

Ian Rory Owen

Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy

On Pure Psychology and its Applications
in Psychotherapy and Mental Health
Care

Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy

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Springer

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This book is dedicated to the generosity of Eduard Marbach in offering a helping hand to me in inviting me to stay at his home and giving authoritative insights into Edmund Husserl's philosophy and what makes a sufficient piece of work in phenomenology. Without his help none of this would have been possible.

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Preface

Phenomenology is a theory of consciousness produced by qualitative methods of reflection and thought experiments that can be replicated. It represents consciousness as consciousness in its own terms and involves a complex account to justify its methods. Phenomenology shines light on what can be discerned about the workings of consciousness through awareness of the differences that appear. It studies the phenomena of meaning in social life and intersubjectively shows how to make rational understandings to explain meaning as publicly available, despite the phenomena appearing differently according to the perspective taken towards them. Phenomenology offers a formal means of representing intersubjective life with others. Personal life is part of the greater social life and is properly addressed by the term “intersubjective”. Intersubjectivity requires understanding that meaning for consciousness lies not only within consciousness and its living body, *leib*, but also between persons culturally and across time. The sought-after ideal conclusions of Husserlian phenomenology have been available since the publication in 1993 of *Mental Representation and Consciousness* by Eduard Marbach, Emeritus Professor of Mind and Phenomenology, at the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Bern, Switzerland, who was previously a student of the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and a collaborator at the Husserl Archives. Eduard Marbach made formal conclusions on Husserl’s behalf after studying of Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts at the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium. What is presented below seeks to amplify the type of insights that Marbach has made available to the phenomenological community.

This book was written to summarise some key aspects of Husserl’s theoretical-qualitative methods for making theory, so empirical research and practice in academia, philosophy and the sciences hit their targets. There are a number of disciplines that have adopted phenomenology as a way to help them co-ordinate theory and empirical research in psychology, nursing, geography, anthropology and other areas. But the main area of concern in this work is psychotherapy and mental health care. The book is written for those who would like to know more about how Husserl’s methods can be applied through knowing how they analyse everyday living, the natural attitude. Husserl’s position is so far from that of Descartes that claims

that phenomenology is dualist and concerns the mind-body split show a lack of reading of Husserl's texts. The work makes a steadily deepening definition of Husserl's approaches. Because Husserl defined his terms contextually, the same words can mean different things in different passages; and different phrases can refer to the same referent. There are interpretative problems concerning how to conclude on equivalent or highly similar terms over a period of almost 50 years. For a brief overview of this sort, it is best to standardise the terminology and present the core concepts and practices that Husserl used. But this has the effect of losing the fine detail and arguing the case for each term. Because of the attention to detail in the original, no attempt is made to present detailed information all at once. Rather, the purpose of each chapter is merely to introduce sufficient information to study the meaning of objects and the relation of consciousness to them. However, phenomenology is manifest when it grounds philosophy, reforms the sciences and improves associated practices through co-ordinating their activities around highly specific relations between concepts and meaningful experiences for consciousness. Because Husserl developed his conclusions and altered his definitions, reading him requires persistence to see the commonalities among the developments and how his writings are cohesive. So with such cautions in place, definitions are provided but without the fine detail of arguing for the conclusions made. The comments below aim to capture the constant themes as expressed in the mature works of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Cartesian Meditations* and to refer in summary fashion to places where key distinctions were established. Detailed Husserl exegesis has been carried out in other works by Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach and is not attempted.

The Husserlian literature is a genre where writers in their current contexts grapple with expressing Husserl's intentions. Some express the general spirit of what he believed, they argue, whilst others stick with the precise letter of what he wrote. What Husserl wanted was a research style of immersion in inherent givennesses to the extent that only the manners of the givenness of consciousness inform the findings. The type of conclusions provided emphasise the connections between intentionality and object sense, "noesis and noema", concerning belief, the presence of the body and the ego, as attention is split across time, place and person. Understanding what is present now exists in relation to re-creating what is no more and what has not yet come to pass. This is one reason why Husserl's writings were so voluminous – there are so many parts and wholes to consider: meaning, habits, the will, drives, the role of the body and social relationships are just a few.

The work is presented in three parts. Part I introduces the map-making method. Part II expresses some maps of the territory of consciousness of what it is like to understand the meaningful world in which we live and share meanings. Theory as a map must represent the territory that it is about and be proven in its accuracy. Part III concerns using the maps made to support self-managed changes of lifestyle, a territory that spans meanings of distress and well being. Therapy and mental health care work lessen the influence of distress although in some cases it cannot be eradicated. It presents formulation as a means of representing distressed consciousness in the world. What is argued for across the first two parts is understanding consciousness as the meeting point of all minds. Such findings apply to the public and the

professional communities of the hypothesisers, testers and users of psychological knowledge. Part III shows how phenomenology creates a common technical language to map meaningful experience. Specifically, what it is like to be an embodied person who lives a life between meanings of satisfaction and distress expressed as emotion, relationships, understanding and belief. Please note that the use of single inverted commas below means that irony is being used. The following disclaimer is also necessary: Although this book is in-part based on my experiences in clinical practice, no real individuals are intended by the brief case vignettes mentioned. Any resemblance between persons mentioned here and real persons is entirely coincidental. Finally, thanks to Chris Stones of Johannesburg University, Helen Williams of Leeds and York Partnerships Foundation Trust and Bill Stiles of Miami University for reading Chapter 15 and making helpful comments.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: The Naturalistic Attitude Cannot Grasp Meaning for Consciousness

This chapter introduces the basics of what it is to be aware and notes that there are a number of traditions that interpret the consciousness-biology or consciousness and natural being relationship in ways that refuse to acknowledge the abundant evidence of how the world is represented in consciousness. This chapter focuses on the problems of their positions and their consequences in general as a false problem and in brief offers a genuine solution to the being of consciousness. The first section comments on the problems of the natural attitude and the limits of the naturalistic attitude of natural science that refuses the existence of the consciousness that gives it its methods and meaning. The dominant natural psychological scientific paradigm is sketched and absurd consequences of Scientism are noted. Second, the problem of naturalistic approaches that cannot grasp meaning for consciousness is because they mis-interpret the consciousness-being relationship and forever remain in an unclear position with respect to consciousness, so that they cannot or will not represent it, while asserting that natural being is the only being worthy of consideration: a version of a doubly negative dualism. Third, some brief comments are made about Husserl's type of answer. The starting point for understanding consciousness is phenomenology, a methodical qualitative cognitivism that identifies the contours of its territory before any empirical approach to ensure that the empirical methods properly refer to conscious experiences. A taxonomy of the types of intentionality has consequences that helps understand the infinite set of instances of conscious experience involving processes that are implicit, tacit, preconscious or unconscious and highly variable. The fundamental territory to be understood are emotions, moods, thoughts, behaviours, mental habits and relationships between people and are evident in how persons treat themselves. The reflective phenomenological attitude provides helpful insights about consciousness and its processes of intentionality. There is consciousness of what it is like to be you or me, to be a child or adult, to be someone in history or merely a person in general who thinks and feels and struggles to understand. The project is to identify consciousness in general

from its evidence. Being conscious is evidently discussible through speech and is certainly not the type of being of an inanimate thing. Indeed, some phenomena of being consciousness are undeniable and can be used to structure qualitative and quantitative reasoning in psychology and psychotherapy for instance.

Understandings at explicit and implicit levels form worlds with others where there are common objects of attention. People have unique personalities and inhabit social contexts and culture, in larger contexts of society and history, through being aware of meaningful cultural objects (although such conscious awareness is influenced by implicit and biological forces). Therefore, a special attention is provided for what it means to relate in a context, in a wide sense of the word “relate”. This includes the consideration of meaning within an attention to the therapeutic relationship in psychotherapy. For two centuries, the split between the qualitative *Geisteswissenschaften*, human studies, and the quantitative *Naturwissenschaften*, natural sciences, and psychological sciences, in this mould, has produced a battleground and a stalemate between incommensurable positions. Natural psychological science refers to the scientific types of psychology, biology, genetics, neuroscience, quantitative social science and physical anthropology. Studying sense-making itself shows how psychological empiricism is shaped by its theories in making its conclusions in meaningful terms. The consequences are multiple standards and manners of justification within these areas and that means that these disciplines proliferate rather than coalesce around a single set of shared justifications and methods. There are a large number of sub-disciplines within cognate, natural psychological science which include genetics and neuroscientific developments in the biological register. The tension is between claims about natural facts versus the aporia within meaningfulness and rationality concerning the openness of meaning to re-interpretation. “Human studies” refers to qualitatively-focused psychological, sociological and anthropological cultural sciences.

The Natural and Naturalistic Attitudes and Natural Psychological Science as the Dominant Paradigm

The naturalistic attitude is a single attention on natural being and natural causality (IX, 7, 14–15, 17), something that is still in evidence today among those who deny the relevance of the products of consciousness as worthy of scientific interest. The naturalistic problem is that focusing on natural causation moves science away from meaningful justification and common sense experience. There are many important topics that together comprise consciousness in the world. In the consciousness-view, there is no doing without being, no thought without feeling, no action without reaction, no values without ethics and no self without others. Being conscious in a context is a multi-faceted whole that exists within yet more contexts of greater size. However, if common sense were sufficient then there would be no need for philosophy or science. The starting point of philosophy and the ground of psychology, and any other discipline for that matter, require understanding the experientially

rich conscious life that people lead. For phenomenology, the natural attitude of the ordinary citizen of being in the world is a relevant starting point for the intentional analysis of meaningfulness, to clarify how consciousness works ideally in order to provide a co-ordinating set of universals about how consciousness is aware. But there are those scientists who take the naturalistic attitude, a focus on various levels of natural being such as the biological, biochemical, cellular and genetic. Obviously, the physical *körper*, the body as seen by natural science as a physical thing is an enabling condition of possibility for consciousness and intersubjectivity (IV, 25, 29, 34, 56–75). But the consciousness-biology relationship varies in sleep, coma, anaesthesia, hypnosis, mood syndromes and other ways.

Despite the variation between a number of materially-oriented psychological sciences, their commonality is discernible as an excessive reliance on natural being with an absent or unclear relation to consciousness, the world of intentionality in which meaningfulness inhabits. Philosophically and theoretically, there are problems of unclear references between concepts and their referent-experiences among the naturalistic disciplines. The philosophical problem of confused references leads to problems of accuracy of understanding and the proliferation of schools of thought and practice. For instance, there are multiple assumptions about the being of consciousness that structure the methods used to generate evidence that is interpreted to conclude on consciousness. Because natural science can only investigate specific non-meaningful biological and physiological processes, then its results are disconnected from the need to make consciousness understood. The naturalistic attitude of natural science is the dominant paradigm (IV, 25, 174, 183, 191, 208, V, 21, 63). So, denying consciousness as qualitatively and scientifically relevant does not realise the consequence of rejecting rationality, personal responsibility in morality and the law, and shared meaning in culture and science. The whole of meaningfulness is lost along with the order that has occurred in the progress of civilization itself. The denial of consciousness is a profound alienation of rational discourses from meaning and qualia that are part of the lifeworld and the history and functioning of science, mathematics and philosophy. One product of civilization is natural science. But for Scientism to deny consciousness, free will and its forms of rationality is to deny meaningfulness, the history of science and its rationality too, because all are based on meaning for consciousness.

Because natural science and natural psychological science cannot focus on consciousness properly, and while some approaches attempt their best in this respect, others believe there is no point in making any connection to consciousness because it is entirely caused by natural processes and is epiphenomenal (Crick 1994; Crick and Koch 2003). The majority of contemporary psychology rejects radical behaviourism as absurd, yet there are some scientists who prefer to theorise in terms of observable neurological processes and observable behaviours following the old programme (Skinner 1953; Watson 1913). In fact what natural psychological science methods enable are focusing on biology, neurophysiology and chemistry, and only through statistical methods do they generally 'return to meaningful experience' as what is happening in a person's brain. Problems arise when natural psychological sciences employ assumed theories, images and metaphors that shape their empirical ac-

tions and ways of concluding but do not follow the inherent contours of consciousness in its intersubjective milieu. This is one reason as to why there are so many competing schools of empirical research. There are associated hypotheses like brain and biological processes as entirely unconscious influences on the conscious.

The many types of natural psychological science express their commonality which is the focus on natural being and natural cause in a variety of unclear relations to consciousness. These varieties of metaphysical realism claim that facts and truth stand completely outside of anyone's perspective. In this view, allegedly true knowledge of facts is not intersubjective: They exist without reference to the views of people and its justification. So knowledge should be disconnected from multiple perspectives. Metaphysical realism is where "the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external sets of things. I shall call this perspective the *externalist* perspective... The perspective I shall defend... [is] the *internalist* perspective... that there is more than one 'true' theory or description of the world. 'Truth', in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability—some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system—and not mind-independent or discourse-independent 'states of affairs'. There is no God's Eye point of view", (Putnam 1981, 49–50). The relevance of consciousness is the fact that all multiple senses of facts about neurons or electroencephalogram (EEG) readings are meanings that are interpreted by scientists in relation to specific objects of understanding. So all that is transcendent appears inside consciousness and findings from scientific tools of any sort, be it computerised tomography (CT) scanning or the large hadron collider, extend human perception and rationality in their own ways. Except the natural processes measured are no longer given in the phenomenological sense. The idea of there being multiple views of the world agrees with Husserl's attendance to manifolds of sense about cultural objects.

The role of empiricism is that the test of any theoretical claim is that they must apply to everyday life and so connect with meaning as a genuine phenomenon, rather than some non-scientific side-issue, a trivial epiphenomenon (VI, 240). For instance, despite large scale international projects that aim to map the workings of the brain, these projects face considerable technical difficulties. Because of the promise of techniques like fMRI and others, there comes into view for neuroscience the possibility of modelling the brains of individuals and later of the brain in general. But natural being is not the only aspect of being worthy of attention. When the naturalistic attitude is applied to consciousness, a hermeneutic mistake is made because of its inability to understand the functioning of consciousness (VI, 229–232). The success of the human genome project in biology is where genetics has been transformed into genomics through the use of computing to read DNA sequences (ENCODE Project Consortium 2012). This has become a model for how computing might deliver general finding about the brain.

At a physical level the brain contains 10^{11} neurons in the cortex, each of which has between 1 000 to 10 000 synapses, connections to other neurons, producing approximately 10^{14} connections in total. The naturalistic attitude of natural psycho-

logical science is typified in physics that brings many victories and improvements but it does not apply to all being. For instance, in some areas of neuroscience, experimentalism and the images produced by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanners that represent images of blood flow over time, and similar technologies, that provide the 'naturalistic evidence' that counts. (Some of which are positron emission tomography (PET) where a radioactive isotope is added to oxygen or glucose that can be detected within the brain. EEG readings derived from 64 or 132 electrodes that records electrical activity on the scalp. Average evoked potentials (AEP) record electrical activity with respect to a meaningful object although it has to be noted that dissimilar objects can produce the same effect). What these methods show are where there is currently oxygen-rich haemoglobin in the brain. But individual studies of current neurophysiological blood flows are insufficient to link the biological, psychological and social aspects to meaning as it exists in everyday lived experience. For instance, the fMRI scanner is the tool of choice in cognitive neuroscience. The results of fMRI scanning show living brain activity and the functional anatomy at a split second of its dynamic action about the everyday experience of living persons whilst they are in the scanner. The findings of fMRI scanning show how biological and physiological processes of parts of the brain work, for neurological activity can be investigated within the confines of a scanner. It can show the effects of the biochemistry of the neurotransmitters, the connectivity between neurons and so indicate the functioning and structure of the brains of individual persons. So far, the discipline of neurosemantics has been able to predict the connections between words and brain processes by calibrating for the physical responses of individuals (Bode et al. 2011; Breidbach 1999; Heinzle et al. 2009; Soon et al. 2008). But the general finding is that experiments prove a one to one relationship between meaningful objects with brain processes only in small areas of decision-making for specific persons (Chun et al. 2008). One finding is that brain activity occurs up to four seconds before the exercise of freewill but that does not mean that such activity is causal even if it does correlate with behaviour. The brain has many active areas before an active choice to move or think something.

When naturalistic science prioritises neurological functioning, biochemistry of emotions, and the neurobiology of empathy and relating come to represent the whole of meaningfulness, then natural representations are mistaken as entirely representative of meaningful experience. The outcome is that it becomes respectable to say that one's work as a therapist or mental health worker is grounded on understanding empathy, understanding the perspectives of others and their emotions, because of understanding the role of mirror neurons in the brain (Schore 1994; Gallese 2001). Or understanding how various neurotransmitters affect personality. However, because of the complexity of the brain and the complexity of understanding the human genome, it is not yet the case that science has been able to come to certain conclusions as regards the biological understandings of the whole of psychological life and that can guide therapy practice individually. Regardless, there are naturalistic therapies that argue for a keen attention to interpersonal neuroscience and neurology as the way forward (Amen 2002; Amini et al. 1996; Badenoch 2008; Cozolino 2000; Damasio 1994; Grawe 2007; Karlsson 2011; Karlsson et al.

2010; Konner 1982; Siegel 2010 and plenty more). There are some areas of mental health work that refuse to acknowledge mental processes but that reluctance has been lessened by cognitive science that, to some extent, recognises that there are common mental processes within mental health problems (Rosen and Davison 2003; Harvey et al. 2004, 4). From the position of phenomenology, despite the interest in studying processes of cognition and social processes in empirical psychology and psychotherapy; cognitive science has made numerous assumptions that may not fit its subject matter. Understanding cognition in its proper sense requires understanding the representing role that mental processes play in making the meaningful world what it is. Fundamentally, that means understanding others and ourselves in it in general. If cognitive science were self-reflexive though, it would realise that its subject matter understands itself and is able to improve itself in its approaches and so produce a cohesive biopsychosocial view around meaning for consciousness.

Given the priority of meaningfulness, the fundamental necessity of understanding sense-making itself, there is no excuse for not formally understanding the experiential mode of the givennesses of the various types of meaning, verbal and nonverbal, emotional and intersubjective, all connected between persons in time. But while it's easy to assume that natural being (the brain and nervous system, the muscles, the biochemistry of moving muscles and firing nerves) causes consciousness. So far there is no experimental evidence that shows how this causation occurs although there is neurological activity up to 350 milli-seconds before moving one's hand or finger (Libet 1985, 1999) although this interpretation has been challenged (Miller et al. 2011). Nor do natural scientific studies find any single control centre to the brain. Benjamin Libet asked people to move their hands or fingers at will and noted the readiness potential in the electrical activity in their brains 250–350 milli-seconds before they moved them. This can be interpreted as showing evidence of brain processes that correlate with free will (Libet 2004). It does not mean that free will is an illusion or a wrong manner of thinking having nothing to do with scientific falsificationism and its deductions (Popper 1959, 30–34). The shared challenge for phenomenology and empirical scientists is incorporating such findings in relation to the domain of meaning for consciousness. Benjamin Libet himself did not conclude that free will is an illusion and argued for complexity of causation and viewpoint and in favour of free will and choice (2004, 155). Alongside the problem of consciousness with the naturalistic attitude, there is the problem of the naturalistic attitude that denies the all-embracing relevance of consciousness.

Problem: How to Bridge Dualism When Consciousness is Denied

However, there are those psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers who argue that there is no self, no free will, that consciousness is irrelevant, has no meaningful contents and is an illusion caused by the brain. These interpretations are remarkably similar to the radical behaviourist deniers of consciousness as epiphenomenal who are opposed to dualism and want to focus on the causation of consciousness by

brains and the nervous system as caused biologically, electrically and electrochemically (Churchland 1981; Dennett 2001; Rey 1983; Wegner 2002) and deny the natural attitude as a suitable starting point for clarifying consciousness and intersubjective meaning (Hood 2011). If their criticisms were limited to only stating that the natural attitude doesn't know the scientific truth of how vision works, or how the ego moves its hand according to electrical studies of brain during the exercise of free will, then that would be no different to any science stating its outcomes. The fact is that germs, quarks and neutrinos, black holes and anti-matter do not appear to the public either.

However, there is something more dangerous in the consequences of not being able to reconcile the dualism that Descartes asserted in 1641. For psychologists and neuroscientists who imply nihilism and solipsism do not realise that whatever natural science shows about the brain; needs making coherent with the first and second person accounts of the natural attitude in which we live. For the consequence of denying consciousness and refusing the existence of the I or ego, because there is no centre to the brain, is to believe implicitly in the dualism that it seeks to deny. Brain explanations cannot be supreme and consciousness denied. If wanting to overcome dualism and remain focussed on the only region of natural being that natural science can find, then those who deny that there is a stream of consciousness and that there is self-reflexive awareness of it, make problems for their own position of which they seem blissfully unaware (Dennett 1991, 113, 454–455). In Dennett's metaphor, there is neither a show to see nor an audience to watch what exists because there is no single part of the brain that is in overall control of being conscious. Nor is visual object constancy true either, because studies of eye movements show that the eyes dart all over the visual field and therefore the sense of object constancy and visual steadiness is an illusion. For naturalistic positions the great mystery exists because they interpret that there is a chasm or gap between consciousness and transcendent being. However, the Scientific idea that everything can be explained in terms of natural cause about natural being has not been achieved in physics or astronomy. So why it should be assumed that consciousness and its meaningful contents can be ignored so that dualism is solved by remaining focused on the natural is no answer to the incommensurability of dualism.

The duality and incommensurability of the being of consciousness, as meaningfully-intersubjective, 'versus' natural being means that the refusal of the fact of dualism forces the naturalistic attitude to refuse intentionality, intersubjective sharing of intentionality and its meanings and transcendental views of them, to conclude that only the naturalistic view is acceptable in interpreting that only natural being is worthy of attention. Therefore, if the only permissible truth is what natural science reveals then it denies itself in understanding its own meaningfulness. For instance, the natural psychological science of vision is never available to self-reflexive awareness or to any sort of reflection: The physiological, electrical and biochemical processes within the brain, and nervous system and muscles are only understood within and empirical approaches. On the contrary, the only theoretically-cohesive way out of dualism is to unite the three regions of biopsychosocial being around meaning for consciousness. This respects that they are intrinsically different and ac-

counts necessary for three orders of being within the only order of being that counts: meaning for consciousness properly understood within culture and history. If not, the risk is that there will be on-going confusions in addition to the problem that the citizen and the academic will be unable to communicate. The following words from Franz Brentano set the scene because who can disagree with the following? “For facts which the physiologist investigates and those which the psychologist investigates are most intimately correlated, despite their great differences in character. We find physical and mental properties united in one and the same group. Not only may physical states be aroused by physical states and mental states by mental, but it is also the case that physical states have mental consequences and mental states have physical consequences”, (Brentano 1973, 6).

Because natural science cannot investigate itself, nor does it understand itself, it does not realise that it uses eidetic conclusions in the form of mathematics and assumptions about the objects it measures. The great benefit of exact essences is that they map natural being accurately and this can be called mathematical reductionism or mapping as it takes assumptions to make the maps used (VI, 23–61). Within physics something unusual occurs because in the natural region there are two different sets of natural processes mapped by two different forms of mathematics. For instance, dependent on natural processes being mapped, different mathematical models are applied to look at the very small (string theory and quantum mechanics); or to look at the very large (relativism). From the phenomenology of science perspective, it needs to be noted that the history of the sciences shows multiple changes in the scientific explanatory narratives of physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology; while these regions of being remain the same (VI, 268, 380). So to deny consciousness is simultaneously to deny rationality, logic and philosophy as tools that serve to develop theorising and problem-solving efficacy. It would serve natural science well to understand its own mapping processes and its intentional history.

Following Thomas Kuhn (1996, 47–48, 83), any academic area where there are multiple cultures of experimental methodology and multiple traditions of concluding on evidence, indicate that the science is immature. For instance, if there are competing schools of thought and practice, it shows there is confusion in the generation of experimental facts and what they are concluded to mean: So it is within natural psychological science as the two sides of psychology as natural science and spiritual human studies can both contribute to develop applications. The business of therapy is primarily a pragmatic discipline that helps people influence their own lives and manage their distress. However, multiple standards and theoretical disagreement between schools of scientists and practitioners shows that maturity has not yet been reached in that region. Kuhn notes that just because the schools approaches to a region have standardised empirical methods, that does not mean that it shares interpretative stances and agreed phenomena. Theoretical and experimental maturation occurs after agreement on the set of phenomena that comprise the body of shared knowledge (Kuhn 1996, 60).

Intentionality Connects Consciousness and the Meaning of Being

Phenomenology was warmly embraced by psychiatrists, psychologists and sociologists shortly after its conception in the early twentieth century and thereafter. The promise that early enthusiasts like Karl Jaspers (1963, 1968) and Ludwig Binswanger (1941, 1963) saw was the possibility of creating an accurate understanding of the qualitative experiences of the public and throwing off false understanding. Psychologists, psychiatrists, nurses and therapists read phenomenology and create a genre that runs adjacent to the humanities, natural sciences, human studies and mental health care. The interest of therapists in phenomenology during the previous 100 years is the lure of grasping the truth about the being of consciousness in relation to its whole—as *it is experienced, meaningful, embodied, temporal, intersubjective, communicative, cultural and historically situated*—and use their insights to inform its practice, empirical research, and the supervision of its services and training. Most therapy trainings feature experiential work and personal therapy as mandatory and definitive ways to understand what it is like to receive the type of care that trainees will practice. Husserl's radical message is that the starting point for any philosophy, science or academic study is realising that knowledge and understanding begin and end in consciousness. Human life is conscious alongside its implicit unconscious processes that shape its awareness but the being of consciousness and its mental processes are initially hard to define in relation to its biological and social processes. Human being is conscious and has direct experience of consciousness in every thought, feeling and action. Everyone has direct personal experience of what it is like to conceptualise, feel, see, imagine, remember and empathise others (who also conceptualise, feel, see, imagine, remember and empathise).

Parallel studies to phenomenology are forms of meditation that simply behold what appears for consciousness without analysing it, but these act as an opportunity for providing direct evidence of the relationship of consciousness to its objects (Kabat-Zinn 1994; Owen 2013). Consciousness has been analysed qualitatively in Buddhism and Eastern philosophy since the seventh century (Hsüang Tsang 1973); and by René Descartes, the British empiricists and Immanuel Kant in Western philosophy. Philosophy after Kant is concerned with how to argue, discuss and conclude through considering conditions of possibility. In a wider view, any academic is philosophising when he or she struggles to sum up their area and justify their methods and manners of judging and concluding: Philosophy is theorising. During the twentieth century, empirical psychology, nascent neuroscience and cognitive science made a number of specific claims and positions about the viability of studying consciousness but were mainly focused on natural processes. These empirical disciplines turn to rationalising and interpreting when it comes to drawing conclusions from what their empirical procedures show. What is presented below is a focus on intentionality, various kinds of mental processes as they appear in relation to given senses of the objects. By way of staying near experience, some simple ex-

amples are provided, but comprehensive formulation of the many types of distress is not attempted, in favour of offering a small number of detailed explanations. There are a number of disciplines that get close to phenomenology but do not follow its attention to detail. Social epistemology, social constructionism, the sociology of knowledge and the history of ideas share similarities with phenomenology. Other similar academic areas include consciousness studies (Chalmers 1996; Seth et al. 2008; Seth 2010, 2012), neurology and neuroscience (Zeman et al. 1997; Zeman 2001, 2002, 2005) and Gestalt psychology, a qualitative discipline that draws observations from studies of sense-perception that knew the difference between noema and object and understood the ubiquity of meaning (Ehrenfels 1890; Koffka 1935; Köhler 1929, 71–2, 81; Michotte 1963). A large variety of opinion exists in this area even to the unsubstantiated speculation that consciousness is an emergent property of quantum effects inside the neurons (Penrose and Hameroff 2011). In some of the critical comments below, neuroscience is not rebuked but is hoped to be developed by offering a means of coherent theorising to promote multidisciplinary work. Some neuroscientists already understand this. Comments below are not criticisms of neuroscience or empirical psychology but are criticisms of those who are unable to understand the complex relations that the term biopsychosocial implies. There are several neuroscientists who are dualists who espouse more complex models of human being than seeing that blood flow in a part of the brain could be in response to several meaningful objects and not just one (Legrenzi and Umiltà 2011, 63). The brain and body as naturalistically understood does not encapsulate meaning in culture (Honderich 2004; Levy 2014; Mangan 1993; Noë 2009; Sacks 2004; Tallis 1994, 2011). Other psychologists have argued that there must always be a place for first-person accounts (Harré et al. 1985), that free will and determinism coincide (Nye 2000) and that dualism is an acceptable account of two opposed interpretative perspectives (Rose 1992). The function of consciousness, even when it is proposed as due to evolutionary cause, is that it is a necessary “inner eye” for self-regulation (Humphrey 1986).

However, the initial interpretative stance of phenomenology is entirely different to the one that believes that consciousness and the meaning of being are separated, disconnected or irrelevant to each other with only naturalistic interests capable of supplying any meaningful answers. Husserl called the alleged gap between consciousness and transcendent being, in the view of the natural and naturalistic attitudes, the riddle of scepticism, which is his way of stating that there is a false problem. If there were a genuine gap between conscious and transcendent being then there could be *no possibility of knowledge whatsoever* and that would be a “fatal mistake”, (II, 36, cf 32–39). Accordingly, the right way of interpreting the relation between consciousness and the meaning of being is that they are connected and there is direct connection between the two. So that, in some circumstances and in ways that are predictable and testable in natural scientific empiricism, there is truthful connection between consciousness and being as proven by the forms of mathematics and the natural sciences that work so well for human purposes (Kocklemans 1993, 2002). The first major insight is the role of the intentionality of consciousness in understanding the immanence-transcendence connection and what that means

within intersubjectivity, the collaborative life in which meaning circulates. Despite the differences in being, there is only one unified region of the meaning of being in consciousness, a dependent whole. The primacy of consciousness has fundamental ontological priority that demands it to be understood.

Phenomenology can overcome simplistic dichotomies such as Nature *or* Nurture as predominant, by creating a wholistic stance for integrating disparate views around the centrality of meaning for consciousness thus establishing a non-Cartesian substance unity (I, 43, 84, 117, IV, 28–29, 284, V, 117, IX, 54–56, VI, 102, 234). Dualism is maintained wherever there is the co-existence of the natural attitude and the naturalistic one. This tension promoted either-or thinking where neither common sense nor natural science can account for each other. In fairness to Descartes it has to be noted that he was attempting to consider the givenness of the mind-body whole and the links within it in a way that is demonstrably more nuanced and attentive to the evidence than many people think (Descartes 1986, 56, 60, 114). For phenomenology, there is a fundamental difference in that consciousness is not a part of natural biological being although the two form a whole (XVII, 136). The duality of meaningful objects for the real world is an effect of the stance taken (XXV, 29). Meaningful objects are only genuinely grasped as existing for-consciousness and that is the embarkation point for any psychology (VI, 214, 243, 246, 256, 257, 264, 266). It is also interesting to note that there are currently extant empirical methods of making a map of intentional experiences that avoid the detailed question of how to make sense of conscious experience itself. And this is where the use of understanding can be tested because there are many competing ways of understanding human distress and how to rectify it. Many of the therapies and psychologies are dominated by the status quo of valuing the material nature of human being over its experiential, meaningful and social aspects. And as noted above, what this over-valuing does is decrease a focus on understanding and helping its clientele via shared meaningful discussion. Specifically, there is no current ability to assess individuals for the state of their brains and biochemistry, so it is impossible to give them natural or neurological remedies. A biological formulation of their troubles only justifies biological remedies through a link to the meaningful and intentional.

To solve dualism and promote unity of understanding around the wholism of understanding meaning for consciousness is to promote the unity of how to represent all forms of understanding. This is either called formulation or conceptualisation and is a major topic below. Applying understanding of intentionality amongst academics and professionals will help them to co-ordinate their activities, share notes and present findings to the public. Human beings are conscious in a way that phenomenology calls “intentional” which has a specific German sense from the word *intentionalität*. Intentionality and intentional in this usage refer to the totality of ways of being aware about being, in that all such forms are *about* something. Meaning only exists within the context of the intersubjective, the psychosocial. The intentionality of consciousness should not be confused with “intentional” in the sense of willed purposeful behaviour towards some goal, although behaviour is frequently about something, often in trying to meet needs some of which are personal and some collective.

The findings of phenomenological work differ from natural scientific and non-philosophical understandings of the natural attitude, the commonsense folk psychology of the lay person (these terms are equivalent). The natural attitude is prior to reflection in the specific sense defined in chapter 4. It is a discursive and experientially-informed understanding linked to “world” and “lifeworld”. The definitive comments on the natural attitude are those that show it as unclarified assumptions and speculation about the communal being-together of the “open circle of other functioning subjects. Everything Objective about the life-world is subjective givenness, our possession, mine, the other’s and everyone’s together”, (IV, 375, cf III, 46–47, 53, VI, 112–113, 176). “Common sense” is used in *Crisis in the European Sciences* (VI, 203–204) in reference to ideas of the difference between the natural attitude and the transcendental one. Folk psychology is a set of theoretical characterisations that psychologists claim that people in general are potentially able to formulate belief and desire propositions, for instance, and other aspects of commonsense, the contents of culture. Husserl claimed that the transcendental attitude was the only means through which consciousness could be analysed as fully liberated from the natural and naturalistic biases. “On the naïve psychological level one distinguishes between the world as “created” by man, i.e., as made up of cultural qualities, and the world “as it is in itself”, in the transcendental reduction one sees that the world in itself has its constitution”, (Cairns 1976, 38). The naturalistic appears as Scientism, materialism, determinism, eliminativism and physicalism connected to the denial of consciousness as a relevant area for study because it is alleged to be an improper region of being. But the phenomenological attitude gives proper credence to the world of intentionality (as meaningful mental objects intentionally ‘caused’ by thought, feeling and other mental processes). For if natural cause and the focus on natural being are allowed to predominate, there is certainly no natural cause usable for the applications of psychological knowledge, like in psychotherapy or other areas. All knowledge is redundant if it is entirely naturally caused by the brain, biology and ultimately physics: The consequence is that the history of science and mathematics is really just brains in physical connection with other brains because consciousness and meaningful reality are superficial illusions.

Phenomenology clarifies natural attitude experience and posits a number of universal experiences, without which the structure of consciousness would be unable to exist. For instance, while we are looking, we know that we are looking (II, 44, III, 50, V, 41, XIII, 200, 203). We have self-consciousness about our straightforward consciousness. Similarly, when we are embarrassed, guilty or proud, then it is ourselves that we are feeling something about. What is believed about the relationship between the physical body and consciousness has great consequences about how to study it and how to make rational interpretations about conscious states and its physical substrate. Given that the human being is biopsychosocial, the sum of biological and individual psychology as part of the greater social whole, then within the intersubjective psychosocial two-thirds of the whole of human being, there arise meaning, motivation, emotion and the influence of learning (particularly from early trauma and childhood). What the ordinary citizen, non-naturalistic psychologists

and phenomenologists share is a commitment to meaningfulness, rationality and free will.

However, many mental health workers accept the influence of natural science for their work and specifically accept what is called the biopsychosocial approach to understanding human being (Engel 1980). A biopsychosocial approach accepts the unity of the multifaceted complexity of humanity as comprised of the biological, psychological and social or intersubjective. The being of the interconnection between brain and body, the unconscious, consciousness, free will and the register of rationality and meaningfulness in the social sphere is a wholistic and simultaneous co-occurrence in the moment where the effect of time, place and people in the past also leave their mark. To claim that one's brain, biochemistry and genetics makes one do things and that oneself personally has no will and no influence in one's behaviour is ludicrous to the citizen and to scientists alike. Such a claim is absurd and contradicts the conventions of speech about personal choice and free will. The problem of the naturalistic excessive focus on the natural being of brain, biology and biochemistry is nihilistic scepticism because the net effect destroys not only the natural attitude as a form of commonsense that works, the destruction also extends to scientific interpretation itself. This faulty reasoning assumes the impossible: that epiphenomenalism is the case and the real drives of human sense-making can only ever be physical.

Contrary to these confusions is finding the correct jurisdiction of biology, physics and chemistry of the brain and physical body, as understood adequately as meaningful and rational through representations of consciousness that are shareable and communicable. The role of phenomenology is to protect meaningfulness and rationality and attend to the evidence that self-awareness presents to make clear how it can be correctly interpreted. Phenomenology is free to embrace natural psychological scientific findings, and although its field of jurisdiction is conscious evidence, that extends to how to interpret the findings about reactive potentials of electrical activity in the brain and the physics and biochemistry of what appears to magneto-encephalography. Phenomenology helps multidisciplinary work towards understanding conscious communicable meaning, social influences, and unconscious processes where physical brain processes may appear as conscious influences and outcomes.

Summary

Although the natural attitude is unclear and the naive realism of the natural psychological sciences reject it and seek to establish a form of understanding disconnected from its inaccuracies. Yet universal constancies remain in conscious experience and are not nullified by using CT scanners or other technological tools. Because it is possible to grasp the conditions of possibility of objectivity for the intersubjective group of scientists, it is possible to identify what must be assumed to be correct for science to work as well as it does. The natural attitude can be explained

as the fundamental starting point of unclarified meaning, and similarly, so are the justifications, methods and findings of biology, physics and neurology grounded in it. The scope of the project below defines some of the methods for deciding on the ideal forms of consciousness as a means of specifying in concepts or notation how there are instances of thinking, feeling, imagining and intentional experience that makes up the shared world in which people live. It is specifically such a form of thinking that Husserl was schooled in the pre-phenomenological way with Karl Weierstrass, from 1878 to 1881, and his empirical psychological work with Carl Stumpf, from 1884 to 1888, that set the scene for his future life's work. The method of phenomenology is a qualitative study of phenomena such as empathising and imagining, how pictures depict their subject matter, how signs signify, how words point to their referents, how memories re-present a previous present and replay it, and how automatic involuntary memory, "retentional consciousness", stores and retains past learnings in the automatic experience of recognising an identity. These are just some base examples of understanding consciousness. Phenomenology is relevant to psychology and psychotherapy because it argues for a fundamental view point that the beginning and ending of any academic enterprise is meaning for consciousness. Higher constructs and methodologies of the sciences are regarded as derivative from the basis of what it is to be conscious and understand, to rationalise and conclude by making judgements from any source. This work is a step on a path to providing a qualitatively-grounded approach to the meanings that clients experience that are problems of the mood, of felt-inabilities and emotional distress in specific contexts and the longstanding problems of the personality. The wholistic qualitative approach of phenomenology grounds its qualitative cognitivism of maps of the ideal and universal aspects of the territory of meaning for consciousness itself. The mission of phenomenology is helping academia gain greater accuracy with respect to its conscious objects, communicate its findings and enable multidisciplinary work. This is far from rejecting empirical natural psychological science. The project below argues why therapy cannot become a naturalistically-dominated colony of clinical neuroscience, which in its worst excesses is theoretically-induced autism where workers are not allowed to make sense because of rationality, evidence, beliefs and relationships. The project is how to reconcile opposing viewpoints and protect meaningfulness as the centre around which to organise therapy and the psychologies.

Part I

Defining Phenomenology and Pure Psychology

In the same way that people would not measure a book with a ruler if they wanted to understand its contents, phenomenology argues that natural scientific psychology cannot adequately grasp meaning and consciousness as they are experienced. The aim of the pure psychology version of phenomenology is to integrate the three registers of the biological, the psychological and the intersubjective around an understanding of meaning for consciousness. For the natural and naturalistic attitudes it is clear that the being of the biological is different from the being of the psychological and the social. Although there is mutual influence between these three regions of being, no scientific approach has yet specified how neurons, chemicals and electrical activity in the brain and genes support consciousness, or specified how the consciousness of one person is connected with the consciousness of others, fully concordant with sharing meaningful events and processes as meaningful, and not focusing only on neurological processes. However, the impact of any piece of research, or the outcome of the psychometrics of a survey of any sort, is apparent when the narrative of the research findings is expressed in simple principles and instructions that the public can follow and colleagues are able to test. Because everyday living is impaired when persons are distressed, the purpose of therapy is promoting self-managed self-care and giving of attention to others through clear discussion. Communication is important because the research findings of psychology require translation of their findings for them to be used by ordinary citizens. The claimants to knowledge are bound to express their positions clearly, when it comes to using their beliefs in the everyday life.

Once a good relationship is built, therapy and mental health care engage clients in thinking, problem-solving and making and maintaining changes: “keep this, increase that, start this, stop that”. Clients’ experiences need to be responded to so that they can work out what do in the specific case of having had a panic attack or how to live more harmoniously with others. One desired outcome is knowing how to cope when there is distress, so it becomes possible to manage it and learn how to re-balance their lives and emotions without on-going assistance. Not only is it the task of therapy to help people manage their personalities and lifestyles; it’s also

for managing activities in contexts of various sorts. Therapy makes itself redundant for those helps. Therapy is not about articles of faith or quasi-religious blind faith. If people are to benefit from its services, let it make its claims clear for empirical testing and the public. The outcome for clients is to permit them to benefit from a treatment that is transparent in its principles and open to questions and challenges. The outcome for therapists is to get the immediate benefit of making their work more accessible to a greater range of the public, with far more complex problems than it was previously possible to help. To make these aims manifest, it is the first-person view that needs to be addressed. Chapter 2 provides some basic information about phenomenology and its manner of argument. A more detailed overview of phenomenology is made in Chapter 3 before defining the details of how it interprets experiences in Chapters 4 and 5. The focus is on the theory and practice of psychotherapy in general. The desired reformation produces a collegiate approach to making psychotherapy a biopsychosocial, wholistic approach around the centrality of meaning for consciousness. This means working with and co-ordinating the biological approaches to psychology and genetics; plus approaches to the psychology of individuals; plus approaches to the social nature of human being.

Chapter 2

Phenomenology and Meaning for Consciousness

Humanity has explored the ocean depths, been to the moon and used its ingenuity to explore the distant universe. However, when it comes to knowing itself with certainty there has been less success. This chapter argues for the place of Husserl's philosophy in guiding a reformation of psychology and psychotherapy and clarifying their aims and subject matter by creating eidetic ideals: "To every eidetic, as well as to every empirical, constation... a parallel must correspond... [Evidence] if taken, in the natural attitude, as psychology, as a positive science relating to the pre-given world, is utterly non-philosophical; whereas the "same" content in the transcendental attitude... is a philosophical science", (V, 147). "Philosophical science" is meant in the sense that it is exact or rigorous in the way that mathematics is. The sequence of topics below introduces a formal approach to intentionality (Brentano 1973; Richardson 1983). Husserl's philosophy can promote standardisation of the accounts of scientists, researchers and the public around subjective meaningful experience. Husserl's phenomenology is the great grandmother of qualitative approaches for grounding the concepts of mathematics, the sciences, psychology, philosophy and other disciplines and practices in meaningful experience. The chapter starts with noting the fundamentality of the intentionality of consciousness and provides an overview of the arguments made below. The purpose of transcendental philosophy is noted next in relation to what that means in making phenomenological conclusions from the givennesses of what appears. The chapter closes by considering what it means for Husserl to apply qualitative methods that he had pioneered in creating number theory that he applied to the many types of being aware and how this can be applied in thinking through the methods and interpretative stances of natural sciences. The chapter introduces a means of being precise about intentional being, its motivations and conditioning contexts. The function of the intentional analysis of the intersubjective lifeworld of everyday commonsense is stated as the right way of looking through the microscope. Once this is accepted it becomes possible to understand the senses of natural being, transcendent ideas and people as the

contents of consciousness are shared, despite the differences in sense that the same idea, person or natural being can have for two or more people. On closer inspection what comes into sight is consciousness and what it does, because we can analyse what and how we are aware of the contents of our perceptions, memories, imaginings and in doing so what appears are common shapes, patterns, forms and figures that are given a mathematical idealising treatment in a parallel to how numbers refer to natural being. The chapter provides some orienting details about phenomenological argument in order to orient the study.

Intentionality is Ubiquitous

Given that the intentionality of consciousness is fundamental to intellectual and emotional sense and is the heart of shared experience, then the scope of the intentional analysis of it is ambitious. Intentional analysis looks for commonalities of being aware and makes conceptual representations across diverse regions of being and their academic study. For instance, phenomenology and psychotherapy are parallel with cognate science and human studies. Specifically, any drawing of conclusions by therapists is a parallel activity to the drawing of conclusions about consciousness by the practices of cognitive science or phenomenologists. There is only one consciousness transcendently-considered “*in general*” or “*as such*”. Cognitive psychologists might use empirical means such as flashing a word on a computer screen for 20 milli-seconds and then asking participants in the experiment to respond. Phenomenologists might analyse the experiences of association that they or others have experienced (IX, 117–128, 385–389). Psychotherapists ask their clients open questions before formulating their problems to them for discussion. These processes are equivalent in the broader view of considering them as ways of making sense of consciousness. Someone is interpreting meaningful experiential data of some sort, some conscious evidence, and concluding on what has occurred. The point for psychology and psychotherapy is that the overall situation of how consciousness is aware of changing meanings (and changing modes of relating according to that dynamic relationship), enables understanding of the universal feature of human life and variability, leading to the possibility of alterations in a dynamic meaningful relationship of any sort.

There is no topic so central, immediate, tangible, and continually present yet taken for granted as consciousness and its forms of intentionality (III, 152). Starting with the everyday experiences of talking, thinking, dreaming, childcare, driving, loving, relying on habits, wanting to be close with others, sex: all of these concern intentionalities and are wholistically involved in the matrix of meaning, time, intersubjectivity, embodiment, culture and history as well as natural being. Phenomenology is a form of inquiry about how consciousness knows and how meaning exists, regardless of higher intersubjective constructs such as race, gender, class and age-appropriate expectations. Phenomenological inquiry is wholistic, universal and transpersonal. It searches for the most fundamental shared aspects of what it

is to experience meaning of any kind. What is required is seeing the constancies between consciousness and experienced objects, contexts, ideas and other people in an attempt at an *ontologically-neutral* interpretative method entirely dedicated to consciousness itself: A way that is free from the prejudices of past assumptions concerning what exists and how things exist, through bracketing (*Einklammerung*), setting obscuring influences aside in the mathematical sense, to lessen prior prejudices in favour of finding a way of grasping the world of meaning as others have it. One prejudice to be avoided is the mistaking of one's own prior assumptions for the truth of the other, a mistake of prejudging how others experience meaning.

Overview

A definitive statement is required to sum up Husserl's position in regard to the progression between the natural, psychological and transcendental attitudes as he repeatedly claimed that the psychological and the transcendental were parallel (I, 70–71, 159, IX, 294, 342–344). In the natural and naturalistic attitudes, the relation between the biological, psychological and the social has an emphasis on people being separate and a focus on measuring natural-biological processes, as these are assumed to be the only indicators of the causes of consciousness, as an individual experience. When social connection is considered in this view the experience of others can be monitored in various parts of the brain, so again, the biological and physical processes that are measurable show up to fMRI and other techniques. These are naturalistically interpreted as causal of meaningful experience which is why free will, meaning and consciousness are considered by the naturalistic attitude to be products of the brain and biology. However, there are two types of phenomenology. The pure psychological attitude, from the transcendental view, admits natural causes and natural being to the degree that this type of cause is considered in thinking consciousness as consciousness. The aim of pure psychology is grasping consciousness as consciousness, in a worldly context of the really possible, to support theorising and promote empirical research and practice. It makes sense to permit natural-biological causation to be considered and so make collegial contact with colleagues in the natural psychological science disciplines (IV, 295, V, 40, 43, IX, 50, 298). However, there is value in keeping true to consciousness as consciousness revealed entirely through phenomenology's methods of reflection and idealising eidetic analysis.

In the transcendental attitude, the focus is entirely on the meanings of objects that are intersubjectively shared and available within culture, society and history. The purpose is to take intentionality out of the natural context altogether to find out how it works entirely in its own terms (III, 212, V, 40, XXVII, 177). The context around such considerations are claimed to be non-worldly so that a coherent intentional analysis can be carried out in an open context, free from the influences of what is already known and retained. The transcendental attitude serves a purpose of encouraging free contextualisation about the region of meaning for consciousness in intersubjectivity in the history of civilization and nothing else (VI, 275–276). Because there

is fundamentally only one region of understanding, Husserl's usages of the principles of grounding number theory are applied to it (XII, 210). Thus, the purpose is finding the ideals of consciousness as a whole with its dependent moments construed on its own evidence, where implicit and unconscious processes show themselves. The claim for transcendental phenomenology is that there are no worldly natural attitude influences that can contaminate its analyses. But the pure psychological attitude is a lesser version of the transcendental one. In the pure psychological view, there is a focus on intentionality in intersubjectivity that uses some precautions to minimise worldly naturalistic contamination. What is considered are the cultural senses and cultural objects for intersubjectivity between self and other, contextualised as real instances of the really possible concerning the findings of natural being, through natural science and natural psychological science with their natural causes.

Something needs to be said about the ontology of the lifeworld and its role in overcoming Cartesian Nature-Spirit duality whilst working to include individual self-responsibility, ethics and self-reflexivity in theorising. The function of the analysis of the lifeworld is precisely to return to the origin of the constitution of sense before the realisation of natural being and intersubjective being in culture, society and history (VI, 380). Husserl's focus on the world or lifeworld is choosing intersubjectivity with its "triangular" infinite series of self, other and manifold views of the cultural object as singly the most important phenomenon to analyse. The point of eidetic analysis of intersubjectivity is identifying the constant relations within the whole, for there is a pattern of ideal relationships. The ontology of the lifeworld can be studied in the psychological or transcendental attitudes. The difference is that in the transcendental attitude there is only a focus on intentionality in intersubjectivity with no permission to include the natural and naturalistic attitudes. In the pure psychological attitude there is a connection to the natural and naturalistic attitudes despite attempts to minimise them (details below). Even in the psychological attitude what can be seen is the irreducible world in retentive consciousness that influences current experiencing in what is an "intersubjective sphere of ownness", (I, 137, cf 129–130), or primordial world of pre-conceptual nonverbal sense of the "origin of all objective factual sciences or, equivalently, of all sciences of the world, is one and the same... as having been perceived and recalled to memory", (IX, 58). This attention grounds concepts about experiential universals in order to create new reformed "concrete sciences which take as their theme the concrete and individual forms of the experiential objects and which want to determine them in their theoretical truth", (IX, 64). Husserl's vision of philosophical science is achieved as a parallel discipline like theoretical physics and mathematics with respect to experimental physics.

But focusing on solo consciousness is insufficient. The self is non self-sufficient, an abstraction from the intersubjective, which is a self-sufficient whole. No matter the influences in the larger community, the self responds through the accumulation of retained social influences in itself and these contribute to its decisions and preferences. The self makes itself self-reflexively as well as responding to objects, past, present and future. Its personality exists in relation to its connection with a multitude of causes that influence it in relation to the biological and social-intersubjective registers. The self (considered in abstraction) has several options open to it and several influences inside its own being. For instance, a good deal of its

emotions and mental processes operate automatically and unconsciously without conscious permission. Within the self, there is the inertia of habits and the effects of past choices that have set a direction and may help it or hinder it. If negative habits and beliefs contribute to feeling overwhelmed in the ability to cope, therapy claims it can change and minimise distress. Recovery from distress and impairment is possible by finding a corrective set of influences in making good decisions and coping with current stress. To take the matter to the psychological sphere of emotions and relationships between people, then it becomes important to grasp what goes on between self and others. Looking at others and hearing their speech makes transcendent meanings in self that belong to others yet occurs in distinctive ways. Phenomenologists can consider the triangular relations of sense for self, others and each other, the “alpha-beta” overlapping views between two or more persons, about cultural objects, ad infinitum (IV, 168, cf I, 140, 142, 144, 147, “overlapping-at-a-distance”). Technically, the empathic experience of other people is called a double object because vision of the other supports empathising their consciousness and their perspective and so participating in all that lies between persons. The consequence is that meaning exists between people.

Husserl showed it is possible to start afresh: By due diligence and adoption of a sufficient interpretative stance, consciousness can understand itself in the context of other consciousness and the region of natural being that appears through natural science. This is why the primary aim of phenomenology is understanding consciousness in an experiential, comparative and self-reflexive way. What it offers is understanding how the consciousnesses of persons unite to create the senses of a shared reality including the differences in perspective that occur also. The revolutionary promise of phenomenology is explained as programmatic and a counsel of perfection. Phenomenology is a qualitative study of consciousness concerning how we know anything, to generate theory to further empirical research. Specifically, despite the great variation in meaningful experiences, consciousness can be experienced, reflected on, understood and communicated about in a standardised way. Phenomenology has always had the allure of telling the truth about consciousness and the relationship it has to its conditions of possibility in general.

And Transcendentalism too

The word “transcendental” has two senses. It is about the way that *consciousness transcends*; it goes towards the world of all being to understand it, and retains these understandings in itself. “Transcendental” also means the consideration of the conditions of possibility for something to be the case. Specifically, transcendental philosophy is a mandate for finding the conditions of possibility of the theory and practice of a meaningful enterprise. For instance: “How is pure mathematics possible? How is natural science possible?” (Kant 1787, B19). What this means in practice is that the fundamental understanding required can re-start empirical sciences and practices in the real world of shared meanings, starting with understand-

ing how consciousness knows anything. The project of the analysis of intentionality by eidetic imaginative variation demands having direct personal experience of the guiding concepts (XI, 387). Specifically, the point of these thought experiments is making explicit what oneself already knows pre-reflexively and assumes which may have been developmentally constituted across time (Cairns 1976, 41). What this meant for Husserl was progressing between the natural attitude, through the psychological attitude, to attending to how the meaningful lifeworld appears for us in a manner allegedly completely free from natural and naturalistic bias (II, 4, 17, 35, 36, IV, 179, 183). What follows are attempts to connect Husserl's cognitivism with the role of mathematics and abstraction in empiricism.

The mode of argument that Husserl urged is that "validities, actualities, etc., that have been scientifically induced or deduced, or derived from hypotheses, facts, or axioms, remain excluded and are permitted only as "phenomena"; and, of course, the same holds for any recourse to any "knowing", (II, 9), which is an inversion of the usual stance in the natural attitude, natural science and natural philosophy of their shared perspective of naive realism, or metaphysical realism. Phenomenology works to overcome the simplicity of mutually exclusive senses of either realism *or* idealism, to focus more on what can be learned by attending entirely to "*real unities... "unities of sense."* Unities of sense presuppose... a sense-bestowing consciousness which, for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue of another sense-bestowal", (III, 106). The assertion is that natural science and academic knowledge belong to consciousness, "the natural sciences, as sciences, are enclosed within the human sphere, the sphere of the human spirit", (IV, 392).

Philosophy makes and tests arguments to see whether they hold up with respect to bodies of relevant evidence. Phenomenology gathers evidence to make arguments in this sense but about the most fundamental objects and relationships. For only through experience does it then become possible to argue in the usual philosophical sense. Because the type of argument considers the conditions of possibility in a most cautious way, by sticking to the detail of how different sorts of objects appear to different ways of being aware, then the type of ontology being achieved is a study of appearance and reality as part of intentional being as it appears for an intersubjective audience (XIII, 217–218). What this means in the practice of seeing evidence is preparation for argument where many specific instances need to be focussed on. The technical language of intentionality about objects and processes refers to concrete instances of conscious detail, but can also be used to refer to implicit events. So the Husserlian manner of argument concerns conscious evidence in the first instance. Although in other cases, what can be argued for is sometimes not apparent and this is called argument by eidetic necessity, explained below. Phenomenological arguments are based on the manners of givenness of noemata that appear in specific noetic ways and conclude by identifying the ideal and universal noetic forms (II, 62, III, 175, V, 54). For instance, to remember a past perceptual occurrence is to be in the present here and now and in one's own bodily self-presence and yet remember the previous being present as if one were immediately in bodily contact with that past perceptual being-there. In remembering, a past perception is present again as a whole once more. It comes into the current timeframe even though

it cannot be perceptual now. What is replayed is usually the bodily-associated point of view of what one did previously perceive. The memory is believed to be real most often. So there is *verdeckung*, an overlapping or modality specific interference between the past perceptions replaying in the current perception, a co-presence of two experiences at once (XXIII, 151–152, 481, 485). The simple example of remembering has many versions though. However, the ideal conclusion is a statement of the universal components of remembering while there are multiple versions that include vague remembering, confabulation, dissociated remembering from a point of view outside of the self, plus associations to other memories or emotions, imaginings, etcetera. Thus, remembering implies past perception although its replay is a modification of those perceptions, and of course, egos have such experiences first-hand. Memories are entirely unique and idiosyncratic yet memory has a structure, and if the ideal structure of memory is discussed with another, they might be able to bring back their perceptions of being there too, to check what is being claimed about memory in general. The memory of shared events could be corroborated. The point is not checking on content though. The point is identifying the ideal structure of memory. Similarly, if the intentionality to be analysed was emotion, imagination, hallucination or anticipation, then the structure of these types of experience can be corroborated with others.

Phenomenological Philosophical Argument

The classical form of phenomenological philosophical argument is comparing and contrasting nested parts and wholes of interconnected egoic acts and non-egoic syntheses because these make meaningful experiences of all kinds: literally all objects, regions and classes of objects that exist, or claimed or argued to exist, plus all that is imagined, feared, loved, hated, believed and disputed—and all forms of their complex combinations. Such is the universe of sense (II, 13, 31, 71–72, 75–76, III, 30–31). The key to making phenomenological arguments is then to understand that there are dependent moments of meaning that comprise dependent wholes of meaning. Without a technical language and a formal-agreed notation for these distinctions, there is literally no point to phenomenology. The role of phenomenology is for moving interpretation away from the natural and naturalistic attitudes that consciousness is a dependent whole, because it is caused by and needs the physical body and the social body to exist in a factual way. Phenomenological philosophical argument is based on evidence that is both personal and intersubjective but serves the purpose of working out questions within the history of philosophy and in its contemporary applications in science, psychology and other areas. The type of argument that phenomenology provides interprets experiential evidence that is definitive with respect to how it identifies the forms of meaning and sense that appear with respect to the processes of awareness itself. So, the type of philosophical argument that studying the meaningful givenness of objects creates is identifying how meaningful experiences present themselves to oneself and must do similarly

for other people. There is no other starting point for understanding givenness and intentionality than grounding a theory of shared meaning in qualitative experience. Hence the methods of the comparison and identification of the same and different types of givenness, and the manners of reference involved, are with respect to belief in perceptual existence or perceptual givenness (II, 36–37), or any other epistemological claim (II, 13).

To amplify what givennesses are, let's first compare the difference between the givenness of watching a film as opposed to the givenness of reading its screenplay. While the screenplay contains the dialogue and mentions specific locations where, say, the drama is taking part; it is not until a comparison is made with sitting in a cinema and experiencing the finished film does it become clear how the intentional forms are different. The givenness of reading depends on the clarity and style of writing, for reading is an indirect request for consciousness to understand. The givenness of watching a film in a cinema is more explicit in showing the audience what the story is. There are very many more comparisons of this sort to choose from. When it comes to psychology, and specifically, a psychology for therapy practice, essences about the relationship between consciousness and its objects need to be concluded on. Although the first categorisation might be to mention the biopsychosocial components of any psychology, it is also important to notice that there is a major difference between the laser beam of proper conceptual pointing at referent experiences themselves; as opposed to an excessively diffuse attention to the biological at the expense of the meaningful. What is pointed at are the cultural objects of commonsense culture, the natural attitude lifeworld, sometimes called "folk psychology" or social reality, that is comprised of a number of processes in relation to personal aims or any other parts of the shared whole. What is formative is understanding that every whole is comprised of a number of parts, in terms of earlier or later experiences, and stages and inter-relations between forms of reference, sign and signification, like the example of the difference between the pointing of a screenplay as opposed to the pointing of the film that the screenplay is about. Because of the differences involved, it is easy to lose track of the basics and the type of preparatory work to be done in safeguarding meaningfulness and rationality against excessively naturalistic and Scientific arguments that entail nihilism. For instance, such nihilism denies the experiential differentiation between perception and presentation, *Vergegenwärtigung*, imagining, remembering, anticipating or empathising and so prevents its own account of its own processes. Perception is what is appearing to the five senses and living bodiliness, here and now. What is presentational is understood but may or may not appear as visual, kinaesthetic, believed and situated, like wholes of here and now perception. Presentations create noematic senses of meaningful objects that are not perceptual here and now. The first consequence of these distinctions is that if the precise details of how any concept or claim about psychological experience that publicly claims knowledge is not defined in detail, and is incapable of being understood in first person terms, then it literally does not mean anything.

Husserl urged a self-aware form of theorising. What this means is the integration of previous attitudes that had been held apart, that bring together and explain what

conceptual reference actually means. A guiding metaphor from the *Sixth Logical Investigation* is a good way of making the distinction between ideal understanding and the applied practice of ideas, between an understanding made and its referent. The metaphor is the difference between a map and its territory as a way of focusing human studies and cognate sciences on what they should be about. “The outline of England drawn as a map may indeed represent the form of the land itself, but the pictorial image of the map which comes up when England is mentioned does not mean England itself in pictorial fashion... as the country on the map”, (XIX/2, 75). The distinction is between theory and its referent. The guidance is not to confuse the two. “*The map is not the territory*” is a useful motto and a good deal can be made of it in keeping apart specific representations of the sense of an object and the object itself: appearance and reality. Yet the two are connected and claims about reality remain on the inside of communities of consciousness.

Phenomenology is an approach that could be disparaged as mere “armchair psychology”, (XXV, 18), when it is “*exact psychology*”, (XXV, 18). The word “psychology” in this context should be understood as a theoretical clarification of meaning in the style defined below. It is the philosophical task of concluding in any discipline to compare and contrast conditions of possibility for making suitable empirical methodologies in various regions of being, in a self-aware epistemologically-sophisticated way. What phenomenology studies are these smallest units of conscious meaning, the noesis-noema correlations and the larger composites that the smaller pieces make. What it offers are conclusions on the ideal structures of memory, for instance, regardless of the vividness of the re-presentation of the original scene. So within the context of the multiple views of empirical psychology, there is a further proliferation of views, methods and hermeneutic stances of therapy theory and practice, for instance, which means that people have to know how to read something in order to get the intended meaning of complex behaviour and relationships between people and how they relate to themselves. What phenomenology provides is the ability to relate scientific findings back to everyday experience and provide an all-encompassing frame which can structure and co-ordinate cognate sciences, human studies and the practical disciplines of providing mental health care. The specific means of doing this is through representing the intentional processes involved in a way that is intersubjective and opens up the possibility of discussion and agreement.

The interpretative stance concludes on concepts that accurately and directly refer to all instances of a meaning of a specific sort in a way that relates to inter-related mental processes as well. The concepts are then checked with colleagues who use the same method and interpretative stance. Thus, phenomenology begins with the *revelation* of the truth of meaning and being, that then leads to the sought-after *revolution* in the accuracy of guiding concepts (XXV, 41), and finally to the *reformation* of practices. (No discipline would want to stay with concepts that were inaccurate or practices and sciences that were unjustified or unsuited to their regions of being). As we shall see, seeing essences, the phenomenological gaze, is similar to finding proofs in mathematics and geometry as these eidetic disciplines map the territory of physical objects by idealising them. The mathematical model (XXIV, 80) that shapes the rationalising processes of phenomenological judging is provided

in overview in chapter 5. Husserl worked at improving potentially good evidence (XVII, 255) through the use of imaginative variation, a process of clarification and the identification of definitive aspects of the forms of intentionality (III, 129–141, IX, 72–93, XIX/1, V, Sec. 20, XXIV, 216–220). Husserl urged finding essences, “a “geometry” of mental processes”, (III, 133, cf, 138, 153), for considering the ideals of intentionality itself. Every region of the meaning of being can be mapped to establish new empirical procedures on the basis of having a broader and better grounding of the type of being in question. Phenomenology ends in conclusions about generalisations concerning relationships and being, according to the study of “essential laws pertaining to the essence of any possible quantity, just as pure geometry is not bound to shapes observed in actual experience but instead inquires into the possible shapes and their possible transformations, constructing *ad libitum* in pure geometrical phantasy, and establishes the essential laws, in *precisely* the same way pure phenomenology proposes to investigate *the realm of pure consciousness and its phenomena* not as *de facto* existents but as pure possibilities with their pure laws”, (XXVII, 79, cf XXIV, 416, EU, 426). So the work to be done is a geometry of experiences that have observable structures that need to be brought to awareness. This means little to contemporary academia but it says something which deserves repeating. Phenomenology as fundamentalism contemplates the conditions of possibility for meaning to exist for consciousness. This is the aim for a transcendental philosophy.

To the Things Themselves of Consciousness

Intentionality is a useful concept because it begins a process that can define the many species and genera of experience. The forms of intentionality need to be understood to know how understanding, reasoning and other forms of meaning-constitution occur. Phenomenological concepts represent processes of consciousness intellectually, in notation or discussion. Intentionality is useful for people to be effective in addressing conscious phenomena and comparing how objects appear differently for the same person or different people. Remarkably, everyday persons with no tuition are able to reflect on their mental processes and discuss them easily. It’s easy to engage another in how they can be aware of themselves, make sense of themselves, take a new perspective on what they behold, become more or less active in some way, and how they can tell the difference between imagination, memory and hallucination, for instance. And this is where the initial experience and understanding of the natural attitude shows itself because vague understandings of these different givennesses can be discussed. There are many ways in which one object can appear and many types of intentionality can present it. It would be easy to rush past these differences, to deny them, ignore them or make incorrect reasoning about them. And this is where those in the naturalistic and natural attitude traditions, who argue that there is no self-consciousness, ego or self fail. It is not only possible but necessary to hold two or more senses of the same object in mind, and knowing that

one can do so, is part of being sufficiently self-aware. The philosophical point is that there is a ground for making rational arguments about first person experience based on the experience itself. Similarly, it's possible to make comments about another's experience too and check it with them. Phenomenology explains mental processes in relation to their objects that also arise out of the base experiences of perception, associations between what is present and what is not, about the experiences that occur between self and others. Thus, theory gained through phenomenology's qualitative methodology orients experimental work and other practical applications.

Previously, overlooking consciousness as an academic topic had been the norm for natural psychological sciences, psychiatry and the therapies. But the rallying call of phenomenology is "*auf die Sachen selbst*", "to the things themselves", (III, 35), linked to the comment in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, "Nicht von den Philosophien, sondern von den Sachen und Problemen muß der Antrieb zur Forschung ausgehen", (XXV, 61), which can be rendered as: Not philosophies but the things and the problems are the points from which the impulses to inquiry must issue. Husserl urged that "we must go back to the 'things themselves' in order to begin to understand what is at once most obvious and most mysterious, the territory of being conscious. We desire to render self-evident in fully-fledged intuitions that what is here given in actually performed abstractions is what the word-meanings in our expression of the law really and truly stand for", (XIX/1, 8). Husserl asked readers to inspect how consciousness works for themselves and 'make a map of it' by reflecting on their own experiences. The qualitative methods employed involve reductions, methods of turning to experience, allegedly devoid of the influence of prior realism and foreclosure about its mode of existence, to study how the meanings of being-for-consciousness appear in the spectrum of ways that are apparent (II, 9, 43). There is no other way of being able to deliver these answers (VI, 129, 130). The methods of turning back to experience and encountering its manifold of appearances began around 1904 (X, Notes 19-34). They were first presented to undergraduates in February 1905 (X, 4) and further elaborated in 1906 and 1907 (XXIV, 212-216) and thereafter (VI, 169, fn, 175). One aim is to avoid theoretical delusions and assumptions that always assume natural cause. What this qualitatively reflective and interpretative methodology shows is that there are universal and constant aspects to the structure of consciousness in its context with other consciousness.

However, what psychologies assume and therapies promise, is the changeability in the senses that consciousness can experience about its objects yet there is no comprehensive account of how this occurs at a qualitative level. Without this awareness, and with no vocabulary to describe universal aspects of being aware, it becomes impossible to account for different perspectives on the same thing. Also, if therapies promise change and then have no fundamental account of how a person can feel better or worse about the same events in their childhood, or how anxiety can be replaced with calm, then these procedures are unclear. The ability to represent such changes is precisely what phenomenology provides for psychology and therapy as intentionality can represent neurosis and psychosis or any event or process. The fundamentality of an ideal understanding of consciousness, solo or in intersubjective connection with other consciousness, is what the vocabulary of noesis,

noema and objects in social contexts explains below. This demands overcoming the lack of attention to the details of the constant flow of experience that has the same shape for consciousness in general. It rejects an excessive reliance on natural being and natural cause in order to grasp the full consequences of cognised being, or better, *intentional being in the world* as it appears as a set of changes about the eidetic structure of consciousness in the world in general. This is why received wisdom about the usual contents of the natural and naturalistic attitudes needs to be set aside. What needs to be pursued is the radical free-contextualising option of starting with the universal and ancient demand to have reason and being coincide (VI, 12). This a turn to the things themselves in being able to comment on the connections between intentionality and intentional being, for that is all there is and ever will be (I, 117, III, 93, XI, 84–85, 90, XXV, 15). Qualitative and meaningful referents count. If they are ignored, there will be theoretical and practical chaos.

The Limitations of Natural Science and Natural Scientific Psychology can be Superseded

In short, it's impossible for natural sciences to map meaning-for-consciousness within a dualistic worldview. With a heavy focus on natural being, rationality and interpreting are intentional processes that run contrary to the denial of the suitability and relevance of intentionality. It's not within their regard to be self-reflexive as their methods study physical correlates of consciousness and not consciousness itself (like electrical activity and the physiology of the brain as revealed by electromagnetic scanning). By necessity then, natural psychological science must make a rapprochement with its qualitative sisters to improve its account and its practices. A characterisation of the relationship between phenomenology and natural science is to note that natural science delivers facts that can be measured. But it's phenomenology that delivers on the relationship of consciousness to the types of meaningful object that are meaningful experience. The gaze of phenomenology is not at the thingliness of physical objects like physics, biology or chemistry. But it looks at the ways that the meanings of objects of this sort are made meaningful for us all. As a discipline, phenomenology is a means of studying how a specific event or process is given meaning in such a way for it to be recognisable and understood publicly as an event of a specific mental sort. It is self-contradictory to claim that the mental, emotional and intentional histories are irrelevant, do not exist or are unworthy of study.

For despite the arguments demanding that psychology and therapy should be based on science, there are trends in natural psychological science and therapy to sneak in cognitive idealisations without having grounded them in any form of research, nor thought through what it is to interpret a conscious process via an ideal. Merely through clinical experience, there abound a host of cognitive idealisations in the form of formulations about specific psychological syndromes that are asserted without citing any experiential or other forms of evidence. For instance, there are maps of the intentionalities involved in panic attacks (Clark 1986) but no account

of where the ideals come from. The use of empirical findings in the place of ideals occurs within a school of thought that does experimentally account for mental processes in learning theory involving animals, and claims universal conclusions about mental processes for human beings (Mowrer, 1960; Pavlov, 1927; Walker, 1984, 1987). This confusing double action of assertion and denial of the work of intentionality is nothing new, as even earlier forms of learning theory claimed specific associations and mental process despite declaring such things are unscientific because they are direct expressions of ‘deadly unscientific consciousness’. The same stance occurred for psycho-analysis which has always looked on experiences as associations but confused itself by positing entirely unconscious processes, while natural psychological science was uncritically accepted without clarifying what was the relationship to the conscious or the unconscious (Freud, 1950a).

But the problem of map-making, theorising and philosophising, is not just the co-ordination and representation of the parts of the territory to be represented (VI, 55). To employ the metaphor of the map and the territory for psychological therapy means that the work of practising is helping clients alter their own map of the world and their ability to move in their territory (cf I, 127, 129–130, 169, IV, 193, VI, 256, XXVII, 175). The map that a person has acquired, via being in culture, includes placing self in the larger whole of meanings and relationships with forms of meaning. Therapists and clients have to make accurate understanding with respect to the actual territories that they inhabit. It also becomes necessary to know how to check and understand the conclusions claimed, and the relationships between conclusions, *on the map*. Maps are further required to co-ordinate the efforts of those who chose to work with each other on projects of complex scope. The danger is that if the territory is not well-represented on a map that is incorrectly claimed to be accurate, then the map cannot be used to get around the territory. Similarly, to turn to a second metaphor, Husserl knew there is a large difference between chess and mathematics for “if we glance at the much favoured comparison of mathematical operations to rule-governed games, e.g. chess. Chessmen are not part of the chess-game as bits of ivory and wood having such and such shapes and colours. Their phenomenal and physical constitution is quite indifferent, and can be varied at will. They become chessmen, counters in the chess-game, through the game’s rules which give them their fixed *games-meaning*. And so, arithmetical signs have besides their original meaning, their so-to-say *games-meaning*, a meaning oriented towards the game calculation and its well-known rules. If one treats arithmetical signs as mere counters in the rule-sense, to solve tasks of the reckoning game leads to numerical signs or formulae whose interpretation in their original, truly arithmetical senses also represents the solution of corresponding arithmetical problems”, (XIX/1, 69). Bringing the two passages together is a way of indicating that intentional analysis covers semiotics, signification and the way consciousness works in being able to hold different senses of the same object in itself in an implicit way. The “territory” means that it is a separate activity to design an experiment or practice some activity in the world. It is completely different process to draw rational conclusions about what the experiment shows and identify specific qualitative components within that process itself.

Summary

Phenomenology is a method that concerns becoming aware, seeing evidence and understanding objects. It finds idealised forms of intentionality by carefully considering givennesses that show the mental processes through which the senses of objects appear as meaningful (III, 278, 319, XVII, 97). The first phenomenon to account for is the constitution of the sense of the one and the same object (XVII, 147). A qualitative narrative about objects and the ways in which consciousness makes them is provided. Changes in sense are due to conditions between consciousness and its object such as orientation, perspective and context (EU, 323). Phenomenology offers the potential to develop academia around the centrality of meaning for consciousness and its intentional relation to objects. The successful resolution of the problem of consciousness is that as long as only natural and naturalistic attitudes are given credence then the problem of consciousness and natural being is incommensurable as these two types of being are different. “Either-or” thinking does not help and maintains the problem. Only when the phenomenological attitude is adopted can both consciousness and being-as-understood become commensurable through creating a theoretical-philosophical space of meaning which has its existence justified by qualitative methodology, for the formulation of one type of being: meaning for consciousness. This assertion is the correct interpretative stance for the research question about the problem of consciousness and any other scientific or philosophical problem. It is looking through the microscope in the right way to attain theoretical commensurability in a multidisciplinary way.

Positing mental processes has its usefulness as an explanatory device to account for variability in the experienced senses about any specific object of attention. The manner of understanding of biochemistry, electrical and neuro-scientific understanding of mental processes, focuses on physical methods for observing events in the brain and body that are parallel to studying consciousness as consciousness. The guiding motive is to plan theory around meaningful experience because discussion is about meanings that people live and cannot be reduced to biology. There are yet no scientific causes identified about how consciousness works. Phenomenology offers a way to promote discussion through a common technical language. It has the benefits of supporting psychological research and the possibility of making its applications more user-friendly. What this means is making consciousness central and using ideal understandings of meaning to capture specific meanings-for-consciousness, to promote the ability to pose and answer research questions, and interpret natural psychological science into the discourse of intentionality and objects, and provide usable answers, hypotheses and co-ordinate activities between the makers and users of psychological knowledge. However, given the nature of psychological knowledge, there is a high standard for what is an acceptable form of justification for this type of interpretative tool. The requirement is that academic discourses should make coherent sense and communicate clearly about intentionalities in relation to objects and contexts. (This is opposed to the corollary, that there are those discourses that are demonstrably inaccurate as explanations of what they

purport to be about). The specific target domain for phenomenological understanding is the sphere of shared meanings as they appear to any single person, or to any understanding or point of view that might be shared. This is the scope of the answer for understanding the conditions of possibility of meaning.

Chapter 3

Two Interpretative Positions in Phenomenology

This chapter introduces the case for a method of theory-making and idealism about meaning in Husserl's two approaches for understanding how consciousness makes sense through its mental processes. The two types of phenomenology are transcendental phenomenology and pure psychology. It is the case that: "*Psychology as an empirical science naturally concerns human beings as they actually, empirically are*", (XXIV, 146–147). But pure theoretical psychology is "not a factual science of the facts of this sphere of inner intuition but is a science of the essence, i.e., one which investigates the invariant, properly essential structures of a soul or of a community of psychic life", (V, 144). The aim is creating an ideal understanding of consciousness as the fundamental way to grasp instances and universals of meaningful experience. The chapter explains the two approaches to consciousness in overview. Below, it is shown how these two versions of phenomenology differ in their theory-producing method and stance. The chapter regards both forms of phenomenology as types of making sense in working from instances towards universals, which is a way of structuring an argument for increased self-reflexivity in the natural scientific and other disciplines. The sequence of topics below starts with a note on the commonality between Husserl and Kant and notes hermeneutics as a ubiquitous term for sense-making so that reductions are regarded as serving the function of overthrowing the deadwood of received wisdom and re-invigorating professional discourses about their experiential referents. Second, experiential hermeneutics is explained in relation to its traditional meaning in the history of philosophy and with respect to the type of critique made in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*. The third and fourth sections also employ hermeneutics in the sense of contextualisation to explain the two types of phenomenology. The difference between pure psychology in the world and transcendental phenomenology, allegedly outside of it, is explained. This study endorses pure psychology as intentional analysis of intentional implication and modifications of forms of being aware and intersubjective intentional implication. Intentional analysis operates within a theoretical context that is contemporarily

called biopsychosocial that Husserl called “psychophysical”, (IX, 279, 305), where all is understood as intentional processes. Husserl’s perspective goes past the Cartesian opposition between spirit and nature, consciousness and biological substrate, to include three foci as they appear to consciousness. The consequence for pure psychology is the possibility of being able to work with contemporary empirical disciplines because all viewpoints are relative to consciousness in intersubjectivity. If psychology did become more qualitatively focused on understanding meaning then it would ensure its connection to making an impact on everyday experience.

Schema and Reduced Object

“The phenomenological field is not “there” at all but must first be created. Thus the phenomenological reduction is creative, but of something which bears a necessary relation to that which is “there””, (Cairns 1976, 11). The way that this definitive comment is explained is to make links between the reduction in relation to what it produces which are ideal-essences. Because of the complexity of Husserl’s viewpoint only the most basic items are noted at this point in the explanation. The act of reduction allegedly removes false understanding of the natural and naturalistic and forces a phenomenological attitude in one of two ways: Either a pure psychological or a transcendental attitude. The terms natural attitude and pre-reflexive refer to what occurs before reduction and before reflection (defined below). The extent of what is unclearly assumed to be the case about consciousness can be large indeed. After reflection it is only in the light of findings that specify the forms of intentionality in relation to its specific regions of objects does it become clearly understood what the role of consciousness is. The equivalent terms natural attitude, common-sense and folk-psychology refer to what everybody experiences first-hand about the world, others and themselves in it. The meaningful life in the natural attitude of naive realism is in-part the discursive reality of everyday culture in addition to the nonverbal and embodied life that is conditioned through the contexts of family, work, culture, society and history. What ‘everybody says’ is unclear and unjustified but what citizens may take to be real. As Husserl put it, the “natural attitude is therefore the attitude of experience. The I experiences itself and has experience of things, of lived bodies, and of other I’s. This attitude of experience is the natural one, in as much as it is exclusively that of the animals and pre-scientific man”, (XIII, 120). In other words, the natural attitude concerns naive belief in the existence and content of the world and ordinary limited perspectives on parts of it. The natural attitude is the totality of all that is actual and assumed to exist in culture refers to inaccurate understandings of consciousness and its intentionality as part of the physical body (also III, 48–50, IV, 375, V, 2–3, XIII, 112, 125, XVII, 239, Misch 1950, 1–3, cf Plato, *The Republic*, VII, 514–517c).

Another important attitude to be reduced and understand is the naturalistic one: when “I proceed from the natural-scientific attitude. Natural science wants to be a science of nature, a science of all nature in general... In all areas of the one nature,

natural science wants to grasp existing entities as something necessary, i.e., as lawfully and exactly determined... Everything that in terms of nature is real or actual is dependent on the other actual realities. The dependencies involve parts of reality, dealing with reality as a context of disjunctive realities; each real being is integrated within a system whose elements belong together in such a way that each change of an element brings about functional changes in others, in accordance with strict laws (in physical nature these are laws of a mathematical form)", (XIII, 90–91, cf XIII, 125–126). But either the natural or the naturalistic attitudes are what are useful to understand consciousness as the medium of all understanding.

A first principle is that unclarified natural attitude experience is the birthplace (and the boxing ring) for manners of argument, evidence and conclusions. Phenomenologists carry out reflection and variation and understand the role of theoretical ideals in supporting practical outcomes. The base experience of any intentionality-object relationship, (also known as noesis-noema correlate) is that the intentionality of consciousness is a universal. For instance, meaningful experiences are forever available to anyone at any moment of the day or night. Even in the case of silence or sitting in the dark, the mind wanders on to some memory, imagination or anticipation. All these experiences are instances of intentionality in referring to some sense. Every living moment is a piece of data in the laboratory called life and capable of intentional analysis. Experiments that test theories and attempt replicate the work of other scientists can be expressed as meaningful experiences for consciousness that are about something specific. Defining experiments and their findings in terms of intentionality becomes one application of phenomenological understanding. Forms of evidence about the work of consciousness are abundant and can be communicated and help collegiate activities.

There is an overlap between Kant's idea of schematism, contemporary psychology and psychotherapy, and Husserl's mapping of consciousness, where the word schema comes from the Greek *σχῆμα*, meaning form or figure. Kant used the word in the sense of there being mental processes, syntheses, that the most fundamental categories of understanding are applied to perceptual experience in the creation of knowledge or experience "The schemata, therefore, are nothing but *a priori determinations of time* according to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following the arrangement of the categories, relate to *the series in time, the content in time, the order in time*, and finally, *to the totality in time in respect to all possible objects*", (1787, B185). Husserl's usage of the terms schema and phantom are equivalent for a reduced object and have connections with Kant (Cairns 1976, 57). To interpret an object adequately in language means having the intention to achieve a full, prolonged experience of its manifold appearances (possibly through increasing the number of experiences of it in several different noetic ways). Thus, foreclosure is prevented: latching on to one noematic sense about an object that could get reified and habituated, and so lose contact with the manifold of its fuller presentations of sense for consideration. So, concluding on schemata in concepts generally is a formal way of noting ideal parts and wholes of sense of all kinds (I, 173, III, 256–259, 315, 316–317, IV, 37, 56–58, 95, 127, 201, 340, X, 6). It has to be noted that the formal and general terminology refers to everyday experiences

that are already understood (XVIII, 253). And because of the abstract quality of the language used it's always better to focus on the specific tangible sorts of experiences that are being referred to. Specifically, the commonality between these areas under the common term of "schema" is that parts and wholes of recognisable objects of attention are being referred to. A schema for a human face would have the parts of eyes, nose, hair, mouth and so on that comprise the recognisable whole: A human face in general, and its schema, its form and its dependent moments, are what is internal to the map of consciousness in general—and these enable the recognition of specific persons' faces. "Schemata" in Kant refers to concepts that point to nonverbal experience and are understandable as ordering principles between the two, and also operate at the nonverbal level and temporality (1787, B177–B178, B180, B185–B186). The schemata are recurrent patterns, shapes and identifiable rules ordering or structuring meaningfulness across both areas. So this is another point of connection between Kant and Husserl because they both make assertions about meaning for consciousness across time, place and social context.

Reading Phenomenology as Experiential Hermeneutics in Relation to Meaningful Sense

Joseph Kocklemans has done much to link Husserlian phenomenology to the development of hermeneutics and make links to how the phenomena of science can also be understood in such a context (1993, 2002). In the same vein Ernst Orth (1987) points out that the traditional meaning of hermeneutics is that it was used for interpreting religious texts, literature, poetry and the law. Orth complains about Martin Heidegger's usage of hermeneutics as part of the ontological phenomenology of *Da-sein* (GA 2, 12, 37). Orth argues that for hermeneutics to maintain its proper sense, then any contemporary usage should refer back to its traditional usage. However, Husserl at one point conceded that in: "the method of correlation-research, the method for questioning back behind intentional objectivity. Genuine analysis of consciousness is, so to say, the hermeneutic of conscious life, where the latter is taken as that which continuously intends entities (identities), and constitutes them within its own self in manifolds of consciousness that pertain to those entities in essential ways", (XXVII, 177). This is taken as a mandate to make the processes of analysis clearer and conceptualise the application of ideals about the universal structure of consciousness and refer to specific instances of it. It highlights those passages in Husserl that this reading calls inherent interpretation by interpolating within the whole set of givennesses of what appears. It is true that the traditional usage of hermeneutics is theory of interpretation, in relation to texts and forms of textual analysis in literature, religion and philosophy. It is argued that Husserl's writing and methodology of reflection, reduction, abstraction and imaginative variation to cognise essences amounts to hermeneutic stances about how to de-contextualise, re-contextualise and make ideal conclusions. The psychological and transcendental reductions have an explicitly hermeneutic function in preventing contamination

of understanding when attending to noetic-noematic givenness and concluding on these essences (III, 275, 283). The central focus is concluding on mental processes, intentionalities, by comparing and contrasting the differences in senses of objects (and different types of object) formed across the different noetic awareness of each, across manifolds of different views of the same thing. Contextualisation is a part of any argument and empirical method though: Parallel to the core senses of the application of words to nonverbal experience, to avoid persuasion and see for oneself in Kant (1787, B848), in Freud (1900a), and in the natural attitude usage of speech. Phenomenology studies conscious phenomena through becoming aware of the workings of consciousness in its social contexts (VI, 240). But it is not the point to stay immersed in experience and apply words without critical thought, as though the intent to achieve “mere description” will avoid all problems. The reading of phenomenology made in these pages is one that argues that in the years after 1913, the *interpretation* of what appears, in Dilthey’s sense, was the actual focus for phenomenology because conclusions are made through comparisons.

Hermeneutics was defined by Wilhelm Dilthey as the comparative procedure of showing what concepts and passages mean by comparing their senses and intentions to communicate (GS V, 332–337). A similar comparative procedure is invoked in phenomenology as the comparison of experiences, then using carefully-chosen language to name the key facets of how meaning and intentionality can be understood (I, 92–93, III, 201–202, 204, IV, 299). Husserl stated his research question clearly as experiencing and making clear the “really inherent in pure mental process, contained in it as the parts, the pieces and the moments not divisible into pieces, of a whole”, (III, 202). This aim is expressed in Marbach’s notation (1993, 2010) that links the many different noemata experienced through different noeses, to the here and now perceptual context and embodiment in it. The intentional analytic methods lead to the inherent interpretation of the different forms of experience. This has various consequences which are explored below. One central concern is noting inappropriate forms of model and metaphor for understanding the work of consciousness. (In the negative, the same task is identifying naturalised versions of consciousness and meaning to set them aside by purposefully not considering natural being, natural cause and higher-level forms of non-phenomenological ungrounded philosophy). The interpretative ideal can be explained by some terminology from anthropology. In anthropology the word “emic” is used to describe those forms of understanding that are based on the inherent being of the topic under discussion (VI, 236, 239). Emic approaches look beyond what is already known in favour of an immersion in experiences that show the differences between forms of cognised being, and only then would they want to account for what they find there as genuine understanding.

The word hermeneutics is used to evoke the sense of how the same situation can be represented in three different ways. In the natural attitude, consciousness in intersubjective sharing of meaning is obscured by ideas of natural causes and biological being, while natural science and statistics are used to quantify, test and falsify predictions. The reason why hermeneutics is used in defining phenomenology is that Husserl is arguing for comparisons of attitudes and complementary abstractions, to

focus on different types of givenness that indicate intentionality. Each aspect of the biopsychosocial can be approached differently and appear differently, whilst each moment remains a part of the dependent whole. It's clear that the complex system of biopsychosocial being is teased apart and its pieces inspected, so referring to different background contexts, for instance the "*physicalist thing* manifesting itself in the intuitively given thing", (IV, 77). For instance, in one passage three attitudes are discussed in short succession (IV, 190–191). Complementary abstractions could feature the naturalistic attitude on natural being; or the psychological attitude on intentional being in intersubjective intentional implication in the lifeworld (VI, 229). Or what might be discussed is the transcendental attitude focused only on intentionality in the lifeworld in history. The focus on the return to the lifeworld has the purpose of beating either-or thinking. It makes intentionality and natural being-as understood become united. What saves rationality is looking at the evidence in the proper way which is to give proper emphasis to consciousness as the starting point (IX, 55–56). When it is realised how consciousness predominates then it is obvious that "the Cartesian theory of two substances is defeated simply because *abstracta* are not "substances"", (VI, 232). This is part of an argument for understanding the importance that all meanings are for consciousness. And when meaning for consciousness in history is properly understood, then it makes cohesive sense that intersubjectivity is ontologically prior and necessary condition of possibility because the contextualisation of instances occurs in much wider vistas of time and place (IV, 294–316). Of course, following the emphasis on intentionality inevitably leads further towards the transcendental attitude which makes communion with natural being and the naturalistic and psychological attitudes problematic. "Knowledge of nature abstracts only from all other values besides the *cognitive values*: "I want nothing other than to experience nature more richly by means of 'theoretical experience' and to know, in a theoretical knowledge on the basis of experience, just what that which appears is, what nature is"", (IV, 26). There are many exhortations to describe faithfully and attend to manifest phenomena of what appears to oneself in a number of different wordings. But describing something faithfully is not a sufficient instruction and misleading. What the descriptions require is the comparison of forms of reference in the sense that what is attended to are objects in contexts, implications of sense projected onto perceptual givenness, that are learned in the collective past. For instance, how dependent moments and wholes are comprised of experiences of higher self-consciousness in lower pre-reflexive self-presence before reflection began, such as how the other's bodily expressiveness indicates their point of view as well as their speech.

Elisabeth Ströker has commented that these two frames in Husserl concern a "specific hermeneutic situation that Husserl creates for phenomenology with its turn to psychology", (1980, 73, cf Ströker 1987, 101, 1988, 84–85), where she was referring to the position that meaning is real. Husserl was well aware of the effects of dualism and wanted to avoid naturalising consciousness and scientificising meaning for consciousness (IX, 37, VI, 219). The reading is made through emphasising its links with Wilhelm Dilthey's idea of hermeneutics, the study of making sense, of interpretation. Intentional analysis requires comparisons between mean-

ings and across broad types of meaningful experience and their forms of awareness. Accordingly, they are hermeneutic in Dilthey's sense as forms of comparison between parts and wholes of sense: Not only is there a manifold of sense about every object of attention (and multiple views of it from different perspectives and in different contexts). There is also a manifold of ways that the one and the same object can appear through different forms of awareness, the intentionalities, noeses or syntheses. Phenomenology has unique methods that compare and contrast experiences to conclude on the connections between consciousness and experiential appearances in consciousness theoretically, by understanding their conditions of possibility through contextualising them in ever larger wholes of sense (III, 15–16). In order to argue for this interpretative gaze as a secure source of the sought-after accuracy of conceptual reference about meaning, this is why phenomenology is discussed as hermeneutics.

Phenomenology is emic in that it seeks the inherent distinctions in its chosen subjects. Emic inherent interpretation of consciousness in intersubjectivity makes concepts that are grounded on the evidence of actual connections of consciousness with other consciousness. An emic applied psychology (or an applied phenomenological therapy, for instance) is one that grasps the major dimensions of its subject matter. The point of the phenomenological attitude as emic emphasises treating consciousness as the unique being that it is and finding the laws of consciousness, its essences, and how the objects of consciousness overlap with each other as parts and wholes, has no counterpart in natural being. Some key passages express the idea that “to the things themselves” means mapping the territory of phenomena according to how they compare in imagination after exhaustive study of them in reflection (III, 1, 31, 43–44, 140, V, 40, 41, IX, 36, XIII, 200, 203, XVII, 189, XIX/1, 20–21, XXV, 31). The mature view of intentional analysis is to see the essences of the accrual of sense about an object of attention as it arises in any intersubjective context across time (XVII, 217). This is done by paying attention to how intentional implication and intentional modification show themselves generally as horizons of implicit non-thematic reference to an object of a specific sort (IV, 172–185, VI, 160, 165, 267). Objects are manifest across a manifold of such senses across time (XVII, 217). They have sedimented historically-genetic or developmental constitutions (VI, 52, 73, 371–372, XVII, 221, EU, 250). To adopt the word emic in phenomenology means that intentional analysis employs interpreting concepts that refer to the experiences themselves (XVII, 239). The methods of reduction attend to emic givenness of noemata as these indicate the noeses that made the senses that appear. Reductions force attending to the territory itself rather than inaccurate maps of it (XXIV, 187, 212, 242, 371, 410). Husserl's use of the words “description” or *Auslegung*, “explication”, is only the beginning of a process of refinement in moving away from instances that are contextually-bound to find ideal meanings (XXVII, 79).

Consciousness appears differently according to how it is approached. The upshot for psychology and psychotherapy is that, if anything other than the right understanding of consciousness is used, then the likelihood of understanding properly and facilitating change will be reduced. Thus, the concern with treating consciousness as consciousness when mapping it, is to ensure that the method of cartography

is adequate. So, the immediate benefit for map-users is to make their actions more accurate on the territory. In the territory of therapy the immediate benefit for clients is helping them find that they can access the help offered easily and feel more comfortable in it, through understanding its purpose and how it is being supplied. On the other hand, non-phenomenological ungrounded theorising and conclusion-drawing practices are “etic” in anthropological parlance: Understanding that is built on the ground of understanding something else altogether than the territory being researched. From the viewpoint of philosophy, the emic and etic terminology supports the idea that the initial understanding of an object shapes the research methods that deliver empirical findings. Etic research is where the object to be known is interpreted in terms of foregone conclusions about it. The methodology used is an expression of this inaccurate prior understanding. The etic danger is having consciousness obscured by the natural scientific psychological focus on biology, physics, chemistry, neuroscience and the use of statistics and positions about anything but understanding meaningful experiences in the context of human relationships and contexts across time. The guiding idea is that meaning is presented through the modalities of intentionality about states of affairs, some of which are only believed possible or might be thoroughly non-existent, here and now. There are a number of places where the distinction emic-etic is invoked (III, 188, 221, V, 20, XVII, 109). The common theme that is communicated is that the whole process of intentional analysis focuses on intentional implication and modification of how senses accrue across time (XVII, 185, 279), within the acknowledgement that the truth of any matter is an “idea lying in infinity”, (XVII, 245).

Philosophy as Rigorous Science as a Hermeneutic Position

The section explains Husserl’s philosophical position and as an argument for the importance of finding guiding ideals from experiential givenness which is also a critique of stances that are ungrounded thus gaining the sense of rigour as a parallel to the mathematical sense of rigour. The 1911 manifesto *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* is programmatic and one place where Husserl made evident hermeneutic criticism of etic positions that do not find the right evidence, fail to interpret it an interpolative manner, and provided justifications for interpretative aims about how to reform philosophy and the sciences: To enable philosophy support practical applications, expose false problems and avoid theoretically-predictable practical mistakes. The detailed picture is to understand phenomenology as the hermeneutics of noesis-noema correlations and the intentional links between the givenness of objects and their many mental processes (V, 144–145, XVII, 246–247). Husserl’s antidote to imprecision is for concepts to point to idealised meaning and experiences of the ontologically-neutralised meaning of the reduced being of givenness that appears. This way of idealising experience of the constancies and conditions of possibility follows the motto “to the things themselves”. The argument made in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* shows the ontological and hermeneutic consequences

for phenomenology and its project as a whole. Primarily, a hermeneutic position is adopted: The meaning of being that academia and everyday stances encounter is relative to initial methods and attitudes (XXV, 8, 10, 28). Non-phenomenological stances are epistemologically ungrounded if their guiding concepts do not point accurately to referent experiences (XXV, 15). Empirical sciences and other practices based on inaccurate concepts are ineffective if their concepts do not refer adequately to experienced meaning and being, because phenomena themselves show their definitive aspects (XXV, 61). The problem is that non-phenomenological stances maintain their inaccurate theories, methods, researches and practices but fail to become aware of their mistakes. This is because they lack self-understanding about how they justify themselves. The inner workings of their procedures for making concluding concepts are not apparent to themselves (XXV, 10). Non-phenomenological stances cannot ground themselves with their current empirical methods and hermeneutic standpoints, because of their inadequate self-understanding. This applies to ungrounded empiricisms because these approaches cannot ground themselves through their methods (XXV, 15). Natural science becomes accurate by processes of idealisation, empiricism and collective discussion. The same criticism applies for the worldview of historicism, for instance. The proposed answer for natural science is to ground empiricism through phenomenological methods.

Phenomenology concerns a change from pre-reflexive experience (III, 65, 83, 148, 275). For what is always already happening in consciousness is that mental life flows by. Yet the important self-reflexive understanding is what is prior to intellectual thought: the embodied being in the world with others that we all share. The change to reflection is understood only by reflective observation or at least realising that one has done it through unconscious processing and physical movement. Grounding concludes how meaning and being appear in a variety of forms of awareness and determine their conditions of possibility (XXV, 14–15, 18, 38). In fact, to emphasise this point, a metaphor for the desired quality of conceptual reference is that it is like a laser beam that points to definitive experiences, so helping to co-ordinate theoretical and practical work and preventing conceptual drift with colleagues talking at cross-purposes: It solves problems of conceptual reference. Phenomenology employs demonstrable methods for the qualitative grounding of theory for the empirical sciences, philosophy and the everyday and academia (XXV, 24). Phenomenology functions analogously to grammar, geometry, trigonometry or number theory, but is prior to the application of mathematics for measuring and quantifying (XXV, 18, 38, 39, 52). The qualitative method employs reductions, steps leading to reflection and analysis. So that forms of intentionality can be concluded on with respect their objects, to determine what they are and how they appear. In this way phenomenological work is making conclusions on the being of consciousness, the essence of its structures and grounding knowledge, research and practice on a demonstrably more accurate understanding of the being of consciousness (XXV, 15–16, 20). It apprehends what exists in the context of what might exist. Phenomenology is self-reflexively cognisant of its own procedures and monitors the quality and consistency of its methods because theory and practice are close together (XXV, 54). It interprets its conclusions emically from out of the evidence

of its topics, from the “ground up” of the experiences themselves (XXV, 39). *Not* by starting etically with ungrounded assumptions that are already in circulation. The consequences of the study of consciousness in the eidetic attitude of cognising possibilities renew academia and the sciences, so self-reflexively promoting the accuracy of their conceptual reference, justification and practical effectiveness (XXV, 45). This project will restore philosophy to its rightful place in academia as being at the centre of promoting practical applications from accurate understanding.

The next two sections provide introductory comments on the commonalities between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology and define the way that phenomenology has been read in relation to its aims. This first section is a brief overview comparing pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Second, a brief sketch is made of how meaningful worldly experience is interpreted in pure psychology. Comments are made on how initially assumed but unclarified understanding of meaning for consciousness applies to philosophy, the sciences and other academia that shape praxis in the world. Only then does it become possible to appreciate what transcendental phenomenology and pure psychology are and how they differ. Those who believe that the transcendental reduction is possible are transcendental phenomenologists.

Extramundane and Intramundane Beginnings as a Hermeneutic Difference

The reading of phenomenology argued for is that it produces a theoretical ‘psychology’ of how consciousness works (IV, 2–3, 25–27, 182–184) about fundamental reference. This is through the creation of two grades of purity. The first is pure psychology and the second is transcendental phenomenology. The two major stances of interpretation exist by virtue of there being a transcendental reduction or not (XVII, 223, 238, Cairns 1976, 94, 97). Both re-contextualise what appear of objects and how they are aware to us. The difference between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology is that each pursues its own interests in its own research attitude, here read as two different hermeneutic stances. It is transcendental phenomenology that is an all-embracing approach only to meaning for consciousness. Both types share a number of methods but have differences in their interpretative stance. For instance, both types of phenomenology wish to overcome all pairs of traditional philosophical antitheses (IX, 300). Transcendental phenomenology is defined as a view that is *extramundane* in the sense that what is considered are the forms of intentional being of parts that comprise the whole of meaningful appearances (IX, 275). The transcendental reduction begins the transcendental attitude where a transcendental on-looker is doing the analytic work (Cairns 1976, 60). The idea that transcendental phenomenologists should be disinterested on-lookers needs to be qualified in the light that phenomenologists do interpret specific noetic-noematic givenness. So there are subtle steps between identifying referents and making new practices and empirical methods because of the accurate concepts. The idea of being an on-looker means analysing oneself and what one experiences in a dispassionate

and rigorous way, a re-interpretation. To understand the transcendental attitude properly is to enter a new realm, a novel academic inquiry that focuses only on intentionality in culture, society and history, allegedly entirely free of the natural, naturalistic and psychological attitudes. It means making a focus after the revelation that natural being is a “construction, in *thought*, of the purely physicalistic thing... [which] is *intersubjectively* common in that it has validity for all individuals who stand in possible communion with us”, (IV, 87): which is mandate to focus on developmental accruals of wholes of sense and action that have been personally learned from being part of culture across time for “psychic realities have precisely a *history*”, (IV, 137). For the individual, persons are a complex mix of egoic activity and non-egoic passive processes (IV, 160–161, 185). However, self is properly understood as a moment in its social context (IV, 191–192, 194). While empathy of culture, society and history connects individuals to the intersubjective mass (VI, 241), what is revealed is that meaning for consciousness is a genuine form of being not to be ignored (VI, 239, 240).

When considering intentional analysis the psychological conditions of possibility in the psychological attitude, the considerations are about actual possibility. Whereas in the parallel transcendental attitude considerations are formal and abstract, about mere possibility allegedly not contextualised within any specific culture but rather existing neutrally in a way that is unlimited by what is already known (XVII, 238). The transcendental attitude concludes from attending to the detail of the meanings that appear. The sense of reductions to experience is attempting a revolution from the constrictions of the natural and naturalistic attitudes and their received wisdoms, to reveal purity of contextualisation about the ready-made assumptions of the natural attitude world. Objects appear differently according to how they are made conscious, through specific approaches to them, or through the group-think and worldview of academic schools and their empirical methods. Intentionality is the correlation between awareness and being, between noesis, noema and object. Objects are identified according to appearing senses that are given by mental processes, according to their being as it appears across the various forms of givenness. The correlations exist between an object’s manifold of senses given noetically (as imagined, pictured, conceptualised or remembered, for instance), temporally (across time) and intersubjectively through empathy (across people). In the idealism of intentional analysis, the world of intentionality is theoretical represented without the bias of naturalistic material fact and everyday received wisdom. These are allowed to fall away to promote studies that are prior to science and empirical practice. The problem with natural psychological science is that its methods cannot see intentionality properly (V, 21). The aim is to allow the processes of meaning-constitution to show themselves entirely according to the appearing of meaningful objects, given in their various ways, in different contexts and for different audiences. The viewpoint captures the possibilities and actualities of objects that appear in a manifold, yet are identifiable as one and the same. The study of objects of various types and their regions is ontology, the study of being in formal ways, like mathematics and transcendental phenomenology, or as theoretical support for empirical projects like empirical psychology and therapy practice and research (III, 23, fn). For instance, a forthcoming empirical psychology

would benefit from realising that noematic senses of cultural objects are indeed created with other consciousnesses and are the outcome of centuries of civilization's signifying practices within traditions of how to make sense and judge what exists (VI, 316, 345–346, 365–386). Thus, intentional analysis and interpretation about what is judged to be psychologically real leads to conclusions about ideal and universal understanding of forms of meaning-making. Transcendental phenomenology is an all-embracing approach to transcendental philosophy where Husserl argued that a phenomenologist is no longer a person, but puts him or herself into brackets too (IX, 341–342). Pure psychology is transcendental in the sense that it considers enabling conditions of possibility but ultimately remains worldly. One major difference between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology is that in the former, the natural-biological aspect of the body ties phenomenology to the natural world (IV, 389, XXIV, 371). Although many of Husserl's contemporaries disagreed with him on the point of the achievability of the transcendental reduction, and many still do for various reasons, within these pages it is decided to accept the view of pure psychology as the way of beginning to deliver applications of the understanding of intentionality.

In order to turn these comments into something more tangible, the term monad appears as a view of the individual in the natural attitude that is seen eidetically in the following way. Because the starting point for seeing is wholes in culture, society and history, the developmental accrual of sense wants to identify dependent moments of eidetic structures that are necessary yet implied in everyday living, such as the accumulations of habits, beliefs and associations. The monad is a general characterisation of what it is to be a person who is a whole by including their connections within their social contexts. The monad is guided by their learnings in retentive consciousness, where some of these are in varying degrees unconscious, and persons in general have abiding styles of their personality. Simultaneously, they are a member of their family and culture and are unique (I, 100–102, 137, IX, 216, XIV, 34–37). Also, the connection between monads is inter-relationship, mirroring of each other and immediate complementarity and reciprocity according to shared social codes (XIII, 233, 228–229). Accordingly, the monad is anyone, a psychophysically embodied *leibkörper*-consciousness whole. The next section looks solely at pure psychology whose roots were made clear as early as 1910 (XIII, 77–98, 183–194).

A Sketch of Intramundane Pure Psychology of Commonsense Culture: Parts and Wholes are Identified in the World

The psychological position for understanding the things themselves of consciousness is the one that supports the work of the broad grouping of psychological researchers and mental health professionals. The purpose of pure psychology is supporting and informing empirical psychologies which include any individual, social,

anthropological or historical research (IX, 53, VI, 214, 259, 260, 267–268, 268). There is an uneasy tension in the psychological attitude because “Cartesian dualism requires the parallelization of *mens* and *corpus*, together with the naturalization of psychic being implied in this parallelization, and hence also requires the parallelization of the required methods”, (VI, 224). A non-Cartesian unity is kept which includes natural and intersubjective-conscious aspects in creating of a wholistic and systemic understanding of the biopsychosocial being which accounts for interactions between the three aspects as theoretically-possible meanings. “Experience presents the mental as a dependent stratum of being to man and beast, who are at a more fundamental level, physical realities. Thus, psychology becomes a dependent branch of the more concrete sciences of anthropology or zoology, and thus encompasses both the physical and psychophysical”, (IX, 303, cf IX, 278). The psychological reduction maintains “the ontological sense of being the soul of a leib existing in pregiven spacio-temporal nature”, (V, 145).

Because intentionality is part of the intersubjective-historical whole there are comments that the connection to natural being is a “*two-sided reality*” of leib, of aesthesiological passivity in connection with the *körper* and as an egoic instrument of the will but “abstracting from the fact that it is a thing” thus making changes in focus and context (IV, 284, VI, 208, 218–219, 253). The link between consciousness and leib is one where the ego can be active in directing this part of it (IV, 33). However, because the whole is intersubjective and there are links of sense between the ego, consciousness, anonymous passivity, leib and *körper*, human being is inevitably tied to natural being (IV, 33). Consciousness is not entirely personal as it is a moment in both culture (IV, 188, 301–302) and natural being (IV, 94, 284–285, V, 62, 94, 124). What is being asserted are complex natural causal and intentional ‘causal’ interactions in biopsychosocial being (IV, 41, 135, 172, 175, 286, VI, 175, 182, 234, 241). In short, while being as biology, genetics, physiology, neurology and biochemistry are undoubtedly part of human being and hard causes—learning, belief, habits and maps of the world in retentional consciousness play a role in relation to how to enact free will in culture and together comprise a set of soft ‘causes’, meaningful motivations for the ego and its passive and unconsciousness processes.

Heidegger (GA 2, 153, 358) and Merleau-Ponty (1962, xiv) agreed that there is an impossibility of a complete reduction in the sense of being able to strip away false knowledge as this would be contrary to the fundamentality of retentional consciousness’s store of meaningfulness itself, for consciousness abhors a vacuum of meaning and quickly supplies sense. However, both agree with the usefulness of checking claims with first-person experience. Within a psychological reduction, an interpretative decision is made not to focus on the natural substrate of consciousness and focus on meaningful events and processes between instances of consciousness in the world and the world in consciousness, in the sense that there is a learned map of implicit representations of the world that enables the ability to inhabit it (IX, 188–189). Consciousness is considered as a series of real possibilities of what consciousness can be, in an all-inclusive sense, because it is considered as an independent whole that extends across persons, across personal and historical time, across language and culture.

Pure psychology focuses on meaning for consciousness in order to increase the accuracy of empirical work and apply its findings. It serves empirical psychology as an intra-mundane procedure (V, 145, IX, 305). The aim is to theorise about the being of consciousness in its intersubjective field of other persons, and to do so in such a way that its evidence is directly observable and experienced by theoreticians themselves. The research attitude is becoming able to identify intentionality and consciousness in the world of others and interpret it in terms of specific interrelations between emotions, thought, behaviour and bodily sensation in such a way that detailed formulation and conceptualisation can be stated and discussed (IX, 36). For the analytic view is that the entirety of social and personal life is formed of a set of wholes of various sorts of dependent moments including noesis-noema correlates (IX, 6). In other words the process is a contextualisation about what is experiential and how intentionalities are associated with each other (IV, 26). Yet biology and psychobiological influences are included as possible.

The proposed theoretical way forward for empirical human studies and natural psychological science is taking an *intramundane* acceptance of consciousness and its implicit processes in the context of quasi-natural psychological realism (IX, 250, 272, 298, 303, 334). The pure psychological way of understanding the biopsychosocial whole, of the three registers of human being, is to maintain the sense of the real world as it is believed and can be informed by breakthroughs in natural psychological science. Intentional analysis studies intentionality in the way that “encompasses both the physical and the psychophysical”, (IX, 303), in the sense that biopsychosocial wholism is a wholism of understanding. It includes an attention to intersubjectivity and the experiences of other people in relation to the theoretician who empathises cultural worlds (V, 41, VI, 240, IX, 8–9, 37, IX, 227–228). There is an attention to the biological drives, embodied consciousness and social acts, and many other qualitative factors within a biological causative context as embodiment and leads to being enworlded, contextualised (Cairns 1976, 6). Pure psychology is a less ambitious introductory approach to understanding consciousness that, despite trying to lessen the unwanted natural and naturalistic biases when analysing consciousness, ultimately remains within the acceptance of the world as real with the sense of time passing in the natural way (IX, 334, 336, 340). The function of applying theory is that only through a map of consciousness, in establishing a body of ideal laws concerning the being of consciousness, is it possible to create accurate empirical psychology (or the practice of therapy for that matter) and this map attends to real life distinctions and instances of everyday events between actual people (I, 170, V, 20, 29, 42–43, IX, 121). For instance, “one of the main tasks of pure intentional psychology is to make understandable, by way of the progressive reduction of world-validity, the subjective and pure function through which the world as the “world for us all” is a world for all from my... vantage point, with whatever particular content it may have”, (VI, 260).

Given that: “All wrong interpretations of being come from naïve blindness to the horizons that join in determining the sense of being, and to the corresponding tasks of uncovering implicit intentionality”, (I, 118). What this means is that wholism of qualitative sense is of fundamental importance. What is concluded on through

qualitative theory-making methods is the world of the mind and the way that it maps what it believes is psychologically real. The object of study is the folk psychology of the everyday commonsense understanding that ordinary persons have of each other, what the mind is and how the intentionalities appear for one person and between people. Natural attitude knowledge circulates its ideas as discursive information. The primary phenomenon is referred to as an “object” which is a general term referring to any meaningful scene. The word “object” refers to a meaning, pattern, gestalt or recognisable identity of any sort. Because this technical term is applicable across a very great number of instances, then the effect that the narrative of the object has is to create abstract wordings. But as a term, object refers to any situation, emotions, relationships or meanings that lie between people of any sort. As Sec. 16 of *Phenomenological Psychology* makes so clear, “object” is synonymous with the term “cultural object” as any object can and does exist for multiple persons. Objects exist in contexts time in a focus of past or future contexts. The full sense of this situation is studying meaning in a wholistic sense of attending to the conditions of possibility for this object-in-context, this meaning to exist in such a way that the manner in which the meaning is potentially available or actually conscious for anyone is included. Specifically, this means becoming aware of how mental processes make present objects in contexts. The easiest example is perhaps looking at a picture hung on a wall and noting that it is visual perception that gives the picture-object in the context of its frame on the wall. However, the terminology applies universally as it is a formal language to designate universal aspects of any qualitative experience and is not just focused on art or visual perception.

In pure psychology the context of the real world belief remains despite the further consequences of the psychological reduction that the pure psychologists are on-lookers but in such a way to note how people in general are involved and participate with each other (I, 73, VI, 242–243, 256, 257, 259, 268, IX, 313). The theoretical methods are carried out by disinterested “*non-participating on-lookers*” even though its stance is still in the world. The *phenomenological-psychological attitude*, or pure psychological attitude, of research and reflection is dis-interested in a particular sense for the basics of qualitative analysis in an explicitly self-reflexive manner (IX, 188). Intentional analysts are on-lookers or meditators who reflect and use thought experiments to vary imagined noesis-noema correlations with respect to finding the essences of meanings of different sorts (IX, 43–44). The focus can be on the meanings, drives, habits, emotions, changes in the will, implicit and explicit beliefs, decisions and associations, to name some of the parts that comprise the spectrum of conscious and unconscious automatic responsiveness. There are processes and contexts that are not in consciousness at any moment in time but the manner of givenness of the unconscious is unusual as it can only present itself through conscious experience (Bernet 1996, 2003, Wakefield 1990, 1992). It is concluded that it is necessary for reductions to keep the belief in the natural and naturalistic views at bay. Phenomenology does have clarity of purpose.

Summary

The grounding of concepts in experiences shows the schemata of experiencing, their forms, so that new more accurate, precise guiding concepts can direct experiments and practices at the referents of experiences of meaning and being. Phenomenology studies the schemata of reduced figures or forms between concepts, beliefs and lived meaning (IV, 37–38). The theoretical methods support future empirical projects and practices. Attending to the detail of how to interpret the primary phenomena shows that consciousness is not natural being. The phenomenological attitude of being true to the being of consciousness refuses to understand it as just another thing that is naturally caused by biology or physics and obeys these forces in measurable space and time (IX, 314). Both types of phenomenology make assertions about the manifolds of how the same object of attention can appear in different ways (as imagined, as perceived or as spoken about). It makes assertions about meaningfulness itself as Maurice Merleau-Ponty pointed out (1962, viii). The different types of givenness taken as noemata appear in some noetic way, as perceptual or presentations that reproduce forms of quasi-presence. It is necessary to show how they appear and are shared by cultural groups across time, place and history (VI, 381–382, IX, 321). The noematic senses of objects vary, and with a different sort of apprehension, a different sense arises. With the preparatory comments above in place, that have sketched the commonalities between the two types of phenomenology, what are studied are forms of the sedimentation of sense—and signification as the means of transmission of meaning across history of civilization. For instance, the focus is the analysis of the roles that geometry, writing and language have played since their invention (VI, 371). The metaphor of the map and the territory is a fundamental distinction about the difference between understanding from theory and what is understood (XVIII, 249–250). The ability to map dynamic processes for an individual or larger cultural group has the limit that no theory could meet all the actual possibilities: a way of stating that all maps are limited representations with respect to their territories (XVI, 79, 86–87, 121, 131). The work that pure psychologists could do is analyse the different types of lived meanings of others and themselves, through comparing and identifying how specific motivations and choices between options, and how people function through identifying goals and sub-goals in their lives. Pure psychology can re-interpret the findings of research into the substrate of neuroscience, behavioural genetics of the research on identical twins, biochemistry, psychophysics and interpersonal neurobiology, to name but a few possible sources for consideration. The study of identical twins actually shows that persons who are monozygotic twins and identical at the DNA level at birth, later develop different physical and mental illnesses due to they being influenced by different social environments which effects their phenotype, the total manifestation in a social context of their physical potential. The biopsychosocial approaches study the three registers that can be made concordant around the centrality of meaning. The theoretical methods identify the focus of any empirical psychology and identify the interrelations between the dependent moments that comprise its biopsychosocial whole (IX, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18). The programme is grounding and reformation, an

introductory study that establishes the proper understanding of the types of intentionality in relation to a type of object. The things themselves can be seen, reflected on in their immediate instances and specific context, and seen as to their potential essence as noetic-noematic in the real world (V, 144–145). After reflection, pure psychology uses eidetic methods to conclude on the noesis-noema correlations (III, 181–182, 193, 272–273, IX, 244, 245, 250, 322–323, 334).

Transcendental philosophy is precisely a consideration of possibilities to calm the anxiety about method and interpretative stance. Concrete examples of how pure psychology can work in therapy are provided below. In everyday life people can influence their own intentionalities and noemata. The demarcation between the pure and the applied is a useful point. This demarcation is blurred when the claims of transcendental reduction are denied, but it does not mean that rationality and emotionality are lost, or that somehow the transcendental approach to philosophy is irrelevant and concluding on universal aspects of intentionality cannot be achieved. The talk about the reduction of the world or life-world, is a short-hand for reducing the previous contamination of the clarification of noesis-noema correlation by prior natural and naturalistic assumptions within everyday intersubjectivity. Academic disciplines have anxiety about their methods and quite rightly so. Concern about methods and justifying stances are the proper ground in helping colleagues work together and be able to replicate each other's findings and develop a body of shared knowledge.

The practical application of understanding is action, so what can be achieved from identifying constant and universal structure in the infinity of possible views: an infinite series of experiences does have a structure that reflection on intentionality lays bare, and the purpose of the technical language notes how different senses compare. This ability is useful in therapy as well as in the everyday life and psychology. For the first time, it becomes possible to specify the smallest differences in senses between different views of the same object. What people struggle with in therapy is variable and not fixed. With changes in perspective, it is entirely possible to change the sense of the objects of attention that have been so distressing. In the therapeutic situation, it becomes noticeable with precision, how over-generalisation, over-certainty, the over-focus of mental habits accumulate, so providing reified or excessively fixed senses that might suggest that other, more accurate senses are unavailable or are somehow prevented, impossible or taboo. In the realm of meanings for consciousness, there is the possibility of new interpretations. In therapy it is possible to get a new sense of self, of another person, and the same old memory that is traumatic. When it is possible to feel the deadweight of depression lift for 30 minute, then their therapists can help them grasp with precision what has happened and how to make it happen again. This is why the manifold of noemata is such an important concept for therapy because it shows how the noematic senses can vary, and be influenced by the free will of clients who can obtain different relationships with their objects through approaching them differently. In therapy, clinical reasoning and understanding motivational causality are major areas of how to be with clients that can be felt. The emotions they arouse and what can be empathised of how they feel, believe and live need attending to through a well justified set of ideas and practices.

Chapter 4

The Reflective Method of the Pure Psychology of Consciousness

This chapter defines the basic method of reflection on one's own or a general instance of being conscious to produce the raw data for further methods of eidetic idealisation and conclusion. Below are assembled definitive remarks on how to make the raw data for careful consideration of ideals about potentially universal aspects of the relationship between forms of being aware about objects. The topics discussed over the next two chapters enable readers to practice the basic method and make universal ideal conclusions. The sequence of topics below starts with reflection. The reflecting ego attends to what appears so that it can make higher objectified senses of the meanings that it sees and identify the differences between them: In the technical language of 1913, what appears to reflection is *Erlebnis*, conscious experience of an experiential whole of the intentional correlation between noesis and noema (II, 6–7, 13, 75, III, 83–84, 265). Setting aside the action of retentive consciousness and its non-objectifying presencing (explained in chapter 7) objective awareness is divided into three parts: The meaningful object is primarily constituted by its *noetic-form* (III, 172, 203), so constituting meaningful *noematic* content (III, 94, 280–281), in reference to an *object* (III, 206, 266–267, 271–273, 278–280, 286–289, 295–297) that accrues or integrates across time (III, 298). Reflective attention can turn towards either the object or the noesis but either way, intentional analysis specifies the morphology of parts and wholes that it sees. The high amount of detail in the original justifies starting a new academic discipline. The chapter provides explanations concerning the most fundamental egoic work of becoming aware and reflecting on noetic-noematic data in a way that improves the initial pre-reflexive understanding of the differences between forms of consciousness and specifies the manifold of meanings of being in an intersubjective context. The explicit account earns the use of the word “rigour” where it is ultimately possible to specify how intersubjective objectivity in culture, society and history accrues across time and the perspectives therein.

Within the Reduction: Reflection as Meta-cognition in *The Idea of Phenomenology*

After a reduction, what appears can be understood as noemata in specific noetic ways that can be discerned by reflecting on experiences and attending to manifest detail. Noesis refers to all forms of intentionality (III, 172–173). There are a number of reductions in Husserl's writings. A *reduction* is used to consider a specific experience that either fully or partially, decontextualises a noesis-noema correlation (IX, 341–342) and begins the work of reflecting on it, so identifying its form and constituent parts (XIII, 200, 207, XXIV, 427). The frames of meaning used must come from the study of consciousness alone and must refuse to interpret the noesis-noema correlation by naturalistic ideas about being and natural cause (IX, 304, XXV, 29). An *eidetic reduction* further decontextualises the manifold of senses that appear and includes potentially invariable aspects of the correlation whilst seeing it in the conditions of its possibility (V, 40, 47, 54–55, 109, 115, 125–126, 129, 133, XVII, 13). The analytic need is attending to the manifold types of givenness as they present themselves. The purpose of reduction and reflection is to remove those associations that obscure the givennesses of meanings as they present themselves. For instance, an early argument for refusing the naturalistic attitude is: “If the critique of knowledge is a science that seeks only to clarify all species and forms of knowledge—as this consideration shows without doubt—then *it can make no use of the positive sciences*”, (II, 6). This next section provides some key ideas about the nature of objectifying conscious attention for the ego and for its self-reflexive ability to be aware of itself and analyse its qualitative experiences.

The guiding idea is that the whole of life, the connections between consciousness and other consciousness, things and ideas, is interpreted as having a universal structure. There are real transcendent beings, things, relationships, emotions, contexts and the views that other people have, plus the future and the past. What appears of objects for consciousness is their noematic senses in consciousness. The senses depend on how they are made aware through sensing them in some way: reading about them, being told about them on the radio, seeing them on film. For the moment, all that will be stated is that after the reduction there is a turn to meaningful experience of what appears as reduced objects, now called noemata in short, or even more precisely noesis-noema correlations because senses exist in relation to their constituting noeses of different sorts (II, 55–56, 71, 72, III, 148, 189, V, 85, 89, X, 50, XVII, 18, XIX/1, 386–387, 425, XXIV, 226–227). Consequently, what is generally referred to as phenomenological idealism includes aspects of realism (V, 153, XVII, 206–207, 245). Henri Ey understood that phenomenology spans the traditional divide between the subjective and the objective, of objects and their contexts (1978, 42). This sidesteps traditional mutually exclusive categories of realism or idealism, immanence or transcendence; although such terms have to be used to communicate the position, as do egoic and passive consciousness, objects and consciousness. Objects appear across the summation of very many appearances of them (III, 271–273). Phenomenology chooses wholism and the supremacy of the meaningful in the intersubjective context. Its identification involves a separation between the meaningful and the identifiable forms of givenness—in relation to intentional forms that bestow mean-




Fig. 4.1 Summary of the correlation between noeses and noemata with respect to the manifold of an object of here and now senses and past retained senses

ing. The gaze of reflection can turn towards the object that appears through noemata, the manifold of senses, or it could go towards identifying the forms of the noeses, the intentionalities of the ego and the non-egoic involuntary syntheses. Meaning gets connected with other meanings in one person’s consciousness and between instances of consciousness. What gets shared include habits, drives, teleology and cultural senses of temporality. Types of intentionality get connected with others, within the same consciousness. The resulting intentional implications are overlapping wholes of sense, associations, links or connections between objects and concurrent intentionalities. Syntheses are types of automatic mental process that are not under the control of the ego directly but they give meanings for it to receive. As we shall see, empathy is a type that promotes community and sharing in that it gives the senses of the objects that others have and their intentions to act, desire and believe. So sharing intentionality and its objects builds a shared world.

After reduction what appears is reflection, the inseparability of noesis and noema, for the noema “the correlate of consciousness is inseparable from consciousness and yet is not really inherent in it... the essences, Noema and Noesis, are inseparable from one another: Infima species on the noematic side eidetically point back to infima species on the noetic side. That becomes extended naturally to all forms of genus and species”, (III, 265). Objective consciousness is not just a straight forward attention to objects but it is also self-reflexive in two ways. There is a constant retentive automatic recording of events to be explained later, and, a higher egoic ability to be aware and reflect on self. The contemporary technical term for awareness of awareness is meta-cognition and this self-awareness serves the purpose of reflection. The awareness of awareness occurs pre-reflexively when the ego is only aware of such connections in a broad imprecise way. Meta-cognition is also called intentional implication within one consciousness and intersubjective implication between two or more (XIII, 83). Awareness of awareness is fundamental set of associations without which there would be no knowledge. Meta-cognition leads to the ability to understand situations psychologically and be able to identify specific aspects of an experiential situation. This is important because meta-awareness is the background prior to reflection that identifies objects within one consciousness and discussion of it with others (XXV, 313) (Fig. 4.1).

The processes of self-awareness are captured in the use of self-reflexive verbs that refer to the self-presence of both the *forms of awareness* and *the object* that becomes apparent in reflection (II, 14). This self-presence can be understood as a simultaneous presence where consciousness is aware of itself across time *as* it is aware of the presence that it is turned toward. Even when such awarenesses are peripheral, subliminal, preconscious or descriptively unconscious, consciousness is still self-present. In French, “se représenter” is used to express the idea that it is understood that when people have conscious experience, they are automatically aware of it. This is why the term “reflet-reflétant” appears in Jean-Paul Sartre’s *L’Être et le Néant* (1943, 198) in relation to the discussion of temporality (Sartre 1958, 151). In German, a person “stellt etwas vor” means a person represents it for themselves (Kern and Marbach 2001, 75). The point is that a meta-cognitive awareness is central to the phenomenological view of how consciousness works qualitatively and how reflective analysis understands it. Even though consciousness is aware of *what* it is aware of and *how it is aware of such*, there is no doubling of consciousness or infinite regress (X, 332, 355). Intentional implication also occurs when explicit egoic acts of memory replay an original perception as recorded and retained in consciousness and stored. For instance, “I can relive the present, but it cannot be given again. If a return to one and the same succession, as I can at any time, and identify it as the same temporal object, I produce a succession of recollecting experiences in the unity of an overlapping consciousness of succession”, (X, 43). Similarly for empathy, imagination and hallucination and all other forms that constitute objects.

Reflection is a two-headed awareness of noesis-noema correlates, where it is possible to study objects and noeses by regarding the manifold of noematic presentations of them across time: “the universally possible turning of one’s regard which can be effected within each act whereby the constituents, which one has as objects of one’s regard, are reciprocally combined with one another by various eidetic laws. The primary attitude is focused on something objective: the noematic reflection leads to the noematic constituents, the noetic reflection on the noetic compositions. From these constituents the disciplines of interest to us here abstractively single out and seize upon pure forms and, more particularly, the formal apophantics seizes upon noematic forms, the parallel noetics, noetic forms”, (III, 307). This is a way of stating that the reflective gaze can go towards the object-side *or* the mental process-side to be aware and define both. The link to the ideal term essence is that both essences on the object- and the intentional-process sides of the noemata are capable of definition. Husserl warned readers not to focus exclusively on the noetic side and only research the forms of mental processes but to span the subject-object connection and create a study of the correlations between *the many forms of mental process* as they present *possible mental senses* that coalesce into identifiable meaningful objects of sense about their referent (III, 266, 267, 307–308, XXIV, 230).

The work of intentional analysis itself, of reflection and making ideal conclusions, is the representation of what we can be aware of. Consciousness is aware of itself in very many ways. With the use of the word “representation” another overlapping idea is brought in, for it is generally assumed that a representation means that a conscious experience is occurring, although it has to be noted that

some referents are not fully conscious at any moment. Meta-cognition is a part of the empirical position called the theory of mind which was originally part of Jean Piaget's developmental psychology (Flavell 1979, 1985). Reflection is either on one's own experience, or a specific other person, or consciousness in general (XI, 327). The terms "meta-cognition" and "meta-representation" form part of the study of how thoughts, feelings, behaviours and associations relate to each other. Hence, the basic idea of meta-cognition is merely thoughts about thoughts, or feelings about thoughts, or any combination of experiences *about* experiences. In pure psychology they could be called meta-intentionality. If they were prior to reflection on them, the senses that are linked could be called meta-presences.

Meta-cognition is any form of awareness about any form of noesis-noema correlation within the same consciousness, or becoming aware through speech and understanding in a discussion, or becoming aware in general discussion about "higher" secondary forms of awareness about the more fundamental sorts defined as reflection in noesis-noema correlates about other consciousness, or the world of meaning for others (XVII, 251–252). The academic study of meaningful experiences through ideals starts with the most basic ability to be aware and discuss similarities and differences of objects across their manners of appearing. The language is abstract yet precise at the same time because what is referred to are universal structures of consciousness that comprise a metaphorical "geometry" or "grammar" of meaning for consciousness.

The following notation formalises the change from the pre-reflexive being immersed in an experience, to identify and reflect on it in the following way. Pre-reflexive self-presence is non-egoic general attention to objects of awareness plus the co-occurrence of what else is in consciousness. This forms an object among other objects in the here and now or within the potential universe of meaningful situations of a consciousness in a world. However, reflection begins the first straightforward representation of objective awareness that can be written as A_1 (objectifying act) $\rightarrow O_1$ or A_1 (objectifying synthesis) $\rightarrow O_1$ where \rightarrow means leads to, when the ego turns its attention to the pre-reflexive level of being in the world. When reflection occurs, the meta-awareness leads to judging, producing a higher self-awareness or representation which could be written: " $A_2 \rightarrow (A_1 \rightarrow O_1)$ ", (Kern 1988, 285). This straightforward awareness and the higher self-awareness of the first awareness are returned to below, because with the comments above, phenomenology has pitched its case. The processes of constituting presences at lower levels lead to a higher awareness on reflection, so it becomes possible to represent in language what was in mere awareness. This higher level of awareness leads to analysis and representation in concepts and notation at the meta-level of intersubjective commentary. There are numerous asides to the process of reflection as gaining direct meta-cognitive awareness. One of which is "the *operation of presentative objectification*, shown symbolically in the sequence $O, P(O), P(P(O))\dots$ where O is any object and $P(O)$ its presentation, admits of iteration, *whereas qualitative modification does not*, and in the further fact that *presentative objectification applies to all objects whatever; whereas qualitative modification only makes sense in the case of acts*", (XIX/1,

486–487): meaning that there are different occurrences where meta-cognition occurs. A similar identification of structure occurs in relation to the understanding of the connection between meaning and the original temporal field comprised of the three parts of the protention, the now and the retention.

The phenomena of being aware and self-aware in a self-reflexive way lead to the phenomenological academic discourse about mental processes within a community who research meanings in culture and history. This is different to other studies of communication that deal entirely with the biological processes of what happens or historical and societal research. The point is that ability to be aware and self-reflexively identify difference in mental processes is a form of knowledge that differentiates between forms of awareness and lends itself to eidetically-understood sets of relations about how consciousness constitutes its meanings (X, 129). Thus, Newton's fluxions and Leibniz's terms *differentialis*, understood as taking apart or taking differences in givenness, and *integralis*, understood as bringing together in calculating an area or volume, as the idea behind the developmental constitution of an object across time, might have been the sort of judgment that Husserl had in mind in his work *Nova methodus* in 1684 and in 1686 (Leibniz 1684).

What is unveiled in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* up to 1911 is the inter-relation between various aspects of meta-cognition within consciousness that are qualitatively identifiable (X, 273). Namely, that there must be a retained consciousness (a sort of on-going working memory) with a part called absolute consciousness that is the originating self-presence of consciousness to itself. (It has to be noted that Husserl used the word "absolute" in conjunction with the central focus on understanding consciousness itself (IV, 180) and in relation to understanding consciousness in connection with other consciousness (IV, 171–172, IX, 344)). The presence of retentive consciousness functions in holding understanding of the world inside consciousness. It shows its presence when the world is made sense of pre-reflexively due to unconscious processing: the transcendent world is unconsciously immediately understood because of the immanent world (VI, 185–190). It automatically records conscious experiences and pre-reflexively helps in constituting all sense prior to reflection (X, 6, 117). Any action or experience is retained in consciousness automatically by implicit processes of retentive memory (XI, 72). So *self-presence* spans past time and refers to pre-conscious and unconscious processes of this sort.

What is pre-reflective is not yet an object of attention (III, 145). Objects become conscious with additions of meaning from retentive consciousness (III, 166). It is only when consciousness has properly focused on sensation that an object appears. For instance, in the case of listening to music for instance, "a tone dies away... and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation", (X, 31), which is a way of describing the immediate lingering on of recent experience although it is hypothesised that this process is on-going across the lifespan. Such a tone or part of a recently heard melody lingers on and automatically plays back prior senses of the objects-experienced into the now. This shows that the original temporal field is connected to retentive consciousness so there becomes an inclusive nature of the current moment that has an involuntary aspect. Two metaphors can explain what is being analysed. Like a waterfall there is

flow of contents across the now, but the shape of the flow remains the same as does its water flow. Yet within retentional consciousness there is a holding onto the past and a supply of patterns from its storehouse. Retentional consciousness holds all the patterns that have registered consciously and subliminally, to non-egoic awareness.

Three Dependent Moments are Identifiable After the Reduction: Noesis, Noema and Object

One way of explaining the three terms that apply to the whole of objective pattern-recognition is to start with a conclusion: ““Reflection” is taken here in an enlarged sense and includes not only the grasping of acts but also every “turning back”, i.e., every turning away from the natural attitude’s directedness toward the Object. Included would also be, for example, the turning to the noemata, the manifold of which brings into appearance the only identical thing”, (IV, 5, fn). This is a clear statement that the moments of the whole are noted but this needs explaining, for the differences cut across three aspects of one experience (cf XIX/1, Secs. 7, 14, XI, 334, fn, 335, XVII, 239). Strictly speaking after a reduction, the focus is cognition in all its qualitative sorts between a noema (from the ancient Greek νοήμα, *representation*, or meaning in contemporary Greek) in relation to its presenting noesis (νόησις, *awareness*, or understanding in modern Greek). Strictly speaking, a noema is the general sense or profile of what is then identified, *re-cognised*, as a sense or profile of the object of whatever sort it is. The correlation between noesis and noema is because the two are ontologically necessary and co-occurring. In as much as these terms refer to ideal universal aspects, they are ideal categories. In as much that they refer to specific instances, they are only instances.

Noematic senses appear through the noeses that apprehend them. When the term noema appears by itself, it is a shorthand for it would be better to write “noetic-noematic sense” to refer to their connection as a class of reduced experiences, or identify specific noemata about an object. This is a convenient correlation to emphasise that meanings are senses or profiles of objects belonging to the intersubjective sphere. The usefulness of the term “noema” is an attempt to lay aside excessive concern with received wisdom in favour of attending to the work of consciousness afresh. Specifically without concern about the previous bias concerning the referent’s actuality and its contextualisation in the already known world of science and commonsense. A reduced phenomenon is also called an acausally-understood “phantom”, (IV, 22, 36–38, V, 2, Cairns 1976, 24, 57). Whereas other senses of it, particularly in different temporal contexts other than the present, its’ senses are presentational and may only be apparent to one person. The terminology for comparing how objects appear includes terms such as “noema”, “intentional correlate”, or “the contents” of what we experience, what is “given” or “present” in various ways. Meaningful objects of attention appear as the immediate result of pre-reflexive “anonymously functioning consciousness” that works without egoic volition in fast involuntary mental processes that give their senses directly to consciousness, and receptively, to the co-occurring ego that bears witness to the products of

unconscious mental processes (III, 271, XIX/1, V Sec. 20–2, X, 83, XIX/2, Sec. 5, XXXI, 78). Explanation in chapter 8 below will show in more detail, there are two types of constitution: The first is the automatic and immediate making of sense of presence, before the egoic attention can turn to it. The second is what appears of the object of sustained reflective attention, the phenomenological gaze proper (I, 65, 83, III, 148–149, X, 128, XXIII, 333, 343), giving rise to the detailed work of the comparison of givenness of the intentional being (X, 278–279).

There are objects that only appear in the immanent consciousness of an individual person (any manner of givenness, although there can be many more examples provided of what it means for an object to appear). A concrete definition of the term object is provided as the “object” of consciousness, the object as having identity “with itself” during the flowing subjective process... thus [producing] an “*intentional effect*” (I, 80). The intentional effect of meaning is a dynamic one in time, where learning comes from the past although there can be an influence from anticipation about how the future has been anticipated. Further inquiry into the primary phenomenon shows that one sense of the appearing object of attention has other senses (*Abschattungen*, profiles) added, appresented to it. Let’s take the perception of a physical thing as a revealing introductory case (III, 247, XIII, 180, XVI, 155, 186). Although something similar applies to imagined and other types of objects (XXIII, 525). The added senses might be memories of what such a thing has looked like previously in three dimensions. The links might be to any number of past experiences of encountering this particular type of thing. (Or perhaps if the thing is entirely novel, then what it might be, or might be used for, will be the associations that get added to it from the past, or out of imagination, which once more leads back to prior knowledge). Figure 4.2 below shows what it means for the contemplation of ambiguous visual *gestalts*, meanings, because these are a test case which shows that the one and the same perceptual object can have more than one noematic sense. What this means for understanding the reflective method is that phenomenologists are to immerse themselves in meanings, and through mental acts of comparison between different wholes of sense, become able to abstract constant and variable constituents in the noemata and the universal noetic forms that make such meanings (III, 271, IV, 99, 156, 299, VI, 176, IX, 113).




Fig. 4.2 Edgar Rubin’s vase, an ambiguous visual object

Another telling example is: “These real [reell] contents themselves we call the contents of sensation. Their complex does not make up... the entire content of perception. We have already mentioned the evidence indicating that the complex of the contents of sensation is quite varied, and yet the corresponding perceptions, by their very essence, pass themselves off as perceptions of the same object. Conversely, it also holds that the same complex of contents of sensation can be the basis of diverse perceptions, perceptions of diverse objects, as every mannequin proves, inasmuch as here, from a fixed viewpoint, two perceptions stand in conflict, that of the mannequin as a thing and that of the presented man, both constructed on the same fundament of sensation. This consideration turns our gaze toward the surplus which, beyond the complex of sensation, is to be found really [reell] in the perception and which, in the most intimate fusion with what is sensed, first constitutes perception... We call this excess the apprehension-character, and we say that the contents of sensation undergo apprehension”, (XVI, 45–46). The passage can be explained as follows. What appears is real objective being for egos to experience. While it is usual to use the word “represent” to express the noematic sense of an object (or better the noetic-noematic sense of an object). What this implies is the summation or integration of such senses in the current original field, and across past time that is held in immanent consciousness (III, 271). Identification of the mere sense data, the hyle, is given the sense of man or mannequin through the action of immediate involuntary sense-bestowal in this case: thus the “contents of sensation undergo apprehension” to make the visually identifiable meaning of the object. To put the process in a larger social context, there is a cultural audience of persons who behold any cultural object and prior experiences of it may be added to what appears. When intentional analysis is carried out then the different manners of noetic reference can be differentiated with respect to each other. What the introduction of the term “noema” achieves is that there is a hesitation before concluding on meaning, a pause that permits the contemplation of unclear, ambiguous or highly complex situations where, to do justice to the phenomenon, it is not permissible to decide on its objective being or its noetic constitution in a flash, as might the naive natural attitude. This hesitation acknowledges the difficulty that is truly the case in contemplating complex situations fairly, without pre-existing bias. This is why the mannequin example above and Rubin’s vase are phenomena that deserve attention.

The ambiguous visual object of Rubin’s vase acts as an example to bring out some key aspects of Husserl’s studies of meaning during the years 1904 to 1909. In Rubin’s vase are the identities of four noemata: one set of visual sensations at the nonverbal level sustain four possible meanings. Noemata appear as (1) a vase, or (2) a tall thin chalice perhaps, maybe (3), two faces in close proximity, or (4), a large candlestick holder maybe. At the nonverbal experiential level, this set of four possible meanings is connected to habits of identification of similar items through familiarity with items of these sorts, somewhat like a Rorschach inkblot comprehension test. The conclusion that can be drawn from any immediate sense is that the nonverbal constitution of meaning depends on past learning, understanding and beliefs. Such learned abilities are well-practised and could also be called cultural conditioning as they occur through links to social contexts where the past learning

has occurred. The way that retentional consciousness throws two or more meanings onto Rubin's vase is a good way of explaining three of his technical terms: noesis, noema and object. Strictly, the technical terms noesis, noema and object are dependent moments, ontologically dependent parts of a greater whole. This is for the reason that noeses, noemata and objects can never exist independently of each other. What appears are identifiable universal dependent moments of the meanings of objects for the phenomenological attitude. What the case of Rubin's vase shows is that consciousness throws meaning into the current now but there are two or more meanings about what the visual noema could be and hence what the object could be. However, when there is a shift to reflection proper, intentional analysis of the implicit is the key task defined below (V, 32, 41, 53). Hence, in the detail required of a philosophy of consciousness built on experience, the whole of life is viewed as being played out between single and multiple noeses presenting single and multiple noemata as they indicate objects in culture (V, 85, IX, 154–155, 174, 175, 316, 348). The assertion is that the universe of sense, of intentional being, is what appears as noesis-noema correlations across time for phenomenologists, as it does for other people in an unclarified way. The difference is that phenomenologists know how to interpret noeses from the noetic-noematic givennesses that appear.

The Phenomenological Attitude: Interpreting and Comparing Noemata to Differentiate the Forms of Noesis

From the cradle onwards, consciousness learns the cultural senses that make a pluralistic objective worldview that is dependent on the stance, manner of approach and the forms of intentionality experienced by self and empathised in others (I, 142, 147, 149, 186, VI, 193). Something challenging appears when studying one's own experiences and those of other persons. *Intentionalities, the noeses, do not appear directly but only leave their mark on the manner of givenness of the noematic senses that do appear* (III, 216). What appears of noeses is the way an object is given as imagined, drawn and discussed, as opposed to photographed or felt. This is another reason why hermeneutics is at work in comparing and contrasting the modes of givenness of the one and the same thing as remembered, imagined, perceived and so on. The givenness of the noemata is the starting point for intentional analysis to compare and specify each one. At first glance, it might seem that a priori judgements are 'just simple reasoning' made in relation to the undeniable and blatantly obvious. Husserl radicalised Kant's approach by treating appearances in a decontextualised way, in order to check the relationships and defer concluding on the correlations between the noemata that appear and the noeses that he emically interpreted. But noeses themselves do not appear in anything other than the contradiction in terms, "*noematic in contrast to a noetic intentionality*", (III, 212), and "*a "noematic intentionality"*" as a "parallel" of the noetic 'intentionality', which is 'intentionality' properly so called", (III, 216, cf XVII, 254). These passages need to be read as key instructions about how to interpret the givennesses of noemata in

such a way to work out from noematic clues, what consciousness does to create these different forms of givenness, for analysis decides on the intentional forms, the noeses or intentionalities at work (III, 281). What these phrases mean is that senses are understood-as noetically given and these forms show themselves in the many noematic senses that appear. The givenness of noemata indicates the universal type of the noesis involved (III, 204, 207–208, 215–216). For instance, the noematic form of the case of representational art is a canvas hanging in a gallery (XXIII, 206). And interpreting the perceptual object as a depicted object of the artist's scene leads to precisely to one type of analysis that Husserl was urging. So with further inspection the turn to "the things themselves" of the primary phenomena becomes further decontextualised to become the *analysis of the ideals of the things themselves*, to decide on their universal and necessary qualities through the process of eidetic imaginative variation, explained in the next chapter.

The various forms of reduction involve an abstraction from others to emphasise what appears of meaning and sense to oneself. Reflection can consider a moment in time in a static analysis, or developmental accrual across a period of time, in a diachronic analysis of seeing the essences of how cultural senses, for instance, accrue across periods of time and social context where the focus is on determining necessities of implicit associations and the accumulations of habits, skills and beliefs (XI, 340, fn). The elucidation can be turning to the noema as it suggests an object that it reveals; or to the noeses involved. Just to emphasise the starting point in the everyday, some of the sorts of primary phenomena are interpreted as follows. Eduard Marbach advises that the way to reflect on the connection between the noemata of consciousness and their noeses is to begin "reflectively, so to speak backwards, from the intended object x "out there" (in the real world or in some fictional setting) to the modes of givenness of this object in my conscious experiences", (Marbach 2005, 155). What this means is that interpretative work is required to contextualise and juxtapose the givenness of a noetic-noematic sense of attention with other types of noematic givenness of the same object, and then repeat with the same and different types of noema, in order to identify differences and universalities. In order to make the method of reflection and intentional analysis tangible, the introductory process of reflection needs defining, in order to show its experiential orientation (Marbach 1999, 254–255). The process can be presented as four steps.

1. Pure psychological reflection stops the previously pre-reflexive intentional process (III, 148, X, 129). It is a type of meta-cognition without infinite regress that uses memory or imagination, for instance, to bring back an experience to consciousness, to enable a greater awareness of its inherent structure which can be gained by noting the different types of meaning and connection that are present.
2. Noemata reflected on with an eye to "multiple constituent parts" with respect to the intentional "activity of the kind in question", (Marbach 1999, 254). The way toward conclusions is through seeing what is relevant to noetic and noematic-objective sides of the analysis. It identifies what is relevant to a noesis, for instance, with respect to its constituent parts and constant features, such as belief or non-belief, perception or presentation, according to noemata that are

empty or fulfilled, of single or double objects. This demands acuity to internal awareness in oneself and careful questioning of others. Intentionality is referentiality. Phenomenologists inquire as to *how* the object is given in its various noemata of appearance—as meant or given, in such and such noetic ways (I, 88). Phenomenologists are initially instructed only by these concrete experiences of givenness (XVI, 125–129). What appears are subtly nuanced different forms of givenness that indicate the intentionalities, associations and intentional modifications involved (IX, 317–321). This can happen because it is a phenomenon in itself to be able to be aware of what sort of intentionality or synthesis is operative in any moment (II, 8, 44–45, 47, VI, 147, 252, X, 27, 161, 363–364). Although empirically, this is not always the case.

3. The aim is to inspect experience in a generalised and idealising way. The generality involved is to consider an object as ontologically neutral (as neither believed nor disbelieved, as just one in a series). For instance, re-contextualising an instance in manifold views of sense, of a larger series of eidetically varied merely possible wholes of sense, of similar correlations. The aim is to become aware of the universal aspects on both sides of the correlation, as a twofold awareness, within a method for expressing the appearing whole, in the language of the professional discourse. One direction for investigation is the wholly sensual exploration of experience and felt-senses. The other direction is the use of language as a manner of expression to conclude on “the essential form of the transcendental accomplishments in all their types of individual and intersubjective accomplishments, that is, the total essential form of transcendently”, merely possible “accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms. The fact is here, as belonging to its essence, and is determinable only *through* its essence”, (VI, 182). Eidetic imaginative variation is a second tool for decontextualisation and inspection of potential universals and necessary aspects and conditions.
4. Final checking and conclusions are achieved through comparing and contrasting with the elucidations of other noesis-noema correlations. The purpose is to check the constancies and variables and spot the necessities involved by using imagination to vary its givenness, a refinement of the raw data of what is reflected on and consciousness makes sense in a specific case (III, 206, 265, X, 278–279). Thus, the end products are ideal conclusions in language about the many forms of intentionality in relation to the meaning of the noeses and objects that appear. Hermeneutics in Husserl’s practice is interpreting what noesis-noema correlations are by comparing them across noematic and noetic forms to show their inherent similarities and differences. This comparative and contextualising process is noted several times (I, 82–86, III, 192, fn, 196, fn, 197, 204, 299, XI, 291, XIX/1, 386–387, XXIII, 29). The final process of concluding is called seeing essences or eidetic analysis.

Tieszen's Notation for Noesis-noema Correlations

The position that is being put forward can be expressed through a mathematical notation from Rick Tieszen who wrote “act(content) → [object]”, (1995, 444). This notation conceptualises the dependent whole as comprised of its three dependent moments but expressed in the terminology of 1913: noesis.(noema) → [object] where the operator “.” is added to signify that there is a manifold of possibilities created between subjectivity and the sense of the object made. Specific conclusions about the noeses are provided in chapters 7 and 8. While the first part of reduction and reflection is only experiential, when it comes to recording and discussing the distinctions and similarities observed, a notation is helpful in making phenomenological arguments. What is being referred to by Tieszen's notation is the correlation between the lived mental processes as they present any object of attention, along with its horizons and links to meaningful wholes that are not currently present, but might be past or future, or in other ways associated with the same object (Tieszen 2005). Tieszen's mathematical style of formulation holds noesis and noema in mind as they provide senses of an object.

The shorthand, “noesis.(noema) → [object]” is a way of making definitive statements about how noemata constitute the object where the arrow indicates the attention to the object in such a way that consciousness constitutes meaning, understood as a naturalistically acausal process in the sense that intentional implicational ‘cause’ is involved. The arrow indicates constitution about an object that “leads to” accumulations of that noematic sense that designate associations between objects, or between an object and a pre-reflexive preconscious presence. These motivated experiences are intentionally ‘causal’ in the sense that re-arranging a sequence of parts of a pattern ‘causes’ a new meaning of the whole to appear, particularly when the meanings involved are public ones: “a causality which is not real causality but which has a fully proper sense: namely, the sense of *motivational causality*... They arouse an interest and, in virtue of this interest, a tendency to turn towards them. This tendency then freely unfolds in the turning, or else it unfolds only after counter-tendencies weaken or are overcome, etc. All this is played out between the Ego and the intentional object... The “same” object can be given to me in an displeasing mode of appearance, and then I experience a stimulus to change my position appropriately”, (IV, 216). “All spiritual modes of behaviour are “causally” linked together through relations of motivation. E.g., I surmise that A is because I know that B, C... are”, (IV, 229–230). It now becomes more obvious what it means for Husserl to have claimed that there are noesis-noema correlations and for him to talk about “bracketing” the being of the object plus the existence of phenomenologists and the everyday belief in the realism of the world. The reduction is an aim to set aside all natural and naturalistic assumptions and only grasp intersubjective intentionality (III, 222, Fink 1970, 104). It means reflection is the direct experience of seeing that one's intentional acts refers somewhere to hyletic content of some sort, but may produce meanings that form recognisable objects of attention.

Closing Discussion: Intentionality Across Referential Contexts of the Presence and Absence of Objects in the World

By way of closing this chapter, a conclusion needs to be made about the connection between subjectivism and objectivism (III, 106, IX, 300). What is described above as the differentiation between noesis, noema and object apply to all objects of sustained attention to the ego: They are the here and now experiences, for instance, of perception and what goes with it, presented after a “primordial reduction”, (I, 129) that refers to an abstraction from being in culture to analyse the own world which is primarily not about others taking part in the self’s I-acts but means assuming a fore-knowledge of the givenness of self and other to self. “Primordial reduction is an abstractive reduction of the egologically reduced world to that part of it which is not the correlate of the constitutive activity of other-selves-as-intended-in-my-acts”, (Cairns 1976, 102). The objects that can be studied are any cultural objects and further details are provided below (chapters 7–9). In visual perception for instance, what appears are one’s own hands and oneself looking out on one’s body into one’s perceptual context as one normally does so. What is apparent are the perceptions of *leiblichkeit* of one’s body and the sensation of sitting upright. For instance, if one is sitting on a chair and looking at a spoon on a table, what exists in addition to that, in the dimension of one’s own visual perception of one’s own body, is that the sense of oneself as a perceiving person, who is on a chair in a room, hearing ambient sounds in a kitchen, looking at a spoon, feeling a sensation in one’s stomach, and being able to move one’s head and upper body around, so exercising choice and looking at and around the spoon and being there. (I am omitting many more possibilities). What appears is one’s living bodily feeling in relation to the look of one’s arms and fingers and the experience of inner dialogue about the spoon. The bodily experience of moving around a perceptual object is connected to it (IV, 144, IX, 12–14, XVI, 189). Noemata appear in some form of noetic-givenness and so it becomes possible to discern the form of each noesis by comparing and contrasting one sort with other types, by attending to the fine detail of their givenness as explained above. Noemata are the data for the differentiating work of noetics or noetic morphology (XXIV, 136). Pure psychology is a novel approach to seeing across manifolds of meaning where not only is there the sense of what appears for self, but the forms of meaning that are of particular interest are those where the views of others adhere to objects (IV, 168, IX, 227). The identifiable extra senses are called cultural senses, another abstract term explained below. In brief, the point of the analysis of meaningful objects is that they have meanings added to them across personal and historical time from the cultural groups who engage with them. Yet the proper way of looking through the microscope is to pool such meanings and keep focussed on the universal ideal constants of meaningful experience in relation to what such an object is and without which it would be ontologically incomprehensible (III, 280, IX, 17, 39, 73).

There are times when people are not reflecting on what they are quasi-aware of and responding to. These experiences are pre-reflexive (III, 145). But after reflec-

tion the understanding of intentionality is that it does have universal forms. Despite it being the case that some types are less apparent than others, and, are either not fully directed by the ego or are not at all directed by it. But pre-reflective syntheses register their presences somewhere in consciousness and so influence it and the ego subliminally. For instance, consciousness can be emotionally overpowered by the other less conscious and implied associations to what is conscious (as in the case of trauma perhaps). It needs to be noted in passing that it is a natural attitude habit to speak of the “intentional relation to an object of attention” whereas a closer attention to detail shows that what appears are very many noematic profiles, often from one perspective, in one form of awareness. Merely being aware of an object is a qualitatively complex event. More accurately, these imply their object. However, this manner of thinking is convenient for what really occurs are a large series of noesis-noema correlations, many of which never appear above the line, the limen, of consciousness, as they are sub-liminal relations between mental processes and their presences, of which we are either unaware, or we might become aware of them in the right conditions. Presences are interpreted in relation to processes and objects that ‘report’ to conscious attention, that are ‘visible’ to it. Occasionally, some processes and objects are not under control of the ego, and if the ego is busy with an object, they may go unheeded.

Writers like Trần Duc Thao (1978), a committed Marxist, criticised Husserl for ignoring social praxis, history and economics as a greater ground which conditions meaning for consciousness. As criticism of the transcendental phenomenology of meaning for an idealised consciousness in intersubjectivity, in history in general, his remarks stand. But in Husserl’s favour, transcendental phenomenology was never meant to address the facts of class struggle or the valuing of capital over labour in social reality due to its purposefully abstract hermeneutic and ontological position. The point of transcendental phenomenology is to consider merely possible connections between mental processes and their senses with an explicit deferring of any consideration about actuality. This is an explicit interpretative strategy to liberate transcendental phenomenology from the constraints of personal worldviews and such tawdry and parochial fashions in natural attitude philosophy and science or the understanding of consciousness. Pure psychology bears many similarities to and methods with the transcendental sort, but has its own ontological and hermeneutic strategies that wish to overcome subjectivism and objectivism and acknowledge consciousness as part of a physical body in a cultural and physical world in natural time. Pure psychology aims to identify ideal aspects of the constitution of meaning by consciousness and its observing ego, the I who acts, rationalises and speaks. Because the belief in the extant world is kept in pure psychology, then it is fully acknowledged that social praxis, history, economics and the views of physics and biology are permitted to stand. In pure psychology, transcendent natural being exists as real events and causes of processes that thinkers like Trần, Schütz, Gurwitsch and Marx would like to tackle. Husserl did acknowledge this in some places like the “trader in the market place has his market-truth”, (XVII, 245, cf XIX/2, 622–623, XXIV, 101), which can be read as understanding motivations in the market as intersubjective implication. For instance, a bubble in a market is caused when the

anticipated amount of financial value that any cultural object has can be supported by global interest rates, so borrowing can fund its acquisition. In a seller's market, there is social proof to say that the object is desirable which is what makes strong demand for it. In a buyer's market, the social proof of its value has gone and so the price falls. What these examples share is the fiduciary attitude of what one cultural object has as opposed to other cultural objects. One major focus is that between noesis and noema and how reduced noemata, noemata appearing through noeses, present manifold cultural senses of a cultural object: that is an object for consciousness for an audience. The constitution of any such cultural senses can become reified and fixated. So Husserl's sense of constitution of the object is similar to objectification, as a process of object-making, is found in Karl Marx's idea that capital is given a greater value than labour and, as capitalism is built on the idea of credit, from the Latin *credere* to trust or believe, then the value of an object can go up as well as down according to the social proof that it has. Similarly, the sense of the phrase the "objectification of women" is one example of where a meaning gets made, reified and passed around for people to consider. Although the larger point to grasp is that any topic for understanding could be similarly objectified, reified and passed around in social life. The difference is that these studies are discourses about the world of alleged facts and histories written from various perspectives. Below, it is preferred to cast phenomenology as interpreting consciousness in an ideal way so it can map claims from empirical studies and compare them to meaning for consciousness in the everyday world.

Summary

Husserl aspired to understand the constraints, universals and ideals of meaning for consciousness in general, decontextualised from the constraints of specific real contexts and real causes on the way to consider instances and being guided by how objects appear across the different forms of awareness and reference. This introduction to the ubiquity of hermeneutics in an experiential sense shows that there is *no* single measure of reality for consciousness. No discipline by itself has the single key to understand the way that meaning gets made in relation to its biopsychosocial whole. Pure psychology has staked its claim to be the most fundamental process of obtaining ideals about the qualitative study of meaning. But in the last analysis, it needs the contributions of other disciplines such as biological psychology, human studies and philosophical argumentation, because these disciplines also provide relevant findings for consideration. Hermeneutics is a unifying factor between theory and empiricism though. It is untrue that empiricism merely lays bare what is real for all to see because the experimental approaches interpret what is shown through their methods. But empirical methods cannot be used to obtain the basic theoretical understandings that guide the methods and justify them. So the theoretical conclusions drawn from any method or experiment are of a different order to what the experiment actually is: the map is not the territory. Theory is the explicit intellectual

space called understanding or interpretation. Theory is an explanatory narrative that discloses the phenomena that the experimental is about. Phenomena are observable by many different persons who follow the same procedure—and consequently as they come from different schools of drawing conclusions—what they believe the phenomena mean is different.

Chapter 5

Concluding on the Ideals of the Things Themselves

This chapter explains what Husserl meant by a “mathematics of the mind”, (IX, 50) as creating an eidetic method that makes theoretical ideals to support empiricism. Mathematics has the specific sense of observing diverse phenomena and finding the commonalities between them. What people ordinarily experience is the natural attitude of the lifeworld of unclarified objects and processes of the production of meaning. The way of analysing and interpreting what appears aids understanding and action because of its ability to refer to specific moments and constant of universal relations within the whole of meaning. This chapter introduces eidetics by setting the scene through making reference to the success of various types of mathematics in the service of physics by brief overviews of how mathematics has been successful in mapping natural being and its causes. The point is that eidetics is a type of conceptualisation where, in a broad sense, the natural world is mapped and interpreted. The major teaching point of the chapter is understanding the progression from the natural attitude to transcendental philosophy of conditions of possibility to win eidetic conclusions and use them in the natural attitude once more. The analogy that Husserl was following in proposing “philosophy as rigorous science” is an eidetics of how consciousness works in intersubjectivity in presenting being. The formula “ $A.B \sim C$ ” is used as a shorthand for the commonality between eidetics (in the pure psychological or transcendental attitudes) that interpret noetic-noematic moments. The universal essences seen make sense of the noeses and noemata that comprise objects and their regions. The formality of the language hides a great deal because what is being referred to by the shorthand expression “seeing essence” requires further explanation. Seeing essence is a more abstract higher order reflection on wholes of sense expressed across many areas of life. This is because seeing essences refers to a variety of forms of understanding. Although, to spot a pattern at the highest formal level of seeing essences is always to be reliant on noting different types of intentionality and different types of noemata. Later sections below explain the novel qualitative methods for making theoretical ideals which are what phenomenology offers to support future empirical projects. This chapter considers

the merely possible as a way of keeping questions open and preventing foreclosure and dogmatism.

Mathematics as Eidetic Mapping

There is a growing literature on the mathematical influences in phenomenology. Number theory and mathematics itself are justification for phenomenology's theoretical methodologies (Hartimo 2010; Hill 1991; Hill and da Silva 2013; Miller 1982). Husserl started his academic career as a philosopher of mathematics and introduced a number of mathematical figures into phenomenology after his 1883 doctoral thesis on the calculus of variations and he had been practising eidetics since approximately 1887 (XII, 297, 337). The categorical intuition of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* is an example of eidetic analysis (*Wesenanalysen*) and Sec. 44, for instance, is a focus on noeses. A mathematical model encompasses the region of essences in the creation of different kinds of 'eidetic geometry'. Phenomenology is modelled on mathematics (III, 136–140, VI, 359–362, XII, 203–213, 335–337, XVII, XXI, 216, 275, XXII, 416–419, EU, Secs. 10, 87, VI, Sec. 9a). There is a link to Kant (1787, B 108–9, B195–205, B858) and open possibility (III, 131). Theory making has a mathematical style that aims at the truth rather than speculation or importing ready-made fabrications from another territory of inquiry. The eidetic context is thinking psychologically within a multidimensional universe of what could be considered real in this one world because: "*the cognition of "possibilities" must precede the cognition of actualities*", (III, 159). The eidetic work of cognising essence occurs through "the connections of the possible formation of consciousness (noematic and noetic) and of penetrating beyond the accidental singularizations of essence-apprehensions to the overwhelming insight into the total structures of consciousness", (V, 56, cf V, 130, XVI, 141, Kant 1781; A110). Husserl's aim is eidetic map-making of territories before empirically exploring them. The aim is finding the conditions of possibility of consciousness in connection with other consciousness and possible objects as a temporal whole (IV, 136, 185, VI, 345, IX, 37). "We do not ask how experience arises... but what "resides" in it", for such definitive ideal conclusions "can be infringed by no theoretical assumption... The sense that resides essentially in experience", of noesis-noema correlations "must supply the norm for measuring the legitimate sense of all interpretation of real being. The conditions of the possibility of experience are the first... The essence of experience is the same as the possibility of experience... [and] *eo ipso* a condition of the possibility of experience", (XVI, 141, cf II, 3, VI, 100–101, 184). Essences are universals that represent regions and categories of being.

The concern is for the greater purpose of making philosophy fulfil its responsibility as theoretical support to academia. So, the basic premise is to take mathematics (for instance, geometry in its relation to real objects) and urge that every academic discipline and empirical endeavour creates its own 'geometry', in relation

to the awareness of its region of being, of its object and its properties, aims and approaches, and discover the universal essence of the particular type of relation to its types of meaning. The role of essences in their application is that they drive forward natural science to achieve new attainments. It is worth citing a lecture of 1917 at length to get the importance of this message:

Obviously, I can here offer no more than this helpful analogy. Without troublesome work, no one can have any concrete, full idea of what pure mathematical research is like or of the profusion of insights that can be obtained from it. The same sort of penetrating work, for which no general characterisation can adequately substitute, is required if one is to understand phenomenological science concretely. That the work is worthwhile can readily be seen from the unique position of phenomenology with regard to philosophy on the one hand and psychology on the other. Pure phenomenology's tremendous significance for any concrete grounding of *psychology* is clear from the very beginning. If all consciousness is subject to essential laws in a manner similar to that in which spatial reality is subject to mathematical laws, then these essential laws will be of most fertile significance in investigating facts of the conscious life of human and brute animals.

So far as philosophy is concerned, it is enough to point out that all rational-theoretical problems, the problems involved in the so-called *critique* of theoretical, valuational, and practical reason, are concerned *entirely* with *essential coherencies* prevailing between theoretical, axiological, or practical Objectivity and the consciousness in which it is immanently constituted... The critique of reason and all philosophical problems along with it can be put on the course of strict science by a kind of research that draws intuitively upon what is given phenomenologically but not by thinking of the kind that plays out value concepts, a game played with constructions far removed from intuition.

... It is utterly beyond doubt that phenomenology, new and most fertile, will overcome all resistance and stupidity and will enjoy enormous development, just as the infinitesimal mathematics that was so alien to its contemporaries did, and just as exact physics, in opposition to the brilliantly obscure natural philosophy of the Renaissance, has done since the time of Galileo.

Freiburger Antrittsrede, XXV, 80–81.

When the comments above are taken with the mission statement that phenomenology and science are mutually complementary (XVIII, 251–252), then it is apparent what the practical purpose of eidetic analysis is. It is to promote the solution of empirical problems by creating better theoretical maps. The mention of Galileo above is to draw attention to his place in science and theory-construction as he was one of the first scientists to make predictions and then to test them by experiments.

The purpose of eidetic work is to make an ideal geometry out of the confused muddle that is everyday experience of shaped things (VI, 357, 359, EU, 427). What this means for eidetic analysis is that the total manifold of all possible sememes of the noesis-noema correlations, the cosmos of all possible intentional achievements, recurrences, bringing together and holding apart, is the realm of merely possible instances that eidetic imaginative variation explores in concluding on the idealised forms (XVII, 252). The core theme of transcendental logic concerns the eidetic forms and connections between objects in the world. This is born out in the sense that eidetic-theoretical work is only ever preparatory for a sharper empiricism, one that really hits the objects, their differences and relations in a highly accurate manner (EU, Sec. 90, XVII, 31–32, 145, 184, 198). When the focus is on noesis-noema

correlations, what can be concluded on are wholistic conditions of possibility in an enlarged sense. The mathematical influence is evident in the first fully mature publication of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* where mathematical rigour and cohesiveness is accepted as a model for eidetics of consciousness (Secs. 13–54). The phenomenological gaze is mathematizing in the broadest sense of the interconnections between two or more persons and their awareness, a communalised subjectivity in its wholeness to conclude on “an a priori doctrine of consciousness in full all-inclusiveness... one which embraced every type of valuing, striving, willing consciousness and so any type of consciousness at all, one which therefore grasped the entire concrete subjective life in all forms of its intentionality and opened up the totality of problems of the constitution of the world and of the unity of conscious subjectivity, individually personal and communalised subjectivity”, (IX, 43). This means that the aim is to distinguish the concordant influences in the biopsychosocial causes on being (Robins 2005).

It is human thought that enables the mathematics of string theory, quantum mechanics and the thinking of relativity and the big bang explanation of the beginning of the physical universe. The general name for mathematical mapping is mathematical reductionism although perhaps mathematical representation would be better. The purpose of eidetics is identifying those aspects of the biopsychosocial that are constant, whilst noting those that change (IX, 306). The end point of the use of the imaginative variation of essences is finding universal aspects of properties, relationships, attributes based on the mathematical model of finding the progress from instances to a series, by being able to establish inherent laws that govern the series: the materials are noetic-noematic correlations where one aspect is varied to find if others aspects change or remain the same. In the phenomenological study of meaning for consciousness, it does not matter if the meanings and the mental processes that made them are about existent things or not because what is being referred to are meanings and beliefs, some of which have no perceptual referent. What is common is concluded as being universally true even though it is possible to make mistakes, for preliminary findings can fail and new judgments need to be conceptualised (XVII, 285–286). The sense of attending to evidence for theory-making is parallel to the empirical means of attending to the evidence produced by experiments. The way to contextualise this aspect of clarification is to make a distinction between the ‘internal’ impossibility and compossibility of essences, a phase of working through mere possibilities because the variations remove context-boundedness to show constancy (I, 104–105, III, 76, XIV, 34–42, XVII, 183, 189). The purpose of the second prolonged eidetic decontextualisation is in order to avoid group think and interpret accurately how noesis-noema correlations can be varied. This is a way of reducing cognitive biases which are not initially apparent. So, eidetics is a further approach to avoiding the influences of the natural and naturalistic attitudes.

The Guiding Ideals of Physics and Mathematics

The guiding examples for eidetics are the various types of mathematics. Mathematics is representative of exact essences and these are claimed to be apodictic in their truth (I, 56, III, 285–289). One proof of the relevance of eidetics to science would be to consider the history of science as a history of changing eidetic characterisations. The understanding of natural science keeps moving forwards. Before James Clerk Maxwell, light, electricity, magnetism and the mathematics of field theory were not connected (Harman 1998). After Maxwell brought these phenomena together, and defined and predicted their relationships through mathematical reductionism, this set of connections between objects and processes became a new platform for further developments. What need to be included are the guiding hands of Isaac Newton, Gottfried Leibniz, Pierre-Simon Laplace and Joseph-Louis Lagrange at work in understanding eidetic processes (Kocklemans 2002). Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier had similarly united the study of heat, sound and light by specifying how sine waves can be mathematically specified to map empirical instances of any type of wave through specifying general and universal forms. Mathematics applies to represent all waveforms because fundamentally there is only one type of wave. Phenomenology researches and understands the need for a standardised terminology that can be justified in applying the ideal type of findings produced. For instance, the use of logic in designing software, mathematics, chemistry and physics in making computer chips, are examples where ideals are made from unclarified natural experience. (Although it has to be noted that there are many who use empirical findings as ideals that are assumed to be correct, in the place of genuine universal essences).

The manner of eidetic rationalising towards making specific conclusions seems abstract but concrete examples of it exist in mathematics and physics. What Husserl proposed is an experiential route to the generation of theory via further eidetic methods, after the reduction and reflection outlined in the last chapter. Phenomenology comprises methods for making theory between theoreticians, like pure physics comes before applied physics experiments (III, 16, 18). The research cycle is a movement between the pure and applied, to see across a manifold the a priori and then check theoretical findings through empiricism (V, 39, 43). This is the same type of mental exercise that Albert Einstein used to work out the theorem of the connections between the speed of light in relation to matter and energy. Einstein's subject matter was light in relation to the dimensions of space, time and matter. Einstein imagined what it would be like to travel at the speed of light (Einstein 1999, V, 22, VI, 128). This is an acceptable method in theory-making and testing prior to experimentation. However, in the same way that Albert Einstein's hypotheses were intentional achievements built on the ground of previous experiments by Albert Michelson in 1881 who also noted that the direction of a light beam had no effect on the speed of the travel of light. Einstein dared to think the previously unthinkable, that the speed of light is the same for all observers irrespective of direction, and used mathematics to focus on key situations that are most pertinent to the problem. Einstein's breakthrough mathematically was his ability to unify basic

three-dimensional thinking about space with the fourth dimension of time. This was made possible by previous work on non-Euclidean geometries by Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nicolas Lobochevskii, Janus Bolyai, Bernhard Riemann and others which is an eidetic breakthrough achieved by persons who let go of the previous mental constraints and traditions of thought and perception, in order to reconceptualise the phenomena of natural being (Gray 1989; Pesic 2007). The focus in physics is on the experiments themselves that show the phenomena for all to see and make sense of. The major interpretive help is mathematics (which in itself is a mapping of natural being).

The natural sciences interact with natural being and interpret it. And to put what follows into perspective, it is useful to make a few brief comments on the state of physics in recent years. The state of physics is to focus on both the smallest and the largest contexts and processes, that are both the tiniest of lengths and time and the largest. What appears to this view is not the intuitive physics of how things seem to be in perception. Rather, what appears to astronomical observation and the large hadron collider is that there seem to be 12 fundamental particles which are like strings in that they are also waveforms; and that there are four fundamental forces in the universe, electromagnetism, gravity and a weak and a strong force. Instead of the four dimensions of space and time that are some what intuitible; there seem to be 11 dimensions. So instead of there being the view that matter is tiny spheres arranged in the pattern of a shell around a nucleus, the most fundamental building blocks of matter are currently claimed to be tiny vibrating strings, where successive increases in the amount of energy, can turn a neutrino into a graviton and into a photon, for instance. The point of mentioning these findings is to emphasise that the revelation of natural being keeps on unfolding and so the narrative of physics changes with the how the phenomena are approached. The former position that the findings of science are true and exist regardless of the observer are unacceptable in physics after getting to grips with quantum phenomena where light can both appear as packets and waves. (First proposed by Max Planck in 1900 but confirmed by Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr and Louis de Broglie). If one were to look at a light through many layers of dark glass under a microscope, what would appear are tiny bursts of light as photons; whereas if light is shone on one side of a small slit, what appears on the other side of it are fringes of darkness and light. The former phenomenon is interpreted as quanta and the latter as waves. But this type of adherence to the phenomena does not seem to be present in some areas of natural science: facts are measurable, observable with a telescope or microscope, and are naturally caused. The naturalistic attitude of natural science finds truth only in assertions of fact about physical matter. This approach is problematic when consciousness does not properly appear to naturalistic methods of inquiry and then concludes that what does appear to it must be ignored. From Husserl's perspective the right way to explain consciousness is to adopt methods for qualitative intentional analysis and eidetic imaginative variation for finding the most fundamental moments of how nonverbal sense and conceptual meaning can appear. These are the subtle phenomena of consciousness itself that are well explained on their own terms.

The mathematical model is that pure eidetics comes before applied empiricism (XVII, 12, XXIV, 376–377). The mathematical model has served the natural sciences well and has made profound contributions to the quality of life over the last three centuries because of its ability to map inanimate natural being (IX, 21, 27, 29, 30, XVIII, Sec. 46). Specifically, the mathematics of Newton’s mechanics, Laplace and Lagrange, for instance, is precisely a set of exact essences that map natural being accurately and that is what enables the prediction and testability of natural scientific experimentation. Husserl urged readers to follow him in creating new eidetic disciplines that would also be accurate and reduce the inaccurate actions implied by using inaccurate understanding. The leading purpose of eidetic analysis is creating an ‘eidetic geometry’ of how consciousness knows various regions of being, including consciousness itself. Such an eidetic geometry is made by theoretical methods for considering experiences that are initially concrete regions-as-understood that get recontextualised as neutrally-considered being.

A.B ~ C: The Role of Idealisation in Theory is Supporting Empiricism

The way that the natural attitude provides raw data to find essences that supports empiricism can be stated as a three step ABC procedure. The progression between “A, B and C” first appeared in the *Prolegomena* where there are brief asides about science and methods needing to be effective (XVIII, 26–27), that essences are norms (XVIII, 47–48), and exact essences act as models for the other academic disciplines (XVIII, 168–169). Mathematicians see essences when they create number theory, sets, matrices and trigonometry and other maps of being (XVIII, 171–172). The progression is one of a transition from A, the natural attitude of unclarified experiences, through B, the seeing of essences, to C the application of those essences in the way that mathematics supports the natural sciences. The A.B ~ C progression starts with unclarified experiences that are known and obvious but their inherent pattern is ‘out of focus’ to the way of naturally-understanding what is present, where “~” means leads to an empirical practice. Essences are theories that result in theory-creation that has practical applications because scientists and practitioners of theoretical and philosophically-based research, translate theory into action (XVII, 351). It is worth contemplating the three steps that are in the movement from A, through using methods that identify B, so claiming universals and necessary a priori across potentially infinite manifolds, and so lead to real-world applications that hit their target, C. Or in a different wording, the progression is territory, cartography, orienteering. There is always a theoretical pre-understanding that guides research or practical action.

A: The starting point is that scientific, philosophical and everyday understanding is based on the conditions of the possibility of commonsense in everyday culture and history (VI, 123). The understanding of the relationship between the natural attitude, natural science and philosophy in 1936 also applies to any claims to understand meaning. The context around the unclarified pre-reflexive understanding

of the natural attitude is an unclear one of the everyday realism of the world and the specific cultural knowledge about how the mind works and what meanings are (III, 50).

B: The sphere of essences are concepts that genuinely point at truthful relations between the objects that are significant, in any case, where universal features and inter-relationships are catalogued formally (I, 106, III, 18, IX, 71, 298). Because essences map an ideal territory, it's fair to extend the map-territory metaphor to claim that the understanding made in seeing essences is cartographics. The mapping of essences starts within A, unclarified base experience. But maps of understanding serve empirical purposes in their application in re-interpreting the natural attitude world, but this time being able to pinpoint what are the significant relations between the objects and processes there. Thus, the technical language of reduction, reflection, eidetics and eidetic imaginative variation towards universal conclusions are map-making creating B, pure eidetic ontology or logic. The eventual prize to be won, C, natural science for instance, is applying these understandings in ways that work. For instance, natural science has been successful because it is supported by forms of mathematics and both capture the nature of natural being accurately. So the finding of B, essences, is a means of identifying ontological necessity and universal relationships between concepts and meaningful experiences at the most basic level of instances of them in general; in making of a map of consciousness in general (III, 17, V, 39, IX, 71, 305).

C: Essences are applied in the natural attitude view in relation to how empirical psychologies currently exist. Thus, applying essences takes its place as pinpointing the fundamentality of meaning and argues for a series of practices that check the laser beam of grounded concepts that maintain a focus on givenness of correlates. Empiricism is necessary (III, 3–4, 9, 17, V, 36, 39, 43). Thus, one application of experiential hermeneutics is checking that concepts refer to their phenomena. This is not to be confused with the application of such concepts to re-interpret natural attitude experience and deliver it as ready for effective action. So to formalise the set of relations that are, at base, forms of meaning for consciousness, the following relations can be noted:

A.B ~ C

After Galileo and Newtonian mechanics the relation between the natural attitude, mathematics and natural science is:

(things falling through air).(mathematics) ~ (theorised interpretation for empirical work)

The most general case of the A.B ~ C form is what transcendental phenomenology works to achieve:

(Unclarified instances of the natural attitude).(a priori essences from reflection) ~ (Clarified re-interpretation of the attitude to identify sources of meaning)

In the case of pure psychology, the theory for empirical psychology and therapy practice is as follows. The context around pure psychology is the formal study of essences of the biopsychosocial sorts, because the transcendental consideration of their conditions of possibility happens within a transcendental view (IX, 327):

(natural attitude understanding).(pure psychology) ~ (formulation of an instance leading to effective action in the psychological register)

Ideas have Empirical Applications

The best way of summing up the higher applications of eidetic findings is to note the following A.B ~ C towards science, technology and the practice of applying knowledge of any sort. Galileo and the Tower of Pisa is an example. In the first ever experiment, Galileo dropped two objects off the Tower of Pisa in 1591 watched by a crowd from the University. Despite one being 20 times heavier than the other, he predicted that they would hit the ground at the same time and they did. The predictions were observable and verified his understanding. Furthermore, through integral calculus it is possible to formulate ideal calculations that predict what will happen within a uniform gravitational field. The general equation for the distance travelled in such a gravitational field is $s=ut+\frac{1}{2}at^2$, where t is the time in seconds, a is the accelerational constant (metres per second per second) and u is the initial speed of an object (metres per second). The formula relates the distance travelled to the time elapsed and includes a factor for the initial velocity of it. Such mapping of an object falling in a uniform gravitational field is approximate and can be further improved through corrections to the model for the viscosity of the air (or fluid) through which the object falls and for the shape of the object. These corrections can only ever be found empirically and never through pure mathematics alone. Mathematical processes for working out how to experiment in the natural register have been around since the early twentieth century (Buckingham 1914; Rayleigh 1915). The mathematical method is called working with pi-groups which is a way of thinking through necessary relations between complex parameters in fluid dynamics, heat transfer and aerodynamics, in the time before digital mapping of these processes with finite element analysis. The point of mentioning these mathematical methods is that it is possible to relate relevant physical characteristics of the physical conditions of possibility prior to experimentation, because an equation must balance its units of mass, time, speed, acceleration and other parameters. Specifically, mathematical modelling works because these mathematical essences map natural being well as shown by the benefits of science and technology.

The purpose of these ways of considering evident givenness are for the creation of the laser beam of concepts that refer precisely to experiences that form an eidetic geometry that can clarify and re-interpret everyday experience in a way that is prototypical for an academic discipline, be it natural science, applied philosophy, applications of empirical psychology or therapy or any other intervention in the world (XVII, 246, XIX/2, 201–202, XIII, 166). But it has to be noted theoretical practice is not a warrant of truth for “truth is an idea, lying in infinity”, (XVII, 245), where different sorts of truth lie “within its *horizons*”, (XVII, 246). The demand to attend to truth across a number of eidetic variants could be summarised as stating that ‘givenness is the teacher’. For all relationships between consciousness and being are derived from direct personal experience in the main. There are difficulties or limit cases because some objects are not given, then other sorts of evidence may be considered in imagination for seeing essence. Similarly, empathy is making for the other something that self will never have; for their actual experiences never will be ours but are only ever experienced second hand (VI, 189, cf I, 142). “Consid-

ered *absolutely*, there is nothing besides mind and there is no other connection than that of mind. But there are connections of a certain kind that tie together the non-independent moments of *a single* mind... there is also a connection of independent minds through empathy”, (XIII, 232–233).

Exact Essences

Mathematics is a region of exact essences: if something is proven true, it is true forever. Exact essences are “*exact* sciences of ideal objects, [that] must serve forthwith as models for every new science... as though there could be only material eidetic sciences of but one single methodic type, that of “exactness””, (III, 141). The formal a priori represent the being of the objects of an empirical discipline and that guides the selection of methodologies, as manners of empirical approach, because of the theoretical pre-understanding of ideals are extra-temporal. Empirical methods are chosen on the basis of abstraction from the whole of being and the at-first inaccurate intentional knowledge of the region. Far in advance of the first question asked, the first experiment made, and before the first empirical conclusion drawn, the pre-understanding of the eidetic region sets the course of methods, the manner of interpreting findings and the scope of inquiry. However, empirical problems are caused by pre-understanding that is inaccurate. Pre-understanding informs selecting experiments, methods and styles of interpreting that inform the whole discipline. Nowhere is false understanding so clearly in evidence than the computer metaphor for the brain that has been used to organise artificial intelligence. John Searle has rightly criticised those who believe that it is sufficient to assume that people are rule-following in the same way that computers are. For instance, it is an incorrect starting point to believe that it is acceptable to assume that rule-following happens in the unconscious mind and the brain (Searle 1984). However, the more general pattern is that presumed understanding (in the place of proper essence) dictates what the being of the object is prior to empirical research. Consequently, finding essence is necessary to inform the pre-understanding of being-as-understood that constitutes empirical methodology and hermeneutic assumptions, which is why initial reflection and essence should be considered in ontological-neutrality. The mathematical model is expressed in statements like: “Connected with this is the practical ideal of exact eidetic sciences which, strictly speaking, only recent mathematics has shown how to actualise”, (III, 17). Husserl added that “it becomes apparent that this mathematical ideal cannot be universally valid”, (III, 17, fn), meaning that symbols and notation are not obligatory and the idea of mathesis universals is just a metaphor.

In the light of understanding Husserl the mathematician who bridged subjectivity and objectivity, it becomes clear what underpins the phenomenological gaze of seeing essences in other areas. In *Ideas I*, Husserl repeatedly tells readers that mathematics and geometry are the guiding forms of reasoning for the interpretation of experience (III, 20, 133–139). Mathematical noeses grasp ideal content and present ideal objects (XII, 77). There are many different types of mathematical noeses, its types of reasoning and referencing. Once the symbolic languages of rationality

are learned, they become a means for making analytic a priori calculations that are approximately correct for the natural attitude lifeworld. The language used in 1913 was that the definite formal axiomatic system, the analytic a priori of mathematics, maps the “definite manifold”, (III, 135) of a purely formal ideal world (III, 136). Only mathematics and logic have these axioms of exact essence (III, 13, 15, 18, 21–22, 141). Similarly, when it comes to the intellectually-derived structure of time, it is only the eidetic form that is apodictic, not the content (I, 67, X, 53). Husserl came to the realisation in 1909 approximately that it was the *form* of time across the lifespan that was an apriori universal that enables the meaningfulness of the current moment (X, 28). This implies that the way to read temporality is that it is a type of calculus for identifying constant relationships within its whole such as portrayed in the diagrams of the constant flow of senses into retentional consciousness from a notional future, although the differences remain the same. This conclusion was expressed in *Cartesian Meditations* as “past, present, and future, become unitarily constituted over and over again, in a certain noetic-noematic formal structure”, (I, 109). This means that the role of the regular ideal form of time-consciousness is what enables each individual to understand the communal senses of objects and learn meaning across time and so share in the intersubjective life. Furthermore, it is natural intersubjective time that is co-condition for the personal inner time of any individual (X, 73, 287). However, it is the ideal understanding of time as past, present and future that enables formulations of the sort of being able to compare learnings with the current model of the world, self and others, to see how individuals work to create a future. Gestalt psychology agrees that time is not given (Gibson 1975). It is non-phenomenological to work by the intellect alone and Husserl soundly rebuked himself for having done so with respect to his interpretation of temporality with the words “the entire doctrine of time-consciousness is a product of conceptual idealization!... Hence, begin by describing the types of primordial phenomena”, (XI, 387), which means there should be a back to basics of grasping experiential differences between primary phenomena rather than intellectual argument. However, the content of the present moment *is* classed as apodictic as well as the apperception of the self’s existence in the present moment (I, 67, IV, 252–253).

Inexact Essences: Morphology of Processes, Shapes, Patterns, Contexts

However, what ensues with regional ontologies rather than ideal ones is a focus on a completely different type of essence that is interpreted on the basis of the mathematical model. Inexact essences are “morphological” sememes of noematic shapes and patterns, of recognisable and identifiable relationships, experienced objects, styles of similar and different sorts of meaning, alongside the recognisable properties of consciousness. Morphology is a general term that could apply to both the noetic and noematic sides of the correlation of meaning. On the objective side, it would be equivalent to a gestalt, often a clearly recognisable shape or pattern of something already known. On the noetic side, it refers to the noetic forms of giving

something in awareness. Morphological or inexact essences are “the correlates of descriptive concepts”, (III, 138), which does not mean they are merely the result of naive description (cf I, 67, VI, 24, X, 53). “Everywhere we investigate the fashioning of noeses and noemata, we project a systematic and eidetic morphology, everywhere bring into relief essential necessities and essential possibilities: the latter as necessary possibilities, forms of unions of compatibility which are prescribed in the *essences* and delimited by laws of essences”, (III, 302): which is Husserl’s way of saying that eidetic contemplations have a normative function for empirical action and thinking. This is one way that essences make a difference.

Reflection begins morphology, the study of parts and wholes relate to the noetic-noematic data and how consciousness fits into the greater set of other consciousness and the manifold senses of cultural objects that comprise the contents of society and history. The aim is to set down ideal and universal findings (XIV, 307–308). These are used to interpret relationships and what happens in them in the following way. The model is a priori disciplines, such as mathematics that map the actuality of shapes through applying sets of ideal rules like geometry, but relevant to the types of meaning and context being studied. Geometry is a simplification of complex real shapes in the world. It is the result of rationalising, idealising, mapping and imagining—whereby a good deal of the details of what occurs in the real territory of natural being is not included. Accordingly, the focus on eidetic imaginative variation is massing observations and employing induction in the mathematical sense of identifying patterns within a series of numbers, in a mathematical analogy. Because the morphology of shared meaning is being considered, then such eidetic axioms or laws are fallible and may not be universal for all humanity.

Similarly, Husserl argued that finding the essences of other inexact regions of being such as consciousness will benefit academia in creating the sought-after laser beam of definitive reference between consciousness and its objects. He argued that reductions are necessary to make sure that the essences decided on are emic representations of the meaning of being about invariant, constant aspects, properties, relations, the constituent pieces and conditions of possibility of meaning, to provide maps of intellectually reasoned conclusions that apply universally and not just to instances. Husserl did specify how to do eidetics. But before employing the higher level language for making distinctions, it is important to stay grounded in the evidence because even though the pre-reflexive processes are fast, the evidence they provide is flimsy. In order to find what stays the same and what changes, then it’s necessary to show how ideas work, how they are influential. The goodness of fit between one concept and a number of noetic-noematic senses is a judgement concerning to what degree any noetic-noematic sense is an accurate or typical sense of its object (or not as the case may be). Such a consideration leads to the topic of eidetic evidence of what is merely possible in theory in addition to actuality.

Eidetic Evidence

Evidence is crucial to see what patterns persist (III, 286–288). What were first unclear senses in the natural attitude culture, society and history are clarified eidetically through the method of seeing where it must be noted that the universals produced are dependent and non-self sufficient as is the process of seeing itself. The sought-after evidence concerns, concerns experiences many of which are either flimsy experiences in their appearing or implicit within the perceptual context of the original temporal flow, here and now. There are gradations of the adequacy of eidetic evidence, made in passive involuntary accruals across time so that “*evidence... has its variant formations, its degrees of perfection in giving something-itself—it has many diversities*”, (XVII, 253). Some of these diversities are as follows:

- There are degrees of inadequate and adequate evidence where the number of repetitions of seeing increases the adequacy of understanding an object. The limit of an infinite number of views is the ideal givenness of the exact mathematical object. For instance, even the proto-phenomenology of the *Prolegomena* (XVIII, Secs. 32, 63, 65) does grasp adequate evidence (XVI, 125–134, 106–109).
- There are degrees of adequate clear and distinct eidetic evidence, where repetitions of seeing show the being of the object (V, 86, 91, XVII, 253).
- There are other types of evidence that includes non-phenomenologically grounded claims like those of ungrounded experimentalism made by ungrounded connections between assumptions acting as ideals to employ empirical methods. The non-phenomenological approaches maintain bodies of knowledge that are inaccurate in ways that are unknown to their users. Such claims are grouped together as ungrounded but could be inspected by reflection and eidetic variations.

So it becomes noticeable that a certain type of theoretical empiricism (reflections on reduced, previously natural attitude experience) is involved in creating the a priori pure distinctions for the desired theoretical constructs that will ensure the accuracy of concepts about noesis-noema experiences. In fact, eidetic analysis can contain errors for non-ideal objects are of the sort where a noema “*explodes and splits up into “conflicting physical thing-apprehensions”, into suppositions*”, (III, 287, cf I, 92, III, 86, 294, XIII, 165, XVI, 285, XVII, 109). However, despite Husserl’s early rhetoric about an Archimedean point and apodicticity, the desire for apodictic evidence was never fulfilled in the mature writings (I, 55). For instance, the contents of past and present time are not apodictic. It is temporality itself that prevents apodictic self-knowledge, for “no factual knowledge—no mundane and no phenomenological-subjective knowledge—is of this [apodictic] sort. No temporal being can be known with apodicticity: not only is it impossible for us to do so; it can itself be known apodictically that it is impossible”, (VIII, 398, written in 1925, cited in Kern 1977, 134). Therefore, eidetic evidence is not apodictic. Despite what Husserl believed about avoiding interpretation by using “description *methods*”, (I, 86), that aim at the phenomena themselves, “viewing, seeing, having insight into it itself”, (I, 93). He strove to avoid a reliance on natural and naturalistic attitude

understanding of ego-driven imagination, memory and other non-egoic syntheses such as associational and motivational processes.

Husserl stated his methods with an emphasis on evidence rather than intellectual argument. Husserl's protagonist is Kant who he superseded by making a number of emic analyses of what really happens in the lifeworld (XVII, 228). The lead from Kant is to follow grounding in experiential and meaningful givenness (1781, A105, A240), and to hold on to the necessity of being true to noetic-noematic givenness as observed during reductions (like the newspaper example, IV, 320). This latter criterion is most important because if the emic interpretative rule were broken by inaccurate intellectual assumptions prevailing, then there would be something naturally causal, conceptual or etic being projected and that would be refusing to attend to what and how senses appear and be non-phenomenological. Husserl's use of the word "logic" has Platonic roots as a universal study of knowledge. Its original sense is invoked but given a new sense in the ability to see for oneself what objects and their relationships are (IX, 73). Like any understanding, essences are on the inside of fallible consciousness and have no connection to Platonic heaven (XVII, 220). "Logic as a theory of science is then the science of the *a priori* of all sciences as such, the theory of what gives them sense as formations of practical reason, what they must necessarily fulfil if they are actually able to be what they want to be, namely, formation of practical reason", (XVII, 351). The good news is that the ground of meaningful being, the proper metabasis, for understanding intersubjective intentional implication is freely available. All object senses exist relative to the absolute ground of consciousness (III, 91–92, XVII, 205). Phenomenology has long been working on noticing changes in gestalt and what that means (XII, 205, 213, XVII, 364). The point is to rationalise experience, and through a theory-making procedure, make conclusions that refer to noesis-noema correlations within the one meaningful whole of the world for intersubjectivity across time and history. Eidetic analysis is a process of identifying trustworthy understanding from the natural attitude and avoiding the naturalistic interpretation of it by seeing the essences of intentionality and differentiating them into families of types (III, 15–16, V, 40, XVI, 141–142, EU, Sec. 90).

Eidetic Variation

The purpose of the comments above is to understand the pivotal role of the use of the imaginative variation of essences in theory-making as explained in Sec. 20 of the *Fifth Investigation* (XIX/1, 413). The use of the imagination appeared in the *Logical Investigations* where *Veranschaulichung* are translated as "illustrative intuition" (XIX/1, introduction, Secs. 1–7, XIX/2, Secs. 16–29, 45–46). However, what can be considered are the noematic senses as results of the many types of noetic attention given them. Whether the object is a person, a memory of another person, a physical place or another type of cultural object, the sense achieved is due to a number of factors. The *en epi pollon* or manifold of senses of an object is

mentioned in the context of looking for an *eidōs* amongst a multiplicity of noematic senses (IX, 78). It is important as to what is included or excluded when considering noematic senses in a manifold. However, imagination is the privileged medium for the thought experiments of eidetic variation which are at once *a priori*, in that they consider the conditions of possibility for universals and necessities to exist, and are thought experiments for deciding on theoretical statements that refer back to regions of clarified experience. Because noesis-noema correlations form wholes then it is possible to vary co-dependent moments of the whole through imagination to see what consciousness pre-reflexively knows already (V, 29–33, 42–43, 51, 62, 87–88, 103–104). Either in eidetic imaginative variation or through actual evident givenness of the sort being contemplated, it is possible to find out how the moments co-occur and so draw eidetic conclusions within the alleged context of ontological neutrality, begun with reflection and extended in the variation. The method for rationalising and concluding on essences and relations between essences is to use imagination to generate the direct experience of evidence and the possibilities of what can be understood to constitute action and the logical consequences of action (IV, 261). For instance, actually moving around of an object and varying one's experience of it, are all part of the direct experience of getting to understand ranges of experiences of different sorts (XVI, 349–355, 358–360, 363–371). In relation to the above it is possible to vary imagined experiences derived from empirical data or from another source completely, to see what it means as intentionality, and so the forthcoming reformed empirical phenomenological applications will be "identical with complete systematic universe of the positive sciences, provided that we think of them from the beginning as absolutely grounded methodologically through eidetic phenomenology", (IX, 298). Husserl's approach is experientially-focused and springs from his principle of evidence that demands attending to the encounter between consciousness and the meaning of being that appears (III, 44, 306, XI, 431). The purpose of eidetic variation is to conclude from fulfilled imaginative experience on what is the case universally and necessarily, within an allegedly ontologically neutral inspection of a manifold. See Fig. 5.1 on the noematic eidetic variation of the idea of a triangle, which is a noematic example of looking for the geometric ideal of a triangle (XXXI, 83). One guiding example is the stating of eidetic necessities about a physical thing (III, 312–313, 315).

Let's take a concrete example focused on a physical object first of all. In the perception of bodily present objects, their colour, shape, surface, length, width, brightness and clarity co-exist to form the perceptual whole (III, 95–96, IV, 177). In eidetic imaginative variation, it is possible to imagine a perceptual scene and vary the colour of a tea cup, say, and find that colour always co-occurs with the recognisable noematic sense of the tea cup shape. Furthermore, it is possible to vary the size of the tea cup shape or to switch to a different noetic form, say memory, and make further variations of both the noematic side or the noetic means of apprehending the noematic senses that comprise the object, tea cup. So, in this case variations in the visual field contain colour, shape and variations on the noematic profiles that comprise tea cup in general. In Husserl's reasoning, an *a priori* law can be discerned that, for visual objects, colour, shape and size co-occur in order to con-




Fig. 5.1 Some noematic examples of the imaginative variation of the universal ideal object of a triangle

stitute perceptual objects. In this example, the noesis-noema correlates are visual perceptions of a series of the object tea cup appearing across a number of noemata. The point for grounding the most fundamental intentional analysis is that through entirely experiential means, based on experience itself, it is possible to identify universal necessary essences about mental processes, personal and shared, and the meaning of the being of objects in their conditions of possibility for whole sets of noesis-noema correlations. In Husserl's view such conclusions are not empirical but eidetic: meaning that they are not bound to individual phenomenologists or to any culturally-bound context and that they are theoretical conclusions that are derived from continua of whole ranges of instances.

The following remarks further explain: "Certain universalities as experienced are found also in the sphere of mere experience... in the skimming through, an overlapping of the perceptual givens takes place passively, and each given becomes an object of consciousness passively as a single moment of what is one common thing for sensuous passivity. But only a synthetic activity of comparing, of bringing to congruence, of distinguishing between what is identically common and what is different, yields synthetically constituted universalities and logical universal concepts. Then we have... universal terms, expressing logical universalities", (IX, 98–99): which has the sense that patterns will appear across the manifold. Idealisation is used to spot what happens within an infinite series of possibilities of noesis-noema correlations. It is unnecessary to run through every member of an infinite series though. The work of running through variations refers to an infinite manifold: "an openly endless multiplicity of variants, in short, a variation. Of course this open infinity does not signify an actual continuation in infinity, the nonsensical demand *actually* to produce all possible variants—as if we could only then be sure that

the eidōs which subsequently becomes grasped actually accords with all possibilities”, (IX, 76–77): which implies that all forms of data can be made into a series of variants. The way of spotting universals and necessities is to run through the possibilities which are the ground of eidetic necessity, by carefully selecting examples beforehand, in order to spot patterns within a series of instances.

The eidetic sight of compossibility and impossibility is another way of considering coherence about forms of meaning that differentiate between the noetic and noematic forms: “Separations are to be carried out on concrete lived-processes through analysis; there are components to be picked out according to sort, basic sorts, of non-selfsufficient moments to be distinguished; and every rational goal of a systematic analysis of lived-process is to be strived for with an immediately forthcoming multitude of special and completely determinate and obviously solvable problems”, (V, 41). This process of differentiation is the work that eidetics does for academia in specifying precisely what are the differences between talking, loving, planning, believing, problem-solving and so forth (VI, 252, XXV, 74).

Constancy of essences is assumed in being able to find a single eidōs, a “multisignificant expression, a priori, that I recognize philosophically”, (XVII, 219). Although Husserl could have added that what he was looking at were always morphological structures on the object-side and noetic forms seen by looking across the ways in which noemata present themselves, comparatively across different givennesses. Such attention to essences creates a theory that “traces the infinity of deductive cognitions back to, or deduces them from, a small number of immediately evident truisms, its “Axioms”... but by no means is the entire science of the type of a mathematics”, (IX, 50). Another parallel between eidetics and the mathematical style of reasoning is highly apparent in “induction” in the mathematical sense of being able to recognise a progression across a series of numbers similarly to the movement across the original temporal field between protention, the now and retention that permits drawing conclusions on the character of the original temporal field (X, 119). What Husserl concluded as the irreal is the best characterisations of his view of conceptual intentionality with respect to its objects (EU, Sec. 64d). There are differing levels of eidetic research that generate findings concerning the universals and constants of how consciousness works in a general way. These noetic universals concern identifying forms of “the eidōs, the essence “perception” and with what belongs to a “perception as such” as it were to the sense, ever the same, of possible perception in general”, (V, 40). This is what it means to conclude within intentional analysis about intentionality shared between persons in the world. During the years 1927–1929, facts get reinterpreted as essences and serve “only as an example and as the foundation for a free but intuitive variation of the factual mind and communities of minds *into* the a priori possible (thinkable) ones... There emerges therewith the eidetically necessary typical form, the *eidōs*”, (IX, 284, cf I, 106, 140, 147, IX, 291, 323–324, 334). Eidetics includes the idea that regular patterns and processes arise and these can be expressed ideally without compromising the manifold.

There is a certain type of tension between finding a single eidōs and contemplating a manifold of noetic-noematic correlations because in addition to the requirement to conclude on commonalities that are necessary for there are exceptions to

the rule being postulated: “we do... see the dissonant unity of the intended essences in the counter-sensical judgement, the incompatibility... we grasp instead of the essence pure and simple... the *non-essence* so to speak”, (V, 88), and even that is fallible (V, 86). The drive is to see the given experiences of noemata and noeses and the constitution of the senses of an object across time as well as during current time (II, 13, 22, 37, 75). Some mature comments are the “method of variation in conscious optionalness, the forming of an open optional multiplicity of variation of single variants, of which each has the character of an optional example, is grounded on this basis. This multiplicity is then the support for the “comparative” overlapping and the intuitive singling out of a pure universal which is singularized exemplarily in this optional varying”, (IX, 86, cf Secs. 9, 10). This comment recaps the purpose of variation as finding compossible and impossible aspects of noesis-noema correlations in such a way as to identify the constant, eidetically necessary aspects, as opposed to the more superficial changeable and context-specific ones (XIV, 34–40). Eidetic studies of consciousness can cognise the categories of conscious experience itself. “What counts is that all the optional single cases come in the sequence of their appearance to *overlapping coincidence* and thereby pass into a *synthetic unity* in which they all appear as variations of one another; and then, in further consequence, as optional sequences of single instances in which the same universal as eidos is singularized”, (IX, 77–78, cf I, 93, IX, 85–86): which is an expression of the theme of exploring compossibility and coherence mentioned in other passages. This reveals that direct seeing of constants can occur through the passive work of consciousness.

Regional ontologies are given brief mention in *Ideas I* as: “Any concrete empirical objectivity finds its place within a *highest* material genus, a “region,” of empirical objects. To the pure regional essence, then, there corresponds a *regional eidetic science* or, as we can also say, a regional ontology”, (III, 19). And: “To each regionally delimitable sphere of individual being, in the broadest logical sense, there belongs an ontology. For example, an ontology of Nature belongs to physical nature; an ontology of psychophysical being to the psychophysical”, (III, 112). The conclusion that: “*Any science of matters of fact... has essential theoretical foundations in eidetic ontologies*”, (III, 19), is a mandate to make qualitatively-derived theoretical conclusions on precisely what appears. The term “eidetic ontologies” refers to yet more interpretations of the raw data of meaning but that become apparent when concluding (III, 20, V, 23). In the same way that triangles are a member of the set of shapes, and that red is one sensuous perceptual quality of colour, the higher genus of an eidetic region is comprised of contributory species relating to many categories within it (III, 26–30). This line of reasoning is the parts and wholes logic of the *Third Logical Investigation* (XIX/1, Secs. 7–8, 14–18, 21–22) and is a new way of looking at ontology in relation to epistemology and phenomenological hermeneutics that fully intends to represent the inherent differences that lie entirely within a region (Simons 1987). Rather than some classificatory system imposed from without. A method of seeing a priori essences must attend to the inherent contours and forms of the being in question. What Husserl wanted to study are *concreta*, self-sufficient wholes of evidence that are self-given in their appearing; whereas *abstracta* are dependent, non-self-sufficient parts of essence that go to make greater wholes of sense (III, 30). One last thing to note is that there is can the use of argument by

eidetic necessity occurs after having come to eidetic conclusions and concerns applying them (I, 103, 158). The process concludes with universal conclusions gained from the transcendental view of the contemplation of fulfilled eidetic possibilities that apply to *real world instances* in the same way that real world triangles obey the principles of geometry and its ideal examples. In the eidetic reduction and variation, examples are understood as mere possibility. The eidetic frame supplied is a much larger domain of possibility that has the effect of checking the assumptions of phenomenologists as a type of thought experiment.

Summary

The worth of applying essences follows the model of the role of geometry in relation to real shaped things in world that enables design and manufacture. Essences introduce order into what otherwise would be chaos or a merely random inaccurate identification of patterns about what truly counts. Because the base material is meaning for consciousness, and not a focus on natural being itself, then the steps of clarification of the natural attitude produce the intentional world-for-consciousness, whose structure becomes identifiable as a clarification of how consciousness works, ideally, that ultimately lends itself to a series of applications in the real world. These ideals are given the designation “extra-temporal” in 1929 (I, 155–156, cf X, 98, XVII, 139, fn, EU, Secs. 63–65). Husserl made explicit comments that pure psychology is an “*a priori* psychology... a mathematics of the mind”, (IX, 50), where “in the attitude of the exact science the thing and its properties are themselves meant as mathematical. Exactness = mathematical ideality”, (IX, 18, fn). Pure psychology plays its part in an A.B ~ C process for moving from the eidetic to the applied. It understands consciousness and its various forms of intentionality in relation to objects in regions of different sorts. The A.B ~ C formula that expresses the relation between unclarified experiences, the application of essences in their return to the world, is the relation of three forms of meaningfulness and reference, but with different contexts around each. So the academic discourse about essences promotes the application of them in pragmatic solutions. There is in fact a tension between drawing theoretical conclusions and experimental research. Getting relevant evidence is for making the higher judgments that are used in empirical research. The cycle of phenomenological research is four-steps including its empirical application: Starting with the *first* step of decontextualising the everyday experience by treating experience as intentionality between subjects. The *second* step is concluding on essences as a priori judgements, like those that ground mathematics, such as geometry and the form of reasoning called mathematical induction, in theorising by identifying a pattern across a series of examples, for instance. The *third* level is the actual empirical application of the knowledge gained. And *fourth*, there is the meta-phenomenological *reviewing* of the effect and accuracy of the eidetic guidance gained by the new empirical endeavour (I, 68, 178, III, 121, 123, XVII, 243, 255).

The order of approach below is to keep the meaning of conscious experiences firmly in sight by taking it seriously that intentionality about mental stuff does provide meaningful choices, decisions and behaviour. Eidetic analysis stops when the constancies of consciousness involved in any noesis-noema correlation have been identified and agreed. These are never more than theoretical predictions concerning how the meaning of an experience is made. Finally, empirical work is required to test the theory generated (IV, 294–295). Eidetic findings are reviewed in the light of experimental contact with the region of being in question and the community of colleagues. Transcendental ‘arguments’ for Husserl are based on the experiences of fulfilled imagination of the conditions of possibility for something to exist, through the protected and enforced consideration of them as decontextualised, as ontologically-neutral, merely possible events (VI, 383, XVII, 183–184, 189). This means that the learning that is important is one that is received or given to the inquiring ego rather than one that is made as an intellectual argument. Arguments are permitted but only those that are demonstrable through asking the reader to turn to their own experiences and regard them in the right way, as the beginning and ending of the project. For in the last analysis there are differences to behold. In being able to tell a flight of the imagination from a memory, it becomes possible to be clear about how the path ahead lies.

Part II

The Findings on Meaning for Consciousness

This part of the work presents a series of summaries that sketch the outcomes of eidetic research of seeing intentionality and connect with the larger social sphere and biological research. This second part focuses on the interpretation of intentionality in relation to the manifold views of cultural objects of individual and collective experience. Consciousness is intersubjective “in general” or “overall” when it empathises other-consciousness. What guides research is the initial general or universal picture of what it is to be a sentient being, which is why pure psychology as fundamental philosophical psychology researches the theoretical matters that enable empirical psychological research and mental health care. Natural psychological science asserts hypotheses about natural cause but there is currently no diagnostic method to find natural causes for individuals. Some of the following are key aspects. There are three forms of givenness which are the interaction between the biological, psychological and the social. There are the egoic and non-egoic aspects of self, “the i” of pre-reflexive bodily immersion in the culture and the on-going business of not really paying attention. What genuinely appears first of all is the cultural whole for a solo person interacting with others. What can and cannot be stated in an overview is the implied universe of all possible and actual experience for all persons across all time, as that is the genuine background to all noetic-noematic sense but cannot be stated in detail. In order to explain the essences that are conclusions about the most significant correlations between noeses and noemata that indicate the objects that comprise the universe of senses, the explanation in this Part comments on an overview of definitive factors. Chapter 6 makes comments on the inter-relation of biological, psychological and social processes in contemporary view. Chapter 7 details the being of consciousness and its intentionalities as they appear for a solo consciousness. Chapter 8 comments on what consciousness does in providing meaning. Chapter 9 comments on the context of consciousness, the intersubjective. The last focus is on how to understand consciousness as shared and distributed between people as communicating, speaking, thinking beings, where codes of communication are the shared communal property of a cultural group who cohabits in the larger environment of society and history across time.

Chapter 6

Concluding on Biopsychosocial Essences

This chapter sketches how the three registers of the biopsychosocial whole of human being fit together when consciousness is made central. It makes links to the current state of empirical psychology to show how consciousness can represent any object and act as a reminder that knowledge is primarily inside consciousness. The chapter links pure psychology to its potential uses in empirical psychologies and practices that would place consciousness and meaning-objects in social embeddedness and intentional forms, at the centre of professional discourses and the manifestation of their aims. The first section below provides an overview of consciousness in empathic connection with other consciousness (that is covered in detail below). The main focus of the chapter is making links to contemporary human biology from the perspective of the pure psychology of the ontology of the lifeworld which is justificatory intentional analysis for understanding the regions of spirit and nature, consciousness and *körper*. Thus, intentionality, ego, intersubjectivity and meaning constitution are explained. Husserl believed that there is a multifactorial biopsychosocial causation operating: “Causality is a relation between one reality and its corrective surrounding realities. But the reality of the spirit is not related to real circumstances residing within nature; rather, it is related to real circumstances that exist in the surrounding world and in other spirits: this, however, is not nature”, (IV, 283). The major topics below are focusing on biopsychosocial wholism by contacting biological received wisdom and making brief introductory statements of some of the contemporary perspectives that reinvent Husserl’s wheel when it comes to intersubjectivity and empathy, motivation, belief, desire and similar intentional wholes in the social world, the “web of immanent motivations” is where people literally share the same felt-aspirations when they are members of the same culture (IV, 226). Ineinander, intentional implication or intertwining, is used to describe how the meaningful connections between one person get added to another (IX, 9, VI, 256–257).

From the outset, it is possible for theoretical interpretation to imagine the interconnection between aspects of being that are systematically intertwined with each other, each with its different type of cause. But the way of looking at the whole is

also formative, because different views present themselves for inspection in different ways. The naturalistic view focuses on the effects of nature. The view that focuses on intentionality between objects and processes, studies how individuals and contexts come together as a meaningful whole. However, the overall model is collegiality between the psychology, biology and sociology and philosophy in producing new ways of working (IX, 52–72). In the transcendental view of focusing on the intentional history of the ontology of the intersubjective lifeworld is considering the all-inclusive transcendental ground (IX, 64, 69). The narrower view is considering the lifeworld of cultural groups and their norms for making and sharing sense in the context for understanding all forms of meaning-constitution (VI, 130–131, 459, 462). A more philosophical reading of Husserl would now place Husserl in relation to Hegel and Fichte. But the context chosen below is to relate Husserl to the current state of thinking in science, and the theorising of the relations between the ego, the social, the unconscious and brain and body. In short, the natural-biological being is a condition of possibility where it might be possible to interpret brain processes for individuals and groups. But that should not be confused with the idea that such processing is entirely causative of all human behaviour and culture. The problem to be solved theoretically is how to distinguish unconscious implicit reactions in relation to the active egoic processing of reasoning, desiring, believing and responding to emotion. What pure psychology offers is a set of conceptual tools to represent or formulate the way that intentionalities are added so ensuring the fundamentality of meaningfulness.

Overview

In order to clarify Husserl's position some introductory comments are required. Because the psychological attitude regards both intentionality and the natural in one view as meaning for consciousness, to consider the findings of natural science and natural psychological science for what they assert at in the meaningful-intentional world, priority is given to the ego and consciousness as a unity in *leib*, *körper* and culture. The Husserlian view of natural being sees it as an open system. In referring to the non-Cartesian relationship between consciousness and *leib*, Husserl noted that: "Obviously, how far all this extends can only be decided empirically and if possible by means of experimental psychology", (IV, 295, also V, 40, 43, IX, 50). The sort of empirical position that is supported is one that can unify consciousness with neuroscience (Price and Barrell 2012). In short, the majority of the population who have not suffered major trauma are people who find themselves to be unified wholes across the lifespan and appear as I-poles in their contexts (III, 242). The "archontic" automatic process of self-unification, object-constancy of the ego or self-presence happens automatically and is observable in the sense of being oneself regardless of changes in physical and social context (XVII, 363, EU 205–206, Tyson 1996). As chapter 7 will show, for the majority of the population, there are four universal aspects of consciousness in general which are noesis, noemata that

indicate objects and what appears to higher reflection of the ego about its actual and imaginable world; where retentive consciousness catches itself, automatically learning and putting into memory what happens every day. Such a process is part of the unified anonymous or implicit passive consciousness (VI, 114–115, 149). The psychological technical term for the co-occurrence of presentation and perception is that there is modality specific interference which means that some givenness become present in factual absence in memory, anticipation, imagination, empathy, hallucination and imagining empathy for others, for instance. The phenomenological context for understanding intentionality is intersubjective history in which all the attitudes of approach are understood (V, 1–21, IV, 281–282).

When the context for understanding is naturalistic what comes to view is that the physical body is open to a large series of physical influences. Consciousness is a dependent moment with the biological “merely a stratum of real occurrences in the leib”, (IV, 175), for the naturalistic attitude. This could be called biology in personal history, or even wider, as part of a collective genetic history of the individual’s deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA). What naturalistic research shows is that through mirror neurons, in the naturalistic view people’s brains are connected to each other. Also the brain is formed by repetition across time which develops some neural connections and not others. Neurologically, the specific nature of the individual lifestyle across time is the physical seat of the emotions and leiblich sensations and unconscious processes. The physical structure of the individuals is due to complex relationships with the meaningful current context and purposes as distal and proximal physical influences from the current lifestyle and physicality interact with evolutionary influences on DNA (Bouchard 1994; Bouchard and McGue 2003).

In brief, the conclusion that can be drawn from putting the psychological and the naturalistic attitudes together is that there are numerous current and historical influences on biopsychosocial being. Biopsychosocial being exists in natural time and the collective world of other biopsychosocial influences. There are mutually conditioning and limiting influences between the three aspects of their unity when seen in a broader view across history. However, the ego and consciousness is only ever properly understood as part of the collective meaningful-intentional within influences from the natural, biological and chemical. What follows below are some more detailed arguments to characterise the unity of biopsychosocial being as-understood.

Hermeneutics of Three Givennesses in the Lifeworld

The ordinary citizen and the natural scientist share something. They both live in the natural attitude of assuming that natural causes are highly influential and that has the tendency to reify natural-existence. The new demand is to contextualise what is understood in the intentional history of the past; perhaps somewhat like Thomas Kuhn or a history of ideas that is used to understand how sedimentation and traditionalisation play roles in the various arenas of the everyday life and what passes

within academia (VI, 49–53, 59). The natural attitude is common sense realism that understands consciousness as a *thing* within the human body-*thing*, as just one more *thing* in the world. The contents of everyday natural attitude commonsense about what it is to think, relate and act are provided by family, neighbourhood and the means of educating and passing on meaning through the mass communications media of TV, radio, the internet and ordinary social discourse. Linked to the natural attitude is the naturalistic attitude of the different types of natural science. One specific sort of the naturalistic attitude is expressed in psychology as a science is a search for the biological bases of human behaviour. Another form is the use of statistics to predict how people will behave. The naturalistic attitude mistreats meaning and cannot do otherwise. For instance, the naturalistic attitude measures meaning by converting it into numbers because the only procedures it has are quantifying rather than hermeneutic. On the contrary, the naturalistic attitude assumes that only the material aspects of human being are genuinely causative and worthy of study. In the naturalistic view, the conscious interconnections between people and the wider social sphere are of less importance because they are only the background of meaning, where the true focus should be the causative forces of natural-being.

However, in the pure psychological attitude, consciousness belongs to the *leibkörper* but in a meaningful way as part of an intentional-world of communal and collective processes of a making and sharing meaning where people share and compare their views of being (IV, 33, 176, 213). It's true they lack detail and the means of being able to show beyond doubt how one characterisation might be better than another but that is the rational job to be done. One conclusion is that “*nature*” and *animate organism*, and, in its interconnection with the latter, the *psyche*, are *constituted in mutual relationship to one another*, at one with another”, (V, 124). However, it is still the case that pure psychology fulfils a supporting role by providing useful information as to the “actualities and possibilities” of consciousness in all its forms and contexts (VI, 212). Denial of the interaction between consciousness and natural being is a form of determinism that goes against the findings of science because there are complex co-causalities between the ego's free will, the physical context and lifestyle choices contribute to the biological body. The biological includes all those influences from the biological condition of possibility of the whole. For instance, in the naturalistic attitude of biology, the finding about telomeres, the place where the strands of the chromosomes are connected, is that they are found to age due to psychological stress such as the receipt of poor parenting, early trauma, poor nutrition or having mood problems like anxiety and depression. If the telomeres are depleted, then the physical body ages faster. However, if a person takes aerobic exercise, does not smoke and speaks two or more languages then these activities maintain cognitive ability in the latter phase of the life cycle.

The project of pure psychology is a perspective that balances the naturalistic interpretation with the pure psychological attitude that focuses on the commonsense lifeworld, to portray the conditions of possibility of accurate understanding. What abounds within everyday experience is one of the objects to be mapped according to a theoretical attitude that understands intersubjectivity and cultural objects (IV, 5, 190–191, 377, V, 3, 94). People live according to the circulating mass of ideas

and practices. How to live means how to be, so with this ad hoc flow of information comes understanding what comprises the good life and how to make manifest human potential, how to defend loved ones and the self, be happy and satisfied, for instance, despite having had trauma as a child. The random content of the natural attitude, its aims and values are shown to each individual according to his or her walk of life. “Someone like us does...”. “Commonsense culture says that in this situation we should...”. The lifeworld teaches “if... then” transcendental arguments, conditional rules of how to act in specific types of social context and relationship.

But it is not the point of the study of regional essences merely to note whether or how something exists or not. The focus for pure psychological eidetic research is to investigate theoretically what sort of meaning occurs qualitatively, how it might be known with respect to other comparable types (III, 18–20). One interpreter of *Phenomenological Psychology*, Georges Thînès, comments that the function of pure psychology as an a priori study is that “it aims at discovering the necessary ontological principles, without which psychological life is unthinkable. Only after completion of this preliminary task can psychology turn to the descriptive analysis of psychological facts and consider the possibility of their theoretical interpretation”, (1977, 115, cf 109). This expresses a cautious theory-first approach to establishing empirical procedures. For the natural attitude: “Eidetic psychology tells us... that a certain dualism between body and soul is even justified insofar as this dualism already results from the originary experience in the life-world on the basis of its regional typology of essences... a dualism of two different scientific directions of view and interests that is justified by the experience in the life-world”, (Ströker 1980, 75–76, cf VI, 229–235). What can be inquired into are the noetic-noematic senses that can be understood in part-whole configurations and how *gestalts* of sense such as emotions and bodily sensations can be understood as focusing on nonverbal communication but going further to include the connections between being in the body and being in a meaningful way to the total cultural environment (V, 1, 5–9, IV, 281–284).

Cartesian dualism, defined as body and consciousness as two different substances, is an over-simplification but it is untrue to state that the biological genetic code and the meaningful code of the intersubjective world are equivalent. Cartesianism is rejected for reasons of promoting a false dualism that does not represent the primacy of intentionality of consciousness in intersubjective history. The better answer is to state the details of how these givennesses appear and co-occur. Philosophy could focus on the forms of dualism between consciousness and natural being, for there are a variety of philosophical positions already in this area of study. The topic of multifactorial cause will be returned to in chapters 10–15 under the heading of formulation. People have minds but their being is elusive. Thoughts, emotions, behaviours and relationships are directly discussible but these meanings are capable of being kept personal and not reported, so the truth requires elicitation. Meanings are open to reinterpretation and dispute and clearly are not the being that natural science can work on. René Descartes did express two types of givenness and Husserl could have followed his own comments about the unity of the physical, lived and expressive body more faithfully towards understanding meaning “like reading

a newspaper: the paper imprinted with sensory-intuitive marks is unified with the sense expressed and understood in the word-signs... “Spirit” and “Leib” are unified” (IV, 320). If the primacy of the intentionality of consciousness is to be obeyed the understanding of how meaning occurs needs to occur. The aim of transcendental research of the conditions of possibility of Descartes’ conclusions is a natural attitude conclusion that needs further inquiry (Descartes 1986, 59, 108, 115). But it has to be noted that a close attention to Husserl’s texts shows that his conclusion about pure psychology are for it to remain a theoretical study highly focused on the intentional whole so much so that he believed that his position was not Cartesian in the slightest. Pre-Cartesian philosophy “is the old *objectivistic* idea of philosophy going back to antiquity, whereas the post-Cartesian philosophy is oriented to a new *subjective-transcendental* idea”, (XXVII, 166). The next three sections provide more details about each of the three registers of human being in brief.

Biopsychosocial Wholism and Forms of Givenness as a Genuine Problem

Because therapy theories are primarily psychosocial, they are concerned with helping clients improve their self-understanding and self-care. Cases where there are biologically-caused problems such as the physical reactions of the body to stress and uncertainty have been noted since 1925 (Selye 1976). Not only is the brain highly plastic in the case of injury, some genes can be over- or under-expressed. Under-expressed genes occur when there are insufficient copies made and hence not enough protein is made. If there is a silencer at the start of the transcription of a gene then it could cause the gene not to be expressed at all or be under-expressed. Over-expressed genes are when there are too many copies made, more than are required. A genetic inducer causes a gene to be over-expressed and too much protein of a specific sort is made. In the natural attitude however, the way forward is achieved through understanding and managing the distress and impairment produced by the interaction of complex factors including free will and personal choice. To carry out Husserl’s project faithfully would mean attending to the detail of how meaningful wholes can be identified as to their constituent parts that definitively constitute the cultural object. The higher objects of interest such as personality, cultural practices, nonverbal communication and the cultural objects that comprise a culture are historical constitutions and developmental acquisitions that are learned informally across developmental stages conditioned by the intersubjective habitat. Later topics of interest for the ability to deconstruct a meaningful whole into its noetic, hyletic and noematic elements also means keeping reference to the objects that appear across the manifold of much more complex experiences: such as defences against unbearable emotion leading to repression, alienation, dissociation, the lived sense of bodiliness and ultimately the production of different senses of self in the same physical body. But to provide detail falls outside of the current project. But a similar empirical principle applies to all academia not just the sciences. So what ap-




Fig. 6.1 The equi-primordial regions of the biological, psychological and the social exist within the extent of the world and across the development of the lifespan

peared to Carl Linnaeus or Gregor Mendel are perceptually noticeable differences of noematic morphology in Husserl’s sense. What appear to natural science, since the microscope and the ability to sequence the genome, are matters that do not appear directly to vision but do appear to human perception and rationality, extended through technological means. The point is that what appears to science is not fixed in time but moves forward with the adoption of new tools to extend the basic abilities of perception and rational inquiry.

Statements about the treatment of the biopsychosocial whole can be found across the texts of *Ideas II* and include regarding noemata as morphologies of different regions of gestalt (IV, 18–20, 25–27, 177, 280–297, 379). *Ideas III* notes intentional history and looking at developmental concerns and the ethics of self-responsibility (V, 128, 139). Empathising the social intentional world is a means of gaining the map of the world of others to theorise the idiosyncratic details of how they experience their part of their world (V, 144–148, 158). What these comments predict is that there is a complex on-going interplay of causes between the three registers across the lifespan. So as not to cloud the issue, more detailed comments on the intersubjective register are set aside for the moment. For the moment, it is enough to note that the conclusions of *Ideas II* that the psychophysical is the domain of biology in connection with consciousness, whereas the intersubjective register and the connection between leib and consciousness are better explored concerning its spiritual structure in what is stated as a complex post-Cartesian focus on the interaction between intersubjectivity and its natural biological substrate (IV, 362) (Fig. 6.1).

One definitive aspect is attending to noesis-noema correlations where the grounding of concepts occurs and there is the mere possibility is interpreting the various types of intentionality with respect to objects of different sorts. These are

the a priori essences of the lifeworld that ground knowledge. Iso Kern concludes authoritatively that: “Nature, society, and self... are not three distinct regions on a plane... [rather] each is in the whole and in the part. In this sense each dimension is total. In my concrete reality I am wholly and completely nature, wholly and completely an Other, a *socius* of my Others; in my concrete reality I am as much you or he as I am I”, (1986, 29). What he is referring to is the intermixture and concurrence of the registers of the biopsychosocial and their conditions of possibility. This is a way of summing up the tensions between competing apparently incommensurate attitudes of approach.

Biological Conditions of Possibility

Before getting into the further detail of the positions outlined so far, a brief summary is required to make clear the differences between a phenomenological approach and a natural approach. Givenness of the perceptual sort is how biology as a science began as attention to the patterns and processes that show themselves to consciousness: a careful attention to distinguishing the many species of living entity, be they plants or animals. For instance, perceptual observation and reasoning enabled the discovery of penicillin by Alexander Fleming in 1928 who observed the absence of sepsis mould in a petri dish and concluded that penicilium had killed it. The point is that the intentional history of the biological sciences began by making distinctions arguing, discussing these and agreeing findings. Biology interprets causes and follows a specific form of rationality. Such influences may contribute to a persons’ mental health. Natural causes are genetic and biochemical and due to the current state of functioning of a person’s neurology and physiology. The genetic aspect, for instance, is the physical substrate operating at a number of levels simultaneously, but its effects challenge the ego to respond to its own innate tendencies. The specific influence of genetics are revealed in Robert Plomin’s idea of heritability which is a numerical measure of the biological outcome, a biological cause on average, with respect to the whole of biopsychosocial causes (Plomin 2013; Plomin et al. 2012). Specifically, the amount of variation of height or intelligence or other factors that is entirely due to biological cause is divided by the total amount of variation due to all biopsychosocial causes in the “environment” which means due to all epigenetic, nutritional, prenatal and intersubjective causes of the expression of the factor.

Thus, in some instances there are likely to be biological forms of bipolar, borderline personality disorder or schizophrenia, where the ego is ‘*innocent*’. It has not contributed to the state of affairs that it is faced with but is challenged to understand and manage its emotions, choices and lifestyle and work to minimise the negative impact on itself. Thus, the numerical estimates of heritability also show a second phenomenon: the estimates of heritable biological cause by genetic inheritance indicate what percentage of personality and psychological syndromes are environmental and psychosocial. Specifically, heritability through natural cause estimates the level of psycho-socially ‘caused’ amounts of the same mental health problems

where, in the absence of specific genes, a person can still suffer stress due to how they process the meanings around them or how their social context acts to maintain the distress. In the latter cases, the ‘causes’ are psychosocial stressors, conditioning and motivators in relation to individual ways of making sense. So whilst there can be biologically-caused bipolar disorder, for instance. Bipolar could be intersubjectively ‘caused’ as the outcome of trauma or prolonged stress that ‘cause’ changes in mood, although the felt-sense of living with bipolar disorder is the same. Both versions are a challenge for the ego to understand itself and work to manage its changes in mood and associated effects. For the biological form its ‘causes’ are specific events where the ego is also ‘innocent’. There have been recent successes in mapping of the human genome but this has raised more biological questions.

In the naturalistic view, there are 20 amino acids that comprise the DNA of all forms of life. In the human being, four nucleobases (adenine, cytosine, guanine, thymine) combine to produce a three billion letter genetic code held in 25 000 genes which then produce 250 000–375 000 proteins. One area where there is promise in human genetics is in understanding that there are 4 million methylation “switches” where methylation is one of a number of biochemical changes that can occur. Methylation is the addition of a methyl group to the DNA that affects the physical nature and abilities of the individual but not their offspring (Mill et al. 2008; Abdomaleky et al. 2005). Methylation turns on and off various aspects of the genes. This is a causative factor in human development as the switches bring on some types of mental and physical illnesses as well as the development of the individual. This has led to the creation of the field of epigenetics which studies changes in gene activity that do not permanently change the DNA sequence because methylation is only a temporary effect. Epigenetics also investigates how nutrition can effect X and Y chromosomes and the trans-generational transmission of illness. For instance, poor diet during the first 10 years of life can produce a range of physical and mental health problems (Grossniklaus et al. 2013; Pembrey et al. 2006). The patterns of transmission are capable of identification because DNA entities form discrete codes and change in the structure of the DNA is identifiable.

However, there are those who believe that biological being is often considered to be factually the only correct view although the claim is contested in the denial of biological reductionism (Rose et al. 1984). What appears in a longer term view is that the biological sciences are in flux over the course of their development in a historical perspective. Biological causes and limitations exist in the real-world practical attitude of getting in around in the lifeworld (IV, 45, 126, 137). The intersubjective dimension is the larger whole in which the individual is merely a part. The intersubjective forms the set of influences that create the sense of self, and makes emotions, mood and self-interpretations differ in relation to the social environment. The ego selects its lifestyle and identity to a degree and as life goes by it may not realise the on-going contributions of any one of the constituent parts of the whole. One thing to note is that the biological aspect of human nature changes slowly, because general human character has been set by millions of years of evolution, having come from its primate ancestry and slowly evolved through previous versions of *Homo Sapiens*. Accordingly, some of its physical and mental abilities

are determined by conditions that are no longer present, such as the need to protect itself against attack by animals or deal with frequent infections because of continually poor hygiene. Some aspects of emotional reactivity and the personality may well be adaptive to the past, as evolutionary psychology hypothesises. For instance, heterosexuality has been given the evolutionary interpretation that argues that there have been long-term selective factors at play in supporting cross-cultural universals about what make a man or a woman attractive to the opposite sex (Buss and Schmitt 1993). Biology, neuroscience, chemistry and physics have a lot to offer. But what is required for mental health care are clear statements of what it means in the specific work of explaining their findings and engaging individuals in improving their quality of life.

All sciences begin and end with meaning which is co-extensive with the inter-subjective world but what heritability means is that biological cause can show itself as tendencies to be one way or another individually and socially that cannot be eradicated but only self-managed through understanding and self-control, if this is possible. When it comes to understanding intersubjective causes, Plomin's research into the ways that separated identical twins are similar and different due to their differing social and physical environments, is a reputable approach to psychology as a science for the following reasons. Biologically, identical twins are the same at birth. (Although in recent years there has been more detailed investigation into how monozygotic twins are not identical (Haque et al. 2009)). However generally speaking, the reasoning stands because it's possible to identify the psychosocial influences on twins who have had separate upbringings, it is a genuine comparison of like with like. Thus the influence of different social environments shows how identical twins differ entirely because of their socialisation. It is the case that biological cause is mixed with two other types of 'cause', each with its own influences (IV, 208). Indeed, biological research shows that social contexts are necessary in order to trigger genes in the same way that visual objects are necessary to produce the ability to see (Bee 2000; Greenough 1991). In the biological sciences, it is laudable that the human genome project has reformed genetics (Plomin and Craig 2001). But if biological sciences were to become the only justification for therapy, then the object will be improperly understood and practice derived from its findings will be inaccurate with respect to the tasks at hand. This is not to say that there is no helpful impact of understanding the biological aspects of mental health problems or their treatment. One solution is treating biological causes with biological remedies; and psychosocial 'causes' with psychosocial remedies. When it comes to neurology, the brain has been shown to be highly plastic in learning and re-growth. Even after damage, the functions of lost portions of it can recover in new areas. For instance, formal rehabilitation is effective to regain speech after a stroke and regain bodily movement. Plasticity extends to include on-going learning across the lifespan so that it is true to say that an individual's brain reflects their lifestyle to date. Wholistically, neurology and lifestyle are co-influencing.

Discussion

Natural psychological science attends to the material aspect of the brain, chemicals, biology and genetics and justifies psychological processes and interventions. But science does not state how it makes its conclusions in a wholly meaning-oriented way. Natural psychological science when it focuses excessively on natural being could be called the biological attitude or “medical model” because like natural science it uses statistics to numericise the spectrum of meaning into discrete packets to explore statistical correlations produced by experimental designs that claim to be able to create only one output from an input. However, non-phenomenological approaches such as natural anthropology, natural sociology and natural psychology attend to the biological nature of one-third of the human overall and then struggle to connect with first-person and social experience. Try as best they might, if there is no account of the overall multifactorial nexus of causes, then each of the biological, psychological and social regions cannot come together because the being of these areas are genuinely different. The registers of the biological or natural; social or intersubjective; or as the psychological (what lies within individuals) are often contemplated in isolation from each other. Some of natural psychology rejects meaning in preference for the meaningless focus on cortisol or other measurable processes that are concurrent with meaning. The focus on natural being is congruent but only around the being of the biological object. The meaningful does not clearly translate into neurotransmitters, biochemistry or the function of one part of the brain. It is the task of future empirical psychologies to indicate complex causes from each of the three registers of human being that comprise specific outcomes in multifactorial research. In a sense, there are individual brains to be understood. Specialisation of role and in society and repetitions throughout the lifespan create enlarged and diminished neurological structures according to the type of lifestyle. Biological processes are the legitimate object of biological science. This is because the natural formulation of natural causes of psychological problems leads to management of those natural reversible causes by natural means. When psychological management is requested after a natural formulation, without specifying how consciousness is related to the natural cause, there is a jump between regions without sufficient explanation or justification.

However, the understandings of nature, biology and neurology are constructions of thought and awareness that require translation into meaning to make them part of psychological understanding regarding how meaningful goal-oriented behaviour of “if... then...” motivations make cultural sense (IV, 86–87). Such motivations circulate and are brought about by empathy within communities. It is clearly acknowledged that there is a co-influencing between leib, brain and states of consciousness (IV, 294). The conclusion on the interplay between the three registers is stated as: “Needless to say, the future cannot be predicted with certainty, but only hypothetically, by supplying the intermediate parts. On the other hand, the past can be encompassed in the understanding by means of clear memory, and each motivational nexus it had can be comprehended... Everywhere natural causality,

what is leiblich, and what is determined in consciousness by the leiblich play their roles together. In no way do these determinations need to be universal. The B[rain] can indeed be a necessary though not sufficient condition”, (IV, 296–297). This conclusion admits that there can be cases where there are different strengths of causative force in operation. So Husserl is not suggesting that what he can elucidate is true merely because he saw its essence. The ultimate arbiter is always empirical testing itself. The state of an individual’s brain or the true nature of their genetic inheritance is at the current time not ascertainable in every respect (although that may change in the future). Currently, biological science has not been able to go any further than being able to find preparatory information. It has to be noted that the state of an individual’s brain is variable in how it contributes to the total situation of the individual’s ego or personality style across the lifespan. It would be a naturalistic mistake to think that a “univocal determination of spirit through merely natural dependencies is unthinkable, i.e., as reduction to something like physical nature... Subjects cannot be dissolved into nature, for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing. Nature is a field of relativities throughout, and it can be so because these are always in fact relative to an absolute, the spirit” of shared consciousness in culture (IV, 297).

Brief Introduction to Intersubjectivity and Cultural Objects

This penultimate section of the chapter introduces intersubjectivity that is covered below in more detail but as it is implied in the discussion of the meaning it is necessary to say something of the manifold of others who are present in the current time and across history. When approached in a meaningful way the whole of intersubjectivity appears as forms of relationship: *Insight* is the apperception of self by self, the psychological understanding of self. It co-occurs with *empathy*, the ability to understand others and their perspectives. In addition to these terms there are a number of equivalent terms that describe what is being discussed to make various forms of psychological knowledge. The list of major topics in socially-oriented studies is as follows. Sometimes the phrases “psychological mindedness” or “emotional and social intelligence” are used (Goleman 1995). One assumption to avoid in western culture is that there is an excessive tendency in the natural attitude to assume that the individual is in fact most causative when in fact the social context is most influential as Karl Marx also noted (1972). Sometimes an excessive incorrect judgement is that all social interactions are due to the personal learning of the individual but that is decreased by citing the fundamental attribution error (Ross 1977). Social contexts and interactions between people are also understood by the words “systems” and systemic family therapy. Another area of developmental study is the multifactorial research of Michael Rutter on the resilience of children (Rutter 2006, 112). Individuals have different abilities to deal with adversity and this has lifelong semi-permanent effects on their abilities to be intimate, to attach and how they

manage the emotions motivated by intimacy, its disappointments and its absence (Liljenfors and Lundh 2014; Owen 2006a). Insight, the higher understanding of self by self, and empathy, the understanding of others and their perspective, are both part of the whole of intersubjective life: pre-reflexively being immersed in family, work and culture. Empathy and apperception (the self understanding itself) are the most basic ground of being human that natural psychological science has long regarded as irrelevant and incapable of being a basis for itself. It is right too. Just by itself the natural attitude cannot ground natural science. Together insight and empathy are currently called “mentalisation” (Fonagy and Target 1996a, b, 1997, 1998; Fonagy and Luyten 2009), “mindreading” or “theory of mind” and social cognition (Moskowitz 2005). An “individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others”, (Premack and Woodruff 1978, 515), which is an inaccurate wording as no inference occurs in immediately being able to understand others and self. In the realm of therapy the expectations and realities concerning the shared life is represented by the expression of the “core beliefs” discussed by Aaron Beck “of the most sensitive component of the self-concept (e.g. vulnerable, helpless, inept, loveless, worthless) and the primitive view of others (rejecting, hostile, demeaning)”, (1996, 4). All of the schools of thought are based on the on-going connection between the sense of self as it is apperceived by itself and the empathised and imagined sense of others and how they might be empathising the self. The building blocks of the meaningful connection with others are recognisable as the immersion in intersubjectivity in a pre-reflexive way where the emotions felt are evidence that is created automatically. Empirically, persons vary in the accuracy of their empathy with the notable exceptions of some people for whom such ability is continually weak or occasionally absent. However, these schools are parallel to the ideal study of empathy and intersubjectivity and parallel to the empirical studies of social cognition and emotional representations of how people reflect on the senses self and other (Owen 2002, 2006b). And importantly, it has to be realised that there are two ways in which the senses self and other can be focused on, against the background of the social experience that we have: Either there are pre-reflexive presences or there are properly reflected on senses capable of description and interpretation.

Specifically, the two levels of awareness are what is felt immediately pre-reflexively in emotion and gut feeling; and what can be explored through the ego rationalising and including what can be imaginatively empathised about what oneself feels or others might feel. Of course, the minds of others are indirectly observable and empathising, the ability to gain the impression of what others think, feel and mean by what they say, write and express in the ways that people express cultural objects and form them in what they do is, something that is beyond the capabilities of empirical approaches but not pure psychology. But the dimension of the psychological world that is held in empathy and intersubjectivity lies between the implicit and unconscious and the egoic; the immanent and the transcendent; concepts and emotions about defensive regulation. The senses of self and others are made by everyone and are types of meaning that pure psychology can study (IX, 321, XIII, 159, 183–191).

Natural psychological science succeeds in understanding mirror neurons that provide the brain with neurological processes about others and the world. But pure psychology uses intentionality as the lingua franca to build well-justified approaches to mapping meaningful experience. When specific aspects of the social whole are reflected on they are identified as specific relationships between persons or specific types of relationships in general. Such meanings are what ordinary consciousness is most interested in. The demand for the seeing of evidence concerns spaciality, temporality and motivational “causality” and results in finding that “the intersubjectively identical thing... is related to an open plurality in relation to subjects “understanding one another”. The intersubjective world is the correlate of intersubjective experience, i.e., ‘experience’ mediated by empathy”, (III, 317). The manifold senses of intersubjectively identical things are later renamed as the cultural senses of cultural objects (IX, 112–118). Consciousness turns its attention to many things in the lifeworld. What is most telling is to reduce to solo consciousness to see the differences between mediate and immediate forms of sense, for instance, the difference between presentations and perceptual senses (IV, 198–200). Such studies could become morphologies of understanding common sense (IV, 190–192, 315–316, 386–391). In later years this was called the reduction to the “intersubjective sphere of ownness” which means that the focus was on the difference between what appears to self as opposed to how a cultural object appears to others in culture of what is common and shared across person and time (I, 137). From 1910 Husserl had made it clear that it is permissible to analyse cultural objects and what appears on reflection on the view of shared senses of cultural objects is that the universe world-whole of sense is immediate and prior to reflection and analysis. Any cultural object is a part of wider culture so how it is used, what types or brands of it are available and public knowledge about it circulate. The term cultural object is a formal term that refers to many material regions such as physical things, living bodies, meanings, tools, consumer products, music, food, ideas, and mathematics. Cultural objects support human communal aims and needs and are connected to values, motivations and beliefs. As an introductory definition of the term and the ability to focus on shared meaning that is distributed across a culture and its history, it is sufficient merely to note that the most formal definition is characteristic is polyvalent cultural senses that are observable for self and others across the audiences that comprehend the same object from a manifold of different viewpoints.

What is given in the primary phenomenon of meaning is available, for self and others. So fundamentally there are manifolds of several noematic senses in everyday experience for cultural communities. It is only in theoretical discussion and analysis that there are greater composite wholes of experience that get investigated as specific noesis-noema correlations. The process identified is one of seeing the object as an emergent property arising from a possible confusion of a manifold of noetic-noematic experiences, a dependent whole (III, 271). What enables sense is overarching mental processes that include syntheses for integrating experiences together in connection with possible cohesive noemata. In a wider view, the dependent wholes of meaning are intersubjective for a culture. They are shared and distributed among a cultural reference group who may all be able to readily identify

noemata of these sorts in any noetic way whatsoever. Let's consider a dependent whole of the sort of recognising physical objects through visual perception. If the region of objects under consideration is utensils for drinking fluids, then there will be a large series of noemata that could be recognised by the natural attitude as cups, mugs, beer tankards, glasses, goblets, chalices and tea cups. If visual perception is the noesis involved, then all the noesis-noema correlations will manifest a closed region of utensils for drinking fluids in visual givenness. Within such a manifold of correlations, Husserl argued that specific types of essences could be identified. Specifically, there are self-sufficient eidetic individua (III, 29) which are essences capable of being considered in isolation from their greater wholes or unities of sense. These are ontologically independent pieces, like pieces of natural being in the naturalistic attitude. The absolute most fundamental self-sufficient whole is meaning for consciousness in intersubjective history. And only this region is the greatest eidetic concretum of all. Within the re-contextualising process of considering the possible and the essences of such: What Husserl is asserting is the priority and supremacy of meaning for consciousness as the absolute ground and the process of eidetic clarification that moves from instances of the meaning of being to universals about it in a re-working of Aristotle's categories (2013). Therefore, actual instances of meaning for consciousness need to be understood within the total range of merely possible cases of consciousness in natural world in time in pure psychology. One dependent moment of the constitution are cultural groups that create meanings for their membership through participating in the sum total of signifying processes and communications media.

Section 16 of *Phenomenological Psychology* clearly explains the links within the cultural world of the objective manifold of plural perspectives. All objects are cultural objects (IX, 111). A world is "world as totality of realities... The real world is the totality of concrete individuals", (IX, 100, fn). A world is made by "culture-creating subjectivity", (IX, 113). A world is intersubjective and concerns "mental facts, with men and animals, insofar as they are mental beings and abodes of mental, psychic happening; as universal psychology, with what holds in common everywhere, as psychological anthropology and animal psychology, with the human realm and the animal realm in their respective limits", (IX, 53). Cultural objects have sense given to them by a group of people, so much so that plural senses stick to them for "every expressed sense and the object entirely endowed with sense, itself refers back, in its disclosed experiential content, to a psychic subjectivity, universally: to a human being or a human community out of whose personal performance it has arisen. It is the product of a subjective fashioning, arisen from intention, aim, setting of goals and means, realizing action—and finally the total performance, therefore, in the broadest sense, a product of work", (IX, 114), where the "product of work" is a reference to intentionality as intersubjective intentional implication. What Husserl did not mention in section 16 is that objects can come together to produce composite objects, and that there is no restriction on this process. For instance, one book exists within a series, and several books together may form a commentary from a specific perspective. This series has a relation to what has gone before and to other rival views on the same topic. And so many commentaries work together to produce

a literature comprising a genre and its sub-genres that comprise the whole. Merely because some works are hard to classify does not prevent the basic observations as to how there can be composite objects of smaller and larger complexities.

Cultural senses are made in contexts (IX, 113) ultimately historical contexts and ‘carry’, or are given cultural senses that signify semiotically, a “unity... of two sides” of “that which expresses and of the expressed, the cultural significance”, (IX, 112). These cultural senses span time historically (IX, 118). Cultural senses are capable of being re-interpreted (IX, 113) and re-experienced (IX, 117). The “relation to a personal community belongs to the proper meaning of all cultural objectivity”, (IX, 118). So in a way reminiscent of the earlier remarks about the public quality of signs within a culture (XIII, 98, fn), and semiotics (XII, 340–373), and the use of a hammer in joinery (XXV, 317), then what is being extolled is a link between cultural objects and human purposes in an extension of previous studies of praxis (XVIII, 105–106). The example of the use of a hammer points out that the mere conceptual label “hammer” and its use in the pre-reflexive process of hammering a nail into a piece of wood can be teased apart to show that there are many aspects to this whole experience. It’s best to savour the whole of Husserl’s wording in order to get the proper sense of what he discerns in the whole of using the physical object of a hammer towards a purpose.

As we enter into the internal world with its motivational nexuses, and at the same time consider it as a psychic existent bound to the external being of physical bodiliness [physischer Leiblichkeit] and bring it into the nexus of a unitary surrounding world, motivation also achieves already an overarching significance for this surrounding world itself beyond the psychical. For only mere *nature* in our sense of *meaningless physis* has *nothing of motivation* in its factual existence. On the other hand the vast manifold of meaning-objectivities, that is to say, levels of meaning in physical things and subjectivities, are *understandable* objectivities, and their scientific explanation is nothing else than just engendering understanding, clarifying motivations. I understand the signification unity that the word “hammer” expresses by relating it back to that which posits the end, to the subject creating a at any time useful means for purposeful productions of a definite type. Means and end is a motivational relation and every more precise investigation into the objective sense of tools is an explication of motivations. As far as acts extend, the sphere of these motivations and the sphere of significations constituted by them extends also. But of course active motivations presuppose the appropriate substratum, just as the active I, the *intellectus agens*, presupposes the passive intellect, the psychical substratum. *And as far as acts and act-motivations extend, extends also the idea and the system of norms of “reason”*. Just as all acts are judged to be correct or incorrect, valid or invalid, so too in a correlative way are the achievements of the subject that are indebted to them; that is to say, all significance-objectivities and significance-predicates are judged in their manner or correlation as rational and irrational. The hammer “is to be useful” but it can be a good or a bad hammer, the artwork is to be beautiful, but it can in fact be beautiful or tasteless, etc.

Ms A IV, 16, 26, cited in Nenon and Embree, 1996, 9–10.

The example given is the cultural use-object of a tool in the greater human purpose of making something that extends some other purpose, towards some endpoint of satisfying some human need. The point Husserl was making in the passage above is that there is only ever latent motivation becomes manifest to some degree in the intersubjective register of consciousness and its personal psychological space that inhabits the wider social expanse. Thus, the practical attitude of behaviour sits in the

context of decision-making, valuing, habit and commitment towards the meeting of human needs through a myriad of purposes. Motivation is the name of what drives consciousness from the specific means of achieving some task towards a specific end. What this means for pure psychology, or the wider transcendental consideration, is that what is required are proofs by concrete examples that demonstrate the minute particulars of motivational explanations due to meanings and the desire to achieve. All the pieces of a whole of an action are what make the overall sense, and the way that they come together shows a specific style of achieving an end point in a particular manner. There are very many cultural objects of course. Some of which are other people but the semiotic commonality is that “any cultural object, of any tool, of a machine, of a building, of a speech or a text, we experience not duality but unity” of the implied associative sort already noted (IX, 112). Psychological cultural objects such as understanding an event in a relationship, or a general sort of relationship, are frequently higher composite objects of attention, based on what can be heard, seen and felt emotionally. In total, cultural objects of different sorts comprise what is existent for a set of people.

The Horizon of the World

Let’s consider the frame or context of the cultural world. Whatever the horizon of the world that is projected forward in time, it is interpreted as the outcome of beliefs about the nature of objects within the intersubjective world of the past. There may not be a precise time or specific event that created the tendency to believe how the contemporary context or the future-world will be. However, the beauty of the intentionality interpretation is that the world as a whole is thrown forwards, as an implied context set around predicted events in the specific creation of a style of world. Let’s look at the example of agoraphobia. Persons with agoraphobia believe that there are places that are anxiety-provoking. In these places, they predict that people will notice their anxiety and strongly disapprove of it, and similarly, their view of themselves will also be disapproving as a result. The study of the meaningful world, a universe of meaning, is sometimes referred to in anthropology as “cosmology”. In the case of anthropology, the world takes a certain shape or style. This wholeness is applied to understanding the world of agoraphobia where open places are felt to be threatening before people get into them in perceptual reality. When people with agoraphobia do enter them indeed they are fear-inducing. The intentional analysis of the links between temporality and belief in this phobia are obvious and can be easily expressed as the style of an intentional world. What the world of agoraphobia means is that it is not just ontology of what exists, in the sense of creating a list of the cultural objects therein, and specifying the style of their senses and manner of interpretation. It’s more about the relationship between the frame of the own world, as it is thrown forward from the past, and creates a reading of the events of the future that is used as a map for feeling, behaving and deciding about the future in the here and now.

A good deal more could be said about essences of the psychological regions and how to identify them. But with an eye to the region of intersubjectivity and the understanding of the own world of each individual that is thrown forwards in time, the intersubjective focus is looking at the variation of self, other, cultural object and world. The world is defined as the “infinity of what is taken for granted”, (VI, 208), which can be read as meaning that the lifeworld of the assumptions and learnings of commonsense form the most fundamental meaning-constituting field of experience. Similarly, “persons are “cultural objects” of the surrounding world”, (IV, 379, fn 2), and there are brief mentions of morphologies of cultural objects (IV, 379, cf IX, 110–118). The spaces of the body and the world in agoraphobia are outside of a limit, the geographical world is unsafe. Inside the safe zone, the body is not threatened. Outside of it, the body is threatened by anxiety itself.

Summary: Psychology and Therapy Involve Philosophical Problems of Conceptual Reference

Conceptual reference is where guiding concepts point to definitive or exemplary experiences of cases in general, or to specific or cultural groups that define a typical or identifiable object of awareness (XVI, 49–50, XVII, 197, 198). But meaning for consciousness interpreted properly, can be alternatively interpreted by naturalistic attitude research. This is because meanings-for-consciousness are meaningful experiences that are outside of the scope of natural science methodology. It’s impossible to weigh a feeling or measure units of meaning. Naturalistic methods apply quantification and statistics to phenomena that are intangible to measuring devices. In short, what the natural psychological sciences like neurosemantics share are attempts to represent consciousness and maintain natural psychological science (Panizza 2012, Pulvermuller 2012). The phenomenological point is to create an accurate narrative concerning *how* people experience verbal and nonverbal meaning. In asserting that anything is the case, the claimant and their audience understand from the perspective of being on the inside of consciousness and being connected to each other through a pool of common cultural objects. Both are part of the shared social world that communicate with others who share socially-connected consciousness in the communication of shared views, although the ultimate future project concerns empirical applications of theoretical investigations. When mental processes are idealised, the *intentional implications*, associations within one consciousness in general, are understood as part of the *intersubjective intentional implications*, associations between two or more people unfolding across time (XI, 115–119). The theoretical view fully acknowledges the social nature of influences between particular instances of consciousness in general and proposes a theory of meaning which is a contribution to philosophy and the sciences.

Therapeutically, the consequence of the naturalistic treatment of a person with medication, as opposed to the psychological treatment of a person through intentionality and empathising consciousness, can be expressed as follows: If a person

has a trauma-induced psychosis and their naturalistic therapist only recommends medication to help them, then the consequences are that there is no explanation offered as to what they can do when they re-experience somatic flashbacks, the bodily sensations of their trauma, in addition to the voices and visions that they have. However, the same person would be understood entirely differently within a therapy that really understands through intentionality where the hallucinations come from. Such an exploration would be that their retentional consciousness gives back to their conscious experience various associations from the past that connect with perceptual objects in the current moment (cf X, 145, 335, Whittacker and Dewhurst 2008). Given that an intentional account can be offered that explains their experiences and helps them understand themselves and supports ways of managing these experiences, then the individual is recombined with culture and society and learns how to self-manage how they feel and can respond to their own distress.

For despite the many superficial differences between men and women, young and old, races and creeds, we share much more than we have different in our journey from the cradle to the grave. So the argument of this work is to stay focused on the biopsychosocial as a worthwhile position for understanding humanity. A central focus on understanding meaning in the context of the psychosocial is arguing for it as the central point around which to organise the manifold activities of research in the psychologies and support therapy theory, practice and research. The cultural life that people share is the sphere in which scientific findings are applied. So, meaningful experience is relevant and not a side issue. A means of representing processes of intentional awareness with respect meaningful objects is required to justify and protect it as a valued means of communication between professionals and the users of the knowledge. It may sound odd to have to argue for the importance of meaning for consciousness in psychology and therapy, but the treatment of meaning is in jeopardy since an excessive focus on the material, biological and neurological formulates a different set of explanations and actions altogether. Indeed, an excessive focus on the biological and its causes only permits and explores biological conditions of possibility, abandoning meaning for consciousness and confounding coherent understanding. In some parts of psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience and psychometric usage of allegedly scientific approaches to meaning predominate. Yet an 'embarrassing' attention to meaning usually needs to be smuggled in via the backdoor at the last moment.

The role of pure psychology to make the actions, beliefs, desires and experiences of the individual understandable through seeing them as the full totality of any self's journey through the world. What is sketched is a strong tension between biological cause and intersubjective motivations of the sort of recognisable public meanings and emotions that abound in family, culture and society. The self-referential comments include comparison of what can be seen through different research attitudes such as comparing what is seen through the naturalistic view; as opposed to the intersubjective view with its necessarily much more complex assertion of how associations between objects, contexts, the ego and the world of others can be noted to form a world-whole (IV, 25–27, 210, 298, 300, 302). The theme that Husserl's detailed analysis of the practices of everyday living and the parallelism between natu-

ral interpretation and the phenomenological one, make a unique discourse about how all forms of mental production obey universal shapes and forms and generate entirely different activities (IV, 377–393). The structuralism that is promoted is not Cartesian with a heavy focus on the natural, but on unbuilding the wholes that present themselves to become able to identify the dependent constant relations in them (IV, 28–29). Pure psychology wants to understand motivations of the “because... thus...” and “if... then...” sorts to make explicit statements about what associations and motivations that drive the social world (IV, 226). The biopsychosocial is a parallelism between the biological and meaning-for-consciousness in intersubjectivity that acknowledges the multifactorial whole (IV, 386–391).

The application of pure psychology to the concrete case of therapy means discussing the ‘causes’ of motivations and meanings with clients. To discuss cause and effect can include writing formulation diagrams between experiences such as thinking and emotion, worry and depression. This is for the purpose of discussing rationales with them with an eye to helping them change these experiences through collaborative work. The first person to organise the motivations of the whole complex of thought, motivation, emotion and belief was Albert Ellis who made a temporal interpretation to explain the links between activating events and beliefs that cause emotional and behavioural consequences, a “formulation” or “conceptualisation” of problematic experiences (Ellis 1962; Persons 1989; Horowitz 1979; Ross 2000). Briefly, formulation is the noting of ‘causes’ that has a history dating back to Sigmund Freud (1900a, 96, Greenson 1967, 102) and Franz Brentano (1973). This topic is an application of pure psychology in therapy, mental health care and empirical psychology.

Pure psychology produces eidetic conclusions and argues that the region of consciousness is ripe for such clarification to understand how the “*enigma of subjectivity*” is “inseparably bound to the *enigma of psychological subject matter and method*”, (VI, 3). Psychological phenomena include connecting with or avoiding others and sharing meaning in a world. They are contributed to by the sum total of learning since infancy, so that adult selves come to treat themselves on the model of how they were treated in their earlier personal history (Fairbairn 1940, 1943). Without revision, sometimes such manners of treating others and self can become engrained at a habitual and intimate level in personal being. Original choices and motivating factors that constitute beliefs are used to handle current specific contexts and relationships. So the new gets treated according to the old familiar map of the world and not in relation to current events.

The biopsychosocial influences on the living body, through its expressive speech, flesh and gesturing form our shared personal experience of being alive, relating with others and understanding the world. Our personal experience is knowledge that is unique, immediate and universal in a way that has an identifiable shape and form. Similarly, psychopathology, the study of lived distress, concerns meanings in life and is the result of interpretation about occurrences therein, brought about by the learnings of what should or could happen in relation to what does happen. Based on how the individual constitutes meaning then therapy promotes changes in meaning, reframes and explains how meaning works and what it means to be distressed.

Given that natural psychological science has an improper emphasis (IX, 55–56), and that consciousness in intersubjectivity is the source of the empirical sciences (IX, 64), the point of the pure psychology project is to produce co-working amongst colleagues by observing the more general mental processes that define the concrete meaningful reality of key distinctions in academic studies and practical disciplines. The role of theoretical psychological research concerns how to understand meaning theoretically first of all, before working to investigate it or help the clients of mental health services change their own meanings to create a qualitative theory that accounts for both the static maintenance of the current state of affairs, and the genetic-development of the accrual of the personality and psychological syndromes that a person may have across the lifespan. What is needed is a basic model that employs intentionality to explain meaningful experiences. The benefit of the concept of intentionality is that it unifies the formulation of research questions and their answers and works to define problems and promote identifying a treatment.

Chapter 7

The Being of Consciousness

This chapter focuses on solo consciousness in abstraction from others in order to define consciousness “in general” or “overall”. The chapter catalogues definitions with the purpose that they can be used in interpreting real instances and merely possible situations, for one consciousness or two or more in a social connection. The sequence begins with two orientating conclusions. Firstly, there are four universal aspects of consciousness. Secondly, consciousness is a whole of many connected noetic-noematic senses that point both to objects and noeses, the intentionalities. One technical term to describe this whole is that there is intentional implication within one consciousness (or intersubjective intentional implication between two or more) where intentional modification of perception and other modifications occur between the intentional forms. This position notes that *eide*, ideal forms of most basic mental processes, are identified so that higher more complex forms can be understood. The consequences of the ideal morphological noetic analysis are that a whole can be identified according to its constituent moments of noetic sense. A closing note is made about the being of the ego and consciousness as unified into a single sense, a monism, for the majority of the population despite the fact that there are a manifold of experiences that comprise it. The aim of intentional analysis is to find the pure “‘laws of thought,’ [that]... express the a priori connection between the categorical form of meanings and their objectivity or truth”, (XIX/2, 92). The conclusions of essences are a priori laws concerning the structure of consciousness for: “Laws of association are laws of essence; they are not rules for immanent consciousness”, (XIII, 83, fn, cf XVI, 141).

The actual instances of noetic-noematic sense are very many simple and compound forms that are interpreted (XVII, 191, 246–247). Because the processes of intentionality and givennesses are universal, the grammar of experience needs to be explained with concrete examples that are tangible and promote the identification of evidence. The requirement to provide basic definitions means it is a necessity to omit discussion about variations of the forms and complex nested versions of awareness. The way to unite the requirements produces a narrative about meaning that is incapable of being specified in any other way. The style of discussion needs

to be both accessible in the way that talking about the “imagination” or “memory” is accessible to professional groups and the general public. However, like any approach within psychology, mental health care and therapy, the discussion extracts the key characteristics of the processes of being aware. The object of consciousness is self-reflexive in a number of ways. Noemata appear noetically: a meaning always appears through some form of awareness.

The Fourfold Being of Solo Consciousness

Husserl’s characterisation of the four universal parts of consciousness is a unifying account across the remainder of this work. Consciousness has four constants which we can detect in our own awareness and interpret. In this view consciousness is a dependent whole with four interlocking moments. Following Iso Kern (1988), the four parts are: (π_1) Noemata, that are integrated to make the senses of objects of attention, are always apprehended in some noetic way. For noeses give noemata and are present self-reflexively to the ego that rationalises and bears witness (X, 27–28, 76–77, 84). The ego in relation to what happens before and after reflection is noted below because there are egoic intentionalities and non-egoic syntheses. (π_2) There is reflective meta-awareness of being aware and being able to analyse and identify the forms that appear (II, 6–14, 44, X, 133, 284–285, 290, 333). (π_3) There is the pre-reflexive continual process of retentive consciousness that records all conscious experience that then has further links to the involuntary world of associations that influence people and meaning. It records current experience involuntarily making an ontological store of patterns that can be re-identified (X, 24, 80–81, 85–86, 360). So, if we hear a song for a second time, we know that we are encountering it for the second time even though we didn’t try to memorise it: we didn’t have to. The presence is retained or played back in the now which enables identification of what has been involuntarily learned. Self-presence in this way concerns automatic processes and engagement with people and the cultural objects that comprise a world. Self-presence as part of the whole is constituted by an aspect of itself that Husserl called “absolute” or “time-constituting consciousness”, (X, 75, 369–372, 381) that acts immediately in each new moment in a wholistic way (cf Kant 1787, B179–182). This automatic presencing of the whole of personal knowledge is of many sorts. (π_4) There is unity of consciousness and its objects when reflecting on being aware of self, bringing self-presence into proper awareness, because of the lower unified self-presence of retained consciousness to retained consciousness itself (X, 80, 83, 373, 378–379, 381–382). After reflection on the self’s pre-reflexive immersion in intersubjectivity and temporality (VI, 264), it is further possible to indicate other parts, many of which are not immediately apparent but implicit and pre-reflexive. Let’s look at the four parts in more detail. The first two have already been defined in some detail in chapter 4.

First, straightforward attention can focus on the noemata of an object that appears in some noetic way. This is the most basic description of consciousness at work.

Second, a meta-cognitive meta-awareness is available to the ego that is capable of meta-reflection on what appears of the straightforward form. Both the straightforward intentionality and the higher awareness of it are objectifying and follow the all-inclusive quality of the subject-object connection between consciousness and the meaning of being. The methodological tool is reflection on awareness in the sense of attending to any current referent, any connection between one person and another, between oneself and another, or any connection between an instance of consciousness and a general situation of it being in a context of any sort. Before reflection, the individual life is immersed in everyday living and just gets on with whatever comes along. The moment that reflection starts, the ego awakes in that reflective attention focuses on what and how things appear. However, there are two further non-objectifying sorts of presencing that have not been properly defined yet.

Third, there is a spontaneous creation, retaining and playing-back in pre-reflexive features of consciousness (I, 81, X, 26). Pre-reflexive experience is comprised of material that can be experienced by the higher reflective ego as the on-looker who analyses what it experiences. The spontaneous absorption of what has just occurred in the original time field passes into retentional consciousness of what appears to non-reflective unclarified tacit awareness. It concerns aspects of pre-reflexive immediacy that Husserl referred to as “absolute” consciousness because it deals with the whole of sense and continually can understand the past and present moments all at once (III, 93, X, 371, XVII, 244). The long-lasting automatic recording process produces a storehouse and that has the associated function of the absolute creation of every new sense that includes making the contents of the now. A whole series of new awarenesses are spontaneous, (“*genesis spontanea*”, X, 100) such as new thoughts arising in internal dialogue that aren’t always bidden by ourselves even if it is our internal voice that is talking. Spontaneous emotion, imagination, memory and anticipation arise within one’s own current perception of the world and may be influenced by factors that are not immediately apparent to the ego. This third part is non-objectifying in its awareness.

Fourth, the third retentional part of consciousness has a fourth part which is a lower self-awareness of its own that has the function of self-unification (except in some empirical circumstances as will be explained below). This lower self-reflexive form of attention focuses on the flow of awareness. When retentional consciousness enables non-objectivated presences become objectified, the me-as-object appears as a higher sort of self-consciousness, one that concerns choice and willed action in relation to the body that appears and the choice of intentionalities deployed such as memory or empathy. These senses of the egoic style happen in the context of other cultural objects, reflected-on senses about being. They contribute to the on-going ability to be united in one’s sense of self, through a synthesis of self-presence for the “soul itself is nothing more than the unity of its properties”, (IV, 123).

To make the purpose of the exposition below clear, meaningful goal-oriented behaviour can be saved from the excesses of the naturalistic attitude by spelling out how it is structured. There are several aspects of consciousness and its attention which operate alongside the more egoic, choice-oriented form. The change from the natural attitude of pre-reflexive immersion of improper awareness, to the

reflective one, entails the direct personal evidence of one's own involvement in one's own experiences. This is just one form of evidence since it's also possible to focus on other people and what they experience of the world also. The phenomena that the unconscious aspect of anonymously functioning consciousness makes manifest are meanings and associations due types of learning including trauma. The phenomenon of perseverance in creative-problem solving is another example where it's possible, for instance, to go to sleep with an unsolved question and wake up with its answer or otherwise think of solutions after having had a much longer period of thought. These answers come unbidden, without the actions of the ego in thinking them through. This can have positive or negative instances. In the positive circumstance, a person can trust themselves to do something, learn something and set a course for their life by entering a training course, for instance. In the negative form, if persons imagine themselves having a heart attack and dying in the street, and repeat versions of this every day, what this feels like for the ego is that its emotions are too strong and out of control. If the ego believes that it is weak and is easily overwhelmed by emotion, and that this experience is a catastrophe to be avoided, then the ego alters its lifestyle to protect itself. Metaphorically speaking, "the burglar alarm goes off too soon". For instance, there are visceral experiences of danger for the claustrophobic person. The possibilities that they are anxious about occur in their cultural world. Let me make the link to the construal of the world of intentionality clear. Claustrophobic consciousness ends up being acutely aware of its own bodily reactions and holds within itself the possible 'catastrophe' of being hemmed-in, in a number of different ways. The ego selects disastrous scenarios and consciousness passively constitutes the anxiety so it works out how it wants to protect itself: this is the work of the unconscious in league with a defensive ego. The specific decisions and accumulation of skills are involuntary and constituted quickly, potentially against the wishes of the ego. But the outcomes are frequently highly conscious and highly problematic. Anonymously functioning consciousness provides the emotions that are congruent with what the ego visualises. Thus, the relationship between ego and consciousness gives clues as to how the whole of self can be out of balance and how this then disrupts relationships between self and other in the lifeworld.

Fig. 7.1 seeks to express the relation between these parts of consciousness. Husserl noted that the world exists before the self and its understanding for "only by being in possession of the totality of the subjective sphere, in which man, the communities of men intentionally and internally bound together, and the world in which they live, are themselves bound together, and the world in which they live, are themselves included as intentional objects—it is only by being in possession of this totality that one becomes capable of seeing and systematically investigating what we characterised as the "*how* of the manners of givenness". It was in just this way that one could first discover that every worldly datum is a datum within the *how* of a horizon, that, in horizons, further horizons are implied, and, finally, that anything at all that is given in a worldly manner brings the world-horizon with it and becomes an object of world-consciousness in this way alone", (VI, 267). Syntheses create presences and consciousness works on them without ego involvement until




Fig. 7.1 Map of solo consciousness with four features only

they become existent at a level of awareness that is no longer tacit or implicit: But explicit for egoic attention. Pre-reflexive self-awareness of one’s presence could be called “the i” as it is present as a *leiblich*-sense but not a focus, not explicitly within the horizon of what *is* being focused on. Because it is not being focused on when the ego and consciousness are engaged on an activity, in conversation or focused on a presentiated object, then it is a mere presence indeed if it registers at all. But the pre-reflexive, like its name suggests, is really about what is involuntary and automatic. Lower self-consciousness as the fourth part of consciousness “stands for nothing else than for awareness of self-consciousness”; whereas lower self-presence is “primarily the self-awareness of the objectivating act”, (Kern 1988, 293), linked to the more spontaneous base awareness. What is prior to reflection, becoming aware of an object, is descriptively unconscious for the most part. What the ego concentrates on forms the foreground of attention; whilst all else becomes background. So in fact there are many degrees of being aware. Subliminal awarenesses are literally below the line of conscious awareness, similarly brain processes and electrical activity never enter consciousness. For instance, pre-reflexive presences include the self-reflective presence of consciousness to itself. When running for a bus, the focus is where the bus is and there is little focus on anything else in this non-reflective mode.

Reflection is becoming aware of the types of intentionality that occur at any moment. But it is also permissible to reflect on memory, imagination, exemplars in fiction and science, and use eidetic imaginative variation to become aware of relations between objects and processes. There are many influences on the ways in which intentionality presents its objects of attention. These forms are interlinked and work together. Some of them are *higher* in that they are centred on conscious

choices and the free will; whilst others are *passive* like temporality, association, emotion and sleep. Others still are mixtures of egoic skills that become highly practised, and so become a part of the automatic behavioural repertoire although they have an egoic initiation. For instance, learning a new language or learning to ride a bicycle become automatic parts of self, after the process of learning. Apart from the perception of what exists in the here and now, in the five senses, there are many additions of understanding to perception and other types of experience. Husserl's position was that: "Mental processes appertaining to original passivity ... are unable to bestow sense", (XVII, 22): meaning that composite sense coming from the "apperceptive character" is 'bestowed', 'donated' or 'projected' from secondary passivity and interpreted by its egoic rationality in higher rationalising, reflection and analysis; whereas pre-reflexive being-there comes from passive consciousness for categorical seeing, syntheses and lower nonverbal presences. A special case of donating sense is empathising the perspective and intentions of others, when hearing and looking at them. One general case is to note the difference between inaccurate senses given to an object in a situation—as opposed to other senses of how the object in question could be accurately interpreted and experienced. How consciousness makes sense of situations involves linking several types of sense together. (Careful open questioning can find what is implicit and specify why individuals avoid anxious situations, for instance). Everybody reflects on themselves in relation to others, concerning their own abilities, purposes and connection with other people (VI, 264). Depending on the manner of apprehending self, the sense can be unified and accepted. But in distress, self-criticism and disapproval, the opposite is true. Ambivalence and confusion occur when, the sense that is believed connects with emotions that provide the immediate sense that is there, should not be there. In everyday life, reflection is a fundamental act and part of making psychological sense that is related to being able to make provisional conclusions, for instance, on the motives of self and others. So, on the one hand, the psychological life and its meanings are not fixed but changeable. On the other hand, there is the possibility of fixing meaning and habits which can appear as going against the trend of the fluidity. So with this in mind, how people apperceive themselves is reflecting on self against the background of their experiences of others in family and culture.

The order of topics below starts with an acknowledgement of the dependent whole of noeses and noemata then identifies specific sorts of the noeses in a definitive way. At the lowest level of self there are the workings of absolute consciousness and temporality, especially the retentive consciousness of automatic memory that stretches across personal history, holding all experiences in a unified store. Retentive syntheses imply various relations to other immanent presences, and stored senses out of awareness, in ways that are associations, variations and connections automatically provide objects that were descriptively unconscious and preconscious before they were attended to. This form of connection between experiences and meanings is called intentional implication and has a connection to appresentations in that noetic-noematic experiences are always connected (IX, 36, XI, 117–128, 339).

The Whole: Intentional Implication and Intentional Modification

The overview above promotes understanding of much more complex actual wholes of thought, affect and behaviour and other complex connections (IV, 135, 224–225, 237, IX, XVII, 232, 234). This section makes comments on more complex combinations of sense and intentionality: Another place where “meta-cognition”, the awareness of awareness, appears is in relation to intentional links between noeses and between objects. The being of consciousness as revealed through phenomenological methods is seen as *wholistic*, *all-inclusive* and *holographic*. Let’s spell this out. The unusual being of consciousness is co-extensive with meaning, others, contexts, time and history. Consciousness is the depositary for human understanding that is achieved through intentionality. Meaning and consciousness are co-extensive: consciousness has no outside in the sense that everything that is understood is inside consciousness (I, 33, 117, III, 93 VI, 169, fn, IX, 344, XIX/1, 425, XXV, 29). What appears of the outside of consciousness (its understandings) are still on the inside of consciousness (II, 7–14). Similarly, all evidence, theoretical and rational argument, justifications of transcendent being and conclusions concerning the being of consciousness or any object are on the inside of consciousness. This is why consciousness is an important topic worthy of study.

The everyday life of the natural attitude is comprised of a whole where specific cultural objects have senses that are apparent to individuals and cultural groups. One case that has been mentioned is multiple occurrences: there are nested types of intentionality that relate to recognisable senses of an object across many different givennesses of it (IV, 225). Something that could be called the recognisability of identity or pattern-matching when the focus is on an object in its context. Intentional implication is called pairing or association (XI, 5), and forms a bridge or link (XI, 123) between what appears sensually because it motivates, conditions or adds sense. The point is that once two meanings get put together then they both combine into a recognisable pattern which grasps the learning between the two previously separate objects (III, 245, 247). Linked connections together then constitute manifold noetic-noematic senses of the same object. For instance, in conjunction with temporality, there are the many facets of the experience of time: past, present, unassigned and future. There is also a link between the basic ability to be aware of one’s own awareness. Appresentation includes the automatic reawakening of the past learnings involved, when self has previously understood any perceptual object (I, 112–113). Appresentation is comprised of the intentionalities that constitute the senses of self that get added to perception (XVII, 362–366) such as additions between oneself as a *körper* for others and as *leib* to oneself thus producing a sense of oneself as *leibkörper* (I, 141, 143).

There is a whole between one consciousness and between all consciousnesses. Constituting egoic intentionalities and non-egoic syntheses implicate others in associations of sense (I, 118–119, IV, 142–143). Consciousness assimilates senses of the ‘outside’ transcendent objects ‘into’ itself. And once such senses are inside,

all the moments are in potential contact with each other. The senses of one object implicate further senses of that object and associate it with other objects altogether, the senses that are already learned or known. Intentional implication is another way of expressing the links between the many parts of consciousness that get stored and created, and is a return to the primary phenomenon (III, 49–50, IV, 226). Yet it includes the idea of association where just one type of it is between perception, its retention and remembering (XI, 284). Hyletic presences, associated memories, motivations and other experiences are linked together in complex ways (III, 181, fn). Intentional givenness can be modified. For instance, memory is a modified form of what may have appeared perceptually or in imagination perhaps. For instance, what was a present experience becomes modified in retentive consciousness when it is replayed. But what is re-presented in memory, is re-playing in a new present moment is an intentional modification of the previous now. This form of connection between experiences and meanings is the “intentional modification” of the forms of givenness, (such as remembering, anticipating, empathising, imagining) that are different to the clarity of their here and now first occurrence (III, 215). The theory of intentional implication is a way of understanding how forms of givenness interrelate (III, 208–213, XXIII, 307–312, 335, 343). Both *implications* and *modifications* comprise the structure of the intentionality of consciousness. There are temporal examples but there are many other ways in which one type of givenness can get modified into another. The inner parts of consciousness and retentive consciousness are linked as parts and wholes. For instance, on being told a story by another person, what was original was their voice that delivered the concepts expressed. But the concepts evoke visual images in the listener and emotions in the total felt-experience of listening. For instance, the point of a story is not just the sum total of the conceptual meanings received. It also elicits an emotional impact and expresses values.

However, the big picture of consciousness is consciousness in its intersubjective life with others. When focusing on solo conscious what appears after the transcendental reduction is the primordial world (I, 129, IX, 58). The lifeworld is comprised of non-egoic passive processes in addition to the egoic ones before 1936 approximately. Empathy acts to co-constitute the intersubjective world of meanings and practices associated with various objects. What this means is that actual everyday living, thinking and feeling are the ground for meaning and theory-building concerning how meaning and its motivations exist. What Fig. 7.1 expresses is the referent set of experiences and meanings that are inevitably the root of the matter when it comes to any form of psychology. Even natural psychological science is still about people in general, even when it doesn't make precise reference to the psychological meaning and their givennesses for it can only ever be the case that meaning is according to the perspective of someone, the participant or the researcher. Finally, what the fourfold picture of the being of consciousness shows is that there is always a world-whole. Whatever the specific style of being in a world, there is an attunement to others. Being intersubjective is simultaneously a connection to others and a positioning of self with them, even if no one is present currently. Simultaneously with present or absent others, there is a positioning in time where the being of any

noesis-noema correlation about an object is existent as memory, or perception, or anticipated, or any other number of types of givenness, plus the doxic sense of the modality of its being. Phenomenology captures and makes explicit the subtle qualities and nuances of how cultural objects are believed to exist. This is Husserl’s boon to philosophy, psychology and academia. The following sections all define conclusions about consciousness in general.

Consciousness as a Whole and the Species and Genera of Intentionality

Let’s go into more detail about the being of consciousness because what has been stated so far was introductory. The watchword for understanding human experience is intentionality: The quality of being aware of specific objects in specific ways. The many objects of attention include conceptual objects, cultural objects that belong to a group or cultural world, values and ideal objects that are unchanging across time and many more besides. Some of these objects are *fulfilled* or *present* and some are *empty* in that they have no sensual givenness. Husserl classified meanings according to the apperceptive characters (III, 265, 258) of noesis-noema correlates; and “hyle”, sensual givenness in the five senses, plus the hyletic-sensual givenness of the visual imagining, anticipation and memory (III, 171–173) which are open to the intentional analysis of these fields of object-awareness (XI, 145–148). Figure 7.2 brings together the family of intentionality between noesis and noema.

In an extended format, Fig. 7.2 formulates the relationships between some of the most pertinent genus and species of intentionality, for one consciousness in abstraction from others. What is happening in the larger sphere is that belief and temporality are at work in bringing together and holding apart these pieces that comprise the apparently seamless whole of taken-for-granted experience that the majority




Fig. 7.2 Some of the species and genera of intentionality

of people experience. It is only when reflection begins does it become understood how the pieces fit together in their definitive ways. For instance, in remembering the “identity of x, which I remember, is given to me only because I do not refer to x solely from *one* perspective... when remembering, I refer to x, the (i.e. the same x) that I had perceived in the past”, (Marbach 1987, 253). The recognition of identity is a similar act whereby what is retained implicitly, in the storehouse of retained past experiences, is still potentially present when a contemporary example is met in perception. When a T is found perceptually, it is recognised as a T automatically because of the earliest or earlier experience of it following the example of a child learning what scissors are (I, 141). Despite the earliest memory of T not being available to consciousness, it is nevertheless the marker by which the here and now T is given meaning. The identity is recognised with respect to the previous learnings of what a T looks like, which could be called pattern-matching. It can also be the case that perception and other forms of awareness need retentional consciousness to confirm the identity of what appears here and now (Marbach 1993, 44, 109). Similarly, there is the evidence of what is felt, be it emotionally or bodily, what love and hate feel like, or anything else that is describable and commonly understood as mental, experiential and recognisable by others.

Consciousness is a temporal whole in that it is caught between the past, the present and the future. In fact there are complex ways in which these types of experiences are encoded and replayed, while (usually) keeping aware of their different types and not confusing one for another. The temporal being of consciousness called retentional consciousness is such that it features a form of automatic memory that records every experience. The evidence of the different givenness of temporal experience is easier to spot with memory and anticipation. The interpretation of the original temporal field is constructed though. The best evidence for protention is surprise and disappointment experiences, where an immediate protention is exceeded or thwarted by reality. Similarly, retentional consciousness is shown in the lingering sense of the immediately past in any experience. Temporality reveals the ability of consciousness to be aware of itself automatically across time, in such a way that processes and objects are united as a whole (cf Kant’s schemata 1787, B179–182) and the observable phenomena is that consciousness unites itself across time (1787, B131–132, cf III, 242). Consciousness is temporal in a number of ways in addition to its holding onto its past through automatic involuntary processes. But consciousness forgets and confabulates too. Consciousness re-presents what it knows via explicit memory. But also habit, belief and anticipation show what retentional memory and anticipation bring to the present moment. Temporality has a role in that it is a fundamental conceptual structure to separate the timeframes now, present and future. Assumptions about future possibility show how understanding of the individual map of the world that each person holds in their automatic memory, their learning about the world, is thrown forwards so it can be checked against what actually happens. The simple forms of intentionality are related to the overall complex experience of existing in time: There is a temporal orientation that pervades experiential evidence. For instance, remembering is about what a visual perceiving was. Or remembering what was said by another, what was felt

and what was thought by self (Marbach 1993, 79). Anticipating is the opposite of remembering as it concerns what will be seen, what will be said and, for instance, how self will feel yet it never has a real referent. There can be further complications because intentionalities can be in relation to an anticipatory empathising of how someone might act. For instance, entering into the present moment with inaccurate understanding can create the disappointment of expectations. Empathising the other accurately and discussing the impression gained of them with them, shows the presence of accurate anticipations that are confirmed (while inaccurate anticipations are disappointed). Comparisons between what is expected and what actually happens can be motivation for emotion and mood. For instance, if anticipations are focussed elsewhere and something pleasant happens, the comparison between the two objects produces surprise and happiness. Similarly, if anticipations are high but are not met in actuality then disappointment occurs.

Perception

What appears in the context of perception, here and now, has superimposed within it all forms of meaning that have different temporal characteristics. There are the passing and changing objects of the straight-forward attention. For instance, text makes sense because it is an encoded visual and linguistic representation of the authorial writing voice. Plus—there is a future orientation. There is more to say and text expresses the story that unfolds. Plus—there is a past orientation because the previous words of the story are still held in consciousness. Retentional consciousness holds on to what the reader has captured so far. In the same way that the previous bars of a song are still fresh when listening to music, a tune appears across time (Ferrara 1984; Smith 1989). All these are facets of the work that consciousness does in making sense in a linear fashion. Perceptual objects are found in vision, audition, taste, smell and bodily felt-sense such as touch, vibration, pain or the position of the musculo-skeletal joints or other physical sensations (IV, 151, 212–213). Perception can be expressed according to the formula of “perception provides a (perceptual noematic sense) that →, leads to, the identification [of a perceptual object that is not contextualised in the natural or naturalistic contexts of understanding]”. Or in a more longhand form a “visual noesis gives a visual noema about an object understood in its identity”. In this case, the noema is the understood or meant sense, as-it-is-experienced to exist now. It appears in the everyday world and gets interpreted to show its manner of being experienced and is the result of a developmental history of accruing changing senses (XI, 345). The case of “SB”, real name Sydney Bradford, is a case of a man who was blind since birth, but when aged 52 he had corneas removed, but was then unable to understand a great deal of what he saw (Gregory 1998). He could recognise some objects and because he had felt them when he was blind, he liked to use touch to support what he saw when he became sighted. But novel objects such as buildings, long distances, reflections in mirrors and the Necker cube illusion were unknown to him. This example can be used to support

the naturalistic interpretation that his brain did not have the neuronal connections to support the learning. But intentionally, the sense fields of touch and vision were disconnected for him and needed to be picked up through careful exposure to them, which is something that did not happen for him.

Eduard Marbach concludes that perceiving in the five senses presents the awareness of real objects and events in the here and now, including how one's own body feels, in addition to being the on-going context for the experiencing of all other types of sense (Marbach 1993, 51–52). Perception includes vision, audition and the kinaesthesia of how one's own body feels (sometimes called the proprioception of one's own bodily sensations). There are four types of bodily sensation: Movement, temperature, physical sensitivity and the position of the muscular-skeletal joints (IV, 144–151, VI, 108–110). Each contributing perceptual system has its own way of perceiving self, others and the world. Metaphorically speaking, perception is *sticky* in that it has past meaning added to it. Perception is *open* in that many different types of sense get connected to the here and now surrounding context. The instant is open temporally to the past, the future and the free imagination, and a host of other possibilities. For a description of vision to refer correctly, one easy way to get started is to see something or be using memory or imagination to inspect a recent vivid and clear example. Looking at a visual object and noting the set of distinctions that can be observed by oneself is a genuine type of evidence that is freely available in the laboratory that is everyday living.

Perception needs to be sharply distinguished from all else that appears in the now (Bernet et al. 1993, 116–125; Bernet 1979). Another word that is used to describe the givenness of what appears is “representation”. Vision represents objects of attention as visually real in the here and now. Generally, what is perceived is presumed to be existent in contradistinction to the cases of hallucination, memory and imagining that override perception if the givenness of these experiences is very strong or they can merely co-occur with perception in lesser strength. Perception is the most basic consciousness. However, all intentionalities represent their objects in their own characteristic manner. Bodiliness in the sense of the direct experience of one's own physiology is directly connected to the emotional self, *leiblichkeit*, is also classed as a form of perception. The body in visual perception makes empathy occur which, in 1912, is referred to as somatology, a phenomenology of the body in the sense of studying those semiotic aspects through which nonverbal communication and *leiblichkeit* make sense. The expressive body has a mode of public givenness now called nonverbal communication (IV, 131, 140, 234–235, 240, 244, 245, 247, 268, 272, 320, 375, 377, V, 8–9, VI, 476–481). Consciousness permeates the body: “Body and soul thus signify two real strata in this experiential world which are integrally and really connected similarly to, and in the same sense as, two pieces of a body”, (VI, 219). In addition to what has already been said about bodiliness above, *leiblichkeit* is a complex form of intentionality for a number of reasons, and is not just plain bodily sensation without a context or history. Consciousness is embodied in a number of different senses. Primarily consciousness is extended into the lived space of the ‘personal’ body-sensation that appears to the ego where emotion and moods come and go. But also the body looks out on itself visually as

it walks, empathises, remembers, listens, sleeps, eats, is depressed... In another sense, the physical body makes consciousness a part of the physical world because it is the container and intermediary for connections between self, others and cultural objects. Bodiliness, of voluntary and involuntary forms, is a special category of being that could be called interbodiliness, a sense that was well expressed by Merleau-Ponty: “Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously. All of which makes another living being, but not yet another man”, in the sense that the meaning of the other is forever a transcendence in immanence (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 354). Another dimension of consciousness is the connection between the ego and the passive self, the difference between the ego, as I can, an ability to physically move and act in a sustained and skilled manner in the world—as opposed to the habitual and automatic aspects of self as anonymous passivity, a motivated and automatic set of connections with other people in relation to one’s own syntheses of felt-bodiliness and temporality. The history of the smile in art, dentistry and nonverbal communication can be interpreted as a set of social meanings of showing affection or withholding it (Trumble 2004). More details about nonverbal communication are provided in chapter 9.

Action

Behaviour is most often the purposeful action of the will towards a desired outcome, one that is not currently existent but one that lies in the future (III, 242, XXXVIII, 106, 230–232, cited in Nenon 1990). Behaviour, or action of any sort, is classed as a mental act and can be the result of both emotional and rational consideration. Tom Nenon comments that: “Where the will exists, the action consistent with it will follow; *modus tollens* tells us that we can therefore also read back directly from the action to the will. Where the action is missing (but was possible) there *can have been no such will*”, (1990, 304–305). Behaviour can vary in its degree of skilfulness. Skilled behaviour improves with practice and sometimes may need on-going practice to maintain good performance. Some forms of behaviour are very conscious and deliberate whilst others are automatic. And there can be mixtures of deliberate and involuntary skill such as playing tennis or speaking. In therapy, the contemporary understanding of changing behaviour sees it as a basic and complex nonverbal change (Longmore and Worell 2007). Changes in practical intentionality are highly likely to change mood and emotion, and that has potentially immediately positive effects for the self-esteem. Behaviour is most often purposeful action towards a desired outcome where understanding guides action (XI, 62). It is a form of intentionality (XXXVIII, 103–106, 107–111, Pfänder 1967). Behaviour is classed as a mental act and can be the result of both emotion and rational consideration. It is permissible to study the behaviour of an individual (IV, 189–190).

Pictorial Presentation

Pictorial presentation is the viewing of a representational picture of an object *x*. This is expressed as noting the differences between the “physical image A... the image exhibited by the physical image A... [and] the object presented” by the image (XXIII, 206). There are many artistic genres for making meta-commentaries on being in the world. Let’s take the visual signification of representational art first, as an easy example to understand (Marbach 2000b). Pictorial presentation is where a perceptual object functions as a double object where the observer is drawn into the individual world of the artist via the daubs of paint on a canvas, for instance. The pictorially-signifying work of the artist is interpreted as being the relation between the mere signifier of the paint on the canvas—that depicts the scene the artist had in mind (III, 226). Marbach concludes that viewing a picture is “I, while grounded in the presentation of my actual surroundings *s*, am re-presenting a real or fictional *x* by means of re-presenting a neutralized perceiving of *x* in so far as it appears in the picture that I actually perceive”, (Marbach 2005, 156). This is what it means for perceiving to be intentionally implied or modified within the conscious unity that is intentionality: “experientially, i.e., from the first-person perspective of my conscious experiences, the intentional reference to the object *x* is altogether differently characterized when I am actually seeing *x* as against only re-presenting a seeing of *x* in one way or another”, (Marbach 2005, 157). I want to add more detail to this point because it is helpful to understand what reflection is and the set of distinctions that it opens up.

Pictorial presentation is a useful form of intentionality to understand because it has similarities with empathy and signs. The picture as a perceptual object indicates two objects through its perceptual appearance. On the one hand there is, in the case of representational art, the perception of the physical object of the paint on the canvas. However, this is not the semiotic effect of painting which is to share the view of the world of the painter to grasp what is seen, depicted and portrayed in an artistic tradition or the individual style of that painter. For the second object, the depicted or signified scene ‘in’ the canvas, is a quasi-appearing of the non-present scene that the painter saw. The depicted scene only ever appears through the paint on the canvas. What is interesting is the influence of the artistic tradition that is the manner of representing the depicted. Across the history of art there have been very many of these styles as historically-situated conventions of what it is to depict. Other forms of art and drama have similar but more complex forms. There are the nonverbal genres such as mime and dance that use traditions of nonverbal movement to depict what the writer wanted the artists to signify. There are the forms of dramatic representation on stage or film that use vision and audition to connect with the audience’s empathy to tell their stories of what the characters (fictional or real) do and feel, and so create the quasi-reality of the story.

Presentiations that Imply or Modify in Mental Giving to Self

This section considers three types of presentation where the giving of objects only appears to the ego, before their expression in language or other media. This class of mental processes, the giving presentations, are private in the sense that when anyone experiences them they only appear to that one person. To look at a canvas is to be literally alone with these experiences and it is only through discussion that they are shared, made public and understood in relationship. In a wider view though, all meanings and their givennesses are apparent only to the ego, unless they are communicated. For people to understand properly these noetic forms, they need to search within themselves to find the experienced referents that are being discussed.

However, let us first compare perception with the presentational types of appearance of imagination, acts of memory and anticipation. In comparison to imagination, what appears imaginatively is not tied to reality or the present. Although imagined objects are based on the perceptual world, imagining concerns something that might or might not happen or exist, at an unspecified time (past, present or future), without believing it is, was or will be real (Marbach 1993, 75). The imagined object has an ontologically neutral belief-character (II, 69, III, 222–226). The imagination is also shown in genres of representation such as novels in literary fiction, art, science fiction, comedy and films. It is driven by life experience and conscious choice, in addition to mental habits about what to imagine. Accordingly, the imagination of a child is not the same as a middle aged adult in terms of content. However, the overall process is the same. Imagination is useful in creative thinking and as part of problem-solving. In this vein, intentional analysis shows that imagination is “I (the subject of experience), while grounded in the presentation of my actual surroundings s, am re-presenting some fictional or real world object x by means of re-presenting a neutralized perceiving of x”, (Marbach 2005, 156). Let’s get clear about what is going on in this example. What this case shows is that being in the here and now perceptually never goes away, in the sense that perceptual reality is always that of the present moment which means that decisions, change and action only ever happen in the moment. However, times future and past are superimposed in the now-moment too. What can be imagined can be believed: and sometimes a mere imagining can be confused with what actually exists. For instance, imagining what it is like to be in a plane crash and die, can get repeated and believed as something that is likely to happen to self, and so get taken as a reason for not going on a flight. These distinctions open up one way that therapy can develop to explain the diagnosis and formulation of personality- and psychological-syndromes because these diagnostic practices are experientially-based and point to a manifold of basic experiences that people have.

Memory can also be fruitfully compared to perception (Marbach 1993, 82, Marbach 2010, 66–68). Memory, whether it is the result of an egoically sought-after specific instance of searching for some experience in retentional consciousness (X, 54); or whether it is a passively spontaneous occurrence (X, 37, XVII, 282), a re-

playing of a past perception that is, in the general case, believed to have been real, although confabulation could have happened (XXIII, 319, 427). Memory gives the earlier perception again, as though it were existing once more, but in a way that clearly shows that the object or event is past. In the example of remembering one's own activities as a child, the then surrounding-context, the perceptual sensations of bodiliness and the sense of reality of the memory get re-created in the current-context of the adult's here and now reality: "I represent x with belief by means of representing a perceiving of x believed to have actually occurred in the past", (Marbach 1993, 81).

Anticipation is frequently central in making meaning and is a part of modelling how to negotiate the world. For instance, the effect of anticipating something good can constitute good feelings about the object expected. If a race is expected as a happy event and as a time for winning, or at least to enjoy the competition, then any thinking about it will be pleasurable. If the race is anticipated as being a tremendous struggle and that people will think negative thoughts as they watch self come last, then as the race approaches, it might become a horror to be experienced or avoided. To anticipate something emotionally is currently feeling how the future might feel, before it happens. Anticipation is linked to planning and problem-solving. Anticipation is linked to imagined visualisation, memory, verbal skills, critical-logical thinking and reflection on one's own experiences—to spot some key distinctions and differences. Thus it leads to the topic of meta-representation and the throwing forward of a world-whole.

Signitive Intentionality

Signs are an interesting case because people are hermeneuts who are motivated to attach meaning to various perceptually present cultural objects that work as communicational markers (IV, 240–241). The meanings of sign-conventions are 'causes' of a sort where an object points to something that it is believed to mean. Signs and forms of signification of all kinds are understood to mean that one thing stands for another (V, 105, fn, Bernet 1988), thus introducing a connection to semiotics (Eco 1976) and semiology (Guiraud 1975). Husserl made a number of relevant distinctions in the differences between different classes of sign and their different types of signification. One important difference is between the verbal signs of speech as opposed to the passive nonverbal signs of the body or other sorts of gesture and imprecise signal. Some forms of speech point precisely. But when a speaker becomes silent something is still expressed by their body. However, the nonverbal signs of the body cannot be turned off and the body signifies, it points all the time, but in an imprecise manner when compared to the conceptual pointing of speech. In either case, the ego employs active signifying codes to point via the conventions of a cultural system. There are various types of signified meaning that can be read in various ways to see the semiotic principles at stake. There are many types of sign convention, some of which are road signs, forms of mathematics that point to ab-

stractions about natural being, musical notation and many others besides. There are two base phenomena when it comes to conceptual meaning. Signified conceptual meanings are usually from audition or writing. Both listening and reading grasp the signifiers that appear in language. These phenomena can be interpreted to show the noesis of linguistically making-sense of what appears pre-reflexively, to focus on what is spoken about in conceptual sense, for instance, as read about. (The audition of speech hears sense through the immediate linguistic interpretation of the conceptual signifiers). Any specific sign rests in a context with similar signs of the same sort. Signs and their means of signifying are important in that they are linked to understanding identity and the stereotypes of how to indicate oneself as a person of a specific sort. Thus, signs show themselves as important forms of culturally-approved communication between signifiers that are perceptually given and the signified meanings to which they point.

However, other sorts of sign system exist. An interesting example from 1910 concerns: “*communicative* acts... acts that turn toward the other, in which the other is taken as the one toward whom I turn; being acts, which contain in themselves the idea that the other understands this turning towards him and may thus possibly modify his behavior accordingly by responding with an act of a similar kind”, (XIII, 98). In Husserl’s technical language it is the semiotic appresentation of the meaning with the sign that is the phenomenon to be analysed (XIX/2, 130–131). The meaning of the sign is not in the object but is triggered by seeing it (XIX/2, 136–137). So the research question when it comes to signs and their referentiality is “how do their meanings get constituted by intersubjective consciousness?” For instance, mathematical systems of numbers point to general classes of objects (XII, 297–300). Similarly, musical notation exists to define the pitch and length of notes to be played. But by extension, in the psychosocial world, there are many types of sign-making and sign-reading activities that form the symbolic order of social life in terms of social skills, the degree of sensitivity towards other people and the ability to negotiate and get mutual needs met. Signs of all kinds are understood to mean one thing or another. Social experience is “intersubjective” because it exists between subjects as do so many cultural objects that act as signs; as well as signs proper. The consequence is that the connection between meanings and the perspectives of people form a whole that exists between participating persons in a culture. Signs are important because they are one class of cultural objects which is a general terminology that has important consequences for understanding intersubjectivity.

Empathy About Others and Their Views of The World

Empathy is “seizing upon someone else’s consciousness” (III, 76), the socially learned understanding of what the perspective of others might be in any situation (I, 141, IV, 130, 140, 347, Marbach 1993, 91–92; Marbach 2000a; Owen 2006c, 162). Empathy is a presentational synthesis and given a fuller account in chapter 9. By way of an introduction though, what appears perceptually of the other person

is their auditorily verbal and visually nonverbal presence: “we “view the mental processes of others” on the perception of their outward manifestation in the organism. This empathic viewing is, more particularly, an intuiting, a presentative act, although no longer an act that is presentative of something originally. The other and his psychical life are, to be sure, given in consciousness as “themselves there” and in union with his organism; but they are not like the latter, given in consciousness as original”, (III, 8). This has profound consequences for ordinary living and psychology because it means that the primary medium for understanding the other is empathic givenness; whereas the consciousness of others is forever out of reach and only perceptually given through speech and their bodily expressiveness. Empathy works pre-reflexively, immediately, without egoic action (IV, 228, V, 111, 112) and in conjunction with egoic imagination. Through empathy, intersubjectivity is possible and all shared-meaning exists. When the object of attention is another self, then what is created by consciousness is an empathised impression of the experiences of the other and their sense of the cultural objects that they experience (XIII, 159, 183–4, 188–190). There are the empathised senses of other persons and their perspectives on the world that are connected with very many cultural and intersubjective contexts.

Empathy takes the human or animal body as a unique double object, for this type of presentation takes the vision of the other’s body and turns it into the variable experiences that we have “of” or “for” others in understanding what they understand (IV, 236). This is such a core aspect of human being that it must not go unnoticed (that would be an unacceptable failure of understanding the social world as a condition of the possibility of being human). Like pictorial presentation, empathy can be written symbolically as “empathy of the (other’s body) → [other consciousness]”. Or with more detail as “empathic noesis grasps (a visual bodily noema) and presents the empathised perspective of the other because [the object of their consciousness] never appears first-hand but only ever quasi-appears as empathised by me as a sense in me that is otherness and their view”. So when it comes to understanding a public cultural object, be it a film, a tool, a book, a person or a meaning that lies between people, then the “co-empathy of what we all empathise grasps (a cultural sense) about → [a cultural object]”. This phrasing indicates the importance of empathy in the construction of a cultural world. The word “co-empathy” is coined to show that meanings of the cultural composite sort are shared between people. This is most important because empathy brings us the world and the shared motivations of conscious feeling and sense (IV, 375).

The mass of acquired understanding of the meaning of objects in retained consciousness can be seen to work automatically ever since the cradle. What it means is that consciousness works automatically in being able to recognise if Anita looks sad, in addition to merely identifying Anita. The ability to recognise sadness, for instance, is just one example of many where empathy shows the emergence of meanings concerning what others feel, intend and mean. Thus, the condition of the possibility of recognising sadness, or any other state in another, is accrued across the lifetime. This example when expressed in the technical language of 1913 is to say that noesis-noema correlations in this case, empathising the state of Anita, a specific

other consciousness, is empathy and the noematic sense that Anita is sad, is an empathic nonverbal experience that can then be expressed conceptually.

The received sense of the bodily expression of others is passively achieved through empathising. Let's take the case of understanding the plot of a film. In film, sound and vision represent experiences of real or merely fictional people. The way that film is edited represents the story that is unfolding. Empathy with the actors enables grasping the experiences and views of the actors in the story they are portraying. When the acting is credible, it is possible for the viewer temporarily to omit the consciousness that they are in a cinema or at home watching a DVD, and the result is becoming completely absorbed in the drama. Similarly, the experience of watching drama in a theatre is also empathy-based and only slightly different to meeting with people oneself, yet it is a good vehicle for explanation. Drama, in film or on the stage, employs a tradition of the means of the portrayal of a fictional or actual story. Watching a drama employs conventions of storytelling and the stylised portrayal of personality and dialogue. Films and plays have many commonalities with ordinary face to face meetings. The actors encode and express the storyline in the performance with their bodies and voices and the audience decodes it with empathy. Each meaning delivered by the plot is a cultural object comprised of many other smaller ones, right down to the tiniest making of sense. Understanding the mental and emotional process of any experience is like watching a film for the first time. The audience has no idea what will happen next. The scenes in the film and the actions of the actors may change the meaning of any scene in the light of what is later revealed, as the plot unfolds. Watching a film for the first time is like any experiential event: in the sense that the detail of what will happen is as yet unknown. It is only the later viewing that updates and contextualises the prior senses gained. Empathy is the taking of the visual perception of the other's body primarily, and the audition of their speech, to make a view of them in their world as they see it. Such a view is sometimes empty in that it may not always be hyletically given in emotive or imaginative associations. Otherwise, it can be a felt-sense that is capable of being described to another, so it becomes possible to confirm that oneself has understood them accurately. The givenness of the perspectives of others is a fundamental ability of understanding where a part of self contains within it a special place of how to hold in one's own mind the minds of others.

Conceptual Referentiality

Conceptual intentionality is the use of language in internal dialogue, discussion, professional discourse and writing, science, logic and philosophy (XVII, 18, EU, 314–316, Sokolowski 1974). Concepts have their own manner of referring to the objects and experiences that they are about. Concepts can point at first-hand experiences of self, or the second-hand, empathised experiences of others or at classes of things in general. Concepts can have an “empty” or abstract manner of giving their meaning: They make meanings known, often without the object of reference itself

coming to consciousness except as abstract mental sense. When reading printed text, words and sentences are the object of conceptual intentionality. Conceptual intentionality points to experience in an empty way in that usually nothing is given hyletically of the referents (Sokolowski 1974), except in those cases where the writing is particularly vivid and fires the imagination. However, there are more evocative forms of language such as storytelling, poetry and hypnosis. What these share is the ability to move people from their here and now surroundings by the meanings used, so strong is the association to the referents.

Husserl's mathematically-inspired view of the world is what is evident when he concludes that meanings are ideal unities: "Pure logic, wherever it deals with concepts, judgements and syllogisms, is exclusively concerned with the ideal unities that we here call 'meanings'", (XIX/1, 91). The relationship between speech, thought and rationality to their referents is the same as the way numbers refer to general collections and sets of objects. The same sense is expressed in his guiding thought that: "'Quadratic remainder' is the same expression by whomsoever uttered", (XIX/1, 42). And: "Ideal objects... exist genuinely... we also have insight into certain categorical truths that relate to such ideal objects", (XIX/1, 125). There are numerous aspects of Husserl's understanding of language that could be commented on but such detail would obscure the points that this section aims to communicate. For the moment, it is best to note that speech acts offer a more precise form of reference than other forms of representation, but any meaning carried through a linguistic or nonverbal referent means that the noematic sense is not the same as the object because the "object never coincides with the meaning", (XIX/1, 46). And furthermore there can be multiple noematic senses about the same object; or one noema can refer to multiple objects: "several expressions may have the same meaning but different objects, and again that they have different meanings but the same object", (XIX/1, 47). The form of conceptual reference is general, the "Logos, of the *conceptual* and, on that account the "*universal*"", in the sense that, within certain conditions, concepts refer to a whole range of diverse referents (III, 258). Husserl admitted that there can be a complexity of reference in that a single utterance or thought can have multiple senses, in multiple contexts, for it is also true that there is "a stratum of expressive signifying and a substratum of the expressed; nor is it easy to understand the essential connections of these stratifications", (III, 259, cf IV, 320), where the focus is on the signified rather than the signifier and the whole comes before the dependent moment, so shaping its understanding. Listening and reading are allied forms of the linguistic referentiality of language. When it comes to speech, for instance, the overall intentional relation can be expressed as the conceptual noesis grasps (a spoken noema) and presents [the understood object] of the speaker's utterances. The same format can be used to note the differences between, say, conceptual intentionality making sense of a text by creating a number of noematic senses that comprise the meant-experience of what the text means (IV, 320). Or as a way of concluding on the way that meaning gets transmitted culturally, between groups of people, through literature for instance. Such examples can be written as: Conceptual intentionality grasps (conceptual noemata) about → [a textual object].

Language identifies categories of objects because of its type of signification: it refers to an experienced object through the linguistic one. The being-content of the world-as-understood flows into consciousness, for consideration in thought. The signifying practices of coding and decoding linguistic meaning can be understood as historical artefacts, created by past unknown persons that are passed on for future generations to use (VI, 366). However, the range of meaning-producing activities is many. Language can be: informal speech, the languages of different geographic regions, reading and writing, drama, science and philosophy. For therapy though it should be noted that when emotion is created through internal dialogue or through discussion, it is “secondary” emotion because it is mediated through language or other forms of intentionality and tied to the choices of the ego (Owen 2006c, 221). But “primary” emotion is more related to being intersubjective in the world. There are many types of meaning and the nonverbal types should not be confused with meanings expressed in language. Meaning in language might be accurate or not with respect to nonverbal meaning. For instance, the conceptual reference of a word points in general to all possible referents; whereas nonverbal meaning is in the emotion of the beholder and points to an instance of experience, or to such experiential possibilities that can become fulfilled. In some cases, verbal meanings are two-fold: there is an explicit statement but the manner of speaking in sarcasm twists the sense or reverses it (like Rubin’s vase, an “ambivalent” or “bi-stable” senses occur because two senses are made at once). *Or* speech can be multiple and ambiguous forms like puns. *Or*, speech might refer to entirely novel meanings never encountered before. *Or* sometimes speech reveals nothing because the meanings are exceedingly weak in their sense. Writing and reading enable sense to be transmitted by pointing to shared experiences. Thought can be internal dialogue, in the way that people talk to themselves or refer to the world by using their own voice but without speaking aloud. The tone of voice of internal dialogue is important in that angry and self-critical tones can add additional distress and tension to what people feel about themselves, for instance. Similarly, believing that something is the case can also be expressed in explicit speech with another, or in internal dialogue with self, where self is both speaker and listener. It has to be noted that the manner and attitude of speaking creates an impact on the emotions and mood felt (Andreas and Faulkner 1996; Bandler 1985; Bandler and McDonald 1989; Austin 2007).

Other Forms

This final section on the givenness of various noeses starts with noting the importance of mood and emotion. Moods show a person’s cumulative intersubjective and temporal relations to others and themselves, past, present and future. Although similar to emotions, moods are highly-persistent felt-senses; whereas emotions are more short-term. The emotions associated with people are a specific form and linked to empathic presentation. Emotions are lived meanings that arise quickly and are fundamental indicators about what is happening intersubjectively. While

there are different types of emotions they all share a form: “Joy and sorrow are not in the heart as blood is in the heart. Sensations of touch are not in the skin as pieces of organic tissue are. Thus it is according to the original meaning-giving presentation of localization of the psychical”, (XIII, 115). Emotions in others are expressed visually in the expressive bodies of others and they have a relationship to the objective state of any emotional expression in a specific culture that, first hand is felt in leib with others in relation to perceptual signs of the visual and auditory expression of being-connected with them. Emotions associated with valuing can be interpreted as the outcome of a valuing act of solo consciousness, which is likely related to the valuing preferences of influential groups of people. Emotion can be written as emotion grasps (an intersubjective noema) and presents the felt-sense of an [intersubjective cultural object] of a specific sort about a self-other relationship. When the focus of attention is on self, apperception, the making of the sense of self by self, the lower sort of self-consciousness grasps (a pre-reflexive sense of self gained out of intersubjectivity) to become [understood as the ego in a moment in a context] in a specific way. The guidance from Husserl is that empathy and understanding meaning or any cultural object are like recognising any object. Such identifications occur at one glance and are “not inference, not a thinking act”, (I, 141). What is also being discussed is the emotional experience of what it is like to live, conceived as part of some greater totality, in comparison to the ways that are possible.

Emotion can be about values but most often represents how the self is relating, or has related, and how others are relating or have related, to self. Emotion can be about noematic senses of people, ideas and values, possibilities, visual images, intentions that we ascribe to others or hold for ourselves. Emotion exists in the here and now and is in-part a bodily felt-sense that represents the meaning of the relationship that is contemporarily occurring and is related to intersubjective events (XIX/1, V, Sec. 15, III, 239, 240, 241, 243). The view of emotion is that it requires pre-reflexive presences to exist in order to feel something immediately. Emotion also shows the pre-reflexive constitution of the world and aspects of it that are psychologically important noematic senses that are immediate and powerful representations of the intersubjective placing of the person in relation to objects, persons and situations actual and merely possible. Emotion is also in-part socially-learned with respect to how to be in family and culture in addition to the causative factors of self-talk and interacting through discussion (Vygotsky 1978; Meichenbaum 1977). On the one hand, emotions are a form of intentionality towards what is usually believed to exist. On the other hand, moods are states of mind that are long-lasting and may relate accurately to contemporary reality or not. Moods have a “higher” purpose and meaning, in the sense that they are based on the “lowest” perceptual sensations of the body, memory and perception of the surrounding context and other types of awareness. Habit refers to an amalgam of various aspects of higher and lower thought, action and experience. The role of habits of automatic syntheses refer to the work done by anonymously functioning consciousness of retention and absolute consciousness, which work across the lifespan and can bridge the current here and now experience to events in the past. The first focus is on the sense of an object that is updated across time (III, 317–318). It is also the case that acts of awareness and non-egoic attention can become added together (VI, 237). There are

horizons, contexts of intentionality which are the frames or containers for sense and sense-constituting activities in relation to the here and now constitution, and to the past and future as well. These could be written as “contextual intentionality grasps (an object) → and places a [context] around it”.

Some further simple types of sense that are created through the intentionalities are as follows: Other types of intentionality include belief, dreaming, hallucinating and delusions. However, there are complex composite forms such as imagining one’s own future satisfactions or anticipating what someone will say or feel in a particular context. Mainly, hallucination exists in audition and vision. Hallucinating is purely mental presentation, a telling example because it can occur in negative and positive forms. Positive hallucination is where an object is superimposed on perceptual presence in the five perceptual senses. Negative hallucination is where a perceptual object disappears from the five senses. Some hallucinations can be identified by the hallucinator for what they are (XVI, 15–16), whilst they are still being experienced and are not believed. However, other hallucinations are believed to be real and become a part of the life of the believer. Hallucinations can be inside the body or external to it and most often appear as representative of past trauma and so bear a strong connection to memory, emotion and mood in the present, without these experiences being under the direct control of the ego for they are involuntary, making the person feel out of control and inhabited by other persons whose influences live inside their consciousness. The topic of hallucination and its associated experiences are that they most often occur in a context of pervasive anxiety and give-back what has been experienced of traumatic experiences, but in a distorted form. There are discrete families of hallucination and these are too complex to present in an introductory overview. What hallucinations show is how highly inaccurate senses can potentially obliterate and replace what is perceptually present.

When self-experience and self-understanding are automatically generated through passive syntheses, there is primary emotion because it is immediately and indirectly connected to the ego and volition. The anonymously functioning part of self expresses itself through emotions that mean something but may dictate directions for action in ways that do not help the individual and so need to be judiciously tolerated and opposed. What this means is that over time, the ego can train a part of itself to be frightened in contexts that bear no harm, and be anxious about things that both have never happened previously and have not happened yet. The point is that objects and their senses can get negatively charged: associated with emotions that motivate withdrawal and avoidance, so producing negative reinforcement. Whereas the original learning of the association, the pairing, was the original connection between how to be anxious with a previously innocuous object got repeated, time and again, until it became a quick and fast way to feel panic in relation to it. In detail, there is put together a chain of mental processes that connect imagined objects and perception of objects with anxiety, in the futural case, and fear in the perceptual one during an encounter with the object.

There are several other types of intentionality that have not been explained. Habits are an important topic as they affect both rationality, emotionality and social behaviour. The drive of attachment is an important topic that is biopsychosocial in its being and deserves a detailed attention in another work. Hypnosis is an interest-

ing phenomenon because it indicates that people can be primed for feeling, action and new understanding and belief. Speaking to people indirectly will motivate them to act, think, believe and feel differently when they become suitably relaxed. Close-up magic is also interesting as it works to distort perception and seemingly achieve the mentally and physically impossible. Finally, none of the above should be confused with the modalities of belief where a “doxic noesis grasps the (noema of a belief-that) so producing [the believed object in an ontological-sense]”. The doxic modalities experienced vary from complete disbelief, through varying degrees of certainty, right up to the complete certainty that something is true or existent. In the circulation of longer chains of signifiers in society, all these phenomena occur in specific contexts.

Consequences for Understanding Representations of Mental Health and Well-Being

The comments above contribute to the individuality of the personality and make it clear what belongs to the collective. For instance, presentiated experiences that are purely mental can only ever be the experience of each ego, they can never be shared although they can be discussed and explained through speech. This is why dreaming, hallucination, imagination, memory, belief are entirely personal and are only ever experienced by one person unless another has had similar objects and discussion is forthcoming. Perceptual objects are more public in the sense that when two people watch the same film they share the auditory and visual objects in the film’s recording. But this shared perceptual experience is then limited due to the meanings made by each person according to their empathy of the characters in the film and how each understands the story, which may or may not be the same at all. These types of distinctions enable there to be a pure psychology of film, for instance, to understand the being of a film that to its audience is the same visual and auditory object but then ‘says’ something slightly differently to each individual in how each person interprets it. Four principles can be asserted from the above with an eye to understand meaning in psychology and meaning-change in therapy.

1. The ego can make choices about the intentionalities, objects, senses of the same objects, contexts of understanding and the duration and intensity of senses experienced. The conditions of possibility of meaning are what change the meanings of distress to any other sense.
2. People require persistence and work to commit to change towards a better future despite distress, setbacks and negativity. All meanings have emotional consequences because both are intersubjective. Any changes will influence the ego in its choices of things and behaviours and choosing its lifestyle. It is meaning that we live by.
3. Therapy is most effective when it maps the maps of the worlds of people and works within their understanding of the territory to change the map and so the noetic and noematic senses of objects on the territory. This approach can be

referred to as an emic or idiosyncratic approach to understanding individuals against the backdrop of much wider expanses of knowledge. (Such an approach is not the etic imposition of ideas onto clients or the application of models that do not fit individuals as these will be more likely to be ineffective and haphazard).

4. The good life is to accept past and future reality and make the journey to the grave as good as possible, whatever the circumstances, even a strong negative presence of the past needs to be accepted and managed concerning its influence. The path of self-managed self-care means taking responsibility for self and being persistent towards a better future.

What the idea of the intentionality of consciousness enables is a means for understanding the unique being of instances of consciousness. Apart from the various forms of intentionality, the first major conclusion is that meanings that appear to consciousness are made by it: “Experience is the performance in which for me, the experience, experienced being “is there”, and is there *as what* it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it”, (XVII, 206). It has to be noted that without tuition of any sort, people are able to make some statements concerning their actual or potential relationships and intentionalities. What the distinctions above mean are that there are many contributory aspects to psychological reality, ontology. What exists for consciousness is far more than is merely perceptually present and visible in the other’s body language and can be heard in their speech. There are numerous forms of the givenness of psychological objects of the sorts of liking and disliking, sharing or not expressing what is felt and believed. The full set of psychological objects includes many other complex composite forms of what one person mis-empathised about what the other might mean. So that if that the other is not consulted then there can be potentially causative unchecked assumptions where what is imagined is accepted for what the other did actually intend. There are further complex consequences as others may want to deceive us of their true intentions or they may also not know what they feel or believe. Pure psychology appreciates intentionality in everyday life because pre-reflexively everybody already knows something of the differences between imagining and remembering, even if the differences and similarities between the two are obscure. Everyone has referent experiences that distinguish imagining from remembering, and these can be made explicit by interviewing in a qualitative style, to find the variety of responses.

The Usual Unity of the Ego and its Consciousness: Apperception of a Unified Self Out of Pre-Reflexive Intersubjectivity

The relationship between the ego and its consciousness is a complex one in relation to intersubjective pre-reflexive (IV, 252–253) and concern social comparison “but disregarding the fact that the apperception of one’s own animate organism is in many respects more incomplete than of the alien animate organism... it is all

the more clear that the objectivity of one's own psyche presupposes mutual understanding", (V, 112). This section comments on the simplest case of the connection between Kant and Husserl where only the possibility of the unity of ego and consciousness are considered. In self-presence, there is a basic set of felt-experiences for the majority of the population that concern the connection with others, the placing of self with respect to others, and being placed in some position with respect to others by their actions. Usually, all the while there is an automatic self-unification and the on-going experience that noemata are also fairly homogenous and unified to make a manifold (III, 117, 135, 203). Even senses of inner conflict and self-criticism can give way to the achievement of an all-inclusive sense of self. This making of pre-reflexive unified self-presence shows the way that consciousness can create distinct forms of sense for each type of being. Specific cultural objects are understood according to their givenness, their modes of appearing. This is the way that families of intentionality are identified. For instance, early conclusions showed a wholistic perspective in that sense-bestowal includes living bodiliness and sensation (XVI, 160–161). And that not only was there a focus on objects for embodied consciousness (XVI, 163), but also leib contributes to both the unity of self and its objects (XVI, 282). Despite leiblichkeit, the living physical sense of the self being in its body, is not continually pre-reflexively present because the sense of one's body can be overlooked if one is concentrating elsewhere. The lived body's own pre-reflexive experience is a constant datum and a contributory factor concerning self-presence because of the automatic work of retentive consciousness (Marbach 1993, 91–92; Marbach 2000a). This pre-reflexive self-presence is all at once embodied, temporal and self-aware (Zahavi 1998, 219–221). Self-presence at a bodily level varies a great deal.

The phenomenon of the ego is a moment of consciousness of the pre-reflexive self-presence that has various facets to it and includes the voice and the ability to speak that in 1914 was classed as an aspect of empathy (IV, 95). When consciousness reflects on its pre-reflexive self-presence, what appears to the attention of the living evidence of its bodiliness, usually and for the most part, is that it works as an anchor for the "archontic" synthesis of self-unification (I, 79, 109, III, 242, 245, IX, 59, 110, XIII, 186, XVII, 208, 278). The insight from 1907 onwards was that embodied consciousness enables its own self-unification and that of its noemata (XVI, 163, 282). Similar comments on the archontic ability of consciousness to unify itself are implied. In relation to pre-reflexive presence, something needs to be said metaphorically about the nature of giving attention. Attention is a spotlight and wherever it is shone, it lights up what might have not been so fully in consciousness, or perhaps, not in consciousness at all. However, Husserl did not support a metaphysics of presence as being merely conscious, preconscious and unconscious. The phenomenon of the ego is that for the most of the population empirically, there is the experience of being one consciousness who is responsive and oriented to the contemporary time of perception, the current surroundings and other persons (IV, 155, 213, 252, 258–265, 320). Following Leibniz (1714) and Kant, the general sense of the unity of apperception of the self to itself concerns its understanding and signification "the transcendental unity of self-consciousness... indicate the possi-

bility of *a priori* knowledge arising from it”, (1787, B131–133) and is noted empirically under the heading of integration (Morsella 2005). Similarly, there are places in *Ideas I* where it is noted that persons experience meaning in the view of dimensions of “temporal *succession*” and “*simultaneity*”, (III, 165). The smallest moments of consciousness make a whole: “A consciousness and a consciousness are not only bound together universally, but they are combined into one consciousness the correlate of which is one noema which, on its side, is founded on the noemata of the combined noeses”, (III, 245). However, within such a sense of unity, there is the actuality of holding two or more objects in mind at any one time, in the experience of overlapping, *verdeckung* (XXIII, 482). For instance, one imagined, remembered or empathised sense can be held with the perception, say, of the here and now sensation of being embodied and participating in the original temporal field of the now.

For the most part, people do experience themselves pre-reflexively as having a self-presence that is merely part of everyday awareness, as it’s both difficult and unnecessary to be always focused on oneself. Empirically though, it has to be noted that in dissociation, repression, dissociative disorder not otherwise specified (DD-NOS) and dissociative identity disorder (DID), there is either great difficulty in this unity occurring or it is absent across time (Boysen and VanBergen 2013; Lynn et al. 2006). For instance, people who have suffered multiple traumata are likely not to find themselves unified and move between discrete senses of themselves. This empirical fact of dis-unity and inability to achieve object-constancy of the ego and consciousness cannot be discussed here as it really needs to be contextualised within an in-depth overview of personality and the associated phenomena that apply. However, the core sense of being a person is to have a constant identity across decades of the lifespan and to recognise familiarities across manifolds of sense. So, at a pre-reflexive level of self-presence there is a sense that is all-encapsulating and wholistic, self-unifying, archontic. The splitting of attention onto more than one object brings with it a certain splitting and variability of the sense of self that a perceptual *and* presentational combination of experiences can have. Yet such differences usually get unified into one whole composite sense of self and object (IV, 333). Whereas the experiences of coinciding concern, for instance, “belief and the reproduction of belief, judgment and the reproduction of judgment, wish and the reproduction of wish coincide in such a way that the phantasied substrate belongs identically to both of the position-taking characteristics, the ordinary and the reproductive”, (XXIII, 343): which means that coinciding is another way of expressing the core idea of intentional implication and modification in the sense that two or more objects are frequently held in consciousness and that occurs with or without the action of the ego in selecting an object to contemplate. For there is also to be considered the power of one object to obscure another “if I intuit a phantasy objectivity, I intuit a spatial world with its determinate orientation. But I can simultaneously direct my regard toward the perceived spatial world with its orientation. If I do the one, the other disappears: And the disappearing is not a mere becoming obscure but a being pressed down into an “empty” presentation”, (XXIII, 485). Similar occlusions happen when responding to questions where a strong memory obliterates the present (XXIII, 41–43) or in the detail of understanding aesthetics

(XXIII, 149–160). What is being discussed and considered is a question of degree: The original temporal field is a whole and continuous, for the most part, even when attention is split by the reproductions of past and future times, and the focus on the meanings and perspectives of other people. For the most part, there is a self-integrating process occurring.

Husserl did at times entertain the idea that *leib* and the original temporal field may possibly be able to substantiate the unity of consciousness. At other times, Husserl concluded that consciousness can be fragmented in that it holds disparate objects within itself and still forms a unified whole at a level of the felt-sense of the personal unity of the one and the same ego. This seems related to the more general belief that consciousness can unite multiple senses across time (EU, 240). And that sedimentation is the integration of sense across time (EU, 250). The ego has the role of maintaining itself. To be a self in a world is to be with others, receive and create the senses of objects around self that mark life and the movement between interests across the years. The aspects are the embodied consciousness, as part of a culture or community, having a unique personality-style and felt-identity, and a general tendency to prefer some activities over others. There are various ways of looking at the total set of meanings concerning what it is like to understand the interpenetration of one consciousness with another, as a uniform whole, with the interpenetration of parts of each individual, connected with others. The whole comes first and any moments of the being of consciousness are embedded and assimilated into wider contexts within a worldview. For instance, intersubjectivity and temporality are equi-primordial. The sea of intersubjective possibility provides content, but time elapsing and meaningful content recorded in memory are constant processes required to understand and believe first, before placing it into the future.

Summary

This chapter presented findings about universal forms of mental process that comprise the complex pieces that make life. Qualitatively there are four universal aspects of the being of consciousness: the most straightforward intentionality explained as noeses and noemata indicating objects, plus the meta-cognitive awareness and egoic ability to analyse, plus the pre-reflexive retentive consciousness presence and its lower meta-presence of itself. What is demanded for understanding are the specific details of what comprises psychological meanings that are felt as distress and wellbeing. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand how meanings of any sort stay the same or how therapists can help people change their meanings and lifestyles. Reflective study shows the many automatic generations of meaning, its shapes and forms, in relation to the types of meaning produced, the noesis-noema correlations. The anonymously functioning non-egoic processes spontaneously create senses and meanings, so that when reflection turns to them, it appears that objects pop into consciousness apparently unbidden by the egoically-driven rationalising of the internal voice or other conscious strivings. One way of summarising

the statements above, on the wholistic being of a solo consciousness artificially disengaged from other consciousness, or for considering one consciousness in contact with others, is to make two brief statements about the nature of consciousness and to state them as axioms. One axiom is “law one”: consciousness includes meaning, understanding, belief, emotion, value and thought are about something and lie on the inside of consciousness, taken for an individual consciousness in abstraction or for communal experience. What is immanent to consciousness is understood as meaning produced by consciousness-being in an intentional relationship (II, 6–7). This also includes all that is deemed *not to exist* is so for consciousness. Hence, the universe of claims and counter-claims that are in dispute are *in* consciousness. This is why consciousness demands serious attention. “Law two”: Specifying a general state of affairs for one consciousness in abstraction is to state that *intentionality* (of various types) creates manifold noematic *senses* of one *object* of attention that is grasped in various *contexts* of awareness. There are many different but equivalent wordings that refer to aspects of this one and the same conclusion. Any one object of attention has a manifold of possible views of it (XIII, 98, 190). The focus is how intentionalities and their objects can be *implicated* and *modified* within one individual and between persons. All examples are conceived in a generalised manner. One aspect of the proper way of understanding consciousness is to grasp its fundamental openness to the experiences and perspectives of others. ‘Personal’ consciousness is illuminated by language and is part of a shared and distributed system of One World, a theoretical ideal map. It is ‘personal’ in inverted commas because the ego co-exists as witness to a whole series of processes that link individuals to the social mass and the accumulating effect of the passage of time. Only consciousness contains understanding and meaning within itself. These meanings are spread across persons, across time, and in larger contexts, across history. The precision of the distinctions is that they specify the universal aspects of what it is to be aware of any object. Some types of intentionality require the co-occurrence of two or more different types of sense that comprise one overall sense: They are *intentionally implicated*. There are many different ways in which meanings, senses and experiences get appresented, overlapped or added together. Some of these may have taken residence in the one consciousness but were once existent previously for two or more people. If so, that is a case of *intersubjective intentional implication*. Within any one consciousness there are forms of *intentional modification* such as when an imagining is based on a previously perceptual experience.

Chapter 8

The Pure Psychology of Meaning

This chapter makes pure psychology show one of its empirical consequences in what is contemporarily called a dual-process theory of consciousness that includes both automatic, non-egoic processes and egoic effortful processes of agency, choice, attentive concentration and complex rule-following rationalisation and behaviour (Stanovich and West 2000; Kahneman 2011; Osman 2014). The remarks below are preparatory for how such ideal findings can be used. However, for any approach for justifying an empirical psychology, there are a number of problems to be addressed. Pure psychology focuses on the object, consciousness in psychophysicality in general. Natural psychological science only focuses on consciousness in an unclear manner on mixed biological and meaningful objects that are connected to evolutionary genetics, culture and history. A future project of a Husserl-inspired empirical psychology would translate its theoretical concerns into a set of skills and practices that can be shared within the community of psychologists and others who want to understand consciousness. One primary problem is that naturalistic received wisdom must be held in abeyance in order to justify the complementary abstraction of the intentionality view. The sequence below starts with the ubiquity of concepts referring to meaningful referents as necessary conditions of possibility of meaningfulness. This Kantian and Husserlian stipulation justifies the intentional analysis of pre-reflexive and reflective meta-awareness. For these to be understood, the right evidence needs to be identified in consciousness and interpreted in the right way. It might be the case that some people lack self-awareness or are not used to becoming aware of noetic-noematic evidence of the most fundamental atoms or building blocks on which nonverbal and verbal sense is made in intersubjective contexts. However, with practice it is possible to become aware of such material and this is the microscope of clarification that Husserl offered in his methods of reflection, intentional analysis and eidetic imaginative variation. The chapter ends with the consequences of identifying sensation (hyle, qualia, *sensa*) as these are 'below' meaning itself. But by specifying them Husserl showed that he had teased apart a gestalt of meaning to see how it works. Accordingly, it becomes difficult to identify the boundaries between the natural attitude studies of ontology, semantics, herme-

neutics and semiotics as these are all within the scope of the intentional analysis of constitution, a mereology of parts and wholes in a formal morphology of noetic-noematic dependent moments of sense.

For this reading of Husserl, the assumption of a distinction between normal and abnormal consciousness cannot be accepted prior to pure psychology investigations. It is deemed epistemologically and morally unacceptable to accept this distinction before understanding consciousness in general. It is better to posit that consciousness is normal for everyone when starting pure psychology. However, a qualitative and interpretative focus reveals problems of agreeing interpretative stances within a community of interpreters and noting that theory-making inevitably makes assumptions, simplifications and generalisations in making its map of a territory. Similarly, Husserl's arguments about empathy and intersubjectivity, for instance, make a series of assumptions that are themselves conditions of possibility for pure psychology. As a terminological note the word "ego" in Husserl can mean "pure I or pure time" which refers to the whole of the active ego plus passive consciousness in relation to its objects (XIII, 155). "Ego" more properly refers to I-acts, the egoic activities such as choosing, rationalising, desiring, planning, imagining and so forth (XVII, 365). When the ego is understood in relation to its emotional self that speaks in moods and nuances of the personal body, *leib*, then its assertion is met with persuasion from the greater nonverbal and non-egoic contexts of sense. Emotional non-egoic motivations are connected to the ego who receives their messages.

The Primary Phenomena of Pure Psychology

The next four sections provide an overview concerning how to interpret the primary phenomenon of the manifold appearances, the noematic senses or profiles of an object in general. This section re-introduces the comparative process that is at the heart of concluding on the different manners of noematic givenness of objects—in relation to forms of intentionality. As a first introduction, after a psychological reduction the following primary phenomenon needs to be explained in an experiential way or major topics do not make sense as a set of coherent justifications. The psychological reduction enables focusing on noetic-noematic senses of objects for their teasing apart and identification. This is for the purpose of attending to manifold meanings of an object as it is understood within the psychological attitude yet the manner of understanding is not adversely affected by the remaining belief in the world. Accordingly, the term *noema* below is used to specify one of a manifold of possible senses that an object can have. The primary phenomenon concerns what it is to be aware of a noematic sense of an object in a specific way though. Awareness is being intentionally-related to an object through mental processes, forms of noeses and syntheses. However, an object appears differently depending on how it is held and recognised by consciousness. The basic phenomenon, and the way of seeing it called static phenomenology, is the "descriptive phase" of intentional analysis that was developed up to about the year 1913 (Ströker 1988, 249). After this time, Hus-

serl provided increasingly sophisticated analyses of actual experiences including developmental analysis of the essences of the accrual of sense across time (XI, 345).

For any meaningful whole, there could be focusing on the various moments that comprise the dependent whole of meaning, a gestalt. So the whole of an object appears in relation to its background associations and references of sense that appear in non-perceptual ways. The primary phenomenon of static phenomenology is found in *Ideas I*, Sec. 27, for instance (III, 50), where *Verweisung*, reference between consciousness and the meaning of being exists within an *Außenhorizont* or *Hof*, which can be rendered as context, lifeworld or surrounding world. The same figure is repeated several times (I, 82–86, III, 161–167, 312–313, IV, 58, VI, 106, 161, XI, 6, 8, 41, 100, XVI, 125–129, XVII, 177, 246, EU, Secs. 21c, 25–27, 81). References are intentional links or associations that an object has to external senses, here and now, and to other internal and external objects. The meanings that can be added include links to perception, the contents of the imagination, anticipation and memory, and there can be further intentional links to where additional meanings come from. For an individual or a group of people, there are relations to cultural contexts in which a football is recognised, for instance, as a football and what that means for the individual who observes it. For instance, how such an identity of the perceptual object “football” was first learned. References to the larger context of football in society in history are at first, pre-reflexive in that they are always already there, when the ego’s gaze notices them. What reflection means is looking closer to understand the manner of the sense-giving of references, according to what becomes apparent of the sources of the types of sense that reflection finds. Concrete experience is referred to as the “correlation”, a gestalt, unity or dependent whole between noesis and noema, between forms of intentionality that constitute a manifold of meanings about the one and the same identical object across time (XI, 137–138). The order of intentional analysis starts with the noemata that appear and works backwards, to delineate the forms of intentionality that constituted them, the origin of the object. Husserl’s view of his theory-making process was that it avoided traditional hermeneutics but attended to the experiential form, within the conditions of possibility for meaning more generally. In the case of the contemplation of a football as the spherical object used in the game of the same name, the primary phenomenon is merely to perceive one visually, regardless of knowing what it is, and keep on attending to it. The point is that pure psychology could make a morphological object-oriented study of such a class of items as footballs through history and the cultural phenomena that go with them; or investigate the perceptual intentionality of vision involved and make noetic analyses of the morphology of perception and other modes of shared awareness that deliver these experiences.

This reading of Husserl keeps his method and argues on the fundamentality of experiential hermeneutics in reflection. Interpretation is ubiquitous and a continual aspect of all meaning-making including phenomenological research and reflection. Objects appear in many ways: There are elaborate intentionalities at work in the internal workings of the coding and decoding of meaning. The focus is comparing and contrasting these evident manners of givenness to specify the ways in which *consciousness holds together and keeps separate* various experiences and interprets

intentional types when it identifies the “*mode in which it [a noematic sense] is an object of consciousness*”, (III, 270). For the “act-species are different... but the noematic What is identical”, (III, 196), in the sense that the same object does appear in a manifold of senses despite how it can appear noetically (XVI, 166–167, 185–186). A horizational context is added to an object of attention because universally, an object co-occurs with other objects and surrounding associated contexts of other references, associations and implications. Or in a different terminology altogether, the object has references to the world which is correct but imprecise when the details of intentionality, sense, object and context are omitted (Heidegger, GA 2, 76–83). What this means is that psychological meaning in the world of psychologically-reduced consciousness is the fundamental base for understanding meaning in a fundamental discipline that justifies empirical methods and practices following the “A.B ~ C” formula.

For instance, when noemata about objects appear perceptually and are understood immediately, the mind stays focused on the noemata of perception and becomes aware that they have added to them a number of senses “*obscurely intended to a horizon of indeterminate actuality*”, (III, 49). What is being referred to as “indeterminate actuality” is the previous work Husserl had done in comparing the givennesses that perceptually appear, as opposed to those that are merely co-intended presentiationally. For instance, when looking at a three-dimensional physical thing, what appears is a gestalt of the face of the thing that appears, but its sides are ap-presented and do not appear in perception. Rather they appear inauthentically. So a gestalt whole is constituted when consciousness understands objects (XVI, 50–51). But the inauthentic empty and quasi-appearing senses are actually “non-given sides of the perceived thing”, (XVI, 57) in the sense that they do not appear perceptually but are additions to what is seen and cognitive psychology agrees. The eyes only see but it takes learning to make sense of what appears empirically. If early learnings are absent they may not be able to be obtained in adulthood as in the case of Sydney Bradford (Gregory 1998). Husserl concluded that the temporality of consciousness constitutes these additions automatically (XVI, 61–64, 155, 197–199). Objects are immediately pre-reflexively understood-as wholes. For instance, objects are recognised in their identity here and now, *and* have added to them a number of associations and links, backwards and forwards in time, *and* have associations to a large number of contexts of sense which involve other modalities of intentionality, *and* have connections of sense to people and usages, in times past and present, *and have further* links to senses that are possible to other everyday experience, *and have further* links of sense that are possible to science and formal academic stances. This account does not exhaust the set of possibilities that a noematic meaning can have. The complex account indicates the overall shape of the manifolds involved with different regions of being: There are links between any one noesis-noema correlation, some on the noematic-objective side with links to associations and contexts; and some on the noetic-side to other types of givenness, perhaps of the same or similar objects experienced at different times.

Each object of attention has with it an *Innenhorizont*, an intersubjectively learned inner horizon, for each individual. So in the first person: While I see only one face

of a visual object, I gain the impression of it in its three-dimensional and meaningful whole. Plus, because of empathy and the retention of the empathised experiences of others in my past social experience, I gain the senses that other people have had of the same object. So the senses that abound in the cultural, societal and historical world could get added to the object and may become co-present with the senses that I have of it. The technical term for an object for intersubjective culture is as a cultural object, because objects of attention are understood as manifolds of the senses that any referent group of people have of them. What this means is that cultural objects are potentially existent across the manifold of possible senses of them for people in general. The use of reductions to create various attitudes of approach to objects and their references supports the realisation that consciousness is diachronic and intersubjective. Objects in consciousness make sense across time and through contact with other people (II, 11, X, 73). So from 1910 there arose the inclusion of temporality and an attention to other people, to intersubjectivity, in “uncovering other phenomenological I’s through a doubled phenomenological reduction”, (XIII, 188). In fact *Text 6* of 1910 makes it clear that an intersubjective approach is one that starts with looking at the body of the other and reads it as having its sense “co-perceived... an undetermined halo, informed by the essential type of a concrete interiority, of an I and its surrounding, appearing in such and such a way”, (XIII, 225–226). What this means is that despite the rhetoric to study what appears for oneself first hand, there are types of givenness that are shared and some belong entirely for others and these are acceptable for study.

Meaning, Being and Temporality

There are numerous references within the *Time* lectures and research papers of 1905–1917 to the connections between reference, meaning and intentional ontology in the sense defined in the last section. The realisation is that temporality structures the higher conceptual and egoic forms of intentional experience. The way in which the meaning of intentional being appears differently is according to whether it is placed in the timeframe of the future, the past or the present moment. For instance, the past inner horizon is mentioned with respect to remembering “a unitary intention related to a multitude of interconnected objectivities and coming to fulfillment in the gradual, separate, and multifarious givenness of those objectivities”, (X, 54–55, cf 27, 67, 92). In the 1920s there were the conclusions on the being of time across the lifespan. Retentional consciousness is the aspect of being conscious across time in the acquisition of learning meaning and its connection to habits: “Original consciousness is only possible in the form of an actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a co-conscious-having of other sides that are precisely not originally there. I say co-conscious, since the non-visible sides are certainly also there somehow for consciousness, “co-meant” as co-present”, (XI, 4, cf 5, 7, 8–9). After 1924, the correlation between noeses and noemata concerned consciousness in developmental eidetic view, in relation to the development of cul-

tural senses with other consciousnesses. This analytic approach is called *Rückfrage*, questioning back from the point of view of the present, to spot the origins of sense across the past (III, 244, V, 126–129). This same view was later extended to an interest in the constitution of signification, reference and meaning within life-worlds across history (VI, 380, VIII, 506, cited in Bernet et al. 1993, 265).

In 1925 it was noted that the perception of transcendent experiences, and hence the context of the world of everyday experience, is open. For instance, “the perceived object which gives itself in all these processes as *the* house, as one and the same, directly experienced, there belongs a subjective *how* of givenness to experience, an open horizon of possible and ever continuable experiences in which whatever emerges is experienced, or would be experienced, as a moment” that pertains to the object itself (IX, 62). These deliberations were concluded stating that the universal *form* of temporality is what enables the regular structure for the universal sharing of meaning “such that past, present, and future, become unitarily constituted over and over again, in a certain noetic-noematic formal structure of flowing modes of givenness”, (I, 109). The primary phenomenon is mentioned there once more with respect to perceptual givenness and temporality as a “worldly object appears as cogitatum, then we have to distinguish the *objective temporality that appears...* from the “*internal*” *temporality of the appearing...* Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitations... but a *connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness...* as “the same” objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes “*constituted*”, (I, 79–80, cf I, 83, 86, III, 242, XIII, 186). What this means is that there is a process of the updating of sense happening automatically. The ego itself is not actively involved in this involuntary process of adding together meaning but rather bears witness to what passive consciousness makes presence (I, 112, 142). The ego is the passive recipient of some types of sense; whereas in higher intentional forms, it is the active creator of sense. Passive syntheses are mental processes such as retentive consciousness, the involuntary recording of what we have experienced and the automatic playback of such senses that come to the ego unbidden. Egoic active intentionality is choosing, striving, willing and rationalising as examples of cases where the ego creates something specific. The two sections above have commented on the basic reflective and analytic procedure. What follows now is a turn to the fine detail of the two constitutional theories of meaning.

Meaning as a Whole: The Dual-Processes of the Apprehension and Content of Apprehension Schema and Pre-reflexive Syntheses and Presences

This section adds further detail to what has already been explained about the attention to meaningful objects and the differences between the pre-reflexive and reflection. The comments below concern how the ego and consciousness make sense

of the world via the figures of gestalt and act-object interpretation that began in *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and *Logical Investigations*. The pure psychological view is to hold the findings of biological and natural science alongside the events of the conscious register (IX, 35). For in this view, the two previously incommensurate registers can be held and understood in mind. The mode of understanding is to have a qualitatively grounded theory checked through eidetics as an acceptable form of understanding of persons in general, about other selves in their cultural worlds. The ultimate purpose is collegiate co-working in a multi-disciplinary way to support empiricism and therapy. Pure psychology can synthesise and express the findings of empirical evidence bases of various sorts, that can be brought into play alongside a means of capturing the processes of human development as experiential and meaningful, with respect to contexts of relationships that are continually influential (IX, 33). The general conclusion that Husserl noted in 1901 stayed in place across the course of his writings for egoic acts including reflection itself. However, the changes in terminology that Husserl used tend to obscure the continuity of that conclusion. The insight is that intentionality creates meaningful objects (content or matter, *Materie*, *Auffassungsin*, XIX/1, 430, 432). But intentionality is also called noesis, interpreting comprehension, objektivierte *Auffassung* or *Auffassungform* (XIX/1, 457–458) and *Qualität*, the quality, act character, or modality of noesis (XIX/1, 89). What appears is a series of senses of the *Auffassungsin*, the givenness of the meaningful noematic object with the being-sense that it has in its context, along with non-objectified and non-genuine forms of givenness. However, between the publications of *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*, there was a refinement that more clearly shows the identification of the universal aspects of the primary phenomenon.

When the pieces of supporting material are put together, what is at the root of the act-object schema is explained in the following comments. The representational theory of the *Logical Investigations* and thereafter is an “empiricistically influenced theory of consciousness. This theory assumes present, experienced *contents*—sensations and phantasms—within consciousness (however they may have arisen). According to the character of the act or the “mode of consciousness”, these contents experience diverse sorts of *apprehension*, interpretation, apperception, corresponding with which we have a perceptual appearance, a phantasia appearance, a pictorial appearance, and so on”, (Bernet et al. 1993, 260). So what came first, the representation theory of the *Fifth Investigation* (Secs. 2, 14, 15b, 20) and *Sixth Investigation* (Secs. 25–27, appendices Secs. 4–6) applies for higher reflected-on meaning in relation to composite cultural objects that are open for intersubjective rationalising and everyday discourse. The same apprehension and content of apprehension schema is noted briefly in a variety of other texts in the years after 1901 (III, 185, 187, X, 7, XIX/1, 381–387, IX, 114, XVI, 46, XVII, 188, XXXI, 39–43). The importance of these comments is to note that objectivated dependent wholes of cultural sense are the meaningful gestalts that are subject to I-acts of reflective analysis. The reflective act of seeing essences itself is one of sense-bestowing as is any prolonged consideration of studying something. Husserl’s self criticism of his etic intellectual approach to inner time consciousness also has to be born in mind

in this respect (XI, 128, 387). Some of the earlier comments on perception and its links need to be over-ruled, for instance, as they go beyond the givenness of the phenomena or are ‘anti-gestalt’ (XVI, 50–51). The situation is vexed as the major force of Husserl’s stance is that meaning is ideal and irreal and it is the emic interpretation of givenness itself that is the teacher who must be obeyed (IX, 118, XVII, 198, 358–360).

As an aside, Husserl was criticised in this respect from the gestalt perspective of Aron Gurwitsch (1964, 265, 1965, 1966, 253–257, 1974, 87–103, 1979). Gurwitsch’s criticism is that meaning appears first but this is something that Husserl knew well, for attention goes to the signified rather than through the sensual presence of the signifier: For instance, the experience of reading a newspaper is that the meanings jump out from the page whereas the vehicle of signification is overlooked during non-reflective and non-analytic modes of attention. Gurwitsch claimed that Husserl has broken his own rule of attending to the phenomena and contaminating them with an externally constructed difference, rather than one that arises from the phenomena. But the better explanation is that Husserl did not explain what he was trying to achieve at various points in his writing so the clear attention to givenness belonging to the unity of the expression and the expressed “just like reading a newspaper: the paper imprinted with sensory-intuitive marks is unified with the sense expressed and understood in the word-signs... It has a sensuous Leib for a spiritual meaning that is grasped by way of understanding; “Spirit” and “Leib” are unified in a particular way in terms of appearances... all such comprehensive unities refer back to the unity of the Leib and spirit in the ordinary and most proper sense”, (IV, 320). The many demands to interpret emically are sufficient evidence to conclude that attending to the hyletic carriers of meaning are part of a semiotic analysis of understanding the conditions of possibility of meaning.

Rather than staying with words, let’s move to a visual example as exemplary for other types of understanding. Figure 4.2, in chapter 4, of Rubin’s vase, is a good example of the concrete phenomena of meaning which is why Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty used ambiguous visual gestalts to explain how interpreted-reality, the meaning of being, is created by each person’s consciousness. The focus is on specific processes while acknowledging that there are socially sanctioned ways of making sense of the cultural objects that commonsense knows about various regions of being. One way to focus on the givenness present in Fig. 8.1 is to explain the difference between what happens verbally and nonverbally (Owen 2006c, 289–300). The understanding of panic is one that takes it as a response to current meaningful stressors that are intentionally-linked to other meaningful objects, some of which may be conscious and some of which may be entirely subliminal in the lead up to the panic attack itself. The connection to reflective analysis is that after the reduction, the reflective ego is presented with noematic senses of an object and, in the general case or in a specific one, can search within its retained store that has already automatically projected or attributed from the store into the present original temporal field (XVII, 237). This is the first pre-reflexive achievement by anonymously functioning consciousness where conscious emotion is the speech of the unconscious processes. The process of making sense that the ego can analyse is that




Fig. 8.1 Intentionality, sense, object and context and links to others objects and contexts and their links during a panic attack

like the exemplary form of Rubin’s vase, consciousness can recognise one or more possibilities, after the fact of the panic attack.

Ambiguous visual gestalts make an excellent teaching tool for explaining the technical vocabulary. Husserl’s examples of an ambiguous tree or a person (III, 214–215), the shop mannequin that could be mistaken for a real person (VI, 165, XXIII, 277) and a mannequin in a waxworks (XIX/1, 442–443) are exemplary. “The ego vacillates between apprehensions: man or mannequin. The expectant anticipatory intentions belonging to the perception do not give a univocal prescription but only an ambiguous one. This leads to a conflict of consciousness, with inclinations to believe either of the two sides. That is, as the ego at first actualizes the motivations tending toward one side, toward the apprehension “man”, it follows the harmonious demand which goes toward this side. Since the ego, as it were, devotes itself exclusively to this side, and since that which speaks for the other side—“mannequin”—remains out of action, the ego experiences a power of attraction, an inclination to turn toward this side in certainty”, (EU, 102). This ambiguous gestalt occurs where one hyletic pattern has at least two possible noemata. The repeated example of the mannequin clearly explains what happens *for* the ego. It receives the meaning that its ‘other half’ gives it. The *other half* belonging to the ego comprises its anonymously functioning passive syntheses, associations and automatic mental habits that make understanding and connections across time. The ego interprets noematic givennesses comparatively according to the manifold of the givennesses of one object in the wider context of implicit presences, syntheses and forms of givenness. It intellectually differentiates the forms of noetic processes that make the meaning-gestalt, the unity that appears, which is an analytic task necessary to create a transcendental philosophy of this phenomena.

Between 1901 and 1909 approximately, the overall view was that the directedness of the attention of the ego to its meaningful object-in-context shows an overall gestalt where there is no one-to-one correspondence between the signified and the signifier: the *meaning-experience* and the *sensual matter* that is its substrate (I, 77, XVII, 253, XIX/1, 46, 382, XIX/2, 21, 233, XXIII, 94, 276). At times there can be one identifiable object appearing across a horizon of a manifold of senses of the one and the same object. It is also the case that there can be multiple forms of noetic awareness of one object that makes it appear in multiply different ways. To repeat: “the complex of the contents of sensation is quite varied, and yet the corresponding perceptions, by their very essence, pass themselves off as perceptions of the same object. Conversely, it also holds that the same complex of contents of sensation can be the basis of diverse perceptions, perceptions of diverse objects, as every mannequin proves, inasmuch as here, from a fixed viewpoint, two perceptions stand in conflict, that of the mannequin as a thing and that of the presented man, both constructed on the same fundament of sensation”, (XVI, 45). Husserl made it clear that sensations by themselves are meaningless (XIX/2, 21, 177). Where meaning comes from is that it is learned and stored in consciousness and the associated experiences of self and others. But the higher apprehension and content of apprehension schema is not the only account of meaning constitution; for there is a second schema that is closer to the workings of anonymously functioning consciousness as noted in the account of Rubin’s vase above.

Where the Apprehension and Content of Apprehension Schema does not Apply

There was a gradual change from the assumption of the ubiquity of the apprehension and content-apprehension schema. One original comment, written in the years 1907–1909 approximately, was that “nicht jede Konstitution hat das Schema Auffassungsinhalt—Auffassung”, (X, 7, fn) as a brief aside indicating that Husserl had changed his mind on the universal applicability of the higher schema since *Logical Investigations*. It was the turn of the years 1905–1908 that produced the second schema of syntheses and pre-reflexive presences that applies to the pre-reflexive whole of the non-egoic immersion in everyday presence (I, 77, III, 181 fn, IV, 102, X, 82, 326–327, 369–372, 378–382, XI, 125, 186, 287, 389–90, XVII, 253, XXIII, 265–276). The exemplary comment on pre-reflexive presencing is the example of the child who learns the sense of the object scissors and who thereafter “sees at the first glance *as* scissors—but naturally not in an explicit reproducing, comparing, and inferring. Yet the manner in which apperceptions arise—and consequently in themselves, by their sense and sense-horizon, point back to their genesis—varies greatly”, (I, 141). Pre-reflexive presence in the world in an immediate way is where a pre-understanding of living bodiliness and the continual syntheses of retentive and anticipatory consciousness produce, for the most part, a seamless meaningful whole of the unification of self-presence, quasi-presence and world-presence

(Cairns 1976, 45, 94). The word “presence” is used because what is being referred to are senses that are literally before reflection and intentional analysis begin. The scissors example is also a model for the important work of pre-reflexive empathising and learning of necessary associations that are held, and without which there would be no higher egoic thought or action. The various forms of intentional implication and intentional modification, concerning intersubjective intentional implication between consciousnesses, create an on-going sense of being in an always already sensuous and meaningful world of temporal duration. So much so, that for the most part, when the ego turns its attention to what is given (temporally-enduring potentially meaningful presence and sensation), in a split second it is found meaningful, recognisable and ready to be analysed and spoken about.

In the terminology of 1911–1917, the second schema that identifies retentive consciousness is comprised of the “Quer-intentionalität” synthesis, in the original temporal field towards quasi-presence, where additions come from the “Längs-intentionalität” synthesis of the pre-reflective absolute source of the constituted flow time (X, 78–83, 377–381). These Cartesian co-ordinates of the fluxions of the absolute stationary present are Quer, towards objects of attention, and Längs, from the future across the now and into the past, where retentive consciousness holds each successive new moment. This explanation is mentioned mainly in *Time* but is present elsewhere (X, 77–83, 291, 292, 319, XI, 363, fn, XVII, 251, XXIII, 188, fn). It is also related to the comments on how language expresses nonverbal experience in *Experience and Judgement* (EU, 276) and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (XVII, 18) in relation to the workings of anonymously functioning passive consciousness. However, as Husserl interpreted the way that contemporary moments ‘flow’ across the immediate now, and move into the just-past form of retained givenness, he got absorbed in the detail of the genuinely immanent reduced noemata and their constituting noeses. He realised that the Quer and Längs passive anonymous processes operate according to a different schema altogether than the higher one he had defined in 1901. By attending to the detail of what must be accomplished involuntarily and all at once, by syntheses that operate implicitly and without the direction and consent of the ego but present conclusions to it. The account of the second schema explains the set of pre-reflexive presences outlined in the years 1905 to 1909 and recorded in the abstract considerations of *Time* (Notes 39–50, Welton, 1983, 192–193, 243–244). In short, the all at once “horizontal”, “implicit” unconscious set of Quer and Längs syntheses work in the direction towards noematic-presences of consciousness *and* across the quasi-flow of consciousness as each successive now gets added to the temporal accumulation, producing the passage of contents across the lifespan that become the contents of the personal history. For the most part, the ego merely passively receives what its mental processes and habits provide for it, with respect to understanding others and understanding itself in relation to them which can be empirically investigated (Hassin et al. 2005; Wilson 2002). And whether we call these fast psychological processes of making-meaning “pre-reflexive”, “unconscious” or “implicit”, it is nevertheless the case that they are highly influential for the ego and the creation of the senses of self and others, and what it chooses and decides upon. What happens is that, for the most part and always already prior to

reflection, the “hyletic presences” in enduring constituted time that carry meaning constituted by the stationary time, conspire in each new perceptual moment to create the meaning of what appears to vision, audition, leiblich proprioception and the tactile kinaesthetic sense of physical things to the living body. Thus, the lower syntheses and presences are conditions of possibility for higher objects to occur. Perception is a mixed representation in that perceptual senses are clearly identifiable. Of course, reflected-on objects of attention occur alongside other passive non-egoic awarenesses and the higher acts of conceptual dialogue of the internal voice of the I who speaks and rationalises in language. The second pre-representational theory after 1909 is an explanation for what the ego receives, the objects that consciousness is aware of (what it sees, hears or feels, imagines, empathises). It is interpreted as having given sense to what is always already there, the presences that are immediately grasped by subliminal attentiveness.

On the one hand, there are higher acts that objectify the sensations, through interpreting *Auffassung*, “apprehension”. They objectify what was previously merely sensual material and take the pre-reflective presences, and turn them into higher composite meaning. On the other hand, the more fundamental lower syntheses and the constitution of inner time itself are concluded as obeying the second schema. Perception and the temporality of the now, the original temporal field, form a set of phenomena for analysis. Studies of what gets added to perception, apperception, are many. Intellectual work finds what comprises the species and genera of the lower syntheses. It is assumed that many noeses and syntheses co-occur to enable the current context that makes sense (I, 79, 82, VI, 160–161). However, that is far from the whole story. Let’s return to consider an ambiguous visual gestalt once more. The next two sections explain what this means in reference to how meaning is experienced.

Semiotics, Ontology, Hyletics, Noetics

This section explains some relations that are implied and are not given a commentary by Husserl himself which leads to confusion and debate. However, at base there are some cultural objects in perception that have definitive self-giveness and cannot possibly be mistaken for anything else once they are learned and can be identified immediately. Some of these include the intersubjective action and relating between persons. The point is that across enculturation definitive stereotypes or typifications about cultural objects are learned (Rosch 1978). These are implicitly held in consciousness when reference to them is made or associations, triggers, are encountered, then their sense is brought into consciousness with the activity of the ego being necessary until it focuses on the senses made for it.

The word “sememe” was coined by Umberto Eco as a name for the smallest possible unit of meaning of any sort (1976, 70). This idea helps to understand the topic of evidence, for essences can be empty or fulfilled in their givenness and conclusions are comprised of many instances, parts, which contribute to the making

of a whole. Despite the abstract language, grounding lies in finding the inherent differences between forms of meaning where the most basic building blocks are themselves wholes of meaning that are distinguishable. Meanings form together to create larger wholes of meaning. Phenomenology commits itself to making explicit the analyses of how noema make sense in contexts in general, which is a search shared with other approaches in twentieth-century philosophy and the sciences. These inquiries could be banded together under the heading of significations in general or semiotics in general where universal qualitative dimensions can be analysed in the manner of part-whole analysis (XIII, 78). The viewpoint is unashamedly structuralist in the sense that the conditions of meaningfulness are being manipulated through thought. What is implied is justifying qualitative and quantitative studies for empirical disciplines where the process of grounding in eidetic ontology is a qualitative study of the most fundamental noetic-noematic manifolds that show objects as relations between intentionalities and identifiable figures, forms, shapes, patterns and processes through time. But at base and prior to reflection, the hyletic presence in the inner 'flow' of time and perception are immediately anonymously given. The interpretative preference is not to link meaning to an unconscious unknown, because "it is just nonsense to talk about an "unconscious" content that would only subsequently become conscious", (X, 119). The terminology of synthesis and presence is used to account for what happens involuntarily through anonymously functioning consciousness.

It is argued that early introductory comments at the end of Sec. 85 of *Ideas I* is a statement that the whole of meaning comes first and that hyle ($\dot{\upsilon}\lambda\eta$, pre-objectified sensation, perceptual and presentiated givenness) is an intellectual abstraction because what primarily appears is the meaning, the gestalt (III, 74, 174, IV, 320, XI, 129, 130, XIX/2, 180, EU, Sec. 16). Thus, the comments at the end of Sec. 85 of *Ideas I* are a move towards the possibility of studying "hyletics", a purposeful analysis of how meanings get associated with sensual mental stuff (Cairns 1976, 65). Hyle is sub-meaningful in the sense that signifiers are the carriers of sense that generally are not the focus of consciousness, which more usually focuses on meaning, the gestalt. For what is being considered are the "multiformed continua of consciousness and the discontinuous connections of consciousness-processes which are connected in themselves by belonging to concatenations of sense by means of the unitarily encompassing consciousness of one and the same objective something, sometimes appearing in this way, sometimes in that way, being given intuitively or being conceptually determined", (III, 176–177). There were many previous comments on gestalts (XII, 22–28, 203–213). Any noesis constitutes sense in relation to the other forms of noematic givenness. And noesis-noema correlates get superimposed in the context of the perceptual original temporal field with respect to the ego and its embodied connection to the spacio-temporal whole that is experienced (EU, Sec. 42). "“Consciousness” consists of consciousness through and through, and the sensation as well as the phantasm is already “consciousness”", (XXIII, 265) in the sense that involuntary syntheses can connect presences together and hold them apart in such a way, most of the time, to supply useful senses to the ego for conscious contemplation. What Husserl is referring to is that the phases of

awareness referred to as retention's overlapping of sense with other retention, do not obey the higher donation of composite sense of meaning-bestowal from the ego. The actions of retentional awareness are not donations of higher conceptual sense. Pre-reflexively, intentional implication and modification occurs in the passivity of the retentional store according to the understanding of presentation. For instance, syntheses and presences work together to produce sense but "not every evidence necessarily has the form, specific Ego-act... to what is itself-given", (XVII, 253). Which when taken with: "Mental processes appertaining to original passivity—functioning associations, the processes of consciousness in which originary time-consciousness... goes on, and the like—are unable to bestow sense", (XVII, 22) is a specific definition to say that the original passivity of time is the lowest most fundamental form of synthesis and does not constitute sense but the secondary passive associative syntheses do. These comments from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* are similar to the acknowledgement of the concurrence of active position-taking of the ego with the receptivity of its passive processes (IV, 214).

What this means is that the account in these pages emphasises the commonalities across Husserl's repeated attention to the phenomena. What is referred to as the apprehension and content of apprehension schema that began in *Logical Investigations* and applies to intentionalities as they grasp objects in everyday focused awareness, continues to apply across the remainder of Husserl's thinking. The higher donation of meaning obeys the schema of apprehension and content of apprehension also known as noesis-noema correlation. The apprehension and content of apprehension schema *co-exists* with the second theory of pre-representation of what exists in pre-reflexive presence-giving. The greater part of consciousness works through non-egoic relations of automatic responding to the world (ideas, others and things) that are presences about transcendent facts and possibilities, and the subliminal bestowing of sense and felt-emotion in leib provided by passive consciousness. The role of the ego is making sense of itself, self-reflexively and qualitatively, in a fundamental way.

The Constitution of Meaningful Objects

This final section makes some introductory comments on the consequences of the arguments above. To return to the previous overview of the analysis of meaning given in chapter 4 and to summarise the position outlined there once more in the light of these added details: the qualitative methodology is that by immersing oneself in the detail of how objects are given, it becomes possible to identify the similarities and differences between specific types of intentionality and synthesis that arise between such experiences as imagining, understanding a canvas, empathising another's view of the world, understanding geometry and numbers, and understanding the reference of words used in communicating. But to explain what is involved in each noesis-noema correlation requires more detail to be added about the sets of links between experiences that act as a whole to synthesise meaning. When Hus-

serl looked on his accomplishment of 1901 from the vantage point of early 1929, and the focus on conceptuality and the intentional analysis of noesis-noema correlations of speech, he noted that there is “the syntactical as such, which makes its appearance already in the pre-predicational sphere and, moreover, has its analogues in the spheres of emotion and volition and, on the other hand, the syntactical that belongs to the specific sphere comprising judgements”, (XVII, 188, fn). What this means is that judging in language is a higher act of rationalising based on pre-verbal meaning, so the schema for pre-verbal or nonverbal meaning-constitution needs to be made explicit. There are pre-predicative judgements in nonverbal sense and understanding (like emotion and anxiety, volition, perceptual and bodily sensual patterns to name a few). But what is important is that despite the huge number of objects that comprise the world, and the even higher number of meanings that they might have, then the apprehension and content of apprehension schema conclusion is relevant for noesis-noema correlations for egoic attention, reflection and intentional analysis.

When considering complex objects and contexts, the ego needs to employ its active rationalising processes to sift through the immediate evidence. At the most fundamental level of presence, what is always already there is a connection to the storehouse about the immanent world in consciousness that has concluded on transcendent cognised being immediately (even though such processes improperly appear to the reflecting ego). Consciousness passively functions even before internal dialogue with respect to the immediate presence of its own living leib (VI, 109–110). The immediate sense of being in connection with presence appears out of the background of the world. This is the most fundamental level of intentional analysis. The central difference between before and after reflection is the meta-cognitive distinction of the full reflection on noemata that are, for the most part, immediately understood. The ego turns to them and recognises them for what they are. Reflection shows how the object-as-understood supervenes in the place of the noema, for actually interpreted sensations are experienced to mean what objectively appears in the five senses and bodiliness. And thus contrary to what natural attitude commonsense might say, there is sufficient reason to insist that passive syntheses are the powerhouse that enables conscious meaning to appear—and that is what gets interpreted by egoic thought and expressed in discussion. Accordingly, the conceptual intentionality of judging in language is a higher ability of the ego that chooses its words in relation to its meaningful gestalts. Strictly, noeses and syntheses constitute non-verbal meaning in relation to their hyletic sensations that are made into presences, then noemata, and then into identified objects for the conditions of possibility of the object demand the presence of the past to make sense in the current moment (XVII, 251). Finally, these correlations get superimposed in the perceptual context of the original temporal field for “no matter how much this world may lose its “actuality”, may “withdraw from me”, perceptively it is always there”, (EU, 205), meaning that in the last analysis, the natural attitude perception of the world-horizon surrounds momentary experiencing and the analysis of meaning.

What the above means for natural attitude experience is that psychological meanings are intentional products. On the one hand, people would like to feel re-

laxed, interested in others and feel good about their personal prospects and those of their loved ones. These types of meanings can be achieved. However, for those with mental health problems and lifelong distress understood as meanings, then the argument above is a warrant to stay in the realm of the meaningful and not become absorbed in naturalistic studies. For even if biology is causative of tendencies of action, feeling and thought then the ego is still responsible for managing its lifestyle and genetic inheritance. The answer promoted for therapy concerns reframing the past and present to find years of the future potential to enjoy life, contribute to society and experience close connections with family and friends. Sometimes the meanings that motivate purposes towards greater happiness can be unclear. But the central importance of studying meaning is being able to represent, consider and theorise it. Meanings and meaningful purposes are a rich vein of material for potential explanations in psychopathology, the study of distress, and positive psychology, the study of well-being. These two disciplines span the whole of human misery and happiness as lived experience. One consequence is that the narrative of the object can be put to work to become an explanatory means for qualitative studies. Psychological problems and personality styles are understood as epistemic difficulties causing motivational ones. These include mis-interpreting sensations, being excessively focused on reified meanings, of not being able to recognise entirely novel cases, or of not being able to recognise positive events when they occur, or being confused by exceptionally vague or actually unexplainable and ambivalent states of affairs. The two theories of meaning unify the connections between the biological and the cognitive science sides of psychology in relation to the imperative to use a first-person subjective description of mental processes: This is because the view of pre-reflexive immediacy permits the emergence of unconscious and biological-neurological functioning into consciousness as a possibility. Centralising justificatory discourses around natural being is the way physics or chemistry. But analysing self-consciousness makes it clear what sorts of rationality counts in drawing justifiable interpretations. What is valuable is that intentional justifications and their evidence require no introduction for everyday persons who can use applications of intentional information to understand themselves. This is because the biological tendencies show themselves as predispositions that influence and motivate and can be considered as concurrent influences in producing meaningful motivations.

At the verbal level of putting words to what appears, the ego attributes explicit conceptual rationalisations to what it nonverbally experiences. It puts an explanatory narrative around the noema and its context. In the case of complex situations and objects, such as the self in relation to its life course, or to specific other people, or to intersubjective events between any two or more people, there is plenty of scope for ambiguity and jumping to inaccurate, or indeed, completely false conclusions about what such an object might mean. In pure psychological terminology, one interpretative problem would be, for instance, to mistake one noematic sense for the entire manifold of noematic senses of the object. The point of understanding simple ambiguous gestalts like Rubin's vase (Fig. 4.2) is that the meaning of the many objects that comprise the universe of sense of what might exist (or not) is that in the everyday lifeworld there is plenty of evidence that can be easily passed

over in favour of the mental and emotional habits of jumping to the first nonverbal conclusion that comes to mind—rather than staying open to further possibilities that might also arise. Given a little further time, given a greater openness to what actually does appear nonverbally, it is possible with any complex object to find further recognisable aspects that comprise the identity that an object in its context might have. This fuller attention to evidence needs to happen over and above the first noematic sense that consciousness identifies—that could have been mistakenly concluded as a topic for a reifying over-focus—thereby excluding the recognition of other plausible or better considered interpretations of the evidence. Hermeneutics in this sense, of making explicit interpretative rules in an experiential way, is where the moments that stand for the dependent whole need to be carefully considered to make sure that they are properly representative. The technical language is to consider the noematic senses that appear, to find if they are properly in relation to the manifold noemata of the object in question. For on the one hand, if the ego cannot recognise an object properly, then it delusionally cannot ‘see’ what actually does exist. On the other hand, a potentially more reliable understanding of the object is possible only when consciousness can recognise the object through checking the understandings it has already obtained.

Summary

The narrative that pure psychology produces uses vocabularies about the grammar or style of a world of human experience. The practices it encourages could be of any sort, as is pertinent for the region of being and the purposes to be achieved, but they are cognisant in a self-reflexive way about how meanings are generated and transformed within their discipline. The way of making this type of interpretation is to be open and sensitive to the phenomena of everyday life. The phenomenological attitude is precisely such an acuity to how consciousness works in making meaning: The primary processes are involuntary and spontaneous where presences get recognised through pattern-matching with what has already been learned. The secondary process are those where there is focused attention and control being exerted in the judgments and choices that are both permitted, corrected and rejected in the set of experiences called egoic. It grasps the processes at work in natural attitude everyday experience, avoids the horror of the naturalistic attitude being applied to interpret consciousness and uses findings from the psychological attitude to identify the universal and ideal noetic forms (VI, 182, XVII, 245). Pure psychology concerns meanings comprised of emotions, thoughts, behaviours and interpreted relationships that are constituted by and in consciousness, where biological and unconscious processes contribute, but the focus is on using the rationalising ego and not natural being and its causes. Psychological meaning, the world of intentionality and syntheses, is a more complex product of sense. To be precise, psychological noematic senses are the result of inter-relatedness in complex ways that build over time. They are the result of connections between specific noeses, about specific

objects in time, in specific contexts as part of a temporal phase. The attitude of approach taken towards an object of attention is highly influential in producing what is meant or experienced. It's not just that there is a specific relationship between the observer and the world of others. It's more about being open to the nuances of sense that accrue in expectation and disappointment alongside beliefs about what should or might be happening. In a human relationship, there is a shared history where each party says something to the other and simultaneously nonverbally expresses it. They look at each other with specific expressions on their faces and feel some way about each other and themselves. At no point is there a guarantee of a constant correspondence between an expression and how it is interpreted. Conclusions on meaning are open to change and factual occurrences capable of being recorded audiovisually are open to reinterpretation by different observers.

Empirically and most often, consciousness is able to bestow sense automatically onto what is apparent in the current context to identify the meaning of the noemata that appear, understanding them as-something already known nonverbally. Wordless experience is just the immediate identification of the noema, most often it is an object already known. Thus, there is retrieval and comparison occurring where the current noema is compared to the retained object already-known. When the two are found to be sufficiently similar, conceptual intentionality can express concurrence about the nonverbal experience. However, the phenomena of failure to understand, vagueness, confusion and ambivalence also occur and can be important. Empirically, there are significant cases where the bestowal of meaning does not occur in creating the sense of identification of the meaning of the current noema. Prior to reflection there are syntheses of temporality acting across distances of actual time elapsed, that can summon senses from the past and add them and their contexts of sense to sensations that are quasi-present to the attention. In standard psychology and therapy, terms like association, conditioning, learning and habit are used to indicate the complex connections of mental process that occur when presentations of various kinds connect with perceptual and sensual presence of the current moment. This adds meaning onto the present givenness of imagined, empathised, expected and perceived events.

Chapter 9

Consciousness in Its Habitat of Other Consciousness

Chapters 7 and 8 were a focus on solo consciousness to spell out the simple findings on the noetic universal forms in general. However, those details are not representative of how consciousness is connected in culture to other consciousness. This chapter begins with how to read key aspects of the highly condensed account of intersubjectivity in *Cartesian Meditations*. The reading made is one that identifies eight major phenomena in the sphere of intersubjective ownness revealed by a special transcendental reduction. The empathic sense of the other is what belongs to self and is further broken down into five contributing parts. The role of retentional consciousness is emphasised as this is read as the storehouse of prior social learning held in individuals. Husserl's mathematical thinking is such that he identified constant and universal necessities in intersubjectivity that are posited as ideal and form real world instances of meeting with actual and merely possible others. The universal form of intersubjectivity is called "triangular" because it involves three continually inter-related moments: a self in relation to another who empathises them and their view of a common cultural object that is also available to self. For the other, this triangular form is the same but reversed and overlapped with the perspective of self. Hence intersubjective meetings between two or more people are comprised of such overlappings of sense which when encountered and learned, comprise the whole of the meaningful world. Husserl posited that: "*consciousness has an essence "of its own"*" and that, with another consciousness, it makes up a self-contained concatenation of the stream of consciousness", (III, 70). The ideal position made in the transcendental view is empathised by recourse to the use of deixis, which although it belongs to linguistics, serves to identify the inter-perspectivity in general that Husserl identified. In short, the sharing of meaning in the world obeys ideal forms and while it's impossible to have the other's consciousness as one's own, their social acts and nonverbal communications "speak the language" that has been learned in enculturation to date. It is both true to say that we can never have their experiences first-hand and we always gain an impression of them even if they don't say a word. The ideal and universal study of the triangle between self, other and cultural object is defined at the end of Sec. 44 of *Cartesian Meditations* (I, 129–30).

The conclusion there is read as the irreducibility of intersubjective senses in self which means that meaning is intersubjective.

This chapter analyses the moments that comprise the experiential meaningful whole of the one world of intersubjectively accessible meaning (IV, 81, VI, 136, 146, XIII, 92). The instance of understanding self and others is just one aspect of the same whole of understanding and social learning about the meanings of cultural objects that circulate and accrue over time, through the addition of the views of people at large in cultures and societies (I, 167). Self, others and cultural objects are a central topic for consideration because as “psychologist, I in general make my theme this being and life in the mode of an “Ego”, and I thematize the person solely with regard to his psychic aspect. In the pure turn to the interior, exclusively following so-called “inner experience” (more precisely, self-experience as well as “empathy”) and deferring all psychophysical questions which include a relation to human corporeality”, (V, 144, cf XVII, 238). Indeed, such material could be called an intersubjective map of the world (I, 137–8), a “*mind-world*” (XIII, 92, cf XVII, 242). “A piece of knowledge is intersubjective, if in grasping the same thing in principally the same manner it is accessible to many, no matter how many subjects. Every piece of mathematical knowledge is intersubjective... Likewise, all physical knowledge is intersubjective... With respect to the knowledge of ideas, as in mathematical knowledge, what is known intersubjectively is something universal. It belongs to the essence of the universal, i.e., to ideal universality, that it is indifferent to the plurality of single acts of knowing, irrespective of whether these acts belong to a single consciousness or not”, (XIII, 217). What this definition of intersubjectivity means is that which is between subjects is common and can be studied although the type of evidence is related to the experiences and views of others and how cultural objects appear to them (I, 129, V, 151, 153). The content of what is known and how it is interpreted is a genuine part of the larger whole of the communicating mass of the world. Because the relationship with cultural objects is intersubjective, the public quality of meaning occurs in grasping common senses of objects that a culture has of the “changing acts of meaning in respect to being”, (IV, 244). Husserl expressed this in a number of different ways depending on the time and focus of the writing overall. Intersubjectivity is important and the contents of this chapter comprise ideal conclusions made from inquiries in the transcendental attitude that also apply to the pure psychological one.

How to Read *Cartesian Meditations*

This reading of Husserl notes the similarity between a self in a world and the other in his or her world. Not only are objects understood in the context of relationships with other objects, it is the case that each self has the experience of being a unique person in a series of unique social contexts across history. On the one hand, every self finds senses of “alter ego” in itself that are usually capable of being integrated into a unity. The task is to find “what kind of constitution is necessary for

another self to appear as an existent in my realm of consciousness and in my world", (I, 34). However, guidance is required from Iso Kern (1997, 356–7) who states that *Cartesian Meditations* omits relevant details from the years 1926 and 1927 that would have helped the analysis. Kern warns that Husserl was "confused" about his own terminology (1997, 357). Also, the way the reductions are described is unclear because two different reductions are noted, both with contradictory findings as they reveal different sets of meaning and mental processes. One reduction has the purpose of scrutinising the motivations of meaning inherent to passive, genetic accruals of sense in intersubjectivity across the lifespan. Another reduction, sometimes called "monadic" or "intersubjective" is difficult to understand in *Cartesian Meditations* because on this occasion it includes empathies which are based on empathising perceptual givenness of others and the intersubjective senses in their perspectives. All the same, a solo monad is an abstraction from the intersubjective world (I, 125, 135).

This creates two problems of how to make sense of the text. Problem 1: How can intersubjective senses be removed or decontextualised in a reduction to reveal an area within the sense of self that is not intersubjective, yet still the source of the empathised sense of otherness and the connection to the being of cultural objects that is part of the meaningful world? This reduction to a sphere of ownness is unusual in that clearly there is an irreducible map of the world revealed even after the stringent effort to consider ownness and what passive consciousness provides immediately (I, 127, 129–30, 135). And problem 2: In the second reduction, empathic senses are included after the reduction and these senses appear within the "best originality" of evidence that is unavailable to the perceptual senses except in the form "of what can be empathised about others and their perspectives" or some emotional or associated intersubjective sense about their veracity in the moment and across the period of time in which they are being empathised. There are several notes to the effect that in an Originalsphäre, senses of self and other remain for contemplation specifically because self and other are forever paired (I, 142), pre-reflexive consciousness is the source of all pairing and retention of empathy and intersubjective senses (I, 142), and the difference in givenness between self and other is forever maintained (I, 144). The solution to this puzzle is that Husserl is analysing a whole and identifying its dependent moments and constant inter-relationships within a much wider transcendental attitude that demands the consideration of the evidence that appears despite how the natural and naturalistic attitudes might wish to interpret it.

What Husserl wrote on intersubjectivity is an exemplar for interpreting the being of specific noetic-noematic sememes, the pixels that comprise the big picture. And as a further extension of the metaphor, to recognise the style of the map of the world of actual intersubjectivity, whereby not only do we know what the world looks like, for we know how to get around inside the referential totality of inter-significations that can be called the style of part of the world in question (I, 129–30, VI, Sec. 54b). The map of the world inside consciousness even after a transcendental reduction is meaningful for "what is included in our ownness and, having its place in this Nature thanks to the bodily organism, the psychophysical Ego... [is]... wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being

the whole constitution of the world existing for me and... the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is concluded in my peculiar ownness and the systems that constitute what is other", (I, 129). "The all-embracing constitution of the world within the ego is outlined as a problem only as far as the theory of clues—as far as the consideration of the world (that is to say: the ontological consideration thereof, as transformed into a constitutional-ontological consideration)", (I, 238–9). Intersubjectivity is comprised of actual and possible connections.

For the transcendental attitude, meaning is a moment of the world, metaphorically, part of a moebius strip of the connection between inner and outer (I, 124–130, IV, 341, VI, 189, 222–3, 260, 514, XVII, 221–2). A moebius strip is when an apparently three dimensional object has been made from a single strip of paper by taking a single band of paper and putting one half-twist in it (named after August Möbius, Gardner 1959; Owen 2000). If one were to take a pencil and start drawing along the length of the strip of paper, something counter-intuitive would be found. The apparently three dimensional object might be expected to have two sides, but it only has one. Also, it only has one edge. By putting a single half twist into the band it makes the resulting twisted-band only have one side. This is a metaphor to explain the connection across the apparent expectations of there being inner and outer regions to meaning. Meaning exists across the dimensions of the inner and outer that are believed by the natural and naturalistic attitudes. The dimension of meaning in the phenomenological view is that it belongs to worldliness and is distributed across self, other, object and temporality as holding inside in learning and memory; throwing understanding forwards in anticipation. (Although it has to be noted that learning is not used as a term, it is nevertheless implied). For another way of defining intersubjectivity in the case of two people is to say that people are dependent moments of the greater whole of culture, family, society and history. The theoretical conclusions provided are ubiquitous. Despite the individual differences between all selves (living, dead and not yet born), there are a number of universal meanings and intentional processes that can be identified. What an ideal conclusion permits, as in the case of mathematics, is the establishment of a logic that acknowledges the regular characteristics and patterns inherent to meaning (XVII, 351). In the case of the mathematics of consciousness, reflection spots the experiences that support number theory, or permit the identification of precise links between associations of thought, belief, understanding, emotion and relationship process (XVII, 239). For if it's true that meaning is the result of contextualisation (Eco 1976, 7) then there is a specific style of connection between the wholes of sense where concepts and specific types of relationship occur.

The analysis of noesis-noema correlations looks for constant, ideal and universal qualities of two or more persons in interaction including the forms of social acts, praxis, knowledge and meaning (IV, 192, 194, 198). In the transcendental attitude, the research question is "what are the conditions of possibility for others' perspectives and meanings to appear for selves, as the senses of cultural objects have been shared since infancy?" The answer is a narrative of the universal conditions of possibility of an irreducible world in general (I, 140–148). Each consciousness, in this

idealising and universalising view, is able to apprehend the meaning of any object of attention, including those of others' bodies in their most fundamental embodied expressiveness in the world that we share (XIII, 230). The open space of consciousness for understanding has specific universal dimensions that are detailed below. One finding is that the universals of the empathic noesis-noema correlation of the other's physical body express their consciousness as a double object: the visual perception of others' bodies indicates their consciousness and the greater systems of interaction between people count (I, 134–5, 149, 156–8, 166). Somatology studies the body in an immanent-transcendent continuum where *leib* is on the inside and open to transcendent conditions such as fear in an unsafe area. Because the *leibkörper* is expressive, the anxiety can be seen by others and so they too, it is expected, will be able to see directly what the fearful self feels in the fear-zone. In an intentional analysis, any psychological state is readily grasped. The phenomena that are referred to need explaining: Firstly the vision of others' bodies reveals what is now called nonverbal communication. In a wider sense still, what appears in perception is both their bodily expressiveness and their speech. In the analysis Husserl focused exclusively on how, since infancy, vision enables to some degree the experiences of the other's mind in self; while the actual mind of the other itself always remains separate. Husserl used the term "transcendent in immanent" to refer to the empathised senses of others in self and what the irreducible intentional world is even after a transcendental reduction to solo consciousness (XIII, 234).

The overall outcome is the application of universals for the future work of interpreting human relationships from an ideal perspective to promote collaborative relationships and actions. The conclusion is the sketch of the minimalistic world of consciousness as an irreducible necessary set of conditions for consciousness to be itself with other consciousness. The task is to "explore the intentionalities implicit in the entire, synthetically unified, *world-experience*, extending throughout the life of the single ego and throughout the life of the transcendental community, one must explore the intentionalities implicit in its *all-embracing style*; and subsequently one must explore its constitutional genesis together with 'the genesis of' this style. In such concrete studies one learns to understand, in *one* sphere, the *essence of evidence, evidence as an effective performance*, which, like other effective intentional performances, takes place as woven into systematically built performances and abilities", (XVII, 250). This excerpt is part of the argument for the necessity of contemplating personal insights as the only mode of experiencing meaning that anyone will ever have: that is for ourselves as part of our own life and how that relates to passing on the ability to discuss mental processes and their senses. Care is required to understand the initial perspective taken and realise that Husserl made many attempts at understanding intersubjectivity.

The method of investigation is to work back from the givenness of the other to ascertain the constitutive associations (intentional implications, associations, motivations) and the intersubjective intentional implication, in order to work out the overall wholes in which these distinctions and associations accumulate over time (V, 127–8, 129). Self-reflexively, the transcendental approach knows full well what it is doing in working out the various interconnections between the senses of the

other. The basic point is that the condition for the possibility of meaning is the constitution of a world (cf Kant 1781, A110). The research question for investigating forms of merely possible encounters between two or more minds can be phrased as: “How can appresentation of another original sphere, and thereby the sense “someone else”, be motivated in my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience—as the word “appresentation” (making intended as co-present) already indicates?” (I, 139). What is being referred to is inspecting the source in self of the empathised sense of another person, another self. The research question concerns the equi-primordially of the conditions of possibility of a whole, for “my “transcendental clue” is the experienced other, given to me in straightforward consciousness and as I immerse myself in examining the noematic-ontic content belonging to him” that appears in oneself (I, 123). This is a way of saying that others are permitted to be included as objects of attention in order to determine the form of the intentionality that gives the empathised sense, when what is only ever felt about others is the quasi-sense of what they are motivated by, what they are trying to achieve, what they think and feel (XIII, 183–191, 219–224). The givenness of others’ minds is forever empathised *second-hand* and never *first-hand* as we only have the experience of our own minds yet there is the transcendental sense alter ego given to them (I, 139, 143, 144, 146, 148). Only through checking with the person themselves can such a sense be found to be accurate or not.

Overview of the Phenomena that Comprise the Whole in *Cartesian Meditations*

On the expressive side of consciousness, there are nonverbal forms of expressive bodiliness and gesture, and verbal expressions are linguistic references that pass on knowledge and other forms of information through the phenomena of dialogue and speech. So watching, listening and discourse communicate sense but at a higher level because self and other are inseparable conditions for each other (VI, 256). The phenomena of the various facets of the empathised experience of the other is that *in the light of the absence of the other’s actual first-hand perspective on the world to self*, their verbal and nonverbal expressions are genuine indications of what it is that they experience, what they are pointing to with their bodies. Yet these additions of sense to what appears visually, occur with other simultaneous demarcations between aspects of this whole. What Husserl did was to identify phenomena that are pertinent to the research question and interpret them according to their consequences for the type of creation of sense that we have at the everyday level of meeting another person and understanding the manifold nature of cultural objects, intentional beings in the world. The type of analysis concerns intentional links in meaning that consciousness makes when apprehending the consciousness of other living creatures. What are considered are a number of senses that are different and in specific ways connected, and simultaneously in other ways, kept separate. Accordingly, these need numbering and defining in order to keep track of them and




Fig. 9.1 Eight universal phenomena of intersubjectivity, P1 to P8

a diagram shows them as a whole (Owen 2006c). I number the relevant conscious phenomena P1 to P8 and note that there are several aspects of the sense of the empathised vision of the bodies of others that are numbered P2a to P2e.

Figure 9.1 relates the moments of those wholes of connection between any two consciousnesses, where the possibility of there being more than one object and multiple others, is included ideally. Figure 9.1 shows phenomena P1 to P5 are conditioned by the higher phenomena concerning the maintenance of evidence P6, P7 and P8. One most basic tie is between the vision of our own bodies and those of others. This tie motivates wholes of meaning to be formed. The empathised perspective of others (P2d) is provided because the empathised place of otherness is constituted by our own empathies of what it might be like to be another—although we never have that experience as they do.

The first phenomenon is the type of mixed givenness that occurs for the perceptual and empathic givenness of the object of attention that is another person. Husserl noted this as a double object, here called P1 and P2. And in order to explain the empathy of the other in total, P2, it is broken into its constituent moments. The motivating similarity between human bodies is the first place to consider the phenomena of the outward expressiveness of consciousness. Kern clarifies the central topics that Husserl concluded on (1993, 1997, 358). The constant and most central aspects of Husserl’s argument are portrayed in Fig. 9.2.

This is an idealisation of the manifold of intersubjective instances where “I identify the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance α with the thing posited by the other in the mode of appearance β ... Each person has... “the




Fig. 9.2 Husserl's basic "triangular" relation between self, other and cultural object

same" appearances of the same things—if, as we might suppose, all have the same sensibility", (IV, 168) which is also called "overlapping-at-a-distance", (I, 147). The focus in *Cartesian Meditations* concentrates on the nonverbal communication happening before a word is said. Altogether, the double object of P1 and P2 is comprised of five facets of empathising the other as:

P2a—The physical body of the other indicates the basic nonverbal leibkörper expressiveness of the other who has a bodily orientation with respect to mutual cultural objects and self (I, 140).

P2b—The visual perception of the other's body indicates their expression of living bodiliness because all bodily otherness is empathised as connected with self (I, 144).

P2c—The visual perception of the other's body indicates the phenomenon of the identical other and their givenness. Although the other is at a distance from self empathy forms a basic mutuality between them, for both parties see and empathise from their own positions (I, 145–6).

P2d—The visual perception of the other's body reawakens previously learned empathising of self into the physical place, consciousness and body of the other to experience vicariously, in quasi-fashion, what objects and the world would look like from the position of the other (I, 146).

P2e—The auditorily-communicated meaning of the other's speech, as they meant it, is based on grasping words as "cultural predicates" as these too lie in webs of sense for a linguistic group (VI, 371, XI, 435).

Figure 9.2 seeks to explain how empathy and intersubjectivity operate to de-centre the self and make it social. Although there is a three-way connection between self, other and object (I, 141–3), if this triangle is accepted as true and universal, it too operates for all others according to the ideal and universal type of assumptions made about homogeneity and reciprocity that form the conclusions. To be explicit, other consciousness also empathises selves and their views of the same cultural objects. This is not a two-person configuration but implies a third term: That of the presence of the shared knowledge of what various cultural objects are like in their manifold of senses (I, 146). The ideal universal form is triangular though. Thus to extend the image of the triangular relationship above, intersubjectivity is an overlapping of triangles where others empathise selves also.

The first observable difference is between the current moment of visual perceptual givenness of the other's körper, P1; as opposed to the presentiated addition of

empathised understanding (the first constitution of the whole, P2). The other has a living body, P2a, that expresses emotions and participation at a nonverbal level. The other is a specific meaningful someone who expresses some shared interest in the world. Specifically, the other living body responds to the same objects that self sees and the contributions that self makes in any encounter. P2a is the basic empathic sensual expressiveness of the physical human body. Vision (meaningful phenomenon P1, the visual gestalt) is empathised with the nonverbal expressiveness of the other (P2a, I, 122, cf 136). For instance, a facial expression and bodily orientation shows co-interest with self with respect to the mutual world. Accordingly, the first aspect of empathy is that the “body [Körper] over there is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism [Leib]”, (I, 140). However, P2a is only the first aspect of empathy that gets added to the visual perception of the physical body. The “motivational basis”, (I, 140), between *human bodies as seen and empathised wholes*, promotes a series of additions of empathised senses from retained past experience with others, with respect to the meaning of what they do, say and express. One pair of objects that appear universally across intersubjectivity is the vision of the self’s körper (filled with its leiblichkeit) in relation to the visual perception of the körper of others, similarly filled with an empathy of their leiblichkeit (I, 142). Husserl’s way of describing empathic presentation was to say that it has a double object. For in the natural attitude, perceptual vision and audition present what is happening now; whilst empathic presentation is frequently clear, giving an accurate meaning that an empathiser gives to the persons they empathically read.

Connected to P2a is P2b, a second aspect of what is created about the consciousness of others. The perception of the other’s body indicates not only their nonverbal expression of living, bodily otherness. The nonverbal visual sense is empathised as another living body, the ego and consciousness of another person: “the other’s animate body [Leibkörper] and his governing Ego are given in the manner that characterises a *unitary transcending experience*” of otherness (I, 144). Husserl argued that this sense was first constituted in infancy. There is a temporal throwing forward of the own world that has been learned. Part of intersubjectivity in the here and now moment is an anticipation of what will happen next, one that can be frustrated, disappointed or fulfilled.

Connected to P2a and P2b is P2c, the next addition of sense. The perception of the other’s body also indicates that the other has givenness in space “There,” (I, 146), as a continually separate person to self who experiences cultural objects from There. What this means is that in face-to-face meetings between two persons, there is a specific constancy of difference between self and other. If the difference between self and other was variable, there would be a fundamental confusion and other people would be felt to be aspects only of one ‘self’. In connection to these empathised senses, there is a linking of sense between self and the empathised senses donated to the other, as an immediately grasped other with their empathised sense of their perspective.

The fourth aspect of the base experience of empathy, P2d, exists because of the total set of conditions P1 to P8. P2d is the view of the world that other people have. We empathise their views of cultural objects and quasi-experience the overall

relationship of the other's views in our empathies of them. The visual perception of other's bodies connect with empathic understanding as a socially learned co-constitution of the 'second-hand', empathised appearances of the other's intentional object for them from their perspective, "those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is", (I, 146). So empathy delivers the senses or profiles on the common cultural objects and world that are apparent to all. One effect is that "I *experience* the world (including others) ... as other than mine alone", (I, 123). This is why objects are cultural objects. This is how cultural senses get into culture because since birth there has been an informed process of teaching children what things mean. Cultural senses belong to the culture, the reference group to which the objects are a part of commonsense. Because of idealization, it is assumed that intersubjective worlds of what is shared, all have the same "triangular" shape. They obey the same principles of the inter-relatedness of all contents within a surrounding horizon of sense, thus producing "an *intersubjective* world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its objects [*Objekten*] to everyone", (I, 123). Yet the triangular transcendental categories, self, other, cultural sense and the cultural object, theoretically and universally remain the same. In a different wording, what this means is that the cultural objects that we see *appear differently* for others. This fourth part of empathy P2d is what makes the world capable of being shared because empathy is the case of mentally representing another's point of view, for instance, "a perception that someone else has of the x that I see or that I imagine to be able to see", (Marbach 1993, 91). The terminology is general and means that higher and more complex forms of differing understanding between selves and others are founded on this ideal transcendental analysis of the conditions for sharing implied and communicable meaning. This is also how speech has meaning, because the speech of the other, P2e, can indicate what actually their view is. When it comes to understanding the other, one phenomenon that is not in the analysis of 1929, is grasping the other as a speaking whole person who says something meaningful, as well as being one who looks and behaves purposefully in accord with what is said. Their verbal presence is only one part of the whole, for what also usually concurs with the spoken aspect, is the 'speech of the body' in that there are nonverbal conformities and rules throughout the public sphere. If these connections of congruent signification were not obeyed, then what would occur would be a failure to share a single meaning. Rather, two meanings would be sent, for instance, one nonverbally and the other verbally, which would be confusing for the successful receipt of what was intended to be said.

The statements above are conditioned by a variety of other phenomena and intersubjective processes that maintain the intersubjective accessibility of objects for all, across time and history. The inter-relation between self and other is always of the sort where the senses of objects become shared as do the manners of intentionality towards them. If this were not the case, persons would be solipsists and there would be no possibility of communication or culture. One clear account of intersubjective intentionality was made in 1915. "The things posited by others are also mine: in empathy I participate in the other's positing. E.G., I identify the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance α with the thing posited by the other in the

mode of appearance β . To this belongs the possibility of substitution by means of trading places. Each person has, at the same place in space, “the same” appearances of the same things—if, as we might suppose, all have the same sensibility. And on this account, even the “view” of a thing is Objectified... Only in the manner of appearance can I have co-given with his leib, his appearances and his “here” to which they are related... Man as object is thus a transcendent external object, an object of an external intuition, that is, we have here an experience of two strata... empathy... which realises the entire psychic life and psychic being in a certain sort of unity of appearance, namely that of an identity of manifold appearances and states localised therein which are united in the form of dispositions”, (IV, 168–9, also I, 142, 147, V, 65–6, 109–110, IX, 227). Although the manners of expression were different in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, *Cartesian Meditations* and *Crisis*, the sense is the same. What is at stake is that through empathy, or better co-empathy between any two consciousnesses, it becomes possible for all to share meaning and potentially understand each other’s perspective on the same cultural object (IV, 198–200). The manner of appearance of the manifold of meanings is that cultural objects *co-implicate sense for the other*, so it is possible to lay their use side by side with one’s own view, and “alpha” and “beta” overlap. It is this type of overlapping co-implication that produces the manifold of possible meanings of the same cultural object and the sense of there being one structure of the worldliness of the world. Husserl also argued for the higher possibility of egoic empathic imaginative transposals into the perspective of others, so it becomes practically possible to interact with others and join with them. Intersubjectivity implies that we can potentially understand any other person and potentially take up any perspective (IV, 169, cf V, 109). The noesis of empathy in relation to the noemata of the bodies of human beings is a “*connexion* constituted through the medium of presentation”, a number of which get added together in the way concluded upon above to create an “identifying synthesis [that] connects them in the evident consciousness of “the Same”—which implies the same, never repeated temporal form, filled with the same content”, (I, 155).

In this light, the argument is that the first clue is attending to the outer expressiveness of the living body that shows other consciousness at work: “it is clear from the very beginning that only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the “*analogising*” *apprehension* of that body as another animate organism [Leib]”, (I, 140). What Husserl meant is that the human body indicates other subjectivity through empathy. The meanings concerning others’ bodies are the starting point for the conditions of the possibility of there being a common nonverbal communicational medium, for the commonality of being an instance of embodied consciousness where nonverbal communication is a condition of possibility of there being a shared cultural world, so consciousness is visibly and empathically expressed in the world (I, 149, 156–8).

The Role of Retentional Consciousness

In answer to the research question of looking for the source of the empathised sense of otherness in self there is the claim that intentional processes must be happening since infancy. Because any understanding of an object “itself points back to a “primal instituting”... points to an original becoming acquainted”, (I, 141). The current recognition of another person as another human being “is not inference, not a thinking act” but occurs “at a glance”, (I, 141), through involuntary automatic associations through social learning from infancy onwards. Phenomenon P3 is the first sense that the otherness of the other must have had, a first-ever occurrence. Husserl argued by eidetic necessity, there must have been a primal institution of the first sense of another human being for each self. Accordingly, there was a first-ever pairing between infant and carer. Similarly, at some time in infancy, P4 is the phenomenon of the first-ever sense of self, that there must have been a first-time that the infant apperceived itself. There is only one referent of the word “self” and all speakers use it. P4 is something that must have happened in the empathic responses of the adult carers towards the infant self. With the first-ever sense of the other (P3), there was a first-ever sense of self (P4) and both must have occurred in infancy. Primary intersubjectivity is the pairing of senses (P3 and P4) that begins in infancy and is usually the primary connection with the mother (I, 141–2, 147, 157, Liszkowski et al. 2004).

However, across the lifespan of the whole of social life are similar experiences of relating with others and past experiences of being paired in this way with groups of people. These are contributory in making lived experiences of being with others as represented in paired senses, self and other, self and groups of others. Such experiences are representations in memory, empathy, emotion, thought, belief, internal speech and other experiences such as imaginings, the drive to be close emotionally and sexual, to work and socialise. But it is impossible to remember the details of the first-ever achievement of the senses self and other, out of primary or secondary intersubjectivity and this is where studies of child development can help (Bartsch and Wellman 1995; Bloom 2005; Bråten 1998; Bullova 1979; Stern 1985; Trevarthen 1994). It is acceptable to use mainstream empirical child development studies on the processes between carers and infants in phenomenology, which show stages in the development of social learning and the attachment bond. The development of intersubjectivity is usefully theorised in a universal and ideal way. In current empirical research primary intersubjectivity is believed to end at about 12 months of age. Intersubjectivity also applies in developmental psychology and empirical studies of the resilience of children and adults because individuals have different abilities to deal with adversity (Rutter 2005). Early life experiences have semi-permanent effects on the ability to be intimate, to attach and how people manage the emotions connected to emotional intimacy and its absence (Owen 2006a).

There are further conditions that enhance and maintain the basic transcendental categories that are being spelled out. Across time, P5 is the phenomenon of the self’s whole of actual and possible intersubjective involvement with others,

the own world. It is the retained source of what the intersubjective world is like to date. It is socially learned and continually capable of being updated across the lifespan. Reflection on its contents so far makes manifest explicit beliefs in the sum total of social learning gained by individuals. Such learnings are structured by the universal phenomena that Husserl noted. P5 shows that passive syntheses operate in co-constituting the current meanings of self, other, object and world. “The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly *harmonious* “behavior”. Such *harmonious* behaviour (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behaviour from phase to phase”, (I, 144). What Husserl was trying to express was: “When I apprehend an external body similar to my bodily organism, as bodily organism, then, in virtue of its similarity, this [alien] bodily organism exercises the functions of *appresentation in the mode of “expression”*. This requires that a manifold inwardness also be posited that develops progressively in typical fashion, [an inwardness] that on its part demands a corresponding outwardness, which actually does then arise in accordance with the anticipation from within. Wherever the appresenting apprehension thus ensues, and is confirmed in this manner within itself by means of the continuance of corresponding expressions, there the appresentation is maintained”, (XIV, 249, cited Bernet et al. 1993, 162). The comment “anticipation from within” means that there is a learning of the usual links between signifier, signified and context that has been taught intersubjectively across time. Such senses form anticipations for how other people might feel and what their perspectives might be.

For instance, a certain shrug of the shoulders or a look around the eyes refers to others and referents of emotional expression in the here and now context. Such nonverbals are well-known by virtue of living in the same culture, society and linguistic group. P5 includes an intuitive sense of what the anticipated empathy of the other’s meaningful behaviour will be, as it is expected to be congruent with their verbal and nonverbal total communication. The role of P5 is that it is a bridge between the individual and the intersubjective expanse. P5 is the totality of social learning that could be called the map of the own-world. Specifically, it is limited in any one individual to the total set of social experiences that he or she has had. But the beauty of Husserl’s analysis is that because of idealisation, the eidetic geometry of social space of the pre-reflexive presences is the same as, the conscious senses he identified, so the intentionalities between consciousnesses are assumed to apply in a universal manner. Thus, it is through P5 that people *literally* know how to be, experientially and socially, not just with respect to each other but also with respect to the commonsense of a culture. The choice of words is to stay with the use of “the world” as a general term. But to be precise it is a cultural world that is being referred to in the sense of P5. The phenomenology of the lifeworld or cultural world is a structuralist and idealising approach to the reading of intersubjective evidence and inferring its conditions of possibility.

Higher Forms of Evidence Maintenance

Sections 53 and 54 of *Cartesian Meditations* are key for grasping brief conclusions on social learning and the maintenance of the senses of self and other. Phenomenon P6 is that although the ego bestows the empathic sense of otherness—it excludes that sense from itself. The sense of the other is only ever an empathised other that appears where their body “indicates the “same” body concretely, with all the constitutive intentionality pertaining to this mode of givenness in the other’s experience”, (I, 146). Self and other are connected and disconnected at the same time: “I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is”, (I, 146). “It brings to mind the way my body would look “if I were there””, (I, 147). The ego is connected to others yet proves itself as itself in continual distinction to them. P6 is an immanent phenomenon and runs through memory, imagination and empathic-intersubjective experience across life (except empirically in the cases of pathological lacks of empathic understanding). On the one hand, there is compatibility with connection and within a sense of stable wholeness. Yet incompatible differences are maintained as well but not confused (XIII, 189–190, 217–8).

P7 is the confirmation that self remains in an identical relation to others who remain themselves. “That which is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous co-existence, becomes compatible”, (I, 148) meaning that there is no escape from empathic sense-giving to the other. It can never become fulfilled for self and forever remains a presentiated sense, because it “never is open to fulfilment by presentation”, (I, 148). “Consequently my entire primordial ownness... has the content of the Here... not the content belonging to that definite There”, (I, 148). The external bodiliness of all persons are empathically tied together for the other is forever given the sense, “co-existing in the mode There... as hands groping or functioning in pushing, as feet functioning in walking, as eyes functioning in seeing, and so forth”, (I, 148). P7 is a relationship of identical, universal and necessary mutual conditions of—exclusion *and* inclusion—between self and others. The phenomenon of the other includes the empathised givenness of their perspective and *keeps it marked as otherness*, despite the confirmatory use of paired associations. The higher egoic empathy about the other is a vicarious quasi-imagining and part of maintaining the congruence of sense. Empathy adds to the visual appearance of the other: “I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is”, (I, 146). These quasi-imaginings of the empathised perspectives of others get confirmed or disconfirmed but are not mistaken for those of self. P7 concerns the spatiality inherent between two or more embodied consciousnesses that are co-empathically tied together, yet remain separate as clearly differentiated selves and others.

Finally, there is a return to the everyday situation. P8 is the manifestation of the believed points of views of others and their believed empathised thoughts, feelings and intentions to act, as depicted by their living bodiliness. Although the phenomenon of the consciousness of others is forever absent first-hand, it is

continually potentially present through empathic accuracy second-hand. The manner of the expressiveness of the other, and whether their communications are accurate about the relationship we find ourselves in, is what we co-create moment by moment. P8 is the phenomenon of the irreducible intersubjective world as a seamless whole, for even after the reduction to consider the ownly motivations of otherness in self, “my whole world-experiencing life and therefore including my actual and possible experience *of* what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness and the systems that constitute what is other”, (I, 129). There is produced an illusion of separation and difference that is built on connection and community. “It is quite comprehensible that... an “empathising” of definite contents belonging to the “higher psychic sphere” arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world—for example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful”, (I, 149). What was previously the natural attitude mystery of the other is based on a false starting point: such an “enigma appears only if the two original spheres have already been distinguished—a distinction that already presupposes that experience of someone else has done its work”, (I, 150).

One conclusion for a culture in ideal and universal view is that “there is implicit a *mutual being for one another*, which entails an *objectivating equalization* of my existence with that of all others”, (I, 157–8). This irreducible experience shows the pre-reflective presence of previously experienced intersubjectivity, an inherent readiness and ability to engage others and share meaning in the social world, which is a fundamental aspect of human being and a fundamental capacity of consciousness. P8 is intersubjective presence inside and between selves, and is a means for relating one’s place within the whole. P8 exists as the starting point of the everyday intersubjective life as we live it, and underpins individual experiencing of the actual and possible social whole, P5, and maintains the structure and inter-relation between the phenomena numbered above. The fundamental irreducibility of intersubjectivity at the pre-reflexive level is a straightforward engagement with presences that even the reduction to solo consciousness cannot remove. It is only when specific relationships become the object of attention does it become noticeable what is common to selves and others about the universal forms of intentional processes, cultural senses and contexts within the whole. Indeed, if the whole is mapped and the accuracy of the representations can be checked with what lies within the shared world. The cultural senses that appear can be connected with the emotions that are pre-reflexive for the sense of self and may not at first make sense to the ego.

To summarise, what is being idealised is the creation of ideals about a set of interlocking places within comprehension itself. To adopt a word from linguistics, the analysis of the triangular relation between self, other and cultural object is the use of deixis, although this term is usually used in the context of certain types of pronoun that point to people and places. Starting with the ideal position of the self, anyone who speaks uses the word “I” to express themselves and that is self-referential in

the linguistic sense, but fundamentally requires the speaker to refer to a sense of a reflected-on me as seen across the myriad senses of the flow of pre-reflexive senses of “the i”. The use of I also refers to previous or futural senses of I in relation to others or to cultural objects. The place of the other in ideal view is you, us or we. Deixis is a good way of summarising the ideal differences that appear across the manifold of intersubjective instances in time because the basics of perceptual difference in space (P1), the difference between the vision of the inter-relationship between self and other supports the empathised differences between self and empathised other (P2). What these constancies and universals within the actual and possible manifold of intersubjectivity shows in further comparison through empathy in connection with time, memories and anticipations, or with imagination, is that further actual and possible instances obey the ideal universals between social contexts defined as “now-then” and “if-then” possibilities. No matter what the variations are between here and now and other temporal frames, certain ideal aspects of intersubjectivity remain the same. When the other is addressed by an I and includes our speaking about us, it is the adoption of the inclusive speech of what we should do, what is happening between us or for we together. The other can also be addressed in the third person which is he, she or they who might not be immediately present. When temporality is included, the deictic adverbials, here and there, and, now and then, also differentiate between present, past and future timeframes. The point is that the triangular intersubjective relation through which objectivity is a common theme that exists not only when self is related to the other, reciprocally, but also to the object. In a wider view, instances of objects and instances of others extend into manifolds of sense, yet the triangular inter-relationship still applies.

Empathy is the Medium of Connection in Intersubjectivity

The ideal material above could be applied to a variety of practical contexts. One application would be to understand the therapeutic relationship, developmental psychopathology, emotional self-regulation, or other matters pertaining to empirical psychological research, or how to apply psychological knowledge to promote meaning and lifestyle change. Because Part III below applies the idea of intersubjective objectivity as formulation and meta-representation then that endpoint is supported in the remainder of the chapter. Let’s bring these assertions back to the world of everyday experience and sum up what happens in empathy in a two-person conversation here and now. In brief in the first person, empathy is a lived embodied experience: I, while grounded in my bodily sensation in my actual surroundings, am empathically presentiating the perspective of the other, on the same cultural object as myself. Empathy is the means of presentiating a series of associations concerning a cultural object, as it would appear from the perspective of the other person as well as mine. Despite the fact that the actual intersubjective whole around each consciousness is different—and varies due to the large number of contextual factors involved—what remains constant is that intersubjectivity is continually produced




Fig.9.3 The connected self who watches, listens and empathises the other

pre-reflexively and absorbed into retentive consciousness. This whole of prior experience varies with the specifics of social history, personal history, social place, physical place, family position and the actions of others, plus the influences of habit, sexual orientation, gender, race, age and other such matters. The sum total of actual and possible intersubjective experience to date forms a whole, a totality that conditions what is already known about others—particularly at a nonverbal level—and what is anticipated and known about novel persons and situations. Encounters with specific, new individuals are empathically read according to this retained whole. So, there is a connection between the inside of self and the outside of others, so their insides are empathised in their looking outwards on the shared world and vice versa. There is an overall congruence about how we expect others to be, feel, think and act. See Fig. 9.3.

The starting point for interpreting is that all types of meanings that appear to consciousness have been pre-reflexively created by work being done by consciousness to create them and their sense is made via the lower “schema” (X, 7, fn). The research question is “what is the source of the empathised sense of the other that gives their views in us?” By applying a transcendental reduction it becomes possible to focus entirely on meanings. What is inquired into is not just “how do we understand another person?” But more like “what are the ideal and universal conditions of possibility for understanding anyone and anything within the social world?” For

it is a universal characteristic that empirically persons who are not feral and have been brought up within culture, have been educated by that culture according to how to behave with others and how to understand themselves in it. The answer to the research question is that cultural worlds and the one substantive world of persons are made by communal intentional processes between people. Each of the moments is connected to others and creates a number of levels and processes between them. The answer is that the apperceived self and the empathised other, whilst appearing and staying separate to higher reflection, are actually connected at the immediate pre-reflexive nonverbal level (I, 141). The universalising and idealising view taken sees that people have a great deal in common; much more than they have separate at the higher cultural level. Cultural objects and their meanings have a place in the universe of meaning and form social learning about what it is like to be in the world because there is the learning of associations and pairings between the “inner” experience of self in relation to the outsides of others’ who are expressing their “inner” to some degree (I, 144). However, the social codes that must be employed belong to the social mass and this collapses the boundary between inner and outer for the transcendental understanding of intentionality as a shared phenomenon.

Discussion

It is instructive to compare the position on essences and the immanence and transcendence of consciousness in *The Idea of Phenomenology* to the otherness of the other in *Cartesian Meditations*. What appears is that there is an intriguing inter-relationship. The wholistic perspective notes the interdependence of these senses particularly when the absolute sense is one where there are contributions pre-reflexively, because of the temporal whole (past, present and future) of the accumulation and previous attainment of the senses of the own-world (is comprised of self-other interactions in relation to cultural objects). Accordingly, the natural attitude senses of immanence and transcendence are not at all what appear to the transcendental attitude. The most basic processes are what happen prior to reflection. Reflection, de-contextualisation and checking procedures consider the parallel possibilities of what it is for one consciousness to know another. There appears an all-inclusive harmony in culture theoretically despite it being not uniformly homogenous empirically. One basic question is how consciousness can “make contact with something that is not immanent to it”, (II, 7), in the sense of the other and their view of any cultural object forms the transcendental category of the other that is always given the sense otherness because of past intersubjective learning: The sense of the other non-verbally, their empathised sense of the same cultural object to self, is what *stands for* a shared difference as wholly and forever transcendent sense that we both actually experience. This is a relationship which is open to mis-understanding without sufficient discussion. Figure 9.4 expresses the relationship between selves and the transcendent others, and how the world of meaning is that which is at the centre of communication, verbally and nonverbally. The progression between immanent ego;

The ego's higher sense of self and experiences not expressed.	The ego's intention to speak.	Verbal communication between both is a means of precise communication: Some senses are confirmed & agreed and some not.	The other's empathised ego and its' intent to speak as transcendence in self.	The other's actual ego and intention to speak and their experiences that are not expressed.
Absolute anonymously functioning consciousness working due to enculturation.	Self's nonverbal expression and emotional representations.	Empathised common sense, the manifold about cultural objects in intersubjectivity: nonverbal senses may not be the same between two persons who share the same traditions of expressiveness.	Other's empathised nonverbal expression, views and emotional representations as transcendence in self.	Other's actual expression and emotional representations, their absolute anonymously functioning consciousness working due to enculturation.

Fig.9.4 Transcendentally-observed idealisations of intersubjectivity

transcendent in immanence others' views in self and the empathised perspectives of cultural objects and the views of others; are not to be confused with the transcendent experiences of transcendent others themselves.

The immanence of the ego and the own world in relation to the senses of transcendence in immanence; the empathised senses of others; the verified senses of others; and the view of the transcendent other are ideal categories of sense underpinning empirical instances. In the terminology of *The Idea of Phenomenology* (II, 4), the consciousnesses of others are transcendent to us. They are people in their own right. The other's point of view and their past social whole are completely unknown (unless we have talked with them). But even so, if we did not meet them, the impact and influence of the past is what permeates the other and connects selves and others through empathy producing shared intentionality. The others' actual perspectives, their personal experience and senses of the same objects (that self sees, has and feels) are communicated through their speech and bodily reaction. Their perspective and expressed descriptions of what they think and feel are primarily perceptually presented to self.

Whatever the difficulties of Husserl's numerous approaches to understanding the meaningful conditions of the shared life, what is apparent is that the motivating similarity, a "similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis" of the empathising of any Körper as "another animate organism [Leib]", (I, 140, cf 142, 143). What happens between the body of self and other is a founding association of nonverbal understanding of culture from infancy onwards. The empathising of nonverbal behaviour of others is one condition of possibility on which higher concepts rest. At first the taken-for-granted sense that others have their own experiences, intentions and points of view, is explored as a mystery. It shows that empathy is presentation with two objects involved: like looking at a bodily picture that gives the other consciousness. The reason why the word "gives" is used is because it is a constant in social experience (except empirically at times of stress and other special cases). With the empirical caveat that the point of view of the other, their emotions, thoughts and experiences *may not be given accurately or clearly to self*, and in some circumstances, the message that is read empathically might be inaccurate, distorted or it might be an

attempt at lying or cheating in some way. Yet we share codes of representation for encoding and decoding sense. The same is true when meeting anybody: *The whole that is intersubjectivity never gets any closer than it being an empathised universe of commonsense.* To express anything means appropriating the shared local code. For instance, to be joyful and communicate that joy, requires that along with the conceptual message, there runs alongside it some nonverbal showing of the joyful sense. What is seen on the face and in the actions of the speaker is congruence between verbal and nonverbal social acts (IV, 222–6).

To comment on another's comments is called "meta-commenting", for the manner of what is said is highly influential because the nonverbal frames the spoken message (Bateson 1972, 208). Thus, nonverbal messages frame spoken ones and so there are two messages being presented at once, the verbal and the nonverbal. The guiding transcendental research question is how can consciousness "make contact with something that is not immanent to it", (II, 7). It is particularly instructive to compare this question to the answer provided about the constitution of the empathised sense of other persons, but to note how empathy gives the way in which others' have perspectives on the same cultural objects as ourselves (I, 138–149, IV, 342, V, 109–112). Empathy is a basic process in which persons share and learn the meanings of the objects and the commonsense rules about how to relate to them. What is being sought-after, across the totality of Husserl's writings, is the objectivity of the object as it appears for an intersubjective audience. Objectivity is not fully apparent in any current instance of experience but shows itself *in* or *across* such instances, of regarding a phenomenon in a number of ways, of it being given or appearing (II, 12, XVII, 213, 226). Many of the forms of givenness that are being elucidated are not perceptual but presentational, or are forms such as motivations to act, complex associations of meaning in relating to others and the apperception of self, pairings of sense and other correlations to perceptual or hyletic sense. While a primary phenomenon might be hyletically given in some way, its other senses for an audience are empathically added to it, including the intersubjective learning of its cultural senses. So the way to understand the psychological life in the everyday world is to reflect on the inherent differences between the different types of appearing of objects. There are the visual contents of the here and now. But what are also present are the implicit memories of how an object was first understood in the personal history of the individual (I, 141). Prior aspects are capable of being remembered, so prior experiences of it can also appear for continued inspection. Some of these objects might be wholly past but sometimes because memory can be intense, what is remembered can obscure what is perceptual now, for instance.

The other is moved by motivations that are first-hand to him or her but might be unknown to self. The intentions, beliefs and understanding of others can remain unexpressed. In a more general sense, intersubjectivity is the space in which the objective meaning of cultural objects is experienced. Objective meaning is the fundamental shared experience of meaning. The phenomenon of meaning is that it exists in a potential world for all to see, even if others in that world do not or cannot experience the meanings that we find there. Differences in points of view exist because of different personal histories, beliefs and perspectives. Intersubjectivity includes understanding how empathy is the medium between subjects.

In the social world, intersubjective phenomena teach us how to anticipate how others will behave with us. They are crucial in promoting understandings that help us attain social learning and accurate empathy. What is helpful are forms of intersubjectivity that permit the discussion of anticipations and enable the empathies made to be checked, to find how accurate our senses are for other persons. So in some specific conditions, intuitions and emotions can be trusted as accurate states of affairs about the views of others. And in other conditions, the senses we have turn out to be inaccurate. However, the commonsense of what is shared and understood between us is a semiotic genre of the total means of signifying. “The geometry which is ready-made, so to speak, from which the regressive inquiry begins, is a tradition. Our human existence moves with innumerable traditions. The whole cultural world, in all its forms, exists through tradition”, (VI, 366). But Husserl was not arguing for a turn to history of first beginnings as the proper answer. Objectivity arises “in understandable fashion as soon as we take into consideration the function of empathy and fellow mankind as a community of empathy and of language”, (VI, 371), which means that meaning occurs through social acts belong to culture and need to be used in order to communicate. When taken with the others conceptual meaning that is nonverbally grounded in the congruence of their body exist with respect to the shared emotional senses. Just through reading or in hearing the first person description of another’s childhood, what is evoked are the many pieces of what another’s world can mean. There can be congruence at a moment in time or between times. However, it’s important to notice if others are liars who have an intent to deceive, or if people vary in how they are, perhaps if they have moments of themselves that they find hard to reconcile. In this case there are the experiences of incongruence between our empathies and intuitions about what others’ experience. This case is one where discussion, or more experience of them, or more relevant experience of ourselves does not tally with what they experience. This is the case of disappointment, lack of delivery of the anticipated sense that we thought or felt that the other had or other forms of non-verification of our empathy about what the other experienced.

Empathy Within the Intersubjective Whole

Empathy can be summarised to be the following. Emotionally speaking, what is called intuition about how other people see the world and specific objects within it is the immediate quasi-giveness that every self has about every other person. A good deal of what can be felt, imagined or logically reasoned about what the other does experience, is the outcome of social learning across the lifespan so far. Empathy places some representation of what other people experience in ‘front of’ the inaccessible space that is forever other consciousness as they experience it. In the most general wording, empathy is the mental process that constitutes immediately what others might be representing to themselves about what they experience in the same world as us. The generality of this statement does not lose sight of what is

being asserted. The empathies or “intuitions” we have about others constitute an ontological bridge between what is self with the horizon of what others might share with us. How to understand the object of the other, as he or she sees it, is discussion with the other, for verification and feedback show if social acts are accurate when we open our attention to them. Empirically, it is the case that if our picture of the other is inaccurate, in some respect we need to be open to their correction of how it really is for them. The idea of the first constitution of the objects self and other, phenomena P3 and P4, has been adopted in mainstream empirical developmental research where experiments have been done to understand how infants learn to recognise their own objectivity in a mirror (Bischof-Köhler 1988; Wallon 1931). Similarly, the recognition of the objects of senses in another’s behaviour of their carers is also empirically studied (Avrahami and Kareev 1994; Baird and Baldwin 2001).

To be inaccurate at empathising has major problems in getting around the intersubjective world, the one that lies between us. To be socially unskilled is being unable to empathise persons and empathise the cultural objects that others use to communicate and identify their relationship style. How they narrate and explain their view of the world to others, plus a manifold of different aims and communal processes, will be likely to be inaccurate and poorly expressed. The person who is poor at empathising others persistently ‘bumps heads’ with others and is socially clumsy. They cannot properly see others’ points of view nor can they see the person. If an intersubjective exchange between two persons were recorded on video and played to an audience, it’s likely that while there might be a specific level of agreeability on what was said and done in the interchange, it would also be possible that many idiosyncratic understandings could be drawn from the same factual data. The basic events of what he said and she said, and how the pair gestured at each other can be factually recorded. But such a record of signifiers might inadequately portray what both parties felt and were trying to express. However, what each person in the same conversation felt and thought, are relevant additions made to what was shared by both, in a few minutes of face to face encounter. The ideal view of human interactions serves the purpose of understanding what is achievable in actual face to face discussions. So in relation to understanding how meanings occur in relationships between two or more people, and how meaningful objects exist in social contexts, it’s necessary to unpack the universal relations within the conditions of possibility for stating the detail of how intentionalities create the manifolds of sense that we can culturally recognise as being of the same object.

The phenomena noted in Fig. 9.4 expresses the transcendent other self, and their actual point of view. Empathic sense-making is the throwing forward of specific moments from wholes of webs of sense. One item, one feature, can be assumed to have the type of sense that it ‘always’ has. Let’s take the phenomenon of listening to someone speak first. In listening to another, what is heard is primarily meaning and not, the manner in which the speech is spoken. Hearing meaning is entering the other’s world to some degree of quasi-experiencing their actual co-implicated whole, of how their part of the world looks from their perspective. What is given is the co-implicated object alongside their conceptual signifiers: a ‘holograph’ of what it is like for anyone to be in a world. Empirically, this empathised sense might be inaccurate,

of course. But from reading the features of some cultural object associated with that person, it becomes possible to focus on an aspect and regard it (rightly or wrongly), as a symbol for the whole of that person. Often the person is immediately put in a category, because of their manner of speech, hairstyle or mode of dress. What empathy does is to keep wholes of larger assemblies of sense that are recognised, in the retained memory of self, in its retained storehouse. When the perceptual presence may contain something similar to what has already been learned, the experience of recognition is enabled, in that the here and now perceptual signifier is taken to be the same or similar as the previously recorded one. Such senses may or may not be accurate and need to be checked in discussion otherwise a wrong sense will be given to the other and their view.

On Intersubjective Worlds

This last section closes with some empirical consequences of the ideal analysis above. Intersubjectivity is made present through empathy in the creation of the connection between subjects in the potentially open system of an intersubjective habitat. *Phenomenological Psychology* provides some pertinent details of what could have been included in the analysis of *Cartesian Meditations* as it is pertinent in a more detailed “high resolution” picture of the world to include the performance of roles and list the kinds of objects and their typical occurrences similarly to *Experience and Judgement* (EU, 398–9) or picking up the theme of Kant’s schematism and schemata (1787, B179–180). Or to have made it clear that scientific theories, artistic creations and physical signs are also expressions of the narrative of the object and its reified objectification of what things do or should mean in culture, society and history (IX, 113). The comments about grounding still apply, for Husserl was concerned with how maps are made of the cultural objects of the meanings of beings in the world, for the manner of forms of the meaning of being occur through skills and habits (IX, 315) as they do through language (IX, 331–2). This is because the scope of forms of intentionality being included in the analytic gaze include the self-awareness of the general aspects of intentionality (IX, 286) in relation to the comment that people are cultural objects for one another (IX, 113), which is a way of including the views of the social studies in philosophy to make a “transcendental sociology”, (XI, 220) for whilst the narrative of intentionality and the object is a contextualised one, it’s another expression of the primary phenomenon (IX, 113). It’s also the case that social phenomena are open and capable of study, and are not just cultural performances like the birth of reading and writing, but other socially-constructed possibilities like education, training for something in common sense, the sciences, and custom and practice in other walks of life. The history of the process of empathising others starts with infants who express themselves instinctively. The accuracy of empathising others can be promoted by focusing on the non-verbal aspects of the total communication in which speakers present themselves. Ever since entry into secondary intersubjectivity at about 12 months of age, there

is an on-going social learning that accumulates with greater participation though later development. From early experiences of object-constitution, past encounters and learnings about other people, we share the fundamentality of the human form and the ability to understand others as other selves. (Except notably in the cases of autism, and the antisocial, narcissistic and other personality syndromes where there are distinctive difficulties in understanding and co-operation).

However, *Cartesian Meditations* is one conclusion on the relationship of being a subject of the world whilst regarding objects in it, so some consideration has to be given of the relationship of immanence and transcendence in consciousness in relation to the cultural world and its' here and now social context. One key issue is the relationship of the immanence of the self. Because the transcendent world (I, 109–110) has been made immanent in consciousness, through retaining previous learnings of sense across a number of prior times and contexts, consciousness carries a map of the own world of its unique personal history. It has within it a generalised sense of the world and the self-other relationships experienced there; whereas what is transcendent is other consciousness and the first-hand perspectives and experiences of actual others (I, 141–2, 142, 143). So, if we firstly exclude the verbal reports of others, what is properly immanent-transcendent is the empathised social world: the learned map of the world that contains the beliefs and understanding achieved via the past and its contexts. Immanence is still concordant in the division self-other to some degree because memory for instance, usually never confuses what happened to self as opposed to what happened to another person. Except in those circumstances where the influence of otherness actually moulds the self, producing a set of beliefs about the intersubjective cosmos, the core beliefs concerning self, other, cultural object and world that belong to others are unique expressions of individuality.

Intersubjectivity refers to what is between people. It refers to “various thematic spheres... that are nevertheless connected with one another and have solutions that mutually condition one another”, writes Iso Kern (1997, 355). Intersubjectivity refers to the social whole where the mutual and reciprocal influences between persons are life-shaping forces. The social environment is a fundamental aspect of being human. Human being is intersubjective through and through (I, 129). Intersubjectivity includes not just relating with others in various ways, but meaning is included in social relationships. When “intersubjectivity” is used as a noun in the Husserlian sense, it means an a priori, non-empirical identification of the common meaningful factors concerning what is shared culturally, societally and historically. When “intersubjective” is used as an adjective, it refers to universal processes of intentionality at the basis of relating and sharing understanding, the contents of what people share in commonsense everyday life. What is included in intersubjectivity is a huge range of experiences that include manifolds of possible senses that could be given to cultural objects, but even with that, the extent of what is constructed-socially, extends to further contexts of sense and further timeframes. A sufficient account of the dependent moments that comprise an intersubjective world is one that includes the interplay between self and other in relation to what exists at various levels of agreed discussion and the emotional felt-senses of what is and what could be. But

what constitutes a sufficient account within the scope of intersubjectivity is one that identifies the key intentional processes in relation to their objects. The importance of intersubjectivity is its constant influence between people across the lifespan. The numbers of things that are intersubjective are motivations to feel, act and make meaning, a series of forces of the social construction of family and child-rearing activities in the making of the next generation. What is at stake in intersubjectivity is gaining satisfactions with others and their lack. For what child-rearing achieves is the placing of the child within a symbolic order where culture is identifiable as a place of teaching and learning implicitly about how to participate and dissent in what is expected of us (Bourdieu 1977, 47; Eco 1976, 71–2). For our personal interpretations of the social order, the maps we have created are what we use in getting around the territory. However, the connection between what is empathised in self and what is nonverbally expressed by the other is an empirical relation dependent on several factors such as:

- Either—there is congruence and fulfilled concordance between what we empathise on behalf of others leading to the possibility of harmony, and validated authenticity between what we empathise and intuit about others, because we have discussed it with them. Thus, the empathised sense has been delivered properly from past learning when it is checked with what it is to be that other person.
- Or—there are possibilities of error arising from our lack of past experience and learning that fits the experiences of the other.
- Or—the other does not communicate sufficiently well or intends to mislead us through lies as to hide their true experiences and intentions.
- Or—we have not been paying attention particularly well and have not captured the clear message that was sent.

Summary

There is a surrounding commonsense of already-known connections between the possible cultural senses of cultural objects. This is the ground of conditions for understanding people and it requires further study. However, there can be agreement between the verbal and the nonverbal. Congruence was originally a term for understanding the overall truthful authentic verbal and nonverbal presence of therapists (Rogers 1959). Congruence has been taken into the lexicon of therapy for making comments on the harmony of a person's verbal and nonverbal total communication so that individuals can participate in cultural assimilation (I, 144–5, 163). Similarly, incongruence is disagreement between the messages expressed in one or more channels simultaneously, or over a period of time, between separate communications. Differences between verbal and nonverbal communication are a fundamental and interesting source of knowledge, for understanding what a person really does believe, experience and express in total. The more complex cases of

confusing, ambivalent and contradictory experiences about the same thing appear clearly when the total communication is investigated. The empathic connection between people is also the means by which people compare their view of the world to those of others. What it means to be conscious is to participate in shared meanings. It is the manner of this sharing that makes us uniquely human. Specifically, there is something unusual about being with other people: the other has a givenness that only appears as “*harmonious* behavior... [that]... must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behaviour from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior”, (I, 144), the case of nonverbal incongruence. This comment is made in the centre of a debate about the nonverbal expressiveness of others across the lifespan that is called P5 above.

In the psychological attitude, consciousness belongs to its physical body and the meaning-constituting practices of groups and organisations of all kinds. Indeed, every aspect of the personal connects with what is acceptable to the greater public. There is always a system of two or more people who are aware and influence each other. In *Cartesian Meditations*, the analysis is intellectual for an argument is made that compares manners of givenness, despite childhood not appearing clearly for adults, for the empathised sense of otherness in self now, is related to past empathised senses of others in self. From infancy onwards, there is on-going learning through processes of confirmation and disconfirmation within the shared life. At a pre-reflexive level of what is present through social learning, the sense of empathised others and their views accrue and cannot be removed. They are classed as originally given part of self and these empathies include past social experience where the difference self-other is maintained (except empirically in cases of dissociation or where the sense of self disappears or becomes another sense of self). It should be clear that the ubiquity of intersubjectivity between selves is continually with others across the lifespan. The influence and presence of others is stamped on every word, laugh, gesture, idea and thing in the world. There are two ways of looking at statements that start “I am...”, “others are...”, or “the world is...”. They are ontological and intersubjective. In one sense they are ontological because they are about people who are allegedly one way or another. Taken in a completely different linguistic sense, the same statements are part of the study of speech. When anyone speaks in the first person, for instance starting a sentence “I...”, or addressing another in the second person “you...”, linguistically the person occupies a place in a convention, so grammar must be appropriated in order to make sense. The deictic pronouns that shape speech are parts of language that are laid down for us. Because turn-taking in speech is part of a greater whole comprised of parts like “what it would be best for us to do now...”, other distinctions in time, place and person form an intersubjective grammar of inter-relations that obeys ideal rules and has an ideal structure. There have been other ideal analyses of intersubjectivity by Mary Douglas, a cultural anthropologist, who produced an idealised understanding of four exemplary cultural forms but did not consider the details of how consciousness uses empathy to share the meanings of objects in the cultural world (Douglas 1978). Also there are empirical studies of infant and child development

that focus on understanding (Bischof-Köhler 1991; De Jaegher et al. 2010; Meltzoff and Moore 1983; Merleau-Ponty 1964; Mitchell 1996; Piaget 1954). The impact for psychology and psychotherapy is that what lies between people obeys the ideal form, so when speech, emotions, thoughts, intentions, desires and behaviours are considered ontologically, they are best understood as distributed across time and space but always obeying the triangular form, self, other and object. Some empirical psychologists have understood the empathic abilities are both taught by social contact and obey an ideal pattern (Perner and Garnham 1988; Perner et al. 1994). But the closest empirical study to Husserl's ideal position is of the sort by Chaiken and Trope (1999) that notes how dual-process explanations function in social psychology.

Part III

Applying Pure Psychology to Psychotherapy and Mental Health Care

This Part explains one application of the ideal understanding of intentionality and the triangular connections between consciousnesses in intersubjectivity in making the implicit explicit. Intentionality is a means of understanding the maps of the world of individuals that helps therapists explicitly represent the mental processes of clients in relation to shared cultural objects. The conditions of possibility of therapy are considered, not as pragmatically possible but as meaningfully possible. The purpose of applying the idea of meta-representation of the awareness of intentional forms is to merely be able to establish representations of meaningful experience in an intersubjective way and this then permits justification of various research findings and courses of potential action as capable of discussion and rationalisation. Those who only focus on natural psychological science have an over reliance on natural biological being and its types of causes. In so doing they have not realised that they make their conclusions disconnected from what they should be about: An excessive focus on biological being and natural psychological scientific experimental methods lack clear relations to meaningful experience and for this reason they are incongruent. The naturalistic traditions hinder meaningful usage because they cannot translate their findings into clear statements about findings about the first-hand experience of consciousness and its empathies of others in the meaningful world. Naturalistic science does not have jurisdiction in the intentional sphere; whereas intentional definitions can easily include naturalistic causes.

The conditions of possibility in the pragmatic sense is that the following need to be in place for therapy to work: Firstly, therapists need to be sufficiently skilled in being able to listen, understand and refer to what is bothering their clientele and that which is irreversible must be accepted. Clients who are actively suicidal or who do not wish to attend need to deal with these impasses first of all. Those who have multiple failed therapies, who lack personal agency or otherwise lack the capacity to use therapy, unfortunately need to be excluded because they may not be able to use any brand of therapy that is offered them. Those who live in chaos, who are subject to on-going violence or abuse drink and street drugs, similarly need to reduce using substances and regain better access to their emotions. The pragmatic strategy is to

exclude those who are unsuited and uninterested, and explain why that is the case to them in such a way that they can work to improve their suitability and interest if that is possible. Pragmatically, the next group to exclude are those who are unsuitable but who are interested and to tell them why also. The next set of persons who cannot be included are those who are suited to therapy but are currently uninterested, so that referrers may need to educate and inform them about what could be gained from it. Finally, only those are both suited and interested are easily admitted because they have reversible meaning-oriented problems. These are people who take responsibility for their problems, have the personal agency to work on them and be able to keep on attending on a regular basis despite the discomfort that it may involve. All these concerns are pragmatic and say nothing about ensuring the meaningfulness of therapy and empirical psychology as disciplines.

When it comes to the practice of empirical research, therapy or mental health care more generally, knowledge of the phenomena is a wholistic understanding of what intentions correlate with specific observable forms of personality and relationship style. Because of being able to identify meaningful patterns in persons' lives such explanatory hypotheses can be put directly to clients and asked as to whether this is a plausible explanation of their motives. It is then up to clients to check the interpretation offered them with their experience. This is one area where pure psychology unfolds the implicit and the tacit, what is implied alongside perceptual experience, prior to reflection and awareness and within taken for granted, implicit commonsense. For participants in research there is a great deal that comes to mind when reflection is encouraged in empirical research. Pure psychology accounts for meaningful phenomena and studies how things are experienced: How any object in the general sense is given as imagined, believed as a contradiction with another representation of the world, one held by the same person or between different persons. All of these experiences refer to greater wholes of meaning and context in which both participants and theoreticians live. The conditions of possibility of meaningfulness in therapy, mental health care or empirical psychology of any sort concern the ability to reflect and represent any meaningful situation in such a way that it is open to comment between two or more people. Thus, the chapters below take the ideal conclusions of Part II and apply them to formulate psychological problems. This produces a way of discussing the psychological meanings called "psychological disorder" and "personality disorder" which are capable of being represented as meaningful intentional processes like any psychological situation.

The type of philosophical answer below is one that considers therapy in general as it is practised rather than therapy as it is understood by professional philosophers. Critiques by Sebastian Gardner (1993), Adolf Grünbaum (1984), Marshall Edelson (1984), Edward Erwin (1997), Martin Heidegger (2001), Imre Lakatos (1978), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1993) and others occasionally make points worthy of consideration by the practising therapist but their comments frequently take a logical point and fail to understand the centrality of people's distress and how to encourage the discouraged to gain new understandings and take new actions to promote their wellbeing. The first theoretical and philosophical question for practice concerns knowing how to intervene and how to justify interventions of any sort. In this regard

pure psychology is the practitioners and experimentalists ally. It seeks to support therapeutic problem-solving by meta-representation through ideal understanding of noetic-noematic meaning. The aim of conceptual-experiential congruence is provided in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* as operating at three necessary levels: “[1], theory of the forms of judgements [2], consequence-theory and [3] theory of truth”, (XVII, 158). It would be an exemplary application of pure psychology to create a psychological grammar of what constitutes ideal a priori reasoning that designates a single universal grammar for therapy, mental health work and empirical psychology. As a step towards coherence, the formal comments below prepare for a basic consideration of how consciousness appears via the findings of empirical psychology.

Pure psychology is not against empirical findings. Those findings that have succeeded in making predictions that could be falsified yet have been supported are worthy of being accepted and can be translated into understandings of intentionality. Such understanding can be used in clinical settings as the preferred form of explanation to achieve further coherence around the centrality of meaning. The therapeutic aim of changing the senses that clients experience occurs through helping them alter their use of intentionalities, objects and the contexts involved. The understanding of consciousness and what it means to inhabit a meaningful world is that consciousness immediately interprets meanings as motivated and motivating. The application of understanding below shares a unity that is too easily assumed by the brand name approaches to psychology and psychotherapy that skim over the surface of the structure of consciousness. In the light of Parts I and II above, the application of universal a priori to a real psychological instance shows that the emotions and noematic senses that people have are expressions of their intentional relationships in a number of ways.

Because there are at least 550 brand name schools of therapy, the proliferation of approaches shows that there is no single overall paradigm in therapy. Therefore, it must be noted at the outset that the task of applying philosophy to clarify therapy is an arduous one. The method is to cut the Gordian knot by stating that they are all sufficiently similar to class them as being like any other interaction between people: Therapy uses social skills in speaking and listening, moving the shared attention and employing the commonsense understanding between self and other in the everyday life in the social world. This is referred to as psychotherapy “in general” or “as such” and is a move away from alleged differences between the brand name schools of practice to treat them as ways of being in the same world as the general public who came for help.

Chapter 10

Formulations of Intentionality

This chapter uses the idea of intentionality to argue for formulation of the development and maintenance of specific syndromes of meaningful distress. This is the worth of intentionality in mental health care, qualitative human studies and natural psychological sciences. This application of intentionality is for understanding multifactorial causes of distress in the context of considering how its conditions of meaning and motivation can be rectified through the ego working on how it construes its world and itself in it. This chapter answers the problem of how to understand the experiences and motivations of clients in a general way. A case of how to help someone who is suicidally depressed is used to bring out key problems that occur when therapists meet clients for the first time in assessment. Such meetings are against the backgrounds of greater unknowns such as multiple interpretative professional views, for there is much information available but little agreement about what helps people with any specific set of problems. The answers provided are that it is most value-free and pragmatic to understand meaning-maintenance in terms of intentionality and its repeating processes (whatever their causes might be biopsychosocially). Below the basic problems of how to practice any brand of therapy or mental health care are answered by creating understanding through applying the universals of intentionality to their current lifestyle. Formulation is discussed as a gateway from distress to better awareness and reflection on self, so beginning improved self-care and attention to others. Such a discussion also identifies people who are pre-contemplative in as yet being unready to make changes in their lifestyles or may have difficulty in understanding the connections between their own thoughts, feelings, behaviours, relationships, habits and beliefs. Therapy is not a panacea and some people are unable to use what it offers for a variety of reasons.

One aim is to promote interdisciplinary working in the psychologies by using formulations of the intentionality of consciousness to make sure that research and the applications of psychological knowledge are capable of communication between

professionals and the public. The ultimate aim is to understand how syndromes of personality and psychological distress are maintained in the present through understanding the psychodynamic ‘causes’ of the mental forces of understanding, belief, habit, emotion and motivation. Such lived experiences form wholes that comprise the textbook definitions of syndromes as recurring patterns of distress in relating, thinking, emotion and behaviour. People function toward some set of purposes. But if persons are unable to look after their own well-being and that of others around them, then finding what distresses them is the first item to understand. With a fine attention to detail provided by questioning clients, what transpires is that all experiences are part of a meaningful intersubjective world. Husserl’s methods explore the conditions of possibility of natural attitude meaningfulness. This chapter focuses on “the hermeneutic of conscious life”, (XXVII, 177) which is both an individual and a collective exploration of “my *“representation of the world”*, my *“picture of the world”*”, (XXVII, 175) in relation to the shared cultural world. Such an exploration makes the academics who take this path more assured about what and how well the experiences of others and themselves can be known. What has been achieved so far is a formal approach to the ideals of consciousness that enable discussion and collaborative working. There are both actions and omissions to act that structure the emotional life. But when it comes to corrective action, people can struggle-on despite intense distress to the point of a “nervous breakdown”, of being unable to continue to function through emotional exhaustion. In order to work out how to help people in such situations, the following terminology is used.

The “narrative of intentionality and the object” is a way of referring to what is concretely meant, felt and acted on. The narrative of the object refers to a conscious account of meanings about specific meaningful objects of attention that are distressing and can be captured through understanding intentionality in relation to them. Clearly, the way to help clients, or engage participants in an experiment, is not to teach them pure psychology but to ask simple questions. In therapy questioning can elicit what stops them doing what they want to do. The answer to such questions are varied yet can be accounted for by the narrative of the object in that they involve first-person and empathic experiences of ideals of noetic-noematic correlations. Such answers can be formulated in words or diagrams about their meaningful processes. In answer to the research question: “What is a minimally sufficient understanding of human understanding?” The context in which this question is answered is the conditions of possibility of how consciousness works. To put the pieces together is to conclude that distress is a part of life. An individual’s style of living is comprised of many dependent moments. What pure psychology offers is a general manner of understanding specific events and processes with individuals, through interviewing them on their conscious experiences, motives and emotions. Pure psychology is an interpretative system of being able to meta-represent individual experience through the general terminology of intentionality toward the meaningful object. The narrative of the object begins with the idea that there are *objects of attention* and all experience occurs through various *types of intentionality*. When attention turns to self, it objectifies *pre-reflexive self-presences* and turns them into objects of higher *senses of self-consciousness*. The subject is the one who

self-consciously represents objects to him or herself, speaks and says “I feel...”, “I am...” and “you are...”. Intentionality is a good way of modelling the awareness of objects because the technical language attends to the fine detail of the universal necessity of there being noesis-noema correlations concerning how objects are conscious. The first four sections below introduce the everyday difficulties of practice and the challenges that face therapists as users of psychological knowledge. Pure psychology theoretically supports empirical approaches to human studies and cognate sciences. When comments on the therapies are made, care is taken not to take sides with any brand name approach but rather understand all positions as a broad type of qualitative cognitivism. Pure psychology and therapy share a tradition of interpreting and discussing what mental processes are. The benefit of the fourfold conclusion is that the four ubiquitous aspects to the psychological life can be used to support practical work.

A Brief Practical Example Concerning Clinical Reasoning

I am sitting with Vanessa who has just turned 60. Vanessa has been depressed many times over the years and she currently has numerous physical problems that are well-managed. Vanessa has been referred to me by a psychiatrist. We have an intense first meeting where I have been asking a lot of questions in a direct but tactful way. Vanessa tells me that all of her major relationships in life have withered. I want to help her but when I inquire to find the level of her difficulties in a specific area, with the idea of some potentially helpful intervention in mind, then nothing seems to be possible. Because of the way she has described her situation, it now appears to be hopeless to me also. For her, there are no options and she feels resigned to her fate of death by suicide: She sees no other option. I comment that it is her understanding that stops her moving forward and I tell her so. Vanessa agrees. She is certain she will kill herself one day. Vanessa is suicidally depressed.

On further questioning, it appears that she is in danger of suicide because only six weeks ago she tried to take her life with an overdose but it didn't work and she woke up in a hospital bed. I ask about her personal history. One of her daughters died in a tragic accident and her remaining daughter, although she only lives 1 km away, will have nothing to do with her mother after they finally fell out after 40 years of arguing where the topics were always the same. When I inquire into the amount of risk through suicide, Vanessa says she won't kill herself. But I'm not so sure as I can see that there is nothing for her to look forward to, and the more I ask about her circumstances and personal history, the worse her situation appears. I am worried that she may try to kill herself and ask if she has a plan to do so. She says “yes” and that it might happen any time if something else goes wrong. So I ask if she would be willing to ask for help. Vanessa is clear that she won't be ringing any telephone help lines in the middle of the night but would prefer to die. I ask her if she would ask for help if she were to feel suicidal because I believe that she is at risk, and although it wouldn't be my wish to make her feel worse, I guess that inad-

vertently our discussions could create in her a state of despair where she might feel that all is hopeless and so she might be motivated to die. Vanessa says “no”. She will not be calling to ask for help if she is actively suicidal. So while Vanessa has accepted her psychiatrist’s advice in coming to see me, I am wondering what there is to work with, as she isn’t motivated to ask for help and if she were to feel sufficiently suicidal then she is saying that she will kill herself. Vanessa feels beyond help, won’t ask for help and holds the idea of suicide as an escape because for her death is a blessed release from suffering. Then Vanessa asks me, while looking me straight in the eyes, “what is to be done then?” I want to help her but there are some dilemmas from practical and ethical points of view. What is the central question about this example from the philosophy of practice?

My answer is that setting aside the ethical answer of whether a person has the right to kill themselves, and the question of her lack of willingness to ask for help when she is actively suicidal, and of other problems about how to treat her because of her physical problems, then the central issue is *how to know psychological being* in general and *in her specific case*. The immediate problem is that some decisions need to be made now, in what to say and do to create safety for her in a way that builds her trust in me. We have only been talking for 40 minutes and I don’t know her and her capabilities. In philosophical terminology there are epistemological, ontological and hermeneutic problems of how to make sense and how to consult with helpful bodies of knowledge, given that if she really did want to kill herself then she could make it happen. The type of thinking around how to help Vanessa, or anyone in general involves knowing in advance, even before meeting with a specific person, what would generally help people with a specific type of distress. Qualitative psychological research can provide information about the motivations that people have to kill themselves and provide factual information. But, like any psychotherapy case, Vanessa’s problem is a meaning-oriented experiential question of what intentionalities clients’ use, what objects appear and what contexts can be brought to bear to rationalise and alter these meanings.

Technically, the first meeting with clients is called “assessment”, a procedure for finding out the level of clients’ difficulties and beginning to think with them in a collaborative way about what will help. Interpreting a person’s psychological being also connects with “clinical reasoning”. For what is being attempted by therapists at assessment is taking general clinical knowledge picked up over the years and held at a pre-reflexive level, and bringing it to bear on the current discussions with the unique person who wants help. For instance, in this case there are a number of unclear aspects of what Vanessa is presenting. Firstly, she is not asking for help in a clear way. There are difficulties knowing how she might respond in the future if a session might make her feel very depressed and hopeless. If something will not help, then it should not be offered. This aspect of clinical reasoning is around understanding her motivations and tendencies to act through questioning and empathising the level of her despair. What brings on her despair? How does she deal with it herself? What sense does Vanessa make about her own suicidal thoughts and feelings? The inquiry is finding if there are specific things, emotions or situations that might motivate or trigger her in taking another overdose. For the next time Vanessa wants

to kill herself, then she might act with a more lethal means than before. Six weeks ago her husband was able to find the empty bottle of pain killers that she had taken and call an ambulance. But this type of medication is available from any pharmacy for a small price. The formal way of working out how to help her is clinical reasoning and that aims to grasp her psychological being. Clinical reasoning about suicide works by consulting larger bodies of general knowledge on suicidal motivation, the being of suicide and its social contexts and then tailoring such knowledge for the unique individual (Appleby 1999; Harris and Barraclough 1997). The outcome is that clinical reasoning produces works towards making an “intervention” which refers to any speech or action from therapists. Most interventions are designed to alter connections of sense and meaning and form part of an agreed strategy referred to as a “treatment plan” that requires clients’ informed consent concerning how to help them. In the British National Health Service it is ethically unacceptable to assess or offer treatment without previously getting informed consent (Department of Health 2001). While therapists do not tell clients what to do, it is necessary get informed consent for assessment and treatment in advance of any specific collaboration that works on altering specific meanings and behaviours. One aim is clarity and collaboration, for if these were absent they would impede treatment.

As an illustration of how to deal with this instance and explain principles, the clinical reasoning goes as follows for helping Vanessa. Vanessa is on anti-depressant medication but since her suicide attempt she is being prescribed small doses of types that are not poisonous. Biologically speaking, her depression acts at a physical level as well as influencing her emotionally, in her selection of memories and ability to imagine the future. Her speech is slowed and her physical experiencing of her body and the world is heavy, exhausted and difficult. She speaks after long pauses as though everything were difficult to say. The general clinical reasoning of how to help people who are depressed is that one intervention would be to explain that she could improve her mood by being more physically active. But this is impossible because of her physical condition. Another intervention would be to allow her to talk in the hope that discussion may provide a spontaneous change in the very same meanings that she currently experiences and by which she is tormented. For instance, Vanessa blames herself for the state of her marriage, misses her daughter who died 20 years ago and she is estranged from her remaining daughter. A talking treatment might be possible but the means of talking would be to speak with her and comment on how she presents herself and feels herself to be in her view of the world, in the hope that a strong and influential relationship can be built where she might permit me into her world. This is an option where I am cautious because she is not clearly willing to ask for help and if she were to be actively suicidal, such a form of treatment may be likely to bring out more and more meanings that would only spell out to her how much of a ‘failure’ that she feels herself to be. In this light, open-ended discussion of her problems is contra-indicated in advance because Vanessa seems convinced of her own worthlessness and believes she has failed as a mother, wife and human being.

Other choices in clinical reasoning are as follows. One option would be to explain that therapy cannot help her at the moment because there are no interventions that meet her needs. Another would be to formulate it verbally or on paper by asking questions about the function of her thinking about suicide, in that it is still an open question as to what her reasoning is, what motivates her to take her own life and explore the conditions of its possibility before going any further. Another would be to refer her back to the psychiatrist for medication or a home care treatment where services could visit her and provide mental health support and physical help. Another potential intervention would be to consider electroconvulsive therapy where she may lose aspects of her memory and personality permanently, although it might have a curative effect of bringing the depression to a close. This drastic form of treatment works through using electricity to induce fits, but even that that might not work for her. If she were able to go out by herself, then an intervention called behavioural activation, which encourages people to be more physically active is a research-proven way that can be highly effective in helping people gain improvements in their mood (Jacobson et al. 2006). Another way forward is to keep on assessing Vanessa and ask about her motivations to help her overcome her own low mood and rebuild her self-esteem. It would also be possible to speak with her husband and wider family, or provide couples therapy where they could both go to try and work on their marriage which seems to be a factor that maintains her low mood. Or perhaps another way forward would be to have Vanessa meet with her husband and daughter, informally by themselves, or formally in family therapy, and to discuss how to proceed and overcome the alienation that has beset them.

But what else needs to be born in mind is that given the current state of her psychological being as suicidal despair, and given that she had made a recent suicide attempt, and that she has a number of maintaining factors of her despair *and* it is unclear if she will ask for help if she were to have the intent again, then it would seem too risky to go down a route that is likely to make her feel worse. What would be helpful is if it was possible to know with more certainty how to help her, and through formulation and clinical reasoning, be able to specify how and where to begin helping her, and how to enlist her participation in her treatment before getting down to the detail of the interventions that should be used. If therapy is to be effective and safe in promoting her best interests, then it would seem that the only way forwards is to put back these dilemmas to her, so she can become active in her own treatment. At the moment, it seems that she is somewhat passive in how she is treating herself and this can be understood as part of her overall picture of being depressed, feeling bad about herself and that she cannot see any future. Although this is a case of how to work with suicidal intent as part of severe depression, the general principles of formulation and clinical reasoning are philosophical and theoretical in nature and involve her representing intentionalities towards meaningful objects in complex contexts. The example concerns how to synthesise and apply general knowledge to the individual case in a situation of uncertainty where there are no guarantees of success.

A Brief Overview of Therapy and Mental Health Care in General

Assessment of the personal history can be created to note the occurrence and increase of syndromes right across the lifespan (Owen 2009, 298–9). What happens when encountering complex cases is that across the lifespan there are complex biopsychosocial causes interacting with each other. The best way of getting a biological assessment is currently to ask about the mental health problems of blood relatives. Given that members of the same household will have been socially influential on each other, it is still the case that some mental health problems are genetically heritable or at least influenced by heritability (Coll et al. 2004). Biopsychosocial causation of distress is complex involving three parameters in complex interactions with each other whereby the biological-neurological whole of any individual is the unique outcome of a lifetime's supply of influences acting on each other in making manifest (or not) the potential of the individual in question (Beresford 2013; Cromby et al. 2013; Read and Bentall 2012; Szyf and Bick 2013). The aim is to explore how there can be a cohesive picture of what are frequently understood as separate syndromes of personality (belonging entirely to the personality not the context) connected with syndromes that exist in contexts between persons and their psychological environment made of their most important objects of attention. And without protective factors or professional help, there will be accumulating effects of distress and the impairment of the passage through developmental phases for children and adolescents, producing young adults who are at a disadvantage with respect to their peers because they have missed out on educational, work, friendship and dating opportunities. These experiences can offer informal teaching of the give and take of socialising, mutuality and reciprocity where people learn through finding out about themselves, their preferences and values in nurturing ways to become competent adults and find their niche in life. Persons who attend assessment might be unable to participate for a variety of reasons that need attending to, so that they can get to be in a place to use what is being offered. So right at the beginning of the process, it has to be noted that not everybody can be helped by therapy and not everybody is in a place to use what it offers immediately.

The first task of practice is to understand and be able to summarise complex and potentially contradictory experiences of those who ask for help. It can be the case that although one part of them may want help, another part of them does not want to stop or change other aspects of their behaviour and their choices that contribute to their problems. In order to explain gaining a basic understanding of what is happening for clients, within a perspective of the fundamentality of meaning in intersubjective worlds, it means representing their problems back to them in order to grasp the basic issues at stake. Therapy works by assessing, formulating, treating and reviewing the progress so far, checking whether a strategy has worked, before closing with relapse prevention. What this means is that the first process of assessing is interviewing clients at length about what is happening for them currently and what their personal histories are (so gaining an understanding of their personality

across the life course). The purpose of reviewing progress at the beginning and end of every session is to make sure that if clients' have doubts and worries that they are elicited and tackled so that their needs are met by the meetings because some persons need more repetitions of the same point than others. When clients are "working" what that generally means is that the relationship is set up correctly as a collaborative partnership and clients openly discuss their motivations as to why they do the things they do and they work on their problems in a proactive manner in between the meetings. The basics include working through risk of self-harm, harm to others and suicide, through access to psychiatric medication and nursing support as priorities, if these are necessary. Triage is the name of the process that determines if a person needs their risk assessing, psychiatric help or social work input, even prior to having therapy. Also, it is necessary to determine if clients can use the brand of therapy that is being offered them before embarking on that course of action. If they are unable to use the specific style of therapy offered, then it is not the fault of clients but rather an inadequacy that therapists are bringing to the situation. In this case, clients will need re-referring to someone who can help them. In the case of possible death to others, the case of homicidal rage, or of death to clients through suicide, self-harm or anorexia, then there are national laws pertaining that need to be obeyed. Therapy stops at the point where people can understand, prevent their own relapses and gain access to new skills and find a suitable niche in society for themselves. The corrective experiences necessary are to pay heed to distress and understand its message in a way that leads to corrective actions and more accurate understanding. The good news is that the ego can respond to its own situation, and through becoming aware of *how* it holds on to inaccurate understanding and belief, it can become open to restorative evidence that is potentially present. A better attention to new helpful evidence explodes an inaccurate noema and replaces it with more accurate senses of the object (I, 93, III, 317–8). This whole process is experiential and requires recontextualising parts and wholes, and re-considering those horizons where there is plenty of evidence of different noemata that appear, that show the being of the object (whether that be self, others, relationships between people or situations past or present, future or imagined). The hermeneutic mistakes of foreclosing, reification and over-focus on inaccurate or downright false understanding are gained by understanding the possibility that learnings from earlier life are unlikely to be accurate 10 or more years later.

Identifying the detailed processes by which people make meaning could invoke plenty of room for disagreement and coming to conclusions that are not shared. Occupying a position in intersubjectivity means that the person in front of the therapist is visible and capable of being empathised and understood according to how they are empathised across various timeframes and in different social contexts that they describe. Might it be the case that one client is overly devoted to others and never takes time to think about themselves? Does it mean that an interpretative schema has grown up in a family that never talked about how it believed that emotions are dangerous? Does it mean that a person has a personality syndrome and the only thing that can help is a specialist type of therapy? How is it possible to decide between these alternatives and make a justifiable conclusion? These are valid

questions where therapists make sense of what they are told by their clientele in specific ways. The understanding made of clients needs to be corroborated by putting back the sense gained to them (Rogers 1986). The aim of therapy is precisely to help clients break out of their own self-limiting understanding, beliefs, habits and emotions that are given reified meanings. And to achieve that aim it's best to get agreement on the problems before proceeding. One of the most frequent aims is to help people re-engage with the same situation but in a new way, with a new attitude of approach. The way that the map-territory distinction can help is to make it clear how a person has mapped their world and how they get around in it. People are turned to the world according to how they believe the world has been, is now and will continue to be. Because of the power of belief, the emotions aroused by the contemplation of catastrophe is such that overwhelming emotional implication is sufficient to put anxiety and fear into settings that can alternatively be inhabited without them. Metaphorically, it's the checking of the map with the territory that helps people get around. For if it's not realised that the map is oriented incorrectly, the salient territory around the map-reader is not recognised for what it is, then confusion can occur where the map-reader moves in the wrong direction altogether. False beliefs and habits provide a wrong steer and lead to disorientation between the map and the territory. For once known places have been left, then everywhere along the route is being misread, both on the map and in the territory with respect to it. So freedom doesn't always mean leaving the old territory. It can mean knowing how to get around within it, depending on the outcomes that want to be attained.

The case of Vanessa is a dramatic dilemma representative of practical problems that mental health workers face, where the ideals of intentionality can make it clear what the problems and the options are for help. When it's possible to specify in detail the nature of psychological reality, then it's possible to be clear about change in a discussible and agreeable way. The evidence of what is happening for clients is gained by asking them open questions. This is not at all scientific but experiential and hermeneutic firstly, in that it is a way into understanding the world in which others interpret the evidence that they inhabit. For Vanessa as for anyone, her view of her world can be interpreted according to how temporality, belief and other intentional processes structure her egoic choices and influence what her anonymously functioning consciousness provides for her involuntarily. The sense of her future is pointless and painful. Her sense of herself is faulty and blameworthy. She blames herself and feels disconnected from everyone around her. She is certain that at some point she will die by her own hand. Because of the explanatory ideas of intentionality, noema and object, it is possible to differentiate the meaningful senses that she has about any object of her experiences. Her relationships can also be understood in an interactive way. In short, psychological reality concerns intentionality and that explains her cognitions, emotions, beliefs and first person experiences of the meaning she bestows on the reality of her meaningful world. The next section discusses how people can be helped to understand themselves though accepting their self-interpretation. Through the vocabulary of noesis, noema and object, it eventually becomes possible to help people see themselves in a new light.

People Suffer Problems of Meaning that They Find Distressing

The two previous sections have set the scene for thinking about how to practice in the light of understanding intentionality. Life is lived with respect to noesis-noema correlations about objects. Yet they can be identified as dependent moments about the prior immersion in the world. This is how specific events are well-known and can be explained as belonging to different wholes. However, when it comes to meaning, through honouring the drive to “understand, make intelligible”, (IX, 8), and the fundamental necessity of interpretation itself (IX, 39), the consequence is that the basics of meaning must be apprehended (IX, 152–3). One consequence of taking consciousness seriously is to realise that what people suffer are meanings. Whatever is the meaning that is immediately present or one that is achieved through the ego’s reflection, emotional syntheses automatically provide the meaning with a visceral felt-sense of what it is like to experience meaning in the moment. This section thinks through how an attention to distress and the possibility of changing meaning fits with practice and makes a brief note on the relation between what is found pre-reflexively and then meaningfully through prolonged reflection. So the central theme in psychological distress is to find that consciousness interprets felt-meanings and creates experiences that are distressing and recurrent. After the initial wordless emotional distress, what follows are periods of reflection and re-creation on self or other experiences that do not soothe self, explain or soothe the distress, but frequently serve to increase and perpetuate it. So effectively, there become two problems instead of one. The basic experience is that a distressing event has occurred. In relation to some comment or realisation, a sensation in the body gets interpreted as emotional distress. Consciousness has created a meaning that is conscious but not properly understood. Primarily, meaning for consciousness is always about something. In a different language, there is always a “trigger” to a distressing experience, or any form of association between two or more meanings or sensations. The word “trigger” refers to a soft ‘cause’ of intentionalities and their senses are linked together, associations and motivations between perceptual and presentiated types of meaningful objects that are present in times past, present and future, that are only ever intentionally connected: such as between highly idiosyncratic meanings of the auditory or visual objects of words and the implied senses of anxiety, for these meanings are intensely threatening. Thus, there can be links between spoken concepts and nonverbal senses of threat in the lived body. Emotion is the fast and frequently involuntary (non-egoic, non-chosen) eruption of sensations that are given meaning as felt-distress. The other words that could be stated are that the unconscious has ‘caused’ the distress, or that there has been intersubjective and intrapersonal conflict because the previous sense of peace and harmony has been lost. It is also true that that the ego is now the mere recipient of emotion and meaning that it has not chosen and would never willingly choose to bring on itself. (For the ego, the I, the sense of self feels under attack by another aspect of itself that it neither likes, understands nor wants to have for a moment longer).

The second event of reflecting and making sense of the first eruption of distress can be unhelpful in that being angry with self or others (around self at the moment of distress who might be interpreted emotionally as perhaps 'causing' the distress in some way), is often an opportunity for further distress, harsh self-talk, rumination and recrimination that add more distress rather than understanding and soothing the first impact. The sense of distress in self can be so strong and sudden that it feels like a blow to the head or to the heart. It's a shock that distressing meaning has arisen. On a very first occurrence, the meaning is amorphous. But every time it occurs, it will be given a narrative of some sort. Thus, hermeneutics operates twice over. The first level is a wordless pre-reflexive making sense of experience where implicit emotion and experiential habits make nonverbal sense immediately. The second level is hermeneutic in terms of making sense of the latter in language to form a narrative in a specific way and the conceptual form can become reified and stay believed in a fixed way, closed to reinterpretation. The problem with fixed conceptual meanings is that they can be incorrectly used to refer to changing experiences and meanings at the pre-reflexive level. Whatever the details of the circumstances of the distress, the following can be said of it: There is an experience that is given a conceptual meaning by consciousness when language picks out highly specific dependent moments about a whole of meaning (XVII, 239).

Because of past learning, and no matter what the true biopsychosocial cause of the felt-distress, there is an experience that is given the meaning of distress. What helps produce recovery from that distress is changing the meaning and motivating clients to change their lifestyle. The recovery phase starts with the ego where new corrective meanings and soothing experiences occur. This possibility is taken up with the practice of therapy in helping the general public soothe their distress themselves. An object appears out of the pre-reflexive immersion in everyday experience and it motivates reflection on it. The object is given the meaning of distress and could be labelled in inner speech or commented on directly in actual speech, as to what it explicitly means. The first phenomenon of therapy is that a distressing felt-meaning has arisen out of the implicit pre-reflexive experiencing of being in the world. There are many other equivalent terms for stating this same basic event of finding meaning at the nonverbal experiential level or the conceptual level. In Gestalt psychology terms, a gestalt has formed which has a foreground and a background. It is a unity in itself and the mere contemplation of a gestalt might have several possible meanings (EU, Sec. 21b). When it comes to the practice of therapy, it is interesting to note that both psycho-analysis (Boston Change Process Study Group 2010; Hobson 2002) and cognitive behavioural therapy (Teasdale and Barnard 1993; Teasdale 1997, 1999) agree that the most powerful change in therapy happens at an implicational level of the whole of experiential meanings, not at the surface conceptual level. The next section adds some more detail about the basic aspects of any type of therapy practice.

Some Basic Points About Practice and Clinical Reasoning

The philosophical answer to support therapy as it is practiced is explained in this section. Some of the most basic points about therapy in general require reasoning and answers where there are a great deal of unknown qualities, mainly because the relationship between the two parties is still unfolding and clients present their needs in a controlled way, only when they begin to trust the capabilities of their therapist. Meetings between clients and therapists are intersubjective discussions and similar to any other meeting between two or more people. Therapists have 50 minutes with their clients who have the other 167 hours of the week to themselves. Before formulating how individual clients are capable of being understood, there are a number of aspects that need to be explained in order to understand the basics of the task of providing the type of care called therapy. Firstly, experience is understood through applying the idealisations of intentionality as it constitutes an intentional world that is shared, for instance, concerning the parts of consciousness of egoic active intentionality in relation to passive processes. Meaningful senses are produced. Plus, there are those new senses that are capable of being produced. The same object can be understood in a number of different contexts from different perspectives. Any relationship to an object in any situation is always intersubjective. Clinical reasoning is the discussion of the psychodynamics of motivations concerning how to provide help and how it works in altering meanings and changing the relationships that clients have with themselves, other current people around them, with more general objects such as the market place in agoraphobia, and by generalisation, how they enworld themselves by throwing forward a frame of meaning and belief into the future.

But for there to be clinical reasoning of recommending some line of action and making justified comments about how to help people get around their territories, there are the necessities of how to judge between important places to go towards and which pitfalls to avoid. The general case is that anticipatory anxiety of the future can be made sense of in an unhelpful way if it becomes construed as reason to focus on self, other or context negatively, to avoid or maintain any set of problems or sense of disconnection from others. The sense of coping that can be attained is at first futural. Similarly, the problem entails potentially avoiding something that does not yet exist. Avoidances entail consequences of the short-term benefits of defence and the loss of pleasure in initiating problem-solving and change. Defence is moving away from short-term felt-risk in a way that entails its' own distress but is deemed as an acceptable solution to it. However, through repetition what happens is that people train themselves to be over-sensitive to emotional distress and so condition themselves to avoid a difficult situation rather than tackle it. So the primary gain of defence concerns a specific reading of how to manage risk and keep it under control. Alternatively, coping is a corner stone of the therapy of emotional regulation. Coping is moving from long-standing sensitivities within the personality and its contexts to promote greater flexibility and improvement in well being. The gain of coping means managing short- and long-term risks, whilst finding that it can still be safe to lower defences and balance the mood and self esteem (Baumeister et al. 2003). Coping puts selves and their associates in a much better place whatever the problem.

Formulation

When consciousness is taken seriously, the focus for mental health care is how to work between motivations of cause and effect in a biopsychosocial view of distress understood as meaning. A person's neurons and cortisol don't distress them. What their emotions mean to them does. By discussing and explaining possible meaningful motivations for emotions and behaviour in formulation, it is possible to turn general theoretical statements and the findings of general empirical research into clear and simple strategies that represent what maintains the current state of distress (British Psychological Society 2011; Owen 2007, 2009). Formulation is explained by showing how intentionality of the overlapping connection between meanings occur with respect to the meaningful objects. When the focus is understanding how distress and impairment stay the same it is called creating a maintenance formulation. This is important because any new understanding and action can only ever be enacted in the current moment. Getting an accurate understanding of the past, others and self may alter these meanings and being clear about the future helps getting leverage in the present. But it's only the present that is the locus of any new understanding and behaviour.

It is a first professional endeavour to define the senses experienced in a formal agreed way, one that enables clients to move forward and lessen the distress that they experience. It is a question of judgement about how much detail to include, particularly when there can be idiosyncratic experiences of what people interpret that may qualify for the title of "health anxiety" or "avoidant personality", but in order to formulate with individuals and get their full participation, they need to have their problems meta-represented to them, so they can make on-going decisions with sustained effort to reduce what they are struggling with. The means of doing this is called "formulation" in Europe and "conceptualisation" in American English and is the same sense as "interpretation", the naming of causes in psycho-analysis when clients do not know but need to know about their purposes. Formulation is a reinvention of one of Freud's wheels about making sense of what people experience but do not understand about themselves (Greenson 1967). This is how intentionality can shine some light on another's view of the world.

Formulation is putting the pieces of meaning together to create a personal treatment plan that expresses the rationale for treatment so clients can understand and agree how to gain can help because without a plan there can be no work. The first application of intentionality is a view of formulation as a shared venture in finding out how to help clients re-balance themselves through taking action after having gained a good understanding of various wholes of sense that contribute to their overall sense of the world-whole. Their emotions and moods say something of the sense of the world so far about the trail of meaningful experiences left behind that come back into the original temporal field; while they look forward to what might happen in the future. By way of explaining the rudiments of formulation of the biopsychosocial aspects of the meanings of distress, defence and impairment in function, and working out with clients themselves how to turn things around to

produce an improvement in the felt-experience of the quality of life, then what is sought-after are pairs of *active control* over the *subordinate sources* of meaning-maintenance. Defence, distress and impairment need to be confronted by the ego and to move through distress when the physical task at hand is achievable. Factually for instance, distress and low self-esteem are never rational reasons that prevent action. However, the way towards a narrowed lifestyle is through chosen inability that prefers to avoid distress repetitively over long periods of time. But change can only occur in the moment that is now. The ego has to take responsibility for self-balancing and checking its' understanding of what is really causative of its difficulties. The good news is that the ego can find an understanding of its predicament and commit itself to work until it achieves change in how it is in the world, with its own self-reflexivity, with others, cultural objects and culture around itself.

The idea of intentionality can be used to help clients manage their meaningful experiences in a detailed way. Because people are intentional creatures; the procedure for interpreting with them moves them towards self-managing their own personality functioning and contextually-bound relationships. It does this by identifying repeating processes of meaning creation which repeat, often in specific situations, and does not get caught in the content of what they believe, but represents their distress and choices in such a way to prepare for corrective action of the sort where noemata could change. Because people do self-reflexively understand themselves to some degree the purpose of formulation is making explicit working hypotheses that, when shared and agreed, become explicit rationales for self-care as explanations for self-managed adaption. In the light of further experience of working on a problem, it might be necessary to alter such a hypothesis to find a rationale that works. Instead of there being strict rules of "if... then..." clinical reasoning about how to help the public, it transpires that how to help people with their mental health is working in a grey area between substantial bodies of knowledge and possibilities of what might be the case for clients and what might help them. Such strategies must be capable of discussion and being stated in such a way that clients understand them. Both contextual-psychological syndromes and personality syndromes are both time-, person- and context-dependent: they occur and go into remission with respect to meaning and mood.

If we take a view of the meaningful interaction between the ego and its cultural objects in the creation of their problematic behaviours in therapy, what we find is that there is a position of 'being out of balance in the world' which refers to the sense of having to work very hard at trying to reduce distress, while at the same time finding that some attempts to regain balance don't work. So if the focus is only on the ego and its cultural objects that comprise the psychologically distressing meanings (and these might comprise some aspect of what is generally understood as personality process or functioning), then the technical mindset that is being employed is a reading of the connections of intentional sense about objects in contexts. (And understanding a problem immediately implies what else it could be—as it obeys the formula of the intentionality-sense-object and context schema). The base experience of consciousness is being able to be in the here and now and be able to map how oneself or others could be in the world as otherwise than they currently are. What is particularly relevant is how to deal with the immediate future because

the future is never real, but it can be imaginarily and anticipatorily represented with respect to how it could be. What this means for mental health care is that the distress-producing beliefs of clients constitute the events of the present and future. Yet positive change can lie ahead. So if the meetings are to be effective they require agreed rationales for corrective action or both persons are pulling in different directions. Obviously, no one has control over the future. The point is that it becomes necessary to cope with genuine uncertainty. In what follows, the aim is to supply ideas to maintain a sharp focus on changing the meaningful maps of the world of clients, in relation to how they see others and themselves. The mechanism of change is primarily understanding what clients have as their map of the world, before acting on any part of it or its overall relation to the territory in which they live. Empirically though, in some cases people can dissociate from their bodies, or experience change in the lived bodily sense within their own *leibkörper*, the lived body and physical bodily whole, in becoming a different person in the case of dissociative identity disorder. A person has a relationship with themselves that is a learned mode of looking at, relating to, and receiving the impact of the self copying, its mimesis, of how it has been treated by others. The self's relation to itself is modelled on the behaviour of others to self (Fairbairn 1940, 1944; Freud 1905d). The self-directed emotions tell the tale: shame, embarrassment, guilt, pride, narcissism, depression over past regrets. All these tell a tale of how the self expects itself to be and that it has possibly 'failed' in its own eyes: that it has not met its own standards for how it wants to be. Through such a route people become strangers to themselves when they embrace unachievable standards and tell themselves that they do not measure up to them.

Whilst potential danger should always be avoided if hazardous; neurotic and psychotic 'danger' by definition always involves senses of anxiety in the absence of actual threat. The sense of felt-threat comes from the meaning of imagined or hallucinated scenes and their emotional meaning. Neurotic and psychotic problems are capable of being identified through noting how specific forms of intentionality constitute wholes of meaning which act as motives for unnecessarily protecting self against anxiety and negative emotions that are felt, but ultimately such senses are inconstant. For with a different manner of approach to the very same situation, these meanings and emotions would not exist and new products of consciousness would occur as new constitutions of a relaxed capability and more positive apperceptions would ensue. In some cases, anxiety may only ever be born of the possibility of something dreaded existing at some unspecified time in the future. So to say it another way, the maps that people make of the world can have features put on them that are not there in the territory itself. One principle of some brand name therapies after Aron Beck is to work with clients through a spirit of clarity and co-operation to find the difference between what works and what does not, which means a form of co-working where therapist and client have separate roles (Beck et al. 1979). Clarity of understanding is required for discussing and explaining care to clients, in order to get their active participation in what is being offered. This is for the purpose that clients become active and willing participants in treatment. Secondly, people have the right not to participate in things that they do not want (Department of Health 2001). Therapy really facilitates long-term self-care as one of its aims.

The Precision of Using the Universals of Intentionality

The importance of accurate understanding, co-working and communication leads to the topic of empathy in a general sense. For the other persons' thoughts, feelings, behaviours and past experiments are what drive them forward. A detailed approach is provided below but just for the moment, empathy in general concerns how to take the information from clients and translate it in a formal way into precise representations of their motivations, meanings and views of the world. Understanding the meaning of an object of attention of another person means understanding that its component pieces are the noematic senses of it that are gained through specific forms of intentionality. The primary phenomenon is that objects have associated with them contexts of sense that provide them with the meanings they are experienced to have. Therapy works to change the experienced senses of objects. However, each practitioner may supply different theoretical stances and contexts of meaning.

Psychological meaning is non-perceptual and presented by the individual consciousness with what does appear. Idiosyncratic meanings need to be verbalised when trying to empathise the motives that another person feels. The phenomenological view is clearly contrary to the natural attitude where reasons for behaviour, choices and meanings are simply assumed to be evident for all to see and self-explanatory, according to what culture knows. The natural science view that biology is what necessitates changes in first person experience would suggest that mental health problems are biological diseases and so in the Scientism view, consciousness is an epiphenomenon and there is no free will, only the illusion of it. What is at first hidden is the whole of personal history across the lifespan, and how decisions based on meanings have been made. Indeed, to specify with precision which intentionalities exist in relation to which objects, produces knowledge that has practical utility. Intentional processes exist within the psychosocial sphere of intersubjectivity, as peopled by the manifold of others and placed in time. For, what is presumed by naturalistic psychologies and therapies is a very great deal. Talking with others and trying to understand them is made possible through the implicit processes of something much larger. The world of meaning in the everyday sense is taken for granted, yet it is a condition of possibility that enables specific instances of knowing anything. There is the fundamentality of the whole, the world, and every instance of knowing an object is but a tiny part of knowing the world. Emotion is one sort of meaningful experience that beliefs and habits can produce. Often when there has been prolonged insecure processes operating around individuals, their higher sense of self can be inaccurately constituted with respect to their potential and actual abilities. This is incongruence which means that multiple mixed senses of an object occur which cannot be tallied with each other. In different approaches to the same relationship or social context, multiple senses of the same object arise in such a way that they remain un-integrated. This confused evidence when improperly interpreted can contribute to imbalance being maintained in preference for what could be a better, allegedly more rational interpretation and solution. Psychological

meanings including emotional representations get added to objects of different sorts in distress, happiness and coping. For if it's true that the observable behaviour of people has no meaning by itself then whatever meaning can be attributed to it is a part of the inner context of what it means for the individual.

The philosophical answer for therapy as it is practised in general is that ideal conclusions about intentionality, its objects and contexts, can be applied to the unique situations of clients. However, such an application concerns understanding how individuals make meaning in their lives. Meaning in this sense is the hermeneutic sort and is not purpose or teleology in desiring to achieve something. (Purpose is a movement between two or more meanings across timeframes and social contexts). Once again there is the ubiquity of hermeneutics. The initial thrust from Wilhelm Dilthey was to contextualise parts within their wholes, to find out what a word, phrase, a sentence, or a series of sentences might mean within a text—and so distinguish between accurate and inaccurate readings. From this beginning there arises something pragmatic about hermeneutics, even though it is creating a qualitative answer within an aporia. The central sense of hermeneutics is that: “The whole must be understood in terms of its individual parts, individual parts in terms of the whole”, (Dilthey, GS V, 262). Hermeneutics in this all-encompassing sense is the general study of meaning-making processes. It means deciding on the forms of intentionalities in relation to the meanings of phenomena. This sense of hermeneutics is a unifying perspective for science, philosophy, everyday life and its therapy. Behaviour, speech and nonverbal communication cannot be stripped of meaning. While it is possible for anyone to mis-understand, what the content of speech, the para-verbal aspects of speaking and the nonverbal aspects of gesture and facial expression communicate is a message that needs contextualising with the psychodynamic forces that are felt. Such impressions need to be checked with clients to make sure that they are being received accurately, so that the understandings made of others are checked with them. However, the overall context is the intersubjective expanse itself and a variably accurate apperception and empathising of others, their motivations and intentions. If for any reason, there is a generalised tendency to be inaccurate in understanding then attempts to help them will be misjudged.

Summary

Pure psychology is the theoretical means for designing empirical psychological practices. What pure psychology wants to create are a priori universal eidetic norms, laws or axioms that are ideal and support the practice of empirical applications in general. As theoretical psychology it serves its role in the way that mathematics and theoretical physics support experiments in physics. Pure psychology prepares the way for an empirical psychology that is wholistic and multidisciplinary (IX, 326). In the way that mathematics supports physics, pure psychology supports the empirical psychology interpreted via intentionality. The task is to create maps of the being of consciousness in its intersubjective milieu. The manifold of instances of human

biopsychosocial being is the full territory (IV, 283, V, 1). The map that functions is one that enables people to use psychological knowledge to specific ends, given that we are sentient creatures with our own ways of doing things and with our own basic preferences. The limit of the study is that the world is limited by the horizon of conceivable meaningfulness for consciousness (IX, 325). When it comes to psychology the promise is to deliver: “Experimental psychology should not be abandoned, but rather made incomparably more fruitful through the phenomenological founding, shaped through it in the genuine sense into an exact, rationally elucidating science”, (V, 49). What has been introduced above is an approach to understanding the details of meaningful distress and recovery from it.

The means of creating self-managed care is through a two-part model. First, understanding is encouraged through promoting discussions to create wholistic biopsychosocial formulation of the causes of problems, spelling out what options the ego has to influence its own experiences. Second, a self-managed lifestyle and behavioural change is sought through the understanding created. There are many parts in achieving this two-step process. Pure psychology can capture the distress of others by identifying key aspects of the maintenance or on-set of their problems across time. The idea of reduction is put into action by using open questions and applying the understanding of intentionality to pick out the most salient aspects of what constitutes the problematic pattern of emotions between the ego and its non-egoic connections in one consciousness, or between two or more, in order to identify aspects of influence and the constitution of meanings that comprise a psychological syndrome. Any psychological syndrome is capable of being understood in terms of how clients simultaneously empathise others and react to their thoughts and feelings and intentional processes. Similarly, whenever another person is characterised, what is said always refers to how an empathiser is placed in the matrix of being-with other people. In therapy, the way to help clients is to represent the other’s map of their world in relation to their territory as it is experienced, and represent it back to them verbally or in diagrammatic form so that they can understand and discuss it with their interpreter. This is the key task of formulation, the “conceptualisation of a case” as it is sometimes called. It is the same basic task achieved in everyday discussion, as well as the formal situation of receiving help and in other types of psychological research where the participants are consulted in the conclusions being drawn about them.

The ideas above however merely indicate the scope of the problematic and provide some introductory details about mapping distress in sessions. With respect to the Husserlian impetus to be philosophically coherent as expressed in Sec. 70a of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, the focus is on the fulfilled evidence of how the fourfold being of consciousness meets with the most basic experiences of theoretical maps about the first person experiences of distress. Coherence can be made through applying the universals of intentionality and intersubjectivity. But when it comes to getting close to truth, the measure is discussing any key experiences with clients themselves who are the ultimate arbiters of what they feel, believe and are motivated by. The truth about consciousness in general is only ever experiential in form, so there needs to be further thought about the relation between natural

psychological science and the forms of appearing meaning. In this light, definitive psychiatric text books like *Diagnostic and Statistical Methods 5* contain checklists of behaviours that refer to meaningful experiences (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Decontextualisation is an inevitable part of theory-making and part of the eidetic process. Applying the idea of the fourfold picture of consciousness in its habitat of other consciousness, that means focusing on shared meanings as the central issue. Sufficient collaboration and formulation and the shared discussions that these produce is sometimes called co-thinking as it moves past formulation to make agreed rationales for treatment.

Chapter 11

On Meta-Representation: The Theoretical and Practical Consequences of Intentionality

This chapter concludes on pure psychology co-ordinating empirical psychology and psychotherapy around meaningfulness. The aim is applying pure psychology ideals to interpret meaningful experiences, relationships, speech and other psychological objects. Precision is required to know how to interpret and apply the universals noted above in specific instances. This chapter explains meta-representation that was implied above but is now made explicit. Meta-representation in this context is not just about empathy and apperception but refers to the ability to make psychological understanding to support discussion and action between professionals, or professionals and the public who only have natural attitude understandings of their own processes. It is possible for people to mis-understand or draw a blank in understanding themselves. Meta-representation helps people understand the presence of possibilities, hypothetical and counterfactual alternatives that human beings are often directed towards or away from outcomes that are non-existent and not perceptually present in the now. The order of approach below starts with defining meta-representation and then explaining how frames or contexts of understanding are held in mind and compared. The distinctions of map, cartography, territory and orienteering are used. What is presented below is an all inclusive relationship between a reflective stance and what is reflected on that takes the previous ideas on meta-awareness and meta-cognition and uses them to outline the important implicit being of what happens in understanding any object of attention. To do this the idea of map and territory is invoked as a narrative for psychological understanding itself. The chapter returns to the position of chapter 4 to re-use and generalise what was stated there to apply psychological hermeneutics and interpret objects of attention in any context. What this chapter sums up is how the universal and formal understandings stated in Parts I and II can be used for interpreting psychological problems and understanding individuals in their contexts. The comments of this chapter are preparatory to worked examples and the discussion of formulation below.

There is a wholistic aim to capture consciousness precisely as it is. The aim is that: “We grasp the whole breadth and magnitude of the problems concerning the range of cognition”, (XVII, 215). Because the focus of this treatise is understanding the meanings of people, in their mental health and distress as well as positivity and effective functioning, then ultimately the region of the social context of others is considered in the developmental view of the constitution of the maps of the world that people have inside them. Specifically, the picture of the world that an individual has is the constellation of habits and beliefs about self, others, world and the cultural objects in it, the map of the world. For instance, there is difficulty in knowing what causes low mood and poor choices when the depressed ego is unaware of how its worry, procrastination and rumination play parts in its own despondency. When depressed the ego may not use its reflective consciousness of its low mood to alter its lifestyle. Overall, what is encouraged is a multifactorial understanding of psychological syndromes and personality syndromes. Diagnostic criteria act as a background when creating a focus for therapy. However, this chapter summarises the assertions that comprise a type of constraining argument. The word representation indicates consciousness because in first-hand experience it is obvious that we are conscious and self-reflexively aware. However, the being of this consciousness is indirectly observable and indicated to us only through reflection. Secondly, the second-hand empathies that we have of the consciousness of others are a quasi-presence of the other as other in self, in our minds and feelings, but their actual givenness to themselves is forever absent for us. Between self and other there are many representations of consciousness which are indicators about how consciousness exists. When taking these conclusions to psychology and therapy practice, it helps to judge accurate from inaccurate understanding and identify how to help people change their own actions, meanings and lifestyles, and move from a distressed state of affairs to coping. What pure psychology asserts is that once the role of intentionality is understood it becomes easier to see how the world is mapped in the past and the future. In order to help people, it’s necessary to communicate about the same object of attention and discuss in detail what people experience: being able to name the moments that comprise meaningful experiences supports specifying how to make changes, so the ego can knowingly participate in balancing its own emotional and relational life. What interpretation really means is being able to specify patterns of conscious experiences by identifying them from what was previously an unclear series of experiences. The difference between the pre-reflexive and the reflected on relation, noetic and noematic senses about an object, and the relation between the pre-reflexive immersion in intersubjectivity and the higher self-consciousness of ego as an agent, are topics at the cutting edge of contemporary debate in child development. Further insight about what it is to be a conscious sentient being can be found from other perspectives like social psychology, the study of distress, the comparative psychology of animals and humans, and areas like philosophy of mind and theory of mind (Beran et al. 2012).

The sequence below starts with the most basic definition of the term “meta-representation” which employs reflective meta-cognition on experience. Simply, it is the process of representing meaningful awareness in language or conceptual

notation of some kind. There is a second sense of meta-representation extent in developmental cognitive psychology where it is used in the sense of mapping or modelling a scene, which is an application of the basic ability to represent a representation of consciousness. The sections below work to summarise these theoretical and representational abilities. Not just to map the consciousness of others, but to apply such mappings and understand the behaviour, intentions, beliefs and habits of others. To empathise another by itself is insufficient. The aim is to formulate clients' meaningful experiences and open a discussion with them about their unique maps of the world that they use in getting around it. The first section of this chapter discusses commonsense as what belongs to the public, as a way of identifying what people have in common. However, the problems of practice require knowing how to synthesise bodies of evidence from research and how to grasp the findings about the mental processes of a specific person's difficulties—only by knowing what happens to people in general or overall, and how to express conclusions in recommending a form of treatment, where literally, it could be a matter of life and death.

The key distinction is to understand how the set of psychological problematics is capable of being re-balanced. The map of the world idea serves to capture the possibility that humanity are fugitives running through time, in some sort of maze, looking for a safe connection along the way. The direction to avoid is toward what maintains distress. The directions to move towards are those future positions where obvious pitfalls are avoided and genuine weaknesses are improved on. Let's stay with Husserl's metaphor of the distinction between the map and the territory: a set of representations and the object to which they refer. Having an accurate map of consciousness means that it is possible to designate, by understanding these differences in meaning-creation, and identify parts of the belief map that are unhelpful, in that it provides inaccurate senses that can be experienced otherwise. But meanings and the doxic modality about them could always be different than they are now. There is an appeal to understand how people make their lives according to habits and beliefs. Born of a comparative position afforded by understanding intentionalities in relation to the senses of their objects (meaningful beings of all kinds) means being able to understand how people make sense when consciousness donates meaning to events (XVII, 22). The map of the world is comprised of retained presences in consciousness, a map of the known cultural objects and how they relate to each other, for cultural objects often have more than one sense. Some senses of any object may be precise or vague. And with respect to any project to be achieved, maps of the world exist within the understanding and beliefs of individuals and cultures who relate to their specific territory (in the contemporary moment) according to how that territory might be. The major work of understanding is assuming that the territory can be navigated by applying the map that each individual has. Accordingly, the explanation for how a person is, how they choose to act, how they feel and are motivated, concerns the map of the world that guides them in how to get around with others, with their maps.

Phenomenological Distinctions are Meta-Representational Ones

Meta-representation is the “ability to represent the *representing relation* itself”, (Pylyshyn 1978, 593). Meta-representation is the ability to understand intentionality in that it is a form of awareness that gives multiple senses of objects. The abstract terminology covers a large number of highly specific possibilities. The media in which meta-representation can occur are thought, discussion, writing or symbolic diagramming for instance. Meta-representation is based on the ability to be aware of noemata and the forms of noesis employed at any time. An associated term is “meta-cognition”, awareness about awareness, where one form of intentionality is directed towards another intentional relationship. For instance, thinking something about what one feels or feeling something about what another person can imagine, are two examples although there are very many other possibilities. Meta-representation involves meta-cognition and what happens when any explicitly conscious senses are compared about the same object. In short, the idea of reflecting on one’s own, or the intentional experiences of others, forms the basics of a qualitatively-based study of representation itself. This is a way of stating some fundamentals within the history of therapy, as it inevitably concerns re-interpreting the mental, emotional and other types of lived experience that people inhabit.

People are, to some degree, able to reflect on their own experiences and so map themselves through being self-reflexive and self-aware. However, the ubiquity of what is being identified in the term meta-representation is even more extensive. Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach defined meta-representation as understanding that “an externally perceived picture or model as a simple object *represents* (darstellt) something in a certain way, and to understand that another person as another subject represents something in a certain way, namely *figuring or representing something to herself* (sich etwas vorstellen), would seem to be rather different modes of consciousness”, (2001, 75). What they are referring to is the basic ability to empathise socio-cultural objects of any sort demands a meta-representational ability also. In empathy what is represented and stored is learning that others’ views of cultural objects are socially acquired. This understanding of the noetic-noematic detail is important because it develops the investigation of the ground of lived experience. What appears as a consequence furthers the ability to make a technical narrative about these inherent differences and be precise in understanding people accurately to help them. This is another reason why naive realism can never be paradigmatic for psychology or therapy: many senses do not exist perceptually in the here and now and only intentionality can map these possibilities. If there was only perception, then we would be like goldfish stuck in the present moment, with no past and no idea where to go. But we have many forms intentionality, intentionality about intentionality, and intentionality about intentionality between people. The presentational sorts of givenness indicate what can be present rather than what is perceptually-present. So the major consequence of understanding the importance of communication is to note that without the sharing of meaning there would be solip-

sism. Community is created through discussion. Another consequence is indicated too. The proper understanding of the psychological is really equivalent to what can be mapped by intentionality in relation to objects and social contexts.

Territory, Cartography, Map

While never losing sight of the basic idea that theoretical abstractions have the purpose of supporting empirical action that hits its targets, in considering understanding and what it is about, the fundamental difference is that the “analogy of what appears and what is meant... does not lead to a straightforward presentation by way of an image, but to a sign-presentation resting upon the latter. The outline of England drawn as a map may indeed represent the form of the land itself, but the pictorial image of the map which comes up when England is mentioned does not mean England itself in pictorial fashion... as the country on the map. It means England after the manner of a mere sign... our naming intention is fulfilled... by... the original object which the name represents”, (XIX/2, 75). In other words *the map is not the territory*: The distinction between understanding and experience is fundamental because what is included is the way that any representational-system maps its referent. The territory is the meaningful world where people live. The maps of each individual concern belief, habit and understanding that can be accurate or not as the case may be. The distinction of the map and the territory refers to how concepts refer to verbal and nonverbal senses, particularly those that belong to other people. As such, representations are maps of territories, the shared meaningful objects that comprise the world. Although consciousness can remember, imagine and anticipate that something is the case, these forms of representation can be inaccurate and what they show can stand for the meaning of being as noted in Fig. 11.1 by sorting between accurate and inaccurate understandings, by being able to discuss them with the persons who have these experiences. However, the functions of representations, mapping, are precisely road maps to guide behaviour in the territory itself. This means that if the representations are inaccurate then the resulting behaviour and relating with others and oneself will be mis-guided. Technically speaking what therapy does is provide correcting map-territory discussions that enable inaccurate representations to be discovered, in potential and actuality, by clients. Because intentionalities represent the world they form an interpretive system of what is believed, anticipated, imagined, empathised, etcetera, so that it becomes realised that behaviour in relation to future, present and past situations, frequently

Speech representing experience	Territory of lived experience of another person
Etic representation discarded after discussion	Formulation of territory agreed with others to refer to their territory

Fig. 11.1 Four fundamental categories in the process of intentional formulation

involves consciousness responding to intentional inexistence which is one reason why behaviourism is inadequate as a theory (Searle 1984).

The basic map of solo consciousness is as follows: The map of the world is a set of beliefs and habits constituted by interpretations and representations of experiences concerning distress and safety constituting cultural objects, people, things, ideas and the types of relationships between them. It is the sum total of making sense of past experiences, and simultaneously, a prediction about a not yet existent future concerning the inter-relationship between self (a lived and higher self-interpretation), others, and cultural objects of part of the sum total of being in the world, plus a horizon, a context that marks the boundary of the known world of the individual. Temporally, there is an interconnection with the evidence-base of the past. If specific beliefs have the doxic modality of certainty, they are held as true and define the meaning of the being that is experienced.

Experiential Givenness as Territory

What is meant by the term territory is any object of study. When Husserl made his maps of consciousness he worked from the territory of the natural attitude of everyday experience to produce the ideal and universal conclusions of chapters 6–9. Pure psychology is map-making in a style of commentaries on consciousness, what it is to be alive. What causes human beings to be, act, feel and relate are different maps of the same territory and needing to respond when in it. The crucial difference is how accurate they are with respect to their territory. The social world is the co-occurrence of nonverbal, verbal and the contents of mass media where face-to-face interactions co-occur and other forms of information about the collective view of what it is to belong to a circle of friends, a family or a professional group. In the case of maps of understanding, they show temporal being concerning what has been, what is now and what might be. When an experience is broken down into its temporal moments, it shows the importance of throwing forward of sense of a wholistic sort, that has the effect of there being an understandable whole. In relation to the past, the sense made of past events is a whole of a different sort. The original temporal field is caught between what has happened and what can be anticipated to come. However, any instance of mapping is an instance of the enworlding synthesis that connects with the cosmos, the all that is the world, and turns it into a specific understandable style of a world that relates to the current territory.

In moving toward any valued outcome there are the necessities and universalities of the space of possibility as that of possible meanings about the future. The vision of looking forwards into future time, as well as understanding what is possible for the here and now, is the purpose of the mathematical style of adopting a universal view. The infinite range of possibilities becomes understandable through the ability to map biopsychosocial emergent forms and patterns within a region of life. A great deal of what the human being deals with does not exist perceptually and so the realm of meaningfulness and motivations about possible forms interact

as biopsychosocial influences across time. The individual brain and body change physically to accommodate current influences. The real work is dealing with the decision-making process that governs how to be emotionally and socially intelligent, in how to co-operate and be mutual and reciprocal, while asserting oneself in the most basic way of providing a proper active influence within the current social scene. Everyone deals with hardships, bad luck, and the consequences of bad decisions. What makes the difference is being able to move into self-healing if that is necessary. The complex systems of intersubjectivity, how societies work in a wholistic view of the interacting forces of money, place, persons and other forces built around the communal life, is that societies are found to move between states of order and chaos. Long-lasting civilizations, empires and dictatorships fall. There are cycles of boom and bust yet the dependent moments of the whole of society is the social matrix in which individual consciousness evolves. The habits of mind are reactive to uncertainty and may follow the lines of sense and motivation, away from the bad and towards the good, however conceived. The beliefs that drive society are those that drive the individual.

The developmental psychologist Josef Perner takes Zenon Pylyshyn's phrase, of the "ability to represent the *representing relation* itself", (Pylyshyn 1978, 593), and uses it to show that meta-representation is understanding that *something is the case, but that the self-same object could be viewed differently by someone else, or viewed differently by self at some other time*. Thus, meta-representation includes: "Explicit understanding... that one and the same representation can have different interpretations", (Perner 1991a, 102). Or in Husserlian terms that there can be two or more noemata of the same object given in one or more noetic ways, for solo consciousness or two or more people. This is not just a comment on the manifold of the senses that any object can have and how it is possible to identify constant and persistent evidence, because patterns do appear out of multiplicity. Meta-representation is a specific form of theorising that tries to show the temporally and teleologically-oriented view of the decision-making that concerns different ontological views of what *is* and how it *could be* otherwise. What Perner is identifying in Pylyshyn's idea is a warrant to understand consciousness as capable of separately holding differing views of the selfsame object. So, meta-representation expresses how consciousness understands the being of the object by considering the phenomenon of having more than one map of the same object and the ability to connect with them: for instance, holding in mind three different maps of an object in the timeframes past, present and future. Other abilities of consciousness that are meta-representational include comparing the perspectives self and other. The ability to problem-solve and be creative requires altering the specific senses of a whole constellation of self, other and object but keeping the constituent composite elements the same. The unifying continuity is to connect similar situations of an object as-understood, that is further understood from multiple points of view of different persons, or as merely hypothetical possibilities for instance (clearly understood as merely possible and not extant). These options are only a fraction of many more possibilities all of which are meta-representational.

Cartography and Orienteering as Metaphors for Meta-Representation and Discussion

The word “cartography” builds on the previous use of “reflection” and refers to the ability to represent the relation between intentionality and its objects. For instance, how beliefs and habits fit together at an implicit level in automatically and involuntarily creating any understanding and reaction to any situation. Cartography is a metaphorical term that implies the idea that there are specific styles of maps made. Not just of different territories but of specifically different important objects on the same territory. Cartography also implies that simplifications take place in making these understandings, because to keep the use of maps in sight is to note that understandings, mappings, enable actions to be achieved. It includes wanting to explain how there can be different maps of the same territory. For the moment the teaching point is merely noting that the terminology of intentionality, intentional implication, intersubjective intentionality, drive and the representation of objects, presence and the consciousness of others—are the processes of symbolisation, of map-making itself. The map of the world is really a pre-reflexive implicit set of understandings and presences that can be made conscious through a variety of experiences where anticipations can become successful in a pleasant surprise; or thwarted and disappointed. When there is an explicitly conscious realisation of the map, intentional concepts differentiate the now conscious objects and intentionalities, and bring into explicit understanding the related objects and their associated intentionalities. A map that an individual has about the world is held within a set of pre-reflexive presences. Anonymously functioning passive processes do their work to re-present what become objects to consciousness. When the ego reflects, interprets and compares the senses of its objects, it turns a mere presence into an object of attention. Accordingly, map-making about human experience is partly about temporality and the intersubjectivity of distress that might be increasing across areas of a person’s life across time. There are many influences on having a specific style of being in the territory of the world and how to predict what will be in the future but these get simplified in producing a map of them.

When it comes to resolution even a good quality map would never show all the territory. Maps are idealisations and are never 100% mappings of every moment of the territory, although the map is still about the specific region of objects and the moments that comprise its whole. Maps are inaccurate when they portray the territory. To be specific, the territory that can be represented could be, for instance, the understanding and beliefs that can be interpreted, that are hypothesised as occurring in a specific client with whom a therapist is working. Specifically, in the case of trying to express the emotional and defensive decisions that a person has taken, in orienting themselves in the life-territory, they are themselves links between emotions as objects themselves. These links about distress and the self’s role in it may have been given more importance within the decision-making process that has created a psychological syndrome, than the achievement of other competing goals of life that would require specific forms of persistence and flexibility for their attainment.

A metaphor to understand some aspects of the map and the territory are as follows. Cartography is the adoption of a term to highlight the way in which a map can be made. For instance, a map might only show various sorts of highlights and not others. The usage is metaphorical of course, as a means of beginning a way of being able to attend to the moments of what is deemed important within any individual's life. Orienteering is the sport of cross-country running where each participant has a copy of a map and a compass in order to cross an unknown piece of woodland. The idea of orienteering is not to suggest that life is a sport, or a race towards some specified end-point, but more to say that map-usage in current and future contexts arises from a map that has been made at some point in the past. When put together, cartography and orienteering for future projects are ways of showing how the territory can be represented at various times in life, past, present and future. This emphasis will be kept throughout the remainder of the work in making basic explanations. When it comes to cartography, a first difference is to note that making a map, as opposed to getting around in a territory, are two different experiences yet they are related. The motto of "the map is not the territory" has a number of repercussions because whilst an understanding is not the experience, then it's only good cartography and good orienteering that work together in the action of getting around the territory they proves the map and its reading as good or faulty.

The metaphor of the map expresses attempts to navigate towards some shared purpose or outcome. Even though there are past experiences of how to be and how to relate, there is also the necessity of applying the right piece of the map to the right current territory. This means that one possibility of mapping and map-reading is that a number of alternatives arise as to how a part of the map is selected as belonging to the immediate territory. What's necessary is to find the correct piece of the map and to apply its representation to the piece of territory that is current in relation to the next stage of the journey in life, the current mission. What comes out of the metaphor is the insight that sometimes the map might need updating as something on the territory has changed, for that previous mistake in negotiating the area, if due to the map, demands it be corrected. But another aspect of the mental processes involved are those that can identify how the map-reader can double check where they are on the territory in relation to landmarks around them, that must be visible in order to determine the certain knowledge of the position on the map. This is the sense of orienteering because there is no point in assuming that one knows where one is on the territory while following the map, when it might be possible that the two do not relate.

The discovery of pure psychology is that it is possible to conclude on ideal aspects to the social world and that human relationships obey these universal and transpersonal aspects, irrespective of their place in history. On the one hand, there is the uniqueness of the individual with his or her personal history and map of the world. On the other hand, there is the ideal structure of the map and the intersubjective world, the real territory of a person, plus the manifold of shifting possibilities of what might happen next Tuesday, or what might happen in a relationship, what Martin might think, and how it will be at home tonight. In any century, the ideal structure of intersubjectivity remains the same. The social world is not only external

but exists in relation to what everyone maps and updates the senses of objects and relations to them. Such senses are frequently immediately given in emotion but can also be represented in belief, automatic assumptions and visual imagination, or perhaps through the favourite sayings of inner dialogue. The power plays of dominance and submission of race, class, gender, sexuality, the shared life at home and work are negotiated in how each self places itself, and is positioned by others, in social contexts, be they family, the work place or in relations to broader and more abstract notions of stereotype, cultural norms, societal conventions and historical traditions. In short, the mental maps relate past social learning to current and future possibility.

Discussion

One ontological problem is as follows: In the terminology of psychology there is a tension between the general and the individual instance, what Wilhelm Windelband (1894, 1998) and the Southwestern school of neo-Kantianism called the difference between the nomothetic and the idiographic. The nomothetic is an abstract level of generalities similar to the universal eidetic laws that Husserl was looking for, concerning the essences of the being of consciousness and the ‘causes’ of motivations of consciousness within intersubjectivity. *Nomothetic* knowledge aims at eidetic generalities that are universal or at least common to a set of phenomena and through studying them it is possible to claim timeless ontological laws and abstract theories about beings and of relationships between them in general. *Idiographic* knowledge refers entirely to explaining and describing the unique instance of events and processes of phenomena, their history and circumstances. In Plato, Aristotle and Husserl a similar tension exists between identifying an instance—and a manifold, category or universal—as it does in other areas of study. The tension is solved by noting that consciousness can recognise an odd one out in a series of experiences where one view or profile is sufficiently different for it not to be included in the series, because it is more different than alike. The tension between an instance and a universal is inherent within eidetic variation and looking across a series of noetic-noematic instances to identify the constancies of intentionality and object. The nomothetic-idiographic distinction is not an abstract problem for two major reasons. Firstly, if a therapist sees 40 clients a year, each for 3–6 months at a rate of approximately once a week, then even after practising for 25 years and seeing 1000 people, there will still only be a relatively small number of recognisable similarities learned from clinical experience. People with the same diagnostic criteria are different when the details of what they bring to the meetings are taken into account. The problem is that the individual experience of client and therapist are insufficient. Therefore, certain knowledge about greater generalisations would be useful to decrease depression or anxiety, for instance, but clients are forever unique. The value of accurate theory is to be able to make applied distinctions that have a high likelihood of working. Specifically in the situation of therapy, useful general understanding leads to conversations with clients about what is really happening

for them. Following Windelband, there are both general theoretical conclusions and unique conclusions that explain and fit the experiences of one person.

There are various ways that the world-map can be used when it is applied to other people. It can be mistakenly seen as the truthful sum total representation when it is only one version of a specific person's way of understanding. The veracity of the map needs checking against the territory to prove the accuracy of the understanding by careful testing of the map made. For the map predicts what the individual actually does, feels and how they may react in any given situation. In the first case, the understanding has either the higher explicit expressions of the core beliefs *or* the lower nonverbal pre-reflexive experiences of being in an emotional current between the people around the self, merely because of having had the personal life history that selves have had. Maps provide everyone with a form of understanding that is enacted in the current social behaviour of how to participate in shaping the social future. So before moving on to any new topics, let's consider the difference between the idea of the map and the territory, for the metaphor provides a focus on that in which a territory can be conceptualised or formalised, indeed formulated to represent the intentional connection between thoughts, feelings and emotions in a cultural world. Whatever the map is a record of, it can be expressed as a representation in language, of patterns across regular domains of the territory, across regions of objects that are arranged or structured in some way (and could be re-organised in a different way). Perspectives for understanding require consulting one's own store of retained information of how to act, deal with oneself, how to make friends and "rules for living" in abroad sense of how and when to act. What is lived is the territory, the natural attitude of everyday life and how to go about in it.

Summary

The process of psychological understanding has been referred to as mapping but what is the case is that any ability to map a territory also implies checking of the accuracy of the ability to map. Meta-representation is a core ability of how to be effective in the world through mapping how it could be otherwise. This ability is part of a reiterative process of being able to refer to the same identical object. Not as it is in only one view but as it could be viewed in various approaches to it. Intelligence is expressed in problem-making, problem-solving and decision-making. From the most mundane to the highest considerations of ethics and politics, meta-representation concerns awareness and then representation in language about what is lived.

- Poor skills of map-reading mean that people only get satisfaction by luck rather than skill. Map-reading that is insufficiently honed may miss its target as well as hit it occasionally. If the learning of map-reading skills is insufficient, then it needs correcting to improve accuracy to help people know where they are and how to move beyond their immediate context.

- A dilemma occurs when there are different senses of the same object or two different objects, both of which appear. If the resolution of the map is low in its accuracy and the map of what exists is fuzzy, then any two objects in question will be barely recognisable and the map-reader has no 'long sight'. This means understanding in this case exists and cannot see into the distance but is only short-sighted. This map has a lack of resolution. Its accuracy is insufficient and needs improving.
- The case of a very poor map and poor map-reading skills is distinguishable by a high degree of inaccuracy and a sense of pointlessness exists because what is attempted, for gaining satisfaction on the territory, does not work. Getting lost with a map and compass or global positioning system (GPS) device is a case in point too. It's necessary to maintain an accurate bearing, a correlation between where self is on the map and on the territory at the same time, for the journey to happen as it should. How getting lost in the territory and the map feels is that energy is expended without the warmth and gratitude of a day well-spent. For this type of inaccurate map of the world, the experience of learning that has occurred was not enough to provide accurate mapping. Proper learnings are required to update the map and map-reading needs to be taught.

In therapy meta-representation is any kind of shared discussion with clients about what will help them as opposed to what will maintain their problems. Meta-representation also occurs in discussion of a shared narrative that is a first-person account of how to move away from the current perception of distressing emotional states due to implicit beliefs concerning the existence of senses of objects that can, at some timeframe in the future, be felt as more acceptable and more a part of self. And a move towards a future state of balance begins a moving towards a state of being that does not currently exist and has no current perceptual evidence of it.

Chapter 12

Two Telling Examples About Belief and Time

This chapter provides two worked examples of how ideal interpretations of intentionality formulate a person's defence, distress and impairment map of the world. Although there are many syndromes and many complex combinations of them, agoraphobia and worry (generalised anxiety disorder) are chosen as exemplars to explain how intentionality makes meanings that are distressing. It would be possible to go through a selection of syndromes and combinations of personality styles and syndromes, but this would take up a good deal of space and be unnecessary because what needs to be explained is how intentionality applies in detail so that readers can abstract the skills and understand how the mapping of the formulation of intentionality applies. One application of pure psychology is creating clear understandings that clients can discuss without training. In other uses of pure psychology, it is possible to be clear about research questions or in presenting provisional experimental findings in a similar manner. The subject matter below briefly notes the answer that meta-representation provides then notes belief and temporality as two major intentional forms in distress and well-being. Two examples are explained and the general process of moving from distress to coping and improving being able to self-soothe and create emotional self-regulation.

There are many different types of impairment, defence and distress. What is discussed below are the basic parameters of time and belief involved in the making of maps of the world at times past, present and future. Bearing in mind that the whole is biopsychosocial, what wholism means is that there is an influence from the past plus maintenance, the on-going renewal and up-dating of habits and learning in the meaningful world. Maps of the world in retentional consciousness adapt to the meanings of the current lifestyle and the anticipated future. However, because there is a degree of uncertainty in mainstream psychological science as to what specifically causes any of the forms of mental distress, the fact remains that the ego has to manage its own distress and lifestyle in some best way. The lack of certainty in the professional discourse forces an attention on how to manage the qualitative and

meaningful life. This foregrounds associations between objects and intentionalities which can then become set in a specific way. But if the natural-biological interpretation is the only permissible narrative then any narrative concerning the object and the intentionalities that present it are disallowed. On the contrary, it is the meaningful narrative that defines the qualitative meaningful experience that must be addressed. There is nothing wrong with the biological approach except that it only justifies the provision of naturalistic-biological help and cannot specify meaningful interventions and self-care. What this chapter shows are the beginnings of how to apply intentional analysis to create maps of territories of distress. At base, therapy has to show what consciousness could provide for clients in advance of the evidence that proves how a problem can be experienced entirely differently, from a new perspective that they have not yet attained. Below concrete examples are provided with respect to the way that the map of the world of agoraphobia, worry, low self-esteem and social anxiety are mis-mappings of how the world can be experienced.

There are Variations in the Certainty of What Exists

The understanding of intentionality first came from the Scholastics and Brentano. It is permitted in contemporary empirical psychology and was also implied in the original definition of meta-representation introduced by Zenon Pylyshyn as the “ability to represent the *representing relation* itself”, (1978, 593), which refers to the detail of how something is made aware or appears. The definition was made in the context of Pylyshyn arguing for the role of conscious meaning and experience as governing meaningful behaviour. His point is that qualitative descriptors about motivations are valid in psychology (Pylyshyn 1978, 592). Even though there is no one to one correspondence between meaning and observable behaviour, there is nonetheless a genuine type of ‘causality’ operating: The ‘causality’ of incentive, belief and desire are motivating forces that shape the teleology between actual and possible states of being. The definition by Pylyshyn marks the formal acceptance of belief and desire intentionalities in some areas of psychology. Empirical psychology prior to 1978 had previously refused consciousness and its intentionality declaring them as non-scientific objects incapable of empirical study. It is true that just because something is an object of attention does not mean that it truly exists currently or has existed at any time for that person. It would be impossible to have a science of things that do not exist. But the pure psychology understanding that is afforded by intentionality is that psychological being is evidently only indirectly related to natural and perceptual being. It is only the concept of intentionality that unlocks what it is for consciousness to believe or disbelieve, to anticipate, hallucinate or remember meaningful experiences, rather than merely being able to claim that there is neurological activity when such experiences occur. Straightaway intentionality provides an insight in to the sense of psychological reality. What is believed to exist is the topic of psychological ontology as based on qualitative experience. On the one hand, psychological problems are often born of the hypothetical construal of what

might exist; rather than what actually does exist. On the other hand, the therapy of such problems must grasp them as they are construed by their originators or it will forever miss their actual sense for its clientele. Because natural psychological science previously claimed that meanings, motives and social learning lie outside of its scope, it declared qualitative experience illegitimate. This still has ramifications after the dark ages of behaviourism, as it seems startling and ‘unscientific’ to some psychologists to have a professional discourse about meaningful objects of attention in the lives of people. But for pure psychology the professional responsibility is how to interpret in a manner that grasps how people experience things in specific ways, so that meanings and their manners of appearing are still recognisable to the participants in the technical language of the researchers.

The Modalities of Belief and Correlates of Being

In pure psychology terminology, when the doxic modality of belief is certainty then what is believed, whether that is true or not, is experienced as real (III, 214). The link to being is that if persons believe that they can, or that they cannot, either way they will be correct. Given that the structure of consciousness is social and that consciousness, the means of representing the world, is frequently focused on others, their views and itself, every experience is intentional in that some mental process is operative whether the ego has chosen it or not. When it comes to intimate relationships, discussion is sharing what people think, feel and believe, and not being sent astray by mis-empathy and guessing. The attitude of noting how clients interpret being and believe in their worlds, the realisation is that people believe their world, and that is expressed in *how* they cast it in a style, a variation, on what a world could be. There is no lifestyle that is worldless for enculturated persons, apart from feral children who have never had primary intersubjectivity with human beings (Candland 1993). Even hermits have with them something of a world, even if their lives are restricted. The link between belief modalities and the sense of certainty in something alleged to be existent (or not): is a fundamental level of experience considered in a formal way. However, belief concerns the difference between false interpretations in relation to a lack of evidence that gets maintained to support previously established beliefs. This is opposed to evidence that shows accurate beliefs in relation to proper evidence. For instance, neuroses and psychoses exist with respect to associations to current perceptual objects but their full set of senses occupies time past and future as well. When there are perceptual objects involved it is the entirely idiosyncratic meanings that are associated with them that trigger distress. These types of composite givenness concerning distress are super-imposed on perception. However, in both cases of inaccurate and accurate interpretation produce memories in relation to bodies of evidence—and the bodies of evidence cited contribute to memories that are believed to be real.

Generally, beliefs serve a function of maintaining themselves and potentially refusing to acknowledge proper evidence, merely because it is contrary to retained

belief (IV, 126, cf Perner 1991b). Or to describe the same phenomenon with different words, the potential truth of what could appear of an object gets re-interpreted so that “what I believe it is” gets mistaken for “what it really is if I were to attend to it better”. This difference between noema and object is an explanation for the inertia to change. The difficulty of change of meaning is related to inaccurate understanding and beliefs in the face of plenty of disconfirmatory evidence across the course of a life. The inertia is that old beliefs born of events decades ago, maintain themselves despite plenty of new evidence that should add subtle nuances to the understanding of the object, in the light of many more experiences of it than the old ones. Because the longer a person lives, the more accurate should be their understanding of meaningful objects in the everyday lifeworld. They have had more chances to correct their false impressions. However, when it comes to changes there are many processes that support inertia and stasis rather than promoting adaptation to the abundance of evidence about what is really the case. The psychologists’ view calls the phenomenon of inertia “status quo bias” which means a preference for believing the same and maintaining the same behaviours and habits even in the face of evidence to the contrary (Bornstein 1989; Kahneman et al. 1982). Belief is not open to access and immediate change by clients themselves. They are frequently stuck in beliefs and habits around close relationships and how the future is anticipated. How they treat themselves may not be apparent in their view of themselves and so is inaccessible to change. The explanation provided is that beliefs bring negative consequences and more distress. Such learnings are made manifest as habits of being a person, for habits make identity and the ability to make changes incur a transitional anxiety in that newness and difference are generally disliked. Status quo bias is another way of stating that there is an inertia in favour of the known, no matter how that might be dysfunctional, untrue and distressing. For the empirical phenomenon is a tendency to prefer predictability, over new more functional options and it may take many days of daily practice to break an old habit and establish a new one (Duhigg 2012). When it comes to establishing new ways of dealing with other people, the basic sense of the other can be negative with respect to self. Such sense requires challenging because of the tendency to mis-empathise others and feel inaccurate emotions in intersubjectivity. So inaccurate senses act as motivating meanings that tend to support the faulty status quo bias; rather than demonstrate new options for living that are more satisfying. Accordingly, even in the presence of evidence to the contrary, a status quo bias is maintained which means that beliefs act in a self-maintaining way. The overall mindset of stasis means that the overall understanding of the interpreted evidence is problematic. The way forward for therapy is to provide arguments for genuine gains that are available to people who are willing to take risks before the attainment of the evidence that will disprove their inaccurate understanding. In this light, it becomes apparent that there are different interpretations of the various means of interpreting the forms of evidence.

An Example of Temporality and Future Belief: The Intentional World of Agoraphobia

The pure psychology of agoraphobia makes a point about the projection of belief into the future and how emotional syntheses add to what is imagined and anticipated. Believed meaningful being in a future timeframe is a fundamental aspect of the creation of a world in the short-term perspective of living for today and moving into the future more generally. Consciousness responds to such habits of belief and understanding with emotional and reasoning habits that help it live in the world that it creates. The meaning of the map-territory distinction is that what is inhabited in the case of beliefs like agoraphobia is that people are living *more in their map than they are in the territory of the world as it is and could be*. The constituent intentionalities follow the constitution of beliefs that literally create the emotional tone of what exists and how it exists. Whether that is in the positive and having an accurate view of things—or whether that is inaccurate. Let's take a concrete example of one phenomenon of a syndrome of meaning and behaviour that expresses maps of fearful belief with respect to a safe territory. The syndrome of agoraphobia is based on anticipatory anxiety, that there is something anxiety-provoking in being outside of a safe geographical area. Agoraphobia is a construct from the Latin, meaning fear of the market place. The point is that people with agoraphobia believe that the future experience of being outside of their safe zone is anxiety-provoking to such an extent that repeated anxious experiences in shops, town centres or away from the home are too threatening. So decisions are made entirely on the basis of reasoning about the emotions felt about futural possibilities. In emotional reasoning, only one mode of intentionality is chosen as the decisive factor. So, such anticipatorily anxious places are avoided or entered into only with the utmost trepidation with the assistance of another person or various props that would 'ensure safety' such as taking medication, a mobile phone to call the emergency services or a rape alarm.

Specifically, the person who is agoraphobic may become housebound and unable to function outside of the home, which has further sequelae for their family, friendships and occupational future. The style of belief is that self sees itself as weak and unable, and that others are better persons because they do not have these anxieties. So, agoraphobic selves enlist help by asking more capable others to accompany them into what is emotionally represented as a danger zone. The sense of self is that anxiety permeates other aspects of life. Without help the prognosis is continuing a narrowing of the lifestyle, plus an increase in dissatisfaction in a number of areas due to inadequate satisfactions of friendship, lack of attendance at family gatherings and difficulties in getting basic needs met. There is an increasing maintenance of evidence that is on-goingly interpreted as meaning that the self is defective and the world is an anxiety-filled horizon. Agoraphobia is the centrality of the anticipatory anxiety before entering anxiety-inducing places, with beliefs about intersubjective responses in the following way. Intersubjective life is primarily the radical de-centring of self by being inter-twined throughout life with the influences of others in mutuality. In agoraphobia, there is the sense of self as threatened through the antici-

pation of excessive difficulty. Yet there is an implied audience of others that is cast as watching a tragedy unfold. Specifically, the anticipated tragedy is the showing of the anxiety to the audience of others and their anticipated displeasure at seeing self as weak and out of control and the audience nonverbally showing how they disapprove of persons who show their anxiety. The problem is exacerbated because this mis-empathy is believed in anticipation of it actually being present for others. Because intersubjectivity is a whole, there are connections between the person's own anticipated apperception of themselves and what it means for others that they will be seen as anxious. The anticipatory angst they feel about themselves is embarrassment and shame at being anxious, in addition to the base feeling of the anticipatory anxiety of going outside of the zone of safety. Others are empathised as potentially dismissive and disapproving to the extent that they can clearly see that self is agoraphobic, a bad person and a nervous wreck on the street. Therefore, people with agoraphobia may believe that there seems to be no way out from a future of isolation, desperation and inability.

Agoraphobia is an example of where there is both the increase in anxiety that intrudes and gets generalised across various domains of life—and that new defences and avoidances are contrived to protect self and try to decrease the anxiety but fail to do so. The component pieces of agoraphobia are the way that the imagination runs riot and that the state of the future that is genuinely unknowable, gets represented as a demon with which to struggle. The demon of the future is that emotionally-based decision-making gets to play a role in justifying avoidance. Such a choice completely overrides the use of logic and problem-solving that could be self-correcting. There is an excessive attention to the bodiliness that is felt in advance of getting outside of the safe area. When the anxiety is excessive there are no means employed to steady the anxiety and the defensiveness employed is only temporarily effective at best. There is a wrong interpretation of the nature of self in relation to the anxiety felt about the possibility of going outside of the safe zone. Thus there are inaccurate understandings and beliefs about specific aspects of the temporal and intersubjective being in the world. Not only are these understandings faulty but there are no corrective actions that work to decrease the anxiety felt. Indeed, the fear of the future can spread to become worry about how to cope with other domains of life that do not concern going outside of the safe zone. Anticipatory anxiety and a fixed set of inaccurate beliefs do not operate for other persons who do not make these predictions about being outside of the safe area. It is possible to defeat this anxiety and disprove these beliefs, if persons with agoraphobia will permit themselves to re-enter the dreaded situation and learn to tolerate and so reduce the anxiety that they encounter. This is strategy called “exposure” that requires repeated experiences of entering the same challenging place a sufficient number times until the fear felt in it drops by half its intensity on each occasion. So the pragmatic treatment of anxiety before entering contexts, and fear during them, has the strongest possibility of success (Paul 1967). The next section discusses worry which has the technical name generalised anxiety disorder. This is another set of phenomena that show the role of maps and territories.

Example of Belief and Psychological Ontology: The Telling Case of Worry

The pure psychology of worry makes another exemplary point about the confusion of possibility with actuality in a way that steers clear of probability in the mathematical sense. This section takes the case of worry as a telling example of the constitution of psychological reality that occurs through the action of the intentionalities of belief and temporality, in the making of an individual map of the world that gets projected out on to the perceptual and intersubjective surrounding world. The case of worry is an interesting example of the roles of belief and temporality in the world. Worry is not planning, problem-solving or acting in the here and now. In producing worry images and self talk, emotions are constituted quickly and involuntarily and that is how they can catch the ego by surprise. It's not that emotions are entirely out of control, because they are subject to the ego's influence to some degree. It's more that intentional links operate between perceptual presences. The imagination of worry objects is sufficient to create immediate senses of threat or danger and if the person has no insight into their own processes then it feels like anxiety erupts now when it's really about implications and future possibilities. Anxiety in this case is half-meaning and half-physiological gut reaction in response to what the ego chooses to imagine and tell itself about what it believes to exist. Anxiety has a sense of urgency that goes with the desire to run toward help or run away from some possible danger. In this situation, disturbing emotions are valuable information providing clues about what needs to change, if they can be interpreted in the right way. The representation of 'causes' of self and other in a world are brought together. Therapy works through knowing that what clients experience and can change. But the question is how? If there are no reversible 'causes' of the meanings and relationships with others, then there is no possibility of altering beliefs and supplying new meaning, then therapy is impossible. One condition of the possibility of therapy is that meanings are changeable and clients are able to make and believe such differences. If this becomes clear to them, then they can apply interventions on themselves gained from their discussions.

The technical name for worry is generalised anxiety disorder which, at first glance, appears to be a free-floating anxiety. But on closer questioning of people with chronic worry, what appears is that the usual ability to meta-represent how the world could be is out of control and has become nightmarish. What is merely imagined can get imbued with belief, and particularly, if self-talk is certain and the visual imagination is vivid then emotional passive processes fill in the gaps in what is said in internal dialogue and what is imagined by the ego. This is a telling example because the usual mapping of the world, that takes place in visualising of how the future might be, becomes catastrophic and uncertain: What might be, is confused with what exists, whilst temporal processes structure the most basic aspects of the mapping of the world (as it is and as it could be). The key feature of worry is the difference of how the world could be at some specified or nonspecific time. Worry




Fig. 12.1 Meta-representation of worry in relation to probable outcomes

is the case where the scenarios imagined and believed are unrealistic, improbable, excessive and closed to reassurance. The effects on the mood and emotions are debilitating to the extent that here and now behaviour may be altered drastically to fit in with a future that is believed to be catastrophic. Worry is unreasonable caution about adverse consequences in a way that is unwise. It is not taking acceptable risks in the knowledge that nobody knows what might happen in the specific case. In dealing with the future, possibly things might go wrong or they might go according to plan. In worry however, the possibility of safety is out of the question. Any plan made in advance accommodates self-doubt and the potentially debilitating effects of the emotions and mood that ‘demand’ defensive behaviour. Some forward planning and fall-back plans might be needed. But the worry scenario is more about the map than the territory. What is imagined are accidents, unknowns and unexpected mishaps, where persons see themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. The intense negative emotions felt now are taken by the ego as evidence of the certainty of catastrophe. Thus, the position being described can be shown diagrammatically (Fig. 12.1).

The problem of the future really does concern knowing what will come next. This can be stated as a research question concerning what might occur in any social context. Worry must not be confused with another fundamental question which is how the ego marks one representation of an object as an accurate one as opposed to judging what is an inaccurate representation. Patterns of the different forms of sense can be identified nevertheless. These questions relate to evidence and what it’s taken to mean. The evidence that really counts may not be available until sometime in the future when it’s too late to arrive at a destination that is unwanted and unintended from the point of view of the actor. Sometimes, the good reassuring evidence is not in sight; but neither should distress about the future be avoided.

So setting aside what has already been said about temporality and the notion of the individual world gained through social learning, let’s attend to the aspect of pessimism that worry shows. Pessimism in the context of worry is a negative anticipation that is a style of interpretation of the ego meeting objects that are already well-known. However, the hypothetical thinking in worry is severely pessimistic. Caution and planning serve a positive function in keeping people safe against realistic threats. However, the style of futural imagining in worry is hopelessly out of proportion to the actual dangers involved. So much so that strong negative emotions are evoked and they might prevent rationality and planning. The process of mapping the world is meta-representation. The way of moving into the future involves

imagining how the world and its contents could be otherwise than they are. Meta-representation is what happens in looking in the kitchen to seeing that the supply of milk is running low and planning how to get to the shops to buy some before they shut. Caution and planning are about how to imagine things going right for self and others, how to look after oneself and a myriad other possibilities.

But pessimistic worry can become a way of life. The worrier thinks that they are looking after their own interests in defensively staying safe. At the same time, they are terrified of the possibilities of things that, by definition, have not yet happened. The interpretative pattern involved in pessimism and negative thinking is that the size of the problem is enlarged through repetitious visualisation of difficulties and negative self-talk and the ability of self to cope is decreased by avoiding building up the necessary skills and assertiveness. Something similar is happening in worry. The amount of uncertainty and risk is subjectively increased far beyond what it really is. The ability of self to cope with the amount of threat and deal with unforeseen possibilities becomes radically underestimated. However, what close questioning reveals is the involvement of worry and its other characteristics. In addition to those already mentioned, the ego can repetitively replay the same catastrophic visual imagining and provide the same voice-over in internal dialogues as an account of the possibility of harm that might be experienced. An additional aspect is an over-focus on the same topics many hours a day and for many days of the week. The objects imagined could be anything including the absence of worry, the nature of the self, the nature of the relationship to others, the possibility of illness for self and others (thus producing health anxiety), the possibility of harm or misadventure that can be forestalled through defensive actions (thus producing obsessive compulsive disorder), or any number of distressing events. So through understanding the mapping of the world as a meta-representational state of affairs, it is understood how the repetition of these catastrophic scenarios with an over-focus continues and how the physiological arousal of anxiety accrues. Because of the motivating sense of the vulnerability of self and loved ones to risk, actions are ‘required’ to defend self from the not yet occurred possibilities. One way of describing the outcome of anxiety is to state that once aroused, the mood of anxiety is like a burglar alarm that has gone off too soon. The setting is far too sensitive and this is because of the emotional effects of belief. However, once the pure psychology of worry is made clear in the individual case, then it becomes possible to work with that person to help them understand themselves initially, and secondly, help them plan their own recovery.

Figure 12.2 is a maintenance formulation diagram, an intentional idealisation in a general sense. Resetting the burglar alarm of worry can occur. The burglar alarm




Fig. 12.2 Formulation of the intentionalities constituting worry

is really the non-egoic processes that are triggered by the catastrophic scenarios repeatedly being played by the ego: its imaginings and internal dialogue elicit emotional syntheses of anxiety that are felt in the body. So what is a defensive looking out for trouble, a hyper-vigilance to the merely possible gets believed as highly possible. Merely possible consequences are felt as though they had already happened. Thus, the ego 'tricks' its emotional non-egoic processes into feeling something dreadful is about to happen, then the emotions themselves can be taken as further evidence of the possibility of harm, so that retentional consciousness begins to pattern-match about the objects and emotions that the ego feels. When there is strong anxiety and depression, then a mood of alarm and despondency impedes consciousness and lends itself to misdirecting attention away from the other safer possibilities that could be imagined, of how to cope and how to plan, so anxiety erupts in consciousness for large parts of the day and night. Hence, the further consequences of people with chronic worry are waking up in the night and having anxiety-ridden nightmares. The whole process of worry becomes an automatic process, so that the ego no longer realises what it is doing in creating its own catastrophic mapping of the world. But the type of evidence in worry bears a relation to its ego and the non-egoic passive syntheses. False evidence is generated entirely by the non-egoic self repeatedly because the ego believes that itself is anxiety-prone. This is a circular series of 'causes' and effects where the overall pattern or process is not fully conscious. The worry is a belief-producing ontological problematic that takes areas of its own products as evidence that it believes to be real (Fig. 12.3).

Worry can be linked to hyper-vigilance about the mere possibility that something might be dangerous to self and bring more anxiety. This can become delusional in that although a good deal of checking for problems may have been done in the sphere of action. The belief that this is not enough can remain, as there just might be some area that has not been checked sufficiently. The topic of the modalities of belief is an interesting one because it completely evades the scientific approach to psychology (Owen 2009, 297–300). When there is doubt, there might be a need for physical actions to confirm safety (although such actions are needless by definition). Some worriers want to employ mental techniques to ensure their safety, but if they are anxious and depressed then their concentration and memory are likely to be poor, so that affects their ability to remember if they have locked the front door, for instance. Let's bring in temporality too. Whilst the structure of the meaning of being for consciousness is always of the form past, present and future, when the attention of the ego focuses on the imagined scenes say, or on its own internal commentary that interprets what might happen as a consequence of what it imagines, then pre-reflexive presence, anxiety and the bodily reactions to strong emotion soon accrue.

The Cartography of Psychological Meaning

The function of meta-representation in pure psychology is explicitly accounting for phenomena for inspection, analysis and comparison. It becomes easy to compare precisely what the general public knows about, say, anorexia, compared to what an




Fig. 12.3 Meta-representation of the movement from distress to recovery in worry

eating disorder specialist knows or what a biological psychiatrist understands about it. The wisdom gained is distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate maps and the map-reading of the maps of the worlds of others. The gift of understanding intentionality and using it to show how understanding and interpretation are what counts. There are no facts about psychological objects. What exist are manifolds of possible sense. When it is understood how there are different noematic senses available, according to how the same objects can be apprehended differently through different noeses or different contexts of sense, a realisation appears. Firstly, it is good that distressing meanings change. However, definitions and good meanings can get altered too. Psychological understanding is ontological in that the topics of believed occurrences of different possibilities in different timeframes are really what the meaning of being is all about.

The general aim of formulation is to represent how clients maintain or have developed. This is in connection to their problems with a manifold of instances that comprise how the being of the world exists. The ego is how higher reflective self-consciousness interprets itself and its objects, past and future, alongside the empathised connection with others and the sense of the symbolic world around them: Patterns appear out of the gloom. Two major distinctions that need to be made at this point, which are developed further below, concern how beliefs can be used to attain outcomes as part of a teleological set of goal-oriented actions, thoughts and feelings towards both general and highly specific outcomes. These are part of a balance of defences and distress that are in relation to each other (Owen 1998, 2004). These instrumental beliefs are controlled by skilful action and feedback on the progress attained so far towards their endpoint and should not be confused with the epistemic rationality of how status quo bias of beliefs connect with regions of evidence. In the latter, a certain body of experiences are classed as evidence that can be represented by beliefs, explicitly or implicitly, in conjunction with status quo bias beliefs that maintain a specific body of evidence. Although the word “rationality” is used in naming the latter, the actual processes employed can be far from rational. For the moment, only some introductory comments will be made. When a specific sense of self co-occurs with specific intentionalities about objects and people, then what is believed is enacted in the world, made into a world in a specific style, a variation of internal sense cast outwards projectively that ties the self into its thoughts, feelings and experiences. The term “implicit knowledge” is sometimes used to describe this but there are a number of different views about enworlding. In the world-whole, all at once everything is meaningful. In a wider non-agoraphobic view, there is not just a safe area and predictable others. For example, the ego could be construed as under attack from its own distressing emotions and decide that it needs to protect itself from them quickly and forever, by employing emotional reasoning over and above other options. One reading of emotional evidence is that what is implicit is enacted but not always put into language. In this case there is no possibility of generating an explicit map of what might be happening and how to put it right. Even if some situations are adequately judged, there is something self-perpetuating about distress when there is no understanding of how it occurs. So when worry is interpreted through the idea of intentionality, it can be seen that worry can create the mood syn-

drome of anxiety and depression in dreaming, poor sleep with strong day residues of anxiety and depression. Worry frequently co-exists with other anxiety produced problems in that anxiety suffuses the whole quality of life.

The professional discourses of psychology and therapy need to go further than everyday discourse about the ability to understand how another feels. The professional way is to understand that ‘cartography’ and ‘orienteeing’ with respect to the territory are ways of moving back and forth across time spans of being and temporality. In the free play of what is actual and what can co-exist with it, and the meta-process of reflecting on them and discussing it with them, there is so much more sense available than just living in perceptual senses. Pure psychology makes it clear how restorative maps of the world can differ from those of the accumulated beliefs, habits and understanding that bring distress. Therapeutic maps make assumptions of the possibility of recovery and security made manifest. A return to balance is the way forward so that the end point of therapy is the ability to be independent of its services. Some object senses get updated accurately. The reason for this seems to be that they get integrated into sets of pleasing and reassuring experiences of what constitutes the low-stress good life. When object senses remain inaccurate and these are central to impairment, distress and defence then they need to be mapped into qualitative manner indicated above.

The role of the construal of the future, for human action is teleological for a future-world does need to be dealt with and is made in some relation to the order of the past by the work done in the present. In this temporal whole, there is the interweaving of much more than temporality and belief. The point is that the maps of the world that clients have are not about facts but include what could be. If conditions permit, clients can discuss their care before altering their maps and so begin to expect a more harmonious and active way of life. When hope is aroused clients may begin to alter their lifestyles without prompting. The new world-whole gained could be one where they begin to find accurate beliefs that could be true for them and could give them the peace and satisfaction they want. The ways to get a new sense of the world is not through moving elsewhere or have anything material change at all. In this light, neurosis, psychosis, the empathising of others and the ap-perception of self by self, can be seen to vary in sense and accuracy with respect to the self-same object of attention. Any situation can be pictured differently through re-interpretation and hypothetical thinking. It is intentionality that enables representation of the “core beliefs” with respect to the metaphorical ‘pictures of the things themselves’ that people live by. For the lived senses of objects that clients’ experience could be inaccurate with respect to what they could experience of the very same object, if it was approached in a different way. Thus, meta-representation is a bridge from syndromes and misery *to* recovery and wellness. Meta-representation is related to temporality and belief in how an object has been, but its sense will not be the same as it appears now. Nor might it continue to be that way as its sense may change again. The ego employs temporality when it looks to the future and provides itself with imagined predictions that can get believed and lived. People respond to the sense of the objects they have made and tend not to realise that there are different senses of the same objects available to them. So before therapy, problems of

anxiety poor functioning, depression and excessive narrowness of the lifestyle can act as evidence to maintain inaccurate beliefs. Given that psychopathologists make meta-representational distinctions, then problematic construals of belief and being are properly understood in relation to non-problematic ones (Cicchetti and Cohen 1995, 3; Masten and Braswell 1991, 35; Wicks-Nelson and Israel 1997, 17).

Telling Differences in Meta-representational View

The answer of pure psychology is reflection and conceptualising connections between forms of awareness and the senses of objects in meta-representation. In the context of therapy, meta-representation is representing telling differences and contextualising defensive habits, beliefs understanding and behaviour. These may appear dysfunctional from a third-person perspective but are understood entirely differently in the first-person one. Some telling differences are as follows as a way of explaining the teleological outcomes that inform behaviour. One telling difference is between solitude and loneliness. Solitude is something prized and sought-after; as opposed to loneliness which is felt as unwanted disconnection with others or thwarted attempts at being connected. Another example is the difference between anxiety and excitement. Anxiety is what happens with respect to unknown situations where the forthcoming reality is felt as threatening from the point of view of person who is neither confident nor relaxed. Excitement is a positive state of anticipation about the future. Anxiety includes the anticipation that there is threat at hand and that something needs to be done to protect oneself and one's loved ones from it. In the case of neurosis, the common factor is that the ego inadvertently generates its own anxiety as the outcome of its intentionalities and noemata. In imagination, the ego chooses to think of something deliberately and emotional syntheses colour-in how it would feel about the visual representations and auditory commentary that comprise the whole of what is imagined. Hallucination is similar but the emotional, visual and auditory aspects are non-egoic in psychosis where the generation of emotion and hallucination are both passive non-egoic creations, often related to past trauma held in retentional consciousness. Hallucinatory experience cannot be merely turned off by the ego. So there is no direct egoic control over the emotional tone that is added to these experiences. Through meta-representation it is possible to understand them and have influence over the emotions that go with the visions and voices. Similarly to hallucination is the involuntary memory of the sort occurring in PTSD flashbacks where the ego does nothing to activate memory itself. The similarity between involuntary memory and hallucination is that in trauma, both might occur and express the strong presence of the past in the present. Both overwhelm the ego because they remind it of bad things. Both are out of control and the ego becomes hostage to strong distress. In fact there are similarities between retentional bringing back of sense, imagination and hallucination in that all three can be involuntary.

There are further problems of how to make sense of emotions like anxiety because they can become treated as proper evidence that threat is real and imminent. Anxiety can be taken as evidence to support the false assumption that threat is at stake. Such a means of interpreting emotion is to understand the being of something or how the imagination of the future can also be compared to delusional beliefs. Inattentance to relevant and conscious evidence is like delusional systems of belief for there are fixed beliefs that have no proper evidence to support them (or have evidence that is completely mis-interpreted to stand for the beliefs held). Such futural beliefs can be closed to discussion or change, despite them being obviously unsupported by others. In anxiety, the mere co-occurrence of distressing emotional states occurs through the ego imagining merely possible catastrophes as pre-reflexive consciousness supplies the negative emotion to the pictures and dialogue made. The presence of the imaginary or anticipated scenario, because it has distressing emotion associated with it, can become mistaken as a future certainty of the object's occurrence—rather than it just being a sense of a possibility about it, which it is. The hermeneutic problem in this example is mistaking one noematic sense for the whole of the object. The ontological difference between these different types of givenness, when rightly understood, is to know that there are a manifold of senses about the same object and there are multiple ways of being aware and there are significant differences between the temporal orientations toward the object. Meta-representation makes it clear how to make relevant distinctions between matters that might otherwise be mistaken for each other when they are entirely different. This point can be used for noting the different ways of how people condition themselves to have a reified sense of an object. For instance, there is the classical conditioning of anxiety about an object that builds up over time and then the anxiety is further strengthened by negative reinforcement when people avoid it. Repetition of both of these processes over years is a self-perpetuating means of gaining a psychological syndrome because over many years, such over-use of intentionalities can become a habitual part of the personality itself so that a phobia is born and stays. The meta-representational stance of being able to judge between different senses of the manifold of meaning about the same object is one of the key benefits of thinking with interpretations about the first-hand experience of clients. Meta-representation is making a map of the territory of conscious experiences. The territory is the one to be negotiated by clients while therapists and clients both need an agreed map to co-ordinate their discussions on how to proceed.

Mapping is for the purpose of informing actual meetings, the territory of therapy-as-it-is-lived, as opposed maps of consciousness generally, the map of the world. A psychology of meaning is a higher level map of the world and orienteering is making an impact in empirical practice. To be rational about the manifold of senses is to know that a thought is just a thought and an emotion is just an emotion. They are both noematic representations of an object and may not necessarily be anything true about it in a more long-term view. These distinctions are utterly necessary to understand accurately. The boon of pure psychology for therapy is to help it understand that bodies of evidence need to be cited and interpreted correctly and there are multiple choices of evidence and the means of interpreting it. Systems like Karl

Popper's falsificationism merely assume that logic applies to experiments or the relation between concepts and phenomena exhibited through standardised experiments (Popper 1959). Whereas in Husserl's understanding of the manifold of senses and the manifold of intentionalities, it is understood that one object can have very many senses and that some of them just do not tally because the object is being approached in incommensurable ways. The good news is that noematic senses can frequently be modified as they are plastic meanings and not set in stone. The bad news is that without maps and map-reading skills it may be possible to get stuck in a false and unhelpful set of senses that are entirely due to an out of date map that needs updating. Some way of taking stock of where the person is in the territory of life is required to agree and create informed consent about how to proceed.

Summary

The intersubjective constitution of the meaningful world begins in childhood where the original process of meaning and practice is that all instances of consciousness are grouped together and conspire to create and maintain meanings of cultural objects of specific sorts. An individual consciousness occupies a point of view, placed within its audience to share meaning, within the greater social expanse. The technical language of noesis-noema correlation is a means of noting the details of how a tight focus on detail constitutes the meaning of reality for itself. In a wider focus, group-consciousness constitutes reality for the group. Moving around in any future territory also uses retained maps from the past and skilful living is knowing how to re-direct self towards the valleys of plenty and away from the pits of despair. Because of living within a huge web of interconnection of meaning, one aspect of being in the territory is that of learning how to trust and make sense of something that is not properly recognisable at first. The units of meaning, the noetic-noematic sememes of sense that comprise any larger pattern of meaning, are formed of associations too. The overlapping of sense brings two or more units together into a larger pattern and begins a nonverbal process that can be adequately reported, merely because narratives are understandable against the backdrop of shared, accumulated sense. With a wide life-experience, it becomes possible to intuit and be aware of the differences between health and distress, between secure and insecure, between anxious and relaxed. The types of current senses can be obscure because the focus is often on the content rather than the intentional process. Both process and content come more from an old map than the new territory. But it would be better to have a new map. Changing meanings raises hope and begins a long-term process of self-managed change. Once distressing meanings are understood they can be altered by recontextualising them in relation to meta-representations of being in the world in a more relaxed, confident and trusting way. Ultimately, it is possible to attain increases in security and more accurate self-appraisal, no matter what the person's prior life had taught them. There can be found the ability to respond to trauma or bad luck and regain comfort after them. Despite having had serious trauma or having lost decades of life to living in destructive and unhelpful ways, it is still possible to recover and stay recovered to some degree.

Chapter 13

A Formulation of the Ego and its Context

The question that drives this chapter is ‘how do we get an agreed understanding of everyday psychological events?’ The answer provided is that there are a number of reflectively identifiable aspects that people can recognise so any instance can be related to ideals and universals: This is the worth of the technical language of pure psychology. It would be possible to carry out many more intentional formulations of the sort made below. But rather than do that this chapter provides one sufficiently detailed example of how intentionality explains the on-set of social anxiety and how relaxation can be restored. The introductory examples of the last chapter showed how to interpret specific other people’s experiences through understanding intentionality. This chapter looks at the specific example of social anxiety and the relationship with self as they indicate the more general relationship between self and others in intersubjectivity. The mental states that others have can only be grasped from what appears perceptually when they are present but empathy and imagining empathy also exist at pre-reflexive and egoic levels which are different and can overlap in positive or negative ways. This chapter provides a concrete example of the on-set of a psychological syndrome where low self-esteem co-occurs with social anxiety. This chapter introduces the major topic of understanding intentional ‘cause’ and effect in the lives of others and how to work with them in creating understanding, sharing it and identifying places where there is the opportunity for influence over the parts of the whole that constitute the distress and impaired functioning that clients want help with. The chapter closes with the consequences of this view for treatment and how to understand others empathically.

Complex combinations of intentionalities form the meaningful experiences of distress *and* the positive quality of life. The task of formulation enables clients to move from syndrome-maintenance to management and possible resolution. The idea of meta-representation applies because people in distress know and want things to be different for themselves, but they don’t know how to achieve the changes they desire without help from someone else. Apart from the statements above on

the intentionalities which are meta-representational differences, the belief-existence correlation also shows a number of telling differences which are a consequence of being aware and able to discuss and analyse them. One consequence is becoming able to judge the differences between being overly anxious and fearful in a neurotic way opposed to the accurate judgement of actual risk; as opposed to fool hardiness in the face of actual risk. Such distinctions inform the idea of defence and are discussed below. Formulation of the ‘causes’ of the maintenance of a series of syndromes on paper happens through drawing a simple diagram for discussion, leading to agreement on corrective actions (Flitcroft et al. 2007). Alternatively, it is possible to formulate how syndromes are maintained entirely through discussion with the person. The aim is to promote informed consent and collaboration in a transparent and accountable manner for clients to achieve their goals.

What Helps Make a Positive Difference in Changing a Maintaining Balance Within the Whole?

Pure psychology helps make it clear how to provide understanding in specific instances by applying universal ideals. The purpose of this type of interpretation, the formulation of the intentionality of consciousness, is that it makes the implicit explicit and begins a discussion as to what clients think of the sense that their therapists have made about their distress. Clinical reasoning is at the heart of being able to assess, formulate, treat and review the effects of work so far and make explicit statements for treatment planning in a collaborative manner. This has the effect of making the co-working and co-thinking between the pair transparent and this increases the sense of safety for clients about what is happening in the sessions. It also makes the understanding of what works and what does not work more attainable, so helping clients to be more assertive in stating when a strategy may not be effective for them.

Therapy addresses three objects: how things were, are now and how they can be. Practically, assessment finds those who want to be helped because they are tired of struggling on by themselves. From the point of view of therapists, the ontologically necessary aspect is how to hold in mind how people map their worlds. This mapping of other’s maps is already with us in an obscure pre-reflexive way when we empathise another and get an impression of them. Everyone is a folk psychologist who has their own personal views of others, consciousness in general and what it is to live. What pure psychology does is go further in specifying the type of qualitative worldliness in detail, so that the experiences of being traumatised get accurately mapped. There are those experiences that clients are capable of, even if it takes years to recover the good life and on-going effort to maintain it. In this light, what therapy does not do is change the facts of the past but change meanings concerning the present understanding of it and anticipate a future where the current sense of distress is lessened in emotional representations to permit new ones of coping with life in the future in a more positive way. From the fundamentality of understanding

consciousness, mental health work concerns the nature of meaning as complex links between noeses and noemata, as they indicate manifold senses of cultural objects in contexts and across time. Meanings are potentially open to change. Mental health work paradigms are ways of altering their clients' meanings. The general nature of changing meanings and lifestyle is to reframe and alter the specific means of over-focus that produces the inhibiting distress that prevents greater coping and the possibility of happiness in the current and future. The inertia at the heart of mis-interpreting the abundant manifold of noemata of any object is that defensive purposes come to override the need to adapt and stay open to what an object can appear to be. This is an explanation of how inaccurate understanding and belief can get generalised to such an extent that the lifestyle of the individual gets narrowed, thereby maintaining and consolidating a problem.

Until 2013, the technical language of American psychiatry used five "axes" to describe a person's overall functioning (American Psychiatric Association 1994, 25–31). Now that this distinction has been officially abolished there are still "clinical disorders" or standalone "psychological problems" that occur in specific contexts. In these pages "personality disorders" are argued to be better understood as syndromes rather than precise entities. *Dis-order* etymologically refers to the felt-sense of dis-location and dis-*ease*, a sense of being out of balance as a way of living with unhelpful emphases that distort what could be a more satisfying and fulfilling lifestyle, one that is more self-balancing. The word "syndrome" means that there is a continuum of the strength of presence and types of a diagnosable problem defined by the textbooks. "Disorder" means a discrete problem that is merely present or not and is not further differentiated into specific types. The use of textbook definitions of syndromes expresses current mainstream thinking in American and European psychiatry and psychology. The term syndrome is more accurate with respect to clinical presentations which can be of specific types and co-occurrences and frequently co-occur with long-term personality syndromes. What are referred to are distressing experiences for clients and the people around them. The checklist definitions serve the purpose of being a lingua franca for mental health workers and researchers to be able to discuss how to help people. But, when there is attention to the fine detail of what specific persons actually experience, it becomes apparent that the fine detail of persons' lives, as revealed through careful assessment, show there are numerous variations and co-occurrences between the defensive ways in which people try to manage their lives through the defences and safety strategies they employ. The manifest lifestyle is the sum of a person's potential less their defences that take them away from 'threatening possibilities', so limiting their potential to be realised. However, those who know how to cope with their potential for distress have more time and energy for activities and can handle problematic situations confidently when they arise. The higher constructs of the textbook definitions of syndromes are conceptual labels that point at complex meaningful experiences. Similar to the account of the constitution of meaning, the general case is that pathogenesis is the creation of distressing meanings. The intentional analysis of these meanings reveals possible avenues for the reversible 'causes' of the meanings and the way in which the ego structures its lifestyle. The basic matter that varies a great deal concerns the amount of relevant detail to be considered.

Let's take an example to explain. In order to understand and formulate a problem, it is necessary for clients to select the topics of reflection and re-experience the memories, thoughts and feelings that occurred. To carry out such an interview therapists should know the key aspects of any syndrome and its components. One such experience might be habitual self-criticism because of some regret from the past. Although the mental re-experiencing is not an action, it involves a mental activity directed and controlled by the will of the ego and in relation to pre-reflexive processes. For instance, if a deeply regretted experience when ruminated on is chosen time and again, the outcome might be low mood, poor functioning and low self-esteem. Episodes of rumination can last for days. Such a situation can be discussed and drawn on paper to create a shared rationale concerning how to intervene on the repetitive nature of rumination and promote clients to identify its beginning and catch themselves when they notice that this process has begun. More positive alternatives can be invented with clients in a problem-solving way and these interventions can be tried instead of rumination. For instance, even if the choice involved is a mental one, a new choice can be acceptance of personal history and current feelings that the rumination is about, that helps them move on and let go of the object of rumination itself. Some people are not particularly good at expressing themselves and this is why it is important to check out ambiguous, unclear or contradictory senses with them, to make sure that their meaning is being received accurately. Through the experience of making meanings that create strong negative emotions, the self learns how to condition itself through creating more anxiety and then 'having to' avoid it and its other consequences.

The Intentional Formulation of low Self Esteem and Social Anxiety as one Version of Intersubjectivity

However, the givenness of the other can be mis-understood and promote a mistaken higher conceptualising approach to understanding others which is not grounded. Pre-reflexively the appearance, intentions and emotions of others are usually automatically appearing presences that tell us how others feel in the moment. Such matters are understood as part of the weave of self and others into the cultures of home and work. The co-occurrence of low self esteem and social anxiety is a telling example that expresses the contextual mode of existence of emotion and how selves can treat themselves and place themselves in social contexts in the shared social space. The detail provided explains how one occurrence of anxiety in a social context can repeat to establish an on-going process of anxious repetition in social contexts and angry rumination afterwards. This is because in this case, the pro-neurotic over-focus on self produces negative associations that are being maintained rather than dissipated. The neurotic focus on self consists of self-focused attention in a negative way, in three parts. First, there is a sense of threat that is anticipatory. Second, there is defence rather than coping and planning. Third, there is monitoring and negative evaluation without a return to a more trusting state that does not compromise

safety but is not anticipatory anxiety. The pure psychology interpretation makes a general point about the irreducible connection between self and others by applying ideal universals to specific instances. In order to explain how knowledge of the universal aspects of intersubjective intentionality can work for therapy one exemplar is to consider social anxiety, to explain the frameworks defined above. There is a self-reflexive direction for reflection within experience in intersubjectivity as well as the empathic direction towards the other and culture. What happens when the ego views itself is based on a more general capacity to be aware. The pre-reflexive emotions and bodiliness produce the meaning of higher self-consciousness when the ego focuses on itself against the background of empathies of what others are like. Over time, habits of using intentionalities and the senses produced get added together, comprising the means by which people gain a higher understanding of themselves in addition to the constant, pre-reflexive *leiblich* and emotional senses of living in intersubjectivity. The terms “insight”, “self-knowledge”, “self-image”, the “core beliefs” and “self esteem” convey specific ways of looking at oneself and constituting meanings that are reflections of self, metaphorically, *in the mirror* of the interpreted empathies of what others think and feel. In pure psychology, people see themselves as cultural objects for one another: “persons are “cultural objects” of the surrounding world”, (IV, 379, fn).

The triangular relationship between the senses of self, other and cultural objects is the sort that includes working out what others think and feel about self, which most often is imagined empathy that is inaccurate and remains unchecked. For persons who experience shame, humiliation and fear in social contexts of any sort, the problem can be considered as one of the associations between empathised senses of the other being against self (not the empirical fact that the other is actually against self). It can be the case that in the personal history of people with low self-esteem (a syndrome that has not been officially accepted for too many would realise how they let themselves down in this way) then the damage on the individual can be seen most easily in those cases where there has been physical attack, such as the possibility of being murdered, traumatised or similar. However, damage occurs in lesser events like bullying and teasing. The central problem of low self-esteem is that those who feel it inhibit their own actions, and like the resistance to speak there is a resistance to act, to connect and be with others, in preference for being unnaturally submissive and avoidant of the sweet spot where self and others meet and feel mutually connected. Self esteem is a type of passivity where the value of self is seen in the attitude of others towards self but also connects with imagined empathy and the expression of warmth, sociability and assertiveness. Some common processes are inhibitions on bids to make connection, attract and connect; or make an appropriate distance with those who subjugate through trying to control and dominate.

In the case of social anxiety, even before meeting the other, the socially anxious self may have had anxiety-inducing anticipations of what might go wrong in the interaction. However, anxiety impairs the abilities to act, speak and empathise accurately in the moment of meeting others. Also, the calm emotional appraisal of a social situation is interrupted when what is felt as shock or strong anxiety that upsets a rational and relaxed equilibrium. The anxiety felt, even on merely imagining




Fig. 13.1 Six step formulation of low self-esteem and social anxiety

that self has made a social gaffe and looked a fool, could be enough to create an anxiety-related understanding of the situation rather than an accurate one. Whatever the perceptually grasped body of the other expresses, it gets emotionally and intellectually read *through* the influence of anxiety. So the way in which the body of the other is empathised whilst being anxious is more likely to be threatening and inaccurate because of the preparation of anxiety prior to encountering others. The consequent mis-empathising of others is because of a distress-charged inaccurate grasp of their point of view. Possibly empathy fails altogether: it presents nothing of the actual other's perspective because the self is in shock and very anxious. Or it presents senses with too much of a focus on one small perceptual object in the other's behaviour. Perhaps, the sense of their object is missed altogether, or the context is mis-understood as the anxious self mis-reads the here and now presences of others and focuses strongly on its own anxiety and imagines what that looks like from outside. One consequence is that wrong intentions can be ascribed. Let's look at six scenes in the typical on-set of social anxiety and low self-esteem. The forms of intentionality are expressed in Fig. 13.1 which is called a formulation diagram. Below, the words anxiety and fear are not interchangeable. Anxiety is used specifically to refer to what is felt in relation to futural imagination or anticipation of going to meet someone or something. Having actual fear in a context or with respect to current meaning is linking it, pairing it, to such situations. So future remembering of having been in the context will produce further distress but of a retrospective anguish over what has happened. So *anxiety* occurs with presentation temporally before and after the actual presence of an object; whilst *fear* is only ever in the present moment of being with the object in its current perception. The next section is an exemplary one of how to understand a person's psychological problems.

A Formulation of Temporality and Intentionality

A pure psychology formulation applies universals about intentionality in the following manner. Scene 1: When a person has low self-esteem, it can be linked to the creation of anticipatory visual imaginings that are merely possible. But low self-esteem is compounded when it is believed as an accurate evaluation of the object self rather than just an occasional sense. For instance, an anxious self-doubting ego creates visual imaginings of having social 'mishaps' such as stuttering, sweating and be-

ing unable to answer questions before arriving at a meeting, then such imaginings are connected with anxiety despite the fact that the scenes are imagined. Another 'causative' intentionality is for the ego to tell itself that other persons are far more socially skilled and superior beings to itself and so the anticipatorily imagined scene with others is given a sense of anxiety arising from passive consciousness. Despite the fact that the person may not be in a social context at the time of the imagining, the passive processes automatically add negative emotion and respond to the ego's visual imagining accordingly. What the pre-reflexive passive processes do is load consciousness with negative emotional responses to the imagining. When the scene is believed as potentially true, then mere appearance gets mistaken as reality: *a single anxious noematic sense of an object is taken to be a fair representation of the whole manifold of appearances*. This is one example of how an imagined difficulty comes to have emotions of distress associated with it that are felt here and now, prior to the actuality of entering a social scene but in a way that promotes actual fear around others when a real social situation is entered.

Scene 2: When it comes to entering a social context, and particularly if scene 1 above leads to leiblich sensations of fear on entering it and a conceptually-expressed internal dialogue in the style of self-doubt, for instance, then the pre-reflexive passive processes fill in the gaps and provide fear in the social context. If this is the case then any event the actual interaction is likely to be felt as fearful with further negative consequences for the empathic, cognitive and behavioural acts of the fearful self. Furthermore, when the ego and its consciousness respond to the recognition of an object in the interaction in the context of fear, there are possibly slight impairments of responsiveness and a high focus on self, so that negative expectations of scene 1 are proven with respect to the apprehensiveness that was imagined and felt in scene 1. If someone speaks and the ego focuses on how it feels fear, then any new occurrence in the current social arena can be sufficient to be a trigger for panicky feelings like a startle reaction, blushing, sweating, stuttering, a desire to exit, freezing, going blank, getting angry, etcetera. By definition, social fear is occurring in a context of little or no actual threat and the amount of fear felt is highly disproportionate to the logically-understood object that it is about.

Scene 3: After even a slight social impairment due to fear described in scene 2, there is then a "post mortem", a harsh ruminative reappraisal and a tendency for angry self-talk. For what ensues with rumination are multiple repetitions of the egoic choice to replay memories of scene 2. However, the addition is that an internal conceptual commentary, a voice-over of a self-critical sort is made with self-doubt, self-directed anxiety and anger. Again, unconscious passive processes have a chance to add more negative emotions. For instance, a sense of self-recrimination, unease and regret at the self's 'inadequacies'. There is a greater de-valuation of self and, possibly, a mis-representation of the quality of the self's social skills. Multiple replays of the memory and the actual fear experienced have further added to them a series of possible meanings such as blaming others and feeling anger or even hate towards them, because self was afraid in scene 2. Or, as is most usual, self looks back at itself from a mis-empathised position of others, where it creates a paranoid view of them who see self as socially inept, anxious, stupid, incompetent (temporarily

or more frequently). This is a paranoid view of self from a mis-empathised position that is imaginary and frequently without basis in the experiences of others. Yet it can be accepted uncritically by self as 'evidence' of its own social incompetence. The problem in this ruminative evaluation then becomes an excessive focus on self as lacking and inadequate. This phase of social anxiety could be called 'little paranoia' because it involves the mis-empathy of imaginings of what others feel that is not checked with them. If this process is repeated often enough, two syndromes begin to co-occur and intentional links are made between objects of attention that only exist in one person's experience and not in anyone else's. For the co-occurrence of low self-esteem and social anxiety is precisely the repetition of processes that create a neurotic fantasy that self is of no value, socially inept and that other people dislike and disapprove of self. These are projections and interpretations of how the self feels about itself. What ensue are emotions of embarrassment, shame and low self-esteem. The ego attacks itself and mis-represents itself to itself in mis-apperceiving itself. Its apperception is inaccurate because only negative experiences are being considered in an attitude of self-directed anger and anguish that creates its own negativity. A cycle can be established so that the factors that create anxiety connect it to self and others and continue to accumulate.

Scene 4: Before entering another social context, the ego imagines visually, some future difficulties that it might have. But because of scenes 2 and 3, this time there may well be conceptualisations in internal dialogue and reasoning about how to defend self in the forthcoming imagined encounter. This time around, there is not just worry and self doubt, as there was in the simple case of anticipatory anxiety, scene 1. This time there is now the possibility of the addition of the memory of scene 2, the actual fear evoked by itself and the ruminations of scene 3. The passive syntheses provide the emotional tone of greater anxiety about uncertainty and harshness, prior to entering scene 5.

Scene 5: In a new real encounter with others, the ego tries to defend itself whilst experiencing the social fear that it has created for itself during scene 4. Because the ego and its consciousness is prepared for something really difficult, fear is more likely to be evoked than in scene 2, and the social skills, empathy and apperception are more likely to be impaired. The ego is out of balance in not trusting its own capabilities and not responding to its needs and those of the immediate situation. If the ego reasons that it needs to over-prepare, for instance, and what it prepares for does not transpire in the meeting, then it has added to its own difficulties because its defences decrease its ability to go with the flow of the meeting and be spontaneous in relation to what does actually happen in it.

Scene 6: The next rumination is of a similar form to scene 3 above. But this time, the harshness and anguish with which self views itself is even more likely to be accompanied with strong negative emotions and may last a longer time. Accordingly, the after-effects are more likely to be distressing and promote a repeating cycle of low self-esteem and social anxiety, rather than reducing it. If the problems expressed in steps 1 to 6 repeat, then the ego conditions itself to have social anxiety and low self-esteem and strengthens the links between inaccurate understanding of the capabilities of itself, the mis-empathised views of what others think and a high

focus on self as inadequate. Thus, inaccurate apperception and empathy are believed as the evidence for the incapability of self due to the actual fear in the social context. The whole setting is read as meaning that these thoughts and feelings are true beliefs which fit with the paranoid empathy of others and low self-esteem, to make a whole of evidence that can be believed as showing that self is inadequate in relation to others.

The six step formulation above concerns the links between intentionalities for one person who has low self-esteem and social anxiety. It shows how intentionalities are shared intersubjectively because one episode of low self-esteem and social anxiety are not problems in themselves. However, through numerous repetitions of such experiences, a syndrome is established and it can become increasingly problematic across the lifespan as the ego makes defensive choices to alter its lifestyle and apply defences that either do not work or make the whole process worse.

What Fig. 13.1 means is that there is major difference between the syndromes of low self-esteem and social anxiety; and the mere occurrence of a momentary fear in a social setting which is of a completely different order. Specifically, what makes social anxiety, the conditions of its possibility, are rumination on self with anger plus the repetitious replaying of the visual, auditory, emotional and other aspects, plus the harsh internal dialogue that brings on even more anger and dismay at self that primes the self for more difficulties in further social contexts. However, the anxiety in the example above is unnecessary, because generally there is no external actual threat to self. The fear and anxiety generated might be triggered by social contact but accumulate across the lifespan to become integrated with how the ego and its consciousness understand any social setting. There are further consequences though for the anxious self. One such consequence is that communication and rationalising are impaired, over and above the baseline of the original mis-reading of the expressions seen and heard. The concomitant sense of self is powered by the anxiety felt, alongside attempts to manage the consequences of the full set of meanings in every part of the lifestyle: How to work, how to treat people and oneself, 'how to redeem oneself for being useless', how to deal with people and earn a living. While there are causative biopsychosocial conditions for the constitution of meanings that produce anxiety in the lived body, the anxiety and fear felt occur in complex connections between self, other and the meanings experienced in the moment. The immediate understanding made of a trigger for fear is the straw that breaks the camel's back. But such an effect exists in connection to the background of the passive syntheses of consciousness that operate at a distance from the ego but are connected to it. So the felt-experience exists partly in connection to others and objects of fixing attention on self, but also to various contexts of sense that contribute to the mood of anxiety and may not appear adequately in awareness at the time of feeling fear. In different examples, intersubjective causes of meaning from the past, present and future coincide depending on the specifics of each occurrence. Such causes can be comprised of tiredness, the loss of the sense of humour is due to being tense in an important meeting, an increase of physical tension in leib, and other frustrations which promote the priming of meanings of more fear due to immediate experiences within the past few hours.

The Irreducible Connection Between the Senses of Self and Other

This section considers the irreducible connections between self and other as a whole, in the light of the example above. Firstly, no wonder what so frequently occurs in social anxiety is not just inaccurate empathising but the interpretation of self as ineffective in dealing with others. Logically, this is a correct observation drawn from the evidence of fear that inhibits the spontaneous and assertive contact of being in a relationship or group of any sort. Anxiety and fear change the self's abilities so there is frequent impairment in the inter-action, such as the self pulling away from others and cutting short its ability to get to know them better, even if it realises that there are no real grounds for these feelings. In this way, social anxiety maintains. The connection between the initial anxiety prior to, and fear during meetings, alter the flow of them and gets expressed verbally and nonverbally to others. (This has consequences for others of how to communicate back). Similarly, the anxious self's low self-esteem makes sense in that self knows that it is not doing as well as it could. Self knows it could be relaxed and grasp the others' perspectives as well as possible. So, the overall formulation of anxiety when encountering others means that both self and others are out of balance, with the quality of contact and communication decreased; in comparison to a more relaxed way of being together.

The fear that occurs in social contexts can arise due to multifactorial causes as already noted. It might be partly due to a meaning influenced by the biological state of affairs within the person at the time because of what else is happening for them during the last few days. Whilst conversation is meaningful, there are a number of other intersubjective contexts that co-occur and mean that any specific remark or look from another can be mis-empathised. If an occurrence of fear is compared to recent events, or to far distant events in personal history, or in relation to the person's current biochemical state, all these factors conspire to create a moment of fear or panic in a social context that can arise quickly and come to an end quickly. What is central to social anxiety is that it involves a negative attention on self and others, so that the occurrence of negative self-consciousness, low self-esteem. The inaccurate empathising of others in a negative mind-reading role of mis-attributing negative thoughts and experiences to others means that there is a self-fulfilling prophecy between what is expected, what happens and the negative evaluation that follows during rumination on the experience of fear in a social situation (scenes 4, 5 and 6 above). So, while a few episodes of fear in social situations is not the same as persistent social anxiety as formulated above, nor are they the same as social phobia where the possibility of social fear is attempted to be avoided altogether.

So what is said of people who are socially anxious and have low self-esteem is that they are overly-sensitive to small comments that were expressed in face to face communication as jokes or banter. The case is that because of their sensitivities to criticism, a person with low self-esteem is motivated to feel pain and embarrassment because they believe they have 'got it wrong again'. Embarrassment and social anxiety happen more with specific other people and specific contexts. Often,

the socially anxious person is working extremely hard to make a good impression. Another defensive strategy is to be socially inhibited or to say things that they believe will be acceptable to others. Similarly, some specific topics of conversation might be more embarrassing than others. On the one hand, people with good self-esteem are the products of social environments that supported them and worked to develop their talents. On the other hand, people who present to therapists are from social contexts that have been damaging through a large number of ‘causal’ factors that provided mis-information that has become believed. The quality of the social space across the lifespan is highly influential. For those who seek help with how they apperceive themselves and empathise those around them, their influences vary considerably from grasping the truth of the actual views of others and the ability to receive loving and supportive comments from others. However, as intersubjectivity is such a major part of human existence, it’s worth looking at some of the styles of this context for learning how people make sense socially.

Social anxiety is connected to inhibition and the difficulty of speaking out and feeling that one has something worthwhile to say. For instance, anxiety is the felt-sense of preparedness because there is imagined and anticipative belief about threat and difficulty when encountering social contexts. Social anxiety impairs social fluency in specific sorts of ways because it can impair functioning in a wide variety of areas. So when there is dys-fluency of speaking and acting, these become further evidence of the expression of anxiety as a cultural object for self to make the meaning that it is bad, inept and impaired in some way and even that is incapable of improvement. The consequences and the emotional reasoning go something like this: because self apperceives itself to be of low value to others globally, then there is no reason to be intimate because it is assumed that others will also not find value in self because there is apperceived to be none.

Apperception: The Self-Reflexive Relationship with Self

The pure psychology of self-understanding is a complex topic and it is necessary to start by explaining the higher and lower ways of understanding oneself. Apperception is coined for this comparative act that functions across many instances and contexts of the self in relation to others. When the object of attention is oneself, how one feels in one’s body, sees it, and hears one’s own thoughts and thinks of oneself, apperception is the higher self-reflexive act of understanding oneself when focusing on what was one’s pre-reflective sense of self (I, 143, III, 32, IV, 159–160, 289–290, XVI, 280). Like all forms of turning a pre-reflexive sense into an object, making bodily sensation or anxiety into an object of attention occurs in the context of empathising what others might think and feel about self. It is clear that in the psychological attitude, higher self-conscious sense is gained by a reflection on self that concerns “I and we in the customary and psychological senses, concretely conceived as mind and community of minds, with the psychological life of consciousness that pertains to them”, (IX, 294). Apperception is interpreting oneself as

a person and is stated in relation to Gottfried Leibniz's 1714 use of the term: "it is well to distinguish between *perception*, which is the inner state of the monad representing external things, and *apperception*, which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this inner state, and which is not given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul", (1973, Sec. 4, cf Kant 1787, B130). The point is that listening to one's own voice, feeling one's body or looking at oneself in a mirror are all forms of perception. So a special term is required to cover the mental act of making insight about oneself. The point is that if empathising is inaccurate, then it is likely that *apperception*, the understanding of self by self, will be inaccurate also.

The ability to understand the self begins in childhood and has been the topic of experimental research by a number of developmental psychologists. Doris Bischof-Köhler found experimentally that children are able to recognise themselves in a mirror at 16 to 24 months of age, and under controlled conditions they were able to empathise an experimenter who pretended to be sad and cry when a teddy bear's arm that she had been playing with, came off (1988, 149). The experimenter continued to role-play being distressed for 2.5 minutes unless the child in the experiment intervened. Experimentally, what Bischof-Köhler found was that the children, who comforted the experimenter with her distress in a helpful way, were the same children who were able to recognise themselves in the mirror. On the other hand, children who were unable to recognise themselves were also unconcerned with the experimenter's distress. Empirically then, the experiment is interpreted to mean that the ability to constitute the object of oneself, and hold in mind another's perspective and intentions, are related and co-occur as a developmental stage.

The higher sense of self is self-reflecting and *apperceiving* self as a unique individual. There are many other possibilities of meaning-constitution though. The person can see self as beautiful or ugly, stupid or brilliant. Whilst the reasoning in any example is often illogical and emotionally motivated, the consequences can be highly influential. There are the possibilities of ruminating on self, for instance, as shameful for having been raped. Those who have been attacked without provocation can see themselves to blame for having been walking by at that time, and do not attribute the attack to the rapist: The idea that the attacker was to blame for it because of their motives does not occur. It is easy to see the same pattern of events as above. The self jumps to the conclusion that it is at fault. This is one example of what is called emotional reasoning that is contrary to logic. Thus remembering 'shameful events' becomes the meaning that self provides for itself and there is also the role of temporality in looking forward to social events where self could see itself as being rejected by others in the future, because of the past influence of the attack. Through emotional evidence, through implicit pre-reflexive beliefs and values, the *apperception* is that self is contaminated, stigmatised by its sins of omission: self should not have walked through the park the day the rapist struck. Despite the fact of an unprovoked attack by a stranger, self creates the sense of its own identity with regret and self-critical hindsight. Thus, understanding intersubjectivity is the ability to understand meaning that promotes the ease of spotting the means whereby meanings about being in a world-whole are constituted through on-going inter-relationship.

On questioning into the personal histories of persons who feel shame and have low self-esteem, what appears is the damage caused by bullies at school or work, the negative ideas of religion, critical parents, or favoured siblings to whom self was negatively compared, or other condemnation that was unfair at the time and has powerfully made its mark. Furthermore, the meaning of such events may not have been questioned since its first occurrence. And, as revealed in the detailed account of the intentionalities involved in the example of low self-esteem and social anxiety, what can be found through interviewing is what constitutes these motivations and meanings about self in the context of empathised and interpreted senses. In personality theory, the neuroticism factor of personality is an attempt to record what types of emotional distress and vulnerability co-occur with self-consciousness (McCrae and Costa 2003, 47–48). Neurotic self-consciousness is when persons problem-solve in ways that exacerbate their distress through the use of ineffective coping strategies because of excessively negative views of self. Unfortunately, an excessive focus on how the body feels and what distress is felt, work to increase both rather than reduce them. What occurs is a vicious cycle of inaccurate understanding (of self, others and the motivating ‘causes’) leading to inaccurate defences, leading to more distress and poor functioning because of distress.

Healthy meanings about what lies between self and other include the experience of having value and dignity. In good self-esteem these are the sort of experiences that are generalised between self and others and by self about itself, in a healthy and pro-social way. So the direction of the cure away from anxiety and self doubt, and away from a mis-apperceived inadequacy of self, is a turn to trusting self. It was Maxwell Maltz (2002, 106) who was the first to point out that learning occurs best when it becomes an automatic pre-reflexive ability: Egoic skills become habitual and confidence in them as a part of self happens without effort. For with relaxed competence comes better skilled-performance. The reason being is that there is a better “flow” of harmony between the ego and its own pre-reflexive abilities (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). The specific sense of flow in this context is that the ego and its non-egoic abilities influence the accuracy of interpreting current situations. When self is relaxed, it is more likely that the emotions felt and understanding made will be accurate. Whereas if there is anxiety and strong negative emotion, then it is more likely that what is understood and felt are inaccurate.

The Direction of the Cure in the Case of low Self-Esteem and Social Anxiety

The remainder of this chapter comments more generally on what is also entailed in formulating the connection between self and others through intentionality. What the above example of low self-esteem and social anxiety shows is an excessive focus on self. Several emotions express how self finds itself within an intersubjective context: pride, shame, embarrassment plus a range of emotions that express forms of anguish about self such as self-doubt, self-pity, self-criticism, self-hatred, self-

frustration and the inability to control one's own emotions. Social anxiety is the product of self-criticism and an internal focus. These can get easily connected to mis-empathic imagining of what other people might think and feel about self. On the other hand, self-certainty, self-trust and feelings of liking self and approving of self can be achieved if there is a way of de-escalating the associations to fear and anxiety. Social relaxation is the product of an external focus on others and establishing a sense of trust and positivity about self. What these experiences share is that they highlight the sense of self in a variety of ways, against experiences of others and the social rules learned from culture about how a person should be. So the topic that is being investigated is the knowledge of self in an emotional and relational sense, and lived meanings within the context of the type of senses gained from intersubjectivity across the lifespan.

Pure psychology thinking enables definition of meaningful problems and this, when agreed with clients, makes the means of agreeing a corrective strategy for help. One way forward is to reduce the focus on self and increase the attention on others, to become absorbed in what is going on currently, and become more involved to reduce the negative rumination on self. Low self-esteem also refuses the sense of achievement that has been worked for. There is an unfair evaluation of self by self. The locus of the first learning of such a valuation is usually in the distant past of receiving criticism as a child. A person with low self-esteem feels that persons who have the passport of good self-esteem can go places in life with freedom. But people without this passport do not permit themselves to do the same, even if they logically know they are qualified to do so. What this produces over a span of time is a set of habits of emotion, anticipation and implicit belief that get fixed. A negative self-image is constituted away from the logical and emotional conclusions that could be operating. The emotions generated by self-criticism and self-doubt allow negative self-esteem senses to predominate. These motivate behaviour that permits logically less qualified others to go first in life, while the self with low self-esteem feels unworthy of their rights. The self with low self-esteem or shame has to stay home and cannot go to the party.

Intentional analysis explores the difference between the meta-representation of negativity about the capabilities of self and the emotional evaluation of how the current social situation could feel so demanding and overwhelming. For some, social anxiety as an experience is potentially 'catastrophic' to self and that the self needs to engage in some means of dealing with the experience and anticipated future scenarios of negativity, which support the occurrence of fear in the here and now of each social interaction. When anxiety occurs it suffuses the whole of biopsychosocial being. So anticipatory anxiety turns to fear in actual contexts tend to accrue and not diminish, particularly when followed by rumination (steps 3 and 6 in Fig. 13.1). In those situations where there is avoidance of situations that might have fear in them, and anxiety before and after, the lifestyle gets narrowed in a form of reasoning that is overly-defensive of self, and this exacerbates the fear and prevents the tackling of the root reversible 'causes' through intersubjective means. It also prevents the 'what if' thinking of solutions to re-evaluate self and the social situation in ways that can rectify the problem and work to decrease fear and improve harmonious, relaxed interactions where spontaneity and genuine communication can occur.

The pure psychology formulation of meaning and intentionality maps lived experience in a sufficient and accurate way. The process is cartography for working on the necessities of therapy practice: Making a map of an individual consciousness in its social world is the project (whether this includes an account of the biological roots or not). What needs to be mapped is the biopsychosocial whole of multi-factorial cause that contributes to understanding meaning through a fixed methodology, most of which concerns how to understand the individual against the background of what happens theoretically and empirically in general. (Noesis-noema correlations of the smallest and simplest units of meaning can be forever re-contextualised within wholes of larger and larger sorts except that intentional formulation is a standardised procedure). The applied formal hermeneutics of understanding can also be used to reveal the reified pictures that people have of self and other and what they expect to happen between them. Such understanding is what governs the making of interventions in therapy sessions. It works by grasping the pre-reflexive whole of lived experience in intersubjectivity across time, and helps clients to understand the nature of their syndromes as they experience them, as a means to helping them achieve new ways of believing, thinking, relating and feeling, so showing that the base of pre-reflexive experience can change.

The way forwards in dealing with the negative evaluation of self by self usually avoids asking what people really think about self, because such an exercise might feel exposing. With low self-esteem and social anxiety, the aim of therapy is to increase the sense of trust that self can have about itself, by helping it relax, focus on others and participate more fully in social situations to overcome the sense of dislocation that it has when it evaluates itself as lacking in its own eyes and then applies these senses wrongly to others. The point is that when self is more relaxed in social contexts, and ignores its readiness to jump to false critical conclusions about itself, then its pre-reflexive abilities come to the fore, and the concomitant tendencies to be anxious and inhibited fade away. New senses of relaxation and more accurate self appraisal promote a better quality of social contact.

The trio of low self-esteem, embarrassment and shame have at their centre beliefs and experiences that can be repeated in visual memory and internal dialogue with accompanying strong negative emotions. For the experiences formulated above in Fig. 13.1, note that the same experience can be replayed numerous times, with the addition of a voice-over that self is bad and useless, which may not have happened at the time of experiencing the fear in a social situation. But rumination and self-criticism after the fact can produce self-loathing, where the anguish felt about self lasts for days afterwards rather than fading away. The inner dialogue of self-criticism is unfair to self and short-lived fear gets replayed frequently in a new harsh set of associations. In total, these have bodily effects of creating physical tension after the fact of their first occurrence because anxiety feeds on itself and its own possibility, then the ego can get obsessed with its own apperceived inadequacies. The problem is that the ego becomes its own torturer. Standards for relaxed behaviour are insisted upon in direct contradiction to the anxiety and fear felt. The self-critical, socially anxious self breaks its own human rights. With a much closer attention to detail than the sort provided in psychiatric text books, there are several

possible versions of low self-esteem and social anxiety dependent on the personality of the individual, and specific concurrent syndromes and personal history. This is why the term syndrome is preferred to disorder. The various variations on a theme can include some of the following combinations. The reason for self-consciousness in the vulgar sense of this term is a negative over-focus but social anxiety can produce bodily changes that can be seen or heard such as sweating, stuttering, blushing and so forth and these act as another meaningful marker for self-criticism and self-directed anger. For some, the on-set of anxiety can be very fast indeed so the bodily sense felt is relaxation in one second and panic the next. There are socially anxious persons who have panic attacks too but this is most likely in the context of a long increase of anxiety for several hours beforehand and may be accompanied by several hours of self-directed ruminative anger after the panic episode. When the anxiety is felt strongly for many hours of the day, then it is frequently an object of attention and internal dialogue, so this is a case where anxiety feeds on itself. This again is another set of circumstances for focusing on self in an unhelpful way and such experiences can be used as evidence for low self-esteem and believing that the self is socially inadequate thus maintaining the distress.

Empathic Evidence

One such style of meaning-making shown is low self-esteem and social anxiety could be called “negative comparison with others” by the ego. Whatever strengths and abilities that self has (that are possibly greater than others) these get ignored in favour of criticism of self by self. If a stranger walked up and made critical comments of this type, they would be told to go away and mind their own business. But when it is the ego commenting on itself, these toxic products are received as the truth and remain unchallenged. So, when the critical remarks are made by self they tend to be believed by self to be true. There are further consequences for the relational ability of the person involved and others in the social context. One connection between low self-esteem and social anxiety is that the apperception of the value of self is deemed inadequate with respect to others, not just because self is judged to be insufficiently physically attractive, funny or clever in comparison to one other person who is very attractive, funny or clever. There are forms of generalisation operating at levels that might be out of awareness to the individual but can be elicited through open questioning. How these senses are constituted is that they are created automatically after many years of having set down a course of evaluating and interpreting self against the background of contexts in which self was judged to be lacking. This generates false evidence about key persons. Frequently this process maintains false evidence in people who were previously bullied by other children. The net effect is that internal speech, learning new things and dealing with others are influenced by material that may not be explicitly conscious or immediately related to actual contemporary interactions with others. But through questioning, links can be found to specific objects of attention where criticism may have taken

place. Associations to the critical persons or to important relationships are such that the ego can identify the influence on itself. Persons who compare themselves negatively to others and criticise themselves unfairly, also have the tendency to feel fear or refuse compliments when these are honestly meant. This is because negative self-evaluations infuse all aspects of intersubjective connections with others and such evaluations can arise at any moment. Furthermore, because the self feels under attack due to turning against itself, then it is to a degree paranoid, feels defensive and can be over-sensitive to rational complaints and negative feedback, even if these are well-worded and well-intentioned. In contrast, persons are strongly paranoid and externalising when they blame others in a hostile manner and get anxious and angry. For them, the other person has broken rules of etiquette and they might use angry responses to try and control them. Other socially anxious persons are able to imagine an external perspective on themselves so that they can imagine how they look from positions outside of their own body. All variants of low self-esteem and social anxiety share one important aspect and that becomes obvious in relation to those social contexts where the person is relaxed and the conversation flows well. The major point of difference is that, what should and can be a continuous flow of attention-giving and inter-responsive conversation between two or more people, in low self-esteem and social anxiety, becomes an encounter full of risk where one or more items that should be automatic and relaxed get charged with anxiety before and after, and fear during social contact.

Rather than making negative comparisons of self with 'perfect' others, based on the events of long ago, the aim is to get better contact and communication with others who now present themselves and their view of the world, with the aim of getting more harmonious contact with them. Increasing self-acceptance is also helpful where it needs to be acknowledged that mistakes, moments of anxiety and unforeseen negative consequences will occur. What is good self-esteem is being able to roll with the punches, to bounce back and shake off self-doubt through reminding self of what is the case and what can be positive once more. It's clear that children deserve basic care from their adult caregivers. The same principles also apply with respect to how people treat themselves as adults. Because selves are self-reflexive, in their attitude towards themselves and their self-reflexive expression of themselves, people represent themselves to themselves (I, 80). They feel and behave on the picture of how they have been treated by their carers in childhood and by others, for instance, as bullied, neglected or violated or in others ways mistreated. Positive self-esteem is where self apperceives itself to have something to offer others and society at large. There is such a thing as appropriate guilt because if self has broken a social rule it should feel bad about itself in relation to another person. The proper role of the guilty conscience is to motivate self not to make such mistakes again, apologise and right the wrong it has made. Some social rules can be formally stated as "do not steal" or "don't stare at people you don't know". But there are other implicit preferences and rules that are never written down and are much more idiosyncratic in origin.

The self that is fair to itself recognises and refuses to jump to previously habitual false conclusions that bear little or no relation to the proper readings of the evidence

at hand. In preference to such a tendency, a fair self stays open to the required manners of getting to know people and itself in relation to them, in a fuller manner. Applying the idea of increasing the mindful awareness of self in relation to others really means being mindful of the dynamic equilibrium between self and others, where both persons contribute to the total relationship. How the self-critical position can be overcome is through decreasing the contamination of the past where anxiety-producing patterns held in retained consciousness get thrown forward in time into the contemporary relationship, thereby distorting its meaning to appear as something that it is not. So, some aspects of the direction of the cure in low self-esteem and social anxiety features reconnecting with others by being more absorbed in the conversation and more focussed on others, so reducing an excessive level of negative attention on self. What is helpful is increasing the attention on the other and checking the impressions gained by self with other persons, to make sure that they are accurate. What is being aimed at is increasing the openness to what others actually say and do, how they say what they do, and so express their intentions to communicate. This is empathising others as they intend to communicate, and grasp what they bring to the relationship. Such new accurate senses are found in practising social skills, assertiveness, self-disclosure and such like. What this does is help the self fit better with others as the self actually presents and expresses itself despite any fear it may have. The possibility of the strong physiological impact of fear requires a narrative about what will help provide the restoration of ease in social encounters. This is only possible through understanding the constitution of the meanings that drive the problem as explained above.

At the level of natural being, the biochemistry of anxiety is such that adrenaline and cortisol are released that affect the physical experience of being in the body. Physical tension in the body raises blood pressure and anxiety decreases sleep and affects every aspect of physical functioning. Part of the pre-reflexive effects of being anxious are widespread alterations to how the body feels and how the nervous system reacts. This is another 'unconscious' aspect in that these physical processes are not under the direct control of the ego in that a person cannot tell their body to stop being anxious and it would obey. However, these physical concomitants of anxiety are indirectly accessible by altering the lifestyle, taking time off, looking after broader needs and paying more attention to others in a spontaneous open way. It is these actions that help to redress the balance towards more relaxation with others.

The Similarity of Social Anxiety with Paranoia

Social anxiety is similar to paranoid thoughts and feelings because if the generalisation about the lack of worth of self gets believed more globally, then it makes perfect sense that others will not like self and that new persons, on getting to know self, will at some point make the discovery that the self is unlovable, unlikable and a fraud. Paranoia is the felt-sense that people are against self, do not like self and are sure to criticise, attack and talk negatively about self in the *absence* of such

intentions in others. Whilst such emotions and mis-empathy do promote defensive physical attacks in the more extreme versions of paranoia, 'little paranoia' is the case where self generalises and becomes convinced that others are against self and that self is being judged negatively by people at large in the world. Because the socially anxious self ruminates on its own shortcomings needlessly, it tends to blame itself for other mishaps and blunders. Thus, there is a motivation for trying to cover over the self-made felt-sense of being 'really poor' by some means that ensures value through some other route, by seeking out power or otherwise. The problem with anxiety is that attending to anxiety gives it excessive attention, and promotes anxiety in consciousness. Anxiety feeds on itself and it looms larger into consciousness. If this occurs, anxiety gets generalised from one area to another and semi-permanent anxiety states and panic attacks may ensue.

What is revealed in anxiety, for instance, is that fast-acting physiological changes are about explicit and implicit or subliminal meanings and consequences. When an anxious reaction to meaning is not understood by the ego, then it becomes more difficult to know how to proceed with hidden and implied sets of beliefs, anticipations, emotional associations and forms of relating that are anxiety-associated. The consciousness-body whole reacts to meaning including presences that need not be spoken or thought but can be rationalised after the fact and made explicit through discussion. With attention to detail, specific thoughts, behaviour and emotions can be brought to awareness to explain distress and make it meaningful. The conditions for social anxiety can be a lack of assertive behaviour, in terms of not stating the needs of self that could be properly met. What are revealed through questioning are the hidden and implied connections in consciousness, considered in particular. If interviewing one person, then what is required is a verbal account of what that person's experiences were in relation to cultural objects, and how they are experienced perceptually, as imagined, remembered, anticipated, as wanted or not wanted. Such details are the conditions of possibility that caused a specific anxiety. There are numerous ways that something can be given in experience. So there might be other types of onset of social anxiety for the same person.

The good news is that the ego can choose to open itself to the potential of disconfirmatory evidence of the self-same object. Such experiences can cure it of inaccurate understanding. The proof of accurate understanding and belief are that they support changes of meaning that often require changes of decision-making, behaviour and lifestyle through effort and persistence. Hope is a commitment to change by believing in a future that is not yet evident: Better adaptation to the possibility of distress will prove the accuracy of the new understanding. The direction of the cure means disambiguating a false illusion of truth through replacing it with a good enough representation of the object—one that proves itself to be better in everyday living in feeling better emotionally, and being more in touch with others and self, so making the self's potential manifest. It's interesting to note that Viktor Frankl in *Trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen: Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager* records his positive insights gained from harsh circumstances, as he was imprisoned in the death camps by the Nazis in World War Two, but concluded that the ego always has choices about how to respond to its emotions and situation and that it is possible to make a difference for the better (Frankl 1964).

Summary: The Implications for Therapy Theory and Practice

Edmund Husserl was the originator of the distinction that the “outline of England drawn as a map... does not mean England itself in pictorial fashion... as the country on the map”, (XIX/2, 75): *The distinction is that maps represent territory but they should not be mistaken for it.* Maps are symbolic, finite representational systems that only show the key features of complex inter-relations; whereas the experiential territory of the biopsychosocial whole is highly complex. Theory is map-making. The link between theory and practice is that hermeneutic formulation of meanings and processes occur through unique instances of intentionality. Practice works according to theory. What the intentionality of consciousness concerns is anyone’s ability to map experience. But lived experience is never entirely personal. It is capable of being communicated and shared through speech and other forms of representation like writing, dance, music, film or painting. The consequence of the idea of the map and the territory is to make a sharp distinction between a concept and the experience that it is about. Understanding something is *not* about one experience of it. Rather, a map of understanding is a complex set of emotions, beliefs and pre-reflexive presences about conscious experience that have been learned through previous experiences that have been influential but are not currently the contents of consciousness. In the case of low self-esteem and social anxiety explored above, the relation between the map and the territory is one possibility where other versions of the same irreducibility of being in a cultural world are possible too. Empathy is the mental act of understanding others and their perspectives and understanding the view of those persons have of themselves, through empathising what they think others think and feel about them.

In short, accurate understanding of the map of the world of others leads to a set of lifestyles that can be designated as mentally healthy. Inaccurate understanding leads to distress and living out of balance. The gradations of accuracy are a hierarchy of enlightenment. Being has been revealed correctly when people are coping, happy and secure whatever their parts. And if people are distressed, it’s due to their explicit and implicit beliefs that are inaccurate about the territory and the self-corrective functioning of good map-reading. Accordingly, the ultimate evaluation of any study is that there is a means of stating how well it is doing what it set out to do. Persons who seek therapy are influenced from their past in ways that they have not yet been able to influence. In problematic states of living (a lifestyle of contacting the world and being in it), temporality, belief and an anticipation of how to be in the world is continually cast forwards in time, based on the relationship with the past. This futurally-oriented pre-reflexive knowledge of how to live, who oneself is and what other persons are like, is the map of the world in consciousness that each individual has. It’s like a prediction. Unhappy consciousness defensively expects that life will be hard and that the world will continue to be a frightening place. How it feels within it is dystopic, a mood of distress, of feeling in the wrong place at a variety of levels of awareness. Some aspects of personality and psychological syndromes

are obvious, whilst others are hidden with implicit aspects. Emotionally though, the pre-reflexive self is not under the control of the ego as it is caught in the context of meaning and emotions with the learning of the past, with the presence of current others and moving towards a possible future.

Chapter 14

Formulating Syndromes

This chapter establishes a formal notation for development and maintenance formulations which support agreed rationales for self-managed change. The meta-representation of first-person meanings and motivations becomes an application of how to understand intentionality enacted through a set of social skills whereby clients of all abilities can enter a discussion about their own well being. Such a discussion should help them take responsibility for their own mental health and become more effective in their relationships with others outside of sessions. The order of topics below begins with recapping the view of solo consciousness and the primary phenomenon of the object but this time in a wider context of the possible change from distress to one of self-managed recovery and greater well-being. To increase clients' ability to reflect and understand it is necessary to understand key intentional processes in the previous maintenance and accrual of distress in their earlier lives. All such discussions have the aim of helping them release themselves from habits and beliefs that keep them tied to a narrowed lifestyle. Four major forms of maintenance of syndromes are posited in a way that includes the contributions of biological cause as well as including intersubjective meanings and motivations, the intentional "causes". There are a large number of ways of working with the research literature on effectiveness, the accuracy of diagnosis and how to work with the relationship. This chapter accepts the following items to argue for a consensus position that accepts diagnosis as a hermeneutic art and not a science as it is correctly based on understanding the course of people's difficulties and their personalities. Firstly, what is most important is to recognise that both contextually-occurring syndromes co-occur as complex psychological meaning, cultural objects that are given the names PTSD, depression and personality disorder. However, to support working with the relationship to keep these difficulties together is a genuinely wholistic way of thinking with clients about how they interact. In a detailed view it is noted in the literature that syndromes are not discrete but are variations on a theme (Bentall 2009; Hyman 2010). For instance, although a person can have PTSD there are

specific forms that this can have such as connections with a changed identity and esteem, depression, with anxiety problems such as panic or worry, or with pain and other long-standing personality problems. Given that intentionality is what characterises a psychological model of the basic building blocks of the meanings called “PTSD” or depression, and that the majority of therapy and mental health care is about techniques for altering meaning and working with the relationship. The most effective way forwards is working with people and following a series of basic procedures of treating people with respect and being open and honest about what can be achieved and clear in how to achieve it (Norcross and Lambert 2011).

Meta-representation of the territory of distress is one step on the way to creating new events in the territory of their lives. It establishes a new map of the territory and enables discussion of how to get there. Formulation is achieved by therapists asking questions and promoting verbal discussion and written diagrams that indicate the on-set and maintenance of syndromes. The order of topics below is to address cause in a formal way and establish commonalities of a view that puts meaning and motivation foremost. A definition of the primary phenomenon is made before presenting a formal notation to express syndromes of distress. The model of therapy mentioned is assessment, formulation treatment and review. The closing phase of therapy is relapse prevention which is a self-help strategy that creates self-caring as part of the recovered lifestyle to maintain well-being long after the meetings have ceased. The order of practice after formulation is to get informed consent on the detail of how to intervene with clients and then agree a treatment plan together, where the rationales for change and the general principles of how to achieve it are explicitly discussed. The constitution of meaning in the current lifestyle and working through the relationship with clients is the primary focus. The therapist role is using specific interventions in response to the problematics presented and the specific stage of treatment across a series of 50 minute meetings.

The Importance of Understanding Meaningful Experience

The good life begins with becoming responsible for self-care care according to principles that are clearly identifiable and capable of discussion. Given that the good life is manifest as self-management, it is only *reversible* causes in any of the domains of the biological, psychological and the social that can be targeted. What can be personally controlled are the lifestyle choices and values that are understood as causing the syndromes. The ‘causes’ that connect with biological cause are the psychological and the social realms of meaning and motivation. ‘Causes’ of meaning and motivation are more abstract and can be reinterpreted in that there are multiply available noemata about the same object. Formulation is a means of connecting clients with explicitly agreed rationales about how to help them, through making discussions with them about the causes of the current maintenance of the syndromes. Maintenance formulations are attempts at summarising potentially reversible intersubjective and intentional ‘causes’ of the meanings that motivate them.

The focus is on steady states of distress that remain the same without intervention. “Maintenance formulations” can be recorded diagrammatically in order to précis complex information derived from asking questions about what clients’ experience. It is also possible to represent a personal history in what is called a developmental formulation diagram. If there is a reversible biological imbalance then discussion or activities that facilitate psychological change is what all therapies and mental health care provide. However, there are mutual influences between the biological and the psychosocial. In the first-person view, this is in-part choosing how to respond to one’s own biological tendencies, how to manage oneself through insight and according to what is best in the long term. Inherited biological influence is more prevalent in childhood, when one’s own tendencies are not fully known and social learning concerning how to adapt is not fully developed. In the future, psychology as a science may know how to identify genetic influence but that would inevitably mean knowing about the intersubjective concomitants of personality type and the types of lifestyle that should be adopted or avoided. In the natural scientific view, the terminology relies on the role of procedural memory to explain the way that memory supports current behaviour: the term used is “implicit relational knowing” when it comes to knowing how to relate in various contexts (Jacoby and Dallas 1981; Lyons-Ruth 1999; Schachter and Moscovitch 1984; Westen and Gabbard 2002). At the time of writing, there is no certain agreed knowledge about specific causes of mental health syndromes.

Both distress and well being are experiential and meaningful. For instance, what can be noticed in phobias, worry and futural anxiety is that there is repeatedly, strong anxiety felt produced by the ego’s imagination in relation to scenes that have not yet occurred. If repeated enough this process may create the belief that self will be unable to deal with distress in the future. However, the strong emotion in the present moment of thinking and feeling can be overwhelming. Although there are different contexts and meaningful triggers of panic attacks, some can occur in the prospect of future demands on the ability to cope. People who suffer panic attacks often have excessive senses of future-oriented threat leading to defensive actions. People with panic may not take actions that will really work in decreasing it (although their action to avoid panic-inducing contexts has a rationale). The point is that when some clients are left to their own devices, they do not get better but worse. This is because their remedies to their panic exacerbate it through the use of over-protection in the absence of genuine threat. Understanding the conditions of the possibility of a panic episode are necessary, because therapists are in the business of understanding contributory meanings and motivations and creating ways for clients to make changes on how they handle themselves: as part of how they handle their lifestyle overall. Rather, there are many competing possibilities as to what might be causative and how to interpret individual suffering and distress. What is formalised below is how the three different forms of cause contribute to make a whole. For instance, biological cause is the action of psychopharmacology, neurosurgery and the findings of medical and psychiatric science that favour attention to physical and material causes (Boyle 2013; Gøtzsche 2013; Mensch 1998). Explanatory accounts sometimes include the material effects of individual lifestyle and developmental

influences such as attachment which is also comprised of mixed causes. Physically, the individual is the summation of their intersubjective trauma, genetic inheritance, neurological damage and the state of their neurotransmitters and brain physiology. However, an entirely biological approach to treatment cannot replace therapy, as it is always the ego's responsibility to manage its causative meanings, relationships and lifestyle in a meaningful way. Self-management and the means of altering meaning and creating coping and problem-solving are outside of the scope of biology and the medical model.

The Ego Finds Itself Amongst its own Productions of Meaning and may be Unaware of how its Pre-reflexive Intentionalities and Syntheses Have Made Them

The specific first focus to be addressed is the ego of clients to help them become responsible for themselves, so active and committed to treat themselves and their distressing meanings in new ways. Despite consciousness being mainly comprised of its passive aspects, there is a great deal that the ego can do to help itself. Biological changes are secondary in the sense that they can be responded to and managed by the ego (possibly through taking medication that actually helps the individual). But therapy as taking action concerns laying the foundations for actual change and occurs through providing and testing new, more accurate understanding that shines a light on the problems that are current. Given that the greatest majority of syndromes are comprised of reversible social 'causes' and are driven by habits and beliefs that belong entirely to the individual, altering these imbalances requires decreasing vulnerability and providing more harmonious and satisfying relationships at home, work and play. This section works to understand what happens in the relationship between the ego and its passive anonymous syntheses, where both aspects can become habit and feature inaccurate beliefs. Social meaningful 'cause' is the type of motivation concerning how to act through family influences, values and the culture of the work place. It is best understood as peer group pressure of a general sort for the influences of other people legitimise specific types of attitudes, behaviours and constitute ways of life as the consensus reality of how to be. Individuals do what culture dictates. People live in social contexts in the same way that birds have nests and flock together. The word "social", as a part of the larger term for mixed causation of one third of the biopsychosocial, refers to a different part of the meaningful world that exists for all. The social is the audience that confers and creates the meaning of what appears (currently, as well as in the past and future). How the self empathises its social context and the meanings that it attributes to the intersubjective world is highly influential. In a more detailed view, the intersubjective world is a whole of a completely different sort to the realm of biological being and its type of cause. Cause in the biological sphere is material, electrochemical, physical, genetic and neurological. Intersubjective 'causation' is multi-factorially

connected with how people live in their everyday first-hand experiences of being alive. The intersubjective refers to all that exists between people—a meaningful and enacted life of cultural objects and manifolds of meaning. To understand it, means focusing on aspects of therapy contextualised in much larger wholes of living, the social psychological, sociological or anthropological views.

Natural science argues that the only proper type of cause to be considered is the biological one. But an excessive focus on natural biological, biochemical and neurological causes makes it hard to translate that type of information, gained from persons on average, into the experiential narrative of the individual client. While the dominant paradigm of natural cause will continue with its research project, the point of the intentionality paradigm is to enable clients and therapists to share a frame of reference that is entirely focused on meanings and forms of being aware. Another area of similarity between phenomenology and developmental psychological views is the observation of the noematic manifold of any object across time. For Husserl, the task of *Abbau* is dismantling finding developments by interpreting emically what the stages and contexts between consciousness and the intersubjective world must have been. Thus, a developmental explanation is the use of eidetic imaginative variation to understand the accrual of cultural senses, in the sense of a reconstruction of a past self-other-object context according to empirical actuality interpreted through intentionality. A preferred point of view is the developmental trajectory across the lifespan where *Abbau* (Marbach 1982, 463), “unbuilding”, “unravelling” constitution or “deconstruction” is brought about through the use of the technique of looking back in a eidetic variation of the history of apperceptions of sense to perceptual stuff, and *Rückfrage* (questioning back), are the preferred means of looking at constitution, *Aufbau*. *Aufbau* is constitutive construction or development across time, in the sense of what the actual learning of the senses of an object have been after the first-ever achievements and on-going enrichment of an object in its horizon or horizons across time (IV, 106, VI, 170–171, 259, XI, 388). Whilst it is possible to use one’s own experience, it is acceptable to interview others and select well-regarded empirical findings and study these to see how they may inform pure psychology of a specific sort of lifestyle within any given social milieu.

Pure psychology can formulate the developmental learning of the senses about an object and provide maintenance formulations, accounts of how noematic senses develop or remain the same. When seeing essences, there is both a static-synchronic approach and a genetic-diachronic view of accrual that need to be concluded on as ideals of consciousness (XI, 339, 345). The approach taken is a “theoretic practice” (IX, 333), an ‘empiricism of essences’ even though it is only ever the meanings and the view of the world-whole that are being considered (I, 100, XVII, 248). What is sought are the assumed to be lawful regularities of the development of sense for individuals and cultures (V, 129, XI, 336–345, XVII, 278). Contemporary meanings are built on the past but also face the future in a Janus-like manner. So not only is there the static analysis of the primary phenomenon that aims to find the universal and necessary aspects of noesis-noema relations: a study of “possible, essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass)”, (XI, 340). There is also a genetic analysis of their development. For the topic of the psychological life, both

of these types of analyses apply to the psychological world of the senses of self, other, cultural objects and cultural world. The method is to think developmentally as an ““explanatory” phenomenology... of regulated genesis”, (XI, 340), to find stages and transitions between accumulating meanings in the a priori style of finding the enabling conditions to move from one stage of meaning production to the next. In developmental view, the accrual across time is the more fundamental and constitutive perspective, one concerning how intersubjectivity impacts on the individual. The static approach comes first chronologically whereas the genetic one is a higher order approach and commences after the introductory study “of the general structures of consciousness [and] constitutive phenomenology”, (XI, 340, fn). The genetic-development viewpoint is one that considers the interactions between self and others through considering a priori enabling conditions for the very many types of empirically different consciousness of the child, the able-bodied person, the distressed person, the non-Western person, the neonate and the foetus still in the womb, to name a small number of possibilities. At some point it may be possible to identify the essences of egoic active and passive development of the senses of objects and motivations across the lifespan in the way Husserl intended, as a type of formulation of meanings that includes the forms of awareness in relation to the meanings that are experienced (I, 111, 118, 167, VI, 168, 182, XI, 342, 336–339, 345, XVII, 183–188, 275–288).

However, because of the wide perspective of pure psychology of intersubjectivity across the personal history, it is best to note how there is a narrative of the psychological object in the sense that understanding anything is a matter of dealing with objects that are culturally shared. Social reality is socially constructed where the “man in the street inhabits a world that is ‘real’ to him, albeit in different degrees, and he ‘knows’, with different degrees of confidence, that this world possesses such and such characteristics”, (Berger and Luckmann 1974, 13). Consciousness and its meanings are the medium in which life is lived. “The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these... we must... attempt to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life, to wit, the objectifications of subjective processes (and meanings) by which the *intersubjective* common-sense world is constructed”, (Berger and Luckmann 1974, 33–34). The focus on cultural objects is being able to identify and deal with types and stereotypes. For instance, in being able to recognise the styles of cultural objects of a particular sort and identify meaning within a social network, with respect to adjacent cultural objects of a particular sort, and identify it within specific groups of people. Sets of cultural objects exist with respect to each other and how their cultures apprehend them. Psychological mindedness about the psychological world, the ability to have emotional intelligence, street savvy in being able to respond immediately to what things mean, requires co-ordinated theory and practice in the lived understanding that other people also represent to themselves, about the same world that we inhabit in a somewhat similar way. The perspectives of others are something no self can have first-hand yet there is sharing and the free play of sense moving back and forth. If there were no flow

of sense, then no context could be established and no agreements or disagreements made. Emotions and behaviours are often immediately understood about what a person in general might feel in any designated setting. (Sometimes even through paying keen attention to the other, what they felt does not appear. Or some sense of their emotion is received but on further discussion it is disconfirmed and only then what they actually felt was established). What is universal is the triangular relation self, other and cultural object for those interconnections are irreducible (I, 129) and are felt (IV, 229–231). For the identification of cultural objects, they come laden with senses (past, present and future). Their manifolds of sense concern visible events between people or the emotions felt in the current bodily space, whatever the timeframe of the remembering or imagining. Husserl can be read as stating that there are implied learnings, associated noemata about an object, that get linked to noemata about another object of a different or similar sort. It's these connections of emotions, thoughts in self-talk or speaking aloud, or patterns of relating that are given the names of any recognisable object. Accordingly, everyone knows to some degree what it's like to be happy or sad, to be in love or hate, to have a good friend as opposed to a bad one. While cohesiveness in culture is not guaranteed, these types of psychological objects are identifiable and form part of the pre-reflexive backdrop that people share.

Husserl had personal experience of a world war, the rise of Nazism, the collapse of the Deutsch Mark, and the social phenomenon of scape-goating as social process where narratives, intentionalities and noematic senses, are collective. On a smaller scale the terminology of reduction is really a warrant to permit a spirit of open inquiry with respect to phenomena. The types of phenomena that are attended to in detail below are those that concern the impact of the style of caring given to infants and children, and how this influences the construction of the emotional and relational world of childhood relates to them as adults. There are many objects of meaning that can be identified in psychological problems and in other areas of conscious experience. Within this type of interpretation there arises the question of the map of the individual in relation to the territory. The easiest way to see how consciousness throws meaning on to the world is to compare unhelpful, relating styles and the ways that people treat themselves, as forms of social learning. For the way that people construe their own world with respect to the present and the future are frequently related to formative past experience, and sometimes very little related to current experience. For when it comes to the specific case of therapy, what is to be interpreted intentionally are the personalities, distress and potential for satisfaction that people can have. It is possible to focus on a small portion of experience, such as belief that brings existence, or the temporal orientation of such beliefs to distinguish telling differences. But pure psychology adopts the idea of the world-inconscientness as a map of how to be in a complex world. For there are many factors being brought forward in a wholistic or holographic way of understanding human being who lives inside the sphere of intentional being where yesterday and tomorrow do not exist perceptually (I, 67, X, 53, XI, 128).

The Narrative of the Psychological Object: Developmental Learning About Cultural Objects in the Communal Life

All objects are cultural objects (IX, 111) and the cultural senses they have were made in specific contexts (IX, 113). The publicly well-known senses of cultural objects are carried or signified semiotically (IX, 114). Cultural objects are parts of larger teleologies for human needs and purposes that are manifested in the experiential world (IX, 112). So the past is involved in the total accumulation of influences, particularly when there have been serious developmental omissions, trauma or abuse (Cohen et al. 2001). What the idea of the map of the world furnishes is the possibility of a self-aware change of attention among the small scale parts that comprise a whole. Specifically, it enables clients themselves to understand their own thoughts, feelings, flashbacks and changes in emotional state, and through identifying them, know how to provide themselves with corrective experience that will put them in a good place. Understanding is comprised of the smallest recognisable pieces of meaning, where there are the means of making explicit the part-whole relationships (concepts-to-phenomena), whilst moving through intermediate regions of sense concerning, say, generalisation and meaningful behaviours as intersubjective ‘causes’. For instance, a person accepts the social pressure to have a thin body shape and learns that it is possible to vomit after meals to maintain a low body weight and relieve self of the ‘danger’ of being fat. What makes sense in bulimia is how to alter oneself as an overall incentivised behaviour. Accordingly, understanding distress and well-being concerns mapping the possible worlds of others in the sense that a specific set of intentional objects are understood in sharp focus whilst others remain in the background.

What current positions assume when they interpret everyday experience through implicit or explicit strategies, (the forms of hermeneutics belonging to schools of psychology, psychiatry or social study) is that there is always already a commonsense about typical objectifications, the learning of objects and the differences between categories of them. Husserl provided details of this new presentation of the primary phenomenon in *Experience and Judgement* (Secs. 83–88, 90 and 96c). The relevance of these remarks were picked up by Alfred Schütz who emphasised the term “typification” in the sense of there being prototypes of objects in noting that concepts refer to ideal poles of sense gained from being immersed in the pre-reflexive world (cf Gelman 2003; Mervis and Rosch 1981). Developmentally, there are the multiple influences of meanings in the personal cultural world of everyday experience, as it accrues informally and tacitly, because the pre-reflexive commonsense that is learned was never formally taught. The sort of teaching and learning happened in childhood, when children ask questions and their parents explain in a way they think they would understand.

The picture of a self in a world with others, a map, is one where there are primarily two or more consciousnesses about the same cultural object, due to their different current and past learnings about it. Their differing senses are verbal and nonverbal representations in the five senses plus empathy and linguistic reference,

plus more complex forms of intentionality and the passive syntheses that operate. The syntheses can be influenced by the ego but are best described as non-egoic, for a good deal of the emotional life exists in a dynamic relation to what the ego chooses to imagine, think about or believe. The understanding that is held in retentional consciousness in any individual is a map of the territory, a set of representations that were built through processes of selection and suppression, disregarding and omitting some details, in order to arrive at the conclusions of what typical objectifications are. One example provided by Husserl is the understanding of the noematic senses of a dog. On recognising a dog, through vision say, “the factual world of experience is experienced as a typified world. Things are experienced as trees, bushes, animals, snakes, birds, specifically, as pine, linden, lilac, dog, viper, swallow, sparrow, and so on. The table is characterised as being familiar and yet new. What is given in experience as a new individual is first known in terms of what has been genuinely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the similar). But what is apprehended according to type also has a horizon of possible experience with corresponding prescriptions of familiarity and has, therefore, types of attributes not yet experienced but expected. When we see a dog, we immediately anticipate its additional modes of behaviour: its typical way of eating, playing, running, jumping, and so on... what is experienced about a perceived object in the progress of experience is straightaway assigned “apperceptively” to every perceived object with similar components of genuine perception. We anticipate this, and actual experience may or may not confirm it”, (EU, 398–399). People have learned that with seeing a dog what comes to mind is its doggishness, how to relate to it and what to expect. Husserl continued: “Thus empirical concepts are changed by the continual admission of new attributes but according to an empirical idea of an open, ever-to-be-corrected concept which, at the same time, contains in itself the rule of empirical belief and is founded on the progress of actual experience”, (EU, 391). The sense of this passage is to emphasise how there is a pulling together of disparate senses around the pole of the object. The analysis of anticipations around seeing a dog is a good example of what happens in identifying other objects between oneself and others.

Empathising the other is being able to grasp the meaning of an object and gains understanding of it as part of the pre-reflexive level. Such meanings are inserted in the world of time, to create manifold senses of it. For whatever the object is, there are manifold possible views of it that others in culture can have (the “interspectivity” of commonsense). These are brought about by manifold experiences of it belonging to others and oneself. When a new dog appears in perception (or imagination or memory for instance) it is possible to re-experience the previous senses of it and have future-oriented anticipations of it that predict how the object will be with self or in any given situation. Thus when objects are typified, what are laid down are schemata in the Kantian sense as to what makes a dog a typical dog (or a non-typical one or a cat) and the understanding and set of beliefs about dogs are learnings held in variegated ways in culture, as to how such objects exist, are intelligible, recognisable and identifiable as such. It is equivalent to saying that specific beings are known and the meaning of these beings has been given to us by previous generations. So the understanding of dogs is a historical product and




Fig. 14.1 Developmental formulation explains how personality and psychological problems are attempts at solutions have negative and positive consequences

all objects are ultimately related to history and human purposes (Schütz 1964, 234, 1967, 97, cf IV, 27). Indeed, the eidon is claimed to be an extra-temporal synthetic even though it is comprised of a manifold of instances but as time and cultural experiences accumulate, the manifold of instances gets broadened yet Husserl claimed that typifications appear out of the manifold of noematic sense.

Tools, for instance, are one type of cultural object that manifests teleologies, needs, values and are projected into the future of the self's world. Self is guided by estimations of belief and credibility (Schütz 1967, 89–96). Husserl is the originator of the link between the learning of implicit meanings (EU, 52, 63). Schütz's contribution is to spell out the implications of the links to various shades of the mixtures of how pre-reflexive understanding gets played out in explicit or implicit beliefs in relation to varying degrees of credibility invested in them in the various forms of training in adult life, "secondary socialisation", (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 158–162), outside of the family in order to take up a role in society. For the territory being mapped is the general set of links between egoic skills, habits and beliefs that are allied to the ego. Yet habits and beliefs of understanding (generally expressible as its anticipations) are revealed when they are disappointed (producing horrified surprise, shock and upset) or if they are exceeded (producing delighted surprise, wonder and awe). The diagram above can capture some of the influential aspects of a person's life. Detailed information is found through discussion with clients and inserted under the headings. Figure 14.1 is a means of providing structure to the development of specific senses of self and the on-set of problems, perhaps with some other more positive life events.

Finally, the narrative of the object and the use of terms like "objectification" are perhaps best seen in the creation of brands for the commercial market place where celebrity endorsement of a product is a way of linking it with persons who are perceived as having worth in society. The launch and maintenance of a brand name in

the communications of society is a specific means of how meanings are; made in much smaller spheres, where meanings get played out as both structuring factors and as ways of mediating personal preferences and forging connections. But narratives made about a product, that a specific soft drink is good for you or a type of toothpaste brings its user confidence, are effective in making the products attractive irrespective of how factually good they are.

On Formulating Biopsychosocial Causes of Vulnerability in Personality-Functioning or Context

The more detailed wholistic view of lifelong complex multiple problems of personality-functioning and psychological syndromes can be diagrammatically presented as a developmental line in Fig. 14.2. For instance, when there has been an initial intersubjective cause, and across time there is the chaining of both biological cause and further intersubjective ‘causes’, this produces deterioration in mood, self-esteem and the ability to interact with others, these effect close relationships, the ability to work and provide child care. The link to eidetic imaginative variation below is creating a formal means of representing current and future-possible changes in the meaningful objects that are called syndromes. Because the notation is formal then other specific meanings can be substituted. The next step is to use clinical experience or research findings to discuss with clients as to what will help them. When it comes to understanding sub-syndromal latencies, tendencies or sensitivities, then they can be understood as semi-permanent aspects of personality, at a biopsychosocial level that are comprised of biological predispositions plus social learning of sub-optimal attachment styles due to dysfunctional parenting, family and social contexts. Distress can get triggered by small meanings in the current social contexts of work and home by meanings that might, at another time, have no effect whatsoever. The sensitivity that people have to distress-inducing meanings is variable and related to the whole set of events happening in a person’s life at any one time.

The biopsychosocial perspective means that intentional implication is happening in three different ways. Firstly, in biological cause there are biological drives that




Fig. 14.2 Temporality and the map of solo consciousness in connection with four features

seek expression and these make some tendencies and abilities much easier than others, merely through genetic predisposition. Secondly, in the intersubjective sphere, intentional implication between persons and cultural objects are linked to learning that accrues across time. The learned meaningful links are the understanding of the meaning of objects and these are related to numerous social contexts, where these meanings have appeared ever since their first occurrence in childhood (I, 141). Thirdly, there is psychological cause in how the individual construes their situation and accepts distress as part of themselves, so defending themselves and making their own intentional links and conditioning associations. The syndromes produced could be in personality functioning or in the clinical syndromes of the general aspects of a person's life. In the biopsychosocial view there may be cases where biological factors and intersubjective ones are in interplay in complex ways that are hard to differentiate. The therapeutic need is for persons to look after themselves, manage their distress and tendency to become excessively self-focused in a negative way, through genuinely understanding what is happening for them. Effective self-care is the remedy for a lack of self-care through self-neglect, lack of compassion to self and the inaccurate valuing of self by self, which are frequent causes of problems in relation to the mounting complexity of beliefs and habits of distress and accepting its presence across decades of the prior lifespan.

Biopsychosocial Causes Present in an Unclear way Through Assessment

In other situations where it is unclear what causation is for the individual, it is possible to amalgamate the three multifactorial causes and state that: biopsychosocial cause → syndrome 1, a summated cause produces difficulties of distress, defence, impairment and how to cope and respond. In other cases, it is possible to conclude with certainty that a traumatic, neglectful or general accumulation of stressful experiences have overwhelmed the ability to maintain well being, openness and functioning composure. It is possible to conclude that the biological constituent can be ignored in terms of its cause, when it is possible to identify 'cause' in poor parenting and social relationships. It is inevitable that meanings create their own temporary, long-term or more permanent changes in biochemistry and the neurological concomitants of distress, written as "'cause' → syndrome 1", as a short hand for what is really an interplay of different types of cause. An example of this is when persons have had stressful experiences over childhood and teenage years, and were able to cope until having a first panic attack in a crowded place. At which point they refuse to go out thereafter. Such a defensive strategy is an avoidant choice of the ego as a way of managing the possibility of future panic attacks. In this case, syndrome 1 is panic and syndrome 2 is agoraphobia written as egoic 'cause' → syndrome 1 → syndrome 2.

Let's consider the conditions of possibility of the causes of syndromes. In reference to the introductory comments above, the first point is to note what to include

in the consideration of a whole. Given that what is constant is the possibility of interactions between parts of the whole of consciousness, there is always the possibility of both better and worse accuracy of understanding of clients themselves as well as changes in the context. When it comes to the precise details of how the pieces of the whole of any individual fit together, then that is the job of formulating to help clients in the empirical testing of the ideas of 'cause'. The task for therapists is to work out how noesis-noema pieces of sense get summated to form identifiable patterns of meaning that are the referents of the definitive textbooks in the professional discourse. The role of universal a priori concepts is to identify the connections between what is manifest, before being able to identify the connection between those parts that control and those that are controlled. The first case is where there are variations of the level of syndromes that do not entirely remit. This can be formalised as: sub-syndromal biopsychosocial vulnerability → subsyndrome 1 → sub-syndromal vulnerability remains. What this expresses is the case where some aspects of a syndrome are constantly present across time, with slight increases, with or without treatment. The changes are due to the person's own ability to cope without medication or help.

Let's consider another condition of possibility of the causes of syndromes one step up in distress from the last case. The next case is where there is one problem and it does not interact with any other syndrome and varies in strength due to stressors in the social context. This can be formally represented as: Sub-syndromal psychosocial vulnerability → syndrome 1 → sub-syndromal vulnerability. This situation is where there are intermittent changes in how to adapt to pressure on self where sometimes there is distress and a short period of impairment that qualifies as a syndrome.

Another situation is one comprised of the simplest case of accounting for simultaneously acting forms of cause across the three registers. Biological cause → syndrome 1, for instance, how to cope with a bipolar illness that is inherited from parents and grandparents. Psychological 'cause' → inaccurate understanding of changes in mood leading to ineffective defending in the context of mis-understanding self in relation to others and cultural objects, sub-syndrome 2. While in social life, intersubjective 'cause' → sub-syndrome 3, e.g. occasional experiences of social anxiety and low self-esteem due to bullying at work, an intersubjective event, occurs when there are current conflicts and tensions in the social contexts of home, work and play. This example permits three types of cause to be current and discussible with the person who has them and can act as a means of presenting research findings.

In a wholistic view, Angélique Cramer et al. (2010) notes that there can be shared intentional processes between any two syndromes. For example, there are similar intentionalities between social anxiety and worry. For instance, the shared aspects might be imagining that things will go wrong, that people will notice that self is anxious and self believes that others will think bad things about socially nervous, worried people. The most general case expressed in formulation by intentionality is that 'causes' can be expressed as motivations for constituting meanings of various sorts. When it comes to being pragmatic in gaining leverage on how to get chang-

es, the point of getting an accurate picture of individuals' personal development is for the purposes of making it plain to them how the learnings of the meanings of various objects have been created over time in relation to intentionalities and other relevant causative factors. The most general biopsychosocial formulation is as follows, in the specific case of vulnerability to social anxiety and worry. Because of the biological heritability of temperament there is a predisposition towards a set of intentionalities 1 → that produces negative meanings about cultural objects, sub-syndrome 1. Psychologically, the ego is actively choosing, willing and rationalising with a common set of intentionalities → and places an excessively negative focus on itself, to create the belief that itself, a cultural object for all to see, is damaged, inadequate and socially inept. This meaningful object of the sense of self as inadequate is common to sub-syndromes 1 and 2. Socially around the person, there are interpersonal conflicts and situations that need careful handling. So looking out towards the mass of society, there is a set of intentionalities 2 → concerning the negative meanings of cultural objects, now being maintained in social contexts, sub-syndrome 2.

Let's consider another condition of possibility of the causes of a different constellation of syndromes. The first case is where there are gradual accumulations of syndromes between two end-states. The type of imaginative variation being requested is merely to think about how some psychological syndromes have been constituted across the lifespan of consciousness in general. If one syndrome diminishes and another remains the same, then they are not connected. And vice versa, if one syndrome diminishes and so does another, then they are interdependent in an ontological sense (XIX/1, 240–241). The progression, sub-syndromal biopsychosocial vulnerability → syndromes 1 and 2 → producing sub-syndromal vulnerability of two syndromes simultaneously concerns variability between two interdependent forms of distress. But, in the case where sub-syndromal biopsychosocial vulnerability → syndromes 1 and 2 → syndrome 1, shows that syndrome 1 persists and is not connected to syndrome 2.

The word "psychological" stands for the worldview of the individual ego that is mediated by intentionality with respect to their sense of self and volition in the world about what can be chosen, valued and willed to exist. Specifically, psychological 'cause' is the domain of the personal. The personal lifestyle is comprised of the very many choices and values that people wish to express in relation to their personality, the social contexts which they inhabit and the values they make manifest. The ego possesses many forms of intentionality, the ways of feeling, thinking and imagining the world and every cultural object's place in it. The experiences that people have are not always the most helpful ones and could be inaccurately understood in relation to what they could be. There are always several potential views at stake about the same scenario. A fundamental difference is what clients experience and how they *could* experience the same, meta-representationally. The extended presence of one type of distress then 'causes', leads to a choice to self-medicate with recreational drugs and alcohol, for instance, which actually leads to further negative consequences. The unforeseen consequences of the prolonged usage of substances to manage mood could be addiction, impaired functioning whilst intoxi-




Fig. 14.3 The lollipop diagram of showing the occurrence of syndromes across a lifespan

cated, and having the hangover and come-down experiences with further associated changes in mood and how that affects their relationships. Three formal statements about natural-biological, individual-psychological and social-intersubjective causes are made in the eidetic sphere across the remaining sections below. They can be written as: Intersubjective ‘cause’ → leads to subsyndrome 1, (a vulnerability for syndrome 1) → subsyndromal vulnerability of type 2 → syndromes 1 and 2 → syndromes 1, 2 and 3 → syndromes 1, 2, 3 and 4. In one example, syndrome 1 could be worry. Syndrome 2 could be anxiety and depression. Syndrome 3 could be alcohol and drug abuse, defined as impairment of roles at home or work. And syndrome 4 would be addiction to drugs and alcohol, with an even greater impairment to the performance of roles at work and home. Worry and low self-esteem are linked to the neurotic personality factor. However, the phenomenological thinking involved is to take clinical observations about how distress and impairments of roles at home and work occur across the lifespan and to represent them in the eidetic way. Because in any possible set of difficulties certain forms of increase in distress and decrease in functioning are observable when there is no self correction. Diagrammatically, a general case of distress across the lifespan can be represented as:

The same state of affairs depicted in Fig. 14.3 can be written as follows in the ‘leads to’ format: Biopsychosocial causes → subsyndrome 1 → syndromes 1 and 2 → syndromes 1, 2 and 3.

The point of this formalism is to discuss about how the ego manages itself defensively across the course of a lifetime prior to therapy. For instance, a person might have experienced the following across the life course: Syndrome 1 → syndrome 2 → syndromes 1 and 2 → syndromes 1, 2 and 3 → syndromes 1 and 2 → syndromes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Where this latter sequence formally expresses a person’s improvements and deteriorations across the lifespan as either a set of experiences of an actual client or merely defines what happens in a general case of a notional person discussed theoretically for the purpose of understanding distress and well-being. There could be all manner of combinations. But for instance let’s say, syndrome 1 is social anxiety of 15 years standing. Syndrome 2 could be panic attacks of 5 years standing. Syndrome 3 could be agoraphobia of 3 years standing and syndrome 4 could be depression for the previous year that has brought the person to ask for

help. So what is expressed is the accrual of four syndromes across time. When there are more complex co-occurrences of sub-syndromal vulnerability leading to the co-occurrence of two or more syndromes, it is possible that syndromes might dissipate by themselves without intervention. But due to further changes in the lifestyle and external context, such syndromes may recur at some later point in the lifespan. Sub-syndromal conditions might be part of the personality, due to biological or intersubjective causes, or they might still be present as a remainder after a successful therapy.

Kenneth Silk (1996) writes that there is no clear causation between nature and nurture, the biological and psychosocial registers. He explains that the relationship between the personal and the social is that there is variation concerning the degree to which people come to accept their own state of affairs. The technical term for this is that some problems might be understood by self to be “ego-syntonic” and are accepted as a genuine part of self as “part of me, my identity”. What is ego-syntonic is often in-line with ideal images of how self wants its life to be. Whilst for other people, there might be the same problems but they are regarded as “ego-dystonic”, not a part of self, even though the problems that occur are rejected, shameful, disavowed and denied as occurring. The tie between self esteem as a product of past social conditioning and what the ego heads towards as an outcome for itself is that in toxic parenting and other sexist, racist and discriminatory attitudes in past social contexts can become part of the map of how the world should be. For instance, if low self esteem is ego syntonic then the learned discrimination is enacted without the person knowing that it is problematic despite the evidence that it is. Alternatively if it is ego dystonic, it is recognised for what it is and can be worked with even if it is felt and has an influence. Even though problems occur, the self-reflexive understanding of them is in-part due to the ego’s explicit choices about how to be. This syntonic-dystonic distinction is a further aspect of apperception, of how the self interprets itself to be with respect to others in the current social context. What is classed as ego-dystonic is frequently judged to be a shameful part by self and alien to the subject’s ideals for itself. Such an ego-dystonic part can be seen as an expression of dreaded, reified experience of itself and be an object for an excessive negative focus so much so that the ego alters its lifestyle in order to avoid, minimise or deal with an aspect of itself without in fact dealing with the problem in a satisfactory manner, for it is frequently the case that people’s attempts by themselves to deal with their own distress does not work and maintains their vulnerability. This phenomenon gives rise to feelings of ambivalent conflicted emotion about self. On the one hand, shame and embarrassment at vulnerability and distress; and on the other, potentially appropriate self-esteem and pride when the vulnerability is managed. Biopsychosocial means the simultaneous addition of different types of cause. Similarly, due to a combination of corrective causes, a good outcome is one where clients know what to do to manage their distress, which can be reactive to intersubjective stressors because it is meaningful in that realm. There are also those cases where there seems to be biological causes because there never has been trauma or intersubjective ‘cause’. Biological causes are where persons find that their mood changes, for instance, in response to nothing in their meaningful intersubjective

world. Clients may unwittingly bring on their own negative changes because they might be currently unaware of how their choices contribute to their distress. Such a conclusion only can be established after full questioning, concerning intentionalities and the meaning of what is currently happening around them and asking about the mental health of what is the case for their blood relatives.

Oscillations Between two Syndromes

The examples below refer to the type of reasoning that typifies the clinical reasoning process that can be explained to clients. The aim of this section is to be able to meta-represent combinations of syndromes due to any biopsychosocial causes. There can be alternations between two specific problems, where each mutually excludes the other which can be written as syndrome 1 \rightarrow syndrome 2 \rightarrow syndrome 1 \rightarrow syndrome 2. For instance, the circumstances of alternating depression and anxiety is one example where there are alternating syndromes, possibly coming from a biological source of causation. Therapeutically, the good news is that the ego is still capable of learning about itself and influencing itself to some degree. It can also be the case that when therapy is applied, then what can happen is that there are a different series of events, such that syndrome 1 is current but when an intervention is successfully applied, it leads to wellness for a while, but later after therapy has ended, relapse occurs and syndrome 1 returns. This pattern is called recurrence where changes are motivated by therapy but recur when the sessions come to an end. If this were to happen, then the therapy has not been effective and the true picture of clients' difficulties has not been grasped.

In commenting on the details of meaningful experience, in a high resolution attention to detail what appears is that there are a number of intentionalities that could comprise syndrome 1, say PTSD, and syndrome 2, say paranoia. So that what is happening is that intentionalities produce noematic senses of specific objects. The most general representation is when biological cause continues long-after the trauma is over in a semi-permanent neurological and biochemical predisposition to be anxious, expressed as flashbacks and a startle response, as a set of intentionalities 1 \rightarrow highly anxious senses of cultural objects associated with the traumatic experience, PTSD, syndrome 1. Psychologically, the ego makes defensive choices and rationalises with a set of common intentionalities \rightarrow a focus on idiosyncratic beliefs, understandings, habits about common cultural objects of associations to crowded places, people who move too quickly, loud sounds, the place where the attack occurred, the cultural objects of spontaneous memory and the personal meaning of the trauma, for example, "I am a different person now" and intersubjectively, the set of intentionalities 2 \rightarrow syndrome 2, paranoia about cultural objects concerning the likelihood of being attacked by people again. Imagining and feeling about the possibility of being attacked promotes hyper-vigilance in social settings where it is difficult to run away or carrying a weapon in the anticipation of a further attack.

Let's turn to the case where there are three causes included, producing three distinct biopsychosocial problems. For the functioning overall, there is biological cause proper, egoic psychologically-motivated 'causes' to defend self, plus complex intersubjective 'causes' and defences at large in the social context. One way of representing this situation is to write that biological cause → syndrome 1, a tendency to be anxious expressed as worry. Individually, psychological 'cause' → syndrome 2 of personality functioning, say, the desire to be excessively conscientious across the domains of home, friendship and work, a non-adjustment that excludes the possibility of getting personal balance with time for family, partner, friendship and proper rest. In the social register intersubjective 'cause' → syndrome 3 of problematic relating in intersubjective contexts due to being socially anxious and the feeling of having to respond by protecting self anticipatorily, in the contexts of formal meetings with others, for instance.

Imbalance Increases Across Time

This section represents how impairment, defence and distress increase across time. When taking a high resolution attention to the fine details of what is occurring, it might be the case that in recurrent anxiety and depression (syndrome 1) may act as a 'causative' factor to motivate the ego towards self-medication, that then entails the unforeseen consequences of the ego needing to further defend itself because it is even more impaired and distressed when it is not intoxicated (rather than attending to its mood problem). Such an attempt at a solution ultimately makes the self alcohol- and drug-impaired in its functioning (producing syndrome 2) because the after-effects of the self-medication prevent optimal functioning and increases anxiety and depression. So because of being incapacitated by the self-medication, relationship problems arise (syndrome 3) and the person is regularly unable to function at home and work. In this case, syndromes 2 and 3 have 'worked', since the person can escape from syndrome 1 for a few hours perhaps but it has a dysfunctional price. So the person as a whole becomes more out of balance, rather than merely receiving a few hours of respite as they had originally intended.


Another way of understanding the 'causation' of meaningful motivations is, when there is more than one syndrome current, to note that when it has ceased, if there remains other different sets of problems. Diagrammatically, another version is that there could be other combinations of cause operating at any point in the lifespan. In this version, there are three distinct areas of problem. Firstly, biological cause → personality syndrome 1, say, unmanaged excessive conscientiousness in the personality. But that co-exists with psychological 'cause' → common ways of dealing with psychological cultural objects shared by syndromes 1 and 2. Finally, intersubjective 'cause' → syndrome 2, say, of difficulties with intimacy due to attachment difficulties since childhood that have never been addressed. This is a more complex form of inter-relation because despite there being interrelated causes, the overall level of distress and impairment are lifelong and a personality syndrome is

included. Strictly speaking, the received wisdom is that the occurrence of a personality disorder means that full complexity is attained and that both therapists and clients need to work harder increasing self-understanding and self-managed change because a set of long-standing difficulties needs to be addressed possibly by representing the difficulties and the desired outcome as a change from old to new beliefs and habits.

When Cause and Effect Feed off Each Other

This section considers the possibility of interacting cause and effect as two-way, either between two different types of distress or between cause and effect. The two-headed arrows below are a means of mapping this more complex situation, where there are considered more complex interplays between cause and effect, in a high resolution attendance to meaningful experiences. Frequently in the case of anxiety for instance, it promotes an excessive and unproductive negative attention on self where the ego loses trust in itself that it will be able to cope with situations that had previously not been problematic. The problem with rumination on the self-interpreted inadequacy of self is that such a mental process in itself is adding an extra burden on self. It impairs the problem-solving process of how to maintain relaxed trouble-free spontaneity and self-reflexive trust in one’s capabilities. Unfortunately, the means of attempting to deal with anxiety actually promotes it on entering the situations where it might occur. In this introductory example, in the received wisdom concerning what is clinically, the most difficult of simple presentations, it might be that, say, depression (syndrome 2) is what brings clients to ask for help at last. Previously, how they had coped was abusing alcohol (syndrome 1) and sub-syndromally avoided some situations if they could. The trigger below is an event, that logically at another time, would never cause such a reaction where a meaningful psychological trigger, say, bereavement → intersubjective ‘cause’ of syndrome 1. But, say in the context of long-term alcohol abuse, the bereavement co-creates ↔ syndrome 2, say, depression.

The diagram below expresses this situation where two syndromes exist and mutually interact. In phenomenological terminology, they are “non selfsufficient”, (XIX/1, 265, III, 29). A flare up in syndrome 1 ‘causes’ a flare up in syndrome 2. The sub-syndrome of biopsychosocial vulnerability gets triggered through a stressful context → syndrome 1 ↔ syndrome 2, so producing two concurrent problems that are intimately connected. The very same possibility can be written differently and adding in the precursors. If one syndrome remains constant but another be-



comes extent, it is still clear where to intervene first of all—with the syndrome that has been extent the longest, represented as:

The constellation above is opposed to the possibility below. A similar but slightly more complex form is the where there is a progression after the cessation of the first problematic, leading to two new concurrent problems written as intersubjective ‘cause’ → triggers syndrome 1 → syndrome 2 ↔ syndrome 3.

Finally, the most complex case concerns increasing imbalance leading to concurrence between two long-standing personality syndromes. If there is further compounding of ineffective defences without change, and without successful interventions, syndromes 1 and 2 become interdependent and interact with little or no prompting by further triggers. In that case maintenance becomes on-going and only ever needs the small meaningful influence to produce a large effect in both. In terms of producing meanings in intersubjective contexts generally, this case is one where two sets of very distressing meanings maintain each other. Pragmatically, an effective therapy is anything that reduces the occurrences of syndromes 1 and 2 on a long-term basis, frequently by clients becoming active in their own care and not just supplying themselves with understanding. In conclusion about the formal notation presented above, in the most general case, the phenomenon of complexity and interaction, formulated above, can be represented in the following representation of how complex interactions can occur. Biological cause ↔ syndrome 1. Psychological ‘cause’ ↔ inaccurate understanding leads to syndrome 2 of ineffective defences and contributes to impairment in personality functioning that has intersubjective effects. Intersubjective ‘cause’ ↔ syndrome 3, for instance, problems in relationships in several social contexts currently. In this final representation distress, defence and impairment are at high levels and there is plenty of obvious evidence for the ego to see every day that it finds many ordinary situations extremely difficult or avoids them altogether in an accurate prediction that they will be very distressing and their defences are ineffective.

Closing Discussion

Pure psychology aims at including and representing possible causes of distress from biology, personal habit and belief, in connection with social contexts as in the representations above. The “medical model” of only the biological causes of distress misses the point of the necessity of focusing on the meanings and empowerment of changing the lifestyle and the meaning of self in the natural attitude lifeworld. When there is biological cause sometimes a syndrome appears, and sometimes it remains a latent possibility or influence of vulnerability and pre-morbidity in the background. Developmentally, what is more often the case is an accumulation of problematic experiences across the lifespan and, in the absence of protective factors and professional help, what is likely to happen are recurrent syndromes that are reactive with respect to social contexts. Across time, what may happen are recurrent experiences of a mood syndrome, for instance, anxiety and depression. But these occurrences

may exacerbate in severity over the years, so producing second, third, fourth and further multiple occurrences of a mood syndrome and related syndromes, either simultaneously occurring or occurring in a temporal order of on-set and spontaneous remission without professional help.

Clinical reasoning occurs between professionals and clients as a set of justifications about how to help them. Such discussions are necessary to help clients take responsibility and make changes on how they look after themselves and respond to their difficulties. Therapy only works on reversible 'causes' that are under the control of clients' egos in relation to their current social context, in order to create long-term changes in meanings and lifestyle. When nature, nurture and intersubjectivity are combined at every step of the way through time, this produces a problem for working with individuals because the pragmatic implication is a need to discuss and agree with them the causes of their problems but in a context that has no certainty. Also, because the ego is responsible for its lifestyle and well-being then its repeated experiences mould its brain and biochemistry in specific ways. Yet the biological contribution is currently unknowable with precision yet the contract is that therapists will help their clientele reduce their distress to some degree. Whatever the amount of cause from inherited personality traits and biological temperament, the ego is responsible to look after itself, problem-solve and remain committed to its own well-being.

The reversible 'causes' that can be accessed in the psychosocial sphere are those of the ego's potential control of its lifestyle. For instance, the syndrome of depression can be tolerated and understood. But if the conditions of possibility of its 'cause' are reactions to meaningful changes that are not understood, and attempts to self-care do not work, then influences become excessive. When people do not know how to self-care and lessen their distress, then what begins as a reactive vulnerability can, through repetition and lack of genuine problem-solving, become the on-set of a syndrome. For instance, the cumulative effect of low mood spreads across the various domains of social contexts of work, home and play. Without adequate reflection and alteration, in this general case of intersubjective 'cause', the ego can add to its own sense of loss with worry, fixation on the loss, worry about their own efficacy and worry about what other people might be thinking and feeling about them. Hence, in addition to the initial sense of depression there is added the avoidance of social contexts that would maintain good mood and good functioning. Hence, the links between the individual and their social world are the creation of a useful abstraction. The individual is momentarily taken out of his or her context and considered in terms of what they bring to their interactions in everyday life. The good news is that through understanding and action, it is possible to alter the emotional tone felt about the same object and behaviour towards it.

Personality syndromes mean that there are a series of intersubjective problems that belong entirely to the ego and consciousness because the person themselves is the constant factor across all their social contexts. Similarly, the defences used persist across many domains, for decades of the lifespan. One telling point is to compare how a syndrome in one area is present or absent in other areas of life. The personality is in-part the way that people style themselves defensively in the psychodynamic

view of their interactions. People are motivated because of how they feel, how they believe how they should defend themselves, and how they construe the world to pre-empt problems that belong to themselves, rather than to the situations that they enter. Personality syndromes often include lack of genuine insight into self. There is a lack of accurate apperception because evidence is mis-interpreted and inaccurate beliefs are maintained in a reified way, and there can be beliefs without any current evidence at all. Perhaps this is what Freud was interpreting when he wrote that the unconscious in his view seems to be “*timeless*”, (1915e, 186), in that the long-distant influence of childhood and previous relationships still operate. Passive consciousness, “the unconscious”, follows its own sense of order and presences in retentive consciousness, for the most part, remain as one condition of possibility in the current recognition of the sense of distress and negative emotion. Trauma is a particularly good example because torture, even if it was 30 years ago, can leave its mark in altering the ego, its lifestyle and social context. Freud focused on understanding dreams, neurosis and psychosis as the constitutions of the unconscious which they in-part are but in the sense that a great deal of conscious experience is the result of anonymously functioning consciousness having played a role in making meaning. Also, because a great deal of what consciousness is conscious-of is passively created, the ego merely receives what that part of itself has made for it. There is an unusual counter-intuitive phenomenon where understanding beliefs, attachment styles from childhood and earlier life stay the same and remain impervious to evidence to the contrary. The phenomenon is one of inertia to adaptation and responsiveness to the contemporary surroundings, so that defences, beliefs and understanding are connected to selective attention and resistance to change. Across a life time there will be disconfirmatory evidence, but bias remains that is ignored in favour of earlier inaccurate beliefs and learnings staying the same. However, early learning has priority because it shapes earliest part of the developmental trajectory of the lifespan. This status quo bias of the ego and its defences contribute to define the personality style. For once established, habits of using the intentionalities, behaving and relating may be difficult to change.

Summary

The formalism above relates to the existing literature on noting causes as expressed by Michael Lyons et al. (1997) and Angélique Cramer et al. (2010). Although several other writers have made similar statements on biopsychosocial formulation including Ross (2000). The formalism represents multifactorial interactions between the types of cause that interact. There could be cases where some aspects of mental health are initially caused biologically through heritability, whilst later syndromes are ‘caused’ through intersubjective learning across the lifespan or are due to the receipt of neglect or violence from attachment figures. In the biopsychosocial case, there is a co-occurrence of two different sorts of cause. There can be cases where there are sub-syndromal presentations which may be an inherent part of the person-

ality. The textbook definitions of syndromes are checklists where if persons have five out of nine symptoms, for instance, they get the diagnosis. But if they only have four out of nine, they do not. Accordingly, what is being referred to are complex processes of self-regulation where greater influence can be accessed by the ego choosing some new way for coping, rather than relying on the previous set of beliefs, habits and behaviours that maintains the syndromes. Clinical reasoning is focused on creating explicitly discussed and agreed formulations of the maintenance of distress in current circumstances. It leads to thinking through where to intervene and how to help clients restore their own balance, where they are active in how to look after themselves. So the type of therapy that is forthcoming is not just relating with the therapist and the discussion of understanding, with no other endpoint in mind. Some thought is required about the active ingredients in therapy. The answer is that on working backwards from a successful outcome, when clients have changed their understanding, their insight about themselves and permanently altered their lifestyles, social contexts and sense of self, the following appears: meanings are part of larger intersubjective processes that influence the conditions of possibility, but do not prevent the free will of the ego from reclaiming a new lifestyle. The ability for capturing these persistent processes with intentionality shines through. Formulation captures the forms of belief, anticipation of the future, the interpretation of experiential evidence, the understanding employed and supports the ego choosing between specific options. The problems of personality and the recurrent contextual-psychological syndromes are attempted solutions that are usually ineffective in managing distress that frequently contribute to maintaining or even increasing the distress experienced rather than attenuating it. The way forward is to help clients find the factors that make life a positive event, such as the set of interests including hobbies, more positive relationships, interests and sufficient time off to promote their niche in life.

Chapter 15

On Being Unable to Control Variables in Intersubjectivity

Given that the proofs of the exact essences like mathematics are the achievements of the natural sciences and technology, it is to be seen what the empirical impact will be from inexact morphological essences. This chapter compares psychometrics and the numericisation of meaning in natural psychological science with the pure psychological approach. The argument below is that empirical methods need to be suitable for the form of being that is researched. For instance, randomised control trial (RCT) methodology is considered suitable for testing pharmaceutical products; and it is assumed to be suitable for testing the effectiveness of different brands of therapy. RCT methodology like any type of empiricism makes a series of ontological assumptions which in testing pharmaceuticals are acceptable to a degree. But if it is agreed that variables in intersubjective processes like therapy are incapable of being investigated in the same way, then findings from that method are unacceptable. The main problem is the difference between treating the client-therapist relationship as if it were a pharmaceutical product when it is a meaningful, evolving interaction between two or more people. The RCT methodology is compared to another form of psychological testing of the efficacy of therapy practice. The aim of the chapter is clarifying the differences between the naturalistic attitude and the pure psychological one. Naturalistically, if the focus is on serotonin in the brain then it would be necessary to medicate because the assumption is that serotonin helps decrease the strength of all emotions and so helps the brain alter its physiology through naturalistic causes. Empirical psychology is noted as permitting the Popperian falsificationist style of hypothesis-driven methods, observations and experiments. Testing falsifiable claims can become sharper when testing what really counts. Given that therapy techniques are ways of understanding and changing meaning, the pure psychological view considers brands of therapy and mental health care as merely alternate means to the same end. In a close attention to detail the natural psychological approach to experimental design is to make two groups of participants who are judged to be sufficiently similar. Psychometric testing is

applied to quantify some psychological aspect of both groups and to measure the impact of a treatment in therapy research (or some other intervention that is given to one group but not the other). The assumptions made are that there are other unmeasured and uncontrolled variables that will affect the participants and show up in the psychometric scores obtained. However, with a large sample size it is assumed that such tendencies will be averaged out to show the impact of the intervention and its absence on two equivalent groups of participants. The acceptability of this assumption is challenged below. The chapter ends with noting the consequences for an empirical therapy and mental health care based on formulation.

The Differences Between the Medical Model, Randomised Control Trials and Meanings in Intersubjectivity

Currently, the dominant paradigm and self-understanding of psychotherapy is that the discipline should be effective in promoting change and the way to achieve this is through empirical RCTs about quantitative outcomes between brands of practice. In the randomised control trial RCT view, the inquiry concerns what is most effective with *single* psychological problems according to the empirical research carried out so far. A further problem is how to attend to the variables introduced by two or more individuals in a relationship of care-provision and receipt. There are many meaning-oriented processes occurring as therapists work to help clients change their meanings, relationships and manage strong emotions. In a high resolution view of practice, it can be asserted that each therapist has their way of practising. So it is a question as to how subtly nuanced intersubjective meetings can be properly represented by a finite number of brand name types of practice. The main problem is that in the intersubjective life, the amount of variables is huge and cannot be controlled in experimental research. Contrary to intersubjectivity mutuality and reciprocity, what RCT research assumes is that only the therapy brand, the style of input from the therapist, is the only causative factor for clients and this is untrue. A naturalistic cousin is outcome research in psychotherapy where RCTs use statistics to understand the effectiveness of the therapeutic relationship despite criticisms of the ability of psychometrics to deliver reliable conclusions (Dar et al. 1994; Henshaw 2005). Thus, the contemporary concern is practising according to the findings of empirical research supported by the use of statistics. This creates competition between the 550 therapies for children and adolescents (Kazdin 2000). There is a proliferation occurring because in 1981 there were only 250 styles of therapy practised for adults (Corsini 1981).

RCT research is compared to the fundamental nature of therapy meetings. RCT methodology seeks to find how effective brand name approaches are with single syndromes. The RCT format is where a specific brand of therapy is provided for one set of persons, who are the test group, whilst other persons who are allegedly homogenous, are provided with a different treatment. However, to understand this experimental design requires understanding the medical model of the biological

sciences as used in pharmacology and medical science (Healy et al. 2014). With attention to detail it becomes apparent that there is something wrong with the RCT format which is the most favoured means of judging the effectiveness of specific brands of therapy. The first point is that the naturalistic “medical model” of investigating natural being is used for comparing and contrasting the meaning-making processes of therapy. The double-blind drug trial is the research design on which RCT of therapies are made. In a double-blind drug trial, a drug, *a single compound*, is administered to patients with physical illnesses by staff who do not know which treatments are effective and which are not. Thus, the trial is doubly blind, both to staff and patients as to which persons are receiving the medication that is on trial and which do not. The only researchers know which patients are receiving the trial medication and which get the ineffective medication. This is important because counter-intuitively, patients can get better without ever being given anything more than a pill with no active ingredients: The “placebo phenomenon”, as it is called, can operate to the extent that in medicine, pain reduction in cancer can be as high as 55% compared to morphine (Evans 1985) and as high as 70% in the treatment of stomach ulcers (Moerman 2008).

Stiles and Shapiro (1989) were the first authors to make the criticisms of the RCT format that are ontological. They refer to the RCT paradigm as the “pharmacotherapy model” or the “drug metaphor” in relation to its research design that necessitates the use of identical clients and contexts. This is problematic because human beings are not identical and statistical procedures are invoked to average the changes between an active psychological ingredient and its absence. For RCT to work with people, allegedly identical clients are matched with allegedly identical therapists practising a specific manualised brand of interaction. For the RCT method to work it is assumed that the one and only difference, the independent variable that is assumed to cause change, is only the input from therapists. This is a problem because it denies any participation between the client and therapist; and different degrees of contribution from both. This is problematic because the RCT format in medicine is acceptable in showing how well physical treatments perform in treating disease. But when the same format is transferred to intersubjective interactions it does not represent meetings where the medium of change is social contact and interpersonal influence. Participants are given an allegedly standardised therapy in a research clinic in the hope that it can test the ‘single ingredient’ of one brand name therapy, to measure its effect against no treatment or another treatment. If this is done across the entire field, what the research findings on empirical effectiveness would show is that the winners of this competition are the ‘most effective brands of therapy’. Accordingly, these must have the most accurate forms of understanding driving them. By this reasoning, it would seem plausible that cognitive behavioural therapy is most effective in its practice and the most accurate in its theory while other brands are poor in both theory and practice.

In RCT thinking it is assumed that the psycho-active intentional processes are only the brand name interaction and the number of sessions. Its representation of the process is that there are no other active causative ingredients of change. But Stiles and Shapiro (1989) do not agree. Even in studies where standardised manuals have

been used to train therapists in order to help them work in a standardised manner, there are still differences in the interpretation of the manuals which suggests that the claim to be able to practise a standardised therapy is unachievable. Stiles and Shapiro remark that therapy trials do not rule out placebo effects. When it comes to the interpretation of statistical results there is an assumption that linear interpolations exist between process and outcome (dose and response). However, it is more likely the case that there are optimum levels of receiving interventions and clients are active in selecting topics for discussion (and not others), and choose when to stop the meetings or drop out if they feel that they are wasting their time or are unable to change. This is parallel to taking medication that may have adverse side-effects as well as the desired effect. There is an assumption that the RCT format is fair to all brand name therapies because it is widely regarded as the dominant psychological scientific method. Stiles and Shapiro note the RCT model goes unchallenged despite it being the case that drug trials only consider one variable: the drug and its absence. This is not so in therapy as part of the lifeworld because there are multiple causes and multiple effects, all concurrent with each other (Stiles and Shapiro 1989, 532).

It becomes a wonder as to how like can be compared with like, between the findings of any two well-designed pieces of RCT research: Even if 1500 persons are initially interviewed and only 100 are given the brand to be studied and another 100 are allocated to a different type of treatment altogether. In doing this, 1300 persons would need to be turned down for the research because they have more than one syndrome or for other reasons they are insufficiently homogenous for the creation of the two groups that will be given the treatments. For instance, although participants have been diagnosed as having the syndrome in question, if it was concurrent with a series of other problems it becomes difficult to work out if therapy brand x works with syndrome A—because the included persons also have syndromes and contextual influences in a random manner. In medication trials of new psychopharmaceuticals, a null or insignificant statistical correlation means that the way in which a dose of medication gets absorbed and metabolized by the body is due to the individual biological characteristics of the patients and that the drug has no effect in comparison to a completely ineffective pill. In therapy, despite extensive research since the 1930s, there is still no consensus about what specifically helps clients who improve. Nor is it clear that therapists ‘cause’ specific events to happen because different clients react differently to the same interventions. Some people need repetition of the same intervention to make sure that rationales are understood, are being employed and that they have worked properly.

Another assumption identified by Stiles and Shapiro is that it is assumed that clients are inert and make no contribution to the meetings. But that is a gross misrepresentation of the nature of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, clients control their amount of self-disclosure and involvement with therapists. Stiles and Shapiro suggest that clients monitor and judge what it is safe for them to work on with any therapist. So rather than all therapeutic input coming from therapists, it is the case that clients and their abilities play a part in regulating therapy and that makes them ‘active ingredients’ too. However, some clients are eager for help and express

themselves well, and really know how to use the opportunities offered them. Some take the smallest implication of what is being discussed with them and run with it, so working to solve problems that they have been suffering with and do so with much aplomb that cannot be credited to therapists—primarily because these matters were never discussed with their worker. In other words, some clients excel in their ability to use the opportunities that are offered them. So the outcomes for clients in a therapeutic relationship are not just a product of responsive relating and clever interventions that hit the right spot. Clients also use their new understanding in their own ways. Therapy ends with relapse prevention, a phase before ending that helps people take responsibility for the on-going maintenance of their recovery thereafter. Thus, people take responsibility for staying recovered through occupying a new lifestyle that *maintains the changes made*: Thus, one upshot is learning from practice and being guided by the experience of working with clients in the right way (Argyris and Schön 1974; Kolb 1983; Schön 1983). What makes a good therapist regardless of brand name is a commitment to receiving feedback from clients plus a commitment to on-going learning about theory, research and practice across the length a career.

However, when the biological RCT model is properly enacted, biologists know there are no simple linear relationships between the physical processes of biochemistry, neurology and biology. In inanimate matter, natural science works by being able to designate necessary and sufficient initial conditions for the causes of highly specific phenomena that are always the same when the conditions of cause are the same: such is the constancy of inanimate being. But even that is not the case with biology (Elasser 1981). This is not a criticism of the biological model which is fully acceptable for biological scientific research, when that too is properly designed and enacted. What is being raised is the question of the conditions of possibility for studying consciousness in a full developmental context where the biopsychosocial influences interact with each other across the course of the lifespan. Specifically, there are a number of causally insufficient conditions that co-occur. Each specific causal factor may play a different role in individual cases. In double-blind drug trials of medication, 100 mg of drug X is the same in Mexico as it is in France but that does not mean that the bodies of French people and Mexicans are the same in metabolising the medication.

Pure Psychology Criticisms

Pure psychology can criticise the RCT format. The major problem is that in RCT research, natural psychological science is built on the ontological model of the double-blind drug trial in biological medicine that makes a number of assumptions that do not apply when it comes to understanding meaning-constitution in intersubjectivity. However, sessions as intersubjective interchanges are not standardisable because of the responsiveness between therapists and their clients and what happens outside of sessions. And furthermore, the ‘dose’ of what is happening between the two persons

in a therapeutic relationship is the number of sessions that promotes changes in meaning and supporting them in changing themselves. However, the intersubjective set of connections to others can be back-grounded, and then what appears as foreground is the individual whose meanings, mood and experiences get numericised, to become an individual in abstraction. So in the case of RCT design it is incorrect to attribute change (or its absence) to a specific therapy brand name entirely due to the therapy in question. The idea that statistics can be used to manipulate the numerical scores made in an impartial way is also a falsehood because consciousness is contextually-responsive and temporally-variable particularly with respect to current contexts and the effects of past contexts producing the associations of learning (Falk 1998; Jones and Sommerlund 2007; Kline 2004; Rossi 1987).

But therapy, an inter-responsive meeting between persons who wants care and those one who offer is neither a standardisable treatment nor is it capable of being made unresponsive without it losing its caring character. There are no therapeutic input variables that 'cause' single outcomes from the psycho-active ingredients of the conditions of possibility of meaning and communication. Stiles and Shapiro (1989) point out that fifty minutes with Paul practising therapy of brand X is not the same as fifty minutes with Pauline practising the same. Apart from the powerful effects of placebo being ignored, Stiles and Shapiro argue that this assumption is "absurd". They explain that a therapeutic 'dosage' is really a collaborative relationship with many impure mixtures of processes from both parties. For clients, their meaning-making habits and beliefs of understanding, and their ways of making themselves manifest with respect to others, may or may not be engaged by their worker. To the extent that clients feel heard, respected and understood, they permit trust and influence and so open themselves to change via the human connection. (Or not as the case may be). It's true that interventions may need to be repeated and checks made in the next session to see whether interventions agreed with clients have been applied by them in the intervening week. Accordingly, interventions may need to be repeated, but this concerns more the ability for clients to absorb the meaning-changing ingredients.

The problem with quantitative research as exemplified by the RCT model is that it overlooks the meanings and intersubjective responsiveness between unique individuals. If psychological research has the general aim of capturing understanding about that which is most relevant to the research question, then according to Bill Stiles and colleagues, the quantitative model is severely flawed because in philosophical terms, it entails unsuitable ontological consequences. Let me be more precise about the ontological assumptions of the drug metaphor as identified by Stiles (2009, 2013). If outcome is assumed to be distinct from process, the relation between the two is assumed to be one direct and identifiable cause-effect relation. For this to be true the referent situation itself would have to be *one* cause-effect relation. The referent would have to have a measurable outcome of change entirely caused by the brand name practised or its absence. In other words, all consequences and changes that arise for clients are assumed to be only the result of therapists providing a sufficient length of treatment and staying "on model" in delivering a standardised therapeutic process (Stiles and Shapiro 1989, 526). Stiles and Shapiro

question the identification of these cause-effect linkages. They also question the simplistic understanding that psychological health is an easily measurable outcome.

When it comes to the applicability of the RCT method to therapy research, the preferred means of working out which brand name therapies are effective, then when scrutinising the fine detail of how a piece of RCT research has been designed, it may be the case that some RCTs follow the model accurately and produce comparable outcomes; whilst others do not. However, there seems to be no possibility of holding meaning-changing processes constant during a RCT or any other therapy research format or ensuring that client contributions can be standardised or that the social context around clients be prevented from affecting them. For therapy to be able to obey the double-blind drug trial methodology there should only ever be *one* meaning-changing process present at a time, not two or more. Clearly, because there are many ‘causative’ ingredients in understanding meaning in intersubjectivity and working to change it and associated lifestyles and mood, then the logic of finding the efficacy of *one* ‘causative’ agent is confounded. The base reason is that ontologically and hermeneutically, RCT reasoning is incongruent with the being of meaning for consciousness in intersubjectivity where there are wholes of sense that are open to numerous contextual influences. The RCT medical model assumes that therapy is a set dose of meaning-changing influence. But that is not the being of meaning for consciousness. The way forwards is to be more specific about how changes in meanings can be precisely communicated, the therapeutic discussion of agreements about rationales and the means of achieving them. The next section offers a completely different view of effectiveness of therapists on average.

Empirical Research About Therapy as it is Practised

However, there are other empirical findings that represent the referent of therapy as it is practised. One worthy of attention has a sample size of 33 587 completed therapies not made within research clinics (Stiles 2013, 36; Stiles et al. 2008a, b). When it comes to interactions between two people, a positive statistical correlation should actually mean that a therapy brand works. But this is not the finding of research into practice in the real world with the general public (Barkham et al. 2005). The statistically averaged finding is that all brands of practice, including eclectic changing of practice brand between different between sessions, is that all approaches are equally effective. The research literature discusses this finding that many brands of allegedly different therapies produce the same effect on average. This outcome shows that, despite there being highly specific processes across different brand names of therapy; they produce uniform changes. It is called the “equivalence paradox”, (Stiles et al. 1986) and is connected to the view that there are common factors within therapy and this promotes empirical research to find the core process by which it works. In brief three major findings are:

- Three major brand names of therapy (each of which were practised in two different forms) were found to be equally effective as measured by therapists practising in the real world not following the RCT format in a research clinic where unsuitable clients have been rejected.
- Individual therapists of any brand are consistently effective with the range of different clients that they see who have various combinations of personality and contextual syndromes.
- Each of the brand names have their own theory and practice yet these have no pragmatic difference in effectiveness.

The finding that all brands on average are similarly effective was called the “Dodo bird” conclusion by Saul Rosenzweig in 1936. He was referring to the declaration by the Dodo bird in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* that: “*Everybody* has won and *all* must have prizes”, (Rosenzweig 1936, 412). This is problematic because the received wisdom is that therapists have definable psychoactive social skills and special knowledge—but that is contradicted by the equivalence hypothesis as defined by Stiles et al. (1986). The Dodo bird finding only occurs outside of formal RCT research though. The “equivalence hypothesis” or “equivalence paradox” means that despite the many brands having entirely different ideologies, attitudes, skills and techniques—when these are practised in the real world they amount to the same outcome. Thus making claims to be the best and most effective appear problematic, particularly in the light of the finding that outcomes are not related to verbal techniques either (Stiles and Shapiro 1994).

Working backwards from the equivalence paradox raises many questions though. Stiles et al. (2008b, 680) found that there is an equal effect size of 1.39 which means that the average amount of change that was created by receiving therapy moved people, on average, from 17.6 points of distress down to 8.83 points, on the Core outcome measure that scores well being and distress from 0 to 40 points. One standard deviation was 6.64 points of change (CORE System Group 1998). Therefore, the effect size of the difference divided by the standard deviation is 1.39, which represents the effectiveness of three of the therapies most widely practised outside of research programmes, as it is practised with the general public. Statistically, a change of more than 4.9 points showed reliable change. So with statistical confidence, 58% of those clients involved moved from above 10 points of distress to below that level; and a further 21% were judged as being less than 4.9 points changed, so could not be judged as being statistically significantly improved; and 1% of the total population had deteriorated by more than 4.9 points.

Across different brands in the real world, individual therapists still need to justify what they do by reaching out to a group of colleagues with whom they share theory, practice and supervision. From this perspective, the received wisdom of the ‘necessity’ of being “on model” (practising a pure brand of therapy) and delivering a sufficient dose (a treatment of sufficient length to make a positive impact) of interventions has no result in increased effectiveness. Furthermore, the outcome equivalence of brands shows that there is a need to establish that an acceptable mode of research is one that can work across the full range of competing brand names. Or

more likely, the infinite range of client-therapist verbal and nonverbal social acts that comprise therapy meetings need to be mapped in a way that does not rely on the use of statistics for a context- and time-dependent set of phenomena of meaning for consciousness in intersubjectivity. As once noted, “there are lies, damned lies and statistics”, (Price 1894, 88). Also a positive statistical correlation does not imply cause-effect relations between a brand of practice and the outcome achieved for clients. Correlation is not causation. If many people play violent computer games and one of them runs amok with a high velocity rifle and shoots 70 strangers at random, this does not mean that playing violent computer games causes running amok, any more than running amok correlates with wearing blue denim trousers. Biopsychosocially in the sessions, intentional ‘causation’ of positive change may be attributable to unidentified causative factors that are not capable of being measured with precision. The most likely of which is the moment to moment intersubjectivity involved in a caring relationship. Therefore, RCT is an ontologically unsuitable model as it only looks at client-outcome and therapist-input and not at the other aspects of the meaningful responsiveness of clients’ negative relationships or uncontrollable effects in their social contexts, as noted by Hans Strupp (1963). Strupp remarked that causative influences from therapists include events in the client’s social context, the on-going responses in each session and their effort to understand and use what is being offered them.

The first attempt at explaining these empirical findings is to infer from an attachment perspective that what happens in therapy, across the board of the different theories and practices, is that it is the quality of the intersubjective relationship that counts (Bowlby 1969, 1973, 1980; Heard and Lake 1986, 1997). Claims to be able to follow a manual in a research trial does not detract from the need to be responsive, apply theoretical understandings and be accountable in a flexible way to the needs of clients. If that is so, then professionally there is a Tower of Babel yet the international language is the felt-connection between the parties involved, where specific workers do their best in serving the public. It remains an open question as to how allegedly different forms of interchanges of social acts of verbal and nonverbal communication between specific clients and therapists can be classed as ‘the same’ in RCT research. In high resolution, in a full attention to the detail of what happens in making meaning, there appear to be a manifold of unique interchanges that follow the ideal structure of intersubjectivity. It’s only with a low resolution approach that different interchanges become capable of being classed as the same or similar, when in fact there are very many different types of interchanges. The RCT way of thinking obscures the fact of the matter that what happens between clients and therapists are unique occurrences where there is meaning-change in a highly detailed way that are represented as one brand of practice being better or worse than another.

As anyone who uses weekly measures of client distress is able to show, through weekly rating with measures like Core 10 or Core 34, that the major variables in a person’s life are influenced by what is happening for them outside of the sessions (CORE Systems Group 1998). When repeated, the measures show that what the scores really represent is the sum total of what is happening through the influence of the therapy and outside of it in their lives. Many influences act on clients during

their week outside of one 50 minute session of one-to-one influence. Contextual meanings and motivations may conspire to help or hinder them in understanding and changing. When meaning is understood as meaning-for-consciousness, where the ego is turned towards the traditions of representation and the transmission of meaning as it exists in culture and society, then the conclusion is that the meaningful register has no direct cause on biological changes. The connection to biology is mediated due to the interpretations of sense made by individuals who live in the culture and may be due to the amounts of repetitions of meaning-constitutions enacted there. For therapies that are provided in RCT research, even if they are delivered after a training programme of three months duration that defines the therapeutic process to be used according to a manual, even if the interviewers who allocate participants go through a training to standardise their diagnostic skills, and even if the clients are sufficiently homogenous in the amount of time and level of severity of their syndrome, then the therapy is still impossible to standardise. Similarly, sessions need to be rated and coded in highly standardised ways before using statistics to improve inter-rater reliability. Specifically, what needs to be identical across all RCTs for them to be comparable are the participants and how they are included or rejected, the self-scoring or means of scoring using the measures, the statistics used, precisely the same brand of therapy or manual used and the amount of training in the brand employed. If research and rating were fully standardised, it would mean being able to treat clients the same in addition to the test and control groups being highly similar. Thus natural psychological science has accepted a false belief: it has mistaken its map for the territory.

When it comes to enabling changes in the meaning-constitution of the objects of others, there is no simple therapist-input which linearly 'causes' a client-output. Both persons interpret and use the explicit and the implicit messages sent by each other in idiosyncratic ways. There are a large number of meaning-constituting processes at work. Lambert and Barley (2002, 18) came to the conclusion that 40% of change on average, created by therapy was due to extratherapeutic change in the home life contexts of clients, 30% was from common factors, the next 15% came from heightened expectations of effectiveness before being treated and the final 15% was from techniques themselves. The details of what they concluded are: Extratherapy changes include spontaneous remission due to changes in the social context, fortuitous events in the clients' life and the effects of positive social support. Common factors are those aspects that are shared with all other therapies: such as empathy, warmth and acceptance as urged by Carl Rogers (1959), plus encouragement of positive risk-taking to overcome negative emotions, attention to confidentiality, the therapeutic alliance made and other relationship process factors. Heightened expectations are those matters such as placebo effects of the reputation of the therapist or clinic involved, the clients' knowledge of how they are treated and the clients' positive expectation that they will be helped. Finally, there are techniques including the use of habituation, relaxation or other specific techniques that permit changes in the maintenance of here and now meanings. These then permit change of sense about the agreed focus of the therapy.

Meaning as the Central Concern of any Psychology, Psychotherapy or Mental Health Care

This section comments on the map of consciousness and intersubjective meaning for understanding the interpreted-reality of everyday relating, acting, thinking and feeling. The general assumption of natural science is that anything obtained through science is somehow basic and justified. But on the contrary to natural science and the natural attitude, pure psychology shows that this assumption of what is ground and what is superstructure is reversed. For pure psychology, everyday unclarified experience and meanings are the ground that needs interpreting. Useful understanding does not appear until a priori systems of thought exist, like geometry with respect to shapes, or numbers with respect to objects, or sets with respect to categories. The role of pure psychology is to state a priori concerning meaning in relation to noemata and noeses about objects of attention. So with the importance of meaning properly asserted, only then does it become possible to understand what natural psychological science does to meaning as it is lived. Meaningful behaviours within the one meaningful world can be best understood as having a specific style with respect to greater wholes of sense that accrue across the personal history (XI, 339).

Meaning for consciousness stands as the subject matter of the psychologies and social studies and is a different type of being altogether in comparison to the biological substrate or observable behaviours in the absence of meaning. Pure psychology protects the phenomena of meaning, understanding belief, experience and existence, and acknowledges the discussion of different points of view. As noted above the being of consciousness is not the same as the being of biological or natural being. The false interpretation of the primacy of natural being leads to false problems of focusing only on it in preference for ignoring consciousness as either irrelevant or not worthy of scientific attention. For the naturalistic and the natural attitudes there is the confusion of dualism. But just because the being of consciousness is a different order of being with respect to its biological substrate therein lies the answer of staying with a self-reflexive view that all theories and all empirical methods are activities born of consciousness. The gift of understanding is that whether something *exists* (or not), and what something *means* (or not) and how it is *referred to* are key concerns that can only be mapped through understanding the essence of consciousness called intentionality. Pure psychology aims to be more fundamental than Cartesian dualism and stick to what is given of biopsychosocial being to consciousness and make ontological arguments from the position. Some natural psychological scientists and some naturalistically-informed therapists believe that the problem of the ontological difference between the being of consciousness and natural being has long been overcome. Phenomenology begs to differ because “psychic reality is founded in the psyche. More generally we can say: the material world is... a closed world of its own needing no help from other realities. On the other hand, the existence of mental realities, of a real mental world, is bound to the existence of a nature in the first sense, namely that of material nature, and this not for accidental but for fundamental reasons. While the *res extensa*, if we inquire of its essence,

contains nothing of mentalness and nothing that would demand beyond itself a connection with real mentalness, we find conversely that real mentalness essentially can be only in connection to materiality as real mind of an animate organism”, (V, 117). The ‘little problem’ of Cartesian dualism is relevant (Merleau-Ponty 1964). Cartesian dualism is a genuine philosophical problem that has not been overcome but needs to be addressed in the right way. Elisabeth Ströker puts it well: “for Husserl this difference did not consist in a dualism of two metaphysical entities. Phenomenologically it consisted in different modes of givenness, which he could make transcendently perspicuous in detail only through a number of abstract divisions”, (1993, 131). Thus, the givenness of biology and meaning for consciousness are genuine problems for the natural psychological sciences as well as psychotherapy practice. This is for the reason that the three registers of the being of the *natural*, the being of solo *consciousness* and the being of *consciousness in intersubjectivity* are different when each is conceived according to their being. But when they are understandable as meanings for consciousness it creates an overall congruence of understanding (which remains lacking if only natural being is preferred). If the focus is only on neurology, biochemistry or the activity of neurons, with a weak attention to what these map in meaningful experience, then “the microscope”, the instrument of inquiry, is facing the wrong way and is not focused on what it should be. When centrality is given to consciousness, and that it is represented in general or specific instances, then not only is meaning highlighted, it actually lessens the possibility of colleagues talking at cross-purposes or not being able to communicate with the public.

Meaning for consciousness cannot be dismissed by saying that Cartesian duality has been overcome for that says nothing of the detail about how consciousness inhabits the meaningful world of observable behaviour, influenced by biological, sociological and historical processes in complex ways. If meaningful and everyday experiences are deemed insufficient objects of science, then science refuses to understand itself because it too is a cultural product. Nor does it follow that acceptable formulations of intersubjective understanding and empathy are entirely due to the understanding of mirror neurons, neurotransmitters and the biochemistry of emotion. Some basic pointers laid down by Husserl were that: “Obviously, human consciousness requires an appearing leib and an intersubjective leib—an intersubjective understanding. Let us already presuppose a plurality of subjects in mutual intersubjective understanding, thus a certain “Objectively” constituted world with “Objective” things, leiben, and real and Objective spirits. A certain relation of the sensations to the respective Objective leib is thereby already presupposed. And let us assume, as it does actually happen, that my leib is a system of sense organs, related to the central organ B[rain]. It is on this that the emergence of sensory phantasms and sensations is dependent”, (IV, 290), in the sense that leiben and consciousnesses only appear in cultural groups, as necessary conditions for sharing consciousness in the mutual world. But leiblich sensations and consciousness are refuted as being parallel or identical levels of the biopsychosocial whole (IV, 294). The two moments of biology and consciousness are concluded as: “Subjects cannot *be* dissolved into nature, for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing”, (IV, 297). And the spirit is “*absolute, irrelative*” a self-sufficient whole (IV, 297).

Hermeneutic Stance About Meaning

Currently, the empirical subject areas of psychology such as child development, learning in children, human development across the lifespan, the biology of learning and cognition, the study of individual differences, personality or language acquisition and psycholinguistics, share a focus on the overall view of what happens. These areas are studied empirically with the focus on findings rather than self-reflexive inquiry about the fundamentals of what meanings are for consciousness and what happens when meaning gets numericised. Over the development of the discipline of empirical psychology, there have been a series of attempts to agree on what counts as the interpretive style of the discipline. Any area of psychological reality can be given a qualitative or quantitative approach which means that they are either attempted to be kept as wholes, analogues of implicit and explicit sense; or such senses are numericised and made into discrete codes and quantities for statistical procedures. This is how current empirical natural psychological science addresses itself to real manifestations of the psychological life in its multitude of different contexts. A key point to note from the pure psychological perspective is the degree to which the empirical findings produced remain focused on the centrality of meaning in intersubjectivity.

Pure psychology interprets with the aim of being emic. It unfolds what is both explicit and implicit in meaningfulness, and contextualises any noetic-noematic correlation about an object that is imaginatively conceivable, to extend the power of reflection and identify relations between dependent moments concerning how people live in their meanings and social contexts (III, 144, 203–205, 227, IX, 33, 227–228, 325). This idealistic interpretation supports empiricism because it makes fundamental distinctions about the being of consciousness (V, 39, VI, 209). But the centrality of the matter is the interpretation of universal and necessary constituents of the intentionality-object correlations and how these relate to the pre-reflexive and reflexive views of what appears (IX, 72–93). It is precisely a focus on universal features that belong to every real and imaginable instance of a specific type of noesis-noema correlation (V, 40). The task is to explain the enabling conditions for the meaningfulness of objects within specific regions of being.

The emic-etic distinction is a useful theoretical distinction to make because the ultimate aim of theorising consciousness is to represent formally any individual instance of consciousness or any research finding. The proposal is mapping instances to produce written or verbal statements that represent an awareness or a series of changes in awareness across time in such a way that the representation produced is clearly understood by the person that it is about and the professional group of theoreticians and researchers. Emic means having a set of sufficient distinctions about the consciousness-world whole for consciousness in general. Thus, comments about consciousness and its surrounding world or the suggestion to practice eidetic imaginative variation of self and world are focused on the endpoint of identifying the dependent moments (I, 106, 117, IX, 334–335). Emic concepts about consciousness are those that are entirely focused on consciousness free of presumptions of

thought that come from the vulgar context of being unable to focus on it. Emic concepts are those which are necessary with respect to the end point of being able to represent the first-person experiences of others, including a focus on how people empathise the social world and the cultural objects in it. Specifically, emic concepts are fit for purpose in understanding any research topic as they have been found from the inherent being of the object itself. Etic concepts are imported from another area entirely and so could never represent their object properly. In short, the argument is an interpretative one: it is an argument about what concepts show the being of consciousness sufficiently well; opposed to those which are clearly insufficient. In the parlance of the emic and the etic, natural psychological science is only focused on its natural-biological conclusions set far in advance. An emic development of the biopsychosocial perspective is what should have been achieved before empirical traditions of interpretation and experimentalism are decided: A sufficiently astute theoretical answer is one that accurately brings together the complex set of influences from the three registers of being human. This is a hermeneutic problem because in natural psychological science, one third of the tripartite whole is mistaken as adequately representative of the whole. This is what Husserl was fighting when he wrote that there was only one region for his transcendental phenomenology (VI, 275–276). What it means for pure psychology is that meaning for consciousness coordinates findings from biopsychosocial where meanings and their intentionalities become the universal language for meta-representing what the truth might be and making them recognisable intersubjectively to promote clear discussion. Because of falsificationism, there is no certainty in science. It's best to include the provisional conclusions of biology within understanding as an influence in investigating meanings qualitatively. But without a theory of meaning-constitution, the precise detail of what are acceptable rules for the translation of analogue meaning into discrete numerical sizes remain unknown. For instance, the quality control and error bands that can be known about any processes about what happens when statistics are applied and then interpreted in producing answers about statistical averages. Currently, it is unclear how the mathematical processes used refer to their original experiential and meaningful objects of concern (Fig. 15.1). However, the statistical tools used are 'causative' of their own unique spin on the numerical evidence used. In some cases, with a blunt statistical tool, large numbers of participants are required for the tool to be applicable. In other cases, smaller numbers of participants would be acceptable. What Fig. 15.1 shows is that natural psychological science takes an etic stance that re-interprets the subject matter. So whilst supposing that it is attending to the overall biopsychosocial whole, it does in fact give an excessive priority to the use of statistics in altering meaningful experiences into numbers that are put through statistical measures, then concluded as being representative of the meaningful cause of experiences due to therapy or some other motivational condition. Or, when the focus is more on the physical substrate, there is the biological interpretative strategy of theorising about how meaning works by attending to the hypothesised neurological processes of an individual without having any certain means of relating meaning to the actual neurology of the individual.




Fig. 15.1 Empirical psychology interpreted as forms of making and transforming meaning through psychometrics

Just because meanings are translated into numbers and then statistics are employed on the numbers, does not by itself justify the procedure. Some psychologists eschew the practice of natural psychological science in the mould of positivism and naive realism. The problem occurs because methods of the natural sciences are taken as a model for measuring the meaning of objects in intersubjective milieus. Accordingly, the justification of the interpretative standpoint taken by human study feels the need to legitimate its practices through self-reflexivity and explain how its claims are acquired. But from the beginning, nothing in the sphere of the meaning of objects of attention that lie within complex ever-changing relationships could ever be considered a fact in terms of meaning *outside* of times, places, perspectives-taken and a whole range of other contributing considerations. In the world of meaning, how research questions are framed is causative in making the results claimed. And, that is one contributory reason as to why there are very many possible ways of the same meaningful object appearing. So whilst the same phenomenon of meaning may have some aspects of it that are conceptual pointing (due to them being expressed in speech or thoughts), then there are others that are nonverbally indicated (their referents are emotions felt, implicit connections to other objects, tacit never mentioned or explained contexts, or the whole situation refers to culture-bound processes within that culture’s commonsense). There is the hermeneutic reasoning required in idealising meaning in the way that eidetics does—but the same applies to all stances. Accordingly, the difference between the woman in the street and a pure psychologist with 20 years experience is that the latter is well-practised in their tradition; whereas the woman in the street just knows what she knows about meaning and mental processes.

Quantitative hypothesis-testing is the dominant model in natural psychological science. But there are many psychologists within the discipline who criticise this format for a variety of reasons. Within the community of mainstream psychologists, the statistician Jacob Cohen has referred to the use of basic logic and methodology by some colleagues as being “mesmerized by a single all-purpose mechanized ‘objective’ ritual in which we convert numbers into other numbers... we have come

to neglect close scrutiny of where the numbers come from”, (Cohen 1990, 1310). Another mainstream psychologist, Paul Meehl, stated that “I am not making some nit-picking statisticians’ correction. I am saying that the whole business [of psychology] is so radically defective as to be scientifically pointless”, (1978, 26). The idea of testing hypotheses and using a null hypothesis does not prevent extraneous variables intruding. For consciousness continually learns and takes its learning with it, so the realisation is that “the empirical fact that everything is correlated with everything else, more or less”, (Meehl 1990, 123). If a hypothesis cannot be made, or cannot be tested empirically, then science as falsificationism cannot be pursued. If an outcome is a correlation that is not greater than chance, then the hypothesis must be discarded or the whole theory discarded.

Natural psychological science converts meaning into numbers to test its predictions that are generated from theory. It performs statistical operations and reinterprets the results back into meaning. In short, their view of their procedures is that quantitative research is the preferred experimental design because it enables the testing of predictions. But for pure psychology, quantitative design in natural psychological science is based on reificatory assumptions that justify an experimental tradition that cannot attend to the biopsychosocial in the full spectrum of its existence. Indeed, the tradition continues contrary to criticism in order to keep the idea that psychology is a science like other forms of natural science. But in fact, only small parts of psychology properly obey the idea of science where the investigation of natural being becomes standardised such as behavioural genetics. This is because identical twins who have grown up apart are studied as to how the influences of their enculturation form their personalities and aptitudes in comparison with each other. This means finding identical twins to understand contextual mental and physical differences.

Participants in empirical research can have their experiences and meanings interpreted in qualitative or quantitative ways. On the one hand, qualitative research looks for common meaningful themes and is made through an applied hermeneutics for classifying and coding the meanings expressed, about a specific event or a type of process between people. On the other hand, in quantitative research, a research question is answered by allocating numbers to the meaningful events and processes observed. The psychometric processes are ways of turning meaningful and observable behaviour, or other meaningful expressions of relating in a situation, into numbers that can be manipulated and stand for analogue meaningful processes of the experiences of the participants. Strictly speaking, psychometrics is turning the ‘analogue into the digital’ in the sense of allocating discrete numbers to what had been more wholistic and implicit contextual experience that was not reflected on (Wilden 1972). The psychometric process could start with self-rating questionnaires that turn experiences and meanings into standardised numerical scores, for instance, or that participants are rated by trained persons who are tested on the constancy of their interpretative skills with respect to a definitive manual to achieve “inter-rater reliability”. This format is acceptable if it has been tried and checked previously, or if the participants have been sufficiently schooled in how to rate themselves. The precise way in which meaning and experiences are numericised can be unclear,

because some questionnaires are handed out without formal instruction to the participants in the research to explain how to rate themselves in a standardised manner. Clearly, some will over-rate and some will under-rate with respect to each other. The numbers created are analysed by statistical means to obtain a mathematical understanding of their significance, as a relationship between input and output, to see if there are correlations of occurrence or other trends between the parameters being observed.

What makes good experimental design is the repetition of the same test at two different times for the same group. This makes the group become its own control group, so that variations and idiosyncrasies in interpretative style and bias among the participants remains the same even if they do under- or over-rate themselves. The strength of this experimental design can be seen in comparison: poor experimental design features the use of two different groups who may be insufficiently similar with each other. In the latter case, one group gets the meaning-making process to be investigated: whilst the control group does not. This introduces a problematic factor into the experiment because it becomes a question as to what degree the groups are comparable and how all other variables in the intersubjective life can be controlled in addition to how well they are rated. It is the case that random events in a person's life cannot be prevented and that external events will make their mark on the meanings being numericised. The reasoning behind the many ways of performing experimental psychology needs to be clear. The claim that something is a 'scientific fact' has to be scrutinised in order to reveal its meaning-making processes. For instance, the use of statistics should not hide potentially erroneous methodological design. Whereas good experimental design takes a sufficiently homogenous group of persons and applies psychometric tests to their meaningful experiences at two different times.

The Consequences so far for Empirical Psychology and Therapy

This section comments on emphasising meaning and mental processes from the perspective of being truthful to what participants' experience. The difference that pure psychology makes is the ability to focus on the meaningful, without losing the relation to biological cause; whereas natural psychological science prefers to stay focused on natural processes but makes itself unclear when wanting to understand the meaningful and contextual. For natural psychological science to apply its findings in a natural attitude context means precision is lost. But when the focus is on the meaningful as noesis-noema correlation, what this means in practice is that the meta-representational ability to throw a world-whole forwards and be teleologically oriented in the world in a specific way, becomes highly noticeable and identifiable. For instance, the meaningful interpretations of self and others bear no one to one relation to fact. Individuals can feel entirely alone in the world even if they have a good marriage, happy children and a successful life at work. The problem is that sense-making produces another sense of the facts. For instance, one aspect

of depression can be seen as no longer valuing previously highly valued objects which is explained through intentionality as a change in noesis leading to changes in noematic sense.

The consequence of pure psychology is first to lay out some general comments pertaining to the style of empirical phenomenological psychology and then secondly, to focus on the particular meaningful world of therapy empirically. A genuine answer has been revealed: Only when the claims of natural psychological science are expressed as first-person and second-person understandings in intentional form about meanings and processes are they capable of being compared, critiqued and tested. What the above means is that empirical phenomenological psychology would be based on qualitative rationalisation of lived meanings concerning everyday living, the maturation of individuals and the shared communal life. Such an interpretation has the primary purpose of keeping the biopsychosocial project firmly focused on what it means to understand consciousness with the attention on meanings that are situated in contexts of relational sorts.

What the theory of intentionality about manifolds of cultural senses of a cultural object mean is that idealisations are used to compare and contrast experience. From this viewpoint, empirical studies of the meaningful life are noted as focusing on the individual “in general” or “as such”. But only in an empirically possible way of asking, testing, observing, recording and interviewing a group of real people who stand for the population at large. The argument for considering the reduced pure possibility before the applied is as a way of constructing a laser beam of conceptual referentiality between the one who claims and the object of attention. There is no other way of defining intentionality than to link concepts to their referent experiences. Pure psychology is precisely the intentional analysis of the references between senses and intentionalities. When pure psychology is applied to experiments, empirical instances and such like, it effectively uses the formulation format defined above. It maps psychologically interpreted-reality and produces maps of meaning. Pre-reflexively, persons have an as yet unclarified grasp of what intentionality is. But they can use their natural attitude understanding as a unifying background in formulating psychological being definitively about meaning and experience.

For when it comes to understanding consciousness and the motives to act, the hypothetical is the test case for any mental mapping approach. In the specific case of therapy, one example of mistaking the map for the territory is mistaking one sense of an object for the whole of its possible senses. One function of the ego’s responsibility for its consciousness is that it acts as part of a control system where what is conscious provides an opportunity for the ego and its free will to change course in adapting to one goal as opposed to others. The patterns are that psychological problems concern associations of the ego imagining anxiously and to produce constitutions of not yet existent associations and then avoiding that which does not yet exist. One way out of the problematic is either for the ego to trust itself once more to undo those associations or to employ behaviour to evoke the fear in specific contexts and to re-learn greater relaxation within them. The function of the ego is to use its self-awareness and ability to understand itself to make its own corrections to its emotions and mood to achieve self-understanding and to use that to respond

to emotional distress in such a way to not incur impairment. In this light consciousness functions as part of a control system although not including the functionalist perspective that it's only the input and the output that count.

Psychopathology is the maintenance of distress in biopsychosocial being that is frequently due to trying to deal with disturbing experiences and violence alone without discussing it with helpful others and the ego makes defensive habits and beliefs for itself which are attempts at problem-solutions that do not work without negative consequences. Fundamentally, psychological syndromes are constituted as complex wholes comprised of the basic building blocks of meaning. Psychological solutions of the good life are comprised of the same stuff. The way to see the difference between distress, defence and impairment and greater satisfaction, ability and openness, is to understand intentional implication in a comparative way. For instance, if the focus is on the ego creating an imaginary visualisation of a social gaffe, a health problem or some negative event, then the emotions follow the ego's lead and provide the emotional tone of distress in relation to the imagination of a negative possibility. If this is repeated sufficiently then the ego conditions itself to having a greater likelihood of experiencing fear, when the actuality does occur. This type of event is the building block at the core of phobia, performance anxiety, social anxiety, health anxiety, worry and obsessive compulsive disorder. The problem is compounded through how the ego focuses on its emotions and uses them to make decisions about how to go into the future. The types of decision-making are given names like catastrophising, emotional reasoning, avoidance and low self-esteem. In the case of ambivalence where there are negative and positive imaginings, if the focus is more on the negative, that is more likely to decrease manifest action being taken hence avoidance, unassertiveness and greater defences and narrower lifestyle may ensue. If the focus is more on trusting one's own abilities to handle the situation and be able to get through it, then the ego's focus is more likely to be on the positive involved and so despite the distress, action is more likely to be manifest and so satisfaction is attempted which is more adaptive and courageous and likely to succeed in the long run. In persons low in neurosis, emotions tell the individual how they are placed with respect to others and what is meaningfully happening. The problem with inauthentic emotion in neurosis and psychosis is that the sensitivities to possible outcomes are excessively high, so providing false warnings in the absence of genuine danger. In this context if emotional senses are to be minimised or avoided then their faulty signals are given a leading role. A second major function of consciousness is being able to think about what exists as it could be otherwise. Maps of the world are at the heart of psychological explanation and this is where the intentional inexistence aspect of intentionality shows its worth. For a great deal of what people defend themselves against only exists through their own picturing of difficulty in the future; when in fact there could be ease instead. A map of defence or coping is the product of the cartographic efforts of the ego understanding how to manage its emotions in relation to the negative impacts of the human environment across the first years of life and thereafter. An interesting distinction is to think of the difference between *using a map in a territory* which is the sport called orienteering. Cartography requires the processing of arial photography, or some data-capture

process, that is then simplified and stylised to become the representation of the ideal space that is the map. What is argued for is the view that an individual can be said to have a map of the world in their understanding, but the formal study of maps and mapping exists at a level higher of study.

Without resort to medication or psychosurgery, the most pertinent route to create change is to map the experiential-meaningful distress and so work to resolve it, as much as possible, by helping clients change their own encounters with the meanings they interpret. Meanings are what we live by and are incapable of being fixed uncertain. They can be formulated in a standardised way because mental processes can be agreed by anyone schooled in phenomenological methods and definitions. There are phenomenologically-influenced empirical approaches that work to make differences: in particular in increasing the understanding of the awareness of the most basic mental processes and by referring to the objects and processes in question and explaining how the account is justified. While it is possible to formulate psychological problems as being caused by neurological over-activity in various sectors of the brain, or due to neurological damage, treatment is only congruent with that rationale if the interventions argued for are similarly neurological or material, for instance, medication of some sort. Despite there being biopsychosocial multifactorial cause, therapy is only ever a psychosocial medium that promotes the management of the three different types of cause and how they might interact.

Pure psychology has no allegiance to any school of theory of empirical psychology or any brand of therapy. It is independent of these and can study any phenomena and the relationship of theoretical and empirical stances to phenomena. Although pure psychology interprets meaning in a regular way, it urges caution and self-reflexive understanding when using psychometrics to turn meaning into numbers and translate them back into meaning. Pure psychology's answer is to safeguard meaning for consciousness by attending to its universal eidetic structure that supports theoretical idealisation and genuine conceptual reference. Given that pure psychology is a counsel of perfection; a sufficient empirical psychology and therapy is where meaningful phenomena are integrated into a whole to support work in the human genome project and neurology, just as well as getting to grips with individual idiosyncratic and unusual presentations of personality and psychological syndromes. Similarly, empirical therapy and mental health care would be a broad and all-inclusive approach to the work of helping clients change meaning and lifestyle. Because pure psychology is a transcendental view of the structure of meaningfulness itself, the meaningfulness of the everyday lifeworld is interpreted from within a wider and looser transcendental consideration of the possible. Husserl's view of the intersubjective conditions for the possibility of meaningfulness, as expounded in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* (I, 138–149), is a model of the structure of distributed intentionality, where senses of an object are appresented through the empathised views of others. The consequence is that meaning is intersubjective because meanings are easily recognised by all in a culture, including those meanings that are in dispute. If this was not so, there would be no communication and no shared meanings. So the outcome of understanding consciousness as consciousness is to make sure that its wholeness is accepted as intersubjective, temporal, of

being comprised of higher egoic aspects as well as the more fundamental passive processes and drives. The ego marches on its automatic involuntary processes and is the mere recipient of a very great deal of sense that comes from social influence, the brain, biochemistry, physiology and genetics. Hermeneutics in this context studies how people identify psychological meanings of various sorts within different types of contexts within cultural worlds, across the personal duration of time or across epochs in history. The definitions of different morphological sorts of parts and wholes in the *Third Logical Investigation* (XIX/1, 240, 262–263, 266, 267–268, 275–276), get re-invoked in *Ideas I* in relation to three sorts of region and essences, which is a form of contextualisation for specific sorts that justify practices of different types (III, 29).

An eidetically justified empirical psychological position is one which uses pure psychology to set its sights on its targets, using the laser beam understanding of what it means for concepts to refer to meaningful experience. In self-reflexive understanding, what are compared are various attitudes of approach to the object. Both theoretical and empirical approaches are addressed to the manifold of senses of the same object of attention. One way forward is to imagine empathically how clients feel when speaking with them as a way of understanding how they construe their worlds. But where eidetics applies is varying self and the senses of the cultural objects experienced in any setting, to see what an answer might look like in supplying help. The variations serve the purpose of explaining the possibility of neutralising prior beliefs and finding which combinations of objects and intentionalities comprise a specific own-world. How therapy intervenes includes asking for commitment from clients to work against habits of thought, imagination, avoidance and emotion, and to show courage in the face of adversity. Clients can beat these anxieties and self-imposed limitations if they are willing to experiment with thinking and acting differently, through throwing a new frame of understanding around their problems, one that explains how to cope and reduce their distress. So the purpose of eidetics in therapy is to map in advance the possibilities of the encounter between distressing meanings and therapy as changes in meaning and intentionality, across the spectrum of talking, relating and action interventions to help clients on the path towards healing and self-managed self-care. What this means is that eidetics justifies and supports how to conceptualise the experiences of clients and begins to think with them about how to provide new experience. The variations of personality and psychological syndrome or “disorder” (in the mental health view of self, other, cultural object and world) now become understood as merely possible sequences of the accrual of the personality style, and links between emotion, behaviour and intentional objects in contexts making meaning across the lifespan, of notional abstract persons in general.

Comparisons and Contrasts

With this in mind, the analysis below compares and contrasts eight different stances towards human being in comparison to the natural science of inanimate natural being.

1. There are the natural scientific approaches to inanimate being such as chemistry, neurology, physics and astronomy. They use a naturalistic scientific attitude to experiment on dead material being, such as taking a brain from a cadaver and cutting up pieces of it to study the types of neurons. These approaches focus on the biological and physical aspects of natural being and natural cause like those of the biochemistry, neurology, genetics or medical science. The findings of natural science have had major consequences due to the accuracy of their ability to map natural being and natural cause (IX, 285, 311). But this is not to suggest that natural science can capture consciousness or its meanings because meaning is experiential and intersubjective and does not register as existent to neurological scanning or blood tests (IV, 208–209, 298). Even before reflection begins there is always already meaning and empathic immersion in the lifeworld that does not appear for X rays or under a microscope and is not a part of biology or chemistry (IV, 164, 190).
2. There could be wholly interpretative attentions to the intersubjectively-motivated, shared life that are *not* phenomenologically-grounded such as *Geisteswissenschaften* like sociology, cultural anthropology, social history, geography or politics. But if they are not grounded, then the perspectives are arbitrary ideologies that abound and are uninterested in being grounded. This is the interpretative free play that is so disliked by natural science.
3. There could be a study of the style of a monad (an abstraction from the intersubjective whole) of its responsibility, of its morals and ethics (IV, 190). A study of the monad could follow Husserl's model since it shows a habitual egoic style, despite its pre-reflexive passive self-presence to itself, and its absolute anonymously functioning aspects. (There could be *non*-phenomenological sorts as well which amount to versions of 2 above).
4. The ontology of nature relevant to human being is biology which includes all approaches to the material substrate of the living human body, its genetic inheritance, neuroscience, physiology and current material functioning due to its material being (VI, 283). Behavioural genetics is a good example of a biological investigation of the causes of psychosocial tendencies (Plomin 2013). But behaviourism and physiological conditioning are similarly not focused on meaning. Whilst these naturalistic approaches are relevant they are ungrounded and over-emphasise one third of the biopsychosocial and do not grasp the multifactorial interconnectedness of the meaningful whole to the extent that they should.
5. There is also the confused form of 'psychology as a science' or natural psychological science. It is confused because it does not relate concrete meaningful experiences to biology and the intersubjective at all well, frequently confusing and mis-applying natural scientific methods and assumptions to meaning and

intersubjectivity. The naturalistic attitude of natural psychological science mistakes a part for the whole and is epistemologically incoherent and imprecise because its concepts do not point to meaningful experiences in a concordant manner. It is not grounded as a laser beam of conceptual reference. From the pure psychological position, its findings are regarded as requiring clarification and translation into what they mean intentionally in terms of noesis-noema correlates and detailed statements about meaning-making processes.

6. There could be a pure psychology of intersubjective consciousness that knows the ego is only an abstraction from the intersubjective whole, to see dependent wholes of sense (IV, 191). For Husserl, this approach was never sufficiently free of the naïve belief in the existence of the world although it does try to rid itself of such problematics by various reductions to the psychological attitude to consider the motivations within and between individuals due to context and retained experiences (Kern and Marbach 2001, 69). The pure psychological attitude studies forms of intentionality between people and the cultural senses they share. It is interpretative in the Husserlian way (IX, 279, XIII, 89–98). The order of analysis is to start with meaningful objects and work back in actual experience to identify the mental processes that made them. Of course, the other direction of constitution works as well. Literally, the senses of the world, empathies of others and the higher sense of self are products of consciousness, constituted through learned beliefs that such and such is the case in the world, that are associated with perceptual events. Consciousness projects its assumptions and contents of mental habits onto what is. Psychological ‘cause’ specifically refers to the habits and beliefs of individuals in terms of how their behaviour, emotions, thoughts become associated and express their personality and values (I, 134). There are a number of associations in operation of rational, emotional and somatological sorts (IV, 279–280).
7. What is ultimately sought-after is a transcendental philosophy approach to psychology in a broad sense of a wholistic understanding of consciousness as intersubjective. Within this one study are included specific aspects of the form *being-conscious of anything*. A few of the most pertinent causes and motivations of the intersubjective and historical context are meaning-related and temporal associations, handled passively. The transcendental attitude is a full attention to intentionality allegedly free of the constraints of the real and its supposed meanings, allegedly unrestrained by the contaminating belief in the existence of the world. It focuses on the lifeworld in history where the understanding of biology, for instance, is included in the intersubjective understandings that circulate in academic and scientific discourse.
8. Finally, the case of therapy and mental health care can be considered as forms of intersubjective practice in the natural attitude lifeworld. Therapy exists between two or more people who meet and discuss the meaningful experiential problems of one of them, with a view to finding influence over sources of meaning constitution so correcting the reversible ‘causes’ of those problems. It proceeds through forming a safe relationship where the one with the problem speaks with the one who can ask questions to understand and represent to them how that problem

occurs. The medium of influence and change is a relationship and may possibly include techniques for creating changes in meaning and experience, habit and relating to others. The therapist who understands works collaboratively to promote change in the other. Depending on the specific type of therapy employed, pure psychology can help by creating and co-ordinating pre-understanding of the laser beam sort. It is unhelpful to study the natural part of the whole without adequate reference to the psychosocial whole of commonsense in which we live.

Summary: Consequence for Psychotherapy and Mental Health Care

Empirically, the theory and practice of different brand names are equivalently effective. Therefore, the focus of attention shifts to discussion about what to do and why to respond in a specific way rather than another, because both have no practical effect. One problem of clinical reasoning is how to synthesise conclusions made from the evidence presented by nationally approved bodies and the recommendations of the various professional groups who have rivalries with each other. Clinical reasoning must be tailored to individual clients or obviously it would have no relevance nor would that rationale work if it were not understood by them. This is problematic when there are frequently no presentations in clinical reality of the single syndromes that have been used in making the research that the nationally approved bodies suggest. There are no guidelines on working with comorbidity as it would be impossible to design a research project around an infinite set of variations which marks the limit of the applicability of RCT findings and methodology.

What is required is a specific focus by inquiring as to which intentionalities are most important in the change from distress to coping. What is important is to note the constituting roles that temporality and belief play in making meaning. There are very many cultural objects that exist for real and possible persons. It makes no difference to eidetics if these are real or not, when all that matters is considering them theoretically, as we might do in teaching when we are talking about particular tendencies for people to be one way or another, to explain a distinction. But what is being created is understanding the being of understanding itself. For what pure psychology demonstrates is that there are specific constants about being in a world such as its social contexts where selves are in culture (IV, 185–208). Psychological narratives are about something happening to someone in a context that explains how they have acquired their distress. They have a dramatic quality as though the narrative could be enacted in a drama. It is the phenomena of intersubjective recognition at work in the identification in the psychological spaces between cultural objects in the world that mean that specific styles of thinking, feeling and acting can be understood. There are parts of the world that make sense, as does some inkling of the whole, even though knowledge of it is limited. There is a primary phenomenon of the occurrence of something recognisable with the self-awareness of how it is being seen.

Chapter 16

Conclusion

The importance of phenomenology for psychologies, psychotherapies and other empirical disciplines that involve understanding behaviour and meaningful experience is that their referents can be formulated by phenomenology's grounded manner of interpreting. It's not the case that pure psychology prevents interpretation from novel stances but there can be a collegiate approach to interpretation, which to a degree, standardises the interpretative process. For instance, the psychological is co-extensive with meaning for consciousness, intentionality in intersubjectivity, lifeworld, culture, society and history. Within the whole there is the co-existence of thought, emotion, memory, anticipation, apperception, empathy and all else besides. Terminology and hermeneutic stances are important because they represent processes that are otherwise implicit and embodied in people's lives and cannot be expressed or understood in any other way. The pure psychological attitude is a development from the natural one in a way parallel to how mathematicians map natural being. The pure psychological attitude is a way of making a professional discourse about thoughts, feelings, behaviours and relationships and all else that comes to consciousness. Besides the focus on the conscious, there are implicit processes of the unconscious aspect of intentional implication that make themselves known in consciousness, because neurological and biological endowments contribute to manifest behaviour and felt-experience also. The difference between the natural and the psychological attitude is that for the latter, experiences are understood against an ideal framework that understands how human beings are simultaneously self-reflexive in being aware. To engage with another human being in any way can also be represented ideally through understanding the triangular intersubjective being of self, other and cultural object senses. Without the phenomenological methods that ground theory and practice in the psychologies, therapies and mental health practices, including the biological and neurological sorts, then there will be a reduced ability to communicate and collaborate.

Husserl's methods are championed because they identify the relevant qualitative evidence and state how to make sense of it. The point of intentional analysis, a qualitative cognitivism, is for future projects of empiricism and the empirical application of psychological knowledge. Despite the variation in noematic sense, some parts of the consciousness-being relationship are constant. With the understanding of noemata about an object made explicit, it becomes obvious how therapy works and what lived experience is really about. When a "thought is just a thought" and a "feeling is just a feeling", it is understood that both noematic thoughts and feelings can be about the same object and yet do not depict it in its entirety in the way that a still photography from a film does not represent the whole of the film. Similarly, philosophical and scientific discussions are intersubjective consideration of noemata about the same objects in the attempt to agree the most accurate representation of them and relationships between them. The universality is that for any observing ego who reflects, he or she can identify specific sorts of noemata that appear in specific noetic ways. The sum total of noemata can be identified as belonging to specific objects understood in a number of contexts or horizons.

Given that permanent self-managed change is the desired outcome of successful therapy, then those clients who maintain their changes well-after the therapy has ceased, are those who have truly benefitted. This distinction means that truly effective therapy is only that which promotes long-lasting change through imparting some type of better understanding for the self-management of the emotional life of clients and their others. Changes should not be limited to only happening during the current series of sessions. The influence of therapy and mental health work needs to become part of the on-going lifestyle of its clientele long after the meetings have ended. The aim of therapy is to help people stay in balance and know how to be resilient concerning the knocks and falls that happen. But if a cohesive understanding of the world has never been attained, apart from a rudimentary one, then the result for the more complex types of damaged maps and map-reading abilities will tend to provide persistent chaos rather than order. This is inaccurate learning in overload. The consequences of the accuracy of resolution of the map are many and as a lived experience they are taken forward through time in an overall way of making a world and knowing one's place in it and using, or indeed, over-using a narrow area of a map uncritically without further reflection. In a different but equivalent wording, if the map of beliefs of the future is inaccurate, the self creates its own ontological experience of the world in the here and now, with the consequence that personal functioning and living are cast in the mould of inaccurate beliefs, and *not* with respect to the actual potential of the person to be able to cope with their situation. It is well-established how contact with others is good for the mood, self esteem and for the immune system and lifespan, it follows that social contact is an important protective factor in creating quality of life (Heckhausen 2001). On closer inspection, there is the overall set of meanings which is the result of the individual biopsychosocial multifactorial mix of influences across time.

Two of the problems of therapy theory and practice can be expressed through two metaphors. First, there is a Biblical analogy about the difficulties of co-operation in joint projects of substantial scope. The story of the Tower of Babel is where

a large-scale building project runs into trouble because each of its teams speaks a different language. Something similar happens in the human studies and natural sciences where the same concepts refer to different phenomena; and different concepts refer to the same phenomena. But the problem of reference is part of a larger problem because there are manifold psychological approaches that could inform therapy and mental health work. This is a problem because with no accurate relation to first-person experience, and the second-person empathies that we have of each other, then the natural scientific psychologies are unable to relate or communicate their findings because their conceptual reference focuses mainly on natural being. In a wider view, the Tower of Babel effect operates when multiple teams of knowledge-makers and knowledge-users push and pull in different directions, so preventing the building of their tower (Owen 1992). Setting aside problems of justification, the decisive action is prioritising conceptual accuracy and reference to meaningful experiences for consciousness, is the first object for study. Understanding mathematics and geometry comes before laying the foundations for building.

The second metaphor for the poor practice of therapy can be explained through the metaphor of playing golf. Poor therapy practice is like playing golf with only one club. Such therapists or mental health workers only offer one sort of interventions to those who come for help. The point of the metaphor is that a golfer who plays golf with only one club has failed to understand that a whole set of clubs is required: The root cause of the problem is poor understanding. The problem is observable in the poor repertoire of skills of speaking, relating and failing to make collaborative work in the therapeutic relationship. To remedy this lack of understanding, the work above is an invitation for the reader to think creatively about the evidence concerning how to deal with the territory of both distress and positive satisfactions in life.

Empirical psychology and its initial understanding provide answers for use in domains like mental health care and other areas in which psychological knowledge is applied. The area called “psychotherapy”, a general term, does not refer to a specific brand name such as psycho-analysis or cognitive behavioural therapy, but refers to all means whereby people want to understand themselves, lessen their distress and improve their well-being. However, the framing of the question is important in forming any answers. The challenge to be effective is urgent because there are persons asking for help from their therapist, psychiatrist or mental health worker. Some decisions need to be made about how to help them and there is a large amount of empirical research of various types and qualities, each of which might recommend one of the many brand name approaches, and each research process has its own means of justification—and both the findings and research methods are in competition with each other within the field. The competition to be effective is connected to the economic forces in the local private and public health systems. Workers want to be genuinely effective in treating specific types of distress. Currently, the major empirical research question in therapy is the average comparison of specific brand names—as opposed to focusing on clients and therapists who are exemplary at working in a brand of therapy itself. However, rather than understanding how to bring about change in the personality, or in specific social contexts for

living, the more fundamental focus is understanding the personality and the motivations that consciousness feels in responding to psychological objects, the meanings that consciousness makes itself, and by which it lives in ordering its life in its cosmos, its universe of sense. The benefit of having a theory of meaning as central to psychology and psychotherapy is that a focus on working with everyday meaningfulness is promoted, protecting it from inadequate naturalistic interpretations.

This introductory work has purposefully not discussed relating in the light of pure psychology and the details of practice but has rather addressed the epistemic aspects for the theory of practice (nor has it addressed the details of defence, personality and complex psychological syndromes and other important phenomena that comprise the fuller picture of human being). Therapy and mental health work are based on relationship skills. Even the most accurate interpretative stance is not going to help difficult clients where the skill is responding in the moment. Or if a chance is missed, to return to the lack of responsiveness and put that right to save the quality of the relationship and move on together. However, in regards to meaning for consciousness interpreted as intentionality in relation to objects, psychology in any of its forms, is not just about perceptual reality but more related to biopsychosocial causes that influence actuality and possibility. This is why it is important to have theoretical maps that represent the territory of actuality and possibility across the general and universal set of instances and the unique instance. Meta-representation is an explicit understanding of what discussion in therapy, the natural attitude or the connection between the natural and psychological attitudes are about. Meta-representation engages professionals and the public in a discussion of what psychologically exists on the way to the greater purposes of getting needs met, understanding and agreeing problems. The lifelong processes of informal teaching, learning and communicating are intersubjective activities concerning intentional processes towards specific outcomes, across timeframes in the meaningful world. In therapy and mental health care, the conditions of possibility for successful communication between the two or more parties involved needs to be in place or intersubjective collaboration will be impaired. The model for both psychotherapy and mental well-being self-care has two stages. First, there is the need to *understand the current set of problems that clients have* that are being maintained currently and affect their personal future. Secondly, formulation creates rationales for clients to self-care. And usually, the main emphasis is helping them alter their lifestyle into a more healthy form *where the alterations are of their choosing*. The test of good therapy is enabling clients to know what works for them in adopting behaviours that mean they can work, love and play, and meet the demands of their situation without further input from professionals on a long-term basis. Whilst some psychological syndromes can be minimised or even eradicated through self-care, others can only be managed and have to be lived with. As a form of therapeutic being-with, what is required is being able to discuss the priorities of clients and their needs with them in such a way that they understand and participate.

In closing, on their side of the therapeutic relationship, clients are empathic. No matter how alienated, psychotic or distressed they are, they can tell whether their therapists care for them or not. So therapists need to look into their own heart and

ask themselves if they genuinely care for the people they see. I am not advocating techniques to help therapists care but I refer them to their sense of calling to be a member of one of the healing professions. I put it to the profession that without a genuine vocation to care, one that is sustained by self-care and enjoyment of the work, that clients will empathise the difficulty in caring for them accurately as inauthentic to the therapist role and that is a genuine reason for them not to return. On the proviso that this is an accurate empathising, the uncaring therapist is rightly sacked. To help therapists feel the reward of their calling they need to look closer to home. Compassion and virtue in the therapist role are achieved in attending to others in a positive way, not because that is a benefit for oneself, but because it is the right thing to do. If helping clients is not gratifying in itself, as part of making compassion for the world manifest, then it can never be a successful strategy to win caring from clients because the care-giving is only ever one-way in this professional relationship. From the perspective of clients, it's easy to see how interested and caring their worker is. From the perspective of therapists, the basics are enjoying the work of caring over a long period of time, happily being able to show warmth and interest because these are activities felt to be rewarding in themselves. There is no technique required for occupying the position of compassion.

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