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Miriam Schader

Religion as a Political Resource

Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris

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To Noémi

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Miriam Schader

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Note to the readers:

The names of most of the participants in the present study have been changed by the author, except for when the interlocutors gave their explicit permission or expressed the wish to be mentioned by their real names. Most of the interlocutors' names mentioned here therefore are pseudonyms. As names in different languages and cultures have different connotations and may give different information on social categories a person may belong to, it has been difficult to find pseudonyms that would be equivalent to the true names. Although the pseudonyms were chosen with great care, it is likely that some of them are misleading or just not fitting. I would like to apologise to the readers for any misleading name choice and especially to everyone whose name has been "mistranslated" into an unsuitable pseudonym. In order to reduce the risk of unfortunate name choices, I decided to use only first names even in cases where I am not on first name terms with the person I interviewed. This is not meant to be a sign of disrespect. If a person's real name is mentioned, the name is stated in the way the person himself or herself requested.

Unless stated otherwise, quotes from the interviews or the literature were translated by the author.

Dieses Buch entspricht der unter dem Titel "Religion as a political resource? The religious and political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in two European cities" eingereichten Dissertation.

1 Introduction

When I first met with the pastor of a small African Pentecostal church in Berlin in order to discuss whether I could interview him for this study, the one thing that seemed most important to him to get across was his view on migrant integration in Germany. Although I had neither asked him about this subject, nor mentioned the term integration or any related terms like incorporation or assimilation, he came back to this several times. Integration, he said, was often portrayed as something that had to be accomplished by the migrant population only. In his opinion, however, integration was a process which needed both sides to co-operate and accommodate each other's needs - both migrants and the receiving society had to contribute to "integration". "We are here", he added, as if to say, "we're here, so let us in, it is time". Shortly after this conversation, I spoke to the pastor of another African Pentecostal church, who raised similar issues. Also, he highlighted severe problems which migrants from sub-Saharan Africa face in Germany, especially racism, exclusion, and exploitation.

The two pastors described the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany essentially as one marked by the many difficulties they encounter when trying to become an equal part of society. A situation, in short, that is often characterised by economic, social and political marginalisation. Indeed, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany, Africans as well as Germans of African descent for instance face more difficulties than other migrant and minority groups in terms of labour market integration. While this is partly due to individual attributes such as a lower level of formally recognized education, structural barriers like legal labour market restrictions for certain migrant groups, racist discrimination, and the non-existence of a segregated ethnic labour market also make it hard for migrants from the African continent and their decendants to find work (cf. Baraulina et al. 2008; Benndorf 2008: 345-46[1]). Furthermore, African migrants and their children also have to face xenophobic and racist attitudes and are the victims of xenophobic or racist violence disproportionately often (Benndorf 2008: 350).

In this context, the reasons to become politically involved are manifold. Yet, the situation described here does not only suggest that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany have many reasons to mobilise. It also highlights that

[1] Benndorf refers to both migrants from North Africa and from sub-Saharan Africa.

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they generally do not have a high socio-economic status and few resources at their disposal. In addition, since they are a rather recent and small migrant group, they are especially vulnerable. Moreover, as a particularly visible minority, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are easy targets for racist and discriminatory behaviour. Also, since their countries and the entire African continent are often identified with poverty, war and disease, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are frequently confronted with the respective stereotypes as well as a generalised suspicion that their presence in Western Europe is illegitimate. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa lack many of the resources necessary for or conducive to becoming involved politically.

Although the issues that the two pastors raised concern the (sub-Saharan) African community as a whole, regardless of their religious affiliation, and although the awareness of these issues is certainly not limited to Pentecostal Christians, or to Christians in general, one can ask whether their religion may provide resources for the politicisation and mobilisation of African migrants. More generally, this leads to the heuristic question whether migrants can draw on religious organisations and on religion as a cultural fabric, i.e. on religion as an organisational and a symbolic resource, in order to further their causes within a European democratic system.

However, whereas a majority of commentators acknowledge the great importance of resources for migrant political involvement, the religious factor has not been accounted for sufficiently in the study of migrant democratic participation. Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind even make out this gap even for migration research generally: "Until recently, the theoretical literature on immigration imitated, unwittingly, the French emphasis on *laicité* [sic] by focusing on the economic, linguistic, and identificational parameters of immigrant incorporation, while ignoring the presence and effects of religion" (Portes/DeWind 2007: 17).

At the same time, since the 1990s and especially since 11 September 2001, (migrant) religion and political involvement do come up together frequently - in academic research almost as much as in public debates and political discourse. Most often, however, this happens either through the very reductionist lens of 9/11 and its aftermath, or through a concern with the rise of the new right in the United States. Religion, then is often simplistically equated with the threat of fundamentalism, and trans-national religious networks with Al Quaeda or, more recently, Daesh. Yet, this focus on religious fundamentalism and terrorist organisations and networks leaves many questions not only unanswered, but unasked.[2]

[2] For a discussion of the "fixation with fundamentalism" (Beckford 2003: 127), Islamic and Christian, in the social scientific globalisation discourse and the subsequent lack of attention to non-fundamentalist religion see James A. Beckford (2003: 127-149).

To be sure, there is a large and still growing body of research on the incorporation of Muslim migrants and their descendants into European societies. Due to different political and ideological contexts, historians, sociologists and demographers in different European countries started at different times to tell the story of the presence of Muslims in this part of the world (e.g. Peach/Glebe 1995; Vertovec/Peach 1997; Nielsen 1999; 2004; Haug et al. 2009). Nowadays, the literature, however, is so extensive for most West European countries that one can easily have the impression recent research on migration focuses on "Muslims" only, thus sometimes ignoring other important social categories. For instance, Turkish migrants in Western Europe, who, for a long time, often were subsumed under the problematic category of "guest workers", are now filed under the heading "Muslims" by many social scientists (cf. Köşer Akçapar/Yurdakul 2009: 141). Thereby, sociologists and others again risk overlooking the heterogeneity of the populations designated by their terms and concepts. As some authors have highlighted, the widespread usage of the (then) newly "discovered" categories of "Muslim" and "Islam" may bear the danger of artificially contributing to the creation or transformation of the social field which is to be analysed - in the worst case ascribing a religious identity to groups and individuals who might not even have considered themselves as Muslims before (cf. Tezcan 2007).

It is therefore necessary to open up our view on migrant religious and political participation and to include not only Muslims, but also other religious communities into the research and to compare them to secular migrant activists, too. On the one hand it is urgent to stop ascribing a Muslim identity to all migrants from countries with a Muslim majority as well as to their children and grandchildren and to take into account that they may just as well not see themselves as Muslims, or that they may or may not practice any religion. On the other hand, it is also necessary to acknowledge that there are many religious migrants who are not Muslim, but still religious.

When researching migrant religion, European students of migration often do not look at religion as a resource for, but rather an impediment to migrant democratic participation - despite the important role many established religious actors play in many European polities[3]. Yet, as research from the US American context shows, religion may also serve as a resource for political participation, collective action or for "integration" - in whichever way this is defined in the respective studies. To be sure, both immigration to the US and the relation between religion and

[3] To be sure, in many European countries, a democratic order was fought for and achieved against the resistance of the Church or churches and in many ways, the important role religious actors still play in politics is often the legacy of these struggles and a bears witness of the great obstacles religion and religious institutions posed to the democratisation of many European societies.

politics there differ greatly from the situation in European countries. Nevertheless, it is important for our understanding of migrant political activism in Europe to understand better the role religion may play for it, too.

In order to contribute some elements to closing this gap in European research, it is the goal of this book to study religion as a basis for the political involvement of migrants in European contexts. Religion may be an organisational as well as a symbolic resource for political action. Migrants as individual residents of the polity and as social movement entrepreneurs may take advantage of religious structures and religious contents to mobilise resources necessary for individual and collective action, but they may also use religion as a symbolic system to create unity and to frame political issues, actors and actions as legitimate. Religious leaders may incite their followers to both individual and collective political involvement.

At the same time, there are limits to the degree to which religion may be a useful resource for migrant activism in a democratic and progressive way. Religious networks and religion as a symbolic system can be the basis for migrants mobilising as a *class by and for itself*. It can provide the material, organisational and symbolic ground for an emancipatory process of getting involved and struggling for one's causes. It can reduce the risk of freeriding and spoiling, and facilitate communication with the non-migrant community. Nevertheless, migrant activists who draw on their religion for their political involvement will always be caught between communicating internally (i.e. to their co-believers) in religious *and* political terms, communicating to external religious partners with their own religious agenda (e.g. non-migrant religious actors needed for support) and external political allies to whom religious arguments will not necessarily appeal. Especially if (ultra-)conservative members manage to set the agenda within a broader faith-based migrant movement or network, the entire movement risks losing support by non-religious actors. Similarly, if they adopt a clearly non-religious agenda the most religious or least political among their co-believers are unlikely to follow or to lend their name for greater legitimacy within the migrant population. From a normative point of view, it is also clear that most religions bear an (ultra-)conservative and anti-democratic potential which may enter the political stage via a religious political network. While some migrants see their religion as a political resource, there is also always the risk that others will take advantage of their political engagement as a resource for reaching religious goals or for imposing their religious agenda on others.

Of course, whether and how religion may be a political resource is not independent of religious and political contexts. It may depend on migration and integration policies, on citizenship legislation, but also on the religious field and the general relation between political and religious institutions. Not only will the migrants' room for manoeuvre for political action differ from one context to another, also the way religion is perceived in public, and especially migrant religion, will not

be the same here and there. What is more, the place migrants may occupy within the religious field is likely to vary, too, and thus also their access to both material and immaterial resources for political involvement via their religion.

As a comparative perspective therefore appears particularly useful, the empirical work is designed as an explorative case study which compares migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and the Parisian agglomeration. The main focus of the study is on Berlin, which is then contrasted with Paris and the Parisian agglomeration. Based mainly on semi-standardised interviews as well as research on the religious and secular associational landscape in the two cities, and on membership lists of umbrella organisations, this study analyses the (religious) associational networks of the migrants as well as how religious leaders may draw on these *organisational* resources and on religion as a *symbolic* resource for their own political participation and the mobilisation of larger numbers of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

Studying migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in two West European capitals is particularly interesting, because they include both Muslims and Christians and thus allow the researcher to compare two religious communities if not from the same country, then at least from the same geographical region of origin. Also, secular, Muslim and Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa share a colonial heritage and the severe disadvantages that African migrants still face in European societies. As already highlighted, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa suffer from great difficulties on the labour market as well as from particularly frequent racist attacks and violence and therefore would have many reasons to get involved politically. At the same time, their marginalised position does not render their political participation or their protest a matter of course. Lastly, it seems fruitful to focus on migrants from Africa south of the Sahara because they constitute an understudied part of French and, especially, German society.

In short, this book analyses whether religion can contribute to the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa as a highly vulnerable group with common interests. The more general question behind this is, of course, whether religion can further the mobilisation of an especially marginalised part of a population.

Thus, this study is not meant to be in defense of religion or a pleading for more religion or religious actors in politics. On the contrary, it aims at scrutinising whether the socially and/or politically excluded can find alternative means to make their voices heard – in this case, by drawing on structures and contents that are particularly easy to access for migrants who, on average, are more religious than non-migrants in Europe. Can migrants take advantage of their religion in order to improve their condition not as religious actors but as migrants or minorities? That is, can they use their religion to overcome marginalisation and to reach *secular* goals?

It also considers whether mainly secular societies leave migrants more room for political manoeuvre if they act as religious actors than if they get involved on secular grounds - for instance through the introduction of faith-based forms of participation such as the German Islam Conference - and the effects this may have on migrant participation.

The remainder of this introduction will present the outline of the book. Before, however, some definitions and clarifications are needed. As will be outlined in chapter two in more detail, the rather broad term "political involvement" is used to designate both individual political participation and collective action. Despite its inherent imprecision, it seems useful to use such a broad and rather artificial category, because the theoretical arguments put forward in this book draw on both theories of individual participation and collective mobilisation and focus on similarities between these strands of research rather than on differences. Also, migrants often have limited political rights as well as limited material and immaterial resources for political action. It is therefore necessary not to apply too narrow a definition in order not to exclude some forms of political mobilisation or participation. What is more, although there are more or less two fields of research and two strands of literature, definitions of "participation" and "mobilisation" put forward by students of political participation or of social movements often overlap. The term "political involvement" therefore draws on both perspectives on political action and includes both conventional and unconventional, both individual and collective forms of political engagement.

While the term "political involvement" is a broad one, the focus is on resources necessary for this involvement. The present book thus concentrates on one (important) aspect of political participation and mobilisation and deliberately exludes a number of other aspects.

The second term that needs to be clarified is that of "migrants". Whereas it is relatively easy to define the concept of "migration", the definition of "migrant" is not as straight forward, since the literature knows several distinct definitions which often are either the expression of a particular theoretical approach or normative or political standpoints with regards to migration and migrant "integration".

As an important international body concerned with migration, the UN's International Organization for Migration (IOM) strives for a universally accepted, more or less neutral[4], more or less legal definition of the term "migration" and related terms. According to the IOM, "migration" is

[4] To be sure, the IOM itself is not a "neutral" body, and may be criticised on several grounds. An important issue is, for instance, its position on "people smuggling", which contributes to criminalising undocumented migration. Nevertheless, the definition of "migration" the IOM proposes seems a reasonable starting point for the present discussion of the terms "migration" and "migrant".

> [t]he movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (IOM online 2011a).

In the literature on migration, the terms of "migrant" and "immigrant" are sometimes used as synonyms, but authors also employ them in order to distinguish persons who move to a new city, region, or country and leave again ("migrants") from those who come to stay ("immigrants"). The term "transmigrant" is used mainly by adepts of transnationalism to underline the importance of movements and bonds across borders in the lives of migrants. According to the IOM's definition of migration, however, the term "migration" covers both "immigration" and "transmigration", and thus the concept of "migrant" includes those of "immigrant" and "transmigrant":

> The United Nations defines migrant as an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. Under such a definition, those travelling for shorter periods as tourists and businesspersons would not be considered migrants. However, common usage includes certain kinds of shorter-term migrants, such as seasonal farm-workers who travel for short periods to work planting or harvesting farm products (IOM online 2011b).

As it is difficult to determine whether a person will stay somewhere forever or whether they will eventually move on or return to where they came from - especially from an outsider's perspective - it seems reasonable to stick to the comprehensive definition proposed by the IOM.

Without the context of the IOM's definition of the term "migration", their definition of "migrants", however, would be somewhat problematic, as some countries do not easily accord citizenship to individuals born on their territory to parents who are foreign residents there - as has long been the case for Germany. Then, the category "migrant" would include persons who are legally foreigners in their country of residence, but who did not themselves move from one country to another. Since the experience of leaving one's country to come and live in another country is likely to be very significant in a person's life, it seems appropriate to distinguish between migrants and their children, if the latter did not make this experience themselves. At the same time, in times of persisting racism, xenophobia and discrimination, growing up as children and grandchildren of migrants often is not necessarily the same as growing up as the descendants of a more or less "autochthonous" family, who has resided in the respective country for many generations. It therefore also seems useful to consider the children and grandchildren of migrants

as a part of society with specific experiences without, however, essentialising their origins or "ethnic" or "cultural heritage".

What is more, the IOM's definition may be understood as excluding individuals who migrated from one country to another and became citizens of the latter country, as they are no longer foreigners there. In contrast, the category of "migrants" as it will be used here will include all individuals who themselves moved from one country to another, regardless of their becoming citizens of the receiving country or not. It will exclude their children if they did not migrate themselves. Persons born to at least one migrant parent will be labelled as members of the "second generation", as "children of migrants" and "descendants of migrants". If only one or more of the grandparents migrated themselves, the grandchildren will be described as members of the "third generation" and as "descendants of migrants".

In what follows, migrants will generally be considered a minority in their country of residence, although few countries accord them the legal status of a national minority. Accordingly, the terms "non-migrant population", "majority" or "majority society" will be used to designate the "autochthonous" population who did not migrate to France or Germany, and whose families have been residents there for many generations.

In this book, persons who entered a foreign country without valid papers, or whose visa or residence permits have expired during their stay there, will be called "undocumented migrants" or "sans-papiers". The highly pejorative expression "illegal migrants" will not be used here as it "carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity", as the IOM rightly points out (IOM online 2011c).

Finally yet significantly, the research question guiding this work evidently is also about "religion". As the focus is on religious organisations, it is clear that the present work is informed by a substantial or a mixed, rather than a functional, definition of religion. While reference will be made to the great classics of the sociology of religion and of the social sciences - Durkheim and Weber - some concepts used prominently in this book come from more recent works. On the one hand, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the religious field and his distinction between religious experts and the laity is highly useful for the study of religion as an organisational resource because it draws attention to important differences between religion and ethnicity. Also, the field concept in addition to the political opportunity structure approach helps to understand the role context factors and especially boundaries play for the religious and political involvement of migrants. On the other hand, it is also important to understand religion as a symbolic system since religion will not only be treated as an organisational resource. In order to highlight the cultural or

symbolic rather than the structural dimension of religion, Clifford Geertz's definition of religion as a symbolic system appears appropriate.[5]

To put it differently, both for the concept of "political involvement" and for the definition of "religion", this study is marked by a deliberate theoretical eclecticism. Deliberate, because it seems necessary to adapt not only the methods employed for the actual case study to the concrete research question, but also the theoretical framework. It is not the goal of this work to decide whether one approach to migrant political participation or one theory of collective action is more powerful than another, or whether one understanding of religion is closer to the "truth" than another. Rather, it aims at exploring whether and how religion may serve as a political resource for migrants at all. Therefore, theories and concepts will be used as a "tool box" in order to create a wide enough framework for such an exploration.

The following chapter will further contextualise the present research question and provide a brief overview over the literature on migrant political participation and mobilisation, before outlining the theoretical elements this book is based on. The third chapter will then discuss the methodological choices made as well as the case selection. Chapter four is the first empirical chapter. It will give an overview over statistical data on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany and Berlin, and France and the Parisian agglomeration, respectively as well as over the (estimated) religious make-up of these populations. Based on several statistical sources, it will thus for the first time present data on the religious composition of the African migrant population in the two cities. The chapter will furthermore discuss the context in which migration from the African continent to Europe takes place as well as other context factors that shape the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France and Germany. This will be complemented by an analysis of the perception of this situation by the participants in the study. The fourth chapter thus forms the basis for the ensuing analyses as it sketches the marginalisation of the sub-Saharan African population in the two countries (and cities), which may be both a reason and an obstacle for their political involvement. The fifth chapter will consist of a formal analysis of inter-organisational networks set up by sub-Saharan African migrants in Berlin. It will hence focus on religion as an organisational resource and show that Christian migrant organisations have been more successful in creating dense co-membership networks than their secular and Muslim counterparts. In the sixth chapter it will be demonstrated that these networks indeed are relevant for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Ber-

[5] Geertz defines religion as "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz 1973: 90).

lin. Also, the Berlin case will be compared to the Parisian case; the differences between the two cities and the different religious groups will be discussed and some elements of an explanation will be proposed. Moreover, the role of religion as a symbolic resource for the political involvement of these migrants as well as for the symbolic reversal of established hierarchies between Black and White, between the formerly colonised and the former colonisers will be analysed. The seventh and last chapter will summarise the main findings and offer some conclusions.

2 Three approaches to the political involvement of migrants – a short overview over the state of research and some theoretical considerations

Political participation, of course, is essential to democracy - without at least some participation of the *demos*, the concept appears devoid of meaning. Indeed, in their nowadays classic "Civic culture" study, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba concluded that a democratic political system needed a "political culture consistent with it" (Almond/Verba 1963: 3) in order to be stable. Observing the political developments in post-World War II Europe and in the newly independent states of the formerly colonised world, they furthermore noted that a new "world political culture" was in the making with all countries striving for modern industrial technology and bureaucracy (Almond/Verba 1963: 2). Whereas the political content of this world culture was not yet foreseeable at the time, so the authors of the study, it was already possible to make out one important political aspect of it:

> "But one aspect of this new world political culture is discernible: it will be a political culture of participation. If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is politically relevant -- that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system -- is widespread" (Almond/Verba 1963: 2).

Nowadays, political theory of democracy still stresses the great importance of political participation for democracy (Barnes 2006: 76), and there are still many studies on political culture.[6] In addition, however, students of political participation today concentrate on explaining variations in concrete acts of participation, rather than on attitudes alone.

According to their respective (normative) views on political participation and democracy, authors define political participation differently. Many either conceptualise it as all actions which citizens undertake voluntarily in order to influence political decisions (Schultze 2010: 723). Or they prefer a definition which stresses the deliberative character of participation. For instance, Manfred G. Schmidt suggests defining political participation as participation in the process of deliberation

[6] There is a comprehensive literature concerned with political attitudes and political culture. Among many others, see e.g. Westle/Gabriel (2009) for the German context; for France, e.g. Mayer et al. (2010).

M. Schader, *Religion as a Political Resource*, Veröffentlichungen der Sektion Religionssoziologie der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie,
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and decision-making on political and/or public affairs (cf. Schmidt 2004: 546). A very comprehensive and widely accepted definition has been put forward by Max Kaase, who explains that political participation is a form of social behaviour oriented towards collective goals, which materialises in a complex interplay of institutional structures, concrete political events, group ties and individual characteristics (Kaase 1996: 525).[7] Schultze's, Schmidt's, Kaase's and many other definitions today have in common that they include both conventional elements of participation such as voting, party membership or holding office, and unconventional elements such as working for a solidarity group, writing a pamphlet or participating in a road block. Political violence is not excluded by these definitions, either.

The inclusion of "unconventional" forms of participation into the definition is essential, especially if the focus is on the participation of migrants. Indeed, while the participatory revolution foreseen by Almond and Verba in the 1960s has since then certainly reached many societies and many different sectors within societies that before were characterised by logics of hierarchy, obedience or exclusion, the participation of migrants still hardly ever is a matter of course. As migrants often are citizens of a country other than the one they live in, they commonly do not have the same political rights as the majority in their country of residence. And even if they are naturalised citizens of their country of residence, they frequently are not perceived as a legitimate part of the *demos*. Social movements and other forms of political participation that are considered "unconventional" thus may be more easily available forms of political involvement for migrants. For the present research, it is therefore advisable to take into account both conventional and unconventional forms of political involvement and to draw on theories of participation and of social movements more specifically - although, of course, the participation of migrants in social movements and other forms of collective mobilisation does not go without saying, either.

As has been sketched briefly above it is the aim of this research to find out whether *religion* can contribute to overcoming the barriers that keep migrants from getting involved politically, to facilitating migrant politicisation, participation and collective mobilisation, and thus to surmounting (at least partly) a situation where migrants are politically marginalised. The focus is on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris who constitute a particularly vulnerable and marginalised population. As will be shown in later chapters, their situation in both cities gives many reasons for protest and collective mobilisation and, at the same time, renders both conventional and unconventional political participation rather difficult.

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[7] Translation by the author (political participation is "auf kollektive Ziele hin orientiertes soziales Verhalten, das in einem komplexen Zusammenspiel zwischen institutionellen Strukturen, konkreten politischen Ereignissen, Gruppenbindungen und individuellen Merkmalen zustande kommt" (Kaase 1996: 525)).

Yet, while Black migrants are particularly often the victims of discrimination and racist violence and their position on the labour market in both cities is especially weak, their political marginalisation is something they share with many migrants. It is therefore useful to take a closer look at what we know about the political involvement of migrants in general, before outlining a few theoretical elements guiding this research. This chapter therefore first gives a short and non-exhaustive overview over the literature on the political participation and mobilisation of migrants generally. Against this background, in a second step, it outlines the theoretical considerations that frame and support this research.

2.1 Three major perspectives on (migrant) political participation and collective mobilisation: A very short overview

Three major elements characterise approaches to the study of both individual participation and collective mobilisation: (1) material and immaterial resources as a requirement for political involvement, (2) cultural factors contributing to or shaping political preferences and actions and (3) context factors. The literature covering these three factors will be reviewed very briefly as the background the theoretical framework guiding the empirical research.

2.1.1 Resources as a necessary requirement for political involvement

One of the most influential explanatory models of political participation still is the socioeconomic status (SES) model proposed by Sidney Verba and his colleagues in the 1970s (Verba/Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978), and the decisive influence of social stratification has been confirmed empirically both for conventional and unconventional political participation in Western democracies (cf. Schultze 2010: 723-725; Schmidt 1995: 740). Fundamental findings include the fact that generally a higher SES, i.e. a higher income, level of education, and status of occupation, correlates positively with a higher level of political participation (cf. Schultze 2010: 723-725; Schmidt 1995: 740; Kaase 2002: 353-354).

In order to elucidate why the socio-economic status explains much of the variation in political participation, Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman (Verba et al. 1995) developed an extended resource model of political participation according to which resources closely related to socioeconomic status - time, money and civic skills - are essential for political involvement. Brady et al. argue that their new focus on resources allows them a) to "move beyond the 'SES model,' that is, beyond explanations of political activity based on one or more of the components of socioeconomic status" and b) to "probe the way resources link backward to SES and other social characteristics and forward to political activity"

(Brady et al. 1995: 271). Thereby they demonstrate that the three resources they identified as essential for political participation "vary in their association with SES and other social characteristics" (Brady et al. 1995: 271). Obviously, money and some civic skills which are acquired at the workplace correlate highly with SES, whereas time as well as those kinds of civic skills that are learnt in clubs, associations or congregational churches are less strongly linked to SES (Brady et al. 1995: 271).[8]

Focussing on collective rather than individual action, an important branch of social movement theory also stresses the relevance of resources as well as of the inclusion of organisations and actors into social networks. While the earlier approaches of collective behaviour and rational action explain the surge of social movements by collective grievances and frustration (e.g. Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970) or by individual interest and rational calculation (e.g. Olson 1965) respectively, the resource mobilisation theory stresses that resources and the strategic actions of movement leaders are necessary for collective action.

To be sure, resource mobilisation theory is less a coherent paradigm than a broader theoretical category which assembles different approaches (cf. Neveu 2005: 49; Della Porta/Diani 1999: 3; 7-8). Whereas some of these approaches concentrate on so-called Social Movement Organisations and rational Social Movement Entrepreneurs within a supply-side model of mobilisation (cf. McCarthy/Zald 1977: 1213), others go further and also take into account institutional and historical factors (Tilly 1978; cf. Neveu 2005: 49). All approaches, however, have in common that they stress the rational character of social movements: whereas theories of collective behaviour conceptualise social movements as inherently irrational, resource mobilisation theory characterises social movements as "rational, purposeful and organized action" (Tilly 1978; quoted in Della Porta/Diani 1999: 8).

In contrast to the resource model explaining political participation proposed by Verba and his colleagues, resource mobilisation theory does not focus on the individual socio-economic status, on individual skills and resources, but on the resources which Social Movement Organisations (SMO) may mobilise in order to achieve their goals (McCarthy/Zald 1977). As Donatella della Porta and Mario Diano highlight, resource mobilisation theory thus stresses the significance of material resources, but also of immaterial resources such as solidarity networks (della Porta/Diani 1999: 8). Also, this approach considers a limited number of Social Movement Entrepreneurs as decisive for the success of a movement (McCarthy/Zald 1977; Neveu 2005). These entrepreneurs draw on the different resources available to them and mobilise and lead others.

[8] Michael A. Jones-Correa and David L. Leal argue that it is mainly the associational character of churches that increases political participation (Jones-Correa/Leal 2001).

In short, when analysing individual political participation or collective mobilisation, relevant theories stress the significance of access to and strategic mobilisation of material and immaterial resources. Migrants, of course, often have a comparatively low socio-economic status in their country of residence and limited access to resources. As newcomers, they occupy the jobs that the autochthonous population rejects; their formal qualifications are often devalued on their country of residence's labour market; their civic skills, networks and integration in relevant organisations frequently differ from those of the majority. Nevertheless, when it comes to analysing the political participation and mobilisation of migrants and post-migration minorities more specifically, the SES and resource models as well as theories of resource mobilisation are very influential. Just as in research on political participation in general, many explanations of migrant and minority political participation focus on resources as a *sine qua non* for political action. For example, for minorities in the United States, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (Verba et al. 1993) show that race and ethnicity do not matter once researchers in their analyses control for the resources that are explicated in the resource model.

At the same time, authors often make certain qualifications to the SES or the resource models when they explain migrant political participation. One example for this is the study of the case of Australia by McAllister and Makkai, who come to the conclusion that differences in political trust and political participation between different migrant groups are due to different socioeconomic resources, but also to the political socialisation in the country of origin (McAllister/Makkai 1992). Similarly, Cho, Gimpel and Wu (2006) show that for Arab Americans political socialisation as well as a context perceived as threatening and/or discriminating mediate the impact of socioeconomic status differences: "Threat and SES work in tandem and viewing either in isolation paints an incomplete picture" (Cho et al. 2006: 989).

Scrutinising the political attitudes and behavioural intentions (i.e. not the actual behaviour) of migrants in Germany, Diehl and Blohm find a certain alienation from the German political system and its main parties which cannot be explained by their lower socioeconomic status alone and which is not compensated for by participation in ethnic associations (Diehl/Blohm 2001: 417). Instead, according to the authors, the low levels of interest for and identification with the German political system reflect the political marginalisation of migrants (Diehl/Blohm 2001: 417) in a country whose official rhetoric has for a long time denied the fact that Germany had become an immigration country.[9]

Meanwhile, critics of the resource mobilisation theory point to the fact that this kind of explanations of social movements tends to underestimate the cru-

[9] Diehl and Blohm, however, do not systematically control for all resources relevant for political participation in Verba, Schlozman and Brady's model.

cial role context factors play in mobilisation processes and also overlook the capacity of the most marginalised groups to get organised. This, of course, is particularly relevant if the focus is on migrant mobilisation, because migrants are more likely to find themselves in a marginalised social position than members of the non-migrant population. Generally, there are not as many studies which explain the collective mobilisation of migrants by resource mobilisation theories than there is research on individual migrant political participation based on Brady, Verba and Schlozman's resource model. Among other things, this is certainly due to the fact that migrants' movements are less frequent and often less prominent than other social movements.

One important exception in the European context is, of course, the *sans-papiers* movement, i.e. the mobilisation of undocumented migrants, especially in France, which has received much scholarly attention in recent years. Thierry Blin's study of the s*ans-papiers*' occupation of the Parisian church of Saint-Ambroise, for instance, draws on the resource mobilisation approach (Blin 2005). The author argues, however, that the resource mobilisation approach is too narrow for the analysis and should be reformulated (Blin 2005: 172-174; 189).

What is more, the resource mobilisation approach emerged as an answer to social movement theories that stressed collective frustration and grievances and thus is a rather "old" approach. Yet, while many authors and important studies nowadays rely on other theories such as the political opportunity structure approach, there are also interesting attempts to further develop the resource mobilisation theory or to combine it with other approaches. Manlio Cinalli (2007), for instance, introduces social network theory into the analysis of social movements in order to combine theories of resource mobilisation and other approaches. His network approach, he argues, thus "encompasses RMT [resource mobilisation theory; MS]" (Cinalli 2007: 5). In an empirical study based on this approach, Cinalli focuses on two socially marginalised and politically rather quiescent groups, but with pro-beneficiary activists campaigning for them: the unemployed and asylum seekers in the UK. He finds that mobilisation in the issue-field of asylum is more effective than in the issue-field of unemployment and concludes that this is due to different relational structures between pro-beneficiary organisations (Cinalli 2007: 18).

In addition to this structural perspective on political involvement, it is necessary, however, to turn to the other two theoretical elements which form the basis of the approach that guides this study. What is more, in addition to social movement theories, theories of individual participation must not be forgotten. The following section therefore briefly summarises what might be called cultural approaches to both individual and collective political involvement. It first turns to identity as an important factor influencing migrant political participation and mobilisation before discussing what may be summarised under the heading "cultural approaches" more broadly. The section after the next will then cover theories that stress the

significance of context factors for collective mobilisation, of which the Political Opportunity Structure approach (POS) is one of the most important.

2.1.2 Identity, frames and migrant political involvement:

Resources and socio-economic status explain a great amount of the variation in individual political participation. Also, access to and strategic mobilisation of resources by SMOs and individual social movement entrepreneurs are important factors that must not be neglected when analysing collective action. However, the individual level of education and income, skills and other personal resources as well as the collective availability and strategic usage of resources alone cannot be the reasons why people participate in politics. As Almond and Verba have already pointed out in "Civic culture", individual participation is not independent of cultural elements, and, especially when it comes to analysing collective forms of political involvement, "culture" must not be ignored. And while the resource mobilisation theory goes beyond approaches that explain social movements solely by the existence of grievances and frustrations, it does not pay enough attention to the social construction of meaning: the significance of group belonging as well as the relevance of particular issues are not primordial, but have to be constructed and reconstructed continuously.

To be sure, the terms "culture" and "cultural approaches" respectively are used here as conglomerated categories referring to a number of very different approaches which cannot all be discussed here in detail. In the following section, the literature focusing on ethnic identity will be reviewed. As one of the major lenses through which researchers look at migrants and their (political) participation is that of ethnicity, this concept will be at the core of this section. In addition, framing approaches of mobilisation will be discussed more briefly.

Ethnic identities as one particular form of collective identity, of course, have been of particular interest to students of political participation in the US, and especially of the political participation of migrants and post-migration minorities. From the US American literature, "ethnicity" found its way into European research, too. The term "ethnicity" was "rediscovered" by American social scientists only in the mid-1970s and from there came into the analysis of political participation and movements on both sides of the Atlantic.

When they first published their now classic book on ethnicity in 1975, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan explained that "[e]thnicity seems to be a new

term" (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 1)[10] and further noted that not only the term, but also the social phenomenon itself was of a new quality: "[s]omething new has appeared" and

> […] to see only what is familiar in the ethnicity of our time is to miss the emergence of a new social category as significant for the understanding of the present-day world as that of social class itself" (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 2-3).[11]

In their view, ethnicity is an important "organizing principle" of great "strategic efficacy" (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 15) when trying to get organised and mobilise in the name of a particular group's interests. This new category according to Glazer and Moynihan, is not the same as "interest", but a "means of advancing interests" (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 19): it is a "political idea" and a "mobilizing principle" (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 20) that can be interpreted as an umbrella social category which has the potential to shape decisively the political behaviour of social groups. It helps to rally and unite individuals by combining interest with affection (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 19-20).

While Glazer and Moynihan stress the use of ethnicity as a rallying resource and thus are rather close in their argumentation to the resource mobilisation approach, the attention they draw to identities and especially ethnic identities opens up new paths in research on (migrant) political participation and movements. With regard to political participation as well as the social mobilisation of migrants, the main empirical question is whether and how ethnic identity and a sense of ethnic group belonging shape the political behaviour of individuals and groups. This has been asked and explored empirically many times for different ethnic groups in the United States, especially for African and Latino Americans, as well as for ethnic groups and "races" in the UK more recently the concept of ethnicity has also found its way into research on political participation in other European countries. Ethnicity is scrutinised in this area of research from two different perspectives. In both cases, authors either focus on the way (ethnic) identity and group belonging are constructed and may or may not change or they analyse how identity serves as a basis for solidarity and thus as an (indirect) resource.

One sub-strand of research focuses on migrant political allegiances, attitudes and values, which stems from the in-group and out-group logic that is at the base of the modern nation-state. In the eyes of many scholars, both state and nation

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[10] Of course, it was not a new discovery - the term having been used and defined already by Max Weber in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Rather, the authors stress the new significance ethnicity as a social category seemed to have acquired.

[11] Glazer and Moynihan compare the emergence of ethnicity as a social category in the 20th century to that of social classes shaped by industrialisation in the 19th century (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 2).

are founded on an in-group/out-group logic, the one politically, the other culturally, which in the concept of the modern nation-state have become inextricably tied together. As Stephen Castles highlights, a member of the political community is conceptualised as a member of the nation (Castles 2005: 303; see also Brubaker 1997: 90; Colas 2004).[12] International migrants - by definition usually of different national origin than the majority[13] - then are recurrently feared to weaken the cohesion of both the society and state where they are residing despite their lack of traditional power resources. What Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut note for the U.S. is true for most Western countries, too: "Throughout the history of American immigration, a consistent thread has been the fear that the 'alien element' would somehow undermine the institutions of the country and lead it down the path of disintegration and decay" (Portes/Rumbaut 1996: 94). Research inspired by these concerns generally focuses on the political allegiance and loyalty of immigrants and their children - can a non-national or someone of a different national "origin" be a "good citizen"? Concerned mainly with the preservation of the social and political cohesion of the "host" society, many of these approaches to immigrant political participation are marked by a rather normative stance.[14]

More importantly for the present research, another sub-thread of this field of study concentrates on ethnicity as the basis for migrant and minority political empowerment. Results are inconclusive: Some authors like Eric M. Uslaner and Richard S. Conley claim that, in the U.S., strong community ties lead migrants and ethnic minorities to refrain from engagement in the wider society (Uslaner/Conley 2003), whereas others demonstrate that the opposite may also be the case. For instance, in their comparative study on the political participation of Latinos, Blacks, and Whites in the United States, Hritzuk and Park find that Latino political participation is not only determined by socioeconomic status, but that the embeddedness into an ethnic milieu increases the likelihood that Latino Americans will get involved politically: "integration into politically active social networks, exposure to mobilization efforts, and affiliation with at least one organization significantly increase the likelihood Latinos will participate at higher levels" (Hritzuk/Park 2000: 164). In contrast, studying three kinds of group-based resources - group consciousness, group identity, and ethnic organisations - as predictors of political participation among Asian Americans, Wong, Lien and Conway come to the conclusion that

[12] For a critique of the influence of this conceptualisation in the social sciences, see also Wimmer/Glick Schiller (2003).

[13] Except for cases of re-migration or the migration of persons who are considered as ethnically part of the nation-state they are migrating to, e.g. the so-called *Aussiedler* and *Russlanddeutsche* who move to Germany from Russia or other succession states of the former USSR generations after their ancestors moved from Germany to the East.

[14] For an elaborate criticism of some of these positions, see for example Takaki (1999).

different ethnic group-based resources are of different importance for political involvement. Whereas a strong ethnic identity does not lead to higher levels of political participation, affiliation with an Asian American organisation and "feelings of linked fate with others of the same ethnic background" correlate positively with political participation (except voting). In contrast, group-based resources do lead to a higher propensity to vote, which makes Wong et al. claim that "[i]t may be that group-based resources are only used when they have some connection to community-level politics" (Wong et al. 2005: 568).

Affiliation with ethnic associations has also been a recurrent concern in European research on migrant participation, and both in Europe and the U.S. commentators have drawn attention to the role these organisations may play for the political participation of migrants. Here again, the literature is quite inconclusive. As pointed out above, Wong et al. (2005) find that membership in ethnic associations facilitates participation in American politics. Similarly, Gökçe Yurdakul's case study of two Turkish migrant associations in Berlin shows that these organisations constitute an important resource for Turkish migrant elites to become relevant political actors in Germany (Yurdakul 2006). At the same time, Strömblad and Adman (2010) come to the conclusion that ethnic associations in Sweden contribute to civic skill acquisition, but do not offer sufficient opportunities for mobilisation and, consequently, "[o]rganizational membership based on ethnic origin does not seem to clear any roads to democratic influence in the wider society" (Strömblad/Adman 2010: 727).

Other studies also show that "ethnic social capital", which could be seen as a form of the resources "solidarity network" and "trust" specific for migrants and ethnic minorities, influences their political involvement. Most notably, members of the research network "Multicultural democracy in European Cities" developed a concept of ethnic social capital, which they applied to the political participation of immigrants in different European countries (Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; Tillie 2004; see also Jacobs/Tillie 2004).[15] Starting from Jean Tillie and Meindert Fennema's finding that migrant and minority political participation correlates positively with the density of networks of ethnic associations, they discuss the hypothesis that

> differences in political participation of ethnic minorities are linked to differences in 'civic community', primarily seen as the amount of 'ethnic' social capital (participation in ethnic associational life) of the relevant group (Jacobs/Tillie 2004: 419; see also Jacobs/Tillie 2004: 420; Jacobs et al. 2004: 544).

[15] Their combined efforts have resulted in a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2004), Vol. 30, Issue 3.

Yet, again, results are not entirely clear: While most of the research teams do not reject this claim entirely on the grounds of the empirical cases in question, the Belgian group's findings do not confirm the hypothesis at all (Jacobs et al. 2004). All authors argue for a refinement of the concept and the inclusion of more explanatory factors.

In social movement theory, critics of the resource mobilisation theory as well as authors who are in favour of a renewal and enlargement of this theory (re)introduce the basic ideas of the Chicago School and symbolic interactionism as well as Goffman's framing approach to social movement theories. Adepts of the framing approach argue that mobilisation depends to a great extent on the framing of issues and actions, i.e. by the way their meaning is constructed. The focus then is less on (material) resources, but on these meanings which individuals and groups accord to objects, and to issues of discontent as well as to their group-belonging (Benford 1997). Like the adepts of the resource mobilisation theory, proponents of this approach adopt a micro-perspective. Yet, theirs is not an organisational or supply-side model of social mobilisation, but much more a social-psychological perspective (cf. Noakes/Johnston 2005). Nevertheless, as Noakes and Johnston point out, framing approaches, too, pay attention to the strategies of social movement entrepreneurs as their role "in the construction of collective action frames is crucial" (cf. Noakes/Johnston 2005: 7).

Yet again, as most new social movements (NSM) in Europe were not led by migrants, research on their mobilisation is not as extensive as on their individual political participation. While there are several more or less recent studies on migrant activism in European contexts (e.g. Pojman 2008), they do not necessarily focus on cultural bases of the movements but rather on context factors that render action possible or, especially in the case of anti-racist or anti-deportation movements, even necessary. There are, however, a number of well-informed case studies on framing processes in social movements of (ethnic) minorities in different parts of the world (e.g. Baud 2004). Furthermore, one important exception to the rule is again the mobilisation of undocumented migrants in different European countries, which is quite present in the (European) research literature. Several studies focus on the construction of the *sans-papiers* as a group and the framing of their actions. Thierry Blin, for instance, speaks of the "invention" of the *sans-papiers* and compares this process of invention to a dramaturgical process (Blin 2008). While Insa Breyer focuses in her thesis on the (legal) context factors of the life situation and mobilisation of undocumented migrants in France and Germany, she also argues that their mobilisation is not independent of how undocumented or "irregular migration" and "sans-papiers" are constructed and perceived by the autochthonous population and the migrants themselves (Breyer 2011: 57-63). Catherine Raissiguier most explicitly adopts a framing approach in her 2010 book with the telling title "Reinventing the Republic", when she studies the situation of undocumented migrant women in

France and the possibilities of coalitions and solidarity between them and other precarious or discriminated against groups (Raissiguier 2010). As will be discussed in chapter 2.2., both theories that relate identity to political participation and framing theories appear particularly relevant when it comes to analysing the role religion may play for the *collective* mobilisation of migrants, because religion is likely to be an important source of both group identities and of (theological) frames for the mobilisation around a particular issue.

2.1.3 Political context and migrant transnationalism shaping individual and collective political involvement

Obviously, political participation and collective action never take place in a vacuum, but in a structured political and social space which renders some actions possible or even likely, whereas it leaves little room for others. Of course, the political culture as analysed aleady by Almond and Verba in the 1960s - i.e. generalised attitudes towards politics and participation as well as the feeling that ordinary people should and can (or should not and cannot) have a say in the political decision-making process - is important here. Also, ideas about who is a legitimate part of the demos influence the scope within which migrants can easily get active. Even more so, legislation, the social structure and political events shape the way migrants and non-migrants can get involved politically - as suggests already Max Kaase's definition of political participation quoted above.

In social movement research, one of the most important approach that focuses explicitly on structures facilitating or constraining mobilisation of particular groups or on particular issues is the so-called Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach. While the POS approach belongs to the field of research on social movements, which is why its adepts often prefer the term "political mobilisation" to "political participation", many definitions of political mobiliation are broad enough to include all forms of political involvement. In their introduction to the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies'* issue on "Ethnic Mobilisation and Political Participation in Europe", Martiniello and Statham (1999), for example, use the expression "political mobilisation" in such a way that it corresponds more or less to the above definitions of "political participation", with the exception, however, of its focus on minority groups and its stronger emphasis on extra-parliamentary mobilisation:

> By 'political mobilisation', we refer broadly to both extra-parliamentary mobilisation by social movements (e.g., protest actions) and also to conventional types of political participation (e.g., voting for political parties) made by minority groups […] (Martiniello/Statham 1999: 568).

Many proponents of POS claim that the political involvement of migrants is shaped essentially by citizenship and integration regimes (Koopmans 2004):

> Differences in types of incorporation regime linked to different conceptions of citizenship go a long way in explaining both national and local differences in the central characteristics of migrant mobilisation and claims-making. In more inclusive political contexts, migrants play a more important role in the public debate on issues concerning them, they are much less oriented toward the politics of their homelands, and focus more strongly on issues pertaining to their integration and rights in the receiving society (Koopmans 2004: 467).

Indeed, the most eminent studies in this field of research with regard to migrant mobilisation are certainly those focusing on citizenship, immigration and integration laws and policies. Yet, different empirical studies of migrant mobilisation also show that context factors other than citizenship legislation and integration policies shape the participation and mobilisation opportunities of migrants. What is more, adepts of migrant transnationalism argue that the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants is not only shaped by national structures but by political issues, networks and opportunity structures that transgress national boundaries.

Sohler et al. for instance show that the presence of many refugee-supporting NGOs facilitates political action of refugees at the local level but that participation at the national level very much depends on national and European legislation and structures for refugee representation (Sohler et al. 2009). Also, as Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) shows, the context in the country of residence does not only influence the political participation of migrants in this country, but also migrant political transnationalism. The author chooses an approach which may be interpreted as an intermediate position between theories of POS and transnationalism and demonstrates how context factors in the country of residence shape the transnational political practices of Kurdish migrants in Germany.

In contrast, Bauböck argues from a political theory perspective that the distinctive characteristic of political transnationalism is precisely the challenge of national boundaries and the creation of "overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities" (Bauböck 2003: 720; cf. also Pries/Sezgin 2012). Thus, the theory of migrant political transnationalism taken seriously necessarily takes the analysis of migrant political behaviour beyond the (from this perspective: narrow) framework of actions with reference either to the country of residence or the country of origin, because migrant political transnationalism then "also affects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies" (Bauböck 2003: 720). The political practices of migrants from this point of view are thus likely also to transform the

political opportunity structure in their country of residence and cannot be seen as solely determined by the latter.

Critics of the POS approach furthermore often highlight its over-emphasis of structural factors over cultural factors (e.g. Goodwin/Jasper 1999). However, as Koopmans and Statham point out, it is a widely shared opinion among students of social movements that it is necessary "to combine political opportunities (contextual factors), mobilizing structures (organizational resources), and framing processes (discursive resources)" (Koopmans/Statham 1999: 1).

While Koopmans and Statham formulate this idea very precisely, it is also found in other approaches. As already mentioned above, Manlio Cinalli, for instance, proposes an interesting way of integrating different theoretical elements into one approach. He introduces network theories in order to bridge the gap between theories of resource mobilisation, the POS approach and cultural approaches to the study of social movements. Cinalli argues that his network approach shows how resources, opportunity structure and cultural elements become most relevant for collective action through relational structures (Cinalli 2007).

It is this idea of combining contextual, resource-related and framing elements which seems the most useful for the purposes of the present research.

The focus of this study is mainly on mobilisation in favour of a particular migrant group itself - i.e. of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa for their own interests - and on their (religious) leaders and organisations. It aims at contributing both to our knowledge about a particularly visible, yet also particularly marginalised migrant group, and to our understanding of religion and migrant activism.

It is sensible to assume that, both for the collective and individual political activities of migrants - just as for the political involvement of everybody else -, resources, symbolic elements as well as context factors matter. This is the case because it is not conceivable that any participation or mobilisation can take place without any resources at all, be they as limited as they may. Even in order to vote individuals need not only have the right to do so, but they need the capacity to understand the basics of the electoral process. This means that they need to know at least that it is asked from them to go to the correct place on the correct day and check the correct number of boxes on their ballot paper. While many autochthonous citizens of a given country will consider this often implicit knowledge negligible, this is not necessarily the case for someone who has moved to the country recently and who first needs to be able to find out how things are done there. Social

networks as well as linguistic and reading capacities, then, are essential resources for participation. It is also implausible to presume that context factors may be irrelevant for the individual participation and collective mobilisation of migrants, whose political rights are determined in the first place by citizenship and immigration policies. The construction of a collective identity, but also the framing and legitimisation of their participation and protest are also particularly relevant for migrants, who are often not perceived as legitimate political actors.

Against this background, the main argument of this study is that the migrants' religion may play a role in the process of getting involved politically. This, of course, leads to a number of further questions. The first question of course is is whether the religious participation of migrants can contribute to their political participation in a European context in a similar way as in the US. Can migrants acquire different kinds of resources through their involvement in churches and other religious organisations? Also, it is interesting to ask whether migrants can draw on religious organisations and inter-organisational networks in order to mobilise collectively in the name of their migrant group or for other purposes and whether there are differences observable between different religions. In terms of the symbolic content of religion, one question is whether religion can contribute to the framing of migrant collective and individual political involvement as legitimate or even necessary. Another question is whether religion can serve as a means to create unity among migrants in order for them to act in public space more effectively. Finally yet significantly, it is important to ask whether and how particular religious and political contexts shape the way religion can be a support for the political actions of migrants. How do opportunities differ for adepts of different religions?

2.2 Some theoretical considerations on religion and the political involvement of migrants

As Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni note, in terms of conventional political involvement, religion, just like social class, has long been one of the "usual suspects" among variables predicting voting behaviour in Europe (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 219). This observation ties in with Rokkan and Lipset's seminal work on the most important cleavages dividing West European societies and the genesis of stable party systems. And although value change and the general trend towards individualisation within West European societies have made both class and religion less powerful

predictors of voting behaviour than they used to be, they are still far from being obsolete (cf. e.g. Elff/Roßteuscher 2009).[16]

As discussed above, the proponents of the resource model of political participation also stress the significance of participation in clubs as well as in churches and religious associations not only for party preferences and voting behaviour, but also for individual political participation.[17]

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[16] For a recent analysis of the German case demonstrating the attenuation, but by no means irrelevance of social structural characteristics such as religion, class, union membership and occupational status for party preference and voting, see e.g. Pappi/Brandenburg (2010).

[17] Furthermore, although the literature is inconclusive with respect to the influence of social capital on political participation, it is important to note that just like the literature on social capital and political participation discussed above, the literature on social capital and religion is growing rapidly. And although they focus on different dimensions of religion - church-membership (e.g. Alexander 2007; Wuthnow 2002), religious participation (e.g. Putnam 2000; Channell 2000; Byfield 2008, Glanville et al. 2008), or the cultural-religious background of social groups (Fukuyama 2001) - most authors agree that there is an association between social capital and religion. Robert D. Putnam even goes as far as to call "faith communities in which people worship together […] the single most important repository of social capital" (Putnam 2000: 66).

At the same time, the notion of social capital is a difficult one, especially social capital as a prerogative or a booster for political participation. If it was Pierre Bourdieu who (re-)introduced the concept of social capital into the social scientific debate, it was Robert D. Putnam (1993; 2000) who most prominently linked it to liberal democracy. Since his 1993 book *Making Democracy Work*, literature on social capital and political participation has grown immensely, under very different academic, political, and normative auspices, and is now as inconclusive as it is vast. While some authors ascertain that there is a clear association between social capital and political participation (e.g. Klesner, 2007; Hansen, 2005), others claim that social capital plays a minor role, if at all (e.g. McVey, 2005; Rie, 2007). Some argue that there may be a causal link between the two, but in particular circumstances only (e.g. Berger, 2004).

In spite of these differences, most recent research scrutinizing the putative association of social capital and political participation is based on Putnam's concept of social capital (cf. Fennema/Tillie, 1999; Jacobs/Tillie, 2004; Tillie, 2004; van Londen, 2007). Although it is probably the most influential theory of social capital today, this approach may still not be the most useful for analysing immigrant and minority political participation. To begin with, there are several problems with what Putnam calls a "'lean and mean' definition" of social capital (Putnam, 2007, 137). According to Putnam, social capital consists of "social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness" (Putnam, 2007, 137). Thus, his definition includes the *assumption* that social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are associated. It is, however, unhelpful for empirical as well as for theoretical purposes to include hypotheses into a definition. (cf. Putnam, 1995; 2000, Newton, 1997, 577). Second, although very influential, Putnam's approach may be particularly unhelpful for the analysis of social capital as a resource for political participation, because it tends to blur the difference between the explanatory variable and the outcome. One of Putnam's major points is that social capital leads to increased political participation. At the same time, he describes political participation as one dimension of social capital (Putnam, 2000, 35-40). His argument thus risks becoming tautological: political participation is part of social capital, which leads to political participation, which is one of the dimensions of social capital, and so on. Finally, but significantly, the way in which Putnam and many others operationalise social capital does not tell us much about the underlying mechanisms of how social capital is generated and how it works. With participation in voluntary associations as the main instrument for measuring social capital, the actual social relations remain a kind of black box. This may lead in fact to unwarranted assumptions, as empiri-

What is more, there are several historical examples in which religion provided a base for the more general politicisation and mobilisation of minorities. Most prominently, the US civil rights movement drew on the Black church in order to mobilise African Americans. What is more, as Aldon D. Morris noted already in the 1980s, the important role of the Black Church in the processes of politicisation and mobilisation of the African American minority goes back even to the times of slavery, when slave revolts often took their beginning in the churches:

> A number of writers have noted the central role that black religious institutions played in slave revolts. John Hope Franklin, in *From Slavery to Freedom*, wrote, 'In most states Negro preachers were outlawed between 1830 and 1835. It was believed that too many of the conspiracies had been planned in religious gatherings' (Morris 1984: 291).
>
> Dr. DuBois, that most sensitive analyst of the black experience, wrote in *The Philadelphia Negro*, first published in 1899, that 'all movements for social betterment are apt to centre in the churches… the race problem in all its phases is continually being discussed, and, indeed, from this forum many a youth goes forth inspired to work' (Morris 1984: 293).

Following the events of 9/11, for a decade, religion, and especially Islam, has been at the core of the debate of migrant "integration" in Western Europe and there is an ever-growing literature on political Islam as well as on the compatibility of Islam and Western democracy and the integration of Muslim migrants and post-migration minorities into European political systems. Also, much research has focused on state policies concerning the governance of increasing religious pluralism.[18] Yet, as Steven Pfaff and Anthony Gill highlight, "[i]n the wake of recent terrorist attacks, scholars and the media have focused attention on Islamic extremism as a threat to pluralist democracies […]. […] but little work has been done to understand the conventional political engagement among the vast majority of Muslims" (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 803-4). What is more, migrant and minority religions other than Islam have received far less scholarly attention, especially when it comes to analysing the relationship between the religious and the political.

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cal research has shown repeatedly. For example, several studies found one of Putnam's core assumptions about the functioning of social capital – namely that the association between civic and political participation is mediated by social trust – to be misleading (van Londen et al., 2007, 1220, Boulianne, 2006).

In the following, there will be only few references be made to social capital, and although this study scrutinises the relation between organisations, networks and participation, it is not based on the social capital approach as such.

[18] See, among many others, Minkenberg (2007), Soper/Fetzer (2007), Koenig (2005), Kastoryano (2003; 2004), Zolberg/Woon (1999); for prominent work on political Islam in Germany, see, also among many others, Schiffauer (2000), Heitmeyer et al. (1997).

One of the few exceptions to this is the study presented by Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni (2011) which focuses on the impact religion has on the political participation and protest activities of Christian and Muslim migrants in European urban contexts. Drawing on data on Christian and Muslim migrants in Barcelona, London, Milan, and Zurich, the authors find that religion may influence the political participation of migrants, but under certain circumstances only. Eggert and Giugni come to the conclusion that religion matters for migrant political participation and protest only in the case of Muslim migrants: "Specifically, they [the results of their binomial logistic regressions; MS] suggest, first, that religion plays a role for Muslim migrants but not for Christian migrants […]" (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 231). In addition, according to the authors, the impact of religion on migrant political participation is mediated by the citizenship model of the respective country and by participation in religious associations (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 231-232). In a nutshell, their results suggest that "religion does play a role in explaining the political participation of migrants but only in culturally pluralist contexts and only through religious associations" (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 232). The authors of this study also note that "the observed impact of membership in religious organizations both on general political participation and on protest activities by Muslim migrants in London and Barcelona remains, even when we control for the effect of overall organizational membership" (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 233). It is thus the membership and participation in explicitly *religious* associations which matters for the political engagement of Muslim migrants in these cities rather than their being members of any kind of civic association as such, as theories of social capital or approaches which stress the importance of associations for developing civic skills might suggest.

In contrast, in their study on Muslim interest organisation in Berlin, Pfaff and Gill (2006) conclude that it is particularly difficult for Muslims to get organised and mobilise collectively. Focussing on collective action rather than on individual political participation, they highlight the obstacles Muslim migrants face in Germany when trying to mobilise as Muslims: firstly, the institutional and political setting is unfavourable, and secondly, European Islam as a decentralised religion "provides opportunities for factions ('spoilers') to undermine broad-based collective action" (Paff/Gill 2006: 822). Despite their different approach, Pfaff and Gill, just like Eggert and Giugni, thus also partly attribute the lack of mobilisation of Muslims migrants to the unfavourable context in the *Land* of Berlin. At the same time, they see the many different Muslim associations as a barrier to effective mobilisation because they render it easy for leaders of small sections of the Muslim community to subvert collective action if they feel threatened in their authority by overarching or centralising religious structures or if they perceive differences in religious interpretations or political goals. In Pfaff and Gill's view, "[a]t present, Islam in Germany has a weak and divided voice" (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 822).

Although the two studies do not contradict, but rather complement, each other, they show quite eloquently that "researchers are only beginning to analyze how religion may influence political behavior and integration" (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 804). Or, in the words of Eggert and Giugni: "[…] the question still remains as to how religious organizations favour political participation and what type of resources religious associations provide for political participation" (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 237).

Against this background, in what follows, the theoretical framework of this book will be outlined further. Naturally, the questions raised by Pfaff and Gill's and Eggert and Giugni's studies are manifold and cannot all be answered by this study. The major question guiding this work is whether religion can contribute to the political participation and mobilisation of migrants. The focus is thus on just one particular aspect that has long been ignored in European research on both migrant religion and migrant political involvement.

In the following sections, the three elements sketched in the previous subchapter will be discussed with respect to religion. The focus first will be on religion as an organisational resource, then on religion as a source of frames for political action. Thirdly, the role context factors play for religion as a support for the political involvement of migrants will be sketched briefly.

2.2.1 Religion as an organisational resource

As pointed out above, resources are essential for political involvement. Yet, as Blin rightly notes, it is important to further specify which resources are particularly significant for collective mobilisation (Blin 2005: 173-174) and for individual political involvement. What is necessary for the present research is to sketch in what ways religion may provide resources for the politicisation, individual participation or collective mobilisation of a highly vulnerable, under-privileged population.

In the first place, politically relevant resources are, of course, material resources as well as formal education and occupational status and the skills that go along with a higher level of education and white-collar jobs. Yet, less tangible resources such as time, more informally acquired skills, friendship and solidarity influence the motivation and capacity to mobilise collectively or to get involved individually, too. These less tangible factors are likely to be especially important if individuals or groups have few material resources at their disposal, as is often the case with first generation migrants. Furthermore, migrants often do not have access to a great amount of these material and immaterial resources easily, and thus may have to rely on sources that others may not need. In the following it will be argued that religion can be such a source of resources. The main reasons for this supposition will be sketched briefly here.

One important factor is that many religions induce the creation of local, and often also national or transnational, organisations of some kind or other and that many migrants tend to participate in religious organisations more readily than in explicitly political organisations in their new country of residence. These religious organisations then can be an important base for participation and activism. To put it differently, the argument is that religion may be an *organisational resource* for the politicisation and political involvement of migrants.

Yet, what characterises religious organisations so that they may be considered a basis for political involvement? Religious organisations often differ from other organisations in several ways which may in some cases be helpful for political mobilisation and involvement. First of all, religious communities differ from ethnic and other civic communities in that they usually imply specific religious practices that can reinforce their organisational structures. Many religious communities congregate regularly in religious services and ceremonies, which facilitate face-to-face encounters and may thus contribute to fostering social networks. In many cases, members may even be morally obliged to come together and worship in public or to participate in the affairs of their religious community or society. In line with Émile Durkheim's sociology of religion, we can furthermore assume that religious rites and rituals foster social integration and thus the ties that make up social networks. If religion, according to Durkheim, may be defined as

> […] un système solidaire de croyances et de pratiques relatives à des choses sacrées, c'est-à-dire séparées, interdites, croyances et pratiques qui unissent en une même communauté morale, appelée Église, tous ceux qui y adhèrent (Durkheim 1960: 65),[19]

religious practices help create a unified moral community. Even if one does not follow Durkheim's definition entirely[20], it would be unwise to neglect or deny the collective character of many religions. It is through shared beliefs, and through collective practices deduced from as well as made necessary and legitimised by shared beliefs that individuals become part of a community and that this community is sustained. More precisely, shared beliefs, regular face-to-face contacts, and collective rites and rituals foster social integration within a community.

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[19] "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden–beliefs and practices which unite into one single community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (Durkheim 1957 [1915]: 47; translation by Joseph Ward Swain).

[20] Later in this chapter, reference will be made to the definition of religion put forward by Clifford Geertz, who conceptualises religion as a symbolic system. While Geertz in contrast to Durkheim highlights the conflict potential that rites and rituals may have, he also recognises their integrative function and thus does not contradict, but rather complement, Durkheim's propositions on religion as a source of integration and solidarity.

The organisational structures that these communities create and sustain, can, of course, become an immensely important resource for political action. Furthermore, in the case of migrants, some forms of collective organisation can be seen as political in themselves as they increase the migrants' public visibility and their opportunities to voice their claims and concerns.

In more concrete terms, the resources local religious organisations can provide include communication networks as well as interpersonal trust which may facilitate collective action and also increase individual political participation. As discussed in the previous sub-chapter, Jacobs and Tillie show for ethnic associational networks that participation in ethnic associations may increase the individual political participation of migrants (Jacobs/Tillie 2004) and it is likely that religious associations may have a similar structural effect. What is more, individuals and groups may access information through communication networks that they otherwise would not have or only receive much later. Also, religious congregations can offer space for the exchange and development of ideas and, in more material terms, local church communities and other local religious congregations usually have premises and some infrastructure at their disposal: a room for regular meetings as well as office space, a telephone, and other office equipment obviously make it easier to get involved politically. Finally yet significantly, as especially Verba and his colleagues as well as Robert Putnam stress, religious congregations may help individuals acquire skills that are relevant for individual as well as collective political involvement.

Secondly, and in an important difference from ethnicity, religion often distinguishes between religious specialists and lay people, as already Max Weber pointed out and as Pierre Bourdieu elaborated in his interpretation of Weber's work and his concept of the religious field.

According to Bourdieu's theory, fields are characterised by several features. These include their boundaries, i.e. the distinction between who is a member of the field and who is not (cf. Bourdieu 2001: 50), the underlying *nomos* as well as what is at stake in the respective field. Actors exist in a particular field only if their presence (or absence) in it transforms the field (Bourdieu 2001: 50). Their positions in the field depend on the amount of capital at their disposal and their behaviour is shaped by their position in the field's structure of power relations (cf. Bourdieu 2001: 49). Accordingly, the religious field is characterised by the distinction between religious experts and the laity. Religious specialists - i.e. in the terminology Bourdieu borrows from Max Weber: priests, prophets and magicians - are players in the religious field, who compete for the monopoly over the legitimate exercise of religious power,

whereas members of the laity do not belong to the field and have been expropriated of their religious capital (Bourdieu 2000: 56-57).[21]

In the context of the present work, it seems reasonable to expect that especially religious experts are well placed to draw on their position for support for political activities. While Bourdieu claims that the social function of religion is to justify human existence in general, and the individual's existence in a certain position in the social structure of society in particular (Bourdieu 2000: 20; 70); and hence has the "external function" of legitimising the political order (Bourdieu 2000: 97), it may be argued that this is not necessarily the case. In Bourdieu's view, the Catholic Church specifically, and religion in general, contribute to maintaining the established political and social order by "naturalising" them through mental frameworks which shape people's perceptions, thoughts and actions and are inculcated in the laity (Bourdieu 2000: 97). In other words, they legitimise a given order by "implanting" a religious habitus in the laity which makes this order seem "natural".

Yet, religion may also have a more subversive function if religious leaders - and in their wake also the laity - can draw on it as a resource for political action which questions the status quo. For instance, on the one hand, their religious capital may increase the legitimacy of religious experts as players within the religious field and thus give them access to information they would otherwise be incapable of receiving and which may help them get involved not only in religious but also in political terms. Also, they may use their religious networks, their position within the religious field as well as their legitimacy as religious experts in order to influence other leaders. On the other hand, as religious experts they may just as well try and shape their followers' perception of the status quo in a way which makes them want to change it. Again, as the seminal work of Aldon D. Morris shows, the role of Black Church leaders within the civil rights movement may serve as an illustrative example (Morris 1985; see also Wood 1994).

Third, for the politicisation and the mobilisation of a group, the actions of individual leaders usually are not enough. As Cinalli shows, coalitions within an issue field are essential for sustained collective action (Cinalli 2007). Religion may therefore contribute to the collective mobilisation of migrants if it supports the creation of overarching organisational structures that permit the co-operation of a larger number of both religious experts and lay-persons.

For instance, if migrants are able to form local umbrella organisations that overarch their individual congregations, these structures increase the probability that resources will be pooled and thus can be accessed more easily for collective

[21] Analogously, the political field is marked by the boundaries between political specialists and non-specialists, and the competition of specialists for power over the "laity", i.e. those who are not members of the political field.

action. Most importantly, religious organisations that are able to create umbrella organisations with other religious organisations are able to draw on these networks for coalitions in their political involvement. These render it possible to act as a united group and thus give leaders a greater "capacity to act" (Hardin) and increase the public visibility of the group. Also, their legitimacy is increased if they speak for the entire Turkish Muslim population in Berlin or for all Black Christians in Paris instead of speaking for a single mosque association or church. As it is likely that many religious organisations set up by migrants usually are rather small, badly equipped in terms of material resources and also have few immaterial resources such as prestige and legitimacy, their co-operation and the formation of overarching structures is particularly relevant in their case. This co-operation may counterbalance the deficits individual migrant religious organisations may otherwise have.

Fourth, beyond the local level, religious communities very often refer to a transnational imagined community, such as global Catholicism or the *umma*. Thus, not only do they permit migrants to perpetuate their membership in their country of origin through transnational religious networks (Levitt 2001: 20), but they may open up new transnational social fields which are not necessarily limited to migrants and post-immigration minorities, nor to specific countries of residence and origin. These may then serve as support for political action in different ways and at different levels: Like in the case of local religious organisations, this may facilitate umbrella organisations and/or coalitions of politically active groups based on their shared religion. This institutionalised unity can then increase the visibility and the legitimacy of their leaders and of the entire group. Obviously, transnational ties built on religion can also be a source of very tangible, material resources, i.e. in the first place money. For instance, more established religious communities elsewhere may contribute financially to the mobilisation of their brothers and sisters in faith in the diaspora. At the same time, the diaspora may also be involved in political struggles elsewhere. Thus, transnational religious ties and representations may also lead to the politicisation of migrants. The most prominent example for this certainly is the support of Muslim migrants in Europe or elsewhere to the struggle of the Palestinians for an independent state, for better living conditions in Gaza etc.

Fifth, religious communities may also bridge the gap between migrants and the majority in the country of residence (e.g. Wuthnow 2002; 2003). This can be assumed to be a particularly important factor for migrant and minority political involvement, since members of the majority tend to have access to more resources that are relevant in the political process - for instance, they generally have more money and higher occupational status and are more likely to be fluent in the respective language, know the basic functioning of their country's political system as well as the media, and so on. In some cases, religious communities may also bridge barriers of class and education more easily than other organisations, which, again, would have similar effects as bridges between minority and majority. Finally, as

Evangelos Karagiannis and Nina Glick Schiller (2008) show, migrant religious communities can also open up "pathways to incorporation" other than those foreseen by the dominant structures in the "host" country (Karagiannis/Glick Schiller 2008: 275).

To be sure, religions in general as well as individual religious communities differ greatly in their form and degree of organisation as well as in their social and ethnic composition. It is therefore only sensible to suspect that their followers and members can draw on their religion as an organisational resource to a varying degree. For instance, the degree of organisation of the Christian religion generally is higher than that of Islam. And while both are part of the wide spectrum of Christianity, Pentecostal congregations are organised differently than Catholic parishes.

Generally, the most relevant features which shape the network structures of religious communities may be derived from what was outlined above. Figure 1 summarises these characteristics, which can be organised along three lines: the organisational form of the religion and the particular community, the ethics of the respective religion, and the community's composition. All of these features may be conceptualised as a continuum ranging from a very low degree of organisation to a very dense organisational form, from religious ethics favouring withdrawal from public life to religious ethics stimulating participation, and so on, with most communities probably located somewhere in the middle.

The religious field itself can be considered as (partly) structuring the creation of networks and the access to resources through the three dimensions just stated.

It is furthermore interesting to know how individuals invest in (faith-based) social relations, and how they access and use the embedded resources in those relations (cf. Lin, 1999). Again, there are different features which can be assumed to be most relevant for an individual's position in a religious network. Some of them are the same as in any social relation, some are specific to migrants and minorities, and some characterise social relations in a religious context. The most important ones are listed in Figure 2.

Organisation	Regular conventions [religious services, ceremonies etc.]
	Shared rites and rituals
	Institutionalisation of the transmission of religious knowledge/values etc. [Sunday school…]
	Special interest groups, social services
	Transnational networks
Religious ethics	Shared set of values and norms
	Obligation to practice religion publicly
	Obligation to participate actively in community matters (of the congregation or wider religious community)
	Obligation/prohibition to participate actively in the wider community
Composition/social structure	Immigrant church/congregation
	Ethnic homogeneity
	Class homogeneity
	Gender

Figure 1. Determinants of network structures and embedded resources.

General	Time commitment
	Money
	Demographic characteristics
Migrant / minority specific	Ethnicity / immigrant origin (Immigrant / member of a post-immigration minority vs. member of majority)
	Language skills (minority / majority language)
	Familiarity with customs, ways of communication etc. of minority / majority
	Orientation towards country of origin / country of residence (transnational ties)
Specific to religious networks	Religious commitment
	Religious knowledge
	Compliance with religious obligations (religious practices, lifestyle, etc.)

Figure 2. Determinants of individual network locations.

Time and money are the two most obvious resources a person can invest in their social relations (cf. Bourdieu, 1992). As Gerhards points out, individual demographic and socio-economic characteristics have been identified as being crucial for network relations, too (Gerhards, 1987). When it comes to immigrant-specific characteristics, being a member of a minority group is likely to lead to overlapping and thus strong ties within the religious community (cf. Jansen, 2004). At the same time, language skills as well as familiarity with ways of communication and of doing things can be considered as essential for establishing ties as fluency in more than one language may facilitate links from minority to majority members. As scholars of transnational religion have shown, it is also significant, whether a person is more interested in establishing ties into the majority society, or whether most of their ties are transnational, i.e. with members of their religious community in their home country or of an imagined transnational religious community (cf. Ebaugh/Chafetz, 2002; Levitt, 2001). Locally or transnationally, in the context of a religious community, religious knowledge, commitment, and compliance with religious obligations must be considered as fundamental determinants of an individual's network position as they are most likely to influence their opportunities to meet with co-practitioners as well as their prestige in the community.[22]

2.2.2 Religious identities and religion as a symbolic resource for political involvement

Religion, however, may not only constitute an organisational resource for the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants. Religion as a *symbolic system* (cf. Geertz 1983) may also be the source of identities and frames which can contribute to their political involvement. In other words, the second argument made here is that religion may not only be an organisational resource, but also a cultural or *symbolic resource* for the politicisation and the political involvement of migrants.

The relevance of ethnic identities and of the participation in organisations based on ethnic identities for political participation and political attitudes and preferences has been outlined in the previous sub-chapter. Religion, just like ethnicity, can be the source of interpretations and identifications which may be the source of feelings of belonging and inclusion or exclusion, in short: of both personal and social identities. Religion as a comprehensive symbolic system is likely to offer even more elements to draw on for individual and collective identities and to play a role for the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants.

To be sure, this is not to say that everyone identifies with a particular religion or that, to most people, their faith is relevant on an everyday basis. Yet, at least

[22] See also Finke and Dougherty's concept of religious capital (Finke/Dougherty, 2002).

for active practitioners of a religion - religious leaders and active participants of a religious congregation for instance - it is sensible to assume that their religious identity is of importance for their everyday lives, for their understanding of the world and of their place in the world. Religion may reinforce their national or ethnic identity or their identity as migrants, if they share the same faith with most of their co-nationals or co-ethnics or if theirs is a religion made up predominantly of migrants. Their religious identity may also be even more important to them than their ethnic or national belonging or their identification with the migrant situation or population. At the same time, religious identities may, of course, be in conflict with other potential elements of personal and social identities and migrants may have to decide whether their being a religious person is more important than their nationality, language, gender etc.

In any case, it is likely that the effects religious identity has on the political involvement of migrants are similar to those ethnic identity may have. It may be the foundation or a reinforcement of solidarities, and it may lead to the participation in particular organisations. Also, religious identities may be a reason to get involved politically, for example because a person deems certain policies as incompatible with their faith, or because theirs is a minority religion in their country of residence and they mobilise for equal rights.

Solidarity based on a "minority identity" - be it chosen or ascribed -, of course, is of the utmost importance especially for the political participation of migrants and minorities. As Dawson shows, it is still more rational for African Americans to vote according to what he calls a "Black utility heuristic" than based on a class-based utility heuristic (Dawson 1994). It is even more important for the collective mobilisation of migrants and minorities because it can at least partly counterbalance the structural disadvantages that these groups face.

At the same time, political mobilisation in the name of a particular religious identity as well as the politicisation of religion are more likely to occur in the case of migrant religion because migrants are more likely to have to get involved politically in order to reach the recognition of their religion by the state or similar religious political goals because they are more likely than the majority to belong to a minority religion. At least in most European contexts, especially Muslims are often in the position that they need to campaign for the adaptation of more or less established models of state-church relations so as to include Islam as a religion with equal status.

Since the relevance of religious organisations, i.e. of organisations that are based on the identification with a particular faith, has already been sketched above, it is useful to turn directly to another reason as to why religion as a symbolic system may be relevant for the political involvement of migrants. Religion, or to put it more precisely, entire theologies as well as individual religious texts, stories, and metaphors and other symbolic elements offer a wealth of possibilities to frame

political actions, and goals, but, of course, also political quiescence. These may be mobilised strategically just as other resources, too. Religion then can be described as a symbolic resource which can be mobilised strategically by social movement entrepreneurs, for example, in order to legitimise their actions or to motivate others to get involved.

As Noakes and Johnston note, "all social movements must 'break the frames' of quiescence and acceptance of the status quo that characterizes everyday life" (Noakes/Johnston 2005: 7). Religion may offer the cultural fabric needed for the construction of interpretations of events and issues which leaders can use to overcome the voicelessness of migrants by "breaking" overcome frames. For instance, it can offer legitimacy as well as examples for collective struggle or justifications for calls for solidarity.

Furthermore, as Wood (1994; 1999) demonstrates, religion as a symbolic system can contribute to the continuity, persistence and success of political activism. For instance, in a comparison of three congregations in the U.S., he finds that "liturgical experience" and "religious symbolism" decisively shape the success or failure of the political mobilisation of these congregations (Wood 1994: 397). Referring back to Swidler, Wood argues that religion may provide the members of a congregation with a "'tool kit' of cultural resources for political action" which will shape their political involvement (Wood 1994: 398). The author goes as far as to argue that this has direct consequences for their political success:

> I investigate how mobilization of these cultural resources influences the character of the resulting politics, and argue that certain kinds of religious practice structure participants' political engagement in ways more likely to lead to long-term political success (Wood 1994: 398).

While Wood seems to overestimate the influence of internal cultural factors shaping the success or failure of political activities of a religious congregation and to underestimate the importance of material resources and especially of external factors, he certainly makes a relevant point. Not only may activists draw on religious organisations for more or less material resources or on religious symbols for legitimacy, but sets of beliefs, liturgy and other elements of religious practice can shape the way individuals approach politics and their collective actions.

2.2.3 Taking religious and political context factors into account

This said it is important to bear in mind that no religious organisation exists completely independent from a religious context, just as every kind of political involvement has to be thought of as being shaped by and referring to a particular political context. Two theoretical concepts are particularly helpful for the analysis of context

factors influencing whether and how, religion can contribute to the political involvement of migrants. These are the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) discussed above and Bourdieu's field concept. The following section will shortly discuss how these two concepts can contribute to the present research.

While the POS approach, as outlined in the previous sub-chapter, is one of the most important strands of research on social movements and has informed essential contributions to the analysis of the claims-making and mobilisation of migrants and of Muslim minorities in Europe, Bourdieu's field concept may serve as a helpful tool better to understand the opportunities and constraints that structure migrant political involvement. To be sure, since it focuses on institutional and discursive opportunity structures shaping the emergence, strategies and actions of social movements (cf. Koopmans 2004: 451), the POS approach obviously differs from Bourdieu's field approach. Nonetheless, if interpreted as conceptual tool boxes, the two theories are compatible and complementary insofar as they both conceptualise the (political) actions and strategies of individuals and movements as being constrained, and therefore shaped, by structures which precede and transcend them.

This idea of a field with boundaries separating (legitimate) players within a social field from those who are not part of the game is important for the research question treated here for several reasons. First of all, drawing attention to the boundaries between members and non-members of social fields is especially relevant in the case of migrants and post-migration minorities because entering or being part of the religious or the political field is likely to be more difficult for them than for "autochthonous" actors. Just like the majority in their country of residence, migrants face the boundaries between those who are part of the field - religious specialists, professional politicians - and those who are not. Usually many migrants, however, find themselves in the lowest positions of the receiving society's social structure so they have to overcome the particular difficulties members of the lowest classes face if they want to enter the political field or make the specialists take into account their interests. Furthermore, migrants are excluded by a second boundary which is drawn between those who are perceived as "consumers" with legitimate interests and those whose interests are often considered illegitimate. Their religious habitus, for instance, does not necessarily correspond to the religious habitus of members of the same social strata but who did not migrate.

Yet, if established players in the religious field perceive migrants as an important part of the laity and change their religious "products" in such a way as to cater also for this new group of potential consumers this may be interpreted by other players in the field as well as by the non-migrant "political laity", i.e. the voters, as a transformation not only of the religious but also of the political field. Migrant religion may thus become a political issue in itself. The same is true, and probably even more acutely so, if migrants as "newcomers" enter the religious field

themselves or try to do so. As the presence of new actors is a more visible transformation of the religious field, the changes it induces to the symbolic order are more obvious, too. If the religious order helps explaining and legitimising the political order, however, the presence of migrants as independent actors in the religious field - for instance, in West European societies as Muslim leaders or as pastors of non-established Christian churches - is likely to be interpreted by the majority not only as a transformation of the symbolic, but also of the political order. It is reasonable to assume that these perceptions then influence the chances of migrants to enter the religious field and the way religion may become a resource for political participation. At the same time, even if migrants themselves initially did not perceive their religious activities as political, these may become so in their point of view as well, if they encounter strong obstacles when attempting to be part of the game.

In this light, the POS approach is especially helpful for the analysis of the political involvement of migrants because it draws attention to the fact that the political field is confined by a very particular boundary which, as a legal boundary, is an important structural and structuring element of this field: this boundary is, of course, created by the citizenship regime of the respective country. Whereas proponents of the theory of post-national citizenship claim that membership rights have been decoupled from nationality and national territory to the extent that the concept of citizenship in the traditional sense of national citizenship has become less important (e.g. Soysal 1997), adepts of the political opportunity structure (POS) approach have shown several times that national citizenship regimes still shape the political behaviour of migrants (e.g. Koopmans/Statham 1999, Koopmans 2004, Eggert/Giugni 2011).[23] In their studies, citizenship models are seen as (part of the) opportunity structures "that may stimulate, constrain, or channel the degrees and types of migrants' political involvement" (Koopmans 2004: 449).

If what has been found by the empirical studies informed by the POS approach is combined with Bourdieu's idea of a field's boundaries being crucial, it is reasonable to assume that national citizenship models still shape the access of migrants to the political field in their country of residence in important ways. This is most apparent in voting legislation, of course, but it is also true for other aspects of political participation where the exclusion through citizenship legislation is not so obvious: Not only do citizenship rules legally exclude non-citizens from certain political actions such as voting in general elections, but they also contribute to stabilising boundaries by marking insiders and outsiders, "legitimate" and "illegitimate" activists, the claims of groups who have the "right" to make demands and those who do not. These rules, while not prohibiting the political involvement of non-citizens, make it easy for members of the field to keep out newcomers on the

[23] For criticism of the POS approach, see e.g. Goodwin/Jaspers (1999).

grounds of their origin and their legal status. The symbolic boundary between autochthonous and allochthonous residents of a country thus is reinforced by a legal barrier.

If states attribute a privileged status to certain religious communities or organisations but not to others, a similar boundary may surround the religious field: If, as is the case in Germany for instance, some religious communities hold a status which permits them to have the government collect taxes for them and to teach religious education in state schools while others do not have the same rights, members of the religious field can build their strategies on the distinction between legally recognized religions and religions that do not have the same status attributing them legitimacy to act in the public sphere. Although it is not as clear-cut a boundary as the one between migrants (and their descendants) and non-migrants imposed by citizenship, the distinction between religions that are publicly recognised and those that are not is particular relevant for migrants since they are more likely than non-migrant residents to belong to a "new" religion which is not part of an institutional arrangement that has evolved over centuries and which thus does not have the same privileges.

As citizenship regimes and legislation governing the relation between religious communities and the state are shaped by laws crafted and passed by the most powerful actors in the political field - politicians in parliament, important lobbyists etc. - the key players in the political field control both the legal barriers confining their field and the religious field.

To sum up, the first part of this chapter has focused on three general perspectives which guide the research on the political participation and the collective mobilisation of migrants: a resource perspective, a cultural perspective, and a perspective focusing on context factors. Against this background, the second part of this chapter has then outlined how religion might be integrated into these three perspectives. It has shown that religion may be an organisational resource which may provide material resources such as money or office space as well as immaterial resources, reaching from ties to individuals with particular skills to legitimacy for leaders. Religion may also be what might be called a "symbolic" resource, because it can offer the "cultural fabric" for individual and collective political activities and for greater solidarity.

Accordingly, these three theoretical elements will guide the analysis of the empirical data: the idea that religion can be an organisational resource for the political involvement of migrants; the idea that it can be a symbolic resource, and the idea that whether religion may be such a resource and whether migrants do draw on their religion for their political participation and collective mobilisation is also influenced by the religious and political context.

More aspects could, of course, be taken into account and would have to be considered if the present book sought to find all possible ways by which religion

could contribute to (or be an obstacle for) the politicisation and the political involvement of migrants. This, however, would be a rather imprecise and possibly never-ending scheme. Obviously, this cannot be the goal of this work. Rather, this research aims at contributing to our knowledge about how religion may support the political involvement by drawing on the most important theories of political participation and integrating religion into these three broad perspectives. All three perspectives, of course, appear relevant and fruitful enough to deserve to be at the centre of attention of this study. Yet, since it would still be beyond the scope of this book to cover all three perspectives to the same extent, it is essential to prioritise. Therefore, the main focus of this study is on religious organisations and on religion as an organisational resource, but the other two elements, i.e. the cultural dimension and context factors, will be taken into account, too.

3 Methodology

Against this background, the third chapter provides an overview over the design of the case study which is at the core of this book. As the focus of this study is on religion as an organisational resource, the empirical work concentrates on religious organisations. Both the case selection and the choice of methods therefore need to be tailored to the study of the organisational landscape set up and used by migrants in a particular context. In addition, it will, however, be necessary to cover the use of religion as a symbolic resource by the leaders of these organisations and to take into account the relevant context.

It is furthermore appropriate to focus on organisations and thus on collective mobilisation more than on individual political participation for at least two reasons. First of all, migrants frequently do not hold the citizenship of the country they live in. They therefore are often excluded from the most accessible and most widely spread form of individual political participation: the vote. Secondly, individual political participation and political attitudes are best analysed by quantitative studies based on representative data. This, of course, is out of reach of this research project. Certainly, there are large studies like the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Survey (EVS) or the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) that could be used for secondary analyses. However, none of these studies includes enough items that would permit to answer the present research question precisely enough. In addition, these representative studies include few migrants.

In terms of methodology, this translates into a twofold approach: on the one hand, and mainly, the empirical analysis focuses on organisations and inter-organisational networks in order to study religion as an organisational resource. On the other hand, it consists of a hermeneutic analysis of the framing processes that make religion a symbolic resource for the political involvement of migrants. Both should be done in a comparative perspective, comparing different religions and places, in order not to neglect the contextual dimension, although it is not at the centre of attention.

What is needed is thus a case to study that is sufficiently confined so that it makes it possible to grasp the organisational landscape in question and to do a network analysis. At the same time, it should offer possibilities to compare different religions and thus different organisational structures and different symbolic systems. Finally yet significantly, it would be ideal to compare the same migrant population in different contexts.

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In order to come as close to fulfilling these conditions as possible, this study analyses religious organisations as a resource for the political involvement of Christian and Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris. As has been argued in the previous chapter, it is particularly interesting to study both individual organisations and inter-organisational networks, the positions of different organisations within the (African) religious field as well as the coalitions these organisations are able to form. While the first part of the empirical work will sketch the general situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the two cities and outline their potential and actual motivations to get involved politically (chapter 1), the second part describes the general organisational landscape, drawing both on a hermeneutic analysis of interview material and, most importantly, on a formal network analysis (chapter 5). For reasons of data collection and the method of analysis, the second part will be restricted to the German case. The third and last part of the empirical study focuses on the two cities again. It demonstrates how leaders of religious organisations draw upon their religion as an organisational and a symbolic resource, e.g. to increase their legitimacy, to overcome internal cleavages or to convince others of the (moral) justification or even necessity to get involved politically. Christians and Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa will be compared with one another as well as with secular organisations. The analysis concentrates on Christians, however, because – as the present study reveals – they are more visible and politically active than sub-Saharan African Muslims in both cities. While the main focus of this book is on the German case, the observations made in Berlin are also contrasted with those from Paris (chapter 6).

In the following, this chapter first discusses the case selection and the comparative design of the study in more detail and then turns to the methods used. Finally, it also gives a short overview over the actual process of data collection and over the data.

3.1 Case selection and comparative design: a "comparaison à géométrie variable"

When choosing a case to study, it is of course necessary to find one that is interesting in itself. In addition, it should also lend itself particularly well to the analysis thanks to the characteristics it featured. For the present research, the migrant population which will be in the centre of attention should not have been "over-studied" yet and it should therefore still be interesting to get to know it better. Ideally, the religious groups under scrutiny here should be equally interesting.

So far, research on migrants in Europe and especially on the religion of migrants and their political involvement has concentrated on the largest migrant populations in the respective countries as well as on Muslims as the largest "new"

religion in Europe. In contrast to the recent, but already rather comprehensive literature on Islam and Muslims in Europe, there is far less literature focusing on migrant religion(s) in Europe other than Islam, especially with reference to the political involvement of migrants. Similarly, smaller migrant populations often are not in the focus of social research. It therefore seems appropriate not to focus on one of the major migrant groups or exclusively on Muslims. Rather, it seems fruitful to turn to one of the smaller and/or more recent migrant populations and also to compare different religions, including, or not, Muslims.

Furthermore, in order to concentrate on religion as a support for the political involvement of migrants, it is necessary to vary religion but "keep constant" the factor of "origin". Therefore, it would be ideal to compare migrants from the same country or region who belong to different religions. At the same time, the case should be small enough to make it possible to study the organisational field, but simultaneously not so limited as to be uninteresting or to provide an insufficient amount of data. What is needed, therefore, is a migrant population which includes members of different religions - in more or less similar number, if possible - and which is large enough to have its own religious associations or churches. Also, this population should be accessible and large enough to provide enough data, but small enough to keep the data still manageable, especially for a formal network analysis.

In addition, it seems indicated to study migrants not only in one place but to compare different localities in order to make it possible to take into account context factors adequately. The ideal population thus should be present in more than one place, and it should reside there in sufficiently small and sufficiently large numbers. A large enough share of the migrants residing in both (or more) places to compare should furthermore belong to each religion.

Finally yet significantly, as most methodologists agree, the cases to compare should not be chosen by the outcome (Ebbinghaus 2009: 494). For the present research, it is therefore important to avoid selecting the case by the presence of a high degree of political activity.

3.1.1 Comparing Christian, Muslim and secular African migrants

In line with these demands, the idea almost suggests itself to compare Christian, Muslim and - as a "control group" - secular migrants from the same country or region residing in different European cities. Comparing Muslims and Christians seems particularly fertile because, although different in terms of history, beliefs, and practices, they share a number of structural characteristics. Both refer to a transnational imagined community that is independent of or goes beyond state borders: the *umma* in the case of the former, global Christianity in the case of the latter. Also, both have established transnational networks. In addition, within Christianity there

are denominations that are often perceived as an autochthonous and essential part of European culture, as well as denominations and movements that are seen as foreign to European societies. A comparison of Christians and Muslims thus makes it possible to compare two different religious traditions (Muslims vs. Christians) as well as "established" and "new" religions (Catholicism and established Protestantism vs. Islam, charismatic movements, Pentecostalism etc.).

While it is almost trivial to say that a comparison between Christian and Muslim migrants seems worthwhile, it is not as easy to choose a specific migrant group to study. Indeed, it is necessary both to reduce the bias introduced by too much variance in the origins of the migrants under scrutiny and to find a group small enough to lend itself for a study of their organisational landscape and inter-organisational networks. At the same time, it must be large enough to include enough followers of both religions. Also, as the access to the field cannot be expected to be easy and straightforward, it is important for the migrant group not to be so small as to render a very small number of individuals the only possible gatekeepers. Finally yet significantly, this particular migrant population should be present in several European cities.

By choosing migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany, it seems possible to meet most of these criteria, although not all of them perfectly. First of all, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa living in Germany have not yet been studied much, but will become more and more relevant as migration from Africa to Europe continues to increase.

Moreover, in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in countries situated just below the Sahel, varieties of Islam and the Christian religion are present in many countries. Among migrants from sub-Saharan Africa both religions in question are present. Obviously, this is particularly important so as not to introduce too many distorting differences into the comparison, such as the clear exceptionality of one of the two religions in the country of origin or of residence. Also, the choice of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa seems useful because both Islam and non-European forms of Christianity are on the advance there.

To be sure, "migrants from sub-Saharan Africa" obviously come from different countries and therefore do not fully fulfil the requirements for holding constant the "origin factor". Yet, as will be shown in more detail in chapter four, these migrants in many ways share important structural characteristics and experiences.

In addition, African migrants in Germany constitute a sufficiently limited case so as to increase the likelihood that it will be possible to gain an almost complete overview over their organisations at the level of one city. Finally yet significantly, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa face more difficulties than other migrants in Germany, and therefore are likely to be in need of alternative organisational and symbolic resources. It therefore may be easier to study religion as such a resource in

the case of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa than in the case of better off migrants.

To summarize, the main focus of this study is on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who reside in Germany and belong to Christian, Muslim or secular organisations. In the following section, it will be outlined why the focus is on the local level, before a second comparative perspective will be introduced into the research design.

3.1.2 Choosing the field: studying migrants in the city

Obviously, increasing religious diversity first becomes manifest locally. What is more, the local level plays an important role for many religions - whether they are characterised by a parochial organisational structure, by independent, and thus local, congregations, or whether believers gather in specific venues or cultic places. Moreover, newly founded mosques and churches initiated by migrants by definition usually start as small, and thus, again, local, projects although their growth beyond the local level is not excluded.[24]

In addition, as has already been pointed out briefly since one part of the present study focuses on social networks, it is indispensable to choose a research site that offers a more or less clearly delimited field, i.e. it is necessary to opt for a site which helps define the boundaries of the networks in question. For this reason, the study can only focus on the local level, or, more precisely, a city where, at the same time, enough migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are at home and the African population is small enough not to render research on their religious networks impossible.

What is more, for several reasons, migrant political involvement is more likely to take place at the local level in cities. First of all, due to the greater economic opportunities they offer as well as to other factors that render cities attractive for newcomers, migrants usually are over-represented in cities and urban agglomerations (cf. Morales/Giugni 2011: 11).

Secondly, migrants often are excluded from the most accessible and widespread forms of political participation such as voting, as many of them usually - at least at first - do not have access to all political rights due to their status as foreigners. It is therefore reasonable to assume that theirs is likely to be a participation in more social movement-like forms of political involvement, for instance in one-off

[24] To be sure, newly set up migrant religious congregations may as well belong to large (transnational) communities such as pentacostal or charismatic (mega-)churches, but even then their congregations in the migrants' new country of residence are likely to start as local projects.

protests, local initiatives, campaigns and associations. These may also have regional, national or even global goals, and their aim may be to speak to an audience which goes far beyond the local, but their action repertoire is usually a rather local one. Also, the receptivity and responsiveness of the society at large as well as of political institutions usually is higher at the municipal level than at the regional or national level. Therefore, as Steven Vertovec notes already in his 1998 article on modes of citizenship, the "city is arguably the best level for inquiry into matters concerning 'local citizenship' and participation" (Vertovec 1998: 189).

Thirdly, as Morales and Giugni point out, "local policies, local institutional settings and the prevailing public discourses at the local level can importantly shape the pace, intensity and level of migrants' incorporation into the public arena" because it is at the local level where changes brought about by increasing diversity are perceived the earliest, and because local governments' responses to these changes may "complement, contradict or supplant national policies" (Morales/Giugni 2011: 3). Since diversity becomes visible and palpable locally first, it is the municipality which will (have to) react first and with different political goals: They may want to prevent or accommodate migrant participation, to warn against or to advertise and support further diversification. As a result, local circumstances are also likely to decisively shape migrant political mobilisation and participation. Or, to borrow Jan Willem Duyvendak and his colleagues' phrase to summarise this dialectic dynamic: "Cities are shaped by people, but people are also shaped by cities" (Duyvendak et al. 2009: 11).

In summary, for methodological as well as for demographic reasons, it is thus appropriate to study migrant religious and political involvement at the city level.

3.1.3 The main focus of the study: Berlin

As has been pointed out, the focus of this study is on the sub-Saharan African population in the city of Berlin. While there is not enough appropriate data on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in German municipalities, a brief look at the regional dispersion of these migrants in the German *Länder* shows why Berlin is a suitable city to investigate. As Figure 3 shows the concentration of African citizens is highest in the *Länder* of Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, if citizens of North African countries are excluded. In all *Länder*, the population share is less than 1 percent, and the total number does not surpass 21,000 African citizens in any *Land*.

In line with what has been said above about the economic attractiveness of cities for migrants, the higher concentration of African migrants in the city-states of Hamburg and Berlin, and the two-city state of Bremen does not come as a surprise.

On the contrary, the proportion of African migrants in these three *Länder* makes it seem even more advisable to focus on the city level.



Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2011b; graph by the author.

Figure 3. Regional dispersion of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany.

Since in Berlin and Hamburg[25] the general population density is higher than in the larger *Länder*, African migrants, too, are concentrated there on less space than elsewhere - an important demographic fact when studying religious networks. Also, the particular city structure of Berlin makes it a good place to do research on social networks, because it is large enough to attract a considerable number of African migrants and simultaneously is a comparatively small European capital. The presence of slightly over ten thousand African citizens in the city increases the likelihood that it will be possible to gain a good overview over the African religious organisational landscape and the inter-organisational networks there. If the field was much larger, it would be very difficult to collect enough data in order to be able to

[25] As the Land of Bremen includes the cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven, the information available on this *Land* is less useful for a study at the city level than that available for Hamburg and Berlin. Also, the spatial and the political structures are not the same as in the other two *Länder*.

analyse the religious networks within the field. And if it was much smaller, the risk not to find anything would be much higher because there might not be enough people to create their own religious associations and/or to mobilise politically. In addition to these demographic and urban characteristics, Berlin also has a long tradition of associations of all kinds, and as the German capital, it is the political centre of the state.

In short, Berlin constitutes a good research site for the purposes of the present study, because it combines high population density - also of the migrant population - with a limited field size with 12.000 African citizens[26] resident in the city and a generally rather active civil society with a multitude of different organisations.

3.1.4 Adding a comparative perspective: Berlin and Paris

While Berlin is an almost ideal research site for the study of the African organisational landscape and inter-organisational networks, it is nevertheless necessary to compare it to another place in order to learn more about the way context factors influence the role religion may play for the political involvement of migrants. For these purposes a most dissimilar design seems suitable: in order to find out more about the influence of context factors, it appears useful to compare the same migrant population in two most different contexts.

This is all the more advisable as the very reasons that make Berlin a good research site also make it a very specific case. In addition to the comparison of Christian, Muslim, and secular African migrants in Berlin it is therefore advisable to add another comparative dimension and to take a look at a different city, too.

Yet, it is obviously difficult to compare African migrants in Berlin to a completely different case which lacks all the specific features that make a case a good case for this study. If Berlin is a very good research site and the structural characteristics of the second city are such that they do not resemble those of Berlin at all, it is likely that the research conditions are rather difficult there. While it theoretically seems to be the most appropriate design, in practice, a "most dissimilar" comparative design thus seems difficult to realise.

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[26] Unfortunately, for the case of Berlin, there are no data available at all which would include all persons with an African "migration background". However, the Statistical Office of the Land of Berlin does provide data on African citizens residing there, not counting Germans of African origin or undocumented migrants who are not registered with the Berlin authorities. As is the case for the Federal Republic as a whole, the figures at the regional level are likely to be lower than they would be if Afro-Germans were also included in the statistics.

What is possible, however, is to follow a strategy that in French might be called a "comparaison à géométrie variable", i.e. an unequal comparison adapted to the specific research question. For the present study this means to concentrate on Berlin and to see Berlin as the case to study, but to choose another city in order to gain some - hopefully illuminating - comparative elements. This will not constitute a full comparison but a systematic collection of a number of contrasting elements which, on the one hand, aims at answering some of the open questions the Berlin case raises and to permit a more informed look at the influence of context factors. On the other hand, it has the heuristic function to help detect new research avenues and raise new questions that would maybe not have emerged otherwise.

In order to design such a "reduced most dissimilar comparison", it seems useful to study Paris because this city differs greatly from Berlin in its city structure, its demography, and the national context it is situated in.

To begin with the local level, the urban structure of Paris and the Parisian agglomeration is very different from the structure of Berlin. On the one hand, Paris is the place where migrants from both inside and outside France move. It is not only the political centre, but also the economic and the demographic centre of the country, a magnet which attracts the hopeful from rural France as well as from former French colonies and other parts of the world. Berlin, in contrast, lost over 100,000 inhabitants after the end of the Cold War despite its new role as reunified capital and has only been growing again since 2004. It has now almost reached the level of the early 1990s (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2012a). What is more, Paris and its agglomeration are characterised by the small *intra muros* city kernel of Paris and its vast *banlieue*.[27] As rents are lower there, many migrants move to the *banlieue*, mainly to the poorer *départements*.[28]

At first sight, Paris *intra muros* and Berlin may seem rather similar, but to compare inner-city Paris to Berlin would mean to compare the better off migrant population residing *within* Paris with the socially more diverse migrant population who lives in Berlin. Also, such a perspective would imply ignoring the often conflictual dynamics between the actual city of Paris and its *banlieue* as well as the conflicts which manifest themselves in Berlin both at the level of the municipality and that of the *Land* of Berlin.

[27] The latter are suburbs often referred to as "Paris", but technically different administrative entities.

[28] For an overview over the history and the urban sociology of the *banlieues* of French cities, see e.g. Avenel (2010). For a very recent study of the often conflictive relation between the population in the suburbs and the institutions of, the identification with and the acceptance as part of the French Republic, see the Kepel, Arslan and Zouheir's book *Les banlieues de la République* (Kepel/Arslan/Zouheir 2012). See also Kepel for one of the earliest accounts of the spread and development of the Islamic religion in French suburbs (Kepel 1987).

Secondly, not only do the local contexts diverge, the national contexts are very different, too. Most importantly for the present research, they differ in terms of immigration history, citizenship legislation and the institutional models of church-state separation.

Due to their different colonial history, not only has migration to the two countries had different reasons and temporalities, migrants came and come also from different places. This is particularly relevant when studying migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, because France has shaped the political, economic, educational, and cultural institutions in many African countries due to its long presence in North and West Africa and is still a major player in the two regions. Therefore, France, on the one hand is perceived as one of the most oppressive powers responsible for many catastrophes on the African continent during the 19th and 20th centuries, and as a major contributor to the continuously difficult and subjugated position Africa holds in the global economic, political, and cultural order. On the other hand, its influence has shaped the respective African countries so profoundly that France is far more accessible for West and North African migrants than for example Germany, due to the presence of the French language in these regions and the similarity of many African countries' educational systems to the French system. Also, France still is a political and cultural reference for many Africans. Migrating from West Africa to France thus is a different story than migrating to most other European countries.

German colonial history makes Germany a less attractive destination for migrants from Africa, who usually speak French, English or Portuguese rather than German and for whom it has long been easier to enter France as documented migrants than to enter Germany with valid visa. To be sure, the German presence in Africa has been characterised by the same creed and cruelty as that of other colonial powers, and both France and Germany still have failed to come to terms with their colonial past, to face their responsibility and guilt. And just like other European colonial powers Germany, too, still benefits enormously from the unequal trading structures established during the times of open imperialism. Nevertheless, due to the defeat in World War I and the loss of its colonies, Germany, i.e. German military, media, institutions, companies and other organisations as well as the German language have not been present in Africa in the same way as France and French institutions, organisations and language during the 20th century. Migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Germany thus takes place under different conditions. What is more, it has become more and more difficult to gain entrance to Germany and apply for asylum, as the right of asylum has been restricted by a change in German legislation in 1992.[29]

[29] At the same time, applying for asylum has become more complicated in both Germany and France since the EU "Dublin Procedure" entered into force in 2003. Also, Germany does not have a coastline

In addition to the immigration context, the citizenship legislation in the two countries used to differ greatly, too. Rogers Brubaker's well known comparison of the French and German concepts of "nation" (Brubaker 1992) may be overstating the differences between France and Germany, but the dissimilar understandings of what a "nation" is and the respective models of citizenship did lead to different modes of accommodating migrants and their descendants. For instance, in contrast to the French citizenship legislation based mainly on *ius soli*, German legislation until recently was based almost exclusively on *ius sanguinis*. While French and German citizenship legislation has become less different in recent years (Weinbach 2005), the different concepts still have repercussions today, for instance for the self-perception of migrants and their descendents as citizens or non-citizens or as legitimate or illegitimate political actors of their country of residence (cf. Amir-Moazami 2007).

Furthermore the divergent models of state-church relations in France and Germany and the different ways these have been adapted so as to integrate "new" religious communities, especially Muslims (e.g. Soper/Fetzer 2007; Kastoryano 2004; 2003; Koenig/Willaime 2008), are of great importance for the present research project. Since the times of the Revolution, the French Republic has been marked by the sharp conflict between proponents of a secular republic and the counter-revolutionary Catholic Church, and in 1905 it adopted a strict law of church-state separation, banning all expression of religion to the private sphere. In contrast, the Federal Republic largely continued in the tracks of the Weimar Republic, adopting a model of state-church cooperation instead of institutional separation, and still accords a privileged status to the two main churches in Germany as well as to other officially recognised religious communities. As J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer show in their work on Muslim mobilisation in the UK, France and Germany, the general model of state-church relations significantly shapes the way migrants can voice their religious needs and demands as well as the way their claims are accommodated (or not) (Soper/Fetzer 2007).

In short, both the local and the national contexts are very different for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa as political and religious actors in Berlin and Paris. In the following, the comparative perspective of this work will be twofold: As Figure 4 illustrates, in Berlin, Muslim, Christian, and non-religious African migrants and their organisations will be compared. This is the main focus of this study, both empirically and analytically. Accordingly, the empirical data collected in Berlin is

on the Mediterranean Sea, and therefore is physically less accessible than other European countries. At the same time, France is not one of the most important destinations of those crossing the Mediterranean by boat, either, because Spanish, Italian, or Greek shores are easier to reach.

It is interesting to note that in the wake of the war in Syria, Germany recently has accepted a great number of refugees who first entered EU territory in Greece without making use of the Dublin rules.

more comprehensive - although not exhaustive, either -, the analysis of the material is more in-depth, and the discussion of this case will take up most of the following chapters. Most importantly, the formal analysis of inter-organisational networks will only be done for Berlin. At the same time, interview material collected in Paris and the Parisian *banlieue* will serve as contrasting elements putting the Berlin cases into a wider perspective.



Figure 4. Overview: Comparative design.

3.2 Data collection and analysis

Since it is the aim of this comparison to take a closer look at religion as an organisational and a symbolic resource for migrants, it is important to adapt the methodological design to the analysis of the organisations set up by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the two places, their inter-organisational networks as well as the use of religion as a source of frames for political involvement.

Religion as an organisational resource for the political involvement of migrants will be analysed in two different ways, as this will make up the core of the empirical analysis. In a first step, the organisational field and inter-organisational networks will be analysed. A second step will consist of studying selected organisations in greater detail and showing how they make use of their religious (umbrella) organisations and inter-organisational ties for their political involvement. These analyses imply two different methods: on the one hand, a systematic study of the said networks based on formal network analysis and a more hermeneutic study of the strategies and self-descriptions of the representatives and leaders of selected organisations that play an important role within the networks. Accordingly, two kinds of data are needed: it is necessary to gather as much network data as possible, while more in-depth interview data is required, too.

In order to analyse *religion as a symbolic resource* it appears most fruitful to draw on the self-descriptions of religious leaders and of their strategies, because it is there that the underlying framing processes are most likely to become apparent. Firstly, leaders may implicitly or explicitly reproduce these frames in their descriptions. Secondly, they may also bring up explicitly their use of religion as a reservoir of cultural elements for the construction of these frames as well as the strategies behind this. Interview material will thus be the most important data for this analysis.

With respect to the *analysis of the two contexts* in question, it would be unwise to go as far as to attempt to do a thorough analysis of the institutional and discursive opportunity structures for the mobilisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in addition to the study of religion as an organisational and a symbolic resource. Instead, in order not to ignore context factors, in a first step, the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the two settings will be described based on official statistical data and current literature (chapter 1). In a later step, the findings from Berlin and Paris will be discussed with reference to the respective local and national contexts.

3.2.1 Data collection

In order to get an overview over the African population in Berlin and Paris, a thorough search of the literature was conducted, which revealed a severe lack of information on Africans in Germany, and particularly in Berlin. In contrast, students at the Free University of Berlin have published a rather comprehensive guide to the religious communities in Berlin (Grübel/Rademacher 2003) which proved very helpful for establishing an overview over the religious organisational landscape in the city and for choosing organisations to contact for interviews. For France, the situation was slightly better,[30] but there, too, gaps in our knowledge of African residents and their descendants remain. What is more, as the Parisian agglomeration counts more than three times the number of inhabitants of Berlin, it is much more challenging to get an overview over the religious and/or the migrant organisations there.

In addition to research literature, official statistics published by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany[31], the Statistical Office of the *Länder* of Berlin and Brandenburg[32], the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (IN-

[30] For recent publications on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and/or Blacks in France, see *pars pro toto*: Pap Ndiaye's well-known *La condition noire* (Ndiaye 2008) and Dedieu's *La parole immigrée* (Dedieu 2012).
[31] Statistisches Bundesamt.
[32] Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, "State Statistical Institute Berlin-Brandenburg" in the official English translation (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. 2012b).

SEE)[33], and the National institute for demographic studies (INED)[34] were used extensively, as were the official registers of associations in Berlin, several Parisian *arrondissements* and the *département* of Seine-Saint-Denis. While the statistics served mainly as sources of information to get an overview over the actual population from Africa and of African descent, the association registers were used to find out more about the African organisational landscape in Berlin and, to a more limited degree, also in Paris and one of the *départements* of its *banlieue*.

For this purpose, the online database of the Berlin register was searched for associations by using a large number of key words. These were either complete nouns or adjectives or (combinations of) syllables carrying meaning such as "afri". All were semantically linked to terms describing the kind of organisation in question, e.g. they were derived from the words "Africa", "mosque", "church", etc. as well as from the names of all African countries. The search was executed with the words and syllables spelled in German, French, and English. The registers of the different city districts of Berlin were searched, too, in order to cross-check whether some associations had been missed.

To include all associations even of the *arrondissements* and *départements* with the most important migrant populations in Paris proved so difficult and laborious that it was necessary to settle for a detailed mapping of the African organisational landscape in Berlin, only. Instead of trying to grasp comprehensively the entire field of African migrant and minority organisations in Paris, it was then decided to focus on a few selected associations in the 18th *arrondissement* and in Seine-Saint-Denis and to interview their representatives.

Of course, it is possible, even likely, that some of the associations that were found in the Berlin registers have ceased to exist or only ever existed on paper. Also, a considerable number of association-like organisations must be expected to exist without being registered. The results of the search through the registers were therefore tested by thoroughly searching the internet for information on the registered associations and on other organisations of this kind. Thereby, it was possible to add a number of associations which were not registered with the authorities and to delete some from the list that did not belong to the kind of associations the study is supposed to focus on. In many cases, this search often also provided the address or other contact details of the associations or a representative of the organisation, which was useful for the second step of the data collection.

In total, the two ways of looking for African associations led to an estimated number of about 250 organisations of this kind in Berlin. In addition to these, it was possible to identify two African umbrella organisations - one secular,

[33] Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.
[34] Institut national d'études démographiques.

one Christian - and several migrant umbrella organisations with African member organisations.[35] They will be presented in more detail in the following chapters.

The mapping of the organisations completed, in a second step, several churches, and secular associations were selected to be contacted for interviewing. The selection was based on religious criteria for religious organisations, in order to include as many different strands of the African religious field in the two cities as possible. As in Berlin there was only one identifiable Muslim association set up by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, a number of other Muslim associations were contacted, too. These were either organisations which outspokenly aimed at catering for a mixed membership or followers of different backgrounds, or which offered religious services, religious instruction and other courses, meetings for girls and women, counselling etc. in languages other than Turkish[36].

Secular associations were selected on criteria of "substance", i.e. on their "thematic" orientation as professed by their names or Internet presentations. The focus here was not on explicitly political organisations only. Instead, other organisations - e.g. cultural and media organisations - were included, too. Again, the purpose was to include different strands of the organisational field.

Both in Berlin and Paris, the selected organisations were contacted by email, phone or mail and asked whether a representative was prepared to participate in an interview. If the organisation agreed to take part in the study, it was most of the time the church's pastor, the parish priest or the president of the association who gave the interview himself (in very few cases: herself).

3.2.2 Interview methodology and thematic framework

The next step consisted of conducting semi-standardised interviews in Berlin (March till September 2009) and Paris (October 2009 till March 2010). In both cities, additional interviews were made in order to complement the material collected earlier. These took place in September 2010 in Paris and in the second half of 2011 in Berlin. Some interviews in Berlin had to be made via telephone.

While a large part of this work focuses on religious organisations, it is also about how religion as a symbolic system motivates, informs and legitimises individual and collective political involvement. The interviews therefore aimed at gaining information on religious and secular organisations as the key units of analysis as well

[35] Based on the interview material that was collected later, the list was continuously corrected and rendered more precise.

[36] Turks and Germans of Turkish descent being the largest single migrant and minority group in Germany, the great majority of mosques and Muslim organisations address this group.

as on how individual leaders or members of these organisations used the organisational resources, but they also included questions on religious beliefs and values etc. All interviews were conducted in a more or less loosely structured fashion based on an interview framework covering the following themes:

- the organisation itself, e.g. its members, organisational structure and funding, and the role the interview partners played in the organisation at the time of the interview;
- the religious beliefs and practices, or the political values and goals it professes; its mission;
- its network, e.g. co-operation and conflicts with other organisations of the same religious/political orientation and others, shared resources, ties of individual members or the leader(s) with other organisations; transnational ties;
- civic and political engagement of the congregation or association itself and of individual leaders and/or members, e.g. co-operation with local authorities, calls for participation
- the perceived situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the country and the city; if the organisation was a religious one, also the perceived situation of African Christians or Muslims respectively.
- the personal background of the interlocutors, e.g. their religious and political socialisation, their educational and professional background, their migration experience.

In total, 43 interviews were conducted, 27 in Berlin and 16 in Paris and the *département* of Seine-Saint-Denis.[37] Most interlocutors were male and had spent more than five years in either France or Germany. Most of the persons interviewed in Berlin held a university degree, and a few of those interviewed in Paris did so, too.

Among the representatives of organisations who agreed to be interviewed, most had been born in an African country and moved to Europe as an adult. Eight were White ethnic Germans or French; two were Germans of Turkish or Indian descent respectively, and one was French of Moroccan descent. One had Cameroonian, Greek and German parents and grandparents. They were interviewed because they represented African organisations or Muslim organisations with a mixed audience. Most interviews were conducted in German or French; one was

[37] The list of all interviews can be found in the appendix.

done in English. Except for four interviews[38], all were recorded and later transcribed.[39]

Figure 5 provides an overview over the interviews in Berlin and Paris. The small number of interviews that were made with Muslims reflects the very difficult access to this part of the field (in both cities) and, as will be discussed in the following chapters in more detail, the low degree of (formal) organisation of Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Berlin.

Berlin: Number of interviews	Paris: Number of interviews
Representatives of Christian organisations: 16	Representatives of Christian organisations: 8
Representatives of Muslim organisations: 5	Representatives of Muslim organisations: 3
Representatives of secular organisations: 6	Representatives of secular organisations: 5
IN TOTAL: 27	**IN TOTAL: 16**

Figure 5. Overview: Interviews in Berlin and Paris

In order to get in touch with migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and to get to know the field better, I furthermore attended several church services (Catholic, Pentecostal, and Protestant), two women's meetings at a Pentecostal church, a meeting of a Christian federation, two meetings of secular organisations - one of them a mixture of an organisational meeting and the celebration of the Muslim *id-al-fitr*, a meeting of a Muslim youth organisation, a Muslim street prayer in Paris, a secular political event on migrant integration and participation in Berlin-Kreuzberg, a silent street protest in solidarity with undocumented migrants in the town of Saint-Denis and a demonstration of migrants in Paris respectively, and an ecumenical international church festival on Alexanderplatz (Berlin). I also visited several *foyers* and *hôtels* for migrant workers in the Parisian *banlieue* and got tours through several churches and a mosque in both cities.

[38] These interviews or conversations were not recorded because the interlocutors had not given their permission.

[39] In order to protect the privacy of the interlocutors, but also to keep the size of the appendix reasonable, the interview transcripts are not included. Please contact the author for more information on (or access to) the material.

3.2.3 Network data

As has been indicated above, the analysis of the interview material which was thus collected and contextualised consisted of two steps. One, of course, was the hermeneutic analysis of the interview material, while the other was a formal analysis of the inter-organisational networks of the African religious organisations in Berlin.

As one of the most influential text books on social network analysis simply and to the point states, the method and theory of social network analysis concentrate on "relationships among social entities, and on the patterns and implications of these relationships" (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 3). It is thus particularly useful for studying the interactions between individuals, organisations or other social entities, the structures that result from these interactions and the advantages or disadvantages "social entities", e.g. individuals or organisations, may have due to these structures. Not only does a social network analysis permit to display ties between individuals or organisations in a straightforward manner, it also is a tool for analysing the possibilities to act, the power structures and the resources which are inherent in or arise from these ties.

Many critics of social network analysis, however, stress its focus on static structures and its failure to grasp the dynamic elements of social relations except through longitudinal studies. Another important criticism concerns the difficulty to include culture in network models. This last point is particularly important here because the networks under scrutiny are inter-organisational networks, and part of the argument of this book is to say that religion *as a symbolic system* is also relevant for the political involvement of migrants.

As has been indicated earlier, the present study therefore does not follow a strict network theoretical approach[40], but combines different approaches to the material. Social network analysis thus is used here as a "theoretically neutral" instrument (cf. Jansen 2006: 12) which permits to describe networks of religious organisations and to find out whether they contribute to the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin. The data extrapolated from the interview material as well as the registers of associations and especially the membership lists of federations and umbrella organisations[41] were used to create a data set in-

[40] Especially the structural determinism of (the early) Harrison White or some of his students does not seem helpful for the present study as its over-emphasis of the importance of social structures does not sufficiently take into account strategic action as well as symbolic elements - both crucial for the present argument.

[41] Access to these lists also was a result of several interviews. They were furthermore checked against the (self-)description of (putative) members of the said umbrella organisations or federations - some of them for instance confirming their formal membership, but pointing out that they really did not participate in any activities.

cluding all African associations in Berlin. With the help of UCINET and NetDraw, the network structures characterising the African religious field in Berlin will be visualised and formally analysed, and the results of this formal analysis will complement the interpretation of the interviews.

3.2.4 Research among highly vulnerable migrants - access to the field in Berlin and Paris

It is a frequent characteristic of migration research that the researchers are not migrants themselves, but belong to the part of the population which is perceived as autochthonous, come as visitors from a foreign country or belong at least to the second generation of immigrants. This, of course, is likely to influence the reactions to the requests researchers make as well as the information they can gather through interviews and observation. Generally, they belong to or are perceived as belonging to a more privileged and more powerful part of the population than the persons who are requested to participate in a study.

In the case of the present work, access to the field proved difficult indeed. Although most of the persons who agreed to participate in an interview were very friendly and helpful, a considerable number of first conversations - which in a few cases also were the last - as well as some of the interviews were marked by suspicion, mistrust or maybe even fear. Also, some of the interlocutors did not want the interview to be recorded, while others were very reluctant to answer any questions concerning their networks or their political involvement.

The caution many members of the African migrant population exercise with interviewers did not come as a surprise - nor was I the first researcher to experience it.[42] In light of the general vulnerability of migrants, and especially of migrants who have to bear even more stigmatisation, discrimination, and racism than others (cf. Benndorf 2008: 350), it is more than comprehensible that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are careful when interacting with members of the non-migrant population. In Berlin even more than in Paris, I was part of this majority: white, well-educated, with German citizenship and German as my first language, I certainly represented a society which does not make life easy for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. For some, their identifying me with *the* majority probably was a reason to talk to me - finally someone who would listen to their cause - , but for others the fact that I so very obviously accumulated so many privileges and represented the dominant class must have been intimidating or deterrent.

[42] Indeed, Rolf Benndorf cites several researchers who experienced a defensive reaction of African migrants to interview requests (Benndorf 2008: 39).

What is more, asylum seekers whose cases are still pending, tolerated refugees[43] and undocumented migrants most probably are reluctant to provide information about themselves to strangers, and especially to members of the non-migrant population, due to their precarious status of residency. Especially in these cases, language barriers or the feeling not to know enough about German (academic) institutions, mistrust towards the media and the equation of academic and media interviews, may contribute to the reservations. What is more, upon their arrival in Germany (or another European country) migrants experience a tense political climate and media coverage and public controversies over migration policies and similar issues therefore shape the field long before the researcher sets out to do her or his field work. Carmen Humboldt very aptly summarises this situation:

> Die Migrant/innen geraten bei ihrer Einreise nach Deutschland in ein politisch angeheiztes Klima und erkennen schnell die Gefahren, die solche Diskussionen für sie mit sich bringen können. Es darf nicht unterschätzt werden, in welchem Maße im Falle ethnologischer Forschung das Feld bereits vor jedem *face-to-face*-Kontakt in einer Forschungsinteraktion von öffentlichem Streit und kontroverser Medienberichterstattung vorstrukturiert und polarisiert ist – ‚mit Konsequenzen für die Zugangs- und Interaktionsmöglichkeit' (Knecht 1996: 232/233). Dies trifft insbesondere auf öffentlich umstrittene Themen zu. Leicht kann ein Gefühl des ‚Beobachtetwerdens' entstehen, das zu Widerstand und Abwehr führen kann (vgl. Dracklé 1996: 21) (Humboldt 2005: 75).[44]

Although authors do not mention it often, another important factor complicating access to the field seems to be time: the everyday lives of many first generation African migrants are marked by a mixture of an often very precarious work situation, demanding family duties, high expectations by the extended family in the country of origin, a continuous struggle with authorities such as the aliens department or the employment agency, and the daily strain the use of a second (or third etc.) language and the adaptation to a foreign society put on everybody who moved to a new country as an adult and who acquired the respective language then. This combination is very stressful and does not leave much spare time to do anything out of the ordinary. Especially women, who often take on the role of the family's

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[43] In German law, "Duldung" (toleration) means the "temporary suspension of deportation" of a migrant.

[44] "When they come to Germany, migrants find themselves in a politically charged atmosphere and they quickly realize the dangers such discussions may have for them. One must not underestimate the extent to which, in the case of ethnological research, the field is already pre-structured and polarized by public dispute and controversial media coverage before any face-to-face contact in research interaction has been made - 'with consequences for the possibility of access and interaction' (Knecht 1996: 232/233). This is particularly true for subjects for which there is public controversy. A feeling of 'being watched' may easily arise, which may lead to resistance and defensive attitudes (cf. Dracklé 1996: 21)."

main bread winner, did not find time to meet for an interview, even if it had been they who approached me in the first place. Indeed, it is interesting to note, and also ties in with what has been said above, that most of the people who did agree to be interviewed were well-educated - some of them with a university degree or even a PhD from a European university - men who had arrived in Germany or France many years previously.

In the case of this research, the experience or perception of religious stereotypes and rejection may have played an important role in the willingness or unwillingness of individuals and organisations to answer my questions. Just like the fact of my being part of the non-migrant population their religious claims in a society they often perceived as hostile may have led some to the decision to be interviewed, but it may also have made others refrain from doing so.[45]

[45] Generally, secular groups were easier to get in touch with than religious groups. Among the Muslim organisations, the *Muslimische Jugend* and the *Deutschsprachige Muslim Kreis* (DMK) were quickest to agree to an interview and the DMK put me in touch with the only *African* Muslim organisation I was able to get hold of in Berlin. Among African Christians, the pastor of a small Pentecostal church and his wife were great gate keepers and door openers, despite their initial reservations. After a first interview, they invited me to several services and women's meetings at their church, and Peter introduced me to other members of the African Christian's federation's board as well as to other later interview partners.
During my later field work in Paris, the story was more or less the same: Again, secular organisations were generally easier to get in touch with than religious ones. For instance, out of all the representatives of the Parisian evangelical and charismatic churches I was able to contact, only three answered and agreed to be interviewed, and only three representatives of mosques or Muslim associations were prepared to answer my questions. No representative of the *Fédération des associations islamiques d'Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles* (FAIACA) was available, and the only representative whose phone number and email address I was able to find out, did not reply to any email and did not answer the phone or call back despite several attempts to reach him. Both in Berlin and Paris, individual members who were not the representatives of their association hardly ever agreed to be interviewed, and none of the few promised interviews materialised.

4 Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris

While almost twenty percent of the population in Germany have a so-called "migration background" (*Migrationshintergund*)[46], and almost nine percent of the country's 81.8 million inhabitants are foreigners (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012a), there are still gaps in migration research. So far, research focusing on African migrants in Germany has been particularly rare, although migrants from Africa are likely to become an ever more relevant part of the population in most European countries "as Sub-Saharan Africa has probably a higher potential for immigration into the EU than any other region of the World" (Kohnert 2007: 6; cf. also Sieveking et al. 2008: 5).[47][48]

In fact, research often focuses on reasons for migration from both North and sub-Saharan Africa to Germany, on the African migration potential or the demography of African migrants resident in Germany and is often published or financed by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the main German development agency, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ, formerly GTZ).

To be sure, important work has been done on the subjects of German colonialism and imperialism in Africa as well as present-day racism against African migrants and Afro-Germans, but independent research on the actual living conditions, (political) participation and organisation of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in Germany is only just beginning to grow.

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[46] For a precise definition of who is considered having a „migration background", see below (Footnote 56).

[47] Of course, in Germany as in other European countries, catastrophes like a sunken boat and migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea, migrant rebellions in inhuman detention camps or changes in bilateral border control agreements between the EU and Northern African states (like the changes induced by the recent developments in North Africa commonly referred to as "Arab Spring"), draw media attention on African migrants and EU border regimes and raise the public awareness of African migration to Europe. Soon after, however, the focus is on other matters again. Also, and more importantly, not only is this kind of attention short-lived, it is also often partial and characterised by an unfortunate mixture of pity, fear and defence.

[48] Kohnert's estimation, of course, does not take into account more recent events such as the so-called Arab spring or the war in Syria. It is, however, likely that his general assessment of the migration situation concerning the African continent and especially sub-Saharan Africa is not wrong insofar as still many reasons to migrate to Europe persist (and some, such as drought due to the changing climate are likely to become more and more important) and make people leave.

M. Schader, *Religion as a Political Resource*, Veröffentlichungen der Sektion Religionssoziologie der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-16788-2_4

Just like the publications by GIZ and BAMF, many studies use official demographic statistics made available by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) and combine them with additional data. Drawing on the said statistics and their own quantitative and qualitative data Sieveking, Fauser, and Faist, in their expertise on African migrants' development cooperation activities, for instance, provide detailed information on the demography and organisation of these migrants in the Land of North-Rhine Westphalia (Sieveking et al. 2008). Baraulina et al. (2008) use similar data to take a closer look at the situation of Africans on the German labour market, and Renate Nestvogel and Dela Apedjinou (2003) as well as Nadine Sieveking (2009) draw attention to gender differences between African migrants in Germany, highlighting, among other things, the underrepresentation of women in African migrant associations and other formal organisations.

Rolf Benndorf's doctoral thesis probably constitutes the first and only attempt to give a general overview over the African population[49] in Germany and the participation of Africans in German society. As Benndorf aims at evaluating the effectiveness of German integration policies, he analyses both archival material which documents African immigration in colonial and post-colonial times as well as the official discourse on (African) immigration, and official statistics on migrants from Italy, Turkey, the African continent and on "autochthonous" Germans. His research leads him to the conclusion that African migrants face more difficulties than other migrant groups to integrate into German society.

What is more, there are also a number of well-informed ethnographic case studies, e.g. McIntyre's research on Hausa-speaking migrants in Hamburg (McIntyre 2004), Humboldt's study on African migrants of different origin resident in Cologne (Humboldt 2006) and Nieswand's work on Ghanaian migrants in Germany (Nieswand 2008). Although their methodological approaches differ, both Nieswand and Humboldt focus on the construction of "diaspora": Whereas Humboldt concentrates on interpersonal relationships and social networks in order to demonstrate that there is no such thing as a homogeneous African diaspora, Nieswand shows how three core elements - Ghanaian nationalism, hometown associations and monetary remittances to Ghana as well as Ghanaian chieftaincies - shape the construction not of an African, but of a Ghanaian diaspora in Germany. What is most important to the present study is that both authors highlight the fact that every diaspora is socially constructed and draw attention to the often essentialising character of discourses about "Africans" in Germany.

[49] As most statistics do not provide information on these groups, Benndorf's study includes neither African migrants having acquired German citizenship by naturalisation nor children of African migrants who received German citizenship by birth. It does, however, include persons of African descent who did not migrate to Germany themselves, but who are still citizens of an African state (Benndorf 2008: 39-40).

Although, when compared to the general state of research on African migrants in Germany, research on African religiosity or African religious organisations in Germany is rather well developed, this does not mean we know much about the religious activities and organisations of African migrants in this country. While his is certainly the most comprehensive account of the situation of African migrants in Germany, Benndorf, for instance, leaves out religion as a category completely (Benndorf 2008: 41). An even more telling example for the lack of information on African religion in Germany can be found in Carmen Humboldt's dissertation, as she notes that when she started her research she had not even known there were African churches in Germany which were of great importance to her interlocutors:

> So war mir zu Beginn der Studie beispielsweise nicht klar, dass es christliche afrikanische Gemeinden gibt, die für viele meiner Informant/innen sehr alltagsbestimmend sind und die generell zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnen. Erst nachdem mir einige Afrikaner/innen erzählten, welch hohen Stellenwert die Kirche für sie habe und dass es sich dabei nicht um eine unserer so genannten großen Mutterkirchen handele, wurde mir deren Bestehen und deren Relevanz bewusst (Humboldt 2005: 74-75).[50]

Of course, Afe Adogame, Nina Glick Schiller and other anthropologists have published valuable research on African churches in different German cities (Adogame 2006; Karagiannis/Glick Schiller 2006; 2008; Weißköppel 2008; Adogame/Weißköppel 2007).[51] Also, Monika Salzbrunn's thesis provides important insights into religious and political practices of Senegalese migrants in France and Germany, i.e. on the religious and political activities of a (mainly) Muslim part of the African migrant population (Salzbrunn 2001a). Nonetheless, we still know little about African Christians and even less about African Muslims in Germany.

Similarly, migration research in France focuses on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa less frequently or less explicitly than on other migrant populations. Since they make up the largest part of the migrant and minority population, North Africans and their descendants are much more often at the centre of attention (*pars pro toto*: Alba/Silberman 2002; Hamidi 2003). In recent years, migrant and minority research in France, like in other European countries, is marked by a focus on Islam and the accommodation of the Muslim minority. A second focus is on the situation

[50] For instance, I did not realise at the beginning of my study that there were Christian African congregations that shape the everyday lives of many of my interlocutors and that are generally of increasing importance. Only when several Africans had told me how important church was for them and that this was not one of our so-called big mother-churches did I realise that these churches existed and were relevant.

[51] See also the proceedings of a conference on the "Berlin-Congo conference 1884/85, the partitions of Africa, and its implications for Christian Mission today" held in Germany in 2003, edited by Afe Adogame, Roswith Gerloff and Klaus Hock (Adogame et al. 2008).

in the suburbs of the largest French cities as well as on urban riots. As the Muslim population in France as well as the population of the *banlieues* include many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants, research on Islam in France, on the social structure of the suburbs, on spatial discrimination, the emergence of ghettos and similar issues also covers migrants from sub-Saharan Africa as well as French citizens whose parents or grand-parents moved to France from sub-Saharan Africa (*pars pro toto*: Kastoryano/Diop 1991; Kastoryano 2004; Kepel 1987; Kepel/Arslan/Zouheir 2012; de Galembert 2008). Therefore, there is a larger body of research in France than in Germany which treats the situation and politicisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, *among other things*.

However, although most of the comparatively large corpus of knowledge on African migrants in France does not or not exclusively focus on migrants from *sub-Saharan* Africa, there still is a difference in the amount of research accomplished on sub-Saharan Africans in France and in Germany. Not only does this reveal a greater interest in migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France than in Germany, it can also be seen as a first indicator of the public visibility and, indeed, the sheer numerical importance of Africans in the two countries.

When it comes to analysing the civic and political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France more explicitly, the *sans-papiers* and the housing movements have certainly received most of the attention. As these are covered later in this chapter, it is not necessary to discuss them here. Yet, three important studies focusing on other forms of participation do have to be mentioned at this point.

In their pioneering quantitative study on the attitudes and participation of "les Français issus de l'immigration africaine et turque" - i.e. of naturalised French citizens who originally came from African countries or Turkey, and French-born citizens of African or Turkish descent - the political scientists Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj ask whether these "new" French citizens are "Français comme les autres" (Brouard/Tiberj 2005).[52] In terms of political attitudes, the authors show that French citizen of African and Turkish origin differ from "other French" in several more or less important ways. For instance, politically, they see themselves rather closer to the left (Brouard/Tiberj 2005: 52-58). Most interestingly, those among this group who belong to the lowest classes differ less from those higher up on the social ladder than French citizens with the same social status, but without migration background (Brouard/Tiberj 2005: 136). These French citizens "who emerged from immigration" and who often face great economic difficulties are thus not estranged from the French political system, even if, as Brouard and Tiberj also note, the adoption of "French" values of autonomy, accomplishment or ambition

[52] "Français comme les autres?", "As French as everyone else?", is both the title and the leading question of their study.

leads to intensified relative frustration of those who are excluded from the labour market (Brouard/Tiberj 2005: 136; 138).

In their works, the historians Pap Ndiaye (2008) and Jean-Philippe Dedieu (2012) take a more specific look at Blacks (Ndiaye) and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (Dedieu) in France, but from a broader perspective. While Pap Ndiaye follows the example of the US American Black studies and analyses the situation of Blacks of different origin in France over several centuries, Jean-Philippe Dedieu explicitly concentrates on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. In his book "La voix immigrée" he studies the different forms the public articulation of these migrants takes in France in the second half of the 20th century and highlights, among other things, the impediments that this articulation had to overcome.

When it comes to analysing the religious lives of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France, the situation is comparable to that in Germany insofar as there are a number of case studies which focus on churches and religious associations set up by these migrants (e.g. Dejean 2011; Dejean 2010online; Bleuzen 2008; Coyault 2008; Fancello 2008; 2003). As has been pointed out above, of course, research on Muslims in France also includes Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa more often than similar research in Germany. In addition, there are some case studies which focus on Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in particular (e.g. Soares 2004; Salzbrunn 2002), which do hardly exist for Germany.[53]

Nevertheless, in terms both of their religious and their political involvement, there are gaps in our knowledge about this specific population in France and it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, especially from a comparative Franco-German perspective.

Based mainly on the literature that exists as well as on German and French official statistics and my own interview material, the present chapter gives an overview over the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the two cities and highlights the precarious situation they are in. It also gives a brief overview over the political and religious contexts and, based on the interview material, a first impression of the migrants' perception of these contexts. The chapter demonstrates that both the general vulnerability of this migrant population and the broader context can be reasons, but also barriers for individual participation and collective mobilisation. It highlights that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa from different countries and of different religious orientation have in common that they are socio-economically marginalised and are the victims of racist discrimination and attacks. EU migration policies aim at keeping migrants from the global South out, and border protection measures specifically target "boat" migrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile the political and economic relations between European

[53] For an important exception, see again Salzbrunn (2002).

and sub-Saharan African states are still marked by the systems of exploitation and domination established during colonial times.

This chapter describes this situation and argues that, figuratively, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa could thus be considered a "class-in-itself" despite many internal differences and that would have many reasons to recognise themselves and mobilise as a "class-for-itself".[54] In a last step, it presents a typology of the grievances and frustrations as well as the reasons and goals for political involvement as expressed by the migrants themselves in the interviews made for this study. Not only is chapter four thus the first part of the empirical analysis, it is also the foundation of the general argument of this book.

4.1 African migrants in Berlin and Paris - visible and invisible at the same time

Africans[55] and Germans of African origin constitute only a small minority within the migrant and minority population in Germany. Officially, there are almost half a million African citizens and Germans of African origin[56] resident in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011a), i.e. they make up some 0.6 percent of the population and some 3 percent of the population with "migration background". In addition, there is certainly also a considerable number of undocumented migrants from African countries, but the very mode of migration makes it more or less impossible to gain reliable data on this group.

Publicly accessible German official statistics provide information on registered foreigners by citizenship, and on persons with "migration background" by the continents and the most important countries of their (former) or their parents' citizenship. As the numbers are relatively small, the statistics do not give details on

[54] Cf. Karl Marx's explanations on the idea of a *class-in-itself* with common interests that has been created by the dominant class and that constitutes itself as a *class-for-itself* through its collective struggle (cf. MEW 4: 181-182). See also Marco Martiniello's article on ethnic leaders and the reproduction of the political powerlessness of ethnic communities in Belgium, where he distinguishes ethnic *categories* from ethnic *communities* analogously to the Marxian distinction between a class-in-itself defined by objective features, and a class-for-itself defined by subjective features (Martiniello 2010: 239-241).

[55] Here: Including North Africans.

[56] The German Federal Statistical Office (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) includes all persons with a so-called migration background in their estimate, i.e. everyone who, after 1949, migrated to what is now the territory of the German Federal Republic, as well as all foreigners born in Germany, and everyone born as a German in Germany to at least one immigrant or foreign parent (translation into English by the author; original definition: "Zu den Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund zählen *‚alle nach 1949 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Zugewanderten, sowie alle in Deutschland geborenen Ausländer und alle in Deutschland als Deutsche Geborene mit zumindest einem zugewanderten oder als Ausländer in Deutschland geborenen Elternteil*'" [emphasis and quotation marks in the original]) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011a: 6).

persons with an African migration background by country or region of citizenship. In terms of citizenship and origin, it is therefore unavoidable to content oneself with data on citizens of African countries resident in Germany and, in addition, some aggregated data for those who do have an "African migration background", but who are not necessarily citizens of an African country.

As Figure 6 shows, over the last decade, the total numbers of naturalisations have been declining for African citizens in general, dropping from more than 12,000 new German citizens per annum in 2000 and 2001 to about 10,000 a year since 2008. If we take a closer look at migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, however, we see that numbers have been stable from 2000 until 2002, and there has been a steep increase in naturalisations between 2002 and 2004. Since then, 5,000 to 6,000 former citizens of sub-Saharan countries have acquired German citizenship every year. It is not surprising, therefore, that while according to *Mikrozensus*-based data on "persons with migration background", there are about 486,000 citizens of an African country or children of at least one African citizen (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011a), the Central Register of Foreigners (*Ausländerzentralregister*, AZR) only counts 271,431 citizens of African countries (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011b). When using statistics on African citizens in Germany it is therefore essential to bear in mind that the actual number of African migrants and their descendants who live in Germany is much higher, especially that of sub-Saharan African migrants.



Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009a, Statistisches Bundesamt 2011a; data compilation and graph by the author.

Figure 6. Naturalisations of (former) African citizens in Germany (2000-2010).[57]

French censuses, in contrast, distinguish between "foreigners" and "immigrants", too, but the official statistics published by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies *(Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques*, INSEE) and the National institute for demographic studies (*Institut national d'études démographiques*, INED) do not include a category similar to the German Federal Statistical Office's category "person with migration background". Instead, they provide data on either immigrants, who were "'born abroad as a foreign national' [and] may still be foreigners at the time of the census or may have become French", and foreigners who "may have been born abroad (in which case they are immigrants) or in France (in which case they are not immigrants)" (INED 2012a). The category "foreigners" thus is the same in French and German official statistics, but the category "immigrants" in France includes fewer individuals than "with migra-

[57] Please note: All network representations and some other figures in this book are in black and white in the printed edition, and may be accessed in colour at the accompanying website.

tion background" as it does not include those who were born to at least one foreign or immigrant parent, but in France as French citizens.

Nevertheless, both the number of African immigrants - as defined by INED and INSEE - and the number of African citizens resident in France are higher than the number of persons with an African migration background: the 2008 census counted 1.5 million citizens of African countries and 2.3 million African immigrants in France (INED online 2012b, INED online 2012c), i.e. 2.4 percent and 3.6 percent of the total population, respectively. African immigrants make up some 43 percent of the entire immigrant population, and foreigners from African countries account for 42 percent of the total number of foreigners in France.[58] When North Africans are excluded, the numbers drop significantly to 634,000 immigrants and 447,000 foreigners, so, at least at first glance, these numbers are comparable to the German ones.[59]

4.1.1 African migrants in Germany and France: countries of birth and (former) nationalities

The majority of African citizens who were born outside Germany came as labour migrants when Germany hired foreign workers to overcome labour force shortages in the 1960s (Herbert 2003; Schmid/Borchers 2010: 148), as students, spouses or children of persons already residing in Germany, as highly qualified labour migrants, asylum seekers or refugees (Schmid/Borchers 2010: 144; Benndorf 2008: 41). After 1949, both the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) accepted African migrants as temporary labour migrants, mainly from Algeria, Mozambique and Angola (Benndorf 2008: 148), as well as African students, for example from Algeria, Guinea, Angola or Cameroon (Benndorf 2008: 160). For many reasons, far fewer African migrants were allowed to enter the GDR than were able to migrate to the FRG, and until today there are still fewer Africans in the East than in the West of Germany.

As the Moroccan and the Tunisian governments had been able to negotiate bilateral recruitment agreements with the West German government in 1963 and 1965 respectively, until 1975[60] the Federal Republic accepted especially North Afri-

[58] Data for *France métropolitaine* (INED online 2012b, INED online 2012c), calculations by the author.
[59] However, due to different naturalisation policies it is likely that the number of French citizens born to African immigrants is higher than the number of German citizens born to African immigrants in Germany. The number of children of African migrants who do not appear in the French statistics is therefore also likely to be high.
[60] With the so-called general *Anwerbestopp* in 1975, the Federal Republic put an end to regular labour immigration and made it more difficult to enter the country. Since 1975, family reunion, education, and

cans as labour migrants (Schmid/Borchers 2010: 148). In contrast, a large part of the Ghanaians came on the grounds that they needed protection from persecution (Nieswand 2008: 32-33), while Cameroonian migration, for instance, mainly takes and took the form of educational migration (Baraulina et al. 2008: 24).[61]

More than forty percent of the African citizens in Germany hold the citizenship of a North African country, more than a quarter are citizens of a West African country, while less than fifteen percent have the citizenship of an East African country. Even fewer are citizens of a Central or Southern African country respectively. For the foreign population with citizenship of African countries residing in Germany, it is also possible to identify the main countries of origin. As can be seen in Figure 8, these are, in this order, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Algeria, and Egypt, or excluding North African countries, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Togo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011b).

The list of the most important countries of origin in Berlin varies slightly as African migrants there mainly stem from Cameroon, Ghana, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunesia, Morocco, and Angola. If we take a closer look at what countries migrants from sub-Saharan Africa come from, we see that the great majority are citizens of West African countries, followed by Central and East Africans with citizens of Southern African countries bringing up the rear (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2012a; see Figure 7).

asylum therefore constituted the most important reasons which allowed African migrants to enter Germany as regular migrants.

[61] Baraulina et al. distinguish between an "old" and a "new" migration, with Ghanaians and Moroccans as examples for "old" migrants and Kenyans and Cameroonians for "new" migrants. As the focus here is different, this distinction does not seem necessary for the present work.



(Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009a, Statistisches Bundesamt 2011a; data compilation and graph by the author.)

Figure 7. African citizens in Berlin (by region of origin).

Like the two German states, France opened its borders to foreign workers due to severe labour shortages in the first decades after World War II, and more or less closed them again in the 1970s[62]. Thus, until the mid-1970s, many African labour migrants, especially from Algeria[63], moved to France. Later, family migration became an important form of migration from the African continent to France. In the 1980s and 1990s, the share of migration from the African continent in the overall migration to France has generally increased (Schmid/Borchers 2010: 121; Le Moigne/Lebon 2002: 12-13). The most important countries of origin of African citizens[64] in France are the former French colonies: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

[62] Although the *circulaires* suspending the influx of foreign workers were abolished in 1978, the number of labour migrants entering France dropped significantly (Le Moigne/Lebon 2002: 12).

[63] Before the end of the Algerian War and Algeria's independence in 1962, Algeria counted as French *département* and children born in Algeria to at least one parent born there (or elsewhere in France) before 1962 are French citizens. According to Le Moigne and Lebon, in French censuses, many of them call themselves Algerians (due to the complex citizenship legislation or for other reasons) (Le Moigne/Le Bon 2002: 16).

[64] For better comparability, I will usually use the statistics for African citizens instead of those concerning African immigrants. The present tables give details on both, however.

followed by Mali, Senegal, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo[65], and Guinea. Without North African countries, the list reads, in this order: Mali, Senegal, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Comoros, and Cape Verde. The main regions of origin thus are the same for Germany and France, but the actual countries and the numbers of migrants from the respective countries diverge.

As Figure 9 and Figure 11 illustrate, at the level of the two cities studied here, the total numbers of African migrants present there diverge significantly, which reflects the different colonial histories, the continuously important French influence in North, West and Central Africa as well as France's greater centralisation. 119,000 Parisians and 388,800 of the France-Ileans are citizens of an African country. Not including the three most important North African countries[66], about 53,300 African citizens live in Paris alone, i.e. more than twice as many as in Berlin. Almost 288,000 citizens of sub-Saharan countries (and Egypt)[67] are residents in the region of Ile-de-France, which means that more than half of all African citizens in France live there. As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, African citizens make up a higher percentage of the entire population in the urban German *Länder* of Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, but the African population is generally much more dispersed in Germany than in France. Of course, the same is true for all migrant groups in the two countries, as well as for the entire population, but Africans, nevertheless, also make up a greater share of the foreign population in Paris than in Berlin. Excluding North Africans, the just under 12,000 African citizens residing in Berlin make up 2.5 percent of the foreign population in the city[68], whereas African

[65] The Democratic Republic of Congo is not a former French colony, but a former Belgian possession. Due to its colonial past, it is, however, also a French-speaking country and a member of the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie*. French influence in the Democratic Republic of Congo must therefore not be underestimated.

[66] The INSEE provides the exact number of foreigners residing in Paris as well as in the other *départements* of the Ile-de-France region, giving the exact figures for selected countries and regions of origin (see Figure 12). 65,700 of them are Algerians, Moroccans or Tunisians, while 53,300 of them are citizens of other African countries, including Egypt. 388,800 African inhabitants of the Ile-de-France hold an Algerian, Moroccan, or Tunisian passport, and 288,000 of another African country. For want of more accurate data and as the category "other African country" does not include North African citizens apart from Egyptians, it will be used as a proxy for the foreign population from sub-Saharan countries. It is, however, important to bear in mind that the use of this proxy leads to an overestimation of the number of citizens of sub-Saharan countries residing in Paris and the Ile-de-France. As some 13,600 Egytians officially reside in France (INEDonline 2012c), and as in general, about half of the French African population lives in the Ile-de-France region, it appears reasonable to assume that there are about 6,800 Egyptian residents there. Thus, of the 288,000 citizens of "other African countries" in the Ile-de-France region, an estimated 281,200 are citizens of countries south of the Sahara.

[67] See the previous footnote.

[68] In Berlin, 17,530 residents are citizens of African countries, with 5,599 of them citizens of North African countries, and 11,931 citizens of sub-Saharan countries (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2012a).

citizens[69] account for 16.2 percent of the foreigners in Paris and for 19.9 percent in the Ile-de-France region. Whereas in Berlin, African migrants from countries south of the Sahara are a minority within the minority, in Paris and the Ile-de-France they are the third largest migrant group after Europeans and North Africans.

This is particularly relevant for the present research as the different share African migrants make up of the migrant population as well as of the entire population is likely to influence the way this group is perceived.

[69] Again, excluding Moroccons, Algerians, and Tunisians, but including Egyptians.

African citizens in Germany.

Citizenship	*Total no. of residents in Germany*
Morocco	63,570
Tunesia	22,956
Ghana	**21,377**
Nigeria	**18,675**
Cameroon	**14,876**
Algeria	13,199
Egypt	12,278
Togo	**10,594**
Congo (Democratic Republic)	**10,495**
Ethiopia	**10,004**
Kenya	**9,246**
Eritrea	**7,079**
Somalia	**6,495**
Angola	**6,416**
South Africa	**4,472**
Libya	4,332
Guinea	**3,430**
Gambia	**3,204**
Côte d'Ivoire	**2,624**
Sierra Leone	**2,527**
Sudan	**2,420**
Senegal	**2,281**
Mozambique	**2,091**
Congo, Republic	**1,732**
Benin	**1,659**

(Data: Statistisches Bundesamt 2011b; table compiled by the author).

Figure 8. African citizens resident in Germany: most important countries of citizenship.

African citizens in Berlin.

Citizenship	*Total no. of residents in Berlin*
Cameroon	**1,828**
Ghana	**1,716**
Egypt	1,642
Nigeria	**1,578**
Tunesia	1,518
Morocco	1,151
Angola	**843**
Kenia	**833**
Algeria	810
Libya	478
Guinea	**471**
Ethiopia	**443**
Mozambique	**418**
South Africa	**410**
(Former) Sudan	**322**
Sierra Leone	**280**
Congo (Demokratic Republic)	**278**
Senegal	**253**
Gambia	**215**
Togo	**211**
Benin	**187**
Côte d'Ivoire	**183**
Congo, Republic	**161**
Tanzania	**132**
Uganda	**129**

(Data: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2012a; table compiled by the author).

Figure 9. African citizens resident in Berlin: most important countries of citizenship.

African immigrants and African citizens in France.

Country of birth	*Total no. of residents in France (France métropolitaine)*
Algeria	712,813
Morocco	653,355
Tunisia	234,442
Senegal	**74,816**
Côte-d'Ivoire	**59,589**
Mali	**58,320**
Cameroon	**58,163**
Congo	**53,406**
Congo (Democratic Republic)	**52,657**
Madagascar	**43,895**
Mauritius	**31,346**
Comoros	**23,344**
Egypt	22,527
Guinea	**20,822**
Cape Verde	**19,240**
Togo	**17,620**
Angola	**15,843**
Benin	**13,678**
Mauritania	**13,099**
Gabon	**11,999**
Central African Republic	**11,115**
Burkina Faso	**5,541**
Ghana	**5,475**
Ethiopia	**5,456**

(Data: INEDonline 2012b; table compiled by the author).

Figure 10. African immigrants resident in France: most important countries of birth.

African citizens resident in France:

Citizenship	*Total no. of residents in France (France métropolitaine)*
Algeria	470,553
Morocco	443,330
Tunisia	143,618
Mali	**59,950**
Senegal	**50,173**
Congo	**47,836**
Côte-d'Ivoire	**42,132**
Cameroon	**38,887**
Congo (Democratic Republic)	**37,123**
Guinea	**23,891**
Madagascar	**16,722**
Comoros	**16,505**
Egypt	13,625
Cape Verde	**13,274**
Angola	**12,518**
Mauritius	**12,482**
Mauritania	**10,364**
Gabon	**9,850**
Togo	**9,440**
Benin	**7,622**
Central African Republic	**7,579**
Ghana	**3,766**
Burkina Faso	**3,423**
Niger	**2,837**

(Data: INEDonline 2012c; table compiled by the author).

Figure 11. African citizens resident in France: most important countries of citizenship.

Foreigners in Paris and in the *départements* of the Ile-de-France region.

	As of 1st January 2008				
	Paris	**Seine-et-Marne**	**Yvelines**	**Essonne**	**Hauts-de-Seine**
French	**1,881,375**	1,205,575	1,282,733	1,098,507	1,372,714
French by birth	**1,689,757**	1,118,333	1,198,154	1,011,854	1,244,163
French by acquisition	**191,618**	87,241	84,580	86,653	128,550
Foreigners	**329,922**	98,127	123,320	107,343	176,905
Spain	**11,731**	3,046	2,942	2,032	4,597
Italy	**14,202**	3,199	3,096	3,233	4,426
Portugal	**28,574**	25,661	30,109	26,478	25,292
Other countries of the EU	**43,043**	7,169	15,734	6,211	16,555
Other European countries	**14,900**	1,824	2,580	2,270	5,249
Morocco	**20,817**	6,770	18,523	8,676	25,785
Algeria	**29,706**	11,014	13,023	11,542	25,050
Tunisia	**15,185**	2,740	2,566	4,613	6,936
Other African countries	**53,338**	**20,046**	**19,109**	**26,269**	**31,355**
Turkey	**4,489**	6,148	4,510	6,148	1,820
Other countries	**93,937**	10,510	11,129	9,872	29,840
Total	**2,211,297**	1,303,702	1,406,053	1,205,850	1,549,619

	As of 1st January 2008				
	Seine-Saint-Denis	**Val-de-Marne**	**Val-d'Oise**	**Ile-de-France**	**France métropolitaine**
French	1,191,782	1,142,969	1,037,047	**10,212,702**	58,531,451
French by birth	1,005,725	1,013,490	926,621	**9,208,098**	55,808,471
French by acquisition	186,057	129,479	110,427	**1,004,604**	2,722,980
Foreigners	314,684	167,907	128,350	**1,446,558**	3,603,415
Spain	4,452	2,926	2,454	**34,181**	128,494
Italy	5,705	5,248	2,791	**41,898**	173,593
Portugal	32,167	34,108	23,276	**225,663**	490,502
Other countries of the EU	13,391	10,262	5,737	**118,102**	504,440
Other European countries	10,594	4,270	1,815	**43,501**	153,760
Morocco	33,266	11,124	15,665	**140,627**	443,330
Algeria	54,815	25,340	18,774	**189,265**	470,553
Tunisia	15,043	7,466	4,328	**58,875**	143,618
Other African countries	**74,869**	**36,382**	**26,627**	**287,995**	**460,434**
Turkey	16,648	4,973	11,041	**55,778**	221,925
Other countries	53,734	25,808	15,841	**250,673**	412,768
Total	1,506,466	1,310,876	1,165,397	**11,659,260**	62,134,866

(Data and table: INSEEonline 2012a; translation into English by the author; emphasis by the author).

Figure 12. Foreigners in Paris and the Ile-de-France.

4.1.2 A young and precarious population

Despite demographic differences between France and Germany in general, the sub-Saharan population diverges from the majority in both countries. As Figure 13 shows most eloquently for the German case, the age structure is very different from that of the average population. With hardly any migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the age of retirement and few older than forty-five, this population diverges greatly from the increasingly "old" majority marked by demographic change. Yet, not only is the sub-Saharan population in Berlin as well as in Paris much younger than the average population (Statistisches Landesamt 2012a, INEDonline 2012b), it is also a population with a surplus of men: As (male) labour migration had for a long time been the main reason for moving from the African continent to Europe, the labour force participation rate as well as the rate of employment was high (cf. Benndorf 2008: 254). With other reasons for migration - education, family reunification, and asylum - becoming more important, the gender composition, as well as the labour force participation and employment rates have changed. Nonetheless, men are still in the majority both in Germany and in France (Schmid/Borchers 2010: 144, 148; INEDonline 2012b).[70]

[Not including North Africans.]



(Data: Statistisches Landesamt 2012a; table by the author.)

Figure 13. Age composition: African citizens and Germans in Berlin by citizenship.

[70] In France, however, the gender gap today is smaller than in Germany (INEDonline 2012b).

In spite of their young average age, the overrepresentation of men, and although mainly the better off and the better educated migrate - i.e. against the *cliché* the migrants moving from (sub-Saharan) Africa to Europe are precisely not the poorest and least qualified (cf. Elwert/Elwert 2011: 92) - Africans face severe difficulties on the labour German market. Indeed, Baraulina, Borchers and Schmid (2008) identify three factors that impede the labour market access of migrants from both North and sub-Saharan Africa. First, it is a matter of formal access to the labour market based on the legal residence status the individual migrant has acquired. Only about 70 percent of the African citizens residing in Germany are allowed to work, and some of them have only subordinate access[71] to the labour market. The second barrier rendering access to the labour market difficult is the fact that school, vocational, and university degrees often are not recognized by German authorities. This devaluation of qualifications hits academics particularly hard, although more recent migrants and young people who came to study at a German university seem to be able to make more of their degrees. The third hurdle is what the authors call the "factual access" to the labour market: the actual employment rate of Africans in Germany is low, and many who are in paid work are in marginal employment[72]. What is more, many Africans work in economic sectors that are particularly sensitive to cyclical variations and thus have a higher risk of bankruptcy (Baraulina et al. 2008: 12).

While a lack of (formal) education or language competencies may play an important role for the "factual access" to the labour market, it is also possible that discrimination is a reason for the difficulties Africans face. Annika and Frederik Elwert partly confirm this assumption in their analysis of the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa on the German labour market: they show that Germans and persons with a different migration background face fewer difficulties in entering the labour market and that neither this fact nor the concentration of Africans in precarious labour market sectors can be explained by the attained level of education (Elwert/Elwert 2011: 122-123). To be sure, this is at least in part due to the non-recognition of foreign degrees and qualifications by the German authorities already mentioned above. Nevertheless, as Elwert and Elwert note, the data available does include children of migrants with foreign citizenship so that it is possible that even

[71] The Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory distinguishes between "foreigners who possess the same legal status as German workers with regard to the right to take up employment or other foreigners who are entitled to preferential access to the labour market under the law of the European Union" (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2012a) and those who do not enjoy the same rights as German or EU citizens. The latter group of foreigners can only be employed if there is no one else available to fill this particular position.

[72] "Geringfügige Beschäftigung" in German, i.e. a minor employment with earnings below a certain level, exempt from social security and with special regulations in income tax legislation.

African citizens who completed their education in Germany face more hurdles when looking for a job than others (Elwert/Elwert 2011: 122). Indeed, in terms of the vocational education of the second generation, Benndorf observes a "culture of exclusion", since young Africans are not represented in many sectors (Benndorf 2008: 295).

To be sure, Benndorf's, the Elwerts' and Baraulina and her colleagues' analyses include only "foreigners", and some barriers such as the subordinate access to the labour market fall with the acquisition of German citizenship. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that German citizens of African origin who did not acquire their vocational training or university degree in Germany or in Europe or the US will be able to make more of their qualifications than foreigners. What is more, the effects of discrimination based on racist prejudice may be reduced by the fact that someone is not a foreigner, but they are unlikely to disappear completely. Also, the official statistics Baraulina, Borchers and Schmid used do not include undocumented migrants, either. These are most likely to face great difficulties on the labour market, and to be victims of severe exploitation.

For France, the historian Pap Ndiaye describes a similar situation when he speaks of "les veilleurs de nuit les plus diplômés du monde", the best educated night-watchmen of the world (Ndiaye 2008: 300). According to him, even young Blacks with degrees from (French) universities find it difficult to be accepted even for an internship, let alone permanent employment (Ndiaye 2008: 307-8). In the light of the difficulties that highly qualified migrants from sub-Saharan Africa with secure residence status and French citizens of sub-Saharan origin face, it is not surprising that the situation of undocumented workers is particularly precarious. Their despairing working and living conditions as well as the great difficulties (Black) Africans face when looking for accommodation are well documented (pars pro toto: Ludwig 2008; Péchu 1999; Breyer 2011). Although both social scientists and the media frequently focus on the political mobilisation of the so-called *sans-papiers,* these studies usually reveal above all the great vulnerability of a population who often has been residing in France for a long period of time, but who is constantly threatened by deportation.

It is important to note that in terms of their residence status, not only those migrants who entered France or Germany without the correct documents, or who overstayed their visa, are in a precarious situation. The great majority of all claims for asylum are rejected by German courts (Schmid/Borchers 2010: 153-154). In addition, those who have acquired only short-term residence permits live in the constant worry not to have them renewed. Therefore migrants who had been in possession of valid documents may become "undocumented" at one moment in time because their residence permit is not renewed and they are not prepared to leave the country because of their jobs, families depending on their income, or their own and their children's social relations in their place of settlement. Both in France

and Germany, undocumented migrants are increasingly criminalised (Breyer 2011: 33).

In a nutshell, the African population both in Berlin and Paris is a young and precarious population: access to the labour market is not easy, many are employed in badly paid jobs and thereby excluded from social security, their degrees and other qualifications are often devalued and finding housing or a placement for vocational training is difficult. What is especially important for the present study is that this most likely indicates a general lack of resources that are relevant for political participation and mobilisation: money, time, and experience are hard to come by if you are young, in a difficult economic or housing situation and potentially threatened by deportation. At the same time, as many migrants from sub-Saharan African experience relative deprivation and exclusion, they have many reasons to mobilise.

The interlocutors who participated in this study are more or less typical for this population.[73] A majority went to university or received comparable professional training either in their country of origin or in Europe; many moved to Europe as students or to work there. At the same time, at least four came as undocumented migrants; one was sent to Europe by the Catholic Church to work and study there without much of a choice. While some have prestigious and well-paid white-collar jobs and work, for instance, as a medical doctor or an engineer, others have a considerably lower occupational status or no job at all. Almost all were in working age, generally between thirty-five and sixty years old. Except for some French and German interlocutors without migration background who were interviewed as gatekeepers or because of their position in a particular organisation, only two interlocutors were female. While Afe Adogame observes an increasing feminisation of African migration as well as of African diaspora religiosity (Adogame 2008), this was not (yet) the case for the organisations that participated in the present study.[74] Generally, the variety in terms of education, occupation and gender was greater in Paris than in Berlin, which probably reflects the different history and numerical importance of immigration from sub-Saharan Africa to the two places.

While it would be methodologically problematic to deduce too much from these observations, it appears appropriate to note that in terms of their migration history and their socioeconomic status, the participants in the study are more or less representative for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, with an above-the-average level of education. More importantly, they are also typical for politically active individuals. Although the participants in this study were selected because they represent

[73] Since most of them have attained a medium or high level of education - with few exceptions, all of them from France - the interlocutors' educational status, on average, most probably is above that of the majority of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

[74] Interestingly, at the time this is written, i.e. some time after the interviews in Berlin were made, the *Afrika-Rat*'s board includes as many women as men (Afrika-Rat 2012online).

particular organisations, on average, they have two important characteristics which increase the likelihood of political involvement: they are male and have attained a more or less high level of education.

4.1.3 The religious makeup of the population from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris

Obviously, for the present study it is not sufficient to concentrate on the socio-economic situation and demographic makeup of the migrant population from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris. Instead, it is important to know more about their religious composition, too. Neither for Berlin nor for Paris are these data available. It is, however, possible, if not to know the exact numbers, then at least to estimate roughly the ratio of Muslims and Christians from sub-Saharan Africa in both cities.

For want of more exact data, the number of Muslims, Christians, followers of African traditional religions and others was estimated very roughly based on the religious demography of each country of origin and the number of citizens of these countries residing in Berlin. Where possible, the data on the religious makeup of the countries of origin were drawn from the CIA World Factbook[75], while the number of citizens of each country who live in Berlin was taken from the official statistics published by the Statistical Office of Berlin and Brandenburg. The information available on the religious makeup in the countries of origin was transferred and the percentage of the total population that each broad religious category (Christians, Muslims, followers of traditional/indigeneous religions, others/miscellaneous) accounts for in each country was used to calculate the size of the respective religious group from each country residing in Berlin. The number of citizens of all countries by religious category was then added up and the percentage of the sub-Saharan African population in Berlin that each religious category accounts for was calculated.

[75] In their report "Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa" the US-based PEW Research Center offers different estimates, and theirs might be more independent, less politically biased data. However, the PEW data itself stem from different sources and "should be viewed as broad approximations" (PEW Research Center 2010: 62), too. What is more, the PEW data unfortunately are only available for a limited number of countries and in some cases they diverge significantly from other data. In order to increase uniformity of methodology as much as possible and to avoid introducing an even greater bias in the calculations, it seemed reasonable to use data from a single source which – hopefully – had applied the same methodology for each country. I therefore decided to rely on the CIA data although these are likely to be politically and strategically biased. Unfortunately, for six countries, the World Factbook does not provide any or imprecise information on their religious makeup, either, so I used the "International Religious Freedom Report" published by the U.S. Department of State and country information provided by the German Foreign Office as additional sources.



(Basic data: Statistisches Landesamt 2012b; CIAonline 2012; AAonline 2012a, 2012b; Department of State 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d; calculations and graph by the author.)

Figure 14. Sub-Saharan African citizens in Berlin: Religion.

As Figure 14 illustrates, according to these calculations, Christians make up more than half of the population from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin. Muslims account for just over one fourth of the population, followed by adepts of traditional African religions with less than a fifth.

To be sure, these estimates must be interpreted with great care as they are likely to be biased in several ways. First of all, the data on the religious demography in the countries of origin stem from different sources and, as the CIA is not very explicit on their methodology, it is not always clear how they were collected and if they are measuring the same thing in each country. Also, the calculations do not take into account whether the religious demography of migrants corresponds to the religious demography of the average population of the country of origin. Neither do they take into consideration whether the migrants who moved to Germany share the same characteristics as all migrants from the respective country. It is, however, very likely that for some countries and for certain periods of time, religion itself may have been a motive for migration and thus members of a particular group will have moved disproportionately often. Also, in one country or the other, adepts of one religion may belong disproportionately often to a wealthier class than followers of another religion and will be able to afford migrating to Europe more easily. At the same time, relative deprivation may of course be a reason for migration, too. Fur-

thermore, for some time, moving to Germany may have been more attractive for Christians than for Muslims from the same country as the latter may have preferred to go to countries with more multicultural policies such as the UK or the Netherlands. At the same time, Germany may have been more attractive for believers of all religions including Muslims than France for example with its strict *laïcité* policy. Finally yet significantly, the estimates do not include former African citizens who have acquired German citizenship by naturalisation - and it cannot be excluded that members of one religious category became German citizens more often than the others.

It is, however, the best estimate that was achievable as it would have been impossible to correctly estimate the likelihood with which Muslims, Christians or others leave their country in order to migrate to Germany in proportion to their share in the average population of their country of origin for at least the last fifty or sixty years. Also, if most migrants enter Germany as labour migrants, students, asylum seekers or in order to join family members, it appears reasonable to assume that religion usually does not play a decisive role in their choice to migrate to Germany. To be sure, while economic reasons are very likely to be far more important than religious ones, it cannot be excluded that a number of refugees and asylum seekers fled their country due to religious rather than political persecution and that some labour migrants left because of discriminating employment practices against their religious group in their country of origin. It is, however, impossible to confirm whether this is the case for all of these groups.



(Basic data: INEDonline 2012b; CIAonline 2012; Department of State 2012a, 2012d; calculations and graph by the author.)

Figure 15. Sub-Saharan African citizens in France: Religion.

For Paris, it is even more difficult to estimate the share of Christians, Muslims and followers of other religions from sub-Saharan Africa living in the city and its *banlieue* due to the lack of exact data on the different nationalities present there. Therefore, the best solution was to estimate the percentage of the migrant population from sub-Saharan Africa in France made up by each religious category. Using the INED data on "immigrants[76]" presented above, the same calculations were applied to the French case that were made for Berlin. As Figure 15 shows an estimated forty per cent of the immigrant population in France born in a sub-Saharan country are Muslims, while thirty-five per cent are Christians. One fifth follows an an African religion. Although it is not possible to confirm this assumption empirically, for the purposes of this research it seems reasonable and justifiable to suppose that the relative importance of each religious category in the Ile-de-France corresponds approximately to its relative importance in France. Obviously, the estimate for France is as problematic as the one for Berlin and things become even more imprecise when the percentages estimated for France are transferred to the sub-

[76] For the difference between "immigrants" and "foreigners" in French demographic statistics, see above.

Saharan African population of the Ile-de-France region. Nevertheless, the estimates for France (and the Ile-de-France/Paris) and for Berlin at least give an idea of the religious demography of the populations in question and in spite of their imprecision are still helpful.

The point most relevant for the present research is that these estimates indicate that there are roughly one and a half times more Christians from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin than there are Muslims, while the difference is much smaller in France/Paris. The absolute and relative numbers are very likely to influence the visibility of the different groups and their ability to mobilise as a group: Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa are much more likely to be present in public space in Paris than in Berlin, and in Berlin they are likely to find it harder to mobilise than Christians. At the same time, the estimates also suggest that both groups are present in both cities and that their numbers are not insignificantly small, as even in Berlin there should be a few thousand Muslim citizens of sub-Saharan countries and Muslim Afro-Germans.

Without a doubt, the visibility and perception of a group does not depend on its size alone. Rather, the political and, in this case, also the religious context also shape the way a group is perceived and perceives itself. It also influences whether a part of a population is or is not perceived as a group at all and whether it does or does not perceive itself as such. The following section will therefore briefly sketch the political and religious context in which migrants from sub-Saharan Africa may - or may not - get involved in.

4.2 The political and religious contexts: a short overview

The previous sub-chapter has concentrated on the demographics of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France and Germany, and Paris and Berlin respectively, and highlighted the precarious situation many of these migrants are in. The second sub-chapter further stresses the general vulnerability of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa by outlining the general context of their presence and their possible participation in society. It argues that border and citizenship regimes, racism as well as the legacy of European colonialism add to the marginalisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and would give reason for collective mobilisation as a group. Each section starts with an outline of the general context and then sketches briefly how the migrants themselves described the precariousness of their situation in the interviews. The chapter closes with a typology of collective grievances and frustrations as well motivations for political involvement as they are expressed by the migrants in the two capital cities.

4.2.1 Borders

While decades after the last African countries have gained their "independence", Europe still has enormous influence on the African continent, its borders are tightly shut for most Africans willing to cross the Mediterranean Sea. The grave effects of the Schengen Agreements, European border policies and the creation of the "European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union" (Frontex) become manifest most emblematically in the fences boarding off the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and in the migrant boats bound for Italian, Maltese, Spanish, or Greek shores. As Jørgen Carling notes, at the Spanish-African border there were at least 21 boat accidents with ten or more migrants dying in 2003 and 2004 alone (Carling 2007: 328). The catastrophes at the shores of Lampedusa and elsewhere show that the numbers of deaths have grown significantly since.

In a politically charged atmosphere, the figure of the desperate African migrant crossing the Mediterranean Sea or the Atlantic Ocean in a breakneck attempt to enter the European Union has become a symbol for what some call the "migration pressure" (e.g. Carling 2007: 319) that is supposed to weigh on Europe. The German conservative broadsheet Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for instance, portrays these migrants as part of a "rush of illegal immigrants" that the European Union has to prepare for and against which it has to equip itself[77] (Carstens 2007online) and it fears that an end of the "Immigrantenstrom[s]", the tide of immigrants, is not in sight (FAZ.NET 2006online). Simultaneously, undocumented migrants from all over the world, and especially "boat migrants" from Africa, are often depicted as victims of "smugglers" or "traffickers", who themselves are described as criminals taking advantage of the migrants' despair (e.g. Carling 2007; FAZ.NET 2006online).[78] African migrants are thus presented as a danger to European societies, and, at the same time, as deprived of their actorship and autonomy. Represented both as illegal and potentially dangerous intruders and as passive contraband goods, they are simultaneously criminalised and commodified; "the" undocumented migrant is constructed as helpless and, at the same time, threatening.

Furthermore, the "boat migrants" have become a symbol for the contradictions and failures of European migration and border policies. As Kohnert argues, the EU benefits from terms of trade between the EU and the ACP countries that

[77] The author uses the German expression „sich rüsten gegen", which in this context means both „to prepare" and „to embattle": "Die Europäische Union (EU) rüstet sich gegen einen bevorstehenden Andrang illegaler Einwanderer und Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge auf ihre Grenzen."

[78] It is not only the conservative *FAZ* that uses terms like these: For example, the more liberal broadsheet *Süddeutsche Zeitung* recently called Mauretania a bulwark against immigration from the countries of the Sahel ("Bollwerk gegen Immigration aus den Sahel-Staaten") (Obermaier/Schenck 2012online).

are extremely unbalanced, and thus is co-responsible for the desperate economic situation on the African continent and for migration from sub-Saharan countries to Europe (Kohnert 2006: 4-6). Despite these unfair trading relations, which in fact are a heritage of European imperialism, and the resulting effects pushing people to leave their countries, the EU still prefers to try and seal its borders rather than to reduce the economic pressure that weighs on African societies and political systems. Indeed, during the first two years of the Frontex agency alone, coordinated actions stopped 53,000 persons trying to enter the EU[79] (Busch 2008: 18).[80]

Of course, borders cannot be "sealed" completely. Rather, the effect of measures like these is rather that migration routes become more expensive and more dangerous, but migration itself does not cease. What happens, then, is that Europe continues to take advantage of the economic inferiority and powerlessness of most African countries and also imports highly vulnerable and thus cheap labour. Undocumented migrants, who moved to Europe at great risk and with considerable financial efforts of whole families, and who have little to no rights in the countries they have arrived in, are forced to accept work under abominable conditions and at starvation wages.

What is more, the increased border controls shape both the selection process of who can afford to migrate (Kohnert 2006; Elwert/Elwert 2011) and the way European societies perceive these migrants. Both the indirect selection of migrants and the perception of those residing in France and Germany - with or without permission - are most relevant for the present research, as the vulnerability, but also the social makeup of African migrants shape what resources they have at their disposal. Even if most migrants from sub-Saharan Africa come or came with a permission to work, as students, or to join their relatives already residing in Germany or France and, thus, do not belong to the most vulnerable group of the *sans-papiers*, they are still affected by border regimes which mainly aim at fencing off undesired migrants and at creating a reservoir of extremely cheap labour without any rights. First of all, the representation of (African) undocumented migrants as both criminal and helpless and without autonomy also marks the way migrants with residence permit are perceived. Secondly, the general level of vulnerability and the amount of resources available among all migrants from sub-Saharan Africa obviously influences their possibility to mobilise and act as a group. Also, as especially the French *sans-papiers* movement has shown, border and immigration policies give much rea-

[79] At all EU borders taken together.

[80] Due to the war in Syria and the political situation in Eritrea, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries, the number of refugees on their precarious route to Europe has grown in recent years and changed the composition of the migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea in order to reach the EU. Still, Africans and others alike find more or less closed borders – with the exception of the very short "summer of welcome" in 2015.

son to mobilise and get involved politically - despite the high risk that undocumented migrants run when getting active in the open - and are likely to arouse the solidarity of members of the majority, but also of other migrants enjoying a more secure residence status.

Although individual characteristics such as the personal history of migration did not belong to the criteria of selection since the interlocutors were chosen as representatives of a particular type of organisation, this is also reflected in the sample of interviewed persons in this study: unsurprisingly, a large number of the persons who participated in the interviews have attained a high level of education and moved to Europe as students or graduate students, a considerable part of the interlocutors had once been undocumented migrants. Accordingly, in several interviews, the issue of "papiers", "Papiere",[81] played an important role (Int1; Int4; Int31; Int33; Int36; Int37; Int39; Int42[82]). Most of the interlocutors who raised this issue either had come to Europe as undocumented migrants themselves or work with undocumented migrants in their everyday social work or both.

In their accounts, the experiences they made as or with undocumented migrants play an important role for their social work or for their political engagement: Several pastors in Berlin spend much of their time on providing or organising the provision of legal support or pastoral care for undocumented migrants (Int1; Int3; Int4; Int7), and some of them make it also part of their political engagement to campaign for more welcoming policies (Int1; Int3).

In addition, several interlocutors from Berlin highlight the great vulnerability and dependency of undocumented migrants as well as of asylum seekers whose cases are still pending. While many of the undocumented migrants came to Europe in order to work (Int4) or to receive an education (Int39), as undocumented migrants, they do not have a work permit and often end up in very difficult work situations. Similarly, asylum seekers, whose cases are pending, have not been allowed to work in Germany until recent changes and in addition are usually forced to live in "shared accommodations" where they are at the mercy of persons who take advantage of their situation. One of the pastors from Berlin, for instance, highlighted the fact that the migrants in these "homes" often were the victims of different forms of abuse including sexual exploitation (Int1).

In contrast to the situation in Berlin, where there is no organised *sans-papiers* movement (see also Breyer 2011: 45), in Paris, the experience of undocu-

[81] In both French and German, the term "papers" stands for the visa and other documents a foreigner needs for a regular stay in the country.

[82] To ensure the readability of the text based on interview material as well as the anonymity of the interlocutors, a list of all interviews with information on the date and place of the interviews etc. will be provided in the appendix. In the actual chapters, only abbreviations of the kind "Int1" for the first interview in the list, "Int2" for the second one etc. will be used.

mented migrants is more politicised. Not only did two of the interlocutors raise the fact that "les papiers" made life difficult for both regular and undocumented migrants as the most important issue defining the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris (Int33). But, as will be described in more detail later, several of them were involved in the struggles for better living conditions of documented and especially undocumented migrants, i.e. mostly for their regularisation and for better housing conditions (Int33, Int36; Int39).

Hassle with the authorities and bad or no accommodation also were the two big issues that the French interlocutors raised in relation to undocumented migrants, while in Berlin "work" - i.e. the lack of money necessary to survive in Berlin, to pay back the persons who helped them enter the country, and to support their families back home - and the fear of expulsion were the two big issues linked to an insecure residence status.

4.2.2 Citizenship

The question of who is allowed to enter France or Germany respectively directly leads to new questions concerning the status of migrants who become permanent residents there. "Who should be permitted to stay – and on what terms?" ask Thomas Faist and Peter Kivisto in their 2010 book on transnational migration, as "[o]nce immigrants are allowed into a country, their status in that country needs to be sorted out." (Kivisto/Faist 2010: 225). Once they have crossed the border, it is necessary to decide what rights and duties migrants should have in their new country. Indeed, as the limited formal labour market access of African citizens described above as well as the precarious residence status of some of them indicate, especially citizenship and nationality are still of relevance - and most importantly so for those who hold the "wrong" passport, i.e. who happen to be citizens of poor or weak states.

What is particularly relevant for the present work is that on the one hand it has become easier to acquire German citizenship, and thus to get politically active as a German citizen with full political, social and cultural rights. For migrants from sub-Saharan Africa with regular residence status it rather recently has become more straight-forward to opt for a German passport if they see their future in this country, to become part of the *demos*, and to get involved in internal political affairs. The French concept of citizenship, in contrast, stresses the voluntaristic element of citizenship as a heritage of the French Revolution and thus French political culture has been marked by very different discourses than German political culture. Indeed, while the citizenship legislation of both countries recently tends to converge, for four to five decades after World War II, the FRG maintained a legislation which not only excluded migrants as foreigners from many forms of political participation, but

also kept them from becoming German. Naturalisation was not encouraged, and German citizenship law did not include *ius soli* which meant that most descendents of migrants born on German territory were not German citizens but foreigners. However, social rights were often extended to long-term residents without German citizenship (cf. Soysal 1997; Weinbach 2005). In France, on the contrary, foreigners were excluded from a number of social and civic rights (cf. Colas 2004) and until 1981 forbidden to form even apolitical associations. However, they were able to become French citizens much more easily, especially if they had been born on French territory.

At the same time, these different processes of inclusion go alongside a process of closure. The lines between citizens and non-citizens are re-sharpened as many long-term residents become German citizens and as French politicians aim at reinforcing "national identity". At the same time, lines between long-term residents with secure residence status and residents with insecure or short-term residence status are not blurred as the extension of social and political rights often does not include foreigners with insecure or short-term residence status. What is more, the precarious residence situation of many non-EU migrants can become perpetuated and thus may lead to a "permanent situation of transition", i.e. to a situation where *de facto* long-term residents remain in a situation where they enjoy only the rights of short-term visitors or passers-by.

Nevertheless, since the two states aim at reinforcing the link between rights, national belonging and citizenship, but also have to make allowance for the presence of migrants and descendants of migrants who are not French or German citizens, both processes - of opening and closure - are not as clear-cut as it may seem. On the one hand, as Weinbach shows, the European Union adds force to the ambiguity of these processes (Weinbach 2005). What is particularly interesting here is that some political rights have been extended to include EU citizens, and have spurred debates whether these rights should not be afforded to non-EU citizens as well. The right to vote in local elections, for instance, has been extended to EU citizens both in France and Germany. On the other hand, however, differences between EU citizens and citizens of third countries are still significant. In France, it has been debated several times whether the right to vote in local elections should be accorded also to third country nationals, and attempts have been made to change the law "but constitutional and political obstacles" have been in the way of such changes (Bauböck 2003: 703). It is nonetheless an important difference to Germany where no serious attempt to introduce such legislation has been made so far.[83]

[83] In 1989, the parliament of the *Land* of Schleswig-Holstein passed a new bill in order to change the local voting legislation (*Gesetz zur Änderung des Gemeinde- und Kreiswahlgesetzes*) that accorded citizens of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland the right to vote in local elections.

At the same time, legislation and formal rights alone do not determine the political opportunity structure for migrant mobilisation. Quite the contrary, discourses on "who and what are considered reasonable, sensible, and legitimate" (Koopmans 2004: 451) are just as relevant. What Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut note for the USA, i.e. that migrants are often perceived as "sappers of democracy, linguistic unity, and territorial integrity" (Portes/Rumbaut 1996: 94), is also true for France and Germany and reduces the legitimacy of migrants as political actors. In more theoretical terms, especially proponents of the POS approach stress the importance of citizenship rules for the mobilisation and claims-making of migrants and minorities, but also highlight that "citizenship" is composed of rules and of discourses which are as important and which are not always congruent with the actual legislation in a particular country.

Of course it is neither the aim nor is it within the scope of this book to fully analyse the discursive context of migrant political involvement in France and Germany or, to limit the focus to the local level, in Berlin and Paris. While it is important to bear in mind the heritage of the different nationalist ideologies and the respective discourses and legislation of the two countries, it is hence equally important to take a look at the way these contexts are perceived by the migrants themselves. Prevailing or changing concepts of the nation, debates and conflicts over citizenship legislation and similar context factors are reflected in the interview material in different ways.

To an extent, the way migrants and their descendants are seen and see themselves still reflects the different understandings of what it means to be a member of the French Republic or to be German - understandings still marked by French (assimilationist) republicanism and German ethno-culturalism[84] - although differences between French and German citizenship legislation and between the concepts of national belonging have become less pronounced. This becomes apparent, for instance, when persons who participated in the study voice the feeling that "der Migrant bleibt immer der Migra-Migrant in Deutschland", a migrant always stays a migrant in Germany (Int18), or when they stress that, in their view, integra-

Yet, the Federal Constitutional Court overturned the bill in 1990 (Tschentscher 2012online). Obviously, it would not have extended the right to vote to non-European migrants in any case.

[84] For France, the historian Pap Ndiaye notes: "Du point de vue du rapport au national, les Noirs de France ressemblent à ceux des Étas-Unis, attachés à leur identité états-unisienne : d'une part, la plupart considèrent que l'identité française est une carte majeure de leur portefeuille identitaire ; d'autre part, que cette identité vaut aussi en ce qu'elle offre une protection juridique minimale notamment face aux pouvoirs publics. Se réclamer français, c'est réclamer l'égalité des droits réels" (Ndiaye 2008: 285). In other words, the French Black minority considers their being French citizens an important part of their identity - being French in itself is important to them - as well as a basis for legitimately claiming the same rights as other French. This attitude palpably reflects the French concept of the nation and the promises that come with a political understanding of the nation.

tion is a process where both sides have to change and make a step towards each other, but that many Germans see it as a one-sided process only (Int3). Whereas the majority of the interlocutors from Berlin express their impression that "migrants" are perceived as inherently and immutably different and that "integration" describes a process of domination of the "Other" by the non-migrant population, citizenship legislation itself is not described as a problem. Quite the contrary, several interlocutors describe naturalisation as a rather unspectacular process; in one case even as something they did not really want to do, but still did - most interestingly - for religious reasons (Int10).

At the same time, many interlocutors in Berlin criticise the way African migrants (are supposed to) integrate in Berlin and Germany. On the one hand, especially migrants who have spent a long time in Germany express great frustration concerning "integration" and condemned mainly what they perceive as the dominant German concept of "integration" as one-dimensional, simplistic, and assimilationist (Int18; Int20). On the other hand, both younger and older migrants stress the notion that the actual "integration" in the labour market and other sectors of German society is low and that it is generally difficult for migrants from (sub-Saharan) Africa to be treated with the same respect as non-migrant Germans or even members of other migrant populations (Int1; Int3; Int5; Int8; Int12; Int13; Int19; Int20). It is thus less the legal act of becoming a German citizen which is perceived as complicated or problematic than the actual participation in German society.

Most interestingly, this is similar in France. Obviously, becoming French citizens for a long time has been more straight-forward for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa than becoming German citizens. Yet, working and housing conditions as well as a lack of respect for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and for Blacks in general was more important in the interviews than citizenship (Int30; Int33; Int36; Int42). Furthermore, as Daniel, member and employee of the Catholic Church in France, most eloquently summarises, in the eyes of many interlocutors discourses on French citizenship and discourses on integration and assimilation are linked:

> Daniel: Pour (...) avoir la nationalité française il faut faire preuve non pas d'intégration, mais d'assimilation ! C'est vrai, juridiquement, assimilation veut dire une chose mais (..) comme on dit, les mots ont une (..) résonance sociale. Quand on dit en France assimilation, ce qui a été la politique française de la colonisation (..) ça veut dire oubliez votre culture (.) et adoptez la culture française. (Int42)[85]

[85] D: In order (…) to become a French citizen, you need to show not only integration but assimilation! It is true that, legally, assimilation has a defined meaning but (..), as they say, words have a (..) social reso-

Similarly to what interlocutors in Berlin often said, his criticism, and that of other interlocutors, is less about citizenship legislation than about concepts of belonging. What is different in Paris, however, is that it is possible for interlocutors to stress the fact that they refused to become French as a means to distance themselves from the dominant discourse and to stress their independence and their "africanité" - an option that the interlocutors from Berlin did not have in the same way because as migrants they usually are considered "foreigners" anyway. In consequence, not to become French can be used as a means to reclaim an African identity and to protest against the colonial legacy of an African "inferiority complex" or a French "superiority complex". Jérémie, a pastor from the Democratic Republic of Congo, most poignantly expresses this claim:

> Jérémie: Je-je le dis haut et fort, je n'ai pas la // je n'ai jamais eu la nationalité française, donc je suis Congolais de Kinshasa. Ça, c'est très important. Pourquoi je suis Congolais de Kinshasa ? Et non pas naturalisé Français ou Belge ou tout ce que vous voulez ? C'est parce que je-je crois en fait qu'il y a une::// que dans ma-ma prise de position, il y a une- il y a une certaine réclamation (.), je crois qu'il faut absolument (..) qu'on nous laisse exister en tant qu'Africains pour que l'Afrique puisse exister, pour que nous puissions exister dans le monde. Et:: cette sorte de::-d'indépendance que nous réclamons, je la:: réclame, moi, en refusant de prendre// de faire une naturalisation quelconque, en me disant nous avons droit à exister (Int30).[86]

So while generally the actual citizenship legislation is not perceived as an essential problem for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, concepts of belonging and their actual participation in French and German society are. Also, while the discourses of the interlocutors from Berlin and from Paris resemble each other in important points, the different concepts of the nation and of what it means to be or to become German or French still open up different discourse opportunities for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa with regards to their positioning as (former) African citizens in a European country.

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nance. When, in France, you say assimilation, which has been the policy of French colonialism (..), this means that you should forget your culture (.) and should adopt French culture.

[86] J: I say it loud and clearly, I don't have// I have never had French citizenship, so I'm a citizen of Congo-Kinshasa. This is very important. Why am I a citizen of Congo-Kinshasa? And not naturalized French or Belgian or whatever you like? It's because in fact I believe that there is a// that in my adopting this position there is a-there is a certain demand (.), I believe that it is absolutely necessary (..) that we are allowed to exist as Africans, so that Africa can exist, so that we can exist in the world. And this kind of independence which we demand, I myself demand it by refusing to take// to have any kind of naturalization, by telling myself that we have the right to exist.

4.2.3 Racism and the colonial legacy

As the quote from Jérémie's interview shows, these representations of the nation and of belonging are entwined with relations of superiority and inferiority between Europe and Africa and the legacy of European imperialism. While this book is about migrants, it is also a book about Black people in mainly White societies. Although the phenomenon of racism clearly is not limited to the treatment of Blacks as an "inferior race" by Whites, racism is an essential part of the experience of Blacks in a world dominated by Whites. In order to understand the context that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in a European city do or do not get politically active in, it is indispensable to take into account that, for centuries, the relations between Africans and Europeans have been and, in a different, but nonetheless relevant manner, still are, marked by racism.

The term racism, of course, is often controversial and sometimes hard to define. The historian George M. Fredrickson, for instance, proposes a definition which distinguishes racism from xenophobia and from what he calls "culturalism". In Fredrickson's opinion, one can consider an attitude or ideology as racist if differences that otherwise would be considered ethno-cultural are seen as hereditary, ineffaceable and immutable (Fredrickson 2011: 15). He further stresses that racism is not only an attitude or a set of attitudes for it expresses itself also in practices, structures and institutions it legitimises. Racism then either legitimises or aims at establishing a social order based on a hierarchy between groups which is supposed to be given by God or nature (Fredrickson 2011: 15-16).[87] In contrast, the cultural sociologist Stuart Hall as well as the philosopher Étienne Balibar go further than many - often more conservative - students of racism and argue that today there are forms of racism that function without a notion of "biologically distinct races". They thus explicitly include culturalist discrimination in their definition of racism (cf. Balibar/Wallerstein 2002; Hall 2008). What is most important to retain here is that racism implies the devaluation and dehumanisation of others, be it on biological or cultural grounds. While there may be research contexts where it is essential to distinguish between "racism" and "culturalism", in the present case, it seems useful to include culturalist forms of devaluation and discrimination into the definition of racism, because the focus is on African migrants and because colonialist ideologies always include(d) both biological and cultural elements.

One of the oldest and most widely spread forms of racism in Europe, of course, is anti-Semitism - with the *Shoa* as the most violent, cruel and systematic

[87] The conservative French researcher Pierre-André Taguieff likewise distinguishes racism from other phenomena such as ethnocentrism or xenophobia (Taguieff 1998: 19 pp.) and also proposes a similar definition of racism (Taguieff 1998: 8).

form of racist terror in history. If European racism first targeted Jews (and often enough still does), there is also an important colonial dimension to both French and German racism, and Africans were (among) its victims. As Frantz Fanon (1964; 1975), probably *the* most emblematic radical theorist of the period of decolonisation, as well as other postcolonial authors after him have shown, racism was an important structuring feature of European colonial rule in Africa and has deeply marked the relations between Africans and Europeans. Without an ideology that constructed different "races", denigrated and dehumanised human beings as members of "inferior races", European colonial domination of the African continent, slavery, the deportation, subjugation and exploitation and often enough the death of millions of Africans would not have been possible. Generally, the cruelty with which Europeans took advantage of their position of power in their encounter with the peoples of Africa, Asia, and the Americas - while at the same time advocating universal human rights or the equality of all humans before God - would not have been feasible without an ideology that denied these peoples their humanity. Without the degradation of the colonised to members of a lower, less worthy "race", without racism in short, the economics of colonialism would not have been possible.

Frantz Fanon describes both the economics of European imperialism and colonial racism, when he explains that the colonised world is a world divided into compartments, a world split into two. It is a world with a rich and tidy zone for the colonisers and a poor, hungry zone in debris for the colonised (cf. Fanon 2011: 454) where their "race" determines which zone a person belongs to:

> Ce monde compartimenté, ce monde coupé en deux est habité par des espèces différentes. L'originalité du contexte colonial, c'est que les réalités économiques, les inégalités, l'énorme différence des modes de vie ne parviennent jamais à masquer les réalités humaines. Quand on aperçoit dans l'immédiateté le contexte colonial, il est patent que ce qui morcelle le monde c'est d'abord le fait d'appartenir ou non à telle espèce, à telle race. Aux colonies, l'infrastructure économique est également une superstructure. La cause est conséquente : on est riche parce que blanc, on est blanc parce que riche (Fanon 2011: 454-455).[88]

The relations between colonisers and colonised are marked by violence: not only the relationship between master and slave, but all relations between colonisers and colonised are violent and this violence penetrates the homes and

[88] This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species. The originality of the colonial context is that the economic reality, inequality, and the immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging or not to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich (translation from: Fanon 1968: 39-40).

thoughts and psyche of those who are subjugated (cf. Fanon 2011: 453-454). If racist violence is the basis of the economic system of colonialism, and thus creates it, it also creates the colonised (cf. Fanon 2011: 452), i.e. human beings who are considered inferior and learn to consider themselves as inferior to the "White race", human beings who internalise the violence brought over them and turn it against themselves.[89]

Racism finds its expression in physical violence as well as in representations of the "Other" reflecting their supposed inferiority or their lack of humanity. Colonial representations of "the African", for instance, oscillate between Africans as "children" to be educated and enlightened or as "noble savages" (cf. Arndt 2012: 21-22) on the one hand and, in the case of African women, as readily available sexual objects, and in the case of African men, as animals with inexhaustible sexual energy and as rapists on the other hand (cf. Arndt 2012: 21-22).

To be sure, just as both French colonialism and French nationalism differ from their German counterparts, French and German (colonial) racism structurally are the same phenomenon, but differ in their concrete formations. As Rieger argues, racist conflicts existed at all times, but racism as a systematic doctrine takes form only from the 18th century onwards and is rooted in the ideas of the 18th and 19th centuries (Rieger 2002: 763). French racism thus on the one hand is marked by the attempts of the French aristocracy to resist centralisation and a loss of power, i.e. to resist the great social transformations that preceded and followed the Revolution with the help of a racist ideology (cf. Rieger 2002: 764). On the other hand, French racism is marked by the idea of the political nation and the values of the French Revolution (cf. Rieger 2002: 763), i.e. by the conflict between the belief in universal human rights, the missionary urge to bring the values of the Revolution to the world and the continued exploitation and denigration of the colonised as described by Fanon and others. This conflict becomes apparent in the treatment of slavery after the Revolution, for instance: slavery was abolished in 1794, but was reintroduced by Napoleon a few years later and only fully abolished again in 1848 (cf. Fredrickson 2005: 53). As both Fredrickson and Ndiaye stress, even before 1789 slavery was kept away from French mainland territory and limited to the colonies (Fredrickson 2005: 52; Ndiaye 2008: 132). At the same time, Blacks were present in mainland France already at this time and their presence was "accompagnée

[89] In his work on the Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy makes a slightly different, but related point when he emphasises that slavery also created the Black diaspora: the terror of the slave trade and the subjugation of Africans brought to the Americas and elsewhere as slaves is a common memory of Africans of very diverse ethnic, religious, cultural, and social backgrounds. The colons, that is, Europeans, with their racist ideology thus created "Blacks", subjugated, captured, enslaved and deported from the African continent, and a Black diaspora that results from this shared memory and trauma shared by many, who until then had nothing in common but their origin from the same *continent*.

de la construction parallèle, par les Français, de préjugés raciaux visant particulièrement les Noirs"[90] (Ndiaye 2008: 131).

In contrast, German racism is to a great part rooted in German romanticism, in Herderian ideas of the *Kulturnation*, i.e. in an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation, or, as Rieger puts it, in the German *Sonderweg*, its unique path, to the creation of a nation(-state) (Rieger 2002: 763). German racism thus emerged on the basis of a naturalist understanding of national belonging that was a particularly fertile breeding ground for biologistic racist theories. At the same time, the racist theories of a French diplomat, Arthur de Gobineau, were well received on the other side of the Rhine river: Gobineau's idea of the superiority of the "Aryan race" and his warnings against a "war of races" contributed to what later led to the genocide of the European Jews and Roma (Arndt 2012: 20). Due to the said *Sonderweg* to a nation-state, the German colonial empire was smaller than those of France, Spain or Britain. What is more, in contrast to French colonial racism, German colonial racism was not called into question by the spread of the values of the French Revolution.

Nevertheless, while every colonial power developed different strategies and justifications for their ways to govern their colonies, none of these strategies would have been possible without a racist infra- and superstructure. What is more, despite important national differences, it is essential to note that both France and Germany share a failure or a refusal to come to terms with their colonial past. In other words, they have both failed to face their moral guilt and their economic debt towards the victims of colonialism and their descendants and to draw the consequences.

As George M. Fredrickson notes, as soon as the second half of the 19th century, the French involvement in the subjugation of Africans was hardly present in national memory anymore and a study on the treatment of slavery in French history textbooks conducted in 1980 revealed that slavery was condemned in general, but that the deep French involvement in slavery and the international slave trade was hardly covered at all (cf. Fredrickson 2005: 54). What is more, the recent debates about the law on the "positive aspects" of French colonialism to be taught in French history classes have shown most clearly that the idea of the (White male) European who brings the light to the world has not disappeared (cf. Gas 2005online, Thomas 2005online).

Likewise, to name but a few examples, in Berlin, as in other German cities, streets are still named after important figures of German colonialism; German textbooks usually hardly cover what has happened in the former German colonies -

[90] "Their presence was accompanied by the simultaneous construction of racial prejudices by the French that targeted Blacks in particular" (translation by the author).

including the genocide of the Herero and the Nama at the beginning of the 20th century - and German media continue to portray Africa as a continent marked solely by HIV, war and starvation. What is more, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have to bear with xenophobic and racist attitudes which, according to several studies, are present among at least one fifth of the German population. What is more, in recent years, in Germany, Africans and persons of African descent have been victim of xenophobic or racist violent attacks disproportionately often (Benndorf 2008: 350; cf. Wagner 2012: 257).

There is, however, one important difference between the two societies in terms of their dealing with racism: While in Germany officially it is xenophobia, *Fremdenfeindlichkeit*, or, worse, *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* ("hostility against foreigners") that is discussed and condemned publicly, in France, first racism and now racist discrimination are the subject of public debates and denunciations (cf. Ndiaye 2008: 286-287; Arndt 2012). The decisive difference here is twofold: firstly, the terms *Fremdenfeindlichkeit* and *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* partly conceal the racism behind attitudes towards Blacks in Germany, especially because they hide the fact that racism not only targets "foreigners", but also German citizen. This is not to say that it would be less grave to treat non-Germans in a denigrating or discriminatory way. The point is that the term racism goes further than xenophobia because it stresses the impossibility to escape from the condition of belonging to a group considered as "racially inferior". Secondly, debates about racist discrimination presuppose that a group that is discriminated against does enjoy equal rights and should not be treated differently. In short, despite all trends of convergence, the French debate reflects much more a political, republican understanding of national belonging than the German one.

Nevertheless, both in France and in Germany there are several parties on the radical right with a racist orientation, some of them with increasing electoral success. After the decline of the "old" fascist parties in most Western democracies in the 1960s, a new radical right rose in the 1970s and 1980s. In France, the *Front national* (*FN*) was founded in 1972 and in Germany, the *Deutsche Volksunion* (*DVU*) and the *Republikaner* (*REP*) came into being in 1971[91] and 1983 respectively (cf. Minkenberg 2005: 264). Under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen the FN celebrated an enormous success in the year 2002 when Le Pen won 16.9 percent of the valid votes in the first round of the French presidential elections and 18.9 percent in the second round. But even before this spectacular result with Le Pen disqualifying the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin in the first round, the FN had been able to gain more than 10 percent of the votes in parliamentary and presidential elections (cf. Mayer 2003: 455). In Germany, the DVU, the REP and the older *Nationaldemo-*

[91] The DVU was founded in 1971, but became a political party in 1987 only.

kratische Partei Deutschlands (*NPD*) have been less successful at the national level, but have been present in several parliaments at the *Länder* level (cf. Wagner 2012: 258-259). In addition to these parties, in both countries there are skinhead and other racist movements as well as important think tanks, and intellectual circles (cf. Minkenberg 2005: 271). As Michael Minkenberg argues these parties and organisations are not only relevant in so far as they may have direct impact on policies through their representatives in local, regional or national parliaments, but also through their influence on established parties and the political landscape in general (Minkenberg 2005: 271).[92] However, Minkenberg observes an important difference between France and Germany: While in France the rise of the FN contributed to a politicisation of issues of migration and national identity, across the Rhine, the opportunity structure was less favourable for parties of the radical right and they did not have the same electoral success than their French counterparts. This, however, was at least partly due to the fact that the established parties (especially on the right) already had integrated some of the issues put forward by the radical right into their agenda (Minkenberg 2005: 291; 295).[93]

In short, racism has deeply branded the relation between (Black) Africans and (White) Europeans and is still present in both French and German discourses and political landscapes. Racist violence has not disappeared, and neither have neo-colonial terms of trade. While the former African colonies have gained their independence from their European *métropoles* several decades ago, racism has remained an important structuring feature of the relations between Europeans and Africans. One cannot think about Blacks in European societies, and thus neither about Afri-

[92] Today, one could argue that an anti-immigrant mood and, in some cases, racism underlie a number of French, German, and European policies advocated for and passed by established politicians and parties. For instance, the EU border regimes described above are based on an implicit devaluation of migrants and refugees: without considering them less worthy than Europeans, how could the EU member states, including France and Germany, knowingly and deliberately, let mainly African migrants drown at their doorsteps in the name of "security" and "economic prosperity"? The German *Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz*, i.e. the law on the benefits for asylum seekers, may serve as another example. Until March 2015, asylum seekers received 220 Euros per month and thus more than one-third less than a permanently unemployed person, although the 374 Euros unemployment benefits are considered to be at the margin of subsistence (Knapp 2012online).

[93] In recent years, Marine Le Pen as the new FN leader has tried to partly conceal the party's racist ideology and has been very successful in elections, most recently for instance in the regional elections of 2015 (see e.g. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Elections-regionales-2015/Resultats-du-premier-tour-des-elections-regionales-2015). With the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AFD) a new right-wing party has come into being in Germany, and focusses increasingly on matters of migration and religion from a xenophobic and often racist perspective. Also, the so-called "Pegida" movement ("Patriotic Europeans against the islamisation of the occident") in Dresden and its offshoots in other cities for several months brought thousands of people to the streets, who are openly against immigration and hostile towards refugees and other migrants as well as Muslims.

can migrants in Berlin and Paris, without taking into consideration colonialism and racism, because they have shaped the relations between Europeans and Africans so profoundly. In doing so, it is essential to be very clear about the fact that racism is not a prejudice against "members of races other than one's own", because this would imply that there are such things as human "races". Racism is not an attitude *towards* members of a different "race", it *creates* "races". It simultaneously is the process of constructing "races", the social practices that are based on and at the same time recreate the differentiation between "races", and the ideology based on this construction of difference legitimising the position of power of one group over another. At the same time as it creates "Blacks", racism also creates "Whites" - despite the fact that most Whites usually experience their being White as "normal" (cf. Arndt 2012: 25), and therefore are unaware of their position of power and dominance. Yet, while a White person may feel that their being White does not play an important role in their life at all, for a Black person being Black or White is highly relevant (cf. Wachendorfer 2012: 90).

This relevance becomes very clear in the interviews in both cities. Souleymane, who represents several secular African associations in Berlin, notes:

> Souleymane: […] Rassismus ist unser-unser Hauptproblem hier in Deutschland, hier glaub ich. Wir leiden wirklich darunter. Wir sind wirklich die-die Gruppe, die am meisten diskriminiert ist in diesem Land. (Int14).[94]

Two general themes may be identified as structuring the way the migrants voice their confrontation with racism in Berlin and Paris. On the one hand, racism is an underlying element of what may be called the "integration and participation theme". In their accounts, several interlocutors in both cities - both pastors and priests and representatives of secular organisations - describe the problem of not being taken seriously and of not being treated as equals by the autochthonous population because they are Africans (Int1; Int8; Int13; Int18; Int20; Int25; Int30; Int33; Int42). According to the interlocutors, this lack of respect and acknowledgement often takes the form of paternalistic attitudes in everyday situations or of reducing the contribution of Africans or Blacks to adding an "exotic flavour" to a common project. It also takes the form of keeping Black migrants from important posts in organisations as well as of general discrimination on the labour market.

While most of the interlocutors who describe situations such as these are very clear about the underlying racism, they discuss it as a barrier to participation in German or French society and to the integration of African migrants into the microcosm of Berlin or Paris. Vincent from Berlin, for instance, speaks of a "migra-

[94] S: Racism really is the major problem here in Germany, here I think. We really suffer from it. We are really the group which is most discriminated against in this country.

tion foreground" in contrast to the official term of "migration background". It is a migration "foreground" because the first thing people notice about him and others is their being Black. Their phenotype then is taken as an indicator of their being "foreigners", and thus someone who does not belong. In Vincent's opinion it is this equation which keeps Black migrants from becoming "integrated". In his experience, it is not his work, his commitment or his behaviour that counts, but the colour of his skin. "Ich fühl' mich nicht intergriert", I don't feel integrated, he says. Ironically, the young journalist has founded a small publishing house and runs a journal on issues concerning Africa as well as the African community in Germany - entirely written in German, because in Vincent's opinion, everyone who lives in Germany should know German (Int19).

In some of the French interviews, the different French and German concepts of belonging become apparent in the interlocutors' criticism of racist discrimination. While some of the interlocutors from Berlin highlight the discrimination of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Afro-Germans on the labour market as well as their underrepresentation in highly visible jobs of a higher status - journalists on TV, employees of banks - as role models for Black children in Germany (Int1; Int8; Int14; Int18; Int20), some of the French interlocutors go further and criticise the lack of (African) migrants or (Black) children of migrants in leading jobs in the civil service or as representatives of the Republic. Daniel, the employee of the Catholic Church in France quoted above, for instance asks: "Dans l'administration française, où sont les Noirs, où sont les Maghrébins?" and answers, "Aux bas étages."[95] Similarly, Ousmane and Abdoulaye, two inhabitants of a *foyer* in the suburbs of Paris, have no illusions about how far a person of African or Arab origin can get in France:

> Abdoulaye: Parce que, hem, je me rappelle une fois au travail on a:: // le jour que Barack Obama était élu président des Amé// hem, des États-Unis. (.) J'ai un collègue, c'est// il est beaucoup plus vieux que moi, il est-il est vraiment (?), il me dit : Abdoulaye, viens voir, (j'ai dit?) t'as vu::, l'Amérique, c'était le pays le plus radical du monde, maintenant, on a un président noir. C'est vrai, mais tu crois quoi ? Ça veut dire, l'Amérique, on a un président noir, la France, il faut pas penser.
> Ousmane: Non.
> A: Nous, on peut pas// même pas rêver.
> […]
> A: Bon. J'ai dit, voyez-vous quand nous on-on veut bien qu'il y a un président soit un Arabe soit un machin qui est issu de immi-immigration, mais d'abord il faut (qu'il soit ?) un député, et les maires et tout ça.
> O: Oui.
> A: Mais il n'y en a pas ça en France. Vous croyez qu'on va passer [(un jour ?)].

[95] "In the French administration, where are the Blacks, where are the people from the Maghreb?" - "In the low ranks."

O: [(Non, non. ?)].
A: Un enfant d'immigré va être président de la République ?
O: Ben, non, non, ça (sera jamais ?) (?).
A: (En?) trois cent siècles, quoi (Int33).[96]

On the other hand, racism is addressed with reference to the colonial history and to the depiction of Africa and Africans by Europeans. In the point of view of several interlocutors, not only are Africans not taken seriously or treated as equals, "auf Augenhöhe" (Int8), the African continent also is depicted exclusively in negative terms (Int1; Int12; Int19; Int20). Africa is presented only as marked by war, starvation, AIDS and other diseases, while the positive aspects of the continent are widely ignored. In addition, the responsibility European states bear for many of the problems that Africa suffers from is not acknowledged and the colonial history is not dealt with (Int1; Int14; Int18). Although not all interlocutors explicitly describe these depictions as racist, they do see it as negative stereotypes and link it to the historical continuities of European racism. In addition to their criticism of racist attitudes and behaviour, several interlocutors in their accounts also link the rejection of African migrants in Europe, colonial history and the grave living conditions in (sub-Saharan) Africa. As Peter Arthur, a Pentecostal pastor from Berlin, argues, the arbitrary borders and the unfair trading system established in colonial times persist and force young Africans to leave their countries and move north. He concludes:

Peter Arthur: So wenn wir wollen, dass nicht so viele Jugendliche hier kommt, dann sollte man sagen: Bitte, wir haben genug mit diesen Fabriken hier und so weiter, denn (Industrie?) mag unsere Land sowieso nicht mehr. Das Beste, so lass uns Fabriken in diesem Ort, wo de Rohstoffe kommt. Wenn wir de Leute Arbeit geben, wenn die Leute die Bauer gut bezahlt, dass ihre Kinder Medikamente kaufen können, eine bessere Haus selber bauen können und leben, denn werden wir

[96] Abdoulaye: Because, um, I remember one time at work we// the day Barack Obama was elected President of the Ame// um, the United States. (.) I have a colleague, that is// he is much older than me, he is really (?), he says to me: Abdoulaye, comme look at this, (I said?) have you seen::, America, this was the most radical country in the world, now we have a black president. It's true, but now what? This means that, in America, we have a Black president, in France, don't even think about it.
Ousmane: No.
A: We can't// can't even dream about it.
[…]
A: Well. I said, you see, when we would be glad to have a president who is an Arab or whatever from an immigrant background, but first of all it is necessary (to have?) a deputy, and mayors and all that.
O: Yes.
A: But that doesn't exist in France. You think we'll get there [(one day?)].
O: [(No, no.?)].
A: The child of an immigrant will be President of the French Republic?
O: Oh no, no, that (will never be?) (?).
A: (In?) three hundred centuries, you know.

> keine Entwicklungshilfe gebrauchen. Wir brauchen das gar nicht. Was wir brauchen, ist die *Fair Trade*. De fair (?). Wenn wir das haben, dann werden wir nicht Mangel// dann werden auch selber leben und die Kinder werden nur Ur-Urlaub in Europa machen, vielleicht Schnee zu sehen *(laughs)* (Int1).[97]

Similarly, Samuel, a Parisian pastor, links the severe living conditions in many African countries, migration, and the colonial past of these countries, although in a different way. He puts it like this:

> Samuel: Il y a une:: grande population, hein, Afr// subs// Afrique subsaharien// en France, juste du fait que, voilà, pour eux, pour ces Africains, c'est ici la métropole (.) étant colonisés, la plupart étant colonisés par la France. Donc::, ils viennent naturellement comme chez eux, ou chez leur colonisateur. Beaucoup pour étudier, beaucoup pour chercher du travail, beaucoup// mais là// ceux qui savent// ce qui a augmenté, ça, c'est que, puisque là-bas en Afrique, les situations n'ont pas arrêté de se dégrader (..). Oui, je crois que cela a fait que, voilà, beaucoup sont ici, (.) certains malgré eux.
> Miriam: Malgré eux ?
> S: Oui, certains malgré eux. Ils préfèrent souffrir ici que:: d'aller mourir là-bas (Int31).[98]

What the interview material shows is that both the colonial heritage and new and old forms of racism mark the experiences of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris. In both cities, they are confronted with racist attitudes and discrimination as a decisive feature of their everyday lives. Unsurprisingly, the way they speak about the colonial history differs between the two cities. While in Berlin, most of the interlocutors who raise this issue take a stance similar to Peter Arthur's and furthermore demand a different way of dealing with Germany's colo-

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[97] PA: So if we want that not so many young people come here, then one should say: Please, we have enough with these factories here and so forth, because our country does not like (industry?) any more anyway. The best is to leave factories in this place, where the raw materials come from. If we give people work, if people pay the farmers well, so that their children can buy medicine, so that they can themselves build better houses and live better, then we will not need development aid. In fact, we don't need this. What we need is fair trade. The fair (?). When we have that, then we won't have deprivation// then we will also live ourselves and the children will only be in Europe on holiday, perhaps in order to see snow (*laughs*).

[98] S: There is a big population in France which is, um, Afr// subs// sub-Saharan Africa, simply because of the fact that, you know, for them, for these Africans, this here is the metropolis (.) as they are colonized, as most of them are colonized by France. So they come naturally, to their home as it were, or to their colonizer. Many in order to study, many in order to look for work, many// but there// those who know// what has increased, this, it's because, because there in Africa, the situations have got worse and worse (..). Yes, I think that this is the reason why, you see, many are here, (.) some of them against their will.
M: Against their will?
S: Yes, some of them against their will. They prefer suffering here to going to die there.

nial past, they do not refer to Germany as "their coloniser", neither as "theirs" or "at home". They criticise the depiction of Africa in German media and school books and the simultaneous lack of awareness of the atrocities Germans committed in Africa during colonial times. And Peter Arthur outspokenly points to the persisting structures that keep Africa dependent and poor and make young Africans migrate to Europe - where they are often unwanted and treated with great disrespect. In contrast, among the interlocutors from Paris, Samuel is not the only one who speaks of (West) African countries as if they were still part of the French empire. Simultaneously, the participatory claims of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris go further than in Berlin and reflect both the greater presence of France as the former coloniser and the internalisation of the French Republic's promises to its citizens. Here becomes apparent what Dominique Colas notes in his book on citizenship and nationality in France: "Les 'étrangers' en France à la fin du XX^{e} siècle, mais aussi une partie de ces citoyens, sont bien souvent les descendants de ses nationaux non-citoyens de la fin du XIX^{e} siècle" (Colas 2004: 22).[99]

4.2.4 Migrant religion in Germany and France and Berlin and Paris

So far, no reference has been made to the religious context that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are confronted with in the two places. With respect to the present research question, this is, of course, just as relevant as the contextual factors outlined up to now. Since the focus of the ensuing chapters will be on religion, however, the religious context and the reference the interlocutors make to it in the interviews will be discussed here only very briefly.

In her introduction to "Les codes de la différence", Riva Kastoryano notes that "la reconnaissance de l'Islam constitue une réponse à la mobilisation des populations musulmanes qui revendiquent un traitement égal avec les autres religions dans les deux pays" (Kastoryano 2005: 29).[100] In other words, due to the increased public visibility and mobilisation of Muslims in France and Germany, the possibility of affording Islam the status of an officially recognized religion (or a similar status) has become an issue in both countries. Matthias Koenig and Jean-Paul Willaime go a step further and claim that, for several years now, controversies over religion have shaped the public opinion of European societies (Koenig/Willaime 2008: 8). They argue that these controversies reveal a structural change of the nation-state that

[99] "The 'foreigners' in France at the end of the 20th century, but also a part of these citizens, are quite often the descendants of its non-citizen nationals of the end of the 19th century."
[100] "the recognition of Islam represents a response to the mobilization of the Muslim populations which demand an equal treatment with that of the other religions in the two countries."

does not leave the boundaries between the religious and the political untouched. As the civil society becomes more and more important, the state is forced to develop new forms of contractual co-operation and to include religious communities in these co-operations. While the sovereignty of the nation-state is thus diminished and European models of regulating religion converge, national differences between these models of church-state relations are increasingly present in public debates. In Willaime's and Koenig's opinion, religious policies are one of the last fields where differences of national identity can still be reclaimed and asserted - at least symbolically. Indeed, according to the authors, political governance, the legal order and collective identities are increasingly decoupled and religion thus on the one hand becomes a resource in the fight for the recognition of collective identities, while on the other hand new, democratic modes of regulating religious pluralism may emerge from this context of decoupling (Koenig/Willaime 2008: 34-35).

Three elements of their argument are particularly interesting for the present study: first of all, religion may become a resource for migrant claims-making. Secondly, according to Koenig and Willaime, the nation-state and with it national models of the regulation of religion are undermined and probably converging, and, thirdly, at the same time, religious controversies offer room for assertions of national identity. It is, however, important to note that religious pluralism does not necessarily lead to the undermining of the nation state and that the processes Koenig and Willaime describe are by no means automatic. Migrants and minorities who now are "Muslims" were perceived as workers before (cf. Green 2005: 72), and religion for a long time has not been a category which was used to deal with minorities. "Culture" often meant language, and cultural diversity linguistic diversity (cf. Tezcan 2007: 55). It is likely that transformations of the nation-state opened up opportunities for migrants to demand the recognition of their religious identities and led to a dialectic process of migrants becoming more active as religious groups and governments and the general public discovering "Muslims" as a relevant category and a means to govern a growing part of the (minority) population.

Nevertheless, it would be unhelpful to go as far as to deny the relevance of national models of regulating religion entirely. There are still differences between the French model of *laïcité* and the German model of secularity, and these still have an impact on the situation of different religious communities in the two countries. Indeed, as J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer highlight, traditions of church-state relations shape the way the claims of Muslims are treated by West European democracies and how conflicts arise, may be avoided or settled. They show that "public policies in each of the three states have been shaped to a considerable degree by inherited Church-State institutions that have structured the political debate around Muslim religious rights and practices" (Soper/Fetzer 2007: 934) and argue that while Britain has been quite willing to accommodate the religious needs of the British Muslim minority, France has been far less open to their demands (Sop-

er/Fetzer 2007: 934-935). In their matrix, the German model is in-between the French and the British ones and constitutes "a hybrid of these state responses" to the religious claims of Muslims (Soper/Fetzer 2007: 935). Schirin Amir-Moazami makes a similar observation and notes that precisely due to the *laïcité* dogma, secular public space in France has been sacralised. According to Amir-Moazami, in contrast, in Germany, the secular constitution and secular values are perceived as rooted in Christian values and in the Enlightenment shaped by Christianity. So while both countries develop mechanisms of (discursive and legal) exclusion and inclusion of Muslims, these build on different interpretations of their particular tradition of the modern nation-state and of the roots of their - anti-clerical or religiously informed - secular achievements (Amir-Moazami 2007).

As has been suggested implicitly in the above paragraphs, in both countries, however, Islam is much more present in public debates than other minority religions. Religious pluralism and the state reactions to it in France and Germany come down to the awareness of the presence and to the governance of a large number of Muslims; both public debates and official policies are far less concerned with other religious groups. At the same time, the category *Muslim* often refers mainly to a specific part of the labour migrant population and their descendants who had been labelled *Türken* (Turks) or *Algériens*, *Arabes* (Algerians, Arabs) before.[101] It generally does not include everyone of Islamic faith, and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are often not considered a part of the Muslim population in France or Germany. As Pap Ndiaye notes for France:

> L'islam constitue ici une variable essentielle dans la distinction établie par les ouvriers français pour se différencier des immigrés. Or, ce sont les Nord-Africains qui sont associés à l'islam plutôt que les Africains subsahariens, dont beaucoup sont pourtant musulmans, mais qui ne sont pas assimilés aux représentations négatives des variantes radicales de cette religion dans l'imaginaire politique des Occidentaux. Bref, les Africains noirs musulmans semblent échapper à l'opprobre antimusulmane, l'une des composantes centrales du racisme antiarabe actuel (Ndiaye 2008: 278).[102]

The same is probably true for Germany, especially since migrants from sub-Saharan Africa constitute a small minority and are not very present in the col-

[101] To be sure, these categories were and are generic in themselves insofar as migrants and their descendants from other areas were and are addressed as "Türken" or "Algériens" (cf. Tezcan 2007: 55).

[102] Here, Islam represents an essential variable in the distinction established by the French workers to differentiate themselves from the immigrants. Yet, it is the North Africans who are associated with Islam rather than people from sub-Saharan Africa, although many of them are Muslim, but who are not assimilated to the negative representations of the radical forms of this religion in the political imagination of the Westerns. In short, Muslim Black Africans seem to escape the anti-Muslim opprobrium which is one of the central components of contemporary anti-Arab racism.

lective German imagery. However, as has been discussed in chapter 4.1.3, it is sensible to assume that neither Muslims in Berlin nor Christians in Paris constitute such a small minority within the migrant community from sub-Saharan Africa that it would not be worthwhile to include them in the analysis.

Considering the different traditions of church-state relations and the situation of Muslims in France and in Germany, it is likely that in Berlin Christians from sub-Saharan Africa will find it easier than Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa to get involved politically in the name of their religion or by using resources drawn from their religious networks. Christians will be perceived much more as legitimate actors in the public realm there because the established Christian churches are considered as such. In contrast, religious actors, including the Catholic Church, are perceived as far less legitimate political actors in France, although even in the country of birth of the *laïcité* principle there is an implicit hierarchy of less illegitimate political actors (Catholics) and more illegitimate actors (Muslims), as the headscarf debates indicate. Nonetheless, in Paris, both Muslims and Christians from sub-Saharan Africa are likely to find it difficult to get politically involved as Muslims or as Christians. At the same time, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in both cities will be in the situation that the majority will not perceive them as Muslims. This may on the one hand reduce discriminatory practices against them, and on the other hand it may render it difficult for them to make themselves heard as *Muslims*.

Indeed, the way the interlocutors describe their religious organisations in the interviews indicates that there are considerable differences between Muslims and Christians from sub-Saharan Africa and between each group in the two cities. As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in both cities are less visible since they are not as organised as *Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa* as Christians are organised as *Christians from (sub-Saharan) Africa*. Also, apart from one exception, all Muslim interlocutors are very defensive about their religion, i.e. they stress their moderation and the legitimacy of their religion. Both Muslims and Christians are more hesitant to describe themselves as political actors in Paris than in Berlin. Most interestingly, the cleavages between different (religious) minorities are not the same: for African Muslims in Berlin it is most regrettable that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are such a small minority that they are often not perceived as a part of the population with its own needs and claims. As the representative of the only African Muslim organisation in Berlin points out: if people think of migrants here, they think of Turks and other migrant groups are neglected (Int5). While most Christians from sub-Saharan Africa would probably agree with this diagnosis, they also regret that Muslims in their point of view receive too much attention, especially due to the newly established instrument of the so-called *Islam Konferenz*. In contrast, in Paris, none of the interlocutors expressed any jealousy in religious terms. Apparently, in the eyes of Christians from

sub-Saharan Africa the French context does not appear as favourable to Muslims as it does in Berlin.

Except for these effects the two contexts have on the organisational capacities of African Muslims and African Christians, three more elements of interaction with these contexts become apparent in the interview material. First of all, claims for recognition are relevant for all four groups: sub-Saharan African Muslims and Christians from Paris and from Berlin all struggle for recognition, either by their co-religioners (Christians) or the public or state (Muslims and Christians). While they share these claims, there also is an important difference between Christians and Muslims in both cities. Whereas the Muslims who were interviewed for this study all but one stressed their moderation and their acceptance of the political system as it is, some of the Christian organisations - to be sure, not all of them - openly campaign for more (ultra-conservative) Christian influence in politics at all levels of the political system, from local to European, and in at least two cases voice extreme hostility against Muslims.

4.2.5 Collective grievances and political goals

In order to systematically summarise the grievances and frustrations as well as the putative reasons for political involvement highlighted by the migrants, it seems useful to identify general themes and to bring them together in a matrix.

Three such general themes can be identified and cover the different issues stressed by the interlocutors. The first one is what has already been dubbed the "integration and participation theme". The second theme includes issues with regards to Africa and Africans and the third one is the thematic field of religion. Figure 16 lists the most important elements of these themes. When reading this table, it is important to bear in mind that the problems that were identified by the interlocutors in both cities as being the most central and the most severe are racism, and racist discrimination on the labour and housing markets, as well as visa and residency policies. The typology, however, goes further and includes other elements that were expressed by the interlocutors, sorted by whether they refer to policies of the country of residence that are criticised or to disputed attitudes prevailing in the non-migrant population or wether they formulate particular goals of political involvement.

	Integration and participation	**Africa**	**Faith**
Disputed policies	• Immigration and asylum policies	• Unfair terms of trade	• Privileges for "autochthonous" religions • (*laïcité* principle)
Disputed attitudes	• Racism • Paternalism • Assimilationist, one-sided concepts of "integration"	• European gaze at the African continent and at Africans; perception of negative aspects only • Disrespect • Missing awareness of colonial past (Berlin) and of historical ties between (former) coloniser and colony (Paris)	• Suspicion towards Muslims, "sects", "African" believers or towards religion generally
Important goals	• Equal participation in all sectors of society (e.g. education, labour market, housing, public administration, politics) • Greater awareness of non-African population / politicians of the presence and needs of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (Berlin)	• Acknowledgement of historical guilt • Respect for and knowledge of African cultures • Improvement of the situation in the village, town, region or country of origin or in Africa in general	• Recognition by the state (Muslims mainly), by society, by autochthonous co-believers (Christians) • Reverse mission (Christians) • Political influence for (conservative) religious causes (Christians)

Figure 16. Typology of collective frustrations as well as motivations for political involvement as voiced by interview participants.

What the sketch of the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris shows and what this typology summarises is that these migrants are an extremely vulnerable migrant population. Despite the great variety of origins, reasons for migration, qualifications and occupation, and despite linguistic, cultural and religious differences, they share common interests and have many reasons for collective mobilisation. At the same time, they also lack many resources for collective action as well as for individual participation. Furthermore, the contexts they live in

can be considered important reasons to mobilise, but simultaneously do not seem very favourable for collective or individual involvement.

Chapter 1 makes the transition from the theoretical considerations outlined in chapter 3 and the research question on the one hand, and the analysis of religion as an organisational and symbolic resource for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the two cities. Accordingly, chapter 5 will discuss whether and how religion contributes to the self-organisation of these migrants (in Berlin).

5 Religion as an organisational resource: Religious self-organisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris

If racism is their most important problem, and if migrants from sub-Saharan Africa both in Berlin and in Paris find it difficult to participate in German and French society, do they mobilise against this situation? If many of them face great difficulties in terms of visa or residence status as well as in terms of work and accommodation, do they protest?

From an outsider's point of view migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have many reasons to protest or to participate politically in a more conventional way in order to improve their situation. Also, as the interview material suggests, the migrants themselves also often perceive their situation as in need of improvement. Unsurprisingly, they are most active in secular associations and movements which were set up explicitly to overcome this situation of general vulnerability. Yet, as they are a minority within a minority and as their situation is so precarious, they need to tap other resources, too, in order to protect themselves and to get involved politically in order so as to improve their situation. Can they draw on their religion in order to do so?

It has been outlined in chapter 1 that religion may be an organisational resource in different ways. One important way is that religion may facilitate cooperation and the creation of overarching structures. Migrants who do not only set up individual organisations, but who form local federations or umbrella organisations can use these structures in order to pool resources and to build coalitions. Religion can support the creation of this kind of structures as well as of coalitions that go beyond the strictly religious realm and can become part of the political involvement of migrants. These coalitions make it possible to act as a united, and thus larger, coherent group and to increase both the migrants' public visibility and their legitimacy as political actors. In addition, individual leaders have a greater capacity to act if they speak for a federation or umbrella organisation. Also, the creation of federations itself can be interpreted as a form of collective mobilisation, and thus of political involvement, if they increase the public visibility of a marginalised group.

Based on my own material, this chapter will give an overview over the organisations set up and/or run by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin, paying particular attention to religious organisations. As has been discussed in chapter 3, it has not been possible to gain the same amount and quality of material in Paris as in Berlin, and, most importantly, the different field structures do not permit to do the

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same kind of analysis in the two cities. This chapter will therefore concentrate on Berlin alone. In the following chapter, however, the findings from Berlin will be compared to the information from Paris wherever possible.

In order to learn more about the relations between the organisations of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin, this chapter first gives a short overview over the African organisational landscape there. Secondly, it presents the results of a formal network analysis based on data drawn from the interviews and other empirical material. It reveals significant differences between Muslims and Christians from sub-Saharan Africa and highlights important characteristics of the existing networks of religious and secular African organisations in the city and their relevance for political involvement.

Methodologically, it would have been ideal to interview representatives of every religious or secular organisation set up or run by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin in detail and to find out about several kinds of relations that exist between them. However, this would have been far beyond the scope of this study. The analysis was therefore limited to relations that could be observed reliably within the range of this project: a) membership in umbrella organisations for (sub-Saharan) African organisation and b) for African religious organisations also shared leaders or representatives. The necessary data was mainly gathered from the interviews, but also from membership lists that the representatives of the umbrella organisations provided after they had been interviewed as well as from publicly accessible information on representatives and members of organisations.

While not all possible relations between the organisations are covered, with the said two the focus is on relations that are likely to be particularly relevant for political involvement. Membership in umbrella organisations can provide important resources for individual members, and at the same time it is important for the legitimacy of the umbrella organisation itself. It also is a measure of the degree to which the formal organisation of the field has advanced. As has been pointed out in chapter 1, this unity provides leaders with the capacity to act, which is highly relevant for their political involvement. Last, but not least, it is an indicator of networks of communication and influence.

It is a rather different, and, to an extent, a stronger indicator for communication and co-operation if different organisations and umbrella organisations share leaders. In addition, this can be interpreted as a proxy of the influence a member organisation has in the umbrella structures. The organisations whose personnel are most active in the umbrella organisations are also the ones that are likely to set the agenda. Also, it is a sign of the extent to which members can draw resources from the network - and the umbrella organisation itself can draw from the respective members as their leaders invest time and other resources into the overarching structures, too.

5.1 African organisations and networks in Berlin

Before the formal network analysis will be carried out, it is useful to get a general idea of the African organisational field in Berlin. In this city, over 250 organisations could be identified - associations, churches, pressure and self-help groups etc. - which were (co-)founded by or which focus on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.[103] Since this study is concerned with the self-organisational structures and the participation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, organisations that were set up exclusively by members of the non-migrant population in order to support migrants in Berlin or Germany or to send aid to African countries were excluded as far as possible. Among the organisations set up and/or led by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa themselves, about fifty to sixty are Christian churches or Christian religious organisations. One to two organisations are Muslim organisations, and more than two hundred are not religious.

Even at a first glance the numerical difference between Muslim and Christian organisations is striking. While secular organisations outnumber both Christian and Muslim organisations by far, there still are more than ten times as many Christian organisations as Muslim ones, although, to our best estimates, there are only about twice as many Christians from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin as there are Muslims.

Despite the growing number of Africans in Berlin and their high level of self-organisation, it was impossible to find any mosques in the city which could be characterised as "sub-Saharan African" mosques (Grübel/Rademacher 2003: 351-355; confirmed by several interlocutors (Int5; Int2; Int6; Int15; see also Spielhaus/Färber 2006)). To be sure, there are several Sufi associations, but according to Grübel and Rademacher's overview over the religious landscape in Berlin as well as several of the participants in the present study, these are not African migrant associations (Grübel/Rademacher 2003: 351-355).[104] What is more, as representatives of both Catholic and Protestant social and legal support centres for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa pointed out in interviews and conversations, Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa often turn to Christian support structures when in need, because there are no or hardly any Muslim social support structures of this kind.

This situation is not surprising, as it is similar to that of North African Muslims in Germany. Although they constitute a far bigger group than Muslims

[103] Calculation by the author, based on the City Council's official register of associations (2010), thorough research on the Internet as well as information provided by umbrella organisations.

[104] The official register of associations in Berlin also lists a branch of the African Muslim Brotherhood in Berlin, but it was not possible to get in touch with them.

from African countries south of the Sahara, they do not have much religious infrastructure of their own (Adogame 2006: 62).

There is, however, one small organisation called *Afrikanischer Muslim Kreis* (AMK), the African Muslim Circle, which grew out of a loose network of believers who attended the same mosque in the borough of Wedding. Their focus is on development projects in Africa and on projects catering to the needs of the growing number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin (Int5).

In contrast to Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, Christians from the same area are rather well organised and present in Berlin. There are about forty to sixty Christian churches or congregations of an African approach in Berlin[105], and they have their own umbrella organisations. Two of these Christian congregations are Roman-Catholic and belong to the archdiocese of Berlin. One of them is a francophone community which has grown out of the French military *aumônerie*[106] in Berlin, while the other one is run by German members of a missionary order (Int27; Int7). Obviously, they both are incorporated into the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the archdiocese. The francophone Catholic congregation today is made up of one hundred and fifty to two hundred believers, mainly migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Many of them are students from Cameroon as well as embassy staff, asylum seekers and refugees and other migrants from different former French colonies such as Cameroon, Benin, or Togo. There are, however, also francophone Canadians as well as French migrants and Franco-German couples who attend mass there (Int27). In contrast, the second congregation is much younger and was set up by and explicitly for Ghanaian, and thus anglophone, migrants in Berlin. It is closely linked to a drop-in centre for sub-Saharan migrants run by members of a missionary order and supported by a lawyer (Int7).

Among the Protestant congregations, there is also a francophone one which goes back to the presence of the French army in Berlin after the Second World War. Since the withdrawal of the French brigades after German reunification the congregation is run by civilian volunteers. It is a reformed congregation and since 1999, it is linked to the Huguenot church of Berlin. The latter is - although Calvinist - a special status member of the Lutheran *Evangelische Kirche Berlin-Brandenburg-schlesische Oberlausitz* (EKBO) (Communauté protestante 2012online; Französische Kirche 2012online). Obviously, this congregation is not made up solely by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, but also includes French migrants and other francophone Protestants (Communauté protestante 2012online).

[105] I was able to identify 49 churches, but one of the interlocutors, a representative of one of the umbrella organisations, estimated that there were about 60 churches in Berlin (Int8).
[106] Chaplaincy.

Apart from these three congregations which are more or less directly linked to the two major Christian churches in Berlin - the EKBO and the Catholic Church - there are about twenty Pentecostal churches and twenty to thirty churches which are either independent Protestant churches or belong to different Protestant denominations. The size and membership of these churches varies: Some are explicitly international and in some cases try to attract both African and non-African believers (Int1). Others mainly bring together migrants from one country and often have an important function as a rallying point for the whole ethnic or national community in Berlin (Int21). Many of the congregations are quite small with no more than fifty members, but some attract several hundred people to their Sunday services (*pars pro toto*: Int1; Int3; Int17; Int25).

Secular organisations set up by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa outnumber both Christian and Muslim organisations by far. There are at least two hundred[107] cultural, ethnic, or homeland-oriented associations, asylum seekers support and anti-racist groups, and women's associations. Within a local section of the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) in one of the Berlin districts, there also is a working-group which was set up by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. It focuses on the African continent and the African minority in Germany. Also, there are several media projects or small media enterprises, including a magazine and a TV production company, which concentrate on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Germany and on improving the image of the African continent in German public opinion. In addition to these individual organisations, there is a secular umbrella organisation that was set up a few years ago in order to be a voice of the entire African population in Berlin.

Of course, the variance among these organisations is enormous. They differ in terms of their goals and membership as well as in their public visibility. The majority are ethnic or country-oriented associations - a considerable number of which are also development aid organisations. The second largest group is that of cultural associations - including groups facilitating cultural exchange between migrants from different African countries and members of the non-migrant population. They are followed by a smaller number of women's or refugees' self-help or pressure groups, and more political associations such as the Committee for an African Monument in Berlin or the Oury Jalloh Initiative[108].

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[107] Estimate based on interview material, a thorough search of the official register of associations and the Internet.

[108] The *Initiative Oury Jalloh* is one of the most political members of the *Afrika-Rat*. It is also one of the most prominent member associations, and its activities, or the information it provides, are regularly presented on the *Afrika-Rat*'s website. The association campaigns for a comprehensive elucidation of the circumstances of the death of Oury Jalloh in police custody, and raises serious allegations against German police and the Courts (Initiative Oury Jalloh 2012). The *Afrika-Rat* often mobilises for its activities

5.2 Secular and religious interorganisational networks in Berlin: a social network analysis

A social network analysis (SNA) is ideal for studying the inter-organisational relations of these organisations, because it uses relational rather than attributational data (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 6). The data used here are both one- and two-mode data. In a first step, two-mode data will be used to describe the general structure of the organisations' network based on their membership in federations and umbrella organisations. A second step will consist of an additional analysis of network characteristics based on the co-memberships of the organisations, i.e. on one-mode data. In a third step, a second kind of relation will be included into the analysis. For all African religious organisations in Berlin, the sharing of leadership personnel will be studied. This will help to analyse who is in a position of influence within the African (religious) network and who has access to network resources - it is thus particularly interesting for the present research question whether migrants can draw

such as demonstrations in front of the Court halls, and also supports it in other ways (with press releases, for instance). It is both an example of the most political activities of secular African migrant associations in Berlin, and for the way the umbrella organisation can offer support to individual members. The support for the *Initiative Oury Jalloh* also underlines the political character of the *Afrika-Rat* itself (for an example, see http://afrika-rat.org/Presse/polizei-brutalitaet.html).

The political dimension of the *Initiative*'s and the *Afrika-Rat*'s protest becomes very evident, if one takes a closer look at the circumstances of Oury Jalloh's death and the role German police and the administration of justice. In a nutshell, Oury Jalloh, a refugee from Sierra Leone, died on 7 January 2005 because of a fire in his cell at the police station in Dessau, Sachsen-Anhalt. Both his hands and feet were tied up when the fire broke out and the police officer in charge apparently turned off the fire alarm initially instead of coming to his rescue immediately. When the officer finally went to check on the prisoner, he supposedly was not able to help him due to smoke. The exact circumstances of Jalloh's death have not been completely illuminated until today. Apparently, some pieces of evidence have disappeared, while others have appeared on a list of court exhibits only three days after Jalloh's cell had been searched (tazonline 2012a, SZonline 2012). In 2007, two police officers from Dessau, who were accused of causing bodily harm with fatal consequences and involuntary manslaughter respectively, were cleared of all charges for lack of evidence. However, there was an appeal against the Dessau court's decision lodged to the Federal Court of Justice (*Bundesgerichtshof*), who annulled one of the acquittals in 2010 and referred the case to the Regional Court (*Landgericht*) in Magdeburg (SZonline 2010a, SZonline 2010b). On 13 December 2012, the Regional Court passed a verdict after rejecting several demands for new expertise put forward by the joint plaintiffs, and sentenced the police officer to a 10,800 Euro fine for involuntary manslaughter (SZonline 2012, tazonline 2012b, tazonline 2012c). The public prosecutor's office lodged an appeal on questions of law (tazonline 2012d) and in November 2013, some activists filed charges against a person or persons unknown and presented a new expertise which calls into question the police's claim that Oury Jalloh had been able to set fire to himself and that no fire accelerant had been used. Due to this new expertise, in April 2014, the public prosecutor of Dessau-Roßlau restarted the investigation. While these investigations still continue, in September 2014, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed the verdict of the Magdeburg Regional Court. The *Initiative Oury Jalloh* continues to campaign for the elucidation of the circumstances of Oury Jalloh's death, and for the rememberance of the man, who "burnt alive in a police cell" (Initiative Oury Jalloh 2012).

on their religious organisational structures for their political involvement. It will also help to reveal whether representatives of religious organisations are influential within secular and explicitly political structures, too.[109]

5.2.1 Affiliation with overarching organisations

To begin with, Figure 17 is a representation of the membership structure of African umbrella organisations in Berlin.[110] Secular organisations are represented in blue, Christian organisations in red, Muslim ones in green; squares stand for umbrella organisations or federations, circles for simple organisations.[111] There are one major secular umbrella organisation, the so-called *Afrika-Rat* (Africa Council), and three Christian federations. Within the sub-Saharan African field, there are no Muslim umbrella organisations.[112]

The network displayed in this figure is an affiliation network. Affiliation networks differ from other networks in that they are "a special kind of two-mode social network that represent the affiliation of a set of actors with a set of social occasions (or events)" (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 291).

In SNA terminology, the African umbrella groups represented in Figure 17 are events[113], and their members are actors, who participate in these events. The

[109] Of course, it would have been ideal to broaden the analysis and use a more complex model, such as the one proposed by Manlio Cinalli (2007) referred to above. However, since it has not been within the scope of this research project to interview representatives of all African organisations in Berlin, this was not an option. In addition, some of the interlocutors were very reluctant to answer questions regarding their networks or to state who they co-operate with and who they had had conflicts with.

[110] Please note: All network representations and some other figures in this book are in black and white in the printed edition, and may be accessed in colour at the accompanying website.

[111] All network representations originally are coloured, but printed in black and white here. To see the coloured figures, please refer to the accompanying website where the material can be accessed for free.

[112] Figure 17 contains all African umbrella organisations and their members that could be found in Berlin at the end of the summer of 2009. For the purposes of this analysis, September and October 2009 are taken as reference, since most of the Berlin interviews were made between March and October 2009, mainly in September and October. Some interviews were taken later (2011), because the field work in Paris preceded the additional field work in Berlin, but the information drawn from these later interviews is only taken into consideration in the network analysis if it is also applicable for 2009. For instance, one of the Pentecostal pastors who was interviewed later in 2011 left his old church and founded a new one in 2010 - this new church does not appear in the network analysis. In contrast, one of the representatives of the CCCAAE also was a representative of the *Afrika-Rat* at the time of the interview, but stepped down from his office shortly afterwards. In the network analysis, he is still treated as a representative of both organisations.

[113] As Wasserman and Faust explain, events can be "a wide range of specific kinds of social occasions", including "social clubs in a community, treaty organisations for countries, boards of directors of major corporations, university committees, and so on" (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 294).

present affiliation network thus is a two-mode network, where each umbrella organisation - each event - links the member organisations - the actors - that participate in it. At the same time, each organisation that is a member of several umbrella organisations or federations - every actor who participates in more than one event - creates ties between the overarching organisations - the events - that it participates in.

Affiliation networks are interesting for the present research question because they are based on membership lists, i.e. on particularly reliable data that is often more easily available than other network data (cf. Jansen 2006: 119). Here, the data was drawn from membership lists that were provided by the organisations or could be established from the interview material. In addition, an affiliation network also reflects a feature of social networks that is relevant for political involvement: events are occasions for actors to interact and facilitate the creation of direct ties between actors which then increase the probability of co-operation (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 293; see also Faust 1997: 157). Also, the participation of actors in different events, i.e. the fact that events overlap in their membership, facilitate the flow of information between groups and can be the basis of co-ordinated action (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 293; see also Faust 1997: 157).[114]

As Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust point out, affiliation networks require a distinct set of methods for analysis because their characteristics are not the same as those of one-mode networks (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 291). Most of these methods aim at representing the networks based on graph-theoretic approaches (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 292). In the following, the affiliation network(s) of sub-Saharan African migrant organisations in Berlin will be presented using these methods. Also, one-mode data will be derived from the two-mode affiliation network data and some more analytical methods will be used in order to study them.

The bipartite graph in Figure 17 shows that the Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have been most successful in building overarching organisational structures.[115] Although there are four times as many secular organisations as there are Christian ones, the *Afrika-Rat* is the only secular umbrella organisation (No. 807 in Figure 17) which unites roughly thirty-five member organisations. In contrast, there are three different federations of Christian organisations, which bring together about forty-five organisations. Most of the Christian associations are members of the Council of Christian Churches of an African Approach in Europe (CCCAAE, 813) and the *Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin und Brandenburg* (Council of African

[114] For a more limited appreciation of affiliation network data, see Jansen (2006: 119).

[115] Please note that the network represented in this figure is treated as an affiliation network, i.e. as a two-mode network. The data has been entered as one-mode data, however, because one of the umbrella organisations (the RaCiBB) is also a member organisation of another umbrella organisation. If the data is entered as two-mode data, this leads to the RaCiBB being represented as two nodes: once as an event, once as an actor.

Christians in Berlin and Brandenburg (RaCiBB), 801), and eight of them belong to an association of African Pentecostal pastors (APPA, 808). So while there are a large number of isolates, i.e. of African associations in Berlin that are not organised in one or more federation or umbrella organisation, there are proportionately few Christian churches which do not belong to the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE or other overarching structures.

Interestingly, there is also a direct tie between the Christian and the secular associations, because the RaCiBB itself is a member of the *Afrika-Rat*. One of the two major Christian umbrella organisations, hence, is a member of an explicitly political federation. In contrast, no Muslim associations or federations are members of the *Afrika-Rat*.[116] This corresponds to the self-description of the RaCiBB - and the CCCAAE, incidentally - as a religious, but also explicitly political umbrella organisation.

The picture changes slightly and Muslim organisations appear if non-African umbrella organisations that include sub-Saharan African member organisations are also taken into account. As Figure 18 shows, the network then has three components instead of one, and in addition to the *Afrika-Rat*, the CCCAAE, and the RaCiBB, there are now five new Christian umbrella organisations[117], three secular ones, and one Muslim umbrella organisation visible.

The newly appeared Christian umbrella organisations are the *Bund freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden* (Union of Pentecostal congregations (BFP), 811), the local conservative Christian network *Gemeinsam für Berlin* (Together for Berlin, 802), the archdiocese (803), the EKBO (810), and the so-called International Convent, which assembles almost all Christian migrant congregations in Berlin (804). Together with the latter, one African migrant church also appeared that is not part of any other umbrella organisation or federation in Berlin (37).

The secular umbrella organisations that are visible in addition to the *Afrika-Rat* now are the *Migrationsrat* (Migration Council; 806), the *Verein für interkulturelle Arbeit in Berlin/Brandenburg* (Association for intercultural work in Berlin/Brandenburg (VIA); 805), and a local section of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (812). Ten secular African associations are affiliated with these organisations, but are no members of the *Afrika-Rat*. One of them is the Africa working group of the SPD's local section (*AK Afrika*, 86). The others are a women's group (76), a students' union (78), two organisations that support children in Africa and/or Afri-

[116] As has been already said, this is unusual for an affiliation network, because the RaCiBB is both an umbrella and a member organisation (see footnote 115).

[117] The term "umbrella organisation" is used here in the widest possible sense of the word so as to include also the archdiocese and the EKBO, which would probably not describe themselves as "umbrella organisations".

can refugee children in Germany (87, 200), ethnic, media and social support associations (198, 137, 117, 120) and a development aid association (451).

The Muslim umbrella organisation (809) is the *Initiative Berliner Muslime* (IBMUS), the Initiative of Muslims from Berlin. One of the nine members of this network is the African Muslim Circle (AMK) (51). Seven are other local Muslim groups, among them the AMK's "parent organisation" (510), and one is a Muslim youth organisations with branches in different cities all over Germany (517).

For better clarity of the display, Figure 18 does not include the non-African members of the umbrella organisations.[118] It is, however, of great importance to note that secular, Christian, and Muslim associations all have ties to non-African organisations via at least one, if not more, overarching organisations. At the same time, there are relevant differences between the three groups. Whereas the AMK, i.e. the only African Muslim organisation in Berlin, only has ties to eight other migrant organisations, all other organisations have direct or indirect links to non-migrant organisations. As has been discussed above, these ties can be particularly significant when it comes to getting involved politically because members of the non-migrant population are likely to have more relevant resources than migrants. As the further analysis of the network data and the interview material will show, the AMK is not as isolated as its membership in formal structures suggests. However, also the further network analysis and the hermeneutic analysis of the material will confirm the differences between the self-organisation of Christians and Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa.

Generally, African Christian organisations have been more successful when it comes to being part of or setting up overarching structures than their Muslim and secular counterparts - also, if non-African umbrella organisations are included into the network.

If, according to network theory, participation in events facilitates communication and the creation of pairwise ties among the participants, the Christian organisations thus have more opportunities for exchange and co-ordination at their disposal than non-Christian organisations. At the same time, the fact that both Christian and secular umbrella organisations overlap means that there is a chance for co-ordinated action of these organisations. African Muslim organisations, however, do not seem to have this chance.

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[118] A bipartite graph which included all Catholic and all EKBO congregations in Berlin would simply be illegible. Also, as the present research is concerned with the self-organisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa as well as the relations between their organisations as a resource for them to become involved politically as Black African migrants in Berlin, it seems more appropriate to limit the analysis to African organisations, except for non-African umbrella organisations with African member organisations.

5.2.2 Co-membership ties

While the differences between Christians and Muslims are rather obvious, it is interesting to take a closer look at the differences between secular and Christian organisations. In the following, the analysis will focus on the density of their networks and the strength of their ties. It has been argued above that strength of ties and network density are indicators of unity and solidarity and thus of the capacity of a group to act collectively in order to improve its situation.

Figure 19 therefore displays the co-membership of African Christian, Muslim and secular organisations in African umbrella organisations. This one-mode network has been derived from the original two-mode affiliation network by the cross-product method which symmetrises network data. The resulting graph is a valued graph of the shared memberships of all sub-Saharan African associations in African federations or umbrella organisations in Berlin. Figure 20 displays a similar graph. This one, however, is based on the organisations' affiliations with *all* umbrella organisations.[119] In both graphs, weak ties, i.e. ties based on just one co-membership relation (strength one), are displayed as grey lines. Those based on two shared memberships (strength two) are green, followed by blue (strength three), red (strength four) and black (strength five).[120]

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[119] For several reasons, it is appropriate to focus parts of the analysis on sub-Saharan migrant organisations alone. First of all, as the present research concentrates on the question whether particularly vulnerable migrants can draw on their religion for their self-organisation and their political involvement in order to try and improve their situation, it is reasonable to focus on structures set up and directed by these migrants themselves. Secondly, the deliberate limitation of the network analysis to African organisations helps to keep the data manageable. If all umbrella organisations and similar structures were to be included into the analysis, the network would be gigantic. There are several hundred Lutheran and Catholic parishes in Berlin alone that would have to be taken into account. The relations then would be even more difficult to interpret because, for instance, shared membership in the Catholic archdiocese and in the *Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin und Brandenburg* (RaCiBB) are likely to be, but not necessarily are, of a different quality. For example, while not all members of the CCCAAE or the RaCiBB will be involved in meetings and projects of their federations, a representative of a Catholic parish like the francophone parish of Berlin may know almost all other representatives of African churches on the RaCiBB personally. But the same representative will hardly know representatives of the majority of all parishes etc. of the archdiocese.
Nevertheless, as both some secular and some religious African migrant organisations are affiliated with non-African overarching structures, and as ties across ethnic boundaries may be particularly relevant for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, it is interesting to include these ties in the analysis, too. In order to keep the data manageable, however, non-African member organisations of the non-African umbrella organisations still are left out and only African member organisations are taken into account.

[120] Although this provides the same information, for additional clarity, the lines in Figure 20 are also wider if the ties they represent are stronger. See also the material available online at the accompanying website.

In the graph in Figure 19, the secular and the Christian organisations belong to two different network components and there are no co-membership ties between them. The RaCiBB, however, here is part of the secular network component, because it is a co-member of all other members of the *Afrika-Rat*.[121] In contrast, Figure 20 shows that there are both strong and weak ties which link secular and Christian organisations if affiliations with non-African umbrella organisations are included. Secular and Christian organisations are linked both via simple organisations and umbrella organisations. Thus, there are several opportunities for the exchange of ideas and of resources between religious and secular organisations. The AMK is not part of the network because it does not share any memberships with other sub-Saharan African migrant organisations.

Both graphs show that in terms of shared membership in overarching organisations, Christian organisations have more and stronger ties than secular organisations. The co-membership graphs thus demonstrate even more clearly what the two-mode affiliation network already indicated: while Christian sub-Saharan African organisations are by far better connected than their Muslim counterparts, they also have a stronger inter-organisational network at their disposal than secular sub-Saharan African organisations.[122] This is the case whether non-African umbrella organisations are included or not. Sub-Saharan African Christian organisations therefore are better connected both within the sub-Saharan African organisational field and in the more general organisational field in Berlin.

[121] Evidently, the RaCiBB has no *co-membership* ties with its own members and, as it is not a member of the other two African Christian umbrella organisations, it is not part of the Christian component. It is important to bear in mind, however, that as a federation, it still does have ties with its member organisations, but that these do not appear in a co-membership network. So while technically there are no ties between the two components, they really are linked as one of the two large Christian umbrella organisations is part of the secular network.

[122] Since the basic network data is the same as before, Muslims obviously do not appear.



Figure 17. African associations: membership in African umbrella organisations.



Figure 18. African associations: membership in African and non-African umbrella organisations.



Figure 19. Co-membership of African associations in African umbrella organisations: strength of ties.



Figure 20. Co-membership of African associations in African and non-African umbrella organisations: strength of ties.

While these graph-theoretical methods are a good way to approach an affiliation network, it is important to combine these methods with a number of network measures which use, of course, the same data, but are of a more analytical character. Network density is "one of the most basic properties of a network" (cf. Beckfield 2008: 429), and is particularly interesting here because, for instance, it may be an indicator of how fast information will travel through the network (cf. Jansen 2006: 94), as well as of solidarity and co-operation.

The density Δ of a network is defined as the ratio of the actual number of pairwise ties present in the network (L) to the highest possible number of pairwise ties in this network. For a directed graph with g nodes, the maximum number of possible lines between nodes is

$$g(g-1)/2$$

Expressed in a formula, a network's density therefore is defined as:

$$\Delta = \frac{L}{g(g-1)/2} = \frac{2L}{g(g-1)}$$

The density of a co-membership network $\Delta_{(N)}$ then is calculated as follows:

$$\Delta_{(N)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{g}\sum_{j=1}^{g} x_{ij}^{N}}{g(g-1)}$$

with i ≠ j, and with x_{ij}^{N} designating the number of events two actors i and j are both affiliated with (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 101-102; 309-310; 314-317; see also Mercklé 2004: 27; Jansen 2006: 94-95).[123]

Figure 21 presents the results of the calculation of the density for the co-membership network of the sub-Saharan African organisations that are affiliated with at least one African or non-African umbrella organisation or federation.[124] The table records the density for the complete network of all African organisations affiliated with the African umbrella organisation as well as for the Christian and the secular sub-networks. For each of them, the density is calculated for the valued and the dichotomous relation.[125]

[123] All three formulae are quoted from Wasserman/Faust (1994: 101-102; 314-317).

[124] As has been pointed out above, the AMK is not part of the network, since all isolates have been removed and the AMK does not share any membership with any other African organisation.

[125] The valued affiliation data represents the strength of ties, while the dichotomised data is coded 0 if a pair of nodes has no affiliation with any event in common and 1 if they have one or more in common.

For the valued affiliation network as it is displayed in Figure 21, the density is ⊿ = 0.6215. In other words, on average, pairs of sub-Saharan African organisations in Berlin share membership in 0.62 African or non-African umbrella organisations. For the dichotomous membership relation, the density is ⊿ = 0.4207, which means that 42 percent of the organisations in *Figure 22* are co-members of at least one umbrella organisation. In comparison, within the sub-network[126] of secular African organisations pairs of organisations share membership in 0.76 African umbrella organisations (⊿ = 0.7596). And within the Christian sub-network, pairs organisations on average even share membership in 1.7 federations (⊿ = 1.7082). For the secular sub-network, the density of the dichotomous relations is ⊿ = 0.7038 and for the Christian dichotomised sub-network, it is ⊿ = 0.9662. In other words, while 70 percent of the secular organisations share membership in one or more overarching organisations, 96 percent of the Christian organisations share affiliation with at least one federation or umbrella organisation.

The density for both the valued and the dichotomous relations thus clearly show that the connections among the Christian organisations are tighter and more encompassing than among the secular organisations. Apparently, it is indeed easier for Christian organisations to form overarching structures than for secular or Muslim organisations. Not only does this confirm the observations made from the first graphical representations of the networks, but also what was expected theoretically. *Religion apparently can be a resource for the self-organisation of migrants, and can even lead to tighter networks and more encompassing structures than secular attempts of self-organisation.*

If the data are limited to African organisations and African umbrella organisations alone, the results are quite foreseeable because the affiliation network than just represents membership in the *Afrika-Rat* for secular organisations and the RaCiBB and membership in the RaCiBB, the CCCAAE and the APPA. The results summarised in Figure 22 nevertheless confirm what the graphic presentation of the two components of this network already suggested: while 100 percent of the members of the *Afrika-Rat* obviously share membership in one federation (for the dichotomous relation, ⊿ = 1), the Christian organisations have a denser network at their disposal. Not only do all of them share membership in at least one umbrella organisation, too (for the dichotomous relation, ⊿ = 1). On average, pairs of Christian organisations also share membership in 1.7 overarching organisations (⊿ = 1.6523) and are thus better connected than their secular counterparts.

[126] Please note that the sub-networks discussed here are not identitcal to the subsets of actors defined by their membership in a particular event. Instead, they are defined deliberately by their attributes as networks of secular or Christian organisations since this is more relevant for the present research question.

(Affiliation) Network	Density (valued co-membership relation)	Density (dichotomous co-membership relation)
Sub-Saharan African organisations affiliated with at least one umbrella organisation or federation	0.6215	0.4207
Sub-Saharan African secular organisations	0.7596	0.7038
Sub-Saharan African Christian organisations	1.7082	0.9662

Figure 21. Co-membership of African associations in *African and non-African* umbrella organisations: density.

(Affiliation) Network	Density (valued co-membership relation)	Density (dichotomous co-membership relation)
Sub-Saharan African organisations affiliated with at least one umbrella organisation or federation	0.7016	0.5003
Sub-Saharan African secular organisations	1.0000	1.0000
Sub-Saharan African Christian organisations	1.6523	1.0000

Figure 22. Co-membership of African associations in African organisations: density.

5.2.3 Central actors within the network of secular and Christian organisations

A second kind of network analytical measures also underlines the importance of Christian organisations in the affiliation network of sub-Saharan African migrant organisations in Berlin. The centrality of different nodes within the present co-membership network points into the same direction as the (sub-)networks' density. Centrality measures are the most straight-forward indicators for an actor's position

of power (or dependence) within a social structure and they have been discussed many times.[127]

There are four standard concepts of centrality - degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality - and the co-membership network can be analysed with these standard measures.[128] For our purposes, it is sufficient to focus on the first three of them. Degree centrality is based on the idea that an actor with many contacts is in an advantageous position because "they may have alternative ways to satisfy needs, and hence are less dependent on other individuals" (Hanneman/Riddle 2005online: chapter 10). In its basic version as proposed by Freeman, degree centrality is a function of the adjacencies of a node. To put it differently, it is a function of the direct ties an actor has (Wasserman/Faust 1994: 100-101; 178-179). Degree centrality is interesting here, because an African migrant organisation with many contacts due to shared membership in umbrella organisations is likely to be able to tap more resources than an organisation that has fewer contacts. Also, an organisation that is central in the co-membership network in terms of degree centrality is either a member of one (or few) large and thus potentially strong federations of sub-Saharan African migrant organisations or it belongs to a larger number of (possibly smaller) umbrella organisations and thus is in a position which allows it to tap different (pools of) resources.

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[127] In her article on centrality in two-mode affiliation networks, Katherine Faust highlights that it is interesting to think of centrality also in terms of both modes at a time (Faust 1997). More precisely, according to Faust, it is important not only to measure the centrality of events and actors separately, but to develop centrality measures that take into account the interdependence of actor and event centrality (Faust 1997: 161-164). For instance, in the present case, an African umbrella organisation can be considered as more central than others if its member organisations are central actors.
Faust suggests several ways of taking the duality of affiliation networks into account appropriately (Faust 1997: 165-178). Based on the formulae put forward by Katherine Faust for the calculation of centrality within affiliation networks, it theoretically would be possible to calculate also the centrality of the respective sub-Saharan African migrant organisations as well as of the federations and umbrella organisations within the two-mode networks and the bipartite graphs presented in the graphs above. However, as it is difficult to consider these networks as "pure" two-mode affiliation networks, because of the RaCiBB's membership in the *Afrika-Rat*, it seems more appropriate to focus on the co-membership networks only. Concentrating on the one-mode networks of course leads to a loss of information because the interdependence of actor and event centrality described by Faust is not taken into account. This avoids, however, the difficulties that arise from the dual role of the RaCiBB as both an event and an actor within an affiliation network.
Nevertheless, when interpreting the data, one should bear in mind that the networks under scrutiny are co-membership networks derived from two-mode affiliation networks and that the centrality of actors and of events are interdependent. While Faust's proposals for the calculation of centrality in two-mode affiliation networks are not applied here, the ideas behind it should not be ignored entirely.

[128] As the present network is a co-membership network, the relations are nondirectional. It is therefore unnecessary to use directional measures of centrality, such as in-degree and out-degree.

Closeness centrality, in contrast, is a measure of how close a node is to all other nodes in the network. It may be defined as a function of an actor's geodesics[129], i.e. of the shortest possible paths to reach other actors (cf. Wasserman/Faust 1994: 184). The most central actors in terms of closeness centrality in the present network thus are well placed to quickly reach all other members of any of the African umbrella organisations.

Quite differently, betweenness centrality results from an actor's capacity to exercise some control over the interactions between other actors because of this actor's location on the shortest path between other actors. If an actor is on many geodesics, i.e. on many of these shortest paths, he or she may have more interpersonal influence than others in the network (cf. Wasserman/Faust 1994: 185-186). In the co-membership network of African migrant organisations, an organisation can excercise some control over the interactions between other organisations if these other organisations do not share any membership in umbrella organisations and thus need to pass through the organisation "between" them. Betweenness centrality here thus describes the power to "mediate the flow of resources or information" (Faust 1997: 160) between other associations.

The results of the analysis of centrality for the network based on affiliation with African or non-African overarching structures are summarised in Figure 23 as well as in the appendix. They show that in terms of degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality the most central actors in the co-membership network are Christian actors.[130] *The* most central actor in terms of all kinds of centrality is an independent charismatic Protestant church, labelled as number 3 in the network representations.

In terms of degree centrality, it is followed by three organisations - numbers 16, 27, and 33 -, all three of them Pentecostal churches. As Figure 25 illustrates, with regards to degree centrality, Christian organisations are generally more central in the co-membership network than secular organisations. Thirty-six, i.e. almost all, Christian organisations are more central than the most central secular organisation. Not only does this confirm the observation that Christian organisations play an important role in the self-organisation of sub-Saharan African migrants in Berlin. It also shows that they are the most active in the network.[131] In the context of this co-membership network, "being active in the network" means having ties with a large number of other organisations due to shared membership in overarching organisations. Their high degree centrality increases the Christian organisations' potential to tap resources and to choose between partners for co-

[129] In SNA terminology, a geodesic is the shortest possible path between two actors in the network.
[130] For the calculation of the centrality measures, only those organisations have been included that actually are members of one or more umbrella organisation. All isolates have been removed from the data.
[131] See Faust's description of degree centrality: "actors are central if they are active in the network" (Faust 1997: 160).

operation and support. Christian organisations thus have more options for building coalitions as well as for raising funds and other resources necessary for all kinds of actions, including political protest and other forms of political involvement.

The comparison between secular and Christian sub-Saharan African migrant organisations in Berlin is more nuanced for closeness centrality. Here, the most central actor again is the Protestant church mentioned above (3), but it is immediately followed by a secular organisation that campaigns again female genital mutilation (191). The following eleven most central organisations are secular, but the ensuing forty-one are Christian (see the appendix). In short, there is one Christian organisation that is closest to all other organisations and thus may reach both Christian and secular organisations most quickly. Yet, there is also a number of important and influential secular organisations that can easily reach all other organisations, too. As Figure 26 demonstrates well, a larger number of secular organisations that will find it slightly more difficult to reach everyone in the network exists, too. While they cannot count on their network to facilitate communication with all African migrant organisations in Berlin in the same way that Christian organisations can do so, they nevertheless are not isolated. Generally, differences in closeness centrality in this network are not huge, and most actors are in a position to reach many others more or less quickly.

There is, however, one actor that is particularly well placed to mediate flows of information and resources. The charismatic church which scores highest on all centrality measures is by far the most central actor in the network in terms of betweenness. Here, all other organisations - both Christian and secular - are much less important than this little church. Due to its multiple memberships, it has the highest potential to exercise control over everything that passes through the network. Interestingly, the ensuing twelve organisations are secular, followed by ten Christian organisations. All other organisations do not have any potential to control the flows in the network.

If memberships in non-African umbrella organisations are excluded from the data again, the results are similar insofar as Christian organisations score higher than secular ones in terms of degree and closeness centrality (see Figure 24). Due to the different structure of the network - two unconnected components - and the great similarity between organisations in terms of shared memberships in the four African umbrella organisations, the results for betweenness centrality, however, equal zero for all nodes. In other words, none of the organisations has the power to control flows of resources or information in the co-membership network.

As the tables displayed in Figure 24 and in the appendix show, the results also differ from the previous ones insofar as the church labelled with the number 3 now is not a more central actor than other Christian organisation. Its important position in the network based on all affiliations hence results mainly from its memberships in non-African umbrella organisations. In contrast, some of the Pentecos-

tal churches are more influential than other churches (in terms of their degree) because they have their own network within the network.

In summary, the strength of ties within the co-membership network(s), the density of the Christian and the secular sub-networks and the different centrality measures show that the Christian organisations set up or run by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin are better organised than their secular counterparts. This is the case whether the affiliation with non-African overarching organisations is taken into account or not. While their intra-group ties are stronger, i.e. the Christian network is tighter, Christian organisations also more often occupy advantageous positions within the entire network.

The greater degree centrality of some of the Pentecostal churches in the network based on membership in only African umbrella organisations indicates that organisations can benefit from confessional ties within the religious field. At the same time, the case of the Protestant church which scored highest on all centrality measures in the network based on all affiliations shows that membership in non-African (secular) federations can be a structural advantage for religious organisations, too.

In short, if, as has been argued in chapter 1, organisational resources are essential for the political involvement of migrants, Christian (and mainly Protestant) migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin are in a good position for getting active politically. As the results of the network analysis suggest, religion can hence be helpful for the creation of overarching structures, which are likely to facilitate exchange of resources and information and thus can be the basis for political involvement.

While Muslims are quite isolated and hardly organised at all, Christians can take advantage of their religion for creating a basis for co-ordinated action, shared resources and solidarity. The fact that Christian and secular organisations are part of the same network and that they are linked through both weak and strong ties indicates that the Christian organisational structures are not built and used for purely religious purposes only. Not only is one of the two large Christian umbrella organisations part of the *Afrika-Rat* and thus of an explicitly political federation. The RaCiBB thereby of course shares membership with many individual political associations and co-operates with them on political issues. Also, individual Christian associations also share memberships with secular associations. Since both the RaCiBB and the individual associations are tightly linked to many of the African migrants' churches in Berlin, they include these churches into their own political structures and also link them to secular political organisations.

The fact that the RaCiBB does not appear as an important actor in the co-membership network in terms of degree, closeness or betweenness centrality must not be misinterpreted. As it is an umbrella organisation, it obviously shares fewer memberships than other organisations. Most evidently, it is not a co-member of its

own members, for instance. In terms of shared memberships, the RaCiBB therefore resembles other (secular) members of the *Afrika-Rat*. It is, however, one of the reasons why Christian organisations have a tight network at their disposal. Furthermore, it is also one of the reasons why the Christian and the secular co-membership networks are linked. Here, the two-mode character of the original network and the interdependence between the centrality of umbrella organisations (events) and the centrality of individual organisations (actors) needs to be considered and the RaCiBB's importance for the Christian network and the influence of its leaders should not be underestimated.

Centrality measure	Most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)	Second-most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)
Degree	3	25.116	16 33 27	22.326
Closeness	3	79.630	191	66.667
Betweenness	3	51.213	191	3.855

Figure 23. Co-membership of African associations in African and non-African umbrella organisations: centrality measures.

Centrality measure	Most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)	Second-most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)
Degree	16; 27; 28; 33; 39; 44	35.965	All other Christian organisations (except 4 and 15)	32.895
Closeness	All Christian organisations	2.857	All secular organisations	2.273
Betweenness	---	0.0	---	0.0

Figure 24. Co-membership of African associations in African umbrella organisations: centrality measures.



Figure 25. Co-membership of African associations in African and non-African umbrella organisations: degree centrality.



Figure 26. Co-membership of African associations in African and non-African umbrella organisations: harmonic closeness centrality.



Figure 27. Co-membership of African associations in African and non-African umbrella organisations: betweenness centrality.

5.3 Key Christian actors in the network

Before investigating further the way in which Christian organisations get involved politically and how they draw on their networks in order to improve the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin, it is interesting to take a closer look at the relations within the Christian network.

A first step to further investigate the network of African Christian organisations in Berlin will consist of analysing the centrality of the actors within this network separately. Degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality will be calculated and discussed for the Christian network alone. In a second step, these analyses will be complemented by the analysis of their shared leadership personnel as an additional relation between organisations.

5.3.1 Central Christian actors in the network: co-membership in secular and Christian federations

If the Christian co-membership network (Figure 28) is analysed by itself, the most central actors, of course, are not necessarily the same as in the complete network. Figure 29 summarises the results of the analysis for all three centrality measures for the Christian network based on co-membership in African and non-African umbrella organisations.

The most important observation that can be made from the analysis of the co-membership network of African Christian organisations is that differences between organisations are small even if overarching structures that are not explicitly African have been included into the analysis. However, although differences in the centrality of the individual actors are not very large, they are not inexistent, either.

In terms of degree centrality, the most central actors are almost the same as for the Christian-secular network discussed above. While the Protestant church that scored highest on all centrality measures in the previous analysis is not part of the top group within the Christian network, the three Pentecostal churches which were the second-most central actors in the complete network are now the most central actors. The small Protestant church has more ties than all other organisations in the network if secular associations are also included. As it is not a Pentecostal church it is not a member of the two Pentecostal federations. Obviously, it therefore does not share the memberships within these groups. As could be seen in the previous analyses, the fact that they belong to their own umbrella organisations is advantageous for some of the Pentecostal churches. While the measurable structural differences are small, the growing influence of Pentecostal churches within the (African) Christian community in Berlin has also been expressed in several interviews.

In terms of closeness and betweenness centrality, they are not as dominant, however. In both cases, one Catholic parish (23), three Pentecostal churches (4, 6, 38) and seven different Protestant churches (3, 5, 8, 24, 35, 42, 45) are the most central actors in the network. Interestingly, also in both cases, there are only two groups of central and less central actors.

This first approach to the matter of who is important in the co-membership network of African Christian associations in Berlin has shown that the most central actors in this network include some of the most central actors in the complete network, but that they are not entirely the same. Among the Christian organisations, a number of Pentecostal organisations unsurprisingly are well placed in the network because they have the highest number of ties to other organisations. However, when it comes to quickly and efficiently reaching every actor in the network or to control flows of information or resources, the fact that there is a Pentecostal umbrella organisation is not as advantageous. Here, one Catholic parish and several Protestant churches have equally central positions.

Since the present research aims at analysing whether migrants may use their religion for the creation of organisational structures that can be a political resource, it is important to take a closer look at the purely religious federations of the African Christians in Berlin. Are the most central actors the same if only religious memberships are taken into account?

Interestingly, if only affiliations with Christian umbrella organisations are included, the results hardly change. While the scores are not the same, they are still similar either in terms of the absolute values or in terms of the relation between most and second-most central actors. Within the African Christian co-membership network, the power and influence of individual actors hence does not vary whether affiliations with secular overarching structures are taken into account or not. Either way, if individual Christian organisations and their co-memberships in umbrella organisations are considered alone, the influential actors are those who are well placed due to their *religious* memberships.

However, the results do differ, at least to some extent, if only African Christian umbrella organisations are included into the analysis. If structures such as the EKBO, the Pentecostal BFP or the archdiocese are left out, the actors with the highest number of ties in the network are Pentecostal churches (16; 27; 28; 33; 39; 44). At the same time, in terms of closeness and of control of flows in the network, none of the churches is in a more advantageous position than any other because they are all co-members of the RaCiBB.



Figure 28. Co-membership of African Christian associations in Christian and secular African and non-African umbrella organisations.

Centrality measure	Most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)	Second-most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)
Degree	16; 27; 33	43.636	45	41.818
Closeness	3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 23; 24; 35; 38; 42; 45	50.000	All others (except for no. 37)	49.438
Betweenness	3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 23; 24; 35; 38; 42; 45	0.308	All others	0.000

Figure 29. Co-membership of African Christian associations in Christian and secular African and non-African umbrella organisations: centrality.

Centrality measure	Most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)	Second-most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)
Degree	16; 27; 33	44.651	45	42.791
Closeness	3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 23; 24; 35; 38; 42; 45	100.000	All others (except for no. 37)	97.727
Betweenness	3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 23; 24; 35; 38; 42; 45	0.322	All others	0.000

Figure 30. Co-membership of African Christian associations in Christian African and non-African umbrella organisations: centrality.

Centrality measure	Most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)	Second-most central actor(s)	Score (normalised)
Degree	16; 27; 28; 33; 39; 44	65.079	Most others (all except for 4; 15; 20; 22; 29; 32; 41; 46; 47)	59.524
Closeness	All	100	---	---
Betweenness	All	0.000	---	---

Figure 31. Co-membership of African Christian associations in Christian African umbrella organisations: centrality.

Hence, the analysis of the Christian co-membership network(s) shows that religious memberships are of an advantage here, especially if affiliations with non-African (religious) umbrella organisations are taken into account. It also shows that the very encompassing structure of the RaCiBB has a balancing effect on the network in that it creates opportunities for exchange, but also control, for (almost) all African churches in Berlin. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that the RaCiBB gains in attraction and influence due to its balancing role in the community, because a church can immediately attain as good a position in terms of closeness and flow control as all others in the Christian network simply by joining the RaCiBB.

However, so far, only one kind of relation has served as an indicator of who is important in the Christian network. In a second step, the analysis of power and influence within the Christian network will be taken further by having a closer look at individual leaders. It seems appropriate to assume that membership in an umbrella organisation means different things for different organisations. Some may only be involved to receive information. Others may simply lend their name because they believe the federation's goals are a good cause, but they do not want to get involved any further. Again others will want to influence the direction an umbrella organisation follows and get involed in its decision-making structures. In order to find out which actors influence what happens within the RaCiBB and other (African) religious umbrella organisations, it is helpful to take a brief look at the leadership personnel. If individual organisations and umbrella organisations share leaders, this is an indicator of the communication between different organisations and of the influence a member organisation has in the umbrella structures. The organisations whose personnel are most active in the federations are also the ones

that are likely to set the agenda. Moreover, it is a sign of the extent to which members can draw resources from the network - and of the extent to which the federation itself can draw resources from the respective members, too, as their leaders invest time and other resources into the overarching structures.

A graphical approach will be most appropriate for these purposes, because it reveals most clearly who shares leaders with whom. Figure 32 shows for all religious associations set up or run by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin who they share leadership personnel with. The network represented here consists of four components, two of which are made up by only one pair of organisations. The AMK's president, Aziz Lamere, also is the president of a secular association (51+201), and the priest who runs one of the Catholic parishes also directs a Catholic legal and social support centre for African migrants (1+764). The association of Pentecostal pastors shares their leader with two Pentecostal congregations and two secular associations (808+27+39+62+243), while the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE share leaders with each other and with several secular and Christian organisations, including the *Afrika-Rat* (801+813+807+23+4+45+111+224).

Several things are interesting here: First of all, the graph shows that the AMK's ties are not limited to the Muslim field in Berlin, as the analysis of the affiliation network suggested. Aziz Lamere, the AMK's president, is also active as the president of the secular Network African Rural and Urban Development (NARUD). As the interview material shows, there is almost a fusion of the two organisations since, for Aziz Lamere, they both serve the same goals: the improvement of the situation of the most vulnerable parts of the population in African countries (mainly Cameroon) and of migrants (from sub-Saharan Africa) in Berlin. One of the associations uses religion to reach these aims, the other one does not (cf. Int5). Nevertheless, the present network data indicates that Aziz's associations both are not very well connected in the network of organisations of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.[132] At least in terms of shared memberships in federations and of shared leadership personnel, the AMK and the NARUD are isolated.

In terms of the present network relation, the two Catholic organisations that share leaders are in a similar position as the AMK and the NARUD. They alone make up the second component in the shared leaders network since they do not share leadership personnel with other organisations. However, the preceding analyses of the co-membership network have shown that the Catholic parish (1) is quite well integrated in the co-membership network (see Figure 33).

[132] However, this observation needs to be qualified insofar as Aziz Lamere and his secular association share premises with other associations of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. The representative of another African organisation and user of one of the offices on the same floor nevertheless indicated that their exchange with the AMK is rather limited (Int19).

The two other components show that, through their leaders, the three African Christian umbrella organisations are well connected both with individual Christian organisations and with secular individual and umbrella organisations. As can be seen in Figure 33, their ties to secular organisations also reach beyond the *Afrika-Rat* and thus link organisations to the network that themselves are not involved in the main African migrant federation.[133] Apparently, for the persons in charge of these organisations it seems preferable to be part of one or more religious federations than to become part of the secular *Afrika-Rat* although they personally are also active in and responsible for secular ethnic and political associations.

Figure 34 illustrates that the relation "shared leaders" can also be interpreted as an affiliation network, which again helps to take a closer look at influential individuals and organisations in the Christian network. We can see that there are only one Pentecostal pastor and one member of the parish council of one of the Catholic parishes[134] who also have responsibilities in the RaCiBB. In contrast, two representatives of the same Protestant church also hold office in the RaCiBB. The same church also has ties to the CCCAAE and the *Afrika-Rat*. The APPA, of course, is led by Pentecostal pastors, one of them also active in his two congregations and in two secular associations. While it is linked to the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE via its members, the APPA's leaders are not in charge of any of these structures.

What is important to note here is that the representatives of a Protestant church are the most active and the most committed when it comes to directing African migrant umbrella organisations. Also, not only is the RaCiBB a member of the *Afrika-Rat*, one of the RaCiBB's board members also is one of the leaders of an exclusively political federation.

In the Christian and secular co-membership network analysed above, the church labelled with the number 3 appeared as the most central actor in the network. In terms of occupying important positions within the African federations, other churches are more influential. Thus, there are two kinds of powerful religious actors in the network of African religious and secular organisations. On the one hand, there are the organisations that are central in the co-membership network due

[133] It is essential to bear in mind that data on the relation of shared leadership personnel has only been collected for African religious organisations. It would therefore be incorrect to draw any conclusions about the role of religious leaders within the complete network in comparison to the role of secular leaders. Also, centrality measures etc. cannot be calculated reliably for the network presented in Figure 33. Nevertheless, the graph illustrates well that several Christian churches are influential in the complete African organisational network because their leaders are in charge of the three largest African umbrella organisations: the RaCiBB, the CCCAAE, and the *Afrika-Rat*.

[134] The respective person is not the parish priest, but was active in the parish council at the time when most of the interviews were made.

to their many and/or diverse and advantageous memberships. It has been highlighted above that religious actors have been more successful in occupying these positions in the network than secular actors. This is mainly due to the fact that the religious organisations have created more and more encompassing federations. If the Christian co-membership network is analysed by itself, the one Protestant church that scores highest on all centrality measures plays a less prominent role. Still, it is part of the more central actors in this limited network, too. Also, the most central Christian actors in the complete co-membership network and those who are central in the Christian network alone partly overlap. Some of them occupy a more or less advantageous position in the Christian-secular network and an even more central position in their religious co-membership network. However, differences within the Christian network are only very small if affiliations with non-African umbrella organisations are ignored. This first kind of important religious actors thus needs memberships in non-African or non-migrant religious overarching structures in order to occupy a good network position.

On the other hand, there are those organisations that are influential in the network because their leaders are in charge of more than their own organisations. Especially the representatives of one Protestant church are most active in both Christian and secular umbrella organisations. This church as well as the Pentecostal church and the Catholic parish whose representatives hold office within the RaCiBB are not among the most central actors in the Christian-secular co-membership network. To an extent, they are in more advantageous positions if only Christian individual organisations, but also secular and Christian African and non-African umbrella organisations are included into the analysis. This indicates that these churches are not in a position to control flows of resources or information in the complete Christian-secular network. They are not as well placed as church number 3 when it comes to choosing between allies or if they want to reach everybody in the network if only their participation in different overarching structures is taken into account. However, due to the great commitment of their leaders to the cause of the African community, they are still very important actors, both in the African community and among African Christians. It is the individual leaders' work in different committees or boards that gives their organisations power.

Since the RaCiBB, the CCCAAE and the *Afrika-Rat* can be considered the most important federations representing the African community in Berlin, influence in their decision-making structures must be considered as highly important. The churches whose leaders are most active in these federations are not in powerful positions in the affiliation or co-membership network and thus can be circumvented by others. However, their influence in the African community and as its representatives must not be underestimated.



Figure 32. African religious associations: shared leaders.



Figure 33. African religious associations: co-memberships and shared leadership.



Figure 34. African Christian leaders with responsibilities in more than one organisation.

5.4 Summary of the results of the social network analysis

In Berlin, several thousand migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are organised in secular and religious organisations. While the majority of them are members of secular associations, there are also a considerable number of Christian organisations and at least one Muslim one. About every fifth or sixth secular organisation and basically all Christian organisations are affiliated with one or more African secular or Christian federation. The *Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin und Brandenburg* (RaCiBB) alone represents more than forty churches and thus about two thousand African Christians who live in or near the German capital.[135]

While the non-African religious umbrella organisations as well as the African Pentecostal pastors' association cannot be considered political organisations, or at least not unambiguously so, the two African Christian federations and the secular *Afrika-Rat* are explicitly political organisations. They have been set up to unify the African community in Berlin, in Germany and in Europe and to give migrants from (sub-Saharan) Africa a stronger voice. They work to improve the situation of African migrants in all-White societies and, in the case of the RaCiBB, to encourage individual migrants to get involved in German politics.

The formal social network analysis of the affiliation network of African religious and secular associations has revealed that Christian organisations are powerful and influential actors in the African community in Berlin. They play a significant role both in terms of membership in these three African (political) federations as well as in other secular and religious overarching structures and in terms of occupying important offices within these structures.

Their inter-organisational network is denser than that of secular associations and their umbrella organisations therefore have increased legitimacy. Furthermore, the two largest African Christian umbrella organisations, who understand themselves as religious and political organisations, have been more successful in uniting the African churches in Berlin than the secular *Afrika-Rat* in bringing together the secular organisations. Also, most of the Christian organisations are strategically well placed in the affiliation network in order to choose from a large number of both secular and religious associations if they are looking for partners for cooperation or want to co-ordinate their actions. One of the Christian churches is also in the best position to control flows of resources, information and ideas through the network. Within the African Christian umbrella organisations and the African secular federation, Christian leaders occupy important offices. Christians are thus well placed to set the agenda of these federations. Finally yet significantly, their ties also go beyond the migrant organisational field and reach important and, in several

[135] Estimates by the author based on membership lists and interview material.

cases, wealthy religious overarching structures which can be a relevant source of both material and immaterial resources for political action.

On the one hand, the network analysis hence has confirmed the hypothesis that religion can be an extraordinarily good base for the creation of organisational structures and for strategic coalitions. On the other hand, it has also revealed that in these networks Christian actors are far better off than Muslim actors. Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa find it much more difficult to organise and to become part of important networks. Religion thus seems to be an organisational resource only under certain circumstances.

To be sure, the present network analysis did only go so far. It reveals the structure of the field and shows that Christians from sub-Saharan Africa are particularly well organised and connected. It also shows that most of the African Christian churches in Berlin are members of two explicitly political federations, and that the leaders of these federations are also active in secular political contexts in the name of their Christian umbrella organisations. The social network analysis, however, cannot go further and demonstrate in more detail whether and how these structures and resources are used also for political purposes.

One of the most important questions that arise from the results presented in chapter 5 therefore is that of knowing how migrants from sub-Saharan Africa use their organisational structures and whether they can draw on them for political purposes. Also, it would be interesting to learn more about the differences between Muslims and Christians in order to find some elements of an explanation of these differences.

Therefore, in the following chapter, the interview material will be analysed less formally, and more hermeneutically, in order to complement our understanding of the relationship of religious and political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin. The findings on Berlin then will also be contrasted with the situation in the Parisian agglomeration.

6 "Jesus was a revolutionary": Religion as structural and symbolic political resource

The theoretical considerations that were presented in the second chapter of this book underline that, in addition to other factors, different kinds of resources are significant for political involvement: individual resources such as a person's socio-economic status, spare time, and skills, as well as material and immaterial collective resources. In addition, the embeddedness into networks is important for political activities, individual and collective.

More specifically, religion, and especially religious organisations, may provide resources relevant for the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants. It has been put forward that religious organisations can help migrants get access to material and immaterial resources and can induce the creation of overarching structures that may increase their unity and the legitimacy as well as their leaders' capacity to act. Furthermore, religion may serve as a symbolic resource for the framing of political issues and actions. Finally, the presence of migrant religious organisations and especially of migrants as religious experts, i.e. as players in the religious (and the political) field(s), can be interpreted as a political issue in itself.

The fourth chapter has then shown that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are a particularly marginalised and vulnerable minority with few resources at their disposal - both in Berlin and Paris. In contrast, the fifth chapter, which has concentrated on Berlin, has demonstrated that there are many attempts to overcome this marginalisation, and that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have created a diverse organisational landscape in the German capital city. It has given an overview over the organisations set up by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and has shown how these migrant organisations create inter-organisational ties. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that there are secular as well as religious actors who aim at bringing together different organisations in order to increase the visibility and the political influence of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. While the network data that could be gathered for this study as well as the SNA method in itself could not answer every question with respect to migrant self-organisation and political involvement, it was still possible to maintain that Christian migrants have a tighter inter-organisational network than their Muslim and secular counterparts and that their position for drawing on these networks is advantageous.

As Manlio Cinalli argues dense networks and coalitions like the ones set up by secular, and especially by Christian, organisations in Berlin are important for

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mobilisation (Cinalli 2007). Of course, his model of conflictive and co-operational relations between pro-beneficiary actors is more complex, but his study nevertheless indicates that the dense inter-organisational Christian networks, and to a slightly lesser extent, also the secular networks as well as the central positions of different actors in these networks are a good basis for collective mobilisation, and, of course, also for individual participation. However, while many of the secular associations as well as the *Afrika-Rat* were set up for political reasons, the question remains whether the Christian actors also want to use their good network positions for political purposes. If Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin are in a structurally advantageous position, does this have any impact on their political involvement? And can we draw any more general conclusions from the observations made in Berlin?

It will be the aim of this chapter to answer these questions and to contextualise the findings from Berlin by comparing them to what has been observed in the Parisian agglomeration. In accordance with the research question guiding the present book, this chapter will continue to focus on religious structures in order to investigate further whether they are a political resource for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. To this end, the analysis will still concentrate on the federations and co-membership networks discussed in the previous chapter, but the interview material will be analysed in a more hermeneutic and less formalised way than before. The aim will be to show how, firstly, these organisational structures contribute to the public visibility and political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, these structures are built on religious frames that give them their legitimacy and contribute to the success of the Christian migrants' leaders in unifying their "target population". In a second step, the focus will be even more explicitly on this symbolic dimension of religion: It will be demonstrated that Christian migrants also draw on their religion as a *symbolic resource* for dealing with persisting colonial and racist hierarchies. While this alone cannot be considered a form of political involvement, it can be interpreted as an important part of claiming the recognition of an African identity and the valorisation of this *africanité*.

The chapter will concentrate on Christian organisations, since at least for Berlin, African Muslims do not have many organisational structures at their disposal. Nevertheless, the double comparative perspective of chapter 1 will be taken up here again: Not only will Christians and Muslims be compared where possible, but the observations made in Berlin will also be contrasted with observations from Paris in order to contextualise the respective findings and to learn more about their generalisability.

The overarching Christian structures in Berlin, whose relevance has been demonstrated in the network analysis, will be analysed first. They will then be compared to overarching Christian structures in Paris. It will be shown that the different African Christian umbrella organisations, federations and similar structures in both

cities indeed are resources for the political involvement and emancipation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the situation of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and the Parisian agglomeration will be compared briefly, and religion as a political resource for sub-Saharan African Muslims will be discussed. The double comparison will confirm again the importance of context factors as well as the differences between religions. Then, the focus will be on religion as a purely symbolic resource. Again, the analysis will focus on Christians in both cities. It will be demonstrated that religion can be a resource for dealing with racism and the colonial heritage, but under certain circumstances only, and only to a certain extent.

6.1 Religious and secular federations as a step towards migrant emancipation

It has been outlined in the previous chapter that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have set up a great variety of secular and Christian organisations in Berlin. The *Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin and Brandenburg* and the secular *Afrika-Rat* constitute attempts to bring these organisations together, to co-ordinate their actions and to give them a unified, and thus stronger, voice. In the same vein, even the very small *Afrikanische Muslim Kreis* aims at representing migrants from all over (sub-Saharan) Africa. As Aziz Lamere, the AMK's president, outlined in the interview, the idea was to assemble African Muslims who shared certain experiences and problems despite their different national background:

> Aziz Lamere: […] und daraufhin haben wir gedacht, wir könnten uns regelmäßig treffen, uns austauschen. Und wir haben ja gleiche Probleme, da wir aus// auch aus Afrika kommen. Und ist jetzt hier// ist auch eine Chance, jetzt hier für Menschen aus Afrika, sich zusammenzufinden und diese Grenzen zu überschreiten, ja? Diese ländliche Grenzen, die da (?) gesetzt werden, ja, also nicht nach Ländern, sondern nach// es geht einfach um Afrika (Int5).[136]

[136] AL: And then we thought we could meet regularly, exchange our views. And we have the same problems, since we from// also are from Africa. And is here now// is a chance, here now for people from Africa to come together and transcend these borders, yes? These national borders that (?) are put there, yeah, so not by countries, but by// it is simply about Africa. [Nota bene: In the German quote, AL uses the word for "rural", "ländlich", and says "ländliche Grenzen" instead of using the composite term "Ländergrenzen"; unlike "rural" and "national", the two German words have the same root, "Land", and thus are more easily confused. MS]

Souleymane, a representative both of the *Afrika-Rat* and of several secular associations, more or less formulated the same aspirations for the secular federation:

> Souleymane: Na ja, sind einfach dreiundzwanzig Vereine, die aus verschiedenen Länder da:: kommen. Und, äh, die, alle diese Vereine waren bisher länderbezogen, ne? Jeder hat Arbeit für seine Leute, Landsleute gemacht, ne? Und wir haben versucht mit Afrika-Rat ein Netzwerk zu bilden, dass diese so zusammenarbeiten, dass sie kooperieren (Int14).[137]

Unsurprisingly, the secular *Afrika-Rat* is the most explicitly political of the different (umbrella) organisations. For instance, it supports campaigns for the recognition and remembrance of the German responsibility in European colonialism. In order to do so, it for example publishes press releases, mobilises for protest activities organised by others, but also organises protest actions itself (Afrika-Rat 2012online). Also, the *Afrika-Rat* counts explicitly political associations among its members, such as the Oury Jalloh Initiative described above, or the anti-colonialist *Komitee für ein afrikanisches Denkmal in Berlin* (Committee for an African monument in Berlin). What is more, with the *Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland* (ISD), the Initiative Black Persons in Germany, one of the most important national associations for the empowerment of Afro-German men and women adheres to the *Afrika-Rat*. The Black feminist movement is incarnated by ADEFRA, *Schwarze deutsche Frauen und Schwarze Frauen in Deutschland* (Black German Women and Black Women in Germany), which is a member, too.[138] These two organisations must probably be considered the most emblematic and important of the Black movement in Germany.

At the same time, the *Afrika-Rat* assembles only about ten to fifteen percent of the secular African migrant associations in Berlin. It is thus not representative of the (secular) migrant population from sub-Saharan Africa in the German capital.

The AMK is even less representative, although it is the only (more or less) established sub-Saharan African Muslim association in Berlin. Although it has some ties to other Muslim associations, and also some within the African community, it has only few members and cannot claim to represent the Muslim community from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin. Even if the AMK's aims at the beginning were to set

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[137] S: Well, it's simply twenty-three associations which come from different countries there. And, er, until now, all these associations corresponded to one particular country, you see? Each one did its work for its people, its fellow citizens, you see? And with the *Afrika-Rat* we have tried to construct a network, so that they would work together, so that they would co-operate.

[138] For more information on these national organisations, see http://isdonline.de/ and http://www.adefra.de/ (last accessed 22/08/12).

up a religious association that also fulfilled social and, to a lesser extent, political functions, it is therefore very difficult for Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa to draw on religious structures for political action in the name of African migrants in Germany.

Quite differently, as the network analyses have shown, the Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have been much more successful in creating overarching structures and they have the densest inter-organisational co-membership network. Almost every African Christian association is a member of the RaCiBB, even if they are not all active in the same way. The analyses also demonstrated that Christian actors are well placed when it comes to taking advantage of or controlling resources and information flowing through the network. Are these facts relevant for their political involvement? And can they draw on their religion not only as an organisational, but also a discursive resource? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to take a closer look at the federations that most African Christian organisations in Berlin are affiliated with. Is there any political ambition behind these networks? Do they intend to use the legitimacy they can draw from their encompassing structure for political ends?

Also, it is interesting to compare further the Christian organisations from Berlin to their Muslim counterparts, and to add a second comparative element by taking a look at Christian and Muslim organisations in Paris. This double comparison should help to assess whether what has been found in Berlin is only valid for this specific case or whether some more general conclusions may be drawn.

6.1.1 Political aspirations of Christian federations in Berlin

The two large ecumenical federations set up by African Christians in Berlin, the Council of Christian Churches of an African Approach in Europe (CCCAAE) and the *Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin und Brandenburg* (RaCiBB), both aim at advancing the recognition of African churches of all kinds in Europe and at improving the situation of (sub-Saharan) African migrants in Europe / Berlin in general. In Berlin, they basically include the same actors, but while the RaCiBB is a local structure, the CCCAAE has members from all over Europe.

The CCCAAE was first started informally in the 1980s, but became a registered association only in 2001. It was founded by representatives of African churches from the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany and other European countries in order to give the African Christian diaspora a voice in Europe (Int18). According to the World Council of Churches, of which the CCCAAE is a member, it had 118 members in 2006: eight from France, thirteen from the United Kingdom, eighteen from Switzerland, and seventy-nine from Germany. Whereas they are very different in terms of their denomina-

tions, the member churches of the CCCAAE are united in their anti-colonial stance. As African Christians, they may refer positively to the spread of the gospel in Africa by the colonialists. But they are very clear in their condemnation of the denigration and alienation of Africans during and after European colonisation, of the continued exploitation of the African continent as well as of the marginalisation of African migrants in Europe.[139]

For instance, although it would have been easier for them to set up their headquarters in Geneva, because they could have had office space there for free, the central office is located in Berlin. According to one of the CCCAAE's representatives, this is because of the historical significance of Berlin. Since the colonial powers divided Africa among themselves at the so-called Congo Conference of 1884/85 in Berlin, he suggested that the centre of their organisation should be in Berlin. Setting up headquarters in Berlin was a symbol of their anti-colonial stance, and a politically rather than a spiritually or financially motivated decision:

> John: […] Berlin ist historisch für Afrika, und die Einheit der Afrikaner soll von hier ausgehen. Und das war mein Plädoyer, dass Berlin als Hauptsitz dann für diese// dass, wo wir geteilt worden waren, soll dann der Ort sein, der gleiche Ort sein, wo wir die Ei// die Versöhnung und Einigung dann irgendwo (bezei// berufen?) konnten und sollen. Und das Argument wurde dann k// äh (.) von allen akzeptiert. Dann haben wir den// das Büro hierher verlegt (Int18).[140]

Generally, for the CCCAAE, their shared religion is a means to overcome linguistic and cultural differences between African migrants in Europe and to struggle together for recognition. It is thus also a means to overcome the historical divide that is the heritage of the partition of the African continent by the European colonial powers (Int18). For instance, as the interlocutor from the CCCAAE explained, African migrants are able to make important contributions to European societies, and they want to be more than cheap labour (Int18). But in order to escape from a situation of marginalisation, and to fight the devaluation of their capacities, they need to be united despite all internal differences. According to the CCCAAE, religion is a means to reach this goal. John put it like this:

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[139] It is interesting to note that the foundation both of the CCCAAE and of the RaCiBB was initiated and encouraged by German Christians, but that the two organisations have emancipated from "European tutelage". Nevertheless, and despite the large number of member churches in Germany, at the time of the interview, the CCCAAE was debating whether they should move elsewhere because they found it too difficult to achieve their goals in Germany (Int18).

[140] J: Berlin is historical for Africa, and we want the unity of Africans to start from here. And this was my plea, that Berlin would be the headquarters for this// that the place in which we had been divided should then be the place, the same place, where we could and should (find?) uni// reconciliation and unity. And this argument was then accepted by everyone. Then we have moved the// the office here.

> John: Ja, und die Ziele ist, dass wir als Afrikaner nicht nur billige Kräfte sein sollen in Europa.
> Miriam: Arbeitskräfte?
> J: Ja, Arbeitskräfte, weil wir haben so viele Intellektuelle in Europa, das sind nur// viele, die hier studiert haben, sind eigentlich nur Tellerwäscher oder, ähm, ja, Taxifahrer oder irgendwas, ja, Zimmermädchen, ja, gut, Zimmermänner oder so Zimmermädchen, wie man das nennt (*both laugh*), ja. Und was können wir mit unsere Bildung, die wir in Europa be-äh-bekommen haben, tun? So das ist ein Grund, uns dann das Gefühl zu geben, wir sind wertvoll in Europa. Wir können auch was, ja, äh was wir mitgebracht haben, auch zeigen, aber da brauchen wir einen Konsens. Die Afrikaner müssen sich erstmal, ja, zusammentun und Ideen und Strategien entwickeln. Äh, da die Vielfalt in der Kultur so gravierend ist bei den Afrikanern, deshalb denken wir spirituell. Das ist ein bisschen einfacher, zusammen zu kommen und Christus als unseren einzigen Heiland anzuerkennen und das konnte den// endlich der Weg zur Einheit der Afrikaner gekommen (.). Und Christus ist für uns alle, für Afrikaner ist eigentlich der A und O, ja. So da wir ja Christen sind, haben wir dann erstmal Christus nach vorne gestellt und dadurch konnten wir auch zusammen kommen. Und das ist diese Lehre, dass Christen zu der Einheit der Menschen// durch Christus, der Sanctus hat uns geholfen zusammen zu kommen, mh (Int18).[141]

John's description clearly shows the political idea behind the CCCAAE: If they want to overcome the prevailing image of African inferiority and to perceive themselves and be perceived by the non-migrant population as valuable and equal participants in European societies, they need to overcome their differences and dividing interests.

Similarly to the CCCAAE, the RaCiBB is both a religious and a political organisation; it was founded to bring together and give a voice to African Christians in the Berlin-Brandenburg region. Although it mainly is a federation of churches, individuals can also join, because it understands itself explicitly as an organisation representing African Christians - whether they are members of a church or not, and

[141] J: Yes, and the goal is that we Africans are not just cheap forces in Europe.
M: Labour force?
J: Yes, labour force, because we have got so many intellectuals in Europe, they are just// many who went to university here are in fact just dishwashers or, er, yes, taxi drivers or something, yes, chambermaids, yes, good, chamber maids or so chamber maids, however you call this (*both laugh*), yes. And what can we do with our education, which we have received in Europe? So this is a reason to give us the feeling, we are of value in Europe. We can do something, too, er, what we have brought with us, we can show this, too, but we need consensus. First of all, Africans need to, yes, come together and must develop ideas and strategies. Er, the diversity in the culture is so serious with us Africans, this is why we think spiritually. This is a bit easier to come together and to recognize Christ as our sole Saviour, and this could // finally, the way to unity for Africans has come (.). And Christ is for us all, for Africans, in fact, he is the alpha and omega, yes. So since we are Christians, we have put Christ forward, and this is how we could also come together. And this is this lesson, that Christians can [contribute to?] the unity of human beings// through Christ, the Sanctus has helped us come together.

whether their church is a member of the RaCiBB or not. According to one of its representatives, there are about forty member churches, but the core of activists consists of about ten people (Int8).

In accordance with its general goals, the RaCiBB encourages African migrants to get involved in German society, not only through religious or spiritual activities, but also through social, cultural, and political activities: "Weil wir wollen äh christliche Leute afrikanischer Herkunft auch, ähm, ermutigen, sich zu engagieren. Nicht nur spirituell, aber sozial, politisch und kulturell" (Int8).[142]

Under the heading "Politics" (*Politik*) on its website, the RaCiBB furthermore points out that it is one of their declared objectives to create a "feeling of love for Germany" (*Liebesgefühl für Deutschland*) among the African community in the Berlin/Brandenburg region. The strategy is to motivate Africans to take on social and political responsibility, for example by joining German political parties. The RaCiBB's leaders themselves participate in conferences, public panel discussions, workshops, and even in events organised by political parties in order to express and represent the interests of African Christians and of African migrants in Berlin in general.

These short descriptions of the RaCiBB's and the CCCAAE's concepts, objectives and activities already show that most of the African churches in Berlin are members of politically active organisations. Also, the encompassing membership structure partly is a political goal in itself.

To be sure, not all of the African churches in Berlin share this political approach. And even some of the RaCiBB's members hesitate when it comes to participating in its activities. Especially some of the Pentecostal pastors are suspicious because they fear a potential loss of influence and control over their churches through the creation of a supra-structure and too great a politicisation of their religion. Nevertheless, some of the Pentecostal pastors are or were very active in the RaCiBB and/or the CCCAAE. For instance, one of the RaCiBB's founders was a Pentecostal pastor, and this is also the case for one of its incumbent representatives (Int3; Int1; Int8; Int9). Similarly, while the priest of one of the Catholic parishes is not interested in getting involved, the umbrella structures permit other members of this parish and its parish council to get active in more political structures.[143]

The following passage from an interview with a representative of the RaCiBB illustrates very well that different understandings of their faith as well as competition and struggles for legitimacy and recognition exist within the federations, too. For those who want to unify the African (Christian) community in Ber-

[142] Because we want to, er, encourage Christian people of African origin also to get involved. Not only spiritually, but also socially, politically, and culturally.

[143] These ties are clearly visible in the graphs that were discussed in the previous chapter.

lin, these apprehensions and conflicts are important hurdles to overcome. At the same time, as this quote by Pastor Peter Sorie Mansaray also shows, religion represents a resource for moving beyond these disagreements and fears and legitimises the organisations' political stance.

> Peter Sorie Mansaray: […] Wir sagen: Nee, nee, hier ist ein Gebiet für alle. Wir haben das nicht zu beurteilen, wer Pastor ist oder wer nicht, wer Christ ist oder nicht, solange man unser Ziele unterstützen will, bitte schön, warum denn nicht? Und die nennen (uns dann?) zu politisch, ja?
> Miriam: Ok.
> PSM: Ja, zu politisch.
> M: Wer sagt das?
> PSM: Viele andere. Die *Pentecostals*.[144] [145]

[144] Obviously, the African Christian congregations in Berlin diverge in theological aspects as well as in their religious activities, according to the religious tendency they belong to and to their individual leaders. For instance, when asked what was central to the faith as their church professed it, the answers of the interlocutors reached from faith, because "faith is everything" (Int10), to the experience that they had been saved by Jesus Christ (Int25) and the attachment to Jesus Christ as well as the Eucharist (Int27) and, finally, to "building bridges" (Int1). Especially the Pentecostals differ from the others in their way of interpreting the bible. As Peter Arthur, one of the Pentecostal pastors, put it in an interview:

> Peter Arthur: Mhm. Ja, charismatische Gemeinde (.) ist// das bedeutet, wir:: glauben, was in der Bibel steht. Weil, äh, wir haben verschiedene, wie sagt man, äh, wenn man ein Evangelischer ist, die Lutheraner haben ihre mm, wie sagt man, Doktrin (.) oder Dogmatik. Was sie glauben und was sie (.) in Frage stellen. Zum Beispiel, wenn man Lutheraner Dogmatik folgt, die Jona zum Beispiel, seine// der Bursche Jona, die sehen das nicht als eine wahre Geschichte, sondern als eine, (.) wie sagt man, eine Gleichnis. Ja. Und wir glauben, dass eine wahre Geschichte ist, weil Jona, sein Name nicht nur in diesem (.) Buch Jona kommt, sondern auch Geschichte Buch Israel, in den Königen, sein Name ist zweimal da erwähnt. Und Jesus hat auch seinen Namen erwähnt. So (Int1). [For a translation of this quote, see the ensuing footnote.]

As Peter Arthur explains in this excerpt, Pentecostal churches interpret the bible literally, and thus are at a considerable distance to mainstream Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church. The story about Jonah and the whale is not read as a metaphor, but taken at face value, as is the entire text. In an attempt to rationalise their approach to this story - and to the bible in general - Peter Arthur uses what might be called a (pseudo-)scientific strategy of argumentation. First, he explains that there was another case of a man who had been swallowed by a whale, and had survived. Then he claims that archaeological evidence has shown that a long time ago there had been whales in the Mediterranean Sea in order to demonstrate that it had not been impossible for someone who had set sails in Jaffa to cross the Mediterranean Sea to have been swallowed by such an animal. Backed up by these rationalising, "scientific" proofs, the story of Jonah then is not seen as a parable for the human experience of ending and beginning, or for God's omnipotence and human salvation, but as a historically "true" story. This literal interpretation of the bible is typical for Pentecostal Christians, and constitutes an important difference especially to European Lutherans and Catholics who usually adopt a more hermeneutic approach to the texts.

[145] Translation of the quote by Peter Arthur in the footnote:

> M: Ok.
> J: Wo wir auch// Peter Arthur ist auch unser zweiter Vorsitzende, der *Pastor-einer-Pfingstgemeinde*, und der ist ein bisschen// es gibt andere, die denken, er is// äh, wir sind zu politisch. Äh, Christen sollen sich nicht politisch betätigen und so weiter. Und wir sagen: Bitte schön, Jesus war auch politisch. Das ist mein Verständ// er war Revolutionär.[146]

This and the previous passages from the interviews with leaders of the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE hence also show that religion is an important framing resource in order to reach the political goal of unity. Jesus Christ is presented as the reason to come together and to overcome differences. Their belief in Him is portrayed as stronger and more important than their disagreements - be they based on religious, cultural or other differences - so that religion can be an instrument to achieve what otherwise is not possible: (sub-Saharan) African migrants speaking with one voice and with a common goal. Also, reference to Jesus serves as a justification for political action *as Christians*.

As the network representations above already indicated, some member churches and individuals are particularly involved in the co-membership network that results mainly from the structures of the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE.[147] These representations also show that there are individual leaders who are particularly involved in the network. Individuals like John (BT in the network representation),

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PA: Mhm. Yes, a charismatic congregation (.) is// this means that we:: believe in what the bible says. Because, er, we have different, what do you call it, er, when you're a Protestant, the Lutherans have their, er, what do you call it, doctrine (or) or dogmatics. What they believe and what they (.) put into question. For instance, when you follow Lutheran dogmatics, Jonah for example, his// the fellow Jonah, they don't see this as a true story but as a, how do you call it, a simile. Yes. And we believe that this is a true story, because Jonah, his name is not only in this (.) Book of Jonah but also in the historical books of Israel, in the Book of Kings, his name is mentioned twice. And Jesus also mentioned his name. There we are.

[146] PSM: […] We say: no, no, this is a space for everyone. We don't have to judge who is a pastor and who is not, who is a Christian and who is not, as long as they want to support our goals, you know, why not after all? And (then?) they (us?) call us too political, yes?
M: OK.
PSM.: Yes, too political.
M: Who says that?
PSM: Many others. The Pentecostals.
M: OK.
PSM: Where we also// Peter Arthur is also our vice-president, a Pentecostal pastor, and he is a bit// there are other who think he is// er, we are too political. Er, Christians should not become politically active, and so forth. And we say: Come on, Jesus was political, too. This is my understand// he was a revolutionary.

[147] Unfortunately, the pastor of the church that scored highest on all centrality measures in the overall network (3) could not be interviewed. However, several rerpresentatives of the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE, among them some of the most central leaders of the "shared leadership personnel" network, were interviewed.

Peter Mansaray (BS) or Peter Arthur (AD) draw on their membership in the umbrella organisations and on their positions in the co-membership networks in order to ensure the churches' unity and to mobilise others to get involved politically. What is more, the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE networks give them the opportunity to act as representatives of all African churches in the region, not only of their individual churches or as individuals.

Both the two ecumenical federations and the individual leaders draw on the networks described above for their political involvement. First of all, and most importantly, they have a far greater legitimacy than they would if they acted in the name of their individual churches. The umbrella organisation gives them the authority of leaders who have the mandate to speak for several thousand people while some of their churches have no more than forty adult members. Also, while many migrant churches - especially small Pentecostal communities - are often disqualified by the German non-migrant population and by the established churches as being obscure and dangerous 'sects'[148], their leaders appear much more respectable if they act as representatives of a federation of all African churches, including, among others, two Catholic congregations. Aware of this need for unity, they aim at bridging the differences between members.[149]

Secondly, they draw on resources such as premises or contacts to the non-migrant population they would not have as representatives of a secular or a Muslim organisation. For instance, the RaCiBB and CCCAAE rent rooms from the German *Missionswerk*, where they hold meetings, and have office equipment at their disposal. Also, they have the support of German pastors and volunteers who, for instance, are German native speakers and contribute to writing press releases, invitations etc. (Int8; Int18; Int21). Moreover, the very creation of the two African Christian umbrella organisations was initiated by native German pastors (Int8; Int9).

Thirdly, the two federations also are an opportunity for individual pastors or, in general, Christian believers whose congregations are apolitical to get involved politically *as Christians*. While the priest responsible for one of the two Catholic congregations may not want to have anything to do with politics, members of this community may well find it attractive or important to get politically active as Catholics within the RaCiBB. In addition, both the leaders of the umbrella organisations and of individual churches have the possibility to quickly reach large numbers of people through their religious networks. Furthermore via the RaCiBB as a local

[148] To be sure, in Weberian terms they are sects. However, the term *Sekte* (sect) is a very pejorative one in everyday German and usually used – also by the two established churches among others – to portray deviant religious communities as harmful.

[149] This paragraph and the following four paragraphs are also part of a paper presented at the workshop "Religion and ethnicity between West Africa and Europe: A transnational feedback loop?" which took place at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, 6-8 June 2011.

organisation they can get in touch with and potentially mobilise the members of the secular *Afrika-Rat*, too, and, via the latter, they can also reach non-African members of secular migrant umbrella associations.

In addition, individual pastors or simple church members also benefit from the fact that their individual churches are networks in themselves. Via these networks, they can mobilise others and increase their own leverage. They also use the fact that they represent a Christian organisation to get involved politically, because it lends them authority. In part, those persons are the same as the ones who are involved in one of the umbrella organisations, but some are also politically active outside these structures. For instance, one of the Pentecostal pastors is quite active in secular associations, too. Furthermore, he used to be a member of the foreigners' council (*Ausländerbeirat*) of a town near Berlin. When he was a candidate for the council, he drew on the support of his church and asked the church members who had the right to vote in these elections to vote for him (Int25). Other pastors participate in public panel discussions or write articles on issues such as the exploitation of natural resources in Africa by the Europeans, on European migration and refugee policies and the 'Fortress Europe', and on racism.[150] Also, in several Protestant and Pentecostal churches, pastors raise political issues in their sermons from time to time and call on people to vote in elections (if they have the right to do so). In one of the two Catholic congregations, the priest would not raise political issues, but he still addresses matters of integration and participation in German society.

The important point, however, is not that there are migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who are politically active and who happen to be Christians. What is important here is that they get involved politically as Christians and that they use their religious networks as a resource.

In a different way, the federations are also a political resource for the secular African migrant community. Not only are the CCCAAE and the RaCiBB important representatives of African Christians as well as a source of information, material resources and especially legitimacy for the political activities of individual Christian leaders. They also link these leaders as well as - potentially - every member of all churches in the two federations to the *Afrika-Rat*. Thus, the latter may spread to and receive information from groups and individuals it might otherwise be unable to reach. It can even draw on the time and other resources of some of the Christian leaders who represent the RaCiBB within the *Afrika-Rat*. The Christian networks hence are both resources for the political involvement of explicitly religious groups and individuals, and of explicitly secular groups and individuals.

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[150] This description is based on interviews (Int1; Int3; Int8; Int18; Int17), but most importantly on participant observation in services and meetings.

In summary, not only have Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin created the most encompassing network structures, these are also relevant for their political involvement. Since they have been set up as explicitly political organisations, and since their aim is to work for, represent, unite and mobilise the African migrant community, the two main religious federations can be compared to "classical" social movement organisations, and their leaders to social movement entrepreneurs. As has been said, they draw extensively on religion as a resource for their political involvement and thus confirm the hypothesis that religion may be a political resource for members of a particularly marginalised minority in order to counterbalance these structural disadvantages.

However, the question remains whether this is specific for the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE in Berlin or whether migrants can profit from their religion for their political involvement in other cases, too. It is interesting, therefore, to turn from Berlin to Paris and to take a closer look at the (inter-)organisational structures set up by (or for) migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

6.1.2 Less encompassing (Christian) structures in Paris

Already at a first glance, the self-organisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris and the Parisian agglomeration differs significantly from the situation in Berlin. According to the historian Pap Ndiaye, an organised movement of associations led by Blacks - including African migrants - first emerged in France as early as in the 1920s (Ndiaye 2009: 359), which means that today's associations can look back at almost a century of public visibility. While there are not many studies focusing explicitly on political and social movements of sub-Saharan African migrants in France (Ndiaye 2009: 393), these migrants made up a significant part of the activists in two more recent movements which received much public and scholarly attention. These are, of course, the "housing" movement which started with protests against the closure of several *foyers* in the 1970s (Ndiaye 2009: 393) and became a wider movement in the 1980s (Péchu 1999: 727), and the "*sans papiers*" movement in the 1990s, which became famous even beyond French borders when undocumented migrants squatted in several churches in Paris and its *banlieue* in order to protest against impending deportation and the precarious situation they were in generally (e.g. Cissé 2002; Ndiaye 2009: 394). In addition, with the *Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires* (CRAN), which was founded in 2005 to fight against the discrimination of Black people in France (CRAN 2012: online), they have a strong representative federation at the national level. As has been pointed out before, there have been no comparable movements led by Africans in Germany.

Nevertheless, the interlocutors' evaluation of the self-organisation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France and Paris ranges from "very good"

(Int31) to "very bad" due to a lack of solidarity across national or ethnic boundaries (Int33).[151][152] While the context for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the Parisian agglomeration at first sight seems to be more favourable and while they have successfully set up secular federations in France, there still seem to be barriers to overcome that resemble those in Berlin. It is therefore all the more interesting to ask whether, in this case, too, religion can be a resource for surmounting problems of discord and factionalism as it is for the RaCiBB or the CCCAAE in Berlin.

For methodological reasons, this sub-chapter will focus on Christians from sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, this offers a more direct comparative perspective on what has been outlined before. And secondly, as the next sub-chapter will show, the situation of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa is very difficult to assess both in Berlin and in the Parisian agglomeration.

Since they are but a minority within the sub-Saharan African population in France, and as the *laïcité* principle renders the context in Paris less favourable for publicly visible religious activities than in Berlin, it would not have been surprising if the situation of Christians from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris resembled that of their Muslim counterparts in Berlin. Indeed, it proved more difficult to get in contact with individual Christian congregations set up by or frequented mainly by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa there than in the German capital. Yet, not only do the Parisian Christians from sub-Saharan Africa have their own parishes and congrega-

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[151] For instance, Abdoulaye, who was one of the leaders of a strike in a migrants' *foyer*, especially denounces the missing solidarity across national or ethnic boundaries:

> Abdoulaye: L'organisation africaine, donc, je cr// je peux dire que (..) de mon point de vue ça veut dire que (.) l'organisation est mal, est très mal. Parce que no-norm// (.) de mon point de vue en tant que Africain donc (..) de-de communauté subsaharienne, et donc Mali, Maurétanie, Sénégal et puis (Bénin ?) et tout, donc chaque pays a son (.) mode de vivre en France (.) ou sa mo// sa// ses modes de voir les choses. Donc quand il y a un problème sur les Maliens, moi en tant que Maurétanien, je peux dire oh, ce problème-là, ça concerne que des Maliens. Donc:: (.) pour dire la vérité je peux dire que les organisations africaines en France, c'est pas très bonne. Parce que on n'est pas:: rassemblés, (nous sommes pas ?) solidaire (Int33).

[152] Translation of the quote in the previous footnote:
A: So the African organisation, I can say that (..), from my point of view, this means that (.) the organisation is bad, very bad. Because norm// (.) so from my point of view as an African (..) from a sub-Saharan community, and thus Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and then (Benin?) and all that, so each country has its (.) way of life in France (.) or its // their// its way of seeing the situation. So when there is a problem for Malians, as a Mauritanian, I can say oh well, this problem there, this only regards the Malians. So (.) to tell the truth I can say that the African organisations in France, it's not very good. Because we are not united, (we are not?) showing solidarity.

tions, there are also several overarching structures that are much more visible than the *Afrikanischer Muslim Kreis* from Berlin.[153]

As has been discussed above, it has not been possible to collect the same kind of data in the Parisian agglomeration as in Berlin and to establish exactly how many parishes, congregations, or other Christian organisations of sub-Saharan African migrants exist in Paris and the Parisian suburbs.[154] There are, however, both Catholic and Protestant - including Pentecostal - structures, which represent, steer or assemble at least a part of these parishes and churches. This section gives an overview over these structures and discusses whether they contribute to the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in a similar way as the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE.

Within the Catholic Church, there is an *Aumônerie africaine* at the national level, and in the Seine-Saint-Denis department there is also a group called *Fraternité africaine* (formerly *Collectif africain*). Some African Protestant and Pentecostal congregations have been able to create their own umbrella structures: According to Frédé-

[153] For important work on African churches in France and/or the *Ile-de-France*, see e.g. Dejean (2011), Fath (2010) as well as the special issue "Christianismes du Sud à l'épreuve de l'Europe" of the *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* (2008).

[154] The official registers of associations for the whole Ile-de-France region, and even that of the single *département* of Seine-Saint-Denis, proved so extensive that it was impossible to identify all Christian churches and associations there that were set up, run by or consisted mainly of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Also, as the density of sub-Saharan migrants in some of the Parisian suburbs as well as in some parts of Paris is much higher than in Berlin, there are also a considerable number of Catholic parishes with many members from sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Bleuzen 2008), which obviously do not appear as such in a register of associations.

Referring to the *Annuaire Evangélique*, Frédéric Dejean notes in his thesis that a particularly high number of evangelical and Pentecostal churches is located in the town of Saint-Denis and the surrounding area of the Plaine Saint-Denis in the *département* Seine-Saint-Denis (Dejean 2010online: 109). He also states that he found most of these churches to be "africaine ou haïtienne" (Dejean 2010online: 110), although, of course, there are evangelical churches in Paris and its agglomeration that were not set up by migrants. This is a good indicator of where African-initiated churches may be found in the Ile-de-France region. Unfortunately, however, the *Annuaire Evangélique* or the *Annuaire Électronique des Églises Évangéliques*, which are both published by the *Conseil National des Evangéliques de France* (CNEF), cannot provide exact data on how many sub-Saharan Christian congregations there are in the city of Paris, or in the *département* of Seine-Saint-Denis, either.

For a first overview over the evangelical landscape in France, and the Ile-de-France, as well as for locating and getting in touch with some interlocutors, the *Annuaire Électronique des Églises Évangéliques* proved very helpful, too. Yet, for obvious reasons, it could not provide data on all the sub-Saharan African Christian congregations in Paris and its agglomeration. First of all, these *annuaires* are directories of the evangelical churches in France, so they do not include all those congregations that would not register as evangelical; for instance, Catholic parishes with a high number of members from sub-Saharan Africa do not appear there. Secondly, evangelical congregations that have not yet been able to or do not want to join the CNEF or one of the affiliated unions of churches will not be listed there, either. Finally yet significantly, it would have been impossible to identify the congregations set up or made up mainly by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa just by the names listed in the directories.

ric Dejean's estimates, about half of the African or Afro-Caribbean congregations in the Seine-Saint-Denis department belong to one of three federations (Dejean 2011: 168). These unions are the *Entente et Coordination des Œuvres Chrétiennes* (ECOC), the *Union des Églises Évangéliques Haïtiennes et Afro-Caraïbéennes* (UEEHAC) and the *Communauté des Églises d'Expressions Africaines de France* (CEAF). These formal unions of churches are all members of larger unions or federations which regroup non-migrant and migrant churches or church unions.[155] Since at the time when the interviews were made, the CEAF had its headquarters in Paris and as it is the oldest union and the one with the most explicit focus on African churches, this study concentrates on the CEAF. The CEAF is a member of the *Fédération Protestante de France* (FPF) and the *Conseil National des Evangéliques de France* (CNEF).

In addition to these more or less formalised networks, there are less institutionalised networks of some of the independent African evangelical and Pentecostal churches in and around Paris (Int43). Because of their informal character and as these networks are often hardly visible or difficult to approach, they will not be covered by the present analysis.[156]

This brief overview already shows that, Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris and/or France apparently are also rather successful in establishing their own overarching structures. Do they see them as religious and political organisations, too, like their counterparts in Berlin? Do they use these networks for political purposes? In order to find some elements of an answer to these questions and to compare the situation in the two cities, it is necessary to learn more about the organisations in question first.

Evidently, the Catholic parishes and umbrella organisations are part of the Catholic Church's hierarchy. The French Bishops' conference installed a so-called *Pastorale des Migrants* as a branch of the *Service National de la Pastorale des Migrants et des Personnes Itinérantes* (National Service of the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People), which also includes, for instance, the *Mission en Monde Maritime* (Mission in the maritime world) and *L'Aumônerie des Gens du Voyage* (Chaplaincy of the Vagrancy people). Within this *Pastorale des migrants*, there is the *Aumônerie des Communautés Africaines* (Chaplaincy of the African communities) mentioned above. The collective *Fraternité Africaine* belongs to this *Aumônerie* (Int42; Int32; Pastorale des Migrants 2012online_a).[157]

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[155] For an overview over the Protestant federations in France, see Aurélien Fauches (2011).

[156] As for instance the research of Sébastien Fath (2010), Baptiste Coulmont (2008; 2010; 2011; all online) and Frédéric Dejean (2010online) shows, the landscape of migrant Protestant churches in Paris and the *banlieue* is very diverse and includes both very small charismatic communities as well as mega churches.

[157] Translations into English by the author.

The *Pastorale des Migrants* was established in order to offer care for migrants - Catholic and other - from a Catholic point of view and to ensure the integration of Catholic migrants from all over the world into the Catholic Church in France (Int42). According to one of the interlocutors, who is a member of this *Pastorale*, it aims at reminding the world in the name of the Church to the presence of migrants and to the need to welcome them: "Alors, l'Église par-par notre service a mission de rappeler cette présence de ce monde de la migration pour qu'ils prennent leur place, qu'ils// pour qu'ils soient accueillis" (Int42).[158]

Within the *Pastorale*, the *Aumônerie des communautés africaines* is the "connector" to the target population. This was set up in the 1970s by former missionaries and priests who had returned from Africa (Pastorale des Migrants 2012online_b). Concerning the chaplaincy structure within the *Pastorale*, it is interesting to note that there is only one chaplaincy for migrants from the whole African continent (without islands)[159] and only two - one francophone and one hispanophone - for migrants from the Americas, but eight individual chaplaincies for migrants from different Asian countries as well as eight for European migrants.[160] The *Pastorale des migrants* justifies this fact by saying that it is the aim of the *Aumônerie des communautés africaines* to help African migrants to live their faith in France, and that it is not its goal to support their "africanité" (Pastorale des Migrants 2012online_b), a term which is probably best translated by "African identity" or their "being African". The interview material and the self-presentation of the *Pastorale* further demonstrate that facilitating the integration of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into the Catholic Church in France and into French society is most important for the chaplaincy. Despite its ambition to draw attention to the presence of migrants and to the need to welcome them, the Chaplaincy stresses the fact that the migrants chose to come to France and therefore should adapt to the way things are done there.

In stark contrast to the two ecumenical federations in Berlin, the French Chaplaincy for the African communities thus is not conceived as a means to increase the recognition of African migrants *as Africans* - or as individuals from different African countries - with their African identities within European societies. Although its representative personally showed himself very critical of French assimilationist policies which in his opinion go back to French colonialist policies, the Chaplaincy is a tool for integrating migrants from (sub-Saharan) Africa into the

[158] "So, the Church through our service has a mission to recall this presence of this world of migration so that they take their place, that they// so that they are welcomed."
[159] The islands of Madagascar and Mauritius have their own *aumôneries*.
[160] It is not surprising that there should be a chaplaincy for Portuguese migrants (and their descendants) as they made up a large part of the labour migrants who came to France after World War II (Le Moigne/Lebon 2002: 21-23). But the Slovak and the Slovenian populations are rather newer and unlikely to surpass the Catholic population from some African countries in numbers.

French Catholic Church on the terms set mainly by the non-African population. Insofar, it is a much less emancipatory, and less political, organisation than the *Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin and Brandenburg* or the Council of Christian Churches of an African Approach in Europe. It cannot be described as a social movement organisation in the same way as the two ecumenical federations from Berlin.

Nevertheless, the Chaplaincy and the *Pastorale des Migrants* also recognise that there are cultural differences and that African Catholics who move to France have had a different socialisation and education than their French-born counterparts. They also acknowledge the fact that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have to deal with problems the non-migrant population does not have, most importantly issues concerning "*les papiers*", i.e. with visa and other documents related to their residence status and often also with the pending threat of expulsion (Int32; Int42).

Although it is not part of the official tasks of the Chaplaincy or the *Pastorale des Migrants*, this recognition translates also into more or less political activities such as public statements on migration-related issues as well as on the precarious situation many migrants in France are in (Int42). For instance, at the time the interviews in Paris were made, they had just organised a conference on migration (Int42). Also, individual migrants draw on support by their parishes or overarching structures for activities that draw public attention to the precarious situation of undocumented migrants (Int39). In some parishes, members of the clergy also organise protest against expulsion, such as a "circle of silence" in front of a church in Saint-Denis.[161]

In short, the general approach of the Catholic structures is marked by the ambiguity between the goal to make migrants from sub-Saharan Africa integrate into the Church in France on the one hand, and the recognition of their needs and of the legitimacy of their demands as migrants from sub-Saharan Africa on the other hand. This corresponds to the fact that they organise meetings at the parish level for the exchange of ideas and experiences (*partage*) of the migrants and that this is one of the most important activities of the *Aumônerie* and also of the *Fraternité* (Int42; Int32).[162] They thus provide an overarching structure facilitating exchange

[161] At the time when the interviews were made, this "*cercle*" took place regularly as a sign of solidarity with migrants who were threatened by expulsion.

[162] In addition to the local meetings, the chaplaincy organises annual national meetings of lay people, so-called *animateurs*, and members of the clergy, who work with its target population. At these meetings, they focus on selected topics in order to improve their everyday work (Int42).

for a population that has been largely marginalised in France[163], but they also co-ordinate and influence what takes place on the ground.[164]

The CEAF, in contrast, is more self-determined and independent and has a more positive approach to the *africanité* of the members of its churches (Int30). While it is not ecumenical to the same extent as the RaCiBB or the CCCAAE, with respect to its understanding of what it means to be African it is similar to the two umbrella organisations from Berlin. According to one of its representatives, it is the CEAF's aim to work towards the complete independence and self-responsibility of Africans, spiritually, but also in economic and political terms (Int30). It thus takes a similar anti-colonial, emancipatory stance as the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE, and in this respect, the CEAF is also a rather political federation.

In terms of political activities, it follows and supports the activities of the *Fédération protestante de France* that it is a member of. It thus draws on resources provided by a non-migrant established religious federation. In so doing, it resembles the French Catholic institutions that focus on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, but partly also the two federations from Berlin. Whereas the German umbrella organisations are independent in their actions, however, the CEAF is integrated into the structures of the FPF.

At the same time, the CEAF is aware of the need to represent, and act as, Africans in France: "Est-ce que cela nous-nous::-nous:: dispense d'avoir des actions spécifiques ? Non."[165] (Int30). It therefore has its own associations, which focus on issues that concern Africans in particular, both in France and on the African continent.[166] In general, the member churches are encouraged to form associations and to voice their claims as migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in France. In addition, just like the RaCiBB, the CEAF co-operates with secular associations when it comes to working on particular issues. For example, their co-operation with *Afrique Avenir* allows them to campaign for a better protection of the migrant population in the French suburbs against AIDS and even "d'interroger le ministère de la santé par

[163] To be sure, there also is an African élite in France. Yet, as the historian Pap Ndiaye shows, the almost inescapable experience of racism and exclusion does not spare them (Ndiaye 2009).

[164] The *Fraternité africaine* must be seen as something in-between the national and the local structures, both in terms of its membership and function, and in terms of its scope. It is a departmental, i.e. regional, structure, but its activities resemble those of the local parishes; simultaneously, its meetings are similar to those of the Chaplaincy at the national level, with the exception that they include not only *animateurs* and church persons, but also simple members (Int32).

[165] "Does that exempt us from having specific actions? No."

[166] For instance, one of the associations which are directly part of the federation aims at improving the situation of African women.

rapport au problème de-du SIDA en ce qui concerne les populations de la banlieue et des populations immigrées d'une manière quotidienne" (Int30).[167]

The CEAF thus partly resembles the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE with regards to its political orientation and activities. At the same time, it differs from them insofar as it is a more established religious organisation, which provides its members with a particular status that the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE cannot and do not want to offer.

Just as their counterparts in Berlin, the sub-Saharan African Protestant and Pentecostal churches in Paris and the Parisian suburbs are very diverse. As Coulmont (Coulmont 2011online, 2010online, 2008online) and Dejean (2010online) demonstrated recently, the number of African evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal churches in the Parisian suburbs is growing, and their need to distinguish themselves from each other is great.[168] Against this background, the CEAF can be considered an instrument for gaining and maintaining a certain status and official recognition. It establishes a division between those congregations who belong to the CEAF and those who don't. Their adherence to the CEAF and thus to the *Fédération Protestante de France* (FPF), the Protestant Federation of France, gives the members the status of respectable, officially recognised congregations, whereas all others, and thus probably the majority of the African migrant congregations, simply are registered associations or exist only "officieusement", informally, as one of the interlocutors put it (Int43).[169]

In line with this status-securing function of the CEAF, a church can only become a member of the CEAF, after a one-year period of probation (CEAF 2012online). A less formalised, but nonetheless important hurdle for becoming a member is set by the fact that affiliation with the CEAF is only possible if a member vouches for the new applicant or if at least a non-member known well by a member vouches for the newcomer (Int30). The CEAF thus has a mechanism of co-optation which, on the one hand, keeps them from letting anyone and everyone join and thus protects its and its members' status and reputation. On the other hand, undesired competition can be kept at bay by denying membership and thus access to a certain status and privileges.

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[167] "to question the Ministry of Health about the problem of AIDS in relation to the populations of the banlieue and the immigrant population on a daily basis"

[168] Obviously, the Catholic Church is not happy with the growing competition in the suburbs, and, as one of the interlocutors said, it observes this development with concern (Int42). But it is not only the Catholic Church who sees these new churches as dangerous, but also the Protestant and Pentecostal churches themselves. One of the interlocutors, for instance, claimed that many of the pastors in the suburbs were charlatans and that their churches were "escroquerie", fraud (Int30).

[169] To be registered as an *association cultuelle* gives them an official status even without being members of the CEAF or another union, whereas the unregistered groups do not have any status and official recognition.

This constitutes a major difference between the CEAF and the Christian federations in Berlin: While the CEAF watches carefully over who enters and who does not, the African Christians' umbrella organisations in Berlin work hard to include as many religious congregations as possible in order to reach everyone and to be the voice of all African Christians there. Both the goals and the strategies of the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE therefore are more encompassing and political than those of the CEAF.

Referring back to the theoretical considerations outlined at the beginning of this book, several things may be inferred from the above analyses. Firstly, in Berlin, the Christian religion helps bring together a large number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa both in individual and in umbrella organisations. Despite internal religious differences, these federations find their legitimacy in *religious* arguments. Religion is an important framing resource for them in order to overcome factionalism and to increase their capacity to get involved and make their voices heard. The largest of these federations have been set up with explicitly political goals, and thus they draw on this framing resource in order to reach aims that lie beyond the religious realm. These social movement organisations strategically use their religion for their political and social aims.

As the last part of the network analysis and the interviews have shown, and as was to be expected, the resulting organisational structures are resources mainly for religious experts, especially a number of Protestant and Pentecostal pastors who want to represent and get active in the interests of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin. The federations, however, also open up opportunities for political action that can be used by politically interested individuals who are no religious experts. If they find it difficult to draw on their individual congregation or parish - like the member of one of the two mainly African Catholic parishes in Berlin - the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE provide organisational resources that they can take advantage of.

In the French case, the matter of who is a legitimate player within the religious field is more important. There, the CEAF draws important (symbolic) resources - both of a religious and a political nature - from its membership in the FPF. It also secures a certain status of legitimate religious players for its own members. In order to be able to keep its status and to provide it to others, it excludes a large number of migrant churches from membership and thus contributes to the drawing of boundaries between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" religious, but also political, actors.

To be sure, the umbrella organisations in Berlin do not have the same status as the CEAF in the first place and thus cannot give their members the same aura of official recognition that the CEAF can provide. Some of the Pentecostal churches in Berlin obtain a similar status via their membership in the *Bund Freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden* (BFP), some of the other Protestants through membership in a

larger denomination and the Catholics, obviously, via their being part of the Catholic Church. Yet, there is no overarching African Protestant and/or Pentecostal union of churches with the same official status as that of the CEAF. In contrast, in the Parisian agglomeration, there is no organisation with the same encompassing approach and the same legitimacy as the RaCiBB when it comes to representing all African Christians - and, to an extent, all African migrants - in spiritual, but also in political and social matters.

In summary, in Berlin, explicitly political federations draw on their religious networks in order to struggle for the improvement of the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. They also aim at including as many Christian organisations in their networks as possible and they co-operate with secular organisations that have similar goals. In contrast, in Paris, while Catholic and Protestant organisations in different ways also want to contribute to overcoming the marginalisation of Africans in France, they have not been set up as political organisations, but as a means to integrate Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into the French religious system.

It is reasonable to assume that the main differences between Paris and Berlin are due both to context factors and to differences in the confessional make-up of the Christian migrant population from sub-Saharan Africa residing in the two cities. Most importantly, the different group size, the French *laïcité* principle, and the different role of the Catholic Church in the two countries are likely to have an impact on religion as a resource for the political involvement of migrants. In addition, it has become apparent that some of the most political actors who use their religion for political purposes are Protestants, while the Catholic involvement is marked by an ambiguity between paternalism, assimilationism and support for migrant causes. It is therefore reasonable to assume that confessional differences contribute to an explanation of the differences in Paris and Berlin.

Before discussing these factors further, however, it is useful to take a closer look at Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in both cities in order to learn more about the role context factors as well as religious differences play for the use of religion as a political resource for migrants. The ensuing sub-chapter will therefore first discuss the situation of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin in more detail and then turn to their counterparts in Paris and the Parisian *banlieue*.

6.1.3 The difficulty to get organised as Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa

It has already been argued in the previous chapter that Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin find it difficult to get organised and to voice their interests. The foundation of the *Afrikanischer Muslim Kreis* as the only Muslim organisation set up in order to represent Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in the German capital so

far, on the one hand is a very ambitious project which aims at overcoming a situation of isolation and marginalisation. On the other hand, it is characteristic for the difficulties sub-Saharan African Muslims apparently experience in their attempts to create lasting common organisational structures.

According to information gathered in the interviews, while there were almost fifty persons at the beginning who were interested in creating such an organisation, the membership has shrunk to five to eleven persons[170] by now. The AMK, however, is not inactive.[171] Providing development aid has become its main goal[172], together with projects such as job application trainings targeting migrants in Berlin in order to increase their integration into the local labour market. Especially during the month of Ramadan, they raise funds for their development projects from the entire Muslim community in Berlin. Considering the size of the organisation, it is surprisingly successful in its activities.

However, while the AMK is especially ambitious and successful in setting up programmes that aim at improving the everyday situation of migrants in Berlin and co-operates on these projects with the local authorities as well as with other (secular) associations, its members cannot draw on it as an organisational resource for their political involvement in the same way as their Christian counterparts can use their organisations. First of all, the AMK does not have nearly the same network or the material or immaterial resources as the Christian organisations. Also, most of its activities depend on Aziz Lamere, the AMK's president, who draws more on his experiences as an urban planner than on his religion. Nevertheless, the AMK is a means to raise funds for development projects and a label which makes it possible to provide the said training programmes and similar activities.

In many ways, an association like the AMK is symptomatic for the situation of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin. First of all, the fact that it is the only sub-Saharan African Muslim association obviously by no means signifies that

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[170] The two members of the AMK whom I interviewed gave different numbers. Either way, it is a very small association with only a few members.

[171] When they started their project, the AMK originally took an African Muslim association from Hamburg as a model. However, while this other association is much older and has had its own mosque already since the 1990s, the AMK as a very small organisation does not offer the same religious and social services. Unlike their model association, the *Afrikanische Muslim Kreis* does not organise religious education, Arabic lessons, prayer groups, or anything the like. Neither does it offer homework groups for school children, social support, or legal advice. In contrast, their model has all this in store and their legal and social support is open to all sub-Saharan migrants, regardless of their religious affiliation - just like the Christian social and legal support centres in Berlin. Still, the fact that there is a mosque run by and catering mainly for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in a major German city shows that it is not impossible for Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa to create their own religious organisations in Germany.

[172] Their development work focuses on Cameroon, where they contribute to the reconstruction and renovation of a mosque which belongs to a hospital. They also raise funds to give to poor children for the *Id al-Fitr* and to help a sick youth in Niger to cover the costs of an operation.

there simply are no Muslims from this region in Berlin.[173] Moreover, several non-Muslim interlocutors knew about a *sheikh* or an imam they had heard about and who, according to them, was frequented mainly by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. None of them knew their name or a place where to find them, however. Similarly, Aziz Lamere said he did not know of an African mosque although he did not want to exclude entirely that there was one: "Berlin ist so groß, ja".[174] He had heard about a mosque where mainly Sudanese migrants went as well as of a group of Ghanaian Muslims who met informally - just like the other interlocutors he did not have any more information, however. What he did know was that, during Ramadan, people met in prayer groups in private flats.

In short, the Muslim population from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin is almost invisible in public space – even for African Muslims themselves. It is a weak, more or less unorganised population that does not have a religious infrastructure of its own. While many mosque associations and individuals seem to be very generous when it comes to giving for the development projects set up by the AMK or to poor people in general, the Muslim population from sub-Saharan Africa lacks a social support infrastructure for highly vulnerable migrants. As they do not have their own Muslim social or legal support structures, they often turn to Christian institutions that focus on sub-Saharan migrants if they need help (Int4; Int7). Also, and despite the idea of a global *umma*, it seems to be particularly hard for Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa to overcome ethnic or national boundaries and to celebrate their faith in an "African" transnational community. As the interviews as well as participant observation suggest, many Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa instead celebrate their faith in ethnic associations or in loose ethno-religious groups, which get together for special occasions.

A different but in some respects still similar observation could be made in Paris and the Parisian *banlieue*. While there are some mosques that are frequented mainly by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, it still seems to be a rather closed or unorganised milieu. This is illustrated very well by answers that potential interlocutors gave on the phone when I was trying to get access to the field. For instance, a representative of a mosque association in Paris *intra muros* explained that there were some sub-Saharan migrants among the regulars at their mosque, but that it was "*un milieu très fermé*", a closed milieu, and that it was unlikely that anyone would agree to be interviewed. Another person said on the phone that they called themselves an African Muslim association, but that they really all came from the same village. When asked who got together in their group and what they were doing, he said: "c'est la famille, quoi", "it's just family." Accordingly, their main goal was to raise

[173] See chapter 4.
[174] "Berlin is so big, yes."

money to "send home". For any questions about Muslims in Paris or the Islamic religion, he referred me to the Great Mosque, *la Grande mosquée de Paris*.[175] The one person who agreed to be interviewed, in the end preferred his nephew to do the interview, and the nephew asked for the information to be handled confidentially (Int41).[176]

Due to the interlocutor's request and since the mosque in question would be rather easy to identify once it was described here, the interview material unfortunately cannot be discussed in detail.[177] Moreover, it is one thing to draw conclusions about the situation of sub-Saharan Muslims in Berlin based only on several interviews with members of the AMK and its "parent" association. But it is a different thing to do the same for Paris based on one interview[178] with the nephew of the founder of just one mosque, even if it is an important mosque in a part of Paris where many sub-Saharan migrants are at home and even if it is frequented by many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. While in Berlin, the AMK can claim to be the *only* African Muslim association - or at least the only one which has reached a minimum of stability, organisation, and public visibility - the Parisian mosque is just one among many. Thus, not only does the AMK represent the organised part of the African Muslim population in Berlin, it *is* the organised African Muslim population in this city. In contrast, the Parisian mosque is also led by an association of a similar status, but this association is by no means representative of all religious organisations sub-Saharan Muslims have been able to set up in Paris and the suburbs.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to point to some similarities, but also differences between the observations from the two cities. Evidently, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in France are much more visible than in Germany. Due to the relative numerical importance, French public opinion is likely to be more aware of the fact that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa contribute to the Muslim population in their country, although in France, too, these migrants are not always automatically included into who is perceived as Muslims in France (cf. Ndiaye 2008: 278).

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[175] I actually did try to get in touch with this oldest and best known mosque in Paris (by phone and by e-mail), but never received an answer.

[176] After having contacted almost every mosque association in Paris I could find - by e-mail, phone, mail, or in person - as well as a number of associations in the suburbs, having visited several *foyers* and *hôtels* where sub-Saharan migrants lived, I eventually found one Malian representative of a Parisian mosque who (or whose nephew) was prepared to talk to me. In addition to this interview, I was able to speak to two representatives of Muslim associations in the Seine-Saint-Denis department (Int28, Int34), too. Both associations, however, are led mainly by North African migrants and their descendants.

[177] Out of respect towards my interlocutor, I will limit the number of direct quotations from the interview to a minimum, and in most cases rather summarise or paraphrase parts of the interview.

[178] Apart from this interview, I managed to talk to representatives of associations located in the *banlieue* (see above), but they could not provide much information about the situation of sub-Saharan Muslim in the Ile-de-France region.

The numerical difference between Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and in Paris also means that, in Paris, they are in a very different position when it comes to negotiating the space they may occupy for their religious practices. Since several hundred believers visit the said mosque every Friday alone, and since there is not enough room for all of them, the association's representatives co-operate with the local authorities in order to build a more spacious cultural centre. This is but one example for the fact that the French authorities are forced to negotiate with and accommodate the needs of different Muslim groups and currents at least at the local level - including Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa (Int41).

What is more, while they are not represented in the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, DIK), Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa used to have their representatives in the French Council of the Muslim cult (*Conseil français du culte musulman*, CFCM). Between 2005 and 2008, and since 2011, the French federation of the Islamic associations of Africa, the Comoros and the Antilles (*Fédération française des associations islamiques d'Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles*, FFAIACA)[179], however, has had no delegate in the CFCM (Le Figaro 2008online; CFCM 2011online). Thus, while they are much more present in public space and in French politics than their counterparts in Germany or in Berlin, sub-Saharan African Muslims in France and in Paris nevertheless seem to be less organised or at least less visibly organised than other Muslim groups. Just like in Berlin, larger minorities seem to enjoy a higher visibility and degree of organisation than Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa. Although North African Muslims may not make up the totality of the Muslim population in France, they are the majority and many Muslim associations are run by North African migrants or their descendents (Int28; Int34).

Finally yet significantly, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa live in an environment which is impregnated with great suspicion and prejudice against them, and against Muslims in general - in Paris just as much as in Berlin. Indeed, Karim, a young representative of a mosque association in a small town in the Parisian suburbs, was the only representative of a Muslim association who did not stress his moderation, complain about mistrust against Muslims, or tried to defend his religion against accusations that had not been made during the interview (Int28).

In contrast, most Muslim interlocutors from Berlin - representatives of the AMK and other organisations - as well as their French counterparts started to defend and justify Islam and Muslims although no allegations or suspicions had been voiced in the interviews. Aziz Lamere and the representatives of three of the Muslim associations, who the AMK shares membership in a Muslim network with, all stressed that they were "Muslims of the centre" and had nothing to do with extrem-

[179] Unfortunately, the FFAIACA was not available for an interview and did not reply to my attempts to reach it.

ists. One of the most important issues one of these representatives raised in the interview was how they as a Muslim association had to face mistrust and accusations. They had to state their will to be part of German society expressly, and to confirm their allegiance to the constitution and the democratic system, although in his opinion, this loyalty was nothing special, but went without saying: "[...] das ist, glaub ich, auch keine Großartigkeit, sondern eine Selbstverständlichkeit" (Int2).[180]

Similarly, the Malian interlocutor from Paris *intra muros* stated very clearly that from his point of view, religion and politics should never be mixed.[181] Instead, he considered it to be completely inappropriate if "some" politicised their religion. In addition, he claimed that "[i]l faut montrer aux gens, l'islam est le meilleur. Mais c'est pas en prenant des bâtons. C'est pas en prenant des armes" (Int41).[182] Despite his belief in the superiority of his religion, Malik stresses that everyone should have their own religion - or no religion - and that it is essential to respect this. Furthermore, he highlights several times that he disapproves of any extremism, and also points out that he appreciates the French *laïcité* principle - although these questions had not been raised (Int41).

Correspondingly, Jamal, who represents another association in the *petite couronne*, first complains several times about the way Muslims are perceived in France. He then points out that all kinds of dialogue and exchange are very important to his association in order to reduce prejudice against Islam and Muslims in French society:

> Jamal: On aime le-le contact et la communication. Et on a vu, à travers des débats, à travers un dîner, à travers des sorties qu'on organise, les gens commence à nous faire confiance. Et ça, on rompe le-le-le// on va dire la solitude (.) et l'ignorance de l'autre. C'est-à-dire quand vous connai-vous connaissez pas quelqu'un, vous le détestez malheureusement. Malheureusement (.) surtout quand vous avez les médias// ils sont pas avec vous, ils sont contre vous (Int34).[183]

This isolation of Muslims Jamal describes and the need to demonstrate that Islam was a peaceful religion and that they were no extremists was felt and voiced by most of the interlocutors who represented Muslim associations.

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[180] "[…] and this is not, I think, something extraordinary, but rather something completely natural."
[181] To be sure, he also spoke about the negotiations they had had with the local authorities in order to be able to build their new cultural centre, but he obviously did not interpret these negotiations as "politics".
[182] "We need to show people that Islam is the best. But not by taking up batons. Not by taking up arms."
[183] J: We like contact and communication. And we have seen that, through debates, through a dinner, through nights out which we organise, people begin to trust us. And that we, we break the-the-the// let's say the loneliness (.) and the ignorance of the other. This is to say that if you don't know someone else, you hate him, unfortunately. Unfortunately (.) especially when you have the media// they are not with you, they are against you.

If this is combined with the observation that the sub-Saharan African milieu appears closed and rather focused on itself, it seems that in many respects the situation of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris does not appear to be so different from that in Berlin after all. Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in the Parisian agglomeration wear "African" clothes more often in public, and it is often possible to tell someone is Muslim by their outer appearance. French public opinion may also be less ignorant when it comes to recognising that there is also a Muslim minority from sub-Saharan Africa in their country. Nevertheless, despite their far greater number, their visibility in the streets and the public attention they receive, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris, too, appear to face many of the problems that their counterparts have to cope with in Berlin. Generally, Muslims struggle to get organised in a situation which in many ways is unfavourable towards them. Even the large Muslim minorities such as Turkish migrants and their descendants in Germany and North African migrants and their descendants in France have to overcome isolation and prejudice. But Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa seem to find it even harder or of less interest than larger minorities to create their own religious, cultural and social infrastructure and to gain public visibility.

In short, Islam is not as good a resource for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa as the Christian religion, at least not for political involvement for the interests or in the name of their migrant group. Although in Berlin it is likely that there is a linguistic and potentially also cultural barrier between Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa and the great majority of Muslims in Berlin who have a Turkish or Arab background, they have not set up their own religious infrastructure. In addition, the AMK is not integrated into the existing networks within the African community to the same extent as its Christian counterparts.

In contrast, in Paris, there are African Muslim associations as well as mosques whose regular visitors are mainly from sub-Saharan Africa. Also, especially in the smaller towns of the *banlieue* there are mosques which aspire at catering for the religious needs of all local Muslims, including Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the milieu is rather closed and difficult to access.

With respect to Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, it has been argued that context factors - group size, the laïcité principle, the make-up of the religious field - as well as confessional differences shape the way they can or cannot draw on their religion as an organisational resource for the political involvement or as a symbolic resource for the creation of political organisations. The above discussion of the situation of Muslim migrants from sub-Saharan Africa suggests focussing on the same factors, too.

Group size seems to play an ambiguous role here. First of all, the comparison between the two cities suggests that the size of a group increases the public visibility of a minority and its relevance for existing religious, social and political infrastructure. For instance, the sheer numerical presence of Muslims from sub-

Saharan Africa in Paris renders them an important group in existing mosque associations just like African migrants are an important target group for the French Catholic Church. Also, the larger a group is, the more likely it is that individuals like Aziz Lamere or Malik and his uncle, the founder of the Parisian mosque, find enough support for their idea and manage to build lasting organisations. Nonetheless, despite their numerical weight, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in the Parisian agglomeration still do not have overarching structures at their disposal that would resemble the CEAF or the RaCiBB. Although there is the FFAIACA, which had even had its representatives in the CFCM, there does not seem to be a communication and co-membership network that could be compared to the Christian structures. Apparently, size alone does not explain the difference between Christian and Muslim migrants, because to our best estimates, there are more Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris *intra muros* and in the *banlieue* than there are African Christians both in Berlin and in the Parisian agglomeration.

One reason why group size is ambiguous is that both the Christian and the Muslim migrant population from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris and the *banlieue* is so much larger and more diverse than in Berlin, so that it encounters more difficulties to unite. While in Berlin, the leaders of the RaCiBB or the CCCAAE know almost every African pastor in Berlin personally (cf. Int18), in the Parisian agglomeration, representatives of any religious organisation would probably be hard put to estimate even the number of African churches or Muslim associations there. Also, within a larger group, there is more room for factionalism and spoilers - as what Pfaff and Gill note for Muslims in Europe (cf. Pfaff/Gill 2006) as well as the exclusivist membership approach of the CEAF illustrate well. Simultaneously, since they are a larger group and already have more or less established secular associations, federations and other organisations, the need to get involved politically *as Christians* or *as Muslims* may be felt less urgently in Paris (e.g. Int31) than in Berlin (Int18).

Secondly, therefore, and in order to account for the differences between Muslims and Christians, factors other than relative and absolute size must be taken into account. On the one hand, as the interviews as well as part of the literature suggest, the discursive political context is less favourable for the political involvement of Muslims than for that of Christians (e.g. Tezcan 2007; Schiffauer 2007): Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere feel the pressure to pledge allegiance to the country they live in and to prove their moderation, "harmlessness", and political loyalty. If a religious group regularly needs to justify itself, and if it is considered either an illegitimate political actor or an unorganised newcomer, there is not much room for political involvement that goes beyond claims for public recognition. At the same time, Muslims in different European countries claim precisely this recognition of their rights as Muslims (e.g. Statham et al. 2005) and the context in which they can do so is changing (cf. e.g. Mourão Permoser 2010; Koenig/Willaime 2008; Kastoryano 2003, Yurdakul/Yükleyen 2009; Bowen 2009).

As the focus then is on *religious groups* and *religious identities* (cf. Kastoryano 2003), however, religion still is less helpful for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of political involvement *for the interests or in the name of their migrant group*. It is also unlikely that it can be used as a framing resource for political action other than self-defence against generalised suspicions in the way Christians can draw on their religion to rally support.[184]

At the same time, the religious field as well as the general opportunities of religious actors to become active politically structure the way migrants can draw on their religion for their political involvement. While the two main Christian churches enjoy great legitimacy as political actors in Germany, the French *laïcité* principle - at least theoretically - confines religion to the private realm. Although they are not concerned by the security dispositive that continually demands pledges of allegiance from Muslims (Tezcan 2007: 56-57), for organisations like the CEAF or the *Fraternité africaine* it is therefore more difficult to get involved in political affairs than for their German counterparts, or to do so with the same legitimacy (cf. Int30; Int32). Also, it is even more important than in Germany for them to secure a certain status and thus some official legitimacy. In addition, the fact that the Catholic Church is not equally dominant in the two countries is likely to influence the way Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa can draw on religious structures for their political involvement. As many Christian migrants from former French colonies are integrated into the structures of the Catholic Church, their room for manoeuvre is confined by the top-down approach of the Catholic Church. Whether migrants can use Catholic structures for political involvement depends very much on decisions higher up in the hierarchy. Also, not only have schools, the army, or political parties and unions always had an assimilatory function in the French nation-state, but also the Catholic Church (Brubaker 2010: 222) - a function that it never had in the bi-confessional, at the beginning protestant-dominated German nation-state. This French assimilatory approach explains the Church's negative view on the migrants' African identity, their *africanité*, and its less political and emancipatory approach towards migrant participation that the fieldwork in Paris revealed. At the same time, due to its long-time presence on the African continent and the presence of many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa within the Church, it has accumulated a great amount of knowledge of and comprehension for the needs of this particular minority - but again also often with the patronising attitude of the missionaries. This complex nexus between mission, colonialism and intercultural experience and comprehension is reflected in the respective Catholic structures both in Berlin and in Paris, but in the French case, these structures appear more elaborated and important.

[184] See quote by this pastor in chapter 4, translation in footnote 77.

Thirdly, "a mosque is not a church", as Malik put it in his interview (Int41). In other words, mosques and the associations that are behind them do not necessarily have the same social functions as Christian congregations. Although associations like those represented by Karim and Jamal offer many religious and social activities that are comparable to the activities of many migrant churches, and although Aziz Lamere's mosque project had similar goals, mosques usually are more open and membership in the respective associations is more fluid than in Christian congregations. The example of the mosque set up by Malik's uncle illustrates this very well: while several hundred believers attend Friday prayers there - especially during Ramadan - it does not have the character of an association or a German *Verein* where people know each other and work together.

Nevertheless, the African Christian landscape in both cities is very diverse, too. The most active actors within the co-membership networks in Berlin are Protestants who use their religion as an organisational and discursive resource for explicitly political purposes. Similarly, in Paris, the pastor of an evangelical church and leader of the CEAF most elaborately and eloquently draws most on religion as a political resource. Catholic structures offer support for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and frequently voice their criticism of the precarious situations many migrants are in. At the same time, both in Berlin and in Paris, there is a paternalistic and assimilatory element in some of these structures. Pentecostal (and other charismatic) churches both in Berlin and in Paris vary in their approach to political involvement. Some are generally sceptical towards political activities and even likely to act as spoilers (cf. Int8) or they are excluded as "crooks" by organisations like the CEAF (Int30; Int31). Others, in contrast, are very active politically, either within structures such as the RaCiBB, the CEAF or in secular organisations and institutions like the *Ausländerbeirat*, drawing on their congregations for support.

In short, religion seems to be an organisational resource for migrant political involvement, especially for Christian social movement entrepreneurs, and a resource for the creation of social movement organisations, but under certain circumstances only. While the role of the size of a migrant or minority group as well as religious or confessional differences is more or less ambiguous, the discursive and the religious context more clearly make it possible or impossible for migrants to draw on their religion for political involvement.

6.2 Religion as a symbolic resource for dealing with racism and colonialist hierarchies

So far, the focus has been mainly on religion as an organisational resource. It has also been argued that religion is an important symbolic resource for the creation of overarching structures. For instance, it can be used in order to give legitimacy to

organisational structures or to justify political involvement. This is most apparent in the RaCiBB's and the CCCAAE's cases: Their shared belief in Jesus Christ helps the RaCiBB and the CCCAAE to legitimise the existence of overarching structures like theirs and to underline the common interests of African Christians.

In chapter 1, it has been pointed out that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are proportionately often the victims of racism, and of missing recognition. Many interlocutors described racism and contempt, i.e. the depreciation of Africans and of the African continent, as the most important problem that they faced in Europe. In this context, it is also interesting to ask whether migrants can draw on their religion as a resource for dealing with negative stereotypes, hostile attitudes as well as with the persisting contempt that has marked the relations between Africans and Europeans since the times of European imperialism. This sub-chapter will therefore outline how migrants from sub-Saharan Africa can use their religion in order to revalorise their identity as Africans in a difficult environment.

6.2.1 Religion as resource in the struggle against racist attitudes

As the interviews from Berlin showed, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa - Muslims, Christians and others alike - have to face the problem that they are only a small minority within the migrant community and therefore are often not taken seriously or simply do not appear on the majority's agenda. What is more, both in Berlin and in the Parisian agglomeration, paternalistic or racist attitudes within the non-migrant population are an important issue all migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have to deal with. Both representatives of secular and Christian associations furthermore pointed out that they had to deal with a certain "exotism" or an instrumentalisation by the non-migrant majority.

While open racism and especially racist violent attacks on the one hand are difficult to eradicate, they can be easily denounced, because they are not ambiguous. More subtle forms of depreciation, exotism and racist paternalism are harder to decry, since they are more easily disguised or are part of a person's attitudes only unconsciously. It is therefore also more difficult to counter these forms of disrespect and to avoid "free riders" or spoilers who, for instance, take advantage of patronising offers of participation, even if this comes at the price of undermining the position of one's own group.

Two examples from Berlin illustrate this most clearly. As Franck, the director of an African migrant TV station in Berlin and member of the *Afrika-Rat* pointed out (Int20), and several other interlocutors confirmed (Int14; Int19), secular cultural and media associations in Berlin are often asked in a patronising and sometimes racist fashion to participate in "projects" set up by members of the non-migrant majority in order to add "a bit of colour" to their own projects or events.

Since there is no common awareness of the damaging potential it may have, if Black migrants agree to make a project "multicultural" or even "colourful" without being allowed to make any real contribution, there is much room for free riding. Franck expresses this problem and his frustration with it:

> Franck: Ne, also dafür brauche ich nicht unbedingt so zu tun oder so-so-so. Die Schwarzen hier in Berlin, es ist nicht anderes als, äh, in Frankreich oder in England. In England haben sie diese::, das erreicht, was wir nicht in Berlin erreichen können. Diese, sie haben ihre Stimme erhoben. Dort werden sie richtig// äh, wenn sie dann rausgehen und sprechen, werden sie gehört. Hier nicht. Wir-wir sind zu wenig. Wir haben sehr wenig Kraft. Vor allem, weil wir uns gegenseitig bekämpfen, (.) ja? Und, äh::, jemand ruft mich an und sagt: „Ach, Franck, äh, (.) ich brauche für mein Projekt ein Tänzer." (.) Ich sag: „Du brauchst ein Tänzer, warum?", sagt er: „Ja:: ich habe in Proka-Projekt gemacht und so für Afrika", und ich sagt hab: „Und, bist du Afrikaner?", sagt er: „Nein.", „Und, woher kommst du?", er sa-: „Ja, ich bin deutsch, ich mache das schon lange." Ich sag: „Und jetzt brauchst du ein Afrikaner, sonst ist dein Projekt kein Projekt?" *(laughs)* Verstehn Sie das? Ich sage zu ihn: „Tut mir Leid, für so was stehe ich nicht, so, weil, ich möchte, dass du von vorne an mit mir sprichst, damit ich genau weiß, worum es geht." Aber er sagt: „Franck, so ist gut." Er legt auf und ruft er andere, und er sagt: „Ah, ich mache, ich gebe Dir 50 Euro." „Ja, ist okay!" (Int20).[185]

Not only does Franck describe the African migrant community in Berlin as fragmented, he also sees this fragmentation as the main obstacle to raising their voice and reaching their common goals as Africans. His example makes this very clear: the Black community in Berlin is not even united and firm enough in order to withstand the kind of "offer" he describes.

Similarly, a number of migrants from sub-Saharan set up an "Africa" working-group within the local structure of the SPD that they were members of (Int13; Int12). Just like Franck, they report great difficulties to be taken seriously, even within the party, and to receive the support they need to work effectively. Pierre-Emmanuel, who moved from Rwanda to Germany already in the 1980 and

[185] F: No, for this I really don't need to act like this or like that. The Blacks here in Berlin, it's no different from, er, France or England. In England they have managed to do what we in Berlin have not been able to do. These, they have raised their voice. There, they are fully// er, when they go out and speak, they are listened to. Not here. We-we are too few. We have very little force. Especially because we always fight one another, (.) you see? And, er::, someone calls me and says: "Well, Franck, er, (.) for my project I need a dancer." (.) I say: "You need a dancer, why?", and he says: "Yes:: I have done a Proka project and so on, for Africa", and I say: "So, are you an African?", he says: "No." - "And where do you come from?" And he says: "Yes, I'm German, I've been doing this for a long time." I say: "And now you need an African, otherwise your project is not a project?" (*laughs*) You understand? I tell him: "I'm sorry, something like this is not for me, because I want that you speak to me before so that I know exactly what this is about." But he says: "Franck, it's alright." He hangs up and calls someone else, and he says: "Well, I do it, I give you 50 euro." - "Yes, that's OK!"

had been active in the SPD for several years, after two years of running the working group had been so frustrated that he stepped down as its president. According to him, there is always a boundary that keeps migrants from moving up the internal ladder and getting into party offices, even at the local level (Int13). As Pierre-Emmanuel describes it, nine years as an active party member were not enough to fulfil the "criteria" to get onto a list and stand for office (Int13). Despite their official party working group, no African migrant managed to reach a higher level within the local party structures.

Christians from sub-Saharan Africa also have to live with often paternalistic or racist attitudes within their Christian milieu. For instance, in France, Evangelical and other migrant churches find it almost as difficult as Muslims to find premises for their places of worship, and if non-migrant French congregations are prepared to host them, this comes at the price of paternalism and exotism that the "guests" have to bear. And, as Peter Sorie Mansaray from the RaCiBB in Berlin explains, African Christians in Berlin, too, often feel belittled by German congregations who invite them once a year to play the drums, dance and sing at special "multicultural" events, but do not take them seriously otherwise.

However, both the CEAF and the umbrella organisations from Berlin have found ways to fight this kind of attitudes. Their unifying structures also help them to reduce the danger of spoilers or free riders, as Franck described them, who take advantage of somebody else's "no". Peter Sorie Mansaray, for example, sees it as one of the RaCiBB's great achievements that their answer to this kind of attitude nowadays is a firm one. Because they stood their ground, the non-migrant German congregations now seem to value their opinions and contributions more than before:

> Peter Sorie Mansaray: Und wir haben auch bei Veranstaltungen gesagt, wir wollen auch mitgestalten und nicht wenn man schon alles gemacht hat und dann fragt man uns, ob wir äh was beitragen können, ein bisschen für Farbe zu sorgen, das machen wir nicht mit. Äh wir können auch mehr machen, als nur trommeln und Popo wackeln (Int8).[186]
> PSM: Und äh, ja etwas harte Worte, aber ich glaube, de// wir sollten die Worte nich' äh irgendwie unter den Teppich äh kehren, um// sonst kann auch Veränderung nicht geben. Ja, und wir haben wirklich manchmal ganz hart und klar gesagt: Das geht nicht, Leute. Es geht nicht nur darum, dass wir was afrikanisches Essen beitragen und dann das is' schon ökumenisch und so. Nee, nee, wir wollen auch bei der Gestaltung planen und (.) auch unsere Elemente auch in dieser Gottesdienst, in diese ökumenische Sache auch einbringen. Ja und ich glaube, es is'

[186] PSM: And we already said to some events [when they got an invitation to participate; MS], we want to be involved in the organisation, and not// when everything has already been done and then they ask us, whether we, er, could contribute anything to add a bit of colour, we don't do that. Er, we, too, can do more than play the drums and shake our hips.

rübergekommen. Ja, rübergekommen. Wir werden jetzt ernst genommen, ja? (Int8).[187]

The CEAF rather focuses on the spiritual dimension and claims to represent or to create "une véritable diaspora chrétienne d'expression négro-africaine en France"[188] whose role is the "expression de christianisme, un christianisme totalement nouveau, dans lequel on invite tous les autres" (Int30).[189] While Peter Sorie Mansaray and his colleagues claim their equality to the German church leaders and congregations, the CEAF stresses the innovative potential and the putative superiority of "the" African way to express their Christian faith. Its representative's fairly essentialising concept and the belief in the strength of the "African" expression of the Christian faith goes beyond the wish to be treated as equals. Indeed, in his formulation one encounters a matter of power and dominance and thus a (symbolic) challenge to the established churches and the power relations between Black and White (Christians) in general: While European missionaries brought the bible to Africa, and European Christian aid agencies nowadays bring wheat, tents and plastic buckets, African Christian migrants bring the bible back to Europe and offer a new, and - according to one of the CEAF's representatives - better, way of celebrating their faith. As will be discussed in more detail below, just like the missionaries from Berlin, he thus (symbolically) reverses the established order of dominance. From this perspective, Africans and African migrants for once are in the role of the superior - even if it is only in the very intangible realm of spirituality.

Religion here serves as a symbolic resource for reducing the destructive potential of spoilers and free riders (Berlin) or for dealing with European superiority and dominance by questioning the old hierarchies and presenting African superiority at least in spiritual terms (Paris). In Berlin, the religious federations seem to ensure a unity that the secular *Afrika-Rat* cannot provide (yet), and thus they have been able to improve their position as players in the religious field. In Paris, the CEAF has a more established status as member of the FPF and can allow itself not only to demand equality, but to stress its innovative character.

In contrast, neither for Paris nor for Berlin, the interview material suggests that Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa can take advantage of their religion in a similar way. Aziz Lamere criticised the fact that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa

[187] PSM: Well, er, these are a bit harsh words, but I think th// we should not somehow brush the words under the carpets to// otherwise, there can be no change. Yes, and sometimes we have really said very hard and clear: People, this is not possible. It's not just about we bring some African food and then this means things are already ecumenical and so forth. No, no, we want also be part of the planning process and (.) we also want to have our elements in the church service, in this ecumenical business. Yes, and I think we got the message across. Yes, across. We are now taken seriously, you see?

[188] "a genuine Christian diaspora of Negro-African expression in France".

[189] "the expression of Christianity, of a totally new Christianity, to which we invite everybody else".

and their needs were often overlooked by the German authorities and the public opinion:

> Aziz Lamere: Wenn man von Integration redet, äh, denkt man gleich an türkische Mitbürger und arabische Mitbürger und die anderen Migrantengruppen werden vernachlässigt (Int5).[190]

However, due to its small size, the AMK is not in a position to rally support for a struggle against this oversight. Also, while Malik from Paris voiced his conviction that Islam was the best of all religions, none of the Muslim interlocutors stressed their spiritual superiority in the same way as the CEAF.

The important role that the Christian religion may play as a symbolic resource for dealing with the old hierarchies between Europeans and Africans will become even more evident in the following section.

6.2.2 Reverse mission as symbolic reversal of colonial hierarchies

While the Christian religion certainly is a missionary religion in general, proselytisation, of course, takes different forms and does not have the same importance to all Christian currents and sometimes not even to each congregation of the same religious strand. Among the African churches in Berlin, for instance, especially some of the Pentecostal churches see themselves as missionary churches. In their rhetoric their missionary fervour, their views of European colonialism and of the Christianisation of Africa as well as a feeling of African religious superiority often tend to fuse. The representatives of the CEAF and of one of its member churches presented a different, but to an extent still comparable, view on African and European Christianity and the role of African Christians as renovators of the Christian religion. As will be shown in more detail in the following, both in Paris and in Berlin, a discursive reversal of the old colonial hierarchies between Africans and Europeans could be observed.

This section will therefore show that religion may not only serve as a symbolic resource when leaders seek to rally support for mobilisation that goes beyond the symbolic realm, but also for purely symbolic acts that still have a political dimension. This becomes apparent if one takes a closer look at the way especially evangelical and Pentecostal Christians from sub-Saharan Africa describe the specificities of their religion and, most importantly, their missionary activities.

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[190] AL: When people talk about integration, er, they think immediately of Turks or Arabs, and the other migrant groups are neglected.

William, for instance, is a pastor of a small Pentecostal church, who originally moved from Nigeria to Germany as a student in mechanical engineering with a *DAAD*[191] scholarship. He had become "born again" and worked as a campus pastor some time before going to Berlin and continued his missionary activities among his fellow students in Germany. When he had completed his education, he worked as an engineer, but then decided to found a church in Berlin. Since then, he has worked as a pastor and now does this full-time without salary, while his wife is the family's bread winner. Mission is at the centre of his life and his church, because in his opinion, the Christian religion is the only way to a better world. While his church is also politically active in that it maintains close contacts to the local administration and, for instance, encourages its members to get involved for improving the situation in their neighbourhoods, the pastor's central idea is that social and political change will be achieved through mission:

> William: […] I was in Texas last Ja// this January. And it was a conference to help, er, prie// er, pastors to plant churches, establish more churches. Not just in their own church, where they're living, but to help also to spread the gospel. And we have to spread the gospel. Mankind// you look at the present time, we are now// we have terrorism in the name of religion. And, er, I'm happy to hear that we have not had a Christian terrorist. I mean, er, Christian principles helps er-er, peace, where the// helps for that peace. It helps. So we have to help also for that Christian, er, churches, and, er, plant churches all over the world (Int17).
> William: Oh, well, the most important contact here in Berlin// Well, we are here to worship God, to serve him, to honor him and to be strong in this world, to make people Disciples of Christ. But like I told you also, ehm, we are here// Christ came for the world, he came that the world be a better place. If everybody would hear Jesus Christ and follow his principles and, er, his way of life, I think it could be a wonderful word (Int17).

Since the Christian religion is the only way to make the world a better place, William goes as far as to legitimise colonialism because of European proselytisation. He probably would not go as far as to say that everything the colonisers did was good, but in his view it still was a fortunate development that those who, according to him, were the first to fully endorse the gospel, subjected the world to their rule and brought the Christian religion to other continents:

> William: We are lucky that Europeans, I would say, were the people who// the first people who collectively (.), er, embraced the gospel and they-and:: they *verbreitet* it, preached it. The Europeans (?) came to Africa and India. The British// through the British domination of the world, they carried the Bible, the missionaries spread around. That's how the gospel went all over the world. It was through the Europeans, actually. (Int17)

[191] DAAD = *Deutscher Akademischer Auslandsdienst*, German Academic Exchange Service.

Regardless of the violence that European imperialism brought over the world, the subjugated peoples must still count themselves lucky, since they were delivered from what William considers to be pointless idolatry (Int17). Nowadays, African missionaries like him bring these spiritual goods back to Europe.

A similar rhetoric can be found in Joshua's account; his approach is an even more clear-cut example of reverse mission and of the belief in a spiritual responsibility African Christians have towards Europe. Like William, Joshua moved to Germany as a student and stayed there after having completed his education. Alongside his work as a medical doctor, he also runs his own church and is an ordained BFP pastor like William (Int10). According to him, he stayed in Germany not because of better prospects on the labour market, but for religious reasons. Just like in William's account, here, too, the fact that he sacrificed his personal career and higher income in order to work as a missionary in Germany plays an important role. According to Joshua, returning to Ghana and earning more money than in Germany with his own surgery still tempts him, but, so he says, his faith makes him stay. He even claims that he took up German citizenship only because of the call to be a missionary in Germany (Int10). In Joshua's account the many economic, social, or other reasons that may make a person stay in Europe rather than going back to Ghana disappear behind his missionary zeal. In his opinion, the seeds German missionaries planted in Africa during colonial times yield so much fruit that God wants some of it to be brought back to Germany:

> Joshua: Ah, okay. Da-das, was ich sagen wollte, wenn (ich?)// okay, das ist es, ich sag es kurz. Wenn ich möchte, dass ähm wahrscheinlich die deutsche Gesellschaft die afrikanischen Gruppen, besonders die religiösen// ich weiß, inzwischen gibt es auch wahrscheinlich auch, öhm, Asiat-Asiaten, gibt auch südamerikanisch, aber die afrikan// dass die Deutschen es so ansehen, dass genauso wie die damals (.) als Missionäre nach Afrika gingen// ich denke, heutzutage sind die Früchte von damals, von den Deutschen, die sind so viele in Afrika, dass es könnte sein, dass der liebe Gott diese Früchte, die dann von dem (Land?), von den Deutschen (*fragend*) hm, die dann zurück nach Deutschland bringen, damit das, was vergessen worden ist und diese Generation wieder auf//(.)erfrischt wird (Int10).[192]

[192] J: Er, OK. What I wanted to say when (I?)// OK, this is it, I say it quickly. When I want that, er, probably German society [consider?] the African groups, the religious ones in particular// I know, by now there are probably also, er, Asians, there are also thos from South America, but the African// that Germans think of it in this way, that just as, back then, missionaries went to Africa// I think, the present represents the fruits of back then, of the Germans, there are so many of them in Africa, so that it could be the case that God [has made that?] these fruits, which have then been brought from this (country?), from the Germans (*in a questioning tone*), er, which are then brought back to Germany, so that what has been forgotten and this generation can be refreshed.

Once again, the missionaries, and thus implicitly European imperialist expansion, are depicted in a positive light, or at least some of the consequences of colonialism are seen as so good that they have to be kept alive and spread. And results need to be returned to where they came from as the religious fervour has disappeared there: "für die heutige de// Generation, deutsche Generation, für die ist Religion nichts, das ist abstrakt. Ähm, oder das ist, ähm, nicht mehr lebensrelevant" (Int10).[193]

At the same time as Joshua highlights the supposedly positive effects of colonial mission, he thus also awards Africans the status of someone who is in possession of something that Europeans do not have. Africans then can share with Europeans and give to them. This is a role in which Africa and African migrants are rarely depicted in the media or in the majority's imaginary. Joshua describes himself just like European missionaries or, nowadays, like European development aid workers are often perceived or perceive themselves: as someone who sacrificed a career in their country which would have yielded much more money and prestige in order to stay overseas and give people there what they urgently need. Although, just like William, Joshua apparently praises the Europeans who first brought Christianity to the world, he then reverses the roles and subtly states the Africans' superiority in terms of faith.

The same reversal of the hierarchy between missionary and "missionised" is expressed by Charles, who also is a Pentecostal pastor:

> Charles: […] Denn wir-wir sind der Meinung, Gott hat uns hier in Deutschland gebracht für eine bestimmte Zweck. (.) Denn, ähm, der ähm-ähm-ähm// in der vergangenen Jahren, in der, ähm, siebziger, äh, ach// ähm, achtziger// achtzehnten Jahrhundert sind, ähm, Missionare nach Afrika gekommen. Haben uns missioniert. Und, ähm, wir haben die Botschaft, ähm, akzeptiert, an-angenommen, akzeptiert. Und nun sehen wir die Deutsche und die, äh, die Deutsche, ähm, meisten (so sind?), als ob Gott ist nicht mehr. Und viele gehen nicht mehr zur Kirche. (.) (So, ?) wir wissen, Gottes Wort hat Kraft und, äh, und, ähm-äh-ähm, Gottes Wort, ähm, ist eine sp// äh, spirituelle Ernährung. (.) […] Und wir-wir sind// es ist unsere Aufgabe, noch mal diese, ähm, geistliche, ähm-ähm, Nährung, oder diese geistliche Bewegung// Gott hat uns befohlen, in diesem Land, in Deutschland hierherzu-zubringen (Int26).[194]

[193] "For the current Ger// generation, German generation, for them religion is nothing, this is abstract. Er, or it is, er, no longer relevant for their lives."

[194] Charles: For we think that God has brought us here to Germany for a certain purpose. (.) For, er, the er-er-er// in the last years, in the, er, seventies, er// er, eighties// in the eighteenth century, missionaries have come to Africa. They have converted us. And, er, we have accepted the message, adopted it, accepted it. And now we see that the Germans and the, er, the Germans, er, most (are like?), as if God was no longer there. And many don't go to church anymore. (.) (So, ?) we know that the word of God has force and, er, and, er-er-er, the word of God, er, is a sp// er, spiritual nourishment. (.) [...] And we-we

In this pastor's explanation, the same inversion of the "spiritual" hierarchy is present as in the previous excerpts. Charles argues that the missionaries brought the gospel to Africa, and Africans now have to bring back the "spiritual nourishment" to Germany. Those who formerly brought the light to the world are now in need of spiritual humanitarian and development aid: God orders African Christians to bring spiritual food to Europeans, Charles claims - again a motive very similar to those put forward by so many European missionaries and aid workers from Europe. Without open criticism of colonialism or the practices of today's aid industry or of the persistent dependence of the African continent, this missionary's rhetoric thus reverses the hierarchy between Europeans and Africans, between Whites and Blacks, native Germans and migrants. For once, the dominated are superior, for once it is not them who are in need and receive alms. In this logic, for once, transmission of aid takes a South-North route instead of the other way around.

More radically than these African missionaries in Berlin, the representative of the French CEAF is very critical of European Christians who, in his view, are stuck in the past and responsible for a growing disinterest of the population in their religion. To be sure, the CEAF stresses the fact that it is not a union of "African" churches, but of churches "of an African expression", which means that their focus is on a particular way of expressing their faith that is imported from Africa, but not limited to migrants born and raised in an African environment. This goes along with severe criticism of European Protestants who are seen as clinging to principles and a liturgy fit for the sixteenth century and thus held responsible for the increasing disenchantment of European populations with their churches (Int30):

> Jérémie: Nous pensons que les églises aujourd'hui sont enfermées culturellement dans le passé. En d'autres termes, sans être très critiques, nous pensons que le protestantisme par exemple, mhm, a eu du mal (de ?)// à décoller totalement de la Réforme. Or, la Réforme, c'était un mouvement (au?) 16e siècle. Et:: la référence à Calvin comme à Luther comme à tous les autres réformateurs, qui est essentielle pour les autres, nous apparaît totalement comme une source de régression de l'Église. Parce que ça signifie que l'Église ne-ne-ne continue pas à créer, qu'elle s'arrête (Int30).[195]

Their commitment to an African way of expressing their Christian beliefs also goes along with a fierce criticism of the French principle of *laïcité*. From the

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are// it is our duty to [bring?] again this, er, religious, er-er, nourishment, or this religious movement// God has ordered us to bring this to this country, to Germany.

[195] J: We think that churches today are culturally imprisoned in the past. In other words, without being very critical, we think that Protestantism for example, er, has had trouble with// to move on from the Reformation. But the Reformation was a movement of the 16th century. And the reference to Calvin, to Luther and to all the other reformers, which is essential for the others, seems to us a source of decline for the Church. Because this means that the Church does not continue to create, that it stops.

CEAF's point of view, religion cannot be a private matter because it has to be expressed publicly and also has to inform the everyday lives of believers, in private and in public (Int30). The CEAF thus claims to represent a more modern, more appropriate form of Protestantism than many European (non-evangelical) Protestants, and it also questions one of the foundations of French republicanism.

In line with these views, mission is an important goal of the CEAF and especially for some of its member churches (Int30; Int31; CEAF 2012online). Also, as has been suggested above, the "responsibilisation" and "spiritual liberation" of Africans are important motivations for the federation and especially its leader. For him, this is a clearly anti-colonial aim and part of claiming the recognition of the Africans' *africanité*.

In sharp contrast to and much more radically than the Pentecostal missionaries in Berlin, and also to the French *Aumônerie africaine*, the representative of the CEAF refused to give up his original citizenship and argues that Africans need to be allowed to exist *as Africans* (Int30).[196] This refusal to become French is part of a wider demand - and of the claim that religious and spiritual freedom and independence are prerogatives for economic and political independence. According to the CEAF, in order to overcome the enduring subjugation of Africa and Africans, Africans first of all need to be free spiritually. In this pastor's opinion, no form of alienation runs deeper than spiritual alienation. Therefore, the spiritual liberation is a prerogative for reaching economic and intellectual independence (Int30). This argument corresponds to Fanon's observation that the relations between colonisers and colonised are marked by violence and that this violence penetrates also the homes, thoughts and psyche of those who are subjugated (cf. Fanon 2011: 453-454). Or, to put it differently, in order to overcome the violence that still marks the unequal relations between former master and former slave, it is not sufficient to free the African countries from exploitation and tutelage by their former colonisers. It is necessary to free the Africans' psyche, i.e. in the interlocutor's interpretation, in order to be free economically and intellectually, Africans first must be free in their religion.

What we see here, of course, is a different way of dealing with the persisting effects of European colonialism. In the rhetoric of the Pentecostal pastors from Berlin, the relationship between the "needy" and the "alms-giver" are reversed without questioning the role that the former coloniser's religion played for the subjugation of Africa and its peoples. In contrast, the interlocutor from the CEAF points precisely to the symbolic dimension of colonial violence that needs to be overcome before Africans can truly exist as Africans. Thus, two very different ways of dealing with the nexus of the Christian religion and the European colonialisation

[196] See the quote by this pastor in chapter 1, translation in footnote 86.

of the African continent are apparent here. In both cases, however, religion is a resource for the symbolic liberation - at least in part - from the usual (post-)colonial hierarchies and the paternalistic relation between Africans and Europeans.

Of course, this symbolic reversal of hierarchies in itself is not a political act. Also, there are secular as well as other religious actors who work with more concrete actions towards a different way of dealing with Europe's and Africa's "shared" colonial past and who take a more radical and more outspokenly political stance. In addition, the symbolic reversal of colonialist and racist hierarchies often goes along with embracing (ultra-) conservative values with respect to other issues - e.g. women's emancipation, homosexuality - as well as with a literal approach to biblical texts. Also, many of the Pentecostal churches will not get involved in "progressive" politics that aim for the emancipation of Black migrants in an almost all-White society, and in Berlin, they display a certain spoiling potential that endangers the work of the two ecumenical federations.

Nevertheless, the above still shows that, in the context of sub-Saharan migration to the former colonial powers France and Germany, the Christian religion can be a means to reclaim an identity that is often devalued and dismissed. This "relecture identitaire" (Fath 2010: 134) can help even the most apolitical and quiescent part of a minority to overcome their inferiority at least symbolically.[197]

The following two charts summarise the networks and political mobilisation of the different migrant groups in Berlin and Paris and highlight the differences between Muslim, Christian and secular organisations (and individuals) as they were described above.

[197] On the nexus between identity, mission and stigmatisation, see also Luca (2008) and Hunt (2002).

African Muslims	**African Christians**	**African secular organisations**
• No mobilisation *as Muslims* • No religious claims-making • Some African Muslims or Africans with a Muslim background are politically active in secular groups, but without reference to their religion	• Mobilisation in the name of the (African) migrant community for secular goals *as Christians* • Religious claims-making • Translation of political issues in a religious language, i.e. contribution to understanding and accessibility of political issues and actions • Churches etc. often support and call for individual participation • Some African Christians are politically active in secular organisatios, with or without referring to their religion • For the most proselytising religious organisations and individuals their religion serves as an "insulation" against racism and as means for bolstering and/or preserving an "African" identity	• Mobilisation in the name of the (African) migrant community • Anti-racist claims-making • Anti-(neo-)colonialist claims-making • Networks help reduce free-riding • Most outspokenly political organisations

Figure 35. Faith-based political mobilisation in Berlin.

African Muslims	**African Christians**	**African secular organisations**
• Often a closed milieu ("c'est la famille, quoi") • Little mobilisation *as Muslims* ("a mosque is not a church") • In Paris and the Parisian suburbs, mosque associations are often ethnically mixed; many of them co-operate closely with the local administration	• Catholic Church: top-down approach towards migrants; offering support, orientation and protection, while demanding integration into the church and assimilation to French society • Protestant federations (in parts comparable to those in Berlin) with explicitly religious, (implicitly) also political goals • Some independent charismatic and/or Pentecostal churches create their own networks in order to get politically influential in Europe	• Mobilisation in the name of the Black and/or the (African) migrant community • Anti-racist claims-making • Anti-(neo-)colonialist claims-making • *Sans-papiers* and housing movements include many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 36. Faith-based political mobilisation in Paris.

7 Conclusion

The point of departure of this book was the heuristic question whether migrants, and especially migrants with only few resources at their disposal, can draw on their religion as a resource for their political involvement. The underlying question, of course, was then whether religion could contribute to a positive shared identity and to the mobilisation or other forms of participation of migrants. Thus, the present study also aimed at contributing to our understanding of religion as a resource for marginalised communities more generally.

In a first step, the leading research question was contextualised by briefly reviewing three major approaches to explaining the political involvement - both individual and collective - of migrants. Theories of individual political participation and social movements converge insofar as three broad elements could be identified that the different approaches consider most relevant for political involvement and protest, and that, both with respect to political participation and to collective mobilisation, approaches that stress the importance of resources belong to the most influential theories. This underlines the relevance of our research question. In addition, cultural and context factors are the central explanatory elements put forward by students of both individual and collective participation. Also, just like *theories* of political participation and social movements to a certain extent are similar, *definitions* of political participation often include "unconventional" forms of participation such as protest actions and other forms typical for social movements. Students of social movements, on the other hand, often focus on the movement character of protest, but still include more conventional forms of political involvement into their definitions (e.g. Martiniello/Statham 1999: 568).

Against the background of this broad theoretical overview, the main argument underlying this study was that religion could play a significant role as an organisational and a discursive resource especially for the political involvement of migrants with few material resources. For methodological reasons, the present research concentrated more on religious organisations and their embeddedness into inter-organisational networks than on individual participation.

The following section will summarise the study and its main results before the next section will offer some conclusions.

M. Schader, *Religion as a Political Resource*, Veröffentlichungen der Sektion Religionssoziologie der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie,
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7.1 Religion as a political resource?

The first task was to sketch the socio-economic position of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris and Berlin as well as the main grievances and frustrations that might make this community get involved politically (or abstain from involvement). Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa both in Germany and in France represent a part of the population that is marked by a general economic, social and political vulnerability. At the same time, in contrast to common clichés, they often do not belong to the lowest social strata in their country of origin. Rather, their socioeconomic position in Germany and France is particularly precarious because their competencies are not recognised on the labour market and due to discrimination. Also, those among them who come as asylum seekers or live as *sans-papiers* in France or Germany face additional legal barriers to labour market integration.

Chapter 1 has furthermore shown that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa face many difficulties both in the process of migration and in their everyday lives in Germany and France. The policies and attitudes that interlocutors criticised as most problematic as well as the goals they want to reach all refer to three broad themes or issue fields: Firstly, the integration and participation of African migrants in all sectors of society, secondly, the situation of the African continent and African-European relations, and, thirdly, religion. In all three fields, issues of dominance and power are most important: from racist discrimination, unfair trade regimes to the missing recognition of their (way of practicing their) faith.

In short, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa constitute a young and vulnerable population with many reasons to protest. As the interview material demonstrates, they are also aware of these reasons. In addition, many of the interlocutors expressed a "pan-African" identity and claimed that, in order to improve their situation, Africans needed unity. At the same time, due to their precarious situation and the fact that they are but a small minority, their resources both for individual and collective political involvement are limited.

The second task was to find out whether religion could help migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to achieve unity, which, in light of their precarious situation and limited resources, is all the more important for political action – and can sometimes even be understood as political in itself. In order to analyse and compare the capacity of secular and religious organisations to overcome internal differences and to form coalitions, chapter 5 was devoted to an analysis of inter-organisational networks of sub-Saharan African migrants' organisations in Berlin.

Inter-organisational networks are an important requirement for the co-operation and co-ordinated action of different organisations. Of course, (social movement) organisations as well as individual actors can also get involved politically without any support by others. As Manlio Cinalli argues, however, networks facilitate co-operation and coalition-building. Thus, they render collective or at least co-

ordinated action more probable and more effective. In order to measure these networks, co-membership in federations or other overarching structures is one of the most reliable indicators. While this measurement does not cover all possible network ties, it does show whether there are important and encompassing structures that may facilitate communication as well as the flow of resources.

The social network analysis has shown that African Christian organisations in Berlin have set up the tightest co-membership networks. Christian organisations also occupy most central positions within the co-membership networks that include both secular and Christian organisations, i.e. they occupy the most advantageous positions in terms of communicating with others in the network and in terms of exercising control over flows of resources and information. While almost all African Christian organisations are part of two major African Christian federations, secular organisations have formed one federation, which brings together a comparatively small share of organisations. Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin have created hardly any organisational structures.

Nevertheless, secular, Christian and Muslim organisations have established network ties that go beyond the African organisational field and link them to other migrant and to non-migrant organisations. Especially for the Christian organisations, some of the ties to non-migrant organisations are particularly important because they provide access to material resources such as premises to rent as well as to more intangible resources such as information, and, most importantly, respect and legitimacy.

In addition to the differences between Muslim, secular and Christian organisations, there are also differences within the Christian organisational field. While internally, the two major Christian federations have a levelling effect on the network positions of individual organisations within the purely Christian co-membership network, a second analysis of shared leadership personnel has revealed that mainly Protestants as well as a smaller number of Pentecostals and Catholics occupy influential positions within the federations.

These observations revealed the capacity of African Christian organisations to overcome internal - theological as well as national, ethnic, and linguistic - differences and to create structures that increase their unity, their public visibility and their leaders' capacity to act effectively. While this is an important condition for religion to be a resource for the political involvement of migrants, it has been equally important to demonstrate that these structures themselves have a political dimension and that central actors draw on their position for political causes.

In a third step, therefore, the structural network analysis was complemented and contextualised by a less formalised and more hermeneutic analysis of the data and the situation in Berlin was compared to that in the Parisian agglomeration. This third part of the empirical study revealed that the two main federations in Berlin are explicitly political actors. Moreover, these federations draw on their reli-

gion in order to create unity and increase their legitimacy. Religion constitutes an organisational resource for their political involvement, because they can draw on support through other (non-migrant and migrant) organisations and overarching structures. But it is also a framing resource that permits to take advantage of or to establish organisational structures. In so doing, African Christian leaders have been able to create two federations that are ethnically mixed as well as ecumenical in their concepts and their actual composition (with a Protestant dominance) and that have explicitly secular goals – especially the social, economic and political participation of Africans in German society.

In Paris, there are no such federations, neither in terms of an ecumenical all-African outlook, nor in terms of an explicitly political outlook. To be sure, there are Catholic and Protestant structures that target migrants from sub-Saharan Africa specifically, but they focus much more on the religious realm. Moreover, although a majority of the CEAF's member churches are situated in the greater Parisian area, there are no local structures like the RaCiBB. Neither are there transnational organisations like the CCCAAE. Nevertheless, despite these differences and although they have not been set up with the same political ambition as the two federations from Berlin, the Catholic *Aumônerie africaine* and the CEAF also publicly comment on the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and voice their concerns.

Both in the Parisian agglomeration and in Berlin, the situation of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa differs considerably from that of their Christian counterparts. As has been pointed out, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in the German capital are hardly organised *as African Muslims* at all. While this does not exclude Muslims in Berlin to be organised in ethnic or other groups and to celebrate their faith there, it still contrast with the situation in Paris and the Parisian *banlieue*, where they have set up mosques and other elements of their own infrastructure. They even used to be represented in the CFCM with their own organisation. Also, they make up considerable shares of the believers who attend Friday prayers or religious and other activities organised by mosque associations that are not African in their majority. However, Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in the Parisian agglomeration still appear to have created a more or less inaccessible milieu and do not seem to want to use their religion for public protest or similar activities in order to improve the situation of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa more generally.

Religion as a symbolic system also serves as a means to "translate" political issues into a language that is accessible for the most apolitical part of the African migrant community. For instance, the CCCAAE and the RaCiBB in Berlin bridge the gap between a highly religious and apolitical milieu and secular or moderately religious actors. This balancing strategy is effective because individual Christian social movement entrepreneurs link the two major federations to their secular and liberal Christian partners on the one hand and to the conservative missionary milieu on the other hand. Peter Arthur and his pastor colleague George, for example, can

be considered as central actors who "translate" the federations' frames for the Pentecostal milieu. They hence help integrate a part of the African population, which otherwise would not have found itself represented by the federations. At the same time, migrant leaders who draw on their religion for political involvement and mobilisation are caught between communicating internally to their co-believers in religious and political terms, communicating to external religious partners with their own religious agenda (e.g. non-migrant religious actors needed for support) and to external political allies to whom religious arguments will not necessarily appeal.

Still, in both cities, Christian organisations and individual leaders draw on their religion in order to deal with racist attitudes in their surroundings and with the established hierarchies between the formerly colonised and their former colonisers. For secular organisations, this option obviously does not exist, and the one African Muslim organisation in Berlin is too small for being able to deal with an frequently hostile environment in the same way as the Christian organisations.[198] Even among the Christian organisations, there are significant differences in the way they use their religion as a symbolic resource. While the leaders of the RaCiBB, and the CCCAAE as well as individual pastors in Berlin use their religion to establish unity and to reduce the risk of free riders and spoilers who take advantage of the others' firm stand against patronising or racist attitudes, the CEAF's representative highlights what he sees as the double discrimination of Black (evangelical, charismatic, and Pentecostal) Christians in France. Most interestingly, some of the Pentecostal pastors symbolically reverse the established hierarchies between colonisers and colonised, between Black and White, through their work as (reverse) missionaries.

Generally, differences exist not only between secular, Muslim and Christian migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. In cities there are important confessional differences between African Christians in their political involvement. While the most active actors in Berlin are Protestants, in Paris, the pastor of an evangelical church and leader of the CEAF most elaborately and eloquently draws most on religion as a political resource. Catholic structures, in contrast, offer support and criticise the precarious situations many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are in, but their work is often mixed with a paternalistic and assimilatory element. Pentecostal and other charismatic churches in both cities vary in their approach to political involvement. Some are very active politically, either within structures such as the RaCiBB, the CEAF or in secular contexts, while some are generally sceptical towards political activities. The most proselytising churches are often those who im-

[198] For methodological reasons, i.e. due to the inaccessibility of the African Muslim field in Paris, it is not possible to tell whether Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa in Paris make use of their religion to deal with racism and colonial hierarchies in a similar way as their Christian counterparts in Berlin or Paris.

plicitly or explicitly symbolically reverse the colonial hierarchies through their missionary activities.

In summary, the main empirical finding of this study is the following: Religion can be an organisational and a symbolic resource for the political involvement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, but only specific forms of religion and under certain circumstances only. There are two dimensions to religion as an organisational resource: firstly, religious organisational structures can support political activities or carry them out themselves. Secondly, these explicitly political structures can be framed religiously, as can their goals and activities. Religion as a symbolic resource can furthermore help dealing with stigmatisation and discrimination. It can be a source of self-respect and revalorisation of an identity that the majority considers as inferior. Finally, but importantly, framing political issues religiously and "translating" political issues into a religious language can help mobilise apolitical parts of a marginalised group.

Not all religious groups are, however, able to or want to draw on their religion for both or one of these options. The general "invisibility" of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, their lack of organisation in Berlin and their closed milieu in the Parisian agglomeration indicate that they do not or cannot take advantage of their religion for their political involvement, e.g. in order to increase their visibility and to mobilise in the name of African (Muslim) migrants. This is the case both for the Parisian agglomeration and for Berlin. Catholics can draw on their religion for political involvement only under the auspices of the top-down, assimilationist tutelage of the Church - again both in Paris and in Berlin. Protestants and Pentecostals in both contexts are more independent than Catholics and more involved than Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, although, especially among Pentecostals, many are also sceptic, and the risk of spoilers is high. Also, the way they can draw on their religion for their political involvement and the extent to which they do so differs considerably between African Christians in Berlin and their counterparts in Paris.

7.2 How to make sense of these findings?

The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the present findings is that it is not religion in general which helps migrants to get active politically, but particular forms of religious organisation and particular theological elements. Bottom-up organisations with concrete membership structures are much better placed supporting, encouraging or even initiating people's political activities than loser or more hierarchical organisations.

If we return to the table summarising the determinants of network structures and embedded resources (cf. chapter 2.2), we can identify several features of

religious communities need to be added and that some are more important than others. Most evidently, a "bottom-up" approach, which allows individual congregations, their leaders or even their members to speak in the name of their religion or their religious community, is more likely to contribute to the respective religion serving as a political resource than a strict hierarchy. It opens up avenues for individual congregations or indeed members to get politically active in the name of or with resources accessible through their religious community while a strict and encompassing hierarchy like that of the Catholic Church makes the political involvement dependent on the approval of a superior and / or the organisation's general standpoint.

At the same time, if structures are too loose it is again difficult to mobilise resources for political activities as the examples of the AMK and of the Parisian sub-Saharan African Muslims show. A mosque is not a church, as Malik expressed it, and it does not offer the same access to material and especially immaterial resources (solidarity, information, legitimacy) as a (Protestant) church, either.

In addition, the role of networks and especially of federations cannot be over-estimated because they give access to immaterial resources such as legitimacy and solidarity which would otherwise be inaccessible. Again, Protestant (including Pentecostal) churches – both in Paris and in Berlin – were the most successful in creating such structures whereas Muslims found it hardest to do so.

Proselytism – Protestant and other – seems to play a mixed role: it can help create a shared identity or to appreciate an identity or group in a context where it denigrated, humiliated or discriminated against. It can also take away resources from broader political efforts as maybe some of the CEAF's member churches and partly the CEAF itself show.

In all religious organisations in this study we see a gender and a class / education bias: women hardly seem to take advantage of faith-based resources for their political involvement, and among the men, mainly the well-educated do so.

Organisation	Regular conventions [religious services, ceremonies etc.]
	Membership or similar structures
	Shared rites and rituals
	Institutionalisation of the transmission of religious knowledge/values etc. [Sunday school…]
	Special interest groups, **social services**
	Local (religious) networks
	Transnational networks
	Bottom-up vs. top-down approach
	(Proselytising efforts)
Religious ethics and ideology	Shared set of values and norms
	Obligation to practice religion publicly
	Obligation to participate actively in community matters (of the congregation or wider religious community)
	Obligation/prohibition to participate actively in the wider community
	Bottom-up vs. top-down approach
Composition/social structure	Migrant church / congregation
	Ethnic homogeneity
	Class homogeneity
	Gender

Figure 37. Determinants of network structures and embedded resources – revised and combined with individual factors.

The finding that protestant (migrant) churches are suited best for supporting migrant political involvement goes along well with what most authors argue for the U.S. American context: as the United States are mainly protestant it is not surprising that religion there is usually found to serve as a resource for political involvement.

In contrast to what Eggert and Giugni found, the present results show that Muslims are precisely not the ones who draw on their religion for political activities. Instead, Christian migrants are in an advantageous position here compared to Muslims and non-religious migrants and secular migrant organisations.

The differences between the Parisian agglomeration and Berlin also point to the relevance of context factors. At the same time, while the political and religious contexts in France and Germany certainly explain some of the divergences, in some respects, context factors and factors that stem from the specific religions or

the specific migrant group are entwined and play a more complex role. Most importantly, context factors have different effects on the different religious groups.

Three parallel processes have decisively marked the perception and the governance of migrant religion over the past two decades, and they have mainly concerned Muslims and the Islamic religion. Firstly, especially since the events of 9/11, religious issues are increasingly "securitised", i.e. in public discourses as well as in concrete policies religion, or, more precisely, Islam is linked to issues of inner security and to war, fanaticism and terrorism.[199] Secondly, at the same time, Muslims, and especially the younger generations who did not migrate themselves but who were born in their country of residence publicly voiced claims for the recognition of their religion (e.g. Statham et al. 2005). Thirdly, and closely linked to these first two processes, the governance of religious pluralism, the integration of Islam and Muslims into more or less established models of state-church separation have become increasingly important in most West European countries (e.g. Koenig/Willaime 2008; Kastoryano 2003). What Julia Permoser and her colleagues note for Austria and West European societies in general is probably true for both France and Germany: "the revival of religion in public life has often been accompanied by the emergence and strengthening of the role of religious organisations as actors within the political system" (Permoser et al. 2010: 1464).

Instruments like the German *Islam Konferenz* (DIK) and the French *Conseil français du culte musulman* (CFCM) open up political opportunities for Muslim religious actors. Also, migrants from mainly Muslim countries - as well as their descendants born in France and Germany - are perceived as Muslims first (e.g. Kastoryano 2003, Tezcan 2007). Especially Muslims are hence encouraged to organise and participate in political affairs *as Muslims*. At the same time, (Muslim) migrants are often reduced to their religious identity when it comes to integrating them into the political system. Nevertheless, the present book has shown that Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa do not want to, or cannot, take advantage of these new political opportunities in the same way as other communities in order to make claims in favour of African migrants. Several reasons are likely to be behind this.

First of all – and in line with what Kastoryano (2003) and Permoser, Rosenberger and Stoeckl (Permoser et al. 2010) highlight – the present research shows that the focus on the governance of religious pluralism and the integration of Islam as well as instruments like the DIK and the CFCM create political opportunities for religious actors who want to reach *religious goals* or goals that are important for them *as religious actors*. They do not necessarily open up opportunities for Muslims to get

[199] The attacks of 13 November 2015 and on the Charlie Hebdo editorial team in Paris are likely to have increased the securitisation of Islam in Europe and especially in France.

involved politically in the name and the interests of African migrants or Blacks in France or Germany.

Secondly, as Pap Ndiaye notes, Black Muslims are not hit by the anti-Muslim opprobrium in the same way as Muslims of Arab descent (or Turkish-origin Muslims in Germany respectively). The fact that they are often not considered as Muslims probably means that they are not seen as important interlocutors in the state-sponsored bodies such as the *Islam Konferenz* and the CFCM, either. Here, the numerical difference between sub-Saharan African Muslims in France and in Germany could explain the fact that the FFAIACA at least used to be represented in the CFCM, while there is no sub-Saharan African association or federation represented in the DIK.

This makes it more reasonable for sub-Saharan African Muslims in the two cities, thirdly, to get involved in ethnically and nationally mixed contexts if they want to get involved as Muslims for religious goals, because they are but a small minority among Muslims - especially in Berlin. For them, there is no Black or African Muslim utility heuristic, as one might call it in reference to the Black utility heuristic which Dalton observed in the United States.

Fourthly, as has been pointed out above, the security dispositive that has been constructed around Islam and Muslims in Europe (see also Tezcan 2007), the great suspicion towards Muslims and especially towards the political activities of Muslims (see also Schiffauer 2007) do not make it easy for Muslims to get active politically outside the state-sponsored frameworks. While it is perfectly normal, and indeed important, in a democracy that some political actors and actions may be considered less trustworthy or competent than others, processes like this are more complicated in the case of ethnic, religious or other minorities. As has been argued in the previous chapter, the interview material points to the great relevance of the ambiguous attitude towards Muslim political involvement for the political involvement of sub-Saharan African Muslims as Muslims. On the one hand, Muslim migrants are encouraged to participate politically *as Muslims*, and, as Kastoryano (2003) pointed out, even primarily as Muslims. On the other hand, however, politically active Muslims are constantly in a position where they have to justify their actions and convictions and where they have to stress their loyalty and allegiance to the state and society they live in.

Finally yet significantly, "a mosque is not a church", and its social function and relevance for the everyday lives of Muslims differ from those of a church. What is more, despite the different official bodies for a dialogue between West European states and their Muslim citizens or denizens, their religious identity may not be as salient for Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa as for other Muslims or for African Christians. For them, for instance, gender, language, ethnic or national belonging, or their political orientation may just be more important than being Muslim. As one of

the interlocutors who is active in the *Afrika-Rat* and other secular associations in Berlin explained:

> Souleymane: Bei mir persönlich spielt [Religion, MS] keine große Rolle, keine große Rolle mehr.
> Miriam: Keine große Rolle mehr, hat es mal eine Rolle gespielt?
> S: Ja, hat, äh, natürlich hat, ähm, als man// (.) wenn man als Muslim da erzogen wurde, (.)'türlich irgendwann mal hatte man als Kind. Äh, jetzt sehe ich das ganz anders. (.) Ich habe// ich glaube lieber an (.) bestimmte philosophische Werte, auch Respekt vor der Menschheit, Humanité […] (Int14).[200]

Of course, the processes described above have shaped mainly the political opportunity structure for Muslim actors, but they are not only relevant for Muslims. They have also transformed and are still transforming the context for other religious actors, too (cf. Permoser et al. 2010). In Berlin, some of the Christian interlocutors, for instance, openly complained about the fact that there was an *Islam Konferenz* and claimed that they as Christians did not receive enough attention.

Nevertheless, the more general context of the German model of a secular state and French *laïcité* are more important for Christians from sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to using religion as a political resource. The German way of separating religion and state, which recognises mainly the two established Churches as important and legitimate political actors, leaves far more room for migrant political activism based on Christian organisations than the strict French *laïcité* principle, which restricts religion to the private sphere and thus keeps migrants from drawing on their religion in order to increase their political legitimacy.[201] Also, for organisations like the CEAF it is not only more difficult to get involved politically than for their German counterparts, but securing a certain established status is also more important to them.

Just as for Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, for Christians the religious and political context does not explain everything. The characteristics of religious organisations and their networks are at least equally important. For instance, the politically most active actors within the Christian networks in Berlin are Protestants, who use their religion as an organisational and discursive resource. Similarly, the CEAF as a Protestant (evangelical and Pentecostal) federation differs from the

[200] S: Personally, for me it [religion, MS] does not play much of a role, not much of a role any more.
M: Not any more, was there a time when it has played a role?
S: Yes, it has, er, naturally it has, er, when one// (.) when you are raised as a Muslim, (.) of course it did when you were a child. Er, now I see this in a totally different way. (.) I have// I prefer believing in (.) certain philosophical values, respect for humanity too, humanité [...].

[201] This is, of course, is constantly put into question by the attempts to adapt the established modes of religious governance or to find new modes in order to deal with migration-induced religious pluralism.

Catholic structures in that it professes a more political and less assimilationist rhetoric. Catholic structures oscillate between social (and to an extent, political) support for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and a paternalistic and assimilatory tutelage. As has been demonstrated, Pentecostal churches in both cities vary most in their approach to political involvement.

On the one hand, theological differences seem to be more important here than external factors. As Wood showed for different Protestant congregations in the United States, theology can be decisive both for a congregation's political orientation and for the success of their political mobilisation (Wood 1994). This is certainly most relevant for explaining the Pentecostals' hesitance when it comes to political activism. Theology is certainly also relevant for the Catholic Church's social support for migrants in general and, especially in the French case, the missing support for emancipatory political involvement of African migrants *as Africans and with an African identity*.

On the other hand, the confessional differences and the fact that they do matter cab be attributed partly to context factors again. Here, path dependencies become most obvious. For instance, Catholicism is much more important in France and in former French colonies than in Germany. Therefore, the paternalistic approach of the Catholic Church towards African migrants matters more in France than in Germany.

Also, Pentecostal, and evangelical / charismatic congregations are hit by a double stigma - that of being migrant, Black churches, and that of being perceived as dangerous, or at least peculiar, sects. While authors like Nathalie Luca (2008: 246) argue that African churches of this kind might be exempt from the stigma of sects because they are already stigmatised as Black migrant churches, and not taken seriously in any case, my interviews carried out in France clearly show that these churches' leaders do feel stigmatised and that actors like the Catholic Church, but also the CEAF, do not spare them when it comes to identifying "dangerous sects" (Int30; Int42; Int43). For them, then, religion hardly can be a source of legitimacy. Rather, it is a reason to get involved politically - for religious reasons more than for the more general interests of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. The same can be observed in Berlin where a number of Pentecostal and charismatic churches are attracted by the (ultra)conservative network mentioned above. While this network permits them to get involved alongside non-migrant actors, it is less a resource for political involvement in the name of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, but for "more Christian values" in politics.[202]

[202] Quote by a German pastor who called for more politicians in the European Parliament who follow "Christian values"; quoted from a religious service attended by many African migrants in a deprived

Nevertheless, it is precisely these churches who reverse the stigma (cf. Fath 2010) as well as colonial hierarchies through their missionary work. Religion here is a symbolic resource for the revalorisation of an African identity because it is stigmatised. In sharp contrast to Catholic parishes or more mainstream Protestant congregations, Pentecostals and Evangelicals can draw on their religion in order to present themselves as equal or superior to their former colonisers and to overcome not only the religious stigma, but also the stigmatisation of the Black migrant, of the colonised.

Religion and especially these non-mainstream churches gain in attractiveness through these processes of identity revalorisation. Without alternative ways of developing a positive identity as African migrants in Europe, many Black migrant may be allured by ultra-conservative charismatic congregations.

This said the present research is, of course, a qualitative study with all the limitations qualitative research has in terms of generalisability of the results. It certainly does show that, at least in the present two cases, Christians can and do draw on their religion for their political involvement – although in different ways. This is in contrast to the findings of Eggert and Giugni's study who found that religion mattered only for the political participation and protest activities of Muslims (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 231). Further research would be needed to clarify when and why religion is a factor for migrant political involvement or not.

In contrast to Eggert and Giugni's quantitative work, it was not within the scope of this study to analyse the impact of participation in religious associations on individual political participation, e.g. on voting or on the participation rate in other political activities has not been analysed for individual members.

What is more, the methodology chosen for this study did not allow taking into account the time dimension. Instead, what has been presented here is more a snapshot of a situation; it would therefore be interesting to study the evolution of the situation over time. Systematic comparisons with Black / African movements in other cities as well as with other migrant groups and their religious structures appear a useful way forward for further testing the generalisability of the present results, and for counterbalancing the lack of the temporal dimension.

neighbourhood in West Berlin, shortly before the European elections 2009 (participant observation by the author).

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Appendix

List of acronyms and abbreviations

ADEFRA	*Schwarze deutsche Frauen und Schwarze Frauen in Deutschland*
AK Afrika	*Arbeitskreis Afrika (SPD)*
AMK	*Afrikanischer Muslim Kreis*
BFP	*Bund Freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden*
CCCAAE	*Council of Christian Churches of an African Approach in Europe*
CEAF	*Communauté des Eglises d'Expressions Africaines de France*
CFCM	*Conseil français du culte musulman*
CNEF	*Conseil National des Evangéliques de France*
CRAN	*Conseil représentatif des associations noires de France*
DIK	*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*
DMK	*Deutscher Muslim Kreis*
e.V.	*Eingetragener Verein*
ECOC	*Entente et Coordination des Œuvres Chrétiennes*
EKBO	*Evangelische Kirche Berlin-Brandenburg-schlesische Oberlausitz*
EKD	*Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland*
FFAIACA	*Fédération française des associations islamiques d'Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles*
FPF	*Fédération Protestante de France*
IBMUS	*Initiative Berliner Muslime*
ISD	*Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland*
KADIB	*Komitee für ein afrikanisches Denkmal in Berlin*
KdöR	*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*
NARUD	*Network African Rural and Urban Development*
RaCiBB	*Rat afrikanischer Christen in Berlin und Brandenburg*
RMT	*Resource mobilisation theory*
SME	*Social movement entrepreneur*
SMO	*Social movement organisation*
SPD	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*
UEEHAC	*Union des Églises Évangéliques Haïtiennes et Afro-Caraïbéennes*

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Transcription signs

Well::	elongated end
(.)	short break
(..) (9)	little longer break timed break
and I felt kind of a// I was already prepared	sentence or word not completed, new beginning
to-to	repetition of syllables or word
(laughs)	nonverbal expressions, other remarkable noises
Challenge	words in languages other than the main language of the interview
(sparken?)	very unclearly expressed words, suggestion of what it could mean
(?)	word or words not understandable at all
I'm <u>not</u> automatically	strong emphasis on a certain word
[word] [word]	Overlap
= =	Latching

Figure 38. Transcription signs.

List of interviews and pseudonyms.

No.	Pseudonym	Organisation	Date	Venue	Remarks
1.	Peter Arthur (real name)	Akebulan e.V. (Global Mission)	2009-02-25	Berlin	
2.	Tariq	Deutscher Muslim Kreis	2009-03-09	Berlin	
3.	George	(African Pentecostal church)	2009-03-09	Berlin	Not recorded
4.	Ingrid	(African Pentecostal church)	2009-03-16	Berlin	
5.	Aziz Lamere (real name)	Afrikanischer Muslim Kreis	2009-03-18	Berlin	
6.	Sinan	Muslimische Jugend Deutschland	2009-03-26	Berlin	
7.	Martin	(Catholic order / Social and legal support centre for African migrants)	2009-03-27	Berlin	Not recorded
8.	Peter Sorie Mansaray (real name)	RaCiBB / UBC	2009-03-30	Berlin	
9.	Gerlind	(CCCAAE/RaCiBB)	2009-05-08	Berlin / Potsdam	Not recorded
10.	Joshua	(African Pentecostal church)	2009-06-24	Berlin / Tel?	
11.	Martin	Gemeinsam für Berlin	2009-07-03	Berlin	
12.	Björn	AK Afrika (SPD)	2009-07-09	Berlin / Tel	
13.	Pierre-Emmanuel	AK Afrika (SPD),(several African secular associations).	2009-09-03	Berlin	
14.	Souleymane	Afrika-Rat, (several African secular associations)	2009-09-04	Berlin	
15.	El Hadj	(African secular association)	2009-09-07	Berlin	
16.	Stephen	(African Pentecostal church)	2009-09-08	Berlin	Not recorded
17.	William	(African Pentecostal church)	2009-09-09	Berlin	
18.	John	RaCiBB / CCCAAE	2009-09-10 (?)	Berlin	

1	Vincent	(African magazine from Berlin)	2009-09-10	Berlin	
2	Franck	(African TV station from Berlin)	2009-09-16	Berlin	
2	Maren	RaCiBB	2009-09-18	Berlin	
2	Aly	AMK	2009-09-20	Berlin	
2	Omar	IBMUS	2011-10-12	Berlin	Telephone interview
2	Paul	(Pentecostal church)	2011-10-12	Berlin	Telephone interview
2	Annika	(African Pentecostal church)	2011-10-13	Berlin	Telephone interview
2	Charles	(African Pentecostal church)	2011-10-31	Berlin	Telephone interview
2	Philippe	Francophone Catholic Parish	2011-12-08	Berlin	Telephone interview
2	Karim	(Muslim association)	2010-02-11	Paris / Banlieue	
2	"Le professeur"	(African secular association)	2010-02-11	Paris / Banlieue	Not recorded
3	Jérémie	CEAF	2010-02-20	Paris	
3	Samuel	(African Pentecostal church)	2010-02-22	Paris	
3	Jean-Pierre	Fraternité africaine	2010-02-24	Paris / Banlieue	
3	Ousmane + Abdoulaye	Foyer Saint-Ouen	2010-03-04	Paris / Banlieue	
3	Jamal	(Muslim association)	2010-03-24	Paris / Banlieue	
3	Julie	(Catholic association)	2010-09-09	Paris	
3	Alassane, Jeanne + Mahmoud	(African secular association)	2010-09-11	Paris	
3	Jean	(Secular association)	2010-09-15	Paris	
3	Fatou	---	2010-09-17	Paris	
3	Jules	(Catholic parish)	2010-09-24	Paris	
4	Jacques	(Pentecostal church)	2010-09-24	Paris	

4	Malik	(Mosque association)	2010-09-27	Paris	
4	Daniel	Aumônerie africaine	2010-09-28	Paris	
4	Marc	(African Pentecostal church)	2010-09-29	Paris / Banlieue	

Figure 39. List of interviews and pseudonyms.

Network analysis: complementary information

List of organisations and their IDs in the network analysis

ID	Name	Category (Christian, Muslim or secular organisation)	Category (religious specification)	Category (individual or umbrella organisation)
1	Kath. Ghana-Gemeinde	Christian	Catholic	Individual organisation
2	Afrikanische Evangelische Gemeinde e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
3	Afrikanisches Samariterwerk / Afrikanische Ökumenische Kirche e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
4	Akebulan Global Mission	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
5	Angolanische Baptistische Gemeinde	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
6	Assemblée de Dieu de Berlin	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
7	Äthiopische Bethlehem-Gemeinde	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
8	Äthiopisch-Orthodoxe Gemeinde	Christian	Orthodox	Individual organisation
9	Äthiopisch-Orthodoxe Tewahedo-Gemeinde	Christian	Orthodox	Individual organisation
10	Brotherhood of the Cross and Star	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
11	Celestial Church of Christ	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
12	Christ Apostolic Church (WOSEM)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
13	Christ End Time Movement International (CETMI); www.cetmi.de; s. EKBO	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
14	Christ International Church	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation

15	Christian Church Outreach Mission (CCOM)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
16	Christian Pentecostal Church e.V.	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
17	Church of Bethel Faith Temple e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
18	Church of Pentecost (zur Church of Pentecost in Hamburg)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
19	Deeper Christian Live Ministry e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
20	Evangelical Church of Faith	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
21	Evangelical European Pentecost Fellowship in Germany (s. EKBO)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
22	Fountain of Living Water International Ministry e.V.	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
23	Französischsprachige kath. Mission / Paroisse Catholique Francophone	Christian	Catholic	Individual organisation
24	Französischsprachige Protestantische Gemeinde / Communauté protestante francophone de Berlin	Christian	Calvinist	Individual organisation
25	Gemeinde „La Nouvelle Jerusalem“	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
26	Ghanaian Adventist Fellowship / Ghanesische Adventistische Gemeinde	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
27	Gospel Believers Centre International	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
28	Grace International Foundational Scriptural Ministry	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
29	House of Prayer International Church / Bethaus Internationale Gemeinde e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
30	International Christian Revival	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation

	Church (BFP) / Rat+Hilfe e.V.			
31	International Triumphant Church of Christ (bei EKBO gefunden)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
32	International Worship Mission e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
33	Jesus Miracle Harvest Church / Jesus-Weg-Gemeinde International e.V.	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
34	Kimbanguisten – Gemeinde (Zaire)	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
35	Koptisch – orth. Gemeinde	Christian	Orthodox	Individual organisation
36	Living Faith Sanctuary	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
37	Ministère du Combat Spirituel (s. Int. Konvent)	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
38	Oromo Christian Fellowship (zu CZB)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
39	Pentecostal Church International „Shalom Chapels“ (same pastor as Devine Pentecostal Church of God, Potsdam)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
40	Precious Blood of Jesus Christ Church e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
41	Presbyterian Church of Ghana-Berlin e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
42	Solid Rock Foundation Ministry	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
43	The Redeemed Christian Church of God Mount Zion Parish-Berlin	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
44	Trust In Faith Gospel Mission Berlin e.V.	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
45	United Brethren in Christ Church (UBC) e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation
46	Versammlung Jesus Christus e.V.	Christian	Protestant	Individual organisation

47	Word of Faith International Church Berlin	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
48	World of Faith Outreach International Church (WOIC)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
49	ACC Protestant Faith Fellowship (PFF) / Pentecostal Church of Berlin e.V.	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
526	Christliche Gemeinde - Int. Christian Church e.V. (Pastor Nimo; bis 2010 bei CCOM)	Christian	Pentecostal	Individual organisation
764	Afrika-Center (Weiße Väter) /	Christian	Catholic	
801	RaCiBB	Christian	Christian (ecumenical)	UO
808	APPA	Christian	Pentecostal	UO
813	CCCAAE	Christian	Christian (ecumenical)	UO
50	African Muslim Brotherhood e.V.	Muslim	Muslim	Individual organisation
51	Afrikanischer Muslim Kreis e.V.	Muslim	Muslim	Individual organisation
52	The Afro-German Islamic Jammat Berlin e.V.	Muslim	Muslim	Individual organisation
53	Afrikanische Frauen und Jugend-Organisation e.V. / AWYO/ African Women And Youth Organization (Kontakt zum RaCiBB)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
54	A.J.A.S.A. – Association des Jeunes Africains et Sympathisants en Allemagne e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
55	A.M., Verein der aus Mbam-Kamerun Stammenden und SympathisantInnen e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
56	A.R.NDE, Verein der aus Nde – Kamerun Stammenden und Sympathisant/-innen e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
57	ABS, Verein von, aus der	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	Sawaregion in Kamerun stammenden Personen eingetragener Verein			
58	ADERFA e.V. Schwarze deutsche Frauen und Schwarze Frauen in Deutschland	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
59	African Circle Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
60	African Connection and Cooperation e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
61	AFRICAN RED RIBBON e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
62	African Refugees Association in Germany / Association des Réfugié(e)s Africain(e)s en Allemagne e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
63	AfricAvenir International e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
64	Afrika - Bildung e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
65	Afrika - Forum e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
66	Afrika Akademie Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
67	Afrika Hilfswerk e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
68	Afrika Kulturinstitut e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
69	Afrika Medien Zentrum e.V. / LONAM Das afrikanische Magazin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
70	Afrika Rise e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
71	Afrika Sport und Kultur Verein, Berlin (AFRISKO) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
72	Afrika trifft Deutschland e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
73	Afrika Yetu e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
74	Afrika-Haus Berlin / Farafina e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
75	AFRIKAHERZ Gesundheit und Migration – Beratungszentrum	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
76	Afrikanische Fraueninitiative	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	(AFI) e.V.			
77	Afrikanische Perspektive für Frieden und Wohlergehen e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
78	Afrikanische Studenten Union Berlin / Brandenburg e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
79	AFRIKDIREKT e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
80	Afro Roots in Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
81	AFRO TV Afrikanisches Fernsehen in Berlin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
82	Afro-Asiatische Union	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
83	AFRO-KULTURINITIATIVE e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
84	AGBE - Perspectives for West Africa e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
85	AIHAK Aktion individuelle Hilfe für afrikanische Kinder e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
86	AK Afrika (SPD)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
87	Alafia - Initiative zur Förderung von Kindern und Jugendlichen in Afrika und Flüchtlingskindern/-jugendlichen in Deutschland e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
88	Amahoro. Förderverein Hospital Jenda/Burundi e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
89	Ambulantes somalisches Kinderhilfswerk e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
90	ANEE e. V. African Network for Education and Entertainment	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
91	ASER - Eritrean Culture Group Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
92	Assocation d'Entraide pour les Zones sans Eau du Cameroun et d'Afrique	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
93	Associação dos Moçambicanos	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	na Alemanha e.V. (A.M.A.) Mosambikanischer Verein in Deutschland e.V.			
94	Associao dos Mocambicanos em Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
95	Association Des Amis Du R.D.Congo "A.A.C." e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
96	Association des Congolais de Berlin/Brandenburg e.V. abgekürzt ACOBE	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
97	Association des Etudiants Camerounais de Berlin e.V. abgekürzt "A.E.C." e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
98	Association des Guinéens de Berlin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
99	Association des Ivoiriens de Berlin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
100	Association des Ressortissants du Congo-Brazzaville de Berlin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
101	ASSOCIATION DES RES-SORTISSANTS TCHADIENS de Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
102	Association of Ghanaian Engineers for Development e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
103	ÄTHIOPISCHER KULTUR-VEREIN	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
104	AVE TOGO e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
105	BENKADI e.V. Kultur-Raum Afrika	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
106	Berlin Postkolonial e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
107	better place e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
108	Bewegung gegen Apartheid in Rwanda und Burundi	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
109	BILDUNG FÜR BALANKA (BiBa e.V.)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

110	Bildung und Ausbildung Pro Afrika (BIA PRO AFRIKA) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
111	Bintumani D-SL - German-Sierra Leone Society e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
112	BLACK FLOWERS e.V. Potsdam	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
113	Brücke Europa Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
114	Brücke zu Togo e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
115	Burkina Faso Kulturverein Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
116	Cameroon Power	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
117	Co.Co.Be e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
118	Comité de solidarité pour la paix au Burundi (CSPB) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
119	Cultura Afro-Guineo-Ecuatorial in Berlin/Brandenburg	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
120	DANBB (Deutsch-Afrikanisches Netzwerk, Berlin – Brandenburg)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
121	Deberlinisation Projekt	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
122	Deutsch – Sambischer Freundschaftsverein e.V./ German – Zambian Friendship – Association	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
123	Deutsch-Afrikanisches Frauennetzwerk DAFNEP	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
124	Deutsch- Somalische Gesellschaft Berlin-Mogadischu	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
125	Deutsch-Afrikanische Gesellschaft e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
126	Deutsch-Angolanische Wirtschafts-Initiative (DAWI) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
127	Deutsch-äthiopischer Verein zur Entwicklungshilfeförderung	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	und Wissensvermittlung DÄVEW e.V.			
128	Deutscher Förderverein Hilfe für ehemalige Kindersoldaten und afrikanische Kriegsopfer e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
129	Deutsch-Kamerunischer Kultur- und Entwicklungsverein, WICUDA e.V. - Berlin – Deutschland	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
130	Deutsch-Kamerunischer Kulturverein Grassland e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
131	Deutsch-Simbabwische Juristenvereinigung/German-Zimbabwean Lawyers Association e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
132	Deutsch-Südafrikanische Gesellschaft Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
133	Deutsch-Südafrikanischer Kulturverein	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
134	Deutsch-Togoischer Freundeskreis (e.V.)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
135	Deutsch-Togoischer Fußball-Fanclub - Association des Supporters des Eperviers en Allemagne e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
136	Dewol-Ethiopian Intellectual Society (DEIS) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
137	Djeli	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
138	Djokereendhan - Afrikanisch-deutsche Begegnung e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
139	EASI e.V. (Verein für Europäisch-Afrikanische Soziale Integration)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
140	Egbe Omo Onduduwa e.V	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
141	Egumbo okulonga pamwe e.V. - Initiative zur Förderung von Kindern und Jugendlichen	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	sowie Betreuung von älteren Menschen in Namibia (Afrika)			
142	Eritrean Community Berlin e.V. c/o Joliba e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
143	Ethiopia Arise e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
144	Ethiopian Cultur Union	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
145	EURAFRIKA! Berlin - Verein für europäisch-afrikanischen Kulturaustausch e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
146	Europa - Somalia – Hilfe e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
147	Europa-Afrika-Kulturzentrum in Berlin-Brandenburg ("Eurafri") e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
148	Faso Djigui	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
149	Faso Initiative e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
150	Förderverein "AfrikaInitiative" (Pankstr.) (Aziz?)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
151	Förderverein der Nigerianischen Volksbefreiungspartei	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
152	Freundeskreis Äthiopien	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
153	Freundeskreis für Guinea-Bissau eingetragener Verein	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
154	G.P AA e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
155	GAPh – Gesellschaft für Afrikanische Philosophie	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
156	Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft für Rechte afrikanischer Frauen mbh (G.R.A.F.) / Africanissima gGmbH	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
157	Gemeinsame Initiative für Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
158	Ghana Council of Chiefs e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
159	Ghanaian Community Berlin e.V. = Ghana Community?	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

160	Ghanaian Women Association Berlin (Verein der ghanaischen Frauen in Berlin) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
161	Global Afrikan Congress	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
162	Gourmello e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
163	Great Africa Network for Women e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
164	Guinea-Bissau Interessengemeinschaft e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
165	Hilfe für Afrika gegen AIDS und Malaria e.V., Peter Sebingi Kamya, Dorf Kachonga in Uganda	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
166	Hirondelles joyeuxjoyeuses (fröhliche Schwälbchen) Ruanda e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
167	Hoffnung für Guinea	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
168	Humanitäre Fördergesellschaft DEUTSCHLAND GUINEA-BISSAU e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
169	IAADH Angolanische AntimilitarischeMenschenrechtsinitiative e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
170	IKRAM Horn von Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
171	Image Nigeria e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
172	Iniciativa Angolana Antimilitarista para os direitos Humanos e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
173	Initiativ Oury Jalloh	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
174	ISD - Berlin e.V. Initiative Schwarze Menschen	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
175	Joliba - Interkulturell Leben und Arbeiten e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
176	Jugendprojekte und Kinderhilfe Afrika (JUKA) e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
177	KADIB - Komitee für ein	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	afrikanisches Denkmal in Berlin			
178	KAITE - Verein zur Förderung nachhaltiger Entwicklung in Zimbabwe e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
179	Kambengo-Project-Gambia e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
180	KAMERUN KULTUR INNITIATIVE - KKI e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
181	Kenya-Hilfe Berlin/Brandenburg e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
182	Kenya-Mocambique-3.Welt e.V. (Ke-Mo-3.Welt e.V.)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
183	Kinderhilfe Sambia e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
184	Kindernetzwerk Sierra Leone e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
185	Kommunikationszentrum Afrika	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
186	Konanani - Verein zur Förderung der Entwicklungshilfe und Völkerverständigung in der Region Venda/Südafrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
187	Kubata Afrozentrum	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
188	Kulturforum Patrice Lumumba	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
189	Liberia-Hilfswerk Verein (LHW) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
190	Malawi Medical Initiative e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
191	Mama Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
192	Mano River Multicultural Organisation e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
193	Manyu Elements Cultural Association Germany e.V. (Kamerun)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
194	Masoso	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
195	Medizinische DirektHilfe in Afrika e.V. (gemeinnütziger	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

	Verein) / Medical Assistance in Africa NPO (Non-Profit Organisation)			
196	MOCAMBIQUE e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
197	Modern Africa e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
198	Monarda e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
199	Mosambikanischer Verein in Deutschland e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
200	Namibia ProKind e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
201	Network for African rural and urban development e.V. (kurz: NARUD e.V.)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
202	Netzwerk gegen AIDS in Guinea - OAPS / Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
203	Niger Initiative e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
204	Nigerian Common Cause	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
205	Nigerian Community Berlin eV. / Nigeria House Berlin / Bini Community e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
206	Nigerian Community Germany e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
207	Nigerianische Studenten Union Berlin (West)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
208	Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (Germany) / NIDO e.V. - Nigerian in Diaspora	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
209	O Romiya Relief And Rehabilitation Organisation e.V. (Äthiopien)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
210	One Africa e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
211	Oromo-Horn von Afrika-Zentrum - Deutsch-Afrikanische Begegnungsstätte e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
212	PAF- Panafrikanisches Forum	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

213	Pemba JOMO (Jovens de Mosambik) e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
214	Pro Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
215	Promote Africa, Initiative für Bildung & Entwicklung e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
216	RAISE Salone - Hilfe für Sierra Leone e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
217	Refugees Emancipation e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
218	Remix Club Berlin e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
219	Schulbausteine für Gando e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
220	Selam Eritrea e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
221	Selbsthilfe Äthiopien	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
222	Selbsthilfeprojekt für Somalia e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
223	Sierra di Lion Sharity Trust Fund e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
224	Sierra Leone Community Berlin/Brandenburg (SLCB) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
225	Solidaritè deutsch - afrikanischer - Kulturverein e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
226	Somalische Kultur und Hilfe Verein e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
227	Somalischer Verein für Friedensinitiative	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
228	South African Club – Berlin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
229	Sozialwerk Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
230	Spielbrücke Berlin - Gambia e.V. Spielraum für Afrika	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
231	Sudanclub e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
232	Sudangemeinde Berlin & Brandenburg e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
233	Sunugaal e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

234	Sustainable Health and Development in Africa e.V. "SUHEDAF e.V."	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
235	Tanzanianetwork.De e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
236	Tätige Hilfe für Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
237	Thabang - Initiative für südafrikanische Kinder e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
238	The New Africa- German Cultural Village e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
239	The Nigerian Cross River State Union, W.Berlin	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
240	Togo Act	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
241	Uganda Community in Berlin (UCB) e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
242	Umoja wa Tansania e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
243	Union des ressortissants togolais à Berlin (U.R.T.B.) e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
244	Verein für humanitäre Hilfe und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Afrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
245	Verein zur Integration afrikanischer Familien (VIAF) e. V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
246	Vereinigung für Rassengleichheit und Selbstbestimmung in Afrika	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
247	VFFM - Verein der Freunde von FRELIMO und Mosambik e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
248	Women in Exile	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
249	Yabonga - Kinder, HIV & AIDS in Südafrika e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
250	Zentrum für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Dokumentation am Horn von Afrika e.V. ("ZEDA") e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
251	Koné (Bamoun in Berlin)	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation

451	Changing Rural World e.V. CRW e.V.	Secular	Secular	Individual organisation
807	Afrika-Rat	Secular	Secular	UO

Figure 40. Organisations founded by / run by / focussing on Sub-Saharan African migrants in Berlin: IDs in the network analysis.