanization, work instability, job turnover and fragmentation would not be conducive to such organization. Creativity would not only materialize at the workplace, but also in the local community, territory and region. In fact, establishing a shanty town is 'a spectacular affair indeed', where 'housing and building skills, community spirit, entrepreneurship, and profit motives play their part' (Karpas 1976: 28). Popular spontaneity requires increased initiative. The issue was forcefully posed by Gramsci for both production and reproduction, as preconceived economist/productivist models collapsed in Italy:

'Spontaneous' in the sense that they are not the result of any systematic educational activity on the part of an already conscious leading group, but have been formed through everyday experience illuminated by 'common sense', i.e. by the traditional popular conception of the world – what is unimaginatively called 'instinct', although it too is in fact a primitive and elementary historical acquisition. (Gramsci 1971 edn: 198–9, within parentheses)

The concept of *spontaneity* introduced here in urban analysis is inspired by Gramsci and has two basic characteristics. On the one hand, spontaneous urban expansion is caused by popular movements without leadership and planning. 'In the "most spontaneous" movement it is simply the case that the elements of "conscious leadership" cannot be checked, have left no reliable document' (Gramsci 1971 edn: 196). On the other hand, the agents of these movements regard land and housing as use values rather than exchange values, and their main purpose is residence rather than speculation. Spontaneous movements should therefore be distinguished from reform and planning on the one hand, and speculation on the other. Planning is an activity by educated experts and the State, and speculation is an activity by agents with interests in the exploitation of land as a commodity 'produced'

in the capitalist mode of production (Harvey 1982: 330–1), integrated in and created by capitalism. Popular spontaneous action, as defined by Gramsci, manifests insubordination. Illegality should be distinguished from spontaneity, however, since it often coexists with speculation (section 4.2.1).

Gramsci also introduces the concept of *common sense* in connection with that of spontaneity. It is proposed here to borrow his distinctions among the following ‘levels’ and types of social conceptions (summarized in Allum 1973: 89–91): (a) philosophy, a critical and coherent conception of the world by a social class; (b) ideology, a world picture of a fraction of a class, which is well elaborated, and responds to immediate interests and problems; (c) religion; (d) common sense, a world picture most widely diffused among subordinate classes, based on practical experience and observation; and (e) folklore, the common sense of an earlier epoch – a residual culture. These conceptualizations are invaluable for understanding urban (except work) experience and conflict, not furnished by any other marxist scheme of gradations of class awareness and consciousness (as in Leontidou 1985a). Popular common sense and folklore constitute the most relevant distinction. The former is not self-generating, but forged in the course of peoples’ struggles. It reflects particular historical experiences. The influence of the ruling class is present in several ways (chapter 7).

Traditional geography is familiar with squatting and semi-squatting as a form of uncontrolled urban growth, as a quasi-peasant mode of land allocation, as a cultural particularity, as an implicit demand of the poor for a stake in the city, or as a form of petty capitalist ownership (section 1.2.2). It will be argued here that it is an informal mode of housing production, illuminated by popular common sense, and can develop into a genuine spontaneous popular culture. Marxism before Gramsci is inadequate for this study, because it can only conceptualize social awareness and consciousness by stressing the primacy of production over distribution and reproduction. However, ‘the dichotomy between *living* and *working* is itself an artificial division that the capitalist system imposes’ (Harvey 1985: 38; cf. also Thompson 1968: 455). Urban social movements in semiperipheral societies often appear more massive and radical than struggles in factories (chapter 7).

#### 1.4.3 *Methodological note and the set of hypotheses*

Positivist geography is obviously inadequate and methodologically inappropriate for the exploration of Southern urban restructuring as conceptualized here. Contemporary critique (Gregory 1978: part 1) has opened up alternative methodological options. In this book, socio-historical

rather than spatial 'variables' are used in explanation; simple indicators rather than more complex models are used in methodology and analysis; questions as to 'what causes' transformations rather than 'how often' patterns appear are asked; causal mechanisms rather than empirical regularities are explored; intensive rather than extensive research is opted for. In other words, epistemological realism is adopted (Gregory 1978: 55-7). Standard 'variables' of positivist studies of urban development, such as incomes, savings or even preferences, take secondary importance to human agency, social action, class practices, popular culture and social relations.

The broader theme explored in this book involves differences in urban development patterns between core and periphery, urban restructuring in the Mediterranean and its relationship with social transformation. The specific research object revolves around two central interrelated questions already posed (section 1.1.1):

- (a) what structures, processes and forces of the urban formation create specific patterns of adaptation of the subordinate classes to the dominant mode of land allocation, and contradictions leading to the emergence of subordinate modes; and
- (b) how these patterns relate, influence and are reshaped in turn by social class cultures and popular creativity, leading to the emergence and reproduction of subordinate modes of land allocation.

The specific hypothesis is that spontaneous urban development through popular land colonization in Mediterranean cities has been an emergent, not a residual, mode. It has emanated from common sense, not folklore. It does not point to the 'persistence' of a peasant or precapitalist past: it emerged as capitalism rose to dominance and was reproduced as functional for the semiperipheral economy. This implies the hypothesis that this mode pertained *not* to rural-urban migrants, but to a working class different from the proletariat in core societies, where casual labourers were over-represented; that the social basis of popular land control consisted of classes integrated in capitalism rather than 'marginal' in relation to it.

Though the study is comparative in scope, the use of aggregate data matrices available for all cities is methodologically inappropriate. Intensive research is required for the exploration of these hypotheses. A monographical treatment, the prerequisite for intensive research, is therefore combined with a comparative method which attempts to contrast Northern and Southern cities, and Mediterranean cities one against another. Secondary sources are used for the latter, while Greece is examined as a paradigmatic case study on the basis of primary material. The 1948-81

period of Greek urban development is focused upon, with frequent references to previous and later periods. Rapid social change after 1981 with EEC integration and the new policies of the government (PASOK) necessarily exclude the 1980s from the scope of this book; otherwise, a detailed consideration of additional aspects of the urban formation would be necessary, which would result in a voluminous work.

The origins, the social structure and the pattern of change of urban development patterns in the course of the twentieth century can be understood if a crucial question is answered: which fraction of the subordinate classes was the creative one in the Athens urban history? Which one constituted the core of the movement for land colonization and spontaneous urban development? In order to explore these questions and test the hypotheses outlined here, our study of urban history begins at the point when the capitalist mode of production became dominant in Greece.



## 2

### *Cities of silence: Athens and Piraeus in the early twentieth century*

Urbanism in Italy is not purely nor 'especially', a phenomenon of capitalistic development or of that of big industry ... Yet in these medieval-type cities too, there exist strong nuclei of populations of a modern urban type; but what is their relative position? They are submerged, oppressed, crushed by the other part, which is not of a modern type, and constitutes the great majority. Paradox of the 'cities of silence'.

Antonio Gramsci (1971 edn: 91)

The Mediterranean world was emerging from a period of war and revolution during the early nineteenth century. Before this, Spain and Italy were still under French control, and Greece, along with the Balkans, was under Ottoman rule. Greece was formally declared independent by the London Protocol of 3 February 1830 and Athens was declared the capital of Greece in 1834. The glorious city of antiquity entered the mid-nineteenth century as a deserted village in ruins, destroyed by four centuries of Ottoman rule.<sup>1</sup> Piraeus, its port, was nothing more than a wild coastline at this time, with no inhabitants and no name (Stassinopoulos 1973: 370-1). A fact rarely acknowledged is that both Athens and Piraeus were rebuilt as new cities: there is a wistful longing for continuity with ancient times. 'In Greece, the past will always detract from the present' (About 1855: 6). In the 1830s the two towns started to develop interdependently and grew rapidly, especially as a result of the centralism of the Greek State: Athens and Piraeus, *comprador* city and its port, unproductive and productive, bourgeois and proletarian cities.

There were several transitions in their early history, but a major turning-point encountered in the 1920s radically transformed the 'cities of silence' into the explosively growing urban agglomerations characteristic of peripheral societies. This chapter summarizes urban history before the Second World War, almost a century regarded by historians as transitional, from peasant to industrial society. During this long period three 'urban

<sup>1</sup> Before independence it had 12,000 inhabitants in 1813, dwindling to 9,000 in 1821 and 6,000 in 1832 as they fled and dispersed to nearby islands (Michalopoulos 1927).

types' unfold: the Athens-Piraeus complex is transformed from the *comprador* to the transitional and then to the Third World city type.

Developments before 1922, which are crucial in interpreting urban structure in the postwar period, have been left to obscurity in geographical research. By contrast, urbanization and housing policy in 1922-40 are well documented even by English-language sources, apparently because of foreign involvement in refugee settlement.<sup>2</sup> On the empirical level, the contribution of this study to Greek social research involves urban restructuring before 1922, and after 1967. That popular land colonization was established by the refugees in the 1920s, and was reproduced in postwar Athens, is known. What is not known is what preceded and what followed it, and what its precise class basis was.

## 2.1 The unification of Greece and the penetration of capitalism

For a long period of its history Greece has been cut off from the rest of Southern Europe. As a result of Ottoman rule, most of Greece lacked a genuine feudal tradition, with the exception of the Ionian islands which were under Venetian and then British domination until 1864. Instead of traces of a feudal past, characteristics familiar from the peripheral world can be discerned in the political economy of Greek development: capitalist penetration and substitutive industrialization, the *comprador* bourgeoisie, dependence and underdevelopment, centripetal urbanization, and later the 'urban explosion'.

### 2.1.1 *A capitalist periphery at the turn of the century*

Under Ottoman rule economic activity in Greece was concentrated around three poles: the handicraft centres of the mountains, especially in Thessaly (Moskov 1972: 77-91); the island shipbuilding industries (Mouzelis and Attalides 1971); and the richer currant-producing fields around the towns of the Peloponnese (Moskov 1972: 83-4). With independence, however, Greece was deprived of most of its islands, its agricultural regions and the towns of the north. As the centre of gravity of the economy moved from the mountains to the plains, economic activity became located in ports. A precapitalist economy was still reproduced then, through the lack of capital accumulation within the country; the predominance of commercial, cosmopolitan unproductive capital; and its small market and narrow

<sup>2</sup> Bibliography is given in the text that follows, but the major English-speaking sources are Eddy 1931 (chairman of the RSC for most of its existence), Mears 1929, Pentzopoulos 1962 and Mavrogdatos 1983; cf. summary presentation in Leontidou 1985b.

boundaries, gradually expanded with the addition of the Ionian islands (1864), Thessaly (1881), Macedonia, Ipiros and the Aegean islands (1913) and the Dodecanese (1947; table 2.2).

The dispersion of the Greek social classes, especially the bourgeoisie, outside the national boundaries constituted the essence of the peculiarity of the social formation. The diaspora Greeks remained from the period of Ottoman rule and originated in the merchants who accumulated capital in the trade between the Balkans and Central Europe (Psyroukis 1974). Their communities continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century, especially in Asia Minor, Russia, Romania and Egypt. The Greek *comprador* bourgeoisie belonged to a periphery and yet behaved like the bourgeoisie of any imperial power, 'settlers' who form capital by colonial exploitation (Psyroukis 1974). Despite their dispersal to foreign countries, they apparently held Greece in a state of neocolonial dependence by exporting surplus, while at the same time financing its economy with remittances, donations and cultural buildings.

The mid-nineteenth-century Greek social formation therefore does not fit into familiar categories. Since capital accumulation was very limited within the national boundaries until the 1870s, there was no industrial bourgeoisie, but also no landed gentry or dominant class of landowners, except the *tzakia*. This oligarchy, which can be traced back to the notables under Ottoman rule, with inadequate land property for continuous political domination, finally turned to activities related to the State (Tsoucalas 1977: 219). The emergence of a landed gentry was prevented by the eventual distribution of 'national lands' to the peasants of Old Greece after liberation (Tsoucalas 1981: 259–82). This averted the tensions between owners of large estates and landless peasants. A second land reform in the early twentieth century (section 2.3.3) established the domination of small and medium-sized agricultural holdings throughout most Greek territory.

Capitalism was not dominant during the nineteenth century. Still, however, this was neither a precapitalist nor a colonial country. Rather the economy was going through a stage of *comprador* precapitalism, peripheral to Europe and dominated by a simple commodity mode of production (Tsoucalas 1977: 45; Dertilis 1977: 99). At the same time, capital entered the country created by the colonial exploitation of other peripheries. Until 1880 there was very little direct capital investment in the Greek territory except for the purchase of agricultural lands (1828–30; Vergopoulos 1975: 94–7) and urban property, and the establishment of banks (1840–82; Dertilis 1980).

After 1870, however, the *comprador* bourgeoisie changed its practices. Trying to improve its competitive position vis-à-vis European capitalists, it

began to return to Greece to live and invest its capital (Tsoucalas 1977: 251–8). Repatriation speeded up during the age of imperialism (1878–1914), when Europe sought raw material and markets for its manufactured goods in backward countries. Despite differences in types of domination, the penetration of capitalism in Greece, the Balkans and Latin America took the same form and appeared at the same time (Stavrianos 1963, 1981). It was effected through the development of infrastructure, the expansion of railway networks, public utilities and trans-oceanic transport. In this context the Greek *comprador* bourgeoisie started to invest particularly in speculative ventures – banks, mines, the merchant fleet, shipping and commerce (Tsoucalas 1977: 265). It also participated in the building of railroads, canals and ports along with the European ‘protective powers’, especially British capital, during the years of Ch. Tricoupis’ liberal administration (Papagiannakis 1982). This effected a transformation of the Greek model of development to a variant of neocolonialism. The Greek ‘railway decade’ began in 1883; and it ended in the late 1890s with an unfortunate Graeco-Turkish war (1897), a national bankruptcy, the decisive electoral defeat of Ch. Tricoupis and the imposition of International Economic Control from 1898. Throughout the period, Greece was colonized by its own *comprador* bourgeoisie. Their controversial influence ended after 1920 with the decline of the colonies.

### 2.1.2 *City-building process and the emergence of the urban market*

Athens was built by the king, the Bavarian administration and the prosperous diaspora Greeks to be a city of luxury and wealth. The *comprador* bourgeoisie, though absent from Athens until the 1870s, drew attention to its existence, as well as the dominance of the centralistic State, by engaging in building. In the urban core the palace, parliament and ministries were encircled by cultural buildings and bourgeois residences. The ‘monumentalization’ of the central city was effected by the fortunes of the ‘Great National Donors’, rich colonial Greeks who, romantic about their place of birth but also eager to avoid taxation (Moskov 1972: 95), financed the reconstruction and cultural ornamentation of their native towns. Their activity in Athens intensified in the 1840s and 1850s (Biris 1966) and involved cultural, welfare and educational buildings, the majority named after some donor. Their regard for the ‘public benefit’ should be contrasted with the attitudes of the rest of the urban social groups, but also with the opposite practices of the Italian landowning nobility.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In Rome the nobility proved destructive of monuments and villas, and not production-minded. It ‘has pursued personal profit as ruthlessly as any nouveau riche, trading and

The city-building process changed as the repatriation of the *comprador* bourgeoisie created a resident bourgeoisie in Athens in the 1870s, ironically referred to by the population as the 'golden bugs' (Stassinopoulos 1973: 441). Besides imported luxuries and conspicuous consumption, this class shifted emphasis from monumentalization to the modernization of infrastructure with the assistance of 'protective powers', in a context of rapid technological innovation. The process intensified during the 'railway decade', the 1880s, and the 1900s, when electricity was installed in the central city.

Athens also yielded considerable profits to its landowners. A land market was founded by its first inhabitants without any conflicts with or displacement of any previous classes. Unlike the *comprador* bourgeoisie, petty bourgeois landowners and the local bourgeoisie were motivated by speculative attitudes. It has been suggested that the very decision to make Athens the capital related to the interests of notables, the Phanariotes, in increasing the value of the land which they had bought from departing Turks (Polyzos 1978: 385). The number of real estate transactions soared from the moment Athens was declared the capital.<sup>4</sup> Overbuilding, not the absence of poverty (as suggested by Tsoucalas 1977: 205), is what made nineteenth-century Athens a city without a housing problem.

After the first years of hasty 'emergency' building, the rapid inflow of population rendered residential construction a profitable business. Housing commodification followed the establishment of the land market. In the 1840s, money was borrowed at 12 % while housing yielded 18–20 % to the proprietor, despite the fact that the house was 'loaded with mortgages before it is covered with tiles' (About 1855: 159). The reduction of rent levels in the late 1870s because of overbuilding, so that houses yielded only 5–6 %, did not dampen this zeal (Biris 1966: 198). The Piraeus real estate market, where small property and subdivision thrived, was equally buoyant. The number of those living on income from letting houses increased in 1837–51 (Tsocopoulos 1984: 209–10, 249). Besides petty landowners, speculation also attracted rich local families, such as those of Veicos and Rizopoulos, who gave their names to the Athens communities they subdivided and sold.

speculating in Roman real estate with little regard for its historic, scenic or archaeological value' (Fried 1973: 99). Speculative interests also mobilized patrician landowners in Milan, who cancelled proposals for open spaces and public parks (Lyttleton 1979: 260).

<sup>4</sup> Speculation in real estate soared whenever a city was declared the capital, and was evident in temporary Greek capitals: Aegina (capital city in 1828), Nauplia (1829) and finally Athens (1834). This issue was perceptively commented upon by a visitor in 1860: 'This capital by accident has no roots in the soil... Nothing would any longer retain this population of 20,000 people in Athens, if the government were to transfer itself to Corinth; and one would soon see Athens as deserted, and as much in ruins, as Aegina and Nauplia' (About 1855: 162–3).

Even industrialists joined the real estate mania. The unity between industrial and landed capital should be stressed at this point. In the 1830s industry was supported by the allocation of rural and urban land plots on favourable terms, rather than loans. The National Bank of Greece asked for mortgaged plots in Piraeus and Hermoupolis, and was in general interested in real estate (Agriantoni 1986: 25, 176, 317–18). Industrialists were equally attracted to it, especially because of the instability of manufacturing industry, which made real estate a safer investment.<sup>5</sup> Scarcity of capital has often been attributed to land transactions, among other factors, and it is probable that industrial enterprises were financed through land transactions.

The contradictions inherent in this lack of separation between industrial and landed capital were evident by the 1880s, when speculation in shares and land had risen considerably (Agriantoni 1986: 307). Piraeus industrialists went bankrupt because they could not repay loans granted in 1887 for the building of factories: 'the money had been turned into land'. Newspapers blamed the bank on the grounds that it 'encouraged the speculation of those who did not possess any capital, and itself gave life to the real estate mania, because of affording the speculators the means to play on land prices'. So when the loans were demanded back, 'because the Piraeus natives had almost channelled them all to land and buildings...[the bank] began to auction the factories' (Anastassopoulos 1947 B: 581–2). A comparison with the Milan industrialists is worthwhile at this point, who, after speculating and backing the reduction of the size of building plots,<sup>6</sup> became aware by the 1900s that unrestrained speculation on land raised the costs of building and contributed to working-class discontent.

The commodification of real estate property during the period of dissolution of earlier modes of production in Greece was thus sudden and all-embracing. It was introduced by unproductive populations who realized large profits by mere land transactions and low-quality building. This was consequently a *speculative* land and housing market. There even emerged real estate enterprises around 1880 to exploit the heavy population inflow (Biris 1966: 274), though the extent of their action is unknown.

The emergence of a land market before industrialization is all but unique in the European context. In late medieval English towns landholding had

<sup>5</sup> The industrialist Meletopoulos, owner of several plots on the northeast side of the port of Piraeus, even gave his name to a neighbourhood marked on an 1896 map (Agriantoni 1986: 180). The industrialist Rallis was the mayor of Piraeus for many years of heated real estate transactions (Agriantoni 1986: 56), and was interested in infrastructure provision (Tsocopoulos 1984).

<sup>6</sup> Lyttleton (1979: 260), referring to the late nineteenth century: 'The final report, drawn up by the industrialist Pirelli, argued that the rapid rise in the price of land dictated more intensive building.'

ceased to be a 'sin'. Long before the rise to dominance of the capitalist mode of production, already in the sixteenth century, a land market was emerging in European cities (Vance 1971). Landownership became divorced from use and competition arose, along with 'a rational valuation of space in terms of an abstract calculated rent' (Handlin 1963: 9). Housing also came to the generalized market at a very early period. In eighteenth-century Naples, the aristocracy turned to renting cheap housing to the plebs, and income from rented housing became a greater source of its revenue than landed rents (Allum 1973: 35). Roman real estate was one of the most profitable investments in Italy, and indeed in Europe, by the 1880s, and landownership passed from religious orders and aristocratic families to capitalist real estate corporations, shaping Rome's plan, creating more building than was needed and causing a crash by 1887 (Fried 1973: 24-5). In London, considerable overcrowding occurred in subdivided tenements, and speculative builders emerged on a small scale, because the danger of bankruptcy still loomed large (George 1966 edn: 83-8). With this, the wealthy began to move out and the more central housing stock was filtered down to poorer groups (George 1966 edn: 73-8).

In the Mediterranean, speculation caused uncontrolled urban expansion rather than a filtering-down process. In Rome, new districts were hastily built in the 1880s, in the certain knowledge that the city government would recognize the *faits accomplis* and incorporate them into the city map. This is directly comparable with the case of Athens. Urban expansion was considered 'disproportionate in relation to the population' (Biris 1966: 246). Information and maps are contradictory, and table 2.1 is only indicative. The city area more than doubled in the 1880s, obviously because of the building activity which soared after the expansion of transport networks. Settlement within the city plan became extremely difficult after 1880, because of prohibitive land rents: 'For the overinflated and absurd prices demanded for plots in the city ... many build outside the limits established by the master plan, and there are therefore always new, unfinished communities added to it ... so that the area of this city is almost as big as that of Smyrna, but including many empty plots' (Biris 1966: 169). The gross population density continued to fall until 1900 (table 2.1). The reversal of this pattern after 1907 will be discussed as an important aspect of the housing question in the early twentieth century.

This excessive urban sprawl was unplanned: settlement preceded the inclusion of areas into the official city plan. Landowners outside the limits of the city drafted rough plans and sold part of their land as small plots, keeping the rest to themselves to sell after appreciation. The new settlers then pressurized the government to 'legalize' their areas. The latter finally

Table 2.1 *Population and density in Athens, 1836–1920*

	Population in:		Athens only:	
	Athens– Piraeus– Kallithea	Athens only	Area (hectares)	Gross density (people per hectare)
1836	17,600	16,588	242.5	68.4
1861/2	47,750	41,300	242.5	170.3
1870	55,473	44,510	411.2	108.2
1879	87,117	65,499	552.9	118.5
1889	144,589	110,262	1,212.0	91.0
1896	173,340	123,240	1,585.4	77.7
1907	242,328	169,749	2,031.0	83.6
1920	453,042	297,176	2,073.1	143.3
<i>Average annual rates of growth (%)</i>				
1836–62	3.91	3.57	0.00	
1861–70	1.68	0.94	6.82	
1870–9	5.14	4.39	3.34	
1879–89	5.20	5.35	8.16	
1889–96	2.62	1.60	3.91	
1896–1907	3.09	2.95	2.28	
1907–20	4.93	4.40	0.16	

Sources: Adapted from SGG 1930; Biris 1966: 318–19; Tsocopoulos 1984: 92.

gave in. Landowners thus caused leapfrog expansion and obstructed the planned growth of the capital by mobilizing against any expropriation and by demanding sizeable compensations. Illegal building was customary. In fact, the first illegal communities, Kolonaki near the palace and Neapolis, were bourgeois (Kaftatzoglu 1858: 7).

This process of urban growth has been carried through to the twentieth century on a more massive scale. The whole recorded history of modern planning in Athens up to the present is a history of strong pressures against the correction of the dominant speculative market, a history of a class of landlords, proprietors and developers sabotaging planners and imposing unrestricted land transactions and building for profit. A *laissez-faire* system was generalized in land and housing allocation, unrestricted by legislation or planning. In 1894, following Ch. Tricoupis' decision to enforce taxation on buildings, demonstrations broke out in Athens, and the crown prince took part in one of the riots. It was believed that this incident contributed to the end of the prime minister's career in 1895.<sup>7</sup> In the nineteenth century,

<sup>7</sup> Tricoupis' angry conversation with the king, after which he submitted his resignation, is recorded in Korisis (1974: 204). The expansion of the speculative market can be captured






Figure 2.1 The expansion of the Greater Athens Plan, 1900–40. Adapted and mapped from the following sources: Biris 1933, 1966; Daskalakis 1932; Dimitracopoulos 1937; Kabouroglu 1883; Vassiliades 1974; Ministry of Public Works 1965.

‘the history of the urban development of modern Athens is an unending series of modifications and extensions of the initial plan of the city, included in over 2,000 decrees’ (Travlos 1960: 255).

The city of Athens expanded outwards in a sectoral rather than concentric pattern, following basic avenues and especially the railway lines (fig. 2.1).

in information about income tax. During the years of the economic crisis (1898–1904), taxed income from real estate rose by 42.8% in Greater Athens and 52.1% in Piraeus (Tsoucalas 1977: 255). Later on, after the 1909 revolt, the bourgeoisie had to put up with Venizelos’ legislation, which, alongside income tax, imposed a tax on inheritance (Dertilis 1977: 202, 210) and on land rent (Vergopoulos 1975: 147–8).

Table 2.2 *Urbanization in Greece, 1853-1981*

Total Greece:				Population (%) in towns of:			
	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population <sup>a</sup>	Urban population (%)	10-49 thousand	50-99 inhabitants	100+	Greater Athens <sup>b</sup>
1853	47,515	1,035,527	6.94	3.46			3.48
1861	47,515	1,096,810	8.68	4.33			4.35
(Ionian islands ceded 1864)							
1870	50,211	1,457,894	9.38	5.57			3.81
1879	50,211	1,679,470	11.01	5.82			5.19
(Thessaly added 1881)							
1889	63,606	2,187,208	14.56	7.95			6.61
1896	63,606	2,433,806	14.99	7.88			7.12
1907	63,211	2,631,952	17.14	7.93			9.21
(Macedonia, Ipiros, Aegean islands added 1913)							
1920	150,176	5,531,474	20.20	7.89	0.96	3.15	8.19
1928	129,281	6,204,684	31.32	12.59	1.86	3.94	12.93
1940	129,281	7,344,860	32.07	11.10	1.88	3.79	15.30
(Dodecanese ceded 1947)							
1951	131,990	7,632,801	36.84	12.05	2.84	3.89	18.06
1961	131,990	8,388,553	42.74	11.81	3.07	5.78	22.09
1971	131,990	8,768,641	52.75	12.65	3.40	7.73	28.97
1981	131,990	9,740,417	57.59	13.16	1.22	12.13	31.08

<sup>a</sup> Within boundaries of each census year.

<sup>b</sup> Until 1907 includes Athens, Piraeus, Kallithea; after 1920, area within 1989 administrative boundaries.

*Sources:* Adapted from SGG and NSSG censuses and Statistical Yearbooks.

The bourgeois quarters occupied the centre and expanded towards the northeast, as far as the wealthy suburb of Kifissia. The growth of bourgeois suburbs related to transport decisions and, in turn, influenced the direction of infrastructure development (Leontidou forthcoming). Though rich in monuments, mansions and palaces, however, nineteenth-century Athens was characterized by unplanned development and backward technical infrastructure. Transport and lighting were inadequate and accessible only to higher-income groups. Water supply, sewage and drainage systems were limited to the central areas until 1925. This was of little consequence for the affluent quarters, but in the popular neighbourhoods it threatened the peoples' lives (Biris 1966: 255-6). No matter how much the 'European'

character of Athens may have been admired in the 1840s, the city had already built the barriers to its development, and initiated congestion.

### 2.1.3 *The early urban society and the emergence of industry*

Throughout the nineteenth century, Athens was the only Greek city with a population over 50,000 and the only agglomeration sustaining high rates of growth (table 2.2). A constant trait of the Greek settlement structure was dispersion into many villages and the absence of towns (Kayser 1964; Siampos 1973). During and after the period of capitalist penetration the urban network apart from the capital showed further signs of population decline. The grouping of urban settlements in table 2.1 illustrates this point. The continuing growth of Athens and Piraeus was coupled until about 1880 with the slow but consistent growth of inland and island towns and export ports, with the notable exception of the major one of Hermoupolis. This first import port in Greece with a diverse industrial economy in 1840–60 (Agriantoni 1986: 85–9) had already started to stagnate before 1870. In the 1880s, however, most towns stagnated or declined, and only Athens and Piraeus, together with towns near commercialized agricultural regions, grew considerably. In the 1890s, finally, the population of towns declined, and growth concentrated in the capital. The rest of urban Greece picked up later, especially when Macedonia was added (table 2.2), but still, the average annual growth rate of Salonica, the only city with over 100,000 inhabitants by 1895, fell from 1.54% in 1895–1913 to only 1.09% in 1907–20.<sup>8</sup> The share of the capital in total Greek population thus kept rising. Periods of annexation of new territory, except 1881, should not be included in this rule (table 2.2).

The ‘railway decade’ thus seems to have created the forces that overthrew the regional balance. This was not coincidental: the Athens–Piraeus railroad had already been started in 1869, and during the 1880s lines radiating outwards from Athens received priority (Papagiannakis 1982). This encouraged capital investment in the city and led to a strongly centripetal urbanization pattern created by political, administrative and economic centralism, as in other peripheries (Hardoy 1975). However impressive as the rates of growth of Athens and Piraeus were in the nineteenth century, especially in comparison with the stagnation of the provincial towns, we

<sup>8</sup> Data on the population of Salonica before 1913 (when it was annexed to Greece) is rare. There is no information in Moskov (1974) or Vacalopoulos (1972), while only approximate figures are given in Triantafyllides et al. (1966: 13): 50,000 in 1865, 90,000 in 1890, 120,000 in 1895 and 132,000 in 1910. The first census in 1913 found 157,890 inhabitants; the figure had increased to 170,320 by 1920 (SGG 1930). For difficulties arising in population estimates for 1913–20, cf. Karadimou 1985: 137,166.

Table 2.3 *Occupational composition of emigrants to the USA, 1900–24*

	Total number of emigrants to USA	Composition (%) by economic sector of emigrants at place of origin:					
		Agriculture	Industry	Commerce	'Workers– servants'	Scientists	Various
1900–4	44,808	33.18	8.33	7.31	37.21	0.40	13.57
1905–9	130,624	15.30	3.30	3.70	69.85	0.30	7.55
1910–14	192,247	19.27	4.56	3.39	63.22	0.30	9.26
1915–19	71,313	13.65	5.32	5.18	58.72	0.55	16.58
1920–4	59,076	2.82	4.98	6.46	56.68	1.12	27.94
Total	498,068	16.72	4.73	4.44	61.20	0.44	12.47
Total, absolute nos.	498,068	83,294	23,537	22,137	304,811	2,205	62,084

Source: Adapted from SGG 1930.

have to be cautious about 'overurbanization' theses (Tsoucalas 1977: 197–202): first, because the growth rates are calculated on a small population basis; secondly, because nineteenth-century Athens never accounted for more than 7% of the total Greek population, despite the narrow boundaries of Greece at the time (table 2.2); and thirdly, because we should certainly reserve such terms for a later period. Greece was as urbanized as Mediterranean Europe, and much less so than capitalist countries by 1920; the rates of growth were already accelerating during the early twentieth century.

Urbanization was not caused by industrialization, but by a rapid migratory movement, which drove about one-third of peasants away from their villages in 1890–1909.<sup>9</sup> Besides Athens, Piraeus and the colonies, a major pole of attraction was the USA. In fact, the massive exodus led to emigration being regarded as a 'national danger' (Zolotas 1964: 40). The migratory movement, following the international flow to the New World, continued at peak rates in 1880–1922. Its nature was transformed during this time; its 'quality' was falling (Fairchild 1911). A study of its occupational composition (table 2.3) indicates that the proportion of peasants fell in 1900–24. Those classified as 'workers and servants', forming the main body of the exodus, were actually step migrants. In fact, the cities, and especially Athens, acted as a transit camp for populations who tried their fortune in

<sup>9</sup> Moskov 1972: 130–8. According to relevant studies, the rural exodus cannot be attributed to proletarianization. It originated in areas of smallholdings rather than those of large landowners (Vergopoulos 1975; Tsoucalas 1977: 97–104), and in heavily commercialized areas – where stagnant prices of agricultural products imposed by the State and intermediaries had the largest impact – rather than in isolated and self-sufficient poor areas. In a sense, it was not traditional but 'modern misery', created by capitalism, which spurred the nineteenth-century rural exodus (Vergopoulos 1975: 251–62).

Table 2.4 *Non-agricultural employment in Greece, 1861-1920*

	Employment by sector (%) of total non-agricultural employment				
	1861	1870	1879	1907	1920
Industry	29.48	30.13	23.36	37.99	44.11
Transport	19.42	17.81	12.34	10.35	11.43
Commerce	9.21	11.87	17.73	22.62	20.68
Personal services	18.31	17.71	21.32	10.05	7.62
Liberal professions	8.52	7.96	9.14	9.38	9.03
Public services	15.06	14.52	16.11	9.61	7.13
Total people with known employment in secondary and tertiary sectors (100 %)	111,270	159,734	192,466	336,775	683,972
Overseas migrants % of non-agricultural employment	—	0.01	0.01	11.10	1.84

Sources: Adapted from Gevetsis 1975; Macris 1972; SGG 1930; Kordatos 1931; Tsoucalas 1977.

the cities before migrating to the New World. Had the safety valve of emigration not existed, they would have lingered as surplus labour in the urban economy. As it was, labour shortages were a constant problem for the early industries (Agriantoni 1986: 28-9, 197-8).

Like any colonial or *comprador* city, the Greek capital was a city of administrators with a large tertiary sector and virtually no productive populations until the 1880s. Historians stress the multiplication of commercial strata, civil servants, 'personal services' and 'liberal professions'.<sup>10</sup> Although statistics for the period are unreliable, table 2.4 was compiled to test out such views. In fact, tertiary activities grew rapidly, particularly during the 1860s to the 1880s. Throughout the phase of *comprador* precapitalism, the urban class structure was characterized by the proportional growth of civil servants and proprietors (Tsoucalas 1977: 24). The State apparatus also supported cadres, mediators, lawyers, financial dealers, servants, printers and journalists (Gevetsis 1975: 47-8). This

<sup>10</sup> Servants outnumbered merchants, pedlars and artisans, and reached an impressive 24 servants per 1,000 inhabitants in 1889. Greece was also exceptional internationally in number of lawyers, doctors and clergy (About 1855: 167-72; Tsoucalas 1977: 191-3, 210-16). Historians would be less surprised, however, if they compared Greece with peripheral rather than core societies, especially colonial Latin American cities, but also Mediterranean nineteenth-century cities.

structure corroborates the view of a solidly petty bourgeois society (Tsoucalas 1977: 203).

After 1870, by contrast, the repatriation of the *comprador* bourgeoisie created a resident bourgeoisie in Athens, which has been estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 families by 1910.<sup>11</sup> They were immediately surrounded by increasing employment in the professions, commerce and financial activity, and of course domestic servants. The share of employment in public administration and personal services declined, and the number of 'proprietors' dropped in the 1880s (table 2.4). The nature of the popular strata was also transformed. Petty merchants, artisans and free labourers rose to 50 % of the Greek urban economically active population (Leontidou 1985b). Their misery was less obvious than that of the few factory workers, who appeared in the earliest enclave of poverty, Ghazi, the community near the Athens gas factory.

Historians of the *comprador* period thus view the urban social and economic structure as strongly 'parasitic'. There was no clear-cut industrial revolution nor a continuous period of import substitution (Panagiotopoulos 1980). Industry emerged from nothing and did not transform any pre-existing manufactories. Though there is some controversy over the 'take-off' period and its subsequent rhythms, modern industry seems to have emerged in Piraeus during the 1860s, after the introduction of the steam engine. In the 1880s, despite the annexation of Thessaly and Epiros (1881), which enlarged the domestic market, and the expansion of railways, which unified it, industrial growth was found to have been rather slow (Agriantoni 1986). The productive sectors were then hit by the crisis in the 1890s combined with the unfortunate Graeco-Turkish war (1897). The Hermoupolis docks and industries and about half of the factories in Piraeus closed down, the currant trade was destroyed and the currency was devalued. Labour shortages, which kept wages relatively high, were a constant problem in the nineteenth century (Riginos 1987).

As the crisis subsided, industrialization speeded up again at the turn of the century, after a series of events of major importance. The institution of a bourgeois democracy after the Goudi revolt (1909) was followed by progressive social and political reforms by the Liberal Party led by E. Venizelos (Dertilis 1977: 226-7). After the Balkan wars, which created a short-term phase of import substitution (Zolotas 1964: 31), the domestic market was expanded with the inclusion of Macedonia and especially the industrial city of Salonica. Finally, the First World War stimulated

<sup>11</sup> Adapted from Dertilis 1977: 71; Moskov 1972: 152. The taxpayers of Piraeus numbered only 1845 in 1881, and they mostly belonged to the petty bourgeoisie (Kabouroglu 1883: 65-8).

substitutive industrialization (Zolotas 1964). The number of factories grew from 415 to 2185 in 1901–17 and the number of workers from about 70,000 to 130,000 in 1907–14 (Leontidou 1990).

The emergent industry settled in cities. Urbanization was principally coastal: 'Since it happens, due to various reasons, that the large urban centres of Greece are near the sea... Greek industries have concentrated in Athens and Piraeus, Salonica, Syros, Patra, Corfu, which are also the most significant ports of the country' (Charitakis 1927: 80). New large factories were increasingly concentrated in Athens and Piraeus.<sup>12</sup> Already in 1876 it was observed that 'Whoever today visits the capital of the kingdom after an absence of 15 years, will be certainly impressed by Piraeus in view of the high chimneys by the railroad station of the community where, a few years ago, there were not even huts, nor trees, nor grass' (Mansolas 1876: 3).

While employment in industry and transport consistently declined proportionately in the period 1861–79 (from 49 % to 36 %, table 2.4), after 1889 productive proletarianized populations began to form a substantial part of the Greek urban class structure, until they rose to 56 % of the non-agricultural active population by 1920. The Greater Athens area (Attica–Beotia), with 12.65 % of the Greek population, concentrated 27.36 % of Greek employment in the secondary sector and 33.4 % of wage-earners in manufacturing in 1920 (Leontidou 1990). This region was the new industrial centre of Greece. Industry had gradually transformed the cities of silence from a *comprador* to a *transitional* urban formation, comparable with the early capitalist city. Athens and Piraeus were literally transitional, centres of a constant movement of rural migrants, step migrants, and a little later, refugees.

Piraeus had attracted industry since 1844, when the first steam-powered factory in mainland Greece, the Rallis silk factory, was established there, surrounded by small workshops providing construction materials for the Athens building boom. Then, as the port developed, a famous machine factory and several more industries appeared in 1861 (Anastassopoulos 1947a: 200–1). In 1864 the Piraeus plan was expanded towards the north exclusively for industrial plots, which covered 50 ha by 1870 (Tsocopoulos 1984: 229). The industrial economy, based on textiles and the iron industry, has been found to have supported directly about two-thirds of the Piraeus

<sup>12</sup> Of the 137 new large factories established in Greece during 1910–21, 20 settled in Athens and 37 in Piraeus (Kalamitsis 1960: 76). By 1920 the average HP per establishment was an impressive 51.3 for the Greater Athens area (Attica and Beotia) against a mere 9.5 for the rest of the country. The number of large factories in Athens and Piraeus rose from 38 in 1876 to 63 in 1900, 243 in 1909 and 868 in 1920, and the HP used multiplied fivefold (Leontidou 1990). Capitalism was not yet dominant in Greece, but had the largest impact on the capital city.

total population (Leontidou 1990). Regional imbalance gradually became evident, as Piraeus concentrated 35 % of Greek machine factories, 51 % of HP and 51 % of workers by 1883 (Agriantoni 1986: 231-2). After a temporary backlash starting in the mid-1880s, industrialization picked up and the Industrial Chamber of Piraeus was established by 1914.

The development of industry in Athens was all the more spectacular because this city had not attracted industry in the mid-nineteenth century. The first factories were a printing press, a silk and a gas factory (1872). By 1909, however, 26,000 workers were living in the city, more than double the number in Piraeus (Leontidou 1990), most of whom were unionized in the Athens Labour Centre the next year, while Piraeus followed suit only by 1913 (Benaroya 1975 edn: 73-4, 111). Industrialization rates were 4.08 % annually in 1879-1920, faster than urbanization rates (3.72 %) and tertiarization rates (3.57 %; Leontidou 1990).

The working-class movement entered its formative period during the early twentieth century (Leontarites 1978). The first massive strikes broke out in Hermoupolis (1877-8) and Lavrio (1883, 1887, 1896; Kordatos 1931: 22-31; Moskov 1972: 197-9). In Athens and Piraeus, the first strikes did not originate in factories, but in the more traditional urban crafts and trades, the printers (1882), tailors, shoemakers, and the Piraeus maritime workers (1889); the class basis of the massive 1894 May Day celebration at the Athens Stadium was even broader (Kordatos 1931; Benaroya 1975 edn). The origins of radicalism in Greece were in general not connected with the factories but, according to three different views, with the communities of foreign workers in Hermoupolis (Kordatos 1931); the trades relating to hotels and cafés (Moskov 1972: 183-4); and those dealing with the press and publishing. The three views correspond to different conceptions about the period of birth of the Greek labour movement, but have a basic common ground. All of these fractions of the working class were in direct contact with the European labour movement (Leontidou 1990). In fact, during its formative years Greek trade unionism was directly influenced by the European one, including that of Italy. Since these are not strictly proletarian groups and would be formally classified as 'unproductive' or service labourers, the pitfalls of any 'objective', nominalist treatment of social classes should again be stressed at this point.

A qualitative transformation in the Greek labour movement followed the Goudi revolt (1909). Popular mass mobilizations around issues broader than work conditions preceded and followed it. This is not the place to join the controversy as to whether Goudi was a bourgeois revolt (Dertilis 1977:



passim; Mavrogordatos 1983: 125–42). It seems that the victorious Liberals represented the rising commercial, shipping and industrial bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurs, while old parties represented rentiers, landowners and the State bourgeoisie. The working class was a conspicuous part of rallies in support of the Goudi revolt. The victorious Liberal Party created a reformist fervour and progressive labour legislation was passed by Parliament, to the point that the prime minister E. Venizelos was accused of ‘mobilizing and luring the workers’ (Stefanou, quoted in Dertilis 1977: 232). The electoral defeat of the Liberals in 1920 was, in a way, a setback for the working class of larger towns.

After the Balkan wars and the unification of Greece (1913), as industrialization speeded up, labour unions shed their resemblance to guilds (*syntechnies*, *rousfetia*) and multiplied (Dertilis 1977: 202–3; Benaroya 1975 edn: 110–11). Strikes became more massive, and steps were taken towards the unification of the labour movement. The process culminated in the creation of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) in 1918, to which 214 unions with a membership of 65,000 immediately became affiliated (Benaroya 1975 edn: 116–19). Some days later, another conference held in Piraeus concluded in the creation of SEKE, the party which in 1920 changed its name into KKE, the Communist Party of Greece (Kordatos 1931). The 1910s thus ended with the emergence of a Greek proletariat in culture and politics. ‘The period of sporadic and dispersed individual efforts, the period of prehistory, is now over. A collective search begins, an organized effort, systematic action, a march toward specific goals – history’ (Benaroya 1975 edn: 114).

## 2.2 The emergent proletariat in the transitional city

A working class thus emerged in the cities of silence. The capitalist mode of production as a form of control over both the relations of production and the labour process was rising in Greece during the early twentieth century, but had not yet achieved dominance. The first region to be affected was the capital. By 1920, 104,000 labourers and artisans worked in the industries of Attica and Beotia, concentrated in Athens, Piraeus, Lavrio, Elefsina and a few smaller settlements. Athens and Piraeus concentrated 45,300 and 24,600 workers respectively (Leontidou 1990). This emergent working class was thrust into an economy ready to exploit them not just as labour but also as tenants. They were excluded from the urban market and neglected by the State, as well as by industrialists, and had to adapt to a speculative land and housing market controlled by landowners and petty speculators, who built Athens from nothing according to their self-interest. Researchers tend to

neglect this, and insist that there were very few workers anyway before 1922. This view is ill founded, as will be argued in the present section.

### 2.2.1 *The context: urban poverty and the housing question*

Transient populations moving from villages to urban marginality on their way to job opportunities outside Greece numbered 37,400 in 1907, or 11.1 % of the labour force in urban sectors (table 2.4). Like European nineteenth-century cities, without emigration Athens would have shown much more evidence of a marginal population, urban poverty and surplus labour in open or disguised unemployment. The city constituted the centre of a constant movement: prospective emigrants left and new ones came in to swell the ranks of the unemployed and then in their turn sail away.

The extent of marginality can be gauged from a 1917 survey conducted in the capital (SGG 1917). Only 6.9 % of the workers in Athens and 14.9 % of those in Piraeus were found to work in factories: the overwhelming majority had 'other places of work'. Though these are not specified, they suggest a widespread informal economy where subcontracting arrangements, piece-work at home, street commerce and services were customary. Moreover, unemployment levels at the time reached 38 % in Athens and 57 % in Piraeus. Misery was amplified by unbearable work conditions in the factories: the work day was 16–18 hours long in 1909, reduced to 10 by 1914. The bourgeoisie sought justification in that 'the heat and glare of the sun make the Greek work with less intensity and assiduity' (Mears 1929: 113). The progressive legislation of the Liberal Party was usually not enforced. All this took place in conditions of extreme urban poverty, which can be partly attributed to the war. By 1919 it was admitted that 'today the worker is paid less than before the war' (Zolotas 1964: 88). A sharp decline in the standard of living and extreme hardship culminated in a famine produced by the Entente blockage (Mavrogordatos 1983: 143).


Already during the 1880s, urbanization was creating a severe housing problem for the poor. This was aggravated after 1907, as urban expansion in Athens slowed down (table 2.1). No areas were added to the official city plan in 1908, 1912–15 and 1918–22, and a mere 42 ha were added in 1908–22 (Biris 1966: 318). The gross population density almost doubled from 83.6 people/ha in 1907 to 143.3 in 1920, and the net density rose to 247 people/ha in 1920 (Leontidou 1990). The advent of the war years is not sufficient to explain this major change. Landowners were discovering a new sort of speculation: housing space would now be provided through the more intensive exploitation of land already integrated in the city.

During the early twentieth century there was a spectacular acceleration of urbanization. For the first time, rates of population growth in Greater Athens reached 5 % annually in 1907–20 (table 2.1). This, combined with the end of urban expansion and the crisis due to the war, created an acute housing problem. A series of articles in the 1918 newspapers were indicative (Agapitos 1928). The number of inhabitants per house rose from 10.5 before the war to 10.9 in 1918, 11.5 in 1919 and 12.9 in 1920 (MNE 1922: 7). Building activity had decreased during the war years and catered for luxury demand: the average value per construction doubled, then increased fivefold (Agapitos 1928). At a time when the average monthly wage was about 100 dr., the monthly rent on an average three-roomed house was 50–60 dr. (Agapitos 1928: 99–100). Three efforts at rent control in 1912 and 1916–19, intended to benefit those enlisted in the army, seem to have diverted capital away from construction (Malainos 1929). A severe housing crisis affected especially the proletariat by 1921. The structural aspects of this crisis, i.e. the distributive groupings formed, are of particular interest.

#### 2.2.2 *The alternatives: squatting and industrial estates*

Labourers arriving in Athens and Piraeus in the nineteenth century clustered together according to their place of origin, which combined *de facto* with the particular skills characteristic of each locality. This can be considered as a distant variant of the occupational quarters of the precapitalist city (Vance 1971). The first spontaneous settlements of dock workers in Piraeus were named after the inhabitants' places of origin – Chiotica, Hydraica, Cretica, later Maniatica (Daskalakis 1932: 860–1). Piraeus had developed its own working-class district near the factories by the late 1860s, as industrial development speeded up, segregated from the rest of the city by the railway station. There were references in the 1867 newspapers to dangerous classes (Tsocopoulos 1984: 238–43).

In the city of Athens, the builders and masons created two unauthorized communities, one of which, the renowned Anafiotica, was named after their island of origin. The other community, established in the 1840s by skilled workers from various Aegean islands at the northern edge of the Athens plan, was later named the 'Suburb' (Proastio; Biris 1966: 80). Anafiotica appeared in the 1860s under the rock of the Acropolis and, though squatters were 'sacrilegious' to the ancient rock (Biris 1966: 172; Dimitrakopoulos 1937: 400), they have remained there to this day. However, these popular illegal communities were exceptional. They remained secluded, not as emergent, but as residual modes of land allocation created by a population of special skills. The vitality of construction workers, their natural tendency



*Figure 2.2* Industrial estates in Attica during the early twentieth century. The 1920 authorized city plan of Athens and Piraeus, the railway lines, and industrial estates mentioned in the book.

to build their own homes illegally, will recur throughout the history of Athens (chapter 4). Conditions for the rest of the proletariat were very different.

There are only a few recorded instances of industrialists trying to attract labour to their factories by building industrial estates, and they all concern settlements in Attica: Lavrio and Elefsina on the southeastern and western edge of Attica respectively, and Drapetsona, just outside Piraeus (fig. 2.2). The oldest estates in the mining town of Lavrio were built by the Greek and French companies from the 1870s onwards, and segregated houses for clerks and technicians from the wretched, overcrowded proletarian houses

(Skitzopoulos 1919: 76–7; Leontidou 1990). The Elefsina industrial estate was built by Kanellopoulos, the owner of the cement factory (MNE 1922: 9).


The same industrialist built the Drapetsona estate next to his factory on the west of the Piraeus port. In 1910 the fertilizer company allocated 9.6 % of its capital to house its workers and clerks (Skitzopoulos 1919: 77–81). Though houses were stratified again by skill level, this estate seems to have been more respectable and has been referred to as a model settlement. Unlike the estates of Lavrio and Elefsina, which were created by necessity to attract labour in uninhabited areas, the Drapetsona estate can be attributed to the need for spatial fixity of the labour force, combined with the paternalist outlook of the industrialist. The latter was exceptional in the Greek context, where the local bourgeoisie, including industrialists, regarded real estate exclusively as a source of speculative profit (section 2.1.2).

### *2.2.3 The outcome: a landless proletariat*

Besides the above exceptional cases, virtually nothing is known about the residential patterns of the majority of the proletariat in the cities of silence, at a time when bourgeois quarters have been extensively described. Several studies of the early labour movement have disregarded living conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was pure good luck to find the single report on working-class housing conditions based on a 1921 survey in Athens and Piraeus cited in a few prewar articles. This untapped and rare source of information will be referred to as the report of the MNE (Ministry of National Economy). It covered a total of 2,000 houses in 678 and 460 buildings in Athens and Piraeus respectively. About 4,300 workers lived in the 40 communities covered in Athens, and 4,434 in the 20 communities of Piraeus. The primitive surveying methods and a professed bias towards the worst cases of poverty only marginally reduce the importance of the findings.

The MNE report revealed that proletarian quarters were unknown because of their segregation from those of the ‘happier classes’, from the city recorded by historians and visitors. As the workers increased with urbanization, the fringes of the dominant land market were inadequate for their housing. A sub-market operating exclusively for poorer workers according to the rules of the dominant market emerged. This was controlled by small landowners who built flimsy constructions, and by speculators or petty developers, a variant of jerry builders. Their actual asset was land, not the flimsy constructions thereon.

As in all early capitalist cities, it was essential for workers to live near



*Figure 2.3* Working-class communities in Athens and Piraeus, 1921. Sources: Mapping of communities cited in MNE (1922) upon the 1920 city plan, with use of Biris (1971) and other sources, on the basis of a LQ showing the concentration of the labourers by trade in each community (Leontidou forthcoming). Adequate data on the city of Athens, inadequate specification of trades in the city of Piraeus by the MNE (1922).

their jobs. Transport fares were still too high for them to bear, as a two-way tramway ticket for a very short distance within Athens would absorb 10–15 % of the worker's wage (Leontidou 1990). Working-class locations by 1921 can be investigated on the basis of the MNE report which, unfortunately, used no standard sampling method. The lack of data about the location of fractions of the Piraeus labourers, most of whom must have worked at the port, creates a problem. A general conclusion is social segregation. Highways, commercial roads, the hills of the Acropolis and Lycabettus, the Stadium, and of course industrial areas provided the physical barriers between social classes in Athens and Piraeus. The alleged 'absence' of workers was due to their invisibility.

The spatial distribution of selected fractions of the Athens working class has been calculated on the basis of a variant of the LQ (Leontidou forthcoming). Fig. 2.3 indicates the boundaries enclosing the communities where selected fractions of the working class lived, in order to indicate the strength of the employment linkage (chapter 1). Manufacturing workers and artisans clustered between the city centre and the first industrial zone of the capital of Greece, an axis from the port of Piraeus along the Athens–Piraeus railway to the Athens CBD. Transport workers lived along the railway lines and stations on the northwest. The construction workers, who did not have a fixed place of work, clustered around Anafiotica and the Suburb, and in pockets among petty bourgeois areas, where construction activity was buoyant. Hotel clerks and sales workers sought centrality along commercial arteries. Pedlars clung nearest to the CBD where casual job opportunities were close to hand. The servants, shoeshine boys, launderers and housekeepers lived in pockets near the homes of the affluent classes. The concern of the early proletariat to keep its journey to work short is quite apparent.

Extensive custom-built slums, then, did exist in pockets in relatively central areas of Athens and Piraeus, and in the vacant spaces between the two cities. Findings of the MNE study point to unbelievable misery. In Athens there were two types of communities: those of the city centre, where workers were crowded in flimsy old ruined buildings awaiting demolition, usually two-storey, including basements; and the outer communities, apparently more spacious, but unserviced and built with flimsy and overcrowded shacks. Conditions were worse in Piraeus especially with respect to overcrowding, as 85 % of families lived in one room compared with 76 % in Athens, and there corresponded an average of 2.8 m<sup>2</sup> per person against 4 in Athens (MNE 1922).

The one common feature was *absolute landlessness*. Among the 2,143 families of the sample in both cities, not one single owner-occupier was

found (MNE 1922: 28). Rents were moderate and would have absorbed about 12 % of family income. Due to rent control, 90 % of the rents were at prewar levels. For new migrants, or those receiving notice to evacuate, rents rose abruptly. The landlords were a variant of jerry builders, speculating with the tacit acceptance of the government. They can be compared with those who emerged in early capitalist cities, when industrial capitalism sparked off rapid urbanization creating a mounting demand for urban space (Vance 1971: 109). As housing in the growing cities became an economic activity in itself, distinct from investment in manufacturing, a new class of developers was formed. 'Speculation was the incidental by-product, rather than the cause' of the valuation of space (Handlin 1963: 9). Petty developers were discovering that scarcity of houses was more profitable than supply. In any case, their profits were initially meagre, as already pointed out (section 2.1.2).

In the case of Athens these entrepreneurs either converted old vacant property to last for a few more years as multi-family dwellings, or built huts of clay, wood and tin for the same short life span. As urbanization accelerated, even 'excessive' WCs, kitchens and basement laundry rooms were converted and rented as houses.

And the situation deteriorates every day because of lack of housing. Mostly in central areas, but also in outer communities, landowners build, or rather compose in the most flimsy manner, low shacks of wood and often mud and tin, appropriate only for cattle. In each of these, they open up a small window and rapidly let them to working-class families or single workers. (MNE 1922: 15).

In early twentieth-century Athens subsistence wages coexisted with *subsistence housing*, small and flimsy, in unserviced locations, in areas polluted by factories. The working class, dependent on proximity to workplaces, was thrown unaided into the generalized market, landless and overcrowded, because of its meagre rent-paying ability. The image is familiar. It seems that overcrowding, landlessness and misery inevitably surround the emergence of the proletariat in capitalist cities.

### 2.3 Urban struggles in interwar Greece

A year after the MNE study was completed, the cities were flooded with the Asia Minor refugees and their transitional period ended abruptly. The year 1922 witnesses the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor. In accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), a population exchange followed, which brought 1.3 million Greek refugees into the country in exchange for half a million Turks. The Greek population increased by 18 % that year, while the



Greek territory decreased by 21,000 km<sup>2</sup> (table 2.2) with the loss of several flourishing regions in Asia Minor. Greek irredentism and the period of the 'Great Idea' ended in defeat. A second major event, which unhappily coincided with the Asia Minor disaster, was the control of immigration by the USA after May 1921, at a time when economic dependence on emigrants' remittances had grown strong. For the first time in a long period, the majority of the Greek population concentrated within the national frontiers, deprived of their cosmopolitan and expansionist aspirations and bewildered by their misfortune. This gathering together was conducive to development, but also created poverty and marginality.

The human geography of the Athens basin was radically transformed. Popular housing conditions could not get any worse; and in fact they did not. There was a housing crisis, of course, but also new modes of land and housing allocation emerged. The Fund for Refugee Assistance was set up hastily to deal with the emergency, but was succeeded in 1923 by the Refugee Settlement Commission. The RSC was established by the Greek government in agreement with the League of Nations as an autonomous supra-national body to administer the permanent settlement of the refugees in residence and in productive work, on terms of ultimate repayment (Eddy 1931: 125). It launched an 'epic enterprise' of urban and rural refugee settlement and was dissolved in 1930, when its funds were spent. Meanwhile, 'slums of hope' had appeared in Greek cities (section 2.4). A new articulation of objective elements transformed the Athens-Piraeus complex into a unique variant of the Third World city (Leontidou 1985b). We will not expand on this period, as already stated, but certain aspects which have escaped attention in existing research will be touched upon, especially with respect to urbanization and the institution of popular land control. It will be shown that a sort of revolution in urban development patterns came about in interwar Athens.

### *2.3.1 Regional segregation and the impact of refugee settlement*

During the first years after their arrival, the refugees were constantly on the move. By 1928 the composition of the Greek urban population had stabilized as follows: natives and internal migrants 72.3 %, refugees 27.7 % (table 2.5). These aggregates conceal a very interesting process which we can refer to as *regional segregation*: a dichotomy between 'refugee' and 'native' towns, and a *trend* towards the reproduction of this dichotomy through population movements, involving the reshuffling of native as well as refugee populations in 1920-8. In other words, it was not only refugees who migrated; native populations also moved in geographical space.

Table 2.5 *Urbanization rates according to presence of refugees in Greek towns, 1920-8*

Percentage of refugees in towns	Total population		Population composition 1928:		Average annual rate of growth (%) of:	
	1920	1928	Refugees %	Non-refugees No.	Total population	Non-refugee <sup>b</sup> population
Over 30 %	385,065	592,772	41.41	347,283	5.54	-1.28
20-30 %	81,600	109,266	23.76	83,302	3.72	0.26
10-20 %	182,883	216,461	12.98	188,371	2.13	0.37
5-10 %	71,555	87,700	7.47	81,148	2.58	1.59
Under 5 %	113,626	137,068	3.14	132,764	2.37	1.96
Greater Athens	453,042	802,000	28.45	573,861	7.40	3.00
<i>Greek population</i>						
Urban	1,193,838	1,945,267	27.68	1,406,729	6.29	2.07
Rural	3,823,051	4,259,417	12.48	3,727,998	1.36	-0.31
Total <sup>a</sup>	5,016,889	6,204,684	17.24	5,134,727	2.69	0.29

<sup>a</sup> Within 1928 boundaries.<sup>b</sup> Including natural increase of population.

Source: Adapted from 1920-8 census data. Towns of over 10,000 inhabitants by 1928 are included.

The refugees had mostly settled in the northern Greek towns of Macedonia and Thrace, as well as Athens and Salonica. Urbanization rates were very high in the 1920s, slowed down in the 1930s and fell further in the 1940s. Two systematic patterns are shown in table 2.5. One is that the growth rates of towns present a close correlation with the percentages of refugees. The population of 'refugee' towns such as Kavala grew by 10.5 % annually in 1920-8 followed by Xanthi (10.1 %), Serres (9.3 %) and Alexandroupolis (9.1 %; Leontidou 1990). The other trend revealed here is the apparent departure of native populations from refugee towns. An estimate of the size of non-refugee, or otherwise native, population in 1928, which includes natural increase, is approximated by subtracting the refugee population from the total 1928 population in each town. This sort of analysis indicates that, the stronger the refugee element in towns, the lower the urbanization rates for the non-refugee population. Natives apparently depart from towns where refugees form over 10 % of the population: rates of growth of native populations in these towns are lower than natural increase (estimated at about 1 %).

The only exception was Greater Athens, where the presence of refugees

was considerable and rates of population growth were very high. The latter reached 7.4 % annually in 1920–8, a spectacular rate indeed in the urban history of Athens. Since natural increase was an average of 1 % yearly, the non-refugee population contributed to the growth of the capital by 2 % annually (table 2.5). Urban ‘explosion’ evident in the capital must be attributed to both refugee arrival and to internal migration. The poorer native populations apparently departed for Greater Athens in search of better job opportunities. As the safety valve of emigration to the USA was closed, these populations had few other outlets.

These important processes have not been observed, let alone investigated, in Greek research for the interwar period. The process of regional segregation revealed here should not be explained away with reference to withdrawing Turks, high mortality rates or any other secondary factor. The refugees did displace natives, while the natives discouraged refugee settlement in certain towns. Factors responsible for the dominance of either group in certain towns remain to be investigated. They may have been geographical – the north/south distinction or towns near the border, where the refugees first set foot, and from which Muslim minorities were deported; economic – relating to poverty, informality and low degree of integration of natives in the labour market in certain towns; and, certainly, political – related to RSC settlement policy and to the attitude of the local populations. The latter is clearly reflected in a petition of native Greeks after the Asia Minor disaster: ‘A committee of residents of Pourlia requests that the settlement of refugees in their area be averted’ (Mavrogordatos 1983: 195). Hostilities between natives and refugees can be seen in a new light if this urbanization pattern is stressed. An actual schism in Greek society was reflected in space, both at the regional and the intra-urban level (Leontidou 1990; cf. also section 2.3.2). There are references to violent local clashes between refugees and natives, especially in northern Greece, and arson against refugee shacks had been reported in Volos, which followed exhortations in the antivenizelist press (Linardatos 1965: 172). National perceptions, attitudes and behaviour to the refugees ‘approximated true racism’ (Mavrogordatos 1983: 194).

Urbanization patterns seem to have changed during the following decade. The growth of towns slowed down considerably, and became confined to Athens and to a lesser extent to Salonica. The rural population, by contrast, grew by 1.32 % in 1928–40, a rate it has never surpassed in twentieth-century Greek history (table 3.4). It seems that the extensive rural land reform was bearing fruit in the 1930s, causing the ‘ruralization’ of Greece. The share of towns other than Athens in the Greek population remained almost stable in 1928–40 (table 2.2).

The refugee inflow speeded up capitalist transformation. The mobilization of Greek authorities and foreign powers to accommodate them has been unparalleled in Greek history. Investment and loans from foreign banks mobilized national productive resources; the refugee settlement ventures widened the domestic market, redistributed agricultural income and speeded up industrialization. The Asia Minor Greeks brought new vitality to the Greek society and economy, and managed to survive in a period of international economic depression. In agriculture, they were the first to apply polyculture and introduced new plants (Pentzopoulos 1962: 151-7); commerce was revitalized by former residents of Smyrna and Istanbul (Aegides 1934: 125-6); the industrial sector developed with skilled labour, consumers and entrepreneurial skills. Their inflow 'resulted in the transplantation of entire industries from one shore of the Aegean to the other' (Pentzopoulos 1962: 114-15). Industries related to the national market, such as textiles, grew rapidly. Manufacturing production expanded at a rate of 6.87 % annually in 1920-30, restructuring towards producer goods industries took place and the HP per worker doubled (Coutsoumaris 1963: 34). Infrastructure development and the building of communities speeded up industrial restructuring and absorbed a significant number of the labour force. The international economic depression created a 'hothouse atmosphere of rapid industrial development' (Zolotas quoted by Vergopoulos 1978: 35), a phase of import substitution in a context of protectionism, as in other peripheries. Greek industry covered 58 % of the domestic market in 1928 and 78.84 % by 1938 (Vergopoulos 1978: 74-5).

These developments took place within a context of economic polarization. The growth of the informal sector was indicated by the shrinkage of the average plant size from 4.31 persons per establishment in 1920 to 3.35 in 1930. Enterprises with over 25 employees, 43 % of which concentrated in Athens and Piraeus, never constituted more than 2 % of industrial establishments (Leontidou 1990). The development of small industry at the time will be taken up in chapter 5, because of the interesting issue of RSC involvement in the creation of the Greek informal sector.

The formal part of the economy consisted of large capitalist enterprises ensuring monopolies in certain industries, and foreign capital, which controlled all key sectors of the Greek economy especially after 1933 (Ellis et al. 1964: 175-9). Foreign participation was significant in finance, commercial, shipping and banking enterprises, large corporations in construction, public works and the supply of energy. The colonial agreements ensured liberal concessions to foreign capitalists investing in various services and utility networks (Stefanides 1930). The enterprises were

regarded as 'sucking popular labour' (Elefantis 1976: 380), and their activity created strong opposition, including urban social movements. Foreign engineers employed by Power & Traction were subjected to embarrassment during the installation of electric wiring in Athenian houses, while the American ULEN company 'managed to live down its unpopularity' and complete the Marathon dam and a major water supply network by 1931 (Mears 1929: 123).

Such incidents are indicative of a polarized society in upheaval. Economic polarization coincided with social polarization in interwar Greece, but the latter was manifested in several ways, such as the rich/poor dimension and the hostilities between refugees and natives. The electorate of Liberals and Royalists had become divided even earlier, from 1915, by what has been known as the 'great national schism' over the question of the monarchy, which spilled over and became the main cleavage of the interwar period (Diamandouros 1983: 50-1; Mavrogordatos 1983: 130-1). Urbanization as studied above seems to have reflected such issues.

Politics were therefore unstable and intense. The Liberals were in power in the 1920s, supported especially by the refugees, the only compact voting bloc of national importance, and the entrepreneurial fractions of the modern bourgeoisie (Mavrogordatos 184, 1983: 131-4). Venizelos himself returned to politics in 1928 with a new conservative face, which contributed to his defeat in 1932 (Dafnis 1955). The KKE was not *the* party of the working class, except in a 'prospective and metaphorical sense' (Elefantis 1976: 375), and was found to be concentrated in one particular segment, the tobacco workers, by 1928-36 (Mavrogordatos 1983: 151). It attracted bourgeois aggression. The communist hunt escalated after 1929, when Venizelos pushed forward a repressive law, the notorious 'idionymo'. In the early 1930s the bulk of the electorate was turning to the Populists, who were mainly supported by unproductive populations and social groups in the traditional economic sectors (Mavrogordatos 1983: 130). As the Liberal Party became more conservative, the power of the KKE rose among the refugees (Elefantis 1976: 392-3). This was a period of political instability, when a series of army interventions opened the road to royalism and the dictatorship of the monarch and I. Metaxas from 4 August 1936 until the Second World War. Parliamentary politics thus came to an end, parties were rendered defunct, collective organizations and unions were suppressed (Linardatos 1965, 1966).

Social polarization was also evidenced in affluence on the one hand and extreme poverty on the other, which spread among the rural and urban population despite economic development. Massive unemployment and underemployment constituted the 'dark side' and the precondition of the

Greek industrialization process. As the economic depression affected Greece and emigration was no longer a safety valve, the per capita income remained stationary or fell in the period 1928–39.<sup>13</sup> Rural populations would somehow rely on subsistence agriculture, but urban poverty was abject.<sup>14</sup> Social inequality at the time compares with the cases of other peripheries which have been ‘socially speaking, a broad-based, rapidly tapering pyramid, exceptionally poor at the bottom, exceptionally rich at the top’ (Hobsbawm 1967: 65). The taxation system and fiscal policy introduced during the dictatorship made the income pyramid even more lopsided by placing a much heavier indirect tax burden on the lowest income groups (Evelpides 1950: 103). Interwar Greece became a typical underdeveloped social formation, polarized and unequal, with scarcely any middle classes as a buffer between the rich and the poor.

### 2.3.2 *Urban ‘explosion’ and socio-spatial polarization*

As already pointed out, Greater Athens doubled its population in 1920–8, growing at an average annual rate of 7.4 %, never equalled before or since. The same is true of Salonica, which grew especially through refugees at a rate of 4.2 % during the same period. By 1928 Athens concentrated 12.93 % of the Greek population, but 33.2 % of Asia Minor refugees, who were mostly concentrated in Kallithea (52.3 %), in Piraeus (40.2 %) and to a lesser extent in Athens (28.2 %; adapted from SGG 1930). During the 1930s, despite slower rates of urbanization, Athens was transformed into a conurbation of over one million people, and the primate distribution of Greek cities was accentuated (Ward 1963: 82). By 1940 the city concentrated over 15.3 % of Greek population (table 2.2) and 46.5 % of the urban population.

During the first months after their arrival the refugees squatted not only on land, but wherever they could.<sup>15</sup> The housing crisis continued throughout the period and shifted the emphasis of social surveys to the refugees. A 1927 census found about 29 % of the urban families to be living in ‘unfit’ dwellings (Eddy 1931: 122). A 1940 survey in Athens, Piraeus and Elefsina

<sup>13</sup> Per capita income at the time was \$61 while it was \$398 in France (Tsoucalas 1969: 54). Wages were frozen, and the people’s purchasing power in 1935–40 was lower than 1929 levels (Evelpides 1950: 109). In 1938, 93.45 % of the families were found to earn less than the sum needed for a decent life (UNRRA, cited by Linardatos 1966: 126).

<sup>14</sup> In 1930, 73 % of the workers in Athens and Piraeus were found to earn wages below the subsistence level, and 40 % of family earnings were spent on bread. By 1938 conditions were worse: 83 % of workers of another sample were found to earn less than subsistence wages, and considerable undernourishment was found among Athens labourers (UNRRA, cited by Vergopoulos 1978: 94).

<sup>15</sup> Refugees squatted in train wagons, warehouses, theatre buildings and churches (Mears 1929: 52; Pentzopoulos 1962: 112–13). Urban unbuilt plots were occupied by sackcloth tents and makeshift constructions of timber and tin cans.

Table 2.6 Area and gross density in Greater Athens, 1920-40

	Total	Athens	Piraeus	Piraeus suburbs	Athens suburbs
Master Plan in hectares					
1920	3,264	1,793	542	—	929
1930	7,068	2,056	592	334	4,086
1940	11,600	2,458	1,102	718	7,322
Gross density, people per hectare in the Master Plan					
1920	138.8	163.5	249.5	—	24.9
1928 <sup>a</sup>	113.5	187.5	359.2	149.9	37.7
1940	96.9	195.8	191.1	154.9	43.8

<sup>a</sup> Population 1928, area 1930.

Sources: Adapted from Biris 1966; SGG 1930.

covering 60,000 refugee houses found that 57% had only one room and most were occupied by 2-5 persons (Vassiliou 1944: 150). Even in 1951, a survey during the slum clearance projects of the Ministry of Social Welfare (1958) reported 10,664 shacks in the capital (fig. 2.4).

The tendency for urban sprawl, later amplified by popular initiative, was initiated by the RSC. In 1924 the Commission decided to build on the urban fringe rather than within the city, segregating the refugees from 'normal' city life. The tensions between refugees and natives in Greek society were thus averted, at least in the case of land and housing allocation. The 12 major and about 34 minor refugee settlements created in the 1920s and 1930s were 'satellite' communities at a distance of at least 4 km from the built-up area of 1922 (fig. 2.4). However, the RSC and the government 'failed' as urban planners. By 1925, the situation was already beyond their control. The fringe communities were immediately encircled by squatters. The RSC had in effect decided the direction, not the volume or the rate of urban growth. Spontaneous popular colonization had begun. With the arrival of the refugees, the suburbs suddenly came to life. The share of the urban periphery in the agglomeration's population rose from a mere 5.9% in 1920 to 43.8% in 1940 (Leontidou 1985b: 62-4). Athens and Piraeus were joined up into one urban agglomeration. The built-up area reached the mountain range of Aigaleo, the feet of Hymettus and the Penteli monastery. Fig. 2.1 shows the expansion of the approved city plan only, which increased fourfold in 1920-40, so that densities dropped from 139 to 97 people/ha (table 2.6). By 1940 urban sprawl reached its peak in the history of the city.

Improvements in power supply, water and transport networks, but especially the concentration of abundant labour, were conducive to industrial development. The rates of growth of productive employment in

1920–8 were especially rapid in banks (12.5%), transport (6.4%), commerce (5.8%) and manufacturing (5.3%). The latter absorbed 31.4% of the economically active population by 1928, while employment in services remained almost stable (Leontidou 1985b: 59). The transformation of Athens from a ‘parasitic’ city, controlling Greece without producing, to an increasingly productive agglomeration, was proceeding rapidly. As of this period urbanization became the main lever of industrialization.

The first four refugee settlements (N. Ionia, Kaissariani, Byron near Athens, and Kokkinia near Piraeus; fig. 2.4) grew to be predominantly industrial communities. The RSC created these settlements near pre-existing factories, but they also attracted new industrialization through refugee initiative and RSC policy. The traditional industrial axis from the Athens CBD to the port of Piraeus was reinforced with milling, tanning and leather manufacturing industries and factories of building materials, and expanded to the northeast towards N. Ionia, concentrating skilled female labourers with a textile tradition.<sup>16</sup> The employment linkage was thus reinforced among the Athens refugee population. In most cases industry followed urbanization. As it was light and footloose, it could settle near dense working-class concentrations. Smaller industries and independent artisans, as well as cooperatives, also increased: the first impetus for the creation of the urban informal sector was given by the RSC (chapter 5).

Upward mobility in interwar Greece was no longer related to the public service sector, but rather to industry and commerce. Some refugees were apparently upwardly mobile. ‘The 7000 merchants and wholesale industrialists included in the books of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Athens include 1000 refugees. For Piraeus, the proportion is larger’ (League of Nations 1926: 185). At the same time, however, there was constant horizontal mobility. The extent of job turnover and marginality is reflected in an attitude common among middle classes: ‘The Greek worker, after a short period of apprenticeship... changes job easily... and consequently can not become perfect in any job’ (Charitakis 1927: 97). Labouring people were thus insecure and fragmented in the production sphere.

In fact, the marginalization of a large part of the population was merely postponed by RSC policies. Once the small industries were established, the economic depression hit the urban economy and programmes were withdrawn. Capitalist development proceeded with heavy exploitation and

<sup>16</sup> The carpet industry and later cotton weaving and ready-made clothes developed here, with the result that N. Ionia deserves its name of ‘Little Manchester’ (Burgel 1970: 20). Researchers of Greek cities and communities seem to be fond of calling them Manchester (e.g. Tsocopoulos 1984). Light industry concentrated near the Athens centre, while heavier plants grouped around the gulf of Elefsina, where the RSC built a settlement in 1924 (Eddy 1931: 118).




a large pool of casual labour. Despite their vitality and creativity, the number of refugees was in excess of the ability of the urban economy to absorb them. Social class polarization was especially acute in Athens. More systematic discussion of the class structure will be taken up in chapter 3, where comparison with postwar developments will be possible. An earlier investigation (Leontidou 1985b) indicated that in 1928, among a labour force of 305,000 in Athens and Piraeus, the bourgeoisie along with middle classes of the tertiary sector constituted about 21 %, 75 % of whom lived in Athens and the rest in Piraeus; the proletariat in industry and transport was only 25 %, but using a broader definition including petty service labourers it rose to 38 % of the active population;<sup>17</sup> and, assuming the marginal condition of the unemployed and the unpaid family members, and of those declaring to be 'workers and clerks' with no other specification, 23 % of the economically active population of Athens bordered on marginality (Leontidou 1985b: 58–61). These are attributes of a polarized society.

Social class polarization in interwar Athens was clearly evident in urban space. As in socio-political life, there were several axes of spatial polarization, the most important of which were those between refugees and natives, rich and poor. For the first time in the history of the city *deliberate segregation* of social classes was introduced. The RSC decision as to the location of the refugee communities outside city limits (fig. 2.4) was one side of the story. The other was the notorious exclusivity of bourgeois communities. Their expansion outwards from the central city to the northeast followed the familiar sectoral pattern. A variant of the 'garden city' (Agapitos 1928) was devised in the interwar period to separate the bourgeoisie from the threat of the 'masses'. Psychico and Ekali, the pioneer communities of this sort of development (fig. 2.4), were a product not just of wealth, but especially of power over planning legislation,<sup>18</sup> the direction of urban infrastructure, and even the management of loans for refugee settlement. Backed by the fundamental law of 17 July 1923 'on plans of cities and towns', leading bankers, higher civil servants, finance capitalists and liberal professionals figured in the lists of the 'Kekrops' Company (1929) founded to create Psychico. The mechanism used to achieve its segregation was the building code, which specified all matters of zoning, planning,

<sup>17</sup> The necessity for a broader definition of the proletariat, due to the fluidity of the class structure, underemployment and income-sharing processes, was even realized by the RSC. It was pointed out that rising wages of the construction worker 'maintained and fed the artisan class into whose pockets went a large part of his wage... Any assistance granted to the working class will at the same time serve to improve the situation of the small retail traders and industrialists who form so large a number of the emigrants' (League of Nations 1926: 181–2).

<sup>18</sup> They were backed by the law of 15 November 1923 'on building cooperatives' (Panos and Klimis 1970: 70; Polyzos 1978: 406–8).



**Figure 2.4** Types of settlements in interwar Athens and Piraeus, 1922–40. Refugee settlements created by the RSC and the Ministry of Social Welfare; more affluent self-built refugee communities on land allocated by the State; communities of poor refugee shacks still existing in the 1950s; communities built by cooperatives (predominantly petty bourgeois) by area of expropriated land (2,000–174,000 m<sup>2</sup>); and bourgeois ‘garden cities’. Sources: Adapted and mapped from Papageorgiou 1968; Polyzos 1978: 417; Vassiliou 1944; Ministry of Social Welfare 1958.

architecture and layout in detail. The same is true of Ekali, a contemporary of Psychico (Agapitos 1928: 234–41), and of the ‘garden city’ of Filothei built in 1932 by the cooperative of the staff of the National Bank (Dimitracopoulos 1973). Variants of this procedure were used later by cooperatives of civil servants and army officials, who received loans on very favourable terms (Vassiliou 1944: 91–2; fig. 2.4). Poorer petty bourgeois cooperatives also built new settlements, which were criticized for their pretensions and their ‘vulgar’ capitalist spirit (Biris 1966: 293).

### 2.3.3 *The politics of land allocation*

The dominant classes were thus markedly apprehensive of social stability and political ‘peace’. Floating populations pressing for a stake in the city alarmed them. The political function of popular landownership as a means

of appeasing the uprooted populations, and as a safety valve in the face of work insecurity and social unrest, will be summarized at this point. Policies were not uniform throughout the interwar period. On the political level, there was a conflict between the Liberal and the Populist Parties. On the economic level, the conflict between industrial and landed capital was a rather milder one, as their separation was not marked (section 2.1.2). The role of imperial powers in this process was evidenced in loans granted and foreign participation in the RSC board and other bodies. Methods of land allocation and housing construction employed can lead us to a comparison of interwar Greece with postwar Latin America (Leontidou 1985b: 65).

Land reform by the RSC in rural Greece was extensive, as it involved the distribution of 50% of agricultural land properties to peasants after 1917 and then in 1923.<sup>19</sup> Its function was the integration of agriculture into capitalism. Matters were more complicated in the case of urban land allocation, which must also be seen as a type of land reform. Since there was no question of the integration of urban land into capitalism as a productive asset, the function of allocating urban property to the refugees was basically political. Through the manipulation of location and tenure of the urban refugees, specific political objectives could be realized. The most obvious was the integration of the dangerous 'masses of refugees swarming the country and demanding revenge' (Pentzopoulos 1962: 178). The averting of the 'communist threat' through owner-occupation was explicitly stressed in official reports (quoted in Leontidou 1985b: 65-6). Though the RSC varied its policy for more affluent refugees, building them villas and allotting plots and loans to their cooperatives (Eddy 1931: 125-6, 164), it adopted a general approach to tenure for the whole refugee population: the provision of *owner-occupied* houses in individual holdings was the rule. Very few multi-family dwellings in buildings of up to three storeys were erected (Vassiliou 1944; Papaioannou 1975). This policy was insisted upon, despite the cost and complications of expropriations,<sup>20</sup> without consideration of any alternatives like multi-storey blocks, and with no reference to levels of land rent (Leontidou 1985b: 65). Housing allocation usually entailed the distribution of urban residential land to the people, and the wide diffusion of land property in cities.

Public and RSC policy with respect to tenure did not change in the course of the interwar period. Location policy, however, did change. The view that

<sup>19</sup> It was more extensive than reform in other Eastern European countries and exceptional in that it had been initiated by the government rather than popular mobilization. By 1933, 40% of Greek farmers were 'new owners', freeholders and independent peasant-proprietors (Vergopoulos 1975: 153, 140).

<sup>20</sup> Expropriations reached 30 million m<sup>2</sup> of urban land by 1932, despite the fact that they were institutionally complex at least until 1927 (Aegides 1934: 129).

the RSC turned its attention to urban refugee settlement after 1927 (Polyzos 1978: 146) is ill founded. On the contrary, investigation of the rates of RSC activity indicates that no less than 78.4 % of the houses built during the interwar period in Athens had been already constructed by 1926 (Leontidou 1985b: 66). The share of Athens and Piraeus in urban refugee settlement fell from 56 % in 1926 to 43 % in 1930, when the housing deficit was estimated at 30,000 dwelling units.<sup>21</sup> The early policy for urbanization related to the interests of the dominant party, the Liberals. A peculiar type of gerrymandering was involved, by which the density of selected districts was manipulated through housebuilding, so that the Liberal element in the urban municipalities increased (Dafnis 1955, 2: 97; Pentzopoulos 1962: 182; cf. Leontidou 1985b: 66).

Urbanization policy had already been reoriented in 1925, when the Liberals and the RSC decided 'that the Commission will henceforth carry out no constructional work in Athens and Piraeus' (Eddy 1931: 119). A slackening of the rate of housebuilding followed. The insignificant volume of public activity during the period 1926-40 justifies the claim that its direct influence on urban expansion lasted only for three years (1923-5; Leontidou 1985b). During the late 1920s, Athens was doubly neglected in the process of refugee settlement. On the one hand, the RSC gave priority to rural establishment, channelling only one-fifth of its expenditure to the cities up to 1930 (Eddy 1931: 117); on the other hand, provincial cities took priority over the capital. The severe housing shortage in Athens after the 1910s did not justify such a 'disurbanization' policy. This was adopted, however, again because of socio-political objectives, and intensified under the Popular Party. As soon as they came to power, the Populists criticized the Liberals for placing the refugees in urban centres 'for clearly electoral reasons' and for devising a peculiar kind of gerrymandering (Dafnis 1955, 2: 97). The danger of social unrest in Athens and Piraeus was stressed: 'Although this district has shown a power of absorption... it is nevertheless desirable to prevent the too rapid growth of the capital, which might become a source of social and economic danger to the country' (Eddy 1931: 119). Disurbanization policy was combined with gerrymandering in its traditional form, i.e. shifting geographical boundaries of electoral districts (Gerondas 1972: 339).

Policies for popular owner-occupation were condoned by many fractions

<sup>21</sup> Pentzopoulos 1962: 117. After 1930 Athens was almost neglected by the Ministry of Social Welfare, which administered refugee settlement (Vassiliou 1944: 79-87). It was also decided to compensate the refugees with the exchange of Turkish properties left behind after the population exchange. In the early 1930s the National Bank of Greece started to auction land plots. The refugee settlement policy thus began to be integrated in the market and to reproduce social inequality (Gizeli 1984: 229-90).

of the dominant classes. The State and bourgeoisie did not have to fight against any landowning interests. Close connection, and even fusion, of industrial and landed capital, the crisis situation, as well as profits from the economy of urbanization, and especially permissive building legislation, weakened the resistance of landowners:

It is well known...that many landowners of areas on the urban fringe insistently besieged the housing authorities and the state, offering their plots free for the building of estates, only specifying that a part of the whole area, however small, be left to them, free from the danger of expropriation; they were sure that this would abundantly repay them for their donation. (Aegides 1934: 128)

Large landowners donating parcels to public housing agencies, to put the city government under moral pressure to bring utilities out to their areas, have been referred to in Rome too (Fried 1973: 116, 119). This resulted in leapfrog development, as well as considerable speculative profits. In the 1930s the Athens landowners found a new means of speculative profit. The process of semi-squatting was beginning (chapter 4). The internal migrants were disadvantaged in urban space compared to the refugees, who were treated as a special category by the government. The migrants were victimized by fringe landowners who subdivided 'agricultural' land and sold it as urban plots at inflated prices. The rhythm of retrospective 'legalization' of these popular settlements indicates their relationship to political expediency. In the early 1930s, 'the political view prevailed, and the expansion of the plan of Athens by 8,000 m<sup>2</sup> for the legalization of unauthorized settlements was proposed in 1933' (Dimitracopoulos 1937: 422). The Popular Party and later the dictator Metaxas used this procedure as a 'favour' to the populace: 3,804 ha were included in the Athens city plan in the 1920s, among which were several bourgeois areas, but 4,532 ha were included in the 1930s, especially in popular communities, which had existed since the mid-1920s (table 2.6). Political expediency along with economic forces created a policy of tacit acceptance of popular semi-squatting.

We have completed one side of the story – the role of the dominant classes in land allocation. In reality, the popular strata of Athens were themselves actively involved in urban land politics. The refugee settlement process had already escaped the control of the planners by the mid-1920s. When the dominant classes realized that their policy had created excessive urban sprawl, it was too late to channel, let alone stop, the spontaneous colonization of the suburbs, first by the refugees, then by the migrant semi-squatters of the 1930s. They did not manage to change the process of urban expansion. Pressure developed from below, from the popular strata. The feeling of insecurity in the polarized economy made them especially sensitive

and dependent on land property. Athens had become a typical Third World urban formation, where precarious owner-occupation was a substitute for insurance and security in the face of the unstable jobs. Popular demands increasingly revolved around urban issues, to the near exclusion of 'traditional' working-class concerns.

The dominant classes were careful to fragment the urban refugees. While farmers were encouraged to form councils or even cooperatives, in the cities only the more affluent families were allowed to do so. Collective action by the poorer refugees, by contrast, was expressly discouraged. They were housed on the basis of waiting lists, and the RSC retained administrative control of their quarters (Vassiliou 1944: 74). Despite all this caution, the popular strata came to create a structure very different from the one visualized by the dominant classes. The first phase in illegality involved refusal to pay for RSC houses (League of Nations 1926: 171). The next phase involved organized invasions by groups of refugees into dwellings completed by the RSC, of which the houses in Kaissariani were never evacuated. The authorities expressed indignation: 'In fact, at the time the refugees contemplated nothing less than free housing at the expense of the government' (Eddy 1931: 129; Leontidou 1985b: 67).

The RSC policies mobilized popular common sense, resulting in a major change in urban development. The refugees actually turned exclusion from the urban market into an advantage. To achieve a tolerable life and counterbalance their insecurity, they went further than the dominant system allowed. Whereas in other cities (and in nineteenth-century Athens) it was the bourgeoisie which determined the frontier of urban growth, in interwar Athens this role came into the hands of the proletariat – first the refugees, then the internal migrants and popular strata at large. An informal popular, quasi-autonomous housing sector and a subordinate secondary land market were thus established in interwar Athens.

#### 2.4 'Slums of hope': from landlessness to popular land control

The 1920s astonish the historian with what Braudel (1980) calls the 'element of surprise'. The presence of the landless proletariat in the transitional city confirms that early capitalism is equally cruel everywhere, be it Manchester, London or Athens. Then, in 1922, the sudden emergence of shanty towns and the transformation of urban development processes provides a striking contrast. Athens has always developed through retrospective 'legalization' of already urbanized areas. This affords a continuity in the process of urban expansion in the two centuries of its modern history: the inclusion of areas into the city plan followed rather than preceded settlement. This continuity

was interrupted in 1922, however, as to its social class basis. Before that year, it was the bourgeoisie who opened up new land to urbanization. After 1922, its rôle was minimal: popular initiative was established in urban expansion. Speculation gave way to spontaneous urban development. We traced its beginnings in a 'revolution from above', clearly related to a tangible social threat. A land reform was effected, as extensive as, and perhaps more significant than, the rural one. Popular mobilization around urban issues followed, and a new mode of land allocation emerged, subordinate to the market, and sustained by popular control over peripheral land. By 1940 the popular strata, which constituted about three-quarters of the urban population, controlled about one-third of the urban built-up area (Leontidou 1985b).

In the transitional city of the early twentieth century, three working-class distributive groupings were encountered: the few residents in the estate sector; the squatter owner-occupiers; and the tenants in the market sector, who constituted the majority of the proletariat. Given the conditions of misery among the working class, and the insight offered by subsequent developments, the question is, why were popular struggles for land and housing, as well as squatting, so conspicuously absent during the 1910s? There were large vacant plots near the industrial axis; the huts which people must have been able to afford to build there would surely have been no worse than those let to them by the petty speculators. The possibility that such incidents did occur, and remained unrecorded, is very slight: they would have left some traces, at least in the MNE report on housing. Several reasons can be discerned for working-class landlessness at the time (Leontidou 1990). Two of them relate to the city as a material context, especially the strict control by landowners over their property at a time when speculation was so profitable. The inclusion of industrial plots in the 'real estate mania' (section 2.1.2), combined with the dependence of the working class on proximity, would diminish land available to be squatted upon. The other two reasons relate to the nature of the urban proletariat. The short duration of this phase of popular landlessness did not allow any movement to mature. On top of this, the more general indifference of labour movements in their formative years for housing conditions is encountered in Athens as well: primary consideration was given to wages and work conditions by people working 12–16 hours a day without a rest on Sundays.

It appears, however, that the most important reason is given by a contrast between the mobility, the *transient* feeling and the *individual* struggle of the early Greek working class, and the determination for *spatial fixity* and the *collective* struggle of the refugee proletariat, especially expressed in struggles for urban land control. In the early twentieth century, job turnover and

migration sustained a feeling of temporary residence in the city. The struggle of the working class to reproduce itself was an individual struggle. With a few localized exceptions, the 'colony psychology' was engraved in their consciousness, unions were regarded instrumentally, the city as a temporary station. Migrants usually kept their property in their village of origin, retained strong economic and family ties with the peasantry and, if circumstances allowed, travelled back and forth from city to countryside. This constant movement, the striving for mobility, the transient feeling, limited class organization and reinforced regional ties, as in other peripheries.

In the new environment, this population will maintain alive the links to its place of birth; it will always live in one neighbourhood, one community, retaining for generations the old customs, habits, the old way of thinking, the localist ideology; for a long time, the local union will remain the only collective organization – a phantom of the old community... (Moskov 1972: 197)

Waves of emigration were especially important in creating a transient, mobility-minded individual. Prospective emigrants regarded Athens as only a transitional phase in their life, as a place for an adequate wage and shelter at walking distance from the workplace, which would allow the accumulation of some savings for migration. In 1907, 11.1% of all economically active people in urban sectors left Greece (table 2.4); among them, 60–70% were referred to vaguely as 'workers and servants' (table 2.3). This transient individual must have been omnipresent among the Athens labouring population.

The refugee inflow provided another element of surprise, and has attracted towards it all emphasis of research on the interwar period. Misery was recorded. Increasing owner-occupation in the 1920s, however, contrasted sharply with the landlessness, confinement and overcrowding of the working class of the 1910s. There were few tenants in Athens after 1922, among whom were some refugees 'who rent rooms in existing houses' (Eddy 1931: 164). The largest number of the popular strata lived in their own shacks in peripheral urban areas. This urban transformation, though abrupt, was not conjunctural, nor culturally and politically specific. Sooner or later emigration, a safety valve against urban poverty, would end, and poorer emigrants would start returning. The steady flow of remittances would stop. These developments, however, coincided in Greece with the 1922 Asia Minor disaster and the worldwide economic depression. Abrupt urban restructuring was inevitable. Among its most important aspects was the emergence of spontaneous urban development by popular initiative.

Many cities have experienced such abrupt passages. Third World



squatters have often appeared as suddenly, after wars and political instability (Leontidou 1985b: 68). Messina in Sicily was rebuilt after the 1908 earthquake and the 1943 bombing with *barrache* in the periphery, and 14% of the city's residents were still living there in the early 1970s (Ginatempo and Cammarota 1977). The relevant question in the case of Greece is, what forces worked towards the reproduction of spontaneous urban development for such a long period – from 1922 until the late 1960s. These forces, inherent in the structure of underdeveloped capitalism, have already been outlined, and will be much more evident in subsequent chapters. A shock absorber of poverty, homelessness and discontent in the face of fast urbanization, precarious job opportunities, marginality and underemployment, squatting at the same time required practically no sacrifices from the middle classes or the State. For their part, the popular strata struggled to safeguard their right to flimsy shacks, built them by mutual aid and defended their communities collectively. They improved their houses as income permitted, in 'slums of hope' which substituted the earlier 'slums of despair'. Since Stokes (1962) introduced these terms, liberals have used them to obscure social tensions and point to self-striving people with petty bourgeois aspirations and prospects (Mangin 1967; Turner 1968). Still, they can be used without underestimating the tensions involved (Worsley 1984: 208–9). This is where the concept of spontaneity is relevant. Popular common sense, in which people take initiatives in their everyday lives, does not necessarily mean striving for mobility *within* the existing order, nor does it pre-empt the outcome of popular struggles for improvement.

The relevance of urban experience was not perceived by radicals, especially communists, in interwar Greece. Though the refugees turned to the KKE after their disentanglement from E. Venizelos, their everyday experience of urban and work situations made them heavily dependent on changes quite different from those pursued by the KKE. The party was heavily influenced by Soviet communism, which was incompatible with several manifestations of the Greek popular culture like the *rebetica*, the songs of the urban subproletariat and later the working class, which encountered the scorn of the KKE (Damianakos 1975). The fluidity and diversity of class structure in the popular communities escaped its perception. The radicalized populations were silent and inconspicuous until their outburst during the clandestine resistance movement in the 1940s, which culminated in a civil war. The movement developed especially in northern Greek towns and mountain villages, but also in the Athens refugee communities.

The abrupt change from the transitional to the Third World city type

found in Athens is a crucial case study in the light of comparative urban theory, since it displays socio-political forces in urban restructuring, but also reverses simple evolutionary models. The urban land and housing market was generalized, and the landless proletariat present in Athens, *before* capitalism rose to dominance. The victory of popular control over the frontier of urban expansion after 1922 was not a recourse to precapitalism or a residual peasant mode; it was structurally connected with the 'evolution' of an underdeveloped capitalist economy. It was a direct response to the new exigencies of survival, an action illuminated by popular common sense rather than folklore. It was held together by structural principles related to peripheral urbanization and industrialization, and developed within a framework of tolerance by urban capitalist interests. It should be expected that the process could change if any one of these forces were transformed. During the interwar period they were in balance, allowing the workers to live in their owner-occupied shacks. The question is, how long this balance would last. In Greece, it lasted until the late 1960s.

### 3

## *The Greek 'economic miracle' and the hidden proletariat*

It did, however, seem that most historical writing about cities and city-dwellers was deficient, not only because it lacked the breadth and analytical rigor which Lampard called for but because it dealt with only a small segment of the population – the visible, articulate elements of the community rather than the masses of ordinary people. The existing literature was based largely upon traditional literary sources which were socially skewed... When they did treat ordinary people they spoke with the accent of a particular class, and too often indicated more about the perceptions of that class than about life at the lower rungs of the social ladder.

Stephen Thernstrom (1971: 673)

The Second World War (1940–5) and the Greek civil war (1946–9) left the country in ruins. The structure of underdevelopment was aggravated by destruction and was carried through to the first postwar decades. Then, however, it was soon overcome. In the 1960s the safety valve of emigration reopened, the centre of gravity of the economy moved towards industry, living conditions improved and the role of marginality and urban poverty declined. Athens began to diverge from Third World urbanization models from a socio-economic point of view, and a solid working class grew in its society. This urban proletariat, however, has been virtually ignored by researchers, hidden within an alleged parasitic urban population.<sup>1</sup> Even the Left went along with stereotypes about 'underdevelopment', 'parasitism', 'overurbanization' and the 'petty-medium society'. In this chapter available evidence will be combined with an analysis of census data in order to discuss the nature of the urban working class, and social classes more generally, within the political economy of Greek development until the 1960s. The social structure of Greater Athens and Salonica will also be explored in their Mediterranean context, in order to discredit views about their 'distortion'

<sup>1</sup> Greek sociological bibliography as presented by Mouzelis (1978: ch. 3) is dominated by social stratification studies or focuses on the bourgeoisie, the State, education, as well as rural society and migration. Concern for the urban subordinate classes is quite recent. It began from theoretical/general papers and short references in the context of research with a different focus (Filiás 1975; Rodákis 1975; Mouzelis 1978; Kassimati 1980) and has more recently developed into a debate (Karabelias 1982; Tsoucalas 1984, 1986; Leontidou 1986), but is not yet supported by adequate empirical studies.

and 'parasitic' economy. This is a prerequisite for the exploration of transitions in urban development in subsequent chapters.

### 3.1 A note on the political economy of Greek development

The Southern European NICs, Portugal, Greece and Spain, were for a long period the poorest areas of capitalist Europe. Apart from slow or arrested industrialization, they offered services as tourist resorts and were financed to a large extent by emigrants' remittances. They were isolated from all major European organizations sensitive about the presence of competitive politics until their authoritarian regimes were brought down by varying forces during the mid-1970s (Diamandouros 1986: 550). Meanwhile, economic development had proceeded at a rapid rate.

#### 3.1.1 *The years of underdevelopment*

The issue of *tiermondisme* has assumed credibility in most poor regions of Southern Europe, like Portugal, Andalusia (Giner 1985) and Greece. At least until the mid-1970s researchers, including those of the Left, compared the Greek political economy with that of 'dependent and underdeveloped' countries. The domination of exogenous forces and foreign agents over local politics and economic life was thought to reproduce relations that diverged sharply from some norm of 'proper' capitalist development. A static economy and society has thus been implied, and the study of economic, spatial and social transformation has been obstructed. The creation of acute regional inequalities and 'overurbanization' patterns has been derived from such an analysis and became an important part of these models.

In fact, foreign participation in reconstructing the economy became the determinant force in Greek economic development during the 1950s. Greece kept its political independence 'but slowly shifted from subordination to an earlier British influence to American predominance', like the Latin American countries (Cardoso 1972: 86). In 1944-7 aid by UNRRA was flowing into the country on an 'emergency basis', in March 1947 the foundations of the Truman Doctrine were laid and in 1948 the Marshall Plan was inaugurated, marking the beginning of the aid programmes managed by the American Mission (AMAG) which lasted until 1954.

The structural defects of the social formation inherited from the interwar years persisted until the 1960s: fast urbanization, slow industrialization in a context of protectionism and abundant supply of labour, labour shortages in agriculture, polarization of the urban economy, marginality, subsistence wages, urban poverty. Greece was still an agricultural country: if the official

Table 3.1 *Employment by economic sector in Greece, 1951-81*

Economic sectors	1951 %	1961 %	1971 %	1981 %
Primary sector	48.15	53.88	40.58	27.43
1. Mining, quarrying	0.48	0.59	0.65	0.65
2-3. Manufacturing industry	15.86	13.43	17.14	18.75
4. Electricity, gas, water	0.33	0.38	0.77	0.72
5. Construction industry	2.64	4.60	7.93	9.21
6. Commerce, restaurants, hotels	9.17	8.58	11.19	12.25
7. Transport, wareh., communic.	4.86	4.23	6.54	7.52
8. Banks, insurance	1.25	1.37	2.43	3.58
9. Services	11.04	9.60	10.79	15.01
Not declared, unclassifiable	6.21	3.34	1.99	4.90
Total economically active	2,839,481	3,638,601	3,234,996	3,543,797
Total excluding Greater Athens	2,255,645	2,932,267	2,366,680	2,478,855
Resident population	7,632,801	8,388,553	8,768,641	9,740,417
Total excluding Greater Athens	6,254,215	6,535,844	6,228,400	6,713,086
Employment ratio (%):				
Athens	42.35	38.12	34.18	35.18
Rest of Greece	36.07	44.86	38.00	36.93

Source: Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1951-81, so that data be comparable.

census is taken as a basis, the labour force in agriculture rose from 48.15 % of total employment in 1951 to 53.88 % in 1961 (table 3.1). Intense economic problems after the war were reflected in the extremely low level of per capita income and in strong inflationary pressures, which destroyed all confidence in the currency.<sup>2</sup> The manufacturing sector was totally stagnant during the 1950s. Industrial production returned to prewar levels by 1950, 'since most plants were located in the Athens-Piraeus area, where relatively little damage occurred' (Ellis et al. 1964: 235-6). After this, however, it came to a standstill. The share of the manufacturing labour force in the economically active population fell from 15.86 % to 13.43 % in 1951-61 (table 3.1). Throughout the 1950s there was a very low share of investment in manufacturing.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Psilos 1968; Ellis et al. 1964: 234-50. The latter was eased by a devaluation of the drachma in 1953 to half its rate. Monetary stability was then restored. The cost-of-living index rose at an average annual rate of only 1.82 % in 1957-60, 2.02 % in 1961-5, 2.5 % in 1965-70.

<sup>3</sup> This even fell from 19 % of total investment in 1948-52 to the prewar level of 9 % in 1960-1 (Coutsoumaris 1963: 248). Industrial production was expanding by an average annual rate of 9.5 % in 1948-52, the period of reconstruction, but 8.2 % in 1953-7, and 5.3 % in 1958-61, that is, a rate lower than that of 1935-8 (6.6 %; Coutsoumaris 1963: 246).

Industrial underdevelopment in the 1950s was largely due to dependence and protectionism, which delayed competition with foreign economies. Throughout the 1950s US assistance was coupled with direct intervention in the economy. Any Greek programme receiving assistance was subject to the approval of the USA which was 'giving advice and...insisting that it was carried out' (Sweet-Escott 1954: 63). Greatest emphasis was put on agriculture; loans to industry were concentrated in a few large firms (section 3.2.1); specific developmental proposals, like the development of steel and aluminium industries, were turned down as uneconomical. Wage increases were refused, and wage differentials were flattened out 'on the principle that at times of national emergency a country can meet only the basic needs of its people' (Jecchinis 1962: 191).

Trade union leaders... were placed in an embarrassing position... of having to bring every labour problem or grievance directly not only to the Greek government departments, but also to the American Mission. (Jecchinis 1962: 211)

The construction industry, and in particular dwelling construction, attracted the largest share of investment throughout the period. The share of construction labour in total employment almost doubled from 2.64 % in 1951 to 4.60 % in 1961 (table 3.1). Greece was characterized by a building boom quite exceptional in the context of Europe. By 1970, 12.9 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants were completed in Greece compared with 9.3 in Spain, 6.6 in Italy and 4.7 in Portugal (OECD 1973). The building boom has been widely noted as a conscious choice by the dominant classes as to the Greek development pattern: emphasis on construction rather than manufacturing has been considered as indicative of a 'parasitic' economy. The few arguments against this thesis, however (Emmanuel 1981: 205-48), are rather more convincing. As in Italy, the construction sector gradually stimulated output in many other industrial sectors: cement, glass, bricks, paint, wood, furniture, iron, various machine products (Ginatempo 1979: 465), and was largely responsible for the Greek economic miracle.

### *3.1.2 Economic growth and industrialization*

Although changes were gradual, 1961 can be considered as a turning point. In July of that year an agreement for gradual entry to the EEC was signed. This coincided with the decision of AID to cease US aid to Greece. At the same time, the country was opening its frontiers to foreign capital and to Greek workers willing (or driven) to emigrate. In the world economy, Greece has been a place of foreign investment and an exporter of labour to core regions. It was only after 1960, however, that the two processes operated simultaneously, changing Greece from a place of sheltered

monopolistic capitalism to an open country, where mobility of labour and of capital were an established phenomenon.

Curiously, despite theories claiming the contrary and the opposition of the Left (EDA) to entry into the EEC (and despite the fact that the EEC agreement was frozen in 1967–74, loans were held back and the military regime had to walk out of the Council of Europe), Greece did develop. In the 1960s the net per capita national income rose from about \$180 in 1955 to \$420 in 1964.<sup>4</sup> Greece crossed the threshold to development, conventionally put at the time at \$1,000 GNP per capita, in 1970. In that year this rose to \$1,060 (at current prices and exchange rates; OECD 1973). In fact, Greece gradually rose from peripheral to semiperipheral status in the world economy, and entered the domain of the NICs. The crisis of the economy during the final years of military rule, reflected in a spectacular fall of the GDP by 1.9% in 1973–4, was partly exogenous and not permanent (Karageorgas 1974, 1977). Growth, however, was more moderate after the mid-1970s, though it reached a rate of 5.9% in 1977–8 (Ministry of Coordination 1976: 12). Inflationary pressures and a relative slowing down of growth were revealed by 1980. Meanwhile, however, the performance of the economy during the years of the oil-induced capitalist crisis was comparatively good, so that Greece improved its relative position among European countries, along with other Southern European NICs (Diamandouros 1986).

Income and consumption of goods and services grew to levels approaching those in advanced societies during the 1970s. Patterns of consumption behaviour tended to converge among classes and regions in 1964–74, a fact attributed to consumption orientation after a long period of wars and deprivation (Karapostolis 1983). Savings were also kept at high levels.<sup>5</sup> Current research tends to underestimate such developments, considering this growth as 'distorted' or 'parasitic' because it lacked 'autonomy' or 'equality' (Negreponi 1979). Capitalism, however, always breeds inequality and imbalance. If 'parasitic' sectors and invisible assets from shipping, remittances and tourism played a prominent role in the Greek development process (Psilos 1968: 30, 69; Leontidou 1988), the role of productive sectors, and especially manufacturing industry, was no less important. Either because of or despite its place in the world economy, Greece developed rapidly in the 1960s. An 'economic miracle' was achieved.

Imperialism is not self-destructive: it is self-reproducing. It is, of course, true that...certain marginal movements of capital, concentrated for various reasons in

<sup>4</sup> The rate of growth of the GDP averaged 7.2% at constant prices during 1948–64 and 7.3% during 1965–73 (Psilos 1968; Ministry of Coordination 1976: 228).

<sup>5</sup> The ratio of domestic savings to the GDP increased from 13.5% in 1953 to 20.1% in 1965, remaining at 19.5% in 1976 (Psilos 1968: 11; OECD 1978).

some small country, such as Greece...may enable such a country to cross the threshold to development. Something like this happens inside a nation when a single proletarian succeeds, as an individual, in rising out of his class. (Emmanuel 1974: 77-8)

In the 1960s the backwardness of industrial structure was also overcome, and the secondary sector rose to dominance. The drive for international competitiveness after 1961 played a role in this. Industry actually led the transition to semiperipheral status, and industrial restructuring was crucial in transformations of the Greek economy as a whole (chapter 5). The construction sector continued to absorb a large though declining share of investment, but the share of construction in the formation of the GNP fell from 10.6% to 8% in 1950-70 (Ministry of Coordination 1976). For the first time in 1964 secondary production surpassed the primary sector in the formation of the GNP.<sup>6</sup> The share of manufacturing in the total exports rose from 10.9% in 1961 to 54.1% in 1977 (OECD 1972, 1979). The manufacturing labour force increased (table 3.1). The rise of productivity, helped by imported machinery, was also rapid in Greek industry, maintaining a rate higher by 29% than that of the economy as a whole (Coutsoumaris 1963: 273). Although the military government shifted emphasis from industrial development to tourism and construction in 1967-70 (Leontidou 1988; Emmanuel 1981), fast growth rates were still maintained after 1966, based on the sizeable investments of previous years (Coutsoumaris 1976: 21-2, 118). The crisis of investment during the following years changed this state of affairs, along with other forces which will be taken up in chapter 5. In any case, Greece, as well as the rest of the Southern European NICs, responded to the oil-induced crisis of the 1970s with remarkable success (Diamandouros 1986).

### 3.1.3 *A note on politics and social inequality*

The Greek 'economic miracle' was achieved through intense exploitation of the working class. Socio-political structuration has been unstable throughout Southern Europe. During the 1930s and 1940s the political history of the region culminated in the rise of fascism, dictatorship, the Spanish and the Greek civil wars. Postwar Portugal, Spain and Greece underwent their most rapid industrial and urban development under dictatorial rule. Greek political history was especially intense. During German occupation a strong popular clandestine resistance movement grew up under the leadership of

<sup>6</sup> The average annual rate of growth of fixed capital formation in industry was 18.8% during 1958-73, and industrial output (value added) grew by 10.3% annually during the same period, which was high compared to other capitalist countries.



the National Liberation Front (EAM) which, along with its military arm, ELAS, functioned as the virtual government for many parts of Greece.<sup>7</sup> This popular movement was defeated by the dominant classes and US imperialism during the civil war and was disbanded with imprisonments, assassinations and exiles. Greek political culture since then has consisted of the subculture of the victors and that of the vanquished, and the State has been identified with particularism and nepotism (Diamandouros 1983: 53).

Postwar Greek governments were based on a conservative-repressive and a populist-clientelist mechanism (Comninos 1984; Meynaud 1965); their victories at the polls can thus not be taken to imply social peace (Tsoucalas 1969; Mouzelis 1978). The conservative Right, for the longest period under K. Karamanlis (ERE), ruled the country for 11 years continuously after the war (1952–63), and then again after the military dictatorship (1974–81). Along with the Center Union under G. Papandreou, which ruled in 1963–5, these parties belonged to 'the "antecedent" stage of development' (Legg 1969: 125; Tsoucalas 1969: 169–70). As the KKE became outlawed in 1950 (until 1974), it was the United Democratic Left (EDA) which represented the broader forces of the Left in Greece and rose to form a strong party, despite the harassment of its members and the fear generated by anti-communist hysteria. This was the only party organized along ideological principles.

Bourgeois dominance was shaky at the polls in the 1950s. The female vote was introduced in 1952 but only exercised much later (Nicolacopoulos 1985: 195). In 1956 a coalition of parties of the Centre and EDA commanded 48 % of the total vote. Its spectacular election gains in 1958 made EDA the main opposition in Parliament. By the early 1960s many of the voters of the Right were alienated either by its policy or by the means used by it to stay in power. The Centre Union under G. Papandreou came to power with a 42.04 % majority in 1963, and again in 1964, when this rose to 52.72 %. For many people this was a substitute for a vote for the Left, in view of anti-communist violence. The Centre Union was more liberal than ERE but remained anti-communist, never legalized the KKE and delayed the enactment of its programme for reforms. Even so, the block of dominant groups did not tolerate any opening, which would necessarily endanger monarchy. G. Papandreou was forced by the palace to resign and a split of

<sup>7</sup> They held elections and congresses, created 'popular justice' organizations, relied on local self-government and operated a school system in several Greek mountain areas (Eudes 1972). The KKE was hegemonic in this movement, which inspired the village and city populations to question traditional authority. In the Athens and Piraeus refugee suburbs, EAM had installed its branches which, along with EEAM, the clandestine labour organization of the KKE, organized massive mobilizations in the capital and attracted German retaliation (Eudes 1972).

his party was fomented to disperse the Centre Union. The period of crisis of bourgeois politics that followed culminated in the breakdown of parliamentary institutions by a military *coup d'état* in April 1967, which lasted until 1974.

The conservatives under Karamanlis then returned to the country with a more modern face and won two consecutive elections (1974 and 1977). The KKE was legalized, but was now split into two factions and had lost a large part of its social basis. Not only did it not win back the votes lost in 1963, but it commanded a mere 12 % of the vote in 1977. To a large extent this should be attributed to the rise of a new party, the PASOK, under A. Papandreou, which finally won the 1981 elections by a 48.07 % majority presenting a socialist discourse. In a country where the conservatives had dominated the political arena, the demand for change was widespread and skilfully exploited by PASOK. Its performance in office gradually exposed its populist logic (Lyrintzis 1987).

Despite this intense political context, and despite the absence of a welfare State (at least until 1975) and the inverse effects of a very unjust system of taxation (Karageorgas 1973), poverty was reduced in postwar Greece. In the 1950s stagnant wage levels, rural poverty and unemployment rendered Greece the country with the most acute income inequalities in Europe, excluding Spain and Portugal.<sup>8</sup> Improvement during the 1960s was evident in income growth and the egalitarian slope of the income pyramid in relation to other underdeveloped countries.<sup>9</sup> This period, however, marked the end of income redistribution. The urban working class saw its life standards deteriorate in the 1950s and then improve rapidly up to the late 1960s. Collective bargaining was introduced in 1952, but the effect was insignificant (Jecchinis 1962: 249, 264). Wages started to rise after 1961: the State controlled them so as to attract foreign capital, but was also apprehensive of social unrest and labour shortages. Workers were therefore allowed to reap some of the increases in productivity.<sup>10</sup> Wage levels hit a low

<sup>8</sup> In the 1950s, 40 % of the population received only 9.5 % of the national income, while 17 % received 58 %, and between these extremes 43 % received 32.5 % (Karageorgas 1974). This was certainly an improvement over the interwar period, when 93.45 % of the Greek families were below the poverty line, as already shown (chapter 2).

<sup>9</sup> In the 1960s, 36 % of the population received 16 % of the national income (after tax), and the highest-paid 25 % received 48 % by 1966 (Pagalos 1974: 66–7). The improvement can be attributed to economic development and the policy of the Centre Union. In underdeveloped countries, it is common for the bottom 60 % of the population to receive 20 % of the national income and the top 10 % to receive 50 % (Lloyd 1982: 112–13).

<sup>10</sup> Real wages remained at an index level of 34–45 in 1950 (1938 = 100), and rose to only 95–109 by 1960 (Jecchinis 1962). US intervention was largely responsible for freezing wages in the 1940s (cf. section 3.1.1). Wages were at an index level of 118 by 1966 (1959 = 100; Pagalos 1974: 66–7). Real wages increased by 7.41 % annually in 1963–73, lagging behind productivity by 1.48 % (Negreponi 1979: 140). Their share fell during the dictatorship, especially after 1969.

point in 1973, attributed to the abolition of collective bargaining and the suppression of any form of trade union activity, as well as inflation and the misplaced efforts of the military government to control it (Karageorgas 1974: 29-30). During 1972-5 the workers did not benefit from national income growth, and wages lagged behind productivity by 3 % annually. Wage rises immediately after the fall of the junta counterbalanced earlier losses (Fakiolas 1978: 278-9); in the 1970s, however, economic development would be increasingly to the advantage of the middle class. The pyramid of social inequality did not improve. Greece was entering a new period of inequality due to inflation and renewed economic problems.

### 3.1.4 *The legacy of emigration from the 'European South'*

A large part of the developments described above can be attributed to emigration to the North, which became a massive phenomenon after the wars. With the internationalization of the European labour market and labour shortages in the North, capital recruited labour first from Italy, followed by Spain and later Greece and Portugal, then from Yugoslavia and Turkey, and finally from North Africa and the Third World (Sasson-Koob 1980). On aggregate in the early 1980s about 16 million people were working in other countries on a short-term basis, with low wages and poor working conditions, without recourse to unionization (Lewis and Williams 1984a). Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece thus became the 'proletarian nations' of Europe.

The importance of the Greek diaspora and emigration before 1922 has been already discussed. In 1900-21 Greece was losing a yearly average of 5.6 emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants, which fell to 1.7 in 1946-74; but the net population loss rose to 440,000 in 1961-71, and there were 2.1 emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants yearly in 1960-4 and 3.1 in 1965-9 (Siampos 1973; Tsaoussis 1975: 68-72). Net migration in 1956-73 has been estimated at 622,000 or 7.4 % of the 1965 population (Emke 1986: 469). These numbers are actually underestimates (Kavouriaris 1974: 27-9) and do not include about 100,000 political refugees who left Greece after the civil war for Eastern Europe. In the postwar period the recruitment of emigrants was selective and organized by both sending and receiving countries.<sup>11</sup> Each migrant group headed for a different destination: Iberian migrants to France, Greeks to the F.R. of Germany (King 1984: 149). The rhythm of

<sup>11</sup> Greek authorities signed official agreements with France in 1955, Belgium in 1959, and Germany, the great gainer from Greek emigration, in 1960 (Nikolinakos ed. 1974). Emigration rates peaked in 1963-5 and 1969-70 for Greece, 1964 and 1969-73 for Spain, 1969-71 for Portugal (King 1984: 149).

emigration and repatriation cannot be studied for the period after 1978, because of a peculiar ministerial decision (September 1977) according to which statistical data are no longer compiled. However, according to recent estimates, a total of 170,000 Greeks work in Western Europe today, of whom 69% are in the F.R. of Germany, despite the trend towards repatriation since the mid-1970s (Hadjipanayotou 1985: 53).

'Assimilationist' theories have recently been criticized (Castles and Kosack 1973), and emigration has usually been considered a mixed blessing for the countries of origin (Kavouriaris 1974; Filias 1974). Emigrants and seamen would provide foreign currency to finance the chronic trade deficit and the lagging public debt; but their remittances, increasingly crucial for the subsistence of their families, would cease to flow during periods of economic crisis.<sup>12</sup> It has been maintained that emigration exported unemployment and marginality and eased social tensions. The selectivity of the migration process, however, meant that the younger, healthier, more literate and more industrially skilled left the rural and provincial areas. Emigration deprived the Mediterranean of the flower of its productive labour, which would gradually exhaust its ability to work in foreign lands, in the least desirable occupations. Greek emigration has been related to a brain drain. Migrants have been absorbed in manufacturing industry as unskilled and semi-skilled workers (Castles and Kosack 1973), and the building and construction industries have been particularly dependent on migrant labour (Borde and Barrère 1978). Subcontracting systems made emigrants especially vulnerable to evasion of registration and control. They were thus exploited and also segregated in the cities of Northern Europe (White 1984: 115-31).

High emigration waves originated in Greek regions where monoculture predominated (Emke 1986: 472), but the Greek emigrants were not clearly rural populations. Admittedly, the occupational composition of the emigration wave at place of origin, as shown on table 3.2, includes step-migrants moving to towns under the category of 'workers in industry and transport'. In the early 1960s, 66.6% of emigrants belonged to this working class. Their share then dropped as that of the peasants increased, but rose again in the late 1970s. Emigration directly from Athens was high during the late 1950s (24.1% of the total), but then fell to under 17%, as the urban economy gradually absorbed step-emigrants into domestic industry.

Greek emigration was initially related to unemployment. By the mid-1960s, however, it had developed into an autonomous process which no longer obeyed its initial laws: by 1972 labour shortages were felt in both

<sup>12</sup> Remittances amounted to \$12.6 billion in 1955-82; they were 4-5% of the Greek national income, and one-third of invisible receipts (Emke 1986: 483).

Table 3.2 *Occupations of permanent emigrants from postwar Greece and Greater Athens at place of origin, 1955-7*

	Total economically active <sup>a</sup>	Workers in industry, transport	Professional, managerial	Agriculture	Clerical, sales, service
Emigrants from Greece, absolute nos. and % of economically active					
1955-9	71,121	18,383	3,520	21,766	4,532
	100.0	25.9	4.9	30.6	6.4
1960-4	267,256	178,004	5,593	54,182	16,013
	100.0	66.6	2.1	20.3	6.0
1965-9	198,831	77,087	4,567	99,087	14,858
	100.0	38.8	2.3	49.8	7.5
1970-4	124,071	43,181	4,005	61,213	9,868
	100.0	34.8	3.2	49.3	8.0
1975-7	28,263	11,961	2,082	8,967	2,443
	100.0	42.3	7.4	31.7	8.7
Total, 1955-7	689,542	328,616	19,767	245,215	47,714
	100.0	47.7	2.9	35.6	6.9
Emigrants from Greater Athens, absolute nos.					
1974	5,660	1,112	452	47	507
1975	5,076	1,095	393	31	427
1976	5,061	1,197	423	32	434
1977	3,381	1,036	226	37	292
Total, 1974-7	19,178	4,440	1,494	147	1,660
%	100.0	52.28	17.75	1.75	19.72

<sup>a</sup> Unclassifiable occupations are included in the total.

Source: Adapted from NSSG Statistical Yearbooks, 1957-78. Relevant data will no longer be available after 1977, and no information exists for Athens before 1974.

agriculture and industry.<sup>13</sup> During the dictatorship, the FGI strongly voiced a demand for official importation of cheap labour from Africa (Yannopoulos 1972: 121). By 1973 the number of such foreign workers with very low wages and no security, most of them without work permits, was estimated at 30-50,000. They were recruited by textile industries in Athens, as servants

<sup>13</sup> Labour shortages were already evident in agriculture in 1955. Pepelasis and Yotopoulos (1962) judged that they had affected farming patterns, holding back the expansion of new labour-intensive crops (cotton, citrus fruit). Industry was affected from the 1960s, but shortages peaked in the 1970s (chapter 5), when a deficit of 50,000 workers in export sectors and public works was evident (Nikolinakos 1974). The number of foreigners with work permits increased especially in 1974-5 and 1980-1 (Hadjipanayotou 1985: 54).

and dock workers in the Piraeus, and a small colony in Chaidari had been formed by 1972 (Nikolinakos 1974: 81).

Massive emigration from Southern Europe slowed down by 1973-4, after the oil-induced recession and the 'recruitment stop' in receiving countries. Later on, a repatriation wave to Southern Europe began. In the case of Greece this lasted from 1973-4 until the 1980s. Net repatriation inflow was estimated at 335,000 people in 1971-81, or 3.4% of the 1981 population (Emke 1986: 470). At the same time, since the early 1970s Greece had become a country of immigration, like other Southern European countries, especially Italy (King 1984: 157). The contradictory place of the Mediterranean as a proletarian region of emigration with respect to the North, but also as a receiving region of immigration with respect to Africa, has not yet been investigated adequately (King 1984).

### 3.2 The rise of the productive primate city: Mediterranean comparisons

Northern Europe has been only one of the destinations of the rural migrants. The other pole of attraction, the large Mediterranean metropolitan regions, constitute the main focus of this book. Stereotypical treatment of postwar Greek urbanization in terms of Third World models and of Athens as an 'overurbanized' city of conspicuous consumption and appropriation of surplus from rural and provincial Greece, and as the gathering spot for 'masses' – internal migrants who swell the informal sector and remain unintegrated in the urban economy – will be dismissed at this point (cf. also Leontidou 1981a, c; 1982). The socio-political function of such views, which have permeated both research and public opinion, will be taken up in chapter 7. They will be countered here first in the context of an investigation of the growth of the urban population and employment structure in comparison with other Mediterranean cities, and a study of the structure of the urban labour force.

#### 3.2.1 *The regional problem*

Urban growth in Southern Europe has generally been associated with surplus population in the countryside rather than industrialization, and has created an urban proletariat. The principal forces for migration have been economic. As industrial and tourist development have been spatially selective activities, they affected only certain sectors and regions, especially the metropolitan and coastal ones (Hudson and Lewis 1984; Leontidou 1988).

The acute regional problem took on a different form in each



Figure 3.1 Greece: regions and major towns. Administrative boundaries of Greek Nomos (prefectures), and names of the nine large regions (Departments) and main cities with a population of over 30,000 inhabitants by 1981 (see also table 5.3).

Mediterranean country. In Italy, regional disparities between the South and the North were already stressed by Gramsci (1971 edn). In Spain, western and central regions were depopulated (King 1984: 165). In Portugal, long-standing disparities between North and South have in recent years been overlain by unequal development between the backward interior and the developed coastal areas (Lewis 1986: 636). In Greece a polarization between the capital and the rest of the country was reproduced. An interesting comparison has been suggested between Portugal and Greece on the one hand, where the major metropolis, port, industrial centre and capital is the main magnet and northern mountainous regions are depopulated; and Spain and Italy on the other, where migrants are directed to northern industrial

regions and to the centrally located capitals of Madrid and Rome, while all rural areas contribute to migration (King 1984: 169–70).

The postwar Greek rural exodus went through three distinct phases. During and immediately after the war the reasons for the increase of the Greek urban population were political rather than economic. Towns were places of refuge, and during the civil war (1946–9) the authorities forcibly evacuated villages to isolate the insurgent forces. By 1947 about 200,000 peasants from regions controlled by the Democratic Army had been uprooted and transported to “refugee camps” in cities (Eudes 1972: 294), while another 100,000 people left Greece as political refugees. The urban population increased slowly, by 1.6% annually, in 1940–51, but the rural population decreased by an average annual rate of 0.3% (table 3.4). Intermediate towns, with a population of 20–30,000, grew at this time, and their number doubled from 7 to 14 in 1940–51. The second fastest-growing category were the towns with 50–100,000 inhabitants. By contrast, Athens and Salonica grew by only 1.9% and 0.6% respectively in 1940–51 (table 3.4).

Metropolitan growth picked up when economic factors started to create urbanization in the 1950s. These factors were also caused by policy to a considerable extent. Economic centralization was largely due to the allocation of AMAG loans in 1948–54: 50% was allocated to 236 enterprises especially in the Athens–Piraeus area (Ellis et al. 1964: 273). Rural depopulation speeded up because of the “pull” of job opportunities in Greater Athens, as well as the ‘push’ from rural areas. The massive migratory wave, which started in the 1950s but reached a peak in the 1960s, has usually been attributed to the search for work, rural poverty and exploitation of peasants by intermediaries, excessive farm fragmentation and surplus labour in agriculture (Vergopoulos 1975). Interwar land reform resulted in extreme fragmentation of farm size. Subsistence agriculture and exploitation of small farmers by local merchants induced the former to let their farms at ridiculous prices and leave their land. This contributed to the deterioration of the dispersed agricultural settlements. Athens grew rapidly with marginal populations in search of job opportunities. During the late 1950s females exceeded males in the domestic migration stream to Athens and worked as servants (Carter 1968: 103–5). Men tended to emigrate to Northern Europe.

It is interesting to note in this context the spatial distribution of the Greek working class in Europe by 1969. The Greek labour force in manufacturing was almost equally divided among three locations: Greater Athens, the rest of Greece, and Germany (table 3.3). The number of workers outside the national frontiers is indicative of the losses to the Greek labour market, as



Table 3.3 *Greek manufacturing workers and emigrants, 1969: places of work*

	Male		Female		Total manuf. workers	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Greater Athens</i>						
Salary and wage earners	125,667	35.25	56,329	32.73	181,996	34.43
Other manufacturing labour	48,550		8,788			
<i>Rest of Greece</i>						
Salary and wage earners	136,605	38.32	47,436	27.57	184,041	34.82
Other manufacturing labour	90,143		12,980			
<i>Germany</i>						
Salary and wage earners, of whom in:	100,261		74,087			
Manufacturing	94,245	26.43	68,308	39.70	162,553	30.75
Construction	6,016		—			
Services	—		5,779			
Total salary and wage earners in manufacturing	356,517	100.00	172,073	100.00	528,590	100.00

*Sources:* Adapted from NSSG census of manufacturing establishments 1969; Castles and Kosack 1973: 72.

well as the importance of Athens for retaining a large section of these populations within Greek territory. It is also indicative of the role of emigration as an outlet for the reduction of marginality and the export of social tensions.

Despite the fact that the Greek 'rural exodus' was quite moderate during the first phase in the 1950s (table 3.4), a survey in 1960 found that 56% of the Greater Athens population were migrants who had arrived during the postwar period (NSSG 1964). The growth of smaller towns created a 'fertile crescent' between Athens and Salonica (Kayser 1964: 45), while an absolute decrease of population was only observed in the Peloponnese and the islands. The Greek regions were then stagnant, not declining. The rural population decreased but the urban one grew by 1.7% annually in 1951-61 (table 3.4), especially in cities of 30-50,000 inhabitants, which increased in number from 6 to 8. Spectacular growth, however, has been located in Greater Athens and Salonica ever since. They evidenced an average annual

Table 3.4 *Urbanization and the growth of Athens and Salonica, 1920–81*

	Greater Athens <sup>a</sup>	Salonica <sup>a</sup>	Rest of urban	Rural	Total Greek <sup>b</sup>
1920: Population	453,042	174,390	489,879	3,899,578	5,016,889
% of Greek	9.03	3.48	9.76	77.73	100.00
1928: Population	802,000	244,680	896,779	4,261,225	6,204,684
% of Greek	12.93	3.94	14.45	68.68	100.00
1940: Population	1,124,109	278,145	953,197	4,989,409	7,344,860
% of Greek	15.30	3.79	12.98	67.93	100.00
1951: Population	1,378,586	297,164	1,136,468	4,820,583	7,632,801
% of Greek	18.06	3.89	14.89	63.16	100.00
1961: Population	1,852,709	380,648	1,351,575	4,803,621	8,388,553
% of Greek	22.09	4.54	16.11	57.26	100.00
1971: Population	2,540,241	557,360	1,528,150	4,142,890	8,768,641
% of Greek	28.97	6.36	17.43	47.25	100.00
1981: Population	3,027,284	706,180	1,875,677	4,131,276	9,740,417
% of Greek	31.08	7.25	19.26	42.41	100.00
<i>Growth rates</i>					
1920–8	7.40	4.32	7.85	1.11	1.45
1928–40	2.85	1.07	0.51	1.32	1.42
1940–51	1.87	0.60	1.61	–0.31	0.35
1951–61	3.00	2.51	1.75	–0.04	0.95
1961–71	3.21	3.89	1.24	–1.47	0.44
1971–81	1.77	2.39	2.07	–0.03	1.06
Interwar (1920–40)	4.65	2.36	3.38	0.61	1.43
Postwar (1951–81)	2.66	2.93	1.68	–0.51	0.82

<sup>a</sup> Greater Athens and Salonica within 1989 administrative boundaries.

<sup>b</sup> Greek population 1920 in the 1928 boundaries of Greece (Dodecanese not included).

*Source:* Adapted from various studies and SGG and NSSG censuses.

rate of growth of 3 % and 2.5 % respectively in 1951–61, which rose to 3.2 and 3.9 respectively in 1961–71. The latter period also evidenced one of the fastest rural depopulation rates in twentieth-century Greece, at an average rate of –1.5 % annually (table 3.4). After 1961, among Greek areas except Athens, only Salonica grew at a faster rate than before, while all other areas except Macedonia experienced an absolute decrease, often a spectacular loss, of population. The Greek provinces were increasingly stagnating. In 1961–71 the population of Greece outside Athens decreased by 307,444 people and the economically active population declined by 565,587 people (table 3.1). Apparent migration (net of natural increase) was obviously

Table 3.5 *Urbanization rates in Greater Athens, 1940-81, by five-year periods*

	Population (absolute nos.)	Percentage of total Greek population	Average annual rates of growth (%)
1940	1,124,109	15.30	1.87
1951	1,378,586	18.05	4.13
1955	1,621,000	20.42	2.25
1961	1,852,709	22.18	3.58
1965	2,133,000	24.89	2.95
1971	2,540,241	29.00	3.00
1975	2,860,000	31.79	0.95
1981	3,027,284	31.08	

*Sources:* Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1940-81, and estimates by various planning reports (EMOCA 1974; OAOM and assoc. 1981; and unpublished sources), as well as NSSG 1980.

more sizeable, and these numbers would be larger if Salonica and the towns were excluded. A relatively dynamic urban S-shaped corridor between Athens and Salonica contrasted with depopulation trends and the loss of productive activity in the rest of the country. During the early 1960s the process of rural exodus had assumed alarming dimensions. This trend was reversed during a third phase of diffuse urbanization starting in the 1970s, as will be detailed in chapter 5.

### 3.2.2 *Urban primacy*

The rates of growth of Greater Athens compared with those of Salonica are presented in table 3.4. After the peak of the 1920s they slowed down considerably in the 1930s, and especially in the 1940s, and were lower than rates in some other Greek cities: during 1940-51 the population of Athens increased by 22.6%, while that of other cities increased by 25-40% (Tsaoussis 1971: 109; Filias 1974: 274), as populations sought refuge in provincial towns during the civil war. It was when economic rather than political forces began to induce migration that the rates speeded up, first in Athens (1950s), then in Salonica (1960s). The Greater Athens population grew by 3% annually in 1951-61, 33.5% in 1966-71.

The calculation of urban growth by five-year periods, though not entirely reliable, is more indicative of stages of urbanization (table 3.5). The early 1950s was the period of the fastest growth. At this time the safety valve of emigration had not yet opened up, and rural migrants flooded the city. Rates

were almost equally rapid during the early 1960s, and remained very high until the mid-1970s despite the dictatorial government's announcements that it would curb them (chapter 7). Then, however, a new trend of diffuse urbanization began (chapter 5). Increasingly, the population of provincial towns stabilized in the 1970s (table 3.4) and the Greater Athens population had ceased to grow by the late 1970s (table 3.5).

Postwar Athens was never a typical 'exploding' city in terms of either population size or rates of growth, especially compared to Latin American capitals which grew by at least 4% annually during the postwar period (Amato 1970). It was simply a dynamic Mediterranean urban centre. It was also a dominant city in the primate distribution of the Greek urban network (Ward 1963: 82-3; Nicolacopoulos and Tsouyopoulos 1976), with an exceptionally high share in the national population, which rose from 15.3% in 1940 to 29% in 1971, and 31% in 1981 (table 3.4). This fact by itself can by no means support an 'overurbanization' thesis (as posited by Burgel 1981 and several planners). It amounts to claiming that small countries should not support any metropolitan areas. It is rather the issue of primacy which is important in this context, and should be treated in comparison with other Mediterranean countries.

Urban primacy as measured by the ratio of the second city compared to the first one by Jones (1966: 82) was highest in France and the UK in 1962 (29% and 13% respectively). As shown in table 3.6, among Mediterranean countries only Greece approached these levels at the time. Portugal came second, with a rank-size distribution. In contrast, Istanbul was twice as large as Ankara, Milan larger than Rome, Barcelona larger than Madrid. In Yugoslavia the second city was almost as large as the capital city. In almost all the countries examined except Italy, the third largest cities have been quite small (table 3.6). However, it is wrong to speak of an 'accentuation of urban primacy' in Greece (as in Gaspar 1984: 211). Distances between the major two cities increased everywhere (the primacy ratio decreased) in 1961-81, except in the case of Greece, where primacy slightly declined, and the cases of Turkey and Yugoslavia, where the ratio oscillated.

Comparisons of the employment structure of the cities of postwar Mediterranean Europe (table 3.7) provide some comparative counter-evidence against views about 'parasitism' of the capital of Greece. In general, about 23-33% of the economically active population of capital cities was employed in industry in 1971, except in the cases of Rome and Ankara, the least 'industrialized' capital cities (and most 'parasitic', according to this widespread terminology). Their employment structure diverges sharply from that of the second cities of the respective countries -

Table 3.6 *Urban population and primacy<sup>a</sup> in Greece, contrasted with the rest of Mediterranean Europe, 1961-81*

All cities over 1 million inhabitants as well as the three largest cities of each country are included below. Population in thousands.

City	1960/1	1970/1	1978/81
Athens	1,852.7	2,540.2	3,027.3
Salonica	380.6	557.4	706.2
Patra	126.0	143.0	154.6
Greece, primacy (%)	20.5	21.9	23.3
Rome	2,363.5	3,033.5	3,228.0
Milan	2,531.8	3,200.6	3,344.0
Naples	1,905.0	2,140.0	2,284.9
Turin	1,351.4	1,775.6	1,854.7
Italy, second city (%)	107.1	105.5	103.6
Lisbon	1,373.9	1,674.5	2,300.0
Oporto	835.7	928.3	1,200.0
Coimbra	106.4	110.2	140.0
Portugal, second city (%)	60.8	55.4	52.2
Madrid	2,393.7	3,564.4	3,188.0 <sup>b</sup>
Barcelona	2,451.6	3,401.5	1,755.0 <sup>b</sup>
Valencia	769.7	1,056.7	752.0 <sup>b</sup>
Spain, second city (%)	102.4	95.4	55.1 <sup>b</sup>
Ankara	713.1	1,400.4	2,242.9
Istanbul	1,581.7	2,772.9	4,656.5
Izmir	568.1	904.1	1,276.4
Turkey, second city (%)	221.8	198.0	207.6
Belgrade	585.2	764.1	
Zagreb	431.0	566.2	
Skopje	197.3	313.0	
Yugoslavia, second city (%)	73.6	74.1	

<sup>a</sup> Primacy measured as a percentage of second city population in relation to the capital city (as in Jones 1977: 82).

<sup>b</sup> City boundaries rather than metropolitan area, 1981/2, adapted from OECD 1982 volume on *Spain*; no information on metropolitan areas in OECD 1983.

Sources: Adapted from various tabulations of the OECD (1983) and the NSSG.

Milan and Istanbul – which also happen to be larger in size than the capital cities. This is an especially interesting conclusion, since it separates urban economic structure from the level of economic development in Mediterranean Europe. In other words, the capitals of the most underdeveloped and

Table 3.7 *Employment structure in large Mediterranean cities, 1970/1*

All cities over 1 million inhabitants as well as the three largest cities of each country are included in the following table.

Columns 1-5 indicate percentage composition of the economically active population<sup>a</sup> by sector: 1, primary sector; 2, construction; 3, manufacturing industry; 4, administration, public and social services; 5, rest of economic activities.

City	Economically active population (000s)	Percentage composition of the economically active population <sup>a</sup>				
		1	2	3	4	5
Athens	868.3	0.88	11.23	32.98	15.15	39.76
Salonica	185.8	2.71	10.78	34.31	11.84	40.36
Patra	72.0	4.17	29.17		30.56	36.11
Rome	1,011.8	2.14	9.71	18.47	19.67	50.01
Milan	1,296.3	0.71	5.89	51.22	3.83	38.35
Naples	552.8	7.18	10.78	30.30	8.98	42.76
Turin	692.5	1.67	6.10	56.19	4.04	33.50
Lisbon	693.6	3.39	8.93	25.48	27.17	35.03
Oporto	363.1	5.92	9.10	40.36	18.58	26.04
Coimbra	39.6	11.87	9.00	25.31	28.29	25.54
Madrid	1,240.1	0.85	11.29	29.64	58.22	
Barcelona	1,286.4	1.54	10.66	48.92	38.88	
Valencia	366.6	7.25	10.58	36.03	46.14	
Ankara	299.5	3.94	6.94	13.03	45.08	31.01
Istanbul	950.0	4.82	7.12	31.23	23.22	33.61
Izmir	188.7	4.65	8.54	27.97	24.14	34.69
Belgrade	350.0	0.72	46.73		21.76	30.79
Zagreb	266.8	0.99	55.96		17.80	25.25
Skopje	197.3	2.74	55.14		19.68	22.44

<sup>a</sup> Only those who declared sector of employment are included here.

Sources: Adapted from various tabulations of the OECD (1983) and NSSG; since errors were found (and corrected) for the case of Greece, this table should be considered provisional for the rest of the countries.

most developed Southern countries respectively are the least 'productive' cities. Then Lisbon, Madrid and Belgrade are also 'administrative' capitals, although in Portugal 80% of industrial employment and 85% of industrial output were concentrated in the littoral at the beginning of the 1970s (Lewis and Williams 1987: 347). Athens figures as the most industrialized capital, with Salonica a very short distance behind in this respect.

The productive role of Greater Athens can also be supported by a series

of indicators of economic performance. In 1962, while the average share of industry in the national GDP was 18.3 %, regional estimates showed that it rose to 26.1 % in Greater Athens and did not exceed 15 % in any other area. In 1969, 48 % of gross industrial production and 54 % of industrial value added was realized in Greater Athens (CPER 1978). It is ironic that the concentration of various dominant productive sectors in the capital of Greece is usually quoted as evidence for the distortion of the urban (rather than the national) economy, and coincides with the conclusion that Athens is a 'parasitic' city (as in Burgel 1981).

### 3.3 Social class structuration in Greater Athens and Salonica

It would be futile to search for the Greek working class in the GSEE, which in fact became a mere appendage to the Greek oppressive State after the cancellation of the only genuine elections in 1946. Proletarianization is also not apparent in the electoral behaviour of popular settlements, or the social composition of strike activity. It is evident in scattered information on spontaneous popular mobilizations, which is lost, unrecorded by historians. The investigation which follows begins with a 'quantitative' approach to the social structure of postwar urban Greece – a 'nominalist' sociology – based on statistical indicators as a necessary prerequisite for the reconstitution of the hidden proletariat. This definitional approach is also crucial for the geographical analysis undertaken in the next chapter. It will then be qualified, however, by a preliminary exploration of the labour movement and popular mobilizations, which will be expanded upon in subsequent chapters.

#### 3.3.1 *Operational definitions and questions of methodology*

Greece is much affected by the usual difficulties of class analysis (chapter 1): in available classification matrices the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, the self-employed and the 'marginal' populations are confused. Postwar social transformation is obscured by the persistent polarization of the urban economy evidenced in widespread self-employment and the reproduction of petty enterprises of the informal sector (Leontidou 1977). Additional difficulties are due to current speculative theory on the informal sector, and the virtual neglect of the urban proletariat in social research. The following exposition will be based on a sectoral analysis informed by the distinction between productive and service (rather than unproductive) labour (table 1.1). Mediterranean particularities with respect to the informal sector will also be examined here, as statistical data permits.

The term 'middle class' will be used only where no distinction between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie is required or intended. The operational definition of the working class or productive labour includes salary and wage earners in manufacturing, construction and transport industries (chapter 1). Despite the better wages and security that supervisory and skilled workers in these sectors often enjoy, they will be treated as a part of the working class, albeit a distinctive part, an 'aristocracy of labour', growing with economic development, and thus contributing to the change in the nature of the proletariat *as a class*. In this respect, we are not following Poulantzas' theory, or structural marxism in general, which in fact becomes problematic when used for the study of particular social formations (Thompson 1978b). Finally, we refer to the industrial and casual proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the service labourers as introduced in chapter 1 (table 1.1).

The operational definition of the informal sector poses an additional problem. Given existing data matrices, informalization through the employment of casual and free labourers in place of wage labour cannot be easily observed. Direct surveys are required in this respect. The main indicator used in Greece (as well as Italy and Portugal) relates to the size of enterprises and the 'independence' of the labour force from regular work procedures. Informalization is evident in industrial decomposition and the growth of self-employment.

Four theoretical debates can be discerned in Greek social research, which complicate the following exploration: on marginalization and polarization; on small and medium-sized enterprises and depolarization; on the 'para-economy' or 'black economy'; and on social polyvalence or multiple employment as an individual and family strategy (Tsoucalas 1986). The two latter debates are usually interlocked, may have been overemphasized and are outside the scope of this book. Full treatment of the other two debates would require a lengthy discussion (Leontidou 1986) rather than the short presentation attempted here.

Difficulties of class analysis are thus amplified in the case of Greece, and a further problem is created because of methods of data collection and classification used in Greek censuses,<sup>14</sup> which have been subject to frequent review and change (Leontidou 1981b). This has been taken into account in

<sup>14</sup> The National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) carries out a general census of population, housing and employment (at place of residence) every ten years (1951/61/71/81), and a census of employment in manufacturing establishments (at place of work) approximately every five years (1958/63/69/73/78/84/88). Censuses of employment in all establishments (at place of work), including commercial and service ones, are carried out approximately every ten years (1958/69/78/88). Finally, yearly employment censuses in urban areas (at place of residence) provide reliable estimates despite their small sample, as *ex post facto* comparison with general censuses has consistently shown.



the construction of the tables which follow. Some trends of class structuration can be observed through the parallel and comparative investigation of several sets of tables based on general population censuses, and one set based on employment censuses. Data for interwar Athens is included for a diachronic comparison (1928–81, table 3.9), and data for postwar Salonica for an inter-urban comparison (1961–81, table 3.10). In this sort of 'objective' class analysis, quantification can furnish *indicators* rather than real social categories, and census classifications capture only the *primary* activities of the population and therefore conceal 'polyvalent' subjects (Tsoucalas 1986). With these considerations and limitations in mind, and on the basis of our conceptualizations of class in chapter 1, the investigation of the tables leads to the following conclusions.

### 3.3.2 *The urban class structure: an 'objective' glance*

It is usually claimed that throughout the postwar period a process of 'tertiarization' was under way in Greater Athens, reproducing 'parasitic' activities which supported civil servants and a multitude of unproductive populations. An examination of table 3.8, which presents the development of employment by economic sector in Greater Athens and Salonica according to the population censuses, undermines such views. At a first level, it is evident that 'tertiarization' has been a very recent phenomenon, due to a previous industrialization process. There is also hardly any indication of persistent 'parasitism' except the low, and declining, activity ratio. This affects rural areas as well, and the Greek economically active population was found to be the lowest among OECD countries: it was 37 % in 1981 (table 3.1) and estimated at 43 % in 1983, compared with 60 % in Italy and Spain (Tsoucalas 1984: 227). To a degree, this reflects the increase in the number of those living on income from property without working. However, a careful analysis of the ratio by age and sex (Pantazides and Kassimati 1984: 36–7) indicates that its decline should be attributed to the tendency for entrance into higher education by broader population strata, and consequently the rise of the age group in which the young enter the labour market. The 'hidden economy' must also have an impact in under-declaring activities. Finally, the role of compulsory enlistment in the army should also be noted. The same long-term trend for the decrease of the activity ratio can be observed throughout the EEC countries (Hassid 1980 A: 28–9).

The sectoral structure of the economically active population indicates fundamental changes through time. In the 1950s a growing concentration of labour in commerce, services and construction could be said to manifest

Table 3.8 *Sectoral composition of employment in Greater Athens and Salonica, 1951-81*

	1951		1961		1971		1981	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Greater Athens								
Primary sector	19,160	3.28	10,133	1.43	7,336	0.84	4,699	0.44
Manufacturing industry	177,637	30.43	203,391	28.80	259,188	29.85	282,643	26.54
Rest of secondary sector	34,627	5.93	69,865	9.89	107,976	12.43	113,690	10.68
Transport, warehousing, communications	52,866	9.05	62,216	8.81	96,524	11.12	125,102	11.75
Banks, commerce	113,824	19.50	156,354	22.14	205,300	23.64	248,646	23.35
Services	136,073	19.50	156,354	22.14	205,300	23.64	248,646	23.35
Not declared, unclassifiable	49,649	8.50	48,272	6.83	37,732	4.35	52,512	4.93
Total economically active	583,836	100.00	706,334	100.0	868,316	100.00	1,064,942	100.00
Resident population	1,378,586		1,852,709		2,540,241		3,027,331	
Employment ratio (%)	42.35		38.12		34.18		35.18	
Greater Salonica								
Primary sector	12,073	10.09	4,412	3.31	4,960	2.67	2,402	1.05
Manufacturing industry	34,687	29.00	44,277	33.25	60,540	32.58	73,970	32.47
Rest of secondary sector	5,702	4.77	14,569	10.70	21,740	11.70	23,357	10.25
Transport, warehousing, communications	11,830	9.89	11,506	8.64	17,620	948	19,434	8.53
Banks, commerce	17,722	14.82	23,600	17.72	42,380	22.81	53,362	23.42
Services	25,634	21.43	27,177	20.41	35,240	18.96	47,501	20.85
Not declared, unclassifiable	11,969	10.01	7,612	5.72	3,340	1.80	7,790	3.42
Total economically active	119,617	100.00	133,153	100.00	185,820	100.00	227,816	100.00
Resident population	297,164		380,648		557,360		706,180	
Employment ratio (%)	40.25		34.98		33.34		32.26	

*Source:* Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1951-81, so that census data become comparable with 1981 classifications.

some trend towards 'tertiarization' (as in Filias 1974). The employment structure of Greater Athens in 1951 and 1961 was dominated by the tertiary sector which improved its relative position in the urban economy. In contrast, the share of manufacturing industry fell from 30.4 % to 28.8 % of the total economically active population between 1951 and 1961. Nevertheless, this process was related to the general pattern of Greek development, since manufacturing employment also tended to concentrate in Athens (chapter 5). The tertiary sector at the time consisted of petty service and commercial activities and therefore approached Third World structures. It

is interesting that Salonica did not go through an analogous phase: its urbanization rates in the 1950s were slow, and its industrial base developed rapidly, while the tertiary sector grew slightly. The industrialization of its economy was carried through to the 1960s, when urbanization rates were speeding up.

The process of tertiarization was reversed in the 1960s – the period of economic development. By 1971, 42 % of the active population of Athens and 44 % of that of Salonica came to be employed in the secondary sector. If transport is included in productive activities, a spectacular increase is obvious: the share of the labour force in these sectors increased from 45.4 % to 53.4 % of the economically active population in Athens and from 43.7 % to 53.8 % in Salonica over the 1951–71 period. Employment in public and private services declined from 22 % to 17.8 % of the total Athens labour force. In the 1970s, however, the service sector rose again in the urban economy. The 1981 census revealed a new trend, the implications of which will be studied in detail in chapter 5.

The low percentage of wage labour in the Greek population and the GNP has been stressed only too frequently (Tsoucalas 1986). However, the trend towards the increase of salary and wage labour in Greater Athens at the expense of other forms of labour commitment is quite obvious in the series of tables which follow. Salary and wage earners, as distinct from independent workers and employers, grew rapidly in 1928–71 (table 3.9), more so if absolute numbers rather than percentages are examined. The development of dependent labourers was very slow in 1951–61 but speeded up later, so that, by 1981, 72 % of the labour force of Athens and 67 % of that of Salonica were salary and wage earners. These percentages are lower in the rest of the country (Fakiolas 1978: 127), and comparable with those of urban Italy (74 %) and Spain (75 %), though much lower than rates for the rest of European rates of 80–90 % (adapted from Tsoucalas 1984).

Dependent labour as an aggregate, however, constitutes an inappropriate indicator of class structuration. More detailed distinctions are obviously necessary within a population which constitutes 70 % of the urban labour force. The category of salary and wage earners includes two classes, the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie (Poulantzas 1975: part 3). Though distinctions are very difficult, an aggregate analysis is possible (table 3.9). The development of salary and wage labour in the secondary sector, transport and communications, is an indicator for the investigation of the development of the working class. Its remarkable rise until 1971 is an indicator of the proletarianization of the urban population. According to this series of data, the working class rose from 34 % to 42 % of the

Table 3.9 *The development of socio-occupational categories in Greater Athens, 1928–81: composition of the economically active population by sector*

Social categories	Greater Athens				1981	
	1928 %	1951 %	1961 %	1971 %	Greater Athens %	Greater Salonica %
Employers (bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie)	7.32	4.67	5.93	6.60	4.45	5.32
Self-employed in industry and transport	6.58	4.65	5.76	7.29	8.79	9.86
Self-employed in tertiary sector	9.26	8.78	9.72	9.16	11.21	12.90
Salary and wage earners in industry–transport (working class)	33.86	37.49	38.76	41.78	37.38	36.83
Salary and wage earners in tertiary sector (new petty bourgeoisie)	24.75	30.64	30.19	28.22	34.10	30.47
Unpaid family members (informal-sector workers)	2.66	1.19	1.37	1.38	1.81	2.03
Unclassifiable (including agriculture)	15.57	12.58	8.27	5.57	2.26	2.59
Total economically active population	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

*Source:* Adapted from SGG and NSSG census data, 1928–81.

economically active population of Greater Athens in 1928–71, and then fell to 37% in both Athens and Salonica by 1981. Wage labour grew especially during the period 1928–51: the working class of Athens increased then by an average annual rate of 3.32% and salary earners in the tertiary sector by 3.82%. These rates were much faster than the rates of growth of any other class, and surpassed the rates of growth of urban population and total employment. They slowed down during the postwar period, but were still faster than those of total employment. Rates for tertiary sector employees (an indicator of the new petty bourgeoisie) were much slower, and their percentage in total employment dropped in 1951–71. Workers appear more numerous in the analysis of socio-occupational categories shown in table 3.10, but here the working class apparently includes some semi-autonomous labour. Diachronic conclusions are the same. We can observe the rise and

Table 3.10 *Employment structure by socio-occupational category in Greater Athens and Salonica, 1961-81*

	Greater Athens			Greater Salonica		
	1961 %	1971 %	1981 %	1961 %	1971 %	1981 %
Scientists, liberal professions, directors	9.50	11.72	18.33	7.81	10.31	16.18
Office employees (white collar)	11.41	15.79	16.83	7.87	11.78	12.20
Merchants and vendors	12.54	11.51	11.99	14.59	12.69	13.18
Service workers	14.82	9.15	10.23	12.20	10.27	9.07
Workers, craftsmen, transport workers	43.38	45.30	38.07	49.01	49.71	43.16
Unclassifiable and farmers	8.35	6.52	4.55	8.51	5.24	6.21
Total economically active population	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

*Source:* Adapted from NSSG census data, 1961-81. For 1981, unpublished provisional data of sample elaboration.

peaking of the process of proletarianization until 1971, as well as the effects of deindustrialization in the 1970s (chapter 5), which appear more dramatic in table 3.10. This discussion will be taken up in chapter 5 below.

Salary earners of the service sector – Poulantzas' 'new petty bourgeoisie', 'unproductive' labour or the famous 'white-collars' of the American sociologists – have developed very rapidly in the Greek cities especially since the 1970s. Certain 'modern' activities, such as the sector of banks and mediation, increased their employment before this, with an average annual rate of 5.62 % in 1961-71. The turning point of the 1970s is quite evident in this case too, and will be discussed at length in chapter 5.

### 3.3.3 *Self-employment and labour market segmentation*

One of the most interesting and direct conclusions of the series of tables presented here is the sharp decline of 'marginality' of the interwar and the first postwar decades. Class structuration in postwar Greece has been compared with the Third World model of the multiplication of 'masses' in 'parasitic' occupations (Mouzelis 1978: ch. 7). However, empirical evidence

Table 3.11 *The structure of 'service' employment in Greater Athens, 1951-81*

	1951	1961	1971	1981
Total 'services'	136,073	156,103	154,260	237,650
%	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
of which: Public	56,948	53,402	65,672	87,621
%	41.85	34.21	42.57	36.87
Social <sup>a</sup>	33,366	46,760	60,136	102,902
%	24.52	29.95	38.98	43.30
Personal	40,005	47,233	15,728	29,115
%	29.40	30.26	10.20	12.25
Recreational	5,754	8,708	12,724	18,012
%	4.23	5.58	8.25	7.58

<sup>a</sup> Includes health, education, welfare, science, medical.

Source: Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1951-81.

suggests that 'tertiarization' trends were curbed during the 1960s, and productive labour rose even within the informal economy (table 3.9).

The trend for the multiplication of 'masses', or reproduction of marginality, on the other hand, slowed down during the first postwar decade, and was reversed after 1961. There are several indications of this trend in tables 3.9 and 3.10. 'Unclassifiable' labour tends to drop dramatically in both Athens and Salonica. This means that the population has increasingly acquired a clearer sense of its occupation, or its inclusion in the urban economy, and that the category of 'unpaid family labour' has been shrinking. A second indicator is the decline of the most typical 'parasitic-marginal' activities like street commerce and personal services. This is especially evident in a more detailed analysis of the service sector (table 3.11). Its general decline in the 1960s was due to shrinkage of the petty service activities, i.e. its marginal part, characteristically mushrooming in Third World cities (Roberts 1978: 126; Santos 1979). Personal services decreased sharply from 30% of service labour in 1951-61 to 10% in 1971, releasing a total of 31,500 workers, who were of course absorbed in other sectors of the economy, especially the secondary one, which developed rapidly at the time. The sharp decline of employment in personal services was a sustained trend throughout the postwar period. At the same time employment increased rapidly in more modern parts of the tertiary sector, such as the social services (table 3.11), as well as the banks, where employment grew by 5.62% annually in 1961-71. The tertiary sector was in a process of modernization along with the capitalist economy as a whole.

Table 3.12 *Employment of recent migrants in Greater Athens by sector, 1955-81*

Compositions (%)	1961		1971		1981	
	Migrants, 1955-61	Rest of population	Migrants, 1965-71	Rest of population	Migrants, 1975-81	Rest of population
Agriculture, mining	1.46	1.52	1.37	0.77	0.40	0.28
Manufacturing, energy	33.66	32.92	34.10	30.19	28.50	29.14
Construction	12.82	8.50	13.56	9.94	8.89	9.87
Transport, communications	6.36	10.33	8.72	14.25	12.05	14.01
Commerce, banks, services	45.70	46.73	42.25	44.85	50.16	46.70
Total with known employment	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Absolute nos.	102,200	493,900	106,220	691,500	235,040	749,030
Total economically active	112,700	534,300	114,420	754,220	240,200	761,700
of whom unemployed (%)	9.85	10.03	3.08	2.75	5.83	5.51

*Source:* Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1961 (2 % sample), 1971 (5 % sample) and 1981 (10 % sample).

The urban economy was also increasingly capable of integrating the new entrants. Contrary to some views (Filiás 1974: 192-9; Mouzelis 1978: 125), cityward migration did *not* create marginal populations entering the service sector. Rarely has it been acknowledged that Athens differed radically from provincial towns in this respect (Kayser et al. 1971: 200; Fragos 1974, 2: 124-8), or that migrants to this city worked in productive activities. However, this was what in fact happened. Migrants into Greater Athens, however recent, have been integrated in the secondary sector since the 1950s: recent migrants of 1961 and 1971 are shown to work in manufacturing and construction more than native populations, who evidenced higher rates of service employment (table 3.12). Equally important is the very slight difference in the rate of unemployment of recent migrants in relation to natives. The familiar Third World model of 'urbanization without industrialization' coupled with marginality was increasingly less evident in postwar Greece. Patterns had changed by 1981, but this should be studied in the context of economic transformation as a whole (chapter 5).

The development of the informal economy is reflected in industrial decomposition and the level of self-employment. The former will be taken up in chapter 5, while the latter can be investigated here, through the series of tables. Self-employed labour in Greece is usually examined in the context of theories on the petty bourgeois nature of Greek society (Tsoucalas 1986; Karabelias 1982). It should be pointed out that the share of the self-employed and those in small enterprises in Third World cities during the

postwar period was much larger than in Athens (Lianos 1975: 164; Coutsoumaris 1963: 59–60). In Greece this category is composed of two groups, which can be studied separately on the basis of available census material: 'employers', and 'own-account workers'. The former category stabilized during the 1970s (table 3.9). Its size fell in Athens from 7% in the interwar period to 4% more recently, while it remains at 5% in Salonica (table 3.9). Consequently the traditional petty bourgeoisie prevalent in Greek cities for many decades, those who would form an enterprise hiring 2–3 workers in order to realize a dream of 'their own' workplace, has been shrinking. Theories about the petty bourgeois nature of Greek society obviously cannot be established by recourse to this small social category.

By contrast, the 'own-account workers', the basic core of self-employed labour, have been constantly reproduced during the postwar period, and rose to 20% of the economically active population of Athens and 23% of that of Salonica by 1981 (table 3.9). In this case we are encountering a crucial characteristic of Greek social class structuration, which is evidently persistent, but not adequately investigated empirically and conceptually; conclusions are usually drawn from everyday impressions and experience. On the basis of categories and definitions introduced in chapter 1, we can classify these populations into two social categories, each holding contradictory locations within class relations (Wright 1978):

- (a) The liberal professions and the traditional petty bourgeoisie of the *formal* economy. Liberal professions (scientists, engineers, etc.) as well as the petty entrepreneurs and owners of family enterprises stand between the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the petty bourgeoisie on the other.
- (b) Petty-service labourers and casual labourers of the *informal* economy as defined in the fourfold diagram (table 1.1), as well as putting-out labourers working for enterprises of the formal economy. Many of these dependent workers are labelled 'self-employed' either because of the legal form of contract with their employer, or because of the procedures by which wages are paid, allowing for tax evasion on the part of the employer and alleviating his responsibility for social security payments (Massey 1984: 35). Such labourers thus become victims of the most acute exploitation, as they often work for firms of the 'formal' sector under subcontracting arrangements. Female piece-work, putting-out and home work, subcontractors, service labourers, and even construction workers, who are considered quite privileged by Greek analysts because of their high wages, may be so only during periods of economic boom. Otherwise they are the first to lose their jobs.



Consequently we are dealing here with two rather than one social grouping, and several fractions of contradictory class locations. It is certainly wrong to insist that their increase was indicative of a traditional petty-bourgeois society. The question of their class allegiances is open to future focused historical research and cannot be answered theoretically.

Labour market segmentation appears to have followed different dimensions than the formal/informal dichotomy. Wage levels did vary according to the size of capitalist enterprises, but inequalities were not as acute as in the Third World (Roberts 1978: 120-3). In 1969 yearly earnings per wage earner in Greece were 52,140 dr. in industries with over 30 employees and 28,000 in those with four or less (Lianos 1975: 162). Higher wages in the formal sector, as well as their regularity, were appreciated by the workers. Jobs were evaluated by these factors rather than by skill or dependence: artisans would be considered as workers (Burgel 1970: 15). Instability of employment and equalization of labour earnings especially between skilled and semi-skilled workers in the 1980s promoted the interpenetration of labour markets and the 'integration' of the formal and informal sectors of the industrial economy.

Labour turnover is found to have been 22-26% of average annual employment in 1958-68, but shot up to 56.6% in 1969 and 64.2% in 1970 during the dictatorship (Kavouriaris 1974: 41). A study among factory workers in Athens in 1974 found that 74% had changed their job at least once, mainly within the manufacturing sector (Kassimati 1980: 94-7). Employers often dismissed trade unionists, women and unskilled labourers in order to discourage industrial action and avoid benefits accorded them by legislation for a long period of employment. High rates of labour turnover in industry and especially construction until well into the 1970s should therefore not be attributed exclusively to 'preference' for independence, or voluntary floating from job to job in search of better prospects. The treatment of the casual and the industrial proletariat in a unified manner in urban social geography is the necessary outcome of these conditions. Their insecurity in work situations and their common mobilizations in the city, studied in the following chapters, is understandable.

Among the disadvantaged segments of the labour force, women were prevalent. Almost all employers were men. Labour market segmentation according to gender was very sharp. The female labour force in Greater Athens was mostly used as servants, unskilled wage labourers and informal-sector workers, besides working in factories. By 1971, while 25% of the labour force was female, this was heavily concentrated in the informal service sector (36% female). In manufacturing, the women constituted 27%

of the labour force by 1971 and worked either as wage earners in large enterprises and sectors with important export activity (Kavounidi 1982: 159), or as informal-sector workers. Female integration into the informal sector was actually more extensive than shown in tables, since piece-work at home was omitted by the censuses almost in its entirety. The overwhelming majority of 'unpaid family members' in the small manufacturing establishments of Athens (over 50% by 1971) were female, while much of the remainder was child labour. Despite the fact that women were no longer excluded from labour unions, as in the interwar period, they received lower wages officially (70% of male wages; Kavounidi 1982: 158), and did not enjoy the social security rights accorded to men and their dependants (Coutsoumaris 1963: 280-4; Fakiolas 1978: 92). It is quite natural therefore that working-class women dreamed of withdrawing from work after marriage, or emigrated to Germany to earn higher wages: in 1969, 42% of the Greek workers in German factories were women (table 3.3).

### 3.3.4 *A note on politics and the labour movement*

A departure from crude quantifications, classifications and statistical indicators will be attempted at this point. If the notion of 'proletarianization' includes that of working-class mobilization, this was obvious in the case of Greece, but was most often suppressed or defeated. The poor economic, work and living conditions of the working class were both a cause and an effect of the absence of independent labour institutions – or rather, of their destruction by the State. Although open political suppression and defeat of the proletariat were a more or less permanent feature, they were never final.

During the civil war and up to the late 1960s 'Greece [was], with the exception of the most remote areas, largely a socially mobilized society' (Legg 1969: 61). However, labour unionism was effectively suppressed throughout this period. The political context of anti-communist violence and the infiltration of the labour movement by the government posed obstacles to unionization. These were exacerbated by the very economic existence of the working class. Since employment in the public sector necessitated 'certificates of national conduct', i.e. allegiance to the Right, many labourers turned to the private and the informal sector. Work instability nurtured submissiveness, however, and the mushrooming of small establishments created ideological barriers to collective action. On top of this, rising wages, property and remittances contributed to individual income improvement and delayed discontent. It has been maintained that workers entered personal relationships with their employer, from re-

cruitment by personal recommendation to dependence within the workplace. 'A businessman or entrepreneur can easily assume a patron's role in this context, further inhibiting organizational activity' (Legg 1969: 118). However, the extent of apathy created by such a type of labour commitment should be put to doubt in the light of the discussion of working-class politics that follows. The proletariat was not non-existent; it was hidden.

The unionization of both secondary and tertiary-sector workers together, with few exceptions, has been a constant characteristic of Greek labour unionism since the late nineteenth century, indicative of the absence of sectarianism (chapter 2). Rates of unionization by social class are not known. However, it has been calculated that the rate of unionization was about one-third of the salary and wage earners in the 1970s, which corresponded to a mere 17% of the total labour force.<sup>15</sup> This rate has become almost irrelevant for the study of working-class culture, because the GSEE can hardly be called a representative labour organization: the dominant classes relegated it to an arm of the State, which actually controlled labour radicalism.

The General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), created in 1918 (chapter 2), was reconstituted after the war as the major nationwide organization of workers and clerks in private contract with their employers. The history of its postwar repression began during its eighth Congress, held in 1946.<sup>16</sup> The Secretary General imposed at this time by the government was 'reelected' to this post up to 1964. A very important barrier to unionization was factionalism at the GSEE since the 1920s, which must have alienated a sizeable part of the working class. The electoral victory of the Centre Union in 1963 made little difference, since G. Papandreou delayed efforts to remodel the GSEE. In 1967 the military government suspended the rights of workers to unionize and go on strike. Before any collective institutions had materialized, then, the trade union movement was dissolved and the GSEE was expelled from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Yannopoulos 1972).

Organizational aspects of the labour movement are responsible to a large extent for its subordination to the government and State paternalism (Katsanevas 1984). Since the interwar period, unlike the European and like the Latin American labour movement, the Greek one has had a regional

<sup>15</sup> Fakiolas 1978: 126-31. Various postwar estimates of numbers of unions and workers affiliated to the GSEE are contradictory. By 1975, 3,150 unions were reported with a membership of 450,000 registered in the 79 Labour Centres of the GSEE. Among their members, 44% or 156,000 workers belonged to the Labour Centres of Athens and Piraeus (adapted from Fakiolas 1978: 162-3).

<sup>16</sup> The communist delegates received 85% of the vote at a time when the civil war was raging. The government stepped in to annul the elections of 'the only genuine GSEE Congress in the postwar period' (ESAK, quoted by Fakiolas 1978: 102).

rather than national character.<sup>17</sup> Unions were financed by the State and therefore under government control. Severe police and State repression can be contrasted with conditions in nineteenth-century England, where unionists encountered an ineffective police force and an army with stretched resources (Roberts 1978: 69–70). Labour legislation which appeared to be progressive was not enforced, and an intricate set of laws was at the disposal of the State, dating back to the period of Metaxas, for use in cases of ‘emergency’.

Government control over labour institutions was extended well into the 1970s. In the context of enthusiasm for liberalization after 1974, public opinion was hardly touched by the continuing government intervention into the trade union movement. The eighteenth Congress of the GSEE in April 1976 was unrepresentative in many ways. Union administrations (who elected the delegates) remained those appointed by the dictators during the preparation of the Congress; the more militant unions and federations were excluded; ‘phantom unions’ or ‘rubber-stamp unions’ representing non-existent occupational categories participated. In the new Executive, affiliates of the Right and even sympathizers of the junta maintained a majority. The most recent Laws 330/1976, and the notorious article 4 of Law 1365/1983 on socialization of enterprises, introduced by PASOK and abolished in 1987 after prolonged mobilizations, limited rather than protected the right to go on strike.<sup>18</sup> Syndicalists were fired and strikes broken long after the military junta, under PASOK, and a new split in the GSEE broke out in 1985.

No additional evidence is required to indicate that as society and economy underwent rapid change and political forms of action were ‘modernized’, labour unionism remained undeveloped, a constant target for bourgeois aggression. At the end of a long period of class struggle the working-class movement was deprived of its leaders, subjugated to government control and torn apart by vehement quarrels, even among factions of the Left.

Spontaneous radicalization, however, was evident, despite the suppression of trade unionism, and the Left did have an influence on popular voting behaviour in the metropolitan cities, despite anti-communist violence. Already in the 1950 elections the Left, the DP at the time, commanded over

<sup>17</sup> Jecchinis 1962: 77–82. Local trade unions were affiliated to a regional Labour Centre, and the latter were united under the GSEE, while very few trade or nationwide federations existed. The labour unions were many and fragmented, with an average of 100 workers per union, structured into Labour Centres and only a few federations. This meant a lack of coordination and inefficiency in strikes.

<sup>18</sup> The law concerned enterprises already belonging to the public sector (communication, electricity, transport, banking) and affected about 100,000 workers in active and effective unions. It specified that a strike in these sectors was illegal unless the support of an absolute majority had been obtained through secret ballot (Lyrantzis 1987: 678).

40% of the vote in Athens and Piraeus, while the national average was 9.7%. In 1958 the support for EDA in the capital reached 42%, while the national average was 24.4%. The tide receded by 1963, after concentrated efforts by the Right, but especially after the restructuring and the rise of parties of the Centre. The vote for EDA had then fallen to 14.3% in Greece, and to 27.6% in Athens (chapter 4). Gradually, the Greek electoral geography was homogenized, however, and by the mid-1960s most regions had converged towards the national average, so that researchers speak of a 'nationization of voting' (Nicolacopoulos 1985: 98-100).

Population movements had played an important role in voting behaviour (section 3.2.1). In fact, urbanization was found to be a stronger feature in explaining the vote for the Left than industrialization. The correlation of urban population (1961) and the vote for EDA (1963) gave a coefficient of determination of 0.2228; 'but when the relation between EDA vote and the percentage of the active population employed in industrial activity was examined, the coefficient of correlation was a mere 0.0103' (Legg 1969: 211-12). While various forms of clientelist relationships predominated in the countryside (Comninou 1984), urbanization disentangled the people from traditional ties in villages, and made them less vulnerable to clientelism (Mouzelis 1978: 60-5). Instead of leading to a 'ruralization' of cities (as in Moustaka 1964), urbanization undermined the authority of the traditional Right.

The Greek cities experienced social upheaval during the popular mobilizations of the mid-1960s: strikes, peace marches, rallies after the assassination of the EDA MP G. Lambrakis (1963); violent clashes in Lavrio (1964); resistance to foreign intervention when legislation for the democratization of the GSEE was discussed (1964); demonstrations on the Cyprus question and other foreign policy issues; massive marches in Athens in May 1964; and the general strike of 27 July 1965, when the Prime Minister resigned, were initiated by the urban labouring people. Some were organized by the Left, but many of them occurred spontaneously, outside 'official' channels of 'conscious leadership' (Gramsci 1971 edn).

Strike activity culminated in the mid-1960s, before the dictatorship. Hours lost in manufacturing then rose from 1 million in 1952-4 to 3.9 million in 1964-6, faster than the number of strikers, which means that during the latter period strikes had become more stubborn. The propensity to go on strike was higher than the propensity to unionize, despite the fact 'that the most common result of a strike was a "no result"' (Legg 1969: 117). The combativeness of the new petty bourgeoisie has sometimes been more pronounced than that of the urban working class. When the rhythm of striking activity peaked in 1964-5, it was especially due to petty bourgeois

mobilization (Fakiolas 1978: 113-14). The relative decrease of the participation of manufacturing workers in strikes during those years was counterbalanced by the increase and tenacity of the participation of construction workers (Fakiolas 1978: 121-6). Their higher wages before the dictatorship have usually been attributed to their combativeness (Study Group 1975: 7-8).

The military dictatorship managed to silence this optimistic mobilization of the popular strata. While it continued, however, productive labourers began to stir. The first strikes in Athens in the early 1970s were then initiated by workers in transport and the press in 1973 (Theodorou 1975: 70-87). Construction workers joined the students in the National Technical University during the celebrated mobilization of November 1973, which is considered one of the events which paved the way for the collapse of the junta.

After 1974 working-class radicalism was no longer evident at the polls. Electoral cohesion before the dictatorship gave way after 1974. The electorate of Athens then contributed greatly in the erosion of the power of the Left (Karas 1977). The decline was sharp after 1974, and very few voters shifted to the Left from centre or populist parties in 1977. The shift towards PASOK can be considered as a vote for the Left only in the 1981 elections: in later periods, the quasi-populist nature of this party and the distance between its discourse and actual policy had become clear (Lyrintzis 1987).

The abandonment of the Left, however, coincided with more militancy and independence from State syndicalism during the late 1970s. The number of strikers has been estimated at 294,000 in 1976 and 560,000 in 1977 (Fakiolas 1978: 105-6). Among them, the working class had begun to constitute a vanguard (Staveris 1977: 33). Despite the publicity enjoyed by petty bourgeois strikers, especially employees in banks and education, it was actually the working class of Elefsina (National Can Greece and Andreadis shipyards), Athens (printers, ITT, construction workers), Piraeus (Lipasmata) and Salonica (MEL), as well as those in some decentralized industries and mining, who opened up the post-dictatorial period with massive and stubborn strikes (Theodorou 1975: 95-6). Many subsequent strikes were autonomous, organized outside the GSEE and even outside the parties of the opposition. New forms of shopfloor-based labour organizations were emerging.

Those supporting the theory of the 'exploitative' role of Athens in the Greek social formation misuse the concept. Exploitation does not occur among regions, but among social classes. 'An "industrial" city is always more progressive than the countryside which depends organically upon it'

(Gramsci 1971 edn: 91). Athens has certainly *not* been a centre 'of distribution and consumption rather than production' (as in Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 366). Its 'parasitic' classes have been much fewer in number than those of other Greek towns. By 1971, 42 % of its economically active population worked in the secondary sector (section 3.3). The rate in other Greek urban areas was 39.9 %, and much lower if Salonica is excluded. Athens, the only 'primate' city within the Mediterranean European context, did not appropriate rural surplus, except surplus labour, which in any case would move abroad if the urban economy could not support them. The increase of productive labour as against 'parasitic' occupations in the urban society in the face of massive emigration and rural disorganization created by capitalist development in Greece means that Athens played a stabilizing role during the process of economic growth and transformation. It revitalized the social formation by retaining many of the migrants within the national territory and maintaining an active population and an internal market. If this outlet had been absent, emigration, which proceeded at an alarming pace, would have literally devastated the country.

The articulation of the productive labourers into a working class remains an open question of culture and class consciousness. It can be said here, however, that the Athens proletariat did not constitute the labour aristocracy of Greece. They did not ally with the middle classes to exploit the peasants. The contrary was often the case, as peasants sometimes allied with petty bourgeois elements during periods when clientelist relationships dominated Greek villages (Comninou 1984). Though important peasant movements have occurred in Balkan history, the urban working class has also mobilized in crucial periods. The civil war may have been fought on Greek mountains, but 'red enclaves' appeared in cities too (Eudes 1972). After the end of the war, class struggle has been particularly fierce in the cities and did not particularly involve urban classes versus the peasants, or, for that matter, the classes versus the 'masses' (as in Mouzelis 1978: 25). It was more of the classic form of struggle of the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat. In fact, the Greek economic miracle of industrialization was partly due to the suppression of the working class.

The problem is that we must rely on disjointed remembrance rather than social research. Despite the importance of the Greek working class, a multitude of questions which concern it still remain open, or are answered only superficially, within everyday stereotypes and myths. Gaps in historical research involve the modes of integration of the working class in the production process; the relationship of formal- and informal-sector workers; their electoral and syndicalist behaviour; their expectations of social mobility; their class pride, cultural and ideological autonomy; and

their geographical behaviour and urban social movements here studied. It should be admitted that, half a century after the Second World War, very little is known of the men and women who actually created the Greek 'economic miracle'.



## 4

### *The 'golden period' of spontaneous urban development, 1950–67*

In reality, even when they appear triumphant, the subaltern groups are merely anxious to defend themselves...Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should therefore be of incalculable value for the integral historian. Consequently, this kind of history can only be dealt with monographically...

Antonio Gramsci (1971 edn: 55)

We have observed the rise of the working class in urban society and politics. In this chapter its emergence in the city will be observed, from a controlled to a dominant group in urban development, from a suppressed to a creative social class in the built environment. Changes in urban development after the Second World War and until the late 1960s were less abrupt than before, but quite rapid. They were not immediately obvious in urban structure. At the surface, spatial patterns in postwar Athens appeared similar to the interwar period and reminiscent of peripheral urban formations. The distribution of social classes and economic activity in urban space did not seem to change much, the bourgeoisie concentrated in the same locations and the colonization of land by popular strata continued on a massive scale on the urban fringe. A lag between socio-economic and spatial transformation will be revealed in chapter 6.

The discussion of the political economy of Greek development in the two previous chapters indicated that each decade of the twentieth century constituted a new and different phase. Economic development, the structure of industrial accumulation, the direction of population movements and urban social structure underwent important transformations, in which the largest cities were in the forefront. It will be shown in this chapter that, after the wars, similarities between the social geography of Athens and that of peripheral cities were only superficial. The rise of the working class in the urban social structure also meant its increasing presence in urban space. The peripheral land of Athens was not colonized by any Third World 'masses' or penny capitalists: alternative modes of land allocation and housing production were predominantly proletarian. This will be shown through

disaggregation and quantification of social groupings in urban space on the basis of an untapped source of information.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4.1 A social geography of Athens and Salonica


The sea has always been important in Greek urban development. As in the Western Mediterranean, in Greece 'the great cities were all near the sea, the greatest route of all' (Braudel 1966: 316). Athens and Salonica are both oriented to the sea in different ways. The coast of Athens on the east of the port of Piraeus was initially a bourgeois recreation area, but was lost to polluting activities in the late nineteenth century (Biris 1966), and today only the southern coast is accessible to the urban population. Salonica has been oriented to the coast ever since the city wall was demolished in 1867 (Moskov 1974: 17), and the area to the southeast of the port is still ornamented with fine walks and parks.

Spatial patterns in Greek cities were structured along two dimensions relating to housing and land respectively. On the one hand, urban social classes used different segments of a dual system of private housing production; on the other, they were relatively segregated in urban space. Before examining the housing sector in more detail, it is necessary to investigate the location and zoning of social classes and economic activities. Broad class categories will be used first, which will become more specific in the next section with respect to the informal housing sector and the urban working class.

##### 4.1.1 *Social groups in urban space*

Greek socio-geographical studies have uniformly referred to a pattern observed in Athens during the 1960s (Burgel 1970): the 'low social level' of the western and northern part of the Athens agglomeration, and higher social categories living 'left and right along a line from Phaleron Bay through the centre of Athens toward the northeast fringe' (Crueger 1973a: 297). This is also illustrated in the maps that follow. The location quotient (LQ) was used rather than a segregation index, so that degree of departure

<sup>1</sup> Unpublished spatially disaggregated data of a study by the National Centre of Social Research and the National Statistical Service of Greece (henceforth NCSR-NSSG study 1973), in the first stages of which the author also took part. The only existing form of processing of this material is a series of unpublished maps for 1971 and 1969, and the relevant computer printouts where information is indexed and located on grid squares of 1 km<sup>2</sup>. Mapping is useless for correlations, save for simple rank correlations, and can provide no comparative tables. The original computer printouts are thus an invaluable additional resource. The process involved decoding, systematizing and finally tabulating or mapping the information for over 600 grid squares for the whole of Attica by the author.



*Figure 4.1 and 4.2 Residential patterns in Greater Athens, 1971: LQ of the bourgeoisie (left, fig. 4.1) and of the working class (right, fig. 4.2) by community.*  
 Source: Adapted and mapped from NSSG population census data, 1971, 25 % sample. Bourgeoisie and middle classes are represented by SIC categories 0/1/2, and working classes by 7/8/9.

of each area from a random distribution of social classes is shown.<sup>2</sup> Areas where the LQs for the bourgeoisie and the working class were over 1.0, i.e. areas where these classes were overrepresented in 1971, are shown on figs. 4.1 and 4.2 respectively, based on administrative boundaries according to the 1971 census. The socio-occupational categories taken to represent the bourgeoisie were the liberal professions and higher administrative staff (international classification 0/1/2); workers in industry and transport (7/8/9) were taken as indicative of the working class. These maps are clear about relative social class segregation: in not one single community did LQs over 1.0 for both classes coincide. At the same time, however, segregation was not complete in any area of Greater Athens.

The main drawback in this kind of presentation is that the central local authority district is too large and dense for analysis. This is overcome with fig. 4.3, which summarizes social class analysis in section 4.3 below. The map is based on grid squares of the NCSR–NSSG study for 1971 and shows, in smaller spatial units (km<sup>2</sup>), where selected social classes were overrepresented (LQ over 1.2) in 1971. The grid pattern reveals a sectoral arrangement of urban social classes, and inverse patterns for each of them.

The bourgeoisie extended along a sector from the highest densities in the centre to the lowest on the northeast periphery, while the working class lived in peripheral areas, especially on the north and northwest. Apparently the dominant classes, excepting a small fraction of the very rich living in suburban villas, were content to live in dense central properties they had owned since the interwar period. The working class encircled the bourgeois areas and the more mixed communities towards the west and northwest, but also lived in southern communities at the foot of the mountain of Hymettus. Social polarization between east and west of the agglomeration appears on every map of other characteristics of the city – housing, amenities, infrastructure – and in every study throughout the postwar period.

Salonica is a linear city along the coast. Factories concentrate on the northwest (TCG 1981: 20), the university campus occupies the central area and the CBD is linear along the seafront. It is noteworthy that it evidences the southeast/northwest polarization observed in Athens, and its spatial structure conforms to a concentric-ring model (Tsoulouvis 1985: 162). Upper-income groups have lived in the urban core and to its east since the creation of the wealthy district in Cale de Zente after a fire in 1890 (Moskov 1974: 22). The working class evidences a ‘hole’ of low LQs in central zones (Tsoulouvis 1985: 162), but concentrates especially in northwestern

<sup>2</sup> For a full discussion of segregation indexes, see Jones 1965: 199–204. Here the expression is used:  $LQ = (C_{ia}/C_a)/(C_{ig}/C_g)$ , where  $C_{ia}$  social class  $i$  in area  $a$ ,  $C_a$  all social classes in area  $a$ ,  $C_{ig}$  all social classes in Greater Athens.




Figure 4.3 Social class segregation in Greater Athens, 1971. Composite map, adapted from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished data (computer printouts), as well as the following figures 4.9 and 4.10.

industrial suburbs. This differentiation has recently intensified (TCG 1981: 255-6).

The general picture communicated by spatial patterns in Athens and Salonica is the combination of a concentric and a sectoral model similar to the inverse-Burgess spatial pattern. As in all Mediterranean cities (chapter 1), social class levels correlate with the land-rent and density gradients (Amato 1970; Emmanuel 1983).

Two further important regularities are evident in the Athens spatial structure in 1971. One relates to its stability since the interwar period. The interwar proletarian enclaves in and around Piraeus remained, contributing to the sharp differentiation between Athens as a bourgeois and Piraeus as a proletarian-popular city. The bourgeois areas have also changed very little since then: Syntagma and Kolonaki in the centre, Psychico further out, and the suburbs of Kifissia and Ekali on the north, P. Phalero and Glyphada on the south, have remained traditional strongholds of the bourgeoisie. The only area added in the 1960s was Papagos on the east, an exclusive community of army officers. This persistence of bourgeois strongholds since the interwar period underlines the lack of any extensive filtering-down process up to 1971.

The other regularity is very interesting in the Mediterranean context (chapter 1): the bourgeois areas appear much more exclusive than those of the working class. LQs in the former (fig. 4.4) were as high as 4.4 in 1971, while working-class communities evidenced more moderate LQs, which means that they were more mixed than those of the bourgeoisie. The same exclusivity of bourgeois areas has been observed in Salonica (Tsoulouvis 1985: 162–3). The mixture of middle and working classes, on the other hand, is due to the alternative to community segregation, encountered throughout Southern Europe: vertical differentiation. The Athens central areas are just a little less colourful than those of Naples (Allum 1973, cf. chapter 1), since the latter has virtually no peripheral shanty towns, and low-income areas concentrate in the inner city. However, the importance of vertical differentiation in urban space remains, as it now tends to affect suburban areas (chapter 6).

#### *4.1.2 Mixed land uses, factories and the journey to work*

The location of social classes with respect to the city centre, which has been the main concern of geographers, always gives an incomplete picture of urban spatial patterns. What should also be studied is their location with respect to other major centres or zones of economic activity. The pattern of mixed land uses stressed in chapter 1 is as evident and long-standing in Athens (Georgoulas and Markopoulou 1977: 73; Leontidou 1977) as in the rest of the Mediterranean cities. Activities of the informal sector are dispersed throughout the urban fabric.

The formal part of the urban economy, on the other hand, conforms to the familiar urban morphology of centralization and development along axes and special zones. The process by which two centres of economic activity have developed since the nineteenth century – Athens and Piraeus




Figure 4.4 Industrial, commercial and service employment in Attica, 1978. Source: Computed and mapped from unpublished disaggregated data (computer printouts) of the NSSG census of establishments, 1978.

– linked by an industrial axis has already been discussed. This distribution of economic activity persisted into the 1960s, and, moreover, by 1978 the trend for employment centralization had created large concentrations of economic activity in the inner city of both Athens and Piraeus (fig. 4.4).<sup>3</sup> The Athens CBD has always had two poles: Syntagma Square on the east concentrates offices and public services, as well as commerce addressed to middle-class consumers; and Omonia Square on the west concentrates manufacturing and wholesale commerce, and attracts consumers from western working-class areas. This polarization correlates with the social character of adjoining residential zones and industrial axes.

<sup>3</sup> The CBD of Athens was as dynamic as ever in the early 1970s. Total employment in and around it increased from 284,000 in 1969 to 317,000 in 1972 (Mandicas 1973, 4: 51), i.e. at an average annual rate of 3.73%; in 1969 only 16.1% of this employment was in manufacturing.




Figure 4.5 The Greater Athens industrial axis, 1969. Density of the labour force in manufacturing at place of work, computed and mapped from unpublished data (computer printouts) of NCSR–NSSG (1973), where employment in ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ industry by km<sup>2</sup> was given separately.

Between the centres of Athens and Piraeus, the industrial axis has developed since the nineteenth century. A study of the density of manufacturing employment per km<sup>2</sup> in 1969 on the basis of information in the computer printouts of the NCSR–NSSG study (fig. 4.5) shows that by 1969 the axis had intensified and was encircled by new industrial areas.<sup>4</sup> New enterprises were installed in old buildings, older ones expanded, even

<sup>4</sup> Intense industrial concentrations appear around the CBD, along the Athens–Piraeus axis and in the interwar industrial suburbs. The creation of an industrial axis near the Athens–Piraeus railroad and the port since the nineteenth century, extended on its northwest in the zone of A. I. Rendis-Tavros, has been already discussed (chapter 2). This oldest industrial zone of the agglomeration was considered aged by 1964 (Burgel 1970: 17). In fact, it was not declining at all, as shown here. Decline after 1973 will be focused upon in chapter 5.



new ones arrived from other urban areas (ETVA-SCET 1974, 3A: 11). Many factories appeared on the west of the Athens centre, in an area traditionally called the Olive Grove. Ironically, this is still the name of this heavily polluted industrial zone, where by 1973 little space for expansion was available. Another dynamic zone grew in the western suburbs, where factories were established among working-class neighbourhoods after the rapid urbanization waves of the late 1950s. By contrast, only a few new factories developed in the zone of N. Ionia on the north, but the stagnation of this textile-manufacturing area was counterbalanced by industrial growth on its north. No important locational rearrangements were evident until the early 1970s (chapter 5), except for the appearance of some new manufacturing activity to the southeast of the agglomeration. The prevalent process was concentration, combined with a dispersal of small industrial and artisan establishments throughout the urban fabric (fig. 4.5).

Athens and Salonica have evidenced the strong employment linkage observed in most Mediterranean cities (chapter 1). The employment linkage could have been weakened by the fact that residential choices have followed the availability of cheap land for settlement rather than accessibility to a fixed workplace. The sectoral rather than centralized development of industrial areas, along with the spatial dispersion of the informal sector, however, has strengthened the linkage. Proximity of workplace and residence is very close in Athens and Salonica, even in the formal economy (Virirakis 1968; Pappas 1970; ACE 1965; Burgel 1970). The average journey to work in 1963 was found to be only 3.7 km (Pappas and Virirakis 1972). Activities recruiting labour from the bourgeois and middle-class population (public services, offices, banks, commerce, hotels) develop in the CBD and along the northeast axis of residence of these classes, who, in turn, continue to follow economic activity, even if this means high residential density due to centrality. In Salonica it is the upper strata who live nearest to their workplaces (Tsoulouvis 1985: 185-7). As economic activity follows residence and vice versa, social classes live in their respective employment zones and the range of commuting is small. This spatial structure is rooted in interwar locational decisions and to the structure of the urban economy.

The correlation between population at place of residence and employment at place of work has been strong, especially in the manufacturing sector. Since the interwar period, factories have come to settle not only near the port and the railroad, but also near working-class communities, and these have been created in turn near factories by the RSC (chapter 2). The employment linkage has remained strong long after relevant policies were withdrawn. One of the reasons for the attractiveness of Athens for industry

was the concentration of labour. As long as industrial concentration remained heavy along the Athens–Piraeus axis and to its northeast, the west and northwest communities of Athens would offer a double advantage to the working class: proximity to workplace, and cheap land for settlement. The fact that urbanization and industrialization have been two interwoven processes from the period of refugee settlement has been reflected in urban space. A variant of the Lowry model applied in Athens showed significant fit (Emmanuel 1983). The comparison of figs. 4.2 and 4.5 shows that the working class lived among the polluting factories along the industrial axis and on its northwest, literally upon their places of employment (PERPA 1985). From Piraeus to the northern suburbs Greater Athens was an industrial, working-class city. Popular communities springing up near the factories to furnish industry with a labour force were soon to be followed by more factories.<sup>5</sup> A constant circle was thus maintained, keeping the employment linkage strong in postwar Athens.

Three case studies at different periods provide evidence for the proximity of workplace and residence in major industry. A 1961 survey of a sample of 5,000 workers in factories with over 450 employees showed that 63.6% of workers lived near their workplaces and, moreover, 32.3% walked to work.<sup>6</sup> In 1964 a study of a smaller sample of 2,800 workers in industries with over 50 employees found that 56.1% lived within the sector of their employment and 33.1% walked to work (Burgel 1970: 134). The journey to work appeared generally longer in 1964 than in 1961, but shorter in newer industrial areas on the southeast and especially the west in 1964. Many new factories were obviously attracted in these working-class areas, which increased the number of accessible workplaces for the residents. A study of workers in different sizes of industrial enterprises in the Nomos of Attica, Beotia, Korinth and Thebes in 1973 found that the employment linkage was much stronger in small artisan establishments.<sup>7</sup> In fact, the dispersal of economic activity in areas of mixed uses was the most basic

<sup>5</sup> Other working-class fractions cannot be studied in the same manner. Workers in construction did not have a fixed workplace. The residential patterns of transport workers are obscured by inappropriate categories used in disaggregated data matrices: the NCRS–NSSG study has grouped them along with labour in the tertiary sector. The trend towards a huge concentration of transport employment in Piraeus in 1973–8 has been observed in Leontidou 1981b.

<sup>6</sup> Smith and assoc. 1963. The respective numbers for clerical labour were only 29% and 6.9%, while only 13% of the manufacturing labour force had very long journeys to work.

<sup>7</sup> ETVA–SCET 1974, 2: 68–70. Among factories with over 100 employees only 25.6% recruited the majority of their workers (over 51%) from a distance shorter than 2 km. Dispersal of recruitment at a distance over 10 km was also considerable. The percentage of establishments recruiting the majority of their workers from a short distance, however, rose to 27.3% in middle-sized industry (10–99 employees), but leapt to 70.4% in the case of artisan establishments.

factor explaining the close proximity of residence and workplace in postwar Athens.

#### 4.2 Housing production and 'arbitrary' settlements

Interwar Greece witnessed the most massive public mobilization in its housing history (chapter 2). This activity decreased in the 1930s and declined further after the wars. Greater Athens became the centre of a buoyant private construction sector which rebuilt the whole city. 'Arbitrary' settlements constituted a large part of this activity. This is the literal translation of the Greek word for illegal building and pirate subdivisions: *afthereta*. Uncontrolled urban development and the dual structure of housing production will be studied in the following section.

##### 4.2.1 *The decline of planning and the public housing sector*

Greek cities grew mostly without planning. This is evident in their spatial structure, and universally admitted. Salonica is a partial and interesting exception: a very extensive area in the urban core was replanned after a destructive fire in August 1917 (Dimitracopoulos 1937; Karadimou 1985). The massive urban planning operation, unparalleled in the Greek context, involved the redistribution of urban property through a type of cooperative (*ktimatikes omades*), which was institutionally original in not only the Greek but also the European context. The resettlement of Salonica gave an impetus to the emergence of planning legislation and the first building code. After all, in Greece urban and housing policy has always been triggered by disaster relief. Soon after 1917, in 1922, the refugee inflow would give an impetus to a major mobilization for housing and land policy (chapter 2). In smaller towns, earthquakes and fires also led to relevant measures, of lesser national importance.

Unlike Salonica, Athens grew haphazardly. A multitude of petty landowning interests have always strongly resisted and undermined planning (chapter 2). Students of postwar Greek planning history find themselves in an awkward position because of the picture of general inadequacy (Wassenhoven 1984; Leontidou 1981c). It is usually posited that planning is actually non-existent in Greece. An analysis of regional and environmental legislation (chapter 5) will contradict these views. At this point, however, the most inefficient and inert division of Greek planning is discussed – urban policy. The Planning Directorate for the Greater Athens Area established within the Ministry of Public Works in 1965, and some minor planning and surveying offices for other towns, had little impact apart from some

efforts in land use data collection and physical planning, and a few blueprints.

Planning did not cease during the dictatorship (as posited in Wassenhoven 1984: 23–4): new legislation for regional development was passed and centralized authorities undertook planning on the national and urban scale in the interests of capitalist development and regulation.<sup>8</sup> Efforts for the drafting of an Athens Master Plan intensified after 1978 and especially after the establishment of the new Ministry of Regional Planning, Housing and the Environment.<sup>9</sup> The 1983–5 period is outside the scope of this book, but it should be mentioned that the Greek authorities, opting for the decentralization of planning procedures for all towns, actually created extreme fragmentation. The ambition of the notorious ‘EPA’ (‘Operation Urban Reconstruction’) was to provide plans for all Greek towns and urban subsectors simultaneously. The result was anything but effective planning or decentralization. Most of the plans, usually not drafted by actual planners, were shelved or served only in ‘legalizing’ illegal operations in several areas including popular unauthorized settlements.

At the same time, decisions and interventions on the development of Athens proceeded without reference to the above plans. The built volume was increased several times through legislation allowing for higher building coefficients, especially during the dictatorship (chapter 6); the ‘legalization’ of already urbanized areas can be seen as a sort of land policy, increasing the horizontal supply of building land; tolerance to semi-squatting (section 4.2.3), encouragement of fragmentation of landownership, and related practices can also be seen as a sort of policy. Even planning without plans was practised in Athens central areas. ‘Pedestrianization’ and renewal programmes without traffic planning and social concern have disturbed the already chaotic transport network. Special plans have benefited already privileged eastern areas of the CBD, including the original nucleus of the nineteenth-century city, Plaka, which was the first community to undergo gentrification, attracting absentee landowners during the last decade. Important decisions concerning restrictions of movement of private cars in

<sup>8</sup> Cf. chapter 5. The Ministry of Coordination drafted a 15-year Development Plan including the first projections for the regional distribution of population and employment (CPER 1972) and commissioned consultants for the Greater Athens Structure Plan (Doxiadis Assoc. 1976), but this programme was subsequently shelved. At the same time, the Ministry of Public Works commissioned a series of studies for the Athens Master Plan (including ETVA–SCET 1974; NCSR–NSSG 1973; Mandicas 1973; and many others), which actually constitute the first point of reference for every investigation of urban growth, population and employment, but did not lead to a Master Plan.

<sup>9</sup> YHOP, later YPEHODE. After an awkward series of negotiations, consultations and public gatherings, a document was produced and nine studies of ‘subregions’ of Attica were commissioned from private consultants, which were predictably shelved too when the new socialist government was elected in 1981 (Wassenhoven 1984; Leontidou 1981c).

the CBD have been taken in the 1980s in the same unorganized, *de facto* manner.

Public participation in housebuilding has been also negligible. It actually declined in postwar Greece, as in the rest of Southern Europe.<sup>10</sup> During the Second World War a substantial part of the housing stock and infrastructure was destroyed. About 25–30%, or over 500,000 buildings, were in ruins. The overall loss of capital stock has been estimated at about \$8.5 billion by the end of the war (Psilos 1968: 33). Despite constant references to the ‘necessity’ for a housing policy, however, public activity in urban land and housing dwindled away. Between 1948 and 1950 public investment in housing amounted to 33–37% of the total housing investment annually; in 1951 and 1955–8 it fell to 10–15%, in 1952–4 it plummeted to 1–8% (Psilos 1968: 20) and in 1959–1971 it fluctuated at the 3–6% level annually. Since 1972 it has never risen over 2%.

Immediately after the war the Greek government and the US agencies engaged in reconstruction concentrated their activity in the provinces, on the grounds that this was the area of the worst destruction. However, political expediency can be discerned: housing policy was used as a counter-guerilla measure in view of the power of the EAM during and after the civil war. The projects completed with US aid used original methods of organization and provided almost as many houses as the RSC, especially if the disaster relief projects of the 1950s are included (Papaioannou 1975: 154–7; Mexis 1970: 185). Urban areas were neglected. The activity of the Ministry of Social Welfare for refugee settlement ceased during the war, so that by 1951 the shortage was estimated at 14,241 urban dwellings, of which three-quarters were in Greater Athens (Ministry of Social Welfare 1958). Building after the war has placed its main emphasis on slum clearance, especially the effort at dispersion of the ‘red enclaves’, the refugee neighbourhoods of Athens and Piraeus.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> As detailed in essays in Wynn (ed.) 1984b and summarized in Gaspar 1984, in Portugal the public sector built 10% of the new stock during the 1970s, but the percentage dropped during the 1980s; in Italy the share of housing directly built by the public sector fell from an annual average of 18% in the early 1950s to less than 3% in the 1970s; the marked fall in the housing shortage in Spain since 1961 from 1 million to 300–600,000 dwellings should be attributed to extensive private building activity in 1961–7 (Santillana 1980). New housing in the market amounted to 74% in Madrid in 1977, while public sector participation decreased sharply from 8.1 to 4.9% in 1973–6.

<sup>11</sup> Refugee hovels had already been torn down by the Germans in 1941, as being hubs of the underground resistance movement. The Greek authorities took over this task in the 1950s and rehoused some of the families in blocks of flats in Piraeus, Keratsini and Tavros in Athens during reconstruction. Throughout the 1950s refugee shacks were being demolished in many areas of the city, but only 5,137 houses were built in Athens and Piraeus and 4,111 in the rest of Greece up to the end of 1957 (Ministry of Social Welfare 1958). After an Act passed in 1959 and a Law of 1961, slum clearance continued jointly under two ministries. Only 4,857 houses were provided in 1961–7, mostly in areas outside Greater Athens (Ministry of Social Welfare 1958; Papaioannou 1975: 165–6; Mexis 1970).

The low level of public housebuilding in Greater Athens (fig. 4.6) includes the combined activity of the two ministries mentioned above, as well as a special body created by LD 2963/1954 especially for white- and blue-collar workers in urban areas: the Autonomous Workers' Housing Organization (AOEK). Its activity was negligible, despite its abundant funds deducted from workers' wages, the rising number of applicants and its high targets. To become an AOEK 'beneficiary' not only required a long period of stable employment; it also presupposed political and syndicalist conformity. A labour aristocracy was thus housed by AOEK (Emmanuel 1979). The low cost of housing projects, of which the Greek authorities boasted, was due mainly to the low standard of constructions and the negligible cost of peripheral land (section 4.2.3). During the dictatorship event this meagre activity declined in the context of 'reorientation' of housing policy (section 5.2.3).

References to a multitude of bodies for the realization of housing policy in postwar Greece (CPER 1967; UN ECE 1973, 1975) should therefore be viewed with some scepticism. Most provided dwellings to already privileged corporate groups with stable employment and relatively high earnings. The only unprivileged group receiving attention were peasants. Their preference for urban real estate, however, was not counterbalanced by public housing policy. It has been suggested that the institution of the dowry was transformed from a mechanism of transfer of rural land property into a mechanism of land sales and transfer of resources from country to city (Karapostolis 1983: 106-8).

Returning emigrants were also favoured by the Housing Savings Bank of the National Mortgage Bank (EKTE), as importers of foreign currency. It has been calculated that already in 1957-9, 20-25 % of new housing was financed by Greeks from abroad. By the end of 1970 deposits by 31,800 foreign workers and sailors in the EKTE amounted to \$1.25 billion, and in 1971 these deposits were estimated as responsible for the import of about \$3 million monthly, of which 90 % was not re-exported (UN ECE 1973: 157-61; OECD 1978: 35). Emigrants and sailors invested in this sector, and capital from abroad has been found to represent one-quarter of housing investment in the early 1970s (Emmanuel 1981: 135).

The Athens working class was doubly handicapped, as a class and as residents of a city receiving almost no attention apart from the slum clearance projects during the dictatorship. Athens accounted for a mere 5.4 % of total public housing activity in 1945-62 (fig. 4.6). This peaked in 1958, with 2,069 houses or 10 % of the country's dwelling construction, and then declined further. In the 1970s the activity of the AOEK as well as bank loans directed to privileged groups concentrated in Attica, while other 'popular' housing programmes were decentralized. Public expenditure for

infrastructure was also small, and provided finance for works for the image-conscious bourgeoisie.

#### 4.2.2 A 'dual' housing market

The structure of private housing production in postwar Greece has been shown to be dual, composed of two essentially different modes, which have been characterized as capitalist-speculative and precapitalist respectively (Emmanuel 1981). It has been argued in chapter 1 that the owner-built sector should be characterized as *informal* rather than precapitalist. This variant of dualism is typical of Mediterranean European cities in general. Opposites like the housing market versus any public sector are irrelevant: the alternative to the market is a self-built, often illegal, housing sector, the material basis of spontaneous urban development.

Though a housing market was established early in nineteenth-century Greece (chapter 2), the apartment building was institutionalized in the interwar period by Law 3741/1929 'on horizontal property', and increasingly dominated the new building activity at the time (Marmaras 1985). Postwar Athens became the centre of a buoyant private construction sector. Private building activity was so limited in the 1940s that a law, KH' Psiphisma, was passed in 1947 to encourage it; then it exploded, so that legislation was necessary to curb it (Ellis et al. 1964: 215). The gap between public and private activity is clearly demonstrated in fig. 4.6. Concentration of the total building stock (old and new) in Athens was moderate in 1970, amounting to 12.62 % of buildings in Greece and 15.92 % of residential buildings. These, however, were the largest buildings in the country: 71.5 % of Greek buildings of over five storeys were concentrated in Athens in 1970 (adapted from NSSG).

The concentration of new building activity was declining in 1961-84 (table 4.1), but new houses were built at a higher rate than population increase at least until the 1978 building boom (fig. 4.6). The rapid rise in housing supply is evident in the following rates: in 1951-61, a comparison of the net population increase in Greater Athens with new residences built indicates that there appeared one new house per 2.6 new inhabitants; in 1961-71 this rose to one house per 1.8 new inhabitants; and by 1971-81, the rate reached one house per 0.88 new inhabitants.<sup>12</sup> Two peak periods of

<sup>12</sup> In 1951-61, when the net population increase in Greater Athens was 474,123 people, 180,688 new residences were built and 125,556 extended. This means one new house per 2.6 new inhabitants of which a mere 4.82 % were supplied by public agencies. In 1961-71, when the population increased by 687,532 people, private activity alone added 379,946 residences in the city, or one house per 1.8 new inhabitants. Since the building volume increased by 134,097,000 m<sup>3</sup>, this meant 195 m<sup>3</sup> per house, or 65 m<sup>3</sup> of newly built space per new inhabitant.




Figure 4.6 Private and public residential building in Athens, 1945–85. Sources: Adapted from NSSG Statistical Yearbooks of Greece, 1955–86, and unauthorized building series from Leontidou and Emmanuel (1972: 31; personal communication with Ministry of Public Works).

overbuilding, 1971–3 and 1976–9, resulted in overproduction, which to a large extent explains the high rate of empty residences in Athens during the 1981 census at 17%, though the earthquake at the time might have been partly responsible. A recent NCSR study has found that the rate has fallen again to about 6%.

These calculations should be qualified by the fact that the old building stock was being destroyed in the process: new dwellings often substituted older buildings. Their demolition, the rates of which have never been quantified, has erased the neo-classical architectural tradition of Athens. It is fortunate that the inhabitants of Rome or Barcelona have not been equally destructive, though the former did destroy some famous villas by subdivision (Fried 1973: 24–5). Greater Athens was subject to an aggressive invasion of capitalism, and was changed into a reinforced concrete agglomeration,



Table 4.1 *The declining concentration of building activity in Greater Athens, 1961-84*

Volume of new buildings (thousand m <sup>3</sup> ), total activity in:			
	Athens	Greece	Athens % of Greece
1961-6	54,846	120,311	45.59
1967-72	92,295	255,572	36.11
1973-8	109,496	348,662	31.40
1979-84	64,069	311,867	20.54

Source: Adapted from NSSG Statistical Yearbooks, 1962-85.

where building space was commercially exploited to the maximum degree possible. Until a few years after the dictatorship, the constant sight of semi-finished constructions and building sites evoked the picture of a new city, a city without history.

Since housing production was controlled by commercial capital which exploited movements in prices and was based on the maximization of urban ground rent, this dominant mode of housing production should be characterized as speculative (Emmanuel 1981). Small entrepreneurial capital and landowners controlled production and prices. Gradually since the 1930s (Marmaras 1985: 169-70), but especially after the war, the system became based on an institution of exchange-arrangements (*antiparochi*) between landowners and builders, as follows: the landowner of each plot turned the property over to the building enterprise; the contractors built the apartment house, usually financing it by selling beforehand; and they gave part of it (one or more apartments) to the landowners, according to the value of their land. This organization of production permitted the entrepreneurs to finance the building by stages and was determined by the fragmentation of real estate property in Greek urban areas, and the small plots in Athens more specifically: it has been shown that even in central urban areas there were no large residential landlords, and landholdings were very small (Emmanuel 1981: 337-41).

A process of piecemeal urban redevelopment was the result, producing building blocks with a small number of properties for owner-occupation or rent. The speculative market was not capital intensive, and evidenced a low level of industrialization. The so-called system of '*fatoura*' was established in cities during the interwar period (Marmaras 1985). Construction was undertaken by teams of craftsmen and was based on piece-work,

Table 4.2 *The structure of the new building stock in Greater Athens by number of storeys, 1961–84*

	Single-storey	2-3-storey	Multi-storey	Total number (100 %)	
Percentage of <i>number</i> of private authorized buildings					
1961	80.19	11.85	7.96	8,309	
1964	65.38	19.51	15.11	7,073	
1971	42.99	31.42	25.59	8,695	
1975 <sup>a</sup>	29.87	44.04	26.09	7,053	
1981	20.74	52.14	27.13	4,051	
1984	20.33	54.65	25.02	2,966	
Percentage of <i>volume</i> of private authorized buildings					
				thousand m <sup>3</sup>	m <sup>3</sup> /building
1961	31.65	15.21	53.14	7,103	854.86
1964	20.66	16.88	62.46	9,765	1380.60
1971	13.16	20.29	66.55	17,365	1997.12
1975 <sup>a</sup>	11.78	30.63	57.59	12,719	1803.35
1981	16.22	39.12	44.65	7,735	1909.41
1984	15.86	38.67	45.47	5,876	1981.12

<sup>a</sup> The year 1974 is avoided, because of the crisis (fig. 4.6).

Source: Adapted from NSSG Statistical Yearbooks, 1962–85.

subcontracting and lump-labour, as in Italian cities (Ginatempo 1979: 467). The multi-storey apartment blocks were constructed in a piecemeal process within a fragmented housing market. Most of them were low-quality constructions. Building standards declined, with the result that a large proportion of recently built housing in Greek cities is already in need of repair or even replacement.

Multi-storey apartment buildings were mushrooming in the inner city independently of demand. By 1970 they constituted 10.36 % of the Greater Athens building stock, while they formed only 1.73 % of the total stock in the rest of Greece (adapted from NSSG). The spectacular growth of new buildings of over two storeys in relation to the number, but especially the volume, of newly built structures is shown in table 4.2 for selected years from 1961 to 1984. A remarkably rapid decline of single storeys as a proportion of new buildings (from 80.19 % to 20.33 %) and new volume (from 31.65 % to 15.86 %) is also shown on this table. Despite fluctuations, the speculative apartment sector rose to dominance, and this was accompanied by structural transformations of urban capitalism, which will be taken up at length in chapter 6.

However expansive, urban capitalism excluded a large part of the population. No credit has been available, no public concern for social housing and no rent policy.<sup>13</sup> The Greek speculative sector has been more 'democratic' than others in Mediterranean Europe, where the interest of real estate corporations in luxurious housing has created large supplies which remain vacant, while a scarcity of low-income dwellings is evident from the proliferation of peripheral settlements.<sup>14</sup> The case of Athens, however, has not been very different. As an alternative to the exclusive speculative housing market, a large self-built informal sector has developed between the commercial and the public one.

According to an early NCSR study (Burgel 1970) carried out in 1964, before the building boom increased the incidence of multi-storey apartment buildings, only 5.4 % of blue-collar workers in major factories were living in apartment houses, while the rate for white-collar and supervisory labour was four times as high – 21.6 %. The majority of the working class (52.2 %) lived in isolated detached low-rise houses, and 41.6 % lived in small apartments in low-rise buildings. The early study did not comment on this finding, which was investigated more systematically much later, when each sector was attributed to a specific social class. 'The Athens housing system is structured around two main sectors: a popular strata/low-rise sector and a middle strata/higher-rise one, which are connected to the precapitalist and the speculative residential production modes respectively' (Emmanuel 1981: 92).

It has been pointed out here that the popular strata have created an informal rather than precapitalist housing sector. A definition of this informal sector which disentangles it from illegality as a necessary condition (chapter 1) is basic for the study of Greek housing. The informal housing sector is more sizeable than the unauthorized housing sector. It comprises a large sector of owner-built housing 'controlled by households-landowners

<sup>13</sup> Provisions in a law for rent control introduced in the 1950s favoured secure tenancies, forced the rentals upwards, but, most important, indirectly promoted redevelopment in areas of ageing housing stock, and therefore demolitions. The law 'pertained to all dwellings already rented in January 1945. A rent-controlled house can only become decontrolled through payment of damages to the tenant and the wrecking of the house' (Ellis *et al.* 1964: 215).

<sup>14</sup> There was a large stock of empty housing in Italian cities during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Marcelloni 1979: 255). The 1971 census found the population to have increased by 6.7 % in the decade, dwellings by 27.7 %, the number of rooms by 33 %, but 12 % of habitations were found to be unoccupied – a total of 416,786 houses (Della Seta 1978). In the Barcelona metropolitan area 50,000 houses were unoccupied during the 1970s, demonstrating the disequilibrium between supply and demand and the fact that rent levels were inaccessible to workers (Remica 1977: 186). New housing provision in this city has been aimed too high up the social scale, and luxurious housing stands empty while the poor inhabit overcrowded tenements and shanty towns for lack of access to the normal market (Ginatempo and Cammarota 1977).

who mostly produce for use' (Emmanuel 1979: 29). Semi-squatting forms only part of the owner-built sector. The latter includes authorized petty owner-building and extensions: small owner-built houses of one or two storeys and conversions and extensions of the existing housing stock, such as the addition of a storey to existing structures to house new members of the extended family, or new families related to the initial settlers. The number of such extensions was substantial during the 1950s, rising to 9,478 in 1956 and 8,500 in 1961. Illegal extensions appeared both within and outside the city plan, and constantly fluctuated at the 53–57 % level of total unauthorized building activity (adapted from NSSG Yearbooks). After the mid-1960s, however, the number of unauthorized extensions fell and maintained a steady decline, along with illegal building as a whole (fig. 4.6).

#### 4.2.3 'Arbitrary' popular settlements

The Greek unauthorized settlements (*afthereta*, literally 'arbitrary') have undergone numerous variations in their very long history, but they were always built on land duly purchased. In the nineteenth century, when Athens was declared the capital of Greece, illegal settlements involved a mixture of social classes and reflected speculative concerns rather than popular spontaneity (chapter 2). The massive intrusion of the working class and popular strata into semi-squatting was effected during the interwar period. Since then, low-density areas have spilled over to the west, north and east of the Athens agglomeration illegally, by popular initiative. Their location and density in the 1960s is shown in fig. 4.7. The irregular, random and small areas of expansion of the city plan as shown on fig. 4.8 bear witness to the fact that retrospective 'legalizations' of unauthorized settlements were the standard procedure of urban expansion and preceded any form of organized urban development.

Urban development in twentieth-century Greece has been controlled, not by plans, but by a rigid nationwide legislative framework specifying a building code and punitive action against illegal building. The fundamental planning law of 1923 'on plans of cities and towns' included restrictions on settlement outside the city plan, but the first special law against building on 'agricultural' land parcels appeared in 1926 (Dimitracopoulos 1937: 384). For many years urban development was based on this law prescribing procedures to be followed by the police and planning authorities to demolish unauthorized structures (codified in Economou 1970). Formally only land within the city plan was approved by the Ministry of Public Works as residential and urban, as opposed to 'agricultural' land outside these limits, where it was illegal to build on plots of under 4 stremmas (0.4 ha).




Figure 4.7 Unauthorized settlements in Greater Athens, 1968-71. Population in unauthorized and recently (1968-71) legalized areas is shown. Source: Adapted and mapped from unpublished data (computer printouts) of NCSR-NSSG (1973), where population in 1971 by grid square of  $250 \times 250$  m was given.

Illegal building was unauthorized in the sense that it was built on small plots of  $100-200 \text{ m}^2$  in violation of this law, and consequently violated several existing by-laws, and evaded taxation. Illegality thus rested in contravening zoning laws and building codes. With few exceptions such as Perama in Athens, it was not land occupation, but only housing construction that was illegal.

Legislation was later reformulated several times. These laws, especially

those of 1955, 1968 and 1984, illustrate the contradictory role of the State. While determination to check urban expansion and impose heavy penalties on dwellers and builders has been asserted in each law, all illegal structures built up to that point have been 'legalized' retrospectively with the payment of a 'special contribution to the public' (Romanos 1969). This system breeds corruption in planning authorities and a calculative behaviour on the part of fringe speculators and landowners as well as the settlers.

The above analysis indicates that the central authorities have thus adopted a hypocritical attitude to illegal building, at the same time encouraging and stigmatizing it. At times, authority was reaffirmed by police measures, demolitions and detentions of settlers. After the mid-1960s austerity was shown more frequently than before: in 1964 alone, about 2,000 shacks were demolished (Romanos 1969: 144), and many more during the dictatorship, when policies of both coercion and incorporation were implemented to bring popular semi-squatting to a standstill, as will be shown in chapter 6. At other periods, by contrast, 'the housing problem' was stressed, lack of resources for its solution and even humanitarianism were referred to, and a relaxed attitude was rationalized which was due to political expediency. Settlers were then appeased – as a numerous electorate – through retrospective 'legalization' of large areas, usually without infrastructure provision. This contradictory policy is not strange, since semi-squatting at the same time relieved the authorities of responsibility for popular housing, but was also thought to obstruct the planned growth of cities.

Although illegal building has frequently been persecuted, then, it has developed under the auspices of government tolerance as in the Third World cities. In fact, planners have tended to consider the final settlers (rather than speculators on the urban fringe) as 'immoral' people trying to escape taxation and take advantage of periods of elections or political instability to erect their shacks. This stresses the biased and exaggerated attitudes in the 'official' interpretation. The authorities have tolerated and even stimulated illegal building as a way to resolve potential social conflicts or to promote political patronage and allegiance by the settlers. Popular common sense has come to expect such policies. The people know that, if patient, they can expect retrospective 'legalization', and that strict laws have been enforced only occasionally and selectively. They have tended to rely on their political weight as an electorate and exert pressure for the 'legalization' of their communities since the interwar period.

The figures for unauthorized housing (table 4.2, fig. 4.6) are not reliable in so far as such activity was not officially recorded;<sup>15</sup> their interregional

<sup>15</sup> Unpublished information obtained by personal communication from the Ministry of Public Works for the 1955–68 period was first presented in Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972: 31. It

Table 4.3 *Concentration of unauthorized building activity in Greater Athens, 1945-69*

	Number of new unauthorized houses in		Athens as	Unauthorized as
	Athens	Greece	% of Greece	% of new houses in Athens
1945-50	17,491	21,492	81.38	48.32
1951-60	49,519	70,448	70.29	28.02
1961-9	70,592	114,207	61.81	19.32
Total, 1945-69	137,602	206,147	66.75	23.81

*Source:* Adapted from unpublished information from the Ministry of Public Works presented in Leontidou & Emmanuel 1972 (cf. also fig. 4.6) and from NSSG, *Statistical Yearbooks of Greece* 1955, 1963, 1968, 1970.

variation and diachronic fluctuations, however, are indicative. Unauthorized building activity was massive in Athens compared to the rest of Greece, though this concentration declined during the course of the postwar period (table 4.3). The peak of illegal building activity occurred just before the dictatorship (fig. 4.6), and the early 1960s constituted the golden period of this mode of housing production.

Demographic studies of underdeveloped countries have shown that squatters constitute 25-35% of the postwar population increase (Dwyer 1975; Abrams 1964; Roberts 1978: 137). The number of the Athens semi-squatters was no less impressive. We have calculated it in several alternative ways which give somewhat different results. On the basis of the number of illegal houses and extensions and the average household size, 560,000 people were housed illegally during 1945-71.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, since unauthorized houses constituted 24% of total new residential building in

should be noted that the number of 282,257 illegal houses given by ELKEPA (as cited in AGA 1962: 10) includes adaptations of extensions into equivalent dwelling units and is therefore imprecise. For other estimates of the extent of illegal building, cf. CPER (1967: 29-34), UN ECE (1973: 105). The former is based on an estimate of a construction rate of 10,000 illegal dwellings annually in Greece during the 1960s.

<sup>16</sup> On the basis of table 4.3, and if we consider a minimum family size of three persons per family, 52,470 persons were housed illegally in 1945-50, 148,560 in 1951-60 and 211,780 in 1961-9 - a total of 412,810 people. Those housed in illegal extensions in 1945-62 can be calculated, with the assumption of a minimum family size of 1.5 members (considering that some of the extensions did not house entire families, but only one member of a growing family), at a total of 154,570 people. The total thus rises to 567,380 people, or 40% of the population increase in 1940-71. During that period, apparent migration was 1,416,100 people. Despite the fact that this method underestimates average family size, this is the largest estimate encountered in the relevant bibliography. Romanos (1970: 30) probably underestimates the number of illegal houses built in 1945-66 at 65-75,000, and consequently the settlers at a figure of 320-380,000.




Figure 4.8 The expansion of the Greater Athens Plan, 1940-80. Adapted and mapped from the following sources: Biris 1966; Thomaidēs 1979; Vassiliades 1974; Ministry of Public Works 1965; as well as comparison and adaptation of unpublished maps of the Greater Athens authorized plan in 1961, 1971, 1982, as drafted by the YHOP (former Ministry of Public Works).

1945-69 (table 4.3), the number of settlers can also be calculated as a similar percentage of the population increase, or about 400,000 people during 1945-70. This seems likely to be an underestimate, since semi-squatters lived in much more overcrowded conditions than the rest of the population. We could therefore safely say that people who housed themselves illegally in the first place were about 450-500,000 or 32%-35% of the population increase of Greater Athens between 1940 and 1971.



Table 4.4 *Expansion of the Athens Master Plan, 1940-75*

	Total agglomeration	Athens	Piraeus	Athens suburbs	Piraeus suburbs
Master Plan expansions, ha					
1940-61	6,360	547	99	5,295	519
1961-71	2,741	90	—	2,546	105
1971-75	282	—	—	252.5	29.5
Master Plan area, ha					
1940	11,600	2,458	1,102	7,322	718
1961	17,961	3,005	1,102	12,617	1,237
1971	20,702	3,095	1,102	15,163	1,342
Built-up area, ha					
1961	27,127	3,800	1,200	20,147	1,980
1971	28,200	4,220	1,270	20,730	1,980
Gross population density, people/ha in the master plan					
1961	103.16	213.41	185.13	63.87	150.30
1971	122.71	288.94	183.34	79.59	176.67
in the built-up area					
1961	68.30	168.76	169.86	40.00	101.87
1971	90.08	211.91	159.09	58.22	119.74

Sources: Adapted from Thomaides 1979 and NSSG land use surveys, 1961 and 1971.

Semi-squatting in Salonica was no less important. All of the city outside the core was built illegally; though data is not consistent or detailed, a 1979 survey estimated that only 29 % of the built-up area had developed on the basis of an authorized plan (TCG 1981: 96-7), and 33.25 % of plot owners had bought their land outside the city plan in the first place, while another 2.4 % had 'bought' it illegally. Areas outside the city plan were still very extensive in the 1980s (Tsoulouvis 1985: 149). Such estimates indicate that people who had at some time been semi-squatters in Greek cities were about 600,000, a population of squatters as large as that in Portugal, where illegal houses have been estimated at 83,015-150,000, indicating a population of 320-600,000 (cf. p. 252, note 7).

Matters change when the question of the share of semi-squatters in the total urban population is dealt with. Retrospective 'legalizations' of Greek illegal settlements from the 1920s to the 1970s have continually reduced the number of people living outside the city plan (fig. 4.8). As shown in table 4.4, the expansions of the Athens city plan after 1940 never covered the built-up urban area, which was almost double the 'legalized' area in the suburbs of

Athens in 1961, and remained substantially larger up to the 1970s. A total of 9,382 ha were added to the city plan during 1940–75, so that its area grew by 79.2 % during this period. Of this growth, 8,093 ha concerned the suburbs of Athens where the authorized area grew by 110.5 % in 1940–75. ‘Legalizations’ were also spectacular in terms of population. It should be noted, however, that urban sprawl was more pronounced during earlier periods of urban history (chapter 2). Gross population densities were continually falling during the nineteenth century and the interwar period (tables 2.1, 2.6), but increased in postwar Athens, both in the urban core (except Piraeus) and in the suburbs (table 4.4).

One of these transitional periods between ‘legalizations’ has been captured in the series of computer printouts of the NCSR–NSSG study, where the absolute number of inhabitants per grid square of 6.25 ha (250 × 250 m) in Greater Athens is given for 1971 (fig. 4.7, table 4.5). The number of dwellers as well as its reduction in 1967–71 can be quantified on the basis of this material. In 1967 the settlers constituted about 9 % of the total urban population, but rose to 19–44 % in the western and northwestern suburbs. During the four following years, however, extensive ‘legalizations’ brought their share down to 3.63 % or 90,000 people by 1971. Together with illegal settlers in areas immediately adjoining the Athens basin (Elefsina, Acharne, Messogeia), they amounted to 126,000 people at the time. The massive postwar land colonization is by no means reflected in this moderate number. Though ‘legalized’, large peripheral urban areas were still areas of semi-squatters, where informal practices went on long after legalization.

From an economic point of view, illegal building was based on the access of the popular strata to peripheral urban land. Houses were cheap because of the low price of land and tax evasion, but also because the settlers built by stages, as savings permitted. Usually they built a ‘core’ and then expanded it as their families grew.

Types of land and level of land rent in Greek cities were differentiated by the polar opposite of legal/illegal: ‘urban’ land within the city plan, as opposed to ‘agricultural’ land. The long-term change in land prices in Athens indicates that average land price correlated not only with demand, but with monopolistically fixed prices depending on exogenous factors.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Such as the dichotomy between urban and agricultural land (Emmanuel 1983: 101–11). The example of Rome is relevant here, where the dichotomy was extreme: land zoned as farmland cost \$640 an acre in 1966, while neighbouring properties zoned for residential development were worth between \$140,000 and 200,000 an acre. It is noteworthy that the case of Athens has initiated a reformulation of current models of urban ground rent, both neoclassical and marxian, the rejection of the ‘law’ of differential rents, the introduction of the theory of monopolistic competition into urban economics, and the integration of land price theory with Lowry-type models (Emmanuel 1985). The theoretical argument is out of place here.

Table 4.5 *Population in unauthorized settlements by area in Greater Athens, 1967-71*

	(1) Population in households (excluding institutions)	Population in unauthorized and recently 'legalized' areas		
		(2) Unauthorized in 1971	(3) Authorized in 1967-71	(2) and (3) as % of total population (1)
Athens (A)	856,456	3,796	2,773	0.77
Piraeus (P)	194,819	—	—	0.00
Piraeus suburbs	234,435	14,081	10,543	10.50
Athens suburbs	1,172,469	71,410	121,925	16.49
of which:				
West	133,026	19,748	5,853	19.25
Northwest	229,540	14,152	86,834	44.00
North	131,158	3,758	17,902	16.51
East	93,549	3,334	3,548	7.36
Northeast 1	89,936	10,716	3,166	15.44
Northeast 2	29,479	2,356	73	8.24
Southeast	217,575	15,008	1,842	7.74
South 1	195,262	1,292	1,610	1.47
South 2	52,944	1,046	1,097	4.05
Total Greater Athens	2,458,179	89,287	135,241	9.13

Communities in each of the above subdivisions:

A: Athens, Galatsi; P: Piraeus, Drapetsona, N. Phalero.

Piraeus suburbs: Keratsini, Perama, Nikaia, Korydallos, Ag. I. Rendis.

West: Aigaleo, Ag. Varvara, Chaidari.

Northwest: Peristeri, Petroupolis, N. Liossia, Kamatero, Ag. Anargyri.

North: N. Chalkidona, N. Philadelphia, N. Ionia, Heracleio, Metamorfosis, Lycovrysi, Pefki.

East: Ag. Paraskevi, Cholargos, Papagos, Zografos.

Northeast 1: Psychico, Filothei, N. Psychico, Chalandri, Vrilissia, Amaroussion, Melissia.

Northeast 2: Kifissia, N. Erythrea, Ekali, N. Penteli, Penteli.

Southeast: Kaissariani, Byron, Helioupolis, Hymettus, Daphni, Ag. Dimitrios, Argyroupolis.

South 1: Moschato, Tavros, Kallithea, N. Smyrni, P. Phalero.

South 2: Hellenico-Alimos-Kalamaki, Glyphada, Voula, Vouliagmeni.

Sources: Adapted from unpublished data from the computer printouts of the NCSR-NSSG study where population is given by grid squares of 250 x 250 m.

Urban land rents were prohibitively high. Land prices rose sevenfold in 1952–63 and the market value of plots in the authorized urban area as a whole rose from about 30 million dr. in 1952 to 200 billion in 1963 (at current prices – an average annual rate of 18.82 %). Such overall figures incorporate the increase of supply of ‘legalized’ land, but are also indicative of urban land price inflation. Subsequent more ‘moderate’ increases brought land prices to excessive heights. The total value of land in Greater Athens rose from 264 billion dr. in 1964 to 690 billion in 1972, an increase of 162 % or 12.76 % annually, while the increase in central areas reached 180 %, rising to 121 billion dr. (Mandicas 1973, 4: 44–5). This value was equivalent to the gross annual product of the Greater Athens region at the time.

So-called ‘agricultural’ land was much cheaper, even if its price also rose very fast. Popular access to peripheral land was largely due to its low price. The price of plots, at about 60–120,000 dr. in 1972 (100–200 m<sup>2</sup> plots), was still far below the prices within city limits, even if the price of ‘agricultural’ land had risen from 100 dr. per m<sup>2</sup> in 1964 to 600 in 1972 (Ministry of Public Works 1975: 33). In the whole country the increase in the price of urban plots was 73 % during 1958–63, that of agricultural plots 65 %.<sup>18</sup> In Athens increases were much more spectacular, and the price of ‘agricultural’ plots in 1960–75 was found to grow by a rate double that of urban ones (1,095 % and 530 % respectively).

It is not fortuitous, then, that the initial landowners (or landgrabbers) on the urban fringe made handsome profits even on small land prices. Profits up to 1,000 % have been stated in Greece (Romanos 1970), comparable with 80 % in Portugal (Lewis and Williams 1984b: 304) and 4,300 pesetas/m<sup>2</sup> in the Barcelona *grands ensembles* (Remica 1977: 187). The Greek speculators subdivided agricultural or grazing land into plots and sold them to poor families and internal migrants at relatively low prices which were far in excess of the initial cost. The fringe speculators were inventive in many respects: they withheld several well-located plots in anticipation of appreciation after the creation of settlements on their land, or, still better, after its legalization. Though these strategies have not been well documented, they were apparently largely responsible for leapfrog development over the several unbuilt properties in illegal housing areas. The role of fringe speculators in creating urban sprawl was of paramount importance. It is also possible that the apparent level of fragmentation of landownership stressed in all studies may have been deceptive in some cases, where landowners owned several plots at different locations.

<sup>18</sup> Ministry of Public Works 1975: 33. In 1964–72 the average rent of agricultural land parcels was found to have increased by 117 % in Greece (Emmanuel 1981: appendix 6.1).

The fact that 'agricultural' plots could not be developed legally, because of their size and location, or sold, for that matter, was inconsequential to their new owners, who did not buy them for development but for shelter. Considerable amounts of popular savings were engaged in illegal building, which are also indicative of its extent. It was calculated that in 1930-52, with an interval during the war years, 43,000 plots had been sold in Athens at the price of golden £40-100 each, representing a total of 700 billion dr. (Biris 1966: 324). It has been also estimated that investment in illegal housing construction (net of land) reached 400 million dr. in 1945-66 (CPER 1967: 27). Capital engaged in land acquisition and housing in unauthorized areas in the 1950s has probably been underestimated at over 500 million dr. annually (Ellis et al. 1964: 217). In 1960-67, 52,320 'agricultural' plots were transferred in Athens to the total value of 1,903,856,000 dr. in current prices, taxed with 170,667,000 dr. (adapted from CPER 1976a: Appendix 7). In other words, popular savings engaged in peripheral urban land alone until illegal building was curbed in 1967 rose to 2,074,523,000 dr., or 238 million dr. annually. Resources were thus transferred from the popular strata to a literally parasitic group, who were usually not even landowners proper, but 'the real squatters' (Romanos 1970), taking advantage of the tumult in the city to grab unclaimed land. Consequently, apart from the final settlers and the State, illegal building involved a set of other actors, a series of landowners, middlemen and builders (Romanos 1969, 1970). It constituted a structured social system in postwar Athens.

#### 4.3 The class structure of spontaneous urban expansion

Up to this point the study has dealt with broad class categories and has treated the working class as an undifferentiated population. This is a general drawback of current geographical studies of Greek cities. A closer study of the residential patterns of different fractions of the popular strata will be attempted now. Since relevant information of the NCSR-NSSG study is available only for 1969 and 1971, however, it is not sufficient for a study of change. Data will be combined and rendered comparable with scattered information given in other social and geographical studies of the 1960s.

##### 4.3.1 *The working class in urban growth, 1971*

Social classes in postwar Athens were distributed according to the land-rent gradient as well as by priority of settlement. The urban core and oldest suburbs belonged to the bourgeoisie and the middle classes, while the working class, which grew especially during the postwar period, lived in the



periphery. Suburban land accumulation by middle-class cooperatives after 1950 was related to vacation and recreation rather than permanent residence (chapter 6). In fact, for the dominant classes the interwar years were the last period when new land was extensively colonized for permanent residential use as the city expanded. It was the popular strata, and more specifically the working class, who opened up new land to urbanization. Since the interwar period, extensive new peripheral areas have come into the hands of the people.

The working-class character of the urban fringe and the western suburbs in 1971 was indicated in figs. 4.3 and 4.4. The classification of the labour force by economic sector at place of residence in 1971 by km<sup>2</sup> in the only useful series of printouts of the NCSR–NSSG study<sup>19</sup> involves two major drawbacks: (a) transport workers have been classified along with the total labour force in the tertiary sector and should therefore be excluded from the analysis of working-class residential patterns; and (b) salary and wage labourers in manufacturing and construction have been classified along with employers and the self-employed in these sectors, but workers can be considered as the majority. The error is less pronounced in the case of the construction sector, where 83.1 % of total employment consisted of wage earners, than in the manufacturing sector, where the rate was 75.9 %.

In order to overcome these difficulties to some extent, the analysis of the residential patterns of manufacturing and construction labourers and the self-employed will proceed on the basis of two series of data matrices. It will first be mapped (plotting their LQs by grid square in 1971), and then quantified in tables. The 5 % disaggregated sample of the NCSR–NSSG study, which overestimates employment in services and underestimates that in manufacturing and construction, is presented in maps. The 25 % sample of the NSSG census is presented in table 4.6 on larger spatial units.

Manufacturing workers constituted 30.4 % of the labour force in Attica in 1971 according to the NCSR–NSSG sample. They are shown to be overrepresented in the interwar refugee communities and near the factories of Piraeus and the western suburbs as against Athens (fig. 4.9). Besides

<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, the study of the working-class residential patterns is confused by absurd classifications: maps of series K of the NCSR–NSSG study (unpublished) and the relevant computer printouts have lumped together: (a) most industrial workers with agricultural and service labourers (international categories 5/6/7/8), and (b) the rest of the labour force in heavy industry along with construction, transport, but also 'sales' workers (international categories 4/9). These inexplicable categorizations have destroyed an invaluable source of information about the differential use of urban space by the various working-class fractions. Fig. 4.3 reunites the working-class population (categories 7/8/9) from another series of NSSG printouts, but the level of spatial disaggregation is inadequate, and the fractions of the working class impossible to separate. Their detailed distribution and land allocation patterns, then, can be studied only through a series of assumptions, as explained in the text.



*Figure 4.9* Residential patterns of manufacturing labourers, 1971. Source: Adapted from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished map I1, and data (computer printouts) which give resident labour force in manufacturing by km<sup>2</sup>.

*Figure 4.10* Residential patterns of construction labourers, 1971. Source: Adapted from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished map I2, and data (computer printouts) which give resident labour force in construction by km<sup>2</sup>.

corroborating our previous conclusion about the strength of the employment linkage, this stresses the continuity of the postwar working class with the refugee proletariat. By 1971 LQs reached 1.73–1.90 in N. Ionia in the north, 2.20 in the 'Olive Grove', the industrial area to the west of Athens, and 1.78 to the north of the agglomeration. Further out, Elefsina and Aspropyrgos to the west and the more recently colonized areas outside the boundaries of the agglomeration, where new industries had settled in eastern Attica, were also solidly working-class.

The labour force in construction, 10.2 % of the sample in Attica in 1971, was strongly overrepresented precisely in new unauthorized settlements (fig. 4.10). The highest values of the LQ were on the northern and southern areas of recent urbanization – Petroupolis, N. Liossia, Kamatero, Brachami – and only moderate values appeared in traditional refugee communities. The role of construction labourers in popular land colonization therefore appears to have been dominant.

Analysis in table 4.6, based on larger spatial units shown in fig. 4.11, corroborates these conclusions. Areas for analysis are distinguished on the basis of (a) type or height of building, which also relates to centrality, and (b) time of incorporation into the authorized city plan on the basis of figs 4.7 and 4.8, so that recently colonized areas are studied separately. It is evident that as we move out of the urban core, overrepresentation of labour in manufacturing and construction industries occur (LQ increases), and underrepresentation of labour in services and commerce (LQ declines). In unauthorized and recently 'legalized' settlements, 59.7 % of total employment consisted of manufacturing and construction workers, while the city average in 1971 was 44.6 %: peripheral urban areas were predominantly proletarian.

This conclusion is underlined by an investigation of the location patterns of informal-sector workers. The self-employed and those employed in family enterprises, 19.7 % of the NCSR–NSSG sample in 1971, as well as those in petty commerce and the unemployed, are the only census categories that could possibly be associated with the casual proletariat and petty-service labourers. Their distribution stresses their heterogeneity in both society and space. Their residential patterns (fig. 4.12) indicate heavy concentrations in areas outside the agglomeration, which should be attributed to the large number of farmers in subsistence agriculture and family businesses. Within the city, their distribution is somewhat random. The traditional petty bourgeoisie and informal-sector workers, who actually constitute the majority of the self-employed population, were overrepresented in both bourgeois and working-class areas in 1971. What is more important, their very weak presence in newer peripheral urban



Table 4.6 *Socio-economic structure by area, Greater Athens 1971: composition and location quotient of resident labour force*

Composition as % of total employment (including unemployment) by area. Location quotient for each economic sector considering total agglomeration distribution with LQ = 1, as explained in footnote 2, p. 130.

	Manufacturing Industry		Construction		Commerce		Rest of tertiary		Self-employed and family labourers	
	%	LQ	%	LQ	%	LQ	%	LQ	%	LQ
1. Urban core	27.11	0.8	7.84	0.7	16.05	1.1	49.00	1.2	19.51	1.0
of which:										
Athens	25.08		8.04		16.50		50.38		20.41	
Piraeus	36.49		6.90		13.99		42.62		15.34	
2. Rest of areas with multi-storey buildings	29.77	1.0	9.07	0.8	24.92	1.7	36.24	0.9	16.62	0.8
3. Rest of 'authorized' city	39.11	1.2	13.54	1.2	11.97	0.8	35.38	0.9	20.64	1.0
of which:										
Piraeus suburbs	44.59		10.61		13.48		31.32		19.50	
West and northwest	44.05		15.11		13.56		27.28		19.68	
East, northeast, south	34.65		13.91		10.63		40.81		21.54	
4. Unauthorized and recently 'legalized'	40.78	1.2	18.92	1.7	11.74	0.8	28.56	0.7	20.02	1.0
of which:										
Piraeus suburbs	46.50		13.06		12.04		28.40		16.73	
West and northwest	41.21		21.81		11.51		25.47		18.02	
East, northeast, south	38.25		17.45		11.92		32.38		23.60	
Total agglomeration	33.27	1.0	11.33	1.0	15.06	1.0	40.34	1.0	19.65	1.0
Outside the agglomeration (mainly unauthorised)	48.13	1.4	20.69	1.8	8.23	0.5	22.95	0.6	25.72	1.3

Source: Adapted from computer printouts of the NCSR-NSSG study (1973; data by grid square, 5 % sample), adapted on basis of 25 % sample of the 1971 NSSG population census. Areas are shown in fig. 4.11, and communities in each subdivision are listed under table 4.5.





Figure 4.11 Boundaries of Greater Athens areas for the study of urban class structure. Sources: Adapted from figures 4.7, 4.8 and 6.1.

settlements – except Brachami in the south and N. Heracleio on the north – shows their insignificant role in popular land colonization. This is an interesting conclusion about the class composition and spatial behaviour of the social grouping closest to the Third World urban 'masses'. It is another indication of the virtual absence of marginality in postwar Athens.

This is corroborated by table 4.6. The self-employed and family labourers are shown to comprise a mixed social category equally distributed throughout the city, including areas of recent urban expansion. It should also be stressed that unemployment levels in 1971 were 2.7–3.2% in the authorized areas, 3.15% in the unauthorized ones and 2.71% outside Greater Athens. Such a slight differentiation constitutes an argument against the supposed concentration of 'masses' in illegal settlements.

The above conclusions are corroborated by findings in two community



**Figure 4.12** Residential patterns of self-employed and family labourers, 1971. Source: Computed and mapped from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished data (computer printouts), which give the number of self-employed and unpaid labourers in family enterprises resident in each grid square of 1 km<sup>2</sup>.

studies carried out in 1971 in Perama on the southwest (Crueger 1973b) and Anakasa on the north (Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972; fig. 4.11). A large part of Perama had been 'legalized' in the 1950s but the community was still encircled by a large illegal area in 1971. Anakasa, a small community of Ag. Anargiri, had just been 'legalized' in 1971. The socio-occupational composition of the two areas shows a low incidence of marginal populations and petty entrepreneurs. The majority of labourers were wage earners: 79 % in Perama, 77.8 % in Anakasa. The residents of Perama worked mainly as sailors, transport workers and warehousing labourers in the Piraeus docks (28 %), as well as in the nearby factories (34 %). Manufacturing workers and artisans were more numerous in Anakasa (41.27 %), attracted not only by the nearby industrial area (N. Ionia, N. Philadelphia), but even travelling as far as Piraeus. Construction workers were also numerous (19.05 %), but

transport workers – bus and taxi drivers and ticket collectors (11.11%) – less on. Commerce and service workers were underrepresented in both Perama and Anakasa.

The proletarian composition of the Athens periphery is thus adequately demonstrated. The most concentrated group in the peripheral settlements were the construction workers (fig. 4.10). This fraction of the working class, the vanguard of the popular mobilizations of the 1960s (chapter 3), was also the most dynamic in the colonization of urban peripheral land, ever since the nineteenth century (chapter 2). As urbanization speeded up in postwar Athens, they were the most recent arrivals, their employment the least stable, their exploitation by urban capitalism the most direct, their dissent to its norms the strongest. Their concentration partly reflects their greater dependence on self-built housing due to irregularity of work, despite relatively high wages (Study Group 1975: 32). Their unhealthy work, inadequate safety precautions and especially flexibility in the increase and decrease of employees according to economic conjuncture, which decreased inelastic expenses of enterprises, directed them towards alternative paths to security. The construction industry has been dominated by casual labour throughout the Third World (Lloyd 1982: 55). Contracts are followed by dismissals, and re-employment in periods of boom. Frank (1966: 217–18) speaks of the ‘notoriously occasional and unstable construction sector’. The dominant role of these workers in land colonization also reflects their skills in building their own homes and helping neighbours. Factory workers had less time to build and different ways to use their skill. In Greek urban social movements the construction workers formed a vanguard. In politics, they combined labour demands with politicization for internal and foreign affairs; in the city, they sustained the alternative modes of land allocation.

As for unstable labour or the ‘masses’, they were either transient or very few in Athens in the 1970s. Petty entrepreneurs and their family members comprised a mixed class with negligible participation in illegal building (fig. 4.12). Land colonization in postwar Athens was a task realized by and pertaining to the working class.

#### *4.3.2 The improvement of popular housing conditions*


It has wrongly been assumed that sums paid for illegal building have ‘been practically wasted on such primitive housing’ (Ellis et al. 1964: 217). On the contrary, they contributed to a substantial improvement of popular housing conditions which would have been unthinkable within ‘official’ housing channels. The popular owner-built sector worked towards individual and collective improvement of popular housing conditions. Popular access to

this informal sector must be attributed to the low cost of land (section 4.2.3), but also construction costs. Until 1971-2 the index of housing construction cost rose in rates not exceeding the general price index. With 1978 = 100, the construction cost was 137.6 in 1972, while the general price index rose to 146.8 (DEPOS 1980). The 'threshold' of entrance into the housing market moved downwards, with a consequent enlargement of active demand, and the wide distribution of owner-occupation. Families cut down on construction costs further by building their houses by stages, extending them as income permitted (figs 4.13 and 4.14). The initial shack was just a small room, and a large part of everyday life was spent outdoors, in small gardens and public spaces. Some families then added rooms to their shacks as savings accumulated (fig. 4.13). Others built solid constructions in place of the original shacks (fig. 4.14), and later added storeys. These two types of action have been found to correlate with the families' values, self-image and view of society at large, and have been classified as 'traditional' proletarian and 'urban' mobile workers' attitudes respectively (Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972: 54-64).

Squalor in public spaces was a striking contrast to the attention paid to private houses and small yards (Romanos 1970). Collective improvement took place outside official channels. Infrastructure was not installed by authorities even after communities were eventually 'legalized', but the residents did not wait for this. The 'spider webs of illegal cables plugged into the city's electrical supply-system' observed by Worsley (1984: 214) in Mexico City were also evident on the Greek urban fringe. Visitors would stumble on water pipes connected to the communal tap. Long after 'legalizations', local authorities were pressing for technical and social infrastructure. This improved especially after the mid-1970s.

Collective improvement of housing conditions can also be seen in aggregate figures. The housing shortage was estimated at 580,800 houses in Greece in 1965 (CPER 1967), and substandard housing conditions were reported in Athens and Piraeus (AGA 1962). This changed radically in 1961-71 with the growth of popular owner-occupation, the decline in housing shortage and the improvement in housing standards and amenities, as reflected in several statistical series. For example, in Greek urban areas 95.5% of households had tap water in their dwellings by 1974, while the rate was only 34.6% in 1964 (Karapostolis 1983: 125). The average density of occupation had much improved in Athens since 1961. Among households of craftsmen and labourers only 1.89% lived in overcrowded conditions (over 4 persons per room) in 1971, while the city average in 1961 amounted to 7.45% of the total population (adapted from NSSG population censuses).

A comparison among urban communities gives a better insight into the



*Figure 4.13 and 4.14 Plans of two types of illegal houses: A solid illegal house (top, fig. 4.13), and one made up by additions (bottom, fig. 4.14). Source: Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972: 56, 58.*

Table 4.7 *Improvement of housing conditions by area in Greater Athens, 1961-71*

	Total no. of households	1961 % of total without:			Total no. of households	1971 % of total without:		
		Mains water	Electricity	Bathroom		Mains water	Electricity	Bathroom
Athens (A)	191,007	3.2	4.0	52.9	293,212	0.6	0.5	15.5
Piraeus (P)	57,065	3.9	7.4	84.5	60,952	1.3	0.8	45.1
Piraeus suburbs	54,667	18.6	9.3	90.7	67,896	7.1	2.1	54.7
Athens suburbs	219,848	18.7	9.4	75.8	344,776	7.3	1.0	36.0
of which:								
West	23,688	23.8	9.8	90.1	37,388	5.9	1.3	48.7
Northwest	38,345	48.3	15.8	93.1	63,780	21.0	1.1	54.0
North	26,576	7.5	6.4	79.3	38,256	2.5	0.6	42.0
East	14,817	8.6	6.5	58.7	29,280	1.6	0.5	16.0
Northeast 1	18,653	8.0	8.5	59.7	26,400	3.7	1.7	28.3
Northeast 2	6,275	6.7	10.6	67.0	8,704	4.1	3.7	34.0
Southeast	42,803	17.0	7.8	78.7	65,056	5.7	0.8	34.6
South 1	41,133	4.1	5.6	63.5	61,044	0.9	0.4	21.7
South 2	7,558	36.3	22.0	60.9	14,868	16.5	3.0	29.6
Total agglomeration	522,587	11.4	7.2	69.9	766,836	4.2	0.9	30.5

*Sources:* Adapted from NSSG general population censuses of 1961 and 1971 (households in 'irregular' dwellings were classified with those in 'regular' ones lacking basic facilities). Communities in each subdivision are listed under table 4.5.

development of popular housing conditions. Each indicator on table 4.7 points to a different dimension of the housing question. The lack of mains water is caused by neglect on the part of authorities; lack of electricity is partly public responsibility and partly due to poverty; lack of a bathroom reflects poverty. The large spatial units used for the above study can be related to social groups on the basis of previous maps, but not to areas with illegal settlements. Still, communities with a larger percentage of illegal settlements apparently improved faster than the rest of the city. In 1961 the worst housing conditions appeared in the western popular suburbs (Piraeus suburbs, Northwestern and Western). Despite the fact that inequality persisted in 1971, however, these suburbs improved throughout the 1960s, since the percentage of households lacking basic amenities was dramatically reduced in all cases.

#### 4.3.3 *Land allocation and popular mobilization*

Findings in this chapter stress the predominantly working-class character of urban peripheral settlements of self-built housing, both authorized and unauthorized. Manufacturing labourers concentrated in Piraeus and its suburbs and were strongly represented in the newly colonized popular areas,

from which industries recruited labour after the massive urbanization waves of the 1960s (fig. 4.9). These popular peripheral areas were attractive to the Athens working class because of proximity to the factories, but also because of access to land and housing property as a security against work instability, low and often temporary wages, and limited coverage by social security. This brings us back to the theory of the Third World city. The attitudes of the working class towards the land question, the functions of land control for popular culture and its relationship with proletarian experience can be explored only indirectly. This is because of the lack of studies of working-class culture in Greece. The following tentative and incomplete account might be useful as a basis for future more systematic research.

Besides the occasional conspicuous presence of the working class in Greek society (chapter 3), most of its life has been lived in apparent social quiescence. Political factors inducing the fragmentation of the proletariat included the harassment of trade unionists and the Left: postwar Greek labour history is one of suppression and defeat (chapter 3). Economic factors inducing working-class fragmentation were heterogeneity, informal work strategies and personal rather than corporate labour commitment. As in other underdeveloped countries, in Greece such structures individualized the problem of making a living. They also reinforced family and regional ties, which, along with home ownership, constituted a means for everyday support, additional income and security for the future. In other words, they made the experience of urbanization more crucial in popular mobilizations and voting behaviour than work experience.

The reproduction of the informal sector and the petty bourgeoisie provided the contradictory social base on which capitalist development was realized and a working class grew in postwar Athens. For a long period the refugee proletariat dreamed of petty bourgeois 'independence' through RSC assistance. So did rural migrants who arrived in Athens, and the emigrants to Germany collecting money to buy a home or open up a small shop. Migration is an individual solution rather than a collective movement. Aspirations of workers for mobility to a petty bourgeois status, at least for their offspring, should not be attributed to their 'character', but to their past and the nature of Greek society. Their world fluctuated between the proletariat and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, between wage earner and free labourer, between the factory and the family as a source of income.

Even if this can be considered as bourgeois hegemony, however, this is as far as it went. One of the best manifestations of popular independence was voting behaviour. Discussion of the correlation of voting patterns with urbanization rather than industrialization (chapter 3) has rested on aggregate figures. The mapping of the voters of the Left by community in Athens




shows that they correlated with industrialization *within* the city:<sup>20</sup> a comparison of figs. 4.15 and 4.16 with fig. 4.2 indicates that the Left appeared the strongest in working-class communities. The refugee element made a great difference here; still, these were industrial communities, whose inhabitants had played a principal role during the resistance. In 1958 they were swept by a Left vote, which reached 65.8% in Nikaia and 60.3% in N. Ionia (fig. 4.16; *Anti* 1974). The self-built suburbs of more recent migrants also voted for the Left. The distribution remained similar in 1963, though the percentages of Left vote were lower (fig. 4.16). The loss was mainly concentrated in bourgeois and petty bourgeois areas. The traditional working-class refugee strongholds (Kaisariani, Nikaia, N. Ionia) and some newly urbanized popular areas (Petrópolis, Kamatero) showed the greatest stability in voters for EDA (Georgiou and Karas 1977).

The popular strata did not accept the values and norms of the dominant classes upon the latter's own terms. A study of class cultures in Athens in 1964 found that the dominant classes and the government were deprived of legitimacy, and that it was popular rather than bourgeois cultural beliefs which shaped Greek attitudes to class in general (Safilios 1973). The articulation of popular common sense through everyday experience is potently demonstrated by sub-cultures in Anakasa, a semi-squatter area. Attitudes and values varied among different working-class fractions, and correlated with housing situations (Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972). The aggressive optimism of 'privatized' construction and transport workers with a 'pecuniary' model of society, who hoped for mobility to petty bourgeois status through competition and tried to improve their houses with consumer items, contrasted with the aggression but also pessimism of the prospective emigrant to Germany, who hoped to improve his condition by abandoning his family for a better job. The lonely radicalism of the transport worker contrasted with communal attitudes towards relatives and neighbours, a small world of 'us' versus 'them', articulated by manufacturing labourers. This traditional proletariat viewed society within a power model, unconvinced by bourgeois hegemony, but secluded rather than oppositional.

Besides spontaneous mobilizations and voting behaviour, a manifestation of alternative cultures pertained to the illegitimate means by which the working class housed itself. Despite its integration in the market and

<sup>20</sup> The data should be interpreted with caution, because of the difference between residents and voters in urban areas. Very frequently, people travel back to their place of origin in order to vote, and the extent of this movement, which intensified after the 1960s, has yet to be studied.

National elections, vote to EDA as % of total vote by community:



Figures 4.15 and 4.16 Vote to the Left (EDA) by community in Greater Athens:  
1958 (left, fig. 4.15) and 1963 (right, fig. 4.16). Source: *Anti* 1974: 10-14.




Figure 4.17 Working-class mobilization, illegal building and land colonization in Greece and Greater Athens, 1952–68. Sources: Adapted from time series in Fakiolas (1978), as well as figures 4.6 and 6.6.

individual procedures of buying a plot and building, semi-squatting involved a quasi-cooperative element, which expressed rebelliousness for popular rights against State authority. Mutual aid extended from the search for vacant plots to the building process. In fact, it is tempting to explain land allocation patterns in terms of the class struggle alone, so close was the correspondence between the rhythm of working-class mobilizations and popular land colonization. As an indication of the coincidence of their fluctuations, we have compared strike activity, illegal house building and transfers of 'agricultural' plots in fig. 4.17. These increased in the 1950s,

were stabilized at high levels in the 1960s and then were decisively curbed. When the total number of strikers was included in this graph, the three trends coincided only in 1966 – the peak year of urban mobilizations – and the correlation coefficient between illegal building and strikers was 0.72 (max. 1). When the new petty bourgeoisie (labour in the tertiary sector transport) was excluded, however, the coefficient rose to 0.75. Fig. 4.17 shows a significant correlation, except for the years 1953 and 1961 – but in this case, elections have always been said to create upswings of squatting, because the police are occupied elsewhere and the politicians are eager to attract voters.

Such a close covariation may entail no direct and conscious links. Individuals involved may have been different (caution against the ecological fallacy is required), but the climate was unitary. The covariation is important, especially since the two phenomena involved the same social category. After 1961 the graphs of strikers and land sales were parallel (fig. 4.17). In the transitional period of the early 1960s the working class was mobilizing and at the same time accumulating land and building shacks on the urban fringe.

The common experience of urbanization and hasty house construction had the effect of uniting the popular strata. In the traditional refugee communities and more recent peripheral areas, a culture of independence emerged which could not be found in State-controlled syndicalism. Initiative in land colonization and house building were followed by informal socializing at the café and on the doorstep, as well as more formal neighbourhood associations. These were reported in Ilissos (Malthy et al. 1966), Brachami (Röe 1979) and Anakasa, where they had just been disbanded by the dictatorship. The workers felt little pride in or commitment to their job or union; rather they were attached to their local community, family and social network. These, however, were no less working-class concentrations than the factory. The formation and defence of popular neighbourhoods indicates the primacy of the urban over work experience in the emergence of alternative cultures, evident in the pride and aggressiveness put into these activities. The satisfaction of the Anakasa workers from their illegal community (Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972) is as understandable as that of the Roman *borgata* residents from their own urban conditions (Fried 1973: 269–70).

This form of collective action serves to counterbalance the lack (or rather the suppression) of trade union activity. This aspect of popular culture can be observed indirectly and partially in the values of self-sufficiency in poverty, the negative cultural stereotypes attached to the rich (Safilios 1967; Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972) and the humanist version of communism

which spread in the northwestern Athens communities outside the bureaucracy of the KKE. The parties of the Left had not yet perceived the relevance of popular urban experience and community life for radicalization. They did not emphasize urban issues nearly as much as a minority of researchers were to do in the 1960s, who idealized self-built houses and the type of community life these supported. For these liberal researchers, squatter architecture, where houses evolved in stages, constituted a 'living' and humane alternative to official norms. Certain architects were fascinated by inventiveness in poverty, the functional use of space for the family as well as the extended family network, the small house as a nucleus expanded along with these networks, and the restricted personal space, including the garden where a large part of everyday life was spent (Malthy et al. 1966; Romanos 1969, 1970).

If solid communities were formed only rarely on the Athens periphery, social segregation and spatial fixity due to owner-occupation, land control and seclusion in spontaneous settlements bred a popular culture which was not yet flourishing fully in 1967 when the dictatorship was imposed. Every struggle around the control of peripheral urban areas was but one aspect of the class struggle waged in a rapidly changing capitalist society. It took a military junta to curb the tide of popular land colonization, along with the radicalized working-class movement, which supported it.

## *Industrial restructuring versus the cities*<sup>1</sup>

Why, in a rationally organized society, ought London to remain a great centre for the jam and preserving trade, and manufacture umbrellas for nearly the whole of the United Kingdom?... Why should Paris refine sugar for almost the whole of France? Why should one-half of the boots and shoes used in the United States be manufactured in the 1,500 workshops of Massachusetts?... The industries must be scattered all over the world; and the scattering of industries amidst all civilized nations will be necessarily followed by a further scattering of factories over the territories of each nation.

P. Kropotkin (1974 edn: 155)

As industrial capital becomes more mobile, the 1970s have been a period of radical transformation of cities and regions. Powerful trends in the direction of decomposition of the production process of many once vertically integrated industries, tend to reverse the trend towards integration which characterized the first decades of the twentieth century in the fordist drive for mass production and consumption (Scott and Storper 1986: 11). The consequent restructuring toward flexible accumulation creates new core/periphery hierarchies, which have much affected the NICs. In Southern Europe, restructuring involves both the formal sector, in which certain industry groups decline while others emerge, and the informal sector. Researchers have focused heavily on the latter. Informal activities have always been growing in the Mediterranean, but recently flexible accumulation revitalized small industry and articulated it in the capitalist economy.

Analysis up to this point has illustrated the transformation of Greater Athens and Salonica into the principal productive centres of Greece during the 1960s and the rise of the working class in urban society and urban growth processes. It was already evident, however, that the 1970s were a turning point in the structure of the urban economy. The Greek cities were affected by industrial decline and population stabilization (chapter 3). The

<sup>1</sup> Chapter title borrowed from Massey and Meegan 1978. The award by the Empirikion Foundation, which helped me complete research presented in this chapter, is gratefully acknowledged.

model sounds familiar in the context of advanced capitalism, but crucial differences are brought to light by more focused research. The specific forms of industrial restructuring in Greece have not been studied until recently, though the concept is used frequently. The analysis which follows will concentrate on the new location of industrial capital and the informal sector, new trends in regional development and diffuse urbanization. Their study is a prerequisite for the exploration of urban restructuring in the next chapter.

### 5.1 The productive base of diffuse urbanization

The Greek metropolitan cities grew rapidly during the postwar period: by 1981 Athens and Salonica together contained about 40% of the Greek population, 66% of the urban population and 51% of the country's industrial employment (1984; 61% in 1978). Compared with the population of over 3 million in Athens and 710,000 in Salonica, the third largest Greek city, Patra, is relatively small (155,000 inhabitants in 1981). Recently, however, the metropolitan population has begun to stabilize. Although the period after 1981, when Greece experienced the impact of full EEC membership and the policies of the new PASOK government, is outside the scope of this book, certain trends of restructuring of the urban economy, society and spatial structure were already evident in the 1970s. Such new trends throughout the Mediterranean have generated a debate on *informalization*, *depolarization* and *diffuse urbanization* originating in Italy, and now spreading to Portugal and Spain. A comparison of Greece with this pattern will be attempted here.

#### 5.1.1 *A note on phases of postwar industrial development*

A recent Greek Five-year Plan (Greek Parliament 1984) has ventured a periodization of the process of capital accumulation in industry. The three periods are actually three phases of industrial restructuring, which have had specific regional implications, as well as phases of transformation of the Greek economy in general. Despite reservations and various alternative views expressed by Greek economists, the distinction into three sub-periods is useful:

- (a) During the period immediately after the war Greece was an under-developed dependent economy with a traditional pattern of accumulation at least until 1963-4.
- (b) After the mid-1960s, however, it started to develop rapidly, as already shown in chapter 3.

- (c) The period after the mid-1970s was one of crisis and 'deindustrialization'. The manufacturing sector not only experienced a decline in investment (the so-called 'investment strike'), but was also restructured towards traditional sectors.

Industrialization during the first postwar decades was characterized by personal companies, individually owned concerns and artisan establishments. The industrial census of 1958 indicated little improvement since 1930: light industry bordering on repair rather than production was still predominant, and small establishments continued to mushroom. Industrialization in the 1950s was 'demand-led'. In the context of protectionism, 'industrial expansion was not so much based upon displacement of imports, as upon the secular increase of demand for manufactured goods generated by rising income' (Coutsoumaris 1963: 91). Investment was concentrated in a few consumer goods industries associated with the basic needs of the population: food, clothing and shelter. The corresponding industry groups (SIC 20, 23, 33) absorbed about half of total industrial investment, while capital in intermediate goods industries absorbed a mere 12.3% of new capital accumulation (Greek Parliament 1983: 54).

A protective import policy was maintained, perpetuating the exclusion of Greek industrial products from the world market in the 1950s, despite a partial liberalization of trade by relaxation of import controls in 1953-4. The latter encouraged enterprises to import modern equipment and substitute capital for labour (Psilos 1968: 21-2). An economy 'of numerous monopolies, some important oligopolies, and some structural peculiarities which make for the severe curtailment of competition' (Ellis et al. 1964: 173) was sustained by State intervention and 'short-sighted protectionism' and by 'tacit agreements between the large financial groups and large-scale monopolies and oligopolies' (Ellis et al. 1964: 197). Leading monopolies barred potential industrial competitors and prevented entry into certain industry groups. Finance capital, concentrated in the National Bank of Greece and the Commercial Bank, accorded preferential treatment to large and well-established businesses, and led smaller enterprises to confine their operation within the limits of self-financing. The level of bank financing in industry was low and concentrated in a few firms throughout the period and up to the 1970s. This monopolistic and sheltered position of the formal part of the economy kept the country underdeveloped during the 1950s.

Demand-led industry opted for extreme centralization. Despite ongoing concentration in Greater Athens and Piraeus before the wars, the locational pattern of industry in 1928 remained dispersed throughout eastern Greece, while Athens concentrated only 17.3% of industrial employment. This rate



had leapt to 39.4 % by 1951, and then grew rapidly to 42.3 % in 1958 and 46.8 % in 1963, and stabilized at 46.3 % in 1973 (Katochianou 1984: 46–8). Deindustrialization trends then started to bring the rate down to 42 % in 1978 and 35.7 % by 1984. Spatial polarization of manufacturing employment and production in Athens, as well as Salonica, then lasted until the mid-1970s, as will be discussed in detail below. The capital was found to concentrate 60 % of demand for manufactured goods in 1958 (Coutsoumaris 1963: 134). By 1963 it was stressed that the concentration of manufacturing production in the Greater Athens area was due to the very structure of Greek industry:

The concentration of manufacturing firms in the Greater Athens area is nothing but the natural outcome of past conditions and expectations which have led the individual firms to search for the 'optimum' location for their plants... It is evident that raw material-oriented industries show a rather satisfactory degree of dispersion... In general, the market orientation is the primary attracting factor in the locational distribution of Greek manufacturing industry. (Coutsoumaris 1963: 137–8, 132, emphasis removed)

Several studies in CPER during the early 1960s have established the terms of a discussion of the regional impact of industrial structure and restructuring (Ellis et al. 1964; Coutsoumaris 1963; Alexander 1964; etc.). Studies of a comparable scope are rare for the changes since 1960. It was then, however, that the nature of 'dependence', the role of the State and its relationship with industrial capital were transformed as the place of Greece in the world economy was changing.

During the period of the Greek 'economic miracle' large modern corporate enterprises rose to dominance. Limited Liability Companies and especially Sociétés Anonymes, which in 1958 controlled only 42 % of fixed capital, had come to control 90 % by 1973, and their number grew from 391 to 1,435 during the same period (Coutsoumaris 1976: 13). Employment in such companies rose from 38.5 % of total manufacturing employment in 1973 to 47.2 % in 1978, and the sectors of metallurgical, chemical, petroleum, but also textile and paper industries (SIC 34, 31, 32, 23, 27) were dominated by such companies (adapted from ICAP 1975, 1980). Intermediate and capital goods industries increased their contribution in output from 22.5 % in 1951 to 44.9 % in 1970 (Coutsoumaris 1970), and came to absorb 34 % of new capital accumulation (Greek Parliament 1983: 55). Capital formation concentrated in relatively few industry groups, of which only textiles belonged to traditional industry (Coutsoumaris 1976: 56). Producer goods also rose considerably among industrial exports.

It has been pointed out that foreign capital has been attracted to Southern Europe by low wages, labour discipline, less restrictive pollution legislation

and financial concessions (Hudson and Lewis 1984, 1985). The sectors attracted and their orientation have varied in time, and so has their impact on the local economy. During the 1960s, foreign investment in export sectors and capital goods industries in Greece has been said to have created 'enclaves' of a 'modern' sector unrelated to indigenous industry (Negreponti 1979: 260; Mouzelis 1978). Although this is not the place to enter into the relevant controversy, interrelations of foreign with domestic capital have apparently been underestimated. They are reflected in joint ventures undertaken, the development of Greek industrial enterprises to the extent of exporting their products, and the improvement of productivity of medium-sized domestic industries, often acting as subcontractors.

Domestic industrial development was also promoted by state policy and by the competitive climate following the agreement on gradual entry into the EEC. The Greek government seems to have followed 'a changed emphasis throughout the Third World from import substitution industrialization to export promotion industrialization' (Warren 1973: 26). This suggests a regime of accumulation comparable to peripheral fordism (Lipietz 1985), which was already affecting Spain as the immediate external periphery of Europe in the 1960s (Lipietz 1986: 31). The automobile industry was typical of peripheral fordism among Mediterranean countries in the case of FIAT, where assembly has been partly decentralized to Greece, while qualified posts remained in Italy. In any case, a great deal of research is needed in this area to improve understanding of industrial restructuring.

The 'economic miracle' in Greece, as well as Italy, was accompanied by urbanization and the territorial concentration of production. Throughout Mediterranean Europe, the 1950s and 1960s have been a period of concentration: emigration, urbanization and industrial centralization led to virtual rural depopulation and rapid urban growth – in other words, to regional *polarization*. This pattern is more or less familiar. Recently, however, a process of reversal seems to be under way. The trend towards regional imbalance tends to slow down after the mid-1970s, during the period of flexible accumulation, especially in Italy.

Signs of overall industrial decline or deindustrialization along with a 'tertiarization of society' (Lipietz 1980) have been noted during the economic crisis in the cities of Western Europe (Massey 1984; Hudson and Lewis eds. 1984, 1985). By contrast, the average rate of growth of manufacturing production in the NICs during the 1970s was quite rapid, ranging from 4.6% in Portugal to 6.5% in Mexico (Lipietz 1986: 35). In the 1970s Greece was spared the full effects of the oil-induced crisis for several reasons: governments took full advantage of the 'European option'; exports to the Middle East grew; traditionally strong invisible earnings

derived from emigrants' remittances and shipping, though declining, financed the economy (Diamandouros 1986: 553). The effects of the crisis, however, were clearly evident by 1980, and had begun earlier in the manufacturing sector. This sector not only experienced a decline of investment, but also gradually approached the sectoral composition which characterized the first postwar phase. Investment was concentrated in the traditional consumption industry groups, Greek products were displaced in the domestic market and the ratio of imports to exports of industrial products rose from 2.5 in 1974 to over 3 in 1980 (Greek Parliament 1983). A growing trade deficit, unemployment and a slowing down of economic growth were the main tangible results (Leontidou 1983).

Through diffuse industrialization, and through a process characterized here as *diffuse urbanization*, polarization and marginalization have been succeeded by economic, social and spatial *depolarization* (Garofoli ed. 1978). This seems like a regularity of regional restructuring in semi-peripheries, since it also affects Latin American NICs, such as Brazil, where a 'polarization reversal' was observed in the 1970s (Storper 1984). The nature of this process and its origins in the case of Greece will be investigated at this point.

#### 5.1.2 *Industrial restructuring: State policy and the informal sector*

The regional impact of industrial decline has received much attention recently in the Mediterranean context. The NICs were able to postpone their day of reckoning with economic problems resulting from the oil crisis, not only because of EEC political support after their democratization with a view to promoting stability (Diamandouros 1986), but also because of productive flexibility. Until the 1960s industrial growth in Southern Europe was based on the use of increasing amounts of labour and the large-scale economies embodied in factories; it was also concentrated in metropolitan areas and increased regional disequilibria (Garofoli 1984). Industrialization increased the development/underdevelopment dichotomy and created a shift of labour from backward to advanced regions and sectors. This fordist pattern is replaced by a process of *diffuse industrialization* and productive flexibility. However, depolarization and metropolitan industrial decline in Greece began *before* the economic crisis. It seems to have been caused by two interrelated spatial processes due to industrial restructuring: the decentralized location of the formal sector, and the ongoing growth of an informal sector in the industrial economy. The turning point can be located during the period of the dictatorship.

A sudden intensification of State intervention in various aspects of socio-

economic development occurred when the dictatorship was imposed. In all tables and diagrams presented in previous chapters, this period presents exceptional features: emigration rates speeded up, the private building boom peaked, the self-built sector declined sharply, the pattern of industrial location changed gradually. An emphasis on construction and tourism led the two sectors to periods of rapid speculative development (Leontidou 1988). However, it would be naive to attribute all such changes to politics. Economic conditions had ripened for capitalist restructuring and 'modernization'.

Regional development has long been a concern of Greek governments. Relevant proposals have been introduced in development plans since 1952, but were still incomplete and unclear in the period 1952-63.<sup>2</sup> Already during the mid-1960s, however, industrialists and the State increasingly sought modernization, rationalization and planning. In 1964 the Center of Planning and Economic Research (CPER) and the Hellenic Bank for Industrial Development (ETVA) were established. The most often repeated among their proposals was industrial decentralization and the coordination of the regional supply of labour. Industrial restructuring tended to create new principles and face new contradictions. Domestic and foreign industrialists had started to complain about shortages of skilled labour, as well as lack of infrastructure, in the provinces.

Concern about such matters culminated during the early 1970s, the years of intense labour shortages in provincial areas, which had been caused by the massive rural exodus of the previous decade (chapter 3). National and regional plans and policy studies were then drafted, and new legislation was passed. Through LD 1078/1971 the Greek area was subdivided into three zones in each of which different kinds of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives for industrial development were practised. Greater Athens belonged to Attica (zone A except Lavrio), which was excluded from incentives policy. This was at the time the only non-assisted area in Greece. The agglomeration thus was already beginning to lose ground in the establishment of new industries in the early 1970s (Leontidou 1983). The decentralization of large enterprises (Limited Liability Companies and Sociétés Anonymes) was already evident in 1973-8, as their concentration in Attica dropped from 52 % to 42 %. Their headquarters remained in Athens, their share falling slightly from 73.5 % to 69.8 % (CPER 1980: 6). A practice

<sup>2</sup> The first postwar five-year plans were drafted only formally as a condition imposed by the USA for the aid granted to Greece (Psilos 1968: 71-3). The efforts were renewed after 1962. Legislation for 'expediency licences', misused in the 1950s in order to prevent new competitors from entering a field, was reoriented (Ellis et al. 1964: 180-6). One of the conditions for granting such licences to new industries was geographical location. Initially the policy did not work: since industrial growth was still demand-led and industrial location was market-oriented, industry could not decentralize.

of selective decentralization of parts of the production process away from management and control is evident here, which created new spatial divisions of labour (Massey 1984: 70–82). Salonica followed suit later, when legislation was amended to exclude it from incentives policy (section 5.2.1).

Restrictions for Athens later became more austere, when policy for industrial decentralization at the national level was supplemented by legislation against environmental pollution. During 1979–85, direct restrictions on industrial development were introduced in Greater Athens.<sup>3</sup> The rhetoric stressed pollution control and the need for decentralization. Regional policies in Greece, however, as well as in the rest of Mediterranean Europe, have facilitated economic processes rather than rechannelling or altering them.

The decentralization of large enterprises was one of the manifestations of industrial restructuring. Recent studies in Mediterranean Europe have focused especially on its second aspect, spontaneous restructuring evidenced in a trend for the creation of a large informal sector in provincial and rural areas. Research originating in Italy during the mid-1970s seriously challenged the North/South dichotomous model, and argued the emergence of a 'Third Italy', comprising northeastern and central regions (Bagnasco 1977, 1981). Though industrial employment declined in Italy, including the dynamic northern regions, during the 1970s, the Third Italy was relatively buoyant. The NEC (North-East-Centre) model of Italian regional development also stressed the important role of small firms in the dynamism of the regions. Their emergence was considered as an antithesis to rationalization trends and the evolutionary views supporting the latter. Later research in Portugal relativized several aspects of the NEC model and its use for comparative purposes in Mediterranean Europe (Lewis and Williams 1987). Greece can be a second case study revealing important differences from the rest of the Southern countries in several respects. The two most important ones will be stressed here: that informalization goes back in history to the interwar period; and that it has been an urban rather than rural phenomenon.

<sup>3</sup> LD 791/1981 gave instructions for the granting of permits to industries under establishment in Attica (Ministry of Industry and Energy 1981). Then LD 84/1984, which substituted it, was more strict than its predecessor. More recently, another piece of legislation, Law 1515/1985 for the Greater Athens Master Plan, specifies five-year objectives for the Attica Prefecture, which are more permissive for industrial development (*Government Gazette* 1984–5). This law, however, gives only general guidelines for urban development and can hardly influence real processes. A few years ago, when the implementation of pollution control was very new, it was pointed out that it would further affect the productive economy of Greater Athens (Leontidou 1983). This is indeed what happened. The impact of this legislation, along with other forces, has only recently registered in statistics: industrial decline had hit Athens by 1984 (section 5.2).

The beginnings of the Greek informalization processes can be traced back to long before the years of the refugee arrival, to the turn of the century, when two particular institutions were founded in 1892 and 1905 under State patronage and protection, with the explicit purpose of strengthening and defending artisans against the onslaught of industry (Mavrogordatos 1983: 140). With the refugee arrival in 1922 the recognition and, moreover, the active support of the informal sector by the State, the RSC and the National Bank was even more pronounced. The first indirect recognition of the informal sector was the erection of small shacks for petty traders by the municipal authorities in Athens in 1923, which replaced the flimsy stalls and wooden shops erected in the central streets of Athens by the refugees on their arrival (Biris 1966: 291-2). Small cooperative production units and groups of artisans as well as independent entrepreneurs were then financed and protected by legislation. The National Bank of Greece 'made vocational loans to small traders and artisans, whether or not grouped in associations' (League of Nations 1926: 180; Morgenthau 1929: 257). Such measures favoured the development of a cooperative movement, small productive units and independent artisans (Leontidou 1990). By 1930, 30% of the people employed in industry, 67% of those in commerce and 69% of those in services had been absorbed in a petty informal economy of enterprises employing less than five workers.

This peculiar State-produced informalization predates postwar policies adopted in countries with unlimited supplies of labour in Latin America (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 335), ILO policies for the small entrepreneurs in Africa, e.g. Kenya (Lloyd 1982: 52), and the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises in Portugal by the government and the OECD as an alternative industrial strategy (Lewis and Williams 1987: 346). Analogies and parallel stories between this sector and semi-squatter settlements can also be found: instituted by the State, then escaping its control, each sector acquired its own dynamic. Their origin strongly contradicts current theories which usually take for granted an informal sector neglected by the State, especially with respect to financing, or even escaping State control and developing to a large extent within illegality, or even corruption.

In postwar Greece the process had developed its own dynamic, especially in Greater Athens (Tsoucalas 1986; Leontidou 1986). This can be shown for the 1951-81 period by a series of indices (table 5.1): (a) the percentage of salary and wage earners, (b) the percentage of the self-employed and (c) the average number of salary and wage earners per employer by economic sector. If the formal economy were expanding, the first and the last of these indices would grow, and the self-employed would decline. This happened in

Table 5.1 *Indices of economic polarization, Greater Athens, 1951-81*

	Percentage of total economically active:		Salary and wage earners per employer
	Salary and wage earners	Self-employed	
Total economically active			
1951	71.37	14.89	14.70
1961	71.85	16.06	11.89
1971	74.00	17.18	11.10
1981	69.89	19.34	16.50
Manufacturing			
1951	81.72	9.57	13.16
1961	78.32	12.80	10.82
1971	75.93	13.54	9.31
1981	74.22	15.83	11.72
Construction			
1951	76.55	16.37	14.96
1961	87.23	8.93	25.26
1971	83.09	10.91	15.61
1981	71.97	21.90	15.96
Energy			
1951	98.74	0.79	533.67
1961	99.35	0.43	613.33
1971	98.53	0.72	509.50
1981	97.10	0.20	987.00
Transport, communications			
1951	84.04	11.03	26.53
1961	80.74	14.79	19.74
1971	76.87	18.49	20.34
1981	78.15	18.07	46.98
Commerce, banks, services			
1951	71.89	20.57	13.78
1961	68.76	28.80	9.62
1971	68.16	22.12	9.14
1981	69.27	22.95	17.10

Sources: Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1951-81.

the construction sector in 1951-61 (the years of its departure from handicraft methods) but was soon reversed, and in the sectors of energy production and distribution, where almost all of the labour force (98-99%) have been salary earners. The *inverse* development has been evident in the manufacturing and transport sectors, where informalization was obviously an ongoing process throughout the period, with the partial exception of 1971-81.

Table 5.2 *The size of manufacturing establishments in Greater Athens and Greece, 1958-84*

	1958	1963	1969	1973	1978	1984
Small manufacturing, 1-9 employees, Greater Athens						
% of total employment	34.84	37.50	39.82	36.00	37.81	44.65
% of total establishments	89.24	90.71	91.99	90.41	81.12	93.11
% of total HP	17.38	21.02	19.42	13.85	25.92	34.22
Persons per establishment	2.76	2.66	2.47	2.60	2.78	2.36
HP per person employed	0.77	1.04	1.22	2.02	2.37	3.36
Total manufacturing, average size, Greater Athens						
Persons per establishment	6.66	6.44	5.71	6.52	5.95	4.92
HP per person employed	1.64	1.85	2.50	5.24	3.46	4.38
Total manufacturing, average size, Greece total						
Persons per establishment	3.79	3.86	4.02	4.98	5.20	4.74
HP per person employed	1.95	2.45	4.02	6.24	6.73	8.98

*Sources:* Adapted from NSSG censuses of industrial etc. establishments, 1958-84.

A study of the manufacturing sector more particularly corroborates this observation. Employment in small establishments increased in absolute numbers, and the average size of establishment fell in Greater Athens until the late 1960s, and then again after the mid-1970s (table 5.2). In 1973 there was some tendency towards larger units. The average size of establishments is still larger in Greater Athens (4.92 employees per establishment) than the rest of Greece (4.74), but the gap has narrowed since 1958 (6.66 and 3.79 respectively): the average size of establishment in Greece was consistently increasing, while the Greater Athens industry has been undergoing informalization, which took place in two waves: 1958-69, and 1973-84 (table 5.2). Concentration of industry in Greater Athens has always appeared higher for larger establishments than for craft manufacturing, but with a declining role of large industry. Larger establishments showed a trend towards decentralization after the mid-1960s, while industrialization in Athens proceeded by the multiplication of small units (Leontidou 1983). After the late 1960s industrial investments approved for Athens concerned smaller enterprises than those in other Greek areas (Hadjisocrates 1983).

While the share of small industry is low and declining in core societies, and its existence is a result of the vertical industrial division of labour, in Greece each small industry has usually been a vertically integrated producing



unit, often including commerce among its tasks.<sup>4</sup> Informalization in the first postwar decades has been attributed to State policy, to the origins of industry in household production, to public preference for the traditional Greek 'arts and crafts', to the size of the national market, to family values for closed control of business, and to characteristics of the capital market. Some researchers have considered the informal economy as a relic of the past, others as functional for Greek and foreign capital.

Today firms with under ten employees form 85 % of all establishments in Italy, 79 % in Portugal and 77 % in Spain (Hudson and Lewis 1984). In Greece by 1984 they represented 94.2 % of establishments and 43 % of employment (adapted from unpublished NSSG data). The nature of Greek informalization remains an open question, since relevant research (Docopoulou 1986; Kafkalas 1984; Vaiou and Hadjimichalis 1987) has concentrated on exceptional regions such as Thrace, a heavily subsidized area near the Greek border which has received special treatment at least since 1973, and on a few tourist areas. The emergence of modern types of informalization related to flexible accumulation (as defined in chapter 1) after 1973 is suggested by data in table 5.2, which indicates structural changes with the year 1973 as a turning point. Types of inter-firm linkages and production structures, however, are not known.

In the case of Italy, depolarization involves several types of relationships among small firms and between them and the local economy: (a) artisanal firms, with the traditional methods of supply of the local market; (b) dependent small firms originating in the vertical decomposition and decentralization of production, with standardized production under subcontracting arrangements with larger firms; and (c) independent small firms innovating in products and selling in a variety of markets, but possibly closely linked with other small firms in the local system of production.<sup>5</sup> Each type is associated with a distinctive organization of production and set of external relationships, as well as different degrees of autonomy.

Studies of different types of small firms and their spatially uneven development in Italy have indicated that the process of industrial decomposition, one of the manifestations of informalization, which creates a treble rather than dual structure of the economy and society, has been

<sup>4</sup> Coutsoumaris 1963: 59-60; Ellis et al. 1964: 174. However, a survey in Athens in 1957 found that, at such an early period, smaller industry utilized more capital, resulting in a low output-capital ratio, which points to poor performance, but a high output-labour ratio (Coutsoumaris 1963: 299; Ellis et al. 1964: 110-12). This cannot be generalized from a small sample, but is indicative of depolarization.

<sup>5</sup> Brusco 1986; cf. summary in Lewis and Williams 1987: 344. The relative weight and the origin of each of these three types constitutes a point of disagreement. Some researchers insist that small firms emerged after vertical disintegration and productive decentralization, while others have found instances of modernization of artisanal production in rural areas.

quite widespread (Garofoli 1984). The rise of intermediate and peripheral regions has been contrasted with the dichotomy between central and marginal ones. The Portuguese case does not contradict the Italian NEC model, but stresses the predominance of independent and indigenous growth in several rural locations, while cases of productive decentralization have been observed in fewer regions.<sup>6</sup> In Spain, finally, a relationship between agricultural and industrial work has been demonstrated (Garcia-Ramon 1985). In all three cases, metropolitan regions apparently evidenced lower rates of informalization than rural regions and provincial areas. The case of Greece is the opposite one. Since the 1970s, small and traditional industry has increasingly concentrated in Greater Athens, in stark contrast with dynamic industry, and despite regional depolarization which brings Greece close to the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish model.

Until the appearance of a focused study, we have to rely on several indirect indicators, especially industrial decomposition by sector and region, and conclude that informalization affected especially metropolitan cities, as well as towns along the 'S' development corridor (chapter 3). Greek informalization has been an urban rather than rural/provincial phenomenon. Another semiperipheral country where metropolitan informalization has been observed is Brazil, where the city of São Paulo has increasingly concentrated small firms during the recent period of 'polarization reversal' (Storper 1984: 154). Despite this important difference from Italy, Spain and Portugal, the case of Greece is also one of metropolitan industrial decline, depolarization and diffuse urbanization.

### 5.1.3 *The reversal of the regional pattern*

The process of 'disurbanization' or 'counterurbanization' was first observed in North American cities (Berry ed. 1976), but scepticism has been expressed about the similarity with Western Europe (Hall and Hay 1980). Still, large European cities are undergoing population decline, and a 'comeback of the medium-sized city' throughout Europe has been observed by comparative studies (Lichtenberger 1976: 81-4; Drewett et al. 1976; Van den Berg et al. 1982). However, the term 'counterurbanization' is only appropriate for advanced capitalism. In Northern Europe population decline in larger cities is long-standing and already slowing down (Robson 1988: 21). It is very interesting that population decentralization *preceded* the decentralization of jobs (Drewett et al. 1976: 54; Robson 1988: 25, 84). By contrast, the large

<sup>6</sup> Lewis and Williams 1987: 345-57. Productive decentralization has created subcontracting in the motorcycle industry, domestic outworking in cotton textile areas on the north of Portugal and a 'subterranean economy' in Lisbon.

Southern European cities were still growing in the 1970s, *despite* the decentralization of jobs.

A closer examination, however, indicates that the rates of growth of all metropolitan areas of Mediterranean metropolitan cities have slowed down since the 1960s (table 3.6). The exception here is Portugal. The dominance of Lisbon and Oporto over the urban hierarchy had been strengthened by 1981 (Williams 1984). The population of the rest of the Mediterranean metropolitan regions, however, has more or less stabilized. In the case of Italy intense migration to the North in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to stability in the 1970s (Gaspar 1984: 213); even the Mezzogiorno was transformed from a rural to an urban, or even industrial, society (Garofoli ed. 1978), and 'rural revival' has been observed (King 1984: 174). In Spain during the 1970s, while traditional migration flows continued, growth in the major cities started to slow down, whereas the populations of smaller towns began to stabilize or even grow (Gaspar 1984: 213-14). Their growth has not yet surpassed that of larger cities, but it seems that the dominance of metropolitan areas has been undermined during the last decade.

The same is true in Greece. It was not Athens and Salonica that grew most rapidly in the 1970s, but some major northern and tourist towns. The number of cities with over 100,000 inhabitants rose from three to six. The fastest-growing towns were Alexandroupolis and Larisa, based on agriculture (table 5.3). Growth also speeded up in the towns of assisted northern areas (Kozani, Katerini, Xanthi, Kavala), in the island towns of Iracleio and Rhodes, based on tourism, and in Patra, based on industry and transport. Counterurbanization cannot be posited, because population growth in Athens, and to a less pronounced degree in Salonica, has been found to have slowed down rather than decreased. This is a clear pattern of *diffuse urbanization*, coupled with the decrease of the power of attraction of metropolitan cities.

Regional inequalities were gradually evened out throughout the postwar period. Studies of regional income have found that inequalities between Athens and the rest of Greece tended to diminish, but most researchers have tried to minimize the significance of this trend.<sup>7</sup> The index of regional inequality oscillated even as early as 1954-62 (Papageorgiou 1973: 44). On the basis of the per capita income of the poorest Greek region (Ipiros = 100), the relative income of Athens rose from 245 in 1954 to 291 in 1958 and

<sup>7</sup> Vergopoulos (1975: 237-54) bases his case of increasing regional inequality on farmers' income alone, disregarding activities such as tourism. Negreponti (1979: 46-53, 137-40, 167-73) observes an improvement in exchange relations between urban and agricultural economic sectors, an increase in the prices of primary production in comparison with the general price index and an increase in farmer's income, but still insists that these trends are either 'contradictory', or 'insignificant' (Negreponti 1979: 49, 51, 173, 298).

Table 5.3 *Population growth in the larger Greek towns, 1951-81*

Towns with over 30,000 inhabitants by 1981	Population	Average annual rates of growth		
	1981	1951-61	1961-71	1971-81
Athens agglomeration	3,027,284	3.00	3.21	1.77
Salonica agglomeration	706,180	2.51	3.89	2.39
Patra agglomeration	154,596	1.12	1.51	2.49
Iraklion agglomeration	110,958	1.85	1.93	2.74
Volos agglomeration	107,407	2.22	0.86	1.98
Larisa	102,048	3.05	2.70	3.50
Canea agglomeration	61,976	3.52	0.43	1.57
Kavala	56,375	0.56	0.38	2.00
Serres	45,213	0.86	-0.04	1.26
Agrinion agglomeration	45,087	3.13	2.30	0.76
Chalkis	44,867	0.40	3.91	2.14
Ioannina	44,829	0.80	1.38	1.11
Kalamata agglomeration	43,235	0.31	-0.23	0.68
Lamia	41,667	-0.38	5.82	0.96
Trikala	40,857	1.45	2.24	1.62
Rhodes	40,392	1.50	1.60	2.33
Katerini agglomeration	39,895	0.31	0.14	2.72
Verria	37,087	1.66	1.37	2.31
Drama	36,109	0.88	-0.81	1.98
Alexandroupolis	34,535	1.19	2.08	4.15
Komotini	34,051	-0.47	0.19	1.66
Corfu	33,561	-0.61	0.59	1.60
Xanthi	31,541	0.26	-0.59	2.41
Kozani	30,994	2.01	0.76	2.92
Total population	9,740,417	0.95	0.44	1.06
Urban (over 10,000)	5,609,141	2.46	2.58	1.95
Rural, semi-urban	4,131,276	-0.04	-1.47	-0.03

Sources: Adapted from NSSG censuses and Statistical Yearbooks.

then fell to 148 in 1960 and 139 in 1972.<sup>8</sup> In relation to the national average (Greece = 100), the Athens relative income fell from 163 in 1961 to 153 in 1971, and from 143.3 in 1970 to 121.5 in 1974.<sup>9</sup> Differences between various estimates are mostly due to variations in the area taken as 'Athens', and the

<sup>8</sup> Adapted from Geronymakis as cited by Ward (1963: 61) and Coutsoumaris (1963: 134) for 1954; from Psilos (1968: 8-9) for 1958; from Babanassis and Soulas (1976: 169) for 1960 and 1972; and from Filias (1974: 277) for 1960.

<sup>9</sup> Adapted from Mandicas (1973, B: 20); CPER (1978: 5); Taoussis (1971: 59, 207); Negreponi (1979: 296-7); Leontidou (1982: 392-3).

nature of income considered. Monthly expenditures and earnings in kind per capita in Greece outside Athens amounted to 27.6 % of the corresponding expenditures in Greater Athens in 1964, but rose to 63.2 % by 1974 (CPER 1978: 5). Consumption patterns in rural and urban Greece were shown to converge in 1964-74 from both a quantitative and a qualitative point of view (Karapostolis 1983). Comparisons with later periods, outside the scope of this book, would further underline regional equalization.

This reversal of the regional pattern throughout Southern Europe should *not* be seen within a 'convergence' theory anticipating a repetition of the Western European experience of counterurbanization. The relevance of two principal interrelated phenomena for the explanation of the new processes has been suggested: the pattern of a spatially diffuse industrialization based on small and medium-sized enterprises frequently located in rural areas, and the reduction of internal and external migratory flows, as well as return migration (Gaspar 1984: 212; King 1984: 160-74). These processes seem to have played a minor role in Greece. The metropolitan location of the informal sector, the small amount of income generated among local populations by the decentralized large industries and the small number and predominant urban orientation of Greek returnees diminish the possibilities of comparisons in these respects.

The latter issue has not been adequately investigated. It has been claimed that until 1973 the returnees settled in large urban areas, but then were directed towards their towns of origin (Emke 1986: 348). However, the distribution by 1981 of Greeks residing abroad in 1975 is indicative of a concentration trend: 35.33 % returned to Greater Athens, 32.73 % to Macedonia (including Salonica) and a mere 5.13 % returned to the Peloponnese, while the rest of the regions were even less attractive (adapted from NSSG, 1985 Yearbook). In 1968-77, 22 % of returnees had settled in Greater Athens (Emke 1986: 349). Among those hired to work by OAED, 52-57 % had settled in Greater Athens in 1981-4 and 20-27 % in Macedonia (including Salonica; Hadjipanayotou 1985: 52).

The improvement in the provinces should rather be explained in the context of Greek capitalism. Migration, and the consequent reduction of population dependent on rural resources, also created labour shortages in the Greek provinces. These induced an equalization of wages between town and country. Rural populations evidenced new needs for consumer durables, often exceeding those of urban workers (Karapostolis 1983: 239). Increasing productivity in 1961-75 increased the farmers' income, while in Attica productivity was found to drop in 1970-4, until it fell to 8 % under the national average (Kindis 1980: table 2). The rate of financial transfers to less developed regions has also been considerable. They included exemption of

peasants from taxation as well as pensions, unemployment pay and emigrant remittances. A large part of public funds have been allocated to agriculture and, already in the 1960s, have contributed to its rapid mechanization, or even over-capitalization (Psilos 1968). It has even been argued that Greek agriculture is *de facto* socialized (Vergopoulos 1975: 206–9). On the contrary, Greater Athens was allocated only 20.2 % of public investment in 1974 and 26.9 % in 1977 (CPER 1978: 6; Mandicas 1973, B: 32–3). It also received a mere 2.8 % of the State budget for community infrastructure (Leontidou 1982), despite the size of the population concentrated there. Besides such financial pressures, the crisis of the metropolitan areas must be attributed to congestion, environmental deterioration and the development of negative externalities. The spread of an economy around tourism has also played a major role in the gradual increase of employment opportunities and incomes in provincial Greece. The alternative decentralized pattern of regional revitalization benefits from the existence of social strata who combine seasonal work in agriculture, tourism and small industry in provincial areas, and exploit their property in islands and tourist coasts. Heavy emphasis on tourism especially through speculative building was another characteristic of the period of the dictatorship (Leontidou 1988).

For different reasons in the various countries, then, large-scale urban development in the Mediterranean is now history. Even in Portugal, where cities are still growing, the deepening economic and financial crisis combined with urbanization has contributed to the resurgence of shanty towns and the 'black' economy, especially in Lisbon (Lewis and Williams 1984b). Contrary to current views (Gaspar 1984: 232), the important regional role of Athens in the eastern Mediterranean has *not* averted the trend towards its stagnation. Diffuse urbanization, by contrast, unexpectedly revives an old European pattern, the 'stage' city between two important capitals, the middle-sized regional or provincial capital. 'Perhaps Italy is becoming again what it was in the past, to the wonder and fascination of everyone, *il paese delle cento città*' (Giner 1984).

## 5.2 The new economic geography of Greater Athens and Salonica

A more detailed regionalization will now indicate the impact of industrial restructuring on urban space. The censuses distinguish between the urban agglomerations (Greater Athens, Greater Salonica) and their wider regions (the Attica and the Salonica Nomos; fig. 5.1 for the Attica region). As commuting flows between urban areas and these wider regions are becoming increasingly important, the regions for investigation should be geographi-

cally expanded as the cities grow and more long-term analysis of population and employment is attempted. Disaggregation, on the other hand, focusing on local authority districts, is difficult because disaggregated data is rare, mostly unpublished or not available. Since each new report produces its own regionalizations, efforts at comparison among various studies are undermined. An analysis based on primary sources follows.

### 5.2.1 *The nature of industrial decline*

The Athens economy was dominated by industry during the 1960s, when it concentrated over 46 % of total Greek manufacturing employment and over 51 % of employment in large establishments. It has already been argued (section 5.1.1) that such a concentration was by no means 'indicative of the absolutely odd development of Greek industry from the point of its regional distribution' (Filiás 1974: 312.). On the contrary, in the context of Greek demand-led industrialization at the time, it would be irrational for industrialists not to opt for location in the largest single market and place of largest labour reserve. The attractiveness of Athens to industry since the interwar years is a well-researched issue.

Contrary to current opinion (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 366; Burgel 1970: 25), Athens was *not* the centre of light, consumption goods industries and workshops of repair in the 1960s. Only in so far as this was in the nature of Greek industrialization in general did such industries predominate in the city; in relation to other Greek areas their concentration here was low. This is established by the study of LQs by industry group for Greater Athens in relation to Greece (table 5.4). Values over 1.0 are observed in most cases of heavy rather than light industries. Among the latter, Athens was most markedly and increasingly specialized in printing (28), miscellaneous (39) and fabric (24) industries. Specialization in heavier industries, such as chemicals (31), rubber and plastics (30) and electrical machinery (37), tended to decline but was still high even during the phase of industrial decline in 1984. Recent attempts at shift-share analysis have also concluded that the Greater Athens manufacturing sector was composed of a modern, dynamic industrial mix in 1963, but gradually lost its locational advantages for modern, larger industry.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> This has been corroborated by three studies where detailed shift-share analysis is undertaken. The first relevant study (Kottis 1980) concluded that whatever deconcentration occurred in Attica in 1963-73 (that is, before deindustrialization hit the city) was due mainly to dynamic industry groups. Similar conclusions are arrived at by a recent study (Katochianou 1984: 125-46) for the period up to 1978. Later analysis for the 1963-78 period in the Greater Athens agglomeration by 3-digit SIC Order and by size of industrial establishments (PERPA 1985) found that smaller establishments grew in Athens more than in Greece as a whole (with one exception), while larger-scale sectors opted for decentralization.

Table 5.4 *Location quotient<sup>a</sup> of employment by industry group in Greater Athens, 1958-84*

	1958	1963	1969	1973	1978	1984
20 Food products	0.69	0.53	0.57	0.52	0.57	0.63
21 Beverages	0.54	0.58	0.84	0.77	0.87	0.79
22 Tobacco products	0.52	0.68	0.68	0.75	0.66	0.68
23 Textile mill products	1.26	1.20	1.19	1.09	1.00	0.96
24 Fabric products	0.89	0.98	1.06	1.13	1.13	1.19
26 Furniture and fixtures	1.21	1.14	1.08	1.14	1.13	1.12
28 Printing, publishing	1.78	1.62	1.69	1.76	1.89	2.07
29 Leather and products	0.85	0.72	0.64	0.59	0.53	0.51
39 Miscellaneous	1.62	1.38	1.41	1.42	1.52	1.64
<i>Light industry, total</i>	0.95	0.92	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.99
25 Lumber and wood products	0.56	0.63	0.64	0.63	0.65	0.66
27 Paper etc. products	1.38	1.24	1.15	1.26	1.26	1.22
30 Rubber and plastics	1.76	1.66	1.64	1.40	1.41	1.23
31 Chemicals etc. products	0.97	1.64	1.38	1.38	1.37	1.46
32 Petroleum refining	1.60	0.86	0.82	0.74	0.41	0.36
33 Stone, clay, glass	0.86	0.84	0.73	0.68	0.65	0.59
34 Primary metals	1.29	0.55	0.46	0.27	0.29	0.17
35 Metal products	1.15	1.13	1.05	0.96	1.03	1.00
36 Machinery except electrical	1.13	1.14	1.08	1.16	0.96	0.99
37 Electrical machinery	1.65	1.71	1.57	1.48	1.36	1.35
38 Transportation equipment	1.29	1.23	1.23	1.21	1.31	1.25
<i>Heavy industry, total</i>	1.07	1.12	1.06	1.05	1.05	1.02

<sup>a</sup> The LQ (related with Greece) is explained in footnote 2 of p. 130.

Sources: Adapted from NSSG censuses of industrial etc. establishments, 1958, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1978, 1984.

The new phase in the history of Greek industrialization after the early 1970s affected Greater Athens and Salonica with a time lag. The two cities were the first regions to be hit by industrial decline. Industry located here as long as its structure was demand-led. Urbanization and industrialization were closely connected in Athens and Salonica. The years of fast urbanization (1961-71) were accompanied by rapid industrial growth rates and a sharp decline in 'service' employment (chapter 3). The working-class suburbs near industrial zones grew most rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s (chapter 4). Later on, however, as the geographical model was reversed in favour of the provinces, the metropolitan regions – first Athens, then Salonica – were hit by industrial stability and then by outright de-



industrialization, as shown on table 5.5. This began *before* the economic crisis and before more general de-industrialization trends in Greece of the 1980s. At the same time the tertiary sector grew, with important transformations in its structure.

The process of industrial decline affected Athens more intensively than Salonica. In the former, industrial employment remained almost stagnant from 1973: the average annual rate of growth fell to 0.14% in 1973–78 compared with 4.6% in 1969–73 (table 5.5). By 1981 productive labour had remained stable in Athens (50%) and Salonica (51.2%) for a decade (chapter 3). By 1984 net employment decline had become evident. A net loss of 37,669 jobs in manufacturing industry has been estimated in Athens (table 5.6), while Salonica appeared more dynamic, but it was actually the region around it (Nomos) that experienced employment growth in the early 1980s.

#### *5.2.2 Metropolitan periphery and inner city: unequal development*

The simultaneous impact of the process of industrial decline on both Athens and Salonica is quite remarkable, and the homogeneity of the geographical distribution of industrial employment in the broader urban regions in 1958–84 is noteworthy (table 5.5). During the early 1970s industrial employment in the unpopulated areas around the two agglomerations increased. Later on, during the late 1970s, more central urban areas evidenced stagnation of industrial employment for the first time in their history.

The slowing down of industrial growth in the Athens urban area in relation to the rest of Greece from the mid-1960s was accompanied by a spectacular acceleration of growth in the metropolitan periphery, i.e. its adjoining regions – Attica and Beotia. The process had not begun to operate in 1963: employment creation was higher than the Greek average in Athens and Attica, but was stationary in Beotia. After 1963, however, and while Athens lost pace, the metropolitan periphery experienced a spectacular acceleration of industrial development rates, which jumped to levels four times as high as the Greek average in 1969–73. The same geographical pattern, though with more moderate rates of growth in the metropolitan periphery, can be observed in Salonica (table 5.5). A new dynamic industrial area was appearing around the dense urban agglomerations.

New legislation has been largely responsible. Despite the rise of industries oriented to raw materials in the Greek economy, many manufacturing establishments still valued the external economies of the urban agglomerations. The area around the Athens basin, Attica, zone 'A' of industrial

Table 5.5 *Employment in industrial establishments in and around Greater Athens and Salonica, 1958–84*

Average annual employment in manufacturing industry, absolute numbers and rates of growth (average annual, %).											
	1958	58–63	1963	63–9	1969	69–73	1973	73–8	1978	78–84	1984
Athens urban area (Greater Athens)	171,237	5.20	220,672	0.97	233,779	4.60	279,824	0.14	281,821	–1.04	244,151
Rest of Attica	11,571 <sup>a</sup>	5.17	14,890	3.15	17,932	16.31	32,814	6.97	45,958	0.85	48,358
Beotia	3,412 <sup>a</sup>	0.12	3,433	12.30	6,884	20.27	14,405	1.74	15,705	3.49	19,293
Salonica urban area	37,754	2.30	42,308	2.67	49,557	4.77	54,454	0.57	56,036	1.10	65,270
Rest of Salonica Nomos	3,982 <sup>a</sup>	1.18	4,223	14.92	9,725	13.41	16,085	10.79	26,850	2.67	31,456
Rest of Greece	186,244	–0.02	186,038	–0.22	183,645	2.97	206,460	3.49	245,126	1.97	275,617
Total Greece (average)	414,200	2.63	471,564	1.03	501,522	4.76	604,042	2.14	671,496	0.31	684,145

<sup>a</sup> Employment in energy is included in available disaggregated data for 1958, but the error is negligible (about 400 jobs in Attica and 100 in Beotia); no data for average annual employment available: employment at date of census is given in 1958 disaggregated data, but again the error is negligible.

*Sources:* Adapted from NSSG census data from censuses of establishments 1958–84.




Figure 5.1 Industrial areas in Attica, Beotia, Korinth and Euboea in the 1970s.  
Sources: Adapted from ETVA-SCET (1973) and Doxiadis Assoc. (1976, vol. 1).

incentives,<sup>11</sup> began to lose ground in the establishment of new industries by the mid-1960s. But not quite; in order to retain the agglomeration economies of Athens without losing benefits granted by the relevant legislation for decentralization, many industries settled on the boundaries of zone 'B' with Attica, in Beotia and Korinth (ETVA-SCET 1974, 3A: 22). A new industrial axis expanded from Euboea via Attica to Korinth, consisting of two newly created industrial axes: that of Athens-Elefsina-

<sup>11</sup> See Kottis (1980) for a review of recent legislation. Law 849/1978 specified five zones where different incentives for industrial development were given: A (Attica except Lavrio, part of Korinth Nomos not belonging to the Peloponnese, Salonica which was zone B under previous legislation); B (Lavrio, rest of Korinth, Beotia, Euboea); C and D (rest of Greece except areas near frontiers); and E (Evros, Xanthi, Rodopi, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Dodecanese). Industrialization was discouraged in zone A and mostly encouraged in zone E near the border, which was heavily subsidized.



Megara–Korinth on the southwest, more recently extended along the highway to Patra; and that of Athens–Thebes–Chalkis on the northwest, with more intensive industrialization around Oinofyta and Chalkis (fig. 5.1). Employment growth in this zone stabilized temporarily in 1973–8, but is still going on today. Like metropolitan peripheries around other large Mediterranean capitals, the Greek ones also appear to be the most profitable locations (Hudson and Lewis 1984: 190). In the case of Portugal, for example, manufacturing did not expand in the cities of Lisbon and Oporto, but in the wider metropolitan areas and especially in the rural zones adjacent to them (Ferrão 1984; Lewis and Williams 1987).

During the period of industrial decline, however, employment stabilized in the Athens metropolitan periphery: in Attica, the rate of growth of employment fell to a mere 1 % annually in 1978–84, contrasting with rates of 16 % and 7 % in previous periods (table 5.5). While most Greek regions have reached a stage of self-sustained growth, Attica can look forward only to a long period of industrial decline. This is not true of Salonica, where employment is still growing.

The redistribution of manufacturing employment on the intra-urban level has been studied only recently, and disaggregated data is rare and should be adapted.<sup>12</sup> The 1969–73 period was still one of rapid industrial development and centralization (fig. 5.2). All areas, including the centre of Athens, continued to attract considerable employment in absolute terms, though rates were slowing down in the CBD, and though its share in total employment continued to decline throughout the postwar period. Until 1973 industrial mobility was low, despite the widespread practice, especially among smaller enterprises, to rent industrial premises (ETVA–SCET 1974, 3B: 2). The prevalent process was concentration and intensification of agglomeration in already existing industrial zones during 1969–73 (fig. 5.2). The reversal of this pattern in the mid-1970s was a very important and novel fact in urban history.

The inner city was hit by industrial decline in 1973–84 (fig. 5.3). Disaggregation of the data shows that deindustrialization in Athens was

<sup>12</sup> Cf. the recent study by Leontidou 1983. Earlier studies present shortcomings in this respect. The 1963 NSSG Industrial Atlas included only graphic illustrations of establishments and employment in nine maps for the census year only. Burgel's studies (1970, 1972) refer sporadically and descriptively to some industrial areas, but are already obsolete since data collection was completed by 1964. The ETVA–SCET (1974) study, covering the period before 1973, has few and inadequate references to the intra-urban location of industry and is oriented to planning. Primary material for the present analysis is therefore derived from the volumes of the 1969 NSSG census, as well as unpublished computer printouts of the 1973, 1978 and 1984 censuses (provisional data), which present the number of industrial establishments and employment by community in Athens.



*Figures 5.2 and 5.3* Change of industrial employment by area in Attica: Manufacturing employment change in 1969-73 (left, fig. 5.2) and 1973-84 (right, fig. 5.3). Sources: Computed and mapped from unpublished disaggregated data (computer printouts) of the 1969, 1973 and 1984 censuses of industrial etc. establishments.

Table 5.6 *Sectoral analysis of manufacturing industry in Greater Athens and its industrial axis, 1973-84*

SIC	Employment 1984		Employment change			
	Total Greater Athens	Industrial axis % of total	In Greater Athens		In industrial axis <sup>a</sup>	
			1973-8	1978-84	1973-8	1978-84
20 Food products	22,417	57.93	699	-1	259	-1,657
21 Beverages	3,979	23.30	209	-673	-365	-546
22 Tobacco products	2,481	97.38	-458	-236	-485	-275
23 Textile mill products	22,473	59.54	-1,640	-10,546	-1,565	-6,690
24 Fabric products	41,231	60.55	3,480	-307	-1,436	-1,466
25 Lumber and wood products	7,889	36.30	-1,093	-1,193	-292	-636
26 Furniture and fixtures	12,609	46.60	-878	-2,180	-1,204	-1,594
27 Paper etc. products	4,722	79.86	1,118	-1,082	1,051	-1,256
28 Printing, publishing	12,941	64.34	673	-780	-397	-1,015
29 Leather and products	3,092	74.13	-120	-356	-235	-534
30 Rubber and plastics	9,073	51.88	1,197	-2,431	829	-2,364
31 Chemicals etc. products	14,312	64.50	2,006	-672	970	-865
32 Petroleum refining	750	82.67	-501	-59	-344	-119
33 Stone, clay, glass	8,269	46.56	-1,079	-2,574	-965	-1,625
34 Primary metals	634	84.07	186	-540	-277	-178
35 Metal products	18,401	50.74	1,967	-5,060	681	-3,811
36 Machinery except electrical	8,564	73.26	-3,755	-458	-3,531	-16
37 Electrical machinery	13,834	53.02	-3,926	-3,215	-2,910	-2,176
38 Transportation equipment	29,302	47.45	4,751	-5,294	3,787	-2,962
39 Miscellaneous	7,177	71.19	-840	-13	-319	-418
2-3 total, of which	244,151	56.81	1,996	-37,669	-6,748	-30,203
Jobs added			16,286	0	7,577	0
Jobs lost			-14,290	-37,669	-14,325	-30,203

<sup>a</sup> The industrial axis is shown in fig. 5.3 and includes 11 municipalities: Athens, Piraeus, Ag.I. Rendis, Keratsini, Drapetsona, Tavros, Moschato, N. Ionia, N. Chalkidon, N. Philadelphia, Heracleio.

Source: Adapted from NSSG censuses of establishments, 1973, 1978, 1984, and unpublished disaggregated data of the three censuses.

very specifically localized: industrial stagnation can be attributed almost exclusively to employment decline along the traditional industrial axis between Athens and Piraeus. The axis has long concentrated the largest share of urban employment. Recently however, its share in the total employment of Greater Athens fell from 62.8% in 1973 to 59.9% in 1978 and 56.8% by 1984. An aggregate analysis of the composition of industrial decline in the whole agglomeration in 1973–84 (table 5.6) indicates that the net loss of jobs was distributed among all industry groups. Even printing industries (28), which for a long time have tended to concentrate in Athens, experienced job loss. Textiles (23) declined the most, with a net loss of 12,186 jobs (table 5.6).

Industrial decline in the inner city was moderate, since it only involved the loss of a total of 44,528 jobs in 1973–84 (table 5.6). If this is further disaggregated by 2-digit SIC Order, however, only industries in SIC Orders 20, 27, 30, 31, 35 are found to grow slowly in the industrial axis, and 38 to grow considerably in 1973–8. In 1978–84 decline was all-embracing: it not only involved constantly declining sectors (SIC 20, 26, 28, 33), but also former growing ones (SIC 27, 34, 35), and even formerly dynamic sectors (SIC 38, 30; table 5.6). It was four groups taken together, however, that accounted for the greatest part of the loss. Machinery (including electric, SIC 36, 37), and the textile and clothing industries (SIC 23, 24) have been responsible for the loss of 19,790 jobs in 1973–84. All of these, except SIC 24, have also declined in Greater Athens as a whole. The conclusion is very interesting, since it suggests that decline was due to both substitution of capital for labour in modern sectors (SIC 36, 37) and the closing down or relocation of traditional industries (SIC 23, 24). Problems of congestion were already evident in Athens by 1973, especially for the more space-consuming groups. However, the groups seeking relocation in 1973 were not those that actually declined in 1973–84.<sup>13</sup> This indicates that it was economic circumstance and policy rather than locational factors that affected at least some of the groups declining in the inner city.

### *5.2.3 Industrial estates against urbanization*

Industrial decentralization policy during the 1970s was coupled with policies against urbanization. Labour shortages in the Greek provinces were

<sup>13</sup> It is peculiar that the drive for relocation as found by a survey in the larger establishments of Attica in 1973 (ETVA-SCET 1974, 3: 99) was concentrated in the groups of transport equipment (38), which grew the fastest in the inner city in 1973–8 (table 5.6), and in SIC Orders 23, 33, 31 and 27, in that order. In 75% of the cases, the need for expansion in land and buildings was presented as the main reason for the relocation drive.

attributed to emigration and urbanization. The former constituted a safety valve which would not be manipulated in dealing with the basic problem of industrial decentralization. Urbanization, by contrast, could be controlled somehow. The industrialists, the State and the planners found housing as a way of coordinating the regional supply of labour. According to their plans, the settlement network was to be reorganized through the building of new estates which would attract labour to industries (Kindis 1966: 51-2). In the Greek provinces, around national and international firms, an estate sector emerged and the direct employment linkage reappeared as large industrial capital tried to manipulate the labour market according to its needs.

During the years of the dictatorship after 1967 the cooperation of industrialists, State and bankers to this effect was favoured. LD 1003/1971 'on Action Planning' gave unprecedented powers to private firms for compulsory purchase of land and the development of estates. The revision of housing policy after 1970 (chapter 6) substituted public housing provision for this kind of organized development of estates. The Workers' Housing Organization (AOEK), along with semi-public and private corporations, were given priority in the allocation of loans granted through the provisions of LD 1138/1972 and the powers for compulsory purchase granted by LD 1003/1971. The year 1971 marked the beginning of the collaboration of the Federation of Greek Industrialists (FGI) with the National Mortgage Bank of Greece (EKTE).

The Federation has long considered the crucial matter of establishing housing programmes as a basic factor influencing both the mobility of industrial units from the center to the regions and the pursued decentralization of productive activity... The FGI supported the basic principle, according to which the mobility and the reallocation of manpower in space is closely related to both the creation of new job opportunities and the existence of appropriate housing facilities...

The possibility of becoming a house owner will operate as an additional incentive for workers to settle in industrial areas and will effectively encourage emigrant workers to repatriate.  
(FGI 1973: 42)

New industrial estates sprang up in rural Greece and around towns (UN ECE 1975: 39-53). Reference to 'social' goals concealed the motive for the reorganization of the labour market according to new principles created by the restructuring of the formal economy and, of course, the drive of new large building enterprises to profit from real estate, given the support of the State. Policies for both renting and owner-occupation were provided (Emmanuel 1979: 93-4). This strategy of attracting labour to the provinces would soon be extended to a policy against urbanization in Athens, which was now beginning to obstruct the development of the new industrial sectors.



There was a long-standing tradition of a strong employment linkage among the industrial population of Greater Athens (cf. chapter 4). Its strength, however, could be finally tested only if a change occurred: if, for example, new land were made available for the working class away from the industrial axis, or if industry began to decentralize to inaccessible areas. It was the second process which actually operated in Attica after the late 1960s. The trends in industrial location observed earlier created a zone of factories around Greater Athens. The failure of the working class also to decentralize formed one of the crucial aspects of the conflict around land allocation in Greater Athens after 1967.

This can be observed first through quantitative analysis. Until the mid-1960s the growth of employment in manufacturing in the Athens basin influenced urbanization by area and, through it, densities and spatial patterns. Though generally underestimated (as in Kayser and Thompson 1964: 2.07), this fact can be substantiated on the basis of table 5.7. In the regions where industrial employment grew most rapidly in 1930-73, fast rates of population growth were also evident in 1928-71. Later, however, a systematic pattern emerged, which broke the employment linkage in the metropolitan area. This process was felt as soon as industries grew in Attica and Beotia. Urbanization and industrialization gradually ceased to be interrelated (table 5.7; cf. also CPER 1978: 6-7). Population was almost stationary in a ring around the city, growing by 1.6% annually in 1961-71 and 2.3% in 1971-81. Industrial employment in the same area, by contrast, was growing at the spectacular rate of 8.0% in 1958-73, and then slowed down to 3.5% in 1973-84. This was still more rapid than population growth. The difference in rates indicates that industry around Athens failed to attract a resident labour force.

Additional evidence about the relationship between factories around Athens and the local population can be provided if Athens and its region are considered first as places of residence of a manufacturing labour force, and then as places of employment in industrial establishments located there. If exchanges among areas were non-existent, employment at place of residence and place of work would be equal; but they were not. In Greater Athens, employment at place of residence in the 1960s grew faster than employment in establishments; in the metropolitan periphery, employment at place of residence grew by 3.92% annually while employment in establishments grew by as much as 8.08%; and, most important, employment at place of residence in this outer region (43,060 people) was lower than employment in its establishments (50,106 employees) in 1971, while the reverse was true in the case of Greater Athens (Leontidou 1981b). Industrial areas of the metropolitan periphery obviously recruited labour from the dense urban agglomeration.

Table 5.7 *Urbanization and industrialization in Greater Athens and its region, 1928-84*

	Greater Athens	Attica	Beotia	Total region around Athens
Population, absolute nos.				
1928	740,520	n.a. <sup>a</sup>	n.a. <sup>a</sup>	284,147
1961	1,852,709	205,265	107,775	313,040
1971	2,540,241	257,608	107,459	365,067
1981	3,027,331	342,093	117,175	459,268
Employment in manufacturing and energy establishments, <sup>b</sup> absolute nos.				
1930	66,142	n.a. <sup>a</sup>	n.a. <sup>a</sup>	9,405
1958	175,810	11,571	3,412	14,983
1973	288,072	33,287	14,448	47,735
1984	253,645	49,832	19,631	69,463
Average annual rates of growth % of population (urbanization) and employment (industrialization)				
	Greater Athens	Attica	Beotia	Total region around Athens
Urbanization (population)				
1928-61	2.82 <sup>a</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	0.36
1961-71	3.21	2.30	0.26	1.55
1971-81	1.77	2.88	0.87	2.32
Industrialization (employment in manufacturing and energy establishments)				
1930-58	3.55 <sup>a</sup>		1.68 <sup>b</sup>	1.68
1958-73	3.35	7.30	10.10	8.03
1973-84	-1.15	3.74	2.83	3.47

<sup>a</sup> The interwar censuses do not distinguish between Attica and Beotia.

<sup>b</sup> Energy was included because it was not distinguished in 1930 and 1958 for Attica-Beotia.

Sources: Adapted from SGG 1928 and 1930 and from NSSG general population censuses, 1961-81 and censuses of industrial etc. establishments, 1958-84.

The new industrial area around Attica failed to attract population eager to maintain the employment linkage. The establishment of new industry in Attica around Athens, but especially on the boundaries of Beotia and Korinth with Attica (fig. 5.1), revealed the stubborn spatial fixity of the urban working class. The owner-built houses caused immobility of labour.

The working class was reluctant to part with the privileges of urban life and the housing it had acquired throughout the twentieth century and would not follow the decentralization of industry. It tended to prefer reverse commuting from Athens (ETVA-SCET 1974; 3B: 30-5). What was happening on the national scale was repeated in the region around Greater Athens. In the early 1970s industrialists and the State had to build new estates not only in the provinces, but also in Attica and Beotia, in order to attract labour (UN ECE 1975: 42, 53-4; ETVA-SCET 1974, 3B: 40). As the years passed and traditional industrial areas became more congested and began to decline, more industrialists sought relocation, and their complaints about labour immobility merged with those of foreign and domestic capitalists unable to attract labour to the provinces. This was an additional force leading to pressures for the change of working-class land allocation patterns in the years that followed (chapter 6).

### 5.3 Farewell to the working class?

#### 5.3.1 *From proletarianization to the crisis*

By 1981, 460,000 industrial and transport workers were concentrated in Athens and Salonica (in a total economically active population of 1,234,600), or half a million if workers in neighbouring settlements (Elefsina, Lavrio, Themi) are added. This proletariat, stubbornly located in cities, has been somewhat underestimated in Greek social research. As shown in chapter 3, however, the process of proletarianization should not be treated as a short interval within the urban development trajectory. Among the most important social transformations in metropolitan regions during the first two postwar decades were the emergence of a working class which, paradoxically, intensified in the 1960s – the years of export of Greek labour to West Germany; the decline of marginal populations and the ‘penny capitalists’ typical of Third World cities; the increase of small and medium-sized industrial and commercial enterprises, and their gradual integration into capitalism; the development of an economy of full employment where previously urban poverty and unemployment were chronic; the absorption of migrants; and the growth of a middle class as well as productive labour in place of the unstable marginal populations of the interwar and the first postwar years.

Proletarianization took place in the context of a polarized economy, where independent labour developed along with the factory working class, and the size of the informal sector continued to grow. Throughout the postwar period, 35-40% of the manufacturing labourers in Greater Athens

worked in tiny establishments of under ten employees (table 5.2). These workers formed part of the proletariat (chapter 3). The Greek 'economic miracle' was realized in the 1960s by a solid, if unstable, working class. Despite arguments to the contrary, proletarianization *did* take place, and Greek large cities were *not* parasitic in the process of economic development. They actually became the centre of production and nurtured mobilizations against the parasitism of power.

The period of proletarianization, with its contradictions and inequalities, has now passed irretrievably, however, and industrial decline is occurring in Greece, a process which affects the largest cities almost exclusively. Productive employment is stagnating and service employment is developing. An 'urban crisis' is under way. One of its indicators is the increase in unemployment. Statistical reliability is very limited in this area. Official figures are underestimates and never refer to disguised unemployment. In any case, it can be discerned that registered unemployment in the past was more marked in rural than urban areas (Fragos 1980: 162-4). Chronic urban unemployment loomed large especially during the first postwar years (Papandreou 1962: 24-6). The 1951 census found 11.26 % of the urban labour force unemployed. This was an improvement over 1928, when unemployment among workers alone in Greece was 18.4 %. Registered unemployment was reduced further from 8.63 % in 1961 to 7.47 % in 1971 and 4.3 % in 1981 (adapted from NSSG censuses). Then, however, it rose again to 5 % in 1985, while inflation rates were rising to 18-20 % in 1983-6 (Lyrintzis 1987: 677). Officially registered urban unemployment peaked in 1967 and then in 1975, and reached its highest levels by 1985. Fig. 5.4 gives an idea about the rhythm, not the volume, of unemployment.<sup>14</sup> It shows that in Greater Athens, unemployment had already started to rise sharply in the early 1970s, as the economic crisis was beginning. Fig. 5.4 in this case is based on NSSG censuses, which underestimate the problem.<sup>15</sup> Unemployment affects especially the working class, and among them female labourers and the younger generation. The percentage of unemployed women in the female labour force grew from 3.4 % in 1971 to 7 % in 1981 and 18.2 % in 1986, while the relevant rates for male unemployment were only 2.5 %, 4.9 % and 8 % (adapted from NSSG censuses and the 1986

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that fig. 5.4 is based on monthly average figures and that it includes the unemployed as registered by the OAED (Organization for Labour Force Employment) for the years after 1978, while previous figures also include those directly hired by employers. Later years are therefore underestimates, as also indicated by the comparison of OAED data with those of various censuses.

<sup>15</sup> The 1981 census found 5.55 % of the economically active population of Athens unemployed, and 6.23 % of that of Salonica, as compared with 3.62 % of the rest of the country. These rates are put in doubt by a reliable survey, which estimates unemployment in Athens at 12.8 % of the economically active population in 1983 (Pantazides and Kassimati 1984: 40).




Figure 5.4 Average annual rates of registered unemployment, 1960–85. Sources: Adapted from Hadjipanayotou (1985: 19, 30, 41) from OAED data, and NSSG, population and employment census data. Average annual rates have been computed by average monthly rates.

labour force survey). Such problems are manifestations of the economic crisis due to industrial decline and the crisis in the construction sector in the cities. The tertiary sector proved less vulnerable to the crisis, and continues to grow.

### 5.3.2 *The new working class: transformations and hypotheses*

In fact, a dramatic class restructuring has been taking place in the metropolitan cities during the last 15 years. On a first level, changes can be observed by quantitative analysis. As shown on the series of tables 3.8–3.11 (chapter 3) and summarized in table 5.8, manufacturing employment remained stagnant in 1971–81, employment in banks, social and public

Table 5.8 *The structure of the economically active population in Greater Athens and Salonica by economic sector, 1971-81*

Economic sectors	Greater Athens			Greater Salonica		
	1971	1981	Average annual change %	1971	1981	Average annual change %
Primary sector	7,336	4,699	-4.36	4,960	2,402	-6.99
Secondary sector:						
1 Mining, quarrying	2,476	1,996	-2.01	400	236	-5.14
2-3 Manufacturing industry	259,188	282,643	0.87	60,540	73,970	2.02
4 Electricity, gas, water	12,256	10,165	-1.85	1,660	1,103	-4.01
5 Construction industry	93,244	101,529	0.85	19,680	22,018	1.13
Tertiary sector:						
6 Commerce	154,496	174,352	1.22	35,080	41,865	1.78
% Wholesale	21.98	25.04			19.96	
Retail	58.27	57.56			60.88	
Restaurants, hotels	19.75	17.39			19.16	
7 Transport, warehousing, communications	96,524	125,102	2.63	17,620	19,434	0.98
8 Banks, insurance	50,804	74,294	3.87	7,300	11,497	4.65
9 Services	154,260	237,650	4.42	35,240	47,501	3.03
% Governmental	42.57	38.38			26.56	
Other	57.43	61.62			73.44	
Not declared, unclassifiable	37,732	52,512	3.36	3,340	7,790	8.84
Total economically active	868,316	1,064,942	2.06	185,820	227,816	2.06
Resident population	2,540,241	3,027,331	1.77	557,360	706,180	2.39
Employment ratio (%)	34.18	35.18		33.34	32.26	

Source: Adapted from NSSG 1971 and 1981 census data.

services increased rapidly, that in personal services diminished and the process of proletarianization was reversed. The percentage of the working class then fell from 45 % to 38 % of the economically active population in Athens and from 50 % to 43 % in Salonica. Tertiary employment grew, and the share of the new petty bourgeoisie of the tertiary sector, which had remained stable or even declined up to 1971, grew rapidly in 1971-81, and came to constitute 34 % of the economically active population of Athens and 30 % of that of Salonica (table 3.10). At the same time, employment shifted from lower office workers to directors, managers and scientists, as in the case of late capitalism (Leontidou 1986: 96). It is clear that the postwar period, and especially the last decade, was characterized by the increase of the new rather than the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The public service sector was particularly sizeable throughout Greece. In fact, while during the immediate postwar period there was one State employee for every two productive workers, the ratio had swollen to 1:1 by 1983 (Tsoucalas 1986: 249). All of the restructuring processes appear even more marked for 1981-4, as shown in recent sample surveys (Pantazides and Kassimati 1984: 76-7) and NSSG censuses. The present employment structure in Athens and

Table 5.9 *Social classes in manufacturing industry, Greater Athens, 1958-78: distribution of employment in industrial establishments*

	1958 %	1963 %	1969 %	1973 %	1978 %
Employers (bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie)	16.31	16.77	19.69	17.97	19.69
Salary earners (new petty bourgeoisie)	11.53	12.21	16.77	17.89	23.61
Wage earners (working class)	68.97	66.84	59.27	60.81	53.21
Unpaid family members	3.19	4.18	4.27	3.33	3.49

Source: Adapted by the author from NSSG censuses of establishments, 1958, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1978.

Salónica (table 5.8) indicates that these cities are being transformed from being the principal productive centres of Greece to the late capitalist model of 'tertiarizing' metropolises, always characterized by the inflated State apparatus peculiar to Greece.

The future profile of the Greek working class is indicated by trends in the internal differentiation of productive labour. In table 5.9 status groups are distinguished within the working class on the basis of Poulantzas' (1975) criterion of manual/mental labour, despite our reservations: it should be remembered that the distinction between manual and mental labour is traditionally slight in Greek industry, and has been rendered useless more recently because of shopfloor politics and new forms of organization of the factory working class (chapter 6). However, it is worth risking an investigation of these issues as far as data permits. Wage earners can be considered indicatively as manual workers, while salary earners are usually mental and supervisory labour. An abrupt change in the balance of these two categories in 1963-9 is evident. Until then, wage earners constituted the majority of workers in manufacturing (around 85 %). After 1969 their share was gradually reduced (77 %), and finally, during 1973-8, the years of industrial decline, they fell to 70 % of dependent labour in manufacturing. This is due to the new technical division of labour. The introduction of new technology and the substitution of capital for labour has created 'tertiarization' trends within the manufacturing sector itself. It is regrettable that putting-out work is not recorded in censuses. Even so, however, it is clear that the nature of the working class is being transformed radically with economic development.

Table 5.10 *Socio-occupational categories within each age group of the Greater Athens labour force, 1983*

	25-35 %	35-45 %	45-55 %
Scientists, liberal professions	30.0	26.5	19.2
Office employees	17.8	12.4	11.2
Merchants, vendors	11.7	13.1	13.5
Workers, craftsmen	29.3	33.5	37.8
Service workers	8.8	9.7	12.3
Others	2.4	4.8	6.0

Source: Tsoucalas 1986: 239 (adapted from Pantazides and Kassimati 1984).

The Greek working class has appeared disinclined towards inter-generational perpetuation. A large section of the younger generation prefer to remain unemployed rather than work in factories. In 1971-81, one out of every two children of working-class families have passed to non-manual occupations (Tsoucalas 1986). Even a decade ago capitalists complained about labour scarcity – but continued to dismiss trade union activists. Conventional wisdom arbitrarily insists on an image of labourers with attitudes such as the pursuit of upward social mobility and independence through small shops, with the attendant ideological opportunism. Such theories of ‘parasitism’, resistance to work discipline, or even ‘laziness’, however, must be viewed with scepticism. The workers actually strive to educate their children so that they can see them move out of dependence, exploitation and insecurity. Individual solutions are sought where collective action has been futile or suppressed.

It has been found that in Athens the percentage of higher education graduates doubled in 1971-83, and professions absorbing scientists increased proportionately (Pantazides and Kassimati 1984: 43). If they do not remain unemployed, or if they do not turn to manual jobs, higher education graduates are absorbed as mental labour in factories, as office workers in enterprises or the public sector, or, finally, as skilled semi-autonomous employees. A definite indication of such inter-generational shifts is provided in table 5.10. The trend is the growth of scientists and office employees among the younger generation, at the expense of the working class. At the same time the number of merchants and service workers also appears to be falling. The new generation contributes in the development of the public sector. By 1981 one out of every two scientists or civil servants originated from ‘lower strata’ (Tsoucalas 1986: 240).



Table 5.11 *Percentage of family income declared to come from the main employment source in total family income in Greece, 1960–80*

	1960 %	1980 %
Salary and wage earners	83.6	93.3
Liberal professions	48.0	38.1
Merchants, industrialists, artisans	79.1	72.7
Income receivers (buildings, property)	91.8	52.0

Source: Tsoucalas 1986: 308 (from NSSG statistics of declared income).

Social mobility in Greek society has recently been attributed to 'polyvalent' forms of social integration (Tsoucalas 1984, 1986). The concept includes multiple employment at the individual and family level, moonlighting and a multitude of strategies for income improvement, and can be only investigated through indirect indicators. One of the most interesting is the percentage of declared family income coming from the main employment source (table 5.11). This indicates that all social categories have increasingly diversified their employment sources, except salary and wage earners. It has been maintained that the 'black' economy or 'para-economy' has grown to be responsible for more than 30% of the GNP (Lyrintzis 1987: 675), which compares unfavourably even with Portugal, where this economy is estimated at 20% of the GDP (Hudson, cited by Lewis 1986: 631). A high level of tax evasion is posited for the case of Greece. The working class is unable to compete in this respect too.

New developments after the 'third' industrial revolution in late capitalism, flexible accumulation and the concurrent social restructuring lead European marxists to new reasoning and views for the future. Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm et al. 1981) observes in England the shrinkage of manual labour, the fall of the propensity to unionize, the loss of faith in massive parties and the concomitant crisis of the Labour Party. Gorz (1982) stresses changes in the work process in France after the introduction of new technology. He sees a passage from a period of unemployment and deskilling to one of the generalization of piece home work, part-time employment and the decline of full-time salary labour. The efficiency of unionization along traditional channels is thus impaired, but at the same time new prospects of autonomy are opened up and alternative cultural patterns are prepared. Western European marxists, from different but converging paths, end up speaking of a farewell to the working class.

In the case of Greece, with its given place in the world economy, the new strategies of the restructuring of capital and the uses into which new technology is put,<sup>16</sup> the farewell is still out of sight. Present trends in reskilling in advanced societies (Scott and Storper 1986: 12) are not followed in the NICs, which still seem to be affected by deskilling. Despite the crisis in peripheral fordism (Lipietz 1985), the NICs have not yet seen the demise of the mass collective worker. However, the transformations observed in Greece point in contradictory directions. The shrinkage of manual labour, the reversal of the Third World marginalization process and the decline of the traditional petty bourgeois society have been counterbalanced by the development of semi-autonomous labour and the new petty bourgeoisie rather than the working class. The continued growth of small-scale industry, as in the rest of Southern European NICs, has important implications, and the reproduction of this informal sector in the future is of crucial importance. 'Traditional' small firms can be flexibly linked with the fragmentation of the production processes allowed by technological developments in microelectronics and a 'modern' informal sector may develop (chapter 1). At the same time, however, the recent introduction of highly automated techniques, especially in textiles and electronics, seems to threaten the economies of the NICs (Lipietz 1986: 55). It is therefore difficult to assume any growth in modern leading industrial sectors.

Available evidence permits only a set of hypotheses, and the statements above should be considered as issues for investigation rather than conclusions. We will end with some more general hypotheses. If the informal sector is reproduced, is its structure transformed smoothly from 'traditional' to 'modern'? Do Greek cities pass from the Third World structure of the interwar period to the new model of 'de-proletarianization' of 'post-modern' societies after two decades of significant industrialization? If this is so, questions of future social class structuration should revolve around integration in new forms of mental salary labour, self-employment and part-time employment. Their increasing dominance in the rest of Europe may have a lasting effect after the inclusion of Greece in European capitalism (the EEC). The alleged 'resistance of Greek labourers to work discipline' posited by sociologists will obviously make this society especially receptive to such trends. The analysis of new developments in class structuration in Greek cities, in any case, is in no way indicative of persistent underdevelopment or a 'petty/medium' society. It is indicative of a transition to late capitalism, which increasingly disposes of the unskilled manual labourer.

<sup>16</sup> In 1985, 47.7% of computers in Greece, 1,235 computers of which 76 were large ones, of a value of \$128 million, were concentrated in the public sector, but they were underutilized (Paschos 1986).

## *The end of spontaneity in urban development*

Their crafts and traditions may have been dying... Their communitarian ideals may have been fantasies. Their insurrectionary conspiracies may have been foolhardy. But they lived through these times of acute social disturbance, and we did not. Their aspirations were valid in terms of their own experience; and, if they were casualties of history, they remain, condemned in their own lives, as casualties.

E. P. Thompson (1968:13)

The forces which curbed the dynamism of Greek metropolitan regions and affected the traditional proletariat have already been illustrated. The concrete processes which undermined working-class land control and displaced the proletariat from the city remain to be investigated. In fact, until the 1960s the strong centralist tendencies of the formal industrial sector created a favourable context for urbanization, which concentrated labour in the capital of Greece. Furthermore, speculative urban capitalism had no claims for expansion on the urban fringe; there was no conflict between its development and the growth of a popular land market in the northwestern suburbs. As long as this balance was sustained, for almost half a century after the 1920s, the social basis of urban expansion in Athens was popular. This has already ceased to be so. The concrete practices of the dominant classes during the period of dictatorial rule combined with changes in the ecological complex initiated a series of urban social, economic and spatial transformations and worked towards the erosion of working-class land control.

After the mid-1960s even surface similarities of the spatial patterns of Athens with those of peripheral cities started to be eradicated. The mid-1960s were a turning point in the structure of industry, urban capitalism, emigration and the working-class movement. Forces were growing in the production structure which would reveal the contradictions inherent in working-class spatial fixity and its control over the land of the primate city of a capitalist country. It was after 1967 that the contradictions became apparent and pressing. Illegal building was then curbed almost overnight, in a manner only a dictatorship could effect. The end of spontaneity, however, can only be interpreted through the study of the transformations in a broader economic and social context which lasted throughout the 1970s.

### 6.1 The State and the transformation of the urban material context

The 1970s were obviously a turning point in Greek urban history, which demonstrates the relevance of the ecological complex approach. Changes in urbanization and industrial restructuring coincided with the transformation of the city as a material context. Within a rhetoric for 'modernization', the capitalist urban market rose to dominance in housing production, and subordinate modes of popular housing and land allocation were suppressed or integrated.

#### 6.1.1 *From spontaneity to speculation*

Urbanization was conducive to urban capitalist accumulation and expansion for a long period. Even if many migrants were directed towards informal modes of housing production, many of them also boosted the demand for the flats provided in the speculative market. The economy of urbanization and income growth, however, reached a threshold by the mid-1960s. As central land was being exhausted and the expansion of the market to other areas and social classes was becoming profitable, the existence of a peripheral land market and an informal mode of housing production was to constitute a major barrier. Popular savings were still untapped and peripheral areas constituted an obvious pool of reserve land in the metropolitan areas.

Throughout the 1960s planners had considered housing as a commodity to be bought and sold in the market, and residents' savings as an untapped resource to this effect. Already in the first Five-year Plan (1966-70), popular savings were considered as a sort of investment which should be channelled into 'more productive' sectors. Even the most rudimentary sort of housing, which was of use-value, a subsistence activity, genuine shelter, was considered 'parasitic'. All plans proposed the so-called 'modernization' of the political economy of Greek housing on the model of EEC countries through the channelling of popular savings through banks (CPER 1967: 13; 1967b).

In practice, the first and most successful instance of 'modernization' was the suppression of Greek illegal building after 1967. The double strategy of repression of settlers and incorporation of large areas into the city plan, implemented during the dictatorship, seems typical of policies of authoritarian regimes and comparable with the combination of 'legalization' of shanty towns in Agro Romano with the demolition and rehousing of several *borgate* residents during the Italian fascist period in 1935 (Fried 1973:165). Repression in Greece was based on new legislation and included effective

policing resulting in demolition of newer structures, arrests, fines and harassment of settlers in Athens and Salonica. The process of 'legalization', on the other hand, entailed the payment of fines, and froze building in the newly incorporated areas (Leontidou and Emmanuel 1972). 'Legalizations' reached a peak during the early 1970s and were more frequent and extensive in Athens than in Salonica. In 1968-71, about 2,700 ha were incorporated into the Athens city plan, of which 2,546 were in the popular suburbs, especially on the west and the north, involving about 152,000 people (table 4.4, figs 4.7, 4.8).

Authorized petty building was also adversely affected by rising construction costs and policies in favour of urban capitalism. The decline of one- and two-storey buildings among new structures in 1961-84, with a few exceptions (table 4.2), and the fall in 'extensions' (fig. 4.6), bear witness to the decline of a whole popular housing economy. It has been estimated that the informal housing sector in Athens, including authorized extensions and low-rises as well as unauthorized houses, declined from 67% of the total volume of new structures in 1951-8 to 56% in 1964-6, and 39% in 1970-2 (Emmanuel 1981: 79). This coincided with the dramatic drop in unauthorized building and in the sale of 'agricultural' land parcels shown on fig. 6.6. Reserve land was being reclaimed for urban capitalism, if only for its more marginal forms.

Through a set of urban policies, then, popular residential unauthorized building virtually ceased in Athens and Salonica. This coincided with the cancellation of agricultural debts, as well as privileges granted to middle-class cooperatives. Outlets were also given to the general quest for a 'holiday home' around Athens. Through RD 7/14.8.67 prefabricated 'mobile houses' were allowed on small plots (250, later 500 m<sup>2</sup> rather than 4 stremmas) in Attica on land specified as 'agricultural' (chapter 4). This encouraged a form of middle-class speculative building, and created a new variant of urban sprawl, outside the Athens basin. Taking advantage of new legislation, the middle classes built illegal villas in Attica as summer residences, which they would later inhabit. A few low-income summer slums also appeared in Attica, in areas such as Lutsa. The emergence of villas and some illegal hotels, however, marked the entry of new social classes into the process of illegal building. Its function was transformed. It no longer catered for the housing problems of the workers and popular strata, but for second residences, and the luxury and speculative purposes of the affluent classes. Popular land colonization had ceased, but illegal building was going on with a new function and class character. Speculation succeeded spontaneity in urban growth, triggered off by the military government.

*6.1.2 The expansion of speculative urban capitalism*

Illegal building was curbed within a general context of capitalist rationalization. The 'modernization' of housing production was more all-embracing.<sup>1</sup> The expansion of urban capitalism at the expense of precapitalist housing involved the creation of a structured urban market with the gradual entrance of credit institutions into the sphere of housing construction. After the mid-1960s banks directed loans towards the apartment market. Bank financing constituted a mere 4–8% of private residential investment in 1958–66. In 1967–75 this rose to around 20% (Emmanuel 1981: 134). At constant 1970 prices, bank financing of the housing sector fluctuated at 400–700 million dr. annually in 1958–62 and 1.3 billion in 1964–6. In 1967 it jumped to 2.5 billion and again in 1968 to 4.9, and fluctuated at between 4.4 and 6.7 billion in 1967–73 (Economou 1987: 124–5). During this period of expansionary monetary policies (1968–72) the major role was played by the EKTE, with a 31.9% share in housing financing, closely followed by the Postal Savings Bank (27.6%) and the Agricultural Bank of Greece (24.7%; UN ECE 1973: 159). These funds were mainly directed to middle-class apartments especially in Athens: in 1971–5, 34.04% of the total number of loans and 55.77% of the total amount of financing concentrated in Attica, or 57.82% and 66.13% respectively if the Agricultural Bank is excluded (Emmanuel 1979: 108–13).

The creation of credit institutions and the expansion of mortgage credit in housing, as well as its concentration in Athens, did not simply mark the decline of self-financing practices in urban capitalism; they also resulted in a loss of autonomy. By the 1970s, when housing loans amounted to 21% of housing finance, they actually controlled 50% of investment in housing (CPER 1976b: 34–7, 53). In fact, building activity could be controlled through the manipulation of mortgage credit. Already in 1969, when the EKTE loans declined temporarily, apartment sales had fallen abruptly. But it was in 1973, when the government decided to control building activity, that cutbacks in loans resulted in a dramatic crisis in the construction sector from which it would take some time to recover (fig. 4.6). In 1974 bank loans fell to 1.7 billion dr. from 4.6 the previous year (at constant 1970 prices), then fluctuated at 3.1–6.1 billion in 1974–81, and then declined from 7.3 in 1982 to 4.2 in 1985 (Economou 1987: 125). Private building could not return to its previous self-financing practices: a substantial part of competitive urban capitalism lost its autonomy and became dependent on organized

<sup>1</sup> It was first felt in Athens by the location of the headquarters of large development agencies and the emergence of institutions engaged in research and preparation of programmes for residential development and planning at the National Technical University, the Technical Chamber of Greece, EKTE, CPER and elsewhere (UN ECE 1973: 199–201).

credit institutions. After 1970, moreover, self-financing became increasingly difficult because of rising construction costs (CPER 1976b: 54-73; UN ECE 1973: 136-48).

This does not imply the emergence of a monopolistic formal housing sector. Studies maintaining this (Study Group 1975: 22-3) forget that new construction enterprises were not attracted by residential developments. Shipping capital preferred ports or industrial buildings; infrastructure development had attracted foreign capital since the interwar period; and industrial estates were built by large construction enterprises in collaboration with banking and industrial capital, which were a new feature in Greece. In residential construction, the EKTE certainly does not constitute a monopolistic formal sector in itself. Nor was this, after all, a transitional phase towards the emergence of monopoly capitalism in housing production, as some maintained on the basis of announcements of large projects during the dictatorship. The formal construction sector was, simply, polarized, and the smaller companies specialized in housebuilding, while larger ones preferred different projects (as in Portugal; Lewis and Williams 1984b: 302).

It was rather the fragmented speculative sector which expanded as urban capitalism modernized, especially during the dictatorship. It used to be a residual sector in housing production; now it became dominant and aggressively competitive. It used to rely on a backward urban and building technology; now it developed in a context of mass production of building materials, supported by a sizeable middle-class market, and its productivity rose rapidly by the introduction of technological innovations, mechanization and developed division of labour via subcontracting (DEPOS 1980: 8). It used to depend on private savings and small entrepreneurial capital for financing; now finance capital gradually penetrated the sphere of construction with housing loans. Some larger construction enterprises and modern production methods gradually substituted the predominantly handicraft methods of housing production. The commodification of housing allocation can be observed in the rising volume of apartment property transfers in Greater Athens, which rose from 31% of the total of new dwellings legally built in 1958-60 to 34% in 1964-6 and 52% in 1970-2 (adapted from Emmanuel 1981: 401). The competitive speculative market tended to become the principal mode of housing allocation.

This transformation during the dictatorship was not due to increase of financing alone. The multi-storey apartment building was then promoted by a series of clear-cut class policies: the increase of plot exploitation coefficients, the expansion of the city plan, the simplification of procedures for a building permit and the 'restructuring' of public housing policy. According to a popular expression, the dictatorial government 'gave

storeys' in urban areas, allowing for higher multi-storey buildings and a drastic reduction of uncovered plot area. The population rushed to take advantage of such legislation. A few tower blocks even appeared on the north of the Athens CBD, backed by special legislative provisions.

The policy of the dictators, originating in the early five-year plans of the 1960s, was thus directed towards middle-class and urban capitalist interests in favour of speculative building. This is what caused the spectacular speculative upsurge of 1967–72 shown on Fig. 4.6. In 1973, however, the dictators had to use housing as it had traditionally been used – as an anti-inflationary instrument. Deflation measures, especially cutbacks in financing and new taxation, resulted in a recession in 1973–5, which at the time was believed to be in effect a permanent crisis. Subsequent developments, especially in 1978, gave the lie to this, but in the 1980s building activity was moderate in Athens (fig. 4.6). The importance of the speculative construction sector in Greek society was reflected in occasional speculations in the press that restrictive policy during the early 1970s had contributed to the fall of the Junta.

### 6.1.3 *The 'reorientation' of housing and land policy*

The suppression of illegal building and the benefits to speculative urban capitalist interests were the two main policies for the 'modernization' of the political economy of Greek housing. These were accompanied by policies for the suppression of every alternative to capitalism in land and housing allocation. Building cooperatives were 'cleansed', so that only 435 remained out of 1,700 (Panos and Klimis 1970). The long-standing policy to rid Athens of threatening 'red enclaves', especially refugee communist strongholds, and to disperse their population, intensified.

The public housing sector was affected by new developments as well. During the first years of the dictatorship, housing policy in Athens emphasized slum clearance, as before. Only 2,884 houses were built throughout Greece in 1967–9, and projects were undertaken in Dourgouti, Kaissariani, Tavros, Drapetsona and Peristeri in Athens (Mexis 1970: 185–7). After 1970 housing policy was 'reoriented' and backed by two laws, 1003/1971 and 1138/1972. Direct provision of housing was substituted by either organized private development of estates, or direct loans to 'beneficiaries' to buy homes in the market. Such loans, channelled as they were through the EKTE and the private market sector, were inaccessible to the majority of the popular strata who had no regular work and saving capacity (Emmanuel 1979: 12–16, 27–9). On top of this, the dictators confiscated the funds of the AOEK, i.e. the savings of the working class, and used them for their own programmes.



After the fall of the dictatorship efforts apparently intensified in a different direction and towards more democratic goals and methods of implementation, though the 'modernization' policy did not change. In 1976, with the legislative framework for popular housing remaining the same, a new organization was created by LD 446/1976: the Public Corporation for Housing and Urban Development (DEPOS). This received heavy criticism from an odd coalition of entrepreneurs, banks and professional associations and remained inoperative in the sphere of popular housing.<sup>2</sup>

Legislation on illegal building was equally punitive and contradictory after 1975, but now at last it included provisions against land speculators. Given the negative experiences of the Master Plans for the control of urban development (chapter 4), alternative solutions were sought, including different ways of financing urban development and formal rules for urban land production. This qualitative change can be found in the so-called Land Laws, appearing throughout Mediterranean European countries at the time: Spain (1975, reformulated 1976), Portugal (1976), Italy (1977; Gaspar 1984:224). In the case of Greece the Planning Law 947/1979 introduced taxation on peripheral properties included into the city plan (40% of land and 15% of its value), irrespective of plot size or socio-economic level of settlers. The law was amended after vocal protest and replaced by Law 1337/1983, introducing progressive taxation according to plot size and thus, indirectly, according to socio-economic level of the population. This law was also sabotaged, especially by speculative interests in Attica (section 6.3.3).

## 6.2 The changing social composition of urban growth

Intense exploitation of central urban areas, the expansion of urban capitalism, the suppression of the informal housing sector in the Athens basin and industrial decentralization outside this basin influenced urban structure in a radical manner. For the first time in the history of Athens, a filtering-down process started to operate in certain pockets on the north of the CBD, and pressure for middle-class suburbanization was felt in the periphery. Changes are too recent and should not be expected to register immediately in statistics, especially since these are always publicized with a considerable time lag. Some aspects of the urban formation, however, responded almost immediately to the transformations discussed, and will be

<sup>2</sup> Romanos 1976. During the first years, reform-minded persons were pushed aside in the relevant ministries; later on, under PASOK, it was constantly undermined or even sabotaged by the government itself. The issue of popular housing faced the reluctance and indifference of the government. DEPOS undertook some small-scale projects in central Athens and a few popular settlement schemes, and produced some worthwhile studies of urban development.



used as evidence of the emerging urban structure after the years of spontaneous popular urbanization.

### 6.2.1 *The nature of cityward migration in the 1970s*

The capital of Greece has approached the period of 'urban crisis' faster than Salonica. Employment decentralization is already under way, popular housebuilding has been curbed, urbanization is ceasing. Population decentralization followed the decentralization of jobs, unlike the case of Britain, where it preceded and even led it (cf. section 5.1.3). Urban primacy is declining in Greece, but the price of this is economic recession, the 'urban crisis' and unemployment. More recently, population movements from Greater Athens to the provinces have been actively encouraged by the government. The extent of such migration is as yet unknown, but the case of construction workers actually moving out has been reported. Reverse migration can be indirectly deduced from NSSG censuses (adapted from data in 1975 and 1985 Yearbooks). In 1965-71, when 256,100 people moved into Greater Athens, 65,240 moved out, so that there was one out-migrant to 3.9 in-migrants. In 1975-81 the ratio had risen to 1:1.4, since there were 217,190 in-migrants and 150,240 out-migrants. Of these most recent out-migrants, 60,530 or 40.3% were directed to nearby provinces of central Greece.

The concentrated policies of the dictatorial government were imposed before any process of reverse migration had started, but at a time when urbanization had been slowing down (table 3.5). After 1967 the internal migrants were the most disadvantaged group. New entrants into the city and industrial employment were not very different socially from those who arrived previously. More of the recent migration to Athens was composed of small-town migrants, while the proportion of those originating in rural areas declined consistently in 1956-81 (table 6.1); the decline was small and natural, however, given the general increase of urban population in Greece from 43.7% of the total in 1961 to 57.6% in 1981 (table 3.4). Industry attracted 34.1% of the more recent migrants. This was less than their share by 1981 (28.1%), but impressively stable if compared with their share in 1956-61 (33.7%); the same is true for their rate of absorption into construction and transport (table 3.12). The social character of internal cityward migration had not changed in the late 1960s.

Its location, however, did change. Although there were certain central reception areas in the 1950s and early 1960s especially in Piraeus (Burgel 1972:84-6), those who arrived in the city could then also take advantage of the process of widespread popular land colonization. Some even bought real



*Figure 6.1* Population density in Greater Athens, 1971. Sources: Adapted from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished map R3, and data (computer printouts) which give resident population by km<sup>2</sup>.

*Figure 6.2* Reception areas of migrants to Greater Athens, 1965-71. Sources: Adapted from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished map Q3, and data (computer printouts) which give migrant population (arriving in 1965-71) by km<sup>2</sup>.

Table 6.1 *Origin of migrants to Greater Athens, 1956–81*


Migrants:	1956–61		1966–71		1976–81	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Residents of Athens in 1961/71/81, residing in 1955/65/75 in:						
Greater Salonica	5,600	2.57	8,880	3.47	9,450	4.27
Greater Patras	6,000	2.75	5,900	2.30	4,090	1.85
Other urban areas	61,200	28.05	79,060	30.87	69,937	31.61
Total migrants with urban origin		33.36		36.64		37.73
Total from semi-urban areas	37,600	17.23	45,300	17.69	39,300	17.76
Total from rural areas	107,800	49.40	116,960	45.67	98,500	44.51
Total migrants to Athens	218,200	100.00	256,100	100.00	221,277	100.00

*Source:* Adapted from NSSG general population censuses, 1961 (2 % sample), 1971 (5 % sample) and 1981 (10 % sample).

estate or a house before migrating (Burgel 1981: 255–7). Migrants of the late 1960s, by contrast, did not have this outlet. Their location correlated closely with population density (fig. 6.1). As shown on fig. 6.2, they were packed in dense inner city areas, especially on the north and west of the CBD and within it, wherever older building stock for rent existed in the city. These were no longer simply reception areas, temporary residences until more permanent ones were found in the periphery. In 1965–71 even intra-urban population movements were not directed to the urban periphery: the strong wave of suburbanization towards the popular suburbs in the 1950s was replaced first by a population explosion towards central areas of Athens in the 1960s, and then by a middle-class suburbanization wave more recently. Let us observe these processes in more detail.

#### 6.2.2 *From suburbanization to concentration and back, 1951–81*

The evidence provided by an aggregate analysis of intra-urban population movements (figs 6.3–6.5, table 6.2) illustrates very clear and major changes. The apparent migration under consideration includes migrants into Athens from the rest of Greece, as well as those changing their community of residence inside the agglomeration. Fig. 6.3 illustrates the wave of popular land colonization during the 1950s by an average annual rate of 5.86 % (table 6.2). Popular suburbanization continued in the 1960s at a lesser rate. This, however, was coupled with a spectacular growth of the central Athens municipality (fig. 6.4), which absorbed 37.47 % of the apparent migration, while the rate was a mere 8.16 % in 1951–61. The decade was thus characterized by massive population movements towards an area built as



*Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 Apparent migration in and around Attica: Population change (excluding natural population increase) in areas consisting of one or more municipalities in 1951-61 (left, fig. 6.3), 1961-71 (centre, fig. 6.4) and 1971-81 (right, fig. 6.5). Sources: Computed and mapped from NSSG census data of general population censuses, 1951-81.*

a city of 40,000 inhabitants in the nineteenth century. This created unprecedented problems of congestion and intensified the anti-urbanization attitudes of dominant classes, who saw their own areas encircled by dense residential quarters. There is an obvious contradiction here. Congestion had actually been initiated by middle-class insistence on a permissive building code allowing for intense land exploitation and the creation of new housing stock by speculative capitalism. The permissive building code introduced during the dictatorship was taken advantage of, and affected all urban areas except a few bourgeois enclaves, such as Psychico, which resisted it. The rest of the middle classes welcomed this opportunity to increase their wealth, and indulged in land exploitation and overbuilding. Peripheral settlements, on the other hand, which could have averted congestion, were stigmatized throughout the postwar period and finally controlled during the dictatorship.

Anti-urbanism was voiced loudly by the very classes who had initiated congestion. The resistance of dominant classes to popular invasion and land colonization reached increased intensity in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and involved rhetoric against 'the monster city' and the 'masses', supported by inflated estimates of the population of Greater Athens (criticized in Leontidou 1981c, 1982). References to Athens were riddled with exclamations about its 'pathological' development which 'paralysed' Greece, with views of it as a 'monster without a hinterland and a body' (Filiás 1974:191), as a 'hydrocephalic centre which simply secures the preservation to life of the rest of its sickly parts' (Negreponti 1979:289), exploding with 'urbanization without industrialization' in the manner of 'overurbanized' Third World metropolitan areas. Planners, mass media, the State and the middle classes stigmatized illegal settlers as 'immoral', expressed indignation about regional disparities and moralized about the parasitic nature of the buoyant construction sector and of internal migrants. This was a manifestation of a new class ideology (section 7.3.2), which justified State policy for the protection of the middle-class environment, against the further growth of the proletariat in Athens, in favour of industrial decentralization and against land control by the popular strata and the working class. After coming full circle, in other words, the interests of industrial and urban capitalism for decentralization of the urban proletariat coincided with those of the more affluent urban residents.

The anti-urbanist rhetoric was accompanied by real processes, among which middle-class suburbanization, followed by environmental legislation (chapter 5), was the most significant. As illustrated in fig. 6.5, rates of growth of the middle-class suburbs culminated in the 1970s, reaching an average annual rate of 4.3 % and the absorption of 82.3 % of the apparent

Table 6.2 *Apparent migration<sup>a</sup> and average annual rate of population growth by area in Greater Athens, 1951-81*

	1951-61		1961-71		1971-81	
	migration rate %		migration rate %		migration rate %	
Athens (A)	29,354	1.27	196,312	3.38	-42,253	-0.46
Piraeus (P)	-23,797	-0.31	-19,791	-0.09	-9,826	-0.44
Working-class suburbs (PS, W, NW, N, SE)	265,948	5.86	216,721	3.45	96,179	1.78
Middle-class suburbs (E, NE, S)	88,276	4.09	130,647	4.10	204,883	4.28
Total Greater Athens	359,781	3.00	523,889	3.21	248,983	1.77

<sup>a</sup> For the calculation of apparent migration, natural increase for total Athens has been calculated from the NSSG Statistical Yearbooks of Greece as 0.81% in 1961, 0.89% in 1971 and 0.87% in 1977; an average of 0.8% in the 1950s, 0.85% in the 1960s and 0.9% in the 1970s was adopted.

*Sources:* Adapted from NSSG censuses.

migration to Athens (table 6.2) compared with 25% during the previous periods. Owners of central property let it to lower-income populations and left for the middle-class suburbs. They carried with them their greed for intense land exploitation evident in intensive urban development with apartment buildings, spacious but still multi-storey, on the northeast and south of the city. The policy of the military government had not differentiated between core and suburbs. In both areas, the legislative framework favoured intense exploitation of plot area, and housing loans were directed to already privileged groups. Only solidly bourgeois communities, such as Psychico and Filothei, mobilized to avoid over-building.

Developments in Salonica are comparable to those in Athens. During 1963-75 the city was expanding almost exclusively towards the west as a result of the establishment of industries there (TCG 1981: 93). The population growth of northwestern working-class communities slowed down by the 1960s, largely because of the termination of the illegal building process during the dictatorship. Population movements at the time were directed towards the higher-density areas but not towards the city core, where population densities dropped especially because of land use changes (TCG 1981:151, 159). A contrast between the two cities relates to the restricted rates of suburbanization in Salonica. Although some middle-class areas on the northeast grew very rapidly, the percentage of those actually

leaving the inner city has been very low (TCG 1981:80, 226). Suburbanization, in any case, speeded up during the 1970s (Tsoulouvis 1985:136-9).

The phases of urban growth in Greece can seem highly surprising to European students: Greater Athens and Salonica experienced two waves of suburbanization, the first of which – popular suburbanization from the 1920s through to the 1960s – *preceded* centralization. This contrasts with standard urban growth models (Van den Berg et al. 1982). The process of population and employment concentration, which has characterized the Athens development pattern for over a century, peaked in the 1960s, during a period when other European inner city areas were losing population. Only in the late 1970s was a new process of middle-class suburbanization along with lower-class overcrowding in the inner city observed, which may mark the beginning of a filtering-down process in Athens.

The pattern should be attributed to the roots of Greek urban structure in Third World city models rather than European ones, and is not peculiar in the Mediterranean context. Urban deconcentration is also very recent in most Southern European cities. References should be made here to the reversal of the classic pattern of density decline from the centre outwards in Northern cities, where signs of increase rather than decrease of population density as we move away from the CBD were already evident in the late 1960s.<sup>3</sup> This pattern seems to spread to Mediterranean Europe. As the larger cities cease to be major poles of attraction, their surrounding regions have absorbed more population, and decline in inner urban areas has been observed (Gaspar 1984:213). The 1981 population census in Portugal indicated moderate population increases in the cities of Lisbon and Oporto and high rates of increase in their satellite towns (Hudson and Lewis 1983:15). During the 1970s in Spain, parts of central Madrid started to decline for the first time (Ballesteros 1977). The centre of Barcelona is also gradually being abandoned as a museum for tourists (Barrio Gotico) or a residential ghetto for recent migrants (Barrio Chino). The CBD is being transferred to the Diagonal, which retains the character of the enterprise centre it had at the beginning of the century (Remica 1977:179). This area of the historic centre, from the Diagonal to the Barrio Gotico, however, is undergoing valorization after its rediscovery by the middle classes (Ferrás 1977b:198).

Patterns in Italy are the closest to Northern Europe. In Rome, population decline in the city centre has been occurring since 1931, after the major housing clearance and public works by the fascist government. The population of the central districts, the *riioni*, dropped from 25% of the

<sup>3</sup> Robson 1973: 11, citing Berry. This might be a future development in Athens, since government measures restricting traffic in the centre and discouraging the further development of employment in it are becoming increasingly more austere during the 1980s.



Table 6.3 *Size distribution of agricultural landholdings in Greater Athens, 1961-71*

Size categories	1961		1971	
	% of holdings	% of area	% of holdings	% of area
1-9 stremmas	56.08	11.48	50.86	9.37
10-29	36.09	22.88	31.20	22.20
30-49	6.98	12.51	7.96	13.01
50-99	4.78	14.08	5.93	17.39
100-199	1.93	12.37	2.18	11.94
200 and more	1.49	26.69	1.87	26.09
Total (100 %)	13,627	275,646	12,820	282,260
		stremmas		stremmas
Average size of holding	20.22 stremmas (2.0 ha)		22.01 stremmas (2.2 ha)	

Source: Emmanuel 1981: 115.

metropolitan population in 1951 to 10% in 1966, but that of the *quartieri* (first ring around the centre) increased from 59% to 74%. The first outer ring, the *suburbi*, by contrast, declined proportionally from 9% to 4%, while the outer ring, Agro Romano, where squatter settlements were mushrooming, increased its population from 7% to 12% (Fried 1973:93). By 1980 most *rioni* were still sending out-migrants to other urban areas, while movements among the suburbs were more complex (White 1984:142-8). Decentralization in Naples effected the reduction of the average inner-city density of 467 persons per hectare in 1951 to 295 in 1971, after the out-migration of 480,000 people (White 1984: 201). Since the 1960s, people have been abandoning the old and overcrowded centres for the outskirts, especially the zones adjacent to new industrial areas. This is indeed a massive outflow, and contrasts with the movement of only 52,080 people from the Athens and Piraeus central areas in 1971-81 (table 6.2).

### 6.2.3 *Land transactions on the metropolitan periphery*

Whilst illegal building had been curbed in Athens by 1969, land transactions were still taking place among the working class (Burgel 1981:258-9). By 1971, however, some changes in the social composition of peripheral landowners of the sparsely built urban fringe could be observed. A process of concentration of landed property to fewer landlords seemed to be under way on the fringe of Athens by 1971. On the basis of the small and declining average size of holding evident in table 6.3, it has been claimed that a great

fragmentation of ownership of 'agricultural' land around Athens exists (Emmanuel 1981:114-15). An inverse process, however, can be observed in the case of medium-sized holdings: while the area of smaller holdings decreased as a percentage of the total land area, that of medium ones, 30-99 stremmas, had increased by 1971. This suggests a concentration which can be attributed to the amalgamation of small into larger plots, since the former were now in any case useless for development. This trend may have been caused by capitalist interests or middle-class cooperatives, which are corporate groups of affluent strata and public employees, using loans and legislative advantages to build luxury houses and second homes. As such, they are comparable to the Italian cooperative 'movement' of wealthy individuals scattering apartment houses all over Rome (Fried 1973:133), rather than the Anglo-American one.

In fig. 6.6, the rhythm of land sales in the Greater Athens area in 1958-72 is shown to correspond to the rhythm of building activity, as follows: sales of urban plots followed cycles almost parallel to cycles of speculative building, while sales of agricultural plots moved with the rhythm of illegal building activity. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 'periods of upswings in illegal activity were also ones of land-accumulation expansion taking place in the periphery of "urban" areas' (Emmanuel 1981:130). The major upswing of land sales outside the city limits in 1973 should be explained differently. After a freezing of sales of agricultural plots in 1967-72, along with illegal building on such plots, an unprecedented peak in land sales can be observed in 1973. If this is not purely an anomaly in data collection procedures or categories used by the NSSG, this upsurge is worth studying.

'Agricultural' land around Athens was also reserve land for urban expansion. Part of it was held for speculative purposes by the larger landowners. As the process of illegal building was curbed, such land could no longer meet any popular demand; it was to be increasingly considered as developable land for middle-class building cooperatives, or for large-scale organized developments of the future accommodating the bourgeois flight from the congested city. Large landowners once sought 'legalization' of their property through popular pressure, anticipating the inevitable urban expansion towards their areas in the future. By 1973, they appeared busy accumulating plots suitable for the building of new estates, administrative and commercial centres. They must have been encouraged by proposals of regional plans during the period of the dictatorship for spilling over development outside the Athens basin and encouraging urban sprawl (as in Doxiadis Assoc. 1976). There is no evidence for more conclusive statements; but the above data indicate significant processes towards the transformation of the social basis of urban expansion under way in contemporary Athens.




Figure 6.6 Land sales and building cycle in Greater Athens, 1958-75. Source: Adapted from time series in CPER (1976a: Appendix 7), as well as fig. 4.6.

### 6.3 The contradictions of urban restructuring

In focusing on the population who initiated and reproduced spontaneous urban expansion, the working class, the aggregate processes observed are highlighted and emphasized. In chapter 4 the working-class residential patterns in 1971 have been studied, for lack of any earlier detailed disaggregated data. It has now become evident, however, that 1971 belongs to a period when spatial patterns were already changing. Geographical analysis up to this point has relied mainly on the LQs of the various social classes, revealing the social character of urban communities irrespective of population density as an additional factor. Actual density of the working class at place of residence and its changes will be taken up now, in an effort to investigate the new distributive groupings formed during the most recent period of urban development.

#### 6.3.1 *The shifting location of the working class, 1964-71*

Due to the improvement in working-class housing conditions during the first postwar decades (chapter 4), no meaningful relationship existed between home ownership and occupational activity in Greece. This can be compared with studies of Barcelona (Lowder 1980:29-30) and Venice, where high status was not related to type of tenure nor to housing age, but to housing size and amenities. However, after the late 1960s popular tenure patterns in Greece were deteriorating. Tenure by class in urban areas (including Greater Athens) is shown in table 6.4. In the late 1950s the workers evidenced the highest rate of owner-occupation: 31% rented their dwellings compared with 40% of bourgeois and 35-46% of petty bourgeois households. Such high rates of owner occupation, double those of Rome (Fried 1973:268), have nurtured speculations about the petty bourgeois nature of the Greek society (Filiás 1974; Study Group 1975:31). In 1951-8 and the owner-built sector had been expanding rapidly: among the newly built dwellings in Greater Athens the share of owner-occupation was 71%, and together with accommodation free of rent this rose to 75% (Emmanuel 1979:92-3). The respective shares in the older housing stock fell to 52% and 57%, while percentages were high in the self-built sector.

During the next decade, however, the working-class tenure patterns started to deteriorate. By 1971, while the percentage of rented accommodation was still very low in Greece as a whole - 25% of households (UN ECE 1973:123 - it had increased from 33% to 40% among urban households. As the majority of Greek urban households live in Greater Athens, inter-class differentials shown in table 6.4 can be considered

Table 6.4 *Rental accommodation by social class in Greek urban areas, 1957-82*

Occupations of heads of households	1958		1974		1982	
	No. of households in sample	% in rental	No. of households	% in rental	No. of households	% in rental
Managerial, liberal professions, etc.	154	40	392	42	429	38
Clerical, white collar	187	46	384	45	286	43
Merchants and sales workers	346	35	419	36	356	32
Workers in industry, construction, transport	739	31	1,440	44	1,166	41
Service workers	186	37	322	45	248	50
Labour in agriculture	139	11	103	17	82	18
Economically non-active	369	34	1,299	35	1,158	30
Total, Greek urban areas	2,120	33	4,359	40	3,725	37
Total, Greater Athens	1,207	39	2,487	43	2,236	39

*Source:* Adapted from NSSG surveys of household expenditures, 1957-82.



representative of the capital. In fact, differentials in Athens were more acute, since increases in rented accommodation were higher as a city average than those of other urban areas, and had risen from 39 % in 1957 to 43 % in 1974. Working-class tenants increased from 31 % in 1957 to 44 % in 1974. Industrial workers came to constitute the class with the highest rate of renting next to clerks and service workers (45 %). By 1981 tenants were 24.5 % of households in Greece, but had increased to 40.7 % in Athens, 36.4 % in Salonica and 30.4 % in the rest of the urban areas, and had remained at 4.4 % in rural areas (adapted from NSSG 1985 Yearbook).

By the early 1980s the rate of renting had stabilized at 41 % for the working class, while the rate for service workers was still growing (table 6.4). Improvement of tenure patterns was concentrated in managerial, clerical and sales workers. The working class also appears to have profited from a series of broader processes: urbanization had slowed down and demand for low-income housing was therefore less pronounced than in the mid-1970s; overbuilding and housing loans had saturated the supply market; second-generation popular families had acquired houses as dowry and inheritance. Problems thus concerned only new entrants into industrial employment.

The density and location patterns of the working class in 1964–71 can be studied through a comparison of figs. 6.7 and 6.8. The former is based on a survey of the labour force in major industry in 1964, and the latter on the NCSR–NSSG study. Unfortunately, we are comparing two slightly different populations within the same economic sector:<sup>4</sup> fig. 6.7 includes only those working in factories with over 50 employees, while fig. 6.8 also includes wage labour and the self-employed in smaller manufacturing, energy and mining establishments. The share of the salary and wage earners in the total sample was thus about 95 % in the 1964 survey and 73.72 % in the 1971 survey; the shares of wage labourers, i.e. the manual working class, were only 78.8 % and 58.1 % respectively. A comparison of the two maps with some caution, however, leads to very interesting conclusions.

The working-class character of more central urban areas, especially on the north of CBD, observed on the basis of LQs in figs. 4.3 and 4.10, was a very recent occurrence in Athens in 1971. A crucial difference between figs. 6.7 and 6.8 can be attributed only partly to the different coverage and size of the two samples. Actual differences are also involved, pertaining to the rearrangement of the working class in urban space, which partly related to the employment linkage. In 1964 industrial decentralization had not yet

<sup>4</sup> In order to be rendered comparable with the mapped information of the NCSR–NSSG study, the 1964 information (Burgel 1970) was decoded from maps with a different grid system or with dots, as well as a series of perplexing tables.



*Figures 6.7 and 6.8* Density of the manufacturing labour force at place of residence, Greater Athens: 1964 (left, fig. 6.7) and 1971 (right, fig. 6.8). Sources: For 1964, computed and mapped from information in Burgel (1970, 1972) on to the grid system of the NCSR-NSSG (1973) study; for 1971, adapted from NCSR-NSSG (1973) unpublished map F1 and data (computer printouts) of labour force by km<sup>2</sup>.

Table 6.5 *The development of tenure patterns in selected communities of Greater Athens by social class character, 1964-71*

	1964			1971		
	Total households	Rented as % of total	LQ of workers	Total inhabited dwellings	Rent as % of total	LQ of workers
1 Urban core of which:	949	41.3		2,034	52.4	
Kolonaki	203	45.8	0.33	361	55.7	0.37
A. Kypseli	131	32.8	0.56	497	35.2	0.70
Freattys	236	52.5	0.81	338	58.6	0.93
Klonaridou	163	36.8	0.23	256	50.0	1.01
Tabouria	216	33.3	1.28	582	62.5	1.33
2 Rest of areas with multi-storey buildings of which:	853	36.3		1,312	54.0	
Charokopou		n.a.	0.68		n.a.	0.64
Kallithea	853	36.3	0.81	1,312	54.0	0.92
Ag. Eleoussa		n.a.	1.09		n.a.	1.10
Tzitzifies		n.a.	1.30		n.a.	1.14
3 Rest of 'authorized' city of which:	1,170	26.6		1,610	46.8	
Kefalari	85	31.8	n.a.	17	17.6	n.a.
Glyphada	152	21.1	0.50	62	64.5	0.72
Petrópolis	239	15.4	1.33	279	25.8	1.07
A. Dafni	203	35.6	1.16	420	46.7	1.24
N. Kokkinia	280	18.2	1.37	588	55.4	1.25
K. Petralona	211	43.6	1.20	244	47.5	1.26
4 Unauthorized and recently 'legalized' areas of which:	467	13.5		491	25.9	
Koukouvaounes	140	14.3	1.55	122	24.6	0.80
Kipoupolis	147	9.5	1.38	179	25.1	1.19
Ag. Varvara	180	16.1	1.22	190	27.4	1.23
Total	3,439	31.4	1.00	5,447	48.7	1.00

*Sources:* Adapted from ACE 1964 (unpublished HUCO tabulations) and 1965, and from the NCSR-NSSG computer printouts (5 % sample). The 18 communities are shown in fig. 6.9.

begun (table 5.5). At that time the labour force lived virtually within industrial zones, especially in the western suburbs, the traditional refugee communities of interwar Athens (fig. 2.4). By 1971 a very different pattern was evident. A new concentration of industrial labour appeared north of the CBD. The pattern can be partly attributed to the expansion of the industrial axis towards the north and the creation of new requirements of accessibility to jobs along the highways leading from Attica to Beotia (fig. 5.1).

The same shifts in location and tenure patterns of the Athens working class are effectively demonstrated through a processual geographical analysis of a sample of urban communities with a known class character. To this end the data of the 1964 HUCO survey in 18 communities (ACE 1964, 1965) has






Figure 6.9 Selected communities for the study of urban class structure. The Greater Athens communities of the HUCO project (ACE 1961), as presented in *Ekistics* (1967, 140: 111), adapted on to the grid system of the NCSR–NSSG study.

been adapted on the grid pattern of the NCSR–NSSG study (1971 data; table 6.5). The adaptation, as shown in fig. 6.9, is fairly accurate, although the HUCO communities were usually smaller than the grid squares. Socio-economic and tenure categories included in the two studies are also not directly comparable,<sup>5</sup> but listings about tenure patterns are. The communities can be grouped into the four categories of spatial units used in our

<sup>5</sup> In the case of 'blue-collar' workers, the 1964 study lists manual labourers (including farmers) as a percentage of total employment, while the 1971 study lists manufacturing, service and agriculture workers (international categories 5/6/7/8) as a percentage of employed household heads. Rented residences are given as a percentage of all dwellings/households by the 1964 study, and as a percentage of all inhabited dwellings in the 1971 study. Such differences should make us cautious of detailed comparisons; LQs rather than percentages were compared. Caution against the ecological fallacy is also required at this point.

analysis of urban class structure in chapter 4 (table 4.6, fig. 4.11). Within each category of areas, communities in table 6.5 were sorted according to the LQ of blue-collar workers in 1971.

It is interesting that minor changes in working-class concentrations in 1964-71 are found to be in the direction of centralization, which agrees with the previous analysis. The value of LQs increased slightly in the more central traditional working-class communities (A. Dafni, Tabouria, N. Kokkinia, Ag. Eleoussa, Tzitziflies, Petralona) and in more central unauthorized areas (Ag. Varvara); and it decreased in peripheral popular areas (Kipoupolis, Petroupolis, Koukouvaounes). Areas with low working-class concentrations in 1964 (Kolonaki, Freattys, Charokopou, Kallithea, Glyphada) continued to have  $LQ < 1$ , although LQ values increased slightly in 1964-71.

Within this general continuity of working-class residential patterns in 1964-71, two cases stand out: the mixed central areas of Klonaridou, where the value of the LQ jumped from 0.23 in 1964 to 1.01 in 1971; and Kypseli, where the increase was more moderate (from 0.56 to 0.70). It has been a fact, then, that the major change in working-class residential patterns involved a process of concentration on the north of the CBD: differences between figs. 6.7 and 6.8 reflect a real process.

The comparison of tenure patterns in 1964-71 (table 6.5) underlines the erosion of popular home ownership. In 1964 rates of rental accommodation declined sharply with distance from the city centre to a mere 13.5 in peripheral popular communities, which were then also unauthorized. The relationship between central and peripheral areas was retained, in 1971, but the average rate of rental accommodation grew from 31.4% to 48.7% in 1964-71. The increase in rental accommodation thus figures more sharply in the sample of 18 communities than in the whole agglomeration, where we found it to have risen from 39% to 43% in 1957-74 (table 6.4).

It is noteworthy that within each category of areas presented in table 6.5, rental accommodation increased in the mixed and working-class communities rather than the bourgeois enclaves. For example, among the areas of the urban core the percentage of tenants in Kolonaki, a bourgeois community, rose from 45.8% to 55.7%, while in Tabouria, a working-class area, it doubled from 33.3% to 62.5%. Among authorized areas with low-rise housing, the percentage of tenants in the working-class community of Kokkinia trebled from 18.2% to 55.4%, while in Kefalari, a bourgeois suburb, it fell from 31.8% to 17.6%. The bourgeois community of Glyphada is an explicable anomaly: the sharp rise in rental accommodation should be attributed to flats rented to foreigners working at the airport and the US base near the area. The increase in tenants also affected the less central popular areas. By 1971 renting had doubled in self-built communities


of low-rises, whilst rising less sharply in more central areas of multi-storey buildings. The percentage of tenants doubled in virtually all unauthorized communities around Greater Athens. After 1967 new occupants of such areas tended to enter as tenants rather than home owners.

### 6.3.2 *An exploration of socio-spatial homogeneization, 1971-81*

These trends of the late 1960s seem to have intensified a little later. The NSSG population censuses of 1971 and 1981 provide a solid basis for the thorough investigation of the shifting location of the working class on the basis of socially and spatially disaggregated data matrices. The 1981 series of tables has not been published, but provisional information is available in computer printouts. The social category used in our comparison for both time periods now approximates to that of the working class: salary and wage earners in manufacturing and construction industry, including energy (electricity, water, etc.). The following analysis, which corroborates our previous conclusions, is mapped in fig. 6.10.

The pattern is absolutely clear: traditional working-class strongholds have been losing their proletarian character, while the inner city and certain inner-ring suburbs have been gaining a working-class population in the period 1971-81. The whole northwestern proletarian city, excluding the remotest communities (Perama, Chaidari, Korydallos, Kamatero), is losing rather than gaining working-class residents. A negligible part of this change can be attributed to the clearance of the refugee 'red enclaves' (Drapetsona, Tavros) during the dictatorship and the dispersal of their population to other areas. The change, however, is much more important than this. The traditional industrial/proletarian axis from Piraeus to N. Ionia becomes de-proletarianized, apart from its core. The inner city continues to receive working-class residents, as in the late 1960s, despite the termination of population centralization on the aggregate level (fig. 6.5). The Piraeus central areas, by contrast, lose more working-class population than any other urban community.

The other surprising pattern which was less evident during the 1964-71 period, concerns the increase of working-class populations in middle-class and mixed inner-ring suburbs to the northeast and the south. Only the most exclusive low-rise bourgeois suburbs (Psychico, Filothei, Ekali, Papagos) have resisted this all-out invasion of the working class. Workers' housing blocks recently built on the northeast (Maroussi, Metamorphosis, Kifissia) are again an inadequate factor in explaining this systematic pattern. It seems that in middle-class suburbs, overbuilt with multi-storeys during the dictatorship, neighbourhoods of apartment buildings have been formed,



*Figure 6.10* The shifting location of the working class, 1971–81. Change (absolute number) of the resident wage labourers in the secondary sector by area in Greater Athens, 1971–81. Sources: Computed and mapped from disaggregated data of the 1971 and 1981 NSSG general population censuses (unpublished computer printouts for the case of 1981).

where a mixture of social classes lives in vertically differentiated flats. The northeastern suburbs offer the workers increased accessibility to the national highways leading to the industries of the metropolitan periphery (chapter 5).

This shifting location of the proletariat reflects social as well as geographical mobility. The traditional working-class families are not necessarily abandoning the western areas they colonized in the course of half a century. They pass their property to their offspring who may stay in the

same community, or let the house and move elsewhere. This new generation has been shown to follow a trend of mobility out of industrial employment (chapter 5). The reluctance of younger residents of popular communities to work in industry changes the social character of popular areas.

By 1981, then, spontaneous urban growth by popular initiative had ceased. The working class had increased in more central and mixed urban areas, and had shifted from owner-occupation to renting to a significant extent all over the agglomeration. The concept of distributive groupings, as defined in chapter 1, relates to tenure categories in specific locations and housing types among a certain social class. Three main working-class distributive groupings could be discerned by 1981:

- (a) Owner-occupiers in the public sector were negligible and shrinking as a percentage of the working class. There were also few owner-occupiers in the estate sector created outside the Greater Athens boundaries after 1967 (chapter 5).
- (b) In the central urban areas with multi-storey buildings and old stock predominant, where tenants were about 50% of total households, the working class was more likely to occupy rented residences, or own small flats in lower storeys of apartment buildings. Such housing in older urban areas, intensively built by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie for speculative purposes, is already in need of repair. Popular properties deteriorate.
- (c) Owner-occupiers and tenants in predominantly self-built, low-rise urban areas, especially old refugee communities in the suburbs of Piraeus and former illegal settlements on the northwest, still concentrate labourers in industry and construction, but tend to become more mixed than in the 1960s, with the exception of the furthest western suburbs. Owner-occupiers are still the most numerous, originating in the waves of popular land colonization since the interwar period.

It can now be concluded that urban development in Greater Athens has ceased to be spontaneous and has acquired a new social character since the late 1960s. It is dominated by the generalized market, and by speculative middle-class and landowning elements. Working-class density patterns have started to correlate with those of the rest of the population (figs. 6.1, 6.8). New entrants into the city and industrial employment with no outlet towards peripheral areas and the self-built sector have to depend increasingly on the dominant housing market and the supply of cheap flats in multi-storey apartment houses of the old housing stock. As the process of popular

spontaneous urbanization is being eroded, recent entrants are forced to be integrated into the generalized market, especially as tenants.

The general division between labourers on the west and more affluent classes on the east of the Athens agglomeration persists, but is becoming less pronounced as the years pass. The ecological processes involved in the new urban growth pattern are *vertical differentiation* and *filtering-down* in pockets of the inner city. A *homogeneization* of urban space is thus evident in Greater Athens, from which only certain traditional bourgeois suburbs and pockets near the CBD are excluded. The spatial fixity of the Athens working class has been broken perforce.

The above analysis lends some insight into the future of the working class in the capital of Greece. Industrial stagnation in the Athens basin caused by industrial decentralization will certainly decentralize a part of the working class as well, especially the landless proletariat. Popular suburbs are threatened by a series of forces. The workers who had managed to own a house during previous years can still extend their property individually, though with difficulty, or rather through collaboration with petty entrepreneurs of the speculative sector. Although 'legalization' leaves settlers the option of developing their property and becoming petty landowners, it has not yet brought about a direct shift from low detached houses to apartment housing: petty developers find this unprofitable in popular suburbs, and families build gradually, adding storeys by stages. Inter-generational occupational mobility and the invasion of new populations as tenants and, probably, of organized developers in the future, can radically transform these areas and consequently change the spatial structure of Athens, which remained fairly stable for half a century or more. Newer working-class families, even those who own land, will no longer be able to erect owner-built houses. Given the additional factor of the rise in building costs after 1972, the decline of the informal housing sector can be seen as irreversible.

The number of tenants in more central areas will increase, especially as a large section of the new labour force has not bought any land. The inner city has an enormous capacity for receiving low-income tenants as the middle-class suburbanization process accelerates. The location of industrial workers is already shifting from traditional working-class areas towards more central high-density pockets. Gradually the presence of a landless proletariat will be felt again in Greater Athens. In certain old inner city areas, a process of dilapidation is already under way, and environmental pollution aggravates living standards. The working class is increasingly housed in the oldest stock and multi-storey apartment buildings in run-down dense pockets in the centre. Such buildings have been built for profit

with the minimum of care. Miserable central slums created by a filtering-down process are therefore not an improbable prospect for Athens in the late twentieth century.

### *6.3.3 Urban experience and work experience: a note on new channels*

The erosion of popular land control was not a direct result of the transformations of industrial and urban capitalism, nor of the slowing down of urbanization rates. It was imposed by a political process and class rule. The dominant classes curbed popular land colonization, not because they realized its alternative potential, but in order to facilitate the new wave of capitalist 'modernization'. The analysis in previous chapters gave the impression that State policy for the expansion of urban and industrial capitalism, for the development of middle-class suburbs and against popular land control was imposed on a passive population. In fact, this is not far from the truth. Though we referred to the stubborn spatial fixity of urban workers, other forms of popular resistance and social protest in the urban sphere seemed virtually non-existent. This contrasts with the optimistic popular mobilization of the 1960s, in which urban experience played a major role (chapter 4).

During the transitional period of the first half of the 1960s there was a widespread hope for social transformation, reflected in popular mobilizations (chapter 3). The dictatorship put an end to all such hope. Violence was exercised, and an intricate set of mechanisms was devised to curb popular independence.

The dominant classes perceived only fragments of urban-based struggles. They concentrated their offensive against the labour movement, towards the clearance of the 'red enclaves', but also against peripheral neighbourhood associations. However, since the process of popular land colonization was individualistic rather than openly cooperative, and since it alleviated responsibility for public housing provision, the dominant classes were indifferent or permissive towards it. It was also expected, as in the interwar period, that the creation of a property-owning populace would preserve social peace. Demolitions therefore were always coupled with the tacit acceptance of unauthorized housing. The timing of 'legalizations' indicates that they constituted a quasi-populist class policy. In 1958 the addition of 1,657 ha to the city plan followed a wave of strikes and the rise of the vote for the Left. The next massive wave of 'legalizations' was during the dictatorship, as already discussed (section 6.1.1). The dictators managed to appease the population and undermine solidarity by rewarding, selectively, communities and individuals.

The working class would never again return to the expectant spontaneous radicalism of the 1960s. Given the repressive political context, it is understandable that no urban social movements appeared until 1974 in the spheres of production and reproduction, including movements against the harassment of illegal building. In the Anakasa illegal housing area we found an adaptive behaviour during the dictatorship, which was based on popular common sense. Residents were not suspicious or competitive awaiting the rewards of 'legalization'; rather they were careful. The authorities managed to secure in certain communities someone who informed on the residents; and the presence of even a single police informer was enough to demoralize a whole neighbourhood. The State would use force only where necessary. In this way, without any resistance from political parties or the populace, the dominant classes achieved the incorporation of illegal settlements, which challenged capitalism, into the norms of their society; they managed to proceed unhampered to the 'modernization' of the urban land economy of Greece.

Popular inertia and 'passivity' with respect to urban issues, however, lasted longer than the dictatorship. The few urban movements after the mid-1970s were exhausted in pursuing their narrow specific goals, remained fragmented and then were dissolved. They were typically defensive urban movements (Pickvance 1985). Demolitions of illegal houses in Perama created one of the most long-lasting mobilizations, but this was often defused by politicians through promises of 'legalization' (Danou and Pandopoulos 1975). Questions of pollution from the numerous factories near working-class areas have caused a split between the workers on the one hand, interested in keeping their places of employment nearby, and the rest of the residents on the other, who want the polluting factories to relocate (Aidoni et al. 1976). Renewal in the inner city created conflict only in the rare cases where solid homogeneous communities were uprooted – such as Ilissos in the 1960s and Anafiotica in the 1970s (Malthy et al. 1966; Danou 1973). The massive demolition of the central city by private activity went unnoticed. This is understandable, because it was a piecemeal and gradual process condoned by the landowners who constituted no organized opponent, and because no structured communities were uprooted (Emmanuel 1981: appendix 3.1).

Landowning interests made their presence felt again after the dictatorship, challenging the Land Laws. Effective resistance against Law 947/1979 by landowners and middle-class cooperatives in Attica brought down a minister. Workers in the illegal areas of Kamatero, A. Liossia and Acharne on the north were used as a front by large landowners in adjoining areas, who demanded free 'legalization' of their properties. It is interesting that



PASOK, then in opposition, sanctioned these mobilizations within a populist rhetoric. When in power two years later, it reformulated the Land Law (chapter 6). Ironically, a PASOK minister was now brought down by the same landowning speculative interests protesting against the new Law 1337/1983.

Urban social movements since the late 1970s, then, remained spontaneous, uncoordinated, infused by the dominant classes and confined to specific issues. The major spontaneous movement for land colonization, which could have led to an emergent urban working-class culture, remained incipient; it did not evolve into cultural creativity. A transfer of power from popular strata to the dominant classes was effected in the process of urban growth, an erosion of working-class gains in the course of half a century and, in effect, defeat.

This was counterbalanced by a resurgence of spontaneous cultures in the sphere of production. Despite changes in voting behaviour (chapter 3), other indications of radicalization appeared in the 1970s. Working-class solidarity, as well as bourgeois aggression, were reflected in the increase in strikes demanding the rehiring of a syndicalist who had been fired (Fakiolas 1978: 116–17). There were also several indications of disentanglement of the proletariat from traditional political forms and tactics, especially their abandonment of the warring factions of the traditional Left, as well as government-controlled syndicalism. After 1974 some strikes were effectively organized outside the GSEE by factory unions, workers' committees or general assemblies (Theodorou 1975). Working-class politics after the dictatorship should *not* be seen as retreating.

The same is true of spontaneity after the final abandonment of the land question. The defeat of the working class in the urban sphere meant the intrusion of the dominant culture in the popular communities in the form of effective hegemony, adaptive acceptance of the capitalist framework and 'modern' administrative controls, and changes in popular common sense. The western Athens communities, however, are at present in a period of transition as a younger generation succeeds the traditional proletariat. The suppression of working-class control of urban development marks the end of a period in which alternative cultures, security and the feeling of collectivity were sought in family, local community, housing and land control. New channels for spontaneity and independence are now being discovered. After all, land colonization and defence was only one aspect of the class struggle in postwar Athens. The end of spontaneity in urban development may prove insignificant in the long-term course of the articulation of alternative popular cultures.

## *Athens and the uniqueness of urban development in Mediterranean Europe*

There is surely no region on this earth as well documented and written about as the Mediterranean and the lands illuminated by its glow. But, dare I say it, at the risk of seeming ungrateful to my predecessors, that this mass of publications buries the researcher as it were under a rain of ash... Their concern is not the sea in all its complexity, but some minute piece of the mosaic, not the grand movement of Mediterranean life, but the actions of a few princes and rich men, the trivia of the past, bearing little relation to the slow and powerful march of history... So many of these works need to be revised, related to the whole, before they can come to life again.

Fernand Braudel (1966: 18)

In a way, this is another 'minute piece of the mosaic', a study confined in time (the postwar period until 1981), space (Greece) and object (the transition from spontaneous urban development to a new urban pattern). Conclusions about the general applicability of findings, or about the adequacy of the model proposed for their explanation, obviously cannot be drawn from evidence about the society and economy of one city. The urban history of Athens, however, as a paradigmatic case study, highlighted some tentative hypotheses about Mediterranean cities. Research substantiated the hypothesis that spontaneous urban development was not a relic of the past, did not belong to precapitalist, peasant modes and was not related to Gramsci's folklore (chapter 1). Popular land colonization emerged with capitalist development, pertained to classes integrated in it and popular common sense, and was reproduced as long as it was causing no crucial contradictions. The transition to a new model of urban development has been explained as an outcome of transformations in both material elements of the ecological complex, and social class struggles and practices. Parallel evidence at this point will be used for a comparison of urban transitions in Athens with those of Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, Lisbon and other Mediterranean cities.

Urban development is a product of social action, a human creation that varies enormously in time and space. The case of postwar Mediterranean Europe leads to a radical reformulation of traditional methodology and geographical models. The central question has been, how should we modify

the standard models, mostly inspired by Northern urban structures, to account for the particularities of Southern European urban development? Rather than modify the models with variables or parameters, human agency was introduced as the crucial axis for investigation. At this point, a more systematic presentation of certain material and cultural traits which seem to move with parallel tempos in Mediterranean cities will highlight tentatively a special approach to urban development, a wider schema which allows for local variation. It will be argued that there *is* scope for generalization.

### 7.1 Conclusions from the Greater Athens case: periodicities and reversals

Findings substantiate the hypothesis that Athens did not follow, but on the contrary reversed the evolution of urban development patterns evidenced in cities of advanced societies of the core. The reversal was found to be both *structural* and *processual*. The former relates to the inverse-Burgess model of urban growth, which has been attributed to the different timing of urbanization, industrialization and the introduction of rapid transit systems. Processual reversals, which have constituted the focus of this book, are even more striking. Greece was an especially appropriate case study. Twice, through abrupt transitions, the Northern European periodicities have been contradicted. First there was a transition from working-class landlessness and centrality to popular land control and peripheral location as capitalism rose to dominance in the 1920s. This book has focused rather on the more recent transition from popular land control back to working-class centrality, landlessness and the homogenization of urban space. Let us now examine structural and processual transitions in turn.

#### 7.1.1 *The relevance of the ecological complex*

Industrial structure and restructuring, urbanization rates and the city as a material context have recurred in the study of Greek urban development as the principal objective forces affecting the type and the social structure of urban development. The beginnings of the inverse-Burgess model can be sought in the timing of urbanization and industrialization. Industrial capitalism arrived late in semiperipheral cities, after urbanization; and because of settlement density and compactness and the availability of transport networks, industrial concentrations did not appear near the CBD but on the outskirts and along railway lines in a sectoral pattern. The dominant classes would bid for central land away from industrial concentrations, in order to safeguard their environment as well as proximity to functions of culture and control in the CBD, and would exclude the

proletariat to the periphery. The working class, by contrast, would bid for peripheral land close to its workplaces. Moreover, small workshops dispersed throughout the urban fabric strengthened the employment linkage for informal-sector workers.

Social class levels thus correlate with the land-rent gradient in most Southern cities, both Mediterranean and Latin American, despite their different histories and geographies. There is hardly any variation in this urban pattern. The employment linkage is strong for all social classes. Popular land rights in peripheral locations where land is cheap allow workers to supplement low and unstable incomes in decentralized industries by subsistence agriculture on the urban fringe. Tenure assumes precedence over location in popular demands. In other words, there is a set of common characteristics among Southern cities, even where industrial capitalism is relatively advanced: 'Although Milan was the Italian city which most nearly imitated northern patterns of development, the way its social divisions were projected onto space was nonetheless different' (Lyttleton 1979: 232).

In the version of the ecological complex used by Duncan and Schnore (1959), Population and Organization are considered as dependent on Environment and Technology. The analysis in this book does not corroborate this formalism. The relationships have been found to be dialectical. One (or more) of these elements (urbanization, industrial structure and restructuring, and the nature of the city as a material context) has tended to become predominant in certain historical conjunctures, keeping the other elements subordinate, imposing its structural principles on them and explaining urban spatial patterns and transformations. Even during the two major turning points of the 1920s and 1960s, when changes in Athens were all-embracing and simultaneous, determinant elements of the ecological complex could be discerned: in the interwar period urbanization received predominance due to refugee arrival; and during the postwar transitional decade, industrial restructuring and the city as a material context (the expansion of urban capitalism and environmental deterioration) were determinant in urban processes. These transitions will now be made more specific.

### *7.1.2 The reversal of the Northern experience*

Labouring people have been found to be landless in the Athens inner city during the period of transition to capitalism (1880-1922). Working-class housing conditions at the time may remind us of nineteenth-century London and Manchester; but in the latter cases the transition to capitalism had been completed. The landless proletariat appeared in Greece only during a transitional period in the cities of silence. While in nineteenth-century

English towns the central housing stock was allocated to the proletariat through a filtering-down process, this did not operate in Athens until very recently. Similarities of urban structures were only superficial. Popular control of land on the urban fringe became established (rather than terminated) as capitalism rose to dominance in Greece.

Since the informal housing sector and the spontaneous urban growth pattern arose during the period of transition to capitalism, it cannot be considered as a precapitalist mode. The refugees were not regressing into a peasant existence or residual modes of land allocation. They struggled to improve their lot by creating an alternative mode of land allocation within capitalism, as in other peripheral societies: 'The main difference is that the new groups are trying to gain *access* to the city ... while the old groups were *traditional* communities *resisting* the assault of the city' (Morse 1965: 489).

Phases of urban development in postwar Greece seem stunning to European researchers, since a spectacular population growth in the inner city occurred as late as the 1960s, following popular suburbanization, and was then succeeded by a new suburbanization wave with a different class basis (chapter 6). The proletariat then came back into the generalized market, where a filtering-down process began to operate in the 1970s. This contrasts with the gradual suburbanization of the working class and the increase of owner-occupation in contemporary Northern European and US cities.

The importance of this reversal is stressed in a closer comparison with Anglo-American urban transitions. Recent transformations in Greece involved several passages:

- (a) from urban 'explosion' until the 1960s to diffuse urbanization since the 1970s;
- (b) from industrial concentration to depolarization, and consequently from proletarianization in the large cities to tertiarization and informalization;
- (c) from a dual to a unified land and housing market, from a spontaneous urban development pattern to its erosion, from working-class land control to its integration into the generalized market controlled by the middle classes and the State, and, occasionally, from uncontrolled development to middle-class speculation and, more rarely, planning;
- (d) from popular to middle-class suburbanization;
- (e) from social class segregation to the increasing homogenization of urban space, excepting certain specific enclaves.

The Northern cities have gone through the second of these transformations and through a variant of the first one (Robson 1988; Massey

1984). The others are particular to Athens, especially since the cities of the North have known neither this sort of dual housing and land market, nor popular control of urban expansion. Suburbanization and the generalization of landownership among the working class through mortgage credit diffusion, as well as middle-class suburbanization in Northern Europe and the USA, present radically different features and timing from those observed in Greece.

Let us first turn to middle-class suburbanization. The Northern middle classes transform villages into commuter suburbs, and live alongside local populations in very low densities and single-family houses (Robson 1988: 24, 41). By contrast, new towns and satellite settlements in continental Europe 'constitute only an accessory element in the urban reality' (Lichtenberger 1976: 98). In the Mediterranean, city extensions are more important; but these, and even experimental interwar satellite settlements such as Ciudad Lineal in Madrid, have long since adopted the compact apartment house (Lichtenberger 1976). In Athens, middle-class suburbanization meant the rebuilding of nearby suburbs with multi-story apartment buildings, invasion and succession of former populations. The commuting range of about 50 km in Europe, rather moderate by US standards (Lichtenberger 1976: 85), is too great for Mediterranean standards. The Athens suburbanization wave was towards nearby areas of 20 km at the most. Seasonal commuting from remoter areas of Attica has started to appear only rarely in the 1980s, during the summer months when the environment of the Athens agglomeration becomes increasingly polluted. Though leaving the centre, the Athens middle classes still prefer urbanism, small distances from the inner city and relatively high densities.

Similarities of early working-class suburbanization in Athens with that of the North cannot be posited either, because the latter is closely controlled by the State and large capital. The working class of Anglo-American cities has long participated in the movement to the suburbs, and the decentralization of jobs followed (section 5.1.3), keeping journeys to work moderate. In the new suburbia, owner-occupation has been feasible, as wages increased, with mortgage credit diffusion. It has been pointed out, however, that mortgage payments have come to constitute a burden for workers. The decline of the rented sector and the inner city pushes them into 'forced ownership', and since the 1950s a 'debtor society' has emerged, tied to organized landlords (the banks) in the mass-produced suburbs (Rodwin 1961: 42-5).

In Greece, by contrast, popular suburbia was combined with independence from the capitalist market. The expansion of capitalism took the form, not of rationalization and concentration of capital, but that of the

domination of a rather competitive and speculative market over the previous widespread informal housing sector. The Greek housing and land market were traditionally dual, composed of a dominant capitalist/speculative and a subordinate owner-built/informal sector; landownership was fragmented; and the role of planning was minimal. Capitalism then expanded and came to control housing production, and the dual market was increasingly unified through the suppression of the informal sector. Still, this was a fragmented, competitive capitalism, a speculative market which produced a piecemeal urban development pattern and precluded the narrow concentration of landownership and construction capital. Despite the entrance of finance capital into housing production, petty landlords and entrepreneurs rather than large ones (banks, credit institutions and the State itself) continued to control urban development. Vertical differentiation of urban space (chapter 4), and its more recent further homogeneization (chapter 6), stress this fragmentation and contradict references to increased segregation 'everywhere' in Europe with increased prosperity (Lichtenberger 1976: 94).

Mediterranean cities do not display identical features, but certain structures and processes are to a greater or lesser extent present in some form, while absent or completely the reverse in cities of the North. Even if the various modes and characteristics present a variety of articulations and developments, they finally compose a specific urban development trajectory. A formalization of our findings is presented in table 7.1. We do not encounter different phases in a process of convergence between Northern and Southern cities, but a different model of urban development. The elements of the ecological complex have evidenced different articulations, class structuration followed a different course and urban development trajectories diverged. It is proposed here to refer to the *Mediterranean* urban development trajectory, and the attendant urban type. This unity among Southern cities, despite their professed diversity, can become the basis of an argument for structural differences between Northern and Southern, core and semiperipheral, cities. It is the unity and divergence that we are trying to understand in this final chapter. To what can this systematic urban development trajectory be attributed? Why is it that in the postwar period one speaks of diffuse urbanization, industrial depolarization, the informal sector, the dual but increasingly unified housing market, and the end of spontaneity in urban development, whether focusing on Greece or Portugal, Spain or Italy?

Several transformations like those observed have been attributed to the postindustrial society and the urban crisis. Industrialism still has a long future in Mediterranean societies, however, due to their role in the world economy. The teleological interpretation of the crisis would be also wrong.

Table 7.1 *Contrasting urban development trajectories in Northern and Southern cities*

Anglo-American cities	Mediterranean cities
Industry creates urbanization	Industry follows urbanization
Factories near CBD	Factories outside CBD or city
Unified land and housing market	Dual land and housing market
'Paradox' in land-rent gradient and Burgess model	Classes distributed by land-rent gradient and inverse-Burgess model
Zoning	Mixed land use
Neighbourhood segregation	Segregation, vertical differentiation, etc. models
Low-income group segregation	High-income group segregation
Bourgeoisie determines frontier of urban growth	Popular strata, besides dominant classes, colonize new land
Landless proletariat after transition to capitalism	Popular landownership after transition to capitalism
Workers in high densities and overcrowding	Workers in low densities but overcrowded and lacking in basic infrastructure
Late suburbanization of workers	Early suburbanization of workers
Early popular struggles for location	Early popular struggles for tenure
Urban development stages: centralization/suburbanization/disurbanization	Urban development stages: suburbanization/centralization/suburbanization/diffuse urbanization

Crises tend to be destructive for the material existence of subordinate classes, but also set a favourable ground for the diffusion of certain ways of thinking (Gramsci, cited by Paschos 1981: 348). Objective forces *are* to some extent relevant in influencing transitions, but they, too, have been created by human agency and culture. Collective attitudes, values and cultures around land allocation and the city will be discussed in the following section.

## 7.2 The emergence and reproduction of popular land control

The popular quest to colonize land as found in contemporary peripheral cities is not peculiar to them. It also made itself felt in European cities at the dawn of capitalism. A history of urban landownership patterns has yet to be written. Unfortunately, while rural tenure patterns and conflicts have often been explored, urban landownership patterns have been underplayed in urban studies, although landlordism and landlessness and the conflict between landlords and squatters are constant important features of urban



development in peripheral societies (Evers 1984: 481). It will now be argued that variations in urban land control relate to certain antitheses between Northern and Southern cultures.

*7.2.1 Popular land rights in European histories: a contrast*

There are references to strong restrictions against land invasions and effective control of illegal building from a very early period in the cities of the North. The procedures of land allocation were self-evident in precapitalist social formations, where individuals became citizens on the basis of landholding, and land was decisive for the political and military power of the feudal lords (Vance 1971; Paschos 1981: 115–16). The land question was posed forcefully in England during the enclosures, which have been considered by Marx and Engels as decisive for the emergence of a proletariat. They speeded up the industrial revolution, turning smallholders into tenants bound to a compulsory way of life, with work in textile manufacturing as the only alternative.

As urbanization rates mounted during the transition to capitalism, the 'crowd' of London and Paris did attempt squatting, but the movement was decisively curbed from the outset. Every kind of illegal building was suppressed at birth in London. Houses 'set up under the ban of the authorities to provide shelter for increasing numbers of artisans and poor people' were razed to the ground for infringing the proclamations (George 1966 edn: 79). Popular land control was out of the question.

Shanty towns appeared in the peripheries of both German and Swedish towns in German-speaking countries and in Eastern Europe during the late nineteenth century in periods of rapid urbanization (Niethammer and Bruggemeier 1978: 125–7; Lichtenberger 1976: 91), but they were controlled at once. Some cities of the USSR and the USA were encircled by shanty towns during periods of intensive industrialization and urbanization. In 1848–57 the growth of Chicago was accompanied by the mushrooming of 40–50 acres of shanties on the west side, where the population rose from 57,000 to 214,000 in 1862–72 (Karpas 1976: 11). Other US cities saw comparable developments. Squatters, however, were driven out by the middle classes as soon as capitalism became dominant and urban technology improved:

[Immigrants] had to seek for accommodation and employment in almost every section of the city, and many squatted in peripheral 'shanty towns', which were displaced only after the Civil War when streetcar systems opened new areas to middle-income development.

(Ward 1971: 297)

This process seems comparable to the Greek case in a sort of temporal dislocation. Strict controls over the urban periphery, demolitions and displacement were the rule in the early 1970s in Athens, not because of transport improvement, but in order to facilitate industrial and urban capitalist restructuring.

France, at the crossroads between Northern and Southern Europe, forms an intermediate case. In the suburbs of Paris in 1560 people from the Balkans were 'living a shanty-town existence in holes in the earth' and huts appeared at the edges of forests. These were demolished after a French ordinance of 1669 (Braudel 1973: 205). The phenomenon, however, was much more systematic and long-lasting, as indicated by the existence of the rag-pickers in the nineteenth century, the residents of the Parisian fortification belt in the early twentieth century and the interwar *pavillons* (Faure 1978, cited by White 1984: 45; Lichtenberger 1976: 91). Foreign immigrants' *bidonvilles* around Paris kept mushrooming especially after the massive influx of North African labour in the 1960s. It is interesting that it was again Mediterranean populations who struggled for such an existence in French cities, and many Portuguese were found living side by side with African labourers (King 1984: 160). By the later 1970s the *bidonvilles* had been reduced, slowly reabsorbed into 'normal' housing after legislation in 1964 (Borde and Barrère 1978). They did not disappear completely, however, until the 1980s.

The control of peripheral urban land seems to have been much looser in the Mediterranean, especially Greece, since the nineteenth century. Although the great diversity of landownership patterns in Mediterranean cities precludes a comparative treatment, certain important aspects can be pointed out here. Diversity among cities is natural, because of the involvement of several types of landlordism: private, large and small, State, church. The absence of large properties, with a few exceptions, the fragmentation of urban landownership and piecemeal urban redevelopment in Athens (chapters 4, 6), does not seem to have been a systematic feature of Mediterranean urban development. Variations appeared not only among nations, but also among cities of the same country.

By contrast, and despite landholding diversity, there are indications that real estate speculation and the lack of planning are general traits in postwar Mediterranean urban development. In general, house building was a motor for economic development (Wynn ed. 1984b), but large real estate entrepreneurs seem to have emerged especially in Italian and Spanish cities. The division between these two countries on the one hand and Portugal and Greece, smaller and less developed, on the other, seems to have played a role

here again. The intervention of landed interests into planning have already been stressed (chapters 1,2). The speculative market has been most notorious in the case of Naples, where the building boom during the 1950s was invaded by people related to the *camorra* and gangsterism, and was partly controlled by city bosses, the virtual economic empires of Lauro and Gava (Allum 1973: 36-9, 296-7). Illegality as an important aspect of the speculative market was less conspicuous in other Mediterranean cities, and more spread among the population. A standard speculative venture was illegal rooftop additions within the approved plan, which gave the middle classes one to two storeys of supplementary dwellings for exploitation. These are common in the petty bourgeois areas of Athens, and are reported in Roman apartment buildings (Fried 1973: 59), and in Barcelona, where residents gained height by the addition of 'aticos' and 'sobre-aticos' built back from the facade (Remica 1977: 178).

Such a material context, where speculation and illegality is predominant and spread among all social classes, is conducive to the development of popular initiative in urban expansion. Peripheral land was not strictly controlled, except in parts of Italy. In Naples, speculators were interested in open land on either side of the new wall from 1551, and until today the two classes detached from land are the working class and the new middle class. In 1860 the peasant uprising for land in this region was dubbed 'brigandage' by the authorities and was severely repressed (Allum 1973: 346, 50). In Rome, by contrast, the concentration of landownership in Agro Romano<sup>1</sup> did not impede the mushrooming of the *borgate* in the countryside in the early 1900s. Some settlements were constructed by low-cost housing agencies on cheap land far outside the plan perimeter. There is even reference to illegal dwellings built with subsidies from the State (Fried 1973: 29, 120). Rome is also a typical case of 'Haussmanization', i.e. massive relocations of poorer populations from central areas towards the periphery and the monumentalization of the city centre. The artisan and small merchant class occupied the centre, but speculation and building entrepreneurs drove them out. After 1900 the inhabitants of the centre of Rome found themselves systematically shifted to the periphery, especially to jerry-built *baracche* (Ghirardo 1980: 227-8), and later the fascist government launched a massive operation for such resettlement (Fried 1973: 38).

The first reversal of land allocation patterns in interwar Greece, where the landless proletariat almost disappeared from the city centre, thus seems to

<sup>1</sup> Concentration of landownership in Rome was rather excessive: in 1913, 40% of the Agro Romano, the urban fringe, was owned by only 11 families. In 1954 their holdings were still larger than those of the city government (8,373 acres belonged to only six families, and only 1,250 to the city of Rome; Fried 1973: 115). These owners engineered the rise of land values and land subdivisions on the urban fringe, where people purchased small plots.

have been all but exceptional, but the role of planning has been markedly inconspicuous, since the sudden arrival of the refugees transformed the city as a whole. Threatened by the deterioration of central urban areas, the Mediterranean dominant classes in general organized the relocation of the poor from the inner city.<sup>2</sup> They preferred to comply with peripheral land colonization rather than tolerate central popular enclaves. The proprietors of the Milan centre 'preferred to hold onto their land and wait for values to rise before building. Instead, in the suburbs it was easier for small investors to buy land and build a few houses cheaply' as early as the 1890s.<sup>3</sup> By 1914 segregation was evident between the inner city of Milan, where the working class was less than one-fifth of the total population, concentrated near the wall gates, and the outer periphery, where 70% of the population formed a proletariat in the immediate vicinity of large factories.

This will be interpreted with reference to the cultural evaluation of urbanism by the dominant classes (section 7.3), but their apprehension of dangerous masses in the city core also played a role. They managed to exclude and segregate the proletariat and the popular strata towards the edges of cities. Their fears included the development of industrial conurbations. There are references to the discouragement of industrialization in papal Rome to avoid the emergence of a restless proletariat (Fried 1973: 21).

The looseness of peripheral land control found in Mediterranean histories also shaped other cities of the capitalist periphery. Spanish and Portuguese practices affected Latin American cities during the sixteenth century. One of the first tasks of colonial governments was the measurement and registration of urban land. Settlement followed the Mediterranean tradition: 'Land was given to the early settlers in quantities and locations (with respect to the central plaza) that varied with social rank... There were other forms of access to land, such as formal recognition by the *cabildo* of illegal occupation (*confirmaciones*)' (Yujnovsky 1975: 202). 'The outcome of the introduction of the Western concept of property was usually a *dual system* of land rights in the city and "native land rights" in the rural areas' (Evers 1975: 125). In other words, popular land rights became institutionalized

<sup>2</sup> Before capitalism, there is a reference of people living, in Genoa and Venice, 'on miserable boats near the quays... or under the bridges of the canals', not on land, who were removed from the quays (Braudel 1973: 205).

<sup>3</sup> Lyttleton 1979: 256. Slum clearances, rising rents and housing scarcity in the 1890s had started to reduce the number of workers living in the heart of Milan, and people 'take refuge in squalid lodging-houses, on the streets, or in the farm buildings on the outskirts of the city' (Lyttleton 1979: 255). These suburbs outside the walls, named Corpi Santi, where bread was cheaper but also taxes on property lighter, attracted workers, and further out, transient populations and very poor rural migrants (Lyttleton 1979: 257).

from the outset, and the location of popular areas was specified as peripheral.

In colonial Latin America a rigorous ethnic segregation was thus established, with the Indians excluded towards the urban periphery (Portes and Walton 1976; Scobie 1974). The spatial pattern established in 1510-1600 determined the present-day scheme. In the period of neocolonialism during the late nineteenth century, the few factories and working-class areas, along with lower-priced subdivisions and shacks for the subproletariat, were in the urban periphery in several cities.<sup>4</sup> Legislation of colonial origin and the enforcement of the law guaranteed the rights of European settlers and their access to resources, high housing and health standards, and the segregation of 'natives'. Though this legislation did not anticipate transformations in the world economy and the postwar urban explosion (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 324-7), peripheral urban land remained largely under popular control.

#### 7.2.2 *The nature of Mediterranean illegal settlements*

The Mediterranean large agglomerations were thus built bit by bit, and their physical expansion was defined by where people built their precarious settlements. Fringe speculators did have a role, if indirect, in creating leapfrog development (chapter 4). The principal role, however, was played by the settlers, who bought small plots where they were likely to be able to consolidate and not be forcibly evicted, like Third World squatters (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 312; Karpat 1976), and attracted urban expansion towards those areas. This is the place to specify the nature of these settlements during the postwar period. It should be remembered here that in most Mediterranean illegal settlements, land is duly purchased rather than occupied (chapter 1).

Italian cities except Rome are mostly characterized by peripheral State-built estates or central tenements rather than self-built peripheral shanty towns, and the latter have often been ignored in housing studies (e.g. Padovani 1984). The industrial cities of the North have attracted State and private initiative in the provision of working-class housing, while Southern

<sup>4</sup> Leontidou 1985b: 68-9. *Favelas* in Brazilian cities are traced back to technological changes introduced in agriculture and the abolition of slavery in 1888 (Karpat 1976: 17). Unfortunately, little information is given for workers. Sociological studies of the 1930s stressed an 'inverse-Burgess' spatial structure. There are also occasional references to 'an accretion of jerry-built peripheral slums' (Schnore 1965: 366) during the interwar period, or to rural populations seeking employment in cities and squatting on vacant lands (Hardoy 1975: 50-3). For lack of stable employment, most of their inhabitants were seasonally occupied with subsistence agriculture (Sargent 1974: 115).

cities such as Naples mostly attract temporary migrants on their way to the North in central tenements. 'The *bidonvilles* of Naples are to be found in Turin and Milan' (Allum 1973: 28). Only Rome evidences a clear pattern of spontaneous urban development. In 1970, 200,000 people were reported as living outside the plan perimeter in scattered *baracche*, in *borghetti*, self-built shanty towns along arterial roads illegally divided into allotments, in *borgate ufficiali* built under the official auspices of the fascist government for those evicted from the city centre, and in the notorious *borgate*, self-built illegal settlements on the urban periphery. Less moderate estimates elsewhere<sup>5</sup> indicate that about one-third of Rome's population is precariously housed, the majority on the urban periphery.

Around every large Spanish city, *viviendas marginales* appear. Official censuses estimate shanty-town households at 1.1 % of total households in Madrid,<sup>6</sup> 1.4 % in Malaga and 2.6 % in Seville (Ferrás 1977a). Peripheral proletarian housing in Barcelona, often illegal, dates back to the 1920s, when the city attracted Andalusian labourers for the construction of the Barcelona Fair and the metro (Brandshaw 1972). In 1927 there were some 6,500 *barracas* around the city (Lowder 1980: 6). Their population was still increasing in the 1960s and surrounding municipalities were affected (Martinez-Mari 1966: 543). Publicly financed housing blocks then started to replace many shanty towns and the percentage of shanty dwellers in Barcelona dropped to 1 % of total households by 1970 (White 1984: 46). In the 1970s spontaneous settlements and working-class housing blocks still persisted on the northern coast, however, next to industrial establishments, and mushroomed with rapid migration, reproducing conditions in Barcelona (White 1984: 194-5; Naylor 1981: 245). Housing programmes in Madrid had not eradicated the Andalusian quarter to the south as well as other settlements persisting in the 1970s (Lichtenberger 1976: 91).

The squatting problem seems the most acute in Portugal. Shanties in the *bairros clandestinos*, or *bairros de lata*, as they are known locally, are as numerous as the Greek *afthereta*,<sup>7</sup> but are much more destitute,

<sup>5</sup> These estimates are cited by Berlinguer and Della Seta 1976; Fried 1973: 70, 271. In the mid-1970s, 650,000 people were reported to live in *quartieri abusivi*, a further 100,000 in self-built *borghetti* and 100,000 in *borgate ufficiali* (Calabi 1984: 66). Other estimates are rather more moderate, referring to some 50,000 people in unfit dwellings (in shacks, under arches, in caves and cellars) in 1970, 300,000 in *barracche* and another 70,000 roofless people in 1969, when invasions of vacant buildings escalated (Fried 1973: 2).

<sup>6</sup> Unofficially estimated at 3.9 %; in the Madrid outskirts, a 1950 report found 6,071 families in shanties (Wynn 1984b: 124). In the 1950s, 15,000 shanties were reported in Barcelona, housing nearly 70,000 people (Ferrás 1977a: 266).

<sup>7</sup> See chapter 4. Official estimates during the 1980s refer to 83,000 houses of which 47,400 in Lisbon, 16,500 in Setubal and 7,000 in Oporto, while other estimates refer to 150,000 houses (Lewis and Williams 1984b: 295). Although there is a number of luxurious properties and second homes built without permits in these *bairros clandestinos*, the majority of dwellers inhabit shanties.

constructed with perishable materials such as cardboard, wood and corrugated iron. Shanties represent nearly 20% of the total housing stock (Gaspar 1984: 226). According to official estimates in 1970, 5.9% of total households or 6.4% of the population of Lisbon was housed illegally, compared to only 0.2% and 0.1% respectively in Oporto (Ferrás 1977a).

On the eastern edge of Mediterranean Europe, finally, Istanbul still expands with *gececondus* (settlements 'built overnight'), actual squatter settlements, where land is illegally occupied. The once glorious city of the Levant, together with Ankara, concentrates most of the Turkish squatter population. In 1980, 23.4% of the total urban population of Turkey still lived in *gececondus*.<sup>8</sup> Turkish spontaneous settlements are inhabited by migrants.<sup>9</sup> Though several studies in Latin America have established that squatters are not necessarily recent migrants but include long-term city residents (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 310), in some other Third World cities, especially Asian (McGee 1971), the characterization of 'ruralization' is not unjustified. In Mediterranean cities, by contrast, migrants live in central tenements rather than peripheral areas, at least initially. In Italy, though migrants were usually blamed for the *baracche*, a 1961 survey found that only 8% of migrants' dwellings were *baracche*, while the rest lived in tenements (Fried 1973: 84). Spanish squatter settlements have attracted the proletariat in general, as well as migrants accompanied by their families, while single non-Catalan migrants have been inhabiting overcrowded rooms in old inner-city locations (Barrio Chino, San Cugat del Rec; Ferrás 1978: 182-3; 1977a; Logan 1978).

The case of postwar Athens, with its proletariat in peripheral settlements and its migrants in central reception areas (chapter 6), is even clearer in this respect. This is the place to sum up all indications of an emergent mode of land colonization. The refugees who established it in interwar Athens were not former peasants or rural-urban migrants, but a predominantly *urban* population, with no previous experience of traditional peasant land rights. They did claim special rights as a population uprooted by a national disaster; but this relates to the prompt establishment of peripheral settlements rather than their cultural origins. That a clearly urban population posed the land question rigorously establishes the fact that

<sup>8</sup> 4.7 in 20.3 million people. This has greatly increased with internal migration since 1955 (4.7%), 1960 (16.4%) and 1965 (22.9%; adapted from Keles & Payne 1984: 181). Dwellings in *gececondus* increased from 500,000 in 1969 to 709,000 in 1974, housing 3.5-4.5 million people, or 9-12% of the total population of Turkey (Karpas 1976: 62). In Ankara, the old centre of Ulus was once the main reception area for incoming migrants, but later the entire city was surrounded by *gececondus* (Keles & Payne 1984: 180), inhabited by migrants.

<sup>9</sup> Karpas (1976: 6) uses 'migrant' and 'squatter' synonymously, because in fact 84% of the Turkish *gececondus* are inhabited by migrants.

squatting was an *emergent* mode, not a residual peasant mode. It might relate to petty bourgeois values about land as formulated in the Greek Asia Minor communities. This tradition, however, was remoulded in a new setting to produce a mode of land allocation which was quite original in the history of Greek or Asia Minor cities. The rise to dominance of the capitalist mode of production, and the class relations this variant of capitalism entailed, underlines the origin of these settlements, not in folklore, but in popular common sense. In postwar Athens it was the industrial and the casual proletariat in industry and construction which colonized new land and constituted the core of the movement of semi-squatting.

If a regularity can be posited among Mediterranean cities, it is the predominance of construction workers, as well as factory workers, on the urban periphery. This seems to go back in history, as exemplified by a reference to Milan's 'brick makers, an underpaid and marginal group, living on the edge of the city' in the 1890s (Lyttleton 1979: 271). Much later, a 1969 survey in the Roman *baracche* found 34% of the 29,318 inhabitants to be building workers, 21% factory workers and the rest in commerce and services (Fried 1973: 271). Postwar Athens, with the predominance of construction workers in the periphery (chapter 4), is another case in point. This is very important in the face of urban theory. In a sense, Athens becomes a paradigmatic case study of semi-squatter settlements. Not only does it provide evidence against arguments for the nature of squatting as a precapitalist peasant mode, but also demonstrates the nature of the working class on the urban fringe, and underlines the unity between formal and informal-sector workers in urban space. The absence of corporatism (section 7.4.1) between the industrial proletariat and casual labourers of the informal economy, represented by the construction workers, seems to be general in Mediterranean cities.

### 7.2.3 *Strategies for suppression and integration*

Popular land control does not mean the outright abandonment of the urban periphery by the dominant classes. Some expensive housing projects in Istanbul and Ankara were developed after squatters had successfully proved the usefulness of certain areas as construction sites (Karpas 1976: 236). The Athens urban fringe is now changing hands, too, as after many decades of popular semi-squatting the middle classes are rediscovering the suburban and seaside locations of Attica (chapter 6). All over Latin America, squatters are 'bulldozed out of shantytowns' against their will (Worsley 1984: 219; Perlman 1976) and are rehoused into public housing estates, so that sites are



freed for more profitable developments. Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, and Lisbon are other cases in point.

It has been often suggested that squatting is a peculiar form of State policy rather than an urban social movement. Although this study has a different view, it is true that self-help schemes in many peripheral cities may relieve the State of responsibility and expenditures, but also exploit the several contradictory functions of self-help informal work as an element of social control: 'if people are mending each other's cars [houses, in our case], they are not generally planning a revolution' (Pahl 1985: 250). The discussion of bourgeois strategies of incorporation of popular alternative cultures is important in this context. These have been particularly effective in the urban sphere. The meaning of 'reform' is still open from a socio-political point of view in peripheral societies. Reform movements of the type that emerged during 1880-1930 in the North never materialized.

'The history of subaltern groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic. There undoubtedly does exist a tendency to (at least provisional stages of) unification in the historical activity of these groups, but this tendency is continually interrupted by the activity of the ruling groups' (Gramsci 1971 edn: 54-5). In the case of urban land colonization, it has been interrupted through the interplay of force and consent. Governments can 'alternate repression and concession' (Roberts 1978: 154) and fragment the popular communities. They adopt an ambivalent attitude, at the same time stigmatizing and tacitly encouraging illegal building. Legal recognition, the installation of services, the organization of self-help schemes by the government, are efforts to build up dependence of residents on authorities and achieve the political exploitation of illegal building. Force is exercised at the same time, in the same city, through suppression by police force, legal means, or illegitimate force, such as arson (Abrams 1964; Frank 1966). The Latin American urban history is full of cases where the rehousing of squatters caused fierce class conflicts, and residents were often brought to new housing estates under the threat of machine guns in the case of Brazil (Perlman 1976). The interplay of *integration* and *repression* in State policies was very clear during the period of the dictatorship in Greece, where it took the form of 'legalization' as well as demolition.

The ephemeral nature of urban social movements thus seems to constitute the rule rather than the exception. In cities where work conditions are unstable, people are dependent on land rights and precarious property,<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Among personal reasons to move to Istanbul *gecekondu*, 'a reason that emerges only after long talks with the squatters, was the desire to own property' (Karpas 1976: 89). Since *gecekondu* were usually not eliminated, and eventually dwellers were granted title to the land, a precedent was established. The same case holds for Athens and the 'legalization' of its popular settlements (chapter 6).

and are easily co-opted by authorities. The settlers take advantage of concessions in one of two ways, reflecting the interplay of popular common sense with dominant cultures and the influence of the ruling class:

- (a) Through acceptance, i.e. adaptation to but normative rejection of dominant modes and values. This can lead to either incorporation or 'assimilation', or to a kind of collective instrumentality (Leontidou 1985a: 548), helping the poor to survive through 'working the system' collectively (Mangin 1967: 83). They are not 'system-supportive' (as in Perlman 1976: 243); they just phrase their objectives in instrumental terms and stress the pragmatic aspects of popular common sense to outsiders.
- (b) Through a 'subgrouping process' (Foster 1974), i.e. the formation of secluded, small-scale alternative sub-cultures to protect themselves from society at large. The values of the sub-groups are defined *within* the existing order and often *against* each other – a fact which naturally leads to fragmentation, as in the typical case of the 'roughs' versus 'respectables' in the UK, the 'mass' versus the 'class' in the Third World, or the 'refugees' versus 'natives' in interwar Greece. This is close to Gramsci's concept of corporatism. Popular common sense is moulded in the course of people's conflicts, not only with the ruling class, but sometimes also against each other.

In exceptional circumstances, where class consciousness is emerging during periods of upheaval, common sense may be forged into an ideology or even into an oppositional philosophy (chapter 1). This is difficult to discern, however, even in periods of radical urban social movements (section 7.4.2). The proletariat can only rarely develop such cultures and it is almost impossible for it to become hegemonic culturally, 'because it is structurally expropriated from some of its essential means of cultural production (education, tradition, leisure)' (Anderson 1977: 46).

### 7.3 Urbanism and anti-urbanism: transformations of dominant cultures

The above analysis indicates that human agency, struggles, urban cultures and the historical development of class relations should not be considered exogenous to models of urban development: they can be conceptualized and must be incorporated into these models. In the realm of theory, a fusion of the human ecology perspective with the Gramscian theory of culture has already been sought in chapter 1. Its relevance was evident in the study of the Greek urban history. It will be argued now that certain aspects of cultures around urban questions can be contrasted effectively, and to a great

extent explain contrasts in urban development patterns between core and peripheral societies. A model of social action rather than behavioural geography is adopted at this point. In other words, behaviour, idiosyncracies of individuals and personal preferences are irrelevant. Cultural traditions, meanings, collective practices and their transformation are at stake.

### *7.3.1 Contrasting cultural orientations to urbanism*

It has been pointed out that two urban/housing traditions have emerged in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Northern one. Southerners see the whole city as the context for urban life and the housing units as small private enclaves; northerners see houses as the essential setting and the city as a context for movement and 'hurried leisure'.<sup>11</sup> These traditions are epiphenomena of the contrasting cultures of Mediterranean urbanism versus Anglo-American anti-urbanism, which have had lasting implications for urban geography.

The Anglo-American dominant classes have traditionally idealized nature and tried to live near the countryside, even if based in the cities (Williams 1973b; Robson 1988: 49–53). In England the elites visited their urban properties only for a season. The gentry built country cottages and safeguarded peripheral urban land very strictly. 'Because land holding was so closely the foundation of aristocratic status, much of England's land was restricted by entail, which forbade the selling of land, allowing only its lease' (Vance 1971: 112). Within the heritage, the bourgeoisie not only controlled central land (for economic purposes), but also raised and protected their vested interests in peripheral land (for residential purposes). In the North, 'land transfer and protection of tenure by registration systems are taken for granted' (Abrams 1964: 58).

It is perhaps wrong to take England as a typical case, since the control of land was strictest in that country. Despite the fact that US cities 'had more, and cheaper, space available for expansion, partly because land monopoly was not as strongly entrenched in a "new" country; the use of this space was facilitated by the early introduction of street cars and electricity' (Roberts 1978: 32), its use was by no means at the disposal of all. Corruption and speculation were already thriving in 1907, when a young

<sup>11</sup> For the two contrasting traditions, see Rapoport 1969: 349. Karapostolis (1983: 262) contrasts Anglo-American 'hurried leisure' with habits of the Athens population: he found that in 1979, 37% of the families were eating out at least once a month. The Southern culture towards the city should not be attributed to the high urban densities of enclosed Southern cities (as in White 1984: 33). It is better understood with reference to the warm climate, which encourages outdoor life; poverty, and hence restricted housing space; and the positive cultural evaluation of urbanism.

social worker was warned: 'If you touch the land problem in New York, you probably won't last here two years' (Lubove 1962: 231). This coincided with an anti-urban cultural heritage: the countryside was exalted and the flight from the city has been a constant theme in the US intellectual tradition from Thomas Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright (White 1977), from Ernest Hemingway to Bruce Springsteen.

The very antithesis of the above cultural orientation is to be found in the Mediterranean: the pro-urban ideology, which since very early times has identified the city with progress and civilized cultural life, while the countryside was considered as the domain of ignorant peasants (Weber 1977). In Greece, 'one can not conceive of civilisation at all outside urbanity' (Kayser et al. 1971: 195), and this is also reflected in the 'aversion to nature in traditional Italian upper class culture, in contrast to the cultures of northern Europe' (Fried 1973: 106). This is echoed in the cultural traditions of the rest of Mediterranean Europe, and in those of Turkey, where 'urban life, because of cultural values rooted in history, is considered a higher form of organization' (Karpas 1976: 232). Gramsci (1971 edn: 91) generalized these positive attitudes for the Italian Risorgimento:

In this type of city there exists, among all social groups, an urban ideological unity against the countryside, a unity which even the most modern nuclei in terms of civil function do not escape... There is hatred and scorn for the 'peasant', an implicit common front against the demands of the countryside... Reciprocally, there exists an aversion - which, if 'generic', is not thereby any less tenacious or passionate - of the country for the city, for the whole city and all the groups which make it up.

It is worth mentioning, however, that Gramsci himself never used this dichotomy, not even with respect to the Southern question. He saw the subordination of the country to the city (the essence of Jacobinism) as an organic relationship, where the city organized peasant consent (Hoare and Smith 1971: 45), and he criticized Papini's views that 'the city does not create, but consumes' as a collection of "absolute" idiocies, exclaiming:

How would Italy of today, the Italian nation, have come into existence without the formation and development of cities and without the unifying influence of cities. 'Supercountrymanism' in the past would have meant municipalism, just as it meant popular disarray and foreign rule. And would Catholicism itself have developed if the Pope, instead of residing in Rome, had taken up residence in Scaricalasino?

(Gramsci 1971 edn: 288, within parentheses).

The positive cultural orientation to urbanism in the Mediterranean has resulted in accessibility to the city centre being valued, though a rural second home is reserved for days of leisure.<sup>12</sup> In nineteenth-century Milan the centre

<sup>12</sup> Second-home access has been pointed out as an important factor in the creation of compact cities (White 1984: 163-4). In continental Europe, the wealthy would rent a central

and its monuments was the 'true' Milan. 'No new fashionable suburb could compete with their glamour' (Lyttleton 1979: 250). The new structures of the age of business emerged around the central piazzas. As soon as was feasible the industrialist Pirelli left his house near his infamous manufacturing firm on the outskirts of Milan to inhabit the centre. 'Such a move was a prerequisite for acceptance into the city's ruling elite' (Lyttleton 1979). This popularity of the city centre combined with the forbearance of the dominant classes towards popular settlement on the urban fringe. The inverse-Burgess spatial pattern, the compact middle-class areas and urban development in Southern cities, including Latin American ones,<sup>13</sup> can be largely attributed to this positive cultural evaluation of urbanism.

### *7.3.2. The emergence of suburbanism in the Mediterranean*

The effective control of spontaneous urban growth in Greece, as well as Southern Europe, seems to have coincided with a change in urban cultures. In Greece, a rhetoric of anti-urbanism has emerged recently, as congestion in metropolitan cities mounted in the 1970s, which, however, conceals ideas of 'suburbanism as a way of life' (Gans 1968) rather than those of Anglo-American anti-urbanism or the idealization of 'nature'. As already pointed out (section 7.1.2), the Athens middle classes are abandoning the city centre for suburbs which are neither remote nor low-density. However, the urban-oriented tradition prevalent for centuries is being relativized. A major contradiction is being resolved by a cultural transformation.

A sort of anti-urbanism has been reflected in Mediterranean metropolitan rivalries. The bipolar urban networks in Southern Europe have long created a tension between the two largest cities. 'Milan and Barcelona, Rome and Madrid, epitomized industry and bourgeois society on the one hand, political and administrative power on the other' (Giner 1984). Controversies about individual 'parasitic' cities and rivalries, however, did not cancel out the positive cultural evaluation of urbanism as such. This has tended to change recently. Mediterranean capitals have never been stigmatized as severely as during the last 15 years. Such moralizing has perhaps taken its most acute form in the cases of Madrid (Salcedo 1977) and Athens

apartment but owned a rural second home. This is corroborated by the rate of renting in middle-class areas in mainland Europe, unlike Britain and USA, and the lack of correlation of tenure with social status in the former. In continental Europe, 8-20% of urban residents have access to a rural second home.

<sup>13</sup> The pro-urban ideology of the colonial bourgeoisie in Latin America is stressed by several researchers (Morse 1976). The remarkable indigenous civilizations of the Aztecs, Incas and earlier Mayas had also developed impressively urban cultures (Hardoy 1973), but a fusion with those of Spanish and Portuguese colonizers *cannot* be posited, since the *conquistadores* wiped out indigenous civilizations and brought along their own urban tradition.

(Leontidou 1981c). The distance of Madrid from the productive metropolis of Barcelona is stressed in Spain, while in Greece moral indignation against the 'parasitic city' peaked in the late 1970s.

Urban environmental deterioration is most often blamed on the migrants. An indication of such attitudes is given by the Istanbul inhabitants, who regard squatting as a peasant invasion. An aristocratic family descendant (quoted by Karpas 1976: 63) remarked indignantly about *gecekondu* residents: 'And it is a disgrace that learned men devote their time to studying these wretches, instead of fighting to preserve what is left of the civilization of our great peers.' Greek planners and policy makers have also tended to stigmatize migrants as 'immoral'. They have always been alarmed about the population growth of the two largest Greek cities, especially Athens. Concern about 'parasitic overurbanization' permeated postwar official reports and the mass media, as well as social studies (e.g. Burgel 1981). The alarm of planners and administrators about urban growth has been deeply rooted in middle-class cultures and attitudes, providing the preconceptions for urban development since the early 1970s.<sup>14</sup> This was the period of the dictatorship.

Anti-urbanism has always peaked during periods of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe. In Spain an anti-urban ideology was preached by state-controlled institutions from the moment the civil war ended: the city was the centre of vice and evil – communism, divorce, prostitution, crime (Wynn 1984b). The role of authoritarian regimes in urban development is best exemplified in the case of Italy. During the Italian fascist era emphasis was placed on rural development, and 'peasant Italy' was idealized as an alternative to the ills of urban living (Calabi 1984). At the same time, planning was one of the central instruments for fascist policy.<sup>15</sup> Monumental

<sup>14</sup> This is demonstrated and examples of such stereotypes are given in Leontidou 1981c. It is ironic that such expressions of fear and alarm peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s, during the very years of relative disurbanization. As developments by 1981 indicated, the direct extrapolation of urbanization rates of the 1960s into the 1970s was false. Through this methodology, Greek planners have been led to considerable overestimations of the future population of Athens and Salonica. It was then claimed that the Greater Athens population would soon reach the 6 million level.

<sup>15</sup> It was under fascism that *urbanistica* (planning) received official recognition and several new towns were built (Fried 1973: 30-1). Mussolini's planners looked back to ancient Rome and its monuments. At the same time, one of the first acts passed by the fascist government was the abolition of a tax on building land (Fried 1973: 28). Large-scale monumental planning coexisted with speculation and the exclusion of the poorer inhabitants from cities, as well as the banishment of the Southern question from public discussion for 20 years (Allum 1973: 84). Historical buildings were monumentalized and rehabilitated, medieval institutions were resurrected, new towns were built (Mariani 1976; Ghirardo 1980). Mussolini financed Roman planning as his imperial capital and was concerned with monumentality rather than amenity (Fried 1973: 166). Fascist propaganda on behalf of Rome reinforced anti-Roman sentiments among other cities, and created the northern slogan 'Turin produces, Milan sells, and Rome consumes' (Fried 1973: 71).

access routes through the centre aimed at removing squalor, and 12 *borgate* were built in 1924–40 in a punitive spirit to rehouse those evicted (Fried 1973: 38). Migration to Rome, which peaked in 1936, alarmed the fascist regime, which attempted to check it through anti-urbanization laws and legislation on forced domicile.<sup>16</sup>

In the case of Greece, the only law against urbanization dates from 1953, a few years after the civil war, when political factors had caused a rapid migratory movement towards Athens (chapter 3). The government then proposed a bill to reduce this movement, which was dropped because of popular pressure (report of the UN Urbanization Survey Mission in the Mediterranean Region, cited by Carter 1968: 100). Occasional threats to control internal migration were also launched by the Greek military government in the early 1970s, but never realized. The set of policies aimed at curbing the growth of Athens through the control of popular house building and the facilitation of industrial decentralization (chapter 6), however, underlines the apprehension of the dictatorial government as to the social threat presented by urban concentrations.

This new phenomenon of anti-urbanism in the Greek dominant culture lasted longer than the dictatorship and culminated during the late 1970s. It has constituted the undercurrent of middle-class suburbanization waves, and has recently been intensified by urban congestion and environmental pollution. The blame for all this has been placed on migrants. In this climate, which bordered on a hysterical 'fear of the masses' by the late 1970s, the policies of the dominant classes against the migrants and the working class on the urban land question found fertile ground.

#### 7.4 Popular initiative in urban growth: an open question

##### 7.4.1 *Urbanism, regionalism and the unity of popular strata*

The popular strata seem to have been unified rather than fragmented in urban structure and mobilizations in postwar Greece. The proletariat, formed through massive migrations, developed positive attitudes towards urbanism and the city. For many decades, the subordinate classes have 'voted with their feet' and expressed their viewpoint on urbanism by

<sup>16</sup> Fried 1973: 80; Allum 1973: 27; Gabert 1958. The Italian fascist laws of 1931 and 1939 attempted to control rural–urban migration: workers had to have a permit before they could legally obtain a job, but they also had to have a job before a residence permit could be issued. These regulations were circumvented through an illegal system of recruitment, and illegal migrants soon appeared in Turin and other Northern cities receiving low wages (Gabert 1958). The *Consulie Popolari* in Rome, Milan and Naples during the 1950s and 1960s organized struggles for the abrogation of the fascist law on the growth of cities, and for the 'freedom of residence' (Della Seta 1978: 308).

migrating and struggling for a stake in the city through illegal building, while retaining close ties with the countryside. In other Mediterranean cities, however, popular attitudes seem to have changed in time. Peasant anti-urbanism pointed out by Gramsci (section 7.3.1) was indeed strong during his time. It was exemplified in the profound gulf between the perception of the city shared by the ruling class/inhabitants of the centre and the proletariat/inhabitants of the periphery (Corpi Santi) in Milan: 'even before the hardening of class boundaries around 1890, the Corpi Santi had a long tradition of hostility to the city and its governors', and violent rioting took place (Lyttleton 1979: 258).

Such hostilities seem to have been later dissolved in the popular mind, however, by massive cityward migrations throughout Southern Europe. 'The lack of parks and recreation facilities in the city is attributable, on the mass level, to the recent urbanization of many inhabitants and their continued association of green with rural misery and of cement with civilization' (Fried 1973: 106). The city-country antithesis was thus not engraved in the collective consciousness of Mediterranean European societies. During the postwar period it has not mobilized the popular strata, and has not interfered with massive urbanization waves. In Greece, the process of migration has always been considered as a natural fact of life, and there has been no pronounced rural-urban conflict in the popular culture since the nineteenth century (Tsoucalas 1969: 137; Mouzelis 1978: ch. 5). The experience of urbanization disentangled the people from traditional authority (chapter 3). In Spanish industrial cities migrants were found to develop class consciousness along with the native working class in peripheral industrial suburbs (Logan 1978). The strong regional consciousness found in Greek popular settlements did not imply any parallel hostility towards the city. It meant a permanent affiliation with family and place of birth, which permeated many spheres of life, including urban spatial patterns.

Social differentiation among popular strata has not been based on class, but on other axes, including geographical ones. In the case of Greece, examples were those of refugees/natives and the clustering of various regional groupings in urban space. The Greek case supports a broader definition of the working class than that given by Poulantzas (1975). Since the turn of the century, service labourers, like café and hotel workers, cooperated with the factory proletariat in strikes (Kordatos 1931; Moskov 1972; 183-4). The massive invasion of productive labour into the working-class movement followed the arrival of the refugees in interwar Greece. During the postwar period the unionization of the working class along with the new petty bourgeoisie in the GSEE has been a constant sociological characteristic. This is not exceptional in the Mediterranean context, and



constitutes a crucial difference from several Third World countries with marked ethnic differences, where the class/'mass' distinction seems to divide the popular strata, as the voluminous debate on marginality and the labour aristocracy amply demonstrates.<sup>17</sup>

The Southern European proletariat does not constitute a labour aristocracy with respect to the informal-sector workers, nor is there any important rift between them. Several reasons can be stated. Marginal populations have been reduced through emigration from South to North, especially during the nineteenth century and in the 1960s, and therefore their weight in class structure has been less pronounced than in Third World cities. Working-class mobility among sectors meant the interpenetration of the formal and informal economy. In Greece, this is reflected in theories about the alleged workers' 'stubborn preference for independence', and inter-sectoral flows (chapter 3), while the creative role of both the industrial and casual proletariat in urban and political mobilizations is indicative of their close interrelation (chapters 3, 4).

Gramsci introduced the concepts of 'corporatism' and the 'historic bloc' in order to account for this unity of diverse fractions of the popular strata. As he pointed out, 'the subjects (social classes) which exist at the economic level, are not duplicated at the political level; instead, different "inter class" subjects are created' (Mouffe 1979: 189). In fact, class analysis on the basis of categories of structural marxism (Poulantzas 1975; see chapter 1) is inappropriate in the Mediterranean. The proletariat resists definitions and classifications, because it did not develop a closed sectarian culture.

<sup>17</sup> For a presentation of the controversy, see Lloyd (1982). Most researchers argue that the labour market and fractions of classes therein are split in the way the economy at large is split: into the informal-sector workers on the one hand, who, together with the underclasses, experience the difficulties of casual employment and low incomes; and into the workers of the formal sector on the other hand, who enjoy relative security, higher wages and general protection, like an actual aristocracy of labour. Researchers and activists only disagree apparently on the question of whether radicalization emerges among populations in the informal or in the formal circuit. Fidel Castro (cited in Horowitz 1967: 167) and Fanon (1967) have stressed the revolutionary potential of the 'masses', not the classes. Touraine and Pecaue (1967) stress trade union strength as a means to achieve benefits. On the other extreme, Hobsbawm (1967: 59) argues that migrants were 'likely to burst the bounds of any already existing labour movements but also to destroy much of the unity of background and style of the smaller and older proletariat. And this is indeed so.' It has been contended that various views can be largely attributed to the influence exerted on students of the phenomenon by the historical experience of their own country (Roberts 1978: 165). Those originating in Peru, with the more evident marginal populations in Lima, have regarded marginality as permanent; those from Brazil, dominated by the industrialized city of São Paulo, maintain that marginality resolves temporary bottlenecks in economic growth.

*7.4.2 Semi-squatting as an urban social movement*

Spontaneous urban development, based on popular land colonization and illegal building, was both a cause and an effect of the unity among subordinate classes, as well as the positive popular attitudes to urbanism. At this point, land colonization will be seen as a massive urban social movement. Such movements have been escalating in Rome, Madrid, Barcelona and Lisbon, related to issues of reproduction, usually housing and service provision, or around the question of housing scarcities and infrastructure (Castells 1983; Pickvance 1985). Mobilizations for infrastructure provision in illegal areas and squatting in vacant property constituted radical movements, raising political issues alongside urban demands.

Italian urban movements have attracted international interest because they were advanced, large-scale and overtly politicized (Marcelloni 1979; Della Seta 1978; Pickvance 1985). During the 1950s they were fairly rare, and took place in non-industrial cities, especially Rome. Squatting, rent strikes and demonstrations, along with trade union action, came to the forefront in the late 1960s (Angotti 1977). After the 'hot autumn' of 1969 urban movements gradually spread to all Italian cities, and went through three distinct phases (Marcelloni 1979). In 1969–70 the working class of Northern towns, especially Milan and Turin, was still involved with fierce struggles at the workplace. *Borgate* dwellers on the urban periphery of Rome and tenement residents in Naples mobilized then, with demands about housing issues or occupations of dwellings on older and abandoned estates, as well as the active support of the traditional Left (PCI, PSI), and dissenting Catholics (Marcelloni 1979; Fried 1973: 105, 133). In 1971–2 industrial workers of Northern cities joined in housing struggles with the support of the extraparlimentary Left. Roman and Southern urban movements then involved especially marginalized populations, and a separation between urban and working-class struggles was evident. In 1972–3, finally, struggles were unified, and various organizations emerged as movements became massive and radical in all cities.<sup>18</sup> Bloody clashes and evictions followed.

Urban movements in Spain were no less politicized. Besides housing issues, they expressed opposition to non-representative government (Cas-

<sup>18</sup> The new Left organized *comitati di quartiere* in inner city old working-class areas; a massive organization of tenants and lodgers, SUNIA, appeared in place of the earlier (since 1964) UNIA (Della Seta 1978: 308; Laganà et al. 1982: 241); and mobilizations against rising transport costs also took place in Turin, Milan and Venice (Marcelloni 1979: 261). The Union of the Roman *Borgate* was also founded in 1972 (Della Seta 1978: 308). Between January and March 1974, 5,000 new private dwellings were occupied in Rome, and similar numbers in Milan, Naples, Florence and Bologna (Marcelloni 1979: 261–2).

tells 1983), and radicalization of inhabitants of the urban periphery can be largely attributed to oppression from the regime (Logan 1978: 1163). The *asociaciones de vecinos*, legally recognized in 1964, have grown to represent hundreds of thousands of inhabitants and have been most active in Barcelona. The citizens' movement in Madrid involved shanty-town associations among other groupings, mobilizing for the solution of housing problems. Castells' (1983: 242-7) study of Orcasitas, a shanty town where construction workers were predominant, indicates the development of a successful association which, though keeping its distances from the State, finally supported the demolition of the shacks and the construction of 'proper' multi-storey houses. The conditions are not clear, but the passage from spontaneity to integration is evident.

In Portugal urban movements were also a focus of opposition to non-representative government, and often focused on specific national issues, such as the colonial wars of Portugal, but played a weaker role than the Spanish ones (Gaspar 1984: 220). The revolutionary period (1974-5) witnessed a climax of urban struggles along with agrarian movements. Public housing estates were occupied by inhabitants from the *bairros clandestinos*. The peak of the urban movements, as measured by housing occupations, occurred in February 1975 (Topalov 1976). Cases of opportunism by well-off populations have been reported in these mobilizations (Dows 1980), and occupations of dwellings and of large estates were clearly supported by the Armed Forces Movement. The shanty residents seem to have preferred to cooperate with government-sponsored SAAL self-help schemes (Lewis and Williams 1984b), with dependence on the State as the natural result.

#### 7.4.3 *Spontaneity and urban class struggle: a lost cause?*

Italian urban movements were not just housing struggles in the sense of demands for more houses, 'but also a demand for the transformation of housing from a commodity to be bought and sold on the market to something to be allocated according to its use value'; struggles for transport were also struggles 'against the separation between work and residence and against commuting'. Just as militants in factories attacked the capitalist organization of labour, movements in cities attacked the capitalist organization of urban areas (Marcelloni 1979: 259). In other words, an *alternative* popular culture around urban issues had emerged in Italy in the early 1970s: the mobilized populations were laying a claim to live differently and be left alone. Between this and an *oppositional* culture, where what is sought by living differently is to change society, there is a very narrow line

in reality (Williams 1973a: 11). In theory an alternative view of land and housing would stress use value, communitarian values against individualistic competitive market allocation, functional use of space instead of possessiveness, cooperative efforts and solidarity instead of individualism and fragmentation (Leontidou 1985a). This sort of culture has been propounded by Fourier and other nineteenth-century utopians criticized by Marx and Engels. Between this and the dominant view of land, stressing competition and the self-evidence of the market, there is a multitude of variations, one of which developed in Italy during the mid-1970s.

The emergence of oppositional cultures around urban issues is a very rare development. The hypothesis has been proposed that it presupposes a certain social class basis and the involvement of the Left (Leontidou 1985a). Where the industrial along with the casual proletariat constitute the core of the movement for land control, it is very likely that alternative cultures will crystallize and gradually struggles for social transformations will emerge, because these workers can relate exploitation in the production process to exclusion from the city. The hypothesis that the precondition for this outcome is also the presence of a political party emphasizing urban issues alongside industrial struggles, was based on the negative experience of Greece and on the positive one of Chile. The most striking and long-lasting example is the *Pobladores* movement in Chile, initiated by the casual proletariat who, together with workers with trade union experience and with parties of the Left, linked urban and industrial conflicts in the *campamentos* of Santiago (Castells 1983: 200-9). The vitality of this movement can be discerned even under military rule. During the last years, mobilizations against Pinochet have originated in popular settlements. The case of Italy, however, complicates the issue, as detailed in the following.

The class struggle in postwar Athens did not bring the 'masses' versus the 'classes', as in Third World cities. It was more of the classic form of class struggle of the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie. One of its manifestations was the struggle for land control. Unlike Third World squatting, which is sometimes related to marginality and sometimes to petty bourgeois aspirations (Perlman 1976), evidence in Greater Athens established the relationship of the proletariat in manufacturing industry and construction with land struggles. This proletariat was in a labour market as unstable as that of the informal-sector workers, and would mobilize around urban rather than work conditions. It appeared at the forefront of social mobilization in the mid-1960s (chapter 4). Land struggles correlated with broader popular mobilization waves. 'The surface appearance of conflicts around the built environment...conceals a hidden essence that is nothing more than the struggle between capital and labor' (Harvey 1985: 57). Such a statement becomes especially concrete in the cases of Greece and Italy.

During May 1968, when urban social movements exploded in other Mediterranean cities, Greece was under military rule. Popular land colonization was suspended and then controlled (chapter 6). As it happens, however, urban social movements declined throughout the Mediterranean during the second half of the 1970s. In Madrid, the authorities managed to assimilate shanty towns by providing basic amenities as well as periodic demolitions. In Barcelona shanty towns were successfully eliminated and replaced with *barraquismo vertical*, substandard dwellings in huge apartment blocks with minimal services (Ferrás 1977b: 194–5; Naylor 1981: 245). The Lisbon shanty residents were housed in large blocks, but immediately new waves of migrants and *retornados* from African colonies invaded the shanties. The erosion of urban movements is somewhat complicated, as evidenced by the disagreement among Italian researchers. Spontaneous settlements were controlled in the late 1970s, and low-income tenants were evicted from renovated central buildings where rents were becoming inaccessible, and were transported to country barracks built in the 1970s. The ease of eviction was evidenced in large numbers, piecemeal sale of accommodation and tenants' opposition (Ginatempo 1979: 481, 484). The most convincing interpretation holds the PCI responsible for such a setback, as it stressed reformist rather than grass-roots action and succeeded in eliminating 'extremist elements' in local mobilizations,<sup>19</sup> and in filtering them 'through the complex bureaucratic procedures of the new local councils' (Marcelloni 1979: 265). In place of earlier mobilizations posing broader objectives, a few, isolated reformist movements persisted in Italy. A radically different view, by contrast, apparently representing the traditional Left (PCI, PSI), speaks of 'town planning by the masses' in 1974–7 (Della Seta 1978: 319–20), and considers administrative decentralization as a victory rather than bureaucratic entanglement (Della Seta 1978: 325–6).

It remains a fact that urban movements declined throughout Mediterranean Europe, and a large number of shanty dwellers were 'assimilated'. The very slogan of the massive 1974 rally in Lisbon – *casas, sim: barracas, nao* (Lewis and Williams 1984b: 321) – is indicative of indignation with poverty and dependence on the State. This recurring outcome will now be the basis of some reflections on the future of spontaneous urban development.

On the basis of the Greek experience, the future of spontaneity seems to be more or less foreclosed. Bourgeois hegemony in the urban sphere seems to be spreading unhampered, and the cities are in a period of transition towards a new model. Can this be the model for semiperipheral cities in general? This is put to doubt in the following. In fact, it seems that the forces which brought the working class back into the generalized market in Athens

<sup>19</sup> With the PCI 1975–6 electoral gains as a result (Marcelloni 1979: 263–4).

and assimilated radicalized populations in other Mediterranean cities, have not yet undermined squatting as a widespread phenomenon in other semiperipheries. In Greater Buenos Aires invasions were still being organized in 1981 by long-term city residents forced out of tenements by the policy of the military government (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 310). In Turkey, *gecekondu* residents still struggle with the authorities. In several Third World cities, conflicts are going on. 'The "illegal" sector of each city is growing and spreading more rapidly than the "legal" sector' (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 337). The State considers squatting as 'illegal', acts as an *opponent*, whether it suppresses it or builds housing estates, and is considered as one by the urban poor. This attitude is not conducive to the establishment of bourgeois hegemony. The question to be asked at this point is, how will capitalist 'modernization' affect the urban spatial structure inherited from the years of underdevelopment? How can convergence theories be avoided at this point?

In the 1960s there were several views about the future development of urban land allocation in Latin America. The earliest one supported 'acculturation', optimistically maintaining that, with rising incomes and more stable jobs, squatters will eventually become a sort of 'satisfied suburbanites' (Mangin 1967). This unrealistic view was later amended, and the projection that squatter settlements might become slums prevailed.<sup>20</sup> Other researchers have stressed middle-class suburbanization and the emergence of central city slums. During the 1980s it has been pointed out that as rural land on the urban fringe is incorporated into the city limits and taken over by development corporations, low-income residents have to move to distant squatter areas, or be integrated as tenants into low-cost housing projects (Evers 1984). Finally, researchers who stress the impact of the economic crisis predict deterioration of the socio-economic and environmental picture in Latin American cities and scarcity of resources, with more shanty towns, slums and illegal subdivisions in more dangerous sites and polluted environment as a result (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987: 321-2).

Destitution, then, seems to be presaged by researchers, even where mobilizations are still going on and concessions are occasionally granted to residents of peripheral settlements. The issue of popular initiative and

<sup>20</sup> 'It appears that the original owners or possessor-buildings found it convenient to move on, renting their (often incomplete) dwellings to poorer newcomers' (Turner 1968: 360). This later view points out that as economic development proceeds, the poor will no longer be so desperate about property possession as security against unemployment. Attention has recently been drawn to actual squatter tenancy in many Third World countries, and to the strength of capitalist slumlords as a key factor in the perpetuation of these squalid areas (Simon 1989).

alternative cultures seems to be forgotten. This is so in Greece as well. The conflict between alternative housing sectors has never surfaced in Greek politics as, for example, in Britain (Emmanuel 1981: 316-17). The decline of urban social movements and popular land colonization was not an inevitable outcome of economic development or modernization. It was a product of submission of the urban poor to bourgeois hegemony, partly induced by the attitudes of the parties of the Left. The Greek Left could not conceptualize popular spontaneity, creativity or independence. It concentrated on demands on the State for housing and infrastructure provision. After the dictatorship, the Left remained essentially indifferent to spontaneity as evidenced in the land question and the potential alternatives of self-building, cooperatives, neighbourhood associations and land control. The culture for 'modernization' thus saturated Left politics. Local authorities and mayors affiliated to either of the two factions of the KKE, when not occupied with questions of national politics, demanded social and physical infrastructure provision by the State and pressured for public policy on collective consumption and environmental issues. The exclusive concern of the KKE with central control by the State and monopoly capital actually stifled popular spontaneity. Tedious lists of demands on the government rather than emphasis on grass-roots action and popular initiative, and continuous references to international powers pulling strings, certainly leads to fatalism about the potentialities of the popular movement of a small, dependent country for social change.

Despite contrasting interpretations, it seems that this was also the case in Italy. The Italian Left has long been 'adamant' in seeking public intervention (Fried 1973: 130). 'This has been a general dilemma of the Italian Left: that its programs, involving massive integration by public authorities, must depend for their execution on existing bureaucratic agencies' (Fried 1973: 67), which they actually disapprove of, and do not control. It seems that the PCI, the PSI and the unions were unprepared to face questions of alternative cultures in cities; the urban struggles of the early 1970s thus led to an internal debate and conflict within the Left as a whole, about the hegemony of the PCI and the unions (Marcelloni 1979: 260). Finally, the 'historic compromise' of the PCI in 1974 turned against grass-roots action (Marcelloni 1979: 263). The left-wing parties, by accepting the logic of 'fair rents', actually accepted the ideology of housing as an investment good and of fair rents as a tool for recovery in the building industry (Ginatempo 1979: 488).

Madrid is another case in point. Relevant analysis has indicated that it was autonomy from political parties that was a precondition for success of urban movements (Castells 1983: 322). The Portuguese Communist Party

(PCP), finally, though involved in agrarian struggles, was cautious and even suspicious in the case of urban struggles (Dows 1980).

Paradoxically, then, the decline of urban social movements in Southern Europe has been found to coincide with the increasing role of left-wing parties in local politics.<sup>21</sup> These parties of a world region where labour traditions are strong and important attributed a secondary role to urban issues as a force in social transformation, with few exceptions. This is not fortuitous. Spontaneity in urban development is in fact probably a lost cause, because of the several ways in which the housing and land allocation spheres can be infused with capitalist norms and values. At the one pole, bourgeois strategies of incorporation are numerous and effective (section 7.2.3). At the other pole, land allocation has only very rarely been invested with alternative values and sponsored by the Left (Leontidou 1985a). This indifference is an outcome of scorn of urban issues by revolutionaries since the nineteenth century, which made their relative unimportance a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Neglecting, or worse still despising, so-called 'spontaneous' movements, i.e. failing to give them a conscious leadership or to raise them to a higher plane by inserting them into politics, may often have extremely serious consequences. It is almost always the case that a 'spontaneous' movement of the subaltern classes is accompanied by a reactionary movement of the right-wing of the dominant class, for concomitant reasons. (Gramsci 1971 edn: 199).

A *latent class struggle* over means of reproduction, centred on the question of land control, has been revealed in our study. The struggle may have been resolved in the core, but not in semiperipheral capitalist cities. A framework for its exploration is proposed here as a concrete alternative to the framework stressing competition as the mechanism sorting out human groups in space. It can be maintained that in advanced societies land struggles were won by the dominant classes, especially after the imposition of an exclusive land market with severe restrictions against any alternatives, and the entrance of the State into the sphere of housing allocation. This was brought about by specific cultural traditions and bourgeois hegemony, as well as the orientation of the class struggle to questions of work and production. In other words, spatial competition must be conceptualized as a historically specific, culturally constructed and socio-economically derived process of land control, characteristic of Northern capitalist cities.

<sup>21</sup> The Italian PCI and PSI increased their share of vote in Rome from 23.3% in 1946 to 44.3% in 1976, especially among populations with insecure employment in the band of *borgate* on the outskirts of the city, despite the low concentration of workers (Della Seta 1978: 305). As the most important cities in Mediterranean Europe (except Lisbon and Oporto) became controlled by the Left, one of the means activated to neutralize the politicization of the urban crisis has been 'regionalization and decentralization whereby political conflict with the central State is fragmented or atomized into several conflicts with the local authorities' (Santos, cited in Gaspar 1984: 221).



In its many variants (free, structured or monopolistic), competition has exerted a strong influence not only on urban development, but also on urban theory. The dominant geographical paradigm may advance our understanding of the adaptation of the working class into the dominant mode of land allocation, the market. For the study of the emergence of subordinate modes, however, it is crucial to incorporate class struggle around land in our explanatory model. The process of competition is understood through the analysis of sets of actors rather than social classes and their practices, individual incomes and preferences rather than class cultures, adaptation rather than creativity, behaviour rather than social action. It therefore neglects every trace of initiative and popular spontaneity in urban structure and growth, and underplays the role of collective institutions dialectically interrelated with material conditions.

As spontaneity and informality constitute a basic axis of structuration in the peripheral and semiperipheral world, the dominant geographical model is inappropriate for the study of these societies. Human agency, social action and class cultures should be introduced. The nature and the outcome of struggles around the control of urban development can be highlighted through the interplay of State/civil society, force/consent, domination/hegemony, spontaneity/conscious leadership, dominant/alternative cultures. These 'couplets' reoccur in Gramsci's work, stressing the complexities and dialectics of class struggle (Hoare and Smith 1971: 45). Land struggles have been going on at different intensities and have involved different classes in various conjunctures. It would be wrong to interpret their nature and outcome within the framework of competition. After all, bourgeois hegemony is not always effective.

While such cultural hegemony may define the limits of what is possible, and inhibit the growth of alternative horizons and expectations, there is nothing determined or automatic about this process. Such hegemony can be sustained by the rulers only by the constant exercise of skill, of theatre and of concession.

(Thompson 1978a: 163-4)

Urban struggles continue to be neglected in broader politics and hidden from history. Their traces are already lost in several countries. Workers' struggles around work conditions and relations of production are relatively well known and brought into the open, while land struggles are obscured by lack of coordination and analysis, and neglect by intellectuals and radicals. The proposal here is for a framework in urban analysis which revolves around popular urban struggles. This would not focus on semiperipheral societies exclusively. The implications of the realization of an ongoing class struggle for land control might go much deeper. They might even lead to a radical reformulation of urban theory where the struggle has been lost but is recently re-emerging, as well as where its outcome is still open.

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