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Surviving in Violent Conflicts

Chinese Interpreters in the Second Sino-Japanese War 1931-1945

Ting Guo

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Palgrave Studies in Languages at War
ISBN 978-1-137-46118-6 ISBN 978-1-137-46119-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016950061

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London

Acknowledgements

I would like to first thank University of Exeter for granting me six months study leave to complete this book. Aston University is also gratefully acknowledged for a three-year scholarship to work on the project and travel grants for my two field trips to China in 2007 and 2008. I am especially grateful to the series editors, Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly, who have supported me throughout the writing of this book. Elizabeth Forrest and Chloe Fitzsimmons at Palgrave Macmillan have also provided me with a lot of advice and encouragement. I also want to thank my husband, Jonathan Evans, for his careful reading of this book and looking after our young daughter while I was writing this book. Thanks also to Julia Calnan Angelica, who read the earlier form of some chapters and gave me useful feedback.

I owe a great deal to a number of people who extended support and help to me throughout this project: Christina Schäffner, Edwin Gentzler, Leo Tak-hung Chan, Miriam Shlesinger, Franz Pöchhacker and Andrew Chesterman. I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to Kate Sturge, who supervised the PhD that this book is based on. Without her support and guidance, this book might well have never reached fruition. Her encouraging comments and insightful feedback have greatly helped me explore new things and present this book to the best of my abilities.

Special gratitude is also extended to Yan Jiarui, who not only generously shared his experience as a trained military interpreter but also

provided me with invaluable sources of information for my research, including a copy of his military interpreter training textbook.

Some of the book has been published in slightly different versions in the following publications:

Chapter One is derived, in part, from an article, "譯員職業化與譯員培訓 -抗戰時期國民政府對軍事譯員喜培。訓與管理的個案研究" (Professionalism in conflicts: China's training of military interpreters during the second Sino-Japanese War [1931–45]), published in *Translation Quarterly*, 2012, no. 65, 31–60.

Chapter Four is derived, in part, from an article, "Interpreting for the Enemy: Chinese Interpreters in the Second Sino-Japanese War [1931–45]", published in *Translation Studies* on February 11, 2014, available online at http://wwww.tandfonline.com/ [DOI: 10.1080/14781700.2014.881302].

I am grateful to the editors of these journals for permission to include parts of these two earlier pieces, although both of them were rewritten and expanded at the time this book was written.

This book is dedicated to my parents, Guo Zhaohe and Wu Kaigui.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

BMA	Beijing Municipal Archive
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CMA	Chongqing Municipal Archive
CMC	Central Military Commission
CPSU	The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CUTEM	The Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow
FAB	[the KMT's] Foreign Affairs Bureau
FAO	[the CCP's] Foreign Affairs Office
HPA	Hunan Provincial Archive
IMTFE	International Military Tribunal for the Far East
KMT	The Kuomintang Party
MSYU	The Moscow Sun Yatsen University
NHA	National Historical Archive of China
NHAT	National Historical Archive, Taipei
NMA	Nanjing Municipal Archive
QMA	Qingdao Municipal Archive
SMA	Shanghai Municipal Archive
USNA	US National Archive

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Introduction

In *Devils on the Doorstep*, a Chinese war film set in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45), a Chinese interpreter, Dong Hancheng,[1] serves the Japanese forces but is captured together with a Japanese soldier by Chinese guerrillas and left in the custody of Chinese villagers for interrogation. The interpreter, knowing that the Japanese soldier's arrogance and his own collaboration with the Japanese forces will endanger his life, makes full use of his language abilities to mediate between the soldier and the Chinese villagers and to secretly pass a call for help to the Japanese troops stationed nearby. Despite a later clash between the Chinese villagers and the Japanese forces, the interpreter manages to survive the vicissitudes of the war. However, when the war comes to the end, the interpreter is accused as a traitor and publicly executed by Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops in front of both the Chinese and Japanese forces, as well as the Chinese public. The executioner says to him: "You have aided the enemy and tried to avoid punishment. This is the worst crime.

[1] The interpreter's name has specific connotations: the literal translation of *hancheng* 汉臣is "subject of the Han people [the Chinese people]", in contrast to the label *hanjian* (汉奸, the one who betrays the Han people) discussed later in this book.

T. Guo, *Surviving in Violent Conflicts*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3_1

Your hands are soaked with Chinese people's blood. Only executing you can dispel the masses' anger. Do you have anything to say?"[2]

Although fiction, this movie provides a glimpse into the important but little researched history of interpreting during the Second Sino-Japanese War. This conflict began in 1931 with a clash between China and Japan in North China, but because of internal competition between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government (also called the Nationalist or Republican government) as well as their respective allegiances to foreign powers during World War Two, it soon developed into an arena of national and international political and military powers (see the Appendix for a timeline[3]). More specifically, the CCP's growth threatened the KMT's political dominance and diverted its attention away from the Japanese forces in the north. Although this internal conflict halted temporarily in 1937 to form a united front against further Japanese expansion beyond their previously occupied Manchurian area (Ienaga 1978: 64), in terms of military operations, foreign policy, and control of geographical regions, the CCP and the KMT remained separate because of different political and ideological values. This separation inevitably led to the presence of two resistance powers representing China's interest against Japan.

The interpreter depicted in the movie is situated in the nexus of these national and international power relationships. Captured by Chinese communist guerillas, detained by Chinese villagers, saved by the Japanese forces, and executed by the Chinese Kuomintang troops, this fictional character becomes the focus of the complicated wartime power relationships, although what he cares about most is simple survival. This cinematic representation of interpreting and interpreters is not the focus of

[2] A translated transcript of the Chinese KMT government's sentencing of Dong Hancheng, the interpreter, to death in the film, *Devils on the Doorstep* (Jiang 2000). All translations used in this book are my own, unless otherwise specified.

[3] There may be some dispute over the starting date of this war given that the Chinese KMT government did not officially declare war with Japan until July 1937. This issue has been much discussed by Chinese historians, many of whom contend that the war began on September 18, 1931, when the Japanese forces provoked the Manchurian Incident in China. In light of my later discussion of interpreting in occupied North China, this book considers the war as encompassing everything from the September 18, 1931, incident to the Japanese surrender in the Chinese theatre during September 1945.

this book, but it does raise several interesting questions about the actual history of the period which this book addresses, for example: What kind of interpreting tasks were involved in this international war? Who were the interpreters? How did the war affect the interpreters' practices? Why were some interpreters targeted as traitors, and how did they respond to this accusation and its potentially extreme consequences?

There has been little research on the history of interpreting and Chinese interpreters in this period. As far as I am aware, only two Chinese scholars have addressed this topic: Yan Jiarui (2005) and Luo Tian (2008, 2011). Luo (2008) provides a brief history of the KMT government's recruitment of military interpreters and argues that these interpreters made significant contributions to Sino-American military cooperation during the war. With information collected from narratives and anecdotes about some individual interpreters, Luo (2011) specifically addresses the roles of Chinese military interpreters at the Burma Campaign during the war and provides some important information on these interpreters' engagement in the Chinese army's operation in the campaign. Yan, as a witness to the KMT's military interpreting training, has published extremely valuable information on this history, including the preface of an interpreter training textbook, *Forty English Lessons for Interpreting Officers* (1945), which is crucial to my research on the KMT's training of interpreters. However, apart from these two studies, interpreting during the Second Sino-Japanese War is an almost untouched field in translation studies, especially the interpreting that involved the Chinese communists and the Japanese forces. Moreover, there has been little theorization or conceptualization of interpreter training and practice in this specific war. Hence, this book aims to fill these two gaps by presenting a more complete picture of the wartime interpreting situation and conceptualizing these interpreters' various practices in this war using Bourdieu's sociological framework.

Before beginning the discussion, however, it is necessary to clearly define the term 'interpreter' as used here, especially given that during the Second Sino-Japanese War, individuals who conducted interpreting tasks were referred to differently in different contexts. Given the fact that the profession of interpreter did not become established anywhere until the end of World War Two, the distinction between translating and interpreting

remained unclear for both the Chinese authorities and the public during the war. For example, interpreters employed by the Chinese Kuomintang government were generally referred to as *fanyi guan* (翻译官, translation officers) or *yiyuan* (译员, translation staff).[4] However, the KMT correspondence in English with US forces in China clearly refer to *fanyi guan* or *yiyuan* as 'interpreters' and the KMT's 'translation staff training programs' (译员训练班 *yiyuan xunlianban*) as 'interpreter schools'. Therefore, these umbrella terms do not mean that interpreters were no different from the translators, who dealt mainly with texts. In fact, a majority of the KMT interpreters were military staff whose interpreting work was interspersed with translation work because of the army's hybrid linguistic needs and the sparse wartime resources. Nevertheless, interpreters in areas occupied by the Japanese forces were often referred as *tongyi* (通译, those who help smooth communication between others with different languages),[5] a word quite probably borrowed from the Japanese term for interpreter, 通訳 (Tsūyaku), given the Japanese influence at that time, rather than a reflection of the Chinese word *tongshi* (通事, 'interpreting clerk') used during the Jin Dynasty (1142–55) (Cheung 2006: 198). Despite these various Chinese source terms, this book consistently uses the term 'interpreter' to distinguish true interpreters from the wartime literary translators addressed in earlier studies (e.g., Zhou 1994; Yuan 2005; Cheng 2005).

1.1 Interpreters' Role and Agency in Wars

Despite a long history of linguists' use in both peace negotiations and military operations in international politics, interpreters' role and agency in wartime as a topic was not explicitly addressed until recently.

[4] Despite the similarity of the English translations of the two Chinese titles for interpreters, *fanyi guan* and *yiyuan*, they differ in terms of power and position. The word *guan* in *fanyi guan* implies that the interpreter is an officer with a military rank, while *yuan* in *yiyuan* is only a general reference to government or army staff, such as secretaries, typists, and other clerks.

[5] According to *Hanyu Da Cidian*《汉语大词典》 (A Dictionary of the Chinese Language) (2005), *tongyi* 通译means "互译两方语言使通晓" (to translate for two parties who do not understand each other). In *Kangxi Zidian*《康熙字典》 (the Kang Xi Dictionary) (2002), one definition of *tong* is "凡人往來交好曰通"(good communication and relationships among people).

One exception is the studies of interpreting in war tribunals such as the Nuremberg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) (Gaiba 1998; Shveitser 1999; Takeda 2007). As in court interpreting studies, however, most of this research is discourse analysis of simultaneous interpreting during the trials and examination of the structure of the interpreting system, including the selecting and monitoring of interpreters. More relevant to the study of wartime interpreters' role and agency are the historical studies of interpreters by scholars like Michael Cronin (2003/1997, 2006), Anthony Pym (1998), Jean Delisle and Judith Woodsworth (1995), and Ruth Roland (1982, 1999). In her book, *Interpreters as Diplomats: Diplomatic History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics* (1990), Roland offers a stimulating historical account of interpreters' multiple roles in diplomatic and political history based on diplomatic anecdotes, interpreters' diaries, memos of international political and military meetings and treaties, and governmental administrative records. As she notes, interpreters are a crucial source in military conquest and political negotiation and could have significant power in wartime due to their political or military affiliations (1999: 171). However, when they encounter both conflicting ideological and cultural inculcation and risk to their lives, it is quite possible for interpreters to "grossly abuse their power" rather than voluntarily abide by any professional codes (Roland 1999: 172).

Margareta Bowen, discussing the recruitment and usage of interpreters in colonial times and during the two world wars, argues that the use of interpreters is often associated with many problems (e.g., "loyalty, breaches of etiquette or ethics") because interpreting is a human activity and involves a "highly personal act of mediation between individuals, often with strong personalities" (1995: 273). These problems, however, in Michael Cronin's eyes are not "a problem" but "a strategy for survival" (1997: 394). For him, the issue central to interpreting events is the problem of control, which directly affects interpreter practices in society. He argues:

> [t]he role of interpreters throughout history has been crucially determined by the prevailing hierarchical constitution of power and their position in it. In this respect, if you or your people are seriously disadvantaged by the

> hierarchy, the most ethical position can be to be utterly "unfaithful" in interpreting in the name of another fidelity, a fidelity of resistance. This is not a "problem". It is a strategy for survival. (ibid.: 394)

This notion of "strategy for survival" captures and articulates interpreters' practical concerns in conflict situations and is further elaborated as "embodied agency" by Cronin (2006). As he emphasizes, interpreters, unlike translators, are visible to other agents and institutions, and thus are more vulnerable to any torture resulting from failed communication during interpreting (Cronin 2006: 78). Hence, for Cronin, this embodied agency not only means that interpreters can express their views through bodily actions like voice, intonation, gesture, and facial expression but also implies that the interpreters' bodies affect their practices because they are usually well aware of the consequences of their interpreting activities (ibid.).

Recently, translation and interpreting scholars have taken up the topic of translation and conflict, in particular translators' and interpreters' interventionist roles (for example, Baker 2006, 2010; Cronin 2006; Dragovic-Drouet 2007; Footitt and Kelly 2012a, b; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a, b, 2008; Jones and Askew 2014; Kelly and Baker 2012; Palmer 2007; Torikai 2009). Focusing on translators and interpreters who were involved in recent international political controversies (e.g., at the USA detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba) and armed conflicts (e.g., in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia), their research has shown that these interpreters, no matter whether they were locally recruited or received training before their deployment, perform duties far beyond merely interpreting. For example, on the basis of interviews with Western journalists working with local Iraqi interpreters since 2003, Jerry Palmer notes that local interpreters were used by these journalists as 'fixers' to perform a range of duties from arranging interviews, selecting interviewees (within limits), security assessment, and gaining access to a network of local contacts to secure protection for the journalists (2007: 18–23). This non-linguistic use of interpreters by Western journalists in Iraq was not unusual, according to Palmer, and their competence as fixers almost determines the success of their employment (ibid.). This fixer model is further enriched through research by Mila Drogovic-Drouet (2007) on translator and

interpreter practices after the dislocation of the federal state in 1991. Drogovic-Drouet shows that in the former Yugoslavia, a large number of liaison interpreters and assistant interpreters were hired from among local residents to work for the media, international organizations, NGOs, and peace-keeping forces. Many of them did not receive any training at all and played a role similar to that of Palmer's model of fixer. However, as she notes, local authorities chose a special kind of interpreter, the 'official translator', based on allegiance (Drogovic-Drouet 2007: 34–5). Thus, these liaison interpreters were not only linguistic mediators but also the extension of local powers in that, while interpreting, they were able to censor or amend information unfavorable to the government to maintain their positions. These scholars' research points out an important but often purposely diluted fact, that is, in wars interpreter agency is recognized and sometimes even constitutes an indispensible part of their roles.

In fact, as research from the recent Languages at War project (see Footitt and Kelly 2012a, b; Footitt and Tobia 2013; Jones and Askew 2014; Kelly and Baker 2012) reveals, it is not unusual at all for interpreters to actively engage in military tasks other than interpreting. For example, research by Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly (2012a) and Footitt and Simona Tobia (2013) show that, in World War Two, British military once used trained translators/interpreters in its intelligence activities based at Bletchley Park. Although their research does not provide many details of these interpreters' intelligence collecting and analyzing work, it challenges the assumption that interpreters with proper training will limit themselves to exclusive interpreting. As Michael Kelly and Catherine Baker (2012: 55) note, deployment of individuals with language expertise in warstime is essentially based on practical needs. Training is, therefore, only an effort attempted to prepare interpreters for their multiple roles in diverse situations. The multiple roles of interpreters mirror the "chaotic" nature of conflict, in which decisions are made rapidly on the basis of available resources. The combination of interpreting and other roles is no doubt challenging for individual interpreters but at the same time provides them with more capital (e.g., military rank, title and network), which could directly or indirectly protect them and even enhance their power. The interpreters examined in this book were embedded in different political and military structures during the war. Their roles were thus defined and shaped by these political and

military forces' interaction with each other as well as with their international alliances. Therefore, these interpreters' agency is not only relevant to their personal background, positions, and linguistic and social skills but also significantly affected by their roles in certain contexts in which they were based. This suggests that in order to better understand interpreters' role and agency in wars, it is important to jointly consider, as I do in this book, interpreters' diversified socio-cultural backgrounds and their interactions with different political powers in society.

1.2 Loyalty and Identity: Hanjian Interpreters in the War

In interpreting studies, the term 'identity' is frequently used in close association with restrictive ethical rules and prescriptive interpreter roles: strict adherence to original linguistic features, an unobtrusive presence, and an impartial, neutral position. Without clarifying what kind of identity interpreters may take, all these rules seem to take precedence in both interpreter training and professional practice. This emphasis on neutrality and impartiality distances interpreters from the issue of identity and sometimes helps them obtain trust from their clients. However, at the same time it also dilutes the issue of interpreter identity and ignores interpreters as biological and social beings. In situations with conflicted interests such as wars, there is no room for ambivalent or ambiguous identity, particularly for people such as interpreters who have to deal with two sides with conflicted interests. However, to clarify interpreter identity is not as simple as one might think. Because one's identity in war situations, as Mona Baker (2010: 200) points out, has nothing to do with his or her actions or beliefs but is "almost completely constructed and enforced by other actors, and once constructed to suit the exigencies of war". No matter how good they are in distancing themselves from other parties involved in the conflicts, interpreters often still encounter suspicion by their clients. They are accused of being treacherous by "their own people" if they work for "the enemy" rather than "their own country", which they are perceived to belong to. For example, according to Takeda (2007: 94), during World War Two and in the IMTFE, the US forces recruited

many *nisei* linguists (second generation of Japanese-born immigrants), who took on important responsibilities such as translating captured documents, interrogating Japanese prisoners, and supporting propaganda activities. However, all Japanese Americans were initially evaluated and classified as 4–F (physically, mentally, or morally unfit for military service) and later as 4–C (enemy aliens, not acceptable for military service because of nationality or ancestry) (ibid.: 94). Therefore, despite their American nationality, the *nisei* linguists had to face prejudice and suspicion because of their ethnic origin (ibid.: 97–8). This blurring of political loyalty and identity results in irresolvable contradictions that many interpreters have to deal with and reinforces the old adage, *traduttore, traditore*. If interpreters are faithful to their tasks, they are often considered unfaithful to their origin at the same time (Rafael 2007: 245). This probably explains why identity is a thorny topic for both researchers and professional interpreters and why many Iraq interpreters chose to wear masks to hide their identity while they were serving the US forces in the 2002 Iraq War.

In the Second-Sino Japanese War, Chinese interpreters working for the Japanese forces encountered similar difficult situations. No matter what kind of roles that they played in the war, they were labeled undistinguishedly as *hanjian* 汉奸 (see Chap. 4 for further details on the wartime application of this term). The term *hanjian* literally means "the evil doers among the Chinese", but in reality, it is always used to refer to those who betray China. Its coverage was very wide before the Opium Wars in the nineteenth century and could include anyone who was involved with foreigners (e.g., worked for them, fraternized with them and learned their languages) (Waley 1958: 222). The series of failures that China encountered in the Opium Wars further reinforced Chinese authorities' suspicion and aversion towards those who served foreigners, including interpreters. Lawrence Wong Wang-chi (2007) provides an interesting example of *hanjian* interpreters during the Opium Wars: an interpreter called Bao Peng, who was one of the chief interpreters for the Chinese officials during the first Opium War (1839–1842) and was accused by some officials of being a *hanjian* and secretly working for the British. However, although Bao did not seem to enjoy a good reputation and was recognized by both the Chinese and the English as a "shrewd, unreliable

[…], thoroughly disreputable [… but] very sociable figure", there is no evidence to prove that despite his undignified behavior, Bao was unlikely to be a real spy for the English during the war (ibid.: 51–4). Therefore, the label itself is in fact a moral condemnation of one's physical or psychological closeness to foreign invaders. However, this wide application of the *hanjian* label to any Chinese with connections to foreigners who had conflicting interests with China does show that during wartime the key component of one's identity is his or her national identity, which has little room for negotiations. Interpreters' "impartial, neutral" role precisely violates their national identity, Given the ruthless oppression and persecutions that *hanjian* usually received when wars came to an end, labeling Chinese collaborating interpreters as *hanjian* is in fact a permanent demarcation of them from other Chinese people and serves to deter those who might follow suit.

Therefore, identity is indeed a useful notion for capturing and analyzing the tension and pressure that interpreters have to face in the real social world. However, given the difficulty of conducting a psychological analysis in a historical project and finding out how the interpreters identify themselves, analysis in this book focuses on the interpreters' real-world actions and adopts the sense of identity advocated by Bourdieu—agents' socially formed perception and tacit self-representation. It therefore highlights the interpreters' self-identification and their practical strategies that result from the conflicting national interests during wartime. It is important to point out that Bourdieu talks little about the issue of identity. In fact, identity is probably a term from which he tries to distance himself because it implies agents' conscious identification and an immutable social classification or categorization, a conceptualization that his notion of habitus challenges. For Bourdieu, agents' identities are never stable or predetermined but are contingently defined and redefined in their socialization processes in which institutions often play a decisive role. Through educational structures (e.g., classes in history and geography), standardization of language, unification of cultural markets (e.g., publishing and media), social ritual, and morality training, the dominant language and culture are imposed on agents to forge their vision of a legitimate national image and feeling of belongingness (Bourdieu 1998a/1994: 45–6). These agents then incarnate this official language,

legitimized and maintained through regulation and education, as part of their linguistic habitus and represent it as part of their national identity. This inculcation process and the function of language in identity formation is highly pertinent to the interpreter training carried out by different political powers during wartime, especially when the legitimized language and imposed language education differ from the agents' previously defined national identity. Chinese collaborating interpreters (or *hanjian* interpreters) in occupied areas constitute an excellent example of the identity crisis that interpreters might encounter in war situations. Its relevance to interpreters' border-crossing strategies is addressed in detail in both Chaps. 4 and 5.

1.3 Interpreter Training in Wars

Although training is not a new topic in interpreting studies, systematic studies on interpreter training in a specific war have been sparse. This gap may be partly attributable to the difficulties of obtaining sensitive information on military conflicts for empirical study and partly due to the frequent lack in such situations of a clear distinction between translators and interpreters. One area that has been touched upon by researchers and is also almost in parallel (in terms of time) in history with the interpreter training that this book aims to investigate is the US Army's training of language officers during the World War Two. For example, drawing from multiple sources, including archives, personal diaries, and the interpreters' memoirs stored in the Japanese Language School Archival Project (University of Colorado, Boulder), Roger Dingman reviews the selection of Caucasian American Japanese officers and their training in the US Navy's Japanese Language School (JLS) between 1942 and 1946. These interpreting officers were sent to work in the Pacific Theatre between 1941 and 1945 and, according to Dingman (2004: 867–8), made substantial contributions to the American victory through their effective cross-cultural communication. As Dingman observes, the sense of military duty and identity as part of the US forces were a crucial component in the training of these American interpreters. All facets of their employment—from recruitment to training to

employment—emphasized American national identity and absolute loyalty to the US Marine Corps as its two firm conditions. This emphasis on interpreter advocacy and political loyalty to the American military in training is also confirmed in research by George H. Danton (1943) and Kayoko Takeda (2007), both of whom address the trust issue in the US Army's recruitment of *nisei* as military interpreter and use of training as an approach to foster and reinforce these interpreters' political loyalty to the Army. Thomas O. Brandt (1944), however, presents a slightly different perspective on this history of military interpreters training. As he notes, the US Army aimed to train army officers with expertise in foreign languages and regional knowledge (known as the Language and Area Project), with the goal of ultimately freeing the Army from its dependency on locally recruited interpreters for military purposes. As Brandt notes, the Army's plan was to cooperate with foreign language departments in US universities and to train officers to be proficient in the language, habits, geography, history, government, and culture of a foreign country. After nine months' training, these officers were expected to "get along in enemy territory without an interpreter of language and ways of living, to deal efficiently in a foreign country when put on their own" (ibid.: 74). The trainees selected were soldiers with solid IQ scores and satisfying results on aptitude tests. Brandt did not offer further detailed information on the result of this training, but he commented that the training of these future military language experts was "worthwhile, imperative, important for winning the war, collaborating with the civilian population of occupied territories, of enemy countries, and with our allies, and for the securing of a lasting peace" (ibid.: 74–5).

The idea of equipping military staff with language skills for operation and cooperation through training in international warfare is also found in current international armed conflicts. Since military staff have usually already passed security checks and received training in the field, they are more suitable for tasks involving sensitive information and more resilient when encountering dangerous situations in wars (Kelly and Baker 2012: 44). For example, both the UK Defence School of Language (DSL) and the UK Military Intelligence school at North Luffenham offer short-term language programs (usually three to five months) for UK army personnel. However, as Kelly and Baker (2012: 32) note, given the limited time, at

the end of these training programs, these officers often are only able to achieve a 'colloquial-level' in the foreign language. This colloquial level is equivalent to B1 level, Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) and the colloquial speaker can engage in simple conversations on topics such as themselves, family, hobbies, work and other daily situations (ibid.: 34). Admittedly, three to five months' language training is still a fairly short time in terms of language learning, and it is unrealistic to expect all these officers to become as competent as the conference interpreters we are familiar with, but it is a substantial investment by both the individuals and the Army, given the urgency of war. This heavy investment makes one wonder what the goal of these military interpreter training programs is and how it will affect these interpreters' later practice. Eleni Markou (2006), leader of DSL's intensive language training course at DSL, points out that linguists/interpreters are demanded before, during and after wars and can involve the following three main areas:

(a) Internal management and operations (if multilingual)
(b) Peace-time interaction with external organizations (political accountability, diplomacy, public relations)
(c) Duties within the theatre of deployment

- Pre-conflict: monitoring, intelligence gathering
- During conflict: situation awareness, managing POWs, refugee movements
- Post-conflict: enforcing martial law, hand-over to civic authorities
- Humanitarian efforts

She also outlines some attributes for interpreting in a military context, including an English/native language combination, cultural appropriateness (status, gender, age), reliability, loyalty, operational awareness, security clearance, and (non-verbal) compatibility with the team. This list of military interpreter attributes is striking in that many are not linguistically relevant but rather relate to interpreters' social competencies and personal qualities, which are seldom discussed in current interpreting studies and some of them might be considered irrelevant

by professional interpreters. Although Markou does not explain how these qualities and competencies are to be assessed in interpreter recruitment and training, the targets that she envisaged for military interpreter training is revealing. Not only does it support the multiple use of interpreters in war situations but it also contributes to our understanding of the nature of military interpreter training; it does not simply provide language training but also prepares its trainees to be competent and loyal military officers ready for any tasks that might need their language expertise. This practice-oriented interpreter training mirrors the diverse and changing demands of interpreters in the international geopolitical landscape, on the one hand; on the other hand, it indicates the possible fusion of interpreting and other activities by individual interpreters in certain circumstances. This fusion problematizes previous linguistic-focused study of interpreters and calls for a wider perspective to take into account interpreters' linguistic and non-linguistic activities in societies as a whole.

1.4 A Bourdieusian Approach to Studies of Wartime Interpreters

Over the past decade, one of the most cited sociologists in translation scholarship has been internationally renowned French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), whose popularity is partly related to the discipline's increased recognition of translation as a social action. A significant body of literature has applied Bourdieu's sociological approaches to translation studies (Simeoni 1998, 2005; Gouanvic 2002, 2005; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a, b, 2008; Wolf 2002, 2007a, b, 2015) and his concepts of 'habitus', 'capital', '*illusio*', and 'field' are widely discussed in a variety of contexts, from asylum interpreting and literary translation to the professionalization of the translator position. These interdependent concepts constitute the basis of a theoretical system of sociology that Bourdieu constructed over almost three decades, which he describes as a theory of practice (1977/1972: 16–22) focused on analyzing agents' social practices, particularly, the dialectical relationship between social agents and social structure.

Recently, a growing number of researchers studying interpreting in situations of conflict like asylum hearings and international clashes have questioned the predominance of textually oriented research methods (e.g., historical analysis) by emphasizing interpreters' active participation in social and cultural contexts (Cronin 2003/1997, 2006; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a, b; Tipton 2008; Palmer 2007; Drogovic-Drouet 2007). To theorize this active interpreter agency, scholars like Moira Inghilleri draw on Bourdieu's sociological approaches and argue for sociological and ethnographic interpreting studies. As Inghilleri (2005a: 126) notes, Bourdieu's work "provides a set of powerful tools" for conceptualizing interpreter practices, especially their "reproductive or transformative" roles in particular historical and socio-cultural contexts". This Bourdieusian study of interpreters is part of the efforts by translation researchers to resort to sociology, particularly Bourdieu's sociological approaches, for theoretical and methodological inspiration (Wolf 2007a). However, despite the currently emerging literature on the sociology of translation, there has been little research relevant to interpreters, especially in the form of systematic empirical studies and through theoretical reflections. As Inghilleri observes,

> The real starting point is the empirical investigation of the relevant social practices, their location within particular fields and the *relational* features of capital involved in both acts of translation or interpreting as well as the academic scholarly activity which takes place in relation to such acts, and their relationship to the field of power. (ibid.: 129)

This sociological perspective fits well with interpreting studies as interpreters are social beings first, and interpreting is a social interaction among social agents and institutions rather than the mere linguistic practice of interpreters. Hence, this book takes this assumption as a starting point and applies a Bourdieusian theoretical framework to study interpreters in a particular wartime situation. It intends to explore the following questions: Is there a field of interpreting? If so, how is the field structured, and how are interpreters positioned? What type of capital do interpreters need to enter the field? What factors can affect the formation of interpreters' professional habitus? How do interpreters respond to

situations that endanger their lives and positioning in the field? It is the aim of this book to contextualize and address these theoretical questions through a systematic analysis of interpreter practices in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Drawing upon Bourdieu's framework, the book first reconstructs the social space in order to contextualize and analyze interpreters' practice during the war. According to Bourdieu, social space is a "multidimensional space" comprising multiple fields in which agents' positions are defined according to their capitals (1991: 229, 231). He adapts and redefines some extant sociological concepts (e.g., habitus, field, and capital), which together constitute his formula for analyzing social agent's practice: *[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice]* (Bourdieu 1984/1979: 101). Applying this formula, he suggests that agents' practice is the result of habitus and capital and is activated and conditioned by the structured social conditions and the field to which agents belong, which is in turn modified through their practice (ibid.). For Bourdieu, agential habitus is formed based on agents' position in the field because the objective relationships between positions are incarnated in their bodies. That is, the volume and components of agents' capital decide the positions they can take and the stakes they can obtain. This structure of capital is thus re-translated into a system of preference, or habitus, which directs agents' choices and direction in the field.

Hence, I identify three fields of interpreting related to the three political and military powers that dominated in China during the war: the Japanese forces, the Chinese KMT government, and the CCP. The distinction between these three fields is, to some extent, geographically designated because of their military blockades and political predominance in different regions. However, in reality, the three fields were not physically separate, and there was no clear border between their dominant geographic regions. On the contrary, they were interdependent because of their frequent military operations, political negotiations, and intelligence activities, although this overlap was uneven because of internal and external conflicts between the CCP and the KMT and between the CCP/KMT and the Japanese. Nevertheless, despite the complexity of the military and political relationships involved, the three fields of interpreting are fairly distinctive. Not only were interpreters physically restricted

to certain regions and to certain power hierarchies, but they were also recruited and trained specifically to serve these political and military powers.

This three-field perspective informs my historical and archival investigation into the nature of interpreter training, the training's influence on the interpreters, and the ways in which the interpreters interacted with other agents and institutions via their interpreting practices. Most particularly, Bourdieu's argument on the formation and development of agential habitus provides a theoretical platform for discussing the process by which interpreters acquire and refine their professional habitus through training and professional practices. To contextualize this analysis, I closely examine the information retrieved from the archives, including training textbooks, syllabi, evaluations, and feedback on the interpreters. I also identify the interpreters' education, family background, and other social origins as major areas for discussing the impact of interpreters' previous social experience on the formation of their professional habitus.

Following the discussion of interpreters' professional habitus, I use both the archival files and the relevant memoirs of interpreters and witnesses to address interpreter embodiment and agency during the war as reflected by individual interpreters' struggle for survival and their border-crossing strategies. This portion of the analysis applies Bourdieu's notions of agents' embodied habitus and capital (e.g., political capital, social capital, and symbolic capital) to capture the relative value of the interpreters' linguistic and social competencies in their social practice and to conceptualize the socially constituted and recognized power that results from their social status and political positions within different power hierarchies.

To further investigate interpreters' active positioning in the social world, I examine interpreters' movements within or beyond the field of interpreting; that is, their decisions to become interpreters and continue or leave the profession. Although the ethnological approach adopted by Bourdieu does not apply to a historical project such as this one, his sociological framework—in particular his argument on the relevance of the relationship between agential *illusio* and practice—provides a fruitful perspective that illuminates interpreter self-perception and career development in the social world. On the basis of the biographical materials

like memoirs and interviews, this book also traces some individual interpreters' social trajectories and speculates on the psychological activities relevant to their perception of the field and their own professional practices. It is impossible to carry out systematic surveys or interviews because few interpreters are still living. However, since the book focuses on individual interpreters and their concrete actions, Bourdieu's sociological approach and his emphasis on agential practices are highly appropriate for this study of interpreters' active position-taking and complement the discussion of interpreters' actions, which is based on the documents from institutional archives.

Due to the absence of relevant transcripts or recordings, this book does not employ traditional discourse analysis. Likewise, it is always quite difficult to represent an individual interpreter's inner world at a specific moment in history, especially when very few of the interpreters are still living. There is, however, very rich information available in the form of archive files and personal memoirs that throw light on the social structure within which the interpreters were working. Hence, this book adopts a sociological approach to examining the interpreters' actions in the social world; in particular, their position-taking and interaction with other agents and institutions rather than their linguistic production. Although this sociological approach may not offer a fully detailed picture of this period in the history of interpreting, it surely provides a useful tool for describing and analyzing interpreting practices in a historical context. Accordingly, by investigating interpreter training programs and some individual interpreters' social trajectories, it offers a tentative view of interpreters' socialization and their positioning in a specific historical period.

The information used is drawn from diverse sources, including archives, personal memoirs, biographies, interviews, and secondary resources like published historical studies. The archive files, particularly, are a crucial source of information in that they not only help to more fully contextualize the historical setting but also provide substantial information on the training and employment of interpreters within different power structures. Moreover, almost all the files referred to here—including government records, public documents, and personal collections (e.g., yearbooks from interpreter training programs)—are unpublished and

therefore under discussion for the first time. Other than the files from the Taiwan National Historical Archive and the Qingdao Municipal Archive, obtained through friends, all files were collected during my 2007 and 2008 visits to both national and local archives in mainland China. The repositories visited included the No. 2 National Historical Archive in Nanjing, the Beijing Municipal Archives, the Shanghai Municipal Archive, the Nanjing Municipal Archive, and the Hunan Provincial Archive (see the list of archives provided at the very beginning of the book). For various reasons, these archive files do not provide an equal amount of information about the three political and military powers (the Chinese KMT government, the CCP, and the Japanese forces). Because of war damage and limited public access to certain archives, much information is still missing. For example, China's Central Archive, in which all the CCP's historical files are kept, is still closed to the public. Therefore, the archival study could only be carried out on currently accessible resources.

In addition to the archival documents, this book also draws on a variety of biographical materials (memoirs, biographies, and interviews), a usage that is somewhat controversial and often marginalized in social scientific research (Watson 1976: 95). The main controversies revolve around two aspects of these personal narratives' subjectivity: the reliability of autobiographical accounts and the intervention of other parties like ethnographers, interpreters, and interviewers. Despite these caveats, social sciences still make use of biographical materials, albeit with careful consideration of their application. In fact, subjectivity can be a precious element of biographical resources, as well as a key to this book's application of Bourdieu's sociological framework. As Perk (1998: 69) points out, life stories told by individuals provide "a much closer view on personal involvement" in the history, which may "compensate for the chronological distance" in most history publications. Because this study uses these biographic materials to disclose and analyze interpreters' practices in the social world, not to reconstruct a history of the CCP or a documentary of the war, such personal involvement is a primary focus of the analysis. Although what is said may be affected by the informants' subsequent experiences, their understanding of the past and their definitions of their lives offer valuable clues on agential *illusio*, agents' self-perception and perception of the social structure, in a certain period of history. These insights are

particularly valuable given the limited availability of witnesses or other resources that would enable reconstruction of the interpreters' inner world at this particular historical moment. Moreover, the manner in which these materials provide this information reveals a great deal about the individual informants and their conceptualization of the past. For example, the informants' over-emphasis on certain themes or their defensive stance on certain topics tends to reveal their values and indicate awareness of potential conflict (Watson 1976: 107). Such personal views and feelings are difficult to find in traditional history books or even archive files like the KMT transcripts of interrogations of collaborating Chinese/Japanese interpreters, which are often institutionalized. Hence, the analysis of biographical materials actually promises to be a fruitful method for this study, one that not only complements other resources but also enables a Bourdieusian investigation of interpreters' *illusio* and practices.

Based on the three interpreting fields discussed before, this book is organized as follows: Chap. 2 investigates the KMT's training and deployment of interpreters in different periods throughout the war. As the official government of China, the KMT was the main recipient of international aid and China's representative in the Allied camp. Because of its intensive interaction with foreign powers, the KMT was encouraged to invest in the interpreter recruitment and training in at least three major language pairs in different periods of time: Chinese/German interpreters in the early 1930s, Chinese/Russian interpreters in the late 1930s, and Chinese/English interpreters in the early 1940s. This chapter reviews these changing demands of interpreters within the KMT structure and argues that the field of interpreting (e.g., the availability of interpreters' positions and the relative value of interpreters' capital) was directly affected by the KMT's foreign policy and political strategies. Through a close examination of information retrieved from No. 2 National Historical Archive of China, including the training textbooks, syllabi, evaluations on the interpreters and the KMT Foreign Affairs Bureau's records on interpreters received disciplinary actions, dismissal or honors, it discusses how the standards for 'good interpreting' and 'honorable interpreters' were established, reinforced, and embodied as part of the interpreters' professional habitus.

The CCP, in contrast, as discussed in Chap. 3, received little international support except from the Comintern, given its 'unrecognized' political status at that time and ideological affiliations with the Russian Communist Party. This situation impeded the establishment of formal interpreter positions but encouraged interpreters to develop their own careers within the Party. In order to reconstruct this sub-field of interpreting, this chapter first discusses the Comintern's profound influence on the CCP in the early 1930s and the opportunities created for those with knowledge of Russian language to interpret for the Comintern representatives in China, particularly the "Russian returned students" (Chinese students who were sponsored by the CCP to study in the USSR and had returned to China after a sojourn in USSR). However, as this chapter later reveals, this sub-field underwent significant changes, and stakes associated with Comintern interpreter positions were affected accordingly due to an internal power struggle within the CCP between the pro-Soviet group and the new power center led by Mao Zedong. To demonstrate the changed field and re-valued linguistic and political capital of Chinese/Russian interpreters, it analyzed the social trajectories of two interpreters who worked with Otto Braun, the only resident Comintern representative to the CCP in the 1930s, and their changed attitudes and reactions to their interpreting work at different times, particularly when the CCP changed its policy toward the Comintern. It argues that rather than seeing themselves as the "Comintern's interpreters", these interpreters had more concerns over their political status and positions within the CCP and tended to re-position themselves when necessary to underscore their political Party advocacy. This practical concern and active re-positioning was also reflected in the emergent Yan'an public interest in learning Russian in the 1940s, when the CCP anticipated its military collaboration with the USSR, and in learning English after the US Dixie Mission visited Yan'an towards the end of the war.

Subsequently, Chap. 4 examines the interpreters trained and/or employed by the Japanese forces. Unlike the interpreters employed by the KMT or the CCP, these individuals were in both physical jeopardy and reputational crisis because of their collaborative interpreting practices. Through examining information drawn from Nanjing, Beijing, and Qingdao Municipal Archives (e.g., records on interpreter recruitment in

various local collaborating governments and evaluation of interpreters for Japanese police squads), this chapter presents a stratified field of interpreting in positions at different levels with different stakes in the prevailing power. Being the nexus of the collaboration between the puppet government and the foreign invaders, these interpreters were labelled as *hanjian* in general and became the target of assassination during the war and persecution after the war. However, for individual interpreters, interpreting often was a strategy of survival as well as a struggle for personal interests within the nearly emergent power hierarchy. Their struggle for life and their strategies for straddling different (and often conflicting) power structures add an important layer to the discussion of tensions among conflicting fields and their impact on interpreter praxis. This struggle and the corresponding strategies are particularly exemplified and elaborated in the case study of two interpreters presented in Chap. 5. The first interpreter, Xia, was a Chinese/Japanese interpreter who served the Japanese forces but secretly cooperated with the Chinese Nationalist during the war. The second interpreter, Yan, was one of the military interpreters trained by the KMT during its military collusion with the USA. Analysis of these two interpreters, Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui, provides more detailed and finely textured qualitative information to complement and crystallize what was presented in previous chapters, which tended to be more quantitative information and focused on interpreters within certain institutions.

This book does not claim to offer an encyclopedic view of interpreting or translation activities during the war. Rather, to keep the scope manageable, it focuses on the interpreting activities organized by three major political and military powers. Admittedly, however, this focus is in turn constrained by limited access to certain information and my own insufficient knowledge of the Japanese language, which necessitates that the analysis draws only on resources in English and Chinese. Nevertheless, as an initial investigation of little-researched resources—including archive files, memoirs, and original interviews—this book provides valuable information for reflection on the theoretical questions raised in this chapter.

2

Responsibility and Accountability: Military Interpreters and the Chinese Kuomintang Government

To contextualize my discussion of Chinese interpreters during the Second Sino-Japanese War, it is important to first examine the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government, one of the most important political and military powers in China and the main employer of the interpreters under discussion. As the official government of the Republic of China from 1912, the KMT government managed to achieve a nominal unification of China through its 1927–8 Northern Expedition, despite its long-lasting civil war with the forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bedeski 1981: 25). The administrative and military systems that the KMT government established and developed in the pre-war period reinforced its control over social, economic, and political affairs in Chinese society, including taxation, education, publication, police, and the army. In fact, despite Japan's encroachment into North China and the development of the CCP's Soviet bases in central China, by the end of 1936, the KMT government still had full control of 11 provinces out of the total 18 in the country (Twitchett et al. 1993/1986: 170).

During the war, on the basis of the United Front policy, which politically legitimized the CCP and KMT's united effort to resist the Japanese, the KMT maintained command of most of the state's military and economic

T. Guo, *Surviving in Violent Conflicts*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3_2

resources and acted as the official government in China's cooperation with the Allied forces. Throughout the war, during its interaction with other international powers, the KMT employed a large number of interpreters, but its interpreter recruiting, training, and employment were independent of the CCP and framed within the power hierarchy of its political and military dominance. This dominance thus determined the formation of a specific field of interpreting for agents embedded in the KMT power structure.

In analyzing this interpreting field, this chapter will investigate three issues: how the 'field', in Bourdieu's sense of the word, formed and changed throughout the war; what type of training the interpreters received and its significance in fostering their professional habitus; and how the interpreters secured their positions and interacted with other agents and institutions in the field. The examination of the first issue outlines the connections between the interpreters and the KMT's interaction with foreign powers, particularly their influence on the relative value of interpreter capital and struggle for interests and positions. This part is unavoidably data-focused, but it provides essential information to reconstruct the field of interpreting for the KMT interpreters and serves as a good base for later discussion of the second and third issues. Analysis of these two issues is based on examples of the KMT's training and employment of Chinese/English military interpreters in the 1940s, as well as a case study of a special group of these military interpreters—university students.

2.1 Interpreters and the Changing Field

Since the ultimate goals of the KMT government's training and employment of interpreters during the war were to gain international support and facilitate military cooperation, its foreign policy was a decisive factor in the field of interpreting and directly determined the language pairings needed, the positions available for interpreters, and the capital that the KMT requested from and offered to interpreters (e.g., knowledge of a certain field, interpersonal skills, and physical condition). As the war developed during these 14 years (1931–45), the KMT continually adjusted its

foreign policy to cater to the changing international geo-political situation. For example, the KMT government had maintained a close relationship with Germany and received strong support in the form of military advice and army training before the latter signed a treaty with Japan in 1936. However, after 1937, following its own military and political interests, Germany shifted its support to Japan and withdrew it from the KMT government. As a result, the KMT resorted to the USA, which, although the Americans insisted on their neutrality at the beginning of the war, turned out to be the KMT's strongest foreign supporter during the 1940s when Japan's expansion began affecting American interests in the Pacific, especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Therefore, at different times during the war, the KMT government encountered at least three major needs for interpreter training and employment: Chinese/German interpreters in the early 1930s, Chinese/Russian interpreters in the late 1930s, and Chinese/English interpreters in the early 1940s. Before further exploring this dynamic relationship between interpreters and the field in detail, however, one important question must be answered: Why were Japanese/Chinese interpreters not part of the picture given that Japan was actually the nation that the KMT had to confront every day, politically and militarily, throughout the war?

2.1.1 Chinese/Japanese Interpreters

Although very little information is available on the KMT's training and/or employment of Chinese/Japanese interpreters, personnel with knowledge of the Japanese language were no doubt indispensable to the KMT's intelligence, diplomatic, and military activities during the war. Hence, Chinese/Japanese must assumedly have been an active language pair in the field. The paucity of data contrasts starkly with the situation for Japanese forces (discussed in Chap. 4), who recognized Chinese/Japanese interpreting as an accepted career that was documented in a variety of resources, from government records and military diaries to personal memoirs. Yet why were the positions for Chinese/Japanese interpreters not established or recognized in the KMT-dominated field?

Because linguistic competency is a distinctive capital for interpreters, answering this question requires attention to the relative value of Japanese

language knowledge—a type of linguistic capital—in this interpreting field. Two factors are decisive for this relative value: the actual need for this capital and the number of agents possessing it. These two factors reflect Bourdieu's (1977/1972: 186–7) market metaphor in his discussion of cultural capital; that is, when the supply of one capital exceeds market need, its value decreases, but when the supply cannot meet the need, its value increases. Although it is difficult to estimate the KMT's exact need for Chinese/Japanese interpreting, compared to the Japanese forces, the KMT government had a linguistic advantage in that the war took place primarily in Chinese territory. Hence, unlike the Japanese forces, the KMT government was fighting on its own ground and did not need to rely on interpreters for its military operations and supply. Rather, its major need for Chinese/Japanese interpreting would have been for intelligence purposes and for political negotiations with the Japanese.

As for the supply of linguistic capital, regardless of Japanese language education in China before and during the war, one important factor is the large number of Chinese people who had undergone higher education in Japan since the early 1900s. As a result, there were many possible candidates for Chinese/Japanese interpreting, a wide distribution of linguistic capital made clearer by comparison with other language pairs. According to statistics from the KMT's Ministry of Education on Chinese students educated overseas between 1929 to 1937 (No. 2 National Historical Archive 1998: 394–5), despite the increasing conflict between China and Japan, there were 3,483 students studying in Japan, the largest group being educated overseas compared to the 565 in the UK, 1835 in the USA, and 590 in the Germany during this period. However, when the numbers of government-funded and self-funded students in the above countries are compared, Japan actually hosted the fewest Chinese students funded by the KMT government, a mere 75 during those nine years.

The USA hosted the most government-funded Chinese students (308), followed by the UK (188) and Germany (92). Although these numbers do not specifically refer to interpreters and do not include students receiving foreign language education in China, they do reveal some important information about the distribution of the foreign language capital of agents in the field. That is, agents with knowledge of

the Japanese language outnumbered those with other foreign language skills. The fact that the KMT government tended to fund more agents to study in foreign countries other than Japan also reflects its need for and investment in training agents with knowledge and skills other western countries might offer, including languages other than Japanese.

In reality, the number of Chinese students receiving higher education in Japan before 1937 is no more than an official statistic kept by the KMT government; the actual number is certainly much larger. For example, according to the Sino-Japanese Student Society, from 1927 to 1937, the average number of Chinese students studying in Japan every year was 3,344, while Japanese institutes claimed that 11,966 Chinese students graduated with Japanese university degrees from the early 1920s to 1937 (Keishu 1983/1981: 118).

More importantly, this linguistic capital of Japanese-educated students was accessible to the KMT government because many of these students took positions in the government or the army after finishing their studies and returning to China. These individuals included Jiang Jieshi (or Chiang Kai-shek), the KMT's political and military leader, who was trained at the Japanese Military Academy. In fact, a 1932 survey by the Japanese intelligence department found that, although 14 of the 45 leading members of the KMT government had no foreign education, 18 (40%) had received higher education in Japan and four (9%) had done so in both Japan and other foreign countries, six (13%) in the USA and three (7%) in other nations (Keishu 1983/1981: 122). Moreover, almost every year between 1900 to 1937, the Chinese KMT government sent a number of Chinese students to the Japanese Military Academy for military training, 665 between 1900 and 1911, but as many as 908 between 1912 and 1927 (Guo 1977, quoted in Jiang 2007: 66). During any service with the KMT government and the army, these Japanese-educated students no doubt had little difficulty with any work involving Chinese/Japanese interpreting—whether administrative, military, or liaison. Although this availability of this linguistic resource does not exclude the possibility of other reasons for the scarcity of records on Chinese/Japanese interpreters, it is also very likely that the KMT did not feel the pressing need to invest more of its limited wartime resources in training or employing Chinese/Japanese interpreters.

2.2 The KMT's Military Interpreters during the War

2.2.1 Chinese/German Interpreters and Sino-German Cooperation in the 1930s

Although in World War Two Germany belonged to the Axis camp and openly supported Japan, during the 1930s, especially the decade from 1928 to 1938, the country had been the KMT government's main source of foreign support. Hence, this decade was, as William C. Kirby (1984: 3) aptly puts it, not only "a period of intense Sino-foreign interaction" but also "a decade of German influence in China". From its completion of national unification to its development of a domestic military industry to army reorganization, many of the KMT government's political and military policies were directly affected by this Sino-German cooperation (ibid.). In addition to credit and equipment support through barter agreements and exchange programs, after 1928, Germany also supported the KMT with an expertly staffed military mission in China, assisting the KMT government in reorganizing and training Chinese troops (Kirby 1984; Twitchett et al. 1993/1986).

As Kirby notes, this unusually close relationship between Germany and China came about partly because the KMT government, dealing with increasing military pressure from both the CCP and the Japanese forces, was not receiving the substantial support it sought from other foreign powers (Kirby 1984: 3–4). This general indifference of foreign powers to the KMT's requests was obvious after Japan's aggression against China in late 1931. Apart from an open statement by the USA on January 7, 1932, reasserting its non-recognition of any changes brought about by Japan's aggression, the KMT's appeal to the League of Nations about Japan's illegal occupation of China's Manchurian area earned no sympathy from other foreign powers nor support from the league other than a report by Lord Lytton's commission in China (Hook 1982: 261–2). Other nations in the league, including Britain and France, remained neutral on any substantial action because of their focus on Europe, especially the rising fascism in Germany and the risk of endangering their own relationships with Japan (Borg 1964: 9–10; Twitchett et al. 1993/1986: 580–2).

Germany, however, showed a different attitude just at the right time for China. Specifically, it carried out a two-fold policy, on the one hand, allying with Japan to constrain the Soviet Union, and on the other, agreeing to support the Chinese KMT government. This latter was aimed at enlarging its political influence in Asia, where it could secure both strategic raw materials and a new market for its own industrial and military development (Twitchett et al. 1993/1986: 582; Kirby 1984: 4). For the KMT government, cooperation with Germany was also positive because German support was "consciously designed to strengthen the military and economic power of the Nanking regime, in a manner that did not threaten Nanking's control of its internal affairs" (Kirby 1984: 4–5). In addition, many Chinese Nationalists, including Jiang, the KMT's political and military leader, found Germany's modern military system very appealing because the nation exemplified the emergence of a global power through a non-revolutionary process soon after its defeat in World War One (ibid.).

The November 1928 arrival in Nanjing of a 26-member German military mission led by Max Bauer signified the beginning of this close Sino-German cooperation and gave rise to an immediate need for Chinese/German interpreters, a need for which the KMT government had apparently made preparations. According to an interview by historian Billie K. Walsh (University of California, Irvine) with former German adviser, Erich Stoelzner, upon arriving in Nanking in November 1928, the German mission led by Bauer immediately proposed a training program for the KMT government, with "a minimum of six months' training in the classroom and in field exercises" accompanied by Chinese interpreters (Walsh 1974: 504).

A majority of the advisers in this first 26-member German military mission, whose numbers increased to 61 by June 1934 (Kirby 1984: 124), were responsible for direct military training; the others were mainly for support (ibid.: 55). These German advisers thus contributed greatly to the modernization of Chinese military forces. When the Nationalist government officially declared war with Japan after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, a total of 300,000 Chinese Nationalist troops had been reorganized by German advisers, and 80,000 of them were trained as the core armed forces for the government, equipped largely with

German weapons (Kirby 1984: 220; Liu 1956: 102, 147). This close cooperation between Germany and the Chinese Nationalist government lasted until late 1937 when Adolf Hitler decided to withdraw his advisers from China and instead seek Japan's support to control Britain's influence in Asia (Twitchett et al. 1993/1986: 128, 635).

With the development of this Sino-Germany cooperation, an increase could be expected in the importance of professional Chinese/German interpreters in the field. This assumption is indeed confirmed by a 1935 proposal to Jiang Jieshi by Hans Klein, the German government representative in China at that time (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 168). In this proposal, Klein gives advice on Jiang's plan to strengthen China's defense economy, particularly the selection and training of Chinese/German interpreters/translators:

(十)翻译问题

翻译问题实为中国建设署与德国代表参谋团来往交涉之最重要关键。

此项职务,仅能由性质优秀之人才担任之。

此项人才须精通中德两国文字

彼须对本身工作范围有充分认识

彼须严守秘密,并须诚信可靠

此项人才之选择及训练,切须即可开始。[1]

(10) The issue of translation

The issue of translation is key in the communication and cooperation between Chinese authorities and the German Commission.

This job shall only be taken on by those with talent.

The candidates shall master both the Chinese and the German language;

Have a thorough understanding of the task that they are going to accomplish;

Be able to keep information confidential, be honest and reliable.

Selection and training of these translators shall begin right away.

[1] This proposal was translated into Chinese for Jiang. The excerpts presented here is the official Chinese translation published by the No. 2 National Archive.

Like most records kept by the KMT, the above Chinese translation of Klein's proposal only refers generally to "翻译" (*fanyi*, translation/interpreting) rather than specifying interpreters. However, given the Germany military commission's advisory role, the "translation" referred to here no doubt includes interpreting. Moreover, given his status as the chief German adviser at that time, Klein's proposal, especially his definition of qualified candidates for this "*fanyi*" job, must have influenced the field of interpreting in that he not only endorsed the value of Chinese/German interpreting but also explicitly set out the essential competencies for agents taking up those positions: knowledge of both the Chinese and German language (linguistic capital), a sense of responsibility, confidentiality, and reliability (social and political capital). In addition, for Klein, training was one of the essential steps after appropriate candidates were selected. Although there is no further information found about the content of the training that Klein referred to, his emphasis on training before interpreters even started their work indicates the demanding nature of the work as well as the differences between general translation work and military interpreting.

In fact, even before Klein's proposal, the KMT government had begun discussing the training of Chinese/German interpreters. In August 1932, the KMT's Central Military Council (CMC) organized a survey for staff involved in the Sino-German cooperation. In the survey, many issues raised are actually related to Chinese/German interpreters, particularly about the insufficient number of interpreters and their knowledge of the military system and standard usage of military terms (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 110–4). It was suggested that the number of interpreters should be at least one and a half times or twice that of the German advisers and relevant training should be provided (ibid.).

Besides these common problems, some of the individual interpreters' comments in response to this survey are also very interesting. For example, Wei Hanqiao, who worked as a Chinese/German interpreter with the German advisers for over four years, points to a potential conflict between Chinese/German and Chinese/Japanese translators and interpreters and its possible undermining of the KMT's goal of military modernization (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 107–9). He argues

that while the army was receiving training on the latest military equipments and new battle skills, the textbooks and references compiled and translated, mainly from Japanese resources, by the education office were out-of-date and useless. For him, field training and up-to-date course books are equally important and should complement each other in the military training process. The "out-of-date" translations, according to Wei, will only impede the training supervised by the Germans and undermine the KMT's goal of military modernization. He even suggests internal reorganization by dismissing the pro-Japanese and moving Chinese/German translators and interpreters from the consulting section to be directly affiliated with the training section and let them also be responsible for the translation and compilation of new course books and references. These suggestions not only reflect Wei's long in-field observation of the diminishing value of Japanese language skills and a Japanese educational background but also mirror his attempts to push out others and create opportunity for people like himself to move up the power ladder. From a Bourdieusian perspective on agential competition for positions and capital, Wei's action could be seen as an excellent example of the competition between the Chinese/German translators/interpreters and the Chinese/Japanese translators in the field. The fact that interpreters such as Wei were included in the survey and were able to voice out their view on the system in general also shows that not only were these interpreters seen like other staff in the KMT government but also they took initiatives to develop their professional skills and reinforce their positions.

In its September meeting that year, the CMC followed up on this survey and made a few important decisions (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 114–5). First, it confirmed the growing need for interpreters and emphasized the significance of training and selecting qualified interpreters.[2] Second, it took up the suggestion that military knowledge should be an essential quality for interpreters in addition to their language skills. This official recognition of interpreters' need for military knowledge is important in that it signifies the position of interpreters in the army and defines the value of this military capital. As regards Wei's report, the CMC does not comment on the interpreters'

[2] However, there is no detailed information provided regarding the selection and training of interpreters in this file.

suggestion of removing the Japanese-educated translators or take any immediate action to relocate the Chinese/German interpreters, but only endorses the strong connection between the interpreters and the training section. However it does emphasize the political and military capital associated with these interpreters' positions by pointing out the difficulties in recruiting and training competent interpreters and the expected increasing demand of them in the near future. For interpreters in the Bourdieusian sense of field, this positive attitude from the CMC, the highest military and political power in the KMT government, constituted official recognition of their positions.

Of course, as discussed in the Introduction, the interpreters' positions and the relative value of their capital were determined by the dominant power relationship in the interpreting field; that is, the KMT government's relationship with Germany. Given the close collaboration between Germany and China during the 1930s, in addition to the German military advisers brought in by the KMT, provincial governments had also hired German civilian advisers for a variety of purposes, including geologic research, radio-telegraphic work, and aerial topographic surveys (Kirby 1984: 70). It is therefore probable that there were also Chinese/German interpreters working with these German civilian advisers. In fact, in the mid-1930s, Germany's influence had reached almost all aspects of Chinese society, from the military and the economy to education. Nevertheless, the main focus of this Sino-German cooperation was still to strengthen the KMT's military power (ibid.: 70–3). Nor was this military focus missed by other foreign powers; for example, a report prepared for Washington by American military intelligence in Beijing noted that although the activities of the Bauer-led German mission covered not only military but also industrial and economic matters, they were "above all an effort to further Chiang's 'military power'" (Kirby 1984: 56).[3]

In fact, as revealed in a conversation between KMT's financial administrator, T. V. Song, and Japanese special envoy, Saionji Kinkazu

[3] The original file is in the US National Archive: Magruder (Peking) to Washington, June 3, 1929, 2657–I–357, US National Archive, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

in August 1937, one month after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,[4] the German-trained and equipped military forces were the pride of the KMT government (Boyle 1972: 67). As seen in the following statement, Song reiterated the strength of Chinese Central Force after the heavy investment by the KMT in its modernization, particularly its German trained and equipped Chinese army.

> The Japanese military still hold to their preconceived ideas about the Chinese army. They think that if you hit us once we will surrender and do what you want. The Chinese army has studied hard since the Manchurian Incident. It has been trained by the Germans, and we have spent much to modernize. It knows that it is stronger, and is confident that it will not be beaten this time. So the Japanese army underestimates the Chinese army, and the Chinese army overestimates itself. Here is where the great danger lies. (Boyle 1972: 67)

In Song's eyes, the German-trained army had taken on an important role in the KMT government's resistance to the Japanese, which was the military capital that the KMT had accumulated through a decade's investment and cooperation with the Germans. As the dominant power in the field, the KMT had to consolidate its position and increase its capital by re-arming and training its troops, especially given the threats from both the Japanese and the communists. Part of the capital that it invested in was in interpreter employment. Any salaries and benefits that the interpreters received comprised the economic capital offered by the government, while their interpreting work constituted a part of the KMT's capital exchange process in that the interpreters were indispensable to the production of military capital. On the other hand, as an important basis for Sino-German cooperation, these interpreters also gained political capital by serving and supporting this network. Hence, to secure economic, political, and social capital, these interpreters needed to look for ways to retain or develop their positions, which reflects the concern in Wei's report about the competition and struggle for position and capital.

[4] Although clashes between Japan and China began in 1931, the war did not enter full scale until the Marco Polo Incident in July 1937.

Apparently, as the KMT's financial administrator, Song also saw the German-trained troops as a source of diplomatic capital, reminding the Japanese envoy of the KMT's increased military strength, particularly in terms of the newly German-trained KMT Central Force. In fact, because of the presence of the German Military Commission in China, Germany's relationship with China was of special concern to the Japanese forces. Since December 1937, Japan had applied pressure on Berlin for the recall of the German Military Commission and for cessation of the provision of German weapons to China (Walsh 1974: 510). During the war, the Japanese protest against German advisers' assistance to the KMT government became stronger after several confrontations with German-trained Chinese troops, especially in the 1938 battles of Shanghai and Nanjing, where Japan paid a heavy price for its victories (ibid.: 510). All these remonstrations, however, only proved the success of the 1930s Sino-German cooperation, including the Chinese/German interpreters' decade of contribution and engagement.

Japan's protests began to have a real effect when Hitler became leader of the German armed forces in early 1938. For Hitler, Japan seemed a better Asian ally for Germany than China. Not only had Germany signed an anti-Comintern pact with Japan as early as the end of 1936 to restrain the Soviet Union (Young 1963: 18), but Japan's overwhelming victory in the war with China reinforced Hitler's opinion (Kirby 1984: 234–5). Hence, the new Nazi foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, promoted an alternative foreign policy to "divide the Chinese spoils with the conquering Japanese" (ibid.: 241). In April 1938, the German government stopped weapons shipments from Germany to China, and by that July, almost all the advisors from the German Military Commission had been recalled (Walsh 1974: 509–11; Kirby 1984: 237–9).

This recall of the German Military Commission signaled the end of the intensive Sino-German cooperation that had begun in 1928 and had an immediate impact on the interpreting field, especially the positions of the Chinese/German interpreters. For these individuals, the Germans had been their direct clients and the KMT their employer. Once the Germans were gone, Chinese/German interpreting was no longer in great demand. At the same time, new power relationships were emerging in this dynamic field, including Sino-Soviet cooperation, which created new interpreter positions and capital. Admittedly, because relevant

government records are unavailable, it is unclear what happened to these interpreters afterwards and what positions they moved on to. However, the incident raises the question of interpreter career development, which will be discussed in more detail in Chap. 4.

2.2.2 Chinese/Russian Interpreters

Currently there is very little information available on Chinese/Russian interpreters employed by the KMT government, partly because the wartime Sino-Soviet interaction was comparatively short (from 1937 to 1941), partly because these interpreters were placed in a less prominent and ambivalent position due to the complicated relationship between the KMT and the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Ideologically, the Russians supported the CCP, which had been the KMT's primary domestic foe since the early 1920s. However, it was clear to the Russians that, compared to the CCP, the KMT held more political and military capital because of its legitimate state power, military strength, and leading role in China's resistance against the Japanese (Hook 1982: 656–7; Young 1963: 18–22). For the Russians, diverting Japan away from the Soviet Union was more urgent than pushing communism in China (Young 1963: 129). Moreover, not only might supporting the CCP push the KMT onto the side of the Japanese, who advocated anti-Bolshevism, but the CCP was not strong enough to effectively lead the nation in resisting the Japanese effectively. Supporting the KMT, on the other hand, would only increase China's strength in resisting the Japanese, especially when it had obtained support from international powers like the USA and Britain, which the CCP could not do at that time (Qi 1996: 99–106).

Hence, the Soviet Union tried to follow a dual approach to China: supporting the Chinese communists' revolutionary activities through Comintern but promoting its relationship with the official Chinese government through the Soviet government (Twitchett et al. 1993/1986: 109). From 1937 to 1939, apart from three loans for a total of US $250 million, the Soviet government provided the KMT with 500 military advisers, 1,000 planes, and 2,000 so-called volunteer pilots to help

China resist Japan (Young 1963: 57; 125–30). All this material, personnel, and political support from the Soviet Union was crucial to the Chinese/Russian interpreters because it not only imported new capital into the field but also created job positions.

Another decisive factor for these interpreters, given that the value of the capital invested by the Russians was subject to the dominant power in the field (the KMT government), was the KMT's attitude towards Soviet support. For the KMT, the Soviet Union was of course a valuable foreign source for military and political support, especially after German support was lost and other international powers offered no substantial help until war broke out in the Pacific. On the other hand, Russia's support of the CCP since the early 1920s had resulted in the KMT's being highly suspicious of the motives underlying this Sino-Soviet cooperation. For example, the KMT believed the Russian volunteer pilots to be disguised Russian Red Army pilots, meaning part of a policy of "qualified intervention", while they thought that the Russian advisers had been sent to China for the purpose of "studying the capabilities of the Chinese and Japanese forces and of testing German concepts, training systems, and equipment on the Chinese battlefront" (Young 1963: 125–6).

This suspicion resulted in the KMT's tactical deployment of its interpreters to monitor and control the Russians' activities in China. For example, on July 19, 1938, Jiang Jieshi, head of the KMT government, issued a telegram[5] in which he requested that all interpreters working with Russian advisers should join the Kuomintang Party and report weekly to the government about their work. Yet this compulsory Party membership and reporting was limited to interpreters for the Russian advisers only, suggesting that both requests originated from the KMT's concern about Russian insincerity and military activities in China. Hence, they seemingly reflect an attempt by the KMT to use the interpreters as monitors and spies. Whereas the weekly reporting would relay the Russian advisers' actions, the interpreters' Party membership would insure their political loyalty and the confi-

[5] *[Jiang Jieshi] Jiang Zhongzhengdianshi He Guoguang Kang Ze eguwen geyiyuan yingyou jianshi zuzhi meizhou ying xiangbao gongzuo* 蒋中正电示贺国光康泽俄顾问各译员应有坚实组织每周应详报工作(Telegram from Jiang Zhongzheng to He Guoguang and Kang Ze about organizing interpreters for Russian advisers and submitting detailed weekly reports), July 19, 1938, National Historical Archive, Taipei (hereafter, NHAT) 002–010300–014–049–001x.

dentiality of their special spying task. Thus, rather than providing a pure linguistic service for the two camps, these interpreters acted as intelligence agents to spy on the other side. As a result, in addition to the knowledge of foreign language and culture, loyalty to the KMT, confidentiality, and the ability to collect information were also necessary capital for the interpreters. Interestingly, the Russians seemed to quickly perceive this special interpreter use. Just a month later, Jiang Jieshi received a telegram[6] from his officers reporting that the Russian representatives had requested that their Chinese interpreters be replaced, although the telegram gave no particular reason for this request, nor did my research locate any other records of these Chinese/Russian interpreter spies. Given that the KMT seemingly acted on the interpreter replacement request without any questions or follow-up, the entire issue seems shrouded in mystery and is not mentioned by any historians. Nevertheless, the interpreters must surely have been affected by the repercussions from the KMT's foreign policy towards the Russians. Although it is impossible to know the extent of this influence, they would at minimum have had to be removed by the KMT from their current positions to cover up the original intelligence plan.

This situation would soon change, however, when the short-term Sino-Soviet cooperation ended. On April 13, 1941, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan and announced their mutual recognition of the puppet Manchuguo and the puppet People's Republic of Mongolia (Hsu and Chang 1972: 37). For the interpreter spies, their stake in the field also changed because all Russian pilots and advisers left China, eliminating the need for close spying or monitoring. In fact, the deteriorating relationship between the KMT and the Soviet Union had immediate repercussions for the interpreters, even before the official break-up. For example, a telegram issued by Jiang a month before this neutrality pact revealing the existing issue of Chinese/Russian interpreter welfare, including the discrimination and poor payment of Chinese/

[6] *Zhu Shaoliang deng dian Jiang Zhongzheng su ezhu gan ning daibiao qingqiu gaishan jichang jinjie yu yaoqiu chehuan fanyi deng wendian ribao biao* 朱绍良等电蒋中正苏俄驻甘宁代表请求改善机场警戒与要求撤换翻译等文电日报表(Telegram from Zhu Shaoliang et al. to Jiang Zhongzheng concerning the requests from the Russian representatives in Gansu and Guangxi provinces to improve airport security and change interpreters), August 13, 1938, NHAT 002–080200–501–135–001x.

Russian interpreters compared to interpreters of other language pairs.[7] In the telegram, Jiang emphasized that Chinese/Russian interpreters should be treated the same as other interpreters and those in financial difficulties should be provided with subsidies. Although no further information is available about those interpreters that had been unfairly treated, the content and date of this telegram implies that the Chinese/Russian interpreters had been so affected by the KMT's relationship with the Soviet Union that the highest authority had to intervene.

Despite their short historical appearance, these Chinese/Russian interpreter spies exemplify the complicated position and practices of military interpreters in conflict. Not only are the nature and content of their work subject to the objective relationships in the field, but they themselves are part of political and military bodies. In fact, as the next section illustrates, the interpreters' political loyalty and physical conditions were the essential capital for their entrance into the interpreting field.

2.2.3 Chinese/English Military Interpreters

Of all the interpreters employed by the KMT government during the war, the Chinese/English interpreters were a special group in terms of the KMT's investment in interpreter training, employment, and management. Although the need for Chinese/English interpreting did not come to the fore until late 1941,[8] in the subsequent five years before Japan's August 1945 surrender, over 4,000 Chinese/English interpreters were trained and deployed for military purposes, with a majority recruited directly from the universities (Mei 2004: 52). This emergent need for Chinese/English interpreters resulted primarily from the KMT's new alliance with

[7] *Jiang Zhongzheng dian Zhu Shaoling Gu Zhenglun deng e'wen fanyiyuan yu taguo yuwen fanyiyuan tongdeng* 蒋中正电朱绍良谷正伦等俄文翻译员与他国语文翻译员同等待遇 (Jiang's telegram to Zhu Shaoliang, Gu Zhenglun and others about the suggestion that Chinese/Russian interpreters/translators should receive the same benefits as other language interpreters/translators), March 16, 1941, NHAT 002-070200-009-080.

[8] *Junweihui suoshu waishiju guanyu kaiban waiyu xunlianban de baogao* 军委会所属外事局关于开办外语训练班的报告(Proposal by the Military Affairs Commission to establish a foreign language [Chinese/English] interpreter training program under its Foreign Affairs Bureau), December 28, 1941, No. 2 National Historical Archive (Nanjing) of China (hereafter, NHA) 763–456.

the USA, which began in 1941. In this case, interpreters constituted an indispensable capital with which the KMT could transcend the linguistic barrier and join the international resistance to the Japanese, especially in terms of military coalition with the US forces in China. These new political and military power relationships developed by the KMT in the 1940s also caused great changes in the interpreting field, changes that had a significant influence on the Chinese/English interpreters.

In the 1930s, both the American public and the US government retained an isolationist view of the war (Hooks 1993: 657). Most particularly, the Neutrality Acts,[9] passed by the US Congress in 1935, prevented the USA from providing any loans to belligerents and placed embargoes on shipments of arms or munitions to nations at war (Hsu and Chang 1972: 35–7). However, the outbreak of World War Two significantly changed the situation. Japan's expansion into the Pacific area directly affected the USA's interests, thereby pushing the US government to gradually give up its neutrality and side with China. The Americans also gradually realized that it was important to assist China because the Chinese armies' resistance against Japan tied down the majority of Japanese forces, which could have been deployed against the USA. In March 1941, the Neutrality Acts were replaced by the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed the US government to provide monetary or material support to belligerent countries like China. On August 26, Washington released its statement on sending a military mission to China led by Brigadier General John Magruder. This statement set out the following aims for this mission:

> To study, in collaboration with Chinese and other authorities, the military situation in China, the need of the Chinese Government for material and materials; to formulate recommendations regarding types and quantities of items needed; to assist in procurement in this country and in delivery in China of such material and materials; to instruct in the use and maintenance of articles thus provided; and to give advice and suggestions of

[9] The Neutrality Acts were a "series of Acts passed at the height of isolationism, amidst fears that the desire for profits from the arms industry might fuel direct or indirect participation in war.…In 1939, the Act was amended, so that arms embargoes and authorized 'cash and carry' were allowed to be exported to any belligerent power, but it continued to forbid US ships to carry 'belligerent cargo'" (Palmowski 1997: 440).

> appropriate character toward making Lend-Lease assistance to China as effective as possible in the interest of the United States, of China, and of the world effort in resistance to movements of conquest by force.[10]

This statement not only describes the material and non-material support that the USA would provide to China's resistance against the Japanese but also emphasizes this American military mission's close cooperation with the Chinese KMT government. Through phrasing such as "in collaboration with", "recommendations", "to assist", "to instruct", and "to give advice and suggestions", it sends a message to the rest of the world that a military and political coalition is forming between the USA and the "Chinese government", which of course gave the KMT government an official status in international politics. This coalition with the USA would undoubtedly increase the KMT's international and national popularity and put more pressure on the Japanese. Hence, this open statement itself constituted political capital granted by the US government to the KMT. In fact, the financial and military aid provided to the Nationalist government by the USA during the war was unprecedented. Through lend-lease, it lent the KMT government around $1,336 million US dollars[11] during the five-year period from 1941 to 1945 (Young 1963: 351). If the 1930s was the "decade of German influence in China" (Kirby 1984: 3), the 1940s was definitely the decade of American influence.

However, American aid to the KMT was not unconditional. The American lend-lease law of 1941 clearly stipulated the type of "capital exchange" or "conversion" between agents and institutions suggested by Bourdieu (1977/1972: 187), one in which, as in any market, agents must invest their own capital to acquire or secure other capital. According to this law, countries receiving aid from the USA had to provide reciprocal aid or benefits (Hsu and Chang 1972: 256). Accordingly, on June 2, 1942, a mutual aid agreement was signed by the KMT government and

[10] "Statement on sending a military mission to China", August 26, 1941, White House news release, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410826awp.html (accessed 2 May, 2008).

[11] As Young notes, according to letters from the US Department of State, from 1941 to 1946, the total US aid to China was adjusted from US $1,546 to around US $1,602 million because of reallocation and correction. Nevertheless, US $1,336 million was the number counted until the end of 1945 without consideration of these adjustments.

the US government in which the KMT government agreed to "provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply" (ibid.).[12] Here one might wonder whether interpreting services were included in these "services" that the KMT was to provide as reciprocal capital for the US government.

According to John W. Mountcastle (2008: 10–15), after the founding of the first US base in the Chinese theatre (in Kunming, Yunnan province, on March 1942), the number of American military officers and staff in China grew substantially every year until the end of the war. By the end of 1942, the number of US personnel in the American military mission was 1,255 (ibid.),[13] but by October 1943, this number had increased to 4,800.[14] In the newly established Sino-US military training centers in Ramgarh (India), Kunming (Yunnan, China), and Guilin (Guangxi, China), a large number of American military officers had also been recruited to train KMT troops. For example, the Guilin infantry training center in Guangxi province was staffed by a total 2,200 American military personnel[15]; before the war ended in August 1945, the total number of American staff in China had reached 60,360 (Hook 1993: 672). This substantial number of American personnel, particularly their close cooperation with the KMT government, meant that Chinese/English interpreting was an indispensable part of this Sino-US interaction. However, one may also wonder whether the Americans brought their own interpreters for this military coalition with the Chinese. Although this would seem likely given the fact the Americans brought their only Japanese/English interpreters in its operations in the Far East theatre, they apparently sought to obtain this linguistic resource in China and through the KMT government rather than training and transporting their own interpreters from the USA. This decision differs from that on the American training of Japanese/English interpreters during World War Two (see the Introduction), possibly because at that time China was a member of the

[12] See also, the *Executive Agreements Series No. 251 or 56 Stat. 1494.*

[13] *China Defensive*, John W. Mountcastle, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Online brochure 10, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-38/72-38.htm (accessed 2 May, 2008).

[14] See also, the *Executive Agreements Series No. 251 or 56 Stat. 1494,* 20.

[15] See also, ibid., 10, 15.

Allied forces, whereas Japan was the enemy with which the USA was at war; therefore, the ethnicity of Chinese interpreters did not constitute a big issue in terms of trust and loyalty in the military collaboration.

A report by the KMT Foreign Affairs Bureau's (FAB) to the Central Secretary's office on September 7, 1943, can confirm that interpreting service was one of the contractual "services" requested by the USA from the KMT government during this US-Sino collaboration. In this report, the FAB describes the urgent need for Chinese/English interpreters following the arrival of the Americans who are going to assist the training of the newly recruited force and confirms that the number of interpreters requested by the Americans this year is going to be over 3,500.[16] Specifically, according to the report, besides training Chinese troops for future united military operations, the US forces also aimed to expand their operations in the Far East theatre through interaction with the Chinese KMT government. Without doubt, to be able to communicate and cooperate with Chinese authorities, the Americans had to rely on interpreters, who were going to be trained and supplied by the KMT government.

In addition to the military training centers, Chinese/English interpreters with different responsibilities were widely used in other places. From liaison and military logistics (supply and transportation) to combat practices, the interpreters' roles varied with the context of their work and were subject to actual military needs. An overview of these multiple interpreter roles is important because, besides being the goal of the KMT interpreter training, they also had a decisive influence on the capital and position of the interpreters in the field.

[16] *Zhongyang mishuchu anzhun guichu bennian jiuyue liuri tezi di qi liu wu hao mihan*中央秘书处案准贵处本年九月六日特字第七六五号密函 (Approval of the internal report (special) no. 765 submitted on September 6), 7 September, 1943, NHA 736–349–45.

The Multiple Roles of Chinese/English Military Interpreters

According to the statistics prepared by the FAB on October 17, 1944,[17] of the 1,919 FAB Chinese/English interpreters trained, 1,335 (69.6%) were stationed in India, 117 (6%) in Guilin (China), and 467 (24.4%) in Chongqing (China). The heavy presence of interpreters in India was related to the US forces' military strategies at that time. Except for 133 interpreters at Ramgarh Base, which served mainly as the KMT's military training center in the Indian theatre (Romanus and Sunderland 2002/1953: 214–21), a majority of these 1,335 interpreters were serving in military units deployed for the Burma Campaign against the Japanese ICHIGO Operation, which had been led since April 1944 by the US headquarters in the Chinese theatre. All these interpreters were expected to work with the troops on the battlefront. For those assigned to the China theatre, 117 were working at the Southeast Officer Training Center (Guilin), while the rest (467) were assigned to different military logistic units in Chongqing, including the Organization of Field Services (98), the Air Force Committee (187), the Department of Military Supplies (40), and the Department of Transportation (49). In other words, Chinese/English interpreters enlisted before October 17, 1944, would have had a 63% chance of serving in field, a 24.3% chance of working in a logistics unit, and only a 13% chance of posting at a training center.

However, within three months, the situation had changed; as indicated by statistics released in January 1945 by the US headquarters in China,[18] there had been a decrease in the number of KMT military interpreters—only 1,651 on January 19, 1945, compared to 1,919 two months earlier. This decline might have resulted from various factors, including interpreter resignations, promotion to another position, or even death during

[17] *Zhanqu meijun zongbu laihan yiwen waiyu xunlianban di'er qi biye laiju fuwu xueyuan mingce luqu mingdan shiyou yiguan tongjibiao* 战区美军总部来函译文外语训练班第二期毕业来局服务学员名册录取名单实有译官统计表 (Translation of a letter from the U.S. headquarters in the Chinese theatre concerning the nominal role of the second group of FAB interpreters who have finished training, the number of qualified interpreters, and relevant statistics on extant interpreters), 17 October, 1944, NHA763–18.

[18] Ibid.

battle.[19] Death was likely given that many interpreters were attached to the Y Force and Chinese Expeditionary Force, which in late 1944 took part in the Burma Campaign. This can be confirmed in a document, "Interpreters who died for their country", found in *Yilianhui Shouce* 译联会手册 (Brochure of the Association of Interpreters), in which 19 interpreters and their deaths were recorded. Among these 19 interpreters, seven were directly killed in battles, two died of accidents in the field, one committed suicide and the remaining nine passed away in service because of diseases.

The information provided by the US headquarters in China also reveals the deployment of FAB interpreters at that time.[20] The top three assignments were with the US-led Chinese troops (Kunming) (697), at US headquarters in Ledo in the North Burma theatre (296), and with the No. 14 Air Force Unit (AVG) (200). These assignments accounted for a total of 1,192 out of the 1,651 interpreters working, meaning that 72% were working at the front, either with air force officers, pilots, and airfield technicians or side by side with American officers and Chinese soldiers in the field. Of the remaining 28%, 19% were employed in military training centers, with 121 in Kunming and 194 in India. The remaining 9% were working in military supply departments (Kunming, 13; Ledo, 113) or in the Chongqing area (nine).[21] In contrast, however, as the same document by the US headquarters in China shows, the number of interpreters needed was expected to grow from 1,651 to 3,014 by the end of June 1945, an increase of 45%. This major increase in demand came from the Kunming area; especially, the Kunming training centers, the Chinese troop headquarters, and the Kunming military supply department, which showed the most need with a steady increase of 150 every

[19] *Yilianhui Shouce* 译联会手册 (Brochure of the Association of Interpreters)included a section on " Interpreters who died for their country" (殉国译官简史), which provided some brief information on some military interpreters who died in their service. SMA Y7–1–0000072, 1946.

[20] *Zhanqu meijun zongbu laihan yiwen waiyu xunlianban di'er qi biye laiju fuwu xueyuan mingce luqu mingdan shiyou yiguan tongjibiao* 战区美军总部来函译文外语训练班第二期毕业来局服务学员名册录取名单实有译官统计表 (Translation of a letter from the U.S. headquarters in the Chinese theatre concerning the nominal role of the second group of FAB interpreters who have finished training, the number of qualified interpreters, and relevant statistics on extant interpreters), 17 October, 1944, NHA763–18.

[21] Ibid.

month. Although in January, the number of interpreters at this supply department was almost one tenth of those in Ledo, by June of the same year, it reached around 763.[22]

This flow of interpreter resources among different military units resulted mainly from adjustments in US military deployment after Japan's Ichigo Campaign. It also underscores that interpreters were required to work in a variety of settings, from liaison offices and logistics departments to battlefields and training centers, which would no doubt pose a challenge to all these military interpreters. Obviously, the war would test their language skills, knowledge of military terminology, interpersonal skills, personalities, physical condition, and even survival skills in both the battlefield and nature. In addition, interpreters working in different settings might face different risks and stakes related to their work. For example, interpreters working with troops on the battlefield would be directly exposed to physical danger but would earn higher subsidies and more chances for promotion because of their courage and work. Interpreters serving in training centers, in contrast, might worry less about their safety but had fewer benefits or chances for promotion. Therefore, the frequent relocation of interpreters as needed by the military also indicates the inevitable physical danger involved in military interpreting. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider the capital and stakes associated with interpreter positions: what types of qualities and skills would the KMT government look for in interpreters, and what was the stake towards which the interpreters would strive?

Interpreter Position-taking in the Field

For Bourdieu, agents' positions in the field are determined by their possession of capital, and the relative value of their capital is subject to the dominant power in the field. For the Chinese/English interpreters, the KMT government, with its right to determine the type and value of qualified interpreters' capital, was this decisive power. The KMT's recruitment, training, and control of interpreters were an inherent part of its function-

[22] Ibid.

ing as a dominant political power in the field because the entire interpreter production process it had designed was functionally related to, not isolated from, the perpetuation of its power and increased capital. By setting the selection criteria, the KMT defined and imposed the standard for "qualified interpreters"—the relative value of capital. The training therefore offered successful applicants a standardized version of the necessary capital, legitimized by the KMT government, including military phraseology, military discipline, and loyalty to the KMT. The interpreters, in turn, under KMT government dominance, had their own practical concerns and short-term stakes and thus had to act in a way that preserved the operation that had produced them. Therefore, interpreter positions result from the interaction between agents and institutions in the field. Specifically, the Chinese-English interpreters aimed to pursue good jobs, as well as better salaries and benefits, while the KMT government wanted to recruit and train qualified staff to strengthen its political and military power.

Within this interaction, the key institution representing the KMT's power was the FAB, founded in 1941 as a subordinate department of the KMT's Central Military Commission, the highest political and military authority in China. The FAB's main responsibilities included military liaison with foreign powers, dealing with matters related to wartime foreign advisers, and training and supervising military interpreters. According to the organizational legislation (revised in 1944), the FAB was the direct supervising institution for interpreters, especially in terms of "interpreter recruitment and training" (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1998: 142), and was responsible for interpreter appointment. In 1943, besides one director and one deputy director, the FAB had one secretariat and two departments. Department I was composed of five offices responsible for liaison with and reception of American or British military personnel; Department II consisted of three offices, mainly for the employment and reception of Russian advisers. During the war, local FAB branches and receptions were established in Ganzhou, Lanzhou, Guilin, Kunming, and India (ibid.: 142–3).

Then, who were these interpreters? Or, to put it another way, what kind of agents would qualify for training as interpreters under the KMT government? An official document published by the FAB for public recruit-

ment of senior interpreters was found in the Hunan Provincial Archive.[23] It specifies the desirable applicant qualities, as well as the benefits offered to successful applicants, including salary, subsidy, medical care, and travel allowances. Although the relative value of this information might change over time because of such factors as inflation, it still provides a useful overview of the pre-training capital needed by interpreters and their stake in the field.

In this recruitment document, the FAB sets requirements in three main areas: the interpreters' physical condition (gender, age, and health), interpreting knowledge and skills (a university degree and knowledge of the English language), and political loyalty and reliability ("富有爱国热忱" [patriotic passion] and "思想纯正" [an uncontaminated mind]). The physical requirements can be related to the fact that these interpreters were expected to work in the military, which customarily applies certain restrictions of age, health, and gender because of the extreme situations encountered by military staff in wartime. This fact also explains why it is stated explicitly in the document that interpreters with unhealthy life habits (e.g., drinking and smoking) were not wanted: a healthy body was the basis of an interpreters' efficiency, especially during times of war.

Interpreters' competence in military interpreting is the second type of capital that the FAB was looking for. As might be expected, the foremost condition was knowledge of the English language; therefore, applicants had to take both a written test (English to Chinese and Chinese to English translation) and an oral test (English dialogue). In other words, qualified interpreters should be able to accomplish both written and oral tasks in both languages. The written test was designed to test applicants' language skills, particularly knowledge of military terms. This can be proved by the following excerpt from an English to Chinese translation test:

> Translate the following paragraphs into Chinese[24]

---

[23] *Junshi weiyuanhui waishiju kaoxuan gaoji yiyuan jianzhang yu sanshisi niandu*军事委员会外事局考选高级译员简章(渝三十四年度) (the FAB's advertisement for interpreter recruitment, Chongqing 1945), Hunan Provincial Archive (hereafter, HPA) 60–1–227–11.

[24] *Junwei, hangwei, jiaoyubu guanyu zhengdiao yingyu fanyi renyuan de xunling gonghan deng cailiao* 军委、航委教育部关于征调英语翻译人员的训令、咨函等材料 (Orders and government

1. Nothing more spacious than your own backyard is needed for your take-off and landing when you own a helicopter, while any airplane will need a field of substantial size for safe operation.
2. The war has hastened the development of aviation by many years and the airplane will be one of the greatest factors in developing political and economic internationalism in a post-war world.
3. At present the speed, ceiling, ruggedness, and especially the effectiveness of the long-range high velocity .50 caliber guns of the Fortresses and Liberators give the Americans an edge over the best fighter defence the Luftwaffe can muster.

…

The oral test, however, measured applicants' ability to conduct conversations in English rather than their interpreting skills. Assumedly, this goal was partly related to the fact that the career of interpreter had not yet become established in China, and a majority of applicants had no prior interpreting experience. In addition, military interpreters might need to put themselves forward and be more assertive than professional interpreters today. A dialogue test could also assess such factors as an applicant's quick response, personality, and interpersonal skills, which could all be very valuable for military interpreters in wartime who would quite probably have to work autonomously and deal with unexpected situations.

The third type of capital was the applicant's political loyalty to the KMT Party, which was measured by a separate exam on Party knowledge. Specifically, interpreters were expected to exhibit certain qualities or potentials for their committed work under the KMT. This inclination is also indicated by the actual Chinese to English translation test for interpreter applicants (see an excerpt further in this chapter).[25] Clearly, the KMT chose the source text for the translation carefully: besides testing the interpreters' English language knowledge, the KMT wanted to examine their understanding of military discipline and authority and to inculcate a sense of duty and loyalty. The three beliefs stated at the

correspondence issued jointly by the Central Military Commission, Air Force Committee and the Ministry of Education on recruiting Chinese/English interpreters), HPA 61–1–38.

[25] Ibid.

end of the source text are in fact the three limits that the KMT tried to impose on interpreters: loyalty to the KMT Party, absolute obedience to the superior, and self-discipline. The training had already begun!

中译英:

请将下段中文译成英文

军纪者,军队之命脉也。军队必须有严肃之军纪,然后精神上之团结力得以稳固战斗力之持久性得以确保。盖战时各部队之任务不同,其境遇亦各有差别,而上自将帅,下至士兵,尤能联络一贯,万众一心,从一定之方针,取一致之行动者厥惟军纪是赖。…而军纪之要素,则在全军一致之三信心。故上下将士,无论在任何时机,当以信仰上官,信任部下,而自信其为效忠党国,服从命令,与爱护人民,恪守纪律之军人也。

Back Translation:

Please translate the following paragraph from Chinese into English.

Discipline is the lifeline of the army. A strict adherence to its discipline and a spiritual solidarity are the key to the army's strength in the field. In wartime, different troops will have different tasks and encounter different situations. The only way to keep the army integrated, from its generals to its soldiers, all following a specific direction and taking consistent actions, is to rely on army discipline.…And the core of this discipline is the three strong beliefs held by the entire army. Hence, all staff, from officers to soldiers, at any time, should believe in their superiors and subjects, as well as in their own loyalty to the Party, obedience to orders, care for the public, and strict self-discipline as an army man.

For the KMT government, however, interpreters' knowledge of the KMT Party and success in the translation test were not enough. It is set out clearly in this recruitment document that before formal registration, all successful applicants had to find a prestigious sponsor to attest to their reliability and personality. According to the KMT request, this sponsor had to be someone directly affiliated with the government or a commercial organization approved by the FAB. All interpreters had to have their sponsors fill in and sign a warranty form.[26]

[26] *Zhongxuntuan yiyuan xunlian yi, san, si qi fenpei fanyiguan wen* 中训团译员训练一三四期分配翻译官文 (On the appointment of interpreters trained in the interpreter training program, sessions 1, 3, 4, at the Central Training Organization), 6 June, 1944, NHA763–338–18.

To request that interpreters obtain sponsorship from agents affiliated with the government or authorized organizations was to ask for evidence of the interpreters' social capital; that is, the social connections and networks on which they could call. In other words, only agents who were in or close to the same class would be allowed entrance. Theoretically, this system could reinforce the KMT's control of the value of capital and maintain the social structure under its dominance. Pragmatically, it would help the KMT impose a double constraint on interpreters because their behavior would also affect their sponsors, who would not want to jeopardize their own positions by sponsoring "potentially dangerous" interpreters.

As for benefits, the recruitment document provides a fairly clear explanation of such details as interpreter rank, salaries, subsidies for service abroad, and free medical care. For example, there were five ranks of interpreters with different grades of salary. Rank 1 is the highest level with a monthly salary of 30,000 yuan in Chinese currency if the interpreter served at home, or 9,000 yuan in Chinese currency and 250 rupee subsidy in Indian currency if he served abroad; Rank 5 is the lowest level with a monthly salary of 22,000 yuan in Chinese currency, or 5,000 yuan in Chinese currency and 140 rupees in Indian currency. It is difficult to extrapolate the exact monetary or material value of the compensation because of regional differences and the high inflation in the 1940s. As some interpreters recall, by the end of the war, a salary of 8,000 Chinese yuan was only enough for four packs of Camel cigarettes (Lu 2005), while an Indian rupee was merely the value of a bowl of noodles (Su 2005: 204). However, what is central to this discussion is interpreter *perception* of these stakes when they applied for these positions. In other words, were these stakes attractive and competitive enough to draw agents from other fields to military interpreting, regardless of the potential danger? A letter[27] written jointly by two applicants (Jiang Shouli and Yang Wenhao) for the interpreter positions was found in the FAB file folder in the No. 2 National Historical Archive. It provides some insights into this question.

[27] In *Zhengdiao ge jiguan xuexiao gongjiao renyuan, xuesheng chongren yiyuan luqu mindan* 征调各机关学校剿教人员、学生充任译员录取名单 (A list of government employees, university staff, and students recruited as interpreters), NHA 763–27. The original letter was written in English.

Two male applicants, aged 29 and 31, were Rank 1 inspectors working in Nanning Customs. This letter stands out from other documents in the FAB file folder because, other than the FAB's correspondence with the US forces in China, it is one of few letters originally written in English and directly addressing the FAB of Central Military Mission in Chongqing. Why did these two Chinese custom inspectors address the FAB in English? Most probably, they wanted to impress the FAB officers with their English language skills. Since knowledge of the English language was advertised as a prerequisite for the position of interpreter, a letter written in English would be one way to demonstrate the applicants' command of the English language. In the letter, they claimed that they want to respond to the government's call and leave their current positions to work as interpreters with the American forces. Evidently, these two applicants, Jiang and Yang, had an acute perception of both the FAB's interpreter recruitment and the value of their linguistic capital. They also showed great initiative by offering the FAB information on their background, as well as proposing possible locations for their service (i.e., the American military headquarters in the Nanning area).

Nevertheless, it may not be accurate to claim that every interpreter perceived the stakes as Jiang and Yang did; perception of the field is always subject to position and previous social experience. In addition, despite the KMT's expectation, it is unlikely that every interpreter recruited possessed all the capital requested, especially given the urgent need for interpreters and the limited number of agents with sufficient English language knowledge. This reality is probably one reason that all interpreters had to undergo a few weeks of intensive training before their service in the army.

Training and Interpreters' Professional Habitus

Interpreter training is a crucial issue in this discussion because, being recruited from the public, few of these interpreters actually had any interpreting experience. Although the length of the interpreter training varied over time (from four to six weeks), for most recruits, it constituted their earliest experience as interpreters in society. Hence, this early understanding of the interpreter profession was the basis of their professional

habitus, which would be continuously refined in their later interpreting practices. As Simeoni (1998: 14–5) emphasizes, the notion of translatorial habitus refers to "a complex, adaptive habitus finely tuned to the practical demands of the (special) field(s) in which it operates". For the KMT, training was not only a process of imparting the knowledge and skills essential to military interpreting but also an indoctrination of ideology and principles favorable to itself—the "ethics" of a military interpreter. This indoctrination continued in the interpreters' post-training interpreting practices because the KMT still held the upper hand in their employment and evaluation.

A four-week interpreter training outline compiled in November 1941[28] provides some interesting information on the goals, requirements, and length of this training, and suggests training methods, subjects (content, hours), and relevant education (seminars and speeches). This training outline clearly defines the interpreters' work as "military interpreting and liaison", a definition that makes a clear distinction between these interpreters and the civilian staff who did translation in offices. However, for the KMT, military interpreters were also the professionals serving the military in diverse aspects, not exclusively interpreting. Such a multiple expectation is also apparent in the curriculum attached as appendix in this training outline, in which language courses (e.g., English dialogue [36 hours], English writing [16 hours], and interpreting military terminology [16 hours]) account for 47% of the training hours. In addition, 11% of the training time was devoted to background knowledge—the military operations of foreign countries (4 hours), the geography of the Pacific Ocean for military purposes (4 hours), and research into the opposition (8 hours). The remaining hours were then to be spent on the interpreters' "spiritual training" (e.g., political training) and military duties, including liaison and intelligence work. This former was to be addressed by courses on President Sun Yatsen's three principles (4 hours), the political leader's speech and behavior (4 hours), and domestic politics (4 hours), as well

[28] *Junweihui wei suoshu weishiju guanyu kaiban waiyu xunlianban de baogao zhiling, waiyu xunlianban zuzhi dagang* 军委会为所属外事局关于开办外语训练班的报告、指令,外语训练班组织大纲 (the Military Commission's report, instructions, and organizational guidelines for the Foreign Language Training Program), NHA 763–456.

as presentations by guest speakers (8 hours), all of which accounted for 14% of the total hours. The remaining 17% consisted of coursework on a military attaché's duties (4 hours), diplomatic protocol (4 hours), international politics (4 hours), international intelligence (4 hours), and intelligence science (8 hours).

This outline's emphasis on interpreters' political loyalty to the KMT is also very clear. The interpreters' belief in the KMT Party's three principles and commitment to its "great revolutionary leader" are explicitly set out as the foremost training goal. Since these three principles of 民族 (*minzu*, nationalism), 民权 (*minquan*, democracy), and 民生 (*minsheng*, socialism)—initially proposed by Sun Yatsen, founder of the KMT Party and the republican government—was recognized as the basis of the KMT's ideology and political stance (Chang 1991), this emphasis is in fact a demand for political loyalty to the KMT and Jiang Jieshi, the KMT government's then leader and president. According to the curriculum, almost 12 hours of training would concentrate on intensive political education, including the three principles, the leader's statements, and relevant political propaganda materials. This loyalty was even raised to the level of individual worship in courses such as the Political Leader's Speech and Behavior, and Domestic Politics, in which Jiang's speech and practices were studied as textbooks. In one sense, this political loyalty became the key principle of the interpreters' professional ethics.

Obviously, as this outline was produced in the training program's infancy (late 1941), the details could be expected to change as the war developed. Nevertheless, the directions set out here by the KMT are explicit and applicable in the long term. In addition, because investigations of interpreting and translation history cannot always unearth training syllabi, this training outline and curriculum is a particularly useful source for analyzing the formation of the interpreters' professional habitus. For interpreters, the training framework meant more than what was actually learned from the courses because the material taught and emphasized conveyed important messages about the military interpreting profession, including the types of qualities and competencies that would be valued or devalued, and the types of behavior considered appropriate or inappropriate for military interpreters. In other words, the training process was in fact one of fostering and reinforcing certain categories

of perception of the field; in other words, the interpreters' professional habitus. For example, the "Foreword to Teachers and Students" in one of the training materials, *Forty English Lessons for Interpreting Officers,*[29] prescribes interpreters' professional performance as follows:

…

11. Interpretation from one language to the other should be rapid, accurate, clear, and in good conversational style.
12. The teaching and study of these lessons should also provide valuable opportunities for education in citizenship, true patriotism, international cooperation, Chinese-American understanding and goodwill, and in those qualities of discipline, courtesy, industry, perseverance, character and service that should characterize the work of an interpreting officer.

These two statements, to some extent, are the KMT's definitions of good interpretation ("rapid, accurate, clear, and in good conversational style") and the attributes of a qualified interpreter ("citizenship", "true patriotism", "discipline", "courtesy", and so on), or in Bourdieu's words, the rules of the game. Hence, these definitions were an extension of the value system determined and maintained by the KMT and had a decisive influence on the interpreters. Through the offering of examples, the correction of mistakes and examinations, training thus became a process of endowing and reinforcing interpreters' perceptions of the value system orchestrated by the KMT.

Nevertheless, in terms of forming the interpreters' professional habitus, training was only a beginning because of its short duration and the limited extent of the interpreters' interaction during training with other agents and institutions. Moreover, an individual's habitus is always unique and varied owing to individual's social experiences in the field. Hence, despite the influence of general training, interpreter perceptions of the field develop with their professional practice, a factor that the KMT's

[29] Unpublished source compiled in 1945 by the Liaison Group of the Foreign Affairs, Bureau National Military Council, provided to the author by retired interpreter, Yan Jiarui, during a personal interview on January 8, 2009.

interpreter management relied on heavily. For example, in the FAB's *Regulation of Management of The CMC's FA Interpreters* published on July 27th 1943, six types of practice were listed for honor and/or prizes[30]:

1) 服务成绩特别优良者;
2) 办理困难或危急事件甚切机宜者;
3) 破获国际阴谋扰乱机关证据确凿者;
4) 冒险达到命令中之任务者;
5) 带病或负伤仍勉力服务者;
6) 工作时能留心考察当地情形,拟具报告供改善参考之资料者.

a) Outstanding interpreting service.
b) Dealing with difficult or emergency situation properly and timely.
c) Destroying international plots aimed at disturbance on site with substantial evidence.
d) Risking their lives to accomplish their work.
e) Committing to their work while being sick or injured.
f) Carefully investigating local areas during work and submitting relevant reports for improving current references and materials.

These six categories of honorable interpreter behavior are directly relevant to the FAB's interpreter training. Besides interpreting skills, interpreter ability to solve difficult problems and emergencies (alertness, wisdom), information collection and anti-spying practices (intelligence activities), and commitment and willingness to sacrifice (nationalism and passion for revolution) were all recognized as value-adding points. Clearly, for military interpreters, moving closer to any of these six categories was the only way to attain the honors or rewards (e.g., promotion, prizes) offered by the FAB for professional performance.

Apart from the honor system shown earlier, through its client, the US forces, the KMT also introduced an evaluation system to monitor all FAB interpreters in service. To this end, the FAB designed an interpreting

[30] *Junshi weiyuanhui waishiju yiyuan guanli guize minguo sanshisa nian qi yue ershiqi ri* 军事委员会外事局译员管理规则 (Regulation of Management of the CMC's FAB Interpreters), 27 July, 1943, NHA 763–452–36.

officer performance rating sheet to be filled out by the American clients.[31] This evaluation assessed professional performance on five aspects: interpreting skills, working attitude, professional development, courtesy, and character. In this manner, the KMT re-applied its standards of "good" interpretation and "qualified" interpreters: the closer the interpreters' performance to the standards, the higher their ratings. The evaluation thus forced all interpreters to check their practice against the standards. In other words, to secure their positions and obtain further interests, they had to follow the standard set by the KMT. Any positive consequences resulting from this evaluation, such as praise, promotion, or subsidy, would then encourage them to shape themselves further towards the KMT's model.

It is not surprising to see that the American clients played a crucial role in this evaluation system given their observation of the interpreters' daily performance and their subsequent ratings. This feedback was decisive for the interpreters' professional life. In fact, many of the FAB's decisions to promote or punish interpreters were based directly on the Americans' reports.[32] For example, Cheng Ching Tung[33] (FAB interpreter no. 241) was suggested for promotion for his willingness and readiness to "work in any capacity for this service, no matter what they may be", and his colleague Wang Han Ping (FAB interpreter No. 272) was also proposed for promotion because of his "exceptional ability in interpreting" and "perfect courtesy".[34] At the same time, however, certain interpreter behavior was also reported by clients as problematic and unacceptable. For instance, interpreter Lin Tsu Chang (FAB interpreter no. 218) was called to account for his attempts to "avoid field duty" on the excuse of ill health. After two physical examinations, the clients formally requested that Lin be replaced with someone who did not "mind the rigor of field duty" and suggested a necessary punishment for Lin.[35]

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[31] Interpreting Officer Performance Rating Sheet, NHA 763–420–12.

[32] *Yiyuan Jiangcheng* 译员奖惩 (Rewards/Punishments for Interpreters), NHA 763–34.

[33] Some interpreters' names are in the Wade-Giles system in the original documents. For accuracy, no conversion to pinyin system is made in this thesis.

[34] May 15, 1944.

[35] May 26, 1944.

Through follow-ups, the FAB kept brief records of almost all reports on interpreter performance. Whereas interpreters Cheng Ching Tung and Wang Han Ping were both honored by the FAB, which was officially recorded in their profiles, Lin Tsu Chang was given a formal warning. This employee–client evaluation system thus became the basic framework for the interpreters' professional development. The honors granted and warnings issued from the KMT amounted to a direct increase or reduction in reputation or social credit; that is, social and political capital. Moreover, because these honors and warnings were written up in these interpreters' work records, they would continuously affect their interpreting careers, including both their current positions and their chances for promotion. Hence, these negative or positive consequences were personal and directly influenced the interpreters' understanding of both the military interpreter profession and themselves. The message in practice was much clearer than in training: play according to the rules; otherwise, you will be out of the game.

That these interpreters perceived the objective relationships in the field and embodied the rules and expectations as part of their professional habitus is evidenced by the fact that some tried to earn good feedback by working towards the standards set by the employer and client. These individuals carried out their professional practice in the manner expected and requested both because they knew it was appropriate and in order to pursue their own further interests. At the same time, the honors or warnings received by certain interpreters set an example for their professional peers. Once interpreters recognized this client–employer feedback structure, they would try to initiate similar practices in their interaction with the client. Hence, from training to practical experiences, these young interpreters gradually absorbed the so-called professional rules, which then constituted the basis for their perception of the field and generated their later professional practices. This process was therefore one of forming and developing the interpreters' professional habitus.

However, this absorption of professional habitus does not mean that professional interpreters were merely the mechanical products of training and the professional interpreting world. Rather, like all social beings, these interpreters had families, friends, and other social affiliations separate from their interpreting work. Their professional habitus, therefore,

was always part of their general habitus and subject to their previous social and educational experiences. These experiences thus constituted the basis of the interpreters' perception of the field, including their initial movement into the interpreting profession and their self-perception of their professional practice. In the next section, I will take a closer look at a special group of these KMT interpreters and their varied responses to their military interpreting work.

2.3 A Case Study of University Students as Military Interpreters

Bourdieu (1998a/1994: 76–7) argues that agential decision-making is a result of *illusio*, a practical sense of the game, rather than rationality. For him, agential *illusio* is produced by habitus—embodied objective conditions—and is acquired through experience in the field (ibid.: 77). Then, if the KMT training was a starting point for the interpreters' professional habitus, how did their previous social experience and interpreting practice in the field relate to this notion of *illusio*?

To investigate this issue, this section focuses on a special group of the KMT interpreters—university students and graduates—who, as documented in two interpreter yearbooks stored in the Hunan Provincial Archive, made up a high percentage of the Chinese/English interpreters. These two yearbooks give basic information—including age, birthplace, and educational background—on a total of 419 FAB interpreters who received their training in two groups in Chongqing in February[36] and June[37] 1945, respectively. One of these interpreters from the August cohort, Yan Jiarui, graciously granted me a personal interview.

[36] *Guanyu zhongxuntuan yiyuan xunlianban tongxuelu ji xingzhengban, chongqing fentuan hunan tongxue deng fandong gugan de zhaopian* 关于中训团译员训练班同学录及行政班,重庆分团湖南同学等反动骨干的照片 (The yearbook of the alumni interpreters trained at the Central Training Department of the administration's training program, including photos of Hunan-born key members of the Central Training Department's Chongqing branch), HPA 59–1–15.

[37] *Zhongyang xunliantuan yiyuan xunlianban disiqi guanzuo tongxue tongxunlu* 中央训练团译员训练班第四期官佐同学通讯录 (The yearbook of the alumni interpreters and officers in the Fourth Interpreter Training Program, at the Central Training Department), HPA 0–5–137.

A prominent feature shown in the examination of these two yearbooks is that these 419 interpreters were particularly young: 273 (65%) of them were between 20 and 25, and 100 were between 26 and 29 (24%). Of the remainder, except for three (1%) who were under 20, 30 interpreters (7%) were aged 30 to 35, 11 (3%) from 36 to 40, and two (0.4%) over 40. In other words, although the original age limit set by the KMT(20–40) is very wide,[38] 373 (89%) interpreters in these groups were aged 20 to 29, and over two thirds were actually in their early twenties.

This trend of youthful interpreters can be understood in two ways. First, given the war situation and the military interpreting needed, being young could be a significant capital for interpreters because of its direct relation to many factors, including health, stamina, quick response, and fast learning. Thus, an age preference (when possible) during KMT selection of interpreters would not be surprising. Second, because of their current positions and habitus, younger agents were probably more likely to need particular stakes. For example, for students with little working experience or social status, military interpreter positions might be a good wartime option given the welfare and material compensation provided by the government. However, for those with established careers or more social experience, the benefits offered by the KMT government might not seem sufficient, especially given the danger and pressure associated with military interpreting. This assumption was confirmed in my interview with Yan Jiarui (2009). In 1945, as a 20-year-old high school graduate from a single-parent family in Kunming, Yan urgently needed a job to relieve the financial pressure on his mother, who had worked very hard to support his studies. For him, being a military interpreter was a convenient way out because, besides his interest in the English language, the military interpreter position was a stable job paid by the government.

Another interesting finding in terms of birthplace or geographic origin is that, as Table 2.1[39] shows, the interpreters came from a total of 23 provinces, but the majority were from areas that had been continuously

[38] *Junshi weiyuanhui waishiju kaoxuan gaoji yiyuan jianzhang* (*yu sanshisi niandu*) 军事委员会外事局考选高级译员简章(渝三十四年度) (the FAB's advertisement for interpreter recruitment, Chongqing, 1945), HPA 60–1–227–11.

[39] The information in Table 2.1 was also taken from the two alumni yearbooks, HPA0–5–137.

controlled by the KMT government before the war. The top three provinces—Guangdong (17.9%), Jiangsu (16.5%), and Zhejiang (16.2%)—were actually the KMT's political and economic centers in China. In contrast, few interpreters came from provinces in north and north-west China like Jinlin, Liaolin, Heilongjiang, and Shanxi, which had all been occupied or controlled by either the Japanese forces or the Chinese communists before or during the war.

This imbalance in interpreter origin may be related to many factors, including poor transportation and communication during wartime and regional differences in the availability of higher education. It does reveal, however, the potential geopolitical constraints imposed on interpreters by their physical locations and social backgrounds; the birthplace being the usual locus of early social experience, interpreters born and raised in KMT-controlled areas would embody the extant political and social structure. This incarnated habitus would in turn affect their *illusio*. As Yan claimed in our interview, one reason for his applying to the interpreter program was to "报效祖国" (*baoxiao zuguo*, to serve my motherland) (Yan 2009) after witnessing the damage caused by the Japanese bombing of Kunming. However, when asked to clarify what "motherland" meant, he admitted that at that time serving the KMT government equaled serving the motherland, and he thought of no other options. Given that Yan had spent all his childhood and youth in Kunming, where the KMT had long maintained political and military dominance both before and during the war, his recognition of his national identity was assumedly the accumulated result of his education and social experiences.

Nevertheless, Yan's case may not be sufficiently representative of the other 418 military interpreters in that he was comparatively younger and had just finished high school. Overall, among these 419 individuals, the ratio between interpreters with and without higher education experience was 14:1, meaning that 389 had attended university or college before their interpreting training, while 27 (including three for whom educational data are missing) presumably had no more than a secondary education.

Interestingly, a similar trend also emerges for educational background. Although the group as a whole represented a total of 84 public and private universities/colleges in China, the majority of interpreters had actu-

Table 2.1 Interpreter origins

Province	Number	Percentage
Guangdong 广东	75	17.9%
Jiangsu 江苏	69	16.5%
Zhejiang 浙江	68	16.2%
Hunan 湖南	41	9.8%
Hubei 湖北	29	6.9%
Hebei 河北	24	5.7%
Anhui 安徽	23	5.5%
Sichuan 四川	20	4.7%
Shandong 山东	14	3.3%
Fujian 福建	14	3.3%
Henan 河南	14	3.3%
Jiangxi 江西	7	1.7%
Liaoning 辽宁	4	1.0%
Shanxi 山西	3	0.7%
Guangxi 广西	3	0.7%
Qingdao 青岛	2	0.5%
Guizhou 贵州	2	0.5%
Yunnan 云南	2	0.5%
Shanxi 陕西	1	0.2%
Suiyuan 绥远	1	0.2%
Gansu 甘肃	1	0.2%
Jilin 吉林	1	0.2%
Leihongjiang 黑龙江	1	0.2%
Total	419	100%

ally attended only a few universities/colleges. Specifically, as shown in Table 2.2,[40] there are 17 universities/colleges from which at least five interpreters had attended or graduated, which together produced 291 interpreters, almost three quarters of the 389 with higher education. Most particularly, apart from some foreign-funded universities, such as Hujiang University, Yanjing University, St. John's University, and Jinlin University, almost all universities listed in Table 2.2 were actually

[40] The information listed in Table 2.2 was taken from the two alumni yearbooks, HPA 0–5–137.

Table 2.2 Number of university-supplied interpreters

	University	Number of interpreters
1	National Fudan University	76
2	Central University	42
3	Central Political University	37
4	National Transportation University	23
5	National Zhejiang University	22
6	Jinling University	13
7	National Zhongshan University	10
8	Chongqing University	10
9	Hujiang University	8
10	Yanjing University	8
11	St. John University (Shanghai)	8
12	National Wuhan University	7
13	National Northern East University	6
14	National Guangxi University	6
15	Datong University	5
16	National Tongji University	5
17	National Qinghua University	5
	Total	291

national universities funded and directly supervised by the KMT government. These include the top five universities of the time: National Fudan University (76), Central University (42), Central Political University (37), National Transportation University (23), and National Zhejiang University (23).

As these data suggest, it is no coincidence that a majority of these military interpreters were university students; their ages, origins, and former universities all indicate particular patterns related to social position and educational experience. However, are these patterns also related to these interpreters' *illusio* and their position-taking in the field? Do they explain what type of capital would be valued by the KMT? What role did the universities play in the interaction between the interpreters and the KMT government? To answer these questions, it is necessary to relate them to higher education in China during the 1940s.

Before the outbreak of the war, higher education in China had developed in both public and private sectors. By 1931, there were 31 national universities, 37 private universities, 20 national technical colleges, and 10 private technical colleges, most of which were situated

in large cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Nanjing (Hsu and Chang 1972: 119). During the 1930s, the KMT government also established academic screening institutions whose main responsibilities were to review educational qualifications, publish college curricula, hold joint entry exams, and provide funding and loans to universities and colleges (ibid.: 121). These screening institutions and their activities were an extension of the government's control over institutions of higher learning and their students. In fact, it could be said that through a series of screening and funding measures especially related to public universities and colleges, the Nationalist government expected to turn the higher education institutions and their students into a national repertoire of manageable agents with knowledge, skills, and even bodies subject to its command.

This entire education system, however, was disrupted by the war. The Japanese forces' expansion into China and their massacre of Chinese civilians forced many students and universities/colleges to retreat physically, along with the KMT government, to the interior. After 1938, a majority of these institutions transferred their students to the unoccupied areas in the southwest and northwest, especially Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces, where the KMT government still maintained control. Therefore, geographically and politically, through its Ministry of Education, the KMT government retained direct administrative control over these universities/colleges and their students.

Moreover, as Hsu Longhsuen and Chang Mingkai's (1972: 12) research shows, despite a significant loss of students and universities in 1937 (17 fewer schools and 108,043 fewer students than in 1936), after 1938, the number of students and universities returned slowly to its previous level. By 1942, university students and graduates numbered 64,097 and 9,056, respectively, and by 1945, the total number of students reached 83,498, almost double the 41,922 in 1936 (ibid.). Hence, even without considering either physical condition or language skills, in each year between 1941 and 1945, at least 50,000 university students and 10,000 recent university graduates had received years of formal training in KMT-controlled academic institutions. Therefore, despite the wide age range

set by the KMT for military interpreters,[41] university students and graduates were more likely than others to become potential candidates.

However, if there were no requirements for interpreter major or subject field as the FAB's recruitment document shows, then what did this formal education mean for interpreters and for the KMT? It is highly probable that students studying at or graduating from government-recognized institutions were endowed with certain symbolic capital recognized and valued by the KMT government. For example, the opening text of *An Educational Objective and Implementing Policy* (1929), compiled by the KMT before the war, emphasizes that the KMT's political policy, the Three People's Principles, is the basis of its educational objectives (Hsu and Chang 1972: 110). Immediately following the statement of objective is the policy for its implementation, whose first two sections explain how the objective could be achieved:

a. The instruction on the Three People's Principles at various levels of schooling should be interrelated with the entire curriculum and extracurricular activities. History and geography instructional materials should be used to explain the essence of nationalism; group living training should be employed to develop the principle of democracy; and practice in production labour should be employed to lay the foundation for the Principle of People's Livelihood. *All in all, knowledge and virtues should be combined under the Three People's Principles to achieve faithfulness and pragmatism*.
b. Ordinary education should be designed in accordance with Dr. Sun Yatsen's teaching to *indoctrinate children and youth with the national virtues of loyalty, filial piety, kindness, love, faith, righteousness, harmony and peace*, to train the people to acquire necessary skills and to increase the people's productivity.[42] (Hsu and Chang 1972: 110, emphasis added)

Evidently, the KMT's basic political policy of the three principles was also the core idea of this KMT-orchestrated educational policy. Curricular and extracurricular activities at all levels were supposed to inculcate these

[41] NHA763–338–18.

[42] All information quoted from this policy was translated by Wen Ha-hsing.

principles or, simply put, indoctrinate and reinforce the KMT's dominance. Hence, the concept of nation in "national independence" and "nationalism" was narrowed down to the KMT government. Likewise, the document emphasized that subjects like history and geography should instill this "essence of nationalism", while the aim of knowledge and "national virtues" like "loyalty, filial piety, kindness, love, faith, righteousness, harmony and peace" should be "faithfulness and pragmatism" under the KMT government. Hence, within the framework of such a policy, after successfully finishing elementary and secondary education, university students and graduates were the end product of a process of indoctrination. In fact, their student status in KMT academic institutions was the capital that the KMT sought.

In addition to the previously mentioned factors, the KMT also had practical considerations in recruiting university students and graduates, including the convenience of command and control, in which the universities and colleges played an indispensable role. That is, through its Ministry of Education, the KMT government could reach all universities and colleges in its controlled areas. These institutions not only had detailed information on their students' ages, gender, and skills but also the ability to assist the KMT government in the initial organization of student applications and language testing. Moreover, being degree-granting institutions, universities and colleges could exert a more direct and immediate influence on students. This connection in interpreter recruitment between universities and the KMT government is apparent in the KMT's formal dictum to many universities and colleges, issued in 1943 via the Ministry of Education, requesting interpreters and making clear the universities' responsibilities in supporting their recruitment.[43] These responsibilities included supplying an approximate number of students, organizing the test, establishing records of students' physical conditions through the resident university doctors, and receiving and distributing travel grants for students who passed the test.

[43] *Guoli zhongyang gongye zhuanke zhiye xuexiao, jiaowu lei: jiaoyu bu (daidian jian)* No. 305 国立中央工业专科职业学校,教务类:教育部(代电建)第三零五号 (The Registry, National Central Industrial Professional College: Notice from the Ministry of Education (telegram no. 305)), CMA 0126–2–510–139 (full transcript of the original source).

In fact, many universities and colleges showed their own initiative in interpreter recruitment. For example, the Southwest Associated University in Kunming even issued a formal regulation on student responsibility in this recruitment, using both carrot and stick to persuade and encourage students to serve as military interpreters.[44] According to this regulation, all male students in their fourth year had to serve as military interpreters unless they failed the physical examination. Those no more than 30 credits away from degree completion would receive their degrees immediately after their interpreting service in the army. However, anyone not responding to the call for interpreting services would be seen as breaking the conscription law by purposely avoiding military service. As a result, they would be deprived of their student status and referred to relevant military authorities. The regulation also included applications from students in the first, second, and third years, as well as from transfer or trial students. Hence, the KMT's power over its academic institutions was relayed, reinforced, and translated into an influence over the university students.

Admittedly, despite the pressure from the KMT and universities, many of these university students might voluntarily respond to the KMT's call for military interpreters, seeing this as a chance to contribute to their country and people. Although data from only one first-hand interview makes it hard to speculate on or generalize the *illusio* of this group of interpreters almost half a century ago, Interpreter Yan's reminiscences do provide some clues to this perception. First, Yan, like many interpreters (quoted in Lu 2005; Mei 2004: 10; Cai 2005), claimed nationalistic passion as one of the most important motives for joining the military interpreter program.[45] In fact, since the early twentieth century, Chinese university students had been very keen on national politics and reform and were probably the most passionately nationalistic group in Chinese society,[46] although more on account of China's almost century-long

[44] *Xinan lianda xuesheng zhengdiao chongren yiyuan banfa* 西南联大学生征调充任译员办法 (Regulations concerning the Southwest Associated University students' applications to be an interpreter), December 3, 1943. See also Xu (1998), 668–9.

[45] Yan Jiarui, personal interview, January 8, 2009.

[46] For example, the well-known May Fourth Movement was kicked off by the protest by more than 3,000 Chinese students in Tiananmen Square in 1919.

humiliation by foreigners than of manipulation (Israel 1966: 8, 184). Although in the early 1930s, Chinese students, especially university students, had vehemently protested against the KMT government's policy of appeasing Japan's aggression (Twitchett et al. 1993/1986: 138), the relationship between students and the KMT during the war was not one of alienation because the nationalism prevalent among students was "anti-imperialist" or "anti-Japanese" (Israel 1966: 184–5).

Although it may be problematic to assume that this nationalistic goal was part of the *illusio* possessed by all the interpreter candidates, the fact that many claimed it as a major motive is enough to imply that they perceived the would-be honor of becoming military interpreters as a stake in the "game" of national pride. In addition, whether this *illusio* was based on a genuine nationalistic passion or was a glory-based excuse for obtaining symbolic capital (or both), the interpreters' beliefs about this honor would be tested and refined in their practice. In Bourdieu's terminology, they would learn whether joining and investing in the game was worthwhile. This probably explains why Mei Zuyi, an interpreter working for the US forces' Kunming headquarter in 1943 and 1944, was troubled by the gap between his ideal of serving his motherland and the reality of his military interpreting work. As Mei revealed in his memoir (2004), he had joined the KMT's interpreter team based on his ideal of or belief in his work as resistance to the Japanese. In this case, however, his ideal was more likely a self-perception of his social position in the field; that is, what he should be doing and what he could do with his knowledge and skills. However, in his memoir, he writes,

> 做翻译员工作的头几个月,心情十分复杂。一方面觉得自己参加了抗日队伍,达到了"为国效劳"的目的,但看到了国民党政府和军队的腐败现象,又觉得自己是"助纣为虐",再则有些美国人员认为我们是落后民族,对中国人十分傲慢。自己常想怎样才能使中国赶快富强起来,一不怕日本侵略,二不求助于美国呢?当然在那时的条件下,一个单纯的青年学生是找不到什么答案的,只是增加了思想上的苦恼。

> I was upset by my interpreting work in the first couple of months. I thought I had reached my goal of serving the country by joining the army to resist

> the Japanese. But when I witnessed the corruption of the KMT government and its army, I felt that I was helping the bad side. Also, some American staff members were very arrogant towards the Chinese because they saw us as inferior to them. So I was always thinking how we could make China richer and stronger so we would not need to fear Japanese aggression or ask for help from the Americans. Of course, in that situation, a young man as innocent as I could not find any answers but only trouble himself more. (Mei 2004: 11)

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland (2002/1953) also provide interesting information on the student interpreters. Being based on a direct summary of US military reports and their interviews with relevant American staff, their data should accurately reflect the client's perception of the interpreters' practices. For example, some American staff in an artillery training center described their 23 Chinese student interpreters as "a problem for the center". Besides a lack of knowledge of military phraseology and concepts, and their "embroidering" of the source text (Romanus and Sunderland 2002/1953: 219–20), these student interpreters seemingly had problems fitting into the military interpreter positions. Although Romanus and Sunderland do not specify the nature of these problems, they emphasize their relevance to the interpreters' self-perception as "members of the superior scholar class" living the reality of "fixed incomes at a time of rampant inflation" (ibid.: 294).

This feeling of belonging to "the superior scholar class" is actually not surprising when related to these interpreters' university education. Although in the 1940s, China had at least 50,000 university students and 10,000 university graduates (Hsu and Chang 1972: 12), university degrees were still a rare and valued capital in Chinese society given its total population and sparse higher education resources at that time. In addition, in that era, a majority of Chinese university students were from upper- or middle-class families, with parents who were officials, businessmen, teachers, and other professionals (Israel 1996: 6). Given their education and family background, it is easy to understand why some regarded themselves as from a superior class and were dissatisfied with their lot.

Admittedly, however, 'dissatisfied' may not be the right word to describe the student interpreters' situation. In fact, after 1943, the KMT started to see an increasing number of student interpreters trying to delay or desert their service. For example, in May 1944 alone, the US forces reported four interpreters to the FAB, two for desertion and two for shirking field duty on the (proven to be fake) excuse of language insufficiency and sickness.[47] This problem of interpreter desertion or shirking became so common in late 1943 that the FAB had to enforce a policy throughout all universities that without certificates from the FAB, no student interpreters could resume their student status or obtain their degrees even if they claimed to have finished their military interpreting service.[48]

However, as recorded in a letter that the FAB received from the Secretariat of the Central Military Commission on September 7, 1943, these were not the only problems with interpreters in service.[49] In this letter, the KMT government shows great concern about certain interpreters' behaviors, especially criticizing the government and requesting benefits from the Americans. To stop such 'improper' conduct and encourage interpreters to work, the KMT government increased the benefits for recruited interpreters by raising their starting military rank (e.g., to the equivalent of a major in the infantry), thereby improving the salary level and enhancing the subsidies for service abroad.

On the other hand, the KMT was also looking for ways to strengthen its control over its nearly 2,000 interpreters, particularly these student interpreters. As the letter states, although many interpreters worked very hard and had contributed much to the army, it was not unusual to see inappropriate interpreter behavior, such as stirring up chaos, blackmailing others, shirking duties, or fleeing positions. In addition, these problematic interpreters were often students enlisted directly from universities. The directors in local FAB branches were informed of precautionary measures, and Wang Shijie, Deputy Director of FAB Central,

[47] NHA 763–34.

[48] *Jiaoyubu xunling gaozi No. 49361, 1943-10-9, wu zhengmingshu huixiao fuxue zhi yiyuan buzhun ruxue* 教育部训令高字第49361号1943年10月九日，无证明书回校复学之译员不准入学" (Orders from the Ministry of Education, HE 49361, 9 October, 1943, that interpreters without certificates should not be allowed to resume their university studies), HPA 61–1–38–7.

[49] This letter was found in the same file folder, HPA 61–1–38–7.

traveled to meet these 'trouble-making interpreters' in person. Interpreter training thus again enters the discussion:

> 今办理是次业务对译员之受训无方致劳专注,实不能辞此重咎,现正设法纠正,今后拟于征调派遣服务之学生,先施以严格政工训练,冀X正其思想,启发其爱国心,而能忠诚服务以期人尽其才,共抗建大业…
>
> As the institution supervising the training of these interpreters, the FAB is responsible for proper solutions. Rectification measures should be carried out immediately. From now on, before their service, all student interpreters shall receive proper political training, so that their thoughts are corrected and their patriotic hearts inspired for loyal service. Then the interpreters can be deployed according to their talents and contribute to our resistance against the Japanese and to national reconstruction….[50]

No official information is available on whether the KMT's adjustments of interpreter payment were effective in encouraging them to remain in and concentrate on their work. However, the fact that many interpreters left their positions or sought interests elsewhere when quitting was impossible already shows that many interpreters with university degrees found the benefits initially set by the FAB insufficiently attractive for them to risk their lives with the army. In other words, when the stakes associated with their positions were no longer perceived as worth adherence to and investment in the game, they left their positions and moved to others.

2.4 Conclusions

This chapter has described four groups of interpreters employed by the Chinese KMT government during the war—Chinese/Japanese interpreters, Chinese/German interpreters, Chinese/Russian interpreters, and Chinese/English interpreters—whose educational backgrounds it then examined in more detail. Subsequently, it presented separate discussions of these four groups, with a focus on the interpreters' various responsi-

[50] Ibid.

bilities in different political and military contexts ranging from military training, liaison, military supply, and combat practices to intelligence activities. As the analysis has clearly shown, the interpreters' position-taking and practices were greatly affected by the KMT government's foreign policy during the war. This policy influenced not only the availability of interpreter positions but also the relative value of their capital, including linguistic capital (knowledge of language), cultural capital (cultural competencies), social capital (educational background, social networks), and political capital (political loyalty). Some such capital, including knowledge, competencies, and networks, was accumulated through the interpreters' educational and social experiences; some, such as political beliefs and values, was inculcated through the interpreter training orchestrated by the KMT government.

The latter, particularly, suggests that interpreter training involved not only interpreter pursuance of more capital and better positions in the arena but also a struggle by the Chinese KMT to recruit useful and loyal workers for its competition or cooperation with other international political and military powers. This dialectic interaction during training between interpreters and the KMT authorities was also part of the formation of the interpreters' professional habitus. Through exams, evaluations, and employment by the KMT, the standards for 'good interpreting' and 'honorable interpreters' were established, reinforced, and embodied as part of the interpreters' professional habitus, which not only generated their *illusio*, whether or not eventually realized, but also directly affected their interpreting practices. Hence, the following chapters further explore this formation of interpreter habitus and the interpreters' relevant practices under other political powers during the war.

3

Political Beliefs or Practical Gains?: Interpreting for the Chinese Communist Party

Interpreting for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was somewhat different from interpreting for the KMT government. First, the CCP had less need for interpreters and therefore organized less training. In fact, 'interpreter' was not a distinctive profession until the late 1940s, especially because during the war the CCP had not yet become an established political power in China and had limited influence and control over resources (Kataoka 1974: 95–6; Twitchett et al. 1993: 632–4). Indeed, prior to the KMT's 1938 acceptance of the United Front Policy, the CCP had always been labeled and suppressed as a rebellion force. At the beginning of the war, therefore, its main force was almost limited to its base in Jiangxi province, where it struggled for survival in civil war with the KMT. Moreover, despite its success in resisting some of the KMT's "extermination campaigns", it was defeated in the fifth campaign in 1934 and had to give up its base and begin the famous Long March to seek safety in other places (Guillermaz 1968: 239–40; North 1963: 163–4). Before it had finished this lengthy trek and settled down in 1936 at a base in northern Shanxi province, the CCP had too little strength to put up any substantial resistance to the Japanese or contact any foreign powers

T. Guo, *Surviving in Violent Conflicts*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3_3

for support (Van Slyke 1968: 32–3). Hence, this almost isolated field of interpreting presents an interesting situation for studying interpreters' positioning in the field because, in their interpreting practices, they had to speculate on and struggle for their political survival.

During this period, because of the KMT's military and economic blockade, it was very difficult for the CCP to establish any connection with foreign powers and organizations other than the Comintern and the USSR. However, as discussed in Chap. 2, despite its ideological support for the CCP, the USSR maintained its formal diplomatic relationship with the KMT government, whose military supplies and advisers "went exclusively" to the KMT rather than to the CCP (Van Slyke 1968: 226–7). In regards to its connection with the Comintern in Moscow, the CCP managed to maintain communications through telegraph and messengers from the late 1920s until 1943. This type of communication, however, was unstable and difficult given the CCP Red Army forces' frequent military actions and movements (North 1963: 164). As a result, in the 1930s, interpreting activities under the CCP were very limited, primarily due to its communication with the few Comintern representatives in China.

The Japanese aggression and the formation of the anti-Japanese United Front in late 1937 temporarily stopped the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, thereby opening up opportunities for the CCP to consolidate its bases and develop contacts with foreign powers. Compared to the situation in the early 1930s, the CCP influenced more areas and so established some anti-Japanese bases. By the end of 1937, it had control of northeast Shanxi, west Hopei province, and part of central Hopei and southern Chahar. However, apart from its Shan-Gan-Ning base (the CCP headquarters in the Yan'an area), its control of other regions was not strong, and its military forces even in the areas under its control lacked coordination because they were not geographically adjacent (Twitchett et al. 1993: 640). In addition, a majority of CCP-held areas were rural, with sparse resources and difficult traveling conditions. Even the CCP's political center, the Shan-Gan-Ning base, was behind Japanese lines during the war. Such communication and transportation

difficulties impeded the CCP's wartime connection and cooperation with international forces, including its interpreting activities, although the isolation, to some extent, also left it free to develop its military and political strength because the Japanese forces primarily targeted cities and areas adjunct to railways.

However, as the war developed, the situation began to change, especially after the KMT encountered heavy losses resisting the Japanese while the CCP gradually increased its military strength in its bases in northwest China. Hence, the CCP began to play an increasingly important role in China's resistance to the Japanese and started to appeal for domestic and international support to further strengthen its political and military power. This inclination is made clear by the CCP's training of Chinese/Russian military interpreters in the early 1940s in anticipation of military cooperation with the USSR against the Japanese forces. At the same time, the CCP's ascended political position also started to attract attention from the West. In the 1940s, Yan'an saw increased visits by Western correspondents, which made Chinese/English interpreting an important area for the CCP's propaganda work. The arrival of a US Military Observation Group, the Dixie Mission, at Yan'an in 1944 further stimulated the development of Chinese/English interpreting, which constituted a crucial part of the CCP's efforts to seek support and aid from the Americans. In regards to Chinese/Japanese interpreting, the data available did not permit an accurate assessment of the situation, although it is known that the CCP ran the Japanese Workers' and Farmers' School for Japanese prisoners in Yan'an, where CCP cadres with knowledge of the Japanese language trained captured Japanese soldiers for psychological warfare against the Japanese forces (Barrett 1970: 34–5; He 2008).

The following sections therefore focus on the Chinese/Russian and Chinese/English interpreters trained and/or used by the CCP, highlighting the relationship between the interpreters' professional practices and their positioning in the CCP context. The underlying argument is that when providing linguistic assistance to clients, interpreters not only participate in the interaction between their clients but also develop new social and working relationships with them. This personal acquaintance

and experience of assisting communication enlarges the interpreters' social network and offers them opportunities for better positions and more capital.

3.1 Chinese/Russian Interpreters

3.1.1 Comintern Agents and the Students Returned from Russia

Unlike the KMT, who received both military aid and personnel support from Germany and the USSR, respectively, in the 1930s, the CCP was almost encircled in its Soviet bases and, because of the KMT government's military blockade, had hardly any contact with the outside world except for the Comintern. As noted in the memoir of Otto Braun (1982), a Comintern agent attached to the CCP in the 1930s, his journey from Shanghai to Ruijin, the centre of the CCP's Soviet bases in Jiangxi province, was very difficult because in the early 1930s, a majority of Chinese territory was still under the KMT government's control. Not only did foreigners need a visa for inland travel, but they were banned from "bandit fighting zones" (areas under CCP influence) (Braun 1982: 29–30). The telegram communication between the CCP and the Comintern in Moscow was highly unstable improved little even after the CCP gained its legal status with the formation of the United Front in late 1937 (Harrison 1972: 295).

Thus, in the 1930s, the CCP's need for Chinese/Russian interpreters was limited to its communication with the few Comintern agents in China, who either worked in the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai or resided at the CCP headquarters. Although the sources accessed do not record the exact number of Comintern agents during the 1930s, it is certain that most Comintern agents left China around 1931 because of the KMT government's political oppression and military blockade, and the Shanghai Bureau was permanently closed in 1935 (Yang 2005). From 1933 to 1939, the only Comintern agent in China was Otto Braun, who worked as the Red Army military adviser to the CCP (Braun 1982). As

a result, there would have been few positions open for Chinese/Russian interpreters working within the CCP during the first decade of the war as their clients (the CCP and the Russians) were physically separated and direct communication was limited. However, whereas this need for interpreters was crucial in shaping the field, it must be understood in context. How many agents, for example, had the necessary capital to be Chinese/Russian interpreters, and what did these agents perceive as the stake associated with such interpreter positions? These relevant factors are best addressed by examining a special group of agents associated with the CCP, students who had returned to China after a sojourn in Russia, termed by many historians, the "Russian-returned students" (Price 1976: 75, 128; Harrison 1972: 151, 171–2; North 1963: 140).

Specifically, this term refers to Chinese communists who had been selected by the CCP to be trained in the USSR during the 1920s and then returned to join the Chinese communist movement in the 1930s to 1940s. This training was partly attributable to support from the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat and partly related to the harsh environment for the CCP in China because of KMT government pressure since 1927 (Price 1976: 89). As a result, in the 1920s, many well-known Soviet institutions received Chinese communists sent by the CCP, including the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow (CUTEM), the Moscow Sun Yatsen University (MSYU), the Red Army (Frunze) Academy in Moscow, and the Leningrad Military-Political Academy (ibid.). Since the CCP's major need for interpreters in the 1930s originated from its connection to the Comintern in Moscow, these Russian-returned students seemed to be ideal candidates for the positions because of their Russian language training and communist education in the USSR.

Above all, some of these students had already had some interpreting experience during their training in the USSR, primarily assisting and interpreting Russian lectures and seminars for newcomers to the Russian institutions. Because a majority of these newcomers arrived with no knowledge of the Russian language, many Russian universities had to use senior Chinese students as interpreters until they had acquired basic language skills. For example, at CUTEM, at least four Chinese students

(Jü Qiupai, Li Tsengwu, Wu Hechü, and Wang Hungtung) were recognized as student interpreters who helped other Chinese students in lectures and seminars (Price 1976: 33). The number of Chinese/Russian student interpreters at MSYU was probably even greater, given the influx of CCP- and KMT-sponsored Chinese students in the mid-1920s, which resulted in an estimated 1,400 Chinese students graduating from the institution between 1925 and 1930 (Dan and Wang 2006). If, as its alumni recall, every class for Chinese students at MSYU was equipped with an interpreter (ibid.), the number of Chinese/Russian interpreters would have been significant. In fact, a few Chinese communists who studied at MSYU, including Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), Yang Shangkun, Yang Song, Yang Fangzhi, Liu Shaowen, Zhang Wentian, and Wu Xiuquan, had previously served as interpreters in the Soviet Union (Price 1976; Wu 1991). Some, such as Wu Xiuquan, had also been formally employed as interpreting staff by MSYU after graduation (Wu 1991: 64). At MSYU, one interpreter recalls in his memoir, not only did many Chinese students serve as interpreters in lectures taught in Russian, but a class was also set up especially to train Chinese/Russian interpreters for teaching purposes (Xiong 2009: 24). In other words, several "Russian-returned students" not only possessed sufficient language skills but also had begun interpreting as a profession. Such professional experience was no doubt a useful capital and would affect their later practice when they returned to China.

Another important characteristic of these Russian-returned students is their political affiliation with the CCP. No matter whether established CCP cadres or young activists, they were believed loyal to the Party because almost all had undergone the CCP's screening prior to studying in the USSR. At least two institutions were directly involved in the CCP's recruitment of these students: Shanghai Foreign Language School (August 1920–July 1921) and Shanghai University (October 1922–April 1927) (Price 1976: 30–40). Shanghai Foreign Language School, founded by the early Chinese communists to "recruit and prepare young Chinese activists for study in the Soviet Union", taught only Russian language and Marxist theories (Price 1976: 31), although its advertisement to the public claimed it to be an open foreign language school with English, Russian, French, German, and Japanese programs. A majority of its reg-

istered students were young Chinese activists from diverse regions, who were recommended by "reliable" references to visit Shanghai in preparation for their trip to the USSR (Zhang and Ding 2002: 30–1; Price 1976: 31). In less than a year after the school opened, around 60 students were secretly sent by the CCP (in three batches) from Shanghai to Moscow for training (Hao 2006: 58; Price 1976: 31).

Unlike Shanghai Foreign Language School, Shanghai University was an academic institution operated jointly by the CCP and the KMT when the two parties were still in the warm relationship of their first United Front.[1] Despite its connection with the KMT, from 1923 to 1927, Shanghai University was a significant institution in terms of the CCP's training because of "the presence of Soviet-trained faculty members and a large contingent of Chinese communists in the student body" (Price 1976: 39–40). By 1927, when Shanghai University was forced to close down because of conflicts between the CCP and the KMT, its graduates had reached a total of 1,800, many of whom were sent directly to MSYU and joined the CCP during their stay in the USSR (Zhang and Ding 2002: 30–1; Price 1976: 40).

Besides recruitment at the two previously mentioned institutions, the CCP also tried to select its candidates directly through its subordinate organizations, including its branches in China and overseas, and the CCP-sponsored Chinese Socialist Youth League (Qian 2008). For example, in January 1926, a total of 20 Chinese communists were ordered to transfer from the CCP's European branch to attend MSYU (Dan and Wang 2006), which the Comintern founded in 1925 to train both KMT and CCP members for a national revolution in China. Although in the mid-1920s, when the KMT and the CCP were still cooperating, a few KMT members were accepted together with the CCP students, most returned to China in 1927 because of the tense relationship between the CCP and the KMT (Price 1976: 90–4). Hence, these "Russian-returned students" who rejoined the CCP in the 1930s were those individuals

[1] Scholars disagree on the exact date of Shanghai University's founding and organization. Price (1976: 39) contends that it was founded by the KMT in 1923 with four departments (social sciences, Russian language, Chinese language, and English language); however, Zhang and Ding (2002: 30–1) claim that it was founded in October 1922 with only three departments (Chinese literature, English literature, and social sciences) but courses in Russian as a foreign language.

originally selected by the CCP, whose pre-approved political loyalty based on references and screening was a sort of belongingness—a necessary capital for agents to be included and considered candidates for positions within the Party, including interpreters.

In addition, because of the privilege of studying in prestigious Russian institutions, many of these Russian-returned students developed a certain understanding of and/or personal relationship with the Comintern, which supervised almost the entire training process. Given the Comintern's profound influence on the CCP in the early 1930s (North 1963: 147–56), diplomas issued by the Comintern-sponsored Russian institutions, participation at Comintern-organized conferences and workshops, or even personal acquaintance with certain Comintern members could significantly boost these Chinese communists' personal profiles once they returned to China. In fact, after training in the USSR, many, including Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), Wu Xiuqian, and Wang Jiaxiang, held senior positions (Price 1976: 9, 101–2). Some not only worked as student interpreters but also benefited substantially from the contact developed with the Comintern through their interpreting practices.

Wang Ming's early success as a Russian-returned student and interpreter with the CCP is an excellent example. As one of the first group of Chinese students at MSYU, he was chosen for training as a student interpreter because of his quick learning of the Russian language in class (Xiong 2009: 23–4). In the interpreting training class, he met one of his professors, Pavel Mif, who was also rector of MSYU and director of the Chinese section of the Comintern. Wang Ming's Russian language skills and organizing ability not only impressed Mif but also helped Wang earn a position on MSYU's interpreting staff once his two-year education at MSYU had been completed (ibid.). Besides his interpreting work in the classroom, Wang Ming showed great motivation in assisting Mif's work with Chinese students and soon acted as his personal interpreter on many public occasions, including his trip to China as the head of the USSR delegation in July 1927 (Li 2008: 61). Indeed, Wang not only served as Mif's interpreter at the CCP's Fifth Congress in 1927 but was also recommended by Mif to interpret for Mikhail Markovich Borodin, the

Comintern's representative in China, in the same year and to serve as the Chief Chinese/Russian interpreter at the CCP's Sixth Congress in 1928 (ibid.).

Later in his political career, Wang used these connections with Mif and the Comintern, accumulated during his interpreting work, to seek better positions and more power within the CCP. In one of a few letters that Wang wrote to Mif in August 1929, he complained that after returning to China in early 1929, he was not trusted by the CCP leadership and was only assigned some translation and technical work (quoted in Li 2008: 63). Wang's complaints seemingly made an impression not only on Mif but also on the Comintern because in December, the CCP received official instructions from the Comintern concerning the positions of the Russian-returned students, especially a young comrade (Wang) who had worked with the Comintern for a long time but had not been treated fairly by the CCP (ibid.). With support from Mif, Wang was soon included on the CCP's central committee and by 1930 occupied a senior leading position in the CCP, later becoming its representative to the Comintern in Moscow from 1931 to 1937 (Zora 1977).

This progression from student interpreter to interpreting staff to important political figure in both the CCP and the Comintern exemplifies the success stories of Russian-returned students who acted as interpreters in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Undoubtedly, Wang Ming's success was a result of many factors, including both his personality, knowledge, and the internal conflicts among the CCP leadership in the late 1920s, but the social network he built up through his interpreting work, especially that with influential Comintern figures like Mif and Borodin, was particularly significant and ultimately enabled his movement up the CCP power ladder. Hence, for Wang, interpreting was far more than a linguistic professional practice: it constituted a crucial transition in his political career, one in which he developed his habitus and acquired essential social capital.

Nevertheless, Wang Ming's legendary success would be difficult for those wanting to follow suit to emulate, simply because the field changed

significantly in the 1930s. Not only had direct communication between the CCP and the Comintern become increasingly difficult because of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, but their relationship had changed subtly owing to an internal power struggle within the CCP between the pro-Soviet group and the new power center led by Mao Zedong. This change directly affected the Chinese/Russian interpreters because of their direct interaction with the Comintern representatives. More specifically, the stake associated with their positions changed, and their capital was re-evaluated. These changing influences are particularly well illustrated by the cases of Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitao, the two interpreters who worked with Otto Braun, who was the only resident Comintern representative to the CCP in the 1930s.

It is first important to mention that as the first and only Comintern military adviser, Braun was initially warmly received by the CCP, who made careful arrangements to support his life and work at the Soviet base, including the selection of Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitao as his interpreters (Braun 1982: 31). Both Wu and Wang were Russian-returned students with years of training in prestigious Russian military institutions and specialized interpreting experience (see Table 3.1 for their basic characteristics[2]).

Besides such factors as age and gender, which could be related to the CCP's consideration of the harsh environment at the Soviet base and Braun's position as a military adviser, these two individuals clearly share some similarities of background. This might, on the one hand, confirm the assumption that Russian-returned students were favored as Chinese/Russian interpreters and, on the other, reflect the CCP's high evaluation of the capital associated with interpreter positions. For example, both interpreters graduated from Moscow Infantry School almost at the same time, with four years of formal political and military education. In the subsequent two years, Wu Xiuquan worked as a university staff interpreter and then as a military and government interpreter; Wang Zhitao taught university-level military classes at MSYU. Hence, Wu Xiuquan apparently gained more experience in interpreting; while Wang Zhitao

[2] The data for this table were taken from Wu's memoir *Huiyi yu huainian* 回忆与怀念 (Memory and memorial) (1991) and other resources (Chen 1993; Cui 2006).

Table 3.1 Characteristics of Braun's two Chinese/Russian interpreters

	Wu, Xiuquan	Wang, Zhitao
Age (in 1933)	25	27
Gender	Male	Male
Family background	Working class city dwellers	Poor peasants
Social and political activities before training in the USSR	Member of the Communist Youth League since high school	Joined the National Revolutionary Army at the age of 14
Education	1925–1927, MSYU 1927–1929, Moscow Infantry School	1925–1931, Kiev Military Academy and Moscow Infantry School
Interpreting/working experience in the USSR	1927, interpreter at MSYU 1928, interpreter at Moscow Infantry School 1929, military interpreter with the Russian Red Army 1929, interpreter at the Soviet Union's Border Security Bureau	1931–1933, officer of the Chinese department at Moscow Infantry School; teaching staff at MSYU
Party membership	1930, candidate for membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union	1931, joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Working experiences in CCP before becoming Braun's interpreter	1931, returned to China, worked as teaching staff in the headquarters of the Min-Yue-Gan Military Zone 1932, teaching staff and Director of Education at the Academy of the Red Army 1933, summer, Political Commissar of No. 3 Division led directly by the Central Military Affairs Committee 1933, late summer, Political Commissar at the Academy of the Red Army in Ruijin	1933, returned to China and worked as teaching staff in the Academy of the Red Army in Ruijin

could have become more familiar with military matters. This situation matches Wu's description in his memoir of their divided responsibilities.

Most especially, Wu (1991: 105–107) recalls that Braun arrived during the KMT's fifth extermination campaign, so that besides daily communications, the immediate work for him and Wang Zhitao was to support Braun's military advising by translating intelligence reports and telegrams from the front (Chinese to Russian), drawing military maps, and interpreting/translating Braun's strategies for and advice to the CCP Military Affairs Committee. In addition, their work was divided according to their expertise. Whereas Wu was primarily responsible for interpreting at the CCP's administrative and military meetings, Wang interpreted mostly at lectures and seminars given by Braun as military adviser to the Academy of the Red Army in Ruijin (ibid.: 105).

The two interpreters' family backgrounds and political affiliations with the CCP also share similarities. Family background, especially, was an important criterion by which the CCP judged its members' ideological and political loyalty (Hsiung 1970: 67–71). More specifically, Mao identified four social classes as supporters of the CCP's national revolution: the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie (e.g., the intelligentsia, urban poor, functionaries, handicraftsmen, professionals, and small merchants), and the national (middle) bourgeoisie (Mao 1991/1939: 645; Hsiung 1970: 70). For Mao, the peasantry and working class peasants were the backbone of the revolution, the urban petty bourgeoisie could be a reliable ally, while the national bourgeoisie might be less firm in their determination and should only be allied during certain periods and to a certain degree (Mao 1991/1939: 645; Hsiung 1970: 70). Hence, the CCP regarded family background as a significant index of belongingness and commitment to the Party, a type of warranty similar to that requested by the KMT government to ensure its interpreters were from social classes favorable to its political goals (see Chap. 2). On this point, both Wu and Wang were impeccable candidates, Wu being from a poor working class family and Wang from a typical peasant family living in poverty. Ironically, in this situation, no economic capital became crucial either politically or symbolically.

With regards to Party affiliation, both Wu and Wang seemingly had early connections to the CCP, and in the early 1930s, both held membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Since

high school, Wu had been a member of the Youth League, a CCP sub-organization for young members, while Wang joined the Revolutionary Army at the age of 14. Although it is unknown whether the CCP would value CPSU membership more than CCP membership, the former was probably true of many Russian-returned students as it was easier for them to join the CPSU while in the USSR.

Above all, Wu and Wang's work and positions after returning to the CCP in China are important when analyzing their positioning and practice as interpreters, because they not only reflect the relative value of their capital as recognized by the CCP but also show their social practices in a chronological and historical context wherein interpreting was only a temporary profession. For example, Wu returned to China in 1931 but was not selected to be Braun's interpreter until October 1933. During the intervening two years, he was a staff interpreter at the headquarters of a sub-Soviet base, a lecturer at the Academy of the Red Army, and then promoted to Political Commissar in both the army and the Academy. In Wang's case, his period of service to the Party was comparatively short. He returned to China in 1933 and began as Braun's interpreter in October of the same year. Before that, he served for a short time as teaching staff at the Academy of the Red Army. Although it is impossible to know how Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitao actually felt about their new appointments as Braun's interpreters, these appointments clearly represented careful decisions by the CCP based on both the candidate's individual competence and the CCP's relationship with the Comintern.

In fact, the Comintern's influence on the CCP was significant, and, at least during the period of 1933 to 1934, even more specific and direct because of Braun's residence. In fact, according to Braun's interpreter Wu Xiuquan (1991: 105), during this period Braun seemingly held decisive rights in CCP military matters and acted as the messenger between the CCP and the Comintern, even though he only spoke Russian and had to rely continually on CCP interpreters. Hence, almost all the CCP's important political and military decisions had to be first endorsed by the Comintern through Braun (ibid.). Wu's perception of Braun's position with the CCP reveals the interpreter's consciousness of the power relationship in which he was involved, which in turn partly explains his later reaction to the interpreter position when this power relationship changed.

This changed relationship can be traced back to 1934, when the CCP's Red Army, advised by Braun, encountered a series of problems during the KMT government's fifth termination campaign. During the resulting Long March, the CCP suffered great losses and lost contact with the Comintern. As a result, the myth of the Comintern military adviser gradually disintegrated and the worship of the Comintern also began falling apart. In contrast, a new power center led by Mao was rising, which was gradually replacing or at least affecting the position of the Russian-returned students in the power structure. Earlier, in the late 1920s, Mao had expressed disagreement with many of the Comintern's policies in China, including its policy of "centering attention on the conquest of the cities" to counterattack the KMT government's "annihilation campaigns", and he had thus "won the disfavor" of the Comintern (Van Slyke 1968: 25–6). Mao had also been dismissed by the Central Committee and the Political Bureau in 1928 for his failure in leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising (ibid.). Hence, despite his success with the peasant movement in a few Soviet bases, Mao did not have Braun's support for his strategies in either the peasant movement or guerrilla warfare (Xiao 2006: 51). This continual failure of the Red Army under Braun's advice and its loss of contact with the Comintern provided Mao with opportunities to enhance his political influence and win over supporters.

The CCP's meeting at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935 was a turning point in its history, as well as a watershed in the influence and positioning of the Russian-returned students in the Party. At this meeting, Mao's faction gained a voice, and Braun's military policies came under vehement criticism and were blamed for the Red Army's military failure in late 1933 (Harrison 1972: 246). In the final resolution of the meeting, "A review of the military errors of comrades Bo Gu [Qin Bangxian], Zhou Enlai, and Li De [Otto Braun]", Braun was repudiated as military adviser, and the CCP leadership was reorganized (Harrison 1972: 245–46). Specifically, because of his firm support of Braun's military line, Bo Gu, Head of the Political Bureau and General Secretary of the Party, was replaced by Zhang Wentian. As Harrison notes, Zhang's appointment was an obvious "compromise between Mao's group and the 'Russian-returned student'" because although Zhang was one of these

students, he had tried to stay neutral in all Party debates (ibid.: 246). Moreover, despite his title, Zhang held little power in the CCP. The real winner was Mao Zedong, who was not only elected as Secretary of the Central Secretariat and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau but also became Director of the Central Military Affairs Committee while keeping his position as Chairman of the Government Executive Committee (ibid.).

This adjusted power relationship within the CCP directly influenced the Chinese/Russian interpreters. First, interpreting for Braun was not as urgent and demanding as before, because after the Zunyi meeting, Braun no longer had access to the latest intelligence reports and news from the front and was not invited to military meetings as frequently as before (Braun 1982). Would Braun's decline in the power hierarchy, then, affect the interpreters' stake? If Braun was responsible for the Red Army's military failure, would being his interpreters still be an honorable thing? Whereas it is unclear whether the two interpreters were excluded from important Party meetings because of their connections with Braun, clearly, they would not attend any meetings as Braun's interpreters. How did the interpreters perceive and respond to this changed situation?

Wu Xiuquan, who had earlier basked in Braun's superior power, commented both at the beginning of the Long March and before the Zunyi meeting that he was not very happy about Braun's arrogance and rudeness at work. For example, in a complaint to Li Weihan, the director of the Party's propaganda department, Wu claimed that "Li De [Braun] is actually an imperialist. I agree to interpret for him only for the sake of my *dangxing* [literally, the spirit of the Party]" (quoted in Wu 1991: 116). It is interesting that the interpreter attributes his motives for interpreting for Braun to his *dangxing*, an incarnated belief in the CCP. He not only sees his interpreting practices as something necessary to proving his political loyalty but also does not hide his personal dislike of his client because it makes his claim of loyalty more convincing. Wu's second comment was made in 1936 when he was no longer Braun's interpreter but was asked to do temporary interpreting work for him. At that time, Braun was no longer in the power circle but was teaching military theory at the Academy of the Red Army in Yan'an. Wu (1991: 128) emphasizes in his

memoir his reluctance to take this interpreting work—"I would rather be a cook or a groom than an interpreter for Li De [Braun]"—and that it was only after much persuasion by Zhou Enlai, Head of the Central Military Committee, that he agreed to work again as Braun's interpreter.

Wu's comments are revealing in that they reflect the interpreter's perception of the field and corresponding interactions with other institutions. Before Braun lost his status as the CCP's military adviser, Wu chose to continue his interpreting work despite his claimed personal dislike for the agent because his work was related to his commitment to the Party—his *dangxing*—and he would gain political capital. However, in 1936, when Braun lost his influence over the CCP leadership, Wu was seemingly determined to decline interpreting work until Zhou's intervention. Given Zhou's senior status in the CCP, his intervention was actually a negotiation between the Party and the interpreter over the capital associated with the interpreter position. For Wu, taking up the interpreting work—that is, showing willingness to set aside personal feelings and work for the Party's interests—proved his commitment to the CCP. In this case, interpreting for Braun was no longer his profession but a means to acquire more political capital and increase his profile in the CCP.

In fact, after the Zunyi meeting, given the reduced interpreting need, both Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitao gradually move away from their interpreter positions and took up other duties in the Party. Wu transferred, or was transferred, to the Third Division of the Red Army, while Wang was assigned responsibilities in the CCP's training and logistics section in early 1935 (Wu 1991: 128). Unlike Wang Ming, neither of these two interpreters benefited much from their interpreting work. On the contrary, they tried to avoid any personal connection to their clients, and neither actually chose interpreting as their profession in subsequent years because both held their political roles and social goals separate from their interpreting activities. For them, interpreting was not simply a profession; it was part of their struggle for position and a stake in the social arena and used to expand their personal social network in the same manner as Wang Ming did. When the power relationship changed, interpreting might actually have impeded their social practices, so both of Braun's interpreters tried to withdraw from the scene. This case underscores the reality that inter-

preting is not a reclusive profession but rather a social practice based on interpreters' interaction with other institutions and agents. Consequently interpreters' position-taking and practices are more likely to be affected by internal power relationships in the field than those of translators, which could in turn lead to agents' speculative practices in the field.

3.1.2 A Speculative Stake: Training Chinese/Russian Interpreters in the 1940s

One important precondition for an interpreting event, as opposed to a translating one, is the face-to-face meeting of agents. This personal interaction was especially true in 1940s China when long-distance interpreting through the Internet or telephone was unimaginable. Although the CCP resumed telegraphic communication with the Comintern after 1936 (Vladimirov 2004/1975: 13), Chinese/Russian interpreting was inactive even in Yan'an, the CCP's political and military headquarters, because only about three residents were Russian native speakers—a doctor, a radio technician, and a *Tass* correspondent and Comintern liaison officer (Peter Parfenovich Vladimirov) who, having sufficient knowledge of Chinese, did not need an interpreter (Vladimirov 2004/1975: 366; North 1963: 202). Interestingly, however, after the early 1940s, the CCP began creating and investing in its own Chinese/Russian translator/interpreter training program. Although information on this program is limited and scattered among former CCP cadres' memoirs, Chinese scholar Cao Murao has compiled a brief history from its August 1941 founding to war's end (Cao 2002: 21–3), which is summarized in Fig. 3.1.

According to Cao, at the time of its founding, this training program was a Russian language program affiliated with the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University in Yan'an (ibid.). Within three years, it grew into a foreign language school, with both Chinese/Russian and Chinese/English language pairs. In its second month, it merged with the Russian language department at Yan'an University and formed the Russian language program at the Yan'an Military Academy. This reorganization is important because it set the direction of the program as



Fig. 3.1 The evolution of the CCP's Chinese/Russian interpreter training programs (1941–45)

militarily rather than academically oriented. At this time, the number of students totaled around 100, but within two months, it was reorganized and became a sub-program of the CCP's Central Military Committee (CMC). Its students increased to 200, 20 of whom were female. In June 1942, the CMC's Editing and Translating Bureau was merged with the program, and in April 1944, the training program was renamed the Yan'an Foreign Language School, with half of its students studying Chinese/Russian interpreting and half Chinese/English interpreting.

In addition to the CCP's direct supervision of this translator/interpreter training program, Yan'an also witnessed an emergent public interest in learning the Russian language. Hence, many institutions offered part-time Russian language courses, including the Party's Central Bureau of the United Front, the Xinhua News Agency, the New China News Agency, Shanbei Public School, Lu Xun Academy of the Arts, the Yan'an Society of Culture, the Marxist Academy, and the Cultural Club (Zhang and Ding 2002: 31). The Yan'an public's passion for learning the Russian language was unparalleled: it was not unusual for 200 to 300 students to be enrolled in a part-time Russian course, although a majority could not finish because of such factors as a busy schedule, work transfer, or learning difficulties (ibid.).

Both this public interest in learning Russian and the CCP's investment in training Chinese/Russian translators/interpreters are particularly interesting in light of Yan'an having only three Russian residents and the CCP's communication with the Comintern being limited to telegrams. Why, then, did the CCP want to train these Chinese/Russian interpreters at this moment, especially when the Russian-returned students were an obvious source upon which to draw? Why did people in Yan'an suddenly have an interest in learning the Russian language? Answering these questions requires reconsideration of the situation that the CCP was facing with the USSR rather than with the Comintern in the 1940s, following the great reduction in the Comintern's influence on the CCP after the 1930s and its official disbanding in May 1943 (McLane 1972: 160–1). As discussed in Sect. 2.2.2, the Comintern was only part of the USSR's dual wartime strategy of reaching out to the CCP while retaining its official diplomatic ties with the KMT government.

Although all the USSR's aid to China was provided to the KMT, the CCP apparently firmly believed that the USSR was its political and military ally in the war. As Mao (1991/1935: 161) emphasized in late 1935, "our resistance to Japan needs international support, of which the Soviet Union is at the forefront; and it will definitely help us because we have mutual interests and depend on each other". Indeed, as pointed out in a July 1945 report by the US Department of War, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP took great care to maintain good relationships

with the Soviet Union, even when the USSR signed a Soviet-Japanese pact in early 1941 (Van Slyke 1968: 212). The CCP's strategy is also obvious from Mao Zedong's 1939 article, "苏联利益和人类利益的一致" (The identical interests of the Soviet Union and all mankind), in which he defends the USSR's strategy of signing the Soviet-Japanese pact but criticizes Britain's policy of directing the war to communist countries and the American government's indifference to the situation (1991/1939: 593–601). Most particularly, Mao emphasizes the importance of maintaining the friendship between the USSR and the CCP:

> In regards to the USSR, we [Chinese] should strengthen our friendship with it in order to establish a front of unity of both great nations, to secure still greater support. (See Van Slyke 1968: 213)

The previous quote should be understood in light of the fact that almost all the USSR's wartime military aid to China went to the KMT government. Hence, rather than complaining, the CCP chose to appeal for "greater support" by endorsing and supporting the USSR's political and military strategies. As pointed out by Vladimirov (2004/1975: 199), Comintern liaison agent and *Tass* correspondent in Yan'an from 1942 to 1945, many CCP leaders, including Mao, were seeking opportunities to obtain substantial support from the USSR, especially in the form of weapons and ammunition. Hence, in June 1941, when Hitler attacked the USSR and brought it into the European war, the CCP leaders began seeing possibilities of military cooperation with the USSR in North China because of its wartime position close to the northern border area with the Soviet Union and behind the Japanese lines. This political background explains the CCP's sudden interest in training Chinese/Russian military translators/interpreters (Zhang and Ding 2002: 30–3; Hao 2006: 58–61; Qin 2001: 115–7).

However, one may wonder why the CCP would want to invest time and energy in training a new generation of Chinese/Russian interpreter rather than using the existing source—the Russian-returned students? As already discussed, many of these returned students had not only undergone years of systematic training in the Russian language but also had experience in interpreting and working with the Russians. One potential

answer could be that the type and amount of capital held by these returned students in the 1940s exceeded that required by the interpreter position. Therefore, almost a decade after their return to China, they might not find interpreting work an attractive proposition, having accumulated a decade's experience of working in the Party and secured senior positions. Put simply, they would not see it as worthwhile to relinquish their current positions. For example, Wang Jiaxiang and Yang Shangkun, who had been interpreters at the MSYU in the 1930s, now held senior positions in the Party, Director of the Central Political Commissar and Chairman of the Party's General Political Department, respectively (Van Slyke 1968: 129–33). Likewise, Braun's two interpreters from the 1930s, Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitao, had both stopped working as interpreters and moved up to higher positions in the Party. Since July 1941, Wu had headed the Military Operations Bureau of the General Political Department (Wu 1991: 185), while Wang had become Deputy Director of the No. 14 Army in Jidong Military Zone (Chen 1993). For these returned students, who had acquired enough capital for a higher position, the interpreter profession must have no longer seemed attractive even though the CCP might still be interested in training Chinese/Russian interpreters for its long-term political and military interests.

In regards to the Yan'an public's passion for learning the Russian language, it is unlikely that those who invested in Russian language learning actually set interpreter as their career goal. In fact, most may simply have wanted enough basic language knowledge to participate in the potential collaboration between the CCP and the Russians. The passion they showed in learning the Russian language reflected competition among agents to acquire the capital essential to certain envisaged positions. In this case, the CCP's translator/interpreter training program might have played a role by conveying an official message about the change in the field, thereby stimulating and encouraging this competition among agents. Nevertheless, the impetus of these agents' perception and speculation on the positions and potential stakes attached came from their habitus, incarnated in the power relationships in the field, including, the CCP's policy towards the USSR. This type of perception and speculation is another example of agents' *illusio* and its role in their social practices, including career orientation. That is, because they believed in the

forthcoming military cooperation between the CCP and the USSR, these agents tried to acquire the capital they speculated would be essential for certain positions and stakes, though this hope was never realized because, until 1943, the USSR was busy with its battles against the Germans far away from China (McLane 1972: 156–7).

3.2 An Unexpected Stake in the Field

3.2.1 The Visit of Western Journalists and the US Dixie Mission

As expected, with the development of the war, opportunities for interpreters in Yan'an finally emerged in 1944; although unexpectedly, they were for Chinese/English interpreters. This development was partly due to the increased visits by Western journalists who were curious about the Chinese communists in North China, given the CCP's increased strength and influence on China's resistance against the Japanese forces. As early as 1937, some Western journalists, including Edgar Snow, Anna Louis Strong, Hans Shipper, and Agnes Smedley, had made their way to Yan'an to report on the CCP-led forces (Zhang 2007: 20–9). Before the 1940s, the number of these journalists was fairly small because of the KMT's military blockade, and they usually foresaw the language problem and brought their own interpreters. Therefore, Chinese/English interpreting was not an issue for the CCP until spring 1944, when Yan'an finally hosted a KMT-sanctioned foreign tour group composed of Western correspondents.

Another reason for this urgent need for Chinese/English interpreters was the CCP's amended foreign policy in the 1940s towards other Western countries, especially the USA. In fact, while working on its relationship with the USSR, the CCP also tried to keep its door open at home and in the world for more foreign support and cooperation. As early as April 1940, the CCP had founded an international propaganda committee in its south China branch. Since the Pearl Harbor incident, the CCP had stopped using the word "imperialists" for the Americans

and referred to the Second World War as a "global struggle between 'Fascism' and 'Democracy'" in which the USA was only one of the Allied countries (Readon-Anderson 1980: 37).

To the Americans, the CCP seemed to be a growing force in restraining Japan's expansion into China and Asia. As early as June 1943, in a memorandum to General Stilwell, Chief Commander of the US Force in China, John Paton Davies, a US Foreign Service officer in Chongqing, suggested a US mission to contact the Chinese communists in Yan'an. Specifically, he observed that the communists were the "most cohesive, disciplined and aggressive anti-Japanese group" in China, and their military expansion in North China would exert an important influence on the wartime activities of both Japan and the USSR (quoted in Barrett 1970: 23). The Chinese Nationalists' military failure in Japan's Ichigo Offensive in 1944 also gave the CCP opportunities to appeal for a joint effort by the United Front, which captured the Americans' interest and attention in China. Therefore, despite impediments set up by the KMT government, a US Army Observer Group—the Dixie Mission—was sent to Yan'an on US President Roosevelt's insistence (ibid.: 23–4).

To make full use of the chance to promote its national and international image and enlarge its political influence, the CCP invested much effort in receiving both the Dixie Mission and the group of journalists. In July 1944, it established a Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) for all matters related to foreign visitors, which directly reported to the Party's Central Military Committee (Ling 2008a: 21–2). On August 19, 1944, just before the arrival of the Dixie Mission, Mao called a central committee meeting in which a formal document, "Guanyu waijiao gongzuo de zhishi" (关于外交工作的指示, On diplomatic work), compiled by Zhou Enlai, was approved and issued to Party members as a guide to the CCP's foreign policy. In this document, Zhou emphasizes the Party's aim to "secure foreign assistance, without compromising the gains of the movement to date or its commitment to self-reliance" (quoted in Readon-Anderson 1980: 41). He points out that the US Dixie Mission is the beginning of the CCP's formal diplomatic work, and it is important to provide opportunities for individual meetings between members from the Mission and communist leaders and all FAO staff should hold

firmly to a nationalistic viewpoint and avoid being "exclusive, xenophobic, or fetishist" (ibid: 37). This document's importance to this study stems from the fact that these principles applied to all CCP FAO staff, including Chinese/English interpreters, whose stake in the field was associated with the CCP's diplomatic relationship with the KMT's foreign supporter, the USA.

3.2.2 From Interpreters to Diplomats

As previously explained, in April 1944, the Chinese/Russian translator/interpreter training program separated from the Central Military Committee and was renamed as the Yan'an Foreign Language School. Another crucial change in this training program was its addition of the Chinese/English language pair, for which there were 90 students, almost half the total enrollment. Although little information is available on these students' origins and backgrounds, a majority was seemingly selected from those in the CCP membership or cadres in Yan'an who had some knowledge of the English language (Ling 2008a: 19–22). However, little time remained for training given that the US Dixie Mission was to arrive in only three months. Therefore, the school divided the students into three groups (A, B, C) according to their performance on a language test and set different training periods (ibid.: 19–20). For example, group A underwent three months of intensive training and by the end of 1994, had only about 12 students who were expected to gradually take on small but real interpreting tasks during their training (ibid.). A few well-known foreigners in Yan'an, such as Michael Lindsay (Lord Lindsay of Birker) and George Hatem (Ma Hai De), joined the training program as teachers (ibid.).

Like the KMT government's FAB, the CCP's FAO acted as the primary institution responsible for communication and liaison between the CCP and the foreign visitors, although the type of interpreting needed was more likely diplomatic than military. Compared to the FAB, the CCP's FAO was much smaller, and although it was divided into four sections—liaison, research (translation of books and newspaper about the Americans), translation/interpreting, and administration—the actual

number of its staff was limited, and they often shared responsibility for interpreting. Three Chinese/English interpreters were primarily responsible for the FAO's interpreting activities at that time: Huang Hua, Chen Jiakang, and Ling Qing (Barrett 1970: 31; Ling 2005: 16–23). Huang Hua began as leader of the translator/interpreter section and then led the liaison section, of which Chen Jiakang was initially the leader, while also acting as chief interpreter in the early days of the US Dixie Mission in Yan'an. Ling Qing (2008a: 23) refers to himself as the FAO's busboy, going wherever (and whenever) a need arose for interpreting, liaison, or even research.[3]

One major reason for this multi-tasking was that the actual need for Chinese/English interpreters in Yan'an was not that significant. Other than some western journalists and the US Dixie Mission, the CCP did not develop any formal diplomatic relationships or regular communication with any foreign powers. In addition, many American officers in the Dixie Mission were staff selected from the US Foreign Service or the US Embassy in China. As military attachés in China, some, like John Paton Davies, David D. Barret, and John S. Servie, had received Chinese language training in the 1930s and had sufficient language skills to carry on a conversation in Chinese and interpret for other American officers (Davies 1974: 162–4; 318). Accordingly, the goal of the Chinese/English interpreter program in the Yan'an Foreign Language School was to prepare for potential military cooperation between the CCP and the US Army after the latter's scheduled landing in China at the end of the war. However, the honeymoon between the Americans and the Chinese communists (from August 1944 to February 1945) did not last long owing to the US government's decision to sustain the KMT government's power in China.

Nevertheless, this short rapprochement between the CCP and the Americans had a significant impact on the CCP's Chinese/English interpreters. With the establishment of the FAO, these interpreters were officially designated language and liaison staff of a diplomatic institution. They thus represented and served only the interests of China (under the

[3] There was probably more interpreting staff towards the end of war. According to Yu Fan, there were at least five senior CCP members from the CCP involving in interpreting/translation work, with support from other interpreting/translation staff, in the American mediated peace talk between the CCP and the KMT in 1946, *Zhonggong de yang baozi* 中共的洋包子 (interpreting/translation staff in the CCP), published in *Xiaoxi* (news) 1946, No 11, 174–5.

CCP) rather than those of any foreign powers dealt with in their interpreting work. In other words, these interpreters were formally positioned at the forefront of the CCP's institution of international relationships. Given the growth of the CCP's political and military strength at the end of the war, these interpreters benefited greatly from their interpreting work, especially in terms of their positions within the CCP. Ling Qing, who was trained at the Yan'an Foreign Language School and served as one of the FAO's interpreters for the US Dixie Mission, comments on this in his memoir:

> 组织部门的决定不仅改变了我今后整个革命生涯的旅程, 是我人生的一个转折点, 而且使我“光荣”地成为最早参加中国共产党外事工作的“元老”之一。尤其是, 这项安排还使我有机会近距离接触中国共产党第一代中央领导集体的大人物, 包括毛泽东、周恩来、刘少奇、朱德、任弼时和很多领导同志。不用说入党几年, 即使十几二十年的老同志也不一定有这个机会。

> The Party's decision [to train me as an interpreter] not only transformed my whole revolutionary career but constituted a cornerstone of my life. I felt proud of being one of the Party's earliest staff members in its foreign service. My interpreting work, especially, allowed me to meet many important figures of the CCP's first generation leadership, including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Ren Bishi and others. Even old Party cadres with ten or twenty years' experiences in the Party would not readily have had this opportunity, never mind those like me who had just joined the Party recently. (Ling 2008a: 19–20)

Evidently, Ling Qing was well aware of how much he had benefited from his interpreting and liaison work. Even though a young inexperienced junior Party member, he was able to reach directly into the Party's power center. Such face-to-face interpreting obviously gave him many opportunities to become acquainted with Party leaders, which significantly expanded his social network and increased his profile in the CCP. As he explains later in the memoir, when the CCP gained full control of China and became the official Chinese government, he was soon appointed to work directly under Yang Shangkun, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department (Ling 2008a: 19–20).

In 2008, when Ling was 90 years old, he was interviewed by Chinese Central TV (CCTV) and made some brief comments on his interpreting work in Yan'an during the war. When asked whether he recognized himself as an expert in translation/interpreting, his answer was a resounding no. Using the Chinese metaphor of a monkey being king of a mountain on which there is no tiger, Ling explained: "There were few people in Yan'an who could speak English as well as our students educated overseas. We had some English training, plus our young age, so we were selected to do the interpreting and/or translation" (Ling 2008b). For Ling, interpreting was only an initial stage of his work in the department. As his experience in interpreting and liaison increased, he soon became responsible for more diplomatic work and gradually occupied senior positions in what eventually became the Foreign Affairs Department of the People's Republic of China (ibid.).

Ling Qing was not the only Chinese/English interpreter in Yan'an to develop a career in another direction. Huang Hua, the leader of the FAO's translation/interpreting section in 1944 accompanied and interpreted for Edgar Snow, author of the 1938 book, *Red Star over China* (Ling 2008a: 22). Huang Hua not only acted as chief interpreter in the CCP's final negotiations with the US representatives in 1945 but also attended many important diplomatic occasions as the CCP representative. In the 1980s, he even became the PRC's foreign minister (Huang 2008).

Like the Chinese/Russian interpreters discussed earlier, for both Ling Qing and Huang Hua, interpreting was once a profession, but not merely a profession. Although chosen as interpreters because of their language knowledge and other qualities, their interpreting work enabled them to acquire more capital and move to better positions. For them, interpreting was part of their job in the Party, and interpreter was the role they were assigned to play in the structure within a certain period. In reality, however, if the term 'interpreting professional' is judged by the length of interpreting time or the exclusiveness of the interpreting work, closer examination of these interpreters' lives and careers as a social whole raises the question of whether they could actually be called professional interpreters. As previously discussed, many individuals were greatly affected by their interpreting experience, even when such experience constituted a comparatively short part of their careers or lives. Such short-term inter-

preter positions raise another interesting question related to the notion of professional habitus (Simeoni 1998; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a). That is, how should the profession of interpreter be defined? If interpreters' professional habitus is a continuous refining process based on professional training, practices, and observations in the field, it is hard to judge when an individual is ready to be called a professional and has developed a professional habitus. In addition, not every interpreter receives training before practice, and the time and extent of the interpreter's exposure to the training as well as the professional world varies in different social, cultural, and historical contexts. Therefore, the application of the notion of professional habitus needs to be carefully considered in different contexts.

Nevertheless, despite their short-term interpreting practices, the interpreters discussed in this chapter are, undeniably, a group of special professionals who not only enabled communication and interaction among agents with different backgrounds and in different relationships but also participated in the interaction between their clients. More interestingly, they tended to make use of or dismiss the personal relationships developed with clients via their face-to-face interpreting work. When the situation was appropriate, these relationships became social capital with which they could use to compete for more interest in the social arena and move to better positions with more benefits.

3.3 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the Chinese/Russian and Chinese/English interpreters trained and/or used by the CCP during the war. Unlike the KMT, and in the face of its conflicts with the dominant KMT government, the CCP did not hire its interpreters from among the public but mostly from among its Party members. Hence, loyalty to the Party and belief in communism were emphasized and incarnated in the interpreters' habitus through their Party-supervised training and employment. As

a result, these interpreters seldom saw themselves as independent professionals but rather related their interpreting practices to their political status and positions with the CCP, and their political Party advocacy constituted an important facet of their interpreting practice during the war. Moreover, the CCP's foreign policy directly affected interpreter positioning. For example, interpreters working with Comintern representatives could have very different attitudes and reactions to their work at different times because of the CCP's changed policy toward the Comintern.

In addition, as the CCP's need for interpreting stemmed mainly from its senior leaders' communication with foreign powers, including the Comintern, its interpreters often acquired significant socio-political capital from their acquaintance with and service to the Party's senior members or Comintern leaders. Accordingly, for the CCP, interpreters were a crucial resource for international support and links with the foreign military and political power, while for the interpreters, interpreting was an important step in developing their social network, proving their political loyalty, and seeking better positions within the Party. This dynamic was especially true when the interpreters had to deal with unbalanced power relationships between different groups: for example, when one involved party relied on or sought profits from the other. This is discussed in detail in Chap. 4 using the example of the Chinese/Japanese interpreters, who had to face a conflicting relationship between the Japanese occupiers and the Chinese civilians.

4

Interpreting for the Enemy: Collaborating Interpreters and the Japanese Forces

Given the length of the war and Japan's military occupation of China, interpreters were undoubtedly a crucial component of the Japanese army's warfare in China; however, for Chinese interpreters, interpreting for the Japanese forces was a far more complicated issue than interpreting for the Kuomintang (KMT) or Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Above all, interpreters working for the Japanese were serving their country's enemy, and they were seriously criticized by the Chinese public as *hanjian* (literally, betrayers of the *Han*—the Chinese people) or traitors. However, for those who could not withdraw inland and had to face the brutal realities of occupation, collaborating with the Japanese was a survival strategy as well as a practical means of avoiding loss of property and life and even struggling for their own interests. Depending on their proficiency in the Japanese language and other skills, Chinese interpreters were employed by the Japanese forces at different levels in a variety of settings during the war, from local collaborating governments to municipal courts to police squads. Because of their Japanese/Chinese language knowledge, these interpreters held crucial positions in the Japanese-dominated power hierarchy in occupied areas. Their practice had a significant impact on the local Chinese public.

T. Guo, *Surviving in Violent Conflicts*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3_4

Like the Chinese KMT government, the Japanese had tried to use their own interpreters during the war. As early as the late 1890s, Japan had founded a few programs in China to train Japanese students in Chinese language and culture, including the Japan-Qing Business Research Center, Shanlin Academy, Fuzhou Society of East Asian Study, Nanjing Tongwen Academy, and Shanghai East Asian Tongwen Academy (Shi 1992:246). Graduates from these institutions constituted a significant source of Chinese/Japanese military interpreters for Japan. For example, most graduates of the Japan-Qing Business Research Center had served as interpreters to the Japanese troops during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and around 100 Japanese students from the Shanghai East Asian Tongwen Academy were directly drafted as military interpreters during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Zhao 2002: 53; Zhou 2006: 56–7, 112). In addition, Japan transferred and used "assimilated" Chinese interpreters from Taiwan, where Japan had established colonial control in the late nineteenth century following the Maguan Treaty between China and Japan (Xu 2004: 455–8).

Nevertheless, Japan's need for local Chinese interpreters was still significant during the war, because it maintained 800,000 to 1,000,000 troops in China (Barrett 2001: 8) and thus had to heavily rely on interpreter assistance with everything from military supply and intelligence work to military battles. At the same time, it had to face the problem of consolidating its control of occupied areas: the majority of North China, especially the Manchurian area from 1932 onwards, and a majority of cities and towns of eastern and central China from the Great Wall in the north to Guangdong province in the south by late 1938 (ibid.: 2). Although the actual need for Chinese/Japanese interpreters varied for many reasons (e.g., the length of the Japanese occupation, education, and population density), locally recruited Chinese interpreters obviously they had a lot of advantage over other interpreters in helping the Japanese forces to strengthen their control of the local Chinese people because of their knowledge of the Chinese language (including local dialects) and familiarity with local areas.

Since the Japanese army's primary need for wartime interpreters came from its encounters with Chinese resistance forces and local Chinese, the field of interpreting examined here is a field of complicated political and military power relationships in which the extent of Japanese control varied

and resistance forces co-existed with the collaborators. Hence, this chapter focuses on the collaborating Chinese interpreters (Chinese/Japanese); in particular, their choice to collaborate, their positioning within the prevailing power structure, and their embodiment in their interpreting practices.

4.1 *Hanjian*: Collaborating Interpreters

As discussed in the Introduction, *hanjian* is a special label applied, even today, to almost all Chinese people having connections with conflicting foreign forces (Wong 2007). During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese public's use of this word was also prevalent and referred to any Chinese people who collaborated with the Japanese forces. However, *hanjian* is a problematic description of the collaborating interpreters because it presumes a "righteous practice" of absolute advocacy for the Chinese people, which might not be the perception that many interpreters actually had of their own interpreting work. It not only oversimplifies the complex situations that interpreters could encounter in extreme situations but also dismisses individual differences resulting from positioning in the field. For example, senior interpreters who mediated between Chinese and Japanese officials in political negotiations might see themselves differently from those who accompanied the Japanese army onto the battlefield and witnessed the violence of the Japanese invasion.

However, as a nationalistic term, the word *hanjian* does reflect the moral and political value system with which every Chinese interpreter was inculcated during the war, as well as the clash between the Chinese and Japanese political and military powers. The latter is especially true for collaborating interpreters in occupied areas; physically situated in a field dominated by the Japanese, because of their Chinese cultural and national identities, they were at the same time subject to judgment and pressure from another field in which the Chinese retained dominance. The extent and degree of this pressure, or the perceived value of this moral and political loyalty, however, differed among individuals according to their political belief and social position and was subject to situational factors related to the varied length and strength of Japanese control in different areas.

For example, Poshek Fu's (1993) case studies of Chinese intellectuals in occupied Shanghai reveals a very tense situation for those choosing to work with the Japanese. For these intellectuals, loyalty to national identity was an essential index of integrity, making collaboration far more humiliating than the loss of a job or even one's life (ibid.: 82). However, as David Barnett (2001: 116, 130) observes, those who had lived in occupied areas actually tended to be more tolerant of collaboration because, on the one hand, they had had to face the brutal realities themselves, and on the other, they indeed benefited from the cushioning role played by collaborationist authorities between the Chinese and the Japanese. Therefore, the majority of the population in occupied areas saw collaboration as a practical issue that could be justified by the need to survive in occupied areas.

This basic need for survival might explain why some people chose to be interpreters and collaborate with the Japanese forces even though they knew their behavior would be criticized. After all, moving and relocating a family was not realistic for everyone, especially during wartime when thousands were trying to escape from danger (Barnett 2001: 125–6). Those who could not afford or find tickets for planes, trains, or other transportation to escape before the arrival of the Japanese and were unable to find shelter elsewhere had to stay and make a living in the occupied areas. To earn enough to feed themselves and their families, they would take any positions available, including interpreter. For those who had some knowledge of Japanese language and culture, being an interpreter seemed to be an easy and practical solution for self-preservation during the occupation. This can be exemplified by the case of a *hanjian* interpreter captured by the Chinese KMT government[1]:

问：姓名, 年龄, 籍贯, 职业
答：张和臣, 46, 浙江宁波人贸易
问：你在什么学校毕业?
答：宁波育才中学
问，你学过日文没有?

[1] NHA 787–17362–0790 (16J–0823, 0790–0796).

答:我在学校没有学过日文,我自民国十五年到日本做过生意,十八年才回上海做生意,以后才搬到宜昌做生意,所以知道日文。
问:宜昌沦陷前你为什么不离开?
答:因手中拮据, 二老年高家小众多,所以不能离开
问:你参加他们工作是哪一年?
答:就是宜昌失陷的那年。没有走的老百姓都到天主堂躲避敌人。敌人到天主堂大肆搜索,[他们]全叫我向敌人说好话,正在两难之间,没有办法,只有挺身而出,为他们说好话。结果都脱了虎口。

Q: Name, age, birthplace, and occupation
A: Zhang Hecheng; 46; Ningbo, Zhejiang Province; business
Q: Where did you graduate from?
A: Ningbo Yucai Middle School
Q: Have you received Japanese language training?
A: I never learned Japanese in school. But I went to Japan for business in 1926 and came back to Shanghai in 1929. I moved to Yichang [where Zhang was captured] for business. So I know the Japanese language.
Q: Why didn't you leave Yichang when it fell into Japanese hands?
A: I couldn't afford to move, and my parents were too old to travel. I couldn't just leave.
Q: When did you start to serve them [the Japanese forces]?
A: Since the year Yichang was occupied. Those who didn't leave all went to the church for protection. But the Japanese troops came to search the church, and I was nominated to say some good words to the enemy [the Japanese troops]. I didn't know what else I should do but go ahead and speak for the Chinese. Because of my mediation, all of us were saved.

[…]

Regardless of the possibility that Zhang might have structured his statements to ensure a light punishment from the Chinese authorities for his "traitorous" interpreting work, his case does suggest that some interpreters chose to collaborate with the Japanese forces for self-protection and/or protection of local communities during the war. Such communication initiated by Chinese interpreters was very important when the Japanese army conquered a city because the silence of Chinese civilians could be understood as resistance and result in punishment and death.

However, although active communication might give civilians a chance to survive, it also implied a willingness to cooperate and was often conveniently defined as "traitorous" behavior.

However, interpreting might not have been simply a trade-off by agents for self-preservation. As the following sections show, not every interpreter had to collaborate with the Japanese in order to survive the violence; on the contrary, in certain circumstances, those in occupied areas made great efforts to obtain interpreter positions. Most particularly because Chinese interpreters were an indispensable resource for the Japanese to consolidate their occupation and sustain their troops, some Chinese saw interpreting as a fairly good job, compensated by the Japanese, and with many potential material and non-material benefits in local communities because of the relationship with the Japanese occupiers. Therefore, although collaboration was the prevailing strategy for interpreters during occupation, their positioning and practices could be very different owing to their different motivations and personal experiences. In addition, as Barnett (2001: 116) emphasizes, because of variations in social status and educational background, survival could mean different things to different people. Therefore, it is important to know who these collaborating interpreters were and how they were positioned within the Japanese-dominated power hierarchy.

4.2 Japanese Recruitment of Chinese Interpreters

On the whole, the Japanese forces' recruitment of Chinese interpreters was less formal and centralized than that of the Chinese KMT government; for example, the Japanese had no designated central institution or authority like the KMT's Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) or the CCP's Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) for addressing the recruitment and training of Chinese interpreters during the war. Rather, as in the case of interpreter Zhang (see Sect. 4.1), many interpreters were simply hired from among local residents, especially given the Japanese forces' wide need for interpreters at different levels during the war. For example, some of these interpreters were responsible for liaison and communication between the Japanese occupiers and local Chinese collaborationist governments, some

were needed to work primarily in local communities with Chinese police and Japanese military squads, while others might have to work on the battlefield with Japanese troops. These different responsibilities resulted in different positioning of interpreters with different competences and experiences. In general, these collaborating interpreters can be classified into two groups based on where they acquired their Japanese language skills: those who had studied or worked in Japan and then returned to China (the Japanese-returned interpreters) and those who were locally trained.

4.2.1 The Japanese-Returned Interpreters

The Japanese-returned interpreters can be further divided into two subgroups: those with higher education (the Japanese-returned students) and those without. As discussed in Chap. 2, a significant number of Chinese people had been to Japan, mainly for the purpose of education, in the early twentieth century. It is estimated that from 1890 to 1937, at least 50,000 Chinese students graduated from universities in Japan (Keishu 1983: 122). These returned students often had years of experience studying and living in Japan and thus had both the necessary knowledge of the Japanese language and specialized knowledge in certain domains. Another group of people who were potential candidates for Chinese/Japanese interpreters were those who had visited and worked in Japan and thus had acquired particular Japanese language skills. Although they may not have had formal language training or education, these individuals usually had no problem holding daily conversations in the Japanese language and were a useful resource in less demanding interpreting occasions for the Japanese. Compared to the Russian-returned students, the Japanese-returned students were facing a more difficult situation because they were involved in the conflicting power relationship between China and Japan. Like every Chinese individual, they were under pressure to resist the foreign invaders; if they chose to collaborate, they would be held in disdain as *hanjian* and thus risk losing their social and cultural capital in Chinese society. However, situating within the violent conflict and/or facing the reality of occupation, these Japanese-returned students also had certain

opportunities to gain other capital because of their knowledge of Japanese and their higher education experiences in Japan.

To illustrate how their Japanese language knowledge helped these Japanese-returned students find interpreting related jobs during the war, let us look at the employment of Chinese/Japanese interpreters by the Beijing Municipal Court from 1938 to 1941, the first three years of Beijing's occupation by the Japanese (see Table 4.1). Within these three years, a total of four Chinese/Japanese interpreters worked in the court. Although none of them had had any past interpreting experience, all had higher education backgrounds in pre-war Japan. Hence, although no files indicate that agents without educational experiences in Japan were rejected for the positions, the 100 % employment of interpreters with similar backgrounds is telling. Three of these four interpreters, Jin Zongxian, Chang Rupei, and Zhou Chuangang, even had law degrees from universities in Japan, which partly explains their appointment as court interpreters. Interestingly, before occupation, each of the four had stable jobs in local government, and two, Zhou and Wang, even held the title of Director. However, when the area fell to the Japanese, the change of dominant power relationship made them lost their jobs and forced them to reposition themselves as interpreters within the dominant power relationship in the field.

According to the court records, the employment of these four Japanese-returned students was based on their voluntary application. Hence, their collaborative interpreting may not merely have been a compromise for physical survival but rather a strategy to readjust their positions by making full use of their capital in the field; that is, using their Japanese degrees and knowledge of Japanese language and culture to gain positions in the Japanese-sponsored government. Although their decisions to work as Chinese/Japanese interpreters might not necessarily bring them an increased gain in the form of promotion or salary compared to what they had before the occupation, such re-positioning was a necessary adjustment to the change in dominant power relationships.

For the new Chinese puppet government, interpreters who were familiar with the local communities and had experiences in working in relevant fields in the previous power structure were also important assets. This can be illustrated by the appointment of Jin Zongxian, one of the

Table 4.1 Chinese/Japanese interpreters employed by Beijing Municipal Court, from 1938 to 1941

Name	Gender	Age	Birthplace	Higher education	Salary	Previous work experience
Jin Zongxian[a]	Male	28 (in 1941)	Wuyuan, Anhui Province	Law degree from Waseda University (Japan)	Level 8	Dec. 1937 clerk, Secretariat of Beijing Special Autonomous Committee Jan. 1938, clerk, Beijing Public Bureau Mar. 1938, clerk, Shanxi Provincial Public Bureau
Chang Rupei[b]	Male	30 (in 1940)	Beijing	Mar. 1920, graduated from Tokyo Railway School (3 years, Japan); Mar. 1936, degree in law from Tokyo Private University of Law and Politics (3 years, Japan)	Level 6	Oct. 1936, business section of Bei-Ning Railway Bureau Mar. 1937, Deputy Director and Foreign Liaison Officer, Fengtai Station of Beijing Railway Bureau Apr. 1937, staff, Publishing and Propaganda Office of Tianjin Railway Bureau Oct. 1938, administrative staff, Jinan Railway Construction Bureau Aug. 1939, Taiyuan Civil Engineering Bureau

(*continued*)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Name	Gender	Age	Birthplace	Higher education	Salary	Previous work experience
Zhou Chuan'gang[c]	Male	33 (in 1940)	Penglai, Shandong Province	Degree from Morioka Advanced School of Agriculture and Forest (Japan)	Level 10	May 1933, Head, Administration Office of Zhuanghe County, Fengtian Province Mar. 1934, Director, Yi County Business Bureau in Fengtian Province Jul. 1935, teacher, Andong Provincial Business School Feb. 1938, Head, Agriculture and Forest Group in Andong Business Bureau
Wang Tingmei[d]	Male	34 (in 1938)	Nanling County, Anhui Province	Degree in politics and economics from Tokyo University of Law and Politics (3 years, Japan)	Level 10	May 1933, Secretary, Headquarters of the No. 17 Infantry 1935 Lecturer of Politics and Economy in Chinese University, Beijing Jan. 1936, Director, Jidong Government Import & Export inspection Bureau

[a]*Beijing difang fayuan xingzheng juanzong, tongyi jiuzhi renshi* 北京地方法院行政卷宗通译就职人事 (Administrative files of the Beijing Municipal Court: interpreter recruitment), March 26, 1941, BAJ 65–3–142

[b]*Beijing difang fayuan xingzheng juanzong, tongyi jiuzhi deng*北京地方法院行政卷宗通译就职等 (Administrative files of the Beijing Municipal Court: interpreter recruitment), 1940, BA J 65–3–128–6.

[c]*Beijing difang fayuan xingzheng juanzong, tongyi jiuzhi renshi* 北京地方法院行政卷宗通译就职人事 (Administrative files of the Beijing Municipal Court: interpreter recruitment), 1940, BA J 65–3–128–44.

[d]*Beijing difang fayuan xingzheng juanzong, tongyi renyuan renmian*北京地方法院行政卷宗通译人 员任免 (Administrative files of the Beijing Municipal Court: interpreter appointments and resignations), 1939, BA J 65–3–106–7.

four court interpreters in the above Table 4.1. As the appointment document reveals, apart from the piled up case files from the Japanese military police to be translated, there was an increasing demand for Chinese/Japanese interpreters in Beijing's Municipal Court because of the court's daily liaison with the Japanese forces, visiting officials, and interpreting in court.[2] According to the same document, as early as August 3, 1939 (two years before the appointment of Jin), a request for a Chinese/Japanese interpreter was referred to the Judiciary Department, but no qualified applicants were found before Jin's application. However, Jin seemed to impress the court and was described as an ideal candidate for the interpreter position: "the current applicant, Jin Zongxian, is a law graduate from Waseda University in Japan. He is only 28 years old, full of energy and vigor, with years of experience living in Japan and excellent writing skills. Since returning to China, Jin has been working with the Beijing Special Autonomous Committee and Shanxin Provincial Public Bureau."[3]

Jin's post was clearly a formal position in the court with regular monthly pay (100 yuan[4]). It is clear that the court had high expectations of applicants for this position because it could not find any qualified candidates until interpreter Jin appeared. The court's description of Jin's suitability is, therefore, revealing in that it stipulates the capital valued for this position, including Japanese language skills, specialized knowledge of law, relevant educational background and experience living in Japan, age, physical condition, and experience working in local government. Most particularly, the court emphasized the interpreter's educational background and sojourn in Japan as evidence of proficiency speaking and writing in Japanese.

Interestingly, apart from Jin's language skills, the court also valued his work experience with the Chinese government after his study in Japan. This emphasis reflects an important reality for the Japanese-returned students working as interpreters in occupied areas; that is, many were actually employed directly by Chinese collaborators, who held the main administrative responsibilities in Japanese-occupied areas. Hence, the

[2] See note 78 above, BAJ 65–3–142.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

interpreter's previous experience in Chinese KMT government, far from being a negative, was seen as evidence of his social competence and personality and added value to his capital.

Compared to the interpreter recruitment by Beijing Municipal Court, the recruitment by the Beijing Police Bureau in April 1941,[5] seemed to be less demanding. This recruitment by the Beijing Police Bureau was clearly aimed at filling some temporary positions in local communities. It was explained in its job advertisement that the interpreters would be paid a daily stipend when asked to work. The task for these positions was mainly to assist the Japanese police squad's investigation of information on Chinese residents in Beijing. The requirements were also straightforward: local residence, excellent knowledge of the Japanese language, and availability. There was no specific requirement on degrees or qualification, and only some personal information such as name, age, birthplace, profession, and address were needed to complete the application form. Clearly, the police bureau was looking for individuals who could speak Japanese and were familiar with the local population and environment. Although both recruitments emphasized Chinese/Japanese language skills, they targeted at different groups of interpreters with different language proficiencies, education, and social backgrounds.

These two examples of interpreters recruited by local authorities in occupied Beijing make it clear that, despite having the same title of "interpreter", at least two sets of interpreters were working in a stratified field of interpreting in positions at different levels in the prevailing power hierarchy and with different stakes. As Table 4.1 indicates, all the interpreter positions at Beijing Municipal Court were occupied by Japanese-returned students, who not only held relevant degrees but also had experience working with local governments. However, the second interpreter recruitment was obviously not aimed at these foreign-educated students; its requirements for applicants were much lower, and the employment was only temporary and paid daily. Hence, the status of the interpreter positions in the second recruitment could be expected

[5] *Jinchaju guanyu diaocha yiban laogong changkuang ji ge gongchang de zizhi ji bao'an ke xuan tongyi yuan deng xunling* 警察局关于调查一般劳工厂矿及各工厂的自治及保安科选通译员等训令 (Instructions from the Police Bureau concerning the investigation by all security departments into the situation of ordinary laborers and organizations in factories, as well as recruitment of interpreters), April 1941, BA J183–2–30008.

to be correspondingly low. In other words, the distribution of the stakes in the field, rather than being even, varied according to the position and interpreter capital. Would the Japanese-returned students, then, have been interested in these positions? If not, who were the potential candidates for this type of interpreter post? The Nanjing City Archive contains a report[6] on seven interpreters employed by the Nanjing Public Affairs Bureau during occupation. As in the Police Bureau case, these interpreters were responsible for assisting communication between local Chinese communities and the Japanese forces. According to this report, the Nanjing Public Affairs Bureau had concern about the competencies of interpreters currently employed. Therefore, in September 1938, almost ten months after Nanjing was conquered by the Japanese forces, the Public Affairs Bureau conducted an evaluation of these interpreters, especially their backgrounds, Japanese language knowledge, and attitude towards work. The evaluation was based on a ten-point scoring system in which better performance earned a higher score. It was conducted by a Japanese intelligence agent and an established Chinese interpreter. As the evaluation reveals, none of the seven interpreters evaluated were Japanese-returned students. In fact, except for the oldest, Yuan Qiseng, male, aged 59, who had graduated from a local Japanese-sponsored school, they had no formal education in Japanese but had acquired their Japanese language skills from years of work experience in Japan or in Japanese stores in China. Apart from interpreter Yuan, who scored 8 on his Japanese language proficiency test, these interpreters scored relatively low, an average of 5.4. Moreover, two interpreters, Wang Changfu (male, 32 years old) and Cai Wingke (male, 35 years old), could not even write Japanese. Compared to their Japanese language skills, these interpreters' attitude was evaluated as slightly higher, with an average of 7.1 points and full points for one interpreter, Yuan. As a conclusion of this evaluation, the reviewers suggested that these interpreters attend a two-month training session covering honorific expressions in the Japanese language, politeness

[6] *Benchu guanyu xunlian ge qugongsuo tongyiyuan banfa* 本处关于训练各区剐所通译员办法 (Training of interpreters employed by the public affairs offices in all districts), September 16, 1938, NCA 1002–2–1292.

in Japanese culture, and administrative regulations at the Public Affairs Bureau.[7] Apparently, the reviewers considered these interpreters' expression of the Japanese language problematic and their understanding of their positions inadequate. In other words, in the reviewers' eyes, despite the temporary nature of the interpreting work, besides having language proficiency and commitment to their work, qualified interpreters should also master cultural etiquette and be familiar with governmental rules and regulations.

At the end of this evaluation, the Chinese reviewer also made an interesting comment: "经以上考察,王长福蔡清科太不行了, 他们只配充军队通译, 候机更换实为必要"[8] (from what we have observed, Wang Changfu and Cai Qingke do not have the necessary competencies for the position. They are only qualified to be military interpreters. They should be replaced whenever possible). There is no information available suggesting that military interpreters for the Japanese forces could have fewer language skill requirements, the Chinese reviewer's comment, however, suggests that at least in some interpreter's eyes, military interpreters belonged to a lower rank in the field. This perception might not be representative but does suggest that for some interpreters, despite its greater risk of physical danger, military interpreting did not have a high professional profile. This situation forms a strong contrast with that of KMT military interpreters and reminds us of the potentially different perceptions of the military interpreting profession in different contexts during the war.

In addition, from the Japanese-returned students to court interpreters, from the Japanese-returned small businesses owner, barber, and store assistant to community interpreters, these interpreters' taking on of these positions reflects the movement of capital as a result of the changing structure in the field brought about by the Japanese occupation. On the one hand, the Japanese-returned students, with their language skills and social and educational experience, held upper-level positions, especially posts requiring specialized knowledge; whereas those whose lack of education and low social status had not equipped them with sufficient

[7] Ibid.

[8] NCA 1002–2–1292.

linguistic and social competencies were positioned in low-level interpreting work. Accordingly, the label "interpreter" covered a wide range of positions associated with different stakes and filled by agents with different capital. On the other hand, these interpreters' position-taking and practices also constituted the field. That is, the value of Japanese language knowledge materialized through these interpreters' status and stakes, encouraging other agents to move towards similar positions. This latter dynamic produced another group of interpreters—the locally trained.

4.2.2 Locally Trained Interpreters: Forced Japanese Language Education and Linguistic Habitus

Strictly speaking, "locally trained interpreters" is not a perfect term for the interpreters discussed in this section because few of them ever received formal interpreter training. Rather, they usually acquired their language skills in the mass Japanese language education enforced in occupied areas. Such enforced language education was part of the Japanese occupiers' aim, in place since the beginning of the war, to popularize and legitimize Japanese as the official language in occupied areas, especially in the educational sector, in the hope that eventually the language problem would cease to be a problem. This policy gave rise to a boom in Japanese language schools and courses in occupied areas. Their graduates constituted another important source of interpreters, especially for regions in which the occupation had been comparatively lengthy. For example, if a Chinese student in the Manchurian area began receiving Japanese language training at age 16 in 1932, when the area was officially under Japanese control (Barrett 2001: 2), he would have had six years' experience learning the language by 1938, the middle stage of the war.

In addition, besides the many Japanese-sponsored public and private full-time and part-time Japanese language courses, every elementary and secondary school in the occupied areas was forced to teach Japanese as the mother tongue. Although the ultimate goal of this enforced Japanese language education was to remove language barriers, which would of course have led to a decreased need for interpreters, changing the socio-linguistic environment was a long, complicated process that lagged behind the

Japanese army's rapid expansion across China. Therefore, the Japanese occupiers' language policy actually stimulated the emergence of the interpreter career; that is, the mass Japanese language education and associated Japanese language qualifications and exams not only encouraged agents to acquire necessary language skills but also helped the Japanese to locate those with the proficiency to become interpreters.

Many Chinese historians (Qi 2002, 2005; Wang 1989; Yu and Song 2005) have conducted research on the Japanese forces' language policy—"enslavement education", as it is often called—as an important component of Japanese colonial education in occupied areas. This policy is also very important for this present study of locally trained interpreters because it was not merely a practical Japanese strategy for solving the communication problem in these areas but also a tool to legitimize the official status of the Japanese language. Such legitimization was designed to crush local Chinese residents' original language identity and construct a new state subject to Japanese control. This inclination was well articulated in 1927 in the following paragraph by the Japanese headmaster of the South Manchuria Railway Society School[9]:

> We shall break the barrier from language first. Teach Chinese students Japanese language and let them act as the mediators to influence their families, so all of them will have less hatred towards Japan and be emotionally closer to the Japanese people and thus start to appreciate them. This can first begin from Dalian to areas controlled by the South Manchuria Railway and then to the whole of northern China. The consequential benefit to Japan's interest in northern China would be significant. (Gu and Zhang 1991: 488)

Why was language emphasized as the first step towards breaking through these barriers? If this language policy aimed at changing Chinese people's attitude towards the Japanese, what influence would it have on

[9] The South Manchuria Railway Society (1907–45) was a Japanese colonial institution in the Manchuria area, whose first President おかまつさんたろう (Santaro Okamatsu), in his book *The Nature of the South Manchuria Railway Society*, aptly describes the society as follows: "It was a state-owned company initiated by the Japanese government, bearing the government's administrative responsibilities in Manchuria. The initiation and running of this society is one part of state affairs, and the society is actually an institution of the state" (quoted in Gu 2001: 125).

interpreters who acquired their linguistic capital through this education? According to Bourdieu (1991: 45), a political unit always wants to legitimate an official language and impose it on the population in a certain territory, that is, a desire "bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses". Hence, this imposition and legitimization was a way to secure and distinguish the language users' political dominance in the state. Although, because of the wartime situation, the Japanese forces' imposition of the Japanese language was more a political strategy than a process of creating a national identity in Bourdieu's sense, it was a strategy by which the Japanese occupiers forged a linguistic habitus that would guide agents' perceptions of the social use of the language and the linguistic market in which their linguistic capital was valued (ibid.: 52–7).

Indeed, education, especially language education, played a crucial role in the Japanese fostering of a linguistic habitus favorable to their military occupation and political dominance. For example, the Cultural and Education Department of the Japanese-sponsored North China government once issued an official announcement, "关于在学校教育彻底普及日语之建议" (*Guanyu zai xuexiao jiaoyu shang chedi puji riyue zhijianyi*, Instructions on the popularization of the Japanese language at all levels of school education), which proposed nine guidelines to promote the teaching and learning of, as well as instruction in, the Japanese language in classrooms and local communities. As its first guideline, this work explicitly stated that, apart from teaching linguistic skills, teachers should "help students understand the spirit of Japan, as well as Japanese customs and traditions, because the key concern in teaching shall be the promotion of the mutual development of Manchuria and Japan" (quoted in Wu 1993: 29–30).

The Japanese occupiers' fostering and inculcation of Chinese students' linguistic habitus is also evident in their emphasis on Japanese as the only official language in elementary and secondary schools (Qi 2005: 49). Not only were new textbooks for Japanese language education composed and issued to these schools in occupied areas, but Chinese teachers who taught the Japanese language were screened, retrained, and monitored by Japanese advisors (Wu and Ding 2008: 86–91). For example, in areas controlled by the Japanese-sponsored Nanjing government,

all elementary school teachers had to pass a political examination and undergo a month's training before taking up their teaching posts and then had to take political tests regularly to provide evidence of their "political integrity" (ibid.). This emphasis on teacher qualifications in elementary and secondary schools mirrors the Japanese occupiers' interest in inculcating elementary and secondary students in occupied areas with Japanese knowledge, which could relate to Bourdieu's argument on the importance of agents' early family and educational experiences in the formation of their habitus. A similar argument is put forward in George E. Taylor's *Japanese Sponsored Regime in North China* (1980), which analyzes the group of Chinese that the Japanese forces were most interested in manipulating and assimilating through elementary and secondary education. That is, rather than concentrating on those who had already begun university degrees (who had already formed their basic perceptions of Japan and the war and were unlikely to be loyal to the Japanese even after re-education [Taylor 1980: 79–80]), the Japanese saw elementary and secondary students as ideal candidates who would be comparatively easier to shape and indoctrinate.

One direct outcome of this emphasis on Japanese language education in elementary and secondary schools was the production of potential candidates for interpreter positions. In this enforced Japanese education system, Japanese language proficiency was a decisive index for academic performance; to progress further and graduate, a student had to prove Japanese language knowledge by taking a test. As admitted by Xu Deyuan, an interviewee in Qi's (2005: 119) oral history project on wartime "enslavement education", after ten years of Japanese language study from elementary school to secondary school, students could not help but have learned the language whether they wished to or not. More importantly, to encourage Chinese students and the Chinese public to learn Japanese, the Japanese occupiers created a system of Japanese language proficiency tests to recognize and reward those with satisfying knowledge of Japanese language, on the one hand, and to set a threshold for profitable positions, on the other. Hence, the Japanese language became a necessary capital for agents seeking good jobs and decent salaries, thereby directly linking this education system (or linguistic market) to the labor market.

Zhou Duo, another interviewee in Qi's (2005: 142) project, also confessed that after six years of Japanese-controlled education, he knew little about Chinese history, did not understand the terms "enslavement" or "colonial", and had little comprehension of his Chinese cultural identity. Accordingly, he decided to apply to the best Japanese high school in his area, not only because students from this high school had a chance to go to Japan for further study but also because its students spoke excellent Japanese:

> 从他们口中讲出来的日本话,真叫一般人望尘莫及、垂涎三尺。你不知道当时会讲日本话的人该多么吃香。能流利的将日本话的人不说是凤毛麟角,也确实没有多少。当时谁要会讲日本话,就可以毫不费力的找到一份称心如意的洋差事干干。

> The Japanese they spoke was much better than average and so enviable. You would not know, but the ability to speak Japanese well was so highly regarded. There are of course some people did speak Japanese, but the number was limited. So, if someone could speak Japanese, he/she would have no difficultiy finding a desirable, satisfying job working for foreigners [the Japanese]. (Quoted in Qi 2005: 142)

Zhou's words paint a vivid picture of the linguistic market in occupied areas while also explaining his motive for learning Japanese in a reputable Japanese-sponsored high school. As Bourdieu (1991: 49) observes, the education system can help the imposition of a legitimate language by increasing or decreasing the value of certain modes of expression in the labor market. Even though the Japanese military occupation might have affected agents' perception of this value and the status of both the Chinese and the Japanese language, the linguistic hierarchy established through education would undoubtedly affect the labor market so that those with dominant linguistic competencies would obtain better positions and more benefits. At the same time, this situation would stimulate the linguistic market to perceive the advantages of the dominant language and adjust its reproduction of the same (ibid.).

In fact, the reality of the Japanese occupation and encouragement of Japanese language education did spur the Chinese public's interest

in learning Japanese. For example, prior to the end of 1938, only 15 Japanese language classes were offered in Shanghai, most affiliated with secondary schools and involving only 14 teachers and 2,763 students (Yu and Song 2005: 235). By 1943, however, according to a survey by the education department of the Japanese-sponsored Nanjing government, the number of professional Japanese language schools in Shanghai had increased to 58, with both day and evening course options.[10] Moreover, in the occupied areas, a Japanese language competence evaluation system became increasingly popular because many governmental authorities and public institutions used it to judge their employees' Japanese language skills. As a result, for many Chinese, taking this test became a way to secure better paid positions or retain current jobs. In fact, the number of Chinese taking this test in the Manchurian area grew from 3,607 to 29,223 over a five-year period (1936–40), more than a nine-fold increase (Okada 2001/1940: 173).

This significant population learning Japanese obviously increased the ease of interpreter recruitment for the Japanese occupiers. In fact, training was often directly omitted because interpreters with sufficient Japanese language skills could be found in local areas just by advertising and testing. For example, in Qingdao, the municipal government publicly advertised interpreter positions in early April 1944[11] and then administered an examination that included written (70%) and oral tests (30%). The written part tested interpreters on Chinese language (20%), Japanese language (20%), translation (Chinese/Japanese) (20%), and mathematics (10%), while the oral part consisted of interpreting (both directions) and answering questions in Japanese. The minimum score to qualify for the position was 80%, and the minimum to be put on the waiting list was 60%.

Two months later, on June 1, the results were published to the public. Five interpreters were formally employed and assigned to work in

[10] *Shanghai tebieshi jiaoyuju: jiaoyubu yinfa ge shengshi riyu xuexiao gaikuang diaocha biao* 上海特别市教育局:教育部印发各省市日语学校概况调查表 (Shanghai Special City Education Bureau: results of a survey by the National Education Department on Japanese language education in cities and provinces in China), March 1943, Shanghai Archive (hereafter, SA) R04–01–370.

[11] *Guanyu luyong banshiyuan tongyiyuan de bugao* 关于录用办事员通译员的布告 (Public notice on the recruitment of administrators and interpreters), April 10, 1944, Qingdao Municipal Archive (hereafter, QMA) B0031–001–00171–0127.

different government sections, and another four were notified that they were on the waiting list for upcoming posts.[12] As expected, almost all the interpreters employed at this time were graduates of local Japanese language schools.[13] Admittedly, the situation may have differed in different regions because Japanese language education was fairly mature and stable in Qingdao, which had been under the influence of the Japanese forces since the early twentieth century and formally occupied by the latter since the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, these locally trained interpreters in occupied areas did present an interesting contrast to the citizens in Yan'an who were eager to learn Russian in the 1940s but failed to find opportunities to use their language skills (see Chap. 3). Although both groups were situated in different fields with conflicting political interests, they showed similar inclinations to speculate on valued capital and move towards favorable positions. More importantly, for these locally trained interpreters, interpreting was more likely to be a strategy for upward mobility in the Japanese-dominated power hierarchy rather than merely a career choice. As pointed out by Zhuo Duo, Qi's (2005: 142) second interviewee, it was not only "a satisfying job" but also a chance to "work with foreigners [the Japanese]". This comment suggests the potential stake associated with interpreters' physical contact with their clients (the Japanese in this case), which in turn raises the issue of interpreter embodiment.

4.3 Interpreter Embodiment

As previously mentioned, the interpreters under discussion constituted a special group of Chinese collaborationists. No matter whether their direct employers were Chinese collaborators or Japanese forces, these interpreters certainly constituted part of the collaborator group and contributed to the collaboration with the Japanese. At the same time, given the nature of interpreting work, interpreters were often physically

[12] *Qingdao tebieshi zhengfu luqu banshiyuan tongyiyuan bangshi* 青岛特别市政府录取办事员通译员榜示 (Results of the Qingdao municipal government's recruitment of administrators and interpreters), June 6, 1944, QMA B0031–001–00031–0082.

[13] Ibid.

present with the Japanese forces, thereby representing an incarnated collaborationist relationship. For example, the court interpreters discussed in Sect. 4.2.1 would have had to deal with the Japanese military police squad on a daily basis—a body representative of the occupiers' power. Thus, these interpreters' bodies became the nexus of the collaboration between the puppet government and the foreign invader.

This type of interpreter embodiment often led to two extremes. On the one hand, the interpreter position could be a very powerful position in that interpreters held the key position in facilitating or obstructing communication between local residents and the occupiers. The more the Japanese forces relied on interpreters, the more powerful the interpreters became. Especially when the interpreters took up responsibilities other than linguistic support, there were more opportunities for interpreters to manipulate both sides and pursue their own interests. This situation somewhat resembles Palmer's (2007) model of the interpreter as *fixer*, in which local Iraq interpreters helped Western journalists to set up interviews and access local networks/resources during the Iraq War (see Chap. 1). There is, however, one major difference: the collaborating Chinese interpreters had to deal with an extreme relationship between foreign invaders/occupiers and local resistance forces and civilians. Witnessing the brutalities and uncertainties of the war and the damage it had brought to the civilians, some of these collaborating interpreters played a more active role and acted as buffers in the clash, providing certain protections to the local Chinese public. Some interpreters, however, tried to make good use of their association with the Japanese forces in order to gain individual interests and benefits.

On the other hand, despite being powerful, the interpreters, seen as "traitors" who acted at the forefront of the collaboration, were easy targets for revenge stemming from the Chinese people's hostility towards the Japanese invaders. This physical danger was especially true for interpreters serving with the Japanese troops and working in areas in which Japanese control was comparatively weak and subject to frequent attacks by Chinese forces. This situation echoes Cronin's (2006) example of Iraq interpreters who had to wear masks to hide their identity from the local public. Hence, with these two possible consequences in mind, the following sections examine interpreter embodiment in interpreting practices,

as well as their corresponding strategies, with a focus on two interesting phenomena: fake interpreters and interpreters as double agents.

4.3.1 Fake Interpreters

The Beijing Municipal Archive currently contains 447,711 files on the Republican period (1911–45), all digitized and available through an online catalogue search. A search on the 1938–45 Japanese occupation of Beijing using the key words *fanyi* (翻译, translator/interpreter) or *tongyi* (通译, a direct translation into Chinese of the Japanese term for interpreters in occupied areas) in 2008 produced 33 results. Surprisingly, 20 of these 33 files, almost two thirds, are criminal records of fake interpreters who, with or without knowledge of the Japanese language, pretended to be working for the Japanese occupiers in order to blackmail local Chinese residents. These bogus interpreters tried their luck in such places as individual residences, shops, restaurants, and even brothels and universities.[14] Although their specific interests varied from case to case—money, opium, clothes, watches, or even women—their common practice was to exert pressure by claiming interpreter status and threatening serious consequences if the victims did not satisfy their requests. As part of their ruse, these individuals also employed fake artifacts related to the interpreter identity, including uniforms, business cards, and even a Japanese accent.[15] This high percentage of fake interpreter cases in the official records, as well as the fact that the major-

[14] *Riben xianbingdui guanyu tihui Li Jiaying deng maochong rifanyi de cheng* 日本宪兵队关于提回李佳英等冒充日翻译的呈(Report from the Japanese military police squad concerning the case of Li Yaying and others pretending to be its interpreters),June 1938, Beijing City Archive(hereafter, BMA) J 181–26–2995 (395–26–1); *Beijing tebieshi gongshi jingchaju tewuke guanyu Jiang Yuke maochong ri xianbingdui tongyi deng xiang shangming zhacai yi an gei jingfake de gonghan* 北京特别市剀署警察局特务科关于姜雨河冒充日宪兵队通译等向商民诈财一案给警法科的剀函 (Report to the legal office by the police intelligence office of Beijing's special city committee concerning the case of Jiang Yuhe's blackmail of shopowners and residents in the guise of being an interpreter for the Japanese military police squad), May 1944, BMA J181–26–6085 (598–51–6); *Beiping shi tewuke guanyu Wu Zixiu deng ren maochong xianbingdui fanyi qiyi zhacai de cheng* 北平市特务科关于吴子秀等人冒充宪兵队翻译起意诈财的呈 (Report by the Beiping [Beijing] City Intelligence Office regarding the case of Wu Zixiu and others' blackmail for money in the guise of being an interpreter for the Japanese military police squad), May 12, 1941, BMAJ181–26–4652 (1–11–22–10).

[15] Ibid.

ity were reported only after the perpetrator's blackmail had been successful, shows clearly that local residents recognized and valued the interpreters' power even outside interpreted events and in the absence of either interpreting activities or the other parties involved (i.e., the Japanese forces). Why, then, did the residents perceive and acknowledge the interpreters' power, and how were the fake interpreters able to convince locals of this power potential? The following paragraphs examine three cases of fake interpreters in occupied Beijing that may provide some answers to these questions.

In the first incident, Mr. Guo Rui (living on Old Drum Street in the Beijing suburbs) reported that he was blackmailed by two strangers, one of whom claimed to be an interpreter for the Japanese.[16] After investigation, the police arrested Mr. Zhao Songyan, who returned to ask Mr. Guo Rui for more money the day after the case was reported. At the police station, Mr. Zhao confessed that he was a clerk at the Beijing Yingshan Bureau at Donghuamen Wai Avenue and at the same time served in a Central Intelligence Group of the North China Transportation Society's Police Bureau at Chaoyang Men Nei Avenue. Xie Zhankui, who was from the same alley where Zhao lived, was his accomplice. Because of financial difficulties, they fabricated the case that Guo had hidden guns for the CCP's Eighth Army and provided them with supplies. Zhao disguised himself as an interpreter for the Japanese from Pinggu County and asked Guo for money to keep the secret, asking initially for 6,000 yuan. Xie then acted as a mediator to persuade Guo to meet Zhao's request. On two different occasions, these two men obtained 200 yuan from Guo and split it between them. On the evening of the 19th, Zhao came again to Guo. He beat Guo and asked for 1,000 yuan by 8:00 p.m. the next day but was caught before that time.[17]

It is interesting to see that in the two accomplices' eyes, the interpreter position was not only powerful but also profitable. Acutely perceiving the conflict between the Japanese occupiers and anti-Japanese forces, Zhao and Xie craftily fabricated a dangerous accusation against Guo, and in

[16] *Cheng jie huotong zhacaifan Zhao Songyan deng er ming yi'an qing* 呈解伙同诈财犯赵松岩等二名一案请 (Report on Zhao Songyan and one other criminal who blackmailed a local resident), August 1942, BMA J181–26–5200.

[17] *Beiping zhenjidui guanyu Zhao Songyan deng er'ren maochong Pinggu xian fanyi zhacai de cheng* 北平侦缉队关于赵松岩等二人冒充平谷县翻译诈财的呈 (Report from Beiping [Beijing] detectives concerning the case of Zhao Songyan and another Chinese person who blackmailed others while pretending to be interpreters from Pinggu County) August 25, 1942, BMA J181–26–5200 (581–310–4).

the guise of an interpreter, Zhao adopted two independent roles. In the first, he pretended to be investigating for (and obligated to report to) his boss, the Japanese forces; in the second, through Xie's mediation, he demonstrated his power by bringing the entire incident to a close and protecting the Guos from potential violence by the Japanese forces. The Guos, however, would have to pay 6,000 yuan for their peace of mind and safety. These two roles, at least to Zhao and Xie, were natural for a Chinese interpreter working for the Japanese forces. The blackmail is then the antithesis of the interpreters' buffer role that can help protect the ordinary citizen, as exemplified by the case of Interpreter Zhang discussed earlier. In reality, during the cruelty of war, concrete evidence was minimally important in the Japanese force's decision to kill someone, especially an ordinary Chinese citizen. Rather, particularly in the conquered areas, the Japanese occupiers' primary concern was to remove any potential resistance. In this context, given their language knowledge, interpreters were indeed a special group of people because of their access to information on both the Japanese and the Chinese side and potential influence on the collaboration via their interpreting. The fact that Zhao and Xie thought that they could level the accusation against Guo and ask for money under the pretence of Zhao's being an interpreter for the Japanese indicates that the potential power of the interpreters in occupied areas had been sensed by the Chinese public.

What also makes the scene set by the perpetrators so telling is the total absence of one crucial Party, the Japanese forces, and thus any source language input. Despite such absence and even though the suggested compromise was indirectly set in motion by the mediator, Xie, the interpreter was still the key figure, pretending to represent his boss's interest, on the one hand, but showing willingness to help his fellow countrymen (subject to conditions), on the other. Xie's mediation is also interesting in that he not only helped to exert more pressure on Guo but also, by putting distance between Zhao and Guo, fostered Guo's perception of Zhao's higher position and power. Not that the 200 yuan the Guos were forced to pay was a large amount in 1942 Beijing, probably about one

or two months' salary for a clerk,[18] but the fact that Guo actually agreed to pay and did not report the incident until Zhao and Xie used violence to push for more money shows his acknowledgement of the interpreters' power to some extent. In other words, he was initially prepared to give in to any request that seemed realistic, even though the accusation was false. Nevertheless, as convincing as the case of Zhao and Xie is, their behavior soon raised suspicions and the police intervened. A second case, in contrast, throws more light on just how far a fake interpreter could go.

In this second incident, the Fuji Store at Dongsi North Avenue in Beijing reported that it had been blackmailed by someone claiming to be an interpreter for the Japanese military police squad.[19] The suspect, Bai Zhaoxiang, was eventually arrested by Beijing Police a few days later, and he admitted that in the guise of being Interpreter Yang of the Japanese military police, he did get 400 yuan and a bicycle from Fuji Store with the excuse of purchasing rice for the Japanese. According to the police report, in similar fashion Bai cheated several shops (including 300 yuan from the Jingshengyuan grain shop, 450 yuan from the Juxingqi Cake Shop, two watches from Hengdian Clock and Watch Shop, 300 yuan from the Yuanshengyong Grain Store, a set of suits and fabrics from the Xieshengxiang Shop, 5 taels of opium from Heji Opium Shop, etc.):

In fact, according to police records, in the prior August, Bai had been arrested and sentenced to prison for similar offenses but had been bailed out the following April. Evidently, Bai well perceived the value of an interpreter's identity in occupied areas and tried to exploit it as much as possible. Although what he gained was comparatively small—ranging from money, watches, and clothes to opium—his frequent success mirrors the Chinese public's, and especially small businessmen's, prevailing perception that in occupied Beijing, interpreters could manipulate situ-

[18] In October 1941, in Shanghai, the monthly salary for a Chinese translator and editor of an international organization was 145 yuan and that for a female high school teacher was 45 yuan:*Shanghai huaji zhiyuan jiating shenghuo zhuangkuang yanjiu* 上海华籍职员家庭生活状况研究 (A survey of the family incomes of Chinese, Shanghai City Archive [hereafter, SMA]) U1–10–801.

[19] *Cheng jie zhenhuo lüci maochong xianbingdui fanyi xiang geshang suoqu caiwu feifan Bao Zhaoxiang yiming qing yu xunhan yi'an you* 呈解侦获屡次冒充宪兵队翻译向各商索取财物匪犯白兆祥一名请予讯函一案由 (Report on the case of Bao Zhaoxiang who, pretending to be an interpreter for the Japanese military police, made several requests for money and property from a few shop owners), BMA J181–2–1623.

ations because of their language skills and connection to the Japanese forces. This perception is probably why a majority of the people Bai approached seemed to recognize and give value to his interpreter status: only one shop was actually suspicious and "took the trouble" to report the fake interpreter. This collective expectation encouraged Bai, to some extent, to use his interpreter disguise repeatedly. Although what he gained from this strategy may seem unimpressive to today's interpreters, given the scarcity of material during the war and the difficulty of making a living in occupied areas, the material benefits of his ruse are important. If the two cases previously described reflect only a handful of the strategies used by bogus interpreters to serve their own immediate interests in local communities, the following third case presents a slightly different perspective and suggests how much influence real interpreters might be able to exert on the public.

In this case, the University of China in Beijing reported that someone purporting to be an interpreter from the Japanese Guhe Troop had come to the university several times and conducted individual conversations with a couple of students.[20] This so-called interpreter's behavior had upset many students and raised the university's suspicions. A few days later, police found and arrested this suspicious individual, Yang He. After making inquiries of Yang and other involved parties, including the students Yang had approached, the police learned that Yang had indeed once served in the Guhe Troop but had recently quit this service. His reason for disguising himself as an interpreter for the Guhe Troop was to approach and court Miss Fang Ji, a student at the University of China. According to Miss Fang, when Yang approached her, he was in military green uniform and wore an armband with the mark of the Guhe Troop. He was serious and told her that a Beijing University student with the surname Zhang had been arrested by the Guhe Troop and beaten to death after admitting that he was a communist bandit. However, before Zhang died, he had confessed that he knew her and another student from the University of China,

[20] *Wei Chahuo Yang He maochong riben budui fanyi raoluan zhongguo daxue konghe nan'nü xuesheng deng qing yi an jie qing xunban you* 为查获杨贺冒充日本部队翻译扰乱中国大学恐吓男女学生等情一案解请讯办由 (Report on the case of Yang He who disguised himself as an interpreter for a Japanese troop, disrupted order at the University of China, and threatened male and female students), BMA J181–26–6204.

so he wanted to meet Fang him in person for a chat in the north gate of Nanchizi. Fang did not go to meet Zhang at the end. Zhang therefore registered classes at the University and approached a few classmates of Fang as the "interpreter of Japanese force" for information in order to pursue her.

Yang's case is particularly interesting in two respects. First, he was not interested in material gains but in a relationship with the woman, Miss Fang. He chose the identity of interpreter to approach Fang and her classmates, hoping his status would impress them, on the one hand, and push Fang towards him with his 'interpreter power', on the other. As recorded in the university's report, many students did indeed feel the unusual pressure of undergoing questioning by an interpreter from the Japanese troop. This means that, apart from small business owners and ordinary citizens, young people with higher education could also be affected by the appearance of interpreters in their lives. Second, Yang did indeed have experience in the service of the Japanese troop, although it is unclear whether he was an interpreter. However, Yang's actions are seemingly attributable to his expectation of the public response to the image of an interpreter and his bodily expression of his interpreter identity. As Miss Fang Ji herself observed, Yang wearing his military green uniform and armband when he approached her, and, using a serious tone, he initiated topics related to the punishment of anti-Japanese forces, implying both his relationship with the Japanese army and the potentially serious consequences of the entire issue.

In fact, Yang is not the only one who attempted to convince the public with symbolic items related to the interpreter identity. Among the 20 cases of fake interpreters, some tried to fake name cards that carried the title of interpreter or certificates of authorization from a Japanese squad, while some boasted of their acquaintance with certain Japanese officers or even spoke a few Japanese words to create an impression of proficiency in the language.[21] Whatever the strategy, their shared goal was to persuade local residents that they were interpreters, most particularly, interpreters for the Japanese military police. The emphasis on this association is also important in that the military police held high authority in issues related to social security in occupied areas, and thus their interpreters were likely to be perceived as more powerful than others. As a result, many fake interpreters, either explicitly or implicitly, used a conditional clause in their threats

[21] BMAJ 181–26–2995 (395–26–1), BMA J181–26–6085 (598–51–6), BMAJ181–26–4652 (1–11–22–10).

to the locals: "If you don't…I will tell the Japanese police that you…". In other words, all the disguising and imitation by these fake interpreters was based on the local Chinese people's perception and recognition of [real] interpreters' positions or, in Bourdieu's words, symbolic capital.

As the previous three cases show, rather than risk offending the real interpreters and causing unnecessary trouble, a majority of the local Chinese people did not immediately report their victimization but rather chose to tolerate it unless reporting became necessary. This tolerance by the public no doubt provided opportunities for fake interpreters, but it also implies that it was perceived by the Chinese public that the collaborating interpreters had some manipulative power and could exert some influence on the Japanese if they wanted. This perception is related to the public's observation of the interpreters' side-by-side working with the Japanese and fitted well with the deep-rooted culture of *guanxi* (network) in Chinese society. Admittedly, all the 'interpreters' involved in these cases are fake, and therefore, it might not be convincing enough to conclude that real interpreters might have enjoyed similar or even greater benefits from local people during the war, which is also not the intention of this study. However, these fake interpreters do contribute to our understanding of the image of these interpreters perceived by the Chinese public and underscore the embodiment of interpreters' practice due to their physical presence at interpreting sites. As we will see in the next section, due to the public's perception of interpreters' connection to the Japanese, many interpreters were targeted as *hanjian* by both the Chinese resistance forces and the Chinese public.

4.3.2 Interpreters' Border-crossing Strategies

问:你去抓过人民没有?
答:我出去抓人均是随同宪兵去的,我自己私人没有抓过人。
问:所带来的人犯审问是你审问吗?
答:审问案犯是由日本宪兵班长以上人员来审问的,我做翻译。
问;审讯时拷打人是由谁来打呢?
答:是宪兵队自己拷打,我没打过人犯。
问:该宪兵队打死的中国人犯有多达数?
答:打死病死的大概有三十多人,再那里的拘所一件小屋多者拘押五十余人各,最易使人犯染病。

Q: Did you hunt and arrest Chinese people [during the war]?
A: I just accompanied the [Japanese] police squad in tasks like arresting. I never went and caught someone myself.
Q: Were you the one who interrogated Chinese people who have been captured
A: Only those Japanese police who were above the level of monitor had the right to interrogate [Chinese] prisoners. I was just an interpreter.
Q: During interrogations, who was responsible for torturing prisoners?
A: The Japanese police did that. I never beat prisoners.
Q: How many Chinese prisoners were beaten to death by the Japanese police?
A: Over 30, including both those beaten to death and those who died from disease. It [disease] happened because there was only one small room in the prison, but the number of prisoners could be over 50. In such a crowded place, it was easy for prisoners to get sick.

If the cases of fake interpreters mirrored the manipulative power of the collaborating interpreters perceived by the public, this section will show how this perceived power could backfire the true interpreters, no matter whether they used this power for their own benefits or not. The previous dialogue was part of interrogation records taken from the case of Bai Tianrui stored in Beijing Municipal Archive.[22] Bai was reported as a *hanjian* by local Chinese residents in Beijing when the war came to an end. It was said that during the war he was an interpreter for the Japanese police squad in Fengyang County, Shanxi. According to the reporter, Bai "无恶不作,并逮捕国民党工作人员爱国青年及基督教徒牧师等加以暴刑残杀" (committed all manner of crimes, including arresting KMT workers, patriotic Chinese youth, Christians believers and ministers, and torturing some people to death). It is interesting to see that Bai was reported by Beijing residents for his earlier interpreting practices

[22] *Cheng wei Niu Xinye jianju xianren Baitianrui qian zai Shanxi Fengyangxian di riben xianbingdui ren tongyi shi can sha tongbao yi'an jieqing xunban you* 呈为牛新业检举鲜人白天瑞前在山西汾阳县敌日本宪兵队任通译时残杀同胞一案解请讯办由 (Report on Niu Xinye's accusation of Bai Tianrui [Xian minority] who slaughtered his fellow countrymen [the Chinese people] during his interpreting service for the Japanese military police squad in Fengyang county, Shanxi province), 1946, BMA J181–26–2420.

thousands of miles away in Shanxi province after the war, with witnesses found as far away as Shanxi.[23] Even though Bai tried to deny these accusations by reiterating that he only performed his interpreting work for the Japanese, the interpreter was clearly perceived by the public as having helped the Japanese forces to control the local Chinese public. This accusation of Bai suggests that by working closely with the Japanese forces, interpreters apparently not only embodied the power relationship but were also endangered by their physical presence as part of the Japanese forces' violence and domination.

Bai's case, however, only exemplifies the Chinese people's punishment of traitors via legal procedures after the war. During the war, interpreting for the Japanese forces was an even more dangerous job. Besides exposure to clashes between the Japanese and Chinese forces, the collaborating interpreters had to face possible death and attacks by all types of anti-Japanese forces, especially local CCP guerrillas and KMT intelligence agents. This situation was particularly true in areas not under full Japanese control, which were frequently disrupted by Chinese resistance forces. Bai was lucky enough to at least survive the war, but another interpreter, Zhu Shiqing, was not so fortunate. Zhu was an interpreter for a collaborationist local government near Shanghai, who was reported missing and then abducted by Chinese guerrillas on a business trip to Shanghai on December 10, 1938.[24]

Evidently, despite their enjoyment of temporary security and power, interpreters were caught between two opposite poles. On the one hand, to survive the Japanese forces' violence and make a living during the occupation, they had to interpret; on the other, to interpret could mean being executed by anti-Japanese forces as traitors. Therefore, some interpreters chose a compromise by acting as double agents for both sides during the war. That is, besides interpreting for the Japanese, they also tried to protect local Chinese residents and assist the Chinese forces where possible in exchange for their own safety and long-term interests. This dynamic is exemplified by the case of Zhang Hecheng, the captured interpreter

[23] Ibid.

[24] *Cheng wei chengbao shuhui tongyi Zhu Shiqing shizong you* 为呈报属会通译朱士清失踪由 (Report on the disappearance of Zhu Shiqing, the interpreter for our county), SMA R18–1–229.

whose words were reported in Sect. 4.1. In his interrogation, Zhang revealed that while he was interpreting for the Japanese forces, he had once saved some captured Chinese guerrillas by persuading the Japanese that they were only civilians. To emphasize his unchanged loyalty to his motherland, he added: "I am a Chinese. If my country is finished, won't we all be slaves of a foreign nation? If you don't believe me, ask the local guerrillas.…I tried very hard to persuade the Japanese forces to set both of them [captured guerrillas] free. If I was willing to be a *hanjian*, why would I do this"? [25] This comment made by Zhang is particularly interesting in that the question could also be read to mean, "I did this because I don't want to be a *hanjian*".

In other words, according to the interpreter himself, he had made up his mind before capture that he would also help the Chinese even when forced to serve the Japanese. It might also be true that the interpreter was just trying to minimize the accusation against him of being *hanjian* by emphasizing his contribution to the Chinese side. The fact that he remembered both guerrillas' names and repeated them during the interrogation clearly shows that he might have even foreseen the consequences of his service to the Japanese forces and might have expected that his secret assistance to the Chinese could help save him from accusation and execution as an absolute *hanjian*. Again, interpreters' border-crossing became a self-preservation strategy within competing and overlapping fields.

Despite the interpreters' diverse reasons and strategies, they did serve as a cushion for the Chinese public during occupation by protecting local residents and the Chinese forces from unnecessary loss of life and property. For example, these two reminiscences by Chinese villagers of the Chinese interpreter Su emerged during a recent oral history project on the wartime Japanese occupation of China's Shanxi province:

> If you were caught and suspected as spies from the Eighth Route Army, you would be buried alive [by the Japanese army]. But if you met Interpreter

[25] *Diliu zhanqu guanbu shengxun difanyi Zhang Hecheng kougong bilu* 第六战区官部审讯敌翻译张和臣口供笔录 (Official transcript of interrogation of captured enemy interpreter Zhang Hecheng, from KMT War Operations Zone 6 Headquarters), NHA 787–17362–0790 (16J–0823, 0790–0796.

> Su, he would ask the reason and then set you free. If anyone from the Eighth Route Army was caught, Interpreter Su would try to get him out. When the day of liberation came, interpreter Su was not killed [by the communists] but was sent to feed cows on a farm. (Quoted in Zhang and Su 2005:156–7)
>
> …The interpreting officer was a nice man, a very nice man. He was polite and very nice to others…(Did interpreter Su try to protect many people at that time?) Interpreter Su said, if you were caught with evidence, [he] wouldn't be able to argue for you; but if there was no evidence against you but only suspicion of your being a communist, [he] could guarantee that you would be fine. (ibid.)

According to the villagers, Interpreter Su's full name is Su Kun. He had a university degree and once served in the KMT's Central Army, but he was captured by the Japanese forces. Because he knew the Japanese language, he became an interpreter. Apparently, in the villagers' eyes, Interpreter Su was not a traitor at all but "a very nice interpreting officer" (Quoted in Zhang and Su 2005:157). On the one hand, he gained sympathy from villagers because of his experiences as a captured soldier forced into interpreting; on the other, he won admiration and respect by providing the villagers with safety and assurance during the Japanese occupation. Specifically, he saved villagers from being buried alive and protected the safety of suspected communist spies. Although it is unknown how the Japanese occupiers actually perceived this interpreter, when he was serving the Japanese forces throughout those years, he seemingly convinced the Chinese villagers that he could intervene in many situations and wanted to help them whenever possible. Therefore, at the end of the war, Interpreter Su was not killed for his wartime efforts to rescue the communists and Chinese villagers. However, he did receive some punishment for his service to the Japanese: he was sent to work on a farm to feed cows.

These two examples, the captured interpreter, Zhang Hecheng, and Interpreter Su, provide different perspectives on wartime interpreters who were ordinary people rather than military officers or professionals. With their knowledge of the Japanese language, they were positioned as interpreters within a field of conflicting power relationships and frequently

had to cross military and political borders in the struggle for their own survival. In their cases, interpreting was not only a means of communication but more specifically one of obstructing information and misleading one Party but not the other. Acting as double agents, these interpreters reconciled incompatible interests to some extent, also protected themselves in the long run. After all, everyone in the occupied areas understood that life had to go on, and the war would end some day if not too soon. Although these interpreters' border-crossing strategy might not be ethical or professional at all according to any interpreter professional codes, it offers an interesting perspective on individual agents' understanding and use of interpreting to survive, not just themselves, in complex situations of political and military conflict.

4.4 Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the practices of Chinese interpreters who collaborated with the Japanese forces during the war even though they knew that their connection with the Japanese might lead the Chinese public to disdain them as traitors. Such collaborative interpreting was not simply a compromise for physical survival during violent times but also an active adjustment of their positions within changed fields and a struggle for personal interests within the newly emergent power hierarchy.

In occupied areas, the profession of Chinese/Japanese interpreter was perceived by local Chinese as both powerful and profitable, a perception motivated not only by agential pursuance of interpreter positions through the learning of the Japanese language but also by the opportunities such learning provided agents to disguise themselves as Japanese interpreters for their own material interests. On the other hand, interpreter was also a dangerous job in that it made survival a more complicated and long-term problem for interpreters who had to bear the consequences of collaboration with the enemy and a loss of cultural identity and capital. Many thus chose to secretly position themselves within different fields, frequently across military and political borders, to seek long-term safety and interests. To a certain extent, these interpreters' different positioning served as a cushion, protecting local Chinese residents from violence and

helping maintain social order during the Japanese occupation, although the extent or degree of their agency varied according to personal and situational factors, such as social skills, personality, and status in local power hierarchies. This last issue is addressed in the next chapter, the case study of two interpreters who served in the KMT government and the Japanese forces, respectively.

5

A Case Study of Two Interpreters: Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui

Whereas in previous chapters, interpreters have been discussed separately according to the political side or power they served (i.e., the Japanese, the Chinese KMT government, or the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]), this classification, although reasonable and convenient given that a majority were indeed directly trained and/or recruited by a certain side, this division is also problematic (see Chap. 1). First, the situation on one side cannot present a complete picture of the fields within which the interpreters were working. After all, interpreting is a two-directional activity, and the wartime interpreters were embroiled in complicated power relationships. Second, being based in one political camp does not mean that the interpreters worked only for this political power. Rather, they may have straddled sides or secretly worked for another power. Third, interpreters are mobile biological agents who can move around and switch sides if they encounter danger or they perceive interests elsewhere. Therefore, it is important to consider the difference between those interpreters who worked *beyond* the boundary of the political side or geographic area and those who worked *within* a certain political power framework.

T. Guo, *Surviving in Violent Conflicts*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3_5

As Richard Jenkins (1992: 90) notes, habitus and fields might not necessarily be in a continually reproductive relationship; that is, agents may grow up in one field and then, as "mature, formed adults", encounter another field. Hence, new habitus and capital may be imported into one field through interpreters' interpreting activities and movements across fields, thereby bridging and shaping the different fields. Indeed, agential positioning within and movements across different fields is a core idea of Bourdieu's notion of social space, a multi-dimensional space comprising multiple fields with different Hierarchies within and between fields. On the one hand, Bourdieu (1991: 230) sees the social space as "a field of forces" within which different power relationships are imposed on agents; on the other hand, the social space is also a social arena in which agents compete with each other and struggle for resources and positions. These competitions and struggles among agents determine that the social space is never static but always changing, whether it be within one field or in the inter-relationships among different fields. For instance, Bourdieu (2004/2001: vii) points out that scientific fields at the turn of the twenty-first century were increasingly affected and threatened by "external economic interests" and "internal denigration", which even intervened in the reproduction of habitus in the field. In other words, capital incorporated from other fields may intervene in the previous value system and structure of the field and ultimately transform its reproduction process. As the carriers of capital and habitus, individual agents—in this case, individual interpreters—certainly play a significant role in this transformation process.

Using a case study of two interpreters, Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui, this chapter explores this issue of interpreter positioning in the social space and the interpreters' corresponding strategies. Most particularly, it highlights the potentialities of interpreters' active agency in transforming and constructing the fields, as well as the ideological and political constraints imposed on them through training and other educational channels. Overall, this case study is designed as an in-depth analysis of individual interpreters and their practices during the Second Sino-Chinese War. It therefore provides more detailed and finely textured information to complement and crystallize that presented in previous chapters, which tended to be more numerical and focused on the groups

of interpreters within certain institutions. The first interpreter studied, Xia, was a Chinese/Japanese interpreter who served the Japanese forces but secretly cooperated with the Chinese Nationalists during the war. The second interpreter, Yan, already mentioned in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.3), was one of the military interpreters trained by the KMT during its military collusion with the USA.

5.1 Xia Wenyun: Interpreter as a Double Agent

5.1.1 A Brief Biography of Xia Wenyun

I chose Xia Wenyuan as the subject of the first case study partly because he was one of the interpreters discussed in Chap. 4—the Japanese-returned students—and partly because of his double agency in high-level political negotiation between the Japanese forces and the Chinese KMT government. To provide readers a clear picture of Xia's life trajectory (1906–78), Table 5.1 provides a chronology based on information drawn from three sources: Xia's (1999/1967, 2000/1967) own memoir *Huangchen wanzhang: Riben qinhua milu* 黄尘万丈:日本侵华秘录 (A different world: Untold stories in the Japan's invasion of China); the *Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen* (General Li Zongren 1979[1]—Li is an important witness of Xia's service to the KMT); and investigation by some Chinese news reporters (Wang and Wen 2005), including their interviews of Xia's daughter and other witnesses. Table 5.1 is divided into two parts (Japan and China) according to Xia's physical whereabouts before and during the war. Xia's activities in China comprise two columns (A and B) that focus on Xia's service to the Japanese forces and his secret contact with the Chinese KMT government (i.e., his different positions in two fields). Given that many of his activities were interwoven—for example, his interpreting work for the Japanese and his intelligence collection for the KMT—broken lines between the three columns emphasize the blurred boundaries between

[1] Tong Tekong is listed in the memoir as the co-author as he was the one who interviewed General Li and drafted and translated the document.

Table 5.1 A chronology of Xia Wenyun's life (1906–78)

In Japan	In China	
1925, studied law and history at Hiroshima Higher School, funded by the Japanese-sponsored South Manchurian Railway Co	1906, born in Dazhujia Tun, Laohu Shan, Jinzhou, Dalian 1913, attended No.1 public school, teacher Laohu Shan 1917, senior at Nanjin Academy, teacher Guandong Zhou 1919–25, Lüshun Normal School	
	A. Activities related to the Japanese	**B. Activities related to the KMT**
1928–31, studied Japanese literature at Kyoto Imperial University	1931, Worked as a lecturer at Feng Yong University (FYU)[a] and acted as secretary to Feng Yong, FYU President	1934–41, secret contact with General Li Zongren, intelligence agent for the Chinese KMT' Zone 5 Intelligence Office, political mediator and messenger between the Japanese government and the Chinese Nationalist government in Chongqing
1937, Tokyo, appointed as liaison officer by Japan's Military Ministry	1932, secretary and interpreter in the military department of the Manchurian state	
	1935, interpreter to General Wachi Takaji (Head of Japan's Special Agency in Beijing)	
	1937, counselor for the Jincha Autonomous Committee and Tianjin government, interpreter for General Wachi Takaji, Japan's Garrison Army Staff in China	

Table 5.1 (continued)

Dec. 1940, Tokyo, political mediator accompanying General Wachi Takaji Early 1950s, resident in Tokyo with his family, worked as counselor to Wachi Takaji, Head of the Tokyo Railway Society (TRS) After retirement from the TRS, ran a restaurant in Tokyo, died in 1978	1937–41, liaison officer for Japan's intelligence agency in Tianjin and Shanghai, interpreter and assistant to General Wachi Takaji (the key figure in the peace negotiation between the Japanese government and the Chinese KMT government in the early 1940s)[b] 1942 suspected by as double agent, transferred to Taiyuan, Shanxi as Director of Japanese sponsored *Xinmin* newspaper 1943–44, Head of construction department in Japan sponsored Shanxi provincial government. Spring 1945, back to Beijing, proposed mediation between Chinese collaborationist government and the Chinese KMT government in Chongqing	Important intelligence activities: Dec. 1937, information on the military operation plan of the Japanese No13 Regime Feb. 1938, information on the military operations by the Japanese No 5 Regime Apr. 1939, Japan's military operation plan and strategies in Zone 5 Dec. 1940, a military and political intelligence report to the Chinese Nationalist government August 1945, contact with organizations of the CCP, resumed contact with General Li Zongren, mediation between the Japanese people and the Chinese KMT government. 1946, arrested as a traitor by the Chinese KMT government. Freed a year later with no conviction 1949, arrested again by the Shanghai Military Committee (of the CCP) but released shortly. Made a trip to Japan with help from a former CCP friend

[a]Xia did not mention which subject he taught at FengYong University

[b]During this period, Takaji was the head of Japan's intelligence agency in Shanghai, Commanding Officer of the 44th Regiment, staff of Japan's 21st Army and Central China Expeditionary Army, and Chief of Staff of the Japanese army in Taiwan

his interpreting work and his political mediation. Although this timeline only gives a rough picture of Xia's education and social and political experience, his connections to Japan, whether cultural, social, or political, are clear.

Despite the sparse information available on Xia's family background, it is known that he was born and grew up in Dalian. This geographical origin is important because Dalian was under the control of Japan as early as 1905 as a result of Japan's 1904–5 victory over Russia. In other words, Xia was not only born into but also grew up and received his primary and secondary education in a place under Japanese control. Among the secondary schools that he attended, Nanjin Academy played a particularly important role in his life in that his teacher, Lu Yuanshan, later became Chief Secretary of the Military Ministry in the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian state founded in 1932. Lu recommended Xia for work in the ministry, which was a turning point in his service to the Japanese forces. After six years of study at Lüshun Normal School, Xia won a full scholarship from the Japanese-sponsored South Manchurian Company to study in Japan.

Between 1925 and 1931, Xia studied in two reputable schools in Japan: Hiroshima Higher School and Kyoto Imperial University, majoring in history and law, and literature, respectively. According to his published memoir (1999/1967: 1, 77), during this period, Xia also tried his hand at literary translation from Japanese into Chinese, translating Kuriyagawa Hakuson's 1923 novel, 十字街頭を往く (Towards the Crossroad), and a few other novels by Kikuchi Kan and Arishima Takeō. His translations were published in Shanghai and, as he recalls, were well accepted by Chinese readers (ibid.). However, he did not carry his literary translation any further. Before his 1931 graduation from Tokyo Imperial University, Xia left Japan and took up a teaching position at Feng Yong University in North China, where he not only taught classes but also worked as an assistant to Feng Yong, head and sponsor of the university.

Within less than a year, following an incident on September 18, 1931, the war broke out, and Xia lost his job when the Japanese forces closed down the university. However, thanks to a recommendation by a Japanese officer whom he had met on his graduation trip back from Japan, Xia soon found another position in the Manchurian state's Department of

Human Resources. His clerical work in this department, however, also lasted only a short time because his former teacher, Lu Shanyuan, offered him another job as secretary to the head of the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian government's military department in which he received the salary and benefits of the rank of colonel. As previously mentioned, this position was a turning point for Xia because he began his interpreting work between the department head and the Japanese military officers who staffed or were related to the Manchurian state. More importantly, many of the Japanese officers he became acquainted with through his interpreting work were to become influential figures in the ongoing conflicts between China and Japan, including Wachi Takaji, who later headed the Japanese wartime intelligence agency in Shanghai (Xia 1999/1967: 1–3).

Wachi was a staff officer to the Guangdong Army from 1931 to 1932. He was later transfer to Canton in 1932 and became head of the Japanese Special Agency in Beijing. In the 1930s, Wachi was one of the key senior Japanese officers looking for opportunities for unofficial political cooperation with the Chinese KMT's southwest clique to revolt against the KMT government led by Jiang Jieshi (ibid: 2, 77). As Table 5.1 shows, a majority of Xia's interpreting and political mediation activities after 1935 were related to Wachi. In fact, it was Wachi who requested Xia from the military department after finding out about his social connections with some Chinese KMT officials in the southwest, in particular the well-known warlord, Bai Chongxi, who was one of the main targets of Wachi's political work at that time (Xia 1999/1967: 2, 77). Xia relates his conversation with Wachi about this request as follows:

> 某日, 接到过去的旧知 "关东军"参谋和知少佐要求会面的通知。见面之后,和知少佐说: "此次晋升中佐,调转至广州任驻广东武官。为此想与广东的西南派实力人物白崇禧打交道、不知应采取什么方法联系接洽" 我便答称: "有办法。白崇禧的侄子白维义是日本士官学校毕业的, 我在日本留学时, 与他交往甚密, 可以通过他与白崇禧取得联系。" "那么, 就请您同我起去广东吧。军政部方面, 我可通过最高顾问多田骏大佐打招呼, 暂时将您借调过来好啦。"

> One day, I got a message to meet my old friend Wachi Takaji, who was staff in the [Japanese] Guandong Army. When we met, he said, "I have been promoted to Chuusa (lieutenant colonel) and will be transferred to Guangzhou. I would like to meet Bai Congxi, the leading figure of the southwest clique of the Chinese KMT government in Guangdong province. Do you know how I can contact him?" I answered, "I can help you on this issue. Bai's cousin, Bai Weiyi graduated from the Military Officer Academy in Japan. I knew him quite well while I was studying in Japan. I can reach Bai through him." "Great. Then please come with me to Guangdong. As for your current position in the military department, I will inform the senior counselor, Tada Hayao taisa [Colonel], requesting your temporary assignment." (1999/1967: 2, 77)

After the Chinese KMT government's official declaration of war with Japan in 1937, Wachi was again engaged in the Japanese negotiation with the Chinese to end the war. Given that the KMT's clique, many of whose officials and military officers were pro-Japanese and had conflicts with the Chongqing government led by Jiang Jieshi (Xia 1999/1967: 2, 77), Wachi saw these conflicts as a chance for Japan to realize its peace negotiations with China, and thus Xia again played an important role as his interpreter and contact, because of his language skills, understanding of Chinese culture and politics and particularly his alumni network among Chinese officials and politicians, many of whom had been similarly educated in Japan.

While interpreting for Wachi, Xia played a role similar to Palmer's 'fixer' (discussed in the Introduction) by finding contacts and arranging meetings for Wachi. According to Xia, besides interpreting, he helped Wachi set up over a hundred meetings between Japanese officials and Chinese KMT politicians at which he assisted as interpreter. However, unlike the fixer/interpreters who were not trusted by the western journalists who employed them, Xia seemed to be more valued and respected by his main client, Wachi. Wachi once made the following comment about Xia and his interpreting and mediation: "夏启为余之秘书、翻译、保镖,有时则是先生" (To me, Xia is my secretary, interpreter, and bodyguard, and sometimes he is also my teacher) (Xia 1999/1967: 1, 78). Clearly, Xia was not an outsider or doing solely linguistic transfer but was

actively involved in Wachi's political work and developed a close personal relationship with him. Even two decades after the war, Xia made note of and reflected on Wachi's comment, implying that he was not only conscious of but also proud of his influence on Wachi (ibid.). Interestingly, in his memoir Xia also talks less about his interpreting and intelligence work than his political mediation activities, particularly the high-level political negotiations between the Chinese KMT government and the Japanese officials to which his friendship with Wachi Takaji gave him access.

However, almost at the same time (around 1934), as the third column of Table 5.1 shows, Xia began secret contact with General Li Zongren, head of the Chinese KMT forces in Guangdong (War Zone 5), who was a key figure in Xia's secret service to the Chinese KMT government but also one of Wachi's targets in his political work. Although Xia does not mention his intelligence cooperation with Li in his memoir, he repeatedly alludes to their personal relationship, especially the general's protecting him from punishment as a traitor when the war ended. General Li's memoir, however, shows that this special "personal relationship" was more complicated. According to Li, his contact with Xia began during Xia's interpreting work between him and Wachi. Li once invited Xia for a private talk in which he asked him why Xia chose to serve the enemy rather than his home country. As Li recalled, at that moment Xia "burst into tears" and exclaimed "if there is a chance to serve the fatherland, I am ready to die for it without hesitation" (Li and Tong 1979: 316–7). Li then asked Xia to work as the Chinese KMT government's intelligence agent in the Japanese camp, an offer Xia accepted immediately, refusing "any remuneration" (ibid.: 317). However, in his own memoir written in Japanese, Xia (1999/1967, 2000/1967) discusses neither the above scene of Li's persuasion nor his own self-confession, a dismissed detail that, to some extent, reveals Xia's spontaneous response to the challenge of his Chinese national identity and the motives underlying his service to the Japanese forces. Hence, Xia's emotional confession to Li and his efforts to clarify and prove his stance should be considered in light of Li's questioning and his high political and military status in the KMT camp. That is, Xia might have seen Li's question as external pressure for him to justify his practices as a Chinese so as not to lose social and cultural capital in the Chinese camp. In other words, interpreter identification may be

stimulated and shaped by external pressure. Therefore, Xia's acceptance of Li's offer to become the KMT's secret agent and his refusal of any material benefits (Li and Tong 1979: 317) might not have been due solely to his patriotic passion but also related to his leaving himself more options in the future and gaining political and social capital for his present and future work.

Whatever the motivation, from 1934 to 1941, Xia kept his promise and provided Li with valuable information, thereby greatly helping the Chinese KMT's military operations against the Japanese forces (see the third column of Table 5.1). Xia's social networks in the Japanese camp and his interpreting service apparently made his work as a double agent more convenient. With support from the Japanese, Xia even established a personal radio station in Tianjin (later transferred to the French concession in Shanghai), which he used in his later political mediation to communicate with both the Japanese intelligence agencies and the Chinese KMT government in Chongqing (Xia 1999/1967: 4, 76; 1999: 5, 78; 2000/1967: 2, 96; Li and Tong 1979: 178).

As Xia revealed in his memoirs, his mediation with and influence on the Japanese was highly valued by the KMT's Chongqing government. In addition to luxury accommodations, women, opium, and a personal bodyguard, Xia received praise and monetary reward (US $300,000)[2] from Jiang Jieshi, the KMT's military and political head. Xia (1999/1967: 6, 77) claims that Jiang once honored him as "孤臣孽子用心良苦" (a lonely and 'traitorous' subject but with a very deep thought for the whole matter). However, because of the rising nationalism among the Chinese public and political pressure from inside both the Chinese KMT and the CCP, the political negotiation ended fruitlessly. Xia's position in the Japanese forces was also jeopardized by growing Japanese suspicion that he was releasing information to the Chinese side. Therefore, to avoid possible danger, Xia backed down from his interpreting and political activities and transferred to Taiyuan, Shanxi province in 1942. There, he first became Director of the *Xinmin Bao* (New Citizen Newspaper)—a

[2] Although US $300,000 might not seem to be a significant amount of money in the late 1930s, according to Xia (2000: 3, 93), the value of all his real estate at the end of the war (1945) was only US $100,000.

Japanese-sponsored news agency—and then Director of the Ministry of Construction in the Japanese-dominated Taiyuan government until almost the end of the war.

In the spring of 1945, Xia returned to Beijing from Taiyuan and, foreseeing Japan's loss in the war, tried to re-initiate interaction with the KMT government via his old connections, including his former Chinese classmates in Japan. However, these attempts did not go as hoped because of the politics and competition among Chinese officials (Xia 2000/1967: 2, 96). Interestingly, however, when Xia was in Beijing, he was approached by someone from the CCP, who showed interest in his relationship with the Japanese and requested his help with such matters as persuading the Japanese forces to surrender to the CCP rather than the KMT and attaining weapons for the CCP (ibid.). Xia seemingly noted the quick expansion of the CCP's power on China's political stage and did not want to burn a bridge by turning down the CCP's request. As Xia claims in his memoir, he felt the situation was difficult for him because although at that time he did not support the KMT politically, but its monitoring of his activities precluded him from offering significant help to the CCP (ibid.). In any case, Xia tried to use his networks among the Japanese to obtain the weapons requested by the CCP and to arrange secret meetings between his Japanese friends and the CCP cadre (ibid.: 97). Xia's work again won favor from the CCP, and he was even asked to join the Party. However, after learning from a newspaper that General Li was going to be the administrative and military director in Beijing when the war came to an end, Xia decided to temporarily put aside his plan to join the CCP and await a meeting with General Li first (ibid.).

However, before meeting Li, Xia was arrested and imprisoned by Beijing police in the name of being a traitor. As promised, General Li offered Xia special protection after knowing Xia's situation. With permission obtained directly from Jiang Jieshi, General Li intervened and claimed that he himself had authorized and approved Xia's activities, including Xia's work for the Japanese-dominated government in Taiyuan after he backed down from his intelligence work. This strong support was apparently given in return for the service that Xia had rendered over the years to the KMT. With Li's support, Xia's 83-day prison term ended and

he regained his freedom (Xia 2000/1967: 2, 100). However, Xia soon lost his protective umbrella when the KMT lost its control of China in its civil war with the CCP and withdrew to Taiwan in 1949. In CCP-controlled Shanghai, Xia (2000/1967: 3, 93) felt increasing pressure after seeing more and more *hanjian* unearthed and punished. He therefore tried to sell his real estate in Shanghai and prepared to emigrate to Japan, trying in the meantime to connect with one of his CCP friends, Wu Kejian,[3] for assistance with his trip to Japan via Hong Kong (ibid.). Xia got to know Wu during the war, because when Wu was arrested and tortured by the Japanese military police, Xia intervened and helped Wu out of prison. Considering the potential use of Xia's knowledge of the Japanese language and his social network among the Japanese, Wu helped Xia contact Zhang Ruoyu, a senior CCP international intelligence officer with the North China Military Committee. Zhang arranged a contact in Hong Kong for Xia to go to Japan, and in exchange, Xia agreed to act as a CCP intelligence agent and collect information during his sojourn (ibid.). However, before his trip, Xia was involved in a legal case related to selling his real estate and was again imprisoned in Shanghai. According to Xia, he worried very much that the police would find out about his wartime service to the Japanese and thus the situation would become more complicated (ibid.). Again, with help from Wu, Xia was set free and successfully reached Hong Kong. However, he did not go to meet the CCP contact in Hong Kong as arranged by Zhang but chose to make his own arrangements to be smuggled into Japan (ibid.: 94). Arriving in Tokyo, he managed to obtain legal right of residence and find a position with the Tokyo Railway Society, where his old friend, Wachi, held the position of Chief Executive after six years' imprisonment as a war criminal (Wang and Wen 2005). Xia never returned to China in his lifetime.

[3] Wu Kejian was Chief Secretary of the CCP's Shanghai Municipal Intelligence Committee in 1949 (Wang and Wen 2005).

5.1.2 Xia's Social Capital and Stake in the Field

Evidently, Xia played a complicated role as a double agent for the Chinese KMT, being not only interpreter but also mediator and intelligence agent. Nevertheless, these different roles were interrelated and complementary. On the one hand, his interpreting work expanded his social networks and gave him access to high-level politicians on both sides; on the other hand, his social networks made him a valuable political source for the Japanese and thus reinforced his interpreter position. Hence, Xia's value as interpreter, informant, and mediator was recognized not only by the Chinese KMT and the Japanese but also by the CCP. In contrast to professional interpreters today, who often emphasize their linguistic roles and exclude themselves from any potential involvement in power relationships (Wadensjö 1998: 285), Xia did not try to exclude himself from the complicated politico-military relationships of the time but rather tended to position himself within multiple fields and enjoyed the benefits provided by different agents and institutions whose specific needs he met. His doing so raises at least two questions: What capital enabled Xia's access to these positions? What stakes were associated with these posts? To answer these queries, it is necessary to place Xia into the Bourdieusian framework set out for the interpreting profession as a whole (see Chap. 1), while jointly considering his educational background, his social experiences, and the work he had to accomplish.

For the interpreter position Xia filled, knowledge of both the Chinese and Japanese language and culture were of course a prerequisite. In this sense, Xia's early experience in a Japanese-controlled city, including his primary and secondary education, even privileged Xia, as he had learned Japanese in early childhood and been funded by the Japanese South Manchurian Company to study in Japan. His six years of education and living experiences in Japan (from 1925 to 1931) are likely to have further enhanced his linguistic and cultural capital. Indeed, such living experience and cultural exposure are crucial for interpreter acquisition of essential cultural knowledge and communication skills. More importantly, this cultural capital was continuously recognized, increased, and converted into symbolic capital and social capital through the honors, grants, and degrees obtained in both China and Japan. For example,

apart from material interests, the recommendations and scholarship from the Japanese company for study in Japan are a type of symbolic capital—recognition of his school performance and Japanese language skills—which was no doubt boosted by the two degrees earned in Japan. Hence, Xia was not only equipped with the linguistic skill and special knowledge for his subsequent interpreting work but also gained official endorsement of his academic competence with diplomas issued by two prestigious Japanese institutions.

Another crucial form of capital that enabled Xia to act as wartime double agent and mediator was his social capital in the form of social connections and interpersonal skills, which originated partly from his educational experiences in Japan. As a Japanese-returned student, Xia was able to connect himself to many senior Chinese KMT officials who were direct or indirect alumni of study in Japan. At the same time, his Japanese educational background also helped him secure a position in the Japanese-staffed Manchurian state, where he began to expand his social networks among the Japanese officials. A decisive factor for Xia's acquisition of social capital was his social competency, especially his interpersonal skills. According to General Li, Xia was "an honest young man, brimming over with vigor" (Li and Tong 1979: 316). He was also seemingly skilful at socializing with different people and made friends everywhere. From his first job in the human resources department of the Manchurian state, which he obtained during casual conversation with a Japanese officer on a train, almost every step in Xia's career was related to social relationships developed and accumulated in his study and work. For instance, his interpreting and secretarial job for the head of the Manchurian state's military department was attributable to his acquaintance with Lu Shanyuan, once his teacher at Nanjin Academy. Then, through this job, Xia met and made friends with many Japanese military officers, including Wachi Takaji. According to some resources, to express his gratefulness to Wachi, whose name was He Zhi (和知) if translated into Chinese, Xia even adopted other names, He Yizhi (何一之/何益之, "yi" means "only"/"benefit", and "zhi" refers to Xia himself in this case), implying that he would fully commit to Wachi for his support and trust (Xiao 2005). This friendship with Wachi, in particular his network among the Japanese senior officials, brought him into the center

of power during the war, which in turn endowed him with more power in his politico-social activities.

On the other hand, Xia was also valued by the Japanese camp because of his social relationships with Chinese KMT officials. For the Japanese, Xia was an unofficial contact for secretly reaching certain key Chinese politicians or military leaders, which was particularly important given the politically sensitive situation between China and Japan. Xia was apparently well aware of the value of his social connections with the Chinese side. He voluntarily put himself forward to the Japanese and exploited any potential social connections to help them, which consequently enhanced his political capital and reinforced his position with the Japanese side. For example, during his political mediation work, his contact with Kong Xiangxi, head of the KMT government's financial department, was established through his friend, Xiao Zhengying, with whom Xia became acquainted during his interpreting work in the 1930s (Xia 1999/1967: 4–5, 76, 80). Likewise, his contact with Tang Shaoyi, a well-known Chinese military leader in the early Republican period who was seen by the Japanese as a potential candidate for leader of the Japanese-sponsored Nanjing government, was enabled through his friend Jin Deguang, whom he got to know when studying in Japan (Xia 1999/1967: 5, 78). The reason that Jin could help Xia contact Tang is because he later married the daughter of Tang's eighth concubine. Admittedly, Xia's use of friendship and nepotism in his mediation work is not unusual at all in network-based Chinese society, but the influence that his Chinese contacts exerted on his interpreting and mediation for the Japanese was un-neglectable.

In addition, Xia's interpersonal skills and popularity among the Japanese senior officers was recognized by his Chinese contacts. His frequent presence as interpreter to the Japanese in various formal and informal meetings between Chinese and Japanese officials impressed some senior Chinese officials, including General Li as discussed before, who saw the value of Xia and his position and so asked for his secret service to the KMT. According to Li, during the early stage of the war, Xia's reports, in terms of speed and accuracy, were "unsurpassed" and "of far greater value and accuracy than the information received by the intelligence department of the central [the Chongqing KMT] government" (Li and Tong 1979: 178). Clearly, Xia's positioning within the two fields dominated

respectively by the Chinese KMT, and the Japanese forces became the source of his power as a double agent. Not only was his capital increased through his border-crossing and different positioning, but his activities also created new power relationships between the fields. His case reflects an alternative perspective to Inghilleri's argument that interpreter positions in converged interlocking fields are often dependent on other more powerful agents and institutions (Inghilleri 2005a: 72–3). Xia, regardless of his dependence, played a more active role in initiating and fostering interaction between different fields.

In regards to the stakes associated with Xia's double agent position, General Li's description of Xia's free offer of intelligence work should be interpreted carefully. As easy as it would be to assume that Xia was a passionate nationalist, caring less about himself than about his fatherland's interest, such an assumption might be misleading and not even perceived this way by Xia himself. In fact, in commenting about his political mediation work, he saw himself primarily as one who stood between China and Japan and delivered the Japanese peace proposals to the Chinese KMT (Xia 1999/1967: 6, 79). Thus, regardless of his intelligence work for the KMT, he (2000/1967: 2, 97) saw himself more as a Chinese cooperating with the Japanese, a stance he once tried to defend in his memoir: "引起事变导致日本占领中国的责任在政府方面,因此不应责难我们中国老百姓" (The outbreak of the war and the Japanese occupation of China are the governments' fault; our ordinary Chinese persons should not be blamed.)

As "an ordinary Chinese person", Xia also showed interest in material gain and social position when describing his wartime interpreting and political work. For example, when offered the job of secretary and interpreter in the Manchurian state's military department, his response was "慨然应允出任军政部秘书,中校待遇" (immediately accepting the job offer with the benefits of a colonel) (Xia 1999/1967: 1, 80). In his memoir, Xia also frequently mentions, or even boasts about, the material benefits enjoyed from this position. For example, he gives the following recollection of his days in Guangdong as Wachi's interpreter:

> [My] expenditure in Guangdong was over one million USD. At that time, my family was still in North China. They could maintain a comfortable life with my salary from the military department. As for me, I had a luxury

> house in Guangdong and sufficient funds for social activities. I remember that there was one time when I lost 10,000 USD at the mahjong table; Wachi paid it off for me immediately. (Xia 1999/1967: 2, 78)

Xia's words might not be fully true, and there is currently no evidence available to support or disprove what he said. However, the fact that he boasted his material gain and the support and trust that he had from the Japanese because of his work is indeed revealing. It is evident that as Wachi's political work developed, Xia's socio-political activities also rose to a higher level. Considered the new "political celebrity" by both Chinese and Japanese officials, he began enjoying benefits such as free opium, luxury accommodations, a personal bodyguard, free transportation, and evening entertainment (Xia 1999/1967: 6, 77). He even received monetary rewards and honors from Jiang, although, according to Xia, he did not keep this US $300,000 for himself but contributed it to activities relevant to his political mediation work (ibid.).

Although provided a comfortable life and security, at the same time, his double agent activities put him in jeopardy. In other words, personal welfare was one part of the stake associated with his position. It is clear that Xia was very cautious about self-preservation, especially his physical safety. For example, when working in Wachi's intelligence agency in Shanghai, he realized that he was being closely watched by Chinese intelligent agents and found that a few Chinese characters, "*Hanjian He Yizhi*" (the traitor, He Yizhi), had been written in chalk on the door of his flat at midnight. Seeing himself in danger, Xia (2000/1967: 1, 71) immediately reduced his public meetings with Wachi and found shelter for himself in other places in Shanghai. He once hid in Hong Kong for nearly half a year when he was suspected by the Japanese of disclosing confidential information to the Chinese KMT. When the war came to an end, Xia smelled the coming danger after observing the KMT's ruthless punishment of 'traitors'. He therefore planned to use his former relationships to turn to the CCP, although in the end this plan was not carried out because of General Li's persuasion and promise of support. This strong will for survival and self-preservation permeated his interpreting, mediation, and intelligence work. Whenever he felt danger approaching, he immediately chose to hide or switch sides to save himself.

Nevertheless, although well aware of the danger associated with double agent work, Xia also knew that the war would end one day and all Chinese siding with the Japanese could potentially have a tragic ending. He had witnessed the Chinese KMT's secret agents assassinating so-called traitors and understood only too well Chinese Nationalist culture and the Chinese public's definition and hatred of *hanjian* (traitors). As Xia (1999/1967: 4, 68) points out in his memoir,

> 在中国把受日方欢迎的亲日分子, 称为“汉奸”, 其下场都很悲惨。
> 中国人尊重人道主义、国际主义精神。正如“天下为剔”、“天下唯有德者居之”的说法, 凡有德者即可统治国家, 无德者则遭受到唾弃。由此可以理解中国文化的含义, 崇尚道德、仁义, 勿宁说较之民族主义、国家主义更为受到推崇。因此, 凡为日本占领当局效劳的中国人, 一律要被当作汉奸而严加惩处的。

> [I]n China, those who were pro-Japan and well accepted by the Japanese were called *hanjian* [traitor]. None of them had a happy ending. Chinese people emphasized humanitarianism and internationalism. As the sayings go, "Everything belongs to the country" and "Only the virtuous can rule the nation", meaning that only those with good virtue can govern the country, and those without will be condemned forever. Emphasis on virtue and morality, this is the essence of Chinese culture, even over ethnicity and nationalism. Therefore, those Chinese who worked for the Japanese [then] were considered traitors and would have been punished.

Xia's observation offers a different and more personal perspective on the Chinese public's usage of the word *hanjian* than that in the earlier discussion of the term (see the Introduction). It is clear to Xia that his cooperation with the Japanese violates the bottom line of Chinese morality and virtue and thus led to his labeling as *hanjian*. This label is the cultural capital that he had to sacrifice and whose consequences he had to bear. Thus, in some sense, his double agency was his self-preservation strategy in a complicated political relationship. With connections to different sides, he could find shelter elsewhere when the situation turned unfavorable, but because of this loss of cultural capital, there were no positions for him in China when the war finished. As Xia recalls, when his neighbor in Beijing, who had a certain connection with the Japanese

forces during the war, came to him for help and was relieved to know about his close relationship with General Li, Xia (2000/1967: 2, 98) gave him the following warning:

> 你好象不明白中国的社会现状似的, 最好先不要那么高兴。汉奸问题即使行营主任也难以庇护得了的, 更不必说你的有关宪兵队的问题, 不是那么简单的事嘛。
> You seem not to understand the current situation in Chinese society. You'd better do not be too optimistic. The issue of *hanjian* is something that even the chief military commander [General Li] could not cover, let alone your connections to the Japanese military police. It is not that simple.

Clearly, Xia knew well that the label of *hanjian* on him would be hard to remove and the situation might get out of control, despite his previous connections to the KMT. This is probably why he chose to emigrate to Japan at the end. Today, Xia's story has been re-told through various people, including his daughter, witnesses, and Chinese journalists. This retelling emphasizes and puts value on his intelligence work for the Chinese KMT government and his contribution to the Chinese resistance against the Japanese. Xia is described as "出污泥而不染的'皇军'翻译官" (a Japanese forces' interpreter who kept his integrity in an adverse environment), "客死东瀛的'海外赤子'" (a patriotic son of China who died in Japan), and "无名英雄" (an anonymous hero) (Wang and Wen 2005). Ironically, after almost half century, these honorable titles re-confirm Xia's observation of the predominant moral standard in Chinese culture by which individuals, including interpreters, are evaluated.

Interpreters' social and cultural identities are topics often excluded from interpreter professional training and ethic codes, as they tend to encourage people to see interpreting simply as language transfer. However, interpreters' social and cultural identities is crucial and unerasable for individual interpreters in the real world. To a large extent, their social identity, especially national identity, is equivalent to a value system imposed on their interpreting practice in that they want to be accepted by their social group and must respect and obey the rules of this social group or the nation. This value system is inscribed in the interpreter habitus through social experiences and is applied by other agents in the

same social group to judge them. This external pressure, which has a significant impact on interpreters, is made particularly evident by the second case study of Yan Jiarui.

5.2 Yan Jiarui: A Trained KMT Military Interpreter

In our interview at his Guangzhou home on January 8 and 9, 2009,[4] Yan expressed his understanding of and sympathy for some interpreters' collaboration with the Japanese as a way of survival. He also pointed out that the Chinese public's hate or criticism of these collaborating interpreters is understandable, because: "他没有记住他是中国人,他做了帮凶,为虎作伥,中国人的精神强调的是威武不屈,宁死不屈" (The collaborating interpreter did not remember that he was a Chinese. He acted as an accomplice and helped the evil side. The essence of being a Chinese person is to be unyielding to the force and die before giving in). Given Yan's status as a military interpreter trained by the Chinese KMT during the war, his above opinion raises important questions about the significance of training for the interpreter profession and the positioning of military interpreters in wartime.

In comparison to Xia, Yan's experience during the war was much simpler and more straightforward. Born in 1927 to a poor single-mother family in Kunming, Yunnan province, Yan finished his primary and secondary education with his mother's support. As noted in Chap. 2 (see Sect. 2.3), he was one of the youngest student interpreters recruited and trained by the Chinese KMT for its military cooperation with the Americans. Only 18 years old when he joined the KMT's three-month military interpreter training program in Chongqing in May 1945, his military interpreter experience was fairly short because the war ended

[4] My interview of Yan was conducted in Chinese at his home in Guangzhou on January 8, 2009. The interview was about an hour a day over two consecutive days. The interviews were based on a total of 27 questions prepared in advance that covered such topics as Yan's family background, his reasons for and his process of applying for the interpreter positions, the content of his training, his understanding of the military interpreter profession, and his self-perception.

before he could be transferred to Yunnan for weapons training and then service in the field. As a result, Yan and the other interpreters were dispersed with some monetary compensation for their short service.

My interview with Yan was divided into two hour-long parts, one on each day, and was based on pre-planned questions that Yan had already previewed, although the actual interview followed Yan's train of thought rather than strictly adhering to the protocol. The interview sessions were video-taped and later transcribed, and the resulting transcripts were submitted to Yan for proofreading and approval. One strong impression from my two-day visit—particularly the two hours of formal interview sessions—was that this 81-year-old interpreter (in 2008) is still excited about his military interpreter experience, even though it only lasted a short time and took place almost 63 years ago. In fact, Yan has reflected continuously on his military interpreter experience and, in 2005, even published an article "Er'zhan shouxunban huigu yu ganxiang"二战受训班回顾与感想 (Memories of and reflections on the WWII interpreter training program) on the Guangzhou Translation Association website. Besides personal observations, this article includes the foreword and content page of the training textbook used in 1945. As a witness to history, as well as a military interpreting officer in China's resistance to Japan, Yan greatly values his three-month interpreter training and over past decades has continued interpreting as a profession. He even retains military courtesy when speaking English with his foreign clients. For example, in both the interview and in his published paper, he emphasized the importance of addressing and answering the other party using "Sir", an important lesson learned from his military interpreter training.

During the interview, I raised the issue of interpreter identity and asked how Yan understood this word, especially in Chinese. After thinking for a second, he engaged me in the following dialogue:

Yan (Y): 在中文里是身份,更确切地讲是有自己的立场。
Ting (T): 身份和立场观点?
Y: 嗯,立场观点。Identity, 平常讲 identity card, 就是你的身份。你自己要明确你是什么样的身份。你是个翻译, 你是一个 co-star, not star, 我是这样理解身份的。在战场上, 你不是指挥官, 你不是commander, 你不能发号施令, 你是 assistant, 是助手。

Y: [This word] means "*shenfen*" (status); more specifically, one should have one's own "*lichang*" (position or stand).
T: "*shenfen*" and "*lichang*"?
Y: Yes, your position or standpoint. Identity, as in the use of "identity card" is your "*shenfen*". You should understand what kind of "*shenfen*" you have. You are an interpreter, and you are a "co-star, not a star". That's my understanding of "*shenfen*". On the battlefield, you are not the commander. You can't give orders. You are an assistant.

The duality of Yan's interpretation of interpreter identity, in particular the blending of his military interpreter experience, is particularly interesting. On the one hand, he sees identity as a "*shenfen*" or "*lichang*", a position adopted rather than born into; on the other hand, he emphasizes that interpreters have a specific social position—as linguistic assistants rather than as part of a psychological reflection related to individuals' different backgrounds. For him, military interpreters have no right to command but should always be obedient to higher authority. However, he also emphasizes that this interpreter positioning does not mean that interpreters should try to be neutral. On the contrary, for Yan, interpreters should take a clear political stand:

Y: 中国的译员在战场上当然要站在中国军队的立场。现在改革开放的时代，你要代表中国剐司的立场，中国人的立场。那外交部的翻译怎么办? (T:对呀?) 绝对是中国政府的立场。
Y: On the battlefield, Chinese interpreters should of course stand for Chinese troops' interests. Nowadays, in the period of reform and China's opening up, interpreters should thus represent Chinese companies' interests and stand for the Chinese. Otherwise, what should interpreters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do? (T: Yes?) They should absolutely stand for the Chinese government's interests. (Yan 2009)

Although the above clarification of interpreter positioning may not be applicable to all interpreted events in different cultures, its emphasis on military interpreters' political stance and advocacy for the national interest is revealing in that it reflects a military interpreter's self-perception of his positioning in the society. This self-perception is of course a result of

the interpreter's habitus developed through his education and social experiences, in particular the interpreter training that he had received. My copy of the primary textbook for the interpreter training, *Forty English Lesson for Interpreting Officers*, generously provided by Yan, offers some clues to the possible impact of this training program on the development of his professional habitus. For example, there are 40 lessons in total in the textbook, each covering a specific topic, including medical service, geography, transportation, mapping, military intelligence weapons, army service, forces, supplies, and chemical warfare. The third lesson specifically addresses discipline, security, and courtesy in the military camp. In the first section, it provides related vocabulary and expressions covering army regulations and disciplinary measures; for instance, "obedience/disobedience; the final decision rests with the commanding officer; absentees will be fined; deserters will be court-martialed; promotion/demotion" (Liaison Group of the Foreign Affairs Bureau 1945: 7). In the second section, a dialogue then provides the interpreter with practice:

C[5]: There seem to be a lot of rules and regulations posted on that bulletin board.

A: That's true of any military camp, and more so here, for the C.O. is very strict. Failure to obey orders leads to immediate disciplinary action; and serious disobedience means the guard-house or severe punishment. But Col. Lyons says that good morale is more effective even than rules or punishment.

C: I see the great importance of military discipline. It is really the development of the "team spirit" in the army where the interest of the team is above that of any individual.

A: That's well put. The lack of discipline may result in serious military defeat. (ibid.: 8)

As emphasized in its foreword, this interpreter training textbook is not limited to language training; it also aims to educate the candidates in the "qualities of discipline, courtesy, industry, perseverance, character and service which should characterize the work of an interpreting officer"

[5] Abbreviations used in the training texts are as follows: C–Chinese Interpreting Officer; A–American officer or enlisted man.

(ibid.: 2). Evidently, the above dialogue was compiled or selected specifically to convey to the prospective military interpreting officers a message of absolute obedience to authority and group interest above the individual. It is hard to say how much influence this lesson would have on interpreters who had received the training, but for Yan, an 18-year-old young man who just finished high school, it is likely that this training was his first direct exposure to the idea of military discipline and commitment to the army. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that Yan's self-perception and perception of his position within the field was significantly shaped by the training.

During the interview, Yan also referred to the Chinese saying, whose English version he was taught in his military interpreter training: "Civil officers should not love money; military officers should not fear death" (文官不爱财,武官不怕死). For him, this saying was meant to remind interpreting officers that they should not pursue material benefits or be afraid of dangers or loss of life. "这是中国很好的格言,超越时代,今天仍有现实意义" (this is a very good Chinese proverb, with a meaning that transcends a specific time and is still applicable to interpreters nowadays!"), Yan added. Interestingly, Xia Wenyun (2000/1967: 3, 94), the interpreter discussed in the first case study, also quoted this Chinese saying in his memoir, attributing it to the original speaker, Yue Fei, a well-known national hero who led the resistance against the invasion of the Jin minority: "文官不爱财,武官不怕死,则天下可治也" (If civil officers do not love money and military officers do not fear death, the nation can be well governed.). However, immediately after this quote, Xia does not talk about himself but comments that, during the war, the KMT government was seriously corrupt and thus lost the support of the Chinese public and that many well-known military leaders switched to the CCP.

Clearly, both Yan and Xia see the importance of individual commitment to country, but from different perspectives and with a different focus. Yan values and promotes an interpreter's self-sacrificing spirit, whereas Xia looks at the problems more realistically, questioning the KMT government's political strategies. Regardless of the temporal and situational factors, the differences in their observations seemingly arise from their different life experiences. Yan, being only 18 years old and with little real

social experience, especially of political struggle, was clearly influenced by his training and incorporated ideas like military discipline and political loyalty as part of his professional habitus. Xia, in contrast, was relatively more mature and experienced; despite not having received any formal training, he had experienced the cruelty of war and been embroiled in far more complicated political and military relationships. Therefore, Xia did not seem to be less bounded by the idea of political loyalty and employed every means to survive and prosper.

Unlike Xia, Yan clearly had a strong sense of duty and is now very proud of his military interpreter position. This is probably a result of both his military training experiences and his early experiences in Kunming, where the KMT's control was seldom disrupted before or during the war. A large part of Yan's memory of Japan and the Japanese during the war are Japan's bullying of China and their bombing of his hometown, Kunming. According to Yan, "报效祖国,打日本" (to serve the motherland and fight against the Japanese) was part of his strong motivation to join the army and become an interpreter (Yan 2009). As previously discussed, individual memory of the past is always mixed in with subsequent experience and affected by the way that information is retrieved; nevertheless, it is important for the discussion of interpreters' self-perception to take into account Yan's patriotic passion. On the one hand, this feeling must have been very real for an 18-year-old who not only grew up and received all his education in a KMT-governed area but also witnessed Japan's invasion of his country and the bombing of his hometown. On the other hand, Yan's emphasis on the honor of serving his country and his patriotic passion as strong motivation for his interpreting work is actually his interpretation of previous experiences in the light of his continuing self-perception as a Chinese patriot.

It is also important to point out that during the interview, Yan did talk about his personal interest in and practical considerations of joining the interpreter training program. For Yan, joining the army and serving the fatherland was also "出路" (a way out, a means to survive). Specifically, after graduation from Nanqing High School, Yan immediately faced life's pressures and needed to make his own living because his mother, with his younger sister to support, could not pay for his further education. Hence, for Yan, joining the army was a two-fold blessing; not only was

it honorable to serve one's country but it also offered a way to be financially independent and relieve the burden on his family. In Yan's words, it was an advantage "当兵吃粮,报效祖国" (to become a soldier fed by the government and serving the fatherland). He asked me smilingly, "你知道为什么叫做GI.?" (Do you know why American soldiers were called GIs at that time?):

> 云南人称当兵的叫吃粮的, 就是当兵可以吃饱肚子; government issued 就是政府供给, 一切由政府配发,真是异曲同工.
>
> People in Yunnan used to call soldiers "grain eaters"; that is, joining the army can help you fill your stomach; "government issued" means provided by the government, or everything will be supplied by the government. Its meaning is the same but expressed in different ways. (Yan 2009)

Hence, for Yan, the decision to become an interpreter and join the army seemed natural, given his family situation and the difficulties of making a living during wartime. However, becoming a military interpreter was also related to his interest in the English language and his dream of studying in the USA, which, he told me, the KMT claimed they would sponsor for interpreters with excellent performance. In actuality, because Yunnan is close to Vietnam (a former French colony) and the French influence was very strong, Yan's first foreign language was French not English. However, after the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Yan decided to give up his more than three years of French language learning to learn English because he saw that the KMT's main military base, although it is also a joint base for KMT and US in Kunming.

This influx of American soldiers changed Yan's life. Still a high school student, he not only had his first live English conversation with American GIs on his school playground but also had the courage to show these Americans around and sneak into the army cinemas to watch the latest American movies with subtitles. Yan was impressed by both the movies and the translations. He still remembers the names of movies such as *30 Seconds over Tokyo*, *The Great Waltz*, *Gone with the Wind*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Rebecca*, and *Casablanca*. The American influence on Yan, however, was much more than these movies. Yan recalled his personal observation of an American military drill in Kunming, which was accom-

panied by a military interpreter from the Associated Southwest University. He was impressed by the interpreter's English/Chinese interpretation, as well as his American military uniform: "我也想穿上美军的服装,去做美军的翻译" (I wanted to wear that uniform and to become an interpreter for the American troops). Later, in a local newspaper, he read the FAB's interpreter recruitment advertisement, particularly the chance of sponsorship for interpreters' further education in the USA. He applied and, despite his youth, impressed the American interviewers with his spoken English, which led to his acceptance into the training program to formally become an FAB military interpreter.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, Yan's investment in learning the English language and his movement to the interpreter position was due to his previous experiences with the American troops and his perception of the field through observation of the Chinese military interpreter accompanying the American troops. For Yan, this interpreter's American military uniform symbolized a capital associated with military position, with honor, with chances for study in the USA, and similar interests of an 18-year-old—everything, that is, except the risk to his life as a military interpreter. When asked whether he would choose a different path if given a second chance at life, Yan gave no direct answer but made the following comment:

> 人生海洋, 随遇而安。我想我只有这样的选择, 因为那是时代的选择, 人生很难, 实际上在那样的情况下, 你没有选择余地, 是当时时代选择了我们。
>
> Life is like an ocean; you have to take things as they come. I think I only had this choice, because that was the choice of the time. Life is very difficult. In that [wartime] situation, you actually had no other choices. It was the time that chose us. (Yan 2009)

At that moment, Yan showed his mixed feelings about the past. It seemed to him that he had simply taken what history offered and followed social developments rather than his personal choice or plan. This viewpoint contrasts starkly with his earlier description of his efforts to seek a way out and pursue honor and a better life in difficult times. Apparently, together with his sense of achievement and patriotic passion, Yan could not see other better choices and felt the constraints and limita-

tions of his options. For him, joining the army and becoming a military interpreter were the best choices given the circumstances. Unlike Xia, at the time when he received his interpreter training, Yan was a young man with limited social experiences and relationships to help him see and explore other possibilities. This aspect is one that Bourdieu often emphasizes in his theory of practice: agents' *illusio*—their practical sense of the field—is generated from their habitus, the embodied objective conditions, which directly affects their perceptions of both self and the field developed through their social experiences. In other words, Yan's habitus was not sufficiently developed to enable a wider view of the field or other fields, and his social capital was insufficient for him to position himself differently within the field or beyond one field.

Nevertheless, Yan's military interpreter experiences did significantly change his situation. First, during training, Yan met Dr. Frank W. Price, Director of the Chongqing Interpreter Training Program, who had a significant impact on Yan and his post-war life. According to Yan, he established a very good personal relationship with Dr. Price (Yan 2009). Like Xia, he took his mentor's first name as his English name during his military interpreter training. When the war ended and the interpreters were dispersed by the KMT, Yan went to Frank Price for a private talk and asked for his help. Price wrote a letter recommending him to his brother Harry B. Price, Deputy Director of the China Branch of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). In this manner, Yan received his first formal job after his life as a military interpreter. In a later letter to Yan, Price wrote,

> It is a joy to have you come and to talk with me a few evening ago and I appreciate your sharing your difficulties and problems with me. I do feel as if you are my own son and I hope you will let me help you in the future as a father could. That means I will give you any assistance in my power and also talk friendly and lovingly to you.[6]

Whereas Dr. Price's help was substantial and timely for Yan, Yan's initiation of a talk with Price about his difficulties and his request for help are equally important. That is, his acquaintance with Price was the social capital accumulated during his training, and as in the case of Xia, when

[6] This letter, copied and given to me by Yan after the interview, is dated September 7, 1945.

the situation changed, the social capital developed from interaction with a teacher-enabled movement to other potential positions and fields.

Second, despite its short duration, Yan's military interpreter training greatly shaped his subsequent life. With the military interpreter certificate issued by the KMT, Yan was recognized as retired military staff and entitled to pursue further study at Wuhan University for free. With his university education background and English language skills, he was selected by the CCP army for further training and, after 1949, become a CCP cadre. However, during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), Yan was persecuted for his past service to the KMT and his previous connection with the Americans. This persecution again underscores Bourdieu's claim that the relative value of agential capital is determined by the dominant power relationship within the field. Yan's interpreter certificate was issued and valued by the KMT, and thus brought Yan benefits; however, once the CCP came to power, with a different ideology and political structures, the value of the interpreter certificate became uncertain and even constituted a negative factor that reduced Yan's social and political capital.

As Yan emphasized in the interview (2009), "'人生路, 关键就几步'。或者关键就一两步。你读什么学校, 你做什么工作, 你叫什么朋友, 你跟什么人结婚, 就是这么几步" (There are only a few key steps in your life. Or one or two crucial steps. They are the schools that you attended, the work that you did, the friends that you made, the one that you married. These steps decide your life). Yan's words echo the major points set out by Bourdieu in his argument on agential practices: education, career, social network, and personal/family relationships. These four aspects together constitute the largest part of agents' social experiences and determine their possession of cultural and social capital.

5.3 Conclusions

This chapter has presented the case studies of two individual interpreters, Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui, and their own representations of their social and professional practices during the war. Examination of these individuals' social trajectories—in particular, an analysis of their self-perceptions—reveals that despite the differences in their ages, social origins, and life experiences, their practices follow similar patterns; that is, their interpreting was not a neu-

tral linguistic service but a personal action to make a living, gain honor, seek protection, and pursue better positions in the social world. For Xia, interpreting was a means to exploit and cash in on the linguistic, cultural, and social capital accumulated through his education in Japan and work in the Japanese-dominated Manchurian government. On the other hand, as it turned out, his interpreting activities further expanded his social capital and enabled his later double agency in the political negotiations between China and Japan. Xia's example adds another layer to our understanding of collaborating interpreters: some interpreters' positions and movements within and across different fields actually endowed them with more power and capital because of their roles linking different fields and creating new power relationships.

In contrast to Xia, Yan had no chance to straddle sides or position himself differently because of factors related to his limited life experiences, including his youth, student status, and limited social networks. Nevertheless, Yan's recollections during the interviews of his professional training experiences—in particular, his self-representation of his interpreter status—offer a more individually oriented perspective on the interpreter profession and cast a different light on the interpreter training discussed in Chap. 2. Education—in this case, professional training and/or overseas study—is an important socialization process for interpreters, one in which they not only acquire essential knowledge and skills for their professional practice but also incorporate values and beliefs as part of their professional habitus. This professional habitus, in turn, continuously influences their self-perception and subsequent social and professional practices.

This analysis of individual interpreters' self-representation and their socialization process through professional training and practice benefited greatly from a Bourdieusian sociological framework, which proved an especially fruitful conceptual tool for such analysis. In contrast to traditional historical analyses of interpreter life trajectories, which focus on interpreters' contributions to history (Delisle and Woodsworth 1995; Roland 1982, 1999; Wong 2007), this sociological approach not only opens up discussions on the social factors affecting the formation and development of interpreters' professional habitus but also proffers a valuable perspective on the potential of individual interpreters' active agency in the social world.

6

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, I have shown how Chinese interpreters acted in different political and military contexts during the Second Sino-Japanese War, a long-lasting conflict that provided them with both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, they had to struggle for their lives during violent military clashes under harsh political dominance. On the other, the conflict stimulated collaborations and interactions between China and foreign powers (e.g., the KMT's military collaboration with Germany and the USA; the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) political interaction with the Comintern and the USA; and the Japanese forces' interaction with local collaborators) and created demand for linguistic support. Therefore, the interpreters' knowledge of a foreign language and culture endowed them with social position and power.

Although a war setting in which interpreters have little control over the interactions among involved parties may represent an extreme case in interpreting studies, it offers an important historical context for the empirical study of interpreter practices in the social world. More specifically, the cultural, military, and political tensions, as well as the pressure to survive physical dangers on the battlefield, surely adds a different layer to our

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understanding of the interpreter profession and individual interpreters' social praxis. In contrast to today's conference interpreting or community interpreting, interpreting during this war was more institutionalized (and even militarized); interpreters were specifically selected, trained, and employed by particular authorities for specific political and military purposes.

For example, the KMT government's recruitment, training, and control of military interpreters was centralized and in charge by its Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB). The FAB monitored the entire process of producing the needed professional military interpreters, from compiling training textbooks and setting training syllabi to disciplining or rewarding interpreters. Although the CCP did not encounter the same need for military interpreters, the interpreters for its communication with the Comintern and later the American Dixie Mission were also carefully chosen, but from its Party members. For these CCP interpreters, Party advocacy was the predominant capital for and decisive stake in their interpreting practices. This inclination to institutionalize the interpreter profession during the war is also evident in the experiences of the interpreters who served the Japanese forces. Unlike freelance interpreters today, these interpreters were usually directly affiliated with Japanese or Japanese-sponsored military and political institutions, including the Japanese military police, Japanese troops, local Japanese-dominated administrations, and intelligence agencies. Hence, their positions within and support from these institutions were the source of their power in occupied areas.

Nevertheless, although the war stimulated the institutionalization of the interpreter profession, it is problematic to assume that the interpreter's professional habitus was automatically and exclusively generated from interpreter training and employment within institutions. As the case studies of various interpreters in Chaps. 4 and 5 clearly illustrate, for individual interpreters, interpreting was often only part of their personal development and/or a self-preservation strategy in extreme circumstances. It was also not unusual to see interpreters straddling different political camps and crossing military borders to maximize their own interests.

Given this complexity, Bourdieu's sociological framework provides a fruitful perspective for analysis, one that places the issues of both interpreting and interpreting history into a wider social context. Particularly

important within such a framework for this study are the interpreter's professional identity, the significance of training in the process of interpreter professionalization, and individual interpreters' embodied agency and active positioning in the social world. Above all, in a sociological context, interpreting practices are not separate linguistic actions carried out indifferently by professionals but rather social practices by individual interpreters for particular purposes and with continuous repercussions on both the interpreters themselves and other social agents and institutions.

Admittedly, as discussed in the Introduction, many controversies remain on the application of Bourdieu's notion of 'field' in translation studies; for example, whether an actual field of interpreting exists and is mature enough to contain distinctive symbolic capital, and whether an interpreting event is one single field or a place in which interlocking fields converge (Simeoni 1998; Wolf 2007a; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a). In regards to the former, I have clearly shown that the field of interpreting does indeed exist and can be reconstructed by considering interpreting as social interaction among social agents and institutions rather than linguistic production by individuals. This emphasis on social relationships and actual actions are perhaps the greatest strength of this sociological perspective for studies on interpreting history, especially in situations when the available documentation (e.g., transcripts) are insufficient for linguistically oriented research.

Consequently, study of this specific history in China not only fills a gap in the world history of wartime interpreting but also sheds light on our understanding of interpreters' professional identity. On the basis of Bourdieu's notion of habitus and translation scholars' elaboration on translators' professional habitus, I have argued that this professional identity is neither a general standard applicable to all contexts nor a finished product of training. Rather, it is an expression of the values and norms that interpreters incorporate and continuously define through their social practice. Some interpreters—for example, Yan Jiarui, the second interpreter in the final case studies—had a strong sense of their professional identity and tended to frame their practices within the professional guidelines. Others, however, such as Wu Xiuquan and Ling Qing (see Chap. 3), tended to decline or avoid the label of 'interpreter' because it was actually in the way of their political career in the

CCP. Apparently, these different interpreter reactions originated from their different socio-political status and later interpreting practices; that is, their self-perception and the relative value of their interpreting practices to their social development.

Nevertheless, regardless of the influence of the interpreters' later professional practices, training did play an important role in establishing the interpreters' professional identity and fostering their professional habitus. Above all, training was an essential process in institutions' selection of appropriate candidates and inculcation of the values and norms favorable to the dominant power, such as interpreter status, standards for honorable or dishonorable behavior, and political advocacy. This finding is particularly useful for our thinking on contemporary interpreters' professional codes and ethics, as well as the significance of training in imposing norms upon interpreters. For example, impartiality and neutrality are one basic ethical principle always emphasized and reinforced in court interpreter training, but at the same time, interpreters are asked to perform in the interests of the court, which, to some extent, is actually an implicit expression of interpreter advocacy and loyalty to the democratic legal system. Training was also an effective way for individual interpreters to acquire essential skills and legitimate their knowledge in the form of qualifications and certificates. Such legitimization was often a necessary and crucial process for interpreters, especially military interpreters in this case, to enter the field and become eligible for the positions. In other words, training is itself a type of symbolic capital, one that sets professionals apart from those without training. For instance, as discussed in Chap. 2, the KMT's military interpreters, including those who had no chance to actually serve the army during the war, received benefits and military rank from the first day of training and enjoyed certain privileges, including free higher education after the war.

The interpreter habitus, however, does not simply consist of abstract norms; it also includes interpreters' biological bodies, and it is in this physical reality that the significance of Bourdieu's argument on habitus embodiment lies. Indeed, one crucial aspect of interpreting, unlike translation, is the necessity of the interpreter's physical presence and bodily actions, an aspect further crystallized by the harsh living environments of wartime. Not only were healthy bodies an important condition for

recruitment of military interpreters but the interpreters' physical condition, will to survive, and quest for a better life were the basis of their social practice. Since any values and norms incorporated by the interpreters had to be expressed through their individual actions, interpreter practices were not standardized professional products but personal actions whose effects varied because of individual interpreters' characteristics, including social competencies, cultural knowledge, and even bodily stature or appearance. At the same time, individual interpreters also had concerns about the consequences of their physical participation in interpreting work. Like others, they feared danger and death and tried to use their interpreter positions for their own best interests. The impact of this practical consideration emerged clearly in the examination of both the KMT's military interpreters and the interpreters collaborating with the Japanese. Whereas some KMT interpreters chose to escape their military duty during training or on the battlefield, some collaborating interpreters chose to secretly serve the Chinese public and Chinese resistance forces to avoid assassination or punishment as traitors. These self-preservation strategies and border-crossing practices provide a unique perspective on interpreters' active positioning in certain contexts.

Interpreters' border-crossing, particularly, sheds light on their agency and power during the war. Although lack of professional training, a low social profile, and humble payment often led to an image of the interpreter as subservient to other agents and institutions (e.g., Simeoni 1998; Wolf 2007a; Gouanvic 1997, 2002, 2005), my investigation of the collaborating interpreters clearly indicates that interpreters positioning within different fields could increase their social or economic capital and sometimes even protect them from violence temporarily. For example, the final case study of Xia Wenyun has shown that as an interpreter serving the Japanese, Xia made full use of his social networks on both sides (China and Japan), which became the basis for his political mediation between Japan and China and his double agency activities for the Chinese KMT government. His multiple positioning not only helped him acquire more capital and survive the violence during and after the war but also enabled connections and dialogues among the Chinese KMT and the Japanese forces and greatly contributed to the Chinese KMT's military victory during the war.

Even though the wartime setting represents a profile of disorder, chaos, and violence, it gives a real sense of the world in which the interpreters were living and working. Their practices, as recorded in the archive files or narrated in their own words, are fertile sources, equally important as interpreter transcripts, for our research on this special group of professionals in society. Many issues discussed or raised in this historical project—including the significance of interpreter training, qualifications, understanding of interpreters' identification or claimed positions, and interpreters' social competencies—are still relevant to today's international communities and offer important avenues for further research. This book represents a contribution to both the study of this specific interpreting history and current debates among both translation studies scholars and historians about translating and interpreting in conflicts.

Appendix: Chronology of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45)

Date	Event
1931	The September 18 Incident (the Mukden Incident: military clashes between Japan and China in North China); within five months, most of Manchuria is under Japanese control
1932	The establishment of Manchukuo, a Japanese-sponsored Chinese government in Manchuria
1933	China signs the Tanggu Truce with Japan and formally gives up its guarding right in areas along the Great Wall, as well as its control of Manchurian areas
1935	He-Umezu Agreement and Chin-Doihara Agreement: Japan is able to establish a North China Autonomous Area under its control
1936	The Xi'an Incident (Jiang Jieshi is kidnapped by KMT generals and forced to resist the Japanese); resumed cooperation between the CCP and KMT; Japan joins the World War II Axis of Germany and Italy
July 1937	The July 7 Incident (a conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops at LugouBridge); the KMT's declaration of war with Japan; Beijing lost
Dec. 1937	Battle of Nanjing; Nanjing lost; the KMT government transferred to Chongqing, Sichuan province; the Nanjing Massacre by the Japanese
Mar. 1938	KMT victory in the Battle of Tai'erzhuang

(*continued*)

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DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3

Table (continued)

Date	Event
Sept. 1939	Beginning of war in the European theatre
Mar. 1940	Wang Jingwei betrays the KMT government and establishes a new puppet government in Nanjing
Jan. 1941	The Wan'nan Incident (CCP troops are ambushed by KMT troops in Maolin, Anhui province); war time conflicts between the CCP and the KMT reach a climax
Dec. 1941	The Pearl Harbor Incident (Japan attacks the American naval base at Pearl Harbor); the outbreak of the Pacific War
1942	KMT aid to the resistance in Burma
1943	KMT aid to Britain's troops in India
1944	Counter-attack by the allied forces; partial counter-attack by the CCP
July 1944	The arrival of the American Dixie Mission
July 1945	The Potsdam Declaration
Aug. 1945	The dropping of two atomic bombs by the USA on the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders
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T. Guo, *Surviving in Violent Conflicts*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46119-3