CULTURE AND RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Civilizational Identity

The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations

Edited by
Martin Hall and
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson

Civilizational Identity

Culture and Religion in International Relations

Series Editors:
Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil

Published by Palgrave Macmillan:

Dialogue among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices
By Fred Dallmayr

Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile
Edited by Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos

Identity and Global Politics: Theoretical and Empirical Elaborations
Edited by Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn

Reason, Culture, Religion: The Metaphysics of World Politics
By Ralph Pettman

Bringing Religion into International Relations
By Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler

The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century
By Scott M. Thomas

Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies: Reconstructing the Public Sphere in Muslim Majority Societies
Edited by Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine

Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Order and Institutions
By Siba N. Grovogui

The Public Sphere: Between Tradition and Modernity
By Armando Salvatore

Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations
Edited by Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson

Civilizational Identity

The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations

Edited by

Martin Hall
and
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson

palgrave
macmillan



CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTITY

First published in 2007 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS
Companies and representatives throughout the world.

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.

ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7544–7
ISBN-10: 1–4039–7544–2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Civilizational identity : the production and reproduction of "civilizations" in international relations / edited by Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1–4039–7544–2 (alk. paper)
1. International relations. 2. Civilization—Philosophy. 3. World politics—1989– I. Hall, Martin, 1967– II. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, 1972–

JZ1305.C48 2007
327.101—dc22 2007013168

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: November 2007

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

To our children, in hopes that they grow up in a world of civilizational plurality:

Arianna

Chloe

Quinn

As this book was going to press, we were saddened to hear of the sudden and untimely death of Hayward Alker, one of the pioneers of the study of global dialogues about world order and a contributor to this volume. Professor Alker was not only a respected figure in the field of International Relations, but an intellectual mentor to many of the scholars involved in this project. His intellectual generosity, his impassioned support of methodological pluralism, and his developmental concern for younger scholars will be sorely missed. We hope that this book helps, in some small way, to advance the endeavor in which he was engaged for his entire career: finding ways to advance a more humane global politics.

—The Editors

Contents

Acknowledgments

This volume has its origins in a workshop the editors organized in connection with the International Studies Association's annual conference in Hawaii in 2005. All the invited participants were quite enthusiastic about the discussions during the workshop, and it was decided that we should endeavor to continue the conversation and then attempt a joint publication of our contributions. We enlisted a few more authors along the way. This volume is the result. The editors want to thank all the contributors to this volume for being willing to participate in the project—often in spite of intercontinental relocations, arrivals of new family members, and other life events.

None of the papers collected here appear in a form that closely resembles their original presentation. All of the chapters have been extensively rewritten after the initial workshop and ongoing discussions: presenters had an opportunity to incorporate and respond to the initial comments from their discussants, and the discussants had an opportunity to revise their comments in response to those revisions. What you have before you here is a record of several rounds of a discussion. We hope that readers of this book will join this—as we see it—still-ongoing discussion.

The editors would like to thank Anthony Wahl at Palgrave Press for his editorial interest in the project, Kate Ankofski and Katie Fahey for their logistical assistance in preparing the manuscript, and Maran Elancheran for his copyediting and typesetting expertise. Shira Zamir did admirable work behind the scenes keeping all of the various versions of documents organized. Cherry Currin and Jay Kawatski at Twin Oaks Publishing did their usual outstanding job preparing the index.

Martin Hall's work on and for this book was made possible by a generous grant from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (Dnr 2003–0261). He hereby expresses his deeply-felt gratitude to the foundation for its generosity and for its nonbureaucratic flexibility. Hall also wishes to thank his colleagues at the Department of Political Science, Lund University for critical and useful comments on the introduction to this volume. Roberta and Arianna have not been the proverbial understanding family, but have instead convinced him about the importance of participating in real life or, in other words, to help reproduce civilization at the very local level.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson wishes to thank several of his Ph.D. students for their ongoing participation in an intellectual community within which

these ideas—and ideas about *Doctor Who* and *Battlestar Galactica*—can continue to be discussed: Kiran Pervez, Maia Hallward, Elizabeth Dahl, Jesse Crane-Seeber, Jacob Stump, Priya Dixit, Elizabeth Breier-Sharlow, Courtney Radsch, and Avi Zollman. Holly, Quinn, and Chloe continue to provide his anchor in the ongoing flux of the social world, for which he remains eternally thankful.

List of Contributors

Hayward R. Alker is professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California and adjunct professor of International Relations at the Watson Institute, Brown University. His current projects include a study of The Dialectics of World Orders with Tahir Amin, Thomas Biersteker and Takashi Inoguchi, a series of studies of early warning information systems oriented toward international conflicts, and further work on the themes of his *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies*, digitally republished by Cambridge University Press in 2007.

Jacqueline Best is associate professor of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her first book, *The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance* was published in 2005 by Cornell University Press.

Brett Bowden is senior lecturer (Politics) at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. His recent publications include *Global Standards of Market Civilization* (coedited with Leonard Seabrooke, Routledge/RIPE, 2006).

Yale H. Ferguson is professor of Political Science and Codirector, Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University-Newark as well as honorary professor, University of Salzburg (Austria). His latest books with Richard W. Mansbach are *Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock* (Cambridge University Press, 2004) and *A World of Polities: Essays in Global Politics* (Routledge, 2007).

Martin Hall holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Lund University, Sweden, where he also teaches. His most recent book (coauthored with Christer Jösson) is *Essence of Diplomacy* (Palgrave, 2005).

John M. Hobson is professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His most recent books are *Everyday Politics of the World Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 2007, coedited with Leonard Seabrooke) and, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson is associate professor of International Relations in the School of International Service, and director of the General Education

Program, at American University. His most recent book is *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (University of Michigan Press, 2006).

Catarina Kinnvall is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden. She is the author of *Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security* (London: Routledge, 2006), and *Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of identity* (coedited with Kristina Jonsson) (London: Routledge, 2002).

Peter Mandaville is associate professor of Government and Politics and director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University. He is the author of the books *Global Political Islam and Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*, as well as the coeditor of several volumes of collected essays.

Daniel H. Nexon is an assistant professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His work covers topics in international relations theory, the logics of empires, religious conflict, and popular culture.

Jacinta O'Hagan is a fellow in the Department of International Relations in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. She is the author of *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Oswald Spengler to Edward Said* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), *Contending Images of World Politics* (with Greg Fry, Macmillan, 2000) and "Beyond the Clash of Civilisations?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 3, 2005.

Mustapha Kamal Pasha is Sixth Century chair in International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, UK. His most recent publications include Protecting *Human Security in a Post 9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights* (coedited with Giorgio Shani and Makoto Sat, Palgrave 2007).

Mark B. Salter is an associate professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa. He is currently editing *Politics of/at the Airport*. He is the author of *Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations, Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations* (recently translated into Chinese), and editor with Elia Zureik of *Global Policing and Surveillance: Borders, Security Identity*.

Leonard Seabrooke is associate professor in the International Center for Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Department of International Relations, RSPAS, The Australian National University. His book publications include *US Power in International Finance* (Palgrave, 2001), *The Social Sources of Financial Power* (Cornell University Press, 2006), *Global Standards of Market Civilization* (coedited with Brett Bowden, Routledge/RIPE, 2006), and *Everyday*

Politics of the World Economy (coedited with John M. Hobson, Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Ann Towns is assistant professor in Political Science at the University of Delaware. Her book manuscript "Norms and Inequality in International Society: The Status of Women as a Standard of Rank" is currently under review.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 1

Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory

Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson

When asked about his view of Western civilization, the Mahatma Gandhi famously replied: "It would be a good idea." His reply reminds us that "civilization" is not a secure possession but a fragile, ever-renewable endeavor; grammatically, it has the character more of a verb than a noun.

—Fred Dallmayr

"Civilization" has meant so many different things to different people that it will be hard to retrieve it from abuse and restore useful meaning to it.

—Felipe Fernández-Armesto

What is civilisation? I don't know. I can't define it in abstract terms—yet. But I think I can recognise it when I see it . . .

—Kenneth Clark

The past decade has seen renewed interest in the notions of "civilization" and "civilizations" in many parts of the social sciences. In particular, Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis (1993a) has attracted an enormous amount of attention, both for its simplicity in dividing the world into mutually exclusive communities characterized by deep-essential differences, and for its pessimistic conclusion that these differences are so fundamental as to make the communities in question more or less implacably opposed to one another. Both of these aspects of Huntington's argument—essential differences, and implacable opposition—have been scrutinized and criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds, as part of a scholarly effort to forge the concepts of "civilization" and "civilizations" into useable analytical tools.

But even Huntington's sharpest academic critics have failed to provide a coherent alternative to civilizational essentialism. Although civilizational

work critical of Huntington emphasizes the ambiguous character of the core values characterizing a civilization, as well as the fuzziness of civilizational borders, such work nonetheless ends up in a place that is in many ways just as essentialist as the "clash of civilizations" thesis it is so critical of. Considering a civilization to be composed of a coherent ensemble of values, or a characteristic set of dispositions, is no less essentialist than Huntington's approach. As such, most existing analyses of civilizations are all on more or less the same analytical side.

It is the aim of this volume to address this one-sidedness by providing not merely another *critique* of the kind of essentialism that Huntington exemplifies but making a serious effort to suggest and develop modes of civilizational analysis that do not rest on such misleading foundations. Political and social actors may advance essentialist *claims* about their identities, and use these claims to justify particular courses of action, but it does not follow that scholarly analysts should import such claims into the heart of their conceptual apparatuses. On the other hand, the identity claims advanced by particular actors must be taken seriously, lest the analyst should fall into the trap of reducing the content of political action to an epiphenomenal effect of other factors. Balancing these two concerns requires the elaboration of a non-essentialist approach to civilization and civilizations, a task that has not yet been adequately accomplished.

This seemingly abstract set of considerations is given increased urgency and pragmatic relevance by the fact that civilizational talk is not just prominent in the academy. Indeed, politicians seem more willing to deploy the notion than most academics, as a quick perusal of recent public statements by major world leaders will quickly demonstrate: George W. Bush characterizes the war in Iraq and the military campaign against terrorists as a "struggle for civilization"; Vladimir Putin, among others, calls for a "dialogue among civilizations" as a way of ameliorating global tensions; and calls to strengthen or defend the fundamental values of "Western," "Chinese," or "Islamic" civilization feature prominently in political debates all over the world. For all of the scholarly skepticism that some have brought to the concepts over the years, the notions of "being civilized" and "belonging to a civilization" continue to have an undeniable political and practical resonance. But an essentialist approach to such notions is unlikely to yield much analytical payoff; in order to make sense of these civilizational appeals, a non-essentialist perspective is required. The chapters in this volume seek to elucidate just such a perspective.

Civilizations in International Relations

Like so many other concepts in the human sciences, "civilization" or "civilizations" come with a plurality of meanings and intellectual legacies. There is no consensus even over a rudimentary denotation, much less a precise definition. For instance, in his monumental *Civilizations* Felipe Fernández-Armesto rejects three broad meanings of the term civilization

in favor of his own definition of civilizations as "a type of relationship; a relationship to the natural environment" (2000: 2–5).[1] The three meanings he rejects are civilizations as significant continuities in thought or ideology, civilization as processes of self-differentiation from barbarism, and civilization as a stage in, or phase of, the history of a society. A fifth designation of civilization, which Shmuel Eisenstadt suggests has been employed by scholars from Max Weber and Oswald Spengler to Fernand Braudel and William H. McNeill, defines civilizations as "distinct societal-cultural units which share some very important, above all cultural, characteristics" (Eisenstadt, 2001a: 1916). By and large, this is how social scientists, as distinct from most historians, art historians, archaeologists, classicists, and populists or ideologues, have conceptualized civilizations.

Although "civilization" is a ubiquitous, if undertheorized or untheorized, concept in archaeology and classicism, for instance, it has for long been "almost invisible in the periphery of macro-sociology" (Tiryakian, 2001: 283). Per force, this is true for international relations (IR) as well. And yet there is a powerful tradition of civilizational analysis to draw upon in the social sciences, for a potential reactualization of this field—and for a redirection of the field in a markedly non-essentialist direction. Edward Tiryakian (2001) divides the existing scholarly tradition into three phases or generations. In the first phase we find the omnipresent Weber, as well as Durkheim and Mauss. In the second generation, lasting from about the 1930s to the 1980s, three major figures represent three different approaches to civilizational analysis although "each underscored civilization as a dynamic entity, really as a process of actualization rather than as a finished entity" (Tiryakian, 2001: 286). Pitrim Sorokin developed a history of philosophy, the main ingredient of which was a cyclical sequence of "sensate," or materialistic, and "ideational," or spiritual, cultural ideal types.[2] Norbert Elias—perhaps the best-known civilizational analyst within IR—explicitly developed a processual theory "of the making of the modern individual as a distinctly disciplined (or regulated), reflexive creature of civilization" (Mandalios, 2003: 65).[3] Benjamin Nelson, finally, emphasized the need to study civilizational encounters and argued that while "civilizational complexes" do "possess degrees of social closure" they are "essentially porous" (ibid.: 73). For Nelson, "symbolic frontiers, not iron curtains" form and shape civilizational identities (ibid.).

Tiryakian's third generation of civilizational analysis lacks even the general consensus of the second. The two dominant figures of the third generation—Samuel Huntington and Eisenstadt—share very little in terms of intellectual outlook. Eisenstadt finds the force of history *within* civilizations; conflict over interpretation of cultural programs set different civilizations on different paths toward modernization. As a result we can today talk of "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt, 2002). Huntington, as we have already noted, reifies his roster of civilizations and suggests that their incommensurability will of necessity create a clash. But this work by Eisenstadt and Huntington has generated much critical commentary, and

has inspired a range of scholars to take up some form of civilizational analysis—enough scholars, we suggest, that we are justified to talk of an emerging *fourth* generation of civilizational analysis.

In the wider social sciences we would point to special issues of *International Sociology* (2001) and *Thesis Eleven* (2000), respectively as two examples of a fourth generation. In IR more particularly, we would point to Christopher Coker's *Twilight of the West* (1998) and Donald Puchala's *Theory and History in International Relations* (2003) as significant recent civilizational work: work that takes explicit appeals to the notion of civilization or civilizations seriously, and seeks to place such appeals in their proper sociological and historical context. Along with several of the contributors to this volume, these authors have done much to put civilizations back on the IR research agenda. At a more immediate level, it is, of course, the aim of this volume to contribute to this fourth generation of civilizational analysis, and to help flesh it out as a specific instance of the general critique of essentialism—applied, in this case, to the notion of "civilization."

Arguably, the central characteristic of this fourth-generation civilizational scholarship is its commitment to a form of *post-essentialism*: skeptical of essentialist claims about civilizations or other forms of community, but sensitive to the power that such claims exercise in social and political practice. Fourth-generation civilizational analysis has close affinities with the ascendance—in IR as well in social sciences more generally—of historical sociology (cf. Arnason, 2000: iii). Within IR, constructivism has opened up an analytical space for approaches that combine materialistic with ideational processes as foundations for explanation or understanding (Wendt, 1999; Adler, 1997). This is the home turf of post-essentialist civilizational analysis.

Before turning to post-essentialism, we will first briefly discuss the essentialism that continues to characterize much extant work on civilizations.

Varieties of Civilizational Essentialism

Although Huntington is perhaps the most obvious of the contemporary civilizational essentialists, it is our contention that many of Huntington's critics remain equally, if more subtly, trapped within an essentialist mode of reasoning.

Huntington's proposal for a new map of world politics revolves around the interaction of seven, or possibly eight, "cultural entities" each distinguished by commonalities of "blood, language, religion, [and] way of life." He suggests that a civilization is

> the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species . . . Civilizations are the biggest "we" within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other "thems" out there. (Huntington, 1996: 43)

As such, the dynamics of social and political interaction are expected to vary based on whether the parties are part of the same civilization or not; fellow-civilizationalists will come to one another's aid based on shared values, and interventions across civilizational borders will ultimately fail due to local resistance. Hence Huntington's prescription for monoculturalism at home and multiculturalism abroad (ibid.: 318).

Huntington's work may have helped return civilizational analysis to public consciousness, but it failed to establish the terms of the subsequent scholarly debate. Indeed, much of the contemporary work on civilizations is explicitly articulated as a response to or criticism of Huntington's project, and in particular is critical of two aspects of his account: his emphasis on cultural factors, and his lack of attention to inter-civilizational encounters and exchanges. The two aspects are related, inasmuch as Huntington's account represents a return to a notion of essential civilizational separateness associated with turn-of-the-century authors like Oswald Spengler (Farrenkopf, 2000: 28). For Huntington, as for Spengler, civilizations are more or less closed entities, resting on homogenous cultural bases and interacting with one another only incidentally (Melleuish, 2000: 113). Huntington's civilizations are thus akin to billiard balls, bouncing off of one another in much the same way that states were thought to do in old realist IR theory (Wolfers, 1962). Much of the contemporary academic work on civilizations rejects this stance.

For Eisenstadt, civilizations are defined by the relationship between a cosmological vision and the concrete institutional life of a group of people (Eisenstadt, 2000b: 2). This relationship gives rise to characteristic tensions, such as the struggle between individual freedom and social control characteristic of the "civilization of modernity" that began in Western Europe (Eisenstadt, 2001b: 326–27). Eisenstadt also emphasizes in his discussion of the dynamics of modernization how interactions between civilizations can transform them in fundamental ways: the rise of a politics based on participatory openness, and the consequent decline of traditional (largely theological) justifications for political rule, posed challenges for populations worldwide which were confronted with this novel approach. But each civilization modernized in its own way, confronting the principles birthed in Western Europe with local norms and practices rather than simply accepting the European vision as a whole; the result was "multiple modernities," a number of discrete civilizations that share modern values and institutions but differ in their resolution of the tensions to which those values and institutions give rise (Eisenstadt, 2000b: 16–18).

Likewise, for Robert Cox, a civilization is "an amalgam of social forces and ideas that has achieved a certain coherence, but is continually changing and developing in response to challenges both from within and from without" (2002: 143). Civilizations are "in the mind rather than on the ground," and are composed of "shared assumptions about the natural order of things"; these shared assumptions form a common stock of resources which people draw on in reacting to phenomena like the increasing worldwide

mobility of capital and shifts in the balance of political and military power between different regions of the planet (ibid.: 39). As in Eisenstadt, Cox's civilizations are not *purely* ideational, but represent a "fit or correspondence between material conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings" (ibid.: 161). The dynamism of civilizations derives from their struggles to maintain this correspondence in the face of shifts in technologies of production, communication, and the like.

But for all their invocations of fluidity and flux, these civilizational analysts retain an essential continuity with Huntington inasmuch as they continue to insist that civilizations are *objects* with essentially continuous core features. To engage in civilizational analysis of this sort is to treat a civilization as a discrete object, as a "thing-like entity" with "an enduring essence" (Collins, 2001: 422). This remains the case even when analysts qualify their specification of a civilization's essential qualities with references to the ambiguity and internal complexity of civilizations; in the end, they return to the position that civilizations are essentially different from one another. Huntington offers perhaps the most revealing qualification:

> Civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of civilizations change over time. The cultures of people interact and overlap. The extent to which the cultures of civilizations resemble or differ from each other also varies considerably. *Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities*, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, *they are real*. (Huntington, 1996: 43, emphasis added)

The assertion that civilizations are "real," coming on the heels of an ample demonstration of the flexibility and even the fuzziness of the concept, is striking. What does it mean to say that civilizations and the differences between them are "real," even though their boundaries and the precise content of their central cores change over time?

Reified Things versus Processes of Production

Among the chapters of this volume there is a definite consensus on avoiding essentialism by using the concept of civilization in its pluralizable and concrete form. That is, the concept of civilization is isomorphic with "society" or "nation," rather than with "politics." There is a contrast between civilizations, then, but not between civilization and noncivilization. At the same time, this does not mean that civilizations are reifiable "things" that in some uncomplicated way can assume corporate agency, the way that Wendt argues that "states" do (Wendt, 1999). Instead, civilizations are better understood as ongoing *processes*, and in particular, as ongoing processes through which boundaries are continually produced and reproduced. These processes, necessarily power-laden, must be analyzed in their proper social contexts.

With a stronger or weaker commitment, and more or less explicitly, the chapters in this book—representing the plurality of approaches to civilizational analysis it seeks to launch—are based on a number of post-essentialist arguments. We borrow some of these arguments from William Sewell's discussion of cultures (Sewell, 2005: 169–71).

Civilizations are weakly bounded, not bounded. At least since the publication of Michael Mann's *The Sources of Social Power* (1986) it ought to have been compulsory to explicitly defend the assumption that the borders of a state are coterminous with that of its society, culture, economy, and so on, or that any of these spheres coincide with one another. Rarely, if ever, in history has there been such a bounded entity. Overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power (Mann, 1986) have always been the norm. This is true also for civilizations—there never is a sharp border between one civilization and another. If such a border could be identified, however, that would be an interesting empirical phenomenon rather than something to base theory on. Nor are civilizations bounded in the sense of standing in splendid isolation from each other. All sorts of things and processes have always been exchanged and diffused, and as such, inter-civilizational encounters should be more central to our accounts.

Civilizations are contradictory, not coherent. There is a profound assumption in much contemporary social science that whatever identifiable entities one is studying, one is bound to find coherence among parts. Social formations, in this view, are like the flowcharts of slick international organizations or management consulting companies. But we do not want to *assume* that civilizations are so coherent. Tensions and contradictions abound, and there is no a priori reason to assume that they can or will be resolved. Values may be incommensurable with regulative frameworks, processes may be at odds, and there may be certain level of ontological and epistemological dissension—as between branches of the same religion, for instance. Much of what goes on within civilizations is about dealing with these contradictions. For instance, Eistenstadt argues:

> The central core of civilizations is the symbolic and institutional inter-relation between the formulation, promulgation, articulation, and continuous reinterpretation of the basic ontological visions prevalent in a society, its basic ideological premises and core symbols on the one hand, and on the other the definition, structuration, and regulation of the major arenas of institutional life. (2000: 2)

The *first* criterion for making this assertion plausible, we suggest, is to insist that "interrelation" is allowed to be ambiguous, disorganized, dysfunctional, suboptimal, and plural and subject to manipulation by multiple actors at multiple levels of analysis.

Civilizations are loosely integrated, not integrated. In a parallel fashion, the parts—however constituted—of a civilization are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. A civilization is not one of early anthropology's tribes in which

kinship, ritual, economic and other practices form a unified whole. Inherent contradictions and the permeability of civilizations continuously work to disassociate the parts of social, or civilizational, life from each other. Trajectories may be differentiated and certain spheres of activity may disconnect themselves from others, and not only in the form of an avant-garde, counterhegemony, or subculture.

Civilizations are heterarchical, not centralized. In his contribution to this volume, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson argues that civilizations have no front desks. In other words, they lack overall centrality. Archaeologists (e.g. Ehrenreich et al., 1995; Earle, 1997) at times use the concept of heterarchy to denominate societies in which "segments have separate internal hierarchies that deflect overall social centrality" (Earle, 1997: 1).[4] Granted, at those historically rare moments when an empire is more or less coterminous with a civilization there may be reason to ask whether there is a front desk. Still, also the segments of civilizations-cum-empires may well have separate internal hierarchies. The Japanese civilization-cum-empire from the battle of Sekigahara to the Meiji restoration may be a particularly unambiguous illustration of civilizations as heterarchies.

As a consequence of all of the above, *civilizations are contested, not consensual*. Whatever else they are, contributors to this volume suggest, civilizations are at least sites of contestation: power struggles over material and symbolic resources and disputes over meaning and purpose abound. As the fortunes of groups and individuals vary over time in these struggles and disputes, furthermore, *civilizations are states of flux; they are not static*. Or at least, flux is the norm; stasis is the exception to be explained.

Is there, then, any useful way in which to talk about civilizations—weakly bounded, permeated, conflictual, contradictory, loosely integrated, constantly changing phenomena that lack centrality—at all? Contributors to this volume suggest that there is, and that there is something distinctive enough about invocations of civilizational identity to warrant a focused set of investigations (see also Delanty, 2007). The first step toward a useful analytical concept of civilizations, we suggest, is to stop thinking about civilizations as if they were structures or things, and start thinking about them as if they were processes and relations. Let us at this point briefly exemplify—with the help of the Roman and Germanic civilizations—how one can usefully talk about civilizations in these terms.

Even if there is no agreement exactly on what civilizations are, everybody would probably agree that, if the word has any meaning at all, the Roman and Germanic social formations of the first half of the first millennium CE were two different civilizations. Indeed, Victor Lee Burke (1997) analyzes the disintegration of the Roman Empire and the development of Western civilization in terms of a clash between Roman and Germanic civilizations.[5]

The coexistence of the Roman and Germanic civilizations illustrates our points about civilizations. The nature and character of the "borders"

between these two civilizations is the key issue. C. R. Whittaker, and Barry Cunliffe, outline the regions where Rome and "free Germany" met in terms of economic zones (Whittaker, 1994: 122–25; Cunliffe, 1994: 336–72). That is, there was never a sharp borderline between the Roman Empire and free Germany, clearly discernable in terms of culture and political-economic organization. Rather, between the system of forts—the frontier—and free Germany there was a zone of about 200 kilometers Whittaker calls "Romanized Celtic area-buffer zone" (1994: 123, Figure 34). This buffer zone was the site of numerous economic transactions: from free Germany, Rome imported slaves and exotic wares such as amber and rare hides, while the Germanic peoples received weapons and silver and gold coins in return. These luxury goods "took a central place in the development of a new social system through their function as prestige goods. . . . [They] represented the elite's monopoly of alliances and long-distance connections" (Hedeager, 1992: 156).

Such cross-border flows were not unique. Ever since the second century, people had moved and traded across the borders in Europe, the societies that had grown up on both sides were in many ways indistinguishable from each other. In the words of Malcolm Todd,

> What is observable on and beyond the northern Roman frontiers, from the third century onward, is the emergence of frontier societies, neither purely Roman provincial nor entirely barbarian. Typically, such societies on long-established frontiers develop a material culture which draws on elements from both sides while remaining part of the dominant political order. When that order weakened or collapsed, a frontier society often remained in being and filled the political vacuum. (1992: 147)

From these societies recruits for the armies were drawn, and some of these recruits would rise to become generals and military overlords. Others, perhaps from beyond the frontier society, would be brought into the empire as federate armies to replace the diminishing numbers of Roman peasants. Particularly toward the fifth century, these two developments combined, and the landlords would become warlords, and the warlords, landlords. With the declining presence of the Roman army, the landlords would have to arm their retainers, and the federate leaders would be given land in payment, and sometimes made Roman governors over "their" areas. Among these landlords, warlords, and generals, it was not easy to sort out who was what. Whittaker writes "Gaul and Germany had turned into a confusion or rival generals, some claiming Roman authority, others Frankish; and some both" (1994: 252).

In this account of Roman and Germanic civilizations, these large groupings are seen as sites of relationships—but not as exclusive, constitutively separate sites. Instead, "civilizations" denote denser sites of relations. And the density and character of these relations manifest weakly bounded, permeated, conflictual, contradictory, loosely integrated, constantly changing

phenomena that lack centrality. What this implies is that we should be treating civilizations not as containers within which events take place, but instead as combinations of mechanisms and processes that sometimes produce the *effect* of stable boundaries—similar to how Timothy Mitchell (1991) recommends that we analyze states.

At the same time as we are shifting our attention to processes and mechanisms, we do not want to go as far as those world-systems historians (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997; Abu-Lughod, 1989; Denemark et al., 2000) whose approach effectively transforms civilizations into epiphenomenal consequences of deeper social and material forces. In other words, world-systems analysts effectively abandon *identity* as a relevant category for the analysis of human social experience, and urge scholars to disregard the terms in which concrete social and political actors frame their positions and struggle to legitimate their actions. Instead, we argue that processes of cultural differentiation have to be foregrounded in any post-essentialist account of civilizations—not because civilizations have some kind of cultural essence, but precisely because they *do not* actually have any such determinate essence but sometimes *appear* as though they do. Civilizations might actually be composed of a myriad of intersecting processes, but in practice—particularly in contemporary political practice—they often appear as though they were more or less solid and determinate objects. This apparent solidity is a puzzle to be solved: how is civilizational identity produced and maintained in practice? Fourth-generation scholarship on civilizations, by abandoning the essentialist assumptions characteristic of earlier waves of scholarship, enables us to ask (and hopefully answer) this question in a distinct and innovative manner.

Outline of the Volume

The reminder of this book is divided into four parts. In each of the first three parts, we have included a "critical engagement" chapter that serves to continue the discussion implicitly begun by the substantive chapters, both by highlighting common themes and by raising questions for future reflection. We should note that we are, in effect, inviting the reader to join the conversation in its second phase; the substantive chapters were initially presented at a workshop at which the authors of the "critical engagement" served as panel discussants, and after the authors revised their chapters we invited those initial discussants to contribute further thoughts and reactions on the revised chapters. We believe that the net effect is to generate a focused, yet expansive, discussion, and we invite the reader to take part on that basis as we move forward.

In the first part Jacinta O'Hagan and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson discuss the nature and role of civilizations in IR theory quite generally. In chapter 2 O'Hagan critically reviews the civilizational debate in IR theory, and discusses the various ways in which civilizational analyses have been carried out in IR theory. Suggesting that it is not enough either to define

and delineate civilizations, or to distinguish this concept from other more or less useful analytical concepts, O'Hagan argues that the civilizational research agenda in IR can be enhanced by a focus on what the concept of civilization *does*, rather than on what civilizations *are*. Taking a slightly different approach Jackson, in chapter 3, suggests that it is important to acknowledge that civilizations are, or can be, actors in world politics. Proceeding from Weberian and transactional premises Jackson reminds us that civilizations are like many other organizations that we name, personify, and attribute actions too. The main difference, Jackson suggests, is that civilizations lack overall centrality—they have no front desks, in his words. In chapter 4, Hayward Alker provides a critical engagement with these two chapters, as well as with this introduction.

In the second part we focus on religion and psychology. In chapter 5, Mustapha Pasha aims to put civilizational analysis, including postcolonial work, on a more self-reflective and critical footing. His strategy has three main points of departure. First, he argues that it is important to make a distinction between a presumed occidentalist rejection of modernity as such, and a rejection of the particular Western modernity. Second, he is critical of the postorientalist tendency to shift attention from power and politics to cultural critiques of civilizations as mere instruments of power. Third, Pasha claims that the historicism often attending IR theory tends to revitalize orientalism, and that this is the main barrier to a non-essentialist civilizational analysis. In chapter 6, Mark Salter focuses on the concept of the barbarian, and particularly the terrorist as the modern barbarian, in the legitimization of the war on terror. Possible competitors to the "barbarian"—such as race, ideology, culture, or religion for instance, are less rhetorically useful for three main reasons. First, the civilization contra barbarian discourse creates a powerful Manichean dualism in which differences among various bad others can be overseen. Second, the invocation of barbarians generates a state of emergency that in turn legitimizes otherwise unjustifiable means and measures. Third, Salter argues, the "barbarian" works as a strategy to individualize the threat to civilization. Rather than, in this case, America opposing a community or a group—which could have legitimate concerns—it opposes individuals who are, simply, barbaric. Arguing that critical civilizational analysis is central in the critique of IR, in chapter 7, Catarina Kinnvall remains unconvinced about the utility of the civilizational concept. If the aim is to resurrect the concept itself, Kinnvall suggests, interpretive approaches risk essentializing civilizations. For instance, neo-Gandhians fall prey to this trap in their critique of Western civilizational analysis and reaffirm a presumed *own* immutable Hindu essence. In chapter 8, Daniel Nexon rounds this part off with a critical discussion of the preceding three chapters.

The chapters in third part of the book are concerned with civilizational encounters. In chapter 9 Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke discuss civilization and the study of economic globalization. Focusing on the notion of a "market standard of civilization," Bowden and Seabrooke

emphasize the ambiguity of this term: the adherence to this market standard of civilization is often thought of as a prerequisite for economic development, but it also masks power relations. Urging caution in the use of the notion of a market standard of civilization, Bowden and Seabrooke discuss historical and contemporary cases in which the application of global standards have had both positive and negative effects. Peter Mandaville, in chapter 10, focuses on civilizational writing as a genre, and queries as to who is addressed by this genre. Reviewing historical debates about colonialism and globalization among Muslims, Mandaville emphasizes an understanding of civilizations as consisting of internal debates within heterarchies. Who, in other words, can make claims on behalf of pluralistic communities? In chapter 11, John Hobson highlights the dialogic historical relationship between the West and the East. Criticizing the Eurocentric understanding of the West as a self-constituting unit, Hobson provides an alternative "inter-civilizational and trans-civilizational" account of the Rise of the West. He thereby urges us to reimagine the West as a profoundly multicultural creation. In chapter 12, Ann Towns explains how the status of women has been employed as an indicator of the level of civilization and as a means of rank-ordering societies along civilizational lines. Towns discuss how the status of women has been—and is—thought to relate to the advancement of civilization, and argues that Western civilization seems to suffer from historical amnesia. To wit, while at present the *inclusion* of women in politics and decision making is a fundamental criterion for being civilized, it was not that long ago, that instead women were supposed to be *excluded* from politics in purportedly civilized societies. In chapter 13, Jacqueline Best ends the third part of the book with a discussion of the preceding four chapters.

In the fourth and last part of the book two chapters stand in place of a more traditional concluding chapter; the fourth wave of civilizational analysis is just beginning, and firm conclusions seem unwarranted at this point. Instead, Yale Ferguson reflects on the arguments of the book as a whole, and Martin Hall suggests some possible future avenues for research that this book might generate.

Notes

1. Fernández-Armesto's definition of civilization is not novel. Edward Tiryakian notes that for *La Grande Encyclopédie* civilization "is what assured humankind of its dominance over other species and over nature" (Tiryakian, 2001: 281).
2. See Sztompka (1993: 151–54) for a concise review of Sorokin.
3. Arguably, Elias anticipated the work of Michel Foucault (Tiryakian, 2001: 287; Mandalios, 2003: 66, 68; and van Krieken, 2001: 353).
4. Arguably, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach's (1996) "nested polities" model has close affinities with the idea of heterarchy.
5. Burke's argument, while borrowing terminology and some logics from Huntington, is not identical to that of Huntington.

Part I

Civilization, Civilizations, and IR Theory

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 2

Discourses of Civilizational Identity[1]

Jacinta O'Hagan

Introduction

Civilization is a notoriously complex term the meaning of which has evolved and shifted across time and context (Arnason, 2001; Braudel, 1995; Mazlish, 2001). It has stood for many different ideas across history (Salter, 2002). In order to understand this complex term we often draw upon associated concepts, locating civilization in particular geographies, linking them with particular forms of society, economy, or with collective ways of thought (Braudel, 1995: 9–23). The term civilization therefore is often associated with concepts such as society, progress, development, religion, culture, empire, and even humanity. These associations suggest that in some respects the concept of civilization is synonymous with community; with societal evolution; with particular ontologies or intersubjective frameworks; with systems of governance; with the heritage of humankind. Yet at the same time, civilization remains a distinctive concept, first, in the breadth of its associated meanings, and second, in the way the concept suggests a blend of material and ideational dimensions of human existence (Braudel, 1980). Robert Cox expresses this in his definitions of civilizations as the fit between material conditions of existence and the intersubjective meanings (Cox, 2002: 4). Mehdi Mozaffari similarly chooses to define civilizations as a specific world vision realized through a historical formation (2002: 26).

How does this complex variety of meanings and associations shape the way civilization is employed in discussions and debates of world politics? This complexity is reflected in its multiple interpretations in world politics over time. Civilization has been used to imply social cultivation; a stage of societal evolution; to mark a standard of international law and governance; as a synonym for imperialism. It has always been used, argues Mark Salter, as a boundary marker, often to delineate European communities from others (2002: 15–18). One way to incorporate studies of civilization into IR is to seek to bring order to this complexity by seeking to define and distinguish civilization from other concepts. A second approach is to seek to

define and delineate the life cycles of particular civilizations. These are obviously valuable and important tasks. However, there is a danger that the study of civilization may become preoccupied with definitional debates or absorbed by constructing macrohistorical patterns. These may help to inform but provide only limited understanding of the role that discourses of civilizational identity play in world politics today. By discourses I do not mean simply an account or story of civilization or civilizations in the plural. I draw instead on Kevin Dunn's definition of discourse as "a relational totality of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done." Discourse therefore not only describes but also "informs rather than guides social interaction by influencing the cognitive script, categories and rationalities that are indispensable for social action" (Dunn, 2004: 126).

In this chapter I wish to argue that in addition to the approaches noted above, we can enhance the research agenda of civilizations in IR through analysis of the ways in which invocations of civilization and civilizational identity are employed in political discourses. How do representations of civilization/s impact upon and influence political perceptions and interaction? This approach somewhat shifts the agenda away from exercises that concentrate on defining civilizations as entities, or seek to confirm whether a universal civilization does or does not exist. Instead, it seeks to understand the importance and impact of interpreting identities, interests, and expectations through the complex lens of civilizational identity, through invocations of concepts such as "the West" or "Islam." I want to suggest that the concept of civilization and of civilizational identities provides a powerful resource for framing identities and interests at the global, regional, and individual level and is used to evaluate and differentiate actors and actions in world politics. Refocusing our research agenda in this way requires us to shift our attention away from defining civilization and toward an analysis of the discourses of civilizational identity. It suggests we study what the invocation of civilizational identities *does* in world politics (Jackson, 2004).

Civilizational Analysis in IR

Before proceeding to discuss how analysis of civilizational discourses can be incorporated into IR, in this section I would like to briefly review some of the key trends in civilizational analysis in both earlier and contemporary discussions of world politics and consider some of the issues and questions raised by these. In the following section I will consider how a more thorough exploration of the discourses of civilizational identity being employed in both political and academic debate can help to illuminate the issues and problems that often remain latent in existing civilizational analysis in IR.

As noted above, discussions of civilization in IR to date have drawn on the rich and complex range of meanings and ideas associated with the concept as it has evolved over time. However, we can identify two significant

trends in IR's incorporation of civilizational analysis. The first trend is the use of civilization as a way of studying and defining interests and identity. The concept of civilizations has been used here in its pluralist sense to define and distinguish political communities, their boundaries, characters, and their likely interaction with one another on the basis of their cultural identity. We might include in this category the range of books and articles that discuss and contest representations of civilizations such as the West, Islam, and Asia.[2] Samuel Huntington's work on the "clash of civilizations" certainly falls within this genre (Huntington, 1996).

A second central trend has been the use of civilizational analysis to understand or explain conceptions and institutions of governance. There has been a particular interest in the way the institutions of international law and society generally incorporated notions of the "standard of civilization" as a measure of a society's capacity to exercise empirical sovereignty. The lack of perceived capacity to exercise effective and "civilized" governance provided the rationale for various forms of tutelage, including colonial rule and forms of trusteeship. In this context, civilizational analysis has focused on civilization as a singular conception of progress relating to the political, economic, and social institutions and practices of societies. Civilization in this sense is interpreted as a universal concept that refers not only to processes of material and social improvement but also the cumulative outcome of those processes (Bowden, 2004a). These studies point to how civilization was used to both define the boundaries of political communities and of international society, to indicate what rights and obligations would be accorded to societies and political communities based on their perceived levels of political development. This interest can be found in the work of scholars such as Martin Wight (1991), Hedley Bull (1977; Bull and Watson, 1984), Gerrit Gong (1984), and more recently Paul Keal (2003), Edmund Keene (2002), and Brett Bowden (2004a). These studies highlight civilization as a normative concept that both differentiates and evaluates on the basis of perceived levels of development and capacities for "effective" governance.

Although the pluralist interpretation of civilization appeared to gain momentum and status during the course of the twentieth century at the expense of the singular conception, these two interpretations of civilization continued to coexist and remain "in dialogue" with one another (Braudel, 1980: 213). They have often become subtly interwoven in contemporary discourses in which the concept of civilization is used to simultaneously differentiate and evaluate various actors and communities in world politics.

The Debate So Far

The two central trends in IR's incorporation of civilizational analysis identified above can also be found in broader, multidisciplinary debates that involve scholars from a range of disciplines, including sociologists, historians,

philosophers, and literary scholars. IR's discussion of civilizations is embedded in and draws from these wider debates. A key preoccupation of these broader debates is how civilizations are constituted. This debate draws primarily on the pluralist conception of civilizations as a multiplicity of distinct entities or "families of peoples" (Durkheim and Mauss, 1971: 809, 811). While some may share Samuel Huntington's preference for treating civilizations as bounded, self-conscious communities, most seek to stress the porous and fluid nature of these entities (Melleuish, 2000; Delanty, 2003). Other scholars highlight the socially and even ideologically constructed nature of civilizations (Dabashi, 2001).

This broader debate on the constitution of civilizations raises important questions for the treatment of civilizations in IR. One concerns the degree to which we should see civilizations as communities having agency in world politics. Can we usefully ascribe agency to "Islam" or "the West?" Do these concepts relate sufficiently to bounded polities to constitute agents? There are many who argue civilizations are not in and of themselves actors in world politics (Mazlish, 2001). For instance, Greg Melleuish argues civilizations are neither unified entities in the way of states or cultures, nor can political or military power be attributed to them. Rather civilizations should be seen as a particular way of understanding the peoples and societies who compose it. This limits the power of civilizations as an explanatory tool (Melleuish, 2000: 110). Within IR also, there are those who maintain that civilizational identity is not what lies at the core of world politics today. Amin Saikal, for instance, warns that whilst Huntington's argument has gained increasing legitimacy at the centers of power in the wake of September 11, it needs to be treated with caution. He is wary of seeing civilizational identity as the cause of conflict and terrorism: "The causes which drive alienated forces into the arms of terrorist such as bin Laden are strongly political in character, and emanate from specific historical circumstances rather than broad 'civilizational identity'" (Saikal, 2003: 9). The dynamo of world politics remains the competition for power amongst states and states do not always define their interests in accordance with their civilizational identities (Waltz, 2002; Acharya, 2002; Xing Li, 2003). For others, such as Tariq Ali (2002), economic structures and inequalities rather than civilizational or cultural identities continue to define and drive the interests of actors in world politics.

There are, therefore, many both within IR and across the broader disciplines who remain skeptical of the accuracy and utility of ascribing agency in world politics to civilizations. This is because it is difficult to define whether "civilizations" are polities given that they are so nebulous. In addition it is hard to determine whether they are cohesive, bounded, or have intent. Yet at the same time, even skeptics such as Saikal, Ali, and Acharya seek constant recourse to concepts such as the West, Asia, and the Islamic world as a means to locate and identify political, social, and economic agents. In this context, it seems that though analyzing world politics in terms of the interaction of civilization remains problematic, the concept

of civilizational identity provides us with a useful framework with which to understand how agents locate their identities in broad, transnational, transtemporal cultural identities. Furthermore, civilizational identity is often invoked in both academic and political debate to provide points of reference from which to evaluate others in relation to the self or some universal standard (Hall, 1992). Therefore, representations of civilizations are important in anticipating and prescribing interaction with others. This is not to argue, however, that those identities should be viewed as static and fixed. Rather the representations of these identities are subject to evolution and reinterpretation.

This leads to a second key debate, which is intimately related to world politics; that is the nature of interaction between civilizations. Is world politics today experiencing ongoing interaction between a diverse range of civilizations, or are we seeing the convergence toward a single civilization, a civilization of modernity? Furthermore, does world politics comprise competing and clashing and incommensurable civilizations, or is it converging toward modernity and a Western model? (O'Hagan, 2002; Fukuyama, 1992). This debate draws both on the pluralist conception of civilizations as distinct entities and on the singular conception of civilization as progress or social evolution.

In recent years a number of contributors to debates on civilizational analysis have focused on testing the efficacy of the clash of civilizations thesis in relation to the past and with regard to the future. Many set out to refute the idea of an inevitable clash. For instance, Daniel Chirot argues in response to the Huntington thesis that the tensions and conflicts in contemporary politics that Huntington attributes to a clash of incommensurable civilizations arise in reality from friction between societies and cultures at different levels of development: "Seemingly irreconcilable cultural differences are more a product of different rates of modernization than of permanent cultural divisions" (Chirot, 2001: 343).[3] A key question here is whether friction manifest in intercultural tensions are a product of the difficult processes of modernization or of resistance to modernization? For instance, in his analysis of the sources of Islamist terrorism, Fareed Zakaria argues that the rage expressed in this terrorism emanates not from any innate qualities in Islam but from disillusionment with the West that arises from the failure of the Arab world to undergo in-depth modernization (Zakaria, 2001).

Zakaria's comment raises further interesting questions regarding the relationship between the concepts of modernization and the concept of civilization as a process. Both entail a sense of progress and development. Are the institutions and norms of modernity universally applicable? Are they a synonym for the civilizing process? Is modernity a distinct civilization, but one that takes different patterns and forms in different cultures as Shmuel Eisenstadt argues (Eisenstadt, 2000b; 2001b)?[4] Or do the institutions and norms we associate with modernity essentially represent the universal projection of Western institutions and norms? (See, for instance,

Mazlish, 2001.) Sophie Bessis provides an interesting interpretation of this issue. She argues that the norms and institutions, such as equality and rights, that lie at the heart of Western civilization, which we often see as synonymous with modernity and upon which the West bases its claims of superiority, do have universal resonance. However, paradoxically, while the West perceives its essential character and supremacy as premised on universal principles, it has actually pursued and promoted these selectively, leading to frustration and resentment toward the West (Bessis, 2003).

The debate regarding the relationship between the concept of civilization and modernity returns us implicitly to the conceptions of civilization as a process of progress toward an ideal form of political, social, and economic governance. But is this, in Lene Hansen's terms, a cosmopolitan civilization comprising elements from the best of a range of cultures, or is it one premised on universal values (Hansen, 2000)? Or is it a third model, one derived from the hegemonic projections of the institutions and norms of a single hegemonic civilization? Like the debate concerning the relationship between civilization and modernity, this broader debate as to whether there is a single model of civilization that comfortably resonates across cultures remains deeply contested but it raises issues that relates to the ways in which discourses of civilization/s are innately linked to the ways in which we differentiate and evaluate societies in terms of their perceived levels of progress and structures of governance.

A key political issue implicit in this debate is, to what extent can political, economic, and social institutions and norms genuinely transfer across cultures and civilizations, and what is the impact of seeking to transfer norms and institutions? Samuel Huntington was deeply skeptical of the wisdom and effectiveness of the universalization of Western norms and institutions of governance (Huntington, 1996). His skepticism is reiterated in the work of the British philosopher Roger Scruton (2002), which seeks to compare and contrast the political cultures of the West and Islam. Scruton, like Huntington before him, is skeptical of the capacity for Western norms and institutions to effectively transfer across cultures that lack the appropriate foundations of strong legal institutional structure necessary to sustain a Western style political system. The West, he argues, is a society premised on the dynamic processes of politics in which individuals engage as citizens. In contrast, Muslim societies are represented as embedded in the static foundation of religion in which individuals participate as subjects.

Two things are of interest in Scruton's argument in relation to the concerns of this chapter. One is the implications of his perceptions of a remaining intractable incommensurability between different civilizations, which fuels tension in world politics and stands in marked contrast to more optimistic views of the possibility of molding societies toward an ideal and harmonized universal form of governance. Scruton therefore uses civilizational identity to differentiate political values and institutions. The second point of interest is the use by Scruton of conceptions of civilizational identity not only to differentiate but also to comparatively evaluate the political

cultures of different civilizational identities. For Scruton, as for Huntington, the West's political culture provides a model of pluralism and tolerance toward which others might aspire; however their aspirations are innately constrained by the inherent qualities and limitations of their own cultures. This suggests that contemporary world order comprises not just a plurality, but a hierarchy of civilizations.

Scruton's work seems to demonstrate the type of tension that Bessis alludes to between Western norms and institutions of governance being perceived as universally relevant and symptomatic of a single civilizing process, and at the same time their being perceived as unique. What does this debate suggest about contemporary discourses of civilizations and civilizational identities in world politics? It suggests that, while there appears to be a broad acceptance of a plurality of civilizations, there is still a strong tendency in contemporary thought to use the concept of civilization to differentiate and evaluate societies that have achieved material and moral progress from others viewed as less developed.

Incorporating Discourses of Civilizational Identity

Let me then briefly recap on the foregoing discussion. Much of contemporary civilizational analysis across IR and a range of disciplines has focused on issues such as defining the nature of civilization/s and of their agency and interaction. These issues are of great importance, but there is also a danger that civilizational analysis may become bogged down in definitional contests. A singular focus on definitional issues may limit progress in our understanding of the role that discourses of civilizational identity plays in contemporary politics. One way to develop the research agenda of civilizational analysis in IR is to push beyond mapping exercises or justificatory arguments to consider in more depth just how and where discourses of civilization and civilizational identity are being employed. It is noticeable that even those who are skeptical of the importance or relevance of civilizations in world politics often seek recourse in the language of civilizational identity.

Among the questions we should be asking, therefore, is *how* are discourses of civilization and civilizational identity used in contemporary world politics? By this I mean to examine how people and communities engage with conceptions of civilization and with representations of particular civilizational identities in framing their identities. In other words, how do they provide understanding of subjects and objects? How does casting subjects in terms of civilizational representations provide particular cognitive scripts and shape interpretations and understandings of permissible actions? The discussion above suggests that civilizational identity may be used to differentiate and to define who is included within the boundaries of a community by defining the lines of affiliation that may link them to others remote from them. But at the same time, the discourse of civilizational identity may be used to evaluate the practices, norms, and

institutions of the other and to valorize the self in ways that suggests a normative hierarchy between different cultural communities. A research agenda that analyzes and unpacks how discourses of civilizational identity function would allow us to better understand how perceptions of civilizational identity are interwoven with local, regional, and global political discourses.

Civilizational Identity and the Drawing of Boundaries

To advocate such a research agenda is to encourage the expansion and further development of work that is already nascent within the field of IR. Analyses of the politics of civilizational representations are already contributing to our understanding of world politics—past and present. A brief overview of some of this work illustrates how discourses of civilizational identity may be used to differentiate and define who is included within the boundaries of a community by defining the lines of affiliation that may link them to others remote from them. At the global, regional, or individual level, invocation or evocation of civilizational discourses can help to locate the self. But in addition, discourses of civilizational identity may also be used to evaluate others.

The well-known work of Samuel Huntington illustrates the way in which discourses of civilizational identity can be interwoven with broader discourses of global politics at the level of thinking about the structures of world order. Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis presented a vision of world order in which civilizational identity becomes a central organizing premise, deeply informing identities and helping to guide the preferences, alliances and actions of states and societies. The thesis is further premised on a conception of a world order of diverse and largely incommensurable civilizations, incorporating an arrogant, expansionist, yet fragile West in tension with a volatile, resentful, fractious Islam. The series of representations contained in this thesis have formed an important frame of reference in the debate about the relationship between states and societies of different cultures in contemporary world politics. The thesis forms the foundation of a particular discourse of civilizational identity and civilizational interaction that can be used as a framework through which contemporary politics is interpreted and understood. Thus events such as the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the protests that erupted throughout the Muslim world in 2006 in response to a series of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed published in a Danish newspaper were discussed with reference to whether they were evidences of the clash of civilizations coming to pass. A research agenda that incorporates analysis of discourses of civilizational identity allows and encourages us to examine the impact of the deployment of discourses of civilizational identity such as Huntington's. It encourages us to investigate more fully how the invocation of the West or Islam function to differentiate societies and to evaluate the institutions and practices of particular societies. It therefore helps us to analyze and understand perceptions

and prescriptions of order at the global level. However, this method of analysis can also be applied at other levels, such as to the analysis of politics at the regional level.

In her study of a series of reports on the Balkans produced under the auspices of the Carnegie Foundation, Lene Hansen (2000) examines different discussions of the Balkans in the twentieth century and notes the way in which the Balkans is constructed in terms of civilizational identity and interaction in each case. Drawing on a 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry into the first Balkan War, she demonstrates how, in the early twentieth century, a particular vision of Balkan civilization informed views on the possibility for progress and change in this region, and of Western responsibility for securing a transformation. This vision constructs the Balkans as a distinct but inferior civilization, its underdevelopment a product of its long separation from Europe; in other words it was a society that had not really entered the civilized world in terms of its moral, political, or economic culture. By contrast Europe and America "were truly civilized" and had a responsibility to bring progress and stability to this backward and divided region. There is, therefore, a certain dualism in the civilizational discourse employed here. Whilst on the one hand this analysis of the Balkans conflicts presumes the existence of separate and distinct civilizations, it also assumes civilization in the singular, a state of moral, economic, and political culture, that is attainable by all peoples, and politically and ethically desirable (Hansen, 2000: 354–55).

In the 1990s, Carnegie again turned its attention to conflict in the Balkans. In 1993 the 1913 Carnegie Inquiry was reissued with a new introduction by George Kennan. Kennan employs quite a different civilizational discourse. His analysis of the conflict portrays Balkan civilization as "a uniform civilization which, due to its Ottoman presence, has acquired a non-Western propensity for brutality and violence." Thus Kennan's analysis of the region was one premised on a discourse that sees the regional order as comprising a plurality of distinct civilizations. As Hansen notes, he is pessimistic of the possibility of transcending these particularities within a universal form of civilization. However, he saw the sources of the Balkan War as not inter-civilizational conflict but as dynamics internal to Balkan civilization (ibid.: 356). This led him to a conclusion that the West had no moral responsibility to intervene in the conflict, and that Western intervention should only be premised on concerns that the Balkans conflict may threaten European and Western stability (ibid.: 357). Kennan's 1993 reading of the region, therefore, was framed by a very different civilizational discourse that influences both his perception of the sources of conflict and of that which differentiates the actors and leads to a very different prescription of the policies "the West" should pursue (ibid.: 356–57). In both documents representations of civilizational identity were used to analyze, predict, and prescribe as well as to constitute agents.

Hansen's work points to how discourses of civilizational identity can be employed in the analysis of the sources and responses to regional conflict.

Michael Williams and Iver Neumann (2000) and Patrick Jackson (2006) have also contributed to the commencement of a research agenda that studies discourses of civilizational identity at the regional level by considering how these discourses can be invoked in the framing of regional communities. All have discussed the role of these discourses in the constitution of a regional security community, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Here a civilizational identity is used to develop links and bonds that provide a normative foundation to this community. Jackson argues that "Western civilization" acts as a "rhetorical commonplace" invoked in the debates leading up to the NATO treaty (Jackson, 2006: 72). The ideas associated with Western civilization, the principles of freedom and democracy, the quest for alternatives to the use of force in the pursuit of international political goals, are privileged and invoked not only in response to perceived threat of totalitarianism but also to generate a sense of community within Europe and "the West." A particular concern here was to counter the recurrent fragmentation of Germany and France (ibid.). In addition, the concept of Western civilization as both a distinctive but also a superior form of society allowed the establishment of common normative and cultural premise that went beyond Europe and was inclusive of the United States. Williams and Neumann argue that NATO was increasingly represented as a cultural or civilizational entity premised on "democratic bonds." It was and is not just a security alliance but "the military guarantor of Western civilization" (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 361). Here then civilizational identity was and is used to define and differentiate a security community, and even the conception of security itself.

The examples above illustrate how discourses of civilizational identity can be utilized to theorize the contours of order; to predict and prescribe political interaction; to define and justify a particular form of community; and to evaluate the particular institutions, values, and practices of societies at global and regional levels. We might also consider how shifting representations of civilizational identity can impact upon the individuals' own sense of identity in relation to their political environment. In an article discussing the Western policy of neutrality toward all parties in the Bosnian war of the 1990s, Ed Vuillamy argued that the West's failure to assist Bosnian Muslims induced a redefinition of some Bosnian's sense of identity. He relates the story of one such person, Nura Celic. Nura "liked rock music and had prewar photographs of herself in bars with her Serbian friends. Within one year Nura outraged her mother by framing her face with the Islamic scarf. Her indignant self-defense was impressive, 'Look what has happened to me; I have lost everything, I am living on the floor of a school. I have been sent into the arms of my religion' " (Vulliamy, 1998: 88).

Vulliamy's anecdote illustrates not only the often significant relationship between religious and civilizational identity, but it also illustrates how particular political contexts can generate the reinscription of one's own sense of identity in civilizational terms.

Discourses of civilizational identity can therefore have a profound impact at multiple levels of politics, from the global to the personal, shaping analyses and interpretation. It can have an important impact upon how actors are perceived and received. Foreign NGOs or peacekeepers, for instance, may not always be perceived as neutral humanitarian actors, but as agents extending "Western" influences. These perceptions can have profound and important impacts. For instance, in the early years of the twenty-first century there were fears that perceptions of NGOs and humanitarian actors in locations such as Afghanistan and Iraq as agents of Western interests and values were leading to the increased attacks on aid workers and humanitarians agencies (Donini et al., 2004; Christian Aid, 2004; Fox, 2001). Here then discourses of civilizational identity become important in describing one's own political and cultural identity, and differentiating the interests of the local community from those of outside actors.

A research agenda that incorporates analysis of discourses of civilizational identity, then, is one that allows us to probe and explore how conceptions of civilizational identity are used to frame interests and identity in a variety of political contexts and discourses. It facilitates moving beyond conceptualizing identities simply located at the nation-state level. Analysis of civilizational discourses provides the capacity to envisage contemporary political identities not confined by territory, which are broad in historical scale drawing on deep and powerful resources from history, culture, and religion that go beyond the nation-state and may even stand in antithesis to a nation-state. Analysis of these discourses is increasingly useful in a contemporary political environment where we are more aware of the powerful role played by nonstate actors, be these ethnic minorities, NGOs, or terrorist organizations. All may appeal to, or be represented in terms of particular civilizational identities as a means to draw boundaries, identify interests, or legitimize actions in terms of some form of cultural lineage or authenticity.

Civilization as Progress: The Return of the "Standard of Civilization?"

The illustrations of discourses of civilizational identity discussed above largely allude to the pluralist conceptualization of civilizations, representations of civilizational identity that are used to differentiate and evaluate the agents or actions of civilizations or cultures relative to other civilizations. References to the work of NGOs and humanitarian actors, however, also draw us back to universalist conceptions of civilization: a process of development or the attainment of a progressive ideal. As Mark Salter (2002) reminds us, the singular conception of civilization has long been used in IR and in the rhetoric of world politics and popular culture in juxtaposition to barbarism. Like the concept of civilization, the related concept of the barbarian has resurged in the language of IR, be it in relation to

the violence of intercommunal conflict, or in relation to terrorism. From September 11 to Beslan, we have become familiar with the casting of terrorist atrocities as barbaric, beyond the pale of civilized behavior. For instance, the attacks of September 11 were widely characterized as not just an attack upon the United States but civilization in general. As Bowden notes, in the weeks and months following September 11, President George W. Bush frequently cast the "war on terror" as a "fight for civilization" (Bowden, 2002; O'Hagan, 2004). Similarly German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder depicted the attacks as "a declaration of war against the entire civilized world" (Erlanger, 2001). President Chirac of France argued that the attacks presented a new type of conflict that was "attempting to destroy human rights, freedom, the dignity of man . . . I believe that everything must be done to protect and safeguard these values of civilization" (Chirac, 2001). The perpetrators were represented as criminal "a bunch of mass murderers." They are those who fail to adhere to universal values, this was reiterated by British Prime Minister Tony Blair who argued: "We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not" (2001). Blair also engaged a civilizational discourse when responding to the London bombings of July 2005 when he argued that those engaged in terrorism "will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other civilized nations throughout the world" (2005).

The move to represent terrorism as barbarism was enhanced by repeated rhetorical linking of those actors responsible for attacks such as September 11 with the enemies of the past, with tyranny and with totalitarianism (Bush, 2006): "Those who hate all civilization and culture and progress" argued President George Bush "those who embrace death to cause death to the innocent, cannot be ignored, cannot be appeased. They must be fought," (Bush, 2001c).

> By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism they are heirs to the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century . . . they follow the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. (2001b)

Thus the language of the "war on terror" today evokes a civilizational discourse that gains resonance by locating the present in powerful images and invocations of civilization and barbarism from the past.

As Salter argues, the representation of actors as barbarians is an exercise of power. It may suggest they are inferior and in need of uplifting, but may also suggest that they pose a threat that requires constant vigilance and control, through violence if necessary, permitting action that might not otherwise be deemed legitimate or acceptable. Thus, for instance, in the United States' case, the gravity of the threat constituted by September 11 warranted the launching of a "war" on terrorism. In addition to assisting in

the legitimation of U.S.-led invasions in Afghanistan and, more controversially, Iraq, the war on terror helped instigate a number of measures that many civil libertarians feared compromised individual rights and liberties at home and abroad. These included the Patriot Act and the detention in Guantanamo Bay of suspects for extended periods without trial or recourse to international law, as well as allegations that the CIA ran a series of covert prisons in various sites around the world to interrogate terrorism suspects.

In addition to the resurgence of the language of civilization versus barbarism in contemporary politics, there is a further way in which the discourse of the singular conception of civilization is weaving its way back into the broader discourses of world politics. This is in the sense of an implicit resurgence of the concept of the standard of civilization, and the commensurate notion of the civilizing mission. Brett Bowden argues that the characterization of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror as a war between civilized and uncivilized "bears the hallmarks of a reinvigorated or resurrected standard of civilization for the twenty-first century" (Bowden, 2002: 37). As Bowden notes, there is a tendency in contemporary political commentary to represent the current world order as a bifurcated one divided between "civic community" and "predatory societies" that suffers from a deficit of institutions and good governance (Diamond, 2002) or, a trifurcated world divided between postmodern, modern, and premodern societies (Cooper, 2002). Whilst postmodern societies, such as the European states, are highly developed, increasingly interdependent, and transparent, and increasingly reject the use of force in their relations, modern states "behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles" (Cooper, 2002: 3). The premodern world, however, is a world of failed states in which the state has lost either its legitimacy or the monopoly of the use of force (ibid.: 4). Failed states or predatory societies, these communities are perceived as dangerous since they present a threat to regional and international order, "zones of chaos" or "bad neighbors" that become centers for drugs, crime, terrorism, and corruption and are prone to fragmentation. These societies therefore present a challenge to international society: how should that society deal with states that fail to or cannot meet contemporary standards of governance? As Bowden notes, both Diamond and Cooper call for some form of interventionism by the international community. Diamond calls for financial and technical assistance to be linked to institutional reform and demonstrated progress toward "good governance" (2002: 12). Cooper calls for a new form of liberal imperialism "one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values" (2002: 5). This appears to be echoed Michael Ignatieff's in his description of the current U.S. global hegemony he describes as "empire lite," a form of hegemony "whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has even known." Writing in early 2003 and prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, he noted the constraints and historical legacy of empire, but went on to note: "The case for

empire is that it has become, in a place like Iraq, the last best hope for democracy and stability alike" (Ignatieff, 2003).

What is noteworthy in the above discussion is that the arguments for intervention are legitimated on the basis of the disorder and instability generated by the failures and weaknesses of governance. These failures of governance present a threat to local regional and even global stability. Furthermore, they deprive the constituents of these societies of basic political and human rights (Krasner, 2004). There is, thus, a heightened focus on international standards of good governance that incorporates a commitment and capacity to respect the human rights of citizens. Good governance is a term that increasingly pervades the language of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and of institutions such as the UN, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF).[5] It can also be viewed as a powerful rearticulation of the "standard of civilization." Gerrit Gong describes the concept of the "standard of civilization" as a natural and necessary consequence of interaction among political and culturally diverse states in search of common values rules and institutions, suggesting therefore, that it is not a fixed concept but one that evolves in line with specific intercultural contexts. Similarly Jack Donnelly has traced the evolution of the standard of civilization in modern international society, suggesting that it has gradually shifted from a minimalist, exclusive, and hierarchical conception based on perceived levels of development to a more inclusive, universal, and liberal conception based on shared standards of justice. This more liberal conception of legitimacy and entitlement to full membership of international society is premised on the extent to which a government implements internationally agreed human rights (Donnelly, 1998: 14). Mehdi Mozzaffari similarly argues that we are seeing the emergence of a new global standard of civilization, facilitated by globalization and premised on liberal values of human liberty and dignity that manifest in the promotion of human rights and democracy (2002). Gong adds, however, that this new liberal "standard" is also manifest on the promotion of particular financial and economic standards that promote an open and deregulated economy (2002).

Does this new standard of civilization promote a particular model of political and economic governance that is increasingly promoted by the international community through a variety of mechanisms and institutions? Some suggest it does. Roland Paris, for instance, has argued that from a certain perspective, international peacebuilding operations resemble a version of the *mission civilisatrice*, the colonial belief that the European powers had a duty to "civilize" dependent populations and territories (Paris, 2002: 637). Paris highlights the role that peacebuilding operations play in the diffusion of norms and institutional models from one part of the international system to the other. He argues these operations seek to bring war-shattered states into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance. "Although" he notes "modern peace builders have largely abandoned the archaic language of civilized

versus uncivilized, they nevertheless appear to act upon the belief that one model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—is superior to all others." (ibid.: 638).

Such a willingness to intervene in societies suffering conflict not only with a view to bring a cessation to conflict but also to assist with the reconstruction of the institutions of governance has been evident in a number of recent cases. In addition to well-known examples of interventions in Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, there are interventions in the Pacific states of the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (PNG). In both cases these states were experiencing long-term problems, domestic conflict, and economic instability. In both cases Australia engaged in "cooperative" or "participatory" intervention aimed at both bolstering law and order and enhancing good governance. This involved the insertion of overseas police and, in the case of the Solomon Islands, military personnel, to assist in restoring law and order.[6] It also included the placement of Australian advisors and in-line personnel in key economic, financial planning agencies and ministries, as well as providing financial aid to the Solomon's and PNG budgets. The objectives of these measures included the identification and reduction of corruption, the strengthening of economic management, and public sector reform (Wielders, 2004; Downer, 2004; Fry, 2005).[7] These interventions, as with the transitional administrations established under the auspices of other bodies, were therefore very much involved in "nation-building" projects in circumstances where the regional or international neighbors felt the standards of governance had in some way failed, and domestic authorities lacked the capacity to fulfill the internal and potentially external obligations of governance of the contemporary international system. William Bain has raised the question as to whether we are seeing a de facto revival of the concept of trusteeship enacted in the context of transitional administrations and such cooperative interventions (Bain, 2003). Stephen Krasner replies emphatically yes, and further argues that in the interests of domestic and international order, major actors, and regional and international organizations could and should consider assuming long-term de facto trusteeship, protectorates or even forms of shared sovereignty in weak or failing states. But we might further ask: to what extent does the revival of the concept of de facto trusteeship also represent a de facto revival of the concept of a "civilizing mission?"

Conclusion

This chapter has considered some of the main trends in debates relating to the incorporation of civilizational analysis into the study of world politics. It suggests that two recurrent trends in IR's analysis of the role of civilizations have been, the role that civilizations play in defining interests and identities and thus influencing patterns of interaction in world politics, drawing on the concept of civilization in the plural as "families of peoples"; and an interest in the relationship between conceptions of civilization

and the norms and standards of governance, drawing on the concept of civilization as a singular and progressive concept.

In this chapter I have argued that although issues of mapping and defining civilizations are not insignificant, there is a danger that the research agenda could become mired in difficult debates concerning arguments such as do civilizations have agency, and are we progressing toward a singular civilization? There are however, real and pressing issues that demand our attention regarding how conceptions of civilization and civilizational identity are deployed in discourses of politics at the local, regional, and global level. One way, therefore, to advance the research agenda of civilization and IR is to investigate in greater depth the nature and impact of discourses of civilizational identity, to consider how representations of civilization and civilizational identity are used both to differentiate and evaluate in contemporary political interaction. What I think we will find is that the way in which these civilizational identities are interpreted, understood, and represented is not incidental to but a powerful dimension of politics.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Greg Fry, Hayward Alker, and the editors for their insights and comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2. For recent examples, see Lewis (2002); Buruma and Margalit (2004); Scruton (2002); Bessis (2003); Saikal (2003); Gress (1998); and Mahbubani (1992).
3. This in many respects is Fukuyama's argument in *The End of History* as well.
4. Eisenstadt's argument is a sophisticated one that has proved influential in the field of sociology. He argues that modernity is in itself a unique form of civilization, a crystallization of modes of interpreting the world. However, it entails different and continually changing cultural and institutional patterns constituting different responses to the challenges and possibilities inherent in modernity. This gives rise to "multiple modernities." See, for example, Eisenstadt (2001b).
5. An IMF Fact Sheet on "IMF and Good Governance" notes,
   > The IMF places great emphasis on good governance when providing policy advice, financial support and technical assistance to its 184 member countries. It promotes good governance by helping countries ensure the rule of law, improve the efficiency and accountability of their public sectors, and tackle corruption. (IMF, 2003)
6. In the case of the Solomon Islands, the intervention is being conducted under the auspices of a Regional Assistance Mission, which is led by Australia but involves a range of other Pacific governments. In the case of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the intervention was conducted under the auspices of a bilateral Enhanced Cooperation Program between the Australian and PNG governments.
7. An additional stated objective in the Enhanced Cooperation Program between Australia and PNG was to deal with "pressing problems in border

control, and transport security and safety" (Downer, 2004). On May 13, 2005, however, the PNG Supreme Court ruled that elements of the PNG implementing legislation were not consistent with the PNG Constitution. Australian police were consequently withdrawn following the court ruling. However a number of Australian civilian officials continued to work with PNG agencies.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 3

Civilizations as Actors: A Transactional Account

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson

Among all of the blunt and controversial quips that dot the landscape of Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, I have always been struck by one statement in particular: the claim that "civilizations are cultural not political entities," which means that "they do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do" (Huntington, 1996: 44). In other words, civilizations are not *actors*; rather, they are cultural contexts within which other actors—"political units"—act.

What I find striking about Huntington's claim is that it flies in the face of what we might call the *grammar* of a proper name like "Western Civilization"—the way that the name is used in contemporary political and social practice. Western Civilization (or "the West") functions as the subject of sentences all the time, and often appears as the doer of various deeds: the West is to blame for things, it hates Islam and disrespects Islamic traditions, it seeks to impose democracy by force, and so on. This all sounds very much like the West is some kind of actor, inasmuch as an actor is simply an entity that acts.

Huntington's likely reply would involve a reassertion of the state-centrism characteristic of so much of IR scholarship: even if they are defining their interests in civilizational terms, states remain "the primary actors in world affairs" (Huntington, 1996: 34–35). But if we think about it, is a state really so different from a civilization in only acting inasmuch as some-one does things on its behalf? Indeed, is any organization any different? Are individuals themselves any different? It seems to me that in all cases up and down the scale, to be an actor is simply to have actions attributed to oneself in a socially sustainable manner. This is precisely what is at stake in competency hearings, where a legal decision is rendered about whether an individual is competent to represent her- or himself in medical or financial matters. As Thomas Hobbes pointed out several centuries ago, this is also what is at stake when responsibility for

some inanimate object is apportioned to some human being or group of human beings:

> Inanimate things, such as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours [*sic*] of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill [*sic*] Government. (Hobbes, [1601] 1997: 89)

As for the state itself, what precisely *is* the state without the activities of its duly authorized representatives (Ringmar, 1996b)?

My point is that it is impossible to disqualify civilizations as actors on the grounds that some-one or some-thing else is speaking or acting on their behalf—impossible, that is, unless we want to simultaneously deny the actor-hood of virtually every other social actor with which we are empirically familiar. It is not so easy to get around the stubborn fact that we know something to be a social actor precisely, and *only*, by the fact that it makes sense to speak of that entity as the responsible origin of various things that take place in the world. And this, in turn, suggests that we need to pay much closer attention to the procedures and processes through which entities are produced, in socially sustainable ways, as social actors. How does it become *possible* to attribute action to an individual, a state, or a civilization?

In this chapter I sketch a way to tackle this problem. I develop my approach in contradistinction to an alternative way of conceptualizing social actors: an *essentialism* that starts off by defining a set of "real" actors and then making sense of social action in terms of the dispositional properties of those "real" actors—whether they be individual persons, sovereign states, or what have you. At the outset, it is important to clarify the precise epistemological *status* of an explanation of actor-hood that eschews an essentialist definition of *any* of the actors involved; the kind of anti-essentialist explanation I have in mind here can best be characterized as an ideal-typical *account* rather than as the kind of strong theory or depiction that makes a categorical claim to Truth.

Equally important is the *transactional* character of my proposed account, which focuses on patterns of social relations and on concatenations of social practice that seek to establish and maintain socially significant boundaries. As a result, a transactional account holds out the promise of taking seriously the importance of claims about the constitution of social actors—including civilizations—while preserving human agency. Dispensing with essentialism is an important part of fulfilling that promise, and of propelling us closer to an account of civilizations in world politics that pays adequate attention to the everyday grammar of what we might call "civilizational talk."

Accounts

A great deal of contemporary social science is characterized by an ontological stance that we might call *dualism*: the position that the world is composed, so to speak, of two orders of being.[1] The central presupposition of dualism is a kind of gulf or radical separation between the world and knowledge of the world, whether that knowledge is held by the researcher or by the people under investigation. This way of rendering the relationship between observer and observed gives rise to the notion that the purpose of empirical investigation is to accurately capture or reflect the way that the world "really is," outside of all perspectives and approaches. Although most clearly associated with knowledge-practices like Popperian falsification, dualism also underpins critical realist (Bhaskar, 1998; Patomäki and Wight, 2000) and Habermasian-communicative (Habermas, 1984, 1990) methodologies (see Rorty, 2001). Applied to the question of actor-hood, dualist methodologies all proceed in an essentialist manner, and try to disclose the core substance of an actor as a preparation for contingent predictions about how that actor will act in a given environment (Sylvan and Majeski, 1998).

But dualism is not the only ontological stance that a researcher might adopt. And when one is dealing with social actors, dualism presents a particularly thorny dilemma: to the extent that a researcher can precisely ascertain the essence of some actor, it becomes correspondingly harder to conceive of that actor as having any meaningful *agency*—understood as the capacity to have done otherwise than the actor did in fact do (Giddens, 1984: 9). The actor's capacity to act is thus *theorized away*.[2] The problem is particularly evident in rational choice theory—how can a rational actor exercise meaningful agency if she or he is restricted to maximizing exogenously given preferences in a relatively fixed strategic environment?—but remains characteristic of *all* dualist approaches. On top of this dilemma, there are also the myriad of technical problems associated with actually ascertaining the essence of some social actor, a problem that becomes particularly acute when dealing with actors as broad and diffuse as a whole *civilization*.

Hence, it may be more useful to explore to possibilities inherent in a social science built on alternative, *monistic* premises. Such a social science would embrace its own radically perspectival character instead of seeking to dispense with it, and would deliberately refrain from claiming to have captured the objectively existing essence of anything in the world. Max Weber's subtle shifting of the concept of "objectivity" exemplifies this conception of social science:

> There is simply no "objective" scientific analysis of cultural life—or, put perhaps somewhat more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes—of a "social phenomenon" *independent* of special and "one-sided" points of view, according to which—explicitly or tacitly, consciously or

> unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed, and representationally organized as an object of research. (Weber, 1999: 170, emphasis in original)

The goal of the social sciences cannot be to neutrally reflect an externally existing world. Instead, Weber places the human "capacity and the will to deliberately take up a *stance* towards the world and to lend it a *meaning*" (ibid.: 180) at the center of his reflections. "The quality of a process as a 'socio-economic' event is not something that inheres 'objectively' in the process as such," he argues. "It is far more conditioned by the direction of our knowledge *interest*[3] as it arises from the specific cultural significance that we attribute pertaining to the process in an individual case" (ibid.: 161). Without this deliberate attribution, no scientific results are possible, as the researcher would never know what to study or under what heading to study it. In this way, the social sciences are *productive* of the world, beholden not to some externally existing set of objects or their essential dispositional properties but rather to the cultural values that orient the investigation from the beginning.

Weber develops this monistic stance by calling for a more self-conscious delineation of the ideal-types with which researchers operate. Rather than "a 'presuppositionless' copy of 'objective' facts," ideal-types are

> formed through a one-sided *accentuation* of *one* or *more* points of view and through bringing together a great many diffuse and discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* events, which are arranged according to these emphatically one-sided points of view in order to construct a unified *analytical construct* [*Gedanken*]. In its conceptual purity, this analytical construct [*Gedankenbild*] is found nowhere in empirical reality; it is a utopia. (ibid.: 191, emphasis in original)

An ideal-type is a deliberately partial way of configuring the world, arising from a subtle combination of empirical observation and the value-commitments made by the researcher. As is proper to a monistic ontology, Weber's position extends even to the level of the most basic *description* of a phenomenon; there simply is no apprehendable "world" (or series of externally existing objects) that could be used to limit the application of an ideal-type or to falsify and improve it. It is not that "the world" does not exist, but that at the most basic *logical* level it is quite impossible to disentangle that world from the practical knowledge activities that we use in constituting and studying it.

It should go without saying that ideal-types cannot be evaluated based on their accuracy or their correspondence with any set of empirical facts; rather, ideal-types form the horizon within which "the facts" arise. One cannot choose between ideal-types on a strictly empirical basis, and no amount of research can ever serve to validate a particular way of constructing the world through cultural value-commitments. "'Worldviews' can never be the product of progressive empirical knowledge," Weber

suggests; "the highest ideals that move us most forcefully impinge for all time in conflict with other ideals that are just as sacred to others as ours are to us" (ibid.: 154). Hence, a ideal-typical account avoids the question of essentialism entirely, in favor of laying bare the value-laden issues that are and remain at stake in any empirical description of phenomena, and even more forcefully in the causal evaluation of connections between phenomena. There is thus never any thought that an analyst has "correctly" apprehended the core dispositional essence of any object under investigation, and we have to look elsewhere for the appropriate standards for evaluating an account.

Transactional Accounts

Recognizing the ideal-typical, "account" character of our analyses of the social world makes a considerable stride away from essentialism, inasmuch as we can immediately dispense with any claims to have *correctly* apprehended the essence of any given social arrangement. But moving to ideal-typical accounts does not resolve the problem entirely, inasmuch as there is a possibility for essentialist notions to reenter the analysis through the back door, as it were. It is entirely possible to argue that one's account is indeed ideal-typical, but then deploy ideal-types featuring putatively stable actors and/or environments. Such moves are characteristic of the "useful fiction" school of rational choice theory (MacDonald, 2003), as well as marking the work of systemic realists like Waltz (Waltz, 1979). Though not making strong ontological claims in their work, such "analytical essentialists" nonetheless propound and defend a vision of a world composed of objects and settings displaying a conceptually determinate character. Thus the *methodological* individualism of rational choice theory slips easily into a kind of "ontological individualism" (Blyth, 2003) protected from scrutiny by an as-if epistemological assumption, and the *methodological* structuralism of Waltz's theory slips into claims about the "objective reality" of anarchy (Sterling-Folker, 1997; Mearsheimer, 1994–95).

As a general principle, ideal-typical accounts of actors and ideal-typical accounts of structures—that is, accounts that operate with ideal-typical images of fully formed, already-stabilized actors and/or structures—reproduce (albeit in a modified form) the problems associated with dualistic essentialism. In particular, they reproduce the "agency" problem noted above, as essentialism—even an ideal-typical essentialism—is "the strongest form of inevitability" (Hacking, 1999: 17) and is therefore difficult to square with an agency-preserving account. But *some* degree of formalization is necessary to the construction of a meaningful explanation; the trick is to formalize the appropriate things and oversimplify in the appropriate way (Weber, 1999: 169–71). Instead of reifying either actors or their environments, analysts should engage in a procedure of tracing the "arrestation"[4] of social process and linguistic ambiguity that is characteristic of actual social action. To map out the concatenation of processes actually characteristic of

a given situation is not an essentializing move, inasmuch as no claim is made that these processes were the *only* processes that could have been present, or that those processes somehow make up the essence of the social arrangements involved. We can thus avoid essentialism by refusing to essentialize.

As a result, we should shift our analytical gaze from the *interaction* of entities with presumptively stable dispositional properties to the processes of *social transaction*[5] that give rise to those entities—both in the first place, and at every successive moment. Stabilization—the ongoing production and reproduction of social arrangements—never ceases, never finishes, and in a certain sense never fully succeeds (Abbott, 2001: 256–57; Neumann, 1999: 35–37). Yet stabilization is the process that *should* be of interest to social theorists wishing to preserve human agency in their accounts, precisely because it keeps the focus firmly on ongoing social action rather than presumptively parametric limits of such action. Doing so requires stepping beyond covering-law models of human behavior, and building more contingency into our accounts of the way that patterns of social activity come together to produce outcomes.

A particularly productive way to do this is to expand on the structuralist insight that actors have room to maneuver in the gaps and holes that are part of actual social structures, but also to note that these gaps and holes are not merely *between* relatively coherent pieces of structure, but also *within* structural components. In other words, the agency that an actor has at any given point in time comes from the *double failure of social structure to cohere on its own* (Jackson, 2003: 14–16; Sewell, 1992: 18–19). The resources on which actors draw in producing outcomes (and, in so doing, (re)produce themselves as actors—more on this below) are themselves ambiguous, standing in need of further specification; their use is in part an effort to lock down their meaning. At the same time, different resources do not simply fit together, but have to be made to fit; this also is part of the process of stabilization. Action is produced out of a context of resources and possibilities, but structuralists and other essentialists go too far in assuming that they can determine the extent of those possibilities *in advance*, instead of leaving that determination to the actors themselves and trying to analyze what they do and did in practice (Shotter, 1993: 77).

Civilizations as Actors

In this way, what I am calling for here is a kind of *pragmatism of human community*—including civilizations. Many, perhaps even most, accounts of community focus on the kinds of empirical commonalities that characterize the members of the community, reasoning from such commonalities to a particular level of groupness or we-feeling. Huntington's version of civilizations places emphasis on precisely such commonalities of value; the literature on nationalism is also rife with such arguments. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's reinvigoration of the "security communities" research

tradition, while distancing itself from the idea that a community is somehow produced by natural affinities between its members, nonetheless defines a community as resting on "shared identities, values, and meanings" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31). The logic here is analytically quite similar to Huntington's: it reasons from the inside out, from a preexisting consensus of some kind to various actions that are thought to arise out of that consensus.[6]

By contrast, a pragmatic reordering of the notion of community works, as it were, from the outside in. Instead of starting with consensus, it begins with a myriad of properties that might in theory be mobilized to produce and reproduce socially significant boundaries (Barth, 1969; Abbott, 1996). Analytical focus then remains squarely on the processes whereby those sites of difference were mobilized and yoked together to form more or less coherent narratives in which actors act. Central to this ongoing production and reproduction of boundaries is the process of *legitimation*, wherein particular commonplaces referring to a community and its boundaries—we might call them boundary commonplaces—were picked up and deployed in efforts to render particular courses of action acceptable.

A civilization is no different from any other human community in relying on legitimation in order to persist. And it is no different than any other social actor in that actions are conventionally attributed to it. These two features are intertwined, in that the legitimation of actions performed in the name of a human community (including a civilization) is also a key process in establishing that community as a social actor: by speaking and acting in the name of some community, that community's actor-hood is, as it were, narrated into existence (Ringmar, 1996a). But civilizational boundary commonplaces have some distinctive characteristics, and civilizations as actors have some distinctive aspects that derive from those characteristics. The study of civilizations in world politics forms a subset of the general study of social actors and social action, and should proceed accordingly, so I begin by discussing the similarities before turning to the differences.

Legitimation: Actors, Boundaries, and Agency[7]

Outside of the purely ethical uses of the term, the vast majority of references to "legitimacy" in contemporary IR assume that legitimation involves the modification of subjective beliefs in heads—whether the heads of elite policymakers or the heads of their citizens. Legitimation is thus understood as a way to answer the question "What motivates states [and other actors] to follow international norms, rules, and commitments?" (Hurd, 1999: 379). Understood in this way, actor essentialism returns with a vengeance: social action becomes a function of the dispositional (and ordinarily the *mental* or *cognitive*) properties of the actors involved. Gone are the public processes of attribution that serve to concretize boundaries and to concretely instantiate social actors; gone, in fact, is the question of

actor-hood itself, as this kind of legitimation changes only an actor's preferences, not its constitutive boundaries.

But there are other ways to proceed. Max Weber, for example, does *not* share this notion of legitimation. Indeed, Weber is trying to direct our analytical attention to the social context out of which policy outcomes arise, and is operating in a quintessentially transactional fashion:

> According to experience, no form of rule voluntarily contents itself with only material or only emotional or only value-rational motives as prospects for its continuation. On the contrary, each seeks to awaken and to foster the belief in its "legitimacy." But according to the kind of legitimacy claimed, the type of obedience, the type of administration designated to guarantee it, and the character of the form of rule exercised all differ fundamentally—along with their effects. (Weber, 1976: 122)

For Weber, the key problem of legitimation is how some people get other people to obey their commands. The problem of whether those living in a given situation—whether they are in power or not—actually *believe* in the terms of legitimation, or whether they cynically act as if they do in order to advance their own self-interest or other private goals, is neatly sidestepped by Weber, who argues that such questions are, at best, only secondary considerations that are "not decisive for the classification of a form of rule." What is decisive is that "the particular *claim* to legitimacy is, according to its *type*, to a significant degree 'valid,' and that this secures the continuation of the form of rule and designates the chosen means of rule." Indeed, Weber points out, even eschewing explicit claims to public legitimacy is a form of legitimation, as a set of relations based purely on conceptions of self-interest is still a pattern of justification that is "in the highest degree decisive for the structure of a form of rule" (ibid.: 123). There is no escaping the impact of the form and content of different claims to legitimacy.

Weberian legitimation, therefore, is about the production and reproduction of *boundaries of action*. The central issue is how the limits of acceptability are drawn; a legitimation process constructs spheres within which certain actions can be performed, and cordons off others as falling beyond the pale. Just as a sovereign territorial state limits its exercise of "domestic" powers to its territorial borders, a religious empire limits itself to actions that are granted to it by its gods and a human being limits itself to actions that it considers itself authorized to perform. In a similar fashion, policymakers enact those policies that they can justify in a manner acceptable to their audience; the configuration of the boundaries of acceptable action, produced and reproduced in the course of ongoing political struggle over policy outcomes, are central to the explanation of those outcomes.

An important distinguishing characteristic of these boundaries is that by *limiting* action, they *produce* an actor, demarcating a sphere in which that actor can then legitimately act. The boundary of an actor "*never marks a real exterior*. . . . It is a line drawn internally, *within* the network of

institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained" (Mitchell, 1991: 90, emphasis in original).[8] "I" am not "inside" my head, any more than the West is completely inside of its boundaries; both I and the West are rather the results of boundary-drawing processes that never completely "contain" us. Both I and the West are empowered to make certain decisions in certain contexts about where our proper boundaries lie; if our boundaries were completely external to us, we could not very well affect them in any way. Our capacities for doing so are never the result of some purely "subjective" determination, but depend on our being embedded in various interactions and networks and stories, upon which we can draw in order to produce and sustain those boundaries. The precise content and form of such boundaries gives rise to particular types of actors and patterns of action.

Legitimation is a crucial aspect of boundaries, not only in the sense that an actor is permitted to act legitimately only within its boundaries, but also in that the establishment of those boundaries in the first place is an act of legitimation. An actor performs or considers performing an action, and offers reasons to justify the action; these reasons constitute the action as it is, and simultaneously serve to draw and redraw the boundaries of the actor itself. I am sitting in my home when a number of armed men break into my living room and demand my cooperation; it makes a great deal of difference whether these men are acting "in the name of the state" as evidenced by their possession of a warrant, or whether they have no such authorization. The actions performed by the armed men are differently constituted in each case: a robbery or an assault if they have no warrant, an investigation or a "bust" if they do. In each case, boundaries are drawn, an actor is defined, and action is performed.[9]

Note that *there is no theory of motivation involved here*. It does not matter what motive the armed men have for breaking into my house: perhaps a particular police officer has a vendetta against me, or perhaps they have reason to suspect that I am harboring fugitives or that I have a great deal of expensive stereo equipment that they could fence. What matters is that in one case they have proper authorization to act in the name of the state, and in the other case they do not. "Motive" is completely irrelevant. In fact, motive is irrelevant not merely in a typological or classificatory sense, but in a causal sense as well. The answer to the question "why did these men break into my house?" can be answered without reference to the supposed contents of their heads at all: by looking back to the discussions preceding the action, we can see how characterizations of particular courses of action squared off and grappled until some such characterization emerged victorious, and justified the subsequent course of action. It is easy to imagine such conversations going on before the observed course of action was carried out, but only empirical research can disclose which arguments were actually utilized and which were successful.

Legitimation claims are through and through *rhetorical*, in that they are forms of speech designed to achieve victory in a public discussion (Weldes,

1999: 117–18). They participate in a "*social and intersubjective* rather than . . . *collective or shared*" discursive space and do not function as the property of any one particular individual. Instead of "ideas" that must be believed, legitimation claims participate in "symbolic technologies . . . systems of representation—metaphorically, symbolic machineries or apparatuses or implements—that have developed in specific spatiotemporal and cultural circumstances and that make possible the articulation and circulation of more or less coherent sets of meanings" (Laffey and Weldes, 1997: 209, emphasis in original). I use the phrase "participate in" because in order to determine why particular articulations succeed and others do not, it is necessary to relate those specific articulations to the broader social contexts in which they occur and upon which they draw in order to advance their claims. A careful empirical analysis of public debates about a course of action is thus called for.

How does public rhetoric work? Following John Shotter, I suggest that an appropriate metaphor to use in thinking about this issue is that of a "living tradition" which consists not of "fully predetermined, already decided distinctions" but of "a certain set of historically developed . . . 'topological' *resources*" which can be "expressed or formulated in different ways in different, concrete circumstances" (Shotter, 1993: 170–71, emphasis in original). These "topological resources," or rhetorical commonplaces, provide the raw material out of which actors and their actions are produced in the flow of events (Kratochwil, 1989: 40–42; Shotter, 1993: 65–69). Specific articulations in the course of a public debate take these more general notions already in circulation and link them to particular policies, legitimating them and attributing them as actions to some particular actor. The analysis of legitimation must take both of these "levels"—the general rhetorical commonplace present among the target audience, and the specific deployment of that commonplace in such a way as to link it to a particular policy—into account.

Each of these two analytically separable levels addresses different explanatory concerns. The notion of a rhetorical commonplace itself explains how policymakers connect their arguments to their audience: public officials cannot simply say anything that they like in defense of a policy, any more than I can prevail in a discussion about where we should go to lunch by discoursing at length on the creative genius of Joss Whedon,[10] or any more than Slobodan Milosevic could whip up a crowd using nationalist language in Times Square or in downtown St. Louis. This is not because the audience in each case "believes" different things, but because a set of speakers, audience, and issues is characterized by a group of rhetorical commonplaces on which speakers can draw with any hope of having the audience follow their arguments, let alone be moved to action by them. Precisely what these resources consist in is an empirical question, and can only be decided through systematic research on actual patterns of rhetorical deployment.

At the same time, the availability of a rhetorical commonplace does not necessitate or even unproblematically imply a particular course of action.

This is because rhetorical commonplaces are only "weakly shared" between individuals. That is, a rhetorical commonplace is not a univocal, completely fixed bit of meaning that is *identically* possessed by multiple people; that would be a "strong" form of shared meaning, and (besides being virtually impossible to ascertain empirically) would also have the logical consequence of making debate and discussion unnecessary: if we already agreed in this strong sense, why would we have to talk about it? Although implicitly maintained by many contemporary scholars of "ideas" (Laffey and Weldes, 1997: 199–205), the very notion of strong sharing "disregards the deeply interactive character of language itself, its location in constantly negotiated conversations rather than individual minds" (Tilly, 1998: 401). Empirical work on the importance of rhetorical commonplaces should focus on these intersubjective negotiations, a task quite at variance with the notion of strongly shared bits of meaning.

I therefore conceptualize rhetorical commonplaces as quite vague and multifaceted, capable of being elaborated in a number of ways and linked to a number of courses of action; there is no way to know in advance how far a particular commonplace can be stretched, as this depends on contingent social negotiations and interactive processes.

> We can think of every utterance as working, in terms of the speaker reacting to what others have said previously, in relation to whom or what the speaker is trying *to be*; that is, how he or she is trying to "place," "position," or "situate" themselves in relation to the others around them. (Shotter, 1993: 121–22, emphasis in original)

What analysts can and should do is to trace patterns of deployment and try to provide some explanation of why they play out the way they do. No sketch of commonplaces alone can set these limits in advance, because this would presume both a determinate meaning for a commonplace *and* its being "strongly shared" by speaker and audience (and analyst too)—thus rendering its actual use in policy debates unnecessary. Careful empirical attention to deployment is also required.

In general, a particular legitimation claim participates in a flow of events by utilizing the available rhetorical commonplaces in order to "make sense" out of a situation. For instance, in an address to the Congress of the United States a week after the airplanes were crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush advanced the following claim about the perpetrators of those incidents:

> We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. (2001b)

Clearly, these allusions (or at least their component parts) were not dreamt up on the spot, but preexisted the concrete situation and were available for deployment at this moment. These allusions are *metaphorical*, in the technical sense in which a metaphor is a "carrying across" of meaning from one object or situation to another, and form the basis for actions which are based on the situation as thus characterized. "We do this as we tell *stories* about the metaphors which we have come to embrace. First we see something *as some-thing*, in other words, and then we construct a narrative about this something" (Ringmar, 1996b: 451, emphasis in original). In this case, seeing the perpetrators of the incidents as adherents of a "murderous ideology" led to a series of policies designed to hunt them down and kill them, rather than to put them on trial or to endeavor to reform them; the characterization makes the policy proposal possible, and helps it to win out over alternative courses of action.

Public rhetoric thus displays a "prosthetic" character, and functions much as a blind person's cane in helping actors to make sense of the world: "blind people do not feel their sticks vibrating in the palms of their hands, they experience the terrain ahead of them directly as rough, as a result of their stick-assisted 'way' of investigating it in their movement through it." As long as "the flow of activity" of daily life continues, "we 'see through' the language we use and are unaware of its prosthetic functioning," and it requires distinct conceptual effort to call attention to this aspect of our being and acting in the world (Shotter, 1993: 21–23). Because of this prosthetic character, it makes little sense to inquire into whether legitimation claims are "creating" or merely "reacting to" a world, because they are always doing *both at once*. A rhetorical claim reveals the world in a certain way, even as this revelation gives rise to particular actions to be performed within the world, which now "make sense" as part of the world that has been revealed.

At the same time, a particular deployment always contains one or more *subject-positions* from which action can be taken, and thus contributes to the production of the actor at the same time as it reveals a particular "world" in which that actor can subsequently act (Doty, 1997: 384–85). For instance, to say that one is a "student" opens up certain possibilities for action, such as enrolling in classes; the world that presents itself to the individual is modified by the subject-position (student) into which he or she is placed by the deployment. Outside of an academic setting, such a deployment makes no sense, and thus does not open up the same possibilities for action. Of course, the "academic setting" is itself continually being produced and reproduced by these patterns of deployment (Shotter, 1993: 35–37). The function of rhetorical deployments, then, is to "naturalize" particular social arrangements and subject-positions from which courses of action appear acceptable (Weldes, 1999: 104–5; Hopf, 2002: 407).

We must be careful not to overstate the coherence of these public patterns of justification, however, or to fall into the habit of "formalizing" the deployment or particular allusions and representations as if their use was merely the blind application of an unambiguous rule. Although

"an 'action' is something for which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account," something that is accomplished "by hermeneutically 'placing' them [the actions] within a larger whole," we should not expect such accountings to be unambiguous or even free of contradiction (Shotter, 1993: 170). The coherence of daily life is somewhat messy and chaotic when viewed according to the standards of academic discourse, and if we are interested in *actual* processes of legitimation we will have to resist the temptation to overly systematize or formalize the articulations of the actors being analyzed (ibid.: 51–52, 129–31).

How does public rhetoric affect the outcome of legitimation struggles? It should be apparent that it does not do so by modifying the subjective content of anyone's head; belief, whether the belief of a speaker or the beliefs of the listeners, is not relevant to the causal process I am proposing here. Instead, the key process involves the creative deployment of arguments in such a way as to shape the public discursive space in favor of one or another course of action. Legitimation is in this way similar to what Riker called "heresthetic" (Riker, 1996: 9–10) or Schimmelfennig calls "rhetorical action" (1997: 227–29), in that words and arguments are used as means for the shaping of outcomes. The importance of arguments is the effect that they have in shaping the public debate; it is this shaping that the analysis of legitimation seeks to capture through a careful empirical tracing of public debates and the policy outcomes to which they gave rise.

The Distinctiveness of Civilizations

Any actor can be analyzed by examining the deployment of the boundary commonplaces associated with that actor, and ascertaining how those boundary commonplaces work in practice to produce and sustain the limits of the acceptable actions that that actor can undertake. But this fairly high level of generality is where the similarity between actors ends. Social actors vary in their organizational capacities, in their sustainable mandates, and in their acceptable competences; the social world is populated by a bewildering array of actors, ranging in size and extent at least from the individual human being to humanity as a whole. And all can be thought of as emerging from the process of legitimation that I have sketched above.

That having been said, it does not follow that each individual actor can or should only be analyzed sui generis. Boundary commonplaces of various kinds share more specific characteristics in common than the generic features associated with commonplaces in general; this is particularly true of those commonplaces that emerged from the same discursive formation. As I have argued in detail elsewhere (Jackson, 2006: Chapter 4), civilizational commonplaces like 'the West' emerged from a specific mutation in the discourse about human collectivities during the nineteenth century, as intellectuals struggled to make sense of the consequences of Hegel's effort to bring off a dialectical resolution of the perennial problem of universality and particularity. As such, all rhetorical commonplaces of civilizational

identity share certain common features that derive from their proximate origin in the same basic discursive crucible. Although these are not determinate in their implications, they do entail certain possibilities for civilizational actors that set them apart.

First of all, civilizational boundary commonplaces refer to broad and diffuse actors within which other polities can be situated. Civilizations are supranational entities, in which other states and nations are "nested" (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996: 47–51). Larger and older than its component states, it is also somewhat superior to them; "civilizational" concerns trump merely national ones. This is very similar to the role played by national identity articulations in somewhat different organizational contexts (Anderson, 1991: 9–11). In this way, I am suggesting not merely that civilizational polities are "imagined communities" in much the same way as particular national polities are; I am also suggesting that the *dynamics of deployment* are similar for national and civilizational commonplaces. 'The West' can, in effect, rhetorically trump an appeal to more provincial identity articulations (Jackson and Krebs, 2007); the commonplace of an "Arab civilization" can function the same way in its region (Barnett, 1998). Just because this nesting strategy is available does not, of course, ensure its success or guarantee that it will even be utilized. But the existence of this possibility to subsume claims about state and national actors may help to explain the continued prominence of civilizational commonplaces in a variety of policy contexts.

Second, civilizational boundary commonplaces participate in a key ambiguity that dates back to several hundred years: the distinction between civilization-in-the-singular and civilizations-in-the-plural. Often understood as a divergence between the French and German approaches to the question (Bowden, 2004a: 36–41), the split has older origins in the rocky history of the concept of civilization itself. Indeed, the ambiguity of the term civilization as representing both a process and an outcome (Starobinski, 1993: 5) seems to have assisted in the process of slipping from one meaning to the other: to civilize meant to transform a society from rude barbarism, but whether the outcome was a single destination (civilization-in-the-singular) or a plethora of diverse destinations (civilizations-in-the-plural) was never particularly clear. Consider the famous observation from Rousseau that "the Russians will never be truly civilized, since they have been civilized too early," which plays with the ambiguity of the term:

> Peter [the Great] had a genius for imitation. . . . He saw that his people was barbarous; he did not see that it was not ready for civilization. He wanted to civilize it when all it needed was toughening. First he wanted to make Germans and Englishmen, when he should have made Russians. He prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they could have been by persuading them that they were something they are not. (Rousseau, 1987: 166)

The nearness of the two discourses to one another ensures that it is almost always possible to subtly slip from one to the other in the course of a given

deployment of commonplaces. "Our civilization" easily becomes "civilization," and "our values" become simply "values." Even Huntington, contemporary master of the civilizations-in-the-plural discourse, slips at the end of his book into a brief appeal to the universal values of Civilization (in the singular, and capitalized!) (Huntington, 1996: 320–21)—even though the existence of any such thing would cast serious doubts on his analysis in the preceding three hundred pages. Given the ways that these two discourses have been entwined over the past several centuries, such a slippage is most probably ready-to-hand with the deployment of *any* civilizational boundary commonplace and creates a debate that any civilizational polity's representatives must confront.

Third, the almost uniquely diffuse and decentralized character of the community envisioned by civilizational boundary commonplaces carries with it a set of important implications. References to state identity generally have an entrenched bureaucracy with which to grapple; appeals to "the nation," in an era of national states, generally have the same character. If some person or group or corporation tries to deploy a state or national boundary commonplace, it normally has to contend with the "authorized" representatives of the community in question. In the case of "the state," and often in the case of "the nation," the authorized representatives generally command considerably more coercive capability, enabling those representatives to silence competitors without much trouble.[11]

But things are different with civilizations. There is no front office or central bureaucracy to control claims made in the name of a given civilizational polity, and there is no concentration of coercive ability in most civilizations sufficient to shut down unauthorized appeals. Instead, virtually *anyone* can deploy a civilizational boundary commonplace in *any* setting, and in effect can speak in the name of the West (or another civilization) without having to first establish their authority or receive a seal of approval from any particular organization. The reasons for this are of course complex, and are wrapped up with the development of the national state and its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a given territorial area; but one of the legacies of this development is a world in which civilizational polities do not have their own clearly demarcated military forces, legislative bodies, and symbolic iconography. Hence it is much more difficult for any civilizational boundary claim to be adjudicated, or ruled out as unauthorized, and we are left with a situation in which a Harvard professor's claim to speak for the West is in some sense just as *valid* as anyone else's claim.[12] The lesson here is that any analysis of civilizational boundary commonplaces must cast its net far and wide, outside of and beyond the formal organizational aspects of the polities subsumed within a given civilization. Since almost anyone *can* pick up and deploy such a commonplace, it stands to reason that many will do so, and analysts have to take such deployments seriously.

Although the study of civilizations as actors poses some technical challenges, it remains my contention that it is no different in its fundamentals

than the study of any other social actor. We should always be interested in those social processes involving attribution, personation, and in general the *naming* of some-one or some-thing as in some sense responsible for the action in question. If Huntington is correct that civilizations are "the biggest 'we' within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from the other 'thems' out there" (Huntington, 1996: 43), this feeling of at-home-ness should be taken as a puzzle to be solved rather than a starting-point for theorizing and policymaking. How we come to have civilizations acting on the world stage is, in my opinion, an important piece of that puzzle.

Notes

1. I have addressed these ontological and epistemological issues at greater length in Jackson (forthcoming).
2. Talcott Parsons referred to this as the "utilitarian's dilemma" (Parsons, [1937] 1968: 64). See also Jackson (2003: 233–35).
3. Erkenntnis*interesse*. The standard English translation of this essay renders the word as "cognitive interest." This imports a subjectivity into the argument that I do not think is really appropriate.
4. Thanks to Yosef Lapid for suggesting this term. Giddens (1984: 180) suggests simply redefining reification so that it refers to a *habit* of taking social processes as stable and thing-like—similar to what I have called arrestation—but I think that the change of term signals an important conceptual displacement.
5. The terminological shift is important here, since "interaction" catches up only those aspects of social life taking place *between* actors while "transaction" also catches up the transformations of the internal or personal character of those actors themselves (Emirbayer, 1997: 281–84; Deutsch, 1954: 39).
6. This despite the fact that Adler and Barnett are explicitly concerned with the issue of how those commonalities are produced in the first place, as members of a community grapple with a variety of precipitating conditions and transform themselves and their relations through complex learning processes (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 37–45). This complex reconstitution takes place *in the past*; in the *present*, we have a set of stable commonalities and subjective beliefs. But historicizing an essence is not the same thing as avoiding essentialism.
7. This section draws heavily on chapter 2 of Jackson, 2006.
8. In this way, an actor is always "in front of" itself, existing somewhere *between* its environment and those aspects of itself that are yoked together to form a boundary between "inside" and "outside" (see Heidegger, [1927] 1962, especially sections 13 and 28).
9. My use of the passive voice when discussing these matters is quite deliberate, because the active voice is itself part of the process of "yoking" (Abbott, 1996) attributes together to produce an actor and to legitimate a course of action. If we want to understand this process, we cannot start with fully formed actors, or with descriptions in the active voice. A desire to "preserve" agency by coding all action into active-voiced, first-person narratives—the kinds of accounts that Charles Tilly (2002) refers to as "standard stories"—is,

strictly speaking, incompatible with a desire to *analyze* or *explain* the phenomenon of action in ways that preserve agency.

10. Joss Whedon is the creator of the television shows *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, *Angel*, and *Firefly*. But you should already have known that.
11. The situations where they do *not* become very interesting indeed—as multiple claims and claimants to represent the community in question engage in all manner of combat in an effort to establish their dominance. But almost by definition, such moments are extraordinary ones—always possible in theory, but less common in practice.
12. The situation suggests parallels with "stateless societies" in which there is no clear central representative organization, or as with diaspora populations lacking much of a formal authority structure. In such situations, one claim to speak for the group or to have grasped its essential needs and interests is approximately on the same *conceptual* level as any other, although different claims may be empirically supported by different sets of resources.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 4

Discussion: On the Discursive Turn in Civilizational Analysis

Hayward R. Alker

The writers of the introduction to this volume, Martin Hall and Patrick Jackson, agreeably start this volume quoting Fred Dallmayr's "grammatical" reaction to Mahatma Gandhi's famous reply to a reporter's question about Western Civilization; "It would be a good idea." They critically review the largely essentialist foci and claims of earlier generations of IR work on civilizations with the claim that "the central characteristic of . . . fourth-generation civilizational scholarship is its commitment to a form of *post-essentialism*: skeptical of essentialist claims about civilizations or other forms of community, but sensitive to the power that such claims exercise in social and political practice" (this volume: chapter 1) Without discussing their contributions to IR, they cite books by Coker (1998) and Puchala (2003) as recent, noteworthy contributions. They conclude their Introduction with a similarly cautionary note about the non-homogeneous, contradictory, and variable character of civilizations.

One can put the challenge faced by the subsequent chapter writers (and readers) in the present volume in the following way. They (and we) are thus entitled to ask: did Gandhi think Western Civilization was a "weakly bounded, permeated, conflictual, contradictory, loosely integrated, constantly changing phenomen[on] that lack[s] centrality?" And if he did not, but we do, *how, following Hall and Jackson's anti-essentialist path, can we say and defend anything as nearly significant as Gandhi's ironically evaluative claim did?*

Jacinta O'Hagan's "Discourses of Civilizational Identity" is a more expansive introductory overview of the subject matter of *Writing Civilizations*. It correctly identifies what I am calling this volume's and IR's "Discursive Turn" in civilizational analysis with her title: "Discourses of Civilizational Identity," and then she substantially elaborates on Hall and Jackson's fourth-generational argumentative focus. Helpfully citing Mark B. Salter's *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations* (2002), O'Hagan shows a certain continuity with Gandhi's rhetoric. She argues that "there is still a strong tendency in contemporary thought to use the concept of

civilization to differentiate and evaluate societies that have achieved material and moral progress from others viewed as less developed." Besides presaging in interesting ways the chapter in this volume by Bowden and Seabrooke, her historical/evolutionary orientation presents stimulating hypotheses about civilizational overlaps and convergences, including Shmuel Eisenstadt's provocative argument that modernity is a distinct, if tension- and contradiction-laden, globalized civilization, taking "different patterns and forms in different cultures" (the "multiple modernities thesis"). She asks if the terrorist actions we see around the world today can be seen as manifestations of a tension-laden modernity, or as resistances to modernization (see also O'Hagan 2002).

It turns out that Salter's book is a response to his "dissatisfaction with the critical response to Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* argument" that O'Hagan, like Hall and Jackson, also criticizes. Salter's principal dissatisfaction is stated in discursive terms: very little commentary has noted that "[Huntington's] description of 'civilization' makes sense only with the construction of marginalized 'Others.' In the imperial discourse that Huntington disinters, barbarians are the natural enemies of civilization" (2002: 3). Part of this lack of sensitivity to an old imperialist discourse on the part of American commentators might well have to do with mythic anti-imperialist definitions of America's beginnings in American high school history-textbooks, and the displacement of arguments about human nature from the core texts of recent American International Relations theory.[1]

This discursive turn is captured and crystallized by O'Hagan in terms of Kevin Dunn's contemporary definition of discourse as "a relational totality of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done." In the best traditions of functionally oriented critical discourse analysis,[2] O'Hagan illustrates many ways in which civilizational discourses have recently been used. Besides noting the role civilizational discourses can play in constituting new entities in world affairs, she illustrates "how discourses of civilizational identity can be utilized to theorize the contours of [international] order, to predict and prescribe political interaction and to define and justify a particular form of [security] community, and to evaluate the particular institutions, values and practices of societies at global and regional levels."[3]

Paralleling Hall and Jackson's critical treatment of Huntington's (and, in part, Eisenstadt's) notion of "civilizations" as decentered and inhomogeneous entities with internal tensions and contradictions, O'Hagan nonetheless goes further in summarizing good arguments against assuming rather nebulous civilizations are actors with agency. It is hard, she says, to define "whether or not 'civilizations' are polities given that they are so nebulous," or to "determine whether they are cohesive, bounded or have intent." Putting aside, for the time being, major global arguments about civilizational definition, development, and decay, she calls on us to follow

the discursive turn in going beyond "mapping exercises or justificatory arguments" to see how and why civilizational identities are invoked. Is she not giving up on the big arguments, or only postponing them, by retreating to linguistic identity invocation foci? From a reader's perspective, I ask: *why does O'Hagan sidestep the many important global claims and debates about civilizational identities, boundaries and developments they review in order to identify how these civilizational aspects figure in discursive practices? Should not many of us soon want to get back to answering key questions, assessing hypotheses, and evaluating claims, based on at least tentative, but analytically/empirically/historically operational, characterizations of civilizational identities, characteristics, invocations, possible or likely interaction patterns, other impacts, and, even—if they can be shown to exist—their essences?*

Patrick Jackson's transactional account of "Civilizations as Actors" is much more narrowly focused most of the time, but similarly problematical, and even more provocative. Hall and Jackson have objected that both Huntington's incommensurable civilizational differences and implacable, presumably intentional and actor-like, oppositions, and his critics' more optimistic invocations of different sets of civilizational values and characteristic dispositions are equally essentialist. O'Hagan argues that many scholars within IR and outside of it "remain skeptical of the accuracy and utility of ascribing agency in world politics to civilizations." She cites alternative explanations for the phenomena focused on by civilizational analysts, the ambiguity of civilizational arguments, the issue whether rather "nebulous" civilizations are polities, and the difficulties in determining whether they are "cohesive, bounded, or have intent." My own published response to Huntington (Alker 1995) similarly argues against imputing "agency" to Islamic (and other) civilizations. Given all the criticism that Samuel Huntington has taken in this volume and elsewhere for treating Islam grammatically as if it were a responsible actor/subject/agent with an essential unity and identity, *why is Jackson trying so hard in an anti-essentialist manner, to reconstruct the "actor-like" qualities of Islamic civilization, the West, or any other civilizations? And how well does he succeed?*

Having raised these author challenging but reader-friendly questions, as a discussant I want now to comment on, and partly answer, these questions. First I shall discuss the discourse-focused poststructuralist perspective I associate with the editors' anti-essentialist ontology. Having already in passing made some remarks about fruitful- discourse analysis research strategies in the civilizational identity domain, I want to link this suggested research perspective to an ontological revolution inhering in what Mustafa Emirbayer has called "Relational Sociology." From such a sociological perspective I think progress can and has been made on Jackson's particular concern with attributing responsible actor-ship or agency. Finally, I want to close with a few remarks about alternative, potentially complimentary foci for making sense of relatively recent world historical developments.

Some Thoughts on Anti-Essentialist Poststructuralist Discourse Theorizing

I would first like to suggest that the consistent anti-essentialist theme of the Hall and Jackson and Jackson papers—given tactical and definitional acquiescence by O'Hagan—comes from similar roots in what Jacob Torfing (2005) calls "post-structuralist discourse theory." First, reconsider the definition of discourse provided by O'Hagan, via Dunn: coming from a conception of relational totalities (about which more will be said below) it focuses on a framework of signifying sequences indicating/constituting what can be said and done. Compare Torfing's broad definition of concrete discourses as "relational systems of meaning" (ibid.: 14) or his retelling (ibid: 9, 14–17) of how post-Marxists Laclau and Mouffe "define discourse in the quasi-transcendental terms of the historically variable conditions of possibility of what we say, think, imagine and do." Second, Torfing argues that the "basic characteristics" of post-structuralist discourse theory are "its *anti-essentialist ontology* and its *anti-foundationalist epistemology*" (ibid.: 13). Torfing clarifies its anti-essentialism citing Derrida as follows: "there is no pregiven, self-determining essence that is capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and totalizing structure" (ibid.: 13). Poststructuralists agree with philosophical realists that there is a world out there beyond our perceptions of it, but that "truth" does not exist independently of us—it is a feature of our language (ibid: 13–24). Discourse theory is said to have a "*relationist, contextual*, and ultimately *historicist* view of identity formation" (ibid: 14).

Torfing elaborates further on Laclau and Mouffe's version of discourse theory, emphasizing discourse's pervasive background role vis-à-vis social practices, the hegemonic struggles that shape discourses of meaning, authority, and identity, the intrinsic role of social antagonisms and threatening others in excluding certain identities and meanings, and the Kuhnian problems of dislocation and incomplete subjects associated with the inevitable, eventual failures of a discourse adequately to represent or to explain new phenomena. Other than noting that Jackson's Weberian focus on legitimating domination/obedience issues more or less fits here, as does Huntington's oppositional treatment of civilizations(!), I think I have succeeded in explicating an important, if partial and controversial, source of the editors' anti-essentialist orientations.

As a neoclassically oriented professor of IR, a Deutschean-Habermasian communication theorist, and a sympathizer with critical rationalist arguments of the Harré-Bhaskar-Wendt variety, I want briefly to say some positive things about a chastened, revisable version of essentialist ontology in social and international theories, a point of view now very much out of favor among many (but not all) discourse theorists.[4] First of all, it is rather ironical that the same half century that brought the linguistic turn and discourse theories into the social sciences was a half century that vindicated a variant of Aristotelean-Leibnizian or Vico-esque essentialist ontology[5]

with a plethora of information-theoretic and DNA-related discoveries, computational reconstructions and organismic fabrications in the natural and computational sciences. Whole new scientific and bioengineering fields of study—including cybernetics, autopoietic systems theory, "artificial intelligence and artificial life," "genetic algorithms," "cognitive linguistics," "sociobiology," "political linguistics," and "evolutionary anthropology/psychology" have come into existence as a result. Both Talcott Parsons and Karl Deutsch were early and deep borrowers from these disciplines in their attempts to theorize the formation of (international) societies and communities. It seems unwise, in my view, to write off without more sustained investigations into these new, hybrid fields, the possibility of a more adequate (but not totally self-determining) grounding for social, civilizational and international theorizing in some of the ontological concepts suggested by these fields.

Since I too am intrigued by different variants of discourse analysis, let me mention a few such recent books that strike me as having high IR relevance, potentially even applicable to the high level analysis of civilization-invoking and constituting discourses. First, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) advocate an "embodied realism"[6] and a neurophysiological account of linguistic "aspect theory" that extends "upward" from information-processing neural nets into both "basic" and "complex" intentionalist, metaphorical aspects of human reasoning. Second, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2003) have probed deeply into the cross-domain "blending" of cognitive concepts underlying many different domains of creative social and political thought. Third, a student of Roger Schank's, Andrew Gordon (2004) has "parsed" a dozen or so linguistic domains of strategic thinking (including business, Machiavellian, and human relationship domains), identified with the help of his computational linguistic colleagues hundreds of common and field-specific concepts underlying the construction of meaningful actions in these domains (including spatial, temporal, causal, and intentional thinking), and is at work computationally representing and analyzing identity-related narratives generated from within some of these domains. Because computers are initially void of structures defined at the level of human vocabularies, this kind of sustained exercise makes highly explicit (and revisable) the ontological "primitives" associated with a particular mode of thinking about human interactions. Finally, Paul Chilton (1996), in a textbook treatment of political linguistics, has a partly speculative account of recent work in evolutionary psycholinguistics that may point toward some grammatical constraints biologically programmed into (slowly changing) human brains. He is exploring the space of Hitler's ideological modes of racist thought.

Torfing suggests that poststructuralist discourse theorists oppose "the causal explanations of social phenomena, which harness empirical events to the yoke of universal laws", or the search for "the intrinsic causal properties of social objects" (2005: 19). In my understanding, none of these authors totally rejects causal explanations, nor subscribes to the full version of

"poststructuralist discourse theory." Each of them postpositivistically recognizes the constitutive/performative functions of language. Yet each of them has also made—to me persuasive—contributions to my understanding of the ontology and epistemology of contemporary international discourse analyses.

One can put my point here another way. Each of the introductory authors—from Hall and Jackson's Dallmayr-inspired discussion of Gandhi's grammar, to Jackson's discussion of the grammar of Huntington's use of proper names—in this volume is interested in grammars. But, as I quoted him in an earlier discussion of "story grammars" (Alker, 1996: 267), Wittgenstein was very postpositivist (and perhaps partly poststructuralist too) when he aphoristically exclaimed: "Essence is expressed by grammar." Here the grammar of a human practice may be thought of as the more or less embodied rules governing discourse interactions: it consists of sequential (rewrite) rules for going ahead. Here there is much room for Vico's radical constructivist insight that "truth" (*Verum)* and "the made" (*Factum)* are validity maintainging, interchangeable predicates. But like in Nicholas Onuf's pioneering study *Worlds of Our Making* (1989), in such cases it seems wise to think about the interrelationships of rules and rule, the exercise of more or less legitimate power, control, or domination. Some of these rules or principles are in our bodies, some in our cultures; and there may well be, over time, an influence of culture and human history on the form and contents these rules take.

Reflections on Relational Sociology and the Constitutive Properties of Agents

Reading and talking with Patrick Jackson has introduced me to the writings of Mustafa Emirbayer, particularly his "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology" (1997). Emirbayer is a key figure in understanding better, and perhaps improving upon, what we might call Jackson and Hall's (and others', like Bertell Ollman's, Harrison White's, Margaret Somer's, Hans Joas,' or Randall Collins') relational constructivism. Like Hall and Jackson's critique of Huntington and his critics for their essentialism, relational thinking contrasts their approach with the substantialist ontologies (of things, beings, essences) deeply embedded in the grammars of many Western languages. It puts relations (including dynamic processes and relations through time) before entities in ontological terms, rather than the other way around. Emirbayer critiques the illusion of self-acting (including rational actor) or interaction conceptions that assume stable actors. Conversations and negotiations are import relational forms. In addition to their poststructuralism, here is another important source of both Hall's and Jackson's anti-essentialism, as already discussed above. Indeed, Emirbayer uses "relationism" and "transactionalism"—Jackson's titular reference—interchangeably at several points.

Marx, Mead, and Elias are among the most famous classical relational social theorists. Perhaps the most recent relationally theorized book directly relevant for civilizational studies is Randall Collins' *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change* (1998). It represents and discusses the dynamics of many international philosophical networks, including substantial periods of classical Chinese thought, empirically oriented analytical thought in Western Europe, and the inter/intra-civilizational dialogue of Christian, Jewish, and Islamic philosophers in the Iberian peninsula before the expulsions of 1492.

Here I want to link another, very substantial, paper by Emirbayer (and Ann Mische) to Jackson's effort to construct a non-essentialist notion of civilizational actors. Because it outlines, in my view, a superior conception of what Jackson is trying to achieve, I quote from Emirbayer and Mische's abstract (1998: 962) at length:

> The authors conceptualize agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its "iterational" or habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a "projective" capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a "practical-evaluative" capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).

Simplifying, these authors treat "iteration [including selective, stabilizing reactivations of past patterns], projectivity [of possible action trajectories] and practical evaluation [judgments of such trajectories in response to emerging situations]" as the "constitutive elements of human agency" (Emirbayer, 1998: 970).

Now the payoff: substituting "iteratively, projectively and practically informed social engagements" for "the responsible origin of various things" in the conceptualization below, we have from the carefully worked Emirbayer-Mische conception an impressive framework for judging what Jackson says we need to judge something like a civilization to be a social actor—"speak[ing] of that entity as the responsible origin of various things that take place in the world" (this volume, 34). Although Jackson persuasively argues for the non-essentialism of Weberian ideal-types, I do not agree with him that civilizations are simply narrated into exist by anyone, even a famous Harvard professor. Criteria such as those Emirbayer and Mische suggest have to be successfully invoked for me to accept such narrations as successful.

Conclusion

For progress to continue in the discursive turn in civilizational studies, civilizations will have to be usefully distinguished from other macrosociocultural entities, or world historical processes. Given their preoccupation, the present authors under review only refer to alternatives—such as world

systems, world orders, superstates, empires, international or global networks, or societies, or cultures—in passing (and often disparagingly). In my own, discursively oriented work (Alker et al. in preparation) I have used the concept of "world orders" as less inclusive, but more intentionally and self-consciously directed entities. Of course other such possibilities exist, but their parallel conceptualizations are needed if the discursive turn in civilizational analysis is to continue to bear fruit.

Notes

1. I am reminded of one of the reasons why I prefer White's *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (1992) to Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979): the later displaces the traditional discussion of "human nature" (including civilizational versus barbarian distinctions) with an appeal to systemic determinants of war and peace, while the former does not.
2. I find Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2002) to be the most inclusive and specifically elaborated text on this cluster of approaches, including chapters by the editors, Siegfried Jäger (a Foucauldian), Teun A. van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, and Ron Scollon.
3. More concrete versions of such analyses are suggested by Ruth Wodak's tabulations of "discourse strategies" and "discourse topoi," which Jackson refers to in his chapter as "rhetorical commonplaces." Discourse strategies include nomination, predication, argumentation, framing, intensification, and mitigation; discourse topoi include usefulness or uselessness, definition and name-interpretation, danger and threat, humanitarianism, justice, responsibility, burdening, finances, culture, and history (Wodak and Meyer, 2002: 72–77).
4. These views are linked to the more elaborated statements in Alker 1996a, Alker 1996b, and Alker 2000.
5. Recall that Vico argued that "there must . . . be a [researchable] mental language [of basic ideas, *voci mentali*] common to all nations which uniformly grasps the essence of things feasible in human social life, and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as the same things have aspects" (quoted in Berlin, 1977: 212).
6. An important "critical realist" treatment of ontological politics in the international domain is Wight (2006). Jackson's chapter in this volume explicitly rejects what is described as the ontological dualism of the Patomaki-Wight approach.

Part II

Civilization(s), Religion, and Psychology

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 5

Civilizations, Postorientalism, and Islam

Mustapha Kamal Pasha

Introduction

[Injury has been done] to every nation which has been dominated by others and treated harshly. The same thing can be seen clearly in all those persons who are subjected to the will of others and who do not enjoy full control of their lives.

—Ibn Khaldun, *An Arab Philosophy of History*: 61

Every culture thrives on establishing difference from others, and pursues this establishment of savage difference with particular energy in situations of serious external conflict or internal flux and uncertainty.

—Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities*: 164

The "return" of civilizational analysis in IR presents contradictory messages about the state of the contemporary world. In the first instance, it affirms the arrival of a globalized *modern* community, albeit with multiple instantiations. In the second instance, it stresses the durability of unbridgeable differences between and among distinctive forms of cultural life underpinning political association.[1] The recognition of globalized modernity (Featherstone et al., 1995) and its consolidation as a civilization in its own right (Eisenstadt, 2001b)[2] overcomes conventional claims of elective affinities between Western cultural uniqueness and the rise of a materialist civilization. With capitalism flourishing in vastly heterodox terrains, allowing varied mixtures of economic purpose and cultural orientation, the thesis of Western exceptionalism has been undermined. The potential and possibility of self-expanding growth and material achievement in non-Western contexts, particularly in Asia, undermine the notion that "modern" or "industrial" ways of life are somehow uniquely the province of Western sensibility and culture. However, the question correlates attending liberal political and social formations and their putative

absence in non-Western worlds remain.[3] Thus, what promised a significant departure from hegemonic claims of Western uniqueness now appears in a refurbished narrative, claims of its exceptional *political* achievement, captured in the negative language of "failed states" and the emergence of "a string of shabby tyrannies" in the Islamic World (Lewis, 2002). The presumed inability of several non-Western states to fulfill the minimum requirements of statehood, including the provision of security, internal cohesion, peace, and economic viability appears to reinforce the thesis that these political entities do not share Western cultural assets. The latter would encompass political culture, habits of citizenship, and the achievement principle reminiscent of modernization claims. With regard to the Islamic world, in particular, the democratic deficit apparently reflects cultural rigidity drawn from a religiously coded social order.

The assertion of incommensurable civilizational difference seems self-evident. By lifting civilizational analysis from the academic periphery to the center and according an implicit parity to rival civilizational complexes,[4] the "clash of civilizations" thesis has revived the study of civilizations. Huntington trades the offensiveness of erstwhile morphological categories with civilizations. Yet, the sweeping rhetorical strategies in Huntingtonian accounts and invocations of a coming global war, with particular reference to Islam's radical difference vis-à-vis the West, have also brought intellectual closure. The process of opening up spaces within a conversation on civilizations, therefore, is an enormous challenge, particularly given the relative ease with which civilizational analysis has been absorbed into new hegemonic claims of defending universal Western values against atavistic forces of irrationality.[5]

This chapter revisits the nexus between orientalist essentialism and hegemony in search for a more inclusive conversation on civilizations. It hopes to offer the lineaments of an agonistic reading of the constitutive politics of civilizational identity, with particular emphasis on the Islamic Cultural Zones (ICZs).[6] Recognizing the problematic global location of Islamic cultural expression and its relational status to the symbolic economy of IR, the task here is to further the "dialogue among civilizations," albeit on a non-essentialist register.

The return of civilizational analysis sharply reveals how cultural essentialism can be effectively mobilized to consolidate hegemony. Essentialism and hegemony are mutually constitutive. In the post–cold war climate, specifically, recent pronouncements on civilization, such as the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1989 and 1992), or "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993a and 1996), congeal disciplinary strategies of consolidation. Seen from their dominant geoepistemological site, these civilizational claims offer political mappings of hegemonic consolidation. Essentialist accounts show an inextricable nexus between knowledge claims and their authorization within discrete spatial and cultural boundaries.[7] Despite their appeal for universalism, these claims bear the imprint of particular locales and mentalities. These accounts respond to new constellations of power, legitimizing

hegemony either in the name of civilizing purpose or civilizational insecurity. In both cases, civilizational analysis of the Huntingtonian variety help secure the boundaries of "Western" identity (Jackson, this volume). Marrying elements of hubris (Connolly, 1999) and disquiet (Coker, 1998), civilizational analysis associated with Huntington and those who follow his lead (Gismondi, 2004) encodes hegemonic thinking.

An alternate formulation reads recent civilizational analysis as a series of ambivalent commentaries on the difficulty of securing hegemony in an increasing porous world; triumphalism may actually hide worries about the curve of imperial power, as Wallerstein (2006) notes. Worries of hegemonic decline now reappear, but adopt the supremacist language of empire (Ferguson, 2003b; Nye, 2002; and Nye, 2004).

Cultural essentialism supplies the apparatus for hegemonic projects. Civilizational analysis from other (non-Western) geoepistemological sites, however, depicts a different portrait of the times. In general, the discourse on crisis metamorphoses as a return to civilizational analysis. Combining nostalgia with aspirations of renewal in the ICZs, for instance, civilizational analysis congeals weakness. The language of crisis symbolizes shades of powerlessness in the face of (Western) hegemony. The longing for glorious times, frustration to reverse the order of things, remonstrations for spiritual awakening, or the death of futures belong to this genre.[8] On the obverse side, the language of civilization can also serve as a pragmatic survival strategy to negotiate (Western) power. The "dialogue among civilizations" proposed by former Iranian president Khatami (Khatami, 2000 and Akhavi, 2003), combines cultural self-confidence with pragmatism. Although Western modernity is politely rejected in these accounts, the idea of a clash is repudiated. Unlike orientalist readings of Muslim negative "responses" based on Islamic exceptionalism (Lewis, 2002)[9], dialogical modes of engagement with the West are advanced. Modernity is embraced, but in its *Islamic* variant. Seeking to preserve cultural autonomy in a runaway world of homogenization, dialogical interventions provide alternatives to hegemonic thinking (Dallmayr, 1996 and Mushakoji, 1996). As subsequent discussion shows, the conditions for dialogue reside not merely in new global power constellations, but in non-essentialist modes of cultural recognition. The former would entail the emergence of multiple civilizational centers, each respecting agonistic modes of cultural belonging. The latter would substitute particularity for radical alterity, the appreciation of commonality as a ground for difference, but also recognition of difference as a condition to forge commonality.

A strategy of unfreezing orientalist essentialism also requires avenues to deconstruct the fixity in Occidental accounts and their reliance on notions of permanence and homogeneity.[10] In this stable self-portrait, the West is depicted as a static, monolithic other, a soulless purgatory bent upon colonizing the social and life-worlds of humanity (Buruma and Margalit, 2004). Non-Western Occidentalism, however, comes in various guises, not simply as anti-Western rage, as Buruma and Margalit propose. Other forms include

its instrumental role as a "counterdiscourse," a critique of domestic exclusionary structures of authority or presumably moribund cultural practices (Chen, 1992), or as an escape from the "cage of nature" (Maruyama, [1952] 1974). In both instances, the West is assumed to offer a liberatory outlet. Finally, Occidentalism serves as an apology for jumping on the fast-track train of economic globalization, the promised land of economic opportunity, wealth, and freedom (Bhagwati, 2004).

Anti-essentialist civilizational analysis must also acknowledge the effects of power and its reproduction in different historical settings. These effects and mechanisms tend to replenish essentialism, which in turn can abet hegemony. In times of emergency, which typically engender sovereign claims over boundaries and "truth," fixed "us/them" classifications can return. Essentialist typologies help the reinforcement of cultural and political boundaries. The fate of post-Saidian (Said, 1978 and 1993) critique in the post-9/11 climate can be read on these terms.

To be sure, postorientalist constructions, particularly in the aftermath of Edward Said's (1978) brilliant deconstruction of orientalism, have yielded multiple and wide openings to link hegemony and understanding. In the wider cultural field, orientalism has been deeply scared by the reflexive turn in the social and human sciences (Bonnell and Hunt, 1999). A paradigmatic instance in this context is the growing self-scrutiny in anthropological accounts of otherness and feminist critiques of orientalism (Yeğenoğu, 1998). Recognition of scholarly complicity in empire-making (Asad, 1973); appreciation of power hierarchies between knower and known (Derrida, 1976); the implausibility of Cartesian framing in ethnographic work (Clifford, 1988); and recognition of the pervasive scope of Eurocentrism in knowledge production (Said, 1978 and Wolf, 1982) are some of the major aspects of the so-called reflexive turn.

However, post-Saidian critique has undervalued the suppleness of orientalist strategies of survival, resistance, and *reconquista*. In part, the problem has rested with postorientalist critique itself, deflecting analysis away from politics to culture; shifting Said's focus on orientalism as ultimately a *political* vision of reality (Said, 1978), an unending process of struggle, to a lifeless frame in the service of power. However, and more importantly, in the unpredictable world of politics, orientalist modes of (mis)recognition have benefited from unforeseen historical events. The consolidation of essentialist stereotyping of Islam and Muslims as common sense (Gramsci, 1971) underscores the association between politics of discourse and politics.

Politics and Civilizational Analysis

A striking feature of mainstream civilizational thinking in world affairs is its unambiguous *political* tenor. Confirming Western liberal triumph over its known illiberal rivals (Fukuyama, 1989 and 1992) or forecasting the coming dark season of an inevitable Western "clash" with Islamic otherness

(Huntington, 1993 and 1996), the popular currency of civilization gestures toward the character of asymmetrical global power, both material and symbolic. Yet, this gesture is fraught with ambiguities and pitfalls. In Fukuyama's case, "the end of history" appears as a curtain-call of a directionless West, robbed of its (missionary) purpose, as explicitly observed by Coker (1998). Huntington's supplication for an "enclavized" West (Shapiro, 1999) misreads globalizing tendencies in the homeland and abroad, endangering the principal object he wishes to secure. In either case, hidden or revealed transcripts of power invade the representational field, either fully transparent or not entirely hidden from the cognitive field. Civilizational analysis, that appears distant from power, too is not fully unchained from the Western story of modernity (McNeill, 1963). Hence, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406)[11] appears as a residual figure in extant civilizational discussion, largely outside the purview of *relevant* theoretical speculation—usually cited, but rarely interrogated to supply meaningful insight. Civilizational thinking principally engages *the modern*, an outcome of European exceptionalism (Arnason, 2001; Eisenstadt, 2001b; Elias, 1995; and Nelson, 1973), the fountainhead of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000a), and the Ideal or ideal-type to measure other civilizations, either aspiring or deficient or both. Those with a more expansive optic (Braudel, 1994; Cox, 2000; Dallmayr, 1996; O'Hagan, 2002; and Suzuki, 2005) prove the exception: the hegemony of Western modernity is the hub in the analytical wheel. Dallmayr's magnanimous gesture to move beyond the West, still takes the West as a point of reference. Eisenstadt's notion of "multiple modernities" can escape neither the philosophical nor the sociological discourse of Western modernity. The paradigmatic centrality of Western civilization provides the master copy against which "others" can be compared (Eisenstadt, 2000a); or "alternative modernities" captured (Göle, 2000). In the generous quest to go beyond the West, these accounts cannot proceed without acknowledging the original point of embarkation.

Voices from other geoepistemological sites either speak of a premodern "Golden Age" to avoid the embarrassment of civilizational comparison or elect to acknowledge the tenor of the times, preferring a "dialogue" to ensure ontological difference (Khatami, 2000). Modernity rests on temporal and spatial distinctions (Fabian, 1983), assigning the West a higher point on as ascending scale. To rethink civilizational discourse, therefore, may require necessary strategies not only to deessentialize but also dislodge the hegemony of modern forms of historicism. The latter resuscitate orientalism in two principal ways: privileging "presentism" and "scientific-rational knowledge" (Nandy, 1995). Presentism rests on the assumption of denying multiple histories within the past, some apparent, others concealed; some expressed, others repressed. Instead, it takes a singular known present, often produced by positivist methodology, as the known destination of the past. Historicism discards the past as a premodern, traditional vestige in the name of progress. As a *particular* form of knowledge, historicism also silences alternative expressions of knowing: myth, folklore, storytelling.

Failure to meet the scientific criteria of verifiability disqualifies knowledge claims. Civilizational hierarchies rest on these twin operations of historicism, "the cardinal principle of the mental culture of modernity" (Al-Azmeh, 2001: 78).

Untying the non-West from the historicist imaginary can allow recognition of multiple cultural instantiations—diverse expressions in time and space—without embracing the story of Western triumph or miracle. In this context, the idea of "provincializing modernity" (or "Europe" for Chakrabarty, 2000) assigns modernity's career the status of a "moment" in the flow of time. This strategy offers the possibility to recover lost cognitive worlds either repressed in/with modernity (Nandy, 1995; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004). On other hand, the act of decoupling of modernity from the master narrative of Westernization, also recognizing modernity's underside, can dampen the force of Eurocentrism.

Postorientalist critique largely avoids the reflexive turn within orientalism, misguided by the success of its "seditious" (Prakash, 1995) powers. Said's recognition of orientalism as an integral part of *modern* political-intellectual sensibility has not been fully appreciated: "Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter of field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and 'Western' imperial plot to hold down the 'Oriental' world" (Said, 1978: 12). Or Young's analysis of the critical reconsideration of colonial modernity as project and practice has contemporary relevance for extant mainstream civilizational analysis. An awareness of the mutual constitution of colonialism and orientalism prepares a cognitive field to recognize similar projects in our own times, implicating hegemony with a refurbished civilizer/barbarian distinction (Al-Azmeh, 2001). Colonial modernity, on this view, is not merely the domination of the non-West by the West, not simply "a particular military and economic strategy of Western capitalist societies, but also as itself constituting and generated by a specific historical discourse of knowledge articulated with the operation of political power: colonization in short, involved epistemic as well as physical violence" (Young, 2001: 383). Despite allusions to power/knowledge nexus, postorientalist critiques have downplayed the effects of new power constellations.

The circulation of a mostly negative portrait of Islam and Muslims is not divorced from the project of hegemonic consolidation. A purely functionalist account that sees the "uses" of Islam to fulfill certain political needs is an insufficient guide to fully appreciate the demonization of Muslims and their faith. Western material and symbolic power *produces* a particular variant of the Islamic civilization. In turn, representations of the Islamic civilization contribute to producing Western power, giving coherence to the idea of Western civilizational identity and mobilizing the global symbolic economy to attain that end. This process has attained a familiar tonality in the post-9/11 world of ontological insecurity.[12] There are several facets to this process. The capacity to represent Islam globally is unevenly distributed. In the global cultural economy, Muslims are represented; they

cannot represent themselves (Marx in Said, 1978). Representations that enter the symbolic economy are often variants of essentialized Occidentalism, not the self-images of peoples in diverse cultural zones, but mirror images of orientalism. Second, orientalist essentialism draws a wedge between the West and its others, particularly Muslims. This may help sanction strategies of containment, management, and more recently, preemption. Demonization legitimates the uses of force.[13] Power delimits the cognitive field; it also buttresses the divide between self and other. Civilizational boundaries can be strengthened by projecting difference from the other (Neumann, 1999).

Hence, seeking an alternative to civilizational essentialism minimally requires negotiations with the question of boundaries, how they are set and maintained. It also entails an awareness of fractures *within* civilizational complexes that remain persistent irritants to notions of uniformity. To consider boundaries as attendant facets of processes of cultural practice and political struggle is to partially diminish the appeals of essentialism. The recognition of internal variation and diversity prevents totalizing constructions of otherness. However, the principal hurdle facing extant non-essentialist approaches to civilizational analysis is the impossible task of mediating between notions of porous and core identities. On the one hand, repudiation of the civilizational identity may advance claims of theoretical anarchism or extreme relativism. On the obverse side, the assumption of civilizational rigidity can reinforce standard orientalist tropes. Alternatives to these accounts are *relational* modes of civilizational thinking attempted by various contributors to this volume.

The Scopic Regimes of Orientalism

The orientalist project has rested on familiar overlapping, if contradictory, scopic regimes, giving durability to its structures. A superficial accounting of these regimes would include *essentialism, stasis, othering, self-enclosure*, and *historicism. Essentialism*[14] relies on civilizational/cultural reductionism, locating otherness to a recognizable, monadic, self-subsistent essence.[15] Particular modes of consciousness or stable cultural patterns explain behavioral variations between discrete human communities or individuals, often on an ascending scale of progress (or a descending ladder of barbarism). Essentialism "normally stresses the (over)-simplifying aspect of the cognitive process of constructing a Self-Other polarity . . . the role played by an 'essence' is that of delimiting the field and the scope of the domestication of the Other" (Al-Azmeh, 1993). Commonplace essentialist tropes include the modern/tradition divide, the separation between a private sphere of religiosity and a public sphere of the secular in the West and an absence of separation in the ICZs, the pervasive colonization by religion of the social and life-worlds of Muslims and the implausibility of social practice autonomous from faith.[16] To these can be added notions of cultural deficiency, want, and emotive excess in coming to terms with the rationalizing

processes of modernity.[17] In these times, the image of terrorism dominates the cultural field.[18]

Essentialism is inconceivable without a notion of *stasis*, the attribution of fixity to otherness. Stasis links culture to nature; culture is reduced to its originary, changeless state—primordial, patterned, thick. Stasis denies both the idea of society and the idea of history; society collapses into nature. Social phenomena appear as the recurrence of nature phenomena, perhaps, with even greater rigidity and predictability. Once its inner principle is grasped, its mind captured within bounded spaces, time can be evacuated. The new and the old become indistinguishable like ghosts inhabiting cultural zones of innateness. Law-like regularity appearing in nature can be found in other communities, outside history, time, or civilization.[19] Temporality dissolves into circularity. Pope Benedict's (2006) recent remarks on the inextricable association between violence and faith as a durable feature of Islam offers a striking example of essentialism's immunization against modernity or globalizing currents, economic integration, cultural flows, or scientific exchange. The other's past, present, and future are simply identical.[20]

Exoticism and demonization are two principal forms of *othering* (Žižek, 1994). The strange and inscrutable world of the other can invite either wonder and awe, or merely repellent reaction—as the embodiment of heresy or totalizing Sin.[21] In the first instance, potential for parity remains, though rarely realized: otherness can apparently enclose mysterious wellsprings of wisdom; refined modalities of harnessing cognitive, spiritual, or sexual energies; and pathways to escape materialism, pathologies of scientific reason, or psychic distress. Encounters with otherness can reveal limits of selfhood and its social constitution, or simply offer momentary reprieve from cultural boredom. The hyperexoticized world of *Arabian Nights*, a depoliticized and decontextualized Sufism (Islamic Mysticism), Islamic Art or the Harem provide familiar tropes. On the other side, otherness affirms civilizational hierarchies. At one extreme, otherness secures ontological certainty,[22] confirming Western moral and material advance, but also deep anxieties about civilizational insecurity in the face of an irrational, fatalistic, or fanatical adversary unimpressed by the modern apparatus of power, thought, or conduct.[23]

Self-enclosure suggests the absence of significant contact between civilizations and the possibility of mutuality, learning, mimicry, or synthesis. On this view, cultural difference acquires permanence within bounded universes imperious to the outside. Connectivity between cultures is either absent or rarely produces change. A major implication of the notion of self-enclosure is naturalization of the other—other cultures are not recognized as historical entities, but timeless entities. On this view, this natural state of affairs is expressed as cannibalism, the practice of widow-burning, pathological violence, or ethnic hatred.

If the notion of stasis accords stability to the other, paradoxically though, orientalism acquires its élan only in/through *historicism*, the central

plank of modern sensibility of space-time. Two aspects are crucial here: the shift in the idea of time from its Divine realm to an objective, secular process imbricating earthly salvation *in* civilization; and the Rise of the West within this imaginary (McNeill, 1963). Historicism rationalizes Western hegemony by introducing the idea of *deficiency* as its Master Signifier for the non-West (Orient). Oriental deficiency appears as the principal plot in Western stories of progress, of modernization and development, of democracy and civil society, or of quasi-states or failed states.[24] In the ICZs, as Al-Azmeh puts it, Islam appears as "a deficient order of things, and an order of deficient things" (1993: 168).[25]

Civilization—as process—then becomes the supplanting of deficiency. To be "civilized" is to escape, to overcome a lack—of reason, rationality, wealth, or freedom. With the idea of deficiency, orientalism provides international relations the quality of recurrence. Hegemony, on this view, is a project of establishing leadership in the name of civilizing mission that will release the non-Western spheres of the globe from their cultural deficiencies. The paradox lies, of course, in the realization that the whole enterprise is ultimately futile. Given the inherent teleological underpinnings of historicism, recognizing no final endpoint (except in narratives of cultural hubris and triumphalism), the (deficient) other is perpetually locked into a circular web without an outlet. Conversely, the endpoint is merely a "moment" reworked by/in time.

Agonism and Postorientalism

Postorientalist reconstructions of Islamic otherness, reflected in postcolonial theory, Postcolonialism, and Subaltern Studies[26] have offered fruitful pathways for recognizing difference *within* difference, fluidity, and connectedness. The orientalist assumption of homogeneity produced by scriptural unity and its uniform instantiation in the Islamic World has yielded to appreciation of heterodoxy, the imprint of place, and cultural hybridity. In turn, the timeless universe of tradition in orientalist mythology engulfing Muslim mind and practice has opened up. Recognition of internal differentiation, contingency, and the importance of locality have dissolved assumed unities. Against orientalist representations of the inseparability of religion and politics in Islam, postorientalism has helped recognize separate and differentiated social spheres, relocating religion to local context and contingency. orientalism conflates doctrine, belief, and ritual. Postorientalism recognizes discriminations. In the Islamic instance, postorientalist reinterpretation has helped distinguish between a contextualized and decontextualized Islam, an Islam of particularity and content versus an Idealized, timeless, and spatially homeless faith for all seasons.[27] Postorientalism furnishes thinking spaces to capture the global experience of Islam, how local Islam is interwoven into wider processes, and cautioning against the tendency to subsume the local into the global or privileging "transnational Islam" above local processes of the social reproduction of Muslim identities.

In turn, an appreciation of movement, malleability, and transformation demystifies the notion of stasis. Orientalism eternalizes historical Islam.[28] Postorientalism frees Islam from timeless fetters. Building on Ibn Khaldun's insight that societies are human, not natural, entities with intersubjectivities and life-worlds (Ibn Khaldun, 1950: 99 and Pasha, 1997), postorientalist (re)interpretation removes the orientalist guise of stagnant civilizational waters (Lewis, 2002). Recognition of change and changeability, however, without deconstructing the cultural logic of Western historicism only offers a halfway house. In refurbished orientalist narration (dubbed as neoorientalism), represented by Daniel Pipes or Martin Kramer,[29] Muslim pathway remains off course, devoid of the right ingredients for internalized transformation; modernity appearing as shallow externality.[30] Ironically, the invocation of the idea of "multiple modernities" cannot escape the historicist burden, making the Western story the original masterpiece with "other" rough translations. As noted, the point of reference for "multiple modernities" remains the Western modern.

Perhaps the major postorientalist intervention concerns the exposure of exoticism in orientalist frames, and undoing the spell of demonization. The exoticized world of difference has surrendered to examinations of the mundane in other worlds. On the other hand, postorientalist appreciation of contingency and complexity in Islamic otherness appears as a form of exorcism. Perhaps, Evil does not reside elsewhere, but is transported from a domestic source. Finally, postorientalist stress on translocal connectivities disrupts the parsimony of orientalist fictions of self-enclosure, of hermetically sealed borders, the home of incommensurable difference. *Identities are relational*, a product of cross-contamination, mutual borrowing, mimicry, and fusion.[31]

The consolidation of a natural attitude toward a presumably unified transnational Islam in Western epistemic communities in the face of dramatic recent events, however, underscores the recursive character of mental states regarding otherness, at once imbued with fluidity and flux and resistant to uncertainty and surprise change inevitably offers. A recurrent theme in neoorientalist accounts concerning Islam is one of Islamic exceptionalism and its "new-barbarian" variant (Al-Azmeh, 2001) that sees violence as an abiding feature of Muslim society (Pope Benedict, 2006). If Western exceptionalism gave the orientalist project its durability, Islamic exceptionalism provides Neoorientalism its raison d'etre. In a world of globalizing modernity, Islam both as religion *and* culture appears as the lonely laggard. In this metanarrative, the ICZs seemingly escaped a Reformation given their own version of Oriental Despotism (Lewis, 2002). Once the envy of Europe, the ICZs succumbed to the cultural lethargy and civilizational involution.[32] Rather than locate the sources of Islamic civilizational decline in the collapse of the medieval superstructure of learning and its displacement in the rise of shallower modes of thought drawn from superficial readings of Western modernity, and equally shallow responses to its advances under conditions not of Islam's choosing, Neoorientalism

relies on notions of unchanging religious ethos and orientation to explain "what went wrong" (Lewis, 2002). Neither an appreciation of unequal power relations under colonial dispensation nor effects of cultural domination enter the explanatory field.[33] Above all, the "explanation" does not consider very large and heterogeneous spatial and cognitive worlds of the Islamic civilization. Rather, isolated examples provide archetypical instantiations of a stable temporal horizon for the entire, monocultural world of Islam. A timeless essence of Islam, unshaken by history or politics, allows neoorientalist accounts to produce a singular zone of otherness. Once this zone has been constructed, social action traceable to its spatial and ideational confines follows a predictable script. The failure to temporalize the Islamic civilization or to recognize agonistic tendencies within its diverse and changing worlds is not surprising. It is a logical outcome of an enabling and consolidated frame that depends on new constellations of material and symbolic power. The polar universe of the West and Islam, as noted, is embedded in strategies of hegemonic consolidation, the continued conjoining of orientalist knowledge structures with structures of institutional and political power.

On another register, postorientalism advances a lure of authenticity, drawn from celebratory accounts of Indigeneity or Nativism (Boehmer, 1998). This lure acquires the character of anti-essentialist essentialism. Some of "unspoken conventions and givens of postcolonialism," for instance, rest on "the binaries that subsist beneath the challenge to Western dominance" (Boehmer, 1998: 20). The postorientalist tendency to reproduce binaries (self/other, metropolis/colony, West/non-West, center/periphery) vitiate the possibility of overcoming essentialism. The Islamic World, for instance, is not made up of a single, integrated space, but a plurality of sites, spaces, and sensibilities. Spivak's caution against the "nostalgia for lost origins" in view of how the precolonial is reworked by colonialism, has been unheeded. To deessentialize, the practice of romanticizing precolonial (or non-Western) societies (including ICZs) as "distant cultures, exploited but with rich intact heritages waiting to be recovered" must be resisted (1988: 211–12).

Postorientalist reinterpretations of ICZs also suffer from the tendency of an authentic/inauthentic dualism. The assumption that an "authentic" Islam is simply outside the mainstream or the suggestion that with good care and proper management, a "truer" Islam can be recovered recycles the authenticity tale. Modernist Islamic hermeneutics in the fields of Quranic studies, attempting to "reconcile" faith and modernity (Fazlur Rahman, 1982) or Islamic feminist attempts (Asfaruddin, 1999) to recover gender-neutral readings of the Word or Tradition are premised on the tired assumption that a purer original is, indeed, accessible. The historical transformation of Islamic social and life-worlds have been marked by change, cross-contamination, and transformation.

A more compelling avenue to deessentialize the Islamic civilization is to recognize agonistic currents (Ben Jelloun, 2002) within its heterodox real,

imaginary, and symbolic worlds. For instance, a sociological treatment of the Islamic civilization can afford sensitivity to differentiations and distinctions of locale, class, gender, or ethnicity.[34] Avoiding a tradition/modernity split in ICZs, the notion of fractures may not be entirely illegitimate (Pasha, 2003). Religious attachment is merely one form of attachment, itself resting on graded levels of intensity. The crucial point is to recognize the *political* context in which the image of a solidified Muslim identity materializes, in both self-representation of "believers" (Euben, 1999), but more significantly in relational processes involving Muslim selves and others. Self-representations do not spring from cultural essences, but emerge in/through political struggles over what it means to be a "Muslim." The imposition of an image of a naturalized singular identity from the outside only helps to intensify religious commitment. Mediations of differential power in the political economy of representation can provide greater legitimacy to safeguard religious boundaries. This returns the analysis to relational processes of the formation and consolidation of civilizational identities not in neutral spaces of culture, but the conflictual terrain of politics.

Intercivilizational encounters carry the twin possibility of simultaneously exposing the porous character of civilizations, and solidifying identities. Attempting to overcome essentialism, hegemonic accounts of intercivilizational encounters (Huntington, 1996) fail to resolve a basic paradox because it rests on essentialist understandings of civilizations. Alternatively, the assumption of *internal* political contest as a durable feature of civilizations can complicate "encounters" and "dialogues." Though the idiom and rules of contest may be based on familiar cultural codes, the assumption of agonistic politics challenges harmony or coherence. This reading obviates civilizational claims of universalism; it also provokes questions of their origin and *political* content.

Conclusion

In globalizing times, fractures within the worlds of Islamic civilization have deepened, and produced new forms of solidarities. The appearance of new ways of articulating religious identities (Gellner, 1981 and Robinson, 2002), and undermining established mores, confronts the usual orientalist narrative of cultural stagnation (Lewis, 2002). However, the transformed representational field makes it painfully difficulty to "think past terror" (Buck-Morss, 2003) with reference to Muslims or Islam. The naturalization of a consolidated image of Islam in the aftermath of recent dramatic global events, with strong historical antecedents (Daniel, 1966), is also helping consolidate the West's own civilizational identity. Rather than going "beyond orientalism" (Coronil, 1996; Dallmayr, 1996; and Gran, 1996), the "new barbarians" frame (Tuastad, 2003) has significantly contributed toward solving the problem of the West's ontological insecurity. Thinning cultural processes seem to now give ground to "thicker" forms of identities. Yet, the unstable nature both of identities and the processes shaping them

must be duly noted. Tensions and agonistic pressures within assumed civilizational complexes are further heightened by translocal relationality. The constitutive politics of civilizational identity suggests not only how strategies to produce unitary and distinct civilizations operate, but equally the difficulty to seal off borders, both real and imaginary. The neoorientalist (re)inscription of "Muslim rage" (Lewis, 1990), as a singular metaphor for the Islamic civilization and its diverse populations, can generate potent malevolent effects in the practice of international relations. With wide institutional and representational support systems, a natural attitude toward "repellent otherness" expressed in civilizational analysis (Huntington, 1993 and 1996; Lewis, 1990 and 2002) cannot be disregarded as merely voices of extremism, outside the Aristotelian middle.

However, the notion of the contested nature of civilizational identities, not a clash of essences, can offer alternatives to self-serving claims of repellent otherness. In the latter instance, the "new Crusades" against the Islamic civilization become a variant of Just War. The process of authorizing particular representations then can provide self-reproducing rationales for an unending cycle of violence without spatial or temporal limits. Recognizing the largely *political* nature of the processes that mobilize symbolic resources to produce a uniform and repellent image of the Islamic civilization; examining agonistic streams within the ICZs; abandoning the lure of Islamic civilizational authenticity;[35] challenging modern historicist trajectories to promote the idea of "multiple modernities"; and deessentializing the idea of "intercivilizational dialogue" are some of the principal alternative pathways to place civilizational analysis on a more self-reflexive and critical footing.

Recent civilizational discourse affirms a more critical facet of epistemic blindness generated in hegemonic accounts—ideological interpretations that take culture as the defining feature of civilization. The process of dethroning the notion that civilization*s* arise in the presumably neutral spaces of culture, *not* politics, allows an opening to recognize incommensurable cultural difference *itself* as a product of struggles to produce boundaries, and helps place relational understanding to its proper place. Distinctions between friend and enemy (Schmitt, [1932] 1976) and strategies to produce hegemony as sources of civilizational difference then are rendered less opaque. Once the monadic nature of civilizations is contested via politics, the essentialist logic of civilizational analysis can be exposed.

The proposal for a "dialogue among civilizations"[36] also offers new pathways to move the analysis in nonhegemonic directions based on a repudiation of "modular" notions of civilizations. Further, the fiction of sealed borders, each (re)producing self-contained civilizational entities must be contested in favor of "intertwined histories" (Said, 1993). Finally, the acceptance of multiple positionalities and sites for civilizational analysis, as a counterpoint to the hegemonic Western gaze, can offer new beginnings. In the context of both the return of "binaries" regarding ICZs and ecological crisis, the task acquires renewed urgency.[37]

Notes

1. Some have received civilizational analysis with considerable skepticism. As Bruce Mazlish puts it,

   > Civilization is one of those great Stonehenge figures looming over our mental landscape. Like its adjacent figure, culture, it is one of the major concepts invented and constructed in the eighteenth century and subsequently elaborated in the course of the development of the social sciences. In the new millennium, it has become a fetish. In the new time-space we have entered, it should not only be "deconstructed" but taken down. (2004: 160–61)

2. The core of modernity is the crystallization and development of mode or modes of interpretation of the world, or of a distinct social imaginaire, indeed of the ontological vision, of a distinct cultural programme, combined with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations—the central core of both being an unprecedented "openness" and uncertainty. (Eisenstadt, 2001b: 320)
3. There is a long lineage, however, on both left and right side of the political spectrum of this sentiment. For notable examples, see Barrington Moore (1966) and Anderson (1974a and 1974b).
4. Samuel Huntington's controversial intervention is a case in point. However, it remains an open question whether his motives for reviving the idea of a "clash of civilizations," originally presented in its nascent state by Bernard Lewis, were basically political, given his location in the web of power.
5. Notice the built-in contradiction in the term "universal Western values" that authorizes a particular weltanschauung to represent humanity. One example of this thinking is provided in British Prime Minister Tony Blair's address to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on August 2, 2006, where he noted,

   > [T]his struggle is one about values. Our values are worth fighting for. They represent humanity's progress throughout the ages and at each point we had to fight for them and defend them. As a new age beckons, it is time to fight for them again.

   (Available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politi. . .25/02/2007, accessed on February 25, 2007.)
6. The choice of the term "Islamic Cultural Zones" (ICZs) seeks to reconcile the plurality of religious and cultural expression in different spaces/times with a relatively fluid and changeable Islam.
7. As Sabine notes, "theories of politics are themselves a part of politics . . . they do not refer to an external reality but are produced as a normal part of the social milieu in which politics itself has its being" (1937: Preface).
8. On the other hand, the language of crisis, as in Spengler's (1922) case, can signal deep historical pessimism, limits to civilizational progress, and the possibility of decline.
9. Lewis is the ideal-typical proponent of Islamic exceptionalism, the belief of Muslim deficiency to fully reconcile modernity with Islam. For a sympathetic defense of Huntington's thesis, see Gismondi (2004).
10. A necessary distinction ought to be made between the West's changeable self-construction (Jackson) and a fairly stable *negative* self-portrait that is then produced with iron regularity in the non-West (Buruma and Margalit, 2004).

11. Civilizational analysis has a rich historical source in Ibn Khaldun's magisterial opus on the philosophy of history (*Kitab al Ibar*), centuries before nineteenth- or twentieth-century discoveries of this important heuristic (Pasha, 1997).
12. Less recognizable in received accounts, however, is the possibility of a *generalized* crisis of modernity and the difficulty of realizing the teleological promise of the Enlightenment without erasing difference through assimilation or cultural genocide. The safer and familiar terrain of civilizational apartheid may produce ontological security. Paradoxically, the enactment of the scopic regime of radical alterity only brings dread, anticipation, and anxiety. Islam's location in this symbolic universe is further complicated by its presence *within* the West, an ontological nightmare for the liberal project of multicultural assimilation, which must now choose between relaxing prerequisites of social and cultural inclusion and more blatant prescriptions for instituting graded citizenship, surveillance, or exclusion.
13. Recall Conrad's poignant statement,

    > The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretense but an idea; an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to . . . (Cited in Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993], p. vii.)

14. Perhaps, the most incisive statement on essentialism is provided by Anouar Abdel-Malek:

    > According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist—sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms—which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all beings considered; this essence is both "historical," since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixed the being, "the object" of study, within its inalienable and non-evolutive specificity. . . . Thus one ends with a typology—based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential—which makes of the studied "object" another being with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo Aegyticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man—the "normal man," it is understood—being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. (1963: 107–8)

15. Al-Azmeh's critique of Gellner's essentialism also applies to other works that depict Islamic societies as unchanging, monadic wholes. Gellner's "pendulum swing" theory of Islam, Al-Azmeh notes,

    > postulates two forms of religiosity, the enthusiastic-rural and the puritanical-urban, in a primordial conflict and cyclical alternance which fundamentally constitutes Muslim history—so fundamentally, indeed, that the present condition of the Muslims can be conceived in no other terms, and which can have no outcome other than the triumph of urban Puritanism. Correlative with this religious characterization of a history, reduced to religious culture, is the proposition that no modernism for Muslims is inconceivable in terms other than those

> of the Muslim puritanical doctrine and its correlates. (Al-Azmeh, 2003: 43)

For Gellner's theory, see Gellner (1981).

16. Al-Azmeh calls it the "over-islamization of Muslims, their endowment with a superhuman capacity for perpetual piety, the reduction of their history and their present life to a play and recovery of religious motifs, and hence a denial of their actual history" (Al-Azmeh, 2003: 44).
17. According to Pipes,

> Future relations of Muslims and Westerners depend less on crude numbers or place of residence, and much more on beliefs, skills, and institutions. The critical question is *whether Muslims will modernize or not*. And the answer lies not in the Qur'an or in the Islamic religion, but in the attitudes and actions of nearly a billion individuals. (1990: 7, emphasis added)

18. As Pipes puts it: "Muslim countries host the most terrorists and the fewest democracies in the world" (1990: 3).
19. Lewis's essentialization of Islam pervades his mighty career as one of the authoritative representatives of orientalism. A key component of the misrecognition of Islam not as a faith, but as a total way of life. Hence, Islamic politics lacks the autonomy found in the West:

> Islamic law knows no corporate legal persons; Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any other kind of elective or representative assembly. . . . the political experience of the Middle East [which Lewis often takes as the equivalent of the Islamic World] under the caliphs and sultans was one of almost unrelieved autocracy, in which obedience to the sovereign was a religious as well as a political obligation, and disobedience a sin as well as a crime. (Lewis, 1964: 64)

20. "Cultures can change, and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can vary from one period to another. Yet the major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures" (Huntington, 1996a: p. 29).
21. King's reading of orientalist constructions of Hinduism also apply to the ICZs:

> Today, there are perhaps two powerful images in contemporary Western characterizations of Eastern religiosity. One is the continually enduring notion of the "mystical East"—a powerful image precisely because of some of it represents what is most disturbing and outdated about Eastern culture, whilst for others it represents the magic, the mystery and the sense of the spiritual which they perceive to be lacking in modern Western culture . . . The second image of Eastern religion—one indeed that is increasingly coming to the fore in Western circles, is that of the "militant fanatic." (1999: 147)

22. Daniel Pipes captures the ahistorical historicity of Islamic interaction with Christianity:

> The fear of Islam has some basis in reality. From the Battle of Ajnadayn in 634 until the Suez crisis of 1956, military hostility has *always* been the crux of the Christian-Muslim relationship. Muslims served as the enemy par excellence from the *Chanson de Roland* to the

> Rolando trilogy, from *El Cid* to *Don Quixote*. In real life, Arabs or Turks represent the national villains throughout southern Europe. Europeans repeatedly won their statehood by expelling Muslim overlords, from the Spanish *Reconquista* beginning in the early eleventh century to the Albanian war of independence ending in 1912. (Pipes, 1990: 3, emphasis added)

23. For a stark example of this sentiment, see Oriana Fallaci, *The Rage and the Pride* (*La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio* in Italian), 2002.
24. On modernization, see Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). On democracy, see Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Divergence of Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001). The classic statement on quasi-states is, of course, Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On "failed states," see Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World in the 21st Century* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004).
25. On Muslim overall cultural deficiency, see Lewis, 2002.
26. For distinctions among these interventions, see Ania Loombia, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, 2005).
27. As Asad suggests, the experience of the spiritual world is shaped by conditions of the social world: "There cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relations are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes" (1993: 29).
28. The orientalist trope "fits with a widespread myth-making in Europe and America that operates in unintended collusion with fundamentalist Muslims' own different, but compatible, myths about themselves" (Fischer, 2002: 65).
29. Martin S. Kramer, *Political Islam* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980); Kramer, ed. *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997); Daniel Pipes, *Militant Islam Reaches America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).
30. Hegel's interpretation of the Crusades offers an interesting bench mark:

> The great army of the Crusaders give us the best example of this. They march forth on a holy errand, but on their way they give free vent to all the passions, and in this the leaders show the example; the individuals allow themselves to fall into violence and heinous sin. Their march accomplished, though with an utter lack of judgment and forethought, and with the loss of thousands on the way, Jerusalem is reached: it is beautiful when Jerusalem comes in view to see them all doing penance in contrition of heart, falling on their faces and reverently adoring. But this is only a moment which follows upon months of frenzy, foolishness and grossness, which everyone displayed itself on the march. Animated by the loftiest bravery, they go on to storm and conquer the sacred citadel, and then they bathe themselves in blood, revel in endless cruelties, and rage with a brutal ferocity. From this they again pass on to contrition and penance; then they get up from their knees reconciled and sanctified, and once more they give

> themselves up to all the littleness of miserable passions, of selfishness and envy, of avarice and cupidity: their energies are directed to the satisfaction of their lusts, and they bring to naught the fair possession that their bravery had won. This comes to pass because the principle is only present in them in its implicitude as an abstract principle, and the actuality of man is not as yet spiritually formed and fashioned. (Hegel, 1995: 53)

31. Ismail (2004):

> the identity constructed is relational: it shapes and is shaped by other social dimensions such as gender, class and lifestyles. Muslims, as actors, occupy different positions in their social settings and in relation to the processes of globalization. They do not engage, in a uniform manner, in the construction of Muslim selves. Nor do they reproduce a monolithic Muslim identity. Rather, their engagement in identity construction informs us of the power struggles that are embedded in material local conditions and global processes, and that make use of a multiplicity of registers and frames of reference. (630–31)

32. For a representative unified image of Muslim deficiency, note the following lecture from Professor Lewis:

> If the people of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bombers may become the a metaphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression, culminating sooner or later in yet another alien domination; perhaps from a new Europe reverting to old ways, perhaps from a resurgent Russia, perhaps from some new, expanding superpower in the East. If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in a common creative endeavor, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own. (2002: 159)

33. As Al-Azmeh states, "We have seen that the primitive, the outsider, the laggard and a host of other antitheses of failures of civilization are bound together, as a generic group of cultural categories, with similar conditions of emergence in the civilized imaginary" (2001: 89).

34. Al-Azmeh suggests a pathway:

> the first step to be taken is critically to decompose the notion of Islam, and to look instead at the conditions of its recent emergence: social forces, historical mutations and developments, political conflicts, intellectual and ideological realities, devotional and theological styles, in addition to local ethnographic detail—it being clearly understood that ethnographic detail is to be regarded for what it is, and not simply as an instance or merely a concrete figure of a pervasive Islamism of life. Without this decomposition, the totalizing category of Islam will continue performing its phantasmatic role of calling things into being simply by naming them. (2003: 27)

35. Civilizations are not societies, though some societal forms may in certain instances be symbolically sustained by appeal to fictitious genealogies, which might be called civilizations; civilizations are rather

hyper-social systems. They are not entities but performative categories, now active, now not. (Al-Azmeh, 2003: 23)

36. According to Khatami,

> There are two ways to realize dialogue among civilizations. First, actual instances of the interaction and interpenetration of cultures and civilizations with each other, resulting from a variety of factors, present one mode in which this dialogue takes place. This mode of interaction is clearly involuntary and optional and occurs in an unpremeditated fashion, driven primarily by vagaries of social events, geographical situation and historical contingency. Second, alternatively, dialogue among civilizations would also mean a deliberate dialogue among representative members of various civilizations such as scholars, artists and philosophers from disparate civilizational domains. In the latter sense, dialogue entails a deliberate act based on premeditated indulgence and does not rise and fall at the mercy of historical and geographical contingency. (Khatami, 2000)

37. As Khatami puts it:

> It now appears that the Cartesian-Faustian narrative of Western civilization should give way and begin to listen to other narratives proposed by other human cultural domains. Today the unstoppable destruction of nature stemming from the ill-founded preconceptions of recent centuries threatens human livelihood. Should there be no other philosophical, social, political and human grounds necessitating dialogue but this pitiable relationship between humans and nature, then all selflessly peace-seeking intellectuals should endeavour to promote dialogue as urgently as they can. (Ibid.)

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 6

Not Waiting for the Barbarians

Mark B. Salter

the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.

—The National Security Strategy of the United States

night has fallen and the barbarians have not come.
And some who have just returned from the border say
there are no barbarians any longer.
And now, what's going to happen to us without barbarians?
They were, those people, a kind of solution.

—C. Cavafy, *Waiting for the Barbarians*

The war on terror is portrayed in American policy and public discourse simultaneously as a clash of civilizations and war for Civilization. Bush describes the new enemy of September 15, 2001: "a group of barbarians have declared war on the American people" (2001a). A key question for scholars must be: why this particular discourse, and why this discourse now? What are the peculiar or unique characteristics of the civilizations discourse that make it so strategically useful? In this chapter, I trace the function of the civilizations discourse in the attempts to create a domestic consensus on the war on terror, both strategically and tactically. This chapter suggests the particular characteristics of the civilizations discourse that make it so useful in the war on terror. O'Hagan argues that it provides a mid-range theory that encompasses a number of anxieties brought about by globalization and allows a nonterritorial consideration of political communities (2005: 384). To push this analysis further, I contend that there are three identifiable characteristics of the civilizations discourse itself, and the figure of the barbarian, which make it particularly useful and flexible in the rhetoric of the war on terror. The civilizations discourse elides the distinctions between in-groups, provides a portable state of exception that makes annihilation of the barbaric the only possible reaction, and diminishes the enemy through a strategy of

individuation, portraying the threat as a series of individuals rather than a group or community.

Analyses of security discourses often focus on how particular constructions reify the sovereign state or a particular version of politics. Discourse analysis places language at the center of its analysis, and in keeping with the critical spirit of its proponents, focuses on the effects and implications of particular linguistic acts (Milliken, 1999: 236). But many discourse analysts provide no way to evaluate *why* particular schemas are used in different situations. Without resorting to analysis of actor intentionality, bureaucratic politics, or social identity, in examining discourse analysis as a structure for meaning construction scholars miss the advantages of one metageography over another. Why, for example, does the paradigm of geopolitical containment rise and fall over the course of the twentieth century? Why is Al-Qaeda represented by the administration as a totalitarian ideology and not a religion? Following Campbell's notion of a discursive economy (1998: 5), we must ask of all the possible public accounts into which rhetorical investments may be made, what is the particular interest accrues to the civilizations/barbarian account? Accepting the Copenhagen School's explanation of securitization—how certain issues such as identity and societal integrity might be drawn into the realm of security—does not provide an explanation of what language of crisis, emergency, and threat make an attempt at securitization successful (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1998).

What Does the "Civilizations" Discourse Mean?

The history of the barbarians discourse illustrates how it has been deployed successfully to both create an in-group with certain values and define an out-group in a particular fashion. The term "barbarian" has its origins in the Ancient Greek description of those whose speech was incomprehensible to them; as Aristotle describes "slaves by nature" (1941: 1128). As they could not participate in Greek speech, which was the foundation of logic, philosophy, and politics, barbarians could not participate in the community (Bacon, 1961: 10). Barbarians are always described in relation to a standard of civilization, and are always defined in relation to a "lack" of civilization. Barbarian, thus, is an identity-constructing, exclusive term that defines the basis of community on language and political participation, not on nation, race, or lineage. The trope of the barbarian is familiar: lacking in manners, language, and morals, but not organization, barbarians represent a violent threat to the "civilized" inside (Said, 1977: 54). "The word no longer refers to a foreign nationality, but exclusively to evil, cruelty, and savageness . . . the barbarian was to be identified as the enemy of democracy" (Kristeva, 1991: 51–52). Defining the community as civilized and the enemy as barbarian escapes the strict territorial inscription of inside/outside—being a barbarian (in our case terrorist), marks one as outside the community regardless of place, nationality, or legal status. This historical context

makes the barbarian image productive in the war on terror: the modern barbarian is the terrorist—"There is a great divide in our time—not between religions or cultures, but between civilization and barbarism" (Bush, 2001b). As such, the trope of the barbarian is tied at its inception with concepts of self, nation, and empire—but in a flexible way that allows for categorization by a political standard of behavior (threat or risk to democracy), rather than a legal standard such as citizenship or residency.

An important but neglected implication of invoking the civilized/barbarian dichotomy is the imperative toward a civilizing mission, what Gregory calls "the colonial present" (2004). With the invocation of the civilized/barbarian discourse, the solution of the barbarian is posed in a familiar imperial code—a colonial economy of violence by which order is guaranteed by the continual application of violence and the ranking of sovereignties, populations, and violence. Gong argues forcefully that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century international law framed an international society that was comprised of civilized, barbarian, and savage spheres. These constructions were based on the capacity of the political communities to meet the standard of European civilization (Gong, 1984). All states are sovereign, but some are more sovereign than others. All populations wish for freedom, but some are more free than others. Some violence is acceptable, whereas other violence is not. Though we are missing the specific legal formulations of sovereign states, dominions, colonies, trusteeships, protectorates, and others that helped structure the nineteenth and early-twentieth-century international society, I think we are seeing the resurgence of much of the secondary characteristics of that civilized/ barbarian dichotomy. Rather than legal status determining the degree to which a state may be subject to intervention, it is the secondary characteristics of civilization, such as legal codes, democratic values, treatment of women, poverty, and economic development, that mark a state as subject to intervention. To me, this is the crux: civilization becomes the master key by which the criteria for membership, as full members of the global community, are unlocked. One may be democratic, enjoy a legal code, be developed, and still become the target of American policy if the particular configurations of those characteristics do not meet the core standards of civilization.

For example, Iran is described as a "theocratic republic" in the *CIA World Factbook* and part of the "axis of evil," despite universal suffrage, an Islamic legal system, and cooperation with the United States during the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.[1] During the 2004 campaign, all of Bush's descriptions of the Taliban use as proof of the regime's barbarism in the treatment of women and children. Preventing girls from attending school is equated with the public whipping of their mothers. America thus colonizes Afghanistan to protect the women and children from Taliban barbarity. Speaking on the Schiavo case, Bush says "The essence of civilization is that the strong have a duty to protect the weak" (2005b). This is a new civilizing mission performed on both American and global populations.

The key question of violence is also framed within a colonial content. The solution to barbaric violence is either occupation or eradication—a logic that we see instantiated in the war on terror.

Civilizational rhetoric, especially the appeal to the defense of civilization in order to the defeat of the barbarian, has surfaced repeatedly in twentieth-century Western public discourse at times of crisis and war (Ifversen, 2002; Jackson, 2006; Salter, 2002). In domestic political debates, the appeal to civilization has been a frequent line of attack in debates over federal funding for art and education and more recently, over judicial decisions regarding the protection of life in the Terry Schiavo case and gay marriage, which Bush called "the basic institution of civilization" (2004g). This coupling of geopolitical and cultural concerns has been present in other times in the United States, such as the House Un-American Activities Committee, and is typified by Huntington's "clash of civilization" thesis and recent discussion of American multiculturalism (Huntington, 2004). The effect of the civilizations discourse enables the construction of vast politically and culturally heterogeneous out-groups that are elided and labeled as "barbaric." Bush administration officials have described as barbaric a wide variety of events: the September 11 attacks; the Afghani regime; the killing of Daniel Pearl; the London transit bombings; the Beslan school massacre; the Iraqi insurgence; the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. All terrorist attacks are barbaric in the same way—tactically, they are all suicidal to some degree (even if the Afghani and Iraqi regimes were suicidal only in opposing the United States).

There are a number of competing discourses that might function in the same way as the civilizations discourse. In the twentieth century, we have seen U.S. foreign policy drawn in Manichean terms according to metageographies of race, ideology, geopolitics, and religion. But, all these discourses lack the elements of crisis, exception, and individuation that the civilizations rhetoric provides without assuming an abstract utility-maximizer who chooses between different metaphors. Race thinking has largely been discredited since the mid-twentieth century; despite the civilization paradigm's dependence on religion, it is imprudent to cause a kin-country syndrome in the Islamic civilization by declaring a new "crusade"; geopolitics does not work, as the enemy is not affiliated with a territorial state; even conventional realism struggles to conceptualize religious actors not tied to sovereign state. The traditional discourses of humanitarian intervention or the promulgation of democracy are also at odds with some of the administration's allies and enemies in the war on terror: the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is largely ignored while Musharraf's Pakistan and fundamentalist Saudi Arabia are both supported. The civilizations discourse allows the flexibility of allying with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia while criticizing Afghanistan and Iraq's regimes for human rights abuses: by being against the terrorists, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia define themselves as inside civilization.[2]

I want to make three points about the civilization/barbarian discourse in the war on terror: it constructs the enemy as outside the boundaries of

normal politics; it makes the only conceivable solutions extermination or colonization; it is an individuating discourse, which allows numerous contradictions to remain unresolved.

Barbarians as Exception

The description of the other as barbaric makes necessary the use of exceptional measures because the barbarian is not simply outside the political community but is antipolitical. The idea of "the state of exception" has gained a wider currency owing to the work of Agamben, who argues that the figure of the *homo sacer* and the metaphor of the camp are crucial to understanding the politics of the war on terror (1998). As Williams (2003) points out, there is a strong link between the Copenhagen School's conception of securitization and the Schmittian framework of friend/enemy, which is so important to Agamben. Gregory argues that the civilized/barbarian discourse operates "from a radically different address" than logic of the state of exception (2004: 62). I would contend that in the popular political imaginary the image of the barbarian operates as a portable, fungible state of exception. The figure of the terrorist allows the subversion of democratic politics in the face of executive power: NSA domestic surveillance, the treatment of Jose Pedilla as a military detainee, the decitizenship proceedings attempted in Florida, and so on (Nyers, 2006). What allows this to happen to American citizens on American soil under American law, setting aside the issue of Guantanamo Bay or the so-called Black Sites in Europe, is the immediate security threat presented by the figure of the terrorist/barbarian so as to make his pacification necessary by any and all means available.

Agamben does not discuss the figure of the barbarian specifically, but we can find a parallel in his description of the ban: "the bandit and the outlaw . . . the wolf-man, the 'man without peace'" (1998: 104). The ban or exclusion of this not-quite-human figure from the political community is "more intimate and primary" than the contractual relationship of sovereign to citizen or the temporary relationship of the foreigner and the sovereign (ibid.: 110). All threats posed by the barbarian are existential to the political community, and the sovereign's decision to exclude the bandit, outlaw, or terrorist from the community precedes any democratic contract or deliberative politics. The figure of the barbarian functions as a portable state of exception—as an existential enemy that not just requires the abrogation of civilized tactics, but negates the very presence of civilized politics, a state of exception that may ignore the traditional spatiolegal boundaries of the community.

The barbarian has always been represented as being beyond the bounds of political community. Though the savage may be "noble" and consequently fetishized, the barbarian is never assimilated into the community. The use of this trope closes the option of all nonviolent responses present and prohibits any negotiation, as Bush repeatedly avows in the war on

terror. We saw the reiteration of this trope in the lack of formal and informal communication between the Americans and the Taliban: as Bush at a campaign rally in West Virginia says, "These people were barbaric. It's hard for the American mind to comprehend how backwards and barbaric these people were" (2004c). We see this again in the recent negotiations between Iraq and America. It is not simply that the barbarian is antithetical to civilization—he is the promise of the apocalypse of civilization. Another major example of this portable state of exception is found in the treatment of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, as illustrated by Butler. She argues that "the language with which [the detainees] are described by the US suggests that these individuals are exceptional . . . that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these" (2004: 78). One finds similar statements against the Aztec by the Spanish, the Mau-Mau by the British, and the Algerians by the French. The reduction of a group to its desire for chaos and destruction legitimates their eradication.

The Necessary Barbarians

The war on terror has reinforced the core arguments of a global cultural clash, the irreconcilability of civilizations, and the need for American lead ership. Offering a metageography of world conflict, Huntington attempts to unify Western civilization around the leadership of America, and attempts to incite America to lead Western civilization. While Milner et al. (2002) argue that the appeal to civilization has been directed at an international audience following a domestic appeal to the "American way of life," I would argue that in the preemption doctrine, the American National Security Strategy, and the recent inaugural address, civilization is the core value around which freedom, culture, and identity circulate. This is not to say that democracy, treatment of women, or weapons of mass destruction are not offered by the Bush administration to justify the object of American policy. For example, in describing the Taliban as barbaric Bush argues,

> These barbarians have a dark vision of the world. As a matter of fact, they think exactly opposite of Americans. They're against—they don't believe in freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of anything. They believe you either toe their line or there will be reprisals. (2004d)

It is the barbarism of the Taliban that underpins the lack of the "freedom of anything." Rather, the underpinning schema for the contemporary American metageography of the war on terror is civilization.

Huntington's response to the post–Cold War world is typical of the reluctant imperialist: confident of Western civilization's merits, but aware, and anxious, of the rising tide of power from non-Western societies; this anxiety, which Coker (1994) has termed the "return of the repressed," is

vital to the economy of danger. In the conclusion of his work, Huntington seemingly argues that more grave than the clash of civilizations is a greater clash. He argues,

> on a world wide scale Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Ages . . . In the greater clash, the global "real clash" [is] between Civilization and barbarism. (Huntington, 1996: 321)

Two things are particularly telling from this quotation, first, Huntington indicates that what is being produced is not a global Dark Ages, but rather the image of it. However, in Huntington's discourse, the representation of disorder is just as worrying as disorder itself. Second, Huntington appropriates the term "the real clash" to apply to his new, greater clash—which supersedes the clash of civilizations. Huntington avers the early-twentieth-century view, borrowed in turn from Spengler and Toynbee, that civilizations are politico-religio-cultural groupings (O'Hagan, 2002). It is only in his final chapters that Huntington starts to refer to barbarism as Collingwood uses the term—a repudiation of civility in domestic society (1992: 291–92). The use of terror tactics in war—the erosion of the distinction between civilians and combatants—maps directly onto the repudiation of civility. Thus the clash of civilizations becomes the clash between Civilization—led by the West that is in turn led by America—and barbarism, as terror. As with any invocation of this trope, in Huntington's formulation, the barbarian cannot be pacified, engaged, or contained. Bush has plainly adopted this schema:

> We face an enemy of ruthless ambition, unconstrained by law or morality. The terrorists despise other religions and have defiled their own. And they are determined to expand the scale and scope of their murder. The terror that targeted New York and Washington could next strike any center of civilization. Against such an enemy, there is no immunity, and there can be no neutrality. (2002a)

One of the most consistent messages of the Bush administration has been that the "war on terror" is *not* a clash of civilizations—but a clash between Civilization and barbarism. Recently, Bush said,

> This is the great challenge of our time, the storm in which we fly. History is once again witnessing a great clash. This is not a clash of civilizations . . . this is not a clash of religions . . . Instead, this is a clash of political visions. (2004b)

Rarely has an administration done as much to distance themselves from a model of IR that seems on the face so appropriate. However, public figures on both sides of the conflict have accepted the logic of the zero-sum cultural clash. Huntington is widely read in public and policy circles. But

many of his critics also accept the essentialist notion of a real standard of civilization and barbarism. Achar's *Clash of Barbarisms* accepts Huntington's substantive view of civilizations and barbarism, and simply argues that the West is more barbaric than the Islamic civilization (2002: 59). What results is a new kind of cultural containment, whereby an American-led West makes war against individuals, but not cultures, values, or religions.[3] The story goes that the terrorists pose a threat to Civilization as a state of being or community and are not targeting any specific community or civilization. To quote Bush again "Ever since September the 11th, 2001, America has sounded a certain trumpet. We've stated clearly the challenge to civilization" (2004e). The meaning of this story is that not only is America acting on the world's behalf but also that it holds a monopoly on the moral high ground. By joining the American war on terror, a state proves itself to be civilized: failing to join America is a sign of barbarity, and marks the state as the future object of American attacks.

President Bush repeatedly refers to the terrorists as "barbarians" and the growing American-led coalition as the "civilized world." Former secretary of state Colin Powell makes a similar, but telling remark: "I think every civilized nation in the world recognizes that this was an assault not just against the United States, but against civilization" (2001). There is no question that civilization is both a threat to and under threat from the barbarians. Gong argues that there is an internal drive to define one's own state as civilized, which implies some constraint on international behavior: "states, wishing to render credible their self-descriptions of being civilized, must adhere to internationally recognized standards of civilizations—as well as to their own principles of civilization" (2002: 81). But, in Powell's definition, it is America that defines which states are civilized and which are not. Further if nations are civilized they are at once under threat. And indeed if the nations do not perceive the threat to civilization, they have marked themselves as outside the community of civilization and thus open themselves to attack by America and its civilized allies. Rather than the European society defining and policing the standards of civilization, we see the United States being the sole global colonial police. Justifying the war in Afghanistan, Bush repeated in his campaign speeches throughout September and October that it was a "country was run by the barbarians called the Taliban" (2004b). In rhetorically distancing these terrorists as barbarians, other Muslim countries may be appeased and co-opted into the American alliance. America is shoring this image of itself as the crusader of civilization itself—at war not with the general barbarian of Islam but the specific barbarian of the terrorist.

Barbarian Bodies

At a basic level, the war on terror has no victory conditions, no visible enemy, no territory to be gained, and no conditions of failure: there is only the process of civilization to be completed. The object of violence is not a

state or a predefined group of enemies, but those who challenge the idea that the state is the only legitimate user of force in the international system. The war on terror aims to eliminate international, nonstate violent actors; in doing so it further legitimates the state as the only legitimate violent actors. Because the enemy is anti-Americanism, and not even the use of violence but the suspicion of the future use of violence, America must move against individuals who cannot be marked by their nationality, religion, ethnicity, or even actions. The doctrine of preemption is about the executive acting before the law, rather than outside the law (Agamben, 2005). American foreign policy also seeks to deter individuals from performing these acts of violence. Since no one can divine the intention of the terrorist, America must take anti-Americanism as the sign of terrorism to come and must act preemptively. The Bush administration repeats the trope of realism, against optimism or idealism: "as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best" (*National Security Strategy*/White House, 2002). These emergent threats are in the minds of terrorists and since America cannot control the minds of the barbarian, by definition, it is their bodies that the administration aims to control.

I have termed this tactic "strategic individualization" by which I mean the targeting of individuals by American statecraft. Individual bodies that stand in for the ideas they are taken to represent: terror, anti-Americanism, fundamentalism, barbarism.[4] It is a characteristic of the civilization/barbarian discourse that functions to allow the individuation of the enemy in the image of the Mahdi or the Mau-Mau, and other figures of colonial resistance (Matthews, 1997). As Bush said, "the war against terrorists is a war against individuals who hide in caves in remote parts of the world, individuals who have these kind of shadowy networks, individuals who deal with rogue nations" (2004a). Strategic individualization is a vital tactic of the colonial economy of violence: individuals are targeted but rarely captured, producing a continuous threat. Cheney recently equated the individualization of the war on terror with the civilization/barbarian discourse: "And after the awful events of September 11th, this nation set out to hunt down the terrorists, one by one if necessary, and to hold accountable regimes that gave shelter to the enemies of civilization" (2005). On the ground, these individual bodies often evade military operations: Osama bin Laden (OBL) remains at large, Kim Jong Il, Fidel Castro, Momar Quadaffi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad all remain in power.[5] The primary individuals who were the target of American foreign policy remain of course OBL and his proxies: al-Zarqawi and al-Zawahiri. There was much discussion about OBL's body in the press—such as speculations about his health and physical well-being (Fisk, 2002).[6] OBL's missing body justifies a continuing offensive against him. Recent offers of a "truce" from OBL have confirmed that he is still alive (*BBC News*, 2006).[7] There is also a great deal of concern in the popular press regarding the physical health of Hussein

during his imprisonment and trial, al-Zarqawi's postmortem, and the possible poisoning of Milosovic.

Although the Bush administration repeatedly asserts that OBL is *not* the sole target or goal of American efforts, it is vexing that they can neither confirm nor deny his existence. The missing body accuses American foreign policy either of incompetence or of having already achieved its aim. Thus, certain strategic bodies are capable of being sacrificed in the war on terror. The deaths of Iraqi or Afghani civilians are not counted, mourned, nor linked to the struggle for freedom.

This individualization is of course functional. The twentieth 9/11 hijacker, "American Taliban" and Shoe Bomber have been granted a position as visible objects of American foreign policy, while Jose Pedilla and the inmates at Camp X-ray are denied their individual rights (even as prisoners of war). Zacarias Moussaoui, John Walker Lindh, and Richard Reid were tried in America—as the individual representatives of Al-Qaeda, and the link to the terrorist group was included in each indictment. On the other hand, the nameless inmates at Camp X-ray are refused their individual rights as prisoners of war and go unnamed. Pictures released by the American forces at Guantanamo Bay indicate that prisoners are isolated by blacked-out goggles, ear muffs, and masks over their nose and mouth. Those (suspected) terrorists who are strategically individualized are those that are already docile. John Walker Lindh has asked for forgiveness for fighting for the Taliban, although he claims he was unaware it was harboring Al-Qaeda terrorists. Richard Reid has not asked for forgiveness, but did request that his association with Al-Qaeda be removed from the indictment (which prosecutors refused). Jose Pedilla has recently been transferred to civilian custody after three years in military brigs. In each case, to varying degrees, each of the individuals repudiates the anti-American, terrorist ideas that are the real object of the war on terror. Those that have not repudiated violence, such as those at Camp X-ray or Jose Pedilla, are refused access to the media and indeed treated as an anonymous group (a group so dangerous that they cannot be allowed onto the continental United States, but remain ironically on a colonial military base). Moussaoui has both sworn that he is a member of Al-Qaeda, and that he was uninvolved with 9/11.

The administration also mobilizes the trope of the terrorist as insane. Butler argues

> the terrorists are *like* the mentally ill because their mind-set is unfathomable, because they are outside of reason, because they are outside of "civilization," if we understand that term to be the catchword of a self-defined Western perspective that considers itself bound to certain versions of rationality and the claims that arise from them. (Butler, 2004: 72, emphasis in original)

Thus, it should come as no surprise that the description of the threats to the United States should be constructed within this rational/irrational, masculine/feminine, white/ethnic framework. This argument meets its limit at the suicide bomber (Salter, 2003; Pape, 2003; Pedahzur, 2005).

In what was widely hailed as one of Bush's best international political performances, Bush challenged the United Nations to accede to American policy or risk irrelevance. In setting the foundation for this ultimatum, Bush subtly reframed the mission and founding of the UN. While the initial Charter and 1945 San Francisco meeting framed the purpose of the UN as protecting the future from "the scourge of war," Bush individualizes the goal. He states "the founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man" (Bush, 2002b). This individualization continues throughout the speech—whether through personalizing the Iraqi regime or in particular calling Hussein to account for the bodies missing from the Gulf War. Bush evokes "one American pilot," and the other 600 individuals of mixed nationality for which Iraq has not accounted, as evidence of Hussein's barbarity. There is no accounting of the deaths caused by UN sanctions because the missing body of the virtuous warrior occludes the hundreds/thousands of Iraqi citizens who have died since as a result of their failure to overthrow the Hussein regime. In this way, the absent American body stands in for a justification for war, and marks the boundary of civilization and barbarity. Even in 2001, Bush's speech to the UN had been saturated with the civilization discourse: "Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization: We will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence" (2001d).

This individualization also obscures the fact that these nonstate actors have gained legitimacy in the international sphere, if only by becoming the enemy of the sovereign state system. Bush elides the state that harbors the terrorist to an individual murderer:

> The United States makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor the terrorists, because they're equally guilty of murder. [Applause]. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an enemy of civilization, and the civilized world will hold those regimes to account. (2005b)

The tactic of strategic individualization facilitates the smooth functioning of the colonial economy of violence. Identifying individuals as targets of American foreign policy makes their pacification and repentance immediately visible on the global stage, while at the same time creating an endless population of dangerous individuals to be targeted. In addition to the habitual metonymy of taking leader to represent state, the tactic of strategic individualization takes the individual to represent a state of mind. Individuals now come to represent terror, and terrorists represent anti-American ideas. The pacification of these barbaric individuals reiterates the ability of the (American) state to impose its military will on the other and generates a never-ending category of enemies. The tactic of strategic individualization focuses military, moral, and political statecraft on the body of an individual—which serves to promote the economical use of danger in public

discourse. This politico-moral-strategic narrative is made possible by the trope of civilization under threat from the barbarians.

How Does the "Civilizations" Discourse Mean?

In this chapter, I have argued that the civilizations discourse, with its central figure of the barbarian, has three characteristics that make it more flexible and adaptable for the public case for the American war on terror. Without assuming a strategic actor who picks one discourse over another, it is important to evaluate why particular discourses operates at certain times. The civilizations discourse presents the threat as a crisis to civilization, which has the effect of cohering internal identity; it necessitates the abrogation of civilized tactics in dealing with the exceptional barbarian; it provides a metonymical structure wherein individuals can stand in for the out-group. If as IR theorists we are to "sing the world into existence" (Smith, 2004: 499), we must examine the times when the discourse of civilization has been successfully challenged or reshaped. Mazrui points to the decline of the civilizations discourse that occurs as the colonized starts to assert their own voice:

> Because the term "civilized nations" was used to justify European imperialism, it began to decline in public usage with the rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa. The new assertiveness of the colonized peoples and their sense of dignity gradually discouraged Europeans from talking about them as "barbarians" and "heathens." (1984: 35)

Césaire is a prime example. An anticolonial writer, in 1955 he used the standards of civilization defined by the West to interrogate Western colonialism in his powerful "Discourse on Colonialism." His comments might be said today of American occupation in Iraq or Afghanistan:

> Security? Culture? The rule of law? In the meantime, I look around and wherever there are colonizers and colonized face to face, I see force, brutality, cruelty, sadism, conflict . . . They talk to me about progress, "achievements," diseases cured, improved standards of living . . . They throw facts at my head, statistics . . . I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled . . . They pride themselves on abuses eliminated. I too talk about abuses, but what I say is that the old ones—very real—they have superimposed others—very detestable. They talk to me about local tyrants brought to reason; but I note that in general the old tyrants get on very well with the new ones. (1972: 21–22)

I am neither advocating a reinvented civilizing mission that is somehow more loyal to the values of civilization than the current war on terror, nor an honest and vigorous imperialism, nor a call to describe America as the "real barbarian." Rather, it is important to excavate the ambiguities and

paradoxes within the civilization/barbarian discourse that complicate the justifications of the tactics of the war on terror. In Césaire we find an example of a powerful articulation of the gaps and contradictions in the civilizations discourse, singing a song in counterpoint to prevailing anthem and a way to complicate or write against the prevailing rhetoric.

Notes

1. CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html, accessed on February 25, 2007.
2. Parenthetically, I think that one can also map the wider distinctions between civilized, barbarian, and savage onto the current discourse on the war on terror. The "savage" and the "barbarian" illustrate the different limits of the political community. The savage is also represented as being closer to nature and as more morally pure than the decadent or corrupt "civilized" man. The barbarian cannot be educated—he is irredeemable and dangerous. The barbarian represents the liberal project gone awry; the barbarian has been educated falsely and cannot be reeducated—they are in Donald Rumsfeld's terms "dead-enders." The *trope* of the savage and barbarian differ along Todorov's axiological dimension of self/other relations—the savage and barbarian are both other, but the savage is redeemable whereas the barbarian is "beyond the pale" (1992). Savages yearn to march for freedom; barbarians march for war. Savages are ignorant; barbarians are nihilist. All "others" are not equal.
3. A Foucauldian argument could be made that this strategy of separating individuals from their values, culture, and religion might be particularly Western or modernist, but such an argument lies beyond the ambit of this chapter.
4. Chris Hodgson points out there may be a parallel to be made between strategic individualization of terrorist enemies and the dominance of the rogue state grand strategic orientation.
5. Saddam Hussein was captured between the first presentation of this chapter and the press deadline. I would argue that the tactic of individualization remained powerful with regards to al-Zarqawi, who has become the figurehead of the insurgency as the fascination with his corpse after the air attack that killed him demonstrates.
6. See also CNN, "Dr. Sanjay Gupta: Bin Laden would need help if on dialysis," (January 21, 2002). http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/01/21/gupta.otsc/.
7. Bin Laden in the same broadcast accuses the United States of "barbaric methods" in torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 7

Civilizations, Neo-Gandhianism, and the Hindu Self

Catarina Kinnvall

Introduction

This chapter deals with current attempts in International Relations (IR) to deessentialize the concept of civilization—to leave behind what Jackson calls a substantialist (essentialist) approach in favor of an approach that treats civilizations as unfolding processes, projects, practices, and relations (Jackson, 1999: 142). As discussed in the introduction, much current discourse on civilization challenges the view of civilizations as immutable natural essences. At an ontological level post-essentialist civilizational analysis prefers constructivism over objectivism, while epistemologically it is an interpretivist rather than a positivist approach. Civilizations, like cultures, nations, ethnic groups, and identities should be viewed as verbs rather than nouns.

In this chapter I discuss and problematize the use of the term "civilization." I do this by outlining some difficulties with the term as it has been discussed in contemporary literature. In particular I emphasize how even interpretative readings can be used to reinforce static notions of the concept. Some of this criticism is dealt with in postcolonial literature concerned with the hybridity of the colonized in regard to power, culture, civilization, and identity. Here lies an attempt to decolonize the subject by demystifying the experience of cultural others. However, as I show in this chapter, this may contain certain pitfalls. Hence, a number of postcolonialists, such as the neo-Gandhians in India, fall prey to essentializing discourses in their efforts to criticize Western civilizational readings. In their search for a Hindu self, conceptions of "tradition," "culture," and civilization become less than a reification of those structures of domination that they profess to leave behind.

Civilizations and the Postcolonial Critique

The "civilization debate" is by no means an isolated one. Rather, it has been played out in a number of fields within IR theory where mainstream IR has

been challenged by various postpositivist approaches. Without going into the details of these debates, it is enough to acknowledge the contention between rationalist and reflective approaches where the latter have emphasized the importance of studying agents, structures, and institutions as being socially constructed. In the fourth-generation civilizational analysis this is often framed as the processual-relational (P/R) approach. Labels used to describe political constellations—the West, the Orient, Islam—have thus been abandoned in favor of seeing such constellations as discursive constructions that challenge static conceptions of identity, culture, and civilization. Opponents of an essentialist view of civilization and culture often argue that a static view of these concepts disregards unequal power distribution between and within groups, globally as well as locally.

I adhere to this P/R approach, but remain unconvinced about the usefulness of bringing back the notion of civilization even in this interpretative sense. The question that must be raised concerns the extent to which the use of the term may still presuppose, and impose, particular social categories rather than contributing to the analysis of their condition of being. As Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004) suggest, academic and social scientific concepts may be employed so as to ground particular category constructions, and may limit our analyses and the political projects that may be envisaged. Hence, it is important to be aware of the limitations inherent in "civilizational analyses" if they are to achieve anything other than an understanding of how civilizations have evolved as social constructions. In other words, we may deconstruct the concept to show how particular categories, such as the West, Orient, or Islam, are rendered meaningful in the first place and how they remain powerful legitimators of identity as they are constructed, promoted, and perceived as essential to human beings and to the organization of society. Critical civilizational analyses are also at the core of challenging IR as a discipline that has privileged an Anglocentric worldview where general Enlightenment beliefs, such as reason, empiricism, science, universalism, progress, individualism, freedom, uniformity of human nature, and secularism have come to assume a universal status. However, if the aim is to reconstruct the term itself, I believe we run into a number of problems.

Here Halliday's (1999) discussion of the term "Islamophobia" can serve as a relevant example of the danger involved in reconceptualizing problematic concepts. Halliday (who prefers the term "anti-Muslim" over "Islamophobia") argues that the term "Islamophobia" is problematic as it implies that there "is something out there against which the phobia can be directed" (898). Using the term anti-Muslim, although not unproblematic, has the advantage of avoiding the implication that there is a single entity (Islam) that is targeted (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004). This line of argument is similar to the critique against using a terminology of "the other," which even in critical writings has a tendency to reproduce the stereotypical homogenization of other cultures and people even when seeking to overthrow them (Riggins, 1997: 4).

As a critical line of inquiry it can also be compared to the postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha's (1990) discussion of Edward Said's Orient. Bhabha is positive to how Said provides a radical critique of essentialist understandings of history and modernity, while he acknowledges that Said's study falls short in providing an account of the so-called Orient. Said, Bhabha notes, fails to investigate the process in which the colonial subject is historically constructed, making orientalist discourse appear monolithic, undifferentiated, and uncontested. Instead of seeing the colonial subject as fixed, Bhabha argues, colonial subjectivity must be seen as a hybrid character revealing the possibility of understanding colonial authority, because "it enables a form of subversion that turns the discursive conditions of dominance in to the grounds of intervention" (Bhabha, 1984: 125–33, see also Keyman, 1997).[1] In this regard Bhabha as well as Chatterjee (1986) criticize those who proceed from a homogenous understanding of the developing world as found in some postmodernist writings. The postmodern dislocation of the subject and its tendency to keep Eurocentrism as its point of reference with respect to the process of othering, is problematic, they argue, as it has been inclined to marginalize racial, cultural, and historical otherness of representation.

Postcolonial criticism entails, in other words, the need to "engender and decolonize IR theory in order to dismantle its Eurocentrism and cultural essentialism" (Keyman, 1997: 194). It is about locating knowledge as a historically created site where the process of othering takes place. Spivak's (1999) suggestion to change the title of an Essex conference in 1992 from "Europe and Its Others" to "Europe as an Other," documenting and theorizing the itinerary of Europe as a sovereign subject, points to an alternative "worlding" of today's "inter-national" relations. In this sense, postcolonial discourse criticizes both the idea of development and the "three world's theory" as part of a Eurocentric discourse of control and subordination. It has a heretical thrust as it intends to "operate a difference and make a new departure through the rupture of what has become institutionalized or normalized as tradition or convention" (Venn, 2000: 48). The aim is to show how Eurocentrism has been and continues to be the prerequisite for how we construct a vision of the Other (Keyman, 1997). The critique of Eurocentrism and universalism, on the one hand, and of the homogeneous understanding of the third world, on the other, thus marks the strategy of postcolonial criticism and its analysis of imperialism.

Postcolonial criticism clarifies the extent to which IR as a discipline attempts to grasp global or universal phenomena, such as "civilizations," almost entirely within one culturally and politically circumscribed perspective (Walker, 1984: 182). It has done so in particular by questioning the idea of the desirability of the nation-state as the form through which self-governance, autonomy, self-respect and justice are to be pursued. This claim has been influenced by poststructuralist notions of anti-essentialism together with its critique of modernity (Seth, 2000). As Chatterjee's analysis of Benedict Anderson shows when he argues that Anderson violates the

concept of imagined (as in imagined communities) by insisting on nationalism's modular quality:

> [i]f nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain "modular" forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? . . . Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized. (1993: 5)

Here, Chatterjee reveals how the official ideology of the Indian state came to rest on a monolithic concept of sovereignty borrowed from modern Europe, thus disregarding both diagonal and horizontal constructions of identity that were the legacy of the colonial past. Chatterjee is thus successful in showing how a national discourse emerged that was able to gloss over "all earlier contradictions, divergences and differences" (1993: 49–51).[2]

Chatterjee's observation illustrates the difficulties international relations theory has had in acknowledging the need to explore difference, not only recognize it in forms of "different" nation-states where the state (or actor) still remains united. In this, much conventional IR theory continues to privilege unity over difference, presuming a sovereign, ahistorical identity. As a result, neither neorealists, nor neoliberals or IR–constructivists have felt the need to concern themselves with "inaccessible" discourses of postcolonialism (or postmodernism). Instead they refer to these as marginal or alternative accounts that can be included or excluded at will, while in reality postcolonial and postmodern scholars pose very challenging and troubling questions to IR–theorists who often remain prisoners of their own conceptions and subjectivity (see McCormack, 2002: 109).

This emphasis on subjectivity brings us back to the discussion of civilization as a problematic concept. If the attempt to open up for differences, contradictions, and alternative imaginings is inherent in the postcolonial critique, then one must also ask questions about postcolonial subjectivity. In this regard it has proved difficult for some postcolonial writers to tell non-essentializing stories about self, largely because they have been unable to traverse the self-other dichotomy. In defining and demonizing the other (e.g., Western civilization), self becomes sufficiently sanctified. In the case of the neo-Gandhians[3] in India, this is certainly the case. In attempting to strike out against both Western monopolies of knowledge and power and against current Hindu nationalist discourse, neo-Gandhians have often found themselves defending *an* Indian civilization.[4] Inherent in this picture is a search for *a* Hindu self that can counter destructive influences from the West as well as deviant versions of this self as expressed in Hindu nationalism.

What this case shows, as discussed below, is the problems we may encounter when culturalism becomes the "other" true story of civilizational analysis. As Desai (2002: 62–63) has noted, culturalism substitutes a right for a left critique of universalism. In this critique, everything that has to do with globalization, modernity, and Western values are bad, while

everything to do with culture, religion, and tradition are good and must be upheld (see also Nanda, 2004).[5] Reinterpreting the concept of civilization does not, in other words, prevent the common abuse of the term. Instead we see in the Indian case how culturalist history is being reinterpreted to give predominance to what I elsewhere have referred to as "hegemonic traditionalists" (Kinnvall, 2004), who take it upon themselves to "properly" define the history and boundaries of the group, community, nation, and civilization.

Telling the "Other" Civilizational Story—The Essentialist Trap

As discussed above, postcolonial scholars have been successful in challenging simple definitions of culture, civilization, and identity. This does not imply, however, that there is common agreement in terms of philosophical inquiry among postcolonial scholars. Similar to other categorical constructions, postcolonial criticism cannot be easily labeled. Bhaba (1994), Spivak (1999), and Hall (1992) are all, for instance, concerned with the hybridity of the colonized in their focus on power, culture, civilization, and identity. Others have given particular emphasis to the idea of the nation-state in the colonial encounter, and to the nation as a subject (Chatterjee, 1986, 1993; Said, 1979). Yet others have explored the shaping of colonial and postcolonial subjectivity, particular in its indigenous and psychological form (Fanon, 1970; Nandy, 1983; Inden, 1986, 2000; Lal, 2000). To this should be added more general accounts that are concerned with how the colonial encounter has affected the ways in which we comprehend the world (Young, 1990; Duara, 1995; Prakash, 1995; cf Seth, 2000).

Here I am particularly concerned with the idea of the nation-state in the colonial encounter as expressed in Chatterjee's writings and the exploration of colonial and postcolonial subjectivity in its indigenous form as articulated in writings by Ashis Nandy and T. N. Madan—two core representatives of the neo-Gandhian perspective, also referred to as the neonativists. Similar perspectives have also been forwarded by scholars such as Vinay Lal and Ronald Inden. The role of the neo-Gandhians can only be understood, however, in relation to the Hindu nationalists' attempts to redefine Indian civilization, nation, and culture and the response among scholars from across the Indian political spectrum. The electoral defeat of the Hindu nationalist party, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), in 2004 has not meant an end of the ideology of *Hindutva* or Hindu nationalist policies and it therefore remains important for illustrating how interpretative notions of civilization and culture can sometimes play directly into the hands of religious (or other) fundamentalists.

Without going too deep into Indian politics and the Hindu nationalist movement, I would like to focus on the ongoing debate in India on how to define Indian history. The aim of the Hindu nationalist movement, or *Hindutva*, has been to construct a chain of events where the past is

connected to the present and where it justifies future actions. In this representation of the Indian past there are no sharp boundaries between "religious fiction" and "material facts" as some empiricist historians would like us to believe. Instead, historical research has often been used to fit the predetermined narrative by making them into "hard facts" (van der Veer, 1996: 143–45). That cultural nationalism is positive and real is, in these accounts, based on two interconnected assumptions. The first is that Hindu nationalism is not a modern phenomenon in India. Instead, its provenance is held to go back to Vedic times and it is therefore enmeshed with the history and culture of the Hindu "race" and Hindu civilization. The second assumption is that the nationalist ideology generated by the anticolonial movement was negative in character and confined to opposing colonialism (Panikkar, 1997: xv), rather than representing the Hindu majority.

Both assumptions ignore the extent to which the colonial encounter involved an essentialized inter-civilizational discourse where primordial notions of Western, Hindu, and Muslim civilizations affected identity constructions in India. Here it is important to emphasize the extent to which the British were instrumental in strengthening religious boundaries by classifying and comparing rates of literacy, population growth, professional occupations, and recruitment to the army according to religious affiliation. As a result religious, national and civilizational identity became equated in the term *Hindutva*, where an Indian was viewed as a Hindu who belongs to the imagined Hindu nation, which as a consequence put other religious communities, such as the Muslims, outside the nation. In nineteenth-century India a colonial society was produced by a colonizing state that was also engaged in creating a national identity at home. Indian nationalisms were formed in resistance to this colonization but were also deeply affected by it. Hence when studying Hindu nationalist discourse of today, we soon discover how Muslim subjectivity is constantly framed in opposition to that of the morally righteous subjectivity of the West and that of the tolerant subjectivity of the Hindus (van der Veer, 1996; see also Kolodner, 1995; Panikkar, 1997). The term tolerance is itself related to the incorporation of Muslim and Hindu populations into a global inter-civilizational discourse, where Muslims, the old rival of the West, are labeled fanatic and bigoted, while Hindus are seen in a more positive light as tolerant.

Hindu nationalists have been able to build upon these essentialized inter-civilizational discourses in the battle for India's history. This battle has been fought in media, in universities, in elementary and high schools as well as in policymaking institutions. In those states controlled by the BJP, textbooks have been written to glorify the "Hindu civilizational past," to revile the policies of the "Muslim invaders," to rename Indian cities and regions (such as Bombay to Mumbai), and to revise the relationship between Hindu religion, national identity, and citizenship (see Smith, 1993). The role of language has been significant in this process as noticed in the early-1990s when All India Radio sent out a directive to its employees regarding the use of Sanskrit. Newspaper translators in the respective languages

including Hindi, Urdu, and Kashmiri, were ordered to use Sanskrit for certain terms, insisting on Sanskrit being a secular language (Duara, 1991). For minorities, such as the Muslims, the closeness between Sanskrit and Brahmanism left a lot to be desired in terms of minority protection.

The most important attempt to rewrite history is, however, the case of Ayodhya—the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992—and the Hindu nationalists' claim that it is the actual nativity site of the Hindu god Rama. The mosque itself, which originates from the 1500s, is supposed to have been built on the Hindu god Rama's birthplace between 900,000 and 5,000 years ago, depending on the "priest" consulted (van der Veer, 1996). Hindu nationalists have long argued that the mosque should be demolished and a Hindu temple built there instead. The story behind the claim is that the Islamic ruler Babur should have destroyed the immemorial Hindu temple and erected a mosque on its ruins. As a story it displays a certain historical logic—a linear time-conception and a demand for the reenactment of medieval politics.

By viewing history as linear, Hindu nationalists exhibit a time conception that is highly consistent with positivist-empiricist notions of what constitutes history. This is problematic in at least three ways. First, a linear time-conception provides a simplistic view of historical events as it ignores more complex, often contradictory, historical readings. In doing this, it also aims to provide a single version of the past. Second, it can be argued that linear time-conceptions interpret historical events as taking place in an orderly, either/or, fashion, India is open or closed; Hindu or Muslim; imprisoned or liberated. Few events actually occur in such neat categorizations. Third, linear time-conceptions play into the belief that history, even historical myths and fabrications, can always be verified or falsified—thus ignoring the fact that interpretations of history is constantly playing into current belief and power structures.[6]

In the case of Ayodhya the Indian nation had been founded by Ram and undone by Babur. In terms of medieval politics, the Babri Masjid, and similar sacred places, are seen as symbols of Hindu subjection that makes their destruction a necessary part of the liberation movement of the Hindus. The strategy is to deny creativity to the Muslims (Bhattacharya, 1991: 128). To "prove" their case, Hindu nationalists have supplied a list of more than 3, 000 sites across the country where, they say, Muslim emperors usurped Hindu ground. Even the Taj Mahal has been claimed to be built by a pre-Islamic Hindu movement and then appropriated by Muslim aggressors, rather than being built by a Moghul emperor to commemorate his wife (Misra, 2000; Smith, 1993). Any of these sites could become sites of contestation in the future.

These stories show how any cultural narrative must have supporting "evidence" if its proponents are to convince others. As a result archaeological excavations have been performed at sites described in the two great Sanskrit epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. Excavations at the Ramayana sites, such as Ayodhya, revealed that these sites were younger

than the Mahabharata ones, which posed a certain problem as Rama of the Ramayana is supposed to have existed later than Krishna of Mahabharata. As one archaeologist commented, however, "we will strive and strive with success to make archaeology and tradition about Rama and Krishna meet on the same plane of time" (van der Veer, 1996: 144–45).

The real force of the Hindu nationalists' propaganda stems from their ability to emphasize the objectivity of the archaeological records. The VHP[7] has been especially successful in situating the chronologies of archaeology within a temporal framework that has forced historians and archaeologists into the field by seeking to submit the original field reports to vigorous appraisals where every detail is being relocated to its "proper" context (Shaw, 2000). This attempt to reerect boundaries between archaeology and local tradition has made it possible to construct a single version of Ayodhya's past. By using a number of narrative strategies, such as concocted figures, dates, and names, the myths become authenticated and create an illusion of concreteness. Concretization, as noted by Bhattacharya (1991), goes along with a method of familiarization. By recounting mythic histories about the reigns of Humayun, Akbar, and Aurangzeb, citing a few well-known sources, we are persuaded to believe in the authenticity of the narrative. Attempts to disprove such narrative through archaeological means, thus becomes part of a larger quest for "setting the history right."

The Struggle over History: Neo-Gandhianism and the Search for a Hindu Self

Historians at the left-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) have been persistent in their attempts to discredit Hindu nationalist and civilizational accounts, publishing pamphlets, books, and newspaper articles. In doing this, however, there has sometimes been a tendency to deconstruct the historical or archaeological base of Hindu nationalists' arguments by appealing to actual evidence and proofs (van der Veer, 1996),[8] thus buying into a "mythical" essentialized discourse through engagement. Some of these scholars, such as Panikkar (1991), a neo-Nehru secularist, have insisted that we must differentiate between "faith" and "facts" and only engage when "facts" are being contested. Neo-Gandhian cultural nationalists, such as Ashis Nandy and T. N. Madan, have argued that such a differentiation is not possible and have instead pointed to the need for properly understanding precolonial religious culture (see Jurgensmeyer, 1996: see also Desai, 1999, 2002; Smith 1996). Nandy has insisted in making a clear distinction between the *Hindutva* type of political ideology and Hinduism, where the latter is regarded as a "faith and a way of life" that permeates Indian culture and civilization. Madan has made similar claims in his hopes that traditional culture can become the basis for a new Indian unity, and Partha Chatterjee has joined this culturalist discourse by launching a new historical nationalist project to "fashion a 'modern' national culture that is nevertheless not Western" (Juergensmeyer, 1996: 133).

This "internal" debate between the neo-Nehru secularist historians and the neo-Gandhians may not always be as separated from Hindu nationalism as it would like to be. By insisting on disproving VHP claims, the neosecularists have difficulties in staying away from the hegemonic narrative provided by the VHP, a narrative that relies on a "mythical" essentialized discourse. The neo-Gandhians, on the other hand, in their search for continuity of a collective memory in order to move constructively from the past to the future, run the risk of glorifying and establishing *a* past that can be verified or falsified. To this should be added those liberal historians, like Brian Smith or Ray Chaudhuri, who claim to stand up for universal principles in their equation of Hindu nationalism with fascism and who accuse more constructivist approaches of providing a relativist "scholarly legitimation for distortions of truth and murderous attempts at ethnic or religious cleansing" (Smith, 1996: 2, see also Juergensmeyer, 1996).

The neo-Nehru secularists and the liberal historians converge in their beliefs in universal values as opposed to the neo-Gandhians' insistence on culture as the basis for particular rights-claims. In this the debate resembles the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate in the West, where the former is focused on either humanity as a whole or on individuals, while the latter is concerned with the political community. This debate is not clear-cut, as liberal-multiculturalist policies in the West have often focused on groups' rights, but with groups being perceived in individualistic terms (see Bauman, 2001; Okin, 1999; Parekh, 2000; Modood, 2005). Policies of multiculturalism and the Indian version of secularism thus share some important characteristics. Both the language of multiculturalism and Indian secularism emphasize how each group in society is said to be protected through the politics of separation rather than integration. This policy often goes together with the liberal emphasis on tolerance and the right to self-assertion and recognition of the group's (often perceived as inherited) identity. As such it corresponds with the liberal belief in politically unconstrained modernization and globalization, and reinforces assumptions of universality and individualism by giving the group homogenous universal features based on rights for the group (Bauman, 2001). One of the main problems with the liberal approach as well as with neo-Gandhian analysis is the assumption that there exists such things as shared cultures (or shared ideologies) (van der Veer, 1996), where each culture has clear boundaries.

When Ashis Nandy and other neo-Gandhians oppose the oppressive and homogenizing values and institutions of Enlightenment, modernity, and colonialism, they praise, instead, an authentic traditional Indianness that has survived both the impact of modernity and the ravages of Hindu nationalism. Nandy here uses the language of critical traditionalism as a discourse of emancipation for colonized (and recolonized in the era of globalization) societies. However, as Desai (2002: 78) points out, Nandy's "critical traditionalism" has profound potential for authoritarianism. "His conception of 'tradition,' 'culture,' or 'civilization' (terms he uses interchangeably) is an elite and conservative, and a Brahminical, one." Authentic

tradition involves the search for a "true" (religious) Hindu self that can resist the onslaught of modernity, secularism, and the Westernized middle classes of India (see Nandy, 1980; 1983; 1997).

Nandy's (1997) argument that secularization as a policy can survive only in nonsecular societies is hence part of an underlying critique against the modern state in India where the humane and tolerant alternative of the real (religious) India must stand up to the "anxieties of a post-colonial society" (Nandy, 1989). This choice of intertwining religion and politics is heavily influenced by independence movement leaders like Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi who employed a discourse that often resembled the Hindu notion of dharmic obligation. Gandhi's continued reference to "Mother India" and "Indian civilization" intentionally invoked characteristics of Hindu religious worship, and despite the fact that he was the most fervent champion of Hindu-Muslim unity, he often took a communitarian view.[9] Here Nandy resembles Gandhi in his insistence on justifying and defending "the innocence [of the "nonmodern" or "traditional" colonized cultures] which confronted modern Western colonialism" (Nandy, 1983: ix; cf. Desai, 2002: 81).

What much of Nandy's and other neo-Gandhians works show is how culturalism converge with neoliberalism in its emphasis on "Indian tradition" and "Indian civilization" as containing "true" bodies of thought. But his claims to Indian authenticity also appeals to a leftist audience, particularly in the West.[10] Radhika Desai even insists that Nandy's claims to progressiveness is greater in the West than in India, where many on the left remain skeptical. His fame in the West, she argues, has to do with the fact that he has been promoted by a small group of followers in American and British universities who have elevated him to the "status of an iconoclastic prophet of liberation from the South" (Desai, 2002: 83).

This promotion, Desai maintains, has prevented any serious interrogation into his work. In comparison, Nandy has been criticized more in India. Indian feminists have been particularly outraged by Nandy's treatment of the 1987 incident of *Sati* (widow burning).[11] He blamed this event on "market morality"—a pathology that had come about as traditional way of life began to collapse because of outside forces—rather than on the role of Hindu patriarchal tradition (see e.g., Qader and Hasan, 1987; see also Desai, 2002; Nanda, 2004).

Conclusion

Neo-Gandhians, neo-Nehru secularists, and liberal historians have all been confronted by a number of constructivist historians, such as van der Veer, Juergensmeyer, and T. K. Oommen, who problematize the construction of knowledge and meaning and show how these are always constructed in relation to others and to discourses of power. As van der Veer argues (1992) in relation to the struggle over Indian history-writing—this "internal

cultural debate" is not a "static debate isolated from the larger context of historical change." Instead it is clear that Hindu nationalism, and its concern with an authentic Indian (read Hindu) civilization, has been strong throughout history. However, as van der Veer (1992) notes, there is more than one version of it and these versions have had more or less support at different points in time. But in order to construct a "true" history of the Hindu past, such contrasting versions must necessarily be ignored in favor of an essentialized account of Indian historic events. In this neo-Gandhianism inadvertently converge with Hindu nationalism, despite the fact that Nandy himself has been one of the most outspoken critics of the movement.

Neo-Gandhians, in their search for a Hindu self, have been quite successful in reestablishing boundaries around concepts of self, nation, culture, and civilization although their claims have been to give voice to marginalized groups who have been suppressed through Western discourse and Marxist accounts. Neo-Gandhianism may in this sense be significant of a greater problem inherent in interpretative accounts that seek to overthrow the reductionism of modern science by bringing to the forefront the debate about the concerns and thinking of marginalized people and groups. By highlighting the struggles of the marginals there is a danger of simultaneously valorizing the traditions most responsible for justifying traditional inequalities based on gender, caste, and race, among others. Hence the suspicion of scientific modernity runs the risk of uniting the left's criticism of Western hegemonic knowledge production with the fundamentalist wish to preserve and cultivate local knowledge as embedded in traditional cosmologies, religions, and practices.[12] This, I believe, constitutes an important observation to keep in mind as we are witnessing an increased preoccupation with reformulating, reinterpreting, and reinvigorating the concept of civilization.

Notes

1. See also Aijaz Ahmed (1992) who argues that Said only after the publication of *Orientalism* started referring to non-Western writers, and that even when referring to these authors they were still not treated with the hermeneutic engagement and informed reading that Said offered to Western canonical writers.
2. See also Ullock's (1996) discussion of how Chatterjee challenges a number of Western accounts of nationalism.
3. Neo-Gandhianism emerged in the 1970s in India. It built upon the ideals of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi, but put even greater emphasis on indigenism and a hardening of positions against both liberalism and the Left. Ashis Nandy, active at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in New Delhi, has been one its main spokespersons. Wanting to depart with both liberal descriptions of world politics and "alien" Marxism, such as the dependency school, the CSDS found its feet in the World Order Models

Project, an international group of academics from different "cultures" focused on preferred world political systems. The journal *Alternatives* is its main forum (see Desai, 2002).

4. This search for *one* secure identity in the light of global change is what I elsewhere refer to as the *securitization of subjectivity*, (see Kinnvall, 2004 and 2006) where religion and nationalism constitute particularly powerful identity-signifiers as they are better able to provide answers to existential quests for security than are other identity constructions. Parts of their appeal consist of their ability to rely on *Chosen Traumas* (or Chosen Glories, see Volkan, 1997), as these provide powerful links between past, present, and future action.
5. Compare the debate on multiculturalism as it has been played out in various literatures, such as the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate in normative theory. See for example, Archibugi, 2003; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Cochran, 1999; Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2000; Sandel, 1982; Shachar, 2001.
6. A number of postmodern/poststructural international relations scholars have shown what happens when we "read" history from a different perspective. Ashley's (1988) use of Derrida's technique of "double reading" to discuss the "anarchy problematique" and Bartelson's (1999) work on the genealogy of sovereignty (proceeding from Foucault) are two good examples of this in international relations theory.
7. Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) is a nongovernmental organization that was established in 1964 to spread "Hindu ethical values" and to establish links with Hindus in other countries. VHP attained national notoriety in the early 1980s when it organized an anti-Muslim campaign following the conversion of over 1000 Dalits, or former untouchables to Islam.
8. Although less so among the Delhi Historians' Groups, represented by a number of scholars based at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, such as Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Muhkherjee, Romila Thapar, Bipan Chandra, and others.
9. See Kolodner, 1995 and Panikkar, 1997. Kolodner further argues that Gandhi attempted to negotiate a compromise between secular and religious forces by applying Hindu ethical norms of satyagraha (the force of truth) and ahimsa (nonviolence) to the nationalist movement.
10. Meera Nanda (2004, 2005) takes this critique one step further by attacking postmodern, poststructuralist, and postcolonial scholars for running the risk of playing into the hands of fundamentalist movements everywhere. Hence she suggests that postmodernist and postcolonial intellectuals have been irresponsible in picking and choosing those aspects of the non-Western world that help them fight their own battles against modern science, without adequate awareness of the role local knowledge plays in sustaining traditional power structures in non-Western societies. I share many of Nanda's concerns although I remain skeptical of her tendency to group together diverse strands of thoughts, scholars, and activists working in a postpositivist tradition.
11. Refers to a public and ritualized murder of a young widow, Roop Kanwar, in Deorala, Rajasthan. Members of her family wanted to revive a high caste practice. Rather than condemning the perpetrators themselves, Nandy launched criticism against those condemning the perpetrators (Desai, 2002).

12. This does not imply an inadvertent celebration of modernity and the project of Enlightenment or that the historical route of Western science is the only route to take, ruling out alternative pathways. I am deeply sympathetic to interpretative attempts to interrogate historically established structures of power—indeed I find many of these both powerful and convincing. However, I remain skeptical to any standpoint epistemologies that privilege all understandings of marginals as truer, better, or more "authentic."

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 8

Discussion: American Empire and Civilizational Practice

Daniel H. Nexon

Introduction

Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Mark B. Salter, and Catarina Kinnvall each grapple with the political dimensions of civilizational discourse. Pasha reminds us that "civilizational essentialism can be effectively mobilized to consolidate hegemony" (62). Salter focuses on how the "war on terror is portrayed in American policy and public discourse simultaneously as a clash of civilizations and [a] war for Civilization" (81). The ideological architecture of Civilization, with its barbarian "other," facilitates, among other things, attempts by the Bush administration to withhold rights and legal protections from "illegal combatants." Kinnvall questions whether postcolonial articulations of civilizational identity—specifically in India—can escape the "essentialist trap" and therefore avoid reproducing aspects of imperial modes of domination (99).

All three chapters highlight the frequent conjunction between forms of civilizational discourse and empire. The role of civilizational ideology in justifying imperial control needs little elaboration (see e.g., Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 89; Pitts, 2006). The explicit notion of a "civilizing mission," for example, helped European liberals reconcile their core ideological beliefs with the inconvenient fact of empire. As Duncan Bell notes of Victorian Britain,

> During the last thirty years of the [nineteenth century], enthusiasm for the civilizing mission waned. Although it did not disappear, its fervor (witnessed especially in the 1830s and 1840s) was diluted by the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857 and the Eyre controversy of the 1860s. But duty, it was argued, compelled the British to remain in India, to accomplish its mission, and to uphold the honour of queen and country. In doing so, liberals argued, Britain itself would be ennobled, the character of its people re-affirmed, and India would be kept stable and propelled gradually into the future. (Bell, 2006: 289)

My goal in this brief chapter is to make more explicit the connections between contemporary civilizational discourse and the question of American Empire. Let me lay my cards on the table. I have always viewed a significant portion of the American Empire literature with skepticism. Many of those who accuse the Bush administration of having "imperial ambitions" invoke, at one time or another, its supposed penchant for unilateral action (e.g., Chace, 2002, 2003; Hendrickson, 2002; Nye, 2002). G. John Ikenberry (2004: 610), for example, associates imperial order with "American unilateralism, coercive domination, divide and rule strategies and reduced commitment to shared rules of the game."

Much of this analysis, from my perspective, simply recapitulates conventional arguments about the dynamics of hegemonic and unipolar orders: for example, whether unilateral or multilateral policies are more likely to trigger counterbalancing behavior. I always found something odd about the association between "unilateralism" and empire. States pursue unilateral policies when they act on their own, particularly without extensive consultation with third parties. Unilateralism, in other words, constitutes a prerogative of sovereign states, not a feature of imperial control. The terms empire and imperialism, at least as used in these contexts, struck me as little more than a way of supercharging conventional criticisms of the Bush administration's foreign policy.

But the three chapters I have been asked to consider give me pause. Salter, in particular, crystallizes for me how the aforementioned critics of American Empire get something very important right. Unilateralism, in itself, does not imperial ambition make. Unilateralism on behalf of some supranational community, however, takes us beyond the realm of sovereign-system prerogatives into an imperial domain. When U.S. policymakers assert their right to decide—to define the exception—for *either* Western Civilization or Civilization, they claim a form of imperial sovereignty.[1]

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in two sections. I begin with a quick overview of my basic position on the question of American Empire. This position derives from my commitment to relational forms of analysis, that is, viewing structures as relative stabilities in transactional patterns between social sites (see Emirbayer, 1997; Jackson and Nexon, 1999, 2001; 2002; Tilly, 1998, 1999). I then expand on the claim I made above: that the conjunction of unilateralism and civilizational discourse implies a different form of imperial logic.

Empire as Relational Structure

Ideal-typical empires combine two features: indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting. As Tilly notes (1997: 3), imperial cores rule their peripheries through the "retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts" and exercise power "through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy over their own domains" in exchange for "compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center." The scope of these

contracts varies across and within empires: some involve simply a threat to the effect that "we will leave you alone as long as you supply regular tribute," while others involve significant benefits reaped by elites—or even nonelites—in a particular periphery. The scope of indirect rule also varies in practice, from extensive autonomy for local intermediaries to rather tight imperial control over specific political, economic, and social domains.

For example, during much of the eighteenth century the North American colonies of the British Empire were essentially self-governing. The contractual basis of core authority varied not only across Britain's North American colonies, but also between those colonies and the British East India Company—which was itself an extremely autonomous intermediary between the British core and Indian components of the Empire (Lenman, 2001). In Korea, Japanese "governors-generals . . . functioned as imperial pro-consuls, rather than as mere agents of civil government." In Taiwan, they were "semi-autonomous and highly authoritarian." Elsewhere, they had far more limited autonomy. Thus, we see various combination of rule through intermediaries that themselves reflect heterogeneous contracting (Peattie, 1984: 25–26).

The relational structure of empires derives from the specific conjunction of indirect rule and differential bargains. As Motyl argues, the "most striking aspect of" ideal-typical empires is "the *absence of a rim* . . . of political and economic relations between and among the peripheral units or between and among them and non-imperial polities" (Motyl, 2001: 16–20, emphasis added). The segmented character of imperial authority, in combination with the use of indirect rule, produces a number of dynamics, including a shift from balance-of-power politics to logics of divide and rule, the development of strong cross-pressures that push and pull imperial cores in different directions, and special problems of legitimating imperial rule across heterogeneous audiences (see Nexon, 2006; Nexon and Wright, 2007).

If we follow this logic, American relations with specific polities do contain significant imperial dimensions. We should code the American occupation and postoccupation relationship with Iraq, for example, in imperial terms: as a mode of informal imperial control in which first the Coalition Provisional Authority and now the current regime operate as intermediaries between the United States and Iraqi constituencies. Outside of Iraq, the question of American Empire proves more difficult to resolve. We can discern elements of imperial relations in, for example, the current American role in Afghanistan and in its relationship with Pakistan. But globalization, the informal and sector-specific character of these relations, and other factors complicate any such analysis (Nexon and Wright, 2007).

It follows that unilateralism has no particular connection with imperial modes of control. Indeed, depending on the terms of the explicit or tacit imperial bargain, imperial subordinates may enjoy a wide range of voice opportunities in, and influence over, the formulation of imperial policies. What empires do involve, however, is a significant transfer of residual rights from a periphery to an imperial core: an empire claims sovereignty—or its

cultural equivalent—over at least some policy domains (Lake, 1996). It can, in Schmitt's terms, "decide on the exception" even though, in practice, doing so may provoke significant resistance to imperial demands and even lead to imperial fragmentation.

Unilateralism on Steroids? Civilization meets Unilateralism

What is the basic thrust of the arguments connecting unilateralism and American Empire, which I dismissed too quickly in previous work? We might restate them as follows: when the United States conjoins unilateralism with certain kinds of policy rationales—such as those stressing democracy promotion, regime change, counterterrorism, and other aspects of "messianism" or a civilizing mission—it will tend to form relationships in which leaders of other states take on the position of local intermediaries who interact with the United States based on heterogeneous and asymmetric bargains. In this sense, ideological frameworks that stress action on behalf of a supranational community, such as "the West" or "Civilization," contribute to the formation of, as well as sustain, imperial modes of interaction in world politics. Unilateralist policies become part of a broader recipe for (informal) imperialism, just as some critics of the Bush administration argue.

But we can also, as the previous three chapters imply, focus on how unilateralism manifests within a discursive context structured by civilizationalist rhetoric. In brief, the combination of unilateralism and civilizationalism does not simply promote the creation of imperial social relations. Rather, it generates legitimation strategies that are, in effect, claims to imperial sovereignty.

Sovereignty and Empire

We tend to think of sovereignty and empire as opposing one another. As we often tell the story in international relations (IR) scholarship, not only did sovereignty emerge in Europe out of the ashes of intra-European universal empire, but also, since at least 1945, colonial subjects have claimed rights of sovereign, national self-determination against imperial rulers. Articulations of state sovereignty, then, amount to claims against imperial authority.

Yet contemporary notions of sovereignty derive from imperial legal theory. During the medieval period, many monarchs in Europe (or at least their legal propagandists) invoked the Roman concept of empire as a way of claiming internal preeminence and external autonomy. A sovereign prince, the argument went, was an emperor in his own kingdom: *rex in regno suo est imperator in regno suo*, or *rex imperator in regno suo* (Pagden, 1995: 12). Theorists later joined with the phrase *rex qui superiorem non recognoscit*, meaning that a king did not recognize any superior authority—specifically,

that of the Holy Roman Emperor (Robertson, 1998: 16). By the early modern period, for instance, Francis I and Henry VII both "thought of their respective kingdoms as empires, by which they meant that they did not recognize a secular sovereign" (Koenigsberger and Mosse, 1968: 180).

Claims to sovereignty, then, operate in opposition to empire only in particular circumstances: when actors advance them on behalf of political communities against existing or would-be dominators. The logic of national self-determination, for example, suggests that sovereignty resides in a nation and thus contravenes the legitimacy of supranational domination associated with colonial empires (see e.g., Philpott, 2001). We might speak of "imperial sovereignty," in contrast, in terms of claims to preeminent authority over political communities that would prefer, all things being equal, to self-determine (cf. Doyle, 1986: 45).

I admit problems with this formulation. After all, as Ross Hutchings (2006: 435) notes, it reifies "the norms that ascribe" subordinate political communities "sovereignty. Under legitimized imperial rule, no such sovereignty exists, and such groups, whether or not they may be identifiable . . . may never have believed that they possessed" such sovereign rights. This is one reason why I advocate viewing empires in relational terms. On the other hand, once sovereignty becomes configured as the property of certain kinds of nonimperial political communities, it makes sense to associate imperial variations of sovereignty with assertions of authority beyond the boundaries of "sovereign states."

Sovereignty and Civilization

With the preceding discussion in mind, let us return to the notion that sovereignty involves a particular *kind* of authority: the "right to decide the exception." In an idealized sovereign-territorial state system, this right to decide the exception establishes *internal* sovereignty: the state (or its authorized agents) exercises this right with respect to a territorially delimited political community. It also establishes *external* sovereignty, insofar as no other actor has the right to decide the exception for that territory.

This condition gives rise to international anarchy: the international system is a state of nature in which states recognize no "higher authority to judge or dictate policy" (Krasner, 1999: 53). Unilateralism—the decision to go it alone—affirms the internal sovereignty of states without calling into question the sovereignty of other actors. For a state to act unilaterally in no way implies a claim over the sovereignty of other states.

But here we find the kind of paradox Stephen Krasner associates with realist theory: sovereignty implies both self-help and autonomy, but a state's pursuit of self-help may involve loss of autonomy.

> Self-help follows from anarchy; there is no higher authority to judge or dictate policy. A state can consider any policy that is in its self-interest. Yet the

> assumption of autonomy implies that some policies will not be pursued: rulers will not engage in actions that compromise the internal integrity of their own or other polities. . . . If there is self-help, there will be circumstances when political leaders will decide that constraining some aspects of the domestic policies or institutions of another state, or accepting constraints on one's own state, is the best policy option. In these cases, self-help undermines autonomy. (Krasner, 1999: 53)

Multilateral action, common international law, and other features of contemporary international relations represent, in some respects, ways to resolve this paradox: to reconcile losses of autonomy with an ongoing recognition of sovereignty rights. But here again, multilateralism, for example, does not necessarily imply the opposite of empire. Multilateral policies, like unilateral policies, represent ways state authorities pursue policies in an anarchical environment. They can go it alone, or they can engage in joint action to pursue their interests.

The implications of multilateralism and unilateralism, however, change noticeably in the context of legitimating frameworks that appeal to the West, Civilization writ large, or any other supranational notion of political community. When the United States, for example, takes *unilateral* action on behalf of the West it claims the right to decide the exception for other, putatively sovereign, polities within that broader community. At that point, unilateralism ceases to be a prerogative of any state in a sovereign system, and becomes a manifestation of imperial sovereignty by one particular state (cf. Hutchings, 2006: 436). The United States asserts sovereignty, in one way or another, over the citizens of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other members of Western Civilization.

Multilateralism, on the other hand, involves joint decision making by other members of, to take for example, the West. The United States no longer acts as an *imperator* or, if you will, the core of the West; instead, the community itself—or some combination of its constitutive polities—exercises sovereignty. The analogy here, as John Ikenberry (2001) and Daniel Deudney (2006) both note, is with republican sovereignty in which "the republic" is coterminous with the civilizational community. Multilateral action, of course, often serves as a thin veneer for the interests of one or a few powerful states, but it at least genuflects in the direction of a nonimperial framework in which sovereignty inheres in the civilizational community itself.

A number of practical consequences follow from whether state actors claim to be acting on behalf of the West (or any other particular civilization) or Civilization writ large. When the United States justifies unilateral action on behalf of Civilization against barbarians, it claims a form of universal sovereignty. But when it justifies unilateral action on behalf of Western Civilization, it claims sovereignty only over a more limited political community.

One implication of this distinction concerns other actors that have the right to contest American unilateral action—to claim, in essence, a right to share sovereignty. To take but one example, Janice Bially Mattern shows, in her analysis of the Suez Crisis, disputes between the British and American over leadership of 'the West' factored into political contestation between the two powers (Bially Mattern, 2004). Fewer actors, arguably, enjoy the right to share in decision making on behalf of Western Civilization, let alone to contest the legitimacy of American action on their behalf, then do with respect to Civilization writ large. Acting on behalf of Civilization carries with it no obvious exclusion comparable to the distinction between Western and non-Western societies; hence, mapping zones of barbarism, as Salter shows, becomes an essential component of an actor's assertion of sovereignty over "Civilization." As Salter argues, "in [former secretary of state] Powell's definition, it is America who defines which states are civilized and which are not. Further, if nations are civilized they are at once under threat." In this articulation, "if the nations do not perceive the threat to civilization, they have marked themselves as outside the community of civilization and thus open themselves to attack by America and its civilized allies" (88).

Consider, in this context, Pasha's and Kinnvall's analyses of intercivilizationalism and postcolonial articulations of civilization. One way that actors might challenge, for example, United States' action on behalf of Civilization *is to assert the distinctiveness and equality of their own civilizations*. Doing so places limits, at least within the discursive battlefield of international politics, upon assertions of imperial sovereignty through rhetorical appeals to Civilization. But it also, as Kinnvall shows, risks reaffirming essentialist notions of civilization that, in turn, reproduce imperial sovereignty and its particular logics of exception.

Actors might, of course, also assert their membership within Civilization writ large or within a narrow civilization: "we really are part of 'the West.'" But in the latter case, they face a dilemma: membership allows actors to claim some sort of right over the fate of the community, but also renders them objects of sovereign exceptions carried out on the community's behalf. In sum, unilateralism on behalf of a civilizational community changes the character of self-help; self-help becomes, in fact, a form of coercive "other help" dictated by a specific state—or coalition of states—claiming the right to speak for the community as a whole.

Final Reflections

We should not lose sight of the most important reason why civilizational discourses occupy such an important place in contemporary world politics: current events, for many observers, vindicate Huntington's "clash of civilizations" hypothesis. Huntington's framework becomes an unavoidable site of contestation for those struggling to make sense of current events, as

well as for those seeking to justify various foreign and domestic politics. The connection between civilizationalist discourses, empire, and unilateralism suggests, however, that other forces also sustain the salience of civilizationalist ideologies in contemporary world politics.

Note

1. I should also thank Alexander Wendt for suggesting this line of reasoning.

Part III

Inter-Civilizational Encounters

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 9

Global Standards of Market Civilization

Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke

With the evolution of the modern states system there have existed "standards of civilization" to which states must measure up to and conform if they are to fully participate as legitimate and sovereign members of international society. The capacity for a high level of social cooperation and self-government of any given society, including economic governance, has long represented a hallmark of "civilization" (Bowden, 2004a). Historically a society required organizational capacity to enter into and uphold mutually binding contracts under the law of nations, the principle of reciprocity being a key demand of relations among the society of states. And though the idea of "uncivilized" societies is at odds with recent trends toward political correctness, today terms such as "good governance" imply a similar logic whereby states and societies are required to conform to contemporary global standards of civilization. At the same time, as in the past, the workings of markets continue to be thought of as having a civilizing effect on society; both internally amongst its members and in external relations with other societies. The latter, that is, the arena of international external relations is a particularly significant concern in an era of elevated globalization and ever-increasing economic and financial interdependence. But as Norbert Elias has observed, "if the reduction of mutual physical danger or increased pacification is considered a decisive criterion for determining the degree of civilization, then humankind can be said to have reached a higher level of civilization within domestic affairs than on the international plane." For at the global "level we are living today just as our so-called primitive ancestors did"—something akin to international anarchy (Elias, 1988: 180–81). As to whether this is the case or not is a matter of considerable debate, and is of more than just a peripheral concern here. The establishment and enforcement of global standards of market civilization are at the very heart of efforts to pacify international relations (IR) through expanding and normalizing the complex web of ties that bind states together—in short, through globalization—supposedly to their mutual advantage.

Globalization and Discourses of Civilization

The concept of civilization and its relationship to globalization has received renewed attention in the wake of recent events in the conduct and study of international politics, including the realm of international political economy (e.g., Mozaffari, 2002a; Cox, 2002; Gill, 1995; Linklater, 2004). Although civilization is a term that is widely bandied about in modern political discourse (and the popular realm beyond), its meaning is generally poorly understood. As such the term is often misused, even abused. Our aim here is to set the record straight and to provide a more nuanced insight into how the term might more usefully be applied to the study of economic globalization. In particular we seek to demonstrate how the notion of a standard of civilization as going hand-in-hand with the "golden straitjacket" (Friedman, 1999) of free-market capitalism has not been sufficiently thought through. The concept of a standard of civilization is necessary in the globalization debate because it provides the basis from which peoples and states are ranked according to their capacity to fit within market globalization. This chapter questions how this can be justified. As such, what we focus on here is civilization—or the *ideal* of civilization—and standards of civilization in particular. Although *civilization* in the normative sense and *civilizations* in the descriptive Huntingtonian sense (Huntington, 1996a) are closely related terms or concepts, the latter is largely set aside for our purposes here. Rather, our point of reference for discreet sociopolitical collectives is the state, for it is primarily through the state, its various apparatus, and its engagement with international and intergovernmental institutions that peoples are managed in the contemporary international system. In essence, then, this chapter deals with issues of globalization, governance, and the management of peoples in contemporary international political economy. It does so by using global standards of market civilization as the means to that end (see also Bowden and Seabrooke, 2006a).

Extant contributions to this emerging field by Robert W. Cox, Stephen Gill, Gerrit W. Gong, Samuel P. Huntington, Mehdi Mozaffari, and Susan Strange tend to focus on outright "clashes," totalizing neoliberalism, or legal international institutions. They do not sufficiently problematize the use of civilization within the globalization debate. It is here, where there are some complementarities between the notion of a standard of civilization—externally established benchmarks for sociopolitical self-organization—and the notion of policy diffusion from international institutions to states. To date this literature has rarely talked to each other but there is much to be gained by doing so.

Within political economy literature the concept of policy diffusion has become increasingly popular, as has literature developed from organizational sociology on institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Thomas et al., 1987). Much of the focus within political economy and IR–literature is on the processes through which global standards flow

down to states, often attributing little agency to those on the receiving end of a standard. Typically a standard is introduced through policy diffusion via technical capacity building (Simmons and Elkins, 2004); from the exercise of "structural power" as authority shifts from states to markets under neoliberal globalization (Strange, 1996); by an international institution's use of "intellectual technologies" (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004); or through the inculcation of norms on what is appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Most prevalent of studies on how states conform to a standard of civilization is early constructivist work in IR. For this literature a norm may be spread through the creation of a civilizing discourse. States willingly adopt the norm in order to demonstrate that they measure up to a standard of civilization, that they can be good members of international society (Finnemore, 1996; Price, 1997).

A key criticism of this earlier literature in political economy and IR is that while it borrowed from sociological institutionalism there was not much that was sociological about it. More recent work in IR, however, has problematized how a standard of civilization, and the notion of an international society, is "Janus-faced," that its adoption by states generated different outcomes and is context dependent (Suzuki, 2005). Here norm diffusion and socialization is not only about how a "logic of appropriateness" was extended to states wishing to be civilized, but also about how norms can constitute the meaning of behavior (Ruggie, 1998).

Similarly, in political economy the literature on policy diffusion, particularly the notion of policy convergence, has been challenged by "varieties of capitalism" scholarship that emphasizes how institutional change takes place along national path-dependent lines (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Recent "economic constructivist" work has also become sensitive to the inextricability of ideas from interests, and how the spread of ideas requires struggle and contestation among social groups within a polity (Blyth, 2002; Seabrooke, 2006a). Finally, "new institutionalist" literature has demonstrated that norms on policy change, particularly global standards, are not simply diffused but, rather, *translated* into domestic contexts (Kjær and Pedersen, 2001; Jacobsson et al., 2004). All of this recent literature has great potential for understanding not only how global standards of market civilization are devised from the "top-down," but also how "bottom-up" processes influence their adoption or defiance. It also asks us to look at practices of global standards of market civilization rather than viewing institutions as providing always the same advice, or states passively adopting global standards. From this aspect market civilization becomes not simply the dominant political and economic power's benchmarks for technical capacity or "world's best practice," leading us to assess others' need to civilize and adapt their capacity to meet the standards of modern capitalism. Such self-referential and functionalist analysis is certainly not what Elias (2000) had in mind in his studies of civilizing processes. Rather, if we question civilization as a framework for meaning, as we should economic globalization or capitalism, we allow ourselves to understand nonfunctional

and noneconomic dynamics that inform what can be referred to as a global standard of market civilization (see also Kristensen, 2005). Increasingly innovative work has questioned market civilizing processes by tracing the practices through which they originate in the institutions promoting them, as well as how they are practiced within different national contexts and economic systems.

This chapter, then, is concerned with how global standards of market civilization can be conceptualized and how they work in an era of intense globalization. International institutions have increasingly embraced, and are responding to, globalization by asserting the need for states in the developed and, especially, developing world to reform themselves in line with global standards. Such standards are evident across a number of crucial issue-areas that are both interrelated and intensifying. From financial crises to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the formation of "national integrity systems" to fight corruption to the role of reformation of the moral self, global standards demand us to change to successfully engage market civilization. Such changes have ramifications from the macrolevel of international institutions to the microlevel of personal health and well-being.

Civilization, the Civilizing Ideal, and Standards of Civilization

In essence, the capacity for reasonably complex sociopolitical organization and self-government according to prevailing standards are widely thought of as central requirements of civilization. The presence, or otherwise, of the institutions of society that facilitate governance in accordance with established traditions—originally European but now more broadly Western—have long been regarded as the hallmark of the makings of, or potential for, civilization. Central to the ideal of civilization are its tripartite components: economic civilization, social civilization, and legal civilization (Collingwood, 1992). What they amount to is sociopolitical civilization, or the capacity of a collective to organize and govern itself under some system of laws or constitution. The oft-overlooked implications of this value-laden conception of civilization led to the colonial-era legal standard of civilization; and more recently its political successors, such as the global standards of market civilization discussed herein.

Historically, the standard of civilization was a means used in international law to distinguish between civilized and uncivilized peoples in order to determine membership in the international society of states. The concept entered international legal texts and practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the influence of anthropologists and ethnologists who drew distinctions between civilized, barbarian, and savage peoples based on their respective capacities for social cooperation and organization. Operating primarily during the European colonial period, and sometimes referred to as the classical standard of civilization, it was a legal mechanism designed to set the benchmark for the ascent of non-European nations to

the ranks of the civilized society of states. Membership in international society conferred full sovereignty upon a state entitling it to full recognition and protection under international law. A civilized state required: (1) basic institutions of government and public bureaucracy; (2) organizational capacity for self-defense; (3) published legal code and adherence to the rule of law; (4) the capacity to honor contracts in commerce and capital exchange; and (5) recognition of international law and norms. If a nation could meet these requirements it was generally deemed to be a legitimate sovereign state entitled to full recognition as an international personality (see Gong, 1984; Bowden, 2004b, 2005).

The inability of many non-European societies to meet these European established criteria and the concomitant legal distinction that separated them from civilized societies led to the unequal treaty system of capitulations. The right of extraterritoriality, as it was also known, regulated relations between sovereign civilized states and quasi-sovereign uncivilized states with regard to their respective rights over, and obligations to, the citizens of civilized states living and operating in countries where capitulations were in force. In much of the uncivilized world this system of capitulations incrementally escalated to the point that it became the large-scale European civilizing missions that in turn became colonialism.

The formal standard of civilization was effectively rendered redundant at the close of World War II. The abrogation of the laws of war as seen in the nature of the totalitarian aggression perpetrated by members of the thought to be civilized world highlighted the anachronism of maintaining a legal distinction between civilized and uncivilized states. The use of nuclear weapons and the subsequent evolution of the concept of mutually assured destruction further undermined the notion of distinguishing between degrees of civility. The war also prompted a growing number of civilized states to recognize that the claims of anticolonial movements in much of the third world to their right of sovereign, independent self-government was increasingly justified and legitimate.

While it might be accurate to mark the post–World War II demise of the formal standard of civilization, in its place a similar hierarchical order parallels and perpetuates the basic functions of the old order, at least in the conduct of international politics if not in international law. During much of the cold war era, the Westphalian states system was effectively a two-tiered system divided along much the same lines as in the colonial era. It was a system whereby the superpowers and their allies abided by an understanding that peace in Europe should be maintained at any cost, while at the same time the contest for influence in the third world was keenly pursued, often by means of violent proxy wars.

In the twenty-first century the world continues to be divided according to states' capacities for sociopolitical organization or systems of government, and still in accordance with Western standards of good governance. Today states are not often explicitly characterized as civilized or uncivilized; rather, distinctions are now drawn between states that are increasingly

referred to as well-ordered or not well-ordered; civic or predatory; postmodern, modern, or premodern; legitimate or rogue; and in the extreme, good or evil. The post–cold war–cum–war on terror(ism) order is generally more receptive to suggestions that liberal democracy and the values associated with it, such as human rights and free markets, are universal aspirations. Hence follows the argument that human rights and democracy combined with policies that promote neoliberal economic globalization are the appropriate standard for the globalized and interdependent world of the twenty-first century.

As with the classical standard of civilization, the current measure of civilization revolves around non-Western states' capacity to self-govern in a manner that allows them to engage with the West (through trade and investment, etc.) in adherence to international law and custom. For some, the identification of different zones of civilization is nothing more than a description of existing or emergent political realities, but on another level its normative advocates see the West as the vanguard of global order. While there is a need to distinguish between different types of states on the basis of legitimacy, it generally goes unacknowledged that there are detrimental consequences to the enforcement of any standard of civilization. The theory of different shades of civilization necessarily requires differential treatment—that is, double standards—where the boundaries of those zones intersect; on the one hand privileging members of the international society of civilized sovereign states, and on the other setting high barriers to entry for the excluded. Moreover, just as the division of the world into civilized and uncivilized peoples and the enforcement of the classical standard of civilization led to colonialism, so too there are serious implications for how the thought to be less civilized world is intervened in by the supposedly more civilized world in the present era through global standards of market civilization.

Progress, Modernization, and Development

Closely related to the ideal of civilization and its accomplice, standards of civilization, is the idea of progress. This idea has two related aspects: the first is that the human species universally progresses, albeit at different rates, from an original primitive or child-like condition, referred to as savagery, through barbarism, to civilization. The second is that all human experience, both individual and collective, is cumulative and directed toward the ongoing improvement of the individual, the society in which the individual lives, and the world in which the society must survive. Acceptance of both propositions leads to the notion that human history has a purpose or *telos*; that history is a story of universal linear progress toward a certain point or end. Or what Mozaffari refers to as the movement toward a "global civilization" based on Western values and ideals (2001).

The idea of progress is said to represent the "first theory of modernization" (Iggers, 1982: 65). Robert Nisbet makes the pertinent point that the

"abundance in the social sciences of foundations and government agencies dedicated to such concepts as 'underdeveloped' 'modernization' and 'developed' is tribute to the persisting hold of the idea of progress in the West" (1980: 308). Probably the most well-known theory of modernization of the twentieth century is Walt Rostow's five stages of economic growth theory. At the height of the cold war, and at a time when communism was perceived to pose its greatest threat to capitalist democracy, Rostow proposed what was explicitly a "non-Communist manifesto" for economic development. He identified in his manifesto five distinct stages of societal-economic progress, evolving in the following order: (1) traditional society; (2) the preconditions for take-off; (3) take-off; (4) the drive to maturity; and finally, (5) the age of high mass-consumption. Despite being labeled an economic theory, sociopolitical organization naturally plays a significant part. In elaborating his manifesto, Rostow argued that the stages he identifies are "not merely descriptive," nor are they "merely a way of generalizing certain factual observations about the sequence of development in modern societies." Rather, he maintained that they "have an inner logic and continuity. They have an analytic bone-structure, rooted in a dynamic theory of production" (Rostow, 1960: 4–13).

The relevance of modernization theory to this chapter is revealed in Gong's claim that "one cannot speak of 'modernization,' or the 'process of becoming modern,' in historical perspective without referring to what an earlier age called 'civilization' and the 'process of becoming civilized.'" And Gong maintains that this conceptualization is "Still relevant today," for "there are no value-free models of development or economic and financial interaction" (1998, 2002: 80). This statement implies an unabashed air of superiority in Western societies' catalogue of claims of achievements and having arrived at modernity. To put it another way, modernity is widely regarded as being the world in which Westerners of capitalist liberal democracies live, while the rest of the world—particularly the third world—is thought of as somehow being backward or premodern. This process is not simply promulgated from the first world to the third. In the nineteenth century during the classical standard of civilization some societies that were excluded from the first tier of civilized societies, such as Russia, referred to their need to overcome backwardness through industrialization (Gerschenkron, 1962; Kotsonis, 1998). In modern parlance backwardness is identified with underdevelopment. From this viewpoint modernization, or modernity, is achieved via development. This idea is quite clearly expressed by the then World Bank senior vice president and chief economist Joseph Stiglitz's account of what it means to be developed.

> Development represents a *transformation* of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more "modern" ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is; the modern perspective recognizes change,

> it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions that, for instance, reduce infant morality, extend lifespans, and increase productivity. Key to these changes is the movement to "scientific" ways of thinking, identifying critical variables that affect outcomes, attempting to make inferences based on available data, recognizing what we know and what we do not know. (1998)

In Richard Norgaard's more skeptical tone, "Modernity, in short, promised to transform the heretofore slow and precarious course of human progress onto a fast track. . . . At mid-twentieth century, progress somehow still assured peace, equality, and happiness for all." And further, that this "confidence in the possibilities of progress was rallied in support of an international economic development that would transform the lives of even the most 'obdurate' landlord and peasant in the most 'backward' reaches of the globe" (Norgaard, 1994: 1). This process has not always been smooth sailing; all too often the fast-track option has been derailed, leaving considerable wreckage and the inevitable return to the drawing board. But there have also been some successes.

Should we equate success with the delineation of a superior way of doing things? In addition to the older discourse on "backwardness" is the more recent propagation of how to transform institutions within "transition" economies. Much of this literature carries the baggage of modernization theory described above, but it is imbued with a new verve drawn from the end of the cold war and the triumphalism of liberal capitalism (e.g., Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). Nowhere is this more evident than in post-communist "transition" states where the "shock therapy" reforms of the early-1990s sought to instill free market capitalism (e.g., Sachs, 1994). Here the initial aim was to change institutions to create market incentives. Institutional isomorphism across postcommunist states established by international financial institutions (IFIs) would provide clear signals to the West that the Eastern bloc was trying to meet the new standards of market civilization. However, as political scientists and sociologists have been keen to point out, social change does not simply reply to changes in market incentives. Social reengineering is not quite as straightforward as simply changing the formal structure of institutions. And in cases where "shock therapy" institutional "revolution" was successful it was highly dependent on the social evolution of attitudes that welcomed market capitalism as suitable behavior (Campbell and Pedersen, 1996). Global standards may be imposed from above, but they can only be truly implemented with consent from below. Moreover, despite providing the "right" formal institutions desired by IFIs, or others, states may still not change their domestic social behavior. Such gaps between rhetoric and practice may be the case in many emerging market economies (EMEs) that formally adopt the IFIs' requests to reform institutions in line with global standards but not their practices. EMEs might be, in other words, learning to "talk the talk" without "walking the walk" (Seabrooke, 2006b).

Double-Edged Discourses

Civilization is a dangerous concept. It is not alone in this but it is *the* social scientific concept to have reemerged in scholarly and popular public discourse as a potential aid in navigating through turbulent and troubling times. The concept of civilization can be dangerous because of its ambiguities. At once it can call us to realize improvement within our own society while disparaging the legitimacy of other ways of organizing social, political, and economic life. It can provide us with a moral quest that can also justify imposing one's supposedly superior standard of institutions, values, and beliefs about sociopolitical organization on to so-called inferior and backward peoples who would do well to listen. If they refuse to take heed then a civilizing mission may be justified for their own good. Civilization is double-edged; it causes harm through the double standards it propagates.

When civilization is applied to markets similar problems abound. The notion of market civilization draws us too easily into looking for standards in order to replicate how the economically powerful became so, rather than questioning the social and political foundations of dominance. We are too readily impelled to assess the notion of market civilization through economic measurements, asking how to technically build better systems for economic growth, or to unravel what cultural traits, even essences, underpin the favored economic model of the day. At the same time, however, the concept of market civilization can prompt the opposite, inviting us to investigate how the economically dominant provide, consciously or unconsciously, structures of discipline that keep subordinate actors, peoples, and cultures in their place (Gill, 1995).

Such calls to inquiry, in our view, lead down the wrong track and reify the notion of civilization and market civilization. For us, the resurgence of interest in civilization in political theory, IR, and studies of economic globalization makes it all the more important to scrutinize and understand how the concept is used rather than to explain how global standards of market civilization are employed. All too often civilization is treated unproblematically as a gift that comes with cultural, political, or material preponderance (e.g., Mozaffari, 2001; Fidler, 2000). Alternatively, civilization is seen as fixed to cultural identities and ways of life that are incommensurable and sure to "clash" in the struggle for world dominance, or even survival (e.g., Huntington, 1996a). However, it is too easy to straw-man (or woman for that matter) entities such as Western civilization, Islamic civilization or Confucian civilization; these unhelpful conglomerations tell us little. Civilization too readily provides a cloak to mask power relations, and not only those imposed from above but also how civilizing processes can be resisted from below. Our aim is to problematize and contextualize the concept of civilization and its application to global markets rather than to reify and deify it.

We suggest that a more fruitful approach is to assess how articulations of standards of civilization are historically contingent, and how such standards

are applied in various forms of globalization. As Elias tells us, there is no "zero point of civilizing processes" from which to evolve from savage to barbarian to civilized (1992: 146). Contrary to long-held beliefs, there is no evolutionary historical trajectory that states and economies can join. This is particularly the case when discussing how civilization relates to economic globalization. Indeed, much of the literature invoking civilization or an endpoint to history has posited economic globalization as providing the means for less-developed states to attach themselves (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Friedman, 1999). But such path-dependent logic returns us to the problem that modernization theory and its contemporary equivalents—good governance, "transparency," "national integrity systems," and the like—provide a standard of civilization that is overrationalized and deterministic. Such catch-calls demand technical capacity building when deeper social dynamics may make them redundant, inappropriate, or just plain pointless. All too often such thinking is self-referential. The abstracted goals of the project are rationalized as the only object worthy of attention. This tendency encourages the assessment of the success of global standards on any policy issue to be made by checking formal implementation rather than the social change it engenders. Economic performance is measured by the standard indicators when social changes underlying or inhibiting growth are neglected and begging for attention. Such a view leads to policymaking that has no historical and no comparative sociological or cultural understanding (Kristensen, 2005). It leads to policymaking in a fishbowl. As Elias relates through his critique of social planning, such attitudes can do great harm:

> The contemporary type of rapidly-growing institutionalized and technicized social planning is—in the poorer, less developed as in the richer, more developed countries—aligned towards future, further development. However, this more conscious, to a greater extent *socially planned* further development, which in some societies encompasses more and more sectors and, in many, all sectors of social practice, is characteristic of a more encompassing *unplanned* development and is constantly interwoven within this unplanned further development of human societies. (1997: 370, emphasis in original)

"Unplanned" development, as Elias puts it, provides the major constraint to any institution or power wishing to establish a global standard of market civilization. It also calls on us to provide a more sociological and nuanced understanding of the relationships between the civilizers and those they seek to civilize. Similarly, Reinhard Bendix once commented that while external powers—be they the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or others—may seek to install "functional equivalents" of their preferred policies within states, first the state must be willing to adopt them (Bendix, 1977: 416). For policies to work, they require legitimacy.

As noted, Gong has argued that modernization is inextricably linked to civilization and that investigating civilization calls us to recognize that there are no "value-free models of development or economic and financial interaction" (Gong 1998, 2002). Indeed, questions of legitimacy in the willing adoption or imposition of global standards of market civilization inevitably raise questions of justice and values. The idea that there exist standards of market civilization brings to the fore questions of justifying various processes of globalization. Furthermore, once civilizing standards are taken into account there is not an apolitical process of diffusion taking place under globalization. Nor can international institutions simply dictate a standard of civilization to their member states.

One strand of increasingly prominent scholarship in respect to how ideas about policy options are diffused and adopted is constructivist work in international political economy in particular and IR more generally (Finnemore, 1996; McNamara, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Reus-Smit, 1999; Blyth, 2002; Parsons, 2003). Constructivist literature has maintained a long-running interest in the concept of civilization as a social construct, just as it has placed emphasis on studying the social processes through which ideas and norms are transmitted. We stress caution in relation to how ideas and norms can be studied with respect to civilization, particularly given the general disposition within constructivist literature to study normative change toward the building of something "bigger and better" (for a contrast on "bad" norms see Rae, 2002). Once more Elias provides sound counsel in arguing against a view of norms as "benevolent, socially wholesome and integrating facts" (Elias, 1996: 159). Rather, for Elias there is an "inherently doubled-edged character of social norms, to the fact that they bind people to each other and at the same time turn people so bound against others. Their integrating tendency is, one might say, a disintegrating tendency" (Elias, 1996: 159).

Constructivists should be aware that when playing with civilization they are playing with fire. There is an urgent need to be aware of historical injustices and the legacies of oppression and appropriation; lest we repeat, or more accurately perpetuate the mistakes of the past. This is particularly the case with constructivists who focus on how "ideational entrepreneurs" carry and transmit ideas and norms. Much of this work concentrates on how ideas and norms are generated within international institutions and then diffused or disseminated to states—especially developing states—that wish to be considered civilized full-members of an international society of states (Finnemore, 1996). Caution is required here in interrogating contingencies behind the creation of such standards of civilization rather than replicating their normative agenda. Furthermore, despite drawing on the rubric of "social" constructivism, there is nothing very sociological about top-down assumptions as to how norms are diffused. The interaction of ideational and material resources that back persuasion, including getting actors to morally inculcate or at least obey a global standard, has not been sufficiently explored (Payne, 2001). More attention needs to be

paid to how the creation of standards creates not only a rationalization of appropriate behavior but a moral authority that must be specified historically (Hall, 1997).

Similarly, recent Gramscian literature has also taken special interest in the concept of civilization and the transmission of norms and ideas (Cox, 2001; Gill, 1995; Morton, 2005). Cox, for example, has recently put forward the notion of civilization as "*a fit or correspondence between material conditions or existence and intersubjective meanings*" (2001: 110, emphasis in original). From this point of view civilization represents "*continuities* in human thought and practices" that have been created not within one particular state, but from "civil society" (Cox, 2001: 106, emphasis added). For Cox, this conception of civilization allows a comparative historical investigation of how people have dealt with economic phenomena, like globalization, and what futures they have imagined. However, the problem here is that such a focus asks us to look for *continuities* in thought across time. For us this appears too large an aim and too big a target. Standards of civilization are generally characterized by discontinuities and contingencies that call attention to the double-edged nature of civilization within economic globalization. Despite Cox's emphasis on civil society and bottom-up processes, we feel that any search for grand continuities, even if civil society is a focus, will inevitably smooth over history and overlook the traumas of civilizing processes and practices.

We are interested in not only how global standards of market civilization have been created and imposed, but also how they are being contested. To that end, the agency of the recipients of standards of market civilization is important (see also Hobson and Seabrooke, 2006). Much of the literature in institutional theory (particularly that which informs the constructivist work mentioned above) focuses on how standards were imposed from above through the "logic of appropriateness" that defined roles for actors to play, as opposed to ends to be acquired, the "logic of instrumentality" (March and Olsen, 1989, 1998). Like standards of civilization, logics of appropriateness call for orderly conduct, requiring actors to be on their best behavior in order to play well with others. Studies of such phenomena that only look from the top-down effectively remove the agency of those on the receiving end of civilizing standards by concentrating on normative consensus (Sending, 2002). However, as John L. Campbell has asserted, we should not see actors as "institutional dopes blindly following the institutionalized scripts and cues around them" (1998: 383). Rather, a focus on actions and practices dispels us of this notion of engineered conformity. Moreover, it reminds us that institutional change is an intersubjective phenomenon that must provide room for contestation for any policy change to have a chance of being effective. That is, while actors may signal that they conform to a global standard, the "institutional script," their actions and practices are somewhat different. Indeed, we must also bear in mind that "institutional isomorphism" is not simply a matter of copying the structures of the dominant in a local setting but, rather, engaging in

processes of "translation" and "bricolage" to fuse local practices, norms, and values onto introduced global standards (Campbell, 2004: 28–29; Jacobsson et al., 2004). Such processes produce institutional pluralism rather than institutional isomorphism.

Detailing such processes takes us into "everyday" life and away from dealing with top-down power structures. Standards of civilization impact on how people regard themselves, who they look to for salvation, and who they look to for survival. Here civilization is deeper than an external structure being imposed; rather, it is the internalization of orderly behavior. As Emile Durkheim noted, civilization "imposes upon man monotonous and continuous labor, [which] implies an absolute regularity of habits" (see Hamilton, 1994). More recently, Ted Hopf has sought to unravel the "thinkability" and "logicability" of what is possible in the construction of identity and one's interests (2002: 13–15). The effective implementation of global standards of market civilization, then, requires some degree of internalization. Expecting policy outcomes without such internalization of civilizing standards has led to a great deal of frustration among international institutions and prompted their calls for transparency, "ownership," and "political will." An insufficient understanding of how macroincorporation of a civilizing standard is not possible without microlevel inculcation is undoubtedly one source of this frustration and a topic for further conceptual and empirical development.

Policy Implications and Social Ramifications

In respect to the issues outlined in this chapter we have identified five key ways in which civilization is used and abused by a new generation of advocates and their adversaries. These five methods are concerned with outlining the processes or mechanisms by which global standards of market civilization are produced, implemented, and contested. Importantly, they also ask us where the source of the adoption and or rejection of civilizing standards lie, as well as differing views on whether the state or the market should take a civilizing role over the economy. Briefly, calls to civilization encompass: (1) *Normalization*: global standards of market civilization are essentially based on the global normalization of economic liberalism; (2) *Contestation*: global standards of market civilization can be contested by recipient states and peoples through various strategies; (3) *Market mechanisms*: global standards of market civilization view the mechanism of free capitalist markets as necessary for states to enhance their capacity for sociopolitical self-organization; (4) *Self-inculcation*: global standards of market civilization demand moral inculcation of the self, particularly at the level of individual self-responsibility; (5) *Ranking of peoples*: global standards of market civilization involve (and perpetuate), implicitly or explicitly, the moral ranking of different peoples and cultures. In one way or another we are seeing through these processes the perpetuation or extension of a

range mechanisms (many deleterious in effect) that have been with us in various forms for centuries.

What policy implications can be drawn from this study of global standards of market civilization? As noted above, the first is that we must turn our attention away from discussions of building technical capacity through implementing international institutions' global standards, or tracing idea and norm diffusion of ideational entrepreneurs, to provide a more thorough sociological understanding of what states and their peoples want in order to manage their political and economic lives—while not forgetting their social and cultural lives. There is little point in an international institution providing a common template for sociopolitical self-organization, a standard of civilization, if its policies within an economic reform program carry no meaning for the people involved. All too often policymakers and scholars of the various international institutions assume that the problem is administrative or technical capacity, and that given sufficient training the developing state would willingly comply. But this is hardly the case. For example, the high failure rate of the IMF's taxation reform programs is not a problem of training or technical capacity; which is readily available to most of its member states. Rather, the problem is the significance which people within the state, its citizens, perceive taxation as morally justifiable and, if so, what types of taxation and at what kinds of rates, and so on. Any aim to normalize a taxation system without addressing this problem of the relationship between the desired policy and the moral self will surely be contested, either publicly or in more silent forms of resistance (Kerkvliet, 2005). So while the IMF might plan with the Philippines to implement a new socially planned taxation system, much informal community based taxation takes place in the "unplanned" economy (Seabrooke, 2005). Opening the door to more sociological analysis of what conduct is considered appropriate would undoubtedly permit greater tailoring and customization of policy prescriptions with greater social legitimacy and implementation outcomes. On the flipside, a further danger is to avoid cultural stereotyping: for instance, that certain peoples or cultures do not have the capacity to engage with "modern" forms of capitalism at a productive level (Landes, 1998), or that cultural traits determine a certain path toward development (Harrison and Huntington, 2000). Such an explicit or implicit (moral) ranking of peoples is unacceptable.

Policymaking that deals with the creation and implementation of market mechanisms can learn from comparative historical investigations of former systems (North, 1990) as well as work in economic sociology (such as Elias and Weber) on civilizing processes of rationalization. Understanding the rationalization of markets, including motives for control and profit, is particularly important in identifying influences on market behavior that are outside of the self-referential performance criteria. Furthermore, the logic that markets work best when everyone has the same system, permitting a greater chance of perfect information, should be questioned when one considers that modern corporations tend to prefer stable profits and

control over fair and free market competition (Fligstein, 1990, 2001). So, instead of homogeneity among market actors, by knowing what civilizing standards are being rejected and contested, market differentiation and specialization rather than market exclusion might just be possible, preferable, and profitable. The introduction of market capitalism into many societies is being shaped by domestic pressures through translation and bricolage. A greater understanding and acceptance of what civilizing standards are viewed as legitimate and those that are not would both accelerate and improve this process.

Conclusions

We began this chapter by stating that it is primarily concerned with how global standards of market civilization are variously conceptualized and the process by which they are developed and evolve, and how they are in turn applied and enforced in an era of economic globalization. Pointing to historical and contemporary case studies and noting the continuities, parallels, and divergences between past and present, we have briefly noted how international institutions have enthusiastically embraced and applied global standards to deal with the challenges and potential windfalls presented by globalization. We have suggested that the application of global standards of market civilization can have both positive and deleterious effects on a number of crucial issue-areas, many of which are either directly or indirectly related; from financial crises to issues of endemic poverty to personal health and well-being.

We conclude on a note of caution: if the concept of civilization must be used at all, and recent trends in and beyond academic scholarship suggest it will be in vogue for sometime yet, we urge that it is used in a more nuanced and contextualized manner than it has been thus far. As Elias suggests, civilizing processes always contain violence as those who claim superiority claim their dominance (Linklater, 2004). However, Elias also outlines a positive conception of civilization that we embrace as the capacity to think "from the standpoint of the multiplicity of people" (Elias, 1994: 140). Following Elias, while we have sought to demonstrate that appropriate use of the concept can prove fruitful, we also urge that it be used cautiously; that appeals to civilization serve to neither reify nor deify the ideal, for as this chapter has also sought to demonstrate, both come with considerable risks attached.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 10

The Heterarchic *Umma*: Reading Islamic Civilization from Within

Peter Mandaville

International Relations (IR) has been struggling with civilizations for well over a decade now. Samuel Huntington's infamous contribution aside, IR theory has been replete with debates about the role of culture and identity in world politics (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Mazrui, 1990). The advent of critical, poststructural, and constructivist theories of IR sought to emphasize the importance of ideational factors and the processes through which diverse actors build intersubjective meaning (Der Derian, 1989; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). Others have mined the vein of historical sociology by way of exploring the contemporary relevance of civilizational analysis (Cox, 2002; Puchala, 1997). No account, however, has captured the popular imagination in quite the same way as Huntington's (1998) pithy story of civilizations in clash. A veritable cottage industry has emerged around efforts to refute Huntington (1996). Some point out that his cultural blocs are artificially bounded, insufficiently dynamic, and bear little resemblance to actually existing formations in the world. Others point out that he has simply reproduced the structural logic of state-based realism at a higher order of affiliation: gargantuan billiards balls pursuing power—defined, perhaps, in terms of something like "civilizational interest"—in an anarchical system.

The present chapter is not primarily concerned with the accuracy or veracity of Huntington's account, nor is it interested to propose better ways for analyzing civilizations. It is concerned with asking a set of questions about civilizational writing as a genre—more specifically, to inquire about the conditions under which "civilization talk" emerges as a discursive modality. How and why do we come to frame the world in this particular way, and what is at stake in doing so? What, strategically, does the writing of civilization seek to accomplish? The immediate backdrop for this inquiry is a set of contemporary debates structured around an intense yet often only implicit invocation of civilizational categories—Islam and (or, in some formulations, versus) the West. Particularly notable here is the

ease with which these terms are deployed in popular discourse today as common-sense referents whose correspondence to things-in-the-world seems unproblematic. That is, we seem to take for granted that there are, roughly speaking, distinctive cultural formations out there that can be identified as Islam and the West. We can discuss their features and attributes, and we can talk about how they have evolved across time and space in terms of ideas and values (ideational factors) and how their sociopolitical manifestations are configured within the world political economy (material factors). In short, we have no problem treating them as civilizations.[1]

The aim here, again, is not to challenge whether it is appropriate or accurate for us to posit the existence of such entities. Others have done this very well (Tuathail, 1996). Rather, we are more concerned with the political effects of this kind of talk—with the idea that a disposition toward reading the world in civilizational terms is symptomatic of a particular type of identity politics. Some have analyzed this as a politics of geocultural insecurity, an attempt by the West to assert its coherence and superiority in the face of numerous challenges from external forces (Shapiro, 1999). Others see in it an attempt to make sense of the world, to provide structure and some modicum of order in the face of considerable chaos and complexity on the global stage. The analysis offered here corresponds more closely to the first of these, although it is not so much concerned with the politics of establishing civilizational others. We already have available to us many accounts of how the construction of the West involved a particular politics of representation vis-à-vis would-be civilizational contenders, of which Edward Said's celebrated account of *Orientalism* (1978) is perhaps the most well-known. More recent authors have looked at similar processes from the other side of the cultural dyad, focusing on "Occidentalist" accounts of the West (Buruma and Margalit, 2004).

Rather, our focus here is on the internal negotiation of what the editors of this volume have, in their introduction, termed the instrinsic *heterarchy* of civilizations. The history of civilizations, in this view, is one of competing claims by multiple actors within a given ideational-material complex to define, speak on behalf of, and articulate the meaning and parameters of that civilization. Islam represents a particularly rich site in which to examine this phenomenon because of the three Abrahamaic faith traditions, Islam is perhaps the most decentralized in terms of lacking a formal clergy and official "church."[2] Although the history of any religion is in part a story of competing claims to authority and sacred authenticity, the inherent heterarchy of religious authority in Islam means that the discourses of its would-be spokesmen make for interesting lenses through which to view the internal politics of civilizational variegation. In short, what does reading a given set of civilizational claims from within tell us about the history and politics of producing that civilization?

This chapter will review two historical moments of debate among Muslim authority figures about the meaning and role of Islam in the world. The first of these involves two disparate Muslim responses to European

imperialism between the eighteenth and late-nineteenth centuries, both of which were framed in civilizational terms. Indeed, they were arguably the first attempts in the modern era to appeal politically to Muslims across the world as members of a civilizational entity. The second set of discourses to be analyzed are reflective of contemporary debates among key Muslim figures about how to understand the nature and meaning of Islam in the face of globalization. The overall framework and even some of the terms of these latter day conversations, it will be suggested, mirror aspects of the earlier debates. In each case we will identify the discursive strategies employed by various would-be voices of civilizational authority, and will conclude by offering some interpretation as to how and where Islam's internal conversations about its civilizational disposition has figured into contemporary rehearsals of the "Islam and West" debate.[3]

Why the choice of these particular authors and these specific moments? They are certainly not the only times Islam has been addressed and represented as a totalizing entity. Indeed, the notion of the *umma*, or world community of Muslims, had been around for a thousand years prior to the emergence of the first set of discourses we will engage. What is significant about both the colonial and globalization contexts are that they represent instances of civilizational discourse being mobilized simultaneously against internal *and* external others. In other words, these are not situations in which Islam's "civilizationess" was only projected outward in the face of an external threat from a civilizational competitor. These forms of civilization talk sought just as much to secure the internal coherence of a particular vision of Islam, and to reconstitute fragmented beliefs and practices around a core normativity *qua* civilization. Talking about cultural threats from abroad becomes a proxy language through which to address concerns about the state of culture at home. We are hence led, by these cases, to ask questions about who is actually being addressed when civilizations get written.

Islamic Responses to Imperialism

The Muslim world in the late-eighteenth century was a thoroughly fragmented entity. The traditional heartland of the Middle East was ruled by an Ottoman empire already in severe decline, with some of its more strategic waterways and passages attracting increased interest from European powers. Other areas of the Muslim world, such as Mughal-ruled India, were already coming under direct foreign rule (Lapidus, 1988). This geopolitical environment, and the "crisis" for Islam that it seemed to represent, prompted a range of responses on the part of Muslim scholars and activists. These are interesting for our purposes because they can be read, at least in part, as attempts to rearticulate the boundaries of Islamic civilization. What is most interesting about the two accounts from this period that we will be examining is that while they both point to the foreign domination of Muslim peoples and lands as indicative of the crisis at hand, they both describe its primary causal mechanism as *internal* to Islam. The two

approaches to be elaborated here are generally termed Islamic Revivalism and Islamic Reformism, respectively (Esposito, 1998). We can identify in them something like a mix of ideational and material components à la Robert Cox—that is, civilization as the "fit or correspondence between material conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings" (Cox, 2002: 161). Both accounts offered below decry the fact these two pieces have drifted out of correspondence, but differ in terms of which of the two they privilege by way of a solution to the crisis at hand.

Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Islamic Revivalism

The namesake of what is more commonly known today as Wahhabi Islam or Wahhabism, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792) was a pious religious reformer active in the central heartland of the Arabian peninsula in the mid-eighteenth century. Though it would be a stretch to describe Ibn Abdul Wahhab as a cosmopolitan in terms of the breadth of his engagement with the world beyond central Arabia, he was certainly keenly aware of the predicament facing Muslims around the world and also had some very clear ideas about what was to be done about it. He developed a reputation for preaching a fairly austere Islam premised on the need to return to the model and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and the immediate generations that followed him. This emphasis on the early pious companions, the *salaf as-salih*, has led later movements modeled on this aspect of Ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings to be labeled *salafi*—the standard orientation of much of the religious establishment in present day Saudi Arabia (DeLong-Bas, 2004).

Hence, such prescriptions were reflective of how Ibn Abdul Wahhab viewed the ills of Islam. To his thinking, the Muslim world had fallen into decline because Muslims had strayed away from the core teachings and practices of the faith. Ibn Abdul Wahhab had particular concern about the prevalence of what he saw as deviant practices associated with sufi mysticism. Labeling these activities, such as the worshiping of saints, as dangerous forms of *bid'a* (innovation), Ibn Abdul Wahhab sought to purify Islam and return it to its original essence through an intense and often very literal engagement with the original sources and the early companions of the Prophet. It is this approach that later came to be called Islamic Revivalism.

The central concept in his teaching was that of *tawhid*, referring to monotheism or the oneness of God, a theme elaborated in his key work *Kitab al-Tawhid* (The Book of Monotheism). To Ibn Abdul Wahhab, praying for saintly intercession and visiting graves seemed too close to idolatry and these actions represented everything that was wrong with Islam. The rejuvenation of Islam was to be achieved through a return to the universal core teachings, free from the distorting influences of sociocultural innovation. We know that Ibn Abdul Wahhab spent some time in Basra in present day Iraq where he encountered and debated with other leading religious

scholars. It is here that translation of his ideas into a political program began in earnest. Returning to Arabia he formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud (the direct forebear of Saudi Arabia's present kings), and with the military support of the latter undertook a campaign to spread the message of pious reform across the Arabian peninsula. Although Ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings did not find widespread purchase beyond the frontiers of Arabia, his ideas have formed an important reference point for successive generations of Islamist political project—not least of all among contemporary advocates of Islamic radicalism such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (DeLong-Bas, 2004).

But what did Ibn Abdul Wahhab represent in terms of a civilizational vision? For him the crux of Islam *qua* civilization was to be found in the core creedal tenants of religion. This is not to say that he had no interest in the material aspects of civilization, rather that the material—and by this we also include the social—manifestations of Islam as lived by Muslims were always to be judged in accordance with their proximity to a universal and unvarying normative core. This core, it is important to point out, was not open to pluralistic or historicist (re)interpretation. Ibn Abdul Wahhab had a clear sense of Islam's ideational bedrock and his complaint, primarily, was that the material conditions and lived reality of Islam had drifted well out of correspondence with this normative baseline—hence prompting the decline of Islamic civilization and weakening Muslims to a point whereby the incursion of foreign forces had become possible. In this regard, Ibn Abdul Wahhab might be seen as the ultimate foe of what today is known as "local culture." Although Wahhabism is often viewed as a parochial idiom of Islam quite peculiar to central Arabia, its chief purveyor actually understood himself to be concerned primarily with the exorcising from Islamic thought and practice of the corrupting influence of cultural idiosyncracy. Islam for him was not an entity whose civilizational strength lay in its ability to accommodate the diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations of religion that characterized its geographic breadth. Civilization without correct faith and practice was for him a vacuous thing at best. To be anything other than an essentialist, according to Ibn Abdul Wahhab, was to betray Islam.

Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Islamic Reformism

A rather different diagnosis of and prescription for remedying Islam's decline was to be found in the work of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), a scholar and political activist who lived and worked some hundred years after Ibn Abdul Wahhab's time. Afghani, later figured as one of the chief exponents of a trend that came to be known as Islamic Reformism, similarly located the source of Islam's decline within the religion itself. For him, though, the problem was not so much the abandonment of an ideational core as the failure of those charged with the maintenance of that centralized knowledge to keep up with the changing material conditions of the world.

Perhaps in contrast to Ibn Abdul Wahhab, Afghani was thoroughly in tune with the latest trends emanating from a wide variety of intellectual milieu. Where the former's worldview was shaped somewhat in the abstract in the relatively isolated setting of central Arabia (an area not under Ottoman or any other kind of foreign rule), Afghani theorized Islamic civilization through a direct engagement with the reality of colonial occupation. His biography is particularly telling in this regard. Despite what his name might suggest, Afghani was born in Persia and lived at various points throughout his life in India, Egypt, Turkey, and even France. An itinerant scholar-activist par excellence, Afghani moved from setting to setting, seeking each time to identify and rally a new generation of socially mobile Muslims around the cause of religious reform. In order to understand how the notion of Islamic reform figured in Afghani's civilizational analysis, it is necessary to look first at how he viewed the current state of the Muslim world vis-à-vis the West. The most concise statement of his thinking in this regard is contained in a famous essay entitled "An Islamic Response to Imperialism" (Keddie, 1968).

Afghani begins by seeking to decouple the direct agents of foreign occupation (e.g., Britain, France, etc.) from that which he understands to be the enabling force behind imperial power, namely science. He refutes the notion that any given country or culture can meaningfully lay exclusive claim to scientific capacity. Afghani implies instead that at different historical junctures, the center of world scientific production has varied, noting that science "is continually changing capitals" (Donohue and Esposito, 1982: 17). For him, the Muslim world in the tenth–twelfth centuries constituted the hub of global scientific innovation. This has simply changed with time, and with it, the locus of geopolitical hegemony. He is not, however, a technological determinist. Science and technology are only so good as the *philosophy* that underpins them, for "community without the spirit of philosophy [can]not deduce conclusions from . . . sciences" (ibid.). Indeed, for Afghani, philosophy must precede and lead to science in order for the significance of the latter to be properly understood and responsibly deployed:

> The first Muslims had no science, but, thanks to the Islamic religion, a philosophic spirit arose among them, and owing to that philosophic spirit they began to discuss the general affairs of the world and human necessities. This was why they acquired in a short time all the sciences with particular subjects that they translated from the Syriac, Persian, and Greek into the Arabic language. (ibid.: 18)

He goes on to decry the then state of intellectual output in the Muslim world, and it is herein that the crux of his internal critique of Islam lies. Afghani is concerned that the early philosophic spirit of Islam has been lost over the intervening centuries as the moral principles of the religion became codified as rigidly dogmatic jurisprudence. Present day scholars of Islam, in his view, had become intellectually stagnant through their

unreflective and uncritical use of medieval models and frameworks of moral philosophy. He elaborates,

> The science of principles consists of the philosophy of the *Shari'a*, or *philosophy of law*. In it are explained the truth regarding right and wrong, benefit and loss, and the cause for the promulgation of laws. Certainly, a person who studies this science should be capable of establishing laws and enforcing civilization. However, we see that those who study this science among the Muslims are deprived of understanding of the benefits of laws, the rules of civilization, and the reform of the world. (ibid.)

It is here that Afghani reveals himself to be most sharply at odds with Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Where the latter seeks to rescue Islam from its civilizational doldrums by reentrenching a literalist reading of a specific and narrow range of religious sources, Afghani equates civilizational strength with having a dynamic orientation toward knowledge. We should note, however, that his prescription is not simply one that exhorts Muslims to expend more energy studying science and technology. He notes in the essay, for example, that although the Khedive of Egypt had undertaken considerable educational reform and placed an emphasis on the empirical sciences, the lack of philosophical inquiry within the educational system had rendered pointless the mere acquisition of technical knowledge.

Afghani's goal then is to reform Islamic thought and scholarship so as to reinfuse it with what he sees as an originary spirit of philosophical inquiry. It is not the case that Muslims were engaged in deviant behaviors that distracted from the core teachings of their religion (as per Ibn Abdul Wahhab), but rather that they had lost the will and capacity to engage in original inquiry and critical thinking. Also crucial to bear in mind is that for Afghani this project of Islamic intellectual reinvigoration possessed a distinctly political valence. It was understood to constitute a path out of colonial rule. The political program to which it was attached went under the mantle of Pan-Islam and deliberately invoked notions such as the *umma* (the "world community" of believers) rather than seeking to appeal to nationalist sentiments (Landau, 1990). It was, in short, an attempt to reanimate Islam as both an ideational and a global material reality. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Afghani was a teacher to a number of figures who would later go on to emerge as key figures in twentieth-century Islamic modernism and social reform, such as Muhammad Abduh. The political component of the project, however, ultimately failed because most Muslims found it difficult to articulate the spirit of modernism and reform in the material form of a renewed commitment to the *umma* as a social entity. Bonds of national affiliation—and, concomitantly, strategies of national liberation—proved a far more attractive option to most as the early-twentieth century progressed through various upheavals in world order.

In each of these two late-imperial thinkers—Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Afghani—we find a different conception of what constitutes civilization in

the context of Islam: for Ibn Abdul Wahhab, a positive and unchanging core of thought and practice, specific to place and time; for Afghani, something decidedly more processual in nature—an iterative ideational/material dynamic whose specific content may well change significantly over time, and whose vibrancy is gauged in terms of achieving the correct balance between, loosely, "Islam for the world," and an "Islam of the world." As we will see when we come to analyze the terms of present day Islamic civilizational debate, traces of the same set of concerns continue to be present.

Islamic Responses to Globalization

The twentieth century found Islamic political thought struggling to situate itself in a world of nation-states, a political geography rather at odds with the premise of the *umma*. It can perhaps be said that between the period following World War I and the last decade of the previous century, Islam as a civilizational project ceased to function as a core trope within mainstream Islamic political thought. Most political theorists and activists, beginning with Rashid Rida in the 1920s and continuing on through key figures such as Abu Ala Mawdudi and the Muslim Brotherhood thinkers Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, accommodated themselves to the idea of "Islam for the world" as mediated through the less than ideal but necessary reality of the nation-state. Hence the project commonly known as Islamism—or the establishment of nation-state based political orders premised on the precepts of Islamic law (Enayat, 2005). Gone was the political language of pan-Islamic solidarity and the *umma*. Those few movements that did seek to rally around the vision of a renewed global caliphate, such as the group Hizb ut-Tahrir at mid-century, found their appeals falling on deaf ears. The intellectual project of Islamic modernism certainly continued, although it represented a minority trend. Figures such as 'Ali Abd al-Raziq (1925) as early as the 1920s, and more recently Fazlur Rahman (1984), Abdullahi An-Naim (1996), Nurcholish Madjid (Kurzman, 1998: 284–94), and Abdolkarim Soroush (2002)—just to name writers working across a range of Muslim national contexts—have consistently argued for the reinvigoration of Islamic thought and its compatibility with concepts such as human rights, modernity, and even secularism. Although many of these figures command an international audience, theirs has been primarily a narrow audience of intellectual elites without any attempt to forge an accompanying mass political movement à la Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani.

It would take another fundamental change in world order toward the close of the twentieth century to prompt the reemergence of a set of discourses addressing Islam and Muslims in civilizational terms. With the end of the cold war and the ensuing reconfiguration of geopolitical polarities, a number of Islamist groups began to rethink their orientation and agendas. Where Islamists in countries such as Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey had previously pursued national-level campaigns against what they saw as the corrupt regimes of national-secular (i.e., inspired by and conspiring with the

West) elites, a new generation of Islamists began to emerge in the late-1980s whose geopolitical theorizing and scope of activism were far more systemic in nature. Some observers have noted the "deterritorialized" nature of this distinctly globalized Islamism (Roy, 2004) while others have suggested that the notion of the *umma* has renewed currency (Mandaville, 2001) in the present climate. What did this new orientation look like and who were its key proponents?

The Afghan war against Soviet occupation throughout the 1980s was perhaps the major crucible in which this renewed Islamic globalism was formed. Fighters from across the Muslim world, but particularly the Arab Middle East, streamed into Afghanistan to join ranks with the mujahideen in their struggle against what were seen as the atheist (that is, even worse than infidel) forces of communism. In the aftermath of that perceived victory for Islam, many of these "Arab-Afghans," as they came to be known, returned home and found themselves quickly disillusioned by what they saw as their governments' collusion with Western powers. When Saudi Arabia subsequently invited half-a-million American troops onto the sacred soil of the Kingdom in the run up to the Gulf War of 1991, the scene became ripe for a new framing of global Islamism. In this formulation, the complaint and scope of political engagement were not confined to specific national governments or regimes—rather, all Muslims were exhorted to rally around a particular vision of Islamic struggle against a world system dominated by infidels and their conniving proxy states. It is within this intervention that we can begin to see the contours of a renewed emphasis on Islamic civilization.

Al-Qaeda and the New Islamic Revivalism

Al-Qaeda—which for our purposes is best treated as an ideological formation rather than an organization or operational entity—is perhaps the most iconic example of the new global Islamism. The founding of this movement developed out of the conclusion of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and the growing conviction on the part of its leadership that that period had been simply the opening battle of a much larger and enduring struggle (Gunaratna, 2002). The key figures are by now well-known and include Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (formerly the leader of Egypt's Islamic Jihad movement)—but also a number of lesser-known ideologues, such as the Palestinian-Jordanian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. An analysis of their elaboration of a distinctive worldview allows us to trace the reappearance of civilizational elements in Islamist discourse.

The central diagnosis bears a striking resemblance to the critique offered by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab some two-and-a-half-centuries earlier, but with a crucial new component. Though the Al-Qaeda leadership was certainly convinced that most Muslims had strayed from the true path of Islam and needed to return to core teachings defined in terms of the correct practice of the Prophet's early companions (hence making

them *salafis*), they also introduced an element of structural analysis that figured the West—and American hegemony more particularly—as impediments to the fulfillment of Islam's civilizational destiny. They sought in other words to couple *salafism* as a spiritual-ideational tendency with an active ("jihadist") orientation toward bringing political change to the world—hence the use by some observers of the term *salafi-jihadi* to describe the Al-Qaeda approach. The ultimate political goals of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are defined in terms of achieving a politically-embodied Islamic universalism in the form of a reestablished caliphate, or *khilafa*. This religiopolitical institution had functioned as the nominal (and often only symbolic) worldly figurehead of Islamic political authority from the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 until its abolition by Mustafa Kemal at the time of the founding of the modern Turkish republic. Al-Qaeda is just one of several *khilafist* movements in existence today. We can also count among their number a rejuvenated version of the aforementioned Hizb ut-Tahrir. Although these groups differ considerably in terms of their basic creedal orientation within Islam (Mandaville, 2004), their political goals have much in common in terms of seeking a renewed civilizational role for Islam.

The proudly essentialized Islam that characterized Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Islamic revivalism is also present in Al-Qaeda's account of religious authenticity. Much of their discourse is occupied with defining the boundaries of "true Islam" and accusing those Muslim authority figures that do not subscribe to their rigid *salafi* vision of having abandoned the faith. The identification of "internal others" is a hence a crucial component of the *salafi*-jihadism, and one that permits us to describe their approach as a form of Islamic Neorevivalism. The same basic analysis of Islam's malaise is present, but with much less conviction that properly reconfigured religiosity will provide the solution. Instead, this must be combined with—and, indeed, can only be achieved through—a pan-Islamic struggle against the hegemony of infidel powers.

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Civilizational "Centrism" in Islam

Where then are we to find the countervailing civilizational voices in contemporary Islam? As has already been mentioned, it is possible to point to a wide range of Islamic modernists, many of them offering the vision of a distinctly liberal "Islam of the world." (Safi, 2003; Kurzman, 1998) As has also been noted, however, the general appeal of this approach within the wider *umma* is quite limited. Very few of these writers possess formal credentials as religious scholars and many of them are based in or have been educated in the West, making it particularly easy for their critics to portray them as inauthentic, "Westernized" Muslims. To find a civilizational alternative to Al-Qaeda framed in terms of issues and traditions that resonate with mainstream Islam, we need to look beyond this rather narrow set of intellectuals.

Beginning in the 1980s, we can identify the emergence of what might be regarded as a new form of "civilizational centrism" in Islam. This is associated with the rise to prominence of a number of key religious scholars, perhaps the most important of them being Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926). Qaradawi, an Egyptian trained at the famed Al-Azhar University in Cairo, had strong associations with the Muslim Brotherhood movement through the 1970s. Moving later to the tiny Gulf sheikhdom of Qatar, he began in the late-1980s and particularly through the 1990s to shape a vision of Islamic identity in the world that was characterized by a need for Muslims to engage the specific issues of the day while staying true to the traditions of the faith and simultaneously rejecting the dangers of religious extremism. In this regard, Qaradawi can be seen as trying to articulate a form of Islam that is sensitive and responsive to the complexities of life in a globalized world, but which does not end up emulating Western liberal solutions to the entailing challenges. Qaradawi is concerned equally with what he sees as the errors of progressive liberalism in Islam (an "anything goes" approach to religion) and also the dangers of the extremism represented by Al-Qaeda and its ilk.

Taking up the Qur'anic injunction for Muslims to form a "community of the middle way," Qaradawi elaborates a firmly centrist vision that seeks to reconstitute the civilizational core of Islam (Al-Qaradawi, 1991). In this sense, he shares a common point of departure with the Reformist trend of the nineteenth century. Qaradawi's writings consistently criticize Muslim scholars who engage in the blind imitation of outdated thought and who castigate dynamic and pragmatic orientations toward sacred knowledge:

> If a scholar renders a decision that facilitates matters for Muslims, he is considered lax on religious issues; if a Muslim preacher tries to call people to Islam in a manner suitable to the spirit and the taste of the age, he is accused of succumbing to and patronizing Western civilization. (Kurzman, 1998: 202)

Since the 1990s, Qaradawi has sought to significantly expand the reach of his teaching and the breadth of his audience. Over the past decade he has assembled a veritable infrastructure for the dissemination of his teachings that leaves little doubt as to his ambition to serve as the figurehead of a new global Islamic centrism. From his extremely popular show on Al-Jazeera entitled *Religious Law and Life*, to the heavily used website Islam Online, to a range of research centers and surrogate organizations across the Muslim world (some of which cater specifically to Muslims in the West), the reach of his message has become formidable (Mandaville, 2005).

In 2000, Qaradawi published a book specifically on the issue of Islam and Globalization. In *Al-Islam wa'l-Awlamah* (Islam and Globalization), he registers a set of concerns about what he sees as the morally eroding effects of globalization and invokes Islam—figured, interestingly, as universalist in contrast to what he sees as the Americanism of globalization—as a defensive

mantle. His text is not wholly dismissive of globalization, but rather he continues the long-standing epistemological tradition in orthodox Islam of making a categorical distinction between moral and scientific knowledge—or, as he might see it, the ethical immanence of culture versus the abstraction of technical knowledge:

> Culture is not a pure and abstract knowledge; it is knowledge and cognitions mixed with values and beliefs, embodied in actions, and reflected in arts and literatures, which are learned and experienced. It is influenced by religion, language environment and cultural and civilizational legacies, as well as by interaction, positive and negative with others. (Qaradawi quoted in Najjar, 2005)

This relationship with the other is welcome in the context of globalization, so long as its benefits are mediated via a secure moral grounding in Islamic civilization. As mentioned much earlier, however, Qaradawi is well aware of the diversity and pluralism within the Islamic tradition today and the fact that he faces competition from other idioms of Islamic civilization. It is not surprising, then, that in 2005 Qaradawi played a key role in founding a world association of Muslim scholars, representing a wide range of sectarian orientations within Islam. The declarations issued by this group have been aimed quite squarely at Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, pointing out the dangers of extremism and questioning their legitimacy to issue religious legal opinions (fatwas) and, most importantly, to declare Muslims to be apostates.

How, though, to understand Qaradawi's approach as a form of civilizational discourse? We can detect this in at least two regards. First, his appeal is deliberately and distinctly framed in universalistic terms. It is for all members of the *umma*, and Qaradawi has developed the distributional capacity to prove it. Translations into local languages are a standard practice and great emphasis is laid on demonstrating how very specific local issues can be approached through the universal principles of the religion. Second, Qaradawi is also aware that appeals to a sense of Islamic civilization will only capture the imagination if they are framed in terms of some tangible, material manifestation. Where Al-Qaeda and the neorevivalists dream of a renewed caliphate *qua* global Muslim polity, Qaradawi urges Muslims to invest in a centralized, ecumenical body of knowledge of which religious scholars like him (*'ulama*) will be the keepers—an "epistemic caliphate."

We should note that in this regard Qaradawi is not seeking to democratize the production of religious knowledge. Rather he is trying to reassert and reconfirm the continued legitimacy of religious scholarship as an institution. At the same time, he walks a very fine line within the tradition itself, urging some latitude for contextualized interpretations of religion while at the same time seeking to reinforce clear boundaries of permissibility.

Conclusion

In the examples above, we have sought to emphasize the heterarchy of civilization through an exploration of several discrepant accounts of the nature and meaning of Islamic civilization during two historical junctures. What emerges from this account is a sense not just of how the positing of claims to civilization and civilizational superiority function as forms of geostrategic othering (à la Huntington), but how they also represent a space in which multiple actors seek to negotiate and structure the inherent pluralism of those entities on whose behalf civilizational claims are made. Contemporary conversations about civilization in Islam cannot be read, as much the Al-Qaedas might want us to, as simply a mirror image of Huntington's civilizations in clash—that is, as an objective analytical account of two discrete geocultural entities inevitably at odds with one another. Today's debates about the place and role of Islam in the world are part of a complex genealogy of internal debate that last appeared in the nineteenth century. It can be argued that even this late-imperial debate was itself the first iteration in the modern era of a schism within Islam that had been manifest at several other points in history.

By way of conclusion, we will want to return to the question of civilization as a discursive genre. The discussion above would suggest that when we encounter civilizational talk, we would do well to ask ourselves about the historical conditions under which self-described civilizational traditions attain currency. If we pry open these entities—which of course represent themselves as far more closed and bounded than they actually are—we tend to find as many internal enemies of a given civilizational vision as we do external challengers. The role internal others play hence emerges as particularly germane (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004). This reading of civilization, in the present juncture, allows us to posit Samuel Huntington and Osama bin Laden as rather unlikely bedfellows. In subsequent work, Huntington has shown himself to be particularly concerned about the effects of multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism on the integrity of Western civilization (Huntington, 2004). In this regard, Huntington and Osama bin Laden reveal themselves to be mirror images of each other in terms of civilizational discourse. Both posit an authentic, unyielding core to their respective traditions, each of which is seen to be under threat from the other. When we situate ourselves within each of these traditions and observe the process of writing civilization, we emerge with a much clearer sense of considerable internal contestations over the nature, terms, and trajectory of these civilizations. Reading civilization from within is hence an exercise that allows us to situate civilizational talk across multiple discursive horizons. The suggestion of a clash between Islam and the West—particularly when there appear to be significant constituencies on each side who support such claims—is best read as an invitation to learn something about the internal processes and politics through which each of those traditions produces itself.

Notes

1. It is worth noting that the Arabic term for civilization, *madaniya*, also derives from a root referring to the social order of towns and cities.
2. Although it is technically true that Islam, particularly in its majority sunni variant, lacks a formal clerical structure, there have existed throughout Islamic history privileged classes of interpreters (*'ulama*; sing. *'alim*, or "religious scholars") schooled in the methods and theology of religious science and also a range of jurisprudential specialists (*fuqaha*; sing. *faqih*). An excellent recent account of their contemporary role is to be found in Zaman (2002).
3. Other authors have taken up the theme of Islam and civilization in recent years, most notably Mehdi Mozaffari (2002). The primary interest of these writers, however, has not been in accounting for civilizational writing as a genre so much as to offer a more empirical account of comparative civilizations.

Chapter 11

Deconstructing the Eurocentric Clash of Civilizations: De-Westernizing the West by Acknowledging the Dialogue of Civilizations

John M. Hobson

The worst thing ethically and politically is to let [Eurocentric] separatism simply go on, without understanding the opposite of separatism, which is connectedness. . . . What I am interested in is how all these things work together. That seems to me to be the great task—to connect them all together—to understand wholes rather than bits of wholes. . . . In a wonderful phrase, Disraeli asks, "Arabs, what are they?" and answers: "They're just Jews on horseback." So underlying this separation is also an amalgamation of some kind.

—Edward Said, *Power, Politics, and Culture*: 260–61, 424

Introduction

This chapter contributes to the "civilizational turn" that is currently impacting the discipline of IR by developing an alternative civilizational approach to that pioneered by Samuel Huntington. Patrick Jackson (1999) has usefully differentiated two forms of civilizational analysis—substantialist and processual/relational—and argues that Huntington's analysis fits firmly into the former category (see also this volume's introduction). A substantialist approach is essentialist, wherein civilizations are thought to display essential characteristics that are largely static or unchanging. By contrast, a relational approach conceives of civilizations as sets of social practices such that their boundaries are written or drawn and redrawn over time. However, while Huntington might baulk at being placed in the substantialist category since he does in fact argue that civilizations change over time (e.g., 1996: 43, 44), nevertheless the logic of his position remains

otherwise, given that the traditional and *primordial* cultural/religious values that he focuses upon are by definition unchanging. Moreover, the second defining feature of substantialism seals his position within this category. This concerns the point that substantialist accounts view the reproduction of civilizations as *endogenously* generated. By contrast a relational approach—as the term properly implies—insists that civilizations are shaped and constituted, reshaped, and reconstituted, through iterated interactions with others around and beyond them (see also Barkawi and Laffey, 2006).

My "relational" point of departure lies in three key words that I borrow from Edward Said (2004): "acknowledgment," "affiliations," and "amalgams." We need to begin by *acknowledging* that civilizations are not only connected but are co-constitutive and mutually embedded in each other. Accordingly, the "clash of civilizations"—which presupposes that civilizations are autonomous and self-constituting—obscures the syncretic *affiliations* and dialogical processes that go to shape and constitute civilizations over time. In this way I argue that civilizations are not akin to self-constituting, solid billiard balls that interact only through conflict along their "hard" volatile edges. Rather, civilizations are *amalgams* insofar as they are never pure or pristine but are always impure or hybrid. And this occurs as they are socialized through iterated interaction with other civilizations. In turn, this necessarily blunts their "hard edges" and reveals them as overlapping and highly permeable. Thus civilizations *coexist* rather than meet only in head-on conflict (cf. Melleuish, 2000; Jones, 2002). Accordingly, Huntington's conception of civilizational edges as zones of conflict are better understood as "zones of contact" (Pratt, 1992) that generate "polycivilizational hybridity." And inevitably, all this culminates in bringing to the fore the "dialogue of civilizations" in the making of Western and Eastern civilizations (for a fuller discussion see Hobson, 2007). But so as to prevent any possible confusion here, I am not arguing that civilizations have not clashed either in the past or in the present. Rather, my point is that the headlining, if not "media-glamorous," discourse of the clash of civilizations has obscured the more peaceful, far less dramatic but highly consequential, *dialogical relations* that have constituted a vital facet of East-West relations throughout the last millennium.

While much of the critical literature on Huntington's approach focuses on the headlining clash of civilizations (eg., Henderson and Tucker, 2001), I focus squarely on the underlying Eurocentric definition of the West from which Huntington's theory and political prescriptions emanate. My basic political argument is that Huntington's policy prescriptions for "renewing and preserving the West" are unable to prevent the continuation of Western universalism. This is because they rest upon a Eurocentric or Western fundamentalist metanarrative, which generates a Western self that is defined only in hostile opposition to "inferior others." By contrast, I argue that we need to *reimagine the identity of the West along polycivilizational lines* before we can hope to create a more peaceful and harmonious world. And this can initially be achieved by *acknowledging* the *affiliations* and *connections* that

occur through the constructive dialogue of civilizations, which has been fundamental to the rise and development of what I call the Oriental West.

This goes hand-in-hand with a second interrelated acknowledgment—that the West owes a considerable debt to the East. For in the absence of Eastern help it is debatable as to whether the West would have ever risen to the top. Or to use Huntington's favored terms, without the Rest there would be no West; or at least a very different West to the one that we observe today. Ironically, however, the West has sought to deny or silence its Eastern heritage and instead of viewing non-Western civilizations as partners, it has preferred to construct them as hostile others. Not surprisingly, therefore, "civilizational partnership-politics" has given way to the politics of Western "civilizing missions." Accordingly, I suggest that these two acknowledgments should constitute the point of departure for the long walk toward genuine global reconciliation and the creation of relative peace and harmony in the world.

My argument proceeds in three stages. Section 1 outlines the essence of Eurocentrism while section 2 reveals how Huntington's approach rests upon this metanarrative. Finally, the longer third section spells out an alternative inter-civilizational and trans-civilizational history of the Rise of the West in order to develop a non-Eurocentric relational approach.

Revealing the Essentials of Eurocentrism

Eurocentrism or Orientalism is a discourse that was imagined in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as Europeans went about constructing European identity in the post-Christendom era. As Said and others originally pointed out, it was this discourse that suddenly pronounced the superiority of Europe over the inferior East (Said, 1978; Turner, 1978). In turn, this entailed two critical assumptions: first, that what had previously been thought of as interlinked, if not symbiotic, regional civilizations were suddenly relocated along either side of what was in effect an *imaginary line of civilizational apartheid*. This sentiment was aptly reflected in Rudyard Kipling's well-known phrase: "Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." And second, the European "self" was elevated to a position of superiority because it was thought to have unique and exceptional, progressive characteristics, while the East was demoted on the grounds that it had only regressive properties. More specifically, East and West were reimagined through two theories—"Oriental despotism" and the "Peter Pan theory of the East."

Both these theories merged, insofar as they imbued the West with a series of "rational presences" while simultaneously writing the East through a series of absences or irrational (regressive) characteristics. Thus, inter alia, the West was privileged with liberal democracy and rational bureaucracy, rational science, and progressive individualism, while the East was inscribed with irrational, oriental despotic states and patrimonial bureaucracies,

irrational religions, and regressive collectivism. This led to the belief that the West is and always has been dynamic while the East was dismissed as stagnant and unchanging. Moreover, the Peter Pan theory of the East, which views the East as a child that would never grow up through its own accord, has immediate resonance with the patriarchal discourse in which the West is likened to a paternal male, the East an imaginary female. In turn, this led directly onto the Orientalist representation of an Asia (or East) lying passively in wait for her Western Prince, since only he could wake her up with a gentle kiss and liberate her from the deprivations of her own nightmarish existence. This, of course, formed the essential rationale for conceiving imperialism as a Western "civilizing mission" and was famously captured by Rudyard Kipling's notion of "the white man's burden." Moreover, by branding the East as exotic, enticing, alluring, and, above all, passive produced a further rationale for the West's imperial gratification through its penetration, conquest, and control of the East. In short, it is the discourse of Eurocentrism that has underpinned the modern phase of Western universalism and the concomitant manufactured notion of the clash of civilizations.

Fundamental to this Eurocentric approach is the assumption that the West is self-constituting, such that its rise was the pure product of its own progressive characteristics and initiative. Or, put differently, the West made it to the top without any help from the Rest (i.e., non-Western civilizations). The upshot of this was the notion that Western history can be written as universal history since only the West could spontaneously develop and spread the gift of civilization to the Rest of the world. And if the East appears to be absent from the progressive story of world history, this is only because it had been already consigned to the dark ghetto of the marginalized periphery.

Importantly, this Orientalist discourse was at its height precisely at the time when the major theories of the Rise of the West were constructed—most notably those of Marx and Weber, and subsequently those developed by the majority of their followers. Crucially, they uncritically endogenized Eurocentrism and sought to explain the West's rise by looking only to causal variables that exist squarely within Europe (see Blaut, 1993; Hobson, 2004: Chapter 1). This was axiomatic given that they unreflexively accepted the twin Eurocentric notions of Europe's separation from the East on the one hand, and Europe's progressive uniqueness and exceptionalism on the other. And for these theorists, it was this that ensured the inevitability of Europe's breakthrough to modern capitalism and its impossibility in the East. Moreover, in the process they usually, albeit largely unwittingly, signed up to the project of Western universalism and the clash of civilizations. For as Marx and Engels famously argued in *The Communist Manifesto*, the Western imperialist bourgeoisie "draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. . . . In one word [the Western bourgeoisie] creates a world after its own image" (1985: 84).

Revealing the Eurocentric Western Fundamentalism of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" Thesis

Responding to the end of the Cold War and Francis Fukuyama's (1992) related optimistic celebration of the West, Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996a) injects a strong degree of "realist" pessimism. He seeks to erase Fukuyama's vision of a gradually increasing expansion of superior Western institutions to cover the whole world to thereby foster peace and signal the end of historical development. Instead he portrays a world that comprises eight distinct civilizations that stand in opposition to each other, much like realism's states under anarchy. That is, their borders constitute "zones of conflict" or, to use Huntington's preferred tectonic plate metaphor—"fault-lines"—that represent sites of civilizational conflict and war. Not surprisingly, the existence of inter-civilizational conflict is viewed as the *historical* norm even if such relations were less sustained before 1989. Indeed it was only during the Cold War, argues Huntington, that this feature was suppressed, though in the aftermath of its demise inter-civilizational conflict returned to stand at the very center of world politics. How then is his approach embedded within a Eurocentric metanarrative?

First and foremost, Huntington's Eurocentrism is apparent in his belief that the West developed its own unique or exceptional institutions, which enabled it to rise to the top entirely of its own accord (1996: 50–52, 69–72, 311). Or as he put it,

> The West differs from other civilizations . . . in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies. In their ensemble these characteristics are peculiar to the West. Europe, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said, is "the source—the *unique* source" of the "ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom. . . . These are *European* ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption." They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it is unique. (Huntington, 1996a: 311)

Moreover, if we extend the previous quote further it becomes immediately obvious that it is from this Eurocentric definition of the West whence his political prescriptions stem. "The principal responsibility of Western leaders, consequently, is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West . . . but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization" (ibid.).

It is significant to note that while his most recent book, *Who are We?* (Huntington, 2004b) stands as a critique of multiculturalism in the United

States, it soon becomes apparent that the intellectual seed of this book was planted in his earlier 1996 book. As he put it in the all-important closing chapter,

> Some Americans have promoted multiculturalism at home; some have promoted universalism abroad; and some have done both. Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western culture. . . . The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. (1996a: 318)

Or as he put it in a 1993 publication,

> If . . . Americans cease to adhere to their liberal democratic and European-rooted political ideology, the United States as we have known it will cease to exist and will follow the other ideologically defined superpower onto the ash heap of history. (1993b: 190)

Accordingly, when he proposes his political project of "renewing and preserving the West" he, in fact, reaffirms a particular form of Western identity—one that is fundamentally Eurocentric. And as his final chapter clarifies, the prime responsibility of the United States today is to police the Eurocentric *line of civilizational apartheid* that serves to keep the contaminating influence of the East at bay. It is at this point, however, that we confront a paradox, if not a contradiction, that lies at the base of his whole enterprise.

On a prima facie reading, Huntington's critique of Western universalism appears to avoid Eurocentrism. But, as should be clear from the earlier discussion, by subscribing to Western fundamentalism and thereby embracing a Eurocentric definition of a pure Western identity he inevitably signs up to the Eurocentric project of Western universalism given that the two are inseparable bedfellows. Put simply, it has been the Eurocentric definition of a pure, autonomous West that has paradoxically ushered in the era of Western civilizing missions, whether these be conducted by the British in the nineteenth century or the United States after 1945 (Hobson, 2006; Bowden and Seabrooke, 2006b). And even if this was not the case, Huntington's rejection of universalism still embraces a Eurocentric political project. For "[i]f 'the West against the Rest' truly describes the future of international conflict, what choice is there but to defend 'Our' inherited values against 'Theirs'" (Rubinstein and Crocker, 1994: 120).

My antidote to this pessimistic vision entails deconstructing the "pure West" by "de-Westernizing the West," which occurs once we erase the imaginary line of civilizational apartheid that was constructed and is continuously policed by Eurocentrism and its political representatives. This necessarily brings to the fore the hitherto obscured dialogue of civilizations. And crucially, this enables us to reveal the contradiction in Huntington's political project, which prescribes that the West needs to

maintain a pure Western culture as distinct from say Chinese or Islamic culture. For as we shall see in the next section, given that Western civilization has been significantly constructed through Sino-Islamic influences, denying the latter is in effect to deny the Western self.

Deconstructing the West and the Clash of Civilizations: Revealing the Dialogue of Civilizations in the Making of the Oriental West

While I do not seek to dismiss the existence of Europe's confrontations with various civilizations (see Hobson, 2004: 107–15, 162–73, 219–42, 257–77), nevertheless we need to begin by deconstructing the manufactured idea of the clash of civilizations. Here I seek to further Said's claim that:

> Rather than the manufactured clash of civilizations, we need to concentrate on the slow working together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together in far more interesting ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can allow. (2003: xxii)

And to quote from Said once more, this section will reveal the process of civilizational *affiliations* he defines as,

> a dynamic concept: [one that is] not meant to circumscribe but rather to make explicit all kinds of connections that we tend to forget and that have to be made explicit and even dramatic in order for political change to take place. (2004: 336)

I shall reveal these polycultural/polycivilizational affiliations by dividing this section into two subsections. The first will focus principally on the Islamic origins of Western civilization between c.650–1500 while the second does the same with respect to China, c.1500–1800 (although I shall also mention various other Eastern influences where necessary). I choose this particular focus and division of labor for two key reasons. First, Huntington views the alleged "Confucian-Islamic" connection as a key threat to the West. But as I shall argue below, this obscures the "Sino-Islamic opportunity" and the point that Western civilization has been significantly defined through this polycivilizational symbiosis. And a second reason lies in the point that Islamic influences on Europe were strongest in the c.650–1500 era, while Chinese influences tended to predominate after 1500.

The Islamic Origins of the Oriental West c.650–1500

Although Huntington's thesis is often thought to apply only to the post-1989 era, on closer inspection it becomes apparent that he views the clash of civilizations as a constant feature of world history (e.g., Huntington, 1993a: 25, 1996: 50). As implied earlier, the suppression of inter-civilizational

conflict during the Cold War turns out to be the exception that proves the historical rule (see also Henderson and Tucker, 2001: 322). How accurate, then, is the view that Europe's relations with Islam, which date back to the seventh century, can be adequately represented as but a clash of civilizations? Deconstructing this idea brings to the fore the dialogue with Islam that the Europeans engaged in throughout the period of the Crusades. This harmonious dialogue was important insofar as it helped fuel almost all of the major turning points in the rise of the West between about 650 and 1500. First and foremost, the famous European commercial revolution of the post-1000 period was enabled by Italy's trading relations with Islamic West Asia/North Africa that continued before, during, and after the Crusades. Second and more importantly, the dialogue involved the borrowing and assimilation of Islamic and Eastern ideas, techniques, technologies, and institutions that helped fuel European development in manifold ways. I shall take each in turn.

Eurocentric history tells us that global history begins with the Iberian voyages that launched the European Age of Discovery in 1492/1498. But this immediately obscures the Eastern Age of Discovery that began around 500 (Hobson, 2004: Chapters 2–4). And it was within this Eastern context wherein Europe's development must be situated. Although a host of Eastern agents were important here, including the Jews, Chinese, Africans, Indians, and Javanese, the crucial pioneering role fell to the West Asian Muslims. The West Asian Muslims built upon the earlier achievements of the Sassanid Persians, which stem back possibly to the third and certainly the fourth century. After 610, West Asia began its rise to global power with the "revelation" of Muhammad. The Muslims began the task of unifying West Asia through Islam and trade. That trade as well as rational capitalist activity was central to Islam should hardly come as a revelation given that Muhammad had originally been a *commenda* trader and that he married a rich Qurayshi woman (the Quraysh had grown rich from the caravan trade as well as from banking). The center of Islam, Mecca, was in turn one of the centers of the global trading network. Islam's power spread rapidly after the seventh century with the Mediterranean becoming in effect a Muslim Lake, and Western Europe a promontory within the Afro-Asian–led global economy. Islam also spread eastward to India, Southeast Asia, and China, as well as southward into Africa through either religious or commercial influence (and often both). Its economic reach was extraordinary for the time, constituting the pivot of world trade. And certainly by the ninth century—as various contemporary documents confirm—there was one long, continuous line of transcontinental trade pioneered by Islamic merchants, reaching from China to the Mediterranean (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 62; Hourani, 1963).

The Islamic Ummayads, Abbasids, and North African Fatimids were vital in that they united various arteries of long-distance trade known in antiquity between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. These refer principally to the middle and southern routes of the global economy

(Abu-Lughod, 1989). To the extent that Islam has been recognized at all by Eurocentrism it is assumed that its power was waning after 1000, thereby making way for the Italian commercial and financial revolutions, as well as the Renaissance that set Europe off on the long road toward capitalist modernity. But this obscures not just the continuing vitality of Islam in the global economy right down to the nineteenth century, but also the point that Italy's success in Europe was made possible only through its connections and affiliations with Islamic West Asia/North Africa.

Thus while the Venetians indeed dominated the European trading system, they always entered the global system on terms dictated by the West Asian Muslims and especially the North Africans. The middle route began on the Mediterranean coast of Syria/Palestine, crossed over to Baghdad, and then forked either along the land route to the East or southward to the Persian gulf, which then linked up with the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and beyond into the China seas. The land route tracked eastward across Persia to Transoxiana, before bifurcating into a southern link to India and an eastern link to China. Across these commercial routes the lucrative Eastern trade found its way across to West Asia, Africa, and Europe (mainly Italy), thereby enabling the Venetians to play an intermediary role between the East and the rest of Europe. Later, with the Fall of Acre in 1291, the Venetians had no choice but to rely on the southern route that was dominated by the Egyptians.

The southern route linked the Alexandria-Cairo–Red Sea complex with the Arabian Sea and then the Indian Ocean and beyond. The fall of Baghdad in 1258 saw the capital of the Islamic world shift to Al-Qahirah—later Europeanized to Cairo—that became the pivotal center of global trade (though this latter process began during the Fatimid era back in the tenth century). As Abu-Lughod claims, "Whoever controlled the sea-route to Asia could set the terms of trade for a Europe now in retreat. From the thirteenth century and up to the sixteenth that power was Egypt" (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 149). Indeed between 1291 and 1517 about 80 percent of all trade that passed to the East by sea was controlled by the Egyptians.

Eurocentric scholars emphasize that European international trade with the East dried up after 1291 (with the Fall of Acre) as Egypt dominated the Red Sea trade to the East *at the expense* of the Christian Europeans. But despite the numerous prohibitions on trading with the "infidel" issued by Pope Nicholas IV, the fact is that the Venetians managed to circumvent the ban and secured new treaties with the Sultan in 1355 and 1361. And right down to 1517, Venice survived because Egypt played such an important role within the global economy. Moreover, Venice and Genoa were not the "pioneers" of global trade but *adaptors* or *intermediaries*, operating within the interstices of the Afro-Asian–led global economy and entering the global economy very much on the strict terms laid down by the West Asian Muslims and especially the Egyptians. Nevertheless, the Venetians accepted this dependent relationship because it was through this that they gained access to the many goods that were produced throughout the East.

The impression conveyed thus far is that the Italians benefited from Islam insofar as the latter delivered the all-important Eastern trade upon which Venice's trading hegemony within Europe was founded. If that was Islam's only contribution it would surely have been significant, given that world historians always focus on the post-1000 commercial revolution as being instrumental in propelling Western Europe out of feudalism. But a far more important contribution to European development lay in the point that these trading routes also acted as conveyor or transmission belts along which diffused manifold Eastern "resource portfolios" (ideas, institutions, techniques, and technologies) into Europe. How did this occur?

Eurocentrism's celebration of Italy's financial and cultural genius obscures the point that many of the ideas, technologies, and institutions upon which they were based were pioneered in Islamic West Asia and then diffused across. We are generally told that Italy's capitalist genius was responsible for the invention of the *collegantzia* (or *commenda*) trading partnership institution in the twelfth century. But what we are not usually told is that the *commenda* was an exact replica of the *qirad* trading partnership that was developed by the Muslims many centuries earlier. Even so, as noted earlier, this should hardly come as revelation given that Muhammad had been a *commenda* or *qirad* trader. Moreover, all the remaining financial institutions, including banks, bills of exchange (*suftaja)*, checks (*hawāla*), and insurance schemes originated in Sumer and Sassanid Persia before they were developed much further by the Muslims. Nor were the Italians the originators of Weber's famous double-entry accounting system, since similar systems had been invented in West Asia as well as in India and China. Given Italy's extremely close trading links with Islamic West Asia and North Africa, it was hardly surprising that these institutions diffused across to be subsequently assimilated or copied by the Italians (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 6).

It might be objected that these diffusions are of economic significance only, thereby failing to undermine Italy's pioneering edge in cultural innovation. Indeed Eurocentric historians give pride of place to the Italian Renaissance insofar as it was crucial in ushering in a new modern epistemic phase. To the extent that the Muslims are credited with enabling the Renaissance, it is usually denigrated by portraying them as but librarians who merely handed the Ancient Greek texts back unchanged to the Europeans. It is true that at the House of Wisdom (*Bayt al-Hikmah*), which was founded in the early-ninth century by the seventh Abbasid caliph, al-Ma'mūn, Ancient Greek texts were translated into Arabic from which the Muslims learned a great deal. But Arab scholars also drew heavily on Persian, Indian, African, and Chinese thinking to craft a corpus of knowledge that extended, and at times transcended, the earlier Greek texts. Moreover the Muslims were often critical of Greek knowledge and sought to take it in new directions.

This claim, of course, immediately stands at odds with the traditional interpretation, not least because the Renaissance thinkers themselves were

in part anxious to forge a new European identity that was independent of the Islamic world. And so we come to the paradox of the Renaissance: that it was in part created to differentiate Europe from Islam and yet it was from Islam that the Renaissance scholars drew so many of their new ideas. How then did Islamic thinkers help shape the Renaissance and the subsequent Scientific Revolution?

Islamic breakthroughs in mathematics including algebra and trigonometry were vital. The former term was taken from the title of one of al-Khwārizmī's mathematical texts (as a result of the translation made by the Englishman, Robert of Ketton, in 1145). And by the beginning of the tenth century all six of the classical trigonometric functions had been defined and tabulated by Muslim mathematicians. Developments in public health, hygiene, and medicine were also notable. Al-Rāzī's medical works were translated and reprinted in Europe some forty times between 1498 and 1866. And Ibn Sīnā's (or Avicenna's) *Canon of Medicine* became the founding text for European medical schools between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. The Muslims developed numerous medicines and anesthetics and pioneered the study of anatomy. Notable here is that the Egyptian physician, Ibn al-Nafis (d. 1288), whose work on the human body, which contradicted the traditional position of the Greek physician, Galen, fully preempted the much heralded work of William Harvey by 350 years. The Muslims were also keen cartographers, astrologers, and astronomers and their ideas were avidly borrowed by the Europeans (see below). Notably, Ibn al-Shātir's mathematical models bore an uncanny resemblance to those used by Copernicus 150 years later. Indeed, Noel Swerdlow has suggested that it "seems too remarkable a series of coincidences to admit the possibility of independent discovery [on the part of Copernicus]" (cited in Saliba, 1994: 64). Also of note is that as early as the ninth century, al-Khwārizmī calculated the circumference of the Earth to within 41 meters. Significantly, the Baconian idea that science should be based on the experimental method had already been pioneered by the Muslims (not the Greeks). Moreover, Ancient Egyptian Hermetic texts also featured in the Italian Renaissance, given that they were translated after 1460 by Marsilio Ficino at the Court of Cosimo de Medici. Accordingly, the very term *European* "Renaissance" is problematic, since it exaggerates its Ancient Greek foundations and denies its substantial Eastern heritage (Hobson, 2004: 173–83; Goody, 2004: 56–83; Ghazanfar, 2006).

Last, but by no means the least, Europe's dialogue with Islamic West Asia was vital in enabling the so-called Voyages of Discovery. But in the light of the earlier discussion it should immediately be noted that the term "Voyages of Rediscovery" would be a more appropriate term. For while the Iberian "discoveries" might well have been a revelation to the Europeans, it was merely yesteryear's news to the Africans and Asians. Indeed all that was really happening was that the Europeans were *directly* joining the Afro-Asian–led global economy that had been created in the post-500 period.

And in any case the Europeans did not "discover" Asia and Africa, for the peoples of the latter had already long been in contact with Europe. How then did the Muslims enable the Voyages of Rediscovery?

The first requirement of oceanic sailing required the lateen sail, because unlike the square sail, the lateen enables ships to sail into a headwind. This was vital given the need to tack into the strong headwinds that blew up south of Cape Bojador on the west coast of Africa. Fortunately the Arabs and Persians had long been using lateen sails before they were finally passed onto the Europeans. In turn, the lateen sail led to a zigzagging (triangular) path that required the use of geometry and trigonometry to calculate the linear distance path traveled, both of which were passed on to the Iberians by the Muslims (as noted earlier). Furthermore, because the strong tides south of Cape Bojador off the west coast of Africa could beach a ship, knowledge of lunar cycles was required (given that the moon governs the tides). Once again these were passed on by the Muslims, though the Jewish cartographer Jacob ben Abraham Cresques, who was resident in Portugal, was also an important intermediary. Further Islamic contributions came in the form of solar calendars, more accurate navigational charts, latitude and longitude tables, as well as the astrolabe and quadrant (Hobson, 2004: 140–44; Seed, 1995: 107–28). In short, in the absence of this Islamic-European dialogue the Iberians would most probably have remained confined to the Islamic Mediterranean, with "the rest not being history."

But to answer the possible Eurocentric retort that this could all have been mere coincidence, thereby implying that the Iberians might have independently come up with all this as "parallel inventions," it is necessary to reveal the transmission paths of these ideas and techniques. Increasingly after about 900 Europeans began translating Islamic texts into Latin. Islamic scholarship developed not only in West Asia but also in Spain, where it was proactively encouraged by the second *Ummayad Caliph* (al-Hakkam II, 961–76). The fall of Spanish Toledo was especially important for it was from its vast library where the Europeans accessed many of the relevant books, which were then rapidly translated into Latin. Learning from Islam was actively continued by the Spanish King, Alfonso X (1252–1284), though largely through Jewish intermediaries (given the political difficulty of employing Muslims during the Crusades). Much the same was true of the situation in Portugal. Islamic ideas also entered Europe via the Ottoman Empire, which was heavily embroiled in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. Finally, Islamic ideas also entered Venice through the trade route from West Asia and North Africa as well as from Islamic Sicily after 902 (notable here was the profound Arabic influence on the School of Salerno after 1050).

This picture serves to produce an alternative vision of Islam's "infiltration" of Western Europe. For the manufactured idea of the clash of civilizations assumes that Islam's presence in Europe—as described above—was based on hostile intent and civilizational difference. Two points are noteworthy here. First, the assumption that the Muslims had been intent on conquering

"Western Europe" as was realized when Charles Martel successfully defeated an Islamic invasion in 733 is highly problematic. The truth is that this was no Islamic invasion, but was rather a small band of raiders embarking on a minor raiding mission (the target of which was the wealthy shrine of St. Martin). And second, Islam's presence in Europe was significant for its symbiotic and largely peaceful, cosmopolitan relations with the Europeans. Indeed behind the dramatic headlines of the "Crusading clash with Islam" lay a more mundane, everyday picture wherein Christians and Muslims as well as Jews peacefully coexisted for many centuries in cosmopolitan Islamic Spain (Menocal, 2002) and elsewhere in Europe (as well as in West Asia). Moreover a striking paradox emerged in the fact that under Muslim rule in West Asia, Jews and Christians were tolerated and protected in ways that even certain Christian sects had not allowed (e.g., in Jerusalem). And so to sum up: far from constituting a bridgehead from which the Muslims sought to launch attacks on the rest of Christendom, *al-Andalus* formed the final rampart of the Islamic "bridge of the world" across which Islamic and other Eastern resource portfolios diffused, thereby fuelling the progressive development of Europe.

All in all, then, we should not be seduced by the idea of a fundamental and inevitable clash of Europe and Islam precisely because this obscures the dialogue that was conducted between the two. And this dialogue was vital in enabling not just the early phase of the rise of the West but in positively shaping Europe's cultural identity (especially through the Reniassance). In turn, this latter point necessarily disturbs or disrupts the linear Eurocentric narrative, which traces a pure European developmental lineage back to Ancient Greece and then forward through the various intra-European temporal markers—feudalism, the commercial/financial revolution, the Renaissance and Scientific Revolution, and industrial modernity. For the fact is that the Muslims acted as "switchmen" in that they served to *retrack* the path that European development underwent, helping to put it on an eventual collision course with capitalist modernity. But while the Muslims were vitally important in the making and retracking of the West between about 650 and 1500, the progressive baton of global power and influence was then passed on to the Chinese who ran with it right down to the early nineteenth century (Hobson, 2004: Chapters 3, 5–9).

The Chinese Origins of the Oriental West c.1500–1800

After about 1500 Chinese influence was vital in retracking the still relatively backward West onto a catch-up phase with the East that culminated in the breakthrough to capitalist-industrial modernity. How then did this occur?

Let us begin by returning to the European Age of Rediscovery. China's contribution here was at least as important as that of Islam's. In particular, the Chinese passed on the all-important inventions of the square hull and sternpost rudder, the triple mast system, and the compass, in the absence

of which oceanic sailing would have been stymied. The other feature of the European voyages that is usually mentioned is the deployment of cannon on their ships. But this misses the point that the cannon was invented in China around 1288. The first European cannon is dated to 1326 in Florence and 1327 in England (the earliest illustration of an English cannon is found in Walter de Millemete's manuscript). This particular illustration is significant because it reveals that the English cannon was in fact identical to the earlier Chinese version, implying that the former was unlikely to have been an independent invention. Also of note here is that gunpowder was invented in China around 850 (and the first metal-barrelled gun firing a metal bullet was invented in China no later than 1275)—and there are various possible transmission paths for these resource portfolios (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 8).

But perhaps the most significant contribution that the Chinese made was to the pivotal British industrial and agricultural revolutions (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 9). The British agricultural revolution was spurred on by a series of inventions, including the iron mouldboard plough, Jethro Tull's seed drill, the horse-drawn hoe, the horsepowered threshing machine, and the rotary winnowing machine. Added to this were breakthroughs in crop rotations. But in each case, these inventions had been accomplished in China as early as the sixth century. In the case of the plough and rotary winnowing machine, Chinese models were directly brought across (either by the Jesuits, European scientists or Dutch sailors). And the remainder were most likely copied from Chinese manuals that flooded Europe after 1650. Finally, while Eurocentrism equates Turnip Townshend with the breakthrough in crop rotations, these were already in place in sixth-century Chinese agriculture.

Much the same story applies to the British industrial revolution. Thus while Eurocentrism celebrates James Watt for his pioneering skills in inventing the steam engine, it is likely that he owed much to the Chinese. The essentials of the steam engine go back to Wang Chên's *Treatise on Agriculture* (1313), which in turn go back to the Chinese invention of the water-powered bellows (31 CE). Although it is usually acknowledged that Watt's engine stems back to Wilkinson's, nevertheless the latter's engine shared many similarities with Wang's. Moreover, the Chinese box-bellows was a double-acting force and suction pump, which at each stroke expelled the air from one side of the piston while drawing in an equal amount of air on the other side. Not only did it share a "close formal resemblance" to Watt's engine but, by the late seventeenth century, the Chinese had developed a steam turbine (Needham and Ling, 1965: 135–36, 225–28, 369–70, 387, 407–8, 411; Pomeranz, 2000: 61–62). Moreover, Chinese breakthroughs in gun manufacturing were also important in enabling the later invention of the steam engine (given that the cannon or gun is in effect a one-cylinder combustion engine and all of our modern motors are descended from it). Interestingly, a further link here is that one of the major challenges confronting James Watt was the need to bore an airtight cylinder. This is

interesting because Watt turned to John Wilkinson for help in this matter, given that Wilkinson owned a boring mill that was designed for cannon production.

Given China's substantial lead in iron and steel production, it was not surprising that British producers (including the famous Benjamin Huntsman of Sheffield) undertook detailed studies of Chinese production methods as late as the eighteenth century in order to develop their own steel manufacturing techniques. Noteworthy too is that the European invention of the Bessemer Converter (1852) was significantly derived from the breakthroughs made by the American, William Kelly, in 1845. But what is not usually pointed out is that Kelly himself had brought over four Chinese steel experts to Kentucky from whom he learned the principles of steel production.

The other great pillar of the British industrial revolution was the development of cotton-manufacturing. But while Eurocentrism celebrates pioneering British inventors such as John Lombe, this misses the point that some of their inventions had been pioneered in China many centuries earlier. John Lombe's silk-machines became the model for the Derby cotton-machines. But while Lombe's "invention" was a copy of the Italian machines, they in turn were a direct copy of the earlier Chinese inventions from the thirteenth century. Notable too is that in textiles, the Chinese had long developed machines that differed in only one detail to that of James Hargreaves' famous "spinning jenny" and John Kay's equally famous "flying shuttle."

However, once again, it might be objected that even if China did bequeath much to Europe this was only economic or technological, thereby enabling Eurocentric historians to uphold their point that the Europeans maintained their pioneering edge with respect to cultural innovations—most notably the European Enlightenment. But this obscures the point that between c.1700 and c.1780, much of Europe formed a virtual love affair with the world of rococo and sought to emulate many aspects of Chinese civilization. This was fuelled by the wealth of translated Chinese pamphlets and books that flooded Europe after about 1650, many of which were transmitted by the Jesuits.

The link between the European Enlightenment and Chinese thought was ultimately bridged by the shared faith in reason as the center of all things. Reason enabled the discovery of the autonomous "laws of motion" that were allegedly inscribed within all areas of social, political, and "natural" life. While many Enlightenment thinkers positively associated with China and its ideas, Voltaire was undoubtedly the major Sinophile. He drew on Chinese conceptions of politics, religion, and philosophy—all of which were based on rational principles—in order to attack the European preference for hereditary aristocracy. Indeed, many of the major Enlightenment thinkers derived their preference for the "rational method" from China. Chinese ideas also played a very important part in influencing British culture and political economy.

In the Anglo-Saxon canon *the* central European political economist was the Scotsman, Adam Smith. But while Anglo-Saxons parochially think of

Smith as the first political economist the fact is that behind Smith lay François Quesnay, the French "Physiocrat." And crucially, behind Quesnay lay China. Indeed in his day Quesnay was generally known as the "European Confucius." And Quesnay, not Smith, was the first European to critique the ideas of mercantilism. The term "physiocracy" means the "rule of nature." The significance of his ideas, derived from China, was at least twofold: first, he saw in agriculture a crucial source of wealth (which became an important idea that lay behind the British Agricultural Revolution). Second, and more importantly, he believed that agriculture could only be fully exploited when producers were freed from the arbitrary interventions of the state. Only then could the "natural laws" of the market prevail (as the Chinese had long realized). Quesnay's debt to Chinese conceptions of political economy was found in many ideas, the most important being that of *wu-wei*—which is translated into French as laissez-faire. Indeed around 300 CE Kuo Hsiang described *wu-wei* as that which lets "everything be allowed to do what it naturally does, so that its nature will be satisfied" (although it should be noted that the concept predates the start of the Common Era). And once this had entered the mind of Adam Smith, as they say, "the rest was history." To close this discussion: none of this is to say that the European Enlightenment was the *pure* product of Chinese ideas, for clearly there were some Enlightenment thinkers who rejected China as a model for Europe—most notably Montesquieu and Fénelon. But it would be entirely remiss to ignore the Chinese input in this major epistemic turning point of Western civilization. And to sum up this section more generally; none of this is to say that the rise of Western civilization is the pure product of Eastern influences. But it is to say that without all this Eastern influence, Western leaders would not be able to strut the world stage today and denounce as barbaric the very peoples who helped it rise to where it now fortuitously finds itself.

Conclusion

The upshot of the argument made in this chapter is that by deconstructing and erasing the Eurocentric *line of civilizational apartheid* we necessarily "de-Westernize the West" by bringing to light the hitherto obscured dialogue of civilizations that significantly *made* the West. In the process, therefore, this forces us to acknowledge the accumulated debt that the West owes to the East on the one hand while enabling us to reimagine the West's image of its self from one of exclusive purity to one of inclusive polyculturalism on the other. Ironically, perhaps the greatest strength of the West has lain in its ability to adapt itself to, and assimilate, the civilizational achievements of others. Celebrating the polycultural origins of the West rather than insisting on exclusive civilizational difference and Western autarchy should be the first task of the new Western political project. Paradoxically, while Huntington is highly critical of Islamic fundamentalism he has no objection to Eurocentric Western fundamentalism

(see also Chan, 1997: 139). Naturally, replacing one fundamentalism with another is by definition unable to restore civilizational harmony and tolerance in world politics. But acknowledging the affiliations between East and West—especially the Sino-European and Islamic-European—can help us reimagine the manufactured vision of Eastern civilizations as inferior, contaminating, and threatening into one of "civilizational partners." Acknowledging these polycivilizational affiliations is surely a first step in developing a more effective weapon against future civilizational conflict than battening down the Western hatches. Indeed it is precisely the process of constructing a pure European or Western self that has been responsible for the waging of war on manufactured enemies precisely so as to maintain this mythical vision of a pure Western self. In any case, the notion of a pure Western self is clearly a myth given that the West has been significantly defined and constituted by numerous Eastern partners. Thus rather than "recognize the irreducible, glorious dignity of difference" between civilizations in order to bring about global reconciliation (Sacks, 2002: 609), we might do better by acknowledging the many affiliations and irreducible similarities that conjoin East and West.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 12

The Status of Women and the Ordering of Human Societies along the Stages of Civilization[1]

Ann Towns

Women in Sweden are physically abused, receive lower pay because of their sex and become ill due to the double burden of housework and paid labor. This makes Sweden uncivilized.

—Jens Orback, Swedish Minister of Gender Equality, *Metro,* March 9, 2006: 2

Let man, when he feels inclined to boast of his advancement, look at the condition of the other sex; and, whilst he finds woman deprived of any of the rights and privileges, which he enjoys, let him lay his hand on his mouth and cry, "uncivilized."

—Samuel Young, NY State Senator and gubernatorial candidate in 1837, arguing *against* women holding public office (Young 1837: 23)

Assertions that the political empowerment of women is closely tied to the values and beliefs of "civilization" and "the West" have recently reemerged in all sorts of arenas. For instance, before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Laura Bush declared that "civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror" about the situation of Afghan women under the Taliban (Office of Mrs. Bush, 2001). The Bush administration has since upheld the status of women as an important indicator of the progress of Afghanistan under U.S. rule. Participation of Afghan women in political elections, female membership in the Afghan Constitutional Council, and the reservations of 25 percent of the seats in the lower house to women obviously communicate something to the world about what kind of state Afghanistan is presumably becoming: more civilized, more Western, more just.

Making links between the situation of women and the civilizational rank of a political society is nothing novel. Indeed, the nineteenth and early-twentieth century saw great interest not only in the nature of women and men but also in how the condition of women related to the progress of a political society. Ever since civilization developed as an organizing principle of international society in the nineteenth century, the status of women has helped differentiate between and hierarchically order societies around the world along presumed "levels of civilization." However, the status of women has never been a formal standard of the kind discussed by Gong (1984) or Bowden (2005). It has instead functioned as a more informal and yet compelling indicator of the progress of a polity.

The overall aim of this chapter is to discuss how discourses of civilization and the status of women have operated to rank-order societies. Many of the ideas about women and civilization were elaborated within the social sciences, particularly as the fields of anthropology, geography, history, and sociology developed. By focusing on the articulation of women and civilization in the social sciences in the nineteenth century, this chapter follows Patrick Jackson's suggestion (chapter 3: this volume) of casting the net far and wide and moving civilization analyses beyond the formal political sphere. As we will see, a focus on the social sciences nonetheless has crucial political implications, not least for international politics and the ranking of states. Showing that the status of women was implicated in the ordering of states along civilizational lines already in the nineteenth century is the first of this chapter's three more specific aims.

The second goal is to elucidate *how*—in what ways and through what understandings—the status of women was thought to relate to the standing and advancement of a society. The situation of women has sometimes had a simple definitional function, serving as a straight-forward criterion to help determine whether societies are "savage," "barbarous," or "civilized." However, the status of women has been more than a simple definitional marker. The relationship between the status of women and the stages of civilization has been understood as more profound, involving concrete material developments. A number of causal theories have tried to make out precisely how and why the standing of women may affect the civilizational advancement of a society. Other approaches have turned the causal relation around, instead investigating the ways in which the civilizational advancement of a society influences the situation of women. My chapter will explore some of these lines of thought, showing the complexity and often contradictory nature of the attempts to link the status of women with the advancement of a society along the stages of civilization.

The third and final aim of this chapter is to draw attention to one crucial point of disruption between the nineteenth century and the present. In the nineteenth century, the *exclusion* of women from the political sphere was held forth as indicative of a more civilized society—European scholars and politicians contended and showed that only "savage" societies ceded political power to women. Today, the argument is reverse. Now, the *inclusion*

of women in politics is championed as a marker of Western civilization and advancement and denying women but not men the right to vote, hold office or participate in politics is characterized as culturally retrograde. Through apparent historical amnesia, the underrepresentation of women in politics is now explained as an effect of "tradition" not yet having given way to "modern" ideas and values allegedly of European origin.

The Social Sciences and the Stages of Civilization

By the early-nineteenth century, the idea that the position of women was linked with the advancement of states and other polities began to flourish. French utopian Socialist Charles Fourier (1772–1837) is generally credited with being the first to explicitly connect the position of women with a state's level of civilization in 1808. However, it seems that this connection was made simultaneously or independently by a series of thinkers. Enlightenment theorist John Millar had included women as an indicator of level of civilization in 1771, in the first edition of his *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* and Fourier's contemporary utopian Socialist French-Peruvian Flora Tristán had done so as well (Nimtz, 2000: 201). Debates and discussions on women and civilization were in full bloom by the mid-nineteenth century.

The emerging social sciences, inspired and influenced by evolutionary theory, were an important arena for developing ideas about the civilizing process and how the status of women related to social advancement. Scientific classification and the use of the comparative method to identify general causal relations critical for social change were central. The civilizing process was understood roughly as the course of transcending the presumed givens of natural existence. As one observer noted, "civilization is the composite result of progress from the purely natural life of the animal to the purely artificial life of the most enlightened individuals and peoples" (Mason, 1895: 272). The process was divided into movement among three classes of existence: savagery, barbarity and civilization. Civilization thus became articulated together with barbarous and savage groups of humans on a single scale of development and success.

These levels of civilization were conceptualized as being both spatial and temporal (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004). The spatial dimension allowed a range of places and peoples across the globe to be pulled together under the savage/barbarous/civilized labels, accompanied with collections of data to demonstrate that groupings such as savages shared certain key characteristics that distinguished them from their civilized contemporaries. The temporal dimension in turn emphasized the civilizing process as stages in the history of a society. In this sense, the classification helped make sense of historical developments by identifying some societies as more advanced and ahead of others. The primitive and barbarous areas of the world were generally connected with a European past, stages beyond which Europe had allegedly progressed.

The comparative method became absolutely central for analyzing these levels and the relations between them. The groundbreaking work of Gustave Klemm in the 1850s and influential U.S. anthropologist Lewis Morgan's mammoth 560-page *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism* (1877) are but two examples of the use of anthropological observation to understand historical change. These contributions were important in part because they refined and systematized the method by comparing societies around the world, on the one hand, and societies at different historical moments, on the other.

One of the fundamental puzzles that animated the social sciences was how a society would move along the developmental stages. What brought about change along the levels of civilization? Two concepts became absolutely central to the various attempts to answer this question: adaptation and competition. Both concepts were complex and open to multiple interpretations, but for the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient make note of a few points. Adaptation to surrounding circumstances became seen as necessary for a society to move forward. A society and the people populating it needed to exhibit the capacity for change and innovation in order to progress or even survive. Adaptation was, in turn, widely understood as a product of a competitive struggle for existence, whether among individuals, "races," or nations. Competition and struggle brought about movement along the social stages, either upward toward a higher level of civilization or downward toward barbarity or savagery.

The nature of this competition was furthermore up for debate. Some, most notably Count Gobineau (*The Inequality of Human Races*), saw the struggle in aggressive, zero-sum terms. The advancement of civilization depended on the maintenance of a hierarchy between peoples of species-differentiated biological "races." Many others, such as Lewis Morgan, understood the struggle to entail active adaptation, a process by which man "worked himself up through the slow accumulations of experimental knowledge" (Morgan 1877). Such progressive notions of civilization held out the hope that perhaps most (though possibly not all) of the "noncivilized races" could adapt and advance.

Sexual Difference and the Stages of Civilization

In wrestling with the question of how societies advance form savagery to civilization, the social sciences were simultaneously preoccupied with the nature of sexual difference. A number of social scientists were convinced of women's vestigial and unadaptive nature, whereas men were identified as the generative and creative force that could bring about advancement. Empirical evidence in support of these claims abounded. Evolutionary biology drew on examples from the natural world to develop a science of sexual selection, a form of progress that depended, in the words of Darwin, "not on a struggle for existence in relation to other organic beings or to

external conditions, but on a struggle of individuals of one sex, generally males, for the possession of the other sex" (Darwin, 1873: 69). The physical strength and intelligence of men was allegedly constantly improved and developed by means of sexual competition for women, while women's capacities remained quiescent:

> The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shown by man's attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than can women—whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands. If two lists were made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music (inclusive both of composition and performance), history, science and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would not bear comparison. We may also infer . . . that if men are capable of a decided pre-eminence over women in many subjects, the average of mental power in man must be above that of woman . . .
>
> [Men have had] to defend their females, as well as their young, from enemies of all kinds, and to hunt for their joint subsistence. But to avoid enemies or to attack them with success, to capture wild animals, and to fashion weapons, requires the aid of the higher mental faculties, namely observation, reason, invention, or imagination. These various faculties will thus have been continually put to the test and selected during manhood. (Darwin, 1873: 873–74)

The academic disciplines of anthropology and geography helped connect the notion of sexual selection with the stages of civilization by adding studies from the human world. These scholars traveled around the world, conducting comparative studies of sexual difference in savage and barbarous societies. Women, it became clear through plain observation, simply did not generate progress:

> One has only to look around him in traveling through countries lately touched by civilization to notice that men have to drop their old occupations for new ones. In fact, not five men in a hundred in the most favored lands are at this moment pursuing the calling for which they were educated. But in transitions from savagery to civilization, and in the vicissitudes of life, women go on housekeeping, spinning, demanding if no longer making pottery, using the same vocabulary, conning the same propositions, reproducing the same forms of ornaments, believing as of old, only making use of modified and better appliances. In this they are conservative, indeed, and the blood coursing through the brain tissue carries on the same commerce that has been familiar to women during many thousands of years.
>
> The savage man in his normal life is ever changing . . . On the other hand, the women of a savage tribe, and the ordinary run of women in any civilized land, who change slightly the duties they have to perform, or their manner of doing them, need to modify their conception and their opinions very little. The constant doing the same things and thinking the same thoughts from generation to generation pass the bodily activity and the mental processes

> on to a semiautomatic habit. Very few men are doing what their fathers did, so their opinions have to be made up by study and precedents. Nearly all women, whether in savagery or in civilization, are doing what their mothers and grandmothers did, and their opinions are therefore born in them or into them. (Mason, 1895: 274–75)

In their explorations and comparative analyses of the world outside Europe, some scholars and travelers collected evidence that connected women across the civilizational divides as stagnant beings. Women in all parts of the world were essentially the same. And women had remained essentially the same throughout history. In this, woman and the savage were connected—both were stagnant, neither had evolved.

Not everyone believed that women were inert, however. For instance, British philosopher and pioneer sociologist Herbert Spencer, a contemporary of Darwin, proposed other explanations for why the mental natures of men and women differed. Spencer is the person credited with connecting Darwin to a social theory of civilization and coining the phrase "survival of the fittest" in his account of the civilizing process. He thus developed Darwin's ideas about natural selection into sociological theories about the advancement and survival of human groups. In his important *The Study of Sociology* (1873), Spencer also belabored how this related to the civilizational advancement of human societies.

Spencer's characterization of sexual difference by and large paralleled that of most of his contemporaries. He contended that in women, "there is a perceptible falling-short in those two faculties, intellectual and emotional, which are the latest products of human evolution—the power of abstract reasoning and that most abstract of the emotions, the sentiment of justice" (Spencer, 1873: 140). His explanations of the origin of sexual difference diverged from Darwin's focus on male sexual competition as the source of male evolution and female stagnation, however. In part, the difference in "mental natures" was a product of physiological reproductive functions. There was a "somewhat-earlier arrest of individual evolution in women than in men; necessitated by the reservation of vital power to meet the cost of reproduction," resulting in a smaller growth of the brain (ibid.: 140–41).

Physiology only provided part of the answer, however. Spencer also identified differentiation between men and women as an effect of the competition among human groups inherent in the civilizing process:

> If we trace the genesis of human character, by considering the conditions of existence through which the human race passed in early barbaric times and during civilization, we shall see that weaker sex has naturally acquired certain mental traits by its dealings with the stronger. In the course of the struggles for existence among wild tribes, those tribes survived in which the men were not only powerful and courageous, but aggressive, unscrupulous, intensely egoistic. Necessarily, then, the men of the conquering races which gave origin to the civilized races, were men in whom the brutal characteristics

> were dominant; and necessarily the women of such races, having to deal with brutal men, prospered in proportion as they possessed, or acquired, fit adjustments of nature. How were women, unable by strength to hold their own, otherwise enabled to hold their own? (ibid.: 141)
>
> Men, and more specifically aggressive, intensely egoistic and unscrupulous men, gave origin to progress. What is more, only such men survived the struggle for existence that permeated human advancement and came to populate more advanced societies. (ibid.: 73–74)

It is important to note that to Spencer, female mental sentiments were not merely the absence of evolution. In contrast with many of his contemporaries, he argued that women in more advanced societies had had to adapt to the stronger and increasingly brutal sex in order to survive. Their survival in the civilizing process depended on inheriting and developing traits such as the ability to please, the power of disguising their feelings, the arts of persuasion, the ability to swiftly distinguish the passing feelings of men, and an admiration of power (which aroused stronger religious feelings in women than in men) (ibid.: 141–42). The civilizing process itself generated distinctions between men and women, making men increasingly aggressive and rational in the struggle for survival with other races, while women became more and more nurturing and emotional in their adaptation to advancing men.

The result, to Spencer, was that the quality of sexual difference and inequality would change with the civilizing process. Savage societies would be characterized by a lower level of sexual difference, whereas advancing societies would see sharper distinctions between men and women. The most advanced societies—Europe and some of Europe's former colonies—thus exhibited separate spheres and distinctive roles for men and women. As for fully civilized societies, a state of affairs not yet achieved anywhere, Spencer hypothesized that sexual differences would once again recede, proposing that in the future,

> it is inferable that as civilization re-adjusts men's natures to higher social requirements, there goes on a corresponding readjustment between the natures of men and women, tending in sundry respects to diminish their differences. Especially may we anticipate that those mental peculiarities developed in women as aids to defence against men in barbarous times, will diminish. (ibid.: 142)

In short, there was agreement among nineteenth century social scientists that increased sexual difference was an indication of advancement. As we saw above, some scholars explained this increase as an effect of men having evolved while women remained stagnant, incapable of changing. Others, such as Spencer, saw the increased distinction as male *and* female adaptation to the civilizing process and expected some of the differences to recede in the future. In either case, sexual similarity became associated with savage society and lack of advancement, whereas sexual differentiation became

linked with progress. The status of women became a clear indicator of where a society was located along the stages of civilization.

The assessment of whether life became better for women through increased differentiation from men varied. To many, the sexual similarity of savage life—close as it was to the state of nature—was seen as brutal and degrading to women. Not only was the physically weaker sex presumably engaged in heavy physical labor like beasts of burden, but women also had no protection from the animal behavior of savage men. Savage societies were imagined to be governed by the "law of the jungle," a might-is-right system in which the strong ruled. It became a matter of established fact that "the condition of woman has always been the most degraded the nearer we approach to a state of nature, or, rather, the less we are raised above the level and mere animal characteristics of the brute creation" (Fullom, 1855: 149).

A smaller number of scholars made a different assessment of the position of women in savage society. In 1892, geographer Campbell explained that with his stay among tribes in Korea,

> the subjection of women, which is probably the commonest accepted theories of the East, received a fresh blow, in my mind . . . Women in these parts of the world, if the truth were known, fill a higher place and wield greater influence than they are credited with. (1892: 145)

Anthropologist E. H. Man similarly states of the Andamanese islanders that

> one of the striking features of their social relation is the marked equality and affection which subsists between husband and wife. Careful observation extended over many years proves that not only is the husband's authority more or less nominal, but that it is not all an uncommon occurrence for Andamanese Benedicts to be considerably at the beck and call of their better halves. (1883: 791)

The observations of Livingstone (1858), Pike (1892), and British Governor and High Commissioner for the Western Pacific Everard im Thurn (1883) provide additional examples of social scientists marveling over the level of equality between men and women in "savage" society. Some of these reflections developed into theories of "primitive matriarchy," arguing that as a society moved from the savage to barbarous and early civilized stages, matriarchy was overturned and women became subjugated until the next stage, full civilization, was achieved. Similar ideas informed Engels' discussions of sexual equality under "primitive communism" (e.g., Engels, 1884).

Although the understanding of sexual differences and their origin were debated and disputed, the link between the status of women and the stages of civilization appears to have become rather well established by the mid-nineteenth century. One pressing question that occupied not only social scientists but politicians, writers, and the emerging women's

movements in the "civilized" part of the world was how best to handle the fact of sexual differentiation in order to assure further progress. In other words, what female role would best stimulate movement toward higher levels of civilization?

The Status of Women and the Civilizing Process

The further progress of more advanced societies would inevitably be affected by the position and role assigned to women. Spencer, who speculated that men and women would eventually become more similar once fully civilized societies evolved, underscored that "we have meanwhile to bear in mind these traits of intellect and feeling which distinguish women, and to take note of them as factors in social phenomena—much more important factors than we commonly suppose" (Spencer, 1873: 142). Without further elaboration, he was sure that an "increase of feminine influence" would affect the advancement of society "in a marked manner" (ibid.: 140). But precisely how did the status of women affect the advancement of more civilized societies? How should women's difference from men—whether inherent or acquired—be handled? Social scientists and other actors concerned with this question came up with a number of answers.

Many were convinced that women must be kept out of politics altogether. As vestigial beings with undeveloped reason, it was critical that women not be entrusted with deliberating law or with other public affairs. If they did, the advancement and very survival of a society would be jeopardized. In this view, the creation of separate spheres and the maintenance of male superiority were prerequisites for social progress.

To some of those defending this view, it seemed sufficient to point out that women shared political power with men only in uncivilized societies. Noted U.S. historian Francis Parkman contended that

> The social power of women has grown with the growth of civilization, but their political power has diminished. In former times and under low social conditions, women have occasionally had a degree of power in public affairs unknown in the foremost nations of the modern world. The most savage tribes on [the North American] continent, the Six Nations of New York, listened, in solemn assembly, to the counsels of its matrons, with a deference that has no parallel among its civilized successors. The people of ancient Lycia, at a time when they were semi-barbarians, gave such power to their women that they were reported to live under a gynecocracy, or female government. The word gynecocracy, by the way, belongs to antiquity. It has no application in modern life; and, in the past, its applications were found, not in the higher developments of ancient society, but in the lower. Four hundred years before Christ, the question of giving political power to women was agitated among the most civilized of the ancient peoples, the Athenians, and they would not follow the example of their barbarian neighbors. (1884: 10–11)

The implicit assumption was that these societies had not progressed in part because women were participating in political life. The exclusion of women from the political sphere was in turn represented as characteristic of civilized states, political societies that had developed sexual differentiation and left the affairs of state in the hands of men.

Others emphasized instead that women had a crucial civilizing role to play in the domestic sphere. Women had a distinct mission in the conversion of nature into culture, especially with reference to the socialization of children. "No universal agent of civilization exists but our mothers," argued Louis-Aimé Martin in his enormously influential *The Education of Mothers; or, the Civilization of Mankind by Women* (1834: 228) that had won French Academy acclaim and reached an impressive 11 editions in French by 1883, 3 in English and translations into Swedish, German and Italian (Bock, 2002: 89). What is more, if they left the domestic sphere, woman was "destined to be the mother of savages and barbarians, who in every age have been immersed in ignorance, blackened with crime and stained with blood" (Young, 1837: 8). The future of civilization clearly hinged on women being able to perform their pivotal role as mothers.

It is important to note that the calls for keeping women away from political life were often made in the name of elevating women through the civilizing process. Once civilization had been achieved, women would allegedly prosper. If law truly placed bounds on and civilized brute force, then women, as the weak sex, could only stand to gain. Best-selling U.S. author Sarah Lewis argued *against* bringing women into politics, since this would create regress and thus degrade women. She contended that "this, then, is the law of eternal justice—man cannot degrade woman without himself falling into degradation: he cannot elevate her without at the same time elevating himself" (Lewis, 1840: 41). The best way to elevate women was to make sure they could flourish in the domestic sphere.

Lewis was far from alone in seeing no contradiction between the maintenance of separate spheres and the emancipation of women. New York State Senator Samuel Young, also a staunch opponent of women entering politics, provides another interesting point of illustration. In making his argument against women voting and holding office in the gubernatorial race of 1837, he simultaneously contended that the subjugation of women was an "oriental, and semi-barbarous delusions," a sign of "Turkish contempt of females, as subordinate and inferior beings" (1837: 17). In short, women were concurrently most in need of civilization, in order to be raised out of degradation and protected from sheer force, and yet they posed a challenge to civilization's creation and maintenance.

In light of the discussion above, it may be tempting to simply equate civilization with men as essentially synonymous. However, man's relation to civilization was also a tenuous one, even if less so than that of woman. Spencer and others had divided the civilizing process into periods of militancy and industrialism. The period of militancy included the stages of barbarism and early civilization and was a period during which warfare was

presumed to help advance civilization. In *The Study of Sociology*, Spencer elaborated how. First, war and colonial conquest "has had the effect of continually extirpating races [and relatively-feeble tribes and individuals] which were least fitted to cope with the conditions of existence they were subject to," resulting in "an average advance" among the stock of humans who remained. And second, "the struggle for existence between neighboring tribes had had an important effect in cultivating faculties of various kinds," most important of which were "adapted intelligence" and a "mutual culture of bodily powers" (Spencer, 1873: 73). In short, "during barbarism and the earlier stages of civilization, war has the effect of exterminating the weaker societies, and of weeding out the weaker members of the stronger societies, and thus in both ways furthering the development of those valuable powers, bodily and mental, which war brings into play" (ibid.: 74).

This period was widely believed to be followed by a civilized phase of industrialism and advancement. Relations within and among civilized states were characterized by having replaced brute force with the rule of law, many claimed. However, civilization could not entirely constrain man's natural passions, as Darwin pointed out: "Man is the rival of other men; he delights in competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too easily into selfishness. These latter qualities seem to be his natural and unfortunate birthright" (Darwin, 1873: 873). Mason (1895: 2), like many others, began arguing that "instead of an *age*, we should rather say a *sex* of militancy and a *sex* of industrialism. Certainly there was never an age in which there was a more active armament, larger battle ships, more destructive explosives and cannon, and vaster establishments for the creation of engines and implements of death than in our own."

If there was a sex of militancy, there was a sex of the savagery and barbarism it could bring along. As the generative force, men were not solely responsible for *elevating* Europe but also for the savage *destruction* of civilization. Their warmongering nature and destructive capacity could become a threat to progress, a point not lost on the women's movements that developed by the latter part of the nineteenth century to demand political power for women. Many of these activists cited Charles Fourier, who had claimed already in 1808 that

> as a general thesis: Social progress and historic changes occur by virtue of the progress of women toward liberty, and decadence of the social order occurs as the result of a decrease in the liberty of women. Other events influence these political changes, but there is no cause that produces social progress or decline as rapidly as change in the condition of women. I have already said that the mere adoption of closed harems would speedily turn us into Barbarians, and the mere opening of the harems would suffice to transport the Barbarians into Civilization. In summary, the extension of women's privileges is the general principle for all social progress. (1848 [1808]: 150)

The calls for female political power for the sake of social progress were drowned out by the conviction that separate spheres were not only indicative

of advancement but also an assurance of future progress. Whereas there had previously been no European-wide formal barriers to women's political participation, exclusion was formalized into law in most European states in the late-eighteenth to early-twentieth centuries (see Towns, 2004). Concurrent with formal entry into the society of civilized states at the end of the nineteenth century, Japan codified a total ban on women's political activities for the first time, such as attending political meetings and joining political parties (Mackie, 1997). The Chinese Constitution of 1912, which attempted to introduce Anglo-Saxon democratic practice into this first of Asian Republic, also explicitly excluded women from participating in electoral politics (Edwards, 2000: 622). The elimination of matrilinear kinship systems and female political authority was likewise carried out in the name of "civilization" and "progress" all over the territories under Colonial rule (e.g., Sacks, 1982; el-Bakri et al., 1987; Okonjo, 1994; Salvador, 1995; Hale, 1996).

Contemporary Renderings of the Status of Women as a Standard of Rank

By the end of the nineteenth century, the following norm was evidently in place in the society of civilized states: civilized states excluded women from politics. Sexual differentiation had become an indicator of the progress of a society, showing advancement to a more civilized stage. And designating women away from formal politics and into the domestic sphere was widely understood as contributing to further advancement. The status of women was thus a criterion for civilization in two regards: as an *indicator* of progress, on the one hand, and as a *cause* of progress on the other.

With the return of discourses of civilization in international politics since the end of the cold war, the status of women has reemerged as a constitutive standard of civilization among states. The political status of women once again functions as way to identify and define the level of progress of a state. Now, however, bringing more women into public decision-making bodies is presented as intimately related to the move away from "traditional" toward "modern" and Western values and practices (Towns, 2004). This is obviously a stunning reversal from the representations of the nineteenth century, when much of the non-European world was chastised as "primitive" for *not* maintaining separate spheres and for *not* keeping women out of political power.

Global and regional organizations that work for bringing more women into government positions now explain the underrepresentation of women as a matter of traditional values and beliefs. And "traditional culture" does not refer to ideas of nineteenth century Europe but rather as a set of beliefs, values and customs that have been passed down from premodern eras. The United Nations Development Program for Women claims that "traditional understandings of space as private and public, women generally being relegated to the former, lie at the very heart of most of the difficulties

women face entering politics" (UNDP, 2000: 23). The Southern African Development Community and others agree that "at the heart of the under representation of women in politics are age old attitudes and stereotypes that assign women to the private, and men to the public domain" (Lowe Morna, 2000: 12) The Inter-American Commission on Women likewise argues that it is "socio-cultural patterns" that hold women back, and that "prejudices and customs limit [women's] participation in public life" (IACW, 1994: n. p.).

In short, traditional culture now appears as a common human past of sexual differentiation and separate spheres, a past that states can escape through successful Westernization. The recent European history of hailing the exclusion of women from politics as an advanced and civilized measure—and of implementing separate spheres in those colonized areas where women were not already excluded from political power—now seems to have become forgotten. Although the status of women remains linked with the progress of human societies, the more specific criterion for entering the "advanced" fold has changed rather dramatically since the past century. Indeed, the standards of civilization hardly remain set.

Note

1. I would like to thank the Swedish Institute for International Affairs and the European Commission for the generous support that made this research possible.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 13

Discussion: The Politics of Civilizational Talk

Jacqueline Best

What are the political stakes of "civilization talk"? That is the central question at the heart of the four chapters in this section. Whether the term is invoked in the "East" or the "West," in religious or secular contexts, in debates about economic globalization or conversations about women's role, these chapters suggest that invoking the language of civilization always has political implications. Each of these chapters explores these political dynamics from two perspectives: by examining the exclusionary politics of dominant civilizational discourses and by pointing toward the political possibilities of a more critical, pluralist kind of civilization talk. The ontological distinction that the introduction makes, between substantialist and processual or relational approaches to the study of civilization, thus also has potential political—and normative—implications.[1]

In the next few pages, I want to suggest that *how* we talk about civilizations matters. There is no single kind of civilization talk but rather a multiplicity of possible forms. This does not mean, however, that there is no pattern informing them. Instead, we might define the kinds of civilizational talk along two axes, those of *logic* and *style*. In spite of their many parallels, these chapters deploy two very different kinds of civilizational logic: some focus on *civilizations* in the plural and others concentrate instead on *civilization* in the singular. There is also a second tension implicit in both kinds of civilizational talk—between dominant and alternative *styles* of civilizational discourse. These styles cut across the different civilizational logics, the dominant, *closed* style of talk seeking to solidify boundaries and foreclose debate, while the alternative, *open* style works to unsettle such fixities and reveal the underlying contingency of civilizational definitions.

I will begin this chapter by examining each of these axes of civilizational talk in turn. I will then dig a little deeper and explore their mutual constitution, examining the ways in which singular and plural forms of civilizational talk tend to rely on and reproduce one another—most commonly

with unfortunate exclusionary tendencies. I will conclude by examining the possibilities for resisting this dominant trend in civilizational talk, suggesting that if we are to develop the kind of ontologically processual and political pluralist conception of civilization/s that this volume seeks to develop, we need to take seriously the relationship between its universalist and particularist formulations.

Civilization and Civilizations

At one level, the concepts of civilization and civilizations are radically different, perhaps even incommensurable. To invoke the concept of civilizations, as Islamic scholars do in Mandaville's chapter and Western scholars do in John Hobson's, is to divide the world up into a multiplicity of particular, often exclusive, groups. To invoke the concept of civilization, on the other hand, as international economic leaders do in Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke's chapter and as political leaders do in Ann Towns', is to view the world in universalist terms, in which all are at least potentially capable of becoming civilized. Yet, a closer examination of these two civilizational discourses reveals that they both have similar kinds of effects, as they seek to foreclose debate, eliminate ambiguity, and fix meaning and identity.[2]

Most of the dominant forms of civilization talk that we hear and read today, whether from the Samuel Huntingtons or the George Bushes of the world, is of a particularist and exclusivist variety. This is the kind of civilizational discourse that Mandaville and Hobson seek to both represent and ultimately unsettle in their chapters. Taking as his starting point the essentially contested nature of civilizational claims, Mandaville explores two different approaches to representing Islam as a civilization from within. On the one hand is the essentialist and timeless conception of Islam that can be traced from Ibn Abdul Wahhab in the eighteenth century through to the contemporary new Islamic revivalism of Al-Qaeda. On the other is the more processual and fluid conception of Islam that can be found in the teachings of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani in the nineteenth century as well as in the recent philosophy of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Ironically, he suggests, the tendency for the former, more essentialist mode of Islamic civilizational discourse to dominate recently is in fact mirrored by much Western civilizational discourse. Samuel Huntington (1996), like Osama bin Laden, seeks to represent civilizations in essentialist, exclusivist terms, thus underplaying internal debates within them over the meaning, scope, and very nature of the civilizations themselves.

Hobson starts from the opposite side of the discursive "divide" by examining and challenging exclusivist Western representations of their own civilization. Western scholars, he suggests, have systematically ignored the ways in which eastern philosophy, science, art, and commerce have shaped the achievements that have come to be called Western civilization. In ignoring the essential hybridity of Western civilization, they have sought

to represent the West as isolated, self-contained, and self-constituting. In appealing to this kind of exclusivist conception of civilization, Hobson suggests, Western scholars have missed not only a wealth of empirical evidence that would considerably increase our understanding of historical and contemporary practices, but also the political possibilities of a more dialogic relationship between East and West than the conflictual representations that have dominated Western civilizational discourse to date. In spite of their different subject matters, both Hobson and Mandaville answer the question "why talk civilizations?" in similar terms. Although civilizations may be ontologically plural, hybrid, and contested, dominant civilizational representations actually work to conceal this hybridity and to foreclose internal debate. To appeal to civilizations is thus to draw and police the boundaries around a particular identity.

Towns, Bowden, and Seabrooke are not concerned with civilizations in their plural and particularist formulation, but instead seek to explore the political stakes of contemporary and historical appeals to a singular and universal conception of civilization. This is a civilization to which we all at least potentially belong. To speak about this kind of civilization is not to ask to what civilization one belongs but rather to ask how civilized one is. Why then have we witnessed a rise in this kind of civilizational talk and what are the political implications of such discourses?

Bowden and Seabrooke provide some possible answers to these questions as they explore the parallels between the nineteenth-century international legal concept of "standards of civilization" and contemporary efforts by international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United Nations (UN) to define and propagate global standards of human rights, good governance, and economic development.[3] What unites these different agents of civilizational discourse with one another and their historical antecedents is a particular, teleological conception of human progress. Although today we may have rejected the racist overtones of nineteenth-century social Darwinism, with its grand narrative of the gradual evolution of human beings from savagery to civilization, we have nonetheless retained its central assumption about the telos of modernization and development. At the same time, while earlier incarnations of the standards of civilization may have excluded those deemed most savage from the promise of eventual membership, today, through the auspices of international organizations, such civilizational claims are made on behalf of all of humanity: no one needs to remain caught in the savage rut of poverty and corruption. All can share in the benefits of civilization.

In spite of the inclusive overtones of such civilizational claims, Bowden and Seabrooke point out that the new standards of civilization are at best a double-edged sword. Such appeals to civilization promise to include all but in doing so they seek to universalize a particular, Western set of standards as the global norm: more often than not, they become a kind of "global standard of market civilization" based on liberal political and, above all, economic practices. If civilization is identified with progress, modernization,

and development, then alternative economic policies are often viewed as "backward" or uncivilized. Many of those who deploy universalist civilizational discourses, not unlike their particularist counterparts, thus seek to contain and homogenize variation and difference, by imposing a single set of standards on the world.

Open and Closed Civilizational Talk

Interestingly, in spite of the considerable difference between the conception of civilization deployed in these chapters, the conclusions that we might draw about the political implications of civilizational talk are quite similar: dominant invocations of civilization in the singular and plural work to fix meaning and shut down debate. Only the logic of this foreclosure is different: if the metaphor appropriate to describe the effects of particularist civilizational discourse is a *boundary* that divides us from them, for the universalist form it is a singular *metric* against which we can measure, classify, and rank the progression or regression of different states.

In either case, the authors of this kind of talk seek to represent their civilizational categories as natural and timeless, whether they are gender roles, religious norms, or economic practices. Yet the very pluralism and hybridity of the practices and identities that they seek to contain belie the essential artifice of these claims. Rather than merely describing a preexisting state of the world as they claim to do, they are in fact working to construct it. In both its universalist and particularist forms, this kind of closed civilizational talk therefore enables a specific kind of identity politics: in both cases it seeks to fix identity—to classify and rank individual and states according to a universal metric of civilized behavior or to locate them within a particular cultural and territorial space of mutually exclusive civilizations.

Following Bakhtin, we might label the dominant style of civilizational talk as centripetal, or *closed*, seeking to forge a unity of meaning and ideology (1981, 270–72). Although this is certainly the dominant style of civilizational talk, it is not the only one. What the authors of each of these chapters seek to uncover and promote is a far more centrifugal or *open* kind of talk, more exposed to the heteroglossia, or multiplicity, of lived life, language, and meaning. At the same time they point toward the limits of dominant efforts to foreclose more processual, plural modes of civilizational talk.

In her discussion of the central place of gender in universalist appeals to civilization, Towns reveals the limits of closed styles of civilizational talk. She suggests that one of the common objectives of civilizational talk has been to carefully fix an appropriate role for women and to generalize it as universally valid; regardless of nationality, culture, or social class, political leaders have argued that women have a specific role to play in a civilized world. Yet, as Towns' research clearly demonstrates, the nature of that "appropriate" role has shifted dramatically over time: whereas in the nineteenth century a civilized woman must necessarily refrain from a public role, today a (developing) state's claim to being civilized is judged in good

measure based on its leaders' efforts to include women centrally in public and formal political roles. If gender roles are this mobile, then what about the civilizational identities to which they have been so firmly attached? They too would appear to be far more historically and socially contingent than on first examination. The timeless universals to which civilizational discourse appeals are thus systematically eroded by the fluidity of the identities upon which they are built.

Mandaville is also interested in exploring the coexistence of a more open-ended kind of Islamic philosophy with the currently dominant exclusive form. Similarly, Bowden and Seabrooke point to the existence of countercurrents that complicate any simplistic "top-down" conception of the standards of civilization. They identify patterns of resistance, local agency, translation, and bricolage, all of which suggest the possibility of a more pluralist and contingent reception (and perhaps even production?) of the standards of civilization.

In their own civilizational talk, all of these authors point to the possibility of a different kind of civilizational discourse. Towns, Bowden, and Seabrooke do not reject the concept of standards of civilization outright as a dangerous anachronism, but rather leave the door open to the possibility of reclaiming and reinventing the term by focusing on its inherent contingency. There may well be some political value in being able to reveal the uncivilized face of sexual exploitation, poverty, or corruption beneath the mask of apparent civilization. Similarly, Mandaville and Hobson refuse to reject civilizational talk altogether. Instead, they advance the possibility of a more plural, processual kind of civilizational talk that does not necessarily deny the usefulness of thinking broadly in terms of particular culturally and historically specific civilizations, but that insists on blurring their boundaries and redefining their relationships with one another in constructive as well as conflictual terms.

Dominant Tendencies

In calling for this more open-ended and contingent conception of civilization, these authors must all contend with the dominant tendency in civilizational discourse toward closure and exclusion. One might think that the very fact that dominant civilizational discourse is divided between singular and plural forms might serve as a foothold for critical purchase. Yet, closer examination of these discourses reveals that singular and plural logics of dominant civilizational discourse not only have similar kinds of political effects but are also far less independent from one another than they first appear: universalist calls for "civilization" and particularist appeals to "civilizations" both rely on one another for their political effects.

Universalist civilization talk presents itself as inclusive: anyone can potentially move up the metric and become civilized. Yet, in practice, such universalist conceptions of civilization are often framed in opposition to an uncivilized other—those who do not treat women appropriately, who do

not run their economy correctly, who do not organize their government as they should. The universal metric of civilization is also a ladder, with some resting near the top, while others cling to its bottom rungs. The spaces between its rungs are also a kind of limit or boundary, a demarcation between the more and the less civilized. When international economic leaders and scholars, for example, deploy the logic of universal standards to justify recent policy initiatives that seek to impose Western "best practices" around the world, they have used the language of "clubs," "maturity," and "advanced countries" to demarcate the distinctions between those deemed more or less civilized (Eichengreen, 1999: 50; Camdessus, 1999). The universalism of metric starts to give way to the particularism of the boundary, as the ideal of civilization turns out to be less inclusive than it first appeared.

Particularist civilizations talk, on the other hand, is unashamedly exclusive, as it speaks to the value of different, specific identities. Yet, as Said (1978) so effectively demonstrated, civilizations almost always define themselves in opposition to others: the West came to know itself in part by rejecting those qualities that it associated with the Orient. Civilizational difference is generally defined in terms of superiority and inferiority. As Hobson notes, Huntington reveals this same pattern as he defines the West as not simply different from but also superior to other civilizations. But how do we know whether one civilization is superior to another? Presumably Huntington and others like him have in mind some sort of universal metric against which they have measured the different civilizations and found some wanting. The particularism of bounded identities thus also relies on the universalism of the metric to establish a hierarchy of civilizations. Dominant, closed styles of civilizational discourse thus combine universal and particular logics to fix identity and contain multiplicity. While one logic always remains dominant, it is always haunted by the other as both its condition of possibility and its limit.

Possible Resistances

In conclusion it is worth asking one final, hopeful question: if the dominant, closed forms of civilizational talk tend to reinforce one another, what possibilities remain for resistance? As all four chapters in this section attest, civilizations, both particular and universal, are materially and discursively heterarchic: not only are the practices that constitute them diverse and often internally inconsistent, the discursive claims that are made on their behalf are also multiple and contradictory. Even the most closed of civilizational discourses thus leave themselves open to some kind of contestation, negotiation, and critique. Some of these challenges are likely to take the form of outright rejection of the appeal to civilization, while others, like those contained in this book, seek to reframe civilizational talk along different lines. By focusing on the relationship between universalist and particularist civilizational logics, moreover, we can also identify a third,

common form of resistance—that which uses one kind of civilizational discourse against the other.

This kind of counter-civilizational strategy gained some notoriety in the context of the "culture as destiny" debate in the mid–1990s, as several East Asian leaders and thinkers sought to resist the spread of liberal "market civilization" by appealing to the cultural specificity of "Asian values" (Zakaria, 1997). As Mandaville points out, certain forms of Islamic civilizational discourse, including that articulated by Al-Qaeda, also seek to define Islam as a particular civilization in opposition to Western universal civilizational claims. On the other hand, as Towns notes, universalist claims about the role of women in civilized nations are represented as a form of liberation from the constraints of particular more traditional cultures. In seeking to challenge closed particularist civilization claims, subordinate groups will often appeal to universal civilizational standards like the concept of universal human rights.

Although this kind of counter-civilizational debate does open up new spaces of contestation and reveals some of the gaps in the closed civilizational discourses, its effects are likely to be very limited if they are not combined with a critique of the terms of the debate themselves. Because universalist and particularist modes of civilizational discourse actually depend on one another for their political effects, any effort to combat one form with the other will only ultimately strengthen the logic of foreclosure that underpins them both.

The only real alternatives are to either reject the category of civilization altogether as debased beyond repair, or to attempt to reclaim and reopen civilization talk as a genuinely plural and processual practice. Though I have to admit to being tempted by the former option, I will, like my fellow scholars in this volume, opt cautiously for the latter. Yet I will also add one further caveat to those already introduced by the other chapters in this book: if we want to write civilizations differently, we need to understand the double nature of civilization talk and treat *both* universalist and particularist forms of civilizational discourse as ambiguous and contestable. Although the form that such a conception of civilization and civilizations will take can only be revealed over time, a passage from William Connolly's *Identity/Difference* may help to define its initial contours

> Without a set of standards of identity and responsibility there is no possibility of ethical discrimination, but the application of any such set of historical constructions also does violence to those to whom it is applied. Such standards are indispensable constructions rather than either disposable fictions or natural kinds. (Connolly, 2002, 12)

Although we may find civilizational talk a useful way of establishing the contours of particular identity and the standards of universal responsibility, we need to ensure that we treat them as indispensable constructions. Only then will we begin to grasp the political potential of a more open kind of civilization talk.

Notes

1. This distinction was originally made by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson in Jackson, 1999.
2. I have discussed the politics of ambiguity and efforts to contain it in Best, 2005: Ch. 2.
3. For some examples of this kind of civilizational discourse as used by IMF leaders, see Camdessus, 1998 and 1999 and Krueger, 2001. I have discussed this dynamic at greater length in Best, 2006. See also Bowden and Seabrooke, 2006a.

Part IV

Conclusions and Prospects

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 14

Pathways to Civilization

Yale H. Ferguson

Postmodernists caution us about the inevitable indeterminateness of language and concepts, and, to be sure, social scientists have to wrestle with more than our share of weasel words: state,[1] nation, culture, society, class, democracy, globalization. Yet it is perhaps correct to suggest that few terms are quite so murky and recently controversial as "civilization," to such a degree that it is tempting to agree with Fernández-Armesto's comment (quoted in the introduction to this volume) that it may be impossible to restore any useful meaning at all in the term. So why not forget it? The answer, of course, is, like Everest, civilization as a notion is "there" and, moreover, thanks to Huntington and the current Bush administration, it looms larger than ever and thus is increasingly hard to ignore.

How, then, can we best comprehend and use the term? This book suggests that we ought to abjure "civilizational essentialism" and strive for a constructivist approach to understanding. It is hard to disagree. At one level, all approaches—even essentialism—are themselves constructs. Yet it is another, a constructivist position, in contrast to the extreme relativism characteristic of some postmodernists, that there is also an "objective" reality "out there" that, especially if misread, can have serious consequences. I submit that one reason civilization as a concept refuses to go away is that it carries just enough empirical substance to be credible and, thus anchored, is available for further construction for good or ill. Put bluntly, there is a sufficient range of intersubjective consensus about the term that it can be used with effect, manipulated in all sorts of ways, to inspire concrete human action, and have plainly visible consequences.

This chapter proposes that it is helpful to conceive of four different approaches or pathways to comprehending civilization: empirical, ideal-type, constructivist, and normative.[2] I argue that each of these pathways has its advocates and utility, although admittedly they are not entirely distinct. As previously mentioned, all are constructions in their way, and we should also observe that all carry normative implications.

Empirical. Huntington (1993, 1996) spoke of a looming "clash of civilizations" and went so far as to name the very civilizations to which he was

referring. His critics immediately seized, among other things, on the fact that there were serious internal divisions within most of the civilizations he listed. To make matters more confusing, Huntington himself added a bipolar "West versus the Rest" category that seemed to imply that "the Rest" were perhaps as attuned with one another as they were distinct. Not long thereafter, Huntington, writing with Berger (2002), edited a collection entitled *Many Globalizations*, the main theme of which was the ways individual states (some in the same civilizations listed earlier by Huntington) had been profoundly impacted by the universal culture of globalization and had shaped it to reflect their own national culture as well. Most recently, Huntington (2004) has been fulminating about the supposed threat posed by a growing Hispanic presence in the United States, implying less a clash than a dangerous undermining and transformation (*reconquista*) of U.S. national culture.

Huntington's own alarms and intellectual peregrinations are obfuscating enough, and the introduction to this volume further roils the analytical waters by insisting that both he and his critics are somehow trapped in an essentialist mindset that will get us nowhere. There is much to support such a position that any quest to capture the "essence" of civilization is bound to be a failure. However, let us go briefly down the dead-end empirical pathway to highlight some of the problems involved.

In this exercise we immediately run into the classic social science issue of defining and relating the whole and its parts. For example, Huntington confidently lumped all of Islam into one civilization, while acknowledging the existence of Arab, Turkic, and Malay branches. Any such classificationt papers over the violent and seemingly perpetual struggle between Shi'a and Sunni versions of the faith, the older "civilizational" divides among Persians and Arabs and Egyptians and Turks, as well as modern-state boundaries and the important roles of families and clans. Huntington also classified Latin American civilization as separate, which would certainly come as a shock to Spanish and Portuguese colonizers and Creole aristocrats who looked to transfer the culture and peoples of the Old World to the New. Paris and London were models and magnets for nineteenth-century Brazilian and Argentine elites, while Prussia provided much of the military training. There were so many Italians and Germans in Argentina and southern Brazil that fascist dictator Juan Perón could not decide whether Mussolini or Hitler was his favorite. Before the 1910 Revolution, Mexican troops in spiked Kaiser helmets goose-stepped down the Paseo de la Reforma in Mexico City.

Fault-lines and clashes within large collectivities have been with us always and run deep. Huntington asserted that clashes between civilizations are more severe than those within, but that is hardly supported by the historical evidence. Consider "Christendom," both the unity imposed for a time by the one true Catholic faith and the rivalries among

different groups of Crusaders, as well as the fragmentation of the Papacy itself at various stages, the Reformation, and the bitter religious wars in the long run-up to Westphalia. Still today, "Christianity" even in the United States is deeply divided between the Christian right and mainline denominations, and the contests do not stop there. Episcopalians, for their part, are faced with schism within their own denomination and potential alienation from the wider Anglican Communion over the issue of gay clergy.

Before and at the dawn of Christianity, all major civilizations had their own profound divisions. The "timeless" civilization of Egypt collapsed into anarchy and chaos several times, only to be revived with significant differences, successively, by Nubians and Libyans and later under Greeks and Romans. Cartledge (1993: 3) writes of the Greeks:

> "The Greeks" . . . is an abstraction, and, at times, an inconvenient one. Herodotus may have thought that he could usefully define *to Hellenikon*, literally "the Greek thing" or "Greekness," in terms of common blood, language, religion, and mores . . . But not only did he have to omit political institutions from his definition in order to do so, when there were well over a thousand separate Greek political communities who could never form more than shortlived, and usually imposed interstate ties. He also had to create the fiction of genetic homogeneity and gloss over important differences of dialect, religion, and mores within the broadly "Hellenic" world.

That world, rather like our own today, was characterized by fluidity, multiple and sometimes competing identities, ideologies, and loyalties. Similarly, regarding Rome, by the sixth century, one might well ask with Davis (1988: 60–61) who exactly were the Romans?

> Were they the people of Rome, battered and besieged now under Gothic, now under imperialist rule? Or were they the members of the imperial court—Justinian who was an Illyrian, Belisarius who was a Thracian, the eunuch Solomon who came from Mesopotamia, and the eunuch Narses whose origin was unknown?

Not for nothing has Rome come to be seen as a precursor of contemporary globalization, at least for much of the known world of that day. The reach of Roman culture was vastly extended, diluted, and modified as a result.

An even more central problem than internal division, or the parts within civilizations is identifying them as wholes in the first instance. What is their essential nature? Again, like globalization, there are many possible dimensions. Huntington regards them as primarily cultural phenomena, but culture—in addition to being almost infinitely divisible itself—may be stretched to include politics, economics, society, religion, secular philosophy, and so on. Kenneth Clark (1969: 1, 3—also quoted in the introduction to this volume) adopted what I like to refer to as a pornography definition

of civilization, that is, he could not define it but thought he could recognize it when he saw it. What he boiled civilization down to actually turned out to be sort of a Platonic mindset:

> [A]t certain epochs man has felt conscious of something about himself—body and spirit—which was outside the day-to-day struggle for existence and the night-to-night struggle with fear; and he has felt to need to develop those qualities of thought and feeling so that they might approach as nearly as possible to an ideal of perfection—reason, justice, physical beauty, all of them in equilibrium.

He proceeds to illustrate his thesis by lauding the "higher state of civilization" evidenced by a (to my eye) rather kitschy Apollo of the Belvedere bust over a powerful African mask. The latter, for Clark, bespeaks a "world of fear and darkness" obviously inferior to the "Hellenistic imagination" a "world of light and confidence." With apology to the memory of Sir Kenneth, a distinguished art historian, this is sheer balderdash.

We are faced not only with identifying the components of civilization that together make a whole, but also—as any number of the chapters in this book emphasize—boundaries. The introduction appropriately quotes Michael Mann (1986) on the key point that societies in the broadest sense have always resisted being "caged" and certainly this observation needs to be emphasized in today's globalizing world. Since the beginning, cultures have been permeating others and in the process have found themselves partially amalgamated and transformed. Economic relations have fanned outward from the earliest trade routes to the myriad financial transactions that today crisscross the globe. People have migrated, pooled their genes and flora and fauna, fashions and cuisines. Religions and other political and economic ideologies have also enjoyed their own global conquests.

Today, I would argue, the supposed clash of civilizations as well as defensive regionalism and localism are all in substantial part symptomatic of a world in which globalization in all its dimensions, for better or for worse, is inexorable. The only unknowns, in my view, are whether globalization's march will be significantly slowed by resistance and how much particularism can be preserved in the process. Like it or not, economic neoliberalism is in the ascendancy, states are being so transformed by market forces or are in varying degrees of decline or collapse, and publics are insisting on more participation ("democracy") and benefits at a time in history when there is waning capacity at the governmental level to deliver. Thus, I believe, the most significant cleavages in the contemporary world are not cultural or religious or somehow between civilizations, however desirable some "differences" can be, but between those persons everywhere who gain from globalization and those who do not—and those who may be caught in between. For example, Saudi family elites profit almost obscenely from global oil but are gravely, perhaps fatally, threatened as much by increasingly

accepted global norms that stress democracy as they are by militant Islamic fundamentalism.

If all of the foregoing were not enough, we are still challenged by change and continuity. Toynbee confidently assured us that all civilizations rise, decline, and fall. That too is an article of faith. Even as we may seek to identify civilizations and their parts, we sense that nearly everything is evolving at an ever-accelerating pace. Any civilization we think we can identify is morphing before our eyes, and yet is also carrying with it bits and pieces of the past. In our own work on "polities," Richard Mansbach and I (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996) have emphasized that few earlier polities and the identities and loyalties associated with them ever completely disappear, and the fact that today's world, however different with respect to the sheer pace of change and volume of transborder transactions, also remains to some significant extent a "living museum." A similar realization is the root at the traditional divide between "primordialists" and those who insist that "nations" are modern social constructions fashioned by states. The controversy, I hold, is a fruitless one, because both past identities/loyalties and modern reconstructions of national identity are plainly important, and one without the other would be unlikely to succeed.

Be that as it may, an interesting and indeed profound question remains: In a globalizing epoch are civilizations as a concept under such substantial threat that they will soon be regarded as anachronisms? I personally believe that will be so. Even "the local" we all crave will be increasingly "glocal." If so, should we mourn? I myself am not prepared to do so, valuing more as I do the cosmopolitan ties that unite rather than the differences that divide. But I have now moved into the normative approach to civilizations and thus gotten ahead of my definitional story. Fortunately, that story gets shorter to tell as we proceed.

Ideal-Type. Some of the chapters in this volume seem to treat ideal-types as constructions. Insofar as all ideas are constructs, of course this is correct. But I prefer to regard ideal-types as part and parcel of the empirical enterprise of classification. Here the "essential" groups a range of phenomena under the same heading, the objective existence of which enjoys a substantial measure of intersubjective consensus.

Nonetheless, intersubjective consensus extends only so far and tends to erode at the margins. Ask most students of history and the social sciences to compile a list of world civilizations and the usual suspects will be named. Or will they? How many would list "English" or "French" rather than "Western"; "Greek" and "Roman" rather than "Classical"; "Russsian" rather than "Slavic"; "Persian" rather than "Islamic" ? Yet most would surely list "Chinese" civilization, however shaped it was by Mongol intrusions. And so on.

Ideal-types suggest the need for continua, including the very notion of civilization. Whatever one's criteria, there will be some examples that fit them well and others more tenuously. Also, as the previous paragraph suggests, ideal-types seem to imply the need to identify subtypes. We are

back in a different sense to the perennial issue of the whole and its parts. For example, should Andalusia be classified as part of Spanish civilization, Western Civilization, or historical Islam—or all three?

Constructivist. As this book makes clear, all civilizations are at root social constructs, coexisting or competing with the multiple identities and loyalties that characterize human beings as a species. Here the analytical categories shift initially from the whole and its parts to "us" and "them" ("the Other[s]"). The key empirical issue, too rarely explored (and unfortunately there is not space to do so here), is why some identities and loyalties come to the fore at certain times and not others? We have a chicken-and-egg problem: to what degree is it prevailing "real-world" conditions that lead to constructions, or is it constructions that shape the former? Obviously, both processes and a sort of feedback loop are involved.

The next issue is whether civilizations have agency. There are those who presume to speak for them, but (as Jackson notes) "there is no front office or central bureaucracy to control claims made in the name of a given civilizational polity." Yet public discourse matters and is directed at individual and group targets who may or may not respond to civilizational appeals. To the extent that they do, civilizations exist in an ideational sense, motivate behavior, and thus matter. Yet this test is inescapably empirical as well as a matter of perception. For instance, what actual impact does Osama bin Laden's invocation of Islam versus the West have? With whom does the message resonate, and to what effect? At the end of the day, as I see it, only flesh and blood individuals and collectivities act and do so in a manner that can be empirically observed. Ideas, identities, and loyalties can be empirically surveyed through opinion polls, content analysis of statements, and so on, but are not themselves actors or agents.

Normative. This final pathway shifts the emphasis to moral judgment about what is and is not "proper" behavior. "Us" and "them" ("the Other[s]") are not just neutral categories but are overtly value-laden. Civilization implies a contrast with its reprehensible or at least benighted opposite, as Salter (in this volume) puts it, "the necessary barbarians." Greeks and Chinese famously applied the barbarian label to those who dwelled outside their own cultures. In fact, "inside" and "outside" tended to shift, as civilization diffused outward and barbarians infiltrated and invaded. Again and again, yesterday's barbarians have become a treasured or at least tolerated part of a central civilization. But, of course, the process also works the other way whenever particular groups need to be demonized. In the early-twentieth century, Germans again became "Huns" and Russians were successively seen as "Bolshevicks," comrades in arms against Hitler, the "Communist threat," and the "Evil Empire."

In closing, it is perhaps appropriate to highlight one of the sad ironies of human existence, that civilized peoples have all too often proved capable of appallingly barbaric behavior. From the bloody festivals in the Roman

arena to the death marches, concentration camp genocide, mass bombings, and nuclear devastation of twentieth-century wars, the picture is not an encouraging one. As American humorist Will Rogers observed in 1929, "You can't say civilization don't advance, however, for in every war they kill you in a new way" (*Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, 545). Will civilization in any meaningful sense ever be attained until the killing stops, swords are beat into plowshares, our natural environment is given respect and protection, social bigotry and oppression cease, the gap between rich and poor significantly narrows, and genuine political participation and justice reign? That is the question at the end of the normative pathway.

Notes

1. Archaeologists often use the term to refer to pre-Westphalian polities, for example, the Athenian state, the Aztec state. At least today there is a definition in international law that a state is a polity that its sovereign-state peers recognize as being independent and sovereign. However, there remain some anomalies like Israel, recognized by many states but not all. Perhaps more important is the fact that the term state applies to such a wide range of actual polities, from superpower to microstate to failed state.
2. These approaches parallel the ones my coauthor and I have suggested might also be used to define "empire" (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2006).

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 15

Toward a Fourth Generation in Civilizational Scholarship

Martin Hall

One of the areas of research most underdeveloped in IR concerns the production of knowledge. Although the intellectual *history* of the field is a booming specialization, and the *sociology* of the field has been the subject of a few significant studies, Naeem Inayatullah's and David Blaney's *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* (2003) is one of few critical studies of how IR was *made*. In this chapter I will briefly suggest that civilizational analysis can clear new pathways in the critical study of the history and—significantly—prehistory of IR. Concomitantly, a focus on the production of knowledge will implicitly, or explicitly, contribute to civilizational analysis.

One theme all the chapters to this volume have in common is that civilizational analysis is important not least because the concept of civilization is being used. It seems, at this historical juncture, that the notion of civilization is a significant carrier of knowledge and of thereby attendant preferences and policies. Scholars, it is argued, therefore have the responsibility of interesting themselves in this notion, whether the aim is to improve civilizational analysis, or to ban the concept of civilization from our analytical vocabulary. A premise of this way of thinking, which both so-called rationalist and reflectivists can agree upon, is that knowledge is inseparable from language, or what many call discourse, in at least the weak sense that conceptualization is a necessary condition for there to be knowledge to begin with. Imprecisely put, one way of understanding the difference between different approaches in the human sciences is to ask what sort of language is best, most appropriate, or most efficient, and so on, to use? Does the formal language of mathematics, or the often difficult-to-understand language of the postmodern art critic best serve our ends, for instance?

One way of using language is to tell stories, and the argument of this chapter is that the field of IR constitutes itself by telling a story. And the story that I find interesting is not the story of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau and of how the first chair of IR was instituted at Aberystwyth and of how scholars got increasingly dissatisfied with the naiveté of the idealist, and of how all of this and some more gave rise to the

field of IR as we know it today. Instead, the more fascinating story IR uses to sing itself into existence (Smith, 2004) is the story about how its own subject matter came into being. In other words, IR identifies a particular empirical reality as its subject matter, and gives as its raison d'être the study of this subject matter: the matter is there, and we are here to study it. Importantly, this subject matter is understood as the historical process—or less sophisticated, the year 1648—of the individuation of states and as the historical process of the differentiation of international politics from other areas of social life—economics, domestic politics, and culture, for instance. In this sense IR as an approach to social life has set up intellectual demarcations for itself on the basis of a set of empirical observations. Interesting as the exceptionally introspective consequence of the IR story is, it is not the topic of this chapter. I am more interested here in the IR story as such, and what role the notion of civilization plays in this story.

Are irrational forces unimportant in history? If we, with Barbara Tuchman (1984), believe not, how are we to study them? Surely we cannot ascribe all irrationality to folly. Joseph Mali argues that "modern historians ought to be (and ought to make us) more aware of the mythical patterns of thought and action that reside in all historical events and narratives (including their own)" (Mali, 2003: 18). The reason is that, and here Mali draws on Giambattista Vico, mythology is both description as well as interpretation of reality (ibid.: 81). In other words, "to the extent that the members of [that] community share and carry out these traditional meanings in their social actions, their historical reality is meaningful only within the narratives that make up their tradition" (ibid.: 6). Mali is thus rejecting both positivism and postmodernism. Positivism he rejects on the grounds of meaning, or rather lack thereof. Joining others in postulating "the narrative construction of reality" Mali claims that "in order to explain historical events, it is [thus] imperative to grasp those ultimate narratives of the agents performing them, their myths" (ibid.: 23). Postmodernism is rejected on grounds of agency and objectivity. In brief, Mali argues that myths grow out of many centuries of "popular impressions and interpretations of historical reality" (ibid.: 24). Myths are thus not, or need not be, concealments and they need not be authored. Also old Marxist and new postcolonial schools are rebuffed. Myths, at least some, are far from being ideological fabrications, or inventions, by ruling authorities. In as far as a myth is an "invention of tradition," Mali claims, it is a "reactivation of the historical recollection" (ibid.: 8). Hence mythistory—neither history (reality) not myth (interpretation) suffice. Both are needed.

Of course, Mali is not alone in his insistence on the importance of mythology. The adherents of the narrative construction of reality are many. Philosopher Richard Kearney, for instance, argues that narrative "provides us with one of our most viable forms of identity—individual and communal" (2001). And religious scholar Bruce Lincoln (1989) has called myth "paradigmatic truth"—something that not only claims to be true, but claims to be authoritatively true. More familiar names than Mali, Kearney, or

Lincoln, perhaps, to IR scholars are William H. McNeill (1986) and Hayden White (1973). These two very different historians agree with each other that history is not the same as chronology. Facts presented after each other will always be trivial. Explanation or interpretation—neither of which inhere in the facts themselves—are needed to give meaning and intelligibility. In this, both scholars agree, history and myth are kin. Both myth and history "explain how things got to be in the way they are by telling some sort of story" (McNeill, 1986: 1). IR scholars, in this vein, explain how they came to be by telling a story about how their empirical field came to be. But narrative and myth, and even much less mythistory, has not made its way into IR on a grand scale.[1] And yet it is recognized that myth is an important aspect of any understanding of any particular civilization.

For instance, Alastair Bonnett states that his "book is about Western and non-Western ideas of the West. It argues that the West is not merely a Western creation but something that many people around the world have long been imagining and stereotyping, employing and deploying" (2004: 1). Bonnett proceeds to conduct something like a historical sociological study of concept formation on the *mythological* concept of the West. Similarly, J. M. Blaut (1993) and John M. Hobson (2004) have made huge and laudable efforts to dispel or destroy the Eurocentric myths about the rise of the West, or the European miracle. Their method in this destruction of myth is history. Blaut, for instance, suggests that

> [T]here seem to be two basic ways to argue that the myth of the European miracle is wrong, that Europe did not surpass other world civilizations before 1492. The best way by far is to look at the facts of history. (1993: 51)

These sort of studies are valuable, important, and necessary. But mythistory is a third, different kind of study. In between the mythological and the historical studies of the "Rise of the West," for instance, a mythistorian might suggest that the myths of Catholic—and later also Protestant—Europe played a not insignificant role in its development. For instance, the French (myt)historian Robert Muchembled argues that

> Satan became the driving force of the Western world: he embodied that part of mankind that has to be continuously fought. For the sake of God, as the contemporaries would have said. To create ties of identity through the civilizing myths and to generate a dynamic tension which urges mankind to conquer itself and the world, as the historian say. (2002: 163)[2]

This argument denies neither historical fact nor the importance of images, representations, or beliefs; it combines them.

Civilizational Analysis

I will now suggest that the claims of mythistory can inform a civilizational analysis for IR. At the center of this project lies the idea that the West—or

any other self-reflective civilization—is constituted exactly by this self-reflection. Just as philosophy is what philosophers do, so the West is what Westerners as well as non-Westerners understand it to be—how they imagine it. And, hence, also how they tell stories about it. Notions of civilization are therefore always mythistorical; as such, they both denote meaningful political and social objects and, at the same time, are subject to manipulation by a variety of political and social forces. In the words of Bruce Mazlish, "the concept of civilization in the last analysis emerges out of a changed consciousness and the enlightened human desire to know itself in its most evolved form" (2004: 14). This, Mazlish suggests, happened in what was to become the West in the late-eighteenth century. A hundred years, or so, later the concept of the West emerged, as did the social science we today call International Relations. The question the here proposed civilizational analysis for IR asks is given that the West constitutes itself by self-reflection, in what way is IR implied in this constitutive process? Which histories does IR imagine—and thus make mythistory of—for those that tell the story of the West? And which mythistories produced elsewhere does it draw on in doing this? And more fundamentally, are the key concepts of IR—of which the West or civilization are just two—of mythistorical origin rather than more purely theoretical, historical, or, for some, mythological? If the West *is* mythistorical, it can neither be rejected as an analytical concept, nor can the scholarly aim be to define, categorize, and, hence, essentialize it. It becomes a continuously and necessarily moving target, but one with a degree of actor-ness in the terms defined by Patrick Jackson (this volume: chapter 3).

Anthropology has, to a much higher degree than IR or Political Science, addressed this sort of questions to itself. Having reflected on anthropology and civilization, Mazlish concludes that

> The New World, in short, was an important midwife in the birth of a new science. What is more, in any and all of its manifestations, the emergence of anthropology as a separate study, a new social science, henceforth constituted a lasting feature of what would come to be called civilization. It is in its deepest aspect a part of the self-reflexivity that creates the concept. (2004: 27)

Also the anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot elaborates on the coconstitution of the West as a concept and the field of anthropology, under the heading "the savage slot" (2003: chapter 1). He suggests that the history of anthropology and the history of the West "have been intertwined from the very beginning . . . the geography of imagination inherent in the creation of the West five centuries ago is a condition of possibility of anthropology" (ibid.: 1). Similarly, Bernard McGrane, in his study of the Western understanding of the other, has argued that the "history of anthropology is the history of an identity crisis, and the history of the different identities we [the West] have existed" (1989: 2). The argument from these and other

histories of anthropology is clear—anthropology could not have produced the knowledge it does produce without the concept of the West.

IR lacks a body of literature that pursues this line of disciplinary self-reflection.[3] Without pretending completeness let me suggest two themes that might be included in such a reflective agenda: Eurocentrism and Evolutionism.[4]

The very concept of civilization itself—and particularly in its singular usage—carry connotations of Eurocentrism. Civilization is an evaluative concept, and those that belong to a civilization are better than barbarians or savages. That Rousseau did not particularly approve of the particular civilization he belonged to, or that Freud did much to expose the thinness of the veneer of civilization, does not change this. When prefixed with Western or European, civilization, moreover, is typically associated with modernity, and, as Jeffrey Alexander has argued, modernity insists on a hierarchical relation between itself and the nonmodern (1995). Is it the case that the mythistories told about the nonmodern civilizations—or barbarians and savages—by anthropologists (the geographical other) and historians (the temporal other) caused IR to differentiate its empirical material—IR's own specific social reality—to reflect this hierarchy? Moreover, did IR *therefore* import the boundaries of their empirical demarcation from a civilizational/ideological construction of the distinction between modernity and the nonmodern into its theoretical foundations? Still further, when IR scholars do venture into the nonmodern in the form of the historical other, they are much more likely to consult explicit proponents of the European miracle thesis such as Michael Mann (1986), Eric Jones (1987), or Charles Tilly (1992) for studies on how the modern world was made, than scholars who take a more globalist view of history (Abu-Lughod, 1989; Frank, 1998; Hobson, 2004). One effect of this is to strengthen the exclusionary circulation of meaning between the West and IR.

A second theme that could be incorporated in a civilizational research agenda for IR is the role of various "evolutionisms." Obviously, the rise of biological and sociobiological evolutionism, the subsequent development of racism and, again, Eurocentrism, is an issue that cannot be neglected. At this point, however, I am more thinking in terms of historical evolutionism and the rise of archeology. Mazlish (2004) shows how it is only with the formation of the concept of civilization that we can start recognizing and constructing ancient civilizations as just that. Mesopotamian, Greek, or Roman civilization would not have been objectified and reified had not the concept of civilization existed to perform this reification. It is at this juncture, I submit, that civilizations assume their bounded character in Western imagination. With the archeological study of civilizations these become spatiotemporal entities that, significantly, rise and fall. Marrying this with the quintessentially modern idea of progress (Koselleck, 2002: chapter 13) modernity brings forth an implicit philosophy of history that combines time's arrow (progress) and time's cycle (rise and fall) (Gould, 1987;

cf. Eliade, 1954). This archeological procedure of establishing spatiotemporal blocs, I suggest, had two major consequences for IR. First, it had a threefold naturalizing effect. To start with, it helped the stage theory (savage, barbarian, civilization) naturalize the view of time and history as an evolutionary process. The archeological record showed that consecutive civilizations, as well, improved in many ways. Whereas there was much to admire about the Ancient Greeks, the European renaissance was still better. Liberalism and Marxism came to rely on this idea of constant improvement. Archeology, or rather the archeological mythistories, also naturalized time's cycle that Realism relies on (Hall, 2006). Civilizations did rise and fall, and there were intervals of barbarism (the Dark Ages) in between civilizations. Though certain things, such as technology for instance, certainly changed over time, there was still a definite repetitive rhythm to history. Finally, the archeological record helped anthropology and sociology naturalize the idea of modernity as something sui generis—something that should and must be analyzed on its own terms.

This led to the second major effect: the justification for differentiating between IR and other human sciences became reinforced. In the first step, only modernity was understood to play host to a genuinely international sphere—a sphere of anarchical politics. Other civilizations were mostly about empire or hegemony, or the struggle against empire or hegemony. Notably, the great exception to this observation was Ancient Greece—which did exhibit an "international" and anarchic sphere. Of course it is no coincidence that Ancient Greece, rather than Rome or the Roman-Germanic synthesis, or any other spatiotemporal demarcation, was the cradle of Western civilization also from the point of view of IR. And in the second step, it was understood that other human sciences lacked an appreciation of this particular aspect of social life. Political scientists, sociologists, historians per force, were all seen, implicitly or explicitly, to proceed from a mind-set many today would call methodological nationalism.

Conclusion

The upshot of these few arguments and questions is that a self-reflective research agenda for a fourth generation of civilizational analysis, within IR, should begin, and end, with a questioning of the precise relationship between IR and anthropology, and IR and philosophy of history as each of these disciplines involve themselves in mythistoricizing civilizations.[5] It would seem to me that (1) the difference between anthropology and IR has its roots in the mythistory of Europe and the West, and (2) that IR is a philosophy of history expressed in contemporary language—a remake of an old story. If I am correct in this, the major issue students of IR should be grappling with is not the metatheoretical divide between rationalist/reflectivist, problem solving/reflectionist, postitivist/postpositivist, and such, but instead the substantive issue of whether IR is based on the right foundation—whichever criterion you want to use to decide this—or not. Are

the empirical boundaries of the field, increasingly permeable as they are, useful at all or are they more of a hindrance? Is it theoretically and methodologically acceptable that empirical boundaries—mythistorically constructed to boot—feed into the theoretical and metatheoretical foundations and boundaries of an academic discipline? These, in my view, are the questions and issues a fourth generation of civilizational analysis in IR should concern itself with.

Moreover, this agenda, it seems to me, addresses important arguments in this book's critical engagement chapters. For instance, Alker's, Hall and Jackson's, O'Hagan's, and Jackson's interest in grammar is not only accommodated by, but might even be a necessary condition for, a study on the precise relationship between IR and philosophy of history. Grammar certainly also figures in any reflection on whether the theoretical boundaries and foundations of IR should be determined by the empirical/mythistorical story IR professors use to sing themselves into existence. Nexon's, Kinnvall's, Pasha's, and Salter's fundamental critiques of the concept of civilization and their insistence in showing how it "naturalizes and obscures" power relations in world politics lie at the very core of any discussion about the relationship between IR and anthropology. Finally, Best's, Bowden and Seabrooke's, Mandaville's, Hobson's, and Towns' recognition that civilizational talk is *always* political talk is one of the key arguments that the notion of mythistory is trying to make. Future civilizational analysts should, amongst other things, recognize these and other discussions as themselves constitutive of the fourth wave of civilizational analysis.

Notes

1. But see Weber, 2005 as well as Hall, 2006 for studies that bring the mythological into IR.
2. I am referring to Muchembled's *Une histoire du diable*, which was published in 2000, and translated into Swedish in 2002. Here, I am using the Swedish text, and any quotation is my own translation from the Swedish translation.
3. The previously mentioned book by Inayatullah and Blaney, as well as Beate Jahn's *The Cultural Construction of International Relations* (2000) are excellent starting points, however.
4. I am thus denying that anthropology alone conceptualized the West. IR and perhaps other human sciences as well were its accomplices.
5. It is tempting to suggest that anthropology and philosophy of history need to investigate their relationship as well, but that is not a call I can issue. Shadia Drury's *Terror and Civilization: Christianity, Politics, and the Western Psyche* seems to be a good starting point for studying what lies at the intersection of IR, anthropology, and philosophy of history. Sadly, this book came to my attention too late for me to discuss it here.

This page intentionally left blank

References

Abbott, Andrew. 1996. "Things of Boundaries." *Social Research* 62: 857–82.

———. 2001. *Time Matters: On Theory and Method*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. 1963. "Orientalism in Crisis." *Diogenes* 44 (Winter): 107–8.

Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1989. *Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250–1350*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Achar, Gilbert. 2002. *Clash of Barbarisms: Sept. 11 and the Making of the New World Disorder*. Trans. Peter Drucker. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Acharya, Amitav 2002. State-Society Relations: Asian and World Order after September 11. In *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, edited by Ken Booth and Tim Dunn. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Adler, Emanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (3): 319–63.

Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett. 1998. A Framework for the Study of Security Communities. In *Security Communities*, edited by E. Adler and M. Barnett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

———. 2005. *State of Exception*. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ahmed, Aijaz. 1992. *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London: Verso.

Aimé-Martin, Louis. 1834. *The Education of Mothers: Or the Civilization of Mankind by Women*. First American Ed. Philadelphia, PA: Lea and Blanchard.

Akhavi, Shahrough. 2003. "Islam and the West in World History." *Third World Quarterly* 24: 545–62.

Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993. *Islams and Modernities*. London: Verso.

———. 2001. "Civilization, Culture and the New Barbarians." *International Sociology* 16: 75–93.

———. 2003. "Postmodern Obscurantism and 'The Muslim Question.'" *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 5: 21–46.

Alexander, J. C. 1995. *Fin de siècle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason*. London and New York: Verso.

Ali, Tariq. 2002. The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity. London and New York: Verso.

Alker, Hayward R. 1995. "If Not Huntington's Civilizations, then Whose?" *Review* 18 (4): 533–62.

———. 1996a. Bit Flows, Rewrites, Social Talk: Towards More Adequate Informational Ontologies. Proceedings of the Todai University Centennial Conference, Information and Its Functions, Tokyo University.

———. 1996b. *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Alker, Hayward R. 2000. "Learning from Wendt." *Review of International Studies* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2000): 141–150.

Alker, Hayward R., T. Amin, T. Biersteker, and T. Inoguchi. In preparation. *Arguing the World: 20th Century World Order Great Debates*.

Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 1991. *Islamic Awakening beyond Rejection and Extremism*. Herndon, VA: International Institute for Islamic Thought.

———. 2000. *Al-Islam wa'l-Awlamah* (Islam and Globalization). Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi wa Nashr al-Islamiyya.

Al-Raziq, 'Ali 'Abd. 1925. *Al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and the Foundations of Government). Cairo: publisher unknown.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities*. Revised ed. London: Verso.

Anderson, Perry. 1974a. *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*. London: New Left Books.

———. 1974b. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: New Left Books.

An-Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed. 1996. *Toward an Islamic Reformation*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Archibugi, D., ed. 2003. *Debating Cosmopolitics*. London: Verso.

Aristotle. 1941. *Politics*. *Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House.

Arnason, J. P. 2000. "Introduction." *Thesis Eleven* 62 (1): iii–v.

———. 2001. Civilizational Patterns and Civilizing Processes. *International Sociology* 16 (3): 387–405.

Asad, Talal, ed. 1973. *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*. London: Ithaca Press.

———. 1993. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Asfaruddin, Asma. 1999. *Hermeneutics and Honor: Negotiation of Female "Public Space" in Islamic/ate Societies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ashley, Richard. 1988. "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol. 17, No. 2: 227–62.

Bacon, Helen H. 1961. *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bain, William. 2003. "The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality." *International Relations* 17 (1): 59–77.

Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1981. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Barkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey. 2006. "The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies." *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 32, No. 2: 329–52

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 2004. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Bartelson, Jens.1999. *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Introduction. In *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*, edited by Fredrik Barth. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

Baudriallard, Jean. 1995. *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*. Trans. Paul Patton. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2001. *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

BBC News, January 19, 2006. Text: Bin Laden Tape. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4628932.stm, accessed on February 25, 2007.

Bell, Duncan S. A. (2006). "Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought." *The Historical Journal* 49 (1): 281–98.

Ben Jelloun, Mohammed. 2002. "Agonistic Islam." *Jourvert* 6: 1–10. http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v613/agon.htm, accessed on May 28, 2005.

Bendix, Reinhard. 1977. *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. London: University of California Press.

Berger, Peter L. and Samuel P. Huntington. 2002. *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1977. *Vico & Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas*. New York: Vintage Books.

Bessis, Sophie. 2003. *The Western Supremacy: Triumph of an Idea?* Trans. Patrick Camiller. London and New York: Zed Books.

Best, Jacqueline. 2005. *The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2006. Civilizing through Transparency: The International Monetary Fund. In *Global Standards of Market Civilizations*, edited by Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke. London: Routledge.

Bhabha, Homi. 1984. "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse." *October* 28: 125–33.

———, ed. 1990. *Nation and Narration*. London and New York: Routledge.

———. 1994. *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2004. *In Defense of Globalization*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Oxford Press.

Bhaskar, Roy. 1998. *The Possibility of Naturalism*. Third ed. London: Routledge.

Bhattacharya, Neeladri. 1991. Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi. In *Anatomy of Confrontation: Ayodhya and the Rise of Communal Politics in India* edited by Sarvepalli Gopal. London: Zed Books.

Bially Mattern, Janice (2004). *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis and Representational Force*. New York, Routledge.

Blair, Tony. November 14, 2001. International Terrorism and Attacks in the USA. House of Commons.

Blair, Tony. 'PM's statement on London explosions' (Delivered at the G8 summit, Gleneagles, Scotland, & July 2005). Available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7853.asp. Last accessed 3 July 2007.

Blaut, J. M. 1993. *The Colonizer's Model of the World : Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History*. New York: Guilford Press.

Blyth, Mark. 2002. *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2003. "Structures Do Not Come With an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas and Progress in Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (4): 695–703.

Bock, Gisela. 2002. *Women in European History*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Boehmer, Elleke, 1998. "Questions of Neo-Orientalism." *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studes* 1 (1): 18–21.

Bonnell, Victoria and Lynn Hunt, eds. 1999. *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bonnett, Alaistair. 2004. *The Idea of the West : Culture, Politics, and History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bowden, Brett. 2002. "Reinventing Imperialism in the Wake of September 11." *Alternatives* 1 (2): 28–46.

———. 2004a. "The Ideal of Civilisation: Its Origins and Socio-Political Character." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 7 (1): 25–50.

Bowden, Brett. 2004b. "In the Name of Progress and Peace: The 'Standard of Civilization' and the Universalizing Project." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29: 43–68.

———. 2005. "The Colonial Origins of International Law." *Journal of the History of International Law* 7: 1–23.

Bowden, Brett and Leonard Seabrooke, eds. 2006a. *Global Standards of Market Civilizations*. London: Routledge.

———. 2006b. Civilizing Markets through Global Standards. In *Global Standards of Market Civilizations*, edited by Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, 3–16. London: Routledge.

Braudel, Fernand. 1980. *On History*. Trans. Sarah Matthews. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

———. 1995. *A History of Civilization*. Trans. Richard Mayne. New York: Penguin Books.

Buck-Morss, Susan. 2003. *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left*. London: Verso.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson, eds. 1984. *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Burke, Jason. October 6, 2002. Bin Laden Still Alive, Reveals Spy Satellite. *The Observer*. http://www.observer.co.uk.

Burke, V. L. 1997. *The Clash of Civilizations: War-Making and State Formation in Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Buruma, Ian and Avishai Margalit. 2004. *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies*. New York: Penguin Press.

Bush, George W. September 15, 2001a. President Urges Readiness and Patience. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html, accessed on March 13, 2006.

———. September 20, 2001b. *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*. White House Press Release Archive. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on March 13, 2006.

———. October 20, 2001c. Bush Calls the War on Terrorism "The Urgent Task of Our Time." United States Department of State: International Information Programs: International Security: Terrorism.

———. November 10, 2001d. President Bush Speaks to United Nations. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html, accessed on March 13, 2006.

———. December 7, 2001e. Remarks by the President on the USS Enterprise on Pearl Harbor Day. Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushtext_120701. html, accessed on June 19, 2007.

———. March 11, 2002a. President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-terrorism Efforts. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html, accessed on March 13, 2007.

———. September 12, 2002b. President Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html, accessed on March 13, 2006.

———. February 8, 2004a. Interview with Tim Russert. Meet the Press. Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618/, accessed on March 13, 2007.
———. June 2, 2004b. Remarks by the President at the United States Air Force Academy Graduation Ceremony. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040602.html, accessed on February 23, 2007.
———. September 5, 2004c. President's Remarks at Victory 2004 Rally in Parkersburg, West Virginia. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040905-1.html, accessed on March 5, 2007.
———. September 23, 2004d. President's Remarks at Victory 2004 Rally in Bangor, Maine. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-10.html, accessed on March 13, 2007.
———. October 25, 2004e. President's Remarks in Greeley, Colorado. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041025-4.html, accessed on March 13, 2007.
———. October 27, 2004f. President's Remarks in Lititz, Pennsylvania. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041027-5.html, accessed on February 23, 2007.
———. October 31, 2004g. President's Remarks in Cincinnati, Ohio. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041031-9.html accessed on February 23, 2007.
———. March 31, 2005a. President Discusses Schiavo, WMD Commission Report. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/ 20050331.html, accessed on March 13, 2007.
———. November 19, 2005b. President Addresses Troops at Osan Air Base in Osan, Korea. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051119-5.html, accessed on February 23, 2007.
———. January 31, 2006. State of the Union Address by the President. United States Capital, Washington DC. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/print/index.html, accessed on March 5, 2007.
Butler, Judith. 2004. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London: Verso.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Camdessus, Michel. October 1, 1998. *Press Briefing by IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus*. International Monetary Fund. Available from http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1998/tr981001.htm, accessed on September 11, 2003.
———. May 17, 1999. *Governments and Economic Development in a Globalized World: Remarks at the 32nd International General Meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council*. International Monetary Fund. Available from http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/051799.htm, accessed on September 11, 2003.
Campbell, Charles. 1892. "A Journey through North Korea through the Ch'ang-pai shan." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography* 14 (3): 141–61.
Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Second ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Campbell, J. L. 1998. "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy." *Theory and Society* 27: 377–409.
———. 2004. *Institutional Change and Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Campbell, J. L. and O. K. Pedersen .1996. The Evolutionary Nature of Revolutionary Change in Postcommunist Europe. In *Legacies of Change: Transformations of Post-communist Europe*, edited by J. L. Campbell and O. K. Pedersen, 207–51. New York: Aldine de Guyter.

Cartledge, Paul. 1993. *The Greeks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Césaire, Aimé. 1972. *Discourse on Colonialism*. Trans. Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Chace, James. 2002. "Imperial America and the Common Interest." *World Policy Journal* 19 (1): 1–9.

———. 2003. "Present at the Destruction: The Death of American Internationalism." *World Policy Journal* 20 (1): 1–5.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chan, Stephen 1997. "Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilizations." *Millennium* 26 (1): 137–40.

Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Thomas Hall. 1997. *Rise and Demise*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. *Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. London: Zed Books.

———. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cheah, P. and B. Robbins, eds. 1998. *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*. Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Chen, Xiaomei. 1992. "Occidentalism as Counterdiscourse: 'He Shang' in Post-Mao China." *Critical Inquiry* 18: 686–712.

Cheney, Richard. December 19, 2005. Vice President's Remarks at a Rally for the Troops in Afghanistan. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219.html, last accessed June 20, 2007.

Chilton, Paul. 1996. *Security Metaphors*. New York: Peter Lang.

Chirot, Daniel. 1985. "The Rise of the West." *American Sociological Review* 50: 181–95.

Chirac, Jacques. "United States Visit—Joint Press Briefing Given by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, and Mr. George Walker Bush, President of the United States—Statements Made by M. Chirac available from http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/United-States-visit-Joint-press.html, accessed on June 1, 2007.

———. 2001. "A Clash of Civilizations or of Paradigms: Theorizing Progress and Social Change." *International Sociology* 16 (3): 341–60.

Christian Aid. 2004. *The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War*. Christian Aid Report. London: Christian Aid.

Clark, Kenneth. 1969. *Civilisation: A Personal View*. New York: Harper & Row.

Clifford, James. 1988. *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cochran, M. 1999. *Normative Theory in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coker, Christopher. 1994. A New World (Dis)Order. In *The International System after the Collapse of the East/West Order*, edited by Armand Cleese, Richard Cooper, and Yoshio Sakamoto. London: Martinus Nijhoff.

———. 1998. *Twilight of the West*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Collingwood, R. G. 1992. *The New Leviathan: Or Man, Society, Civilisation and Barbarism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Collins, Randall. 2000. *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

———. 2001. "Civilizations as Zones of Prestige and Social Contact." *International Sociology* 16 (3): 421–37.

Connolly, William E. 1999. "The New Cult of Civilizational Superiority." *Theory and Event* Vol. 2, No. 4: 1–6.

———. 2002. *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Expanded ed. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Cooper, Robert. April 7, 2002. The New Liberal Imperialism. *The Observer*. Available from http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,680093.00.html.last accessed June 20, 2007.

Coronil, Fernando. 1996. "Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories." *Cultural Anthropology* 11: 51–87.

Cox, Robert W., ed. 1996. *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*. London: Macmillan for the United Nations University.

———. 2000. "Thinking about Civilizations." *Review of International Studies* 26: 217–34.

———. 2001. "Civilizations and the Twenty-First Century: Some Theoretical Considerations." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 1: 105–30.

———. 2002. "Civilizations and the Twenty-First Century: Some Theoretical Considerations." In *Globalization and Civilizations*, edited by Mehdi Mozaffari. London: Routledge.

Cox, Robert W. with Michael G. Schechter. 2002. *The Political Economy of a Plural World*. London: Routledge.

Cunliffe, Barry. 1994. The Impact of Rome on Barbarian Society, 140 BC–AD 300. In *The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of Europe*, edited by Barry Cunliffe, 336–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dabashi, Hamid. 2001. "For the Last Time: Civilizations." *International Sociology* 16 (3): 361–68.

Dallmayr, Fred R. 1996. *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter*. Binghamton, NY: SUNY Press.

Daniel, Norman. 1966. *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*. Edinburgh, UK: The University Press.

Darwin, Charles. 1936 [1871]. *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection; or, the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life and the Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*. New York: Modern Library Edition.

Davis, R. H. C. 1988. *A History of Medieval Europe: From Constantine to Saint-Louis*. New York: Longman.

Delanty, Gerard. 2003. "The Making of a Post-Western Europe; A Civilizational Analysis." *Thesis Eleven* 72: 8–25.

———. 2007. Introduction: The Idea of a Post-Western Europe. In *Europe and Asia Beyond East and West*, edited by Gerard Delanty. London: Routledge.

DeLong-Bas, Natana J. 2004. *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Denemark, Robert A., Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gills, and George Modelski, eds. 2000. *World System History*. London: Routledge.

Der Derian, James and Michael Shapiro, eds. 1989. *Intertextual/International Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*. Lexington, KY: Lexington Books.

Derrida, Jacques. 1976. *Of Grammatology*. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Desai, Radhika. 1999. "Culturalism and Contemporary Right: Indian Bourgeoisie and Political Hindutva." *Economic & Political Weekly* 34 (12): 34 .

———. 2002. *Slouching towards Ayodhya*. New Delhi: Three Essays Press.

Deudney, Daniel (2006). *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1954. *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Governance Imperative. *IGD Policy Paper No. 1*. March.

DiMaggio, P. and W. Powell. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Donini, Antonio, Larry Minear, and Peter Walker. 2004. "The Future of Humanitarian Action: Mapping the Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises." *Disasters* 28 (2): 190–204.

Donnelly, Jack. 1998. "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?" *International Affairs* 74 (1): 1–23.

Donohue, John J. and John L. Esposito, eds. 1982. *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1997. "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory." *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (3): 365–92.

Downer, Alexander. December 1, 2004. Papua New Guinea: The Road Ahead: A Speech at the launch of the DFAT Economic Analytical Unit Report. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs.

Doyle, Michael. 1986. *Empires*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Drury, Shadia B. 2004. *Terror and Civilization: Christianity, Politics, and the Western Psyche*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Duara, Prasenjit. 1991. "The New Politics of Hinduism." *Wilson Quarterly* 15 (3): 42–50.

———. 1995. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Dunn, Kevin. 2004. Narrating Identity: Constructing the Congo during the 1960 Crisis. In *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, edited by Patricia M. Goff and Kevin Dunn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Durkheim, E and M. Mauss. 1971. "Note on the Notion of Civilization." *Social Research*. 38 (4): 808–13.

Earle, Timothy. 1997. *How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Edwards, Louise. 2000. "Women's Suffrage in China: Challenging Scholarly Conventions." *Pacific History Review* 69 (4): 617–38.

Ehrenreich, Robert M., Carole L. Crumley, and Janet E. Levy, eds. 1995. Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies. *Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association* 6.

Eichengreen, Barry. 1999. *Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Eisenstadt, S. N. 2000a. "Multiple Modernities." *Dædalus* 199: 1–29.

———. 2000b. "The Civilizational Dimension in Sociological Analysis." *Thesis Eleven* 62: 1–21.

———. 2001a Civilizations. In the *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 1915–21. Oxford: Pergamon.

——. 2001b. "The Civilizational Dimension of Modernity: Modernity as a Distinct Civilization." *International Sociology* 16: 320–40.
——. 2002. *Multiple Modernities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
el-Bakri, Zeinab Fahima Zahir (el Sadaty), Belghis Badri, Tamadur Ahmed Khalid, and Madiha el-Sanusi. 1987. Sudanese Sub-project: Women in Sudan in the Twentieth Century. In *Women's Movement and Organizations in Historical Perspective*, edited by Saskia Wieringa, 175–85. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
Eliade, M. 1954. *The Myth of the Eternal Return*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Elias, Norbert. 1988. Violence and Civilization: The State Monopoly of Physical Violence and Its Infringement. In *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, edited by J. Keane, 177–98. London: Verso.
——. 1992. *Time: An Essay*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
——. 1994. *Reflections on a Life*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
——. 1995 [1939]. *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press and Blackwell.
——. 1996. *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. New York: Columbia University Press.
——. 1997. "Towards a Theory of Social Processes: A Translation." Trans. R. van Krieken and E. Dunning. *The British Journal of Sociology* 48: 355–83.
——. 2000. *The Civilizing Process*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Emirbayer, Mustafa (1997). "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (2): 281–317.
Emirbayer, Mustafa and Anne Mische. 1998. "What Is Agency?" *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (4): 962–1023.
Enayat, Hamid. 2005. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. London: I. B. Tauris.
Engels, Frederick. 1972. (1884). *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan*. New York: International Publishers.
Erlanger, S. September 27, 2001. "Italy's Premier Calls West Superior to Islamic World." *The New York Times*, A8.
Esposito, John. 1998. *Islam and Politics*. Fourth ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Euben, Roxanne L. 1999. *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fabian, Johannes. 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Fanon, Frantz. 1970. *The Wretched of the Earth*. London: Penguin Books.
Farrenkopf, John. 2000. "Spengler's Theory of Civilization." *Thesis Eleven* 62: 23–38.
Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner. 2003. *The Way We Think*. New York: Basic Books.
Featherstone, Mike, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds. 1995. *Global Modernities*. London, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ferguson, Niall. 2003a. *Empire: The Rise and Fall of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. New York: Basic Books.
——. 2003b. *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane.
Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. 1996. *Polities: Authority, Identities, and Change*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
——. 2006. Defining Empire: Four Approaches. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA.
Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. 2000. *Civilizations* London: Macmillan.

Fidler, David P. 2000. "A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulation? International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization." *Texas International Law Journal* 35: 387–413.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn B. Sikkink. 1998. International Norms Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52: 887–917.

Fischer, Michael M. J. 2002. "Islam: The Odd Civilization Out?" *New Perspectives Quarterly*. Winter: 62–71.

Fisk, Robert. August 20, 2002. The Two Deaths of Abu Nidal. *Counterpunch*. Edited by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair. Available from http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk0820.html, accessed on March 2, 2006.

Fligstein, N. 1990. *The Transformation of Corporate Control*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2001. *The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fourier, Charles. 1841 [1808] *Oeuvres complètes I*, 145–50, as reproduced online at http://irw.rutgers.edu/research/ugresearch/international/fourier.html, accessed on June 12, 2003.

Fox, Fiona. 2001. "New Humanitarianism: Does it provide a moral banner for the 21st century?" *Disasters* 25 (4): 275–89.

Frank, A. G. 1998. *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Friedman, Thomas L. 1999 *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux.

Fry, Greg. 2005. The "War Against Terror" and Australia's New Interventions in the Pacific. In *Governance Challenges for PNG and the Pacific Islands*, edited by Nancy Sullivan. Madang, Papua New Guinea: Divine Word University in association with the State, Society, and Governance in Melanesia Project, Australia National University, DWU Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16: 3–18.

———. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man* London: Penguin.

Fullom, Stephen Watson. 1855. *The History of Woman, and Her Connexion with Religion, Civilization & Domestic Manners from the Earliest Period*. London: Routledge & Co.

Gellner, Ernest. 1981. *Muslim Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ghazanfar, S. M. 2006. *Islamic Civilization*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gill, Stephen. 1995. "Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 24: 399–423.

Gismondi, Mark David. 2004. "Civilisation as Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Hermeneutics of Conflict." *Geopolitics* 9: 402–25.

Göle, Nilüfer. 2000. "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities", *Daedalus* 129 (1) : 91–117.

Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press/ New York: Oxford University Press.

——. September 29, 1998. Asian Financial Crisis: Culture and Strategy. ICAS Fall Symposium, University of Pennsylvania. Available at www.icasinc.org/f1998/gwgf1998.html, accessed on January 15, 2007.
——. 2002. Standards of Civilization Today. In *Globalization and Civilizations* edited by Mehdi Mozaffari, 77–96. London: Routledge.
Goody, Jack 2004. *Islam in Europe*. Cambridge: Polity.
Gordon, Andrew S. 2004. *Strategy Representation: An Analysis of Planning Knowledge*. Mahwah, NJ: Earlbaum.
Gould, S. J. 1987. *Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle : Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Gran, Peter. 1996. *Beyond Eurocentrism: A New View Modern World History*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
Gregory, Derek. 2004. *The Colonial Present*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gress, David. 1998. From Plato to NATO: the Idea of the West and Its Opponents. New York: Free Press.
Gunaratna, Rohan. 2002. *Inside Al-Qaeda*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Vol. 1. Trans. T. McCarthy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
——. 1990. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*. Trans. F. G. Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hacking, Ian. 1999. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hale, Sondra. 1996. *Gender Politics in Sudan. Islamism, Socialism, and the State*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Hall, Martin. 2006. The Fantasy of Realism, or Mythology as Methodology. In *Harry Potter and International Relations*, edited by Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Hall, P. A. and David Soskice, eds. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, Rodney Bruce. 1997. "Moral Authority as a Power Resource." *International Organization* 51: 591–622.
Hall, Stuart. 1992. The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power. In *Formations of Modernity*, edited by Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben. Cambridge: Polity Press in Association with the Open University.
Halliday, Fred. 1999. "Islamophobia Reconsidered." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (5): 892–902.
Hamilton, G. G. 1994. Civilization and the Organization of Economies. In *Handbook of Economic Sociology*, edited by N. Smelser and R. Swedberg, 183–205. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hansen, Lene. 2000. "Past as Preface; Civilizational Politics and the 'Third' Balkan War." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (3): 345–62.
Harding, S. G. 1998. *Is Science Multicultural?: Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. 2000. *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books.
Hedeager, Lotte. 1992. *Iron-Age Societies*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. [1892–1896]. 1995. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History:* 3 Vols.: *Modern and Medieval Philosophy*. Trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.

Heidegger, Martin. [1927] 1962. *Being and Time*. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. San Francisco: HarperCollins.

Henderson, Errol A. and Richard Tucker 2001. "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 317–38.

Hendrickson, David C. (2002). "Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security." *World Policy Journal* 19 (3): 1–10.

Hobbes, Thomas. [1601] 1997. *Leviathan*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Hobson, John M. 2004. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2006. "Civilizing the Global Economy: Racism and the Continuity of Anglo-Saxon Imperialism." In *Global Standards of Market Civilizations*, edited by Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, 60–76. London: Routledge.

———. 2007. "Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphilian, towards a Post-Racist, International Relations." *Review of International Studies* 33 (S1): 91–116.

Hobson, John M. and J. C. Sharman. 2005. "The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (1): 63–98.

Hobson, John M. and Leonard Seabrooke, eds. 2007. *Everyday Politics of the World Economy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hopf, Ted. 2002a. "Making the Future Inevitable: Legitimizing, Naturalising, and Stabilizing. The Transition in Estonia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan." *European Journal of International Relations* 8 (3): 403–36.

———. 2002b. *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hopkins, Nick and Vered Kahani-Hopkins. 2004. "Islmophobia" as a Rhetorical Resource in the Construction of Muslim Identity. Paper presented at the International Society of Political Psychology Annual Meetings held in Lund, Sweden, July 2004.

Hourani, George F. 1963. *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*. Beirut: Khayats. Available from http://www.ewtn.com.library/PAPALDOC/b16bavaria11.htm, accessed on February 20, 2007.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993a. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 21–49.

———. 1993b. "If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post–Cold War World." *Foreign Affairs* 72 (5).

———. 1996a. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

———, ed. 1996b. *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

———. 2004a. "The Hispanic Challenge." *Foreign Policy* March/April: 30–45.

———. 2004b. *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53 (2): 379–408.

Hutchings, Ross (2006). "Empire and the State: A Critical Theoretical Assessment." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60 (3): 429–38.

Ibn Khaldun. 1950. *An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332–1406)*. Trans. and arranged by Charles Issawi. Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press.

Ifversen, Jan. 2002. The Crisis of European Civilization: An Inter-war Diagnosis. In *Globalization and Civilizations*, edited by Mehdi Mozaffari. New York: Routledge.

Iggers, George. 1982. The Idea of Progress in Historiography and Social Thought since the Enlightenment. In *Progress and its Discontents*, edited by G. Almond, M. Chodorow, and R. Pearce, 41–66. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Ignatieff, Michael. January 10, 2003. "Empire Lite." *The New York Times*.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2004. "Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age." *Review of International Studies* 30 (4): 609–30.

im Thurn, Everard. 1883. *Among the Indians of Guiana*. London: Paul Kegan.

IMF. 2003. The IMF and Good Governance: A Factsheet. April 2003. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm, accessed on June 16, 2007.

Inayatullah, Naeem and David L. Blaney. 2004. *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*. London: Routledge.

Inden, Ronald. 1986. "Orientalist Constructions of India." *Modern Asian Studies*, 20 (3): 401–46.

———. 2000. *Imagining India*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Inter-American Commission of Women (IACW). 1994. Strategic Plan of Action of the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM). 27th Assembly of Delegates of the CIM.

Ismail, Salwa. 2004. "Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics." *Government and Opposition* Vol. 39, No. 4 :614–31.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 1999. "'Civilization' on Trial." *Millennium* 28 (1): 141–53.

———. 2003. "Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11 (3): 223–52.

———. 2004. Whose Identity? Rhetorical Commonplaces in "American" Wartime Foreign Policy. In *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, edited by Patricia M. Goff and Kevin Dunn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2006. *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

———. Forthcoming. "Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory." *Review of International Studies*.

Jackson, Patrick and Daniel Nexon. 1999. "Relations before States: Substance, Process, and the Study of World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (3): 291–332.

———. 2001. "Whence Causal Mechanisms? A Comment on Legro." *Dialogue-IO* 1 (1): 1–21.

Jackson, Patrick and Daniel Nexon. 2002. Globalization, the Comparative Method, and Comparing Constructions. In *Constructivism and Comparative Politics*, edited by D. Green, 88–120. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Ron Krebs. 2007. Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric. *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (1): 35–66.

Jacobsson, B., P. Lægreid, and O. K. Pedersen. 2004. *Europeanization and Transnational States*. London: Routledge.

Jahn, Beate. 2000. *The Cultural Construction of International Relations : The Invention of the State of Nature*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jones, Christopher S. 2002. "If not a Clash, then What? Huntington, Nishida Kitarô and the Politics of Civilizations." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2: 223–43.

Jones, E. L. 1987. *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1996. The Debate over Hindutva. *Religion* 26 (2): 129–36.

Keal, Paul. 2003. European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kearney, R. 2001. *On Stories*. New York: Routledge.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Transnational Advocacy Groups in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keddie, Nikki. 1968. *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Keene, Edward. 2002. *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keene, Edward. 2004. *International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction*. New York: Polity Press.

Kerkvliet, B. J. T. 2005. *The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Changed National Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keyman, Fuat. 1997. *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Keyman, Fuat. 1997. *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Khatami, Mohammad. September 5, 2000. Empathy and Compassion. Speech at the U.N.-sponsored Conference of Dialogue among Civilizations in New York. Trans. the U.S. Federal Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS). Available from http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2000/September/Khatami/, accessed on May 29, 2006, and http://www.unesco.org/dialogue2001/en/khatami.htm, accessed on February 25, 2007.

King, Richard. 1999. "Orientalism and the Modern Myth of 'Hinduism.'" *Numen* 46: 146–85.

Kinnvall, Catarina. 2002. "Nationalism, Religion and the Search for Chosen Traumas: Comparing Sikh and Hindu Identity Constructions." *Ethnicities* 2 (1): 79–106.

———. 2004. "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for Ontological Security." *Political Psychology* 25 (4): 741–67.

———. 2006. *Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security*. London: Routledge.

Kjær, P. and O. K. Pedersen. 2001. Translating Liberalization: Neoliberalism in the Danish Negotiated Economy. In *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional*

Analysis, edited by J. L. Campbell and O. K. Pedersen, 219–48. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Koenigsberger, H. G. and George L. Mosse (1968). *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*. London, Longmans, Green and Co.
Kolodner, Eric. "The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall(?) of Hindu Nationalism." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 25, no. 2.
Koselleck, R. 2002. *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kotsonis, Y. 1998. *Making Peasants Backward: Managing Populations in Russian Agricultural Cooperatives, 1861–1914*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1999). *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. *International Security* 29 (2): 85–120.
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1989. *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kristensen, P. H. 2005. Modelling National Business Systems and the Civilizing Process. In *Changing Capitalism: Internationalism, Institutional Change and Systems of Economic Organization*, edited by G. Morgan, R. Whitely, and E. Moen, 383–414. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kristeva, Julia. 1991. *Strangers to Ourselves*. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press.
Krueger, Anne O. September 24, 2001. *Transcript of a Briefing with Journalists*. International Monetary Fund . Available from http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2001/tr010924.htm, accessed on September 11, 2003.
Kurzman, Charlie. 1998. *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes. 1997. "Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (2):193–237.
Lake, David A. (1996). "Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations." *International Organization* 50 (1): 1–33.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. *Philosophy in the Flesh*. New York: Basic Books.
Lal, Vinay, ed. 2000. *Dissenting Knowledges, Open Futures: The Multiple Selves and Strange Destinations of Ashis Nandy*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Landau, Jacob. 1990. *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Landes, David S. 1998. *The Wealth of Nations*. London: Little, Brown and Company.
Lapid, Josef and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. 1996. *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Lapidus, Ira M. 1988. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lenman, Bruce (2001). *Britain's Colonial Wars 1688–1783*. London: Longman.
Lewis, Bernard. 1964. *The Middle East and the West*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
———. 1990. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly*. September: 1–6.
———. 2002. What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, Sarah. 1840. *Woman's Mission*. Eighth Ed. London: John W Parker, West Strand.
Lincoln, Bruce. 1989. *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Linklater, Andrew. 2004. "Norbert Elias, the 'Civilizing Process' and the Sociology of International Relations." *International Politics* 41: 3–35.
Livingstone, David. 1858. *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa Including a Sketch of Sixteen Years Residence in the Interior of South Africa, and a Journey from the Cape of Good Hope to Loanda on the West Coast; Thence across the Continent Down the River Zambesi, to the Eastern Ocean*. New York. Harper and Brothers.
Lowe Morna, Colleen. 2000. Towards Sustainable Democratic Institutions in Southern Africa. Paper prepared for the International SADC-IDEAS Conference *Women's Political Participation in SADC*. May, 2000.
MacDonald, Paul. 2003. "Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 551–65.
Mackie, Vera. 1997. *Creating Socialist Women in Japan: Gender, Labour, and Activism, 1900–1937*. New York: Routledge.
Mahbubani, Kishore. 1992. "The West and the Rest." *The National Interest* 28: 3–12.
Mali, Joseph. 2003. *Mythistory: The Making of Modern Historiography*. Chicago: Chicago Univeristy Press.
Man, E. H. 1883. *The Andamanese Islanders*. London: Bibling & Sons Ltd.
Mandalios, John. 2003. Civilizational Complexes and Processes: Elias, Nelson and Eistenstadt. In *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin. London: Sage.
Mandaville, Peter. 2001. *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*. London: Routledge.
———. 2004. Sufis and Salafis: The Political Discourse of Transnational Islam. In *Remaking Muslim Politics*, edited by Robert Hefner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2005. Towards a Virtual Caliphate. *Yale Global Online*. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6416, accessed April 1, 2006.
Mann, Michael. 1986. *The Sources of Social Power I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
Maruyama, Masao [1952] 1974. Studies *in the Intellectual History of Togugawa Japan*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1985. *The Communist Manifesto*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Mason, Otis Tufton. 1895. *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*. London: Macmillan.
Matthews, Glenn. 1997. Forests of the Night: The Moralized Topography of Mau Mau. In *At the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender And Dependency*, edited by Philip Darby. London: Continuum.
Mazlish, Bruce. 2001. "Civilizations in Historical and Global Perspective." *International Sociology* 16 (3): 293–300.
———. 2004. *Civilization and Its Contents*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1984. The Moving Cultural Frontier of World Order: From Monotheism to North-South Relations. In *Culture, Ideology and World Order*, edited by R. B. J. Walker, 24–43. Boulder, CO: Westview.

——. 1990. *Cultural Forces in World Politics*. London: James Currey.
McCormack, Brian. 2002. "Postcolonialism in an Age of Globalization: Opening International Relations Theory to Identities in Movement." *Alternatives* 27 (1): 99–116.
McGrane, B. 1989. *Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other*. New York: Columbia University Press.
McNamara, Katherine. 1998. *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
McNeil, W. H. 1963. *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
——. 1986. "Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians." *The American Historical Review* 91 (1): 1–10.
Mearsheimer, John. 1994–95. The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security* 19 (3): 5–49.
Melleuish, Gregory. 2000. "The Clash of Civilization: A Model of Historical Development?" *Thesis Eleven* 62: 109–20.
Menocal, María Rosa. 2002. *The Ornament of the World*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Millar, John. 1806. *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks;* or, *An Inquiry into the Circumstances Which Give Rise to Influence and Authority in the Different Members of Society*. Fourth ed. Edinburgh: William Blackwood.
Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (2): 225–54.
Milner, Neal, Sankaran Krishna, and Kathy E. Ferguson. 2002. "The U.S. Response as Armed Struggle." *Theory and Event* 5 (4). Available from http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4ferguson_01.html, accessed on February 12, 2007.
Misra, Amalendu. 2000. "Hindu Nationalism and Muslim Minority Rights in India." *International Journal on Minority Rights* 7: 1–18.
Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." *American Political Science Review* 85 (1): 77–96.
Mitterand, Francoise. September 18, 2001. "A Pledge of Full Support from the French." *The New York Times*.
Modood, Tariq. 2005. *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship*. London: Routledge.
Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon.
Morgan, Lewis. 1877. *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism*. London: Macmillan and Co.; Albany, NY: Hoffman and White.
Morton, A. D. 2005. *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony, Imperialism and Resistance in the Global Political Economy*. London: Pluto Press.
Motyl, Alexander J. (2001). *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mozaffari, Mehdi. 2001. "The Transformationalist Perspective and the Rise of a Global Standard of Civilization." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 1: 247–64.
——, ed. 2002a. *Globalization and Civilizations*. London: Routledge.
——. 2002b. Globalization, Civilization and World Order: A World-Constructivist Approach. In *Globalization and Civilizations*, edited by Mehdi Mozaffari. London: Routledge.

Muchembled, Robert. [2000] 2002. *Djävulens historia [Une histoire du diable]. Trans. Lotta Riad (to Swedish)*. Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag/Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Mushakoji, Kinhide. 1996. Multilateralism in a Multicultural World: Notes for a Theory of Occultation. In *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, edited by Robert W. Cox. London: Macmillan for the United Nations University.

Najjar, Fauzi. 2005. "The Arabs, Islam and Globalization." *Middle East Policy* 12 (3): 91–106.

Nanda, Meera. 2004. *Prophets Facing Backwards: Postmodernism, Science and Hindu Nationalism*. New Delhi: Permanent Black.

———. 2005. "Response to My Critics." *Social Epistemology* 19 (1): 147–91.

Nandy, Ashis. 1980. *At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

———. 1983. The *Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

———. 1989. "The Political Culture of the Indian State." *Daedalus* 118 (4): 1–26.

———. 1995. "History's Forgotten Doubles." *History and Theory* 34: 44–66.

———. 1997. "The Twilight of Certitudes: Secularism, Hindu Nationalism, and Other Masks of Deculturation." *Alternatives* 22: 157–76.

Needham, Joseph and Wang Ling 1965. *Science and Civilisation in China*, IV (2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nelson, Benjamin. 1973. "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters." *Sociological Analysis* 34: 79–105.

Neumann, Iver B. 1999. *The Uses of the Other: The "East" in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Nexon, Daniel. 2006. Religion, European Identity, and Political Contention in Historical Perspective. In *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, edited by T. A. Byrnes and P. J. Katzenstein, 256–82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nexon, Daniel and Thomas Wright. 2007. "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate." *American Political Science Review* 101 (2): 253–71.

Nimtz, August. 2000. *Marx and Engels. Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough*. New York: SUNY Press.

Nisbet, Robert. 1980. *History of the Idea of Progress*. London: Heinemann.

Norgaard, Richard B. 1994. *Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future*. London: Routledge.

North, D. C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2002a. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. Oxford:* Oxford University Press.

———. 2002b. "The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians." *The Economist* 362: 23–25.

———. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Nyers, Peter. 2006. "The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Sovereignty and (Un)Making Citizenship." *Economy and Society* 35 (1): 22–41.

Office of Mrs. Bush. November 17, 2001. Radio Address by Mrs. Bush. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html, accessed on December 15, 2001.

O'Hagan, Jacinta. 2002. Conceptions of the West in International Relations Thought: From Oswald Spengler to Edward Said Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.

——. 2004. "The Power and the Passion": Civilizational Identity and Alterity in the Wake of September 11. In *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, edited by Patricia M. Goff and Kevin Dunn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

——. 2005. "Beyond the Clash of Civilizations?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (3): 383–400.

Okin, S., ed. 1999. *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Okonjo, Kamene. 1994. Women and the Evolution of a Ghanian Political Synthesis. In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, edited by Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury, 67–87. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Oommen T. K. (2002). *Pluralism, Equality and Identity: Comparative Studies*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Orback, Jens. March 9, 2006. Cite from *Metro*, p 2.

Pagden, Anthony (1995). *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c. 1800*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Panikkar, K. N. 1991. A Historical Overview. In *Anatomy of Confrontation: Ayodhya and the Rise of Communal Politics in India*, edited by Sarvepalli Gopal. London: Zed Books.

——. 1997. *Communal Threat: Secular Challenge*. New Delhi: Earthworm Books Pvt. Ltd.

Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 97 (3): 343–61.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Paris, Roland. 2002. "International Peace Building and the '*Mission Civilisatrice*.'" *Review of International Studies* 28: 637–56.

Parkman, Francis. 1884. *Some of the Reasons against Woman Suffrage*. Boston, MA: n. p.

Parsons, C. 2003. *A Certain Idea of Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Parsons, Talcott. [1937] 1968. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: Basic Books.

Pasha, Mustapha Kamal. 1997. Ibn Khaldun and World Order. In *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, edited by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——. 2003. Fractured Worlds: Islam, Identity, and International Relations. *Global Society* 17: 111–20.

Parthington, Anna, ed. 1992. *Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Patomäki, Heikki and Colin Wight. 2000. "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism." *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2): 213–37.

Payne, Rodger A. 2001. "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction." *European Journal of International Relations* 7: 37–61.

Peattie, Mark R. 1984. Introduction. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, edited by R. H. Myers and M. R. Peattie, 3–60. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pedahzur, Ami. 2005. *Suicide Terrorism*. Malden: Polity Press.

Philpott, Daniel (2001). *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pike, Warburton. 1892. *Journeys to the Barren Grounds of Northern Canada through the Subarctic Forests*. London: Macmillan.

Pipes. Daniel. November 19, 1990. "The Muslims Are Coming! The Muslims Are Coming!" *The National Review*. Available from www.danielpipes.org/article/198, accessed June 16, 2007.

Pitts, Jennifer. (2006). *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. *The Great Divergence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pope Benedict XVI. September 12, 2006. Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections. Regensburg University Address.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2004. "The Essence of Constructivism." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7: 319–36.

Powell, Colin. 2001. *President Urges Readiness and Patience: Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft Camp David* . Thurmont, Maryland. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html, accessed on March 13, 2007.

Prakash, Gyan, ed. 1995a. *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

——. 1995b. "Orientalism Now." *History and Theory* 34: 199–212.

Pratt, Mary-Louise. 1992. *Imperial Eyes*. London: Routledge.

Price, Richard. 1997. *The Chemical Weapons Taboo*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Puchala, Donald J. 1997. "International Encounters of Another Kind." *Global Society* 11 (1): 5–29.

——. 2003. *Theory and History in International Relations*. New York: Routledge.

Qader Imrana and Hasan Zoya. November 14, 1987. "Deadly Politics of the State and Its Apologists." *Economic and Political Weekly* 22 (46).

Rae, Heather. 2002. *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rahman, Fazlur. 1982/1984. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 1999. *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Riggins, Harold, ed. 1997. *The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse*. London: Sage.

Riker, William H. 1996. *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ringmar, Erik. 1996a. *Identity, Interest and Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——. 1996b. "On the Ontological Status of the State. *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (4): 439–66.

Robertson, John. 1998. Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modern European Political Order. In *Theories of Empire, 1450–1800*, edited by D. Armitage. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Robinson, Francis. 2002. "Islam and the West: Clash of Civilisations?" *Asian Affairs* (*Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs*) 33: 307–20.

Rorty, Richard. 2001. The Ambiguity of "Rationality." In *Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn: The Transformation of Critical Theory*, edited by W. Rehg and J. Bohman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rostow, W. W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1987. *The Basic Political Writings*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Roy, Olivier. 2004. *Globalized Islam*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rubinstein, Richard E. and Jarle Crocker 1994. "Challenging Huntington." *Foreign Policy* 96: 113–28.
Ruggie, John G. 1998. "'What Makes the World Hang Together?' Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization* 52: 855–85.
Sabine, George H. 1937. *A History of Political Theory*. London: Harrap.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 1994. Understanding Shock Therapy. *Social Market Foundation Occasional Paper 7*. London: Social Market Foundation.
Sacks, Jonathan 2002. "The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations." *Orbis* 46 (4): 601–9.
Sacks, Karen. 1982. An Overview of Women and Power in Africa. In *Perspectives on Power: Women in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, edited by Jean O'Bart, 1–10. Durham, NC: Duke University, Center for International Studies.
Safi, Omid. 2003. *Progressive Islam: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism*. Oxford: Oneworld.
Said, Edward. October 6, 1977. "Palestinians." *The New York Times*, 127 (43,720): A27.
———. 1978/1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
———. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.
———. 2003. *Orientalism* (Anniversary Edition). Hamondsworth: Penguin.
———. 2004. *Power, Politics, and Culture*. London: Bloomsbury.
Saikal, Amin. 2003. *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Saliba, George. 1994. *A History of Arabic Astronomy*. London: New York University Press.
Salter, Mark B. 2002. *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations*. London: Pluto.
———. 2003. Violent Resistance: The Bodies of Anti-colonial International Relations. Paper presented at International Studies Association. Portland, OR, March 2003.
Salvador, Riosang (Minister of Community and Cultural Affairs of Palau). September 14, 1995. Non-Governmental Organizations Address Beijing World Women's Conference at Conclusion of General Exchange of Views. Press Release of Fourth United Nations World Conference of Women. WOM/BEI/32.
Salvatore, Armando. 1997. "Beyond Orientalism? Max Weber and the Displacements of 'Essentialism' in the Study of Islam." *Arabica: Revue d-Etudes Arabes* 43: 412–33.
Sandel, M. 1982. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sayyid, Bobby. 1997. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. London: Zed Books.
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 1997. "*Rhetorisches Handeln in der Internationalen Politik*." *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 4 (2): 219–54.
Schmitt, Carl. [1932] 1976. *The Concept of the Political*. Trans. George Schwab. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Scruton, Roger. 2002. *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

Seabrooke, Leonard. 2005. Civilizing Tax Regimes: The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform in East Asia. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Hawaii, March 1–5.

———. 2006a. *The Social Sources of Financial Power: Domestic Legitimacy and International financial Orders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2006b. Civilizing Global Capital Markets: Room to Groove? In *Global Standards of Market Civilization*, edited by Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke. London: Routledge/RIPE Series in Global Political Economy.

Seed, Patricia 1995. *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sending, Ole Jacob. 2002. "Constitution, Choice and Change." *European Journal of International Relations* 8: 443–70.

Seth, Sanjay. 2000. A "Postcolonial World?" In *Contending Images of World Politics*, edited by Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan. London: Macmillan.

Sewell, William H. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (1): 1–29.

———. 2005. *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Shachar, Ayelet. 2001. *Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapiro, Michael. 1999. "Samuel Huntington's Moral Geography." *Theory & Event* 2 (4): 1–11.

Shaw, Julia. 2000. "Ayodhya's Sacred Landscape: Ritual, Memory, Politics and Archeological 'Fact.'" *Antiquity* 74: 693–700.

Shotter, John. 1993. *Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

———. 1993. *Cultural Politics of Everyday Life*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Simmons, B. and Z. Elkins 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98: 171–89.

Smith, Brian. 1993. "Reconceiving a Nation." *Commonwealth* 45 (5): 24–27.

———. 1996. "After Said, after Ayodhya: New Challenges for the Study of Indian Religions." *Religion* 26 (4): 365–72.

Smith, Steve. 2004. "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 499–515.

Soroush, Abdolkarim. 2002. *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Spencer, Herbert. 1873. *The Study of Sociology*. London: Henry S. King & Co. As reproduced by the Online Library of Liberty, at http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/EBook.php?recordID=0623, accessed on June 19, 2007.

Spengler, Oswald. 1922. *The Decline of the West*, 2 Vols. Trans. Charles Francis Atkinson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Spivak, Gayatri C. 1988. Can the Subaltern Speak? In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Education.

———. 1999. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Starobinski, J. 1993. The Word Civilization. In *Blessings in Disguise*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 1997. "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 1–25.

Stiglitz, Joseph. October 19, 1998. Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and Processes. Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, Geneva.

Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Suzuki, Shogo. 2005. "Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society." *European Journal of International Relations* 11: 137–64.

Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski. 1998. "A Methodology for the Study of Historical Counterfactuals." *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1): 79–108.

Sztompka, Piotr . 1993. *The Sociology of Social Change*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Thomas, G. M., J. W. Meyer, F. O. Ramirez, and J. Boli, eds. 1987. *Institutional Structure*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 1997. How Empires End. In *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building*, edited by K. Barkey and M. von Hagen. Boulder, CO: Westview: 1–11.

———. 1998. International Communities, Secure or Otherwise. In *Security Communities*, edited by E. Adler and M. Barnett, 397–412. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1999. Epilogue: Now Where? In *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, edited by G. Steinmetz, 407–20. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2002. *Stories, Identities, and Political Change*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Tiryakian, Edward A. 2001. "The Civilization of Modernity and the Modernity of Civilizations." *International Sociology* 16 (3): 277–92.

Todd, Malcolm. 1992. *The Early Germans*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Todorov, Tzvetan. 1992. *The Conquest of America*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Torfing, Jacob. 2005. Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges. In *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, edited by David Howarth and Jacob Torfing. Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Towns, Ann. 2004. Norms and Inequality in International Society: Global Politics of Women and the State (PhD Dissertation). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.

Trouillot, M. R. 2003. *Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tuastad, Dag. 2003. "Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarian Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(s)." *Third World Quarterly* 24: 591–99.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. 1996. *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Tuchman, B. W. 1984. *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Turner, Bryan S. 1978. *Marx and the End of Orientalism*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Ullock, Christoph. 1996. "Imagining Community: A Metaphysics of Being or Becoming?" *Millennium* 25 (2): 425–41.

UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women.) 2000. *Progress of the World's Women 2000*. New York: UNIFEM.

van der Veer, Peter. 1992. "Ayodhya and Somnath: Eternal Shrines, Contested Histories." *Social Research* 59 (1): 85–110.

———. 1996. *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Venn, Couze. 2000. *Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity*. London: Sage.

Volkan, Vamik. 1997. *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*. USA: Westview Press.

Vulliamy, ed. 1998. "Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement." *International Affairs*. 74 (1): 73–92.

Wæver, Ole. 1998. Securitization and Desecuritization. In *On Security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.

Walker, R. B. J., ed. 1984. *Culture, Ideology and World Order*. London: Westview.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2006. "The Curve of American Power." *New Left Review* 40 (July–August): 77–94.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

———. 2002. The Continuity of International Politics. In *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, edited by Ken Booth and Tim Dunn. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Weber, Cynthia. 2005. *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*. London: Routledge. Second edition.

Weber, Max. 1976. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Edited by J. Winckelmann. Fifth ed. Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr.

———. 1999. *Die "Objektivität" Sozialwissenschaftlicher und Sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis*. In *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, edited by E. Flitner. Potsdam: Internet-Ausgabe, Available from http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/paed/Flitner/Flitner/Weber/, accessed on June 16, 2007.

Weldes, Jutta. 1999. *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Wendt, Alexander E. 1992. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46 (2): 391–425.

———. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

White House. 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf , accessed on June 19, 2007.

White, H. V. 1973. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Whittaker, C. C. 1994. *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wielders, Iris. 2004. Australia's "Interventions" in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea in a Global Perspective. Paper Presented to the Oceania Conference, Australian National University, Canberra July 2004.

Wight, Colin. 2006. *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wight, Martin. 1991. The Theory of Barbarians. In *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, edited by Gabriele Wight, Brian Porter. Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

———. 1992. *International Theory: The Three Traditions*. New York: Holmes and Meier for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Williams, Michael C. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 511–31.

Williams, Michael and Iver B. Neumann. 2000. From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity. *Millennium* 29 (2): 357–87.

Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer, eds. 2002. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.

Wolf, Eric. 1982. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. *Discord and Collaboration*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Xing Li. 2003. "Dichotomies and Paradoxes: The West and Islam." *Global Society* 16 (4): 401–18.

Yeğenoğu, Meyda. 1998. *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, Robert. 1990. *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London: Routledge.

——. 2001. *Postcolonial: A Historical Introduction*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Young, Samuel. 1837. Suggestions on the Best Mode of Promoting Civilization and Improvement; or, the Influence of Woman on the Social State. *A Lecture Delivered before the Young Men's Association for Mutual Improvement in Albany, NY*.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. Culture Is Destiny? A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. In *The New Shape of World Politics: Contending Paradigms in International Relations*. New York: Foreign Affairs.

——. October 15, 2001. The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us? *Newsweek*.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2002. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Žižek, Slavoj, ed. 1994. *Mapping Ideology*. London and New York: Verso.

This page intentionally left blank

Index