Comparing Party System Change

Edited by
Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane



COMPARING PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE

Until the end of the 1980s most party systems were stable and reflected the structures of the pre-war period. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall there have been many forms of party system change in Europe, which have had far-reaching consequences for democracies throughout the world.

Comparing Party System Change focuses on the complex changes that have occurred in Western, Eastern and Southern Europe. Key features include:

- a comprehensive view of party system change
- the integration of quantitative, qualitative and comparative approaches
- an explanation of party system change in the 1990s using comparative case studies
- an explanation beyond the traditional "cleavage" approach to explain party system development

This study provides important new data to show that there are many examples of recent changes in the functioning of European party systems. Importantly, the findings illustrate that in most countries the traditional cleavage systems are being replaced by more open, flexible and changeable structures of party competition.

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London and New York

First published 1998
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 0-203-45105-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-45695-5 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0-415-16550-4 (Print Edition)

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SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

Party systems have been investigated and analyzed by many comparative political scientists. One of the reasons for the continual attention paid to the working of party systems is that they can be considered an enigmatic element of the study of democracy in political science. At the core of these studies lies the conviction that in liberal democracies political *parties* are the principal bearers of societal conflict which can and must be solved within the political arena by means of consensus formation. In turn, these arenas are regulated by formal institutions and informal practices that have been developed over time within the democratically organized polity. Hence, most—if not all—party *systems* are complex structures which must be understood in terms of the historical development of the democratization of political systems. On the other hand, the emerging patterns of *interaction* between parties in the various European democracies—which have shaped party systems-show remarkable similarities in terms of *inter*-party behavior (degree and type of competition) and *cross*-party strategies (extent and forms of cooperation). This can be observed across Europe during the past and the present of democratization. In other words party systems have emerged in all European liberal democracies and appear to have many crucial features in common and simultaneously demonstrate a large degree of variation—cross-nationally or over time-in the way they operate and affect the working of democracies in Europe. This volume of the European Political Science Book Series—published by Routledge in conjunction with ECPR—can be considered as an important addition to the existing literature on party systems. Three reasons can be mentioned to underline its importance: First, various existing and seminal typologies are extensively re-analyzed and assessed in the view of new evidence, and by including a broader array of party systems than ever before. Second, the perennial issue of change and stability is not only carefully conceptualized, but is also analyzed as two sides of the same coin: persistence *and* development of a party system are not considered as exclusive, but rather as a reflection of the continuing modus operandi of parties in elections, parliament and government. Third, this volume brings together a wealth of new information about European party systems hitherto not available, simply because these systems did not exist or were seen as marginal cases. In addition to the established party systems in Western Europe, a number of contributors to this volume focus on recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe as well as on lesser known party systems like Iceland and Israel. As such this volume can indeed be considered as a new and useful extension of the existing literature on European systems.

Apart from these qualities a great number of the analyses presented here are also important as a means of assessing the value and tenability of existing approaches to the study of party systems in liberal democracies. Most of these original approaches were developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and are now fundamentally contested and discussed in this volume on the basis of new data and techniques. This has been possible because the editors have pursued the view that the patterns of interaction between parties are by and large produced by the basic properties of the political functions of a party in a pluralist democracy: vote-seeking (i.e. parties in competition), office-seeking (i.e. participation of parties in government) and policy-seeking (i.e. political control of societal governance). By consistently applying these properties to the analysis of party systems, either in one polity or across nations, the volume offers new insights into the organization and working of both emerging and existing party systems. Old divisions often appear not to be valid. Cleavages tend to be replaced by issue-politics, and related waves of electoral volatility (albeit often temporarily) and patterns of party competition and cooperation seem to become reshaped. These fresh insights are not only important for re-assessing existing typologies of party systems, but are also crucial for understanding the emergence of party systems in "new" democracies in the southern and eastern parts of Europe. In sum; party systems do remain at the core of democratic politics in Europe but, as the contributions to this volume clearly demonstrate, their format and patterns of interaction do indeed change more frequently than is often thought. This is in itself an important observation for understanding the European party-politics of today and tomorrow.

Yet these observations also show that whilst change and development is apparent, political contestation and democratic competition is and remains shaped by the institutional arrangements that exist. Change is therefore also subject to the institutionalization of political systems which it has inherited. All in all, there is no easy answer to what makes party systems "move" and subsequently "develop". However—as this volume clearly demonstrates—there is distinctive movement of and within party systems across Europe and across time. It is for this reason the learned student of party systems and the undergraduate student in comparative politics will benefit from this book. Both will find this volume not only interesting but also challenging to their present knowledge of party politics in general and of the emerging democracies in particular.

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Haarlem, *October 1997*

FIGURES

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PREFACE

Party systems structure the competitive and cooperative relationships between political parties. Until the end of the 1980s most party systems have been evaluated as being stable and reflecting the cleavage structures of the pre-war period. This situation has changed drastically within less than ten years. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have witnessed many forms of party system change in all parts of Europe. In several Eastern European countries these changes mark a radical break with the past. In other cases these changes take place in a more moderate fashion. In both instances the process of democratic decision-making is much affected. This accounts for the central place of party systems and party system change within the political science literature.

The causes and consequences of party system changes are diverse. Party system change is more encompassing than electoral change, which is why the approaches in this volume have been extended beyond the electoral aspects of party system change. We have brought together comparative studies and in-depth case studies that research the diversity of party system change. The contributions focus on the electorate as well as office and policy-related evidence of change. In doing so, this volume contributes to the methodological, theoretical and empirical knowledge about party system change.

This volume results from the joint sessions of the ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research) workshop on Party System Change in Europe in Oslo in March—April 1996. We have benefited from the support of the European Consortium for Political Research and the University of Oslo, which hosted this conference. This book originates from the discussions and deliberations of the members of this workshop. By presenting the results to a broader audience we hope to stimulate innovative future research on party systems in the changing democracies.

Paul Pennings, Amsterdam
Jan-Erik Lane, Geneva
January 1997

1
INTRODUCTION

Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane

All over Europe, the prevailing mode of government is party based, meaning that the political parties are the main actors on the political scene. Understanding party systems is thus vital in getting to grips with modern democracy. This book provides an overview of comparative approaches to and empirical evidence of party system change. From the late 1980s onwards we have witnessed many examples of party system change, which have had far-reaching consequences for the way in which European democracies function. The collapse of the Berlin Wall—and the subsequent German unification—and the earthquake elections (where power-holding is reversed) in Italy are two evident examples of farreaching systemic change. But, as the contributions in this book will illustrate, there are many more examples of important recent changes in the functioning of European and non-European systems.

Compared to many earlier works on party system change in Europe, this volume offers new insights, for example:

- it extends its comparative character by developing a comprehensive view on party system change in Western, Southern and Eastern Europe;
- it integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches in a comparative way;
- it provides an updated view on party system change in the 1990s by means of comparative and crucial case studies;
- it provides a multi-faceted view on party system change by looking further than just the cleavage approach that tends to explain party systems developments by referring to the cleavage structures that came into existence around 1920;
- it holds several examples of innovative data gathering and presentation.

How these qualities are expressed into the chapters of this book will be explained in the following sections.

Central concepts

The contributions in this volume refer to the same central concepts in the party system literature, i.e. the number of (effective) parties, fractionalization, segmentation, polarization, electoral disproportionality, cleavage structures, issue dimensions, electoral volatility, party competition, and the left-right dimension. Detailed discussions of most of

these concepts can be found in the original wordings in the volume edited by Peter Mair, titled *The West European Party System* (1990).

In party system theory, one key topic is Lipset and Rokkan's *cleavage approach* (1967). Their emphasis is on social conflicts and their translation into party systems. They claim that only a few relationships in the social structure tend to polarize the politics of any given system. There is a hierarchy of cleavage bases (i.e. grounds for fundamental division) in each polity. Most of them are cultural or economic cleavages, based on class, language, region, ethnicity or religion. Lipset and Rokkan also distinguish between a variety of logically possible sources of strains and oppositions. Each so-called "set of conflicts" has its own political expression. When cleavages are "cross-cutting" the situation even becomes more complex.

Cleavage structures develop over time and are translated into party systems. In case of European party systems, the decisive dimensions of opposition stem from the national revolution (Churches versus government and subject versus dominant culture) and the Industrial Revolution (workers versus employers and primary versus secondary economy). Party systems are products of these two fundamental processes of change. Divergencies in the European party system often stem from differences in the timing and character of these two revolutions.

In order to understand how stable systems arise from conflicts, one has to analyze the processes of alliance formation that result in *party alignments*. These processes may be divided into three stages:

- the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (the center-periphery cleavage): the struggle for the national versus supranational control of the ecclessiastical organizations within the national territory;
- the democratic or national revolution, 1789 and after (state-Church cleavage): the conflict over the secular versus religious control of mass education;
- the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century (the land-industry cleavage): the opposition between landed interest and the claims of the rising commercial and industrial leadership in cities and towns (control versus freedom for industrial enterprise).

Lipset and Rokkan have developed eight types of alliance-opposition structures that are the combinatorial products of three successive dichotomies. The main differences between Western, Southern and Central European party systems can be understood with the aid of these different types of alliance-opposition structures.

Lipset and Rokkan claim that party systems have been frozen since they came into existence on the basis of the emerging cleavage structures; this is the so-called *freezing hypothesis*. The introduction of universal manhood suffrage at the beginning of the twentieth century proved the crucial catalyst that froze the cleavage structures into place. According to them, "the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:50). The extension of the franchise enables party organizations to incorporate virtually the entire

mobilizable electorate. This early closure of the electoral market left little room for the emergence of new cleavages.

The validity of the freezing hypothesis for the 1970s and 1980s has been tested by Bartolini and Mair (1990) on the basis of volatility indicators that measure the degree and direction of electoral change. Their main conclusion is that most Western European democracies are indeed remarkably stable and that there has been no substantial party system change. Their book, in fact, confirms the freezing hypothesis for the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. In the present book, the reader will encounter more extensive evidence on (fundamental) party system change, essentially because our analyses have been extended in several ways:

- the period of investigation includes the first half of the 1990s;
- a large range of indicators have been included that go beyond the electoral aspects of change;
- Southern and Eastern European countries have also been included, among which several have recently shown party system change.

Because of these extensions, the contributions in this book are likely to display more evidence of enduring party system change than Bartolini and Mair's analysis did. In this volume, we speak of party system *change* when the competitive or cooperative relationships between parties in the electoral, parliamentary or governmental arena are altered.

There is, one may assume, a broad variety of conditions and effects of these changes. Change is radical if it occurs within a few years and if it affects the inter-party relations significantly. Change is gradual if it takes one or more decennia to affect the inter-party relationships in a significant way. We speak of party system *stability* (or system *inertia:* Smith 1989) when the relationships between parties are more or less fixed owing to the prevailing rules and institutions that favor dominant players within the party system. Thus stability is definitely more encompassing than just the absence of change.

Stability is a situation in which certain players in the electoral, parliamentary and executive arenas are able to uphold their dominant rules, mostly by imposing barriers to competition by means of institutional engineering. Systems that are dominated by this type of player are called *dominant party systems.* Chapter 6 offers an extensive overview of electoral, parliamentary and executive dominance in six countries. Naturally, party systems without dominant players may also be stable, but the focus of this volume is less on these alternative types of stable systems. We are aware that there is not always a clear dividing line between change and stability. Stable systems may gradually change towards another type of party competition, or the stability may be fragile. We also recognize that it is sometimes hard to determine whether changes in the conditions of party systems have a significant and enduring impact on inter-party relationships or not. The selection of case studies in Part 2 of this volume, however, covers the main types of enduring party system change and stability in contemporary (European) democracies as they relate change to the *core components* of party systems (Smith 1989). These components more or less coincide with the series of party system indicators that are discussed below.

Party system typologies

One crucial topic in the party system literature is the division of party systems along dimensions. One device that is often used to make these divisions is the party system typology. Duverger (1954) divides the polities on the basis of only one dimension: the number of parties. On the basis of this criterion, he devised a classification scheme of a single party, the Anglo-Saxon two-party and the multi-party system. The problem with this division is that two-party systems are sparse and that the category of multi-party systems is broad and diverse.

Another influential typology stems from Giovanni Sartori (1976), who divided systems on the basis of two dimensions: the ideological distance and the degree of party system fragmentation. Sartori hypothesized that two-party systems and systems with one dominant party are the most homogeneous and stable. These systems are characterized by *centripetal polarization* (parties have a tendency to coalesce towards the center). Multi-partisan and polarized systems are supposed to be more segmented and unstable since parties tend to gravitate towards the extremes *(centrifugal polarization)*. Sartori's emphasis on conflict and polarization has been contested by Lijphart (1977). Lijphart's typology is based on the dimensions "structure of society" (plural versus homogeneous) and "elite behavior" (coalescent versus adversarial). As such, this typology classifies *democratic* systems in general, more than *party* systems. Nonetheless, Lijphart's division of democratic systems comes close to a party system typology as the assumed dynamics of democracies have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of party systems. Lijphart's central argument is that segmented systems may be stable when the elites find ways to cooperate on a structural basis. His focus is, therefore, on the *conditions* under which democratic party systems become stabilized.

Several recent evaluations of existing typologies argue that they seem outdated or inconsistent (Keman 1995; Ware 1996). They need to be adjusted to developments that occurred after 1970. More specifically, a typology is needed that is able to account for the adversarial or coalescent tendencies at the system level and the cooperative versus competitive interactions at the party level (Keman 1997; Mair 1989).

Main indicators

Party systems may be defined as structures of party competition and cooperation. The concept of party system change relates to the development over time of basic properties of party systems. These party system indicators or properties may be characterized as specifications of the underlying dimensions of party systems that are made explicit by typologies. One useful empirical overview of these properties is presented by Lane and Ersson in *Politics and Society in Western Europe* (1994). Some important indicators are:

- total volatility: the aggregate change in votes between elections;
- polarization: the ideological distance between parties (e.g. distances on the left-right scale);

- the effective number of parties and the fractionalization index are slightly different (highly correlated) measures of the number of parties weighted by their seats in parliament;
- electoral disproportionality: the difference between the seat share and the vote share of parties;
- the number of issue dimensions is an indicator for the cleavage structure of a system.

These indicators have been used frequently in the chapters in this volume. In many cases, party system change involves change in one or more of three factors: the *number,* the *distance* and the *size* of parties. These factors shape both the structure of competition (e.g. the competition for votes) and cooperation (e.g. the formation of governments). The indicators are related to the core components of party systems (Smith 1989). These components are no longer pure derivatives from cleavage structures. Although cleavages are still important in many cases, they are no longer necessarily the main structuring forces of party systems. Occasionally their role may still be eminent, but there are also other and sometimes more important factors. Party system change and its effects may be related to a broad variety of factors, like a changing international environment, a transformation of the economy, a change in party leadership, electoral rules, societal discontent, regime collapse, earthquake elections, etc. This book provides examples of a broad range of factors which invoke party system change; changing cleavage structures are but one of them.

Types of party system change

Party system change may be defined as an enduring change in the inter-party relationships that both results from and affects the competition and cooperation between political parties. Hence we expect a reciprocal relationship between parties and party systems. Party system change may be invoked by *party related factors,* such as the number, distance and size of parties and by *system related factors,* such as the institutional environment in which parties operate (such as the electoral system). These factors are crucial for the ways in which parties compete and cooperate both in and out of government. We therefore distinguish between three forms of party system change:

Stability or inertia: there is no fundamental change in the institutional environment in which parties operate, nor in the number, size or policy distances of parties. In most cases, party system stability is the result of a persistent and institutionally defined pattern of party cooperation and competition. Chapters 6 and 7 provide examples of party system stability. This does not, of course, mean that this stability is a given fact and that parties are inactive. On the contrary, party system inertia mostly involves an *active* engineering role of dominant players (see Chapter 6 for this).

Gradual change: one or more core elements of party systems (as enumerated above) are changing gradually. The votes, office and policy-seeking behavior of parties that is related to party competition and cooperation may be affected by it. Gradual change may take the form of what Gordon Smith calls *restricted change* (Smith 1989:353). This type of change is permanent, but it is also limited to the extent that most other features of the system

remain unaltered. In that case, each development (e.g. the rise of new parties, increase of polarization or system volatility) remains self-contained. Gradual change may also have more far-reaching consequences when it affects multiple major components of party systems and party behavior. Examples of different forms of gradual change that generate far-reaching effects are given in Chapters 5, 9,10 and 13.

Radical change. within a short period of time party systems have changed fundamentally, owing to actor-related or institutional change. Examples are given in Chapters 11 (on redemocratization), 8 (on the German unification), 12 (on Eastern Europe) and 13 (as far as the Italian crisis is concerned). Apart from the instances of redemocratization, the other forms of radical change are rather recent. But, as stated earlier, even in cases of radical change it is sometimes difficult to grasp the enduring effects on the functioning of a party system. In the cases we have selected, it has been convincingly argued that party behavior and inter-party relationships have changed fundamentally in a short period of time.

European developments

This book seeks to compare party system change within Europe by means of different comparative approaches. There is certainly a tendency of convergence towards the Western model, as has recently been argued by Lane and Ersson (1996). At the same time, Western, Southern and Eastern Europe remain distinct because of their dissimilar regime types, political history and economic development (Gunther *et al.* 1995; Pridham and Lewis 1996). The late development of Southern European party systems in the context of West European politics is related to a history of alternating regimes, as well as the political economy underlying competitive party politics. Most of the party systems of the late nineteenth century were molded after the British two-party system and degenerated to electoral machines controlled by the corresponding governments. The underdeveloped economic structure prevented the establishment of social movements which would be able to transform the political system. Social movements such as a socialist subculture have always been too weak to transform the highly oligarchical political system of the late nineteenth century. The forms of representation were dominated by patrimonial practices. Democratic access to public goods was only granted to a small oligarchy and excluded a large part of the population. During the twentieth century, these early features of party system genesis have remained inherent parts of the new political systems.

The practices of patrimonialism—the special access of certain groups to public goods—continued to persist in spite of social and regime change. In the case of Italy, a kind of centralization of power via the dominance of one party over the political system could be observed during Fascism and the post-war period up to 1992. In Spain and Portugal, the influence of authoritarian practices within parties could be observed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Social change did not lead to the transformation of the modes of representation, instead the parties tended to construct their own cleavages. The growing marketization and conscious cleavage building made the parties less dependent on the electorate, but more dependent on marketing strategies. In recent years, the establishment of new forms of parties such as Berlusconi's firm party or *Lega Lombarda's* regional leagues

indicate that the patrimonial elements of the Southern European political systems is being eroded by the emergence of a stronger civil society. Nevertheless, the growing dissatisfaction with political systems is leading to the emergence of a cynical attitude to politics.

Democratization in Eastern Europe follows a long period of authoritarian or even totalitarian rule. As well as being lengthy, East European dictatorship was far-reaching, more so than in Southern Europe. In both regions, however, political democratization has been accompanied by economic transformation towards market capitalism. When the Communist regimes collapsed, around the second half of 1989, the interests of diverse groups were represented by social movements and not by political parties (Pridham and Lewis 1996:12). These social movements formed the basis for the emergence of the new party systems in several Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. In other countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, former Communist elites were able to perpetuate their ruling position by winning a majority in elections. But the dominance of the social movements soon disappeared, owing to further splits. This smoothed the way for post-Communist formations, as the elections in Poland (1993) and Hungary (1994) have shown. All in all, the role of political parties in the democratization process seems rather weak. The East Central Europe parties have very small memberships, weak national organizations and instead of activities at the grass-roots level they are over active in the sphere of macro-politics (Ágh 1996). East European party systems seem too fragmented to be based on solid and lasting cleavage structures.

Comparing party system change (Part 1)

The first part of this volume examines the main indicators for party system change. These indicators are related to the triad of party goals: votes, office and policy. What the chapters in this part have in common is that they present new ways to measure the votes, office- and policy-related conditions that shape competitive and cooperative party behavior.

Ersson and Lane explore the indicators of electoral change in Chapter 2. They demonstrate that the net electoral total volatility masks the degree of change at the individual level. The voters are no longer frozen in established commitments towards political parties. Gross volatility has increased to such an extent that political parties can no longer expect to retain the same level of support from one election to another. Ersson and Lane conclude that nowadays few party systems are frozen. The Lipset-Rokkan model should be abandoned in relation to today's realities because it is an excessively mono-causal way of interpreting party system change. Long-lasting cleavages are being replaced by short-term issues that come and go.

Examining the office-related aspects of party systems makes it possible to assess the conditions that influence the translation of coalition potential into governmental power. In Chapter 3 Stefano Bartolini takes a fresh approach to the presence or absence, duration in office, status of cabinet and status of the party, proposing two new indicators to measure the coalition potential and the governmental power. By studying the discrepancy

between potential and actual power both synchronically and cross-sectionally it becomes possible to examine the development of the party system configurational elements.

Uwe Wagschal explores the policy-related evidence that party systems matter in Chapter 4. The policy effects of party systems and their change are often neglected in the literature. Testing the "tax-smoothing hypothesis" that governments use the deficit as an instrument to reduce tax rates and to smooth economic distortions caused by high taxation leads one to the counter-intuitive expectation that bourgeois governments produce higher deficits than labor governments. Actually, many variations in socio-economic policy formation relate to the systemic features of the polities that are part of the OECD world. Wagschal concludes that party systems do explain some of the variation in socio-economic policy formation, but the main determinant is party ideology (i.e. pro-market versus pro-interventionism).

In Chapter 5, Paul Pennings seeks to combine the approaches in the previous chapters. By examining simultaneously the votes, office- and policy-seeking behavior of parties, he presents a comprehensive picture of the causes and consequences of party system change. The examination of the development of party behavior is done with the help of party system typologies because these are based on underlying hypotheses of how different party systems operate and how parties are apt to behave within these systems. We need these typologies because they provide hypotheses on the most probable direction of party behavior. Starting from these, our approach matches established typologies that intend to classify polities along two dimensions that capture the essence of what party systems are about. These system types are then confronted with post-war developments related to the underlying dimensions of these typologies. In this way it is possible to determine the extent to which the original classifications are today still valid. One may start from the well-known typologies espoused by Lijphart (1977), Sartori (1976) and von Beyme (1985). The Lijphart typology stresses the importance of coalescent elite behavior in order to understand why segmented societies manage to maintain a high degree of political stability. Although Lijphart's typology was devised as one for democratic systems, it is also useful for party systems because the underlying dimensions structure party behavior. The Sartori typology, on the other hand, stresses the importance of the conflict dimensions and polarization in order to understand why some systems are more stable than others. Paul Pennings concludes in Chapter 5 that these typologies are only partially able to explain relevant variations between party systems, since they describe the pre-1970 variations better than the post-1970 variations.

Stability and change in established systems (Part 2)

Part 2 presents studies of stability and change in established systems. The focus is on the dynamics of party dominance, i.e. the way in which established parties are able to uphold their dominant positions in the party system. The main characteristics of party dominance are discussed in Chapter 6. Here, Françoise Boucek focuses on the dominant party's ability to maximize its electoral gains into parliamentary benefits. She argues that the market analogy is useful for understanding party systems. Electoral laws can be seen as rules which may be open to manipulation by dominant players in order to place "barriers

to entry" in the way of new parties. The "alternative model of one-party dominance" needs to specify the endogenous features of the structure of competition as well as the party strategies that account for the ability of some parties and not others to maintain themselves in office for long periods. Within this overall framework, the author presents a model of party dominance which sees it as the outcome of competitive behavior in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas. Focusing on the role of electoral laws in perpetuating dominance, she presents an empirical analysis of deviations from proportionality brought about over successive elections by the electoral laws in six different countries: Great Britain, France, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Ireland. These countries are selected because they differ in electoral systems or in the type of dominant parties. In this sense these countries are representative of the existing types of party dominance.

The following chapters provide in-depth analyses of dominance. These case studies may be placed on a "scale," ranging from prevailing one-party dominance to a complete lack of party dominance (Iceland). By analyzing and comparing the long-term trends in these systems we get an overview of the complexities of party dominance of changing party systems.

An in-depth study of party dominance in a two-party system is presented in Chapter 7 by Ian Budge. He argues that neither the policy nor the structure of the main parties in the UK have changed very much during the post-war period. This is surprising because the British social structure did change radically. Ian Budge seeks to explain this paradoxical situation by the common interest of the two major parties in preserving the electoral procedures, which enable them to monopolize governmental power. In doing so, this case study gives additional detailed information on the various ways in which party dominance is established and it also illustrates the long-term potential fragility of it. What seem to be hard frozen relations of dominance may, under certain conditions, alter into a more well-balanced power configuration.

The next two chapters present examples of more or less dominant systems that are confronted with quite radical forms of party system change. The first example is how the German unification changes the one-party East German system into a more fragmented one and how this affects the Western German parties. The second example is Israel, in which the dominant party, Mapai, collapsed around 1977.

In Chapter 8 Oskar Niedermayer analyzes the process in which, within the short period of one year, all the properties of the former GDR system were altered so radically that a new one emerged. The transformation from the former non-competitive hegemony to a pluralist party system took place in four phases, which Niedermayer characterizes as bipolarization, differentiation, adaptation and unification. The unification of the two German party systems took place in a period of increasing fragmentation of the West German party system. The inclusion of the highly divided GDR's party system reinforced this development. At the same time the two big parties, the CDU/CSU and the East German SPD were confronted with the shrinking or disappearance of their traditional core electorates, so that they were forced to search for voters in other social groups, mostly potential floating voters. Additionally, a dramatic legitimacy crisis was caused by changes in the issue structure. The traditional parties were also challenged by new parties,

such as the Greens. These factors all fundamentally altered the conditions of party competition in Germany.

Reuven Y. Hazan presents in Chapter 9 the fascinating case of the Israeli party system as a comparative case for the analysis of party system change in parliamentary democracies. The analysis of the core element, as opposed to the entire party system, is particularly interesting in the case of Israel. The core of the Israeli party system during the period of dominance was (1) Mapai, (2) the existence of satellite coalition partners in the left bloc and (3) the "historical partnership" with the orthodox religious party (NRP). All these factors have gone through an extensive form of change since the late 1970s.

Until this point, the contributions in Part 2 have moved from a discussion of prevailing types of party dominance towards forms of an increasing fragmentation of party dominance. It is illuminating, therefore, to take a closer look at the most extreme opposite of party dominance, namely a system that is not only fragmented at the system level but also at the party level. Iceland is an example of what a party system without dominant parties or cleavages looks like. In Chapter 10 the peculiar case of Iceland is introduced by Svanur Kristjánsson. The cleavage lines within the main political parties about most issues of public policy are more profound than the cleavage lines between the parties. It is one of the very few democratic countries in the world in which the main political parties routinely employ open primary elections to select parliamentary candidates. This only became possible after the class basis of the votes first weakened and then disappeared. The open primary was part of the parties' intention to build new party—society connections. This development led from the weakening of party institutions to less accountable political parties, owing to decreased party cohesion and the subsequent difficulty of formulating policy within the party.

Stability and change in renewing systems (Part 3)

Part 3 examines stability and change in renewing systems, mostly former democratic systems that are regaining the democratic structures after a period of authoritarian rule. This part starts with an introductory overview of various types of "redemocratization" processes. The next two chapters discuss the processes of redemocratization in Eastern and Southern Europe.

In Chapter 11 Anne Bennett examines the degree and nature of party system change by looking at the way formerly authoritarian regimes have tried to regain their formerly democratic character and at the same time adapt it to modern conditions ("redemocratizing"). Time series data are used on the effective number of parties (Molinar index), party unity and party orientation, and net electoral volatility change in ten Western European party systems in which there have been, for internal or external reasons, an interruption in liberal democracy. Doing so means that a number of countries are included which have suffered involuntary interruptions in their political life and would not normally be considered redemocratizing countries. However, the method permits comparison among countries that have experienced breaks in the continuity of liberal democracy for different reasons and different lengths of time. This approach seems novel and useful because it can be applied in a variety of different contexts or situations to

measure the extent of continuity and change in core or other facets of party systems. The same approach could be used to assess the extent and nature of party system change before or after some key event, such as changes in the electoral law, or even regime change.

Chapter 12 provides an overview of the developments in East Central Europe (ECE). This part of Europe is not covered in Bennett's paper, but is nonetheless relevant for the study of renewing party systems. In most of these countries forms of redemocratization are prevalent since these countries are trying to pick up pre-Communist forms of democratic decision-making. Attila Ágh argues that the ECE parties and party systems achieved a partial consolidation in the mid-1990s. There have been some characteristic tendencies in political and electoral behavior in ECE (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia) which Ágh summarizes as: electoral and party fragmentation, high electoral volatility and protest voting, the return of the "post-Communist" vote and parties, growing abstention at the elections and declining confidence in parliaments and parties. These five tendencies are interpreted as normal features of the party formation in the emergence of a multi-party system. In his contribution Attila Ágh convincingly argues that, although the ECE parties and party systems still demonstrate some characteristic features of "infantile disorder," the parties have already made great strides from polarized pluralism to moderate pluralism, from movement parties to cartel parties: altogether they have reached a partial consolidation of both party systems and individual parties ("early freezing"). Chapter 13 describes and explains the distinctive features of party system change in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece from a long-term perspective. The redemocratization process applies mainly to Spain, Portugal and Greece. José Magone describes them as patrimonialist party systems in which privileged access to power is given to some groups rather than others. Whereas the regime change in Eastern Europe has been radical, in Southern Europe changes take place in a more gradual fashion. Modern and traditional elements coexist in the transitional regime of patrimonial rule. Discontinuity, heterogeneity of social, political and economic rationalities, fragmented political economy and the colonization of the state by certain groups seem to be the major features of patrimonialist party systems. Furthermore, political syncretism and "bureaucratic" and "party" clientelism are essential elements of party systems in semi-peripheral and peripheral societies that were subject to late industrialization processes. In the post-war period, all four countries have shown similarities in the process towards a genuine political market and party competition.

Approaches of party system change

The chapters in this book present new methodological, theoretical and empirical insights concerning the development of political parties and party systems in modern democracies. The *methodological aspects* refer to the ways in which party system change may be approached. The book incorporates a combination of different quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to integrate both indepth studies and broad overviews of types of gradual and more radical party system change. The strength of the qualitative approaches (especially the comparative case studies in Parts 2 and 3) lies in the description

of evolving patterns of party interaction, either of a gradual sort (such as described for Iceland and Israel) or of a more radical kind (such as described for Italy, East Central Europe (ECE) and the former GDR). It is precisely the party interactions and the party level as such that are hard to analyze by means of the quantitative approach. For example, the transformation of Eastern European "movement parties" to "cartel parties" would be hard to analyze on a purely quantitative basis. But the strength of the quantitative approach is that it enables the study of cross-sectional variation in the type and degree of party system change. All parts of this volume give examples of quantitative approaches, such as the studies of general party system development (Part 1), party dominance (Part 2) and redemocratization (Part 3).

This volume also contributes to the *empirical* knowledge of party systems which will indeed be helpful for future research. The innovative data gathering on party switching urges future researchers to err on the side of caution when drawing conclusions on electoral instability purely on the basis of aggregated data. These types of data may hide the real levels of volatility, as has been shown in Chapter 2. Another example of new empirical findings concerns the measures for coalition potential, as proposed in Chapter 3, which have the potential for a better understanding of the development of party systems at the level of party government. The same applies to Chapter 4 with regard to the policy effects of party systems in which the empirical party system variations in socio-economic policymaking are unfolded by means of elementary techniques of data analysis. The comparative analysis of redemocratization in Part 3 is novel in its empirical approach and its findings. It is also useful for future research on other facets of party system change and regime change.

The *theoretical aspects* are related to the concept of party system change. The book focuses upon a diversity of types of change and stability, instead of focusing on one particular element of change, such as electoral volatility. Since there is no way to formulate one univocal or mono-causal view on party system change in Western, Eastern and Southern Europe (Mair 1989), this volume brings together a selection of core variables that are relevant for the study of party system change and which have been applied in various ways in all contributions. These core variables, we argue, relate to (1) the size, distance and number of parties, and (2) to the institutional environment of parties (i.e. constitutional and electoral rules).

The cleavage approach

Given the diversity, degree and frequency of gradual and radical party system change we conclude that the cleavage approach, in its *traditianal* form, is no longer a fruitful explanatory device. This finding is one of the most important theoretical breakthroughs presented in this volume. The traditional view on cleavages describes party systems merely as reflections of frozen cleavage systems. Several contributions in this book illustrate that, in most countries, these cleavage systems have been (or are being) replaced by more open, flexible and changeable structures of party competition. Clear signs of these changes are seen in Eastern, Southern and Western Europe. They should be interpreted as part of an ongoing process that has not been completed yet.

In the past, the cleavage approach has been the most frequently employed theory underlying studies of party system change and stability. Although this approach no longer seems to be able to provide the best explanation for recent forms of party system change (or stability), this does not mean that cleavages have completely vanished. It does mean, however, that alternative factors have also grown in importance and that the character of cleavages has changed from "frozen" to "unfrozen" or changeable. Strictly speaking, the term "cleavages" is not applicable to the new "engineered" divisions that are the result of political and electoral strategies and therefore not deeply rooted in society. For Lipset and Rokkan, a typical cleavage has three specific connotations (Bartolini and Mair 1990):

1 A cleavage involves a *social division* that separates people in terms of social characteristics such as occupation, status, religion, or ethnicity.
2 The groups involved in the division must be *conscious* of their collective identity.
3 A cleavage must be expressed in *organizational* terms, by means of trade unions, parties, churches or other social organizations.

A change in the cleavage structure may occur as a result of transformations in the social divisions, changing identities or changing organizational structures (Gallagher *et al.* 1995). Several chapters demonstrate that there is evidence of change in all three components in all parts of Europe, but also (and more importantly) that not all countries are necessarily changing at the same *pace* in the same *direction* and with the same *results*.

Directions of party system change

Party system change may go in different directions. There are forms of realignment (voters moving toward "new politics" parties such as the Greens) and also forms of de-alignment (or disintegration). The phenomena of de-alignment in Western European party systems may be analyzed by means of three types of evidence, listed in Table 1.1:

1 A decline in party identification, the psychological attachment which is alleged to tie voters to parties, declining membership rates and an increase in the "floating vote" (Chapter 2).
2 An increase in levels of electoral volatility, although this increase does not appear to be universal. The aggregate level of volatility in the 1990s and 1980s is somewhat higher than in the decennia before (Chapter 2).
3 The emergence of new political parties leading to fragmentation of party systems, although the electoral success of these new parties has been moderate. The effective number of parties, however, has increased slightly in the 1990s (Chapter 6).

Table 1.1 illustrates the steady, albeit moderate, increase in volatility (notwithstanding its cyclical character), in the effective number of parties and in postmaterialism, and a decline in the membership rates and party identification. What all these trends have in common is that they weaken the bonds between voters and parties and, for this reason, constitute *conditions* enhancing party system change.

Table 1.1 Estimates of party system change in Western European democracies, 1950–94

	Party identification	*Post-materialist*	*Vote shares of left, center and right parties*			*Membership of parties*	*Effective number of parties*	*Volatility*
			Left	*Center*	*Right*			
1950–4			37.9	24.9	29.7	8.1	3.9	9.4
1955–9			38.4	25.7	30.6	8.2	3.6	7.1
1960–4			38.2	25.1	31.4	8.1	3.7	7.4
1965–9			38.6	25.1	32.6	7.7	3.9	7.5
1970–4			38.5	25.0	32.5	7.4	4.4	10.8
1975–9	29.9	9.6	38.8	23.0	33.3	7.6	4.1	9.4
1980–4	28.5	10.3	38.1	21.5	34.8	7.8	4.1	12.3
1985–9	24.8	13.9	36.9	22.6	33.5	7.0	4.5	10.0
1990–2/4	23.1	15.9	36.2	25.6	27.6	5.7	4.9	12.5

Notes: The number of countries included varies per column. "Vote shares" excludes Spain, Portugal and Greece, other columns include them. "Party identification" and "Postmaterialism" exclude Sweden and Norway.

All figures are means.

Party identification is the percentage of respondents that feels itself very close or fairly close to any party. Postmaterialist is the percentage of respondents that adheres to postmaterialism (*source:* Eurobarometers as reported in Gabriel and Brettschneider 1994:566–7, 570–3.

Vote shares are based on Mackie and Rose 1991, and 1992 updates in *European Journal of Political Research*. Membership of parties is a percentage of the total population and covers the period 1950–92 (*source:* Katz and Mair 1992). Effective number of parties (the mean number per country) and volatility are derived from Lane and Ersson 1996:131. Volatility is the net electoral change between two consecutive elections, as measured by the Mogens Pedersen index.

The vote shares of left, center and right parties have remained approximately the same, meaning that the left-right division remains crucial for the understanding of party cooperation and party competition. The left-right distinction does not lose its relevance for the study of party system change. This does not, of course, necessarily imply that left and right have kept the same meaning over time. For example, Chapter 9, on Israel, demonstrates that the left-right division in Israel relates to the socio-economic cleavage before the 1967 war and to the conflict-peace cleavage after this war. More generally speaking, the meaning of left and right has become increasingly diffused, which is in line with the transition of "cleavage politics" (with fixed dividing lines and stable electorates) to "issue politics" (with changeable dividing lines and floating voters). However, the left-right distinction retains its relevance, despite the fact that its contents are not invariant across time and cross-sectionally. Given this variety, it is obvious that the left-right division is no longer to be interpreted solely upon the basis of the class cleavage (i.e. on social divisions and expressed in organizational terms), but should be viewed as a clash between a broader range of liberal and conservative issues on the one hand and progressive issues on the other (more or less unrelated to social divisions and changing from election to election).

Even Icelandic politics, described in Chapter 10 as a polity with dissolved cleavages, is still affected by fairly consistent patterns in left—right positions of parties. The four main parties remain more or less on their "own" side of the left—right spectrum. They may not do this as consistently as the majority of established parties in other European democracies, but the basic distinction between left and right is still prevalent in party movements.

As stated earlier, party system change will rarely take the form of an earthquake election because the pace, direction, nature and the effects of change differ in each case, depending on distinctive institutional settings of party systems. Several chapters in this volume show that similar changes in core components do not necessarily have the same effects everywhere. For example, the gradual breakdown of patrimonialism in Southern Europe does not have the same pace and effects for all Southern European countries, which have different forms of patri-monialism. The Italian patrimonial pattern may be characterized as "political syncretism," Spain and Greece have polarized patrimonial patterns dominated by two main parties and Portugal has a fragmented pattern of patrimonial representation (see Chapter 13). The regime breaks in Eastern Europe also have differential effects on the Eastern European party systems. The emergence of center-left and center-right parties has taken place in most ECE countries, although they are rather unbalanced. In Hungary and Poland, the center-left is well organized and the rightist parties are fragmented, whereas in the Czech Republic and Slovenia it is the other way around. In Slovakia and Croatia both sides remain weak and fragmented (see Chapter 12).

Whereas different outcomes may result from similar events, similar outcomes may be produced by different institutional environments, such as the convergence or redemocratization that occur in different party systems (see Parts 1 and 2 for this). Thus, the institutional settings of party systems shape the effects (if any) of changes in the distance, size and number of parties. As a consequence, the following paradox is born:

parties are converging in many polities (partly as a consequence of cleavage decline) and party systems are converging (in the sense of a global wave of democratization), but at the same time the variety in liberal democracies does not vanish. This paradox can be explained by the fact that party system change is path dependent because party systems are interlinked with (and based on) other institutional structures, most notably the electoral and constitutional features of a country. For example, the pluralist character of a multi-party system is not only present at the level of party competition and cooperation, but is also rooted in the whole network of institutional arrangements such as electoral laws that prescribe proportional representation, federalism and institutionalized forms of interest intermediation. Consequently, the pace and direction of party system change is affected by institutional contexts.

Future developments

What future developments could one most expect? Alan Ware has summed up three possible roads for Western party systems in the following manner (Ware 1996:225–33):

(1) Parties transform from representative bodies to office seekers (cartel parties) competing for power for themselves and seeking electoral support in more or less homogeneous societies in which cleavages have more or less vanished. The assumptions underlying this prediction are questionable as there appears to be merely a *partial* weakening of existing social cleavages, as is shown in several of the chapters in this volume. The left-right distinction, however reformulated, is still important for party competition. The impact of cleavages has certainly diminished on organizational capacities and social consciousness, but it has not vanished.

(2) New cleavages and new parties emerge as a response to new lines of division in society, such as the "postmaterialist" and "lifestyle" issues. Partly this has already happened, but these new parties such as the Green parties, do not seem to be able to take over the position of the established ones. The latter have managed to integrate new issues into their traditional vocabulary and are mostly able to maintain their shares in the electorate in doing so.

(3) Existing parties will survive and seek to "develop" new lines of division to obtain power. Parties are involved in "cleavage politics" or in "exploiting" cleavages by means of redefinitions of cleavages as a reaction to changes in the social structure (such as immigration).

The problems in finding the most probable direction of party system change are manifold, mainly because all three answers are partly true: they are not exclusive. All three trends can be seen in Western democracies. Party systems have potentials for both change and stability because this dynamic is at the very heart of the democratic process. On the one hand, parties have to adapt to new situations ("party responsiveness") in order to be able to compete effectively and cope with economic and societal change. On the other, parties have to maintain some kind of stability in their ideological views in order to remain accountable ("party accountability"). Because of this dual role of parties, namely the role of competing and adapting in order to win in the short run and the role of maintaining some ideological rigidity in order to survive in the long run, future party

system developments are most likely to be captured in this pendulum swing between change and stability. One main difference between the 1990s on the one hand, and the 1960s or 1920s on the other, is that the conditions enhancing change or fluctuations have become much stronger, owing to the breakdown of the cultural and geographical encapsulation of the electorate. This has been both a national and international development.

Conclusions

Most Western party systems are not frozen anymore. Renewing systems in Eastern and Western Europe are finding their ways toward democratic development. The analyses that are presented in this book indicate that the conditions for party system change have increased in strength and relevance. The main cause for this new development is that, in some way or another, the bondage between parties and voters has been weakened in Western, Eastern and Southern Europe.

Yet party system change is not a univocal or a one-directional process. How and why party systems change depends on a wide range of factors. In order to get an in-depth overview of the causes and consequences of party system change, this book focuses on both the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and their interrelationships. This is done by means of both quantitative and qualitative approaches and by means of case studies and comparative studies.

Future party system developments are most likely to be caught between the extremes of change and stability. Party system change is not confined to the national level. National parties are becoming increasingly integrated into international arenas, of which the European Union is quite central. This process may be labeled as the transnationalization of party systems, meaning that the national levels of party systems are linked to international levels of party competition and cooperation. This process will probably strengthen the tendency of convergence among party systems that has already become prevalent in parts of Europe.

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Part 1

COMPARING PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE

2
ELECTORAL INSTABILITY AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE

Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane

Introduction

The European electorate votes regularly in national elections, since parliamentary democracy is the prevailing regime all over Europe. The basic theory about the relationship between the electorate and the party system is the Lipset-Rokkan model. According to Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset, party systems tend to be stable because the shares of the major parties remain intact from one election to another, as if the electorate were frozen into fixed patterns of alignment corresponding to the social or historical cleavages in society of the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:50).

Much research has dealt with the so-called frozen party system hypothesis, the relevance of which to Western Europe has been confirmed in recent research. Thus Bartolini and Mair wrote,

> Notwithstanding the seductive imagery of transformation which permeates many of the prevailing interpretations of contemporary Western European politics, it is clear that, in the long term, the bounds which tie the electorates into a set of political identities and alignments have demonstrated their resilience.
>
> (Bartolini and Mair 1990:287)

This stability argument has been further developed by Mair, writing three years later that "The electoral balance now is not substantially different from that thirty years ago, and, in general electorates are not more volatile than once they were" (1993:132). Moreover, he claims that "despite the challenges from new parties and new social movements," most of the old parties "still remain in powerful, dominant, positions. They have not suffered substantial electoral erosion."

Our aim here is to reconsider the Lipset-Rokkan model both theoretically and empirically. One should distinguish between two different hypotheses within it: (1) parties remain stable over time in terms of electoral support (macro-level hypothesis about the party system); (2) the electorate is frozen in relation to the party system behind cleavages (individual level hypothesis about the electorate). What follows below is first an examination of (2), because it is the explanation of (1). When (2) no longer applies, the

rug being pulled away from beneath the parties, then it is only a question of time until (1) also falters.

Against the hypothesis about stable electorates and stable party systems there is the contrary argument that "something new has happened" in West European politics. An era of stability has been passed to be replaced by an era of instability and de-alignment. The dating of this new era varies, but some point between the early 1970s and the early 1980s has been suggested. R.J. Dalton *et al.* wrote in 1984,

> Electoral alignments are weakening, and party systems are experiencing increased fragmentation and electoral volatility. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the changes in all of these nations reflect more than shortterm oscillations in party fortunes. This decomposition of electoral alignments often can be traced to shifts in the long-term bases of partisan support—party identification and social cleavages. Virtually everywhere among the industrialized democracies, the old order is crumbling.
>
> (*Dalton et al.* 1984:451)

Thus the Scandinavian experience supports the de-alignment hypothesis; not only is it the case that gross and net voter volatility has reached very high levels, but in remaining there, this great volatility is also showing that the traditional cleavage pattern for aligning the voter groups behind a special political party has not remained intact during the recent political turbulence (Lane *et al.* 1993: 226–7).

However, in addition to these two hypotheses a third one may be developed, suggesting that there are periods of stability followed by periods of instability. Paths of political development basically follow a cyclical pattern, because fundamental for human beings like the voters (Hirschman 1982), is the probability of disappointment with any kind of solution, market-oriented or state-based. Disappointment with existing policies would be followed by the search for alternative solutions. This cyclical pattern in policy-formations could spill over into a similar development path when it comes to support for political parties and governments: a period of stability to be followed by a period of instability. As Alan Ware notes, the electoral upheavals of the early 1990s were a new phenomenon, but they should not be exaggerated (Ware 1995:326).

When one talks about electoral instability and party system change, it is vital to distinguish between the micro- and the macro-levels. First, there is the micro-level, which is the individual voter behavior. Second, there is the macro-level, what is referred to as the party system level. Are recent data at both the micro- and macro-levels compatible with the hypotheses stated above or do they support the counter-hypothesis that there are no frozen party systems any longer in Western Europe?

Measures of and data about electoral change

"Electoral instability" in the West European setting refers in some way to the relationship between the voters and the political parties. When the electorate is firmly attached to parties, then one speaks of strong partisanship. Partisanship is the glue between the voters

and the parties: "Most obviously, partisanship contributes to stability in individual voting behavior.... When partisanship is declining, electoral volatility is likely to increase" (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995: 100).

Partisanship may be expressed in several different ways, one of which is loyalty in elections, the voter choosing the same party in election after election. Partisanship is shattered when processes of electoral de-alignment set in. And it may increase again if realignment takes places. But what are the consequences for party systems when processes of de-alignment and realignment take place?

If increased voter volatility is one expression of a decline in partisanship, then non-participation is another. A voter may cease being a strong party identifier by simply abstaining from voting. In a multi-party system the voter is faced at regular intervals with a choice between more than two alternatives. In some countries the set of alternatives may comprise as many as ten parties, whereas in others it is basically a question of three alternatives. In Western Europe no countries offer only a binary choice opportunity, even if one does not recognize the alternative of abstaining from voting as the first option.

Let us first look at the change at individual level, which is often labeled as gross volatility. Following the systematization suggested by Butler and Stokes (1971: 337; see also Valen 1981:332) it is possible to identify three different paths of individual electoral change. The first one we will call "party switching" (PS), the second will be called "gross volatility" (GV), and the third "overall volatility" (OV). These three types of electoral change may be elucidated upon by referring to Figure 2.1.

"Party switching" (PS) stands for those voting at both elections who change their support of a political party from one election to another. The proportion of PS is arrived at by adding together all individuals in cells marked 1 and dividing this number by the sum of all individuals in cells 1 and 0 (i.e. all voters). When estimating "gross volatility" one takes into account all the eligible voters over the two elections and defining those changing between voting and non-voting as volatile voters. For example, GV is calculated by dividing all individuals in the cells 1 and 2 with all eligible voters (cells 1 and 2 plus cells 0 and 00, i.e. eligible voters). Finally, "overall volatility" refers to the total electorate, thus including those entering or leaving the electorate, which also is an indicator of change. OV is estimated by dividing all individuals in the cells 1 and 2 with the total electorate

(all 48 cells, i.e. 1, 2 and 3 plus cells 0 and 00) (see the estimates presented in *Heath et al.* 1991:20).

Moving to measures of aggregate level electoral change we will distinguish between net volatility and seat volatility. By "net volatility" we mean the net changes in electoral support for the political parties from one election to another; this is what is also known as the Pedersen index. "Seat volatility" refers to changes in the parliamentary representation from one election to another, measured by the same formula as used for the net volatility.

There are few difficulties in retrieving data about aggregate level changes and the indicators are easy to calculate. Estimates of net volatility or seat volatility might differ owing to the comprehensiveness of the electoral statistics employed, or the criteria for computing the measures, but in most cases they tend to go in the same direction. But there are more problems involved in estimating individual level electoral changes. Ideally

			Election 2						
			A	B	C	D	E	F	G
								non-voters	leaving (dead)
Election 1	A		0	1	1	1	1	2	3
	B		1	0	1	1	1	2	3
	C	parties	1	1	0	1	1	2	3
	D		1	1	1	0	1	2	3
	E		1	1	1	1	0	2	3
	F	non-voters	2	2	2	2	2	00	3
	G	entering (too young)	3	3	3	3	3	3	–

Figure 2.1 Matrix of electoral change between two elections

one needs panel data covering a pair of elections; recall data tends to be less reliable, as they underestimate the degree of change in individual electoral behavior. This is the kind of data that is suitable for estimating party switching. However, estimating the gross volatility may be problematic, since surveys in general have difficulties in tracing the non-voting electorate. There are further difficulties involved in estimating the overall volatility since surveys are not always designed to take into account those leaving the electorate; thus estimates of overall volatility from panel data surveys could be biased towards underestimating the extent of real change.

This is one reason why techniques have been developed to estimate individual level transitions from data at an aggregate level (Thomsen 1987). In two cases (Thomsen 1987 for Denmark and Zilliachus 1995 for Finland) we have relied upon such estimates of individual level voter transitions.

When presenting data about electoral change in Western Europe at the individual and the aggregate level, we rely on two different kinds of data: (1) data (mostly) from election surveys estimating individual electoral change, and (2) data about aggregate level electoral change. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the problem these data are intended to illuminate is how to map electoral change over time in Western Europe. When it comes to aggregate data it is possible to cover all eighteen Western European countries, while we only have been able to collect data about individual electoral change

consisting of time series of some length from at most some ten countries, mostly from the northern and western parts of Western Europe.

Micro-level: individual voter change

In order to ascertain if the voter voted for the same party as in the most recent election one must have access to survey data, assembled either at election day or shortly after the election. It is possible to estimate voter changes by means of ecological data, but the results of so-called ecological regression are contested. Here, we will employ relevant data that we have been able to collect. Let us first look at data originating in various election research projects.

In most Western European countries regular electoral studies are available from the mid-1950s onwards. Here we have only relied upon data reported in published works. Because of the organization of these electoral studies, in some cases no reliable panel studies have been available, and in other cases we have not been able to trace relevant data. Here we concentrate on reporting over time data from eight countries; for two of them, Denmark and Finland, we have mainly relied upon estimates of electoral mobility from aggregate data. The other six cases—Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom—are based upon various studies reporting results of the national electoral studies.

Our focus is upon party switching, gross volatility and overall volatility. Although the measurement of party switching seems to be made in a similar way in most studies, it is obvious that various estimates may differ. To cite some cases; estimates of party switching between 1971 and 1972 in the Netherlands varies from 35 percent to 26 percent and 21 percent (respectively Irwin and Dittrich 1984:288; van der Eijk and Niemöller 1985:357; and Daalder 1987:230; our calculation) while German estimates of party switching between 1980 and 1983 varies from 18 percent (Klingemann 1985:241; our calculation) to 15 percent (Zelle 1995:323). It is even more difficult to be sure whether the scores for gross volatility and overall volatility have been arrived at uniformly. At best one can say that what we have are a set of estimates of individual level electoral change over time in some Western European countries. Let us first look at how these scores, by and large, are distributed between the countries (see Table 2.1).

It is evident that party switching varies between countries, and Austria and Germany seems to belong to the set of countries with a relatively stable electorate. One may also note that gross volatility and overall volatility is something quite different from party switching when it comes to numbers. When talking about volatility at the individual level it is necessary to distinguish between various paths of electoral change. This is clear when scores for these three measures are portrayed for the thirty-four cases—from Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom—where all of them are simultaneously available. Party switching then has an average score of 19 percent, gross volatility of 29 percent and overall volatility of 35 percent. This means that party switching catches roughly 50 percent of the overall volatility while making up about two-thirds of the gross volatility estimated. Our interest is, however, primarily directed towards the development over

Table 2.1 Individual level electoral change in eight countries, 1950–94

	PS	*GV*	*OV*
Austria	7	8	–
Denmark	21	27	35
Finland	15	–	27
Germany	12	24	38
Netherlands	22	36	31
Norway	24	37	–
Sweden	17	29	34
United Kingdom	21	37	48
All	18	27	33

Source: See Appendix 2.1.

Table 2.2 Individual level electoral change over time in eight countries, 1950–94

	PS	*GV*	*OV*
1950–4	11	25	29
1955–9	10	19	27
1960–4	14	25	34
1965–9	16	22	28
1970–4	18	26	37
1975–9	19	24	34
1980–4	16	24	29
1985–9	20	31	36
1990–4	26	40	39

Note: The countries are those given in Table 2.1.
Source: See Appendix 2.1.

time of individual level electoral change. Aggregating the time periods makes it possible to arrive at a rough picture, as is suggested in Table 2.2.

Although these aggregated scores are not truly representative of all Western Europe, they do indicate some patterns over time. In the long run electoral change is on the rise, but there are clear signs of fluctuations over time, high scores followed by lower scores, followed by higher scores again. What is also important is that these three measures seem to co-vary. Changes in party switching follow quite closely changes in gross volatility (r=0.89); and changes in gross volatility match changes in overall volatility (r=0.93).

Evaluating the data mapping the individual level electoral change, there seems to be reasons to state that in the long run there is indeed an increase in volatility within the electorate in Western Europe. One must, though, keep in mind that there are ups and downs in the levels of individual volatility. The early 1990s seem to be highly volatile, but there are at the same time a few indications of a drop in volatility during the elections of

the mid-1990s. The next step is to inquire into how these individual level measures are related to the aggregate level measures of electoral change.

Aggregate level: net and seat volatility

We employ two measures to describe the development of the aggregate level electoral change, namely net volatility and seat volatility. The volatility scores are calculated in a similar way, meaning that the net change in support for any party in a pair of elections are summarized, and then divided by two (see Bartolini and Mair 1990:311–12; Pedersen 1979:4 for details). We will first inquire into how the aggregate level measures and the individual level measures are related to each other; then we will go on to a more detailed mapping of the development of the aggregate level electoral change. It is obvious that the aggregate measures only partially capture the individual level volatility. As is detailed in Table 2.3, the level of net volatility is roughly 50 percent of the level of party switching; the same holds true for seat volatility, which in general has a slightly higher score than net volatility.

These two sets of measures seem to go together; net volatility captures a lower level of change, while party switching indicates a higher level of individual volatility; gross volatility and overall volatility capture even higher levels of electoral change. Still, what is important is that party switching and the aggregate measures of change do co-vary to a certain extent; the correlations between party switching and net volatility and seat volatility are (r=0.74, n=0.77; r=0.78, n = 0.77) respectively. Thus it is reasonable to say that there seems to be an empirical relation between measures of electoral change on the individual level as well as measures at the aggregate level. The aggregate level measures underestimate the

Table 2.3 Party switching and levels of net and seat volatility in eight countries

	PS	*Net vol.*	*Seat vol.*
N = 34	18.9	9.4	10.5
N = 47	18.3	9.1	9.9
N = 52	18.5	9.1	10.2
N = 77	17.7	8.6	9.5

Note: The countries are those given in Table 2.1.
Sources: Appendix 2.1, Bartolini and Mair 1990; our own calculations; Mackie and Rose 1991, and updatings in *European Journal of Political Research, Keesing's Record of World Events*.

size of electoral change, but they seem to move in a similar direction to the individual level measures.

Net volatility

The chief indicator on net volatility is the Pedersen index. It focuses only upon the gains and losses of the political parties, bypassing the question of whether the electorates participate more or less. Thus, whether there is a secular increase or decline in the turnout is not measured in the index. It says nothing about the kind of instability in the electorate that would stem from a secular decline in the participation rate. What the net volatility index does inform one about are the average gains versus losses for all the parties in the party system of a country. The over-time development of net volatility for Western Europe is shown in Table 2.4.

It can be seen that net volatility scores vary over time and between various countries, as indicated by the coefficient of variation (CV). If electoral instability is measured by the net volatility index, one can see an increase in instability since

Table 2.4 Net volatility: Western European party systems, 1950–94

	Mean	*CV*
1950–4	9.3	0.760
1955–9	7.4	0.805
1960–4	7.6	0.613
1965–9	7.7	0.404
1970–4	10.1	0.681
1975–9	9.1	0.608
1980–4	11.1	0.699
1985–9	9.9	0.563
1990–4	12.7	0.604

Sources: Bartolini and Mair 1990 (to 1985); our own calculations.

the late 1970s. Interestingly, the CV scores indicate that countries differ less and less with regard to net volatility. Does the trend in Table 2.4 towards a rise in net volatility apply in all eighteen West European countries studied here? Table 2.5 has the country scores on this indicator on electoral instability for the period 1980–97.

One major finding in Table 2.5 is that among eighteen countries about two-thirds have experienced a rise in net volatility. Actually, in the early 1990s only a few countries fell below 10 percent in net volatility and no less than four countries had figures above the 15 percent level. In some countries the net volatility was sharply up in the 1980s only to fall back in the 1990s to a more moderate level.

A level of net volatility higher than about 15 percent may be interpreted as the occurrence of an earthquake election where the electorate repositions itself in relation to the existing parties or places its vote with a new party. Whether the electors after such a realignment stays with its new party preferences is an open question. Table 2.5 shows that in some countries the net volatility goes down after such a realignment whereas in other countries it stays at a high level.

Seat volatility

Parties may cope with electoral instability as long as it does not reduce their net support drastically. Processes of electoral de-alignment and realignment present

Table 2.5 Net volatility: country scores, 1980–97

	1980–4	*1985–9*	*1990–4*	*1995–7*
Austria	4.6	6.3	11.2	4.0
Belgium	16.4	7.1	13.0	6.3
Denmark	11.7	8.0	11.6	–
Finland	10.3	6.9	12.4	10.8
France	13.5	10.5	19.1	4.0
Germany	6.5	5.9	6.3	–
Greece	27.2	5.7	8.1	8.9
Iceland	10.4	23.6	13.3	11.6
Ireland	5.5	15.4	15.4	9.1
Italy	8.3	8.4	28.6	–
Luxembourg	15.2	14.6	5.6	–
Netherlands	9.1	7.8	21.5	–
Norway	11.2	9.9	14.8	16.2
Portugal	7.3	22.3	9.6	20.2
Spain	39.0	7.3	10.5	5.7
Sweden	7.9	7.5	12.8	–
Switzerland	6.1	8.0	7.4	7.4
United Kingdom	11.1	3.9	5.1	12.6
Mean	11.3	10.2	12.9	–

Sources: Our calculations based upon Mackie and Rose, 1991, and updatings on *European Journal of Political Research and Keesing's Record of World Events*.

challenges to parties, because they cannot count upon receiving the same level of support from one election to another. However, extremely high levels of voter volatility could occur at the same time as there are no changes for the parties, losses being canceled out by gains. What counts first and foremost for the parties as political players are the consequences of election outcomes for their mandates in parliament. One may compute a corresponding volatility index with regard to the allocation of parliamentary seats to the parties, which boils down to the net volatility index corrected for the effects of the election system. More specifically, the index of seat volatility takes into account the amount of disproportionality contained in the electoral formula used in a country. Table 2.6 shows the volatility in seats between 1980 and 1997.

The amount of volatility in seat distribution follows a similar pattern to that in net volatility and it has risen during the last decade. Whether it will stay as high as 15 percent on average in Western Europe is too early to tell. Any prediction about the future trend must take into account the immense country differences in seat volatility. France and Italy have had exceptionally high levels of seat volatility, reflecting in the first case the

Table 2.6 Volatility in seats, 1980–97

	1980–4	*1985–9*	*1990–4*	*1995–7*
Austria	2.8	7.7	15.0	4.4
Belgium	14.6	6.8	11.0	6.4
Denmark	12.1	7.5	15.8	–
Finland	9.8	10.8	12.5	10.5
France	35.9	19.4	37.5	40.8
Germany	6.3	5.6	9.0	–
Greece	27.1	6.3	9.7	7.1
Iceland	15.1	23.1	13.5	9.5
Ireland	6.8	10.6	16.0	13.3
Italy	8.7	7.8	33.2	–
Luxembourg	12.2	10.2	5.1	–
Netherlands	9.8	8.4	22.0	–
Norway	12.2	12.4	16.3	19.8
Portugal	23.2	24.6	8.4	22.0
Spain	53.1	9.7	8.6	5.8
Sweden	7.2	9.2	16.1	–
Switzerland	5.0	6.5	9.5	9.0
United Kingdom	12.0	3.8	6.6	26.5
Mean	14.1	10.6	15.2	–

Sources: Our calculations based upon Mackie and Rose 1991, and updatings in *European Journal of Political Research and Keesing's Record of World Events*.

workings of the electoral system and in the second case the complete breakdown of the Italian party system in the early 1990s.

Young party systems such as those in Spain, Portugal and Greece could experience much change in their early phases, and could stabilize later on. The figures

for Portugal indicate that such a process of stabilization may actually not take place. Old party systems could experience one earthquake election and then stabilize again. Whether the old systems move along one trend towards a higher level of volatility or go through a circular process is an open question. One may find examples of both processes in Western Europe.

Micro-level: the floating electorate

The evidence is clear cut, pointing to a long-term rise in electoral instability in Western European countries. The data on the electorate that we consulted—party switching, gross volatility—display increasing signs of instability. More people change their party

allegiance from one election to another. At the macro-level the scores of net volatility are up. Many people do not even decide what to vote for until the day before the election, at least so it seems.

One part of the Lipset-Rokkan model of the party systems in Western Europe cannot be upheld, namely the hypothesis that the electorate is frozen, or hypothesis (2) (p. 24). The electorates in the West European countries are mobile-this the gross volatility scores indicate. Why is this the case?

The voter's decision to change his or her voting behavior from one election to another must be designated an intentional one. Generally, one just does not happen to abstain from voting nor change party allegiance in a random fashion. The reason for a change in voting behavior must be either that the voter distances him- or herself from previously held beliefs and values or has acquired new beliefs as well as values. Let us call the first motive the negative reason and the second motive the positive reason.

The literature on societal developments surveyed in *Beliefs in Government* (1995) by Max Kaase and Ken Newton has identified a long list of negative reasons: (1) welfare state crisis; (2) fiscal crisis of the tax state; (3) legitimation crisis of the market economy; (4) government overload; (5) contempt for politicians. These reasons would be conducive to reactive voting, where the voter changes allegiance as a result of disappointment in public policies or economic conditions. At the same time there is a large literature with a number of positive reasons: (1) higher level of education; (2) extended media coverage of politics; (3) weakening of traditional loyalties. These reasons would enhance voter instability by furthering prospective voting, where the truly informed voter makes a choice between alternatives without being burdened by socialization or inherited loyalties. Thus, the voter would consider fundamentally new values, such as those promoted by postmaterialism. When examining postmodern theories of social change Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann find that, "Individual modernization has both a formal and a substantive dimension. The formal dimension consists in an increase in personal skills; the substantive dimension in a change in value orientations." (Fuchs and Klingemann 1995:12).

In relation to these two dimensions, the formal and substantive aspects of social modernization in the post-industrial society, Fuchs and Klingemann also point out that the latter comprise very different kinds of value change, on the one hand moral and on the other hand hedonistic. Individual modernization being such a heterogeneous phenomenon one may ask whether it really has specific implications for politics or consequences that do not cancel each other out.

However one accounts at the societal level for the rise in electoral instability in the post-industrial society, whether focusing upon fundamental problems in state and society or referring to improvements in living conditions and citizens' rights, one still must connect the macro-forces with the micro-level predicament of the citizen that can be deduced from Figure 2.1. Why would voters change voting behavior when there is a crisis in state or society? And why would voters start changing their voting behavior when they become more informed or receive more opportunities?

Not denying the relevance of broad social change from an industrial society to a post-industrial society or bypassing the many difficulties at present with regard to the European

Welfare State, we wish to underline that rising electoral volatility or gross volatility is one thing and increasing party system changes, or a rise in net volatility, is another. The electoral consequences for the political parties may not be that tremendous because, after all, the net volatility scores are much lower than the gross volatility measures and because the large bulk of voters who abstain do not count, at least not in the short run. Why is it the case that some West European party systems go into limbo under the pressure from increased voter volatility whereas others seem to cope well?

Macro-level: party adaptation

In the Lipset-Rokkan model of the frozen electorate the political parties have at the same time both an easy and a difficult task. Each party is restricted to mobilizing a certain sector of the electorate, their electoral niche as it were. The existence of such a niche, structured in accordance with cleavages, guarantees the parties a high survival probability. But at the same time their prospects for expansion are severely limited.

The political parties could try to overcome the barriers that the social cleavages present to them, be these cleavages objective or subjective, latent or manifest, ideological or interest-orientated. There are two options: (1) the catch-all strategy by which parties play down the relevance of old cleavages; (2) the issue orientated strategy by which a party may base its votes upon a new cleavage or the reformulation of an old one.

The catch-all as well as the issue-orientated strategy operate on a short-term basis. They seek the votes of the electorate by focusing upon issues which shift from one election to another. The interaction between the parties and the voters is characterized by myopic considerations from both sides. If what parties offer seems acceptable, then the electorate accepts it—for the time being. If circumstances change or if parties fail to deliver, then the voter looks for something different.

Lipset and Rokkan argued in their model that inherited loyalties counted decisively on these special and non-recurrent occasions. Perhaps this was true of the industrial society with its strong cleavage patterns. But the argument is less valid in relation to the post-industrial society where large chunks of the electorate do not make up their mind until the eve of the election day. The irrelevance of the cleavages approach appears from the decrease in class voting in Western Europe (see Nieuwbeerta 1995:53).

Why, then, do parties cope very differently with increasing voter volatility? In some party systems, the catch-all strategies work and parties manage to maintain their share of the votes cast, whereas in other party systems the issue strategy means that new parties are forthcoming, some of which only survive one or two more elections—the flash parties. Why?

The unstable party systems in Western Europe are today in Italy, the Netherlands, France, Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, The stable party systems are in Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Given the rise in electoral instability all over Western Europe, what needs to be explained is the latter category of countries. Is their stability a temporary one, meaning that they will soon face an earthquake election?

The potential for party system instability applies also to these seemingly stable countries. Whether it will materialize depends upon how the parties respond to the electoral instability at the individual voter level. If parties begin to display internal weaknesses, then their fate is sealed at the next election. However, if they successfully play the game of election campaigning, then they may camp on the seesaws.

As the relationship between voters and parties is less regulated by established cleavage patterns than by strategic interaction, the probability of the occurrence of earthquake elections rises sharply. The emergence of mass media politics further strengthens the forces that sustain electoral instability. However, party systems may be resilient to the increase in electoral instability, especially if the parties manage to maintain internal stability. This means that it is neither possible to talk about a frozen electorate and a stable party system, nor to say that it is an unstable party system riding on a highly volatile electorate. Rather it seems to be more appropriate to characterize at least some of the West European electorates and party systems as moving in a cyclical pattern from states of stability to states of instability and back.

Conclusion

The evidence from several sources is that electoral instability is up in the late twentieth century in Western Europe. The voters are no longer frozen in established commitments towards political parties. Gross volatility has increased to such an extent that political parties can no longer expect to retain the same level of support from one election to another. Although net volatility in votes and seats is not that dramatic, several party systems in Western Europe have witnessed a major election of electoral de-alignment and realignment, the so-called earthquake election.

There are no frozen party systems in Western Europe any more. The consequences at the macro-level for party system stability of increasing electoral volatility at the micro-level can only be a rise in net volatility, which may occur in various ways and at different times in different countries. The Lipset-Rokkan model should be abandoned in relation to today's realities, where the crucial question is whether countries will remain at a high level of party system instability after the occurrence of an earthquake election or move back to a temporary stable state, as the circular model predicts. In any case, the electorate is no longer hooked up with the political parties through the Rokkan mechanism, i.e. social cleavages. The parties may attempt to stabilize the environment by sticking to long-term commitment on issues, but issues come and go.

The West-European party systems have reached a stage of development characterized by a floating electorate. One may argue that the Rokkan carpet of cleavages has been pulled away from under the parties. Voter individualism as well as party opportunism will, we predict, strengthen the tendencies towards volatility in all West-European party systems, although the impact varies from one country to another.

Appendix 2.1 Estimates of individual level electoral change from various electoral studies, by country and year

Election year	Austria		Denmark			Finland		Germany			Netherlands			Norway		Sweden			UK		
	PS	GV	PS	GV	OV	PS	OV	PS	GV	OV	PS	GV	OV	PS	GV	PS	GV	OV	PS	GV	OV
1947			21	27	32																
1948																					
1949																					
1950			17	23	33																
1951						12	25														
1952																					
1953			6	13	20			12	38	43											
1954						10	23														
1955																					
1956																7					
1957			11	19	29																
1958						12	24														
1959																					
1960			18	23	32											7					
1961								9	22	25											
1962						21	34														
1963																					
1964			12	18	32											11			18	35	45
1965								13	29	33											
1966	11	11	17	23	29	15	24														
1967											28		25								
1968			19	25	29											12					
1969								13	24	27				18							
1970	12	12				21	31									16			16	34	49
1971	3	3	21	28	37						23		35								
1972						11	19	12	22	25	21		34								
1973			38	43	49									34		16					
1974																			24	42	51
1975	4	4	27	32	35	18	28														
1976								10	19	23						19					
1977			30	37	41						28		37	24							
1978																					
1979	4	4	25	32	40	17	26									18	22	27	22	37	49
1980								10	17	22											
1981											19		31	19	31						
1982											19		22			20	25	29			
1983	9	9				14	24	15	21	26									23	40	49
1984																					
1985														20	29	19	25	29			
1986																					
1987						19	32	13											19	37	47
1988																20	28	35			
1989											19	30		30	38						
1990								16													
1991						15	30									30	37	41			
1992																			22	37	
1993														33	48						
1994			30	38	45						32	42				29	38	41			

Note: PS = Party switching; GV=Gross volatility; OV=Overall valitility.

Sources: Austria: Harpfer 1985:245; Denmark: Thomsen 1987: Appendix 2; our calculations; Thomsen 1995:321; our calculation; Finland: Zilliachus 1995:Appendix; our cancellations; Germany; Klingemanm 1985:242; our our calculation; Zelle 1995:323; Netherlands: Daalder 1987: 230; our calculations; Anker 1996: personal communication; our calculations; Norway: Aardal and Valen 1995:33; Valen and Aardal 1983:52; Aardal and Valen 1989: 160; Valen *et al.* 1990:27; Aardal and Valen, 1995:238; our calculations; Sweden; Gilljam and Holmberg 1995:30; Holmberg 1981:40; Holmberg 1984:29; Holmberg and Gilljam 1987:87; Gilljam and Holmberg 1990:108; Gilljam and Holmberg 1993:73; Gilljam and Holmberg 1995:33; our calculations; United Kingdom: Heath *et al.* 1991:20; Heath *et al.* 1994:281.

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3
COALITION POTENTIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL POWER

Stefano Bartolini

Party system theory and the governmental role of parties

Party system theory has been dominated by three main approaches: a *genetic,* a *morphological* and a *spatial competition* approach, epitomized by the influential works of Stein Rokkan (1970), Giovanni Sartori (1976) and Anthony Downs (1957) respectively. The genetic approach is mainly concerned with the historical process of politicization of different conflict lines and the way in which the interaction among different cleavage structures generated different party system constellations. The morphological approach concentrates primarily on the implication for democratic performance and stability of different party system formats of the number of units and the relative distribution of forces. Finally, the spatial competition approach views party systems mainly through the competitive interaction drives among parties, and parties and voters in ideological space (s). The governmental role of parties was rightly seen in these three perspectives as derivative, that is, as resulting from the historical-ideological, numerical and spatial compatibility and opportunities of individual parties. Particularly in the politically frozen period following the Second World War, these compatibilities resulted in patterns of governmental coalition which were quite stable within countries and could serve to characterize the party system at the systemic level. So specific patterns of coalition making were strongly associated with genetic and morphological features: two-party systems and limited pluralism would favor alternating party government, while extreme fragmentation would impose only peripheral turnover in coalitions; deep ideological polarization would foster "immobilist" centrist coalitions, and genetic consociationalism would favor oversized cabinets. At the same time, the spatial competition approach and the field of formal coalition theory could not depart from the consideration of these elements of historical and ideological viscosity, paying the price for unreasonable lack of realism.

However, a historical evaluation of the governmental role of different parties and of its change over time was not a major concern in the literature. Of course, national accounts were replete with analysis and information of individual cases of parties in cabinets, but a comparative systematic perspective of the governmental performance of parties has not been attempted. More precisely, there has been little debate on precisely which conceptual framework and which empirical indicators should be used to engage in such historical and comparative endeavor. The lack of attention to this problem, or the lack of

consensus on how to handle it empirically, has contributed to several shortcomings in various areas of the party system literature. I will mention three examples which, in my opinion, precisely require a general framework and specific indicators for the evaluation of the parties' governmental role over time.

First, the history of West European party systems was dominated by the historical problem of the access to governmental responsibility of certain types of parties regarded as untrustworthy outsiders or otherwise unreliable partners by the dominant and established forces. Historically, the problem has concerned mainly socialist and, later on, Communist parties, or extreme-right or nationalist groups. More recently, however, the problem of entry or exclusion has concerned ecologist or regional parties and newly formed extreme right formations. The formation of new parties in opposition to established ones and to the dominant patterns of coalition raises the issue of their incorporation. The earliness or lateness (or the persistent refusal) with which such entry to governmental responsibility is granted to newcomers varies from case to case according to circumstances that are so numerous and so country specific that they are difficult to model in a general explanatory pattern. Yet we would need to identify some objective reference point for the comparative evaluation of the governmental potential of these outsider parties in any given context. The more idiosyncratic factors explaining their governmental role should be invoked only after their systemic coalition potential has been identified.

Second, a large body of literature concentrating on the issue of whether "parties matter" has attempted to relate policy outcomes (generally in macro-economic fields: inflation, unemployment, welfare policies, etc.) to the governmental completion of European cabinets. Most of the time, the governmental role of the parties which are supposed to be associated with certain policy commitments and preferences is ascertained by the presence in or absence from cabinet, or in terms of relative portfolio share in the coalition cabinet. These operationalizations are not completely satisfactory in measuring precisely the governmental role of a party within each given cabinet. Moreover, given the high viscosity of policies, that is, the high level of policy inheritance from cabinet to cabinet, we need measures of party governmental role that extend over a longer period of time or phases, rather than concentrating on the single cabinet; that is, we need to improve our over-time evaluation of the governmental role of individual parties or party families.

Third, coalition theories are nowadays less in vogue than they used to be. In part this is due to changing fashions in academic interest. However, it is also due to their own inadequacy in properly conceptualizing what needs to be explained. To predict the next coalition in a given party system once the distribution of seats is known is not a particularly exciting exercise. According to their premises and assumptions, different coalition theories actually identify the *potential for coalition* of any given party. The *actual governmental role* or performance of the same party may differ substantially from the potential which derives from coalition theories. However, an independent measure of the actual governmental performance is not available. Such performance is again usually identified and operationalized exclusively in terms of presence in or absence from cabinet, or in terms of portfolio distribution. This is a too rough operationalization and,



Figure 3.1 Coalition potential in relation to party system configuration

moreover, it refers only to single cabinets and can hardly be used to characterize longer periods of time. As a consequence of this, the literature never concentrates on the most crucial aspect: the identification (and, later, therefore, the explanation) of the actual difference between the potential for coalition foreseen by a given theory and the actual coalition role of the same party.

A further reason to suggest a renewed interest in the governmental role of parties is that, by the end of the 1990s, almost all traditional parties have had experience of government participation (Mair, forthcoming: 17–18). There has been both access to cabinet power for an increasing number of parties, and a gradual broadening of the range of coalition alternatives. We can speak of a growing promiscuity in coalition formation and of the progressive generalization of the typical pattern of *allgemeine Koalizionfreiheit,* once a peculiar characteristic of Belgian governmental coalitions. Although this growing equalization of the governmental role of European political parties has not happened everywhere with the same intensity and speed, it remains true that this is an important long-term and emphatic change which merits close inspection.

This chapter develops a few analytical considerations and devises the corresponding empirical indicators about the governmental role of political parties within their party system. One way to characterize past and present party systems is to look at the way in which such a governmental role is distributed among their constitutive units: whether it is concentrated on only a few such units or is distributed more or less equally among all of them. The rationale for this exercise is offered by the rather unsatisfactory conceptualization and poor measurement of this governmental role. The few points just discussed in fact have an element in common. The issues they raise cannot be properly addressed unless we manage to clearly distinguish between, and then measure, two distinct phenomena: the level of coalition potential that a given party enjoys within the party system once the basic elements of the distribution of seats are known; and the actual governmental power the same party manages to acquire on the basis of such potential. The first is a "potential" exactly because it points to a structure of opportunity offered to a party by objective elements such as parliamentary strength, the number of other parties, their distribution of seats, etc., that is, from the format and configurational elements of the party system. The second is an "actual record," which indicates the outcome of governmental performance in terms of entry,

status in cabinet, duration in office, etc. If we can distinguish the two aspects, we can try to measure them independently and then study their mutual relationship. This requires that we measure the potential for coalition in a way which is "neutral"—that is,

independent of any substantive political consideration and linked only to the format configuration of the party system. Then we can relate it directly to the governmental record according to the scheme in Figure 3.1.

Briefly, if the coalition potential for a given party corresponds to and is perfectly translated into governmental power, then the political environment of coalition formation does not produce any influence on that party. Alternatively, if there is no such correspondence (i.e. if there is more potential than power or more power than potential) then we must assume that powerful political factors intervene and distort this transformation of potential into actual role, and we can try to identify them, systematize them, and, eventually, interpret them. This logic can be applied to individual parties in specific circumstances, but also to broader historical period characterizations, which, from my point of view, are far more interesting than single spot coalition forecasts or performances. Coalition potential and governmental power can, probably also be used to characterize whole national party systems on the basis of the distribution of such potential and actual records, and their variation over time. The key questions we should address are the following: (1) how is coalition potential distributed among the units of a party system (can we characterize the party system through such distribution?); (2) how is governmental power distributed among the same units; (3) what distance separates, for individual parties and the whole party system, the potential for coalition from the actual record of cabinet; (4) how should we interpret those discrepancies between potential and actual role?

One problem is immediately evident. These concepts and measures refer to different temporal and spatial units. Table 3.1 summarizes the level at which these phenomena should be studied and clarifies the high complexity which may be implicit in their theoretical use. The governmental power of each individual party needs to be measured at the cabinet level. There may be more than one cabinet in one legislature. Therefore, to obtain a legislative measure, the governmental power must be weighted by time, i.e. by multiplying the specific governmental power each party has in each cabinet by the length of this cabinet within the legislative term. The same applies if the period of time chosen is longer than one legislature. The coalition potential, insofar as it is linked to the format properties of a party system, is to be observed at the legislative level. It will remain the same for all cabinets within a legislature (provided, of course, that the party does not split, fuse or otherwise modify its parliamentary representation during it). It can be averaged or multiplied by time in order to characterize any period longer than one legislature. Finally, the unit of the party system is not characterized by governmental power or coalition potential; these are party features. It can be characterized at each moment or over time by the distribution of these properties among its units, or by the discrepancies between them.

This paper is meant to develop this line of argument and to investigate its potential value for both the synchronic and historical analysis of party system change. In the following section I shall first discuss analytically the two dimensions of coalition potential and governmental power. I shall then propose two ways to measure them, and discuss the implications of such measurement. In the conclusion I shall mention a few relevant fields of empirical application of the analytical framework and the indicators.

Table 3.1 Across-time and across-space ways to study coalition potential and governmental power

		Time	
		Cabinet	*Legislature (or broader periods)*
units	individual parties	Governmental power Coalition potential is constant for the cabinet within a legislature	Coalition potential Cabinet governmental power must be multiplied by time to get a legislature measure
	party system	–	Distribution of coalition potential among units Distribution of governmental power among units Discrepancy between governmental power and coalition potential among units

Coalition potential

Three conditions pertaining to the format of the party system are normally cited which increase the chances of a party being in government. The median MP's position being by definition a governing position, the closer a party approaches to such a position the earlier its entry, the longer its stay and the higher the status of its cabinet experiences should be. The distance from the median seat in parliament is therefore a key indicator. Yet if size is a key resource of coalition potential it is certainly not the only one. The conditions which set the coalition potential of a party depend also upon the constellation of the forces it is opposing, a set of factors pertaining mainly to the structure of the party system and to its cleavage configuration. A given distance from the median voter acquires a very different meaning, depending on whether the party is the strongest in the system or whether it is outweighed or balanced by other stronger or similar-size opponents; whether it confronts a very divided and dispersed contenders' vote or a concentrated one. Often these elements are conceptualized in terms of the dominance of the party (Pelinka 1980:99–100),[1] by measuring the distance of its parliamentary support from either the second strongest party or the strongest party in the system. Finally, the number of parties in the system may have indeterminate influences on the individual party coalition potential. On one side excessive fragmentation leads by definition to coalition cabinets and often to oversize coalitions. It also clearly contributes to the instability of cabinets and therefore to the short tenure of office for these coalitions. Generally speaking, the level of fragmentation of the party system must have some bearing on the chances of governmental incorporation of any given party.

The aspects that are normally and intuitively invoked constitute, however, poor and incomplete indicators of what we have in mind when we imagine the relationship between the configurational aspects of the party system and the coalition potential they attribute to different parties. These dimensions do not lead to a single uni-dimensional measure of the coalition potential of a given party and may exclude other configurational aspects which are likely to influence its cabinet chances. What we ideally need is a unique and comprehensive indicator of the "configurational structure of opportunity" offered to the parties by the party system format. In the following, I propose a way of deriving this indicator.

The aspects so far discussed are configurational elements that pertain to the format of the party system and that define the kind of opportunity the parties have to play a governmental role. Given a situation of electoral strength, a given dominance, a given number of parties and also a given distribution of forces among other parties, a party can constitute a more or less necessary coalition partner. Yet, in the actual governmental outcome—the only thing we can observe-plenty of other political factors may have determined the full exploitation or the over- or under-exploitation of its coalition potential. I propose to measure this potential independently of all such other ideological, political and historical circumstances, and rely exclusively on the configuration format of the party system. To do so we can resort to the formula of coalition power within decisional bodies developed originally by Shapley for computing an index of decisional power within committee systems.

The Shapley formula is one of the many developed for measuring decisional power in voting bodies from a game theory perspective (Shapley 1953). Such an index, also known and cited as the Shapley-Shubik index, because of its final formulation with a modification for majority games by these two authors (Shapley and Shubik 1954), can be interpreted as an a priori power index measuring the "potential" power of an i-th member of a certain body (be it a small committee or a parliament). An alternative way to read the Shapley value is "the probability for the i to deliver the necessary votes for a qualified majority" (Bomsdorf 1981: 284). A third definition is the probability that unit i, by casting its votes, establishes a winning majority in any voting sequence or, to put it differently, as the relative frequency with which unit i plays the pivotal role in an infinite number of random majority coalitions among k units (Rattinger l981:223).

The index that derives from the Shapley algorithm has the advantage, together with the measure developed by Banzhaf-Coleman (Banzhaf 1965), of describing in an adequate way the dynamics underlying the formation of a majority in a voting body. This index has often been presented as the standard measure for game theoretical analysis (Riker and Ordeshook 1973: ch. 6) and it has also frequently been used for the descriptive analysis of the distribution of voting power in specific legislatures (see for example De Fraja 1988; Frey 1968; Guillermo 1975; Holler and Kellermann 1977; Miller 1973). Its use, however, has been more exemplary than systematic. To the best of my knowledge it has never been applied systematically to comparative study election results across countries and over time.

Given the percentage of seats of a given party, this measure computes in how many of all the possible winning majorities above the 50 percent threshold that party is a necessary



Figure 3.2 The operational logic of the "coalition potential" index

coalition partner, that is, a partner whose withdrawal would imply the coalition falling below the 50 percent threshold. It determines, in other words, how often that party is a critical partner, and how many of all the possible majorities require its presence. By repeating the procedure for all parties in the system, and standardizing the results for each party, a new percentage is obtained which describes the percentage of coalitions potential of that party to be read as the percentage of all possible majorities that require its presence. A party with a Shapley index of 100 is a party that must be present in all possible coalitions. A party with an index of 0 is unnecessary in any of the coalitions that can be formed.

On the basis of the Shapley-Shubik formula, a computer program has been devised that allows easy calculation of this index for each party in a party system, starting from the distribution of seats among the parties. The operations actually done through the algorithm are represented in Figure 3.2. The mathematical details of the algorithms and of its variations employed here are not documented owing to limitation of space, but are available upon request.

Attention has to be paid to the type of majorities considered by the algorithm itself. These are not the minimum winning coalitions, but all possible majority coalitions in which the party under scrutiny is crucial or pivotal. This means that the set of majorities from which the value is finally calculated also includes oversized majorities, as a result of the presence of some *other* party whose withdrawal would still leave them with a majority of seats. The choice of this type of set of majorities is necessary because the calculation is finalized as the coalition potential of the party in question.

It is evident that this index incorporates and indirectly points to all potential factors that affect the probabilistic chance of a given party being a member of a cabinet. As such it should be associated with aspects such as the party strength, its dominance and the party system fragmentation. However, it should go beyond these elements to include the entire set of numerological potentials implicit in a given distribution of strength among actors in a voting body. The index of coalition potential was described above as being "neutral" or, more aptly, "blind." In other words, it only indicates a potential which is related to the numerical distribution of forces among a given number of parties. This "blindness" presents both assets and liabilities. The major asset is that it provides a theoretically adequate description of the situation in which the chances of a party being incorporated into a majority are cleaned of all political considerations and are dependent exclusively upon the numerological configuration of the party system. It is the situation in which each party is totally compatible with all the others, and deprived of all political idiosyncrasies

stemming from past history, from previous coalition experiences, policy preferences, etc. It represents a situation of pure and absolute "coalitionability" of all partners. This situation is wholly unrealistic but has the advantage of defining the chances of a party in advance of any known political fact. That said, this element of strength is also its liability. As the algorithm proceeds to compute all possible coalitions in which each party is critical, it does so without any consideration of feasibility. In brief, the possibility of a coalition between an extreme left and an extreme right parties is the same as the probability of the coalition of two centrist parties, provided that the numbers are the same. It is therefore obvious that the coalition potential so calculated is inflated in comparison to what it would be if "other available informaton" about political compatibility or incompatibility were taken into account.

In principle, any of the many theories of coalition formation can be modeled into the algorithm through the introduction of conditions which confine the number and type of *feasible coalitions* (the second square from the left in Figure 3.2). An obvious condition that I have introduced for a modification of the index is a constraint linked to the spatial positioning of the parties. Assuming that the parties are located in one-dimensional space, a constraint can be introduced into the algorithm which forces it to take into consideration only those majority coalitions which are stipulated among spatially connected parties. The coalition potential is then computed only in reference to them. A second modification may relax the stringent criteria of perfect connectivity. We may allow coalitions only among connected parties, but permitting a "spatial" jump; that is, permitting one of the connected parties to be absent. This forces the algorithm to consider all connected coalitions plus all connected coalitions which have within them an empty space with respect to the continuum in which the parties are rank-ordered. This also reduces the problems linked to the "correct" ordering of parties over the space. A mistake in such ordering will not influence the index.

To give an idea of the results of these calculations, in Figure 3.3 I have charted the coalition potential index of socialist parties from the 1880s to the 1980s for all elections in the countries of Western Europe.[2] One line represents the development over time of the coalition potential of non-spatially located parties, while the second refers to the coalition potential of the same parties once they are spatially ordered from left to right. (For the period before 1945 I have relied on secondary historical material; for the period after 1945 I have used the locations in Castles and Mair 1984; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Laver and Schofield 1990). These data are not analyzed here and they are reproduced for documentation and exemplary purposes. The reader should keep in mind that a 0 value of the coalition potential index points to a situation in which the party is unnecessary to any kind of majority coalition, while a value of 1 points to the situation in which it is necessary for all coalitions. The potential for an across-country and across-time comparative analysis implicit in this kind of data is evident.

Other conditions of coalition feasibility can be introduced. Modifying the set of total feasible coalitions, we can determine a different reference point for the coalition opportunities of the party, and we can change accordingly its coalition potential (see Figure 3.2). It is not clear to me so far, if and how Euclidean distances in a two-dimensional space can be introduced into the algorithm.

Governmental power

The index of coalition potential indeed points to a "potential" role in coalition. This should be compared and related to the actual role every given party has or has had in such coalitions. The latter will obviously deviate more or less from the former, the more a set of political conditions (spatial locations, past experiences, issue bargainability, mutual trust, etc.) value or devalue the coalition potential. To develop this comparison, however, requires the definition of an independent indicator of the governmental role or power of parties; so far no agreement has been reached and no systematic data have been collected on such an indicator. Such disagreement pertains to (1) the analytical dimensions which should be incorporated in the concept of "governmental power;" (2) how each of them should be measured individually; and (3) how they should combine into a single index on the basis of their respective weight.

It is easy to know whether party *X* is or was in cabinet at a given time, for how long it has been there, which type of coalition it was participating in, and what weight it had in the coalition. It is far more difficult to reach agreement on the overall governmental power the party enjoyed in the cabinet. Even more difficult is to get two scholars to agree on the ranking of the overall governmental power of two different parties (in the same or in different systems) in the last decade. We need first to spell out clearly which dimensions we believe contribute to governmental power, and then to find ways of combining them into a single index.

Let us first consider which elements are implicit in the theoretical connotation of the concept of "party governmental power," taking this to refer directly to the influence a party exercises over public policies. The first dimension is obviously presence or absence from cabinet, that is, ministerial portfolios: yes or no? Yet this dichotomization does not fully exhaust the possible governmental role of a party. We should at least consider two other situations which point to intermediate levels of governmental role: necessary external support, and necessary abstention. These are situations in which a given party behaves at the confidence vote or at the moment of formation, and in crucial instances of the life of a cabinet, as a necessary support or a necessary abstainee without being represented by minis-ters in the cabinet. I underline "necessary" because if such external support or abstention is actually unnecessary for the survival of the cabinet, then the leverage of influence of the party on such cabinet is reduced to nothing. To rank these four situations is easy. We can clearly put at the top direct participation, and distinguish it from necessary external support, necessary abstention, and, finally a clear opposition role: (1) presence in cabinet; (2) necessary external support; (3) necessary abstention; (4) opposition.

The actual governmental role of a party does not derive solely from its being part of the cabinet. It also very much depends upon the parliamentary status of the cabinet; that is, how much influence a party has on government depends upon the overall status that government enjoys *vis-à-vis* the parliament. The parliamentary status of a cabinet results from the intertwining of two dimensions: number of partners (single-party versus coalition); and majority status (minority versus minimum winning versus oversized). From the first point of view we can easily distinguish between single-party cabinet and multi-

party coalition cabinets, assuming that parties have more power in single-party than in coalition cabinets. Yet the second dimension—that is, whether it is a minority or a majority cabinet, and in the latter case, whether this majority is a minimum winning coalition (MWC) or a largely oversized one—does not add to, but cuts across the first. In principle we can assume that, *ceteris paribus,* parties in cabinet enjoy more policy control in minimum winning coalitions than they do in those which are oversized, and even more so than in those with a minority status. To combine the two dimensions is not easy. I propose the following rank-ordering, always taking as a reference point the governmental power a party can be expected to enjoy: (1) single party majority; (2) minimum winning coalition; (3) surplus coalition; (4) single party minority; (5) multi-party minority. Everything else being equal, the governmental power of a party in cabinet will be minimal when it is a member of a multi-party minority coalition, and maximum when it is forming a single-party majority cabinet. The intermediate cases are subject to a more contentious ordering.

A third dimension of the governmental power of parties in cabinet is the status of the party itself within the coalition. For coalition cabinets we cannot assume that the size of the party in question plays no role in its governmental power. Whether the coalition is minority, minimum winning, or oversized, a party may have a leading, equal or junior partner role in it. This depends both upon the sheer electoral size of the party, but also on the electoral size of the others. For example, a party contributing its 15 percent of seats to a 55 percent majority is unlikely to be a leading partner; but it may be an equal partner if the coalition is made up of three parties of roughly similar size; whilst it will be a junior partner if it is in coalition with another party with 40 percent of the vote. The actual operationalization of these labels—leading, equal or junior—may require some measure of the respective strength relationships among coalition partners and the definitions of thresholds to attribute individual cases to one group rather than the other. For the moment, in the context of a tentative analytical distinction, let us treat these concepts qualitatively, without getting too involved in precise operationalization and measurement problems.

The fourth and final dimension of governmental power is, of course, time. If governmental power is considered for a single cabinet, time is irrelevant. If, however, we want to use such a measure over a longer period of time—a legislature as well as the post-war period—then we must multiply the previous dimension for the length of time for which a party has enjoyed a given value. An easy provisional way to do so is to multiply the previous three combined scores by the number of months.

Table 3.2 summarizes the discussion so far, indicating the four dimensions of governmental power and their respective status. It shows how complicated it is to obtain a comprehensive measure of the overall governmental impact that is able to track all the dimensions at the same time, given that not all of them apply to all cases, and that they do not add up linearly, but produce mixed and ambiguous combinations. Certain combinations are clearly impossible. For instance, the status of the party is applicable only to coalition cabinets. Yet, even excluding empirically impossible cells, the number of cells resulting from a cross tabulation is still too high.



Figure 3.3 Socialist parties' coalition potential, by country: with no spatial location and with left to right ordering











Key

coalition potential

— no spatial location ····· left-right location

Table 3.2 Dimensions of governmental power

Presence or absence	*Cabinet status in parliament*	*Party status in cabinet*	*Duration*
in cabinet	single-party, majority	leading	Number of months
	minimum winning coalition	leading, equal, junior	
	surplus coalition	leading, equal, junior	
	single-party minority	leading	
	multi-party minority	leading, equal, junior	
necessary external support	multi-party minority single-party minority		
necessary abstention	multi-party minority single-party minority		
in opposition			

In principle, one should also qualify the "opposition" category and not consider it as an undifferentiated case of low policy influence. To oppose a minority or an oversized majority cabinet are not the same. Opposition parties in federal systems may sometimes enjoy considerable influence through the federal chamber (as often happens in Germany). Even different committee structures and powers within the parliament may offer opposition parties opportunities for more or less substantial influence on the policy process. Yet, at this stage, I prefer to leave the opposition role unqualified, not least because the differences appear to me to be of minor importance.

There are two ways of combining the three main dimensions into a single measure. One is to attribute to each ordered category for each dimension a value and then add them or multiply them (or average them; actually the choice of how to aggregate values has important theoretical implications and empirical consequences). To take an example, one can decide that to be represented in cabinet gives 5 points, to be a necessary external support gives 3, to be a necessary abstainee gives 1 and to be in opposition gives 0; to be in a single-party majority cabinet gives 10 points, to be in a minimum winning coalition gives 0, and so on and so forth for all dimensions and categories. The alternative solution, which I prefer so far, is simply to rank-order the different possible combinations of the three main dimensions in terms of descending governmental power.

Table 3.3 Governmental power of parties

Governmental status	*Ranking points*
single-party majority	13
leading partner in MW coalitions	12
leading partner in surplus coalitions	11
single-party minority	10
equal partner in MW coalitions	9
equal partner in surplus coalitions	8
junior partner in MW coalitions	7
leading partner in multi-party coalitions	6
equal partner in multi-party minority coalitions	5
junior partner in surplus coalitions	4
junior partner in multi-party minority coalitions	3
necessary external support (to minority cabinet)	2
necessary abstention (to minority cabinet)	1
opposition	0

My final choices are given in Table 3.3. This results in a single rank-ordering of types of cabinet from the point of view of the party role in them. The two extremes of this rank-ordering are clearly represented by the case of single-party majority and, at the other extreme, of party opposition. I have chosen to consider the cases of the party with a leading role in MWC and in oversized coalition as the closest to the top of the ranking, and the case of the party with junior position in multi-party minority cabinets and in surplus cabinets as closest to the bottom of the ranking. In the middle the ranking gets more controversial. Equal partner status in MWC and surplus coalitions come logically before a junior status in them. The major difficulty is ranking minority cabinet experiences and in particular the single-party minority cabinets and the multi-party minority cabinets, where the party has a leading or equal status. Finally, equally difficult is to find the appropriate ranking of necessary external support and necessary abstention. In this cases, being the party outside the cabinet, one may argue that its governmental role and influence is below all other cases, apart form sheer opposition. Yet we know that for minority cabinets the systematic external support of other parties may be of crucial importance. Does such an external support role point to more or less policy influence as compared with the role of a junior partner within the cabinet? I have chosen the second solution, but the choice is open to debate.

I prefer not to engage in a long argument to justify this rank-ordering. One of the major goals of presenting this paper at such an early stage of the research is indeed to test how much controversy it produces among scholars.

The calculation of the indices of governmental power for many European countries, parties and elections is very time consuming. For this reason, it will not be carried out until there is sufficient confidence in the validity of the index. Yet even for the index of governmental power, for the index of coalition potential, I think it is useful to give an idea of the shape of the final data set. For this purpose I have run a test computing the

governmental power index for European socialist parties in the period between 1918 and 1966. In Figure 3.4 are reported the values of this index by each individual cabinet and cumulatively over time (i.e. adding over time the governmental power of each cabinet). While the "over-time" values give an idea of the short term fluctuations in the governmental fortunes of the socialist parties, the cabinet values offer a historical synthetic overview of the governmental power accumulated by each of them.

Coalition potential, governmental power and party system change

Once one has at one's disposal two acceptable indicators of the potential for cabinet coalition of each party and of its record of governmental role, it is possible to describe and study party systems from the point of view of how these aspects are distributed among their units and over time, and also model a general theoretical framework for the governmental role of parties. Such a framework is summarized in Figure 3.5.

Configuration and format factors directly influence coalition potential and only indirectly, through it, governmental power. The non-spatial version of the index of coalition potential should be closely associated with the numerological and distribution conditions of the party system and much less with the actual governmental power of the parties. The extent to which the two—coalition potential and governmental power—associate is an indirect indicator of the influence of spatial-ideological and political factors that prevent potential strength being directly translated into actual power. In a world of rational actors deprived of any motivation other than power-seeking, the two indices should in the long run coincide.

Traditional *ideological factors* enter into the picture, introducing sympathies or compatibility among parties, as a result of past experiences. The spatial rank-ordering of the parties can be considered as a valid indicator of this historical compatibility and can be incorporated in the index of coalition potential when it is computed on the basis of left-right ordered party units. To the extent that parties can be reduced into a single-dimensional rank-ordering, these factors should be measured by the "spatial" (and "spatial with jump") version of the index. In a world of ideologically ordered, power-seeking actors such an index should approach the actual governmental power over a sufficiently long period of time.

What intervenes between a spatially conceived coalition potential and governmental power can be conceptualized as the black box of *"other" political factors* not measured by any potential index. These factors do not pertain either to the numerological structure of opportunities offered by the party system, or to the historical ideological sympathies firmly established among parties. They are more idiosyncratic and short-term elements, normally the kind of factors which we invoke in explaining why one cabinet was formed rather than another one. We can only try to regroup them into three categories: aspects pertaining to the *cohesion* of the adversaries (of each given party); aspects pertaining to the *issue bargainability;* and aspects pertaining to the presence of *legitimacy perceptions.*

For each given party, its change of access and its role in cabinet will depend upon the cohesion and the willingness or capacity of the other parties to coalesce. Secondly, parties

gain earlier, more frequent and more stable access to executive responsibility the more their policy requests are bargainable with those of the other forces with which they have to make coalitions. The third set of factors that may introduce strong deviations in the relations between coalition potential and governmental power measures is the presence in the system of legitimacy dimensions cutting across the spatial dimension of the party system, identifying certain parties as unacceptable coalition partners (the bases for anti-system perception may be numerous). The presence of such dimensions lowers the governmental role of a party—and correspondingly increases the governmental role of the others—far beyond what would be expected on the basis of its coalition potential both "blind" and "spatial." Briefly, discontinuities in the space of competition can be both conceptualized and measured as otherwise non-explicable discrepancies between potential and actual governmental role.

The many political factors that crowd the black box and make governmental power deviate markedly from coalition potential can normally be easily identified within one specific context at a given moment in time, but they are hard to chart systematically in a broad comparative and historical perspective. However, we may try to come to an indirect appreciation of their weight, if not of their specific nature, precisely by studying the discrepancy between potential and actual party power for which they are thought to be responsible. Their impact will be measured by this discrepancy. They have to be considered as a residual element of the variance of governmental power explained by the party system configurational elements and by the ideological spatial ordering expressed by the versions of the index of coalition potential. The more the two diverge, the more one can think of these factors as being important. If a given high coalition potential does not correspond to a similarly high governmental role, one can imagine that powerful political contextual factors contribute to delaying or even reducing the governmental chances. If, on the contrary, access to cabinet responsibility proves to be frequent and important even in cases and circumstances of low coalition potential, then one might make the case that political factors (high issue bargainability, high systemic integration, high divisiveness of adversaries) enhance such potential. In cases in which coalition potential tends to equal governmental power, the conclusion is that numerological and format opportunities and spatial orderings tend to be quite naturally transformed into actual governmental power, implying a small role for intervening political context variables.

Beyond the improvement in the methodological tools for the descriptive account and comparative interpretation of long-term change in party systems, the parallel study of coalition potential and governmental power may prove particularly useful for the investigation and test of classic as well as new theoretical issues and concerns. Let me conclude by mentioning a few of these possibilities.

Party systems may be characterized by distribution measures of these indices, and the change over time of their predominant pattern of coalition can be studied through them. To give an example, in theory a *perfect* two-party system can be characterized as a system in which the coalition potential averages around 50 percent, and the difference between such potential and governmental power is nil. At the other extreme, a center-based coalitional system is characterized by considerable differences between the potential and actual governmental role of the parties according to their spatial location. In principle, a



Figure 3.4 Cabinet and cumulative governmental power of the socialist parties, 1918–66













Key

governmental power

—— cumulative ····· by cabinet

Bottom axis shows some of the cabinet beginning dates for the relevant period.



Figure 3.5 A theoretical framework for the analysis of governmental power

promising application of the indices provides exactly the possibility of modeling—on the basis of the cross-party distribution of the indices' differences—different types of party systems and of monitoring over time their departure from the predominant model.

A more specific theoretical use of these measures can be sought studying issues such as:

(1) The determinants of both the coalition potential and the governmental power can test the hypotheses here advanced about their main determinants. Coalition potentials should be strongly associated with party system format variables and spatial positioning of parties, while governmental potentials should be less so.

(2) The discrepancies between potential and actual values can be used to characterize different political contexts (or periods) for the role in them of political factors independent of both numerological opportunities and spatial compatibility. More precisely, the extent to which parties and party systems are characterized by pure office-seeking drives can be empirically estimated considering the discrepancies between coalition potentials and governmental roles.

(3) The validity of spatial location of parties can be tested through the study of how their coalition potentials vary as a function of their presumed spatial location. For instance, it is possible to study how the coalition potential varies for parties of the same size according to their spatial location. More generally, the coalition potential for equally sized parties can be studied relating it to the variation in the number of parties, dominance and other systemic properties.

(4) Issues like the loss of dimensionality of the party system, of the consequent increasing promiscuity and freedom of coalition-making among parties can be studied with these indices. The underlying argument is that the less ideological and political factors impinge upon coalition compatibility, the more the governmental power should approach

the coalition potential. Comparative coalition theories can be improved by the availability of an independent measure of coalition potential for each party. Moreover, the concept of party "coalition performance" can be conceived as a ratio between coalition potential and coalition power. This would give these theories the possibility of going beyond the simple forecast of individual coalitions and the study of the empirical variance explained by each of them. The historical and contemporary question of the entry into government of new parties can be approached establishing whether their early or late incorporation can be attributed to format, ideological or political factors. With these indices we possess a more objective base upon which to decide which has played a dominant role.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Stefano Bocconi who developed the DOS programme for the calculation of the Shapley-Shubik algorithm and Massimiliano Miglio who actually computed the index for all the European elections.

Notes

1 Pelinka computes this index as the difference between (a) the distance from the 50 percent threshold and (b) the distance from the second strongest or the strongest party in the system: D=(b—a). I have preferred to keep the two aspects separate, calling the first "distance from the median seat" and the second "dominance."

2 In order to reduce the number of units of the party system and the factorial computations which they entail, I have excluded all those parties which obtain less than 2 percent of the seats and considered coalitions including up to four parties.

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4
PARTIES, PARTY SYSTEMS AND POLICY EFFECTS

Uwe Wagschal

Introduction

Two substantial dimensions of public policy in industrialized democracies are taxes and public debt. They are closely related: the annual deficit is the difference between government expenditures and government revenues. These variables will be analyzed in this study, while focusing on how parties influence them. Ascertaining the influence of parties on public policies has a long tradition in comparative public policy research. It began in the work of Douglas Hibbs (1977). Within this field there are many other scholars such as Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Cameron (1978), Castles (1982), Schmidt (1982) and Tufte (1978), to mention only a few. Behind the "parties-do-matter" proposition that all these writers adhere to lies the assumption that there are distinct differences in the ideologies of parties.

This partisan theory is based on several assumptions which should be fulfilled if one wants to identify party effects (Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1996). Firstly, the constituencies of the parties have different preferences about public policies. Political parties tend to adopt the preferences of their social constituencies. The major goals of parties—according to Downs (1957) and Schumpeter (1993)—are office-seeking and vote-maximizing. Once elected, the incumbent party implements policies in accordance with the preferences of its constituency. This means that the government has the capacity to act and to realize these policies. Partisan differences, therefore, lead to variations in the policy output.

According to Hibbs's partisan theory, left-wing governments produce higher debt and deficits. The core constituency of parties of the left favors low unemployment in contrast to low inflation rates. In times of high unemployment this results in more spending. All things being equal, this leads to a bigger deficit. Furthermore, low income groups have stronger preferences for public expenditures, e.g. social welfare, which can also drive the deficit up. Further support for this argument is that left-wing governments adopt Keynesian policies. According to Buchanan and Wagner (1977:24), this is the "intellectual legitimacy" leading towards a deficit bias.

Standard public opinion that left-wing governments cause higher deficits than right-wing ones is a view that has been challenged by theories from Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). Both theories suggest that governments use the public debt to influence the policy of their successors, which would mean that debt is a strategic

instrument. The two theories discuss the behavior of governments that are in danger of not being re-elected. Persson and Svensson analyzed the behavior of a conservative party in office. They found that a "stubborn" conservative government will produce high debt and deficits in order to influence the politics, and so the policies, of its left-wing successor. Hence, the following left-wing government will not be able to initiate all projects in accordance with its ideology. The "low spender" influences the "big spender," which is diametrically opposite to the reasoning derived from the partisan theory. In contrast to this view, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) analyze the strategic use of deficits without distinguishing between political parties. This is similar to the Nordhaus hypothesis (Nordhaus 1975), which also imputes no differences in governmental behavior of parties.

From the logic of the "tax-smoothing hypothesis" (Barro 1974), another causal model can be derived. The original "tax-smoothing hypothesis" is based on the Ricardian equivalence theorem. Within this theory taxes and deficits are equal. Governments use the deficit as an instrument to reduce tax rates and to smooth economic distortions caused by high taxation (see also Alesina and Perotti 1994). An extension of this argumentation, which I will label the "political tax-smoothing hypothesis," leads to the result that bourgeois governments produce higher deficits than leftist governments (Wagschal 1996). The difference between the models is that the political tax-smoothing hypothesis does not use rigid assumptions, such as an infinite time horizon or a mathematical model, while the resemblances are the possible choice between taxes and public debt and the policy results of lower taxes and higher deficits. The reason for this governmental behavior—by an analogy to the Hibbs theory—is the constituency of the parties. The driving force for high deficits are again the voters but now those of the bourgeois party. Because of their ideology, right-wing governments always want to reduce tax rates, to lessen the burden for their clientele, and deficits. We assume that the government has to a certain extent the power to choose between taxes and deficits as sources of revenue. The core constituency of bourgeois parties profits more from tax cuts than low income groups do. To achieve its main goal of re-election, the government uses the policy instrument that has short-term effects in increasing the real income of their electorate and maximizes the probability of being re-elected. It is therefore quite clear that a bourgeois government cuts tax rates.

The main questions are: why do parties choose a certain tax and debt policy? Can one find evidence for their choice in the party manifestos and within their electorate? The outline is as follows: the next section analyzes taxes and deficits in the OECD countries and their links with the complexion of governments. The following section looks at the ideology of parties, types of party family and their orientation towards free market and tax cuts or towards interventionism. Also a more detailed look at party systems has been undertaken. The section after that deals with the voters directly, namely their party affiliation and their orientation towards free enterprise and taxes. The last section summarizes the findings.

The impact of parties on taxes and deficits

Table 4.1 displays the relation between the political tendency in government and general government revenues (calculated as percentage of GDP (gross domestic product)). The

Table 4.1 Party complexion of governments and general government revenues

Tendency in government	*Average total receipts of general government (1960–92)*	*Number of valid cases*	*Average total receipts of general government (1973–92)*	*Number of valid cases*
Bourgeois hegemony	36.31	270	39.05	176
Bourgeois dominance	35.41	93	38.59	60
Balance	39.57	73	42.32	49
Left party dominance	44.16	36	46.36	26
Left party hegemony	44.27	86	43.96	78
Average and number	38.20	558	40.87	389

Notes: Hegemony means the share of cabinet seats equals 100 percent. Dominance means the share of cabinet seats ranges betwecn 66.6 percent and 100 percent. Balance means that both tendencies have cabinet shares greater than 33.3 percent and equal to or less than 66.6 percent. The classifications are based on yearly data.
For the period 1960–92 the following 18 countries are in the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. In addition, Greece, Portugal and Spain, since becoming democratic, are included.
Total receipts of general government are measured in relation to GDP.
Sources: Schmidt 1992:396 and OECD.

ordinal party variable, based on the share of cabinet seats, has five categories (Schmidt 1992:396). Comparing the means for each category shows that under bourgeois governments the revenues are lower than under left-wing governments. This statement holds also true for central government and for other research designs such as correlation and regression analysis. The result of lower taxes and expenditures under bourgeois governments is—of course—not new but well established in comparative public policy research (Cameron 1978; Castles 1982).

The next step is to look at budget deficits. Table 4.2 examines the relation between the average budget deficit (calculated as a percentage of GDP) and the party complexion of governments in OECD countries. The results are surprising and contrary to the hypothesis based on the Hibbs's theory and public opinion, which suggest that left parties produce higher debt and deficits. As one can see, the overall average budget deficits for left party dominance and left party hegemony in government are remarkably lower than the corresponding bourgeois ones. One can therefore identify a bias of bourgeois governments towards relatively higher deficits. Going into more detail and applying correlation analysis supports this result. This holds for the central and general level of government and other similar dependent variables. The use of different party indicators confirms the robustness of these findings. Multivariate regressions and pooled time series support this result, which is valid for different time periods (Wagschal 1996).

How then can one explain these findings? In the introduction, three possible explanations were offered. According to Persson and Svensson (1989), a conservative government produces a high debt in order to influence the policies of its left-wing

Table 4.2 Party complexion of governments and general government deficits

Tendency in government	*Average budget deficit of general government (1960–92)*	*Number of cases*	*Average budget deficit of general government (1973–92)*	*Number of cases*
Bourgeois hegemony	−1.85	270	−3.13	176
Bourgeois dominance	−2.75	93	−4.92	60
Balance	−1.42	73	−3.03	49
Left party dominance	−0.62	36	−1.68	26
Left party hegemony	−0.13	86	−2.45	78
Average number	−1.60	558	−3.16	389

Notes: The classifications are based on yearly data. For countries and definition of tendency in government see Table 4.1.
Total receipts of general government are measured in relation to GDP.
Sources: Schmidt 1992:396 and OECD.

successor. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) argue that any government, irrespective of its ideology, will leave a higher debt to its successor.[1] Both views can be criticized.

According to the economic theory of democracy, the main objective of parties is winning elections and vote-maximizing. For that reason, the rationale of incumbent parties for debt politics is a different one. They produce higher deficits in order to be re-elected and not to influence the possibilities for other parties if they are facing losing power. This is the theory of political business cycles (Nordhaus 1975). In addition, political parties offer different programs and policies. Corresponding to their ideology, bourgeois parties want to strengthen market forces, reduce tax rates, reduce budget deficits and the public sector. In a world of uncertainty, it is essential for parties to stick to their platforms. Responsibility and reliability are necessary for the success of parties. Without consistency and integrity they will be defeated (Downs 1957:108). As the mandate theory has proved (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1990), this holds in real-world politics. Persson and Svensson argue in the opposite direction. The "stubborn" conservative government, which produces a high debt, acts against its own ideology and therefore becomes untrustworthy. Once credibility is lost, its election chances in the long run will be significantly reduced. This motive for high deficits and their effect on subsequent behavior seems very implausible.

The third explanation of high deficits and low tax rates under bourgeois governments is the "political tax-smoothing hypothesis." This theory seems to be much more realistic, and empirical evidence for this view will be given in the next two sections. Under equal conditions, the political tax-smoothing hypothesis predicts that bourgeois governments reduce taxes and increase deficits because their constituency benefits from that. Wealthier people vote for bourgeois parties; one of their main economic motivations is to pay lower taxes. For the average left-wing voter, the rationale is a different one. Low income groups have a lower tax burden and benefit more from the redistribution of wealth effected by high-spending left-wing governments. Strong evidence for this argument can be found in

the US during the 1980s with its big tax cuts and exploding deficits, and in Sweden under the Bildt government.

Ideology, parties and party manifestos

If parties really do make a difference this should be reflected in their programmatic positions. This is the subject of the research project on party manifestos (Budge *et al.* 1987). In this section, election programmes of sixteen OECD countries during the post-war period from 1945 to 1988 will be examined.[2] The goal of looking at party manifestos is threefold. The first hypothesis is that there are differences in the party programmes, regarding the key economic issues. The second hypothesis is that there are also different *types* of parties, with divergent programmatic profiles. Looking only at the ideological location of a party on the left-right scale is insufficient because the type of party is of great importance. Take, for example, religious and liberal parties. Both are classified as center parties but in their attitudes to free enterprise or state intervention there might be big differences. A more detailed look at the type of party certainly gives more information about the key issues inside a party system. The third point to be considered is what changes in election programs, if any, have occurred after the first oil crisis (in 1973), because this is the starting point of the economic crisis and of growing deficits.

If the political tax-smoothing hypothesis holds, it should be possible to identify major differences in the issues concerning the economy, especially when looking at the overall attitudes of the parties towards the free-market and state intervention. Right-wing and bourgeois parties should have strong preferences for tax cuts, free enterprise and welfare state limitation, while left-wing parties should have a disposition for interventionist policies. In the manifesto data set, which consists of fifty-six categories (variables) derived from content analysis, it is possible to identify several program issues for both policy dimensions: (1) pro-market and against taxation (PROMARKT)[3] versus (2) pro-intervention (INTERVEN).[4] Each variable is calculated as the sum of eight content categories closely related to the respective policy field.

Table 4.3 presents the data showing the relation between the ideology of parties and their economic orientation. It displays the means of the two aggregated variables and two different time periods. One would expect that the more rightist a party, the stronger the preference for "pro-market" issues and the weaker on "pro-intervention" it will be, and vice versa, the more leftist a party is. Indeed, one can clearly observe this pattern, except for the ultra-right parties and their programmatic position "pro-market" (both periods). Looking at their "pro-intervention" attitude, they became less enthusiastic about interventionism after the first oil crisis. The overall correlation for both periods between the party ideology and the *pro-market variable* is r_s=0.53 and for the *pro-intervention variable* Spearman rank correlation is r_s=-0.51, which supports the hypothesis. The differences between both variables and time periods show that ultra-left parties became much more interventionistic after the first oil crisis. Moderate left and moderate right parties changed only a little in a more "pro-market" direction, while the difference for the center parties remained constant. The greatest change is observed for ultra-right parties. During the 1970s and 1980s, they were much more strongly pro-market.

Table 4.3 Ideology and the economic orientation of parties

	Pro-market and against taxation[a]		*Pro-intervention*[a]		*Number of cases*	
Ideology	*1945–73*	*1974–88*	*1945–73*	*1974–88*	*1945–73*	*1974–88*
Ultra-left	5.05	3.61	25.73	30.13	59	42
Moderate left	8.31	8.29	27.60	24.70	140	91
Center	16.40	14.18	16.34	14.18	257	154
Moderate right	20.67	22.94	11.04	10.66	128	74
Ultra-right	11.67	16.89	12.71	6.78	9	7
Average	14.21	13.33	18.73	17.75	593	368

Notes: Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands and the USA.
a=sum of eight aggregated variables (descriptions see endnotes 3 and 4).
Classifications of parties according to von Beyme (1984) and Lane, McKay and Newton (1991).
Cell entries (columns 2 to 5) are averages of the selected content categories ("quasi-sentences").
High values indicate strong approval.
Source: DATASET CMPr3, Comparative Manifesto Project.

Within each of the five categories of the variable *Ideology* one finds a great heterogeneity. Parties classified as "center" can be liberal, Christian Democratic, or center parties. Moderate right parties are not only one type of party, too. Here we have conservative, some agrarian and some minor religious parties. A closer and more detailed look at the type of party reveals what kinds of parties tend to be stronger against taxation and pro-market.

In studying Table 4.4 we have several possible modes of comparison. Firstly, we can identify the types of parties with high preferences for pro-market policies or pro-intervention policies. Secondly, we can look at the differences between the two time periods within one variable. Thirdly, we can compare the differences between both variables and their change over time. The strongest propensity to free market and low taxation have "discontent" parties, which are usually "tax protest" parties demanding big reductions in taxes, such as the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway, as well as the Poujadists in France. Conservative parties and, surprisingly, agrarian parties also put a strong emphasis on the market. On the one hand, agrarian parties favor a well-functioning market but on the other, they have the strongest preference for protectionism. Astonishingly, liberal parties are less in favor of the market, which can be explained by their emphasis on personal freedom, civil rights and external relations. Amazing also is the relatively high pro-intervention score for liberals. The Communists and socialists are most in favor of intervention, but Religious parties also put a relatively high value on interventionistic policies, and this led in the past to welfare state expansion.

Analyzing the variations within each variable, we can detect that religious parties especially, and mainly Christian Democrats, were less pro-market after the first oil crisis. The other changes are minor, except for regional parties. The biggest changes regarding pro-intervention policies can be seen in extremist parties at both ends of the scale.

Table 4.4 Type of party family and economic orientation

	Pro-market and against taxation[a]		*Pro-intervention*[a]		*Number of cases*	
Type of party family	*1945–73*	*1974–88*	*1945–73*	*1974–88*	*1945–73*	*1974–88*
Communits/left-socialist	5.05	3.61	25.73	30.13	59	42
Socialist	8.25	9.16	27.49	25.48	143	82
Green	n.a.	1.24	n.a.	17.46	0	5
Liberals	17.30	15.90	15.64	13.97	151	86
Religious	15.25	10.99	16.89	15.80	82	48
Conservative	21.48	21.84	12.27	11.68	110	60
Agrarian	20.13	21.09	12.36	10.64	27	15
Regional/Ethnic	5.74	9.43	7.33	10.65	9	15
Discontent/Protest	29.11	30.16	4.95	7.15	3	10
Extreme right/Fascist	4.61	2.40	14.03	3.82	8	4

Notes: a=sum of eight aggregated variables (descriptions see endnotes 3 and 4). Cell entries (columns 2 to 5) are averages of the selected content categories ("quasi-sentences"). High values indicate strong approval.
Source: For data, countries and classifications of parties, see Table 4.3.

Communist parties become much more interventionist, while ultra-right parties show a greater condemnation of these policies.

Comparing the differences between the two variables for both periods as a measure of the overall tendency towards free enterprise, we can identify a slight move pro-market for agrarian and socialist parties and a strong move for ultra-right parties. Liberal, conservative and discontent parties remain nearly constant in their distance from both pro-market and interventionist policies, while Communist and religious parties experience the opposite, moving away from free enterprise. Taking all results into account, one can further conclude that there is no convergence in the party systems, contrary to Thomas's analysis (1979).

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 support the political tax-smoothing hypothesis. Bourgeois parties have a stronger propensity in their election manifestos for more market activities and lower levels of intervention. However, only looking at the party and ideological level does not take into account that governments produce taxes and deficits. It is also useful to examine the election manifestos before parties participate in government. Examination of the incumbent parties provides strong evidence that bourgeois parties are nevertheless more market-orientated than left-wing parties. An interesting fact is that one can now discover only slight distinctions between liberal and conservative parties. Religious parties are still more interventionistic and less likely to support free enterprise. The high intervention level for socialist parties is a compelling reason to expect higher taxes because of redistribution policies and engagement in the public sector. Both will probably lead to higher levels of spending and higher tax burdens. Disregarding nuances and

details, the presented findings indicate a clear distinction between left-wing and right-wing parties in their attitude to the economy.

The findings presented so far indicate substantial differences between parties. The next step should be to ask whether or not these differences are related to party systems. Parties are operating within party systems and therefore the ideological differences and the left-right positions should also be connected to party systems. Figure 4.1 gives a general overview about the ideological location of parties in twenty-one democracies. These locations on the graph are derived from expert judgements for each party (Laver and Hunt 1992) and are based on four important policy dimensions (e.g. increases for services versus tax cuts and the attitude to public ownership).

Most parties are located in the center category, which seems to support the old hypothesis from Downs that parties are tending to move towards the median position. Nevertheless, in nearly all countries, parties appear also in the moderate left and moderate right sections. This map of the political landscape is, however, insufficient if one wants to take the strength of the parties into account. To get more detailed information, one can first look at the ideological gap between the two largest parties of a given system, which are usually the major party of the left and the major party of the bourgeois camp (except in Ireland, Canada and the USA). A second possibility is to calculate a polarization index based on the formula for the variance. The advantage of the first indicator is that it gives a clear dichotomous structure of the party system, reflecting the counterbalance of the two largest parties, one from each side of the political spectrum. Its disadvantage is that it disregards some relevant parties. In contrast, the polarization index considers the strength of all parties and their ideological location.

The spatial theory of democracy suggests differences between the type of party system and the ideological distance of the parties. As the party manifesto data have shown, no overall change towards convergence within the party systems has been observed over time. Polarization and ideological distance are dependent on several factors. These factors can be party system fragmentation, the type of political competition (centripetal versus centrifugal), the differences between political systems (parliamentary versus semi-presidential systems), the relations between government and opposition (e.g. fundamental opposition, issue-orientated or a cooperative opposition), the different types of political culture (e.g. competitive Westminster democracies versus consociational democracies), the extent of political extremism and the occurrence of different cleavages. Despite these intervening variables the general hypothesis of the spatial theory is that a two-party system favors low polarization, while a highly fragmented multi-party system is likely to produce a high degree of polarization.

What can be concluded if we look at the relation between the party systems and the ideological indicators, derived from expert judgements at different time points (Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver and Hunt 1992)? A longitudinal comparison is formally not possible with this data because of big differences in data collection and measurement. However, Table 4.5 gives some fruitful insights into the party systems and party system change. Though there are several possibile ways to classify party systems (e.g. von Beyme's classification), the first column of Table 4.5 sticks to the degree of the fragmentation of party systems measured by the Rae index. The division



Notes: Only parties are considered that had at least 2 percent of the valid votes (on average) at the last three elections before January 1993 (in total 109 parties) and which are classified by Laver and Hunt (1992). Four policy dimensions are used for the classification. Data for Switzerland is from Sartori 1982: 9.

Figure 4.1 Position of parties on a left-right scale in twenty-one democracie es

Table 4.5 Fragmentation and polarization of party systems

		Ideological gap between the two major parties[a]			*Polarization of the party system*	
Data source		*Castles & Mair (1984)*	*Laver & Hunt (1992)*	*Huber & Inglehart (1995)*	*Castles & Mair (1984)*	*Laver & Hunt (1992)*
Year referred to in data		*1982*	*1989*	*1993*	*1982*	*1989*
Party system fragmentation	*Low*	0.27(6)	0.26(7)	0.23(6)	2.19(6)	8.70(7)
	Medium	0.39(6)	0.32(8)	0.30(8)	4.62(6)	13.34(8)
	High	0.39(5)	0.33(5)	0.36(6)	4.84(5)	14.12(5)

Note: a=all three indicators are standarized on the interval 0.0 (minimum) to 1.0 (maximum). Number of cases is in parentheses. The fragmentation categories are calculated with the vote shares from the last three elections in each country before January 1993 (derived from the Rae index). All data for the ideological gap and the polarization indices are based on expert judgements.

into three sub-categories is based on the last three consecutive elections in each country before January 1993.

Comparing the means for each category of the party system fragmentation leads to the conclusion that party systems with low fragmentation have smaller ideological distances between the two major parties. However, there seem to be only small differences between the medium and highly fragmented party systems in the ideological gap of the two major parties. This reflects the problem of a clear distinction between polarized and restricted party systems. Though the difference in the magnitude of the polarization indices is due to the different coding schemes, the picture is similar: the level of polarization in medium and highly fragmented party systems varies only to a small extent. Going into detail, idiosyncratic factors can explain this finding, e.g. in a consociational democracy such as Switzerland the conflict between government and opposition, as well as strict accountability of policies, have never played such an important part as in typical Westminster systems. Moreover, the pattern of the ideological distance seems to be relatively stable over time and over the different categories, though a longitudinal comparison is problematic with that data. The party system fragmentation can be traced back to the formation of cleavages within a society (Lijphart 1984) but the left—right distance depends on many more factors, of which the class conflict is the most important one (Huber and Inglehart 1995).

Value orientations of voters

After identifying different tax and debt policies between left and bourgeois governments and showing supporting evidence with party manifesto data, the next step is to go to the micro-level. Can value-based differences be identified in the attitudes towards free enterprise and taxation controlling for the left-right placement of the voters? Are there differences between countries? The meaning of left-right is fundamental for understanding

politics. For individuals, the dichotomy between left and right reduces the complexity of politics. It is certain that left and right are multi-dimensional concepts and its understanding varies throughout the western democracies (Dalton 1988:25). However, in Europe, the vast majority of voters are able to recognize the left—right dimension and to place themselves on a left—right scale (Klingemann 1995).

Knutsen (1995) understands—on the micro-level—the left-right identification as an expression of values and ideological orientations. He stresses the left-right materialist value orientations in his analysis as the most important conflict dimension in industrial societies. Further, new value orientations stress the role of libertarian versus authoritarian orientations and environmental values. One of Knutsen's conclusions is that left-right materialist orientations still have a great impact on left-right self-placement. This is in accordance with the historical formation of the cleavage between capital and labor, which is regarded as the most salient. As Lijphart (1984:130) has demonstrated, this issue dimension, he labelled it "socio-economic," is prevalent in all democratic party systems.

The main focus on the micro-level is on the attitudes to taxation, free market and the role of the government in the economy. For the following analysis an indicator, based on surveys in OECD countries, has been constructed. This index measures the "pro-market and against taxation" orientation of the respondents. The data base for the index construction is the International Social Survey Programme 1992, which originally covered seventeen countries, including ten OECD countries. The index "pro-market and against taxation" orientation is based on six items (each is on a five-point scale): (1) Government should reduce income differences; (2) Government should provide jobs for all; (3) Government should provide basic income for all; (4) Level of taxation for high incomes; (5) Level of taxation for middle incomes; (6) Allowing business to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone's standard of living.

The response alternatives for questions 1, 2, 3 and 6 were: (1) "Strongly agree," (2) "Agree," (3) "Neither agree nor disagree," (4) "Disagree," (5) "Strongly disagree." For questions 4 and 5 the possible answers were: (1) "Much too high," (2) "Too high," (3) "About right," (4) "Too low," (5) "Much too low." The construction of the variable is as follows: the scores of the "leftist" items are added (questions 1, 2 and 3) and the scores of the "rightist" items are subtracted (questions 4, 5 and 6). The extreme values are -12 for the most "leftist" point of view and +12 for the most "rightist" position, which indeed both occurred in the sample. The higher the scores, the stronger the affection for the market was. The average for this variable is -0.87 (n=11,105) in the ten OECD countries, which means on average a slightly stronger interventionistic attitude of the respondents. Between the different countries one can observe big variations. The univariate averages vary between 0.75 (USA) and–2.36 (Italy).

The aim of this section is to reveal relations between the left-right placement of the voters and their pro-market orientation. The "voters' ideology" variable used in the analysis is based on questions about the party identification of the respondents. The respondents are then classified into five categories ("far left," "left," "center," "liberal," "right, conservative," "far right"). Table 4.6 divides the parties into five categories, according to the classification used in the party manifesto data set, which I based on the classifications of several scholars (mainly von Beyme 1984; Lane *et al.* 1991). Owing to a lack of data for

two countries concerning this variable, only eight OECD countries could be analyzed. Table 4.6 displays the overall mean, and the means for each country, as well as for each category of the party affiliation. The expectation was that the more rightist a respondent is, the stronger the disposition for lower taxation and free enterprise will be. For all countries this holds true only for the first four categories. People classified as "far right" have strong tendencies for interventionistic policies. However, it should be noted that only respondents from West Germany and Norway appear in this category. Compared with the findings from the research on party manifestos one can detect many similarities. The analysis of the "pro-market orientation" has also shown that ultra-right parties do not have the strongest tendency for pro-market policies. The level varies between the moderate left and the center parties (see Table 4.3), which correspond with the findings of Table 4.6. One can therefore identify a relation between the left-right position of the voter and his or her orientation towards the market.

The overall correlation between both variables is r_s=0.37, with large differences between the respective countries. Looking at the correlations between the "voters' ideology" and the "pro-market and against taxation orientation" reveals also differences between the various nations. The highest correlations can be found in Great Britain (r_s=0.52), Sweden (r_s=0.52) and Norway (r_s—0.46), whereas the lowest correlations are in Austria (r_s=0.13) and Germany (r,=0.22). In comparison with those presented by Knutsen (1995), these results are not very surprising. His confirmed hypothesis was that left—right materialist values have the largest impact in Protestant countries. When one correlates the share of Protestants with the ranked correlation coefficients, this relationship is also established within this study (r_s=0.86). In Catholic and mixed religious countries religious values are of great importance for left—right placement, while in other countries materialist or postmaterialist orientations seem to matter more.

Comparing the distribution of the voters and the parties' positions towards free enterprise, very similar patterns can be seen within each country. This strongly supports the hypothesis that parties adapt their programs to the preferences of their constituencies. There are only a few exceptions. The first is the difference between the election program of the Progress Party in Norway and its voters. The Progress Party is classified as far right. It strongly advocates the strengthening of market forces and reductions in taxes. Voters for the Progress Party are much more interventionistically orientated than it appears in the election manifestos of this party. The second exception is the contrast between the election programs of the Social Credit or Social Democrats in New Zealand and their voters. Social Credit voters are much more leftist than is visible in the program of this party. Thirdly, quite strong anti-market attitudes are noticeable in Republikaner voters in Germany. This party does not appear in the party manifesto data set and for that reason it is not possible to compare it.

The main conclusion of this section is that one can identify a clear tendency that voters of center, liberal and conservative parties tend to favor low taxation and free enterprise in comparison to voters of Social Democratic and far left parties. Usually, voters of conservative parties have stronger preferences in this direction than center parties. This pattern can be detected in all examined OECD countries, with some minor exceptions.

Table 4.6 Party affiliation and pro-market orientation in eight OECD countries

	All countries	*Austria*	*Australia*	*Germany (West)*	*Great Britain*	*Norway*	*New Zealand*	*Sweden*	*United States*
Far left	−4.52	−5.00		−7.00		−4.42		−4.65	
	(181)	(2)		(5)		(154)		(20)	
Left	−1.88	−2.08	−0.95	−2.52	−3.75	−2.79	−2.00	−1.64	−0.64
	(3427)	(280)	(946)	(663)	(316)	(255)	(480)	(133)	(354)
Center, Liberal	−0.69	−0.98		−0.31	−2.31	−2.39	−3.82	0.27	0.42
	(1497)	(208)		(456)	(138)	(195)	(22)	(102)	(376)
Right, Conservative	1.44	−1.42	2.04	−2.07	0.79	1.40	0.75	2.83	2.78
	(2396)	(71)	(812)	(92)	(365)	(211)	(425)	(102)	(318)
Far right	−0.24			−4.50		−0.12			
	(70)			(2)		(68)			
Average number	−0.64	−1.60	0.43	−1.68	−1.48	−1.78	−0.78	0.02	0.78
	(7571)	(561)	(1758)	(1218)	(819)	(883)	(927)	(357)	(1048)

Note: "Pro-market and against taxation orientation"=additive indicator consisting of 6 five-item-scale answers (see text). High values indicate a stronger pro-market orientation. In the cells the means of each category are displayed. Number of respondents is in parentheses.
Source: ISSP 1992–Social Inequality II.

The strength of this relationship varies between the analyzed countries. However, the presented findings support our political tax-smoothing hypothesis to a great extent.

Conclusions

The analysis reveals that bourgeois governments produce higher deficits and debt than left-wing governments. On the other hand, bourgeois governments favor lower taxes, which is best explained by the political tax-smoothing hypothesis. Political parties are acting in agreement with their constituency. The core constituency of left-wing parties belongs mainly to low income groups, while the core constituency of bourgeois parties belongs to wealthier stratas. People with higher incomes have strong preferences for low tax rates while poor people favor redistribution and therefore, higher tax rates. Bourgeois governments choose, to some extent, between the two sources of revenue. They choose the option "tax cuts" and "deficits" for two reasons: firstly because it is a main objective of their electorate and secondly because it gives them the greater chances for re-election.

The study also unveils divergent interests in the election manifestos of the political parties. Left-wing parties put a stronger emphasis on interventionism, while bourgeois parties are much more in favor of "pro-market policies" (including low tax rates). A disaggregated research shows widespread differences within the group of bourgeois parties. Compared to conservatives and liberals, the Christian Democratic parties are anti-market and pro-intervention. Looking at the types of party family and their economic orientation before and after the first oil crisis, we can see a high stability for these issues, which indicates no overall convergence within the party systems. Moreover, there are significant differences between the degree of fragmentation and polarization of the party systems.

On the level of the voters, one can also identify different attitudes towards tax cuts and free enterprise, according to their ideological placement. The pattern of the voters' left-right positions and their pro-market orientation is similar to the pattern revealed in the election manifestos. The more to the right a voter is, the stronger his or her preference for free enterprise is. This holds with the exception of ultra-right voters, who place stronger emphasis on interventionism. After reviewing the findings, there seems strong evidence for the validity of the political tax-smoothing hypothesis. Furthermore, this also strengthens the "parties-do-matter" view.

Notes

1 Alesina and Tabellini (1990:404) identify three conditions under which the public debt is higher than its social optimum: (1) the larger the degree of polarization is between alternating governments; (2) the higher the probability is that the current government will not be re-appointed; (3) the more rigid is the downward trend in public consumption. Empirical tests have shown that this theory is not very convincing (Wagschal 1996: 121).

2 The database is the DATASET CMPr3 (author A. Volkens), the Comparative Manifestos Project, Programmatic Profiles of Political Countries in 20 Countries, 1945–1988. The non-OECD countries and Luxembourg are omitted from the analysis.

3 Sum of 8 content variables=per401 (Free enterprise) + per402 (Incentives for enterprises) +per407 (Protectionism: negative) + per410 (Importance of productivity) + per414 (Economic orthodoxy) + per505 (Welfare State Limitation)+ per702 (Labour Groups: Negative) + per704 (Pro Middle Class and Professional Groups). Source: DATASET CMPr3, Comparative Manifestos Project.

4 Sum of 8 content variables=per403 (Market regulation) + per404 (Economic planning) + per409 (Keynesian Demand Management)+per412 (Controlled Economy) + per413 (Nationalization) + per503 (Social Justice) + per504 (Welfare State Expansion) + per701 (Labour Groups: Positive). Source: DATASET CMPr3, Comparative Manifestos Project.

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5
THE TRIAD OF PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE: VOTES, OFFICE AND POLICY

Paul Pennings

Introduction

The three preceding chapters have analyzed three core components of party systems: the electoral, office-related and policy-related aspects of party competition. These aspects affect parties in their roles of vote-seekers, office-seekers and policy-seekers. This concluding chapter of Part 1 examines party system change in relation to the three main party goals that are conceptualized by Strom: votes, office and policy (Strom 1990). Party competition and cooperation are the result of both the office-seeking and policy-seeking motives of parties, which are in turn modified or intensified by the party system. Although the causes and consequences of party system change are manifold and although numerous authors have stressed the multi-dimensionality of party system change, there are few studies that actually analyze the diversity in these changes (Lane 1989; Laver 1989; Wolinetz 1988). Most studies are limited to particular aspects of change and its consequences for interparty relationships. Many studies focus on either the electoral or the office-related or the policy-related aspects of party system change. Examples are studies on the changes in electoral volatility and voting behavior (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair and Smith 1990; Pedersen 1979), coalition formation (Blondel 1968; Taylor and Herman 1971; Warwick 1994) or policy positions (Klingemann *et al.* 1994; Laver and Schofield 1990). Until now, only very few studies provide an all-encompassing empirical outlook on several of these key elements of party system change.

It is my contention that the study of party systems needs to focus on the triad of votes, office and policy that refers to the three main goals of political parties. It may help us to develop a multi-faceted view on party system change according to which major changes in one of these factors do not automatically involve changes in other factors. An increase in volatility, for example, is therefore not in itself a valid indicator of party system change, unless it has identifiable effects on the way a party system functions as a whole.

The analysis of party system change that integrates the votes, office and policy-related aspects of party behavior may start from the party system typology. The typology enables us to distinguish between polities on the basis of two dimensions that relate to the distinctive structures of party competition. The typology is therefore an encompassing heuristic device for the study of party systems. However, this particular virtue of the typology does not necessarily make it useful for the study of party system change. Most

established typologies are inadequate tools to perform longitudinal analysis, mainly owing to the characteristics of typologies in general, but also to the inadequate conceptualization and operationalization of the key variables (Pennings 1997; Schmidt 1995; Ware 1996). In those instances where typologies are used to study party system change, this "change" comes down to the jump from one category to another. This approach to party system change is far from satisfactory. First of all, it takes the premises of the existing typologies for granted; and secondly, it neglects the complexities of the measurement of party system change.

This chapter seeks to improve the utilization of party system typologies for the study of party system change by taking the following consecutive steps:

1 Three competing party system typologies are selected that are based on different (if not opposed) assumptions and hypotheses, which cover all the core components of party systems, in particular variations in the conditions that affect the vote-, office- and policy-seeking behavior of political parties.
2 The underlying dimensions of the typologies are operationalized and all the data are gathered in a time series format in order to enable the longitudinal analysis that is necessary in order to be able to signal party system *change*.
3 The underlying hypotheses are then confronted with the actual development of party systems in order to see to what extent these hypotheses are corroborated by real-world trends.

This three-steps approach enables a theory-guided empirical analysis of party system change that incorporates the three core components of party competition: votes, office and policy.

The party system typologies of Sartori, von Beyme and Lijphart provide the starting point of the analysis because these three typologies reflect the main hypotheses about the causes and effects of the variety of democratic party systems as we know them today. The typologies of Lijphart and Sartori were developed during the mid-1970s (Lijphart 1977; Sartori 1976). Von Beyme's typology was later introduced as a modification of Sartori's typology (von Beyme 1985:261). All these typologies have been widely discussed (and adapted), but are nonetheless quite different in their assumptions and predictions. Lijphart's typology is strictly speaking a classification of democratic systems that has far-reaching implications for the ways in which party systems are assumed to function. In the context of this paper, the typologies of Lijphart and Sartori are discussed as opposites and von Beyme's typology is viewed as an "in-between" typology.

The following two sections will discuss the main characteristics of these typologies, next will come the measurement of the underlying dimensions, followed by the results of matching the three typologies with real-world trends. In the last section it will be concluded that Lijphart's classification and theoretical assumptions provide a relatively good basis to explain the long-term changes in the constituent parts of party systems.

Sartori's and von Beyme's typologies

In Sartori's typology, the independent variable is "party system fragmentation" (indicated by the number of relevant parties) and the intervening variable is ideological distance. These dimensions are dependent as they co-variate directly: the larger the number of parties, the greater the ideological distance is assumed to be (Sartori 1976:291; Lange and Meadwell 1991:88; Ware 1996:172). The co-variation of the number of parties and the ideological distance enables us to reformat Sartori's typology into a one-dimensional scale in which the predominant type is the opposite of the polarized type. This particular kind of one-dimensional scale is also applied by Sartori himself (Sartori 1976:283). One problem with Sartori's typology is that the predominant system, where one party has an enduring winning majority of parliamentary seats, fits rather uneasily with his framework, given that this type is not exclusive (as any other type may become predominant) (Mair 1996).

Sartori's typology of party systems represents perhaps the most important alternative to Lijphart's typology. Sartori's focus is not on mass and elite values but (instead) on ideologically driven party competition in which the competition for votes is necessarily paramount (Lange and Meadwell 1991:89). Sartori's typology focuses on the way in which competition between parties affect stability. The two predictors (fragmentation and ideological distance) are supposed to account for "a large number of dependent variables and predict a variety of trends and outcomes" (Sartori 1976:291). The typology also seeks to explain the direction of party competition: centrifugal or centripetal. The polarized systems are characterized by centrifugal, and the other systems by centripetal, competition.

Von Beyme's typology is similar to Sartori's, but differs in that it distinguishes within the comprehensive category of moderate pluralism between moderate pluralism with strong wing parties (abbreviated hereafter as MP-wing) and moderate pluralism with centrifugal tendencies (abbreviated as MP-frag) (von Beyme 1985:264). In this respect this typology has corrected the drawback of Sartori's typology: the category "moderate pluralism" being too inclusive. Von Beyme also detaches the predominant category, which makes his typology more internally consistent than Sartori's typology.

This chapter employs a revised version of von Beyme's typology that has recently been constructed by Keman (1994). The main differences with the original typology are that Ireland and Sweden are put into the MP-wing category. The category of two-party systems has also been excluded from the data analysis because it comprises only one case: the UK. This does not mean, of course, that two-party systems are neglected altogether in the volume. In Part 2, Ian Budge will present an in-depth study of the functioning of the two-party system of the UK.

Lijphart's typology

Lijphart's main hypothesis is that segmental cleavages at the mass level can be overcome by elite cooperation (Lijphart 1977). He proposes a typology based on the structure of society (homogeneous versus pluralist) and the behavior of elites (coalescent versus adversarial). The elites behave in a cooperative and stabilizing manner by means of the four

well-known practices: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. According to Lijphart's typology, the key category of party system is the consociational type, as this entails the cooperation of segmental elites in spite of the deep cleavages separating the segments (Lijphart 1977:53).

The Sartori and the Lijphart typologies seem to be quite the opposite: where Lijphart predicts stability, Sartori predicts instability and vice versa. As both typologies can hardly (in their original format) be equally valid at the same time, it is interesting to test their predictive and explanatory capacity just by comparing them. On the other hand, the typologies can also be partly interpreted in an additive (instead of exclusive) fashion by looking at Sartori's typology as vote- and office-orientated and at Lijphart's typology as a policy-orientated one. In Lijphart's recent work on democracies, he explicitly uses his typology to explain variations in policy performance (Lijphart 1994). The typologies also correspond in another way, namely they share the assumption that centrifugal competition may lead to instability, unless additional systems (brokerage, clientelism) promote stability.

Both typologies pretend to be able to account for trends and outcomes of electoral competition and government formation, yet they are not very explicit about the "trends and outcomes" that can be explained (Lane and Ersson 1994: 38). The two-dimensionality, in combination with the nominal scoring, complicates the distillation of clearly defined hypotheses that seek to explain party behavior in various and varying circumstances. Additionally, the typologies are also static, meaning that they are not very well equipped to forecast or explain change in the behavior of parties.

The apparent weaknesses of the typologies, however, do *not* necessarily mean that they are useless for the study of party system change. In this paper, the discussed typologies will serve as tools to explore changing institutional and electoral competitiveness.

Data and analysis

The main part of the data analysis is purely explorative. The party system typologies are the independent variables that are used to explain the set of phenomena that they were originally intended to explain, namely patterns of voting, office-seeking and policy formation. Table 5.1 presents the classification of the Western European polities that is based on the divisions of Lange and Meadwell (1991) and Keman (1994). As it is confined to Western Europe, it does not utilize all the potential explanatory power that is captured by the original typologies. In particular, the majoritarian dimension in Lijphart's typology is not well represented by the selection of countries. This may to some extent flatten the results of the data analysis.

The first step is to change the nominal party system scores into ordinal ones. Ordinal scoring implies that the two-dimensional typologies are reformatted into a one-dimensional rank ordering of countries. Sartori's rank-orders become an indicator of "multi-partism" (corresponding to the degree of polarization) and Lijphart's dimension can be interpreted as "degree of coalescent elite-behavior" (that also linearly corresponds to stability). The use of rank-orders and the selection of countries imply that we are not comparing the original scales. The rank orders that belong to the party system types are

Table 5.1 Typologies of party systems

	Sartori	*von Beyme*	*Lijphart*
1	*Predominant:* Norway, Sweden	*Two-party:* United Kingdom	*Centrifugal:* France, Italy
2	*Two-party:* Austria, United Kingdom	*MP-wing:* Austria, Germany, Ireland, Sweden,	*Centripetal:* Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland
3	*Moderate multipartism:* Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, France V, Ireland	*MP-frag:* Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland	*Consociational:* Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland
4	*Polarized:* Finland, Italy, France IV	*Polarized pluralism:* Finland, France, Italy	

Sources: von Beyme 1985; Keman 1994; Lange and Meadwell 1991.

given in Table 5.1. In the case of Lijphart's typology, the consociational and depoliticized types have been merged into one category.[1]

One part of the analysis consists of multiple correlations[2] based on regressions. These scores result from comparisons of the three party system scales with variables that are mainly related to *votes* (volatility and vote shares), *office* (government-related variables) and *policy* (policy distance measured by various indicators, such as convergence, polarization and left-right scales). This analysis covers four time periods, i.e: the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, in order to ascertain whether the explanatory power of the typologies has changed across time. A consistent increase or decrease in the correlations serves as a crude indication of the nature, degree and direction of party system change.

The empirical analysis abstains from country specific references. The main goal is to examine the explanatory capacities of party system divisions, rather than to describe or explain developments in individual polities. Treating the party system typologies as one-dimensional scales (or rank-orders) implies that the explanatory capacities of these typologies have been expanded by upgrading them from a nominal scale to an ordinal and even interval scale (by means of dummy variables). By relating these typologies to aspects and trends in party behavior that were not known to the divisors of the typologies, we have also tested the present validity of these typologies. Beyond that, we have also used the typologies as tools to generate hypotheses on the behavior of parties in different and changing institutional environments.

The data has been arranged in a cross-sectional time series format and embodies actor-related and institutional variables for thirteen Western European countries for the period 1950–1990.[3] Appendix 5.1 provides a compact overview of the operationalizations of the

variables. The data set is an amalgation of other data sets that have hitherto been used separately:

Data on ideological distance: the party manifesto data set comprises the emphases that political parties put on 54 issue categories (Volkens 1994).[4] On the basis of these scores several scales and indicators have been computed: left-right scale, polarization, degree of convergence (see Klingemann *et al.* 1994; Laver and Budge 1992 for detailed descriptions and analysis of these data).

Data on governments include the color of party government, the type of government, the duration of government in days, the seats of the parties in government and the party control of ministries in twenty-one post-war democracies (Woldendorp *et al.* 1993).

Data on institutions: the systemic aspects of the environments in which parties operate, i.e. the number of (effective) parties, disproportionality, consociationalism, patterns of interest intermediation. These variables differ from the data on governments and party positions because they are not always available on a yearly basis.

The integration of these different types of variables into a time series format has enabled us to confront the existing typologies with the long-term trends and outcomes they seek to explain. The following section examines the vote- and office-related variables.

Sartori's and von Beyme's typologies and party system change

The following provides a descriptive summary of the main findings on the basis of multiple correlations and graphical presentations. An overview of these correlations is presented in Appendix 5.1. The data collection focused on voter-related variables such as total volatility, office-related variables like the duration and color of governments and policy-related variables such as convergence and polarization. This mix of variables is assumed to give an inclusive overview of the main trends in party system change (Ersson and Lane 1982).

In the case of total volatility (TOTVOL), Sartori's typology would presumably predict a relatively high volatility in the more polarized systems, as these systems are inherently unstable. The volatility scores originate from Bartolini and Mair's party volatilities data base (1990:323ff).

Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the total volatility is indeed relatively high in the polarized and multi-party systems before the 1960s. After this period, the systems converged into a similar level of volatility. The predominant systems have become more volatile, whereas the polarized systems have become less volatile. The two-party systems and the moderate multi-party systems remain at roughly the same level of volatility during all four decennia. In sum, Sartori's predictions were not confirmed for the 1970s and 1980s. One explanation for the higher volatility in polarized systems may be found in the relatively low percentage of members of trade unions and political parties. This is accompanied by a low degree of organizational unity (UNITY) and corporatism (CORPORHK). In short, the low degree of encapsulation in polarized systems increases the degree of volatility, but



Figure 5.1 Total volatility (Sartori)

this tendency has clearly not grown stronger across time since these systems gain more electoral stability during the 1950s and 1960s.

Sartori's typology correlates remarkably strongly with the electoral strength of left, center and right parties. The left parties are strongest in the predominant systems, the right parties in the moderate multi-partisan systems and the center parties in the polarized systems. There seems to be no "inherent" explanation for this pattern in Sartori's typology. The strong relationship between the typology and the electoral strength of left, center and right parties affects the association with the policy-related variables. One example is the positive association with restrictive socio-economic policy-making (TEDC).

Most systems that are characterized by Sartori as highly polarized have often been dominated by right-wing governments (measured by means of the variable CPG: colors of party government (Schmidt 1996), but this pattern has become less distinct since the 1960s. The two party and the moderate multi-partisan systems appear to be the most changeable in the left—right orientation of party government (they also change into the same direction).

Sartori's typology suggests a relatively high degree of convergence in the two-party and predominant systems and a lower degree in the multi-party and polarized systems. The degree of convergence is measured with the help of factor analysis on the basis of the party manifesto data. It is based on four variables: the range of the party system, the degree of center space occupation, and the magnitude of the space occupied by left and by right parties (the "left space" and the "right space" respectively) (Keman 1994 and 1997; Pennings and Keman 1994;). The results shown in Figure 5.2 are based on the left-right scale that was constructed by Klingemann *et al.* (1994:40).[5] They do not confirm one central hypotheses of Sartori's typology, namely that polarized systems are characterized by relatively large ideological distances and therefore a low degree of convergence. The systems that appear to be most alike are the two polar ends of the typology, namely the



Figure 5.2 Convergence (Sartori)

predominant and the polarized systems. The two in-between systems, on the other hand, appear to be less convergent. In the multi-party system, the convergent and divergent forces are in balance (near zero in all decennia). The observed patterns of convergence indicate that the systems were different during the 1960s and 1970s: the polarized systems tend towards convergence, the predominant systems towards divergence, whereas the other two systems hold a position in between. In the 1980s, all systems took the balanced position that the moderate multi-party systems took during all four decennia.

If the above findings on convergence are correct, we should find a low degree of polarization in the systems that Sartori classifies as polarized. Polarization is measured by the Sigelman and Yough formula (1978)[6] and is strongly based on left and right differences between parties. The trends in Figure 5.3 confirm what we already have seen in the case of convergence: Sartori's predictions have been refuted. Overall, the polarized systems have the lowest degree of polarization. In the 1980s, the degree of polarization per system was exactly opposite to what one would expect on the basis of Sartori's typology. The two-party systems are consistently moving into a polarized direction. This inverse relationship suggests that Sartori's central assumption, namely that fragmented systems are more polarized than homogeneous systems, is no longer applicable (Ware 1996:172).

However, in other instances Sartori's predictions prove correct, such as in case of the duration of government (Figure 5.4; variable DUR). Extremely polarized systems are characterized by a relatively short duration of government. The most stable systems are the two-party systems. The supposedly stable predominant systems witnessed less durable government in the 1970s and 1980s.

Totally in line with these findings are the results on the reason for termination of governments presented in Figure 5.5 (variable RFT). It was recoded so that the upper scores indicate a discordant ending of the government owing to dissension within



Figure 5.3 Polarization of party systems (Sartori)



Figure 5.4 Duration of government (Sartori)

government or a lack of parliamentary support. Generally speaking, the governments in polarized systems tend to end up with more discordance than in less polarized systems. In this respect, Sartori is correct. Since the 1960s two-party systems have been the least discordant systems, followed by the predominant systems. The multi-party systems, on the other hand, have been confronted with a steady increase in discordant endings of governments in the 1970s and 1980s. The "type of government" (TOG) is another variable that may be related to Sartori's typology. This variable is also transformed into an ordinal score (the higher the score the more parties in government). The predictions and the actual scores are well in line: in polarized and multi-party systems the dominant types of government are the "minimal winning" and the (surplus) coalitions. This may seem an all



Figure 5.5 Reason for termination of governments (Sartori)

too obvious finding, but it is highly significant, because the type of government is always a main determinant of the room to maneuver of political parties. In sum, it appears that Sartori's typology has relatively more validity in relation to the selected office-related variables.

Von Beyme's typology is similar to Sartori's, but there are some significant differences. One of them is that it is weaker when correlated with the color of party government and left votes. This is because von Beyme eliminates the predominant category and puts Norway and Sweden into the moderate pluralism categories. Von Beyme's typology also relates differently towards the type of electoral system (ELSYS) (Lijphart 1984). In other respects, his typology confirms the global patterns that stems from Sartori's, such as the positive relationship with the fragmentation of votes (FRAGVOT), the number of parties (NRPTIES) and issue dimensions (ISSUEDIM) and the negative relationship with corporatism (CORPORHK).

Lijphart's typology and party system change

The assumptions underlying Lijphart's typology predict electoral instability in the centrifugal systems on the one hand and stability in the consociational and—to a lesser degree—the centripetal systems on the other. The trends in total volatility, as shown in Appendix 5.1 and Figure 5.6, confirm these predictions.

The centrifugal systems are relatively volatile, but they also appear to have moved into a more stable direction during the 1960s and 1970s. The centripetal systems hold a position in the middle. The consociational systems were the least volatile systems in all four decennia. At the same time there was a steady—albeit gradual—increase in volatility in consociational systems, which indicates that these systems are becoming unstable.

This process was accompanied by an increase in the number of floating voters. One explanation for the lasting low volatility in consociational systems may be found in the



Figure 5.6 Total volatility (Lijphart)

high degree of encapsulation of the electorate in these systems, implying a relatively high score of party membership (PERCMEM), union membership (DENSITY), in combination with a strong unity of the confederations (UNITY) and a high degree of corporatism (CORPORHK)[7] (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). In all these respects, the consociational systems are gradually becoming "normalized." The most remarkable sign of this is the dramatic drop in the percentage of party members (Katz and Mair 1992), whereas in the other systems this percentage remains roughly the same (Figure 5.7 and Appendix 5.1).

The relevance of volatility for the change of party systems depends on its effects on the structure and dynamics of party competition. An increasing volatility also means a rise in the uncertainty of electoral victory. The greater this uncertainty becomes, the more competitive the party systems will be (Strom 1989:5). Additionally, the trends in volatility favor particular party families. Generally speaking, the collectivist ideologies lose electoral support and the liberal (and protest) parties gain support. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats (as the main representatives of the collectivist ideologies) have lost support in all systems, but this process goes in phases. During the 1960s they lost, but in the 1970s they recovered and in the 1980s they again lost votes. The net outcome has been electoral loss. The liberals on the other hand have won votes. This pattern is found in all systems, but the systemic consequences of these changes are not the same. In the consociational systems they have affected the heart of the party system since they have potentially undermined the stable and pivotal role for the center parties. This may have far-reaching consequences for the type of coalitions and the process of policy formation.

Another topic that plays a major role in the party system literature is the degree of convergence and divergence (Budge 1994; Downs 1957). On the basis of Lijphart's typology we can predict that the centrifugal systems are predominantly divergent, whereas the centripetal and consociational systems are more convergent. When we



Figure 5.7 Percentage of party members (Lijphart)

examine the degree of convergence in Lijphart's party system types (Figure 5.8) it is clear that these predictions are correct. The degree of convergence in the centripetal and consociational systems appear to be very stable. That the consociational systems are not by definition the most convergent systems is understandable: there may well be considerable policy distance in these systems but this is moderated by the fact that these parties also have to cooperate (Keman 1994; Schmidt 1996). The centrifugal systems went through a process of increasing divergence until the 1970s. During the 1980s, this trend was directed in a more convergent direction. Lijphart's early concern that the consociational systems (in the case of the Netherlands) would be caught in a trend towards divergence and polarization seems to have been based on an overestimation of the effect of a sudden increase in polarization in the 1960s. Although there has been some degree of divergence since the 1960s, this trend is very modest. Given these scores it would also be erroneous to classify the consociational and centripetal systems as typically convergent systems. It would be better to say that the divergent and convergent forces are more balanced in these systems than in centrifugal systems.

As the differences in convergence are not large, it is understandable that the discriminating capacity of the Lijphart's typology is also weak in case of the degree of polarization. Until the 1970s, the systems seemed very alike. During the 1980s, the degree of polarization increased in the centripetal systems and—to a lesser extent—in the centrifugal systems. Figure 5.9 also shows that centrifugal systems are not necessarily more polarized than centripetal systems.

In case of the duration of governments, Lijphart predicted the highest degree of government stability in systems where the political elites tend to cooparate. This prediction is confirmed by the data in Figure 5.10. The more a system tends towards consociationalism, the higher is the duration of governments. This pattern is also stable in time.



Figure 5.8 Convergence (Lijphart)



Figure 5.9 Polarization of party systems (Lijphart)

The reason for termination follows a similar pattern to the duration of government (Figure 5.11). The better the conditions are for consociationalism, the more governments are ended by elections. In the centrifugal systems, dissension is a more important reason for termination of government and this pattern has become more distinct since the 1960s. The dominant type of government in the more consociational or centripetal systems is, for understandable reasons, inclined towards multi-party government. These characteristics tend to be fairly stable in time. Regarding the "color of party government," the centripetal systems are more to the left than the consociational systems and the centrifugal systems are most to the right (except in the 1980s, when they



Figure 5.10 Duration of government (Lijphart)



Figure 5.11 Reason for termination of governments (Lijphart)

moved rapidly to the left; this confirms Lijphart's predictions that these systems are relatively unstable).

Conclusions

Party systems appear to matter for the intensity and nature of the party competition for votes, office and policy. Parties that belong to the same party family behave differently in various polities owing to the way the party system functions. The vote-, office- and policy-related forms of party competition are affected by the party system, but not all in the same direction or to the same degree. The way party systems change is path-dependent:

Table 5.2 A test of Sartori's and Lijphart's predictions of party system properties on the basis of their typologies (multiple r)

	Sartori			*Lijphart*		
Typology	*Hypothesis*	*1960s*	*1980s*	*Hypothesis*	*1960s*	*1980s*
Color of party government (CPG)	r = 0	−0.63	−0.4	r = 0	0.3	0.27
Cabinet duration (DUR)	r < 0	−0.47	−0.32	r > 0	0.55	0.37
Reason for termination (dummy) (RFT)	r > 0	0.4	0.42	r < 0	−0.15	−0.17
Type of government (TOG)	r > 0	0.44	0.44	r > 0	0.55	0.55
Polarization (POLARSYS)	r > 0	−0.5	−0.22	r < 0	−0.04	−0.43
Type of leadership (LEADERSH)	r < 0	−0.55	−0.48	r > 0	0.69	0.69
Number of issue dimensions (ISSUEDIM)	r > 0	0.59	0.5	r > 0	−0.41	−0.47
Number of parties (NRPTIES)	r > 0	0.74	0.49	r > 0	−0.32	−0.41
Effective number of parties (EFFNOP)	r > 0	0.68	0.49	r > 0	0.2	0.43
Fragmentation of votes (FRAGVOT)	r > 0	0.71	0.55	r > 0	0.14	0.3
Organizational unity (UNITY)	r < 0	−0.4	−0.4	r > 0	0.71	0.72
Union density (DENSITY)	r < 0	−0.78	−0.43	r > 0	0.28	0.6
Electoral system (ELSYS)	r < 0	0.48	0.41	r > 0	0.5	0.52
Total volatility (TOTVOL)	r > 0	0.41	0.34	r < 0	−0.34	−0.29
Disproportionality (DISPRDEF)	r < 0	−0.33	−0.48	r < 0	−0.52	−0.36
% party membership (PERCMEM)	r < 0	−0.49	−0.58	r > 0	0.24	0.23
% no attachment (NOATTCH)	r < 0		−0.26	r < 0		−0.36

they change in ways that are specific to that particular type of system. This is what Smith (1989) calls the "systemness" of party systems.

Although the three typologies have a considerable explanatory capacity, as is shown by Table 5.2, they are not able to predict or explain all differences between party systems. This is partly because of inconsistencies within the typologies themselves, most notably the non-exclusiveness of the categories. Lijphart's typology seems a necessary theoretical addition to Sartori's typology since it focuses on the forms of cooperation between parties that seem to be as important as forms of competition. Party systems direct and influence the room to maneuver of parties and therefore the possible cooperation between parties in order to solve societal conflicts by means of collective decision-making (Keman 1997). When we compare Sartori's emphases on polarization and fragmentation with Lijphart's focus on cooperation and coalescence we may conclude that Lijphart's general approach is better able to explain the office- and policy-seeking behavior of parties (notwithstanding some flaws in his typology). The reason for this is that Lijphart's approach is able to solve the paradox that fragmented systems can be stable.

Contrary to Sartori's typology, the behavior and ideology of parties are not central in Lijphart's typology so that it appears as a somewhat "party blind" typology of party systems. Another problem, common to most typologies, is that Lijphart's typology is non-exclusive, since several countries share the features of more than one category (Schmidt 1995:249). At the same time, it is clear that Lijphart's typology is becoming outdated, owing to gradual changes in West European consociational democracies, which can be summarized as a trend towards more "openness" (Mair 1996). That these changes in consociationalism are gradual can be explained by the interlinkages with institutions such as economic openness and corporatism. The interaction and interdependence of these institutions provide one of the reasons why most consociational democracies have maintained some of their distinctiveness during the 1970s and the 1980s.

For future research it would make sense to amalgamate Lijphart's and Sartori's typologies into an entirely new typology, which would be able to account for the adversarial or coalescent tendencies at the system level and the cooperative versus competitive interactions at the party level (Mair 1989; Keman 1997). Such a scheme would be better equipped to provide a multi-faceted and updated view on party system change.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Ian Budge, Richard I. Hofferbert, Hans Keman, Ruud Koole and Michael McDonald for the many stimulating discussions within the context of our Research Theme Group at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS). Their comments and remarks were extremely helpful. I am also indebted to Andre Krouwel for helping me to update the Party volatilities data base of Bartolini and Mair (1990).

Appendix 5.1 The correlates of party system change

	Variable type	*Variable name*	*Sartori's typology*				
			1950s	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*	*Total*
1	VOTES (volatility)	TOTVOL	0.5	0.41	0.31	0.34	0.31
2	VOTES (volatility)	CD	0.26	0.44	0.48	0.19	0.24
3	VOTES (volatility)	SD	−0.29	−0.29	−0.36	−0.21	−0.11
4	VOTES (volatility)	SOC	−0.51	−0.77	−0.89	−0.3	−0.54
5	VOTES (volatility)	CON	0.61	0.5	0.71	0.49	0.16
6	VOTES (volatility)	LIB	−0.05	−0.43	−0.19	−0.15	−0.12
7	VOTES (encaps.)	NOATTCH			−0.56	−0.26	−0.33
8	VOTES (encaps.)	PERCMEM	−0.58	−0.49	−0.74	−0.58	−0.34
9	VOTES (encaps.)	DENSITY		−0.78	−0.45	−0.43	−0.45
10	VOTES (shares)	CENTER	0.49	0.51	0.5	0.44	0.48
11	VOTES (shares)	RIGHTV	0.49	0.63	0.6	0.49	0.54
12	VOTES (shares)	LEFTV	−0.69	−0.73	−0.54	−0.42	−0.58
13	OFFICE	RFT	0.26	0.4	0.41	0.42	0.29
14	OFFICE	CPG	−0.69	−0.63	−0.36	−0.4	−0.47
15	OFFICE	TOG	0.32	0.44	0.65	0.44	0.42
16	OFFICE	DUR	−0.4	−0.47	−0.41	−0.32	−0.37
17	POLICY (output)	TEDC		−0.36	−0.45	−0.38	−0.34
18	POLICY (input)	POLARSYS	−0.36	−0.5	−0.27	−0.22	−0.23
19	POLICY (input)	CONVERGE	0.68	0.44	0.27	0.26	0.27
20	POLICY (output)	PE		−0.47	−0.44	−0.35	−0.28
21	POLICY (conditions)	OPENNESS	−0.68	−0.42	−0.4	−0.44	−0.48
22	POLICY (output)	WEDCFAC1		−0.37	−0.37	−0.32	−0.29
23	SYSTEM	LEADERS	−0.57	−0.55	−0.44	−0.48	−0.49
24	SYSTEM	CONSOC	0.42	0.49	0.63	0.55	0.52
25	SYSTEM	ELSYS	0.49	0.48	0.38	0.41	0.41
26	SYSTEM	UNITY	−0.49	−0.4	−0.4	−0.4	−0.4
27	SYSTEM	CONSENS	0.67	0.71	0.69	0.61	0.67
28	SYSTEM	ISSUEDIM	0.7	0.59	0.59	0.5	0.6
29	SYSTEM	DISPRDEF	−0.43	−0.33	−0.16	−0.48	−0.3
30	SYSTEM	FRAGVOT	0.81	0.71	0.61	0.55	0.65
31	SYSTEM	EFFNOP	0.74	0.68	0.62	0.49	0.58
32	SYSTEM	NRPTIES	0.59	0.74	0.56	0.49	0.56
33	SYSTEM	CORPORHK	0.65	−0.68	−0.66	−0.67	−0.66

Notes: The scores are Multiple R scores based on regression analysis on the country by year data set. *TOTVOL*=total volatility (*source:* Bartolini and Mair 1990). *CD, SD, SOC, CON, LIB* =volatility of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists, Conservatives and Liberals (*source:* Mackie and Rose 1991). *NOATTCH*=percentage of voters without attachment to party they voted for (*source:* Cumulative file Eurobarometers, 1970–90). *PERCMEM*=percentage of adults that are members of a political party (*source:* Katz and Mair 1992). *DENSITT*=trade union density (percentage of non-agrarian employees) (*source:* Visser, *European Trade Unions in Figures,* 1989). *CENTER, RIGHTV, LEFTV* =percentage of the votes of center, right and left parties (*source:* Mackie and Rose 1991). The variables RFT through *DUR* are based on Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 1993: *RFT*=reason for termination of government (range 0–1; high score=discordant ending); *CPG*=color of party government (range 1–5; high score=left); *TOG*=type of government (range 0–1; high score=multi-party government); *DUR*=duration of government measured in days. TEDC=the degree of economic interventionism based on factor analysis on the variables deficit spending, total taxation, public economy and the social security contributions (*source:* Keman, "Proliferation of the welfare state," in Eliassen and Kooiman, *Managing Public Organisations, London,* 1993). *POLARSYS*=the degree of polarization measured with the Sigelman and Yough formula (1978). *CONVERGE*=the degree of convergence and divergence, based on the factor analysis on the ranges of the party system and the degree of center

von Beyme's typology					*Lijphart's typology*				
1950s	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*	*Total*	*1950s*	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*	*Total*
0.3	0.28	0.55	0.16	0.2	−0.65	−0.34	−0.31	−0.29	−0.35
−0.38	−0.09	−0.4	−0.28	−0.19	−0.3	−0.37	−0.09	−0.11	−0.19
0.17	0.1	0.31	0.17	0.12	−0.28	−0.19	−0.36	−0.35	−0.1
0.52	0.38	0.19	0.34	0.3	−0.24	−0.62	−0.46	−0.44	−0.4
0.47	0.43	0.22	0.44	0.23	−0.75	−0.49	−0.1	−0.01	−0.43
0.05	0.17	0.23	0.38	0.05	−0.24	−0.13	−0.34	−0.08	−0.14
		−0.26	−0.56	−0.4			−0.47	−0.36	−0.3
−0.55	−0.22	−0.46	−0.39	−0.18	0.35	0.24	0.18	0.23	0.1
	−0.91	−0.18	−0.28	−0.24		0.28	0.52	0.6	0.52
0.1	0.13	−0.09	0.29	0.12	0.54	0.5	0.46	0.66	0.51
−0.17	−0.16	−0.15	−0.32	−0.18	−0.36	−0.27	−0.28	−0.47	−0.33
0.25	0.15	0.26	0.17	0.16	−0.38	−0.33	−0.33	−0.32	−0.31
0.13	0.38	0.53	0.22	0.19	−0.14	−0.15	−0.38	−0.17	−0.16
−0.13	−0.18	−0.38	−0.18	−0.13	0.34	0.3	0.5	0.27	0.22
0.19	0.25	0.31	0.24	0.14	0.54	0.55	0.53	0.55	0.51
−0.44	−0.52	−0.41		−0.31	0.14	0.55	0.27	0.37	0.33
	−0.19	−0.3	−0.27	−0.23		0.34	0.08	0.34	0.17
−0.36	−0.16	−0.48	−0.18	−0.24	−0.11	−0.04	−0.28	−0.43	−0.21
0.34	0.06	0.52	0.21	0.15	0.34	0.25	0.27	0.38	0.2
	−0.34	−0.31	−0.35	−0.22		−0.22	−0.23	−0.12	−0.08
−0.73	−0.78	−0.61	−0.62	−0.64	0.59	0.64	0.65	0.67	0.58
	−0.15	−0.22	−0.09	−0.15		0.48	0.37	0.57	0.39
−0.53	−0.51	−0.53	−0.61	−0.53	0.69	0.69	0.73	0.69	0.71
0.37	0.48	0.64	0.49	0.48	0.52	0.53	0.43	0.48	0.46
−0.62	−0.57	−0.51	−0.63	−0.57	0.49	0.5	0.41	0.52	0.46
−0.59	−0.58	−0.6	−0.59	−0.59	0.69	0.71	0.75	0.72	0.72
0.6	0.54	0.61	0.64	0.58	0.38	0.33	0.31	0.43	0.36
0.58	0.65	0.65	0.69	0.63	−0.46	−0.41	−0.39	−0.47	−0.43
0.38	0.47	0.33	0.67	0.42	−0.27	−0.52	−0.08	−0.36	−0.26
0.36	0.59	0.78	0.68	0.59	0.31	0.14	0.18	0.3	0.13
0.37	0.54	0.74	0.65	0.56	0.34	0.2	0.32	0.43	0.27
0.35	0.59	0.76	0.62	0.56	−0.46	−0.32	−0.21	−0.41	−0.32
−0.47	−0.44	−0.46	−0.37	−0.43	0.41	0.39	0.41	0.35	0.38

space occupation *(source:* Keman 1997). *PE*=Public economy (total outlays as percentage of GDP (*source:* OECD, *Economic Outlook*). *OPENNESS*=the openness of the economy (imports plus exports as percentage of GDP) (*source:* OECD, *Historical Statistics*). *LEADERS*=the type of political leadership (range 1–5; high score=coalescent leadership) (*source:* Keman, *The Development towards Surplus Welfare,* Amsterdam, 1988). *CONSOC*=the conditions for consensus democracy on the basis of factor analysis on three of eight variables that Lijphart mentions as the key variables of consensus democracy, year-to-year scores (*source:* Pennings 1997). *ELSYS*=the type of electoral system (range 1–3; a high score means a PR-like system) (*source:* Lijphart 1984). *UNITY*=the degree of organizational unity of trade unions (range 0—1; a high score means a high degree of unity) (*source:* Cameron, "Social democracy…," in Goldthorpe (ed.) *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism,* Oxford, 1984). *CONSENS*=the conditions for consensus democracy (constant scores) (*source:* Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). *ISSUEDIM*=the number of issue dimensions (*source:* Lijphart 1984). *DISPRDEF*=the disproportionality of seats and votes (*source:* Mackie and Rose 1991). *FRAGVOT*=the fragmentation of the votes based on Rae's index of fractionalization (*source:* Mackie and Rose 1991). *EFFNOP*=the number of effective parties on the basis of the Laakso and Taagepera index *(source:* Mackie and Rose 1991). *NRPTIES*=the total number of parties (*source:* Bartolini and Mair 1990). *CORPORHK*=the degree of corporatism (range 1–5; a high score indicates a higher degree of corporatism) (*source:* Keman, *The Development towards Surplus Welfare,* Amsterdam, 1988).

Notes

1 The implication of this is that Austria is added to the consociational category. For the period after 1966 this is not wholly adequate, because Austria is moving away from consociationalism (see for this: Luther and Müller 1992).
2 Multiple r scores on the basis of regressions of the party systems scales (in dummy format) on variables that are related to votes, policy and office. The highest rank-order scores serve as the reference group.
3 This data set formed the basis for the work of the Research Theme Group "Political parties and the quality of democracy" at the Dutch academic institute NIAS (1995/6). The data are comprised in two formats: the country by year (17 countries, 1950–92) and a country by party by year format (17 countries, 110 parties, 1950–92). I restricted the data analysis to the 13 Western European countries that are included in Table 5.1.
4 Only those parties are selected that reach a vote share higher than 2.5 percent or participated in more than five elections (in total 93 parties in 13 countries).
5 The left—right scale is constructed by summing thirteen left items and thirteen right items; and the latter is subtracted from the former. The result is an interval score for each party in each election.
6 The formula is directly parallel to the formula for the variance statistic. It includes the number of parties in a system, the percentage of vote won by each party, the left-right score assigned to each party and the system mean of left-right scores (Sigelman and Yough 1978: 357).
7 Although not so high that corporatism can be interpreted as an integral part of consociationalism. See the discussion on that subject between Lijphart and Crepaz, and Keman and Pennings in the *British Journal of Political Science,* April 1995.

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Part 2

CHANGE AND STABILITY IN ESTABLISHED SYSTEMS

6
ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ASPECTS OF DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS

Françoise Boucek

Introduction

The second part of this book focuses on stability and change in established democracies, with a particular emphasis on dominant party systems. These are democratic polities which are dominated by one party or a bloc of parties which control government for long periods. However, dominant party systems vary in many ways, with regard to the institutional rules and mechanisms that regulate party competition, and in terms of stability.

In this part of the book different aspects of party dominance are discussed. The present chapter offers a conceptualization of one-party dominance in dimensional terms with a comparative survey of several dominant parties operating under different electoral regimes (i.e. PR systems and non-PR systems). In the following chapters, the mechanisms of dominance, its prevalence (UK: Chapter 7), change (Germany and Israel: Chapters 8 and 9) and absence of dominance (Iceland: Chapter 10) are analyzed in greater detail. This encompassing analysis of party system change in established democracies is supplemented by an overview of party system change in renewing systems in Eastern and Southern Europe, in Part 3.

The dominant party systems discussed in this chapter are those of PR systems (Sweden, Italy, Ireland) and of non-PR systems (Japan, Britain, France). These countries cover Social Democratic (Sweden), Christian Democratic (Italy), Liberal (Japan) and Conservative (Britain, France) dominant parties. This particular selection of countries allows us to examine both institutional aspects (i.e the electoral law) and actor-related aspects (i.e. party blocs) of party dominance because the six cases differ significantly on these crucial variables.

There is certainly enough reason to study recent party system change in dominant party systems, especially in the countries that have been selected. In the early 1990s rule by dominant parties has come under strain: in July 1993 Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was replaced in office for the first time in nearly forty years; in Italy the "earthquake" election of April 1992 and the 1992–4 *Mani Pulite* corruption investigation led to the implosion of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, which dominated all fifty of Italy's post-war governments but finally split before to the 1994 general election; at the

1991 Swedish general election, the ruling Social Democrats (SAP) received their lowest share of the vote since 1928 and had to relinquish power for only the second time in sixty-two years (although they regained office in 1994). In Britain, however, party dominance appeared to be reasserting itself when, in April 1992, the Conservative Party obtained its fourth consecutive victory since 1979. But in 1997 this pattern of party dominance was broken by the first electoral victory of the Labour Party in twenty-three years.

To explain how dominant parties have come to dominate the political landscape of their respective countries we need to define a dominant party and characterize dominant party systems. From the perspective of party competition, it is clear that dominant party systems are peculiar. Their distinguishing feature or their "core element" (Smith 1989) is low inter-party competitiveness (Sartori 1976). Restricted competition, however, emanates from party behavior. The skewness of the competitive process springs from the strategies of one party in its interactions with the electorate, with other parties and with institutions. Indeed, party behavior is what gives the concept of a party system any substantive meaning.

To capture the various aspects of party competition and avoid the reductive drawbacks of typologies, it is preferable to "dimensionalize" the party system variable, that is, to look separately at the salient features of party competition in a polity (such as the number of electoral parties, the number of legislative parties, the concentration of governmental power, the coalitional character of governments, and methods of allocating executive positions). Focusing on dominant party systems, this chapter presents an alternative framework of analysis which seeks to dimensionalize and give operational meaning to the notion of dominance. The empirical research (given in the two following sections) concentrates on party-maximizing strategies that will translate electoral dominance into parliamentary representation, to attain security in office. Viewing electoral rules as incentive systems, I try to assess the extent to which rules favor dominant players and how these players can, in turn, influence rule-making to strengthen their hold on power.

An alternative framework of analysis

A party's ability to establish a dominant position depends on its success in maximizing its electoral support, that is, in securing a sufficiently large share of the market to secure office. To that effect the dominant party shifts its strategies in response to voters' preferences and to the strategic moves of competitors. Its choice of strategy depends at any particular time on the various trade-offs between vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking objectives (Strom 1990) according to prevailing electoral market conditions.

However, strategies are also devised according to the institutional environment in which the party operates. Competition is regulated through a system of rules (i.e. electoral laws, implicit rules of government formation, power-sharing and cabinet porfolio distribution) which may act as a check against monopolistic behavior. But rule-making also has the potential of being controlled and as such offers political actors incentives to restrict entry and insulate themselves from competition.

Figure 6.1 presents a synopsis of the process of one-party dominance. The institutional framework (on the right side of the diagram) indicates that institutions can affect one-

party rule directly if, as explained below, they help consolidate a party's hold on power (these effects are indicated by solid arrow lines). However, because institutions can be manipulated, their instrumental potential provides ruling parties with opportunities to reinforce their dominant position (these effects are indicated by dotted arrow lines). The middle part of Figure 6.1 indicates the electoral, parliamentary, and executive dimensions of dominance, which are elaborated in greater detail below. These dimensions represent the outcomes of the dominant party's maximizing strategies in the pre-electoral, parliamentary, and executive phases of party competition (outlined on the left hand side of the diagram).

The concept of dominance is dimensionalized in the following ways.

Electoral dominance

Dominant parties achieve electoral dominance by maximizing their electoral support. They aggregate broad segments of the electorate through successful collective appeals (via issues and policies) and preference-accommodating strategies. Although the social structure of electorates and other cleavages are considered exogenous to party competition, it is possible for parties to "endogenize" such aspects of the competitive process. Political parties can seek to shape or reshape the structure of voters' preferences (Budge and Farlie 1983; Dunleavy 1991:112–44; Laver and Hunt 1992).

In this task, dominant parties are at an advantage. As enduring office-holders, they have at their disposal a greater choice of policy tools and greater opportunities to control the dissemination of information than their competitors. Outright state censorship of broadcasting (of the kind practiced in France under de Gaulle, for example) is no longer tolerated and privatization and deregulation have loosened the links between state and media in most West European democracies. However, governing parties can still influence the content and flow of information to electors by other means. Similarly, the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns put dominant players at an advantage. Because such funding tends to be apportioned according to levels of party parliamentary representation, large parties always get the lion's share of financing, while minor parties failing to meet the specified thresholds are entirely deprived.

Parliamentary dominance

Having gained the support of the largest share of the electoral market, dominant parties are in a good position to achieve parliamentary dominance. They can maximize their representation in the legislature by taking advantage of various aspects of electoral laws. Electoral laws often have built-in biases which can buttress dominant parties by delivering bonuses to large parties and penalizing small parties. Examples of these mechanical aspects of electoral rules are seat allocation formulae, thresholds for party parliamentary representation, district magnitudes, apportionment, and the preference voting mechanism.

Next to the mechanical aspects there are also the instrumental aspects of electoral rules. As objects of human design, institutions such as electoral laws can be manipulated



Figure 6.1 One-party dominance: a framework of analysis

to reduce competition. Parties can engineer rule changes to enhance their own parliamentary prospects. Ruling parties can maintain disproportionalities beneficial to themselves by resisting demands for reform aimed at rectifying "unfair" outcomes.

The electoral strategies of competitors may facilitate one-party rule. It is not just the distribution of votes among parties (Sartori 1976:197) or the combined vote (or seat)

shares of the two strongest parties (Rae 1971:51) which matter. Non-cooperative electoral strategies from opposition parties can sustain the dominant party in office. Cooperative strategies in forming alliances or electoral pacts can succeed in breaking the ruling party's monopoly of executive power. In sum, these three aspects of electoral dominance (mechanical, instrumental and oppositional) represent the intervening variables in the process of moving from the electoral dimension to the parliamentary dimension (middle level of Figure 6.1). I elaborate on them in the empirical analyses in the following paragraphs.

Executive dominance

The successful outcome of maximizing strategies for dominant parties in the electoral and parliamentary phases of competition, is executive power. This is acquired either because absolute parliamentary majorities enable the dominant party to rule alone or because coalitional potential allows the largest party to dominate the government formation process. A party's coalition potential is enhanced by its spatial positioning along the ideological spectrum. A central position gives a party leverage in bargaining with smaller parties on both its right and left flanks as well as the opportunity of playing one (or more) partner against others. Furthermore, executive structures and procedures that affect bargaining may advantage the dominant player. Investiture decision rules may benefit the present government; implicit rules determining the choice of Prime Minister often favor the largest party; and informal rules generally give the senior coalition partner priorities in parliamentary committee arrangements. Executive power transforms governing parties into gatekeepers. Control over policy and patronage enhances electoral prospects and the likelihood of continued entrenchment of the dominant party in power.

Measuring electoral and parliamentary dominance

To measure the extent to which dominant parties can insulate themselves from competition (and thus assess the monopolistic tendencies of party systems), I rely on a few accepted measures in the empirical examination. I concentrate on three different, but related, measures: the "effective number of electoral (N_v) and legislative (N_s) parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989) indicate how fractionalized electoral and legislative party systems are.[1] In the line graphs, Figures 6.2 to 6.7, the lines drawn in relation to the left *y* axis, display (for each country) over-time variations in the effective number of parties in the electorate (N_v) and in the effective number of parties in the legislature (N_s). The expectation is that generally N_s will be below N_v since most electoral laws (even under PR) have a reductive effect on the number of parties in parliament. It is assumed that with increases in the number of parties, particularly in the legislature (N_s), the more vulnerable dominant-party rule becomes. In other words, the greater the number of competitors, the less monopolistic the party system.

The index of "relative reduction in parties" (RRP) expresses the relationship between N_s and N_v.[2] The RRP, which carries the same type of information as is measured by disproportionality (D_v) and which shows similar patterns, calculates as a percentage the

extent of the gap between N_v and N_s. It calculates the reductive effect of the electoral law and gauges the degree of competition present in a party system. It shows "the extent to which the electoral system oligopolistically buttresses established political parties against the entry of new or different competitors by excluding these parties from representation" (Dunleavy and Margetts 1993:8). The assumption is that when electoral systems deliver low or decreasing levels of disproportionality, that is, when dominant parties gain less bonus, the more vulnerable they become. RRP levels are displayed in the bar charts, using the y right axis, in Figures 6.2 to 6.7.

Party advantage ratios (*A*), which simply divide a party's percentage of seats by its percentage of votes, measure the extent of bonus (or penalty) that the electoral law confers on different parties. It indicates the extent to which a party's electoral support is represented in parliament. If no seats are obtained, *A=0;* if the party obtains seats but less than its proportional share, *A* is between 0 and 1; and if the party obtains more than its proportional share, *A* is above 1 (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). In general, large parties tend to receive a bonus while small parties tend to be penalized.

The measures of fractionalization of electoral and legislative party systems and the indices of relative reduction in parties reveal a distinctive pattern between PR and non-PR systems. As expected, PR systems show a close symmetry between N_v and N_s, low RRP levels, and relatively low to negligible advantage ratios. Non-PR systems display much larger discrepancies between N_v and N_s, higher **RRP** figures, and large advantage ratios for dominant parties.[3]

PR systems

Countries operating under systems of proportional representation include Sweden, where the Social Democrats (SAP) have dominated politics since 1932; Italy where the now-defunct Christian Democrats (DC) dominated all post-war governments until 1994; and Ireland, where Fianna Fáil has been periodically dominant.

Sweden

The Social Democrats (SAP) have been the largest electoral and parliamentary party in Sweden since 1917. The party's electoral support has averaged 45 percent throughout the post-war period, giving it uninterrupted control of government since 1932 (except 1976–9 and 1991–4). Although the "bourgeois" three-party bloc often obtained a numerically superior parliamentary majority, it did not manage to dislodge the SAP until 1976, owing to an inability to form a cohesive political force. The Social Democrats ruled either alone in minority situations, or sometimes in alliance with the Agrarians (later called the Center Party), and sometimes with the Communists (the left party). The SAP has received no particular bonus from the mechanical effects of the electoral system. Its advantage ratio has averaged 1.03 for the period. The efficiency and fairness of the Swedish preference list PR system, is generated by fairly large district magnitudes averaging more than 12 representatives per district (the 349 Riksdag seats are distributed among 28 districts). Furthermore, party exclusion is kept in check through the allocation of 40 "adjustment



Figure 6.2 Party system fragmentation, Sweden

seats" to parties whose total number of constituency seats is less than their share of the national vote. This fairness is clearly reflected in the very narrow gaps between N_v and N_s (note the symmetry between the two lines in Figure 6.2). The reductive effect of the electoral law is minimal, with the RRP index averaging 5.9 percent for the period. However, the 4 percent threshold has generated some degree of party exclusion.

Gradual increases in party system fragmentation in the 1970s coincide with changes in governing patterns from one-party dominance to alternation in 1976. The only two dips in the effective number of parties reflect significant SAP victories. Increased multipartism is apparent from the mid-1980s, after the entry of new competitors in the Riksdag. N_v jumped from 3.39 in 1982 to 4.58 in 1991. In 1988, the Greens managed to break through the 4 percent barrier, while in 1991 two new parties entered parliament, the Christian Democrats and the right-wing populist New Democracy. The return in 1994 to normal historical levels of fractionalization reflects the recovery of the SAP's vote from its abysmal 1991 level (allowing the party back in office), but also vote and seat losses for the Liberals, Center Party and Christian Democrats and the virtual disappearance of New

Democracy. Hence the expected association between increased party system fractionalization and a vulnerable dominant party appears to be borne out. Although the 4 percent entry barrier limits competition, this effect does not exclusively benefit the SAP, it also helps its main rivals.

Because the fairness of the Swedish electoral system offers only limited incentives for parties to maximize their representation, it would be difficult to argue that it accounts for the dominance of Social Democracy in Sweden. However, PR favors multipartism (Duverger 1954:239) and has allowed the maintenance of a fragmented opposition in Sweden, enabling the conservatives, liberals, and center parties "to appeal to a wide range of voter preferences" (Pontusson 1990: 65). This has helped maintain SAP dominance because for a long time the party's main competitors were unwilling to collude against it. Hence, the SAP benefited indirectly from the workings of the electoral law. However, to derive more satisfactory and significant explanations of Social Democratic dominance in Sweden one would have to consider other dimensions that are related to the SAP's

agenda-setting role and links with the labor movement, which are beyond the scope of the present analysis.

Italy

Figure 6.3 confirms the fractionalized nature of the Italian electoral and legislative party systems. Such fractionalization has increased gradually during the 1970s but dramatically since the late 1980s. It more than doubled during 1976–92, with N_v increasing from 3.39 to 6.86. This increase in the effective number of parties reflects declining support for the dominant party, which eventually imploded, increasing support for regional and protest parties, and a split in the left in 1991. The final outcome was a complete realignment of forces in the Italian Chamber of Deputies under the new electoral law, which was adopted in August 1993.[4] However, electoral reform has not had the intended reductive effect on the number of parties so far. On the contrary, N_v increased to 7.51 after the 1994 general election.

The dominant party does not appear to have gained disproportionately from the mechanical aspect of the electoral law, but it has gained substantially from parliamentary deviation (Colomer 1996). Electoral rules have tended to deliver fairly proportional outcomes, as indicated by the narrow gaps between N_v and N_s. However, the average RRP index is almost twice that of Sweden (just below 10 percent prior to the 1994 poll). Since Italy also has fairly large district magnitudes, this is likely to reflect the workings of the Imperiali remainders quota system, "the least proportional among quota systems" (Lijphart 1994:23), which tends to exclude minor parties with small vote yields from quota seats.

While reducing "team spirit" (Katz 1980), control over the preference vote mechanism presented elites with opportunities to generate desired outcomes. Although blatant attempts at electoral engineering to manufacture parliamentary majorities failed,[5] the mechanism of the preference vote helped the DC to maximize its parliamentary representation. After the June 1991 referendum the preference vote was restricted to one, and required voters to write in the name of their preferred candidate rather than candidates' numbers on party lists (Pasquino and McCarthy 1993). Previously, however, voters had been allowed to cast three or four preference votes each for a different candidate on the same party list. But since people tended to disregard their preference-voting right (using only on average about 30 percent of the preference votes available to them, casting a single party vote instead) (Hine 1993:130–2), opportunities for electoral fraud abounded since ballot papers could be manipulated by adding numbers on blank ballots or on those with unfilled preferences. Moreover, particular minorities of voters were effectively given disproportional control over the ordering of names on lists increasing incentives for deputies to build up bases of local support among particular groups of voters through their hold on local patronage resources.

The DC was always the largest party, with an average 35 percent vote share. However, support for the Communists (PCI), the second-largest party, represented a constant threat to DC dominance. To counter such threat and the potential formation of non-DC



Figure 6.3 Party system fragmentation, Italy

coalition governments, the DC resorted to deligitimizing the Communists in its electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, from an average of 25 percent, PCI support in 1976 rose to 34. 4 percent, which prompted a "historical compromise" and the formation of a government of solidarity relying on PCI support in parliament but not in Cabinet. Hence, throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, the dominant party was instrumental in keeping the opposition divided in order to preserve its hold on the executive. It neutralized any potential alliance between the Communists and the Socialists by coopting the Socialists into the government formation process and acquiescing in relinquishing for the first time the prime ministership to a non-DC candidate, in 1983. However, once the Communist creed became discredited after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–90, this strategy became obsolete and the DC's blocking power became irrelevant.

The Italian case indicates that the instrumental potential of electoral rules provides dominant players with mechanisms to control electoral behavior, to delay electoral reform, and neutralize opposition dynamics. It also shows that one-party dominance and extreme party-system fractionalization are not mutually exclusive. However, dramatic increases in fractionalization (post 1987) render the dominant party more vulnerable and dispensable, especially if its capacity to prevent collusion between minor players is rendered inoperative.

Ireland

The Irish party system went through two phases of party dominance (1933–48 and 1957–73), during which Fianna Fáil, as the largest party with an average 45 percent vote share, formed continuous sequences of single-party governments, often in minority situations (Mair 1990). Changes in oppositional electoral strategies after 1973 triggered changes in governing patterns, with one-party dominance giving way to alternation when Fine Gael-Labour coalitions offered an alternative to Fianna Fáil rule. Fianna Fáil itself began to



Figure 6.4 Party system fragmentation, Ireland

enter coalitions, joining forces with the Progressive Democrats in 1989 and with Labour in 1992.

Figure 6.4 reveals an overall decline in fractionalization of the electoral and legislative party systems, ending in 1987. Barring the dips for N_v and N_s in 1944, which reflect Fianna Fáil's overwhelming majority of 55.1 percent, the number of parties gradually decreased until 1987. At that election, competition intensi fied with the entry of a new and significant player, the Progressive Democrats (out of Fianna Fáil's and especially Fine Gael's dissident groups) taking an 11.8 percent share of the vote.

The overall reductive effect of STV (single transferable vote) is relatively modest. N_v and N_s track each other fairly evenly throughout the period and RRP figures are of a similar magnitude as in Italy, with the mean at just below 10 percent. However, this overall figure masks occasional divergences and can hide district-level disproportionalities (Gallagher 1975). The 1951 and 1965 elections produced near-perfect proportionality while others (1961, 1977 and especially 1987) were quite disproportional. Competition is also restricted by the strategic behavior of the major contestants who have a common interest in preventing smaller competitors encroaching on their support. For this reason, the practice of bailiwick politics in Ireland has been quite effective (Farrell *et al.* 1996). The major players carve up districts among themselves between the different party candidates to maximize the spreading of preferences, so setting implicit barriers to the entry of smaller aspirants.

The instrumental use of district size to generate positive outcomes was also part of Fianna Fáil's strategic behavior. Since lower district magnitude is associated with greater disproportionality (Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989) and since constituencies in Ireland are relatively small (between three to five members) high barriers to entry tend to be placed in the way of minor parties. This restricts competition and benefits the major governing parties in whose interest it is not to change the rules of

Table 6.1 PR systems

RRP (%)				*Advantage ratios*			
Country	*Mean*	*Maximum*	*Minimum*	*Party*	*Mean*	*Maximum*	*Minimum*
Sweden	5.9	9.5	2.2	SAP	1.03	1.07	1.01
Italy*	9.8	17.0	2.2	DC	1.09	1.12	1.06
Ireland	9.2	17.7	3.1	FF	1.08	1.16	1.00

Notes: SAP: Social Democrats; DC: Christian Democrats; FF: Fianna Fáil.
* Based on elections for the period 1946–92.

the game. Because the electoral law can be changed by normal legislation in Ireland—leaving revision of constituency areas, boundaries, and seat allocation to ordinary law passed by the government of the day—and because Fianna Fáil has been in office most often (especially during 1935–73), it has had more opportunities to arrange the sizes and boundaries of constituencies to further its partisan interest (Gallagher 1975:511). Since the strength of its support was greatest in the over-represented western counties, it was in the interest of the party to try to change boundaries and constituency sizes there to maximize its support.

A powerful variable explaining the transformation of electoral dominance into legislative dominance during periods of Fianna Fáil rule lies in the vote management tactics that have helped sustain the party in office. However this has happened not so much because of Fianna Fáil superior strategies, but rather because of non-cooperation by its competitors in the distribution of surplus votes. Under STV, parties are encouraged to form pre-electoral alliances for the transfer of lower preference votes in order to maximize their number of seats. Because Fine Gael and Labour failed to form such electoral coalitions by agreeing to interparty transferrings at subsequent stages in the counting process, their initial majorities tended to dissipate. Able to retain a greater proportion of its own lower preferences, Fianna Fáil gained absolute or sufficient majorities to form governments (Busteed 1990:59–62). It was only after Fine Gael and Labour agreed in 1973 to reciprocal transfers of unused lower preferences, that they also began to enjoy a slight positive advantage ratio of seats to votes and offer an alternative to Fianna Fáil's single-party rule (Mair and Smith 1989).

The Irish case supports the hypothesis that increased competition renders dominant parties more vulnerable. With more actors vying for a share of the electoral market, the dominant player's share not only diminishes but the possibilities for inter-party collusion against the ruling party also increase. Under STV, cooperative electoral strategies give rivals the means of displacing the governing party. These two processes have diversified patterns of party competition in Ireland and helped replace one-party rule with alternation. Although still the largest party, Fianna Fáil is now on a more equal footing with its competitors, and also needs to cooperate with a smaller partner to form governments. Table 6.1 summarizes the relevant data for the three PR systems.

Non-PR systems

These include Japan where, until 1993, a single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) operated in multi-member constituencies, and where the Liberal Democrats (LDP) were continuously in office from 1955 to 1993; Britain with a "first-past-the-post" (FPTP) plurality system in single-member constituencies, where the Conservative Party (Tories) held power in Westminster for 77 of the past 111 years; France operating mostly under a two-ballot majority system (TBMS) and where the Gaullist Party (RPR) was the dominant governing party in power in 1958–81, 1986–8 and 1993–7, at times ruling alone (1968–73) but mostly with center coalition partners.

Japan

1993 witnessed a major restructuring of party competition in Japan when a split in the ruling Liberal Democrats (LDP) brought about the first non-LDP government in almost forty years. This opened a window of opportunity for the new (but short-lived) government led by the New Frontier Party to replace the electoral law.[6] The objective was to address citizen disaffection with politics, which the country's corrupt electoral and campaign-finance systems had provoked. The effectiveness of the LDP's electoral strategies and the instrumental use of rule biases by party elites explain the party's electoral dominance and its resistance to rule changes.

Under SNTV, each citizen had one vote to elect one candidate on a categoric ballot but constituencies returned between three to five members to the Diet. The system was implemented in the 1920s to encourage multipartism, giving each of the three parties then sharing power the opportunity to win a seat in every constituency. However, party strategic behavior produced non-intended outcomes and led to party dominance instead. To maximize their seat returns, parties had an incentive to present more than one member in each constituency, thus blocking opportunities for smaller rivals. The LDP became particularly effective at calculating as accurately as possible how many candidates should be endorsed in each constituency to prevent diluting support by running too many candidates or wasting it by endorsing too few. This skill translated into impressive seat-winning records for both the LDP and its main rival, the Socialist Party (JSP) who often won between them all the three seats in small districts and three out of four or five seats in the larger districts.

Party competition was much reduced in 1958 when the LDP (recently formed from the amalgamated Liberals and Democrats) contested its first election and obtained an overwhelming majority (61.5 percent) of Diet seats. The LDP's sheer size considerably skewed the competitive process. The number of parties in competition dropped by almost half (note the sharp drop in N_v and N_s for 1958 in Figure 6.5). Until the late 1960s electoral competition became two-way contests between two unequal parties: the LDP and the much smaller Socialists JSP). However, by the end of the decade the party system began to fractionalize with the growth in support for new minority parties (Communists, Komeito, Shinseito) combined with LDP defections putting pressure on the dominant



Figure 6.5 Party system fragmentation, Japan

party. The dramatic increase in N_v and N_s in the 1990s eventually ended the era of continuous LDP rule.

Increasingly high levels of disproportionality insulated the dominant party from competition. While the mean RRP index stands at 15.7 percent, for half the post-war elections it topped the 20 percent mark, peaking at 25 percent in 1969 when the LDP's advantage ratio was 1.55. Disproportionality has tended to be the product of relatively low district magnitudes and malapportionment, which the LDP was instrumental in maintaining.

Since low district magnitude (between three and five members in Japan) reduces party competition and penalizes minor party representation, it was in the interest of the LDP (and the JSP) not to lower the threshold of representation and to keep district sizes to between three and five members, in order to maximize their seat returns. This enabled them to reach the critical 20 percent threshold in four-seat constituencies or the 17 percent threshold in five-seat districts. However, because medium-sized districts also generate expectations among small parties about their chance of winning seats on the basis of fairly narrow levels of support (< 20 percent in five-seat districts), it encouraged the formation of new parties (the Social Democrats and Komeito). But an increase in the number of competitors did not present a real threat to the LDP's hold on power as long as the smaller opposition parties were unwilling to coalesce and offer an alternative government. Malapportionment giving rural districts as much as twice the voting power of urban ones benefited the LDP (Hrebenar 1986:23). Consequently, electoral reform for the Diet was delayed until the LDP lost office in 1993.[7]

One-party dominance in Japan evolved from the LDP's sheer size (it was always the largest party), its seat maximization behavior, and its ability to exploit the rules of the game to reduce competition. But public disillusionment combined with increased party competition and changes in opposition dynamics led to a dramatic erosion of support for

the LDP, which lost half its seats and the executive in 1993. However, the party regained office in 1994 as the senior partner in an unholy alliance with a number of Socialists (now called Social Democrats) and the small New Party, Sakigake. While falling short of winning an absolute majority after the October 1996 elections held under new rules, the LDP appears to be reclaiming its dominant position. Having secured the conditional support of its two coalition partners and pledges of allegiance from several independents and conservatives, and because of power struggles within the New Frontier Party, the LDP has effectively returned Japan to one-party rule.

Britain

Disproportional electoral rules and a divided opposition have helped sustain British Conservatives (Tories) in government from 1979 to 1997 even though their electoral support (of less than half of the vote) remained roughly the same. The party managed to win the support of the largest minority of electors, garnering approximately 42 percent of the vote at each contest up to 1997. Yet, in 1983, the Tories won a 61.1 percent majority in the House of Commons when only 42.4 percent of electors voted for them.

The quirks of FPTP (first-past-the-post) in single-member constituencies which can dramatically amplify victories and heavily penalize non-geographically concentrated parties, have over the post-war period gradually skewed the competitive process in Britain. The degree of party exclusion produced has directly benefited the Tories.

The UK provides the most striking example of the reductive effect of the electoral law on the number of parties in the legislature. A glance at Figure 6.6 clearly indicates that this process has become more aggravated over the past two decades, with the widening gap between N_v and N_s. Growth in third-party support since the mid-1970s did not hampered the establishment of one-party dominance because this support has consistently failed to be reflected in the legislature. Vote shares of 25.4 percent and 22.6 percent for the third party (now the Liberal Democrats), in 1983 and 1987 respectively, translated into puny seat shares (at below 4 percent). In 1983, electoral support for Labour was barely 2 percent above that of the third party and yet this 2 percent difference in support translated into a 186 seat difference. However, small regional parties (Scottish Nationals and Ulster Unionists) have fared reasonably well under FPTP because their vote is geographically concentrated.

Both major competitors—Labour and Conservatives—have enjoyed the fruits of disproportionality but the Conservatives' bonus has clearly surpassed that of Labour. Since 1979, the Tories' advantage ratio averaged 1.32 and Labour's 1.17 although disaggregated figures reveal very large regional disproportionalities (Dunleavy and Margetts 1993). By contrast, the Liberal Democrats only managed a meager 0.15. With "landslide" elections being magnified under FPTP, the Tories' 1983 victory produced a whopping 1.44 bonus, the highest score for any British party during the whole post-war period.

The mechanical effect of the British electoral system restricts party competition considerably. It forces electoral multipartism into a duopoly of party government (Willis 1987) and has worked to the benefit of the Tories for nearly two decades. High barriers to



Figure 6.6 Party system fragmentation, UK

entry have effectively neutralized the threat of third party competition with the preferences of approximately 20 percent of electors being effectively disregarded. The Tories monopolized the executive at Westminster for eighteen years, not because of increased popularity but because of a divided anti-Conservative vote. The electoral split on the left in 1981, when twenty-nine MPs defected from Labour to form the Social Democratic Party was decisive in generating Conservative victories in 1983, 1987 and 1992.

The propensity of FPTP to engineer parliamentary majorities combined with shifting patterns of support on the non-Conservative side de-fractionalized the British legislative party system and propped up one-party dominance since 1979. Because the two major rivals have gained from the anti-competitive aspects of plurality rule, the Tories and most of Labour elites share an interest in preserving the present rules of the game. As long as this bipartisan consensus remains, the Liberal Democrats' desire to reform the electoral law, so that the diversity of British electoral behavior can be accommodated into the legislature, is unlikely to be fulfilled.

France

Gaullist executive dominance under the French Fifth Republic has beenenhanced by the idiosyncracies of the two-ballot majority system (TBMS) whichconsiderably reduces the scope for party competition at the decisive roundof parliamentary elections. If no candidate manages to win an overall majority atthe first ballot, a second ballot is held and the candidate with the majority (orplurality) of votes wins the seat.

The adoption of TBMS under the 1958 constitution had a dramatic effect on the number of parties competing in the National Assembly. It reduced the number of parties voted for at the first ballot by almost half (RRP at 43.4 percent) and amplified Gaullist



Figure 6.7 Party system fragmentation, France

representation in the National Assembly by over 100 percent. The party's 20.6 percent vote share translated into a 42.6 percent seat share setting the stage for Gaullist ascendance over French politics (note the extreme drop in N_s in 1958 at just below 3.5 in Figure 6.7). RRP levels of similar magnitudes were achieved on only two other occasions, in 1968 and 1993, both "landslide" victories for the RPR. Parliamentary representation was reduced by 43 percent in 1968 and by 58 percent in 1993, conferring enormous bonuses to the RPR, which received advantage ratios of 1.58 and 2.20 respectively. Hence the potential of TBMS for amplifying victories can significantly bolster a party's legislative representation and reduce the scope for competition in parliament.

Of all six cases presented in this chapter, France features the highest RRP figures; they average 33 percent for all elections held under TBMS. Because the Gaullists were always the largest electoral party between 1958 and 1981 they derived the most political rents from the disproportionalities produced by the electoral law.

The RPR was also the direct beneficiary (and engineer) of high entry barriers, which were gradually raised. The 5 percent threshold introduced in 1958, was raised to 10 percent in 1967, and to 12.5 percent in 1976, distorting competition even more by making it very difficult for small parties to get representation in the National Assembly. For example, a 9.8 percent support for the extremist National Front (FN) at both 1986 and 1988 general elections, translated into thirty-five National Assembly seats (6.3 percent) in 1986 under PR, which the Socialists had re-introduced to curb their own losses. However, in 1988 under TBMS, which the right-coalition government of 1986–8 had brought back, the same vote delivered one single seat to the FN.

The advantages derived from the mechanical effects of TBMS, which bolstered Gaullist parliamentary representation for two decades, were supplemented by the party's efficient electoral strategies. The operation of the second ballot (when most of the seats are at stake) forces parties on both sides of the political spectrum to make electoral agreements

with their allies to avoid fragmenting the vote at the second round. Allies agree that at the second ballot the losing candidates withdraw from the race, leaving the best-placed candidate to fight the second round alone on behalf of the alliance. Apart from "bipolarizing" the party system, these arrangements can produce some curious results (Wright 1984:155–6). Historically, electoral alliance strategies on the right between the RPR and the center parties (grouped under the UDF umbrella) have been quite effective in helping the Gaullists consolidate their first ballot results.

Left parties, however, were less skillful at building cohesive electoral coalitions for national elections (although not for local ones) because the Communists were fearful of the Socialists encroaching on their own bases of support. Hence, often difficult and uneasy alliances tended to produce sub-optimal outcomes, especially for the Socialists, who failed to win office in 1978 despite being the strongest single party (Tsebelis 1990:187–232). Gaullist dominance was thus boosted by default. The fickleness of cooperative behavior on the left helped to sustain the Gaullists in power.

Finally, the instrumental use of electoral reform for partisan purposes has played a key role in constraining party competition and buttressing dominant parties throughout French electoral history. The introduction of "reinforced PR" by the center parties in 1951, in order to penalize anti-system parties, was partisan motivated as were the changes implemented by the Gaullist fathers of the constitution in 1958. The switch to a limited form of PR by the Socialists in 1986 and the hasty return to TBMS by the government of the right in 1978 were likewise engineered with partisan objectives in mind.[8]

The French constitution provides numerous incentives for dominant parties to engage in instrumental design (Tsebelis 1990) and strengthen their position. For example, Jacques Chirac (now President of France but Prime Minister in 1986–8 when a right-dominated Assembly co-habited with a socialist president) managed to get TBMS readopted by exploiting certain constitutional clauses. Normal parliamentary debate was entirely bypassed through the use of Article 49.3. Blackmail enabled Chirac unilaterally to neutralize potential opposition to electoral reform. Similarly, Article 38, which allows the government to legislate by decree, made it possible for him to give exclusive responsibility for the long-delayed and sensitive task of redistricting to one of his loyalists, the arch-Gaullist Charles Pasqua.

In France, the electoral law provides multiple incentives for parties to protect themselves from competition. Because parliamentary representation can be grossly overstated, TBMS can considerably reduce the scope of parliamentary opposition. Furthermore, the constitution offers opportunities for institutional design, allowing governing parties to establish themselves and afterwards consolidate their own position. Consequently, the Gaullists were able to dominate the executive in the formative years of the Fifth Republic and shape France's state institutions. Table 6.2 summarizes the relevant data for the three non-RR systems.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored ways of dimensionalizing the notion of one-party dominance and of characterizing dominant party systems. These are explained in terms of a heavily

Table 6.2 Non-PR systems

RRP (%)				*Advantage ratios*			
Country	*Mean*	*Maximum*	*Minimum*	*Party*	*Mean*	*Maximum*	*Minimum*
Japan	15.8	25.7	4.1	LDP	1.31	1.55	1.13
UK	20.1	32.8	3.8	Cons	1.16	1.44	0.85
France	22.0*	57.6	5.8**	RPR	1.26	2.20	0.56

Notes: LDP: Liberal Democrats; Cons: British Conservative Party; RPR: *Rassemblement pour la République*.
* 33% RRP for elections held under TBMS (two-ballot majority system).
** Except for Negative RRP or -9.6 for 1951 election.

skewed competitive process, which reflects the attempts of one party to insulate itself from competition. The maximizing strategies of this dominant player in its interactions with the electorate, with other parties, and with institutions produce long office tenure. Focusing on the mechanical, instrumental, and oppositional aspects of electoral dominance, the chapter has examined how different electoral regimes offer ruling parties distinct incentives to maximize their parliamentary representation.

It appears that the dominant party systems of major western democracies have gradually opened up to greater competition. Their "core" element, that is, "the feature or parts of the system which are more immune to change" (Smith 1989: 356), has been altered. Dominant parties have become less monopolistic in their behavior because barriers have gradually come down, either explicitly (through changes in the rules of the game) or implicitly (because party strategies have adapted to particular institutional constraints). Challenges by new parties have put the electoral support of dominant parties under pressure while the cooperative strategies of their greatest rivals have lessened their hold on executive power.

Changes in governing patterns have occurred at different times in different places and have not always been triggered by similar circumstances. The effects have varied according to the context. In some cases (Sweden, Ireland, and France) the transition from one-party dominance to alternation has been rather smooth, with parties adapting their strategies to the new status quo. In other cases (Italy and Japan) the change has created major disruptions and constitutional upheavals and opened windows of opportunities for instituting changes in the rules of the game. Making a return to monopolistic power more unlikely, these institutional changes leave party systems in a state of flux. But in places such as Britain, the maintenance of reductive electoral rules continues to impose major barriers to competition preventing the diversity of electoral behavior being reflected in parliament, as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Professor Patrick Dunleavy for commenting on early drafts of this paper and for stimulating my interest in the study of electoral systems.

Notes

1 According to the measure proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and applied by Taagepera and Shugart (1989). N_v is measured as one divided by the sum of the squared fractions of the vote for each party:

$$N_V = (1/(V_1^2 + V_2^2 + \ldots V_N^2)$$

N_s is measured as one divided by the sum of the squared fractions of total seats held byeach party:

$$N_S = (1/(S_1^2 + S_2^2 + \ldots S_N^2).$$

2
$$\frac{N_V - N_S}{N_V} \times 100$$

3 Indices compiled from electoral data in Mackie and Rose's *International Almanac of Electoral History,* 3rd edn (1991) and *Keesing's Contemporary Archive*.

4 Before 1994, Italy operated under a PR-list system; it had 32 districts with large magnitudes ranging from 1 to 36 and a remainders system distributing 50 of the Chamber of Deputies' 630 seats nationwide. After the 1994 electoral reform 75 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (and the Senate) have been allocated on a plurality basis in pre-existing local uninomial districts, and 25 percent of additional seats have been allocated according to a list system of proportional representation. Each voter has two votes: one for electing the candidate in the local *collegio* and the other for electing a candidate on the party list at the level of the regional *circoscrizione* (Katz 1995).

5 The 1953 "Swindle" law, aiming to give the governing DC-dominated coalition of parties that received 50 percent+1 of the votes cast two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber, was rejected by a narrow margin.

6 Under the new 1993 electoral rules (first used for the October 1996 poll), 300 single-constituency Diet seats (the lower chamber) are chosen on a first-past-the-post basis and 200 additional seats are chosen separately by PR in eleven regional constituencies. Each citizen had two votes, enabling her to cast one ballot for her local representative in the single-member district and one for the party of her choice in the regional constituency.

7 A recent analysis points to the evolution of informal cooperative strategies among the non-Communist opposition parties from the 1980s onwards (Christensen 1996).

8 For an excellent analysis of the 1988 change from a rational choice perspective, see Chapter 6 in George Tsebelis's *Nested Games* (1990).

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7
GREAT BRITAIN: A STABLE, BUT FRAGILE, PARTY SYSTEM?

Ian Budge

Introduction

Great Britain forms an interesting case in the context of this book. The national two-and-a-half party system has persisted unchanged almost to the end of the millennium. Governments have continued under the marked predominance of the Conservative Party, which has been evident since the First World War. Party stability has been buttressed by political institutions—Parliament, civil service, law courts—established in the mid-nineteenth century and unchanged since then. In all this Britain contrasts with the other large democracies of Western Europe—France, Italy, Spain, Germany—all of which have seen major party and institutional changes since the Second World War (sometimes more than one). Britain also shows more party system stability than most of the smaller countries outside Scandinavia. Sometimes, after the Second World War for example, such stability has been seen as a good thing, representing the success of the British in maintaining their democracy in the face of authoritarian threats. Latterly it has been dismissed as another symptom of the country's failure to adapt to the modern world.

Whichever point of view is endorsed, there is no doubt that the party system has been unusually stable in the European context (perhaps the only real parallel is the United States). It has survived a world war, two social-political revolutions in the post-war period, economic globalization and the transition from world to European power. More than that, it has survived change in the composition and nature of the parties themselves—a split and secession from the Labour Party in 1981–2; a decline in mass membership to below a third of what it was (Katz and Mair 1992:334); penetration of local government by a new kind of party activist-the local councillor; increasing orientation to television, radio and press; sharp ideological shifts from the "social democratic consensus" of the 1950s to the New Right and New Labour of the 1990s. These are charted in Figure 7.1 (based on Budge 1994).

In the course of adaptation, party leaderships and MPs have changed in character. The traditional grandees of the Conservative Party (Churchill, Macmillan and Home) have been succeeded by upwardly mobile new men (and new women): Heath, Thatcher and Major. A Labour Party leadership with its base in the traditional trade unions has been replaced by an intelligentsia ever more rooted in the "talking classes" of teaching and



Figure 7.1 Left—right positions of British parties, 1945–97, mapped from election manifestos

journalism. The Liberal Democrats have drawn heavily on new social movements to produce new leaders and activists heavily geared to grass-roots mobilization.

Yet even such qualitative changes have affected the macro-system, and power relations between parties, relatively little. Conservatives and Labour may get 10 percent less of the votes, on average, than in their heyday: and the Liberals about 10 percent more. This has not been reflected in parliamentary seats, where the Conservatives have continued, usually, to gain a majority and form governments. The alternative to Conservative rule has been, and continues to be, Labour as demonstrated dramatically in the 1997 General Election. The electoral battle between these two "majors" still dominates parliamentary proceedings and media coverage of politics, even though the Liberal Democrats doubled their number of seats in the 1997 election.

Yet this impressive continuity and stability rests in the end on one very narrow base—the electoral system. Any change in the way it works in a more proportional direction would immediately give the excluded Liberal Democrats a major and decisive role in forming governments.

Even the system in present use is not a guarantor of stability. It protects the two strength of the manual, factory-based, unionized working class, the core of Labour support. Services grew at the expense of manufacturing: manufacturing itself changed, reducing the role of both skilled and semi-skilled manual workers such as ship-builders and miners, and even of repetitive assembly-line operatives such as car-workers. They were substituted by more skilled or by more flexible workers, often part time, with women increasing to half the workforce. The life experiences of most workers became increasingly divergent from those of the traditional unionized manual worker, who stayed

in one job, one establishment and often one house all his life. Economic change was intensified by the levelling effects of the comprehensive Welfare State introduced by Labour in 1945–8.

The traditional, static bases of the class cleavage began to erode rapidly after 1959. This was mirrored in the rise of Liberal voting and the increase of electoral volatility in the 1960s and 1970s. At first this led to rapid Conservative— Labour alternation in government. By the 1980s, however, as the Labour vote shrank and the Conservatives gained a large enough plurality (around 42 percent) to keep themselves permanently in government, it appeared that they were the main beneficiaries, and Labour the main losers, from the social changes that had been under way. Helped by a Social Democratic split from Labour in the early 1980s, the Liberals improved their electoral standing to a point where their results (especially in 1983) rivalled Labour's. These points are illustrated in Table 7.1, which shows voting support for the major parties as well as turn-out for the post-war period.

Table 7.2 shows, however, that the national result of 1992 (as for the other elections not broken down into areas) was the result of very different votes obtained by the parties in different regions of Great Britain. Generally speaking, though with some anomalies, the Conservative vote went down and that of the non-Conservative parties went up, the further one went north and west from London.

The sharply differentiated pattern of regional results illustrates a central point about British political divisions. That is, they are only partly based on the class differences in terms of which they have been almost exclusively discussed (Pulzer 1967). It would in fact be more accurate to describe the central political cleavage as a cumulation of regional and class conflicts rather than purely class ones—a cumulation in which the territorial and regional components are now more important than class, if they can be separated out at all (Miller 1981).

The reason why territorial and class cleavages overlap, both socially and politically, is that the manufacturing and extraction industries associated with the nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution (mining, steel, ship-building and textiles) developed in the peripheries rather than the core of Britain: in Scotland, Wales, Cornwall and the North of England, rather than London and the South-East. Thus the classical industrial proletariat also developed in these areas, in the new metropolises of Glasgow, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Cardiff, and their associated mining and mill towns. In many ways the cultural and social experience of these areas was shaped by the existence of the new class and its social and political struggles. Existing regional contrasts with the South-East of England, the stronghold of established institutions and of the traditional elite, were reinforced by, and became entangled with, class ones.

Industrial change and Conservative policy brought about the partial collapse of the older industries of the North and West in the 1970s and 1980s. The new service industries grouped themselves around London, the largest market and the largest parties up to the point where a competitor gets less than 30 percent of the vote. This is an exceptionally high threshold, which has underpinned the party system stability of the last sixty years. Yet if a third party attains that level the system will destabilize very rapidly, perhaps in just one election. Such destabilization has occurred both at national level, when

Labour replaced the Liberals as second party in the 1920s; and at regional level, where the Conservatives are being overtaken by the Nationalists in Scotland.

So far the two major parties, and particularly the Conservatives, have succeeded in retaining the type of election system that favors them: small, single-member, territorial constituencies with plurality voting. Their ability to do so, however, rests in their monopoly of government, which rests in turn on the electoral system. Should this circle be broken, either by a "hung" Parliament or by constitutional reform, the party system will change rapidly and drastically. It is for this reason that party system stability in Britain is fragile. Change just one institutional feature and you change everything.

The election system of course works its effects only in conjunction with political and social cleavages, which it shapes into a particular pattern of parliamentary results. In the following discussion, therefore, we shall first explore the underlying divisions and social line-ups in British society. Then we shall assess the interaction between these and the election system, before going on to prospects for change. These include the impact of devolution in Scotland and Wales and developments in Northern Ireland, which may also have their effects.

British political cleavages

The major British cleavage is associated with social class (Pulzer 1967) but not wholly composed by it. Class differences involve type of occupation (factory-based manual labour versus other types of work), education, income, accent, lifestyle, location and type of housing, union membership, and the life experiences associated with them. Class cleavages were intensified in the inter-war period by the removal of cross-cutting territorial cleavages, with the secession of Southern Ireland, and the general decline of religion as a serious political force. In voting terms class influences reached their apotheosis in the early post-war elections from 1945 to 1955.

Class as a political cleavage both produced and was sharpened by Labour and Conservative conflict over this period. The decline of the religious and Irish cleavages caused a weakening and near disappearance of the old cross-class Liberal Party. This transformed earlier three-party competition into effective two-party competition by 1935—a situation which continued at the electoral level till 1964 and which, because of the electoral mechanisms described below, means that the Labour and Conservative Parties remain the only effective competitors for governmental power.

The social bases of the class cleavage weakened after the 1950s. This was due in part to industrial and economic changes, which reduced the numerical communications centre. At the same time the negative redistribution of wealth from poor to rich, fostered by Conservative government, hit most severely in the peripheries where the poor were concentrated in larger numbers.

The 1980s thus saw a re-emergence of the territorial basis of British politics, where the Conservatives drew their parliamentary majorities from the South-East of England and the Labour MPs came almost exclusively from the North and West. At the extremes, the Conservatives had derisory representation in Scotland and Wales, while hardly a Labour

Table 7.1 Percentage votes for British parties in General Elections, 1945–97

	Turn-out	*Conservative*	*Labour*	*Liberal and Liberal Democrat*	*Minority Nationalists*
1945	73	40	48	9	0
1950	84	44	46	9	0
1951	82	48	49	2	0
1955	77	50	46	3	0
1959	79	49	44	6	0
1964	77	43	44	11	1
1966	76	42	48	8	1
1970	72	46	43	7	1
1974 (Feb.)	78	38	37	19	3
1974 (Oct.)	73	36	39	18	4
1979	76	44	37	14	2
1983	73	42	28	25	2
1987	75	42	31	23	2
1992	78	42	34	18	2
1997	71	31	43	17	3

Notes: The Liberal vote includes the combined vote for the "Alliance" in 1983 and 1984. The "Minority nationalist" vote is that of the Scottish Nationalist party (SNP) plus Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party). Percentages do not necessarily add up to exactly 100 because of rounding of figures and the omission of some minor parties, especially from Northern Ireland.

Table 7.2 Percentage votes in 1992 for British parties by region

	Conservative	*Labour*	*Liberal and Liberal Democrat*	*Minority Nationalists*
South-East England	53	23	22	0
Greater London	45	37	15	0
South-West England	48	20	31	0
Midlands	46	38	15	0
Northern England	36	47	16	0
Wales	29	50	12	9
Scotland	26	39	13	22

Notes: South-East England and Greater London are separate regions. Votes do not necessarily add up to 100 percent across the rows because of rounding of figures and omission of minor parties.

MP came from South-East England outside the deprived area of central London. These tendencies reached their logical conclusion in 1997, when the Conservatives had no Scottish or Welsh MPs.

This sharp territorial contrast underlines the essential political conflict in Britain, between a coalition of dispersed, peripheral groups (both social and territorial) supporting Labour, and a cohesive, centrally located and privileged group supporting the Conservatives—who can thus enhance their electoral appeal as defenders of the national

"British" interest. The restored Liberals, who might have bridged the gap between Labour and Conservatives, have been penalized by the electoral system, which privileges regionally concentrated parties. They thus secure few parliamentary seats even when they receive a quarter of the national vote. Meanwhile local Nationalist parties, especially in Scotland, are increasing their local support.

The electoral system

The electoral system is the "first-past-the-post," or single member, simple plurality, system (Budge *et al.* 1998: ch. 15). As the name implies, one candidate is elected for each territorial constituency on the basis of receiving more votes than any of his or her rivals. There is no requirement to get a majority. In an extreme case a candidate with 33 or even 25 percent of the vote would win the seat if he or she got one vote more than any rival.

The consequence of this is that parties win seats if they have strong local support; and are in a position to win a majority of seats and form a government if such support extends over wide areas of the country. Local minorities do not get represented. A party with wide national support spread evenly but not thickly, like the Liberals, gains very few seats. This is the reason for extreme discrepancies between their national vote shares and seats (in 1983 they and their partners took 25 percent of the vote but just over 3 percent of parliamentary seats). Liberals are in local minorities almost everywhere and hence do not usually win seats. It is Labour and Conservatives who have enough support over wide areas of the country to gain a large parliamentary representation. Tactical voting by Labour and Liberal Democratic supporters modified this discrepancy in 1997, but the Liberal Democrats are still substantially under-represented.

The reason that Conservatives and Labour gain is that their support is regionally concentrated. Conservatives have pluralities in the South-East of England, and Labour in the West and North, including Scotland and Wales. Despite sub stantial minorities of the other major party's supporters existing in its rivals' areas of predominance, these are not generally represented. The system thus exaggerates regional contrasts in support; so that Conservatives increasingly seem like a South-East-English party in terms of parliamentary representation and Labour like a coalition of outsiders and peripheries.

Were a third party such as the Liberal Democrats to get over 30 percent of the vote, its support would necessarily be enough in certain localities to pick up parliamentary seats very rapidly. This is a very high level to attain before gaining influence, however. In effect, first-past-the-post operates to consolidate and stabilize the existing party system and thus resists and deflects major movements for change. When these become very strong, however, it may register this change very rapidly.

The same considerations apply to regionally strong parties like the Welsh and Scottish Nationalists. As these can generate concentrated regional support they do not suffer from under-representation to the same extent as do the Liberals. The Scottish Nationalists are still under-represented in Scotland, however, to the benefit of Labour. Were they to expand their 22 percent of the Scottish vote by another 10–15 percent, they would suddenly gain seats. The political impact of this would be an immediate demand for independence.

The inflexibility of first-past-the-post thus enables the two main parties to ignore many political movements and the demands they voice. Where these become even more widely supported, perhaps because of the frustration generated by this stalemate, the electoral system creates a critical situation by suddenly registering the strength of the movement. This may happen regionally as well as nationally and where it coincides with autonomist movements may have explosive effects. Territorial or constitutional change in Britain is thus liable to come all at once, after long inattention and non-response by policy-makers.

Both in its direct and indirect effects so far, however, the British electoral system has operated to reduce the number of parties by restricting effective parliamentary representation to two. It has tended to give an unequivocal parliamentary majority to only one of these two, thus promoting the creation of strong single-party majority government in the teeth of what is effectively a three-party system at electoral level.

Prospects for electoral system change

In the foreseeable future, major change will occur only under certain types of election outcome. We sketch below possible scenarios following on the General Election of 1997, with its overwhelming Labour landslide.

(1) Giving devolution to Scotland entails (a) an element of proportionality in regional elections, (b) reducing Scottish representation at Westminster, by cutting the current over-representation to 50 MPs. As the Labour majority depends disproportionately on Scottish MPs, these reductions will threaten its long-term political position. This might well tempt Labour to keep the Conservatives out permanently, by changing the all-British electoral system to a more proportional one. Such a change would lead to permanent coalitions in which the Liberals would be pivotal. For the foreseeable future, however, Liberals are more likely to ally with Labour than the Conservatives. Labour might thus be tempted to gamble on this if they foresaw Conservatives winning the next election under the old system. The introduction of proportional representation (PR) in regional elections, and the report of its own Plant Commission on electoral reform, would provide plausible reasons for doing this.

(2) If there were a hung Parliament in the next election after 1997, with Labour as the largest single party but without an absolute majority over all other parties, system reform would be even more likely. It is probable that Labour would in the first place form a single-party minority government pursuing measures with which most non-Conservative parties agreed. It would then dare the Liberals to bring it down. Sooner or later they would be likely to do so. But a second election would probably confirm the results of the first, and incline Labour strategic calculations towards PR.

(3) This outcome is less likely, however, to the extent that a political settlement reduces or eliminates the political representation from Northern Ireland. The local majority Unionists have favored the Conservatives. Their departure or weakening would to some extent balance Labour's loss of Scottish MPs.

(4) System change is less likely to the extent that the Conservative Party itself splits, or concentrates all its energy on internal conflict. Usually Conservatives have put possession of political power above other goals and thus have ensured party unity. Their more

extreme ideological positions (see Figure 7.1) and in particular their strong internal divisions over Europe, seem likely to override this consideration however (see next section). To the extent that Conservatives seem unlikely to win the next election, Labour's self-interest would point to *not* changing the national system and thus forming their own single-party governments into the foreseeable future.

(5) The Liberals will not crack the 30 percent voting threshold under the existing system. Change will come only through having enough MPs to hold the balance in a future "hung" Parliament, where Labour and Conservative representation is nearly equal.

(6) The Nationalists are more likely to make a spectacular breakthrough in Scotland, because of their local concentration. Scottish independence is likely to be resisted by Labour, which can also claim to have a mandate there. It is, paradoxically, more likely to be granted by Conservatives who could not resist a strong Scottish mandate for change but could calculate on weakening Labour irrevocably in England by conceding it.

Policy consequences of party system change in Britain

At one extreme, therefore, the workings of first-past-the-post could lead to territorial secession through privileging regionally concentrated parties. What would happen to government policy as a result of party system change is a topic usually neglected in discussions of this type. We are surely interested in party system changes ultimately because of their policy consequences, however—changes mediated certainly by a shift in relationships between their party carriers. To appreciate the consequences of system change for Britain and Europe we need therefore to look at the general policy orientations of the British political parties, above all, at those of the Conservatives who have predominated in power over the post-war period, and those of Labour and Liberals who would probably replace them semi-permanently in government under a change of system.

The Conservatives

As stated above, political power has been more important for the Conservatives than for the other parties and they have historically been willing to make more ideological concessions than Labour to get it. They have therefore been quite consistent in upholding the unitary British state, unlimited parliamentary sovereignty (which gives effective autonomy to the leadership of the majority party) and in opposing attempts to codify the Constitution, which would reduce governmental power *vis-à-vis* other groups in society. They have been prepared to accept that at times Labour may have access to these powers, counting on their own electoral strengths to minimize these periods. In this they have not been mistaken. The Conservatives have controlled the government for thirty-three years of the half century from 1945 and were in office uninterruptedly from 1979 to 1997.

Conservative core values relate primarily to the idea of a strong state which will secure social order. Different elements in the party emphasize different aspects of this role: on the one hand, as an instrument of law and order through police, courts, school discipline and traditional religious morality; on the other as a supporter of paternalism and hierarchy with minimum welfare for the less well off. In the first part of the post-war period this

latter point of view seemed electorally popular with the majority of the population, so the party pragmatically accepted it as a policy to gain power, which it did from 1951 to 1964. The subsequent Labour government's attempts to impose widely unpopular measures such as comprehensive (neighbourhood) schools and a further redistribution of wealth, gave strength to a New Right element in the Conservative Party. This mounted a radical attack on Labour policies, in favor of re-establishing an entirely free-market economy, cutting welfare and increasing wealth differentials. Traditional Conservatives who did not themselves feel the same attachment to a free market were reconciled to this stance by its reassertion of state authority in the face of the social opposition, particularly from trade unions, which these changes provoked. This combination of "free market, strong state" (Gamble 1988) underlay Conservative policies from the mid-1970s onwards, reaching its full flowering in the period of Margaret Thatcher's premiership (1979–90). The reassertion of state authority also applied to foreign policy, where it fitted happily with Conservative support for a strong military and diplomatic position. The electoral successes of Thatcherism, with its particular appeal to the upwardly mobile sectors in the South-East and Midlands of England, reconciled even the non-free-marketeers to the Conservative position during the 1980s.

The breakdown of the Thatcherite synthesis came with the question of closer British integration into the European Union, which pitted its "free market" elements against supporters of the "strong state." For them the concept of British sovereignty became increasingly important as it seemed to be threatened by the growing powers of the Commission under the Single European Act of 1986–7 and especially the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. For the free marketeers, led by Mrs Thatcher's successor John Major, the liberalization of trade within a larger European market was of greater importance, even though they diverged radically from other European governments on questions of social protection from free market forces. It is this opposition between marketeers and British nationalists (europhiles and euro-sceptics) which seems likely to be exacerbated by election defeat.

Labour

The party's core beliefs are centered on the question of social and economic equality; as we have seen this is also a matter of central importance to the remoter peripheries where the underprivileged are more concentrated. Labour stands historically for the elimination of poverty, steady improvement in ordinary people's living standards, the narrowing of income and wealth differentials, wider and more evenly spread opportunities, and abolition of social and legal distinctions based formally or informally on social status. Recently it has paid growing attention to racial and sexual equality as well as class equality. Its international outlook also originates in egalitarian values: traditionally it has supported transnational organizations, seeing this as a more effective road to international peace and world redistribution than military alliances. Thus it has given more reluctant support to NATO and the American alliance than the Conservatives, which has opened it to charges of being "soft" on national security. Labour has also been active in support of anti-colonial movements and the elimination of Third World poverty.

Unlike some other European socialist movements Labour has downplayed political reform, seeing in the undefined reserve powers of the British state and its formally unlimited parliamentary sovereignty a useful instrument for imposing social change. This accounts for its reluctant support for regional devolution and unwillingness to consider radical constitutional experiment at national level. Even after its long exclusion from power after 1979 it has been reluctant to support reform, or to consider an electoral alliance with the Liberal Democrats, being still allured by the possibility of untrammelled action as a single-party government which the present set-up gives it. However, this may alter as a result of the strategic considerations outlined above.

The Liberals

The Liberal Democratic Party emerged, after the Social Democrats seceded from Labour, from their fusion in 1988 with the Liberals, one of the traditional parties which had been gradually squeezed out of power by Labour and Conservatives in the inter-war period. The Liberals predominated in the new party, and it is their core values which give it its distinctive ideological tinge—above all a concern with individual freedom. As we have seen, support for individual freedom could lead, as in the Conservative Party, to support for radical free market measures and a lack of concern for individual security and welfare. This is what characterizes many free enterprise Liberal parties of the Continent. In the case of the British Liberals, like their Scandinavian counterparts, a concern for freedom led to support for welfare on the grounds that political freedom is impossible without some level of economic and social security for all. More direct preoccupations have been their opposition to censorship, advocacy of a written and limited Constitution, a liberalization of abortion and divorce. The Liberals have always been firm on regional devolution, on environmental protection and on extending ownership of industry to the workforce, with workers having the same rights as management. They have also been the most consistently favorable of the parties to full integration with the European Union. And of course they have supported a reform of the electoral system towards full proportional representation, both because this gives greater freedom of individual choice and because they are the party most penalized by existing arrangements.

Liberal policies do not fit too well into classic left-right divisions, which accounts for their largely centrist position in regard to these (see Figure 7.1). Of all the parties they are the most committed to an extension of political rights and to constitutional reform, which would, given their central ideological position, make them the determining factor in choosing a Conservative or Labour partner in a coalition government. As it is, the existing electoral system shuts them out from effective policy-making and debate.

Conclusions

Should a change to a more proportional electoral system and a consequent weakening of Conservative party hegemony occur, therefore, there is likely to be a shift in British policy towards an integrated Europe, a shift in power towards the regions, the substitution of tolerant for restrictive political and social policies, and marginally more support for

welfare and education. These would be guaranteed through the ideological orientations of the parties that would then predominate in government, Labour and Liberals.

While this may seem a far cry from previous Conservative hegemony, the peculiarity of the British case is that it would take just one institutional change to effect it: the reform of the electoral system. Labour aspirations for sole governmental power, which have so far preserved existing election procedures when they had the chance to reform them during their limited spells in office, have been somewhat diluted by the experience of Thatcherism. Permanent power-sharing could be better than another twenty-year exclusion from office, if their political prospects change before the election of 2001 or 2002.

Change depends on election prospects therefore. New Labour under Tony Blair will not reform the existing system unless faced by the certainty of election defeat in 2002. Labour has so far always been prepared to gamble on its prospects of winning sole power. Ultimately the prospects for party system change in Britain depends on a radical change in Labour strategic calculations. This can only be produced by a dramatic collapse in their political position while they are in office. That possibility exists for the turn of the millennium. But it cannot be said to be very likely in the light of either Labour party history, or the downplaying of the leadership's commitment to national constitutional reform once their prospects improved for the election of 1997.

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8
GERMAN UNIFICATION AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE

Oskar Niedermayer

Party systems and their properties

Party systems can be characterized by their elements—the political parties—and the relationships between them or their attributes. Since the set of inter-party relationships constitutes the system level of analysis, its individual dimensions the party system properties—have to be the main topic of a party system analysis. In the following, we therefore will shortly describe these properties and their measurement. Thereafter, we will discuss how the development of party systems over time can be analyzed and which factors determine the persistence or change of these systems. In the main part of the chapter, this analytical framework will then be used to analyze the genesis of a pluralistic party system in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the development of the all-German party system till the second federal election of 1994.

The party system belongs to the intermediary system of a country which acts as a mediator between the electorate and the government. We therefore distinguish between two dimensions of party system properties: the electoral and the governmental dimension. The electoral dimension consists of five properties: fragmentation, asymmetry, volatility, polarization and legitimacy. The governmental dimension contains the segmentation and the government stability (Niedermayer 1997).

Concerning the electoral dimension, the property mostly used to describe party systems is their fragmentation, measured by indices that take into account the relative strength of the parties, measured by their electoral success. The index used here is the "effective number of parties" (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), which corresponds with the real number when all parties have the same percentage of votes. The more unequal the distribution of the vote, the smaller is the effective compared to the real number, and in party systems clearly dominated by one party, the index approaches the value 1.

It is often appropriate to use not only information about the relative size of all parties but also of the two biggest ones. When party democracy is seen as a system of changing party governments, the equality of chances to gain power is very important and the degree of inequality in this respect is indicated by the asymmetry of a party system, measured by the difference in the percentages of votes of the two biggest parties.

The previous properties show the state of a party system at a specific point in time and information about developments can be gained only by comparing two states. The third

one, called volatility (Pedersen 1980) and defined as net electoral change between two consecutive elections, directly refers to the phenomenon of change, however, and not its results. The commonly-used volatility index measures changes in the relative size of the parties that are caused by changes in the citizens' electoral behavior by showing the cumulated gains in votes of the successful parties.

Since the work of Sartori (1966) at the latest, party systems are also characterized by a substantive property: their polarization. To use this property in empirical analyses, one first has to determine the respective parties' placement in the ideological space, mostly measured by referring to the left—right dimension. This is done by analyses of the literature or documents, by expert judgements or by an examination of the orientations of the general population. The polarization of the party system is then measured by the ideological distance between the two extreme parties or by measurements including all parties.

Last but not least, the electoral dimension includes the legitimacy of a party system, measured on the basis of the citizens' support for the totality of the parties constituting the respective system.

Concerning the governmental dimension, we distinguish two system properties: the first, called segmentation, is dealing with the possibilities of the formation of government coalitions and is measured by relating the politically impossible to the theoretically possible coalitions within a party system. The second, called government stability, is dealing with the duration of government coalitions and is measured by the number of changes in the party composition of the cabinet.

Determinants of party system development

Turning to a longitudinal analysis, we have to answer the question, "Which kind of development of the party system properties described above can be characterized as persistence or change of the respective party system?" Following Smith (1989), we distinguish four levels of system change: temporary fluctuations (the normal ebbs and flows of party fortunes), restricted change (change of only one or a few properties), general change (several changes taking place at the same time), transformation (altering of all properties, so that a completely new system comes into existence).

To structure the variety of factors determining these developments, we go back to the notion of party systems as subsystems of a nation's intermediary system, which links the micro-level of the citizens with the macro-level of the government institutions. The development of party systems is influenced by factors on both these levels. The macro-level factors form the institutional framework that party competition is subject to. The most important of these factors are the respective electoral law as well as the rules about what parties are allowed and how they are financed. The micro-level factors shape the demand side of the party competition. Here, we have to consider the cleavage structure and the issue structure of the social system. The cleavage structures of West European societies consist of their main conflict lines, which historically reflect the consequences of the national and the Industrial Revolution, are embodied in the social structure, take effect on a long-term basis and are politically organized by coalitions of party elites with

specific social groups. The issue structure consists of the current range of relevant political issues and the assignment of problem-solving competencies to the parties by the citizens. The parties are not only subject to developments in their institutional and social environment, however. They actively influence this environment and thereby change their relationships with one another. We therefore also have to take into account determinants at the meso-level, the level of the intermediary system itself. The most important factors at this level are the resources which the parties use and their political behavior.

The genesis of a pluralistic party system in the former GDR

Using the analytical framework developed in the previous two paragraphs, we will now analyze the genesis of a pluralistic party system in the former GDR from autumn 1989 till the German unification in autumn 1990 (Niedermayer 1996:80ff.). Concerning this short period, we can clearly speak of a party system transformation, since all properties of the system altered so much that a completely new system emerged. The transformation process took place in four phases, which can be characterized as bipolarization, differentiation, adaptation and unification.

The first phase, up until the end of November 1989, was characterized by the open outbreak of the GDR's latent system crisis and the formation of a visible opposition to the regime. While some of the citizens showed their opposition to the system by leaving the country, others began to organize public protest and intra-state opposition. The pioneers of this opposition were small groups which had developed since the end of the 1970s under the umbrella of the Protestant Church and now became the political opponent of the ruling Communist Party (SED). From the beginning, the opposition movement was organizationally diversified but there existed a broad substantive consensus with the common aim to overcome the power of the SED, so that this phase can be described as "bipolarization."

The political elite of the SED regime was less and less able to stabilize the system and to stop the transformation process. Neither the coup by some of the party establishment against Honecker nor the resignation of the whole government and the passing of a reform program succeeded in halting the decay of power. The palace revolution was followed by a revolt of the grass roots, and in early December the organizational and leadership structures of the SED were to a large extent not functioning and the party had largely lost its grip on the state and security apparatus.

The power vacuum in the government system on the one hand and the changing issue structure concerning the change of the citizens' orientations towards German unification on the other hand strongly determined the second phase of the party system development from December 1989 to January 1990. This phase was mainly characterized by a dramatic increase in fragmentation because of three differentiation processes. First, there was an internal differentiation of the opposition. One part followed an adaptive strategy concerning the rapidly changing societal environment, organized itself in party form and said "yes" to unification, whereas the other part perpetuated the movement concept and judged unification skeptically or refused it totally. The dynamic of reunification, together

with the announcement of free parliamentary elections, also determined the second differentiation process: the foundation of new small parties without direct roots in the early opposition days but with considerable support from West German parties. Third, the so-called "block parties" CDU, DBD, LDPD and NDPD, which during the SED regime were largely conveyors of official ideology and a means of integrating certain social groups, now emancipated themselves from the SED and began a process of programmatic and personal change. The SED itself, which changed its name into PDS in February 1990, went through severe crises but survived the regime change.

The dynamic of this process took the West German party elites by surprise and up until the end of 1989 they saw no incentive to intervene massively, because German unification seemed only a long-term perspective and there existed party-specific cooperation problems. However, when the internal and external conditions for unification dramatically changed early in 1990 and the first free parliamentary elections were being considered, their reserve gave way to more and more intensive intervention, which led to the adaptation phase of the former GDR's party system. The Social Democrats (SPD) in West and East rapidly drew closer to each other and for the West German Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP) many reasons emerged for a cooperation with the former block parties. However, both in the Christian Democratic and in the Liberal sphere, new organizations had been founded. To maximize their chances in the forthcoming election, the West-CDU and FDP on the one hand encouraged the transformation process of the former block parties and on the other hand prevented the fragmentation of their camps in the GDR by persuading the several newly founded parties to form electoral alliances with the former block parties *(Allianz. für Deutschland, Bund Freier Demokraten).* Most of the citizen movement organizations formed an electoral alliance *(Bündnis 90)* too, so that the party system became much less fragmented.

The outcome of the parliamentary election, especially the victory of the

Allianz für Deutschland—which was caused by the electoral success of the CDU—came as a surprise, because many observers had expected a victory of the SPD. However, voter behavior could be interpreted as a plebiscite for a quick unification and under these circumstances, the ambivalence of the West-SPD's elite over this issue surely contributed to the bad result for the East-SPD. Another reason was the fact, that—with the help of their West German sister parties—the block parties had survived the peaceful revolution and could use their organizational and personal resources during the campaign, whereas the early date of the election prevented the East-SPD from building up an efficient organization.

The election and its political consequences affected future developments in several ways: in the Christian Democratic—conservative camp the power relationships were settled to the advantage of the Eastern CDU, the relatively good performance of the PDS secured its survival despite its internal problems, the Social Democrats passed through a severe crisis because of the electoral defeat and internal conflicts, and for the movement part of the opposition, which had pleaded for a "third way," that is, a reformed socialism, the electoral result of 2.9 percent of the vote meant its marginalization.

The fourth phase of the former GDR's party system development began in May to June 1990, when the preparations for the unification of several parties with their western sister

parties were intensified. After difficult discussions, the Liberals were the first to unify in August, the Social Democrats followed in September and the Christian Democrats in early October. Only the green and citizens' movement camp remained separated. For the 1990 federal election the East German part formed a common list named *Bündnis 90/Grüne-Bürger Innenbewegungen,* whereas the West German Greens stood for election only in the western part of the country. In 1993 the two parties merged under the label *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*. In mid-1990 the PDS began its formal extension to West Germany but thereafter remained a marginal party there without public support till today. The parties therefore began to unite before the formal national unification in October 1990. However, the real integration of the former GDR still causes difficulties and problems for Germany's government, intermediary and social system (Kaase *et al.* 1996).

The development of the all-German party system

The merging of the two party systems took place while the West German party system was becoming increasingly fragmented. The inclusion of the GDR's party system reinforced this development, because—despite of the concentration process during 1990—this system was still considerably more fragmented (see Table 8.1 for the fragmentation scores). The unification therefore induced fears of a return of "Weimar conditions," that is, an extreme fragmentation of the party system with all its politically disintegrative and ideologically radicalizing effects (Veen 1995:17).

Bonn is not Weimar, however. Apart from the time of the exceptional 1919 election, the party system of the Weimar Republic was extremely fragmented (although it was structured in three big camps) and went through a rapid concentration process only in 1932–3 with the increasing success of the National Socialists. Even in 1933, however, the party system of the Weimar Republic was considerably more fragmented than the all-German party system in 1990. In addition, the fragmentation of the East German part further decreased after 1990 (see Table 8.1), so that the fragmentation of the all-German party system remained unchanged.

The constancy of fragmentation does not mean, however, that there were no changes in the relative strength of parties. To take the two big parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD): the long-standing asymmetry of the German system, that is the structural electoral advantage of the CDU/CSU, was increased, temporarily, by the very weak performance of the East German SPD at the first all-German federal election in 1990 (see Table 8.2). At the 1994 election, however, the asymmetry between the two parties in East Germany was considerably less. All in all, the two big parties could in 1994 stabilize themselves which respect to their combined electoral support, after it had continuously decreased in West Germany from 91.2 percent (1976) to 80.1 percent (1990).

This fact should not be seen as a real consolidation, however, because the two big parties have a long-term structural problem. Their historical roots are to be found in the two central social cleavages, which have shaped the history of Germany since the very beginning: the class conflict and the Church-state conflict. The determining power of these divisions for the party system was reinforced by the early development of milieus,

Table 8.1 Party system properties at federal and Land level, 1990 and 1994

	Year	*Fragmentation*	*Asymmetry*	*Volatility*	*Government stability*
Germany	1990	3.14	10.3		0
	1994	3.15	5.1	7.7	0
Old Federal Republic	1990	2.96	8.3	5.5	
	1994	3.01	4.6	6.1	
Former GDR (Volkskammer election)	1990	4.00	18.9		
East Germany	1990	3.75	17.5	13.5	
	1994	3.45	7.0	16.4	
Baden–Württemberg	1992	3.7	10.2		1
Bavaria	1990	2.6	28.9		0
	1994	2.7	22.8	5.8	0
Berlin	1990	3.6	10.0		1
	1995	4.2	13.8	15.1	0
Brandenburg	1990	3.8	−8.8		
	1994	2.7	−35.4	22.0	2
Bremen	1991	3.7	−8.1		1
	1995	4.0	−0.8	17.7	1
Hamburg	1991	2.8	−12.9		1
	1993	4.0	−15.3	20.9	1
Hesse	1991	2.9	−0.6		1
	1995	3.2	1.2	4.1	0
Mecklenburg–West Pomerania	1990	4.0	11.3		
	1994	3.5	8.2	11.1	1
Lower Saxony	1990	2.6	−2.2		1
	1994	3.0	−7.9	7.5	1
North Rhine–Westphalia	1990	2.6	−13.3		0
	1995	2.7	−8.3	7.1	1
Rhineland–Palatinate	1991	2.8	−6.1		1
Saarland	1990	2.4	−21.0		0
	1994	2.5	−10.8	10.9	0
Saxony	1990	2.9	34.7		
	1994	2.5	41.5	12.4	0
Saxony–Anhalt	1990	3.9	13.0		
	1994	3.6	0.4	18.2	1
Schleswig–Holstein	1992	3.0	−12.4		0
Thuringia	1990	3.6	22.6		
	1994	3.3	13.0	15.2	1

that is, common ways of living produced by the coincidence of specific economic, cultural and regional factors (Lepsius 1966). These milieus formed a unidimensional socialization environment, which produced relatively stable, emotionally and normatively embodied ties with specific parties. The SPD therefore could build upon its socialist milieu consisting mainly of industrial workers organized in trade unions, and the religious

Catholics embodied in the Catholic milieu formed the traditional core electorate of the CDU—in spite of its foundation as a Christian and not merely Catholic party.

In the course of time, however, interrelated processes of socio-economic and socio-cultural change have led to a considerable shrinkage of these milieus in West Germany. This process has considerable consequences for the two big parties. It is true that their milieu-bound, emotionally and normatively motivated voters still form their core electorate, but this core has shrunk to only a small part of the total electorate and the strong ties of the remaining core voters are beginning to weaken. In the former GDR, comparable milieu ties between workers could not persist, because a clear dividing line between kinds of employees did not exist and free articulation of interests and representation by trade unions was suppressed (Schmitt 1994:202). Therefore, the SPD in 1994 still had problems in mobilizing the workers in East Germany. As for the CDU, its election results show that its religious component is mainly Protestant. In East Germany there are very few Catholics, and only a minority of the citizens belongs to any of the churches; pure membership of a church is in itself an indicator of religious affiliation. The big parties therefore have partially different social bases in the two parts of Germany.

Because of the shrinking or disappearance of their traditional core electorates, the big parties are more and more forced to search for voters in other social groups. This leads to an increasing heterogeneity of interests in the total electorate, and the party ties of the new voter groups are not emotional or normative but instrumental or even lacking. These groups are potential floating voters which have to be mobilized again and again by attractive personal and programmatic political propositions, which the big parties, especially the SPD, find harder and harder to deliver. This potential flexibility of individual voting behavior need not necessarily lead to an increase in the volatility of the party system. This is shown by the development of the party system volatility in West Germany during the 1980s, which has—with the exception of 1983—only slightly increased. In East Germany, the volatility between the *Volkskammerwahl* and the *Bundestagswahl* of 1990 was considerably higher and it even increased in 1994. The volatility was also very high at the level of the *Bundesländer* and in four of the five new *Länder* the changing voter preferences in 1994 led to changes in government (see Table 8.1). In the western part of Germany, volatility at the *Land* level is also mostly higher than at the federal level and nineteen coalition changes occurred in the last ten years. This high instability has dramatically changed the long-term trend of an increasing government stability at the *Land* level in the previous decades.

In addition, the mere comparison of the two points when the federal elections took place, 1990 and 1994, does not reveal the dramatic change of the party system's legitimacy between those two dates. We can measure the legitimacy by an indicator similar to that used by Rattinger (1993:26ff), the resulting index ranging from -5 to +5. At the end of 1990, East and West Germans attributed relatively high legitimacy scores to the party system (East: 3.7, West 3.8). In 1991 and 1992 the legitimacy decreased sharply, however, and reached its lowest level in mid-1993 (between 2.3 and 2.6). During this period there is good reason to impute to the Germans a considerable weariness with the party system. This was caused solely by a marked loss of sympathy with the traditional German parties, that is, both the government parties CDU/CSU and

Table 8.2 Federal elections 1990 and 1994 (turnout and results as percentages, and distribution of seats)

	Turnout	*CDU/CSU*	*SPD*	*FDP*	*B90-GR*	*GR/W*	*B90/GR-B*	*PDS*	*REP*	*Other*
1990										
total	77.8	43.8	33.5	11.0		3.8	1.2	2.4	2.1	2.0
East	74.5	41.8	24.3	12.9		0.1	6.1	11.1	1.3	2.5
West	78.6	44.3	35.7	10.6		4.8	0.0	0.3	2.3	1.9
old Fed. Rep.	78.4	44.2	35.9	10.6		4.7		0.3	2.3	1.9
Seats		319	239	79			8	17		
1994										
total	79.0	41.5	36.4	6.9	7.3			4.4	1.9	1.6
East	72.6	38.5	31.5	3.5	4.3			19.8	1.3	1.0
West	80.5	42.1	37.5	7.7	7.9			1.0	2.0	1.9
old Fed. Rep.	80.6	42.2	37.6	7.7	7.8			0.9	2.0	1.9
Seats		294	252	47	49			30		

Notes: West=electoral region West (= old Federal Republic and West Berlin); East=electoral region East (former GDR); REP=the *Republikaner*.
In 1990, the green and citizens-movement camp remained separated; *Die Grünen* (GR) stood for election in West Germany including both parts of Berlin; *Bündnis 90/ Grüne-Bürger Innenbewegungen* (B90/GR-B) stood for election in East Germany and West Berlin. In 1993 the two parties merged, so that in 1994 only one green party, the *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (B90-GR), stood for election.

FDP and—after a short period of improvement—the SPD opposition. Meanwhile, *Die Grünen* in the West and the PDS in the East were able to attract much more support. The dramatic legitimacy crisis was above all caused by developments concerning the issue structure: the steadily worsening perception of economic development, the dissatisfaction with the course and consequences of unification and problems with persons seeking asylum. When the government parties and the SPD compromised over the treatment of asylum seekers and the public began to be much more optimistic about the economy, early in the summer of 1994, the party system suddenly began to look more legitimate. At the time of the federal election of 1994, the legitimacy scores in the West nearly reached their starting level but they decreased again thereafter. In the East the legitimacy remained somewhat lower and the continuing decrease after the election was more marked, so that there was what can be called a widening legitimacy gap.

In the first half of the 1990s there were remarkable changes not only in the two big parties but also in the small ones. The Liberals especially suffered a lot. With 11 percent of the vote, the FDP in 1990 had gained more than ever before in federal elections. In 1994, however, it decreased to only 6.9 percent and in East Germany mobilized no more than about a quarter of its previous voters (see Table 8.2). In autumn 1993 the party was represented in all sixteen *Land* parliaments, in the beginning of 1996 just in four. The causes for this decline were to be found especially in the personal resources and the political behavior of the party. In a time where politics was increasingly personalized the party lacked the prominent leading personality who could give it a positive image. Even more important, however, was the fact that the party had gone on neglecting one of the two functions on which its strategic position in the German party system was based. Since the beginning, the role of the FDP had been that of providing government majorities together with one of the two big parties and of being a liberal corrective for their policies. The FDP had increasingly neglected its corrective function, however, so that it was more and more perceived by the voters as a mere appendage of the CDU/CSU and not as an independent party with substantial policies of its own.

In view of the skeptical attitude of the German voters to absolute majorities of one party, the problems of the FDP favored the Greens, which—according to many observers—in West Germany have already taken over the role of the Liberals as the "third power" in the party system. In the 1990 elections, however, the West German Greens unexpectedly failed to surmount the 5 percent barrier. They stood for election—separately from the common list of the citizen movement in the East *(Bündnis 90/Grüne-Bürger Innenbewegungen)*—only in the western electoral region and gained only 4.8 percent, while the East German list entered parliament. The failure of the West German Greens was caused both by the issue structure and the political behavior of the party and its main competitor, the SPD. Apart from the refusal of an early fusion with the Green-alternative and citizen-movement camp in East Germany, the main reasons were their hesitant attitude to unification, which was the dominant issue during 1990, the paralysis resulting from internal quarrels and the attractiveness of the SPD chancellor candidate Oskar Lafontaine for some potential Green voters.

In spite of this temporary defeat, the Greens are now solidly established in the West German party system: in nearly all West German *Land* elections since 1991 their share of

the vote increased, they are now represented in all eleven *Länder* parliaments and they entered the federal parliament in 1994 again with a West German result of 7.9 percent. In East Germany, however, the party became more and more marginalized. It had to put up with considerable losses in all five East German *Land* elections and cleared the 5 percent barrier only in Saxony-Anhalt.

The position of the Greens in the West German party system of the 1990s is influenced by the following four factors (Kleinert 1996:36ff.).

1 Voters attribute political competence in environmental matters—which is still one of the dominant political issues—mostly to the Greens.
2 Their image has changed since in the public perception the party is no longer dominated by fierce intra-party battles between different factions.
3 They are the political expression of cultural changes in the West German society that have occurred since the late 1960s.
4 They benefit from the partial withdrawal of the SPD from the competition over the supporting groups of voters.

In East Germany, however, with another social structure, other cultural patterns, a different party system and an issue structure dominated by economic and social problems, their voter potential is much weaker.

At the other end of the ideological spectrum, the unification process stopped the wave of right wing extremism organized in party form, which arose in West Germany from the mid-1980s on. It is true that in 1991–2 the right-wing parties DVU and the *Republikaner* were again able to increase their share of the poll, which was caused by the asylum problem of the time and people's dissatisfaction with economic development and politics in general. In the *Land* elections of 1994–5, however, neither the DVU nor the *Republikaner* played a significant role and in the 1994 federal elections the *Republikaner* did not even come up to their poor result of 1990 (see Table 8.2).

More dramatic was the development of the PDS during the first years after the system transformation. From the *Volkskammerwahl* in March 1990 in the former GDR to the all-German federal election in October 1990, the PDS had to put up with a loss of nearly half of their electorate (in absolute numbers). Until the end of 1991, the party continued to loose support, so that it seemed to be doomed. In 1992–3, however, a recovery began and in the federal and *Land* elections of 1994 the party succeeded in establishing itself as the third biggest party in East Germany. To explain this revival, one has to take into account all groups of potential determinants described at the beginning, that is, the institutional framework, the cleavage and issue structure, and the political behavior and resources of the party.

The specific form of the institutional framework implemented during the transformation of the former GDR, and the all-German rule system after unification, helped the PDS to survive the system transformation and establish itself in East Germany. According to the former GDR's party law of February 1990, extreme right-wing parties were banned. The PDS, however, was never threatened by such a ban and could therefore maintain its continuity. In addition, the PDS was the only beneficiary of the decision of

the German Federal Constitutional Court about the common federal electoral law of September 1990, which led to a split-up of the German territory into a Western and Eastern electoral region and to a separate application of the 5 percent barrier for the 1990 election. While this rule enabled the PDS to enter the first all-German Bundestag, a special feature of the electoral law, the direct mandate rule, enabled it to enter the second one after the 1994 elections.

At the demand side of the political competition, the development of the PDS was influenced by the specific conflict and issue structure in East Germany and its change during the first years after the unification. Concerning the conflict structure, it seemed that forty-five years of Communism—by eliminating the party competition and leveling out the social basis—had destroyed all preconditions for the survival or genesis of long-term party ties based on the social structure. This was not the case, however. Contrary to the former GDR's own ideology, the class conflict had not become obsolete but had been transformed in a particular way. A bureaucratic socialist estate system was formed with new social hierarchies and a new elite in the party, the economy and bureaucracy. This group formed the core electorate of the PDS after the transformation of the system (Schmitt 1994: 201ff.), and the party continued to shrink to this core up until 1991. As euphoria waned after unification, however, the party began to benefit from another development: the genesis of an intra-German center—periphery conflict. On the basis of real economic and social problems, a particular attitude took shape among East Germans; it was a combination of disappointed expectations, pessimism, economic discontent, feelings of discrimination and colonization, nostalgic idealizations of the GDR's past, non-acceptance of the western model of democracy, distrust of parties and governmental institutions, identification with socialist norms and values, and approval of socialist core statements. This anti-western and ideologically determined pattern, particularly strong in certain regional milieus, will determine a vote for a genuine East German socialistic party.

That this intra-German center—periphery cleavage has found its organizational expression in the PDS, is also due to the political behavior of the party. The PDS takes a populist line in articulating the attitude just described; it cultivates reminiscences of the good side of the GDR's socialism and concentrates on advocating popular social policies that meet the everyday needs of the East Ger-man people. In doing this, the party benefits considerably from its outstanding in comparison to the other parties—personal and organizational resources. Despite the extreme loss of members during the transformation process, the PDS has still by far the highest membership of all parties in East Germany and the best structure of local organizations.

The PDS is neither a protest party nor an interest party but a regional milieu party with a relatively stable electorate which is emotionally and normatively tied to the party. Its position in the East German party system therefore seems secured over the medium term. An extension of its electorate in the future is not likely, however, since the party has not succeeded in working its way into other groups of voters. In addition, the long-term survival of the PDS as an all-German party depends on a considerably higher electoral support in West Germany. The party leadership is well aware of this fact but until now, all attempts to gain a foothold in the West have failed.

According to the ideological conceptions of themselves, the PDS and the *Republikaner* are the opposite poles of the German party system. The West and East Germans share this view by locating these two parties at the left and right margin of the ideological spectrum. On a polarization scale ranging from 0 to 5 and taking into account people's perceptions of the parties' ideological place- ment as well as their electoral strength, the perceived polarization of the whole party system decreased in West Germany from a score of 2.1 in 1990 to 1.6 in 1994. The East German party system was somewhat more polarized in 1990 (2.2) and the polarization index remained nearly unchanged in 1994 (2.1), so that we find in 1994 a discrepancy between a lower polarized West German and a higher polarized East German party system.

Politically even more relevant than for the polarization is the existence and electoral success of the PDS for the segmentation of the East German party system. Since the *Land* elections of 1994, only three parties are represented in the East German *Land* parliaments: CDU, SPD and PDS. This implies a considerable reduction of the theoretically possible coalition options. When there is no absolute majority of one party, only three possibilities remain and as long as the other two parties exclude the PDS from coalition building, a grand coalition of SPD and CDU is the only politically possible alternative. In such a highly segmented party system there are great incentives to extend the existing coalition options, so that—from a merely strategic point of view—the discussion within the SPD about its relationship to the PDS, especially at the *Land* level in East Germany, is understandable. With Oskar Lafontaine's public speculations about a majority of the "left camp," this discussion was revived at the federal level, too. Furthermore, the CDU is also beginning to think carefully about extending its coalition options, especially in West Germany (Veen 1995:121), and is considering the possibility of coalitions with the Greens at the *Land* level. A realization of this possible restructuring of party competition would have considerable effects not only on the segmentation of the party system but also on all other system properties.

Conclusion

During the change of regime, the non-competitive hegemonic party system of the former GDR rapidly changed to a pluralistic system which merged—owing to massive interventions by West German party elites—with the West German party system before national unification. Taking into account the development of all party system properties analyzed here, one can state that—at the federal level-this merging has caused a restricted party system change but it has not altered the core characteristics of the West German party system. The return to "Weimar" conditions feared by some observers at the beginning, that is the transition from moderate pluralism with relatively low fragmentation and polarization to extreme pluralism, has not taken place.

However, the unification considerably strengthened the pre-existing regional differentiation of the German party system by a new East—West dimension, whereby the dividing line between the western and the eastern part of the system is marked by the PDS. The successor of the former GDR's leading party remains marginal in the West but —by expressing the emerging intra-German center-periphery cleavage—it has established

itself as one of the three big parties in the East with considerable relevance for the present structure and future develop-ment of the East German party system.

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9

PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN ISRAEL, 1948–98: A CONCEPTUAL AND TYPOLOGICAL BORDER-STRETCHING OF EUROPE?

Reuven Y Hazan

Introduction

The chaotic nature of Israeli politics in general, and of the party system in particular, has left most observers in despair. Elections for the parliament, the Knesset, have produced dozens of parties vying for seats, with an average of a dozen actually winning representation. Yet most of the parties failed to survive even a single decade. None of the twenty-one parties which put up candidates for the first Knesset in 1949 was listed in the elections for the fourteenth Knesset in

1996. The Israeli party system—established when the country's population totaled less than one million, which today is almost six million—has been identified by high fractionalization, fragmentation and polarization.

But this cursory description is quite misleading. Scholars familiar with Israeli politics have pointed out the remarkable consistency that the extreme multi-party system has displayed over almost half a century. When the party system is divided by blocs, rather than parties, this stability is nothing short of remarkable (Gutmann 1979). During the first three decades of statehood, for example, there was one dominant party which held power, and its bloc of parties on the left never received less than 47 percent of the vote or more than 51 percent. The rival bloc on the right never received less than 23 percent or more than 27 percent, while the religious bloc never received less than 13 percent or more than 15 percent. The average deviation for all three groupings, for the entire period, was less than 1 percent. The rapid appearance and disappearance of parties is also downplayed by focusing on blocs, not parties, whose cores have remained the same over time. Despite the puzzling array of name changes, alliances, mergers and splits, the major contenders for power have shown both continuity and exclusivity. This stability was sustained while the population doubled, tripled and quadrupled, owing largely to massive immigration from non-democratic countries by people having little to no connection with the ideologies of the main parties.

The stability, however, did not last; and a crucial transformation took place in the late 1970s. Israel, one of the twenty-three established liberal democracies in the late 1950s, is also one of the only four that had a radically different party system thirty years later (Ware 1996:213). Yet this change did not alter the basic party blocs, nor their cores, but only the distribution of the vote between them. The dominant party and its allies were reduced

to a status equal to that of their main rival, while the religious bloc remained the same in size but became the power broker between the two competing sides. In the elections since the late 1970s, the left bloc has won between 41 percent and 48 percent of the votes, the right bloc between 28 percent and 39 percent, and the religious bloc between 11 percent and 19 percent. That is, apart from the rise of the right, the other two blocs have remained relatively unchanged and consistency has been maintained as in the previous period.

The confusing nature of Israeli party politics, which has succeeded in confounding both foreign and local students, has produced a perception that confines Israel to a unique, fluid and perplexing type, excluded from most typologies. However, this situation is misleading on two counts. First, as has been pointed out, "the most salient characteristic of Israeli politics has been persistence" (Isaac 1981:2) and not instability, within two distinct time periods—it is only between these two that a realignment took place—thereby exhibiting a similar state of stabilization to the European electorates (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Rose and Urwin 1970). Second, if the goal is *not* to create yet another typology, then Israel can be used to assess the applicability of systemic typologies generated by the comparable parliamentary democracies of Europe, which is what this paper will attempt to do. Lijphart (1984:13) correctly noted that Israel is a non-European country that can be regarded as a political-cultural "extension" of Europe. In other words, Israel is truly a comparable and comparative case for European purposes.

This chapter will trace the development of the Israeli party system from one type during the first two decades, through its transformation in the 1970s and into a second type in the 1980s, along with accompanying changes at the electoral, institutional, partisan and behavioral levels. It will also elaborate the electoral and political reforms adopted in the 1990s, and their dramatic ramifications, which could transform the party system into yet a third type. In its conclusion, this chapter will endeavor to contribute to the discussion of new ways to measure and model party system change.

A dominant party in a moderate multi-party system, 1949–77

A dominant party, according to Duverger (1954:308–9), is a party larger than any other, which clearly outdistances its rivals over a period of time. Electorally, a dominant party must be differentiated from a majority party. Majority status is a facilitating condition, but not a necessary one. Thus, the definition of dominance does not include a majority; a party may be dominant despite never having, and being unlikely to ever have, a majority. Duverger's definition of a dominant party is, therefore, distinct from Sartori's (1976:192–201) predominant party, which requires a majority over a series of elections.

Domination is not only a question of power, according to Duverger, but also one of influence. Beyond the electoral element there are also sociological and belief factors. A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch, and when public opinion considers it to be dominant. Hence even the opponents of the dominant party acknowledge its superior status and influence. Yet a dominant party is not a type of party system because it may coincide with several types of systems; but it does have a stabilizing influence on whichever type it is assumed to correspond to. Blondel (1968, 1972), for example,

Table 9.1 Percentage of seats won in Knesset elections by the two largest parties, 1949–73

Party	*1949*	*1951*	*1955*	*1959*	*1961*	*1965*	*1969*	*1973*
Mapai	38	38	33	39	35	38	47	43
2nd largest	16	17	13	14	14	22	22	33

pointed out that there are multi-party systems with a dominant party—in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and France—and ones without a dominant party. Israel should be added to the former category.

The dominant party in Israel's multi-party system, until 1977, was Mapai and its successors (Medding 1972). In the first eight Knesset elections, Mapai clearly outdistanced its rivals. Table 9.1 shows the percentage of seats obtained by Mapai compared to the second largest party in the Knesset. Despite never having obtained a majority, Mapai won more than twice the number of seats than that of its nearest rival in the first five elections; and until 1973, the gap was never less than 10 percent of the total number of seats. After every election it was Mapai that was called on to form the coalition, and it was Mapai that was able to control a majority within the coalition. Mapai thus fulfilled the criteria for electoral dominance.

But it was more than electoral advantage that made Mapai the dominant party. Mapai was ideologically located in the middle of the party spectrum, and it could prevent the formation of a coalition by those to its right or to its left. Hence it was also in a pivotal position during the first eight Knesset elections. When the parties were arranged according to an ideological continuum, the median legislator always fell within Mapai (Diskin 1976). In addition, despite its non-doctrinaire socialism—which would make it a candidate for the moderate left by European standards—Mapai occupied a middle position in Israeli politics. This position was true not only for the left-right continuum, but also for the two other spectra that were relevant in Israeli politics—the dovish—hawkish continuum on foreign and security affairs concerning the Arab—Israeli conflict, and the religious—secular continuum involving issues of religion and state—on which Mapai was positioned in the middle (Hazan 1996b). Mapai's electoral size, pivotal role and middle positioning combined to make it a dominant party according to all the criteria posed by Duverger. Not only was the party identified with the struggle for Israel's independence and its leaders considered the founding fathers of the state, but, as Horowitz (1977:4) pointed out, "other parties as well accommodated themselves to this state of affairs, aiming to become junior partners in government or, as the leader of one such party once put it, to be 'a corrective rather than an alternative'."

Mapai's dominance, in accordance with Duverger's assertion, brought stability to the party system, despite the purely proportional electoral system, ideological doctrinism and extreme multipartism. Therefore, in a country that lacked a consensus, the presence of a dominant party was the manner by which stability was obtained. Israel thus exhibited several features common to another multi-party system with a dominant party of the same era, Italy, in the factors through which stability was achieved by the dominant party (Arian and

Barnes 1974:601). These factors include: the role of centralized hierarchical structures in society, such as bureaucracies; the co-optation of the lines of communication by the dominant party, on the basis of networks of personal ties; and the filtering of political inputs through structures controlled by the dominant party. In short, a multi-party system with a dominant party is still a competitive party system although, in order to maintain stability, the opposition is deprived of either access or influence at several key strata of society, i.e. it is a dominant monopoly, with a resulting apparatus somewhat typical of single-party states.

Goldberg (1992:27–8) suggests three criteria for the classification of a dominant party system, using the Israeli experience. First, in accordance with Sartori, electorally the dominant party should win at least 10 percent more seats in three consecutive elections than the second largest party. Second, in line with Duverger, sociologically the dominant party should enjoy spiritual and ideological superiority over its rivals, who acknowledge their inferior status. Third, as with Huntington, no other party or alliance can present a credible alternative to the dominant party. Dominance is, therefore, an attenuated form of predominance, with the dominant party—through its majority in and control of the coalition—operating at times as if it were a party with an absolute majority.

Party system change (1): the collapse of domination

The erosion of Mapai's status began while it was still a dominant party, and culminated when it was deposed in the 1977 election (Arian 1977). One of the tactics used by Mapai to assert ideological dominance was the delegitimization of its rivals and their ideology. Whether it was the Communists to its left, who were stigmatized by Mapai as anti-Zionist, or the rightist Herut party, which Mapai declared irresponsible and dissident, the dominant party defined the legitimate borders of party politics. Yet this tactic could not be sustained because of the counter-measures of Herut, in particular. Through participation in major nongovernmental organizations dominated by Mapai, and by merging with more legitimate moderate right parties, Herut was able to gain both legitimacy and voter support. But the collapse of domination was due to more than the rise of a legitimate opposition. It was also due to the demise of Mapai, its pivotal position, dòminant ideology and centrality.

The slow but constant decline in Mapai's ideological dominance began to affect its political dominance a decade before it lost its hold on power. The first serious attempt to undermine one of the major features in Mapai's dominance took place in the mid-1960s. Several of the party's leaders left in 1964 to form a party to the right of Mapai—Rafi—hoping to undermine its pivotal position and hold the balance of power. Yet, in the 1965 elections, Mapai was able to preserve its pivotal status, leaving the splinter party in the opposition. On the municipal level, however, Rafi and the right wing collaborated and managed to force Mapai into the opposition. Most of Mapai's defectors eventually merged with the dominant party (Mapai then changed its name into the Labor Party), while the rest subsequently joined the rival bloc.

Duverger (1954:312) posited that "the dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its vigor, its arteries harden . . . every domination bears within itself the seeds of its own

destruction." The rejection of Labor, and the appeal of its main rival, can be seen from several perspectives which validate Duverger's assertion. Arian (1979) shows the decline of Labor's political and ideological dominance using voter surveys that show a slow but consistent trend shifting to the right and away from the dominant party, using numerous criteria such as education, place of birth, ethnic origin, age, etc. Yishai (1985:235–42) suggests that Labor's demise was due to resentment by the disadvantaged sectors of society, dissatisfaction with the institutions of the dominant party and the party's estrangement from growing sectors of the population. The main rival, Likud (Herut's successor), presented the appeal of upward mobility for the disadvantaged (both socially and politically), respect for religious principles (as opposed to the secular position of the dominant party) and hawkish patriotism on matters of security, which after 1967 became the dominant dimension for party competition and identification. This last point deserves both emphasis and elaboration.

The 1967 Six Day War, in which Israel won a decisive military victory over numerous Arab states and captured territory four times the size of Israel, resulted in a paradox. On the one hand, the victory fortified the dominant party's hold on government; on the other hand, it changed the very nature of party competition, which facilitated the end of domination. Until 1967, the socio-economic cleavage was the main site of party competition, with Mapai occupying the middle. After the Six Day War, the socio-economic cleavage was replaced by that of territories and defense. Arian and Shamir (1983) claim that from the 1970s the socioeconomic differentiation of Israeli parties into left and right all but lost its meaning. However, the terms "left" and "right" did not become devoid of all significance; rather, they were adopted to distinguish between the parties' positions on security, which became the most salient factor (Ventura and Shamir 1991). The leftist Labor Party was largely perceived as dovish, willing to trade territories for peace with the Arab world, while the rightist Likud was identified as hawkish, believing that the territories should be held for both historical and security reasons. Yet the socio-economic cleavage did not disappear; it was simply not emphasized, or came to coincide to a large extent with the security concerns. Owing to Israel's small size, and the constant threat from its Arab neighbors, the population at large perceived the captured territories as a strategically important buffer for Israel's defense, and hence supported the Likud's previously illegitimate position on this issue. The growing importance of security dimension thus pushed Labor out of the middle and toward the left, placed Likud as the legitimate ideological alternative and granted the opposition wide public support on an issue which forced the dominant party to be on the defensive. The 1967 war also brought to an end Labor's previous efforts to delegitimize Likud, because on the eve of the war the dominant party felt it had to include the opposition in an emergency national unity government. This step not only made the opposition acceptable in the eyes of the public, it also showed that the dominant party no longer felt that it could monopolize power.

The rise of the security factor also had an impact on the religious parties, who until then had played the role of loyal partners to the dominant party and had supported practically every coalition. After 1967, the religious parties either began to contemplate supporting the Likud, if it should win power, because of the religious significance of the captured territories, or altered their positions and began to move toward the right.

Therefore, in the period following the Six Day War, the decrease in the number of seats won by Labor, and the increase in seats won by Likud, was accompanied by the religious parties becoming both more important in the formation of coalitions and no longer automatically supportive of the dominant party.

The end of the battle to delegitimize the opposition, and the opposition's rise both in power and acceptance, showed that the dominant party's ideology had collapsed. The domination of the leftist orientation advocated by Labor gave way to a situation where at least two ideologies competed for support, and the public began to shift to the right. But the decline of the dominant party and its ideology should be understood in the context of both electoral and socio-cultural developments, most notably the transition from the socio-economic dimension of party competition where a collectivist, egalitarian and socialist orientation dominated, to the security-based arena of electoral competition where individualism, differentiation and free-market ideas were more accepted than ever before. The waves of immigration and the new, more open society caused the dominant ideology to lose its claim and commitment to broad sectors in Israeli society. Moreover, Labor not only declined in the electoral arena, its ideological position also changed into one that held few of its traditional leftist connotations.

The second attempt to dislodge the dominant party from its pivotal position was made in 1977 with the creation of a new party to the right of Labor, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC). While Rafi failed in 1965 because the shift of votes to the right—away from the dominant party—was too small to enable it to hold the balance of power, the 1977 shift was so great that Likud and the religious parties were able to form a coalition that excluded both the dominant party and the DMC. The pivotal position moved from the previously dominant Labor Party to the religious parties located in the middle, who allied with Likud to form the coalition and put the last nail in the coffin of domination. Duverger (1954:308) was correct when he said that in a multi-party system, the loss of power by the dominant party generally means the end of dominance. Since 1977, Labor has never been able to regain its dominant position, and the party system has changed to a new type with entirely different characteristics.

Imperfect two-partism in a polarized multi-party system, 1981–96

If the 1967 war is partially responsible for the undoing of the dominant party—despite the clear military victory—then the crisis of the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War accounts for its final collapse. The 1973 election was delayed by the war, and its results reflected only the initial stages of the impact of the war. Labor maintained its hold on power, but its dominance all but disappeared. The Likud won, for the first time, more than two-thirds the number of seats of the dominant party, closed the gap between the two biggest parties to 10 percent of the seats, and presented itself as a credible and possible alternative. Labor formed a minimal-winning coalition, instead of the usual oversized one that would have allowed it as dominant party to play off its partners against each other. The era of the parties perceiving themselves as possible correctives to the dominant party had clearly ended, and the era of possible political alternatives had arrived. Sartori (1976:155)

Table 9.2 Percentage of seats for left and right in Knesset elections, 1977–96

Election	*1977*[1]	*1981*	*1984*	*1988*	*1992*	*1996*[2]
Left	42	45	49	46	51	43
Right	58	55	51	54	49	51

Notes: Left=Labor bloc+Arab bloc; right=Likud bloc+religious bloc.
1 Of the 15 seats won by DMC, 7 are included in the right and 8 in the left. The reason is that when DMC joined the Likud-led coalition, the party split and eight of its MKs opted to join the opposition.
2 A centrally-positioned immigrants party won 7 seats and is not included in the breakdown between left and right, although it did join the coalition formed by Likud.

correctly noted that the results of the 1973 election "point to the emergence of a sizable, unified opposition and, therefore, to a possible trend toward a system based on alternative coalitions."

Yet, although remnants of political dominance were maintained, ideological and sociological dominance had been lost, and the final decline of political dominance itself was exacerbated by two processes leading up to the 1977 election. A string of important defectors split from the Labor Party to form a new party (DMC), which won almost half the number of seats as Labor; and the historical partnership between Labor and the orthodox National Religious Party (NRP) began to fall apart as the latter's reigns were taken over by the young guard who moved it toward the right. The results of the 1977 election brought Likud to power with almost 10 percent more seats than Labor, which dropped to its lowest point ever.

Since the 1981 election, there have been several trends that have given the Israeli party system a bipolar character. First, the two major parties have been separated by only a few seats—in two elections by only one seat. Second, the smaller parties have begun to be clearly identified with one of the two major parties, becoming "satellite" parties. Third, the size of the two blocs of parties has become almost equal. The Israeli party system has thus shifted to a competitive bipolar structure, resulting in a constellation similar to that of a two-party format, yet in a multi-party system. Galli (1966) discerned a similar development in the Italian party system, which he called "imperfect two-partism." Table 9.2 shows the evident dualism the party system has exhibited in the last six elections by pointing out the development of equilibrium between left and right. Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the election results for the entire history of Israel, and the rise of bipolar competitiveness in the party system. Figure 9.1 presents the four party blocs, while Figure 9.2 focuses on the two major parties within each of the two main blocs. In short, on all three levels—left versus right, party blocs and major parties—the contemporary Israeli party system has been characterized by competitive bipolarity.

Yet the advent of imperfect twopartism did not maintain the moderate mechanics of the party system. There are two indicators of the direction that the Israeli party system took in the 1980s. The first is the splintering of the two major parties or the creation of entirely new parties, which positioned themselvesoutside of the two major parties—i.e. they were more extreme—in practicallyevery election. In 1981 Tehiya split from Likud



Figure 9.1 Percentage of seats for the four party blocs in Knesset elections



Figure 9.2 Percentage of seats for the two major parties in Knesset elections

and positioned itself to the rightof it. In 1984 Kach occupied the extreme right position, while the PLP occupieda position further to the left of Labor. In 1988 Kach was outlawed, but most ofits extremist policies were adopted by a new party called Moledet; Tsomet wascreated to the right of Likud; and Mapam broke off from Labor and moved to itsleft.

The second indicator is the failure to establish a viable center party, or parties, after the previously dominant party was pushed to the left. Apart from the DMC's successful electoral victory in 1977, when it won 13 percent of the seats, the numerous attempts to form center parties all fared poorly and they were quickly absorbed into one of the two major parties, or bloc of parties (including the DMC). Yet the Israeli party system, despite is apparent coalescence into two major blocs, exhibited heightened polarization,

increased fragmentation, and extreme fractionalization; apart from the two major parties, none of the others (8 in 1981, 13 in both 1984 and 1988) won more than 5 percent of the seats.

Galli's imperfect twopartism is thus an applicable and appropriate model for Israel, where the two party blocs are to be found one on each side of the center, rather than as in Italy where one bloc was in the center and the other on the extreme left. The bipolar voter *distribution* in the Israeli party system of the 1980s resembled the Italian one of the same era. The *positioning* of the party blocs in Israel in the 1980s resembles, however, the Italian party system of the mid-1990s, after Italy's adoption of electoral reform. Recently, Israel too is experiencing a transformation of its party system as a result of electoral reform.

Party system change (2): electoral reform and its ramifications

In 1992 an electoral reform bill was adopted in Israel. The new "Basic Law: The Government," gives Israel the distinction of being the only country to have direct popular election of its Prime Minister, from 1996. This new basic law not only effectively alters the electoral system, but also changes the entire political system in Israel (Hazan 1996a).

Articles 3 and 13 of the new "Basic Law: The Government" laid down the new electoral system for Israel (as shown in Figure 9.3). Article 3B states that the Prime Minister is chosen on the basis of direct popular elections. The tenure of the Prime Minister is concurrent with that of the Knesset (four years), and they are elected simultaneously. The Knesset continues to be elected by a strict list system of proportional representation with the entire state serving as one constituency and the electoral threshold set at 1.5 percent. The Prime Minister, however, is elected according to the two-ballot system. Article 13 states that a majority of the vote is necessary to elect the Prime Minister in the first round; if that is not obtained, then two weeks later a second round is held in which only the two candidates with the highest vote in the previous round can participate.

The new political system is described in several of the articles of the same Basic Law. According to Article 3C, the Prime Minister is given the power to nominate the Cabinet; however, a parliamentary vote of investiture is necessary before the Cabinet can begin to function. Moreover, Article 19A states that the parliament not only must approve the cabinet, it also can oust the Prime Minister through a vote of no-confidence, which requires only a bare majority of 61 out of 120 members. In accordance with Article 19B, the removal of the Prime Minister brings about the dissolution of the Knesset as well, meaning that new elections will be necessary for both. By the same token, Article 22A states that the Prime Minister—with the support of the President, a symbolic position elected by the Knesset—has the power to dissolve the Knesset, but such a step would also end the Prime Minister's own tenure and force new elections.

The effects of the electoral reform on the 1996 elections in Israel were characteristic of electoral competition in some of the European countries. In Israel, where the entire country serves as one constituency, the election of the Prime Minister in a national single-member district created party alliances aimed at winning the necessary absolute majority.

However, these alliances were of two types: on the left, there was simply a unified stand behind one candidate for Prime Minister, but the parties remained separate units for the proportional Knesset election; on the right, there was a formal alliance between three parties, who became factions within one party, to advance a single candidate for Prime Minister and a single list for the Knesset election. Therefore, the electoral competition on the left in Israel came to resemble that of Germany, where a small party seeks voters in the proportional election and backs one of the major parties in the majoritarian election, while the constellation on the right conformed to that of Italy, with its alliance of forces in order to win the necessary majority.

The reforms in Israel were aimed at consolidating the apparent direction of change in the Israeli party system, i.e. to propel the party system further down the path toward a more perfect form of twopartism. However, because of their ability to split the ballot, the two main parties succeeded in dominating the race for Prime Minister, yet both lost seats in the Knesset to more ideological and sectarian parties. Labor and Likud together won only 66 seats, their lowest achievement since 1961!

In a party system characterized by ideological intensity over the most vital of issues—survival—it remains uncertain if the experience of almost two decades of imperfect twopartism has prepared Israel for a real two-party system. In short, will the ongoing reform of Israel's electoral system eventually lead to a moderate two-party system, or will it be impossible to truly concentrate political opinions into two parties and Israel will witness the survival of its multi-party system? That is, will the continued domination of the race for Prime Minister by the two major parties push the party system towards further consolidation, or will the two main parties' loss of seats in the Knesset election lead to the eventual breakdown of the imperfect two-party mold that has developed since the early 1980s? These questions, at present, remain unanswered.

Conclusion: measuring and modeling party system change in Israel

Systemic change should include not only a different classification of the new party system, but also a new set of behavioral characteristics, or mechanics, which identify it. From all possible perspectives, the Israeli party system of the 1950s and 1960s was dramatically different from that of the 1980s and 1990s, with the interim phase of the 1970s being the period of change. It would thus be correct to say that the Israeli party system underwent a realignment (Shamir 1986). However, this change began before the 1970s, and continues today, with the possible development of a third type of party system. Yet one of the most prominent measures used in Europe to assess party system change, and at times to predict it, has proved inadequate for Israel. Electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979) produces results which hide a large number of the vote switchers in Israel (see also Lane and Ersson in this volume). That is, since Israeli party politics is largely understood in terms of party blocs, by limiting the volatility measure to blocs of parties (Mair 1983), rather than to the parties themselves, the results point to impressive stability. The relatively low scores produced by measuring bloc volatility helped create an impression among scholars of Israeli politics that the voters switched between parties within their bloc, and not across blocs.



Figure 9.3 The old and new electoral processes in Israel

More recent studies have shown this impression to be false (Diskin 1991; Zuckerman 1990). The floating vote in Israel moves across blocs, and does so in such a manner that it counter-balances itself and therefore does not produce high bloc volatility scores. In other words, despite the rather large amount of vote switching, the party blocs remain relatively stable. Zuckerman (1990:190–2) states that there is a very high rate of vote change at each election in Israel, and that the campaign itself is more important in determining which party to vote for than other issues previously considered important, such as the social structure. Moreover, in the five elections between 1973 and 1988, more vote switchers jumped blocs than changed parties within the same bloc. Labor and Likud voters, when they switch, move to the other bloc rather than staying within their bloc. In addition, the new voters of the two main parties come more from the other bloc than from their own. It is the smaller, more ideological parties, further to the extremes than the two big parties, whose voters, when they switch, stay within their respective blocs.

Assessing party system change should, therefore, be done using more than one measure, because a single result could hide the true extent of change. Ersson and Lane (1982) have suggested a set of minimal properties to characterize party system change, with volatility being only one of the properties. By adding measures of functional orientation, fractionalization, radical orientation and polarization, this set of properties could uncover more of the destabilizing factors within the relatively stable party blocs in Israel. Furthermore, it is also important to assess the extent of change, because change can be small or large, temporary or permanent. Smith (1989a) has suggested four levels of party system change temporary, restricted, general and transformation—and has pointed to a concern with the core element of the party system in the assessment of change.

The analysis of the core element, as opposed to the entire party system, when change is being assessed is particularly interesting in the case of Israel. The core of the Israeli party system during the period of dominance was: (1) Mapai; (2) the existence of satellite coalition partners in the left bloc; and (3) the "historical partnership" with the orthodox religious party (NRP). All three factors have gone through the most extensive form of change proposed by Smith, i.e. transformation: (1) there is no longer a dominant party in Israel; (2) the coalition partners for each of the two major parties are drawn both from their respective extremes and from the middle; and (3) the historical partnership has ended with the movement of the NRP into the right camp, even further right than Likud.

Moreover, if the Israeli party system during the era of domination had one "people's party" (Smith 1989b: 158–60), it now has two. Yet it was only in the later stages of domination that Mapai became a people's party; and it was the transformation of Mapai into a people's party that assisted in its decline from domination. During the 1950s, Israel came close to what Lijphart (1968) identified as consociational democracy, in which Mapai headed the dominant socialist pillar. It mobilized support through political education, whether in the youth movements, in the schools or in the training centers set up by the party. However, when waves of immigrants began to arrive, this type of mobilization could not be as effective, and Mapai adopted a new pattern of political mobilization, that of attracting sympathizers from those who depended on party-controlled institutions and of manipulating the national symbols associated with the party. Joining the dominant party shifted from being an ideological commitment to a way of life, and included a materialist

incentive, that of receiving assistance during the process of immigration. Mapai thus ceased to mobilize differentially and selectively, and adopted some of the techniques associated with catch-all parties. The level of devotion and commitment produced by this newer form of mobilization was relatively lower than that of the previous method, as it focused on the instrumental dimension and lacked a significant political effect. Mapai thus gradually became a people's party, combining coherence with flexibility; but in the process its ideology and principles were watered down, leading to the collapse of an overarching dominant ideology and so of the party embodying it.

The decline of ideology also helped reduce the differentiation between the two main parties, thereby assisting in the demise of domination. In its wake, the Israeli party system in the era of imperfect twopartism came to possess two people's parties. However, the growing emphasis on security recreated a distinct difference between the two major parties, especially after 1977 when Egypt became the first Arab country to negotiate peace with Israel, and the prospect of exchanging captured territories for peace became realizable. Moreover, with the rise of individualism in Israeli culture, supplanting collectivism as the prevailing ethos, the ideological domination of the left not only disappeared but was replaced by a civic culture that belongs more to the right than to the left.

In summation, the change in the Israeli party system points to three conclusions concerning party system change in general: (1) measuring party system change only at the electoral level might either produce false indicators or miss the development of more comprehensive change that will soon impact on the party system; (2) modeling party system change should be done within the available systemic typologies, until better ones are available, but the extent and depth of change should be assessed on both a horizontal and a vertical level; i.e. it should be asked if the change is a temporary fluctuation or a more general trend, and if the change affects the party system on a superficial level or down to its core; (3) Israel provides much material for comparisons when analyzing party system change in parliamentary democracies.

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10
ELECTORAL POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN ICELAND, 1970–96

Svanur Kristjánsson

Introduction

The previous chapters discussed political parties mainly as unitary actors. When a party is dominant, its pivotal role presupposes that the party is united and able to carry out a mandate. But when parties are internally fragmented, as in Iceland, and when there are also no clear ideological dividing lines between the parties, party dominance is hardy feasible. This chapter is meant to analyze the exceptional case of Iceland in which mandates and cleavages are mainly linked to candidates and not to parties. From the analysis of a deviant case like Iceland it becomes clear what a country without party dominance and without traditional cleavages may look like. Furthermore, it appears that some western democracies are moving towards the Icelandic model because party dominance and cleavages in their traditional forms are becoming diluted in more and more systems. Hence, it makes sense to have a closer look at the Icelandic case.

The development of political parties in Iceland for the past twenty-five years can be viewed as material for a case study on how methods of candidate selection affect the leadership of parties on the one hand, and democratic procedures on the other. A four-party system in Iceland developed in the 1920s and the 1930s, based for the most part on social class divisions (Kristjánsson 1977). In the late 1960s and early 1970s the established parties faced severe challenges; their legitimacy was questioned and demands were raised for more democratic politics. The parties could no longer rely on previous segmentation of the electorate and the traditional party—interest group connections. The established Icelandic parties responded with considerable ingenuity to these new circumstances in the 1970s, most importantly by employing primaries to select party candidates.

The primaries in Iceland have two main characteristics. First, party institutions do not screen candidates competing for top seats on the party list. The maximum requirement is that the candidate be a party member; he or she often needs the endorsement of only a low number (20–50) of party members. Secondly, the primaries are generally open primaries. As most of the political parties do not keep records based on dues-paying members, no meaningful formal distinction can be made between party members, party identifiers and other voters. Thus no restrictions on participation in primaries can be effectively applied.

The introduction of primaries in Iceland should be viewed as part of party strategy designed to deal with internal party disagreements on nominations and to improve the party's electoral fortune. It is the central thesis of this chapter that the four-party system has largely succeeded in maintaining its electoral standing through party adaptation. However, this innovation in party strategy has had a wide-ranging and lasting impact on the parties as organizations, on the logic of politics and governance and, ultimately, on the basic issue of democracy, relations between the rulers and the ruled.

The data cover the four main political parties, in order of size: the Independence Party (IP), the Progressive Party (PP), the People's Alliance (PA) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). These parties received, on the average, 88.8 percent of the popular vote and 91.7 percent of the seats in Alþingi (the Icelandic parliament) in the eight parliamentary elections held in 1971–95. In the period 1971–87 forty-nine of the sixty Alþingi members were elected in eight constituencies: thirty-seven in five- and six-member constituencies, and twelve in Reykjavik, the capital. In each constituency, seats were allotted to ranked lists, put forward by the political parties according to a simple proportional system (d'Hondt). The eleven remaining seats, the supplementary seats, were allotted to the parties that had won at least one seat in order to minimize the difference between each party's proportion of the vote and the party's proportion of seats in the Alþingi. The supplementary seats were filled with candidates who were not elected in the constituencies but came next on their party's list (Harðarson 1987: 431). In 1987 three seats were added and new complex rules of allocation introduced, designed to better obtain the goals of exact proportional representation. As before, the voter selects one of the lists put forward by the political parties. The parties rank the candidates beforehand and the voter has little chance of altering the ranking.

Changing rules of candidate selection

Before the election of 1971 the main parties in Iceland all employed very similar methods of nominating parliamentary candidates. These selections were internal party affairs, handled in party institutions by delegates who in turn were elected in party organizations. Ordinary party members did not participate directly in selecting nominees in parliamentary elections.

The methods of nomination changed drastically in the post-1970 period:

- The two largest political parties conducted open primaries before the 1971 election; the PP in all eight electoral districts and the IP in five districts.
- In 1974 Alþingi was dissolved and parliamentary election called at short notice. Consequently all parties used the traditional method of selecting candidates.
- In 1978 three political parties conducted open primaries, the IP and the PP in three districts and the SDP in six districts. The PA held a closed primary in one district.
- An election was called again in 1979. Two parties had open primaries, the SDP in seven districts and the IP in three districts.

- In 1983 the number of open primaries was fourteen. Seven were held by the IP, five by the SDP, and two by the PP, which also conducted a straw-vote within party conventions in five districts. In the PA four closed primaries took place.
- In 1987 fifteen open primaries occurred; four in the IP, which also held a straw-vote among party delegates in two districts, seven by the SDP and four by the PP. The PP also had one straw-vote. The PA stuck to closed primaries, six at this time.
- In 1991 the open primary was employed most frequently by the IP (five). Three took place in the SDP but only one in the PP. The PA held a closed primary in five electoral districts.
- In 1995 the IP had open primaries in six electoral districts; in the remaining two districts a straw-vote was conducted among party delegates. The PP held three open primaries, the SDP only two. Three closed primaries took place in the PA.

Table 10.1 shows the frequency of and participation in open primaries in 1971–95 and relates them to the votes received by the different parties.

On the basis of this overview of nomination methods, and the data shown in Table 10.1, we can draw the following conclusions:

1 The 1971 parliamentary election ushered in a new period in which all the main political parties, to various degrees, have opened up the nomination process to include voters and supporters, as well as party members. In many cases participation has even been open to all eligible voters in the forthcoming general election.
2 Only one of these parties, the PA, has generally restricted participation in nominations to due-paying party members.
3 Several nomination methods are now used by the main political parties. Selection rules vary between parties, electoral districts and from one election to another. One standard nomination procedure is nowhere to be found.

The position of political leadership is greatly affected by nomination methods employed. Changes in these methods can also significantly alter the position of sitting MPs. Paradoxical as it may seem, MPs' position has been both strengthened *and* weakened by the opening up of participation in decisions on the parties' nominees. The certainty of their re-nomination has been greatly reduced, and in most cases it has in fact disappeared; they can not even safely anticipate the nomination method to be used at the next election. Consequently the MPs do not know who are the keepers of their fortune—party members, supporters or voters—and from whom their political mandate originates. My argument does not postulate a complete uncertainty on behalf of the sitting MPs. Compared to the pre-1970 situation the change is, however, quite drastic and includes less predictability with reference to the process of candidate selection and the outcome, that is, who become the party's nominees in safe and in hoped-for seats.

On the other hand, freedom of maneuver has vastly increased for the individual politician. When party institutions suffer a loss of power over nomination of candidates, the party's disciplinary power is reduced as well. Party institutions cannot reward faithful politicians and they cannot realistically expect to keep politicians toeing the party line. On

Table 10.1 Parties' participation in open primaries in Iceland, 1971–95

	(1) Participation	*(2) Electoral districts*	*(3) Votes*	*(4) The National Vote*	*(5) (1)/(3)*	*(6) (1)/(4)*
1971						
The IP	16,653	5	29,951	38,170	56	44
The PP	11,428	8	26,645	26,645	43	43
The SDP	1,416	1	2,620	11,020	54	13
Total	29,497	14	59,216	75,835	50	39
1978						
The IP	19,735	3	29,596	39,982	67	49
The PP	11,049	3	7,868	20,656	140	53
The SDP	13,471	6	25,597	26,912	53	50
Total	44,255	12	63,061	87,550	70	51
1979						
The IP	19,829	3	32,991	43,838	60	45
The SDP	10,245	7	21,166	21,580	48	47
Total	30,074	10	54,157	65,418	56	46
1983						
The IP	29,190	7	48,740	50,251	60	58
The PP	1,974	2	4,165	24,095	47	8
The SDP	8,200	5	13,466	15,214	61	54
Total	39,364	14	66,371	89,560	59	44
1987						
The IP	9,664	4	23,645	41,490	41	23
The PP	8,732	4	12,580	28,902	69	30
The SDP	9,482	7	22,709	23,265	42	41
Total	27,878	15	58,934	93,657	47	30
1991						
The IP	21,495	5	52,808	60,826	41	35
The PP	478	1	1,582	29,861	30	2
The SDP	5,472	3	11,915	24,454	46	22
Total	27,445	9	66,305	115,141	41	24
1995						
The IP	21,310	6	53,975	61,183	39	39
The PP	7,532	3	12,349	38,485	61	20
The SDP	10,300	2	7,612	18,846	135	55
Total	39,142	11	73,936	118,514	53	33

Key:
Column 1=total number of primary participants;
Column 2=number of electoral districts holding a primary;
Column 3=votes received at the general election in the electoral districts of column 2;
Column 4=the total national vote in all eight electoral districts;
Column 5=column 1 as percentage of column 3;
Column 6=column 1 as percentage of column.

the contrary, individual politicians often perceive an anti-party position as beneficial to their political success, increasing their popularity among potential participants in an open primary by taking a stand for "the people" and "democracy" against the dictates of "the party bosses."

The relationship between politicians' power and their mandate is further explored in the next section.

Political leadership: mandate and power

In this section the position of the leadership in each of the four main parties is examined. I concentrate on the overall picture; the details of changes in mandate and power are mostly left out.

The Independence Party (IP)

Before the 1970s party institutions selected candidates for parliamentary elections. The same persons were leaders of the national party and the parliamentary group, jointly elected by the MPs and the party's central committee. The party's chairman submitted his list of government ministers to the parliamentary group, for them to reject, or, as always happened, to ratify in an open vote.

All this changed in the 1970s. The point of interest here are the changes in candidate selection and their impact on the party. The IP adopted primaries, and they have been open to all supporters of the party, that is to say, to all prospective voters who claim to be party supporters.

The IP open primary did not come about as an automatic response to alterations in the party's environment. On the contrary, leaders of the party's youth movement pushed the open primary on to the party's agenda and the national leaders agreed with minimum resistance. The leaders' reaction is indicative of the IP's organizational features as well as the distribution of power within the party. The leaders had two interlocking goals: vote maximization and office holding at the national and local level. The party's two main groups, the leaders and their followers, united in seeking these goals; national government participation and control of local governments, notably in the capital, Reykjavik, directly benefited both.

The unanticipated impact of open primaries on the IP organization, and its way of doing business, became quite marked as time passed. A winner in an open primary receives a personal mandate, not one based on the party as an organization. Personal mandate confers upon a politician personal power. Each and every one of the party leaders must have a personal basis of support and political organization. An open primary provides a strong incentive for the individual politician to pursue narrow self-interests, if necessary at the expense of the party's collective interests. Viewed from this angle, relations between mandate and power are quite close. Mandate change results in power change. The open primary as such was not the sole cause of decreasing cohesion within the IP leadership; it did, however, weaken the party's institutions, providing an incentive for politicians to become political entrepreneurs rather than a part of a cohesive party front.

Thus, taking sport as an analogy, politics is turned into a competition in individual sporting events rather than team contests. I will support this case in the next section of this chapter by, for example, dealing with the overall development of the Icelandic four-party system. Before that we must turn to questions of mandate and power in the other main parties, starting with the SDP, the only party in Iceland to alter its statutes to make the open primary mandatory in selecting candidates in parliamentary elections.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP)

The SDP adopted the open primary as the only legal method of nominating its parliamentary candidates at the 1976 Party Convention. Although the party has since abolished the absolute rule of primaries, the open primary is still considered to be the most legitimate method of nominations within the SDP, and a device used in cases of serious competition for top seats on the party's ticket. This happened, for example, in two districts in 1995, where primary participants (10,300) greatly outnumbered SDP votes in the parliamentary election (7,612).

The open primary affected the mandate of SDP's leaders. It contributed to a situation in which personal mandates largely replaced collective mandates for leaders, issued by party institutions. The SDP party organization did not, however, have great strength in the period preceding the widespread use of the open primary. In the twelve years of continuous SDP governmental participation (1959–71) the party organization was not severely tested. But when out of power in 1971–8 it became evident that party organization, along with the day-to-day running of the party, had become primarily based upon linking the SDP to the state. Ideology also played a role in weakening the party organization, notably the political theory propagated by one aspiring SDP leader who postulated that political parties, the SDP explicitly included, were inherently corrupt, placing harmful barriers between political leaders and the people. Such ideas undermined party members' belief in the value of party work as well as the legitimacy of party institutions.

Unlike the development within the IP, the open primary did not reduce the power exercised by the SDP leadership. The main reason was a simple one: its power had already greatly declined and it was significantly weaker than the other main parties. So the SDP leaders did not have much to lose by adopting the open primary. On the contrary, it became an integral part of the party's new and much improved image in the 1978 election. The open primary also helped in replacing the old leadership by younger and more dynamic politicians. A more positive profile and new candidates undoubtedly proved almost magical in 1978 when the SDP increased its national vote from 9.2 percent in 1974 to 22 percent in 1978 and received fourteen MPs in place of the five in 1974. The open primary has also aided in making the SDP more attractive for aspiring politicians outside the party; they perceive a better chance for obtaining good seats when nominations are not under party members' control.

Internal disputes have characterized the SDP in recent years, but so they did in the past. The party chairman was disposed of or the party split four times before the open primary, in 1918, 1930, 1938 and 1956. Nevertheless the open primary creates a new

environment in which party service is not emphasized and party institutions get weaker; pressure from party members, insisting on leadership cohesion, is thereby lessened. The leaders gain more room for action, unfettered by policy prescriptions formulated by party institutions. Leadership performance, notably that of the party's chairman, is measured almost solely by one criterion: success in the election market and getting the party into local and, primarily, national government. So we have to focus on factors explaining leadership contests and party splits in the SDP rather than merely observing the frequency of such events. In the pre-open primary period ideological conflicts between "left" and "right" tendencies threatened the SDP's unity. No such disagreement played a role in the replacement of the party chairman in 1980 or again in 1984. Similarly, the party splits in 1982 and 1994—in both cases a prominent leader left and formed a new political party—are not intrinsically tied to ideological differences.

Change in mandate has increased the personal power of individual SDP leaders in a very similar fashion to that in the IP. The leader can improvise greatly in his or her politics, but incurs the risk of losing the job: the leader's survival is dependent upon his or her success as the "delivery man," obtaining votes and offices for the party.

The Progressive Party (PP)

Changes in selection rules happened suddenly in the PP in the 1971 parliamentary election, when the party conducted open primaries in all eight districts, the only party ever to do so in the same election. Previously, nominations had been in the hands of party conventions.

The primaries were introduced by the PP in somewhat similar circumstances to those in the IP in 1971 and in the SDP in 1978: the party faced less dependable voters. The PP badly wanted satisfactory results in the 1971 election; it had spent twelve years in continuous government opposition after having being in the national government for most of the time since its founding in 1916. In two elections, 1963 and 1967, the government parties, the IP and the SDP, had maintained their government majority. Thus introducing open primaries was in the PP undoubtedly part of electoral strategy, as in the IP and the SDP. In all three parties the primaries were urged by the party's youth section, who wanted to replace older MPs with younger ones. There is, however, an important twist to the story, for only in the PP was internal strife based on ideological disagreements between "left" and "right" wings in the party. The left emphasized the role of the PP as the leading party of all left forces, viewing the IP as the PP's main opponent. The right wing envisioned the PP as a center party, seeking coalition partners in left or right parties depending on the circumstances each time.

The PP's left wing had a strong position among active party members and in party organizations, particularly in the youth section. In 1968 a new chairman came to power who favored the center-strategy. An open power struggle soon followed, ending with a decisive victory of the right wing in the open primaries. As it turned out, the primaries fitted nicely with the party's leadership conception of the PP as a flexible center party. The PP participated in a left coalition government in 1971–4, switching to co-operation with the IP after the 1974 election. That same year, the left wing left the party.

Generally we observe a closer fit between the PP's leadership mandate and evolving of power in the post-1970 period. The party definitely became a party in which the leadership had almost unlimited leeway in decision-making, notably in the bargaining game of forming the government. Office-holding occupies first place in the party's ranking of goals. Such correspondence between mandate and power contribute to leadership stability. In the PP, leadership change takes place peacefully. The PP leadership enjoys more job security than is the case with the other main political parties in Iceland. This, however, comes at a price. First, party membership activity has significantly decreased within the PP since the late 1960s and early 1970s. This development is particularly striking in the youth section. Second, the PP institutions have suffered a loss of authority. Most often serious disputes over nominations of parliamentary candidates are settled outside the party, in an open primary. Finally, localism has been further strengthened within the party. Party unity has decreased even to the point of the PP's candidates formulating their own position on basic issues in opposition to national party policy. Individual and local mandate clearly leads to individual and local power in the policy formation processes. The connection between changes in nomination rules and a party's policy-making capacity is further explored in the next section of this chapter.

The People's Alliance (PA)

From its founding in 1956 the PA was an electoral alliance rather than a party with its own members, up until 1966/8, during which period it gradually adopted the structure of a political movement in the same mold as the other main political parties in Iceland.

Initially the PA's MPs were authorized by an elite, their nominations being the results of bargaining between leaders of different sections within the alliance. During 1968–78 party institutions, primarily a party convention in each electoral district, decided on nominations. Then, starting in 1978 the PA employed closed primaries in which normally only due-paying members took part. The primaries became more frequent, peaking in 1987.

The PA leadership mandate changed along with changes in nomination methods. The mandate is at the present partly personal, obtained in a personal contest (the closed primary), and partly a collective one, based on the PA as an organization. The political power held by the PA's leadership has also developed in rather diverging directions. It has been strengthened by the PA's participation in the national government. At the same time its power has weakened because the PA's intermediary role of representing a distinct social bloc, mainly the labor unions, has all but disappeared.

Within the PA organization the leaders also wielded greater power in the electoral alliance period. The informal leadership mandate provided ample space for maneuvers, particularly in selecting new parliamentary candidates. The closed primary has curtailed the leadership's internal power, for through the closed primary ordinary party members issue mandates to the MPs, and in the next primary they can withdraw these mandates.

The informal mandates in the period as an electoral alliance, and the formal ones throughout the closed primaries' period, have both proved to be a mixed blessing for the PA and its leaders. The electoral alliance as an organizational form suited the PA quite

well in various ways. The leadership had the scope for the negotiations and brokering necessary to keep together diverse elements within the alliance and at the same time could deal with other political forces on behalf of the power bloc supporting it. This wide room for action also carried a downside; the leaders could use it to engage in personal conflicts within the alliance if they chose to do so. When they did, the alliance's institutions were either non-existent or lacked the authority necessary to push the leaders toward some semblance of cohesion, regardless of their own personal preferences. The severe conflicts within the PA and final split of the party during 1967–71 clearly demonstrated the inability of an electoral alliance to settle internal leadership disputes.

The closed primary has undoubtedly limited the leaders' range of action. To take one clear example, it decreased the leaders' opportunities to make firm offers of safe and probable seats on the party's ticket. As the party on the radical left in Iceland, the PA and its predecessors have instinctively pursued a strategy of alliance politics since the days of the Comintern's United Front policy in the 1930s. After becoming a formal political party the PA continued the same strategy. Thus in the early 1970s it responded vigorously to the new women's movement, placing a woman from outside the PA on its list in Reykjavik; from this she was elected to Alþingi. This sort of measure proved impossible after the closed primary came into widespread use. Such concrete action was replaced by the PA's general declarations of its willingness to elect more women MPs. But until 1987 the PA parliamentary group included only one woman. The party now has two women MPs, out of a total of nine. The primary made the PA inward-looking, increasingly unable to reach out to new movements and new people.

I do not intend to make the adoption of primaries seem directly responsible for the successful entrance of the famous Women's Alliance (WA) into Icelandic politics in 1982 (see Styrkársdóttir 1986). The fact remains, however, that primar-ies are a great hindrance to women's progress into politics (Burrell 1993). The WA has turned out to be a serious competition to the PA, without the PA leadership being able to fashion a very credible response by greatly increasing its number of women MPs. Other political parties who rely on primaries face the same difficulties in this respect.

The PA clearly needs a revival of its fortune at parliamentary elections (in 1978 it won 22.9 percent of votes, in 1995, 14.3 percent). In its search for votes the party has partly turned to the old methods of nominating candidates. In reverting to the form of organization of its alliance period, the PA might start to be haunted again by the old disunity. After all, there was a positive side to the closed primary; it established a common party-based mandate for the PA MPs. When they disagreed—even when engaging in bitter public conflicts—party members and party institutions would intervene, backed up by their power to reward or punish, and demand an end to leadership disunity. Without this power, such demands have a way of going unheeded. In the future, as in an earlier period, the PA might experience difficulties in maintaining party discipline in an electoral alliance, without a party-based mandate for all of its leaders.

Transformation of the party system

Political parties are said to have many functions, some of which are presumed rather than being what parties in fact do (King 1969). At the rock bottom political parties in democracies are engaged in two minimum but basic functions: (1) the electoral role, fielding candidates to contest parliamentary elections, and (2) the governing role, forming the national government.

The way parties are organized greatly influences their performance in these arenas. One of the party's organizational tasks, central to its electoral role, is selecting the party's candidates. The methods of nomination vary greatly in the traditional democratic countries but there is, nevertheless, generally one central fact: a small, or even tiny, proportion of voters is directly involved in the selection of parliamentary candidates; nominations are party decisions made by party members in party institutions. In Western European countries, according to Gallagher and Marsh (1988), the highest percentage of voters participating in nominations, 2.1 percent, is found in Belgium. In the political science literature as in the quality press (see e.g. *The Economist,* 24 February, 1 March 1996) the United States has been considered to be unique in this respect. Before the 1976 presidential election 43 percent of registered voters, 28 percent of the voting age population, participated in primary elections. Since then the percentage of primary participants has somewhat declined, being in the 1992 season around 20 percent of people of voting age (according to a report published by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate as reported by the *New York Times,* 2 July 1992).

I described earlier in this chapter how the main political parties in Iceland introduced new nomination methods, notably the open primary, in the 1970s. Table 10.1 shows participation in primary elections in 1971–95. One measure of the participation rate is the ratio of primary voters to the party's vote in the general election, expressed as a percentage (shown in column 6). This percentage ranges from a low of 24 percent (1991) to the high of 51 percent (1978). Another indicator is the percentage of primary voters in the vote received by the same party in primary elections districts only (column 5). The summary percentage there goes from 41 percent to 70 percent. For individual parties in each district the lowest percentage is 30 percent to the astonishing percentage of 135 and 140! (the percentage of primary elections voters to all eligible voters is as follows: 1971: 25 percent; 1978:32 percent; 1979:21 percent; 1983:26 percent; 1987:16 percent; 1991: 15 percent; 1995:20 percent).

The primary election period in Iceland, since the early 1970s, coincides with decreasing party cohesion. Increasingly Icelandic political parties resemble umbrella organizations for individual politicians rather than highly disciplined organizations. From each party's point of view such internal conflicts are preferable to official party splits or founding of new political parties; not to mention the events most dreaded by an Icelandic political party; these are (1) a permanent decline of its share of the popular vote; (2) a decline in its parliamentary seats, and (3) being excluded from a national government coalition. My research shows that established political parties can respond to new circumstances; they have changed as organizations and influenced the course of their own fate.

The development of Icelandic political parties since the early 1970s is unique indeed: Iceland is the only democratic country in the world with a parliamentary system of government in which the main political parties routinely employ open primary elections to select parliamentary candidates. We can also observe political parties in action, being at the same time "victims" of changing circumstances and "makers" of their own fortune.

Icelandic political parties have never had great strength as autonomous organizations; the breath of life to them was patronage, not the general making of policy through participation with party members (see Kristinsson 1996). The parties' basic policy orientations and basis of their organization was at first provided by their links to interest groups, most importantly farmers' organizations, employers' associations and labor unions. Then the class basis of the vote weakened and disappeared (Harðarson 1995). The close ties between party and interest group, often shown in the way the same people were leaders in both, also slowly dissolved. The open primary was a concerted response by the parties to changing circumstances: an attempt to build new party-society connections, and grow new roots. In short, the parties were trying to survive by finding new ways of life while still maintaining their patronage nature.

From the point of view of the main parties their efforts have been basically successful. The four-party format has been preserved. From our theoretical vantage point a complex chain of events has transformed the Icelandic political parties as well as the logic of the political system as a whole. The development leading from weakening of party institutions to less accountable political parties can be analyzed as a four-step process (Sjöblom 1986). Step 1: loss of party domination over recruitment leads to less party cohesion. Step 2: decreased party cohesion makes it more difficult to formulate policy within the party. Step 3: the less party policies are formulated, the more difficult it becomes for parties to achieve authority in government decision-making. And step 4: people therefore find it more difficult to hold parties accountable, thereby decreasing democracy. I now turn to further, although brief, discussion of these four steps.

Step one: the loss of party domination over recruitment leads to less party cohesion. This sequence was analyzed earlier when we examined leadership in each of the main parties. I also point out the following events:

1968: Split of the PA and a new parliamentary party of three MPs formed.

1974: Split of the PP, particularly the youth section.

1979: The SDP parliamentary group decided to break up a coalition government. The party leader was not present at the meeting and was not consulted. Two sitting MPs left the IP and head new lists, one in the South, the other in the North-East electoral districts. One was elected.

1980: The vice-chairman of the IP became Prime Minister in a coalition government with the PP and the PA. Two other IP MPs joined the government and one of the top IP MPs in Reykjavik announced his support for the government. But all national IP institutions declared party opposition to the government. None of the IP government supporters left the party; none were expelled.

1982: A leading SDP MP left the party and formed a new one.

1983: A separate PP list was entered in the North-West electoral district, headed by an MP. The same thing took place in the West-Peninsula (with the IP). The Women's Alliance was formed, gaining three seats. The main justification for the formation of the party was the scarcity of women in parliament. (Women's representation rose from a poor 5 percent to 15 percent after the election of 1983. The gain came solely from new parties.)

1987: One PP MP left and put up his own list at the election. An IP government minister split and formed a new party.

1988: One PA MP declared his opposition to a coalition government of the PA, the PP and the SDP.

1991: Two IP MPs declared themselves not to be government supporters in the field of regional policies. Thus the IP-SDP coalition was officially supported by 34 MPs although the parties had received 36 MPs at the election.

1994: A leading SDP MP resigned as minister and then left the party; she then became the leader of her own political party.

1995: The government parties, the IP and the SDP, kept a parliamentary majority. The IP Prime Minister decided to dissolve the coalition and formed a new coalition with the PP. The Prime Minister estimated that, on the basis of the experience of the past term, a government coalition needed the initial support of 35 or 36 MPs to provide 3 or 4 "spares"; a numerical majority consists of 32 MPs, the number received by the IP and the SDP combined.

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This catalog of splits and conflicts within the four main parties could be longer but support my case that the parties have been divided and disunited.

Step two: Decreased party cohesion makes it more difficult to formulate policy within the party. Several studies have shown lack of policy-making capacity and low policy consistency to be one of the basic characteristics of Icelandic political parties (see Kristjánsson 1994). Little party cohesion is undoubtedly one explanatory factor but at a deeper and more enduring level the parties have traditionally been weak as autonomous policy-making organizations.

One recent change can, however, be observed. Disagreements on basic economic policy—the public management of fishing—are now publicly aired by party factions. In fact, two IP MPs declared in the last election campaign that they reserved the right to demand "satisfactory" policy changes as a precondition for their support of any government formed after the election.

Step three: the less party policies are formulated the more difficult it has become for the parties to dominate government decision-making. The low level of party domination of national government policies are to be expected, given that no party formulates a fairly detailed party programme. Some governments attempt to carry out a policy of one kind, then switch to another set of policies. The 1983–7 government started out with a pro-market policy and less government intervention, only to move over to a corporatist model.

Such government policy formulations are sometimes found in (some) other democratic countries. The unique feature of Icelandic governance is seen in two related phenomena:

(1) Corporatism without political parties. A very comprehensive corporatist agreement, called the National Consensus, was reached early in 1990. This consensus, which was initiated and formulated in great detail by the employers' association and the labor unions, included agreements on wage-raise policies. The role of the government was primarily to get the necessary legislation through parliament, pay the bill from the budget, and keep public employees' wage settlements in line with those included in the National Consensus.

(2) The great leeway enjoyed by individual government ministers in formulating and implementing government policy. Charles Cobb, US ambassador in Iceland, commented on this when leaving the post in 1992 *(Morgunblaðið,* an Icelandic daily, 9 January 1992):

> Icelandic politics is both fast-paced and very personal in nature . . . In Iceland policy is deliberated for one evening and implemented the next day…In the US cabinet secretaries always express the same view on issues of the day. Members of the government do not publicly disagree…The Icelandic situation is very different; it is quite common for government ministers to publicly disagree on policy. Such behavior is considered acceptable so far as I can observe.

Thus there is a special logic in the way government policy is formulated as well as implemented in Iceland. In my view this logic of individual politics and limited role of political parties at the level of government policy can be fully explained by the process outlined in this section of the chapter: the enduring features of the selection of parliamentary candidates, leading to a big role for the individual politician, a relatively small one for the party as an organization.

Step four. taken together, steps one, two and three make it more difficult for the people to hold parties accountable. Discussion of party system change can and should be linked to a larger issue: relations between the people and their representatives. Sjöblom (1983:370) has emphasized that in a constitutional and representative political system,

> the exercise of power is supposed to be connected to accountability, and in a democracy the decision-makers are ultimately accountable to the electorate… Voting in a general election is the most important way in which the voters exercise their right to hold decision-makers/parties accountable; they are rewarded and punished through electoral outcomes. From this perspective party system change usually affects accountability by altering the connections between political parties and the voters.

In postulating less accountability by political parties to the people as a consequence of steps one, two and three, I am following the arguments of Sjöblom (1986:20–1). I also find Ware's (1987:1–29) ideas useful. Ware's position is that in a democratic country political parties *should* offer a choice between different policy alternatives on important issues. Thus the possibility of voters holding politicians responsible is kept open.

Conclusions

Parties' formulation of policy alternatives constitutes a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for democratic accountability. Putting Icelandic politics in this context one conclusion is quite clear: on just about every important issue of public policy the cleavage lines within the main political parties are more profound than those between them. Within all parties we find a strong underlying town-country cleavage, closely related to conflicts between pro-market and protected economy forces, pro- and anti-Icelandic membership of the European Union positions, and between those wanting more representation for the urban districts in the parliament and those wanting to keep the electoral system intact. The classic conflict between ideas of status quo (or the ideal of preservation, to use a more favorable term) and the ideas of "modern" change is being waged in Iceland. This is the way it should be in a healthy democracy. The attempts of Icelandic political parties to increase democracy has, however, stifled this process, helping to make it more difficult for the ruled, the people, to make the rulers, the politicians, accountable.

We should be careful, however, not to exaggerate party system change in Iceland. Thus the parliamentary system of government clearly works against the strong tendency for parties to split up. The parliamentary system encourages at least a minimum party unity: MPs of the same party are required to work together and each parliamentary group is usually united, either behind the government or in opposition. A cohesive parliamentary majority for the government is almost always required in Iceland. Unlike the other Nordic countries—chiefly Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Bergman 1995)—Iceland has no tradition of minority government. Icelandic political parties are very keen to participate in government as they want the benefits of power. In a majority government there is no need to share it with others. The winners in the coalition bargaining game take it all.

The electoral system in Iceland also works against a completely independent power basis for each MP. The MP must gain, and retain, a good seat on the party's list. The open primary is not the only selection method in use, so the wise MP would not offend party members unnecessarily or disobey the party line. This rule holds with one crucial exception: an MP with strong local support can generally do whatever he or she wishes. Nevertheless, a wise MP only breaks discipline to cultivate local support. In the case of conflict between an MP and local party institutions the MP can demand an open primary as "the democratic way" to settle such disputes. Should the party refuse, the MP has been handed a powerful asset, that of posing as champion of the people, fighting against "the boys in the smoke-filled back rooms." The overall conclusion of this analysis is clear: the open primary is like Pandora's box: easy to open but hard or probably impossible to close.

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Part 3

CHANGE AND STABILITY IN RENEWING SYSTEMS

11
PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN REDEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES

Anne Bennett

Do party systems appear similar?

In this part of the book we will discuss new forms of party system change in renewing democracies, mainly in Eastern and Southern Europe. This chapter provides a general introduction to this theme by presenting a comparative analysis of processes of "redemocratization" by looking at the way recently authoritarian regimes have tried to regain their earlier democratic character and at the same time adapt it to modern conditions.

The development of democracy in Europe has been neither a smooth nor a steady process. In this century it has undergone reversals and even complete breakdowns in many countries. In all instances, and regardless of the types or actions of the intervening regimes, many scholars have noted that with redemocratization familiar-looking party systems quickly re-emerged (Ehrmann 1976; Gunther *et al.* 1988; Pickles 1955; Rudzio 1991; Zariski 1972). That some type of party system develops is a necessary component of redemocratization, but why might party systems look and operate in the same manner after redemocratization as before a collapse? Can we predict where, or under what conditions, a collapse will instead lead to party system change?

After developing a set of components by which we may evaluate party systems we will then examine how variables associated with the collapse and non-democratic interlude affect these party system components. Evidence is presented for ten countries which have undergone redemocratization in order to evaluate hypotheses based upon these variables.

One of the best known and most cited works on party system development is Lipset and Rokkan's *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967). In the introduction of this book they present an explicitly comparative, historically based model of party system development in Europe. Lipset and Rokkan propose that cleavage alignments resulting from alliances made during a country's national and industrial revolutions explain the divergence among European party systems. They stop their historical categorizations in the 1920s, claiming that,

> the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920's…The party alternatives, and in remarkably many

> cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates…This continuity is often taken as a matter of course; in fact it poses an intriguing set of problems for comparative research.
>
> (1967:50–1)

Although many European countries experienced collapses in democracy between 1920 and 1960 Lipset and Rokkan never directly discuss redemocratization and only superficially address the topic of continuity, but their model and findings provide a strong basis for supposing continuity at the party system level.[1]

In subsequent studies of politics and government many scholars looking at single countries also observed similarities and overlap between the previous and newly developing party systems of post-war redemocratizing Europe (Rudzio 1991; Zariski 1972). These authors found the rapid resumption of the activities of political parties and the similarity of electoral results, at least by left-right tendency if not by party, noteworthy. However, these authors rarely spent much time discussing political parties and did not investigate questions of continuity in any depth.

Even with the more recent occurrences of redemocratization (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Eastern Europe) we have few studies of party system developments. With the more recent occurrences (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Eastern Europe), studies have focused on details of how the transition was playing out in a particular country rather than party system developments. Even when emphasis is placed on party systems and the role of parties in the transition and consolidation of new regimes there has tended to be little, if any, attention to party systems and parties in the previous democratic era (Kitschelt 1992; Pridham 1984 and 1990). One exception to this body of work is Sgouraki-Kinsey and Hamann's (1993) study of party system continuity and change in Spain and Greece. They argue, similarly to Remmer (1985), that the longer the interruption of democratic elections, the less continuity there will be with redemocratization in the political behavior of party elites and the electorate. They test the argument by comparing national level electoral results from the previous democratic era with results from the first post-authoritarian elections. These studies afford some basis for supposing that we should find some party system continuity, but the vagueness or narrowness by which party systems are evaluated leave many aspects of continuity uncertain or unexplored. Developing a broader set of components will allow us to overcome these problems and provide a comprehensive answer to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter.

Components of party systems and how to measure them

Three components will be presented as comprising the fundamental aspects by which we can evaluate party systems: format, social orientation, and volatility.[2] Though format (the effective number of parties) and social orientation are both static measures, there is no theoretical or substantive difficulty in using them to look at changes over time. In fact it is my belief that we gain much by doing just this. It is much more common, however, to use an inherently dynamic component, electoral volatility, when analyzing party system change.[3] Conversely, though electoral volatility is rarely considered a central component

when evaluating or classifying party systems, adding volatility as a third component provides additional information on the patterns of interaction and competition among parties and gives us one dynamic measure.

The format of the party system is the component with the longest tradition and most frequent use (e.g. Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994). By taking account of the number and relevance of parties, format provides a gauge of the fragmentation of political power, the number of possible interaction streams, likely tactics of party competition, the opportunity for clear decisions and electoral accountability, and government formation possibilities (Sartori 1976:120). A debate over rules for counting the number of parties manifested itself in successive attempts to make the resulting numbers better correspond to intuitive and scholarly understandings of the importance of various parties (Blondel 1968; Lijphart 1968; Rae 1967; Rokkan 1970; Wildenmann 1954). Laakso and Taagapera's (1979) N, a reformulation of Rae's index of fractionalization, became the standard method of counting though it did not solve the weakness of the index in overvaluing large parties and too quickly compressing small parties. Molinar's (1991) modification of N eliminates the overcounting of large parties by counting the largest party as 1 and weighting N by the contribution of the smaller parties. Thus, in this paper we will use Molinar's formula:

$$NP = 1 + N\frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2\right) - p_i^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$$

where $N = 1/\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2$, p_i stands for the proportion of votes obtained by thewinning party, n denotes the number of parties for which national electoralresults are reported.

Knowing the format, though, provides only some of the information necessary to understand the functioning of party systems. By also looking at the social orientation of parties competing we will gain valuable information about the importance of political divisions and the representation of group interests.[4] We are interested in a system measure of whose interests are represented with how much support. Parties may be grouped into categories on the basis of their underlying social interests. In previous work the number of possible categories ranged from two (conservative versus bourgeois, bourgeois versus socialist) to ten (ethnic, religious, conservative, liberal, agrarian, socialist, left-socialist, Communist, discontent, ultra-right) which can be collapsed into fewer groups.[5] Both the strength (percentage of the vote accumulated by parties) and unity (the number of parties) of each orientation are important aspects of this component.

The final component, electoral volatility of a party system, refers to the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers. Many different measures of volatility have been proposed (see Ersson and Lane in this volume). Since these measures capture different aspects of volatility the appropriate measure to use is a question of theoretical concerns rather than a methodological dispute. To emphasize the macro-level and the strength of links between social orientations and voters the measure of electoral volatility used here will be aggregate bloc volatility. This is calculated volatility by the standard formula proposed by Pederson (1979):

$$V_t = \tfrac{1}{2} * \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} | p_{it} - p_{it-1} | \right)$$

where p_{it} stands for the percentage of the vote that was obtained by parties inorientation *i* at election t, p_{it-1} for the percentage at the previous election, and nfor the total number of orientations.

Variables and hypotheses

While many variables associated with redemocratization affect the context in which parties operate, they do not directly affect the components of party systems. Here we will investigate two variables, length of break, and the cause of the break, which do have potentially important affects on party system components.

The cause of the collapse of democratic government has received little attention since the few scholars investigating party systems in redemocratizing countries have tended to look at single cases or cases which all had a common cause. However, the cause of the democratic regime's collapse could be either external or internal and the consequences for party systems are unlikely to be the same.[6] Internal breaks result from the collapse of weak institutions, or their manipulation by non-democratic parties and leaders. External breaks, on the other hand, result from direct foreign pressure causing institutional collapse or outright invasion and occupation. While redemocratizing politicians from both sets of countries want to prevent repetition of a breakdown and promote stable, effective government, the lessons they learned from the past about how to do this and their incentives to make changes from the previous system may not be the same. Elites in countries with external breaks might reasonably perceive their primary problem to have been a matter of insufficient military strength and unfortunate geographic location. In countries with internal breaks elites might assign some of the blame to international political and economic factors, but they will also be forced to look internally to institutional rules and actors. For example, after the collapse of the Weimar Republic in Germany the view that the "excessive" fragmentation of its party system was the key source of its internal weakness became more widespread (Finer 1935; Hermens 1941). While objective assessments of internal collapses might not always lead to this conclusion, this assessment of Weimar disproportionately influenced interpretations of similar and subsequent events. Thus, given a view that excessive fragmentation is bad, redemocratizing elites might seek to alter the party system's format (i.e. decrease NP).

Redemocratizing elites have at least two mechanisms for reducing fragmentation: electoral laws and political pressure. It is well established that electoral laws can be written with the aim of influencing the number of parties or of advantaging specific parties (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1967). Vote thresholds may be raised in order to hinder small parties or legal decisions may ban certain parties from participating in elections. Pressure may be either formal (e.g. licensing criteria) or informal (e.g. encouragement to merge parties or to form new "catch-all" parties). The aim is to develop a system with fewer parties supporting "mainstream" policies capable of promoting stable, effective government.

Both of these mechanisms are elite driven. We need to keep in mind, though, that it was not only elites in countries with internal breaks who were concerned about the causes of internal collapse and the requisites of stable government. Since internal collapses sometimes preceded external aggression, political elites in countries with external breaks were able to observe first hand the negative consequences of excessive fragmentation. No one wanted to instigate such events or to permit them to occur again. Thus all redemocratizing countries may use one or both of the mechanisms discussed above to alter the format of their party system and decrease NP.

> Hypothesis (la): In all countries the party system format will be lower in the second democratic era than in the first.
> Hypothesis (1b): The decline in the format will be greater in countries whose break was the result of internal forces.

Blame for events of the past might not only be placed on institutional factors and structures, but also directly on particular elites, parties and orientations. Since authoritarian interludes are associated with loss of political liberties and often economic difficulties, there may well be a desire by many in society to punish those considered responsible for causing the breakdown or supporting and collaborating with the intervening regime. Two questions to address, then, are how widely the blame will be spread and how to carry it out. No single individual is responsible for the breakdown of a democratic government. Some actors may have had more powerful and influential roles than others, but generally they worked through or with the acquiescence of particular parties. If these parties re-emerge with new names, or have made other changes, it may be difficult to know which party to blame. If the discredited party was the only party representing that orientation, or if other parties in that orientation were closely linked to it by policies, ideology, or actions, then it may be valid and easier to blame the orientation as a whole.

Both elites and masses have mechanisms through which they can enforce blame. Elites may use legal barriers to refuse to license a party, license it only under conditions such as making specific leaders step aside, or ban parties outright. As a consequence, certain political parties may be prevented from participating at all, or, at a minimum, with a known label and leaders, both of which are cues for voters.[7] As members of the electorate, masses also have an important mechanism at their disposal. They may withhold their votes and sit out the electoral process, decreasing the support for a discredited party or orientation. Alternatively, they may choose to remain as participants in the electoral process, but move their support to another party or orientation. All of these actions should result in a decrease of electoral strength for parties representing the orientation from which the parties responsible for the break came.

> Hypothesis (2): Countries whose break was the result of internal forces will demonstrate greater decline in the strength of the orientation containing the parties deemed responsible for the break, relative to the strength of other orientations.

In addition to these effects from the cause of the break, party system components may also register changes due to the length of the break. The effects of the non-democratic interlude may be both direct and indirect and should be stronger the longer the interlude lasted.[8] Direct effects result first of all from population change. Exit from the population, due to death, exile and emigration, along with the entry of new generations will lead to more of the population being replaced during longer breaks. As more of the electorate is new, fewer citizens have direct ties to, or memories of, previous parties. Concurrently with this forgetting and diffusion of party identification the population may develop new political interests and norms.

Further, longer breaks will increase the difficulties of parties that attempt to maintain an organizational existence during the break or try to reform and revitalize themselves after the non-democratic interlude. As noted above, the leadership of a party is less likely to remain in the country or survive intact the longer the break. Those leaders still around would be unable to meet openly with other elites or supporters. Party elites thus cannot advertise themselves, their parties, or their policies, and they are not in positions to provide benefits to their supporters. Finally, it is also unlikely that parties would be able to direct, or maintain links with, associated organizations (for example, religious, cultural, or social clubs and associations). Over time the physical property of the party may be repossessed, lost, or fall into disrepair. As a consequence of these organiza tional difficulties and restrictions the links between social orientations, and especially individual parties, will be fewer and the bonds weaker.

Indirect effects of the length of the break may come through changes to the socio-economic structure of the country (e.g. the level and composition of economic development and the composition and characteristics of the population). The economic structure may change, for example, owing to growth in the industrial or service sectors and corresponding decline in the agricultural sector. Any economic changes which bring about changes in the class structure and class strength may result in changes to the underlying distribution of social orientation support of a party system. Border revisions or population exchanges will affect not only the total population numbers of a country, but may also alter the ethnic, religious or occupational composition of society. To the extent that these regions or groups had their interests represented in the party system we should expect to see changes in the social orientation of the party system. Thus, the longer the break the more we should expect the underlying basis of the social orientation to change and the weaker the bonds between voters and social orientations will be.

Hypothesis (3): Countries which experienced longer breaks will demonstrate greater change in the social orientation of their party systems.
Hypothesis (4): Countries which experienced longer breaks will demonstrate greater change in the volatility of their party systems.

Data and sample

The indices used to measure the three party system components require electoral data, but this data may be reported in many forms and at different levels of aggregation. The

national percentage of the vote received by each party competing for seats in the lower house was chosen as the most appropriate data to use. Though sub-national variations in party strength may occur, and how these variations change between eras is a fascinating question, the primary concern of this chapter is with the national party system. Recognizing that party systems tend to have fewer parties represented in the legislature than participating in the electoral arena, the percentage of the vote, rather than percentage of seats, is used so that the options presented to the voters are taken into account. There is great variation among the existence, powers, and selection into upper chambers, so a focus on lower chambers permits more uniformity across countries.

The selection of the set of countries in which to gather this data to test these hypotheses followed two criteria: (1) countries must have already undergone the process of redemocratization and (2) the relevant electoral and party data must be available for both democratic eras.[9] The set of countries needs to be large enough to have some variance on the independent variables so that a rigorous test is provided and we can be confident that the findings are general and do not explain just a single case. A number of countries satisfy the first condition, but fewer satisfy the second. The countries for which I was able to gather the most complete and comparable data are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Greece and Spain.

For eight of the ten countries (all but Greece and Spain) the first democratic era covers the inter-war years as long as free, competitive elections were held. The second time period covers approximately fifteen years after the end of the Second World War. It is assumed that if continuity exists it will be evident during this time period, and following the developments over a longer time period might introduce changes due to other causes. For Greece the first time period covers the years after the Second World War and civil war until the military junta took control (1967) and the second time period begins with the resumption of elections in 1974. For Spain the first era covers the Second Republic and the second era covers the period since Franco's death.[10]

Among these countries there is variation on both the cause and the length of break. Five of these countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain) suffered internal collapses led by parties associated with the right and nationalist rhetoric. The other five (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway) saw democracy collapse because of invasion by Germany.

The variation in the lengths of break experienced by these ten countries is substantial: from as short as five years in a number of countries to over forty years in one country. Grouping these countries into categories by length of break gives the following result: short breaks (up to seven years): Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway; medium length breaks (twelve to twenty one years): Austria, Germany Italy; long break (forty years): Spain. Almost all of these countries experienced moderate to severe destruction of physical property and infrastructure as a result of the Second World War. Though parts of Spain also suffered destruction during its civil war, by the time of its redemocratization its economy had long since recovered and become significantly more industrialized. With the exception of Greece these countries experienced numerous war casualties during the relevant time period, but only Germany underwent substantial border and population shifts.

Results and evaluation

It is now possible to evaluate the hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts a decline in the format in all ten countries. Hypothesis (lb) follows this up by predicting that the greatest decline in party system format will be seen in the five countries that experienced internal breaks: Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway should register the least change. Results are presented in Table 11.1.

The table shows that the format did decline in nine of these ten countries (all but Italy). A difference of means test on format averages for each era reveals that in only half of the cases is the difference statistically significant, but given that there are so few degrees of freedom it is perhaps more surprising that the differences in any country are statistically significant. These data support hypothesis (la). To make it easier to evaluate hypothesis (1b), the results are rearranged by cause of break in Table 11.2. Clearly the extent of decline in format was much greater where the break was a result of internal factors. Hypothesis (lb), then, is also supported.

The second hypothesis predicts that in countries with internal breaks the strength of the discredited orientation will decline more than the other orientations. From the results for each era absolute and percentage differences between eras were calculated. Results are presented in Table 11.3. In every country the discredited orientation lost strength and in four of five cases the discredited orientation was the only one to lose strength. By this test, then, hypothesis (2) is supported.

The next two hypotheses predict effects based upon the length of the break. The third hypothesis states that countries with longer breaks (Spain, Italy, Germany and Austria) should show greater change in the social orientation of their party systems than countries with short breaks (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway). From the strength scores for each era differences were summed across orientations to determine country totals. The percentage differences in unity were also summed across orientations, but being concerned here with the number of parties per category, the more meaningful measure is the number of categories which demonstrate change. Change of 0.25 or greater within an orientation means that the orientation has gained or lost at least one party of some importance and will be used here as an indication of change. Results are presented in Table 11.4.

To make it easier to evaluate the hypothesis the results are rearranged in Table 11.5 by the length of break. These tables indicate that overall hypothesis (3) is supported, though a close examination reveals that Greece exhibits "too much" change and Austria "too little."[11]

The fourth hypothesis predicts that longer breaks will lead to greater increases in party system volatility. From the average scores for each era percentage differences across eras were calculated. Results are presented in Table 11.6.

Seven of the ten countries did show increases in average volatility, but Germany, the Netherlands and Norway all registered decreased volatility. Table 11.7 compares the percentage differences by the length of the break.

Table 11.1 Party system format

Country		*Number of elections*	*Format average*	*% difference* t_2 v t_1	*T statistic Difference of means*
Austria	t_1	5	2.40	−0.075	2.25*
	t_2	5	2.22		
Belgium	t_1	7	2.94	−0.235	4.31*
	t_2	5	2.25		
Denmark	t_1	8	2.61	−0.023	0.57
	t_2	7	2.55		
France	t_1	5	4.82	−0.135	1.18
	t_2	5	4.17		
Germany	t_1	8	3.98	−0.231	1.63
	t_2	4	3.06		
Greece	t_1	8	2.62	−0.210	0.80
	t_2	6	2.07		
Italy	t_1	2	2.61	+0.142	0.35
	t_2	4	2.98		
Netherlands	t_1	6	3.95	−0.094	3.08**
	t_2	5	3.58		
Norway	t_1	7	3.37	−0.427	2.82**
	t_2	4	1.93		
Spain	t_1	2	6.05	−0.595	6.21**
	t_2	4	2.45		

Notes:
*=significant at 0.05 level; **=significant at 0.01 level.
t_1 refers to the first era of democratization;
t_2 refers to the second era of democratization.

Table 11.2 Extent of decline in party system format by cause of breakdown

Cause of breakdown	*% decline in average number of parties*
Internal (excluding Italy)	0.278
External	0.183

These tables indicate apparent support for hypothesis (4). However, the averages for the long to medium category are greatly inflated by Spain's relatively high volatility in the second era. Excluding Spain from the calculations gives a percentage difference in average volatility of 0.153, which is increased to 0.184 if Germany is also excluded since its volatility decreased. Without Spain, then, the results are much weaker, if not contradictory.

Table 11.3 Social orientation strength in countries with internal breaks

Country	*Party*	t_1 *strength*	t_2 *strength*	*Difference in strength between* t_2 *and* t_1	*Percentage difference in strength between* t_1 *and* t_2
Austria	*N*	0.168	0.092	*−0.076*	*−0.452*
	C	0.400	0.439	+0.039	+0.098
	W	0.405	0.467	+0.062	+0.153
Germany	*N*	0.285	0.012	*−0.273*	*−0.958*
	E	0.044	0.145	+0.101	+2.295
	C	0.138	0.396	+0.258	+1.870
	L	0.141	0.108	−0.033	−0.234
	W	0.376	0.335	−0.041	−0.109
Italy	*C*	0.433	0.131	*−0.302*	*−0.697*
	T	0.205	0.416	+0.211	+1.029
	W	0.351	0.427	+0.076	+0.217
	E	0.009	0.010	+0.001	+0.111
Greece	*C*	0.466	0.016	*−0.400*	*-0.966*
	T	0.393	0.498	+0.105	+0.267
	W	0.127	0.473	+0.346	+2.724
Spain*	C	0.459	0.436	*−0.023*	*−0.050*
	W	0.494	0.530	+0.036	+0.073

Notes:
C=conservative or right; E=ethnic or regional; L=liberal; N=nationalist; T=center; W=working class or left. Discredited group is in italic (the top row of each country).
* Spain has many regional parties which together gain a significant percentage of the vote. Many of these parties have either a rightist or leftist orientation so here, to the extent possible, I have combined regional parties with the national parties.

In order to evaluate these hypotheses I have calculated the extent of change for each component. We may now ask whether, or to what degree, countries registering high change on one component also register high change on the other components. Table 11.8 presents the rankings of the relative amount of change by component for each country and sums the scores for an overall ranking.

We can see in Table 11.8 that the rankings along components are often, though not always, similar.[12] Spain is the country which experienced the most change in its party system, but Germany, with an internally caused break of moderate length, ranks only fifth.

Table 11.4 The social orientation of party systems

Country	*Party*	*Difference in strength between* t_1 *and* t_2	*Sum of differences*	*Percentage diference in unity between* t_1 *and* t_2	*Sum of differences*	*Proportion of groups with change of over 0.250*
Austria	C	0.039		0.010		
	N	0.076		0.351		
	W	0.062	0.177	0.020	0.381	$\frac{1}{3}$
Belgium	C	0.055		0.048		
	L	0.034		–		
	W	0.030		0.059		
	E	0.041	0.160	0.400	0.507	$\frac{1}{4}$
Denmark	C	0.015		0.126		
	L	0.070		0.080		
	W	0.064		0.050		
	E	0.006	0.155	0.259	0.515	$\frac{1}{4}$
France	C	0.061		0.008		
	T	0.003		0.359		
	W	0.061	0.125	0.211	0.578	$\frac{1}{3}$
Germany	E	0.101		0.279		
	C	0.258		0.010		
	L	0.033		0.495		
	W	0.041		0.306		
	N	0.273	0.706	0.057	1.147	$\frac{3}{5}$
Greece	C	0.450		0.324		
	T	0.105		0.265		
	W	0.346	0.901	0.210	0.799	$\frac{2}{3}$
Italy	C	0.302		1.430		
	T	0.211		–		
	W	0.076		0.731		
	E	0.001	0.590	0.405	2.566	$\frac{3}{4}$
Netherlands	Rc	0.022		–		
	Rp	0.040		0.010		
	L	0.052		0.390		
	W	0.111	0.225	0.069	0.469	$\frac{1}{4}$
Norway	C	0.057		–		
	L	0.070		0.490		
	W	0.142	0.269	0.071	0.561	$\frac{1}{3}$
Spain	C	0.023		0.121		
	W	0.036	0.059	0.593	0.714	$\frac{1}{2}$

Key: C=conservative or right; E=ethnic or regional; L=liberal; N=nationalist; T=center; W=working class or left; Rc=religious-Catholic; Rp=religious-Protestant.

Table 11.5 Social orientation differences by length of break

	Average difference		
		Unity	
Length of break	*Strength*	*Sum*	*Groups*
Long or medium	0.383	1.202	$\frac{1}{2}$ (0.546)
Short	0.306	0.572	$\frac{1}{3}$ (0.347)

Table 11.6 The volatility of party systems

		Average	*Percentage difference* t_2 *average vs* t_1 *average*	*T statistic Difference of means*
Austria	t_1	0.049	+0.163	0.31
	t_2	0.057		
Belgium	t_1	0.046	+0.435	2.00*
	t_2	0.066		
Denmark	t_1	0.039	+0.103	0.05
	t_2	0.043		
France	t_1	0.077	+0.026	0.04
	t_2	0.079		
Germany	t_1	0.089	−0.090	0.21
	t_2	0.081		
Greece	t_1	0.107	+0.037	0.10
	t_2	0.111		
Italy	t_1	0.073	+0.205	–
	t_2	0.088		
Netherlands	t_1	0.050	−0.260	1.08
	t_2	0.037		
Norway	t_1	0.060	−0.833	2.13*
	t_2	0.010		
Spain	t_1	0.025	+1.24	–
	t_2	0.056		

Note: In Italy's case there were only two free elections in t1. Spain had three elections but the data for the percentage of the vote by party of the first election (1931) are incomplete.
* = significant at 0.05 level.

Conclusion

Competitive party systems quickly redeveloped in European countries after the non-democratic regimes fell. How familiar party systems appear in the newly democratic era depends upon which component is being emphasized. Through a more comprehensive approach to examining party systems it has been shown that while some countries showed minimal change, in others the changes were both broad and deep. That some change occurs is not necessarily unexpected or undesirable, especially if weaknesses of the previous party system contributed or led to the break.

Table 11.7 Party system volatility by length of break

Length of break	*Percentage difference in average volatility*	*Percentage difference for 7 countries with an increase*
Long or medium	0.417	0.536
Short	0.282	0.150

Table 11.8 Rankings of the relative amount of change

Country	*Format*	*Social orientation*	*Volatility*	*Overall rank*
Austria	9	6	6	8
Belgium	4	9	3	6
Denmark	10	10	7	10
France	7	8	10	9
Germany	5	3	8	5
Greece	2	1	9	3
Italy	6	2	5	4
Netherlands	8	7	4	7
Norway	3	4	2	2
Spain	1	5	1	1

It was proposed that the cause and the length of the break would affect the extent of change in party systems. While these variables do not explain all variance, they did a good job of predicting change along format and social orientation, but held up less well regarding volatility. In this sample longer breaks were also associated with internally caused breaks, but inclusion of Eastern European and some Latin American countries would bring more variation on the independent variables and permit more in-depth investigation of the effects of these factors.

Notes

1 While many who have tested Lipset and Rokkan's conclusion (e.g. Pederson 1979; Rose and Urwin 1970) argue that there has been an unfreezing of party systems, these tests relate only to changes in the post-war (or redemocratic) era. Further, only if cleavage alignments are equated with party system alignments, and party system alignments are measured solely by electoral volatility, do these methods of testing make sense.

2 If we group together typologies which measure polarization, the spectrum of parties' ideologies, and the ideological center of the party system, then ideology would also be a frequently used and conceptually important component. Unfortunately all of this work, even the recent Party Manifesto Project, focuses exclusively on the post Second World War (or newly democratic) era and therefore I am unable to use this component.

3 See Ersson and Lane 1996; Mair 1989; Pederson 1979; Rose and Urwin 1970.

4 This component is also used by Duverger 1951; Key 1964; Lane and Ersson 1987.

5 See Duverger 1954; Lane and Ersson 1987. The four groups used by Lane and Ersson are (ethnic, religious), (conservative, liberal, agrarian), (socialist, left-socialist, Communist), and (discontent, ultra-right). Rarely will two categories be sufficient to capture the diversity of interests, but making categories too fine means that in practice they are rarely occupied. Cross-country differences in the existence and relevance of certain categories will occur as a result of differing social structures, economic development, and history, but here our concern is with evaluating within country differences so it is not necessary to use one schema for all countries. For example, depending upon the country and time frame groups one and four may not be occupied or may receive only trace amounts of support. It may also be necessary to add groups for centrist and nationalist parties and useful to split liberal parties off from group two.

6 Looking at paths toward redemocratization, Stepan (1986) does distinguish between internally and externally caused breaks, but he was not focusing on party systems. I am not making any normative judgments about the cause, but recognizing that regardless of what led to the collapse it was necessary for countries to redevelop their party systems.

7 It should be noted that there are two potentially important constraints on (native) elites' abilities to use the mechanisms. If the authoritarian regime was overthrown by external powers who remained in the country as occupiers, then it may be external actors who play a decisive role in deciding which parties and elites, if any, to legally punish. Additionally, if both the fall of democracy and the fall of the authoritarian regime are due to internal forces, there may be a need to keep those associated with the discredited party or orientation playing along with the move to democracy if they still control important political or economic resources or if the discrediting is not accepted by all in society. So rather than punishing those elites and parties, there may be a need to ensure their participation and "adequate" representation.

8 Remmer (1985) found that the length of break had a substantial effect on party system continuity. Though she defined continuity in a much narrower manner, her work provides a basis for supposing that we will also find effects due to the length of the break.

9 If the first condition does not hold then these hypotheses may serve as predictions, but we cannot assess their accuracy. If the second condition does not hold then we are unable to calculate the indices used to assess the amount of change.

10 Because we are looking at changes within countries it is not necessary that all time periods coincide.

11 As these results indicate, the length of the break may not always be a good proxy for the extent of socio-economic change. For example, Austria underwent less socio-economic change, measured as sectoral distribution of employment, than other countries with medium or long breaks, while Greece underwent far more socio-economic change than the other countries with short breaks. See Mitchell 1992.

12 Spearman correlations on the rankings indicate that a country's rank along social orientation change is correlated with its rank along percentage change in the number of parties (0.55). The overall ranking is correlated with rankings for numbers, social orientation and volatility, though with declining magnitude (0.90, 0.72, 0.53) and significance. The empirical results remain the same whether Molinar's NP or Laakso and Taagapera's N is used.

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12
THE END OF THE BEGINNING: THE PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Attila Ágh

Introduction

It is too easy to conclude from the analyses of the East Central European (ECE) parties and party systems, as most analysts have, that these parties are too weak and too undeveloped compared to West European ones. Although this is true, it is actually surprising how much ground they have covered in their formation process in the short period since 1989. This "great transformation" is missing from the usual treatments of ECE parties and, therefore, their entire analysis threatens to become a mere commonplace: the West is West, the East is East. However, the ECE parties and party systems achieved a *partial consolidation* in the mid-1990s, having emerged from the "original organizational chaos" just a few years before, in 1989—90, and have by the late 1990s reached some crystallization of political forces.

There have been some very characteristic tendencies of political and electoral behavior in ECE (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia) which may be summarized as follows:

1 electoral and party fragmentation;
2 high electoral volatility and protest voting;
3 the return of the "post-Communist" vote and parties;
4 growing abstention at the elections;
5 declining confidence in parliaments and parties.

These five tendencies are, however, the normal features of the party formation process during which a multi-party system emerges. The first two tendencies indicate just the temporary "high temperature" of the political body in the first years of democratic transition. The third tendency proves that they are already more or less over, that is, we are at the end of the beginning in the transition process. In the initial stage of democratic transition a "hundred-party system" came to being, but was eliminated by the two or three consecutive free elections; a surprisingly strong wave of traditionalist conservatism and nationalism in ECE was also defeated. These are very big achievements for barely six years. The reasons for the fourth and fifth tendency are much deeper, as they are

connected with a drastic social transformation and they will persist until the economy is consolidated, the first signs of which can be seen in most ECE countries.

This leads us to a hypothesis about the early freezing of the ECE parties as a partial consolidation of a partial system (Ágh 1995). As Schmitter argues, democratic transition and consolidation are not only subsequent stages but the former may already include the consolidation of some "partial systems" (Schmitter 1995: 556). In my understanding, this has happened especially to the parties in ECE; the Czech and Hungarian systems are rather well consolidated, the Slovenian and Polish ones are to a great extent, and only the Slovakian and Croatian systems are lagging behind. This paper tries to argue that, although the ECE parties and party systems (about the distinction see Lane and Ersson 1987:94–6, 154–6) still demonstrate characteristic features of "infantile disorder," the parties have already made great strides from *polarized pluralism* to *moderate pluralism* (with parties increasingly able to form coalitions) and from *movement parties* to *cartel parties',* altogether they have reached a partial consolidation of both party systems and individual parties.

From movement parties to cartel parties

There have been four periods of party developments in ECE from movement parties to cartel parties (Ágh 1994b).

(1) The particular type of political organization that emerged in ECE is the so-called *movement party* and competition among the movement parties created the first multi-party systems (see Batt 1991:55–6). They represented to some extent the "original" and "ideal" unity of society and party, even though they were fragile and transitory political phenomena, not yet suitable for the roles of political parties in a competitive multi-party system. They had no stable and definite memberships, just participants in their actions. The cult of spontaneity was characteristic of them, since they tried to overcome the division between everyday life and politics, and this brought with it a domination of horizontal ties over vertical ones. Leadership roles were based on personal authority and not on the elected posts of the party hierarchy. The programs were vague, emotionally supported and directly connected with such actions as mass demonstrations. These movement parties and their social movements played a big role in ECE just before and after the collapse of the former system, but they had to transform themselves step by step into real parties. This turning point came in Hungary in late 1989, in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia in 1990. It has not yet been fully achieved in Slovakia, where the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, as the biggest party, has tried to preserve its national and emotional features in order to maintain itself as a large populist movement.

(2) In the early 1990s, however, parties collected some stable memberships, initially as networks or movement parties, and in doing this they took the first steps in becoming national organizations with party programs. Prior to the first, founding elections the early political organizations were under pressure to decide whether they would or could become real parties instead of the previous "travestita" or embryonic proto-parties. This was the honeymoon period for newly emerging parties, since the new legal regulations favored parties over meso-political organizations, e.g. over organized interests and civil society associations. Therefore, many interest organizations opted for a party existence in order

to be able to exert pressure upon politics; since then the border line between macro-and meso-systems, parties and organized interests, has remained blurred. Actually, all bigger "baby" parties had already won some power, or at least political influence, through negotiating mechanisms between the government and the opposition. Their specific political strength, however, was still unclear before the elections.

The *overparticization* process—the springing up of too many parties—had already begun in this early period. Parties became the main agents of political change, and during their formation they used and abused all their available resources. This is why virtually all socio-political forces sought to be organized as parties, otherwise they would have been left out of politics. Parties were, however, more successful outside than inside; that is, they succeeded in pushing out other actors from politics, but they were not very successful in organizing themselves. This deficit was clear even in this dynamic period. The ECE societies were activated and over-politicized, but the parties' social ties remained minimal, since people did not join parties in great numbers and the national organizations remained weak. Therefore the biggest difficulty for the parties as they started to become institutionalized was to transform themselves from movement parties with loose organization and spontaneous actions (which had the broad but diffuse support of the population) to organized parties with disciplined memberships, regular and formalized meetings, and extended party bureaucracy and professional leaderships. Even the most successful "baby" parties were only elite parties led by a small group of intellectuals, with a minimal and rather inactive membership. When, in the early 1990s the warring cultural and tribal factions led to the emergence of the first "real," i.e. organized parties, they promoted first and foremost their ideological character. Therefore the first ECE party systems can be characterized in Sartori's term as ideologically based *polarized pluralism*. The most characteristic feature of this period is the reform and transformation of the post-Communist parties.

(3) The crucial turning point for the parties came after the first elections, through power transfer and the start of the *parliamentarization* process (Ágh 1994b). In this period the overparticization was reinforced by the winners, the parliamentary parties, which acted aggressively to exclude both all the other socio-political actors and the non-parliamentary parties from politics. Their justification was based upon the specialized nature of other organizations compared to parties representing more general, if not national, interests. The exclusion was also seen as protecting parliamentary democracy from the "corporative" pressure of organized interests which were, supposedly, in most cases delegitimized by their participation in the former political system. At the same time, parliamentary parties concentrated all resources in political and public life on themselves, raising the "entrance fee" into politics too high for the other parties. There was a historic time after the first elections in all ECE countries when parties received big office buildings as their headquarters, along with many other privileges. The democratic institutionalizing of macro-politics—parties, parliament and government—had to take place quickly, and its actors asserted their rights definitely and aggressively.

The biggest challenge for the parties' organizational structure was certainly their participation in power with all its consequences. The parties were, even before the elections, organized from above by small groups of intellectual elites taking the initiative.

After the elections this top-down character became absolutely dominant, shockingly quickly. *Overparticization* and *overparliamentarization* reinforced each other, and politics once again became a remote realm for people, but this time on a multi-party base. Membership of parties at first increased quickly in the parliamentarization phase, then reaching a peak, it began slowly to decline. Parliamentary parties remained relatively small—except for some post-Communist parties with membership continuity—and still monopolize the public scene by securing a privileged access to media for themselves. This cruel selection process among parties at the first elections was necessary and unavoidable, and it has mostly been successful. But the selfishness of the "successful" parliamentary parties and their eagerness to become the only actors of the political game backfired and isolated the parliamentary parties even more from society.

The political parties had to turn inside in order to organize themselves under the new, powerful pressure of parliamentarization. This occurred in two ways: in the parliament as party factions each with their leaderships and expert teams; and within the party as a relationship between the newly "parliamentarized" leadership and the whole membership. For some time, the parties had very few leading personalities and an even smaller number of experts. The leaders of party and parliamentary factions merged very closely, with the result that the gap suddenly increased between the narrow party elite and rank-and-file members. In the early 1990s the ECE parties adopted a special "congressing" way of working. They often convene party congresses or national meetings in order to mobilize the members, to give the activists a chance to participate, and to influence the leaders. This "congressing" has obviously been a substitute for everyday party life, which has been missing so far because of the sparseness of party membership and low level of the usual party activities.

(4) By the mid-1990s, however, the ECE parties and party systems had entered a new —the fourth—stage of their emergence. It became vital for the parties to widen participation in political activity; they had given up their monopoly in politics although with some hesitation. Yet the national political scene began to open up, step by step, so as to include organized interests, local and regional government and civil associations, both as an institutionalization of the pre-parliamentary stage in the decision-making process and as a manifest or covert political pressure on macro-politics. The low organizational level of the political meso-systems (the missing middle) and its fragility has always been the weakest point of the ECE political systems and it has been the missing link between parties and the population. There has been a lack of functional democracy which could provide the interest articulation and aggregation for the macro-politics and this negative historical heritage has now to be overcome (Ágh and Ilonszki 1996:451).

In the present period the parties have turned into cartel parties under the external pressure of other actors and because of their own social weakness. They rely almost completely on the state for their resources, and share these resources exclusively among themselves (on cartel parties see Katz and Mair 1995). Similar moves can be noticed in all ECE countries, e.g. data about Hungary indicate that parties have usually drawn more than 90 percent of their incomes from the state support.

Consequently, the major contradiction in party formation in ECE is that the newly emerging parties, with many difficulties, switched very quickly, in just a few years, from

loose movement parties (representing some kind of spontaneous unity of parties and society) to rigidly-organized cartels as power parties (expressing a new separation of parties and society), which are close to the traditional type of Gentral European hegemonic parties. This analysis suggests that instead of the former hegemonistic or state party a hegemonistic party system as cartel of parties or a "partyist" democracy may emerge in the ECE countries.

Consolidation of party systems

The South European (SE) and then ECE developments have proved that strongly organized parties opt for strong parliamentary governments, while weakly organized parties in Latin America and Eastern Europe encourage presidential systems and personal leadership. This approach can explain the contrast between the Latin American and South European developments, but our concern here is only to show the relative closeness between ECE developments and the South European democratization. The "strong parties and strong parliamentarism" connection has increasingly characterized four countries in ECE. The tyrannical majority has taken a presidential form only in Croatia, but in Slovakia it has had a purely parliamentary form. Democratic consolidation as the next step in the institutionalization process has to be prepared and accomplished by consolidating the party systems through a rupture with traditionalism and provincialism, and by promotion of Europeanization. In the case of the individual party development, Europeanization means new types of linkage between parties and society, and a social dialogue, institutionalized also by the solid contacts between political parties and interest organizations. Thus political party consolidation has at least two aspects. The first is the above-mentioned "external" consolidation, i.e. through social contacts and establishing firm relationships between macro-and meso-politics, parties and organized interests. The second aspect is, so to say, internal, through a further and "final" institutionalization of parties in terms of a smooth and efficient working relationship between the major decision-making bodies, or, in general, between leadership and membership. The maturation of these two processes support the hypothesis that there was an *early freezing* of parties in ECE.

This first stage of maturation may be considered as an only partial consolidation of a partial system, but it is an important and necessary precondition of the final democratic consolidation of the entire polity. It means that the specific political profile of the individual parties and the whole structure of party systems have become almost ready and quasi consolidated. It is far from the West European stability, and even after coming a long way yet the ECE party systems will keep their regional particularities, as the SE party systems have kept theirs after their first phase of Europeanization. We can therefore confirm the early freezing hypothesis that has been put forward by Olson, on the basis of the findings of ECE analysts:

> Parties now developing in Central Europe may very well evolve their own distinctive traits, not closely resembling those currently known in western democracies. The range of possible structure and behavior is much wider in the new democracies simply because they are starting anew. While their leaders are

> acutely aware of at least some western democratic practices, and while many attempt to duplicate what they see, their new circumstances have the potential to lead to entirely new political structures and behaviors than currently known and which the participants themselves cannot currently foresee. We are perhaps witnessing the "freezing moment" of the new party systems of post-Communist countries.
>
> (Olson 1993:620)

This hypothesis, seemingly, contradicts the main argument of this chapter about the relative social vacuum in and around these "half-created" parties and party systems, but in fact it does not. This paper, in fact, argues that the ECE party systems have rapidly advanced in the last six years. If we take all the international and domestic factors into account, we can see why this early freezing has occurred in the ECE party systems. The first determining factor is rather obvious: the ECE parties can survive internationally and domestically only if they fit into the West European party systems, into the party internationals. These internationals have imposed mandatory requirements on all major types of ECE parties that are prospective partners in return for cooperating with them. They are ready to support and protect them, but only by forcing them through a political learning process. This is a multi-faceted process, in which the Euro-connection of parties, including both the exemplifying effect of, and the constraints on organization by, western parties have to be considered as milder or tougher forms of this forced cooperation. The western parties provide informal channels for giving practical help to their ECE partners and make official declarations to protect their counterparts, also giving them moral and financial support in the electoral campaigns. This effect has snowballed in that these "import" models are increasingly imitated by ECE parties as they desperately compete for power (about Hungary see Ágh *et al.* 1995).

Altogether, the European model of individual parties and structure of party systems is held up to the ECE parties by the EU in expectation they will meet it in order to be accepted as partners. There is therefore not much hope for late-comers, not having West European "parents," or for the "non-standard parties" as the Slovak political scientists call these "outsiders" (see Meseznikov 1995: 106–8). But there is a big chance for further selection, fusion or disappearance of parties belonging to the same family of parties. Altogether, the inner party structures may be fragile and so, some smaller parties could still emerge or disappear, but the major actors are already on the political scene and the future structural transformations in the ECE party systems (except for Slovakia and Croatia) will be only marginal. The "election filter" has worked efficiently by eliminating the "hundred-party-system"; many smaller parties have already been removed from political life or been reduced to a mere nominal existence. The ECE party systems are getting closer and closer to the balanced European model of center-left versus center-right kind of multi-party system.

The second conditioning factor operates domestically and it is much less obvious than the international one but it is still operating intensively. The existing bigger parties already represent the major political alternatives and occupy their political space; so there is no longer any chance for a new party to get a large constituency. Furthermore,

nowadays, in the present stage of the party formation process it is not just the parties that are looking for a solid social base but also the newly emerging social strata who are seeking political representation, by reconquering the parties and making them more and more suitable to represent their views. Thus, after the "culturalization" phase, the parties have now entered the "socialization" phase, that of socio-economic constraints and pressures; this creates closer commitments between some parties and their respective social bases. Both the individual parties and the party structures have arranged themselves more and more closely along the cleavages of the Lipset-Rokkan model. After at least two general elections the parties have developed more capacity for social dialog and a particular preference for the specific demands of certain social strata. It is still a long way to go to the well-established "Rokkanian" parties and party systems, but it is mostly the same parties and the same party systems that have to go through the further maturation process.

The final—and very important—conditioning factor in this historical development from movement parties to cartel parties has been the creation of the *political class.* It has been one of the major functions of the party formation process. This political class had already emerged, and became more or less consolidated by the mid-1990s. The parties have been the chief actors in democratic transition and they have had almost a monopoly in creating the new political elite, and beyond that, the new political class. The *political elite* embraces only the top- and middle-ranking party leaders, so it is an eminently party and government elite (in Hungary, about 10,000 people). But the political class includes all those elected in (national and local) politics and those employed in public administration who are "state dependent" and live from politics and for politics (in Hungary altogether around 100,000 persons, including the political elite). There has been a lot of debate on elite change, succession or continuity in ECE. This would need a separate analysis, but cultural and social capital has certainly played the dominant role in the emergence of the new elites, including the new political class, the formation of which is a very important factor in the stabilization of politics and the consolidation of party systems (see Szelényi 1995).

The competitive party system has thus already produced in ECE a *new political class* that is increasingly professional, but so far, while privatization continues, with a fusion of the economic and political spheres. The creation of an active and relatively well educated political class has been a very positive process from one point of view, but a very negative one, in the merging of politics and economics, on the other. By the end of the 1990s it will be decided whether the ECE countries will, after the privatization period, which has made the clear separation of political and economic interests actually impossible, take the "Italian road" as a "partyist democracy" with the *clientura* system as structural connections between politics and business, or turn down the "Austrian road," as some kind of "neocorporatist democracy," with more or less regulated relationships and articulated separation of these two worlds. The latter one is more likely, since the tripartite institutions are already relatively well developed in all ECE countries. But they could not work properly because of the overwhelming eagerness to privatize politics, which pervades the entire political class (Ágh and Ilonszki 1996). The further consolidation of the ECE party systems can be expected at the end of the 1990s when privatization ends

and the laws on conflict of interest can effectively be applied, to ensure actual separation of the worlds of politics and business.

The main types of ECE parties

In the conventional literature on ECE parties the problems of party *systems* and *individual* parties have not usually been distinguished carefully, creating many confusions. After having analyzed the party systems in its four stages of development from movements to cartel parties, I deal here with the specific party formation process in ECE with regard only to its main *individual* party types (not to the party *systems*) and their internal maturation. There are several ways of characterizing ECE parties by using typologies. In the following analysis I will outline the most common typologies, adding my own functional and genetic approaches as well. This analysis of the development of the individual parties and their types in ECE will, I hope, provide further support for the hypothesis of the early freezing.

Descriptive-quantitative typology: parties may be characterized according to their size as far as membership or parliamentary seats are concerned. It is easy to conclude that the "hundred-party system" still exists in the ECE countries, since formally and legally there are more than a hundred parties overall, but actually the zones of the big, medium-size and small parties have been differentiated sharply. The *small* parties still exist in great numbers, but they are completely marginalized politically and they do not play any significant public or political role. Yet we should not forget about them, because some of them are very aggressive small groupings or parties on the extreme right and as "happening" or "performance" parties they sometimes produce a lot of noise and public scandals. Most of the *medium-sized* parties have their own social, political or ethnic base by now, and so their number in a country (usually below ten, and close to five) and public or political role have already been consolidated. There are only two or three *big* parties, usually arranged on the center-left and center-right axis, which play the decisive role in the public and political life, with 80 to 90 percent of MPs.

Functional typology: the party formation process in ECE has produced typical functions for parties, among which two party types have proved to be predominant. The first and most characteristic party type of the emergence process, the *movement party* as an *umbrella organization* has already been described. In a manner of speaking, the "popular fronts" came back in the late 1980s in the ECE countries as movement-oriented parties, which featured at the same time as representatives of the general interests of the whole nation, since they were above parties as "fora" instead of following "narrow" party interests. These umbrella organizations have disintegrated everywhere in the region, but their successor parties inherited the idea of representing the whole nation directly as "the party above parties." Actually, all bigger parties more or less followed the pattern of the defunct umbrella organizations and determined their party profiles as "national parties," that is, parties serving and combining the interests of all important social strata. These "national parties," with their claim to represent "national interest" directly, were in fact close to the type of "state parties" of the authoritarian periods and this change took place very quickly

in the early 1990s from loose, action-oriented movement parties to rigidly organized quasi-state parties.

This ECE "definition" of parties above the "normal" party level was accompanied by the other extreme, by the stubborn existence of some medium-size parties below the party level, i.e. too close to organized interests. This "narrow interest party" is also an "archaic" type in the party formation process, since in the early stages some interest organizations (e.g. the peasant parties and the parties of entrepreneurs, etc.) became parties to exert political pressure. There is still a grey area between parties and interest organizations in which, to various degrees, the organizations appear legally as parties yet act politically as organized interests. This duality of *national parties* and *interest parties,* as two main functional types, is still—although decreasingly—an "infantile" feature of ECE party systems, as a point of departure for the parties' further development. There is a tendency nowadays for national parties to be socially more selective, so that they can anchor themselves more in particular social strata, and also for interest parties to open up beyond their direct constituencies. The early freezing process of parties is definitely going on, yet this duality is going to stay with us as a long-term functional feature: the bigger parties are premature catch-all parties competing for the votes of all strata, and the medium-size parties still rely more on the "automatic" votes of their direct constituencies.

Genetic typology: parties may be differentiated by the roles and places they had in the party formation process. In this respect we can describe three major cleavages which originally arranged the types of the newly emerging parties with their opposition counterparts. We have in this way six major types of parties as discussed below:

(1) The first cleavage line is between the former ruling, now reformed *post-Communist parties* and the *new opposition parties.* Their confrontation through negotiations led to the formation of multi-party systems, and—with deep transformations on both sides—these "first generation parties" of both types are still the major players. They have mobilized the most talented people as well as other resources, and the most important parties organized themselves along ideological lines most successfully. The former ruling parties disintegrated, but one of their successor parties in each country has gone through a modernization process and everywhere in ECE there are already new socialist and social democratic parties with a consolidated social and political background. On the other side, the old opposition parties turned to some new leading parties which were the trend-setters of political development in the first years of democratization. Some of them have become parliamentary parties, eliminating or marginalizing the others from the parliamentary and political scene by politically, i.e. electorally, out-competing them. What looked like the "original organizational chaos" in the late 1980s and early 1990s was in fact a quick and cruel natural selection process on a "first come, first served" basis. As we now realize, the most important parties had already qualified themselves at a very early stage of the transition process. At the later stage, they further transformed only internally, but there have been no newcomers among the bigger parties since the beginning. The first cleavage line determined the broad landscape of party systems, on both sides, although right after the collapse of the old system it seemed as if the ruling parties or their successors might be completely eliminated. Just the contrary happened. With a relatively quick social-democratization, the degree of which varies tremendously from country to

country, the reformed post-Communist parties in the ECE countries have been able to survive any efforts of their competitors to delegitimize them and to articulate the demands of the larger society for a renewed leftist perspective (see Waller 1995).

At the same time, in the first period the original opposition parties had the legitimacy of fighting against the one-party system. They also benefited from the early mobilization of the masses, and attracted the most talented leaders and activists as well. Although the transitional political elites have already more or less disappeared in all ECE countries, these "priority birth-rights" remain valid. The reformed leftist parties and the most important former opposition parties have captured both the largest memberships and the most skilled professional politicians, remaining the leading parties since the beginning. These two types of parties have been connected as twins by the formation process described above. Both types are successor parties in some ways, since most of the former party members joined the newly emerging opposition parties as they succeeded. Therefore, it is not only the formal and legal continuity that matters, in the reformed post-Communist parties, but also the fact that there was continuity in parties, of mentality, membership and organizational principles, as they transformed from ruling to opposition role. The two types of parties have converged in their major features, becoming national parties or early, premature catch-all parties. When the early movement parties left the stage, not only the "legal," post-Communist successor parties, but also the new parties inherited the mantle of the quasi-state parties to a great extent.

The former big opposition parties, seizing power after the first free elections in ECE, became the new ruling parties and sometimes showed more resemblances in this period to the former ruling parties than their legal post-Communist successors did, since the latter were forced into opposition. Political life became too subject to ideology, above all because these new parties first of all emphasized their ideological confrontations against the former political system using loud anti-Communist rhetoric, but also because the new leading parties built up client organizations rather similar to the old state parties. Thus, for various reasons by the mid-1990s this original *dominating* cleavage between the reformed versions of the previous ruling parties and the newly emerging parties lost most of its force and validity, although some new bigger parties still try to keep and reinforce it for electoral and political advantages, as a device for delegitimizing the reformed leftist parties.

(2) The second major cleavage between the ECE party types has been the confrontation between the *old* and *new* parties. The old, "pre-Communist" parties usually reactivated themselves only after the new parties first emerged; they were formed as "second generation" parties; the small "third generation" parties woke up even later. Because of that situation a strange contradiction in political life appeared, namely, that soon after their emergence the new parties received all necessary resources and tried to monopolize them. The belatedly-arriving "historic" parties, however, protested and wanted to regain their former party fortunes. They hoped to play a dominant role in political life as in the good old days, that is, the pre-Communist period. This belated attempt at political takeover by the historic parties failed in all ECE countries; the historic parties as second generation parties have usually been relegated to the lower positions of party politics (the Czech Social Democratic Party can be considered the only exception). They were

significantly reduced in size, in both their social and political forms of existence and most of them have survived only as medium-sized interest parties of secondary importance. Originally these historic parties were connected to particular social strata; their values and interests as social democratic, Christian democratic or peasant parties led to their "automatic" revival in some cases, but only in a modest way. In addition, because of their archaic style and outdated programs and primarily of their old or senile leaders, they were sometimes not even competitive enough as interest parties. Some new interest parties have therefore formed, or in other cases trade unions or business interest associations have formed the backbone of new interest parties. In such a way, the contradiction between the old and new types of parties has been reproduced at the level of interest parties, although it has not among the national parties.

(3) The third cleavage is between ethnically and locally or regionally based parties on one side and nationalist parties on the other. The ECE countries are multi-ethnic societies where ethnic rights and interests have been traditionally oppressed and their organizations banned or paralyzed. These interests have come back with a vengeance in the democratization process through ethnic or regional parties forming and trying to represent these national minorities at the highest level, that is, at macro-political level. At the same time, there has been the phenomenon of rising nationalism even in those ECE countries that have not produced any significant extreme right-wing, nationalist-populist, "single-issue" parties. The only political issue for the latter is the representation of the interests of "true" Polishness, Hungarianness or Slovakness, etc., against the international or domestic "conspiracy" of national minorities or the Jews (Bugajski 1995; Hockenos 1993).

There is no doubt that the ethnically based parties sometimes overstate their case because they are single-issue parties, making almost exclusively ethnic or regional demands without a differentiated ideological and political stance. But to a great extent they have been forced to do so, because democracy as it is generally understood, entails a confrontation between its "majoritarian" and "consociational" varieties. The new ECE democracies are not yet ready to protect vital minority rights by incorporating the ethnic and regional interests in some way into the national policy-making process. The ethnically based parties are also medium-sized parties like some interest parties, and receive electoral support almost "automatically." Opposing them, there is at least one small or medium-sized extreme nationalist party in each ECE country. These extreme nationalist single-issue parties, however, have very volatile electoral support, and their political strength varies greatly from country to country. The nationalist-populist parties may also be considered phenomena of the political transition, expressing the frustration and disappointment of some groups in the population, and, as a reaction to Europeanization and modernization, they only emphasize the nation as a symbolic pre-modern community, the promotion of which will definitely solve all the other social and political problems.

The party systems of the ECE countries consist of these six major types of parties as three couples or pairs of parties. The predominance of the first cleavage line characterized the early stage of the party formation process but from the very beginning it has also shown a rather fast maturation process. So, by now this early feature has mostly been abandoned,

although the parties still bear the signs of their particular emergence from different party "families." Yet, more recently the first two cleavage lines already play a less and less decisive role, and the parties have been arranged more or less according to the Europeanization-traditionalism and left—right axes. The significance of the third cleavage has not yet been diminished; its two party types will stay with us for a longer period, because (1) the minority rights and representations in the ECE countries are still unsolved questions and (2) the socio-economic crisis and difficulties of European integration have produced new tensions that facilitate the survival of the nationalist-populist parties, and even giving them a new push in their extravagant activities.

At the same time, this genetic party typology also shows the huge difference between the ECE and Eastern European (EE) parties: (1) there is a genuine, although unfinished, social democratization process of ECE leftist parties, but the successors to the former ruling parties in the EE countries just simply changed their facade by renaming themselves "socialist" parties, when in fact they are mostly "national and socialist" parties; (2) the historical parties have revived as significant parties in EE to a lesser degree than in ECE, and the former Communist parties, as special "historical" parties of the region, still dominate in EE in slightly changed forms, ranged against the newly organized parties; (3) both the nationalist and ethnic parties are much stronger in EE than in ECE; the national and ethnic issues clash in EE in a violent way, producing some kinds of hidden or open civil wars, while these clashes are fairly minimal and peacefully controlled in the ECE countries.

Ideological typology: the conventional western typology describes the party families first of all as liberal, conservative or Christian-democratic, and as socialist or social-democratic, etc. This grouping has been most frequently applied from the very beginning to the ECE parties as well, and the ECE parties have been categorized according to the headings applicable in West European countries. This typology was an obvious and an almost unavoidable one to use but it is misleading because of two conspicuous limitations. First, ideological labels such as liberal, conservative, etc. imported straight from the West could not be properly applied to ECE parties, these terms being rather blurred and misleading even in the West and their local meanings absolutely idiosyncratic. Second, the basic information from the countries concerned was not easily available and the ECE parties themselves, to a great extent, had blurred or mixed, unidentifiable profiles. Nevertheless, in the ECE countries these party families may be observed, and they are getting closer to the West European types. It is, indeed, one of the most characteristic signs of the early freezing and maturation process that the major ECE parties have by now acquired quite clear political profiles and they can be more or less unambiguously identified along these ideological lines and labeled as member parties of the European party internationals. This is true although they do not completely follow the lines of the parties of Western Europe, and they still have a long way to go to become really Christian Democratic, Social Democratic or Liberal Parties.

Conclusions

Summing up the different typologies, I can conclude that first, the genetic approach—combined with the functional one—gives us the most correct description of party types, since, as I see it, which were to be the major parties was decided very early in the formation process. Later on, after this first turning point, or rather, point of departure, the ECE parties have come closer and closer to the West European party types, and now they can be seen more or less as proper members of the ideological party families. They have become mostly "standard" parties; this is a term used by Slovak political scientists, because in Slovakia they still have some bigger "non-stardard" parties, i.e. those without western parallels or counterparts, such as the Democratic Movement for Slovakia. The next defining moment came in the mid-1990s with the partial solving of the first crisis for the ECE parties, in which they began to split along the lines of Europeanization versus provincialism, modernization versus traditionalism. The parties with a clear commitment to modernization with Europeaniza-tion got the upper hand, at least in Hungary, the Czech lands, Poland and Slovenia.

My second conclusion is that, after overcoming the crisis of the nationalisttraditionalist deviation, the West European pattern of *center-right* and *center-left* parties (or party alliances) have clearly emerged and have stabilized among the ECE parties. Thus the early freezing means that the ECE parties have been significantly westernized from outside, but still much less so from inside. The parties' places and roles, as an institutional framework, are already given in the ECE countries, but the parties both as social networks and as political organizations are still underdeveloped and immature. Even so, some parties have progressed in this field, and their success in the internal transformation will force other parties to speed up their own internal changes, in order to remain competitive with the most successful ones.

The key issue is, indeed, the emergence of balanced center-left and center-right parties that has taken place in most ECE countries, the degree and character of which varies from country to country. In Hungary and Poland the center-left is well organized, but the rightist parties are fragmented and unconsolidated to a great extent; in the Czech Republic and Slovenia the center-right is well organized and the leftist parties are quite fragmented; in Slovakia and Croatia both sides are still weak and fragmented.

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13
THE LOGICS OF PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

José Magone

Introduction: patrimonialism, modernity and democratization

At the end of the twentieth century it is amazing that a history of party system change has not yet been written that takes into account the accumulation of knowledge from one political regime to another. Most studies emphasize the aspect of continuity in the process of party system change. This assumption may be relevant for some countries of Western Europe after the Second World War, but it cannot be sustained if we see post-war party system changes in the context of longer diachronical analysis. Here, the studies of the great Norwegian political scientist and sociologist Stein Rokkan come to the fore. He clearly analyzed postwar party systems in a wider historical, long-term analysis. He took into account that party systems and electoral systems were intertwined processes and subject to historical analysis. He dedicated a substantial part of his studies to delineating the progress towards universal suffrage in West European countries. His study of trends, from unequal particular, to equal universal, suffrage makes us aware that today's competitive party systems emerged from a long history of suffrage extension, which was interrupted in some countries by regime discontinuity (Rokkan 1970:29–40).

In a longer historical context, party systems are products of the history of modernity which had its origin in the early sixteenth century and replaced the turbulent Middle Ages. This is not the place to go deeper into it, nevertheless it is relevant to mention that the history of modernity created a new rationale of behavior based on the market economy. This was not an innovatory element of the new modern civilization. On the contrary, a market economy and behavior already existed in the larger urban centers of the Middle Ages. Merchants were major agents of this rationality. The period was dominated by the Thomistic rationale of behavior—at least as an ideological overall *Weltanschauung*—which was based on the principle of self-sufficiency and a static social corporatist structure of economic organization (Fanfani 1933:152–3).

The new rationale of the market economy was based on individualism, equality of rights and opportunities of exchange. The creation of *Homo economicus* was a long-term process. Control of affective behavior and socialization toward market behavior became the major conditions for the emergence of capitalism as a system (Elias 1985; Giddens 1985). According to the historian Fernand Braudel, capitalism was based on the rationale

of the market economy; nevertheless it is qualitatively a new dimension. Capitalism is a system of complicity, destroying the ideal case of equality in the market economy. Although economic behavior was dominated by the market rationale, capitalism created a hierarchical structure based on complicity. Braudel asserts that the development of European capitalism started in small city-states and evolved, later to be sustained by the competition between nation-states (Braudel 1985). No wonder that the seventeenth century was called the century of warfare. Anthony Giddens called the process one of internal pacification which was simultaneously complemented by external warfare (Giddens 1985). The nation-state became a power-container, always in competition with other nation-states, first in Europe and later on, in the colonial era, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Competition became the principle of the new capitalistic world system.

After the French Revolution, the new market rationale on which most nation-states were based could not sustain the oligarchical, aristocratic political systems. The emergence of the *tiers état* during the Revolution destroyed the *ancien regime* and built a more rationalized form of government, which, although it continued to be autocratic until 1830, developed towards more broad-based forms of representation. And it is clear that developments in one country influenced developments in other countries. The internal pacification of the territory and the lessening of competition among nation-states in the nineteenth century led to internalized forms of competition within the countries. Industrialization attracted the rural population to larger towns. It was chiefly, the mobilization of the population and the creation of new, more flexible, social groups that brought competition into the politics. Although stability was the major issue in the second half of the nineteenth century for most political systems, new social groups began to disrupt the stable alternating of the traditional political parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Polanyi 1944). The creation of socially-oriented political parties was important in introducing the rationale of market behavior into the West European party systems.

According to Samuel P. Eisenstadt, modernity implies the establishment of the rational-legal state, which is clearly differentiated from one in which political actors follow particular interests. The coming into being of a differentiated civil (or class) society through industrialization is a further condition. Modern party systems emerge along with the creation of a market-oriented society. The introduction of an economic rationale into politics was a major feature of modernization, and the market rationale permeated all spheres of the political systems and made them more dynamic (Eisenstadt 1987:6–7). As the masses became integrated into the political system the myth grew up of the equality of "one man, one vote, one value."

While modern party systems evolved more or less continuously towards such a market-shaped form of politics, patrimonialist ones lagged behind in creating an open political regime. The construction of parties and party systems followed this rationality of power organization, which was subsequently controlled by huge electoral machines which (re) produced what Gaetano Mosca characterized as the "ruling class."

There are many definitions of patrimonialism and patrimonial forms of rule, but the one by Lemarchand and Legg most clearly brings to the fore that which will be discussed in this chapter:

Table 13.1 Overview of countries with continuous or non-continuous democracies

Continuous democracies	*Non-democratic periods in democratic countries*
Belgium	Austria (1933–45)
Denmark	*Bulgaria* (1923–32; 1935–44;1947–91)
Finland	Czechoslovakia (1939–45; 1948–90)
Great Britain	East Germany (1933–46; 1967 74)
Holland	France (1940–5)
Iceland	*Greece* (1936–46; 1967–74)
Ireland	Hungary (1920–45; 1947–89)
Luxembourg	*Italy* (1924–43)
Norway	Poland (1926–45; 1947–89)
Sweden	*Portugal* (1926–47)
Switzerland	*Romania* (1938–45; 1946–90)
	Spain (1923–30; 1936–76)
	Yugoslavia (1929–45; 1945–90)

Note: Southern European countries are in italic.
Source: G. Sapelli 1995:123.

> Patrimonialism has two possible forms. In one, the traditionalistic variant, the patron-client relationship permeates the entire political system… In the second, the modernizing patrimonial system, the greater rate and extent of social mobilization lead to potential discontinuities in the set of patron—client relationships, not only between different levels of governmental authority but between different sectors as well… Despite the growing differentiation of the social, economic, and political spheres, the expansion of bureaucratic structures, the emphasis on welfare values and secularization—all reflective responses to social mobilisation—social change at the mass level tends to lag far behind the structural changes' effect at the center. Thus, in its actual operation, the system constantly tends to swing back into the clientelistic mold of its predecessor. The result is a hybrid situation in which clientelism resuscitates itself in the traditionalistic interstices of the modernising party.
>
> (Lemarchand and Legg 1972:166–7)

The transition from traditional patrimonial to modern patrimonial politics is not a feature unique to Southern European countries. Indeed, all major West European democracies underwent such a phase and still have "partial regimes" exhibiting those features. The distinctiveness of the Southern European cases is that such forms of modern patrimonial politics continue to persist until today. Luigi Graziano writes that in the Italian case the party of notables of the nineteenth century was replaced by political machines dominated by political entrepreneurs engaged in the buying of votes by distributing office and other material rewards. Consequently "the party becomes a bureaucratic, complex organization, even though the need for autonomy of the local politician-entrepreneur makes its supra-local coordination difficult" (Graziano 1975:31–2).

As Martin Shefter argues, patronage and clientelism also existed in the origins of the modern party systems in Germany, Britain, France and the United States. They had developed a modern autonomous state bureaucracy along rational and legal lines, before introducing universal suffrage to the population. The functional separation of state and interest intermediation structures made it possible to develop towards modern party systems. In the case of Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal this has only partially been achieved to date (Shefter 1977: 403–51; Silberman 1993). An overview of democracies with different degrees of continuity is given in Table 13.1.

Regime discontinuity and patrimonial party systems

While modern polities evolved only after the establishment of a culture of contract, in patrimonial societies both the economic rationale and the political model were imported from the first countries evolving towards a liberal democracy (Janos 1989). The late industrialization of patrimonial democracies is one of the causes of the uneven spreading of a contract culture, which is itself the main precondition of a development toward political economic behavior as well as regime change toward democratic leadership (Sapelli 1995:170–4).

Former oligarchical elites attempted to control the inclusion of the political masses into the political system by limiting and restricting the right to vote. This runs counter to the creation of a political market which would complete the economic arena. The weak market culture in Southern Europe is paralleled by a weak political market culture. Both seem to be controlled by oligarchies of power. The social integration of political groups is a major impediment to achieving a distinction between state and society. For instead of pluralism in the political market, there is then a tendency for centralization, that is, the control by a few parties of most social and political groups (Almond 1956:391–409). This trend toward a situation of "political syncretism" reflects other aspects of life in Southern Europe. The centralization of power and the control of society by a sophisticated system of clientelism contributed to the freezing of electoral cleavages in these countries. Neopatrimonialist arrangements informed a deviation from a modern party system, which is based on genuine political pluralism, political market rationality, equal access to the market following the principle "one man, one vote, one value," the clear distinction between state and civil society, and last but not least, the fact that different parties can hold power in turn (Palma 1978:11).

All these features of modern party systems were lacking in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, the societies we are dealing with in this chapter. Discontinuity, heterogeneity of social, political and economic rationalities, a fragmented political economy and the colonization of the state by certain groups seemed to be major features of patrimonial party systems. Furthermore, political syncretism and "bureaucratic" and "party" clientelism are essential elements of party systems in semiperipheral and peripheral societies that were subject to late industrialization processes (Mouzelis 1986).

The historical legacy: the electoral machines of the nineteenth century

In the nineteenth century the electoral market in Southern Europe was shaped and controlled by electoral machines which would continue to exist in a transformed form in the twentieth century. The control of electoral results by the dominant oligarchy undermined the development of a strong political market and the creation of modern parties in Southern Europe. Instead the patrimonial party tended to control political electoral outcomes by misusing the control over the governmental machinery. One can find examples in all four countries.

In Portugal *rotativismo* (alternance in power) was based on a nationally organized system of *caciquismo*. *Caciques* were influential local bosses (priests, lawyers and owners) who acted as intermediaries between the government and the local community. During *rotativismo* the *cacique* worked closely with the regional party representative to achieve the desired outcome in Lisbon. Normally, parties did not integrate *caciques* into their party lists; nevertheless there were exceptions to the rule. In exchange for votes, the *cacique* offered to influence the government in order to speed up the issuing of licenses, to achieve exemption from military service and even the construction of a road to the locality of the individual voters. The *cacique* was the intermediary between the literate culture of Lisbon and the illiterate one of the local communities (Sobral and Ameida 1982; Vidigal 1988). The electoral machine based on *caciquismo* began to be less viable in the early twentieth century. The Republican and the Socialist Parties were able to achieve representation in the Portuguese parliament at the turn of the century and they vehemently contested the legitimacy of the system of *rotativismo*. Such elements of an electoral machine would continue to persist during the First Republic (Lopes 1994) and the *Estado Novo* (Makler 1979:123–65). Political market behavior was thus thwarted until 1974.

Similarly to Portugal, in Spain the system of *canovismo* in the late nineteenth century based its stability on *caciquismo*. Prime Minister Canovas del Castillo transformed his ministry into a powerful coordinating institution of electoral processes in Spain. Between May and June 1875 about 8,000 to 10,000 new officials were co-opted at local level, replacing less dependable mayors (Kern 1974:27). Romero Robledo, the first Minister of Public Administration, established the electoral machine of the Restoration period, and it was adapted and made more efficient after his retreat. Votes were bought at elections. This system of coercion and corruption was called *romeroroblismo,* after its instigator (Kern 1974:33–4, 39).

Before elections the government negotiated a list of electoral candidates with local *caciques* with the mediation of civil governors. This list was called *encasillado,* a word derived from *encasillar,* which means "to put in a pigeonhole"; it is applied to each deputy or senator. In these negotiations even the main opposition leaders were involved. With the passing of time, the elaboration of the *encasillado* became more difficult, because new parties emerged and challenged the system. Elements of *caciquismo* and clientelism continued to persist in the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and of Franco; nevertheless the lack of genuine electoral procedures made the re-establishment of electoral machines

impossible. In Franco's Spain elections ensured that the system co-opted 'persons (mainly civil servants) who were loyal to the regime (Gomez 1976:3–5; Lara 1992:119–23).

In Italy, the so-called *post-risorgimento* period did not produce an alternative to the Liberal Party. The restricted electorate had no choice but to vote for the main party, which was divided into a left-wing and right-wing faction. After the *risorgimento* there was a lack of any big ideal. *Post-risorgimento* became known as a period of administering and creating the new Italian nation, and not to be compared to the *risorgimento* period when the idea of Italian unification was a catalyst in drawing people into political participation. Since 1876 the dominant figure of the left-wing faction, Depretis, developed a powerful clientelistic system which became known as *transformismo*. It was based on an alliance of the liberal class with the more powerful economic groups in the North and in the South. The liberal political class gave special access to the state to the industrialists in the North and landowners of the South and so was able to keep in power. Such a system became unmanageable in the early twentieth century, because the extension of the electorate made it more difficult for the political classes to control the outcome of elections. Therefore the new leader of the Liberal Party, Giovanni Giolitti, attempted to integrate the working classes into this system. But the enlargement of the electorate and the emergence of the Italian Socialist Party before, and the Italian People's Party after, the First World War, made it almost impossible to keep the system of *giolittismo/transformismo* in place. This became quite clear when Giolitti tried to appease the National Fascist Party by integrating them into the government (Hentze 1939:73–4). Although elections were not held in the Fascist period after 1925, elements of clientelism continued to persist and would reappear in a different form post-1945 under the leadership of *Democrazia Cristiana* (Christian Democracy—DC).

In Greece, the two-party system of the late nineteenth century was based on a well-organized electoral machine. Here the role of notables was quite essential. Clientelism was established around certain figures, who would allow better access to the state. In fact, clientelism goes back to the period when Greece was under Osman rule, and clientelistic practices were used by businessmen to gain special concessions from the Turkish rulers. Elements of such clientelistic practices persisted until 1967. The main characteristic of Greek politics was, and remains, the persistence of clientelism based on individual personalities (Clogg 1993:4–5).

The Italian party system: the persistence of political syncretism

The implosion of clientelism in post-war Italy (1974–92)

After the elections of 1948 universal suffrage became the basis of the Italian party system. The Cold War led to a reconstruction of political syncretism, democratic style (Leonardi and Wertman 1989; Zariski 1972). The DC became the dominant party; the second largest party, the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano,* PCI) remained excluded from the political system. This so-called *bipartismo imperfetto* (imperfect

bipolarism) as Giorgio Galli has called it, was based on a huge clientelistic electoral machinery. Back in the 1940s and 1950s intimidation and patronage were used to gain votes among the peasantry in the South, in which the involvement of the Mafia became well known. In the early phases of the Italian party system elections came about partly through clientelistic arrangements (Gilbert 1995:36–9; Lewis 1964:138–9).

The transformation of the PCI from a rigid to a more flexible party structure in the 1960s and 1970s made it possible for it to challenge the dominance of the DC. De Gasperi's, and later on, Moro's electoral machine became less efficient in the 1960s and 1970s. The electoral gap between the two parties closed up considerably during this period, which contributed to a change in perception of the parties in relation to each other. Moreover the Cold War period was steadily replaced by an age of *détente* and peaceful coexistence. Although Communist containment continued to be a priority during the Nixon period, the PCI had become an integral part of the Italian political scene. The introduction of regional elections and subsequently of regional governments gave the Communists another chance to be influential; they were strong in Emilia-Romagna, Umbria and Tuscany (Pridham 1985). The drawing together of Aldo Moro and Enrico Berlinguer and the move towards the *compromesso storico* (the Historical Compromise) almost integrated the PCI into the national political system. However, the assassination of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978 would prevent total *rapprochement*.

The Historical Compromise began a new era in which anti-system parties began to be integrated, nevertheless the dimension of the para-state is the main obstacle to a genuine alternating of power within the party system in the Italian case (Ferraresi 1993; Willan 1991). The sudden death of Enrico Berlinguer on 11 June 1984 marked the moment when the PCI became an integral part of Italian politics, having lost its post-war anti-systemic nature. As Leonardo Morlino emphasizes, the final inclusion of anti-systemic parties into the political system was achieved after the integration of the Italian Social Movement and the National Alliance (*Movimento Sociale Italiano* and *Alleanza Nazionale,* MSI/AN) in 1994, into the coalition government with *Forza Italia* (FI) and the *Lega Nord* (LN) (Morlino 1996a: 5–10). In the 1980s, the gap between the DC and PCI widened again. By this time, the electorate became aware of the difficulty of bringing both DC and PCI into a broader coalition, because of the dimension of the para-state and because their ideologies were diametrically opposed. The re-emergence of the PSI in the 1980s was quite crucial, because it became the dominant party in the coalition with the DC and other smaller parties. The period of National Solidarity *(Solidarietá Nazionale)* and later on of *pentapartiti* government introduced new constellations into the political system and further eroded the hegemony of the DC. The political center thus became more pluralistic and less dominated by the DC.

The realignment of voters in the 1980s was not only an Italian phenomenon. It could be observed in almost all European countries. The fragmentation of the vote is related to social changes, the so-called process of "changing classes" defined by Gøsta Esping-Andersen. The new information society based its structure on the control and dissemination of information. While Northern Italy seemed to adapt well to the changes and searched for a possible electoral alternatives, Southern Italy continued to stick by the

previous choices. Party system change was partly initiated in the 1980s by the social pressures imposed by globalization of information exchange (Esping-Andersen 1993).

The crisis of the DC was not a new phenomenon in the early 1990s; it had its roots in 1980s when the clientelistic machinery was finding it difficult to adapt to new social realities, because of the growing disfunctionalities in its informal political economy. The DC system was based on a multi-level system of clientelism and corruption. The link with the Mafia, at least in Sicily in the person of Salvo Lima, was shattered by the growing self-confidence of the judiciary system in the face of the Mafia. A more self-confident civil society, opposed to the Mafia, and a new generation of judges began to attack some informal regimes within the political economy (Sabetti 1989). The inclusion of the PSI into the government further destabilized the monopoly of the DC. Now other actors began to take part in the whole system of clientelism and patronage. The decline of *partitocrazia* in the late 1980s and early 1990s was related to the growing suspicion that the political class was involved in several political scandals. Moreover, the call for a reform of the electoral law as a result of the growing fragmentation of the vote became a major issue (Guizzini 1994).

In the early 1990s Mario Segni's reform movement led to the adoption of new electoral laws to change the electoral procedure of both houses of the Italian parliament. The new electoral laws were partly based on a first-past-the-post system and partly on a system of proportional representation. The new system should assure the creation of stronger majorities for government formation. The reforms were completed in 1993.

The new Italian party system since 1992

Widespread bribery *(tangentopoli),* uncovered by the *mani pulite* operation initiated by the Milanese judge Antonio Di Pietro in 1992, brought down an entire political class (Donovan 1994; Sidoti 1993). A vacuum remained, one which had to be filled within a very short time. A new electoral system consisting of relative majority and a proportional representation system changed the conditions of the electoral market.

The two houses of parliament were elected by similar procedures, although there was a slight difference. The lower house *(camara di diputati),* consisting of 630 members, was elected in 26 regions. These were subdivided into districts. In the districts candidates were elected by a first-past-the post system. About 75 percent of members, that is, 475 of them, were elected in this way. The other 25 percent, 115 members, were elected in the regions by proportional representation. In the elections to the Chamber of Deputies voters could vote for one candidate in the district and for a different party at regional level. In the Senate, the upper house of the Italian parliament, 232 members were elected by a first-past-the-post system and 83 by proportional representation in one national electoral constituency. This new electoral system was adopted by the Italian parliament on 4 August 1993 (Bartolini and D'Alimonte 1995:915–16; Katz 1996:33–40).

The collapse of *partitocrazia,* the introduction of a new electoral law, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new parties considerably changed the nature of the electoral market. As Gianfranco Pasquino has put it, there was a renewed "transition to democracy." The new party system appeared after the elections of 26 and 27 March 1994

(Pasquino 1994:383–401). Some of the old parties had changed or disintegrated and new ones had formed, hoping to fill the vacuum left in the center of the party spectrum.

The former PCI, now renamed the Party of the Democratic Left (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra,* PDS), remained at the center. The steady decline of the share of the vote for the PCI from the end of the 1970s had created pressures inside the party to change its image. The discussion on reform was conducted throughout the 1980s, and became quite urgent after 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major impetus to reform, and it changed its name when under the leadership of Acchille Occhetto. Nevertheless, internal dissent over strategy continued to prevail. At the same time that the new party was founded in January 1991 (Bull 1994) a splinter group decided to leave and found the Communist Refoundation (*Rifondazione Comunista,* RC). Ideologically this splinter group continued to advocate the need to preserve the Communist identity of the party. It occupied the electoral space previously held by Proletarian Democracy (*Democrazia Proletaria,* DP) (Foot 1995:174–8).

An innovation in Italian politics was the rise of the *Lega Nord,* which was composed of several northern leagues such as the *Lega Lombarda* and *Lega Veneto.* The party organization resembled a movement. Its strategy was to address northern sentiments against the "southernization" of bureaucracy. The main stream of the *Lega* advocated independence from the Italian state. Other currents were more interested in institutionalizing a federalist constitution in Italy. The notion of building up a federation of three macro-regions in the North, Center and South was put forward (Woods 1995).

In the center the DC broke down into several groups. Its continuity, however, is ensured by the Italian People's Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano,* PPI), founded in January 1994. Some members of the DC became members of the right-wing National Alliance (*Alleanza Nazionale,* AN), others founded the Christian Democratic Center (*Centro Cristiano Democratico,* CCD). Others became members of the Social Christians or the well-known group *La Rete* (Network) close to the PDS. A few became members of the new *Forza Italia* (Go Italy!, FI). The former parties of the Center Coalition, PRI, PLI and PSI, disintegrated and joined new tiny alliances or parties (Morlino 1996a: 9).

The inclusion of the MSI/AN in the new political system has quite changed the nature of politics in Italy. Under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini the new party endeavored to present itself as democratic. Small extremist groups remained in the party, nevertheless Fini prevented the isolation of the AN from the center of Italian politics. His ability to compromise was an important factor in the including of AN in the political system (Ruzza and Schmidtke 1995).

The new business/party of Silvio Berlusconi, *Forza Italia,* became the most original party of the 1990s. The plans for a new party were laid down in the second half of 1993, and the organization was set up in late January to March 1994. In a few days, 13,000–14,000 clubs all over Italy with an average of 80 people per club were founded. The growth of the new party followed the marketing practices of the football world. Moreover, it included elements of a rotary club. The party was highly publicized on television. Silvio Berlusconi's firm, *Fininvest,* used an advertising company called *Publitalia* to ensure his victory (Morlino 1996a: 16–17).

Prior to the elections several alliances were formed to contest them. Three main groups appeared: the freedom/good government axis, the Progressive Alliance and the Pact for Italy. In the end, the freedom/good government axis consisting of FI-AN and LN and other smaller parties such as the CCD won the elections. The Progressive Alliance came second.

The electoral results of March 1994 brought to the fore a different electoral geography. Studies by Morlino and by Bartolini and D'Alimonte show that voting has become territorial and less national. Parties are strong in certain territories, less so in others. The electoral results produced three different electoral territorial constellations. In the North, the *Lega* and *Forza Italia* have their strongholds, and the AN is less important. The alliance "Pole of Freedom" *(Polo della Libertá)* was tailored for an electorate in the North.

In the Center, the PDS continued to control the share of the electorate inherited from the PCI. Here, the progressive alliance became the major political force, despite being challenged by FI. In the South, FI is the dominant party and is the dominant party of the *Polo del Buon Governo* ("Pole of Good Government").

Another factor affecting the final outcome was the introduction of the new electoral system. According to Stefano Bartolini and Roberto D'Alimonte the *Polo della Libertá* and the *Polo del Buon Governo* succeeded in obtaining better results in the elections than the left-wing parties. It has been suggested that this is because voting for the left is less oriented towards personalities, but it has more of an ideological nature (Bartolini and D'Alimonte 1995). If this is so, the new Italian electoral geography may be of a provisional nature. The habituation to the new rules of the game by the electorate and the parties may cause problems for the consolidation of the new party system. On the whole, the increasing flexibility of the social structure is putting the Italian parties under pressure to gain control over segments of the electorate in the electoral market. Berlusconi's business/party caused a radicalization of the ongoing marketization of politics and a transformation of the means for cleavage-building. The parties' construction of alternatives through mass media, advertising and other forms of influence are leading to the final demise of the membership party. Former huge party machineries are being replaced by parties with lighter structures, as the case of the PDS clearly shows (Morlino 1996a: 24). It is too soon to predict whether one can speak of a consolidated new Italian party system. The shadow of *tangentopoli* continues to dominate. The effort to rebuild the center, dominated for over forty years by the DC, will require a reformation of the party system, otherwise political instability will continue to be the fate of Italian politics.

The elections of 19 May 1996 seem to confirm the thesis that both left-wing and right-wing coalition groups are trying to occupy a center left vacant after the collapse of the DC and the PSI. The absolute majority victory of the *Ulivo* coalition, comprising the PDS, PPI, *Lista Dini,* the Greens, and supported by the *Rifondazione Comunista,* clearly shows the highly unstable electoral situation. *Ulivo* and *Rifondazione Comunista* won 319 seats in the Chamber of Deputies against the 246 seats of *Polo della Libertá* consisting of AN, *Forza Italia* and the *Centro Cristiano Democratico*. The *Lega Nord,* fielding candidates on its own, was able to gather 59 seats. Recent discussions inside the *Ulivo* coalition seem to show that PDS and PPI are each trying to build for themselves a stronger center party, which may lead to a more stable party landscape in the left-center or center-left ideological space (*La*

Stampa, July 1996). This may further destabilize the already highly unstable left-center coalition.

The genesis of party systems in the new democracies: Portugal, Spain and Greece

Students of the transformation of the Italian party system can draw some lessons from the new democracies of Portugal, Spain and Greece. All three countries moved from authoritarian dictatorships to democratic political regimes and all three were successful in this venture. Moreover, it became the starting point for a wave of democratization around the globe. This global move towards democratic forms of regime is quite astonishing, because it shows that a qualitative new era at the world system level is emerging. Democratization has become a major trend (Pateman 1996:5–12).

Here, the primacy of structuring first democracy and building up later democratic culture, as defined by Geoffrey Pridham, continues to be valid and important. What emerges is a kind of sociology of knowledge of democratization processes (Pridham 1984). In this respect, the genesis of party systems and parties is a fascinating task. It is fascinating, because after years, and in some cases decades of authoritarian dictatorships, discontinuity of democratic experiences and the lack of experience with a genuine political market, newly emerging parties have to learn to deal with the mainstream interpretation of democracy, of which the central element is the modern party system based on regular electoral competition. Past authoritarian cultural elements have to be replaced by more flexible forms of thinking. Such cultural transition from neopatrimonial values to more modern ones can only be accomplished over a long period of time.

Portugal: the persistence of Multipartidismo Imperfeito

The formation of a party system in Portugal was quite complex and difficult. It took over a year after the *coup d'état* of 25 April 1974 for elections to take place. The military elite Movement of the Armed Forces (*Movimento das Forcas Armadas,* MFA) was the main cause of delay for the election date. Different political models were presented during the revolutionary period; from the establishment of a people's democracy to that of a liberal democracy (Magone 1996b: 321–5). In this sense, the Portuguese transition was characterized by a high level of uncertainty. The new party leaders were not sure in which direction the political system would evolve. In early 1975, it seemed that the MFA was trying to impose on the country its own model of an alliance between the people and itself. The model would build up a kind of grass-roots democratic structure. The *coup d'état* on 11 March 1975 of General Spinola, who intended to reverse this process, led to a further radicalization of the military elite. The MFA forced the political parties to sign a pact in early April 1975 which would acknowledge the monitoring role of the military over the democratization process after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, no matter what the outcome of the elections (Eisfeld 1984).

The victory of Mário Soares, leader of the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista,* PS) and the second place of Francisco Sá Carneiro's People's Democratic Party (*Partido Popular*

Democratico, PPD) strengthened the moderate forces. The poor results of the Communist Party of 11.78 percent showed that the large majority of the population supported the moderate parties. The fourth party, the Social Democratic Center (*Centro Democratico Social,* CDS), with a Christian Democratic ideological program, contributed too to the strengthening of the moderate forces. The mobilization of international support for Portuguese democracy through the Socialist International was a major factor in stabilizing the democratic transition in Portugal.

After the intervention of Colonel Ramalho Eanes on 25 November 1975 the radicalization of the Portuguese transition came to a halt. The adoption of the constitution on 2 July 1976 completed the pre-constitutional period of Portuguese democracy. Further adjustments relating to the ideological content and institutional setting defined in the constitution had to be made in 1982 and 1989. The party system as such moved to a "four-party format" after 1976. The four main parties, PS, PSD, CDS and PCP continued to dominate politics in Portugal. In spite of smaller parties and the emergence of the Democratic Renewal Party in the October elections of 1985, the four-party format remained quite stable in the face of external challenges. Its main instability was its inter- and intra-block volatility. Aguiar therefore calls the Portuguese party system ultra-stable and fluid at the same time (Aguiar 1994). The four parties were able to increase their total share of the vote from around 89.6 percent in the 1970s to over 95 percent in the 1990s. This confirmed the ultra-stability of the party system. The two parties of the center, PS and PSD, seemed to be quite vulnerable to inter-block volatility, the right-wing CDS and left-wing PCP more to intra-block volatility.

This ultra-stability was challenged by the new Democratic Renewal Party (*Partido Renovador Democrático,* PRD) which was founded by outgoing president Ramalho Eanes in 1985. The party received 17.4 percent of the vote. Most of the voters came from the PS. The PRD occupied the ideological space between PS and PSD. Nevertheless, after two years the new party declined to just slightly over 4 percent. Most of the voters swung to the PSD, thus ensuring the first absolute majority in the young Portuguese democracy. Cavaco Silva's victory in 1987 was repeated in 1991. The volatility from the PRD to the PSD was a major contribution to the stabilization of the party system as well as the political system. The 1985 elections brought an end to the period of political and party system instability, which characterized the period between that year and 1976. It marked the completion of a cycle of political experiments at governmental level.

Between 1985 and 1995 the PSD became the ruling party, after 1987 with an absolute majority. It forced the main opposition party, the PS, to abandon ideological considerations and become more pragmatic and issue oriented. The programmatic differences between the two parties disappeared completely in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The moderate style of PS Secretary General Antonio Guterres was intended to present to the electorate an alternative government. Following the British model, the PS called itself a *governo de sombra* (shadow government). Electoral strategies were designed to achieve an absolute or a strong relative majority. The stepping down of the charismatic Anibal Cavaco Silva in 1995 was the long-awaited opportunity for Antonio Guterres to become Prime Minister. The changeover did not bring with it a change in the nature of the party system. Change has usually lain in the way the parties approach the electoral

market. More than ever, cleavages are constructed by the political parties around general programs. The main slogan in the 1995 elections was *PS—A Nova Maioria* (PS—The New Majority), which was put up against the old majority of the PSD. Antonio Guterres made this appeal to the electorate in order to give himself a new majority against the PSD government. Gentral to the campaign was the idea of fostering a strong civil society and a qualitative approach towards democratization (Cruz 1995).

Another surprise of the 1990s was the transformation of the CDS from a Christian-Democratic party to a populist party. The leader Manuel Monteiro decided to change the name of the party to People's Party (*Partido Popular,* PP) and to forge a more nationalist anti-Maastricht position. This led to the splintering off of several MPs and MEPs from the CDS. The party was even expelled from the European People's Party. Nevertheless, this party appealed to the social groups who did not profit from the European integration process, mainly farmers and fishermen (Magone 1996a: 150). Between 1992 and 1995 the CDS became a major force in Portuguese politics. The CDS-PP more than doubled the electoral share from 4.5 to 9.4 percent and trebled the numbers of MPs, from 5 to 15. Most of the voters came from the PSD.

In steady decline is the Communist Party. It continues to adhere to its orthodox Leninist identity. The dominant figure is naturally Alvaro Cunhal, although a new secretary-general, Carlos Carvalhas, was elected in 1992. The PCP did not change its structure or ideological frame after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–90.The share of the vote is now below 9 percent and was surpassed by that of the CDS-PP in the last elections. The membership is declining, because most of the members are old and the party has difficulties in recruiting new members (Patricio and Stoleroff 1995).

The Portuguese case may be characterized as a fragmented patrimonial political system. Until 1985 no party was able to achieve a stable long-term majority. Only after 1987 was the PSD, under the charismatic leadership of Anibal Cavaco Silva, able to gather an absolute majority. Between 1987 and 1995 Portugal experienced a period of political and economic stability. Nevertheless, during this period cases of corruption, clientelism and patronage came to the fore, which should steadily undermine the legitimacy of the governing party.

On the whole, the Portuguese party system continues to be ultra-stable. The main cause of instability is the fluidity between the main four parties. The transformation of the CDS-PP may lead in the long run to a transformation of the other parties. The PSD had difficulties in coping with the retirement of Anibal Cavaco Silva, and factionalism began to reappear during the presidency of Fernando Nogueira. Nevertheless, it seems that after a long period of instability the Portuguese party system was able to find its equilibrium (Aguiar 1994).

Spain: Bipartismo Imperfecto

Influenced by the Portuguese transition to democracy and the past experience of a violent and bloody civil war, Spanish political elites tried to negotiate a reform with the Francoist regime. These negotiations between old and new elites took over three years, when a new democratic constitution was approved. The result was a *ruptura pactada* (negotiated break

with the older system). The idea of a "transition through transaction," as it was characterized by Donald Share, was to be the most original element of Spanish transition (Share 1987). The cooperation between old and new elites would be reflected in the formation of the new party system. During transition the *Union de Centro Democratico* (Union of Democratic Center, UCD), founded by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, became the pivotal party. This coalition of several Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties, together with other supporters of the political reform was able to achieve a relative majority between 1977 and 1982. It was the party of transition, *par excellence,* and it had immense difficulties in consolidating its organizational structure. The different parties of the coalition continued to preserve their distinctive identity within it, thus preventing consolidation into a cohesive structure (Hopkin 1993). This transition party collapsed after 1982. Its voters swung partly to the new party that Adolfo Suarez now formed, the liberal Democratic Social Center (*Centro Democratico Social,* CDS) and partly to the conservative People's Coalition (*Coalicion Popular,* CP).

The Spanish Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Español,* PCE) under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo had become one of the major parties resisting the authoritarian dictatorship. The late legalization of the party in early February 1977 showed the resistance of the Francoist establishment to accepting the new reality. One of the ideological factions of the regime was based on fierce anti-Communism. However, the PCE was a very moderate party from the start, and worked closely with the other parties to achieve a constitutional settlement. The PCE was able to get 9.1 percent of the vote in 1977 and 10.5 percent in 1979, but declined afterwards to 3.9 percent in 1982. After 1986 it formed a coalition with other parties called the *Izquierda Unida* (United Left, IU). This new configuration was able to win 9 percent in 1989 and over 10 percent in the subsequent elections (Heywood 1994).

Back in 1977 the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español,* PSOE) became the second largest party. In the late 1960s and early 1970s it had increased its presence in Spain. The so-called Andalusians Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra re-established a clandestine organization in Spain. Such organization resources would become an important factor in the success of the party after 1977. The PSOE became the second largest party in 1977 and 1979, and a pivotal actor in the constitutional settlement process. Secretary-general Felipe Gonzalez transformed the party by breaking down its rigid commitment to ideological principles. The electoral strategy of *cambio* (change) in 1982 ensured an absolute majority which would be repeated in 1986 and 1989. The PSOE became the party of government. It attracted voters from all social groups and became a catch-all party. Its original working-class nature was replaced by a more flexible image. Until 1979, the PSOE represented cleavages that had remained frozen since the establishment of the Second Republic. Afterwards it increased its share of the vote by penetrating other social groups. Ideologically, the PSOE shifted from a social democratic to a social liberal stand. James Petras even characterized the ideology of the PSOE as patrimonial socialism, meaning that the socialist political class had become closely linked to the financial establishment (Petras 1993).

On the right, there was no alternative. After the collapse of the UCD, the People's Alliance (*Alianza Popular,* AP) would become the dominant party on the right.

Nevertheless, its links with the past were a major obstacle to presenting itself as an alternative to the left. On the contrary, its ambivalence to the regionalization process in Spain and several aspects of secularization, such as the abortion issue, served further to strengthen the PSOE. Only in the late 1980s, did it begin to change its image. In the elections of 1986 it tried to promote a more catch-all party image, but had difficulties in influencing the electorate beyond its traditional voters. A breakthrough came in the elections of 1989. A new leader, José Maria Aznar, emerged who created a rejuvenated image of the party, renaming it (again) the People's Party (*Partido Popular,* PP) (Nieto 1988). The growing discontentment with the PSOE, arising from corruption and patronage scandals, increased the probability of the PP replacing the PSOE in power. In 1993, the PSOE won the elections with a strong relative majority, but the PP was able to close the gap between them. It won votes in Catalonia and the Basque country, which are traditionally strongholds of a socialist party (Lancaster 1994).

Between 1993 and 1996 José Maria Aznar made the PP appear more flexible. Ideologically, it became more of a catch-all party. It has now moderated its interest in regional questions and shaped its ideological framework round liberalization of the economy. Since 1994 the PP was able to win the European elections (l0 June 1994) and the local and regional elections (March 1995). The support for the PSOE has meanwhile decreased since 1994, owing to the Anti-Terrorist Groups of Liberation (*Grupos Anti-terroristas de Liberacion,* GAL) which were used against the ETA-military, killing family members of alleged Basque separatists.

Felipe Gonzalez declined in credibility during this period. Other cases of corruption continued to be shown to be connected with the government. This so-called "patrimonial socialism," which tended to use clientelistic methods to remain in power, has been a major feature of the Spanish party system. PP became the only force able to form a strong relative majority and to look able to become an alternative to the PSOE. However, corruption also was too widespread among the leaders of PP Cases of corrupt dealings between the PP and local government were reported in Valencia and the regional government in the Baleares (Heywood 1995:110–14).

The elections of 3 March 1996 seemed to transmit this message. The popula tion was discontented with Felipismo, but it did not see in the PP an alternative. On the contrary, the results confirm that the PSOE continues to be the dominant Spanish party. Nevertheless, the so-called *bipartismo imperfecto* seems to have been overcome for now. Although the PP was able to gain a relative majority of 38.85 percent and 156 seats in the Chamber of Deputies *(Camara de Deputados),* the PSOE remained a close second, losing only 1 percent of the vote between 1993 and 1996. It achieved 37.48 percent of the vote and 141 seats. The third major force in the country continues to be the Communist-led IU coalition, which was able to improve from 9.6 percent and 18 seats in 1993 to 10.58 percent of the vote and 21 seats in 1996. Nevertheless, the IU leaders were not content with the results, owing to the fact that they hoped the people who were disappointed with the PSOE would cast their vote for IU. The fourth largest party is the Catalan regionalist-nationalist party Convergence and Union (*Convergencia I Unió,* CiU), which declined slightly, keeping nonetheless 4.61 percent of the vote and 16 seats. After more than a month of negotiations José Maria Aznar, leader of the PP, was able to achieve a coalition

agreement with the CiU in early May 1996. This represents a major turning point in the Spanish party system, because the PP accepted that it had to concede more autonomy and participation in national decision-making to the regionalist parties; it thereby confirmed the trend of having a stronger presence of the regions in national decision-making, which had started with the PSOE-CiU coalition government between 1993 and 1995 (*El Pais,* 4 March 1996).

The two main parties, PP and PSOE, are constructing their cleavages through the electoral process. As Mariano Torcal and Pradeep Chhiber say, the main variable defining the PSOE electorate is profession; in particular, wage earners tend to vote for the socialists, while PP is closer to a catch-all party. Because of this, the weak civil society is more susceptible to the heavy marketing of policies by political parties at elections (Torcal and Chhiber 1995:132–3).

To the institutionalizing and consolidating of democracy must be added a further element. The regional party systems play a role at national level too; different regional parties have representation at national level. This impact of the so-called electoral Spains *(Españas electorales)* should not be underestimated. The best example is the growing importance of the CiU in contributing to the governability of Spain (Cotarelo 1993:369–71).

In spite of a basis of proportional representation, the Spanish party system is quite stable. Anti-system parties are almost non-existent at national level, apart from *Herri Batasuna,* the political arm of the ETA. On the whole, party system change in Spain is increasingly related to the nature of the electoral market. The growing marketization and conscious cleavage-building make the parties less dependent on the electorate. Electoral strategies have become central to achieving a majority government. In sum, Spain's party system has become more flexible, less ideological, and parties conceptualize politics more in marketing terms.

Greece: the persistence of party clientelism

The transition to democracy in Greece was very fast. It took one year for Greece to have a new constitution. The major factor was the return of Constantinos Caramanlis from exile in July 1974 and his ability to prepare the transition to democracy. His first move was to organize elections in November 1974. The historical background of Caramanlis' party New Democracy (*Nea Dimokratia,* ND) gave stability to the whole democratic process. His supporters were notables, but he nevertheless attempted to build up a modern mass party. Being a charismatic leader, Caramanlis dominated the ND. In the elections of 1977, his party's share of the vote declined, but it was strong enough to keep its absolute majority. This was essential for Caramanlis, who wanted to lead Greece to EC membership (Loulis 1981:67). This was to be his strategy to consolidate democracy. The referendum on the form of the political organization was also quite important. The majority voted for a republic. The emerging party system consisted of the conservative center party ND, a party of the center—EDIK, the socialist PASOK and the two Communist parties, the euro-Communist KKE and the Stalinist KKE-es (Psomiades 1982).

After Caramanlis became president of the republic in 1980, ND lost the subsequent elections. This period witnessed the rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) which had come third in the elections of 1974 and achieved a hegemonic position in the Greek party system after 1981. Between 1974 and 1981 the third political force was the EK-ND which occupied the ideological space of the Center Union, Giorgios Papandreou's party of the 1960s. Nevertheless the EK-ND declined from second to the third largest political force between 1974 and 1977 and disappeared completely in 1981. Indeed, between 1974 and 1981 PASOK established its hegemony and inherited the votes of the EK-ND.

PASOK was a very radical party, which found its counterparts in Third World movement parties. It was against Greece's integration into the European Community and called for a Greek route to socialism. It emphasized the need to keep complete independence from any military alliances. This verbal radicalism would become more moderate after the elections of 1981. Although in the first legislature PASOK attempted to implement redistributive Keynesian policies for demand creation in the Greek market, by 1983–4 the government had enormous difficulties in keeping public spending under control. It had to implement austerity policies to control the huge public debt (Spourdalakis 1988). Nevertheless, in 1985 PASOK developed a more sophisticated form of clientelism than before the authoritarian dictatorship. Different Greek authors seem to point to the phenomenon of bureaucratic clientelism, "party clientelism" or "mass clientelism" during PASOK's government. The distribution of public administration jobs shortly before elections became widespread in the elections of 1986 and 1989 (Clogg 1993).

During PASOK's second legislature several scandals over the misuse of power were revealed. PASOK tried to minimize the expected loss in the elections of 1989 by changing the electoral law. It introduced a reinforced proportional electoral system which favored the larger parties even more. In the end, the ND was able to win the elections but it did not have a large enough majority to form a government. It decided to form a coalition with the "Communist coalition" *(Synaspismos),* so that parliament could make inquiries about PASOK's misuse of power. After four months new elections were held, in June 1989. The same configuration of a weak ND majority came to the fore. Only one year later the impasse was solved in favor of ND (Pridham and Verney 1991). Nevertheless, in October 1993 PASOK came back to power with an absolute majority, highlighting the fact that PASOK is well entrenched in the Greek party system. It seems to be an hegemonic party. Although for a long time it had the image of a "charismatic party," recent developments show that the party is able to manage well without the dominating figure Andreas Papandreou. On the whole, Greece's party system may be characterized as a "quasi-perfect bipartyism." It is too early to judge whether we will witness a radical party system change in the second half of the 1990s. In terms of voter fragmentation, the two parties were able to control an electoral share of 70–80 percent.

The recent death of Andreas Papandreou and the emergence of the moderate Costas Simitis as the new leader of PASOK may introduce a new style in Greek politics. Until now, as Calliope Spanou says, the state structure has been used by the two main parties as

a means to remain in power, rather than to transform Greek society towards a rational and legal culture (Spanou 1996).

Conclusions

In this chapter I have assessed the logics of party system change in four Southern European countries. For this purpose it was necessary to go back in history and delineate the development of electoral politics since the nineteenth century. This long-term approach highlights the fact that party system change in Southern Europe was characterized by political and party system discontinuity. Democratic experiments were often interrupted by authoritarian ones. Such discontinuous development of modern parties and party systems in Southern Europe was related to the fragmented nature of the political economy as well as the incipient dissemination of a rational-legal contract culture among the population. This was reinforced by illiteracy and a low level of urbanization.

The development towards a genuine political market, based on "universal, equal and secret suffrage" for the whole adult population was only completed after the Second World War, and in the case of Portugal only after the revolution of 1974–5.

All four societies comprised elements of traditional forms of representation, developed before the establishment of universal suffrage, as well as modern ones. This *mixtum compositum* can be found in all four countries. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that the party and political systems of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece have to be characterized as patrimonial, meaning above all that they did not achieve a complete breakthrough towards a genuine political market based on rational-legal conditions and a genuine "one person, one vote, one value" situation. Instead, parties tended to establish linkages between the state structure and civil society to perpetuate their hold on power. The primary aim was not to change society, but to serve best their clienteles (as in Italy before 1992).

Although patrimonialism can be identified in all four countries, it has to be acknowledged that "similar" doesn't mean the same. At least three forms of patrimonial party system can be recognized, which may be partly explained by the previous historical context and partly by the context in which they emerged after the authoritarian regimes.

The Italian patrimonial pattern seems to show that parties tend to build a strong party in the center (normally a coalition of different interests) to gain access to the state structures and to keep in power; this tendency is due to the construction of an extensive clientelistic and patronage network which permeates civil society, the public sector and the private economy. During almost fifty years of such a patrimonial organization of politics, pathological political phenomena became part of the socialized cultural setting. The transformation of this center since the foundation of Italy leads Giuseppe di Palma to call it "political syncretism." Such a phenomenon can be found in *transformismo, giolittismo,* Fascism and in the period of polarized pluralism when the DC was the dominant party. The collapse of the DC after 1992 created a vacuum which parties on the left and the right have been trying to occupy since 1994. To date, neither the right-wing block dominated by FI and AN, nor the left with PDS and PPI at its center have been able to occupy this position. Moreover, the Europeanization of the Italian political system will put severe

constraints on the (re)construction of a clientelistic network. On the contrary, the decrease of available resources for distribution may be a factor in making the political structures more efficient and less vulnerable to particularistic interests.

The polarized patrimonial pattern can be found in both Spain and Greece. The political system is dominated by two main parties. In the case of Spain, the PSOE shaped the political system between 1982 and 1996. In these fourteen years, it was able to colonize the state structures and use its resources to create electoral victories. The historical tradition of *romeroroblismo* reappeared in the 1980s and 1990s in a transformed form. The victory of the PP in the last elections was not convincing enough to say that José Maria Aznar will be able in the long term to achieve an absolute majority similar to that held by the PSOE in the 1980s. In Greece, the dominance of Andreas Papandreou between 1981 and 1995 shows that charismatic figures still continue to be the main factor of attraction during elections. The death of Papandreou and other old political leaders belonging to the traditional Greek political families and the emergence of a moderate leader at the top of the PASOK may introduce a change of approach towards politics.

Last, but not least, a fragmented pattern of patrimonial representation can be found in Portugal. Although the PSD was able to gain two absolute majorities in 1987 and 1991, this was due to the charismatic appeal of the leader Anibal Cavaco Silva. After his decision to step down as Prime Minister and party leader in 1995, the PSD returned to its normal size, of between 29 and 34 percent of the vote. The Portuguese party system is a four-party system. A stable patrimonial party system was never established. Nevertheless clientage linkages pervaded the political system in the 1970s and 1980s. These were not related directly to the party in power, but aimed, through personal contacts or other strategies, to obtain access to power. During the PSD government some criticisms were voiced against the colonization of the state by the governing party. The so-called "orange state" was compared with the former single party UN/ANP of the authoritarian regime.

In sum, the logics of party system change in Southern Europe was characterized by patrimonial patterns of political representation. Such patterns belong neither to forms of political representation common in traditional societies nor to fully developed modern party systems. They are in-between forms of representation. Nevertheless, they are products of modernity and are, as such, embedded in the overall self-sustaining and interdependent party system change which has been developing in Europe since the early sixteenth century.

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Paul Pennings, Svanur Kristjánsson, Françoise Boucek, Reuven Hazan, Attila Ágh, James Newell, Anne Bennett and Michael Waller for useful comments during the ECPR workshop in Oslo. I am especially grateful to the excellent editorial comments and suggestions of Mick Wilkinson.

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