

Building a Nation IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

VIEWSS OF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE GENERATION



EDITED BY

David Kavanamur, Charles Yala
and Quinton Clements

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PANDANUS BOOKS
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Cover: A yam mask, one of the many forms of elaborate art created by men of the Abelam people, who live in the vicinity of Maprik in the East Sepik Province. The masks, made of plant fibres, are embellished with coloured clays, and used at harvest time to decorate the ceremonial long yams (*Dioscorea alata*). *Photography by Coombs Photography*.

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Typeset in Garamond 11pt on 13.75pt and printed by Pirion, Canberra

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Building a nation in Papua New Guinea: views of the post-Independence generation

ISBN 1 74076 028 X

1. Papua New Guinea — Politics and government — 1975-. 2. Papua New Guinea — History — 20th century. 3. Papua New Guinea — Social conditions. 4. Papua New Guinea — Economic conditions. I. Kavanamur, David T. II. Yala, Charles. III. Clements, Quinton.

995.305

Editorial inquiries please contact Pandanus Books on 02 6125 3422

www.pandanusboks.com.au

Published by Pandanus Books, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200 Australia

Pandanus Books are distributed by UNIREPS, University of New South Wales,
Sydney NSW 2052 Telephone 02 9664 0999 Fax 02 9664 5420

Editor: Gillian Fulcher

Production: Ian Templeman, Duncan Beard, Emily Brissenden

This book is dedicated to the children of the post-independence generation. It is our hope that the Papua New Guinea they inherit is one that has finally lived up to its enormous potential.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Putting together a book of this size has been a happy addition to our intellectual journey. We are almost certain too that this has been the case for those who have contributed chapters to this book. The concept of a book of this nature first emerged in May 2000 when the editors were invited to a State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project organised workshop on 'Papua New Guinea Provincial Capacities' at the Murrumbateman Winery outside Canberra. The idea grew and, despite our study commitments and other delays, resulted in this book. Although the workload was taxing, the joy and pains of putting together this collection were very much worth the effort.

This book would not have been possible without the role played by many people. We are especially grateful to David Hegarty, convenor of the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project at the Australian National University, for recognising the value of such a book when the concept was first mooted. David Hegarty provided invaluable advice and support throughout the development of the book and was particularly keen to foster new links between post-independence generation leaders and academics in Papua New Guinea and Australia. David was also instrumental in facilitating funding and publication.

We are also particularly grateful to Professor Hank Nelson, a veteran of Papua New Guinea studies at The Australian National University, for kindly reviewing the first draft of the manuscript. Hank gave us the green light for publication. Tim Curtin from the National Centre for Development Studies reviewed the chapters. His comments and suggestions were particularly helpful in verifying facts and finalising the chapters, given his long association with Papua New Guinea. For this we are deeply indebted to Tim.

A book of this nature that covers varying aspects of development in Papua New Guinea is not possible without the contribution of those many Papua New Guineans who want nothing short of a better country

for themselves and their children. We thank the contributors for their wonderful efforts and tremendous patience in awaiting the publication of the book.

For ensuring that the manuscript saw the light of day we are grateful to AusAID for sponsoring the presentation of the manuscript at the 'Governance Update Workshop' in Port Moresby in March 2002, and for the eventual publication of the book. We would also like to record our most sincere thanks to Pandanus Books, for recognising the importance of such a collection of essays, for agreeing to publish it, for their patience with novice editors, and their assistance throughout the process.

David Kavanamur

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Quinton Clements

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PREFACE

What is a nation? A question asked by many a theoretician as well as by individuals who persist in recognizing some form of community, recognizable relational identities and political will to declare sovereignty over geopolitical spaces, cultural and social environments. Where a nation is defined in terms of nationalism a paradox appears. Since the definition of a nation can have the elite influence and insist on 'standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy' (Gellner, 1983: 55). The paradox of this is that

under these conditions only, nations can indeed be defined in terms both of will and of culture, and indeed in terms of the convergence of them both with political units. In these conditions, men will to be politically united with all those, and only those, who share their culture. Polities then will to extend their boundaries to the limits of their cultures, and to protect and impose their culture within the boundaries of their power. The fusion of will, culture and polity becomes the norm, and one not easily or frequently defied (Gellner, 1983: 55).

Though the argument presented here is more relevant to nations within the European context, the definition might not be too appropriate for the postcolonial world where nationalism has a different flavor.

Since the beginning of nationalism in Papua New Guinea, the persistent attempts by Papua New Guineans to define themselves within its boundaries, cultures and society as a nation, challenges Gellner's arguments. Indeed, attempts to define nation has often eluded any definitional concerns in Papua New Guinea. Why? Simply because of the

historical conditions from which it emerged as a consequence of colonialism, nationalism, prior to political independence in 1975, was the channel in which Papua New Guineans vented and resisted European colonialism. Since political independence was achieved, nationalism began to undergo a transformation, paradoxically in disguise, so as to achieve a desired result such as reinvention of a nation, and reclaiming cultural and social values deemed inherently Papua New Guinean.

Nationalism has, however, lost its fervent political fire. It has transformed itself to embody a nation, by nurturing a divergent cultural, social, philosophical, political outlook of people within a nationally defined frame of reference. The success of this was that as a nation, the manifestation of nationalism was only operative at the ideological level, while the insistence at the provincial and local level was for the recognition of governance directly affecting those who do not necessarily, understand the nature and goals of a nation. That is to say, nationalism was sound at the national level, whereas provincialism was ideally sound at the provincial level. These are two different sets of praxis, in terms of their desired goals and expectations.

The suggestion here is that at the provincial level a nation exists only as an idea that correlates the representation manifest in the general elections, from which a political leader is elected to represent the voters in the nation. What exists for most people at the provincial level is the affiliation they make of themselves within various cultures, languages, and social groups, economic and educational units. The political experience is defined in very specific and culturally instituted frameworks. The political expression here often precludes the nation, since it operates outside the immediate social, cultural and political conditions. Indeed, one may argue there is a sense of resistance to nationalism, which is imbued with deceptions, empty promises and sentiments directly stemming from an elite conception of a nation. Papua New Guinea has and still experiences this tension with provincial government autonomies and regional premiers groupings: the possible threat to nationalism and its demise. This is perhaps, where we agree with Gellner:

Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of peasants, of the Volk, the narod. There is a certain element of truth in the nationalist self-representation when the narod or Volk is ruled by officials of another, an alien high culture, whose oppression must be resisted first by a cultural revival and reaffirmation, and eventually by a war of national liberation. If nationalism prospers it eliminates the alien high culture, but it does not then

replace it by the old local low culture; it revives, or invents, a local high (literate, specialist-transmitted) culture of its own, though admittedly one which will have some links with the earlier local folk styles and dialects (Gellner 1983: 57).

This perhaps is the root of contradictions, confusion, tension and delusion experienced in Papua New Guinea. The obverse may also be given some thought: that the imagined culture of the nation is also the process by which provincialism is denied of its culture and identity, as opposed to others, for the sake of an imagined culture made of differences drawn from across the plain of social and cultural norms at various strata of the nation. That is the requirement of a nation.

The attempts to define nationalism then falls on the selected and educated Papua New Guineans who respond more to a social political influence outside the folk culture from which they began their journeys outward to secure a place in a nation. Whereas those who stayed back or live within the boundaries defined by tribal, cultural, linguistic and all other contingencies, respond only to the continuity of such boundaries through practice and praxis known to them for centuries. The consequence of these two tensions, between nationalism and what is labelled as provincialism, or better still tribalism, is the violent, and often demeaning result of differences between individuals who have to struggle between the two levels under which a nation is imagined.

Out of this tension a need for rethinking nationalism, nation, independence, selfhood, governance, post colonialism, and citizenry is necessary. Asked by the editors to write a preface to this timely publication, the task seems rather ominous, in that the preface itself has already presupposed and imagined, a shape and content that is an endorsement of nationalism's ideals: definitions of nationalism and what a nation is. The paradox is that again this book is an echo of the earlier remarks that the definition comes from those who are educated, leading a social and economic class above their own kind, and who are its nation's intellectual leaders. This paradox cannot be underwritten, or be overemphasized. One is reminded that such paradoxes exist as necessary preconditions for self-definitions as well as for discursive practices that are productive and valuable to understanding depths of knowledge produced from such a collection of essays. Within such spaces of competing ideals and discourses the promise of a collective identity is realized, irrespective of one's positionality.

It is this angle that allows a dialogic process to emerge in this book. The editors have the daunting task of assembling papers from a wide section of the society. The task of organizing and presenting a book that commemorates the 25 years of Papua New Guinea's independence is

as cumbersome as attempts to reevaluate what has been achieved and what has not been achieved since 1975. In other words, the editors have provided a stage in which Papua New Guineans in all walks of life are now asking: Which way Papua New Guinea? Where did they come from and where are they going? Have we done this or that? What are we going to do next? The answers to these questions remain with Papua New Guineans themselves. Perhaps this collection will serve to answer some of these questions.

The answers to these questions are so varied and complex that even the contributors to this collection of essays may not be able to answer them succinctly. The suggestion here is that even those who claim to answer such questions have not sufficiently answered them. In truth answering these questions is a lifelong continuous effort in the chain of movement between those who are governed and those who govern, between the subsistence farmers of villagers and the captains of industry, between the illiterate and the educated, between the older generations and the future generations. The answers, it seems, are only realized as rather sentimental nationalistic utterances or as written narratives informed by a configuration of various discourses that shaped, formulated and transformed the political unconscious of a nation.

What undercuts all these papers is that Papua New Guinea as a nation is being reimagined. The various categories of the book and the various contributions serve the purpose of reinvention, rethinking and structuring of our mental precepts and collective experiences of a nation. Since the contributors to the book are the post-independence generation of Papua New Guineans, it is a gesture toward realization of the answer to the question: who should define and speak for Papua New Guineans? Such privilege engages the political unconscious upon which a nation looks for its purveyors of a desired goal and vision.

As it is, the book engages in the issues of development and planning, culture, identity and nation making, aspects of good governance, economic development and social development. Each contribution in this book has achieved one goal and that is the author's views and experiences encompass the state in which Papua New Guinea finds itself. It is not too difficult to imagine a nation; but to make a nation all views, actions, plans, visions and perspectives need to be taken into account.

It is with such a view that this preface opens the book of a modern nation's development since 1975. Earlier platforms upon which this nation is built should be revisited as well, in order to map out a clear sense of direction. Here is Somare's experience as Chief Minister:

What was I to do? Papua New Guinea could not go into self-government without a constitution. I thought about this for a long time and talked to many of my ministers. I did not want to lose the opportunity the House had given me to declare Papua New Guinea self-government on 1 December 1973. Then an idea came to us. Perhaps it would be possible to have a two-stage self-government, involving full transfer of powers except for defense and foreign relations but continuing with all the basic institutions and constitutional rules. The second stage could be after the C.P. C. had made its recommendation. Then we could enact our own home grown constitution. I put this to the House and the C.P. C. and gained acceptance for the idea (Somare, 1975: 101).

I hope these essays will stimulate discussions and fulfill the visions of the editors. It is a rare publication that will become an important one in the lives of Papua New Guineans as well as those learning about Papua New Guinea.

Steven Edmund Winduo
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A MIXED INHERITANCE

David Kavanamur, Charles Yala and Quinton Clements

‘To understand where we are going, we must understand what has happened and what is happening to us.’

Michael Somare (1985: 5)

PAPUA NEW GUINEA: WHICH WAY?

At the beginning of the new century, 25 years after political independence from Australia in 1975, Papua New Guinea has lost its way. Media headlines, editorial pieces, letters to the editor, talkback radio shows and casual conversations all point to numerous crises and lament the state of the nation. The common theme is that the nation-state is on the edge of a precipice, facing a complete breakdown. The perception of crisis has taken on a life of its own, with most people, both Papua New Guineans and interested foreigners, accepting perception as reality.

Between the 1950s and 1970s nation building was the central preoccupation of the recently independent former colonies in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. Nation building referred to the ‘policies and projects by which newly independent governments would purposively effect the transition from tradition to modernity’ (Foster, 1995: 3). These governments in effect embarked upon a quest that ‘entailed a total and massive effort of social engineering in which all the elements of the modern state were assembled’ (Foster, 1995: 3). They were led by the departing colonial powers and prevailing political thought to conceive of the state they were building in Weberian terms — that is, the state is made up of administrative, legal, extractive and coercive elements.

The path to independence lacked what Geertz (1973: 236) so eloquently described as the ‘consciousness of massive, univocal, irresistible movement, the stirring to action of an entire people, that the attack upon colonialism almost everywhere induced’. Stephen Pokawin (1982: 57) states that:

Independence for PNG on 16 September 1975 was not the result of national consensus. The majority of Papua New Guineans were either not concerned, against, or not committed. It was the doing of a small group of people led by the Pangu Party and its sympathizers in the House of Assembly. Many people were not sure of what independence would bring for them and the country.

In the period prior to independence, political struggle tended to be confined to the jockeying amongst various groups for advantageous positions, rather than against the colonial state. The introduction of a dual wage system for public servants in 1964 is often cited by some Papua New Guineans as the beginning of a political consciousness amongst urban, tertiary educated Papua New Guineans that eventually led to independence (Wanek, 1996: 49). Related to this was the absence of what Apter (1963) refers to as a ‘political religion’, a populist nationalism celebrating either the rise of a new nation or the rebirth of ancient glories. Given that there was no national struggle, it follows that there were no charismatic leaders in the vein of Gandhi, Sukarno and Nkrumah. Political deliverance in the context of colonial Papua New Guinea did not require such ‘prophet-liberators’ (Geertz, 1973: 235).

THE GENERATIONAL TRANSITION

Judging from events in former colonies throughout the developing world, 25 years after independence marks the beginning of the transition of power and leadership from the independence to post-independence generations. Two forms of transition have emerged. Firstly, the post-independence generation struggles, often through violent conflict, to gain control from the independence generation. Secondly, there is an accommodating to and facilitation of the transition by the independence generation. Independence generation political leaders have taken one of two paths to power — being groomed for leadership by the departing colonial power such as Fiji’s first Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamasese Mara, or seizing power by driving out the colonial order like Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. But whether as favoured son or independence fighter, the period of their leadership is generally marked by the accumulation of status, domestically and internationally, power and often considerable wealth that

they are reluctant to give up. They may, therefore, resist the transition to the next generation of leaders.

Papua New Guinea's political leadership at independence was a mixture of a young, western educated elite and more traditional *big-men* with little or no formal education. Don Woolford (1976: 237) observed that 'power was uneasily shared between the politicians and senior public servants'. For several years following independence there was a shift in favour of the latter with the public service run by a cadre of ambitious young graduates who, by virtue of their education, were better equipped to handle the task of government than most parliamentarians and ministers. By 2002, however, politics has become the only game in town, the public service a shadow of its independence self, and ambitious graduates competing alongside disillusioned public servants to enter parliament. In the 1972 general elections for the House of Assembly that voted in independence, 605 candidates contested 100 seats and few public servants resigned to stand. In 2002, the sixth national elections had 3150 candidates contesting 109 seats, with an exodus of public servants resigning to stand (*The National* newspaper, 19 April 2002: 6).

The post-independence generation has been educated under the leadership of the pre-independence generation. It is now more than 25 years after independence and the post-independence generation is beginning to transit into the realm of the political, administrative and economic decision making structures of the country. The management of the transition is important. If poorly managed, the country could easily follow 'the Somali road to development' as its neighbour, the Solomon Islands, increasingly has (Bayart et al., 1999: xiv).

In his novel *Gutsini Posa (Rough Seas)* Regis Stella (1999: 14) describes an unfolding crisis in contemporary Papua New Guinea and the sense of frustration gripping ordinary people:

The country was in imminent danger of total chaos, controlled only by gangs of thugs. The financial crisis deepened daily; workers were laid off; vital services scaled down. The government urged people to make sacrifices, yet the MPs had voted themselves pay increases and an increase in the slush fund allowance. For the last several weeks the newspapers had been frontpaging the crisis. The former colonizers were reluctant to come to the rescue and now the nation was at the mercy of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Stella's central character, Penagi, believes the only solution is revolution!

THE PURPOSE OF THE BOOK

Many changes have occurred in Papua New Guinea's political and socio-economic environment since September 1975. Globalisation and other international forces, uneven development, the Bougainville civil war, political crises and socio-political changes have brought new challenges for Papua New Guinea. In some quarters, especially amongst aid donors, resource companies and foreign policy makers and analysts, there has been ongoing interest in the nation building project in Papua New Guinea. This interest is underpinned by Papua New Guinea's status as the third largest nation-state in the South Pacific and second most populous, and its unique geopolitical and cultural position between Asia and the south-west Pacific.

Despite the historical, personal and geographical ties between the two countries, Papua New Guinea has drifted off the public radar screen in Australia, a Conradian nightmare and byword for failure within the Australian popular imagination. Few Australian tourists venture to Papua New Guinea, and for most Australians working there it is a hardship posting and primarily regarded as a career stepping stone rather than as an end in itself. The generations of Australians who lived and worked in Papua New Guinea and retained a powerful emotional attachment to it upon their return home, constituting a powerful Papua New Guinea lobby underpinning Australia's post-independence commitment to PNG, is ageing and unlikely to be replaced.

In the lead-up to Papua New Guinea's 25th anniversary of independence on 16th September 2000 we found very little interest in Australia in acknowledging this milestone. In Papua New Guinea itself the anniversary celebrations were rather muted, reflecting the sense of popular despair the country found itself in. However, from our discussions with colleagues throughout Papua New Guinea and abroad, there was identified a clear need for a book about the state-of-the-nation 25 years after independence and, more importantly, written by a new generation of Papua New Guineans.

This book, therefore, is a collection of essays by the post-independence generation after 25 years of independence. This generation have come into their own since independence and their views reflect the experiences of being part of an independent Papua New Guinea. Moreover this is a generation that is beginning to move into the mainstream of leadership across various fields in modern Papua New Guinean society. This generation is passionate about discussing the problems and achievements of the first decades of independence. Letters to the editors, talkback radio and national forums are evidence of the extent of these discussions.

It reflects a strong nation-building ethos amongst this generation and their concerns about the state of the nation.

This book has sought to capture their thoughts and views. Papua New Guinean societies have a strong oral tradition. Therefore many of the views expressed by Papua New Guineans are lost to future generations. This book provides an avenue for expressing their views in writing, to structure the ideas being talked about and preserve these. It reflects the views of the post-independence generation who are articulating a vision for the future and who will be the next leaders who realise this vision.

There is a long tradition of publications on Papua New Guinea that were wholly or dominated by foreigners — the first in 1928, *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea: Record of Round Table Discussion*. In March 1974 the first edition of *Yagl-Ambu: Papua New Guinea Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities* was published. Until its demise in the late 1980s, this quarterly from the University of Papua New Guinea attracted a mixture of Papua New Guinean and non-Papua New Guinean contributors. Some of the inspiration for our edited collection is derived from the March 1985 special issue of *Yagl-Ambu* 'How Far Have We Come: Ten Years of Independence'. Other publications on Papua New Guinea and with Papua New Guinean contributors include *Administration for Development*, the journal of the Administrative College of Papua New Guinea, and the annual Waigani seminar series. Both had stopped being published by the early 1990s. Attempts have been made by some Papua New Guineans to revive this tradition with occasional publications being produced by the National Research Institute, the Institute of National Affairs (both in Port Moresby), and the new tertiary institutions, the University of Goroka and Divine Word University in Madang. The most recent edited collections, combining contributions from Papua New Guineans and foreigners, include *Papua New Guinea: A 20/20 Vision* edited by Ila Temu and *Modern Papua New Guinea* edited by Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi.

Our book represents not only another attempt to revive a rich publication history, but more importantly, a shift in focus away from established and well known commentators, both foreign and Papua New Guinean, to an exclusively Papua New Guinean authorship. These are the views of the post-independence generation — that is, the younger, up-and-coming members of Papua New Guinean society who will be the leaders of the future and who will be the ones who answer the question 'where to from here?' In this respect this book is the most comprehensive and exclusive Papua New Guinean engagement with major contemporary issues. It provides an overview of the history of the past 25 years and

frankly assesses the state-of-the-nation in terms of its formation and continued development from the perspective of a new group of commentators. Whilst the views of the pre-independence/independence generation are important, in many ways they have had their day and it is the next generation, the post-independence generation whose views have not been shaped by the colonial experience but by the nation building experience following independence, whose voice should now be heard.

THE CHAPTERS IN BRIEF

The chapters of this volume offer divergent perspectives, rather than a common approach, on the nation building process across a wide variety of areas. Each contributor has sought to assess developments in his or her field. Common to all, however, is the theme of nation building. All see themselves as part of a process that will ultimately produce a tangible Papua New Guinean nation.

Many issues are not covered in this collection. This is, in some cases, an indication of the absence of suitable Papua New Guinean authors, itself an indication of the level of development in many fields. The absence of some issues also reflects the challenge to open up ideas on contemporary issues in Papua New Guinea. The majority of the authors are junior academics, their views are neither official nor grassroots but tend towards a middle path reflecting their education and status within Papua New Guinean society.

The book is divided into four sections. The first section sets the scene on the state of the nation and thinking about the nation building process. The novelist, Regis Stella, examines the relationship between tradition and modernity, sometimes portrayed as antagonistic. He argues writers and artists in contemporary Papua New Guinea have been silent on the many challenges the country faces.

The second section on aspects of good governance confronts the dilemma Papua New Guinea faces after two and half decades of independence. Having adopted a Weberian system of government, Papua New Guinea has had difficulty fitting such a system into the local context. Questions of governance have therefore been predominant since independence. The chapters in this section review this ongoing debate and propose some solutions. Alphonse Gelu argues that although constitutionally Papua New Guinea has adopted the core elements of liberal democracy, it still has a long way to go to make this work. Henry Okole aims to provoke debate on the role of the provincial government system and examines ways to enhance the system. Three specific case studies are provided to highlight the governance challenges confronting PNG —

James Laki on the role of the troubled Defence Force; Hengene Payani on the causes, consequences and strategies for combating corruption; and Joe Kanekane on the obstacles faced by the media in reporting corruption.

The third section focuses on the progress and challenges of economic development. Overall the economic development of Papua New Guinea has been disappointing, a story of great promise squandered. Modowa Gumoi provides a sobering appraisal of the economy. His conclusion is that, despite the rich natural resource base and substantial external financial assistance, overall economic performance has been dismal. Gumoi's chapter is followed by four chapters on specific sectoral issues. Christopher Hnanguie asks how effective foreign aid has been in Papua New Guinea and what its future is. Benedict Imbun examines the development of industrial relations institutions. Enaha Peri Kwa argues that development has come at the expense of the environment. Ruth Turia discusses the controversial issue of the management of forest resources.

The seven chapters in the fourth section focus on aspects of social development. The social sector is a barometer for developments in governance and the economy. Francis Hombhanje provides an overview of the disease pattern in Papua New Guinea, in particular the emergence of lifestyle diseases such as HIV/AIDS and diabetes that have placed an additional burden on a health system struggling to cope with existing tropical diseases. Samuel Haihuie looks at the state of the vital, but neglected education system. Only half of Papua New Guinea's eligible school age children are currently engaged in some type of formal education. Anne Dickson-Waiko analyses the emergence of civil society organisations within Papua New Guinea and argues that this has been a promising development. Margaret Vatnabar addresses the development of women since independence. She notes that progress has proven slow. Daniel Leke examines the important role of the churches in nation-building through the provision of vital services such as health and education. Julianne Kaman focuses on peace studies as a means to countering an emerging culture of violence and proposes a curriculum for a tertiary level peace studies course. In the final chapter Elizabeth Kopel provides a study in the gap between policy development and implementation. She outlines the main policy developments in the housing sector and examines the problems that have hindered the implementation of these policies.

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SECTION 1

SETTING THE SCENE

PNG IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: Some Troubled Homecomings

Regis Stella

As early as 1979, the novelist Russell Soaba in his novel *Maiba* portrayed Papua New Guinea as ‘a society caught in the tension between greed and materialism, cultural betrayal and historical nostalgia’ (Ashcroft, 1987: 86). Indeed the diagnosis of the sociopolitical and economic landscape of PNG has deteriorated so much that in recent times critics have compared Papua New Guinea to a fast sinking ship caught in an ocean of corruption, economic chaos, political turmoil and social inferno. The culture of corruption that Papua New Guinea faces today is to a large extent of our own creation. Despite numerous warnings that the country needs to take stringent measures to keep afloat, our leaders have not taken heed but continue to maintain political improbity. Therefore to some extent how outsiders perceive Papua New Guinea is ostensibly based on well-founded inferences and observations.

In a paper ‘Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of “the South Pacific”’ (1997), Greg Fry of the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at The Australian National University in Canberra discusses the different images of the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea. In his analysis the contemporary Australian view of the South Pacific countries has shifted (though not exclusively) from the earlier depiction as either paradise or hell to what he calls a new ‘doomsdayism’. This new doomsdayism imagery has its provenance in ‘the heartland of “rational” thinking’. The representers include bureaucrats, academics, economists, and journalists, among others. This ‘new’ representation is saturated with a conflation of western social, political, cultural and economic meanings that expand its signified far beyond

its immediate localized meaning. The significance of this delineation is that it expresses and influences national predilections and national character at the same time as it plays a cardinal and salient part in the Australian aesthetics of perception. Fry notes that, ‘in the dramatic imagery associated with this conception, the South Pacific is the “hole in the Asia-Pacific doughnut”, or “the eye in the Asia-Pacific cyclone”’ (1997: 305). This essentially means that the South Pacific has become an economic, political and strategic backwater in the New World Order. The new ‘negative’ depiction of the region draws attention to what is seen as ‘a series of grim trends: a history of failure in development as measured by gross domestic product; “soaring” population; unsustainable exploitation of resources’ among other factors (1997: 305–6). These representations are grounded essentially in economic rationalism. According to Fry, ‘the images are embedded in a forthright salvationist message that describes a region in danger of “falling off the map”’ (1997: 305). This contemporary portrayal of Pacific Islands is mainly dictated to and grounded in western economic notions and practices. On the other hand, the traditional representation that is still embraced by the Australian popular culture is grounded and influenced mainly by cultural practices and variables.

There is another cardinal dimension about these recent portrayals. They both provide intriguing insights into the Australian imagination at the same time as they affect the lives of the people they portray (1997: 306). To put it differently, the kinds of ‘knowledge’ that these representations evoke and embed in the minds of Australians, especially those who have never had any or very little experience of Papua New Guinea, play a significant role in shaping Australian attitudes and behaviors towards Pacific peoples and the way they are perceived and how they are treated. The primary creation of such images is essentially to force an economic discipline upon the governments of the region because of the Australian government’s role and position as the major aid donor. Indeed in recent times, outside aid and financial institutions have reproached Papua New Guinea (and other Pacific Island states) on the failure of sustainable development because of its lack of policy shift towards one that is development and economically orientated.

In essence there is this ongoing collusion between outsider and insider perceptions of the Pacific including Papua New Guinea. The point then is that we must also be cognizant of the fact that many of these depictions and views are (un)consciously reinforced, and encouraged by our own doings: the media has been a very powerful medium in shaping the perceptions which define the country. While it performs an important role in exposing and externalizing deep-seated corruption, it

has simultaneously created images that are sometimes 'fallacious', and are socially and politically damaging and at times pernicious.

Concomitant with the media, tourism is another agency that has often insensitively, and relentlessly, encouraged representations that are not only 'negative' but which espouse the ambivalent perception of Papua New Guinea and encourage the voyeuristic nature of European attitude toward the Pacific in general. Tourism agencies are largely purveyors of exoticism. In their endeavour to attract tourists into the country, they continue to depict and project Papua New Guinea as a pristine wonderland. This gesture of primitivity and exoticism has been at the forefront of many tourism expositions domestically and abroad. Indeed the PNG Tourist Promotion Authority depicts Papua New Guinea as both nation and destination through the fantasies of 'collective expenditure — in this case the expenditure of (tourists) passing through' and their voyeuristic narratives (Sissons, 1997: 187). These 'insider' representations act in concert and help reinforce Greg Fry's assertion. Indeed the need for progress and development has 'coerced' countries in the South Pacific to be dependent on tourism as well as aid and resource exploitation. One of the significant consequences of this is the tendency of local people to produce images (often superficial) of their cultures for consumption by tourists. It has led to the commodification of culture and indeed national identity. As Sissons (1997: 3) argues, 'new constructions of nationhood are engendered as a result of the consumption practices of foreigners rather than citizens ...' The point here is the fact that people are 'forced' to represent themselves in the guise of their pristine cultures in order to make money. In indigenous societies, the Eurocentric incubus and discourse have employed tourism as an extension of the European gaze and the general voyeuristic attitudes of Europeans. Through tourism, the knowledge of indigenous cultures as exotic, primitive or inferior is advanced covertly. This is the ultimate dialectic of alienation.

The point is that twenty-six years on Papua New Guinea is sailing in uncharted waters. The unstable political climate, irresponsible governance and the general lack of accountability and management of the country's economy and resources further kindle and nourish this. Mr. Mekere Morauta (current Prime Minister), then the governor of the Bank of Papua New Guinea, for instance stated at the launching of The Australian National University's Pacific 2010 project that 'the doomsday scenario ... is not surrealistic. The seeds and signs of that scenario have been planted in every Melanesian state, and are growing daily' (1994: 1). This reinforces Greg Fry's assertion. It attests to a monster that is both of our creation and that of outsiders. The production of images locally

therefore collude with the outside 'theological' collaboration in this orgy of 'negative' imagery and bestialization. While mindful of the preceding thesis and scenario, my point is that this dire and adverse diagnosis and assessment should be alarming and requires our immediate attention as concerned citizens. Greg Fry has raised important concerns and issues and I want to engage some of the issues as scaffolding for this paper. My particular orbit is Papua New Guinea. This paper addresses in a general way the lack of critical response and the role of artists and the elite in the increasingly unquiet waters of Papua New Guinea post-colonial politics. It also addresses the issue of traditional culture and development and argues that traditional culture and development are not necessarily diametrically opposed but can perform complementary roles.

A number of questions arise from the foregoing contentions: why should an outsider provide the diagnosis when we have equally qualified people on the ground to provide such assessment and help liberate us from the prevailing, generated definitions of our past, present and future? If it were true, why are Papua New Guineans silent about such a frightful malignancy which intrudes and invades the fabric of our society? If, as many people like to argue, conscience and morals are higher than politics, why haven't we begun a process of recovery and rehabilitation to steer out of this social and political nightmare?

One of the problematic issues in post-colonial Papua New Guinea (and indeed the South Pacific) has been the role of tradition in national development. All of a sudden the mass appeal of traditional culture which birthed the scaffolding and framework for the nationalist idea, and helped combat colonialism is disavowed. In other words, its principal and eminent role as an agency in nationhood and national formation has now taken a subordinate role to the promotion of private enterprise and economic development. While this is unavoidable, it seems development is affirmed at the expense of traditional culture, the very soul of the nation. This philosophy is not only peccable but also inchoate. It demonstrates a blithe indifference to the significance of traditional culture in development. Policy makers castigate traditional culture as smothering development and progress. Traditional culture has been viewed as the major cause of the failure in progress and other related problems like population increases, unsustainable development, among others.

However, experience demonstrates that the two (traditional culture and modernity) are not necessarily diametrically antagonistic. In fact in many significant ways they perform complementary roles. The prejudiced view amongst people (policy makers and entrepreneurs especially) that traditional culture and development are antithetical is

predicated on a binarism in which a dichotomy is drawn between development and progress as the way forward on one hand, and traditional culture (kastom) as constricting and impeding the former. The point is that development and traditional culture seem to be incompatible because policy makers deliberately want them to be.

The proposition that traditional culture is inhibiting and deleterious to development is not only parochial but lacks depth. This view is derived from a common fallacy, which conceives of traditional culture as static. The point, however, is that traditional culture is not static at all. Culture exists as a living organism, expanding and recreating itself, metamorphosing. Culture automatically succumbs to the wheels of development and progress in its endeavour to be operative and to stay alive. When development meets resistance from indigenous people it is not always impelled by traditional culture. Sometimes it is because development callously tries to ignore ethical, cultural and social blind spots.

For too long we have misconceived the meaning of progress and development. Most often we only conceptualize development in economic and monetary terms, thereby relegating and neglecting the other significant constituents and meanings of the concept. For me at least, development means improving the condition of mankind so that people are able to enjoy freedom and democracy. This is actualized through evolving ways and strategies for total and integral human improvement and progression. In order for this to be established, the minimum conditions are equitable distribution of services and resources for the benefit of everyone, ensuring that citizens have adequate opportunities for education, social and economic services, and spiritual development. In Papua New Guinea, this is enshrined in the country's constitution and pronounced aptly in the Eight-Year Plan. By conceiving and viewing the concept in these terms, we embrace all the different aspects of development.

Apart from the yoking together of aspects of traditional culture and modernity, the commodification of culture is perhaps another example of how development and culture can concur and coexist. In this country, we have seen how culture is commodified through marketing of 'tradition'. There are however pockets of culture which vigorously refuse to yield to the developmental progress. For instance, customary land tenure. In general, by commodifying aspects of traditional culture, cultural values and practices survive the onslaught of change and globalization. I am not saying whether this is good or bad. However, this new configuration (commodification of culture), while adverse to many of our cultural values and heritage, is inevitable given the global shift towards monetarist economic ideology and the notion of economic rationalism. My argument

is that traditional culture must not be subservient to economic rationalism. Policy makers must ensure that culture is a significant element in any ideology of development. Traditional culture must play an important role in the country, because it is one of the main constituents defining national identity and the formation of nationhood. The point is that post-colonial Papua New Guinea is a hybridized society. This is because as Helen Tiffin (1987: 17) asserts, it involves 'a dialectical relationship between European ontology and epistemology and the impulse to create or recreate independent local identity'. And culture, especially the arts, must inevitably mould into the praxis of progress and globalization. In this instance, traditional culture and economic development are integral and consequential in the developmental process of any nation. We must be conscious that the function and part played by traditional culture in the pre-independence period is different from its perceived contemporary function and role. In contemporary Papua New Guinea, our quest is to locate ways in which traditional culture can continue to recreate and metamorphose itself. Our role is to accommodate and nurture such a transformation.

THE ROLE OF THE ARTIST IN POST-COLONIAL PNG

We have seen how traditional culture as an important oasis of national identity played a paramount role in nationhood in the early years of Papua New Guinea's 'struggle' for political independence. This is conspicuous and evident among the artists and writers of the pre-independence period. Traditional culture is utilized to irrigate and sustain national formation and notions of nationhood by flows of nationalist sentiments. Through the narrativizing and projection of a Papua New Guinean social consciousness and vision within the larger disabling narrative of the oppressor, a new sociopolitical reality and national psyche was forged and established. While this is somewhat currently absent in Papua New Guinea, I am not advocating or implying a return to that past. The pre-independence era existed in both a different time frame and matrix. While common culture and language are crucial to unity, they are not the essential ingredients for nationhood, but that collective will to nationhood is. What our artists need to do is create a 'new' vision, nationalism and nation for themselves through blending and appropriating the cultural diversity that comprises the country. While the cultural diversity of Papua New Guinea is often received and understood as an impediment to national formation and nationhood, the arts have established and demonstrate how cultural variance could become a common denominator, a springboard for the harnessing and revival of nationhood and the appreciation of our cultural heritage.

Artists (indeed writers) have always played a pivotal role in society. In recent times however, they have 'failed' to interrogate and challenge the social injustices and evil, to free society of historical or other superstitions. In Papua New Guinea, we are witnessing a somewhat deafening (political) silence. The once pulsating voices have been reduced to sporadic lone laments in the wilderness of a raging bush fire. In 1998 during the PNG writers' conference at the University of Papua New Guinea, Bernard Kaspou, President of the Writers' and Artists' Association, proudly informed the local media that 'a third wave of writing in PNG is now beginning to emerge and this is going to be more radical than the previous ones' (cited in *Post Courier*, 1998). His florid words have not borne fruit as yet; at least to my knowledge. While the statement made by Bernard Kaspou is ambitious (at least in the short term) nevertheless he meant well. What is required is the translation of his words into actual writing.

The question that needs to be asked is where are these artists and writers today? Why aren't they challenging the Eurocentric incubus who has dominated the country for a long time? On the domestic front, why haven't they unmasked this country's love affair with corruption? Perhaps the creative muse and energy has been exhausted without even much attempt at penning thoughts and dreams? At the time when Papua New Guinea's reality is clotted up with an avalanche and the debris of political, social and economic greed, selfishness and dishonesty, it is necessary for artists to develop a sixth sense, that shamanistic vision. Papua New Guinea today is quickly becoming a social, political and economic wasteland. Yet, many of us are maintaining that public no care attitude. At the moment there is a lack of social and political conscience and responsibility among artists and writers in the increasingly unquiet waters of Papua New Guinea post-colonial politics. Artists and writers are not executing their roles as barometers of progress and development. Of course this is not their only ideological preoccupation. But still the silence and quietude is discomfiting and frightens me profoundly.

Right now Papua New Guinea is going through the most contemptible period in our history. The political leadership and apparatus is dominated by infantile politicking with a propensity for greed and improbity. Many of these leaders engross themselves with defrauding and embezzling from state institutions and the national coffers. In the process they prevent equitable prosperity for all. In order to consolidate and strengthen their positions, politicians and the leadership hierarchy are involved in nepotism and cronyism in the bureaucracy. The politicians in this country continue to harvest where they have not planted. It is

common knowledge that many politicians and their cohorts are deceiving their own people through misappropriation of the national wealth and the mismanagement of the economy. The manipulation of government institutions/polity and the legal processes to cling onto or gain power at the expense of deteriorating economic, political and social indicators and spiralling internal and external debt is a classic example.

The question then is what are we supposed to do as artists? Should we play the fool and remain non-committed to this malignant illness? One contingency would be to show blithe indifference. Another is silence and cunning. Unquestionably, some of us will do precisely that. As Satendra Nandan writes, but in a different context: 'the treachery of the few won't go away unless the artist can transform and transcend the nature of immediate reality' (1994: 43). This, however, is only possible if the artists and writers are able to recognize reality itself. Artists and writers demonstrate this recognition through the capture and recording of the Papua New Guinean political and social condition. Through literature and the arts, artists and writers engage the present and concurrently envisage what Wole Soyinka refers to as 'the social harvest of struggle' (1976: 74).

Artists must be committed to their work, social vision and egalitarian discipline. Non-committal attitudes asphyxiate the creative process. They must view art as a normal, but a *sine qua non*, social activity of man. This means that art is not only for aesthetic fulfilment but also a means to reflect and mirror the reality and condition of their communities and society. They must concern themselves with a visionary projection of society.

The frustration that I have with our artists and elite is the recalcitrant and obscure shallowness of the level of response to a Papua New Guinea tragedy — a tragedy (as Nandan puts it) 'not so much of telling lies, rather of knowing the truth and keeping silent' (1994: 43). Papua New Guinea has many artists with blunt carving knives, broken pens, brushes and untuned guitars. The early years of the country's political development was the most profitable and visible period in artistic and literary production. This period was a time of heightened activity because as many people in the industry have said again and again, there was a subject to write or sing about.

Nevertheless, this view while generally true is parochially constricted. There is as much to sing about, write, paint and narrate today as in the past. I can vividly recall in the early 1980s, the New Irenader Philip Lamasisi, who released an album which contained songs that dealt with the social ills of society. Or that flamboyant character of Cowboy whose songs of self-pity vibrated through the shopping centre of Boroko. In recent times, the satirical plays of Nora Vagi Brash poke fun at

unscrupulous and insensitive politicians and Pati 'Potts' Doi's song, 'Lukautim Mama Graun', demonstrate the countless possibilities that await artists and writers. These are instances of some of the isolated attempts by Papua New Guineans to express and condemn the nefarious evil that embraces and suffocates this country.

Perhaps one of the main reasons why the creative energy has not had a constant flow is because of a lack of social and political consciousness, commitment and duty towards the country. The point to bear in mind is that it is precisely this 'lack' that could suffocate and drain the creative process. One of the discernible reasons that contributes to this rather selfish and egotistical reason on the part of artists and writers is the 'dependence-syndrome' perpetuated by patronizing expatriates. For example, Ulli Beier, whom many have referred to as the mid-wife of Papua New Guinean contemporary literature, did too much 'spoon feeding' in aiding the birth and provenance of our literature. This is essentially why, when he departed, many writers have found it difficult to be 'independent'. This led many to argue that 'if the years between 1968 and 1974 produced all the excited energy of the birth of a literature, perhaps the recent silence is the stunned realization that the infant is a bastard' (McGaw, 1984: 9). This is a veneer proposition. The 'infant' is not a bastard at all. The crux of the matter is that the creative impulse of indigenous writers lacks sustainability and independence. Indeed, sustainability not only means the continued and constant engagement and flow of creativity but also corporate and government patronage and support of the arts.

Papua New Guinea today is sailing in uncharted waters and it is more a concern for artists to provide advice before it sinks. At the same time they must be able to capture the 'territoriality of the authentic' and articulate the essence of the PNG psyche. There are a lot of talented people out there. But their creative potentials need to be tapped and supported. The lack of patronage and sociopolitical consciousness is perhaps one reason why there seems to be a great difficulty maintaining an equilibrium between simple narratives and a more serious literature with a questioning attitude.

The post-colonial Papua New Guinea scenario has changed much: the developing political culture has been brutalized, coerced and deception stalks the land (Nandan, 1994). Our world has been full of intellectual improbity, hypocrisy and political treachery. These ills have been integral to our political landscape. Therefore one of the fundamental responsibilities of the Papua New Guinean artist is as a visionary who is able to perform the task of a shaman at the same time, as his/her work is aesthetically fulfilling. Wole Soyinka once stated that 'I have a special

responsibility because I can smell the reactionary sperm years before the rape of the nation takes place' (cited in Hunt, 1991: 87). Soyinka sees himself as a shaman, an ombudsman of society. He makes the point that the artist must be conscious and committed and be a watchdog for the politics that defines his/her country. He/she must keep abreast with the social and political realities and developments that are taking place.

If artists and writers sharpen their vision and write about the many issues that confront ourselves, our country, our women, we can bring some sense to those who are in positions of power and those who are not able to tell and see the trouble the country is heading towards. Artists are never alone; they have a collective responsibility in their communities. They are seers and visionaries. There are of course a few that go astray like the character of Doboro Thomas in Russell Soaba's novel *Maiba* (1985).

In these unquiet waters, artists must dynamically resist the temptation to be silenced by buy-offs and bribery. They must not only be concerned with local realities but simultaneously with the long heresy of Eurocentric belittlement of indigenous people. They must challenge the 'negative' imagery and the propagation of untruths that has been disseminated by outsiders. Indigenous artists must evolve strategies which will expose these biases. They have a constructive role in educating our people. The arts move the heart, broaden the mind and venerate the soul. Artists have a paramount role not only in alerting us to the political and social pandemonium but also to the education of the young in the growth and development of an emerging society. There are other roles, indirect roles that are equally consequential. They revolve around a nation's search for national identity, an almost impossible task given the cultural diversity of the country and the problematic nature of identity itself. One cardinal role of the writer is as an educator and teacher. Chinua Achebe (1988: 143) once stated, 'the writer cannot expect to be excused from the task of reeducation and regeneration that must be done. In fact he should march right in front.' Artists must not be trapped in a cocoon of sociopolitical under-nourishment. They have a duty to defend the country from unscrupulous and ruthless politicians and leaders.

The artist/writer in PNG is slightly fortunate, unlike others in the developing world. The government is not intent on locking up those who oppose and speak against it. At least, not yet. As Satendra Nandan once again points out, 'The writer, or artist, must have the integrity and the daring to recognize wolves. Suddenly to see us so much part of a universal evil is wisdom to make our people see that a challenge to the protean power of the artistic imagination' (1994: 45).

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the paper I concerned myself with the new Australian representation of the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea. This new imagery is grounded in the view that Pacific Island governments must shift their policies towards one that embraces sustainable development. Fry argues that in order to do this, Pacific Islands governments must jettison 'inappropriate traditions, and connect to the dynamism of Asia' (Fry, 1997: 306). While I generally acquiesce, the fact is that entrenched meaning of the new imagery remains connected to the early portrayal of Pacific Islanders and underlines the 'Manichean deep structure' in which Pacific Islanders and their cultures are subordinated and delineated as inferior. Therefore, Papua New Guinean artists and writers have both an international and a domestic challenge. Artists and writers must be forthcoming. While their writings, songs, carvings, paintings must be freighted with important lessons and advice for those who lack political and social accountability towards their own citizens, they must also interrogate and expose the Eurocentric biases and misrepresentations of themselves and their cultures.

The Papua New Guinea artistic (literary) soil is very fertile. It is a conflation of legends, songs, myths, facts, imagination, and works of art. Like seeds, therefore, all that is needed are cultivators who will nurture and irrigate them. Very soon they will germinate in a ceaseless organic recreation. Henry James once wrote: 'the flower of art blooms only where the soil is deep' (Lombard, 1993: 94). But it's up to the artists to suckle and nurture it.

There are however, other important seers and visionaries who have been marginalised and neglected. These are the community elders, together with the ancestors and spirits whom one of the characters in Leo Hannet's play, *The Ungrateful Daughter*, refers to as the 'cave of knowledge'. The elders and old people must not be neglected and artists must always consult them and open a line of dialogue with them. Let us be mindful of an old Banoni proverb, 'Clouds are swept away by the full moon'. This refers to the advice of old people in times of trouble. Artists and writers must seek and take heed of the wise counsel of our elders, ancestors and spirits. They have lived life and seen it all.

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SECTION 2

ASPECTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

A DEMOCRATIC AUDIT FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Alphonse Gelu

INTRODUCTION

Papua New Guinea inherited a democratic system of government after it attained its independence on 16 September 1975. The transition to a democratic system of government emerged shortly after the Pacific War with the establishment of the Local Government Councils in 1950. Since then, beginning with the Legislative Council in 1960 and later the House of Assembly in 1964, democratic practices have flourished simultaneously with the establishment of representative institutions. The institution of representative democracy, which is the norm of democratic governments in the twentieth century, provided the opportunity for Papua New Guineans to elect their own representatives to the legislature. This saw, for the first time, the extension of universal suffrage to all adults over the voting age in the first election to the House of Assembly that took place in 1964. The conduct of this election was based on the democratic ideal of free and fair election, a core tenet of modern liberal democracies. The subsequent elections were all based on that ideal with the objective of sustaining the practical workings of a democratic system.

The 1968 election was conducted with the participation of political parties in the electoral process of democratic regimes. Pangu party, which was established in 1967, emerged with strong nationalist platforms and its success in the 1968 election enabled it to advance calls for early self-government. Despite it being characterised as radical, it never advocated an alternative system to democracy (Woolford, 1976). In fact its leader Michael Somare (now Sir Michael) was content to make overall changes in putting the interests of the indigenous people first without destroying the democratic framework that had emerged. Pangu's commitment to democracy can be revealed in the disagreements between the

members of the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), especially John Momis and John Kaputin, who tended to favour a socialist system and its ideals. Somare produced a counter document that mellowed down the socialist aspirations of Momis and Kaputin and maintained the democratic ideals (Hegarty 1998) that now shape the democratic system of our government.

The constitution of Papua New Guinea that was formally promulgated on 16 September 1975 made specific references to the democratic framework of government and society. This follows the tradition of other great democracies such as that of the United States and France (Goldring, 1978). The United States constitution and especially the declaration of independence follow the tradition of John Locke, a leading proponent of liberal democracy in the seventeenth century.

The preamble of the Papua New Guinea constitution states that:

WE, THE PEOPLE, do now establish this sovereign nation and declare ourselves, under the guiding hand of God, to be the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. AND WE ASSERT, by virtue of that authority

- that all power belongs to the people-acting through their duly elected representatives
- that respect for the dignity of the individual and community interdependence are basic principles of our society
- that we guard with our lives our national identity, integrity and self respect
- that we reject violence and seek consensus as a means of solving our common problems
- that our national wealth, won by honest, hard work be equitably shared by all

The above points encompass the core elements of liberal democracy, namely representative democracy, individualism, respect for others, order and stability, and equality. These elements are enforced through the various sections of the constitution as well as other related laws. Despite their not being legally holistic in nature, their political underpinnings are important in framing the democratic nature of our society. Any acts of government that are unconstitutional are also commonly referred to as undemocratic and this further highlights the collaboration between the constitution and democratic system of government.

Another important part of the constitution that outlined the democratic nature of the political system is the section on basic rights. This section in the preamble states that:

WE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE that, subject to any restrictions imposed by law on non-citizens, all persons in our country are entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever their race, tribe, places of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the legitimate public interest, to each of the following:

- (a) life, liberty, security of the person and protection of the law; and
- (b) the right to take part in political activities; and
- (c) freedom from inhuman treatment and forced labour; and
- (d) freedom of conscience, of expression, of information and assembly and association; and
- (e) freedom of employment and freedom of movement; and
- (f) protection for the privacy of their homes and other property and from unjust deprivation of property,

and have accordingly included in this constitution provisions designed to afford protection to those rights and freedoms, subject to such limitations on that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations primarily designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the acknowledged rights and freedoms by an individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the legitimate public interest.

These rights promote the liberal democratic nature of the political system and make it part of the great tradition of the constitution of leading democracies such as the United States.

The chapter is divided into three sections: in Section 1, I discuss the activity of measuring democracy, which has become a prominent task undertaken by political scientists throughout the world. Section 2 examines the practice of the democratic audit as a method of measuring democracy. Section 3 briefly reviews key aspects of democracy in Papua New Guinea's democratic process and Section 4 concludes the chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is not to provide answers to specific questions of the democratic audit, but to highlight major issues and concerns that are central to democracy in Papua New Guinea. A detailed democratic audit by interested Papua New Guinean scholars may be able to do this.

MEASURING DEMOCRACY

The art of measuring democracy is as old as the idea itself. Plato and Aristotle in their great works provided a philosophical interpretation of it, while the Scholastics or the Church Fathers presented a theological interpretation of democracy. St Thomas Aquinas and St Augustine were the

leading writers in the scholastic tradition. Despite the conflicting interpretation of democracy and what it represents, there was a common tone of it being an ideal system during the different stages in human civilisation. The Greeks who invented democracy enabled it to flourish in the city-state of Athens, and many centuries later the American founding fathers embraced it. An inevitable outcome of the different forms of democracy stipulates its evolving nature. That is, democracy and its principles are not static but evolutionary; therefore over many centuries, democracy has evolved from its beginnings in Athens through to the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The American War of Independence and French Revolution provided an impetus to seek new meaning and direction for democracy together with its new partner known as 'liberalism'. Liberalism was the product of the Industrial Revolution and the Social Contract School took it upon themselves to clarify the assumptions of the new idea. Political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau were prominent in highlighting the central tenets of these new ideas. The ideas of these individuals added new dimensions to democracy; not only to what Plato and Aristotle had interpreted it to be, but what they foresaw once liberalism was incorporated. Thus this brought into place liberal democracy, a new version of democracy that not only upholds the popular will of the majority but also guarantees individual liberty.

The new face of democracy therefore has given rise to numerous debates about its appropriateness to civil society both in theory and practice. Its major elements, which included principles such as good government, free and fair elections, individual rights and political equality, and rule of law, have gone through constant scrutiny to determine whether they have been protected or abused by legitimate authorities. Most recently the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen political scientists arguing among themselves over the proper operations of the principles of democracy. The result has been the numerous methods of measuring democracy within individual states, or comparative studies of different democratic states to determine how democratic they are. The measurements have resulted in numerical indices being allocated to different countries as well as certain benchmarks being set to measure individual countries against. Those that met the benchmarks are said to be democratic and those that failed are classified as undemocratic.

According to David Beetham (1999), measuring democracy began with identifying the social and economic conditions that are conducive to democratic consolidation or stability, and in particular with testing hypotheses about the relationship between levels of economic

development and democracy. Lipset's work (1959) on 'some social requisites of democracy' was the beginning of serious study to correlate levels or stages of democracy with indices of economic development (the more telephones, the more democracy). This line of measuring democracy culminated in the famous work by W. Rostow on his different stages of development that came under the development school of modernisation. Rostow targeted mostly non-western societies that were not democratic or partly democratic. Concentrating on economic development and less on political development, Rostow's analysis was similar to Lipset's.

Serious consideration of measuring political development or more specifically democracy was made by Robert Dahl (1956). In his famous work, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, he outlined the definitional characteristics of polyarchy. Polyarchy means rule by the many and it denotes a representative democracy with substantial interest-group influence on government (McLean, 1996: 392). The characteristics of democracy come under four stages that are all related to an election: during the pre-voting period, during the voting period, during the post-voting period and during the inter-election stage. Each stage incorporates different elements which must be fulfilled in order to make the system democratic or become a polyarchy.

The work by Dahl led to other attempts by political scientists to provide a systematic measurement of democracy. Some of the famous work was done by Downs (1957), Lipset (1960), Neubauer (1967), Olsen (1968), Flanigan and Fogelman (1971), Vanhanen (1997), May (1978) and Bollen (1979). Besides the contribution of these individuals, various groups have also contributed to the task. Groups such as the Freedom House, the Inter-Parliamentary Council and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have been prominent in offering their own methods of measurement on specific principles of democracy.

Even the measurement of democracy has become more practical and oriented towards policy-making. This has come about as part of the calls by governments in western democracies in their efforts to bring about good government (Beetham 1999). Initially it was the World Bank that decided to add an element of political conditionality to its structural adjustment programmes, as it concluded that the transparency of government procedures was important to the effective management of economic loans. Even donor countries have been highly sceptical about giving aid that might be used to assist authoritarian regimes that engage in serious violation of human rights. The goal of promoting democracy has become part and parcel of the aid packages that have been given to recipient

countries. This new agenda has required donor governments to be able to assess the level of a given country's democracy and human rights, as well as its progress over time, whether as a basis for targeting aid in the first place or to monitor the effectiveness of its programmes in practice.

DEMOCRATIC AUDIT

The idea of a democratic audit originated with Trevor Smith and the Democracy Committee of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. It was seen to be a viable method for providing a systematic outline on the state of democracy in the United Kingdom. How democratic were we actually? Providing an authoritative answer to this question, through a systematic audit of democracy, could serve to demonstrate if, and how far, these concerns were justified and help identify where reform might most be needed. Such an audit could also provide a benchmark against which any future reforms could be evaluated (Beetham, 1999: 568).

There are significant differences between the democratic audit and the other forms of democracy assessment mentioned. Firstly, in the previous assessments of democracy, outsiders make judgements on a country's democracy. When looking at the existing scholarly works on comparative politics, it is obvious to see that western scholars are dominant in determining the degree of democratisation in non-western societies, most of which are Third World countries. The democratic audit is different as it is undertaken by citizens of the country being assessed as part of an internal debate about the character of its political institutions and public life (Beetham, 1999). However, there still is a need for reference to be made to international benchmarks as well as the employment of external auditors and consultants, but the final version of the audit is the responsibility of the local auditors.

The second difference is that in the previous assessments of democracy, established democracies were used against developing ones on the assumption that the former do not lack in their democratic capabilities. The democratic audit does not make any such assumption. According to Beetham (1999), 'adopting such a standard uncritically simply creates an air of smugness: we here, who are unblemished, find you over there to be thoroughly deficient'. To assume perfection is to cast serious doubt on the conception of democracy and the assessment criteria being employed. This means that the work of democratisation is never finished and that established democracies are as much in need of critical assessment as developing ones.

Thirdly, the conception of democracy undertaken by the democratic audit is more comprehensive and the assessment criteria more rigorous than those used in other democratic assessments:

We have not limited democracy to the two areas of electoral competition and inclusiveness and civil and political freedoms that have become standards since Dahl's polyarchy. We have extended the analysis of political institutions to issues of government openness, accountability and responsiveness; and we have also included criteria to assess aspects of civil society and its relationship to government. In addition, we have used the principle of political equality as a key index of democratic attainment throughout our assessment of political rights and institutions (Beetham, 1999: 569).

Finally, the democratic audit resists aggregating the assessment of the different aspects of democracy into a single index or numerical score, as so many other democratic assessments have done. The numerical scores of democracy may not only cast doubts on the objectivity of democracy but also the judgements that have been made of different indicators of democracy. This approach is inappropriate to the democratic audit because it does not differentiate those aspects of a country's political life, which are more satisfactory from a democratic point of view and those which give cause for concern. For this purpose, keeping the different aspects separate, and making a discursive assessment of each in turn, is both more appropriate and a more defensible procedure (Beetham, 1999).

The starting point of a democratic audit is to find a defensible conception of democracy from which specific criteria for assessment can be derived. Beetham notes:

We started from the simple proposition that democracy is to be defined in the first instance as a set of principles or regulative ideals and secondarily in terms of the institutions and practices through which these principles are realised to a greater or lesser degree. These principles we took to be those of popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers, and equality of status and consideration in respect of those decisions. Popular control and political equality comprise our two key democratic principles and provide the litmus test for how far a country's political life can be regarded as democratic (Beetham, 1999: 570).

The different components of democracy provide four sections to be audited: the first section on free and fair elections looks at the process of election and how democratic they are; the second section assesses the degree of openness, accountability and responsiveness of government; the third section assesses the quality of protection for civil and political rights and the fourth section looks at the democratic society and how groups are formed and interact, the accountability of economic institutions, the role

of the media and the tolerance of diversity. And because democracy is not an all-or-nothing affair, the questions were phrased in comparative terms, how far is appointment to legislative and government office determined by popular election? How far is the executive subject to the rule of law? How equal are citizens in the enjoyment of their civil and political rights and liberties? How strong and independent of government control are the associations of civil society (Beetham, 1999).

The following are some examples of the questions for the democratic audit as provided by David Beetham (1994) under each main aspect of democracy:¹ the first set of questions concerns the electoral process, its reach, inclusiveness, independence, integrity and impartiality, as well as how equally it treats its citizens, how much effective choice it offers them, and how far governmental outcomes actually reflect the choices made. Thus:

1. How far is appointment to legislative and governmental office determined by popular election, on the basis of open competition, universal suffrage and secret ballot?
2. How independent of government and party control are the election and procedures of voter registration, and how free from intimidation and bribery is the process of election itself?
3. How effective a range of choice and information does the electoral and party system allow the voters, and is there fair and equal access for all parties and candidates to the media and other means of communication with them, and an overall balance in the treatment of the various parties and candidates by the media?
4. What proportion of the electorate actually votes, and how closely does the composition of parliament and the programme of government reflect the choice actually made by the electorate?

The second set of questions involves the area of open and accountable government:

5. How accessible are elected politicians to approach by their electors, and how effectively do they represent constituents' interests?
6. How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected politicians over the non-elected personnel and organs of the state?

¹ The questions are grouped according to the four areas or dimensions of democracy. The boundaries between the areas are not watertight, and some questions relate to more than one area. Some questions are also much bigger than others. Thus single questions on the powers of parliament in relation to the executive, or on the civil liberties of citizens could well be broken down into a sub-set of further questions. The exact balance between them must be a matter of judgement and emphasis.

7. How extensive are the powers of parliament to oversee legislation and public expenditure and to scrutinise the executive; and how effectively are they exercised in practice?
8. How publicly accountable are elected representatives for their private interests and sources of income that are relevant to the performance of their public office, and the process of election to it?
9. How far are the courts able to ensure that the executive obeys the rule of law; and how effective are their procedures of ensuring that all public institutions and officials are subject to the rule of law in the performance of their functions?
10. How independent is the judiciary from the executive, and from all forms of interference; and how far is the administration of law subject to effective public scrutiny?
11. How readily can a citizen gain access to the courts, ombudsman or tribunals for redress in the event of maladministration or the failure of government or public bodies to meet their legal responsibilities; and how effective are the means of redress available?

Questions in the third section address issues of civil and political rights:

12. How clearly does the law define the civil and political rights and liberties of the citizens, and how effectively are they defended?
13. How secure are citizens in the exercise of their civil and political rights and liberties; and how far is their equal enjoyment of them constrained by social, economic or other factors?

The final set of questions is premised on the assumption that the quality and vitality of a country's democracy will be revealed in the character of its civil society as well as in its formal institutions:

14. How widespread is political participation in all its forms; how representative of different sections of society is it; and how far is it limited by social, economic or other factors?
15. How open are the media to access from all sections of opinion and social groups, and how effectively do they operate as a balanced forum for informed political debate?
16. How far do the traditions and culture of the society support the basic democratic principles of popular control and political equality?
17. To what extent do people have confidence in the ability of the political system to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their ability to influence it?

Since these questions were drawn up, additional audit questions have been posed covering new areas such as the civil-military relationship, political parties, and so on.

After 25 years of independence, how democratic is Papua New Guinea? This is the central question asked by the democratic audit. In carrying out an audit for PNG, the four sections of the criteria will be looked at. They are:

- free and fair elections
- open and accountable government
- civil and political rights
- a democratic society.

Each section carries a series of questions (examples provided) and data need to be collected to answer the questions.

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

The first area that a democratic audit for Papua New Guinea should analyse is the aspect of free and fair elections. The conduct of free and fair election is one element of democracy that separates itself from elections that are not free and fair. For Papua New Guinea, five elections have been conducted since independence, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. The conduct and features of these elections have been analysed in various studies carried out by the Electoral Commission and the Department of Political Science, University of Papua New Guinea, as well as by scholars from mainly The Australia National University who have had a long association with the politics of the country. From these studies a number of important trends can be identified for our purposes.

First, on the issue of open competition between political parties, there was clearly competition between the various parties in government and those in the opposition. The elections have not been the only means in determining the change of governments. This is despite the fact that new groups formed the government after the 1992 and 1997 elections. The ineffectiveness of the elections however was substituted by the numerous votes of no confidence. After the 1977 election, the coalition government of the Pangu Pati and the People's Progress Party (PPP) maintained their position in government. However, the coalition was removed by a vote of no confidence in 1980 that saw the PPP ejected from its marriage to the Pangu. After the 1982 election, Pangu regained control of the government, but was once again removed from office through a vote of no confidence in 1986 by the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) which comprised former Pangu members led by its former Deputy Prime Minister, Pius Wingti. After the 1987 election the PDM remained in government, but was voted out of office in 1988 by a vote of no confidence initiated by the Pangu. After the 1992 election, the PDM regained control of the government but was removed through a vote of no confidence in 1994 (after Pius

Wingti resigned as Prime Minister) by its former ally, the PPP that had switched in time to team up with the Pangu. After the 1997 election, the People's National Congress (PNC) led by Bill Skate took control of the government with the Pangu and the PPP as coalition partners. Both were later sacked resulting in Skate losing the government (Skate resigned as Prime Minister) in a vote of no confidence on 14 July 1999. Sir Mekere Morauta who headed the PDM became the Prime Minister. This method of changing governments is obviously a key source of political instability. The political system would be more stable if elections determined the change in government as a result of open competition between the various political parties.

Second, the use of the secret ballot, which is the principal means by which voters cast their choices, is another emerging trend. This process has been severely abused in Papua New Guinea turning the secret ballot into an open or public ballot. The freedom of choice, which individuals have, has been hampered by undemocratic means employed by different individuals at polling stations. The gross abuse of the secret ballot has been well documented by the media as well as the various election studies (see Saffu, 1989; Moore and Kooyman, 1998).

A principal area of abuse is the use of scrutineers. Scrutinisers are employed by various candidates to ensure that the voting is conducted in a fair manner, but have gone further by inducing and coercing voters to vote for their candidates. Severe penalties are imposed on individuals who vote against the choice of the scrutineers and this practice has made a total mockery of the use of the secret ballot. There have also been instances where ballot boxes have been stolen and marks illegally made on the ballot papers before returning them to electoral officials for counting. The case in Kagua-Erave in the 1997 election is typical of this practice. Another example is the attack on a helicopter carrying ballot boxes in Okapa for the by-election of the Eastern Highlands provincial seat in 1999.

Gross abuse of the secret ballot experienced in past elections is related to the third trend, an increase in electoral violence. Electoral officials have been the main targets of violence as well as supporters of opposing candidates. The 1997 election saw an increase in violence after counting ended. The Electoral Commission in its 1997 election report noted that the election witnessed the highest level of violence since 1977. Electoral violence occurs before polling, during polling and after polling (Dinnen, 1996; Standish, 1996). Physical abuse of electoral officials in New Ireland and parts of the Highlands and the involvement of a rebel faction of the military in the election in the Highlands are just some cases of violence witnessed during the 1997 election. The increased use of police

and military personnel during polling indicates increasing violence where electoral officials and ballot boxes are key targets.

Fourth, the insignificant role of the parties in elections is indicative of another trend. As discovered by various studies, political parties mean very little to voters (Turner and Hegarty 1987; Saffu 1989). As such, political parties in Papua New Guinea do not provide an effective range of choice and information to the voters. Most political parties are weak and their source of revenue is non-existent, which explains their poor performances in capturing votes in all parts of the country. Parties have not explored effective means through which they can sell their ideas to the people, the bulk of whom live in rural areas.

The practice of 'concentrated campaigning' that has been seen in past elections is still the norm today. It is a fact that no party in the current parliament can boast of representing the entire country in terms of its electoral support and representation. The lack of providing alternatives to the voters in party platforms makes it even harder for voters. More interestingly, party-endorsed candidates prefer presenting their own platforms to their voters rather than using their party's platforms. Thus, a culture which has been cultivated in the minds of voters is that party platforms are irrelevant to them and therefore candidates have to sell what they think would secure them votes rather than what their respective party think is best for the people. As correctly stated by Hegarty and Turner (1987), parties in Papua New Guinea are weak institutions with few links to the grassroots and limited organisational capacity. They are parliamentary factions whose electoral machines spring into action only during election years. All the parties in the current parliament are parliamentary factions with the exception of a few. A few parties have been merely stitched together on the floor of parliament such as the PDM, the People's National Congress and the National Alliance. Of all parties, the Pangu has been the main victim as its membership has dwindled since the 1980s due to poaching and splinter factions.

The electoral votes that parties acquired since the 1977 election has declined over time. This scenario further exemplifies the decline in the strength and significance of parties in PNG's political system. Thus, the overall decline of parties in the electoral process can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 in which the Pangu is used as an example to show its decline. With the current trend, the Pangu might go into oblivion along the path of the United Party and the National Party.²

² Paul Pora, the Open Member for Hagen, is the only surviving member of the party.

Table 1: Split in Pangu Pati's Membership since 1977 and Change of Leadership

<i>Date of Split</i>	<i>New Party</i>	<i>Party Leader</i>	<i>Change in the Pangu's Leadership</i>
20 March 1985	People's Democratic Movement	Pius Wingti	—
April 1986	League of National Advancement	Tony Siaguru	—
22 May 1988	—	—	Rabbie Namaliu replaced Michael Somare as party leader
July 1992	—	—	Jack Genia took over from Namaliu
1994	—	—	Chris Haiveta assumed leadership after the sudden death of Genia
March 1997	National Alliance	Michael Somare	Chris Haiveta
November 1997	Further split which saw prominent members leaving the party: Namaliu (independent),* Kilroy Genia (Advance Party), Ian Ling Stuckey (PNC) [†] and Nakikus Konga (resigned from parliament)		Chris Haiveta

* Namaliu has since re-joined the Pangu.

† Stuckey has also re-joined the Pangu.

Table 2: Total Number of Seats and % of Votes Won by Pangu since 1977

<i>Election</i>	<i>Seats Won</i>	<i>% of Votes Collected</i>
1977	38	n.a.
1982	51	34
1987	26	14.8
1992	20	9.3
1997	15	7.44

A fifth trend that can be identified is the increase in the number of candidates who contested the elections independently rather than being affiliated to a party. The number of these candidates has not only increased, but their votes received have been higher than any political party contesting (see Table 3).

Table 3: Independent Candidates in the 1987, 1992 and 1997 Elections

<i>Election Year</i>	<i>Votes (%)</i>	<i>Seats Won (%)</i>
1987	40.9	20.8
1992	63.1	35.8
1997	48.4	33.03

The huge increase in the number of independent candidates winning seats has presented a major problem to the functioning of parliamentary democracy in Papua New Guinea. The norm after every election is that the independent candidates eventually join a party and the party preferences would be made based on the likely rewards or gains in terms of a ministerial appointment or other unconventional inducements offered to the candidate before the election. The political environment created by the independent candidates is that of instability rather than stability due to their loose allegiance to parties. The longevity of holding a government together is secondary to the parochial interests of independent candidates. A classic example of this can be seen in the 1997 election when Skate's PNC won only 6 seats, but later increased its numerical strength to about 40, courtesy of many independent candidates joining his party. Just before the vote of no confidence on 14 July 1999, a majority of these independent candidates deserted Skate and joined the other group resulting in Skate losing office to Mekere Morauta. Soon after the vote, Skate was left with only 9 members and by October 2000, the number has further decreased to 4. After the adjournment of the Bill on the Integrity of Political Parties in November 2000, some of the members of the government (mostly ministers) were sacked for not supporting the bill and are now back with Skate. Skate was reported to refer to these deserters as his 'prodigal sons' who were bound to return to his camp once the going got tough. Most of these members were independent candidates who were once members of Skate's party then joined the PDM but are now back with Skate.

A final trend that needs careful consideration is the electoral roll or common roll, which has a direct bearing on the voter turn-out. Voter turn-out in Papua New Guinea remained high (see Table 4).

Table 4: Voter Turn-Out

<i>Election</i>	<i>% Voter Turn-Out</i>
1977	68.9
1982	66.3
1987	72.9
1992	70.0
1997	74.8

Source: Anere (1998).

The voter turn-out in Papua New Guinea in terms of figures is grossly over represented and exaggerated due to a number of exorbitant practices such as multiple voting; and even, in some parts of the country, names of dogs and pigs have been used by people to secure the right to vote more than once; children under the voting age also vote; and even more bizarre, deceased people's names have been resurrected to vote at election time. Problems associated with the common roll have also contributed to the figures not representing the actual turn-out rate. The Electoral Commission who is responsible for updating the common roll has expressed openly the problems and hardships it faces in doing this. In the 1997 election alone, for instance, a large number of eligible voters were turned away because their names did not appear on the common roll. The voter registration that the Electoral Commission embarked on before polling did not alleviate the problem. The updating of the common roll is usually done after the conduct of a national census, but a census was never conducted due to financial problems. The Commonwealth Observatory Report of the 1997 election also reported major problems with the roll especially in getting the voters to register and updating the roll.

OPEN AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT

The ideas of open and accountable government have become part and parcel of the democratic ideal in the twentieth century. As political ideals, open government and accountability are two distinct ideals that are committed to maintaining democracy through the government's decision-making processes.

Open government is based on the principle that what happens in government should be open to public scrutiny and criticism on the basis of a free flow of information from public bodies to representative institutions, the mass media and the general public (Heywood 1997). This principle favours the public's right to know. The advantage of open government includes checking on incompetency, corruption and tyranny. It also promotes political argument and debate, as in a market of ideas, resulting in improved policy outcomes and a better-informed electorate.

Accountability on the other hand is based on the requirement for representatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers and duties, act upon criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept (some) responsibility for failure, incompetence, or deceit (McLean 1996).

In applying the ideal of open government to PNG, a question that can be asked is how open is the government to the public in its decisions? With the exception of the need to withhold certain information

relating to national security, all other processes of government must be made available to avoid instances of corruption, which is a major problem in Papua New Guinea. The successive governments seriously face a dilemma of withholding information from the public and the current government of Morauta is no exception. This can be a result of mere arrogance or a deliberate attempt by governments to keep the public in the dark. The Sandline deal is one such example. Another is the current debate on privatisation. Despite the government's commitment to the exercise, there are still unanswered questions demanding answers. In other words, the government has to convince the public that the exercise will benefit them and that there are no hidden agendas. The argument by Ben Micah, Chairman of the Privatisation Commission that the exercise will create more jobs is a step in the right direction but it would be more convincing if statistics were given to support such claim (*The National*, 20 November 2000).

The inquiry into the affairs of the National Provident Fund (NPF) has revealed numerous instances of incompetence and corruption by public officials responsible for managing the finances of the contributors, who are mostly private-sector low-income earners. Without the inquiry, much of the information relating to corruption that is now before the public would have never been revealed. Inquiries into the affairs of many of the now insolvent state-enterprises should likewise be encouraged.

There is an urgent need to expose government dealings and decisions that would demystify the government black box. Transparency International (TI) led by Sir Anthony Siaguru is leading the way in its crusade for ensuring that there is transparency in key areas of government. Currently the drive to privatisate statutory bodies by the Morauta government has come under the microscope of the TI and the recent announcement by the Privatisation Commission, that every aspect of privatisation would be transparent (*Post Courier*, 21 November 2000), is a good sign for open government. Even TI is calling on the government to prosecute officials responsible for defrauding the NPF, including its former managing director and chairman who fled to Australia.

An area that has a negative effect on the ideal of open government is the process of making appointments to senior positions within the public sector. A demonic culture has been cultivated and institutionalised by successive governments that allows for the appointment of unqualified and inexperienced officers. Most of these officers are either political associates of the governing coalition government or are just friends and wantoks of power wielders. This culture is such that ministers and their cronies think that they can make any appointment they wish without due regard to the established procedures.

One such piece of legislation, the *Public Services (Management) Act* (1986), stipulates that for any appointment to be lawful, the Public Services Commission (PSC) must be consulted on all appointments to senior positions in the public service before the National Executive Council (NEC) makes its final endorsement. The endorsement by the NEC must be based on the recommendations of the PSC. That is, it is not the prerogative of a Minister or Prime Minister or some ill-informed adviser to have the final say, but an independent body with quasi-judicial functions. The rationality of this procedure is quite simple; PSC is an independent body (constitutional office) that is free from all forms of influence and whatever recommendation it makes is based on merit rather than on political convenience. The current practice of pushing an appointment through without any consultation made with the PSC makes the whole process invalid. The process of consultation is just a mechanism that was put in place to make the process more open and transparent. Unfortunately even the PSC itself has fallen victim to the politicisation process of the appointments of its commissioners. The case of Peter Peipul appointing his brother as a commissioner exemplifies this point. The PSC was once a respected organisation filled with senior bureaucrats such as Rabbie Namaliu, Ekeroma Age, Paul Songo, Henry Veratau, Winifred Kamit and Joe Wal among others. It was in the early 1990s that the PSC became highly politicised under Pius Wingti's regime.

To look at some specific cases, how many individuals trained in the field of international relations are now acting as our diplomats overseas? The Department of Political Science at the University of Papua New Guinea is the only institution in the country that trains students in this field however, how many of these students are offered jobs within the Department of Foreign Affairs? Many such students earned high academic grades and would fit in well in any division within the department, but the system has denied them their chance to contribute meaningfully to their country after going through four years of training in international relations. The current practice of posting people overseas as diplomats without any knowledge in international affairs makes a mockery of not only the diplomatic posts, but also belittles having tertiary institutions that should be providing skilled manpower for the public service. How could these people talk intelligently on international issues if, before their appointments, they were policemen, lawyers, patrol officers, bank clerks, school teachers, tax collectors and finance officers?

How many Deputy Police Commissioners have become Police Commissioners? The trend in the police force is another example of incompetence on the part of the government where junior officers are

appointed to senior positions ahead of their senior counterparts. Appointing individuals from outside government departments affects the procedure of open and transparent government, and is demoralising to the rank and file.

How many individuals appointed to boards of statutory bodies have experience in business management and have specific industry knowledge? The current problem facing the NPF is a classic example that demonstrates how individuals with limited knowledge of the superannuation industry were given the responsibility to make decisions concerning the proper management of the fund. In the first place, who appointed these individuals and why were they appointed? It was the government and the current inquiry has revealed how politicians have been making appointments despite the fact that they have no legal basis for doing so. Under Bill Skate's regime a commercial airline pilot was appointed as the Chairman of the Telikom Board. What skills does this pilot possess to make him a qualified person to make decisions regarding the telecommunications industry?

In discussing accountability, there is a growing concern among the people that their representatives have not performed as expected of them. It is a common feature in the media of concerned citizens asking of the whereabouts of their elected representatives. Citizens have also raised concerns regarding the failure of the government to deliver basic goods and services to the people. Bernard Narokobi, the current Speaker of the Parliament, raised some important issues on the accountability of politicians. Under the heading of 'They sin against the people', he defined sin as something politicians are not supposed to do, or not doing something they are required to do by virtue of their oath of office. He listed several areas that are problematic with regard to the performance and responsibilities of the leaders (Narokobi, 1983):

- lack of interest shown in parliamentary sittings;
- parliamentarians concentrating in running their businesses rather than serving the people who elected them;
- failure to present the views of the electorate and finding out the needs of the people;
- ministers neglecting the wishes of their people;
- ministers not attending cabinet meetings.

I don't know whether the massive pay rise awarded to Members of Parliament (2001) by the Salaries Remuneration Commission (SRC)³ of which Narokobi is the Chairman can be referred to as a 'sin'. This is contradictory to his statement that the people in Papua New Guinea are

³ The establishment of the SRC was controversial. It was a body established to determine the salaries of the very people who are its members, which include politicians and senior civil servants. The chairman is the Speaker of Parliament.

poorer than before (*Post Courier*, 4 January 2002) while politicians are well off.

The former Chief Ombudsman, Simon Pentanu, has also raised similar concerns. He stated that at the heart of our democracy is the principle that people place trust in their leaders and in return demand accountability (*The National*, 17 January 2000). Leaders are urged to ask, 'How may I serve?' and not 'What's in it for me?' The country and the people are searching for outstanding leadership and accountability from our elected leaders. The challenge is to find leaders who will create, not destroy; will lead, not follow; who will believe, not doubt; and who will be forces for the greater good, and not just for themselves. Leaders have enriched themselves at the expense of citizens. How many politicians owned businesses or properties overseas before entering parliament? Obviously, only a few, but if we look around today it would be equally obvious that many have become rich overnight after their entering parliament — all at the expense of an increasingly impoverished society.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

A democratic system of government clearly recognises the rights and freedoms of its citizens. Papua New Guinea, following the traditions of other democracies, has a profound outline of the various rights and freedoms of its citizens. The framers of the constitution in its formulation stages took the rights of citizens very seriously. The framers knew that for Papua New Guinea to be truly democratic, the rights of the citizens must be protected by providing for an environment of political equality for all citizens.

Civil rights or liberty refers to a private sphere of existence that belongs to the citizen not the state. According to Heywood (1997: 365):

Civil liberty therefore encompasses a range of negative rights usually rooted in the doctrine of human rights which demand non-interference on the part of government. The classic civil liberties that are usually thought to include the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of movement and freedom of association. These key freedoms are generally seen as vital to the functioning of liberal-democratic societies, since they provide the individual with protection against arbitrary government. In many cases, the principle of civil liberty is given constitutional expression through documents such as a bill of rights.

The classic civil liberties mentioned by Heywood are all guaranteed in the constitution of Papua New Guinea under the 'Rights of All

Persons'. They include the liberty of the person (S42), freedom from forced labour (S43), freedom from arbitrary search and entry (S44), freedom of conscience, thought and religion (S45), freedom of expression (S46), freedom of assembly and association (S47), freedom of employment (S48) and right to privacy (S49). All these rights are upheld and enforced by the constitution.

However, since independence there are growing concerns regarding the abuse of these rights by the state and society in Papua New Guinea. The Police Force has been the main perpetrator of the abuse of some of these rights. This is usually seen in the due process of the law being ignored by members of the police force. Over the years, the state has been forced to pay compensation to parties whose rights have been violated by the use of excessive force by members of the police. The Highlands region of the country is the worst hit area that has experienced destruction to properties such as houses, gardens, tree crops and domesticated animals. The principle that someone is not guilty unless proven otherwise does not hold in many instances. It is a common scene on the streets of Port Moresby and other centres where members of the police force are seen beating up individuals who have committed petty crimes such as shoplifting or street vending. The procedure of reading someone his/her rights is not the method that is usually followed. The old west saying of 'shoot first and talk later' is the norm.

The killing of two University of Papua New Guinea students and two members of the public by the police in 2001 reinforces the dilemma that Papua New Guinea faces with regard to political and civil rights. Never before had citizens been killed in a protest against the government and the Morauta government and the police have a lot of explaining to do. The students from the University of Papua New Guinea have acted as a voice for the silent majority over the years and the killing of the two students marked a departure from the right of citizens to protest against the government. In this case it is a democratic government that has committed the crime against its citizens.

Another important freedom that is causing controversy in the country is the freedom of conscience, thought and religion. The building of a Moslem mosque in Port Moresby has raised a wide range of opinions. The wider opinion was that because Papua New Guinea is a Christian country, other religious groups must not be allowed to practise their beliefs in the country. This view is not only undemocratic, but also violates the constitution that allows for freedom of religion. The constitution does not make Christianity the state religion because this would place Papua New Guinea in the same category as those fanatic Moslem states and would

greatly undermined the basic right of individuals to choose what is best for them rather than the state dictating to them. From an ethical point of view, the majority view cannot be used as a guide to deny individuals the right to enjoy what he/she thinks is best for him/her. This is because religion is an area of liberty in which the individual must be free to choose.

This case heralds the beginning of increased debates and controversies likely to emerge in the future concerning individual rights relating to lifestyles, behaviours and tastes of individuals. An important factor that allows for the exercise of individual pursuit without interference from anyone is the level of toleration that society allows. That is, how far can society accept certain individual pursuits such as abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and prostitution that are accepted in other democracies like Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Britain? There are bound to be clashes between the tradition and customs of the people and these new practices which have fallen under the category of basic rights. If the popular perception is that these practices are immoral and unacceptable then the constitution has to be changed to make these practices illegal because, as it now stands, individuals are free to pursue what they think is best for them and the majority cannot deny them the right to do so.

A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

How does society in PNG help sustain democracy? Long before the coming of western influence, Papua New Guinea society was highly egalitarian with the exception of a few communities. Consensus was the major means in which disputes and conflicts were resolved. The introduction of democracy further enhanced this principle, which is part of deliberative democracy, that involves all parties reaching an agreement that is accepted by all disputing parties. This form of solving disputes has been commonly used apart from settling disputes within the judicial system.

Democratically, the people are aware of their status and roles in society and know what is expected of them. This can be seen in many community projects in which people have co-operated to achieve certain collective goals such as building roads, schools, and airstrips with little assistance from the government. The people can embrace any changes whether social, economic or political but, over the years, experience has shown that there have been no motivation or incentives from the centre, that is from the national government to assist the people and get them involved in community oriented projects. As such there are times in which people do feel neglected and powerless. They do not see themselves as having any power to influence public policy, except where they have to be mobilised together with other civil society partners. Mass protests against

the Sandline deal in 1997 and land registration and the privatisation process in 2001 are cases in point.

An emerging trend that is adversely impacting the democratic process is PNG's high level of violence in both urban and rural areas. Regard for human lives as well as respect for other human beings and property is on the wane. Innocent people (nationals and expatriates) have fallen victim to the encroachment of serious social disorder that threatens to displace the moral fabric of society. Business houses have fallen prey to the whims of violence, while innocent and powerless females have been violently raped. The government as well as churches are working tirelessly to address this problem, but no measures seem to be working. Even the harsh retributive justice employed by the police force is counter-productive. This creates a dilemma for the police as to how it should appropriately respond to crime and violence. The public have had no choice but to endorse the harsh tactics that police use in combating the escalating crime level. In many cases in rural stations, police are often over-powered by gangs and often police have to decide between protecting their lives or that of criminals.

The law and order problem is so widespread that in some provinces services have been greatly affected. The Southern Highlands province is an example where basic services such as hospitals, banks and schools, communication and so forth have been shut due to a never-ending spiral of violence. The Western Highlands and Enga (*Post Courier*, 23 November 2000) have also faced similar problems, where hospital workers have been abused and properties destroyed resulting in the closure of health services in these two provinces. The mass rape of schoolgirls in the Eastern Highlands province in 1997 and also in the Western Highlands in 1998 are only some examples of how society is being invaded by these sickening acts.

Another dilemma facing the country that stems from the law and order problem is the manner in which the Defence Force personnel have continuously protested against government decisions and shown open rebellion against the state. Violent acts by members of the force have resulted in destruction of properties both public and private. The Defence Force was once an institution that the citizens were proud of but its undisciplined character has turned it into an entity that has no worth to the state and society. The Sandline Affair in 1997 was destructive to the discipline within the force and its members. Various attempts by the Defence Force hierarchy and government to instil stability in its command structure have failed. The recent clashes (2001) between the police and the military after the shooting of an officer suspected of armed robbery in Port

Moresby shows how the members for the force have very little regard for the due process of the law. The involvement of a rebel faction of the military in the 1997 election is troublesome to our democracy as well as the alleged infiltration of the military by some politicians. This has caused divisions, thus affecting the sense of loyalty and allegiance to the state.

Finally, one area that needs attention is the dissemination of information to the public. It is important to democracy for citizens to be well informed about issues affecting them so that they can develop their personal opinions on matters of national importance. The media is the major means through which this can be effected. However, it has not been effective, not because it is not playing its part, but through the failure of successive governments to ensure that this medium is available and is effective in its role. The major newspapers that are well read by educated Papua New Guineans are only available in urban areas as is television. The use of radio is and was the only effective means since the 1960s. It was through the radio that the people learnt about the first election in 1964, about the existence of political parties and became aware of the appointment of Somare as the Chief Minister in 1973 during self-government. It was a common sight even in very remote areas for villagers to sit around the radio and listen to programmes such as education news, church news and the popular tok-save programme. However, since independence this medium has been completely neglected by the government. Many provincial radio stations are off air, some for years because of run-down facilities. The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) has been under-funded and the current equipment is out-of-date. Many members of parliament failed to see the importance of the radio and few have used their rural development funds to support their respective provincial radio stations. How would their voters know what they are doing for them and also whether they are in the province for consultation or not? It makes one wonder how members of parliament travel to all the villages in their electorates to visit as many of the villages where there are no road links and the terrain is difficult to cross by any form of modern transportation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a new method of measuring democracy that can determine and assess the degree of democratisation in Papua New Guinea. This method has been used in Britain and will soon be applied to other democracies like Australia and New Zealand. The chapter has identified four major aspects of democracy that a democratic audit should focus on. First, elections and the manner in which they have been conducted in PNG are unfair and in most instances not totally free. The high number of

electoral disputes after each election is testimony to this dangerous trend. Secondly, the ideals of open government and accountability are also problematic. Governments over the years have failed to allow their policies to be scrutinised by the public. Decision-making processes are also closed processes and the public is usually taken by surprise when radical decisions are made which at most times are highly questionable.

On the ideal of accountability, successive governments have not done well in fulfilling their roles as representatives of their people. The continuous infighting between members of political parties and coalition partners has been counter-productive for the country as a whole. It is a common scene in Papua New Guinea politics that when there is a formation of a new government after an election or a motion on a vote of no confidence is moved, the country's legislative process comes to a standstill because of the manoeuvring of the members of various parties.

On the third aspect of democracy, despite the guarantee of basic rights to the citizens, there is gross abuse and violation of these rights in Papua New Guinea. The 'Rodney King' case is predominant in the country and it is usually the state that is accused of using sometimes excessive violence against its citizens.

The final aspect of democracy is the democratic society and as briefly discussed, there are limitations to the realisation of democracy in society due to a number of factors such as the increasing level of violence, problems with disciplinary institutions such as the Defence Force and the lack of informed citizenry due to the ineffective use of the media by the government. All these factors have contributed to a waning democracy. Violence and total disregard of the law are the norms in Papua New Guinea.

Despite all the shortfalls towards the full realisation of democracy, Papua New Guinea has done well compared to other developing democracies. Comparing Papua New Guinea with countries within the Melanesian group, it is the only one that has not faced any fundamental changes to its governmental structure. The structures and institutions of democracy are intact especially the continued role played by Parliament, the existence of a strong judiciary and most importantly the continued survival of the Constitution. The people and the successive governments know which areas need improvement and this requires a total commitment from everyone to maintain the democratic processes in the country. The government must take the lead and the people will follow.

Finally, PNG still has a long way to go in terms of embracing the important elements of democracy. An atmosphere must be cultivated to sustain the working of democratic principles. It is the duty of the government as well as the people that this is realised. Democracy is an

ideology that does not exist only within the government system but within society as a whole. It is society that gives the democratic impression to the political system within which government operates. The 'date with destiny' by the Morauta government in 1999 is the starting point in achieving confidence in the government system that has been impaired by past regimes. It is quite a simple commitment by a government that is trying to make itself more responsible not only to itself, but also to the larger society. We must aspire to create a society in the next 25 years where the different aspects of democracy discussed in this chapter are realised and sustained at a level that is truly progressive in bringing about a strong democratic political system. Liberal democracy is the only appropriate political framework for a country as diverse as PNG and it must be made to continue to work for us all.

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ENHANCING NATION BUILDING THROUGH THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: Overtures toward Federalism

Henry T. Okole

INTRODUCTION

Papua New Guinea (PNG) has now achieved its first 25 years of independence. The founding fathers of the country were never oblivious to the task that lay ahead as they manoeuvered what was then a colonial territory of Australia to self-government (1973) and eventually independence (1975) in a comparatively short period of time. For a country that was literally a stateless society — comprising hundreds of semi-autonomous tribal and linguistic groups — a sense of nationalism among the people had to be cultivated at the dawn of and even after independence. Just how an independent PNG was to be transposed after the political transition was never a comfortable scenario to ponder. Nevertheless, the country has progressed well and heralds a democratic history that is quite remarkable by Third World standards (see Lijphart, 1999).

This chapter seeks to provoke meaningful debate and discussion on the status of PNG's provincial government system. It is considered here to be the nexus for furthering nation building in PNG. Therefore, much needed change to governance in PNG is beholden to its supposed integrative role. Indeed, the provincial government system has performed its decentralization

responsibilities and its structure has allowed a resemblance of formal administration in rural areas. However, is there nothing else to it in substance than token demonstration of 'participative' democracy? In short, the provincial government system has not been a successful enterprise, even in the wake of the changes made to it in the mid-1990s. A lot more can be achieved through provincial governments by supplementing their current functions. How to increase their role is what this chapter seeks to address. Even though a federal system is idealized, it is discussed briefly toward the end for the reason that there is still a lot more to be done in terms of provincial institutionalization before federalism becomes more viable. At the outset, institutionalization is the process whereby practices, routines, or organizations become ingrained in the established and recognized ways in how a group would do things. And in relation to political systems, it is illustrated through 'adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence' (Huntington, 1968: 12).

THE AUTONOMY DEBATE IN PNG

Papua New Guinea currently comes under a unitary political system. Theoretically, this is where a supreme central government is given the ultimate power and authority to rule. Second-tier governments can be created, but subordinated to the central government. The governing system was deemed the most suitable model that would have allowed more control from Port Moresby (Waddell, 1998: 114). Threats by segments of the national population, as demonstrated by secessionist and political movements at the eve of independence (see May, 1982), meant that a strong central government was the best option. This was needed not only to withstand these simultaneous political developments, but also to strengthen a state infrastructure that was vital to summon attention and loyalty from all regions of the country. The provincial government system was then introduced immediately after independence primarily to reconcile unity and the diversity of the country. By 1980 nineteen provincial governments and the National Capital District had been created.

Currently, there are compelling questions regarding the intrinsic worth of the provincial government system. Is it still useful for integrative purposes, or has it outlived its original purpose? Has the system played a positive role in the development and administration of the country, or has it been a hindrance? Given its lacklustre record, is there hope for improvement in the system any time soon? Therein lies the debate between proponents and opponents of increased autonomy for provincial governments.¹

¹ Paucity of relevant sources has necessitated an attempt to see what hypothetically may have been the main tenets of the debate. However, that exposes me to the charge of destroying my self-created *straw man*. That aside, the arguments are general and plausible.

A Case against More Provincial Autonomy

For deeply fragmented countries, there is weight to the argument that a political system that guarantees more power to peripheral governments can potentially perpetuate the disintegration of the country. This point is relevant and befits the contemporary times where there is still an adherent propensity for existing states to break up, especially based on historical and ethnic grounds (see Kegley and Wittkopt, 2001: 62). In the past, Papua New Guinea has had regional groups that have flirted with both secession and the idea of having regional governments. National unity cannot be readily ascertained in present times, even though on hindsight, one can make the argument that PNG has jelled over the last 25 years. Amidst the smouldering Bougainville conflict, however, the climate may still not be suitable for talks of more autonomy for the other provinces. Bougainville currently is about to be legally granted a full autonomy status and some observers, including Daniel Alo (in this volume), are circumspect about the wider repercussions for the rest of the country.

Of the wide South-West Pacific region, there is reason for countries such as Australia and Indonesia to be more watchful if more autonomy were to allow provinces of Papua New Guinea to become more self-assertive vis-à-vis the national government. Ethnic-induced political autonomy, whether possessed or desired, is a powerful force and its effects cannot be comfortably predicted.² Territorial PNG is very important to Australia's strategic interests. Likewise, Indonesia — especially in the recent past — has been working to contain the fallouts of East Timor's referendum in support of independence, and there is no let up in either Aceh or West Irian. Therefore, there is no room for complacency regarding local politics of communities along the Indonesia-PNG and the PNG-Solomon Islands borders. The recent events in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, and the lingering activities of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in West Irian, are reminders of possible geopolitical scenarios in the Melanesian region.

Another argument against more autonomy would be that the provincial government system is not at fault. Rather, the public servants and politicians generally have made it unworkable. Perhaps the quality of public servants at the provincial level is inadequate to sustain performance at an acceptable standard. Therefore, it would be counter-intuitive to give more autonomy and expect a better performance from provincial governments. The number of provincial governments that have been suspended for various reasons since the early 1980s may illuminate this point (e.g.

² I use ethnicity loosely here to mean the manner in which groups see commonness or likeness in themselves (very often along racial, religious, and linguistic lines) and then act prejudicially on them vis-à-vis other groups.

Dorney, 1990: 178). Conversely, the renowned exceptional performances of the North Solomons before the crisis and East New Britain, to give but two examples, demonstrates that the system can work if respective management teams are up to the task.

A third argument to oppose the push for more provincial autonomy would be that it might seriously weaken the authority of the national government. Evidently, it is already weak as it is under the unitary system where the national government is supposed to have pre-eminence (May, 1998a: 66). How strong would the national government be if provincial governments were to usurp more power? And what guarantee is there that provincial governments would pick up the slack if the national government were to become weaker? Such questions are important to consider, especially at a time when the central government appears to be faltering in its efforts to govern well and address social problems such as lawlessness, unemployment, and corruption (see Kavanamur, this volume).

Also, the state has been struggling to command undivided loyalty. There is the tendency for people to identify more with localized social groups and their issues as opposed to the state and its issues. The danger here is twofold. First, competition for public loyalty may develop between the national and provincial governments under a new system. Any conflict between the levels of government may truncate the much needed coordination process. Unresolved or blown-out differences would then negate the very purpose why a more decentralized system was needed at the first place. Second, individuals can find themselves in awkward positions where they have to show allegiance to one level of government over another. The dilemmas in allegiance showed by Bougainville parliamentarians, Paul Lapun and John Momis, in the early 1970s, are cases in point. Lapun was a cabinet minister under Somare's government, but was also the patron of the separatist Napidakoe Navitu movement of his island province. Momis was a staunch supporter of Bougainville's cause, but was the chairman of the powerful Constitutional Planning Commission (CPC). In recent years, another Bougainvillean — Sam Kauona — has epitomized this loyalty impasse with unfortunate telling consequences. He deserted the PNG Defence Force and became a high-ranking officer in the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) (see Liria, 1993: 182). In a country where traditional social cleavages are still very much unperturbed, keeping the provincial government system in its present form, especially if it is to be improved, would go some distance in building a much-delayed identity of the state.

A Case for More Provincial Autonomy

The decentralized powers under the current provincial government system are partly federal. One scholar has categorized Papua New Guinea under a federal system type called 'constitutionally decentralized unions'. Such countries — including neighboring Indonesia, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu — have unitary systems (Watts, 1999: 8–12). Therefore, to grant more autonomy to provinces in PNG would only add additional responsibilities to the provincial governments' repertoire, based on a system that is already quasi-federal. Giving provincial governments more autonomy, or eventually a federal status, does not necessarily connote household changes. If and when more power is granted, the national and provincial governments can jointly dictate a gradual pace for the transfer of responsibilities to the latter. To recap, Papua New Guinea made a quantum leap to full statehood in a very short period of time amidst an aura of cynicism and scepticism. If that is to be any indication, the country can surely allow concessions to slow political change in this day and age, especially with some maturity to show for it.

Would granting more autonomy to provincial governments cause the disintegration of PNG? First of all, those who make the assumption that there is a causal association between the integration of the country so far and the provincial government system are presupposing that the system has actually worked. However, there is no concrete evidence to confirm that proposition. If anything, abundant evidence shows problems that clearly distort a clear view of any objective assessment. The continuous suspension of provincial governments (especially in the 1980s) and gross corruption in provincial governments are signs of political decay, and they hardly constitute litmus tests for any process of national integration. Corruption in many provincial governments is widespread and Bui Mana (1999) has suggested the adoption of an anti-corruption mechanism at this level of government to curb the festering problem. Interestingly, a prominent political scientist says that the impact of institutional designs (of which PNG's provincial government system is an example) is often devoid of empirically generated knowledge. What carries the day, when it really matters, is assessment based on intuition (Przeworski, 1991: 35). For proponents of the present provincial setting, one then wonders as to where this intuition is sourced, given evidence thus far to the contrary.

Second, the imminence of disintegration may have been overplayed (see Dinnen, 1998). If there were a time when the country could have easily succumbed to disintegration, it would have to be the transitional period of the mid-1970s. Time has certainly allowed the people to acquire a national identity, even if only symbolic in most instances.

It suffices to say that it would have to take something substantially deeper than mere political autonomy to cause people to desire outright independence and zealously stand by it. Whether it is religious, cultural or other sources of ethnic affiliation, the desire to stand alone would have to endure more forcefully and independently over time and transcend whatever political system is in existence. In that respect, the type of political system becomes immaterial. Thus, the fact that Bougainville wanted to secede under Papua New Guinea's unitary arrangement does not permit a case that it would have succeeded under a federal system.

Indeed, there is also an argument to deter those who would want to use more provincial autonomy as a stepping stone to secede from PNG. People who would appreciate the reality of the current configuration of the international system are likely to realize that that there is little to gain by existing as small independent states. The current globalization process in the post-Cold War world has accentuated a more competitive pecking order where new countries have to struggle with established countries for a niche within the international system. Only irrational and ill-informed leaders would want to leave the comfort zone offered by an independent PNG and be subjected to the relentless anarchy of the global environment. And more frankly, such small states practically would have to give up a substantial degree of autonomy, anyway, through 'neocolonial' arrangements, by engaging foreign firms or governments to harvest whatever resources they may have.³ An advantage with more autonomy for provinces, or ultimately a federal system, is that it would be an in-house arrangement that can guarantee and protect semi-autonomous provinces of PNG under a proven structure that has existed since the late 1970s.

The geopolitical and security interests of the region have also been alluded to above. Throughout the Bougainville crisis many countries adopted hands-off policies. For them, this was a domestic matter for Papua New Guinea. That political stance can be interpreted as a modest gesture toward the maintenance of the status quo, in case a chain reaction were to eventuate should Bougainville be granted self-determination. For that reason, it is reasonable to say that for any area or region of the country

³ Neocolonialism, which also goes by the term 'neoimperialism', simply means that there is an economic rather than military domination by foreign countries and/or multinational corporations (MNCs). Another concept also used above is the globalization process. It is essentially the integrative networks among states in contemporary times where there are increased communication and trading activities which have caused people to be bound together in a holistic international system. What is often expressed is that everyone has a common fate (see Kegley and Wittkopf 2001).

wishing to attain independence, there is more to it than the initial step of breaking away from PNG. Regional countries have the power to either grant or refuse recognition to aspiring states. And if regional stability were their priority, it would inversely affect the independence inspirations of would-be new states.⁴ East Timor's new political status — which was supported by Australia and the international community — was an exceptional case, lest one starts calculating parallels.

The second argument by advocates against more autonomy stipulates that the fault lies with people occupying political and public service positions. Therefore, what requires change is the personnel rather than the political system. That is not disputed. Papua New Guinea did not have skilled manpower in its formative years. However, a major part in the argument for more autonomy to provincial governments is the search for ways to reinvigorate and engineer good governance through channels that the current provincial government system does not offer. For instance, the present distribution of governing power has to some degree allowed Port Moresby to become the predominant city. It is the centre of business, government, and therefore employment. Initially, provincial governments were supposed to 'shrink' the central bureaucracy with the hope that better qualified people would transfer to provinces (Dorney, 1990: 177). That has not taken place, and may not for at least some time. Granting more governing power to provincial governments hopefully may reverse the brain drain to the betterment of provinces. After all, the people who rightfully need services live in provinces — not in the national capital.⁵

Regarding the weak support that the modern state commands, the reality is that nothing may change the situation as it is for now. Much of the rural-level politics is still hamstrung by what Clifford Geertz (1963: 109) called 'primordial attachments', or given ties through birth. The least one can hope for, arguably, is for the state to utilize existing traditional cleavages in ways that may empower the people to transform their loyalty bases to ways that may contribute toward their own development and nationbuilding in a big way. The disintegration of the former USSR, the Balkan Wars and the increasing racial tensions in the US should be noted when designing a new PNG federal arrangement.

⁴ Some countries such as Eritrea fought protracted and costly wars for their independence. But even with that, there is no guarantee of success. And even if a state does succeed, there is the long process of rehabilitating the people, land, economic avenues and infrastructure. For PNG, the Bougainville conflict should serve as a deterrent case. Unnecessary suffering should never be visited on innocent civilians.

⁵ Maintaining the present system is not going to assist in minimizing problems such rural-urban drift and squatter settlements and, for that matter, the concentration of manpower and resources away from provinces.

ENDURING ISSUES THAT DEMAND CHANGE

It has been established above that the push for more autonomy and eventually a federal system needs to go above and beyond current thinking about the supposed critical role that the provincial government system plays in serving to unite PNG. There are big problems that we will continue to live with for as long as the current system remains unaltered. Fearing that the country might disintegrate is not going to improve, much less eradicate, these problems. A structural change is long overdue. What follows are three broad topics arbitrarily chosen to represent areas that can be improved by granting more autonomy and hence political space to provinces.

Bridging Dependency and Self-Reliance

Local people developed a sense of dependence in the erstwhile colonial administration of Australia and then currently the PNG national government. While Australia may have played a part in augmenting dependency in certain regions specifically for administrative purposes (see Woolford, 1976: 4), a mentality descended upon much of the territory when the government was expected to purvey what it took to develop a locality, or even generate business opportunities for individuals (Nelson, 1974: 131–2). Transactions as such were to pass through local representatives in parliament and conduits within the public service. With time, and especially since independence, pork barrel politics (government exchanges benefits for votes) and other *tit-for-tat* relationships were to develop between politicians and members of their constituencies. Consequently, the national government has become something akin to a one-stop shop at the behest of private beneficiaries, well outside the interests of the country. That corruption has become endemic and debilitating to good governance is hardly surprising (Okole and Kavanamur forthcoming).

A state of dependency and the handout mentality cannot be adequately addressed as long as the national government, through its disproportionate share of governing power, disallows provinces to take part more meaningfully. In fact, the very act of decentralizing mundane responsibilities to provinces serves to build and sustain dependent subservience of the people on the national government. Any notions of self-fulfilment and aggrandizement by provinces are then squashed or stagnated. For provincial governments and their people who have attempted to do well for themselves, it becomes bothersome that their efforts are somewhat overshadowed by how a political system allows the national government to lead them from the front. That the government currently is submerged in its pervasively rotten political and administrative culture is hardly an

inspiration to provincial governments. Neither are provincial governments nor the public at large surprised by the lack of leadership credentials of the recent crop of parliamentarians who enter the House of Parliament with ulterior and private motives. How often do we hear or read about public complaints regarding lack of infrastructure maintenance in rural areas? Who speaks out about the perpetual shortages of basic supplies to schools and aid posts? Needless to say, many of these responsibilities either belong exclusively to provincial governments or are under concurrent arrangements. But to think that the bulk of the annual funding that comes from Port Moresby originally came from provinces is almost as absurd as instituting *lame* governments close to the very people who, in the first place, contributed a significant proportion of that revenue. Why not break the cycle and allow the people to use their own revenue? Why should the people be impoverished and denied their right to a good life by misguided government policies? And why should productive and law-abiding provinces suffer the trauma of bailing out rogue provinces?

The dependency syndrome has its inherent tentacles. One of them is what may be called the 'compensation disease'.⁶ What requires compensation depends on the situation at hand and the 'assets' that draw value. Therefore, it is really an open market where people can make overnight financial windfalls. To give an example, it has become a diabolical habit that for every policy initiative being suggested for development, landowners are to be compensated. That is understandable, especially in cases where productive or sacred land is to be interfered with. However, it becomes counter-productive, for all sanguine reasons, when some landowners demand exuberant payments from the national government or other parties as a condition for the actual commencement of work.

If responsibilities as such were given to provincial governments, especially where they deal with landowner groups, then two things would happen. First, it would distance the national government from direct responsibility. Therefore, the rest of the country would be let off the hook. This is necessary since the national government often finds itself in a precarious and often no-win situation since traditional ownership takes up 97 per cent of the country's total land area. Second, compensation demand is a problem that should be kept at the local level. The provincial government would then be in a better position to handle it. The country should not be held to ransom by actions of minorities. Localizing compensation issues would mean that repercussions emanating from such cases would be confined to where they would be felt the most. That would deter the people who would want to capitalize on compensation in lieu of the

⁶ I am inclined to call it a disease for the basic reason that it is contagious and it has what it takes to ravage the body politic.

necessity and importance of projects. Groups would then be forced to start thinking strategically in terms of give-and-take scenarios. Hopefully, dependency would then be replaced by self-emancipation from one's own mental siege and this would be followed through by self-reliance.

Cultivating Social Capital in Social Dilemmas

Under the present system, perhaps many provincial governments think that their very existence, first and foremost, is to serve as conveyor belts in the delivery of goods and services from the national government to the people. The amendments to the *Organic Law on Provincial Governments* in 1995 may have further strengthened this feeling. What is conspicuously undermined is any proclivity to do one's best at this level. It is on that note that self-reliance would have to be prioritized under a new provincial government arrangement.

What is called 'social capital' can be encouraged under a more autonomous provincial government system. Collectively, it means 'the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.' (Putnam, 1993: 167). The antithesis of social capital is social dilemma. Such dilemmas come in the form of shirking or free-riding conditions and practices where people avoid work, duty or responsibility. Individuals with independent choices confront social dilemmas when they find themselves in interdependent situations. For some time now, experiments and theorizing in some social science fields have come to conclude that it is possible for human cooperation to overcome social dilemmas. What it takes is 'trust' and coordinated endeavours within and among given groups that guarantee reciprocal benefits. Motives and incentives are then self-perpetuated (see Ostrom, 1998).

Papua New Guinea is well endowed with traits that can encourage and sustain social capital. In fact, kinship-based reciprocity was once the 'basis of Melanesian morality' (Dinnen, 1998: 41). For a society today that is still very traditional in many ways, goodwill and reciprocal relations are still used extensively in provinces. These efforts can be transformed under a more autonomous provincial system toward the well-being of the people concerned. The wantok system, perhaps the most easily recognized social capital in the country, points toward potential social networks that can be utilized. However, and admittedly, its tendencies are still very delicate and fluid so that it may espouse more problems than benefits (de Renzio and Kavanamur, 1999). That is where provincial governments need to step into the gaps and do what it would take to overcome social dilemmas. The negative side of wantokism is nothing

more than social dilemmas that feeds the appetite of those who stand to benefit from each transaction, which very often is at the expense of others or the bigger society. We see such practices in nepotism, cronyism, misuse of public facilities and so forth.

How can social dilemmas be addressed in a PNG provincial setting? Empowered provincial governments, given the latitude to manoeuvre, can do many things. Once a provincial government becomes more institutionalized, an array of related things can happen, of which a couple are stressed here. A government can campaign vigorously to promote ideas depicting a sense of *esprit de corps* within the province for the betterment of all and future generations.⁷ Social capital that generates benefits can transcend social barriers. Not only are overtures toward self-reliance strengthened here, but also it reduces dependency on a distant government in Port Moresby. Confining their efforts to enhance their respective province's capacity comes out as a more comfortable trajectory, especially if one acknowledges how the national government appears to have become indifferent to the plight of rural dwellers in more recent years.

An institutionalized autonomous provincial system could also exert some sort of learning process among the provinces themselves. For instance, if New Ireland province was doing exceptionally well in a small fisheries industry, Milne Bay province may do well to learn from the former to improve the operations of its own industry. By extension, these learning processes can also be transformed into a healthy inter-provincial competition.⁸ This would be beneficial in areas such as tourism and small industries. What appears to be the existing practice is that the national government gives operational guidelines through pieces of legislation and directives through departments and expects conformity at the provincial level.

(Re)-inventing Provincial Development

Of all the rhetoric surrounding self-government in the early 1970s, development was held in high esteem. The ultimate goal was that development in its many facets was to promote self-reliance (Woolford, 1976: 219). Over the years efforts to fulfil that goal have become haphazard. Some of the parliamentarians who rigorously campaigned for the idea of

⁷ For example, East New Britain is very prone to natural disasters. The provincial government can set up some kind of relief fund in preparation for tumultuous times. It can then encourage the citizens of the province to contribute to it as a form of mortgage on their part for the future.

⁸ If the game were being played in a capitalist court, then everyone would have to play by capitalist rules. In a general way, innovative methods as such place the onus on provinces to do well for themselves. Competition can then allow self-reliance to develop.

self-reliance before independence lost track of it later when they became increasingly sedated by the glamour of power and wealth (Hegarty, 1983b: 1–3; Standish, 1999). Today, everything resembles a shattered dream of the mythical *Don Quixote*. In spite of the efforts of the current Morauta government, the economic structure is still in shambles, while the government and its institutions have been compromised so much by greed, naivety and mismanagement at the top. The economic growth rate since independence has hovered barely above zero, while social problems have swirled out of control (see May, 1998b; Kavanamur, 1998). The United Nations Development Programme's human development index depicts a grimmer reality of how the 85 per cent of the country's population are surviving in rural areas (UNDP 1999). The burning questions become. Is it reasonable to wait on the national government to eventually lead the country out of the abyss of despair? Or should the central government grant itself a favour, in offloading the burden, by allowing provinces to be more self-assertive and self-reliant? And how much longer should provinces wait to see some changes for the better?

Genuine development through the current provincial government system may be a long way off, a point implied by Prime Minister Morauta: '... the still unclear role of lower levels of government under the New Organic Law, and the poor linkages between them, provincial governments and the national government, are among the main obstacles to development' (quoted in *The National*, 29 November 1999). Pokawin contends that the present provincial government arrangement is hindering development initiatives. He says that a centralized system of government cannot effectively administer development in PNG. Furthermore:

The emergent sociopolitical culture has imposed new parameters that must be organised and managed. The provinces provide the basic functional units for development of the country ... People identify themselves with the provinces that they come from. The issue of equal participation takes provincial representation into account (Pokawin, 1999: 42–3).

Pokawin also goes on to say that human development should start at the village level. Since provincial governments are situated closer to the people than the national government, it is logical that the former should be empowered to assist the villagers in appropriate ways. Also a more intimate interaction between the people and their provincial governments would reaffirm — among other things — the popular democratic cliché that political power comes from the people (Pokawin, 1999: 43).

The rationale behind the top-down administrative approach has amounted to nothing less than a political fantasy. Many parliamentarians

continuously put on a façade that they are aware of the people's needs. Half of the listed parties that contested the 1997 national election included the word 'people' in their names, as if they were parties by the people.⁹ Nothing can be more deceitful, conniving, and contemptuous to the trust that simple unassuming villagers place on their government! The irony of it all is that politicians within the existing system appear to have distanced themselves from their people in significant ways by failing to address the issue of development in more meaningful ways.

For a start, many politicians even lack a vision on how to go about promoting development. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that politicians do not get elected on the strength of salient issues, ideologies, and even defined national interests. Rather than assisting middle persons in business cycles and rural agriculturalists through self-help schemes and related avenues, governments see it in their interest to introduce pragmatic policies, such as the populist free education, which undoubtedly are needed to avail certain people with specific difficulties. However, they do not contribute directly to economic growth and may even be fermenting dependency on the national government. It is for such reasons that an attempt to balance out government handouts and economic policies are to be handled by provincial governments. Provinces, when allowed to use their own revenue, could make a better effort in fostering development if they were to work in small closely-knit networks. The national government can be a general overseer. The manner in which the Bank of PNG oversees the activities of the East New Britain Savings and Loans Society is a good illustration.

A FEDERAL SYSTEM IN PNG

The configuration of federalism comes in many forms. Normatively, it invariably refers to a league of sorts comprising semi-autonomous political units that come under a central governing authority. In terms of institutions, a federal political system is a generic term that encompasses political systems in which 'there are two (or more) levels of government thus combining elements of *shared-rule* through common institutions and *regional self-rule* for the governments of the constituent units' (Watts, 1999: 6–7, original emphasis).

⁹ The parties were: People's Progress Party; People's Democratic Movement; People's National Congress; People's Action Party; People's Resources Awareness Party; People's Unity Party; and People's Solidarity Party. This is a misnomer since PNG parties come under a category invariably known as 'cadre'. Such parties are organized and run by political elites and other influential people purely for electoral purposes, as indeed is the case in PNG. They also lack any mass (or 'people') bases. Therefore, it is deceptive to regard them as people's parties in spite of what the names imply.

In democratic settings, it is misleading to readily assume that one system of government is better than another. The power to effect a difference and change lie with the subjects: the people themselves. A system merely reflects their collective choice, based on how they perceive it to suit their needs and circumstances. An elevation of a federal system in Papua New Guinea should not be mistaken for a panacea for the country's impediments to governing. Rather, it is to be appreciated as a framework that offers a more pervasive institutionalization opportunity for provinces. Where the emphasis of federalism is skewed toward coordination, the unitary model epitomizes subordination.

Federalism is often regarded as the best 'fit' for countries typically with heterogeneous populations and far-flung territories. Therefore, the principal intention of the model is to enhance and/or maintain unity through the distribution of central governing power to lower governments. Traditionally, the central government possesses only the responsibilities that do not belong to peripheral governments. These include foreign affairs, national security and the central bank. Just before independence, Hank Nelson observed that federalism might not belong in Papua New Guinea. He pointed to a trend where newly independent states did not have much success with federal systems of government. He also perceived that it would have been problematic to demarcate the fragmented PNG into states (Nelson, 1974: 166). A lot, however, has happened since those formative years. Dinnen (1998) makes an interesting case that the current national society has gone through waves of changes since the colonial era, featuring continuities and discontinuities, that it may be resilient enough to withstand even the forces of disintegration. Perhaps this is attested to by the enduring unity of the country.

Federalism in Papua New Guinea would resemble a leap into the dark. Assuming that it is desired throughout the country, many things need to be taken into consideration. Would all provinces have the capacity to perform independently as states, or would it be more sensible for some provinces to stand together to increase their respective capacities? Would regions of the country become susceptible to secession, or would the national temperament of PNG that has been developed so far be sufficient to rise above citizens' differences? These queries are to be considered when the time is appropriate for them. As for now, the issue of more provincial autonomy should be salient. If some provinces were to perform exceptionally well under a new provincial system, which would not be that far removed from a federal system, then a federal status could be granted only to legitimate and authenticate their successful transitions. Also, provinces being granted more autonomy can serve as inspirations and a beacon of

hope to other provincial governments who may be moribund and directionless at some point.

CONCLUSION

What has been presented here resembles a one-sided brainstorming session of sorts. The fundamental argument is that the current provincial government system can be reinvigorated to perform responsibilities that, with time, can contribute immensely toward nationbuilding. The tendency for people to rely on the national government for goods and services has to be drastically reduced. The government has only limited capacity to cater for so much. Therefore, it would make more sense for the national government to give more autonomy to provinces and play a more supportive role rather than lead from the front.

For a highly fragmented country like Papua New Guinea, it would seem unwise to even consider giving more autonomy to provinces, let alone suggest the adoption of a federal system. However, it makes for a sound, argument, too, to say that provinces restricted within a unitary system can breed a double-pronged problem of dependency on and resentment against the national government. In line with the latter, some provinces are being seen as liabilities and that is a potential flashpoint too. A line needs to be drawn between provinces that labour to make a difference and others that shirk and are blind to the need for a difference. Finally, some of the points presented here are likely to be viewed with scepticism. Who would believe that social capital could be encouraged in provinces where there are factions that harbour animosity among themselves? Or that the problems in Port Moresby would ease once more manpower and resources are committed to provinces under a new provincial arrangement? To respond to such judgments, one should consider the permanency of problems, as we know them today — which are bound to exacerbate with time. Are we going to accept the current system with its inherent shortcomings? And generally, are we going to allow paranoia emanating from the disintegration myth and a general lethargy from a rigid, expensive, and unworkable provincial government system to cloud our rational endeavors to do what is best for us? Without a doubt, Papua New Guinea is better off innovating ways to climb out of its ‘backwardness’ pit rather than living up to the status quo as if it was destined by fate to be inevitable.

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PNG DEFENCE FORCE: An Analysis of Its Past, Present and Future Roles

James S. Laki

‘The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency.’¹

Vagts (1959: 13)

INTRODUCTION

Servicemen have resorted to indiscipline to show grievance because of years of neglect by successive governments of the military. Conditions of services have deteriorated to an extent that the Defence Force has become a liability and its discipline deteriorating as attitudes amongst all servicemen changed over time. In 1989 the rank and file members marched to parliament house to demand an increase in pay, whilst in 1994 the maritime element boycotted duties in protest over lack of maintenance and non-serviceability of ships. The frustration of Sandline contracts in 1997, that is said to be a blessing in disguise, was really a rebellion against acceptable standards by western principles, yet tolerable in Melanesia. Members of the Force were paid pay increases as a result of illegal demonstrations and fear of further repercussions.

As a result of many of these issues a ministerial committee was set up followed by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG). Both groups — the Taranupi Ministerial Committee and the CEPG — identified the problems that have existed in the Defence Force, the latter

put forward a 'definite proposal' — massive reduction in manpower. Unlike the Taranupi Report, the CEPG Report did not give many options which the government could choose from, hence another confrontation with servicemen that has since stalled the reforms in the PNG Defence Force. Many are of the opinion that the country does not require a standing military force while others believe that the force should combine with the Police Force. Some believe that the military could continue and be more outward looking, addressing transnational crime issues and performing peace keeping duties in the region and the world.

This chapter discusses the various roles of the PNG Defence Force as an institution for defence and security as well as a facilitator for unity and nation building. It explores and explains many of the perceptions for the continued existence of the Defence Force, while at the same time determines what other role could be played in the future. These discussions highlight the various perceptions, which the wider PNG community has, at a time when government services to rural areas have been lacking. State institutions are continually being asked to validate their purpose and be more accountable and transparent. What could the Defence Force offer given the government's commitment to public sector reforms?

BACKGROUND

Papua New Guinea is relatively young and, as yet, it has no institutions of advocacy to turn to when deciding on roles and objectives for an existing military force. Even during the Second World War, PNG remained ignorant and innocent but was drawn in by both the Allied Forces and the invasion forces. Men were recruited as carriers, guides, informers, and coast-watchers in a war that meant nothing to them. At the peak of the war, as many as 55 000 villagers worked as labourers or carriers for the Allied Forces (Sinclair, 1992: 43).

Formal military units were formed specifically to help out during the war. The men in the New Guinea Infantry Battalion (NGIB) and the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) served with distinction, enduring battle stress and general hardship. Later, they combined to become the Pacific Island Regiment (PIR). Its role was to, 'provide medium range reconnaissance patrols, garrison for local defences, guides and advisers, and reconnaissance detachments for Australian Army units' (Sinclair, 1992:1). The PIR was disbanded in 1946, leaving only a company of three New Guinea Infantry Battalions, when the question of military effectiveness, discipline, and reliability arose among Australian settlers and certain government officials who could not trust natives with firearms (Sinclair, 1992: 44–5).

Combined with their reputation during the Second World War and the looming threat of war from the Indonesian–Dutch conflict in West New Guinea, Australia decided to resurrect the PIR units. The recovery of the PIR units in 1958 had the strong support of the Returned Servicemen's League (RSL), which vowed to assist troops in any way possible. It was rather quick, especially the formation of 1RPIR, 2RPIR, and the establishment of Igam Barracks in Lae. Australia at that time was almost sure of going to war with the Indonesians, in support of the Dutch, but submitted to the idea when the US abandoned its policy of 'passive neutrality' in fear of a communist domino effect in South-East Asia. Thompson (1994: 89) argues that:

Australia was forced to agree to the idea of capitulation. Its Government was unwilling to join the Dutch in a war with Indonesia, without US or British support.

The re-establishment of the PIR was the beginning of an era that culminated in human development. Understanding changes in social, economic, and political development had already been experienced by many war veterans, carriers, and guides because of their exposure to the Australians, Americans, and Japanese. By independence, the PIR units and other services became what is now the PNG Defence Force, intended to be a small unified, effective force, based around low-level conflicts, and comprising three elements — *land, maritime, and air*.

The infantry troops in the Pacific Island Regiment became a symbol of national sovereignty and unity at independence. The PIR was regarded as the ceremonial force, attending to formal government occasions, receiving foreign dignitaries, and displaying weapons skills at open days or cultural shows. The pipes and drums of the PIR added further attraction, and boosted the image of the army. Other components, such as the maritime element remained as a relic of the Australian Navy with a few patrol boats and two landing crafts. Further additions were made later with the incorporation of the air element, with two DC3 aircraft, followed by Nomad aircraft, which were donated by Australia.¹

THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP (CEPG) REPORT

It was the force of the 1970s that the CEPG referred to in its report, with no additional responsibilities, such as the need to be present at the sea borders and to patrol the 200 miles of the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) limit. That force was generally supported by elements of the

¹ See O'Connor (1994: 13–15) for the Order of Battle for the PNGDF.

Australian Defence Forces as reflected in the Book of Reference, BR1000. As at 1 May 1976, there were 350 Australian loan personnel. Not counting the number of personnel in Defence Headquarters and elements such as the Defence Supply Agency (DSA), and those training at Goldie, there was a strength of 2152. This total included 50 officer cadets at the Advance Defence Training Wing (ADTW) at the Joint Services College (JSC) in Igam, as at November 1976.

The outcome and the recommendations of the CEPG report have several explanations. First, the government wanted an independent and uncompromising view, with no national sentiments as an obstacle towards these reforms. This meant that strategic military considerations were not to hinder the decisions based on financial constraints. Hence, one of the requirements was affordability.

Second, the government wanted immediate savings on the Defence Force's payroll bill. By engaging outside resources to determine the reforms, especially the Commonwealth, external funding assistance could be expected. The CEPG Report's estimate of K70 million was to have come from the World Bank to execute the Voluntary Release Scheme. This was to be in line with the public service retrenchment rules, with an additional ten per cent for service in Bougainville.

Third, the Defence Force has been on the verge of collapse. Frequent acts of indiscipline, mainly to show grievance at the government's negligence over the years, appear to be less when compared with the frustrations to which servicemen were subjected. Unexplained missing weapons and break and enters into the Defence Force's armoury would not build confidence in the community at large. The reforms were necessary, but through a negotiation approach.

The CEPG report recommended a wholesale cut in manpower that led to intense feelings — some of which touched nationalistic sentiments. This occurred when the nation's 'pride' was assessed by non-citizens, and some functions of the Defence Force were considered irrelevant and costly. Soldiers, in their roles as servicemen, have more nationalistic feelings than the state authorities may think. Furthermore, their sentiments touched ones similar to those of concerned Papua New Guineans about the way the country was debt ridden when conditions were imposed under the Structural Adjustments Programs. Such conditions have made it impossible for the state to agree on a minimum wages package. Yet, it was possible to raise the salaries of the Members of Parliament and constitutional office-holders.

The events at Murray Barracks — breaking into armoury by troops — would seem to aim at just such sentiments, but with some

bargaining power. The reasons were that state authorities have diminished, and there were lots of high-powered guns held by undesirable people throughout the country. The question posed was what would the outcomes be if there was another Bougainville type crisis, especially when mob rule, terrorist rule, and intimidation, in some areas seemed to be the way? Government officials trying to conduct state businesses have been attacked, and had to be escorted by police to avoid further violence. It appeared that there was no new-look Defence structure for negotiation by the Defence management. Therefore, the soldiers took this task of negotiation upon themselves.

Contradictions appeared to emanate from the report. The proposed reform bodies that were set up — the Defence Reforms Steering Group (DRSG) and the Defence Reform Implementation Team (DRIT) — would have sorted these out. However, the appointment of these two groups had also left some doubt with many people, including the soldiers. The appointment of foreigners in exchange for their funding, and those who were recently disengaged by the Defence organisation appeared to be antagonistic and created opinions that they had, with no regard for the affected servicemen.

Areas of concern were the need to have revitalised core capabilities in communications, intelligence and surveillance, air support, maritime surveillance, and maintaining a presence at the land border. These proposals were manpower intensive that may demand a technological edge, and would require skilled manpower. While the intention may be to outsource many of the functions, operational experience has shown that facilities or resources may not be available as required. In most instances, services or resources could be held against the Defence Force for outstanding bills, or generally as bargaining tools as has happened for the Bougainville operations. This was another situation for which the earlier Defence Force of the 1970s was not designed. Alternating two battalions on a six-monthly basis disturbed and frustrated the initiatives of one, and resulted in further violence and killings.

PAST ROLES OF THE PNG DEFENCE FORCE

The fundamental role of the PNG Defence Force has been to defend the country from external, armed invasion, as enshrined in the National Constitution. This is followed by the secondary task of assisting the civil police in quelling internal law and order problems, as stipulated in Section 204 (1) of the National Constitution, and Sections 6 and 11 of the Defence (Aid to Civil Power) Regulation 1974. The former role has become remote, as the world is heading towards 'global governance' and

good neighbourly relations at the end of bipolar polarisation and an end to the Cold War.

The latter role has been the biggest challenge and has dominated the activities of the Defence Force in recent times. These activities have ranged from simple 'shows-of-force', to conducting curfew operations (O'Connor, 1994: 11)². The most active participation has been the attempt to crush the rebellion in Bougainville. It was in these operations that some critics accused the Defence Force of being politically entangled. This entanglement could be seen from two perspectives — one of being manipulated to achieve a political solution, and the other of being the victim of a disastrous outcome.

Seeing a greater role for the PNGDF, the Government introduced the nation building concept, which established the Engineer Battalion. Its roles were to be accomplished in two ways — a combat role in support of the infantry battalions, and field engineering and construction. Under the construction role, the Engineer Battalion has been able to build bridges and access roads into some of the most remote areas. The support of the people came in the form of financing the construction, while the Defence Force provided the manpower and equipment.

In supporting the Engineer Battalion, other elements came into play. The maritime element, using its landing craft, was able to transport large engineering equipment to project sites. One other role was in surveillance of the maritime waters, using the patrol boats, and included the boarding and apprehending of illegal fishing vessels within the 200 nautical mile EEZ. Other emergency services such as medical evacuations from remote islands to the nearest hospitals also involved the maritime elements. Its presence in the local waters has prevented the large-scale smuggling of illicit drugs and other illegal activities.

While patrol boats have been used by the maritime element on the surface, the air element has had the task of carrying out a similar airborne role using the Nomad aircraft. These tasks have been assisted by, and continue to receive the support of, the P3 Orion services from the RAAF and RNZAF, under the respective Defence Corporation Programs.³ In addition to the surveillance task, the air element, which is primarily regarded as the Air Transport Squadron (ATS), operated its DC3 aircraft as transport planes. Their fleet had increased to five by the mid-1980s. Not only did they transport defence equipment and personnel but also catered

² O'Connor has a different perspective for defence role.

³ O'Connor (1994: 13) describes the tasks, stating scant maritime surveillance. Australian and New Zealand involvement has been purely information gathering and surveillance of Bougainville for their own purposes.

for the dependants. For example, the ATS flew servicemen and their dependants to their places of origin for recreational leave when funding for such travel could not be obtained from the Defence Force budget.

ACTIVE ROLES OF THE PNG DEFENCE FORCE

Apart from the quelling of rebel activities against the newly elected Vanuatu Government of Fr Walter Lini in 1980, the PNG Defence Force's other active involvement has been on Bougainville. The initial 'call out' of the Defence Force had been to assist the police force in restoring what had appeared to be the 'Paguna crisis'. Dissatisfied with the negative outcome of the proposal to negotiate with Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), Francis Ona resorted to militant activities by blowing up a power pylon and assaulting mine workers. Police were called in, but they exacerbated the situation when their brutality prompted the rest of Bougainville to be sympathetic towards the landowners' cause. An all-out war was assumed on the rebel movement by the national government.

The situation warranted a full-scale military operation that required a decision declaring a state of emergency. The Defence Force was on a call out to assist civil authorities to restore law and order and not to enforce martial law. The security forces believed that they had the mandate to kill, because they conducted military operations as they saw fit. Also, little did Cabinet know of the consequences of involving the Defence Force, without declaring martial law on the island. The Defence Force was compromising its role on Bougainville as militants got killed. The role of the Defence Force remained in limbo, as the central government became indecisive.

This political indecisiveness led to the Defence Force not achieving its objectives. Therefore, the soldiers became frustrated and resorted to intimidation, sometimes holding people in captivity for brutal interrogation that resulted in death. These actions caused widespread outcry for humanitarian intervention. Retired Brigadier General Leo Nuia, then a colonel in charge of the operations, further revealed these actions on a Four Corners ABC Program (Douglas, 1991: 267). The PNGDF became more unpopular on all fronts, as it suffered from a lack of political support from an indecisive Government. Without further word, the Defence Force withdrew to Nissan Island to the north, enabling the first so-called cease-fire for the BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army). This gave the BRA the opportunity to bring in more arms across the Solomon Islands border, and to regroup themselves for a long guerrilla war as atrocities against their own kind also continued.

The withdrawal of the security forces, together with a sea blockade, heralded the darkest days for Bougainville. The BRA ran riot, coercing and killing those who they believed to be supporters of the National Government, including many of the former national and provincial government officials (Dorney, 1979: 46–7). Out of fear, many undecided youths took up arms against the security forces. Genuine traditional border crossing was prevented by the sea blockade and this led to a general mistrust of the national government for abandoning the people, mostly from North West and South Bougainville.

However, the sea blockade by the PNGDF was not only ill-conceived, the Government was mistakenly led to believe that a blockade would be effective. The military forces thought that financial and resource support by way of logistics and equipment would be free-flowing to maintain that blockade. But the national government was facing real economic hardships which were brought about by the closure of the Panguna Mine. Budget estimates of income for 1990 were expected to be K1.2 billion, but they fell well short. Consequently, the government could not effectively support the military operations in Bougainville.

Actual Defence Budget spending in 1990 rose by 35 per cent, and averaged 31 per cent for eight years to 1997 when operations slowed down in Bougainville. The budget figures have a direct relationship to the Government's attempt to increase the PNGDF manpower to 5200 by 1995, following the internal security review in 1991, and the recurrent cost of operations in Bougainville (see Table 1). This cost was not separated until 1995 after the government had spent unbudgeted funds in 1994 that amounted to K23.21 million. There was also additional allocation in 1995 of K2.05 million for a 'Mopping up Exercise' in Bougainville, details of which could be another discussion point. Thereafter, actual appropriation for Bougainville declined gradually to its lowest level of K700,000 in 2002.

In 1997, after almost three years of on and off negotiations surrounding the signing of the Honiara Declaration of Peace that took place in the Solomons capital in 1994, some headway for peace was made. But the Honiara Declarations allowed for demilitarised zones, and the establishment of South Pacific Regional Peacekeeping Forces (SPRPF), made up of the small Pacific Island countries, Australia and New Zealand. The Declaration also recognised the constitutional role of the Defence Force, and enabled its presence on Bougainville. Further, peace initiatives were taken with the assistance of the New Zealand government when it offered Burnham Camp in Christchurch for talks to be held amongst more than 200 delegates comprising women, BRA factions, church groups and the National Government representatives.

Table 1: PNG Defence Force Budget (thousands of kina)

Year	Allocation	Appropriation	Actual	Revised	Manpower	Remarks
1988		35,284.40	38,411.57		3,515	
1989	40,859.50	40,859.50	47,667.80	40,819.50		
1990	43,176.70	45,036.70	66,768.40		3,392	
1991	50,789.30	50,789.30	92,042.80		4,040	
1992	56,528.10	56,528.10	82,898.60			
1993	54,400.00	54,400.00	77,124.00		5,075	
1994	54,300.00	54,300.00	83,342.60			
1995	60,013.30	57,043.00	73,909.10		5,200	
1996	68,000.00	90,644.40	103,073.80			
1997	92,553.70	92,553.70	114,412.00		4,475	Retire 600
1998	86,035.60	86,035.60	87,097.60			
1999	80,000.00	80,000.00	91,720.70			
2000	85,109.00	85,109.00	96,761.60			
2001	90,433.80	90,433.80			4,173	
2002	53,724.00	700,000.00		54,624.00	2,870	Retrench 1,300

Source: PNG National Budget Revenue and Estimates since 1990.

In the lead up however, the military endeavoured to use its initiative, and was able to regain control of some 80 per cent of the island by 1993. These initiatives eventually were too demanding of the military, but the government remained confident that the military maintained control, despite scant support. The lines of communications were extended against all odds and against any principles of war. The military was caught up in a dilemma, where it got the support of the public when soldiers were killed, but received criticism when a military operation was conducted and members of the BRA were killed. The BRA media campaign worked very well, while, on the other hand, the military sought other means to win the hearts and minds of other Bougainvilleans, as well as the wider PNG and international communities.

A new and challenging role for the Defence Force came into being. This required a psychological operation, which was aimed at winning the confidence of the people — the military meant peace for those not engaged in the war. It was also a public relations campaign against the negative portrayal of the Defence Force, which was branded as being insensitive, arrogant, and heavy-handed, without addressing the root cause of the crisis. These operations saw many soldiers risk their lives in contacting rebel leaders to broker peace, through the understanding of many local chiefs who, at times, became the ‘meat’ in the sandwich.

Undermining the use of the military and, at other times, overuse of the military for the purposes not intended could be troublesome. The Sandline Crisis is one empirical occurrence that has now been documented to date.

THE SANDLINE SAGA

The Prime Minister obviously did not suspect that the Defence Force was disillusioned and was being undermined. What the mercenary forces proposed equated with the real requirements for capability enhancement that had been requested over the years. What seemed impossible was approved to be available, at the stroke of a pen, within a few months. The military leadership, headed by General Jerry Singirok, interpreted the situation as suspicious and sinister, and therefore as needing to be exposed. The Contravene Contract with Sandline International was subsequently exposed, and evoked public outcry and street demonstrations aimed at forcing the government to stamp out corruption, and back the military for its stance.

Unknown to the public were the intricacies of international negotiations, betrayals, persuasions, commissions and corrupt deals that contributed to this outcome. General Singirok was said to be part and parcel of the whole deal, having had earlier discussions with officials of Executive Outcome. These were revealed from evidence presented at the Andrew Commission (Andrew, 1997: chapter 6), and were also inconsistent. It would appear that Sydney Franklin, from Franklin J. & S., international arms dealers, may have influenced the way Singirok behaved. Franklin was also known to have had a run in with the Sandline Group, Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone.

Singirok had been the guest of the arms dealer at the Royal Horse Guards Hotel in London (O'Callaghan, 1999: 278), and was to be given a total of £31,000 sterling (PNGK193,508), beginning with a Visa account that would be difficult to trace, by the time the crisis occurred. When Singirok was a junior officer living with the troops in the field, he complained bitterly about the poor state of field equipment procured from the same arms dealer, Franklin. Within just two years he was not just being more than friendly with the principal but ensured that outstanding bills from Franklin were settled without further queries.

As the news broke about PNG engaging the mercenary forces assembled by Sandline (*Weekend Australian*, 22 February 1997; see also Donrey, 2001: 225), Singirok was haunted by his commitment to Franklin, who also proposed much of the arsenal that Sandline had on their inventory. Given the exposure Sandline was also going to deviate

from earlier plans, and could even fight the war for the PNG government while its troops were to be mere spectators. There were also fears that Franklin could expose Singirok should the Sandline became involved in Bougainville, while at the same time the Prime Minister proposed different command arrangements for the Special Forces Unit (SFU) at Goldie Barracks. There was no evidence though to suggest that Singirok would have benefited in any way by engaging Sandline, but it was thought highly likely that the Minister for Defence and his associates would have some benefits.

Meanwhile, the years of neglect and misconception in the military finally took their toll when rebel elements of the PNG Defence Force held several politicians captive in Parliament House on the pretext of ensuring their safety from the public. However, it is arguable as to whether the soldiers' actions were intentional, based on the fact that there was some thought amongst the troops the parliamentarians should be allowed to go. Furthermore, the public had overstayed outside the bounds of a curfew requirement that was in effect from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. the next morning. By leaving the public in the precincts of the National Parliament, the police did not apply the curfew provision, and hence ended up with more chaos.

The public was convinced that the political leadership was corrupt and should be removed from office. Those who believed in that notion remained vigilant outside Parliament House during its session. The non-governmental organisations that were concerned about the dormant *Internal Security Act* displayed placards stating that Sandline would target the general public after Bougainville. Even the Governor General who should normally remain politically unaligned took out full-page advertisements in the daily newspapers. Public demonstrations ensued for several days, mainly in Port Moresby. The unemployed and petty criminals took advantage of the situation, damaging public property, and looting shops and supermarkets.

Despite what appeared to be intimidation by the public demonstrations and the military involvement, the democratic process prevailed when Parliament voted in favour of not ousting the Prime Minister. Instead, the Prime Minister agreed to step aside so that a public inquiry could proceed in light of mass demonstrations that were to take place if he did not do so voluntarily. However, the military was not yet rid of mischief. The 1997 National Elections reported intimidation by military personnel attached to the Electoral Commission, which resulted in the prosecution of twelve soldiers. A good civil–military relationship that had a good consultative network would have prevented many of the frustrations and expectations of the military.

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Establishing an effective civil military relation partnership is important because, far too often, civilians who are not leaders, and are not members of the security forces, have caused problems. Civilian officials and military officers both have the important responsibilities of preserving democratic effectiveness and maintaining the security of the state. Also, open discussions between officers and civilians are vital in resolving operational challenges in civil–military relations and defence decision making.

The military forces are the basic component of a national security policy. This policy is aimed at protecting Papua New Guinea's national interests — be they environmental or physical — as well as the lives of the citizens of the state and their interests. Civilians must decide what form of national security policy Papua New Guinea should have. A national security policy is not necessarily centred on the defence of a nation. It comes in three forms of policy, and at two levels — *military security, internal security* and *situational security*.

Before discussing the need for military security so that its roles and objectives promote confidence in, and have approval from the people, it is important to discuss other security issues that make up the national policies. First, the internal security of a country must be in order so that other developments such as economic, infrastructural, social cohesion, and political processes are not hindered. If these issues are affected and become a major source of concern, then the situational security of the country is at risk. Factors such as poor living conditions, reduction in primary production, deteriorating road conditions, and abuses of political power reduce the relative power of a country.

Papua New Guinea has no real or perceived external threats to its status and survival as an independent state. It is in a strategic location, astride air and sea lines of communications that are constantly used by most of its regional neighbours; several of those have fought each other in past wars. Most of these neighbours are also working in bilateral or multi-lateral forums, confidence building, or comprehensive and cooperative security measures for peaceful coexistence in both track one and track two organisations or institutes.

Papua New Guinea participates in most of these forums, but is faced with many internal challenges. Poverty and crime are becoming increasing problems, as people move to urban areas in search of a better life. They carry with them their tribal feuds, loyalties and patterns of behaviour, which are then being imposed on others within their new surroundings. Economic infrastructure is very fragile and there appears to be a lack of socio-economic development, as well as an absence of physical

and environmental security. Government services are lacking in rural areas. There is a tendency to return to 'Taim Blong Bipo' (the past) in these areas, while in the cities there is no discipline, no respect for others, and generally, people have no standard of behaviour and practice, from the homeless to the senior leaders and politicians. PNG is walking a tightrope as far as its survival is concerned.

For military security to be effective and perform its designated roles there should be an effective civil–military relation (CMR). Like the other two components of the National Security Policy there are operational concepts, which are institutionalised, so that the ultimate goals are achieved. Examples of these in the military are characterised by military customs, tradition, prestige and doctrine, and most of the military's interest. Other considerations include quantity (size), quality, and when and where to use military force. The military way is where the major stakeholder is the Defence Force (see Janowitz, 1968: 22). The Defence Force then provides the technical advice in pursuing and maintaining the roles and objectives of the military, in association with the civilian community.

It is also important that civilians and military officials have open and transparent discussions in civil–military relations and defence decision making. Huntington (1957: 2) argues that:

Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in search of security.

Solutions in a properly balanced society are easily presented, while those nations that do not have a balanced structure end up with instability. For example, such problems have reached the quiet Pacific, with the events in Fiji, beginning on 19 May 2000, and those in the Solomon Islands a month later (*The National*, May, June 2000; *Post-Courier*, May, June 2000).

Furthermore, differences between civil and the military groups have led to power struggles, and created different governance and political systems. Examples of such political systems are the authoritarian system, which is based on a warlord concept and was commonly found during the feudal system in western Europe, and in some parts of Africa where personal autocracy was developed over tribal systems. In African Uganda, the Baganda Kingdom was short-lived because the Ugandan Military destroyed it for a greater united Uganda (Randall and Theobald, 1985: 75).

Others in the list include the *civilian mass party system*, the *democratic model*, the *civil–military coalition*, and a *military junta system*. A civilian mass party system was witnessed in Indonesia, led by Sukarno, prior to the military coup of 1965 (Randall and Theobald, 1985: 77–8).

Following the coup, Indonesia adopted a civil–military coalition, with 75 military personnel (reduced from 100) in the Cabinet. Most western Nations have enjoyed the democratic competitive system. In contrast, some developing countries, for example Somalia, experienced a military junta when Siad Barre governed that country until its collapse. It required a UN humanitarian intervention, led by the United States, through 'Operation Restore Hope', in 1992 to bring some order (Makinda, 1999: 61).

The importance of having good, effective civil–military relations should be understood and institutionalised. The PNG Defence Force (PNGDF), and the country as a whole, have adopted the democratic model of governance. The military, just like any other government bureaucracy, competes for its appropriation in the national budget, and it is the government's prerogative to prioritise according to its goals and objectives. The key player is the Minister for Defence who heads the Defence Council of three men; the other members being the Secretary for Defence and the Commander of the Defence Force. As Defence Council decisions are not independent of committee systems in other national portfolios, some decisions may get overturned or renegotiated in preference to other national interests.

One way in which the Defence Force was able to assert itself was through the production of a Defence White Paper in 1999. This document outlines the defence policy, the expected roles and functions, and the level of threat perceived by PNG (Papua New Guinea Defence Force, 1999: 12–14). While the normal expected democratic principles are inherent in the PNG constitution there have been many variations. It becomes so inconsistent and problematic that predicting and analysing developments is difficult, if not impossible. Patterns of behaviour for many politicians or organisational executives are just as unpredictable, because there appear to be no norms and standards, as each attempt to personalised a mission-oriented function or institution.

FUTURE ROLES OF THE PNG DEFENCE FORCE

While there are no real threats to Papua New Guinea's sovereignty, as indicated in the *1999 Defence White Paper*, skirmishes along the land border with Indonesia seem to be the major security concern. The likely contentious issues relating to the border arise from several observations. The first problem could arise, if, or when, PNG joins other Melanesian countries in seeking independence for West Papua. West Papua, together with other provinces that are already seeking autonomy in Indonesia, could flaw this proposition, as the present administration in Jakarta appears to be willing to accept calls for independence, or the seeking of

greater autonomy. This stand is an indication that the Indonesian Government has begun to dismantle its constitution at the expense of these small power bases. However, strategic and military considerations in Indonesia may have a very different perception of these phenomena, at this early stage of the new era.

The second scenario results from the pressure, on PNG soil, of the rebel group, Operasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). There have been cases of cross-border 'hot pursuits' in the past, but such situations have usually been resolved diplomatically. In most cases, these incidents have occurred in the absence of PNG officials, or military troops who should be patrolling the border regularly. Although confrontations between the OPM rebels and Indonesian troops are usually isolated incidents, they could become frustrating, and the possibility of heavy-handed treatment of PNG personnel at the border cannot be ruled out. The Independent State of Papua New Guinea has a duty to protect its citizens under any circumstances.

The third possibility stems from the continued frustration of Indonesian troops at not being able to 'weed out' the OPM. This could possibly lead to the Indonesian Government applying pressure on the PNG Government, to conduct joint operations to seek out and engage the OPM. This scenario seems a possibility, if our troops do not patrol the border regularly, and deter the OPM from crossing onto PNG soil. Further complicity could arise if the OPM chooses to arrange 'outside' military assistance, like the 'dogs of war', to assist in creating the State of West Papua. Although the scenario may seem remote, opportunities for the acquisition of mineral concessions, as part of the provision of 'mercenary security services', could be a promising 'business' proposition.

Any request for 'hot pursuit' of the OPM by Indonesian troops could be unfounded if PNG is seen to carry out its share of preventing illegal activities by having a presence at the border. Unfortunately, this presence has been curtailed in recent times by the events on Bougainville. It will be some time, if at all, before the Defence Force recovers from the Bougainville crisis.

Assurance for many countries is provided by the security forces — civil police for internal matters and military forces for external relations, including the formation of alliances, while diplomacy is played by Foreign affairs. In PNG for instance, civil police and the military are lumped together under the functions of Law and Order for budgetary purposes. If there were an increased budget allocation for Law and Order then Justice, Correction and Police would get some form of increases, while Defence may be left in a dilemma and to ponder on what role to play.

It is only in crisis that the military is called upon and has been seen to be acting against their own people from within and abroad when, in their untrained roles, these military personnel make errors and the state could not even defend them. This has led to the loss of confidence and raises the question of the role of the military that eventually undermines the integrity of the sovereign state of PNG and its capacity to prosper. It further raises the question of strategic importance, and working in partnership with other military allies in common interest, which could be harmful and embarrassing when small countries like Fiji, Vanuatu and Tonga could contribute towards collective security in the region or even further afield.

The discussion on military and security consideration emphasises the importance of acquiring respect for sovereignty, which would ultimately command the power to bargain and induce the drive to engage other military allies for common good in the push for harmony and prosperity. Transnational issues such as terrorism, poaching and gun running have made the military more outward looking while most intending allied countries await the anticipated level of commitment by PNG or any other small country for that matter. Tangible results could be foreseen were the military to be used as a vehicle for economic prosperity.

On the domestic front, restoring and strengthening state authority could be another additional role for the Defence Force. This requires enforcing peace whereby a military force conducts offensive operations against armed individuals and groups. Such operations are possible although some will argue that the military should not be used against one's own people. The people involved are in remote areas, are well-armed, and use their natural environment as a defence. It is absurd to ask the police to search out and disarm such lawless thugs, when their role is to maintain peace and order.

In some areas, tribal disorder has reached critical proportions and many lives have been lost. The only means to survive has seen people being just as violent as the aggressors in order to protect what they can salvage. Rather than declaring a state of emergency, the Government should, first of all, redefine the role of the Defence Force. This should include an element of peace enforcement, re-equipping, and reassessing its supply and demand arrangements, and addressing the issue of maintaining state authority and a state presence in those areas which need it.

In other areas of reforms, the emergency provisions could be reassessed to give greater powers to the Defence Force to act alone, rather than to assist the civil powers. This could include the powers to arrest, detain, and prosecute in declared emergency areas, until peace is restored

and the declared area is returned to the civil police. Many of the provisions could be extracted from the code of military discipline that would apply to members of the Defence Force and other people in authority in the emergency area.

LAND FORCES

The challenge for the Defence Force is to determine how to continue to play its peacetime role and assist with global peace enforcement. With its manpower reduced to a bare minimum, a 'new look' Defence Force will have a peacetime role in nation building, and will carry out regular patrols on the border to show the state's presence. Such a structure could free up many of the logistical shortfalls currently being experienced. One battalion, with the support of two helicopters and the necessary ancillary staff, may seem satisfactory, considering the pressing developmental needs elsewhere. The other battalions could be regarded as restricted establishments until enough resources were mastered. The involvement of helicopters would mean that the Air Transport Squadron — the rotary wing capability — would become an integral part of an infantry battalion.

As well as patrolling the border, the land troops, with helicopter support, could be used in search and rescue operations, medical evacuations and natural disasters. With the inclusion of an air capability for the infantry group, it would be possible for the Defence Force to adopt new characteristics, such as the rapid deployment of troops and better logistical disbursement. The rapid deployment capability would also become a valuable asset in the support of internal security requirements and in assisting police, so that movement into declared areas is effected.

The Engineer Battalion could carry out many of the building and construction activities in small-scale, community-based projects as opposed to large ones. First, however, the combat skills of the engineers should not be compromised by having these troops heavily engaged in construction projects.

Second, to allow the large-scale involvement of troops would imply that the state institution which is responsible for works and implementation — the Department of Works — should be dismantled, and its role taken over by the Defence Force. This would appear to be making savings and reducing overheads at the expense of another vital government agency. However, it would be contrary to streamlining the Defence Force, which would inevitably pick up those assumed savings in the central revenue.

Third, the Defence Force should not be seen to be competing with those small contractors that carry out construction work, thus

preventing the employment of other citizens. Instead of moving a great deal of equipment and personnel, and in accordance with fair business principles, the Defence Force should utilise machinery and equipment from these small construction companies. This would ensure a win-win situation with the business fraternity, as well as the communities whose projects are being constructed.

The Defence White Paper has also introduced the concept of a military cadet scheme. Its primary aim is to instil discipline and a sense of duty and responsibility in the youths. Although some schools have been identified, the scheme should be introduced in consultation with the Youth Council so that youth organisations, which are run by various governmental and non-governmental organisations, take part in the scheme. The scheme could also provide the basis for a National Defence Concept, which the White Paper discusses. It would involve citizens in other paid jobs on a part-time basis or a Reserve Force that could be mobilised during complex national emergencies, such as the Rabaul volcano eruption or the Aitape tsunami disaster.

MARITIME FORCES

Another important peacetime role for the Defence Force is its presence along maritime borders. The continuous poaching of marine resources has denied the country its optimum revenue. The prevention of poaching activities has been limited by the capabilities of the maritime forces. Also, there have been increases in the illegal passage of boats involved in illicit drug deals, contraband, people smuggling and piracy.

A revitalised maritime force should be equipped to counter these activities, in addition to providing a support base for an integrated surveillance concept. It would operate on a similar principle to the coast watcher system that was employed in the Second World War. It could be enhanced with the commissioning of an Operational Support Ship (OSS) that would have the capability of carrying and launching a helicopter.⁴ This ship would also provide the logistics and supplies for the smaller patrol boats, which could extend their patrol periods, as opposed to the early returns that they currently must do. Elements of the air units could be devoted to maritime support, and in doing so, share the airport base. This would overcome the problem of lack of identity and unit cohesion of the Landing Craft Base, which is located on the waterfront, in Port Moresby.

⁴ While the concept is for troop mobilisation and movement of stores, a helicopter based on the ship could investigate reports of illegal fishing and other activities, within range.

AIR FORCES

Being technically sophisticated, and having one of the most expensive maintenance programs, this capability would be the most affected in any rationalisation process. The helicopter units could be redeployed to become part of the infantry and maritime support groups. This would leave the air transport capability — specifically the fixed wing component of the Air Transport Squadron — at odds with the only possible option to let that function operate under a commercial support concept. This function could revert back to the squadron, when the government reassesses the security implications or at the end of the contract, whichever is considered appropriate.

Attempts are being made to free up other resources so that they can be effectively utilised in other deficient areas. The outsourcing of some of the functions has been realised through the Commercial Support Program (CSP), which involves the use of private contractors to carry out some specific functions. The CSP exercise would not necessarily save on costs but it is believed to be a cost-effective concept. It may also free up military personnel so that they can be utilised elsewhere. In other countries' armed forces, the aim has been to have fewer men in uniform, and to be 'lean and mean'. An example of this is the outsourcing or contracting of catering facilities to private firms, such as Eurest, for a period of time, to feed service personnel in a base environment. Other areas such as warehousing, logistical supplies, and maintenance of vehicles are currently being investigated.

CONCLUSION

The Defence requirements are set out by the Defence White Paper of 1999, which 'maps' future defence initiatives, and further defines the strategic outlook. Many critics have also pointed out that no threat scenarios were painted in the White Paper, while some continue to maintain that a Defence Force in PNG has been a luxury and a burden to national development. Others have said that we have created an institution that has turned against its own people.

Internal squabbling within Defence is very clearly observed by the community at large. Many of the recommendations by the CEPG confirmed this view. In the Defence organisation there has been the 'us versus them' relation existing for sometimes now, and this has affected working relations between the civil bureaucracy and the military chiefs. Their credibility to function as a respectable military institution has a very slim chance. It does not help either when the attrition rate of senior Defence management becomes very high. The position of Commander

has not been substantive for quite sometime, therefore certain policy initiatives have been retarded, hence management issues compounded.

It is the duty of the military executives to maintain some co-operative, and credible PNG Defence Force despite what many may think and say. There are many people out there who stand to gain from the military instability and internal squabbles, hence the reform 'ball' in their court has to be played with great skill. There are also some people who have gained directly from the absence of formal security institutions, and there are others who would like to see state democratic institutions destabilised for their personal gains.

Defence approach to the reforms and future planning should be regarded as a 'mobilisation period' to launch a battle against the unknown. It is similar to fighting a battle against terrorism. There are lots of unknowns. Until they are addressed, which may have been already implanted within them and may have further camouflaged their ability to segregate or dissect in an elimination process, the Defence Force will continue to struggle in carrying out its roles and objectives as stipulated in the constitution of PNG.

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: Causes, Consequences and Remedies

Hengene Payani

INTRODUCTION

Corruption was not a serious concern and was incidental during the colonial period in Papua New Guinea (PNG). However, national concerns about corruption arose in the newly independent State of PNG, especially during the late 1970s and in the early 1980s (Kalinoe and Leka, 1998: 1). Since then, corruption has become a way of life in PNG. It is so pervasive and ingrained at all levels of government and in many private sector operations, that it is now fast becoming a cancerous disease, which is threatening the very fabric of Papua New Guinean society.

Corruption is destroying people's faith in democracy, undermining confidence in democratic governments, creating political instability, discouraging foreign investment, and encouraging capital flight. Moreover, corruption has led to the misallocation of resources, and retarded private sector development. Intimidation, violence, and even murder suppress many of those people who dare to act in an honourable way and raise their voices against corruption. In short, corruption fosters criminal elements, feasts on public resources, slows economic development and distorts trade.

As in the rest of society, corruption is rampant at all levels of the public service in PNG. At independence in 1975, the Government

expected the public service to play a vanguard role in the task of nation-building and national development. As an integral part of the decision-making structure of government and a major link between the citizens and government, the public service was expected to effectively carry out and implement government policies and be responsive to the needs and aspirations of all Papua New Guineans.

However, the performance of the public service since independence has been very disappointing. Over the years, the public service has grown in size, roles and activities, and consumed a large portion of the national budget. However, its productivity and output continues to be minimal (Kavanamur and Kinkin, 2000). Papua New Guineans from all walks of life, as well as politicians and donor countries, have expressed concern over the widespread corruption and its effect on bureaucratic performance and development. There are many problems that have contributed to the poor performance of the public service, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of them.

After defining the term 'bureaucratic corruption' the chapter outlines the various forms of corruption in the public service, examines causes of corruption, analyses the effects of bureaucratic corruption on the bureaucracy itself and the society at large, and suggests some remedial strategies for combating bureaucratic corruption.

BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION

Bureaucratic corruption is defined as a deviant behaviour exhibited by public servant(s) in order to acquire some socially, administratively or legally prohibited favours for oneself or for friends. A bureaucrat is personally corrupt if he or she sacrifices the interest of those for whom he or she works for to his or her own benefit, or that of his or her friends. Being personally corrupt, he or she may not necessarily violate a rule, but is corrupt because he or she has betrayed a professional trust. A bureaucrat is officially corrupt if, in serving the interest of those for whom he or she works, he or she violates a rule or law (codified or by convention), and acts illegally albeit in the interest of those for whom he or she works (Sause, 1992).

Bureaucratic corruption in PNG covers a variety of illegal activities and manifests itself in various forms. Some of the most commonly recognised forms of bureaucratic corruption are (Caiden, 1988: 5):

- bribery, graft, extortion, illegal levies, and kickbacks;
- nepotism and favouritism;
- misappropriation, forgery, embezzlement; padding of accounts, diversion of funds, misuse of funds, unaudited revenues and skimming;
- absenteeism, non-performance of duties, desertion and parasitism;

- deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, cheating and swindling;
- use and abuse of official confidential information for private purposes, and falsification of records;
- misuse of inside knowledge in awarding contracts and arranging loans and subsidies; and misuse of official seals, stationery, residences, and requisites;
- illegal surveillance, and misuse of mails and telecommunications.

These activities are so widespread in the public service that they are often considered as 'business as usual'. They range from the misconduct of heads of public sector institutions and departments and leading politicians, to low-level government employees. These practices produce many costs for a society such as inefficiency, mistrust of the government and its employees, distortion of program achievements, waste of public resources, encouragement of black market operations, and eventual national instability (see Jain, 1995).

Commenting on the widespread corrupt practices in the public service, Sir Julius Chan, a former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea stated:

There is a very visible lack of discipline, initiative and pride at all levels of the public service. Occasions of carelessness and outright misappropriation in handling public money are increasing at a disastrous rate. I would hate to know the total figure of money stolen over the years from the public by the public's servants. It must now run into the millions. But there is a more subtle form of decay, of corruption, which does not involve theft or misuse of money. It involves the misuse of power and position, and the cynical disregard for ethics. Simple examples spring easily to mind, such as the public official who will destroy a letter or deliberately lose a file because the job involved is too hard for him to handle; the senior public servant or minister who will blatantly misuse government assets at his or her disposal — all are simple and common examples, but deadly in the corrosive cumulative effect they have on collective morality (Chan, 1984: 38).

Almost sixteen years later, a former departmental head observed that:

In Papua New Guinea, corruption is evident in the national planning and budgetary processes where resources are allocated along political, regional or ethnic inclinations and affiliations. In certain resource sectors like forestry, coffee or copra, evidence of malpractices such as transfer pricing, grant facilitation and rebate payments have surfaced as an area of concern in the last decade.

Financial misappropriation in tendering, contract approval and procurement of goods and services is gradually taking prominence in the construction sector and major resource development projects. Major reports of politicians and public servants in the country abusing their positions for personal gain are a common phenomenon (Bengo, 1999: 3).

Paul Bengo (1999: 1) further notes that:

Empirical evidence suggests that bribery, back room deals, excessive payoffs, and widespread theft are rampant and threaten to cripple investment in the country ... this cancer cell is eating away the richness of a country blessed with vast resources at the expense of others.

Two years earlier, PNG's Governor General warned that innuendos, manipulations, undercover deals, greed, and corruption are becoming deeply rooted in this society (*The Australian*, 14 June 1995: 17; Lamour, 1997: 1).

CAUSES OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION

Why do public servants engage in corrupt activities? What causes or prompts people to become entangled in corrupt practices? Jabbra (1979: 674), an expert on bureaucratic corruption in the Third World, contended that 'bureaucratic corruption is created by attitudes and patterns of behaviour interwoven not only throughout the bureaucratic structures of merging nations, but also throughout the whole of their social fabric'. In other words, cultural attitudes and behavioural patterns shape and condition bureaucratic corruption. Elaborating on this point, Caiden and Caiden (1977: 303) asserted that bureaucrats in the Third World countries 'are faced with a choice of adhering to the standards of modern development administration or to the accepted traditional standards. The latter is usually chosen.' In PNG society where kinship and other parochial loyalties are a well-established system, doing favours to one's kinsmen, relatives, or friends is usually viewed as normal, especially by those who are involved in such practices. This has a significant influence on the behaviour of many public servants, and leads them to indulge in corrupt practices in order to satisfy their clients' demands.

The situation in PNG is very similar to most developing countries where the practice of using public office for private gain is the result of a predominant belief that there is nothing wrong with such conduct. This kind of belief is reinforced by a widely held benevolent

attitude towards the abuse of the public, resulting in its acceptance as a normal pattern of administrative behaviour (see Kpundeh, 1995: 54).

The abuse of power thrives in developing countries such as PNG for a number of reasons. Five primary factors contribute to, and even protect, corrupt practices (see Hoppe, 1995). The first argument is the general absence of a work ethic in the public service. Public servants in PNG seem to lack a sense of purpose and commitment to their duties and responsibilities.¹ They believe that they own their jobs and only feel obligated to themselves. Hence, they should exploit their positions for personal gain. The following example illustrates this assertion.

Having had two vacation jobs with two separate departments in my undergraduate days I know what lack of work ethics is. In one department nearly the entire staff of the section where I was employed would not turn up after having lunch on the Friday fortnight week (this is not to mention turning up late after lunchtime every weekday). I soon found out that one of the reasons why they had to leave early was because there was little to do ... in the other department, staff of my section would regularly come out for 10–15 minutes and buy buai (betel nut) and chew because the street market was on the other side of the road (Sause, 1992: 10).

Such an attitude is prevalent in the public service. Some public servants seem to consider their public jobs as their property. This kind of proprietary attitude, according to Jabbra (1979), personally furthers the institutionalisation of a pattern of bureaucratic behaviour, which is characterised by goals of self-aggrandisement, usurpation of power, and the conception of public office as an avenue for wealth.

Second, a lack of economic development in PNG creates a bipolar type of income distribution that consists of the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. The consequence of this is that public servants, who strive for high social status so that they can be counted among the 'haves', resort to the instrument of 'demonstration effect' — a conspicuous consumption of luxury goods which cannot be afforded given low salaries (Hoppe, 1995).

¹ For criticisms directed at the public service for poor work ethics and general lack of commitment to work, see 'Public Servants told to improve', Editorial, *Post-Courier*, Friday, 3 August 1990, p. 10; 'Public Servants must try harder', *Post-Courier*, 3 August 1990, p. 5; 'If they don't work, get rid of them', *Post-Courier*, 20 January 1995, p. 10; 'Sack lazy public servants', Editorial, *Post-Courier*, 16 June 1994; 'The Mess at Waigani', Editorial, *Post-Courier*, 25 June 1990, p. 10; 'Public Service must work', Editorial, *Post-Courier*, 4 January 1993, p. 10; 'Copy NZ public service system', *The Times*, 4 May 1995, p. 9; 'Motivating the public service', Commentary, *The Times*, 19 August 1993, p. 11.

It would seem that officials have an unlimited desire for power, wealth and the good life, which would be necessary to confirm their status as members of the elite in government and society.

In recent years, there has been the propagation of the 'pajero culture', whereby most public servants (and politicians, too) own a Mitsubishi Jeep. The desire to be seen as 'somebody' or 'a big man' in society has been one of the factors responsible for public officeholders engaging in corrupt acts to acquire luxury goods.

Third, politicians and political parties in Papua New Guinea lack appropriate leadership and discipline. Widespread corruption among politicians and weak national interests are contributing factors towards widespread corruption among public servants. The misuse of public funds, misconduct in office, deliberate negligence of public duty (such as lack of attending parliamentary sittings), vote buying during elections, and misuse of state property are widespread among politicians in PNG. The laws have often been violated and loopholes in the legislation have been taken advantage of to pursue self-interest. If the political leadership is corrupt, chances are that the public service is also corrupt. As Sir Julius Chan (1984: 35) contended, 'political leadership is interlocked with the bureaucracy. The performance of one depends on the other, and the quality of both must be of an equal standard. Corruption among leaders can only result in equal corruption in the public service.' Similarly, Bautista (1982) correctly observed that the public service not only facilitates corruption but also supports it when leaders fail to emulate proper behaviour. Raul de Guzman (cited in Bautista, 1982: 256) further notes that 'an organisation can be corrupt only if its leadership is corrupt. The behaviour of the lower echelon officials is strongly influenced by the example set by the leadership.'

Fourth, as in other developing countries, state activity in PNG has grown since independence. The growth of state activities has undoubtedly resulted in the growth of a bureaucracy with increasing discretionary power to regulate its economy and social affairs. This contributes to bureaucratic corruption. Johnston (1995) notes that government actions and decisions are shaped by pressures, demands and influence placed upon them by individuals and groups in society. The origin lies in the interaction between the government and its people. Planned development has enabled the state to intervene in the socioeconomic sphere, and this has led to an increase in regulations.

According to Dwivedi (1984: 4), this 'increased regulatory authority creates various opportunities for money-making, for example, in connection with development of planning permits, contracts for construction, granting import-export licenses, collecting customs and other duties,

and strict accounting for foreign exchange'. In PNG, where the Government is the main employer, its interaction with the private sector has led to rampant abuse by public officials ranging from bribery, kickbacks, discretionary laws made in order to let public officials collect bribes, and underinvoicing. The rules and regulations have often been interpreted and enforced essentially to facilitate personal gain.

Fifth, because of the highly centralised administrative structure, effective communication channels are almost absent, and the management of national development tends to become paralysed. The ultimate result of these manifestations is that there is a lack of coordination of policies among departments, as well as a lack of dissemination of information necessary for effective decision-making. This leads to decision-making powers being concentrated with those at the apex of the decision-making pyramid, who are often hard pressed to cope with the range of decisions they must make. According to Hoppe (1995), the effect of this is either procrastination or inadequate and inept policies.

A weak moral fibre among public servants also presents a strong case for them to be corrupt; that is, a bureaucrat with low moral standards and values is susceptible to graft and corruption when the opportunities are present. Quah (1989: 842) contends that:

[a person's] incentive to be corrupt will be great if his or her personal virtue is low, if his or her colleagues are corrupt, if his or her familial loyalties override his or her loyalty to his or her organisation and country, if his or her monthly salary is low or insufficient to meet his or her needs, and if his or her society tolerates corrupt behavior. Conversely, a persons incentive to become corrupt will be minimal or absent if 'he or she is of strong moral character, if his or her colleagues are not corrupt, if he or she is more loyal to his or her organization and country than to his or her family, if his or her wages are adequate, and if corruption is not condoned in his or her society.

Quah (1989) further states that one's incentive to be corrupt does not, by itself, result in the person's corrupt behaviour. There must be opportunities that facilitate or allow that person to indulge in corruption. This, in turn, depends very much on the 'extent his or her official activities are controlled by others, the frequency of his or her contacts with the public, and his or her position in his or her organization'

Other factors that may cause public servants to resort to corruption are job scarcity, insufficient salary, a dual salary system, and lack of or poor accommodation and office facilities. The difficult economic realities of the country may also force public servants to resort to corrupt practices.

EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Bureaucratic corruption has a serious adverse effect on the performance and productivity of the public service. Like a blockage in a pipe which thwarts the free flow of water, these problems hinder the effective implementation of government policies for socioeconomic development and nationbuilding. Further, the problems seriously affect the provision of the government's goods and services to the people.

Bureaucratic corruption may be beneficial to those bureaucrats who engage in corrupt practices, as long as they are not caught and penalised. To them, corruption is profitable, and they can live exceptionally privileged, sheltered lives, and accumulate wealth without much work. On the contrary, all corruption, as Caiden (1988) states, is a deceit, a lie, that sacrifices the common good or the public interest for something much less. It detracts from the search for the good of the society. Therefore, they gain at the expense of someone else or the society, although the losers may never realise that they have been denied what should have been theirs (Caiden, 1988).

Bureaucratic corruption contributes to inefficiency, laziness, slackness, and low work ethics in the public service. The public service lacks suitably qualified personnel because of *wantokism* and other forms of corrupt practices. The recruitment of poorly educated *wantoks* who are not trained in work ethics, and the culture of a modern bureaucracy, hardly do justice to the machinery of the government. It only produces inefficiency and waste.

Moreover, the widespread abuse of power, misuse of public properties, and negligence of duties and responsibilities seriously affect and demoralise the public service. Also, it is not uncommon to find some departments and agencies operating without telephones because the telephone lines have been disconnected for non-payment of bills. It is a common practice for officials and their friends to use government telephones for long-distance private calls. Photocopying machines and other stationery are also used for private purposes, and in some cases, private holidays are paid for as if they were official trips.

These practices are so widespread that few Papua New Guineans recognise them as a form of corruption. In this way, a department (and the country) loses millions of kina, or is deprived of much needed revenue. Over the years, many government departments and agencies have run out of money either because of lack of funds, mismanagement or overspending of allocated funds. This has seriously affected departmental performance and eventually has had negative repercussions on the nation.

According to Dwivedi (1984: 12), the abuse of power in the public service 'undermines the public confidence and trust in government, reduces the capacity of government to fulfil its functions effectively, subverts ethical responsiveness to the citizenry, and imposes unnecessary financial burdens on the public'. The citizenry will then begin to have a low opinion of the public service. They have a negative view of the public service as corrupt, slack, unresponsive and inefficient. Such perceptions can directly or indirectly affect the self-esteem and morale of capable officers. This, in turn, affects their performance and lowers their effectiveness.

Likewise, the politicisation of the bureaucracy has some serious adverse effects on the public service. The frequent changes in government and constant political interference in administrative affairs create instability and uncertainty in the service. As Dwivedi (1984: 3) warned, 'an environment of administrative malaise may develop if politicians appear to be less scrupulous, unduly interfering in the normal functioning of the administrative machinery, and unnecessarily exercising their power to achieve certain political or personal goals which are not articulated and sanctioned through the established public decision-making process'.

Furthermore, one cannot expect consistency and continuity in policies and priorities of government when there is a frequent change of government and the constant reshuffling of top bureaucrats. Removing competent officers and replacing them with *wantoks* or political cronies (whether competent or not) definitely demoralises the public service. Other capable officers in the department may feel reluctant to work with those who won have positions through corrupt practices, rather than on merit. Additionally, it creates a feeling of insecurity, cynicism, and apathy in many senior public servants. This further creates confusion in political and administrative accountability as well as attitudinal friction between politicians and public servants (Public Service Rationalisation Task Force, 1993).

It has been noted that problems such as *wantokism*, especially in recruitment and promotion, have led to the ethnicisation of some departments and agencies. How do minority officers in the department feel about working in a department that is dominated by people from a particular region or province? Will the concept of 'one-nation-one-public-service' be promoted in this kind of department? Will the sense of belonging to one public service be there? Unfortunately, the recent study by the Rationalisation Task Force reports that this sense of belonging to one public service is weakening in the public service.

Minority officers feel alienated and uneasy working in an environment that is dominated by people from a particular province or region. To some, these organisations look more like tribal enterprises than

government departments. There have been complaints that, in such departments, there is a complete lack of work ethic: instead there is slackness, absenteeism and laziness. The poor representation and participation of women and other ethnic minorities in the public service is also a complete waste of human resources. This means that their unique talents, abilities, and capabilities are not being fully utilised in the public service.

Furthermore, the ethnicisation of departments or agencies could cause anger, frustration, and resentment among minority officers, and this could discourage them from performing their duties effectively.

EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION ON SOCIETY

Bureaucratic corruption also has seriously affected the socio-economic development of the country. What happens if the bureaucracy that is supposed to effectively carry out and implement the government policies for modernisation, economic development and the extension of social services is failing to implement these tasks?

Several indicators suggest that there has been serious deterioration in the quality of many essential services provided by the public service (World Bank, 1995). In January 1995, for example, the Ministry of Health called an urgent conference on the national health crisis. Recently, studies have shown an alarming spread of familiar diseases as well as a sharp decline in health services and central supervisory activities (World Bank, 1995). Health facilities and equipment have deteriorated. Many buildings are in a sad state of disrepair, are unhygienic, and need remedial maintenance. Also, there is a lack of standard treatment manuals, medicine, cleaning materials, syringes, reliable water supplies, electricity, refrigerators and sterilising equipment. The major hospitals in the country are faced with serious staff shortages, drug and equipment shortages, unhygienic patient accommodation, delays in obtaining laboratory results, and so on. People have increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with erroneous treatments, absenteeism, lack of discipline, and poor commitment among health workers (World Bank, 1995: 49).

PNG's nutritional indicators are among the worst in the Pacific region. A Department of Health Review in 1994 found that in the 1980s and the 1990s there was a significant increase in malnutrition among children, especially in the Highlands Region. Additionally, there was an increase in diseases such as measles, tetanus, pneumonia, heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, and chronic infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis and yaws. Moreover, malaria, sexually transmitted diseases, and AIDS/HIV are emerging as significant health problems (Department of Health Review, 1994).

Performance in the education sector is no better. Despite high costs per student, by international standards, the education system in PNG yields disappointing results, and has low enrolment and high dropout rates (Department of Health Review, 1994). Moreover, despite the high level of expenditure, the educated manpower remains low. According to the 1990 Census results (provisional) (National Statistical Office, 1991) approximately 52.3 per cent of citizens aged 10 and over (excluding those at school) had no education, 18.5 per cent had grades 1 to 5 education, 16.4 per cent had completed grade 6, 5 per cent had grades 7 to 9 education, 3.8 per cent had grades 10 and 11 education, and 0.6 per cent had grade 12 education. Moreover, only 0.2 per cent had completed a university degree and 1.8 per cent had completed certificate or diploma level education (UNDP/ILO, 1993: 133). In absolute terms, there were only 13,921 upper secondary graduates, 4,499 degree-holders, and 45,914 certificate/diploma graduates in the country in 1990.

The overall quality and standard of the education system is increasingly deteriorating. Much has been said and reported about the deteriorating condition of school buildings, budgetary constraints, school overcrowding, lack of basic furniture, shortage of teachers, teacher absenteeism, poor housing conditions for teachers, inadequate teaching materials and support facilities and underutilisation of existing facilities (Turner, 1990: 76–81).

In relation to infrastructure, the situation is no better. There are approximately 25,000 kilometres of roads in the country, of which national and provincial roads account for 16,934 kilometers. Only a little more than 20 per cent of all roads are sealed, but most are in poor condition (Haiveta, 1995: 100). According to a 1994 World Bank study, expenditure on the maintenance of national roads has declined by 70 per cent in less than a decade. As a result, poor roads are common, even in major cities such as Port Moresby and Lae. Additionally, more than 50 per cent of its rural airfields have been shut down in recent years because of lack of maintenance. In terms of water supplies, only 15 per cent of urban residents have access to piped water. In the capital, Port Moresby, water shortages are a frequent problem. Many village clusters have the population agglomeration of a city, but remain without basic amenities such as piped water and sewerage systems (World Bank, 1995).

In urban centres, the unemployment rate is high. Many unemployed urban dwellers lived in overcrowded and unsafe squatter settlements while some urban residents live in makeshift or low-cost housing. Most of these urban houses often lack piped water systems and electricity. Approximately, one-third of urban households still rely on

firewood for cooking (World Bank, 1995). In the rural areas, where most Papua New Guineans live, the provision of government services has been minimal, or almost non-existent in some of the remotest areas.

High dropout rates in schools and high unemployment rates are some of the factors contributing to the worsening law and order situation in the country. This indicates that the law and order enforcement agencies have not been very successful in controlling that situation. Therefore, crime is on the rise.

According to the Police Department statistics, the number of serious crimes that have been reported has risen sharply, from 6,200 in 1980 to 13,100 in 1990 (World Bank, 1994). In the second half of 1994, the crime rate soared to an unprecedented level as a consequence of funding shortages for public services such as the police. Murder, armed robbery, break and enter, drug trafficking, rape, riots, tribal fights, and corruption have been on the rise since independence. These problems create and instil fear amongst the people, and restrict their movement, especially in the urban centres. Most visitors to PNG, as well as potential investors, are bombarded with the impression that crime in PNG is out of control.

The deterioration of health, education, infrastructure, and other essential services reflects a lack of direction, and the feeble efforts by the national and provincial government departments that are responsible for the provision of these services. Moreover, it reflects the ineffectiveness and poor performance of the public service. This poor performance has led to much criticism by Papua New Guineans from all walks of life. People have often likened the public service to a huge monster eating up most of the nation's budget in salaries and benefits, but with low productivity. As Turner (1990: 124) notes, the public service 'is perhaps the greatest recipient of criticism in PNG'. It is not uncommon to find daily newspapers in PNG carrying rebukes and criticism directed at the public service for being inefficient, too bureaucratic, incompetent, and unresponsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. Former Prime Ministers such as Sir Michael Somare, Sir Julius Chan, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Paias Wingti, and many other leaders have all criticised the public service for not implementing the government's policies effectively.

Since independence, there have been numerous calls for a massive clean up in the public service following widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of its officers. When new governments come into power, they promise to eradicate bribery and corruption in the public service. However, in reality, nothing effective has been done. Therefore, the evils of bribery, corruption, and other administrative malaise have

compounded over the years. These problems definitely have adverse effects on the overall performance and productivity of the public service.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CURB BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION?

Having discussed bureaucratic corruption, its causes and its consequences, the question is, what can be done to curb, or at least minimise the widespread corruption in the public service? As already stated, corruption is so widespread in both the public and private sectors that, over the last 25 years, there have been concerns expressed about these problems by politicians, the general citizenry, and donor countries alike.

In response to these challenges, actions have included 'campaigns' to clean up public life and fight against corruption, reviews of the rules and regulations applying to public officials, attempts to redefine public service 'values' and new 'codes of conduct', and so on (Bengo, 1999: 1). However, despite these efforts, the problem is fast becoming endemic and threatens to become systematic in public and private sector operations. Part of the reason for the existence of the problem is that we lack the technical and financial resources and the institutional capacity to combat this cancerous disease (Bengo, 1999: 1).

One tends to find corruption when someone has a monopoly over a good or service, has discretionary powers to decide whether you receive it and how much you get, and is not accountable. Combating corruption must begin with a better system. Systems must be put in place to ensure that monopolies are reduced or carefully regulated. Official discretion must be clarified. Transparency and accountability must be enhanced and strengthened, and the probability of being caught must be increased. Penalties for corruption (for both givers and takers) must be increased. The introduction of new laws, more controls, a change in mentality, ethics, and so on may prove insufficient when systems are not in place to implement them. The systems that breed corruption must be fixed (Klitgaard, 1997: 2). Strategies for fixing the systems include convicting and punishing highly corrupt people, paying competitive salaries or wages to public servants, and educating the people about the pros and cons of corruption.

It will not be easy to eradicate corruption from our society. The introduction of new laws and ethics, or punishing the offenders will not be sufficient because these are not the root causes of corruption. The Government needs to get to the root cause of the problem and try to fix it. Greed is the root cause of corruption, as it causes those with money and power to offer bribes to win unfair advantage, thus abusing power and

wealth. People should be taught to live within their means and share with others. Thinking of oneself more than others often, or always, leads one to engage in corrupt dealings.

The fight against corruption and bribery at all levels of society, as well as in the public sector, is every citizen's responsibility. As discussed, corruption is eating away at our society and public institutions throughout the country, and is responsible for most of the injustices that occur. It is destroying our country, and unless all of the citizens cooperate and do something about it, this nation will collapse. Every citizen has the responsibility to fight this calamity. This requires the government, the private sector, and civil society to work together to combat corruption. As Pope (1999: 1) stated, 'we will fail to prevent such injustices unless we attack corruption. We must use every fibre of our energy to wage this fight if we are to contribute to a more humane world that ensures dignity and opportunity for all'.

In our democratic society, civil society, in particular, has to play a vanguard role as 'governments are often part of the problem and lack credibility even when promoting anti-corruption strategies and business is often as much the perpetrator of corrupt practices, as it is the victim' (Pope, 1991: 4) Therefore, civil society should be encouraged to mobilise efforts to fight fraud, bribery, and corruption.

In the bureaucracy, the top management and their subordinates must accept the fact that corruption is a serious problem in the public service. Top management should be available at all times to deal with the causes of such crimes in their respective departments, in a firm and a decisive way — without fear or favour.

In summary, corruption is prevalent in the public service. However, this problem can exist only if someone is willing to be corrupted, and someone is capable of bringing about that corruption. In the current age, where a materialistic way of life supersedes moral and ethical values and standards, the former has a tendency to subvert the integrity of those who are in the public service. However, the onus to weed out corruption lies with those at the top of political and administrative hierarchies. Their total commitment and direction is required to weed out corruption. After all, corruption in PNG starts at the top and seeps downward.

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CHALLENGES IN REPORTING CORRUPTION IN NEWSPAPERS

Joe R. Kanekane

In the matter of factual reporting, judgment and opinion, only the most diverse and competitive press can sustain democracy.

John Stuart Mill

INTRODUCTION

The demise of the late Prime Minister Bill Skate's regime in July 1999 was largely the work of the media. From March to July 1999 Papua New Guinea newspapers were at the helm of predicting the downfall of the Skate regime. What started as a 'wishful prediction' came into fruition and the media's sin was that of propagating the downfall of an otherwise populist regime. The debate was carried right through into the height of horse-trading up until the very last night of July 13, being the last darkest night of the Skate regime. The next day brought to light a new chapter in PNG's political history as Sir Mekere Morauta was elected in an unprecedented 99–6 overwhelming majority, including Bill Skate himself. The future of a country that was near tatters was suddenly bestowed upon Sir Mekere as he was expected, given his credentials as a former secretary of finance, managing director of a commercial bank and central bank governor, to pull back the country from the edge of chaos, and hence oblivion.

Is the media a catalyst for democracy and a reflection of society's views of issues and developments? Countless demarcations abound that circumscribe the role of the media, but the best one is succinctly summed

up by David Robie (1994) who, writing for the *Nius Bilong Pacific*, asserts that, 'A vital function of the press in a democracy is performing the role of a public watch dog, protecting the people's right to know and protecting them against bad governments'. The same observation is also made by Nash (1997), particularly in the context of PNG and the Pacific Islands.

A more refined description of the role of the media is propagated by award winning American journalist Bob Woodward, who notes that 'Our job simply and happily is to find out what is going on and publish it'. Woodward is best known for exposing the Watergate scandal in the United States in the 1970s which subsequently led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon. The media today is one of the pivotal mechanisms in the democratic world and will continue to be so.

REPORTING CORRUPTION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Indian scholar Sekar (1981) highlights an interesting perspective into the way investigative journalism, especially reporting on corruption in India, is received. Coming from an environmental background and from the world's second most populous country, he gives three reasons for the indifference of recipients towards reports of corruption. Firstly, people are so preoccupied with their daily chores that they hardly have time to read, but if they did read, it would be about something that concerns their immediate well-being. Secondly, although India's literacy level is among the world's highest, very little impact is registered by corruption levels. Finally, reporting on environmental issues is regarded as global and therefore does not concern the local populace.

These are the stark realities that investigative journalists like myself confront every day. The question that often faces us is, if a report comes out how will it make an impact? Obviously pressured by deadlines, most reporters simply treat news items as just another piece of news needed to quickly fill the pages and therefore to meet strict deadlines. Some of us, however, often think long and hard over what is likely to become of a story in the final analysis. The type of work involved, the risks taken and the man hours of pouring over documents, doing searches, seeking legal advice and meticulous writing absorbs a significant proportion of a reporter's energy and stamina. And after publication the question arises again as to what mileage has been gained or otherwise in either bringing the culprits to justice or in how the reading society is reacting to a story.

But that is the ultimate price for those of us in the investigative journalism game. It is not so much the sacrifices that investigative journalists make in a developing country like PNG, but the passion of reporting and satisfaction that this style of reporting brings us and seeing the beneficial

effects brought to bear on the society we live, breathe and work in. Our passion follows the desires of our hearts and conscience to see that transparency is prevalent and some degree of accountability is recorded. Investigative journalism in PNG has always been the yearning of the learned public because corruption is rampant and people accept the principles of an open society rather than an enclosed corrupt one. There is always the argument that the country lacks this style of reporting and that journalists are not really doing enough to ensure that what is not visible to the public at large actually gets reported.

It is too easy for lay people to demand more from newspapers. The tedious, painstaking and laborious effort being put into a piece of corruption news by a journalist is not usually acknowledged. Our hard work, the very high stakes involved and sometimes costly mistakes can have fatal ramifications for a journalist. When one sees the type of demand that exists for this kind of reporting in the PNG context where violence is prevalent (see Kaman, this volume), one can easily be tempted to just walk away and turn a blind eye on the rot eating away at our society. But then the probing question that will haunt our conscience is who is going to do the dirty work of exposing corrupt and rent-seeking behaviour if we decide not to do it? The cost of being an investigative reporter, particularly in PNG, is, to say the least, already a burdensome task on reporters and their families. The following are some of the predicaments that I myself have had to face and deal with in the line of duty.

CONTEMPT

Wherever you are, irrespective of the event and location, the public always looks at you with contempt. They know your character and what you are capable of doing and often mix with you freely. They know that they can get into trouble and risk their careers by simply talking to you or being seen mingling with you. It can also be implied that this is 'polite respect' from loyal readers when you are in pursuit of a story. Often valuable and reliable sources do not come easy because informants may fear you or are against you.

THREATS

Many of my colleagues have been on one occasion or another the subject of threats. Some have been assaulted, others have been victimised, ridiculed and often such experiences tend to restrict their movements. Phone calls are often popular where anonymous callers ring up and threaten a reporter to abandon a story potentially damaging to those involved. *Wantok* editor Yakam Kelo was confronted by supporters of

former Finshafen MP Yaip Avini when he wrote a story on the MP's humiliating dismissal. The former MP and his supporters stormed the Word Publishing premises and demanded an audience with the reporter who apparently made himself available. According to Kelo, 'They wanted me to know that I should not play around with them. I suppose they had the impression that I had no respect for their deposed leader.'

In another case, EMTV's senior reporter Jerry Ginua was threatened by rogue gang members believed to be associated with the December 1999 infamous 'Port Moresby Millennium PNGBC Robbery', where notorious criminals used a chopper for the first time in the history of PNG to attempt robbery on a commercial bank. He requested police to be present at his premises and was forced to abort the story. Another case involving EMTV reporters happened when former Madang Governor Jim Kas and his wife strenuously attempted to assault EMTV reporter Ilan Amo when she covered the dismissal of the Madang MP from parliament. As a result she could not get the footage and had to make do with script minus footage.

A final case that comes to mind is one that involved the National newspaper reporter Thomas Kilala, who was forced out of writing a story about a rift between PNG Defence Force soldiers and rogue police personnel when personnel from the latter threatened him. He has since not written a story relating to the alleged tensions between the two disciplinary forces.

LEGAL SUITS

Court injunctions have been in my experience one of the successful ways in which alleged offenders have prevented the publication of stories. The potential danger of huge costs arising from libel cases has often hampered the publication of good investigative stories. I remember a court injunction against me for a report I did on Concord Pacific Ltd. The company is responsible for the Kiunga–Ambiak project in the Western province. They served an injunction on me and that was the last I did on their alleged illegal activities.

RELIABILITY OF SOURCES

Reliability of sources is the biggest challenge which I have pondered over long and hard. The reliability and authenticity of documents, tips and leads have been very difficult to put together. While there is an influx of information, it is very hard sometimes to see the real agendas or realpolitik behind the sources supplying the stories. I share with Lichtenburg (1993) the point that 'journalists have to make important choices about

whether a statement is controversial enough to warrant balancing it with an opposing view. News sources have vested interests in the issues they are promoting and can exert different levels of powers on the media and wider policy making machinery'.

While researching a story on the National Provident Fund (NPF) sale of its shares in Steamships I was led into a pool of information by an internal source. I was led to believe that a certain staff member in the company had been diverting its shares into other areas. It was only when I sat with the staff member that I realised that the source had misled me into believing that he was innocent and had used the staff as a decoy. Such malice and concealed agendas act to marginalise our efforts and reinforce our suspicions of the unreliability of news sources. Because of one bad episode we may inadvertently stigmatise all sources as unreliable hence jeopardising future news sources. Often a journalist unsuspectingly gets news, writes it and then people use him/her to air their grievances, only to find herself/himself being caught later in a personal tussle between two people with different agendas.

COMPROMISE

Sweet-talking subjects or news sources are often very difficult to get away from. They use invitations such as luncheons, dinners and receptions in places where the top elite of society dwells. Once one is treated to such a luxurious reception it is often difficult to write negatively about a person who has done something bad. Often these are people who fall under the category described by David Lea (1998) as leaders whose supposed mandate is to source goods and resources for clansmen and relatives. Such people throw every trick and gimmick they know at journalists to prevent publication of their illegal activities and thereby hoodwink society. Hans-Martin Scholl (1997) refers to such illegal sourcing of goods and services for clansmen as part of a broader cargo cult mentality embedded in society (see also de Renzio and Kavanamur, 1999). Multinational companies are not innocent as they also tend to invite reporters to visit their projects and show them the areas they prefer coverage on rather than letting reporters find out for themselves what is newsworthy. The issue of favour then becomes a contested issue because on the one hand a reporter goes there because (s)he feels it is part of his/her job, while on the other hand the host uses the chance to get a reporter away from the issue being pursued.

For example, in November 2000, I was in Vanimo with officers of the National Forest Authority. I had heard that a certain species of monkeys were found in the logged area which apparently would require a sanctuary. I was visited by a representative of the timber company there

who, after offering me lunch, proceeded to give me a handful of money. I refused and walked away. I later learnt that a certain article about the company was doing the rounds with the media and the 'token' was intended to get me on their side.

CONCLUSION

Reporters are vulnerable to confrontations and dilemmas whether they like it or not. Often their working conditions may have a bearing on them, i.e. low pay, lack of proper accommodation, long working hours without commensurate remuneration, and so on. They may then resort to other moneymaking areas such as failing to report issues which relate to corruption in return for bribes. They may have friends in high places or relatives in these areas which make it difficult for them to report objectively. Thus, following a recent call by the International Chamber of Commerce, NGOs like Transparency International are expected to create ethical standards of conduct for companies to abide by. The media in PNG should also set up an Independent Centre for Journalism so that it can render independent assessments of issues and identify areas where reporters can report freely. It should also complement the work of government agencies such as the Police Fraud Squad, the Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts, the Auditor General's office, financial inspectors from the Treasury Department, the Bank of PNG, and others. This would allow the media to be at the helm of exposing corruption without fear or favour, using the network it has.

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SECTION 3

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

AN APPRAISAL OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEAN ECONOMY: Retrospect and Prospects

Modowa T. Gumoi

INTRODUCTION

Papua New Guinea (PNG) gained political independence on 16 September 1975. The transition from the clutches of colonialism to self-rule was smooth. A snapshot of time, from independence to the present, portrays an economy that has undergone change. Change has been of various types and magnitude. Some changes have been adverse while others have been positive. But both the adverse and positive changes have been shaped and determined by both domestic and international events. While the influence of international events on PNG has at times been inevitable, the changes in the domestic arena have been shaped by internal forces such as natural phenomena and self-infliction. The vehicle for self-infliction has been policy formulation and application and lack of self-discipline. External forces have also shaped domestic policy.

This chapter gives a synopsis of the PNG economy in transition since independence to the present. It also surveys the prospects beyond the new millennium. Specifically, it discusses the peculiar characteristics of the economy, the paradoxical development experience and the problems encountered, and the macroeconomic policy framework. An outline of the major challenges is also presented.

STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECONOMY

PNG is still very much a small open developing economy susceptible to the vagaries of international market forces. The general structure of the economy can be described in terms of productive and consumption activities and the formal and informal sectors. Agriculture forms the backbone of the economy. Over 80 per cent of the population are rural-based subsistence farmers who constitute a large portion of the informal sector, although the rapid monetisation of the economy has seen the transition to semi-subsistence agriculture where rural household production is not only consumed but the surplus marketed.

PNG is predominantly a primary producing nation with a high degree of dependence on exports and imports. The exports consist of primary products such as mineral and petroleum products and export tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, copra and palm oil. In general, the export sector has performed well due to mine developments, aid and investment projects, high commodity prices, producer efforts and government incentives. At the end of 1999, a total of 472,500 tonnes of these tree crops were exported, earning some K930.3 million kina. About 40,400 tonnes of copper ore, 16,400 tonnes of gold, and 7.8 million barrels of crude oil were exported. They earned K574.3 million, K1529.3 million, and K1397.6 million, respectively (Bank of Papua New Guinea, various).

PNG still depends heavily on the import of a wide range of consumer, intermediate and capital goods and services. The immediate danger with such a heavy dependence is that given the openness of the economy, transmission of imported inflation is highly likely. At the end of 1975, the total import bill was K471 million. By 1993 the import bill was valued at K1920 million. Much of this import bill consisted of capital goods and services essential for developmental purposes. The government forecast the import bill at the end of 2001 to be well above the 1993 level (BPNG, various). The longevity of import dependence can be attributed to the rather slow development of export promotion and import substitution industries and inadequate downstream processing brought about by development constraints (Gumoi, 1993).

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

When compared to South East Asian countries, PNG's overall economic growth performance and development between 1976 and 1999 has been relatively erratic, sluggish and falls short of its potential.¹ This is rather

¹ However, this growth performance is reasonable when compared to most African countries.

paradoxical given its rich and diverse agricultural and natural resource base and the external financial assistance PNG has received, particularly from Australia, and other donor agencies.

Levantis (2000) argues that the report card for PNG after 25 years of independence is one of increased poverty and wealth disparity, decline in economic and social development, and a slow disintegration of civil society. The economic and social indicators seem to reflect this assessment. For example, the human development index (HDI) for PNG fell four consecutive years in a row between the years 1997 to 2000. In 1999 PNG was ranked 127 out of 177 countries. By 2000 the ranking fell to 133, which places PNG third last in the Pacific and South Asia (UNDP, 2000). PNG has a high per capita income (USD 1130 in 1993) compared to other South Pacific island countries. However, the social indicators are not commensurate with the high per capita income level. The adult literacy rates, the infant mortality rate, and life expectancy, although improved over time are much lower compared to the small South Pacific and developing South-East Asian nations. In 1993 the adult literacy rate was 52 per cent compared to 92 per cent for South Pacific countries. The infant mortality rate was 67 per thousand births compared to 25 per thousand births, and life expectancy was 56 years compared to 70 years for all small South Pacific nations (AIDAB, 1993).

It can also be argued that the failure of development in PNG is manifest in the high level of subsistence and the generally poor performance of export crops, poor state of rural infrastructure, rural education and health facilities, and a collapse of the agricultural research system. The government, with assistance from donor agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs), is doing its best to address these problems.

The GDP growth rate between the years 1976 and 1983 was a dismal 1.4 per cent (Goodman et al., 1988: 34). This was envisaged because the objective of macroeconomic policy then was that of economic stability and not economic growth. The GDP growth rate then declined to an average of 2 per cent over the 1980–90 period. The period between 1991 and 1993 witnessed an average of 9.3 per cent positive growth rate, largely attributable to the rapid growth of the mining and petroleum sectors: in particular, mineral production from Misima and Porgera mines, followed by oil production from the Kutubu operation. In 1994 there was a macroeconomic crisis. The impact of this crisis was felt in the following year. The GDP growth rate declined in 1995 but stabilised by 1996. However, in 1997 there were a series of economic shocks. This included the Asian economic crisis, a severe drought, the Aitape tsunami disaster and the Rabaul volcanic eruptions. This resulted in the GDP growth rate in 1997 declining by 5.3 per cent. But at the end of 1999, the GDP grew by about 2.4 per cent.

The traditional agriculture and manufacturing sectors also experienced erratic growth over the 1975–1999 period. In the seventies and eighties, agriculture (including fisheries and forestry products) made a substantial contribution to GDP. Towards the latter part of the 1990s, this contribution declined. For example, by 1991 the contribution was only 14 per cent and between the 1992–1996 period the overall growth of the sector averaged to around 6 per cent (Goodman et al., 1988). At the end of 2000 the overall growth of the agricultural sector did not show much improvement. The decline in the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP can be linked to, among other factors, the reduction in government budgetary allocations to the sector, unfavourable trade conditions (e.g., a downturn in commodity prices), inappropriate economic policy and the persistence of domestic structural problems.

The manufacturing sector also showed erratic but more stable growth than the agriculture sector. In general, the relative share of manufacture in the GDP increased in the late seventies, peaked in the early eighties, but followed a downward trend in the nineties. High positive growth was recorded for the years 1984, 1989, 1991–1992, 1994 and 1996. The growth rate in all the other years between 1976 and 1999 was negligible. In particular, there was a 20 per cent decline in the sector's contribution to GDP in 1990. This sharp decline may have been due to the closure of Bougainville mine in the preceding year and the exchange rate policy (BPNG, various; Mawuli, 1999). Much of the manufacturing sector consists of processing and assembly-type industries. Such industries are heavily dependent on imported capital used as inputs for fixed domestic capital formation.

Despite dismal economic growth, some progress has been made since independence as indicated by development indicators. For example, there have been increases in per capita income from the 1970 figure of US\$245. However, despite the high growth years of 1991–93, per capita income growth between 1989 and 1999 averaged about 0.9 per cent per annum. Formal education enrolment (especially at the primary school level) has increased due to the introduction of compulsory education and increased government expenditure and donor assistance to the sector. Life expectancy levels have increased from 40 in 1970 to about 56 in 2001 and infant mortality per thousand births has decreased from 112 in 1970 to about 67 in 2001. However, as argued earlier, these development achievements are low compared to other South Pacific and developing South-East Asian nations. Other achievements include diversification of goods and services, commercialisation of indigenous enterprises, and improvements in education, health, transport and communication facilities.

Mawuli (1999) categorises the development process in PNG into seven phases. The first phase (1976–1980) was characterised by macroeconomic stability. Growth and development were satisfactory. The second phase was a period in the first part of the 1980s when macroeconomic stability was undermined, resulting in unsatisfactory growth. The third phase commencing in the latter part of the 1980s witnessed the restoration of macroeconomic stability, revival of investor confidence, a strong currency, low budget deficits but high interest rates and employment growth. The fourth phase was the period 1989–1990. There was an economic downturn. Fiscal and exchange rate instability was prevalent and there was negative growth. This was a period when the Bougainville crisis surfaced in May 1989. The fifth phase (1991–1993) witnessed rapid economic growth, courtesy of the commencement of major mineral and petroleum projects. The sixth phase saw financial instability due to economic mismanagement, in particular, fiscal indiscipline. This was a period when the Skate government was in power. The seventh phase (1997–1998) was a period of economic, political and natural calamity.

An additional phase should be added. This phase is the period 1999 to 2001. The current Mekere government was voted into office on 14 July 1999. In his maiden speech Sir Mekere outlined five objectives. They included the restoration of the credibility of institutions of the state, stabilisation of the kina, restoration of the credibility of the 1999 budget, removal of impediments to investment and growth, and continuation of the Bougainville peace process. The general consensus is that there has been a return to fiscal discipline and restoration of investor confidence. However, exchange rate instability, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the government, is still prevalent and there is very little improvement in employment levels. Inflation and interest rates are at high levels. Prices of consumables and public utilities are still on the increase, welfare levels are negligible and the endemic structural problems are very much intact.

The overall assessment of the dismal economic growth performance since independence and to 2001, reveals that it has been narrowly based. For almost two decades following independence, it was dependent on cash crops. In the 1990s it was dependent on the mining and petroleum sectors. There is therefore the need for broad-based growth. An assessment of government policy shows that it worked well during the first fifteen years of independence. There were lower inflation and interest rates than Australia, reasonable economic stability, and real annual economic growth of about 1 per cent was moderate compared to South-East Asian countries, but high compared to African countries. However, in the 1980s high-level corruption emerged together with a decline in government

services. By the 1990s the situation had become much more difficult. The turning point was the Bougainville crisis in 1989 that resulted in loss of 10 per cent of GDP and 30 per cent of export earnings. Other problems during the 1990s included volcanic eruptions in Rabaul, the Aitape tsunami disaster, and the Asian economic crisis. There was a brief period of resources growth in 1991–1993 with the commencement of the Kutubu, Porgera, and Lihir projects. The fiscal indiscipline that followed this period of growth may have resulted in the change in Australian government aid policy from budgetary support to project aid. In many respects, this change in aid policy stance resulted in unplanned government spending that provided a sufficient condition for the fiscal crisis that surfaced in 1994. This crisis resulted in poor economic growth and a decline in living standards.

PROBLEMS

The relatively dismal overall growth performance between the time of independence and now attest to the fact that there are and have been problems encountered and that development constraints exist (Gumoi, 1999). Moreover, it can be argued that the development process has resulted in some social problems. Some of these problems are endemic while others are not.

The entrenched problems include inadequate physical infrastructure (health and educational facilities, transport and communications); paucity of skilled local labour and inappropriate skill mix (human capital); rising levels of unemployment and underemployment; some degree of dominance, dependence, and vulnerability in international relations; low levels of living; a relatively underdeveloped financial market; market disintegration (small and fragmented domestic markets); a high cost structure economy; low savings and investment rates; heavy public debt burden; an expensive bureaucracy whose service delivery has been poor; lack of efficient entrepreneurship; protectionist and inward-looking policies; lack of technological advancement; inadequate investment in research and development; lack of appropriate legal institutions; excessive government regulation and economic controls; corruption; capital flight; misuse of public funds; wide income disparity; land constraints; law and order problems; political instability; lack of modern work ethics; and some deficiencies in prudent economic management.

In recent times, beginning in 1994 and in particular in 1997, these entrenched problems have been compounded by both natural and man-made disasters. They include (as mentioned) the severe drought, the tsunami disaster, volcanic eruptions, the Asian economic crisis, and fiscal

indiscipline. The problems PNG is currently experiencing that have gained prominence include the falling value of the kina against major currencies, rising inflation and interest rates, spiralling prices of consumables and public utilities, rising cost of living, rising unemployment and underemployment levels, increase in external debt, unacceptable levels of foreign reserves, and some decline in business and investor confidence.

MACROECONOMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK

The problems PNG has encountered over time can also be attributed to the macroeconomic policy framework. Specifically, it can be blamed on the design and implementation of economic policy. The 1973 Improvement Plan, which stipulated the infamous eight aims, is often considered by many policy analysts as the origin of the macroeconomic policy framework. However, the origins of PNG's macroeconomic policy framework can be traced back to the 1948 report of the Economic Development Committee. This document outlined a detailed strategy for the economic development of PNG. Subsequently, the IBRD-sanctioned Iverson Report (1965) and the Faber Report (1972) were produced. The former report outlined the programs and policies for economic development of the then Territory of Papua and New Guinea. The latter report identified the social, political and economic priorities for the Territory, including the type of investment and growth patterns that would facilitate their implementation. It recommended that economic growth should not be an objective economic policy. Economic stability was preferred instead (O'Faircheallaigh, 1983).

PNG achieved self-government in 1973. Prior to this, the Improvement Plan was devised. In fact, the recommendations of the Faber Report were adopted and contained in the Plan. The primary objective of the Plan was self-reliance and social justice. Economic growth was not an objective. This was a deliberate action. Policy makers opted for economic stability rather than economic growth (Mannur, 1986). Hence, PNG adopted a macroeconomic policy framework (1973–1982) that aimed at neutral growth but was geared to achieve stability. Policy makers at that time envisaged that macroeconomic stability could be achieved through price stability, which would translate into both domestic demand and import price stability. Domestic demand stability aimed at internal balance and was aided by income and government expenditure stabilisation policy and restrictive monetary policy. Import price stability aimed at external balance which was aided by a currency revaluation policy. In fact the kina was revalued five times between 1976 and 1979. This basic policy framework formed the basis for the adoption of different development strategies that produced different outcomes. These strategies and outcomes are outlined below.

At the time of independence the first indigenous government (Somare government) simply adopted the 1973 Plan. In particular, the Plan was encompassed in the development of the National Development Strategy (NDS), in 1976, that also emphasised economic stability (Ganguli, 1982; Fernando and Shiota, 1992). The NDS formed the basis of National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP), and the Public Investment Programme (PIP).

It can be argued that a policy of economic stabilisation led to economic stagnation. For example, Mannur (1986) points out that PNG's macroeconomic policy between 1973 and 1982 was successful in achieving price stability and maintaining low inflation levels. For example, he observes that in 1976 the percentage increase in CPI was 5.6 per cent. By 1982, it was only 5.9 per cent. However, he argues that economic stability is more than price stability. Economic stability has also to do with stability of total and per capita GDP, employment, international reserves and many more economic variables. It can be observed that stability in these areas was not achieved. For example, during the period 1973–1980, the average annual real GDP growth rate was about 1 per cent. The percentage change in real GDP in 1976 was negative 1.4 per cent. By 1981 it was negative 3.7 per cent. The BOP (current account) recorded negative figures from 1979 onwards and foreign investment was negligible. In 1972 foreign investment was K64 million. By 1980 it dropped to K46 million. The formal sector employment index between 1980 and 1984 was negative 4.2 per cent.

By 1982 the then second Somare government recognised the problem of economic stagnation brought about by pursuing the objective of economic stability. It changed the focus of macroeconomic policy from macroeconomic stability to economic growth. Successive governments have since adopted this basic policy framework, although strategies employed to achieve this new objective have varied. The change in focus of economic policy meant the eight aims were brushed aside. Instead, the policy objectives were GDP expansion, import replacement and export promotion, improvement of trade balance and international reserves, and wage reduction. With the exception of the objective of wage reduction, these new objectives were achieved through industrialisation and economic diversification. Wage reductions were achieved through successive Minimum Wages Boards (MWBs) that have always prescribed a policy of downward minimum wage adjustment (Mannur and Gumoi, 1994; Gumoi, 1995). The 2000 MWB is an exception as it has recommended the opposite policy.

The 1982–1988 period saw the objective of economic growth pursued more vigorously. The development of the Medium Term

Development Strategy (MTDS) in 1985 facilitated the new objective. The MTDS aimed at economic growth and productive employment creation. The MTDS was revised in 1997 by the Skate government. The 1986 Budgetary and Planning Strategy facilitated the MTDS. It defined the development plans, programmes, and expenditures. Economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining and petroleum, fisheries and tourism were afforded high priority. Strategies were devised such that each sector should contribute to positive growth and employment creation. The change in policy contributed to economic growth, even though in comparative terms it fell far short of its potential. For example, the average annual GDP growth rate between 1983 and 1988 was about 2.7 per cent and the formal sector employment index between 1984 and 1988 was a positive 3.2 per cent. The balance of payments situation also improved and there was sound import cover. It should also be noted that mining activities and manufacturing activity contributed to a positive growth.

The cornerstone of the PNG macroeconomic policy framework in the past and the present are the exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies. In general, the objectives of these policies are to maintain price stability and external balance, achieve full employment, and promote economic growth and development. Other objectives include equitable income distribution, and encouragement of investment and savings. Ultimately, the success or failure of the PNG macroeconomic policy framework will depend on whether these objectives are achieved. These policies are now discussed below.

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

Since the introduction of the kina in April 1975, two distinct exchange rate regimes have been implemented — a fixed regime and a flexible (floating) regime. The fixed exchange rate policy was adopted in April 1975. Under this policy, the kina was fixed (pegged) to the Australian dollar (K1=A\$1). In December of the same year, the kina was fixed to a trade-weighted basket of currencies of major trading partners. These cross-currencies determined the value of the kina.

The Hard Kina Policy (HKP) was the cornerstone of the fixed exchange rate regime adopted at the time of independence. In particular, kina revaluations formed the basis of the HKP. The primary objectives of the HKP were to stabilise the external value of the kina, maintain price stability and ensure free convertibility of the kina (Garnaut and Baxter, 1983). There was an active pursuit of the HKP between 1975 and 1979. Three revaluations of the kina against all currencies and one against the Australian dollar were effected to ensure tight control over wage and price

increases. The period beginning 1980 saw a passive pursuit of the policy, a period that marked the end of the HKP. The passive pursuit of the HKP was typified by kina devaluations. In fact, there have been three devaluations between 1983 and 1994. On 8 March 1983, a 'de-facto' 10 per cent devaluation of the kina was applied when the Australian dollar was devalued by 10 per cent. The objective was to strengthen the depressed state of the economy. In January 1990, the kina was devalued by 10 per cent to counter the adverse impact of the Bougainville mine closure and the prolonged depressed state of the prices of major commodity export crops. The kina was devalued by 12 per cent in September 1994, aimed at improving the deteriorating BOP situation.

The HKP seemed to have been a success over the period of its implementation. There were moderate wages/salaries and inflation, stable employment growth, and satisfactory export performance. However, the dismal economic growth and unsustainable budget deficits in the early eighties cast serious doubts on the success of the policy.

The current flexible exchange rate regime was adopted on 4 October 1994. Under this system, the supply and demand forces in the foreign exchange market set the value of the kina. It has been observed that the value of the kina, especially against the US dollar and Australian dollar, has deteriorated since 1994. The excess of demand for kina over supply, coupled with low levels of activity in the export sector in relation to the import sector may have precipitated this situation. Mawuli (2000) discusses the principal determinants of the exchange rate and the means to intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize abrupt fluctuations of the exchange rate. On several occasions, however, temporary measures have been enforced. For example, the Central Bank has had to intervene to reverse the decline by injecting money into the banking system. Injection of foreign exchange as a result of successful loan agreements between the PNG government and foreign governments and external donor agencies has also alleviated the downward pressure on the kina.

Duncan and Xu (2000) have suggested that PNG should adopt the Australian dollar as a remedial measure to counter the free fall of the kina. The Mekere government in 2001 was seriously considering this proposal.

FISCAL POLICY

Fiscal policy has been the mainstay of macroeconomic policy in PNG. In particular, government taxation and expenditure and budget balances have been the ingredients of fiscal policy.

Fiscal stability was maintained over the 1975–1979 period. However, in the early eighties fiscal indiscipline saw budget deficits

balloon. But the second half of the eighties witnessed the restoration of fiscal discipline and hence, control over budget deficits. A relaxed fiscal policy was pursued between 1992 and 1993. Specifically, the mineral and petroleum boom allowed the Wingti government to impose broad tax reductions. For example, top personal income tax was reduced from 45 to 28 per cent and company tax was reduced from 30 to 28 per cent.

The relaxed fiscal policy also involved unplanned recurrent and development expenditures and more government borrowing. This resulted in a fiscal crisis. Budget deficits and public debt increased while economic growth and welfare were adversely affected. A tight fiscal policy involving reductions in expenditure but broad tax increases was adopted in early 1994. This policy is currently pursued.

MONETARY POLICY

Monetary policy in PNG has complemented the fiscal and exchange rate policies. Specifically, it has been employed to achieve internal and external balance. Internal balance refers to attaining stability in growth performance and price and external balance refers to maintaining healthy balance of payments and foreign reserves. Lately, monetary policy has been employed to curtail the depreciating value of the kina.

The instruments of monetary policy often used by governments to influence money supply and therefore attain internal and external balance are interest rates, reserve ratio requirements, open market operations, and moral exhortation. In PNG, the specific monetary policy instruments employed by the government (usually through the Bank of PNG) include the minimum liquid asset ratio (MLAR), treasury bills, competitive bidding courtesy of the Kina Auction Facility, the discount facility offered by the Bank of PNG, and government directives on the basis of the *Bank of PNG Act* (section 38).

An assessment of the monetary policy practice in PNG reveals various scenarios. Under the fixed exchange rate regime (1975–1994), the kina was revalued on several occasions between 1975 and 1980. The objective of the revaluations was to contain imported inflation. The period 1981–1991 saw tightening of liquidity, particularly between 1985 and 1986 where a general decrease in interest rates was also observed. The MLAR was also applied in this period. The MLAR rose from 12 per cent in 1981 to 14 per cent in 1989 before contracting to about 11 per cent the following year (BPNG, various).

An easy monetary policy was pursued between 1992 and 1997. Indicator lending rates were reduced from 12 per cent to 8.75 per cent, but actual lending rates remained high due to a rather slow compliance by

commercial banks to the government request to lower rates. On 15 September 1993, the Finance Minister used section 38 of the *Bank of PNG Act* to force commercial banks to lower lending rates. The deposit and lending indicator rates and the discount facility rate fell as a result. In 1995 there was a problem of excess liquidity created by budget deficits. The government employed several monetary policy instruments to mitigate excessive liquidity. These instruments included the increase of the MLAR, abolition of the Central Bank's discount facility, selling of treasury bills, and use of the kina auction facility (BPNG, various).

In 1998 a tight monetary policy was instituted. This policy was still intact in 2001 even though there have been suggestions to ease monetary policy so as to kick-start the producing sectors of the economy. The objective of tight monetary policy was to combat excess liquidity and, in more recent times, to stop the kina from sliding further against all major currencies. The danger of pursuing a tight monetary policy is that it can act as a disincentive mechanism. It can discourage domestic savings necessary for capital formation, discourage private investment, and inhibit creation and expansion of business. It can also lead to capital outflow. The problem of capital outflow has been very much prevalent in PNG in recent times because it has been aided by both a tight monetary policy and a fast depreciating kina. The Central Bank therefore needs to enforce stringent control measures to counter the problem of capital flight.

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

PNG is not only the land of the unexpected but of promise. The nation's prospects hinge on sound economic governance and adequate attention to solving its structural problems. Mawuli (1999) argues that the most important factor that influences the course of development is economic management policies. He argues that economic growth and development can be constrained by both exogenous and endogenous factors, but economic management failure should be blamed for the persistence of any economic adversity. The conditions that influence steady economic development are macroeconomic stability, economic liberalisation, and both business and political commitment.

It is therefore absolutely essential that there is sound design and management of economic policy. The design and implementation of sound economic policy in PNG can, however, be a daunting task. This is because economic policy has to be devised and implemented under several challenging contexts. First and foremost, due recognition must be given to the fact that PNG is and will continue to be a small open economy. The economy will always be subject to the dictates of external market and

natural forces. While natural events are inevitable, sound economic governance requires that the domestic economy is adequately insulated from market forces. This requires a synergy between economic policies such that they are operating in unison. It also requires complementarity in the objectives of such policies.

Second, as previously mentioned, there are endemic structural problems that are well entrenched. Economic policy formulation and implementation needs to give due recognition to these problems and their underlying causes and sources must be explicitly identified. Examples abound of economic policies in PNG that are superficial.

Third, there are both natural and man-made internal and external shocks that policy design, economic planning, and budgeting have to account for. However, such shocks are hard to predict in advance. Nevertheless, good policy design, economic planning, and budgeting requires adequate accounting of internal and external shocks. Personnel in strategic government agencies lack appropriate econometric forecasting and mathematical modelling and programming skills to predict unforeseen events. Current forecasts of economic variables are rather ad hoc and based on guesstimates. The use of both partial and general equilibrium models for forecasting are fraught with technical and methodological problems. It is therefore commonly observed that convergence of government estimates of economic variables with actual values rarely occurs. One simply needs a glimpse of the national budget documents to verify this assertion.

Fourth, policy designers have to contend with the inevitable process of globalisation. In addition, PNG has an obligation to the WTO-sanctioned trade and market liberalisation requirements. These probably pose the greatest challenge.

Fifth, management of the economy under the flexible exchange rate regime is not a simple task. Given the unpredictable nature of exchange rate movements at any point in time, economic planning and budgeting can be a precarious task.

Sixth, the objective of sustainable development and not just development *per se* needs to be met. The underlying tenets of sustainable development are the fundamental concepts of equity (both inter and intra-generational), efficiency and resilience (Gumoi, 2000). PNG is a signatory to the 1992 UNCED accord signed in Rio de Janeiro and has a global obligation. But fulfilment of the global objective means a national commitment to achieving sustainable development in all sectors of the economy. It also means that all components of economic policy need to achieve this objective. This is a daunting task. Experience has shown (e.g. Gumoi, 2000) that in practice inequitable income distribution is prevalent,

there is inefficient management and resource use and the need for development has led to serious environmental degradation. In a nutshell, the need for development has superseded the need for sustainable development.

Seventh, the transformation of the informal sector to the formal sector poses a major challenge. Most of the populace is in the informal sector, where most production and consumption decisions are made. Yet these decisions are not accounted for in the System of National Accounts (SNA) and, hence, are absent from economic growth calculations. There is therefore some validity in the view that the use of GDP as an indicator of economic growth is suspect. In most cases, this indicator may be a gross understatement.

Eighth, basic institutions need to be in place to ensure a continual flow of private investment and development. They include those in support of property rights (land tenure), security of contracts and competition in markets. The role of the government should move from production to one of institutional development and market regulation to ensure competition. The government also needs to ensure that there is political stability.

Ninth, PNG needs to improve its ability to manage risks through economic diversification and developing a sound and vibrant financial system that is competitive and operating efficiently.

CONCLUSION

The PNG economy has been in transition over time. There have been both positive and negative changes. These changes have been shaped by both international and domestic events. The events have either been natural or man-made in nature. Man-made events relate to economic policy formulation and implementation.

The overall economic performance and development experience has been rather dismal even though there have been positive improvements. This is paradoxical given the rich natural resource base and substantial external financial assistance. Development constraints and structural problems are endemic and well entrenched and have been a deterrent to sound economic performance. Despite these constraints and problems, the prospects for PNG are bright and its destiny is within. Future prospects can be enhanced with sound design, implementation and management of appropriate macroeconomic policies, eradication and/or minimisation of structural problems and sheer hard work.

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THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA AFTER 25 YEARS OF SUCCESSES OR FAILURES

Christopher Taylor Hnanguie¹

INTRODUCTION

After over 25 years of political independence, Papua New Guinea (PNG) continues to receive a high volume of foreign aid for her socioeconomic development. The purposes and worth of that spending remain issues of debate by observers. The debate is intensified by a rather disappointing socioeconomic development record since 1975 and this has led donors to call for its elimination or wholesale reform. But is aid to blame for the disappointing record? How effective has foreign aid been in PNG? What would be the future of foreign aid in PNG after 25 years of experience? Could it be improved or should it be done away with?

This chapter attempts to shed light on some of these profound questions, especially with regard to the question of 'the future of foreign aid in PNG'. It begins by examining the nature and flow of foreign aid so as to establish the context for analysing the future of foreign aid in PNG. It then attempts a cursory evaluation of the successes and failures of aid in the country over the last 25 years and draws some conclusive recommendations on its future in PNG. The article is a mere overview of this

¹ Any views, opinions or facts expressed in the article are solely the author's and do not reflect any position of the Asian Development Bank or the Department of Finance & Planning, Government of Papua New Guinea.

multifaceted subject,² which is complicated by limited reliable data. Hence, it is based largely on the experiences of the author on the subject.

FOREIGN AID TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Official Development Assistance (ODA), commonly known as development assistance/cooperation or foreign aid, is provided by member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Foreign aid is provided for various reasons³ including that of the donor country's strategic, economic, political and ideological priorities and historical or cultural links. For aid-receiving countries like PNG, aid is an important source of capital to complement the shortages of domestic resources necessary for social and economic development. It has at times been a determining factor in their development processes.


The main aid donors to PNG are Japan, Australia, Germany, the USA, China, New Zealand, Korea, the World Bank group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, the United Nations systems, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and Kuwait Development Fund. PNG receives the following types of aid: (i) Direct Budgetary Support Grants; (ii) Programme or Project Grants; (iii) Micro-project Grants; (iv) Concessional Loans; (v) Technical Assistance; and (vi) ad-hoc Aid. All these types of aid have their own terms and conditions.

Papua New Guinea's foreign aid policy states that all aid should be directed towards the preparation and implementation of priority programmes and projects of the Government. In the absence of any strategic national development plans, the Government's Public Investment Program guided by the Medium Term Development Strategy (1997–2002) continues to be the main vehicle to channel foreign aid towards priority programmes. The net disbursements from all sources to PNG increased in 2000 to K520 million from K280 million in 1975, which is an increase of over 50 per cent. It peaked in the early 1990s and declined in absolute terms in 1999. The net disbursements from DAC countries to PNG have grown at an average rate of 3 per cent per annum between 1975 and 2000 (Government of Papua New Guinea, Budget books of 1980, 1990 and 2000; Office of International Development Assistance 1994). Figure 1 shows the average flow of foreign aid over a

² A thorough evaluation of the impact of foreign aid on Papua New Guinea's economic development is covered in Hnanguie, (1997).

³ See the Chapter on Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries, in Hnanguie, Christopher T., (1992).

Figure 1: Average Foreign Aid Disbursement to PNG (millions kina in nominal values)



* The substantial increase in bilateral aid is due to the shift from Australian budget support to project aid. Projections for 2005 are based on annual averages and macroeconomic forecasts.

Source: Government of Papua New Guinea *Budget books* 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2001.

twenty-five-year period between 1975 and 2000 and projections for 2005. The steady growth of foreign aid to PNG has and will depend on the continued commitments by the donors and improvements to Papua New Guinea's capacity to efficiently implement projects and programmes.

THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUNIEA

One of the common arguments posed by Papua New Guinea's donors is that foreign aid to the country is no longer necessary because of the dramatic increase in private capital flows from the developed countries to the developing world. In this argument, aid was justified until recently to palliate the failure of private capital to flow to the developing world. In 2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that net private capital flows to developing countries totalled some US\$120 billion, up from an annual average of US\$3 billion as recently as 1990 (International Monetary Fund, 2000). Private flows are now much more important than public aid flows (which in 2000 totalled just under US\$60 billion). In this situation, these donors assert: why provide aid at all to PNG? Does it not simply allow incumbent governments to maintain inefficient economic policies?

These arguments hold some truth, especially for middle-income and upper middle-income countries. It is hard to justify aid to any country

in which counter-productive policies are preventing economic growth, and economic rationale alone clearly does not justify providing large amounts of aid to relatively rich countries that already receive significant private flows. However, this argument is too generic and overemphasized to apply to PNG and there are two good reasons for this.

First, private capital has been almost entirely directed to either extremely large economies like China, or middle income countries like Thailand. Private capital flows are heavily concentrated in a few countries, and some flows are volatile. A surge in the late 1970s receded after the onset of the debt crisis in 1982. Another big rush occurred in the mid-1990s, but with the financial crises rocking East Asia in 1997 foreign investment dropped sharply. The flow of private money to the developing world fell by US\$80 billion between 1996 and 2000. In any event, private flows continue to go to a small number of (mostly) middle-income countries. In 2000, 26 countries received 95 per cent of private investment; the rest went to the other 140 developing countries (Hnanguei, 2000; see also ADB, 1999, 2000).

In a typical lower middle-income country like PNG, foreign aid remains far and away the primary source of external finance. With the exception of the mining and petroleum sector, the country has not been able to attract significant private capital in recent years. Perhaps, as the country emerges from its difficult economic mismanagement, its vast economic potential and resources will attract significant private capital, and so proponents could then push for elimination of foreign aid. But that maybe sometime away. Meantime, aid remains one of Papua New Guinea's major revenue flows, providing about a quarter or comprising about 30 per cent of total Government revenue every year. Table 1 below shows the composition of aid in Papua New Guinea's annual budgets between 1975 and 2000. A significant portion of grant aid is not reflected in Table 1, as it is not provided through the Government's budgetary system. Hence, for the foreseeable future, PNG will rely on public money for her external capital requirements. In some instances, it is true, private capital has been driven away by certain governmental practices and counter-productive economic policies and the law and order situation.

However, the Morauta Government in 2001 has implemented difficult reform programs amidst strong domestic opposition under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF and can now boast of market-friendly economic policies, and yet investment has been kept away by many of the characteristic features of a lower middle-income economy: small consumer markets, poor physical and communications infrastructure, an ill-trained labour force, law and order and uncertainty about

Table 1: Average Composition of Foreign Aid in Annual Budgets, and Projections, 2000–2004 and as a Proportion of Total Revenue 1975–2000*
(millions kina in nominal values)

Source	1975– 1979	1980– 1984	1985– 1989	1990– 1994	1995– 1999	2000– 2004**
I. Domestic						
Internal Revenue	400	520	650	760	1,050	1,700
Domestic Borrowing	100	90	110	160	210	315
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>610</i>	<i>760</i>	<i>920</i>	<i>1,260</i>	<i>2,015</i>
II. Foreign Aid***						
Australian Budget Support	180	220	200	190	210	0
Project Grants	n.a.	n.a.	3	11	175	430
Concessional Borrowing (Loans)	50	60	50	120	130	150
Commercial Borrowing (Loans)	10	20	50	290	210	180
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>240</i>	<i>300</i>	<i>303</i>	<i>611</i>	<i>725</i>	<i>760</i>
Total Revenue	740	910	1,063	1,531	1,985	2,775
Foreign Aid as % of						
Total Revenue	32	33	29	40	37	27
Australian Budget Support as % of Total Revenue	24	24	19	12	11	0
Project Grants as % of Total Revenue	n.a.	n.a.	.28	.72	9	16
Concessional Loans as % of Total Revenue	7	7	5	8	7	5
Commercial Loans as % of Total Revenue	1	2	5	19	11	7

* Figures refer to average for the period.

** Projections are based on annual averages and macroeconomic forecasts.

*** A significant portion of grant aid is not reflected, as it is not provided through the Government's budgetary system.

Source: *Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure*, Government of Papua New Guinea Budget books, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2001.

future stability. Nor has PNG benefited substantially from the dramatic expansion of trade generated by trade liberalization, most recently under the aegis of the World Trade Organization. Papua New Guinea's share of trade continues to decline and was insignificant in 2000. Indeed, the evidence suggests that PNG may prove to be a big loser, with its share of trade further declining if present trends continue.

Second, Papua New Guinea's development needs remain enormous. Close to two thirds of the country's population continues to live below the poverty line, as measured by the World Bank. On average, 90 per cent of the rural population lives below the poverty line. Despite the progress made over the last 25 years in the areas of health and education,

PNG remains behind other Asia-Pacific countries and further back on a number of important indicators. Only 60 per cent of school age children are in primary school compared with full enrolment in most of the countries in the Asia-Pacific. Infant mortality has been cut by a third in the last 25 years but, at some 90 per thousand, remains more than twice the prevailing levels in the Asia-Pacific (ADB Newsletter, 2001).

Moreover, partly because of the political instability and economic mismanagement, and partly because of a typically small economy trapped by its own poverty, PNG is simply not capable of meeting all of its development needs from its own resources. The Wingti and Chan governments, for example, routinely devoted close to a quarter of their total expenditures on education, and yet PNG still has an adult literacy rate of less than 55 per cent, while only 75 per cent of school age children are in primary school. In many provinces, the density of the road network is less than five per cent of the levels in Australia and other developed Asia-Pacific economies, yet the cost of maintaining existing roads is larger than the country's total transportation budget (Hnanguie, 1996). The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the private sector will not provide much help for overcoming these problems, which will remain the responsibility of the Government for some time yet.

With economic growth, in time PNG will be able to finance these developmental expenditures out of her own revenues. Thailand, once one of Asia's largest per capita recipients of aid, sustained one of the fastest growth rates in the developing world during the 1970s and can today finance nearly all of its ambitious development programmes from its own funds. The country is gradually receiving less aid from most donors, including the ADB (Asian Development Bank). Thailand can today attract private capital on its own. But for most Asian and Pacific countries including PNG, foreign aid remains necessary if they are to break out of poverty.

SUCCESSES OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Given the relatively large volume of foreign aid since 1975, how effective has this aid been in the development efforts of PNG? The answer depends on what aid was intended to achieve. As a tool of transferring resources, the results have been mixed. As a project funding gap filler, the answer would be positive. When aid was primarily intended to bridge the gap between the country's investment target and domestic savings, it did help to bridge that gap, in gross terms. An externally derived resource, aid also bridged the foreign exchange gap. Alongside many disappointments, aid has financed many development projects and programmes which achieved

very high internal rates of return, including schools, clinics, health posts, bridges, roads, capacity building and training programmes.

The egregious failures of foreign aid usually get the headlines. Indeed, much aid has been ineffectual in economic terms, not least because it has often been given for reasons that had little to do with economic development. During much of the post-independence period, PNG was the leading recipient of Australian aid; in retrospect, it should not be surprising that aid so obviously given for historical reasons would prove ineffective at promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. Fortunately, this type of aid appears to be gradually phasing out. In any event, the egregious cases tend to obscure the fact that aid to PNG is behind many important achievements over the past two decades. Indeed, the results of many individual aid efforts are unmistakable across the country: roads and bridges have been constructed, schools and hospitals built, institutions established, and thousands of Papua New Guineans sent abroad for scientific and technical training.

In the health sector, aid can claim much of the credit not only for infrastructures such as the Port Moresby General Hospital, but for the eradication of endemic diseases such as smallpox and polio. The dramatic decline in fertility in some provinces can be directly linked to the population programmes of donors, notably the United Nations. The critical battle now being waged against AIDS is almost entirely funded by foreign aid. Characteristically, aid is not only helping to finance the establishment of new health institutions, the training of personnel and the development of public awareness campaigns to spearhead this battle, but it was also at the forefront of the initial effort to convince sometimes reticent incumbent governments of the very need for public action.

In the agricultural sector, aid was largely instrumental in establishing the network of research and extension programs that plays an important role in the widespread development and dissemination of high yield tree crop varieties, now a key component of the national tree crop system. In the transport and infrastructure sector, aid has contributed immensely to building or upgrading major roads and bridges including portions of the Hiritano and the Okuk highways. Many of the key sectors in the country have experienced the use of foreign aid. From agriculture, livestock, fishery, education, health, water supplies, finances, transport and socioeconomic infrastructures to institutional capacity building and training. Thanks in part to aid, the social impact of the 1998 tsunami in Aitape was not too severe; Kokopo sprouted from the volcanic eruptions in 1996 from the reallocation of aid funds; Bougainville is being rebuilt from the ruins of civil war in 2000 from donor assistance.

There is thus simply no denying that aid can be credited for much of 'what works' in PNG. At the same time, aid has undeniably been less successful in promoting sustained economic growth across the country. Many of aid's achievements during the 1980s and 1990s were negated by the counter-productive economic policies of successive governments. Since the early 1990s, the donors, led in particular by the World Bank, have been assisting successive governments to undertake economic policy reform, in order to reduce heavy-handed government intervention in the economy and create policies that are friendly to the private sector. Progress on reform has been slow and halting. Powerful interests have mobilized to defend the old policies,⁴ despite their dismal economic legacy. Nonetheless, after almost three decades of effort, enormous progress has been made on policy reform. Aid has helped convince the Government to implement realistic exchange rates, improve monetary policies and widespread deregulation and price liberalization. Much remains to be done, notably in the areas of privatization and institutional reform, but the donor-led reform process has helped transform the policy environment in PNG.

FAILURES OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Over the 25-year period, even those seemingly positive achievements started to be put to the test. Indeed, resorting to project rehabilitation and structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s is adequate testimony to this conclusion. With the onset of structural adjustments, the goals of aid became a lot more blurred and the effectiveness of aid much more complicated to evaluate (Asian Development Bank, August 1998).

Foreign aid in PNG between 1975 and 2000 has seen more failures than successes. The Asian Development Bank's 1998 *Country Assistance Plan* reported that of the 16 ADB for Papua New Guinea assisted projects that have been evaluated only five were rated as generally successful. The World Bank (1998) summarized the performance of the 30 projects it undertook since it began operation in PNG in 1968, and concluded that projects evaluated between 1968 and 1978 had a failure rate of 22 per cent. But the failure rate of projects completed after 1978 rose to a disappointing 60 per cent. The large failure rate of aid from these two multilateral donors is largely attributed to the lack of counterpart funding and economic mismanagement by the Government.

A number of factors have undermined aid effectiveness in PNG. First, aid was not effective when the principle objectives of the donor were

⁴ Lives have been lost in attempts to prevent the reform process. In late June 2001, three students from the University of PNG and others were shot and killed by police during protests against aspects of the reform process.

not Papua New Guinea's economic development. Aid which was motivated by commercial or foreign policy motives inside the donor country have often not served well the interest of the local economy. The problem in each case is that non-economic motives have led to aid activities that were not tailored to the specific needs and capacities of PNG. Similarly, it is evident that the socioeconomic and political environments in PNG have critically affected aid effectiveness. Aid has been successful in an environment of macroeconomic stability, characterized by low inflation, predictable and sustainable policies, and secure property rights. The quality of the economic environment depended largely on the policies and stability of successive governments.

The ability of the Government to integrate aid into its own coherent development strategy and management has been critical to the success of aid. Donors can never fully compensate for the absence of an effective government with an appropriate budgeting and planning process. Most of the recurring problems of aid in PNG have their origin in breakdowns in these governmental functions. Thus, for example, the common failure to sustain projects after the end of donor resources is typically due to the failure to budget for recurrent expenditures in advance. Similarly, the failure of aid coordination, leading to overlapping, contradictory, and redundant aid activities, is typically a consequence of the failure of the Government to integrate these activities within coherent national development budgeting and planning exercises.

Several factors have particularly affected the ability of successive governments to adequately manage aid resources. First, the low capacities of many national institutions account for the majority of difficulties during the project cycle. While the level of education and training available in the civil service has improved over the years, the ability of public bodies to implement aid projects effectively remains very limited. These abilities vary enormously across the country, but in general, most national public organizations especially government departments are rarely capable of implementing more than simple administrative tasks; typically, they possess limited analytical capacity to design or critically evaluate aid activities. As a result, aid projects that did not involve complex procedures and intensive administrative oversight have been less taxing of the Government's limited managerial capacities and thus more successful. Similarly, aid activities have been successful in programmes or projects where there were a few clear objectives that were easily assimilated by government officials and enjoyed the support and commitment of the top leadership.

Second, high administrative turnover and economic mismanagement in PNG has had a devastating impact on Government capacity and

thus on aid effectiveness. Economic mismanagement has pushed successive governments to reduce various recurrent expenditures and over time led to reduced governmental effectiveness. For example, public service salaries are less than a tenth of their levels of 20 years ago in real terms, pulled down by the combination of sustained high inflation and the Government's almost permanent fiscal crunch. At such wage levels, staff turnover is extremely high, particularly at skilled positions, while corruption, nepotism, moonlighting, and absenteeism is rife. This has resulted in the Government's diminishing capacity to manage its aid resources effectively (Hnanguie, 1996).

In addition, the chronic political infighting and instability over the years have institutionalized a kind of crisis management, in which long-term development planning and careful budgeting are replaced by ad hoc gap filling, continuous negotiation with external creditors and the increased politicization of revenue allocation. Over time, sound management practices are eroded and public corruption increases. Continual under-spending on maintenance and various other recurrent expenditures eventually prevents public organizations from functioning effectively. Starved of resources and left to their own devices, individual public managers or politicians lobby on their own for foreign aid to meet pressing emergency needs rather than to address longer-term development problems.

Third, certain donor practices have contributed to weakening government development management capacities. The proliferation of donors and donor projects taxes existing government capacities. There are about 20 official donors and over 60 distinct projects. These totals do not even include non-governmental organization (NGO) aid, often fragmented over dozens of small organizations. About 15 NGOs are officially registered with the Government, including several international NGOs. While donors have increased informal coordination at the country level, little progress has been achieved in consolidating or harmonizing project accounting, procurement, or evaluation procedures.

Pressed by the need to achieve quick results, donor agencies have often sought alternatives to the arduous and long-term task of developing the central government's management capacities. They have, for example, exercised control over the identification, design, and evaluation of projects to compensate for the limited ability of the Government to undertake these critical functions. Many aid projects continue to be designed with little or no local input. Donors have fielded long-term expatriate experts to man projects, rather than rely on local expertise. As a result, there are still between 2,000 and 5,000 foreign experts in PNG, even though their

salaries are often equivalent to those of several hundred civil servants. More pernicious yet, donors have too often tried to bypass central government institutions entirely, first by setting up single project structures in the 1980s and 1990s, and today increasingly by turning to civil society and the NGO sector to implement their projects.

These donor practices have undermined capacity development, because government institutions are often marginalized in the aid process. For example, only two per cent of all projects in the mainly donor-funded Public Investment Program have ever been formally evaluated by the Government. Valuable opportunities to gain experience designing and evaluating projects in order to 'learn by doing' are lost; more seriously, such practices erode the Government's sense of 'ownership' over projects, and lessen the likelihood that the Government will develop a long-term financial commitment to the project. The higher levels of aid effectiveness can be explained by the Government's insistence on integrating all aid within its own budgeting and planning and where the Government was willing to turn down aid resources that did not fit into its own development priorities.

The plethora of organizations involved in aid activities defies adequate coordination by the Government. In the health sector alone, official donors are currently funding no fewer than five single projects outside the Department of Health. Often, these independent structures are more efficient than the Government at delivering short-term results; they may be cheaper, closer to the population, and less bureaucratic. But bypassing the central government leads to predictable results in the longer term: projects are less likely to be sustained after the end of donor support, there is a haphazard and fragmented quality to policy implementation and, starved of resources, government institutions suffer further decline in skills and capacity. Empirical evidence suggests that NGOs can be extremely cost-effective service providers, but that it is a mistake to believe they can replace the central government across a wide array of public goods (Hnanguie, 2001).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Papua New Guinea continues to face many economic problems, including mounting external debt, declining exports revenue, economic stagnation, and government dominance of key economic activities. The difficulties facing the majority of Papua New Guineans are enormous. Among other things, they lack access to many services crucial to a quality of life. For instance, 4 million people — more than 85 per cent of the national population — have no access to electricity, about 3.5 million do not have

proper sanitation facilities, and some 3 million have limited access to basic services (Hnanguie, 1997: 7).

Foreign aid, although helpful particularly for the poorer provinces, is not adequate in accelerating Papua New Guinea's economic development. This kind of international resource flow is largely governed by factors outside Papua New Guinea's control; it is highly fluctuating; it is inadequate; and it is often being mismanaged. It should also be observed that much of the foreign aid is directed towards the ordinary activities of the public sector and/or for humanitarian purposes. Little, if any, of the aid is utilized for the development of the private sector, or for the establishment of institutions for supporting entrepreneurship. In addition, aid is mainly 'tied' in that it is allocated by donor countries to a specific sector, project or purpose in the country. Put differently, PNG is normally incapable of influencing the allocation of much of the financing among her developmental programmes, or among other critical needs. The shift in the Australian aid from budget support to project support, for instance, has already shown signs of the Government losing all control over the allocation and utilization of the only aid share over which it once had direct influence.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING AID EFFECTIVENESS IN FUTURE

Given the successes and failures of foreign aid over the past 25 years, let us focus on several measures that could help to improve the capacity of the Government to manage its aid resources effectively in future. First, donors have to start taking this issue more seriously and stop trying to bypass the central government. The widespread belief of both free-market economists and NGOs that government is the problem and not part of the solution has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, far from undermining the private sector, a limited but effective government is needed to enable a vibrant civil society and strong business sector. It is the best means to foster both economic growth and poverty alleviation. Donors must devote greater attention and resources to help build the capacity of the Government to effectively manage aid, even as they encourage the central government to retrench from nonessential functions.

This entails giving more support to the policy, planning, and evaluation divisions of key government departments including the Department of Finance & Planning, as well as to central budgeting activities. Perhaps more importantly, it entails a greater respect for the integrity of the national budgeting and investment planning processes of government during the aid cycle. Donors should assist the Government to develop its five-year rolling development plans and medium term investment strategies

to set objectives and increase the coherence of government development efforts. Basing their aid on the Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) has seen a lack of focus and coherence in their operations. Donors should ensure that aid activities are explicitly integrated into these processes, so that the long-term recurrent expenditure implications of aid are formally planned, budgeted and accounted for.

Second, donors should give preferences to a government that demonstrates commitment to improve its management of aid.⁵ Current efforts to promote performance-based allocation of aid should be continued and deepened. It is important to establish clear incentives for the Government to improve its capacity to manage aid resources. With poorly performing governments, foreign aid should be refocused onto the non-governmental sector and the meeting of basic needs and human capital investments.

In this context, donors must allow the Government to play a larger role in the design, management, and evaluation of aid activities. Rather than 'pushing' aid and seeking short-term results, donors should rather help the Government formulate its own preferences and act upon them, even if this means lower aid levels in the short run. Encouraging the decentralization process, privatization, and the growth of civil society are all appropriate and desirable, but donors should not view them as substitutes for central government institutions.

Third, the World Bank and the IMF's economic stabilization and adjustment efforts should be supported. Achieving macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for the effective use of public resources, including foreign aid. Progress on such issues as poverty reduction and child welfare will not be sustained in the absence of steady growth and healthy public finances. There is thus no alternative to the sometimes quite painful reforms advocated by the international financial institutions, which have gained valuable experience at reform implementation. At the same time, more attention should be devoted to enhancing local capacities in provinces undergoing economic reform to ensure that they are not eroded by the fiscal crisis. Wholesale reform of the public service may be prohibitively expensive in the short run, but the donors can and should begin to upgrade key parts of the civil service right away, most notably those involved in economic policymaking like the Department of Finance & Planning.

⁵ Without realizing the implications of the Wingti Government's decision to abolish the Office of International Development Assistance (OIDA) in the Department of Finance & Planning, donors continued to pour in massive amounts of aid. It should be noted that the management of foreign aid in PNG deteriorated after the abolition of OIDA in 1995.

Fourth, donor coordination efforts should be refocused. It is a peculiar irony of aid today that donors do not coordinate their individual aid coordination efforts. Groups like the Development Assistance Committee, Consultative Group Meetings or the National Development Forums are useful avenues for donors to engage in dialogue with each other and to harmonize their policies and procedures. They should be reinforced. At the country level, however, the Government should be empowered to coordinate all aid activities and donor-directed forums such that the Roundtables or the Consultative Group meetings can be progressively downgraded.

The donors can, however, undertake a number of measures at the country level to facilitate government coordination efforts. For instance, donors should consider specialization in a few sectoral and sub-sectoral areas, in which they have a comparative advantage. The resulting decrease in the number of donors present in any one area would facilitate governmental coordination and thus increase effectiveness. Similarly, the World Bank or the ADB should be identified as a 'lead donor' and charged with conducting the policy dialogue with the Government and establishing the broad policy framework within which other donors would plan their activities. This would free the Government from the current burden of engaging in policy dialogue with some 20 different donors. Given their unparalleled policy analysis capacities, the World Bank or the ADB are uniquely qualified to play this role.

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HAVE WE WALKED ‘ON THE CLEAR(ED) PATH?’ An Assessment of the Development of Industrial Relations in Papua New Guinea

Benedict Y. Imbun

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I discuss the development of industrial relations in Papua New Guinea (PNG) since the early 1960s when core institutions were established for the political and economic governance of the colony. Institutions such as those relating to industrial relations were particularly developed and introduced as ‘stepping stones’ for future ‘advancement’ by an indigenous state. This chapter examines the introduction of industrial relations institutions and assesses their operations as well as their activities since 1975.

Although the PNG industrial relations institutions have changed very little since inception, the government and other social partners have cultivated an atmosphere of a dynamic industrial relations system, which is pluralistic in character. At the outset, the chapter compares PNG with similar less developed countries and notes the development of an open industrial relations system in PNG, despite some imperfections. Moreover, it discusses the rather constrained environment within which the state has evolved which inhibits it from improving the effectiveness, and optimising the efficiency of, the industrial relations system. The chapter concludes that although the country has not ‘advanced’ from the colonial government’s introduced institutions, the in-

corporation of the institutions has not been that easy and smooth in the process of making the institutions work to everyone's liking. In the future, there is optimism that the industrial relations system would come of age and play a significant role in the country's economy and polity.

OVERVIEW

In most developed countries of the world, governments have established legal frameworks for their societies, necessarily impacting on the area of industrial relations. Theoretically, this impact of state or government on labour relations takes the course of restoring power balance where there is inequity between capital and labour. It is often perceived that the countries of the developed west have promulgated a *laissez-faire* approach to both industrial relations and economic management. This mode of approach allows the state to act strictly as a referee in disputes between unions and management. A government does this by utilising the installed state mechanisms (i.e. arbitration tribunals) to address industrial disputes. Everything else is left to the contract of employment or existing regulated terms and conditions of the respective occupations to determine industrial relations practices.

The assumed minimalist approach of states in the west is not equivalent to industrial relations practices in developing countries. In order to enhance industrialisation right after independence, automatic state intervention in industrial relations in most developing countries has become more of an 'indispensability' than a constitutional obligation (Caire, 1977; Siddique, 1989). Hence, in such countries, governments are said to control every aspect of industrial relations in the supposedly best interests of economic development. The crucial regulations and policies that justify such intervention have been the handiwork of 'development obsessed' and repressive regimes, or supposedly developmental states. Much of these regulations are 'home grown' initiatives which have superseded outdated ones that colonial masters had utilised to extract capital under the guise of dispensing development.

IMPOSITION OF AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

The Australian government imposed its system of industrial relations together with other inseparable core institutions on the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG). The other core institutions which were vital to the function of the colony, included the legislature, judiciary, military, administration and the economic system, which all had to accommodate labour relations. It was anticipated that the new environment was to be conducive to the emergence of a system of industrial relations. As one observer puts it succinctly:

In this sense the industrial relations system was part of the over-all socio-political and economic development process formulated by the colonial administration. Obviously, it was intended to settle potential industrial disputes in the capitalist production process. Hence, its effectiveness depended on the existence and prosperity of other institutions such as education, judiciary, legislature, police, agriculture and economic system (Gissua, 1993: 4).

In the TPNG, the industrial relations framework with its dispute settlement process was introduced as a matter of urgency (Hess, 1982). It did not derive from the making of any major industrial development programmes or capital intensive industries nor major industrial unrests in the Territory, but from international pressure and Australian domestic politics. However, against bureaucratic advice and settler resistance, Paul Hasluck, the Australian labour minister, moved away from the indentured labour system and pushed for modern industrial relations legislation to be introduced in the Territory. It was in 1963 that the two pieces of legislation responsible for formally establishing the industrial relations machinery in the TPNG were enacted and introduced. The *Industrial Relations Act* and *Industrial Organisations Act* allowed for the existence of conciliation and arbitration machinery, trade unions and employers organisations, respectively. To Hasluck, the indigenous state was to develop its own system of industrial relations and what he had done was to facilitate that process with the initial enactment of the relevant Acts. As he put correctly, 'he would clear the path but let them walk it' (Gissua, 1993: 4). In all fairness, the industrial relations legislation was not relevant and practical at that time, as nearly all the indigenous population was in the subsistence sector. But Hasluck's ingenuity and foresight has to be acknowledged for having the initiative to establish core labour legislation, as colonies elsewhere never had that luxury. However, the operation of the industrial relations system in the post-colonial era in PNG was to reveal whether we have 'followed the path' or deviated from it.

OPERATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

After political independence in 1975, PNG inherited the colonial industrial relations machinery that had already been in force for some eleven years. The industrial relations machinery was in theory established as an avenue for the state, workers and employers to converge and settle labour issues. However, in practice some unique problems have constrained each of the parties, especially the union movement, in its endeavour to become an effective partner in the industrial relations sphere. Nonetheless, the union movement has demonstrated an ability to survive the demise of

colonialism, and it continues to play an influential role in the nation's economic and political life as a partner in 'pluralist' bargaining arrangements and as a largely independent 'loyal opposition' to employers and government. The further development and operation of the industrial relations system can be explained in the context of government institutions, employers' organisations and trade union development in the country.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Unlike many developing countries, the role of the state in the country's industrial relations system was developed and maintained within the laissez-faire framework that is found mainly in the developed west, where the economy and polity are kept almost separate. This is in contrast to Siddique's (1989) assertion that the state in developing countries has a dominant position in influencing industrial relations policies, because of weak market institutions.

Siddique (1989) and others (Crouch, 1977, 1979; Wiarda, 1981; Poole, 1984) characterise the dominance of the state in industrial relations as 'corporatist'. The political system in developing countries allows the state to dominate both the industrial relations system and the economy. Although PNG shares vast similarities with other developing countries in having weak class formation, weak political organisation and a dualistic economic structure, these characteristics have not helped shape a strong state able to dominate the various groups in society (Collier, 1979: 366; Wesson, 1982). Among other reasons which will be discussed later, the minimal role of the state in PNG in industrial relations is partly because of the absence of the following factors: relevant and exclusive pro-capital policies, a surplus skilled labour market, an expanding economy, and dire poverty. These factors have come collectively to be the common denominator of countries particularly in Asia and Latin America, where the emergence of a strong interventionist state has occurred (Henley, 1979; Schregle, 1982; Leggett, 1988; Deyo, 1989; Ai, 1990). According to Siddique's (1989) model of the Third World industrial relations system, the presence of these factors, coupled with a weak working class and capitalist class, have allowed the state in the developing countries to play a dominant role in both the economic and industrial relations system.

The PNG state's role in industrial relations, however, does not resemble Siddique's model of the dominant state nor the interventionist state, but is a pluralist state dealing only with its established institutions. Its functions are in theory and practice performed in a laissez-faire environment, allowing it only a minor role, which is surprising for a developing country. Similar to developed countries such as Australia, the role of

the PNG state is threefold in its intervention in the industrial relations system. Firstly, it legislates through parliament on the workplace by establishing substantive rules on leave, working hours, and in what form wages should be paid. The state also creates the general economic environment of industrial relations through its policies on such matters as incomes, employment, inflation, and tariff protection. Secondly, being the largest employer in the country, its wages and conditions paid to public servants set standards, which affect wages and conditions in private industry. The third role the state plays (which is more relevant to this part of the discussion) is in the area of establishing procedural rules to limit the ways in which employers and employees may conduct their negotiations and disputes.

This administrative role of the state is in the hands of the Department of Labour and Employment (DLE), which is the agent for overseeing the productive relationship of workers and employers at the workplace. Of the several objectives of the Department, administering the laws pertaining to the employment relationship is the crux of its activities. In PNG the two pieces of legislation which have the greatest impact on the industrial relations system are the *Industrial Relations Act* and the *Industrial Organisations Act*, both enacted in 1963 by the administration. Only minor amendments have been made to these Acts. The former allows workers to form their own unions and the latter allows establishment of industrial relations processes such as Industry Councils, Boards of Inquiry and direct negotiations as well as compulsory conciliation and arbitration. These laws set up the voluntary framework for employers and trade unions to meet together to settle disputes and to allow the state (in this case, the DLE) to intervene in certain circumstances. But the employers and unions are left to come up with viable agreements governing the conditions of work.

In an effort to provide a more conducive industrial environment and make existing industrial relations more productive, the DLE opened up Provincial Labour Offices in the twenty provinces of the country. A Provincial Labour Officer was responsible for labour disputes within the province but industrial relations officers from Port Moresby attended serious disputes. In a further move in 1972, the DLE created the Bureau of Industrial Organisation (BIO). The BIO was established after recommendations from the ILO to provide assistance to the fledgling union movement. It had a statutory character and operated under a tripartite Board of Management, which was allocated the task of helping workers to form unions and educating the union officials on the workings of an industrial relations system. But the BIO failed to achieve the objectives it

had initially aspired to due to lack of funds and mixed reactions from the already established unions, who saw it as a 'puppet recruiting' exercise by government (Gissua, Interview, 21/4/94).

A subsequent initiative by the DLE was the establishment of the Labour Advisory Council (LAC) of PNG which basically served to bring about changes to some aspects of the *Industrial Relations Act* which the three parties (government, employers and unions) felt needed attention. Some of the changes included methods of improving industrial relations to achieve high levels of employment and productivity (Daley, 1987: 32). In 1974, ironically, the LAC disbanded because the parties could not agree on the proposed amendments (Gissua, 1993). Another attempt at making amendments was made in 1982 by the DLE through a tripartite working party, which arrived at some possible amendments. It went only as far as getting read in Parliament and was then abandoned because the unions felt some of the changes were detrimental to their growth and progress. The latest attempt at amendments was in 1989, when the DLE once again spearheaded the formation of a National Tripartite Council (NTC) which was similar in function to the previous LAC. The current status of the NTC is in an operational stage and encourages dialogue between employers, government and trade unions on significant issues affecting the parties.

CONSTRAINTS ON THE STATE ROLE

There are several other reasons, which have also led to the rather mediocre role of the state in industrial relations in the country. Firstly, it has been constrained by an unreceptive and apathetic civil society. The role played by the civil society, whether active or passive in acknowledging the presence of the state in both the economic and industrial relations systems, has not been articulated in Siddique's (1989) model of the Third World industrial relations system. Generally, Papua New Guineans' 'don't care' attitude to the state's role in administrating the country differs significantly from other developing countries. Much of this circumstance is the result of the late advent of the cash economy. The conventional structure of PNG society had no ethos of union organisations nor an economy that created large numbers of 'proletarians' who survived by selling labour to the capitalist. A working class ideology has been virtually absent apart from nationalistic resentments against foreign companies (McGavin, 1991). The great majority of wage earners enter employment because it provides what is judged to be the most favourable alternative rather than the only alternative. In such circumstances the state's role in industrial relations has been rather minimal and restricted to interacting with existing institutions.

The general level of community acceptance of the state's role in industrial relations and other areas is not high in PNG. Hess (1989: 118) observed that a 'lack of familiarity' and compliance with the directions of the state (which is seen as an outside authority) has made the workers generate 'ambivalent attitudes' regarding any government's action as 'government's business' and not 'our concern'. This pattern of avoiding commitments to the legitimate state has weakened the role of industrial tribunal based industrial relations where the audience is the general community.

Additionally, the state has not dealt with industrial relations issues more urgently because there has been no pressure for it. A former senior public servant claims that PNG unions are too weak to pose a threat to government policies (*Post-Courier*, 6 May 1995). There have been a few unions in the public and private sectors that have taken up industrial action due to poor working conditions. But the bulk of the workforce both in the public and private sectors is still content with the wages and other conditions offered by their respective employers. Only on some occasions, where the issue is other than that of working conditions, has the state intervened in some chaotic situations to quell dissatisfied workers. In Port Moresby a near majority of public service workers stood down from work for a day in August 1988 as a result of law and order problems in the city. This quickly led the PNG Parliament to pass stringent laws on crime and robbery in the city and the entire country (*Niugini Nius*, 14 September 1988).

The state also bears partial responsibility for what seems to be inactivity in the area of industrial relations. This is because some parts of its own industrial relations machinery has been weak or has become defunct and is therefore unable to adequately perform its role. Minimal funding to the BIO and finally its abandonment has adversely affected the Industrial Registrar and the Conciliation and Arbitration sections of the DLE. In some respects it has been the parties who now provide information regarding disputes to the industrial relations machinery which has been unable to pursue its own assignment (Daley, 1987: 13).

Notwithstanding its constraints and weaknesses, the ability of the state to influence industrial relations has been best demonstrated in the wage tribunals over the years after independence. The wage fixation system has so far been consistent, in which the state determines and sets the minimum rural and urban wages. But the Minimum Wage Board (MWB) with its increasing prestige and seminal effect on decisions has been simply an adoption of the Australian model. The high wage structure (in contrast to other similar developing countries in the region) has been consolidated

and adjusted at various times over the years, however the question of relevance and the ability of the country to sustain such a wage structure has been the focus of reservations by economists (see Levantis, this volume).

It has only been recently that a deregulated wage system has been created. In 1992 the MWB opted for a deregulation of the minimum wage system by leaving the employer and employees more leeway in determining the wages at the workplace based on productivity and capacity to pay. Similarly, the current wage system is aimed at generating more employment opportunities especially for youths. The decision was reached amid some controversy mainly from the trade unions that opposed the determination on the basis that the new wage system was not socially and economically adequate to cope with the ever-increasing cost of living in the urban areas. They favoured the traditional wage fixation system, which was tied to the CPI and argued strongly that it should be maintained in an already expensive society. Despite the heated saga, in the end Government and the various key employers successfully put pressure on the MWB to decrease minimum wages to allow the economy to attain greater employment (Carrol, 1993).

Moreover the state has so far played an influential role in the settlement of industrial disputes in the country. Being the single largest employer of more than 63,000 public servants its maintenance of various awards for its employees has been well kept and controlled through the different branches of government. The public service tribunal and teaching service tribunal respectively has effectively handled mainly wage issues for public servants and teachers. In the private sector the state has intervened and established boards of inquiries in attempts to settle serious industrial disputes. The successful settlement of the Ok Tedi mine dispute in 1988, the Air Niugini case in 1990 and numerous public service cases are significant industrial dispute settlements the government has become involved in over the last few years (Hess and Gissua, 1992).

EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS

As in Australia, employers' organisations fulfil two major functions. One is to promote and represent the trade interests of their members. This is done in PNG mainly by keeping an eye on the Government to make sure that its policies are not detrimental to the trade of the members but positively help and encourage it. The second function is to determine the conditions upon which its members will employ labour. Depending upon the circumstances, employers' organisations vary in function from only representing their members for commercial and trade interests to performing as industrial relations agents for their members.

In PNG the Employers' Federation of PNG (EFPNG) registered as an industrial organisation in 1963 and was one of the first four bodies to be registered under the *Industrial Organisation Act*. The organisation originated in the late 1950s when it acted as the mouthpiece for its members in the territory (Daley, 1987: 160). Currently the federation has ten members whose commercial activities are diverse, although all fall in some important sectors of the economy. The federation has been a unifying force acting for all the major employers in PNG, particularly in industrial matters. However, over the past few years large companies have been taking over industrial relations functions and, as a consequence, its influence has declined. There is also the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce whose membership of fifteen includes representatives of businesses in the wholesale and retail, hospitality and construction industries in the city. It also has sister organisations in other major provincial towns. This group has not been industrially active but it has represented its members' interests in MWB hearings.

Another significant group of employers is the Papua New Guinea Planters' Association. This group comprises members mainly from the agriculture sector. It has remained a powerful lobby group for some years particularly on the MWB and has represented its members at fact finding meetings held by the government on issues affecting the agriculture industry (Daley, 1987: 162). Recently the Papua New Guinea Chamber of Manufacturers has registered as an employer's organisation. It only represents a few members in small manufacturing industry and its role so far has been restricted to lobbying (DLE, 1994: 23).

The PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (CMP) represents the mining industry. With an office in Port Moresby and an executive officer at its head, CMP is the mouthpiece of the companies in the mining and petroleum sector (there are only two current petroleum projects in the country). The organisation is made up of 115 companies which includes the companies operating in the mines and the support companies whose business relates entirely to mining and petroleum. The role of CMP is non-industrial. It fulfils several functions with the aim of serving the interests of the members. It mainly liaises and consults with government on matters pertaining to the industry and also engages in public relations exercises. The Chamber also gives priority to the promotion of education and training at all levels and sponsors training schemes at universities and colleges. Conferences and seminars on topics and issues relating to the industry are also coordinated and run by the organisation (PNG Resources, 1994: 3). Industrial relations matters have, however, become largely the preserves of the individual management in the mining projects.

The mines have single-handedly been representing their position in major industrial disputes with close backing from parent organisations and joint venture partners. They have signed new awards for workers in close association with relevant unions and the DLE (PNGTUC, 1995: 23).

TRADE UNIONS

The development of trade unionism in developing countries differed significantly from that in developed countries. According to Siddique (1989: 390) the very different process of industrialisation, social formation and economic structure have hampered the proletarianisation of the workers of developing countries. Because of the restricted economic development during the colonial period, there remained a dual economy, which still continues in most developing countries. The dual economy, a surplus labour market, and pro-capital government policies have reduced the economic bargaining power of the working class, forcing them to supplement their earnings from the subsistence sector. It is in these circumstances that workers have formed trade unions which often have to battle many other obstacles, including colonialism, culture, tribalism, and politics to stay committed to representing the workers' needs (Taylor, 1979: 238). The emergence and development of unionism in PNG provides us with an example of the hardships and struggles workers have gone through to form and maintain unions in the face of adversity.

Trade unionism formally began in PNG after the enactment of the 1963 *Industrial Relations Act* and *Industrial Organisations Act* by the colonial government. Unions replaced the ethnically based welfare societies that had sprung up in the towns during the 1950s as Papua New Guineans struggled to come to terms with an urban lifestyle and permanent wage labour. Several former regional workers' associations (such as the Kerema Welfare Society and the Western Welfare Society) were the first to register as unions under the *Industrial Organisations Act*. Only three such workers' organisations have attracted detailed study (Metcalf, 1968; Stevenson, 1968; Hess, 1982). Out of these studies there emerges a common picture of capable, ambitious leaders who led the unions and often quickly moved on to the national political stage. There was very little grassroots contact by these leaders with the result that the unions were unable to represent their workers in mundane workplace matters. Basic clerical tasks such as conducting annual elections and audits were never completed and the unions were far from meeting their obligations under the *Industrial Organisations Act*. However, they were not deregistered, but were propped up by the DLE to fulfil, on paper at least, the tripartite requirements of the industrial relations system (Interview, Apmeledy, 6 March 1994).

The failure to develop effective unionism in the 1960s and 1970s has prompted various commentators to identify reasons for this situation. Reasons range from poor leadership (Chapman, 1965), colonial background (Rowley, 1968), and 'misconceptions' about how unions should operate (Patterson, 1969), to workers' lack of education (Bailey, 1970). This poor level of union development undermined the industrial relations system's potential for dispute resolution and wage fixing (Isaac, 1969). But there are a few exceptional organisations, which have developed both the membership and leadership prerequisites for effective operation within the system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration (Spaull, 1974; Hess, 1986).

In fact, there were a total of 142 trade unions registered between 1963 and 1996 (Imbun, 1999). Of the 142 registered, only a very few managed to actually perform their industrial role of attending to member needs and expectations. A lot of them merely existed on paper for a brief period and quickly disappeared into oblivion. In fact this seemed to be the trend up until the 1990s. This happened for a number of reasons. The first is the extremely small size of the unions with only nine having more than 500 members at the time of their registration. For the rest it was not financially viable to adequately represent members against well-established employers' organisations. The second is the significant number of unions with a regionally located membership. These particular unions were inefficient and failed to exist as viable industrial organisations because they had a membership whose jobs were irregular and their membership declined dramatically as companies and government departments ceased to operate in these particular areas. Moreover, there were a few notable exceptions like the Bougainville Catholic Teachers' Association whose membership covered teachers on the island (Badely, 1982). Finally, the general membership composition of many unions was not steady but subject to fluctuations with the result that the unions' organisational capacity was adversely affected. All these problems contributed to the malfunction of the overall trade union movement in the country. However, some unions, which did manage to survive, have subsequently consolidated their membership strength by including new member intakes that are mainly from the public sector and a few in the private sector, such as mining.

After independence in 1975 only a handful of unions began to use the newly installed industrial relations system. The Public Service Association and the Teachers' Association were organisationally competent, while in the private sector only the Bougainville unions and the Central District Waterside Workers' Union were able to represent their members' interest. Other unions were able to participate in the industrial relations

system at the level of award making through the intervention of leaders absent from the workplaces. Members of these unions received flow-ons from major awards as periodic minimum wages increased (Hess, 1986: 42). Only a few unions had the ability to negotiate over a wide range of issues and to sometimes use industrial action to achieve gains. However, with the introduction of MWBs (the centrepiece of the wage fixing system) in the early 1970s, these same unions were able to advocate successfully. The outcomes had a seminal effect and other unions had to apply to have their awards altered to abide by the new national minimums (TUC, 1979).

PEAK UNION COUNCILS

Attempts to establish a peak union organisation began in the mid-1960s. It was mainly initiated by the colonial government to bring the regional workers' associations together into a territory-wide federation (Hess, 1988). There were to be two crucial roles played by this peak union council. The first was the industrial role in which it was to represent the interests of workers in the newly created industrial relations system. As the colonial state interpreted it, such a central body was to provide the much-needed balance in making the newly established industrial relations system work. This was simply because there were few unions capable of acting as representatives of workers in the formal proceedings of conciliation and arbitration. Dwyer (1972) explains that the belief was that a central organisation would have greater potential than the tiny regional associations for fulfilling the role ascribed to unions by the government.

The colonial state also wanted the national union organisation to play a political role in the transition to independence. This role was necessary because the colony lacked both national institutions and national leadership, as the colonial state was minimally prepared for the eventual transfer of power. In such a situation, the establishment of a national peak union council had particular significance for the broader political process as well as for the individual union leaders who were attempting to make their mark on national politics (Interview, Dembo, 12 March 1994).

With the assistance of the colonial state the Federation of Workers' Association (FWA) was established in early 1970. Initially, the FWA's function was mainly to be that of lobbying for more indigenous representation in the 1970 MWB, where only two Papua New Guineans were appointed as members: John Guise and Paulus Arek, two of the most experienced indigenous politicians, both representing themselves as champions of workers rights. They declared that the era of cheap labour in PNG was over and that workers must be treated as 'people and not as

slaves' (*Post-Courier*, January 1970). This incident shows the political importance of these industrial issues and indicates the extent to which the new generation of indigenous politicians was to go beyond the spheres of the industrial relations arena. With a combination of political ambition and rhetoric they used their positions in the House of Assembly to make 'an effort to ensure that the voice of the workers is adequately heard in the highest councils of the land' (Arek, 1970: 8).

In practice the FWA's achievements were limited to those it could make through a bureaucratic mode of operation. Again it had to rely on the presence of the colonial labour bureaucracy. Literally the Department of Labour in the colonial era provided everything from office space to support staff. The FWA sponsored two industrial actions, which brought about a 50 cent per week increase for workers and a second flow-on of \$3.50 per member of urban unions from the 1972 MWB decision. There were those critics who quickly pointed out that the FWA had achieved very little and therefore had become inactive and existed merely as another political avenue to consolidate power (Langmore, 1973: 169). However, for the Department of Labour officials the eventual establishment of the peak council meant the existence of a body with which it could liaise in order to facilitate the smooth operation of the infant industrial relations system. For the politicians, it was an institution that they could be proud of, where they could be seen to lead the aspirations of the indigenous working class. In reality the FWA was frustrated by a lack of genuine worker participation and achieved very little for both the politicians and the bureaucrats and for the workers at the level of their workplaces (Hess, 1992: 148). It existed in a weakened state throughout the 1970s and early 1980s until the formation of the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress (PNGTUC).

By the end of the 1970s the TUC existed as a nationally effective organisation under the leadership of Tony Ila. Effectiveness was visible in the expansion of affiliates and the attraction of funds from government and international sources. However, as an organisation geared towards providing the base for a genuine union movement, it was frustrated by its lack of attention to advocating industrial issues. It appeared in some MWB hearings where flow-ons were gained from decisions for its affiliates. Moreover, overall, the organisation functioned to aid one person, Ila, in his quest for political office and financial grants were largely used in his electorate to fund various community projects (PNGTUC, 1976: 5).

The TUC in the late 1980s was in a better position for the first time for many years under the full-time general secretary Lawrence Titimur and the ICFTU trade union adviser, Harry Sandrasekera. Titimur

was an able media user and often made press releases on issues relevant to the workers. Though most of these were plain remarks and rhetoric, at least it created the impression among the public that 'at last the unions are doing something' (Interview, Gissua, 6 March 1994). In the meantime the TUC, under this reformed leadership, attracted more affiliates. Several unions including the Ilimo Workers' Union, Ok Tedi Mining Workers Union (OTMWU), and the Burns Philip Citizen Staff Association joined the TUC. Some of these unions had earlier sought TUC assistance in setting up their organisations. The reformed TUC demonstrated the capacity to provide both administrative and technical assistance in such areas as registration and award negotiations and made sure the members received appropriate wages. In return those unions whose members had benefited from such assistance became the strongest supporters of the new TUC leadership.

The next couple of years saw the TUC consolidating its position as a truly national peak union organisation. Former fence-sitters such as the Public Employees' Association (PEA) and the Teachers' Association (TA) made moves to join the TUC. The latter actually sought affiliation and Titimur called it an 'historic' occasion. PEA's affiliation fees amounted to K18,722 for the year (*Post Courier*, June 1987). This represented a third of the TUC's budget, and with the eventual affiliation of the TA boosting the TUC's membership to 20,000, financial independence for the peak organisation was nearing a reality. This funding from affiliates was reliable, unlike the funding from relatively strong unions such as the Waterside Workers' and Seamen's Union and the BMWU which had not been meeting their financial obligations to the TUC over the years. With improved financial and industrial strength of a revived union movement, Titimur was able to claim with justice that the 'TUC had gained greater legitimacy in the eyes of government', employer organisations and the general public (Interview, Paska, 19 November 1995).

The fragile cooperation of the major unions, however, was short-lived. During the 1990s the TUC was reduced to its former days of disorganisation and fragmentation. The PEA and the TA pulled out suddenly from the TUC claiming policy differences and personality clashes. What in fact occurred was disagreement over the allocation of TUC executive positions, none of which were allocated to representatives from the two large unions. The larger unions also felt their financial contributions had gone to 'rescue' the TUC's activities but that in return they had gained very little. Their officials openly stated their organisations 'don't need the TUC' (*Post-Courier*, August 1991). From then on they conducted their own affairs. The final blow to the effectiveness of the

TUC was the sudden resignation of Titimur in 1987 to contest the general elections for parliament. With an under strength executive and a small number of affiliates, the TUC in the 1990s and 2000s continues to function in a rather mediocre way under John Paska, who is now the general secretary.

The PNG experience shows that its industrial relations institutions are under-utilised because the key players are either weak or restricted by many factors beyond their control in fully representing their members' interests. Unlike other developing countries where such a situation has allowed the state to monopolise power and control every aspect of industrial relations (Siddique, 1989), in PNG the absence of pro-capital policies and relatively weak unions has prevented this. Notwithstanding the constraints, the ability of the state to influence industrial relations has been felt in the staffing of wage tribunals over the years, but this falls short of the authoritarian intervention characteristic of other Third World labour relations systems.

CONCLUSION

After more than two decades of independence and some thirty-eight years after the enactment of the *Industrial Relations Act* and *Industrial Organisations Act*, the PNG industrial relations system has achieved some maturity. However, it has done that in a rather constrained industrial and economic environment. Generally, the workings of the industrial relations system have come to reflect the whole problematic situation of other service-orientated institutions in the country. In theory, there is the Australian style conciliation and arbitration system in existence, but, in practice, unions have remained weak and they have been unable to use the industrial relations system to their advantage. The struggle of the TUC to establish itself as the mouthpiece of the trade union movement in the country, amid the narrow perception of some workers and the policy differences of leaders, shows just how hard it is to exist as a viable peak union organisation in a newly developing country with fragile post-colonial institutions.

Surprisingly for a newly developing country, however, PNG is something of an exception with the legal and political framework which allows for a pluralistic environment that encourages the exercise of freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike. The right to strike therefore is not seen as a barrier to economic development. The competing parties produce decisions of industrial and political consensus. However, when contrasted with a number of developing countries PNG's industrial relations system is enviable, to say the least. In

these countries it is usually the state and employers that exercise unbridled authority over unions and labour. For example, in the neighbouring South-East Asian countries there is very little participation by trade unions in their industrial relations system, which are strongly governed by authoritarian states. Often solutions are offered whenever there is an industrial dispute between unions and employers, which reflects the paternalistic style of government. Negotiated outcomes often reflect the achievement of a pluralistic consensus by both parties.

As experienced, the parties to the PNG industrial relations system operate as equal partners in a tripartite arrangement. They have their own structural and organisational weaknesses but their commitment and dedication to acknowledging and advocating for an independent industrial relations system is encouraging. The roles the unions, employers and state play in upholding and making use of the existing industrial relations system differ according to the expectations and wishes of the constituencies they represent.

Trade unions operate as independent institutions in the industrial relations system very much in the pluralist tradition. Generally, the PNG state and the employers accept unions as part of the industrial landscape, which allows them to resolve industrial issues through the industrial bargaining process. This, in turn, consolidates the pluralistic relationship. Although unions may be organisationally weak, they enjoy a wide range of worker and state support which places them as equals in the bargaining environment with employers. Union leaders are very much part of the economic and political decision-making process where they appear on Boards and other organs of the state decision-making apparatus. Hence, they play an influential role in both political and economic aspects of the country.

Although rough and rudimentary, PNG's industrial relations machinery is independent and focused on collective bargaining and industrial tribunals and so warrants the epithet 'pluralistic', and in this sense is also somewhat 'exceptional' when contrasted to labour systems in similar developing countries. Despite weakness and constraints in the industrial relations system, the country has 'walked on the path' Hasluck had paved some thirty-eight years ago. However, the 'walk' has not been easy and smooth as the stakeholders have witnessed, there is optimism that in the long run the pillars of the industrial relations system will continue to function as they have been doing for the last thirty-eight years.

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ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: 25 years on

Enaha Peri Kwa

INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years of independence in Papua New Guinea is a time of celebration and reflection. Reflection continues for many concerned Papua New Guineans, who ponder over the state of affairs in the country over the last twenty-five years, as such development, its outcomes and other related issues continue to be the focus of discussion. The deep concern that is currently being expressed is that after the next twenty-five years when Papua New Guineans sit back to reflect on its golden jubilee, the development scenario of the present must not be the case.

Papua New Guinea has always been regarded as a potentially rich country because of its mineral and oil wealth, its tropical climate, the ready availability of cultivatable land, its immense water resources, and the rich biodiversity of its forests and fisheries. However, in the years since independence while the overall wealth of the nation has increased in real terms, this increase has been accompanied by an increased gap between rich and poor. At the same time the benefits of the utilization of Papua New Guinea resources have been inequitably shared. One of the major causes for concern is the fact that financial prosperity has been achieved with unacceptable levels of environmental degradation and destruction, thereby robbing opportunities for future generations.

DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA TODAY

Development in PNG has not been without its success stories and it is appropriate to highlight some of these achievements. The maintenance of a strong political tradition has been one of the country's strengths. PNG has been able to successfully hold elections and form new governments every five years. A continuous improvement in health and social conditions has taken place: for example, life expectancy at birth has vision from 47 years in 1970 to 56 years in 1993; and despite high population growth rates the number of physicians (1:100,000) and nurses per capita has remained constant. PNG has also joined a select group of countries that have been pronounced polio free since 1997 by the World Health Organisation (*Post Courier*, October 2000: 4). A strong increase in access to education has also occurred although this is offset by the concern that this increase has not corresponded to an increase in the quality of education, and that many young people are still being denied the opportunity to be formally educated.

Observations concerning development in PNG are made in following manner. Development is generally described as lagging, uneven, stagnant and even backward in some areas of the country. Development definitely cannot be described as having been environmentally friendly in most situations; the forestry industry and large natural resource development projects such as mining have been highlighted in these instances. Development is seen as overstretching resources, especially financial. In short, despite the success stories, the summary of the development process in Papua New Guinea is that the broader picture shows that development continues to be unsustainable. In relation to the environment, development has tended to destroy the environment rather than to work towards an ecological sustainability.

After twenty years of independence, an appraisal was made of the 'environmental friendliness' of current developmental practices as part of a wider study of development generally in Papua New Guinea Planning the New Century Committee (1998). The Committee concluded that there were real problems in relation to current development practices. The unsustainable use of natural resources was a major cause of concern for the committee, so much so that it was prompted to note that:

The 4NGDP [National Goal and Directive Principle] commits the Nation to sustainable resource management and to intergenerational equity to ensure that present generations did not use the environment in a destructive way for their own use and leave a degraded environment for future generations.

Over the last twenty years, a considerable proportion of PNG wealth has been generated from the utilisation of PNG's natural resources, particularly petroleum and mineral resources and through the logging of PNG's forests.

In some areas PNG's natural resources have been ruthlessly destroyed by largely foreign companies which have not contributed sufficiently to PNG's prosperity through vertical integration and transfer pricing arrangements which have minimised tax paid in PNG. They have been permitted to do so by a corrupt and selfish political leadership which has facilitated such short term plundering of PNG's natural resource heritage (Planning the New Century Committee, 1998: 67).

These findings served to confirm and strengthen what was already common knowledge to many Papua New Guineans who had felt that there was something terribly wrong with the development process. A case in point that needs to be mentioned here is the issue of the Bougainville crisis. Some of the contributing factors to the crisis emanate from the fundamental issue of environmental destruction as a consequence of the Bougainville Copper Limited activities; perhaps even more fundamental is the question of who owns the development process? and who stands to benefit from any development that is to occur? The position taken by Bougainvilleans on these issues is actually prompting other Papua New Guineans to take a position too, particularly on the issue of overall ownership of the development process.

Linking development to the environment is a major task that is undertaken by all concerned development practitioners. The physical health of the environment needs to be able to support all life forms within its system, if the balance is altered then some life forms will have to die to make way for a new balance. Environmental degradation today does not occur according to the normal flow of events, rather it happens when the balance is altered. Once the balance is altered the current quality of life is not maintained, but starts a catastrophic downward spiral, which triggers a negative effect on all life forms within that particular ecosystem. The environment as a subsystem of a broader system should therefore become an important stakeholder in the development process (Turare and Kavanamur, 1999: 25).

ENVIRONMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

The environment has been an integral part of PNG's official development agenda since the early 1970s. The Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), in its deliberations and consultations in framing the Constitution

of Papua New Guinea, made specific recommendations on the subject of the environment in 1972. The CPC's approach to the environment was to link the central elements of Papua New Guinea society, namely the people, to their environment and resources. The Preamble of the Constitution contains five National Goals and Directive Principles, which in totality is the state policy of Papua New Guinea (Constitutional Review Commission, 1996).

In his contribution to PNG's response to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Port Moresby, Professor Lance Hill of the University of Papua New Guinea made the following introduction when referring to PNG's development vision:

The Constitutional Planning Committee tabled their report in the House of Assembly in 1974. The proposals were based on an unprecedented process of consultation and consensus throughout the country. Skillfully interwoven, the National Goals and Directive Principles — with an emphasis on integral human development, equality and participation, self-reliance, conservation of the environment and natural resources and the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic organisation — form a powerful statement of the type of society our country aspires to and a fine antecedent statement on sustainable development. The heady exhilaration of those early days passed sometime ago (*The PNG Response to Rio*, 1992 : 75).

The inclusion of the fourth goal of the National Goals and Directive Principles was deliberate on the part of the CPC to address what had been foreseen as a potential area for abuse in future development. This goal calls for the wise use and management of natural resources and the environment:

We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's natural resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, and be replenished for the benefit of generations.

We accordingly call for:

1. wise use to be made of our natural resources and the environment in and on the land or seabed, in the sea, on the land, and in the air, in the interests of our development and in the trust for future generations; and
2. the conservation and replenishment, for the benefit of ourselves and prosperity, of the environment and its sacred, scenic and historical qualities; and

3. all necessary steps to be taken to give adequate protection to our valued birds, animals, fish, insects, plants and trees.

The environmental policy in Papua New Guinea contains the fundamental ingredients of ecological sustainable development. Terms such as 'wise use', 'replenishment', 'for future generations', 'adequate protection' and 'conservation' integrate the principles and goals of ecologically sustainable development.

The CPC saw the need to join these for what they defined as proper development or what is currently defined as ecologically sustainable development. In so doing, the CPC treated the environment as part and parcel of a development process that would maximize benefits accruing to everyone from the exploitation of natural resources. This in effect recognized the nature of natural resources, and the inter-generational nature of usage of those resources. Therefore the CPC intended that the use of natural resources could not justify environmental degradation, which not only involves the destruction of land, rivers and wildlife but also impedes the need for the integral development of people. For the CPC, unsustainable development practices, and development that neglects the human face of Papua New Guinea, would have dire consequences for future development in PNG.

Since independence in 1975, a policy document entitled 'The Environment and Conservation Policy — A Statement of Principles' was adopted by Parliament in 1977.

This policy relates to the wise use and management of the environment, and is divided into three parts. Part 1 sets out the introduction, the key element reads 'Development must be ecologically, socially and culturally suitable for Papua New Guinea and her people'. Part 2 declares the environmental responsibility of the people in their pursuit of development and Part 3 spells out the environmental principles to be taken into account when planning for development (Constitutional Review Commission, 1996: 13). The environmental policy sets out very noble principles of environmental management. However, it lacks the necessary structural framework for its implementation.¹

Despite these statements and the commendable efforts on the part of the state to declare a forward looking environmental protection policy with the relevant legislation, the inclusion of environment and conservation in the constitution, the enactment of a series of environmental protection laws and the signing of the South Pacific Convention on Environmental protection, there remain today serious problems in the sustainable management of our natural resources.

¹ This point was clearly highlighted in the Constitutional Review Commission, *Interim Report on the Constitution and Management of Natural Resources* 30.

An examination of the environmental policy reveals that it does adopt and promote the ecologically sustainable development concept. The Constitutional Review Commission's review of the environmental policy indicated that the policy is in 'broad terms and lacks any concrete framework for implementation' (Kwa, 1997: 5). In other words, the environmental policy could not be effectively implemented because it had not been given the relevant tools. There are a number of factors that have effectively restricted the active implementation of ecologically sustainable development. Two of these were identified by the Constitutional Review Commission as (1) mismanagement of the natural resources and environment by successive governments; and (2) lack of constitutional support of ecologically sustainable development in its substantive provisions (Kwa, 1997: 3). The other factors are lack of political will, lack of expertise in environmental management and lack of funding. Together these factors pose momentous obstacles in including a practicable environmental perspective in the development process of Papua New Guinea.

MISMANAGED DEVELOPMENT PROCESS INSTIGATING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION: EFFECTS ON THE COMMUNITY

The impact of the development process is seen most clearly at the community level. The availability of basic health services can make a big difference in the lives of villagers for whom basic health care is a luxury. Likewise, the availability of teachers in rural areas can make a big difference in rural life and is an important service that starts the cycle of human and social development in the local area.

The successes and failures of all decisions ought to be measured at the community level based on how they impact on rural livelihoods. If, for example, a decision is not being implemented and the effects are not recorded, then the difficulty needs to be rectified. In other words, there should be impact indicators developed so as to facilitate clear feedback signals. Examples of possible indicators are abundant in service delivery and the mechanisms dealing with citizen's representation. Decisions and practices that have detrimental effects at the community level have rippling effects on social, cultural, economic and political spheres of influence. It is therefore important to note that the nature of development impacts most significantly within the local community. For example, if the Gross National Product is acceptable by international standards, but the vast majority of Papua New Guineans in communities continue to live without enough food and drink dirty water daily, then clearly development benefits are not being equally distributed.


The state of health in an environment directly affects the quality of life in the community. The importance of the environment becomes clearer when the intimate relationship between the environment and people is taken into account. In PNG, as is the case with communities throughout the world who coexist with the natural environment, perceptions of their well-being and their very existence in the world is ruled by the nature of the environment they live in. Alterations to the physical environment generate chain effects throughout the human communities that depend upon a particular ecosystem for their livelihood. Put simply, the well-being of such communities depends on the health of the environments within which they live.

Despite the forward looking policies that subsequent PNG governments have espoused, policies have not ensured the 'wise use' of our natural resources. This has led to the destruction of many pristine ecosystems in the country. Ecologically Sustainable Development or development that is environmentally friendly was initiated at independence. The fundamental difficulty with Ecologically Sustainable Development in Papua New Guinea is its application. At the root of this difficulty are the fundamental choices that are being made. Successive PNG governments are faced with the dilemma of choosing Ecologically Sustainable Development (development that places priority on environmental health) or steaming ahead with development at the cost of environmental degradation. Experience has shown that despite the inclination of the governments to accept the former strategy, the latter continues to predominate, leading to numerous environmental disasters. The Government's piecemeal approach to natural resource management continues to compromise the health of the environment for the benefit of the minority. Instead of integrating ecologically sustainable development practices into the existing mining and petroleum projects, or even across the board covering all natural resource projects, the Government has instead opted to concentrate on forestry and fisheries projects which result in less environmental degradation. The Government has continually failed to recognise that environmental degradation cannot be readily quantified in terms of economic benefits, such as those derived from the exploitation of a natural resource.

The devastating effect of the government's irresponsibility is felt most severely within the community by the vast majority of people who live lifestyles that revolve around communally owned land and sea resources. The case of the Middle Fly people in the Western Province and their plight as victims of the environmental injustices emanating from the mismanagement of the Ok Tedi mine is a case in point. In this situation, the choice is between closing the mine operations now or sometime in the future. The choice has already been made by the government. Minister for Mining, Sir

Michael Somare made the views of the government clear that mine closure before 2010 was not an option. The landowners themselves have stated clearly that OTML (Ok Tedi Mining Limited) can close until they (OTML) have given 'something' (meaning development) back to the people.

FLY RIVER, SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL REGION



The Middle Fly floodplain is 15–20 km wide. This area is a mosaic of lakes, alluvial forest, swamp grassland and swamp savanna. These include Papua New Guinea's largest lake, Lake Murray. There is extraordinary diversity of the freshwater fish species of the Fly wetlands, with at least 105 species from 33 families which make the fish fauna of the Fly River system the most diverse in the Australasian region (Roberts, 1978: 20).

The people of this area have a special ecological adaptation to a distinctive environment: that of the lagoons. The key resources here are sago swamps, fish, reptile and avifauna in the lagoons and lagoon inlets, and the macropods, cassowaries and other game animals of the bush tracts behind the lagoons. The Boazi and Zimakani people, in particular, are occasionally described as following a hunter-gatherer way of life, but in reality all peoples of the area are gatherer-hunter-horticulturalists: 'gathering' consists mainly of processing sago at distinctly located sago swamps; 'hunting' includes a range of hunting methods and fishing with nets, traps and line; and 'horticulture' is anything from opportunistic planting of bananas in small patches in settlement areas and along river-banks to more systematic lagoon-fringe gardening and tree-cropping among the Suki (people from further down the river).

The environmental degradation which the Fly River has undergone as a result of the dumping of mine waste by OTML has destroyed many important sections of the river's ecosystem. Some of the environmental effects are the flooding of riverine gardens, deep muddiness of sago swamps, and so on. As a result of this activity, the lifestyles of river communities have been affected adversely. For the Yongomm, Boazi and Zimakani people, the Fly River is a 'dying' river and for them this also means that life has changed irreversibly for them and their children.

Burton (1995) sought the opinion of the Middle Fly villagers on their prospects. He asked these people, What do the your troubles boil down to? From the responses given by the villagers, the focus of villagers everywhere is on the deterioration of their situation. Burton's summary was that, according to the answers they gave, the respondents perceived all their troubles arose from the following three sources (1995: 59):

PROBLEMS OF THE GOVERNMENT: we remember the optimism of the pre-mine days around Independence when the government officials led us to believe we would at last see development in our area, but none of this has occurred and all we see of it is big money figures for someone else, somewhere else — in fact we are worse off than we ever were;

PROBLEMS OF THE VILLAGE: we occasionally get opportunities for development, but we never get anywhere because we cannot sort out our village problems, we are 'jumping over one another' — we were better off before Independence when the manus (kiap) simply laid down the law;

PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: we used to have a pristine environment, but the mine waste has caused changes clearly observable to us all — it was better before the mine.

Burton qualifies these responses in the following terms. It is true that the government has neglected the province as a whole. Therefore in many parts of the Middle Fly area villagers are condemned to 'jump over one another' because the limited resources available for development are misapplied and because no agency other than the two churches (the Catholic and the Evangelical Church of Papua) that operate here possess basic social planning skills. The period 1984–1994 in Western Province saw substantial windfall monies from the Ok Tedi project flowing into the Western Province Government, but with no lasting effects for the people in those districts (Burton, 1993: 60). The environment is one of the three sources of woe for villagers. Each concern no doubt is sufficiently important on its own to pose a threat to livelihood in that area.

Burton wrote the following comment on development in the Middle Fly in his report (1993: 27):

By any reckoning, the Middle Fly villages are surrounded by bountiful natural resources. Opportunities would seem to exist, therefore, for a dramatic improvement in living standards. Yet no one who visits this area can fail to be struck by the absolute lack of progress in achieving the most modest social development goals.

The Fly catchment has, by comparison with other remote areas in Papua New Guinea, experienced relatively rapid development and arguably, progress. However, this has been brought about almost exclusively through the spin-offs of technologically intensive and commercially dominated enclave developments. No other development models have received anything other than cursory attempts at application within the Fly catchment. The knowledge that the current enclave developments are likely to be transitory and the lack of tried and tested alternatives is the crux of the current dilemma.

Having set the wider stage on the current state of environment and development in the Middle Fly. The discussion will now focus on the community and the situation as it is today in the Middle Fly in relation to the issues at hand. In real terms, environmental destruction of the river system means that these villagers have been affected profoundly, for them they are payers of development or progress for the rest of Papua New Guinea.

MIDDLE FLY VILLAGERS' VIEWS ON THEIR ENVIRONMENT

Many of the statements made by villagers have yet to be verified by officials. However, are the communities along the Middle Fly supposed to wait for this confirmation before some action is taken? Or should these communities

use the changes to their current way of life as indicators of the status of environmental health? The former has been the strategy adopted by consecutive PNG governments, OTML and other stakeholders as a delay tactic. While action has been delayed for one reason or another, the result has been that the environment in the Middle Fly continues to deteriorate. The result is that the ability of the environment to sustain life forms and act as a natural sink is on the wane. This is the environmental reality, despite official reports from OTML that water is of drinking quality and marine life is not sufficiently affected to cause concern.

It is obvious that in the Middle Fly, a level of intense negative environmental alteration has occurred. The following gives a brief description of the environmental situation. Dieback has occurred in areas of prolonged flooding. Build-up of sedimentation in the riverbed has resulted in the river overflowing its banks and the shallowing of the actual river and the blocking of smaller river channels normally used as breeding grounds by fish and other river species. The effect on food sources is devastating, as the overflowing has resulted in the destruction of riverine gardens and sago swamps. The increased levels of copper and other metals in the river system is showing in the food chain of the wildlife with villagers reporting that they often find small black balls in the intestines of fish (especially barramundi), while deer and wild pig are reported to have pusslike liquid and a terrible stench from their flesh soon after being killed. Villagers also report that harvested sago is no longer at the level of the quantity and quality as it used to be, and the riverine garden produce that has survived is not fit for human consumption. The water is not fit for drinking and washing; and there are health complaints of severe stomach problems and skin diseases shortly after usage. Villagers who claim that these areas and sources are unsafe for drinking or even for dwelling have in extreme cases moved their homes further inland or no longer use these areas as sources of food, because they fear for their own and their children's health.

When villagers make these statements they are referring to felt changes in their societies. For these people, life is inter-related with and dependent on the ecosystem. Therefore if one part of life, such as the environment, is affected then, their perception of their relationship, consequently their responsibility to their environment is altered. Reduction in marine life profoundly affects their lives because for them it affects their nutritional intake as well as their spiritual cosmos. Interestingly, the importance of wildlife is not only seen as a major source of food, rather, clans in the area are named after the cassowary, crocodile, turtle, and so on. The relationship becomes even more significant when the Boazi tribes explain that marriages are formed following a strict pattern of marriages being arranged between members of certain clans, because some clans are

considered cousins and others are considered enemies. Elaborate rituals are followed to maintain these relationships are formed from marriages and bloodlines. Thus the importance of environmental health is part and parcel of community life. Unfortunately this importance does not translate into gender relations and the following discussion will clarify this point by focusing on sago swamps and the prolonged flooding along the river, and its effect on gender relations.

SAGO SWAMPS AND WOMEN

'Sago swamps are drowning because there is a lot of mud build-up in the swamps', answered a man from Bosset village when he was asked what in his opinion the main concern facing the village and his own household was. His opinion was reminiscent of those raised by many other villagers in all the Middle Fly villages interviewed. Sago is the staple diet of these people, and in many cases is the only meal they may eat over long periods of time. The women harvest the sago and prepare the sago for consumption by the family. For the women of the Middle Fly, the destruction of sago swamps has profound and devastating implications for their lives as individuals and as a contributing and participating group in society today.

The destruction of sago swamps means that sago palms are not growing and producing the normal quantity and quality of sago. Women point out that the harvesting of a sago palm is hardly sufficient to fill a sago bag nowadays as was the case prior to the mine's operation. For the women this means that they have to travel further away from the village, paddling a canoe, looking for sago palms that are healthy. Women noted that many sago palms have black liquid inside and are not edible when harvested. As a result women spend more time harvesting sago. Where women were able to do other work in the home and even sit in at public meetings in the past, they are now absent from these activities because most of their time is spent looking for food for their families. Women are generally overworked and undernourished in the Middle Fly area and the destruction of sago swamps is the major contributing factor. Men, children and youth have also suffered and that is obvious from the lack of activity in the villages and the general state of health in the community. There is no doubt that hunger is prevalent because of declining supplies of sago.

PROLONGED FLOODING AND THE COMMUNITY

The effect of prolonged flooding in the Middle Fly area has devastated riverine gardens, and produced dieback where many trees have died. Trees that have been used for house posts, canoes, paddles and vines used for rope have all but disappeared in the immediate area of the Fly River.

For the men who are mainly involved with house, canoe and paddle making, this means that they have to travel further into the bush to look for these materials. Houses are not being maintained and/or replaced as often as they should be because the materials are very distant. In the case of the roof materials which are made from sago leaves, the palms no longer produce the right size of leaves as the leaves are now much smaller. This has meant that the general standard of housing has dropped, so that today most houses are in dire need of repair. The workload for maintaining houses and canoes which has been the task of the menfolk has increased threefold because of the increased distances required for preparing and transporting building materials. For example, even the vines needed to build houses are no longer growing on the main riverside.

As a result of the prolonged flooding, one of the concerns raised by Middle Fly villagers is that OTML or the Government must consider building permanent houses for villagers. This request was a genuinely raised concern in response to housing materials being destroyed by the prolonged flooding which has resulted in dilapidated houses not being replaced sooner.

The destruction of the environment in the Middle Fly has devastated these communities. Their devastation is one that cannot be easily measured because it has far reaching consequences even into future generations. Environmental destruction is irrecoverable for a minimum of fifty years even if the Ok Tedi mine were to cease operations tomorrow.² Today the consequences of the environmental destruction on development for the people of the Middle Fly have meant that these people now live in poverty.

POVERTY: THE LACK OF ...

Poverty is the lack of something whether it be lack of essential services such as health and education, lack of basic food, lack of information to make informed decisions, lack of finance, the lack of any basic need: that is the true meaning of poverty. In fact poverty occurs in extreme rural areas and in the middle of high-rise cities in the modern world. Poverty knows no boundaries and respects no one. Poverty in short is the lack of development.

Today more and more Papua New Guineans have acknowledged that poverty exists. In Papua New Guinea, poverty has become a face to be reckoned with because development has not followed the visions espoused in the National Goals and Directive Principles. The following discussion suggests that poverty caused by environmental damage is an outcome of development resulting from the neglect of Goal 4 of the NGDPs referred to earlier.

² This is a well-acknowledged fact that Managing Director for OTML, Roger Higgins, highlighted in the 1999 Waste Management Report.

In the case of the Middle Fly people, the environment has not been used wisely, the interests of the environment have not been maintained such as to preserve its abilities to conserve and replenish itself, and wildlife as well as human beings have not been adequately protected against actions in the name of development. The situation plainly illustrates the choices that have been made in the name of development.

The choices that have been made are firstly, development over environment and secondly, benefit for the majority to the cost of the minority. In reality what it has meant is this: choice number one of development over environment has allowed certain communities to have their livelihood destroyed through environmental deterioration and its effect on the Fly river communities, consequently these communities now live in poverty. Choice number two, benefit for the majority by the sacrifice of the minority has in effect taken away from these Middle Fly communities, and other such communities in similar situations, their right to actively participate in their own development. In other words, for the Middle Fly communities, choice number two has all but disempowered them in their own eyes. The relationship between these two choices is that poverty is fed by disempowerment. In order to alleviate poverty, people must be empowered to feel that they can actively participate in their own development or make a difference in their own communities.

Disempowerment is the inability to make a difference whether perceived or real. The indicators for disempowerment are when individuals and/or groups are unable to mobilise support or the means to create developmental initiatives whether it is political participation, social development or economic activities that are sustaining. The inability to act enables the self-perception that 'we are unable to perform' and this in turn feeds the cycle of inaction and inertia that results in the decline of quality of life, which results ultimately in poverty.

DEVELOPMENT BEFORE ENVIRONMENT HAS RESULTED IN POVERTY IN PNG

The question then arises as to what is exactly meant by development that has occurred over the previous twenty-five years. Development as envisioned by the CPC is holistic and integrated, development that has actually been pursued has been neither holistic nor integrated. Development in real terms has been pushed ahead by economics because the fundamental assumption has been that once economic development has been achieved then all other aspects of development will necessarily follow. However, this has not been the case, economic development has not been followed by social, human and political development. It may be fair to say that development in PNG has not occurred in all four areas

despite twenty-five years of independence. Development — social, human, political and economic — has occurred sparingly. The destruction of the environment as a direct consequence of development has resulted in poverty that is being strengthened by the disempowerment of the people.

The issue then is how do we break the cycle of poverty in Papua New Guinea? The solution lies in the people of Papua New Guinea. Whether that person be a coffee grower in the Waghi valley, a woman fishing for prawns on Umboi Island, a young person aspiring to be a schoolteacher yet to complete Year 6, a current Member of Parliament, a university graduate or even an intending political candidate in the forthcoming elections, we all have a part to play in development. Breaking the strengthening cycle of poverty in PNG means making choices about development. In real terms, choices have to be made about the nature of development in Papua New Guinea.

The challenge for the next twenty-five years is about choices followed by decisions, followed by actions. The first step can be made right now by firstly, not choosing development over the environment, and secondly, by choosing development for all with benefits for all.

CONCLUSION

Development in PNG has been to the detriment of the environment. This is against the grain of the development vision espoused in the Papua New Guinea Constitution. All people of Papua New Guinea have compromised development for the past twenty-five years since independence. The vision for development came from the people therefore all people must take responsibility to make this vision come alive. For too long Papua New Guineans have allowed events to take control of the development process thereby placing governance in crisis-management mode. The price of crisis management is borne out in the deteriorating state of the environment as a result of development.

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EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF FOREST RESOURCES

Ruth C.H. Turia

INTRODUCTION

Forest resources in Papua New Guinea (PNG) are being categorised as a commodity from which the owner can gain benefits, by way of revenue, social services, and economic development (Montagu, 1997). The term 'owner' is debatable in the PNG context. On one hand, the Constitution places all natural resources under the administrative ambit of the nation state — the independent State of Papua New Guinea. On the other hand, it acknowledges that all land is customarily owned. Would it be possible then for a nation state to efficiently manage its forest resources under this system of ownership? Forest management is defined here as 'the application of appropriate forestry principles and practices and business techniques necessary to a forest so that it remains healthy and vigorous and provides the products and amenities that the stakeholder desires' (Heiligmann, n.d.).

There have been suggestions (Yauieb, 1979; Baines, 1989; and Montagu, 1997) that the system of forest management introduced and as applied in PNG is not consistent with the unique land tenure system. This is because the land tenure system in PNG is such that ownership of land is vested in communal groups (kinships) and not an individual, as is the case in western society. In order for the Government to apply any form of forest management on the land, it has to secure some form of lease — transfer of timber rights from the customary owners. There have been obstacles associated with this form of lease, and I am sad to suggest that PNG has not efficiently managed its forest resources due to it. In this chapter, I will attempt to highlight how PNG has fared in the last 25 years since it became an independent state and offer some suggestions as to how it may develop efficient or sustainable forest management in the new millennium. By sustainable forest management I mean:

the process of managing forest to achieve one or more clearly specified objectives of management with regard to the production of a continuous flow of desired forest products and services without undue reduction of its inherent values and future productivity and without undue undesirable effects on the physical and social environment (adopted from ITTO, 1998).

HISTORY OF FOREST POLICY

The colonial policy relating to forestry was (1) to locate, assess, and regulate the availability of natural forest resources to bring them within the reach of development; (2) to encourage investment of private capital for the development of these resources; and (3) to ensure native participation in this development (Montagu, 1997). It is sad to note that these objectives from the colonial period have been adopted in all forest policies of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, with no strong evidence that efficient forest management has taken place in the country at the turn of the twenty-first century. Montagu (1997) suggests that PNG is still practising a culture of forest management that was inherited from the colonial era, which is geared towards timber production for economic growth.

Since the time of its progress towards an independent nation up to the present period, PNG has published and implemented three forest policies. These policies had different emphases — depending on what was the immediate need of the nation at the time. The first forest policy of the Government was published in 1973 — at the time of self-government. The 1979 forest policy after independence, and the current 1991 forest policy followed this.

1973 Forest Policy

The emphasis of the 1973 policy was on 'managing the forest resources of PNG as a national asset in the interests of present and future generations of the people' (Turia, 1995). During the period of this policy, the timber industry was geared towards producing timber for both the domestic and international markets. With the burden of sustaining and enhancing a new independent nation, and the need for generating its own revenue, the Government replaced the 1973 policy in 1979.

1979 Forest Policy

The 1979 policy emphasised meaningful contribution 'to the national development objectives through revenue generation, national ownership (the concept of landowner companies), and regional economic development'

(Turia, 1995). This policy was more geared towards log production for export. It also created an avenue for landowner companies to be established — the notion of national ownership, initially as joint venture partners with foreign loggers, but a trend developed whereby landowner companies were issued with timber permits and they subcontracted their obligations under the timber permit to the foreign contractor.

The trend under the 1979 policy created an opening for corruption and malfeasance (Barnett, 1989). The then government under Prime Minister Pais Wingti established a Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Timber Industry in 1987 which concluded its inquiry in 1989. One of the many findings of that Commission (also known as the Barnett Report) was that the 1979 forest policy was a defacto policy, in that the government was not complying fully with the objective of that policy, regarding the allocation of forest resources and the regulation of the timber industry (Barnett, 1989). The Commission recommended a new forest policy.

1991 Forest Policy

The 1991 policy acknowledged the merits of the two previous policies and re-enforced them, by emphasising 'management and protection of the nation's forest resources as a renewable natural asset and its utilisation to achieve economic growth, employment creation, greater PNG participation in industry and increased viable onshore processing' (Turia, 1995). The important objective of the 1991 forest policy, which was also that of the two previous policies, has been on economic growth, largely through revenue generation. Unfortunately, the aspect relating to forest resources being managed as a renewable natural asset has been given less attention. Even if the Government wanted to manage the forest resources as stated in the policy, it is faced with the issue of ownership of the forest resources and the land.

LAND AND FORESTS

Land

It is widely documented that about 97 per cent of all land in PNG is held under customary title that is unregistered, but constitutionally enforced. This therefore means that the forest resources on the customary land are also under customary title (Filer, 1998: 30). Within the overarching framework of customary ownership, there is individual usufruct of the customary land. While this usufruct could provide a basis for individual title — maybe on a leasehold basis from the customary clan owner — Hunt (2000: 5) suggests that overall 'the forest is invariably community-owned'.

The ownership issue has major implications for the notion of sustainability, and whether the Government can efficiently manage the forest resources of the country. I would suggest not — not because the Government is incapable of managing the country's forest resources, but because the land tenure system does not allow the Government a free hand to undertake forest management on customarily owned land. The situation in PNG is such that governments, even during the colonial period, generally had no control or, at most, very little control over the land.

Forest Resource

The National Forest Plan has classified the forest resource areas of PNG into five categories. These classifications are depicted in Figure 1, and include:

1. **production forest**; comprising *currently acquired* and *identified production forest yet to be acquired*;
2. **protection forest**; comprising *protected* areas that have been identified and gazetted by the Department of Environment and Conservation as being areas with high conservation and biodiversity values;
3. **reserve forest**; comprising forest areas yet to be classified (as productive, protection or salvage forest) pending future decision (includes *potential production forest areas, montane forest with slopes greater than 30° and inundated areas*);
4. **salvage forest**; refers to forest that is cleared for other uses, for example, clearance for agricultural development;
5. **land suitable for afforestation**; refers to areas of grassland and severely disturbed natural forest that have been identified and rights acquired from the landowners for the purpose of establishing a forestry estate (Papua New Guinea Forest Authority, 1996: 12).

Sustainable Annual Cut Level

In line with the objectives of the 1991 forest policy and the ensuing legislation, the National Forest Plan set a maximum sustainable annual cut level for the country, which is at 4.9 million cubic metres (PNGFA, 1996: 14). There are debates (Filer, 1997) as to the reliability of this estimate, but given that PNG has not undertaken a full forest resource inventory of the country, this paper will not argue about the estimate. This paper acknowledges that the estimate is above the annual log volume extracted in PNG up to 1998 — see Table 1. This suggests that PNG is harvesting a lower volume of logs than the estimate and that it is able to maintain a sustainable level of forest

harvest, therefore enhancing sustained yield. The estimate is also within the recommended estimates as determined from Landsat images that were/have developed under Australian aid, and which has been used as the official resource estimates for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of the *Forestry Act, 1991*.


Table 1: Log Exports, 1976–1998, also Forest Products as a Percentage of Total Export Earnings

Year	Export Volume — Logs (‘000 m ³)	Export Value — Forest Products (K'000)	Forest Products as a Percentage of Total Exports (%)
1976	488.9	22,000.0	4.7
1977	412.4	23,700.0	4.2
1978	421.9	24,200.0	4.3
1979	472.0	36,400.0	4.8
1980	641.9	47,000.0	6.8
1981	737.7	43,400.0	7.7
1982	1,057.1	61,400.0	10.8
1983	1,019.0	54,700.0	8.0
1984	1,201.1	81,700.0	9.9
1985	1,140.6	67,300.0	7.3
1986	1,298.9	74,700.0	7.5
1987	1,450.0	110,900.0	9.9
1988	1,347.9	97,500.0	7.8
1989	1,348.7	96,200.0	8.7
1990	923.4	69,900.0	6.4
1991	1,060.0	90,000.0	6.0
1992	1,600.0	148,000.0	8.0
1993	2,370.0	410,000.0	16.0
1994	2,940.0	494,000.0	18.0
1995	2,510.0	450,000.0	13.0
1996	2,610.0	480,000.0	14.0
1997	2,380.0	433,000.0	14.0
1998	1,070.0	173,000.0	5.0

Source: Fernando (1990), Turia (1995), AusAID (1999).

Table 1 only records the volume of logs exported, as the figures for processed logs are not very reliable. However, it is sufficient to point out that the processed volume has been very minimal — about 15 per cent due to the low priority given by the Government in encouraging the processing industry (Filer, 1997).

Figure 1: General Forest Classification (millions of hectares)



- * Areas of salvage forest and areas suitable for afforestation have yet to be identified.
- # Some forest areas under forest management agreement do not show/indicate all constraints on logging.

Source: Adapted from the General Forest Classification published in the *National Forest Plan* (1996), and the *Forest Resource Acquisition General Information* (1998).

This situation though appears to be changing, partly as a result of the 1991 forest policy, but more so because of the conditions that were attached to the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP),¹ in particular, an increase in the log export tax. This, in a way, forced some investors to invest in downstream processing plants, for example the Rimbunan Hijau Timber Processing Ltd plant in the Western Province, which is now producing and exporting veneer. Although this may imply an effort to log sustainably, this is not the case as, presently (2002), Rimbunan Hijau Timber Processing Ltd is not able to supply all its raw logs from the existing timber area where the processing plant has been constructed. The author was privileged to meet with some landowners from the Vailala Blocks 2 and 3 Forest Management Area in the Gulf Province, who indicated that some of the raw logs from their timber area is being transported to the Western

¹ The PNG Government sought assistance from the World Bank under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1995 to bail it out of its economic crises. The forestry sector was one of the sectors that had conditions attached to it as part of the SAP.

Province to feed the processing plant there (Meeting with landowners on 1/10/02).

It is important to note also that the volume of log exports has increased markedly as compared to 1976 — see trend in Table 1. This has been due in part to the emphasis placed by the Government on revenue generation (Ministry of Forests, 1979). The market conditions also play a major factor in the volume of logs harvested as can be noted in Table 1, particularly the sharp increase from 1993 up to 1997 and then a sharp fall in 1998 (AusAID, 1999), also as a result of the high log export tax.

PRODUCTION FOREST AREAS

The Papua New Guinea Forest Authority estimates PNG's current potential production forest areas to be about 26.2 million hectares (Forest Inventory Mapping System data as at 30 June 1999). Of this estimate, it has secured timber rights over 10.5 million hectares (see Table 2),² out of which it has allocated 6.1 million hectares to timber loggers for exploitation and management (PNGFA, 1998). This represents about 58 per cent of the total forest areas under some form of logging activity. Table 2 shows the breakdown of these areas by provinces. The table further shows that of the 6.1 million hectares allocated, 64 are under the timber rights purchase, 17 under local forest areas and 9 under forest management agreements.

It would be very interesting to note the size and location of these production forest areas and compare them with the level of forest areas under plantations — see Table 3. As Table 2 shows, the Southern Region has the largest forest area under logging. The New Guinea Island Region follows this, with West New Britain Province alone dominating with a total of 1.1 million hectares of land under logging.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREST MANAGEMENT

Responsibility for forest management has largely been placed on the Government, by statute; however, the Government passes some of that responsibility onto the logger, under a negotiated project agreement. The Government's role has been more on regulating the Act and monitoring the progress of the project agreements. To this end, the Government has in place a Logging Code of Practice, and other Guidelines and Procedures for regulating the forest industry. Even with all the above in place, I cannot see efficient management of forest resources, mainly because the land and the forest resources are owned by the customary landowners, and they determine whether it can be efficiently managed. I question why the customary

² This includes 967,508 hectares of declared forest areas under the Local Forest Area of the repealed *Forestry (Private Dealings) Act*.

Table 2: PNGFA Timber Rights and Areas Allocated to Loggers by Region and Province

Region/ Province	Total Number of Current Acquired Timber Areas	Total Area (Ha.)	Total Number of Areas Allocated by Type				
			TRP*	LFA**	FMA***	Total Area (Ha.)	
Southern							
Western	9	2,028,312	5	0	0	738,906	
Gulf	12	2,535,668	3	0	5	2,400,603	
Central	15	482,978	3	0	2	239,741	
Milne Bay	5	202,101	1	0	0	87,530	
Oro	6	358,096	2	1	0	101,877	
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>5,607,155</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>3,568,657</i>	
Momase							
West Sepik	9	681,255	2	1	0	325,928	
East Sepik	6	630,948	0	2	0	79,978	
Madang	10	384,070	5	0	0	255,485	
Morobe	14	276,569	4	0	2	119,685	
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>1,972,842</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>781,076</i>	
New Guinea Island							
West New Britain	57	1,507,008	13	12	0	1,106,046	
East New Britain	26	567,517	14	0	0	375,367	
New Ireland	17	562,341	5	0	0	223,065	
Manus	2	51,734	1	1	0	51,734	
North Solomons	11	96,660	0	0	0	0	
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>2,785,260</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1,756,212</i>	
Highlands							
Southern	10	39,241	6	0	0	37,070	
Eastern	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Western	13	83,129	0	0	0	0	
Simbu	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Enga	6	42,767	0	0	0	0	
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>165,137</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>37,070</i>	
TOTAL	228	10,530,394	64	17	9	6,143,015	

Source: Table drawn on the basis of data from the Forest Authority as presented in:

- 1) *The Forest Resource Acquisition General Information*, November 1998;
- 2) *Current Projects as at 18 May 2000*; and
- 3) *Status of Forest Working Plans and Annual Logging Plans for Timber Projects as at 31 March 2000*.


* TRP

** LFA

*** FMA

landowners have no responsibility at all in the management of the forest on their land. Figure 2 shows the trend or culture of forest management as currently practised by the Government. It shows that the Government is only interested in forest management by name but in reality, no forest management is undertaken on the ground (customary land).

Figure 2: PNG's Culture of Forest Management



Forest Plantations

It is also worth highlighting that the Government has established some forest plantations, mainly on land that was presumed state land from the colonial era, and that it is undertaking natural reafforestation (very small scale) on customary land. In respect of the plantations, these are mainly of exotic timber species, which highlights another issue for PNG as to whether it should be encouraging plantings of such exotic species. On the other hand, under the natural reafforestation system, indigenous timber species are being utilised; however the success of this system is yet to be known. Unfortunately, some of the established plantations have now reverted to customary ownership in Table 3 (private forest areas are shown). Even with these plantations, it is not enough to replenish what is being harvested from the natural forests. Table 3 gives an indication of these plantations, by location, ownership of land, and species type.

Timber Industry

There is no strong evidence to suggest that the exploitation of forest resources has enabled greater Papua New Guinea participation, nor enabled more Papua New Guineans to be employed in the forestry sector (Filer, 1998: 242). Filer further suggests that there may be between 6,500 to 7,000 people (mostly men) employed in the forestry sector, and mainly

Table 3: Main Forest Plantations in PNG

Province	Location	Main Species	Total Area (ha.)
State Forests			
Central	Kuriva	<i>Tectona grandis</i> (Teak)	600
Madang	Madang	<i>Eucalyptus deglupta</i>	900
	North Coast	(Kamarere); <i>Acacia mangium</i> ; <i>Terminalia brassii</i>	
Morobe	Wau-Bulolo	<i>Araucaria cunninghamii</i> (Klinki); <i>A. hunsteinii</i> (Hoop); <i>Pinus caribaea</i> (Pine)	12,144
Milne Bay	Sagarai	<i>A. mangium</i> ; <i>E. deglupta</i> ; <i>T. brassii</i>	1,500
New Ireland	Kaut	<i>E. deglupta</i> ; <i>Calophyllum</i> spp.; <i>Pterocarpus indicus</i>	250
Eastern Highlands	Fayantina	<i>P. patula</i>	900
Highlands	Lapegu	<i>P. patula</i>	3,200
	Kainantu	<i>P. patula</i>	1,000
Western Highlands	Wagni	<i>E. grandis</i> ; <i>E. robusta</i> ; <i>E. saligna</i> ; <i>P. patula</i>	2,100
Southern Highlands	Orere, Kui, Baino	<i>P. patula</i> ; <i>E. robusta</i>	400
<i>Total State Forests</i>			22,994
Private Forests			
Madang	Gogol (Gogol Reforestation Co.)	<i>E. deglupta</i> ; <i>A. mangium</i> ; <i>T. brassii</i>	10,745
East New Britain	Open Bay (Open Bay Timber Co.)	<i>E. deglupta</i> ; <i>T. brassii</i> ; <i>A. mangium</i>	12,004
	Kerevat (Customary — ex state forest)	<i>T. grandis</i> ; <i>E. deglupta</i> ; <i>A. mangium</i> ; <i>Octomeles</i> . <i>sumatrana</i>	1,900
West New Britain	Ulamona (Ulamona landowners with Catholic Mission)	<i>E. deglupta</i>	n.a.
Central	Brown River (Customary — ex state forest)	<i>T. grandis</i>	1,200
<i>Total Private Forests</i>			35,107
Overall Total			58,101

Source: Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (1997).

in the logging and log exports area (1998: 50). The timber industry has and continues to be focused more on logging for log exports, quite the opposite of the objective of the forest policy regarding downstream processing. As to date, the following processing facilities have been established and are in operation: 1 plywood factory in Bulolo; 1 woodchip mill in Madang; 49 sawmills with various capacities; and 27 furniture factories and joinery workshops (PNGFA, 1997). It is estimated that the combined log input for all these processing facilities is about 15 per cent of the total log harvest.

Lessons Learnt in the Last 25 years

It would appear that the Government has not really learnt from its past handling of forest management, especially in ensuring real forest management occurs on the ground. Many studies under various auspices, for example the Commission of Inquiry (Barnett, 1989), and the Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP), led by the World Bank (World Bank, 1990), have highlighted the problems in the forestry sector, which are related to ownership of land and forests, as well as the poor efficiency of the Government in regulating and monitoring the timber industry. This is not to say that the government policymakers are not aware of these problems.

The Government took the necessary steps to implement some of the recommendations of the Barnett Report under the TFAP umbrella through the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme (NFCAP). It now has in place the 1991 forest policy and a unified National Forest Service under the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority. The role of the Authority is to manage the forest resources of the country so that they be conserved and used for the collective benefit of all citizens now and in the future (World Bank, 1990). Other government agencies, for example, the Department of Environment and Conservation, the Department of Agriculture and Livestock, the Department of Lands, the Department of Finance and Planing) and non-government organisations were also included in the NFCAP process. This was to allow for the management of forest resources that would take into consideration all the factors (ecological, economic, and social). Unfortunately, at the end of the day, the same trend prevails, in that a government agency works on its own.

RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING FOREST RESOURCES

It is my strong belief that the current forest policy is appropriate as it covers all aspects of forest management that a government would have. What is needed though is a change in the approach and methods of


delivery of forest management principles. The Government must now realise that it cannot apply forest management principles on land that it does not own. Likewise, a logger cannot apply forest management on land that it does not own. Yet, both are interested in having a sustainable and viable forest base.

The change that I am proposing (many others have also suggested this: for example, the World Bank, 1990; Filer, 1997) is related to the involvement of customary resource owners in the actual management of the forests. Instead of the Government passing on part of its responsibility to the logger, it should instead be looking at coming up with an institutional framework that would enable customary resource owners to be actively involved in the management of the forest. This framework would include all three parties, government, logger and resource owners. The Government would continue to regulate the industry; the logger would undertake the logging, including infrastructure and the like; and the resource owners would undertake the applied forest management that has been determined and agreed to by all parties.

It may be argued that the resource owners lack the knowledge to undertake this task of forest management. This may be true in the scientific sense of understanding the growth yield and the ecological interaction of forest disturbance. But I believe that the resource owners know the importance of why they should have a forest resource that they could gain benefit from now and for their children's use in the future. It therefore would be in their interests as well to ensure that it is managed efficiently. I would therefore suggest that the Government improve on its present culture of forest management by including resource owners in the management process, along a structure such as that shown in Figure 3.

This firstly means that in line with the current forest policy and legislation, the Government prepares the National Forest Plan. This plan would include all the potential forest areas that have been identified by the Government and which, in consultation with the appropriate landowners and the Provincial Governments, are recommended and listed as the future forest management areas. These would be the areas that the Government will manage on behalf of the landowners for their immediate benefit as well as for the benefit of the whole of PNG in the long term.

Figure 3: Recommended Culture of Forest Management



CONCLUSION

As Montagu (1997) asserts, existing institutional frameworks are in place for Papua New Guinea to enhance its drive for sustainable forest management, and be seen in the global arena to be contributing to the well-being of its citizens through its management system. Unfortunately, there appears to be no efficient forest resource management in PNG. This is because both the Government and its people have not allowed for land to be developed and managed for the purposes of maintaining a forest resource base. While Papua New Guineans can be proud of the form of land tenure that they have, in that the land is not viewed as a commodity to be traded (Baines, 1989), they must be mindful of their constitutional obligation to foster the development of their country and their children in the future, and not to hinder development because of their right to the land. A suggested method of ensuring that some form of forest management does take place is to involve resource owners in all phases of a forestry project, commencing from acquisition, through to allocation.

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SECTION 4

SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT:
PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS

THE HEALTH PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: Persisting Problems and Emerging Challenges

Francis W. Hombhanje

INTRODUCTION

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a tropical country and, until recently, tropical diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, and childhood infections such as measles, pertusis and diarrhoeal diseases have been the major issues on the health agenda in the last forty years of the last century. While a few of these diseases such as leprosy are slowly waning, others such as malaria continue to persist without signs of abating. In addition, in the last two decades or so new infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and other lifestyle diseases such as diabetes have emerged, adding an extra burden to the already overburdened health system (Crouch-Chivers, 1998).

Thus PNG has to address double burden disease problems as it enters the first decade of the twenty-first century: first, some major infectious diseases that survived the twentieth century — the unfinished health agenda — and second, the emerging infectious and non-infectious diseases which are becoming prevalent. This chapter provides an overview of the disease pattern, rather than discussing the diseases in detail.

PROFILE OF SOME MAJOR DISEASES

The range of diseases impairing the health and well-being of Papua New Guineans is largely influenced by culture, social and economic factors, including, most likely, the consequences of adaptation or mal-adaptation to the rapid changes associated with sociocultural change and urbanization.

The importance of diseases, therefore, may be considered from a number of perspectives and according to their social, economic, political or health significance.

Some of the major diseases that are of public health concern in PNG at present can be considered under the following sub-headings: (1) diseases that, despite health services improvement in the last 25 years, continue to be leading causes of morbidity and mortality, and (2) diseases that have emerged and re-emerged within the last 25 years that are poised to overshadow persisting diseases, and (3) diseases that are not omnipresent but are a potential health threat to PNG.

Diseases that Persist to the 21st Century

Despite the advances of the twentieth century, a significant component of the health burden still remains, particularly those attributable to infections, undernutrition and complications of childbirth. In this subsection, some important diseases in terms of morbidity and mortality are outlined, and, for simplicity, diseases are considered according to the mode of transmission.

Mosquito-borne Diseases

Mosquitoes transmit several diseases that are of medical importance. Mosquito-borne diseases of public health concern in PNG include:

- Malaria
- Filariasis

Malaria

Malaria is one of the ancient diseases of the world. Malaria is now confined to tropical and subtropical countries including PNG. It is caused by *blood parasites* and female *Anopheles*, mosquitoes that are abundant in the coastal regions which transmit these parasites. There are four different species of these parasites, causing four different forms of malaria. The form that kills individuals with malaria is caused by a parasite species called *Plasmodium falciparum*. The other three parasite species (*Plasmodium vivax*, *Plasmodium malariae*, *Plasmodium ovale*) do not usually kill but can cause acute infection and hospital admission.

Malaria is one of the five leading causes of deaths in hospitals and health centres. From 1960 to 1970, it accounted on average for 4.6 per cent of all deaths; from 1971 to 1984, for 6.3 per cent of deaths (PNG Department of Health, 1974, 1986) and from 1995 to 1997 the mortality due to malaria has increased to 12 per cent, now second only to pneumonia as a cause of hospital admissions and deaths (PNG Department of Health). Its greatest impact is on children; remote coastal villagers who have little

access to health services; the mobile population of the Highlands, migrating to the coast; and individuals of coastal origin having lived in non-malarial areas of the Highlands returning to the coast from mine sites. Over the past two years, malaria epidemics have occurred in some highland areas, affecting the resident population and resulting in high mortality. The trend is expected to continue to increase with increasing mobility of the population to and from coastal areas.

The presence of multidrug resistant forms of malaria and other operational issues such as behaviour towards the use of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, health promotion activities, and quality of diagnosis also complicate the application of effective control measures throughout PNG. Malaria will still remain a significant public health problem in PNG with high morbidity and mortality. The trend is expected to continue to increase as population increases, and also as a result of the changing nature of the disease itself (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Malaria in PNG: Admissions and Deaths

Filariasis

Filariasis is the name given to the general condition resulting from parasitic infection by threadlike or filiform worms called microfilaria. These microfilaria are transmitted by mosquitoes to humans, but are a different mosquito species from those that transmit malaria. There are several forms of filariasis but one form commonly occurs in PNG and is due to *Wuchereria bancrofti*. The parasites live in the lymphatic system, and block the lymphatic system (lymphatic filariasis) and cause hardened tissue swelling. The disease does not kill directly but causes great disability.

Lymphatic filariasis is a public health concern in PNG. The disease affects approximately several hundred thousand people. It is most widespread in PNG where the disease is endemic. However, the tools needed to control and eventually eliminate lymphatic filariasis are available. The method for distributing a combination of two drugs is simple and consists of annual mass distribution of a combination of diethylcarbamazine and albendazole. In areas where filariasis is still a problem, with adequate coverage and good compliance, the responsible microfilaria can be eliminated in a period of less than five years.

Elimination of lymphatic filariasis is an attainable goal in PNG. A successful drug distribution campaign requires careful planning for mass drug distribution and preparation of logistical support, including well trained health workers and full community participation through mobilization. However, it would be more difficult in areas of PNG where the disease is endemic and logistical problems are enormous. More resources will be needed to overcome some of these logistical problems, which are a key to the success of mass drug distribution strategies. It is hoped that PNG will free itself of lymphatic filariasis in the next decade as has been achieved in some countries of the Pacific.

Airborne Diseases

Airborne diseases are spread from an infected person to others through spitting, sneezing and coughing. The important airborne diseases of major public health concern are:

- Tuberculosis
- Pneumonia
- Other respiratory conditions

These diseases can be prevented by preventive measures that involve personal hygiene, improved standards of living, and better nutrition. High morbidity and mortality are due to delayed and poor treatment compliance, especially in tuberculosis. Early diagnosis and treatment will prevent deaths and disabilities.

Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis is a disease caused by a bacterial organism (germ) called *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*. The same family of germs, but different species, also causes leprosy. Leprosy (not discussed here) is spread usually through direct personal contact and the disease itself is declining in many areas.

Tuberculosis is a disease that remained a public health problem in PNG since its introduction. Tuberculosis has a higher incidence in the

coastal provinces of the country. However, incomplete data prevents calculation of comparative incidence rates for coastal regions and the highland provinces. In 1974 the incidence rate was estimated at 0.8 per 1000 population nationally, with rates of 1.5 per 1000 in the coastal regions below 1000 metres and 0.04 per 1000 in the Highlands above 1000 metres. In 1984 the national incidence and prevalence of tuberculosis were estimated to be 10.7 and 20.1 per 10,000 respectively, while the Highland region showed increases, ranging from 0.2 to 4.5 in incidence and from 1.2 to 6.6 in prevalence. By 1999, the national incidence and prevalence stood at 176 and 549 per 100,000, respectively, while in the Highlands the incidence and prevalence rates were 51 and 130 per 100,000, respectively.




Figure 2: Tuberculosis in PNG: Admissions and Deaths, 1961–1997

The mortality due to tuberculosis is unlikely to change, if anything it will increase as the nature of the disease changes. It accounted on average for 5.8 per cent of the mortality rate in 1960–1970, 4.5 per cent in 1971–1984, and surged to an all-time high of 7.0 per cent in the period 1995–1997. Tuberculosis thus has moved from sixth place in the leading causes of death in the period 1960–1984 to fourth place in 1995–1997 (PNG Department of Health Plan, 1986, 2000). Overall, tuberculosis is a disease that is showing an upward trend (Figure 2), a serious concern indeed.

Pneumonia

Pneumonia (infection of the lungs) has long been recognized as a major cause of morbidity and mortality, particularly among children of less than five years and adults over forty-four years of age. Pneumonia is a disease

that affects the lungs and impairs breathing. The common causes of pneumonia in PNG are either due to bacteria or viral agents.

Hospital statistics and epidemiological studies indicate that the disease has not changed much over the last two decades. Pneumonia ranks third, after obstetric conditions and malaria, accounting for 14 per cent of all institutional admissions. However, in mortality, pneumonia is the leading cause of death, accounting for 16 per cent of all deaths in the period 1995–1997. The regional distribution shows pneumonia to be number one killer infection for the Highland (22.0 per cent) and Momase (16.0 per cent) regions, while it ranks only second to perinatal conditions, for the Southern region (10.0 per cent), and third, to malaria and perinatal conditions for the Island region (11.0 per cent).

Although there is a slow downward trend in morbidity and mortality (Figure 3), the mortality statistics for this condition have not changed dramatically in forty years. From 1960 to 1970, pneumonia accounted on average for 19.2 per cent of all hospital and health centres deaths. This figure increased in the 1971 to 1984 period to 21.3 per cent, but declined to 16.1 per cent in the three years 1995 to 1997. Despite improvements in accessibility to health services and widespread use of antibiotics for its treatment, pneumonia will still remain one of the leading causes of death in PNG, partly as a result of overcrowding, and the transmission of more virulent (drug resistant) forms of the infection.




Figure 3: Pneumonia in PNG: Admissions and Deaths, 1961–1997

Other respiratory conditions

Other childhood respiratory illnesses which include bronchitis, pertusis, and asthma still carry high morbidity and mortality. These illnesses affect young children under eighteen months of age. The incidence rate of pertusis was estimated at 1 per 1,000 per year population in 1997–1999, which is a decline from 8.2 per 1,000 per year population a decade ago. Chronic lung diseases — such as asthma, chronic obstructive lung diseases, including bronchitis — are also common, particularly in the highlands where it affects over 20 per cent of individuals over the age of forty-five years. It is a major concern because it results in high morbidity and disability.

Sexually-Transmitted Infections

The incidence of sexually transmitted infections, which include gonorrhoea, syphilis, donovanosis and chlamydia, is still unacceptably high. The sexually transmitted infections of major public health concern are:

- Gonorrhoea
- Syphilis
- Other sexually transmitted diseases

Gonorrhoea and syphilis

Gonorrhoea and syphilis are the two most frequently reported sexually transmitted diseases in PNG. A bacterial organism called *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* causes gonorrhoea and syphilis is due to another bacterial organism called *Treponema pallidum*. The diseases have become entrenched in some regions, particularly in the highlands and National Capital district of PNG. However, over the last thirty years or so there have been some notable changes in the general trend of both diseases (Figure 4).

In 1963 there were 376 and 3 confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis, respectively. In 1974 there were 6,333 cases of gonorrhoea and 1,347 cases of syphilis. In 1984 there were 16,696 and 6,943 confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis respectively (PNG Department of Health, 1974, 1986). In 1995 there were 7,431 and 1,800 confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis, respectively. These figures remained stable over the last five years (1995–1999) with a trend to a further reduction in the number of cases. In 1999 there were 4,760 confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and 1,199 cases of syphilis and, overall, there has been a general decline in the number of cases reported (PNG Department of Health, 2000). This may indicate either a real decline or incomplete reporting of the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.

Whatever the reason for the downward trend, the reduction in the number of confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis in the 1990s

must be interpreted with caution — the bigger picture of both gonorrhoea and syphilis, including other sexually transmitted diseases, has probably been submerged by the emergence of HIV/AIDS. The potential danger of a hidden epidemic of gonorrhoea, syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases (excluding HIV/AIDS) is probably overshadowed by HIV/AIDS at present — after all, these diseases are culturally sensitive.




Figure 4: Gonorrhoea and Syphilis in PNG, 1963–1999

Food- and Waterborne Diseases


Food- and waterborne diseases are transmitted from infected individuals to others through eating and drinking contaminated food and/or water. The common food- and waterborne diseases of public health importance in PNG include:

- Rotavirus-caused diarrhoeal diseases
- Bacillary dysentery
- Amoebic dysentery

Diarrhoeal diseases

Diarrhoeal diseases remain a major public health problem despite a downward trend in recent years (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Diarrhoeal Disease in PNG, 1961–1997



Acute diarrhoeal illness caused by bacterial, viral or protozoal organisms vary from mild bowel disturbances to fulminant, life-threatening diseases. It is responsible for one third of childhood deaths and malnutrition in PNG. It mainly affects children under one year of age with a high proportion occurring in males. When these illnesses occur with malnutrition in young children they can become particularly serious, causing severe dehydration due to excessive water loss. Diarrhoeal diseases are not good for children because this can affect their growth and mental development.

Diarrhoeal disease remains a major health problem for children under five years of age. From 1960 to 1972 diarrhoeal diseases accounted for between 4.7 and 9.3 per cent (5,000–16,000 cases) of all hospital admissions, with mortality ranging from 3.8 to 11.3 per cent in the same period. Two decades later (1993–1997), morbidity and mortality figures of 3.4 per cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively, still remain close to the 1960–1972 figures. Regional 1993–1997 data show the Highland region had a high percentage (4.0 per cent) of admissions, while Momase had the lowest (2.6 per cent) but mortality figures showed totally opposite trend, a high death rate (4.1 per cent) in the Momase region compared to the Highland region, which accounted for only 2.9 per cent (PNG Department of Health, 2000; Wyrsch et al. 1998). However, the general trend for that period seems stable for the four regions.

In adults, bacillary and amoebic dysentery are common. These two conditions manifest as diarrhoea, however, have low morbidity and mortality. Much of the diarrhoeal diseases are related to poor sanitation, poor quality of water supply and overcrowding in peri-urban areas. For children, bottle-feeding is also a known contributing factor to childhood diarrhoeal diseases and deaths. Among the urban community the practice

of using bottles and teats is increasing despite community awareness and existing legislation.

EMERGING DISEASES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Like anywhere else in the Western Pacific, PNG has been faced with emerging and re-emerging communicable and non-communicable diseases in recent years. The emerging diseases are due to newly identified and previously unknown infections or disease processes that cause public health problems. In contrast, re-emerging diseases are due to a re-appearance and increase of infections that are known, but have fallen to a low level and hence no longer considered public health problem. Again, the diseases can be considered under various modes of transmission.

Mosquito-borne Diseases

Apart from transmitting malaria and filariasis, mosquitoes, but a different species, transmit two other diseases of medical importance to PNG (Mackenzie, 1998). The following mosquito-borne diseases are of important public health concern:

- Dengue fever
- Japanese encephalitis

Dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis

Arboviruses cause dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis. These viral agents are transmitted by mosquitoes to man. These are diseases that appear to be emerging particularly along the PNG-Indonesian border area in Western Province. However, the true incidences of dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis are unknown at present due to poor diagnostic and surveillance systems.

These viral infections occur sporadically and while many of the infections are clinically mild, may, in severe cases lead to serious complications and death. However, they are important infectious diseases because of their epidemic potential which could be devastating.

Airborne Diseases

Tuberculosis infection alone is already a major public health concern as mentioned above. However, tuberculosis/HIV co-infection is now emerging.

Tuberculosis/HIV co-infection

Tuberculosis and HIV co-infection is a serious public health problem. As the HIV infections increase so will tuberculosis and HIV co-infections. The implications are that tuberculosis would be more difficult to treat

even with current anti-tuberculosis drugs; at the least, treatment will take more than 6 months. Without serious attention to this emerging phenomenon, a tuberculosis epidemic would be a likely predicament.

Sexually-Transmitted Infections

The following sexually transmitted diseases have emerged and have become a major public health concern:

- HIV/AIDS in adults
- HIV/AIDS in children


AIDS/HIV adults

Acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is the most serious expression of a series of related disorders due to infection by human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV). HIV/AIDS, first known in 1987, is already one of the leading causes of adult medical admissions and deaths in major hospitals in PNG (PNG Department of Health, 1995, 2000).

Since it was first reported, there has been a steady increase in the number of confirmed cases of HIV and AIDS (Figure 6). From 1991 to 1999, there were 2,271 confirmed cases of HIV, 769 cases of AIDS and 169 deaths from HIV/AIDS. Regional distribution shows that in the same period (1991–1999), there were 1,635 (168.1 per 100,000), 441 (8.8 per 100,000), 145 (1.6 per 100,000), and 50 (0.8 per 100,000) cases of confirmed HIV in the Southern, Highlands, Momase, and Island regions. The disease pattern shows a positive trend in all four regions, particularly in the National Capital District (Port Moresby). The annual number of new cases of HIV/AIDS appears to be doubling. However, there is significant under-reporting and under diagnosis of both HIV and AIDS, and cumulative totals of only 2,271 HIV infections and 769 cases of AIDS have been reported in the period 1991–1999; that is a total of 3,040 HIV/AIDS cases. HIV/AIDS is a major public health problem almost reaching epidemic proportions.

Much of the transmission of HIV in PNG in adults is through sexual contact. HIV can affect any person of any age, and in PNG it is affecting young sexually active adults who are also in the economically productive age group. This not only has serious socio-economic implications for the young developing nation but also places an increased burden on the limited resources available for prevention and control efforts. There is a lack of appropriate legislative framework for the prevention and control of sexually transmitted infections such as HIV/AIDS. Some form of legislation for future AIDS care needs is also needed, which may include strategic planning and development of clinical guidelines and protocols to meet those needs.

Figure 4: HIV/AIDS in PNG, 1991–1999



HIV/AIDS children

In children, transmission of HIV/AIDS is usually through maternal transmission from infected mothers to newborn babies. The incidence of maternal transmission from infected mothers to newborn babies is alarming and in the last five years 90 children have been registered, their ages ranging from birth to six years of age. The common causes for admission for these infected children are pneumonia, chronic gastroenteritis and failure to thrive (Kiromat et al., 2000). As the HIV/AIDS population increases so will the population of children born to mothers with HIV infection, a situation that needs immediate action for its obvious implications.

Food- and Waterborne Diseases

The common food- and waterborne disease that is emerging or re-emerging rapidly and is of public health concern is typhoid.

Typhoid


Typhoid is a communicable disease and has recently become a disease of major public health concern in PNG. A bacterial organism called *Salmonella typhi* causes typhoid and although it has remained sporadic in the past (Figure 7) with very low morbidity and mortality, it is feared that it might become more prevalent as peri-urban squatter settlements expand with more overcrowding. Regular epidemics have occurred in those peri-urban areas of Port Moresby that have limited water supply and poor sanitation.

From 1993 to 1997, typhoid accounted for 1.9 per cent of all admissions and 2.6 per cent of all deaths in hospitals and health centres. The prevalence rate for the same period was estimated at 33 per 100,000. The five highland Provinces were more afflicted than any other province in

PNG, while Manus Province recorded no cases of typhoid in the period 1993 to 1997 (PNG Department of Health, 2000).

Typhoid is a preventable communicable disease. Drug treatment of typhoid has its limitations; bacteria have already developed some degree of tolerance to the readily and cheaply available drugs. This might pose a major problem for typhoid treatment in PNG. Although incidence and prevalence of typhoid infection show a downward trend in the last few years (Figure 7), the challenge now is how to enhance the downward trend and prevent the disease from ever reaching epidemic proportions.

Figure 7: Typhoid in PNG, 1961–1997



Lifestyle Diseases

Until the 1970s, lifestyle diseases were not a public health problem in PNG. However, there has since been a rapid increase in these diseases, particularly amongst the urban and peri-urban populations. Lifestyle diseases are associated with tobacco use (Kaul, 2000), excessive alcohol consumption, lack of physical exercise and consuming food and drink high in sugar, fat and salt. Other important factors include stress associated with social displacement, rapid economic and cultural transition and air and water pollution (Sinnet et al., 1992).

Lifestyle diseases of public health importance are:

- Cardiovascular diseases
- Diabetic diseases
- Alcohol and illicit drug use

Cardiovascular diseases

There may be a hidden epidemic of cardiovascular diseases with social changes. Collectively, within cardiovascular diseases, ischaemic heart disease, hypertension and cerebro-vascular diseases including stroke are the most significant conditions. The current trend appears to be that ischaemic heart disease will be the largest single cause of disease burden in PNG over the next decade.

Diabetes

Type-2 (non-insulin-dependent [NIDDM]) diabetes mellitus is known to be common in some coastal populations in PNG. The disease prevalence is high and it is increasing. It was estimated that by year 2000, there would be approximately 180,000 diabetics in PNG in a population of about 5 million. This number would rise to 450,000 by the year 2025. These are frightening figures by any standard and if the figures become reality, this will be a major strain on the health budget (King, 1992; Ogle et al., 2000).

It is quite probable that currently only a small proportion of the population with NIDDM is recognized and on treatment, while the majority (more than 90 per cent) may have the disease but not be aware that they have it. What we are seeing is only the 'peak' of the iceberg.


Neoplastic Diseases

Another large cause of disease burden in PNG is neoplastic diseases (cancers). The leading cancers are:

- Mouth cancer
- Cervical cancer
- Breast cancer
- Primary liver cancer

These cancers are responsible for a large proportion of life lost and years lived with disability. Neoplastic diseases are one of the ten leading causes of hospital admissions and deaths. Among coastal men, the common cancer is the mouth cancer, while primary liver cancer is relatively prevalent in the Highlands. Uterine cervical and breast cancers are the leading causes of death among women, the former being the second most common malignancy (Mgone, 1998). Due to lack of community awareness and diagnostic services, the extent of these cancers including others such as lung cancer, leukaemias, oesophageal, bowel and childhood cancers are largely unknown. Neoplastic diseases in general seem to be rising (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Cancer Deaths, 1961–1997



Physical Injuries

Injuries, intentional or unintentional now constitute serious public health concern, and account for significant morbidity and mortality. The physical injuries result from the following events:

- Motor vehicle accidents
- Domestic violence


Injuries, intentional or unintentional, have been on the health agenda for some time. These have been a largely neglected or ignored health problem in all regions. Road traffic accidents are common and for adults aged between 15 and 44 years, road traffic accidents are the biggest cause of ill health and premature death nationwide in PNG (Watters, 2000; Kaminiel and Kevau, 2000). Unless preventive measures are put in place, the number of road traffic accidents is likely to increase.

Domestic violence, especially against women, is not always reflected in physical injuries but may be apparent in psychological sequelae. Traditionally, violence has been classified as a cause of injury, particularly among women, where the connection may not always be evident; the health consequences also need to be understood. So too does the different nature of the violence experienced by men, women and children.

Nationally, injuries are responsible for some deaths and disability. Injuries have, nevertheless, often been a neglected area of public health policy. More attention, therefore, needs to be focused on dealing with the growing problem of injuries — through more comprehensive prevention, improved emergency and treatment services, and better rehabilitation.

There has been an upward trend since the 1960s (Figure 9) and accidents and injuries are expected to increase as mobility of population and the number of vehicles in use increase. Accidents and injuries are not limited to the urban population but also the rural population who have to commute long distances to towns and cities.

Figure 9: Injuries and Accidents (including poisoning) in PNG, 1961–1997



DISEASES UNDER SURVEILLANCE

Diseases under surveillance are those diseases to which the health services give special focus because of their potential health threat. The diseases include:

- Cholera
- Rabies
- Dengue fever
- Yellow fever
- Plague
- Poliomyelitis

In the year 2000, PNG joined those parts of the world where polio is not a problem or where polio has been eradicated. To maintain a polio-free state, continuing surveillance is important.

THE HEALTH AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The Unfinished Health Business

Despite better health services and health infrastructural development over the last 25 years, disease patterns appear to have changed little. Infectious diseases are still the major cause of death in PNG. There are five major childhood conditions, which are responsible for more than 80 per cent of all deaths in rural and urban (peri-urban) areas: diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections including pneumonia, malaria, measles and peri-natal conditions. It is noteworthy that most of the deaths among infants and young children are attributed to a limited number of conditions for which either preventive or curative interventions exist.

Immunization programmes have yielded the most significant changes in child health in the last two and half decades. Vaccines probably represent the most cost-effective public health intervention of all, yet the country does not use these enough. Children still die each year from diseases for which vaccines are available at low cost. Similarly, for diarrhoeal disease, inexpensive and effective intervention is available: oral rehydration therapy. A high proportion of deaths in children under five years of age are attributable to diarrhoeal disease and pneumonia. In several developing countries including PNG, diarrhoeal disease, pneumonia and malaria have been merged into a programme called 'Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses', a simplified approach to promoting child health mainly through preventive strategies which must be promoted aggressively.

In adults, maternal conditions, cancers, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis are three major causes of the disease burden. Together they account for almost half of all deaths. However, the burden of maternal conditions is hard to quantify because of lack of reliable data. But it is a major public health problem and represents a major and necessary burden for which policymakers should be held accountable. It is unacceptable that women should continue to suffer and die as a result of complications related to pregnancies and childbirth. Expanding health system coverage is required: women must have access to skilled assistance during pregnancy and childbirth, and must be able to reach a functioning health care facility when complications arise. This may require safe motherhood policy initiatives.

The Problems of Emerging Diseases

Emerging diseases are expected to account for an increasing share of the disease burden. The next two decades will see dramatic changes in the health needs of the PNG population. Non-communicable diseases such as

ischaemic heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes are fast counterbalancing the traditional diseases, particularly infectious disease and malnutrition, as leading causes of morbidity and mortality. The rapidity of these changes will pose serious challenges to the health care system, and will force decisions about the allocation of scarce resources.

The Problems of the Changing Nature of Diseases

There remain some significant threats that are particularly challenging because of the changing nature of the disease pattern and the ways it manifests itself in a population. One clear example is malaria, which has resurged in many tropical countries including PNG with a vengeance. Public health efforts in the last four decades (1960s–2000) has failed to effectively reduce the burden of malaria, hence malaria remains a major public health problem in PNG.

Malaria, along with tuberculosis, can be classified among a group of diseases for which control efforts are being compromised by anti-microbial drug resistance. This has become a major public health concern and is having a deadly impact on the control of diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and pneumonia. The phenomenon of anti-microbial drug resistance is something not new but has grown out of control in the last few decades. In the case of tuberculosis, poor prescribing practices or poor patient compliance with treatment has led to the development of strains of mycobacterium tuberculosis which are resistance to available drugs. Malaria is worse presenting with double resistance problems: resistance of the Plasmodium parasites that cause the disease to antimalarial drugs, and resistance of Anopheles vectors transmitting the disease to insecticides. Bacteria that cause acute respiratory illnesses in children are also resistant to common antibacterial drugs.

A large proportion of the deaths occurring between the ages of 15 and 49 years are attributed to HIV/AIDS and/or tuberculosis. During the period of active tuberculosis infection, an infected person may transmit the infection to a person previously uninfected. Effective and cost-effective strategies exist for tuberculosis, but standard treatment requires regimes of six or more months of chemotherapy. This relies on well-organized services to achieve high rates of compliance. Since HIV infection is projected to increase over the next decade or so, the burden from tuberculosis may also increase unless greater efforts are made to contain the disease. The interaction of HIV and tuberculosis is an important public health matter.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The steep projected increase in the burden of some diseases in PNG is largely driven by population increases. These increases are augmented by the rapidly increasing numbers of people who are at present exposed to tobacco, and other risk factors, such as obesity, physical inactivity and heavy alcohol consumption. Increases in diseases induced by changes in age distribution also pose significant problems. Health systems must adjust to deal effectively and efficiently with the changing nature and pattern of diseases.

Papua New Guinea is passing through a stage of demographic transition, where demographic characteristics of the population are rapidly shifting from very low birth rates and high death rates to high and low rates, respectively; from, initially, a low population growth rate to a high growth rate with a consequential increase in total population; from an age distribution that was biased towards middle-age with few young and few elderly, to one with a high young and middle-aged population; and from a non-mobile rural-based population to a high mobility one with trends towards urban migration. These demographic changes are likely to impact on the epidemiology and the epidemiological profile of the diseases in the country.

Health policymakers are challenged with ways to find the most cost effective uses of their limited resources to control the rising trend of infectious and non-infectious diseases. Increased health services may be required to provide for an increasing demand for health services with the changing nature of diseases and the disease profile. Although the bulk of the population live in rural areas, easy accessibility by road and other means will increase the proportion of population seeking medical services in urban hospitals — the rate of increase will parallel closely that of the urban population.

The challenge posed by these persisting and emerging health issues is that the tools to control them have either not been developed or, if available, are not used effectively or in some cases are becoming increasingly ineffective. Anti-microbial resistance is a worrying phenomenon since it could have a greater effect on the control and treatment of diseases such as pneumonia, tuberculosis and malaria. These developments emphasize the need for health systems to invest in research and development strategies to counter these health problems.

It is hoped that this overview will provide some sense of direction for all of us, particularly to the leadership of the twenty-first century. If this country is to achieve sustained socio-economic development we must all work together towards a common goal, and what is important is to focus our limited health resources on where these resources can make a big difference — PREVENTION.

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EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Samuel Haihuie

INTRODUCTION

There has been a variety of theoretical debates and policy decisions by governments the world over on the issue of what development is and how development can be achieved. These debates have sometimes stressed that technological advancement and material goods and services are important but at other times have focused on the social well-being of humanity. In pursuing either of these goals for development a key variable has been the role that education plays in the process of development.

Is there a correlation between education and development? If yes, how has Papua New Guinea as a country planned and managed the development of its education system? Is resource allocation to education adequate and is investment in education as an overall policy of the Government justified? After 25 years of independence as a sovereign nation what have been some of the achievements and shortcomings in the development of the education sector in Papua New Guinea? It is the intention of this chapter to reflect on these questions.

Discussions will begin with a brief theoretical perspective on why education is a significant variable as a government policy in the aspirations of the country's development objectives. A review of the progress, if any, in education during the colonial experiences of the country and the state of education at the time of self-government and independence will be discussed to give a backdrop on the current developments, including strengths and weaknesses and accomplishments and challenges ahead. After 25 years of independence the Papua New Guinea education system, from elementary to tertiary level, has made considerable

progress in all facets of its core functions and this will be presented in the final sections. It is to be noted here that much of the historical facts and data in this chapter have been taken from Jinks, Biskup and Nelson (1973: 129–31). For the other two sections I relied on the work of Thomas (1976) in his discussion of the challenges confronting the provision of education at the time of self-government and independence, and the National Department of Education's (NDOE 1999b) report, *The State of Education in Papua New Guinea* on policy direction and current reforms in the education system.

ARGUMENTS FOR INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION

Fagerlind and Saha (1989), in presenting a comparative perspective on education and development based on the work of economist Shultz on investment in human capital, point out that education has traditionally been justified by optimistic assumptions. The first is that an educated population contributes to the socio-economic development of the society as a whole, and second, that education contributes to the well-being of individuals within the society.

Further, it has become clear that rapidly changing technologies and the changing face of the world economic and political systems require a new flexibility and adaptability by societies and individuals. There is no doubt that education is increasingly being seen as an essential component of an adaptable and flexible population. Papua New Guinea is a member of the changing global community and to achieve its developmental objectives education must be embraced as a major factor in achieving these goals. The debate on rates of return (public/private) at differing levels of education has, however, been argued out in the case of PNG by Curtin (1991), amongst others.

EDUCATION IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Prior to self-government and independence, education was provided mainly by Christian missions, with the specific objective of spreading the Christian message and evangelization in both British Papua and German New Guinea.

In his review of the Australian Administration of 1920 Governor Murray admitted that the colonial government had done very little for the education of the people of Papua, but he was able to announce a new scheme: the missions were to be subsidized from the Native Taxation Fund so that they continued to provide education. In 1929 the Government Secretary of British Papua, H.W. Champion (Jinks et al., 1973: 36), described the progress made in education by the govern-

ment and the missions; this is summarized in the following two sections and draws on Jinks et al. (1973).

EDUCATION IN BRITISH PAPUA

The first school that was opened in Papua for the indigenous population was in Port Moresby in 1874, by the London Missionary Society (LMS). By 1918 the Native Taxes Ordinance came into force. Under this scheme the Government invited the various mission organizations, in return for financial assistance, to extend and improve the educational facilities that existed for the indigenous population. Because of the many different languages and dialects, the Government thought that there should be one common language and chose English as being the most suitable and, as far back as 1907, directed its officers to use English in speaking to Papua New Guinea.

The first inspection under the new conditions was made in 1927. The total number of pupils in the schools inspected was about 2,000. The accommodation was found suitable and adequate, and the equipment satisfactory, but the want of an English reading book in keeping with Papuan conditions was commented on. The European teachers and their native assistants were favorably spoken of.

The schools were again examined a year later by the same Inspector. A school reader suitable for Papuan conditions had been written by a missionary of the LMS, published by the Government, and its use made compulsory in all the subsidized schools. The Inspector found a decided advance upon the year before. The use of English had made some good progress while arithmetic was still weak. Not much progress had been made in general knowledge, but the Inspector's view on the new reader was that it was a valuable factor in the education of Papuans. At this examination 1,366 pupils were examined, and 1,147 passed.

One of the practical benefits of the education of the indigenous population was seen in the number of Papuans employed by Europeans at clerical and other duties, which was a result not believed possible a few years earlier. In the Government Service many native Papuans were employed. On the issue of the provision of higher education for Papuans, Governor Murray's thoughts were as follows:

My own opinion, which in itself is not of any importance, but which probably coincides with that of most of the European residents of Papua, is that Papuan and European overlap; that is I think that the best Papuans are superior to the worst Europeans, but that Europeans as a whole have an innate superiority over Papuans. As for the possibility of higher education among Papuans

one must admit that, if a Papuan can qualify for the priesthood, there is no reason to suppose that another Papuan could not qualify for medicine or law. Personally, I have no doubt that Papuans could be found who could be educated to the standard of an ordinary professional career; but, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, I may say at once that I am quite opposed to the creation of a Papuan intelligentsia, and would rather aim at the diffusion of an elementary education, with a knowledge of English, over as wide an area as possible (Jinks et al., 1973: 135).

EDUCATION IN GERMAN NEW GUINEA

In German New Guinea the colonial government entered the field of education in 1907 by opening a school at Namanula, East New Britain Province. The language of instruction during the first two years was Kuanua, thereafter German. The government also subsidized missions for the teaching of the German language.

For the first twenty-three years of the Protectorate all educational activity was in the hands of the Christian missions. Even when the Government did enter the educational field, its activities, though influential, were restricted.

For the most part the medium of instruction was the vernacular, the learning and writing of which entailed tremendous labour and resource. There was no lingua franca, no literature, not even an alphabet. In this they had to start with a blank sheet. As in Papua, there were hundreds of languages and obviously it was impossible to learn them all or commit them all to writing. Hence, the administration developed the practice of selecting a local language, committing it to paper, and then teaching this language to people of other linguistic groups, superimposing one vernacular to make it the lingua franca for a whole area. And as their influence spread to other areas, they took that vernacular with them, with its alphabet and its books. A start was made to introduce German, but this did not make much headway.

When the Government did interest itself in education, it did so in a limited field only, with one European and one Native School, both in Rabaul. Even then in the latter, subsistence gardening was necessary to cut down expenses, and the Native School was also the Government Printery, which helped cut down the costs of administration. Towards the end of the era, it seemed that the Government was planning to coordinate the work of the different missions and so to develop some sort of unified system of education. However, when the 1914–1918 War came, each mission was still running its own schools in its own way. Their common

purpose was to use the schools as a means to the end of bringing the gospel to the people.

In 1914 the Germans prepared a three year 'developmental plan' involving the opening up of new areas in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, an expansion of medical and agricultural extension services, and the establishment of a government school system. The latter was prompted by increased demand for educated workers rather than by welfare or humanitarian considerations. Government schools were also opened at Kieta and Kavieng. The erection of a second school on the New Guinea mainland, probably at Aitape, was reserved for future years, in order to disseminate the German language in the colony.

Under the Mandated Territory of Papua and New Guinea the aim of the government under the Australian Administration appears to have been to provide a more advanced education than the missions. The first elementary school was opened in Kokopo in 1922, and another at Kavieng soon after. In 1927 it was announced that similar schools would be opened in each of the nine districts but nothing was done (Jinks et al., 1973: 279).

Consequently two reports were commissioned, the McKenna report of 1929 and the Griffiths proposal of 1933. The McKenna Report made six specific suggestions that included the following:

- (a) The establishment of elementary schools for natives in populous centres;
- (b) The establishment of boarding schools at selected centres for the training of native teachers, the trainees to be selected by the teachers of the elementary schools;
- (c) The drafting to Rabaul of pupils selected for training as teachers, tradesmen, agriculturists, and so on;
- (d) The creation of a staff of white teachers who will be officers of the Territory, and who will have the charge of the bigger schools, and the supervision of such adjacent village schools as can be efficiently supervised;
- (e) The holding of refresher courses for European teachers at the Kerevat Agricultural College;
- (f) The granting of subsidies to Mission schools on condition that they teach English and throw their schools open to Government inspection — the granting of such subsidy to be subject to a satisfactory report by an Inspector.

The Griffiths proposals were that all education should be entrusted to missions and subsidized by the government. Change of the administrators in 1934 saw a souring of the relationship between the missions and the proposals were never implemented.

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION AT THE TIME OF SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE

State of Education at the Time of Independence

At the time of independence in 1975 at least two different schools systems were beginning to emerge. There were the government schools, including the Primary 'A' schools for the elite and the expatriate community and those schools that were operated by the many different missions. School curriculum varied accordingly but no nationally developed curriculum was in use in the different schools.

In commenting on the state of education at the time, Barrington observed the following:

Papua New Guinea will soon become independent of Australia, and will seek admission to the Commonwealth of Nations. With the end of the colonial era, Papua New Guinea will acquire new status, new dignity, and new responsibilities. Many of the old problems will remain, however, and not the least of them will be the problem of providing suitable education for its population of 2.6 million, scattered over two million square miles of land and sea (Thomas, 1976: 3).

The Development of a National System of Education

The following and the next five sections present the challenges of educational provision in Papua New Guinea, as noted by Thomas (1976: 3–13) at the time of independence.

Papua became an Australian Territory in 1906 and German New Guinea was acquired by Australia in 1914, becoming a mandated territory in 1921 and a Trust Territory in 1946. The Australian Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea had been jointly administered since 1946, and the first Director of Education was appointed in that year.

Prior to the Second World War, schooling offered by missions was almost entirely elementary. In 1939 there were approximately 90,000 pupils in mission schools. The schools tended to be modeled on the German, Australian or American pattern. Apart from the opportunity for a few select students to become mission workers or pastors, there was little employment available, so the main aims of the missions were 'to develop character and personality, prepare children to grow up as good Christians and useful members of society, to advance cultural development and to promote a healthier existence' (Thomas, 1976: 4).

The commonly held view of education as a tool for changing individuals and society as a whole was noted to be held by the populace at the time of independence and continues to prevail twenty-five years on. The post-war period saw an emphasis on the extension of mass literacy. According to Thomas (1976: 4), 'Many village people wanted education for their children, believing it was bound to transform their society. Education was looked upon as the source of western influence, power, privilege and wealth.'

In 1955 the Australian Minister for Territories declared the following educational objectives for Papua New Guinea: universal primary education, the blending of cultures, the voluntary acceptance of Christianity by the indigenous people, and the fostering of English as a common language. In 1958 the Director of Education drafted a plan for universal primary education within fifteen years. The Minister for Territories outlined plans in 1961 to increase school enrolments from 150,000 to 350,000 in the next five years, and long-range plans to increase enrolments to 750,000 by 1975, by which time all children of school age would be within reach of school. However, the United Nations Visiting Mission of 1962, under the chairmanship of Sir Hugh Foot, was critical of these plans for mass literacy, acknowledging that whilst it was commendable enough in principle, it was inadequate for the needs of Papua New Guinea at the time. The UN Mission pointed out that the system was not providing the secondary and tertiary education necessary to train Papua New Guineans to replace Australians in professional and administrative positions. A new approach was essential to provide at least one hundred university graduates per year.

Thus, Australia's educational policy in Papua New Guinea changed direction in the sixties, and became one of elitism. Secondary and higher education began to receive high priority in the country's educational development. New high schools were established. The University of Papua New Guinea commenced classes in Port Moresby in 1966. An Institute of Higher Technical Education was also established in Port Moresby in 1967. It was later transferred to Lae, and is now called the Papua New Guinea University of Technology.

Primary Education

Although the objective of universal primary education was postponed during the sixties, the growth in the school system was remarkable. Whereas in 1960, enrolments totalled 95,366, in 1972 the figure was 251,557. In 1960 only 2 per cent of the total number of indigenous children enrolled was in high school; in 1973 this figure had grown to 14

per cent. Further evidence of the growth of the school system can be gained from the figures shown in Table 1, relating to the number of schools and teachers in 1960 and 1972.

During the sixties, as the education system expanded, it became increasingly clear that the missions, which provided about 65 per cent of primary education and 35 per cent of secondary education, and trained their own teachers, could not maintain these services unless the financial structure was changed. Voluntary agency teachers were resentful of the fact that they received, in general, only about half of the cash salary of Administration teachers of comparable grade. Furthermore, the missions and churches were predominantly local or regional in character, and were becoming increasingly doubtful about sharing control of the system with a powerful Department of Education centralized in Port Moresby. In 1968 Professor L.J. Lewis, of the Institute of Education, London, visited Papua New Guinea, and was invited to extend his visit to make a review of the primary school curriculum. In this report, Lewis commented that the differences in status of teachers with the same qualifications and experience being employed by different agencies in the system would become 'increasing causes of frustration and dissatisfaction' (Thomas, 1976: 6); suggested that the establishment of a National Teaching Service separate from the Central Civil Service would become inevitable; and recommended the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry to look into the matter and report to the Government.

In February 1969 the Minister for External Territories announced the appointment of a three-man Advisory Committee on Education 'to advise on the relationships between mission and Administration educational systems in Papua New Guinea' (Thomas, 1976: 7).

In its Report, the Committee pointed out that although there were mission and administration schools, the system was not, in a number of important ways, a separate or dual one. The curriculum, the external examinations, and the classification of teachers' qualifications were the same for all schools. Every recognized school was subject to inspection. At the primary level, every village school was part of a system 'in that it is recognized by the Administration, and with some reservations by other missions and churches, as the only school for the village or area that it serves' (Thomas, 1976: 7). So there was already, in a sense, a national system. What was lacking was a completely national system in the sense that there should be equality of salaries, duties and conditions for all teachers, whether employed by the missions or the Administration.

The Committee also stressed that it found two distinct viewpoints on educational planning in Papua New Guinea. The missionaries were

accustomed to looking at education from the viewpoint of the village and the individuals in it, and so set out to give as many children as possible an education, of some sort. However, another, newer purpose of education was to help a country achieve independence, economic growth, and higher living standards. These two views of education, the village-centred and the nation-centred, could, if pressed to extremes, lead to very different policies for education.

Table 1: Government and Non-government Schools and Indigenous and Non-indigenous Teachers in PNG, 1960 and 1972

	1960	1972
SCHOOLS		
Government		
Primary	267	554
High	26	36
Technical/Vocational	7	55
Teacher Training	6	3
<i>Sub-total government schools</i>	<i>306</i>	<i>648</i>
Non-government		
Primary	920	993
High	13	31
Technical/Vocational	4	24
Teacher Training	21	7
<i>Sub-total Non-government schools</i>	<i>958</i>	<i>1,055</i>
TOTAL, ALL SCHOOLS	1,264	1,703
TEACHERS		
Indigenous		
Primary	1,449	6,383
High	20	179
Technical/Vocational	3	93
Teacher Training	3	29
<i>Sub-total Indigenous teachers</i>	<i>1,475</i>	<i>6,684</i>
Non-indigenous		
Primary	469	998
High	82	900
Technical/Vocational	36	296
Teacher Training	36	184
<i>Sub-total Non-indigenous teachers</i>	<i>623</i>	<i>2,378</i>
TOTAL, ALL TEACHERS	2,098	9,062

Source: Adapted from Thomas (1973).

The 1970 Education Ordinance established a National Teaching Service, whose members would be employed by a Teaching Service Commission, and declared a tripartite system of control that divided functions between the Department of Education, the voluntary educational agencies, and the local government councils and district education committees. This form of administration permitted a gradual devolution of certain powers from the centre to the provinces. Thus, the Education Ordinance was an attempt to reconcile local and national needs. This was the beginning of the decentralization of education functions in Papua New Guinea.

The establishment of Provincial Education Boards (PEB) was seen as the cornerstone of the new education system being developed at the time of independence and reflected a genuine desire to decentralize decision-making in education. There were nineteen of these boards, one in each province of the country. The assistant secretary for education was the chair and membership of the board included representatives from the Government, churches and missions, local government councils, teachers and the community. Functions of the PEB included selecting entrants for primary, secondary and technical schools, appointing staff, determining school fees, administering education funds, and coordinating education activities within the province. In addition, the boards were also required to prepare plans for the establishment and development of schools in the province, and the supervising and carrying out of these plans when approved by the National Education Board.

The National Education Board has fourteen members, drawn from many different sectors of the community. Its chair, and chief executive is the Secretary of Education. It is responsible for keeping the economy and efficiency of the National Education System under continuous review, and must submit an annual report to the Papua New Guinea Parliament through the National Executive Council. Its functions include advisory and supervisory duties, as well as the allocation of staff to provinces and of students to teachers' colleges, and the establishment of national criteria for the selection of students for secondary schools and colleges.

High School Selection and School Leavers

The real problem is the 'bottleneck' situation created at the completion of grade six. Although the absolute number of students in high schools increased rapidly the proportion admitted declined steadily. The children between the ages of 13 to 16 considered 'drop-outs' are being 'uprooted and abandoned' by an unkind education structure. The fact that only a very limited number of primary school graduates can be admitted to

secondary school has had the most far-reaching social and educational consequences in Papua New Guinea. Primary education is not seen as a phase of education in its own right, but merely as a prerequisite for admission to high school. Those successful at the grade six examinations who are not selected for high school tend to be regarded as failures by themselves, their peers and their families. Those who fail, and those who pass but are not admitted to high school, either remain in the village—where they frequently do little else but sit around wondering why the world refuses to owe them a living, and cause trouble and concern to the elders of the village, or drift to the towns to compound the problems of unemployment, poverty, overcrowding, crime and misery existing there. In both cases, the student's education has not fitted him/her for either the old life or the new.

Curriculum

What kind of education do Papua New Guineans want for their children? There was evidence of disillusionment with the western model. After Paulias Matane visited Africa in 1967, he urged on his return that provision should be made in schools for the primary school leavers who will go back to a rural life. The aim should be to produce good farmers or rural workers — people who would be happy to work on the land. Somehow the drift of young people to the towns would have to be stopped, and village life made more interesting and useful. The then minister for education Ebia Olewale (Thomas, 1976: 13) pointed out in 1972 that Papua New Guinea had a 'perfect' system of education for a static society long before the arrival of the Europeans. The teachers were experts, the pass rate was high, and there were few dropouts. Today, however, the village folk can't impart the ideas of the village traditions and the dances and the ritual to their children. The children are also neglecting their obligations and making attacks on such cherished institutions as bride price payment.

In 1971 the Department of Education invited thirty-three Papua New Guineans, representing all sections of the community, to come together to discuss the aims and objectives of the primary curriculum. They were asked to list the most important tasks for the primary school. The resolutions showed the concern of indigenous people for an education relevant to the needs of Papua New Guinea society. They stressed the need for the education system to prepare children for a changing society, to teach them to respect the views of their parents and the village community, to give them practical knowledge to enable them to live a full and useful life, and to teach them how to reconstruct their cultural heritage through practising traditional dancing, folk songs, drama and craft.

In April 1974 the Minister for Education announced that an eight-person committee, consisting entirely of Papua New Guineans and headed by Alkan Tololo, had been formed to prepare a five-year education plan. The overriding aim of the plan would be to gear the education system to more practical aspects and to make every stage of education as self-contained as possible. The Minister stated that it was important that the system should help people to acquire useful skills at different levels to fit them into the communities they live in, both urban and rural, and to avoid social dislocation arising from lack of opportunities in rural areas.

Supervision and Inspection

The education system has developed a rigorous inspection system covering all levels from primary through to secondary and national high schools, vocational centres and teachers colleges. This ensures that procedures are followed and standards maintained. In 1971 nearly two-thirds of the primary teachers in Papua New Guinea had only a primary education and one year of teacher training. For many teachers, their primary education was indifferent and their training meagre and far from recent. In such circumstances, school inspectors have a special responsibility to assist the professional development of teachers. Compounded with this are problems of supervision and inspection in an area of such scattered population and rugged terrain. Inspectors travel by air, by vehicle, by boat, by canoe, and on foot. It is not unusual for an inspecting officer to walk half a day to see one school of twenty to thirty children, and then to have to walk the same 20 to 30 kilometres back to a canoe or a boat for a short journey.

Tertiary Institutions

At the time of independence Papua New Guinea had more than thirty post-secondary training institutions, including two universities, an Administrative College, a Forestry College, an Agricultural College, a Local Government Staff College, and Co-operative College; colleges for medicine, nursing, dentistry and paramedical training; three technical colleges, two agricultural training institutes, and eleven teachers' colleges; not to mention training institutes operated by such diverse organizations as the Department of Civil Aviation, the Police, the Corrective Institutions, the Army, the Electricity Commission, and the Department of Transport. There were over 3,500 students in these institutions, which are scattered over ten of the nineteen provinces. Institutions that are within the same province are often separated widely from each other; even those in Port Moresby are sufficiently separated to make coordination of effort between them a major problem.

The cost of operating the two universities was a concern for the Minister for Education. The Minister stated that the cost of operating the two universities for some 2,000 students was in excess of \$10 million the previous year. The total educational budget for the whole country was some \$30 million. He observed that the figures do point to a 'certain imbalance' and warned that a system that benefits a few at the expense of many results in the creation of a privileged group, set apart from the bulk of the people. One does achieve development that way in the short run, while sowing the seeds of a revolution in the long run.

Policy Directions: Education Reviews and Reforms since Independence

After independence major educational reforms have been undertaken. These education reforms have not happened overnight. There are a number of milestones that have occurred over the years since independence that are significant. Studies have been undertaken and reports put together mostly by Papua New Guineans themselves to determine and chart the future for the development of the education sector. These signposts, as stated in the State of Education Report (NDOE, 1999b), are as follows:

- Tololo Committee, 1974
- The Matane Report, 1985
- The Jomtien Declaration of Education for all (EFA), 1990
- The Education Sector Study, 1991
- Conference of the Council of Education Ministers, 1991
- The National Education Reform Task Force, 1992
- NEC decisions made in 1992 and 1994
- The Education Sector Resources Study, 1995
- The National Education Plan, 1996
- Provincial Education Plans, 1995–1998
- Ministerial Consultation, 1998 and 1999
- World Bank Education Sector Study, 1998
- World Bank Cost Effectiveness Study, 1998
- Department of Education Corporate Plan, 1997
- Technical Vocational Education and Training Corporate Plan, 1999
- National Skills Plan, 1999–2000

In the next section I discuss in brief each of these key studies and reports.

The Tololo Committee of 1974 was the first of these significant reports. Many Papua New Guineans were unhappy with the direction that colonial administrators set for education. In 1974, a committee chaired by the then Director of Education, Alkan Tololo, with an entirely Papua New

Guinean membership, drafted a post-independence five-year education plan. It proposed that schooling be community based, the use of vernaculars be emphasized, and education be linked to development and more widely and more equally provided. They planned to expand primary schooling to Grade 8 and expand access to Grades 9 and 10. They were also concerned that greater access to education should be given to females and to those from disadvantaged areas.

The Matane Report published in 1985 was entitled 'A Philosophy of Education' for Papua New Guinea. This should be seen as being the birth of the education reforms, in particular the reform of the curriculum.

The National Goals as expressed in the National Constitution recognized the importance of:

- Integral Human Development
- Equality and Participation
- National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance
- National Resources and Environment
- Papua New Guinean Ways

The Matane Report stressed that the school can help educate children but cannot and should not be regarded as the only agent of education. The home, the churches, the community, the police and the politicians are also influences on a child's life and must all contribute to the integral human development of the child. The attitude that the school is the only agent of education must be changed.

The process of integral human development calls for an education system that helps individuals:

- identify basic human needs;
- analyse situations in terms of needs;
- see these needs in the context of spiritual and social values of the community;
- take responsible action in cooperation with others.

The success of such an education system requires the integrated involvement of all the agents of education: home, church, school, community and others. Within that broad educational system the school must integrate knowledge, skills and attitudes to create subject matter appropriate to producing the desired outcome of integral human development.

To achieve the aim of integral human development, an individual must live and work with others and, accordingly, the goals of education should be directed towards socialization, participation, liberation and equality. The needs of individuals, the educational input from

different agents, the learning content and the goals of integral human development are interrelated.

There were twenty-three recommendations altogether and it is instructive to reflect on some of the recommendations of the Matane Report and note just how much has been implemented, either through the education reforms or through other policy measures.

Recommendation 12 is that the vernacular language be used as the medium of instruction in the early years of schooling and English be used in later years. Recommendation 13 is that ways be found to immediately expand upper secondary education. Recommendation 8 is that funds be redirected from Higher Education towards the goal of Universal Primary Education. Recommendation 15 is that standards in English and Mathematics be nationally monitored and further improved. Recommendation 7 is that those who benefit from upper secondary and tertiary level education should pay a larger proportion of the costs of that education.

In the final analysis of the Matane Report, the challenge posed for Papua New Guinea was this: 'What kind of a citizen do we want for our society?'

In 1990 the National Government joined other nations to sign a Declaration of Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand. By signing this agreement the National Government, along with other nations of the world, committed itself to providing Education for All, and in Papua New Guinea, if not at all levels then at least for the lower primary sector.

The 1991 Education Sector Study was a major investigation into the state of education in Papua New Guinea. It was carried out at the behest of the Education Minister of the time, Utula Samana. The study identified the problems of the system and then looked at various ways in which those problems could be solved. If the Matane Report can be seen as being the birth of the curriculum reforms, then the Sector Study was the birth of the restructuring of the education system.

Major problems were identified at both the primary and secondary levels. It became clear that the country could never achieve either universal primary education or its targets for access to secondary education, under the system that was operating at that time.

The Council of Education Ministers met in Madang in 1991 and considered the findings of the Sector Study. This meeting chaired by Minister Samana endorsed the recommendations of the study and tasked the Department of Education with implementation.

Two specific National Executive Council decisions of 1991 paved the way for these first initiatives. These decisions, as part of Decision No. 183/91, were that the NEC:

[The NEC] ... approved in principle the topping up of existing selected Provincial High Schools as a means to rapidly and economically expand the National High School system. This be critically evaluated as part of the revised education structure proposed by the Education Sector Review and the results of this evaluation presented to NEC with recommendations for action;

[The NEC] ... directed that the recommendations of the Education Sector Study, particularly as they relate to the restructure of the education system, be critically evaluated for implementation resulting in a full report to NEC. Possible projects resulting from the Sector Study be formulated and fully documented for consideration and future funding as some of the donor agencies have indicated interest in funding human resource development related projects (NDOE, 1999b).

A National Education Reform Task Force chaired by the Secretary for Education was formed in 1992 to look at ways in which the recommendations of the Conference could be implemented. This Task Force was made up of representatives from the Education Department, the provinces and other interested groups. The Task Force met frequently through 1992 and 1993. It was decided to start the primary and secondary initiatives in the Madang and West New Britain Provinces.

Provincial Education Reform Task Forces were also formed during 1992 and 1993 to consider ways in which they could implement the reform agenda in their particular provinces. The Department was able to support these Task Forces with small amounts of money to ensure full representation.

There were further decisions made by the NEC in 1994 regarding the expansion of access to grades 7 and 11. NEC Decision No. 68/94 reads:

On 17th May, 1994, Council:

1. approved the establishment of grade 11 and 12 classes at selected provincial high schools at the rate of at least 3 a year as being a major strategy for increasing access to upper secondary over the next five years;
2. amended its Decision No.224/90 of meeting No.64/90 relating to the establishment of five new National High Schools in Western Highlands, Oro and New Ireland Provinces except for those underway for Gerehu in NCD and Markham Valley in Morobe; and
3. approved the establishment of grade 7 and 8 classes at primary school as being a major strategy for increasing access to grades 7 and 8 instead of building new Provincial High Schools (grades 7–10).

A major study was embarked upon in 1994 and 1995 called the Education Sector Resources Study. This study was co-funded by AusAID (or AIDAB as it was called at the time), the Asian Development Bank and the Government of Papua New Guinea.

The reason for this study was that it was realized that there were enormous cost implications involved in the implementation of the education reforms. The Resources Study looked at all of these implications — financial, manpower, infrastructure, and so on. A major finding was that, although the education reforms reduced unit costs significantly, there was still a resource gap that needed to be closed. In order to achieve this the country would need to commit itself to a number of cost saving and cost recovery measures.

The National Education Plan was completed in 1996 following a considerable effort from many officers within the department, in particular from the newly formed Facilitating and Monitoring Unit. The plan leans heavily on the recommendations from the Education Sector Review and also the Resources Study. In two parts, Part A describes the problems and outlines what will be done, while Part B goes into much more detail about what has happened in the past and the reasons behind the education reform programme.

The Plan was forwarded to the National Executive Council for endorsement which was received in June 1997. The Plan was officially launched by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bill Skate, prior to the January 1998 conference of the Council of Education Ministers that was held in Lae.

The National Education Plan was to be revised and updated in the following years. This would incorporate many of the lessons learnt from the early years of implementation and reflect fully the effects of the passage of the *Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments*. The Department of Education Corporate Plan was produced following instruction from the Prime Minister's Department and should be seen as a companion document to the National Education Plan.

The World Bank conducted an education sector study in early 1998. This study looked at the implementation of the education reforms. It painted a particularly rosy picture whilst suitably identifying the problems that were being faced by the country. Five key issues identified in reform implementation were: Teacher supply; Institutional strengthening; Assessment; Curriculum development, and International efficiency.

In a decentralized system, such as that operating in Papua New Guinea, there was no point in having just one national plan. There was clearly a need for twenty provincial education plans. Work on these started in 1995 and continues. Members of the Facilitating and Monitoring Unit,

along with the Regional management and Planning Advisers, have been working closely with provinces in order that these plans be completed and endorsed by their respective Provincial Executive Councils.

The role of Department of Education officers is to ensure that the Provincial Education Plans are consistent with the National Education Plan and to provide technical expertise where required. It was important that provinces had a sense of ownership of these plans. By mid-1999 sixteen provinces had completed their education plans, along with the implementation schedules. A much lower number had managed to get their plans through all of the endorsement procedures. A few provinces have started the important process of reviewing and amending their plans. This is a very healthy sign.

Ministerial Consultations were held in Lae, January 1998. It was the first such gathering since the 1991 conference in Madang. The most important recommendation to come out of this conference was that all provinces should have completed their provincial education plans by September 1998 and that these plans be consistent with the National Education Plan. This meeting strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the education reform agenda.

One of the objectives of the World Bank funded study was to look again at measures identified in the 1995 Education Sector Resources Study to enable education services to be provided in a more efficient manner. This study was completed in late 1998 and its major recommendation was to look at teacher deployment, and to utilize funds saved through a more efficient use of teachers for a variety of activities such as incentives for teachers to go to more remote areas. It built on the World Bank's Education Sector Study earlier in 1998 and looked at the internal efficiency of the system. The final study was endorsed by the Senior Education Officers Conference at Goroka in June 1999.

Again, under the auspices of ministerial consultations, a conference was held in Rabaul in January 1999. The Chair of the Education Committee in each province reported on the progress that had been made on their plans. Major decisions were made with regard to a National Education Skills Plan and the state of literacy in the country. The National Skills Plan has many objectives, one of which is to identify the development of skills for life and living required by young people at each level of schooling.

A Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Corporate Plan was produced for the ministerial consultations in Rabaul. At this conference the plan writers were asked to reconsider and to consult more fully with the provinces. It was endorsed in principle at the Senior

Officer's Conference in Goroka, June 1999. The TVET shows the way forward with relation to the unification of technical and vocational education.

Implementation of the Education Reforms: 25 Years on

The 1991 Education Sector Study looked at these tensions building within the system and proposed a totally new structure for education.


The reform involves the restructuring of the formal education system from the pre-primary level through to the upper secondary level. The reform was designed to directly address most of the systemic weaknesses and problem areas identified in the sector review.

The 'old' 6-4-2 structure had been characterized by high attrition rates at the primary level and a serious access problem at the secondary level. The two major bottlenecks were at grade 7 and grade 11. In the new structure as shown in Figure 1 the first 'push out' would be at grade 8 and not grade 6 as in the old structure. The 'push outs' have pathways opened to them to pursue further education through grades 9 and 10 and vocational education or pursue studies, distance and open learning.

Elementary Education

At the first level, village or settlement-based elementary schools will be formalized. Annual intakes will become possible allowing for the reduction of staggered intakes. This, in time, should solve the problem of over age entry. Enrolment at the prep level begins at six years of age. These schools should be building on existing *Tok Ples Pre Skul* (TPPS) initiatives and provide a preparatory year's education (EP) followed by grades 1 and 2. These are often referred to as Elementary 1 (E1) and Elementary 2 (E2) in order to distinguish them from grades 1 and 2 in the community schools. The language of instruction in elementary schools is the vernacular allowing for acquisition of literacy in the language which the children speak. Prep curricula emphasizes initial literacy, numeracy, ethics, morality and cultural bonding. To make the curriculum more relevant, expand enrolments, and help improve retention in elementary schools, EP, E1 and E2 will comprise a new integrated curriculum based on the child's own culture and community. In many schools, teaching is done by one teacher using multi-grade teaching methods. The transition to English begins in the third year. A new more relevant, integrated activity-based curriculum has been adopted, and will use locally developed materials. An initial literacy kit of eighteen stories has been provided. School is for four hours duration each day. There are more than 137,000 children enrolled in the three years of elementary education in 2000. Most of these children are between six and eight years old.

Figure 1: The New Education Reform Structure



Notes:

1. P: Preparatory class with initial literacy and general education in the vernacular.
2. Vocational: Two years of lower secondary education with a vocational skills bias.
3. Other: A wide range of 'permitted' institutions which offer two or more years of secondary education, with a bias determined by the needs and opportunities in the areas they serve.
4. Grades 11–12: Upper secondary education or Matriculation will develop particular curriculum biases, for example, academic, agriculture, technical, commercial and so on. The reform structure provides for Grades 11 and 12 in traditionally separate institutions, or added on to existing provincial high schools.
5. PETT: Pre-Employment Technical Training courses, which are for two years post-grade 10, and located in technical colleges.
6. College: Covers the more than sixty non-university 'tertiary' institutions which currently take mainly grade 10 leavers, but who are in the process of raising their entry level to grade 12 as the pool of grade 12 leavers increases.
7. Open learning: College of Distance Education, and other distance education providers.

Source: NDOE (1999b).

Elementary teachers are being trained through a three-year mixed mode program. A system of supervision for elementary school teachers is being developed. Teachers receive a salary commensurate with training and hours of duty.

Primary Education

The elementary schools act as feeder schools for primary schools. The introduction of elementary schools in the villages frees classroom space and other facilities within the primary schools. This allows for the relocation of grades 7 and 8 classes from the high schools. There need be no great increase in either the enrolments or number of teachers in the

primary schools over the plan period. Six years of primary education can be provided through to grade 8. All children are expected to be able to continue with their education until grade 8. It is hoped that this will help overcome the problem of the loss of students, particularly girls, from the system after grade 6. To improve the quality and relevance of education, the primary curriculum will become more subject-specific and a strong vocational component will be developed for the upper grades as part of a Curriculum Reform Project. A new examination system will be formulated for graduation from grade 8 and to enable selection for grades 9 through to 12. Teachers currently within the system are being offered the opportunity to upgrade their qualifications to diploma level through an in-service programme. New graduates from the Teachers Colleges will be diploma holders equipped to teach in the upper primary grades. Figures from the NDOE (1999a) show that in the primary and community schools there are approximately 550,000 children enrolled.

Secondary Education

The facilities freed up by the relocation of the grade 7 and 8 classes can be used in one of two ways. In the majority of schools there will be an immediate increase in the number of grade 9 and 10 places — up to double in most cases. At the same time, grades 11 and 12 are being developed at selected schools. It has been a government objective to have one such school in each province. Secondary education therefore consists of four years — grades 9 to 12. There should be no great increase in either the enrolments or number of teachers in the secondary schools over the plan period. However, additional teachers still need to be trained to fully localize the teaching force. The University of Goroka is expected to develop programmes for the upgrading of existing secondary school teachers. Enrolment in secondary schools was more than 76,000 children, but taking into account the 6,000 or so enrolled in the College of Distance Education the total enrolment figure would surpass the 80,000 mark.

The curriculum will be broadened to include more technical, agricultural, commercial and scientific content. Vocational centers will become part of the secondary system. Open learning will provide an alternative opportunity for secondary education.

The net effect of all this on schooling will be greatly increased access at all grades. The major expenditures required will be the upgrading of facilities and provision of materials at the primary and secondary levels, and the cost of elementary school teacher salaries. The unit costs of education in grades 7 through to 12 will be reduced through the increased enrolments utilizing facilities at existing primary and provincial high

schools. This reduction is further enhanced by the almost complete abolition of boarding students in Grades 7 and 8.

The following table shows the figures under the reform from elementary schools through to teachers' colleges and the College of Distance Education (CODE).

Table 2: Total enrolments by institution type, 1997 and 1999

		1997	1999
Elementary	EP	19,686	55,464
Schools	E1	5,012	46,902
	E2	935	27,825
<i>Elementary subtotal</i>		<i>25,633</i>	<i>130,191</i>
Primary and	G1	122,538	98,065
Community	2	104,562	120,965
Schools	3	89,687	105,175
	4	77,802	89,780
	5	69,536	76,348
	6	57,645	64,707
	7	16,577	28,608
	8	9,909	20,237
<i>Primary subtotal</i>		<i>548,256</i>	<i>603,885</i>
Secondary	7	17,032	14,764
and Provincial	8	16,182	15,526
High Schools	9	18,644	23,540
	10	15,562	18,807
	11	1,263	2,745
	12	1,063	1,659
National	11	1,339	1,280
High Schools	12	1,334	1,280
<i>Secondary subtotal</i>		<i>72,419</i>	<i>79,601</i>
School Total		646,308	813,677
Vocational Centres		11,106	15,573
Technical Colleges		1,859	1,949
Primary Teachers' Colleges		1,870	1,731
Post-Secondary Total		14,835	19,253
CODE		13,691 students enrolled in 22,727 subjects	

Source: NDOE (1999a).

Post-Secondary Education

With the expansion of the upper secondary system one thing is obvious: that there are more grade 12 school leavers now than when there were only four national high schools. With a combined grade 10 and 12 output of more than 20,000 students per year with an intake capacity of only about 5,000 existing in the tertiary sector institutions, where will the remaining 15,000 or so end up? Will they all return to the villages as envisaged?

The number of tertiary institutions has not increased nor expanded in capacity in correspondence with the expansion of the secondary level. According to Education Department figures in 2000, about 30,000 school leavers were undertaking courses at vocational training centres and technical colleges.

Teacher Education

Teacher training for primary level and vocational schools is provided by the two government owned colleges, Madang and PNG Education Institute (formerly an in-service college) and five mission owned colleges. For secondary teacher training, the University of Goroka is the major provider of training with Pacific Adventist University training a smaller number.

University Education

The establishment of the Higher Education Sector of the National Education System was the end result of the 1962 visit by the United Nations Mission led by Sir Hugh Foot. In 1970 the Currie Commission stressed the need for an appropriate balance between various levels of education and the maintaining of sound academic standards in the then newly established University of Papua New Guinea.

In 1971 the Brown Report strongly recommended the establishment of the Commission for Higher Education, enacted by the parliament in accomplishing the *National Higher Education Act* in 1983. The 1998 *Higher Education Act* then moved to separate the Office of Higher Education (OHE) from the Department of Education. The *Higher Education Act* empowers the OHE as a secretariat to foster the rational development of higher education with regard to the needs and resources of the country and to coordinate the growth and development of institutions of higher education.

With the rapid expansion of upper secondary education from only four national high schools to more than thirty top-up secondary schools, the pressure has now shifted to universities and colleges. Will universities in their current capacity be able to accommodate the influx from these top-up secondary schools?

These are the next questions the government and its policy makers through the Commission on Higher Education will have to answer. In the National Higher Education Plan II, launched in April 2001, the Government, in conforming to the reform program at the lower level, states the following from its White Paper on Higher Education as its vision statement:

- lively, just, and self-reliant nation forward and outward-looking citizens;
- at peace with our neighbours at home and abroad;
- proud of our rich cultural and environmental diversity;
- upholding and upheld by Christian principles;
- equipped with the best that higher education, research, and science and technology can provide to improve and sustain the quality of life for the good of the nation as a whole, and in accordance with the national goals and directive principles, as embodied in the Papua New Guinea Constitution.

The White Paper goes on to state that specific objectives in each policy area include:

- increasing access, participation and rates of advancement at every level of higher education, while improving the range and quality of services provided, and achieving the highest academic standards appropriate to circumstances, including resources and needs;
- raising the productivity, quality and relevance of research;
- promoting awareness, knowledge and application of science and technology.

The three main principles underpinning the Reform Program that are presented in the White Paper and endorsed in the NHEP are *productivity, responsiveness and responsibility*, and *partnership*.

From only two universities at the time of independence, Papua New Guinea now has six, with at least one university in each region. This is a significant expansion for the university sector.¹ Table 3 provides some statistical information on the growth of university education showing current enrolment and staffing.

Compared to the status of education twenty-five years ago, Papua New Guinea no doubt has made considerable progress in providing a modern education for its people.

¹ Apart from the four new universities and the amalgamation of the government-owned provincial nursing colleges with regional ones, many of the department-owned institutions such as the Civil Aviation Training College, Telikom Training College and PNGIPA, remain independently operated and do not come under the OHE.

Table 3: University Enrolment and Staffing, 2001

University	Year of University Status & Controlling Authority	Student Enrolment	Total Academic Staff	Non- Citizen Academic Staff	Citizen Academic Staff	Citizen Academic Staff with PhDs
UPNG	1966–Govt	3042 *	222	51	171	44
UNITECH	1968–Govt	2034 **	145	55	90	8
UOG	1997–Govt	789	71	13	58	15
UOV	1997–Govt	267	17	Nil	17	Nil
PAU	1996–SDA	323	28	23	5	1
DWU	1997–Catholic	496	59	42	17	Nil

* Figure excludes distance education students through IDCE

** Figure excludes distance education students through DODL

Source: Statistical data obtained from Staff/Personnel Offices from the respective universities counting warm bodies only and does not include vacant positions.

CONCLUSION

While education is being vigorously applied as a solution to social problems, the problems often seem to get worse. Many people move to urban areas, while fewer move away. The number of classrooms increases every year, while the number of people to be educated increases every hour. The demand for education grows rapidly, but the means of satisfying that demand grows slowly. Papua New Guinea will keep juggling to implement its policies and priorities influenced by factors such as population growth and availability of resources to meet its educational needs.

A lot may have been achieved; however, it must be noted that only half of Papua New Guinea's eligible school age children are currently engaged in some kind of formal schooling. The country still has a huge task ahead to redress this situation.

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White Paper on Higher Education

CIVIL SOCIETY AND NATION BUILDING

Anne Dickson-Waiko

INTRODUCTION

One of the more promising developments in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the last two and a half decades has been the emergence of non-government organisations engaged in all manner of activity. It is promising because it underscores the increasing acceptance and legitimacy of the state as civil society becomes engaged with the state. It is also promising because of the high level of participation by women in mass-based civil society organisations. The appearance of civil society organisations means that the weak PNG state is not 'suspended' above PNG society.¹ As in other third world societies, it is recognised that there is only partial penetration of the state into society, especially in the rural and peripheral areas. The formation of national and provincial civil society organisations demonstrates progress in state-building in welding together some seven hundred linguistic units into a nation. They have begun to shed some of their parochial loyalties to work for the common good.

Both the state and civil society in Papua New Guinea have developed slowly and remain relatively weak and fragmented (May, 1998: 66). This discourse adopts Stepan's definition of civil society which distinguishes associational life from institutions of 'political society' such as political parties (Stepan cited in Bratton, 1989: 419). Under civil society in Papua New Guinea, I include charitable and voluntary associations, women's groups, religious organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs), unions, various business, industry and professional organisations and landowner groups and associations. There are now NGOs in PNG specialising in human rights and democracy, literacy, land rights, small

¹ I am using Goran Hyden's description of states as in Africa, see 'Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry' cited in (Bratton, 1989).

business enterprises, environment, micro credit, a nuclear free Pacific, gender, decolonisation in the Pacific, health, breastfeeding (*susu mamas*), Christian fellowship, youth, HIV/AIDS, poverty alleviation, and conflict resolution just to name a few. There are numerous civil society organisations which have been formed, nationally, provincially, community and even village-based throughout the country. Many are offshoots of international NGOs such the Anglican Mother's Union, Girl Guides, the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), Christian Women's Association (CWA), Rotary International, Greenpeace, Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) and Groots International to name only some. Some are linked to NGOs throughout either the Pacific subregion or the Asia-Pacific region. Many have formed solidarity networks linked to international NGOs beyond the region, working on specific issues such as violence against women, women and politics, decolonisation, the environment and human rights. A few have formed links with European funded NGOs in order to access funding from Europe through the European Union (EU) under the EU-ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) Cooperation Agreement, though inter-church aid organisations Bread for the World, and the German Protestant Association for Cooperation, *Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe e. V.* (EZE).

BACKGROUND DISCUSSION

But indigenous civil society organisations in Papua New Guinea have a history that goes back beyond 1975. While documenting the emergence of locally-based mass movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ron May has characterised many of these movements as micro nationalist (1982: chapter one). These were locally-based movements which attempted to mobilise people in various parts of the country in order to maintain some form of independence against the encroachment of the colonial state. And as May and others have asserted, cargo cults which appeared after the Second World War were precursors of micro nationalist movements which appeared immediately before self government (1973) and independence (May, Gerritsen et al., 1981; May, 1982). Much of the idealism imbued by many leaders of micro nationalist movements was also held by the membership of non-government organisations which began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. But like leaders of the marginal cargo cults, local protest movements and the self-help development movements, many of the leaders from the NGO movement in the 1990s also used these movements and organisations to launch their individual political careers. There are strong indications that women leaders may also follow that route to power.

The involvement of Port Moresby-based NGOs such as Melsol and PNG Watch in the 1997 Sandline upheaval² and the 1997 national elections — when a number of NGO leaders were elected into parliament such as Fathers Lak and Ambane, Peti Lafanama, as governors of Western Highlands, Simbu, and Eastern Highlands respectively — has tarnished the reputation of NGOs and the good work done by them in the 1980s and early 1990s. This was made worse by the forging of political alliances between NGO leaders (now governors), with the Skate Government, a government which many observers see as the worst post-independent government yet. Unfortunately, the endemic corruption that exists in PNG is not confined to officers and leaders in government authorities and state instrumentalities: it has seeped into civil society organisations with the infusion of financial assistance from external non-government organisations and international donors through government approved projects. It has led to the collapse of and disillusionment with the once promising local NGO movement (see Cox, 1999; Faraclas 2001).

The fiery idealism of the 1970s and the self-help groups has given way to the realisation of the growing strength of free market forces and their attendant liberal political institutions in the country. This realisation is manifested in the emergence of landowner associations and groups. Landowner groups are registered clan-based landowner associations which have been transformed, to accommodate and negotiate with state authorities their traditional land rights in a market driven economy. Landowner groups are a new kind of civil society organisation peculiar to Papua New Guinea. They were created by clan members out of 'clans' using the traditional concept of clan-based access to land: the exploitation of resources on and beneath the *graun* (or land) has transformed the relationship of clan members to the land. The same *graun* to which clan members had once upon a time (in most cases still do, because it contains amongst other factors, the clan cemetery) formed a spiritual attachment, because of common access and user rights. Thus forest or certain trees on clan land are now identified as economic trees such as coconut, banana and betel nut trees.

STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN PNG

A discourse on civil society organisations presupposes the existence of a civil society. Alfred Stepan's definition sees civil society as an 'arena where manifold social movements and civic organisations from all classes ... attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express

² A number of books have been written on the Sandline Affair, see O'Callaghan (1999), Dinnen, May and Regan, (1997), Dorney (1998).

themselves and advance their interests' (cited in Bratton, 1998: 417). Civil society consists of the public political activity that occupies the space between the state and the family. I agree with Bratton that civil society does not necessarily have an adversarial relationship with the state. Civil society organisations may choose either conflictual or congruent relations with the state depending on a particular issue or policy under consideration. For instance, various organisations in business and industry, such as the Chamber(s) of Commerce and the PNG Employers' Federation, may support or oppose various aspects of the state, economic policy because of their business interests. For instance, the outgoing chairman of the PNG Business Council, Mel Togolo, reiterated the Council's stand '...where possible, support the reform program of institutional strengthening public sector reform, micro-economic stability and good governance. These elements of the reform program are good for business, and will create confidence and facilitate investments in the country' (*Post Courier*, 11 May 2000: 36).

In a recent examination of the PNG state and society, Ron May, using Migdal's tools, has concluded that PNG is a clear case of a weak state and weak society (May, 1998: 60–76; see also Dinnen, 1998), while, at the same time, he claims that PNG has been a remarkably stable polity. This chapter attempts to describe and explore the nature of this remarkable polity by claiming that this is due to a vibrant and increasing confident civil society. Up to the late 1990s, it has remained almost inconspicuous mainly because it has not shown much dissent (with the exception of Bougainville), until the recent Sandline crisis in 1997. But this lack of dissent should not be seen as weakness. The combined effectiveness of a weak state and a stable civil society has seen a number of state policies reversed. Two significant achievements were the defeat of the *Internal Security Act* in 1993 and the cancellation of a World Bank SAP condition on land registration in 1995. Non-government organisations, churches, women's groups, students and unions have been around in PNG for more than twenty-five years but the linkages between them, the synergy, has only recently become obvious. There was dissent on the eve of independence: for instance, the renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement, the aspirations and activities of self-help and micro nationalist associations such as the Matanguan Association, the Kabisawali and the Napidakoe Navitu and the only anti-colonial movement ever to be led by a woman, Papua Besena.³ For female citizens, the legislative conception of the National Council of Women in 1979 was a significant milestone.

³ The Matanguan and the Kabisawali Associations, the Napidakoe Navitu and Papuan Besena are all discussed by various authors in May (1982).

Bratton's useful survey of the literature on civil society (1994: 51–81) identifies the essential definitional notions about the nature of civil society and its relationships with the state which can be summarised as follows:

- civil society is a public realm between the state and the family;
- civil society is distinguished from political society;
- civil society is a theoretical rather than an empirical construct;
- state and civil society, although conceptually distinct, are best considered together;
- civil society is the source of the legitimisation of state power.

Thus, for example, the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) students organised around provincial groups are not part of the family in the household or private arena, but are citizens from the provinces who are engaged in collective action to pursue shared goals. Their public civic actions are not part of politics in the 'public sector', which is the realm of the state. The use of the terms 'private' referring to family life, and 'public' meaning state actions, presupposes no public space for civic actors (Bratton, 1994: 56). Yet in the last 25 years many citizens in PNG have developed shared interests that are inadequately expressed by ideas of the family or clans or state institutions. Thus the evolution of clans into landowners in the resource-rich areas. Civil society is a public formation. In PNG civil society is where clan members wean themselves from dependence on either family or state and forms an important arena for their becoming citizens in a state which was created or imposed in 1973. It is the arena in which citizens relate politically to each other and to the state. Using Stepan's definition of civil society which, as Bratton indicates, is opposed to Gramsci's (Bratton, 1994: 56), women's groups, youth, unions, churches, student unions, NGOs etc. are not part of institutions in the political society such as political parties, legislatures, elections etc. Stepan locates civil society in society while Gramsci views political society to be synonymous with the state. 'Political society is not part of the state, but its institutions specialise in partisan contestation over state power' (Bratton, 1994: 56). Thus the state stands apart from civil society.

NGOs are essentially any organisation or association that isn't directly connected to government and is not profit making. They range from the tiny collection of people working in a specific community using just their own human labour and intellectual skills to the massive international NGO working throughout the world with a multi-million dollar budget. But civil society organisations are more than NGOs: they are any collective that is not part of the state machinery which is working towards

the collective good of society. This includes labor unions, churches, community organisations, industrial organisations, charitable organisations, manufacturing councils and foundations. The most successful mobilized opposition to the state has come from separatist movements: the pre-independence Papua Besena Movement (see Daro, 1976; Badu, 1982) and the Bougainville Secession Movement whose roots date back to Napidakoe Navitu in 1964 (see Griffin, 1982). The former drew on a shared common colonial history and the latter on common ethnicity and the conviction of being neglected by the former colonial power. The Bougainville Secessionist Movement has since developed other grievances against the state.

CHURCHES

The establishment of the mainline churches in the country predated the creation of a civil society and the colonial state. The London Missionary Society and the Methodists (who now form the United Church), and the Anglicans arrived in the country and began establishing their respective bureaucracies before formal annexation was even contemplated by Germany and Britain in 1884, to be followed soon after by the Catholics, and Seventh Day Adventists. According to Foreman, 'foreign missionaries did not want to rule or dominate but were helpers of the indigenous people, providing a kind of scaffolding to aid in the construction of an indigenous church' (Foreman, 1978: 35). And so the scaffolding they built included health, education and agricultural extension work. The Christian churches pioneered development efforts in the provision of education and health since the 1890s. The church still forms the bulk of the NGO involvement in the health sector, providing about 45 per cent of all health services nationwide (UNICEF & GoPNG, 1996: 95). In some remote rural areas they provide around 49 per cent of health services, and up to 90 per cent in some districts (UNICEF & GoPNG, 1996: 95). They train all of the community health workers and most of the nurses (AusAID, 1999: 13). Church health services continue to be administered by the Church Medical Council and at the provincial level, church health services are part of the provincial divisions of health.

Churches were instrumental in founding formal education in the country. Their influence remains strong today and church-run institutions account for nearly half of all student enrolments. The churches also run six of the nine teacher colleges. Both the church health personnel and teachers now draw salaries from the state. They remain active in agricultural development through the ownership of small and medium-sized plantations and the provision of high quality extension services. The

churches, through the Papua New Guinea Council of Churches (PNGCC), operate a number of NGOs: these include environmental organisations such as the Melanesian Environment Foundation; City Mission which works with youth; Caritas which targets justice, peace and development issues; and Lutheran Development Services which specialises in agriculture and shipping.

The seven major churches are part of the ecumenical movement through the Papua New Guinea Council of Churches (PNGCC). They include the United Church, the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Salvation Army, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Baptist Union of Papua New Guinea and the *GutNius* Lutheran. The churches are the largest formal organisation with a mass following and a capacity to span ethnic and clan loyalties. Although the churches are the longest established civil society organisation, certainly the most experienced as service providers, they have been relatively quiet in contributing to public opinion and debate, a role that they undertake in the privacy of the pulpit. Despite the formation of the PNGCC, the churches maintain their separate identities through denominational loyalty. The churches were affected by criticism in the 1970s for contributing to the large-scale destruction of traditional culture. The churches themselves have undergone a remarkable transformation during the last twenty-five years in terms of localisation in both personnel and ritual and a search for their place and purpose in a young Pacific nation.

The churches are now very much an indigenous church, those newly arrived in the various Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations have indigenous members now highly placed in the church hierarchy. It has only been in the last decade that the churches have begun to criticise the fledgling state. This self-imposed silence was broken in 1997 during the Sandline crisis, when Bishop Getake Gam of the Evangelical Lutheran Church publicly opposed the Government's deal with Sandline International to hire mercenaries to bring the Bougainville crisis to an end. There was also a report of a Federation of Religions with a membership of more than 1500 sisters, brothers and priests in both PNG and the Solomons who called the government to terminate its engagement with Sandline International (Ferea, 1997: 9–16). The launch of the 'Operation *Brukim Skru*' (kneel and pray) campaign by the Christian Leadership Crusade (CLC) during the 1997 national elections is another example of the church attempting to influence state policies. This was a campaign by the CLC amongst its parishioners to elect God-fearing leaders after prayer and contemplation. Brian Barnes, the Catholic Archbishop of Port Moresby, led a stinging criticism of the Skate government in 1999. The

archbishop's criticism was levelled at the gross mismanagement of the nation's affairs especially its economy. Archbishop Barnes explained how he could no longer watch in silence the pain felt by his parishioners and continue to refrain from criticising the Skate government. According to the Archbishop (and the Catholic archdiocese in Port Moresby), to remain silent, (under those circumstances) would have been obscene.

The churches were the first national institution to recognise women as individual persons by providing the opportunity for women to organise as women and as citizens (see Dickson-Waiko, forthcoming). All denominations including the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches have women organisations. Churches have provided a space within their hierarchies for women to become mobilized to be part of civil society, raising awareness and tackling issues not even thought possible in the 1950s and 1960s (see Dickson-Waiko, forthcoming). In addition, the women's organisations in the seven mainline churches under the PNGCC have formed a coalition called PNG Christian Women. As members of PNGCC, they are linked to the World Council of Churches (WCC). Through this linkage, Christian women, particularly the United Church Women's Fellowship being the first of the church women's groups to affiliate, have been exposed to global political issues, long before their secular sisters in the National Council of Women. In fact, many of the church women leaders now provide leadership within the secular National Council of Women. As an example of the WCC's progressive stance on global issues, it is now calling for the cancellation of debt incurred by Third World debt-ridden countries.

LABOUR UNIONS

Although the union movement remains weak and fragmented it has formed important links to unions outside the country. Trade unionism began after the enactment of the 1963 *Industrial Relations Act* and *Industrial Organisations Act*. They replaced mainly ethnically-based welfare associations that had sprung up during the 1950s in towns as problems of urbanisation became noticeable. The earliest unions included the Papua New Guinea Workers' Association (PNGWA) formed in response to the 1959–60 Native Wages Board hearings, the Milne Bay Workers' Association organised by John Guise in 1965 and the first real union, the Central District Waterside Workers' Union which brought together the ethnically-based welfare associations in Port Moresby. In 1975 the number of registered unions with the Labour Department stood at 47 registered unions (Hess, 1992: 74). Most were ineffective, small, and district-based, and were only able to enjoy a very short lifespan. Of those registered, only

eight had membership beyond 500 (Hess, 1992: 73). Unionism was new to Papua New Guineans in the late 1960s and early 1970s and this showed in their initial attempts at unionism.

Attempts were made in the mid-1960s to establish a peak union organisation. This initiative came from the colonial government who wanted to bring together the regional and town-based workers' associations and to ensure the workings of the newly created industrial relations system (Imbun, 1999: 38). After many discussions the Federation of Workers' Associations (FWA) was formed in 1970. One of its first acts was to lobby for more indigenous representation on the 1970 Minimum Wages Board. This action resulted in the appointment of John Guise and Paulus Arek to the Board. Both men championed workers' rights in the House of Assembly of which they were also members. Despite much political rhetoric, the FWA remained ineffective. Paulus Arek served as the first president of the FWA. The FWA was to be later transformed into the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1974. The TUC was effective in the mid-1970s under the leadership of PANGU stalwart, Tony Ila. It had gained new affiliates while at the same time attracting funding assistance from the government and international sources. The close association of PANGU and the FWA and the TUC reflected PNG's political history at the time, with PANGU as the leading nationalist voice for Papua New Guineans articulating the lived reality of colonized subjects.

The 1980s saw a reinvigorated TUC under the leadership of Henry Moses, then general secretary of the Bougainville Workers Union (BWU). Mr Moses brought a more industrial orientation to the TUC (Imbun, 1999). With more 'industrially competent unions' such as the BWU, the Waterside Workers Union and the Seamen's Union (Imbun, 1999: 41), the TUC affiliated a number of public sector unions such as the Teacher's Association (PNGTA). With the appointment of Lawrence Titimur as a full-time general secretary and other professional staff after 1986, the TUC was able to function, albeit briefly, as a peak union organisation. The affiliation of the Public Employee's Association (PEA) and the Teachers' Association (PNGTA) in the late 1980s boosted its affiliation fees to over K18,000 (Imbun, 1999: 42) representing a third of the TUC's budget. The TUC enjoys a membership of some 43,751 workers (Hess, 1992). An updating of the Labour Department's records will have seen a significant rise in union membership. This cooperation ended in 1991 when both the PNGTA and the PEA pulled out of the TUC over differences on the TUC's allocation of executive positions (Imbun, 1999). As the two largest unions in the country, they felt both this and their financial contribution should be adequately reflected in the TUC's executive committee representation.

The mining boom in the 1990s realised the formation of mining unions. The Bougainville Mine Workers' Union was the first to be established, followed by the Ok Tedi Mine Workers' Union, the Pogera Mining and Allied Workers Union and the Misima Mine Workers' Union. The mining unions have left their mark on the labour history of PNG as being the most active industrial organisations of the 1990s. Generally the mining unions have been more successful in negotiating tangible benefits for their members because of the strategic importance of the mines to the political and economic landscape of the country.

By far the largest, most vocal, and the longest surviving union is the Public Employees' Association (PEA). The PEA was formed in 1947 as an all expatriate Public Service Association, until 1962 when its constitution was amended to include indigenous state actors. The PEA has been predominantly Papua New Guinean in membership since 1972. Other government workers have since formed separate unions such as the Papua New Guinea Teachers' Association (PNGTA) established in 1970, the Papua New Guinea Nurses' Association (1972), the Police Association of Papua New Guinea (1965), the National Doctors' Union (1991), the Postal (PTC) Workers' Union (1983), the ELCOM Workers' Union (1990), the National Airline Employees' Association (1969) and the National Academic Staff Association (NASA) (1987), National Capital District Interim Staff Association (1988) and the National Academic Staff Association of Unitech (1990). Each of these unions has successfully negotiated, separately, salary increases during the last two decades. In 1997 a total of 152 industrial organisations had been registered with the Department of Industrial Relations but subsequently, 97 workers' associations had to be deregistered due to non-compliance of some of the conditions stipulated in Chapter 173 of the *Industrial Organisations Act* (Gima, 1998: 78). There are a number of workers' associations which are large and nationally-based enjoying the services of full-time paid staff.

The 1990 census showed that just over 9 per cent of the citizen population have paid employment. Labour Department records show that only a little over 19 per cent of them were registered members of unions. Most unions are weak and suffer from a lack of able leadership with a demonstrated capacity for union organizing. With a very few exceptions, most of the leadership are not full-time union workers and thus the possible termination of their employment has posed difficulties for the leadership in speaking out for better employment conditions and providing a critique of state policies. This has been demonstrated by the sacking of unionised Air Niugini Aircraft engineers in 1999. There have been attempts by the various Port Moresby-based unions to collaborate on

issues such as the attempted blocking of passage of the 1999 budget which had included legislation for a new Value Added Tax (VAT), but this kind of solidarity has not been sustained. The PEA does have full-time staff, and continues to be a vocal, often the sole critic of major national issues and state policies through its current president Napoleon Liosi. Mr Liosi is the first elected full-time president and has served ten consecutive terms, now almost twenty years, at the helm of PEA. While the PEA has bargained hard for salary increases for state workers, it has backed down on a number of occasions, 'claiming it would have been irresponsible' (Gima, 1994: 87) to squeeze increases out of various governments who have struggled to manage the economy. Unions, including the PEA, have threatened to bring workers out on nationwide mass strikes but that has not eventuated as yet. The PNGTA were the first to demonstrate their solidarity in their claims for pay increases in 2000. But solidarity was not maintained as various regional (Highlands and New Guinea Islands) and provincial branches (Eastern Highlands) of the PNGTA broke ranks with the leadership who were negotiating with the state. The responsibility to organise public sector mass actions would have to come from a union council in the TUC. Under the able leadership of a number of articulate TUC organisers such as Lawerence Titimur and John Paska, the TUC has been able to increase its public profile through its effective use of the media. Generally, the unions continue a 'cautious and pragmatic approach to improving wages and [employment] conditions' (Gima, 1998: 86). Most unions are too small to be viable industrial organisations. In the 2002 national elections John Paska contested under a newly formed PNG Labour Party of which he is the President.

EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS

Employer organisations have existed in Papua New Guinea since the late 1950s. The Employers Federation of PNG (EFPNG) was one of the first four such bodies to register under a new *Industrial Organisation Act* in 1963 (Imbun, 1999). The EFPNG currently has ten members, mainly from the private sector and brings together all major employers over industrial matters (*ibid.*). There is a Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce with some fifteen members representing business interests from the wholesale, retail, hospitality and construction industries in the country (*ibid.*). A number of provinces have a Chamber of Commerce set up outside the capital. There is also the Papua New Guinea Planters Association representing the agricultural sector, a Chamber of Manufacturers representing employers from the small manufacturing industry and the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum representing employers from the mining and

petroleum sectors (*ibid.*). They monitor economic policies of the state, making sure that taxation and employment policies remain in their best interests. The Chamber of Mines and Petroleum has also been prominent in the last two years organising high level conferences and symposiums to facilitate communication between the government, donors, and potential investors. They liaise and consult on both economic matters and other development issues including the development and maintenance of infrastructure, social services and law and order problems throughout the country. This function has been formalised through their membership of the multi-sectoral Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC) since 1998.

STUDENTS

The development of student politics in the country provides an insight into the development of civil society in PNG. Tertiary students, particularly from the first national university, University of Papua New Guinea, have since the early 1970s considered themselves as the voice of the nation and have, through public forums, petitions, demonstrations and the award winning student newspaper *Unitavur*, expressed strong views on numerous national and student issues. Issues raised have ranged from whether PNG should join the Commonwealth in 1975, to law and order, single line salary, registration of customary land, the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), user pay systems for health and education, freedom of the press, electoral development funds (MPs' slush funds), violence against women and student allowances and scholarships. They joined forces with NGOs to defeat the dreaded Internal Security Bill and provided key leadership in mobilising the country against compulsory land registration, an important condition of the 1994 SAP programme. In the last eight years various civil society campaigns have sought out linkages with students. Many student leaders have since moved on to state politics; so far two have served as Prime Minister. Student politics at the University of Papua New Guinea has contributed to the moulding of the strategic elite in PNG.

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

In those crucial years between the 1970s and 1980s, the young state was engaged in placing building blocks for a new nation. The human resources produced by a handful of tertiary institutions were quite literally consumed with nation building. Most of the good work undertaken by NGOs also took place in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. An attempt was made to combine a number of NGOs in 1988/89 in the formation of an

umbrella organisation called NANGO, but after some bitter struggles NANGO became moribund. NANGO stands for the National Alliance of Non-Government Organisations. Initially funded by UNDP, NANGO brought together between fifty and seventy NGOs with a broad range of development interests including spiritual, cultural, education, business, women, the environment and landowner awareness. It appears that the formation of NANGO was at the beckoning of donors who wanted to see some kind of coordination from this burst of civil society activity which was part of a global trend.

The initiative behind NANGO's formation came from an international NGO named the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific (FSP) which, in 1986, formed a regional umbrella organisation called the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO).⁴ Together with the Wau Ecology Institute and others, FSP wanted to see a PNG umbrella organisation so that NGOs would have access to international funding while implementing the Tropical Action Plan (TRAP) (a rather disarming acronym). The FSP now operates under the name Foundation for Community Development. The FSP introduced a new wave of NGOs in the Pacific who, according to Nicholas Favaclas, 'were funded and controlled by a group of Americans with powerful links to the US State Department (pers.com. 2001). The acrimonious debates which occurred between various members of NANGO were over attempts by indigenous NGOs, such as the PNG Trust and the Melanesian Environment Foundation, to wrestle control of NANGO away from foreigners (Favaclas, pers.com., 2001). Some indigenous NGOs were totally opposed to receiving money from the World Bank (Favaclas, pers.com., 2001). FSP-PNG managed and implemented the National Forestry and Conservation Action Plan's (NFCAP's) EcoForestry programme. Other NFCAP projects were subcontracted to other NGOs.

The TFAP Plan was renamed the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), a global plan backed by a number of multilateral organisations, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank and the World Resources Institute (WRI). The aims of the Plan were to curb tropical deforestation, to promote the sustainable use and conservation of forest resources to meet local and national needs, and to increase the flow of international aid to the forestry sector (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995).

Late in 1988 the PNG government made a decision to be involved in the TFAP process. In a memorandum of understanding the government instructed UNDP to take a lead role in supporting the development of the

⁴ FSP organisations have been formed in a number of Pacific Island countries such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Tonga.

non-government sector (Fergie, 2001). This initiative led to the commissioning of the first major study of non-government organisations in Papua New Guinea and the formation of the National Organisation of Non-Government Organisations or NANGO.

The TFAP Plan provided the basis for PNG's own National Forestry and Conservation Action Plan (NFCAP). The PNG NFCAP was different to other TFAP programmes elsewhere in the world. The ownership of the PNG NFCAP was broadened to include and involve more national ownership by including PNG-based NGOs and landowners. The increased global activity and interest in forest conservation coincided with the holding of the Barnett Forest Inquiry in 1989. The idea was to strengthen NGO capacity in environmental management and to promote the concepts of sustainable resource use and conservation (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995). The task of preparing and implementing the NFCAP would also be jointly performed by the Government and the NGO community under this new umbrella grouping of NANGO under a new 'partnership with NGOs' (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995: 11). Needless to say, the expectations of both landowners and NGOs were raised as they were promoted under this project as 'equals' with the Department of Environment and Conservation and the National Forestry Authority (NFA). They were represented as 'equals' on the NFCAP Steering Committee and several sub-committees, the Board of the National Forestry Authority created under a new Forestry Act in 1991 and the provincial forest management committees (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995).

A Technical Support Project (TSP) was established to provide support to the new project whose composition included the lead donor, the World Bank. The World Bank represented other donors to the project which included Japan and Australia mainly through technical assistance, New Zealand, Sweden, Germany, UNESCO, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Tropical Timber Organisation (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995). Those NGOs working on environment and forest issues embraced this windfall with open arms. Donor money was not restricted to environment-oriented NGOs. Other NGOs, described by Mayers and Peutalo as 'critically engaging' with the community, were included to carry out awareness in their areas such as the Village Development Trust, East Sepik Council of Women (ESCOW), East New Britain Sosel Eksen Komiti, Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF), Daga Bahai'i Spiritual Assembly in Milne Bay, the Enga Baptist Union and the Kiriwina Community Council (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995). For instance, in the space of two months in 1993, some US\$ 286,400 was paid out to ten NGOs (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995) to implement their respec-

tive environment projects. In September 1994, some US\$ 303,600 was allocated to five NGOs in Milne Bay, Morobe, New Ireland and Enga provinces (Mayers and Peatalo, 1995: 15). This sudden influx of money was a case of 'too much too soon'. Although NGOs and self-help associations were mushrooming everywhere, most lacked organisational, management and leadership capacity. Unfortunately, donors and the Government showered them with too much cash and power, which most could neither handle, nor absorb. Nevertheless the NFCAP project provided an opportunity for NGOs to learn and expand. A number of NGOs did survive this experience and continue with their work in their local areas.

The lessons from this experience appear to have gone unheeded. Other schemes continue regardless, such as the World Bank conceived Targetted Community Development Project (TCPD) and AusAID's Community Development Scheme (CDS). These schemes mean well but cash-strapped NGOs have taken the money in order to survive. Many volunteer workers in NGOs have left their voluntary jobs for consultancies offered by donor-driven projects to administer and manage donor-funded projects. The success of the NGO campaign on the land mobilisation programme led to their undoing. According to Faraclas, 'the World Bank got quite a scare from the reversal of its policy that it began to buy off NGOs' (pers.com., 2001). It was immediately after the anti-land mobilisation campaign and the cancellation of land moblisation as a SAP condition that PNG Watch was created. Its only function was to disburse World Bank funds to NGOs. PNG Watch was dominated by Melanesian Solidarity (MelSol). The Targetted Community Development Project was yet another scheme conceived following the heels of the anti-land moblisation campaign. The anti-land mobilisation campaign brought out an outpouring of sentiments against the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and thus the World Bank in 1994 and 1996. NGOs were at the forefront of the vehement opposition to SAP. The TCDP was conceived by the World Bank, to be funded by the PNG Government to channel money to the NGO sector to keep them quiet. The TCDP has been unfunded in the last three or four years due to shortage of money from the state coffers. Those NGO leaders who were elected to Parliament in the 1997 national elections have everything but NGO needs on their minds. Their immediate priority now is to stay abreast of the competitive *bisnis* of staying on the right side of the House.

It is little wonder that NGOs view the infusion of funds, especially by the World Bank, as part of a conspiracy to control them and destroy their good work. Donor interest in civil society comes from a global realisation of the failure of democratic institutions to gain a firm

grounding in many developing countries such as PNG. Political cronyism, endemic corruption, patronage politics and bureaucratic inefficiency have paralysed those democratic institutions created in 1975. Thus the donor community sees the development of civil society as a possible opening out of this *cul de sac*. The state considered the funding of NGOs as a viable option in terms of 'diversifying' outlets for development funding (Mamae, pers.com., 2001). That is to say, development funds could be disseminated through NGOs rather than relying solely on the state route. Certain civil society organisations had demonstrated the capacity to manage increased funding in the late 1980s and early 1990s through their work on literacy, women, poverty, social justice and human rights, and forest conservation and the environment.

The most recent indigenous NGO development is landowner groups. Landowner groups have organised to negotiate royalties for the exploitation of resources from tribal lands and to make demands on both the state and transnational companies for 'development' services such as roads, schools and hospitals in their local areas. It is an innovative use of an indigenous social institution to manage the impact of resource development and royalties or equity. Landowner groups are the fastest growing indigenous NGOs. Landowner groups pose a formidable challenge to the state because of the complexity and the explosive nature of the issues they are dealing with, and the strategies they use to achieve their goals and demands.

Over the last ten years NGOs have attracted into their membership government employees who are both state actors and members of the civil society. This has improved access for some civil society organisations to state funding and other state resources. The relationship between state and society is acknowledged but inroads made by society, in this instance civil society, into the state are equally important. An increasing number of tertiary-educated citizens have chosen to work with civil society organisations. This has raised the standard of debate within civil society, and the enhancement of society-state relations. However, their participation in civil society has also had negative consequences, in that they aggravated the conflicts between indigenous NGOs and the international NGOs as they tried to gain control and manipulate NANGO (Faraclas, pers.com., 2001).

A DEVELOPING 'WOMEN'S MOVEMENT'

There is a small struggling nascent women's movement but its position wavers between opposition to and cooption by the state. The 'women's movement' is overwhelmingly mass-based, conservative and has yet to develop a feminist framework. It has successfully mobilized rural women

through the National Council of Women network and the various church women's organisations but it lacks focus. The most effective examples of mobilized women are found in the Western Highlands, Eastern Highlands, East New Britain, East Sepik and Manus provinces. It suffers from a general lack of interest amongst female citizens within the strategic elite who have opted to pursue individual class-oriented goals. There are women in mixed NGOs but the leadership has been predominantly male. Women who are organised within the Council network view it as an alternative to state-led development programmes and projects which are not reaching those within civil society and those beyond the state. The involvement of women in civil society organisations especially the church is impressive considering the inherent cultural constraints circumscribed by a gendered post-colonial state.

Thirty-three percent of the sixty female candidates who contested the 2002 elections were closely associated with, supported by or leaders of NGOs. Like their male counterparts who have used their NGO network as their primary electoral base, they will have to extend their political base significantly in order to increase their chances at the polls. Female activism cannot be easily transformed into political votes.

STATE AND NGO RELATIONS

There may be some merit in the criticism levelled at the state and major donors, particularly the World Bank in its attempts to control and divide NGOs. One of the unexpected outcomes of the surge in the NGO movement was the creation of a government NGO unit. NGOs everywhere have guarded their autonomy. The NGO Unit was created in 1993 from a National Executive Council (NEC) decision in 1991 'to facilitate communication between NGOs and the state, among NGOs and to monitor activities of NGOs' (Kua, *pers.com.*, 2001; Mamae, *pers.com.*, 2001; Fergie, 2001: 1). The NGO unit was to be housed in the Department of Home Affairs and Youth. This policy decision was taken with little memory of events in the late 1980s when the department failed to agree on a national policy on religion and development. Two consultations were held, out of which a government NGO policy was developed in 1993.

By the beginning of the 1990s the Government had begun to acknowledge its inability to accommodate the growing aspirations and demands of Papua New Guinean communities. In a paper by Camillus Midire (cited in Fergie, 2001: 1), Midire admitted that the government cannot implement all its development agenda, and that it does not have the capacity to do so. Midire also stated that the government recognised the significant contribution of NGOs and churches in the delivery of

social services to the communities (Fergie, 2001: 1). He further stated that the government's offer of a *partnership* recognised NGOs as a *more* effective vehicle for delivery of services to communities (my emphasis). This was a major concession by the state as Mr Midire was then first assistant secretary, Social Planning Division, Department of Finance and Planning.

This shift in government policy happened at a time when the Australian Government had made known its intention to change its bilateral aid arrangements from budget support to programme aid. The Australian Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade had since 1991 accepted the idea of increased development assistance through NGOs (see Fergie, 2001: 4). The Department of Home Affairs and Youth was well aware of the position of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) on an appropriate policy and delivery mechanism for distributing aid through Australian NGOs (see Fergie, 2001: 4).

While there was great interest from NGOs and churches in the initial deliberations to develop an NGO policy, this had dissipated by 1995 because of the Department of Home Affairs insistence on locating the unit within the government ambit despite its opposition from NGOs, NANGO, churches and other arms of the government (see Fergie, 2001). The disregarding of NGO views on the location of the NGO Unit speak volumes about 'partnership and cooperation' and may be the contributing factor to the NGO Unit's lacklustre performance.

Despite the intent of the NGO policy, very little was achieved by the NGO Unit except its regular consultation to facilitate communication and disseminate useful information. The promised funding by the state and the donors was controlled by the Planning and Monitoring Department, and thus the NGO Unit within the Department of Home Affairs has remained ineffective (Paraha, pers.com., 2001). The Unit, like most units within the Department, remains underfunded.

One of the innovative strategies being attempted as best practice is the multi-sectoral approach being undertaken by the Government. This is state-civil society approach to development. This is the approach which builds on linkages between civil society and the state through institutions such as the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC) and a multi-sectoral National AIDS committee. These two agencies have a built-in consultative process which allows civil society to directly contribute to, assess, critique and assist in the development of state policies. They also allow the state to independently monitor the success and failure of development policies and their impact on society. For instance, the CIMC held two economic development summits in 1998 and 1999 and four regional workshops in 2000, and four more were

planned for April and May 2001. A number of state projects have included civil society input in the organisation, planning, implementation and management processes of projects. This is particularly true for programmes in health, population, informal education, skills training for the informal sector, the National Training Council and forestry.

2002 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

The political ambitions of a number of NGO leaders elected in the 1997 elections post-Sandline, have suffered a setback in 2002. These include Ludger Mond, Peti Lafanama and Fr Robert Lak. However, with eighty-five appeals pending in the Court of Disputed Returns, political fortunes may change. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the 2002 election results due to widespread cheating and vote-rigging in a number of electorates. In the case of the former governor of Western Highlands, Fr Lak was able to double the number of votes received in his 1997 victory but was still unsuccessful in 2002. Fr Louis Ambane has retained his connections to the NGO community and was successfully returned in 2002. Peti Lafanama has been described as being 'aloof' since his election to high office in 1997, and thus was replaced by Malcolm Smith Kela as governor of the Eastern Highlands. Lafanama was also referred to the Leadership Tribunal for the alleged misuse of public funds from the Gaming Board on the eve of the elections. Smith Kela sits on the board of a strong, province-based NGO called the Research and Convention Foundation. Other vocal NGO leaders who contested the elections and did not do well include John Paska, General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, and Powes Parkop of Melsol.

CONCLUSION

When Papua New Guinea attained sovereignty in 1975, the country was very much a collection of different ethnic and tribal peoples who had to be coached into believing they belonged to 'one nation, one country' and that they were 'one people'. Twenty-five years later, they are well into the process of accepting their common fate as a nation. Aside from the various Christian denominations, students and a handful of unions, there were very few civil society organisations twenty-five years ago.

The growth in civil society organisations in the country in the 1990s augurs well for Papua New Guinea as a fledgling democracy. It strengthens the legitimacy of the state created during colonial rule. In many ways the development of civil society organisations in the 1990s is the manifestation of the political idealism so evident on the eve of Independence 25 years ago. Those politically conscious citizens, highly

motivated and overly idealistic, with a firm desire to bring 'development' to their communities, have been able to achieve a measure of meaningful participation. All the rhetoric about self-reliance and sustainable human development which was commonplace at the time of independence has been channelled into the development of a growing civil society. It has given rise to the participation of non-state actors in self-help development projects. Unfortunately, some of the idealism has since been extinguished by some state actors through endemic corruption, and community and group welfare replaced by individualistic self-interest. This insidious social disease has also penetrated our civil society organisations in the 1990s, affecting its most able leaders in certain women's groups, churches, church-linked organisations and NGOs.

The emerging civil society in PNG has not escaped the notice of opportunistic politicians on both sides of parliament, as recent events such as Sandline and the accompanying military siege and two military stand-offs at Murray Barracks have shown on the eve of, and soon after the country's silver anniversary. The state has survived some unsettling political crises in the past but the respect for the state, the nation and the constitution (the *mama lo*), even by General Jerry Singorok who led some factions of the military against the state's Sandline deal, should mean something. The support given by NGOs in Port Moresby to Singorok's bold stand and the military-led siege on parliament stunned Francis Ona, Sam Kaona, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the various factions of the Bougainville secessionist movement. This has subsequently led to the current ceasefire and negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the ten-year Bougainville crisis. It is an abiding legacy for civil society organisations in PNG.

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GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Margaret G. Vatnabar

INTRODUCTION

In Papua New Guinea gender and development is still a very new concept to many people. Its application as a development tool has not yet been fully harnessed.

Gender in Papua New Guinea should be addressed from the viewpoint of improving the roles of both genders (male and female) in the community in order to enhance their contribution to economic development through increased productivity. With this in mind, gender and development is another approach to addressing development which should also be incorporated in the project cycle.

In this context, gender can be defined as the sociocultural attributes that are assigned to men and women, as they play their roles in society. However, gender should not be confused with sex, which refers to the biological attributes of men and women. Men are able to produce sperm, while women produce ova and have the capacity to give birth and breastfeed babies. These attributes are fixed at birth.

In contrast, gender attributes are not fixed. They can be changed over time. Gender attributes are influenced by factors such as education, the environment, and culture. Gender addresses the roles that individuals play, and can be classified into three groups — *reproductive roles*, *productive roles* and *community roles*. It is the productive roles that influence an individual's contribution to economic development.

This chapter attempts to address women's development in Papua New Guinea since independence. The chapter has been divided into five sections.

The first section presents the history of gender and development. It describes the events of women's work from as early as 1850, when the first missionaries arrived, through to independence, when the women's movement was given a foundation to build upon, and into the 1990s when a women's policy was put in place. It is this policy that has been the vehicle upon which the women's movement has tried to address women's issues affecting development in Papua New Guinea.

The second section looks at how international developments have been a driving force in pushing the development of gender in PNG. It also looks at the different approaches to development in this area, and how these approaches have changed, over time. The third section is on the reality of development of women and children in PNG. It looks at the real situation of women and children in terms of education, health, and other human development indices.

The fourth section is on gender in agriculture. It provides a practical example of how gender can be institutionalised, using the skills of lobbying and networking. The section also highlights how the mechanism can be made ineffective, if it is not properly resourced. The final section is the conclusion.

HISTORY OF GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN PNG

In Papua New Guinea, new activities for women were introduced in the 1850s by the early missionaries. The idea was to equip women with basic skills to enable them to look after their families. The women were taught basic skills to improve their roles as mothers and homemakers. This included cooking, sewing, hygiene, and child-care lessons which were developed around Christian principles. Then came the extension officers, welfare officers, and community development officers in the 1960s. They tried to pass on general information on health, agriculture, law and order, governance, and community organisation. Women were also taught home economic skills.

In 1974 a female adviser was appointed to the Prime Minister's Department. During that time, a Women's Unit was created in the Department of Decentralisation. This move led to the appointment of activity officers in all provinces in Papua New Guinea (National Steering Committee, 1995).

In 1975 Papua New Guinea gained its independence from Australia. Along with independence came our National Constitution. It is the Papua New Guinean Constitution that is the foundation upon which the Women's Movement is built, especially on the following goals:

Integral Human Development

We declare our first goal to be for every person to be dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or herself from every form of domination or oppression so that each man or woman will have the opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationship with others.

Equality and Participation

We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of our country (National Constitution of PNG 1975).

The Papua New Guinean Constitution has been most progressive and liberal in embodying equal rights for all its citizens.

Although women did not have to fight for equal rights under the National Constitution, revisions to some legislation were required to implement its spirit. However, cultural beliefs, practices and attitudes have restricted women from fully exercising their rights (National Steering Committee, 1995). On the other hand, Papua New Guinea has embraced new initiatives aimed at enhancing women's development. It has established the National Council of Women, which is a non-government organisation that advocates for a better quality of life for the women of Papua New Guinea. The National Council of Women, although set up in 1975, was formally established by an Act of Parliament in 1979. Its goal was to promote the status of women, as equal partners in development in Papua New Guinea.

In 1983 the Women's Section in the Department of Decentralisation was upgraded to divisional status (National Steering Committee, 1995). In 1984 the first Women's Development Program was introduced. The aims of this programme were to:

- mobilise women and get them involved in the development process; and then,
- establish a vibrant network of women's organisations from the district level to the national level in order to implement developmental projects and activities.

It was later realised that there were no policy guidelines in place to guide women's development in the country. This resulted in working towards developing the Women's Policy, which was put in place in 1990.

EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS ON GENDER AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S COMMITMENTS AND PROGRESS

As a sovereign nation and a member of the British Commonwealth, Papua New Guinea also had global commitments to consider when addressing the situation of women and children in the country.

At the time of gaining its independence from Australia, the first international conference on women was held in Mexico, and Papua New Guinea participated. The global trend at this time was to advocate specific projects which would enable women to participate more fully in various activities to improve their situation. The Women in Development (WID) approach was used to address women's issues, through programmes and projects.

The Nairobi Conference on Women in 1985 reviewed the performance for the period 1975–1985 and found that, although there was some improvement in certain areas, the overall situation of women had not improved at all. The WID approach was seen as isolating women's issues from the mainstream of development. This led to a call for the integration of gender issues into the development process of governments and the global move towards the use of the Gender and Development (GAD) approach in planning. This was because:

Despite these early initiatives, successive government policies have not been consistent enough to maintain the momentum. This has resulted in fewer achievements in the advancement of women with the consequential impact of a poorer quality of life for women in Papua New Guinea (National Steering Committee, 1995).

In 1994 the Papua New Guinean Government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

The Beijing Conference (held 4–15 September, 1995) was the significant international event that meant a lot to women's policy and development worldwide. Domestically, it was very important for gender and development in Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea began its preparations for the Beijing Conference some eighteen months before the actual conference took place. A steering committee, which comprised officers from all key departments, organisations, and non-government organisations (NGOs), met on a regular basis to discuss the United Nations document that was to be the basis of deliberation at the world conference. The committee had to reach a position for PNG on every issue in the document, and these decisions had to be consistent with all other commitments into which PNG had already entered. Christianity, culture, and 'Melanesian identity' played a big role in many of the decisions that were taken.

The continuous publicity in the media and on radio raised awareness of the bleak situation that women and children in this nation were facing, and the need to address it. There was also a call for inter-departmental involvement on the steering committee. This initiative raised an awareness of the situation among other departments, agencies, and NGOs, and it was anticipated that an integrated approach was needed to address the situation. This dialogue raised awareness in other government departments through the concept of gender and gender-mainstreaming in the planning process.

Papua New Guinea prepared well for the world conference by resolving the issues at the subregional and national levels. This preparation enabled PNG to establish its final position on the global level. The subregional meeting was held in New Caledonia, and PNG had its inputs into the Pacific Platform for Action, which was titled, '*Rethinking Sustainable Development for Pacific Women Towards the Year 2000*'. This document gave Pacific islanders a stronger position at the ministerial meeting for the Asia-Pacific Region (Government of PNG, 1999). In June 1994 the Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on Women was held in Jakarta, and was attended by forty-eight ESCAP members. It was at this meeting that the 'Jakarta Declaration for the Advancement of Women in Asia and the Pacific' was adopted (Papua New Guinea Delegation, 1995).

Papua New Guinea sent a delegation of 111 participants to the Beijing conference. Thirty-one were from the government sector, and eighty from NGOs. The government delegation comprised representatives from the Departments of Home Affairs, Personnel Management, Agriculture, Fisheries, Health, Education, Works, and Justice. The Prime Minister's Department, and the National Planning Office were also represented. Two national government ministers were also part of the delegation.

The Commonwealth Ministers' Meeting was convened on the eve of the official opening of the Beijing Conference, and all Commonwealth nations pledged their government's support for the Beijing Platform of Action. PNG was also represented.

Papua New Guinea had its country paper presented on 11 September 1995. It had nine critical areas of concern that needed to be addressed to improve the situation of women in Papua New Guinea. The critical areas of concern presented were:

- health;
- education, training, and literacy;
- mechanisms to promote the advancement of women and shared-decision making;

- economic empowerment and employment opportunities and conditions;
- legal and human rights, which address the issues of violence, peace, and national unity;
- culture and family, which address the issues faced by young women, girls, and special groups;
- transport, shelter, water, and communication;
- agriculture and fisheries; and,
- environment and development (National Steering Committee, 1995a).

Each of these critical areas contained specific issues that were seen as constraints on women's development, and required action from the relevant government departments if the present situation faced by women and children was to improve.

At the Post-Beijing Conference, four priority areas were identified to set the scene for the implementation of the *Global Platform for Action* and the *Papua New Guinean Platform for Action*.

These priority areas were:

- institutional strengthening and upgrading of the national women's machinery;
- economic empowerment of women;
- shared decision-making and good governance; and,
- integration of gender issues in policies, programmes, and plans (National Steering Committee, 1995a).

Progress in the four priority areas since the Beijing Conference has been very slow. This is due to the lack of commitment by the Government to allocate financial and human resources to implement the platform for action.

Efforts to strengthen the women's machinery have stalled due to financial and human resources constraints. At present, the national women's machinery in the Women's Division is housed under the Department of Social Welfare and Development as a division. This means that the Department of Social Welfare and Development's budget has to be shared with seven divisions. This has made it almost impossible for the Women's Division to carry out programmes and monitor the implementation of the Beijing Platform of Action. Also, as a result of the government's restructuring programme for the public service, the officers in the Women's Division were reduced from thirteen officers to only four.

Calls for the establishment of a Women's Office and for upgrading the status of women contradicts the policies of the present Government, which is trying to downsize the public service. This has a direct effect on the

establishment of the proposed office. If the Women's Division is not upgraded to Office status, with its own budget, then very little progress will have been made by the end of decade (1995–2005) for the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA). A high-powered, interagency committee has been revitalised and expanded to coordinate the progress and implementation of the BPA (PNG Delegation, 2000). This may be an interim way to address the monitoring of the BPA while other alternatives are considered.

The economic empowerment of women has advanced through two projects. First, the National Women's Micro-Credit Scheme. The aim of this project was to enable women's groups at the grassroots level to obtain mini-loans to operate small-scale, income-generating projects. However, loan repayments have been a problem. Loans are not being repaid on time to enable allocation to other women, as the scheme works on a revolving concept. Repayment of loans is also a common problem in other mini-credit schemes, where proper training and awareness were not conducted before the loan applications were processed. Second, is the launching of the Small and Medium Enterprise Policy, which provides a starting point for women's effective engagement in the formal economic sector (Government of Papua New Guinea, 1999).

In the area of shared decision-making and good governance, there has been good progress, because the *Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments* (OLPGLLG) accommodates the representation of women at all levels of government. As a result of this law, some eighteen women have been appointed to the provincial level of government, in their respective provinces. At the local level of government, there are some 284 appointed women members throughout the country. At the ward level, there is provision for two women on a ward council. There are 5,747 wards throughout Papua New Guinea. If these positions were all filled, there would be 11,494 women's representatives at ward level (Government of PNG, 1999). However, many of these posts are yet to be filled. Prior to the introduction of the OLPGLLG, there were only two women in the national Government, out of a total of 109 members (National Planning Office, 1998).

Women's desks and gender units are being established in several government departments, which is in line with the Commonwealth Plan of Action that states:

The Commonwealth Plan of Action aims to strengthen women's machineries within governments and integrate gender issues into the mainstream of all government and secretariat activities in order to achieve equality and equity of outcomes of women (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995: 6).

The trend began with the establishment of a Gender Unit in the National Planning Office in 1992, and was followed by the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (1996), the Department of Education (2000), and the Department of Police, and the Defence Force. The gender desk within the Department of Education carries out gender awareness in schools, teachers' colleges, and other institutions of higher learning. The University of Papua New Guinea has a gender studies programme which began enrolling students in 2000.

Despite these achievements, many of the gender desks and gender units are not able to carry out their plans and activities because they are inadequately funded, or are not receiving any funding at all from their respective departments. It is imperative that these gender units should not be transferred to the Women's Division of the Department of Social Welfare and Development because the department has no technical expertise, and the units will end up being abolished. An example of this is the Women in Fisheries Project, which was transferred from the Department of Fisheries to the Women's Division in the Department of Home Affairs and was eventually abolished.

REALITY OF DEVELOPMENT OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PNG

Papua New Guinea has one of the lowest life expectancy levels in the world. Present life expectancy is estimated at 53.5 years for females and 54.6 years for males (National Planning Office, 1998). In 1980 average life expectancy was 50 years. Since 1980 there has been a marginal life expectancy increase of 3.5 years for women.

In comparison with neighbouring Pacific Island countries, Papua New Guinea has a low life expectancy rate compared with Fiji (75 years, 1995 data), New Caledonia (76 years, 1995 data), and the Solomon Islands (61 years, 1986 data) (National Planning Office, 1998). It is also one of the few countries in the world where male life expectancy is higher than that for females.

Papua New Guinea has one of the highest rates of pregnancy related deaths in the world, at 930 per 100,000 (Government of PNG and United Nations Children's Fund, 1996). The national infant mortality rate is 73 per 1,000 live births, and the national child mortality rate is 31 per 1,000 live births, for children between the ages of 1 and 5. This situation is worse in the rural areas than in the urban areas. The heavy workload, that the women are daily burdened with, is compounded by inadequate health facilities, poor sanitation, the lack of safe clean water, and violence, all of which lead to a low life expectancy.

A comparison of provincial data on infant mortality rates and female adult literacy rates shows a correlation between these two variables. Provinces with high adult female literacy rates have low infant mortality rates. In contrast, provinces with low adult female literacy rates have high infant mortality rates. For example, the National Capital District has the highest adult female literacy rate and the lowest infant mortality rate (National Planning Office, 1998).

In PNG, some of the common diseases that kill children are pneumonia, meningitis, malaria, diarrhoea, and anaemia. Malnutrition, which is another common problem among young children in PNG, is estimated to affect approximately 34 per cent of all children under the age of five years.

Education is important in bridging the gender inequality gap in Papua New Guinea. At present, formal education is reaching only 70 per cent of primary school children, and less than 20 per cent of secondary school children (Government of PNG and United Nations Children's Fund, 1996). The current National Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for elementary schools is 90.5 per cent, for primary schools 55.8 per cent, and for secondary schools 9.2 per cent (National Planning Office, 1998). The transition rates from elementary to primary, and primary to secondary education are relatively high, with national averages at 89.4 per cent and 89.9 per cent, respectively.

However, retention rates, that is, the number of students who finish school compared to the number who start, show fluctuations for the country as a whole and for individual provinces (Government of PNG and United Nations Children's Fund, 1996). During the period 1983–1988, the average retention rate was 62.1 per cent. However, there has been a gradual decline to an average of 56.5 per cent during 1989–1994. Retention is regarded as the most serious problem in primary education in PNG.

Access to education by females is still a problem in PNG and is attributed to cultural attitudes (Yeoman, 1987). In 1980 female enrolment, as a percentage of total enrolment, was 41.4 per cent. In 1994 this rose to 44.9 per cent, which is only a 3.5 per cent increase over a fourteen-year period (NDOE, 1994). This occurred, even though 736 new schools were opened during that time (Government of PNG and United Nations Children's Fund, 1996).

However, literacy for women in PNG has increased from 22.8 per cent in 1971, to 40.3 per cent in 1990. This increase has mainly occurred as a result of the numerous literacy programmes that were put in place by NGOs. The literacy rate is still slightly lower than that for males, which was 49.5 per cent in 1990. The 1990 national census showed that

45.1 per cent of the population, aged ten and over, are literate. However, this is still very low compared to other Pacific Island countries, where the national average literacy rate is some 85 per cent.

Another concern with the literacy rates is that they are highest in the vernacular, and then *Tok Pisin*. Only 29.1 per cent of the population is literate in English which is the language that is used in education, commerce, and government (Government of PNG and United Nations Children's Fund, 1996). This means that functional literacy¹ in Papua New Guinea is still very low, and could be a factor hindering development in many rural areas.

While no definite study has been conducted on literacy, it is estimated that there is only a 25 per cent functional literacy level in the population.

The national Human Development Index (HDI)² value for Papua New Guinea is 0.363, which indicates that, although there has been a considerable amount of economic development,³ it is not filtering through to improve human development (National Planning Office, 1998). On a global scale, Papua New Guinea ranks in the lower one-third of all nations, and lowest among the Pacific island nations.

The rankings are even worse when human development indicators are analysed, using gender. Achievements in gender equality have been poor throughout Papua New Guinea. The Gender Development Index (GDI)⁴ value of 0.318 shows that, in every province, male achievement in life expectancy, educational attainment, and income are greater than female achievement. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)⁵ value of 0.177 highlights widespread inequality between men and women in

¹ Functional literacy is defined as the capacity to use reading and writing skills as a means of communication, to access information through various media, and to express needs and views to decision-making authorities (Ahai and Bopp, 1993).

² Human development can be described as the process of enlarging people's choices to improve their well-being. Development is often measured in terms of economic growth, technology, markets, and gross domestic product. However, the human development model differs by placing people at the centre of development (National Planning Office, 1998). The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure developed to show human well-being. It focuses on a long and healthy life, knowledge, and level of living. Four variables are used to calculate indices: *life expectancy at birth, aggregate gross enrolment ratio for Grades 1 through 12, adult literacy rate, and domestic factor income* (National Planning Office, 1998).

The HDI ranges from zero to one. A value of 1.000 represents an optimal condition, while a value of zero represents extremely poor conditions.

³ Extractive sector led development.

⁴ The Gender Development Index (GDI) has a maximum value of 1.000, which represents equality, and a minimum of 0.000 which represents absolute inequality between males and females in terms of life expectancy, education, and income (National Planning Office, 1998).

⁵ The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) measures the opportunities by focusing on the inequalities between men and women in the areas of economic participation, decision-making, and political participation (National Planning Office, 1998).

terms of economic and political participation and decision-making (National Planning Office, 1998).

The difference between GDI and GEM national values indicates that relative improvement in human development for women in the last two decades has had minimal effect on their economic and political participation. The majority of the female labour force in Papua New Guinea is engaged in agricultural production, primarily as subsistence food producers, while only 4 per cent is engaged in formal sector employment (National Planning Office, 1998).

It is also evident from data that a large gap exists in earned income. Females earn only 16 per cent, whereas males earn 84 per cent (National Planning Office, 1998).

GENDER IN AGRICULTURE — GENDER INSTITUTIONALISATION

An important priority area is the integration of gender issues with policies, programmes, and plans. This is the fourth priority area, as stipulated in the Papua New Guinean Platform for Action, from the Post-Beijing Conference. The majority of Papua New Guineans live in rural areas where the agricultural sector plays a multiple role of being the main source of income, subsistence, and employment. The majority of the female population (37.3 per cent) are engaged in this sector. Therefore, the integration of gender into agriculture policies, programmes and plans is important for the development of the country.

Women's labour⁶ is important in food production in Papua New Guinea. For example: 'Women's work in the subsistence agriculture sector is vital for the survival and well-being of the families that make up the nation of Papua New Guinea' (Vatnabar, 1999).

According to the Department of Agriculture, women play a major role in food production because they contribute between 50 to 70 per cent of agricultural labour in tasks such as clearing, planting, weeding, harvesting, and the transporting of food crops. They are also dominant in the marketing of food crop surpluses at the local market and in urban markets. They are also responsible for food processing and the preparation of meals. The task of carrying heavy loads of garden produce, firewood, and water can take up to 30 per cent of women's time, as Jenkins found (1992).

⁶ In PNG, a woman's labour can be described as a continuum of diverse multiple and overlapping activities. This is because she plays the role of a mother, a housewife, a food producer, a food processor, and the family breadwinner, unlike in Western society where the male is the breadwinner. Unfortunately, there is no clear boundary between monetary production of food, and food that is for the family's consumption. This results in women's labour being taken as invisible and not being included in official accounts (Vatnabar, 1999).

With respect to cash cropping, women also provide a large amount of labour through weeding and harvesting. Furthermore, 'Women are also responsible for the maintenance of the gene pool for food crops so that there is a continuous supply of planting material to ensure that food is available for their families, as well as a surplus for societal obligations and sale' (Vatnabar, 1999).

Factors constraining women's productivity are:

- time constraints between agricultural production and multiple domestic tasks, such as food processing and preparation; collection of water and firewood; and childcare; as well as time involved in walking to and from food gardens;
- the lack of technical extension support, facilities, and financial advisory services on food crop cultivation and marketing directed to women;
- the lack of access to relevant information and technology on intensive cultivation techniques and cash crop management;
- the lack of micro-credit facilities where women can obtain small loans to assist them in the purchase of appropriate items of technology ;
- the lack of informal education programmes for rural women, which are aimed at empowering them economically to improve their standard of living; and,
- lack of access to a proportion of earnings from cash crops (Shoefffel-Melissea, 1987).

It is important that agricultural policies and extension services attempt to address these constraints in order to increase food production. There is a Gender Unit in agriculture within the Department of Agriculture and Livestock which is struggling to achieve its objectives. So far, the unit has succeeded in incorporating actions to alleviate these constraints noted in the Department's *White Paper on Agriculture, Sectoral Policies: 1996–2000* and the National Food Policy. Despite the recognition of these constraints and the announcement of policies, there is no structured mechanism in the agricultural sector to implement these objectives.

CONCLUSION

New activities for women in Papua New Guinea were introduced as early as the 1850s, and were given formal recognition in 1975. Despite this recognition, very little improvement in women's standard of living has occurred, especially in the areas of health, hygiene, functional literacy, education, and employment opportunities.

Although the National Constitution has been an empowering instrument for equal participation of all citizens including women, in reality, this has not been the case. The main obstacles to gender development in PNG have been the traditional and cultural beliefs and practices, the attitudes of men, and also to a large degree, women who are bound by tradition.

Also, the constant policy changes by different governments in this area have not allowed developments in gender to gain momentum. The general view by most governments is that gender development is a low priority area.

The planning approach of the 1970s and 1980s, using the Women in Development Approach (WID), was portraying women's issues as welfare issues. Therefore it isolated women's issues from mainstream programming and project planning.

It has been five years since the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing. However, very little has been achieved in terms of implementing strategies in the nine critical areas by the respective in sectors, as outlined in the document *Papua New Guinea Platform for Action: A Decade of Action for Women Towards National Unity and Sustainability 1995–2005* (National Steering Committee, 1995).

The four priority areas set after Beijing were :

- institutional strengthening and upgrading of the national women's machinery;
- economic empowerment of women;
- shared decision-making and good governance; and,
- integration of gender issues in policies, programmes, and plans.

The overall progress in these areas has been very slow. Institutional strengthening and upgrading of the national women's machinery is still an outstanding issue that has not been dealt with since 1995. It has been found to contradict the policies of the present Government. Today, the call for an establishment of a 'Commission for Women and Development' is still echoing in the ears of our leaders, while women and children are dying. If PNG is to continue this way in addressing the situation of women and children, then there will not be much progress to report back to the United Nations World Conference in 2005.

Economic empowerment is still a long way from becoming a reality, while shared decision-making has made some positive progress by enabling women's representation at all levels of government. Many of these positions still need to be filled.

The integration of gender issues in policies, programmes, and plans has started in many sectors such as Agriculture, Education, Health,

Police, and the Defence Force, although there is still a lot more work to be done. There is an enormous need for many more planners to be gender-sensitised across the country, if much is to be achieved through sectoral plans and programmes in terms of an improved human development index. There is still a lack of gender analysis in most public investment programmes and projects. This is where the gender desk at the Department of National Planning needs to be more aggressive in addressing the situation.

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THE ROLE OF CHURCHES IN NATION BUILDING IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Daniel K. Leke

INTRODUCTION

The Church in Papua New Guinea has played a significant role in the process of nation building. Since first contact by various missionaries in Papua New Guinea in the 1870s (Piau, Lynch and Crowley, 1992: 113), the work of the Church has taken on wider dimensions. Different mainline churches have laid the foundation by planting local churches and engaging heavily in evangelism. In the process of engaging in different areas of ministry, they have contributed much to the building of Papua New Guinea. The churches got heavily involved in training and equipping Papua New Guineans. They also got involved in building up people's leadership potential and capacity to realize a vision and future challenges for the Church and the nation. The Church therefore, is seen today as a catalyst for change, a facilitator for national development, and an equipper for the ministry of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

To add, the churches saw the need not only to preach the Word of God but also to apply what they preach and teach in practical situations. Such application of the work of churches in practical situations involved the provision of health services, education, literacy and transport. These areas are considered as very crucial for the development of Papua New Guinea. But before we look at some of these practical involvements of the work of churches in nation building, I shall begin by discussing some of the challenges and moral responsibilities of churches in PNG and see how these contribute to nation building.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHURCHES TOWARDS NATION BUILDING

The Church in PNG has a moral role to play based on justice and righteousness. The Church also needs to combat activities that contribute to poverty and economic and social disparity, it needs to encourage peace, love and social harmony and emphasize the development of the total person, rather than an aspect of it. We shall look at each of these and see how they could contribute to nation building.

Promoting Justice and Righteousness

The Church needs to exercise justice and righteousness based on biblical principles. One of the ways to do this is to speak out against injustice and evil practices prevalent in state or private institutions, the established systems which people manipulate to pursue their own agendas and interests. For example, in the distribution of goods and services, some people in government, especially, politicians and bureaucrats make decisions and allocate resources in favour of their cronies or supporters.

Senior executive appointments are decided by politicians and other senior bureaucrats, usually those associated with major political parties in government. In some cases, it appears that appointments are not made on merit (based on qualification and experience). One is put in a position just because he or she is an ally or political associate of certain major ruling bodies, such as political parties in government or unions. As a result of this type of injustice or unfairness in the selection and distribution of goods and services, there tends to be inefficiency and a lack of productivity in various organizations. Given the unstable political situation in the country, those who are placed in various responsible positions to administer and manage public assets or funds tend to misappropriate these public monies as much as possible.

Because of these injustices at institutionalized levels, churches in Papua New Guinea have a moral duty to propose alternatives and solutions, which both seek to reform and, if necessary, draw guidelines and to eliminate practices that may have adverse effects on the nation. The Church must proclaim the truth about the injustice and pressure the government and its institutions, in particular the managers and guardians of those public institutions, to come out fair and play a righteous and just role. The Church needs to rebuke injustices and emphasize righteousness to supersede all dealings of the government, from decision-making to resource allocation and resource management. Only then, will we begin to see a just and fair society.

The Church in PNG is in a better position to advise people in leadership and management positions to be good servants and stewards of the resources. They have to acquire wisdom if they wish to lead and manage material and human resources wisely and effectively. Jesus Christ, for example, has convincingly shown this kind of management skills in relation to the calling of the Twelve Disciples. According to Avis (1992: 96), Jesus Christ showed scant regard for modern management wisdom; he was not looking for managers, but for learners and leaders — disciples and apostles.

According to the Gospel of St Mark, Jesus appointed the Twelve to be with Him and to be sent out to proclaim the message (Mark, 3:14). Jesus's appointment of the Twelve Disciples, Avis maintains, point towards the twofold requirement of today's Church for (a) highly trained personnel, equipped with professional skills, whose learning programme continues throughout their career, and (b) leaders of communities who can not only ensure that all things are done decently and in order (management skills), but who can focus and direct the energies and even the conflicts of that faith towards the attainment of goals, the overcoming of problems, and a realization of a vision of the glory and grace of God (Avis, 1992).

This is what the churches in Papua New Guinea need to preach, particularly to reiterate and encourage their members to utilize their professional knowledge and skills in an orderly, effective and honest manner. The church members should be encouraged to be good and faithful managers and servants in whatever responsibility they may be engaged in. They have to be transparent in their dealings with public resources, such as financial matters. If most public servants in PNG know their roles as 'servants', then they should be motivated to serve the Government and its people with respect and dignity. They should not allow themselves to be served by others but to serve others with honesty, humility and with genuineness. People, who serve the Government in whatever capacity for mere pay, may not be productive and innovative enough; they may tend to have the 'don't care attitude'. On the other hand, however, we would see a real difference if the people who work under various organizations in the public and private sectors serve wholeheartedly by committing their time, effort and talents to producing best results. The churches, apparently, have to get their priorities right by encouraging their members to exercise these servanthood qualities in non-government or government-related activities.

Combating Poverty and Social Disharmony

Furthermore, the Church needs to speak out against practices that allow for poverty and social disharmony within individuals, families and groups.

The example shown by the Catholic Bishop of Port Moresby, Bishop Brian Barnes (*Post Courier*, 14 August 2001), in speaking out against the national Government's overwhelming support to retain poker machines in the country should be noted. Here is a concerned clergy, a bishop, representing a main denomination, speaking against a practice that has, over the years, enslaved and crippled individuals and families.

Time and time again, some church groups and individuals have warned about the dangers of such games, poker in particular. This game has marginalized urban dwellers and, particularly, the casual and middle class workers into poverty. Yet, the decision-makers, especially the politicians, see fit to defeat the motion recently to abolish poker machines in PNG. Where is the justice when a handful of politicians who represent the majority failed to listen and to seriously take note, the concern of the people to abolish poker machines in Papua New Guinea?

The national Government, in the name of development and subsequent job creation, allows certain businesses to operate, such as poker and other related games businesses, which tend to have an adverse effect on the society. The churches, therefore, have to come out and warn the Government, and particularly their church members, about the negative implications such games have on their lives and the society. When people begin to realize the negative impact these games have on their lives and quit or avoid such habits as much as possible, they will then begin to see some positive change in their lives.

The Need to Proclaim Peace and Love

The Church also has a moral role to play in proclaiming peace within the PNG society. This is considered to be crucial as far as nation building is concerned. Peace and reconciliation have an important place in a society like PNG where there are ethnic, racial, social, religious and political conflicts. 'Reconciliation', as White & Blue (1985: 47) put it, is that process by which hostility is abolished and peace restored. It is God replacing war with peace, alienation with friendship and intimacy. Peace with God, peace with ourselves and peace with our neighbours (even peace with our physical environment) are inseparably linked. To lose one is to lose all. To regain the one (peace with God) is to begin to regain all.

The various churches' role in mediating peace in the Bougainville conflict in PNG, for example, needs to be noted. The Catholic Church, the United Church, the Evangelical Church, the Anglican Church, the Salvation Army and the Seventh Day Adventists have put in a lot of their time and effort in providing support, encouragement and counselling with those affected by the conflict. There was

tremendous help from church groups in prayer and kind (money and clothing) for the war-torn island.

The driving force that permeated these church organizations and individual Christians to preach about peace and act as mediators is 'love'. When a person is motivated to do things in love, he or she wishes to go beyond the normal to do the unexpected and extraordinary. Love wants to give freely without reward or pay; love does not take revenge; love does not hate others; love wants to sacrifice. This is biblical love, the 'agape' love that God has. It was while we were sinners that Christ came to die for us. God, taking the form of a man and dying for the sins of the World, is a clear demonstration of self-sacrificial love. As White and Blue (1985) put it, the gospel is the story of a loving God reaching out to people. The Apostle Paul, as God's servant, tells us he is preaching the gospel because love forces him to (2 Corinthians 5:14). Love, he tells us, reconciles us to God (2 Corinthians 5:18). Such love makes our salvation more than ransom from merited punishment.

To this end, the Church in PNG should be compelled to preach peace and love to those in conflict, those in need, having in mind that the one they preach about (Jesus Christ) is the Peace Maker (Ephesians 2: 13–14) and the One who loved us so much (John 3:16). Christ preached peace to us so that instead of being enemies, we might become members of His family (Ephesians 2:17–19). The Church has an obligation to go out and tell the world, in particular, the people of PNG, that sin enslaves (John 8:32). Christians must adopt the character of God by preaching against immoral behavior and encouraging people to follow Christian principles and values, such as showing love to others and establishing peace within us and with our neighbours. By doing this, we should be able to build a peaceful society, a peaceful nation that even outsiders would have the glamour of visiting.

Relevant here are the words of the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who had this to say when addressing an International Pentecostal Youth Day Function in his country in June 1997:

Religious institutions can help restore the culture of moral responsibility and a respect for human dignity. This means each individual taking responsibility for building our country and forging our nationhood. In our own small way each one of us can help to rebuild this country, by every criminal we refuse to shelter and by every policeman we help to do his job. If every Church member decides never to buy stolen goods, the market for stolen goods will be made that much smaller.

He further reiterates that:

... as South Africa strives for reconstruction and reconciliation, nation building and development, religious organizations can make a contribution of particular importance in their programs for the youth, especially those that build moral strength, emotional maturity and civic responsibility in young children. (Mandela, 15 June 1997).

It appears that Mandela's speech came in the midst of restoration and reconciliation after a long struggle of conflicts of various types, ranging from ethnic or racial tensions, youth unrest and subsequent criminal activities. One can agree the words of Mandela and take it as a challenge for Papua New Guinea. The problems prevalent in South Africa and other countries also apply in PNG. Therefore, church leaders in collaboration with government leaders should be challenged to stand up and address issues that contribute to social unrest. The factors that contribute to the deviant behaviour of youth — such as drugs, alcohol, prostitution, armed holdups, rapes, to name a few — should be addressed hand in hand with the churches and the national Government. Law enforcing agencies, such as the local court system, the police force and correctional institutional services, or even the Defence Force, can be given more powers to eradicate problems, but this alone may not help. One can use force to minimize crime and to punish law-breakers but this may have very little effect on the life of the law-breaker and the society.

The Church therefore, has a major role to play in such situations where spiritual counselling, love, care and encouragement is required. Unemployed youth and those involved in drugs, alcohol and prostitution need to be cared for, accommodated and fed. If the Church and government leaders begin to develop a tendency to avoid such people, we are going to have real problems. Rehabilitation centres like the Halfway Christian Centre of Morata Settlement, in Port Moresby and Koki's Every Home for Christ Centre, also in Port Moresby can be revitalized with financial support by the national Government and donor agencies in the country. One hopes that this financial support would help in a major way to bring in more unemployed youths, drug addicts, ex-prisoners, criminals, and the abused in society. These people would then be trained and taught vocational and recreational skills and about morality and its importance. Further, financial support should also be made to similar mission organizations like the Salvation Army. The Salvos throughout the country are doing exceptionally well, particularly their involvement in humanitarian activities and their provision and facilitation of capital works like schools and health facilities. This sort of work should be encouraged and

supported by the national Government, as it would help to bring positive changes in society.

Such action of rehabilitating the unemployed and deviant youths in Church and mission-run centres in the country should, in a major way, alleviate or lessen some of the identified social and economically-related problems. Other such rehabilitation centres in the country should also be identified by the national Government and allocated funds so that the organizations, especially churches who are engaging in these activities, can continue to provide essential services to young people who may need such facilities. This is seen to be the churches' practical approach to helping people, particularly the unemployed, school leavers, drug addicts, ex-prisoners and the homeless in society. By doing so, the churches in Papua New Guinea would contribute immensely to nation building.

Combating Economic and Social Disparity

In addition, we have to look at what some World Church organizations are doing in relation to combating economic and social disparity and see how they might apply in Papua New Guinea, such as Asia's World Evangelical Fellowship Group headed by Secretary-General Wong Kim Kong. In his keynote address at a gathering of World Evangelical Fellowship leaders in Cyprus in 2000, Mr. W.K. Kong, quoted by Bryan L. Myers of World Vision, presented the following needs and challenge:

... Economics, demography, technology, the social and spiritual fabric of society, all are undergoing foundational change at a rate almost too fast to follow. Asian nations are grouping for answers to the serious problems of economic crises, political turmoil, religious and ethnic conflicts, moral decadence and ecological abuse. With such phenomena threatening human life and institutions, how is the Church, the 'ecclesia' of Jesus Christ, going to face these challenges in these end-times and be God's agent to reconcile the Asian community with God and bring transformation through the Gospel.

In trying to answer this question, Kong has the following to say in relation to the 'Lust of the Eyes', which we view as relevant to our Church, Government and society here in Papua New Guinea. In summary, there tends to be a hindrance to accepting God's message, and that is the obsessive concern with and pursuit of wealth, often at the expense of social values and the individual may become inevitable, the spiritual and aesthetic (i.e. the things to do with beauty, the lusts of the eyes). This has led to an inevitable corruption of spiritual and moral values of society and individuals. The Church needs to be increasingly challenged

to develop a radical kind of Christianity that is willing to count the cost of discipleship and stewardship and to fulfil its mandate to be the 'salt' of the earth and the 'light' of the world. The Church must develop 'issue' studies and engage in discussion with government, authorities and civic organizations in making economic policies and legislation that will eradicate this disparity. If conventional solutions no longer respond to today's problem, Kong continues, the Church needs to be proactive in facing the following challenges.

There is a need for continuous evangelical response and articulation of this issue. The Church cannot remain silent. We must become advocates for the poor. There is a need for the development of certain social clauses that may elevate this condition of disparity and a need for social and community development. Social and community development is a precondition for permanent economic development and increases productivity and efficiency; better education strengthens competitiveness, better wages boost purchasing power, and just distribution of land among many people increases productivity. Kong further maintains, that the Church is called to continue to give mutual assistance, relief and to understand development projects. The goal of economy is to serve life, which means to enable a decent development of the marginalized. The Secretary General further reiterates the Church's need to manifest the power of the Holy Spirit by breaking the principality of economic materialism and individualism. The Church must be seen in the promotion and practice of economic sharing; exhibiting a deep sense of *koinonia*...

These issues and challenges facing the Asian Church and the need to eradicate these social and economic disparities is something that the churches in PNG must resolve if they want to see change in the right direction. The poor, the homeless, the bereaved, the uneducated, the unemployed, the street seller, the subsistence farmer, the casual labourer, the middle class, etc., all need to see some form of change, not necessarily in material terms but spiritual change in the lives of Papua New Guineans.

Developing the Total Person

The notion of 'being poor physically and rich spiritually' tends to deviate from a holistic view of developing the total person which is stipulated in Papua New Guinea's philosophy of education. If one wishes to elaborate on this philosophy, it obviously calls for the development of the whole person, that is, integral human development. In the context of education, this means that education should be geared towards integrating and maximizing the potential of individuals, their socialization, participation, liberation, and equality (Ministerial Committee, 1986: 7).

The churches, therefore, are called to play their roles in meeting these needs to develop the whole individual. Incentives and avenues should be provided by the Church where both the affluent and the less affluent in society should become dynamically involved with others, not only in a family context but also in schools, church, community and beyond. By interacting with each other and by sharing ideas, skills, and expertise, they motivate and encourage one another to conserve and transmit knowledge and cultural values to future generations and to bring about development in the lives of individuals and the society.

Moreover, the Church, in collaboration with the government, can identify influences that dominate and oppress the lives of many Papua New Guineans. In a developing nation like PNG, people tend to focus their attention on identifiable objectives or needs and ignore the very fundamentals that make up the human being. Spiritual, emotional, psychological, and social or economic needs can be ignored in a way that is oppressive. Thus, the goal of liberation for every Papua New Guinean is to minimize this both within himself or herself and within society. The emphasis is for every person living in PNG to have the opportunity to take part in the spiritual, social, physical, economic and political life of the country.

There should be positive steps taken by the Church and Government to identify disadvantaged individuals or groups in PNG and make attempts to redress the inequalities by providing them with the stated basic human needs. Only then will we begin to see some form of change in the right direction for this country (Leke, 1997: 27–8). Only then, will the Church contribute much to building Papua New Guinea in a better and just way.

Having discussed the moral responsibilities and challenges for the Churches in PNG, we now draw our attention to some of the services and activities some churches and mission organizations are engaging in which are contributing much to economic development and nation building.

SERVICES PROVIDED BY CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS IN PNG

There are a number of services some churches in PNG have engaged in which contribute to nation building. Among other Church-related responsibilities, the notable ones we want to concentrate on are health services, education, literacy and transportation. We will see how these areas contribute to nation building in PNG.

Health Services

One of the key objectives of the Church (i.e. the universal Church, the Bride of Christ made up of all Believers) is not only preaching about

'Spiritual Salvation' as the result of 'believing' and 'accepting' the Word of God, but also about 'Physical Salvation'. The emphasis is that a person must be both physically and spiritually healthy. A person must experience both physical and spiritual healing. The former cannot happen without the presence of the latter; both must work hand in hand in order to produce healthy physical and spiritual results in the life of a person. This ideology has become a driving force for various church and mission organizations in providing health services. They tirelessly commit themselves to providing some of the best health facilities and services in the country.

Most health services in the early stages of Papua New Guinea's development came about as the result of the pioneering work done by committed foreign missionaries and mission volunteers. Many of the missionaries came to PNG with a view to preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ to the lost tribes and did not give much attention to other social services until they were faced with the realities of life in the land of the unknown. Soon they realized the realities of the 'Great Commission' of Jesus Christ (Mathew 28:19–20) which required them to go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them and teaching them everything that the Lord commanded them.

A Summary of a Ministerial Brief by the Churches Medical Council of PNG

A paper prepared for the Minister for Health by the Churches Medical Council of PNG (3 July 2001) has some important information about the responsibilities of churches in providing health services and facilities. According to this document, the churches today provide a total of 363 health facilities throughout PNG (Table 1), or about 45 per cent of the total health services and slightly more, 49 per cent, of all rural health services (Tables 2 and 3). They also provide 60 per cent of General Nurse Training and 100 per cent of Community Health Worker Training. Church health work is now mainly confined to two main areas: the provision of health services in rural areas and the training of nurses and community health workers. Service delivery involves preventive and curative care being provided through the District Hospitals, Health Centres and Sub-Health Centres and Aid posts throughout the country.

The tables that follow provide a surprisingly clear picture of how much the various churches and mission organizations have put and are putting into health work for the development of this young country — Papua New Guinea. Let us admit now that, given the scope of this material, it is our interest to look only at the Church Health Services and not Government Health Services. However, we will provide a comparative

review on education, that is, both government and Church-run education agencies. Table indicates Church Health Facilities by province.

Table 1: Number of Church Health Facilities by Province, 2001

Province	Provincial Hospital	District Hospital	Health Centre	Sub/Health Centre	Aid post	Total
Western	-	2	-	18	25	45
Gulf	-	2	2	7	19	30
Central	-	-	2	12	6	20
Milne Bay	-	-	2	23	4	30
Oro	-	1	1	4	1	7
Southern Highlands	-	-	4	25	12	41
Enga	1*	1	2	4	-	8
Western Highlands	-	2	1	11	4	18
Simbu	-	-	1	5	3	9
Eastern Highlands	-	-	2	12	3	17
Morobe	-	1	3	3	-	7
Madang	-	1	5	11	12	29
East Sepik	-	-	1	21	8	30
West Sepik	-	1	1	20	-	22
Manus	-	-	-	-	3	3
New Ireland	-	-	5	6	-	11
East New Britain	-	1	-	12	-	13
West New Britain	-	-	1	12	2	15
North Solomons	-	-	1	6	-	7
PNG	1*	12	34	212	102	3631

* There is a second district hospital in the Enga Province, run by the Baptist Church, the Kompian District Hospital, not shown in the original table.

Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 5).

Table 1, clearly shows that the churches are responsible for 1 Provincial Hospital (Sopas Adventist Hospital in the Enga province), 13 District Hospitals (in all), 34 Health Centres, 212 Sub/Health Centres and 102 Aid posts. In addition, there are 5 General Nursing Schools and 13 Community Health Worker Schools.

Table 2: Church Health Services as a Percentage of Total PNG Health Services by Province and for National Capital District, 2001

<i>Province</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Total PNG Health Services</i>
Western	52	50
Gulf	52	50
Central	48	46
Milne Bay	64	61
Oro	29	26
Southern Highlands	61	60
Enga	27	29
Western Highlands	50	48
Simbu	29	26
Eastern Highlands	38	38
Morobe	31	26
Madang	42	38
East Sepik	70	67
West Sepik	76	71
Manus	33	25
New Ireland	36	33
East New Britain	43	42
West New Britain	65	59
North Solomons	45	39
Total Coverage	49	45

Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 6).

The Regional Summary provided by the National Department of Health specifies Health Services Coverage by regions of the country. This can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3: Church Health Services as a Percentage of Health Service, by Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Total PNG Health Services</i>
Southern	52	44
Highlands	45	44
Momase	55	49
Islands	45	40
Total Coverage	49	45

Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 6)

As seen, Papua New Guinea is divided into four main regions, namely the Southern, Highlands, Momase and Islands regions. The provinces that are part of the Southern region include Western, Gulf, Central, National Capital District, Milne Bay and Oro; while the provinces in the Highlands region includes the Southern Highlands, Enga, Western Highlands, Simbu and Eastern Highlands. Likewise, the provinces in the Momase region include Morobe, Madang, East Sepik and Sandaun (or West Sepik) while the provinces in the Islands region include Manus, New Ireland, East New Britain, West New Britain and North Solomon. According to the rural Church health services coverage by region, it appears that Momase and Southern regions have a higher percentage of rural health services than the Highlands and Islands regions respectively.

Health Institutions

As specified in the Churches Medical Council of PNG's Ministerial Brief (2001: 12), churches are largely involved in a number of Health Worker Training Institutions. Many of these health worker training schools were established to train Nurses, Nurse Aides and Aid Post Orderlies. All training institutions are approved and are visited regularly by the Nursing Council of PNG. Nurse Aide and Aid Post Orderly training were combined and are now known as the 'Community Health Worker Programme'. The other course is the General Nurse programme to train nursing sisters.

Health worker training remains a national function and the subsidies for training are the responsibility of the National Health Department. There are two major channels by which the Government subsidizes training schools: running costs, student allowances and tutor salaries. The Government, through the Human Resources Division of the Health Department and the Commission of Higher Education, provides grants to assist training schools. Table 4 shows an estimate of General Nurse Staffing and Student levels per school.

Similarly, the Ministerial Brief Document shows that there are well over 13 Community Health Worker Schools. These schools also have a staff/student ceiling and gives a good picture of the kind of training various churches provide which ultimately contributes to nation building. This is indicated in Table 5.

Table 4: General Nurse Staffing and Student Levels per School

School	Church	Programme	Student Ceiling	Tutor Ceiling	Province
Balimo	ECPNG	General Nurse	40	4	Western (closed)
Kudjip	Nazarene	GN	60	7	Western Highlands
Sopas	SDA	GN	40	4	Enga
Madang	Lutheran	GN	90	12	Madang
Alotau	Combine	GN	45	5	Milne Bay
St Mary's Vunapope	Catholic	GN	90	12	East New Britain
Total			325	40	

Note: A training school run by the ECPNG for general nurses, with a student ceiling of 40 and a tutor ceiling of 4, previously operated in Balimo.

Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 12).

Table 5: Community Health Worker School Staffing and Student Levels

School	Church	Programme	Student Ceiling	Tutor Ceiling	Province
Rumginiae	ECPNG	CHW	45	5	Western
Kaupuna	GCS	CHW	60	6	Gulf
Veifa,a	Catholic	CHW	35	3	Central
Budoya	Catholic	CHW	12	1	Milne Bay
Salamo	United	CHW	12	1	Milne Bay
Oro Bay	Anglican	CHW	40	4	Oro
Det	Catholic	CHW	30	3	Southern Highlands
Tinsley	Baptist	CHW	40	5	Western Highlands
Braun	Lutheran	CHW	50	6	Morobe
Gaubin	Lutheran	CHW	60	7	Madang
Aitape	Catholic	CHW	60	7	Sandaun
Telefomin	Baptist	CHW	12	1	Sandaun
Lemakot	Catholic	CHW	45	5	New Ireland
Total Schools			13	501	54

Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 13).

All these examples of health services show that the churches contribute much to the development of Papua New Guinea. The health services, facilities and training given to Papua New Guineans and the subsequent improvement of life for the people of this country is such that it should not go un-noticed. The imparting and facilitating of health services, basic theory, skills, and practical application of this knowledge has

been and will continue to be the foremost objective of churches which will enhance the well-being of the people of this country. This is a clear indication of the roles that churches play in contributing to the building Papua New Guinea.

Education

Education in Papua New Guinea is divided into two main systems: the private and the state. The former operates under two sub-systems: church agency institutions and non-denominational, while the latter is operated and controlled by the state. Similar arrangements are seen elsewhere, particularly in Australia (Chalklen et. al., 1986: 16). We can focus our discussion on the church-run schools in Papua New Guinea and see how it contributes to nation building.

Table 6 shows the numbers of church agency institutions by province and institution type in Papua New Guinea. According to these statistics made available by the Department of Education (1997: 9), there are 21 provinces and each province has a number of educational institutions run by various churches. The church agency institutions range from elementary schools to secondary, then to colleges and universities. Table 6 shows these Church-run institutions include 259 elementary schools, 1,511 community schools, 49 provincial high schools, 50 vocational centres and 6 teachers colleges. The total number of educational institutions ranging from elementary to college is 1,876.

The figures shown above were recorded for the 1997 cohort year and could have increased, especially under the new Education Reform. Under the new Education Reform, a number of schools (both community and high schools) have become primary and secondary schools in which the former provides for grades 3 to 8 while the latter takes in grades 9 to 12. Also, a number of elementary schools have been introduced throughout the country, which cater for preparatory classes (Prep 1 & 2 stages).

In contrast, the government agency institutions during the same cohort consist of 274 elementary schools, 1,374 community schools, 97 provincial high schools, 61 vocational centres, 5 national (senior) high schools, 7 technical colleges and 3 teachers colleges. The total number of state-owned institutions is 1,821. This distribution is shown in Table 7.

Table 6: Church Agency Educational Institutions by Province and Institution Type**

Province	Elementary School	Community School	High School	Vocational Centre	Teachers College	Total Institutions
Western	17	42	1	-	-	60
Gulf	1	39	-	-	-	40
National Capital	5	9	2	2	-	18
Central	-	92	2	1	-	95
Milne Bay	7	115	3	5	-	130
Oro	-	40	1	1	-	42
Southern Highlands	-	37	2	-	1	40
Eastern Highlands	-	71	4	1	-	76
Simbu	24	47	2	4	-	77
Western Highlands	20	101	3	4	1	129
Enga	15	60	3	4	-	82
Morobe	9	95	2	3	1	110
Madang	10	111	6	2		129
Sandaun	-	106	4	9	-	119
East Sepik	-	146	3	2	1	152
Manus	5	36	2	1	-	44
New Ireland	34	74	2	4	-	114
East New Britain	31	82	3	5	2	123
West New Britain	22	83	-	1	-	106
North Solomons	43	84	4	1	-	132
Kiunga/Lake Murray*	16	41	-	-	-	57
Total	259	1511	49	50	6	1875

* District status

** Other church institutions, such as, theological colleges, seminaries and universities are not included here.

Source: Department of Education (1997: 9)

Table 7: Government Agency Educational Institutions by Province and Institution Type

Province	Elementary School	Community School	High School	Vocational Centre	National High	Technical College	Teachers College	Total Institutions
Western	16	37	1	2	-	-	-	56
Gulf	17	60	5	3	-	-	-	85
National Capital	17	28	5	4	1	2	1	58
Central	-	78	6	2	1	-	-	87
Milne Bay	50	51	3	3	-	-	-	107
Oro	-	56	3	4	-	-	-	63
Southern Highlands	15	162	9	3	-	-	-	189
Eastern Highlands	-	88	6	2	1	1	1*	99
Simbu	15	78	7	2	-	-	-	102
Western Highlands	3	52	7	2	-	1	-	65
Enga	35	51	6	4	-	-	-	96
Morobe	20	188	9	6	-	1	-	224
Madang	4	62	2	3	-	1	1	73
Sandaun	-	48	4	7	-	-	-	59
East Sepik	-	96	5	4	1	-	-	106
Manus	9	31	3	1	-	-	-	44
New Ireland	22	42	3	1	-	-	-	68
East New Britain	1	54	4	3	1	1	-	64
West New Britain	36	71	5	3	-	-	-	115
North Solomons	1	23	2	-	-	-	-	26
Kiunga								
L. Murray**	13	18	2	2	-	-	-	35
Total	274	1374	97	61	5	7	3	1821

* District Status

** Goroka Teachers College became the University of Goroka in 1996.

Source: Department of Education (1997: 8).

When we compare the totals in Table 6 and 7, we find that there are 1,875 church schools for the 1997 cohort while the state has 1,821 schools for the same period. Surprisingly, it appears that the church has 54 schools more than the Government but in terms of enrolments, it is the opposite: the Government has 52,952 enrolments more than church institutions.

Moreover, the Church-run universities and other theological colleges and seminaries with their student outputs are not included as is also the case for government-run universities, theological colleges and seminaries. However, to highlight some of the universities and theological colleges, we note that there are two church-run universities: the Pacific Adventist University outside Port Moresby, and the Madang Divine Word University which is run by the Catholic Church. These institutions compete with the state-owned universities and colleges by providing some of the best programmes. Similarly, the church-run theological colleges include the Christian Leaders' Training College of Papua New Guinea (CLTC), an Evangelical Alliance College, in Banz, Mt Hagen, Western Highlands Province; Raronga Theological College in Rabaul, East New Britain Province, run by the United Church of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands; Sonoma Adventist College in Rabaul, East New Britain Province; Lae Martin Luther Seminary, Morobe Province, run by the Lutheran Church; and Kwinkya Baptist Bible College, Baiyer River, Western Highlands Province, to name a few.

The Church agency educational institutions (including all levels of education) tend to provide an integrated curriculum. The courses include both religious and secular material. Adherence to Christian values is part of the school rules, and the students are required to apply them in their lives. The teaching and practising of religious beliefs is an integral part of the educational process. This integrated religious and secular curriculum makes church schools in the country different from the rest of the schools in the public sector, even though the Religious Instruction (RI) Class is promoted but for a limited time only, for only one hour per week.

In addition, it is worth noting that most of these church agency institutions in PNG and abroad, including Australia, are both religious and secular-oriented and cater for all needs of children including religious, social, political, mental and intellectual needs. Because of this holistic approach to education, some parents see it as especially worthwhile for their children to attend these schools. They believe that the state schools, which are secular in nature, would detract from their children religious and moral values, such as tolerance, reverence for others and the fundamentals of literacy and numeracy, which church schools claim to have taught in a disciplined and stimulating way resulting in the high performance of their students (as Hogan [1984: 37] argues for Australia). Similarly, according to Fox (1985: 142) some parents view Church schools as better because they maintain better academic results, provide a disciplined training, treat children as individuals, provide better teachers and teaching methods, manage the class and the school efficiently, and the general teaching and learning environment is quite attractive.

The parents' views about Church schools are considered to be genuine because they not only want their children to be Christians but also to behave in an orderly fashion. Church schools in Papua New Guinea, for that matter, are seen as having a moral obligation to teach children to behave properly and do things wholeheartedly as this could not only contribute to their well-being but also lead to an ordered civil society. It is both the parents' and Church schools' view that children and youths engaging in drugs, alcohol, gang holdups, prostitution and gambling, contribute to the moral decay of individuals and the society at large. Therefore, such behaviours are not allowed in church schools. Students are given maximum penalties if they are found guilty of engaging in such illegal activities as taking drugs or alcohol.

Enforcement of such rules of behaviour by church-run schools in the country is seen to be in the right direction as this will help to build Papua New Guinea in a right and just way. As the Bible states, 'When the wicked rules, a nation suffers but when a righteous rules, a nation prospers' (Proverbs 29:2). This refers to people in leadership positions, but it is equally applicable to ordinary people, family members, church groups, community organizations, social clubs, schools and public or private offices. If Papua New Guinea can produce a well-equipped, well-mannered, honest, hardworking, committed, God-fearing population, one believes the country could prosper in wider dimensions. Church schools for that matter, are doing all they can to produce a system of education that meets these criteria, that is, to build Papua New Guinea based on justice, peace, honesty and integrity. It may take quite some time to produce such a good civil society but at least the churches in PNG are becoming the catalyst or bridge for such human resource developments.

Literacy Work

Mere verbal communication of information in any of Papua New Guinea's three main lingua francas (English, *Tok Pisin* and *Hiri Motu*) or 854 vernacular languages spoken by almost five million people (Nekitel, 1998: 78; Nekitel and Kamene, 1991: 3) may play some role in nation building but not to an effective or extended level. One assumes that, to develop a human being and thus a nation, it requires both spoken and written language, which is understood meaningfully by individuals. In order to make communication relevant or meaningful and establish understanding, the form in which the information is transferred must be accurate. This requires basic literacy skills, that is, the ability to read, write and speak effectively and confidently in one or more of the lingua francas and vernacular languages of the country.

As far as the churches' role in nation building in terms of 'literacy knowledge' is concerned, one is convinced that they (the churches) have been at the forefront in promoting literacy. If one refers to the historical development of literacy in PNG, it seems that the missions were teaching the native people the basic skills of reading, writing and speaking in the two lingua francas (*Tok Pisin* and *Hiri Motu*) and other dominant vernacular languages. This provision of literacy was purposely done for the local people to read the Bible and other religious documents for themselves and also for them to teach others their new knowledge (Ahai, 1984: 27). This was seen as a breakthrough, especially for some old people during those first mission contact days, because they learned the skills of reading some versions of the Bible being produced for them in *Tok Pisin*, *Hiri Motu* and other local vernaculars (Leke, 1997: 36).

It is also encouraging to note literacy programs in modern PNG. For example, when providing an overview of Women's Literacy Programs, Nekitel and Willie (1989: 2) indicate that the main church organizations in the country have run literacy programs for women. These literacy skills enabled them not only to read the Bible but also equipped them to become more effective contributors in family life, because they were able to read about the skills of health care, home economics and the like.

Likewise, a multi-strategy method workbook, entitled *Working Together for Literacy*, co-authored by Dr Mary Stringer from the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) at Ukarumpa, in the Eastern Highlands Province, PNG, and Dr Nicholas Faraclas of the Department of Language and Literature (University of Papua New Guinea), (Stringer and Faraclas, 1987), specifies the primary reason for providing literacy for people in their community languages (including *Tok Pisin* and *Hiri Motu*). The main aim in providing literacy is to help the people solve their own community problems and for them to achieve community goals which are stipulated in the Ministerial Committee's (1986) *A Philosophy of Education for PNG* (see Faraclas, 1991: 2). Solving such community problems would relate to reading vital information on health and hygiene matters, family planning, land and resource management, legal aspects of life and so on. The Government and churches alike have a greater role to play in imparting literacy knowledge to Papua New Guineans, especially those living in rural areas so that the nation can benefit from it and grow as a result of it.

Moreover, a few main mission organizations heavily involved in promoting written literacy in PNG can be highlighted. The first of these notable organizations that provide written literacy in a number of languages is the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) based in Ukarumpa,

Eastern Highlands Province, PNG. In collaboration with Bible Translation Association (BTA), SIL produces a number of religious materials, including the Bible, articles, pamphlets, journals and many other works of Christian literature and cassettes. The organization is managed and staffed by qualified personnel, especially linguists, teachers, translators, interpreters, mechanics, carpenters, health workers, pilots, and equipment operators. Most of the specialists are from the United States and a few from Papua New Guinea. Its fleet of aircraft provides daily flights to remote communities in the country.

Other mission organizations that get involved in literature production and distribution, which subsequently contribute to nation building, include: Christian Bookshops, Wewak Christian Books Melanesia, Christian Leaders' Training College of Papua New Guinea, Scripture Union of PNG, Gospel Recordings of PNG, Evangelical Brotherhood Church of PNG, and many other theological colleges and church organizations. These organizations play a very important role in imparting literacy skills and knowledge to the people of PNG. Having access to information contributes in various ways to the development of a person and thus, a nation. That is, a person becomes spiritually, physically and mentally aware of himself or herself and able to make decisions in the right way, which contributes to improving one's livelihood, the community and the nation. These organizations should be supported financially by the national Government and other financial institutions so that those who are engaging in literacy work can do more. Most of these mission organizations have done literacy work without such help, and it is necessary now that they be encouraged and supported by the national Government.

Air Transport

One of the important means of contributing to nation building is through the use of air transport services. For the purpose of this discussion, it is relevant to omit *land* and *sea* transport and concentrate on *air* transport only. As such we ought to highlight the important role that the Missionary Aviation Fellowship in Papua New Guinea plays in contributing to nation building. The following information is summarized from the Missionary Aviation Fellowship's website.

The Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) is a worldwide inter-denominational Christian aviation organization, which aims to serve the church and communities in remote areas. Drawing highly specialized staff from many nations, MAF seeks to extend God's Kingdom through the provision of air transport in less accessible areas and through the witness of

its staff. Church workers, missionaries, patients and goods are flown across great distances in much less time than they could travel by other means.

MAF works in thirty-one countries worldwide, in Africa, South and Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific. Four major operational organizations, MAF-USA, MAF-Europe, MAF-Canada and MAF-Australia are independent, though united in name, concept and aim. MAF-Australia serves in Papua New Guinea, remote parts of Australia and in Cambodia. Australians and New Zealanders predominantly staff it, with others drawn from MAF organizations overseas.

Though it is a mission agency in its own right, MAF is also an important servant of other Christian organizations — increasingly national — working in remote areas of the world and, in particular, Papua New Guinea. MAF's main objectives are: to witness and to expand the Kingdom of Jesus Christ, a ministry of support and service to the Church and its community through aviation and related services; to provide staff, aircraft and facilities to meet the needs of the Church and its community; to train persons interested in the aviation vocation so as to gain the necessary qualifications for the purpose of carrying out the objectives of the society; and to engage in charitable operations as may best be served through air services and aviation technology.

In addition, MAF provides church support through increased mobility and time savings, as well as radio communications and a community air service by providing a crucial supply line and reliable transportation to isolated areas. Thus, MAF in PNG, rated as a third level airline, serves in some of the remote parts of the country. MAF has its Headquarters in the Western Highlands Province, PNG, and seven bases all around the country. From its Headquarters, MAF provides flying training on fixed wing aircraft from initial training through to commercial pilot licences and instrument ratings. Also, young Papua New Guineans get their training in aircraft engineering in the form of apprenticeship or a diploma level course. This covers theory and practice up to CASA airframe and piston-engine licences level.

As one can see, MAF in PNG not only provides air services but also trains Papua New Guineans to become pilots and engineers. This is a clear indication of a mission organization that aims to pass on knowledge and skills to young Papua New Guineans, and create employment. MAF should be applauded for its faithfulness and dedication in providing air services and creating employment for the people. Definitely, the tourists would find MAF an ideal air transport to visit remote places in PNG.

Other mission organizations that provide air services are the Seventh Day Adventists and the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL).

The former is restricted to its church work as it has at most a couple of aircraft. The latter needs more of our attention as it serves a nationwide function, thus contributes much to the development of PNG. As seen earlier, SIL has its Headquarters in Ukarumba in the Eastern Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea, and has taken the front line in translating the Bible and other Christian literature into a number of local vernacular languages, including the three national lingua francas (English, *Tok Pisin* and *Hiri Motu*). In order to facilitate and effectively fulfil these objectives, SIL provides a fleet of aircraft that operate effectively out of Ukarumba.

Unlike the Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) which is a third level commercial airline, these SIL airplanes, to our knowledge, are not allowed to compete commercially with other established air services in the country. However, these planes, in their limited capacity, play a very crucial role, particularly in very isolated regions of the country. They provide air transportation as situations allow, not only to their workers, but also to government officials, missionaries and, in urgent cases, to the local travellers in the areas where SIL works, at reasonable prices. Like the MAF, SIL also operates radio transmitters and receivers in remote stations in order to maintain contact with its linguists in the field, with its aircraft, and with its office workers at Ukarumba. Also, SIL air services do have accounts with MAF and have to either refuel or transit passengers and cargo, as situations require. The people living in rural areas of PNG, do treasure the air services being provided by these missions. Where Air Niugini and other third level airlines are unable to go, MAF and SIL are both able to provide a very needy air service that does ultimately contribute to the building of PNG.

CONCLUSION

It is very encouraging to see the way the churches in PNG have contributed to nation building. The various church organizations have realized the need to embark on preaching justice and righteousness in a society where there is dishonesty and injustice within social institutions. It appears that the Church needs to do more if it wants to see real change in the lives of people who administer private and public offices. Also, some churches and church workers realize the need to combat activities that contribute to poverty and social harmony. This is seen to be in the right direction, but they need to do even more to provide avenues where the less affluent in society can realize their potential and benefit materially and spiritually, thus living a meaningful life.

The churches have also done much to preach about peace and love in the midst of social and political conflicts. The people in various

ethnic, racial and social groups need to come together and live peacefully and harmoniously. But the Church and church workers need more time to demonstrate how to establish peace and love others. Love is seen biblically to be the central thing in any human relationship and that needs to be emphasized and encouraged. As Christians, the need is to remind people about the dangers of a materialism that dominates individuals. The more the people have lusts for pleasure and possession, the more likely it is that these people will not share their wealth and talents. If the country can learn to share resources, such as lending money to the less fortunate to start a business, we will begin to see some form of change in life and the society. The Church also needs to emphasize the importance of developing the total person. In other words, the Church needs to focus on integral human development, which is provided for and recognized in PNG's Philosophy of Education. Every person in PNG should realize their potential to maximize their liberation from all forms of influences and domination so that they can participate equally in areas of education, religion, politics, work, speech or communication and decision-making.

It is also seen that some churches and mission organizations are engaging in some important activities that contribute immensely to nation building. The highlights are the involvement of church organizations in health, education, literacy and air transport services. The air services that the Missionary Aviation Fellowship and Summer Institute of Linguistics provide should be encouraged by the national Government. The national Government, through its Rural Action Program (RAP), should make funds available, as an incentive, to upgrade airstrips in rural areas of PNG, so that MAF and SIL planes can continue to provide effective air services to the people. Whether it is providing health, educational work, literacy or air transport services, all are vital agents for development for Papua New Guinea. These services rendered by churches and other mission organizations are integrated in such a way that they meet the physical, mental and spiritual needs of the people in this country. For example, the missions provide health services to bring physical healing that, at the same time, aimed at bringing spiritual healing and wholeness in one's life. Similar goals are achieved through educational services, literacy work and air transport services.

Yes, the churches and other mission organizations are engaging actively in PNG in becoming the agents of development. They engage in promoting moral responsibilities, such as enforcing justice and righteousness, combating activities that contribute towards poverty and social disharmony and encouraging peace and love. They are also combating economic and social disparity, promoting integral human development

and contributing immensely towards other activities such as health, education, literacy, and air transport services. Yes, again we realize that the Church in PNG has and is playing a major role in building our beautiful nation – Papua New Guinea. We shall treasure their service, their commitment and their zeal, and by doing so, become part of their service, working hand in hand to build our nation. Yes, the Church in PNG has played a role and will continue to play a role in building Papua New Guinea.

To conclude, we reiterate that if the national government can give a hand, in providing resources like money and other materials to cater for certain activities of the Church, we believe the country should develop in the right direction. Most churches survive on individual donations and support from church members. Some churches are comfortable with the Weekly Church Offering (Tithes and Love Offering) but the amount collected is not enough to meet the ever-growing demands of the Church. Other churches have wider visions of expanding their ministries in important areas like combating law and order problems, rehabilitating ex-criminals and unemployed youth, and engaging in rural health work, education, literacy, and air transport services, to mention a few. These areas of ministry require sufficient funding from the national government. A few churches want to maintain their independence and have become reluctant to seek funding from the national Government. As a result, they have done little in terms of development. Other churches have invested much in business and are able to get some things through quite successfully. This is seen as positive as far as development is concerned, so long as they do not lose sight of their prime objective — which is for winning souls for Jesus Christ in order to expand God's Kingdom.

Whatever the ministries the churches are engaging in, it is for the development of this nation. As such, the Church should not isolate itself from the state. Rather, they should work hand in hand. The national Government should provide the required funding and the Church should put the money and other resources into good use so that our people can benefit from it and the nation can grow as a result of it. God, through His Holy Spirit, richly blesses Papua New Guinea.

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PEACE STUDIES AS A PROCESS OF PEACE BUILDING: An Alternative Approach to Violence in Papua New Guinea, 25 Years and Beyond

Julienne Kaman

INTRODUCTION

I write this article with great pride, joy and compassion for a great country I love and call home. Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a nation endowed with immense wealth both on land and in the sea. The country is equally blessed with diverse cultures and traditions and has over 800 different languages and dialects. The common expression — *the land of the unexpected and the land of the unusual* — depicts this diversity. After 25 years of independence, so much has changed in such a short time in pursuit of economic growth. While economic growth has benefited a few people, the majority are suffering in varying degrees. For instance, people no longer feel safe in their environment because they fear being robbed, raped, or even killed by *rascals*. Nor can they afford balanced meals daily, have access to clean water nor a good home. The buying power of the poor continues to deteriorate due to falling values of the kina. Feelings of insecurity are prevalent, causing many citizens to question the adopted western model of development and to ask questions relating to the ownership of the current development process. The majority of Papua New

Guineans for whom development is intended have remained marginalised. Against the backdrop of this situation, the drive for profit making continues to be the relentless focus of development as depicted by the current World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), or economic recovery programme. Frustrated by the country's entrenched injustices, youths who have been pushed out of the education system, joined by many employed workers in the formal sector, turn to violence. Coupled with this type of violence is white collar crime. Therefore the cry everywhere throughout the country is simply for nothing more than peace.

The search for peace in PNG will come to fruition when development is centred on four key factors. These include (Ekins, 1992; Bopp, 1995; Jenkins, 1999):

- the valuing of indigenous cultures;
- the liberation of the local people from all forms of oppression and domination;
- protection of the environment;
- a change of attitudes and values among Papua New Guineans; and
- the active involvement of Papua New Guineans in the process of development.

Peace in the context of this paper is used not to mean simply absence of violence. Its meaning is broader and deeper and includes overcoming the emotional, physical, and spiritual feelings of insecurity that may arise as a consequence of social, economic, political and even legal systems that restrict or deny people's access to realising their full innate potential as complete beings (Ahai, 1996; Kaman, 1998; Spence, 1999).

Violence has escalated so much in the last ten years posing a serious threat to development and peace. The high level of violence has also acted against political and economic stability in the country. Government's typical reaction to violence is increase spending on law and order and arm the police to fight crime. Militarisation of the police and the PNG Defence Force by the Government consumes a large slice of the national budget every year contributing to the country's soaring foreign debt (George, 1994, 1995). It appears that succeeding governments and aid donors have so far failed to critically address the underlying causes of violence other than merely bandaging the symptoms. This chapter presents the argument that as long as the underlying root causes of violence are ignored, the cycle of violence will continue (Ahai, 1996; Kaman, 1999). Hence, Peace Studies (PS) or Peace Education (PE) is proposed as an alternative means to achieving long-term peace. PS is proposed as an alternative non-violent strategy to human development

and demilitarisation. There are numerous non-government organizations (NGOs) in PNG whose work focuses on human development and peace and their efforts need to be applauded, supported and strengthened. In this light, education has a role to play by introducing new curriculum initiatives to develop students' critical thinking and nurture appropriate values and attitudes to counteract entrenched injustices (Toh Swee Hin and Cawagas, 1987).

In this chapter, I present a brief overview of a PS curriculum. The philosophical basis for PS is in line with Matane's Philosophy of Education proposed in 1986. Matane's Philosophy is premised on five themes: *integral human development, equality and participation, national sovereignty and self-reliance, conservation and sustainable development and Papua New Guinea ways*. These values can be developed via the teaching of PS.

VIOLENCE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Violence in PNG has been documented widely and continues to capture headline news in both the Papua New Guinean and overseas media, namely the Australian media. Although violence is often highly sensationalised, the nation is well aware of the seriousness of the problem (Clifford et al., 1994; Dinnen, 1992; Reid, 1993). In many of the direct forms of violence, one hardly gets to hear about the underlying causes. This may be due to ignorance or that elites are the direct beneficiaries of such a corrupt system that they will resort to whatever means, even violence, to protect the status quo.

DIRECT OR PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

This form of violence is widespread in PNG and is mostly executed by the growing number of unemployed urban youths, predominantly males between the ages of 12–30 who have been pushed out of the formal education system (Ahai & Farclas, 1991: 84, Ahai, 1996: 236). They are known as *raskols*. These youths see themselves as 'failures' and feel alienated from their traditional cultures by a western system of education; education has turned them out to be misfits in their own culture. Many are lured into crime, ranging from petty theft to more serious criminal activities associated with brutal killings, murder, robbery, savage rapes, armed robberies, motor vehicle theft and breaking and entering homes and buildings (Clifford, et al. 1994; Harris, 1988). Violence of this nature is a growing problem in urban towns of PNG. The magnitude of the problem is more serious and widespread in Port Moresby. One reason is due to the problem of urban drift; an increasing number of the country's

rural population are migrating to the city in search of better opportunities such as education services and employment. These people join their friends and relatives in squatter settlements on the city outskirts. Children who grow up in squatter settlements have parents who have no source of cash income and cannot afford their education. When these squatter children are old enough, many join *raskol* gangs in order to acquire goods and services of the modern cash economy. Also, some of the employed join *raskol* gangs as a means of accumulating wealth. At the same time, politicians and those in the top echelons of society have also been observed to encourage the culture of *raskolism* by employing criminal gangs to engage in violent crimes so as to protect themselves against rival criminal gangs attached to their political rivals or *bigmen*, and to build their own power bases. Thus what one sees emerging in PNG is the rise of *warlordism*. Despite the unreliability of crime statistics in PNG, the huge increase in the period 1980–1990 is confirmed by my own observations, and overwhelming anecdotal reports as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Estimated Number of Serious Crimes in Papua New Guinea, 1980 and 1990

Crime	1980	1990
Homicide	127	1,777
Rape*	285	1,896
Assault	2,622	3,149
Armed Robbery	530	1,944
Breaking and Entry	2,438	2,200
Arson	197	2,137

* Informed sources suggest that only 30–40 per cent of all sexual assaults is reported. Of those reported, a portion is classified as aggravated assault.

Source: Fallon (1992).

INDIRECT VIOLENCE

Indirect or institutionalised violence is another form of violence embedded in the social, political and economic structures of society. The following are examples.

Social Dimensions

Education

The education system adopted from the country's former master, namely Australia following the British education system, is still the dominant education system in the country at all levels of education. To many Papua New Guineans, it is still an alien system because the medium of instruction

is in English, the language of the coloniser, while the curriculum transmits western values, philosophies and ideologies (Ahai and Faraclas, 1991; Kaman, 1998). Teaching about PNG and Third World development issues and problems seems to play a peripheral role in the curriculum. Moreover, teaching is about imparting knowledge to students rather than practised as a process of empowerment and peace building (Kaman, 1998). The present education reform spearheaded by the WB and funded also by the Australian Government continues to perpetuate the status quo since the curriculum has no significant relevance to PNG. In fact, although the reform has made some significant inputs, such as the introduction of vernacular language at the elementary level, the problems it has created for this country are immense, given the magnitude of the restructure. For example, lack of modern classrooms, qualified teachers and funds to purchase appropriate school materials are only some examples of a whole range of issues about the quality education. There is a desperate need in the country for decision-makers and planners to think systematically and critically through these educational issues before accepting many of the educational reforms in the country.

Churches

While churches have contributed positively to peace in PNG, it is time Papua New Guineans stood back and critically assessed the practices of some of these different denominations. In particular, the many new religious groups entering PNG is beginning to raise concern among many citizens. The Constitution of PNG states that PNG is a Christian country. In the last ten years, the country has seen an influx of a whole range of denominations building their churches throughout PNG. There are other individuals and groups that enter the country under the pretext of being part of a Christian organisation while their real motive is to seek business opportunities. For others, their primary goal is to convert the 'savages' and the 'uncivilised' into the western culture as agents of westernisation, aside from some Eastern religions in the country. At the same time, some of these churches, using direct and indirect means, are destroying the rich cultures of PNG which are treated as backward, inferior and sinful (Narakobi, 1980: 134–43). Followers are often indoctrinated into the church-defined doctrines and, in the process, the churches fail to impart the fundamental principles of all religions which are love, compassion, tolerance, humbleness, respect for one another and the environment.

A more meaningful process is to contextualise religion and this is where the practice of liberation theology offers a meaningful solution as a suitable alternative if religion is going to be a catalyst for peace building. Liberation theology has the potential to relate religion at the personal level

to the realities of the wider social context. Churches have a moral obligation to be active at the political level to do something constructive about injustices and poverty in society. For example, it is wrong to preach that happiness waits in heaven and that it is all right to suffer and remain poor while the inner soul and spirit is healthy. Although the search for personal peace is important and very necessary, social peace is equally important and should be fulfilled. It is the inner peace that is dependent on a socially peaceful environment. To promote wider social peace, for instance, churches can exert their influence at the political level and make a direct contribution to social, political and economic changes for justice (Boff and Boff, 1987).

Media

Media ownership in PNG remains mainly state-owned but with key interests in foreign hands. Media, being a powerful tool, is used extensively as an effective way to promote Australia and the Papua New Guinean Government's political and economic interests. Reporting on EMTV features mainly Australian news, which has a direct impact on shaping the minds and attitudes of viewers; as an agent of western capitalism it raises so many hopes, dreams and fantasies among Papua New Guineans that only a few can afford.

On the other hand, reporting in the local papers is often biased towards the Government and in the process fails to promote critical journalism other than merely reporting facts. For example, while ordinary citizens read about the alarming rise in corruption, nepotism and graft (Gawi, 1996), the media reports these incidences often without addressing their root causes. Instead, reports make reference to the problems created by previous government or state that the issue is being referred to the Ombudsman Commission. Journalism ought to take a critical dimension to reporting, with a view to raising people's awareness of problems, and it should offer possible solutions. The media can be a powerful tool to cultivate a feeling of nationalism among Papua New Guineans.

Political Dimensions

Western democratic system of government

When the western system of government was adopted in PNG, citizens were denied the opportunity to analyse the system to obtain a balanced view. Moreover, this system and laws governing the country seem to pave the way for politicians and their cronies to abuse the system. So far, democracy has paved the way for western domination of the Third World, as is evident in PNG.

Legal laws

The legal laws in the country are not only foreign but are too difficult for any layperson's comprehension. It only allows lawyers to interpret laws; moreover poor citizens can hardly afford qualified lawyers. For instance, how many people in PNG actually understand the PNG Constitution and are thereby denied the right to understand the so-called mother law of this country? How many citizens know what their legal rights are?

Moreover, crown law introduced by Australia during the colonial period regarding land rights conflicts with traditional land ownership. The law relating to mining in PNG, which states that the first two metres of top soil belong to the landowners and the rest remains the property of the state, has been protested by landowners throughout PNG where the mines are located. In the eyes of any landowner, everything above and below the land belongs to them regardless of how deep one digs. These two value systems have since been in constant conflict and have led to more serious conflicts, such as the Bougainville crisis. The issue of land has still not been effectively resolved. The crisis is further complicated in matrilineal societies where women are the traditional landowners because western laws are patrilineal.

Furthermore, succeeding governments often manipulate the law to suit their own interests and those of their foreign counterparts, namely large multinational companies (Jenkins, 1999; Turare and Kavanamur, 1999). Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) and Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML), for instance, are pulling out of the mine after causing diabolical damage to the livelihood of the local people and the environment. However, despite being aware of the environmental damage caused by BHP, the PNG Government allowed BHP to operate the mine without any tailings dam. BHP knows that the action is legally wrong and it would not have got away with it in any developed country. In fact, the PNG Government went ahead and changed a section of the law pertaining to mining companies merely to protect the interests of BHP. This law empowers foreign companies like BHP, and the PNG Government, to suppress landowner protests for compensation. Only now that BHP is closing the mine is the Government openly stating that PNG does not have laws governing the conduct of mining companies in the country (*Post Courier*, 17 April 2000: 2).

A disheartening scenario is developing where the political system acts as a haven for politicians to acquire their power and abuse the power bestowed on them by the people, as they see fit. There is a general feeling among politicians that as leaders they are above the law and so can change the law at will. The acceptance of foreign laws, coupled with the general

disrespect and abuse of the law by politicians and the law enforcement agencies, has prompted the public to show little respect for the law and confidence in the state resulting in the current worsening law and order situation in the country.

Comparing traditional leadership and modern leadership

The political system evidently is a breeding ground for more serious corruption under the guise of democracy. As one critic once said, 'politicians in PNG are like bees. They suck honey from one tree and when the honey runs out, they move to the next tree.' In the process, they forget that democracy means 'power of the people for the people and by the people'. Failing to understand the bigger picture of why they are politicians, most leaders view winning elections as the road to becoming rich overnight. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why politicians were initially reluctant to support the proposed Political Integrity Bill. The Political Integrity Bill may be an advantage to women at least to open the door for women to enter politics. Overall, PNG needs to do some critical rethinking of the practice of democracy to make it more suitable to the people of PNG. The recent coup in Fiji is an example of a democratic system being seriously contested by indigenous Fijians.

At the traditional level, the western system of democracy that promotes accumulation of wealth for enhancement of personal power, greed and competition, is contrary to the interests of traditional leaders. Traditional leaders gained power and popularity through the distribution of their accumulated wealth. In the Melanesian context of leadership, power was either inherited or attained based on certain specific qualities, such as being an orator, a war strategist, a decision maker or peace maker, and possessing the wisdom and supernatural power to lead.

Economic Dimensions

The current economic model needs, just as the practice of democracy does, to be critically analysed to determine whether national wealth is trickling down to the majority of the population or not. The Government introduced the Eight Point Development Plan at Independence to correct the fallacies of the current economic model which was being followed by the colonial administration. However, although governments claim to base development on the Eight Point Plan, the economic system is still predominantly geared towards the modern market economy. This economic system breeds rural and urban disparity when wealth fails to trickle down to the poor but instead benefits 20 per cent of the internal and external elites (Standish, 1993; Pokawin, 1996). Rural areas throughout PNG lack the very basic essentials such as clean water supply, proper sanitation, fuel for

cooking, good homes, electricity, roads and access to medical services. Over the years, funds allocated to national politicians for rural development projects have failed to reach the grassroots.

Trapped in debt, the country has been coerced by the World Bank to be further integrated into the globalised economy in order to earn more and repay debts owed to foreign governments and banks. To start the process, the kina was devalued and then floated. This was a deliberate act by the WB and the IMF to force the PNG Government to commit itself to selling government assets and the country's natural resources to earn foreign exchange. Other measures undertaken include downsizing the public service.

The effect of globalisation and privatisation is borne out in rising levels of poverty just as it was predicted by renowned critics of the Bretton Woods institutions such as Susan George (1994, 1995). Faced with the hardship of struggling to make ends meet, the poor are turning to fast money schemes, poker machines, begging, illegal prostitution, bribery, and con artistry, coupled with increased levels of brutal violence. In the process, the victims and the perpetrators lose all sense of dignity and morality. The number of HIV victims is rapidly increasing in the country because of poverty and development-related problems. Women are further victimised in this process of economic hardship. In urban towns, more women are forced into prostitution to support their families. Others submit to sexual demands from their bosses who take advantage of their condition. There have been incidences of women who have been physically assaulted by their husbands frustrated over their poor salaries and their inability to meet the demands of their families and *wantoks*. Some men spend all their fortnight, earnings in poker machines and, when their wives complain, they beat them to cover their shame and guilt. More unemployed women in urban towns are forced to search for means of supporting families in the informal sector.

Advocates of the SAP and the PNG Government explain that these actions of economic rationalisation are necessary only as a short-term measure. The underlying message is that in the long run, the kina will regain its normal value and the country will return to normal. But this will only be possible once the country's debt obligations are met in full. Meanwhile, every year the Government is asking for more foreign aid while the generated profit goes to service past debts. Part of this aid money from donor countries goes to support fly-in, fly-out consultants who claim to be experts in the recipient country to help solve their development problems whether in education, health, police, women or agriculture. Usually, they leave behind a big report which can only be interpreted by other consultants.

Cultural Violence

Cultural violence refers to how the varied dimensions of violence in the social, political economic and the legal domain are used to legitimise violence in its direct form (Galtung, 1990: 291). There is a greater tendency to simply accept the situation and live with it. This type of violence colours the values of people thereby conditioning them to accepting the other types of violence as morally justifiable (Swan, 1995: 41). A feeling of powerlessness sets in when nothing is done to make a difference. For example, the widespread use of guns in PNG shows that the people have come to accept them and are not applying pressure on the Government to remedy the situation. If peace is going to be given a chance, it is necessary to find alternative solutions to pave the way for peace. For example, is PNG going to pursue the policy of globalisation when the majority of Papua New Guineans continue to suffer from poverty? Why can't the Department of Education and the Curriculum Unit provide more appropriate curriculum to address the needs of students? Should educational curricula teach only facts and not develop students' critical thinking, attitudes, ethics and morals? What can be done to bridge the widening gap between the rich and poor in PNG? Is it morally right that a few enjoy the fruits of development while the majority suffer?

Emotional and Psychological Violence

When violence affects the heart and spirit of individuals, it breeds pain and hurt such as loss of pride, self-esteem, happiness, integrity, self-respect and dignity. Persons who lack in these areas often end up being discontented with life and therefore tend to be suicidal.

Moral Violence

Moral violence is placed at the bottom of all the forms of violence because this is where it matters the most if humanity is serious about changing a culture of violence. Johan Galtung (1969, 1990), the leading peace researcher, proposed the concept of 'cultural violence' in which he referred to the notion of a violence triangle representing direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. The first is overt. The second institutionalises indirect violence embedded in the social, political and economic system. The third colours the values of people making the other forms of violence morally justifiable. However a fourth category of violence can be added that underlies all classes of violence, making the violence triangle a violence tetrahedron. This is moral violence which Swan (1995: 41-2) defines as:

Violence that originates in the belief that the human being is his/her own point of reference and the sole arbiter and judge of what is right and wrong, reducing morality to personal or social preference and need ... Morality is then seen as relative. Moral violence confuses and culminates in societies where the blind believe that they see, and lead the blind. It militates against peace, for it may infect and indeed, poison nations, societies, organisations, groups and individuals, whether secular or religious and even those who speak for peace.

In PNG, in view of some of the worst committed violence and corruption witnessed at the political level, ordinary people are asking: what happened to morals, ethics and values embedded in the PNG traditional culture premised on the value placed on human life? Increasingly, there is greater realisation of the magnitude of the social problems eating away at the very fabric of society.

Moral violence raises some of the deeper human concerns that become matters of the heart, not the mind. The perpetuation of violence signals that not all is well in PNG and that something more than the absence of direct, structural and cultural violence needs to be built. It is about ethical issues of right and wrong. For human beings to make a decision as to whether it be wrong or right, there are certain fundamental values that should be developed and fostered to aid the process of deciding whether an action is just and or unjust, right or wrong. These include values of altruism, compassion, shame, trustworthiness, tolerance, empathy, honesty, respect and self-dignity (see Kavanamur, this volume). When the heart is deeply touched about the justices and injustices in the system, it is powerful and can make a difference to lasting peace. People can be influenced to value the simplicity of life, and to develop a feeling of contentment to defeat greed generated by the material culture. This development will lead to a certain level of discipline in people who will say no to violence and work for justice and peace.

HOW IS THE PNG GOVERNMENT DEALING WITH VIOLENCE?

The state of PNG resorts to violence to counteract violence by institutionalising laws to deter and control violence. These laws are implemented via the legal system and law enforcement agencies such as the police, Defence Force and the growing number of private security firms. The approach by the state has two weaknesses. First, the grassroots can clearly see discriminatory practices when it comes to implementing these laws. One set of laws protects politicians and senior government officials. The other set of

laws deals with crime committed by the poor especially *raskol* gangs. Frustrated and angry at such injustices, criminals take the law into their own hands by inciting more violence. According to Dinnen (1992: 1), 'the impression is one of escalating lawlessness, on the one hand, and a progressively ineffectual crime system, on the other'.

There is generally a lack of respect for the law when Papua New Guineans fail to see themselves as belonging to one nation or state. This is the reason why there is a lack of nationalistic sentiment expressed among Papua New Guineans. Instead, they identify themselves more closely with their own province and tribal groups, reflecting a deeper level of societal disunity in the country. Moreover, the legal laws are unsuited to the Papua New Guinean cultural context and thus remain weak and ineffective. For instance, the acceptance of bribery among the PNG police force has raised serious concerns. PNG is living more or less in a state of anarchy. Overtaken by the growing level of violence throughout the country, government reacts by implementing short-term solutions. For instance, in 1991 the National Security Advisory Council submitted a package of control measures for consideration by the national Government that included:

- the introduction of capital punishment for murder, rape and drug offences;
- the tatooing of convicted crime;
- more maximum security fenced facilities;
- the possible introduction of ID cards;
- vagrancy laws; and
- the forced repatriation of unemployed people and troublemakers.

(*Post Courier*, 15 March 1991: 1, quoted in Dinnen, 1992: 2).

Included also is the proposed introduction of the 'electric chair' (*Post Courier*, April 20 2000: 1). In view of the actions taken by Governments to deal with criminal cases, Dinnen (1992: 3) further remarks:

State responses to crime in Papua New Guinea since independence in 1975 appear to have been influenced by considerations of political expediency rather than any discernible philosophy of crime control. In practice, this has increasingly entailed bypassing the normal processes of criminal justice in favour of more visible and direct exercise of state power.

The overt violence perpetrated by the unemployed draws quick reaction from the PNG Government, foreign governments, and foreign investors, and even the public who call for harsher punishments for the perpetrators. In fact, the state acts on the demands of local and international

investors to stamp out behaviour they find threatening to their interests. This is the underlying reason why, in the last five years, law and order has become the focus of attention by the PNG Government, aided by the Australian Government which invests huge sums of money and human capital into enhancing the capacity of the police. Police in Port Moresby, for instance, are issued with Australian-made Falcon cars, a helicopter named 'Eye in the sky' to assist police operations, new homes built for the special Police Task Force and armoury for storing guns. In fact, a friend working with the Australian High Commission mentioned that the armoury was too heavy to be shifted to some of the most remote Police Stations in the country so that the project was abandoned. The more serious concern is that violence is consuming a large portion of the national budget as indicated below:

Table 2: Government Expenditure on Selected Categories, 1989–1996 (current prices, thousands of kina)

Year	1989*	1991	1994	1995*	1996*
Education	44,878 (20.5%)**	45,055	78,303	88,998	52,807 (20.1%)
Health	44,475 (20.3%)	40,887	51,498	53,486	45,106 (17.2%)
Agriculture	41,688 (19.0%)	26,212	11,185	11,499	10,000 (3.8%)
Police	47,156 (21.5%)	NA	67,857	69,850	86,235 (32.9%)
Defence	40,820 (18.6%)	NA	83,342	57,043	68,000 (25.8%)
Total	29,1017				262,148

* These figures refer to actual expenditure rather than to appropriations.

** Bracketed figures refer to the proportion of the total expenditure on these five categories.
Source: *PNG Budget Estimates*, various years.

Violence in PNG therefore remains a cancerous disease that no one seems to know how to cure. It is time appropriate action is taken to look into long-term measures to effectively address the root causes. The overemphasis on mere control, threats and suppression seems to give rise to more violence and is costing the country millions of kina each year.

PS is proposed as a major component of education programmes across all levels of education to support the process of peace building. The following presents a brief overview of a peace curriculum I developed as the main focus of my PhD research study at UPNG.

PEACE STUDIES EDUCATION IN TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS

Peace Studies — University of Papua New Guinea

The PS course was conducted in the second semester of 1996 in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, UPNG, as the main focus of my field research for my doctoral programme at the University of New England, Armidale in New South Wales, Australia, completed in 1998. I undertook the study with the confidence that PS can make a difference to students and in the long run to PNG. The title of my thesis reads: *A Search for Peace and Justice in Papua New Guinea: Can the Study of Peace Make a Difference?*

The research study proved that PS can change attitudes and influence sound moral and ethical development among learners and that it stands as a critical prerequisite to building peace and justice. In a PS course, the *content* is as important as the *process* of teaching to achieve the end result. PS is an empowering method of peace building, exposing learners to a method of teaching where the learning environment is conducive to promoting four critical stages of learning: *holistic understanding, conscientization* or awareness raising, *critical thinking* and a questioning mind that would lead eventually to *action for peace and justice*. PS aims to move academic learning away from specialised learning to a multidisciplinary or transdisciplinary domain of learning that links theory to practice.

Emergence of Peace Studies

PS was initiated in the Western countries because of the Cold War, militarism and the threat of nuclear war. PS was a later development following the early peace movements. The purpose of PS was to discover what militated against peace and what would promote and enhance it (Swan, 1995: 34, 1997: 5). It is a course not easily accepted in academic institutions to be taught alongside traditional disciplines, either because the course does not fit into any specific discipline or because of fear that the course will bring the status quo into question. The introduction of PS to PNG and other countries of the Third World is in direct response to the level of peacelessness stemming from poverty that can also lead to death. According to Galtung (1980: 145), 'in war life is taken away from people, people are killed. But in misery life is also taken away from people, not instantly and quickly by a bullet or a bomb, but slowly through diseases until they pass away.' In a recent G77 Summit meeting of Third World leaders, Fidel Castro made this remark:

a world economic order dominated by the rich was criminal for insisting the poor pay ever-swelling debts and for pushing down prices of their commodity exports. We need a Nuremberg to put on trial the economic order that they have imposed on us that every three years kills more men, women and children by hunger and preventable disease or curable diseases than the death toll in six years of World War 2 (*The National*, 14 April 2000: 10).

Goal of Peace Studies at UPNG

PS can best be understood by reflecting on these two questions:

1. How can PS contribute to a better awareness of the root causes of conflicts, violence, and peacelessness in PNG and globally?
2. How can PS cultivate values and attitudes that will encourage individual and social action for building peace in PNG and ultimately a more peaceful world? (Toh Swee-Hin and Cawaga, 1987: 2).

Do Peace Studies Really Make a Difference?

From the questionnaires, structured and unstructured interviews and journals, students were convinced that PS had made important differences: differences in the way they understood issues of conflict and injustice; in their motivations; in their willingness to reject conventional thinking (with some doubts) about their ability to act to change society for the better.

Are they right in their convictions? We now turn to two ways of validating these opinions — before/after comparisons of PS students and comparisons with no-PS students'. The most obvious way of discerning change is to make appropriate measures over time. In this instance, learners are measured on various dimensions before undertaking the course and after its completion, i.e the before versus after method. The main limitation of this method is that the environment that affects students over this period includes influences other than the PS course. How can we distinguish between changes (if any) that are the result of the course and those that are the result of other influences, which would have occurred in the absence of the course? The usual way of tackling this problem is to employ a separate (control) group of people who are similar to the (experimental) group. The experimental group were twenty-three second-year UPNG students who chose to take the course. The control group in the present study consisted of third and fourth year Politics students. Assuming that the two groups were initially similar and that they

went through similar experiences over time other than the PS course, then any changes discernible in the PS students but not in the Politics students may be reasonably attributed to the PS course.

Three hypotheses follow from the above reasoning:

1. Politics and PS students are initially similar in terms of their personal characteristics and responses.
2. Politics students are not significantly different at the end of the period.
3. PS students are significantly different at the end of the period (and are therefore different from Politics students at the end).

If each of these hypotheses is supported, then this is evidence of the impact of studying peace.

The major difference is that over half the PS students, who had work experience, were a little older. This difference, it must be admitted, may cast doubt on the validity of the first hypothesis. Of more potential importance for the first hypothesis, however, is the fact that the PS students voluntarily chose to undertake the course. It may be, for example, that they were initially more conscious of and active in working for peace and justice than the Politics students and we examine this point shortly when we discuss responses to a series of twenty questions on conflict, violence and peace issues.

Table 3: Characteristics of Peace Studies and Politics Students

	<i>Politics (n=22)</i>	<i>Peace Studies (n=23)</i>
Gender	Male	17
	Female	5
Age (mean)	25.8	29.0
Region	Highlands	11
	Momase	1
Southern/Papua	3	4
	Islands	4
Other	3	1
Previous work experience	1	13

The survey instrument consisted of questions relevant to each of the dimensions identified earlier – holistic understanding, conscientization, critical thinking and peace values and action. Respondents were asked, for example, to indicate their level of agreement (1 = strongly agree to 4 = strongly disagree) to statements like: 'The government needs to use more force to deal with law and order problem (critical thinking

dimension), 'I feel powerless to do anything for peace' (values dimension) and 'I would be willing to take part in a non-violent protest if the issue was important enough' (action dimension). The same questions were answered at the start and end of the course.

Results

Table 4: Mean Scores on the Three Dimensions

		Number of respondents	Values	Critical thinking	Action
Peace Studies	before	23	2.48 (0.75)*	2.89 (0.78)	3.10 (0.82)
	after	22	2.91 (0.88)	3.21 (0.70)	3.24 (0.83)
Politics	before	22	2.39 (0.51)	2.72 (0.52)	2.93 (0.70)
	after	17	2.38 (0.44)	2.78 (0.54)	3.01 (0.73)

* Figures in brackets are standard deviations

Table 4 records the mean scores on each dimension for PS and Politics students before and after exposure to the PS course. For each of the relevant comparisons (i.e. PS students before and Politics students before, PS students before and after and Politics before and after), the well-known difference of means test was applied to determine whether apparent differences (e.g. the increase in the mean score for PS students on the values dimension from 2.48 to 2.91) could reasonably regarded as a real change. The resulting *t* values indicate the following:

1. There were no significant differences between PS and Politics students on the four dimensions before the start of the PS course (lines 1 and 3 of Table 4).
2. There were no significant differences between Politics student responses before and after (lines 3 and 4).
3. PS students had significantly higher scores on values and critical thinking (at the 5 per cent level) after their study. That is, PS students had become more positive, generous and optimistic and they had become less accepting of the conventional wisdom. There were no significant differences as regards holistic understanding or the action dimension.

The apparent effect of studying peace on the values and critical thinking dimensions is impressive, given the relatively short time available for the study of peace to 'do its work'. This may be a similar case in past evaluations of PS course that the frequently non-significant results of previous studies of this type might be explained by a need for a considerable period of time (e.g. several years) to elapse after studying peace for its

effect to become apparent. It may be that the extent of actual or perceived conflict and violence in PNG compared to the United States (where all the previous studies were carried out), and/or the novel and optimistic approach which PS offers to such issues in PNG, explain why its effect is as strong as it is. An alternative explanation may be the participatory way in which the course was presented. It may be thought that the gender and cultural background of the lecturer(s) may have facilitated or constrained students learning. In my opinion, the effect was more strongly influenced by the subject matter of the PS course, its capacity to personally confront students and the methods used to teach the course.

The experiment described here provides some confirmation of the strong opinions, expressed by students during structured interviews, and in their journals, that studying peace makes a difference. Students become more optimistic that a more peaceful and just society is achievable; they recognise and increase their ability and willingness to think critically; and they found the continual linking of issues to provide holistic understanding, beyond a narrow discipline approach, to be quite intriguing.

CONCLUSION

Violence is a serious concern in PNG. The strategies used by the Government of PNG over the years have failed so far to promote any level of peace. The underlying problem is society's embedded injustices that have not been effectively addressed in the process of development. PS is proposed as a process of raising the awareness of Papua New Guineans to this problem in the hope of working towards building a better society. UPNG students, as future elites, can make a difference to building greater social peace if they have studied PS as a subject at UPNG or at any other tertiary institution.

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PROBLEMS OF HOUSING RESOURCES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Elizabeth Kopel

INTRODUCTION

Housing problems are ultimately problems of turning official commitment by governments in the form of policies and programmes into reality through improving the housing and living conditions of a country's people. The extent to which housing policies are implemented by governments is largely hampered by resource constraints and administrative shortfalls. Housing market inputs, namely land, finance, infrastructure, labour and materials are essential, but lack of these resources or inefficient organisation and use of resources often contributes to problems.

Appropriate state intervention which directly attacks these constraints is necessary; but instead, many governments intervene in housing production by such means as price fixing, and rent controls. These actions distort signals to the market and exacerbate the original problems. Factors that impair a competitive market include an unorganised land market, inappropriate and poor housing finance systems, inadequate provision of infrastructure and an underdeveloped building materials industry. Inappropriate planning and zoning regulations, taxes, rent controls and building standards are also vital factors that influence the extent to which poor people can have better access to appropriate housing (Shidlo, 1990).

Large-scale resources, proper planning and sound administration are necessary for the successful implementation of any housing policy. The most important issues are the availability of land, and an equitable system of land tenure; the availability of housing finance on flexible terms and conditions for the most needy sections of society; the setting of clear lines

of responsibility for public agencies; the speedy resolution of administrative problems and delays; the provision of infrastructure, namely transport, schools and other public facilities; and the provision of appropriate building materials at affordable prices. Developments in Papua New Guinea suggest that these principles have not been fully grasped. Housing policy has been erratic, poorly directed and inefficiently applied. The result has been a catalogue of fundamental errors.

Active state intervention in housing in this country only commenced in the 1970s. There is no comprehensive housing policy for the entire country comparable to that for health, education or other social services. Housing policy in Papua New Guinea is focused almost entirely on urban needs and the rural majority of the population has been ignored. The following section provides a brief outline of the main policy developments in housing. The rest of the discussion considers the major problems that have hindered and continue to influence the effective development and application of necessary resources to implement official policy incentives over the last 25 years.

STATE INTERVENTION IN HOUSING

National Housing Commission 1968

In response to the rapid increase in the urban population and settlement formation, the National Housing Commission (NHC) was set up in 1968 by the Australian administration following its recommendation by the World Bank. The National Housing Commission was given wide-ranging responsibilities to improve housing conditions throughout the country. It was vested with the function to build houses either for sale or rent, but the houses were too expensive for most people (Stretton, 1979). Attempts were made to reduce housing costs by changing designs and specifications, yet still the cheapest house produced by the National Housing Commission was beyond the reach of most nationals. In the end the houses were offered for rent at highly subsidised rates.

The Self-Help Housing Scheme 1973

By 1973 the administration recognised the difficulty of providing housing through conventional methods and introduced a government White Paper on self-help housing (PNG Ministry of the Interior, 1973). The White Paper set out its policy on self-help housing for urban areas. The self-help housing scheme was introduced in 1974 and the responsibility for implementation was vested with the National Housing Commission.

The main principles of the self-help scheme included recognising existing urban settlements as part of urban activity that needed improvement, upgrading of settlements on a self-help basis and developing new settlements in conjunction with employment opportunities (PNG Ministry of the Interior, 1973; Mangar, 1977). The National Housing Commission was most successful in the area of self-help housing in terms of coverage rather than through its provision in the formal sector. Unfortunately, cost recovery was not built into the programme and this resulted in high subsidies which had to be incurred by the Commission.

The self-help housing approach has also been commended by international observers as having demonstrated an enlightened policy. It drew on the best of international experience and adapted it to local needs and conditions. For example, Emiel Wegelin (1983) commented on the policy:

At a time when the country was preparing for independence, the policy took a more sympathetic view of difficulties faced by new migrants in housing than do many other countries. The customary references to 'squatters' and 'squatter areas' were missing in policy documents and have been replaced by the use of terms 'settlers' and 'migrant settlements'.

The Morgan Scheme 1979

After Independence, as the expatriate civil servants were replaced by nationals, nationals began to move into the houses that had been occupied by the expatriates. While statutory bodies have had and continue to control their own housing stock and allocation, most government houses were tied to specific positions in the public service and the tenant acquired the house by virtue of their position. Higher, senior management level employees in the public service were provided with high cost subsidised housing, while those further down the income scale were given low cost housing or lived in NHC houses. Semi-skilled or unskilled employees were not catered for, so they lived in villages, settlements, *boi-haus* (bed sitter type accommodation for domestic servants) or with relatives.

After only two years of Independence the government came to realise that the cost of maintaining its housing stock was too expensive. A study to find ways in which costs could be reduced, and possible alternative forms of housing, recommended that all government housing be sold to sitting tenants. In order to save costs and to encourage Papua New Guineans to acquire home ownership, government houses have been progressively sold to sitting tenants under the Morgan Scheme since 1979

(Stretton, 1979). This initiative implanted the seeds of future directions in housing policy development in the country. A number of very basic and crucial issues were not considered even before recommending for home ownership. The questions of whether urban home ownership was appropriate, affordable and desirable for most people at that stage of the country's development was given no consideration at all.

The effects of the Morgan Scheme were that those who had a house and money were able to buy their houses on highly concessional terms at below market prices and there was an increase in housing shortage due to the loss of existing stock of houses that were sold off. Demolition and renovation of some of the existing houses and the somewhat slow pace of any new construction activity made the problem even worse.

National Home Ownership Scheme, 1981

This scheme was introduced by the Wingti Chan government in 1981. The home ownership approach reinforced the pace of development that was set by the Morgan scheme. Its objective was to encourage urban home ownership among Papua New Guineans. Under the Home Ownership Scheme, the National Housing Commission was to continue to implement the Morgan Scheme, build houses for sale to potential home owners, and develop and sell serviced plots for home ownership purposes (Newell, 1982). The responsibility for implementing the national Home Ownership Scheme was also placed with employers to assist their national workers to obtain their own homes. Following the re-launch of the National Home Ownership Scheme in 1985, a number of the major employers, such as Air Niugini, the Electricity Commission, Telikom, South Pacific Holdings, and the Steamships and Harbours Board, have established and operate home ownership schemes for their staff. An investigation into the implementation of the Home Ownership Scheme by employers has shown those who benefit from the scheme are mainly employees who are at the top end of the income scale, staff on contract, highly skilled and economically better off than the majority of middle or low income groups (Kopel, 1989, 1991, 2000).

National Housing Corporation 1989

In 1989 the National Housing Corporation was set up through an Act of Parliament with the amalgamation of the National Housing Commission and the Department of Housing. Since that time Papua New Guinea has been the only country to have a Minister for Housing without a department to head. Two most fundamental changes came with the formation of the National Housing Corporation. First, the National Housing

Corporation is the only government arm responsible for housing, yet its newly acquired function was no longer to build housing for rent or sale, but to develop and sell land for urban housing and continue to sell existing government housing. The Corporation has no social housing responsibility, it is supposed to be self-sustaining and operate as a commercial body.

Second, under the new Act the former National Housing Commission's settlement responsibilities were done away with and handed back to the Provinces. That policy is ill-conceived, and short-sighted as the Provinces do not have the legal responsibility over land matters which rest entirely with the National Lands Department. Provinces do not have the administrative structure, capacity, personnel and funds to take on such a huge responsibility on top of their existing work (Wrondimi, 1994). The effect has been that Provinces have played an ignorant role and in the meantime the growth of unplanned settlements has been rising for more than a decade.

PROBLEMS OF HOUSING RESOURCES

Consecutive governments in Papua New Guinea have adopted policies that appear to look good on paper without a proper consideration of their implications and appropriateness. Policy ideals are based on advice from western experts or local elites with western values acquired through their education and training in western countries. The real source of housing problems has not really been considered and addressed in sufficient detail. Because of this, housing policy has not made much difference to most people's housing circumstances.

This section aims to analyse the practice of official housing policy through the development and application of necessary resources. First, the availability of land and land tenure issues are crucial because houses cannot be built up in space. Second, the availability of housing finance on flexible terms and conditions in favour of the most needy segments of society is another key element to consider. Third is the need for people to have access to durable building materials at affordable prices. Fourth, the provision and maintenance of basic infrastructure and services and efficient administration and coordination of activities related to implementing housing policies are important factors. Unnecessary delays are caused by inappropriate zoning and planning regulations. There are also administrative problems with clear division and allocation of responsibilities between different departments and individual officers. These often leads to confusion and unnecessary delays. Any real policy attempt to address housing problems has to tackle these issues.

COLONIAL APPROACH TO MOBILISATION AND USE OF HOUSING RESOURCES

During the colonial period, the usual practice was for employers both in the public and private sector to provide housing for their employees. The development of and access to the use of resources necessary for housing provision and maintenance was the responsibility of employers. Housing came as part of the employment package for all expatriate workers and indigenous workers in the territory. This also continues to be the case in mining towns such as Ok Tedi, Kutubu and Porgera where the employers are entirely responsible for the provision and maintenance of accommodation for their workers, both married and single. Other employers who provide housing for their workers are similarly responsible for organising, acquiring and using the necessary housing resources, which means that the tenant is free from hassles of personal housing responsibility. For most people, the process of acquiring the necessary resources that would enable them to access the most basic form of housing is too complex and expensive. Housing policy in practice operates against the interests of those who need housing. The discussion which follows explores the strategies through which official policy is implemented and its impact on the poor and settlement and rural dwellers.

ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAND FOR URBAN HOUSING

Simet (1993: 12) outlines two of the most familiar problems of land for urban development and housing purposes. These relate to the shortage of alienated land supplies in urban areas for development purposes and the inefficient administration system which impairs the development and delivery of available land for housing purposes. The legal and administrative procedures governing the release of both customary and alienated land compound the problems of physical shortage of urban land, and the land allocation procedure further delays the process of shelter development (Simet, 1993: 12). In outlining the progress of the implementation of the National Housing Corporation's programmes over three years, Simet (1993: 16) highlights the problem of acquiring required land with legal titles for housing from the Department of Lands and Physical Planning.

In an attempt to overcome the problems of using customary land for housing and general development purposes, four procedures have been developed for formalising evidence of customary land ownership. These procedures were developed so that customary land owners in rural areas, where land registration is not required can have access to credit from financial institutions (Aruga, 1987: 135). First, clan land usage agreements

enable the clan leaders to sign an agreement certifying that an individual member has usage rights over a given piece of land. The Agriculture Bank provides a loan if it is supported by a number of guarantors from the clan. The problem with these agreements is that the amounts involved are quite small (a maximum of K10,000 over ten years), but the bank hardly has any extension services to promote this type of development so this option is not widely utilised. Second, the Land Groups Incorporation Acts enable the identification of group or individual interests in customary land and these names are registered. The concerned tribal parties have to make an agreement on the identified group or interests, but this is a very delicate and time-consuming process. For example, in mining areas, the government leaves the responsibility of this tedious task to the mining companies, and intervenes only to formalise the agreements (UNCHS, 1993: 32). So far this approach has been mainly applied in areas where there are commercial interests.

The third system instituted for formalising the use of customary land for development purposes is the Lease-Leaseback system under which the government leases land from the customary owners and then leases it back for a specified period to a legal entity formed by all or some of the members from the same clan group. This option is more promising and effective. As a registered interest, the land can be formally mortgaged by the customary owners to the Agriculture Bank and substantial amounts are lent on this basis. Problems are caused by the lengthy delays in the process of land acquisition to get an application accepted. These schemes have not yet been tried in peri-urban or urban situations (Aruga, 1987: 135; UNCHS, 1993: 32). The final option is direct dealings through which speculators negotiate directly with customary land owners, with the lease issued by the state. This method was noted to have had some success in Wewak and Lae and appears to be straightforward, but the procedure is very sensitive and time consuming.

Unfortunately, these approaches to formalising evidence of customary land ownership are not sufficient in themselves to meet the need for individual housing loans. Banks are well aware of disputes over land claims, and the danger that customary land cannot be alienated should the borrower default. Because of this banks often refuse to lend for housing on customary land and insist on an individual land title as security, plus regular employment and evidence of savings capacity. This practice actually discriminates against the urban poor who do not have either the funds, secure employment or land title to offer as security. Residents in unplanned settlements do not have any land title at all. However, despite criticisms and problems most of those migrants who

occupy customary land in urban areas or the peri-urban centres, both in Port Moresby and other centres, make some form of informal personal arrangements with customary land owners and pay nominal monthly or annual rents to occupy specified portions of land for housing until the land is needed by the owners. Residents on unplanned settlements are at the mercy of the government or customary landowners, and cannot make any long-term plans to improve their temporary structures. They do not have security of tenure and can be evicted at any time.

The complex nature and lengthy administrative practice of applying for and acquiring titles to land and housing is described by Doherty (1987). In a paper presented at the International Seminar on Housing Actions towards Shelter in Asia and the Pacific in 1987 in the International Year for the Homeless, Doherty succinctly highlighted some of the common issues of land rights, title and transfer of titles for low cost urban housing in Papua New Guinea. She points out that the constitution of Papua New Guinea does not allow for non-citizens to acquire freehold land (1987: 152). The *Land Act* prescribes a procedure whereby customary landowners wishing to dispose of their land must first sell it to the state. The state will then lease the land to third parties while retaining the freehold title. Virtually all alienated land in urban areas used for housing is owned by the state. If and when a lease is granted, a document is issued stating the rent payable, the use to which the land must be put (which in turn has to conform to the zoning of the land under the *Town Planning Act*), the amount of improvement that must be made to the land, and how long the lease will run (Doherty, 1987: 153).

If the leaseholder wishes to sell or dispose of the land he must seek approval from the state through the Minister for Lands based in Port Moresby. There is stamp duty payable for the processing of the transfer of title documents together with payment for an additional supporting contract document that has to be written in English to accompany the transfer document. In reality, there are no guidelines on the grounds on which transfer of titles can be approved, and there are no offices in the Provinces to supply the forms or qualified lawyers to assist individuals to draw up the contracts. The majority of low cost house owners for houses bought under the Morgan and sell-off schemes were never issued with a title document, a copy of approved transfer or a contract copy, even though many have paid off the full price. In some cases people have waited for three to five years. This came about partly because the National Housing Commission never had any title documents themselves to begin with. The problem is compounded by inefficient administration within the national housing authority which continues to debit a tenant who has paid off the

price early because their calculation of a payment schedule is fed into a computer and acquires an irreproachable status (Doherty, 1987: 158).

The National Housing Corporation leases parcels of land to developers or employers who then develop it and build housing for the market, or provide housing for their employees, in the case of employers, under the National Home Ownership Scheme. On completion of building on the plot, individuals obtain individual lease titles from the Department of Lands; but problems with this process include lack of clear criteria for allocating leases and lack of services in new housing areas. The Department of Lands and Physical Planning has the responsibility for processing every land transaction in the country which involves cumbersome multi-stage procedures. A major and continuing problem has been the inability of the department to keep up with the flow of new applications and to make headway in reducing the backlog of pending applications (UNCHS, 1993: 42). The requirement for the state to process and approve all land transactions is supplemented by the need to comply with planning and zoning regulations, building regulations, and survey requirements.

According to the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements:

Planning and zoning regulations require conformity with the standard of building required in addition to land use conformity; building regulations require full conformity with the building regulations, resulting in the need for a high cost building (except in designated self-help areas under the NHC); and the surveying regulations, using the Torrens system, require high cost methods of plot survey and registration. The effect of these regulations is to make possible only high cost construction, affordable only by the higher income groups (UNCHS, 1993: 43).

HOUSING FINANCE

Inadequate housing finance is a major constraint. The initial development of infrastructure requires public finance. Funding that is needed for developing land and servicing individual plots for people to construct houses is often not available and land rates are high. Most people lack the collateral to qualify for loans and those who are fortunate to access mortgages are faced with having to pay high mortgage interest rates. Poor people do not have secure long-term employment, cannot save much and so they do not qualify for loans from formal sources. In most other Third World and developed countries there are state sponsored special arrangements for housing finance intended to benefit lower income groups, but not in Papua New Guinea.

There are six main sources of housing finance in Papua New Guinea, which include five commercial banks, Government guarantee schemes, employee contributions towards pension funds, employer subsidies and informal sources. Access to any one or more of the formal sources of funding depends largely on income and employment factors. This problem is compounded by the shortage of freehold land that can be used as collateral to acquire long-term housing loans. This means that the elite, those in formal employment with more funds and registered land titles have the best chance of benefiting from formal sources of finance. The less fortunate and low income groups are denied assistance. The crux of the problem is not lack of lending capacity, but lack of effective demand. Driven by the profit-oriented motive, commercial lending institutions require land as a major collateral for lending and most customary owned land is not registered. Therefore, most customary owned land cannot be used as collateral, and consequently the level of lending for housing has been noted to remain very low (Dahanayake, 1991: 6).

Commercial Banks

Lending for housing in the formal sector is mostly done by the commercial banks. With commercial motives, banks require collateral, set high interest rates and loan repayment terms and conditions that eliminate low income groups from accessing such services. Interest rates on housing loans are quite high, but the exact figures differ between banks. The commercial banking industry lacks long-term deposits and this is partly why home loan repayment periods are less than ten years. Even though commercial bank lending for housing has increased since the introduction of the national home ownership policy, there is still an acute shortage of long-term mortgage finance (UNCHS, 1993: 34). In order to assist individuals to obtain loans from the banks and enter into home ownership the government has devised and instituted two schemes with the commercial banks. These include the Home Loan Guarantee Scheme and the Home Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme.

Home Loan Guarantees

The Home Loan Guarantee Scheme was introduced in 1986 to provide a government guarantee of up to 80 per cent of a loan to assist potential homeowners to obtain housing loans from financial institutions. Its main aim was to overcome the land title problem which many borrowers are confronted with. The scheme progressed quite well over the years with a default rate of only about 2 per cent (Dahanayake, 1991: 13). The government provided home loan guarantees in which it guaranteed to the banks

80 per cent of the outstanding loan balance in case of default by the borrower. The guarantee programme has raised K10 million within five years and three of the participating private commercial banks reported low default rates (UNCHS, 1993: 34).

Interest Rate Subsidies

The Home Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme was established in 1984. The main aim of this scheme was to reduce the cost to low income earners of financing low cost formal sector housing by subsidizing interest rates over the first ten years of the loan (National Planning Office (1984), cited in Dahanayake, 1991: 13). This involved granting interest rate subsidies to the borrower which either reduced the amount of periodic loan repayments for loans or increased the borrower's eligible loan amount and this programme mobilised less than K2 million in five years (UNCHS, 1993: 34).

However, in 1990 the Home Loan Guarantee Scheme and the Home Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme were terminated, and replaced with legislation to permit public employee pension (superannuation) funds to be used as down payments for housing loans (UNCHS, 1993: 34). A scheme for a mortgage finance company was also approved by government in 1990, but more than ten years later it has not yet materialised. Yet, like the old schemes the new schemes are also characterised by the need for a regular, higher level income in order to qualify for a loan and to be able to afford the regular loan repayments (UNCHS, 1993: 34).

Superannuation Funds

The use of superannuation funds to finance housing has been applied in Singapore and it proved to be very successful (Seng, 1991; Doling, 1999). This can be a useful way to finance housing, but Papua New Guinea has its own problems which prevent superannuation funds from being fully utilised. There are two major superannuation funds to which workers make regular contributions. Public sector employees contribute to the Public Officers' Superannuation Fund (POSF) and those in the private sector contribute to the National Provident Fund (NPF). The use of superannuation funds as down payment for housing loans has not progressed as anticipated. This scheme has not been publicised. Because of this there is very limited awareness that people can use their superannuation funds for housing purposes and this facility is not widely used. In addition, those who do apply for funds have to put up with excessive periods of administrative delay. The worst situation with the NPF at the moment is that management has made poor investment decisions as well as misappropriations which have resulted in huge losses. The World Bank has agreed to

help with financing a recovery package on the condition that the management is changed and that half of members' contributions are written off. The latter condition has been considered to be totally unacceptable by the unions and negotiations are still under way to find an acceptable and more economic solution to the problem. If the security of members' personal contributions cannot be guaranteed, how can anyone, let alone the government expect these agencies to better organise and provide additional services to the public? Savings and loans societies also make advances for housing purposes, but only in small amounts (UNCHS, 1993: 35). Finance and insurance companies do not provide housing loans.

Employer Subsidies

Some major employers provide subsidies towards the equity for securing housing loans under their respective National Home Ownership Schemes through arrangements with commercial banks (Kopel, 1989; UNCHS, 1993: 35). Most employers contribute the 10 per cent equity that is required by commercial banks for a housing loan for their staff who are entitled to join their home ownership schemes. The only exception is the South Pacific Holdings company which contributes 40 per cent of the cost of the house to each employee, while the potential home owner contributes 10 per cent and 50 per cent of the cost of the house is covered by the loan. The condition of this very high rate of subsidy is that the employee has to serve the company for at least ten years, but if she or he leaves earlier than that the principal amount has to be repaid with 14 per cent interest to the company (Taim and Kaitilla, 1996: 146).

Informal Sources

Those in medium and low income regular employment, and the bulk of the self-employed and unemployed segment of the urban population who survive in the informal sector, cannot benefit from formal sector sources of housing finance. They are left with having to save and use their own funds for housing as and when they can, or obtain loans, material and labour assistance from informal sources. Sources of informal financial assistance for urban housing in Papua New Guinea are mainly in the form of cash as loans or in kind, offers of cheap or free labour or assistance with transportation mainly from family, relatives, *wantoks* (Pidgin term used to refer to someone who comes from the same place or speaks the same language) and friends. It is common for those in need of finance for housing or other purposes to borrow from family, friends, neighbours and *wantoks* rather than approach the banks, which require security, regular income and secure employment.

BUILDING MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES

The high cost of building materials is a common complaint in Port Moresby and other urban areas. Though high costs affect the entire population, the middle and low income groups suffer the most. Among factors that exacerbate and inflate housing costs is the use of a higher proportion of imported building materials. With the depreciating value of the Kina, imported materials are very expensive. This leads individual builders to trade quality for quantity by using cheaper, poorer quality materials. Poor materials wear out faster and require frequent maintenance. Untreated timber is often eaten away by ants and termites over several years. Aluminium tin walls and corrugated iron-sheet roofing do not permit air circulation and make the houses extremely hot.

Labour costs and wage levels in the building industry are also very high. Building regulations demand very high construction standards. The building construction industry is dominated by a few, big foreign owned companies with international connections (UNCHS, 1993: 47). There are very few local construction companies capable of adapting local materials and methods to the needs of the middle and low income groups. Additional factors include the use of machinery intensive construction methods, the cost of construction finance, the use of high-technology management techniques unsuitable for the current level of management in the country. The private real estate sector concentrates on supplying high cost housing as there is an effective and stable demand from the high income sector, with the prospect of quickly recouping capital investment and making high profits. Problems of land shortages are overcome by building high rise housing complexes especially in Port Moresby (Dahanayake, 1991: 8).

While maximum use of local materials is the national policy, the building industry continues to import a large proportion of materials, with the exception of PNG Forest Products in Bulolo, Lae, that produces competitively priced timber kit houses using local materials. Housing costs can be reduced by adopting and using appropriate local materials and techniques instead of imported prefabricated materials. The self-help informal sector could benefit from a greater availability of locally produced low cost chemicals that make materials more durable and extend the useful lives of houses. There is no building research institute in the country and even though the NHC pledged to set up such an institution it does not have the resources to turn that aim into reality.

According to the UNCHS (1993: 63), the Department of Works disseminates information on good building practice throughout the country. The Department did in fact put out a proposal to develop appropriate

building materials. The Department operates at all levels nation-wide, so this work could have had extensive impact; but the only form of government intervention in the building industry has been in the direct provision of soft loans for building materials for housing under the Self-help Housing Scheme. The building materials loan scheme was introduced in 1974 under the Self-help Housing Scheme. It provided interest-free loans for the purchase of building materials up to a certain limit for low cost housing. Despite good intentions the scheme had limited success due to very low rates of recovery (27 per cent) and financial mismanagement. The scheme was eventually abolished in 1985 (Dahanayake, 1991).

The high cost of housing production is partly reflected in high rents. Rented housing is limited in supply, and most private sector rental housing is rented by employers for their workers.

It is very uncommon for a householder to rent a house from a private owner, simply because most wages would not permit it. Even a highly paid expatriate employee, earning twice the salary of a Papua New Guinean counterpart (K1400–K1600 per month), would not be able to afford to pay the market rent for a medium cost three bedroom house (Dahanayake, 1991: 2).

A study done on citizen middle-class urban housing showed that two thirds of the respondents live in employer-provided, subsidised housing, paying an average of K46.00 per month. On the basis of a market rent of K350 per week (K1400 per month) for an average three bedroom house (the most common house size found in Dahanayake's study), this represents a subsidy of more than 90 per cent (Dahanayake, 1991: 2–3).

A comparison of formal sector housing rents in Papua New Guinea showed that by Third World standards, the housing costs in Papua New Guinea are extremely high. It was argued that rents at that time were comparable to those in many developed countries. In 1991 the average weekly rent for a three bedroom house in a residential suburb in Sydney was about K155 (A\$200) while in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt. Hagen or Madang it was over K350 (Dahanayake, 1991: 3).

ZONING AND PLANNING REGULATIONS

In a paper on the effects of zoning and socio-economic differentiation, King (1987: 139) argues that the colonial principle of provision of housing by employers was that the area and quality of housing came to be related to the educational level, income earning capacity and occupation of the employee. This person, the head of the household, became part of a newly created elite system even though the other members of his household unit did not necessarily share the same educational or occupational characteristics. Early

colonial towns were characterised by a separation of the population in divisions between the expatriate population, existing native villages on customary land, and areas set aside for migrant labourers and skilled workers. In this way zoning was originally a separation of different classes of the population and this set the pace for the basic division of the towns into high, medium and low cost housing areas and self-help housing areas.

Several problems have emerged from the practice of zoning towns. First, urban populations have grown faster than commerce and industry and this has led to a shortage of residential land, while the land set aside for the latter purposes is underused. Second, town boundaries have been artificially drawn and most boundaries exclude large sections of the population living on customary land adjacent to town centres. The third problem is the creation of exclusive residential areas that separate the population into socio-economic groups. Most informal housing areas are ethnically homogeneous while formal housing areas are divided into high, medium and low cost areas, dividing the population in formal housing into homogeneous occupation, income and education groups. Customary villages and informal housing lie on the periphery of this arrangement.

All of the large cities and towns of Papua New Guinea conform to the same residential pattern (King, 1987: 140).

The variety of self-help and informal housing is considerable, but zoning creates the impression of a stratification, an exclusiveness of residential areas that separates people into high cost, low cost and self-help etc. at the bottom of the scale. Inevitably, it is the characteristics related to occupational status that are most closely related to housing type. Activity, education and type of occupation most closely follow the patterns of housing type. Thus each town gives a superficial impression of having distinct socio-economic areas that have been fixed by the establishment of zones of different residential areas (King, 1987: 141–2).

The immediate visual image of the organisation and layout of most towns transmits to the newcomer that there is a distinct separation of the people into exclusive residential enclaves marked by socio-economic characteristics. This has largely led to a stereotyped image of settlement areas as being areas of social breakdown, infested with unemployed and notorious rapists, drug addicts and criminals. The physical separation of the wealthy and the poor through zoning of residential areas is resented by many marginalised, out of school and unemployed youth. Most of these youths live in settlements. Housing and other property of the wealthy become targets of breaking and entering, robbery and physical attack by those who are considered to be or who view themselves as disadvantaged (Dinnen, 1992).

INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION

Provision and maintenance of basic infrastructure is essential. Some settlements are initially provided with minimum infrastructure. The problem lies in ensuring that facilities such as roads, stormwater drainage and bridges are adequately maintained because they deteriorate very quickly in constant hot and wet conditions. In planned settlements, provision is made for people to connect electricity to their houses if and when incomes improve, but many low incomes do not permit this. Free water supply to many settlements was enjoyed by settlement dwellers in Port Moresby until the mid 1990s when the responsibility for water was taken over by a Malaysian commercial firm (Eda Ranu). Since the takeover, meters have been installed to every house with a water tap and this means that low income people have to pay for water at market rates.

Many settlements are not adequately provided with basic services. Because of this settlement dwellers have to travel to distant locations for health, education and employment and that entails extra costs. Benton (1987: 176) notes that the colonial legacy of separating housing from urban planning functions has given rise to a situation in which many residential developments are in reality dormitory settlements, with little or none of the basic services and facilities that are necessary for a satisfactorily balanced community. It is essential that any new residential development for low cost housing make provision for schools, churches, transport, clinics, social and cultural centres and recreation and leisure areas.

Planning and provision for income-generating and employment activities such as markets, shops and art and craft is also a crucial element for people who are either unemployed or on low and/or irregular incomes. When people set up their own markets, shops and service centres, these are considered an infringement of planning and zoning regulations. They become the target for harassment by town authorities for street vending, selling where they are not supposed to, or conducting illegal businesses. Most residents of both planned and unplanned settlements make their living solely or partly through informal sector activities. With high costs of urban living, even those in secure employment and housing find it a necessity to engage in informal economic activities to supplement their incomes, but authorities tend to outlaw such informal sector initiatives in the interests of hygiene and tidiness (Norwood, 1984: 18; Kopel, 1996).

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFUSION

Interagency links and relationships between relevant public sector organisations that are required to implement housing policies are either missing or very poor. The process of acquiring land is time consuming and too

complex for the average citizen. The UNCHS (1993: 58) suggested that, to overcome the lengthy and complex process of developing and releasing urban land, some of the cumbersome land development processes should be deregulated to increase and encourage the role that customary land owners could play in mobilising their land for urban development without the necessity for all transactions to go through the government. Similarly, writing six years before the UNCHS research, Doherty (1987: 161) recommended that the stamp duty and transfer fees on low cost houses be abolished. She suggested that the responsibility for processing the transfer of land titles be decentralised away from Port Moresby and the state should issue a simple transfer of land title document to avoid unnecessary lengthy delays in processing title documents. To date, none of these changes have been considered as many good ideas hardly get a chance to struggle through the many bureaucratic channels to reach the level of the top management and the advisers of political and administrative decision makers.

CONCLUSION

Public policy has tried to address some of the key constraints in the formal housing market: the limited availability of mortgage finance, problems in land tenure, constraints due to cumbersome allocation procedures, lack of customary land mobilisation, lack of a home ownership tradition and inappropriate high housing construction standards. But these efforts have achieved very little. State initiatives to curb urban housing problems have operated just as well as making a dog without teeth bite or a bird without wings fly. The major government initiatives to review urban housing, the Morgan Committee (1979), the Home Ownership Policy and the National Task Force on Shelter Policy and Planning (1989) which led to the establishment of the National Housing Corporation have failed to address crucial issues of tackling problems of housing affordability and finance, issues of land tenure and the development of durable materials at affordable costs (UNCHS, 1993: 35). The social and cultural attitudes and aspirations that influence human settlements in the Melanesian context have also been ignored, and housing has been taken out of context and treated as a separate entity rather than through a holistic approach to planning appropriate urban settlements suitable for Melanesians based on local values and culture.

It is ironic that important policy initiatives are adopted without proper consultation with the general public for whom policies are made for. The limited income from formal employment or informal sector activities is not sufficient and often cannot stretch far enough to make sufficient savings towards housing costs. The people who had and

continue to access urban home ownership or formal sector rental houses are the better off sections of the urban community. The policy of urban home ownership remains to be a dream in utopia for the vast majority of people.

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
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
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