MODERN EGYPT

Studies in Politics and Society

ELIE KEDOURIE & SYLVIA G. HAIM

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Contents

Due to the high cost of printing, it has been decided to eliminate diacritical marks in transliteration, except in a few cases where ambiguity could arise.

The First Egyptian Student Mission to France under Muhammad Ali

*Alain Silvera**

In March 1826, Charles X's sloop *La Truite,* with Captain Robillard commanding, docked in Alexandria. Accompanied by his first and second mates, the captain proceeded to Cairo for an audience with Muhammad Ali. The French party was then escorted on a sight-seeing tour of Guizeh and Sakkara, rounding off its visit with a full-day's inspection of the new artillery barracks at Abu Za'bal where General Boyer, who for the past two years had been drilling the Viceroy's recruits along Western lines, greeted his compatriots with a makeshift but creditable parade consisting of two of his choicest detachments. However Captain Robillard's mission had nothing ostensibly martial about it, for his orders were to carry back with him to France the first contingent of forty-four Egyptian subjects-all civilians-to be sent by Muhammad Ali to pursue their studies in Paris. On 13 April, *La Truite,* laden with its cargo, set sail for its month-long voyage to Marseilles.[1]

Thus, with this first trickle of what was to grow into a steady flow of further batches of Egyptian students to France, 'the founder of modern Egypt' took yet another, this time novel, step in opening his country to the West. His motives (not unlike those of his suzerain who was quick to follow his rival's example by sending an even larger group of Turkish students to Paris the following year)[2] were prompted quite plainly by the desire to bring to Egypt the practical wisdom of the French, not so much in order to regenerate his country in their image, but rather to consolidate his power by mastering their superiority in the art of war. Regarded as an integral part of Egypt's first efforts at autocratic modernization, this so-called *Mission égyptienne,* along with the simultaneous gro wth at home of the tr anslation mo vement, the secularization of education, and much else besides, has been rightly interpreted as being dictated by military ambition-the *primum mobile,* or in more contemporary academic terms, the independent variable, responsible for Muhammad Ali's grand design to assert his independence from the Porte and then turn to the Ottoman provinces around him as areas of military expansion.

But if the driving force behind the creation of Egypt's *Nizam-i Cedid* was to discover and emulate the secret of Europe's military might, the means employed to achieve that goal were to give way almost imperceptibly to something more far-reaching, so that the result of a student mission that produced in Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi the forerunner of a new sense of national identity, represents an indirect

and quite unforeseen consequence of the Viceroy's original intent. It also illustrates on the French side the ambiguous legacy of Bonaparte's occupation-that dazzling escapade in which the French Revolution's civilizing mission went hand in hand with the harsher necessities of military aggression. For if the Albanian despot now found his French allies only too willing to satisfy his need for more engineers and military advisers as a way of regaining some influence in their lost colony, he could also not help encountering among many of those who stood ready to support him a genuine conviction that this technical assistance could become the instrument of a more extensive scheme of social and cultural transformation. Itself a distant by-product of Bonaparte's fertile imagination, the educational experiment conceived by its French champions as the entering wedge of a cultural regeneration that their fallen Emperor could still fondly contemplate from his exile, was adopted by Muhammad Ali from less exalted motives.[3] Seen in this light, an examination of the first Egyptian student mission to be sent to Europe brings out in tangible form some of the ambiguities lying at the root of Egypt's first faltering steps along the road to westernization. A closer look at its origins and at the Parisian odyssey of *La Truite's* passengers may therefore serve to draw attention to the cultural strand within these two broader patterns of contact during such a formative phase in Franco-Egyptian relations.

The idea of sending young Orientals to be trained abroad can be traced well before the French invasion to the early 18th century missionary efforts of the Franciscans, and to a lesser extent the Jesuits among the Copts of Upper Egypt.[4] These efforts, very modest in scope when compared to the hundreds of Coptic children attracted to their missionary schools in Asyut, Luxor and Aswan by the 1750s, came to naught, as did a Jesuit attempt in the 1730s to send Coptic and Armenian children to Marseilles to be brought up in the Catholic faith.[5] The attempt was repeated some forty years later when the Vatican College of the Propaganda tried to lure to Rome some of the children of Christian refugees from Syria encouraged by Ali Bey el Kebir to escape religious persecution in their homeland by settling in Egypt.[6] This too was abortive, although the Syrian newcomers, settling in Egypt in large numbers, contributed to swelling the ranks of the Franciscan 'convent' schools now spreading to the Delta. J.Heyworth-Dunne has succeeded in identifying one notable result from this early period of contact-the appearance of the first printed book to be used in Egypt, the *Missale Copto-Arabicum,* compiled in the College of the Propaganda in Rome in 1736 by a certain Raphaël Turki. A Coptic convert to Catholicism, Turki appears to have been the first native-born Egyptian to have been educated in Europe.[7] However it is not unlikely that Turki may have had a few isolated predecessors among the *jeunes de langue*. These were young Levantines initially recruited by the Capuchins both in Istanbul and other French *Echelles du Levant* to be sent to Paris for the dual purpose of being trained as both native missionaries and consular interpreters in a special school called the *Salle des Arméniens* attached to the celebrated royal college of Louis-le-Grand. Among the thirty-six dragoman cadets educated at the school in the 20 years after its foundation in 1720, at least one, bearing the Greek name of Constantin although born and raised in Egypt, is listed in the records as having chosen to return home soon after his arrival on the ground that he was soon 'découragé par la sévérité de la régle.'[8] After 1721, however, and until the eventual incorporation of the school

into the *Ecole des Langues Orientales* in 1826, what could have become a promising channel of communication with Europe changed drastically in character. The Levantines, regarded as unreliable and slow-witted, were henceforth excluded to be supplanted entirely by French boys, many of them born in the *Echelles,* who were alone considered capable of undergoing the rigorous linguistic training required to serve as dragomans in the French diplomatic and consular corps throughout the Levant.[9] Combining scholarship with practical experience, the school turned out such notable Orientalists as Amédée Jaubert, who translated Idrissi and served as Napoleon's diplomatic agent in Persia, and Pierre Ruffin, the Turkish linguist who also had the misfortune of being the French *chargé d'affaires* in Istanbul at the time of the Egyptian invasion. Among the *jeunes de langue* who accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt, the venerable Venture de Paradis, the general's chief interpreter and translator of his Arabic proclamations, stands out as one of the finest products of the school.[10]

It was not until 1798 that the original missionary objective lying behind the creation of the *jeunes de langue* was revived-this time, however, adapted by Bonaparte to meet the revolutionary spirit of the new era. His purpose is clearly revealed in the measures he took immediately after the capture of Malta. On the grounds, as he so succinctly put it, that 'education is the pillar of both prosperity and public safety', he gave orders shortly before sailing on to Alexandria that a batch of sixty of the most promising Maltese youngsters picked from the wealthiest families on the island and ranging in age from 9 to 14 should be promptly shipped to Marseilles in order to be educated in the Republic's *collèges* at their parents' expense.[11] But once in Egypt, he soon discovered that local conditions, to say nothing of the setback of Aboukir, ruled out any possibility of repeating such an experiment with the children of Muslim notables. Yet there is ample evidence that the use of education as a tool to win over the minds of a native elite to the revolutionary principles he so self-consciously incarnated was never absent from Bonaparte's mind. Indeed, the whole thrust of his native policy, from the creation of the various *diwans* to the pageantry lavished on the celebration of Islamic and Republican festivals, was directed to the purpose of using education in its broadest sense to spread the gospel of the French Revolution among Muslims and minorities alike.[12] In addition to propaganda, this was also to some extent accomplished by his policy of amalgamating native recruits into selected infantry detachments decimated by the ravages of combat, disease and the British blockade. Thus, less than two weeks after Nelson's victory, orders were given to conscript 2,000 Mamluk slaves into French service. Soon thereafter, the nucleus of a Cairo police force was enlarged by Colonel Papazoglou, a Mamluk turncoat from Chios, into a full-fledged Greek legion which, together with a handful of Knights of St-John conscripted into the Maltese legion, helped the French in suppressing the first Cairo insurrection of October 1798.[13] In the following year, the heavy casualties suffered in Syria led Bonaparte to go one step further in trying to relieve the growing shortage of manpower. On 22 June 1799, he ordered General Desaix campaigning in Upper Egypt to purchase at his own expense 3,000 black slaves from Abdel Rahman, Sultan of Darfur, reminding him in a second letter one week later, that 'je n'ai pas besoin de vous faire sentir l'importance de cette mesure'.[14] Given time, the

amalgamation of such blacks into French units organized along the lines of Carnot's *demi-brigades* on the Continent may well have produced the only example of a racially mixed colonial army which, in Bonaparte's mind, was designed to combine military training with French schooling.[15] Colonel Sève's Aswan training camp, created two decades later, bore some resemblance to this precedent, though Napoleon's insistence on stressing French education would not recur until 1828, when, albeit in a somewhat modified form, Muhammad Ali decided to add a contingent of blacks to his *Mission égyptienne* in Paris.

More significant in the event was the actual creation in the course of the French occupation of an independent Egyptian unit-Mu'allem Jacob's Coptic legion-a few weeks before Kléber's assassination. From its modest beginnings as a motley assortment of tax collectors participating in Desaix's campaign against Murad in Upper Egypt, it eventually grew into a well-disciplined auxiliary force of well over a thousand fighting men whose remnants chose to be evacuated with Menou after the Treaty of El-Arish. It was from the ranks of these so-called 'Egyptian exiles', wretchedly quartered with their families in Marseilles, that the French were to select the interpreters required to greet Muhammed Ali's students on their arrival in France twenty-five years later.[16] It was also in their name that the notorious Chevalier Theodore de Lascaris, the former knight of Malta who had cast in his lot with the French, drafted a bizarre scheme, the first of its kind, for Egyptian independence to be carried out by a handful of Copts under the First Consul's auspices.[17] The scheme, eccentric, abortive, and premature, can be dismissed as the work of an unbalanced mind, illustrating the lunatic excesses that can be unleashed when romanticism is transplanted in the East. Bonaparte, more soberly, recognized the limitations of the forces he had himself set in motion when he confided to Kléber that only with the gift of time could education bridge the gulf that separated Egypt from the West.[18] As for his hopes for accelerating that process by sending a native élite to be schooled in France, it is significant that the only time he reverted to the Maltese precedent was in his parting instructions to Kléber, entrusting the fate of his beleaguered army to his command. 'If 5 to 600 Mamluks could not be found', he ordered, 'then send to France an equal number of Arab lads and *Cheikhs el Balad*. After a couple years' residence among us, these individuals would be dazzled by our greatness. Having mastered our language and adopted our culture, they would become the sturdiest champions of our cause on their return to Egypt.'[19]

Neither Kléber, nor Menou after him, was able to comply. Yet the lingering hope of realizing Bonaparte's design was kept alive by two veterans of the expedition, the French consul Bernardino Drovetti and the geographer Jomard. Of the two, Jomard was the more persistent; Drovetti, a Piedmontese born in Leghorn who had become a fanatical Bonapartist, more supple and persuasive.[20] As the man on the spot, it was Drovetti who succeeded in diverting the Pasha's instinctive tendency to look to Italy, which presented no political threat, rather than to France as a source for foreign cadre, although it is Jomard's name that has become indissolubly linked with the trials and tribulations of *La Mission égyptienne* in Paris-an institution which, formally at least, was to survive until the 20th century.

Edmé-François Jomard, whose passionate dedication to all that pertained to Egypt was to earn him the sobriquet *'le vieil Egyptien de l'An VII'* or simply

'Jomard l'égyptien', had been a member of Jacotin's élite corps of 'engineer-geographers' forming part of the Egyptian Institute's *Commission des Arts et des Sciences*. Like so many Frenchmen, notably the Saint-Simonians, who were later to serve as Muhammad Ali's advisors, he was a graduate of the prestigious *Ecole Polytechnique*. His three years in Egypt were largely devoted to a pioneering topographical survey extending beyond the Delta to the confines of Nubia, to drawing up the first accurate maps of Cairo and Alexandria and to compiling the first truly scientific estimate of the country's population going beyond Volney's earlier approximations. On his return to Paris, he became a founding member of the *Société de Géographie,* personally promoting and publicizing the African explorations of Cailliaud, Caillié, d'Abbadie and others, and the founder and, until his death in 1862, curator of the Map Section of the *Bibliothèque Nationale,* which originally consisted of his own private Egyptian collection. His chief title to fame, however, was as editor of the monumental *Description de l'Egypte*—a position that was rewarded in 1818 by his election to the French *Institut*. The publication of that great collective enterprise, finally completed in 1828 after almost twenty years of preparation, confirmed his reputation as France's leading authority on Egypt past and present.[21]

It was his lively interest in the transformations brought about by Muhammad Ali that led him as early as 1811 to submit through Drovetti for the Viceroy's consideration 'a plan', as he put it, 'for civilizing Egypt by means of education'.[22] The original document, pressing the Viceroy to waste no time in sending his choicest subjects to be educated in France, has survived neither in the Citadel Archives nor in Jomard's papers deposited in the French Academy. Nor is it mentioned in Drovetti's consular reports, or in his published correspondence beginning only in 1819.[23] It is summed up by Jomard himself, however, in a confidential memorandum, transmitted this time through the French consul Cochelet on 27 June 1839, aimed at persuading the Viceroy to put his house in order so as to win the sympathy of the West on the eve of the resumption of hostilities with the Porte. The memorandum's lengthy rubric on education, severely critical of Egypt's modest achievements in this area, contends that one of the major reasons 'why Egypt is now almost one generation behind in the formation of its indispensable élites' could be attributed to the Viceroy's rejection of Jomard's advice some twenty-five years earlier to establish a permanent mission of Egyptian students in France. Jomard wrote in 1839:

> Some dozen years after the French conquest one of the members of that expedition, placing his faith in the native qualities of the Egyptians whom he had closely observed under favourable conditions and firmly believing that the seeds which had thus been planted on the banks of the Nile would ultimately bear fruit, conceived the notion of perpetuating the intellectual regeneration of that country…by the Prince to send a contingent of students to France, to remain there long enough in order to receive, in spite of the divergencies of culture, a complete and thorough education…. He also stressed the dangers inherent in the method of instruction by means of

> interpreters and dragomans, which had a distorting effect on imparting and inculcating knowledge.

According to Jomard, his advice was turned down by the Pasha at that time on the grounds 'that his subjects were too ignorant to benefit from European travel'. And when, seven years later, Jomard instructed Osman Nourredin, the first Turk in Egyptian service to be sent to study abroad, to persuade the Pasha to reconsider, this was again to no avail. In Jomard's words, Muhammad Ali's reply to Nourredin on his return to Cairo in 1817 was: 'Now that you've acquired all that learning abroad, why don't you create a school of your own right here with the means at your disposal? When your students have attained a certain level of proficiency I shall then send them to Paris.'[24]

But even by 1826, their 'level of proficiency' had clearly fallen below expected standards. This can be attributed to the piecemeal and haphazard manner in which the various schools had been established; to the drawbacks of the double-lecture system imposed on students by foreign, mostly Italian or Italian-speaking, instructors; and to the calibre of the students themselves dragooned into quasi-military establishments where the relevance of the knowledge imparted, only dimly perceived by their interpreters, could scarcely be expected to arouse their interest. At first the students were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the household Circassian Mamluks inherited by the *Wali* from his predecessors to receive military training supplemented by the traditional *kuttab* curriculum as well as a smattering of Persian in a school set up within the walls of the Citadel in 1816. Some two or three years later, a separate Palace School, the *Dar al-Handassah,* was founded within the Citadel, this time recruiting its students from a somewhat broader Ottoman ethnic mix consisting of Turks and Georgians, Greeks, Armenians and Kurds, but not Egyptians. It was this establishment that became the nucleus of yet a third school, the *Madrassat al-Handassah,* or School of Geometry, founded in Bulaq in May 1821 with the purpose of training land-surveyors to replace the Copts. J. Heyworth-Dunne, in his pioneering study of Egyptian education, regards the latter, repeatedly expanded and modified after its transfer to Qasr el-'Aini in 1825 to become the famous Abu Za'bal school of 1836, as the forerunner to a type of school primarily designed to train administrators to meet the needs of Muhammad Ali's *Nizam-i Cedid,* which in turn can be traced back to its modest beginnings in the first Citadel School for Mamluks.[25] The evidence itself, however, suggests a less rigid separation between civilian and military schools-at least during this formative and rather chaotic period. Although the Citadel Mamluks, later to be replaced by black slaves levied from Nubia and the Sennar (and only as a last resort by Egyptian *fellahs*) did in fact constitute the bulk of Colonel Sève's earliest trainees in the Aswan camp which only began operating effectively after 1818, it should be noted that a good many others also found their way into the *Madrassat al-Jihadiyah al-Harbiyah*—an expanded version of the Bulaq school which opened its doors to no less than 600 fresh students in its new location of Qasr al-'Aini in July 1825. Yet it should also be noted that Qasr al-'Aini remained no more than a military depot, originally set aside for billeting

transient slaves, still sedulously purchased by the Pasha, en route to their military assignments.[26] These naturally mingled with the new students in their midst-students composed of the same ethnic elements as their predecessors in Bulaq, but now receiving a somewhat sounder education in a more regimented and disciplined ambience. A cadastral survey of Lower Egypt, which had been the chief practical task assigned to students and teachers alike in the original Bulaq school, fell by the wayside, or what is perhaps more likely, continued to be carried out in a sporadic way within the confines of Qasr al-'Aini. It is this work that may have served as the basis for a map of Lower Egypt drawn up in 1827 by Pascal Coste, a gifted Marseilles architect and Islamic art historian who stands out as the only man of any talent among the Bulaq teachers.[27]

The first director of both these schools was the notorious Osman Nourredin, a son of Muhammad Ali's *saqqa bashi*. A quick-witted adventurer, it was Nourredin who at the instigation of the Swedish consul Bokhty, himself an Italian, was sent from 1809 to 1817 on a leisurely tour of Italy to study engineering, printing and military science in Leghorn, Milan and Rome, and finally, for less than a year, to Paris where Jomard eagerly took him under his wing.[28] A miscellaneous assortment of books that he collected along the way was to form the core of the Bulaq library. His stormy life, culminating in his defection to Turkey in 1834 as a result of arousing the Pasha's displeasure by his mild rule as governor of Crete, has tended to obscure the earlier phase of an erratic career which included his appointment as Egypt's first chief of staff in 1825, and three years later, 'admiral' of an Egyptian navy that he 'westernized' by the adoption of the French naval code he had brought back from Paris.[29] His European itinerary points to the *Wali's* instinctive desire soon after seizing power to look to Italy in particular for the training of his cadre and technicians rather than continue to depend on the unreliable and generally incompetent foreigners attracted to his country. The names of the other students, estimated at twenty-eight in all, also sent abroad either individually or in small batches up to 1818, have not survived the fire that destroyed the Citadel records in 1820,[30] except for the Syrian typographer, Nicola Musabiki, who on his return from Milan in 1819, was placed in charge of the famous Arabic printing press established in the Bulaq school.[31] The location is significant: the printing and translation movements were to go hand in hand with the needs of technical education.[32] Equally significant is the title of the first book to come off the press in 1822-the Bolacco *Dizzionario italiano-arabo* put together by the Melchite priest, Don Raphaël de Monachis. Don Raphaël, a savant of sorts, formerly employed as Arabic teacher at the *Ecole des Langues Orientales* in Paris, had been the only native 'Egyptian' elected to Bonaparte's Egyptian Institute.[33] Italian, still the *lingua franca* of the Levant, served as the chief medium of instruction in all these early schools. And until the Bulaq press could begin to turn out adequate text-books and manuals, consecutive translation with all its pedagogical drawbacks continued to be the only feasible way for the motley assortment of teachers to discharge their duties.[34]

It was the mediocre results produced by Qasr al-'Aini at great expense that finally persuaded the *Wali* to turn once again to Europe as a quicker and perhaps cheaper way to achieve his purpose. Nourredin, fearful that such a course would undermine his privileged position (in addition to being its director, the Bulaq

records list him as the school's sole 'French professor'), was quick to raise objections.[35] Boghos, the Foreign Minister, seemed to have favoured sending the students either to Italy or England. He consulted his friend Drovetti who, in a reply dated 7 January 1826, showed where his real loyalties lay by dismissing Italy. Italy's universities, he wrote, were languishing under reactionary regimes; its people, filled with religious prejudice, were especially hostile to Muslims. Paris, on the other hand, was noted for its tolerance and generosity to foreigners, its healthy climate, its fine institutions of higher learning; and despite 'la guerre que fait main-tenant S.A. contre les Grecs', he reassured Boghos that French public opinion could be expected to display 'de la bienveillance pour les Turcs'.[36] On 26 February, after several weeks of intrigue between the pro-French and pro-Italian factions, General Boyer could at last report to General Belliard in Paris that the champions of France had prevailed.[37] Without further ado, the forty-four members of the *Mission égyptienne* were ordered to assemble in Alexandria for embarkation.

Little is known as to how they were selected save for a passing reference in the French consul's dispatch of 4 April to the Foreign Minister, le baron de Damas, confirming that the decision to send them at all had been reached only after considerable debate. Malivoine, replacing Drovetti who had left for Alexandria to recover from his exertions, reports that the majority came from well-to-do families 'qui ont toutes ambitionnés comme une faveur de se voir préférer dans cette occasion'.[38] This was certainly the case with the four gifted Armenian Catholics in the group, Sikyas Artin and his brother Khusru, Estafan and Yusuf—all of them protégés of Boghos, their co-religionist. Almost all the others, belonging for the most part to the ruling classes, seemed to have been picked out of favouritism rather than ability, but it is easier to determine their ethnic origins rather than their family ties from the list compiled by J.Heyworth-Dunne on the basis of the works of Prince Omar Toussoum, Yacoub Artin (Sikyas' eldest son) and Ali Mubarak.[39] The only contemporary source, Jomard's own *liste nominative,* included as an appendix to the lengthy progress report he published on the students in *Le Nouveau Journal Asiatique* in 1828 unfortunately omits all the information he had gathered on their family background for the sake of brevity.[40] By then, the *Mission* had dwindled to thirty-seven, five of the original batch having left the capital for practical training in the provinces, and two of its five Egyptian sheikhs, Sheikhs Muhammad Rukaiyyak and El Alawi, as well as a certain Wahbah Effendi, having returned home, to be replaced, however, by two additional Egyptian students identified only by name in Jomard's report. The predominant element in the group-made up, almost entirely, as Jomard confirms, of the scions of Cairo notable families—was, of course, Turkish or Turkish-speaking. Sixteen of them were born in Egypt, the remaining eighteen in other parts of the Empire. At least two of them came from Pasha's home town of Kavalla. Having had the opportunity to observe them at close hand for almost two years, Jomard noted that those who had arrived in Egypt before the age of fourteen were more advanced than the others, with the notable exception of the precocious and versatile Artin, born in Constantinople in 1800. No less than twenty-five of the students claimed to have matriculated from Bulaq or passed through Qasr al-'Aini, but like the other five who had studied elsewhere or with private tutors, had acquired no more than a rudimentary

knowledge of elementary arithmetic. A few of the Turks could converse in Arabic, and some of them even possessed a smattering of Italian. With the exception of the four Armenians, all of them were Muslim. As is well known, it was only at the behest of his Azhar teacher, Sheikh Hassan al-'Attar, that Sheikh Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi was attached to the *Mission* at the last minute to serve as its *imam*. At twenty-five, Rifa'ah was only slightly younger than the others, whose average age was twenty-six, ranging from the thirty-seven year old Abdi Effendi, one of the three leaders of the group, to Muhammad Assad, who was barely fifteen. Assad, an Egyptian, was destined to be trained as a typographer. Other menial professions, such as medicine and pharmacy, were also reserved for Egyptians. Not a single member of the *Mission* knew any French.

Contrary to Drovetti's assurances, the Egyptians' arrival in Marseilles on 15 May was greeted with a revival of local philhellene sentiment, provoked only two months earlier by the news that Muhammad Ali had commissioned Lefébure de Cérisy to build two new Egyptian frigates in the city's ship-yards.[41] The students thus found themselves unwittingly embroiled in the broader issues of Egypt's role in the war of Greek independence. The radical press condemned them as the instrument of Prime Minister Villèle's pernicious pro-Turkish policy, only to be taken to task by the sober and scholarly Parisian *Revue encyclopédique*. Inspired no doubt by Jomard the *Revue* stressed the necessity of drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, Egyptian extermination of the Greeks in the Morea-a policy, the journal alleged, forced upon the reluctant Pasha by his suzerain-and on the other, 'la determination pleine de sagesse et féconde en résultats que le même prince vient d'adopter' by choosing France as the place to send his élite to seek enlightenment.[42] As the controversy subsided, the *effendis,* after being released from their eighteen-day confinement in quarantine, devoted the months of June and July to mastering the French alphabet in a rented hotel set aside for their classes, and were rewarded for their pains by Sunday outings in the city parks and streets. It was there that they encountered for the first time the strange mores of a western metropolisnewspapers, unveiled women, and the cafés they frequented as they were taken sight-seeing along the Canebière. What Tahtawi found most startling about these noisy and crowded establishments was the enormous number of people that could be squeezed into such small quarters. Bewildered by the sight of both himself and his companions in the midst of exact replicas of all the other patrons, he suddenly realized that the cause of his optical illusion was the reflection produced by the surrounding wall mirrors-something he had never seen before.[43] Such endearingly naïve experiences, recurring in many of the early passages of the *Takhlis,* set the tone to only one aspect of a work that was to mark the beginning of the author's evolution into the first, the very first exponent of a radically new sense of Egyptian self-consciousness. That a man of Tahtawi's stature was included in the mission at all was an entirely fortuitous event, pregnant with meaning for the future. Yet for all the undeniable merits of his great book, its first impressions of a weird and unfamiliar world could scarcely avoid drawing attention to such seemingly bizarre or trifling phenomena as the use of knives and forks, of beds raised above the floor, or of the chimes of church bells heard for the first time as *La Truite* docked into Messina. These, like other observations in the same vein scattered throughout the *Takhlis,* represent of course a very insignificant part of

the work as a whole, but serve nonetheless to underline all the more dramatically the formidable obstacles that stood in the way of the other less talented students as they set forth to begin their studies in Paris.

In order to facilitate their adjustment to the new conditions awaiting them in the capital, Jomard had taken the precaution of adding five interpreters to the mission. These were all drawn from Mu'allem Jacob's colony of Egyptian 'refugees' and their families, still subsisting on a War Ministry dole since their settlement in Marseilles in 1802. Their names, recorded in the Château de Vincennes archives, are mere cyphers-Jean Pharaon, Michel Halabié, Eid Bajaly, and Joseph Awad.[44] But the fifth, Joseph-Elie Agoub, deserves to be singled out, not only because he served as permanent liaison with the student mission throughout its stay in Paris, but also because his collection of poetry, *La Lyre brisée,* was the only literary work by a fellow-Egyptian that Sheikh Tahtawi saw fit to translate into Arabic.[45] One of the major themes of this romantic extravaganza was a eulogy to Muhammad Ali, singing the glories of the heir to Egypt's Pharaonic past:

> Mais sous tes vieux débris ta gloire ensevelie,
> Se réveille aux rayons d'un jour inattendu:
> Quel est cet étranger sur tes bords descendu
> Des plages de la Romélie?
> Aly! que des beaux arts la splendeur t'environne!
> Rends à l'antique Isis ses honneurs disparus;
> Rends-lui les Pharaons! héritier de leur trône,
> Hérite aussi de leurs vertus!
> Les bienfaits sont suivis d'une longue mémoire:
> Veille aux destins du Nil, à tes mains confiés
> Que ses troubles sanglants sous ton règne oubliés
> Cessent d'épouvanter l'histoire…
> Vois dans l'Europe un juge, et marche vers la gloire![46]

It is unlikely that such verses, originally published in 1824 at the height of the Parisian vogue for Egyptology, made any direct impact on Tahtawi's nationalist sensibilities. But they did accomplish the author's purpose of bringing his name to the Pasha's attention, for after being translated into Turkish by Boghos Yusuf for his master's edification, Agoub was awarded the post of Jomard's assistant with a generous monthly allowance of 1,000 francs.[47]

Born in Cairo in 1795 of an Armenian father and a Syrian mother, Agoub belonged to that curious group of Levantines from Egypt who in the wake of the French occupation came to play a not insignificant part as cultural intermediaries between their homeland and their country of adoption. Among the others were Don Raphaël de Monachis, Champollion's Arabic teacher at the *Ecole des Langues Orientales;* the Copt Ellious Bochtor, his successor to that post, which in turn was coveted by the younger Agoub, and the author of a colloquial Arabic-French dictionary completed after his death by Caussin de Perceval; the Syrian Basil Fakr, French consul in Damietta under the Consulate and the Empire who,

according to his biographer, Auriant, was the real initiator of the Egyptian translation movement; and Joanny Pharaon, perhaps the most gifted of the lot, sometime professor of Latin at the prestigious Parisian college of Saint-Barbe, author of the first Algerian grammar, *Grammaire élémentaire d'arabe vulgaire ou algérien à l'usage des Français,* who ended his career as chief interpreter of the French expeditionary force to Algeria-all of whom contributed in a modest way to promoting a Franco-Egyptian *rapprochement* in the admittedly restricted scholarly circles in which they moved.[48] Agoub stood out from the rest, however, by being first and foremost a man of letters, sedulously applying himself to projecting a highly romanticised image of Egypt, both ancient and modern, by his literary efforts. These were highly prized in the Paris salons he frequented, notably Madame Dufrénoy's, where he made his literary début in the 1820s. Lionized because of his exotic origins by Béranger, Nodier and Lamartine, he found an admiring audience among the Parisian literati for such maudlin and stilted poems as his *Dithyrambe sur l'Egypte,* couched in the same flamboyant style as the historical introduction he contributed to adorn Felix Mengin's *L'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly,* first published in 1823. More significant in the long run was his skilful translation of the *maouals,* the Arabic popular songs he had heard recited in his youth by his fellow exiles in Marseilles. This showed him at his best, revealing a more authentic Egypt to his French readers and inspiring at least one of them, Gustave Flaubert, to write the only original work resulting from his voyage to Egypt, *Le Chant de la Courtisane*.[49] It also confirmed a rare ability for rendering colloquial Arabic into rhyming French prose. And the help he gave Jomard in revising the transliteration of all the Arabic words appearing in the successive volumes of the *Description de l'Egypte* was rewarded by an appointment as part-time lecturer in Arabic at the *Ecole des Langues Orientales* following the death of Bochtor in 1821. A vain and rather superficial man, whose scholarly pretensions could not match Bochtor's or Don Raphaël's, he is nevertheless credited by Jomard for having performed yeoman's service for the *Mission égyptienne,* supervising its day-to-day activities and assuring the personal well-being of the students placed under his care.[50]

Upon their arrival in Paris, the students were at first lodged in a hotel on the rue de Clichy, then in what was to become their permanent residence-an elegant left bank *hôtel particulier* rented for the occasion by Jomard, the former *hôtel* de la Guiche at 15 rue du Regard, not far from the Luxembourg gardens in the Latin Quarter.[51] Their preparation was so woefully inadequate that Jomard had no choice than to revise his original plan of study, deferring specialization until the students had acquired a basic working knowledge of French. This had the effect of setting back his carefully designed program by at least a year, though in addition to French, a distinguished faculty of *lycée* professors and military instructors provided daily instruction in such subjects as drawing and calligraphy, elementary arithmetic and geometry, history and geography. Since all the classes were conducted in French, the interpreters were no longer needed, and all of them, save Agoub, were sent back to Marseilles after only a couple of months in Paris. According to Tahtawi, the only student to have left any record of his experience, the schedule was a rigorous one, consisting of constant drilling in French grammar and conversation interspersed with the other subjects taught

almost without interruption from seven in the morning till six at night with only a short break for lunch.[52] Yet progress was slow, even slower than Jomard had expected, largely because the students tended to revert to their own language when left to themselves.[53] Following a disappointing performance by the group as a whole on a final exam given at the end of their first year in July 1827, it was therefore decided to accelerate the pace by breaking them up into smaller groups and dispersing them according to merit in nearby *pensions-or* more frequently, in the homes of their teachers-where it was hoped that their language proficiency could be improved by mingling with their fellow French boarders preparing to pass their entrance exams into the *grandes écoles*. Thus Artin, his brother Khusru and young Mazdar, the most diligent member of the Turkish contingent, became paying guests in the house of Goubaux, the founder of the Collège Chaptal, whereas Tahtawi and others were lodged with Lemercier, Jomard's private secretary and successor as director of the *Mission égyptienne* after his death in 1862.[54] Formal classes still continued to be held in the rue du Regard, however, which also served as a social center and occasionally as an overnight residence. Discipline was strictly regulated according to a quasi-military code of conduct enforced in rotation by three of the group leaders—Abdi, Mukhtar and Hassan effendis, all of them Turks—under the watchful eye of Jomard, who supervised the activities of his wards down to the most minute detail.[55] Although the Mission's funds were in the hands of Abdi, it was Jomard who advised him in deciding the amount of pocket money each of them deserved to receive,[56] made arrangements for Thursday and Sunday visits to theaters and museums, and composed for their information a lively digest of current affairs, *l'Almanach pour l'an 1244 de l'Hégire,* carefully omitting any reference to the Greek war of independence.[57]

Yet in Paris, unlike Marseilles, the war scarcely affected the public's reaction to the new arrivals in their midst. Jomard spared no effort to keep them in the public eye, issuing a steady stream of news releases on their academic progress, hailing them as ambassadors of good will-the avant garde, as he put it in one of his many communiqués to the press, of what would soon become Egypt's new westernized élite.[58] At a banquet held in their honor by some of the surviving savants of the Egyptian expedition, General Belliard expressed a similar view, describing the effendis as the vanguard of their country's future.[59] Outside such academic circles, however, the tone was much less solemn, since the popular *boulevardier* press could hardly resist the temptation of bringing out some of the more farcical aspects of the students' first encounter with the West. Conspicuous in their native robes and turbans as they were marched two by two from one museum to another, they soon became the butt of satirical journals depicting these disoriented Orientals as noble savages bewildered by the unfamiliar sights of a large Western metropolis. *La Pandore,* for instance, evoked in vivid and irreverent detail the vain attempts made by one of them during a stroll in the Palais Royal to recruit all the unveiled damsels within sight for his harem in Damietta, while a vaudeville writer, harking back to the light-hearted *turqueries* of *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme,* made them the central characters of a comic opera which enjoyed a long and successful run at the *Théâtre de Vaudeville*.[60]

Then, in 1827, the general curiosity aroused by the arrival of an Egyptian giraffe, a personal gift from Muhammad Ali to the King, at the *Jardin des*

Plantes,[61] revived the capital's interest in the Egyptians and inspired two Marseillais poets, Barthélemy and Méry, to portray them as the comic heroes of *La Bacriade ou la guerre d'Alger*. This mock-heroic epic poem written in rhyming couplets represents the students as the innocent victims of an international intrigue. Dispatched to France by the Viceroy in response to the Bey of Algiers' appeal for help in recovering a stolen fortune that Nathan Bacri, a Jewish-Algerian embezzler, was squandering in Paris, the bungling students merely succeed after a series of far-fetched accidents and miscalculations to be duped by the wily Jew into provoking the French government to declare war on Algeria for meddling in its domestic affairs. Bacri, 'the Helen of Troy of the Algerian War,' as the authors call him, was a real character. And for all its frivolity, the amusing plot, combining fact with fancy, proved to be remarkably prophetic, for the Bacri affair was indeed used by the Polignac ministry as a convenient pretext for invading Algeria three years later.[62] But in a more immediate sense, the enormous success of the *Bacriade,* which went through several editions, served to focus attention once again on the real students, paving the way to the wide publicity that Jomard gave to their final oral exam in 1828 held in the main auditorium of the *Ecole des Langues Orientales* on the rue de Lille on February 28 and March 1.

The solemnity of the occasion was underscored by inviting a distinguished group of dignitaries to witness the proceedings. These included some of France's most prominent Orientalists-Jaubert, Bianchi, Garcin de Tassy; members of the French Academy; General Belliard, Costaz and other veterans of Bonaparte's expedition; and, in a significant gesture to mark the international importance of the event, Sir Sidney Smith of Acre fame accompanied by the British consul David Morier. The examining board was chaired by the Comte de Chabrol, another veteran of the Egyptian campaign and collaborator to *La Description de l'Egypte* who had become the prefect of the department of the Seine. The oral had been preceded one week earlier by a written examination divided in two parts: a one-hour test on French composition and a one-hour-and-a-quarter test covering arithmetic, algebra and geometry, as well as drawing. From Jomard's account, which includes all five of the arithmetic questions, it is quite obvious that little was expected of the students beyond simple computations.[63] More impressive was the performance of at least some of them in the French essay test, which took the form of writing a letter home describing what had most impressed them during their two years in Paris. The prize-winning essay by Mazhar, the only one to be reprinted in its entirety in Jomard's report, shows a sound command of idiomatic French combined with a wry sense of humour. Mazhar, who was also awarded the first prize in geometry, had admittedly benefitted together with the four Armenians from courses he had taken the previous year at the collège Bourbon, where he had ranked sixth out of a class of seventy.[64] Jomard regarded him and Baiyumi as the two most promising Turks in the batch, and indeed his subsequent career as a military engineer who assisted Mougel in building the Delta barrage and the Alexandria lighthouse and rose to become the *Nazir* of the Egyptian Department of Public Works before his death in 1872 confirmed Jomard's expectations. Another Turk who, according to Jomard, showed a real literary flair on the oral part of the French exam was Khalil-Mahmud. Khalil can be cited as an example of those students who were

misemployed on their return to Egypt. Reduced to earning his living as a tourist guide, he was highly regarded by Maxime du Camp, Flaubert's travelling companion in 1849, who used him as an invaluable source for the chapters of his book covering Egyptian culture.[65] Although the Egyptians did not fare as well as the Turks on the exam, Jomard is careful to point out that their record, based on the number of first and second prizes awarded, placed them only slightly behind those Turks who, like Mazhar and Baiyumi, were born in Egypt, the least successful group being the category of Turks born elsewhere. Surprisingly enough, Tahtawi received no prizes, and is even mocked for his clumsy performance on the orals, but he is nevertheless praised for his able translation of a treatise on mineralogy as well as of Jomard's almanach.[66]

It was at about this time, shortly after a graduation ceremony held at the rue du Regard on 4 July, that Jomard announced the arrival of a fresh batch of students, this time young 'Ethiopians' who were to be trained to assist in the exploration of the Upper Nile. The idea had originally been conceived by Drovetti who as early as 1811 had been so favourably impressed by the native intelligence displayed by the black slaves employed in Muhammad Ali's factories that he suggested that some of them if properly educated in France at a sufficiently early age could eventually contribute, as he grand-iloquently put it, 'to spreading civilization into the heart of Africa'. It was not until 1827, however, that the Viceroy could be persuaded to approve such a scheme, and in the following year the members of the *Société de Géographie* were informed that six young African slaves, ranging in age from nine to twelve, had been set free by Drovetti to be educated in Paris at France's expense, and were already capable of conversing in French after only a couple of months in the capital. These blacks, who in fact came mostly from Kordofan, although technically members of the *Mission égyptienne,* were lodged throughout their stay in two suburban pensions. Tahtawi makes no mention of them and it would seem that Jomard was anxious to keep them segregated from the rest of the students placed under his care. Their fluency in French is attested by all the contemporary sources, which also report the amazing progress they were making in geography and natural history. In April 1832, Muhammad Ali assumed all expenses for their upkeep. By then, one of them had died of consumption, but the others remained in Paris until January 1836, when all the remaining members of the first mission were abruptly recalled to Cairo. Since there is no further trace of them after that date, it is impossible to tell to what extent these youngsters succeeeded in realizing Drovetti's hopes.[67]

In the meantime, the history of the *Mission égyptienne* entered its final phase as the students, broken up into fifteen groups, were at last allowed to begin their specialized studies in April. Jomard's assertion that they were free to select their own specialties is contradicted by Pierre Hamont, a severe critic of Muhammad Ali's regime, who contends that it was Jomard alone who was responsible for making the decision, which seems more likely.[68] The system adopted combined group tutorials with attendance at selected courses given at the various *facultés*. Some of the sections were taught by such well-known professors as Lacour in military science, Macarel in administrative law, Olivier in engineering and gunnery, and Gauthier de Chaubry in chemistry. By the fall, at least two of the students, Mazhar and Mukhtar, were sufficiently well-prepared to gain entrance into the *Ecole Polytechnique* and the *Ecole des Mines* respectively, and in the

following year, two others, both of them Egyptians, were admitted as full-fledged students to the Faculty of Medecine. Jomard's breakdown shows that three of the Armenians were picked to study law and diplomacy, along with Abdi and Selim effendi, a Georgian.[69] By 1829, a group of four, including the Armenian Yusuf effendi, having completed a course of study in physics and botany, were sent to the famous experimental farm of Roville, near Nancy, which later became the model for Ibrahim Pasha's agricultural school at Nabahroh. It was there that Yusuf effendi developed a variant of the tangerine, the mandarine orange, which still bears his name.[70] Another group of five, pretentiously described as naval engineers, were sent to a cadet school in Brest, where in fact, all but one of them were trained to become ship-builders. Many of the others could also hardly be considered as students in the accepted sense. Together with newcomers, Egyptians for the most part, who began arriving in France in growing numbers after 1829, they were scattered in trade schools or workshops, both in Paris and the provinces, to be taught such crafts as metal-founding and silk-weaving, metallurgy, dyeing, printing and engraving. Tahtawi, on the other hand, was singled out by Jomard to become a full-time translator-a task he began carrying out in earnest while his companions pursued their technical studies. In addition to a vast amount of reading in the French classics and contemporary literature, faithfully recorded in the diary that was to become the basis for his *Takhlis,* he was also able to complete the translation of at least four major works before the end of his tour in Paris-Burlamaqui's *Principes du droit politique* and *Eléments du droit naturel,* Depping's *Aperçu historique sur les moeurs et coutumes des nations,* and Jomard's extracts from Malte-Brune's *Précis de la géographie universelle,* three of which were subsequently published by the Bulaq press.[71] And when put to the test in November 1831, in a special final examination held before a learned body of Orientalists, he successfully demonstrated that Jomard's faith in his prize pupil had not been misplaced.[72]

By then, a good many of the first contingent of students had already begun to drift back to Egypt. Tahtawi himself left at the end of the year, preceded by half a dozen others who had returned immediately after the outbreak of the July Revolution. According to one estimate, however, the members of the first mission remained in France for an average of about five to six years.[73] Encouraged by its results, Muhammad Ali was easily persuaded by Jomard to establish the Mission on a more permanent footing, swelling its ranks with a steady flow of new arrivals, coming either individually or in batches over the next few years. It has been estimated that at its peak in 1833, a total of 115 students were registered with the Paris Mission.[74] Some, like a group of six who as early as August 1828, in the year following the battle of Navarino, had been sent directly to the Toulon arsenal to study naval construction, clearly consisted of semi-literate artisans who bypassed Paris altogether. But the majority of those studying in the capital tended to be of higher calibre. Most of them, recent graduates of Qasr el-'Aini now in full operation, were trained in engineering and ancillary subjects in the Paris school, where the curriculum was gradually adapted to meet the needs of fresh students arriving with a more solid grounding than their 1826 predecessors. The medical mission led by Clot Bey in 1832 deserves special mention, since it was meant to demonstrate that with its own medical school functioning at Abu Za'bal since 1827, Egypt was now quite

capable of holding its own in that area. It was also designed to dispense with the tedious double-lecture system which prevailed in that school by training its twelve members to replace its European instructors on their return. All except one in Clot's group were native Egyptians, originally recruited from El Azhar and selected as the most capable of the twenty who had completed the five-year course at Abu Za'bal. But although their performance on an exam conducted before members of the Paris Medical School enabled Clot to refute the charges made against him by Dr. Pariset and his other French detractors, most of them found it necessary to extend their stay in the capital in order to qualify for a medical degree which required completion of a dissertation in French. It is interesting to note that three of these medical students married Frenchwomen, the first recorded instance of such mixed marriages.[75]

The success which attended Clot's mission was the highpoint in the early history of the *Mission égyptienne* and prompted Muhammad Ali to express his appreciation by sending Jomard the gift of a golden snuff box accompanied by a fulsome letter of gratitude.[76] The geographer had previously refused any payment in return for his services, rejecting the generous offer of a salary of 10, 000 francs a year in a letter that was widely publicized in 1828. His motives, he declared on that occasion, were purely altruistic, representing a genuine desire on the part of France to bridge the gulf that separated Egypt from the West. But for all its rhetoric on the legacy of Bonaparte's expedition and France's civilizing mission, Jomard's open letter was in fact meant to remind the Viceroy of his responsibilities, for it bluntly warned him that the ultimate purpose of his educational endeavour would never be achieved 'unless the students were allowed a free hand on their return to introduce those principles of justice and order which, alas, have for so long been sadly neglected in their wretched and unhappy country.'[77]

Leaving aside such chimerical hopes, it would be more appropriate to examine to what extent these first European-trained students were able to fulfill Muhammad Ali's less exalted ambitions. From the Pasha's standpoint, the Mission's real objective was certainly not to encourage the penetration of Western ideas among his subjects, but to create the nucleus of a group of hand-picked and loyal servants capable of contributing more effectively to carrying out his ambition of transforming the state along Western lines. Conceived from its very inception as an integral part of his radical program of educational reform, the Mission was primarily designed to become the major instrument for achieving that goal as rapidly as possible. In the long run, the students were expected to furnish Egypt with the necessary engineers, technicians and teachers required to lay the foundations of a modern administrative structure geared to the Viceroy's military machine.[78] But an even more pressing need was to assist in the translation of the European text books on military and allied subjects made increasingly necessary by the proliferation of the Viceroy's westernized secondary and specialized schools, and ultimately also relieve his treasury of the financial burden of relying exclusively on the growing number of European instructors attracted to his service. If we are to believe Yacoub Artin, the way in which this was accomplished was both crude and arbitrary. His account of how the returning students were kept confined to quarters in the Citadel during their first three months in Cairo not to be released until each had produced an

adequate Turkish translation of a book in his specialty may perhaps be dismissed as apocryphal.[79] But the evidence of other writers bears out his contention that many of the students were not only ruthlessly abused by their capricious master, but were also denied the chance of working in their specialties.[80] Pierre Hamont, a contemporary source admittedly hostile to the regime, confirms the general view that the Viceroy failed to make the best use of their talents. Thus, Mukhtar and Ahmad, who had studied military science were both posted with the civil service; Mahmud, a naval engineer trained both in Brest and Toulon, was assigned to the treasury department; Estefan, who had specialized in political science and diplomacy, was at first placed in charge of supplies and stationery in the Ministry of Education before finally proving his mettle by succeeding Sikyas Artin as Foreign Minister when the latter fled the country following Abbas' accession; Baiyumi, trained as a hydraulics engineer, became a teacher of chemistry; and the Egyptian Amin, a metal-founder by training, was put in charge of one of the Pasha's new powder factories.[81] Even Tahtawi, the most eminent member of the Mission, could not at first escape from such erratic and haphazard assignments, and it was only after holding subordinate positions, first in the Medical School at Abu Za'bal, then in the Artillery School at Tura, that he was finally appointed director in 1837 of the Cairo School of Translation created by the Pasha at his own suggestion.[82] Other, more extreme examples of how some of the members of this and succeeding missions were misemployed on their return, can be cited from the experience of European travellers. Maxime du Camp, for instance, records how astonished he was to discover that a humble book-binder he encountered in the Muski was a former student of the *Polytechnique,* and the painter Prisse d'Avennes also reports coming across two others, one of whom had spent five years studying silk-weaving in Lyons, reduced to earning their living as a shoe-maker and jeweller respectively.[83]

On the whole, however, and despite all the hasty improvisations and sheer inefficiency that marked Egypt's first steps toward modernization, this pioneering educational experiment cannot be dismissed as altogether futile. Admittedly most of the students arrived in Paris both too old and inadequately prepared to gain much more than a rudimentary knowledge of the subjects they were made to study. Jomard himself acknowledged that in addition to their ignorance of French, it was their age and the fact that they lacked anything like a sufficiently solid educational background that were the major obstacles which stood in the way of carrying out the Mission's s objective.[84] Restricted in their movements by their native garments, their lives strictly regulated by the harsh military discipline that governed the school, most of them found it difficult to adapt to their new surroundings and seemed to have retained little of permanent value from their experience abroad. Yet others, more talented and enterprising than their companions, could not fail to derive some real benefit from their first encounter with the West. Because of their Christian upbringing, the Armenians undoubtedly found themselves in the best position to adjust to Western ways and make the most of their stay in Paris. But there were also some striking examples among such individual Turks as Mazhar, Baiyumi and Mahramgy who, notwithstanding their background, spared no effort to excel in their studies, developing a genuine appreciation for Western culture which they in turn tried to communicate to their colleagues at home. It is noteworthy that all three of them

ultimately succeeded in graduating from the *Polytechnique,* where their teacher Auguste Comte held them in the highest esteem, recommending the former to his disciple John Stuart Mill on his subsequent visit to London.[85] Yet although on their return to Egypt, these students were too few in number to have any immediate impact on the existing order of things, they eventually managed to overcome the hostility of the entrenched bureaucracy to assist some of the more enlightened of Muhammad Ali's French advisers in reforming the state along Western patterns. As members of the Pasha's inner circle, it was the Armenians in particular who were rewarded with the most important posts, Artin and Estefan being successively appointed Foreign Minister following the death of their co-religionist Boghos, while Khusru rose to become first secretary to both Muhammad Ali and his successor Abbas I.Muhammad Ali's Saint-Simonian advisers, notably Lambert Bey and Dr Perron, also prevailed upon the Pasha to make better use of many of the Turks who eventually attained positions of eminence in government service, Abdi and Mukhtar becoming Ministers of Education; Mazhar Director of Public Works; the Circassian Mahmud Nami Minister of Finance; and Hassan al-Iskandarani, Minister of the Navy after serving as director of the Alexandria dockyards. As for the Egyptians, it was Tahtawi's case which of course stands out as the most significant by-product of this educational endeavour, for it was he, and he alone among all the other members of the Mission, who was able to absorb Western culture to the fullest possible extent. It was also largely as a consequence of his influence that the following missions sent to France as well as other parts of Europe contained a larger element of Egyptians, hybrid products of two contrasting civilizations, who as a result of their exposure to Western ideas were to make a notable contribution to the intellectual and political life of modern Egypt in the years ahead.

NOTES

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25. Heyworth-Dunne, 111 ff.
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38. France. Archives du Ministère des Archives Etrangères: Le Caire (Correspondence Politique), 26, fol. 282, 4 April 1826. Family connections also helped in the selection of Turkish students sent to Paris. Cf. Richard L.Chambers, 'Notes on the Mekteb-i Osmani in Paris, 1857–1874', in William R.Polk and Richard L.Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East in the nineteenth century.* Chicago; 1968, 323.
39. Heyworth-Dunne, 163.
40. E.-F.Jomard, 'L'Ecole égyptienne de Paris', *Nouveau Journal Asiatique,* II (August 1828), 96–116. 'On a réuni quelques notions sur leurs familles qu'il serait trop long de rapporter ici.' 113.
41. Georges Douin. *Les premières frégates de Mohammed Aly (1824–1827),* Cairo; 1926, 7.
42. *La Revue encydopédique,* XXX (May 1826), 577.
43. 'Relation d'un voyage en France par le Cheikh Re'faa,' trans. by Caussin de Perceval, *Nouveau Journal Asiatique,* XI (June 1833, 231.
44. Archives du Ministère de la Guerre, Vincennes. 'Relugiés d'Egypte', Carton 17: Dossier Joanny Pharaon.
45. Cf. *La Gazette de France,* 24 August 1827; *La revue encyclopédique,* XXXVI (October 1827), 208–9.
46. Joseph Agoub, *La Lyre Brisée*. Paris: 1824, 6.
47. Giovanni Marro, Il *Corpo epistolare di Bernardino Drovetti* (Rome, 1940), 12–13; see also S.Zavatti, 'Bernardino Drovetti', *Oriente Moderno* (November-December 1965), 878–88.
48. L.de la Brière, *Champollion inconnu: lettres inédites* (Paris, 1897), 59; Bachtaly, *op. cit.;* E.-F.Jomard, 'Notice sur Ellious Bochtor', *La Revue encydopédique,* XXII (October 1821), 543–52; Anouar Louca, 'Ellious Bochtor: sa vie, son oeuvre', *Cahiers d'histoire égyptienne,* V (December 1953), 309–20; Auriant, 'Un précurseur du Docteur J.-C. Madrus', *Le Monde Nouveau,* (1–15 September 1923), 176–181, and the same author's *Aventuriers et Originaux* (Paris, n.d.), 70–104, on Basil Fakr. On Pharaon, see André Massé, 'Les Etudes Arabes en Algérie (1830–1930) *Revue Africaine* (1933), 210–11.
49. Jean-Marie Carré, *Voyageurs et écrivains français en Egypte*. Cairo; 1952, II, 116.
50. M.de Pongerville, 'Notice sur Joseph Agoub,' in *Mélanges de littérature orientale et française* (Paris, 1835), iii–vii; Bibliothèque Nationale, MS, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises, 3580. fols. 98–103; 163–176.
51. Charles Mismer, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1891), 289; Jacques Tagher, 'Les locaux qui arbitrèrent la mission scolaire à Paris existent toujours,' *Cahiers d'histoire égyptienne,* II (1950), 333–36.
52. Tahtawi, *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* Cairo; 1905, 147–150.
53. *La Revue encydopédique,* XXXII (December 1826), 837.

54. Gabriel Guémard, *Les Réformes en Egypte d'Ali-Bey el Kébir a Méhémet—Ali, 1760–1848.* Cairo; 1936, 302.
55. Tahtawi, *Takhlis,* 20–21, 150.
56. This was in addition to the students' pay, fixed according to a salary scale established in Cairo, and ranging from P.T. 5,000 for the Turk Abdi to a paltry P.T. 100 for the lowly Egyptians. Tahtawi's salary was P.T. 250. Cf. Heyworth-Dunne, 159–163.
57. Auriant, 'Histoire du Cheikh Refaah,' *Les Cahiers d'Occident,* II, x (10 September 1930), 147.
58. *Le Moniteur Universel,* 13 August 1826.
59. Belliard to Boyer, Paris, 4 August 1828, cited in Douin, *Une mission militaire,* 132.
60. *La Pandore,* 22 August 1826, and again 26 August 1826. The opera, entitled 'La Girafe, ou une journée au Jardin du Roi', was composed by M.Théaubon.
61. *La Revue encydopédique,* XXXV (July 1827), 258–61. See also Hans Houg, 'La girafe de Charles X et son influence sur l'art populaire et la mode,' *Art populaire en France,* IV (1933), 119–130 and Georges Dardaud, 'L'extraordinaire aventure de la girafe du pacha d'Egypte', *Revue des conferences françaises en Orient,* XV, i (January 1951), 3–11.
62. H.Barthélemy and Joseph Méry, *La Bacriade ou la guerre d'Alger: poème heroi-comique en cinq chants* (Paris: A. Dupont, first 1827 edition); Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. Vol I: La Conquête et les débuts de la colonisation (1827–1871)* (Paris, 1967), 21–28.
63. The fifth and hardest arithmetic question read as follows: 'Forty-two men at sea must share a fifteen days' supply of drinking water on the basis of a half a litre a day per man. Calculate what each man's share would be if the ship is to remain at sea for twenty-five days.' Jomard adds, however, that the questions had to be answered within a fixed time-limit. Jomard, 98.
64. Jomard, 102–3,105.
65. Maxime du Camp, *Souvenirs littéraires* (Paris, 1882), II, 472–3.
66. Jomard, 100, 104.
67. M.Pacho, 'Essai sur la civilisation de l'intérieur de l'Afrique d'après un projet de M. Drovetti, consul-général de France en Egypte, *'Bulletin de la Société de Géographie,* XII (October 1827), 137–42; Pacho, 'Sur un projet de M. Drovetti, consul-général de France en Egypte, pour préparer la civilisation de l'intérieur de l'Afrique,' *Revue encydopédique,* XXXVII (February 1828), 344–8; *Le Moniteur universel,* 26 May 1830; 'Education des jeunes Ethiopiens envoyés en France. Extrait d'un rapport présenté…par MM.Bally, Coutelle et Jomard', *Revue encydopédique,* XLVI (June 1830), 806–809. See also Jomard to d'Abbadie, 30 March 1841, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 22430, fols. 268–271.
68. Jomard, 105. Cf. Pierre N.Hamont, *L' Egypte sous Méhémet-Aly* (Paris, 1843), II, 192.
69. Jomard, 109–10.
70. Heyworth-Dunne, 151, n.9.
71. T.X Bianchi, 'Catalogue des livres arabes, persans et turcs imprimés à Boulac en Egypte depuis l'introduction de l'imprimerie dans ce pays', *Nouveau Journal Asiatique,* II (1843), 24–60.

72. 'L'examen final du Cheykh Refah,' *La Revue encyclopédique,* XLVIII (November 1831), 521–23.
73. Eusèbe de Salles, *Pérégrinations en Orient ou voyage pittoresque, historique et politique en Egypte, Nubie, Syrie, Turquie, Grèce en 1837–1839* Paris; 1840 I, 40.
74. Anouar Louca, *Voyageurs et écrivains égyptiens en France au XIXe siècle* Paris; 1970, 46.
75. A.B.Clot Bey, *Compte-rendu des travaux de l'Ecole de Médecine.* Paris; 1833, 219–30; and the same author's *Aperçu général sur l'Egypte.* Paris; 1840, II, 414. For a dissenting view on the quality of the students, see Hamont, II, 107, although Clot's pride in their abilities is borne out by their performance before the medical faculty of Marseilles' *Hôtel-Dieu,* which they visited on their way to Paris. Cf. *Le Sémaphore de Marseille,* 3 October 1832 and *Le Messager de Marseille,* 24 October 1832.
76. The letter was published by Count Jules Boselli (Jomard's grandson) in 'E.-F.Jomard', *La Revue d'Egypte,* IV (January-April 1897), 72–8.
77. Cf. *Le Moniteur universel,* 12 March 1828, and *La Revue encyclopédique,* XXXVII (March 1828), 843–5.
78. Victor Schoelcher, the anti-slavery publicist, exposed the Pasha's educational reforms as a mere façade entirely dictated by military ambition: 'Les écoles n'étaient pour Méhémet Ali que des instruments de guerre; il y renonce aujourd'hui que son role d'agresseur est fini et qu'il a perdu l'espérance de conquérir le trône du Sultan. II n'a plus besoin d'armée; il ne veut plus d'école.' *L'Egypte en 1845.* Paris; 1846, 63. See also A.L.Tibawi, *Islamic Education: its tradition and modernization into the Arab national systems.* London; 1972, 55.
79. Yacoub Artin, *L' Instruction publique,* 73.
80. See, for instance, Paul Merruau, *L'Egypte contemporaine de Méhémet Ali à Said Pacha (1840–1857).* Paris; 1858, 88, or J.-H.Guisquet, *L'Egypte, les Turcs et les Arabes,* Paris; 1848, II, 84.
81. Hamont, II, 192–195.
82. Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *'Asr Mohammed Ali.* Cairo; 1947, 414.
83. Maxime du Camp, *Souvenirs littéraires,* I, 545–6; E. Prisse d'Avennes, 'Politique et administration de l'Egypte moderne,' Bibliothèque Nationale, MS., Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 20422, fol. 84.
84. Jomard to Artin Bey, October 1844, cited in Gaston Wiet, 'Quatre lettres inédites de Mohammed Ali', *La Revue du Caire* (October 1944), 37.
85. *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à John Stuart Mill (1841–1846),* Paris; 1877, 123–24, 169, 177; Francis E.Mineka, ed., *The Earlier letters of John Stuart Mill (1812–1848),* Toronto; 1963, II, 592, 617.

The Near East in the Balance of Power: The Repercussions of the Kaulla Incident in 1893

Gordon Martel

It has become a commonplace of European diplomatic history to regard the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 as a turning-point in relations among the Great Powers. According to this view, the occupation abruptly halted the good relations that had hitherto existed between Britain and France, relations summed up in the appropriately vague rubric of the 'liberal alliance'. The French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war had led them to abandon earlier hopes of establishing hegemony in Europe; British commercial success in the generation following the Crimean War had convinced them of the wisdom in remaining aloof from the European balance of power. Thus, the two nations drew together, ignoring Europe and cooperating in Syria, China and Mexico. They worked together the more easily because Gambetta's liberalism dominated the politics of the Third Republic, co-operating nicely with Gladstonian liberalism in Britain. The French however, in abandoning the old dream of hegemony in Europe, took up the new one of empire in the Mediterranean. The British, in occupying Egypt, struck a blow at the new dream and henceforth antagonism replaced harmony as the dominant feature in Anglo-French relations.

Peace and stability in Europe had been preserved in part by the liberal alliance, in part by the Three Emperors' League among Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Neither arrangement was aggressive nor revisionist. Bismarck drew the other two eastern powers together in order to prevent them from fighting one another. With Russia content in the East, the French would recognize the futility of trying to overthrow the settlement imposed by the Treaty of Frankfurt. Although Bismarck had found it increasingly difficult to play the part of honest broker between his two eastern allies, he continued to believe it was a part that must be played. The split between Britain and France did not weaken, but strengthened, his resolution: an isolated France might be prepared to overcome her isolation by agreeing to Russian terms in the Near East. Tied down as he was to Austria, Bismarck would not be able to match the terms offered by France for Russian aggrandizement. The British occupation of Egypt was therefore decisive in the diplomacy of Bismarck's last years in office, and was largely responsible for relations in the East taking on the appearance of a patchwork quilt.

The ramifications of the occupation did not end here. One of the few stable factors in the diplomacy of the European powers in the nineteenth century had

been the good relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Although difficulties had arisen from time to time, the essential nature of those relations had remained intact: the British regarded it as a vital interest that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire be maintained. The building of the Suez Canal altered the formula. Hitherto, the Straits had been Britain's s first concern in the Near East; from 1869 onwards the balance began to shift in favour of Egypt; by 1882, thirteen per cent of Britain's foreign trade passed through the canal. Partly as a result of financial changes brought about by the success of the Canal and partly as a result of the expansion in Egyptian cotton exports brought about by the American civil war, a local crisis developed in Egypt. Britain and France established a Dual Control of Egyptian finances following her declaration of bankruptcy in 1876. An Egyptian revolt against the Dual Control developed, leading to unilateral intervention by Britain in 1882. Henceforth, relations between the sultan and the British government soured. Although the British claimed to be acting on his behalf, this argument began to look more and more like a convenient legal fiction: the British had violated their own principle of upholding Turkish integrity.

Although the balance of British interests in the Near East had swung away from the Straits to the Canal, this did not mean that the Straits came to be regarded as insignificant. In fact Salisbury, in 1892, regarded continued protection of Constantinople and the Straits as essential to the British position in Egypt. Thus, the British faced the difficult task of accommodating the sultan at the same time as their occupation of Egypt had embittered relations with him. The threat remained what it had been throughout the century: Russian domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. The occupation of Egypt made cooperation with the sultan difficult while destroying the possibility of a renewed Crimean-style alliance with France. Consequently, the British gradually came to rely on the Triple Alliance to assist her in the Near East. More specifically, when Egypt had gone bankrupt, the *Caisse de la Dette* had been established by the European powers to ensure that they would be paid what they were owed. This meant that the British, to govern Egypt, were dependent on European approval of financial measures, so the government of Egypt became 'the football of European diplomacy'. For successive British governments this meant relying on German assistance, and thus Bismarck's Egyptian baton was created.

On 7 January 1893 the German consul-general in Cairo announced to the British commissioner that he must no longer look to Germany for assistance in English projects in Egypt. He made this announcement in one sense because he was using Bismarck's Egyptian baton to force the British to submit to German demands elsewhere. He made it in another sense because the British foreign secretary had, in the autumn of the previous year, refused to commit himself more firmly and more openly to the Triple Alliance, and because neither the foreign secretary nor his ambassador at Constantinople understood the political and commercial implications of the new course in German foreign policy that came after the fall of Bismarck. The Kaulla affair, in January 1893, initiated the Earl of Rosebery to the German uses of the Egyptian baton, forced him to face the wider implications of German policy, and, temporarily at least, to submit to the demands made upon him. His policy during the course of the affair, and his actions immediately following it show how the British regarded the connection

between commercial and political interests in the late nineteenth century, and, more important for understanding the position of the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean in the international politics of the next decade, how far they were prepared to go in accommodating the Germans, and what they understood the alternative to be.

The Bagdad railway project, which led to many Anglo-German difficulties during the next twenty years, began, in 1888, as an effort to establish greater cooperation between the two Great Powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.[1] Sir William White, British ambassador at Constantinople from 1886 to 1891, used to complain that while the Triple Alliance was useful to Britain elsewhere, notably in Egypt, it did her no good at Constantinople because it did not exist. The Germans, he argued, were determined to maintain the Three Emperors' League of Germany, Russia, and Austria, and in practice this meant not offending the Russians at Constantinople. He thought the Germans were able to take this position because they had no direct interest in the Near East. When the sultan proposed to German bankers in September 1888 that they undertake a substantial railway concession in Anatolia, White therefore welcomed the proposal as the first step in driving a wedge into the Three Emperors' League.[2]

The wedge took the form of a railway concession in Anatolia. Working together, the British, Germans and Italians had secured from the Sultan the right to build a railway from Ismidt (Izmit) to Angora (Ankara). The concession, given to Alfred Kaulla of the Wurtemberische Vereinsbank and Dr Georg Siemens of the Deutsche Bank, was to include secret British participation through a group led by Vincent Callard, President of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.[3] A French group had unsuccessfully opposed the concession, marking the first serious defeat of Franco-Russian interests since the British occupied Egypt. More important, White assured Salisbury, it marked the beginning of a split between Germany and Russia 'and bids fair to become a new departure for Germany at Constantinople which it will be interesting to watch'.[4] The Kaulla affair, which in 1893 appeared to drive Britain and Germany apart in the Near East, began in 1888 with the promise of bringing them closer together.

By 1890 Caillard's participation in the railway had fallen through, and the Anatolian Railway Company became an entirely German enterprise, a state of affairs equally suited to the political and financial interests of the sultan. Politically, the Germans appeared to have no territorial ambitions in the Ottoman Empire, distinguishing them from the British and the Russians.[5] Further, if a Russo-German rivalry should develop in the Near East, and end in war, that war would, logically, be fought in Poland rather than Asia Minor. Cooperating with the Germans, then, offered the possibility of long-term political advantage, but it also offered financial rewards: the sultan's immediate motive for granting the concession of 1888 had been the promise of a loan. In 1892 the sultan, who again needed money, proposed to Kaulla that the Anatolian Railway should extend its line from Angora to Bagdad, realizing this would stimulate a bidding war from which he could extract another loan.[6]

When Kaulla, joining with a German commercial company, responded favourably to the sultan's s proposal in December 1892, he did not bother to inform the British, their participation having disappeared some time ago. When the British Foreign Office first heard of the proposed arrangement its initial

reaction was to regard the affair as strictly commercial. The Germans, after all, had not approached them to arrange things politically. When British commercial interests expressed opposition to Kaulla's concession therefore, the British government prepared to intervene on their behalf, and saw nothing extraordinary in doing so.

Explaining the relationship between British commercial interests and the government has never been easy, but the difficulty itself is easy enough to explain: the British, never sure what the relationship was, or what it should be, were themselves confused. During the Kaulla affair the policy of Lord Rosebery, Liberal foreign secretary in 1886, from 1892–1894 and prime minister in 1894–95, can be understood only by taking this confusion into account. When Rosebery decided to intervene on behalf of British commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire he knew practically nothing about them. He thought he knew enough because, at the end of December 1892 Edgar Vincent, another Englishman who had served as President of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, and who was now President of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, had assured him the extension of the Anatolian Railway Company would result in a loss to British interests of two million pounds sterling.[7] Ironically, in view of later developments, Rosebery did not object to Germany's extending the railway from Angora to Bagdad, as he assumed it would stabilize the Turkish economy and thereby contribute to Britain's political interest in maintaining the Turkish state. Besides, he realized the sultan would refuse to award the concession to Britain, as it would look like a preliminary to declaring a protectorate over Asia Minor.

What Rosebery instructed his ambassador to object to, on the basis of information provided by Vincent, was not the Angora to Bagdad line, but a second, smaller, politically and strategically less significant one. Because the line to Bagdad would run through difficult terrrain, it would be extremely costly and take years to build. Kaulla had proposed therefore, in exchange for undertaking to build this line, that he should be given the concession to extend the Hidar Pasha-Ismidt line south to Konia. This line, which could be built quickly and which would terminate in Turkey's prime agricultural area, would conflict with the designs of two other lines, the Smyrna to Aidin and the Smyrna to Cassaba, both of which planned to branch out to the interior around Konia. Excluding them from this area, they claimed, would bankrupt them. Rosebery, on 25 December 1892, instructed his ambassador to try and delay the granting of the concession to Kaulla, in order to take their claims into account.

When the German foreign minister, Baron von Marschall, heard of the British intervention he erupted. On 6 January 1893 he called in the British ambassador to tell him, if the information he had received were correct, 'he must regard it as an inimical act towards Germany'. It would, he declared, 'render impossible the continuance of the cordial cooperation which had been of so much benefit to both countries'.[8] Rosebery, he said, had delivered a blow to the Triple Alliance; the French were already jubilant. Marschall no doubt assumed Rosebery knew what he was doing, an unwarranted assumption. The German government, which for a decade had been balancing domestic agrarian, industrial and trading interests, each having its own view of a proper foreign policy, regarded commerce and politics as two sides of the same coin: neither could be considered apart from the other.[9] Assuming the British thought in the same way, Rosebery's

action in opposing their railway must have been motivated by wider political considerations.

The Germans were particularly sensitive to actions like Rosebery's opposing the Kaulla concession because they regarded them as indicating how the British connection with the Triple Alliance worked, and under what conditions.[10] Nevertheless, had it not been for the new course in German foreign policy instituted after the fall of Bismarck, this particular controversy would have amounted to little. Essentially, the new course meant breaking the old, defensive and conservative arrangement with Russia, and substituting for it an aggressive policy of commercial expansion, particularly in the Near East. The Triple Alliance, in the hands of William II, was to be transformed into an offensive arrangement assisting the growth of German economic and political power; Bismarck's fear of Russia, and his defensive arrangement with her, would be shown to have hindered this growth.[11] Rosebery's action in January 1893 therefore threatened a fundamental assumption of the new course, proving, as it appeared to do, that the British regarded their connection with the Triple Alliance as political and defensive, and would refuse to assist German commercial expansion. Henceforth, Marschall aimed to use the affair in demonstrating to Rosebery why the British were bound to assist them in the future.[12]

The Germans were also determined to insist on good behaviour from Rosebery because they were conscious of Gladstone's attitude to the Triple Alliance. Gladstone disliked the alliance and wanted to avoid any connection with it. He thought Britain's problems abroad could be solved by improving relations with France and Russia, first by evacuating Egypt, second by rejecting a forward policy in Asia. He considered French enmity to have been caused by the Egyptian occupation, and had, before resuming office in August 1892, announced his intention to evacuate as soon as possible. He had also attacked the Triple Alliance as increasing the likelihood of war, and had warned the Italians against joining it. The Germans, therefore, had good reason to worry when Gladstone returned to office, and they tried to overcome their worries in the autumn of 1892 by inducing Rosebery to commit himself to the Triple Alliance.[13]

The German fear of the ramifications of Gladstonian foreign policy was not without foundation. If the British evacuated Egypt, the Triple Alliance would lose its most effective instrument for applying diplomatic pressure. If amicable relations were restored between Britain and France, Italy would be powerless in the Mediterranean and might decide to leave the Triple Alliance and turn her hopes for expansion in the direction of Austria. Austria, already faced with the antagonism of Russia, and determined, since Sadowa, never again to fight a war on two fronts, might decide to follow Italy in leaving the Alliance, and join Russia instead. Gladstonian policy, in other words, appeared to contain the elements which might lead to the collapse of Germany's diplomatic position in Europe.

The Germans had, therefore, taken the first opportunity to test Rosebery's attitude to the Triple Alliance. In September 1892 they asked him to define his position. He refused to commit himself any more directly than Salisbury had done in the Mediterranean Agreement of 1887 when he had promised to cooperate with the Italians if the status quo in the Mediterranean were threatened.[14] Under

no circumstances, Rosebery told the German ambassador, would he commit the government in advance of actual events, and then the British would assist the Italians only if the French were to attack them 'groundlessly'.[15] In place of commitment Rosebery offered the sympathy of the British public, and his own, well-advertised disposition to regard the French as the enemy, and the Triple Alliance as the friends of the British. The Germans and Italians were, understandably, less than enthusiastic about this state of affairs, and used any opportunity arising to test Rosebery's disposition to work in harmony with them and, if possible, to bring Britain into full partnership in the alliance. The Kaulla affair represented a great deal more than simply bargaining for commercial concessions: it represented both the existing state of Anglo-German relations, and the possibility of a turning-point in those relations.[16]

The telegram announcing Marschall's reaction to the British representations at Constantinople arrived on Rosebery 's desk the morning of 6 January 1893. The next day a second telegram arrived, this time from Cairo. The German consul-general, Lord Cromer reported, had called on him to recite Marschall's complaints against the attitude of Britain in Constantinople. The German, he said, had laid particular stress on the British actually having supported French interests over German. Given the British attitude at Constantinople, the German foreign office had instructed their representative to inform Cromer 'that I must no longer look for German assistance in English projects in Egypt'.[17] Cromer, naturally, was upset: the Austrians and the Italians would follow the German lead, the British would be isolated, and only the French and Russians would benefit. 'A good understanding', he assured Rosebery, 'is very much to be desired'.[18]

Rosebery, who had never before experienced the sensation of having his knuckles rapped with the Egyptian baton, was startled by Marschall's action. The German explosion, he told Cromer, was 'quite unexpected', but he promised to try his best to arrange it amicably.[19] Britain's problem in the Kaulla affair, however, did not arise so much from the particular feature of Rosebery's inexperience, but from a general, haphazard way of dealing with questions of commercial interest traditional to the British Foreign Office. Rosebery had undertaken to act against Kaulla entirely on the information provided him by a private individual, Edgar Vincent. The first hint of this information possibly being suspect came from the Germans, via Cairo, when they complained of being disregarded for the sake of a French interest. Rosebery, in acting to defend the interests of the Smyrna-Cassaba and Smyrna-Aidin lines, did not realize that the former, originally a British venture, had fallen under the control of the French group; a subordinate interest in the line had been maintained by a British group however, a group that included Edgar Vincent.[20] Only the Smyrna-Aidin line could be considered a proper British interest, and its representatives had never approached the Foreign Office[21] Rosebery had, through ignorance, managed to do precisely what the Germans had accused him of doing: taken the side of French interests at Constantinople.

British ignorance, for a few days in January, succeeded in compounding the original error. Sir Edward Malet, the ambassador at Berlin, began with a moderate defence of his government's action by arguing the question of constructing a railway from Angora to Bagdad to be a vital one for Britain,

raising as it did 'the whole question of our communication with India'.[22] The Germans, he assumed, would appreciate how delicate the situation was if they were given to believe that the British had acted out of their concern for the defence of India. In this situation it could be understood how the British might find it necessary to take some step at Constantinople to prevent a concession being given without obtaining guarantees to safeguard their interests. But in fact, the possibility of a German railway to Bagdad having political consequences damaging to British interests had never occurred to Rosebery, nor, apparently, to anyone in the British Foreign Office. So far, the political consequences had arisen as the result of Britain treating the affair as entirely commercial, not out of any concern for India.

Malet's attempt to defend British action succeeded only in convincing Marschall that he had been right from the start: the British looked at the situation in its political aspects, and they had to be made to see this meant working with the Germans at Constantinople. The British should recognize it as being in their interests to have the line to Bagdad built by the Germans rather than any other nationality. Germany, he said, 'could never have any political designs in the East', and her support for Britain's policy must be of some value.[23] Marschall was, quite clearly, attempting to use the Kaulla affair for the purpose of establishing a formula to guide future Anglo-German relations in the near east: the British, politically suspect at the Porte, could hope for few commercial concessions in the future, and, as the Germans were friendly while the French and Russians were not, they should assist the Germans in securing whatever concessions became available. If the British were not prepared to yield to the simple logic of this argument, then the Egyptian baton could be wielded to drive the lesson home.[24]

The British came closer to accepting the argument than might be imagined. When the affair began in December they saw no reason to treat German interests in any special way; the concession threatened existing British interests to the amount of two million pounds sterling, and these interests were to be defended, no matter who threatened them. The head of the eastern department at the British Foreign Office, Sir Thomas Sanderson, later noted having had misgivings that the Germans would be offended, but he appears to have been alone, and even he 'did not anticipate their flying out like this'.[25] By the time the affair ended the British were prepared to accept the basis of the German argument, although Rosebery attempted to deny their contention of its applying automatically, suggesting instead that they should arrange affairs first in London, not an inconsequential modification.

Rosebery began his rather awkward attempts to appease the Germans by denying he had done what they accused him of. He had, he said, merely instructed his ambassador to delay the concession while the government decided whether, or how, it would injure British interests.[26] In fact he had gone much farther, instructing Sir Clare Ford 'to prevent the concession being granted as being prejudicial to British interests', and the Germans were quite correct to believe Ford had done his best to act against them.[27] Rosebery had acted too rashly, but he was not prepared to admit it. Instead, he blamed the Germans for not asking for an explanation from him before they acted at Cairo; and for not, from the start, coordinating their policy with the British. Rosebery, in January 1893, was

paying the price for his refusal to commit himself to the Triple Alliance; informal, friendly arrangements depending on national sympathies and personal understandings, the German actions during the Kaulla affair implied, were an imperfect substitute for clear working agreements.

In spite of his arguments, Rosebery backed down from his original position, instructing Ford to arrange his next moves with his German colleague; but backing down turned out to be more difficult than he realized, and the process revealed his ambassador to be among the factors making a complicated situation more so.[28] Sir Clare Ford was not one of the great ambassadors of the nineteenth century. All his diplomatic experience had been in the west, where he had worked hard at quietly encouraging British trade, and where he had steadily, if slowly, risen in rank. At Constantinople he was controlled by the officials he was supposed to command, he never appeared able to grasp the political situation, and he had never made any attempt to consult Radolin on the concession, though reporting that he met with him frequently. He thought it the duty of an ambassador to protect British interests, and in his zeal to do so had gone farther than Rosebery intended.

Ford wanted to reserve the Angora to Bagdad railway for Britain. He had not, it turned out, awaited instructions from Rosebery before intervening in the Kaulla affair. When Rosebery first instructed him to delay the concession, Ford reported that he had already brought 'to the serious consideration of not only the Porte but of the Palace as well the great prejudice which would be inflicted on British interests were new railway concessions…given to a German Company'.[29] When Rosebery reported the German complaints, Ford could not see he might have made a mistake, 'all I asked for was fair play', he complained.[30] Nothing could be more traditional, nor more praiseworthy, but it was precisely this against which the Germans complained: in the east the British continued to compete with German trade even while they received German political help.

When Rosebery, on 9 January, instructed Ford to arrange his policy with his German colleague, he did not yet realize how zealous his ambassador was in protecting British interests. Ford continued to oppose the concession, even after receiving his new instructions, and reported, on 13 January, his sending a pro-memoria to the grand vizier pointing out 'the injuries which the German concessions now contemplated would inflict' on the British companies.[31] He also complained of the Porte's neglecting the proposals of a Mr Staniforth, who wanted the concession of the line to be built to Bagdad. Three days later he asked Rosebery to take a firmer line at Berlin, suggesting this would induce Kaulla to be more reasonable in satisfying the claims of British interests.[32] The British, Rosebery replied, no longer cared about the Smyrna-Cassaba line, nor did they desire to press too strongly the claims of the Smyrna-Aidin; Ford should try to find some concession 'not necessarily great', that would, to some extent, satisfy the Smyrna-Aidin people. Ford's obduracy, his determination to protect British interests and his conviction of being right in asking for no more than fair play, was forcing Rosebery into a position where he had to make explicit the nature of the new relationship with Germany in the Near East.

In Berlin, Marschall continued to impose his version of the Anglo-German relationship on the events of the Kaulla affair. When Malet tried to defend British actions as a legitimate defence of existing interests, dropping the

argument of the Bagdad line being politically important because it affected communications with India, Marschall dismissed the contention as irrelevant, given the Anglo-German friendship. Because a German application was detrimental to British interests did not mean the British should protest, 'as it brought the British government into play as against the German government'.[33] Germany aiding Britain politically at Cairo, henceforth meant Britain giving Germany unqualified support for her commercial programme in the Near East. Malet tried his best to resist the conclusion, but Marschall, who had by this time completely receded from his angry attitude, seemed convinced that he had gained his point by the action he had taken.

In London, Rosebery showed himself to be well aware of the implications involved in the Kaulla affair. But, like his ambassador, he was powerless to do more than hint at the possibility of German action having consequences not entirely agreeable to themselves. If the good understanding between Britain and Germany were to be translated into Englishmen standing aside at whatever sacrifice to their interests whenever a German financial agent applied for a concession, Rosebery told the German minister, then 'it would have to bear a very severe strain'.[34] If the Germans wanted to arrange for mutual action, they should do so in advance; had they informed Rosebery of the true state of affairs concerning the Kaulla concession he would, he assured them, have followed a different course.[35] The Anglo-German understanding, as defined by Rosebery, implied nothing automatic; he was prepared to offer help when circumstances requiring it arose, but it was something to be negotiated.

As far as the Kaulla concession was concerned, Rosebery had no alternative to accepting the German position, and Ford was instructed to work closely with his German colleague and avoid any appearance of working with the French.[36] When Ford continued to misconstrue his instructions he compelled Rosebery to be more explicit: it was important to work 'in complete accord with Germany as regards railways in Asiatic Turkey'.[37] No matter what Rosebery suggested concerning the future ramifications of the Kaulla affair, the Germans had made their point decisively and dramatically, and Rosebery was forced to accept it. He was forced to accept it because, as long as Britain needed Germany's help at Cairo, minor interests like railways in Turkey had to be subordinated to the major interest of safeguarding Britain's position in Egypt. Precisely how precarious the British position in Egypt was, was demonstrated in the immediate aftermath of the Kaulla affair.

The German demonstration of the connection between railways in Turkey and politics in Egypt might have lost some of its dramatic impact had not the British already been expecting trouble there, and had it not precipitated a crisis in Egyptian domestic politics. The young Khedive, Abbas Hilmi had, over the past few months, given repeated indications of his determination to act independently of Cromer's advice. By the end of 1892 the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, had fallen seriously ill, and the Khedive was proposing to replace him with an anglophobe, Tigrane Pasha.[38] Simultaneously, a number of important financial questions were about to come before the *Caisse* where, Cromer assured Rosebery, the German representative would virtually control the decisions, as the Austrian and Italian representatives were certain to follow his lead.[39] Marschall

could not have chosen a more opportune moment to instruct Rosebery in the uses of the Egyptian baton.

Cromer was particularly upset when the Germans, on 9 January, threatened to stop helping the British in Egypt because he had finally reached the point in his administration of Egyptian finance where he felt able to undertake some positive action of his own. After ten years of financial reforms Cromer had succeeded, not only in balancing the budget, but in producing a surplus of revenue. He proposed to use this revenue to increase the Egyptian army. The European Powers, naturally, interpreted the proposal as designed to tighten Britain's hold on the country, as the army would continue to be commanded by British officers. France refused to agree to the proposal, but before the Kaulla affair exploded, Germany had promised to agree to it. When the German consul-general called on Cromer on 7 January, telling him he must no longer count on German assistance in Egypt, he withdrew the earlier promise of support for the increase of the Egyptian army. Cromer feared his management of Egyptian affairs was threatened by British opposition to the Kaulla concession at Constantinople.

Cromer's fears soon proved correct. The khedive, Sir Clare Ford discovered in September, had been corresponding with his grandfather, the deposed Ismail, who lived in Constantinople. The khedive appeared to be listening to his grandfather's advice, while relations between Ismail and the sultan appeared to be 'very friendly'.[40] On 3 January, Cromer, anticipating trouble, warned Rosebery of the khedive's inclination to grasp the first opportunity to show his independence and strength of character. When the Kaulla affair threatened to end Anglo-German cooperation at Constantinople and Cairo, therefore, it must have seemed to Ismail and the khedive that the opportunity to oppose Britain had arrived.[41] On 15 January the khedive dismissed Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, replaced him with Fakhry Pasha, described by Cromer as a close friend of Tigrane's, the anglophobe he had expected to receive the appointment, and an 'incapable man of bad character'. What began as an apparently harmless competition for railway concessions in Asiatic Turkey had precipitated a political crisis in Egypt.[42]

Cromer welcomed the crisis. The khedive, he told Rosebery two days before Mustapha's dismissal, 'will have to receive a sharp lesson sooner or later—and the sooner the better'.[43] He wanted Rosebery to authorize him to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent the change in ministers. If English influence in Egypt were to be maintained, he argued, the khedive had to be forced to yield 'at whatever cost'.[44] He proposed to take military possession of the ministries of finance, justice and interior, and the Egyptian telegraph office. In place of the deposed ministers, Cromer would put Englishmen who would act under his instructions until the khedive submitted names of ministers acceptable to the British.[45] 'If the Khedive is allowed to win the day', he telegraphed to London, 'English influence will be completely destroyed'.[46]

Cromer presented Rosebery and the cabinet with a simple choice: they could go either backward or forward, the Egyptian situation having reached the point where it was impossible for the British to go on as they had been. The khedive, when he decided to assert his independence, had, according to Cromer, destroyed the system that had hitherto prevailed. Under the previous khedive, Tewfik, Cromer had managed to stay out of sight, pulling the Egyptian political strings as seldom as possible, but pulling them nevertheless. He disliked the system

because it was artificial and unsatisfactory, but it had one merit: it worked.[47] Abbas Hilmi, complained Cromer, wished not only to appear to govern, 'but to do it actually'. By refusing to listen to advice, Abbas forced Cromer out of hiding, made apparent the reality of British management, and shattered the old system. If they were to remain in Egypt the British had no choice but to assert themselves more vigorously: 'I would take the present opportunity of bringing matters to a head'.[48]

Cromer's decision seemed certain to lead to a cabinet crisis in Britain and perhaps to the fall of the government, as Rosebery and Gladstone were known to have conflicting views of the Egyptian question. In 1884 Rosebery had refused to join Gladstone's government because of its Egyptian policy, and changed his mind only after the fall of Khartoum convinced him that it was his duty to 'rally round the government'. He was, nevertheless, careful to dissociate himself from the government's previous policy, clearly aligning himself with those who believed Britain must remain in Egypt for some time to come. If the British evacuated Egypt prematurely, he argued, the French would enter, threatening Britain's strategic position in the Mediterranean, her trading relations, and her route to India. Before evacuating, therefore, a stable and independent Egyptian government had to be established and, in case something went wrong, Britain must be given the right to re-enter. Although Rosebery consistently declared himself opposed to a policy of annexation, many contemporaries found it hard to appreciate how his policy differed from it.

During Rosebery's first term as Foreign Secretary, in 1886, his difference with Gladstone on Egypt had been kept hidden by Ireland. Home Rule had then, according to Gladstone, precedence over all other issues, so his instructions to Rosebery were simple: keep foreign affairs quiet. Rosebery, who was determined to shield Egypt from the nightmare of more 'Commissioners, reports and experiments', in other words from any sign of impending evacuation, was happy to oblige. The system worked well: Gladstone ignored Egypt, Rosebery cooperated with Bismarck at Con stantinople and Cairo, and a crisis in the Balkans, which seemed likely to involve Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria in war, was settled peacefully by the Great Powers, symbolizing their cooperation in a blockade of the Greek fleet. Gladstone, praising Rosebery for his management of policy, began to predict that Rosebery would succeed him in the leadership of the Liberal party. In his enthusiasm, Gladstone forgot they were divided by a real difference of opinion in Egypt.

In 1892 Rosebery realized the difference still existed, while the solution no longer applied. First, as Home Rule was coming in for more discussion following 1886, Liberal leaders found themselves increasingly divided on matters of detail. Second, the country becoming disenchanted with the Irish preoccupation, party leaders had to return to the questions they had managed to ignore. Third, the Parnell divorce case, splitting the Irish party itself, removed obstruction in Parliament as an excuse for concentrating on the Irish question. Gladstone recognized that his new Home Rule Bill was certain to fail, and was no longer prepared to ignore other questions involving important principles, such as the British occupation of Egypt. Rosebery, who had already lost much of his appetite for political life as a result of the death of his wife, faced, in the summer of 1892, the prospect of heated battles in the cabinet, if he were to keep Britain in Egypt.

Not surprisingly, the majority of the cabinet preferred to avoid vigorous action in Egypt but, if forced to choose, were more inclined to go backward than forward. The three most prominent members of the government, excluding Rosebery, considered the occupation of Egypt to have been a mistake and were anxious to end it at the first opportunity. Gladstone, Sir William Harcourt and John Morley agreed to reject Cromer's proposal. This amounts to the annexation of Egypt', cried Harcourt, 'a claim to our right of exclusive possession'.[49] Morley declared he would be no party to active intervention in Egypt.[50] Gladstone feared Cromer's 'large words' might include the use of force, 'a breach of the dual understanding that the British were in Egypt to support the government'.[51] Cromer anticipated difficulty with the government, arguing the khedive had acted because he believed the government would not support their representative in Egypt.[52] Knowing Rosebery's views of Egypt, however, he felt he could count on the support of the foreign secretary. 'Lulu' Harcourt, Sir William's son, and an enemy of Rosebery, thought it likely both Rosebery and Cromer would resign over the issue.

Rosebery did not resign, coming, as a matter of fact, nowhere close to it—not the least interesting aspect of the January crisis. The Kaulla affair and its aftermath should have, given Rosebery's desire to establish British paramountcy in Egypt and his reputation for bad temper, led him to demand the cabinet support Cromer and threaten to leave if they refused. He had assured a close friend, only three days before Cromer asked for his support, that he was having his own way at the foreign office, his colleagues having seen 'that he must take his own line or else they will have to get on without him'.[53] Cromer's request suddenly revived the cabinet's interest in foreign policy, and where they had neglected the Kaulla affair and recent developments in Morocco, they were now preparing to tell Rosebery what policy should be. Here was a classic situation for a fit of Roseberian temper, but none came. To everyone's surprise, Rosebery agreed to tell Cromer that the course of action he had proposed was unacceptable.[54]

Rosebery's reaction to Cromer's request seemed inexplicable. Cromer immediately complained to the queen of Rosebery's failure to support him, suggesting the cabinet must have been too strong for him. He did not realize Rosebery had given in without a fight. To Cromer, looking at the situation from the perspective of an administrator, the question facing the government was simply one of who was to govern Egypt: he or the khedive. If the government answered the khedive, the British might as well pack up and leave tomorrow. He guessed, incorrectly, that forcing the government to choose between extremes would strengthen Rosebery's hand.[55] It did the opposite. Given a simple choice between annexation and evacuation the government would choose evacuation. 'Having his own way' at the Foreign Office did not mean Rosebery was in the position of being able to annex Egypt. On the contrary, having his own way practically depended on avoiding the issue altogether. The Kaulla affair embittered Rosebery's future relations with the Germans partly because their actions, by precipitating an Egyptian crisis, threatened to upset his control of foreign policy, an ironic result when it is remembered that one of his aims in controlling policy was to maintain a close connection with the Triple Alliance.

Rosebery's hands were tied, not strengthened, by Cromer's extremism. 'It would have been impossible to get the cabinet to agree to the occupation by force

of the public offices, and more especially to the seizure of the telegraph wires'. Nor did Rosebery agree with the alternatives posed by Cromer: the vigorous measures 'should be reserved as a fifth act, and not as a second'.[56] The best diplomatists recognize steps of intermediate action where others see only a dichotomy. Cromer, Rosebery said, might have refused to receive any communications from the new government. Failing this, the British might announce an increase in their garrison. Next, Cromer could have agreed to the sultan's proposal of having the khedive come to Constantinople for investiture, reminding him he was a vassal of the sultan. All these steps, Rosebery argued, would have gradually increased the pressure on the khedive, while the cabinet would not be forced to choose between annexation and evacuation. Possibly, if all these measures had failed, it might have been necessary to take the measures proposed by Cromer, but this last step, Rosebery felt sure, would never have been reached.[57]

Cromer, misled by his own stake in the situation, saw none of the possibilities envisioned by Rosebery. Instead, he saw ten years of hard work and administrative reforms about to be thrown away overnight by an impetuous boy. He welcomed the crisis over the ministerial changes because he saw the opportunity of safeguarding his work in the future. When Rosebery asked him to suggest less extreme measure he refused: 'I can suggest nothing less violent than the measures which I have already proposed', and complained of Rosebery's telegrams giving 'little indication of your intention to act vigorously in support of any representations I may make here'.[58] Rosebery, famed for his bad temper, responded calmly to the impertinence, explaining it away as the result of the stress and strain under which Cromer had been labouring. 'I can well understand', he wrote privately to Cromer, 'that under those circumstances telegrams are not so calmly studied as in the sylvan seclusion of Berkeley Square'.[59] He asked Cromer to remember that telegrams not marked private would be seen by the cabinet, and that there might be aspects of the situation better seen only by Rosebery.

Events proved Rosebery's view of the situation to be the right one. Without resorting to the extreme measures proposed by Cromer the British managed to frighten the khedive, who gave way, removing Fakhry Pasha and promising to follow British advice on all important matters. Rosebery successfully rejected both Cromer's measures and his conclusions. 'My own view', he concluded, 'is that we must affect to go on as before', precisely what Cromer had claimed to be impossible.[60] Rosebery realized there was no easy way out of the Egyptian situation: they could not evacuate because the French would step in, but they could not annex because the cabinet would not allow it. The situation made them depend on German help more than ever, and the Germans had demonstrated, in the Kaulla affair, that the price of their help was going up. Rosebery saw no alternative but to go on as before.

Going on as before did not necessarily mean standing still, and one of the consequences of the Kaulla affair was to convince Rosebery of the necessity of strengthening the British position in Egypt. Ironically then, just as Rosebery appeared to acquiesce in the cabinet view of Egyptian policy, and thereby avoid a ministerial crisis, he produced the crisis he appeared determined to avoid, by agreeing to a new proposal of Cromer's. Before the January crisis Cromer had

agreed to replace a British infantry battalion in Egypt with more cavalry. On 19 January he proposed, instead, to have the infantry battalion remain, to have the cavalry sent out anyway, and to have an additional infantry battalion accompany it.[61] Rosebery agreed. The settlement of the day before, he told Gladstone, was only a respite.[62] The snake', he told the queen, 'is scotched and not killed'.[63]

Gladstone was enraged. In the autumn of 1892, soon after the formation of the government, he had responded favourably to a French move to begin negotiations on the evacuation of Egypt.[64] Rosebery had managed to avoid the negotiations only because the French ambassador had foolishly violated protocol and approached the prime minister rather than the foreign secretary.[65] Gladstone had accepted Rosebery's stand, but sending reinforcements to Egypt went too far in the other direction. 'I would as soon put a torch to Westminster Abbey as send additional troops to Egypt', he declared. 'I can see nothing for it but for Rosebery to resign'.[66] His reaction, along with the cabinet's, was made the more intense because Cromer's recent demand for vigorous action raised the possibility of the additional force being used for offensive purposes. The secretary for war, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the colonial secretary, Lord Ripon, felt the reports from Egypt contained 'a strong tinge of Cromerism', that Cromer was trying to force them into annexing Egypt.[67] English troops and residents could not be imperilled, Campbell-Bannerman thought, or Cromer would have said so.[68]

Rosebery, who had decided to support Cromer's request from the start, recognized the cabinet's decision would turn on the question of immediate danger. Cromer's unfortunate expressions at the beginning of the crisis, he complained to the queen, had aroused irritation and suspicion in the cabinet.[69] The English in Egypt must, as he said, affect to go on as before. A massacre of residents, a dervish invasion, another arabist uprising, because they would create a political crisis in Britain, were the kind of threats to which the government would respond. After some hints from Rosebery, Cromer discovered a threat to the garrison and the residents.[70] Rosebery did not resign, nor did Gladstone put the torch to Westminster Abbey. Cromer received his additional troops, and Rosebery, announcing the increase, claimed it indicated no change of policy or modification of the assurances Britain had given on the subject of the occupation.[71] The English, as Rosebery said they must, were affecting to go on as before.

The Kaulla affair and its aftermath demonstrates, as clearly as any incident could, the dilemma in which the British found themselves in the 1890's. Naval strategists, although they did not agree on all the features of the situation, were convinced that Britain had lost her naval superiority in the Mediterranean. In fact, they were generally agreed, if Britain faced a war with France and Russia, apparently a logical conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance, she would have to withdraw her fleet from the Mediterranean. This made the control of Egypt even more important than it had been for, it was believed, if France controlled both the Mediterranean and Egypt, she would not only force Britain to rely on the slower and more expensive Cape route for trade and communication with India, but she might use her control of Suez to mount an attack on Britain in the Indian Ocean. Therefore Rosebery, who had opposed evacuation in 1885–86, was more determined than ever to retain control of Egypt. The opposition of the

Gladstonians to continuing the occupation, however, meant Rosebery could do little to strengthen the British hold on Egypt: at best he could, by conjuring up the threat of a disaster, send a few more troops.

These considerations made Britain, and Rosebery in particular, more dependent on Germany than they had been in the days when Bismarck first used the Egyptian baton to secure colonial concessions. Germany tried to use the dependence in the nineties to force Britain into the Triple Alliance. The reason the British found German methods so irritating-there was little difference between Rosebery's complaints and the later ones of Lansdowne and Balfour—was that the Germans had to demonstrate their dominance. Given the ambitious designs of the new course, it did the Germans no good to negotiate quietly and amicably for commercial and colonial agreements with the British, and permit British participation in the Triple Alliance to remain informal. Germany could expand only by transforming the Triple Alliance, and Britain's role in it, into an offensive arrangement. To this end, the British had to be made to realize that their position in Egypt, making them dependent on German help, could be maintained only by acquiescing in German commercial expansion in the near east, and in German political leadership of the Triple Alliance. The Kaulla affair had offered the perfect opportunity for demonstrating the logic of this reasoning.

The aftermath of the Kaulla affair seemed to show Rosebery had no alternative to accepting the German argument. At the first sign of trouble between Britain and Germany at Cairo, a crisis erupted, and Rosebery, with the connection between German commerce in Turkey and the British political position in Egypt demonstrated so forcefully, immediately reversed his position on the Kaulla concession. The reaction of the cabinet to Cromer's proposals for solving the Egyptian ministerial crisis, showed, at the same time, that the alternative to evacuating Egypt, annexing it, did not exist. Britain must, in Rosebery's words, 'go on as before', which seemed to mean continued dependence on Germany at Cairo. Rosebery, it seemed therefore, in accepting the logic of the German argument, would be forced to accept the conclusion as well, and Britain would be drawn into the Triple Alliance, the terms and purpose of which would be determined by Germany.

Rosebery's policy in the period following the Kaulla affair showed, even under circumstances most favourable to Germany, that Britain would make every effort, and undertake a number of risks, to avoid joining the Triple Alliance. When Marschall, in the midst of the affair, claimed the transaction had dealt a blow to the good understanding between Germany and Britain, Rosebery agreed 'but not in the way Baron von Marschall intended it'.[72] Rosebery was disgusted with the German outburst: although he was a leading advocate of the good understanding with Germany and the Triple Alliance, they, in turn, treated him with contempt, and embarrassed him in cabinet by making the foundation of his foreign policy seem shaky. Rosebery, who would not evacuate Egypt, but who could not annex it, had to continue working with the Germans, but, partly as the result of the Kaulla affair, it became an irritating, awkward relationship, with each side distrusting the other, and each trying to assert control.[73]

The Kaulla affair set the tone of Anglo-German relations for more than two years, until the collapse of the Liberal government. Germany persisted in trying to drive Britain into the alliance, using the same methods she had used during the

affair. Rosebery, determined to resist, developed a programme which would allow him the freedom to remain outside the Triple Alliance, and to acquiesce in German economic expansion only after negotiation and when it suited his purpose: 'our understanding is not altogether one-sided'.[74] The first part of this programme saw Rosebery try to lessen the danger from France by establishing better relations with Russia, a policy which resulted in the Pamir Agreement of 1895. In the second part of the programme, Rosebery aimed to overpower France in the Mediterranean by an increase in naval building, a policy which resulted in the Naval Act of 1893, Gladstone's resignation, and Rosebery becoming prime minister. The third part of the programme was less straightforward. There is a considerable section in the Liberal Party that would gladly see a close understanding with France', Rosebery declared during the Kaulla affair. 'It would greatly facilitate their views if they knew of this sort of proceeding.'[75] Rosebery began using, only occasionally at first, the prospect of an agreement with France to avoid reaching one with Germany. The results of this policy were demonstrated in 1905, the consequences felt in 1914.

NOTES

1. On the background of the concession, see Colin Smith, *The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople.* Oxford; 1957, pp. 118–133; Bekir Silki *Das Bagdadbahn-Problem 1890–1905.* Freiburg; 1935; J.B.Wolfe, The Bagdad Railway', *University of Missouri Studies,* xi (1936); M.K.Chapman, 'Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway, 1888–1914', *Smith Studies in History,* xxxi, (1948).
2. White to Salisbury, Private, 16 Oct. 1888. F.O. 364/1. Smith, *White,* p. 129. The Italians too were anxious to extend the application of the Triple Alliance in the Near East. Crispi wanted to draw in both the British and the Turks. See C.J.Lowe and F.Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy, 1870–1940.* London: 1975, pp. 51–4.
3. On Siemens and the first phase of the Bagdad Railway see Karl Helfferich, *George Von Siemens,* volume III, Berlin; 1923. Little information is available on Caillard. He was 32 at the time of the original concession, and had already been in the East for eight years. He began his career by working on the frontier settlement that followed the Congress of Berlin and was President of the Council by 1883. He served on the Debt Council for 14 years.
4. White to Salisbury, private, 16 Oct., F.O. 364/1.
5. See, for example, Ahmed Djemal Pascha, *Erinnerungen eines Türkischen Staatsmannes.* Munich; 1923, who argued that this was the motive behind the Turkish alliance with Germany in 1914.
6. See K.H.W.Hilborn, 'British Policy and Diplomacy in the Near East During the Liberal Administrations: August 1892-June 1895' (D. Phil. Oxon., 1960).
7. Rosebery to Ford, telegram no. 79, 29 Dec. 1892, F.O. 78/4411.
8. Malet to Rosebery, no. 11, confidential, 12 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1293.
9. For an interesting example drawing the connection between 'world policy' and commercial expansion see Bülow's memoirs: Prince Bernhard von Bülow, *Imperial Germany,* trans. by Marie A.Lewenz, Toronto; 1914, pp. 26–31.
10. On this relationship generally see Theodore A.Bayer, *England und der neue Kurs 1890–1895; auf Grund unveröffentlicher Akten.* Tübingen; 1955; Lillian

M.Penson, 'The New Course in British Foreign Policy, 1892–1902'. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* A series XXV (1943), 121–39; and Helge Granfelt, *Der Dreibund nach dem Sturze Bismarcks;* Volume I, *England im Einverstandnis mit dem Dreibund,* 1890–96. 1962.

11. A good, although limited, introduction to writings on German policy in this period may be found in: Peter G.Thielen, 'Die Aussenpolitik des deutschen Reichs 1890–1914, Literatur und Forschungsbericht für die Jahre 1945–60', *Welt als Geschichte,* 1962, vol. 22, No. 1 & 2, pp. 27–48. See also, Fritz Fellner, *Der Dreibund europäische Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg.* Munich, 1960; and the provocative article by Christopher Andrew, 'German World Policy and the Reshaping of the Dual Alliance', *Journal of Contemporary History,* (1966), 137–151.
12. On the new course, see Norman Rich, 'National Interest in Imperial German Foreign Policy: Bismarck, William II and the Road to World War I', in *War, Strategy, and Maritime Power,* B.Mitchell Simpson III (ed.), New Brunswick; 1977.
13. The German ambassador in London, Paul von Hatzfeldt, opposed the policy of forcing Rosebery into commiting himself. Rosebery was Germany's best friend in the Liberal government, and they should not risk weakening his position. Hatzfeldt to 24 November, 1892. *Die Grosse Politik,* viii no. 1744, pp. 93–6.
14. The character of that cooperation must be decided by them, when the occasion for it arises, according to the circumstances of the case.' Salisbury to Corti, 12 February 1887. Reprinted in Harold Temperley and Lillian M.Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt to Salisbury* (London), pp 450–1. For the background of the Mediterranean Agreements see C.J.Lowe, *Salisbury and the Mediterranean,* Toronto; 1965.
15. Rosebery to Sir Philip Currie [Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs], 8 September 1892, National Library of Scotland, Rosebery MSS Box 90.
16. As Hatzfeldt proposed to put it to the British: 'in continuing our present policy, which obliges us to bear increasingly heavy military burdens, we are also defending great English interests in the Near East, and therefore are indirectly defending India. We no longer want to bear these burdens alone or sacrifice our lives for English interests if England will not act with us, or does not recognize that English interests are involved'. Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 28 November 1892. Norman Rich (ed.), *The Holstein Papers, Volume 111, Correspondence, 1861–1896* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 426.
17. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 7, confidential, 7 Jan.1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
18. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 13, confidential, 7 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
19. Rosebery to Cromer, telegram no. 7, 8 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517A.
20. Rosebery to Ford, telegram no. 4, 9 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4485.
21. Minute by Sir Thomas Sanderson, [Head of Eastern Department], on Ford to Rosebery, telegram no. 5, 13 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4486.
22. Malet to Rosebery. No. 8 confidential, 7 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1293.
23. *Ibid.*
24. See Henry Cord Meyer, 'German Economic Relations with Southeastern Europe, 1870– 1914', *American Historical Review,* (October 1951), 77–90; and M.L.Flaningam, 'German Eastward Expansion, Fact and Fiction: A Study in

German-Ottoman Trade Relations, 1890–1914'. *Journal of Central European Affairs,* (January 1955).

25. See the minute by Sanderson on Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 12, confidential, 7 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
26. Rosebery to Malet, No. 17A, secret, 12 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1291.
27. Rosebery to Ford, No. 271, 29 Dec. 1892, F.O. 78/4411.
28. Rosebery to Ford, telegram no. 4, 9 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4485.
29. Ford to Rosebery, telegram no. 116, 26 Dec. 1892, F.O. 78/4419.
30. Ford to Rosebery, telegram no. 2, 9 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4486.
31. Ford to Rosebery, telegram no. Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4486.
32. Ford to Rosebery, telegram no. 7, 16 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4486.
33. Malet to Rosebery, No. 15, confidential, 14 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1293.
34. Rosebery to Malet, No. 23, secret, 17 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1292.
35. Rosebery to Malet, No. 17A, secret, 12 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1292.
36. Rosebery to Ford, telegram no. 8, 18 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4485.
37. Rosebery to Ford, telegram no. 15, secret, 25 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4485.
38. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 177, confidential, 31 Dec. 1892.
39. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 13, confidential, 7 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
40. Ford to Rosebery, telegram no. 111, secret, 12 Dec. 1892, F.O. 78/4419. Ford concluded that Ismail's advice was not directed against the British in Egypt.
41. Malet to Rosebery, private, 21 Jan. 1893. Malet MSS., P.R.O. 343/13; 'and, of course, anything Ismail says is inspired by the Sultan', Cromer to Rosebery, private, 13 Jan. 1893. Cromer MSS. P.R.O. F.O. 633/7; Rosebery to Dufferin, No. 24, confidential, 17 Jan. 1893, F.O. 27/3117.
42. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 19, 15 Jan. 1893; and telegram no. 20, 16 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
43. Cromer to Rosebery, private, 13 Jan. 1891, Cromer MSS., P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.
44. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 20, confidential, 16 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
45. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 22, 17 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B. Besides the prime minister, the khedive had appointed new ministers of finance and justice.
46. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 25, 17 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
47. Cromer to Rosebery, private, 22 Jan. 1893, Cromer MSS., P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.
48. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 19, 15 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
49. Harcourt to Rosebery, 17 Jan. 1893, N.L.S. Rosebery MSS. 10035.
50. Hamilton Diary, 17 Jan. 1893, Hamilton MSS., B.M. Add. MSS. 48659, f. 85.
51. Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 16 Jan. 1893, *Letters of Queen Victoria,* iii, II, p. 203; (Henceforth, L.Q.V.) Gladstone to Rosebery, 16 Jan. 1893, Rosebery MSS., N.L.S. 10026.
52. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 19, 15 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
53. Hamilton Diary, 14 Jan. 1893, Hamilton MSS., B.M. Add. MSS. 48659.
54. Journal of Lewis Harcourt, 17 Jan. 1893, Harcourt MSS., Bodleian Library.
55. Cromer to Rosebery, 28 Jan. 1893, Cromer MSS., P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.
56. Rosebery to Cromer, private and confidential, 19 Jan. 1893, Cromer MSS., P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.
57. *ibid.,* Rosebery to Queen Victoria, *L.Q. V.,* iii, II, p. 207.
58. Rosebery to Cromer, telegram no. 16, secret, 17 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517A; Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 28, 18 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B. The complete text of this telegram is reprinted in *L.Q. V.,* iii, II, pp. 205–6.

59. Rosebery to Cromer, private and confidential, 19 Jan. 1893, Cromer MSS., P.R.O. F.O. 633/7.
60. Rosebery to Cromer, secret, 27 Jan. 1893. Cromer MSS., P.R.O. 633/7.
61. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 31, 19 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
62. Rosebery to Gladstone, 19 Jan. 1893, Rosebery MSS.; N.L.S. 10026.
63. Rosebery to Queen Victoria, 20 Jan. 1893, *L.Q. V.,* iii, II, p. 208.
64. Gladstone to Rosebery, 1 Nov. 1892, and 2 Nov. 1892. Rosebery MSS., N.L.S. 10025.
65. Rosebery to Gladstone, 4 Nov. 1892, Gladstone MSS., B.M. Add. MSS. 42290, f. 41. Gladstone to Rosebery, 4 Nov. 1892, Rosebery MSS. N.L.S. 10025.
66. Hamilton Diary, 20 Jan. 1893. Hamilton MSS., B.M. Add. MSS. 48659.
67. Ripon to Kimberley, 22 Jan. 1893, Ripon MSS., B.M. Add. MSS. 43526, f. 157.
68. Campbell-Bannerman to Gladstone, 21 Jan. 1893, Rosebery MSS., N.L.S. 10026.
69. Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 31 and no. 32, 19 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B; Rosebery to Cromer, telegram no. 18,20 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517A; Cromer to Rosebery, telegram no. 36, 21 Jan. 1893, F.O. 78/4517B.
70. Rosebery to Queen Victoria, 22 Jan. 1893, *L.Q.V.,* iii, II, p. 211.
71. Rosebery to Dufferin, and all Embassies, telegram no. 5, 23 Jan. 1893, F.O. 27/3122.
72. Rosebery to Malet, secret, 11 Jan. 1893, Malet MSS., P.R.O. 343/3.
73. Hatzfeldt recognized the change and sensed the irritation. 'I cannot avoid a feeling of concern that Ro[sebery], who is *extremely sensitive and resentful personally,* might *ultimately* be pushed into an undesirable course by *repeated* threats of this kind/Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 22 March 1893. Rich, *Holstein Papers* III, p. 433.
74. Rosebery to Malet, secret, 11 Jan. 1893, Malet MSS., P.R.O. 343/3; Rosebery to Malet, no. 23, secret, 17 Jan. 1893, F.O. 64/1292.
75. *ibid.*

The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National Integration in Egypt

Mahmud A.Faksh

A.
NATIONAL HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION

The beginnings of the modernization process in Egypt date back to the French invasion (1798–1799), which really revolutionized Egyptian thought. It provided the leaders with an opportunity to compare and contrast the two vastly differing cultures: the medieval Muslim and the modern scientific outlook. The old culture was subjected to a severe test, and in response, Egypt undertook a series of changes to modify its traditional culture. It would seem, however, that the most important social change brought about by this contact was the development of modern secular education, introduced during Muhamad Ali's rule (1805–1849), which was vastly different from the already existing religious system of education. The result of this innovation was the creation of an educational system rivalling the traditional religious one but not supplanting it.

This division into two systems of education-the traditional religious and the modern secular-was inevitable as a new way of life was being introduced. The new way of life demanded a special system of education to serve it and perpetuate it; the old way of life continued to maintain its own. Each system served a different clientele and performed a different function. The religious schools continued to provide a rudimentary education for the masses in the form of the three Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic), while the modern government schools provided a secular, European-style education for the existing and aspiring elite.

The split in the education of the nation created a dichotomized and chaotic culture that has persisted to the present.[1] The basic conflict in education has prevented a unification of the national culture.'[2] The dual system unquestionably tended to perpetuate differences between social classes by creating an intellectual elite-'the cultured aristocracy'-who monopolized government positions and high-income professions.[3] Moreover, the leaders of Egyptian education believed that it helped to breed two distinct mentalities in the people and two ways of thinking, so that in any issue that arises or event that occurs,

> the graduate of the Azhar [religious school] conceives it in one sense, while the graduate of the modern schools conceives it in another sense.

> Thus the two different graduates agree in neither their thinking nor in their evaluation; nor do they agree in judgment and decision; nor in procedure and action.[4]

The problem implicit in this dichotomy of mind or at least of education, is one to which Ahmad Amin (a leading Egyptian novelist) repeatedly addressed himself in his essays, *Hayati* (My Life). One of the most striking on this theme of intellectual integration of old and new is *al-Halaqat al-Mafqudah* (the Missing Links), in which he pleads for a group of scholars truly at home in both worlds, who would provide a bridge of culture. Those versed in Islam know the Qoran and tradition with meticulous care, but they live in isolation from the problem of the present. By contrast, the modern stream of education makes its products familiar with physics, chemistry, Bergson and Shaw, but they lack Arabic fluency and cannot transmit their learning.[5]

The tension resulting from the cultural gap is particularly acute since the contrast between the traditional Islamic and the modernizing cultures is so marked, and the former, as Malcolm Kerr has observed about Egypt, is not conceded by all its educated members to have been made obsolete by the advent of the latter. Thus 'contact between the two cultures has been one of more bitter and protracted conflict, and has caused much pain, uncertainty, equivocation, and proneness to illusion and emotionalism.'[6]

The struggle between the two ideological orientations-the products of the two educational systems—had considerably influenced the course of political events in twentieth-century Egypt. Egyptian politics after the First World War can be characterized as a triangular struggle for authority among the British, the king, and the parliament. As the instrument for the centralization of authority, parliament was generally supported by the modernists who wished to counteract the influence of the British, to limit the power of the king, and to unite the independent system of religious education with the modern government-controlled system. The active antagonism of the group of *ulama* to any change in the status quo turned al-Azhar into a royalist bastion. This alliance between the throne and al-Azhar had deepened the split between the modernists and traditionalists and thus isolated al-Azhar from the nationalist movement toward secularism.

An indication of the failure of the different modernizers to reform al-Azhar as an educational institution and how, in turn, they turned to work their way around al-Azhar and religious questions was that Muhamad Ali preferred to introduce an entirely new school system rather than institute reform at al-Azhar. Khedive Ismail likewise created *Dar al-Ulum* to avoid any direct confrontation with religious leaders over reforms within the religious system of education. The old is never destroyed; it is simply allowed to lapse into disuse.'[7]

It appears, then, that the revolutionary officers inherited a nation deeply split over modernist and traditionalist orientations, an unreformed Azhar, and a religious class which was desperately trying to defend its crumbling position while refusing to participate in the modernization of Egyptian life and thought.[8]

In his study of the role of education in nation-building, Trevor Coombe maintains that

> since religious leadership in those countries is created by an entirely separate and self-perpetuating system of education, it will presumably require fundamental changes in the nature of the religious institutions themselves before the fissure between the traditional-sacred and modernizing-secular world is closed.[9]

This was precisely what the young officers tried to accomplish. The revolution has sought to achieve cultural unity no less than political unity, for it has perceived the necessity of social and cultural transformation on the way to political revolution. A law passed in June, 1961, provided for the conversion of al-Azhar into a modern-style university offering degrees in the full range of scientific and humanistic secular disciplines alongside those of Islamic law and theology. It totally integrated the religious system of education with the government's modern system. 'In a word, al-Azhar has been nationalized.'[10] How rapidly and effectively it will substantially affect and change the training and outlook of students in the traditional field to forge a cultural unity remains to be seen.

Malcolm Kerr maintains that there are limits to the adaptability of a traditional institution such as al-Azhar, which has acquired high visibility and great respect, to a modern national educational system. The cultural gap between the educational patterns in the different spheres of the dual system inevitably means that the graduates of the traditional institutions have a competitive disadvantage in the modern sector of society.[11] Recent studies on the impact of secularization on the religious institutions in general and on al-Azhar in particular have shown the failure of reforms to have the desired effect upon the traditional core of religious studies within the university or upon the *ulama*.[12] The course of secularization in modern Egypt is still far from complete.[13]

Religious education remains an important means of social advancement for lower-class persons, but government control over the curriculum, over career placement, over financial resources, and over placement in high religious positions is rendering the whole religious institution but an adjunct of state administration. In spite of all this, however, the fact remains that in many ways those studying in religious schools and those who call themselves *ulama* are still predominantly traditional in their manner and dress, in values and beliefs, and in social behaviour. Indeed, al-Azhar and its affiliates continue to produce men who are largely out of touch with the problems of modern Egyptian life and useless for the modern sector.

The educational division of al-Azhar, in cooperation with voluntary groups, maintains about three hundred Qoranic (religious) schools in the provinces.[14] In 1968–1969 the total number of those enrolled in the primary and secondary levels of al-Azhar affiliates was 69,676, in comparison to the total number of 13, 587, enrolled in the same year in industrial, commercial, and agricultural technical institutes.[15] These are traditional schools for higher religious studies.

TABLE 1 STUDENT ENROLLMENT IN DIFFERENT EDUCATION LEVELS, 1953–1954 AND 1965–1966

Level of Education	*Enrollment (Thousands)*		*Percentage of Average Increase*
	1953–1954	*1965–1966*	
Primary	1,393	3,418	145
General preparatory	349	574	65
Vocational preparatory	3	27	800
General secondary	92	209	127
Vocational secondary	19	101	432
Teachers institutes	24	49	104
Universities	54	124	130
Total	1,934	4,502	132

Source: U.A.R., Central Agency of Public Mobilization & Statistics, *Population Increase in the U.A.R. and its deterrent to Development,* (Cairo, 1966), In Arabic, 190.

Hence, a fair number of these students are not nearly as prepared for what they will find in Cairo as the regular preparatory school students are.[16]

Further efforts have been made to correct the existing maladies in Egyptian society and culture, and to forge national unity. These were mainly reflected in a considerable educational expansion at all levels of the modern system of education. This actual physical expansion of the educational opportunities in Egypt since the revolution has been very impressive indeed. In 1952 only 45 per cent of children of primary school age attended school. By 1960 the proportion had risen to 65 per cent; 80 per cent for boys and 50 per cent for girls.[17] By 1967, with a total enrollment of 3.4 million, it represented 80 per cent of the eligible children.[18] The expansion of the school system has been limited in recent years by the fact that Egypt has given budget priority to other areas of activity, such as the Aswan Dam and armaments. Thus by 1970–1971 the school population was 3.7 million.[19] Also, school construction has lagged behind the birth rate, which is one of the highest in the world. Most primary schools, particularly those in the cities, are already operating with two shifts of pupils to increase their capacity.

There has also been a moderate increase in enrollment in technical secondary schools. This is in line with the revolutionary government's general programme of economic development and industrialization of the country. The data presented in Table 1 leave no doubt that since the 1952 revolution one of the chief targets in the field of education has been the expansion in technical training at all levels. The percentage of average increase at vocational secondary schools between 1953–1954 and 1965– 1966 is almost four times as much as at the general secondary level.

The fact remains, however, that students have continued to favour general secondary education because it is the stepping-stone to a prestigious university degree. In 1970–1971, technical secondary education enrollment reached about 270,000 compared with a total general secondary school enrollment of almost

300,000 students.[20] Accordingly, the most impressive facet of the expansion of higher education in Egypt has been in the university student enrollment, which rose from 35,016 undergraduates (excluding al-Azhar and the American University) in 1951–1952 to 86,539 in 1960– 1961.[21] It rose to 152,382 in 1970–1971.[22]

The rapid expansion of higher education, particularly after the revolution, has been due to several factors. First, an obsessive desire has emerged of young people in every class of Egyptian society for higher education. A second factor relates to government policy, which in response to public pressure enhanced the expansion in liberal arts, law, and commerce. Further, in order to meet the needs of the country for trained specialists, it promoted increased enrollment in science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine. The need for such trained technical persons has become progressively greater in recent years as a result of the heightened trend toward industrialization. Thirdly, the rapid expansion in university enrollment has been influenced by the democratization of education in the sense that financial barriers no longer represent a serious obstacle to those who are seriously interested in obtaining a university education. After a gradual reduction in tuition fees, extensive exemptions, and generous financial aid, a presidential decree in July 1962 made all higher education entirely free. Financial assistance for living expenses is also provided to needy students as well as the superior ones as a recognition of excellence.

But did the expansion of educational opportunities at all levels of the educational system succeed in bridging the gap between the modern educated few and the traditional uneducated many and thus contribute to national integration? Manfred Halpern recognizes the magnitude and complexity of the problem in its different dimensions by stating that 'no rulers of the Middle East ever attempted to mobilize so large a mass whose view of the world was so different from their own.'[23]

Before the 1952 revolution, the modern system of education of the government type and of the foreign type was 'elitist' in the sense that it continued to provide education to the children of the Western-educated middle and upper-class Egyptians. Fees were not abolished in primary schools until 1944, and in high schools until 1951. Consequently the gap separating the educated young Egyptians from the illiterate masses of the people grew wider. The 'modernized sensibilities' of the educated people differentiated them from the masses of their countrymen who stood as staunch supporters of traditionalism and conservatism.[24]

The special character of this social imbalance has become so deep that it has produced profound obstacles to both national mobilization and social reconstruction. The ensuing split in outlook and approach toward the basic issues confronting the Egyptian polity divided the elite internally and reduced its capacity for joint harmonious action to solve the growing economic and social problems facing the nation. This becomes apparent in the zig-zag form of Egyptian politics which moved in the direction of different 'system-challenging' organizations, such as the Muslim Brother-hood, the Young Egypt movement, the Communist party, the Ruwwad movement, to the numerous efforts to reinvigorate the dominant Wafd party leadership, to the formation of the Free

TABLE 2 FOREIGN SCHOOLS' ENROLLMENT AND THE PROPORTION OF EGYPTIAN STUDENTS, 1942–1943

Kind of School	*Total Enrollment*	*Number of Egyptians*
American	8,719	8,073
French	30,259	23,053
English	9,239	5,522
Italian	8,757	4,518
Greek	9,973	512

Source: Roderic D.Matthews and Matta Akrawi, *Education in the Arab Countries of The Near East* (American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1949), 113.

Officers movement, and to the near-collapse of the old regime upon the burning of Cairo in January, 1952, and finally, six months later, to Nasser's military coup.

Since 1952 the expansion of mass education has contributed significantly to the unification of cultural life in the country by proportionately decreasing foreign schools' graduates to a much smaller number than before. After the Suez crisis of 1956 most foreign schools and colleges have either been nationalized or put under tight state control and forced to change their curriculum to conform with the government system. Before the revolution the foreign schools produced the privileged social and cultural elite in Egypt. Table 2 shows the proportion of Egyptians enrolled in these schools in the year 1942–1943. Egyptian boys and girls who attended them could usually neither read nor write Arabic. Furthermore, it was to a large extent the minority communities-Copts, Jews, Syrians, and Lebanese, as well as Greeks and Italians-and the Egyptian upper class whose children attended these schools and who felt no sympathy for the great mass of their fellow countrymen. They were best qualified upon graduation to fill key commercial jobs in the cities requiring fluency in foreign languages. It is not surprising, therefore, that the revolutionary regime regarded such schools as breeding grounds for one of Egypt's social evils, its irresponsible aristocracy.

A careful examination of the expansion of educational opportunities, however, would reveal that the resulting increase in school enrollment is largely meaningless. This is due to the low standards resulting from inadequate physical and human resources, a rapid population growth, and a war-burdened economy, which have combined to frustrate all efforts to eliminate illiteracy. In 1950 a UNESCO report estimated the Egyptian population over seven years old to be 90 per cent illiterate. In 1956 the proportion was still about 82 per cent illiterate.[25] Indeed, in spite of all efforts to reduce the illiteracy rate, especially among males, in absolute terms the number of people who cannot read or write has continued to increase, as shown in Table 3. In a recent series of articles on education, Lewis Awad, a Copt who is a literary editor of *al-Ahram,* showed that seventy-five per cent of the people of Egypt are still illiterate-almost the same percentage as during the last years of the monarchy.[26]

Thus, the fact remains that despite all these efforts since 1952, the educational system in Egypt remains inadequate to the regime's requirements. Egypt's high illiteracy rate accounts for the predominance of traditional cultural beliefs and

TABLE 3 ILLITERACY TRENDS IN EGYPT, BY SEX: 1907–1960

	Total Persons Aged 10 and over	*Persons Not Able to Read and Write Aged 10 and over*	*Illiteracy Rate*		
			Male	*Female*	*Total*
1907	7,848,024	7,277,303	87.0	98.6	92.7
1917	9,161,944	8,357,461	84.8	97.7	91.2
1927	10,268,404	8,816,601	76.1	95.6	85.9
1937	11,603,488	9,885,300	76.6	93.9	85.2
1947	13,489,946	10,407,972	66.1	88.2	77.2
1960	17,914,323	12,587,686	56.6	83.8	70.3

Source: Donald C.Mead, *Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy,* (Homewood, 111.: Richard D.Irwin, Inc., 1967), Statistical Appendix 301, Table 11-A-6.

practices which could still block the flow of integrative sentiments toward the nation and the elite. Daniel Lerner asserts that those without 'a usable literacy' tend to remain traditional, whereas those with literacy tend to exert themselves to gain access to modernity.[27] Edward Shils goes further, to say that illiteracy greatly restricts not only the range of knowledge of the world beyond national boundaries, but even beyond narrow local boundaries, which, in turn, causes estrangement and impedes the growth of the sense of membership in that national community.[28]

Accompanying this high illiteracy rate, the great stress laid on university education has served to perpetuate the imbalances in the different levels of the educational system and, in effect, to exacerbate the wide cleavage separating the illiterate masses from a highly educated group at the other extreme. Between 1953–1954 and 1961–1962, the budget of the universities has almost quadrupled, whereas the budget of the Ministry of Education little more than doubled.[29] Indeed, the secularization of the masses remains the great unfinished business in Egypt.

This dichotomy in Egyptian society and culture which attests to the poor integration of the Egyptian polity is reflected clearly in the political culture of the educated Egyptians. It is a culture marked by a crisis of identity, ambivalence of attitudes, values, and beliefs not only toward the traditional order of society, but also toward the new national order and the elite. This reveals something of the complexity of present-day political and social attitudes that are sometimes ecountered among educated Egyptians.[30]

This ambivalence is most clearly shown in a study of the character of nationalism among the Egyptian professionals based on data gathered from interviews with one hundred and ten Egyptian professionals conducted by the Bureau of Applied Research of Columbia University during the spring and summer of 1951. The picture of nationalism that emerges from these interviews is a complex one having many features of ambivalence. The complicated character of the nationalistic attitudes of the professionals is derived from the ambivalent situation in which they found themselves. On the one hand, they were

strongly oriented toward the West and Western culture; on the other hand, they felt that they were rejected by the West-scorned, unappreciated, and 'occupied'. In this situation of ambivalence, their nationalism was indecisive in character.[31] 'Uncertainty as to their identity, their function, their future obscured clear vision of themselves in the future world and increased their remoteness from the Egyptian masses.'[32]

This lack of a clear-cut and straightforward perspective of political nationalism and the consequent lack of a clear vision of Egypt's national problems among the educated was a severe handicap to Nasser. Indeed, it was disagreement and disillusionment with civilian politicians and administrators over the extent and pace of reform that prompted the military officers to stay in power and, subsequently, recruit 'trustworthy men' (i.e., officers) rather than 'experts' (i.e., civilians) for responsible positions in the government. Upon consulting Egypt's experienced leaders, 'we were not able to obtain very much', comments Nasser. He goes on to say: 'Every man we questioned had nothing to recommend except to kill someone else.[33] The Free Officers who originally wanted to avoid any political involvement discovered that their socioeconomic choices, such as land reform, nationalization, and the general ideological trend of the regime, entailed political choice. In particular, the direction of the new order was to be entrusted to the loyal members of the military junta rather than the educated elite.

The army officers who are 'in' have monopolized power and deprived the educated 'experts' who are 'out' of the right to free self-expression. This has alienated the educated and strengthened what Shils calls the 'anti-political politics', the 'politics of withdrawal,'[34] that has been growing among Egypt's educated elite. The whole picture of this half-hearted, indecisive relationship between the officers and the educated can be more readily seen in the 'participation crisis' which characterizes the pattern of political life among the educated in Egypt.

B.
NATIONAL VERTICAL INTEGRATION: EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

To look at the problem of political participation among educated Egyptians and the ensuing 'crisis of participation' in a proper perspective, I shall address myself to the following question: Did education actually lead to a wider-spread participation in the political process in such a way as to bridge the gap separating the rulers from the ruled and thus attain a certain measure of vertical integration on the way to political development?

The literature on education and political participation has widely documented research findings that participation in political activities increases as the educational level of respondents rises. Among the various demographic variables usually investigated in social science research-income, occupation, sex, age, place of residence-education has been found to have the greatest effect on political behaviour. Obviously, the educated person is a different kind of political actor than the person who has little or no education at all.[35]

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have done considerable research on the relationship between education and political participation. According to their five-nations study, there is a positive relationship between education and political participation that holds true in all of the five nations.[36] Because formal schooling is very strongly related to political attitudes, Almond and Verba believe that education provides the shortest route toward the creation of a modern political culture. One of the greatest advantages of education is that 'skills that may take years to develop for the first time can be passed on much more easily once there are some who possess them.' Education can equip persons to gather information about government and politics; it can impart the skills of political participation. Therefore, Almond and Verba called education 'the most obvious substitute for time.'[37]

In studying the effects of the spread of education in Nigeria, David Abernathy reached the conclusion that 'education has the dual effect of raising personal ambitions and furthering awareness of politics.'[38] In more general terms, Karl Deutsch observes that 'social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population.'[39]

But the issue of central concern here is whether the educated people in Egypt do effectively participate in the political process. In order to explore this problem, it is essential to analyse the inner dynamics of political life in Egypt today.

In general, the 1952 revolutionary regime has sought to increase the participation of the masses, whom it intended to benefit but who made few concrete demands other than that their government be a Muslim-Egyptian government. It has also sought to limit the political participation of the urban-educated elite which was likely to make the greatest demands: "the educated Egyptian cannot participate in government; he can only respond to it, and that response must be more or less favorable.'[40] This has precipitated a'participation crisis' that characterizes the pattern of political life among the educated in Egypt today.

The realities of political life in Egypt today may be characterized as administrative-oligarchic in nature. Nothing really significant goes on in Egypt which is not the result of some action by the governing inner circle comprising a hard core military-technocratic elite.[41] This, in turn, would frustrate any desire to participate on the part of the average member of the educated class in Egypt. The absence of opportunity to participate renders the government a relatively distant, cold object no matter how much the leaders appear psychologically familiar and warm. Thus 'political support from the regime, while not deficient, is generally passive.'[42]

This interpretation suggests that the participation crisis in Egypt is at present invisible or suppressed. That there is no open pressure for increased participation and that only the most harmless of private murmuring goes on is certainly the case. It would appear that many recent graduates in Egypt are not engrossedly concerned with political participation. This is in sharp contrast to the pre-revolutionary situation.

Before 1952, students organized along the lines of political parties, both officially recognized and not. Student political organizations were training grounds for a future political career and also a means of winning a claim to

future employment should the party of one's choice obtain a certain measure of power.

Under the revolutionary regime, there is only one policy, and everyone is expected to accommodate himself to that policy. Members of the educated classes may dutifully play their part, when they are called upon, in the various government organizations, such as the National Union or its successor, the Arab Socialist Union. Beyond this, however, they tend to do and say what is expected of them.

Indeed, the oligarchic, clique-like structure and centralized character of the revolutionary regime are most apparent in the disparity between the actual political dominance of the army and the intended civilian participation in the government by the National Union or the Arab Socialist Union. The National Union or its successor, the Arab Socialist Union, have been subordinated to secondary roles with hardly any real participation in the political process. At best, it serves to mobilize the enthusiastic support of a politically impotent populace. The army, on the other hand, is the preponderant force of political power in the country. The new men not only seized political leadership, but also penetrated almost every key position in the state. This has led one Egyptian leftist to argue to the effect that Egypt is a'military society'.[43]

The determination of the military junta to become the ruling elite in the country precluded any long-range alliances with rival groups. Its political interest-the desire to rule in order to carry out the revolution-could not have been reconciled with other group interests. As such, the Free Officers became the nucleus of a new ruling class whose membership continued to be recruited largely from the army officer corps, but which was slowly invaded by certain professional groups in Egyptian society with whose services the military power could not dispense or easily replace.[44]

Indeed, under the revolutionary regime the essential socialization role played by the existing educational system in Egypt supports this pattern of passive, non-participatory political life among the educated Egyptians. In general, educational practices still emphasise the authority of the teacher, memorisation, formal curricula, strict uniformity, discipline, and routine, despite some reports of newer but marginal influences penetrating the system. In the primary and preparatory schools strong efforts are directed toward developing a strong loyalty to the regime. Here the students are repeatedly taught the various patriotic themes of Islam, nationalism, Arabism, and socialism. Textbooks are full of stories about the glory of medieval Islamic heroes and the great Arab nationalist struggle against colonialism and other political and socio-economic injustices that culminated in the 1952 revolution. Many pages are given over to Qoranic passages and sayings of the prophet on ethics. This overt and general pattern of socialization might on frequent occasions take the form of celebrating Port Said Day (the evacuation of the British and French troops in 1956), or Palestine Refugee Day, or any other nationalistic event.

Based on my own experience with this kind of socialization I underwent in my primary, preparatory, and secondary school years, it would be safe to assume that such ceaseless efforts to bring about an identification with the regime have been somewhat successful. My classmates and I developed a strong sense of identification and pride with Arabism, anti-colonialism, and nationalist leaders

of Nasser's calibre. On different occasions, as the government deemed it necessary, we were able to express these feelings and attitudes by demonstrating in support of regime causes and against antiregime causes, domestic or foreign.

At the university level, this overt socialization process takes the form of advanced ideological indoctrination that is manifest in the curriculum of the faculty of politics and economics, and other courses on 'National Subjects'—*al-Mawad al-Qawmiyyah-such* as 'Arab Society', The July 23 Revolution', and 'Socialism', required for all students. This indoctrination presents Egypt as its leaders and people would like to see it: proud, independent, strong, and successful in meeting present and future challenges and achieving national goals. Moreover, the general national framework of these features extends to the whole Arab world. As a result, students have been prepared to forego their individual ideologies for the sake of the national goals, and the universities have been consequently emptied of their spirit. Indeed, Egyptian students have always been motivated by national aims.

In addition to these processes, the students have come to recognize those accomplishments of the revolution that have produced some benefits. The large expansion of the higher educational system, the very low tuition, and financial aid have widened opportunities for a large number of students who might not have received a university education under the old regime. Moreover, the dramatic achievements of the late President Nasser during and after 1955 left the students, like most Egyptians and Arabs, in a euphoria of pride and contentment. R.H.Dekmejian maintains that 'as a socialising agent, the charismatic leader's role in the re-socialising process seemed to be decisive'.[45]

At this stage, however, the more covert and specific socialisation begins. It is here where the student is first introduced to the inner workings of a bureaucratic atmosphere-the way in which the university is organized under the revolutionary regime, the career prospects and influence of each field of specialization, and the relationship of 'organised' and 'controlled' extracurricular activities for his career advancement.[46]

The student will soon learn that the higher institutes with their more practical training have better career prospects and thus enjoy a higher prestige and security, whereas graduates of the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Law have been waiting almost three years to be placed. They find out that the military ruling elite has not much respect for professorial and academic types, and that students themselves are somewhat suspect and subject at certain occasions to special praise. They come to realise the important role of the security officer assigned to the university by the Ministry of the Interior, and the subordinate administrative authority of their teachers. The power of the Ministry of Education becomes more evident after a time, and the student becomes aware of its control over student organizations as well as its connections with the High Council on Youth Welfare, which is partly responsible for the indoctrination and for demonstrating the loyalty of the university.[47]

Through the four or more years of his university education the student becomes acquainted with the inner mechanics of a bureaucratic structure in which he will try to find a place to serve for the rest of his working life. He takes a close look at the manner in which those with 'real' political power behave, how those with cultural attainments behave, and how those with petty administrative

positions behave. If he is wise enough, he will come to understand where his station is in the 'democratic' Egyptian Arab Republic.

Leonard Binder states succinctly:

> Imperfect a system though it may be, the university performs a very important socializing function for the administrative elite of the country. As they learned about the overt character of the political system and its ideal goals in grammar school, they learn about its internal workings, the flow of authority, prestige, and permitted deviations during their higher education.[48]

The process of overt and covert socialization has to a great degree successfully denied the students the possibility of taking the initiative to act as an independent body, and, except for the February-November 1968 demonstration over the lenient sentence against the Army and Air Force commanders who were charged with responsibility for the military defeat in 1967, they have been transformed into a massive crowd of regimented individuals, devoid of their former concern with political participation. Whereas in former regimes educated Egyptians found an outlet for their disappointments with reality by adopting new ideologies and system-challenging movements from outside the regime, such as the Muslim Brotherhood religious reactionaries, Young Egypt fascist-type nationalists, and Communists, under the revolutionary regime students are imbued with a single ideology which appears to them morally and practically complete, and they have no reason to reject it. Students are given the opportunity to express themselves in the institutions of the Arab Socialist Union-Egypt's only political party; they are not, however, given the possibility of independent action but have to operate in cooperation with other groups' representatives within the party's organization. Coupled with this is a general feeling of frustration and despair among the educated arising from the impression that they have no role to play in revolutionary Egypt and that society has no need for them. The resulting perplexity of the educated Egyptians has, in most cases, led to political passiveness and frustration.

NOTES

1. Malcolm H.Kerr, 'Egypt', in James S.Coleman, ed., *Education and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969,160–94.
2. Russell Galt, *The Effects of Centralization on Education in Modern Egypt.* Cairo: Department of Education, American University at Cairo, 1936, 27.
3. Ismail Qabani, *Mudkakkirah 'an-Siyasah al-'Amah lil-Nashr wal-Talim fi Misr* (A Memorandum on the General Policy of the Spread of Education in Egypt), Ministry of Education. Cairo; 1945, 2–3.
4. Taha Husayn, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqafah fi Misr* (The Future of Culture In Egypt). Cairo; 1938, 64. The venerable Mosque of al-Azhar is the oldest existing Muslim

university in the world. It was founded by the Fatimids soon after their conquest of Egypt. Its foundation stone was laid in 970 A.D., and it was opened for services in 972 A.D. From being an important centre of instruction in Muslim law and religion and the Arabic language, al-Azhar, with the passage of centuries, has become the unrivaled institution of Islamic learning, receiving students from all parts of the Muslim world.

5. Ahmad Amin, *Faid al-Khatir* (The Outpouring of Thought), I (Cairo, 1938), 24–7.
6. Kerr, *op. cit.,* 184.
7. Daniel Crecelius, 'Al-Azhar in the Revolution', *Middle East Journal,* 20 (1966), 32.
8. *Ibid., 34.*
9. Trevor Coombe, 'Education in the Building of Nations', Special Paper, Ph.D. in Education Program, Harvard University (May, 1963), 49.
10. Crecelius, *op. cit.,* 44.
11. Kerr, *op, cit.,* 183.
12. Daniel Crecelius, 'Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Faithfulness to Tradition', *Mid East,* April, 1970, 34–41.
13. Daniel Crecelius, The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt', paper presented to the Conference on Religion and Political Modernization, Honolulu, March 22–26, 1971.
14. Leonard Binder, 'Egypt: The Integrative Revolution', in Lucian W.Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969,416.
15. U.A.R. Central Agency of Public Mobilization and Statistics, *al-Mu'ashirat al-Ihsa'yah* (Statistical Indicators). Cairo, 1969, 193.
16. Binder, 'Egypt:…', *op. cit.,* 416.
17. *al-Ahram,* October 20, 1961.
18. *New York Times,* January 12, 1968.
19. Arab Republic of Egypt. Central Agency of Public Mobilization and Statistics, *Statistical Handbook,* (Cairo, 1972), 180.
20. *Ibid.,* 182.
21. U.A.R. Wizarat al-Talim al-Ali (Ministry of Higher Education), *al-Talim al-Ali fi Ithna-ashara Sanah* (Higher Education since 1952). Cairo, 1964, Table 16.
22. Arab Republic of Egypt, *op. cit.,* 187.
23. Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 211.
24. *Ibid., 29*
25. UNESCO, *World Communications* (1951), 142. For an analysis of historical statistics on literacy in Egypt, see UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries* (1953), 83–86.
26. *al-Ahram,* January 26, 1971; February 19 and 26, 1971; and March 12, 19, and 26, 1971.
27. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (4th ed.: New York: Free Press, 1968), 252.
28. Edward Shils, 'Political Development in the New States', *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 2(1960), 273.
29. U.A.R. Ministry of Education, *Comparative Statistics of Education* (1953–1954 to 1961– 1962). Department of Statistics. Cairo, 1961, Table 17.

30. On the 'Crisis of the Intellectuals', see the series of articles by Lutfi al-Khawli and others in *al-Ahram,* March 12–21, 1961, and that by Muhamad H. Haykal in *al-Ahram,* weekly beginning 2 June, 1961.
31. Publication A-193 (Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1952).
32. Lerner, *op. cit.,* 240–1.
33. Gamal Abdul Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution.* Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959, 33.
34. Shils, *op. cit.,* 265–92 and 379–411.
35. L.W.Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 122–4.
36. G.Almond and S.Verba, *The Civic Culture.* Boston: Little Brown, 1965, 318–19.
37. *Ibid.*
38. David Abernathy, *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, 194.
39. Karl Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development, *American Political Science Review,* 55 (1961), 497–8.
40. Binder, *op. cit.,* 400.
41. See Mahmud A.Faksh, 'Education and Political Modernization and Change in Egypt, an unpublished dissertation (University of Connecticut, 1972), 144–195.
42. Binder, *op. cit.,* 402.
43. Anouar Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Mllitary Society.* New York: Random House, 1968.
44. See Faksh, *op. cit.,* 144–195.
45. R.H.Dekmajian, 'Student Activism in Egypt, paper presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Columbus, Ohio, November 6–7, 1970. Mimeo., 6.
46. Binder, *op. cit.,* 414.
47. *Ibid.,* 414–415.
48. *Ibid.,* 415.

Agricultural Technology and Rural Social Classes in Egypt, 1920–1939

Alan Richards

The pivotal role of the interwar period for Egyptian development has received increasing stress in recently published research.[1] The English language studies have largely focused on political developments and structures, although the development of banks and industry, especially of the Bank Misr group, has also been the subject of recent work. However, developments in the agricultural sector have received somewhat less attention.[2] This paper seeks to fill this gap by analysing the technical and social changes in Egypt in agriculture from 1920 to 1940.

It is true that the agricultural changes of the interwar period were not as dramatic as the 1890–1914 period which saw the rapid expansion of the cultivated area and of cotton production or the land reforms and expansion of the early years of the Aswan High Dam under Nasser. It is equally clear that output per worker in agriculture stagnated. Yet production did increase, especially after 1935: agricultural output increased some 50 per cent between 1915–19 and 1935–39. About half of this growth was due to recovery from the war, since output grew only 26 per cent from 1910–14 to 1935–39.[3] Indeed, I shall argue that the rural economy had to recover not merely from World War I, but from the intensification of agriculture which preceded that War. The prosaic, yet important, technical changes of the period were largely a response to production difficulties and bottlenecks which had been created during the pre-1914 phase of expansion. I shall also argue that these technical changes probably favoured large landowners more than small, but helped to prevent the position of the landless class from further deterioration. Nevertheless, the position of the landless was, of course, extremely grim.

Although these rural developments were less dramatic than the rise of Egyptian industry, investment banking, and political parties, they were fundamental to the period. After all, about 71 per cent of the population still lived in the rural areas and 69 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture in 1939. A large proportion of the Bank Misr's funds originated in the agrarian sector, and as Al-Dasuqi has shown, all of the major political contestants of the period were agriculturally based. Clearly, developments in agriculture had a broad impact on Egyptian society during this period.

These changes are of more than historical interest, however. Just as the British neglected drainage while extending irrigation, so did the Nasser regime. Just as the interwar period saw stagnation coupled with efforts to remedy the damage

caused by past policies, so did the 1970s. The current concern with Egyptian agricultural stagnation and the current debates over agricultural strategies in Egypt makes timely an historical inquiry into a previous period of stagnation.[5]

TECHNICAL CHANGES

In order to understand the interwar changes, a brief sketch of pre-1914 developments is necessary. During the earlier period the principal changes were the extension of permanent irrigation and the spread of a more intensive crop rotation within perennial systems. Perennial irrigation was extended throughout the Delta upon the completion of the Delta Barrage in 1890, and into Middle Egypt by the Aswan Dam in 1902. By 1914, perennial irrigation was the rule as far south as Asyut. Unfortunately, these irrigation investments were not complemented by adequate investment in drainage. The additional water which the public irrigation works provided allowed debt-pressed small peasants to shift to a crop rotation in which cotton was planted every two years instead of every three. Large landholders, on the other hand, largely retained the three-year system.[6]

The result of these two developments was a fall in the yields of cotton, the principal cash crop, beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century.[7] Contemporary observers stressed three causes for the fall in cotton yields: (1) a rise in the water table, (2) soil deterioration due to shortening the fallow, and (3) insect attacks. The rise in the water table suffocated the deep roots of the cotton plant and promoted soil salination through capillary action and evaporation. The inadequate drainage system was the root of this problem. The rotation shift exacerbated the situation by pouring more water on the land: not only was the fallow time shortened, but cotton was a water-using crop. By 1908 the water table was less than 1 meter below the surface in many central Delta regions.[8] The intensification of cropping also contributed to other soil problems and to insect attacks. Contemporary agronomists attributed much of the stability and fertility of Egyptian basin cultivation to the long fallow period *(sharaqi),* during which the soil heated, dried out, and cracked. This aerated the soil, broke up colloids, and promoted the growth of nitrifying bacteria. With the shortening of the fallow, first by the switch from basin to perennial irrigation, and then by the rotation shift from three to two years, these beneficial effects were lost. The shortening of the fallow and the increased use of water also contributed to the proliferation of insect pests. Serious attacks occurred every year after 1904.[9]

One can imagine a variety of responses to these problems. One obvious possibility would be the abandonment of the two-year rotation in favour of the less intensive three-year system.[10] However, the available evidence indicates not only that such a reversal did not occur, but rather that there was *further* intensification of cropping and a more widespread adoption of the two-year crop rotation. In addition to this intensification, there were three principal changes in agricultural techniques: improved drainage, earlier sowing and closer spacing of cotton plants, and increased use of chemical fertilizer. Further, some agricultural machinery, especially threshing and segregating machines, were imported. I

shall argue that drainage and new planting techniques were adopted as responses to the problems of soil deterioration and insect pests, respectively. Fertilizer use presents a somewhat more complicated case. On the one hand, we shall see that there were price incentives for its adoption along the lines of Hayami and Ruttan's notion of 'induced technical change'. This would appear unrelated to previous production problems. Government policy played a role here: the Sidqi government's tariff on wheat imports bolstered the internal price, thereby encouraging landowners to purchase fertilizer for use on their wheat fields. The spread of threshers and segregators in the 1930s seems to have had a similar motive. On the other hand, adoption of fertilizer was linked to the previous ecological problems in two ways. First, use of nitrogen fertilizer led to earlier ripening of cotton, which in turn helped avoid pest attacks. Agronomists therefore advocated its use on that ground. Second, the marginal physical product of fertilizer used on cotton varied directly with the quality of the soil and therefore with the quality of the drainage. There are reasons, then, for regarding the above three technical changes as a 'package', whose adoption was related to the production problems which pre-1914 changes had generated.

The paragraphs which follow seek to demonstrate these assertions and to determine the pattern of resource use which the adoption of these techniques implied. It will appear, in general, that they were 'land saving and everything else using'. Attention will be given to any evidence, such as indications of the existence of economies of scale or of differential access to resources, which might indicate that the technical changes favoured the pashas (holding more than 50 feddans) and rich peasants over the small peasants (less than 5 feddans). This forms the background to the second section of the paper in which I examine the distributional consequences of these technical changes.

Let us first consider the question of the choice of crop rotation. The available evidence suggests that those already using the two-year rotation (small and rich peasants) retained the system, and that more farmers adopted it. As Table 1 shows, the ratio of cropped to cultivated land rose steadily during the period, although at a slower rate than during the pre-war period. Other quantitative measures, such as the ratio of cotton to cultivated area, also indicate increased intensity of land use. Qualitative information supports the contention that the two-year rotation spread during the period. First of all, the (ineffective) government restrictions on the cotton area were interpreted as laws imposing the three-year system.[11] Discussions of the evasions of these restrictions mention that the large cultivators were the most conspicuous violators of the law, providing evidence that some large cultivators were adopting the two-year system. There is testimony that the small peasants continued to use the two-year rotation.[12] Jean Anhoury, writing in 1941, asserts that the two-year system was 'the rule', with only a *minority* of the large cultivators retaining the three-year system. A publication of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1936 asserted that the two-year rotation has been 'generally adopted'.[13] Some landowners, apparently, did keep the old system: if we compare the cropped area/cultivated area ratio for the period of the Korean War with the same ratio just before World War II, there is a jump in the number from the latter to the former (see Table 1). There is ample testimony that large cultivators switched to the two-year rotation during the Korean War years due to the high price of cotton.[14] The appropriate inference is that some pashas retained

TABLE 1 RATIO OF CROPPED AREA TO CULTIVATED AREA 1897/98–1952/53

Year	*Ratio*	*Year*	*Ratio*
1897–1898	1.346	1923–1924	1.5543
1898–1899	1.356	1924–1925	1.5153
1899–1900	1.369	1925–1926	1.5704
1900–1901	1.384	1926–1927	1.5622
1901–1902	1.393	1927–1928	1.5566
1902–1903	1.405	1928–1929	1.5354
1903–1904	1.410	1929–1930	1.5561
1904–1905	1.400	1930–1931	1.5581
1905–1906	1.401	1931–1932	1.5989
1906–1907	1.418	1932–1933	1.5384
1907–1908	1.426	1933–1934	1.5300
1908–1909	1.427	1934–1935	1.5401
1909–1910	1.443	1935–1936	1.5110
1910–1911	1.433	1936–1937	1.5911
1911–1912	1.453	1937–1938	1.5953
1912–1913	1.460	1938–1939	1.5963
1917–1918	1.4806		
1918–1919	1.4519	1948–1949	1.5712
1919–1920	1.4715	1949–1950	n.a.
1920–1921	1.5054	1950–1951	1.6516
1921–1922	1.0842 (1.5362)*	1951–1952	1.6610
1922–1923	1.5042	1952–1953	1.6605

Source: Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics. *Annuaire Statistique,* 1941, p. 322.
* Unreliable data

the three-year system until the early 1950s. Taking into account the various kinds of evidence that are available, it appears that the peasants retained the two-year system, that other farmers made the switch, and that some, but not all, of the large landowners were among the new users of the two-year rotation.

Given the adverse soil effects which the two-year rotation involved, one may ask why some of the pashas adopted this system. Let us look first at the ratio of rents to wages. If this is the relevant choice parameter for technical choice between a more (two-year) and a less (three-year) labour using/land saving technique, we would expect to find that the rental/wage ratio was rising, reflecting the increasing scarcity of land relative to labour, as the pashas (or anyone making crop decisions, for that matter) adopted the two-year system. That is, a rise in the price of the scarce factor would induce some landowners to adopt the technique which economised on the use of that factor.

Table 2 presents the scattered data available on wages and rents. There is little to support the hypothesis that changes in input prices were the main force behind the pashas' decisions. The ratio falls, or at least, allowing for data problems, does not rise, while the pashas shifted into the more labour using/land saving technique. As a comparison of Tables 2 and 1 shows, the rental/wage ratio for the interwar period is, in general, well below the same ratio for 1910–1914, yet the ratio of cropped area to cultivated area (a proxy for the rotation in use) is higher. Much the same picture emerges if one uses the price of cotton, rather than rents as an

indicator of the value of land: pashas *retained* the three-year system during the period of *rising* relative land scarcity, and adopted the two-year rotation during the period of *declining* relative land scarcity.

TABLE 2 RENTAL RATES, WAGE RATES AND RATIOS OF RENTS TO WAGES, AND COTTON PRICES TO WAGES, 1870s –1938

Year	*Rent (£E/Feddan/yr)*	*Wage Rates (£E/day)*	*Rent/Wage*	*P/wage[d] c*
1870s		.02–.03		
1877		.03		
1889		.04		66.35
1890	1.05; 1.5		26.25–42.9	
1891		.035		65.89
1895	3.6			
1900		.035–.045	88.9–133.3	59.21–88.97
1901	4.0	.03		71.35
1902	4.0			
1906		.025		136.2
1907		.025		152.88
1910	10.0	.035–.04	250–286	112.05–128.06
1912	8.0–10.0		178–400	80.2–121.97
1913	12.0–18.0	.03–.045	267–720	126.8–152.16
1914[a] (early)		.025–.03		
1920s	12.8–32[b]	.07–.08[i]	160–457	85.59
1922		.04–.05[d]		122.84–153.55
1927	7.09[e]	.05[e]	141.8	118.72
1928	7.0–11.0[c]	.045[i]	155.5–244.4	115.02
1928–1929	11.0[f]			
1930–1931	5.3[g]: 7.1[f]	.04[g]	132.5: 177–5	50.4
1931–1932	4.53[g]	.03[g]	151	81.87
1932	3–5[c]		100–166	
1932–1933	5.1[f]	.025[i]	204	91.12
1937	5–80[c]			
1937–1938	6.5[f.h]	.03[h]	216.6	71.2

Sources: a. Pre-1914, Rent: 1890, Nahas, 104; Moritz Schanz, *Cotton in Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,* (Manchester, 1913), 44–45; 1895: Hamed el-Sayyed Azmi, 'A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt,' *L'Egypte Comtemporaine,* 25 (1934), 714; 1901: Nahas, 143; 1902, Owen, 242; 1910: Raoul de Chamberet, *Enquête sur la Condition du Fellah égyptien* (Dijon, 1909), 33; 1912: Owen, 242 and Schanz, 44–45.
Sources: a. Pre-1914, Wages: 1870's: Owen, 266; 1877; J.C.McCoan, Egypt as It Is (London, 1877), 178; 1889: William Willcocks, *Egyptian Irrigation* (London, 1913), 256; 1891: R.Wallace, 'Opening Address on Egyptian Agriculture,' University of Edinburgh, Agriculture Department Pamphlet (1891), 20; 1900: Owen, 266; 1901: Nahas, 133; *Ministry of Justice, Report…1901,* 84; 1906: Siegfried Strakosch,

Erwachende Agrarlaender (Vienna, 1910), 71; 1907: Chamberet, 17; 1910: Strakosch, 71; 1913: Schanz, 45; 1914: Owen 273–4; A.Lambert, 'Les salaires dans l'entreprise agricole égyptienne,' *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 33 (1943). Price of Cotton: *Annuaire Statistique,* 1914.
b. Based on Crouchley's statement that postwar rents were '60–100% above 1914 levels,' *Economic Development of Egypt.*

c.A.Lambert, 'Divers Modes de Faire Valoir les Terres en Egypte,' *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 1938, p. 196.
d.Muhammad Saleh, *La Petite Propriété en Egypte,* 1922, p. 71.
e. Minost, 'L'action contre la Crise,' *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 1930, p. 573.
f. M.R.Ghonemy, *Resource Use and Income in Egyptian Agriculture,* unpub. ph.d thesis, N.Carolina State College, 1953.
g Hamed el-Sayyid Azmi, 'A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt…,' *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 1934, p. 714.
h M.Anis, 'The National Income of Egypt,' *L'Egypte Comtemporaine,* 1950, pp. 753, 759.
i A.Lambert, 'Les Salaires dans l'entreprise Agricole Egyptienne,' *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 1943, p. 229.
j *Annuaire Statistique*

TABLE 3 RELATIVE PRICES, COTTON AND SUBSTITUTE CROPS 1913–1937

Year	*P/P c maize*	*P/P c wheat*	*P/P c bean*	*P/P c barley*	*P/P c millet*	*P/P c rice*
1913	3.022	2.3492	2.4594	3.4478	3.2833	1.1890
1914	2.7614	1.8989	1.862	3.1466	3.0006	0.9604
1915	3.1852	2.1955	2.8972	3.2341	3.2929	1.2219
1916	4.0953	3.4931	3.6040	5.9141	4.5772	1.5123
1917	3.4503	2.1723	3.0089	4.7293	3.3904	1.3820
1918	2.9438	2.0792	2.6370	3.7782	3.1297	1.2993
1919	5.0182	4.1806	3.7793	6.0887	4.2929	1.6973
1920	2.9097	1.8297	1.4639	2.8917	4.9261	1.1583
1921	5.3632	2.9934	3.7956	6.2602	5.3187	1.3184
1922	4.5910	3.1669	2.6110	4.6990	4.3464	1.1023
1923	5.5532	4.7051	3.2333	7.3482	5.6838	1.8796
1924	4.0651	3.4977	2.8316	5.6163	3.8396	1.6607
1925	4.1271	2.4518	2.2960	4.4759	3.8876	1.2281
1926	4.2600	2.1959	1.4176	3.7064	4.1434	1.0934
1927	4.6338	3.7230	2.7541	5.8564	4.3806	1.6469
1928	3.8439	2.7755	1.7767	4.7834	3.6838	1.3819
1929	3.7245	2.4910	2.3435	4.9105	4.7073	1.1715
1930	2.2048	1.6225	1.1440	2.9903	2.3521	0.7935
1931	2.2591	1.3260	1.1009	1.9884	2.3644	0.5667
1932	3.6152	1.9941	2.5099	3.8075	3.8773	1.1164
1933	2.1858	2.0338	2.5949	4.9055	2.4282	1.1490
1934	2.4986	1.7674	1.7093	2.9384	2.9161	1.1271
1935	3.7100	1.9284	1.7845	3.2176	4.3337	1.2873
1936	3.4240	2.4987	2.2475	5.6849	3.5008	1.2788
1937	2.0065	1.7019	1.6165	2.9193	2.2161	0.8345

Source: Calculated from Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics, *Annuaire Statistique.*

Changes in output prices or tenurial arrangements might provide the explanation for the change. If the price of an output produced relatively intensively in a technique rises, then at the margin that process will be chosen, and we will observe an increase in its use. However, the price of cotton, produced relatively intensively under the two-year system, does not rise markedly in comparison with *any* (not to mention all) of the relevant substitute crops. (See Table 3). Nor do tenurial arrangements appear to be the explanation: first and most importantly, all of the sources emphasise the close degree of supervision of large estates in the interwar period. Rotation, irrigation, and drainage questions were all decided by the proprietor, regardless of the type of land/labour contract used.[15] Second, there is no evidence whatsoever that large estates were renting out more of their land in the interwar period than they were before World War I: in 1939, 70–76 per cent of estates between 50 and 500 feddans, and 91 per cent of estates larger than 500 feddans were exploited directly.[16] Such a breakdown by size of farms is not available for 1929; in that year 78 per cent of the land area was cultivated directly. Pashas had been using, and continued to use, direct exploitation.[17] It would appear that tenurial arrangements cannot explain the pasha's choice of the two-year crop rotation. An alternative explanation is required.

It is likely that the pashas chose the two-year rotation at this time because some of the production problems associated with perennial irrigation and the two-year system began to be alleviated. The 'loosening' of these constraints raised the possible long-run output-and hence long-run revenue-of the two-year system. This made its adoption more attractive at the margin.[18] The next task, then, is to examine the measures which were taken to counteract the problems associated with more intensive land use.

Recall that the principal problem caused by the switch to perennial irrigation and the two-year rotation were the rise in the water table, the salination of the soil, and the adverse physical and chemical effects upon the soil due to the shortening of the fallow. These problems, in turn, were the result of inadequate *drainage*. Sa'ad Zaghlul stressed the importance of raising the productivity of the land, and of extending drainage and irrigation in particular, in his opening address to the Egyptian parliament in 1924.[19] The Egyptian government tackled the drainage problem in the interwar period. First, pumping stations were constructed:

> The Delta was divided into a number of zones, corresponding with its natural drainage areas between the lines of higher land which mark the ancient water-courses. After the war, work was undertaken on the drainage of these areas by the construction of big drainage canals in which the water was to be maintained at a suitably low level by pumps designed to lift the water from the terminal ends of the canals and pump it into the sea or northern lakes. In this way, in 1930 no less than ten big pumps were in operation along the northern fringe of cultivation in the Delta. Since that date the electrification of these pumping stations has been undertaken. There are now (1938) seventeen drainage stations providing drainage to over one million feddans in the north of the Delta.[20]

A large scale program of drain construction was undertaken (see Table 4). By 1933–4 some £E13,500,000 had been spent for this purpose.

TABLE 4 PUBLIC DRAINS, 1922–1939 (STOCK)

Year	*Kms*
1922	6,523
1923	6,756
1924	6,786
1925	6,678
1926	7,030
1927	7,088
1928	7,369
1929	7,453
1930	7,528
1931	7,726
1932	7,709
1933	8,040
1934	8,200
1935	8,563
1936	8,972
1937	9,168
1938	9,708
1939	10,246

Source: *Annuaire Statistique.*

A word about the nature of the public finance of these drains might be in order here. First, *public* drains and canals were those which served the lands of two or more villages.[21] There was no user fee as such for either drains or irrigation canals.

> Direct support for the Irrigation Service is derived from the Land Tax and supplemented by revenue from the government owned railroads, customs collections, etc. There is no direct water tax.[22]

Rather, payment of the land-tax was a 'guarantee' of the fellah's obtaining irrigation water.[23] The lack of a charge for water provided no incentive to economise its use. Regional allocation of drains was, apparently, decided on technical grounds, which seems reasonable enough given the interrelated nature of Delta drainage and the generally good natural drainage of the Sa'id. Finally, if a person's land were to be selected to have a public drain or canal transverse it, he was to be repaid the market value of the land.[24]

Some of the well-to-do landowners in the northern Delta had installed pumps and built drainage canals on their own land.[25] Such works were complements to the government drains, since the former empty into the latter. However, on the whole, the private sector lagged behind the public in this crucial area.[26] The reasons for this lag are not difficult to see. An adequate drainage network required (1) capital expenditure, and (2) the use of as much as ten per cent of the land area. Due to the indivisible nature of a drain, the small cultivators would have found the percentage of their land so occupied near the maximum. In an area characterised by very small hold ings, it was no doubt difficult to get

agreement on whose parcel of land would be turned into a drain. The externalities problem was serious.[27] Given the indivisible nature of the input and, therefore, the economies of scale in its use, not to mention the capital costs of construction, it is not surprising to find that smallholders lagged behind large landlords in adopting the drains which were complementary to the government's projects.

> Le voyageur remarque en quelques endroits de petites propriétés qui sont incultes à cause de la faute de drainage. Malheureusement, le petit propriétaire n'apprécie pas le drainage à sa juste valeur, et voudrait-il entreprendre un tel travail, il n'en aurait pas les moyens. Les grands propriétaires seuls ont pu procéder à cet aménagement grâce à l'étendue de leurs domaines.[28]

A possible alternative system to field drains which would have circumvented the problem of taking up cultivated area was pipe drainage. This, however, was prohibitively expensive, and it was only discussed, not undertaken, before World War II. Experiments in 1956 showed that such drains were effective for removing water, required almost no upkeep, increased yields by approximately thirty per cent, but cost about £E 28 per feddan to construct[29]-approximately equal to the yearly budget of a fellah family of four.[30]

It is difficult to determine to what extent the lack of secondary, private drainage slowed the 'production' of high quality land. It does seem clear, however, that the government's projects contributed substantially to the removal of the problem of the rise in the water table, primarily by 'unblocking' the lines of natural drainage. We may conclude that the problem of drainage was ameliorated but not entirely solved. Furthermore, it would appear that drainage was superior on the pashas' lands than it was in those areas where small peasant holdings predominated.

The second technical change during the period was a change in *planting techniques.* Cotton was planted earlier and the seeds were spaced more closely than before. Both of these changes promoted earlier ripening, thus helping to avoid attacks of the pink boll-worm. According to agricultural experts, the optimum spacing of the ridges (i.e., that which maximized yields per feddan) had changed for 75 cm. in 1915 to 65 cm. in 1935, and the space between the holes from 45 cm. to 35 cm. for the same years.[31] Spacing may have become even closer in the latter half of the 1930s.[32] There is only qualitative evidence on the extent of the adoption of this technique: it appears to have been widespread.[33] Earlier planting seems to have been adopted in the early and mid-1930s.

TABLE 5 PLANTING DATES FOR COTTON, 1930s

% of cotton crop sown by:	*End of Feb.*	*March 15*
1930	7	31
1936	14	60

Source: Nassif, 'L'Eygpte, est-elle surpeuplée?, in *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 33 (1942), 729.

These measures seem to have been successful in inhabiting the attacks of the pink boll-worm.[34]

It was difficult for poor peasants to adopt the technique of earlier planting. Their common practice under the two-year rotation was to take several cuts of birsim to guarantee food for their animals. If they adopted earlier planting, they would have had to take fewer cuts of birsim or to change birsim's place in the rotation so that it did not precede cotton on a piece of land. Either course of action presented difficulties. Since birsim was the principal fodder crop, a reduction in cuttings would imply a fall in the animals' food supply, unless alternative food sources were expanded. This did not occurthe yearly output of beans, maize, and barley was, if anything, lower in the 1930s than in the 1920s. Consequently, if peasants were taking fewer cuts of birsim their animals would have had even less to eat. Since small peasants owned 59 per cent of the buffaloes and 44 per cent of the cattle, such a reduction in cuttings would almost surely imply a reduction in the number of animals. However, the opposite occurred.[35] Given the absence of any positive evidence that peasants *did* reduce the number of cuttings, in view of the above information we may safely conclude that it did not occur.

The evidence on birsim's place in the rotation is ambiguous. *All* descriptions of either the two- or the three-year rotation from before 1914 which I have seen have birsim preceding cotton. Interwar evidence is scanty: a 1933 source has birsim before cotton in the two-year system.[36] On the other hand, Anhoury, writing in 1941, has cotton coming after maize, not birsim, in the two-year system.[37] This would be consistent with a tale of peasants adopting earlier planting during the course of the 1930s. Saffa's description of the two-year rotation in 1948 has birsim before cotton, but he is describing a large estate, which did not have the same fodder requirements, since such estates often substituted steam pumps for animal power in irrigation.[38]

If birsim was *not* planted before cotton, there would have been an increased need for nitrogen fertilizer for the cotton. *Ceteris paribus,* the absence of a nitrogen-fixing crop would have led to an increased demand for nitrogen fertilizer. Mosseri estimated the nitrogen fixation of a hectare of birsim as the equivalent of between 250–500 kgs of nitrate of soda.[39] Some 'evidence in reverse' for this hypothesis is provided by Nagy, who says that if a cotton field was *not* manured, then birsim would have preceded it.[40] As Nagy implies, this may not have presented any very serious problems insofar as it was met by the increased supply of natural fertilizers. We note, however, a certain complementarity between earlier planting and fertilizer use for small holders. We shall see that such a complementarity existed regardless of the size of holdings.

Changing the place of birsim in the rotation would also have meant planting birsim on land adjacent to the cotton fields. This would have given the *leaf* worm pest more plants to feed on as it developed, before moving on to the cotton plants.[41] The closer spacing of the cotton plants may also have contributed to the attacks of this pest by multiplying the number of plants per feddan. These attacks were quite severe, occurring in thirteen of the twenty years from 1920–39, inclusive. The average loss appears to have been on the order of eighty pounds per acre or about 18 per cent of the average yield per acre for 1920–39 in the areas affected.[42] The attacks of this pest gave rise to an increased demand for

child labour, since the principal method of combating the leaf worm attacks was to have children pick the worms off the leaves of the plant. This method required anywhere from one to five children per feddan.[43]

This increased demand for child labour was only one of a number of complementarities involved in the new planting techniques. If small peasants changed the place of birsim in the rotation, they would have needed to use more nitrogen fertilizer. Such a demand was reinforced by the fact that nitrogen fertilizer induced more rapid growth in plants.[44] Anything that induced growth and earlier ripening was needed to combat the boll-worm attacks. Any increase in fertilizer use would have been accompanied by an increase in the demand for labour, for the two inputs were complementary, as we shall see. In addition, the closer spacing of the plants must have required more labour, given, as was the case, that the techniques of making the ridges and implanting the seed remained unchanged. A further rise in the demand for labour would also have occurred insofar as labour-using methods of watering were employed, since more frequent waterings, and especially earlier waterings, stimulated the growth and earlier ripening of cotton plants.[45] This, in turn, would have been complementary with increased drainage. Drainage was complementary with closer spacing in another way, as well. The closer spacing of the plants inhibited the lateral growth of the roots of the cotton plant. This could be compensated for by the downward extension of the roots, *provided* that the water table was low enough.[46] Finally, the additional quantity of seed per feddan would have required more capital, as would any increased demand for fertilizer to hasten plant growth.

In summary, the new planting techniques were a response to the problem of pest attacks, a problem which was exacerbated by the extension of perennial cultivation and the adoption of the two-year crop rotation. The new techniques economised on land, and made intensive use of both child and adult labour, water, fertilizer, drainage, seed, and capital.

The final major technical change of importance in this period was the *adoption of artificial fertilizers.* Total imports rose over 400 per cent from 1920 (120,246 Metric tons) to 1937 (641,838 Metric tons). This was primarily a demand for nitrogen fertilizer: between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of imports were of this type. Since Egyptian soils are rich in potash, such fertilizers were rarely necessary.[48] Phosphates were also used, primarily for birsim.

There is some question as to which crops benefited from the application of fertilizers. In particular, the question concerns the utility of nitrogen fertilizer for cotton. There was substantial agreement among agronomists that nitrogen fertilizer raised the yield of cereals such as wheat, maize, and barley. Birsim did not require nitrogen fertilizer, but seemed to benefit from the application of phosphates.

The case of cotton was less clear. D.S.Gracie, a government agronomist, and his colleagues argued on the basis of field experiments that the limiting factor on cotton yields was soil mechanics: permeability to water and air, ‘properties which are in the main a reflection of the amount of deterioration the soil has undergone.’[49] *Within the limits imposed* by this and other soil features, nitrogen fertilizer ‘can and does cause important increases in yield.’[50] Original yield level, determined by the quality of soil, and responsiveness to fertilizer were found to be positively and significantly correlated. The maximum percentage

increase from nitrogen fertilizer was constant; therefore, the marginal physical productivity of fertilizer was higher in areas with a higher 'pre-fertilizer' yield level.

Consequently, there were regional variations in the use of fertilizer for cotton.

> Cotton has always been the most heavily manured crop; in the early 1920s it was receiving practically all the fertilizer imported; even in 1937…it did not get less than 340,000 tons out of a total of 566,000 tons and it may have received considerably more.[51]

The heaviest use of fertilizer was in Upper Egypt; the cotton crop there was 'by far the most heavily manured crop in Egypt, receiving 'fully half of the nitrogen fertilizer imported into Egypt'.[52] Its use seems to have been especially heavy in certain areas; 'growers in Minya and Asyut provinces used to speak of giving six hundred kilos per feddan in the 1920s.'[53] Within the Delta, use of fertilizer increased from north to south.[54] In 1935–40 Delta cotton was receiving at least one hundred kilos of fertilizer per feddan on the average, an average which, as they point out, conceals differences within the region.

Although temperature differences were one cause of the regional differences in fertilizer use, the quality of drainage was of considerable importance. The lands of Upper Egypt, newly converted to perennial irrigation and having relatively good natural drainage, did not suffer from drainage problems to the extent of those in the Delta; this quite probably contributed to the higher productivity of fertilizer in the former area. This link between fertilizer and drainage was underscored by the policy recommendations of Gracie and Khalil.

> The main, if not the only, practical steps which can be taken (assuming average seasons and the permanence of the pink boll-worm) to increase the possibilities of nitrogenous manuring of cotton in Egypt must obviously be directed to raising the general yield level. This can only be accomplished by the prevention and remedying of soil deterioration by the general adoption of intensive drainage.[55]

The early failure of the British to provide sufficient drainage had consequences that lasted for a long time.

On balance it would appear that nitrogen fertilizer and animal manure were complements rather than substitutes. The Khedival Agricultural Society urged its members to use animal dung to 'improve the land and raise its fertility' and chemical to stimulate plant growth. The application of animal manure would increase the porosity of the soil, in turn the key element in determining the level of yields and the responsiveness of the plants to nitrogen fertilizers Given that the growth of livestock outstripped both the growth of cropped land and of the population, we may conclude that an increase in the application of animal manure per unit of cropped land occurred, even allowing for the use of some

dung as fuel by the fellahin.[56] Farmers were increasing their inputs of both animal and artificial manures, rather than substituting one for the other.

The complementarity of nitrogen fertilizer use with the labour-using technical changes of closer spacing and earlier planting was reinforced by the fact that the use of fertilizer was itself a labour-using activity. Animal fertilizer had to be collected, usually by children (see, for instance, the description of work tasks in Ammar[57]). It was usually applied by adults. For instance, the application of 25–30 cubic metres of animal manure on a feddan before the planting of maize required the labour of two men. The application of artificial manures was also labour using; here, too, children were used.[58]

In summary, the following pattern of technical change and resource use in the interwar period emerges: the new techniques of closer spacing and earlier planting were complementary with the use of labour, water, seed, as well as fertilizer. Fertilizer use, in turn, was a labour-using activity. The increased demand for seed and fertilizer induced and increased demand for credit. Both the new planting techniques and the use of fertilizer for cotton were complementary with drainage. The large number of complementarities involved is reminiscent of the 'package' of new inputs required for implementing the technical changes in underdeveloped agriculture in our own time, the 'Green Revolution'.

These technical changes were responses to problems generated before World War I. The extension of perennial irrigation and of the two-year crop rotation system in that early period caused deterioration in the quality of the soil and the spread of insect pests. Drainage and earlier planting were direct responses to these problems. The motivation behind the adoption of artificial fertilizers was more complex. On the one hand, its adoption was both directly and indirectly related to the previous production problems which were produced by the technical changes of the pre-1914 period: directly, because the use of nitrogen fertilizers accelerated the growth of cotton plants and consequently helped to reduce losses to pests; indirectly, because the productivity of fertilizer for cotton depended upon the quality of the soil (and, therefore, on the quality of the drainage). On the other hand, a case can also be made that the adoption of fertilizer was induced by changes in input prices. Using rent as the price of land services, we find some support for the notion that changes in the relative scarcity of land and fertilizer induced the adoption of the latter. For any sequence of years, the direction of change of the index of the relative price of land and fertilizer imports is the same. However, it is not at all obvious that the very large difference in fertilizer imports at the end of the 1920s and at the end of the 1930s can be accounted for by differences in the relative prices. The numbers for rent that we have are, of course, highly suspect; the prices of fertilizer are average prices. Given the very severe data problems, it would be wise to look at the relative price of cotton to fertilizer. Recall that cotton received at least 60 per cent of the ferilizer imported from abroad. If the adoption of fertilizer was being 'induced' by relative price shifts, we would expect to see a marked upward trend in the price of cotton relative to the price of fertilizer. However, we observe nothing of the sort (see Table 6).

On the other hand, fertilizer was also used for wheat. Here the evidence supports the 'inducement' hypothesis. Government policy helped here, for the Sidqi government placed a tariff on wheat in 1930 to discourage imports and to

TABLE 6 RENTS, COTTON, WHEAT, AND FERTILIZER PRICES, AND THEIR RATIOS, 1920–1938

Year	*Rent*[a]	P_{cotton}[b]	$P_{fertilizer}$	r/p_f	f^{P_f/P_c}	P_f/P_{wheat}[e]
1920	12.8–32.00[d]	6.900	25.35	0.5–1.26	3.676	7.741
1921		6.858	15.28		2.227	7.680
1922		6.142	12.83		2.088	7.617
1923		7.959	11.96		1.504	8.140
1924		7.897	12.00		1.520	6.118
1925		6.093	11.11		1.825	5.148
1926		4.306	10.68		2.481	6.272
1927	7.09	5.936	10.04	0.706	1.692	7.250
1928	7.0–11.0	5.176	9.58	0.73–1.15	1.852	5.915
1929	11.0	4.072	9.05	1.22	2.222	6.373
1930		2.410	8.71		3.610	6.748
1931	5.3; 7.1	2.016	7.76	0.68–0.91	3.846	5.879
1932	4.53–3–5	2.456	8.12	0.56;	3.311	7.589
1933	5.1	2.278	6.66	0.77	2.924	5.943
1934		2.650	5.75		2.169	3.836
1935		2.726	5.00		1.835	3.504
1936		2.870	5.15		1.795	4.483
1937	5–8.0	2.154	5.81	0.86–1.37	2.695	4.590
1938	6.5	2.136	6.25	1.04	2.924	

Source: a. Rents, LE/feddan/year. See Table 2
b. LE/canta. *Annuaire Statistique.*
c. Average price of nitrogen fertilizer, LE/m. ton, calculated from Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Egyptian Customs Administration, *Annual Statement of Foreign Trade.*
d. Rental figures are for early 1920s.
e. Calculated from *Annuaire Statistique* and "c".

bolster prices. This seems to have contributed considerably to the increase in fertilizer use in the 1930s (see Table 6 and Figure 1). In view of the evidence of fertilizer being heavily used on cotton lands, however, such price changes cannot be the whole story. We may conclude that although the evidence lends some support for the 'inducement' hypothesis, it is shaky enough to warrant serious consideration of the connection between fertilizer and drainage. Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion would be that price changes induced the short-term, year-to-year fluctuations in fertilizer imports, whereas the improvements in drainage and the adoption of earlier planting determined the long-term, secular trend of increasing fertilizer use for cotton.

The wheat tariff also stimulated the adoption of some agricultural machinery. The Agricultural Censuses of 1929 and 1939 provide data on ploughs (both native and steam), threshing machines (native and other), segregating machines, and winnowing machines, Note that mechanical threshers and segregators show by far the most rapid rate of growth. This is plausibly explained by government policy and by the fact that native threshers produced a low quality of grain. It is also worth noting that the kinds of farm equipment owned by pashas increased much more rapidly than those owned by small peasants.



FIGURE 1 Fertilizer imports 1913–1937(000,000 tons)

TABLE 7 AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, 1929 AND 1939

Machine or Tool	*Number (1929)*	*Number (1939)*	*% Change, 1929–1939*
Steam Ploughs	1,008	1,795	78
Native Ploughs	564,144	603,903	7
Threshing Machines	569	2,123	273
Segregating Machines	746	2,083	179
Winnowing Machines	2,373	2,494	5
Native Threshers (Nurag)	302,023	301,705	0

Source: Agricultural Census, 1939, pp. 110–111.

TABLE 8 OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY AND IMPLEMENTS, PASHAS AND SMALL PEASANTS, 1939

Machine or Tool	*% of total owned by Pashas (50+ feddans)*	*% of total owned by Small Peasants (0–5 feddans)*
Steam Ploughs	84	3
Native Ploughs	15	53
Threshing Machines	87	3
Segregating Machines	72	9
Winnowing Machines	69	7
Native Threshers (Nurag)	15	43

Source: Agricultural Census, 1939, Table XXIX.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Let us now turn to the impact of these changes on the various rural social groups. On the whole, it appears that the new techniques (a) favoured large landowners over small, (b) helped to slow the fall of rural wage rates. These outcomes were the result of the distribution of ownership of resources, the pattern of resource use engendered by the technical changes, and government policy.

Changes in cash revenue per landowner is the outcome of (a) changes in cultivated land per owner, (b) changes in the ratio of cotton land to cultivated land (i.e., changes in crop rotation from three-year to two-year) and (c) changes in cotton yields.[59] We have seen that small peasants retained the two-year rotation-there was no change in the percentage of their land planted in cotton. Some pashas, on the other hand, were switching to the more cotton intensive rotation. With respect to the crop rotation, we find the *direction* of change in cotton revenue favouring the pashas. The same may be said for land per owner: from 1920 to 1939 the trend in average small peasant landholding is steadily downward, whereas pashas' holdings show more stability. Although legally fragmentation affected everyone equally, in actual practice it hit the small peasants harder. This is due in part to pasha land purchases of newly reclaimed land in the Northern Delta in the late 1920s.[60]

There is no reason to suppose that the changes in crop rotation and the changes in land per owner, both of which favoured large owners, were offset by

small peasant yields rising more rapidly than those of large landowners. Indeed, an argument can be made that here, too, the pashas did better than the small peasants. First, recall the importance of well-drained land for cotton yields. Two points are in order here. First, since the small peasants adopted the water-using two-year crop rotation in the pre-World War I period when drainage was most inadequate, their lands presumably had deteriorated more than those of the pashas, who had, in general, retained the three-year system. Second, the existence of indivisibilities and hence economies of scale in drainage meant that the peasants did not invest in drainage to the same extent as did the pashas. Third, even if we assume that drainage was characterised by constant returns to scale, the cost of installation would have been prohibitive for a fellah: the cost of drainage installation on a five feddan farm was equal to roughly one-third of the net revenue of the farm.[61] Consequently, it seems highly likely that their lands suffered more than those of the pashas from drainage problems. Given the interrelatedness of drainage and fertilizer application, it is likely that the pashas' yields rose more than those of the peasants.

The credit system also favoured the rich. During the 1920s the small peasants either had no access to credit or got it from moneylenders, since the Law of Five Feddans made it illegal for the fellah to offer his land as collateral for loans. Since small peasants would have had to borrow if they were to obtain fertilizer (or, for that matter, adopt any of the technical changes discussed above, all of which were capital-using), and since they would have had to borrow from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest (20–30 per cent per year), the user cost of fertilizer would have been higher for them than for the pashas. Therefore, we would expect them to use less fertilizer than the pashas, for whom credit, and therefore fertilizer, was cheaper.

In 1931 the government established the Credit Agricole Egyptien. This bank was to make loans to small fellahin and to cooperatives. Initially, it charged the former 7 per cent per year and the latter 5 per cent. The rates were lowered to 6 and 4 per cent, respectively, in 1933, and to 5 and 4 per cent in 1939.[62] *Annuaire Statistique* presents detailed figures on these loans, telling us not only how much fertilizer was purchased with the loans, but also for which crops the fertilizer was to be used (see Table 9). It is interesting to compare the tonnage figure for cotton for 1937 with the statement of Balls, Gracie, and Khalil that, in that year, cotton 'did not receive less than 340,000 tons' of fertilizer.[63] Thus the bank was financing about 19 per cent of all fertilizer used on cotton. Now although there are serious data biases, *Annuaire Statistique* figures give 32 per cent of the land area as held in plots of 0–5 feddans in that year. This leads us to suspect that, in fact, many peasants were not borrowing from the Credit Agricole Egyptien. There is evidence that most small peasants continued to rely on village moneylenders in the 1930s.[64] Such a view is reinforced by comparing the figures for the number of borrowers with the number of small holders in the 0–5 feddan class, assuming that *all* borrowers were small fellahin. These figures are not to be trusted entirely, however, since the *Annuaire Statistique* numbers overstate the number of proprietors.[65]

This bias, however, is quite probably counteracted by a different bias. In fact, numbers of borrowers from the bank were not small holders (as defined here), but rather were either (1) 'middle' or rich peasants owning more than five feddans,

TABLE 9 FERTILIZER TONNAGE PURCHASED FOR USE ON DIFFERENT CROPS WITH CREDIT FROM THE CREDIT AGRICOLE EGYPTIEN, 1933–1939

Year	*Wheat*	*Beans*	*Cotton*	*Rice*	*Maize*
1933	28,834	297	10,036	96	9,543
1934	42,841	1,509	35,318	952	19,163
1935	49,524	2,728	40,099	4,515	25,331
1936	37,482	1,425	54,653	5,449	22,331
1937	47,482	1,435	63,975	2,925	16,435
1938	44,895	1,413	60,070	5,425	19,014
1939	52,972	1,320	54,134	6,230	22,633

Source: Calculated from *Annuaire Statistique.*

or (2) large landowners. The law establishing the Credit Agricole Egyptien explicitly empowered the bank to sell fertilizer and seed to *all* cultivators, regardless of the size of their holdings. Large landowners also borrowed through the mechanism of cooperatives. Cooperative borrowings amounted to 20–29 per cent of the bank's loans for fertilizer from 1936 on. These cooperatives were dominated by large landlords, who used them to obtain fertilizer at the very low interest rates charged by the bank.[66]

The weight of the evidence suggests, then, that the small peasants did not use as much chemical fertilizer as did the large landlords. This appears consistent with the fact that peasant lands had probably been more subject to deterioration than those of the pashas. Further, there is evidence that the peasants feared using the Credit Agricole Egyptien. Mention is made of the 'complicated bank loan processes and restrictions'.[67] Second, peasants feared having their lands taken away, and mention is made of 'une certaine indulgence' among moneylenders toward the repayment of loans. The fact that payments on loans from the bank were collected by the state tax collection machinery at the same time as the land tax was collected no doubt contributed to peasant mistrust. The fellahin's fear and distrust of government institutions continued to play its role in the countryside.

Finally, since the peasants were probably *not* using as much fertilizer as the pashas, they would have had difficulty adopting earlier planting. Recall that if the numbers of cuts of birsim were not to be changed (and there is no evidence to suggest that peasants reduced the number of cuttings), then the adoption of earlier planting required changing birsim's place in the rotation. This, in turn, implied an increased need for nitrogen fertilizer. Since the peasants had relatively less nitrogen fertilizer than the pashas, the adoption of earlier planting would not have increased their yields to the same extent as earlier planting would have for the pashas. Of course, failure to adopt such planting would also have prevented their yields from advancing. Whichever alternative they chose, the peasants were likely to have had lower increases in yields than the pashas.

It appears, then, that the pashas' gross revenue from cotton grew more rapidly than did that of the small peasants. The changes in the percentage of land planted in cotton and in land per owner favoured the pashas. Because the pashas were getting at least as much fertilizer and were able to drain their lands more easily,

their yields probably increased more than those of small peasants. Pasha lands had also undergone less deterioration than had those of the peasants, and the pashas were better able to adopt the technique of earlier planting. It seems highly likely that the position of the small fellahin relative to the pashas was deteriorating.

What of the 'rich' peasants? Many middle proprietors adopted the two-year rotation before World War I; like small peasants, the percentage of their land planted in cotton presumably did not change. Likewise, land per 'middle proprietor' also seems to have been quite stable. The average holding for 5–10 feddan holders was 6.93 feddans in 1914, 6,84 in 1939; for 10–20 feddan holder, the averages are 13.8 and 13.6, and for 20–50 feddan holders, 30.5 and 30.1 in 1914 and 1939, respectively. Although there is no direct information on rich peasant yields, let us see whether any of the forces which prevented poor peasants from adopting the three major technical changes of the period constrained rich peasants as well. First, consider earlier planting. Recall that small peasants were prevented from adopting this technique because they needed to take extra cuttings of birsim to feed their animals. Here rich peasants were better off; small peasants, owning some 30 per cent of the land, owned roughly 50 per cent of the cows and buffaloes, while rich peasants, with 30 per cent of the land, held only 34 per cent of the work animals. Since the animal/land ratio was lower for rich peasants than for poor peasants, they would have had less reason, on the average, for taking extra cuttings of birsim and thereby delaying the planting date of cotton. Further, they could have changed the place of birsim in the rotation more easily, since as we shall see, it is likely that they could purchase nitrogen fertilizer more easily.

Drainage presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, because middle proprietors had switched to the two-year rotation before the war, their lands had probably undergone the same deterioration as had those of small peasants. On the other hand, rich peasants' lands were larger and their resources greater, so the problems of fixed costs and indivisibilities must have been less acute. Further, the larger size of their holdings meant that the rich peasants faced fewer costs and difficulties in arranging agreements on whose land would be traversed by drainage canals. And should such a problem have arisen, their considerable local political and social power, strengthened by their role in the electoral system, would have guaranteed a solution favourable to their interests. Since their lands were probably better drained than those of small peasants, the marginal physical product of fertilizer on their cotton fields would have been higher. This in turn, would have made its adoption more attractive to them. It was also easier for them to get credit. In the 1920s the Agricultural Bank made loans to holders of 5–10 feddan farms, and the Credit Foncier and the Egyptian Land Bank made loans to those holding ten feddans and more. The expansion of credit by the Credit Agricole Egyptien in the 1930s must also have helped them. They were eligible for the loans,[68] and their prominence in their localities would have ensured them favourable treatment by the cooperatives. If credit was more readily available to rich peasants fertilizer would have been cheaper, and we would expect them to have used more of it than did the poorer fellahin. It seems fair to conclude that the rich peasants' yields grew faster than those of small peasants. It is likely,

therefore, that the gap between rich and poor peasants widened in the interwar period.

The evidence suggests that these middle proprietors began to exploit their estates more directly in the interwar period. These proprietors relied heavily on share and cash rental systems before World War I. By 1939, however, some 73 per cent of lands held in farms of 5 to 50 feddans were exploited directly. Such a breakdown by farm size is not available from 1929, when 78 per cent of the total cultivated area was exploited directly. But there is evidence that the change came in the 1920s. First, from 1929 to 1939, there was hardly any change in the cultivated area which was exploited directly. Second, the census of 1917 lists 506,181 persons as 'cultivators of land on lease'. By 1929 that number had fallen to 234,687, although the population occupied in agriculture had increased from 2. 8 million to 3.5 million.[69] In 1937 the number had fallen again, to 210,384, while the agricultural work force grew to 4.28 million. The striking change clearly took place in the 1920s, when nearly 80 per cent of the total decline from 1917 to 1937 occurred. Sharecropping in particular seems to have declined. Although Saleh in 1922 described this system as the normal mode of exploitation for rich peasants, writers in the 1930s speak of the system as being 'very rare' or 'infrequent'.[70] At that time sharecropping seems to have been confined to poor or middling land where the rural population density was relatively low, such as in the Northern Delta or on Delta lands abutting the desert.[71] By 1939, when the agricultural census differentiated cash from share rents for the first time, 75 per cent of leased lands were rented for cash.[72] Share-cropping *(métayage)* was practiced, then, on only about 5 per cent of the cultivated area.

It would appear that the shift away from renting was toward some variety of wage-labour system, whether it was the *'izbah* system[73] or simply a straight cash wage system. The 1917 census lists 414,162 persons as 'agricultural labourers (wage earning)'; the 1927 census lists 1,435,214 as 'labourers'. Now, in view of the difficulties surrounding the 1917 census with respect to the definition of 'labourers' as well as the probability that agricultural labourers were often drafted into service in World War I, it is helpful to compare the data from 1927 with those of 1907. In 1907, 832, 785 workers were listed as 'ouvriers et domestiques de ferme'. Thus, from 1907 to 1927, the number of 'paid workers' rose some 80 per cent while the population occupied in agriculture grew by only 46 per cent. It would appear, then, that a shift out of renting, and especially out of sharecropping, into the *'izbah* system or some other form of direct exploitation occurred between 1907 and 1927, probably between 1917 and 1927.

The picture of relative and absolute deterioration in the position of those on the bottom of rural society is unrelieved when one looks at the situation of the landless agricultural workers. We have seen that the share of wages remained constant, while the share of rents fell. The course of wage rates is shown in Table 10. In general, nominal wage rates were fairly steady in the 1920s and fell sharply in the Depression. Of course, much of the fall can be attributed to the collapse of the prices of agricultural commodities which occurred in the early 1930s (see Table 10). Given the very spotty nature of the data, we may conclude that the trend of this (deflated) wage was either roughly constant or slightly upward. This is consistent with the pattern of agrarian technical change in this period. Drainage, earlier planting and fertilizer were all labour-using techniques.

TABLE 10 NOMINAL WAGES, MAIZE PRICES AND REAL WAGES, 1900–1938

Year	*Wage Rate (£E/day)*	*Price of Maize (£E/ardeb)*	*$^{w}/Pm$ (ardeb/day)*	*Price of Cotton (£E/cantar)*	*$^{w}/Pc$ (cantars/day)*
1920	.07–.08	2.0592	.034–.039	5.9916	.012–.013
1922	.04–.05	1.1619	.034–.043	5.3343	.0075–.0094
1927	.05	1.1127	.045	5.1560	.0097
1928	.045	1.1695	.038	4.4954	.010
1931	.04	0.7749	.052	1.7506	.023
1932	.03	0.5902	.051	2.2337	.014
1933	.025	1.0427	.024	2.2791	.011
1937		1.0733		2.1536	
1938	.03	n.a.	.028		.014

Source: Wage rates, see Table 2, Maize Prices, Cotton prices, Annuaire Statistique. (lardeb= 5.444 bushels)

The increased cropping intensity and especially the increase in the percentage of land planted in cotton also increased the demand for labour. Finally, the area planted in rice, another labour intensive crop, more than doubled from 188,788 feddans in 1920/24 to 401,613 feddans in 1935/37. At the same time, the supply of labour also increased. First the population occupied in agriculture rose from 2. 82 million in 1917 to 3.5 million in 1927 to 4.28 million in 1937.

It should be emphasised that a large percentage of these people were seeking wage work. First, as fragmentation proceeded, increasing numbers of peasants had to enter the market as wage workers. Second, land losses for debt and especially for failure to pay taxes continued in the interwar period. Until 1926, if a peasant accumulated more than £E 2 in tax arrears, he lost his land. In that year the level of arrears for which land was to be seized was reduced to £E 1. From 1927 to 1937, some 44,000 fellahin lost their lands.[74] The early years of the depression under the Sidqi government seem to have been especially bad, when tax collectors revived the use of the *kirbaj* and forced the peasants to sell cattle, implements, and land to pay the taxes.[75] There was resistance to such ruling class violence,[76] but it was never organised on any scale. Law Number 65 of 1942 legalized industrial trade unions but forbade the organization of agricultural workers. By that time there were at least one-and-a-half million landless peasants.[77] To this number should be added the 1.75 million who held less than one feddan. Actually, we should add all of those who held less than three feddans, the minimum necessary for self-sufficiency. Such figures are not available, however. Given that the average holding in the 1–5 feddan class was 2. 10 in 1920 and also in 1930, and had fallen to 2.05 feddans by 1938, it seems reasonable to suppose that any upward bias in the number of 0–1 feddan holders is more than offset by the exclustion of a large number of fellahin holding between one and three feddans who would also have been seeking wage work. Overall, more than 75 per cent of the rural population had too little land to live on and had to enter the market for labour, increasing the supply of labour.[78]

The situation of these landless and land poor was grim indeed in the interwar period. A relevant index would be the wage deflated by the price of maize. As Table 10 shows, real wages fell sharply in the Depression. In addition, per capita

consumption of the principal foodstuffs declined in the 1930s after a rise in the 1920s.[79] There is certainly no evidence to indicate that such deficiencies were made good by consuming other sorts of food. Even small peasants owning some land often sold the butter, milk, and cheese produced by their livestock as well as any eggs, rather than consume them themselves. In any case, production was low: in 1929, 1.7 gallons of fresh milk for fresh consumption per person were produced; the figures for butter and cheese are 2.6 and 3.3 pounds per person, respectively. Egg production was 2 dozen per person per year. Apparently, rural consumption of eggs was about 50 per cent that of the urban population, and people in the countryside consumed from two-thirds to three-quarters less meat than city dwellers. Further, in the rural sector, more than 66 per cent of the population consumed less than the rural average.[80]

As a consequence, malnutrition was widespread. A study by the Cairo University Medical School in the 1930s estimated that peasant diets lacked 20 per cent of necessary proteins.[81] Pellagra affected perhaps one-third of the Delta population,[82] which is not surprising given that the bulk of the peasants' food was corn bread.

> It is associated with a corn (maize) diet and is primarily due to a dietary deficiency of niacin. Although corn has more niacin than some other staple foods, it seems that this is not all utilized, most likely because it is in a bound form unavailable to the body. The human body can convert the amino acid tryptophan into niacin…the main protein in corn is zein which is very low in tryptophan content.[83]

It is interesting to note that there is a vegetable source of niacin-beans[84]but, per capita consumption of this food fell sharply in the interwar period. These nutritional problems were aggravated by the synergistic effects which exist between protein and vitamin deficiencies and the parasitical diseases bilharzia (schistosomiasis) and anklyostoma, diseases which continued unabated in the interwar period.[85]

CONCLUSION

The interwar period saw further intensification of Egyptian agriculture. Much of the technical change, especially the extension of drainage, was an attempt to undo the effects of British hydraulic policy and peasant crop rotation choice on land fertility. This was essential, not only for its impact on yields directly, but also because the main cash crop, cotton, was *more* responsive to fertilizer on well-drained land than on land which had undergone deterioration from inadequate drainage. Closer spacing and earlier planting were also attempts to remedy problems caused by earlier technical changes. Insofar as perennial irrigation, the increased use of water, and the increased number of plants per feddan per season characteristic of the two-year rotation fostered the growth of pests, attempts to hasten the maturity of plants and to avoid these attacks were

responses to earlier, *produced* production problems. The same may be said for the increased use of nitrogen fertilizer to hasten plant growth. The nature of technical change in the interwar period supports Owen's contention that 'much of the investment in the agricultural sector between the two wars was necessary to repair damage already done to soil fertility.'[86]

Yet despite increased drainage, more farm animals, improved water supply, and large scale imports of chemical fertilizers, the growth of yields could not compensate for the fall in land per person during this period. The real problem in Egypt was the production of high quality land, and previous events had made this difficult and costly. The technical changes managed to increase the demand for labour just enough to keep pace with the growth of population. Despite all this, by 1940 output per worker in agriculture was still below the 1914 level. Although the situation appears to have been improving in the late 1930s,[87] in the interwar era Egypt was experiencing a kind of agricultural involution.

This is a gloomy picture, It becomes more gloomy still when one turns to distribution. The technical changes of this period either maintained the pre-existing distribution (with respect of wage earners), or worsened it (between large and small farmers). The changes did little to affect the strength of moneylenders in the villages. Government credit policy, directed by the interests of the pashas, probably weakened the moneylenders' position somewhat, but it hardly eliminated them. Government price policy probably hurt the landless, for by protecting the price of wheat, a crop with low labour requirements, it not only contributed to a weakening of the demand for labour directly, but also indirectly by inducing imports of labour-saving machinery. The government's cotton price policy would have had the same effect, but it was ineffective in reducing cotton acreage. On the other hand, these adverse effects of price policy were almost certainly offset by the increased demand for labour which followed from the government extension of drainage.

One can usefully compare Egypt's interwar experience with the presentday 'Green Revolution'. In both cases the technical changes were a 'package' of new techniques which embodied certain indivisibilities and increased the demand for labour. In both cases the rich farmers benefited more than the small, in part because of indivisibilities, but more importantly because of their greater wealth and better access to credit and government largesse. In both cases, the position of the landless deteriorated despite the higher demand for labour which the new techniques implied. In Egypt this was primarily the result of the impact of the international depression, while in the Green Revolution areas of South and Southeast Asia tractor mechanization eliminates at least as many jobs as the new seeds create.[88] Further, the changes in Egypt were an attempt to repair past damage and to cope with the consequences of past actions. Only at the end of the period did they make possible an increase in land productivity; this increase was sufficient to offset the rise in the population density, so agricultural labour productivity fell. This is, of course, unlike the Green Revolution experience.

On the other hand, it closely resembles the current problems of Egyptian agriculture. Perhaps 70 per cent of the most productive lands in the country are afflicted with drainage problems, and the country is losing roughly 20,000 feddans a year to urban encroachment. The installation of tile drainage, financed

by the World Bank, as well as such potential changes as shifting more lands to high value, high employment generating crops like vegetables, may well simply repair past damage and prevent further deterioration of agricultural productivity and rural real wages rather than actually increasing them. Recent attempts to extend the cultivation of higher yielding varieties of maize have been frustrated: small peasants have to strip the leaves off of the plants to feed their buffaloes, thereby lowering yields, just as their grandfathers could not adopt earlier planting of cotton. The principal difference between the current problems and those of the interwar years is that there is much less room for further intensification of cropping and of yield increase because land use and land yields are already near the frontier of modern agricultural production possibilities.

Finally, one should note the increasing strength of the position of the well-to-do peasantry. They not only increased their revenues relative to small peasants, but they also increased their control and supervision of their work force. Their role in the electoral system reinforced their economic position. The interwar period saw the consolidation and strengthening of this group, a process which continued under the Nasser regime.[89]

NOTES

1. See, for example, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment: 1922–1936,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977; Marius Deeb, 'Bank Misr and the Emergence of the Local Bourgeoisie in Egypt', and Robert L.Tignor, The Egyptian Revolution of 1919: New Directions in the Egyptian Economy', both in Elie Kedourie, ed., *The Middle Eastern Economy: Studies in Economics and Economic History.* London: Frank Cass&Co., 1976.
2. In Arabic we have the important work of 'Asim Dasuqi, *Kibar mullak al-aradi al-zira'iyya wa dawruhum fi'l mujtama' al-misri* (Cairo, 1973). He concentrates primarily on land ownership patterns and the political activities of the large landlords and does not discuss the agricultural developments of the period in any detail. He demonstrates that large landowners made significant investments in industry; the thrust of this article supports his contention that large landowners were calculating 'economic men', not passive rent collectors.
3. See Patrick O'Brien, The Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production in Egypt: 1821–1962', in P.M.Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt,* London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 188 ff.
4. The manner by which these techniques spread supports the 'inducement hypothesis' of technical diffusion. See, e.g., Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan, *Agricultural Development: An International Perspective.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974.
5. See, e.g., A.Azim Abul-Atta, The Conversion of Basin Irrigation to Perennial Systems in Egypt', in E.Barton Worthington, ed., *Arid Land Irrigation in Developing Countries: Environmental Problems and Effects,* N.Y., 1976, 99–105, and U.S. Department of Agriculture cooperating with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture, *Egypt, Major Constraints to Increasing Agricultural Productivity.* U.S.D.A. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 120.

6. I have discussed these changes in detail in Technical and Social Change in Egyptian Agriculture, 1890–1914', *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 26, 4 (July, 1978) 725–745.
7. Cotton yields fell steadily from 5.47 cantars per feddan in 1895–99 to 3.58 in 1915–19. The recovery of the 1920s was interrupted in the early 1930s, but by the eve of World War II they had recovered to 5.20 cantars/feddan. See *Annuaire Statistique* for data.
8. A.E.Crouchley, *The Economic Development of Modern Egypt.* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938, 157–60; V.M.Mosseri, 'La fertilité de l'Egypte', *L'Egypte Contemporaine* 17 (1926), 93–124; G.P.Foaden and F.Fletcher, *Textbook of Egyptian Agriculture,* Cairo, National Printing Department, (1910), 2:337.
9. Fallow lasted roughly from March to November under the basin system, from June to October under the 3-year rotation of perennial irrigation, and from mid-May to mid-July under the 2-year system. Mosseri, pp. 116–24. Samir Saffa 'Exploitation économique at agricole d'un domaine rural egyptien', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 40 (1949), 326. See Richards, op. cit., pp. 728–30 for a fuller discussion and other references.
10. This was done after the land reforms of the 1950s. See Gabriel Saab, *The Egyptian Agrarian Reform.* London: Oxford University Press, 1967, 33–4.
11. S.Avigdor, "L'Egypte Agricole', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 21 (1930); E.Minost, 'L'action contre la Crise', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 22 (1931); L.Jullien, 'Chronique Agricole de l'année 1927', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 18 (1927).
12. V.Israel, 'Le problème du blé en Egypte', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 20 (1929), 251; *Géographie du bassin du Nil,* F.A.L.des écoles chrétiennes; M.Cassoria, 'Chronique de l'année 1922', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 14 (1923), 148.
13. Ministry of Agriculture, *L'Egypte Agricole,* Cairo, p. 21.
14. Saab, op. cit., Ch.2.
15. A.Lambert 'Divers modes de faire valoir des terres en Egypte', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 29 (1938); *L'Egypte Indépendante.* La group des études d' Islam. Paris: Centre d'études d'Islam, 1937, 289–90.
16. Calculated from *Agricultural Census,* 1939, 12–13.
17. For a more detailed analysis of Egyptian rural production systems in this period, see my 'Land and Labor on Egyptian Cotton Farms, 1880–1940'. *Agricultural History,* 52, 4 (October, 1978).
18. Of course, the relevant question is not whether the removal of constraints on production raised revenue alone, but whether it raised revenue by more than it raised costs. There are two points worth noting in this context: 1) Part of the cost of drainage was borne by the government, and 2) there seems to have been economies of scale in its installation and use. Both of these points are discussed in the text below.
19. Ibrahim 'Amr, *Al-Ard wa'l-fallah: al-mas'alah al-zira'iyya fi Misr.* (Cairo, 1958), 130.
20. A.C.Crouchley, op. cit.
21. Egypt, *La Loi sur les Digues et Canaux.* Decret de 1905.
22. R.R.Platt and Muhammad Hefny, *Egypt: A Compendium,* N.Y.: American Geographical Society, 1958, 18.
23. William L.Balls, *Egypt of the Egyptians,* London: Sir I.Pitman and Sons, 1915, 157.
24. Egypt, *La Legislation en Matière Immobilière en Egypte.*

25. L.Jullien, op. cit.
26. Crouchley, op. cit.
27. There is, of course, the possibility of peasant cooperation to solve the problem within a given village. Although there is some testimony about peasant's exchanging labour services, when it came to issues involving land, they seem to have been highly individualistic and noncooperating. The Egyptian village is not a community in the social sense, not an organism, but a mass.' Henry Habib Ayrout, *The Egyptian Peasant.* J.A.Williams, trans. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, 113. However this externalities problem should not be overstated. Since the lateral flow of water was impeded by Egyptian soil conditions in the Delta, drainage of the individual plot could improve land quality to some extent even if his neighbours did nothing. See E.Catzeflis, 'Le drainage des terres humides et salées du Delta égyptien', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 6 (1915–16), 307–42.
28. M.Saleh, op. cit., 21–2.
29. Abdel-Mawia Basheer, *Approaches to the Economic Development of Agriculture in Egypt,* unpub. Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1961.
30. William Cleland, *The Population Problem in Egypt;* Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press Printing Co., 1936. Samir Saffa, op. cit., 396. Even today there are numerous labour, materials, and transportation bottlenecks impeding the installation of tile drainage. See U.S.D.A., F.A.E.R., No. 120,86.
31. D.S.Gracie, Ministry of Agriculture, *Technical and Scientific Service Bulletin No. 152,* Cairo: 1935.
32. William Balls, *Yields of a Crop.* London: E. & F.N. Spon, 1953, 62.
33. See, for instance, *ibid.*, 11.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, *Agricultural Census of Egypt, 1939,* 102. The number of buffaloes rose from 645,537 in 1921 to 956,036 in 1937; cattle, from 595,964 to 983,219, for the same years. *Annuaire Statistique.*
36. F.A.L. des écoles chrétiennes, op. cit.
37. J.Anhoury, 'Les grandes Lignes de l'Economie agricole de l'Egypte', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 32 (1941).
38. Saffa, op. cit.
39. V.M.Mosseri, 'La Fertilité de l'Egypte', op. cit., 113.
40. I.E.Nagy, *Die Landwirtschaft in heutigen Aegypten und ihre Entwicklungsmoeglichkeiten.* Vienna: Scholle-Verlag, 1936, 67.
41. M.Schanz, op. cit., 68.
42. William Balls, *Yields of a Crop,* Figure 51.
43. Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, *La Culture du Coton en Egypte.* Cairo, 1950, 95.
44. Hefnawi, 'Manuring of Vegetables', Ministry of Agriculture, *Miscellaneous Publications:* Balls, Gracie, and Khalil, Ministry of Agriculture, *Technical and Scientific Service Bulletin No. 249,* 24.
45. D.S.Gracie, Bulletin No. 152, 7.
46. Balls, *Yields of a Crop,* 69.
47. E.Dudgeon, 'Cotton Cultivation in Egypt', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 1923, 529.
48. Hefnawi, op. cit.
49. Gracie, Bulletins No. 152, No. 249, op. cit. esp., 152, 32.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.,* No. 249, 31.

52. *Ibid.,* 24, 31.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.,* pp. 19–20.
55. Gracie, No. 152, p. 32.
56. Buffaloes increased 48 per cent, cattle by 65 per cent, cropped area by 3–5 per cent, and a rural population by 50 per cent, from 1920 to 1937. *Annuaire Statistique* and *Agricultural Census of Egypt.*
57. H.Ammar, *Growing up in an Egyptian Village.*
58. Schanz, op. cit., 37; Saffa, op. cit., 306–307.
59. Formally, let

$$Y_i = \frac{pQ_i^c}{T_i c} \frac{T_i^c}{T_i^*} \frac{T_i^*}{N_i}$$

Y_i = per capita gross cotton revenue;
Q_i^c = quantity of cotton;
T_i^c = land area planted in cotton;
T_i^* = total cultivated area;
N_i = population;
P = price of cotton (assumed to be the same for both peasants and pashas);
i = p, f, where p = pashas, f = fellahin or peasants;
Q^c/T^c = cotton yields;
T^c/T^* = percentage of land in cotton, a measure of the rotation system;
T/N = average land ownership per capita, each for the respective class.

We wish to examine what happened in this period to the ratio of the gross cotton revenues of the pashas (Y) to the gross cotton revenues of the peasants (Y_f), a proxy measure for the inequality of cotton incomes between the two classes. Since the revenues for each class are identical with the products shown in the expression above, it follows that the change in the inequality of cotton revenues is proxied by the movements in the terms on the right, dividing their values for pashas by their values for peasants. Thus the change in inequality of cotton revenues is equal to the percentage change in the amount of land planted in cotton plus the percentage change in per capita landholdings, all for the pashas, *minus* the percentage change in yield for the peasants, the percentage change in the amount of land planted in cotton, and the percentage change in land held per person, all for the peasants.

60. Further, there was, of course, a qualitative difference in the impact of fragmentation on peasants and pashas. For large numbers of peasants, fragmentation wrought fundamental changes in their lives. If a peasant held less than three feddans he could not support his family and had to enter either the land market, trying to rent a parcel, or, more likely, the labour market. In either case he entered into relations of dependency and lost a significant degree of decision making power over his work.
61. *L'Egypte Indépendante,* 283. The calculation of net revenue does not include amortization costs on implements and livestock.
62. M.H.Abbas, *The Role of Banking in the Economic Development of Egypt,* Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1954, 109.
63. Balls, Cracie, and Khalil, *Ministry of Agriculture Technical and Scientific Service Bulletin No. 249.*
64. *L'Egypte Indépendante,* 284.
65. See Gabriel Baer, *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1800–1950.* London: Oxford University Press, 1962 for a discussion of this point. No more than

13 per cent of peasants owning less than five feddans ever borrowed from the Credit Agricole Egyptien during the 1930s. See *Annuaire Statistique.*

66. Platt, 'Land Reform in Egypt', *A.I.D. Spring Review of Land Reform,* 1970, 18; Abbas, op. cit., 105; Ayrout, op. cit.; Joseph Zannis, *Le Credit Agricole en Egypte.* (Paris, 1937).
67. Ghonemy, op. cit., 64.
68. E.Minost, *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 1930, 348–9. At first only individuals holding forty feddans and under could receive loans from the Credit Agricole Egyptien, but this was later raised to ninety, and finally to two hundred feddans in 1937. Abbas, op. cit., 103–4.
69. *Agricultural Census, 1939,* pp. 12–13; *Annuaire Statistique.*
70. *L'Egypte Indépendante,* p. 293. Lambert, 'Divers Modes…
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Agricultural Census, 1939,* p. 18.
73. The most commonly used system was one in which year round workers, *(tamaliyya)* were paid largely by granting them the use of a parcel of land to plant their maize, a parcel which rotated with the crop rotation of the estate. In return they worked in the owners' cotton fields at a reduced wage. For a more extended discussion see my 'Land and Labor on Egyptian Cotton Farms', op. cit.
74. L.A.Hugh-Jones, The Economic Condition of the Fellahin', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 20 (1929), 410–11. Ayrout, op. cit., 24.
75. 'Amr, op. cit., 132.
76. M.F.Elkaisy Pasha, The Public Security in Egypt in 1927', *L'Egypte Contemporaine,* 19 (1928), 23–4; *L'Egypte Indépendante,* 290.
77. Husni Husayn,' 'Ummal al-tarahil fi-l-ard al-jadidah,' *Al-Tali'a, 7,* 1 (Jan., 1971), 21; Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East,* London: Oxford University Press, 1948, 34. Indeed, this number may be much too low: Mahmoud Abdel Fadil gives a figure of 4.4 million landless in 1939. *Development, Income Distribution, and Social Chang in Rural Egypt (1952–1970).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 5.
78. Of course, they also entered the market for land, trying to rent small parcels. But we have seen that most lands were exploited directly. However labour was remunerated, the rise in the number of peasants who did not own enough land to live on contributed to the increase in the supply of labour to the pashas and rich peasants.
79. Per capita consumption of maize (defined as production plus imports less seed and exports moved from 121.38 kg. in 1920–24 to 130.96 in 1925–29 to 112.72 in 1930–35 to 98.2 in 1935–37. *Annuaire Statistique.*
80. Anthony Galatoli, *Egypt in Midpassage,* (Cairo, 1950), 44; Jacques Berque, *Histoire Sociale d'un Village Egyptien,* (Paris, 1957) 32–33. El Zalaki, op. cit., pp. 250ff Galal Amin, *Food Supply in Relation to Economic Development, with Special Reference to Egypt,* (London, 1966) 63–64.
81. *Ibid.* (Galal Amin).
82. *Ibid.,* quoting W.H.O. and F.A.O. sources; M.B.Ghali, *The Policy of Tomorrow,* (Washington, D.C., 1953), 42.
83. Michael C.Latham, et. al., *Scope Manual on Nutrition,* (Kalàmazoo, Michigan, 1970), 41.
84. *Ibid.,* 72

85. Jacques May, *The Ecology of Malnutrition in the Far and Near East,* (N.Y. 1961), 652.
86. E.R.J.Owen, 'Agricultural Production in Historical Perspective', in P.Vatikiotis, ed., *Egypt Since the Revolution.* N.Y.: Praeger, 1968, 65.
87. O'brien, op. cit., 188.
88. There is an immense literature on this subject. See, e.g., William Bartsch, *Employment and Technical Choice in Asian Agriculture.* N.Y.: Praeger, 1977, and International Labour Office, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia.* Geneva: I.L.O., 1977.
89. Cf.Abdel Fadil, op. cit., and Samir Radwan, *Agrarian Reform and Rural Poverty: Egypt, 1952–1975.* Geneva: I.L.O., 1977.

The Dilemma of a Liberal Some Political Implications in the Writings of the Egyptian Scholar, Ahmad Amin (1886–1954)

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The failure of liberal parliamentary institutions to take effective hold and survive in most countries in the Middle East, as indeed in most countries of the Third World, is an all too familiar fact. In 1963 Bernard Lewis commented that after the First World War 'constitutions and parliaments spread all over the Middle East in what seemed a universal triumph of liberal and democratic principles. Today this great experiment must be written off as an almost complete failure…. In Egypt, which has the longest and, on the whole, the most successful record of parliamentary government in the Arab world, the abandonment of the Western form of representative, liberal democracy was most final and most complete.'[1] Not too much has happened since then to reverse this judgment. Nevertheless, the present regime in Egypt has taken some steps toward increasing the freedom of expression of opinion and reintroducing a multiparty system, so as perhaps to justify a hope that Lewis was not guilty of purely wishful thinking when he further commented, The fight for political freedom has been fought and lost-though as an old-fashioned liberal I find it hard to believe that such a defeat can ever be final.'[2]

Lewis and many others have sought to discover and set forth the reasons for this failure, and it is not the purpose of this paper to review all of these reasons. The fact and its consequences are important enough, however, that there would seem room for a presentation of any material that might shed further light on it. It is my intention to do this by examining the writings of one of the leading liberal intellectuals of the parliamentary period of Egyptian history, Ahmad Amin (1886–1954),[3] in whose writings I believe that we can see an indication of the dilemma that confronted liberal thinkers in Egypt in his time and adumbrations of what was to come after 1952.

Briefly, I shall argue that although Ahmad Amin's liberal convictions were clear and undeniable, his lack of faith in the public opinion of his nation led him to a highly directive concept of political leadership that, in the context of the political situation of the time, boded ill for liberal parliamentary government. Contributing to this also were a strongly moralistic attitude and a'technological' model of government. To the extent that he reflected or influenced the educated public opinion of his time—and he did both—this effort may help us to understand better one of the reasons for the failure. To the extent his way of thinking is still prevalent in Egypt—the men of his generation were the teachers

of the generation that rules today—it may help us to evaluate the prospects for re-establishment of liberal democratic forms in the foreseeable future.

Ahmad Amin's life was in some ways a paradigm of the experience of modern Egypt. Born into the family of an Azhar *shaykh,* his early upbringing and education were very much in the traditional mould, but over the first half of his lifetime he was gradually and effectively introduced to Western ideas and transferred his sympathies and associations from the traditional to the westernizing sectors of Egyptian society. Crucial to this development was the fifteen years (1907–22) that he spent as a student and then a teacher at the school for *shar'i* judges *(Madrasat al-qada'),* which was established under the influence of Muhammad Abduh and sought to introduce prospective *qadis* to modern ideas as well as training them in traditional lore. Here he became familiar with European and particularly English ethical and social thought, and during this period he developed close ties with those of his own generation who had studied in England or France, although he himself was not to visit Europe until he was well over forty. He was actively involved in the Egyptian struggle for independence, 1919–1922, and his transition to the westernizing sector of society was completed when in 1926, at the suggestion of Taha Husayn, he accepted a position teaching Arabic and Islamic literature at the Egyptian University (now the University of Cairo), where he remained until his retirement in 1946.[4]

He devoted much of his time to propagating the new ideas and seeking ways to integrate them with more traditional Islamic ways of thinking. He was chairman of the influential committee on authorship, translation, and publication *(Lajnat al-ta' lif, wa-l-tarjama wa-al-nashr),* and wrote a popular series of books on the cultural history of the first four centuries of Islam, which represented the first such effort by an Arabic-speaking Muslim to use the insights of western orientalists.[5] From 1933 until the end of his life he wrote short articles regularly for such popular periodicals as the monthly *al-Hilal* and the literary magazines *al-Risala* and *al-Thaqafa.* He was editor of the last of these during most of its life-span (1939–53) and contributed something to it almost weekly. Most of the material discussed below is drawn from these articles. In his last years he was one of the elder statesmen of Egyptian letters and, in spite of increasingly poor health, continued to be quite active until his death in 1954.

He withdrew from involvement in partisan politics after 1922, directing his effort rather to literature, history, and general moral and social concerns. Nevertheless, he did deal with political matters in a general way and from time to time proffered advice to the politicians. For him the political leader was, or at least ought to be, a leader of social reform, and he was very much interested in this aspect of his task. Moreover, his party preferences are at least identifiable. He favoured Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafd at first and then the Sa'dist party, probably from its inception in 1938.[6]

Among the liberal political convictions prominent in his writing are a concern for the freedom of expression of unpopular opinions, faith in democracy, and a commitment to parliamentary institutions. The first of these is evident from his support of Taha Husayn in the controversies over the latter's book on pre-Islamic poetry that aroused so much conservative antagonism. Although he was hardly in the forefront of the action, his committee on authorship published the revision of this book in 1927, and later he supported Taha Husayn in the face of the latter's

dismissal from the university in 1931.[7] Echoes of the struggle appear in an article published in 1933, when he notes that one of the obstacles to modernization in the East is the danger to which its proponents expose themselves when they speak openly.[8] Two years later he wrote that although more and more was being written there was less and less genuine and constructive criticism and suggested that one reason for this may be 'politics—God combat it!' Politics has meddled in literature, he continued, with the result that 'men could not distinguish between the scales of politics and the scales of literature, and that spoiled both literature and [literary] criticism.'[9]

His concern for freedom of opinion was also manifested in his reaction to the Free Officers' coup d'état of 1952, which he greeted on the whole with cautious optimism. He expressed concern that not enough opposition was being voiced to government policies: 'We have all become drummers and pipers, and that is… regrettable, for healthy life is built on two opposing bases,…support and opposition.'[10] In August 1953, in an article hailing the establishment of the Republic, he noted the danger of a government that is republic in name and tyranny in fact, and stated that a sound republic needs newspapers, writers, and a public opinion that is not afraid to criticize the government when necessary.[11]

The word 'democracy' not only appears frequently in Ahmad Amin's writing but also represents one of the major elements in his value system. By 'democracy', which he once defined in Lincolnesque terms as 'government of the people, by the people, for the good of the people,' he meant primarily a concern for the common man, and he argued that in both literature and government the time of the common man had arrived. In an article on The Art of Government' published in September, 1937, which may be read as a warning to the politicians of the day, he argued that democratic government demands more precise organization than tyrannical government since it involves and seeks to serve more people. He further emphasised the necessity for the rulers to respond to the needs of the people, to sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of justice, and to lead the way in positive social reform, because people now demand both their rights and a share in government.[12]

That he saw the parliamentary institutions of his time as the appropriate channels for this democratic concern is also clear, although in most of his writing this is assumed rather than explicitly stated and argued. He hailed the re-establishment of regular parliamentary life at the end of the second world war[13] and when the coup d'état of 1952 resulted in the suspension of parliament, he was among those who called for an early return to parliamentary life on the grounds that parliament is a protection against governmental tyranny, that it is 'the natural state of things', and that it is the most just form of government.[14]

If, then, Ahmad Amin held these liberal convictions, what weaknesses can be discerned in his support of parliamentary democracy? Perhaps the most serious is the dilemma implicit in his attitude toward public opinion. He often stressed the need for an enlightened and aroused public opinion

> Nothing keeps a ruler from his tyranny like his seeing a nation that does not support the tyrant in his tyranny and a bold public opinion that is aware of justice and clearly expresses this awareness, and a people that analyzes his

> actions and criticizes and evaluates them. And a people cannot arrive at this stage except by enlightenment and education *(tathqif),* and I do not mean special academic education, but general education by the newspapers, magazines, radio, mosque, sermons and the like in the actual subjects it faces every day…[15]

In fact, he devoted much attention to such general education, not only through his articles but also through radio broadcasts and the establishment of an adult education programme called the Popular University.[16] Occasionally he manifested some degree of satisfaction in the progress that had been made in Egypt in his time. In January of 1945 he noted with satisfaction that the Arab public was reading more than ever before and that this would enable them to develop the public opinion that would lead to good government.[17]

Much more often, however, the emphasis was on the distance public opinion in the East must still travel before it would be prepared to play its proper role. We clearly see a less-than-optimistic evaluation of public opinion in the following comments on the problems of Taha Husayn and others:

> [Politics] interfered and helped the masses against the leaders and supported public opinion against the thinkers. The masses and public opinion would not have won in this manner if politics had stayed neutral.[18]

Moreover, the people of the East had been so long accustomed to autocracy that it would take a long time and a major educational effort for them to recognize their ability and right to play a role in government. This was a particularly frequent theme after the 1952 revolution. In August of 1952 he wrote that, having gotten rid of the king, people were still looking for someone they can treat as a king, and illustrated his point with a story of a lion that escaped his cage and then returned to it out of force of habit.[19] Later he wrote:

> How easy it is to change the externals and how hard it is to change the souls. We have revolted and changed many of the laws, but we are still in severe need of the reform of souls. For a long time we have sanctified the ruler and have looked upon him, as the late Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha said, the way a bird looks on a predator; we need to look on him as an older brother who raises his younger brother and guides him till he can stand on his own feet.
>
> In spite of all our reforms, most of them regrettably have not been absorbed by our spirits. We have abolished titles, but still use them when we speak…We have demolished aristocracy and revived democracy, but people inwardly still respect the aristocracy of wealth, position, and prestige and we still greatly need to understand the meaning of sound democracy. And this is natural, because it is impossible to change souls overnight and a long time is needed until they reject the old and become

> accustomed to the new, but what I fear is that they may move gradually back to the old rather than gradually abandoning it.[20]

Among his suggestions for the retraining of people's attitudes were the elimination of titles, the abolition of the distinction between first and second class on buses and trains, and the elimination of class distinctions in dress, although he thought the last 'will need generations'.[21] Ahmad Amin may have subscribed to Lincoln's ideal of 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people' but he did not share the faith in the wisdom of the common man implicit in another of Lincoln's statements, that 'you can fool all of the people some of the time; you can e ven fool some of the people all of the time; but you can't fool all of the people all of the time.'

It is consistent with this low evaluation of existing public opinion that he often emphasized the need for strong leadership. In July, 1934, he published an article entitled 'Flattery of the Leaders', in which he complained not that people flatter the leaders but that the leaders flatter the people and are more concerned to receive their applause than to provide true leadership. As a military commander is responsible for winning victories, not pleasing his soldiers, he argued, so each of the leaders of literature and science and the social reformers ought to 'have a goal that he aims at in his science, his literature, or his reform, and a programme that he wants to make men follow whether they wish it or not.'[22] The desire for highly directive leadership is striking in an article entitled 'Leaders of Opinion', published in 1947, which consists of an extended analogy between a national leader and the captain of a ship. 'The captain of a boat does not follow the desires or will of the passengers in deciding the speed or direction or how to enter or leave the port, but the science and laws of oceanography and what he sees as the welfare of the passengers, not what they want.'[23] Such leadership demands high moral qualities of the leader, particularly a willingness to put service to the people before his personal or partisan interests, a point which Ahmad Amin also frequently stressed. An article in 1946 on 'Leaders and Leadership' accurately sums his view of the qualities needed in leaders under four headings: (1) frankness and honesty; (2) moral courage to take unpopular stands when necessary; (3) practical intelligence and competence; (4) sympathy and compassion for his people.[24]

Of course, Ahmad Amin recognized that the political leader is more immediately beholden to the opinions of his constituents than the officer to his soldiers or the captain to his passengers, but given the absence of a sufficiently enlightened public opinion in the East, the leader has more of a responsibility to mould public opinion than he does to follow it. In an article written shortly before the 1952 coup he wrote that the leader should be a moral example and 'crystallize' the people's demand for justice. He should say, The aim of the nation is justice and order' and then 'should undertake such actions and establish such systems as will realize justice over a long period, until people are accustomed to it and revolt against the tyrant and his injustice…,'[25] It is to be noted here that the leader is not to wait until the people are fully aware of their desire for justice, nor is he to 'crystallize' all of their desires. It could be said, in

these terms, that the political leaders of the late 1920's and early 1930's were 'crystalizing' certain desires of the people when they persecuted Taha Husayn and others, but it is clear that Ahmad Amin never approved of this. The political leader must know the correct goals and selflessly lead people to see them.

In all of this there is a dilemma which Ahmad Amin did not seem to notice. Justice in government depends on an enlightened and effective public opinion, which will prevent it from acting tyrannically; yet it is precisely the governmental leaders who must play a key role in bringing such a public opinion into existence. In other words, the development of that which is to control governmental action depends in a great measure on the government which needs to be controlled. The dilemma is illustrated by his discussion of the nineteenth century Tunisian reformer, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi. In his second period in power Khayr al-Din had failed to re-establish representative government, arguing that the necessary conditions, the favour of the ruler or a strong public opinion demanding it, were not present. Ahmad Amin finds this argument weak however, 'for when the ministry was entrusted to him he was strong…and if he had absolutely refused to accept power without the representative system, the Bey would have had to accede to his demand, and in his term of office he could have kept it going until people became used to it and satisfied with it, and felt that it was an indispensable necessity.'[26] Ahmad Amin had criticized the old idea that 'government is ordained by fate, which, if it wishes will have mercy on the people and provide for them a just government and if it wishes will subdue them and provide an unjust government.'[27] but somehow one wonders what but an uncommonly benevolent fate could provide quite the combination of disinterested, enlightened, and forceful leadership that Ahmad Amin demands here.

This dilemma is, to be sure, as much a measure of the existing political and social situation as it is of any weakness in Ahmad Amin's thought. It is the reflection in terms of his ideas of the commonly recognized problem of how to develop liberal parliamentary institutions in a society whose historical background is so different from that of the western societies in which these institutions arose. Perhaps the most serious fault of Ahmad Amin at this point was his failure to recognize the dilemma. Failing to recognize it, he could not seek for a solution to it beyond describing the ideals of political leadership and urging the politicians to adhere to them, essentially the same approach as generations of classical Muslim writers before him.

In any case, it was clear enough to Ahmad Amin, as to nearly everyone else, that Egypt in his time did not have such leadership. He complained that the political parties lacked well-prepared and precise programmes for social reform,[28] and that in its extreme partisanship each party devoted most of its energy to gaining power and keeping others out rather than to working for the good of the nation as a whole, so that 'a ministry comes and begins a reform, and shortly it goes and another comes and tears down what it built and starts over again, and the building and the tearing down continue till not even a hut can be completed.'[29] The parties were based more on personalities than on principles, he felt, and each of the leaders thought he was the only one who could lead the nation, but in fact they pandered to people's desires rather than leading them.[30] Moreover, they disrupted education by using students in demonstrations they

were not willing to lead openly themselves.[31] He did not wish to see the parties eliminated but he did wish a thorough reform. In December of 1952 he wrote, 'it is necessary to clip the claws of the parties, restrict their power, cleanse them of unsavory elements, and form a sound parliament on new bases.'[32]

But why, the implicit question is, should a new parliament be formed? If the parliamentary system had failed to produce the needed kind of leadership, why not replace it with a different system? One might answer that it is required for democracy, which as we have seen, was a very important value for Ahmad Amin. But is this the case? His most extensive definition of democracy, part of which is quoted above, is as follows:

> What is the meaning of democracy? It is the government of the people, by the people, for the good of the people. It is the abolition of the domination of a particular class over the people as a whole. It is the removing of the obstacles in the way of the people's progress. It is the limitation of vast wealth and the abolition of degrading poverty. It is war against political and economic concessions. It is giving the individual the opportunity to develop his talents and powers according to his aptitude. It is to educate public opinion and to accustom it to keep watch over the government and to guide the rulers for the public good. It is a general spirit that rules the people and directs it to the good of the whole. It is the abolition of the slavery of individuals and nations, of the ignorance and passions that enslave individuals and of the exploitation and colonialism that enslave nations. It is a revolution against the enslavement of the many by the few, of nations by individuals, and of nations by nations.[33]

One notices that parliamentary institutions are not mentioned here. Rather, democracy means a concern for the common man and, at the political level, a willingness of the government to labour for his well being. Neither here nor elsewhere in his writing does Ahmad Amin explicitly link democracy with parliamentary government.[34] If, then, the parliamentary system is not in fact working for that popular welfare that stands at the heart of democracy, might not democracy be better served by some other system?

Ahmad Amin does not deal with the question as explicitly as this, but his writings suggest two answers. One is that parliament is a necessary means for the control of the government. In an article written on the occasion of the parliamentary elections of January, 1945, he notes that one of the functions of parliament is to keep the government under surveillance,[35] and once after the 1952 revolution, as mentioned earlier, he argued that a parliament is a protection against governmental tyranny.[36] The other answer—and I think the one more often implicit in his writing—is that parliamentary government is natural to man. In a short article in 1951 he compared the conflict of ideas within an individual's mind to that within a parliament and comments that this inner parliament has existed since Adam but that men have only recently gotten around to copying it at the social level and still have not perfected or completely understood it.[37]

Twice after the 1952 revolution, he argued for a return to parliamentary government on the grounds that it is 'the natural state of things.'[38] The first of these answers could be convincing il elaborated more,[39] but the second is hardly so, since neither ancient nor modern history supports that contention that parliamentary government is natural. By failing to connect parliamentary government clearly with 'democracy'—an indisputably central symbol and powerful concern for Ahmad Amin and for others—Ahmad Amin's writings fail to counter those who would argue that 'true' democracy does not involve liberal parliamentary forms.[40]

So far we have concerned ourselves with implications that could be drawn from Ahmad Amin's s writings, rather than any actual illiberal elements to be found in them. These are not totally absent, however, although they are relatively rare. Perhaps the concern over the absence of strong leadership reached this point occasionally. There is some evidence that this concern increased over the years. Several articles in the 1930's suggest relative complacency on this matter. Discussing the lack of 'great men at the time, he suggested that it was because people were now less deceived by counterfeit greatness, less willing to abase themselves before 'great' men.[41] Moreover, historical research has diminished the stature of many of the 'great' people of the past.[42] By contrast, in November of 1952 he complained that literature has tended to diminish the value of the great men of the past and cast doubt on their existence or greatness, and- create stories that ridicule men and society, but we expect that all that will end…and the writer will be filled with zeal, trying to build up resolution, not destroy it…'43 This is far from an espousal of a fascist 'leadership principle', but it suggests a greater concern for strong leadership.

Illiberal ideas are closest to the surface in some of what Ahmad Amin had to say about the relation between literature and society. While he was very much committed to freedom of speech and press, he was also concerncd that literature contribute to healthy social attitudes and educate people in the cause of social reform.

On one hand, literature should be 'a complete and truthful manifestation of [the nation's] social life in all its forms, in its seriousness and levity, in its members' childhood, maturity and old age, in its agencies and its hopes, its daily life and its home, its factory, its amusements houses and theatres, its political and economic life.'[44] On the other hand, 'not every truth is to be said,…for there are people whose nerves are sick, whose passions are sick, whose intellectual and social lives are sick, and it is dangerous to nourish these with kinds of literature that increase the turmoil of their nerves and passions, even though what is said is said with truth and sincerity. So it we demand that the writer say only what is truthful, we demand also…that he say only the truthful things that are consistent with the public welfare.'[45] A series of articles in 1944 on The Future of Arabic Literature'[46] in which he called for writers to serve the cause of social reform provoked a short running debate with Tawfiq al-Hakim in which the latter argued that Ahmad Amin's s suggestions would prostitute literature to materialistic or political goals, while Amin replied that Al-Hakim's s position ran the risk of social irresponsibility.[47] The illiberal possibilities discerned by Tawfiq al-Hakim are clearest in a short article published on August 11, 1952 under the title 'The

Revolution in Literature', which constituted Ahmad Amin's first explicit response to the events of July.

> Now that there has been revolution in politics, there needs to be a revolution in literature, for a political revolution always needs literature to help defend its principles, support its doctrines and explain its theories. This is what the Italian writers did in the revolution of Mussolini and the German writers in the revolution of Hitler and Abdullah Nadim in the revolution of Urabi, because the literature of the revolution serves it like the soldiers, for it reaches the hearts of the elite and the common people, and establishes its doctrines on firm foundations…This democracy requires long study and the writers are the most suitable men to explain it. The time has passed…when it was alleged that art was for art's sake. The prevailing view has come to be that art is in the service of society, and if not, it is not sound art. In short, the leaders of literature must do what the leaders of the army have done, each in his area of competence, and the service of literature to society is not less than the service of the army to it.[48]

It would hardly be fair to take this as typical, for, as we have seen, the writer in his view also has a responsibility to criticize the government when it is wrong and he was soon to voice a concern that the new government was not receiving enough criticism. Still, it does suggest conclusions that could be drawn from his general position. Nor are the references to Hitler and Mussolini totally atypical of his few references elsewhere to these men or their movements. I have seen no evidence that he ever sympathized with the Nazis or Fascists at the time, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, when many Egyptians did, but neither did he ever manifest passionate opposition to them. He was able, in a 1937 article, to present Hitler and Mussolini as evidence that contemporary political leadership is grounded in service to the people.[49]

The basic criterion for Ahmad Amin was moral. A writer or a politician should be supported if what he says is right—that is, conducive to the material and moral welfare of society—and opposed and restricted if it is wrong. This is, of course, neither unusual or novel, but it is particularly important for Ahmad Amin, who was first, last, and always a moralist. He had taught ethics at the School of Shar'i judges; his first published book was on ethics; and moral concerns run through most of his popular articles. Whatever doubts he may have had on religious, political, social, or scholarly matters, he never seems to have had doubts about his fundamental moral judgments. This kind of moral certainty applied to politics can have very illiberal implications if it is not counterbalanced by a healthy tolerance for views and actions that one considers immoral. His articles suggest that he had such a tolerance in the 1930's, but that it diminished in later years. In the later 1940's and early 1950's one can observe a noticeable increase in moral indignation in his writing. A good illustration of this is his treatment of the brilliant but profligate Abbasid poet, Abu Nuwas. In 1936 he wrote

an appreciative article on Abu Nuwas as a 'modernizing poet,'[50] but in *Yawm al-Islam,* published in early 1952, his only reference to him is a brief, sharp attack on his immorality.[51] In part this reflects personal factors, such as his poor health. In part, however, it also reflects the political situation: the obvious deterioration of the parliamentary political system in Egypt and the reluctance of the western nations to relinquish their colonial control of the East, a topic about which he wrote frequently during this period. His ideals for both international and Egyptian society seemed further from realization at this time than they had earlier, and this seems to have bred decreased tolerance for those persons and forces that opposed them. In this context, the 1952 revolution seemed an opportunity for a fresh start, and this undoubtedly explains his first response to it in The Revolution of Literature', quoted above. In Ahmad Amin this moral indignation did not go to extremes of intolerance, but it represents a tendency that, if carried far enough, could lead one (and certainly has led many) to reject parliamentary government and freedom of speech on the grounds that their results are morally wrong and socially disruptive.

Another element in Ahmad Amin's thought that carries illiberal potentialities is one that might be called 'technocratic'. Earlier I have noted an article in which Ahmad Amin compared the role of a national leader to that of a ship's captain. In this article he not only pointed out that the captain acts according to the welfare rather than the desires of the passengers, but also that he does so on the basis of his competence in such sciences as oceanography and meteorology. Likewise, he continues, for the political leader 'crowd psychology has become a science that must be known, the history of his country a record that must be read, and international politics a complicated science, indeed complicated sciences, that must be studied and understood.'[52] In one of a series of articles entitled 'To My Son', published in *al-Hilal* in 1950, he argued that students should stay out of politics because politics is now a 'science like the other sciences, like engineering, medicine, physics, and chemistry' for which one must be qualified by training and experience (a statement which stands in almost pathetic contrast to his attacks on the behaviour of the current political leaders in the same article).[53]

The model for Ahmad Amin's ideal of political leadership is in fact provided by the dedicated applied scientist—the doctor, the engineer, or the ship's captain —who, adhering to the ethics of his profession and making full use of his technical knowledge, labours for the benefit of those he serves. In such cases the specific decision about what is to be done depends more on the expert's technical knowledge than on the client's opinions, although these decisions must be in accord with the client's real (not necessarily perceived) needs; and he must be persuaded of their rightness to at least some extent.

This technological model is also evident in his conception of social reform. In an article on 'Modern Reform' he argued that while 'ancient reform' *(al-islah al-qadim)* limited itself to exhortation and command along with alms for the poor and prison for the criminal, 'modern reform' seeks to discover the basic causes of social problems and treat them. It can be said to use laboratories', like those of physics and chemistry, in which social phenomena are analysed to discover their causes, and the reformer is like a doctor who diagnoses the cause of society's sickness and prescribes the appropriate remedy.[54] This has, I believe, broad

implications. Ahmad Amin and other westernizers have, in fact, received two distinct models for social reform and government from the parliamentary democracies of the West, a 'liberal' model that assumes that the will of the people must be discovered and followed, and a 'technological' model that assumes the existence of 'experts' who know better than the majority of people what is the correct course of action. The former is based on the West's political experience but the value of the model is by no means self-evident to all people. Parliamentary government has not been historically the 'natural state of things', nor have all of its results been obviously beneficial. In non-western (and many Western) eyes, many of these results have looked like anarchy or moral corruption. Moreover, the West itself has provided competitors to the 'liberal' model, such as fascism and communism. By contrast, western science and technology have improved health, lengthened life, improved communications, produced previously undreamed of luxuries, and literally reached for the stars. These accomplishments are obvious to all. However much they differ on political ideologies, western fascists, liberals, and communists use essentially the same science and technology. That people should seek to use the clearly successful system as a model to solve social problems is hardly surprising. This is true enough in the West—witness 'scientific socialism' and, in their own ways, Walden II and Watergate. Ahmad Amin's reverence for science was at least as great as his reverence for political liberalism, and more regularly and insistently presented. That those who read him might have developed more of the former than the latter would hardly be surprising.

The material we have examined indicates the extent of the dilemma in which a person of Ahmad Amin's convictions found himself in the Egypt of the early 1950's. He had a vision of a rational, democratic society, a society whose leaders would work for the welfare of all its people using the most scientifically effective means at its disposal. One of the necessary guarantees of achieving and maintaining such a society is an enlightened and effective public opinion, one which both knows what its interests are and is prepared to insist on them. Unfortunately, however, public opinion in Egypt had not yet reached this point on either count. It needed to be educated, and it needed leaders who would educate it, leaders who would be 'experts' in the science of governing and whose moral commitment would lead them to work for the welfare of the people. But the existing parliamentary system was not producing this kind of leadership. While Ahmad Amin himself was committed to parliamentary government, this commitment was not too clearly integrated with other, more obvious central ones. Thus it would not be surprising if one who shared all the other aspects of his thinking except this would conclude either that some other system would be more consistent with the welfare of the people, or at least that the parliamentary system ought to be suspended until such time as the people were better prepared to make it work. The action of the revolutionary leaders in January 1953, in dissolving the political parties and declaring a three-year period during which the Revolutionary Command Council would rule was consistent with the latter line of thinking and the actual development of events with the former. Whether the present government is in the process of deciding that the people are finally prepared for another try at parliamentary democracy remains to be seen.[55]

In any case, the development of events since 1953 has not been inconsistent with at least significant elements in the thought of one of the liberal spokesmen of the previous era.

NOTES

1. *The Middle East and the West,* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964, p. 56.
2. Ibid., p.69.
3. Ahmad Amin is one of seven 'liberal intellectuals' singled out for study by Nadav Safran in *Egypt in Search of Political Community,* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961, ch. 9ff.
4. For Ahmad Amin's life see his autobiography, *Hayati* (Fourth Printing, Cairo, 1961).
5. *Fajr al-Islam* (Cairo, 1929), *Duha al-Islam* (3 vols., Cairo, 1933, 1935, 1936), and *Zuhr al-Islam* (4 vols., Cairo, 1945, 1952, 1954, 1955).
6. An accurate measure of his relation to party politics is the fact that he was asked, and declined, to become editor of the Sa'dist party organ in 1946. (*Hayati,* pp. 319–20).
7. In *Hayati* he claims that this, along with his general opposition to the politicians in power at the time, prevented his attaining the rank of full professor and prevented his receiving a doctorate on the basis of his published works (pp. 283–6). He did attain the full professorship in 1936, the year that the Wafd returned to power and Taha Husayn to the university.
8. *Al-Hilal,* November 1,1933.
9. *Fayd al-Khatir,* I, 359 (*Al-Risala,* June 1, 1936). Most of Ahmad Amin's articles were collected in the ten volumes of *Fayd al-Khatir* (Cairo, 1938–1955). In addition to the reference in this work I shall also give, where I have it, the name and date of the periodical in which it first appeared.
10. *Fayd,* IX, 119–122.
11. *Fayd,* IX, 123–126 (*Al-Hilal,* August, 1953).

11a. *Fayd,* 111, 98.

12. *Fayd,* I, 268 (*Al-Risala,* September 6, 1937).
13. *Fayd,* X, 233–236 (*Al-Hilal,* January, February 1945).
14. *Al-Thaqafa,* December 22,1952 and *Fayd,* IX, 120.
15. *Fayd,* VI, 28–29 (*Al-Thaqafa,* December 12, 1944).
16. Some of the articles in *Fayd al-Khatir* are based on manuscripts of radio broadcasts. On the Popular University see *Hayati,* pp. 308–12 and Matthews and Akrawi, *Education in Arab Countries in the Near East* (Washington: American Council on Education, 1949), p. 12.
17. *Al-Thaqafa,* January 2, 1945, p. 2.
18. *Fayd,* I, 359 (*Al-Risala,* June, 1936).
19. *Al-Thaqafa,* August 25, 1952 (cf. ibid., December 15).
20. *Fayd,* IX, 121 (cf. III, 26 and IX, 124).
21. *Al-Thaqafa,* December 22, 1952.
22. *Fayd,* I, 320 (*Al-Risala,* January 8, 1934).
23. *Fayd,* VII, 357 (*Al-Thaqafa,* June 10, 1947).

24. *Fayd,* VII, 268–71 (*Al-Thaqafa,* May 21,1946).
25. *Fayd,* IX, 261–2 (*Al-Thaqafa,* February 25,1952).
26. *Zu'ama al-Islah fi-l-'Asr al-Hadith,* (Cairo, 1965), p. 176; *Fayd,* VI, 225 (*Al-Thaqafa,* May 1, 1945).
27. *Fayd,* VI, 26 (*Al-Thaqafa,* December 12, 1944).
28. *Fayd,* 216 (*Al-Thaqafa,* September 5, 1939) cf. *Fayd,* 1,140.
29. *Al-Thaqafa,* December 10, 1946, pp. 1–2; Cf. *Fayd,* II, 224; X, 235–6.
30. *Al-Hilal,* February, 1947, pp. 8–10.
31. *Ibid.* and *Ila Waladi* (Third Printing, Beirut, 1969), ch. 4 (*Hilal,* May, 1950).
32. *Al-Thaqafa,* December 22, 1952.
33. *Fayd,* III, 98–9.
34. But see next footnote.
35. He states that the main functions of a parliament are to watch over the actions of the government, to pass laws that would respond to the changing needs of society, and to supervise the budget, for 'the basic idea in this parliament is that the people governs itself by itself; thus each has a share in governing: one by work and another by surveillance and supervision. For if the executive is aware that there is a strong surveillance he keeps his eyes open, acts fairly, and fears a harsh accounting, so that justice functions well in the nation; otherwise he turns over the government to one who can serve the nations's welfare better than he.' Parliament's right to supervise the budget is based on the fact that 'it represents the nation and it is the nation that spends the money…' *Fayd,* X, 233–234; *Al-Hilal,* January-February, 1945).

    The phrase 'the people governs itself by itself suggests the phrase 'government of the people, by the people, for the good of the people' in the definition of Democracy quoted above. This, to my knowledge, is as close as he ever comes to linking the idea of parliament with that of democracy. It shows that the link is implicit, but the fact that the link is not made explicit is important. Democracy is not only a concept and an ideal, but the very word 'democracy' *(al-dimuqratiyya)* is itself a powerful symbol, both for Ahmad Amin and for many others. But for many of these others the symbol does not necessarily evoke the idea of parliament. For this reason it would have been important for the defender of parliamentary government to show clearly its link with the symbol 'democracy'
36. *Al-Thaqafa,* December 22, 1952.
37. *Fayd,* IX, 264 (*Al-Thaqafa,* July 23, 1951, p. 8).
38. *Ibid.* and *Fayd,* IX, 120. He also states in the latter place and implies in the former that a freely and honestly elected parliament is the 'most just system for governing the country.' This is still rather abstract, and perhaps not convincing, either, in view of his strictures against the current crop of politicians.
39. The role of controlling governmental tyranny, which he ascribes in passing to a parliament, is the same role that he ascribes to an enlightened public opinion. The two are related, of course, since in theory at least the parliament is the voice of public opinion, but it could be argued that a parliament independent of the executive, even if not fully representative or free from corruption, could play the role in controlling the government and in the educating public opinion that is needed and thus solve the dilemma discussed above. This seems a potential line of argument from Ahmad Amin's s presuppositions, but he never follows it out.

40. Cf. fn. 35 above. Safran makes a similar point in a somewhat different way when he argues that one reason for the neglect of systematic political theorizing was the tendency to subsume political principles under ethics. 'It is true that all political theories are ultimately related to some ethical presupposition, but if a particular political system is to be justified, it is not enough to proclaim and extol the ethical principles on which it is founded. It is necessary, first, to justify those principles and then to show how the particular political system is designed to safeguard and realize them by means of political strategy. This the intellectual leaders failed to do… Ahmad Amin, for example, considered political rights and obligations as ethical values in themselves and enumerated them among values in general in a textbook on ethics which he had written for the Ministry of Education.' (*Egypt in Search of Political Community,* p. 149) Ahmad Amin tends to treat parliamentary government as a value in itself rather than as a means of establishing and safeguarding democracy. I would stress not only that parliamentary government is a means to the goal of democracy and that this needed to be shown clearly, but also that the concept of parliament was not in itself a very powerful or positive symbol for Ahmad Amin's Egyptian and Arab contemporaries (in contrast, I imagine, to the case in England), whereas democracy was and is.
41. *Al-Hilal,* November, 1933, pp. 98–9; *Al-Hilal,* July, 1935, pp. 1022–1025; *Fayd,* I, 305–311 (*Al-Hilal,* May, 1937). In 1944, however, he wrote that one of the most serious problems of the East was its lack of strong leadership (*Fayd,* VI, 23–5; *Al-Thaqafa,* November 28,1944) and between 1943 and 1946 he wrote the series of articles on the lives of the great Islamic leaders of the previous century, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and others, that was later published as *Leaders of Reform in the Modern Age (Zu'ama' al-islah fi-l-asr al-Hadith),* giving as one of his reasons that the current generation be made aware of them (*Fayd,* V, 193). Several other articles in the 1940's also reflect this concern. 'Leadership and Leaders' (*Fayd,* VII, 263–271; *Al-Thaqafa,* May 14, 1946) and The Leaders of Opinion' (*Fayd,* VII, 357–360; Al-Thaqafa, June 10, 1947) end by noting the need for the kind of leadership described and two articles in 1949 entitled 'The Struggle of the Past and the Present' and 'Heroism and Heroes', while they do not explicitly discuss the current lack of 'heroes', do underline the importance of the individual heroic leader and seem to reflect a felt need for such 'heroism' (*Fayd,* VIII, 21–25; *Al-Hilal,* June, 1949 and *Fayd,* VIII, 17–20; *Al-Hilal,* March, 1949).
42. *Fayd,* 1,309.
43. *Fayd,* IX, 167 (*Al-Thaqafa,* September 29, 1952). The article in which this is found is almost identical with an earlier one (*Fayd,* VIII, 62–5 probably written between 1945 and 1947), but the lines here quoted do not appear in the earlier article.
44. *Fayd,* III, 93.
45. *Fayd,* III, 95.
46. *Fayd,* VI, 65–73 (*Al-Thaqafa,* April 3, 25, and May 9, 1944).
47. Tawfiq al-Hakim in *Al-Risala,* April 10 and 24, 1944 and Ahmad Amin in *Al-Thaqafa,* April 18 and May 2, 1944.
48. *Al-Thaqafa,* August 11, 1952.
49. *Fayd,* I, 308 (*Al-Risala,* May 3,1937).
50. *Fayd,* X, 83–88 (*Al-Hilal,* August 1, 1936).

51. *Yawm al-Islam* (Cairo, 1958), p. 81. This book is atypical of Ahmad Amin's writing in general but seems to reflect a phase that Ahmad Amin went through between about 1949 and 1952 marked by greater attention to Islamic apologetics as well as moral and political indignation. Safran takes it as an indication of a retreat from the West on Ahmad Amin's part (Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community,* pp. 226–8) but in fact it would be more accurate to describe it as manifesting a highly ambivalent love-hate attitude toward the West. This volume does not, properly speaking, conclude the series on Islamic cultural history but is rather a separate essay, incorporating material from several other essays written in the immediately preceding years.
52. *Fayd,* VII, 358. (*Al-Thaqafa,* June 10, 1947).
53. *Ila Waladi,* p. 50 (*Al-Hilal,* May, 1950); the analogy with medicine and engineering is repeated on p. 51 and also mentioned in the article, 'Leaders and Leadership' (*Fayd,* VII, 270; *Al-Thaqafa,* May 14,1946).
54. *Fayd,* II, 289–93 (*Al-Thaqafa,* August 20, 1940).
55. In January, 1977, Anwar al-Sadat was quoted as stating, 'Our revolution…wasn't against the multiparty system as such but against the corruption that engulfed them and also against the fact that the parties had no programs or ideologies. The new parties have started to define their programs. I want them to go to the people. We should have done this in 1956, following victory in the political battle after the Anglo-French-Israeli Suez aggression—not twenty years later.' (*New York Times,* January 15, p. 21.) This suggests an attitude identical to Ahmad Amin's.

The Iranian Settlement in Egypt As Seen Through the Pages of The Community Paper— *Chihrinima* (1904–1966)

Mohammad Yadegari

Chihrinima, an illustrated Persian language weekly edited by Mirza Abd al-Muhammad Mu'addab al-Sultan Isfahani Irani was founded in 1904 in Alexandria but relocated to Cairo the following year. Mu'addab al-Sultan was born in Isfahan in 1289 A.H. (1872 A.D.) and grew up under the tyrannical rule of Zill al-Sultan (the son of Nasir al-Din Shah and governor of Isfahan). Mu'addab al-Sultan's early education was in a girl's maktab.[1] In 1310 A.H. (1892 A.D.), he left Isfahan on business ventures to Shiraz, Bushehr, India, then back to Iran and on to Russia. In 1320 A.H. (1902 A.D.) he decided to go to the U.S., but upon passing through Egypt, he changed his plans and decided to stay.

Chihrinima was designed to be of interest to the general public and this may account for its long life, a span of sixty-two years (1904–1966). Like many other Iranian emigrant papers, *Chihrinima* was prohibited in Iran during the reign of Muhammad Ali Shah (1907–1909), a period referred to as the period of 'Minor Despotism'. Subsequently this ban was lifted and, as the letters from readers and correspondents indicate, it was popular all over Iran and in Iranian communities in India, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries.

Under the direction of its founder and first editor, *Chihrinima* tried to play a political and social role. Its impact was negligible. It remained, for the most part, a community paper. The editorials advocated unity of the Islamic world to ward off aggressive foreign elements, economic sanctions such as boycotts against foreign aggressors, a sound educational system, and jobs for the workers to prevent 'bloody revolutions'.

Its second editor, Manuchihr Mu'addab-zada, emphasised sound education and the psychology of child rearing.

Chihrinima provided a platform for those Iranians who wished to voice their thoughts, grievances and complaints. Reading their letters in *Chihrinima* provides clues to the educational and cultural activities of Iranians abroad.

One of the most important contributions of *Chihrinima* is that its pages marked, step by step, the history of the Iranian community in Egypt from 1904–1966. The information gathered from this community paper is very valuable in that it reflects the characters and activities of the members of that community and offers a clear picture of a typical Iranian emigrant settlement in action.

Before exploring the origin of the Iranian community in Egypt, a few facts should be mentioned about the conditions existing in Egypt at the turn of the

century. First this study will examine the factors that attracted the Iranians, and foreigners in general, to that country.

The time of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1803–1849) is referred to as the period of modern Egypt because attempts at Westernization in that country began with him. From the time that he was sent by the Ottoman Sultan to fight Napoleon in 1799, Ali Pasha knew that he could only defeat the Westerners with their own weapons, and like the rest of the rulers of the Middle East, he emphasised reform of the military. To do so, he arranged for military training by the French and others, the opening of technical schools, and the translation of technical and scientific books into Arabic.

Innovation started by Muhammad Ali and carried on by his successors included establishing Arabic printing presses and newspapers, creating a major network of communication, rebuilding ports in the cities of Cairo and Alexandria, and developing systems of public supply of water, gas, and electricity. The most important social change was the development of a Western style educational system.[2] Muhammad Ali's industrialization attempts brought about an influx of foreign merchants and entrepreneurs who flocked to Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities reaping both material and intellectual profits.

It was through the Bulaq press which he established, that the Iranian element in Egypt published classical and non-classical books in the Persian language.[3]

During Muhammad Ali's reign, there were only 10,000 Europeans, mostly Greeks and Italians, living in Egypt. However, during the reigns of Sa'id Pasha (1854–1863) and Isma'il Pasha (1863–1879), 'as a result of the great financial and commercial opportunities connected with the cotton boom and the manifold projects of these two rulers',[4] the number of Europeans increased a great deal and 'Egypt was simply swept off her feet by the European whirlwind since the free-for-all to get hold of this succulent prize brought merchants, bankers, tourists, soldiers, engineers, explorers, priests, and mountebanks to Cairo in its golden wake.'[5]

By 1907, the total number of foreigners was 151,414, of which 16,000 were Asians, Maltese, and North Africans.[6] They lived in major cities, especially Alexandria and Cairo where they controlled much of the commerce as well as banks, stores, hotels, and restaurants.[7]

Egypt itself had neither the economic and social institutions nor the trained manpower to take advantage of the sudden influx of capital and increased trade. The benefits of the economic boom therefore went to the foreign entrepreneurs and their existence in Egypt suppressed the development of a native entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.[8]

Where did the Iranian element fit into the Egyptian scene? There are few sources that discuss this subject directly. The picture which follows has been reconstructed from letters, comments, and articles which appeared throughout the pages of *Chihrinima.*

Even though the Iranian community in Egypt was a small one, it was a very active and vigorous community socially, commercially, and intellectually. *Chihrinima* places its population in 1938 at 3,500 souls.[9]

The history of the Iranian community in Egypt seems to go back to the period of Sa'id and Isma'il Pashas. There is no information available in *Chihrinima* on the Iranian residents of Egypt prior to that date. Some prosperous Iranians came

to Egypt via India. Most were merchants possessing British passports. Mr. Mu'addab-zada asserts that 'it was easier, or rather more advantageous, if they acquired British citizenship which allowed more rights and facilities. But to acquire British citizenship they had to be residents of India for at least five years'.[10]

Some Iranians, such as Ali Muhammad Kashani, the editor of *Thurayya* and *Parwarish* and Mirza Mahdi Tabrizi, the editor of *Hikmat,* came by way of Istanbul while others came directly from Iran. In later issues of *Chihrinima* a slowing down of the influx of new Iranian emigrants is noted. This was a factor which contributed to the accelerated integration of Iranians into Egyptian life. Many Iranians still travelled through Egypt to India, Turkey, and Europe, but only a few settled. Throughout the pages of *Chihrinima* newcomers were welcomed. The length of their visits varied.

THE ORIGINAL FAMILIES AND THEIR DESCENDANTS

The upper class of the Iranian community were those, as mentioned earlier, who came from India. They were the ones who seemed to be in the centre of most social activities such as running the affairs of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce (Utaq-i Tijarati)[11], organizing Imam Husayn's mourning anniversary, or throwing banquets in their homes for four or five hundred guests.

Haji Abd al-Karim Mu'tamid al-Tujjar Kaziruni (d. 1340 A.H./1922 A.D.) who opened the 'door of Indian and Iranian business to Egypt'[12] was the first of the Kazirunis to settle in Egypt. His sons Abd al-Hamid Beg and Abd al-Majid Beg along with his nephew and son-in-law, Jamal al-Din Beg, continued with the business of importing rugs. Abd al-Hamid Beg had graduated from a business college and had exerted great efforts promoting rug sales in Egypt.

'In order to open up foreign markets to Iranian rugs, he (Kaziruni) exerted his energy in two ways: first he opened two rug weaving factories in Shiraz and Tabriz, then he employed two Italian artists to prepare special designs which he specified and which were sent to Iran so that his factories would weave such especially ordered patterns.'[13]

These innovations clearly indicate that the Kazirunis were successful entrepreneurs. They were aware of the differences in taste between Iranians and their customers and they tried to adapt their merchandise to the preferences of the host country.

Mergers and diversification were common phenomena in Iranian business. In 1927, Jamal al-Din Beg separated from the family business and founded his own rug firm.[14]

Another extremely wealthy family was that of Haji Mirza Fazlullah Beg Abd al-Jawad al-Husayni (d. 1345 A.H./1927 A.D.), the Shirazi merchant who had two sons, Mirza Muhammad Ali Beg and Mirza Abbas Beg. In addition to commerce, they were involved in agriculture and real estate. They owned many buildings in Egypt. The elder of the sons founded the Iranian school in Cairo and provided for its expenses.[15] Haji Mirza Fazlullah Beg al-Husayni was the father-in-law of Mustansir al-Saltana, the Iranian ambassador to Egypt (1314–1322 A.H./1896–1903 A.D.).

Also influential was the family of Aqa Abd al-Rasul I'timad al-Tujjar Sahib Shirazi (d. 1342 A.H.).[16] He was the nephew and the son-in-law of Haji Aqa Buzurg Tajir Shirazi whose interests were commerce and agriculture. I'timad al-Tujjar had four sons: Aqa Ahmad, Aqa Mustafa, Aqa Mahmud, and Aqa Muhammad Hasan, the Shirazi merchants.

The sons of Mirza Fazlullah Beg al-Husayni merged their business with that of the sons of I'timad al-Tujjar in 1925 to form the Iranian Business Corporation. A second merger took place during the same year between the above mentioned people and Aqa Asadullah Shirazi, and Aqa Mirza Siham al-Din Ansari Isfahani (Farwardin Company) to form the Iranian Import-Export Corporation. The Iranian Business Corporation managed other businessmen's investments (in both Egypt and Iran), imported rugs, all kinds of tea, and haberdashery from Iran, India, China, and other countries. The task of the Iranian Import-Export Co. was tobacco trade in Iran, Egypt, and other places. Both these companies had branch offices in Port Sa'id.[17] The reason for these mergers seems to be the relative decline in the sale of Iranian products. The activities of united merchant groups were designed to 'prevent market sluggishness and price declines'.[18]

Another wealthy and influential family was that of Mirza Muhammad Rafi' Mishki (b. 1262 A.H./1846 A.D.). This man's grandfather, Haji Mirza Fazil Hindi, was a famous merchant in Calcutta. Mirza Muhammad Rafi' Mishki migrated to Egypt in 1282 A.H.[19] The Mishki Company was called Jawad, Riza, and Rafi' Mishki and Partners.

Aqa Mirza Mahdi Beg Rafi' Mishki, son of Muhammad Rafi' Mishki, was chairman of the Iranian Charity Organization and the Chamber of Commerce for many years, and he was a leader in Egypt's Masonic Association. He was a good Arabic poet and, although his poetry was only occasional, it was very well received.[20] He was the treasurer of the Jam'iyyat al-Rabitah al-Sharqiyyah (Eastern Relations Association), an organization composed of various members from the Islamic countries residing in Egypt.

The common denominators that united these families were wealth, commerce, and the problems connected with their businesses, national origin, their sense of responsibility for the less fortunate Iranians living in Egypt, and, of course, family ties.

These wealthy families dominated almost all facets of the social, economic, and political functions of the community. Prior to the 1920's, the Iranian ambassadorship in Egypt was chosen from the local Iranian group. The title was honorary and the expenses were provided by the Iranians themselves. Thus, persons like Mustansir al-Saltana, the son-in-law of al-Husayni and Misseu Armandanlian, a 'first class merchant of Alexandria' represented the Iranian government in Cairo and Alexandria respectively.[21]

A different element, that of the intellectual elite, was added to this original nucleus. Even though they did not match the prestige of the merchant group financially, they were on a par with them socially for the might of their pens made them welcome and privileged.

THE LOCATION IN CAIRO

In Cairo there was no particular Iranian district such as the Khan-i Valeda of Istanbul. Iranians in Cairo 'were scattered according to their needs and means, but a sizable number lived in the area of Seyedna Hussein.'[22] Seyedna Husayn is situated in the heart of old Cairo built by Gowhar, the Fatimid general who took over Egypt in 969. It is to the north of Fustat-Misr and now is situated in the middle of the city of Cairo. Seyedna Husayn is a revered Shi'ite centre where, according to Shi'ite belief, the head of the third Imam, Husayn Ibn Ali (martyred 680) is buried. Being Shi'ite, Iranians were interested in the Shrine of Husayn's Head which is the reason why many of them congregated in that area. Since this is the old city,[23] the author speculates that those who lived there were of very meagre means and ability. The rich and well-to-do might have visited the shrine for religious purposes, but they lived in the better parts of Cairo.

Prior to the 1930's a bazaar composed of antique shops known as Khan-i Khalili, belonged entirely to the Iranian merchants. The April 1938 issue of *Chihrinima* noted that 'There are still many Iranian shops in that bazaar'.[24]

OCCUPATION AND ECONOMY

The story of Iranian immigrant life which emerges from the pages of *Chihrinima* is one which makes the observer nod in approval and say bravo. It is the story of the success and diligence of hard working men imbued with the spirit of free enterprise and always ready to help their fellows.

They provided housing and guidance for the travellers, helped the needy, and contributed to every good cause, particularly to the victims of natural disasters. They quarrelled among one another occasionally but they tried to settle differences peacefully and graciously.

In the third and fourth decades of this century, hard times began to creep in as the Egyptian bourgeoisie grew and became efficient enough to compete with foreigners who had developed 'Egypt's resources remarkably swiftly in the period 1860–1913.'[25] Coupled with the growth of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, was the awakening of national and Arab consciousness. Egyptian nationalism hampered the business of Iranians in Egypt.

From the pages of *Chihrinima* comes a clear picture of the class structure of the Iranian community, showing the types of goods they dealt in and the problems they faced. At the top were the original families with their intellectual-ambassadorial group. Directly below them were middle class shop owners and second class merchants who could be described as well-to-do, yet not wealthy. At one time Khani-Khalili bazaar belonged entirely to Iranians. Middle class Iranians operated candy stores such as the candy factory of Abd al-Karim Hasan and Haji Shukrullah Hilwani, Inc. in which all kinds of confections were produced. Its employees amounted to over 100 men, women, and children. Many of the workers were Iranians.[26] Hilwani attended many Egyptian fairs and *Chihrinima* enthusiastically reported these activities.[27]

Less well off were the workers. They were employed by Egyptians and Iranians. This group included those working for Hilwani's candy factory. The welfare of this class depended on the fortunes and benevolence of their wealthy Iranian counterparts. The Iranian Charity Organization provided monthly salaries, clothing, and school allowances for many of these people.[28] Their condition declined by the fourth decade of the twentieth century when the emergence of Arab nationalism along with their own lack of interest in their national heritage and language drew them into complete assimilation with native Egyptian life. This study will return to this element below.

Women were almost shadows behind the men of the Iranian community. Commenting on the role and contribution of women, other than to family life, to the Iranian community or to Egyptian life in general, Mr. Mu'addabzada confines his reply to a short phrase, 'slightly in benevolence areas and very casually.'[29] Indeed, the pages of *Chihrinima* testify to this 'casual' role. In the early volumes of this magazine, we read of 'the daughter' or 'wife' of such and such person rather than the specific name of the woman. It is only later, after Riza Shah abolished the veil in Iran (June 8, 1936) that we see their pictures side by side with the men.

As this is reflected in *Chihrinima,* the affairs of the community—social, economic and political—were run and regulated by only a few wealthy families. We see the same people always in charge of the Charity Organization or Literary and Scientific Organization, etc.

Chihrinima reported quite often on the business of Iranians and the problems and successes they encountered. The April 1938 issue presents an overview of the total volume and type of exports from Iran to Egypt. Oil, first in terms of importance, is followed by rugs, dried fruit and nuts, tobacco, etc.[30] The volume of the rug export was approximately £80,000– £100,000. £597,664 (5,000,000 tomans) worth was the total Iranian export sold in Egypt while only £1,348 (10, 000 tomans) of Egyptian products were sold in Iran. Egypt exported only cigarettes to Iran in addition to some European drugs.

An early challenge confronting Iranian merchants was competition from within their own group. 'Up to now', says *Chihrinima,* 'the Iranian merchants dealt in business either alone or in cooperation with their own relatives. This has often led to rivalry resulting in sluggishness in the sales of Iranian products and reduction in prices. Recently, Iranian merchants have become aware of the deleterious effects of this rivalry and recognized the benefits of unity and cooperation.'[31] The Iranian merchants responded by counteracting the rivalry with merger and cooperation.

This rivalry, it is speculated, may have come about because of the growth of the Egyptian bourgeoisie itself. The merger and cooperation of Iranian merchants —a response to that growth—seems to indicate that the Iranians foresaw the emergence of the Egyptian bourgeoisie and tried to counteract it.

In 1930, the Egyptian government changed the customs tariffs on merchandise imported to Egypt by labelling many products as cosmetics or luxury items. The president of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Abd al-Hamid Kaziruni, warned of its disadvantages if it were to be applied to rugs. His basic argument was that since rugs constitute a very valuable gift commodity, readily available to all, increased tariffs would cut into its sale, thus harming the Egyptian economy. His

second point was that Iranian merchants in Egypt were trying to make Egypt the greatest commercial centre in the world (the reference is obviously with respect to rugs).

Nationalists claimed cheap tariffs on Iranian rugs enhanced the advantage of Iranian rugs in competition with Egyptian rugs which were in the cradle of development. Kaziruni argued that rugs varied in terms of colour, design and durability of material and that each rug had established its own reputation among people. Thus each had its own customers. He stated that an increase in the tariffs would harm the Egyptian economy since the customers would not be able to afford them and he further suggested that Egyptian rug weavers create a special design characteristic of Egypt rather than imitate foreign designers. If that happened, he said he and his merchant friends would undertake the sale of Egyptian rugs abroad.[32]

A recurring theme in business reports from the pages of *Chihrinima* was the increasing pressure of Egyptian nationalism felt by Iranians. It was treated in a subtle way. The Iranian merchants approached disagreements with the Egyptians with reason and discussion rather than with defiance. Iranians knew they were living in a foreign land and had to abide by the laws of the land. Their response was always cautious and yielding in the end. Iranians finally surrendered to Egyptian nationalism and assimilated slowly but surely.

In one situation, the objection to increased tariffs on rugs was not heeded by the Egyptian government. Iranian merchants then made suggestions for regulations concerning this tariff. They met in Mr. Kaziruni's office and, after hours of discussion, they agreed to suggest to the Customs that the tariff should be imposed according to weight and quality of rugs. The first category was the Shirazi rug or anything of lesser quality. The second was top quality rugs including anything of better quality than the Shirazi category. They hoped that the Customs would cooperate.[33]

This was basically the Iranian attitude as shown in *Chihrinima.* At first the Iranians objected by making excuses or trying to convince. Later they agreed to cooperate, while still making suggestions on how to implement measures. This attitude was also apparent in their quarrels among themselves.

Another problem which faced Iranian rug merchants was the cost of rail transport from Alexandria and Port Sa'id to Cairo. Rates charged for transporting Iranian rugs were higher than for transporting European rugs. Transport rates from Alexandria were five times greater and from Port Sa'id three times greater.[34]

As reported in *Chihrinima,* in an effort to lower the fare, Mr. Kaziruni met Mr. Hobert,[35] who was in charge of Egyptian Railways Storage Facilities, to ask him to cooperate with the Iranians. He warned that if prices did not decrease, the Iranians would have to transport their rugs from Alexandria and Port Sa'id by trucks bought and operated by themselves. Secondly he reminded him that the native Egyptian rugs were also being discriminated against by the three to five times higher charge. He maintained that this had a bad effect on the Egyptian economy. From this came approximately a 50 per cent reduction in prices.[36] In later issues, the reduction was recorded as 80 per cent.[37]

No doubt, both arguments did much to bring about an agreement in freight tariffs. The reader might wonder if Mr. Kaziruni perhaps threatened to make a

national issue out of the second point realizing that such a threat could be effective in obtaining the necessary concession which Iranian merchants sought to achieve. Such a manoeuvre illustrates the political finesse and shrewdness of the Iranian merchant class.

Rugs and tobacco were two of the most important commodities imported from Iran to Egypt. Rug merchants were faced with competition from native Egyptian industry, increased customs tariffs, and high rates of rail transport. Then a great blow was struck against tobacco merchants in Egypt when a monopoly agreement was signed between an Iranian and an Egyptian, Khalil Ma'tuq. It appeared that this agreement was to counteract competition by Egyptians with Iranian tobacco. However, *Chihrinima* reported that the Iranians had warned against this monopoly from its inception (date not given).[38] Khalil Ma'tuq's real intentions, according to *Chihrinima,* was to ruin Isfahan tobacco's reputation in Egypt by raising its prices, thereby leading people from smoking water pipes to cigarettes. His motive was obvious for he had a franchise from a big cigarette company. Khalil Ma'tuq was aided in his attempt by Iranian officials, including the treasury minister of the time, S.Hasan-i Taqizada.

According to *Chihrinima,* Khalil Ma'tuq succeeded. The number of water pipe smokers decreased tenfold in the tea houses of Egypt. *Chihrinima* urged Iranian merchants to pick up the business, encouraging them to compete and once again to revive the Isfahan tobacco business in Egypt.

This is one instance in which the Egyptian bourgeousie attempted to use a political tool to achieve its goal. In cases such as these, the Iranian recourse was only to advise and protest, to wait and hope.

The thirties were years of challenge and trial. There is no doubt that the Iranian community was faced with most difficult questions and vigorous competition in an environment of antagonistic attitudes. These attitudes were displayed in the government decision to buy some 5,000 metres of rugs from Iranians for the Prophet Muhammad's Court in Medina. Under pressure from Egyptian newspapers, they decided to study the issue further. The government determined it would take fifteen years for native producers to weave such a huge quantity. Since the Iranian carpets were available, and of better quality, the Egyptian Ministry of Endowments announced its willingness to buy the Tabrizi type of rug from them. After the bidding was announced, Egyptian papers such as *al-Ahram* and *al-Musawwar* argued against it. *Rooz al-Yosuf* even suggested that since the purpose of the purchase was religious, the Iranian government should provide the money for it.

The Iranian Chamber of Commerce, especially its president, Mr. Kaziruni, was instrumental in persuading the Ministry of Endowments of the advantages of Iranian rugs.[39] He realized that Iranians were reluctant to speak out individually in defence of their rugs when opponents called them flimsy. They could not retaliate with criticism of their opponents' rugs since downgrading local products would put them in an unpopular position. Kaziruni urged the establishment of a committee to represent Iranian merchants in promoting and advertising their rugs.[40]

Kaziruni's report indicated many things. The Egyptian bourgeoisie was growing and the Iranians had to compete not only against local products, but also

against national sentiment expressed in the Egyptian newspapers. Yet, they had to maintain good relations with the Egyptians, a difficult task indeed.

Kaziruni's efforts were commendable. He had considerable effect in the promotion of rugs in Egypt and also demonstrated an awareness of the 'psychology' of rug buyers in Europe and the Middle East. His reports on rug markets were full of suggestions on how to improve the quality of production and designs to suit the needs of customers.[41] Kaziruni put his own suggestions into practice by founding a rug weaving factory in Shiraz. After having tried requesting specific designs from Shiraz and realizing poor results, the new factory produced rugs designed to please European customers whose taste in design and colour differed from that of Iranians. The factory was opened in Shiraz in 1925 under the management of Mr. Urdubadi and was highly successful. Within four years, the factory trained over 200 workers in a city 'where the majority of the residents lacked skills.'[42] This was an important contribution to local industry. Others followed the example of Kaziruni and one hundred rug weaving looms were set up throughout the area.[43] Kaziruni's company alone had around twenty looms and employed over 80 workers in addition to teachers. The volume of the operation seems to have been several thousand metres of rugs of varying sizes.[44]

In 1947, the enmity toward the Iranian rug dealers increased further. The rugs were designated as luxury items and import was prohibited altogether. Again, the Iranians chose Abd al-Hamid Kaziruni to represent them before the Assistant Secretary of Commerce. As a result of the meeting, the Ministry of Commerce forwarded a request to the Treasury Ministry asking them to consider Iranian rugs a necessary luxury item and to set a limit on its import.[45]

The plight of the Iranian merchants was increased, not only by Egyptian controls and regulation, but also by the Iranian government's apathy and inconsistencies. An article in *Chihrinima* under the title of The Pitiful Condition of Iranian Commerce in Egypt' expounded on this subject and predicted dire consequences for the Iranian community. The article warned that if Iranian officials continued their apathetic attitude towards the condition of Iranian commerce in Egypt, the entire Iranian commercial enterprise would be in jeopardy. *Chihrinima* further stated that two great problems threatened the Iranian merchant community in Egypt. First the Egyptian government decided that Iranian rugs were luxury items, which increased the tariff, while Belgian machine-made rugs, on the other hand, were considered necessary items. The government also imposed a limitation on the import of products from Iran. The government's intent was to balance the commercial budget by evening out the export-import business. The paper warned that while other foreign countries affected by the Egyptian government's decision had sent missions to Egypt to discuss plans for commercial agreements, the Iranian government had not taken a single step to secure its future trade.[46]

Another basic problem which faced Iranian merchants in Egypt was the inefficiency of their own countrymen in Iran. Iranian businessmen usually had two kinds of 'capital' to deal with. First there was their own capital which they invested in goods as they saw fit. In addition, friends, who were often themselves businessmen, would give them goods to sell or extra cash to invest. These goods would be sold with a commission to the seller (occasionally no commission was

asked). Additional goods were always helpful to a business but, because of this practice, the quality, style, and variety of materials offered in a particular store were not necessarily under the control of the owner.

Articles in *Chihrinima* indicated the need to regulate the quality of goods. This was recognized by the businessmen. For example, an article called for the Iranian Ministry of Commerce to set up standards of cleanliness and packaging for anghuza,[47] an important product exported to Egypt, India, Iraq, and Europe. There were complaints that dirty and unpitted anghuza had previously been exported. It was suggested that improved quality of exports would increase the market and increase the profit to merchants.[48] In the case of tobacco, the paper mentioned that 15,000–20,000 bags, valued at 100,000 pounds (1,000,000 tumans), were exported from Isfahan to Egypt, almost none of which were honestly packed.[49]

Thus, the Iranian merchant community in Egypt was hampered by the cheating and inefficiency of their own countrymen as well as the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government.

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

The Iranians shared in one another's joys and sorrows and socialized on occasions of marriages, deaths, and feasts of Azha, Fitr, Ghadir, etc. Meetings and gatherings on the various anniversaries connected with Imam Husayn were the focal points of Iranian activities in Egypt. *Chihrinima's* report on one of the meetings of the general body of the Iranian community published in the June 15th issue of 1935 describes some activities of the Iranian residents in Egypt. A progress report on the formation of three new organizations was given. The Iranian Charity Organization headed by Abd al-Hamid Beg Kaziruni, the Scientific and Literary Organization headed by Manuchihr-i Mu'addab-zada, and the Chamber of Commerce headed by Mahdi Beg Rafi' Mishki had been recently formed.[50] The charters of the first two were voted on and approved while a vote on the charter of the third was postponed.

Abd al-Hamid Beg Kaziruni spoke of the income and expenses of the Charity Organization. Income from endowments was mentioned and the possibility of increasing proceeds from a lottery was discussed. Expenses consisted of school tuition for children of needy families and cloth distributed to the poor on the anniversary of Husayn's martyrdom.

Of the three bodies mentioned, the Literary and Scientific Organization was the most newly formed. Later issues of *Chihrinima* shed no light on its actual activities (other than meeting for tea and requesting contributions of books and periodicals from the readers of *Chihrinima*) or achievements. The charity and commercial organizations had already been functioning for many years prior to 1935 though periodically their activities were suspended. The main concerns of the Iranians seemed to be their need for cooperation with emphasis on helping the poor.

Study of that article and the annual statements of expenses and income of the Charity Organization show that the income of the organization was provided by

TABLE I STATEMENT OF INCOMES AND EXPENSES OF THE CHARITY ORGANIZATION FOR THE YEAR 1945

Expenses	*Egyptian £*	*Income*	*Egyptian £*
Monthly contributions	494,650	Balance	175,865
Cloth material	140,852	Princess Fawziyyah contribution	200,000
Aid to students	105,110	Lottery	411,053
Aid for medical expenses	49,100	Asadullah Isfahani endowment	30,000
Others	77,075	Kaziruni endowment	150,000
		Other contributions	8,500
		Contributions from:	
		Qazi-zada	119,500
		Ja'fari	10,000
		Hamid Kaziruni	15,000
		Majid Kaziruni	10,000
Total	866,787	Total	1,029,918
			−866,787
Balance in treasury at end of December			163,131

Source: Chihrinima, vol. 42, no. 4 (July 1945), pp. 12–14.

private contributions as well as income from endowments and lotteries. Private contributions varied from year to year and person to person. For instance, one of the contributors was Princess Fawziyyah, who married the crown prince of Iran, Muhammad Riza Shah. She contributed both cash and cloth for needy Iranians of Egypt. Occasionally, when money was short, or their patience ran out, some Iranians went to court to fight those who were in charge of endowments but had held the money back either out of greed or personal rivalries. In the October 1943 meeting, the members of the Charity Organization decided to demand payment of £3,000 which the trustees of an endowment owed them. This money was to go for children's education. The Egyptian court ruled in favour of the Charity Organization.[51]

The greatest part of the income came from lottery tickets instituted by Ambassador Bahman (appointed in 1341 A.H./1923 A.D.). Permission for sale was granted by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior.[52] The volume of sale varied. In 1945, the number of tickets sold was 200,000[53] and in 1947, it reached 300, 000.[54]

The anniversary of Husayn's martyrdom was celebrated with all the pomp characteristic of devout Shi'ites. Ta'ziyas (passion plays) were held in the Himzawi and Jamaliyya tikyas.[55] Expenses for these anniversaries were provided by Asadullah Isfahani who had left several properties and buildings, the proceeds of which were to be spent on such occasions. Others also contributed, among them, Mahdi Mishki.[56]

The following table provides a statement of the kind of income available to the Charity Organization and the objects on which it was spent.

They celebrated annually Husayn's death, Arba' in (40th day after his martyrdom), and his birthday. On the two former occasions, they gathered for ta'zia, rawza Khawani (recitals about his martyrdom), and attended sinazani

processions (beating of chest) and qama-zani (beating of shaven heads with poniards). During Fathullah Khan's ambassadorship (1332–1341 A.H./1914–1923 A.D.). qama-zani was prohibited.[57]

The community not only provided aid to its less fortunate members, but also to disaster-stricken people of Iran (such as the earthquake victims in Khorasan in 1929).[58] Contributions were made to Firdawsi's mausoleum[59] and a gift was given to Prince Arfa' as a token of appreciation and gratitude.[60] Two fully equipped ambulances were bought and delivered to Riza Shah.[61] These were signs of the community's sense of awareness of their national responsibility.

The presence of the Iranian papers in Egypt shows that the Iranians there were interested in intellectual matters. Some of the members of the community, namely Mirza Muhammad Ali Beg Fazlullah al-Husayni and his family, established a school for the children which opened at the beginning of the century and closed in 1930. The average number of students was 200 per year. Grades went through high school and teachers were provided proportionally according to the number of students. Expenses were paid for by the community, mainly by the Husayni family.[62]

RELATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY WITH THE EGYPTIANS

From the pages of *Chihrinima,* it is very difficult to reconstruct an exact picture of the treatment the Iranian community received from the Egyptians. It appears that those in the lower social level were abused and degraded. The favourite Iraqi expression for them was *'ajmi mamqut* (detestable Persian).[63] Yet, the same people who abused the poor and less fortunate Iranians respected and envied the rich and powerful among them. Only rarely in *Chihrinima* appeared a general comment concerning 'abuses which Iranians in Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey suffer.'[64] Comments regarding their lives in Egypt, more specifically in terms of their relations with the Egyptians, were either non-existent or of the more formal type. The more prosperous of both groups intermingled at social gatherings honouring prominent persons. Intermarriage among Egyptians and Iranians was very common [65] (a cause of concern for those Iranians worried about the drift toward assimilation). Famous public figures who intermarried included Jamal Abd al-Nasir who married the daughter of Haji Kazim Isfahani and Abd al-Fattah Hasan (the son of Haji Hasan Abd al-Karim Tehrani, an Iranian in origin) who married the daughter of the president of al-Azhar University.[66]

Several Iranians held positions in the Egyptian government. Muhammad Ali Namazi served many times as a minister (department unspecified) and was also Assistant to the chairman of the Arab League.[67] Others served as high officials in the ministries of Agriculture, Education, and Social Welfarè.[68]

In terms of rights and privileges, Iranians as well as other foreigners were awarded capitulation rights and representation to the mixed courts. The mixed court was instituted during Isma'il Pasha's reign and did not accommodate the Iranians until the ambassadorship of Fathullah Khan who persuaded the Egyptian government to appoint an Iranian judge. Anton Manuk Beg, an Iranian Armenian

was elected for three consecutive years.[69] Then, in January 1927, Abd al-Hamid Beg Kaziruni was elected,[70] followed by Ahmad Beg Abd al-Rasul Shirazi, a member of the Iranian Business Corporation.[71] On 28 November, 1928, however, the agreement signed in Tehran between the Egyptian representatives and the Iranian government ended all capitulation rights for the Iranian residents of Egypt.[72]

Jam'iyyat al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya (Eastern Relations Committee), established at the end of World War I and lasting until the end of World War II, was an organization composed of members from the Islamic world residing in Egypt. Mirza Beg Rafi' Mishki was the treasurer of the committee. The platform and the activities of the committee were published in an Arabic magazine of the same name.[73] Committee activities, as far as can be determined from *Chihrinima,* were largely symbolic or ceremonial. Its goal was cooperation among Muslims in general and those residing in Egypt in particular. The committee collected contributions for worthy causes such as providing for the victims of strife in Palestine and Syria and voiced objections to brutalities committed by foreign powers such as those of France in Syria.[74]

One important concern of the Iranians was assimilation. The cause for alarm was warranted because the emergence of Arab nationalism along with most Iranians' lack of interest in their national heritage and language quickly drew almost all Iranians into complete assimilation with Egyptian life. The resultant decrease in readership caused *Chihrinima* to cease publication in 1966. Portions of an editorial in *Chihrinima* voicing concern over assimilation into the fabric of Egyptian life are included below:

> One should not forget that children born through intermarriages between the two nationalities (Iranian and Egyptian), rarely know their native language (Persian). Regrettably, one can add that they are not aware of their historical, literary, or political heritage. Quite often, they even introduce themselves as Egyptians, and truly they can pass as Egyptians. It is natural that when an Iranian marries an Egyptian woman, their children should be influenced, morally and educationally, more by the woman than the man. They learn her behaviour and her language. Since the father associates with the Egyptians, he himself speaks less Persian. Therefore, the children of the family grow up to think, speak, and act as Egyptians do. This situation applies to Iranian youths from poor or middle class families. As for the rich and well-to-do, they can afford to send their children to Egyptian or foreign schools. Thus, the children grow side by side with their Egyptian counterparts. Since the parents have no desire to go to Iran, they do not think of sending their children either. Since they have settled here for so long, they have learned, in a way, Egyptian ways of life. Since their children are more Egyptian themselves, they allow them to be employed in this country. For this reason, they may forget even the name, Iran.
>
> The poor class of Iranians is like the rest of the poor of the world. 'Darvish may sleep wherever and whenever night falls.' His home

> is where he can find his subsistence. The children of this class grow, playing in the streets, with those of the Egyptian poor. Their destiny is tied together.
>
> Unfortunately, there is no Iranian college in Egypt that could provide an atmosphere for learning and teaching Iranian language, customs, history, geography, and literature. This is a factor in the Egyptianization of Iranian children. One must understand the plight of a child whose mother is Egyptian and whose father is an Iranian emigrant, and who has never gone to school as most of these children do not. Even if he is fortunate enough to go to school, he attends either an Egyptian or foreign school in which not a single word of Persian is uttered. Where does a child like that learn the Persian language, etiquette, or his heritage? How can he identify with Iran as his country? He has learned Arabic from childhood and behaved as an Arab would. How can he understand that his country is not Egypt, but Iran? Moreover, during the last three decades, no more than a handful of
>
> Moreover, during the last three decades, no more than a handful of families have migrated from Iran to Egypt. Thus, the present generation of Iranians are Egyptian-born and it may be said that they are not interested in inculcating Iranian culture in their children, especially when the means (schools) are not available and when it is not practical (economically) to hire teachers from Iran for the sake of education of one or two interested families.[75]

What was *Chihrinima's* answer to this problem? It suggested that the youth of the community be sent to Iran to serve in the armed forces of the country. Conscription laws had been recently passed and they included Iranians abroad. In an editorial, the paper supported these new laws asserting that if every Iranian youth spent two years in Iran, he would learn the language, customs and culture of his native land and would come back with a better understanding of his origin. He could then pass this knowledge on to those residing in Egypt.[76]

There were references made to Iranians in Sudan or Egypt who, after their death, left all their belongings to organizations or schools within those countries. *Chihrinima* lamented those cases saying they should have left them to their relatives within Iran or to the Iranian Red Cross.[77] It commented that these Iranians shared no bonds with their mother country except origin or name.

The extent of the assimilation of Iranians into Egyptian life by 1935 is demonstrated in an incident recorded in *Chihrinima:* the Iranian ambassador to Egypt, Ali Akbar Bahman, in a gathering of Iranians in the embassy, had to deliver his speech in Arabic. 'Dear countrymen', said the ambassador, 'you have delivered your speeches in Arabic and so do I. In order to tell you all that is hidden in my heart, I will have to speak in Arabic or use a translator…' He further asserted, 'After living in Egypt for a generation or two, you have forgotten your language, your customs, and your national heritage. You're not even familiar with Iranian food. Your tastes have changed…,[78]

As this study shows, the original Iranians came to Egypt in the middle of the nineteenth century to reap profit along with other foreign entrepreneurs.

Possession of British passports helped them a great deal in acquiring more rights and privileges and being Iranians made it easier for them to deal with the Egyptians since they shared the same faith.

In the 1930s and 40s Egypt was struggling to free itself from British occupation and foreign capitulations. The Iranians were squeezed, undoubtedly along with other foreign nationals, and they had either to leave the country or adjust to the rising waves of nationalism, but their response was hardly antagonistic. It was a determined and rational response. They adjusted, accepted the pressures and modified their positions—slowly but surely.

The picture of the Iranian community in Egypt constructed above speaks for itself concerning the role of *Chihrinima* as a community based and oriented paper. It was the mirror that reflected the lives and the struggles of its constituency. In that respect, *Chihrinima's* contribution is extremely valuable as a written saga of a people—now almost fully Egyptianized.

NOTES

1. Nineteenth century Iran had basically two types of schooling, *madrasa* and *maktabs.* Those who aspired to become clergy attended madrasa to study grammar, theology, and other subjects. In maktabs, children studied reading, writing, and arithmetic. Many government officials, the bazaris (merchants of the bazars) and those who could afford it sent their children to these schools. Boy's maktabs were separate from those of the girls. However occasionally, because of limitation of space and funds, boys attended girl's maktabs and vice versa.
2. Gabriel Baer, 'Social Changes in Egypt: 1800–1914,' *Political and Social Changes in Modern Egypt,* ed. P.M.Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 159.
3. *Chihrinima,* vol. 43, no. 7 (October 1946), p. 6 and vol. 46, no. 6 (September 1949), p. 3.
4. G.Baer, 'Social Change,' pp. 155–156.
5. James Aldridge, *Cairo* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), p. 195.
6. G.Baer, 'Social Change,' p. 158.
7. Amir Boktor, *School and Society in the Valley of the Nile* (Cairo: Ellias Modern Press, 1936), p. 233.
8. Charles Issawi, 'Asymmetrical Development and Transport in Egypt, 1800–1914,' *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 390–392.
9. *Chihrinima,* vol. 35, no. 1 (April 1938), p. 68.
10. Letter received from Manuchihr-i Mu'addab-zada (the second editor of *Chihrinima),* March 30, 1978. One must keep in mind that the capitulation rights granted to European citizens allowed them greater privileges and freedom compared to the native population. Therefore, many people who could afford it, bought European citizenship. This practice was prevalent all over the Middle East.
11. Information on the activities of Chamber of Commerce, which are mainly meetings for discussion of business affairs, are provided in many issues of *Chihrinima.*
12. *Chihrinima,* vol. 21, no. 1 (February 9, 1925), p. 22.
13. *Chihrinima,* vol. 35, no. 1 (April 1938), p. 70.
14. *Chihrinima,* vol. 24, no. 14 (February 1928), p. 19.

15. *Chihrinima,* vol. 21, no. 6 (April 24, 1925), p.6.
16. *Chihrinima,* vol. 21, no. 2 (February 24, 1925), p. 17.
17. Ibid., p. 19.
18. *Chihrinima,* vol. 21, no. 7 (May 24, 1925), p. 31.
19. *Chihrinima,* vol. 23, no. 6 (November 6, 1926), p. 19.
20. Letter from Mr Mu'addab-zada, March 30, 1978.
21. *Chihrinima,* vol. 24, no. 2 (August 1, 1927), p. 15.
22. Letter from Mr Mu'addab-zada, March 30, 1978.
23. At the turn of the century, Cairo was basically divided into two sections, east (in which Sayyidna Husayn was located) and the west (where thousands of foreigners lived). While the east remained a medieval Arab city, the west was 'a complex matrix of novel circumstances, new techniques and new transport, new money, new social habits, and a new sort of traveler.' See J.Aldridge, *Cairo,* p. 196.
24. *Chihrinima,* vol. 35, no. 1 (April 1938), p. 69.
25. C.Issawi, 'Asymmetrical Development,' p. 390.
26. *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 15 (February 14, 1930), pp. 8–10.
27. *Chihrinima,* vol. 27, no. 15 (April 18, 1931), p. 18.
28. *Chihrinima,* vol. 39, no. 2 (May 1942), p. 6.
29. Letter from Mr Mu'addab-zada, March 30, 1978.
30. *Chihrinima,* vol. 35, no. 1 (April 1938), p. 69.
31. *Chihrinima,* vol. 21, no. 2 (February 24, 1925), p. 15.
32. *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 16, (February 20, 1930), p. 14.
33. *Chihrinima,* vol. 27, no. 4 (September 9, 1930), p. 27.
34. *Chihrinima,* vol. 44, no. 11 (February 1948), p. 14.
35. Full name is not given.
36. *Chihrinima,* vol. 31, no. 75 (March 1935), p. 18.
37. *Chihrinima,* vol. 44, no. 11 (February, 1948), p. 14.
38. *Chihrinima,* vol. 32, no. 76 (June 15, 1935), p. 5.
39. *Chihrinima,* vol. 32, no. 83 (March 1936), p. 9.
40. *Chihrinima,* vol. 33, no. 4 (July 1936), p. 10.
41. Ibid., p. 28.
42. *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 7 (October 3, 1929), p. 15.
43. A company usually had several looms.
44. *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 7 (October 3, 1929), p. 14.
45. *Chihrinima,* vol. 44, no. 11 (February 1948), p. 14.
46. *Chihrinima,* vol. 50, no. 4 (July 1953), p. 12.
47. A gum like substance exuded from a ferula and used for medicinal purposes.
48. *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 7 (October 3, 1929), p. 7.
49. Ibid.
50. *Chihrinima,* vol. 32, no. 76 (June 15, 1935), pp. 10–16.
51. *Chihrinima,* vol. 40, no. 8 (November 1943). p. 10.
52. *Chihrinima,* vol. 42, no. 4 (July 1945), p. 12.
53. Ibid.
54. *Chihrinima,* vol. 44. no. 4 (July 1947), p. 12.
55. *Chihrinima,* vol. 45. no. 8 (December 1948), p. 17.
56. Ibid.
57. *Chihrinima,* vol. 24. no. 2 (August 1927), p. 5.
58. *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 1 (June 8, 1929), p. 3.

59. *Chihrinima,* vol. 23, no. 2 (August 10, 1926), p. 13.
60. *Chihrinima,* vol. 27, no. 12 (February 18, 1931), p. 1.
61. *Chihrinima,* vol. 23, no. 15 (May 4,1927), p. 20.
62. Letter from Mr Mu'addab-zada, March 30, 1978.
63. 'Ajam is an Arabic word meaning non-Arab. However, it came to denote Persians particularly. This writer was born and raised in Iraq in an Iranian emigrant family and was well acquainted with this expression.
64. *Chihrinima,* vol. 22, no. 10 (February 29, 1926), p. 3.
65. *Chihrinima,* vol. 49, no. 10 (March 1953), p. 6.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 7.
69. *Chihrinima,* vol. 23, no. 13 (March 4, 1927), p. 9.
70. Ibid.
71. *Chihrinima,* vol. 24, no. 14 (February 17, 1928), p. 17.
72. *Chihrinima,* vol. 35, no. 11 (December 12, 1928), p. 3.
73. *Chihrinima,* vol. 55, no. 6 (November 1, 1958), p. 9.
74. *Chihrinima,* vol. 22, no. 4 (November 22, 1925) p. 25.
75. *Chihrinima,* vol. 31, no. 79 (October 25, 1935) p. 2.
76. Ibid. The assimilation theme and laments of *Chihrinima* concerning it are evident throughout. For example see *Chihrinima,* vol. 26, no. 19 (May 3, 1930), p. 2 and vol. 28, no. 31 (April 7, 1932) p. 21.
77. *Chihrinima,* vol. 31, no. 65 (May 14, 1934), p. 18.
78. *Chihrinima,* vol. 37, no. 8 (December, 1940), p. 9.

Al-Muwailihi's Criticism of Shawqi's Introduction

Mattityahu Peled

In a recently published paper Roger Allen draws attention to the importance of the criticism, levelled by Muhammad al-Muwailihi at Ahmad Shawqi's Introduction to the first publication of the *Shawqiyyat* for understanding the earlier phases of modern Arabic literature.[1] With the passage of time both the Introduction and the Criticism seem to be gaining a great deal as major statements of two prominent Egyptian literary figures at the turn of the century. It is no wonder that these documents appear now to merit even closer study.

Abd al-Hayy Diyab was probably the first contemporary scholar to show that there is in these documents a great deal more than a record of personal rivalry of the rather typical sort for those days.[2] In his valuable and lucid presentation of the critical situation of the time he places each one of them in context, thus enabling us to see clearly the nature of the intracultural conflict within which they were born. The advantage of Diyab's approach is that it helps to overcome the mistaken impression of Shawqi's Introduction as 'a confused jumble' which Allen evidently shares.[3] In fact, this was al-Muwailihi's main criticism against Shawqi's view on poetry and for a long time no one challenged its validity. The argument which readers found most impressive in the Criticism is summarized as follows: at first Shawqi speaks very highly of Arab poets such as al-Ma'arri and al-Mutanabbi, but soon after that he claims that having knocked at poetry's door —meaning Arab poetry—he had found only unpoetic *diwans*.[4]

Yet, strange as it may be, this representation of Shawqi's argument is inaccurate. What Shawqi really said was: 'I knocked at poetry's door *without knowing as much about it then as I know now*. All I found were *diwans* of the dead…and *qasidas* by the living which merely imitated the ancients.'[5] The underlined qualification is of the essence of Shawqi's argument, which becomes very clear in Diyab's book. For the situation of Arabic poetry facing Shawqi in his youth was indeed lamentable, and a young intellectual could understandably know no more of it than was being written in his days. The realistic evaluation of the situation had nothing to do with the excellence of ancient Arabic poetry which Shawqi apparently learned to appreciate only after he began writing poetry of his own. As Diyab shows the very desire for a renaissance of Arabic poetry sprang from the realization that Arabic poetry had degenerated into sheer metre and rhyme. Only after the Barudian renaissance re-discovered the long neglected ancient poetry was it possible to appreciate that those ancient *diwans* were anything more than '*diwans* of the dead'. Thus al-Muwailihi's accusation of

Shawqi that he had displayed inconsistency by first admiring some of the ancient poets and then telling of his distaste for the poetic situation in his youth, before knowing of poetry as much as he came to know subsequently, is one of the weakest points in his Criticism.

Al-Muwailihi's anger at Shawqi clearly stems from the latter's frank admiration for Western poetry, which he came to appreciate before developing a more profound understanding of ancient Arabic poetry. He refuses to admit the validity of Shawqi's criticism of poetry as he had perceived it only because it placed Western poetry above Arabic poetry. However, criticism of the then contemporary Arabic poetry was not voiced exclusively by admirers of Western poetry. Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i, who was very suspicious of any sign of admiration for Western values, had recorded criticism against contemporary Arabic poetry and poetic values that was in no way less severe than that of Shawqi's.[6] Such criticism became inevitable after Barudi, though it took on two different aspects: the conservative and the innovative. According to Diyab, al-Rafi'i voices the conservative sentiment while Shawqi is clearly an innovator, and this is precisely the reason al-Muwailihi attacks the latter so fiercely. At times it seems indeed that out of resentment to Shawqi's uninhibited admiration for Western poetry and his willingness to adopt Western aesthetic values, al-Muwailihi employed every means at his disposal to discredit him. He thus failed Shawqi as a critic in the manner indicated, he criticised the poetry Shawqi wrote and even denied his ability to write prose by means of petty linguistic pedantries which were indeed not infrequently considered to be the essence of literary criticism.[7]

That not all of Shawqi's readers were so unfavourably impressed with his prose we can see in the praise it gained from the pen of Shakib Arslan, himself a master of prose writing.[8]

> And of Shawqi's prose I consider the best to be his Introduction to the first edition of the *shawqiyyat,* and I do not know why they have omitted it in the second edition. For there he has distinguished himself above the [prose] writers just as he has distinguished himself in his *diwan* above the poets.

But of much greater interest is the question of Shawqi's ideas on poetry; how are they to be understood? Clearly Shawqi did not mean to give in his Introduction a precise statement of the theoretical principles of poetry. The whole document is written as an autobiography explaining the nature of the poetry of his first *diwan* which reflects the author's development as a poet, and the circumstances which brought about the publication of the *diwan.* B ut his concept of poetry comes out nevertheless unmistakeable as that of an open minded, forward looking poet anxious to expose his readers to a new and foreign kind of poetry. That many years later Taha Husain could still complain that he knew of 'no clear credo *('aqida)* of Shawqi's regarding poetry'[9] is probably more indicative of the need Egyptian intellectuals had felt, after a period of far reaching intellectual agitation, for concise statements of faith, than of Shawqi's muddled thinking.

Perhaps Shawqi's moderate views and restrained behaviour looked undecisive to Taha Husain who had himself undergone acute transformation from rigid conservatism to radical modernism.[10] But when viewed against a wider perspective Shawqi's ideas are clear and straightforward.

The scheme outlined by Diyab is very useful indeed in this respect. He distinguishes between the renaissance of critical thinking *(al-nahda al-adabiyya)* and the innovative trend in criticism *(haraqat al-tajdid fi al-naqd)* as two distinct phases of development in modern Arabic critical thinking. Very significantly he places al-Muwailihi with a group of critics who had certainly contributed considerably to Arabic literary renaissance but had nothing to do with modernizing literature or with critical thinking. The distinction is fundamental, for Shawqi on the other hand is placed among the innovators who were continually criticised by the conservatives. This insight into the nature of innovation, which recognizes that innovation had actually come on the heels of renaissance *(nahda)* but renaissance *per se* is not necessarily innovation, must be regarded as Diyab's unique contribution to our understanding of that important phase of modern Egypt's intellectual development. In the case of the Barudian renaissance it seems clear that although it was occasioned by the encounter with the modern world it was essentially conservative in nature. Diyab's succint definition of the process is worthquoting:[11]

> We shall discuss in this book the critical heritage as it had developed before the emergence of the 'new generation school', and we shall notice that it had taken two directions: The first one was that which took place in the second half of 19th century and consisted merely of resurrection and awakening *(wa kana ba'than wa yaqzatan faqat),* for it took literary criticism back to the heyday of Arabic criticism and literature of the 4th century of the Muslim era and its aftermath.
>
> The second was the innovative trend that followed this resurrection and awakening of literary criticism and was developed by the pioneers [of innovation]…

If we accept this categorization, as I believe we should, then an important deduction which Allen draws from his analysis of the situation as depicted by the documents under consideration, must be seriously questioned. He is suggesting that al-Muwailihi's criticism of Shawqi reflects the resentment of the neo-classical tradition to 'alien interpolation'.[12] Such formulation calls for a clearer definition of the term 'neo-classicism' in this context.

The term is a neologism introduced into the study of modern Arabic literature as a practical means of classification. As defined by Mustafa M. Badawi[13] the neo-classical period begins with al-Barudi and includes both Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim. Neo-classicism in this sense,

> unlike 'the neo-classicism of English and French poetry, has no 'philosophical' foundations. It does not rest upon a theory that clearly

> delimits the role of reason and the imagination, nor does it assume the principle that 'generality' is a principle that the poet must follow. Nevertheless, it is clearly based upon the assumption that there are absolute and immutable rules and standards of judgement, valid for all time, to be found in the works of a glorious period of the past, and that the task of the poet is to imitate creatively these works.

If we take this definition as applicable to the term 'neo-classicism' used by Allen for explaining al-Muwailihi's resentment to Shawqi, we are clearly faced with a contradiction of terms. According to Badawi, Shawqi is part of the neoclassical tradition. The dificulty is augmented when we notice that Allen places Hafiz at the side of al-Muwailihi as equally critical of Shawqi for the same reason. Apart from placing Shawqi outside the camp of the neo-classicists, Allen's conclusion would also have us place Hafiz alongside al-Muwailihi for another reason—namely because they were both 'deeply committed to the nationalist causes of their day, so that any attempt to incorporate alien elements into this [neo-classical] tradition may have been regarded as more than a mere literary threat'.[14] Thus, rather than help clarify the situation Allen's interpretation seems to lead us into ever greater and probably unnecessary complications.

Here again Diyab's scheme spares us the unnecessary involvement in matters that at best must remain dubious, while at the same time relieving us of the need for generalities which do not seem to be helpful. According to Diyab Hafiz too is to be placed with Shawqi as an innovator whose critical horizons spread far beyond those of al-Muwailihi. Hafiz's own *qasida 'al-shi'r',* which Diyab cites in support of his categorization, can leave no doubt as to his basic critical view which is similar to that of Shawqi's.[15] He too deplores the poetic situation of his day ridiculing the blind imitation of the great masters, which turns poetry into something contemptible. The solution can be found, according to Hafiz, only in breaking the old shackles and breathing the 'northern wind':

aana ya shi'r an nafukka quyuda
qayyadatna biha du 'atu-l-muhal

farfa'ua hadhihi al-kama'ima 'anna
wada'una nashummu riha-1-shimal

It would be easy to quote passages of Hafiz admiring the great poetry of the past, but this would not place him in a position of one contradicting himself as al-Muwailihi would have us place Shawqi. Allen seems to base his argument that Hafiz should be considered as lending support to al-Muwailihi's criticism of Shawqi on a discussion of the latters poetry in *layali satih*.[16] The evidence is far from conclusive and the passage quoted there may well represent a discussion of Shawqi's poetry as it had actually taken place at the time.

Taking then both Shawqi and Hafiz to be innovators as defined by Diyab, we are now faced with the further question of their relation to the so-called neo-classical

school of which al-Muwailihi may indeed be a true representative. The difficulty here is that in essence Arabic neo-classicism as defined by Badawi is a formal concept revering classical forms as superior to any other form. It can therefore be argued that whenever the tendency to adhere to traditional form is discernible we are faced with neo-classicism. Thus, Muhammad Mandur could very plausibiy suggest that the poetry of *jama'* at *al-diwan,* which Badawi classifies as romantic, should be considered as neo-classical because it has practically adopted André Chénier's motto *sur ces pensers nouveaux faisons des vers antiques*.[17] But form as such does not seem to have been the issue at all in the literary battles of which our two documents are but isolated specimens. What really mattered very much to the disputants was indeed the 'philosophical' foundations underlying the poetic creation.

The accepted demarcation of the various 'philosophies' of the different tendencies has always been that of conservatives, middle-of-the-road and modernists.[18] As far as form was concerned all displayed remarkable adherence to traditional rhyme and metre. Even motives *(ma'ani)* did not always occasion disagreement since conservatives had no hesitation to use modern themes in their poetry.[19] Yet all this seeming consensus could not spare poets and critics the agony of fierce disputes. Most uncomfortable was the position of the middle-of-the-road school as can clearly be seen in Shawqi's own experience. While being bitterly criticised by al-Muwailihi the conservative he was not spared the most vituperate criticism from al-'Aqqad the modernist leader of the *diwan* group. What angered the former was Shawqi's obvious sympathy for Western models of poetry; what incensed the latter was Shawqi's ready compromise with conservative norms.[20] In his lengthy criticism of Shawqi's Elegy to Mustafa Kamil al-'Aqqad denigrates as faults basic conventions of traditional poetry none of which is directly formal.[21] So also, al-Muwailihi finds no real formal faults in Shawqi's poetry, except as regards the use of a random word. What really bothered both critics about Shawqi's poetry was the 'philosophy' underlying it. So it seems that if we accept the term 'neo-classical' as an attribute of the conservative tendency—which is justifiable—then we must consider both Shawqi and Hafiz by at least one remove further up the road to modernism from the neo-classicists.

The next question is whether this more progressive group can be characterised by such term as pre-romantic, which would be inevitable according to Badawi's formulation. For to him Mutran is the typical preromantic and there can be no marked difference between him and Shawqi either in tendency or philosophy, that would impel us to regard them as representing different schools. When we read Shawqi's evaluation of Mutran we find that he had admired him for being perhaps somewhat more deft than himself in overcoming conservative opposition to innovative tendencies.[22] Perhaps this is the reason why most Arab scholars still regard both poets as representing the middle-of-the-road school or 'the innovative-traditional trend' according to Diyab in his book on the poetry of al-'Aqqad.[23] By placing Shawqi outside the neo-classical tradition, as Allen is doing, he is inevitably placed with Mutran within the pre-romantic school, which is a conclusion Allen seems to accept in the concluding remarks of his paper.[24] Yet the question remains: What is the use of imposing this kind of terminology on a

phenomenon which is perfectly accounted for in terms of the conflict between old and new *(al-qadim wa al-hadith)* which is how Arab scholarship regards it.

Viewed in this way al-Muwailihi's criticism becomes much more significant. It is not concerned mainly with a polemic on poetry but encompasses a great deal more. As Allen rightly points out al-Muwailihi was no hater of Western culture *per se*[25] but like al-Rafi'i and other conservatives he wished to ensure that whatever Western influence is allowed to manifest itself in the resurging Arab literature it should always assume an Arabic appearance.[26] The difference between the conservative and modern attitude can be defined in psychological terms. The former is guided by an introvert state of mind endeavouring to adjust its disturbed relations to the outer world by falling back on known and familiar norms, while the latter is guided by an extrovert willingness to relate itself to alien norms. It is therefore characteristic that al-Muwailihi repudiated not only Shawqi's innovative inclination in poetry but rejected systematically all its manifestations throughout the Introduction. In fact the Criticism is much more concerned with the autobiographical aspect of the Introduction than with poetry which after all gets only a scant treatment from al-Muwailihi.

But there is an interesting difference in the way he treats the two issues. He is fully aware of the theoretical dimension of Shawqi's discussion on poetry, and consequently presents a theoretical case of his own to confront it. However his treatment of the purely autobiographical components of the Introduction is done in the strictly traditional terms of Arabic literary criticism with no apparent awareness of the theoretical question which is involved in adopting an entirely new genre of writing. In fact, al-Muwailihi never accuses Shawqi of doing that. He seems to have fought the foreignness of Shawqi's autobiographical writing without recognizing the model. This is significant because this too may indicate that al-Muwailihi's strongest motive in attacking Shawqi was not so much xenophobia as a genuine care for traditional values.

This is well illustrated in the instances where his argument against Shawqi involves matters which, strictly speaking, lie outside the realm of literature. For example, his criticism of Shawqi's treatment of the principle of inheritance. Shawqi says of his father[27] that although he had wasted in his youth all his inheritance, he nevertheless managed to live comfortably for the rest of his life. Then in his turn he left nothing to his son Shawqi who remarks that it looked as though his father preferred him too 'not to live off the leftovers of the dead' *(an la aqtata min fadalati al-mawta).* Regardless of the literary merits of the story, this attitude is unacceptable to al-Muwailihi, himself heir to considerable wealth.[28] He considers this a case of *sahw,* a term traditionally signifying in literary criticism an unbecoming expression resulting from inattentiveness to propriety. For 'ever since Adam inheritance has been regarded as one of the most virtuous means of living, and you cannot say of a rich man who has inherited property or of a king who has inherited a kingdom that he is living off the leftovers of the dead.'[29]

But al-Muwailihi's real difficulty lies in the very way Shawqi treats autobiographical data, and his criticism reflects his utter dislike for exposure of one's inner life so alien to Arab tradition. When he discusses this aspect of the Introduction the disagreement between author and critic is no longer over aesthetic values but over much more fundamental cultural values.

Historically Arabic literature abhors a too personalized biographical writing. As von Grunebaum has shown depersonalization of its most admired sons enabled the Arab to revere them as types or models attesting to God's unlimited grace.[30] A modern editor of a classical biography could therefore rightly say[31] that what it offered was *'une biographie sans profoundeur'*. For, as he explains: 'De toute manière, il faut avouer qu'al-Anbari ne pouvait pas satisfaire notre curiosité, car il ne fut guère qu'un savant fidel à son époque.'

A biographer of a scholar, or a scholar biographer, was expected to report important dates in his life, the names of his teachers and disciples, books he had written and such like. Personal meditations, even mental afflictions, are known to have been reported. But any detailed truly personal story is ruled out. As von Grunebaum remarks; 'the opening of the inner life as subject and problem of literary endeavor is one of the most significant results of contact with the West.[32]

While Shawqi offers a clear example of such opening of his truly personal life as a subject to be brought before the public, al-Muwailihi demonstrates the abhorence with which his culture looked on this kind of novelty. This he does by attacking almost every instance of a truly personal story, but without being able to put his finger on the literary problem involved. His criticism is couched in strictly traditional terms of literary criticism and denounces the autobiographical anecdote as unacceptable by norms of good writing. The impression is very much that al-Muwailihi did not quite understand what Shawqi had really done.

The third part of the Criticism opens with the proverb *a'udhu bi allahi min qawlat ana* and proceeds to accuse Shawqi of entering in his Introduction 'upon a course of talking of himself which no poet has ever entered before him'.[33] The most we saw them do, continues al-Muwailihi, was 'telling of their roots in literature not of their roots in lineage'. They might mention their teachers and masters, 'but the honourable poet [i.e. Shawqi] mentions four roots of his lineage and not one of his literature'.

In sum, al-Muwailihi finds that Shawqi is remiss on four grounds: he displays vanity, negligence, verbosity and guilelessness. *(al-zahw wa al-sahw wa al-hashw wa salamat al-niyya)* all of which are revealed in the process of exposing his personal life.[34] Not once does he suggest that Shawqi is introducing a new genre, though Shawqi takes pride in his diverse attempts to introduce new genres into Arabic literatures.[35]

As a case of vanity al-Muwailihi quotes[36] from the Introduction the passage in which Shawqi apologizes for not having his picture reproduced in the *diwan* and explains why he did accede to a request to include autobiographical episodes in his Introduction. However the quotation stops short of the sentence in which Shawqi shows that he was fully aware of the novelty of his writing, trusting that it will be met with his friends' approval: 'I apologize therefore for acceding to this request on condition that my story be considered as being told among loving friends'.

Al-Muwailihi, however, took no heed of Shawqi's plea, having omitted to mention it. For him all this is a case of compounded vanity as are several other instances in the Introduction. Other faults are mentioned which also bring down al-Muwailihi's wrath.[37] The atmosphere created by such bitterness could not fail to affect Shawqi. He must have found the resentment against himself swelling in many quarters. The kind of compliments *à double entente* he occasionally

received from close friends is illustrated in the episode of Shaykh Ali al-Laythi which al-Muwailihi quotes as a case of *salamat al-niyya*.[38]

> I was told once by the late master of conviviality Shaykh Ali al-Laythi, who said:—I met your father when you were still an unborn fetus, and he told me a dream he had. I said to him jokingly: a son is soon to be born to you who will rend, as the saying goes, a rending in Islam *(yakhriqu kharqan fi al-islam).*
>
> Then it had come to pass that I visited the shaykh when he was lying in his death bed. He held in his hand a copy of *al-Ahram* and hastened to address me saying:- This is the meaning of your father's dream, O Shawqi. For, by God, no one in Islam has said anything like that before you.—And what is that? said I.—Your *qasida,* said he, describing the ball[39] in which you say at the beginning:
>
> *haffa ka'saha al-hababu fahyya fiddatun dhahabu*
>
> here it is in my hand and I am reading it. I begged refuge with God and said to him:- Thank God Who made this the 'rending' *(kharq),* for Islam has not been harmed by me a farthing's worth.

The situation must have been very delicate, what with the old shaykh lying there very sick in bed expressing himself in such an ambivalent manner. One cannot help sympathising with Shawqi sticking to his guns not quite certain what the old man really meant. Yet for al-Muwailihi it was as unforgivable an anecdote as all the others. So, omitting in his quotation Shawqi's reply, which shows that he was not as simpleminded as al-Muwailihi attempted to make him look, he adds the following comment.[40]

> Any one who knew shaykh Ali al-Laythi and his bent for elegant jokes would immediately see the thrust of the joke regarding the *kharq* in this Europeanized *qasida.* For had he intended anything other than joking he would have said 'never have the poets said anything like that' rather than 'no one in Islam'. But the honourable poet took it with his guilelessness as a compliment and a praise.

Al-Muwailihi thus accomplished two things with one stroke. First, he placed at his own side shaykh al-Laythi in disliking the distasteful *qasida* with its 'gatherings of entertainment and music, dancing and revelry, shapely figures and cheeks and busts and female breasts and throats and necklaces.'[41] Second, he took this opportunity to ridicule once more Shawqi's bewildering manner of divulging personal episodes which tradition precludes from being published as literature.

As Allen shows, Shawqi could not remain indifferent to this kind of abuse. Shawqi Daif, in his book on modern Arabic literature in Egypt, remarks:[42]

> We suspect that this erroneous criticism had an adverse influence on Shawqi, for he began to doubt his own attempts at innovation…Perhaps we shall not exaggerate in saying that it was this [criticism] which turned him towards imitating the ancient poets, in order to show his superiority over them and to convince al-Muwailihi and people like him among the conservatives that he was not inferior to the ancient poets in excellence and skill.

All this bespeaks the agony that befell a pioneering though perhaps not a very daring spirit. Some of Shawqi's closest friends must have realized the ordeal he had undergone and stood up bravely for him. Shakib Arslan was such a one: 'I became the executioner of Shawqi's enemies *(wa kuntu jalladan li a 'da' Shawqi)*', he said.[43]

NOTES

1. Roger Allen, 'Poetry and Poetic Criticism at the Turn of the Century', *Studies in Modern Arabic Literature,* ed. R.C.Ostle, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1975, pp. 1–17. Shawqi's Diwan was published in Cairo, 1898. For al-Muwailihi's Criticism see 'naqd diwan Shawqi', *mukhtarat al-Manfaluti,* Cairo n.d., pp. 138–57. The Criticism was first published serially in 1900 in *misbah al-sharq.* The documents will be referred to as Introduction and Criticism.
2. Abd al-Hayy Diyab, *al-turath al-naqdi,* Cairo 1968. Allen, p. 2 stresses the role personal rivalries played in the literary debates at the time.
3. Allen, p. 11.
4. Introduction, pp. 5–8; Criticism, pp. 145–6. For a summary of al-Muwailihi's argument, see Allen, p. 3.
5. Introduction, p. 7; Criticism, p. 145. The translation is from Allen, p. 2.
6. Diyab, *op. cit.* p. 72 where very few quotations from al-Rafi'i's extensive criticism of contemporary poetry are given.
7. Diyab op. cit. p. 63 concludes a summary of al-Muwailihi's Criticism as follows: 'these examples of al-Muwailihi's criticism show us that his criticism was subjectively linguistic which indicates that he was influenced by the customary critical tendencies of the ancient books of criticism'. Diyab adds that this kind of criticism is disappointing coming from the pen of al-Muwailihi.
8. Shakib Arslan, *Shawqi aw sadaqat arba 'in sana,* Cairo 1936, p. 51.
9. Taha Husain, *Hafiz wa Shawqi,* Cairo, 1966, p. 13. Cf. also Allen, pp. 11–12. What Taha Husain expected from a poet was a clear statement of his principles like that given by Mutran in his introduction to his collected poems. See *ibid.* p. 12.
10. Diyab, *op. cit.* pp. 78–83, where Taha Husain's s earlier views are discussed together with those of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i as representative of the 'traditional trend in criticism' *(al-ittijah al-taqlidi fi al-naqd).*
11. *Op.cit.* p. 11.
12. Allen, p. 11.
13. M.M.Badawi, *An Anthology of Modern Arabic Verse,* Oxford, 1970, p. xi.

14. Allen, *ibid.*
15. Diyab, *op. cit.* p. 103.
16. Allen, p. 8–9.
17. Muhammad Mandur, *al-shi'r ai-misri ba'd Shawqi,* Cairo, n.d. p. 109. For Badawi's definition see *op. cit.* p. xv.
18. Cf.Mahir Hasan Fahmi, *tatawwur al-shi'r al-'arabi al-hadith,* Cairo 1958, where each one of these tendencies is discussed in detail.
19. Abd al-Hayy Diyab, *sha 'iriyyat al-'Aqqad fi mizan al-naqd al-hadith,* Cairo 1969, p. 14.
20. Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad and Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, *al-diwan,* part one, 1921 p. 33 et seq.
21. See *op. cit. 'ratha li Mustafa Kamil',* p. 44 et. seq. The four faults enumerated by al-'Aqqad are all *ma'nawiyya,* i.e. relate to substance rather than form: incoherence *(tafakkuk),* absurdity *(ihala),* traditionalism *(taqlid)* and fondness for the non-essential *(al-wulu bi al-a'rad duna al-jawahir).*
22. Introduction, p. 9: 'I cannot but praise my friend Khalil Mutran…who combines the style of the Europeans in writing poetry with the way of the Arabs'.
23. *Op. cit.* p. 17. The use of this term, in the context of a general review of the phases modern poetry had gone through is appropriate. The earlier term namely 'the innovators', used in a review of the earlier phases only, to describe the same group of poets, was appropriate in that context.
24. Allen, p. 13.
25. *Ibid.*
26. For a discussion of al-Rafi'i's views see M. Peled, The Controversy over Concepts of Arabic Literary History', *Asian and African Studies, v.* 10, no. 1 (1974), pp. 1–23.
27. Introduction, p. 14.
28. Muhammad al-Muwailihi was the grandson of Cairo's *sir-tujjar* under Muhammad Ali. His father Ibrahim, more famous for his literary activities, was also a prosperous merchant. Cf. Shawqi Daif, *al-adad al-'arabi al-mu'asir fi Misr,* maktabat al-dirasat al-adabiyya no. 4, pp. 234 ff.
29. Criticism, p. 151.
30. G.von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam,* Chicago 1962, pp. 21 ff.
31. Attia Amer, *nuzhat al-alibba fi tabaqat al-udaba d'al-Anbari,* Stockholm 1963, p. xxii.
32. G.von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam,* New York 1964 p. 181. Taha Badr, in *tatawwur al-riwaya al-'arabiyya al-haditha fi Misr,* Cairo 1968, ch. 3 traces the development of the autobiographical novel in Arabic literature and furnishes further illustrations of the same development.
33. Criticism, p. 148.
34. Criticism, p. 148. The symmetry between the number of faults found by al-Muwailihi and those found by al-'Aqqad (see note 21) is striking.
35. Introduction, pp. 8–9.
36. Criticism, p. 149, Introduction, p. 13.
37. Criticism, pp. 151–4.
38. Introduction, p. 15; Criticism, pp. 152–3.

39. A poem describing a ball at the Abdin Palace, *shawqiyyat,* 1898, p. 30.
40. Criticism, p. 153.
41. Criticism, p. 157.
42. *Op. cit.* p. 236.
43. *Op. cit.* p. 38.

Urban Elites and the Foundation of Municipalities in Alexandria and Istanbul

Steven Rosenthal

In a rich and stimulating article Professor Gabriel Baer has compared early municipal reform in Alexandria with that in Istanbul.[1] Both cities were distinguished by a European and Europeanized merchant population familiar with and desirous of Western municipal institutions, services and amenities. While a municipality enjoying a large measure of autonomy was inaugurated in the foreign section of Istanbul in 1858, a similar institution was not introduced in the Egyptian city until 1890. Professor Baer attributes this disparity in municipal development to the difference in the response of the diplomatic community in each city to the possible foundation of a municipality. In Alexandria the European consuls perceived municipal reform as a threat to their treaty rights. 'In contrast with other parts of the Ottoman Empire, it was the customary privilege of foreigners in Egypt that no tax whatever could be imposed on them unless it was sanctioned by a specific international convention.'[2] Hence the diplomatic community of Alexandria was unwilling to concede the taxing privilege which was a prerequisite to the successful functioning of the new municipality. In addition the consuls feared that since foreigners made up less than one third of the population, 'there would be no guarantee for an adequate representation of the European community.'[3] For both these reasons the consular authorities refused to sanction the development of municipal institutions in Alexandria.

In Istanbul, according to Professor Baer, the situation was different. Internal taxes could be levied upon Europeans and the area in which municipal reform first took place was inhabited primarily by foreigners. The diplomatic corps could not object to a new internal tax and was presumably less fearful of losing control of a municipality located in a predominantly European area.[4] Thus the foreign consuls voiced no objection to the experimental municipality which was inaugurated in the Galata section of Istanbul in July, 1858. In the absence of extensive data dealing with the municipality of Galata, Professor Baer wisely uses the example of municipal reform in Istanbul primarily to set off and contrast his much more extensive data on Alexandria.

Recent research in the British and Ottoman Archives and in contemporary journals has produced evidence which demonstrates that the views of municipal reform in Istanbul presented by Professor Baer call for some modification. The difference in municipal development between Alexandria and the Ottoman capital cannot be explained merely by diplomatic opposition in the former and

diplomatic acquiescence in the latter. The attitude of the foreign consuls toward municipalities in both cities had much more in common than has hitherto been suspected. In any case both the impetus behind the formation of the experimental municipality and the determina tion of its success was not the exclusive province of the diplomatic community, but the product of a complex interaction between the embassies, the Porte, and the inhabitants of Galata.

Galata, the foreign section of Istanbul, had always had a unique relationship to the other parts of the capital. Sharing the European side of the Bosphorus with the old city of Stambul, Galata was cut off from that seat of empire and tradition by the muddy and slow-moving waters of the Golden Horn. Separated from both Asia and Stambul, Galata had long been the seat of alien influences. Even before the Turkish conquest it had been the site of the Genoese commercial colony whose activities had gradually sapped the Byzantine Empire of its economic vitality. After the Turkish conquest of 1453 the suburb retained its foreign and commercial character. When in the seventeenth century European commercial contacts were supplemented by political ones, Galata became the site of permanent European embassies. The embassies increased their power and influence within the district in inverse proportion to Ottoman decay, and by 1850 about half of the district's inhabitants, including many native Ottomans, possessed foreign citizenship.[5] This state of affairs was based upon the so-called Capitulations granted by the Ottomans to the various European powers as a part of commercial treaties or after military defeats. Resting upon the assumptions that Islamic civilization was vastly different from that of Europe and that Ottoman administration was so corrupt that it was unthinkable to permit Europeans to be subject to local authority, the Capitulations gave the embassies almost complete control over their citizens. Foreigners within the Empire were not subject to local administrative or judicial authority, and any crime committed by a foreigner on Turkish soil could be prosecuted only by the embassy which protected him.

This legal system, originally designed to protect the relatively small numbers of diplomats and merchants resident in the empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was quickly expanded by the European powers. Ottoman citizens, under the rubric of a real or ostensible connection with an embassy, were enrolled on protected lists, often at a price.[6] Their new European citizenship removed them from the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts and in many cases had the effect of freeing the new citizen from the necessity of paying taxes to the Ottoman government, since foreigners were exempt from most internal taxes. Moreover, as each European power tried to pose as the protector of religious minorities within the empire, large numbers of Greeks, Armenians and Jews were added to the protected lists and accorded the status of European citizens. By 1858 Galata had a population of approximately 237,000 and over 100,000 were classified as Europeans.[7] The vast majority of these, however, were native Ottoman Christians who had been granted protective citizenship in accordance with the Capitulations. In addition 25,000 Jews, 32,000 Greeks, and 28,000 Armenians who had not obtained foreign citizenship resided within the district. Galata's 40,000 Muslims represented but a small portion of the district's population.[8] From a legal point of view Professor Baer is correct in stating that foreigners predominated in Galata but the foreign population was made up of a

small number of diplomats and native Europeans, and a much larger component of non-Muslims born and bred within the Empire. In addition to this cleavage within the foreign population the poorer Greeks, Armenians, and Jews who had not obtained foreign citizenship were divided into autonomous self-administered communities known as *millets*.

Galata's multitude of nationalities, religions, and social classes reflected the heterogeneity of the empire as a whole. The reconciliation of the emerging national aspirations of these subject *millets* with the traditional concept of the Ottoman state posed the chief domestic problem of Ottoman administration in the nineteenth century. The concentration of such diversity into the limited area of Galata, the resulting urban problems of congestion, crime, and disease, the influence of the foreign embassies through direct pressure and indirect example, and the ambitions and pretentions of the emerging European and native bourgeoisie exemplified the problems of imperial administration and gave them a special urgency. Municipal reform in Istanbul was therefore an integral part of the general Ottoman effort to revive its administration and to revitalize the Empire. An examination of the roles played in the reform of the capital by the inhabitants of Galata, by the Ottoman government, and by the diplomatic community will reveal that the foundation of a municipality was not exclusively determined by the diplomatic community but was the result of a complex interaction between all three participants.

The role of the native non-Muslim class of Galata in encouraging the foundation of a municipality is clearcut and its motivations had much in common with those of the merchant community of Alexandria. The merchants of Galata were the principal beneficiaries of the great increase in trade following the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of 1838. Their accumulation of new wealth and foreign contacts in the intervening years gradually extended their vision beyond that of the counting house. New commercial opportunities stimulated a wave of foreign immigration and the new arrivals encouraged and reinforced the non-Muslim's sense of Europeanness and their desire to emulate the life of the great cities of the Continent. The decade of the 1840s was marked by the foundation of an opera house,[9] of an exclusive men's club,[10] and of various national friendship societies. The inhabitants of Galata began to demand the amenities of European cities and as early as 1849 had formed a commission to study the feasibility of lighting the entire city with gas.[11]

The Crimean War vastly increased the economic and cultural interaction inaugurated by the 1838 treaty of commerce. French-style cafés opened along the district's main street, European carriages came into common use, and French began to vie with Italian as the *lingua franca* of the suburb. The new cosmopolitanism increased the demands of the merchants for Western urban services and amenities. They were now seconded by the French and English diplomatic communities which faced the problems of quartering within the capital the armies bound for Sebastopol.[12] The latter years of the Crimean War were marked by an unsuccessful effort to reform the administration of the capital by means of an advisory commission composed exclusively of Muslims.[13] In 1854 the government created a similar commission composed of foreigners and non-Muslims who were longtime resi dents of the capital. After almost four years of existence marked by many plans but little real achievement, the

members of this commission demanded that their advisory role be converted into one marked by real administrative and financial power.[14] The response of the Porte was to create the municipality of Galata and a council chosen from among property owners of the district was given substantial power to direct the course of municipal reform.

It was Istanbul's position as imperial capital and seat of the diplomatic legations that was a primary factor in the Porte's decision to endow a portion of the city with municipal institutions. The effects of Western cultural penetration had been reinforced by considerations of practical politics. The Crimean War was over and the influence of the French and the British reached new heights. The institution of a programme of municipal reform would meet the longstanding complaints of the Allies about the condition of the capital, demonstrate the empire's capacity for internal regeneration and help establish its credentials as a bona fide member of the European community. An earlier memorandum of the High Council of Reform had noted the exemplary importance of Istanbul to the rest of the empire and to the European powers. 'In other countries the state of the capital is a model, but 'in Istanbul the state of the buildings and of the cleanliness of the city is second rate.'[15] The government's determination to remedy these conditions was highlighted by the sultan's personal interest in the reform of the capital. As early as 1856 gas supplied from the sultan's own factory was used to light a small section of Galata, and Abdul Mecid often visited the district incognito to personally inspect public works and municipal improvements.[16] When the municipality of Galata was inaugurated in 1858 the Porte took great pains to emphasize that the new body was an Ottoman entity. It was stipulated that the municipality be headed by a functionary of the Porte, and that any foreigners on the new municipal council would be known not as members but as 'advisers' *(mu avir)*.[17] When the news of the foundation of the municipality was communicated to the European embassies, the information on the composition of the new body was deliberately omitted as 'purely an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire'.[18] All of this indicates that the Ottoman government was extremely anxious to demonstrate that it could provide the capital and its foreign inhabitants with the services and amenities of a European city. In contrast to Alexandria, the Porte strongly supported the foundation of a municipality in Istanbul. The Porte's strong support of municipal reform in the capital achieves an even greater importance in view of the reaction of the Istanbul diplomatic community to the inauguration of the municipal experiment.

The response of the diplomatic community to the foundation of the municipality was neither so positive nor so based upon economic issues as has been assumed. The embassies' view of the new municipality was somewhat schizophrenic and derived from two conflicting sources. The British and the French, who wielded the most influence with the Porte, would support, at least in principal, any reform that seemed to lead to the revivification of Ottoman administration. The British specifically recognized the importance of reform within the capital. As Sir Henry Bulwer, British ambassador from 1858 to 1865, stated with uncharacteristic succinctness, 'The course taken by social improvement generally is from the great towns and centres throughout the territory they are connected with…and if this city is the seat of a great empire it must gradually and even not slowly extend throughout that Empire generally'.[19]

In certain European diplomatic and political circles the success of municipal reform was presumed to be no less than the key to the revitalization of the entire empire. Such ideas reflected the influence of David Urquhart, a former diplomat and one of the most widely read political commentators of his time. Convinced by the 1830s of the Russian threat to Istanbul, Urquhart wrote voluminously in the hope of rousing England from its apathy by proving that the vast wealth of the empire could be exploited and its political institutions regenerated. The key to both was a revivification of the municipal principles which Urquhart claimed had existed within the empire since ancient times. Urquhart claimed that the prosperity of certain towns within the empire had derived from the fact they had been given the municipal power to assess their own revenue.

> The cause of their rise may be traced most satisfactorily to their social constitution, and can be attributed to nothing else; and in their decline, when they have declined, may be distinguished the excellence of the municipal form of administration by the evils that have immediately followed its corruption.[20]

According to Urquhart, the strengthening of village and town communes and the assuring of their financial independence would prepare the way for increased trade, for profitable exploitation of the empire's agricultural and mineral wealth, and for the reformation of the central government. As a result Urquhart conceived the development of Turkish municipal institutions as

> …a field for diplomatic action of the noblest and most philanthropic character, where our [British] interests are so much at stake as to call forth our most strenuous exertions, and where that interest is so reciprocal as to involve no selfish motives and to introduce no invidious distinctions.[21]

Others familiar with the Ottoman Empire failed to echo Urquhart's optimism. Admiral Adolphus Slade was a sagacious observer whose evaluation of the failures of Ottoman reform may have even influenced the course of Ottoman intellectual history.[22] Writing in 1837, Slade felt it necessary to criticize Urquhart's s *Turkey and its Resources* because 'many persons, out of Turkey have considered it authority'. The admiral considered Urquhart's theory of municipal institutions was imaginary.

> Finding traces of such scattered here and there, like columns of an old temple, he collected them with the spirit of antiquarianism, and ingeniously rebuilt the edifice. Vainly everybody in the East looks for it, though lighted up by the torch of fancy.[23]

Slade's evaluation was supported by the observations of the empire's leading man of letters, Ahmed Vefik Pasha. In a conversation many years later the Pasha

maintained that Slade's books were the best foreign works on Turkey while those of Urquhart, despite their Turcophilism, were among the worst.[24] Yet despite these criticisms, so great was Urquhart's influence that seventeen years after the publication of *Turkey and its Resources,* one traveller still felt it necessary to label the theory of municipalities as a dream. It thus appears that Urquhart's popular influence owed less to the practicability of his municipal theories than to the fact that those theories bolstered the claims of those who felt that the Ottoman Empire could be resurrected. Not only did Urquhart's description of the agricultural and mineral wealth of the Empire demonstrate that the structure was worth saving, but his municipal theory provided a mechanism which appeared to provide the means for the exploitation of those resources and for the internal regeneration of the Ottoman government. By the time of the founding of the Galata Municipal District, the success of Ottoman regeneration had become all the more important to the British and French in view of Allied sacrifices during the Crimean War. Indeed the ideas of Urquhart were no longer the exclusive property of his countrymen. The French *Journal de Constantinople* perceived the foundation of the municipality in distinctly Urquhartian terms. 'Extended from the capital to the provinces municipal councils will be first occupied with the construction of roads and ports, the navigation of rivers and the building of bridges. The richest productions of the soil will no longer be rendered valueless by the simple fact that they cannot be transported to market.'[25] For many, including a portion of the diplomatic community, municipal reform merited strong support as the key to the restoration of the empire.

However much the diplomats may have favoured municipal reform in principle, their response to the actual foundation of a municipality in Istanbul was remarkably consistent with that of their colleagues in Alexandria. Like their counterparts in Egypt, the diplomatic community of Istanbul was concerned above all with defending their capitulatory rights. Every act of the Porte which concerned foreigners, irrespective of its inherent wisdom was judged by this yardstick, and any increase in Ottoman local authority was traditionally resisted as incompatible with the treaty rights of the European powers.[26] It was therefore not surprising that as soon as the formation of the Galata Municipality had been announced, the French immediately suggested a meeting of all the consuls of the Capital to coordinate the response of the foreign legations. The purpose of the meeting was 'to facilitate as much as possible the material amelioration of the city' in a manner 'consistent with the rights and dues of the capitulatory regime'.[27] But it soon became apparent that the protection of treaty rights took precedence over any desire to improve the capital.

The assembled consular officials agreed that it was just to finance municipal improvements by levying a municipal property tax upon foreign citizens.[28] They could hardly have done otherwise. The 1838 Anglo Turkish Treaty of Commerce had conceded to the Ottoman government the right to levy upon British citizens the same internal taxes as those levied upon the most favoured class of Ottoman subjects. In accordance with the 'most favoured nation' provisions, which governed the Porte's various capitulatory treaties, the provisions of this

agreement were applied to the other European powers. Moreover, since foreign ownership of real estate was illegal, and since most foreign-owned property was held in the name of Ottoman citizens, it was subject to Ottoman law despite its *de facto* foreign ownership. Yet despite the Porte's unassailable legal position, the influential foreign consultates succeeded in extracting from the Porte a promise that legal sanctions against those who refused to pay municipal taxes would be applied only against Ottoman citizens. In return the Embassies promised to *advise* any recalcitrants among their citizens to settle their accounts. At the suggestion of the British the question of the various embassies coercing recalcitrants to pay by threatening to withdraw consular protective citizenship was permanently tabled.[29] The diplomats' failure to throw their weight behind the tax collection mechanism rendered all other expressions of support almost meaningless. In Galata resistance to the tax collector had traditionally been elevated to the level of a moral principle, and most people would not pay their taxes unless forced to do so. Because of the inability of the Ottoman government to exercise its legal rights over foreigners without the help of the embassies, the lukewarm support of the diplomatic corps in Istanbul was nearly equivalent to the outright rejection that had marked the consular response to a municipality in Alexandria.

The diplomats' fear of local administration also demonstrates the inaccuracy of the previous assumption that they were favourably inclined to the new municipality because the predominantly foreign population of Galata assured European control. Objections put forward by the British consul at the meeting called by the French demonstrates that this was not the case. At that time the British refused to relinquish to the municipality their control over wine shops operated by British citizens. Their reasons were most revealing. The consular authorities feared that the municipal council would use the power of inspection to Insist that all artisans be members of *esnaf* or corporations—a rule which would end in the total exclusion of foreigners from practising their several trades and secure a monopoly to natives.'[30] Despite its foreign character, the municipal council was from the first perceived not as a European entity, but as a tool of the Porte designed to do away with the Capitulations. This attitude must have been extremely insulting to the Christian and European members of the council who in fact had taken every opportunity to assert their independence from the Ottoman government. Ironically on the point at issue the council, far from being a tool of the *esnaf,* later acted with such force against the traditional merchant and craft guilds that most within Galata were completely destroyed. Despite its progressive stance and its real achievements, the municipal council was never viewed by the diplomatic corps as European in orientation. Its composition of Ottoman Christians and of Europeans long resident in Europe inspired not confidence but suspicion, since Levantines were disliked for their presumed dishonesty.[31] Thus a sense of unity between the diplomatic corps of the capital and the municipal council of Galata was entirely lacking and also played a large part in the failure of the foreign powers to accord any meaningful support to the Istanbul municipality.

Since the diplomatic response to the proposed and actual municipalities in Alexandria and Istanbul was more uniform than divergent, one must search for other factors to explain the early start and relative success of municipal

reform in the Ottoman capital. In this sense the significance of the Ottoman government's strong support of the municipality in Istanbul can hardly be overemphasized. The Porte provided the Galata municipality with generous grants and guaranteed the very substantial loans undertaken by the municipal council shortly after its formation.[32] When the municipality of Galata went bankrupt in 1863 as a result of its inability to collect municipal taxes, the Porte assumed its debts and reorganized the council under its strict administrative and financial control.[33]

It was therefore the Porte's committment to urban reform in the capital and not diplomatic support of such reform which was primarily responsible for the successful inauguration of a municipality in Istanbul. Since the administrative reform of Alexandria was not perceived by the Porte as involving its prestige, the provincial city remained bereft of the governmental initiative necessary to overcome the results of the diplomatic resistance to the foundation of a municipality. In both Istanbul and Alexandria it was the domestic policies of the Ottoman government and not the attitudes of the diplomatic community, that determined the relative success or failure of municipal reform.

NOTES

1. Gabriel Baer, The Beginnings of Municipal Government', *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp 190–209. Originally published as The Beginnings of Municipal Government in Egypt,' *Middle Eastern Studies,* 4, no. 2 (January, 1968)', pp 118–40.
2. *Ibid.* p. 196.
3. *Ibid.* p. 197.
4. *Ibid.* p. 197.
5. 'Dar as Saadat ve Bilad-i Selese Nufus Sayimi 1882 p. 18. Nassau Senior, *Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece* (London, Longman, Brown, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1859) p. 73.
6. U.S. Archives, State Department Dispatches 15 December 1858, 3 February 1860. Public Record Office F.O. 78 1673/84 Ali Pasa to Foreign Office.
7. 'Dar as Saadat ve Bilad-i Selese Nufus Sayimi p. 18.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Ahmed Refik, *Istanbul Nasil Egleniyordu* (Istanbul: Suhulet Kitabevi, 1927), p. 192.
10. *Journal de Constantinople*, 29 November, 1849.
11. *Journal de Constantinople,* 3 October 1849.
12. Concerning some of the problems of the Allied Troops see F.O. 78. 1062/59 Office of Quartermaster to Foreign Office, 11 June, 1855 and F.O. 78. 1062/137, Office of Quarter-master to Foreign Office, 23 July 1855.
13. Osman Nuri (Ergin), *Mecelle-i Umur-i Belediye* (Istanbul: Istanbul Sehiremaneti 1914– 1922), 1–1402.
14. Osman Nuri (Ergin) *Mecelle-i Umur-i Belediye* (Istanbul: Istanbul Sehiremaneti, 1914– 1922), 1–1402.
15. Official *Teskere* (memorandum) reproduced in Nuri, *Mecelle* 1 p. 1377.
16. Refik, p. 192.

17. Official Report of the High Council of Reform 21 Rebi ul Akhir 1274 (December 9, 1857) reproduced in Nuri, *Mecelle* 1 p. 1418.
18. F.O. 195. 590/4495 Cumberbatch to Bulwer. undated.
19. F.O. 78/1637. Bulwer to Russell, undated.
20. David Urquhart, *Turkey and its Resources,* (London, 1833) p. 45.
21. *Ibid.* p. 45.
22. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 144n.
23. Adolphus Slade, *Turkey, Greece and Malta,* (London, 1837) 1-pp 297–98.
24. Senior p. 138.
25. *Journal de Constantinople* 5 July 1858.
26. The unreasonable extent to which the embassies protected their capitulatory rights was articulated by the British ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer. 'At the present moment there seems to me, I confess, somewhat of a tendency on the part of the legal authorities to stretch the meaning of old treaties to an extent which would wholly destroy all the independent attributes of the Turkish government. This might be a matter of little moment if British subjects were the only parties that would be gainers, but as every right we contend for and are able to establish, becomes equally the right for all other powers we are in fact in this manner pulling down with one hand what we have been endeavoring by a great expense of blood and treasure to put up with another' F.O. 78. 1713/322 Bulwer to Russel, 31 December 1859.
27. Thouvenel to Bulwer. 31 July 1858, unnumbered.
28. Cumberbatch to Bulwer, F.O. 195. 590/4495 undated.
29. *Ibid.*
30. F.O. 195/612 Edmund Hornby, 'Report on the Municipal Regulations' 27 July, 1858.
31. On European perceptions of the Levantine see, Julia Pardo, *The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of the Turks,* (Philadelphia: 1837) p. 44; Edmund Hornby, *Autobiography,* (Boston, 1928) pp. 74, 78, 98–99. For the best modern accounts, see E. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East,* (London, 1956) pp. 73–77. A. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon,* (London, 1946) 1968 Beirut edition: pp. 70–72.
32. Ba Bakanlik Ar ivi, ephiremaneti Tasnifi 22231, 31 July 1813, Table of Municipal Debts'.
33. Bas Bakanlik Arsivi Sehiremaneti Tasnifi 2228119 December 1863.

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