

Jonathan H. Turner

**Theoretical  
Principles of  
Sociology** Vol.3

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**Mesodynamics**

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# Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 3



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Mesodynamics

 Springer

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ISBN 978-1-4419-6220-1                      e-ISBN 978-1-4419-6221-8  
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-6221-8  
Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2010929259

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*To the memory of my father, J. Hugh Turner,  
who at 97 years of age died in 2010  
in Santa Fe, New Mexico*



# Preface

This is the third volume of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. As is evident in all three volumes, I have taken seriously the charge of developing *theoretical principles*.

I view these principles as the “laws” of sociology, or at least my best effort to develop these laws. Over the almost fifty years that I have been a sociologist in graduate school and in the profession, I am amazed at how much knowledge has been accumulated that, remarkably, remains uncoded across domains of social reality and theoretical subfields within the discipline of sociology. My goal in all three volumes of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* is to be integrative and to assemble and integrate into a set of models and principles demonstrating that sociology can be a natural science.

The book on meso dynamics comes last in the series because it is about the domain of the social universe that stands between the macro universe of institutions, stratification, societies, and intersocietal systems, on the one side, and the micro universe of encounters among individuals. This meso realm is pushed by the forces operating at the macro and micro realms, and it provides the building blocks of the macro realm, while being the end result of micro encounters that become stabilized and structured over time. Once the dynamics of the macro and micro realms have produced the core structures of the meso realm, these meso-level sociocultural formations are constrained by the micro and macro realms. I have conceptualized these constraints as macro and micro-level *fields* of culture and social structures that arise from the play of forces at the micro and macro realms. These fields contain the resources that actors use to build up the sociocultural formations of the meso realm: corporate units and categoric units. This book is thus about how corporate units revealing divisions of labor for meeting goals and categoric units defining persons as members of social categories operate in

the fields generated by the forces of the macro and micro domains of social reality. By seeing how these operate, it becomes possible to link the macro and micro realms of reality theoretically, eliminating the often-hypothesized macro–micro “gap” that has been perceived as problematic by many sociologists.

I make no apologies about producing a grand theory, consisting of a set of abstract sociological principles that, I hope, can explain a good portion of social reality. Sociology has become, in my view, overspecialized not only in empirical work but, more improbably, in its theoretical outputs. Overspecialization always creates integrative problems that, in the case of theory, can only be resolved by making theories abstract and eliminating as many scope conditions on theories as possible. I draw from the rather large amount of accumulated knowledge, and so my role is not one of creative genius but of integrating the creative insights of many theoretical sociologists.

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# Acknowledgments

I must acknowledge the Academic Senate at the University of California at Riverside that provided small grants to support the research for this book and virtually every piece of scholarship that I have written over the last 45 years.



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# Chapter 1

## The Meso-level Realm of Social Reality

### The Presumed Micro–Macro “Gap”

Over the last few decades, a great deal has been written in sociology about the problem of the micro–macro link (e.g., Alexander et al. 1986). Indeed, there has been considerable angst over the “failure” of theoretical sociology to connect explanations of interpersonal behavior with the properties and dynamics of larger-scale social structure and culture. The fundamental question is how do social structures and their respective cultures explain the dynamics of interpersonal encounters and vice versa? Many sociologists believe that theoretical sociology has not provided adequate answers to such questions.

At times, this presumed failing to close the micro–macro “gap” has been used by antiscience critics to condemn the prospects for a scientific theory in sociology. A moment of reflection, however, reveals that even the “hard sciences” have not resolved their own version of the micro–macro link problem. For instance, subatomic physics has hardly reconciled its micro–macro gap with astrophysics; biology still has not fully closed the gap between population ecology and the modern synthesis of evolutionary theory, and moreover, the genetic revolution has yet to integrate all biological sciences; and macro and micro economics have a gap that is easily as wide as the one presumed to exist in sociology. Thus, sociologists are a bit hard on themselves for their failings in developing a fully integrated theory of micro–macro linkages.

In reality, however, sociology is as far along in resolving these linkage problems as most other sciences. In fact, we may be closer to linking theoretically all levels of social reality than is commonly recognized. It is not a stretch, I believe, to proclaim that we are closer to this linking the domains of our universe than the biological, physical, and other social sciences. As I hope to demonstrate in this third volume of *Theoretical Principles of*

*Sociology*, sociology has a well-developed set of ideas that go a long way to closing the presumed micro–macro “gap” in theoretical sociology. To place into context the approach taken in this volume, let me begin by briefly reviewing the major strategies that have been employed by sociologists to close the micro–macro “gap” (Turner 1983; Turner and Boyns 2001).

## **Strategies for Closing the Micro–Macro Gap**

### ***Micro chauvinism***

One of the most prominent approaches is simply to proclaim that all social structures and cultures are created and sustained by people in interaction, thereby giving priority to micro-level theory. For example, Herbert Blumer (1962, 1969) proclaimed that “society is symbolic interaction”; Randall Collins (1975, 1981, 1988, 2004) asserts that social structures and their cultures are built from “chains of interaction rituals”; ethnomethodology in its early and somewhat arrogant incarnation presumed that reality was somewhat mythical, only sustained by the “folk methods” that persons use in creating the illusion that social structures exist (Garfinkel 1967; Zimmerman and Pollner 1970). Implicit in much of this micro chauvinism is the view that conceptions of larger-scale social structures are reifications, which on the surface seem absurd since it is hard to not notice an army gunning you down or the power of a school or workplace constraining thoughts and actions.

Less shrill approaches might acknowledge that social structures and their cultures are “real,” but then go on to argue that they can *only* be understood by examining the micro-level interpersonal processes by which they are created and sustained. Explanatory theory, to the extent that it is even possible, must focus on the dynamics of these interpersonal processes. Among some who make this argument, however, there is also a general skepticism that there are universal processes in the social universe that can be theorized. Rather, because humans have agency, they have the capacity to change the fundamental properties of the social universe; hence, theory like that in the natural sciences is not possible because there are no invariant and universal properties of the social world that operate in all times and places (Giddens 1984). At best, theories can be composed of “sensitizing concepts” that can be used to describe and interpret interactions among individuals at a given time and place, and as agency alters the very nature of reality, new sensitizing concepts will need to be developed (Blumer 1969). Still, some like Collins (1975, 1981, 1988, 2000, 2004) are positivists in the

sense that they believe that general theoretical principles on the social universe can be developed, but he and others still contend that the most important principles are those about micro-level social processes. Yet, to continue with Collins as an example, much of his recent work on violence uses his theory of interaction rituals as a sensitizing framework to describe various micro-level situations of violence, just as Blumer and Giddens advocate, although the verdict is still out until the forthcoming more macro-level analyses of violence and social change come into print.

Thus, for micro chauvinists, volume 1 on *Theoretical Principles of Sociology: Macrodynamics* (Turner 2010a) is fundamentally flawed and, indeed, unnecessary if not illusionary. A theory of macro dynamics assumes that there are emergent macro-level sociocultural formations and that these are driven by unique forces requiring their own set of abstract theoretical principles. Volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology: Microdynamics* (Turner 2010b) is informed by micro chauvinism because obviously such chauvinists have dedicated considerable effort to understanding interpersonal processes, but I remain highly skeptical that their analyses can adequately explain *all* or even very much of social reality, including even the reality of the micro-social realm. The macro realm represents an emergent phenomenon, requiring its own conceptualization and explanatory principles, whereas the micro-realm cannot be fully explained without attention to how macro-level forces and meso-level structures constrain what transpires at the micro level of encounters. Unfortunately, some take this basic insight and convert it into the converse of micro chauvinism: macro chauvinism.

### ***Macro chauvinism***

On the opposite side of micro chauvinists are those who believe that macro-level processes deserve theoretical priority because the properties and dynamics of the macro realm circumscribe what transpires at the micro realm. Among macro chauvinists, micro processes are often taken as “givens” and simply bracketed out of analysis or conceptualized as rates of certain types of behavior (ignoring the complex dynamics involved). Instead, emphasis is placed on such emergent properties of the social world as population size and growth, patterns of differentiation (spatial, horizontal, and hierarchical), stratification, technologies, networks, distributions of power and wealth, and other emergent properties of human social systems. Talcott Parsons’ (1951) “action theory” for all of its lip service to “action” and “unit acts” is essentially a macro-chauvinist theory explaining social reality in terms of actions that become institutionalized to meet fundamental system needs.

Bruce Mayhew's (1974, 1981a, 1981b) baseline modeling approach is similarly macro chauvinist, arguing that macro structures circumscribe and delimit opportunities for interaction and, hence, explain most of the variance of micro reality. Similarly, Peter Blau's (1977, 1994) last major theory emphasized that opportunities for contact and rates of interaction at the micro level are determined by the distributions of people in social categories and in corporate units revealing divisions of labor. And, because the macro-structural realm determines opportunities for interaction, macro theory should be given explanatory priority. Unlike most micro chauvinists, macro chauvinists are generally committed to explanatory scientific theory but a theory that emphasizes the constraints imposed by macro structures on interpersonal relations. Donald Black's (1976, 1993) long-term theoretical project is, to some degree, a case of macro chauvinism because he does not believe that the psychology or social psychology of individuals should be part of sociology; rather, only the structural properties of social reality as they affect rates of activities among individuals are the legitimate concerns of theoretical sociology.

The fact that volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* is devoted to the analysis of micro-level encounters makes a clear statement that macro chauvinists, like their micro-chauvinistic counterparts, go too far. True, encounters are embedded in social structures and cultures that constrain interaction, but the reverse is true: social structure and cultures are built from, and potentially changed by, chains of interactions in encounters. Both micro and macro theories are essential to a general or "grand theory" of the social universe. Moreover, as will become evident, so are sets of meso-level principles that explain the dynamics of corporate and categoric units that stand between macro and micro levels of reality—a topic to be taken up shortly.

### ***Middle-Range Theorizing***

Robert Merton (1968) made a similar call to the one that I just made above, but he then took this call to unfortunate extremes. Merton criticized Parsonian and virtually all macro-level theories as overly blown-up conceptual schemes while also noting that there was too much dust bowl empiricism that describes but does not explain micro reality. His solution was to develop "theories of the middle range," which is where most of the real dynamics of societies occur. These theories would have scope conditions, denoting the phenomena to be explained, and they would offer generalizations that could explain the phenomena delimited by these scope conditions. The result was probably not what Merton intended because researchers began to elevate

what were really empirical generalizations on specific topics—deviance, gender, ethnic antagonism, groups, marriage, and family—to the status of explanatory principles. Some of these generalizations were sufficiently abstract to constitute an explanation, but most were simply generalizations from specific empirical contexts that were elevated to theory.

The end result was the appearance but not the substance of explanatory theory; indeed, a series of what I have termed *theories of* \_\_\_\_\_ (fill in the blank with some empirical setting) proliferated. Many of these theories were simple summaries of data, often using cross-sectional surveys, that do not capture much less explain generic social processes. For example, seemingly macro-level “explanations” of stratification’s effects on achievement and mobility were often gleaned from cross-sectional data, with the macro-level process being measured by people’s responses to questions on their income and education or other background information, and with the microlevel dynamic being measured by answers to questions about individuals reported subjective states and behaviors. Most such studies were highly descriptive, often about Americans and their occupations, and as a consequence, they did not explain very much about a generic process like stratification in general. They described mobility patterns of Americans at a particular time period—say 1965 to about 1990. For all of the then-sophisticated methodologies employed, these path analyses of achievement and mobility were descriptions rather than theoretical explanations.

### *Conceptual Staircases*

Many efforts to close the micro–macro gap have outlined distinctive of levels of reality, beginning with a conception of individual-level behavior or action, moving to interaction, then to iterated patterns of interaction, and finally to their institutionalization in larger-scale social structures. For example, Max Weber’s (1968[1922]) conceptualization of types of action, followed by interaction among mutually oriented actors (by virtue of the relative dominance of the four types of action: traditional, affective, value-rational, or rational), which in turn, leads to “communal or associative relations” that then become “legitimated orders.” These legitimated orders form the basis of stratification orders (*classes, status groups, parties*) and organizational (bureaucratic) orders, and together, these orders are the building blocks of whole societies. Talcott Parsons (1951), being the commensurate Weberian, outlined a similar conceptual staircase, beginning with “modes of orientation” (*motivational*: cognitive, cathetic, evaluative; *value*: cognitive, appreciative, moral) leading to a type of action as *instrumental, expressive,*

or *moral* which, in turn, produced interactions among individuals that become institutionalized in status-role structures, regulated by values and norms, in “social systems.” What is notable in both Weber’s and Parsons’ models is that the *process* of interaction is not conceptualized to any degree; types of action lead to interactions that then mysteriously generate various kinds of social structures, but the interaction itself is not analyzed at all. The conceptual staircase thus jumps over the most important step in moving from micro to macro.

The approach that I outlined in volumes 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* has some of the characteristics of a conceptual staircase. Social reality unfolds at three levels of reality: micro, meso, and macro. Each level of reality reveals distinctive structures and cultures. Both the macro and micro levels are driven by unique forces that determine both the formation and operation of these structures and, as we will see in this volume, the formation of distinctive meso-level structures of corporate and categoric units.

These meso-level structural units constrain interaction in encounters and bring the constraints and culture of macro reality down to the level of the encounter. Conversely, corporate and categoric units are, respectively, the building blocks of institutional domains and stratification systems, which in turn are the building blocks of societies and intersocietal systems. But unlike most conceptual staircases, I emphasize the *dynamics* of encounters, corporate and categoric units, institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and intersocietal systems. These are steps in a staircase that are constantly in motion. And, as will become evident, the forces of the micro and macro realms—to be outlined shortly—push on actors who create corporate and categoric units, and in this sense, encounters are the building blocks of these meso-level units, and as noted above, corporate and categoric units are the conduits by which the forces of the macro realm reach the micro (see Fig. 1.1 on page 7). Encounters are thus the building blocks of corporate and categoric units, while the latter are the building blocks of institutional domains and stratification systems, which are the sociocultural formations from which societies and intersocietal systems are built. This vision is, to be sure, a kind of conceptual staircase, but laying out this vision is only *the starting point* for understanding the forces that drive the formation and operation of structures at all levels of social reality. And so, in my conceptualization, delineating the steps in the staircase is not the endpoint of theorizing but only the beginning. A view of the social universe as ordered at three levels does not explain anything; rather, models and principles on the dynamic processes driving each level of social reality, as well as relations among levels, are what explain the social universe.




Fig. 1.1 A simple conceptual scheme

### *Formal Sociology*

Georg Simmel’s (1956[1903]) analysis of the “forms of association” suggested another route to managing the micro and macro gap. By focusing on the forms of relationships among social units—whether individuals or collective actors—rather than on the properties of the social units themselves, theoretical principles could be developed that explain simultaneously micro-, meso-, and macro-level phenomena. Contemporary network theory often illustrates this approach by viewing the pattern of relationships among nodes in a network, regardless of what or who the nodes are. It is the

structure and dynamics of the network *as a whole* that is important, and theory is about networks rather than the properties or nature of the nodes in the network. Richard Emerson's (1962) exchange network theory follows this logic by focusing on the generic forms of exchange networks rather than the characteristics of the actors in the exchange, and from his approach, a long lineage of creative work has developed. Peter Blau's (1964) early exchange approach also employed this formal logic by emphasizing that the same exchange processes—attraction, competition, exchange, differentiation of actors by status and power, and varying patterns of integration and tension among actors—operate at the level of individual exchange as well as at the level of corporate units building up macro structures.

Thus, to the degree that there is isomorphism among the processes operating at each level of social reality—whether micro, meso, or macro—theories of these processes should be able to explain the dynamics of all levels of reality. For these formal sociologies, there is a kind of simultaneity of forces working in the same manner across levels of reality. Thus, the linkage problems of sociology quietly go away, and no theoretical staircases are necessary. Yet, sometimes the units forming social relationships *make a difference* in what kinds of social relations can be formed and, more importantly, in the dynamics that are operative. Thus, the problem of the “gap” among theoretical levels reemerges because the actions of individuals and corporate units are often driven by different forces and cause the formation of different types of relationships.

### ***Deductive Reductionism***

Yet another approach to explaining linkages among levels of social reality is to develop principles about the operation of each level, but then to employ a deductive—indeed a reductive—logic. This logic apes the rhetoric, but rarely the logical rigor, of axiomatic theory by positing that principles on micro processes are the higher order “laws” from which meso- and macro-level principles can be “deduced.” George Homans (1961/1972) and most rational choice theorists all pursue this strategy. They develop elementary principles—incorrectly termed “axioms” in a few cases—from which principles on ever larger sociocultural formations are deduced. The result is that theoretical linkage of the micro and macro emerges from the deductive rigor of the quasi-axiomatic scheme.

For many sociologists, this approach is too reductive, trying to explain complex social processes about social structure and culture by the more elementary processes of behavior and interaction by which these structures

are built. They might even argue that deductive formalism becomes another micro-chauvinist approach, but if such is the case, most science is chauvinistic in this sense. Physicists would love to explain all of astrophysics by principles of subatomic physics, and biologists could be content to explain life forms by principles from the modern synthesis of evolutionary theory. By itself, then, deductive reduction is very much what a good deal of theoretical science does. The problem is that many practitioners of this approach forget that one must first develop some principles of ever-more complex layers of reality to deduce from principles on elementary processes. George Homans, for example, would construct layers of theoretical statements derived from a principle of individual, person-level rationality, but the actual principles did not explain very much because steps in the logic of deduction were often missing and the macro-level phenomenon was typically an empirical regularity rather than a universal social process. If deductive theory is to work, then, it must employ more precise logics than supplied by ordinary words and the grammar that strings words together, and it must demonstrate that a principle on the operative dynamics of one level is indeed deducible from a more elementary principle. To illustrate, let us say that the more macro-level theoretical law or principle is *the level of differentiation in a social system is a positive s-function of the number of people in the system*. To simply state, for instance, that differentiation of society occurs because people find this to be the most “rational way” to manage population growth sidesteps all of the interesting sociological questions, and it does not add much explanatory power to the principles that have been subsumed by some notion of rationality.

As will become evident in these pages, I make no effort to deduce principles in volumes 1, 2, and 3 from each other. Instead, I present principles in a manner that allows one to see the connections to micro- and macro-theoretical principles outlined in volumes 1 and 2. For, if the levels of social reality are “connected” in some way, the dynamics of one level constrain the dynamics at a lower level of reality, while lower level dynamics create, sustain, and potentially alter higher-level dynamics. For instance, events in encounters are constrained by embedding of encounters in corporate and categoric units and, by extension, in more macro-level structures, and thus, principles of these higher levels of reality are incorporated into micro-level principles. The converse is also true: events in encounters can alter the dynamics occurring in corporate or categoric units, and so, we will need to blend key ideas from volume 2 on micro dynamics into principles on meso dynamics. Similarly, corporate and categoric units are constrained by macro-level reality, and principles outlining the dynamics of macro-level reality will need to be part of the principles explaining the meso level of social reality. And again, the converse is true: dynamics of meso-level formations have

large effects on institutional domains and stratification systems which, in turn, affect the dynamics of societies and intersocietal systems, and therefore, we will need to develop some principles about how the dynamics of meso-level sociocultural formations affect the macro level. Such principles already exist, to a limited extent, in volumes 1 and 2, but to complete the picture, we need to develop those about the meso level and then take them to the analysis of the micro and macro levels, and vice versa.

Nothing is deduced or reduced in the principles that I present; instead, the principles blend into each other in a less rigorous manner than quasi-axiomatic theory, but in the end, the relatively small number of total principles in all three volumes offers a robust—if less logically rigorous—theory of human social organization. Very few sciences or even subportions of a science are truly axiomatic; most involve what I call “folk deductions” and, I might add, folk “blending of principles” that come together to explain empirical events. There is no rigorous logic employed, just the sense that, together, a set of principles offer a better explanation than alternatives.

## *Dualities*

A common approach is to posit a duality—often between “agency” and “structure”—and then build a conceptual scheme that connects the two. This kind of argument is often conflated with the micro–macro link, but in fact, it is a separate problem, distinct in its own right (Archer 2000; Ritzer 1990). Still, it has been offered as a “solution” to the micro–macro “gap.” For example, Anthony Giddens (1981, 1984) develops a “structuration” theory that emphasizes the interconnections between individual agents and social structures. Thus, for Giddens, structure is ultimately composed of “rules and resources” that active agents use in structuring social relations that become institutionalized. Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1980) employs a similar strategy—albeit in a very different rhetorical style. Individuals reveal what he terms *habitus* which is a set of dispositions, tastes, and practices that they have internalized, giving them a kind of world view, and it is via *habitus* that structure and culture become part of persons who simultaneously reproduce and modify structures as they engage in strategic behaviors in various fields of institutional activity.

If this kind of argument seems vague, it is. The conception of structure is rather imprecise, and then, it is simply asserted that people use elements of structure and culture to reproduce or change these same social structures. There are, to be sure, some very interesting ideas in these approaches, but the linkage between micro and macro is not detailed in any precise way.

Structure is both “outside” and “inside” people who use it to reproduce or change structure, although we are typically not told exactly what the properties of structure are, how they get inside of people, how they work once inside of people, how they are used strategically under varying conditions, and how actions, under what conditions, reproduce or change social structures. The linkage among levels of reality is more metaphorical than real. It would be hard to formalize these kinds of arguments because it is never quite clear what forces are in play and how they interact with each other.

### ***Multidimensional Approaches***

Theorists often construct multidimensional schemes laying out micro and macro properties and then try to integrate these and thereby close the micro–macro gap. For example, George Ritzer (1981, 1990, 2000) has sought to develop an “integrated paradigm” that can reconcile micro and macro reality. He argues that theories of the social world can be categorized along two cross-cutting dimensions—(1) the microscopic–macroscopic continuum and (2) the objective–subjective continuum. These two continua yield four quadrants: the macro objective, the macro subjective, the micro objective, and the micro subjective. On the macro objective continuum are institutionalized properties of social structures, such as law, bureaucracies, language, and material technology, while on the macro subjective continuum are cultural phenomena such as values, beliefs, and norms. On the micro objective are the processes of observable action and interaction, whereas on the micro-subjective dimension are perceptions, personal routines, and other subjective states and processes whereby individuals try to make sense or reality. As far as it goes, this fourfold division of the turf seems reasonable, but the question becomes: Does this category system lead to explanations of social reality? For me, reality is simply chopped up and categorized but not explained. What forces influence the values for any quadrant? How do they influence each other? How are they connected? These are other questions immediately emerge if explaining this multidimensional social universe is to occur.

### **An Alternative Approach to Closing the Micro–Macro Gap**

As I have stressed, my approach adopts elements of a number of these strategies for linking the micro, meso, and macro levels of reality theoretically. Empirically, as I noted earlier, it is relatively easy to make the link—as would be the case, for example, if social psychological characteristics of individuals

were statistically regressed against a composite measure of class position, or some other macro-level variable. But these kinds of linkages are rarely explanatory in the sense that I am advocating. They may be somewhat historical (although the data are usually cross-sectional) because they argue that a history of growing up in a particular social class within the larger stratification system affects a behavioral propensity, attitude, perception, or some person-level property at the micro level that, in turn, reproduces the macro-level stratification system. Thus, despite the typically cross-sectional nature of the data involved, this is a historical explanation because events at time<sub>1</sub> are seen to cause particular events at time<sub>2</sub>. The explanations that I seek to develop, however, are more *nomothetic* and involve highly abstract principles to explain the dynamics of generic and universal properties of social reality that *are always operative* when humans behave, interact, and organize. There is a kind of “covering law” logic to what I am doing here, but it is not the covering law approach of axiomatic theory or even less stringent formal theories (Freese 1980; Freese and Sell 1980a, 1980b). The principles are formal and abstract, and the goal is to use them individually or in sets to explain a range of basic phenomena operating at the micro, meso, and macro levels of social reality.

### *A Simple Conceptual Scheme*

A theory must begin with a sketch or outline of what is to be explained. A general, even “grand” theory, like the one I am developing, requires a conceptual scheme to demarcate, at minimum, (1) the levels of reality that are to be explained, (2) the interconnections and intersections among these levels, (3) the structural and cultural properties of each level and their interconnections, and (4) the driving forces that create and transform the structures and cultures evident at all levels of reality. For me, the conceptual scheme should be as simple as it can be and avoid becoming an exercise in category building. The famous or infamous Parsonian action theory is an example of what can occur when a large portion of reality—indeed, the social, biotic, and physical–chemical universes—is to be explained. The scheme gets larger and ever-more complex, and eventually, it becomes concerned with its own architecture rather than providing a broad framework within which to do theorizing. Thus, while I have incorporated many of Parsons’ ideas in this work, especially volume 1 on macro dynamics, I begin with a very different view of what a conceptual scheme should do.

My goal is to outline the simplest conceptual scheme possible and still denote the properties of the social universe to be explained. Complexity will

come later as specific dynamic forces and processes driving sociocultural formations are explained with theoretical principles. Thus, in contrast to Parsons and even scholars like Giddens (who also explains by conceptual schemes filled with categories), my approach is to keep the conceptual scheme simple and only add complexity through abstract theoretical principles. In this way, I do not become concerned with the majesty of my scheme, but with the power of principles to explain the relatively few generic properties and forces outlined in the scheme. This strategy makes it less likely that I will explain by typologies and categories; instead, I will explain through abstract principles that articulate the dynamic processes operating in the social universe. This is why the subtitle of these three volumes emphasizes “dynamics”; there are, of course, generic structures in the micro, meso, and macro realms of reality, but these are to be understood by principles on the dynamics driving their formation, operation, and transformation.

Figure 1.1 on page 7 is a version of the same figure that appears in volumes 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. Social reality is divided into three distinct levels, each more encompassing than the one below it. At the micro level are *focused* and *unfocused* interpersonal *encounters* (Goffman 1959, 1961, 1967, 1983; Turner 2002b, 2010b). At the meso level are two basic kinds of social units: (1) *corporate units* revealing divisions of labor in pursuit of goals, no matter how vaguely defined, and (2) *categorical units* defining people as distinctive on the basis of what Peter Blau (1977, 1994) defined as *parameters* marking differences. At the macro level are *institutional domains* that evolve to meet problems of adaptation facing members of a population and *stratification systems* built from inequalities in the distribution of valued resources, *societies* that organize a population in geopolitical space, and *intersocietal systems* composed of relations among two or more societies, typically through their respective institutional domains but often through other macro- and meso-level structures. To be sure, highlighting these three levels of reality represents a set of analytical distinctions, but I would argue that they are more: they are the way that social reality empirically unfolds as populations grow. In small-scale populations, this tripart division is evident in only incipient form, but as the number of people to be organized increases, this tripart division moves from being an analytical abstraction to denoting *the actual way that human populations organize*.

In Table 1.1, I define each of the structural units at the micro, meso, and macro levels of social reality. Let me elaborate a bit on the meso-level structures since this is the focus of this volume of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. Corporate units are typically bounded structures and their attendant

**Table 1.1** Structures of the macro-, meso-, and micro-social realms

## Macro realm of reality

1. *Institutional domains*: Culturally regulated congeries and systems of corporate units dealing with selection pressures generated by macro-dynamic forces of population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction
2. *Stratification systems*: Identifiable subpopulations created by the unequal distribution of valued resources by institutional domains in a society
3. *Societies*: The organization of a population by institutional domains and stratification systems in geographical space, regulated by centers of power to define and defend this space
4. *Systems of societies*: Relations between two or more societies that are created and sustained by actors in various institutional domains or locations in the stratification system


## Meso realm of social reality

1. *Corporate units*: Structural units revealing a division of labor for realizing (variously defined) goals. There are only three basic types of corporate units: groups, organizations, and communities
2. *Categoric units*: Structural units created by the demarcation of nominal and graduated parameters identifying individuals as members of a distinctive social category, the members of which are differentially evaluated and treated by members of a population

## Micro realm of reality

1. *Focused encounters*: Episodes of face-to-face interactions among individuals where face engagement is sustained for the duration of the interaction
2. *Unfocused encounters*: Episodes of copresence and movement in space where individuals mutually monitor each other's behaviors while avoiding, if possible, face engagement for the duration of their copresence

cultures revealing goals or purposes. There are three basic types of corporate units: *groups*, *organizations*, and *communities*. A group is a more stable encounter that endures and develops a division of labor, even if this division is very loose (say, differentiated by dominant and subordinate members, by instrumental leaders, by socioemotional leaders, or by roles associated with categoric unit memberships of its members). Organizations are built from relationships of groups and by status-roles in a division of labor structured to accomplish tasks and goals. Communities are geopolitical-spatial units in which groups and organizations are lodged and which organize their activities. Most of the time, groups are embedded in organizations which, in turn, are embedded (located) in communities. Figure 1.2 outlines this layering of embeddedness in its simplest form. There can be, however, complexities. For example, a very large organization can be spread across many communities, and so it is not embedded in any one of the communities but perhaps a system of communities that can reveal some of properties of a macro structure.



**Fig. 1.2** Layers of successive embedding of generic types of social units

Or, a community can come into existence because of the activities of corporate units within an institutional domain. For instance, some early cities were created to carry out religious practices, and so the embedding can work the other way: the community is also embedded in religious corporate units and, more broadly, in the institutional domain of religion. To take another example, early city-states were often created as the means to mobilize power, and thus, they too were embedded in powerful corporate units and the institutional domain of polity.

As defined in Table 1.1, categoric units emerge when individuals are distinguished by particular characteristics denoted by a *parameter*. There are two types of parameters: *graduated* and *nominal* (Blau 1977). A graduated parameter marks persons by their *degree* of possession of particular characteristics, such as amount of wealth and money, years of education, and age. A nominal parameter marks more discrete units in which persons are either members or not members, as is the case for sex and gender, religious affiliation, ethnicity, or social class. In actual practice, the distinction between nominal and graduated parameters can get a bit fuzzy for several reasons. First, graduated parameters are often converted by individuals into quasi-nominal categoric units as a means of cognitive simplification. For example, differences in wealth and income may translate into people being described as “rich” or “poor,” or as members of a particular social class (e.g., “blue collar,” “upper middle”). Second, nominal parameters often take on a graduated character, as might be the case for a light-skinned person whose ancestors are of African origins being defined as more “white” than “black,”

although just the opposite can occur with this same person being defined as black even though their skin color is clearly lighter (e.g., Mariah Carey looks “white” but is defined as “black” by virtue of her distant ancestry). As a rough generalization, graduated categoric units are more likely to be turned into nominal-like units than are nominal units to be turned into graduated units. The reasons for this will, of course, need to be theorized in later chapters.

Figure 1.1 on page 7 also contains a listing of what I term “forces” for the micro and macro levels of reality but not for the meso level. Why is this so? My vision is that corporate and categoric units are created, sustained, and transformed by forces emanating from the macro and micro levels of social reality. Corporate and categoric units are subject to pressures from the forces driving the macro and micro realms.<sup>1</sup>

While I will not go so far as to proclaim that there are not unique forces operating at the meso level, I do believe that these are extensions of the forces driving the formations at the macro and micro levels of reality. These forces are defined in Table 1.2. As volume 1 outlines, for example, corporate units are created under pressures to coordinate and control more people (*regulation*), to expand *production*, to increase rates of *distribution*, or to deal with *reproduction*; individuals respond to macro-level pressures by creating groups, organizations, and communities, and thus, corporate units always reflect the institutional domains that organize sets of organizations into a distinctive domain, such as economy, kinship, religion, polity, law, education, and so on for all institutional domains. The dynamics of corporate units thus flow from the forces of the macro realm as they have push on a population for the formation of new kinds of structures that, over time, coalesce into a distinctive institutional domain.

Similarly, many categoric units are created by the unequal distributions of resources to members of a population incumbent in corporate units that make up a society’s various institutional domains. For example, being poor, educated, middle class, healthy, religious, and other such distinctions is the outcome of incumbency of individuals in various types of corporate units from which an institutional domain is constructed. When shares of resources converge for persons, classes are likely to develop and become rank-ordered in a macro-level stratification system. Moreover, other types of categoric units often become consolidated with class locations in the stratification

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<sup>1</sup> If one does not like the term “forces” because they smack of physics envy, other labels like “processes” can be used; I will use the term forces because I probably have physics envy and still would like to see sociology by the name Comte originally intended for the discipline: *social physics*.

**Table 1.2** Forces driving the macro-dynamic and micro-dynamic realms**Definitions of macro-dynamic forces**

*Population:* The absolute number, rate of growth, composition, and distribution of members of a society

*Production:* The gathering of resources from the environment, the conversion of these resources into commodities, the creation of services to facilitate gathering and conversion

*Distribution:* The infrastructures for moving resources, information, and people about a territory as well as the exchange systems for distributing commodities and services among members of a society and, potentially, members of other societies

*Regulation:* The consolidation and centralization of power around four bases of power (coercion, administration, material incentive, and symbolic) and the creation of cultural systems to coordinate and control actors within institutional domains and stratification systems

*Reproduction:* The procreation of new members of a population and the transmission of culture to these members as well as the creation and maintenance structural formations sustaining life and social order

**Definitions of micro-dynamic forces**

*Ecological forces:* Boundaries, configurations of the physical space, and the props in space as these constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

*Demographic forces:* Numbers of individuals represent their density, their movements, and their characteristics as these constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

*Status forces:* Positional locations and their organization within corporate units revealing divisions of labor and memberships in categorical units defined by parameters as they constrain behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

*Roles forces:* Moment-by-moment configurations of gestures mutually emitted and interpreted by persons to communicate their respective dispositions and likely courses of action as these constrain behaviors in focused and unfocused encounters

*Cultural forces:* Systems of symbols organized into texts, values, beliefs and ideologies, and norms as they generate expectations and thereby constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

*Motivational forces:* Universal need states as these constrain behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

*Emotional forces:* Types and valences of affect aroused, experienced, and expressed that constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

system. For instance, members of devalued ethnic populations often experience discrimination that denies them access key corporate units and/or resource-distributing positions in their divisions of labor. The consequence is that ethnicity is superimposed on the stratification, thereby creating ethnic stratification that is to varying degrees correlated with class stratification. Similarly, such categorical units as sex, religion, age, city of origin, and

other parameters can also become consolidated with class locations because of discrimination and the resulting differential access of categoric-unit members to resource-distributing corporate units. Thus, the categoric unit of class is the ultimate building block of a stratification system, but it is typically not the only one because other categoric-unit memberships often become correlated with class locations.

Forces at the micro realm of reality also exert pressures on corporate and categoric units, and indeed, the dynamics of the meso realm are extensions of these forces. For example, people's motives, say, for identity verification, often drive the formation of categoric units, as is the case when people develop social identities that are built from the parameters defining people in key categoric units such as gender and ethnicity. The dynamics of categoric unit formation, persistence, and transformation are driven by other micro-dynamics beyond just identity verification; other micro-dynamic forces such as playing roles, negotiating status, invoking culture (especially *status beliefs* about members of category units), and feeling emotions also affect the dynamics of categoric units

Similarly, like categoric units, corporate-unit dynamics are also subject to pressures from the micro level. People respond to situational ecology and demography, to their status and roles, to the culture built up in encounters, to their needs to verify various identities, to needs to secure profits in exchanges of resource, to feel included in the interpersonal flow and other need states, and to the emotions arising from what transpires in encounters. These responses can change groups, communities, and organizations, and at times, they can lead to the formation of change-oriented corporate units like a *social movement organization* (SMO) that changes portions of the institutional order and stratification system at the macro level of social organization (see Chap. 8).

The arrows in Fig. 1.1 on page 7 linking the basic structures of each domain and carrying the forces of the macro and micro realms to the meso level are all intended to highlight the interconnections among the three basic realms of reality. One line of interconnection is, as emphasized above, the pressures generated by forces of the micro and macro realms on meso structures. Another is embedding of micro units in meso units that, in turn, are lodged inside of successive layers of macro units. Still another is the constitutive process of building up of meso-level units from encounters, institutional domains being from corporate units, stratification systems from categoric units (and societies being from institutional domains and stratification systems, and intersocietal systems constructed from societies, particularly key institutional domains like economy, polity, and religion). As is evident, corporate and categoric units are at the center of these dynamic interrelations among levels of reality. They are the units created by

individuals in response to pressures from the micro- and macro-level forces; they are the building blocks of all macro structures; they are the immediate constraints on micro processes; and they are the conduits by which the macro level exerts pressures on micro-level encounters.

None of the labels or the arrows connecting boxes in Fig. 1.1 explain anything; however, unless placing a social unit in a general category and drawing arrows among categories are seen to constitute explanation. Rather, the arrows simply denote connections that *still need to be theorized*. The figure is only intended, as I noted at the outset, to outline the areas where theorizing about dynamics needs to occur. Thus, we need to know how forces working through macro and micro structures influence the dynamics of corporate and categoric units; we need to understand how the complex sets of interconnections among sociocultural units at each level mutually influence each other, and we need to understand how meso dynamics are shaped by the dynamics of embedding in macro units and by the fact that they are built from dynamics operating in encounters. Thus, as I move forward, a great deal of complexity will be introduced as I outline important connections among the elements delineated in Fig. 1.1 and as I try to theorize the dynamics in these connections by developing abstract theoretical principles.

### ***The Evolution of the Meso Realm of Reality***

For hominids or hominins (primate ancestors on, or near to, the human clade or evolutionary line) and for early humans to survive, they had to get organized, or die. As Alexandra Maryanski and I have documented in a number of places (e.g., Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2008a, b), humans as evolved apes are not naturally social or prone to tight-knit group formations. If there is a stable formation among the last common ancestor of humans and our closest relative, common chimpanzees, it was the community or regional population. Within this community, however, individuals walked around alone or in temporary groupings that would eventually disband and, then, reform again with somewhat different set of members living the regional population. Since great apes and certainly our common ancestors are promiscuous, paternity was never known, and thus, kinship did not exist beyond relations between mothers and their prepuberty offspring. In all apes, both male and female offspring leave their natal community at puberty, except chimpanzee males who remain in their natal community. Among chimpanzees, brothers and male friends often bond but do not easily form stable groups over time, and sons stay in contact with their mothers, visiting them often, but they do not form a stable group structure

around their mothers. Thus, within the community marking the territorial range of our closest relatives and, no doubt, our common ancestors, groups were not stable, and organizations as we know them did not exist. Only community as a type of corporate unit existed in its incipient form.

As long as hominids could live in the forests that afforded protection from predators, this very loose- and weak-tie social structure promoted fitness. Yet, as the forests began to recede about ten million years ago in Africa, the great savannas began to spread. Many species of primates and especially apes were now forced to survive on the savanna where group-level organization would be critical for defense against predators and for food foraging. Given the very weak-tie structure among apes and surely our early terrestrial ancestors, it is not surprising that apes immediately began to go extinct. Without bioprogrammers for group organization, they were not able to develop sufficient coordination of their activities. Selection pressures favored organization but weak-tie animals that were the product of twenty million years of evolution *away from* the strong-tied patterns of monkey groupings would have trouble surviving in open country. Moreover, apes are slow compared to predators; they have a reduced sense of smell that prevents them from sensing predators; and they are highly emotional and individualistic, with the result that they would often panic and scatter when confronting danger, thereby making them easy prey for packs of predatory animals. As a consequence, most species of apes could not sustain themselves in the open-country savanna; indeed, the biotic world is now down to a handful of species of apes, most of which will not be able to survive in their traditional habitats in the relatively near future as human destruction of their forest niches proceeds.


Eventually, blind natural selection hit up a “strategy” that could make hominids more social and group oriented. I have argued (Turner 2000) that first enhancing emotions to forge stronger bonds and, later, growing the brain to make language and emotionally charged cultural codes possible were the keys to increased group organization. Emotions could be used to sustain interpersonal relations, and once language and culture began to evolve, new kinds of sociocultural formations could be developed. These formations—corporate units and categoric units—are those that I have placed in the meso level of social reality.

At first, nuclear kin units within hunting and gathering bands were sufficient to sustain humans on their savanna, and indeed, this structural formation was highly adaptive because, for 95% of humans’ time on earth, bands of nuclear families were the principal adaptive strategy. So, for most of human history, the social universe consisted of face-to-face interactions in encounters embedded in two kinds of group structures—nuclear kin units

and bands—and perhaps a general sense for the larger community or regional territory. Within this territory, bands and their constituent nuclear kin units would move in a somewhat circular pattern, breaking camp when resources were depleted and moving on with the intention of returning to abandoned encampments when plant and animal life regenerated.

When hunter-gatherers would settle near water—lakes, rivers, and oceans—populations began to grow. Initially, settlements may have been more seasonal and episodic, but when they became more permanent, animal and plant life would soon be exhausted, forcing members of these settlements to develop new kinds of structural and cultural arrangements or face the consequences of not having enough food to support the larger population. Kinship was the only clear institutional domain among nomadic hunter-gatherers, with economic, religious, and political activities embedded in kin units and band. When nomadic hunter-gatherers first settled, Big Man systems often emerged, thus differentiating polity and religion, in their simplest form, from kinship. For these institutional domains to differentiate, new kinds of corporate units were created as the basic building blocks of polity and religion. Later, when humans began to engage in horticulture, this Big Man system gave way to a kin-based system of organization. Economic, political, legal, and religious activities were once again organized by a dramatically expanded system of kinship rules, built around descent rules, for creating corporate units that were the functional equivalent of complex organizations today. Nuclear units became part of extended families (clusters of nuclear units) or lineages; lineages were organized into clans and subclans and clans into submoieties and moieties that divide a population into two halves. Hundreds if not thousands of people can be organized in this way, and these systems very much resembled the organization chart of a modern complex organization, and in fact, they represented a solution to the same selection pressures: how to organize individuals into a division of labor meeting certain goals that are essential to adaptation. I have drawn Fig. 1.3 delineating the properties of a unilineal kinship system to highlight its similarity to the “organization chart” of a modern bureaucracy. The big difference between the systems is that unilineal system is built from kindred, which makes them much more volatile than a Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy. Still, they accomplish the same goal: organizing large numbers of individuals in a system of authority, thus allowing the scale of social organization to increase.

At the same time, permanent settlements or small villages evolved, with kin units embedded in these. A very small horticultural society might only have only one or a few settlements, but larger ones had many more. And so, by the time that humans adopted horticulture or farming with human power



**Note:**  
 A moiety generally divides a society in half. Hence, the figure only represents half of a relatively small horticultural society. Nuclear families are grouped to form lineages which, in turn, are grouped to form clans that are placed into one of two moieties. A more complex pattern in some societies involves subclans and submoieties, but the form of the organizational system remains the same. As is evident, this form resembles an hierarchical structure of bureaucracies; and this fact should not be surprising because this kinship formation is the functional equivalent of a bureaucracy.

**Fig. 1.3** Kinship as the organizational base of simple horticultural societies

and low technologies (such as digging sticks and animal husbandry), the three basic types of corporate units that are the building blocks of all larger-scale societies were evident: groups, organizations, and communities. These were now available as a resource—in a kind of social technology resource niche—to organize ever larger populations, when and if selection pressures pushed on individuals to find the means to build up more complex institutional domains.

The other basic meso-level structure—categoric units—has always existed in human societies because humans always make distinctions by sex and age. Among hunter-gatherers, these were correlated with the division of economic labor within the nuclear kinship unit: men hunted, women gathered, and the young helped out when needed, with the sexual division of labor of

kinship increasingly directing the activities of younger males and females into increasingly gendered roles in the band. Because nomadic hunter-gatherers work very hard to reduce inequalities, stratification did not exist and thus was not correlated with either gender or age. But, with the emergence of the first Big Men systems and then their replacement by horticultural systems, inequality emerged and the beginnings of something like classes became part of human societies. In Big Man systems, inequalities based upon power and rights to usurp productive surplus emerged, although the surplus usually had to be redistributed because it would spoil. Yet, the act of redistribution would give male leaders claims to honor and prestige for their “generosity.” Since a Big Man system gives power to the headman and his allies, a gender bias was also introduced into the incipient class system. Among horticulturalists, stratification was embedded in kinship, with power, authority, and rights to property dictated by rules of descent rules organizing lineages, clans, and moieties. Typically, one clan would become dominant and, hence, begin the process of forming a chiefdom, with a paramount chief who was a member of a dominant clan and/or village. Again, something like classes emerged, favoring men over women and at times particular age cohorts. Thus, the corporate units embedded in the larger organization generated by kinship rules led to increased inequality and the beginnings of macro-level stratification.

Ironically, the very weakness of social ties among hominids and early humans—that is, the lack of strong bioprogrammers for cohesive and tight-knit group formation—can be seen as a preadaptation for the evolution of ever-more macro societies. Very few animals form macro societies of hundreds of thousands, much less millions and even billions of individuals. The “social” insects are the most common form of macro societies; most other animals cannot form such societies for a number of reasons (Mahaleck 1992). For example, their bodies are simply too big to be organized into large societies (e.g., whales); the resources needed to support large populations, especially those with large body plans, simply cannot be secured; and the existence of bioprogrammers for tight-knit structures among *known* individuals (monkeys in troops, lions in prides, jackals in packs, etc.) precluded the organization of large numbers of individuals, many of whom would have to be strangers to each other.

As Mahaleck (1992) has summarized, macro societies require that members of the population are organized into distinct categories and roles in a division of labor designed to secure resources and meet other selection pressures for coordination, control, distribution, and reproduction. This organization means that individuals must interact with strangers and categories of others playing designated roles. Monkeys, as the primate cousins of apes

and humans, could never organize into a macro society because they form matrilineal lines of related females and dominance hierarchies among males; they are, in essence, oriented to the local group of familiar individuals. In contrast, apes are weak-tie animals and are not naturally group oriented, and if they have an orientation to any structure, it is the larger regional community that can be as large as ten square miles. Thus, the very characteristics of apes—weak ties, individualism, and constant mobility—that doomed them to extinction on the savanna and that posed problems for creating corporate-unit organization at the level of the group could work in their favor in creating larger-scale societies. These weak-tie behavioral propensities do not impose impediments to building macro societies as they do for monkeys and other group-oriented animals. Moreover, with the ability to use parameters to forge categorical units based upon age, sex, and class allowed humans to interact with each other as categories, which is an important capacity for the evolution of macro societies.

The result is that humans are the *only* large animal that has *ever* been able to create a macro society, ultimately built from meso-level social units—groups, organizations, communities, and social categories—as these can be employed to build up institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and even intersocietal systems that can now span the globe. Once the knowledge of how to build corporate units existed, the underlying weak-tie propensities of evolved apes would allow humans to use these structures as building blocks for larger-scale societies revolving around complex divisions of labor, categorization of others, and interaction with relative strangers.

One way to view the meso realm, then, is as an adaptive strategy for hominids and early humans to survive in their respective environments. This realm could only be built by the enhancement of emotions and the creation of culture along the hominid line because the first priority of survival was to make ape-like animals with their weak-tie propensities able to forge stronger bonds in encounters that, in turn, could be iterated to produce the structures and cultures of the meso realm (Turner 2000). Stronger ties could thus move beyond one-to-one interpersonal relations to coordinated relations in larger, more permanent groups that could be linked together to produce organizations, both of which could be lodged eventually in more permanent settlements or communities. With this structural base, and its attendant culture, the macro realm could be created, and once in place, the macro realm of reality would operate as the constraining environment of meso- and micro-sociocultural formations.

In the beginning were weak-tie apes that, along the hominid line, became more emotional and slowly more cultural, allowing them to form encounters as described in volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*; this increased

capacity for sociality then enabled humans to form the three basic types of corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities) and many types of categoric units. With this meso-sociocultural base, it became increasingly possible to build the larger-scale formations of the macro realm, on an ever-more grand scale, as outlined in volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. And so, the evolution of the meso realm becomes the “missing link” between the micro and macro realms. Of course, it has never been missing (since most subdisciplines within sociology are devoted to the study of meso-level formations), but it has been rather undertheorized for what it allows us to do: close the micro–macro “gap” and develop a more unified (though still somewhat loose) set of theoretical principles explaining the operative dynamics of the social universe created and inhabited by humans.

It may seem strange to introduce these evolutionary ideas to the study of corporate and categoric units. Yet, my view is that the subdisciplines within sociology that study the units of the meso realm lack a full appreciation of the bigger picture of, first of all, how these structures evolved and, secondly, how these structures are embedded in macro-level sociocultural formations. The study of each type of meso-level unit is somewhat isolated from the study of all other units. As a consequence, structures outside any one of these meso units are examined in a rather unsystematic manner. For example, even in the well-developed field of study by organization theorists and researches, often denoted by the label “the new institutionalism,” there is no clear conception of institutions; indeed, elements of some institutions are invoked in a rather ad hoc way to explain the “environments” of an organization. Despite the many insights thus produced, the new institutionalism cannot close the micro–macro “gap” because it does not possess a more general conception of social reality, like that outlined in Fig. 1.1. Moreover, even though there are rather sophisticated ecological and evolutionary approaches (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989; Aldrich 1979; Aldrich and Reuf 2006; Scott 2008a, b) in the study of organizations, these approaches all lack of attention to the origins of the meso realm and the complex environments of organizations created by the evolution of macro-level structures and their cultures. Instead, only a few elements of the environments are emphasized, with the result that explanations are limited to just a few types of organizations—mostly business corporations in capitalist systems—and to just a few environmental influences rather than the full range of potential influences from other meso-level structures, from micro-dynamic forces, and most importantly from the full range of macro-level sociocultural formations. A longer-term view of evolution and a broader view of the social universe can help correct for these biases in existing work on meso-level sociocultural formations.

## Conclusions

My approach to theorizing about the dynamics of the meso level of social reality is as a general theorist, not a specialized or even middle-range theorist. I do not see corporate and categoric units as existing or operating alone, or even in local environments of other organizations or members of categoric units. These meso-level units arose as responses to micro-dynamic and macro-dynamic forces, which *always* constitute the environments of corporate and categoric units. Thus, to understand the dynamics of corporate and categoric units, we must first examine the micro- and macro-level environments in which they must operate, and indeed the environments where the forces generating the selection pressures for their formation ultimately reside. Individuals in corporate and categoric units are always responding to pressures from the micro and macro environments, and as they respond, meso-level units change. And as these change in significant ways, both the micro- and macro realms of reality will also change.

Thus, the meso realm is where much of the real “action” occurs. Encounters are almost always embedded in corporate and categoric units, thus making the meso realm where interpersonal action occurs. Meso-level units are the building blocks of the macro realm of institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and intersocietal systems, and thus, much of the action of the macro realm occurs inside and among its basic building blocks. I have waited to analyze the meso realm in volume 3 not because it is a residual realm but rather because it is the realm that *connects* the micro and macro. If micro dynamics are to change the macro realm, the changes will first occur at the level of corporate and categoric units, and if this change is sufficiently widespread, it will transform the macro realm. If macro dynamics are to change structure and culture of micro reality, they will do so by altering the corporate and categoric units in which all encounters are embedded.

To appreciate this centrality of the meso realm to understanding the micro and macro realms, I will begin with how the latter form the environmental constraints and pressures to which meso-level units must respond. Chapter 2 is, therefore, devoted to analysis of the macro-level environment, while Chap. 3 outlines the properties of the micro-level environment that exerts pressure on the meso realm. Then, in the next four chapters, I will examine the dynamics of categoric and corporate units, beginning in Chap. 4 with categoric-unit dynamics and proceeding to examine group, organizational, and community dynamics in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7. In Chap. 8, I will turn to the analysis of social movements as a form of corporate-unit structure that often causes change in both the micro and macro realms of societies

and intersocietal systems, especially changes related to grievances among those in disadvantaged memberships in devalued categoric units. At some point in almost all societies, discrimination on the basis of categoric-unit memberships and the formation of stratification systems cause mobilization by the victims of discrimination for conflict, and as they mobilize, these victims and their sympathizers begin to create corporate units organizing ever-more clear agendas. As these social movement organizations (SMOs) press for change, they almost always are successful in causing change, but not always the change intended. Moreover, many grievances are not attached to experience of members in categoric units; rather, some aspect of organization in communities, in institutional domains, societies, or intersocietal systems generates discontent and escalates grievances against authority. These escalating grievances can become the basis for social movement organizations, which push for change, and usually get it, but again not always in the direction intended.

Thus, the dynamics of all realms of social reality revolve around meso dynamics because meso-level sociocultural formations *reside at the center of social reality* and are the place where social changes in societies become sufficiently organized to force transformations of both the macro and micro realms. True, I am not outlining any distinctive forces of this meso realm, but it is in the formation and operation of corporate and categoric units as they develop from macro- and micro-level forces that much change and conflict in the social world are generated. And thus, understanding the meso realm is critical to a general theory of sociocultural dynamics.

## Chapter 2

# Macro-dynamic Environments of the Meso Realm

The meso-level social realm emerged as hominins, and later humans responded to selection pressures, driving the formation of the macro-level realm. These selection pressures pushed on individual and collective actors to create new kinds of *corporate units* to deal with escalating problems of adaptation. The history of human social evolution is, in essence, the evolution of macro-level structures using groups, organizations, and communities as the building blocks of macro-level sociocultural formations. As they evolved, these macro structures and the forces that drove their formation became *the environment imposing constraints* on corporate units and categoric units.

Thus, before the macro realm evolved, the social world of humans revolved around meso-level sociocultural formations—originally only groups but eventually organizations and communities.<sup>1</sup> Yet, as groups became increasingly lodged inside of organizations which, in turn, were embedded in community structures, the macro realm of reality was built up into institutional domains composed of relations among organizations addressing particular problems of adaptation and, increasingly, into stratification systems created by the unequal distribution of scarce resources by these organizations and the groups in them.

The other basic type of meso-level structure—categoric units—always existed as a response to the obvious differences among humans. Because sex and age are inherent realities of humans as mammals, the first categoric


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<sup>1</sup> It could be argued that even nomadic hunter-gatherers had incipient community structures because they almost always had a sense of their home range and of the bands that “belonged” in this range. And early in societal evolution, community appeared when hunter-gatherers began to settle down, perhaps in temporary locations but eventually for good.

units made distinctions among people by their sex (gender) and age. While early hunter-gatherers worked very hard to prevent differential evaluation of members in these categoric units and avoided the unequal distributions of resources to members of different categoric units, settled hunter-gatherers and people in all subsequent societal formations did not. They began to evaluate members of categoric units and, on the basis of these evaluations, to allocate valued resources unequally. In so doing, they created new kinds of categoric units, beginning with quasi-classes composed of individuals who shared common types and amounts of valued resources. Moreover, very early on in human evolution after nomadic hunting and gathering, quasi-social classes were correlated with memberships in other categoric units. And, as societies grew and had contact with other populations—especially through warfare and conflict—categoric units like ethnicity, language, religion, or regional affiliation became parameters marking people as “different,” and once marked, they could be subject to discrimination in their access to resource-distributing corporate units, thus increasing the level of inequality and, ultimately, forming the bases of stratification.

Today, the macro structure of societies and even intersocietal systems are given; they exist and are often presumed by sociology to have always existed. Yet, knowing something about how the macro level of reality evolved is important to understanding the environment of the meso level of social reality. Even though meso-level structural units and their cultures evolved first in human history, their formation was still driven by macro-level forces, such as reproduction (of the species and corporate as well as categoric units), production (of resources needed for survival), distribution (of resources to kin and band members), and regulation (coordination and control of individuals). And, once population as a macro-level force increased in intensity, the elaboration of meso-level structures was increasingly constrained by the macro-level structures (and their cultures) built up from these meso structures. As corporate units became integrated to meet particular pressures from macro-level forces and as categoric-unit memberships determined access to positions in resource-distributing corporate units, the macro universe of institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and intersocietal systems evolved and now constitutes the environment to which meso-level structures must adapt. Figure 2.1 delineates in abbreviated form this process of building up macro-level environments from the first meso-level structures.

In Fig. 2.1, the dark line denotes the sociocultural environments generated by the processes that are set into motion by selection pressures from macro-dynamic forces. As corporate units are formed, eventually they begin to differentiate and coalesce into the boundaries of institutional



**Fig. 2.1** The evolution of macro level

domains, and they increasingly will use diverse generalized symbolic media suited to domain activities in which they are engaged. From the use of these generalized symbolic media in interactions and transactions, *ideologies* developed for each domain. These ideologies always incorporate the more general value premises of a population and, in so doing, attach abstract values to more specific beliefs and norms governing the actions of individuals and corporate units within institutional domains. Ideologies thus *moralize* the diverse elements of culture within institutional domains. But, as institutional domains are formed and develop ideologies, the latter may begin to alter values, particularly if significant amounts of institutional change and elaboration occur. As corporate units form, they distribute resources unequally, either through their internal divisions of labor or through discriminatory practices causing differential access by members of categoric units to corporate units in the first place. In either case, discrimination often ensues, and out of this discrimination, categoric units take on increased salience, and/or new categoric units are formed. These may have already existed—say, for gender, age, ethnicity/race, or religious affiliation—but discrimination makes them highly salient because they are increasingly correlated with locations in the emerging system of classes. Classes, themselves, become categoric units and, if they are correlated with other categoric-unit distinctions, then the stratification system will evidence gender, ethnic, and religious dimensions. As the stratification system is formed, the ideologies of dominant institutional domains are consolidated into a *meta-ideology* legitimating the system of ranks and classes.

These ideologies and meta-ideologies become ever-more prominent parts of the environment of all corporate and categoric units. Institutional domains and their ideologies are the most immediate environments of all corporate units, while the stratification system and its meta-ideology are the most important environment for categoric units. Yet, institutional domains and their respective ideologies also constrain almost all categoric units, while the stratification and the distribution of individuals across strata will often constrain the operation and culture of corporate units. A theory of meso dynamics will, of course, need to specify the conditions under which the various structural and cultural formations at the macro level exert constraints on meso-level corporate and categoric units. The large arrows in Fig. 2.1 from these formations are intended to emphasize the constant sociocultural push of these macro-level dynamics on meso structures.

The environment of any given corporate unit thus consists of the pattern of relations among types of corporate units and their cultures that form an institutional domain, whereas the environment of a particular categoric unit

is the stratification system and the *status beliefs* about characteristics, worth, and behavioral propensities among members of these units.<sup>2</sup> Today, most theorizing of the meso-level realm focuses on the environments and fields of organizations, but most of this analysis is rather ad hoc. Particular elements of these fields or environments—other organizations, the state and law, professions, markets, networks, etc.—can be selected to explain the operation of an organizational corporate unit.<sup>3</sup> What these analyses ignore, despite the often-used label “the new institutionalism,” are the more general properties of institutions in general as they have evolved as corporate units proliferated and became integrated by a number of generic mechanisms. Moreover, while culture is also seen as part of the environment of any organization, the elements of culture selected—for example, corporate culture and professional ideologies—are also rather ad hoc and fail to conceptualize *systems* of culture that have evolved along with institutional domains, stratification, societies, and intersocietal formations. Important insights have been produced by these approaches, but they fail to conceptualize how robust the structural and cultural environments of the macro realm are (Abrutyn 2011; Friedland and Alford 1991). The result is that much contemporary analysis misses, I believe, critical environmental influences on corporate units in all institutional domains and on categoric units that bring stratification dynamics through the door of any corporate unit. This third volume of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* is devoted to filling in, and expanding upon, the new institutionalism and other approaches, such as human ecology. Reconceptualizing the environments of the meso realm is the best place to begin.

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<sup>2</sup>For references on the emergence and operation of status beliefs, see: Berger 1958; Berger et. al. 1972, 1977, 1980; Berger and Conner 1969; Berger and Zelditch 1985; Ridgeway 1998, 2000, 2001, 2006; Ridgeway et al. 1998, 2009; Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000.

<sup>3</sup>It is rather remarkable how the new institutionalism has come to dominate organizational analysis, but perhaps even more remarkable is the lack of criticism from “old institutionalists” about the limitation of institutional theorizing in the field of organizations. For a sampling of basic references in the new institutionalism, see DiMaggio (1986), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), Fligstein (1990, 1996), Jepperson (1991), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Hirsch (1997), Hodgson (1996), Scott and Meyer (1983), Zucker (1988), Scott (1987, 2005, 2008), Scott and Christensen (1995), Thornton (2004), and Tolbert and Zucker (1996). On the other side, there have been relatively few critiques of this larger literature on the new institutionalism. Among the few critiques, see Friedland and Alford (1991) and Abrutyn and Turner (2011).

## **Environments of Corporate and Categorical Units**

### ***The Environment of Corporate Units***

What is “the environment”? This is not an easy question to answer, as is evident in the rather large literature on organizations and the comparatively smaller literature on groups and communities. For me, part of the environment of corporate units is, first of all, other corporate units—that is, groups, organizations, and communities—and their respective cultures. Corporate units almost always have relations with other units, which means that they must respond to each other. Second, these relations among corporate units are always embedded in the structure and culture of macro-level institutional domains and, generally to a lesser degree, the structure and culture of the stratification system. In turn, institutional domains and stratification provide conduits by which the structure and culture of societies and intersocietal systems affect the dynamics of corporate units, whether groups, organizations, or communities. Third, categorical units and their distribution have large effects on corporate units. Corporate units expand categorical units beyond sex and age because they differentially distribute resources that mark individuals as members of a social class and, potentially, as members of other categorical units whose memberships becomes correlated with particular social classes. Fourth, as the next chapter will seek to document, the environment of any corporate units is composed of the individuals—and the micro-dynamic forces driving their behaviors and interactions—who are incumbent in corporate units. People’s motivations, emotions, and behavioral propensities always influence corporate unit structure and culture; indeed, the forces of the micro realm have generated selection pressures for the formation of corporate units in history and, now, continue to influence meso dynamics.

### ***The Environment of Categorical Units***

The environments of categorical units are, first of all, the corporate units in which members of the members of categorical units are differentially distributed. Access to types of corporate units—workplaces, schools, churches, health care providers, recreational facilities, political parties, courts, and other corporate units lodged in various institutional domains—determines who gets what resources in a society, and when access involves discrimination,

it inevitably creates new kinds of categorical units. For example, if people cannot gain access to school structures, they become labeled “uneducated”; if they cannot find work in the economy, they are labeled “unemployed” or, more severely, “deadbeats”; or if they are excluded from particular religious organizations, they are labeled by their lack of affiliation or by the religious organizations that would accept them. The distribution of people in the divisions of labor of these corporate units to which they have access also operates an environment for categorical units. For instance, people at high-salary and high-power positions will be evaluated and treated differently than those in low-pay and low-power locations within a corporate unit. And, if there is active discrimination by sex, age, class, religion, ethnicity, and other parameters marking categorical memberships, then differential access to corporate units and/or divisions of labor in these units will increase the salience of categorical-unit memberships and the power of status beliefs about these members—thereby making corporate units an even more powerful environmental influence on categorical units.

Secondly, other categorical units also operate as an important environmental influence. Evaluations of, expectations for, and discrimination against members of one categorical unit are almost always made by members of other categorical units, particularly members of units that are considered more worthy by meta-ideologies and status beliefs. Thus, the status beliefs defining moral worth, value, and behavioral propensities among members of one categorical unit are generally juxtaposed against those of another, thereby increasing the salience of status beliefs for members of both valued and stigmatized categorical units. For instance, if more highly valued whites are discriminating against more lowly valued members of a nonwhite ethnic subpopulation, the relative evaluations and treatment of whites and nonwhites will be highlighted, thereby increasing the salience of both categorical units and reinforcing the legitimacy of status beliefs for members of these categorical units. At other times, membership in one categorical unit may intersect with that of another in ways that mitigate negative or positive evaluations. For example, if a person of color, where color is devalued and associated with lower-class categorical units, happens to have the income to be a member of a higher social class, the positive evaluation of the latter will generally reduce the salience of ethnicity. In contrast, membership in two devalued categorical units—say, a lower-class location and stigmatized ethnic subpopulation—the salience of both the devalued class and stigmatized ethnic memberships will increase.

Third, institutional domains and stratification systems are the most relevant macro-level environments for meso-level categorical units. Institutional

domains are built from relations among corporate units as they address problems of adaptation; and as we will see, the modes by which they are integrated have large effects on the formation and evaluation of members of categoric units. Domains also reveal ideologies that adopt elements of societal values to the particular focus of an institutional domain; and as these ideologies are collated into a more general meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system, they establish standards of moral worth for members of categoric units, thereby becoming part of the cultural environment for status beliefs that specify evaluations of, and expectations for, members of categoric units.

In sum, then, this rather cursory overview of macro and micro environments imposing themselves on meso-level structures and their cultures should be sufficient to indicate that we need a more robust conceptualization of environments than is presently found in the literature of “new institutionalism.” In organizational sociology, which is the most theoretically developed of the fields devoted to studying meso-level phenomena, the conception of environments is too simple, ignoring rather important dynamics. Moreover, the properties of environments are almost always conceptualized in a rather vague manner. For example, notions of “niches” in organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989), “fields” in the new institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; DiMaggio 1986), or organizational “logics” (Fligstein 1990, 1991) in economic sociology are never entirely clear. They are suggestive, but it would be difficult to come up with a generally accepted, much less precise view, of what a niche, field, or logic is. Part of the reason for this vagueness is that these labels denote only selected elements from what are far more robust environments than these terms can include; the result is that the definition is constantly shifting depending upon which elements of environments are being highlighted in a particular analysis. Given the more limited purposes of organizational analysis, this is not a fatal error but, if we are to develop a more general theory of the meso-level social realm, we need to expand our conceptualization of environments. As I have emphasized, part of this expansion is understanding how these environments evolved over the long history of human existence, while another part is to include a more detailed analysis of how the forces of the micro and macro realms continue to generate pressures on meso dynamics revolving around corporate and categoric units. In this chapter, I begin with the macro environments of meso reality, turning to the micro environments in Chap. 3.

The structures of the macro realm are built from corporate and categoric units, and as these units evolve, they form institutional domains and stratification systems that evidence their own cultures. Thus, even though the structure

and culture of macro-level sociocultural formations are intermingled in their operation, I think it is useful to begin to analyze each separately as somewhat different environments of the meso realm. Let me first look at the operation of cultural properties of the macro realm as a set of environments of corporate and categorical units.

## Macro-level *Cultural* Environments of Corporate and Categorical Units

Institutions emerge as individual and collective actors confront problems of adapting to their environment(s). I have termed these problems of adaptation *selection pressures* because they place demands for new kinds of corporate units or segmentation of additional units from existing organizational templates. These selection pressures emerge along several lines, or what I call the generic *forces* of the macro realm (Turner 1995, 2003, 2010a): (1) population (growth but also diversification), (2) production (of goods and services), (3) distribution (of people, information, resources), (4) regulation (coordination and control), and (5) reproduction (of human bodies and sociocultural formations).<sup>4</sup> In response to these pressures, entrepreneurs develop corporate units organizing a division of labor to meet the challenge posed by selection pressures. Some of these corporate units will be more fit than others, and the first ones that facilitate adaptation become the core units and the templates for the formation of additional corporate units (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Abrutyn 2011). Core actors are those who have mobilized necessary resources—demographic, organizational, material, and symbolic—into a corporate unit capable of responding to problems of adaptation.

The most important elements of culture during the formation of institutional domains are the symbol systems built up from the use of *generalized symbolic media of exchange*. As entrepreneurs mobilize resources, they begin to develop a symbolic medium for discourse and talk that, in turn, leads to the development of themes and eventually ideologies that translate general values of a population into prescriptions and proscriptions about good–bad, right–wrong, and appropriate–inappropriate for the networks of corporate units that emerge within an evolving institutional domain. As corporate units in emerging institutional domains develop, broad institutional

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<sup>4</sup>See volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (2010: 41–104) for a review of these forces. For earlier statements, see: Turner (1995: 1–75), (2003:23–56).

**Table 2.1** Generalized symbolic media of institutional domains

Kinship	<i>Love/loyalty</i> , or the use of intense positive affective states to forge and mark commitments to others and groups of others defined as kindred
Economy	<i>Money</i> , or the denotation of exchange value for objects, actions, and services by the metrics inhering in money
Polity	<i>Power</i> , or the capacity to control the actions of other actors
Influence	<i>Influence</i> , or the capacity to adjudicate social relations and render judgments about justice, fairness, and appropriateness of actions
Religion	<i>Sacredness/piety</i> , or the commitment to beliefs about forces and entities inhabiting a nonobservable supernatural realm and the propensity to explain events and conditions by references to these sacred forces and beings
Education	<i>Learning</i> , or the commitment to acquiring, passing on, and accumulating knowledge
Science	<i>Knowledge</i> , or the invocation of standards for gaining verified knowledge about all dimensions of the social, biotic, and physicochemical universes
Medicine	<i>Health</i> , or the concern about and commitment to sustaining the normal functioning of the human body
Sport	<i>Competitiveness</i> , or the definition of games and activities that produce winners and losers by virtue of the respective efforts of players
Arts	<i>Aesthetics</i> , or the commitment to make and evaluate objects and performances by standards of beauty and pleasure that they give observers

*Note.* These and other generalized symbolic media are employed in discourse among actors, in articulating themes, and in developing ideologies about what should and ought to transpire in an institutional domain. They tend to circulate within a domain, but all of the symbolic media can circulate in other domains, although some media are more likely to do so than others

norms for the domain as a whole are adopted to form a distinctive culture and normative system of each corporate unit. These normative systems are always constrained by the ideologies that are emerging through the use of *generalized symbolic media*, creating a hierarchy of cultural control, emanating down from core values to meta-ideologies, ideologies, institutional norms, division of labor norms, and corporate-unit culture (see Fig. 2.3 on p. 50 for a visual image).

In Table 2.1, some candidates for generalized symbolic media for various institutional domains are listed, as was outlined in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (2010: 118). These are drawn from Talcott Parsons (1963a, 1963b), Parsons and Neil J. Smelser (1956), and Niklas Luhmann (1982, 1984), and the list only gives a sense for what these media might be.

Clearly there needs to be more conceptual and empirical work on these media, but they are an idea from functional sociology that needs to be retained in conceptualizing the environments of the meso realm (Abrutyn and Turner 2011).

As institutional domains begin to emerge and differentiate from other domains, their generalized symbolic medium become (a) the vocabulary of discourse, (b) the valued resource exchanged, (c) the valued resource unequally distributed, and (d) the moral basis for ideological formation. The level of constraint that they impose on meso structures varies with the degree of integration and consistency among values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and norms the level of consensus over these cultural systems within and between domains the rate and scope of circulation of generalized media and the dominance of the institutional domains in which they operate. These considerations must be theorized in more precise ways in a theory of meso dynamics. For the present, let me emphasize some of the key ways that media determine the culture of the macro-level social realm.


Even though generalized symbolic media are indeed symbolic, they are also symbols denoting and calibrating value. For example, paper money is a symbol since it has no intrinsic value, *per se*; rather, this symbolic medium denotes *amounts* of value for securing other resources that people want and need. Even hard currencies, such as coins made of “precious” metals, have no inherent value except what actors chose to consider important and valuable (because hard currencies were “pretty” and/or scarce). In fact, water would have a great deal more value for thirsty people, although water is obviously not very convenient to use as money.

Generalized symbolic media also become *the actual resources* that are distributed unequally as stratification systems evolve from the unequal distribution of resources by corporate units in diverse domains. For example, *money, power, health, learning*, and other symbolic media circulating within and across institutional domains are highly valued as resources, and depending upon (a) individuals’ access to corporate units in various domains and (b) their location in the hierarchical divisions of labor in these corporate units, their total shares of these and other valued resources will vary. The varying amounts and kinds of valued resources received by subpopulations will eventually coalesce into a stratification system. The structure and culture of this system will, in turn, become part of the environment for all corporate and categorical units in a society. Thus, as symbolic media are distributed unequally by corporate units to their incumbents, stratification inevitably emerges as a property of the macro-social realm.

Because symbolic media are also the building blocks of ideologies within institutional domains, they also become crucial to legitimating the

inequalities of the stratification systems. Typically, the ideologies of the dominant institutional domains are collated, as noted earlier, to produce a *meta-ideology* that legitimates the stratification system as a whole and that also forms the basis of *status beliefs* about the characteristics, moral worth, and behavioral propensities of individuals in the divisions of labor of corporate units and, even more significantly, about members of categoric units (Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). These ideologies have enormous power because they are built from the symbols that are also the valued resources that are being distributed unequally by corporate units. When the resource being distributed unequally and the symbols used to form a legitimating ideology for such equality are the *same cultural elements*, the ideology gains significant traction in regulating actions with a domain and in making inequalities seem right and just—at least for a time

Figure 2.2 outlines the process by which generalized symbolic media are used to build up the culture of the macro realm of social reality. Selection pressures set the process in motion by pushing on some actors to mobilize material, demographic, organizational, technological, and symbolic resources in order to meet the challenges posed by these pressures. There is, of course, no guarantee that these entrepreneurial efforts will prove successful, as the death of corporate units, larger sectors of domains, and even whole societies and intersocietal systems demonstrates. Nevertheless, the



Note:  
=/+ = lagged positive relationship

Fig. 2.2 The evolution of culture

greater are the selection pressures, the more likely are individuals and collective actors to find new or change old sociocultural formations to cope with new problems of adaptation. For corporate units to develop, especially organizations whose division of labor is geared to goals that respond to selection pressures, a medium of discourse and exchange must develop, and this medium must carry evaluative content that makes talk, themes, and eventually ideologies *moral*. This symbolic medium is exchanged in interactions within and between corporate units, and it is exchanged by corporate units in one domain for the generalized symbolic medium of corporate units in other domains. For instance, *money* from corporate units in the economy may be given to corporate units in other domains—for example, whether as taxes to polity or income to families—for rights by economic actors to use *authority* (as franchised power given by polity to regulate actions within a corporate unit) or *loyalty* to economic corporate units from family members for employment that gives them income. Thus, a fourth critical property of symbolic media is that they *circulate within and between domains*, an issue to which I will return shortly. As corporate units segment and, then, differentiate, additional mechanisms of integration, beyond segmentation and differentiation, per se, increasingly come into play, as I will outline later when examining structural mechanisms of integration (see Table 2.3 on pp. 84–90).




Fig. 2.2 (continued)

As generalized symbolic media are used in discourse and exchanges, they are codified into an ideology. This ideology provides moral premises for behavior and actions within a domain. Generally, the ideology adopts and adapts societal level value premises and translates them into moral codes that are relevant to an emerging institutional domain. As ideologies are formed, they also have reverse causal effects on value premises, typically reinforcing these premises but potentially changing them as the culture of a domain evolves. Societal and perhaps even intersocietal cultures thus evolve as their moral premises are used by actors to form ideologies, and as institutions evolve, their respective ideologies are adjusted to new circumstances. As ideologies change, they feed back into value premises, often altering some of these premises. Indeed, the more rapid is the development of institutions and the more dominant are the institutions undergoing change, the more likely are these institutional transformations to alter the ideologies of other domains and, equally, important the value premises of a society.

Similarly, as meta-ideologies are constructed from the ideologies of dominant institutional domains distributing highly valued resources, these meta-ideologies not only legitimate inequalities in the stratification system, but also reinforce value premises. And hence, stratification and its legitimating meta-ideology change, the new meta-ideology will also alter value premises. These reciprocal effects strengthen the power of culture as it is adapted to new circumstances. At the same time, ideologies and meta-ideologies become the cultural conduits by which highly abstract values are made relevant to actors in corporate and categoric units.

Ideologies and meta-ideologies instantiate practices in value premises and, thereby, provide the moral template for institutional norms regulating interactions and exchanges among actors. And these broad institutional norms always carry the moral content of values, ideologies, and institutional norms that, in turn, operate as a moral template for more specific norms guiding conduct of incumbents in the divisions of labor of corporate units within a domain or the behaviors of persons in categoric units. Thus, as symbolic media are used to form ideologies, meta-ideologies, institutional norms, and specific norms for members of corporate and categoric units, they *moralize the cultural environments* of meso- and micro-level social units. When moralized, cultural environments exert even more constraint on corporate units and on the other cultural elements of the domain in which they operate.

This influence of moralized symbols is particularly evident in “codes of professional conduct” that emerge in institutional domains. Such codes of conduct are often part of the more general process of *professionalization* of roles in organizations that engage in exchanges with other organizations in diverse domains. Thus, accountants, lawyers and judges, teachers and

professors, doctors and nurses, priests and clergy, and actors in many other organizational corporate units codify ethics, drawn from ideologies and institutional norms, to assure client organizations and persons that they are trustworthy, thereby providing another layer of morality for exchanges within and between domains. Indeed, there is often a certain level of “moral outrage” when these ethics are violated. Interestingly, for certain domains, such as the economy in capitalist systems or polity in virtually all societies, “professional ethics” are not as highly institutionalized, as is the case when incumbents in organizations are professionalized and certified by specialized training in corporate units of the educational domain.

Thus, to the extent that ideologies and meta-ideologies specify value premises for the activities of actors in institutional domains and legitimate both the domain as a whole and the stratification system created by the actions of corporate units, they provide a powerful force of cultural integration. And, if general institutional norms, more specific norms and expectations for incumbents in corporate and categorical units, and systems of ethics for professions within a domain all follow from the moral premises of ideologies, meta-ideologies, and value premises, key properties of culture are even more integrated and operate as a highly constraining environment for actors in corporate and categorical units. Indeed, the successive embedding of norms in ideologies, ideologies in meta-ideologies, and meta-ideologies in values adds even more integration among, and hence power to, moral codes at all levels of culture. Conversely, if this integration is weak or value premises, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and normative systems are inconsistent with, or stand in opposition (articulating different moral codes) to, each other, then the lack of cultural integration in the environment ensures that conflict among individuals in corporate units and members of varying categorical units as well as conflict between corporate units within and between institutional domains will emerge.

As emphasized, generalized symbolic media circulate not only within the domain in which they evolved but also to other domains. Some media are inherently more likely to circulate because, while moral, they are also “cooler media” that are emotionally neutral and, as such, can be used in a wide variety of institutional context. These more neutral media have some properties of what Parsons’ termed “universalism” (equally applied to evaluations of all actors). In contrast, media that are “hot” arouse emotions, are tied to particular institutional context, and reveal properties of “particularism” (applied to evaluations of individuals unequally). For example, *money*, *power*, *learning*, and *knowledge* are more easily imported into domains than are *sacredness/piety* and *love/loyalty*, and they are inherently “cooler” and more universalistic than are *sacredness/piety* and *love/loyalty*.

Moreover, because they are universalistic, cooler media are more difficult to moralize, thereby allowing them to more readily circulate across institutional domains.

The nature of media, however, is only one condition affecting the rate and scope of circulation. Another condition is the *degree of autonomy* of institutional domains; the more autonomous and bounded is a domain, the more likely is its indigenous medium to circulate within a domain and the less likely are media from other domains to widely circulate. For example, in capitalist economic systems, the economy is relatively autonomous, with the result that medium of *money* will dominate transactions and will be the primary basis for ideological formation. Yet, even an economy will see the circulation of other media: franchised *power* from polity for authority in the corporate units, *learning* and *knowledge* from education and science (often in the form of technologies but also professional-level knowledge), and *influence* from law (via decisions in polity) to coordinate and control relations among economic corporate units and between these units and the units of other domains. Religion in the United States is perhaps a better example of how autonomy imposes boundaries. Law often restricts religious activity, but in a society valuing freedom, the dominant ideology of religion is “freedom of worship,” which translates into moralized limitations on how much other institutional domains can influence the operation of corporate units within the religious domain. Coupled with the fact that *sacredness/piety* is a “hot medium,” the ideology operates as a kind of cultural high-pressure area that keeps other media and the ideologies built from these media from penetrating religion. What is true of religion is even more the case for kinship in the United States where the value premise of freedom is translated into the rights of family to be free from external influence and for members of nuclear units to be guided by *love/loyalty* to the family first, with other commitments being secondary. True, families must take in money to survive, and their members are subject to laws about family members (especially marriage and child abuse) and often by the desirability of giving *love/loyalty* to religion in exchange for *sacredness and piety*, but the kinship system is still relatively impenetrable by even cooler media.

Penetration of external media into a domain is affected by the degree of cultural integration of a domain. High degrees of cultural integration exist when (a) the symbolic medium of a domain is the primary source of evaluative codes for discourse and ideological formation, (b) the ideology systematically draws its general moral premises from core societal-level values, (c) the ideologies of dominant domains used to form meta-ideologies are

compatible and consistent with each other, (d) the level of consensus over the ideology and norms derived from this ideology is high among actors operating in a domain, and (e) the moral codes are successively embedded in each other and form a hierarchy of morality from highly generalized value premises down to norms. Under this set of conditions, symbolic media from other domains and the accompanying ideology will not penetrate a domain as easily or extensively, as is the case when some of these conditions do not prevail. Integration in the sense enumerated above may not, however, be highly adaptive to changing conditions because individual and collective actors may not easily give up moral beliefs and moralized norms, even when selection pressures would indicate that change is necessary.

Still another condition affecting cultural integration is the configuration of the structural mechanisms integrating the corporate units within a domain (to be examined shortly; see Table 2.3 on pp. 84–90 for a preview of these structural mechanisms). When *segmentation* is the dominant mode of integrating corporate units—that is, corporate units in a domain are essentially copies of each other—cultural integration is high, and individuals in corporate units are structurally equivalent and thus share worldviews. As a result, the domain can sustain its integrity from “invasions” of media and ideologies from other domains, but often at the expense of adaptability to changed conditions and new selection pressures. For example, because kinship in the United States is mostly composed of segmented nuclear family units, the power of the ideology built from *love/loyalty* (to family members) is great and limits the penetration of symbolic external media and the ideologies built from these media into kinship as an autonomous institutional domain.

As *differentiation* of new types of corporate units operates as an integrative mechanism, however, gaps appear in social structure that lower the degree of structural integration, and in fact, since differentiation of new kinds of corporate units has proven adaptive, some of these units may well be engaged in exchanges with many corporate units in diverse domains. In so doing, the symbolic media ideologies of corporate units in these outside domains will penetrate domains where differentiation is a mechanism of integration.

When integration is achieved by *interdependencies*, especially exchange relations within and between domains, the symbolic media and ideologies built from these media circulate and reduce the level of cultural integration, and the shift in structural modes of integration will similarly be more chaotic and complex. Yet, when integration is achieved by interdependencies, especially when mediated by markets, money, and law, a dramatically increased level of flexibility is introduced into a domain. And, despite the

lower levels of integration, flexibility will often prove more adaptive under new selection pressures.

Similarly, *mobility* across corporate units within and between domains operates much like markets—and indeed is often regulated by them—because, as actors move among corporate unit, they bring with them some of the culture from diverse corporate units. Mobility in a domain may involve only variants of the ideologies and norms generated by the use of symbolic media in that domain, but these variants increase the cultural flexibility and adaptability of corporate units. And, if mobility involves individuals moving from corporate units in one domain (say, education) to corporate units in another domain (e.g., economy), the circulation of symbolic media—*learning* and *money*—and the ideologies built up from these media are likely to generate increased adaptive fitness.

Boundary *overlaps* of corporate units increase the diversity of cultures in play, especially if overlaps occur among corporate units in different domains. But, even if the overlaps are within a domain, the overlaps are typically created to improve synergies among somewhat differentiated units, and thus, both the structural complexity (and accompanying chaos) and the cultural diversity increase adaptability, even as they lower somewhat the level of integration.

*Embedding* of corporate units inside of more inclusive units operates to increase the structural integration of the units involved, but often at the price of decreased flexibility. Yet, if the level of differentiation among the units is high and if the level of interdependence and exchange is also high, then more flexibility and adaptability in the culture of the consolidated units will ensue. Moreover, if units within a domain are embedded in differentiated units, the embedding sustains some degree of structural differentiation and structural interdependencies (and exchange and mobility as well), thereby decreasing tight cultural integration which, in turn, increases the adaptability of the sociocultural formations created by embedding.

*Domination* of corporate units by core units within a domain and/or by corporate units outside the domain, such as those in an authoritarian polity or fundamentalists' theocracy, increases cultural integration. At the same time, domination decreases flexibility of cultural codes and structural integration, thereby decreasing flexibility and adaptability.

To the degree that differentiation and structural interdependencies among corporate units increase the *intersection of parameters* marking categoric-unit memberships—that is, memberships in corporate units and divisions of labor within these units are *not* correlated with categoric-unit membership—then interaction rates among diverse categoric units increase. And as rates of interaction increase, the differentiated culture associated with categoric

units—especially *status beliefs* about moral worth—becomes less salient in corporate units and the encounters that occur in these units, thereby reducing potential tensions emanating from the stratification system. And to the extent that categorical-unit memberships by, say, age, ethnicity, religion, place of birth, and gender consolidate somewhat different worldviews and cultures associated with these categorical distinctions, the culture of any corporate unit becomes somewhat less integrated by virtue of this diversity; yet, diversity can also create cultural variation and, hence, increased potential for adaptability to altered conditions and new selection pressures.<sup>5</sup>

The circulation of generalized symbolic media across institutional domains can loosen integration in the short run, creating ambiguity for which media and the ideologies built from these media should guide conduct of individuals and corporate units. Yet, interinstitutional circulation of cooler media, such as *money*, *power*, *influence*, *learning*, and *knowledge*, brings elements of the ideologies and normative systems built from these media to diverse domains. Scholars such as Jurgen Habermas (1973[1976]) sometimes characterize this movement of symbolic media as an invasion and “colonization” of the “lifeworld” by *money* and *power* (from economy and government) as they enter domains like education or science. Moreover, hot media like *sacredness/piety* can also circulate under certain structural conditions and be imposed on domains like education, polity, and economy that are dominated by cooler media. For example, the Iranian revolution in the 1970s set into circulation *sacredness/piety* into many institutional domains, diluting and distorting the operation of media in these domains and the ideologies that had been built up by actors using these media. Under these conditions, the integration by culture is precarious and, typically, must be imposed by patterns of structural domination and heavy doses of coercive power. Still, when the exchange of media from different domains is more balanced, with corporate actors giving their media for those of another domain, then these more balanced exchanges can provide a flexible basis of integration. Thus, as *power* and *money* circulate across domains and, in fact, are exchanged for the media of these other domains, this circulation

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<sup>5</sup>The more structural and cultural variation evident in a sociocultural formation, the more selection has something to work on. Conversely, the less variation, the less selection has to select on, if pressures for change arise. Moreover, cultural systems with little variation are often rigid and inflexible, especially if they have been highly moralized. Conversely, when cultural systems have a great deal of variation, they are generally less rigid, and thus, even if existing variants are not fitness enhancing, they are less likely to inhibit efforts at innovation by actors responding to selection pressures.

creates a basis for society wide cultural integration under conditions of high structural differentiation.

For, when generalized symbolic media and the ideologies as well as normative systems built from these media within a domain are exchanged for the media of *money* (from economy), *power* (from polity) as franchised rights to authority in corporate units, *influence* (from law) as a means to achieve needed coordination, *learning* (from education), and *knowledge* (from science, often imbedded in higher education), this mixing of media provides cultural bases for structural interdependencies. Mixing of cultural symbols thus breaks down barriers that high degrees of institutional differentiation and autonomy can erect. Individuals, corporate units, and members of categoric units will possess a common repertoire of generalized symbolic media that can be used in interinstitutional discourse and a set of hybrid ideologies (or meta-ideologies) that provide a common moral basis for normative agreements among highly diverse actors.


As differentiation becomes a structural mechanism of integration (see later discussion), cultural integration cannot so easily be achieved without some mixing of generalized symbolic media and ideologies in ways that facilitate agreements and mutual understandings among differentiated actors operating within a domain and, most importantly, across differentiated domains. Corporate- and categoric-unit actors in diverse domains or in differentiated sectors of one domain will, if they are to form flexible relations that can endure, require a larger mix of media and evaluative symbols by which to construct relations that increase integration in *highly* differentiated societies. And so, family, religion, higher education, arts, sports, medicine, and corporate units in other domains can all achieve a certain level of cultural equivalence by exchanging their respective media for *money* and perhaps franchised *power* (as authority in corporate units) and incorporating elements of the ideologies built from these media into the ideologies that have been constructed by the indigenous media. Thus, medical administrators and doctors, clergy, parents, professors, art's administrators, even artists themselves, and athletes all have similar experiences and worldviews, even though they are located in diverse domains. As a result, they will be less culturally insular and, moreover, significantly more capable of forming new kinds of relations with actors in corporate units in diverse domains, now and in the future. When these "hybrid" cultures are consistently mixed through exchanges of media, they provide a stable but flexible cultural environment for meso-level action.

Integration of culture is also determined by the nature of the meta-ideology legitimating stratification and the degree of stratification itself. As a general rule, the more stratified is a society, the greater are the cultural differences

among social classes, and hence, the greater is the potential for class-based tension and conflict. And if categorical-unit memberships, especially religion and ethnicity, are correlated with high- and low-class positions, then the conflict will be more intense when it periodically erupts in corporate units, such as organizations and more often in communities. If the meta-ideology is composed of ideologies accepted by members of diverse classes, however, this meta-ideology can be effective in legitimating stratification and transferring blame for the fate of lower-class persons to their “personal failures,” although the anger associated with inequalities can often break through this cultural façade of “false consciousness.” Moreover, if the cultures of classes are very different and are laced with additional differences by categorical-unit membership that are enshrined in status beliefs, meta-ideologies may not be able to sustain cultural integration. The result is that the environment of corporate units is filled with contradictory cultural elements, heightened emotions over inequalities, and high potential for conflict.

In Fig. 2.3, I have diagrammed the elements of culture, with an eye to how they can become integrated. This conception of culture is obviously highly simplified, but it is sufficient for my theoretical purposes. All cultures carry a storehouse of texts, traditions, and technologies that constrain the formation of values and, reciprocally, are reinforced or changed by values. An integrated culture at this level would be one where values emerge as highly abstract moral cultural codes that reinforce the themes and tenets of key texts. As generalized symbolic media are used by actors in building up institutional domains, the ideologies that develop will, in an integrated culture, instantiate value premises in the actions and transactions within and between corporate units (and individuals in corporate units). In this way, as Durkheim (1963[1893]) emphasized, the highly abstract values become more specific and germane to concrete social relations. In turn, these ideologies constrain the formation of broad institutional norms, with these general norms constraining specific norms in the division of labor of corporate units and, along with the ideology of a domain, the evolution of corporate-unit culture. Thus, flowing down from highly abstract values are a series of symbol systems that specify value premises in emerging institutional domains and that provide normative regulation of relations within and between corporate units in a domain. Reciprocally, in a highly integrated cultural environment, lower-level cultural codes are embedded in, and will thereby reinforce, increasingly more abstract codes—institutional norms, institutional ideologies, meta-ideologies, value premises, and if needed, reinterpretation of texts and traditions.

As corporate units distribute resources unequally and as stratification emerges, symbolic media of dominant resource-distributing institutional



**Fig. 2.3** Elements of the integration of culture and macro-level environments of meso realm

domains will coalesce into a meta-ideology legitimating stratification. Even though this legitimization may be unfair, it is essential to an integrated culture. And, in societies where class categoric units are correlated with other categoric units, status beliefs about the desirable and undesirable characteristics of members of these units will, in an integrated culture, be constrained by the moral tenets of the meta-ideology while reinforcing these tenets, and in so doing, both the meta-ideology and status beliefs will generate expectation states for members of categoric units that are

consistent with the moral tenets of meta-ideologies and the norms evident in corporate units where members of categorical units are incumbent. If, however, structural and cultural changes are occurring at the corporate-unit level, these changes will work their way up the integrated hierarchy of cultural systems portrayed in Fig. 2.3, altering these so that they are consistent with what is occurring “on the ground” in relations of individuals in corporate units. These changes may come from mobilization and formation of social movement organizations (SMOs) to protest inequalities (by members of categorical units), large shifts in political policies, transformations in the economy, and other of changes in corporate units. The key to integration is that the hierarchy of moral codes is sufficiently flexible, especially at the junction of ideologies and meta-ideologies, to accommodate the changes in norms, corporate cultures, status beliefs, and expectation states at the meso level of corporate and categorical units. Value premises can typically accommodate changes because they are highly abstract, but if texts and traditions have narrowed the scope and lowered the abstractness of values, as might be the case, say, in a theocracy where values are coextensive with religious ideologies, then cultural contradictions and conflicts will be evident and the system of culture will eventually disintegrate.

As generalized symbolic media circulate across domains, they systematically generate hybrid meta-ideologies built from the ideologies of diverse institutional domains. A complex society will thus reveal not only a meta-ideology of dominant domains that legitimates the stratification system but also sets of additional meta-ideologies that are built up as generalized symbolic media are used and exchanged in diverse domains. The key is that these meta-ideologies, in an integrated system, reinforce the main tenants of the dominant meta-ideology; or if change is occurring in the relations among corporate units in diverse domains or members of categorical units, these meta-ideologies can alter the dominant meta-ideology and, if necessary, the dominant values, texts, and traditions. If, however, changes in the circulation of symbolic media create new meta-ideologies that stand in conflict with the dominant meta-ideology legitimating stratification, then the culture system will evidence disintegrative pressures.

The cultural environments of corporate and categorical units are thus potentially complex and highly dynamic in differentiated societies or in societies that are part of extended intersocietal formations. A highly integrated culture of the macro realm will reveal (a) embedding of less general symbol systems in ever-more general codes, (b) consistency among cultural elements up and down the hierarchy of moral codes, and (c) consensus over each element in the hierarchy of moral codes. Such a system will generate stable environments for corporate units and categorical units, but often at the

expense of flexibility. Indeed, if changes at the corporate- and categoric-unit levels are rapidly occurring and if the moral tenets of the various levels of culture are rigid and too mired in dogmatic texts and traditions, then at some point the cultural environment of corporate units will begin to disintegrate and become chaotic. Cultural conflict will inevitably generate structural conflicts among corporate units in diverse domains—for example, among corporate units in polity, religion, and economy—as well as among members of categoric units (e.g., mobilized ethnic subpopulations pushing for economic and political changes in patterns of inequality and the culture that has legitimated these).

In sum, then, the cultural environments of corporate and categoric units can be very complex, somewhat fluid, and often filled with contradictions. The level of cultural integration can be high, but integration of culture often imposes less flexibility on actors in corporate units and members of categoric units—thereby decreasing adaptability of corporate units and institutional domains. As I briefly previewed above, cultural integration is very much affected by the mechanisms of structural integration. Indeed, since culture is ultimately tied to social structures, modes of structural integration can significantly alter the environments of corporate and categoric units. And, depending upon the actions of corporate units and members of categoric units, the cultural environment can be sustained, or it can disintegrate. Thus, before we can begin to get a sense for the robust environments of the meso realm, it is necessary to outline the basic modes of structural integration of institutional domains and stratification systems of the macro level of social reality—as is done in the next section.

## **Macro-level *Structural* Environments of Corporate and Categoric Units**

Institutional domains are created by virtue of mechanisms of integration among the corporate units operating within and between domains. In turn, the *specific configuration of mechanisms* that connect corporate units within and between domains determines, to a very high degree, the environments of any corporate unit and, to a lesser extent, any categoric unit. Coupled with the operation of the integrative dynamics revolving around systems of cultural symbols—that is, relations among generalized symbolic media, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, norms, and professional codes examined above—the sociocultural environments

for meso-level formations are determined. And, depending upon the patterns of integration at the structural and cultural levels, as well as the connections between the two levels, the environments of meso-level sociocultural formations will vary, and despite wide variations in these environments, they will reveal clear and often converging patterns that can be theorized.

Similarly, stratification systems like institutional domains evidence cultural and structural mechanisms of integration. At the cultural level, classes and social strata usually reveal a distinctive culture, while the system as a whole is, to varying degrees, legitimated by the clarity and power of the meta-ideologies combining the ideologies of the dominant institutional domains. At the structural level, the level of access of individuals to resource-distributing corporate units and the number of domains in which access is possible will have large effects on structural integration of stratification. Moreover, the configuration of mechanisms integrating corporate units within and between domains will also have large effects on the integration of the stratification system as a whole.

I should add a cautionary note here on what the concept of *integration* denotes. For me, integration is not an evaluative term but a descriptive one that describes (1) the mechanisms by which sociocultural formations are organized and (2) the capacity of these mechanisms to sustain sociocultural formations in their environments over time. As I have mentioned, a highly integrated culture or institutional system may be highly effective in sustaining patterns of organization over time, often at high costs to individuals, but in the long run, the pattern of integration may generate internal tensions that erupt into conflict or that reduce flexibility and adaptability should environments change. Thus, highly integrated cultural and structural environments of meso-level units may generate consistency over time, compared to less integrated environments that are more chaotic, but the latter can be more adaptive in the longer run. The means by which culture and structural formations at the macro level of social organization can change or remain the same for long stretches of time can be theorized, as can the effect of these macro-level environments on corporate and categorical units of the meso realm. As long as theory, such as the new institutionalism, selectively simply picks elements as they affect modern economic organizations (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983), theorizing will be historically time bound and, at best, relevant to only advanced postindustrial capitalist societies. Moreover, analysis will not include the full range of corporate units in all institutional domains and the complete profile categorical units in the system of stratification.

## ***Mechanisms of Institutional Integration and Meso-level Environments***

Table 2.3 (on pp. 84 to 90) lists the mechanisms of structural institutional integration in a manner similar to Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (2010: 141–42), but with an emphasis on how different mechanisms, alone or in various configurations, generate varying institutional environments for meso-level units. Later, I will turn to the integration mechanisms operating on the stratification system to complete the analysis of the environments created by meso-level dynamics.

**Structural Segmentation.** When corporate units are created in response to selection pressures, the most successful become templates for subsequent corporate units. This is the easiest route to integration because the structure and culture of the units are already in place. A generalized symbolic medium is available for discourse and exchange; ideologies for the domain have been built up or in the process of being codified; institutional norms and specific norms for the corporate unit are known; divisions of labor in new units are structurally equivalent to those in the old, thereby giving incumbents common worldviews (Sailer 1978).

When the first corporate units evolved, segmentation was the principal means for integrating them. When units are structurally equivalent, they are generally culturally equivalent as well. Durkheim termed this process “mechanical solidarity” because individuals and the units that they build will experience and adapt to the same environment composed of similarly structured organizations, the common culture that they carry, and the converging experiences of incumbents in organizations. Thus, new groups look like the one’s already in place, communities look much the same as they proliferate, and organizations copy those that have been successful.

Even when domain-wide segmentation is no longer possible, corporate units operating within resource niches within a domain will often copy each other. New institutionalists emphasize this process in their analysis of how organizations respond to similar “fields” will tend toward isomorphism (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Organizational ecologists (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1977) stress that once the structure and culture of founding organizations begin to proliferate and sustain themselves in a resource niche, they become legitimized, with the result that they are increasingly likely to be copied, even as a niche becomes increasingly dense and competitive. Markets can also increase segmentation because, as Harrison White (1981,

1988) has argued, successful competitors in markets become models for organizations that seek to enter a particular market segment. For example, large discount retailers in the United States emulate what works in the market, as was the case for Walmart which imitated the structure of K-Mart, and any new firm that enters this market will typically imitate Walmart. The same is true even in noneconomic niches, such as higher education, with various niches in this domain (say, large teaching university, small liberal arts college, large public research university, elite private research university). All universities and colleges in similar niches look similar because they are, first of all, copying what has been successful, and, secondly, they are responding to similar environments composed of (a) the demographics of students, (b) the ideologies of higher education, (c) the material resource niches composed of those who can pay fees and fund research activities, (d) authoritative mandates from polity and law, and (e) markets for professionalized personnel.

Moreover, their environments will consist of regularized exchanges of symbolic media with corporate units in other domains. For example, because money circulates through most domains in industrial and postindustrial societies, money will come to higher education from diverse sources, including families who pay tuition and fees, alumni who make donations to endowments, economic actors that fund research or make donations, government that support research and teaching in state universities, corporate units in science that also sponsor research, fans who pay for tickets to watch university sport teams, and so on for other domains. What is being exchanged is *money* for *learning* and *knowledge* in most cases, except perhaps for sport where money is exchanged for *competition* (because colleges and universities in the United States overlap with the institutional domain of sports). When the same symbolic media are exchanged, these media carry on their backs the ideologies that have been built from these media, with the result that the flow of symbolic media reveals a similar pattern across educational corporate units. Thus, even when there is differentiation among corporate units in diverse domains, the pattern of exchanges across domains is, in a sense, segmented because the structure and culture of any basic type of college or university will evidence the same structural pattern of organization, similar patterns of exchange of symbolic media, and hence converging cultures. As a result, it is relatively effortless to move about any university campus in the United States because only a few basic types exist. Such segmentation of structure and culture is a powerful mechanism of integration. In fact, it is normally not very stressful to walk across and participate in any university in the world because they are, in essence, segmented.

The same is true in all other domains. The institution of kinship in postindustrial societies is integrated by patterns of structural and cultural equivalence; business organizations in various resource niches are much the same; communities segment along a few basic patterns (large core city, suburbs, exurbs, and rural communities); government agencies converge in their structure and operation; courts at all levels of the legal systems are structured alike and reveal the same culture; and so it goes for corporate units in virtually all domains. Thus, even as differentiation of corporate units within and across diverse domains occurs, segmentation still operates as a basic mechanism of integration for corporate units in similar locations in the matrix of differentiation. Segmentation is the easiest route to structural and cultural integration, and so, when corporate units are in similar environments, they make similar adaptations to these environments, while mimicking those corporate units that have been successful in these environments.

As this kind of segmentation within differentiated institutional domains proceeds, each domain will reveal a relatively small number of diverse types of corporate units, thereby dramatically simplifying the culture and structure of a domain. When retailers, universities, governmental agencies, law firms, courts, research organizations inside and outside of academia, sports teams, medical clinics and hospitals, K-12 schools, churches, and all of the many corporate units in diverse domains evidence subsets of structural and cultural equivalence because of segmentation, the integration within and between corporate units across differentiated domains is simplified.

Furthermore, there are elements of segmentation even across corporate units that are otherwise differentiated from each other. For example, there are isomorphic elements among all community formations; there are similar structural patterns among all organizations of various sizes in how they are organized by bureaucratic authority linking offices (as Weber's famous typology on bureaucracy outlines) and using money tied to promotions as incentives for work performance. The result is similarities among churches, schools, universities, businesses, law firms, governmental agencies, major league teams, hospitals and clinics, and so on for corporate units in all domains whose similarities far outweigh their differences in structure and, to a lesser extent, their culture. This kind of pan-segmentation provides an important basis of integration across all corporate units within and between domains, and in so doing, pan-institutional segmentation generates environmental homologies across differentiated corporate units. And homologous environments, especially in differentiated institutional domains, allow for more flexible integration than segmentation alone, which at some point is an inadequate response to selection pressures from macro-level forces.

**Structural Differentiation.** The larger is a population and the greater are the selection pressures on its members, the more likely will segmentation alone prove maladaptive. Increasingly, new kinds of corporate units engaged in varied types of institutional activity will be necessary to manage macro-level selection pressures. Differentiation of corporate units thus ensues and, by itself, can provide an integrative basis for a society, but almost immediately, differentiation generates its own selection pressures revolving around problems of coordination and control of differentiated corporate and categorical units. Regulation as a macro-dynamic force thus pushes for new mechanisms of integration, most of which operate to generate *structural interdependencies* among differentiated units within and between institutional domains. Before turning to these mechanisms of interdependence, however, let me first examine differentiation, per se, as an integrative mechanism.

Historically, on an evolutionary timescale, societal differentiation began when other institutional domains began to evolve out of kinship. Settled hunter-gatherers, often organized around a Big Man and his allies, revealed a clear differentiation of polity and, at times, religious practitioners outside of kinship proper (Lenski 1966; Parsons 1966; Turner 1972, 1997, 2003). Some settled hunter-gatherers, such as the Chumash in Central and Southern California, went even further, revealing a true economic division of labor among specialists who coordinated their output for trade, hereditary leaders of communities and sets of communities, and religious practices not tied to kinship (Arnold, 1992, 1993, 1995a,b, 1996a,b). Yet, with the rise of horticultural (gardening with human power) and pastoral (herding) societies, the initial emergence of more distinctive economic, political, legal, and religious activity occurred within kinship which, in its most elaborated form, moved from separate nuclear families to a system of nuclear families embedded in lineages, lineages embedded within clans, and clans embedded in two moieties dividing a society in half. These structures were built around a descent and residence rules, but they looked very much like a complex organization and can be viewed, therefore, as the first true organizational corporate units. These unilineal kinship units were embedded in more settled villages, and typically a paramount political leader of a dominant clan emerged to govern within one community but often across a set of communities. Figure 1.3 on p. 22 illustrates the similar structural form of systems of kinship built from a descent rule, which, as is clear, look very much like the organization chart of a business corporation or any bureaucratic structure.

As populations grew and began to use nonhuman sources of power, kinship increasingly lost its capacity to organize an entire population, with the

result that kinship began its long odyssey back to the nuclear form typical of nomadic hunter-gathers, thereby pushing out of kinship's shrinking nest new kinds of corporate units engaged in distinctly economic, religious, and political activity. In this way, it became possible to organize larger numbers of individuals in society; and once this organizational template was in place, it became the implicit model for further differentiation under selection pressures. As all of the first sociologists recognized, especially the first functionalists like Herbert Spencer (1874–1896) and Emile Durkheim (1963[1893]), the scale of society could not grow without structural differentiation. As Spencer emphasized, a larger “social mass” requires a more complex structural “skeleton” to support and carry this increased mass. However, even as institutional domains began to evolve with organizational corporate units pursuing different goals in response to selection pressures, the form of these newly differentiated organizations was often segmental in that they copied successful formations that had evolved during the first wave of differentiation among institutional domains. And, over time, they copied bureaucratic templates because these proved to be relatively efficient and effective ways to organize large numbers of people. And it is for this reason that Max Weber (1922) could emphasize *rationalization* as a master social process that altered the structure of many corporate units and more general patterns of domination.

Thus, as I mentioned earlier, even as differentiation in the goals of organizational units varied, their structural forms remained much the same. True, an army accentuates some features more than a religious denomination or a business enterprise and school system, but the essential structures look much alike, especially if diagramed by their network structures and hierarchies of authority. Differentiation can only operate, therefore, as an effective mechanism of integration by generating some degree of segmentation that in turn increases sets of structural and, to a lesser extent, cultural equivalences among organizations in diverse institutional domains.

Within domains, dominant core organizations or powerful networks of organizations often force other organizations to copy the structural form of the core. Moreover, as organizations begin to exchange resources, including movement of personnel across organizations, there are pressures for segmentation not only of structure but also of culture built from the dominant generalized medium in the domain. These same kinds of pressures operate across domains, as organizations exchange symbolic media as resources, and through the back door of these exchanges come the ideologies built from these media, leading to some convergence of the respective structures and cultures of organizations. For example, if corporate units in the economy hire graduates of universities, the exchange revolves around *money* for

*learning*, with the respective ideologies of economy and education also being exchanged. As noted above, hybrid meta-ideologies often emerge, and these lead to some degree of cultural convergence to accompany structural convergences. Although a large business corporation and a university reveal many organizational differences, their structural forms and, to a much lesser extent, their cultures tend to converge. While academics in capitalist systems often moan the encroachment of capitalist models of profit-making in the university, this trend is simply an obvious example of how interdependencies cause some degree of segmentation of corporate units across institutional domains. Indeed, to take another example, the mega (mostly Protestant) churches that have evolved in the United States look far more like economic actors than churches of the past (e.g., through their marketing efforts and their need to ensure a cash flow for their high overhead), just as the Catholic Church of the middle ages looked very much like a large business and, at times, political corporate unit. Thus, pressures for isomorphism not only occur within a domain, they occur across a domain as interdependencies among corporate units in diverse domains evolve and provide similar structural environments to which corporate units in diverse domains must adapt.

Institutional autonomy intersects with these segmentation pressures that accompany differentiation and that, in fact, provide for much of the integrative power of differentiation. If an institutional domain is relatively autonomous, its constituent organizations (and the groups in these organizations) may not be as isomorphic with organizations in other domains (Abrutyn 2011), but there will be some degree of isomorphism because of various patterns of interdependence (see discussion below) and because organizations in one domain will always look for successful organizations in their own *and* other domains to emulate, if the latter have been successful. The power of the ideologies within more autonomous domains also works to sustain institutional autonomy, especially if the ideology of the domain is potentially in conflict with the ideologies of other domains. Thus, the domains of science, education, kinship, and religion, for example, often have some autonomy, with the result that the structure of their corporate units and, more significantly, their respective cultures differ from those in other domains. And yet, except for institution of kinship in postindustrial societies, which is built around a group (i.e., the nuclear family) rather than from formal organizations, there is still considerable structural convergence in their various bureaucratic forms and some mixing of ideologies into a hybrid meta-ideology.

The degree of isomorphism in structure and culture of corporate units within a domain and between domains thus determines the nature of the envi-

ronment of corporate units and, at times, categoric units as well. If there are high levels of differentiation among corporate units of a domain, then more complex patterns of structural interdependencies will exist in the environment of each differentiated type of organization, while the cultural environment will reveal a common ideology built up from the use of a common symbolic medium of exchange and, as a consequence, may provide a greater level of cultural than structural integration. In this manner, organizations revealing somewhat different structures (say, a small, family-run business versus a large multidivisional company in a capitalist economy) can become integrated by specific networks of exchange and, more importantly, by a common capitalist ideology.

The same process works across institutional domains, but here structural mechanisms revolving around interdependence are more important than common culture. Exchanges of symbolic media and other resources, such as material goods, services, and personnel, will be the principal integrative mechanism and, hence, will dominate the environment of any organization in diverse domains. Depending upon relative institutional autonomy and the power of the ideologies of respective domains, the degree of cultural integration will vary from relatively moderate because of meta-ideologies that may emerge across domains to relatively low when the ideologies of domains can potentially come into conflict. Thus, even though there are some pressures for structural and cultural convergence that create patterns of structural and cultural equivalence among differentiated corporate units within and between diverse institutional domains, differentiation always generates new selection pressures revolving around regulation, which in turn increases pressures for corporate units in domains, such as polity and law, to become part of the environment of differentiated corporate units in all other domains. These pressures also push for the creation of more structural mechanisms geared to creating and sustaining interdependencies among corporate units, as is explored below. And to the degree possible, these mechanisms of interdependence cause some convergence of structural forms and the development of meta-ideologies that blend, to varying degrees, the ideologies generated by the respective generalized symbolic media of diverse institutional domains. Thus, in contrast to segmentation as an integrative force, where the structural and cultural equivalences across corporate units generate a similar environment for each corporate unit, the environments of corporate units in differentiated societies will be more complex, depending upon the configuration of mechanisms of structural interdependence and the degree to which hybrid meta-ideologies are developed from these structural interdependencies.

**Structural Interdependencies.** In Table 2.3 on pp. 84 to 90, rows 3a through 3d highlight what I see as the most general mechanisms of integration by structural interdependence. Depending upon the configuration of these mechanisms within and between corporate units in differentiated institutional domains, the environment of any corporate unit and some categorical units will vary. In turn, these structural configurations also affect the nature of the cultural environment of any corporate unit and, in this case, the environment of members of categorical units as well. Let me now review these structural mechanisms in the order list in Table 2.3.

### Exchange

As corporate units differentiate, they increasingly become dependent upon other specialized corporate units for necessary resources, whether for materials or services. Under these conditions of demand for resources, markets using money and credit inevitably emerge and begin to differentiate horizontally (as market sectors for different types of resources and services) and vertically into meta-markets where the medium of exchange in lower-level markets (e.g., money, stocks, bonds, mortgages, insurance contracts, commodities contracts, and the like) becomes the resource exchanged in a higher-order and often highly speculative market (Collins 1990; Braudel 1977, 1982[1979]; Turner 1995, 2003).

Once operative in response to selection pressures from distribution and regulation as macro-level forces, markets become differentiating “machines” in societies because they allow for the diversification of demand and thus create incentives for specialized corporate units to meet this demand. Indeed, as Collins (1990) argued, they become “the driving force of history.” As markets expand and differentiate, markets become part of the environment of virtually every corporate unit in all institutional domains because the medium of exchange increasingly revolves around *money*, which circulates across all domains. The result is that the symbolic medium of money becomes conflated with the distinctive symbolic media of all other domains, thereby creating sets of hybrid meta-ideologies built around money and other symbolic media within diverse domains. In so doing, money links corporate units across institutional domains and reconciles, to varying degrees, potential conflicts in their respective ideologies. The result is that there is a certain level of segmentation in the cultures of differentiated institutional domains because *money* as a symbolic medium becomes part of the meta-ideology of *each* domain. In so

doing, money creates cultural equivalences in the environments of most domains.<sup>6</sup>

As markets expand and as money circulates across domains, it provides the necessary liquid resources to support (via taxes and fees) polity and law as autonomous domains. At the same time, markets themselves create selection pressures for regulation by administrative agencies of polity and by legal codes, most of which in any legal system involve specifying the rules by which contracts for exchange are to occur. Since market transactions extend across most, if not all, domains, polity and law become part of the environments of all institutional domains, imposing administrative and legal constraints on diverse kinds of corporate units—families, churches, teams, clinics, schools, businesses, nonprofits, and virtually all of the many diverse corporate units in institutional domains. Moreover, government and law become not only the means for organizing communities (as a type of corporate unit), they also become part of their environments as ever-more encompassing layers of law and government impose restrictions on lower-level governmental formations in communities and the organizations embedded in these communities.

As government and law become part of the constraining environments of corporate units, the media of *power* and *influence* circulate in virtually all domains. And, like the circulation of any medium across institutional boundaries, the media of government and law carry with them ideologies of these domains that, in turn, become part of the meta-ideology in any given domain. The result is that institutional domains now have several ideologies mixed with the ideologies of each domain, thereby creating a broader institutional base for converging meta-ideologies that are now part of the cultural environment of each domain. Moreover, since the media of economy, polity, and law are generally dominant in a society, the meta-ideology from these domains exerts even more constraint as part of the cultural environment of any corporate unit. At times, as is the case in contemporary Iran,

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<sup>6</sup>Critical theorists like Jürgen Habermas (1972) and some postmodernists argue that this circulation of money and other, in Habermas' terms, "delinguistified media," colonize the lifeworld of actors and disrupt if not destroy what is meaningful in other noneconomic domains. I think that these theorists overdo this claim because it is clear to me, at least, that the symbolic media of domains in which cooler media also circulate seem to sustain their cultures and traditions. Moreover, in the spirit of Simmel (1978[1907]), these critical theorists underestimate the integrative effects of media like *money*, as I have also emphasized in a somewhat different way than Simmel. Generalized symbolic media and their cultures become mixed and often equivalent, thereby giving people common worldviews and hence ability to form meaningful relationships with diverse actors within and between institutional domains.

religion and its medium are dominant, with the result that the meta-ideology in diverse domains is still a broad hybrid but one dominated by *sacredness/piety*, mixed with *money, power, and influence* (from Islamic law). Still, this meta-ideology operates like the meta-ideologies built from *money, power, and influence* in capitalist democracies in that the cultural environments of diverse corporate units converge and provide powerful symbolic basis for integration.

When market forces extend across institutional domains, they expand the ideology extolling the efficiency and uses of markets beyond actual monetary exchanges. Other, nonmonetary exchanges increasingly become viewed as what I termed (in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*) *quasi-markets*. For example, dating is seen as a market process, hopefully involving the exchange of *love for love*, but there is *money* in the mix (if only to pay for dates and/or a dating service). Or churches may exchange clerical knowledge of the *sacredness* for *piety* from their members (although money as a donation and a marker of piety is almost always involved as well). Thus, both structurally and culturally, relations are seen as mediated by markets and quasi-markets, which again allows the environments of diverse corporate units to converge.

Convergence in their structural patterns of exchange and in the cultures of most corporate units in most domains creates a weak form of segmentation that, in turn, provides for a strong basis of integration in even highly complex societies. Moreover, there is more flexibility in these environments because markets are capable of accommodating new kinds of exchanges among new corporate units requiring new kinds of resources, and hybrid meta-ideologies will always carry some flexibility because they are not as tightly integrated, as is the case where the sole mechanism of integration is segmentation and cultural homogeneity in societies with very low levels of differentiation (or “mechanical solidarity” in Durkheim’s terms).

We can see the power of markets as mechanisms of interdependence and their capacity to form stable and converging structural and cultural environments by comparing their dynamism in the capitalist West with that of the old Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries of the Cold War era. For the most part, markets in this part of the world were (dreary and understocked) depots that distributed goods and services in response to top-down allocations by economic planners; demand from individuals and corporate units was much less important in determining the products available in these dreary distribution depots. The result was that money was not the dominant symbolic medium, but rather *power* and its use in formulating a restrictive political ideology backed up by the coercive and administrative arms of the state dominated not only economic transactions but also relations among all

corporate units. The environments of all corporate units were thus much the same and provided considerable integration but at the cost of flexibility and, more importantly, dynamism in the economy where per capita productivity continued to decline from its initial peak in the early 1960s. By the time the Soviet Union fell apart 30 years later, the inflexibility and lack of dynamism of the Soviet Union in a world that was rapidly going capitalist were all too evident. Thus, a powerful basis of structural and cultural integration can be highly successful in the short run but lack the flexibility and dynamism in the long run.

And so, as free markets rework all bases of interdependence across institutional domains and as they drive further differentiation, they also create more segmental subenvironments for all corporate units than might be expected. They first circulate money and the ideology of capitalism; then they pull in polity and law because of their own integrative problems and because of the need to regulate money and transactions, and as they do so, they generate sets of hybrid meta-ideologies that provide a common culture across even highly differentiated institutional domains.

### Structural inclusion and embedding

When smaller corporate units become embedded in larger units within a domain, the level of integration among the units increases. When organizations first evolved, they were built from the inclusion of group-level corporate units into systems of authority linking groups to coordinate pursuit of particular goals, many of which were ultimately responses to selection pressures. Thus, organizations reduce the number of free-standing groups in a society and, in so doing, integrate the environments of groups and organizations, and the greater the rate and degree of embedding of groups inside of organizations, the more stable will the structural and cultural environments of both groups and organizations become, while at the same time, the more likely are these organizational units to be capable of dealing with selection pressures.

Organizations, even virtually built ones, must be located in physical space, which means that they are likely to be embedded inside of community corporate units which provide infrastructures for the operation of organizations and their constituent groups. Since communities reveal clear tendencies toward segmentation, they reduce the complexity of the environment for organizations because they will generally build up similar infrastructures, evidence similar patterns of governance, and organize similar districts for key functions, whether economic, governmental, religious, educational, legal, and

familial (housing and recreation), with the result organizations in the same or different communities respond to similar local environmental pressures. Historically, and to the present, community structures and their culture have been influenced by the configuration of organizations in institutional domains within the borders of the community. For example, many of the first larger cities in various parts of the world were dominated by political and religious organizations. Later cities could be based on market transactions or particular industries or trades, or a city could revolve around its infrastructural functions (as a port or a way station on a transportation route). Increasingly, cities can revolve around particular service industries, such as banking or equities trading, and even today, cities can be built to provide a inclusive unit for particular institutional activities of corporate unit, beyond the early pattern evident for politically and religiously based communities (which still persist, of course, in capitals of states and nations and foundational centers of religion). For example, entire communities or significant portions of them can be organized to service corporate units devoted to education (e.g., college towns), science (research parks), entertainment (as an emerging institutional domain), medicine (mega-medical campuses), and kinship (suburbs), and economics (manufacturing, banking, insurance, trade).

When communities reveal a similar configuration of corporate units devoted to a particular range of institutional activities, the culture of these communities will converge, as will the development of infrastructures facilitating exchange, distribution, and movement of people and resources. The result is increased integration not only within the community but also across communities revealing a similar profile in terms of such variables as population size and mix of institutional domains. As a consequence, groups inside of organizations, organizations inside of communities, and segmentation of communities into a few basic forms increase the structural and cultural integration of all corporate units in all institutional domains across a society. The sociocultural environments of individuals, corporate units, and categorical units will be similar, thereby facilitating adaptation to these environments. Structural and cultural equivalences feed off each other, with structural equivalence generating common worldviews and ideologies, and with the latter coalescing into a common culture that constrains individual actions and structural formations. Thus, even in highly differentiated societies, equivalence provides for integration and environmental stability.

Community corporate units are typically embedded in larger geographical units, such as counties and districts inside of states or regions, which in turn are embedded in societies. Integration increases with such inclusion because agents of polity are successively embedded in ever-larger and more inclusive governing units while being regulated by a system of ever-more

inclusive laws culminating in the system of laws at the societal level. The environments of communities are thus not only other communities with which exchanges may occur but communities regulated by the same system of law and governance from regional, state, and national polities. The result is that, aside from the effects of community segmentation, per se, two of the key environmental forces—that is, corporate units from polity and law—will be structured and operate in the same manner for all communities, as will the environments for all of the corporate units of differentiated domains located within any community. A further result is that the culture of communities and institutional domains will converge because of community segmentation and embedding in the same successive layers of polity and law created by larger geographical sociopolitical formations.

Just as groups are embedded in organizations, smaller organizations often become embedded in larger ones, or through merger processes, organizations of varying sizes become included in a new, larger corporate unit within an institutional domain. The result is to increase the level of overall integration in a domain. One force behind structural inclusion is markets; corporate units are always exposed to the vagaries of market forces—for example, competition, downturns, fraud, collapse, inflation, etc.—and one way to limit exposure is to internalize functions within a larger corporate unit rather than through market-mediated interdependencies. Integration comes from more extended hierarchies of authority rather than market-based interdependencies, coupled with a corporate-unit culture built from the generalized symbolic medium of an institutional domain. This kind of integration, however, creates problems of structural and cultural rigidity, exposure of the larger and less flexible corporate units to market forces, and because of these potential problems of regulation and control, intervention by polity and law becomes inevitable and, hence, part of the environment of corporate units, especially those in the economy.

As a consequence of these dynamics, the environments of corporate units in a domain become populated by larger corporate units, which often force smaller units to merge and form a more inclusive unit in order to compete in the markets that spread across institutional domains outside of the economy. As units become larger, the ideology of an institutional domain becomes more unified, especially if some larger corporate units dominate transactions within a domain. Moreover, there is generally some convergence in the structural forms and culture of larger units, with the result that the environment of units inside a domain is stabilized and simplified because of these segmentation pressures.

The systems of authority that extend across larger corporate units engaged in various institutional activities increase the likelihood that domination will

become an important mechanisms of integration (see later discussion). Large units may exert considerable influence on corporate units in polity and law, but the reverse is even more likely to be true: larger units come under the authority of polity and its administrative agencies or, alternatively, the influence of laws enacted by polity as well as adjudicative structures (e.g., courts) and enforcement agencies funded by tax revenues collected by polity. In this way, extrainstitutional authority outside a domain hooks up with the larger and longer reach of intrainstitutional authority generated by the successive embeddedness of corporate units, whether organizations incorporating small organizations and their constituent groups or communities providing places, infrastructures, and services to larger organizational units in institutional domains. The result is increased structural integration and, at the same time, a mixing of ideologies of several institutional domains into a meta-ideology, both of which simplify and stabilize the environments in which corporate units of varying types and size operate—often at the price of reducing institutional flexibility and, hence, adaptability.

### Structural overlaps

When organizational corporate units engage in exchanges creating interdependencies, they often take a further step for more integration: merging of some of their activities and, thereby, creating structural overlaps. For instance, universities often set up research parks on their campuses, or near them, and share personnel, administrative overhead, and budgets with the research arms of for-profit economic corporations; they can also encourage overlaps with religious corporate units when they allow on-campus counseling and other services provided by religious corporate units. Similarly, even competitive corporate units in the economy of a capitalist society can create overlapping research groups in new organizations or even set up joint production units. Overlaps allow organizations to draw upon each other's resources without dealing with the vagaries and uncertainties of markets, while also enabling them to save on other resources from administrative overhead, research and development, marketing, and personnel.

Overlaps have many of the same effects as inclusion, but when they involve organizational corporate units from different domains—for example, education, science, economy, polity, religion, and law—the overlaps increase the level of inter-institutional integration in several ways. One is that their organizational forms will be similar and have many of the same effects as segmentation in creating structural equivalences, but perhaps more important is the effect on culture, as symbolic media and ideologies are

mixed and reconciled to produce inter-institutional meta-ideologies that extend across domains and thus generate expanded and more stable cultural environments for individuals and corporate units in diverse domains.

Overlaps also can potentially increase the rate of intersection between corporate units and categoric units. If overlaps allow for members of different categoric units to gain access to the same organization, or to residential areas where the overlapping organizations are located, then individuals from diverse backgrounds will have higher rates of interaction, and over time, the salience of categoric-unit memberships will be reduced. Similarly, if members of diverse categoric units can also be distributed across the full range of positions in the divisions of labor in overlapping units, the salience of categoric-unit membership and the *status beliefs* that devalue some and valorize others will be reduced (see Chap. 5). When tension-producing inequalities legitimated by status beliefs and the meta-ideology of the stratification system from which they are drawn lose their power, while the meta-ideologies of diverse domains increase in salience and power, then the environments for individuals and corporate units will evidence less potential for conflict and more potential for increased cultural unity. The inherent tension built into all stratification systems is thus mitigated. If, however, the reverse is true—overlaps sustain discrimination against members of devalued categoric units and reinforce status beliefs and the underlying meta-ideology legitimating stratification—then the environments of individuals and corporate units will be filled with potential cultural conflict.

### Structural mobility

Movement of incumbents across corporate units, especially those in diverse institutional domains, increases interdependencies between corporate units and, most significantly, their respective cultures. For example, when universities send out trained professionals to corporate units in diverse domains—economy, government, law, medicine, religion, arts, etc.—they bring with them the generalized symbolic medium of the university (*learning*), the ideology of education, and professional ethics derived from this ideology; they must then reconcile this cultural set with that of the institutional domain in which their corporate unit of destination is located. As an outcome, meta-ideologies are built up, and a certain amount of cultural homogenization occurs, which in turn simplifies both the structural and cultural environments of individuals and corporate units.

In highly differentiated societies, then, career movements of all incumbents in corporate units work to increase common cultures. And if rates of

movement are high and the destinations are in diverse institutional domains, then differentiated domains will share at least some common culture or at least be familiar with differences in culture and thus be more able to adapt to these differences. Moreover, if high rates and distances of mobility increase intersections of categorical units with diverse corporate units and all locations in their respective divisions of labor, the rates of interaction among members of diverse categorical units increase, and over time, the salience of categorical-unit membership declines—thereby mitigating tensions associated with inequality and relevance of status beliefs and meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system. In contrast, when mobility is low and corporate units present barriers to mobility, especially when active discrimination against certain categorical-unit members is operating, then structural differences become large cultural differences, and highly differentiated environments always present greater problems of adaptation for corporate units and individuals in them.

As is the case with overlaps, if access to resource-distributing corporate units in key institutional domains (e.g., economy, education) and/or to high-resource bestowing locations in divisions of labor of corporate units is restricted by discrimination against members of devalued categorical units, then the status beliefs and legitimating meta-ideology of stratification also become part of the cultural environment of individuals and corporate units. The effect is to inject the tensions associated with stratification into the environments of all actors, creating more problems of adaptation. Conversely, as noted above, if mobility allows diversely categorized individuals to have access to all resource-giving corporate units and all locations in division of labor of these units, the salience of status beliefs and the meta-ideologies of stratification are reduced.

### Structural domination

With differentiation and the evolution of mechanisms of structural interdependence, the consolidation of power inevitably increases, creating systems of domination within and across institutional domains. There are four fundamental bases of power (Turner 1995, 2010a): (1) coercive, (2) administrative, (3) symbolic, and (4) material incentive. The configuration of these bases and their location within or outside a given institution affects much of the social and cultural environment of any particular organization. If the coercive base is used heavily by polity, then the administrative base also becomes highly centralized to organize coercion and to monitor conformity to political directives. The result is for the environments of all corporate units in all institutional domains to be dominated by decisions of polity—as was the case in the Soviet Union

and is now the situation in most totalitarian regimes. Typically the legal system becomes highly restrictive in how it regulates relations among corporate units and manages acts of deviance. Moreover, the cultural environment is heavily infused with ideologies built up from *power* as a generalized symbolic medium but a conception of power as imposed upon actors in contrast to being facilitative of transactions among corporate units. The environments of corporate units become part of an extended system of top-down authority, backed up by law and ideologies of power that dominate other institutional ideologies, with relatively little use of material incentive bases of power. Instead, incentives to actors revolve around avoiding punishments and the heavy hand of coercive and/or administrative power. Authoritarian regimes all over the world illustrate how this form of domination creates highly restrictive environments for individuals and corporate units organizing their activities. Such systems are, at least in the short term, integrated because they persist, but as the Soviet Union learned, they reduce flexibility and adaptability to an external intersocietal universe that was going capitalist and leaving the Soviet Union behind by all measures of economic productivity.

The opposite profile of domination is where material incentives and symbols from a meta-ideology built from *money*, *power*, and *influence* dominate. The meta-ideology will emphasize the expansion of wealth loosely regulated by additional incentives provided by tax revenues collected (or uncollected) by polity and by the legal system designed to facilitate rather than limit market transactions. The consequence is an environment for all corporate and categoric units that is less restrictive. Administrative bases of power are relatively weak and decentralized; ideologies emphasize the dynamism of free markets and lower taxes on corporate unit activities; only strategic use of coercive power is condoned, and material incentives are designed primarily to stimulate economic growth. Such a system is somewhat chaotic, subject to often unstable and extreme market oscillations, while increasing wealth and per capita income of some, while at the same time increasing inequalities between the affluent and poor. Moreover, all actors will generally confront more risk.

Domination by polity almost always causes the elaboration of the law, but the nature of law—that is, the restrictiveness of legal codes, the degree of open debate in an arena of politics during their enactment, the degree and severity of their enforcement, and the fairness of their adjudication in courts—will depend upon the pattern in the configuration of bases of power along the two extremes outlined above. The more the coercive configuration prevails, the more likely will polity and law be part of the environment of all corporate units in all institutional domains, whereas the more the material

incentive profile dominates, the more polity and law will be part of the environment of a more restricted set of domains, particularly economy, education, and science, and even here, the restrictiveness of law and administrative actions by polity will be far less than in the more coercive-based configuration of the bases of power.

When the consolidation of power occurs under the influence of corporate actors in nonpolitical institutional domains, typically religion, it will generally gravitate toward the more coercive base of power. The emerging theocracy will rely upon a linkage between the coercive and administrative bases, while the meta-ideology created by mixing ideologies constructed from *power* and *sacredness/piety* as symbolic media will be highly moralized and restrictive, demanding religious orthodoxy and commitment. And the legal system will be closed, as the case with Islamic law, to legislation that violates the tenets of the religious belief (ideological) system. If polity is, as Marx and most Marxist believe, dominated by core actors and dense networks of economic corporate units, then polity and law will move toward the material incentive configuration of power, with polity and law being relatively weak compared to the consolidation of wealth and influence of economic elites. If less dynamic market systems are typical, such as was the case in more feudal societies, polity will vacillate between centralization of power (e.g., in the king) and decentralization of power away from a central figure (e.g., owners of manorial estates). In either case, the environment of all corporate units will revolve around the meta-ideology mixing the virtues of feudal forms of power (around the coercive-administrative bases of power), elite privilege and control of economic and legal activity, and religious beliefs legitimating elite and religious wealth.

Domination is also a function of the autonomy of institutional domains and the power of core actors and corporate units in a domain. Through their control in the formulation of institutional ideologies and networks of interdependencies (often through control of key market sectors in the economy but also in other domains), intra-institutional domination of a domain biases the structural and cultural environments of all corporate units within the domain and the environments of those corporate units in other domains that form interdependencies with units in this domain. This pattern domination is not confined to just the economy; indeed, it can occur in all domains in all types of societies. For example, in horticulture, kinship units dominate all other institutional activities; in early feudal system, a particular set of religious corporate units can dominate other corporate units in other domains such as political, legal, economic, and educational corporate units and, in the case of the West, corporate units and individuals seeking to institutionalize science. Even in societies with markets, such as Iran, the networks among

religious actors dominate activities in polity, education, and, to a lesser extent, economy and family.

Domination is, therefore, a bit more complicated than portrayed by Karl Marx and Max Weber, even with the latter's more nuanced analysis. And it is in the very nature of power to be intrusive, even in a less coercive profile, and thus the structural and cultural environments of corporate units in any domain are constrained by the way in which power is institutionalized structurally as it forms patterns of asymmetrical interdependence and as it codifies symbolic media into intrainstitutional ideologies and extrainstitutional meta-ideologies. And, depending upon the autonomy of institutional domains, the pattern of consolidation of power around its bases and the capacity of core corporate units in other domains to consolidate power through control of networks will vary. Patterns of domination can become quite complex because they involve more than polity and law but actors in other domains who possess counterpower or sufficient power to mitigate against the power of polity and influence of law.

**Structural Segregation.** The separation of corporate units engaged in incompatible activities and of categoric units that are differentially valued can, in the short run, reduce conflict. However, when corporate and categoric units are separated in space, there is almost always a differential evaluation of these units, and those that are devalued will be subject to discrimination. For example, if prostitution is pushed to a "red light district," resentments will still build, and corporate units will begin to cross the lines marking them off from the mainstream. Or, if highly polluting activities are separated from normal routines in communities, it is inevitable over the long run that questions will be raised about whether or not such activities should be occurring in the first place. Segregation of corporate units engaged in incompatible or harmful activities is accomplished by the use of power that forces, whether formally or informally, certain types of corporate units to move away from the mainstream. Still, these are all still part of the macro-structural and cultural environments to which meso-level units must adjust.

More potentially volatile is segregation of members of devalued categoric units from members of more valued units. Here discrimination is systematic and legitimated by meta-ideologies legitimating stratification and the status beliefs and expectations states derived from these meta-ideologies. When categories of person are separated in physical space, when they are denied access to resource-distributing corporate units, and when they are given only low-status positions in those corporate units where they have minimal access,

resentments build and eventually lead to conflict. Thus, segregation among members of categorical units can work for a time, but over the long run, it will promote disintegration as resentments build and members of categorical units that have been the victims of discrimination become mobilized to pursue conflict. A conflict generated by stratification of categorical units will always be potentially more volatile and violent than conflict over incompatible activities of corporate units. Indeed, the negative emotions, counter-mobilization of new ideologies against meta-ideologies, and the organization of victims of discrimination can tear a society apart. Thus, segregation of members of categorical units only works for a relatively brief time and, in the end, promotes disintegration more than structural integration.

### ***Mechanisms Integrating Stratification Systems and Meso-level Environments***

As outlined in Chap. 1, stratification systems are generated by the unequal distribution of valued resources by corporate units—often the symbolic media of an institutional domain. As stratification systems evolve, they evidence five fundamental properties (Turner 1984, 2010a): (1) the unequal distribution of resources; (2) the formation of relatively homogeneous subpopulations or classes on the basis of shares and configurations of resources held by individuals, families, and other corporate units; (3) the rank ordering of classes on the basis of their members' relative worth as defined by meta-ideologies and status beliefs; and (4) rates of mobility across class boundaries. These four properties all vary. A society is highly stratified if levels of inequality are high, classes are homogeneous, rank ordering of classes on a scale of worth is linear, and rates of mobility across classes are low. Conversely, a society is less stratified if unequal distribution of resources is low and possession of one resource is not highly correlated with holdings of other valued resources, classes are not homogeneous and boundaries among classes are ambiguous, rank ordering of classes is not highly linear, and rates of mobility across class boundaries are high and promote intersection of parameters marking categorical-unit members with locations in a fuller range of corporate units across institutional domains and within the full spread of locations in the divisions of labor of these corporate units (see pp. 153–185 of Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* for a more detailed discussion and Chap. 4 in this volume).

These two extremes are end points of a scale that reveals many intermediate points between high and low levels of stratification. Yet, these

extremes also represent two different routes to high degrees of structural integration in stratification system. It is the intermediate points of stratification that are less integrated and more likely to initiate conflict in a society. I draw this conclusion because both high and comparatively low levels of stratification can persist in their respective environments for long periods of times. It is the more intermediately stratified systems that are more weakly integrated because *both* sets of the mechanisms working to integrate high and low levels of stratification exist and generate tensions that lead to collective action (see Chap. 8 on social movement organizations).

**Integration in Highly Stratified Societies.** In highly stratified populations, the differentiation of institutional domains is not as great as it is in less stratification systems. Access to resource-distributing corporate units, especially in economy, polity, law, and education, is not universal and is highly restricted to members of valued corporate units. The unequal distribution of resources is often legitimated by a highly moralized meta-ideology dominated by religion and polity, giving elites moral rights to their privilege while morally stigmatizing those who do not have rights to valued resources. This meta-ideology is typically well aligned with societal values and institutional norms operating in all domains, but especially religion and polity. Ironically, such a system is often considered legitimate by a large proportion of the population, even those in the lower classes. If tensions and protests emerge (e.g., banditry or rural revolts in weak feudal systems or acts of terrorism in modern states), the state's capacity for social control is high and can typically crush incipient revolts.

A highly stratified system imposes boundaries to mobility across class lines; individuals and families see "their place" in the system as permanent, often accepting the meta-ideology legitimating their class location. When aspirations for mobility are so low, expectations for a "better life" are equally low, with the ironic result that individuals are less likely to be aroused by the pervasive inequalities that are perceived as an inevitable contingency of daily life. A system like this, however, cannot be sustained in a highly dynamic society because any change in the structure and culture of the society breaks the system of control imposed by stratification. For example, dynamic markets cannot exist, and when they do begin to emerge, they create new expectations for what is possible while generating many new kinds of corporate units in expanding domains that offer new opportunities for resources. Whether from the "wheels of commerce" (Braudel 1982[1979]) of early capitalism in Europe, the dramatic expansion of capitalism in the

world system surrounding the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, or the spread of capitalism in present-day China, free markets generate change, and change of any sort disrupts the basis of integration in highly stratified systems.

Class location thus becomes the principal categorical unit in a society, although gender, region of origin, religion, and ethnicity are almost always salient. Indeed, memberships in these other types of categorical units are highly correlated with class location, thus institutionalizing consolidation of parameters linking diverse categorical units with class-based categorical units defining stratification. At times, particular categorical units, such as Jews in early capitalist Europe, can secure new positions in emerging corporate units, but the prejudice and discrimination against (and stigma of) members of these “mobile” categorical units sustain the integrity of the class system by confining them to “middle-man minority” roles (Blalock 1967; Bonacich 1973; Turner and Bonacich 1980). Thus, highly stratified systems create an environment for corporate and categorical units that (a) restricts the number and form of corporate units in economy, polity, law, education, and religion and (b) limits persons’ access to resource-distributing positions in divisions of labor in these units. Such structural restrictions are legitimated by a highly moralized meta-ideology, often dominated by religion or state ideology.

Yet, if highly stratified societies discriminate in ways that lead to high correlations between class and other categorical memberships, such as religion and ethnicity, then the tensions generated by such discrimination will increase and begin to undermine the stability of the system. Class is a potentially volatile dynamic, but when class is correlated with other categorical units, this volatility increases dramatically. And as a result, the environments of meso-level units are dramatically transformed, often making them more conducive to mobilization for conflict (see Chap. 8).

**Integration in Societies with Low Levels of Stratification.** In societies revealing higher rates of mobility across less clearly bounded and rank-ordered classes, the legitimating meta-ideology revolves around “freedom of opportunities.” In such systems, inequality is still very high, but the illusion of opportunities is also high, and structural arrangements in institutional domains—democratic polity, positivistic law enshrining freedom and civil rights, universalistic education, and dynamic markets in the economy—all work to create a meta-ideology that legitimates the rights of individuals to be successful and mobile across boundaries of the class system. The linkage of education and labor markets offers routes to mobility, with the ideology of education (universalistic access to *learning* that

translates into job opportunities for earning *money* in economy and other institutional domains). Individuals thus have dramatically expanded access to a larger range of corporate units in all institutional domains. Moreover, civil rights laws typically offer “proof” that discrimination on the basis of categoric-unit memberships does not operate, thereby giving equality of opportunity to all. As a result, the correlation between categoric-unit membership and class location is lower than in highly stratified societies (although de facto and de jure discriminations still operate and ensure that some members of categoric units will have less opportunity to gain access to resource-distributing corporate units, thus sustaining a class system biased by such prominent categoric units as gender, ethnicity, and religion).

This kind of stratification system is typical of capitalist systems, although many capitalist societies offer a heavy dose of “welfare programs” to mitigate the vagaries of markets and to ensure members of a society of certain basic resources needed to sustain themselves. For example, the state may universalize access to corporate units distributing *health* as a valued resource, educational credentials certifying levels of *learning* as yet another valued resource that increases access to *money*, *power*, and *influence* in, respectively, economy, polity, and law.

The environments for meso units created by this form of integration are much more chaotic and dynamic because they place large burdens on individuals to secure (or fail to secure) access to resources in corporate units. The symbolic media and ideologies of democratic polity, positivistic law, and open education generate a cultural environment emphasizing individual success and achievement through “hard work.” Structural arrangements in virtually all institutional domains, especially when mediated by dynamic markets, regularize competition among individuals for access to corporate-units resources, while persisting patterns of discrimination restrict (to varying degrees) access of categoric-unit members to resource-distributing corporate units and/or their divisions of labor. The result is that the consolidation of categoric memberships with high- and low-class locations above and below poorly demarcated middle classes. If mobility to the loosely structured set of middle classes becomes possible, tension and conflict decrease, but if membership in devalued ethnic and religious categoric units is persistently correlated with more clearly defined lower classes, then the conflict potential generated by the stratification system increases and undermines patterns of integration.

Yet, even though opportunities are not limitless and despite persistent discrimination against members of categoric units, this system of stratification is integrated because it tends to blame individuals for their “lack of

initiative” or “failure to assimilate”; if such definitions of the situation are pervasive, individuals internalize this blame as “self blame.” The consequence is that the persistence of stratification is not blamed on either the system itself or the culture that legitimates this system but, instead, on individuals who have failed to take advantage of opportunities. Conflicts, particularly violent- and class-based conflict, are thus less likely to erupt. And, when conflict does emerge, it is almost always around persisting patterns of discrimination against categoric-unit members who have been denied full access to corporate units in education and economy. In fact, social movements for change in the distribution of resources are less likely to attack the system and its culture, *per se*, but instead to push for extending the more open system and its opportunities for access (through individual effort) to members of all devalued categoric units. The plea is for universalism rather than the destruction of the system of stratification or the institutions that have generated this system.

Thus, the environments of these kinds of stratification systems raise expectations as a normal course of market-driven capitalism and a democratic state, which can lead to social movement mobilizations when the tenets of the meta-ideology legitimating the more open stratification system are seen as not operative for certain categories of person (see Chap. 4). There will, then, be much more turmoil in such a society with a more open stratification system, but frequent, lower intensity, and institutionalized forms of conflict (by law and an arena of comparatively open politics) release tensions rather than letting them accumulate to point of class-based conflict (Cosser 1956), especially class conflict in which categoric-unit parameters like race/ethnicity and religion are also involved (because of their consolidation with class locations).

## Conclusions

Some of the claims of macro-chauvinists are correct in this sense: the macro-level structures and cultures of a society generate many of the environments for corporate and categoric units, as well as micro-dynamic encounters. What meso-level units build up—that is, institutional domains and stratification—becomes the environment of these meso units. The culture and structure of the macro realm thus constrain what can be done at both the meso and micro levels of social organization. Thus, the first priority of an analysis of meso dynamics is to get a handle on the properties of these macro-level environments, and it is for this reason that this chapter

appears so early. I will consistently draw upon what has been said in this chapter to understand both the dynamics of categoric units (Chap. 4) and corporate units (Chaps. 5, 6, and 7), as well as the pressures for change that these environments generate (Chap. 8). In particular, the modes of structural and cultural integration of the macro realm, especially at the level of institutional domains and stratification systems, are a critical part of a theory of meso dynamics, and so, I will constantly make references to these as they are outlined in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

Macro environments are only part of the story. The micro level of social reality—that is, interactions in encounters—also becomes an environment of the meso realm. It would be rare for any one encounter to change formations at the meso level, but when chains of encounters strung out over time and when viewed collectively exert enormous power on not only what transpires in encounters but also what occurs in meso-level social units. The reason for this power is that it is at the micro level of reality that human emotions are aroused, and these provide much of the energy that fuels all of the social universe. Thus, as positive or negative emotions build up over time and spread among individuals in encounters, these become the energy behind the formation of micro-level environments. In almost all meso-level formations, the emotions of individuals, the beliefs and attributions that individuals develop about the causes of these emotions, and the motivations that mobilize individuals to accept or reject meso-level processes in corporate and categoric units represent a constant source of pressure on the meso realm.

As I have emphasized, the meso level of reality is caught between the forces driving the macro and micro realms. A useful way to conceptualize this pincher movement on the meso level is as a series of environments generated by macro-dynamic and micro-dynamic forces. Once we conceptualize these environments, then we can begin to develop theoretical principles on how they affect meso-dynamic processes.

**Table 2.2** Integrative elements of culture and environments of corporate and categoric units

Integrative mechanisms	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p><b>1. Texts, traditions, technology</b>                      Written and oral texts and accounts of a population's history, codified into perceptions of traditions, provide highly generalized and common cultural frameworks for members of a population. Technologies about how to manipulate the environment provide accepted knowledge used by corporate units to adapt to their respective environments</p>	<p>To the extent that texts and traditions are shared and accepted, both individual and corporate actors have shared worldviews that create a "deep background" assumption in the environments of corporate and categoric units. Technologies that are adopted and used by corporate units generate an accepted and common knowledge base in the environments of corporate units that, at the same time, can also be drawn upon by corporate units as they seek to adapt to environments of corporate units</p>
<p><b>2. Values</b>                      System of abstract moral codes that specify good–bad, right–wrong, appropriate–inappropriate, and other dichotomous moral tenets. These are both derived from texts, traditions, and technologies while at the same time are used to moralize these deep background assumptions of a population. Values are also what provide the moral premises of all other regulative codes: ideologies, meta-ideologies, and norms. Because they are highly abstract, values can be adopted into a wide variety of more specific sets of moral codes</p>	<p>To the extent that there are (a) consensus over values, (b) few contradictions among value premises, and (c) incorporation of values in lower-level moral codes, values provide a highly generalized and common moral background for all actors as they adopt to cultural environments. They also circumscribe the construction of other cultural codes systems and the morality in these codes as corporate units and members of categoric units adapt to their environments</p>

(continued)

**Table 2.2** (continued)

Integrative mechanisms	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p><b>3. Generalized symbolic media</b></p> <p>Symbolic media emerge to structure talk and discourse within institutional domains that emerge to deal with selection pressures. These media are used to develop themes and perspectives among actors operating within institutional domains, and from these come the formation of ideologies that specify which value premises are to undergird actions by individuals, corporate units, and members of categoric units. Symbolic media also become the resources that are exchanged among actors within and between institutional domains, as well as the resources that are distributed unequally by corporate units to create a system of stratification, which is then legitimated by the ideologies built from these media.</p> <p>When symbolic media are used in exchanges among corporate units in diverse institutional domains, they provide many of the resources and markers of value in such exchanges, thereby facilitating exchanges among differentiated corporate units. With such exchanges of symbolic media come the ideologies of each domain involved in exchange, which generally leads to the formation of meta-ideologies that regulate relations between domains.</p>	<p>Symbolic media generate a stable and common environment for actors by providing terms for talk and discourse, worldviews and perspectives, and ideologies that translate the morality of value premises into more concrete moral premises within an institutional domain. Thus, symbolic media simplify the cultural environment while at the same time moralizing cultural codes that are developed in the institutional environment to which corporate and categoric units must adapt. For corporate units, symbolic media become not only the common means of discourse and ideological formation but also the resources exchanged with other corporate units within and between domains, thereby regularizing, moralizing, and providing criteria of evaluation in exchange relations. For categoric-unit members, symbolic media are used to construct ideologies and their combinations into meta-ideologies that are used to legitimate the stratification system and, in so doing, to specify morally laced status beliefs and expectation states for members of categoric units. Even as they legitimate inequalities down to the interpersonal relations of persons in corporate units and even as they generate tensions always associated with inequalities, they provide members of categoric units, fairly or unfairly, a common culture in their immediate environments. When symbolic media are used in exchange among corporate units in different institutional domains, they provide common terms for discourse, markers of value, and a delimited set of symbols that can be used to form meta-ideologies and norms regulating exchanges.</p>

**4. Ideologies**

Ideologies are built from the generalized symbolic media used in discourse, theme-making, and exchange, and as they are built up, they also pull relevant value premises into more concrete moral codes. Ideologies are thus the vehicle by which the media used in social relations are moralized by pulling highly abstract values down to the level of interaction and making them relevant to the activities of actors within a particular domain. By providing a set of moral beliefs about what is good-bad, right-wrong, and appropriate-inappropriate for actors within a domain, ideologies also set moral parameters for the formation of (a) broad institutional norms, (b) specific norms directing the operation of the divisions of labor in corporate units, (c) the general culture of a corporate unit, and (d) the professional standards of incumbents in corporate units. And, as ideologies are used to form meta-ideologies legitimating stratification, they also provide moral evaluations of and expectations for members of diverse categoric units.



Ideologies specify moral courses of action and provide a common set of more concrete moral codes in the environment of corporate and categoric units operating within a domain, while also providing markers of value for many of the resources exchanged among corporate units or distributed by corporate units to members of categoric units. Since ideologies are built from symbolic media that are often exchanged between corporate units in differentiated domains, they provide the moral codes and norms derived from these codes for regularizing and moralizing the exchanges and even more so when ideologies are combined into meta-ideologies providing a common cultural environment for interinstitutional exchanges among corporate units. Moreover, if personnel are exchanged among corporate units, ideologies also form the basis of professional standards and codes of ethics for incumbents, thereby generating a common cultural environments for these incumbents and those who employ them.

(continued)

**Table 2.2** (continued)

Integrative mechanisms	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p data-bbox="559 839 589 1580"><b>5. Meta-ideologies</b></p> <p data-bbox="589 839 1030 1580">When ideologies are combined into a meta-ideology, they form a more concrete set of moral premises for all actors in the institutional domains from which the ideologies forming the meta-ideology have been drawn. When the ideologies of dominant resource-distributing corporate units in dominant institutional domains are the basic building blocks of meta-ideologies, they have large effects in legitimating the stratification systems and in reinforcing or forcing changes in value premises. When meta-ideologies are confined to combining the ideologies of less dominant domains, they give these exchanges moral premises for the norms that emerge to regulate exchanges and, in so doing, work to create at least some elements of a common culture among diverse corporate units operating across domains.</p>	<p data-bbox="559 839 1030 1580">Meta-ideologies always operate to increase the density of the morality in cultural environments for corporate and categoric units. When dominant ideologies of dominant domains are collated into a meta-ideology, they work to provide a common moral environment for all corporate units in all domains and for categoric units that are also part of the class structure of the stratification system. When meta-ideologies are confined to the specific institutional domains where corporate actors exchange resources, they generate a common environment for all actors in the domains involved, thereby regularizing exchanges that are moralizing them in ways that control interactions. Once the first meta-ideologies are formed, they become the cultural template for additional meta-ideologies, thereby increasing the level of cultural regulation of exchanges across domains and facilitating the circulation of generalized symbolic media across domains.</p>

**6. Status beliefs/expectation states**

For most positions in corporate units and for virtually all categoric units, status beliefs emerge, specifying the value, moral worth, expectations for behaviors, and other characteristics of incumbents in either locations in the divisions of labor in corporate units or memberships in categoric units. Many of these status beliefs as they generate expectations for behaviors for individuals at the micro-interpersonal level are derived from meta-ideologies, especially the meta-ideologies legitimating stratification. Since status beliefs almost always make distinctions of moral worth and of who should get what shares of what resources, they legitimate inequalities in divisions of labor of corporate units and differential treatment, including access to corporate units and their divisions of labor, of members of categoric units. Status beliefs as they cause the formation of expectation states thus pull macro-level culture down to the meso and micro levels and moralize inequalities.



Status beliefs provide a common moral evaluation of, and set of expectations for, the actions of individuals. In so doing, they bring common ideologies and meta-ideologies to the divisions of labor in corporate units and to the memberships of categoric units, providing a common culture for regulating actions in divisions of labor and in members of categoric units. Even when perceived as “unfair,” they operate to culturally regulate the behaviors of persons in micro encounters that are lodged or embedded in meso-level structures, and in so doing, they legitimate inequalities among in status, whether the status locations of corporate units or the diffuse status characteristics denoting members of categoric units.

**Table 2.3** Structural integrative mechanisms and institutional environments of corporate and categoric units

Integrative mechanism	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p><b>1. Segmentation</b></p> <p>Reproduction of similar corporate units, revealing similar structures, goals, divisions of labor, generalized symbolic media of discourse and exchange, and common ideology built from this symbolic medium.</p>	<p>Common culture of generalized symbolic media, norms, and ideologies. All units within a domain are structurally and culturally equivalent. And, these patterns of structural equivalence can also exist for corporate units in different institutional domains. Structural and cultural environments are relatively stable for corporate units and, at times, for categoric units as well.</p>
<p><b>2. Differentiation</b></p> <p>Creation of new types of corporate units revealing new structural forms, alternative goals, and divisions of labor within an institutional domain where common culture revolving around a generalized symbolic medium, ideology, and institutional norms sustains some degree of cultural segmentation. As new institutional domains evolve, however, structural and cultural differences increase, as new symbolic media, institutional norms, and ideologies emerge. Yet, exchanges among corporate units within and between domains generate some selection pressures for segmentation as exchanges of symbolic media and reconciliation of institutional ideologies through formation of meta-ideologies occur.</p>	<p>Culture of symbolic media, institutional norms, and ideologies is relatively stable and much the same for corporate units within a domain. Corporate units reveal structural differences, but exchange relations with other types of units generate some convergence in their structures. Exchanges between corporate units in differentiated institutional domains lead to some cultural convergence in the formation of meta-ideologies integrating diverse institutional ideologies as well as structural convergence as a consequence of exchange but also as a result of copying successful structural forms in other institutions. Autonomy of each institutional domain affects rates of exchange and the degree to which meta-ideologies emerge. For highly autonomous domains, segmentation is high within a domain, and differentiation of structure and culture is higher between domains. Thus, environments within domains are stable and evidence converging structural and cultural formations, while environments between domains are differentiated with some pressures for convergence of ideologies in meta-ideologies and among corporate units engaged in exchange.</p>

### 3. Structural interdependencies

#### 3a. Exchange

Differentiation increases rates of exchange among corporate units for resources, initially exchanges of symbolic media within and between corporate units, but increasingly exchanges mediated by markets using *money*. Such markets accelerate differentiation and the circulation of money in all institutional domains, and as markets and quasi-markets spread across domains, polity and law intervene to regularize and coordinate exchanges, thereby introducing *power* and *influence* as symbolic media into all domains. This circulation of money, power, and influence brings the ideologies, respectively, of economy, polity, and law to most other domains creating structural equivalences of corporate units in domains and cultural equivalences from meta-ideologies that emerge as money, power, and influence are mixed with the medium of each differentiated domain.



Use of money in most exchanges among corporate units in all domains generates structural equivalences in all corporate units involved in exchanges. As money, power, and influence are used to regulate exchanges, all corporate units have converging relations with corporate units in economy, polity, and law. The ideologies of these domains, mixed with the particular medium of each domain, create converging meta-ideologies across most domains. As a result of converging patterns of exchange and cultures across domains, networks among corporate in diverse domains are expanded, and these networks evidence patterns of structural and cultural equivalence. The result is that the environments of corporate units reveal common patterns of exchange, similar network relations, use of common symbolic media, and meta-ideologies built from reconciling institutional ideologies of diverse domains.

(continued)

**Table 2.3** (continued)

Integrative mechanism	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p><b>3b. Inclusion/embedding</b></p> <p>With differentiation among corporate units, groups are increasingly embedded in organizations that, in turn, are embedded in communities and, at times, systems of communities. Organizations of varying sizes often merge, creating larger corporate units composed of inclusion of smaller units in larger units. Such inclusion reduces the direct exposure of embedded units to market vagaries while increasing the size and scale of corporate units within the economic and other domains as well. These larger units integrate within their structure and culture smaller units across a domain. Larger corporate units often become more dominant in exchange relations, thus creating convergence among corporate units involved in exchanges with dominant units. In turn, convergence in structures and cultures generates structural and cultural equivalences not only within domains but also across domains and particularly if polity and law intervene to regulate their actions. As clear types of corporate units within particular institutional domains become embedded in communities, communities become increasingly equivalent in the structures and cultures and, as communities are embedded in larger geographical-political formations, this convergence increases by bringing in higher levels of polity and law into the regulation of communities and the organizational units embedded in them.</p>	<p>Successive embedding of corporate units inside of each other extends a common authority system across a greater number of units, invites similar patterns of external regulation by polity and law, and increases patterns of exchange within and between domains. Larger units also serve as templates to be copied, thus increasing segmentation across subsets of corporate units within diverse domains. Embedding of organizational units in community units increases rate of segmentation for groups, organizations, and community formations, which in turn increases convergences of their cultures built from the media of each domain and the meta-ideologies that emerge from the blending of each medium in a domain with the media of, at a minimum, economy, polity, and law and potentially others such as religion and kinship. Both individuals and corporate units become more structurally and culturally equivalent and thus operate in similar environments, which makes adaptation to the environment easier.</p>

**3c. Overlaps**

Overlaps have the same effects as inclusion, as summarized in 3b. above. Overlaps reduce market-mediated exchanges among parts of corporate units within and between domains. When overlaps are among corporate units from different domains, the scope of relations among diverse corporate units is increased, mixing their respective media to produce a common meta-ideology that can often bring media from polity and law into the mix, thereby generating a meta-ideology across several domains. Overlaps increase the likelihood that membership in categorical units will intersect with locations in divisions of labor of corporate units. Intersection increases rates of interaction among members of differentially valued categorical units and thereby reduces the salience of categorical-unit memberships and the status beliefs derived from the legitimating meta-ideology of the stratification system. The salience of tension-generating inequalities and the ideologies justifying these inequalities is thus reduced.



Overlaps extend relations among corporate units in diverse domains and, in so doing, reduce market-mediated relations, promote intersections of categorical units with locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units, mix generalized symbolic media and ideologies to produce common meta-ideologies, and mitigate the tension-producing effects of status beliefs drawn from the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. As a result, there is convergence in the culture and structures of corporate units, especially if patterns of overlaps are copied because of their success. As the salience of status beliefs and meta-ideologies legitimating stratification declines, the salience of institutional ideologies alone and the meta-ideologies generated by coordinated activities in overlapping corporate units reduces tensions in the environment of all corporate units, while evaluating corporate units and their incumbents by more universalistic criteria.

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(continued)

**Table 2.3** (continued)

Integrative mechanism	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p><b>3d. Mobility</b></p> <p>When individuals reveal high rates of mobility among corporate units within and between domains, rates of interaction among members of diverse categoric units increase and thereby reduce the salience of status beliefs and meta-ideologies tied to the stratification system. Over time, high rates of mobility weaken class boundaries in the stratification system, while increasing the spread of universalistic criteria (as opposed to particularistic criteria) for evaluating individuals. As they move, individuals bring with them familiarity of diverse symbolic media and the ideologies built up from these media, thus creating meta-ideologies that, with very high rates of mobility, generate common cultures across institutional domains.</p>	<p>Mobility decreases the salience of status beliefs and meta-ideologies legitimating stratification and, in so doing, increases the use of universalistic criteria for evaluating incumbents in corporate units. By reducing the consolidation of parameters marking categoric units with locations in corporate units, the environment of any corporate unit and the society as a whole becomes less tension-ridden and less subject to conflict. If mobility occurs across many domains, rather than within a few domains, the symbolic media of all domains and the ideologies built from them circulate widely, thus creating larger and more encompassing meta-ideologies that reduce the complexity of the cultural environments for all corporate units and incumbents in them.</p>



**4. Domination**

Domination always involves mobilization of bases of power and, at times, other resources as well. Domination by polity revolves around the consolidation of the coercive, administrative, symbolic (cultural), and material incentive bases of power and then the use of this power to extract material surplus from actors in economic and other institutional domains to finance the operation of polity's four bases of power. Polity also will control the legal system, with both embedding and overlaps in key corporate units of polity and law, especially law-making and enforcement of law, but also in its administration. Domination can also occur within institutional domains by nonpolitical actors, typically around core (often foundational) corporate units that control resources and have advantages in exchanges of resources with less dominant actors. Domination of any sort leads to coordination and control of corporate units within and between domains as well as the imposition of the ideology of a domain on other corporate actors in this domain and, when exchange across domains occur, on corporate actors in other domains. Domination that is highly restrictive is also more likely to consolidate parameters marking categoric-unit memberships with locations in corporate units, thus reinforcing the salience and power of the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. In contrast, when domination relies more on material incentives and symbols, intersection of parameters with positions and locations becomes more likely, thereby reducing the power of the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system.



The configuration of bases of power consolidated, the degree of centralization of these bases, and the overlaps and embeddings of corporate units of law in polity determine the environments of all corporate units in a society. Highly centralized power consolidated around coercive, administrative, and symbolic bases of power generates a stable and unambiguous—if highly restrictive—socio-cultural environment for all corporate actors in all domains, whereas a less centralized consolidation around material incentives and symbols creates a more complex and chaotic environment for corporate units built around high levels of differentiation among domains, diverse symbolic media organized into various meta-ideologies among corporate units engaged in exchange. Law is positivistic and oriented to regularizing market-mediated exchanges among corporate actors. Dominant nonpolitical actors do so through control of key markets and network structures, with the ideology of the domain of core actors dominating the meta-ideologies and in particular the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. Still intersection of parameters defining members of categoric units with locations in diverse corporate units is more likely to occur in forms of domination using material incentives and symbols, thereby decreasing the tension-producing beliefs and patterns of discrimination in the environments of all corporate units. The opposite is the case for domination built around coercion and administrative control.

(continued)

**Table 2.3** (continued)

Integrative mechanism	Environments of corporate and categoric units
<p><b>5. Segregation</b></p> <p>Segregation always separates in time and space members of categoric units and incumbents in corporate units in order to isolate corporate units with conflicting goals and categoric units that are denied access to corporate units and their respective divisions of labor. Segregation both creates and sustains cultural differences between types of corporate units and members of distinctive categoric units. Segregation is almost always the result of domination by polity or by valued members of categoric units who have disproportionate power compared to members of devalued categoric units and who use their power advantages to discriminate against devalued members of categoric units in gaining access to particular types of corporate units or positions in these units, thereby sustaining inequalities in resource distribution, categoric.</p>	<p>Almost always promotes consolidation of parameters denoting members of devalued categoric units with each other and with differential access to corporate units and positions in these units. Promotes environments where members of categoric units have high rates of interaction with each other, while corporate units within segregated sectors of the society reveal structural and cultural equivalences because of high levels of corporate-unit segmentation. Since inequalities in resources and culture will generally correspond to barriers between corporate and categoric units, these barriers will become, over time, resented by those who are denied access to corporate units or, if access is allowed, to higher-ranking positions in these units. The environment of corporate and categoric units is punctuated by a meta-ideology legitimating stratification and discrimination through prejudicial stereotypes and status beliefs, by structural barriers against members of particular categoric units, and by separation in geographical space of different types of corporate units. This culture is also charged with negative emotions by those who are the victims of discrimination and subject of demeaning status beliefs.</p>




## Chapter 3

# Micro Environments of the Meso Realm

Ultimately, corporate and categoric units—and indeed, all of social reality—are built up by the interpersonal behaviors of individuals in encounters. This point has been made often, whether by Randall Collins’ (1981) argument that social reality is chains of interaction rituals iterated over time and space, or Herbert Blumer’s (1969) proclamation that society is symbolic interaction. True enough, but where do such bold statements take us? In my view, these kinds of proclamations take us to a kind of reductionism that limits the ability to theorize about meso and macro levels of reality. Concepts denoting the operation of micro dynamics *cannot* fully explain the emergent social realities built from these dynamics. Like almost everything in the social world, there are reverse casual effects: the very realities created by interaction impose constraints on interaction. Moreover, and this is the point of the present chapter, micro dynamics can be conceptualized as an external environment for meso-sociocultural formations. As part of the environment to which meso-level units must adapt, the micro level of reality continues to generate selection pressures on actors in the meso realm. People’s reactions to their experiences in corporate and categoric units can be analyzed *collectively* or in *sum*, especially as they become codified into cultural beliefs. Thus, when micro-dynamic processes generate collectively or simultaneously experienced emotional reactions to experiences in corporate and categoric units, a new set of environmental pressures are placed on the meso realm. And, as I will argue in Chap. 8, micro dynamics are often a source of change in corporate and categoric units as individuals create social movement organizations, a type of corporate unit whose goal is the change what transpires at not only the micro level but at the meso and macro as well.

At first, it may take a bit of a mind shift to visualize the micro as an environment for the meso and, by extension, the macro realm built from



**Fig. 3.1** Micro reality as an environment of the Meso realm

corporate and categoric units. The reason this point of vision may seem odd is that persons are standing inside encounters lodged in corporate and categoric units; they are not outside the units that they constrain in the same way as institutional domains and stratification systems are “outside” corporate and categoric units. Yet, if we examine the *collective effects* of micro dynamics—that is, subpopulations of individuals who are incumbent in corporate and categoric unit or who want to be incumbent—we can begin to see how dynamics operating at the level of encounters represent an important environmental constraint on the meso realm. Figure 3.1 outlines my point here.

In Fig. 3.1, the bold arrows denote the successive, upward causal effects of micro-level processes among individuals in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units. I have extended the bold arrows to the macro realm because, at times, the micro environments of the meso realm change the structure and culture of corporate and categoric units to such an extent that they drive the transformation of institutional domains and the stratification system. For example, social movements revolving around civil rights

in the United States involved emotional arousal over injustices at the micro level that led to collective mobilization of individuals into a series of social movement organizations (SMO's) which dramatically changed the structure and culture of most corporate and categoric units in America as well as the structure and culture of key institutional domains and the stratification system and, indeed, the whole society. This collective movement began at the micro level of encounters as individuals felt that their fundamental needs, status locations, and roles in corporate and categoric units were unpleasant and demeaning, causing emotional arousal that led to the mobilization of resources to change the structure and culture of corporate and categoric units. Thus, the micro environment composed of populations of persons in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units exerted pressure for change in the structure and culture of American society and the sociocultural formations from which it is built.

At other times, this micro environment can sustain the structure and culture of meso-level units, even when they are highly oppressive, if individuals accept as inevitable their subordination. Thus, corporate and categoric units are always embedded in an environmental field created by individuals' collective experiences as they seek to meet transactional needs in status positions and roles embedded in corporate and categoric units. Emotions can radiate across and out from locations in corporate units and memberships in categoric units. In so doing, emotions create a collective mood that becomes codified into beliefs and potentially counter-institutional ideologies that can mobilize individuals collectively and thereby force actors in the meso realm to make adjustments to the culture and structure of corporate and categoric units. In this chapter, my goal is to draw from volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* to outline the elements of this micro-level environment. Later, we can see how the environment conceptualized in this chapter and that in Chap. 2 affects meso dynamics.

## **Elements of the Micro Realm as an Environment for the Meso Realm**

In Table 1.1 on p. 14, I briefly defined the forces of both the micro and macro realms. Micro-dynamic forces revolve around (1) transactional need states or motives, (2) status-organizing processes, (3) role processes, (4) interpersonal demography, (5) interpersonal ecology, and (6) emotional arousal. These dynamics drive the formation and operation of both *focused*

(face-to-face) encounters and *unfocused* (avoidance of face engagement) encounters. Depending on how these dynamics play out as individuals interact in corporate and categoric units, the environment of meso-level structures will vary. Let me now review each of these micro-dynamic forces with an eye to the environmental pressures they impose on corporate and categoric units.

### ***Transactional Needs in Encounters***


Human actions are always motivated, and ultimately, much of the “energy”-driving behavior and, hence, all of social reality come from individuals trying to meet fundamental need states (Turner 1987, 1988, 2002a, b, 2008, 2010b). There are many needs that are inherent in being a biological organism—for example, for food, water, and sex—but the ones that I emphasize are those that are always activated when individuals are copresent in unfocused and focused encounters. The viability of an encounter depends upon individuals’ capacity to meet these needs and, as a consequence, so does the long-run viability of corporate and categoric units. When a high proportion of individuals are able to meet transactional needs, the structure and culture of corporate and categoric units become more viable and, in the eyes of individuals, legitimate. Conversely, when these needs, especially the most powerful of these transactional needs, are unrealized, then reproduction of the culture and structure of the meso-level units will become ever-more problematic.

Table 3.1 outlines a version of a similar table (7.1 in volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*) on the basic types of transactional needs. Humans are motivated to (1) verify their identities, (2) make a profit in the exchange of resources, (3) feel a sense of group inclusion, (4) experience trust with others, and (5) derive a sense of facticity. This number and listing also rank-orders these transactional needs in terms of their relative power to energize persons in encounters embedded in meso-level sociocultural formations.

**Needs for Identity Verification.** People have identities—that is, emotionally laden cognitions about themselves—along a number of dimensions. *Core identities* are cognitions and feelings that persons have about themselves in general and that they carry with them to virtually all encounters. As suggested by Fig. 3.2, where identities are rank-ordered in terms of their relative power, core identity is the most emotionally laden level of self. Moreover, many of the cognitions that are part of this self are implicit

**Table 3.1** Transactional needs

1. *Verification of identities.* Needs to verify one or more of the four basic identities that individuals present in all encounters
  - a. *Core identity.* The conceptions and emotions that individuals have about themselves as persons that they carry to most encounters.
  - b. *Social identity.* The conception that individuals have of themselves by virtue of their membership in categoric units which, depending upon the situation, will vary in salience to self and others; when salient, individuals seek to have others verify their social identity.
  - c. *Group identity.* The conception that individuals have about their incumbency in corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities) and/or their identification with the members, structure, and culture of a corporate unit; when individuals have a strong sense of identification with a corporate unit, they seek to have others verify this identity.
  - d. *Role identity.* The conception that individuals have about themselves as role players, particularly roles embedded in corporate units nested in institutional domains; the more a role identity is lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals need to have this identity verified by others.
2. *Making a profit the exchange of resources.* Needs to feel that the receipt of resources by persons in encounters exceeds their costs and investments in securing these resources and that their shares of resources are just compared to (a) the shares that others receive in the situation and (b) reference points that are used to establish what is a just share.
3. *Group inclusion.* Needs to feel that one is a part of the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter, and the more focused is the encounter, the more powerful is this need.
4. *Trust.* Needs to feel that others are predictable, sincere, respective of self, and capable of rhythmic sustaining synchronization.
5. *Facticity.* Needs to feel that, for the purposes of the present interaction, individuals share a common intersubjectivity, that matters in the situation are as they seem, and that the situation has an obdurate character.



**Fig. 3.2** Types and levels of identity formation

and, even at times, repressed, which can raise the emotional potential considerably as repressed emotions transmute and eventually surface when core identity is not verified (Turner 2002a, 2002b, 2008, 2011). People have powerful needs to verify this most important of identities, and since it is the highest-order identity, it is usually part of all other levels of identity formation. Thus, even when core identity is not directly on the line in an encounter, the failure to verify other identities down the hierarchy will activate strong feelings to the extent that the core identity is part of one of the three other types of identities. As a consequence, even if only indirectly, the core identities of individuals in corporate and categoric units should, when taken together as a whole, be a very important dimension of the environments of corporate and categoric units. If people cannot verify their core identity, they will experience highly charged negative emotions, and when sufficient numbers of individuals experience such emotions, their feelings, beliefs, perceptions, and actions become an important environmental pressure for change of corporate and categoric units. Conversely, if core identities are realized among most incumbents in corporate and categoric units, individuals will experience positive emotions, thereby making corporate and categoric units more viable and more likely to be reproduced.

The next level of identity formation is a *social identity*, which is built up around persons' membership in categoric units, such as age, gender, ethnicity, religion, and social class. Depending upon the situation, this identity can be very salient, and especially so, if core identity is tied up in the ability of persons to have their categoric-unit membership verified. But more than verification is involved, or at least an extra measure of verification is required: persons seek positive evaluation of their social identity. Thus, even if people have a devalued social identity verified, this verification will not generate positive emotions unless individuals perceive that others are also offering a positive evaluation of this identity. When the environment of a corporate or categoric unit includes large numbers of individuals who have failed to have their social identities verified *and* viewed positively by others, this environment will be emotionally charged and place extra pressures on a corporate unit to change its culture and division of labor and on those responding to members of a categoric unit to revise *status beliefs* and expectation states. One of the reasons that ethnic, religious, and gender dynamics can be so volatile is because identities are built around persons' categoric-unit memberships, and when larger numbers of people consistently feel that their social identities go unverified or remain negatively evaluated, their collective emotional reaction increases the volatility in the environment of meso-level units.

The next level of identity formation is *group identity*, which I view as an identity that is formed from a person's identification with the personnel, structure, and culture of a corporate unit—whether a group, organization, or community. A person does not have to be an actual member of a corporate unit to form a group identity—as is the case with most sports fans who often, to say the least, get highly emotional about “their team”. In general, when people identify with a corporate unit, and especially when they also put elements of their core identity on the line, group identities can become very strong. Gangs, motorcycle clubs, university professors and students, residents in a community, and many other potential affiliations can go beyond just being an incumbent in a corporate unit. Indeed, people often take the next step and build a set of cognitions and emotions about themselves as incumbents in particular corporate units, with the expectation that others will verify this source of identity.

The least comprehensive conception of self is *role identity*, which is the cognitions and feelings that people have about how they play a role in a corporate unit within an institutional domain. These identities tend to be narrower, but they can also become more inclusive. For example, the role of mother in the family often pulls in elements from core identity, social identity (mother as a categoric unit), and group identity (mother as member of family); the result is that a lot can be on the line when other identities are part of a role identity, thus raising the potential emotional stakes. Moreover, role identities are more numerous than other identity formations because, potentially, an identity can be built up around each role a person plays in diverse corporate units—for example, worker, father, mother, son, daughter, team player, church member, community resident, and so on for many potential roles in corporate units.

Since identity verification is the most powerful of the transactional needs—at least, I hypothesize that such is the case—this set of motive states arouses emotions among individuals that become an important part of the environment of the meso units where people seek to have their identities verified. Depending upon which identities are salient in encounters embedded in meso-level units and the degree to which they are verified in encounters, the environment of meso-level units will vary. When, for example, most identities go unverified, all of those individuals for whom this has occurred will experience negative emotions, or conversely, when individuals have all of their identities verified, the flow of positive emotional energy will be part of the environment. In either case, the structure and culture of corporate and categoric units will be affected. Positive emotions make meso units viable and legitimate, whereas consistent arousal of negative emotions creates an environment that will, in the end, force changes in corporate and categoric units.

**Needs for Making A Profit in Exchange of Resources.** As all exchange theories emphasize, people seek to derive a “profit” relative to their costs (resources given up and alternatives forgone) and investments (accumulated costs). Virtually anything can become a resource, and certainly, the generalized symbolic media circulating within and across domains constitute one class of resources. However, the processes by which individuals calculate, typically implicitly, whether or not they have made a profit in exchange are more complicated than subtracting costs/investments from the value of resources gained in an encounter. There are several additional complications related to the comparison points used by individuals when assessing if profits are fair or acceptable.

First of all, people also assess the cost investment/rewards gained relative to a *standard of fairness* or justice. These standards are part of the cultural environment of an encounter, and they operate at several levels: (a) the norms guiding the exchange itself within a particular encounter or an iterated encounter, (b) the norms organizing the division of labor of corporate units in which the encounter is embedded, (c) the status beliefs and expectation states of categoric units, (d) the moral codes of the ideologies or metaideologies of institutional domains, and (e) even the value premises of a society. Thus, the micro-level cultural environment of meso-level units is, to varying degrees, internalized and, at the very least, used to assess fairness. When individuals perceive that standards of fairness are not realized, they will experience and often express negative emotions, and when they consistently have such experience in mass or collectively over time, these emotions and the cultural standards that have been employed to assess justice become part of the environment that places constraints on the meso realm.

Secondly, people engage in a comparison process that can become rather complex. One point of comparison is with the rewards less costs/investments of others relative to self. People are not just invoking cultural standards, but they are also using them in comparing to others’ payoffs relative to self. If a person perceives that he or she has realized a profit and met standards of fairness or justice, this person will feel *satisfied*, but this emotion can turn to *dissatisfaction* and other negative emotional responses if others in the situation or others in similar situations seem to be getting a more profitable payoff with the same level of costs/investments. Another comparison point is what Thibault and Kelley (1959) term *comparison level of alternatives* or the ratio of payoffs to costs/investments in other situations that persons perceive (whether accurately and inaccurately) themselves to have forgone or that they feel are available to them. Still another point of comparison is the relative status of persons;

people assess their payoffs relative to the status locations in the division of labor in a corporate unit or the diffuse status characteristics of a categoric unit. People of higher status in corporate units and more highly valued categoric units are supposed to gain more profit than those lower in the status hierarchy. And so, when lower-ranked persons gain the same as higher-ranked people, those in higher positions in corporate units and in more valued categoric units will experience variants of *anger*. Even when higher-ranked individuals perceive that they get more than lower-ranked, they will still become angry if they believe the difference in payoffs for lower- and higher-ranked persons is not “big enough.” A final point of comparison is *abstracted distributions*. Individuals often carry a sense for the overall pattern of unequal distribution within (a) a corporate and for a categoric unit, (b) an institutional domain, or (c) even a whole society (a kind of implicit sense of the Gini coefficients for the distributions of various resources such as money, power, prestige), and they often use this sense of the overall distribution of resources as a comparison point for assessing whether their resource payoffs relative to costs/investments are fair. As Jasso (1990, 1993, 2001, 2006) has documented, a much smaller level of perceived under-reward will arouse negative emotions like *anger* than is the case for over-reward where it takes a great deal of over-reward to arouse such emotions as *guilt*. In fact, people may only begin to feel guilt when they perceive that their over-rewards lead to under-reward (in terms of standards of fairness) for worthy others (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995).

Since both corporate units and categoric units allocate valued resources unequally, cultural standards of fairness are almost always salient and become a very important part of the environment of the meso-level units distributing resources to individuals who almost always make comparisons to assess payoffs. Whatever the specific cognitive route in making comparisons, the emotions aroused become a very important dimension of the meso-level environment. People become emotionally aroused along a positive–negative continuum, and if larger numbers of person or strategically placed individuals react negatively to their experiences in meso-level units, change in these units becomes ever-more likely. And, if the change is sufficiently dramatic and comprehensive, then the structure and culture of even macro-level sociocultural formations will be transformed. Conversely, if most individuals experience positive emotions by virtue of their incumbency in corporate units across domains and from memberships in categoric units, then the micro level creates an environment that reinforces and legitimates meso-level formations and, by extension, those in the macro realm as well (Turner 2008, 2010b).

**Needs for Group Inclusion.** The third most powerful transactional need is for group inclusion. Individuals need to feel part of the ongoing flow of interpersonal activity in an encounter or in a series of iterated encounters. They do not always have to feel high solidarity but only a sense that they are included in the interpersonal flow and that they are part of this flow when encounters are repeated and chained together. Feeling included has large effects on whether or not other transactional needs are realized, since it is more difficult to verify an identity or feel that payoffs are proportionate to costs/investments and all salient comparison points when a person does not sense that he or she is involved in, and part of, key encounters. The same is true for other transactional needs such as needs for trust and facticity discussed below.

Just how included a person must be in encounters depends upon the dynamics of embedding of encounters in meso-level social structures. If individuals do not feel sufficiently included in encounters that are critical to maintaining status in key locations in the division of labor of a corporate or in important categoric units, then their emotional reaction will be stronger. This reaction will be doubly strong if they had invested role, group, social, or core identities in a sense of being fully part of encounters in meso-level structures. Conversely, their emotional reaction will be muted if participation was not so important and if identities were not on the line.

Individuals can also experience engulfment in ongoing encounters because they are too included to the point where they feel that they are smothered and, moreover, that they cannot realize needs to feel part of other ongoing encounters in other corporate units or that they cannot meet other transactional needs. Thus, there is often a delicate balance between a sense of inclusion or engulfment, but even more problematic is the situation where people sense that they are not a fully acknowledged participant in encounters that are important to them, especially encounters where expectations for realizing profits in exchanges or for sensing verification of one or more levels of self are high. Under these conditions, individuals will experience a potential collage of negative emotions such as *anger, fear, frustration, sadness, shame*, or even *guilt*, and if enough people have this sense of exclusion, the negative emotional energy generated will become part of the environment of a meso-level unit, thereby forcing a corporate unit or particular portions of the unit to adapt to this emotionally laden environment.

**Needs for Trust.** In most encounters, individuals need to feel a predictability and rhythm to the interactions and that others are sincere and respectful of self. Without a rhythm to the interaction, it is difficult to have a sense of group inclusion, to perceive that exchanges have been profitable, and without a sense of people's sincerity and respect for self, identity verifica-

tion becomes problematic. This need state for trust is probably lower key than the first three transactional needs, but if people chronically experience a lack of trust, and if enough people in corporate units have this sense, then the negative emotions aroused will become part of the environment to which a corporate unit must adapt.

**Needs for Facticity.** People have needs for ontological security (Giddens 1984) or that “things are as they appear” and for a sense that, for the purposes of an interaction, they share intersubjective worlds (Schutz 1967[1932]; Garfinkel 1967). When they cannot have this sense, they experience mild negative emotions like *anger*, *irritation*, and *frustration*, and, if the situation was important, perhaps stronger levels of these emotions, plus *fear*. When this need cannot be met, people will feel uncomfortable and, moreover, that they cannot meet other transactional needs. And if the situation was as important in meeting needs, especially for identity verification and profitable exchange payoffs, the discomfort will activate more powerful negative emotions.

In sum, then, these five basic transactional needs are always present in interaction, and no matter what other episodic or chronic need states motivate people in an interaction, these transactional needs will drive interacting in encounters (Turner 1987, 1988, 2002a, b, 2008, 2010b). When looked at collectively, these needs exert considerable pressure—a kind of micro-level selection pressure—on the structure and culture of corporate and categoric units. The same is true of other micro-dynamics forces examined below, but need states are the energy for not just interaction but also for all of the other structures built up from iterated interactions in encounters. Structures and their culture that consistently fail to allow individuals to meet these need states will eventually become less viable and subject to change. But, even before this outcome arises, encounters in corporate and categoric units are constantly under pressure to enable individuals to meet these needs because, when they are not met, day-to-day interactions in chains of encounters become tense and awkward, with the result that individuals often become motivated to change the structure and culture of a situation before more volatile reactions occur.

### ***Culture Taking/Culture Making and Normatizing Encounters***

In any encounter of face-to-face interaction, individuals assemble expectations along a number of critical dimensions, summarized in Table 3.2

**Table 3.2** Dimensions or axes of normatization

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*Normatization* is the process of culture taking and culture making in which individuals establish expectations for how individuals should interact during the course of an encounter. These expectations revolve around the following axes:

1. *Categorizing the encounter.* The process of culture taking and culture making in which individuals typify (a) the categoric-unit memberships of participants in the encounter, (b) the relative amounts of work-practical, social, and ceremonial activity to be conducted in the encounter, (c) the degree of intimacy to be achieved with others along a continuum of treating others as personages (people as only representatives of categoric units or as incumbent in positions of corporate units), persons (with some knowledge of others as individuals), and intimates (with more in-depth knowledge of others), and (d) the relative authority/power of self and others, and, on the basis of these nodes of categorization, expectations for behaviors of self and others are developed.
  2. *Framing the encounter.* The process of culture taking and culture making that imposes expectations for what can be included and, conversely, what is to be excluded as subjects of talk and nonverbal behaviors.
  3. *Forming communication in the encounter.* The process of culture taking and culture making by which expectations for the proper modes of (a) talk and conversation as well as (b) expressions of body language and demeanor.
  4. *Ritualizing the encounter.* The process of culture taking and culture making in which expectations are developed for the appropriate rituals to (a) open and close interaction, (b) form and structure the flow of interaction, (c) symbolize the significance of the interaction, and (d) repair breaches to the interaction.
  5. *Emotionally energizing the encounter.* The process of culture taking and culture making whereby expectations for the nature and valence of (a) emotions to be felt by a person and (b) emotions to be displayed to others are established.
- 

(which is shortened version of the discussion in Chap. 6 of volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*). I have termed efforts to assemble these expectations the process of *normatization* (Turner 2002a, b, 2008). This process is greatly facilitated by embedding of encounters in corporate and categoric units, which provide the more general cultural framework for individuals to normatize the encounter, and as they do so, they often generate new cultural elements that put pressure to alter (a) the norms of the division of labor of corporate unit and perhaps the more general culture of this unit and (b) the expectation states for, and underlying status beliefs about, members of categoric units. Normatizing is essential because norms and expectation states are typically too general to cover the specifics of interaction in encounters. Indeed, if norms had to specify every contingency of interaction, they would be too complicated. Thus, individuals must, as they respond to each other and take cognizance of the structures and cultures in which an encounter is embedded, piece together a set of contingent expectations to guide interaction in encounters.

The first phase of this process begins with *categorization* where individuals assess which memberships in categoric units, if any, are salient and then draw from status beliefs and expectation states to assemble expectations for

individuals in various categoric units. At the same time, individuals are also taking cognizance of the nature of the situation in terms of the appropriate amount of ceremonial, work-practical, and social content that it should reveal, and to do so, persons rely on their assessment of each other's categoric-unit memberships, the structure of the status system in the corporate unit, and the norms attached to locations in the division of labor. Finally, they categorize the situation and others copresent in terms of the appropriate level of intimacy or lack thereof (Schutz 1967[1932]), using the information that facilitates categorization of each other and the situation. All other dimensions of normatization are also being assembled as categorization proceeds, but once categorization crystallizes, it greatly enhances and accelerates the assembling of expectations along the other dimensions of normatizing. Thus, if categorization is not successful, and individuals remain unsure about how to categorize each other and the situation, the other normatizing processes will be tentative and often awkward. Yet, when individuals cannot immediately and easily categorize others and the situation, they will seek to clarify the expectations along these other dimensions—that is, the appropriate forms of talk, rituals, framing, and emotions. In so doing, the implicit hope is to achieve clearer picture of expectations and, then, to backfill the process of categorization if it could not be firmly assembled at the very beginning of an encounter.

Normally categorizing constrains framing and forms of talk (both verbal and body language), but the reverse is possible: initial rituals and tentative forms of talk and body language can help establish frames for what information is to be included and excluded from the encounter and what forms of speech and body language are appropriate, and once these dimensions are assembled, they can facilitate categorization, if it had not been fully achieved and thus remained incomplete. As I noted above, rituals are useful in establishing other dimensions, but more typically, rituals become clear when categorization, framing, and forms of talk and body language have already been normatized. Yet, if they have not, then signaling in a highly ritualized manner can help normatize other dimensions. The emotions that can be aroused and displayed—what some (Hochschild 1979, 1983) have termed *feeling rules* and *display rules*—also need to be normatized, and often when situations are unclear, people pay especially close attention to what arouses positive and negative emotions as they tentatively work to normatize along other dimensions. But, if initial categorization, framing, language, and rituals have been established, then the feeling and display rules are typically clear.

This whole process I conceptualized as *culture making* and *culture taking* because individuals assemble expectations “on the ground” (culture making) by taking cognizance from the general culture of corporate and categoric

units as these serve as conduits for the movement of institutional and stratification cultures down to the level of the encounter (culture taking). This is a highly fluid set of processes, but culture taking and culture making are constrained by embedding of encounters in corporate and categoric units. When the culture of corporate and categoric units does not provide adequate information to normatize successfully, encounters will be stressful and potentially breached, thereby arousing negative emotions, and if this situation is chronic for chains of encounters, then the *anomie* of culture and the emotions aroused can, when experienced by most participants to encounters in corporate and categoric units, become part of the environment of meso-level sociocultural formations. Moreover, when normatization is not easy and individuals must work very hard at culture taking and culture making, it is very likely that needs for meeting transactional needs will not be met, thereby accelerating the pressure on corporate and categoric units.

Culture will remain detached and abstract, even though people carry norms, ideologies, and values in their heads, *until* they can make culture relevant by normatizing actual moment-by-moment interaction in encounters. And once situations are normatized and particularly if normatization occurs in iterated encounters within corporate and categoric units, it becomes somewhat institutionalized—granted, on a more micro level. As this process unfolds, the cultural environment of meso-sociocultural formations is increasingly built up from the micro level of social reality. The culture of the macro realm can thus only take on real force *when it is confirmed by normatization at the micro level*, and if micro processes lead persons to assemble culture in ways that contradict or, at least, deviate from the culture of the meso or macro realms, it is this micro-cultural environment that may exert more pressure than the macro-level environment, especially if this culture remains at odds with what larger numbers of individuals are assembling in many diverse and iterated encounters at the micro level.

### ***Status Making and Status Taking in Encounters***

Status plugs individuals into meso-level sociocultural formations. Status in a corporate unit is a location in the division of labor of this unit, and by virtue of this designated position, a person's relation with other locations in the structure is established. What are sometimes termed *diffuse status characteristics* (Berger et al. 1992; Webster and Foschi 1988; Wagner and Turner 1998) or, in Blau's (1977, 1994) terms, *parameters* are used to define people as members of a categoric unit. In all encounters, individuals are involved in the dual processes of status taking and making in order to

determine the status of others (status taking) or to assert the status that they are seeking to establish in the encounter (status making).

If these processes are successful, individuals know their respective places in the division of labor of corporate units and, thereby, the culture that they are to invoke during the process of normatization. In status making and status taking to determine individuals' respective categoric-unit memberships, the process is much the same, but an important initial step is to see *if* memberships in categoric units are, in fact, salient; if they are not, then the respective status locations of individuals in the divisions of corporate units become the default position. For both status and diffuse status characteristics, there are attendant expectation states attached to status. In corporate units, these expectation states are tied to the authority and prestige hierarchies, if any, in the unit; those with higher status are subject to different expectation states than those with lower status, with the dynamics of status-organizing processes revolving around whether or not people meet expectation states and whether the status of higher-ranked individuals is challenged or verified by lower-status persons (see volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* 2010b: 93–132 for a review of these dynamics). Much the same is true with diffuse status characteristics or memberships in categoric units, except that the dynamics here are somewhat more volatile because a diffuse status characteristic can carry a more intense moral evaluation, typically derived from the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. Individuals in devalued categoric units often exhibit *diffuse anger* over their evaluation, and persons of higher status need to step carefully and subtly in asserting their more valued membership, unless the status order in a corporate unit (a) reproduces the rankings of members of categoric units in its division of labor (or *consolidates* the ranking of categoric units with the hierarchies of the division of labor of a corporate unit) and (b) is legitimated by powerful norms sanctioning differential evaluation and treatment. If there is some *intersection* of status and diffuse status characteristics (i.e., they are not consolidated), however, the situation is more complex and individuals with rely upon normatization to assemble expectations states during the process of categorization (see Chap. 4 for details on the dynamics of consolidation and intersection of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships).

These negotiations over status are particularly important because status locations and memberships constrain, as noted above, all other micro-dynamic processes: (a) the degree to which and the manner by which transactional needs are to be realized by individuals, (b) the relevant culture from an institutional domain and the stratification system to be invoked and used in culture-taking and making to normatize an encounter, (c) the roles are to

be played (see below), (d) the meanings of ecological space and interpersonal demography (see below), and, most importantly, (e) the emotions that will be aroused (see below). Because status embeds individuals in corporate and categoric units and, by extension, institutional domains and stratification, status making and status taking are both central to the dynamics of corporate and categoric units, but the degree of success and acceptance of status making and status taking can also become part of the micro-level environment of these units. If status-organizing processes allow individuals to establish their respective status and if they are able or willing to accept their respective locations and memberships in the status order, then all other micro-dynamic forces can proceed in ways that, at a minimum, allow people to experience *satisfaction*. Satisfaction with the outcomes of status taking and making, coupled with (a) meeting transactional needs to a sufficient and expected degree, (b) normatizing successfully, (c) playing accepted roles, (d) using situational ecology appropriately, and (e) understanding the demography of the situation, will collectively generate a set of environments that facilitate the operation of status processes in meso-level units. If, however, status processes cause individuals to fail to meet transactional needs and to fail in normatizing, role making, and understanding situational ecology and demography, these status dynamics will arouse a variety of negative emotions. When these emotions are aroused collectively among larger numbers of individuals, they will create an environment that makes the current operation of corporate and categoric units problematic. The result is that these environmental pressures force alternations in the structure and culture of corporate and categoric units.

### ***Role Taking and Role Making in Encounters***

As George Herbert Mead (1934) emphasized, “taking the role of the other” or reading gestures to determine the dispositions of others, their propensities for behavior, and their evaluation of self is at the core of face-to-face interaction. Not only do individuals mutually *role-take* with each other, they also role-take with *generalized others*, a process that I have described as *culture taking* and normatization of the encounter. Role taking is greatly facilitated when individuals can successfully *status-take* and determine their respective locations in corporate and categoric units. The reciprocal of role taking is “the presentation of self” (Goffman 1959) to others by the conscious and unconscious orchestration of gestures that become the material that is implicitly assessed during role taking. Ralph Turner (1962) termed such presentations of *role making* as the reciprocal of role taking in that

individuals seek to “make a role for themselves” vis-à-vis the roles being made by others. Out of this mutual role taking and role making, individuals learn what is possible in an encounter, especially when these efforts are supplemented by active culture taking and making as well as status taking and making. Moreover, as these assessment processes ensue, individuals learn which, if any, transactional needs can be realized and to what degree.

As individuals mutually role-take and role-make, they begin to invest in roles, along several fronts. First, they may invest an identity in a particular role and, moreover, pull in other identities beyond role identities, such as a social or group identity or even a core identity. Second, they may invest other resources—time, energy, and emotions—into a role with the expectation of making a profit in the resources received from others. For interaction to succeed and for individuals to make a return on their investments in a role, they must have their roles *verified* by others (R.H. Turner 1962, 2001). When a role is verified—that is, determined by others to be appropriate for the situation—individuals are more likely to have the identities attached to their role-making efforts verified, and they are more likely to get a return on any other resources invested in the role.

Verification of roles is more likely to occur when a situation has been normatized through culture taking and making and when status locations and memberships in corporate and categoric units have been not only established but also accepted as appropriate by all participants to an encounter. And, as roles are verified in this way, they have reverse causal effects and make it more likely that transactional needs will be met, that the situation will be successfully normatized, and that status-organizing processes will proceed smoothly. As a consequence, individuals will experience positive emotions and develop commitments to each other as well as the culture and structure of the corporate and categoric units in which the encounter is embedded.

These emotions will then legitimate cultural symbols—that is, status beliefs, norms, expectation states, ideologies, and meta-ideologies—and reinforce the cultural environments of meso-level units. At the same time, positive emotional flows also reinforce the status order in corporate units and the parameters of categoric units, if salient in the situation. And the level of positive emotional energy increases even more when transactional needs are also realized. When culture and structure are reinforced, when need states are met, and when positive emotions circulate among most or all individuals in iterated encounters embedded in meso-level social units, the environment of these units is positively charged because it reinforces, legitimates, and increases attachments to not only the culture and structure of meso-level units but also the macro-level sociocultural formations in which these units are lodged.

The converse is also true. When role making and taking are not successful in verifying identities and in meeting other transactional needs, when the status order is not accepted, and when normatization remains problematic, negative emotions are aroused. And once aroused, they further disrupt these micro-dynamic processes. The result is that the environment of meso-level units becomes negatively charged, especially if role making and taking are chronically problematic over iterated encounters in meso-level units. When culture is unclear or not accepted fully, when key transactional needs are not fully met, and when the status order is challenged or unclear, the environment of meso-level units becomes unsupportive of meso-level sociocultural formations and requires that the culture and structure of corporate and categoric-unit change. A kind of micro-level anomie now exists and generates selection pressures on incumbents in corporate and members of categoric units to redouble efforts at adapting to this now hostile environment.

### *Situational Ecology and Demography*

Encounters occur in space that is organized by boundaries, partitions, configured spaces, stalls, props, and territories (Goffman 1963, 1971). When these are embedded in corporate units, the meaning of each element of space is generally understood, allowing individuals to meet needs, establish status, play roles, and normatize encounters. Both focused (face-to-face interaction) and unfocused (avoidance of face engagement) are possible because individuals understand what they can and cannot do in the ecology of an encounter. They know what boundaries and partitions signal, who can adopt use spaces and when, what props mean and how they are to be used by whom, and what territories can be claimed by individuals and when. As the principles in volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* delineate, situational ecology constrains both focused and unfocused encounters, and when individuals follow the implicit rules of ecology, other micro-dynamic processes—meeting needs, normatizing, status-organizing processes, and role dynamics—are likely to operate smoothly.

Moreover, the ecology of space and its configuration also influences interpersonal demography: what persons and categories of persons are to be copresent, how they are supposed to migrate through space, what territories, props, and use spaces they can adopt, and when they can enter a territory and when they must leave. When the “right” categories of persons are present, when individuals honor rules of either face engagement or avoid-

ance of face engagement, when they display appropriate behavioral and interpersonal demeanor, and when they honor understanding of what each element of space means, behaviors, movements, and interactions in and through space proceed smoothly. Again, embedding in corporate units dramatically increases these understandings because these units will always carry the culture (norms and ideologies) of domains in addition to their own organizational rules.

Ecology represents a spatial environment for encounters and the divisions of labor of corporate units, and when the norms guiding individuals in space are unambiguous, individuals will generally use the elements defining space appropriately and derive low-level positive emotions like *satisfaction* and *pleasure* from the movement through and use of the elements organizing space. Thus, a low-intensity but nonetheless important flow of emotion is also being aroused by ecology, and this emotion also becomes part of the environment. In a quiet but fundamental way, then, these emotions legitimate the corporate units in which space is organized—whether this be a stroll down the street or walk through the park in a community, the entrance and movement through a shopping mall or its stores, a walk through the doors of a business, movement to and from a classroom, and virtually all corporate units organized in space. When the space is organized in ways that people understand and when there are implicit and explicit rules to govern activities in space, ecology can work to legitimate meso-level sociocultural formations. This effect is even more pronounced when the “proper” use of ecology by the “proper” people occurs. Space also signals who can and should be copresent and how they should comport themselves, and when individuals in the appropriate status positions in the division of labor of corporate units and/or members of “appropriate” (however, fairly or unfairly) are copresent in space and navigate space in normatively acceptable ways, space provides important promptings for how to normatize, meet needs, status-make and status-take, and role-make and role-take. Again, the result is the arousal of low-intensity positive emotions that give extra energy and legitimacy to the meanings of space and interpersonal demography.

The converse is also true. When the meanings of space are unclear, when the “wrong people” use space inappropriately, and when individuals have trouble using and moving through space, negative emotions are aroused, and the environment of both corporate and categoric units becomes stressful. If, for example, teenagers become aggressive and noisy in a mall or a park, others are forced to adapt to an unpleasant environment and, if such behavior is chronic, to abandon the corporate unit(s) organizing the space in this “inappropriate” manner, thereby undermining implicit understanding about

who is to be present and use this space. Thus, as corporate units build up the ecology organizing individuals and as they develop ecology with understanding of the demography of who is to enter and use this space, they can create an environment which, if rules are followed and enforced, can stabilize the environments of corporate units and, indeed, legitimize their operation. Alternatively, if they *cannot* impose rules or enforce those intended for organizing encounters in space, then the ecology of situations creates an environment that can undermine the legitimacy and viability of both corporate and categoric units.

Complaints about panhandlers in city centers, ethnic gang movements in neighborhoods, crowding that cannot be controlled, long lines and waiting for simple services, presence of inappropriate categoric units, violations of norms about noise, inappropriate movements across space (e.g., young skateboarders in crowded areas), too much pushing and shoving because of overcrowding, public intoxication, and other “inappropriate” behaviors by “inappropriate” categories of persons or individuals from the “wrong” corporate units (e.g., gangs) will arouse negative emotions. And these negative emotions can become rather intense and delegitimize the corporate units organizing this space, forcing them to engage in corrective action if they can.

Thus, because actions all must occur in space and take into account situational demography, the processes involved in navigating situational ecology and demography are critical to producing and reproducing a viable micro-social order. This order can easily be undone when ecology is disrupted and the demography of individuals (i.e., numbers of person copresent, their movements in space, and their membership in categoric units) violates previous understandings about situational ecology. And, as these micro dynamics are disrupted, so are other dynamics revolving around meeting needs, establishing status, and playing roles. The consequence is the arousal of negative emotions—*anger*, *fear*, *frustration*, and *sadness*—that can dramatically change the environment of corporate units where understandings about situational ecology and demography breaks down. Calls for restoring “public order” are directed at restoring previous rules about the ecology and demography of public places in community corporate units. Indeed, as protestors learned long ago, the easiest way to disrupt corporate units is to violate rules of ecology and demography, and when disruptions and violations of the rules of ecology and interpersonal demography increase as part of the normal operation of a corporate unit or units, the viability of the units becomes problematic, and the units will need to make significant adjustments to the new negative environment.

## *The Arousal of Emotions*

People respond emotionally to all situations. And, when a large proportion of incumbents in corporate or categoric units experience the same emotions, this collective energy becomes a critical element of the environment of meso-level social units. Emotions are aroused under two basic conditions: (1) meeting expectations or failing to do so and (2) experiencing positive or negative sanctions. When individuals meet expectations and/or receive positive sanctions, they will experience positive emotions built from the primary emotion of *satisfaction–happiness*, whereas when people fail to meet expectations and/or are subject to negative sanctions, they will feel a range of negative emotions revolving around *assertion–anger*, *aversion–fear*, and *disappointment–sadness* (Turner 2002a, b, 2008, 2010b).

When individuals experience emotions, whether positive or negative, they will make attributions about their causes. In encounters, there are a variety of targets for causal attributions: (a) self, (b) others, (c) encounter, (d) units in which encounters are embedded (i.e., corporate and categoric units), and (e) macro-level sociocultural formations (institutional domain, stratification, society, or intersocietal system). Emotions and attribution dynamics reveal either a (1) proximal bias or (2) distal bias (Lawler 2001; Turner 2002a, b, 2008). Positive emotions evidence a *proximal bias* with individuals likely to see themselves as the cause of their positive emotional experiences and to see others in the encounter or the encounter as whole as the cause of their positive feelings. The result is that attribution for positive emotions stays at the micro level rather than migrating out and targeting meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations. In contrast, the arousal of negative emotions reveals a *distal bias* with individuals more likely to make attributions to the meso-level sociocultural formations and, sometimes, more macro-level formations as causes of negative emotional arousal. People do so to protect self; to blame oneself is painful or to accuse others as being the cause of negative emotions invites counter-negative emotions from others. And so, if a person's desires that others in the encounter verify various one more identities, it is less costly to blame more remote structures for negative feelings. Also facilitating the operation of this distal bias in attribution dynamics is the activation of defense mechanism that leads individuals to repress in various ways negative self feeling, with the consequence that identities and self will be protected when attributions move away from self. Yet, repressed emotions will intensify and often transmute into other emotions, and when they eventually break through the cognitive censors, they come out as a more extreme emotions that target meso- and macro-level structures (Turner 2008, 2011).

The operation of this distal bias for negative emotions increases the likelihood that negative emotions will target corporate and categoric units and, by extension, the institutional domains and the stratification system in which these meso-level units are embedded. It is far easier to blame the structure and culture of a corporate unit or members of a devalued categoric unit (e.g., Jews, Arabs, The West) for negative emotional arousal. Thus, as individuals fail to meet transactional need states, to normalize the encounter, to status-take and status-make, to role-take and role-make, to understand and navigate successfully situational ecology, and to deal with situational demography, they are more likely to make external attributions and, as they do so, they create a negatively charged environment for meso-level units.

The proximal bias for positive emotions also has effects on the environments of meso-level units because attributions are more likely to stay micro in most cases, with the result that the meso level is often not held as responsible for positive emotions that people feel. Yet, we know that people do make external attributions for their positive feelings because they legitimate more remote sociocultural formations and develop commitments to these formations (Turner 2008; Lawler et al. 2009). The general condition under which positive emotions begin to go external and target meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations is when encounters embedded in meso units *consistently* lead to the arousal of positive emotions. Under this condition, the power of the proximal bias is broken, and attributions begin to move outward as individuals recognize that the structure in which encounters is embedded is also responsible for positive feeling. As these positive emotions collectively move outward, they generate an environment that reinforces and legitimates corporate and categoric units, while also increasing individual commitments to these more distal social units.

Still, the operation of the proximal and distal biases makes it *more* likely that when negative emotions are aroused, they will first target the meso level, thereby negatively charging the environments of these meso-level units. Conversely, it will take longer for positive emotions to move to more distal targets because individuals must consistently experience a high rate of positive emotional arousal across iterated encounters for the power of the proximal bias to be broken. These dynamics, then, almost ensure that the environments of meso-level units will be charged, at least some of the time, by negative emotions when people's expectations are not met and/or they experience negative sanctions.

Many of the expectations in encounters are set up by transactional needs (especially those for identity verification and profits in exchanges), culture (ideologies, norms, status beliefs, expectation states), status taking and making, role taking and making, and situational demography and ecology.

People generally expect these dynamics to flow smoothly, and as a result, they will become emotionally aroused when they do not. Moreover, in addition to any direct negative sanctions experienced, the failure to meet expectations is often seen by people as a negative sanction. As people make attributions for these negative emotions, they not only target meso-level units but also develop beliefs (often inaccurate) about why they feel the corporate unit to have failed them and why members of targeted categoric units are to blame. Indeed, these beliefs explaining negative emotions are often the beginnings of counter-ideologies that may fuel conflict or the formation of new social movement organizations (see Chap. 8). Thus, the arousal of negative emotions alters the valence and intensity of the energy not only in the environment of meso-level units but also in the cultural environment. And, if both the emotional energy and culture of the environment change, they force meso units to accommodate the new environment or to work at shifting the valences of emotions toward the positive end of the negative–positive continuum.

## Conclusions

Understanding the micro environments of meso units is important because it is at the level of the encounter that emotional energy—whether positive or negative—is generated. Micro-dynamic forces push individuals to act in particular ways, and they do so within the constraints imposed by corporate and categoric unit and, by extension, macro-level institutional domains and stratification systems. But, people are not robots that are totally programmed by culture and social structure; they are driven by specific processes unique to humans and the micro domain of reality, and so they create a micro environment that pushes back on meso dynamics from below, just as macro dynamics pushes down on the meso level of social organization from above. There is rarely a perfect synchronization of these forces pushing on corporate and categoric units, and so, the dynamics of the meso realm involve an effort by actors to cope with these often contradictory pressures from macro dynamics and micro dynamics. It is these efforts that make the meso realm so critical to understanding the social universe, and indeed, as I will emphasize, this is where much of the critical action is in human societies.

We are now ready to pursue the goal of this third volume of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*: the analysis of the sociocultural formations of the meso realm, with an eye to their dynamic properties that can be summarized as a series of highly abstract propositions. These principles can only be

developed, I believe, by recognizing that macro- and micro-level dynamics create environments to which the structures of the meso realm—categoric and corporate units—must respond. In the next chapter, I will address the dynamics of categoric units, and then in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7, I will examine the three basic types of corporate units—groups, organizations, and communities. Then, in Chap. 8, I will examine social change, particularly social change generated by the dynamics of categoric units as they lead to the formation of social movement corporate units to effect social change in societies, not just at the meso level but also across the full spectrum of macro-level sociocultural formations.

## Chapter 4

# The Dynamics of Categorical Units

### Blau's Last Theory

During the latter part of his career, Blau (1977, 1994) developed what he thought was a theory of macro structure, but the dynamics of the theory are, I believe, better understood as meso dynamic in nature. Blau argued that the structural properties of a population *cannot* be conceptualized in terms of their micro foundations, as so many theorists do. Indeed, it is inappropriate, he felt, to conceptualize the macro-level structural properties of populations in terms of interpersonal social processes because these processes are constrained by the emergent properties of macro structure. Theory should, therefore, concentrate on how macro-structural forces increasingly affect ever-more micro-level phenomena rather than the reverse.

### *Blau's Conception of Macro Structure*

For Blau, at the most macro level, the members of a population can be characterized as being distributed across positions and groups that, in turn, circumscribe their chances and opportunities for social associations. Macro structures thus offer both opportunities for interaction as well as constraints on who is likely to associate with whom. The goal of theory is thus to conceptualize the properties of macro structure and, in so doing, to develop some basic laws of macro-structural dynamics. These laws explain the operative dynamics of what I have termed categorical units. A categorical unit is denoted by what Blau conceptualized as a *parameter* or *structural parameter* by which members of a population identify others as distinctive in some way. There are two types of parameters: (1) *nominal parameters* that

distinguish members of a population in terms of discrete categories, such as people's gender, ethnicity, and religion and (2) *graduated parameters* that place members along a continuous scale or rank order, such as their income, years of education, age, power, wealth, socioeconomic status, prestige, and other graduated scales that rank order people.

For either of these types of parameters, members of a population are distributed. For example, a certain number of individuals will be counted as members of various ethnic groups, or varying numbers of individuals will be located at different income levels. Thus, at the most general level, macro structure can be conceptualized as the distributions of population members across all of the nominal and graduated parameters that distinguish people. It is the *number* of parameters, the *nature* of parameters as either nominal or graduated, and the *distributions* of population members across parameters that the dynamics of macro structure ultimately inhere.

Nominal parameters place people discrete categories, and the degree of differentiation among nominal parameters determines the *level of heterogeneity* of macro structure, which is defined as "the chance expectation that two randomly chosen persons belong to different groups (Blau 1994: 13–14)." The greater is the number of categories into which people can be placed, and the more even is their distribution among these categories, the greater is the level of heterogeneity in a society.

Graduated parameters are distributions of people on rank-ordered scales. A population is differentiated by such graduated parameters, causing a given *level of inequality* in the population, which is defined as "the chance expectation that the absolute difference in given resources between two randomly chosen persons relative to the mean resource difference in the population (Blau 1994: 14)." Thus, the more resources of two randomly chosen individuals diverge from the population average on some graduated parameter, such as income, the greater will be the inequality in the distribution of this resource. The theoretical minimum of inequality for a resource would be an even distribution of resources along a scale, whereas the maximum would be for all resources of a kind to be held by one person. And so the more resources held in the fewer hands, the more unequal is their distribution.

Macro structure, then, is viewed by Blau as distributions of population members across all of the nominal and graduated parameters that distinguish people. In turn, the number of parameters and the respective distributions of people at various grades and, in particular, categories determine, respectively, the degree of inequality and heterogeneity in a society. The most important emergent property of macro structure, Blau argues, is the degree to which parameters are correlated. Does a position on one parameter

predict the position on another? For example, if members of an ethnic group are disproportionately located on lower positions of graduated parameters, such as income, wealth, prestige, and power, then parameters are correlated with each other. As I have already suggested in previous chapters, the higher is the correlation among parameters, the more they are, in Blau's terms, *consolidated* with each other, and the more consolidated these parameters are, the greater is the barrier that they present to social interaction and social mobility among the diverse members of a population. Conversely, the lower the correlation among parameters, the greater is the *intersection* of parameters and the more they promote social relations and mobility among differentiated members of a population or, in my terms, among members of differentially evaluated categoric units.

### ***Blau's Formal Theory of Macro Structure***

The first assumption in Blau's view of the social universe is that the probability of association among individuals in a population depends upon their opportunities for social contact. This assumption seems rather obvious, of course, but it is fundamental to what Blau wanted to do: explain how macro structure influences the opportunities for contact among individuals. To realize this goal, he introduces a second basic assumption that the proximity of individuals in a multidimensional space (organized by nominal and graduated parameters) increases the probability of social associations among. To this assumption, he adds two sub-assumptions: (1) rates of association among people in the same position as determined by a nominal parameter will be higher than their rates with outsiders and (2) average social distance among individuals in a position established by a graduated parameter will be lower than with the population at large. Later, after introducing several theorems, Blau adds a third assumption that I will state here at the outset in order to keep all of the assumptions together. This third assumption states that associates in other groups (as determined by nominal parameters) and strata (as defined by graduated parameters) will facilitate movement or mobility to these groups and strata. These associations often become the bridges for mobility to new groups and strata. These basic assumptions of Blau's theory are listed in Table 4.1.

With these very simple assumptions, Blau then develops a series of theorems. These theorems are to explain how the dynamics inhering in the properties of macro structure—that is, heterogeneity, inequality, consolidation, and intersection—influence rates of social association and mobility among individuals. The theorems are listed in their numerical order in

**Table 4.1** Blau's basic assumptions

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A-1: The probability of social association among individuals depends upon their opportunities for contact
A-2: The proximity of individuals in multidimensional space increases the probability of social associations
A-2(1): The rates of associations of persons in the same nominal position are higher than their rates with outsiders
A-2(2): The average social distance in graduated positions between associates is lower than in the population at large
A-3: Associates in other groups or strata facilitate mobility of associates to these groups or strata

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Table 4.2, but I will review them somewhat out of order because Blau does not introduce them in numerical sequence. Theorem 1 (T-1 in Table 4.2) is not derived from any of the assumptions but, instead, is a mathematical truism: the rate of association of members in one group with those of another, as defined by some parameter, is inversely related with its size relative to the other group. Thus, members of a large group will have in all probability lower rates of association with members of a smaller group than the reverse. The reason for this truism is that if members of two groups of varying size have relations, the smaller group has fewer people who can have relations, whereas the large group has more people who can have relations; as a result, the same number of reciprocal relations between members of these two groups will constitute a greater proportion of the smaller group's total possible relations than the larger group's total relations. For example, since African Americans in the United States constitute a much smaller categorical unit than whites (as defined by the parameter of skin color), the rates of association of blacks with whites will, on average, be higher than those of whites with blacks. This truism is just that—a truism—but it has many implications for the dynamics of macro structure because it affects rates of association and mobility among groups in a population.

The second theorem follows from assumption 1 that argues that the greater is the level of heterogeneity, the greater are the chances for fortuitous encounters involving members of different groups or categorical units. The logic behind this theorem is that, if social associations depend upon opportunities for contact and if heterogeneity is defined as the chance that two randomly selected individuals will belong to different groups or categorical units, then it is more likely that people from different groups will come into contact. Many of these contacts will be of low salience and soon forgotten, but heterogeneity increases opportunities for contact and, hence, the development of more lasting relations—a fact which has important implications for other macro-structural processes and, more importantly to my argument, for *meso*-structural and cultural processes as well.

**Table 4.2** Blau's basic theorems

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T-1: The probability of intergroup relations declines with proportionate increases in group size (from a mathematical truism)
T-2: The greater the heterogeneity, the greater are the chances that fortuitous encounters involve members of different groups (from A-1)
T-3: The probability of status–distant social contacts and associations increases with increasing inequality (from A-1)
T-4: Mobility improves chances of intergroup contact because mobile persons are likely to bring their old and new contacts together (from A-1)
T-5: The smaller the group, the better the chances of mobility by its members (from T-1 and A-3)
T-6: High rates of intergroup or status–distant relations increase the probability of social mobility (from A-3 and T-3)
T-7: Heterogeneity increases the probability of intergroup mobility (from A-1 and T-2)
T-8: Inequality increases the probability of status–distant mobility (from A-1 and T-3)
T-9: An excess of moves from larger to smaller groups raises, and an excess of moves from smaller to larger ones lowers the level of heterogeneity (from definition of heterogeneity and T-1)
T-10: Mobility, up or down, toward the boundary between the upper and middle classes reduces inequality (from definition of inequality and T-1)
T-11: The more pronounced the intersection of social differences, the greater the probability that people's in-group choices involve them in intergroup relations (from A-1, A-2, and T-2)
T-11(1): The more heterogeneity penetrates in lower-level substructures, the more probable are intergroup relations
T-11(2): The more inequality penetrates into low-level substructures, the greater is the likely status distance between associates
T-11(3): The more intersecting differences penetrate into low-level substructures, the more probable are intergroup relations
T-11(4): The rates of intersubunit associations increase with increasing penetration of heterogeneity
T-11(5): The rates of intersubunit associations increase with increasing penetration of inequality
T-11(6): The rates of intersubunit associations increase with increasing penetration of intersection
T-12: Multiple intersection of parameters makes mobility more probable (from A-3 and T-2)
T-13: Intersecting social differences reduce the likelihood of intergroup conflict (from A-1, A-2, and T-2)
T-14: Mobility increases the consolidation of social differences (from A-2 and A-3)

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The third theorem is the same as the second, but this time, the underlying assumption is applied to inequality. The theorem is, however, less intuitively obvious. It states that the probability of status–distant social contacts and associations among people increases with inequality. Again, if social associations depend upon opportunities for contact and if inequality is defined

as the chance that two randomly selected individuals will diverge from the mean average of resources among all members of a population, then it is more likely that people with very different resource levels on some graduated parameter will come into contact.

The fourth theorem is about mobility, which involves the movement of individuals from one position to another, as defined by either nominal or graduated parameters. This mobility can take many substantive forms, such as migration into a country, movement to new occupations and/or positions of power or prestige, movement to higher-paying positions, and in general, movement to new positions in groups defined by nominal parameters or places on rank-ordered scales as defined by graduated parameters. The theorem states that mobility increases the chances of intergroup and inter-status contact. The reason for this tendency is that as people move, they will tend to keep some of their old associations at the same time that they acquire new ones, and this fact increases the probability that both the old and new associates will, themselves, come into direct contact.

Now, Blau skips to theorem 11 on the intersection of parameters. This theorem states that the more pronounced is the intersection of parameters—that is, the less a position on one parameter is correlated with positions on other parameters—the more pronounced will be the intersection of social differences, and therefore, the more people's choices of in-group (intra-categorical unit) associations will also involve them in intergroup (inter-categorical unit) associations. From this basic idea, a set of important corollaries is developed by Blau. These corollaries concern what he terms *penetrating differentiation*, or the extent to which differentiation at one level of macro structure is retained at a lower level. For example, if differentiation of ethnicity at the national level is retained or replicated at the community level, then the differentiation has penetrated a lower-level structure. In fact, the parameter of ethnicity has become *consolidated* with community of residence or, more typically, with neighborhoods within a community. In Blau's view, the more differences can penetrate into successive levels of structure—say, for example, ethnic differences at the national level are reproduced at state, community, neighborhood, household level—the greater will be the associations among diverse members of the population. To phrase these corollaries more or less in Blau's terms, (1) the more heterogeneity penetrates into lower-level substructures, the more probable are intergroup (inter-categorical unit) relations, (2) the more inequality penetrates into lower-level substructures, the greater is the likelihood of status distance between associates, (3) the more intersecting differences penetrate into lower-level substructures, the more probable are intergroup (inter-categorical unit) relations, (4) the rates of inter-categorical unit associations increase with increasing penetration of heterogeneity into these

subunits, (5) similarly, rates of inter-subunit associations increase with penetration of inequality into such subunits, and (6) rates of inter-subunit associations increase with penetration of intersections of other parameters into such subunits.

As they flow out of the mathematical truism and the first two assumptions, this set of four theorems—T-1, T-2, T-3, and T-11 in Table 4.2—are the core of Blau's theory, although the six corollaries to theorem 11 on penetrating differentiation should be included in this core. Blau will add assumption 3 in Table 4.1 as he develops other theorems on social mobility and conflict, but in a real sense, these theorems follow from the core.

The first set of these more derivative theorems concerns mobility processes, or the movement of individuals horizontally and vertically in the multidimensional space created by nominal and graduated parameters. Theorem 6 uses assumption 3 and states that high rates of intergroup and status-distant contacts increase the chances of mobility from one group or status to another. The next two theorems, numbers 7 and 8, state what is implicit in theorem 6, namely, that heterogeneity and inequality increase the probability of mobility. The reason for this conclusion is that heterogeneity and inequality increase rates of intergroup and status-distant relations, and since associates in other groups and strata facilitate mobility to these positions (assumption 3), associations generated by heterogeneity and inequality will be likely to increase rates of mobility. Theorem 12 follows the same logic in asserting that intersection of parameters increases rates of mobility because such intersection increases intergroup and interstrata associations.

The final theorem on mobility—number 5—takes up the matter of how the varying sizes of groups and strata affect mobility. Since the rates of association of members in the smaller group or strata will be higher than those of members in the larger group or strata (the mathematical truism specified in theorem 1), the large size of a group or strata distinguished by a nominal or graduated parameter will reveal lower rates of mobility, and conversely, small group size will increase the probability of mobility. Somewhat later in his presentation, Blau examines the effects of mobility on the respective sizes of groups or strata, arguing in theorem 9 that an excess of moves from larger to smaller groups raises heterogeneity, and conversely, large-scale movements from smaller to larger groups increase homogeneity. For example, if whites flee the central city in large numbers to smaller suburbs, the heterogeneity of the city increases (because whites and other ethnic populations are now more equal in their respective numbers and, hence, more likely to be selected randomly), and the homogeneity of the smaller suburb escalates (because the larger proportion of whites increases the probability that only whites would be randomly selected).

The same logic applies to inequality, although theorem 10 is stated in a more complicated form: mobility up or down strata specified by graduated parameters toward the boundary that separates the upper and middle strata will reduce inequality because this movement is toward the largest segment of the distribution. The reason for this conclusion resides in the shape of distributions revolving around inequality. Such distributions will be pyramids, with the very few at the top of the resource distribution, and ever-more as one goes toward the middle and bottom. Hence, mobility of top members down increases the size of middle strata, as does mobility up from the bottom. As the middle stratum becomes more populous, the probability of selecting at random two individuals from this same stratum increases, thereby indicating that the level of inequality has declined.

Blau also embarks on a discussion of conflict, but he introduces only one new theorem to do so. His argument is that as rates of association increase, so do potential rates of conflict since conflict is, indeed, a type of social relation. Hence, from theorem 1, members of smaller groups or strata are more likely to be involved in conflict, whether as victims or malefactors. From theorems 2 and 3, both heterogeneity and inequality are also likely to increase rates of conflict, and from theorem 4, higher rates of mobility will likely increase the incidence of conflict. Theorem 13 is new and addresses the question of what consolidation and intersection of parameters do to conflict. This is an important theorem because it qualifies the effects on conflict specified in theorems 1–4. The argument is that the consolidation of parameters intensifies conflict in terms of frequency and animosity, whereas intersection decreases the intensity of conflict. This point of emphasis comes from Simmel (1956) who observed that crosscutting cleavages keep conflicts in bounds because those in conflict along one parameter may be in a more positive association along another. For example, members of different ethnic groups may be colleagues at work, thereby taking some of the edge off ethnic conflict.

## **Revising Blau's Theory for Understanding Meso Dynamics**

### ***Modeling Blau's Theory***

Blau's theory addresses the fundamental issues of integration in societies. For Blau, high rates of interaction among members of categorical units (which, for me, includes both units defined by graduated and nominal parameters) will increase the level of integration in a society, even if there

are initial lower-intensity conflicts during initial associations. The theory then seeks to outline the processes that increase or decrease rates of interaction among diverse members of a population. The degree of inequality will, in Blau's theory, increase the chances that two person selected randomly will come from diverse categoric units defined by graduated parameters. Similarly, the degree of heterogeneity will increase rates of interaction for the same reason. Much of this argument is purely mathematical: the more points of division along which individuals are distributed by parameters, the more likely will people be likely to bump into each other, and especially when the numbers of individuals in categories defined by nominal and graduated parameters are approximately the same. What this argument ignores, of course, is that *graduated parameters are part of a macro-level stratification system in which classes are sustained by discrimination, which is legitimated by status beliefs derived from meta-ideologies.* Moreover, discrimination and its legitimization often consolidate nominal with graduated parameters, thus ensuring a certain degree of segregation of diverse individuals from each other and, hence, lower rates of interaction than would be expected by chance. Indeed, membership in categoric units *reduces* the chance that diverse persons, even when there are many points of difference, will interact. Statistically, we can pick people at "random," but people do not pick each other at random in forming social relationships; they are *very selective* in determining with whom they will interact, and they use moral evaluations of categoric units to make this determination.

Blau also sees mobility as increasing rates of interaction among individuals defined by different parameters, and here, he is on firmer ground. High rates of mobility increase the likelihood that individuals will move across positions in corporate units that eventually lead to interaction with members of different categoric units defined by graduated and nominal parameters. True, there is often a bias to mobility that channels it in certain directions, but a high rate of mobility, per se, will increase contact with, and rates of interaction among, people in different categoric units. These interactions increase integration because, over time, they break down prejudicial beliefs and differential moral evaluations and because they create more crosscutting ties among individuals in diverse micro structure. Thus, mobility will generally increase the intersection of parameters and, thus, the intersection of memberships in categoric units with locations in the divisions of labor of categoric units (or what Blau views as "successive penetration" of categoric units across all types and sizes of corporate units).

What Blau's theory intentionally ignores, then, is the micro and meso processes that are constrained by inequality and heterogeneity. The distribution of opportunities to interact is affected not just by the number of parameters




Fig. 4.1 Revision of Blau's theory of integration




Fig. 4.2 Elaborating on Blau's theory

and the distributions of people among the categoric units created by parameters; rather, the formation of cultural beliefs at the macro level—*ideologies*, *meta-ideologies*, *prejudicial beliefs*, and *status beliefs*—and at the micro level as *expectation states* derived from more macro-level beliefs have very large effects on opportunities for interaction and whether or not interaction will have integrative effects. If interactions reinforce the inequalities and differences in the status order, they do not integrate members of a population in the short run, and moreover, they increase tensions and the potential for intense conflict in the long run, which can lead to disintegration. Thus, rates of interaction, per se, do not integrate as much as Blau implies; rather, the nature of the interaction as sustaining or mitigating the status beliefs and moral evaluations of individuals in different categoric units is also very important. Interactions that break the power of status beliefs and decrease the salience of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships are more likely to be integrative, whereas those that sustain them, whether from low or high rates of intercategory-unit interaction, decrease integration in the long run because they generate tensions and increase the potential for conflict. Figure 4.1 outlines Blau's argument, and Fig. 4.2 on pp. 124–125 modifies it in light of what actually occurs at the micro and meso levels of reality.




Fig. 4.2 (continued)

The causal path through the middle of Fig. 4.1 delineates Blau's basic argument that high levels of inequality and heterogeneity increase the number of parameters, denoting categories of persons, which in turn increases rates of interaction (between two randomly chosen persons in a society) and hence the level of societal-level integration. The same is true for the causal path passing through high rates of mobility. Blau does not conceptualize the forces leading to consolidation of parameters, even though consolidation reduces rates of mobility which, in turn, lowers rates of interaction and hence societal integration. In contrast, intersections of parameters increase rates of interaction and rates of mobility (which then increase rates of interaction), thereby increasing integration. And to the degree that intersections penetrate successive layers of social structure, or what I term corporate units (i.e., communities, organizations, and groups), rates of interaction rise, and so does the level of integration. Yet, like the consolidation of parameters, Blau does not specify in any detail the forces increasing intersections of parameters.

As noted above, levels of inequality and heterogeneity are created by meso-level dynamics forces as they push for the formation of corporate units that, in turn, generate the stratification system that causes the consolidation of parameters or, alternatively, the intersection of parameters. In focusing on the number of parameters and the distributions of individual across parameters, Blau is successful in sustaining a macro focus, but he leaves out the theoretically interesting questions: How do inequality and heterogeneity come about? How do processes inherent in generating inequality and heterogeneity cause consolidation or intersection of parameters? This and related questions cannot be fully answered by sustaining a macro-level focus; it also becomes essential to see what occurs at the meso and micro levels of social reality. Thus, the real driving forces of Blau's theory *inhere in the dynamics of corporate and categoric units within the meso-realm of social reality*.

Blau himself always recognized that other forces generate parameters, distributions of persons across these parameters, intersections of parameters, penetrations of parameters across diverse types of corporate units, and consolidations of parameters. He recognized that the number of parameters, their nature, the distribution of people in them, and the degree of consolidation, intersection, and penetration of parameters are influenced by historical forces (Blau 1994: 173–203). Moreover, in his later formulation of the theory, Blau sees two types of exogenous forces as most important: (1) demographic trends, as they affect rates of migration (both immigration and emigration), fertility, and mortality, because such demographic forces determine the respective sizes of groups and strata which, as

theorem 1 emphasizes, have an enormous influence on rates of association and, as other theorems indicate, on mobility and on conflict as well; and (2) economic development as it determines the number of positions in the division of labor and rates of mobility to and from various positions. What these two exogenous forces do is load the variables in Blau's theory, telling us the number and nature of parameters, the respective sizes and rates of growth of groups and strata, and the movements of people across positions. Yet, these two conditions are not well integrated into the theory, and it is for this reason that Blau's theory needs some elaboration in light of the dynamics examined in Vols. 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* and the operation of additional processes, especially the dynamics of discrimination.

Figure 4.2 revises Blau's model by introducing key processes that are needed to understand how categoric-unit dynamics operate. The model obviously becomes complex—perhaps too complex—but if we are to understand the dynamics of categoric units, it becomes necessary to introduce more processes that are in play. For categoric-unit memberships to become salient, the parameters marking membership must be visible to others. A key set of processes not fully addressed by Blau revolve around discrimination against persons who are categorized on the basis of a visible parameter. For, consolidation of parameters is normally the outcome of discriminatory practices by individuals in encounters embedded within corporate units. Discrimination increases as a consequence of perceived threat by those who discriminate (Turner 1986), which in turn increases the intensity of prejudicial beliefs about victims of discrimination. By developing such beliefs, discrimination can be legitimated, especially as individuals who are members placed in a categoric unit are devalued by status beliefs derived from prejudicial beliefs. And ironically, prejudicial beliefs that emphasize the negative attributes of members of a categoric unit make them even more threatening. Thus, members of categoric units about whom highly negative beliefs and stereotypes are formulated and who are thus differentially valued are the most likely to be targets of discrimination that leads to consolidation of parameters, thereby decreasing access of devalued categoric-unit members to resource-distributing corporate units or, if the divisions of labor in corporate units are hierarchical, to higher-level positions in these corporate units. The combination of threat, prejudicial stereotypes, and differential evaluation causes an increase in the intensity and salience of status beliefs as well as the moral evaluation that they contain and, thereby, increases the likelihood that members of devalued categoric units will be subject to discrimination at the level of the encounter, including encounters within resource-distributing corporate units, whether groups,

organizations, or communities. The result will be further consolidation of parameters that in turn leads to a higher correlation between the unequal distributions of resources and memberships in categorical units. And as classes form and the level of stratification increases (see right side of Fig. 4.2), *class* (as yet one more type of categorical unit) becomes consolidated with other bases of categorical-unit formation, especially nominal parameters such as gender, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, and national origins.

Thus, the more consolidated are parameters denoting categorical-unit memberships, the more identifiable are persons along several criteria, and hence, the more likely will they be (a) subject to discrimination, (b) perceived as threats to the well-being of those who discriminate, (c) objects of highly prejudicial beliefs, (d) victims of stigmatizing status beliefs, and (e) subject to stigmatizing expectation states. The result is that rates of interaction among individuals from valued and devalued categorical units will be tension producing, with the result that both members of valued and devalued units will avoid interaction, particularly those in devalued and stigmatized units. Thus, even when there are many parameters denoting nominal and graduated categorical units, the dynamics revolving around discrimination against categories of persons will decrease rates of interaction among members of categorical units, contrary to Blau predictions, because people are not “randomly selected” but highly biased by those with whom they prefer to interact.

All of these dynamics as they unfold have direct, indirect, and reversal causal effects on rates of mobility, the degree of intersection of parameters, including penetration of locations in corporate units, and access of members of categorical units to resource-distributing corporate units and/or the full range of locations in their respective divisions of labor. With discrimination comes consolidation of parameters, inequality, class formations correlated with other bases for categorical-unit formation, low rates of mobility, and low rates of interaction. These outcomes, once in place, will reinforce the pattern of discrimination and consolidation of parameters.

When dynamics of discrimination are absent, intersections among categorical-unit members and access of these members to corporate units and to the full range of locations in their divisions of labor will increase mobility and rates of interaction among members of diverse categorical units. And to the degree that rates of interaction increase among members of identifiable categorical units, the salience and intensity of status beliefs decline, thereby decreasing discrimination and consolidation of parameters. These dynamics all occur at the meso rather than either the micro or macro levels of social organization. Still, as Chaps. 2 and 3 emphasized, we need to conceptualize the micro and macro environments that constrain the operation of those meso-level processes increasing or decreasing consolidation of parameters that define categorical units.

## Macro-level Environments and Categorical-Unit Dynamics

### *Macro-level Structural Environments of Categorical Units*

Structural environments at the macro level are generated by (1) the configuration of integrative mechanisms that link corporate units together within and across institutional domains and (2) the degree of stratification. Let me begin with modes of integration among corporate units in institutional domains.

**Institutional Integration and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** As Table 2.3 on pp. 84–90 outlines, there are five basic structural mechanisms of integration: segmentation, differentiation, structural interdependences, domination, and segregation. Depending upon the extent and configuration of these mechanisms integrating corporate unit within and between domains, the environment of categorical units will vary.

#### Structural segmentation

When segmentation dominates as a mechanism of integration, widespread structural equivalences will exist in corporate units, and corporate units will reveal a common culture. Segmentation will generate a structural environment evidencing low levels of heterogeneity, to use Blau's terms, with corporate units revealing similar structures and with divisions of labor being truncated. While some consolidation of parameters marking categorical-unit membership with corporate units and their respective divisions of labor can occur, the existence of structural equivalence increases the likelihood that memberships of categorical units will intersect with corporate units and a wide range of status locations in their divisions of labor. This relationship must be qualified, however, by the degree and extent of hierarchy in the divisions of labor of segmented corporate units. When hierarchy is high, it is likely that discrimination will generate consolidation of some categorical memberships with high, middle, and low locations on this hierarchy.

#### Structural differentiation

When differentiation is the dominant mechanism, with only segmentation of basic subtypes of corporate units, heterogeneity increases. If discrimination is not prominent, then heterogeneity, per se, can increase intersections

between categorical and corporate units. And, as a result, the salience of parameters should decline as individuals' interact with each other in all corporate units and in all or most locations in their divisions of labor. However, if discrimination is operative, and especially discrimination fueled by perceived fears, then differentiation will work contrary to Blau's prediction that intersection of parameters should increase. Instead, consolidation of parameters defining memberships in categorical units will be more likely than intersections of parameters.

### Structural interdependencies

The various mechanisms of structural interdependence generally operate to increase differentiation (or heterogeneity) among corporate units and their divisions of labor. *Exchange processes* mediated by markets are differentiation-generating machines because they create markets in response to individual and corporate-unit demand, thus increasing the number of resource niches for corporate units and, hence, opportunities for members of diverse categorical units. Also, labor markets for incumbents in many diverse corporate units in differentiated domains increase the mobility of members of differentiated categorical units across locations in corporate units, thereby decreasing over the long term the salience of parameters marking categorical-unit memberships. Again, if some categorical units pose threats to others, then discrimination processes can reduce these trends toward intersections of categorical-unit memberships with diverse corporate units and locations in their divisions of labor. Yet, if rates of mobility as a separate type of integrative mechanism are high, and especially if mobility is an outcome of training of individuals in one domain to assume positions in corporate units of another domain, then mobility will be institutionalized in labor markets in ways that increase the pressures for intersections between categorical and corporate units (see further discussion of mobility below).

*Embeddings* and *overlaps* among corporate units can increase intersections among categorical and corporate units, while providing a less market-mediated way for individuals to move across positions in the divisions of labor of the larger units created by embedding and overlap. However, when the hierarchical divisions of labor in these larger units increase the range of status locations, there is more structural space with which to consolidate categorical-unit memberships with status locations in the extended vertical division of labor. Just whether this space is an opportunity structure for mobility or a series of barriers to mobility by members of diverse categorical units depends upon the extent to which discrimination

rates and categorical-unit salience are high. Salience of parameters, threat, and discrimination will increase under a number of conditions, including (a) high levels of visible diversity that serve as a basis for categorical-unit formation (e.g., high ethnic diversity), (b) previous conflicts among members of categorical units that sustain the sense of fear, (c) high levels of stratification that create distinct class-based categorical units that are consolidated with other categorical units, and (d) level of competition for access to corporate units and their divisions of labor. Under at least these conditions, the dynamics revolving around identifiability, threat, prejudice, differential evaluation, and categorical-unit salience will be likely to cause some degree of discrimination and consolidation of categorical-unit parameters with diverse corporate units and their extended divisions of labor.

Just whether or not these conditions produce this outcome is, to some degree, conditioned by the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system and the specific institutional domains from which this meta-ideology is constructed. If the meta-ideology is dominated by tenets of a market-based economy (e.g., capitalism), a democratic polity relying on the use of material incentives and ideologies emphasizing of free, a positivistic system of law, credentials bestowed by an educational domain open to all members of a society and emphasizing universal and universalistic ideologies, and a prominent scientific domain, then the symbolic media of these domains are “cooler” and are more likely to be codified into a meta-ideology, emphasizing universalism when compared to hot symbolic media like those in religion and kinship. If the meta-ideology is composed of “hot” symbolic media that are inherently more particularistic and that have been built up to legitimate political control, use of coercive and administrative bases of power, restrictive laws derived from religion, lower levels of access to education, and widespread fears of science and new knowledge in general, then conditions (a)–(d) listed above are likely to decrease mobility. The result is that consolidation of parameters will increase, and the salience and intensity of the consolidated parameters and their use as markers of targets of discrimination and devaluation will also increase.

*Mobility* as a mechanism of structural interdependence will increase with differentiation, per se, but it will accelerate with exchanges mediated by markets as well as by structural overlaps and embeddings that generate larger social units with more protracted divisions of labor. Also, the circulation of generalized symbolic media across domains will increase mobility across domains as individuals become the conduits, via markets, for exchanges of diverse generalized symbolic media. For example, *learning* from education for *money* in the economy, polity, law, religion, or any corporate unit that needs learning; *knowledge* from science, often generated

in academia but exchanged with polity or actors in economy; *influence* from law (often via learning in law schools) for *money* in many domains; and so on. High rates of circulation tend to break down particularism and decrease the power of hot symbolic media to restrict actions, including social mobility of individuals. Thus, the more diverse are the generalized symbolic media circulation within a domain and the more these media penetrate corporate units in other domains, the greater are opportunities for mobility and the more likely is intersection of parameters marking categorical-unit memberships to spread across institutional domains. Discrimination can, however, often interrupt these processes if markets can be split into various segments based on categorical-unit memberships, and especially if powerful beliefs can legitimate these *split labor markets* and other markets for housing in neighborhoods or even access to particular community units. Yet, in the long run, free and open markets, especially if regulated by universalistic and positivist law in conjunction with a democratic polity, make it difficult for discrimination to block markets over the long term, but discrimination can distort markets and thus promote consolidation of parameters for many decades.

### Structural domination

The use of coercive and administrative bases of power to control and regulate all actors in a society creates a system of domination in which virtually every social relation at all levels of society is defined by the respective authority of the actors involved. And as power is concentrated in polity, law, religion, and economy, all of these domains reveal relations of domination. As a result, the consolidation of parameters marking graduated and nominal parameters defining categorical-unit memberships will likely increase. Extended hierarchies of authority within or between domains generate spaces where discrimination can park members of devalued categorical units, and the more coercion and tight administrative control are the bases of domination, the more likely are categorical units to compete for control of these bases. And, once in control, they will use them to bias decision-making in favor of some categorical units while encouraging widespread discrimination against other categorical units, thereby increasing consolidations of devalued categorical units with the lower classes and valorized units with middle and higher social classes. Moreover, class locations and active discrimination will further consolidate categorical-unit memberships with high and low resource-distributing corporate units in institutional domains and/or higher-ranking locations in the divisions of labor of not only these domains but most other domains as well.

### Structural segregation

One result of discrimination, of course, is segregation of valued and devalued members of categorical units. Indeed, consolidation of categorical memberships with locations in community corporate (e.g., neighborhoods) units will separate in time and place individuals and lower their rates of interaction. Such separation inevitably sustains prejudicial beliefs and status beliefs about devalued members of categorical units, thereby legitimating their continued segregation. If separation within communities is not a viable strategy (as was the case on the plantation systems of the American south), then strictly segregated by locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units are likely, with this segregation seen as necessary given the threatening and undesirable characteristics of those segregated. And if both segregation by community of residence or neighborhoods within communities is coupled with (and indeed, a partial cause of) access to resource-distributing corporate units in the first place (in economic and educational domains, for example) and/or to better paying and more powerful locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units where some access is allowed, then segregation is compounded. Moreover, it is used to legitimate discrimination and prejudices because members of devalued categorical units have “failed” to be mobile or do not have the “capacity” to fully participate in the institutional domains of society (obviously, conveniently ignoring that segregation in the first place came about because of discrimination and its legitimization by prejudicial beliefs).

**Stratification and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** Both highly stratified and comparatively open stratifications systems have integrative consequences for societies, but for very different reasons and with very different long-term outcomes. Highly stratified societies reveal high levels of inequality on most valued resources, high degrees of class formation, linear rankings of classes on a scale of worth, and low rates of interclass mobility. These are built on patterns of domination (see above) in most encounters in most corporate units when members of high- and lower-ranking classes meet in all institutional domains. These patterns of domination establish status beliefs for virtually all members of society by virtue of their class position as a categorical unit and for any other visible parameters marking other types of categorical-unit memberships. This kind of macro-structural environment typically leads to a high degree of consolidation of parameters that are differentially valued, to structural rigidities in the modes of integration of corporate units in institutional domains, and to longer-term accumulations of tensions that, under specifiable conditions, increase the potential for conflict. This conflict can lead to either the disintegration of a society or

transformations of the modes of integration within and among institutional domains.

In contrast, a more open system of stratification reveals lower levels of inequality in general. Where there are high levels of inequality, it is likely to be confined to resources such as money, prestige, influence, and power, with other generalized symbolic media as valued resources, such as *love/loyalty*, *sacredness/piety*, and *learning*, being more equally distributed. Such systems generate lower levels of class formation, especially among a larger set of middle classes where class boundaries are ambiguous and open. Often, the only clearly marked classes are those at the very top and bottom of the class system. The linearity of class rankings in terms of their members' moral worth is thus flattened in the middle, and biased toward a positive moral evaluation in all classes except the lowest. And rates of mobility are comparatively high, especially to the next adjacent class, but not high in terms of the overall rate or in the distances across classes that are traveled by mobile individuals and families. Moreover, because this kind of system emerges in more industrial societies, there is a great deal of structural mobility generated as the nature and number of corporate units in economy and, elsewhere, change with growth and differentiation among and within corporate units in an expanding number of more autonomous institutional domains. Yet, such mobility may not change dramatically the shares of resources received by those who are mobile—say, for example, from well-paying unionized blue-color jobs to lower-wage white-collar service jobs.

The environments of these polar opposites of stratification generate very different macro-structural environments for the operation of categorical-unit dynamics. Highly stratified systems generate demands for identifying parameters marking differences, first those about class and then denoting gender, ethnicity, origins, religion, and perhaps age as categorical units that are entitled to varying levels of resources. Discrimination is legitimated by codification of valorizing and stigmatizing stereotypical prejudices, moral evaluations of worth, status beliefs, and expectation states for both diffuse status characteristics and status locations in corporate units that reinforce structural patterns of authority and domination. The result is high consolidation of parameters marking devalued categorical units and marking class rankings. More generalized resources, such as prestige and positive emotions, are also highly stratified and correlate with linear class rankings (Turner 2010c), but clearly biased toward only the upper classes. Given this kind of structural environment, it is virtually impossible for individuals to escape being forced into accepting memberships in categorical units, which in turn determines the access to resource-

distributing corporate units and locations in divisions of labor where access is allowed.

In contrast, the more open system of stratification generates a structural environment where institutional integration is achieved through mechanisms of structural interdependence among differentiated corporate units rather than through domination at all levels of a society. This shift, in turn, increases heterogeneity and mobility and, thereby, also increases rates of intersection between members of categorical and corporate units and their divisions of labor in diverse institutional domains. Markets are a key dynamic in these transformations because they continually increase heterogeneity, thereby generating niches and space for new corporate units to evolve, and as new types of units evolve, they expand opportunity structures, especially as markets increasingly “commodify” or, in Polanyi’s (1944) terms, “marketize” evermore types of outputs of corporate units in diverse institutional domains. For example, educational credentials commodify *learning* for labor markets that extend into most noneconomic domains; *knowledge* produced by science is commodified as technology in its own market niches within the economy, education, and polity; *competition* is commodified by professional sport teams; *aesthetics* increasingly commodified by auction houses and galleries; *health* care is commodified by government or private insurance charges, specified for each potential procedure; and so on for other domains. Commodification thus accelerates the speed, scale, and scope of market exchanges by imposing money as a standard marker of value; and, in so doing, commodification creates incentives for entrepreneurs to build new kinds of corporate units for producing new outputs for markets.

As the number and degree of differentiation of corporate units grow, levels of heterogeneity and rates mobility increase, thereby creating a structural environment in which members of categorical units can move across corporate units in diverse domains and their respective divisions of labor. The result is higher rates of interaction among members of diverse categorical units and, as a further result, some diminution in (1) the consolidation of categorical-unit parameters around class, (2) the salience of categorical-unit memberships in general and the prevalence of prejudicial stereotypes, differential moral evaluations, and stigmatizing status beliefs, and (3) the power of expectation states in encounters. As a consequence, memberships in categorical units become less salient and relevant, thereby reducing discrimination. Moreover, status in divisions of labor of resource-distributing corporate units becomes more salient for evaluations of individuals than diffuse status characteristics or memberships in categorical units.

### ***Macro-level Cultural Environments of Categorical Units***

Cultural environments are, to some extent, generated by structural arrangements organizing a population, but once in place, the reverse is true: culture constrains social structure. Such is particularly likely to be the case for categorical units because they are defined by cultural beliefs about the characteristics of individuals who are placed into a category. Because members of categorical units are distributed across divisions of labor in resource-distributing corporate units in diverse domains, the ideologies of these domains have large effects on categorical-unit dynamics. Even more importantly, since categorical-unit memberships are often correlated or consolidated with dimensions of the stratification system, the meta-ideology legitimating this system (drawn from the culture key institutional domains) has even larger effects on categorical-unit dynamics. Let me examine first the effects of the culture of institutional domains and then the culture of the stratification system on categorical units.

**The Culture of Institutional Domains and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** The cultural systems that emerge with institutional evolution are built from the generalized symbolic media of each domain, and as corporate units within and between domains become integrated, the pattern of structural integration affects the culture of categorical units, either increasing or decreasing consolidation, or intersection of parameters.

#### Generalized symbolic media and categorical-unit dynamics

Symbolic media that evolve in a domain contain the seeds of an intra-institutional morality. Talk and discourse require a common medium for exchanging ideas, and as this medium develops, institutional themes begin to emerge, and these, in turn, evolve into ideologies that provide a morality for action within institutional domains. To moralize action at the meso level, ideologies make societal-level values relevant for action and interaction within and, eventually, between corporate units in diverse institutional domains. Once in place, the morality of an institutional domain can become the moral yardstick by which differences among individuals in a society are highlighted and used to evaluate the parameters defining memberships in categorical units. As Fig. 2.2 outlines, identifiability of, and perceived threat posed by, individuals will accelerate the process of categorical-unit formation. Prejudicial beliefs, moral evaluations, and status beliefs will always carry some elements of the broader institutional ideology, and as these cultural elements are used to define and evaluate people, those who are

devalued by the moral standards contained in the generalized symbolic medium, per se, will be subject to discrimination and, hence, fewer resources than those who are more positively evaluated. For example, if *learning* is the symbolic medium of education, people who do not learn enough will be devalued, while those that do will be valued. This evaluation will occur irrespective of the codification of (1) the implicit morality of the symbolic medium with and (2) the abstract value premises of the whole society. To take other examples, *money* in economy and other domains implies that the moral value of earning greater amounts of money is more worthy than having little money; *competition* in sport defines worth, whether or not actors win or lose; *sacredness/piety* implies that the more of either of this medium is better, with those who possess little piety being stigmatized, at least in the domain of religion; *power* institutionalized as authority in corporate units places a value on having power, per se, and using it effectively, whereas those with little power or authority are stigmatized in various ways; *love/loyalty* in kinship must be possessed and revealed to gain respect if not prestige among members of a kinship system; and so it goes for all domains. It is not only a matter of how much of a symbolic medium people come to possess but also how it is used, and such becomes increasingly the case as ideologies codify and constrain norm formation about proper conduct within a domain.

These dynamics have their greatest effects on status in corporate units, but when discrimination leads to consolidation of categorical-unit memberships, this discrimination must be justified because it denies access to valued resources in a society. Thus, in limiting access to resource-giving corporate units and/or to positions in the division of labor in these units, the implicit morality of the symbolic medium is used to codify *status beliefs* and expectation states for members of a categorical unit. For example, if members of a visible subpopulation cannot earn enough money, cannot graduate from secondary schools or enter colleges, or cannot gain power, they will be stigmatized not only by the lack of enough *learning* and *power*, but also by the morality inherent in these symbolic media and the ideologies built from them in each of these domains. And individuals will particularly likely use ideologies to justify discrimination when a subpopulation defined by a parameter is perceived to pose a threat. Discrimination may not even initiate this process but, instead, come after the process of stigmatization of this subpopulation is set into motion. For example, if members of an ethnic minority cannot speak the language of schools and workplaces, their access to some corporate units is blocked, and if language impairs their ability to move up the division of labor in those units where access is possible, the failure to gain access and/or to move up the hierarchy will, itself, stigmatize

them as not “measuring up” to the standards inherent in the symbolic medium and the ideologies constructed from this medium. The stigmatization leads to devaluation and then to discrimination against those who are not seen as capable of measuring up to standards of proper and successful conduct within a domain. And as discrimination against those who have not “measured up” begins to spread, it must be legitimated by the articulation of prejudicial stereotypes that often make those stigmatized seem threatening, which only sustains the cultural beliefs legitimating discrimination against unworthy and threatening classes of individuals.

Whatever the route to stigmatizing status beliefs and lowered expectation states for identifiable categories of persons, once this process has occurred, it increases the likelihood that devalued categories of person will be disproportionately located in the lower classes of the stratification systems, absent from prestige-giving corporate units in key domains (say, higher-education corporate units or skilled-professional units in economy and other domains), and overrepresented in low-level positions in the divisions of labor in those corporate units where they can gain a foothold. These beliefs thus bias evaluations so that consolidation between categorical-unit memberships and blocked access to resource-giving corporate units seems proper and appropriate.

These dynamics are mostly likely to occur in societal formations where integration among institutional domains is achieved by domination relying upon coercive and administrative bases of power and on interdependencies that involve structural inclusion along long chains of authority from a centralized polity and legal system, backed up by monitoring and coercion if necessary. Such a society will reveal relatively high levels of stratification, with meta-ideologies dominated by the media of *power* (from polity) and *influence* (from law) reinforcing the rights of those with power.

In contrast, if integration is achieved through (a) consolidation in polity around the material incentive bases of power, (b) strategic and episodic use of coercion, (c) moderate amounts of administrative control, and (d) symbolic bases of power emphasizing democracy, human rights, and freedom of choice, then the structural interdependencies in such a system will tend to be mediated by the circulation of money in markets and quasi-markets, thereby increasing mobility to, and intersections of, categorical-unit memberships with corporate units and their divisions of labor. From these intersections with corporate units, there will be further intersections with a loose set of middle classes where rank-ordering is ambiguous, as is differential evaluation of their members. These kinds of systems, most typical of post-industrialism, do not eliminate the dynamics revolving around identifiability, threat, prejudicial stereotypes, stigmatizing status beliefs, and discrimination against members of categorical units. Rather, they mitigate discrimination

and promote greater degrees of intersection among parameters, corporate units, and classes in a society.

In more market-driven systems, other symbolic media such as *learning* (as professional and technical skills), *knowledge* (as technology), *competition* (in careers and market transactions), and *aesthetics* are commodified. As a result, meta-ideologies combining *money*, *power* (as franchised authority to corporate units), *influence*, *learning*, *knowledge*, and *competition* are increasingly forged into a meta-ideology that not only legitimates the more open stratification system but also the actions individuals and corporate units in virtually all domains. This combination of relatively “cool” media increases the likelihood that universalistic criteria will be invoked in evaluations of persons and performances, thus pushing against the processes feeding discrimination and stratification revolving the consolidation of class memberships with other categorical units. The result is more mobility and interaction among members of categorical units through the intersection of parameters.

### Ideologies and categorical-unit dynamics

As noted above, ideologies are built from generalized symbolic media as individual and collective actors mobilize resources to construct corporate units to address selection pressures. As they do so, they draw from the abstract value premises of a society and the implicit morality inhering in the symbolic media and, if successful, create a system of evaluative codes for regulating thought, action, and interaction within an emerging domain. When the structure of domains changes, the ideology will also change, which will then reverberate down to institutional norms, corporate-unit cultures, and even status beliefs. Ideologies add new layers of morality to generalized symbolic media by indicating how symbolic media should be distributed and used in relations among actors within and between corporate units. And they make much more explicit the criteria for (a) evaluation of status performances in divisions of labor and (b) evaluation of *diffuse status characteristics* that members of categorical units are presumed to possess.

Individuals who are identifiable as a member of a social category will be evaluated collectively *as if* they occupy similar locations in resource-distributing corporate units in dominant domains and *as if* they are over-represented in particular class locations in the stratification system. Depending upon how they are *initially* evaluated, status beliefs about their characteristics and likely courses of action may emerge and become the basis for expectation states at the level of encounters.

These processes can take hold without being driven by threats posed by members of devalued categorical units. Differential evaluation and status-belief formation can come as an outcome of members of a categorical unit being (a) over- or underrepresented in some institutional domains and (b) incumbent in a *consistent range* of locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units in these domains. However, if this basis of identification and evaluation is also threatening, then the dynamics of categorical-unit formation will inevitably involve increased discrimination. For example, if Jews are overrepresented in a narrow range of corporate units in economy and religion, in neighborhoods in communities (i.e., Jewish “ghettos”), and in schools (e.g., universities) in the educational domain, these patterns make it easier to form status beliefs about Jews. But if Jews are threatening or perceived as threatening, these status beliefs will incorporate prejudicial beliefs and legitimate discrimination that will harden parameters defining “Jews as different.” African-origin slaves in the American south were even more likely have suffered from these dynamics after their “emancipation” (from slavery) because they represented a larger proportion (sometimes almost half) of the population in southern states and, thus, were perceived to pose a threat to the “(white) southern way of life.” Since the prior oppression of the African-origin population on plantations had already generated a powerful set of prejudicial beliefs, members of this population were seen by whites as even more threatening when “freed” from the plantation system. This sense of threat drove the formulation of a new set of highly discriminatory beliefs that legitimated Jim Crow discriminatory practices that limited the access of former slaves to the full range of institutional domains and corporate units in them. Much of the power of these kinds of prejudicial beliefs comes from imposing moral standards of institutional ideologies in evaluating the “failures” of targets of discrimination to “live up” to these standards, conveniently ignoring the discrimination and prejudices that prevent targeted members of categorical units from gaining access to resource-distributing corporate units in dominant domains. To be systematically discriminated against in their efforts to move into a broader range of locations in corporate units in economy, polity, education, and communities (neighborhoods) was then used to condemn them as “not living up” to the moral standards of the ideologies in these domains, and once prejudicial beliefs emphasized that African-origin descendants of slaves could never do so, continued discrimination was considered “appropriate” and only affirmed the prophecy set up by prejudicial stereotypes, status beliefs, and expectation states.

In a less extreme form, these kinds of cultural dynamics revolving around applications of moral tenets in ideologies can make more salient parameters

defining devalued categorical units and discrimination against those so defined. For example, the “poor” or even members of the “working classes” can be defined as not measuring up to ideological standards by their inability to enter higher positions in corporate units of economy, polity, and education as well as neighborhoods (in community corporate units), and this “failure” is then used to build up more subtle prejudicial stereotypes and status beliefs that legitimate discrimination. Discriminators rarely fully recognize that their prejudices and discrimination work as self-fulfilling prophecies; instead, the outcome of “not measuring up” to ideological standards (ignoring subtle and even blatant discriminatory acts) is what counts because this moral judgment is enshrined in institutional ideologies and typically fueled by some vague sense of threat.

The effects of symbolic media in categorical-unit formation also explain the same dynamics revolving around institutional ideologies. These dynamics can also occur—as the American case makes clear—in societies with more open stratification systems, comparatively higher rates of mobility, political democracy, and markets as dominant mechanisms for allocating persons to positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units. For example, as Bonacich (1972) and others have documented, there are often incentives for economic actors in market systems to employ devalued members of categorical units (who will work for less than members of more valued categorical units out of desperation and who could be used by capitalists as “strike breakers” in the early days of the union movement in the United States). Here, markets which open opportunities for mobility intensify the sense of threat by those who fear for their jobs and worry about infiltration of desperate members of devalued categorical units into their neighborhoods, schools, and churches. Often, the result was intensified prejudices and discrimination that can turn violent as was the case, for example, when former slaves began to migrate to northern industrial cities from the rural south in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The disruption caused by violence can lead to an eventual partitioning of the labor market into a high- and low-wage sectors—often termed *split labor markets*—that consolidate location in corporate units (and hence class locations as well) with memberships in categorical units. This kind of splitting of markets allows prejudicial beliefs and discrimination to be legitimated in ways that are seen consistent with the ideology and the status beliefs derived from this ideology within a domain. Again, the blatant and institutionalized discrimination built into split labor markets is ignored; instead, the lower-level locations of those on the short end of the split are used to affirm that the victims of discrimination have “not measured up.”

Yet, over the long run, markets in dynamic economies, coupled with political democracy and presumably universalistic and positivistic law,

work against split labor markets. Members of devalued categorical units eventually become resentful of restrictions on their options and often initiate social movement organizations (SMOs) to deinstitutionalize discriminatory practices. When these movements are successful, or even partially successful, they break the hold of consolidated parameters and begin what is often a longer-run increase in the intersections between (a) parameters marking categorical-unit memberships and (b) access to the full range of the divisions of labor in corporate units of all institutional domains. And even in more repressive economic systems, as was the case in South Africa, the dramatic splits in its labor markets eventually led to sufficient protest that the system of apartheid began to be dismantled; previous ideologies and status beliefs simply could not be sustained in the face of the mobilization by the vast majority of the population.

### Meta-Ideologies and categorical-unit dynamics

Meta-ideologies are, as I have emphasized, mixes of institutional ideologies. Sometimes these emerge as a result of interdependencies, especially exchanges of resources (often the generalized symbolic media in each domain) among corporate units in a set of domains. Meta-ideologies also evolve to combine the ideologies of dominant institutional domains, and as they do so, these emerging meta-ideologies provide a moral bases for interinstitutional actions, but they also give moral justification to acts of discrimination and to the unequal distribution of resources generated by such acts. This meta-ideology is particularly powerful because it is built from the morality inherent in resources of the dominant domains (i.e., their symbolic media) that are unequally distributed to members of various categorical units by corporate units in dominant domains. The meta-ideology then operates as a moral yardstick to evaluate the moral worth of those who have been successful in gaining access to resource-distributing corporate units and higher locations in their respective divisions of labor.

These meta-ideologies can work to consolidate parameters defining categorical-unit memberships with higher- or lower-class locations in the stratification system, but they can also operate to break down prejudices and discrimination against members of targeted categorical units. If, for example, the ideologies built from *money* in a market-driven society, from *power* as subject to consent of the governed, from *influence* in a positivistic legal system, from *learning* in an educational domain requiring universal access to education, and from *knowledge* in science as it overlaps with education, then the meta-ideology will be constructed from comparatively cool set of generalized symbolic media that are more universalistic than “hotter”

media, such as *love/loyalty* from kinship and *sacredness/piety* from religion, both of which gravitate toward particularism. As a result, the meta-ideology will be more likely to valorize mobility and achievement, equality of opportunities for all categories of persons, and distributions of resources on the basis of merit and performance (universalism) as opposed to ascribed categorical-unit memberships (particularism). Of course, meta-ideologies of this nature do not completely eradicate the cultural basis for prejudice and discrimination, but they do make it more difficult for actors to sustain consolidated parameters over the long run or to increase consolidation in the short run, especially when social movement organizations can build a counter-belief system around the failure of a society to live up to its values, particularly those enshrined in the ideologies of dominant domains.

Highly stratified societies can use the meta-ideology built from the coercive/administrative bases of *power*, *influence* from repressive law, perhaps *sacredness/piety* from religion, and regulated markets to legitimate inequalities and stratification. In so doing, stratification and the institutional arrangement that generate and sustain the class system can endure. And the more stratified is this system, the more likely will the meta-ideology legitimate discrimination and the resulting consolidation of categorical-unit parameters with class locations. Yet, over the long run, this kind of system will evidence rigidities that make it less capable of dealing with institutional changes from the outside, such as those in the geo-economic and geopolitical systems surrounding a society or the eventual internal mobilization by the victims of discrimination. For example, few predicted the 2011 wave of protests in the Middle East that began with the earlier revolt in Tunisia and spread to Egypt and beyond to Libya, Jordan, and Syria, but the resentments of individuals had been increasing for many decades, and the existing political authority proved less capable of managing revolt, except by coercion that, when the revolt is sufficiently widespread, often fails. Still, for long periods of time (decades), the meta-ideology can work to maintain high levels of stratification, which inevitably increases levels of consolidation of parameters with resource-distributing corporate units in key institutional domains and with the class structure of the stratification system.

### Normative systems and categorical-unit dynamics

Institutional norms are the general expectations for how individuals, corporate units, and, if salient, members of categorical units should act and interact within and between institutional domains. These normative systems bring evaluative tenets of ideologies and meta-ideologies as well as the systems of beliefs that have been drawn from these (e.g., prejudices, devaluations of

members of categorical units, and status beliefs about the characteristics of persons) to the level of interaction in corporate and categorical units. Norms give more specific “instructions” for individuals as they seek to normalize encounters embedded in corporate and categorical units.

When norms are consistent with ideologies and meta-ideologies that legitimate inequalities and the formation of prejudicial beliefs that legitimate discrimination against visible members of devalued categorical units, consolidation of parameters with resource-distributing corporate units and locations in the divisions of labor of these units increases. Moreover, consolidation of devalued categorical units with lower-class locations in the stratification system and, at times, in small resource niches in the middle classes will also increase, as is the case with “middle-man minorities” (Bonacich 1973; Turner and Bonacich 1980). If norms are more ambiguous or even somewhat contradictory to general ideologies and meta-ideologies, then discrimination will be less evident and consolidation may be mitigated. And, over time, this slippage at the normative level can serve as a wedge for the emergence of a social movement organization at the micro level that, eventually, leads to corporate-unit organization at the meso level which, if sufficiently widespread, can alter the culture and structure of institutional domains and stratification systems at the macro level of social organization.

When general ideologies and meta-ideologies do not sanction inequalities and formation of prejudicial beliefs and stigmatizing status beliefs, normative systems are likely to be far less restrictive and allow far more latitude when individuals normalize interactions at the level of the encounter. Discrimination by individuals and corporate units can still occur and be justified by prejudicial beliefs. Yet, when these are not fully supported by the moral premises in ideologies and meta-ideologies, they can serve to arouse emotions to the point mobilizing individuals to join social movement organizations that use the lofty moral tenets of ideologies and meta-ideologies to form a social movement ideology. For example, the Civil Rights movement in the United States was fueled by anger and frustration of those subject to long-term discrimination and negative stereotyping that legitimated discrimination, but the movement could use the egalitarian tenets of value premises as instantiated in the ideology legitimating polity as a means to recruit both devalued and valorized members of various categorical units to the cause. In essence, the supporters of ethnic oppression could be demonized by the very ideologies and meta-ideologies that had previously been used to stigmatize African Americans. Thus, whenever norms that directly constrain normalizing of encounters are at variance with general moral tenets enshrined in ideologies and meta-ideologies, cultural spaces and opportunities open up for conflict mobilization.

In sum, then, macro-level environments impose constraints on meso dynamics (as was outlined in Chap. 2). In particular, they push for either consolidation or intersections of parameters. When the macro-level socio-cultural environments favor or even push for intersections of parameters, higher rates of interaction among members of different categorical units in diverse corporate units across institutional domains generally reduce the salience of categorical-unit memberships and the prejudicial stereotypes, devaluations, and stigmatizing beliefs that justify the discrimination that inevitably increases consolidation of parameters, and structural barriers to access to resource-distributing corporate units. When the environment constrains actors in ways that consolidate parameters and reinforce discrimination, tensions are more likely to accumulate, and over the long haul, conflict will eventually erupt.

Macro-level environments, however, are not the only environments in which meso dynamics operate. Consolidation or intersections ultimately transpire at the micro, face-to-face level, creating a micro-sociocultural environment from the experiences of individuals in chains of interaction in encounters within corporate units. Just what transpires at the level of encounters and builds up into regularized patterns of discrimination begins at, and is sustained by, discriminatory interactions in encounters. These patterns of interaction are legitimated by status beliefs pulled from (a) prejudicial stereotypes, (b) selective and biased interpretations of ideologies in key institutional domains, (c) cultures of corporate units in diverse domains, and (d) meta-ideologies legitimating stratification. And as cultural systems are used to build up institutional domains and stratification systems, and as they persistently arouse negative emotions at the level of the encounter among those subject to discrimination, tensions will increase and, eventually, lead individuals to resist degradations at the level of the encounter.

## **Micro-level Environments and Categorical-Unit Dynamic**

Micro-level dynamics revolve around individuals seeking to meet transactional needs through status taking and making, role taking and making, culture taking and making (normalizing) in encounters. On the basis of their success in these endeavors in encounters, individuals will experience either negative or positive emotions. From these activities in all the many encounters embedded in corporate and categorical units, a micro-level sociocultural environment is generated and, once in place, this environment constrains actions and interactions at the meso level. This environment is, however, more charged with emotions, and as a consequence, it can become unstable

and volatile if micro processes consistently arouse negative emotional energy. And once this “negative charge” in the environment is present, it can have very large effects on meso-level processes, and especially so for categoric-unit dynamics.

### *Transactional Needs and Categorical-Unit Dynamics*

As I have emphasized, I see all interaction in encounters as driven by five need states: (1) verification of identities, (2) profits in exchanges of resources, (3) group inclusion, (4) trust, and (5) facticity. This listing is also the rank-ordering of these need states by their relative power to drive interaction. Need states are constant source of motivational energy in encounters, regardless of other motivational states that may also drive individuals. When need states are met, individuals experience varying types and valences of positive emotions, whereas when they are not realized, individuals feel a variety of potential negative emotions. Since emotions are also energy, the combination of need states and emotional reactions to success or failure in meeting these needs represents a large portion of the energy that motivates individuals and, in turn, that drives meso-level dynamics.

**Needs to Verify Identities and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** Identities operate at four levels: core identity, social identity, group identity, and role identity (see Fig. 3.2 on p. 95). Each of these can be salient in encounters or, more typically, several are on the line when individuals interact. The need to verify *social identities* revolves around individuals’ efforts to have their membership in a categoric unit(s) affirmed by others. In the case of verification of social identities, others must (a) acknowledge categoric-unit membership if it is relevant and (b) offer at least a neutral and, even better, a positive evaluation of this membership. Since social identities almost always include elements of core identity and role identities, and perhaps even group identities, verification of social identities also has effects on the verification of other identities. When a social identity and all of the other identities interwoven into this identity are verified in a minimal way, individuals will experience satisfaction. And if a positive evaluation of this identity is evident in the responses of others, then more intense positive emotions are experienced.

When social identities or memberships in categoric units defining self are consolidated with other categoric units, members of categoric units with higher levels of evaluation are likely to have presentations of a social identities verified by others, thereby arousing positive emotions. If, however, membership in a particular categoric unit is devalued, presentation of the

social identity tied to this membership is more problematic. Others may accept the identity, *per se*, but they may not be willing to communicate a positive view of this identity. At best, they may only offer neutral responses and, at worst, signal the negative evaluation to anyone who is a member of a categorical unit and who presents this as a salient social identity. And if this social identity and the underlying categorical-unit membership are consolidated with other devalued categorical units, such as lower-class position in the stratification system, others may be even more reluctant to offer a positive evaluation.

When consolidation is high among members of valued and devalued categorical units and when these evaluations are also consolidated with locations in resource-distributing corporate units, individuals will tend to have high rates of interaction with those in similarly ranked categorical units. As a result, social identities are likely to be verified and evaluated positively, with the result that members of like-categorical units will experience and express positive emotions to each other. Indeed, “birds of a feather tend to flock together” not only because of discrimination and consolidation of parameters but also from the likelihood that fellow devalued and valued categorical-unit members are almost always willing to verify their respective social identities. The positive emotions that are aroused from mutual verification of social (and other) identities by fellow categorical-unit members operate as a conservative force in societies because individuals often self-segregate themselves and thus voluntarily consolidate parameters and locations in corporate units because it is more emotionally gratifying to do so.

Even in interactions among individuals from differentially evaluated categorical units, individuals are always aware of the potential for negative emotional arousal, such as *anger* and potential violence, and thus, they will generally try to offer at least a neutral if not mildly positive evaluation like acceptance, thereby enabling a person in a devalued categorical unit to experience mild positive emotions. In highly stratified societies, however, others may feel that it is not necessary to verify a person’s social identity in even this minimal way. Such systems of stratification almost always consolidate other parameters with class position, and people may be reluctant to offer positive evaluations for a social identity for fear of offering positive evaluations of other devalued categorical-unit memberships. The result is that resentments by those who have not been able to receive acknowledgement of, and positive sentiments toward, their social identities will experience *resentment* and *anger* over many iterated encounters, and this anger will increase if the failure to verify a social identity is coupled with lack of access to resource-distributing corporate units and/or positions in these units’ respective divisions of labor. The consequence is for negative emotions to take on more intense valences.

In contrast, in societies with more open stratification systems, and especially those that distribute resources through free markets, the rates of mobility are sufficiently high to reduce consolidation of parameters and, in fact, are likely to promote more intersection of parameters. Intersection and high rates of interaction among people in diverse categorical units will, over time, lower the salience of categorical-unit memberships in general, thus reducing the potential for intense negative emotional reactions. Moreover, intersections and higher rates of interaction make others far more likely to verify a social identity, if on the line, and to offer positive assessments of this identity. Thus, it becomes more likely that individuals will experience positive emotions, and if other identities were interwoven with the presentation to others of a social identity, the sense of verification and positive evaluation will increase the level of positive emotions. Furthermore, since intersections reduce consolidation of even a devalued membership in categorical units, others will be more willing to offer a positive evaluation of social identities, without seeing this positive evaluation as disrupting the hierarchical status order in either corporate units or in the class structure of the stratification system. And as individuals consistently have their social identities verified positively, the emotional energy in the environment of meso units will be positive, although failing to meet other need states or disruptions to other micro-dynamic processes can overwhelm this positive emotional environment.

**Profitable Exchange Payoffs and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** Individuals need to feel that they have made a profit in the exchange of resources in encounters. As I emphasized in Chap. 3, however, the perception of profit depends upon a number of implicit comparisons: cost/investments relative to rewards, cost/investments of self relative to the cost/investments of others, shares of resources received relative to what would be considered a just or fair share, resources received in one situation compared to perceptions of the resources to be gained in alternative situations, and comparison of shares received with a sense for the overall distribution of these resources in a society. Thus, individuals reveal expectations for profits that are calibrated against some or all of these comparison points, and the more these expectations for profits are realized, the more profit a person feels that he or she has received, and the more positive will emotional reactions be. Conversely, the more expectations cause a person to believe that they have failed to make a profit, the more negative will be their emotional responses.

The relationship of these comparison processes and the emotional reactions that they produce are complicated by either the consolidation or intersection of parameters defining categorical memberships. Members of devalued categorical units, especially when consolidated with other devalued

units, may have dramatically lowered expectations for what would constitute a profit, depending upon which comparison points are used to make this assessment. Yet, if there is less consolidation and if devalued categorical-unit members have at least perceptions that they can be mobile, then their expectations may rise, and even if they receive a profit (resources received less cost/investments), they may not perceive that such is the case if they use comparison points that raise expectations. These same dynamics also affect members of more valued categorical units; high levels of intersection raise their expectations too high, and consolidation of positively evaluated parameters can also have the same effect if valued categorical-unit members perceive that consolidation automatically ensures a *higher* payoff when, in fact, it does not.

Comparisons can also be affected by ideologies and status beliefs that can raise or lower expectations for members of valued and devalued categorical units. Ideologies and meta-ideologies that emphasize freedom, opportunities, individual rights, and mobility will raise expectations, often beyond what can be accomplished by members of categorical units, whether valued or devalued, whereas ideologies built around domination and control by central authorities lower expectations for resources, which may lead people to experience sadness but will diminish their anger. Similarly, meta-ideologies legitimating stratification have this same effect, holding out opportunities for upward mobility without providing clear avenues to be mobile (Merton 1968). Structural properties of institutional domains and the stratification system can have much the same effect on expectations. Market-driven societies tend to raise expectations for all categorical-unit members in all domains since markets will penetrate most domains outside of economy and open (or at least appear to open) up opportunities for mobility. Moreover, open stratification systems where some class mobility is evident will often raise expectations about members of categorical units to realize new opportunities that are created in markets. In contrast, in less market-driven societies with high levels of domination and with high levels of stratification, expectations for all members of categorical units are likely to be low.

Just how to calculate the outcomes of all of these interacting conditions is not easy, but as a general rule, the more expectations for resource shares rise, the more likely are these expectations for profitable payoffs to go unrealized by members of categorical units, and hence, the more negative will their emotional experiences in at least some situations in corporate units in institutional domains. In contrast, the more expectations remain low, the more likely will they be realized, although individuals may not feel even *satisfaction* but instead negative emotions like *sadness*. Moreover, the nature of the resources gained or lost relative to expectations can also have large effects on people's sense of realizing a profit. For members of

categoric units that are not consolidated with other categoric units or with locations in corporate units, expectations for profits will probably be too high in at least some domains, whereas for members of devalued categoric units where consolidation of devalued categoric units with each other and with limited access to corporate units and their division of labor are more likely to have lowered expectations because their comparison point is likely to be resource shares received by their fellow devalued categoric-unit members. In fact, these lowered expectations among members of consolidated and devalued categoric units represent a conservative force against the *anger* that arises when raised expectations are not realized. Indeed, one of the critical goals of ideological mobilization by social movement organizations is to change the comparison points of those categoric units being mobilized so that their expectations are higher relative to their present situation. In this way, the *anger* that is aroused can provide the energy for the social movement.

**Group Inclusion and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** Members of devalued categoric units are far more likely than those in valued units to have experienced a sense of not being part of the interpersonal flow in encounters within corporate units. As a result, they will have accumulated a larger reservoir of negative emotions—*anger, disappointment, sadness, fear, alienation, shame, and even guilt*—than those in more valued categoric units. Moreover, it is likely that those who have not felt a sense of group inclusion will have failed to verify as least one level of self, especially a social identity tied to categoric-unit membership. They may have their categoric-unit membership recognized and, in fact, used to snub them, and without a corresponding inclusion in the interpersonal flow, it is difficult to feel that a social identity, along with other identities tied to a social identity, has been positively evaluated. This sense of exclusion will increase to the extent that a member of a categoric unit must interact consistently with members of more valued categoric units, and while there may be a tendency for the salience of categoric units to decline with repeated interactions, if these interactions do not produce a full sense of group inclusion, then they arouse negative emotions tied to a sense of exclusion. Moreover, exchange payoffs will not be seen as meeting expectations, while identities will not be seen as being evaluated in a positive way. The consequence is a diffuse set of negative emotions that generate tensions in social relations and that, under certain conditions, can lead to the creation of social movement organizations or to spontaneous outbursts of collective anger.

If parameters marking categoric-unit memberships are so consolidated that there are high degrees of segregation in corporate units between

members of valued and devalued categorical units, then interaction with fellow members of categorical units will increase the sense of group inclusion, and as a consequence, it will be more likely that individuals will meet other needs for verification of social identities and profits in exchange of resources. Thus, negative emotional arousal will decline, to some degree, as a result of meeting this fundamental need state. Still, segregation will almost always generate a larger sense of exclusion, especially from access to valued resources, and will thus arouse negative emotions as more general distributions of resources in corporate units or in the society as a whole are used by segregated members as comparison points in assessing if their shares of resources are just or fair.

**Trust and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** Trust is a need state to perceive that self is treated with dignity and respect, that others are being sincere, that the action of others is predictable, and that interaction is in rhythm. Failure to meet any of these elements of trust, but especially the first one on being treated with dignity, also means that needs to verify self and received profits in exchange will go unmet. And, reciprocally, the failure to meet needs to verify self or realize profits in exchange payoffs will erode a sense of trust group inclusion.

When needs for trust are met, it becomes more likely that other need state will be realized, but consummation of the need for trust would have to occur early in encounters or be built up over time in iterated encounters to increase the sense that identities are verified and that needs for profitable payoffs and group inclusion have been or are likely to be realized. Trust thus generally adds additional weight to people's sense that the most important need states—verification of identities, profitable exchange payoffs, and group inclusion—have been realized. Since violation of trust activates *anger* and, at times, *fear*, the failure to realize this need can add a considerable amount of negative energy to the environments of meso-level units. It is far more likely that individuals in devalued categorical units, particularly units that are consolidated with other devalued units and to lower-level positions in corporate units, will experience a lack of trust, and thus, they will be likely to feel negative emotions. In contrast, members of more valued categorical units are less likely to fail in meeting the need for trust across all encounters. Perhaps in a few encounters, members of valued categorical units will experience a lack of trust, but it is unlikely that they will consistently feel this way, thus reducing their anger to particular encounters compared to members of devalued units that are consolidated with each other and low-status positions, where the sense of distrust is cumulative across a wide range of situations and, hence, is more chronic, extensive, and diffuse.

**Facticity and Categorical-Unit Dynamics.** People need to sense that “things are as they appear” in a situation, that for the purposes at hand, they are experiencing the situation in similar ways with others, and that they have achieved as sense of intersubjectivity. Failure to meet these needs for facticity is far more likely for members of devalued categorical units, especially when they must interact with members of more valued categorical units. There is, then, more comfort in meeting needs for facticity when members of equivalent categorical units interact, which encourages consolidation of parameters rather than movements toward increased intersection of parameters marking valued and devalued categorical-unit memberships. Thus, while the need for facticity is the least powerful, it too can operate as a conservative force because it encourages intra- over intercategorical-unit interaction.

### *Status and Categorical-Unit Dynamics*

Membership in a categorical unit is a *diffuse status characteristic* (Berger et al. 1977; Webster and Foschi 1988) that individuals carry with them by virtue of parameters marking their membership. The other form of status as a location in the division of labor of a corporate will, at times, consolidate or, alternatively, intersect with diffuse status characteristics. For both forms of status, there will be expectation states for how individuals possessing diffuse status characteristics or locations in divisions of labor should behave, and if individuals perform in accordance with these expectations, the status order is reinforced. If, however, individuals fail to not meet expectation states, then negative emotions will be aroused, and the encounters in which these failures have occurred will, to varying degrees, be breached. Individuals will have to renegotiate their expectations for each other.

As I emphasized in Vol. 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*, clarity of status is critical in avoiding such breaches, although there is no guarantee that this alone can ensure that breaches will not occur. Indeed, when members of categorical units become resentful of their devalued status, breaches at the level of encounters in corporate units can increase, sometimes to the point of conflict. Still, despite this conflict potential, individuals in all interactions status-take to determine the locations of others in the divisions of labor of corporate units and to assess relevant diffuse status characteristics or memberships in categorical units; in so doing, they have a better understanding of how to status-make in order to present their status to others. There are often “games of micro-politics,” to use Clark’s (1987,

1990) terminology, as individuals jockey to enhance their status vis-à-vis others. Yet there are limits to what can be done because of established expectation states that apply (a) to locations in divisions of labor, especially positions differentiated by authority and prestige, and (b) to members of categorical units.

The key status affecting categorical-unit dynamics revolve around (1) the clarity of markers denoting membership, (2) the explicitness of the status beliefs for members of categorical units, (3) the level of moral evaluation contained in status beliefs, (4) the extent to which broader ideologies and meta-ideologies are part of this moral evaluation, (5) the degree of consolidation or intersection among differentially evaluated categorical units, (6) the number of institutional domains where consolidation or intersection of differentially evaluated categorical units with resource-distributing corporate units, and (7) the degree consolidation or intersection among members of differentially evaluated categorical units with locations in the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor of corporate units in which institutional domains exist. Let me review each of these dynamic processes.

**(1) Markers of Categorical-Unit Memberships.** The more visible are the markers of categorical membership, the more status taking will initially place individuals into a categorical unit and the more likely the accompanying status beliefs will be evoked. Markers of categorical-unit membership, such as visible parameters like skin color, parameters supplemented by visible objects, props and demeanors, graduated parameters converted into quasi-nominal parameters, and high levels of evaluation (whether positive or negative) in status beliefs accompanying categorical membership, all increase the clarity of membership in a categorical unit. And the greater the clarity of these markers, the more will status taking and making be constrained. Even when the salience of memberships declines, under conditions to be enumerated below, there is still an awareness of membership when markers are clear. For example, people do not forget to notice gender or skin color, even when conditions operate to reduce the salience of membership and the status beliefs associated with memberships. Gestalt processes of *contrast-conceptions* still operate, but the power of status beliefs accompanying these dynamics is reduced to the point that they do not greatly influence the flow of interaction.

Members of society that is highly stratified, that evidences discrimination in most institutional domains, that reveals high levels of consolidation of parameters with incumbency in different types of resource-distributing categorical units, and that reveals high levels of consolidation of categorical-unit memberships with locations in their respective divisions of labor will normatively require individuals to “discover” categorical-unit memberships,

even when markers are not clear. To fail in doing so might lead to disruption of the status order. Yet, once parameters become consolidated with locations in stratification and access to corporate units, there are almost always some markers of memberships—for example, clothing, demeanor, and speech—to mark people off as distinctive. If these kinds of minimal markers are not evident, it will be difficult in the long run to sustain a nominal categorical unit because individuals can learn how to dress, carry themselves, and speak in ways that disguise membership. In the case of graduated parameters—for example, income, education, wealth—it is often difficult to determine exactly where on the graduated parameter individuals are located, unless there is some consolidation with nominal characteristics (e.g., skin color), locations (e.g., neighborhoods in communities), or demeanors that are difficult to emulate. This ambiguity often leads individuals to convert a graduated into nominal parameter (e.g., wealthy–poor, educated–uneducated) in order to simplify status taking. Yet, if markers are still not definitive, then individuals can often escape notice as members of a devalued categorical unit, which as we will see, changes the dynamics of categorical units.

**(2) Clarity of Status Beliefs.** When markers of categorical-unit membership are clear, then status beliefs about members will also tend to be unambiguous. Equally important, when status beliefs are derived from prejudicial beliefs used to justify discrimination, status beliefs will take on even more clarity and intensity. If status beliefs are derived from, and incorporate clear tenets of, institutional ideologies or meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system, they once again increase in clarity. If memberships in categorical units are consolidated with equivalently valued categorical units, the evaluative component of status beliefs not only becomes clear but also becomes more relevant and powerful. And if categorical-unit membership is consolidated with class locations in a more linear system of class ranks, then the evaluative component of the meta-ideology legitimating stratification will be evident in status beliefs. The converse of all of these conditions does just the opposite: clarity of status beliefs declines and the evaluative component disappears or becomes less significant part of these status beliefs.

**(3) Moral Evaluation.** Status beliefs associated with categorical-unit membership almost always carry a moral evaluation. If the moral evaluation is high, then individuals will be able to experience deference, prestige, and positive emotions, whereas if the moral evaluation is low, members will have to give deference, live with stigma, and experience negative emotions in at least those contexts where categorical membership is salient. High and low moral evaluations lead individuals to redouble their status taking and making to be sure that they know who is morally valued and who is not.

Status making by members of stigmatized categorical units will be circumspect and directed as de-emphasizing their memberships so that the low evaluation of a categorical unit will not force members to give too much deference, live with stigma, or experience such powerful negative emotions as *shame*. Among individuals in categorical units between these extremes of high and low moral evaluation, there is considerably more room for negotiation, and in fact, status in the divisions of labor in corporate units may be an easier route to maintaining dignity; in this case, status locations in the division of labor or incumbency in the corporate unit as a whole may become the default status framework for implicit negotiations over individuals' relative moral worth. For when categorical-unit memberships are neither high nor low, it is often too much trouble or too emotionally complex to establish the proper moral tone; it is far easier to simply use status locations in divisions of labor or the corporate unit as a whole to establish a workable moral tone to the interaction because expectation states attached to positions in divisions of labor are typically specified by formal and informal norms that are understood by all.

**(4) Ideologies and Meta-Ideologies.** As noted above, when status beliefs are derived from ideologies of institutional domains or meta-ideologies, particularly meta-ideologies that legitimate stratification, the evaluation implicit in status beliefs becomes more explicit. Because ideologies and meta-ideologies instantiate highly general value premises in evaluative symbols tied to social structures, status beliefs drawn from them take on an even more powerful moral character. If status beliefs are drawn from a particular institutional ideology, then these beliefs can often legitimate discrimination against devalued members of categorical units, whether in limiting access to corporate units or in delimiting access to higher locations in their hierarchical divisions of labor. The result is, of course, increased consolidation of membership in devalued units with access to corporate units and locations in their divisions of labor.

When status beliefs are drawn from the meta-ideologies legitimating inequalities and the stratification system as a whole (i.e., class formation, linear rank-ordering of classes, and low rates of interclass mobility), the moral evaluation is more diffuse; it is no longer tied to a particular domain but to all domains and virtually all encounters. The result is that discrimination can be legitimated in *almost all institutional domains* and *all corporate units* in these domains—save, perhaps, for kinship (although, as was noted earlier, slavery in the American south could even deny individuals access to nuclear family corporate units making up the kinship institutional domain). Thus, the more stratified a society and the more categorical-unit memberships is consolidated with high and low locations in the class system, and the

more classes are rank-ordered in terms of their moral worth, the greater will be the moral evaluation of other categorical-unit memberships consolidated with the class structure.

**(5) Consolidation and Intersection of Categorical Units.** The more consolidated are graduated parameters with high and low evaluations of nominal parameters marking categorical-unit memberships, the more salient will these memberships be and the more likely will status beliefs be highly salient in contacts between members of differentially evaluated categorical units. However, in interactions among individuals within high-and low-evaluation categorical units or in sets of units that are consolidated, status beliefs become important; individuals can interact in a more relaxed and personal manner since sustaining the status order is not on the line. For this reason, individuals will often seek to interact with fellow categorical-unit members or sets of members in consolidated units to avoid at least some of the intensity of games of *micro politics* (Clark 1987, 1990). Consolidation of categorical-unit memberships with ranked class locations creates more opportunities to interact with members of one's own set of consolidated categorical units, plus an incentive to do so in order to avoid the tensions that always exist in intercategorical-unit interaction between members of higher-and lower-ranking categorical units. And if categorical-unit memberships are also consolidated with access to corporate units and to divisions of labor in these units, then the intracategorical-unit bias is that much greater.

On the one hand, intra-unit interaction is more relaxing, but since consolidation of parameters marking categorical-unit memberships is almost always an outcome of discrimination, those in low-ranking categorical units are likely to perceive the distribution of resources as unfair, and hence, intraunit interactions among members of devalued units are also likely to involve shared expressions of grievances and frustrations. One potential outcome, then, of intra-unit interactions is (a) the articulation of new beliefs that challenge demeaning status beliefs, (b) the arousal of mobilizing emotions such as *anger* and even *vengeance*, and eventually, (c) the emergence of leaders who begin to organize individuals into social movement corporate units. Among members of more valued categorical units, and particularly with high levels of consolidation with ranked classes and corporate units in domains where highly valued resources are unequally distributed, interactions will often reinforce status beliefs about their superiority and the inferiority of those in devalued units, thereby reinforcing prejudicial beliefs that legitimate continued discrimination.

This kind of polarization of beliefs and the emotions behind them can set up potential conflict that can often turn violent. This potential for violence can be mitigated, however, by higher rates of mobility, lower rank-ordering

of classes, and ambiguous boundaries among the middle classes that intersect with these polarizing forces between valued and devalued categorical units, especially if consolidation is not carried through these middle classes and the corporate units (and their divisions of labor) distributing resources to these more amorphous middle classes.

**(6) Consolidation and Intersections with Corporate Units.** Intersections of parameters, especially among nominal and graduated parameters in corporate units, will eventually break down the power of status beliefs about members of categorical units. At first, intersections may create a certain tension in status making and taking, but as rates of interaction among diverse individuals across a range of corporate units increase, the differential evaluation of members of categorical units will decrease, and the salience of status in the divisions of labor of corporate units or of neighborhoods in community corporate units will increase.

Still, these effects of intersections between categorical and corporate units are influenced by how pervasive they are across the full range of institutional domains. If, for example, intersections only occur in economic corporate units, while communities reveal consolidation by categorical-unit membership (i.e., segregation), then consolidation in other types of corporate units—schools, churches, recreational facilities—will occur, thereby undoing some of the effects of intersection in one domain. And if consolidation extends to political parties, access to law (whether as an employee or litigant), or kinship (i.e., low rates of intercategory marriage), the erosion of the benefits from intersection is that much greater. Thus, the more intersections of categorical-unit memberships with corporate units extend across all types of corporate units in all institutional domains, the greater are the effects of intersection on increasing rates of intercategory-unit interaction. And with increased rates of intercategory-unit interaction at diverse locations in all types of corporate units in all domains, the less important to individuals will categorical-unit memberships become and the less power will status beliefs have in setting up expectation states for individuals from diverse categorical units.

Still, those who are members of traditionally devalued categorical units will have an extra tension-management burden to carry because of previous stigmatizing status beliefs, especially if those in traditionally valued categorical units are perceived to be patronizing. When individuals of distinctive categorical units intersect in corporate units in key domains such as economy, polity, law, and education but then self-consolidate themselves with fellow categorical members in corporate units of other domains (e.g., religion, kinship, and recreation) as well as in neighborhoods in community corporate units, then self-consolidation is a sign of lingering tensions in those units

where intersection has occurred. Nonetheless, intersection increases rates of interaction and breaks down much of the intensity in the morality of status beliefs, especially when categorical-unit memberships intersect in the full spectrum of locations of the divisions of labor among key resource-distributing corporate units in domains such as economy, education, polity, and law.

**(7) Intersections and Consolidation of Categorical Units with Divisions of Labor of Corporate Units.**

It is possible to have high rates of intersection with corporate units but still have high levels of consolidation with their respective divisions of labor. For example, members of devalued categorical units can gain access to corporate units in economy, education, recreation, law, politics, and religion, but discrimination can still determine how high they are located in the respective divisions of labor of these units. Moreover, there still may exist consolidation by types of corporate units within domains as a result of access to neighborhoods (because of income, discrimination, or self-selection), with the result that members of valued and devalued categorical units go to different churches and schools, while living in segregated neighborhoods. Indeed, this is a very common pattern when intersections are only partial. Thus, without successive penetration of intersections across the full range of locations in all corporate units in a society, the power of intersections to reduce the salience of categorical-unit memberships is limited, with the consequence that status beliefs and expectation states for members of differentially valued categorical units will persist. But the more intersections occur not only at the corporate-unit level but also across their respective divisions of labor, the more will higher rates of face-to-face interaction decrease the power of status beliefs. As this kind of intersection occurs, the ideologies of each domain are used to valorize all members of corporate units, especially those at the higher-level positions that distribute power, prestige, and income. And as intersection becomes evident at these higher levels, consolidation of categorical-unit memberships with class locations declines and, if this decline is complete, is replaced by intersections of classes and diverse categorical-unit members that are more proportionate to the latter's numbers in the total population. With high rates of interaction among diverse individuals, status beliefs cannot receive the consistent support necessary for their persistence, and in fact, if they are persistently challenged, they change or even go away (Ridgeway 2001).

Yet, if stigmatizing beliefs are not consistently challenged, then they may endure and cause the tensions that come with people feeling devalued. And if members of categorical unit chose to self-select out of possible intersections and resegregate themselves in homogeneous neighborhoods and, hence, schools, kin units, churches, and recreational facilities, then consis-

tent challenges to status beliefs will decline, and remnants of traditional and often stigmatizing status beliefs will persist. As a result, tensions will remain and often be carried back to locations in divisions of labor of corporate and categorical units intersect, and as this occurs, the salience of categorical-unit memberships, even in situations where high intersection exists, will persist. And this persistence in the face of intersections generates extra tensions as people experience an increased sense of relative deprivation as they compare patterns of consolidation of categorical and corporate units with intersections in other institutional domains. Even when people have self-selected themselves into a pattern of consolidated parameters, the tensions that forced them to do so still exist and are piled on top of the sense of deprivation that comes with consolidation in the midst of widespread intersections of parameters.

### ***Roles and Categorical-Unit Dynamics***

As part of their cultural repertoire, individuals hold conceptions of roles in their implicit stocks of knowledge (Schutz 1967 [1932]), and they use these stocks to role-make a line of behavior in a situation that they hope others can interpret and verify through role taking and scanning their stocks of knowledge. Role making and taking thus involve culture taking and making to organize self-presentations and to interpret the syndromes of gestures emitted by others that are “presumed” to mark a given role (Turner 1962, 2001). Moreover, individuals also engage in status making and taking because the location of individuals as incumbents in the divisions of labor of corporate units or as members of categorical units provides additional information about the range of roles that are available for role making, thereby making role taking easier by delimiting the range of roles that people must search for in their stocks of knowledge. Additionally, demographic cues and the ecology of the situation also provide important clues to what roles can be played in an encounter.

On the one hand, role taking and making are dependent upon culture taking and making, status taking and making, and attention to the ecology and demography of the situation, but on the other hand, role making can provide essential cues that facilitate culture taking (and subsequent culture making), status taking (and making), and interpretations of what situational ecology and demography “mean.” Roles are sequences of overt behavior that are presumed by individuals to constitute a syndrome of gestures marking an identifying role. R. Turner (1962) termed this presumption of consistency the “folk norm of consistency,” but I would argue that this folk norm

is, in reality, another Gestalt process wired in the human brain to seek patterns and consistency among cognitive elements. Behavior is visible and hence an important signal about what elements of culture, status, ecology, and demography are relevant to an interaction, and thus, other microdynamics are dependent upon individuals' ability to successfully role-make and role-take and to verify each other's roles. In doing so, individuals can understand how they are to go about meeting transactional needs, how they are to normalize the situation, how status constrains the situation, especially by the embedding of status in corporate and categorical units. They can better interpret and use props, spaces, territories, and portals in situational ecology. And these role cues can be used to make sense of situational demography by discerning meanings communicated by the number of people copresent, their density, their distribution among categorical units, their locations in corporate units, and their movement in and through space.

Moreover, roles can become a resource that is used consciously or unconsciously for strategic purposes to present a particular kind of self, to change expectations for behaviors, to dictate how situations will be normalized, to change status or to dilute the salience of status, and to achieve many other potential outcomes (Callero 1994; Baker and Faulkner 1991). Because behavior is too visible and serves as a set of clues about all other micro-dynamic processes, roles can be the vehicle by which individuals become strategic agents and use role cues to control, manipulate, change, or otherwise influence what transpires during the course of interactions embedded in corporate and categorical units.

When the parameters defining categorical-unit membership are highly visible (e.g., skin color, gender, eye fold), these alone can cue expectation states (and underlying status beliefs) and, hence, the relevant roles that members of a categorical unit can be expected to play. If there is consolidation of membership in categorical units with specific locations in divisions of labor of corporate units, then individuals are even more aware of the expectations for roles—a mix of expectations association with status and diffuse status characteristics. If there are intersections of memberships in categorical units and status in divisions of labor, then expectation states for members of categorical units will not be as strong, but they will still constrain *how* people play the role associated with status in the division of labor. I invoked the concept of *trans-situational roles* in Vol. 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (Turner 2010a, b, c, d: 40–41) to emphasize that members of categorical units are still expected to reveal behaviors that meet expectation states and that affirm status beliefs. For example, in the same location in the division of labor in a corporate unit, males, females, members of ethnic groups, and older or younger individuals will all play their role with a style

that meets expectation states for their respective categorical-unit memberships. However, over time as intersections persist, these expectation states will decline in power, with the result that the normative expectations attached to status in the division of labor of corporate units will become ever-more salient, often to the point where categorical-unit memberships are hardly noticed. For instance, over the last 40 years, I have noticed that gender has become virtually irrelevant in higher-level administrative positions at my university, with individuals playing the role in a style that is not so much based on gender but on other personality characteristics and, more importantly, the normative expectations attached to status locations in the hierarchical division of labor. And even though clothing and many other markers of gender differences are clearly evident, they do not cue up trans-situational roles based on expectations for members of a categorical unit. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, of members of diverse ethnic categorical units in role-playing of higher-level administrators at the university. So, with persistent intersections between categorical-unit memberships and status in divisions of labor of corporate units, status in the division of labor trumps diffuse status characteristics. In fact, upon reflection, I do not notice gender in interactions with senior administrators, whereas with students, roles are played with a style that signals the relevance of status beliefs about gender, and I do not notice the gender distribution of my classes when I look at students as a whole. In fact, it came as a surprise to me when the students in one of my classes mentioned that there was only one male in the class—something that I had not noticed for 5 weeks.

Categorical-unit formation is thus related to the extent that individuals invoke status beliefs, expectation states, and trans-situational roles reinforcing expectation states. The more the categorical-unit formation consolidates with types of corporate units in institutional domains, with specific types of locations in divisions of labor of corporate, and with class locations in the stratification, the greater will be the power of expectation states for categorical-unit memberships and locations in social structures. The correlation among structural location and categorical-unit memberships raises the salience of status beliefs and expectation states, pushing individuals to invoke the appropriate trans-situational role that reinforces status beliefs.

If this correlation increases inequalities in shares of valued resources, then those categorical-unit members who receive fewer resources will experience negative emotions and be disposed to play roles in ways that violate expectation states, if they can, while those who receive higher levels of resources will have an interest in sustaining the status order that favors them. When there is a society-wide system of domination in which virtually all social relations among members of valued and devalued categorical units (and locations

in all corporate units) demand deference and demeanor rituals and behaviors that acknowledge status differences and that are enforced by negative sanctions, the role options of subordinates will be limited. They will be less able to use roles as a resource to strategically manipulate the situation. Yet, as the “shuffling” patterns in body movements and talk of African American slaves in the pre-Civil War south document, even those under intense oppression will find ways to “tweak” the system of domination with “slavish conformity” to expectation states that implicitly mocks the status order.

Still, the need to consistently show deference will, over time, increase resentments and anger (often repressed) that can become a volatile force, when released. And in societies where domination is not so tightly controlled, discriminatory treatment of devalued categorical-unit memberships will erupt into episodes of collective conflict. And in societies where there are intersections among some categorical units and resource-distributing corporate units and consolidations stemming from discrimination against other categorical units, then the sense of relative deprivation of those experiencing discrimination will be that much greater and will eventually become the basis for social movement organization to alter patterns of discrimination. Thus, once intersections begin to occur, those left behind will eventually mobilize to eliminate those consolidations of parameters with resource-distributing corporate units and their divisions of labor, and as changes in status beliefs and expectation states occur as discrimination is reduced, dynamics among categorical units will alter corporate units and hence institutional domains as well as resource distributions and, thus, the stratification system.

Because transactional needs must be realized by playing roles attached to status and diffuse status characteristics, roles themselves often become the point of conflict and tension. When verification of roles does not also lead to verification of key identities, to a sense of fair and reasonable profits in exchanges, or to a sense of group inclusion, the level of motivational energy among individuals forced to play roles that frustrate meeting humans’ most powerful needs eventually increases collective anger and resentment, and if large numbers of individuals have had these experiences, then their mobilization almost always leads to structural and cultural changes in a society. If people are forced to normatize each and every encounter (through culture taking and making) in accordance with status beliefs that stigmatize members of categorical units, then this collective anger will be that much greater. And if in public places they must navigate ecological space and use this space in ways that affirm the stigma imposed by status beliefs, then one more flash point of anger is added to the daily lives of devalued members of categorical units. For example, to be forced to stand aside as higher-status people walk by, to not be allowed to use certain facilities in space available

to others, or to be excluded from portions of space will all aggravate the sense of degradation and turbocharge the arousal of negative emotions. And as the micro-level environment becomes charged with negative emotions over roles, the potential for conflict increases, and as this potential rises, individuals will begin to re-role make in order to alter expectation states, status beliefs, and even the broader meta-ideology from which status beliefs are ultimately drawn.

## **Elementary Principles of Categorical-Unit Dynamics**

We are now in a position to offer several elementary principles of categorical-unit dynamics, as they unfold at the meso level of social reality. In particular, I emphasize the processes by which categorical units form in the first place and the clarity of such formations, the consolidation and intersection of parameters marking categorical units with class locations in the stratification system, the intersection and consolidation of nonclass-based parameters, the emotional arousal that accompanies the formation of categorical units in the first place and their consolidations or intersections, and the likelihood of conflict initiated by those in devalued units that have been consolidated.

1. The level of categorical-unit formation and clarity of boundaries marking this formation among members of a subpopulation in a society are:
  - A. A positive multiplicative function of the visibility of nominal parameters marking membership which, in turn, is an additive function of distinctive:
    1. Biological features
    2. Demeanor cues
    3. Markers of distinct cultures
    4. Patterns of corporate-unit affiliation markers
    5. Class memberships
  - B. A positive function of the visibility of graduated parameters marking memberships and/or the ease of converting graduated into nominal-like parameters, which is a positive function of 1-A above
  - C. A positive function of the degree to which social identities are important to individuals in a subpopulation, which in turn is a positive and multiplicative function of:
    1. The extent to which verification of core identities as well as group identities and role identities depends upon verification of social identities

2. The degree to which inter- and intracategorical interactions lead to verification of all levels of identity
- D. A positive function of the degree to which intra- and intercategorical interactions enable individuals to meet needs for profits in the exchange of resources which, in turn, is a function of:
1. Verification of social identities and other identities tied to social identities
  2. Use of realistic comparison points for assessing costs/investments to resources gained in interactions
- E. A positive function of the degree to which inter- and intracategorical interactions lead individuals to meet needs for group inclusion, which is a positive and additive function of meeting needs for:
1. Identity verification
  2. Profits from exchanges of resources
  3. A sense of trust
  4. A sense of facticity
- F. A positive function of the level of discrimination by members of high-evaluation categorical units against members of devalued categories, which is a positive multiplicative function of:
1. Visibility of parameters marking membership (1-A above)
  2. Level of perceived threat posed by members of an identifiable subpopulation to the majority of a population or to members of its dominant categorical units, which is a positive function of:
    - a. Relative size of the threatening subpopulation
    - b. Level of resources and entrepreneurial skills possessed by subpopulation
  3. The power of discriminators relative to that possessed by the targets of discrimination
  4. The capacity of discriminators to control and manipulate cultural beliefs about valued and devalued members of categorical units
- G. A positive function of the level of intensity of prejudicial beliefs about members of devalued categories identifiable subpopulation, which is a positive multiplicative function of the level of threat and discrimination (1-F above), and valorizing beliefs, derived from meta-ideologies, among those who discriminate
- H. A positive function of the degree to which status beliefs about devalued members of social categories contain negative moral evaluations

derived from prejudicial beliefs and meta-ideologies that establish restrictive expectation states or members of devalued categories

- I. Positive function of the degree of consolidation of parameters marking membership in devalued and valued social categories which is a positive function of the conditions listed in 2 below
2. The consolidation of parameters marking devalued members of categorical unit with lower-class locations in the stratification system is a positive and additive function of:
  - A. The degree of stratification which, in turn, is a multiplicative function of:
    1. The level and pervasiveness of inequality in resource distributions made by corporate units
    2. The degree of class formation at all levels of the stratification system which is a function of:
      - a. Homogeneity of class members in their resource shares
      - b. Boundaries separating classes from each other
    3. The degree of ranking of classes on a scale of moral worth, derived from the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system and the degree of consensus over this moral evaluation
    4. The barriers to interclass mobility which is a function of:
      - a. The level of resource inequality
      - b. The level of moral rank-ordering of classes
      - c. The intensity of, and consensus over, differential moral evaluations of members of all classes
  - B. The degree to which discrimination by those threatened by devalued categorical-unit members can limit the latter's access to resource-distributing corporate units and/or to lower-status locations in the divisions of labor of these units, which in turn is a positive function of:
    1. The relative power of discriminators over their targets
    2. The intensity of and consensus over:
      - a. Prejudicial beliefs about members of devalued social categories
      - b. Negative moral evaluations of members of devalued social categories
    3. Stigmatizing status beliefs about, and highly restrictive situational expectation states for members of devalued social categories

- C. The degree to which discrimination can draw upon the moral premises of ideologies and meta-ideologies and use the moral tenets in these in developing prejudicial beliefs, negative moral evaluations, stigmatizing status beliefs, and restrictive expectation states
- D. The degree to which integration of corporate units in institutional domains relies upon:
  - 1. Structural domination relying on coercive power and its administration
  - 2. Structural segregation between valued and devalued members of a society that penetrates across all types of corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities)
  - 3. Penetration of relations of domination–subjugation to encounters across all types of corporate units so that status making and taking, role making and taking, and culture taking and making (normalization) all reproduce the status order and diffuse status characteristics
- E. The degree to which discrimination can limit or reduce the integrative effects of:
  - 1. Structural segmentation to increase structural and cultural equivalences that promote intersections among parameters marking categorical-unit memberships
  - 2. Differentiation of corporate units within and between institutional domains that increase opportunities for mobility and intersections among member of diverse categorical units
  - 3. Structural interdependencies that increase intersection among members of diverse categorical units, especially discriminators that have the capacity to restrict:
    - a. Labor market exchanges through splitting labor markets and exclusions in other markets that disadvantage members of devalued categorical units
    - b. Access of devalued categorical units to the expanded divisions of labor that come with structural embedding and overlaps
    - c. Mobility of members of devalued categorical units among corporate units within and between institutional domains
- 3. The intersection of parameters marking diverse categorical-unit memberships is an inverse function of the degree of stratification and level of discrimination, while being a positive and additive function of:
  - A. The number and diversity of corporate units in differentiated institutional domains, which is multiplicative function of:

1. The size of a population
  2. The level of production
  3. The degree of reliance on free markets
  4. The rate and scope of circulation of generalized symbolic media
  5. The consolidation of power in polity around:
    - a. Use of material incentives
    - b. Ideologies and meta-ideologies emphasizing democracy, opportunities, and universalistic standards of evaluation of individuals and performances
    - c. Strategic, short-term, and episodic use of coercive power
    - d. Moderate use of administrative power and authority to monitor and regulate actions of individual and corporate actors
  6. The reliance of a positivistic and universalistic legal system to regulate interrelations among individual and corporate actors in all institutional domains
- B. The rates of interinstitutional mobility and interclass mobility, which is a positive and multiplicative function of:
1. The level of structural differentiation or heterogeneity
  2. The extensiveness of structural embedding and overlaps
  3. The level and scope of reliance on free labor markets for sorting incumbents in the divisions of labor of corporate units in diverse institutional domains
  4. The pervasiveness across institutional domains of using of educational credentials as markers of skill, learning, knowledge, and professionalism in labor markets
  5. The rate, diversity, and scope of the circulation of generalized symbolic media across institutional domains
- C. The level of consensus over and degree of integration among values, ideologies, institutional norms, and meta-ideologies emphasizing open markets, equal opportunities, and universalistic evaluations of performances in corporate units across domain consolidation of categorical-unit parameters with social class locations
4. The likelihood of conflict between members of valued and devalued categorical units is a function of the proportion of members in devalued categorical units who consistently experience negative emotional arousal in encounters within corporate units across diverse institutional domains, with this arousal being a positive and multiplicative function of:

- A. Failure to meet transactional needs in intercategory-unit interactions, which is a multiplicative function of:
    1. The inability to verify social identities embedded in category-unit memberships and all other identities tied to a social identity
    2. The inability to perceive a consistent and acceptable levels of profit in the exchanges of resources with others
    3. The inability to feel a sense of group inclusion in a high proportion of interactions in encounters within corporate units
    4. The failure to achieve a consistent sense of trust, particularly a sense of respect for self and its underlying identities, in encounter within corporate units
    5. The failure to achieve a sense of facticity, particularly a sense of intersubjectivity
  - B. Failure to culture-take and culture-make in intercategory-unit interactions in ways that meet transactional needs and that allow members of devalued category units avoid the effects of stigmatizing status beliefs and expectations states
  - C. Failure to status-take and status-make in intercategory-unit interactions in ways that enable members of devalued category units to reduce their subordination in the status order and to break the stigmatizing status beliefs tied to the diffuse status characteristics defining and evaluating category-unit memberships
  - D. Failure to role-take and role-make in intercategory-unit interactions in ways that, over time, enable individuals to use role behaviors as a resource in altering expectation states for members of a category unit
  - E. Failure to reduce the stigmatizing effects of situational ecology that restricts movements of devalued category-unit members through and their full use of props, territories, and regions of space
  - F. Failure to have the same options as members of valued category units of access to move in and out, assemble, and avoid deference demeanor in space in and around corporate units
  - G. Failure of *intracategory*-unit interactions, even when allowing individuals to successfully meet transactional needs, culture-take and culture-make, status-take and status-make, and role-take and role-make in ecological space in and around corporate units, to avoid discourse and talk about negative emotional arousal in intercategory interactions
5. The more consistent, intense, and widespread are negative emotional arousal and the conditions generating this arousal among members of devalued category units, the more likely are members of these devalued

units to mobilize for conflict, with the likelihood for conflict increasing with:

- A. Intersections of parameters are limited to corporate units within a few institutional domains, thereby increasing the sense of relative deprivation over the inability to secure resources in other institutional domains, with relative deprivation increasing with:
  - 1. Initial expansion of market mechanisms for distributing resources
  - 2. Initial weakening of traditional systems of domination by polity, law, and religion
  - 3. Initial increases in mobility of members from some devalued categoric units
  - 4. Initial formulation of more egalitarian tenets in ideologies and meta-ideologies emphasizing equality and expanded opportunities
  - 5. Initial expansion of new middle classes standing between upper and lower classes
- B. High levels of consolidation of devalued categoric-unit memberships with:
  - 1. Other devalued categoric units
  - 2. Lower-class locations in the stratification system
- C. High rates of discrimination against members of devalued categoric units in encounters in corporate units across a wide range of institutional domains
- D. Highly stigmatizing status beliefs that degrade members of devalued categoric units in a high proportion of intercategoric-unit interactions

## Conclusion

There is some overlap of the propositions above and those on categoric units in Vols. 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. There is no avoiding this in light of my theoretical strategy, outlined in Chap. 1. The propositions in this chapter focus on how both macro-level and micro-level environments influence the formation of categoric units and their dynamics. Even with the effort to include the micro- and macro-level environments of the meso level (as outlined in Chaps. 2 and 3), the focus is on the meso level. I have drawn from, but substantially revised, Blau's theory of macro structure and, in essence, converted it to a meso-level theory because I want to explain why and how categoric units form and, once formed, how they operate.

Categorical units are often part of the larger macro-level stratification system, and in fact, the dynamics outlined in this chapter seek to explain how this consolidation or intersection of categorical-unit memberships with stratification can explain not just categorical-unit dynamics but also dynamics operating at the macro-level of social reality. Categorical units naturally form around universal parameters: gender and age. And once societies grow and differentiate, new categorical units form for a number of reasons, including new types of relations with other populations, increased immigration, new classes in the expanding stratification system, and new ethnic, religious, national, or regional designations. The nature of institutional domains and stratification systems has large effects on the formation of these newer types of categorical units and on their operative dynamics, as do micro-dynamic forces. Once categorical units form and reveal patterns of intersection and consolidation with each other, with class locations, and with access to corporate units and their divisions of labor, they become additional building blocks of stratification and, through their effects on corporate units, institutional domains as well. And as Vol. 2 emphasized, categorical units always influence interaction, whether in focused or unfocused encounters, because it is a rare encounter that is not embedded in categorical units.

I have emphasized discrimination and the belief systems that legitimate this discrimination because they accelerate consolidation of parameters, and with consolidation comes negative emotional arousal that, eventually, will fuel social conflicts within a society. This fuel is generated at the micro level, but it is most likely to become manifest at the meso level. And if negative emotional arousal among members of devalued categorical units persists, it will typically increase in intensity, leading to collective behaviors and, under specifiable conditions, to the formation of corporate units devoted to change in the status beliefs about, and the patterns of discrimination against, members of devalued categorical units. And while these social movement organizations occur at the meso level, their effects are almost always on the macro and micro levels of social organization. Thus, when social change occurs, it typically begins at the meso level, whether through the action of key corporate units or members of categorical units. And when they both are involved in pushing for social change, the effects on macro structure can be dramatic, and at the micro level of social organization, the dynamics of encounters embedded in corporate and categorical units must also change.

## Chapter 5

# The Dynamics of Groups

Groups were the first type of corporate unit to evolve in human evolutionary history. Indeed, for well over 180,000 years of human existence on earth, groups were the basic organizing principle of human societies. There were, in essence, two basic groups: (1) nuclear families of parents and their offspring embedded in a larger (2) band composed of a few to many dozens of nuclear families that hunted and forged for plant sources of food. There was, perhaps, a “sense of community” or home range of persons sharing territory, culture, and language, but only with the emergence of settled hunter-gatherers did community denote geographical locations in which groups of individuals resided and carried out institutional activities. With more permanently settled hunter-gatherers and later full-blown horticulture, communities expanded and proliferated as a basic type of corporate unit, and within and among these communities, something like complex organizations were created with the evolution of unilineal kinship structures organizing kin-based groups (i.e., nuclear families, lineages, clans, subclans, and sometimes, two moieties) in a hierarchical structure resembling and functioning as organizations (see Fig. 1.3 on p. 22). With this structural base, institutional domains could begin to differentiate out of kinship, as new kinds of groups dealing with selection pressures were embedded inside of organizations that, in turn, were lodged into communities. Once this sequence of steps was taken, further differentiation of institutional domains became possible. With differentiation of institutional domains, the constituent corporate units in each domain began to distribute resources unequally, thereby making stratification a permanent feature of all societies. Today, postindustrial societies are still organized into institutional domains by the three basic types of corporate units: groups, organizations, and communities.

These basic corporate-unit building blocks have allowed humans to become one of the few life forms that can organize macro societies housing millions of individuals. Humans are the largest animal form that has ever organized a macro society, which itself is a remarkable achievement. What is even more remarkable is that since there are comparatively few bioprogrammers in humans directing precise behaviors (as is the case with members of macro-insect societies), a very large burden of social control falls upon meso-level corporate and categoric units. The micro-level world of interaction in encounters and the macro-level universe of institutional domains, stratification, societies, and intersocietal systems both meet *in corporate units*. The same is true of categoric units, as examined in the last chapter. The structure and culture of corporate units and categoric units are where “the action is.” People in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units are, to be sure, constrained by macro-sociocultural formations, but they act in ways that either reproduce or change all levels of social reality—macro, micro, and meso. Indeed, from alterations in the pattern of interactions in iterated encounters at the micro, social change first becomes evident at meso level. And if change at these levels is sufficiently great, then even the macro realm of institutional domains and stratification changes; and as these macro-level structures and their cultures are transformed, so will the society as a whole and even intersocietal systems in which societies are embedded. Thus, as I have noted, analysis of the meso realm has been saved for last, not because it is a residual topic to fill in the “gap” between micro and micro levels of reality. Rather, the meso level is where *either change or reproduction of societies occurs* because meso-level sociocultural formations are the building blocks of the macro realm, and they are the formations through which micro-level forces exert their influence on societies. If these forces cannot generate viable groups, the social universe would collapse.

## **Analyzing Corporate-Unit Dynamics in General**

The dynamics of corporate units revolve around (1) the macro-level environments that always generate pressures on meso-level structures, (2) the meso-level environments created by interrelations among the three types of corporate units as well as the relations between categoric and corporate units, (3) the structure and culture of corporate units themselves as they adapt to their respective environments, and (4) the micro-level environments created by the culture and the distributions of positively and negatively valenced emotions that are experienced collectively by members of

categoric units as incumbents in corporate units. Let me briefly elaborate on these points before examining the dynamics of each basic type of corporate unit, beginning in this chapter with groups as a type of corporate unit.

### ***Macro-level Environments of Corporate Units: Fields and Niches***

Corporate units must always respond to the culture and structure of macro-level sociocultural formations and the cultural and emotional climate generated by interactions among persons in encounters. Of course, these macro and micro environments are analytical distinctions, but these distinctions also denote hard empirical reality. Macro structures and their cultures are built and sustained by the actions of corporate units, but once the macro realm exists, the structure and culture of institutional domains and the stratification system impose powerful constraints on corporate units. They become what is sometimes denoted as the “field” to which these units must respond and adapt. This notion of “field” is often rather vague and is employed in an often ad hoc manner to highlight the influence of other corporate units on a unit of interest to investigators (e.g., DiMaggio 1986; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott and Meyer 1994). This kind of approach produces interesting insights, especially since most research focuses primarily on organizational corporate units in the economy. Thus, from the perspective of economic sociology and the new institutionalism, economic corporate units must respond to the field created by other economic units as well as external inputs from corporate units in other institutional domains, especially polity, law, and sometimes education (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These other corporate units constrain options for any given economic unit, and at the same time, these units bring their culture to those economic units with which they have relations. This culture will almost always include generalized symbolic media as a valued resource as well as the ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norm built from these media.

Another vague notion is the often-used concept of “logics,” which appear to be guiding blueprints inherent in the culture of particular corporate units, and also, it seems, the cultural instructions inhering in the environment of the unit under study (e.g., Fligstein 1990). For me, I prefer the more general term—*environments*—of corporate units, and these environments can be conceptualized along two dimensions: (1) *resource niches* and (2) *fields*.

A *resource niche(s)* is where a corporate unit seeks the resources necessary to emerge, grow, and reproduce itself in its environment. All corporate

units must extract at least three types of resources<sup>1</sup>: (a) *demographic resources* which include the number and characteristics of incumbents in its division of labor and the number and characteristics of individuals who consume the outputs of a corporate unit; (b) *material resources* needed to recruit and to compensate incumbents, to build the physical structures and infrastructures in geographical space necessary to organize activities of incumbents, to distribute outputs from these activities, and to forge relations with other corporate units; and (c) *symbolic resources* needed to gain incumbents, to organize their activities, to regulate the distribution of outputs and forge relations with other corporate units, and to legitimate the corporate unit as a whole. The dynamics of corporate units are affected by the location of resource niches in sociocultural–biophysical space, the levels and types of resources in niches, the density among corporate units seeking resources in a niche or niches, the diversity of structures and cultures of corporate units in niches, and the level of competition among corporate units for resources.

A *field* consists of (a) the culture and structure of corporate within the same institutional domain as the unit under study, (b) the culture and structure of corporate units from outside institutional domains, (c) the patterns of structural and cultural integration in all of the institutional domains exerting pressure on a given type of corporate unit, (d) the structure and culture of the stratification system, (e) the distribution of diverse categoric units and the culture used to evaluate them, and (f) the culture and collective emotional valences of individuals interacting in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units. As is evident, then, my concept of a field is far broader than is typical of the new institutionalism (DiMaggio 1986; Powell and DiMaggio 1991) because my goal is to develop a theory that can explain the dynamics of *all* types of corporate units operating within *all* institutional domains.

By dividing up the macro-level environment into fields and niches, I can draw upon well-developed theories of human ecology and expand upon the insights of the new institutionalism. I can, in essence, take their insights and extend them to the analysis of all types of corporate units in all institutional domains. There is, of course, some overlap in the properties of niches and

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<sup>1</sup>For basic references on resource niches within the field of human ecology, see Hawley (1950, 1981 [1971], 1986), Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984, 1989), and McPherson (1981, 1983, 1988). There are more than three types of niches created by sociocultural fields; I just list the three most important, but other niches can include technological resources and organizational resources or templates for how to organize a group or a series of groups into an organization.

fields, but I still believe that it is useful to analyze corporate units and a set of corporate units from both angles, one emphasizing securing sufficient resources to survive and another stressing the properties of structural and cultural environments in which a corporate unit operates. Moreover, as I move to organizations and communities as types of corporate units, it becomes evident that fields generate the resource niches where organizations and communities seek resources. As will be evident in this chapter, however, this connection between fields and resources is less obvious in groups because groups are almost always embedded in organizations and communities.

### *Meso-level Environments*

The three types of corporate units—that is, groups, organizations, and communities—are almost always embedded in each other. Groups are embedded in the structure of organizations, and organizations are embedded in communities. At times, groups form outside of a larger organizational unit and even (in the virtual world) outside of a community. At certain points in history, communities are more embedded in institutional domains, as has been the case when ceremonial cities devoted to religion or to political governance first emerged. Still, whatever the pattern of embedding, organizations are the central point for the relations between groups and communities. Organizations aggregate groups into horizontal and vertical divisions of labor, while communities provide geographical space and necessary infrastructures for organizations and their constituent incumbents to act.

Because meso-level corporate units are often successively embedded, they constitute the most immediate environments for each other. But, they often do so in the absence of embedding. Organizations are the point of contact between institutional domains and communities because the number, type, and distributions of organizations in communities are the conduit by which institutional domains and their various cultures constrain communities. Similarly, the number, type, and distribution in corporate units and geographical locations in communities are often the point of contact of the stratification system with communities and organizations. Groups link encounters in space and over time, and in so doing, they become the point of contact of encounters and the micro environments created in encounters with organizations and communities. Thus, the structure and culture of both the macro and micro levels of reality exert much of their influence on meso-level units through groups, organizations, and communities—above and beyond their effects when embedded in each other.

Yet, communities are often part of a system of communities, as is outlined in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (2010a:269–282), and so the structure and culture of networks of communities generate environments for any given community in the network. In particular, the means by which these networks are built up, such as with the expansion of markets or the imposition of power or rule of law, are critical to understanding how communities influence each other. Similarly, the networks among organizations within and between domains are created by various mechanisms of integration, and these mechanisms and the structure of the networks that they generate determine which, how many, and what types of organizations serve as immediate environments for organizations.

Similarly, groups are also linked together by networks, typically structured by the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor of corporate units within and, sometimes, between institutional domains. So, the number, size, goals, and types of groups as well as the properties of the networks connecting these groups constitute the immediate environment of any particular group. As this field of groups pulls the culture and emotional valences from iterated encounters at the micro level into the networks of group, these networks exert even more effects on the dynamics of groups, as well as the organizations and communities in which they are embedded.

The number, degree of differentiation, differential evaluation, and level of either consolidation or intersection of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships have direct effects on corporate units because categoric-unit dynamics determine the distribution of members of categoric units in corporate units and their respective divisions of labor. And when categoric-unit membership is consolidated with class locations in the stratification system, the culture of the stratification system is pulled into corporate units, and depending on whether or not categoric-unit memberships are consolidated with access to types of corporate units and/or hierarchical locations in their divisions of labor, the structure of social relations in the stratification system penetrates corporate units, which then reproduce the class system by determining shares of resources received and mobility up or down the hierarchical divisions of labor in corporate units.

### ***The Structure and Culture of Corporate Units***

Corporate units vary along a series of basic structural dimensions, including (a) their relative size, (b) clarity of their status order, (c) degree of differentiation in the subunits organized by their divisions of labor, (d) degree of

hierarchy (in authority) and centralization (of decision making) in the division of labor, (e) explicitness of boundaries for the corporate unit as a whole and its subunits, (f) distributions of members of diverse categorical units in the corporate unit and across its division of labor, (g) institutional domain in which a corporate group is located and the resource niches generated by sociocultural fields within this domain, (h) modes of cultural and structural integration within this domain as well as among differentiated domains, and (i) mechanisms creating interrelations among corporate units within its own institutional domain and corporate units in other domains. There are isomorphic pressures working on corporate units, as a result of processes such as mimicking successful units, acceding to the power of units imposing their culture and structure on dependent units, and establishing more permanent exchange relations with units hoarding valued resources. These pressures for isomorphism cause some degree of segmentation that, in turn, produces a certain amount of structural and cultural equivalence among corporate units within and between institutional domains.

Still there are also pressures for differentiation among the cultures and structures of corporate units inherent in diverse institutional domains using a distinctive generalized symbolic medium. As these media are used within an institutional domain, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms for ordering relations among corporate units build up. The circulation of symbolic media from other domains will, however, exert isomorphic pressures, especially those media like *money* (from economy), *authority* (as franchised power by polity), *influence* (from law), and *learning* (from education). As these media circulate, ideologies and institutional norms are piggybacked onto these media, often creating meta-ideologies that lead to increased equivalence in the cultures of those domains in which the same generalized symbolic media circulate.

Yet, since corporate units operate in somewhat different niches and fields, there should be some differentiation of structure and culture in those units adapting to varying fields and niches. Those in the same niche may evidence isomorphic tendencies, but those in different niches and fields should evidence more differentiation than those units in similar niches and fields. Even those in the same niches or fields can pursue somewhat different strategies, leading to some degree of differentiation among corporate units in the same niche or field. I would hypothesize that the niches and fields of organizations vary the most (compared to groups and communities), and thus, they should reveal higher levels of differentiation when in the same or different niches than either groups or communities. Groups order encounters within the more inclusive horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in organizations, and thus, they are in very similar fields and niches

within organizations because organizations reveal high levels of structural equivalence, and communities order relations among corporate units in diverse domains and, hence, are even more structurally equivalent than organizations. Organizations, however, exist mostly in institutional domains, and they are often structured to adapt to diverse niches in these domains in order to realize their goals. The end result is that each of the three basic types of corporate units will reveal varying levels of structural and cultural differentiation. The same applies to all of the dimensions for corporate units listed above; organizations will exhibit more diversity along these dimensions than either groups or community corporate units.

### *Micro-level Environments of Corporate Units*

Encounters are almost always embedded in corporate and categoric units, which then constrain what transpires in encounters. Thus, it is easier to see encounters as so embedded that they do not constitute the environments of meso-level corporate units. Yet, micro-level encounters that are iterated over time can become an important environment for all three types of corporate units. People's behaviors and interactions can be viewed *collectively* as generating a set of collectively experienced emotions around which beliefs will generally form. For example, industrial workers in factories hold structurally equivalent positions and probably interact with each other, machines, and people at different locations in a similar manner; they thus have similar experiences. Out of such experiences, an emotion culture emerges (Hochschild 1979, 1983), as does a set of beliefs articulating what is right–wrong and good–bad about the corporate units and perhaps even the entire domain in which structurally and culturally equivalent corporate units are embedded. Given pressures for isomorphism, common fields, and similar niches, sets of corporate units systematically generate convergent emotion cultures, coupled to evaluative beliefs. These then become an environment to which corporate units must adapt. If workers are alienated and angry, for example, these negative emotions are something to which all those corporate units producing these emotions must adapt, especially when these emotions create a common emotion culture. And as people make attributions for their emotional experiences in structurally equivalent positions in similar types of corporate units, they develop beliefs that codify into a moral evaluation of their experiences. These beliefs can also become part of the micro-level environment for corporate units.

Thus, just as any corporate unit must respond to its resource niche and field, so it must adapt to the emotion culture and evaluative beliefs

generated by the aggregate experiences of incumbents in structurally and culturally equivalent corporate structures. For example, people living in large cities generate a very different emotion culture and a set of evaluative beliefs compared to those in rural communities or those in suburban communities. Teachers in high schools reveal converging emotion cultures and beliefs anywhere in a society, but these cultural elements of “teacher culture” will vary in different types of corporate unit within the institutional domain of education. Teachers in high schools and universities, for instance, will certainly evidence structural and cultural homologies, but there are also significant differences in their emotion cultures and beliefs as well.

Thus, when leaders of corporate units worry about such matters as employee morale, anger, and efforts for collective mobilization (say, to unionize), high absenteeism at work or school, lack of commitments of incumbents to the culture of the corporate unit, and similar kinds of “trouble,” they are, in essence, responding to the micro environmental influences emanating from people’s experiences in encounters within corporate units. These may become part of the “field” of a corporate unit and exert the same power as the fields and niches generated by the macro-level environments of corporate units.

Yet, there is something unique about these micro environments. They are not institutionalized in the same way as the culture of institutional domains; and hence, they are more subject to rapid change, and they can become more volatile, as would be the case when emotions and beliefs are converted into change-oriented ideologies, fueled by high levels of negative emotional arousal. They often can seem to have “come from nowhere,” but that is only because those in authority of a corporate unit have not been paying attention. For example, the “riots” that broke out in many American cities in the 1960s and drove the civil rights movement to its climatic moments or the efforts at revolt in the Middle East in early 2011 are manifestations of how powerful micro-level environments can become. They seem to arise rapidly and to force changes in the actions of corporate units in institutional domains, but the *anger*, *frustration*, *alienation*, and *fear* that provide the emotional energy of such uprisings had long been codified into what Neil Smelser (1962) termed “generalized beliefs” about moral wrongs inherent in the current “system” (of structural relations and ideologies legitimating these relations) generated in iterated encounters. This micro culture becomes less micro, of course, as individuals codify their experiences into collectively held emotions and beliefs, but this culture is not very far from its micro roots: negative emotional arousal in encounters. And thus, for this reason, I prefer to visualize collectively experienced emotions and emergent culture as important parts of the micro-level environment of corporate and categoric units.

We are now ready to look at the three types of corporate units in more detail. I will approach them with the general considerations about all corporate units outlined above, but the nature of the unit—as a group, organization, or community—*makes a difference* in the nature of corporate unit dynamics. In this chapter, I will begin with groups, moving then to organizations in Chap. 6, and ending with communities in Chap. 7.

## Group Dynamics

Let me turn to address an important preliminary matter: the difference between “group” and “encounter.” The distinction between a small group and an encounter may seem artificial, but I think that it is fundamental. For me, a group is what emerges as encounters are iterated over time with more or less the same set of participants. Relations among members become more permanent. The beginnings of what Collins (1975, 2004) terms “particularistic cultural capital” become evident (e.g., knowledge, common experiences, perhaps even common speech patterns, and other symbolic elements). And, if they were not initially present, goals become more coherent, even if the goal is pure sociality. Encounters can also be rather large, as when a person attends a lecture, although here the focus of attention is primarily on the speaker, but over time, when the lecturer and attendees repeat this encounter over the course of, say, a semester in a college, more group-like properties begin to emerge. Of course, groups are sustained by the microdynamics outlined in Volume 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*, but there are emergent properties when encounters are chained together in time and space; and while these may not be very dramatic, they change encounters from an “episode” to something with more culture and structure: a group.

For example, my wife and I keep a sailboat where we usually stay for several nights (since the boat is 170 miles from where we live). Every day, rain or shine, an assembly of perhaps 15 men hang out for a couple of hours, beginning around 7 AM and then disappearing by 9:30 AM or so. If I only saw them for one day, I would assume that this daily event was a one-time encounter, but since it is iterated each day, there is more to these gatherings. Over the last decade, it is clear that these are mostly retired fishermen, who obviously had a group before retirement, and they are probably doing what they have done for the last 30 or 40 years: gathering, talking, and taking in the early morning spectacle of fish being unloaded from a parade of boats lined to have their catch craned up to the pier as the morning sun rises over the coastal foothills. In the pieces of conversation that I have been able to

hear over the years as I walk by them on my way to the newspaper stand, these men's interactions evidence the properties of a group: a division of role behaviors and even the emergence of a leader. Like "doc" in William Foote Whyte's *Street Corner Society*, this leader is central figure of a network with subcliques that break off at times to sit on various benches along the sea wall, but 15 min later, everybody can have reassembled by the railing overlooking the harbor. There is clearly a particularistic culture, boundaries in which others sitting around at that hour are not included, although some quasi "outsiders" like the harbor patrol and current fishermen can join the group. To my amazement, even I have been "noticed" and now receive an occasional "hello" as I walk to get my morning newspaper paper (indeed, maybe I will have a conversation with them in a couple of years!). There is a distinctive speech style and demeanor, particularistic totems (hats jackets with logos) signifying their culture and other elements of a group culture (although a couple of members will, after the morning gathering in "full fisherman dress," change to Hawaiian shirts for the sunny afternoon and by the end of the day look like tourists). This group is not embedded in an organization, and so, it stands alone but is obviously linked to past groups and to present cliques and other groups within the local fishing sector of this town. It is their common history, focus of interest (looking at fishing boats and talking about fishing, but also general harbor gossip and even world affairs), assembling into encounters of mutual focus of attention, and persistence over years that makes these iterated encounters a group, with emergent properties beyond an encounter alone.

Gary Alan Fine (2010) and colleagues (e.g., Harrington and Fine 2000) have long argued that groups need to be analyzed above and beyond the dynamic processes that flow through them. Groups have special properties that connect micro-level encounters to the social structures and cultures that organize people. They provide the *arena* (what I term situational ecology), longer-term networks of relations, shared experiences, and common history that connects daily encounters into something more substantial and less fleeting. As groups form, a micro culture is assembled from talk and emotional responses over iterated encounters, while at the same time, groups reconcile this emerging micro culture with larger symbol systems operating in more inclusive corporate units like organizations and communities, and even beyond, in institutional domains, stratification, societies, and intersocietal systems. But, without groups as culture- and structure-producing entities, there would be a "missing link" between the micro level of interpersonal processes operating in encounters and other meso structures and their cultures which, in turn, are the building blocks of the macro realm of reality. Groups "...provide larger systems with the tensile strength based upon common communal affiliation" (Fine 2010: 361), and moreover, when

the structures of societies begin to crumble or change in significant ways, the groups linking micro-dynamic processes to larger social structures and culture have already been under pressure. And conversely, for changes initiated at the macro level of social organization to be fully institutionalized, viable groups must have formed within organizational systems so that micro-dynamic processes at the level of the encounter can indeed provide the “tensile strength” necessary to sustain larger-scale structures that rest of the foundation on groups.

When groups are embedded in organizations within communities, their structure becomes more evident, but even a series of iterated encounters like those of the retired fisherman inevitably takes on group properties, which is an emergent reality beyond the microdynamics of their daily encounters. Since most groups, most of the time, are embedded in a more inclusive corporate unit, I will emphasize the dynamics that arise from embedding as a basis for comparison with dynamics that emerge in groups, *per se*, regardless of their level of embedding. But the power of groups is most noticeable when they are embedded because they link encounters with the meso realm and, ultimately, the macro realm beyond. What occurs in groups was critical, then, not only for the viability of the smaller-scale world of preliterate peoples in our distant evolutionary past but also for the macro-social worlds in which humans now live. The daily lives of humans are still played out in the groups—indeed, multiple groups in diverse institutional domains. And so, even as the external world beyond groups has become incredibly elaborate and complex, the immediate universe of a person remains embedded in groups. Even groups created and sustained virtually, or sustained through constant chatter and texting on cell phones, still represent a world of groups.

And yet, my focus in this chapter is on what Fine and others have criticized: emphasis on interpersonal processes without sufficient attention to the properties of the distinctive groups in which these processes play out. My goal here is a general theory of the social universe, and so, what is always most fascinating to me is the operation of what appear to be generic and universal processes. Indeed, as experimental work on artificially assembled task groups documents, certain micro-dynamic processes are always initiated, and if these groups had functioned for longer stretches of time, they would move from what I would define as an encounter to a real group. And if embedded in a community and an organization, they would begin to have effects on the structures and cultures of more inclusive corporate units. George Homans once argued that groups are “not *what* we study but *where* we study,” and the discussion to follow has elements of this bias, but I also think that the generic properties of groups also have large effects on the

unique events in any particular group as its structure and culture unfold. Still, I do not pay sufficient attention on the unique properties of *locales* where groups form because my goal is to understand how groups—as one of the three basic types of corporate units—organize the energy and culture of encounters so that these can become the building blocks of human societies. What is unique about groups is important because often this uniqueness and the particularistic cultures that are built up in groups are the origins of change, but again as we will see in Chap. 8, my goal is to understand the generic conditions that *give groups this transformative power*—whatever the exact nature of the transformation may be.

## Macro-level Environments of Groups

Generally, groups are embedded within organizations and communities, and as a result, the macro-level structure and culture of institutional domains and stratification filter down to groups via these two more inclusive corporate units. For example, a group in a business corporation or a factory will be highly constrained by the internal division of labor of the corporate units themselves but also relations (via markets, networks, structural inclusion, or overlap) with other economic corporate units and the broader modes of integration of economy as an institutional domain. The generalized symbolic medium of *money* will order talk and discourse, and the institutional ideology will be built from this medium, with meta-ideologies constructed from money mixed with the medium of other domains (e.g., *power*, *influence*, and *learning*). These ideologies also influence the formation of institutional norms and the culture of the corporate unit, and it is this more immediate field of the group—that is, the division of labor as it orders group structures and the culture of the corporate unit as a whole—that will determine the configuration of ecological space, the demography of this space, and the status order, roles, and norms of the group. In turn, the flow of these micro-dynamic forces will affect the degree to which transactional needs are realized and the level as well as valences of emotions aroused.

As a general rule, the more embedded in an organization is a group, the greater will be the clarity of meanings for situational ecology and demography (including members of categoric units), the status order (again, including diffuse status characteristics), the roles that can be made, and the relevant culture to be brought to bear through normatizing. If the division of labor is hierarchical, role taking will be clear, and options for role making will be limited by status beliefs and expectation states as these are derived from ideologies and meta-ideologies. And under these constraints, the paths to

meeting transactional needs will be highly delimited. If there is consolidation of categoric-unit parameters with locations in the hierarchical division of labor, normatization will increase the salience of categoric-unit memberships and their respective locations in the hierarchical division of labor, as well as the power of *status beliefs* and *expectation states* for positional status in divisions of labor and diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric units. If consolidation is the result of persistent discrimination against members of devalued categoric units, then *status beliefs* will be conflated with *prejudicial beliefs* of varying intensity and legitimated by selective interpretations of more general institutional ideologies. Under these conditions, the tensions associated with inequalities attached to categoric-unit memberships will increase the arousal of negative emotions among members of devalued categoric units, thereby increasing the power of the emotional tone and culture arising from encounters and becoming part of the micro environment of the group (see below).

In contrast, if a group is relatively free-standing within communities, it will be far less constrained by a field because there is no organizational unit mediating the effects of community structures and cultures on groups. Groups will be most constrained by the ecology and demography of public spaces and the culture that may be relevant in these places. For example, well-formed groups engaged in such activities as power walking through a mall early in the morning, playing pickup baseball or soccer in a park, watching children play in a sandbox, meeting to eat together in a restaurant, hanging out on a corner, or my retired fisherman assembling each morning in along the breakwater will be mostly bound by their own status order as it has evolved over decades, by roles that have been made over time and by particularized norms and cultural capital that have been assembled. There will be constraints, of course, imposed by group member's location within community structures, but the structure and culture of these will be subordinate to the culture and structure that have been built up over long chains of face-to-face encounters. Thus, the field will impose broad constraints, and unless serious breaches to the public order occur, this field will not impose sanctions nor will the culture of other corporate units around the group be salient. As a general rule, the less embedded is a group within a more inclusive corporate unit, the less influence will structure and culture of this more inclusive corporate unit have on members of the group. And, the more will situational ecology and demography be the principal constraints on culture making and taking, status taking and making, and role making and taking as it has evolved from face-to-face encounters; and the more likely are individuals to meet all transactional needs, especially those for identity verification, profits in exchange payoffs, and group inclusion.

Under these conditions of fewer constraints on less embedded groups, encounters will generate positive emotional arousal that will become blended with elements of the particularistic culture produced by group members. The consequence will be, in Mazur Olsen's (1965) terms, the production of a joint *private good* that will become more valuable to, and consumed by, group members which, in turn, will increase their dependence on the group for this good and thus raise the existing costs of leaving the group (Michael Hechter 1987). Dependence on this private good that is only available to group members provides much of Fine has termed the "tensile strength" of groups. And, I note below, these same dynamics can also unfold in any group even when embedded within a more inclusive corporate unit.

What is true of fields is also the case for resource niches, to the extent that they exist for groups. When embedded in an organizational corporate unit, the resources for the group—demographic, material, and symbolic—come from the culture and structure of the organization. And while there might be competition to move up the hierarchy in the corporate unit, niche density is less important—unless, of course, the material resource base that the group draws upon shrinks and thereby makes the demography of who must leave the group relevant. In less permanently embedded groups that form and disperse in diverse locations, the resource niche is composed of a network of friends to draw upon, the material resources that members acquire from their activities, and the resources that are available in public spaces and in other corporate units in which people can assemble (e.g., restaurants, theaters, clubs of all kinds, malls, and shops). In many ways, groups do not so much draw resources from community structures as use them temporarily, and if fees or memberships are required, each member of the group will secure them from incumbency in other corporate units (e.g., work, family, school, church). The most important resource for less embedded groups is symbolic: accumulated particularistic cultural capital, common memories of past events, sense of shared history, and emotional valences attached to these cultural elements. Since this is the resource generated by group members, it becomes part of their micro environment, and thus, much of the strength of group ties resides in the fact that they create their own micro environments to sustain the group, thereby making resources from other corporate units less essential.

The macro-level mechanisms of integration within institutional domain and among domains surround a group also affect the dynamics in play (see Table 2.3 on pp. 84–90). If domination by polity or other powerful actors in economy and religion is the principal mode of integration, then hierarchy in the society is reproduced at more levels, making the field of any group filled

with relations of domination–subordination among all actors, institutional ideologies built around tenets of power and authority, and meta-ideologies emphasizing the importance of rankings of persons (in terms of their relative moral worth) in the classes of the stratification system. Even if not highly embedded in corporate units revealing hierarchical divisions of labor, groups will seek their place at each locale in terms of where they stand in the system of domination. Yet, when institutional integration is achieved by domination, such free-floating groups are rare because the entire society is built from hierarchies of groups, with outlying groups always seen as posing a threat to centers of power. Not only will the group seek its place, but if it has a division of labor, status differences within the group and corresponding status beliefs and expectation states will be highly salient and reproduced by interactions of individuals in encounters.

In contrast, if institutional integration is achieved through mechanisms of structural interdependence, especially free markets, democratic polity, and positivistic and universalistic law, there will be more space in the meso-level environment for groups to function independently of hierarchies in corporate units, with the result that their divisions of labor are more likely to be horizontal; if it exists at all, leadership will be more ad hoc and situational, and their members' efforts at making status and roles while normatizing will involve more negotiation and renegotiation. Moreover, the ideologies and meta-ideologies of the macro-level environment are more likely to emphasize universalism, equality, opportunities, and performance as the basis for evaluation of individuals and groups. And when groups are embedded in corporate units, even those with some hierarchy, the status order will still evidence some flexibility, expectation states will be less restrictive, roles can be made in different ways and used to alter status, normatizing will be more flexible and subject to re-culture making, and parameters for categoric-unit memberships will be less consolidated with inequalities and class locations. Under these conditions, individuals will be more likely to meet transactional needs and thus experience positive emotions, which will generate a micro environment supportive of the macro environment.

## **Meso-level Environments of Groups**

As I have emphasized above, embedding of groups in corporate and categoric units exerts the most influence on group dynamics. The more clearly and persistently is a group embedded in a corporate unit within a relatively autonomous institutional domain, the greater is the influence of

the structure and modes of integration of the institutional domain and the ideologies and meta-ideologies formed from the generalized media of this domain and those other domains with which its constituent corporate units have relations. And, as hypothesized earlier, the structure and culture of the organization in which a group is embedded—that is, its division of labor, its distributions of categoric-unit members across this division of labor, its system of authority, its productive outputs, and its culture—will bring the macro-level institutional structure and culture to groups. Moreover, when groups are embedded in hierarchies of larger corporate units, group goals will be more well defined, tasks will be allocated by leaders, performances will be more explicitly monitored and evaluated, status beliefs and expectation states will be more explicit, roles will be less flexible, norms will carry the culture of institutional domains and the corporate unit to each status position, and restrictions on how transactional needs can be met will exist, which in turn will increase the likelihood that some transactional needs will not be fully realized, thus causing the arousal of negative emotions.

When the division of labor in corporate units is mostly horizontal with diminished hierarchies of authority, group boundaries will be more open, leadership will be more collaborative, status will be less salient in most interactions, norms will be less restrictive, roles can be played with increased latitude, status beliefs and expectation states can often be renegotiated over iterated encounters within groups, key transactional needs are more likely to be realized, and positive emotional arousal becomes the basis for the micro environment generated by iterated encounters. If, however, the groups' system of authority is hierarchical, then the converse will be more likely: group boundaries will be more explicit, leadership will impose decision and monitor conformity to these, norms will be restrictive, roles will be delimited, status beliefs and expectation states attached to status will be more difficult to change, high-priority transactional needs are less likely to be met, and the arousal of negative emotions becomes more frequent and alters the emotional mood generated by iterated encounters. Still, much will also depend upon the style of leadership within the group, with the effects of in-group hierarchy being mitigated by a more informal and flexible style of leadership.

When categoric units are distributed across the divisions of labor in corporate units, the degree of intersection or consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with the full range of groups embedded within the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor of an organization and, at times, a community become critical dynamics. When categoric-unit memberships are consolidated with group memberships at locations in the divisions of labor, rates of inter-categoric interaction will be lower, and the salience of the relative

evaluations contained in status beliefs and expectation states for memberships in diverse categoric units will remain somewhat more salient and will be more likely to evoke tensions and negative emotional arousal. If categoric-unit memberships under these conditions are also correlated with class locations in the stratification system, the intensity of these dynamics will increase. And if categoric-unit memberships are further consolidated with groups and individuals at different points in the hierarchical division of labor, the inequalities in authority, prestige, and material rewards will increase the tensions of intercategoric-unit interactions when they do occur, and even more so if consolidation is the result of long-term patterns of discrimination legitimated by prejudicial beliefs and selective interpretation of institutional ideologies and the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system.

Intracategoric-unit interactions under these consolidated conditions will, however, be more relaxed, reducing the salience of diffuse status characteristics and, to a lesser degree, differences in locational status (authority) within the group, if any, allowing for more latitude in role making, enabling some renegotiation of expectations states from past performances in the group, and, thereby, providing latitude for culture making (normatizing) within the group. In turn, the likelihood that social identities and other identities tied to social identities can be verified will increase, thus arousing more positive emotions. These processes will likely lead to the production of a *joint private good* (e.g., friendship, solidarity) that will be highly valuable to group members, thereby making them more dependent upon the group and making exit costs high (Michael Hechter 1987). If, however, talk in encounters within the group centers on resentments over the segregation and inequalities created by consolidation of categoric-unit membership with group incumbency, then negative emotional arousal will significantly alter the emotional mood as it generates the micro environment of the group, and moreover, these negative emotions are also likely to cause formation of generalized beliefs about injustices that codify these negative emotional experiences. Ironically, this negative emotional arousal targeting other groups, positions in the division of labor, or other categoric units will also become a joint private good that has value for group members because of the positive emotions that come from venting frustrations and anger with supportive fellow group members. And, to the extent that generalized beliefs lead to more organization and collective action by group members, this action will lead to the production of yet another valuable joint good. Thus, even in the context of negative emotional arousal, this arousal can cause actions arousing more positive emotions that become increasingly valuable to group members.

## The Structure and Culture of Groups

### *The Effects of Group Size*

The smaller a group is, the higher will be the rates of interaction among its members, and with higher rates of interaction come a number of distinctive outcomes: (1) higher density networks connecting group members, (2) higher ratios of positive to negative emotions, (3) higher levels of attachment among group members, (4) higher solidarity among members, and (5) higher commitments to the group as a whole. As these features of small groups develop, additional features are likely to evolve, including (6) particularized culture (e.g., experiences, beliefs, speech, and demeanor), (7) symbols or “totems” marking the boundaries and solidarity of the group (e.g., special words and phrases, clothing, emblems, or any marker of the group), and (8) righteous anger if rituals to be directed at these totems are violated (Collins 2004). Perhaps, a prototypical, if extreme, manifestation of these outcomes can be seen in a motorcycle gang like the Hells Angels, where solidarity, commitment, and attachment, particularized cultural capital, and totems clearly symbolize the group (e.g., the bikes themselves or the clothing of members), and indeed, I would not wish to ever show disrespect for these totems (assuming I ever got close enough to do so) since it is not wise to arouse the righteous anger of biker gangs.

In contrast, larger groups are more likely to have lower rates of interaction among *all* members, especially if the group is so large that it becomes impossible to see or hear all members at once or to interact with them simultaneously. As a consequence, overall network density will decrease, but subcliques are likely to emerge, as are patterns of centrality, brokerage, and bridging linking subcliques. As groups get larger, they will reveal differentiation not only among subcliques but also among status positions (if only differentiation of task and socioemotional leaders; see Bales 1950), and there will be a tendency for these to reveal some degree of hierarchy in authority and prestige. As status positions differentiate in larger groups, status beliefs and expectation states are likely to become more important in culture taking and making and in role taking and making, and situational ecology and demography will be more reinforce status differences. Moreover, if memberships in the group include representatives of diverse categoric units, then status beliefs, and expectation states associated with these will become salient, although if they are not consolidated with locations in the divisions of labor, their power will decline and beliefs and

expectation states for status positions in the division of labor of the group will become more important.

Because normatizing through culture taking and making is restricted in larger groups by a status order, so are options for mobility up the status hierarchy, especially through role making that violates expectation states. The result is that some transactional needs may go unmet, and coupled with the inequalities of status and, if relevant, diffuse status characteristics, individuals will be more likely to experience negative emotions in at least some encounters within the group. The outcome of these processes is that individuals will develop less attachment to, and solidarity with, other members of the group, and moreover, they will be less likely to manifest high levels of commitment to the group. Furthermore, they will not seek to symbolize the group with totems or attach much significance to totems if created by leaders, and they are not likely to be emotionally aroused by rituals directed at these totems or by member's violation of these rituals.

From a more rational choice perspective, these processes operating in small groups result in the joint production of a private good, which becomes highly valuable to members (Hechter 1987) and leads them to stay in the group because (a) they increasingly value the *joint private good*, (b) they are thus dependent upon the group for this private good, and (c) they see high exit costs in getting this joint good elsewhere. While this kind of phrasing of the process is interesting, I believe that it does not adequately capture the underlying processes that increase these conditions, and while the argument may be essentially correct, I seek more detail about *how* private goods become valuable and the mechanisms that increase their value and make people dependent upon groups and thus willing to make commitments to them and to the larger-scale corporate units and macro structures in which a group may be embedded.

The likelihood that solidarity- and commitment-generating processes will operate in smaller groups is greater than in larger groups. Yet, small groups can fall apart through conflict or for simple lack of caring about other members (as, e.g., is the case in many small academic departments), and larger groups can develop high levels of attachment, solidarity, and commitment (like the Hells Angels in San Bernardino, California, where their numbers well over 100 members). Thus, size only loads the averages, but does not guarantee that the underlying mechanisms operating will cause high or low levels of attachment, solidarity, commitment, and symbolization of the group. We need, therefore, to isolate these mechanisms and, then, see why and how group size biases the operation of these mechanisms.

## *Operative Mechanisms of Group Structure and Culture*

**Status-Organizing Processes.** Many studies on experimental task groups document the effects of status-organizing processes (Berger 1958; Berger et al. 1972, 1977, 1980; Berger and Zelditch 1985; Ridgeway 1978, 1982, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2006). When differential status is given in the structure of the group, status beliefs will also be given or will soon emerge, with the result that expectation states for higher- and lower-status members will constrain interaction. If status is challenged, higher-status persons will reveal variants of *anger* and sometimes *fear* (if they do not think their status is deserved or earned), while lower-status members will also experience negative emotions and sanction those who challenge the status order. Because higher-status persons are likely to experience and give off positive emotions if their status is verified, lower-status members are more inclined to verify status and receive the positive emotions from leaders instead of the negative emotions when someone challenges the status order (Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). These findings are documented for task groups, but they probably apply even more to naturally occurring groups that persist over longer periods of time. There appears to be a clear tendency for expectation states to form rather quickly in groups (Ridgeway 2001; Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988; Ridgeway et al. 1986, 1998, 2009), with these expectations being higher or lower depending upon individuals' role performances in groups. Of course, contributions to task outcomes offer a clear criterion for assessing performance, but I suspect that all groups invoke criteria by which to judge performances and to give individuals at least greater and lesser amounts of prestige and sometimes authority, even if prestige or authority is not built into the more inclusive corporate unit in which a group is embedded. Once this kind of differentiation emerges, status-organizing processes ensue.

However, if higher-status individuals do not meet expectations, lower-status group members will experience negative emotions like *frustration*, *resentment*, *anger*, and perhaps even *fear* if a leader's incompetence will affect the external evaluation of the group as a whole. And, challenges to incompetent leaders will also increase negative emotional arousal as well. Thus, while there is a certain bias to verify status locations, tensions can emerge when individuals do not meet expectation states drawn from status beliefs. If lower-status members do not meet expectations, then they will be sanctioned negatively by both leaders and some fellow lower-status members. If these sanctions do not work, the sanctioned person may receive the severe sanction of being ostracized, if not physically, then interpersonally (thus failing to meet needs for group inclusion). All of these dynamics

arouse a complex of negative emotions—*anger, fear, frustration, sadness,* and *alienation*—which will erode attachments, solidarity, and commitments to the group and its symbols.

Since large groups are more likely to differentiate levels of status, if only to get tasks accomplished, they are more prone to the disruptive effects of status. And if subcliques of local solidarities have formed, these can become the basis for not only individual conflict but also conflict between factions (again, as any member of an academic department has no doubt experienced). Thus, status differences, per se, can increase the arousal of negative emotions; and these differences are more likely to exist in larger than smaller groups, and coupled with the increased capacity for factional conflict in larger groups, it should not be surprising that these groups gravitate to more formality in order to ramp down potentially volatile emotions when expectation states are not realized and when conflict potential among group members increases.

All of these same status-organizing processes can occur in smaller groups, but the higher rates of face-to-face interaction, per se, generally increase mutual liking; even when there are status differences, the more informal pattern of interaction gives individuals some latitude in readjusting expectations and in lower-key sanctioning so that the positive emotional mood of the group and its sense of cohesiveness do not erode away. There is, of course, no guarantee that such will be the case, but the odds are much better with smaller groups where individuals can sustain face-to-face interaction with all members of the group in most encounters.

**Joint Tasks and Shared Responsibility.** Edward Lawler and associates (summarized in Lawler et al. 2009) have conducted a series of experiments on exchange processes among individuals (although, unknown to the individuals, they were really exchanging with a computer program). Even in these contrived groups, where no actual face-to-face interaction occurs among real people, individuals who interact and reach exchange agreements frequently with the (computer-generated) others develop mild positive emotions—*interest/excitement* and *pleasure/satisfaction*—toward these “others.” And they also begin to exhibit commitment behaviors, such as willingness to give gifts, staying in the exchange relationships (even when better alternatives are available), and contributing to joint ventures with partners. These outcomes occurred between exchange partners who were equally dependent upon each other for resources, and thus, there were no status differences (although these were not measured, or even part of the study). The same outcomes could be predicted for status-organizing processes when there is no inequality among status positions, again biasing smaller groups toward positive emotional arousal when their members are

able to interact and exchange resources frequently. For, even in rather contrived circumstances, positive emotions and commitments begin to emerge with high rates of interaction among equals.

Lawler (2001) also became interested in the conditions that would increase commitments to groups, beyond specific individuals in dyadic exchange relations. Again with his associates (Lawler et al. 2009), Lawler's team isolated from various experiments additional conditions under which individuals will develop commitments to group-level social units. When individuals are engaged in *joint activities* where the contributions of each individual are not discernable but conflated in producing an outcome, status differences become less salient, and individuals develop a sense of *shared responsibility* for outcomes—whether positive or negative—and begin to make group-level attributions for their success or failure (and with failure, this *jointness of activities* increases individuals' collective motivation to do better in the future). And if this sense of shared responsibility is accompanied by a *sense of efficacy* and *self-verification* for each individual in the group, the emotions experienced become more positive, and individuals are even more likely to make group-level attributions for their positive emotions to the group as a whole and, potentially, to even larger-scale structures in which groups are embedded—including communities, states, and whole societies (Lawler et al. 2009).

Thus, the more members of groups, who are of equal or equivalent status, interact, exchange resources, participate in joint activities, and experience a sense of shared responsibility, efficacy, and self-verification, the more likely are they to experience positive emotions that lead them to develop not only commitments to each other but also commitments to larger-scale social units in which groups are embedded. These conditions are more likely to be realized in small groups where individuals interact and exchange frequently and cannot separate their respective contributions to group outcomes. Larger groups are more likely to develop status differences, unequal exchanges of resources, less “jointness” of activities, less shared responsibility, less of a sense of personal efficacy, and less self-verification in at least some interactions; the more these larger groups produce these outcomes, the less will be the commitments of members to group-level structures and other types of corporate units or even macro-level sociocultural formations. However, larger groups can be structured along the lines suggested in Lawler's and associate's experiments, as is evident by research teams in universities or high-tech industries, where status differences are downplayed and individuals feel a sense of jointness, share responsibility, efficacy, and self-verification. And, smaller groups can develop inequalities in status such that these conditions fail to be realized. Still, smaller groups

are more likely than larger groups to produce the conditions isolated by Lawler et al. (2009) in their experimental studies of group dynamics.

**The Dynamics of Attributions.** Lawler's work calls attention to the importance of *attribution processes*. Individuals always make causal attributions for their experiences, especially those that arouse emotions, whether positive or negative. Lawler (2001) has argued that there is a *proximal bias* in attributions for positive emotions toward self or immediate others in an encounter, whereas there is a *distal bias* for negative emotions away from self and immediate others. Thus, for individuals to make group-level attributions for their positive emotional experiences in a group, they need to break the hold of the proximal bias, and his experiments document some of the conditions that allow for positive emotional arousal and external attributions not only toward the group as a whole but also toward larger social structures in which groups are embedded, including macro-level structures.

My own work (Turner 2002a, b, 2008, 2010b) has evolved along a parallel route to Lawler's, beginning with very different theoretical assumptions. In my work, I argue that positive emotions tend to circulate in the local encounters and perhaps the smaller groups or networks in which these encounters are embedded. In small groups, then, even the proximal bias will produce some group-level attributions, but in larger groups, such is less likely to be the case. In my theory, individuals experience positive emotions when they meet expectations and when they experience positive sanctions from others, and they will generally make self-attributions and/or attributions to immediate others, thus causing positive emotional energy to circulate through the group. Conversely, when individuals experience negative emotions or negative sanctions, they invoke defense mechanisms—often revolving around repression of such painful emotions as *shame* and *guilt* but *anger* and *fear* as well—and make external attributions to larger corporate units or members of categoric units who are not part of the interaction. In this way, individuals protect self and become more likely to perceive (often inaccurately) that their self was verified, that their roles were played adequately, and that they have met expectations in encounters within groups.

If all groups revealed these biases, legitimization of larger-scale social structures and their cultures would rarely occur; rather, they would be “blamed” by external attributions for negative experiences, or, if repression had occurred, the negative emotions will typically come out as *anger* directed at larger meso structures (i.e., organizations, communities, categoric units) and macro structures and their cultures, even if the connection to why they feel this way has been lost because of repressed negative emotions. Like Lawler, I wondered how this “distal bias” to negative emotions could be overcome. My answer is similar to his: to the extent that individuals

can meet transactional needs by occupying status positions and playing roles that bring positive sanctions and that enable them to meet expectations *consistently across encounters* lodged in groups embedded in larger corporate units embedded in institutional domains, they will experience positive emotions and begin to make more distal attributions directed at larger corporate units and institutional domains, and as they do so, they develop commitments to these more distal sociocultural formations. The same is true of the stratification system: If people have *consistently* been able to experience positive emotions in many encounters lodged in resource-giving corporate units, and if they have *consistently* been able to receive fair shares of these resources, they will make commitments to the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system, and they will be more likely to stigmatize those in the lower classes who have not “measured up” to the standards of moral worth inhering in the meta-ideology. They do so by developing attachments to persons in groups, and then, over time, they begin to follow the paths provided by embedding to evermore macro-corporate units and eventually develop commitments to all macro-level structures, including whole societies and, potentially, even intersocietal systems (if they see these as relevant to their positive emotional experiences). So, in the end, I came to the same conclusion as Lawler and associates: external attributions are made when certain conditions are present in groups. When these conditions are met, individuals are more likely to accept status differences, if any, develop attachments to others in the group, feel a sense of solidarity, develop group-level symbols, and most importantly, develop commitments to more remote meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations.

All of these outcomes are more likely to occur in smaller than larger groups, but they can occur in larger groups. In fact, if the attributions only need to go to the small group as a whole, then the conditions producing more distal attributions may not even need to hold, since the group is small and positive emotions can more readily circulate among the small number of members, even with the proximal bias. For larger groups, however, these conditions outlined in Lawler’s and my theory that break the hold of the proximal bias may not be present. Still, there are many routes in these larger groups for breaking free from proximal bias. For instance, one route might be members of a clique or subgroup in a larger groups to make external attributions to the larger, more inclusive group for their positive emotional arousal in the smaller subgroup and, from there, to the more inclusive organizational or community-level corporate unit to the broader institutional domain in which the subgroup is ultimately embedded. Yet, often subgroups become one of several contentious factions, with the result that negative emotions in the subgroup are seen to be the fault of another subgroup or the

larger group as a whole and, potentially, the more inclusive meso- and macro-level structures in which the group is embedded. Thus, larger groups are more likely to have inequalities and conflict-oriented subgroups making external attributions over what the other faction has “done to them.” These same dynamics can occur in smaller groups, but the high rates of interaction and positive emotional arousal in such interactions mitigate against the negative emotional consequences of faction formation. Another potential route for breaking the hold of the proximal bias might be from group to corporate unit in which the group is lodged and then, over time, to institutional domain. And if this set of connections is repeated in other domains, the stratification system and indeed the whole society may also benefit from positive and distal attributions.

**Intersections and Consolidations of Parameters.** If there are high levels of intersection of differentially valued members of categoric units across groups and across locations in their divisions of labor, then the power of status beliefs and expectations will decline over time in groups where individuals have high rates of interaction—which is more assured in smaller than larger groups. Yet, even in larger groups, if memberships in diverse categoric units are in proportion to their respective numbers in the society, then rates of interaction alone will be sufficient to reduce the salience of status beliefs attached to categoric units.

In contrast, if categoric membership is consolidated with groups or locations in their divisions of labor, then status beliefs and expectation states will remain powerful. The effects of consolidation vary, depending upon whether consolidation occurs with groups or the divisions of labor within groups. If members of devalued categoric units are excluded from some groups and only allowed to be in other groups composed of the same categoric-unit members or if these segregated groups are located at different places in inclusive corporate units—for example, neighborhoods in communities or locations in divisions of labor—rates of intercategoric-unit interaction will be low, while rates of intracategoric-unit interaction will be high. The greater is the inequality in the resources available to individuals in such segregated groups, the more tension will segregation generate over perceived discrimination and unfair distributions of valued resources. Moreover, members of devalued groups will generally give voice to their negative feelings and often begin to articulate *generalized beliefs* (attributions) about the cause of these feelings, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict between groups. At the same time, members in segregated groups are likely to have transactional needs for at least social-identity verification, group inclusion, trust, and facticity realized. The positive emotions aroused by meeting transactional needs can mitigate, to some degree, the

negative emotions attached to segregation, but if their payoffs from exchanges within and between groups are not perceived to yield a profit, then the negative emotions aroused for failure to meet this key transactional need may cancel out all of the positive emotions for meeting other need states in encounters with fellow categoric-unit members. In contrast, those in more valued categoric units under these conditions of segregation will experience positive emotions because they are likely to meet all of their transactional needs, with the result that positive emotions become yet one more stratifying resource that gives clear advantages to members of more valued categoric units.

Members of valued and devalued categoric units will generally be able to meet expectations for their status within their endogamous group, play roles in ways that are rewarded, and normatize situations successfully; thus, both types of groups will experience positive emotions from these sources and, thus, will likely form attachments to, solidarity with, group members as well as commitments to the group as a whole. Yet, if consolidation is sustained by discrimination and legitimated by prejudicial beliefs, then intergroup conflict becomes more likely. And, such conflict will be between groups with high solidarity who are mobilized by belief systems (prejudices and stigmatizing status beliefs among members of valued categoric units and generalized beliefs about the injustices of group segregation among members of devalued categoric units). These respective beliefs will likely moralize the conflict, thereby increasing its intensity and potential for violence.

If a group reveals internal differentiation of status, and if membership of valued and devalued categoric units is consolidated with different status locations in the group (e.g., women are secretaries, and men are their bosses in an office group, or blacks are unskilled laborers, and whites are carpenters of a construction crew), and if these locations bestow varying resources, then intercategoric-unit interactions will be stiff and ritualized, and members of devalued categoric units will feel hostile emotions to those in valued units. These hostile emotions will only increase to the extent that individuals in devalued units fail to meet transactional needs, must assume subordinate status for the duration of intercategoric-unit interactions, must reveal subordinate deference and demeanor in role behaviors, and must normatize so that their devalued membership in categoric units is made explicit, requiring forms of talk, rituals, and emotional demeanor that highlight their devalued status. And if the negative emotions, such as *shame*, *anger*, *frustration*, or *fear*, are repressed, they will eventually begin to emerge in more intense and transmuted forms, revolving mostly around variants of *anger* (Turner 2002a, b, 2008, 2011).

The result will be increased potential for conflict. The same would also be true for segregated groups because the segregation between groups is

likely the result of open discrimination justified by prejudicial beliefs which, in essence, means that, in addition to any other resources that are denied victims of discrimination, such highly valued resources as honor, dignity, and prestige are also denied to members of categoric units. Thus, discrimination, prejudice, and segregation between groups almost always generate negative emotions, and these emotions lead to external attributions about their cause: members of the other group and the structure and culture of the larger corporate units in which the groups are embedded, whether a community or organization. And if this pattern of segregation of groups is repeated across key institutional domains—for example, economy, education, polity, law, religion, or any other domain—then the resentments by the victims of discrimination and segregation will grow more intense and spread across the entire society, and thus, when conflict does emerge, it will be more likely to cause large-scale change. Perhaps it will, at first, occur between groups in one corporate unit, and, then as emotions are aroused in this one context, they will be aroused in other corporate units across ever-more domains. And if the groups are large and negative emotions have been aroused and generalized beliefs articulated, the negative attributions will reveal the build-in distal bias of all negative emotions and target macro-level social structures. Much of this emotional charge will have accumulated in the micro environments of groups.

## **Micro Environments of Groups**

Encounters in groups are where much of the energy driving the social world is generated, and as the smallest corporate unit in the meso realm of social reality, groups are the closest to encounters. The energy generated by iterated encounters in groups is, ultimately, the emotional and motivational fuel of the entire social universe.

Groups generate and channel motivational energy while at the same time creating cultural beliefs that either support and reinforce the cultures of other corporate units, institutional domains, or stratification systems or, as is often the case, challenge ideologies and meta-ideologies, institutional norms, status beliefs, expectations states, and the cultures of corporate units. The combination of energy and culture is what I view as a kind of micro-level environment because it is generated and circulates at the micro level of the encounter, and most significantly, it meets and mixes with the macro-level sociocultural environment that filters down through corporate and categoric units to groups. Sometimes the mixing is like oil and water, and at other times, it is more explosive and is like igniting the fumes of gasoline with a

spark. But, it is in this micro environment created from group formations that micro-dynamic processes are played out, either sustaining the group or generating tensions that may break the group apart.

### ***Meeting Transactional Needs***

Encounters in groups are always motivated by transactional needs for identity verification, profits in exchange payoffs, group inclusion, trust, and facticity. Whether the group is embedded in a more inclusive corporate unit or is more autonomous and free standing, individuals will always seek to meet these transactional needs in encounters within the group. As encounters are strung out in chains of interaction to form a group, people's sense of the degree to which these needs have been met will have large effects on the micro environment of a group. Smaller groups that reveal more informality, less differentiation of status, particularly hierarchies of status, and less concern with status beliefs about members of categoric units are far more likely to meet these needs than larger, more stratified groups. Hence, these smaller groups are most likely to generate a positive emotional mood than larger groups, and the longer the group lasts, the more this positive emotional mood becomes an "emotional expectation state" and pushes individuals to work at allowing others to meet all transactional needs. In these kinds of groups, status distinctions, if any, are downplayed, and normatization is less concerned with categorizing that emphasizes differences than with facilitating the smooth flow of interaction through use of appropriate but flexible frames, forms of talk, rituals, and emotion rules (Goffman 1967, 1974; Hochschild 1983). There is almost always a considerable amount of flexibility in role making, but once made and verified over time, the roles that people have made for themselves are more difficult to change (Turner 1962), but the roles that people are expected to play are more likely to allow individuals to meet transactional needs and, thereby, experience positive emotions. As a consequence, it becomes easier to meet all transactional needs.

Once groups become larger or even once smaller groups reveal status differences in (a) divisions of labor and (b) categoric-unit memberships, then their members become increasingly less likely to meet some need states. Inequalities in status translate into inequalities in resource distribution, leadership, authority, and prestige, and these inequalities generate differential expectation states and evaluations of group members. And, these outcomes become more pronounced when status hierarchies emerge, creating status beliefs and expectation states that limit options in role

making and culture making (normalization) which, in turn, make it more likely that lower-ranking individuals will not meet all needs, particularly the most important need states revolving around verification of identities, profitable exchange payoffs, and group inclusion. The longer the group endures, the more likely are members in some encounters some of the time to fall short of meeting their transactional needs, and as a result, an ethos of negative emotion will emerge in the group. And if of fellow lower-status individuals can talk with each other, then beliefs about points of unfairness, exclusion, disrespect, and indignity will codify or begin to be articulated even if they fall short of full-blown generalized beliefs. And as these beliefs form, they can both cause and legitimate conflict.

### *Culture Taking and Culture Making*

Groups almost always reveal a “generalized other,” to use George Herbert Mead (1934) term, which consists of a perspective or “community of attitudes” that is a combination of group norms, status beliefs, expectation states, and if relevant, ideologies and meta-ideologies drawn from the macro realm. At the same time, individuals are normalizing and trying to develop expectations for how to categorize other group members, how to talk with them, how to frame episodes of interaction, how to use rituals to establish frames and to structure the interpersonal flow, and how to feel and express emotions in accordance with feeling and display rules (Hochschild 1979, 1983). These normalizing processes are at the core of what I am calling culture taking and culture making in which individuals discern relevant elements of culture and, at the same time, try to make certain elements of culture pertinent to members of the group. The longer the group lasts, the more individuals come to implicit agreements about the culture that will guide their actions. At the same time, group members generate a “particularized culture” consisting of representations of their common experiences in the group, and mix these with macro-level cultural elements pulled from (a) macro structures, (b) more inclusive corporate-unit culture, and (c) expectations developed during the process of normalization. As this culture is developed, the group will have a more micro-level basis produced by emotional arousal and the particularistic culture generated in iterated encounters. This mix of emotions and culture will increasingly moralize the activities of individuals in the group and the group itself.

Just how this culture is built up depends on the demography and ecology of the encounters over time, the status order, the roles that can be played,

and the success in meeting transactional needs. Depending upon how these micro processes play out, the ratio of positive to negative emotions aroused over time will vary. If emotional arousal has been mostly or entirely positive, then the culture will emphasize attachments to others, group commitments, reverence of and ritual toward group symbols (even in a low-key manner), and anger-driven sanctioning for those who deviate from this culture will occur (whether subtle or aggressive). The opposite is the case when experiences have been negative, at least for a segment or faction of the group. Consistent tensions in culture taking and making will persist, with normatization not being wholly successful. Or, there will be *alienation* or *anger* with individuals only giving minimal conformity to the expectations in the culture that evolves “from the ground up” and in the mixes with the culture of meso- and macro-level units in which the group is embedded.

For instance, having been a member of my department of sociology for well over 40 years, I have seen the culture of the department change, and significantly so, over time. The meso- and macro-level culture typical of a research university has remained relatively constant, but the culture of the group (the department) has changed depending upon what has transpired on the ground. When the department was relatively young, when I first came to UCR, the demography and ecology favored high rates of interaction among a large number of new assistant professors, almost half the total faculty. We all had offices on one floor, with doors open and constant chatter, while the senior faculty stayed away and generally kept their doors shut. There was a great deal of positive emotional arousal, and interactions spread to going out to lunch, drinking beer, and playing pool, and entertaining at each other’s homes. Because there was considerably more status consciousness among the more senior at that time, the junior faculty became a faction that was often in quiet conflict with the senior faculty who met separately before each faculty meeting (as the “executive committee”), although they allowed for one junior faculty representative and one graduate student representative (which only added to perceived status differences). As senior faculty left and retired, as half the junior faculty left and those that remained became senior, and as new junior and senior faculty were recruited, the culture changed significantly. There was less solidarity among junior faculty, and factions now split along more political and professional lines, and conflict became much more overt and often intense, even during a time when status differences were being downplayed within the department’s culture (e.g., no more “executive committee” of senior faculty; all faculty of any rank could vote on all merit increases and promotions). Thus, it was the ideological differences that generated negative emotions during and after

faculty meetings about those in the “other” faction. The result was that the tensions between members of the faculty reduced rates of interaction between members of different factions; more faculty stayed home rather than worked at the office; how to implement general normative requirements of the more inclusive unit (the university) became an arena of conflict; hiring became a game of counting which faction would gain votes, and so it went for almost 20 years. Eventually severe conflict occurred between the two cultures that had emerged, and to this day, there is an uneasy tension but interesting effort among the faculty to “get along” and successfully verify each faculty member’s role identity (as an academic), to normatize at least faculty meetings and day-to-day interactions, to allow individuals to play out their roles, and to de-emphasize status differences. Solidarity is not high, but neither is the level of conflict potential. There is no Durkheimian (1984[1912]) “effervescence” as there once was when I first came, but the factions are not so clearly defined as at the moment of the great explosion causing conflict, and thus the department is less polarized. Who knows what the future will bring, but the conflicts all began with individuals trying to impose different academic and professional cultures (basically around whether or not sociology should be value-free and scientific or normative and activist); the split is still there, but the effort to avoid conflict has pushed members to renormatize the department so that this conflict can be avoided. Anyone who has been in an office or academic department has seen similar process play out over time, as the demography of the group changes and as individuals re-culture-take and remake the culture; the result is that a new micro culture emerges that significantly changes the broader culture and mood of the group, at least for a time.

### ***Status Taking and Making, Role Taking and Making***

The micro culture of a group varies with the level of status differentiation and the ability of individuals to role-take successfully and, more importantly, to make viable and rewarding roles for themselves. Hierarchies of authority and consolidation of devalued and valued categoric-unit members with the hierarchy of status positions will arouse more negative emotions, per se. These inequalities also decrease people’s ability, especially those at the bottom of the hierarchy and in devalued categoric units, to be successful in culture making, status making, and role making. In turn, these reduced abilities to successfully execute cultural, status, and role dynamics block individuals’ capacities to meet transactional needs. The consequence is that more intense negative emotions will be produced over time and become

part of the “mood” of the group, and this mood may be codified into negative generalized beliefs about unfairness and other ills stemming from inequalities. However, these tendencies can be mitigated by the fact that individuals at the bottom of the status hierarchy have dramatically lowered expectations and are less likely to invest too much emotional energy in status- and role-making efforts, nor in efforts at verifying self, making a profit, and meeting other transactional needs when the cards are stacked against them. Roles distance and displays of alienation are often a defensive response to being unable to have much control over interpersonal actions, but even though these kinds of actions signal an interpersonal distance, the emotional state of *alienation* is still built upon *anger* and, thus, is always a potential source of conflict.

### ***Situational Ecology and Demography***

When ecological space is unequally available to individuals at particular status locations in the group or to members of devalued categoric units, these status processes, by themselves, arouse negative emotions. Who can come to, move through, and leave space is often determined by status in larger corporate units or by locations in the stratification system. These processes can also operate at the group level, especially with group segregation by status and categoric-unit membership. Or, in larger groups, there can be restrictions on who can use space and various territories. For example, students cannot use the podium in a large lecture class, and this partitioning of space emphasizes our status differences and my (limited) power, but students generally accept this level of situational ecology as a marker of status as appropriate. Thus, unless use of ecological space by only some demographic categories is a result of open discrimination justified by status beliefs and/or prejudicial beliefs, situational ecology and demography are probably the least important micro-dynamic forces affecting the culture and emotional mood of a group. Still, secret meetings behind closed doors, grabbing the head of a table in a meeting, and other uses of space can generate conflicts or can be markers of status differences that place others in the group in subordinate positions, thereby arousing negative feelings and generalized beliefs. For example, one of the chancellors of my university deliberately chose to sit in the middle of one side of a table, rather than at either end, to emphasize her just being “one of us.” Since she was small, it was often hard to see or even hear her in a larger meeting when she did this, and since we all knew highest-status person who in the room was and who, in the end, would make the final decisions, we used to grumble that it

seemed like a futile gesture since the salience of status remained and the seating arrangement was inconvenient for those at either end of the table, especially her side of the table. I suggested in a personal communication that she might assume her rightful place at the head of the table, but she preferred this symbol of our being “a group of equals.” Ironically, her actions only highlighted that we were not, and in fact, resentments were aroused because many had to work “too hard” at conversations because they could not see her face or hear her when she spoke—thus violating expectation states about how “leaders” should act. Thus, the point is that space and demography (who is present, who can immigrate or emigrate into and out of the group at will, who will sit where, or who can move around when the group is formed) can be used to highlight status differences or to mitigate these differences, and if there is a persistent pattern in situational ecology and demography among members of a group over time, then it can have large effects of the micro environment of the group—even if not intended.

## Elementary Principles of Group Dynamics

As is evident in the principles developed below, I have not reviewed all group dynamics—as the many textbooks on the topic did in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>2</sup> Nor have I tried to develop a model of groups per se. Rather, my goal is to recognize that groups are an emergent meso-level property of the social universe, despite their often small size and short histories, that connects the micro level of the encounter to the meso and ultimately to the macro level of social organization. It is in groups that micro dynamics play out, affecting what occurs in the group but, more importantly for my goals in *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*, what occurs in larger-scale corporate units like organizations and communities. And I also have sought to show that the distribution of categoric-unit members in groups affects not just the dynamics of the group but also the dynamics of other corporate units and, ultimately, macro-level sociocultural formations.

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<sup>2</sup>See, for example, Acock et al. (1974), Bales (1950), Cartwright and Zander (1968), Crosbie et al. (1975), Dunphy (1972), Festinger et al. (1950), Golembiewski (1962), (Foschi and Lawler 1994), Hare (1976), Berlpwotz (1978), Hollander (1964), Homans (1950), Mills (1967), Newcomb (1979), Olmstead (1959), Ridgeway (1983), Shaw and Ashton (1976), Shepart (1964), Sherif and Sherif (1953), Steiner (1972), and Thibaut and Kelley (1959).

It is true, however, that I am making the persistent mistake of emphasizing micro-level processes that operate in groups rather than the properties of groups and their unique characteristics in particular locales. But in response to critics like Gary Alan Fine, I did not write this chapter to celebrate the importance of group formations alone; instead, my focus is on how groups as one type of corporate unit are part of the larger picture of how the entire social universe operates. Indeed, to turn the critique around, if groups are the tensile strength of social reality, it is important to understand theoretically how they are part of the larger social universe.

6. The smaller the groups are, the more likely will they meet the conditions listed under principle 8 below, and thereby evidence:
  - A. Higher rates of interaction among group members
  - B. Higher density of networks among group members
  - C. Higher ratios of positive to negative emotions
  - D. Higher levels of attachment to, and solidarity with, group members
  - E. Particularized cultural capital among group members
  - F. Emotional arousal and creation of symbols or totems for marking group boundaries and group solidarity
  - G. Righteous anger among group members when violations of group norms or when failure to enact rituals directed at group symbols occur
  
7. The larger the groups become, the more likely will they reveal the converse of the outcomes listed under 6 above, and the less likely will they meet the conditions under 8 below and thereby evidence:
  - A. Subcliques or subgroups potentially in conflict
  - B. Patterns of centrality, brokerage, and bridging among subcliques
  - C. Differentiation among status positions, impregnated with status beliefs and expectation states, especially if:
    1. Status positions are differentiated along a hierarchy of authority
    2. Status positions in this hierarchy are consolidated with memberships in devalued and valued categoric units
  
8. Regardless of group size, groups will arouse positive emotions among group members and thereby increase (a) attachments to and solidarity among group members and (b) commitments to the group and more inclusive corporate units in which the group may be embedded, if and when:
  - A. Status-organizing processes enable all group members to meet expectation states
  - B. Challenges to, and conflict over, the status order are not seen as necessary in light of 8-A. above

- C. Members of a group perceive that they are engaged in joint tasks and shared responsibility for outcomes
  - D. Members perceived that they possess efficacy and that relevant identities are verified
  - E. Individuals perceived that they have consistently met expectations and received positive sanctions across many iterated encounters
  - F. Parameters marking categoric-unit memberships intersect and are of low salience
  - G. Members produce a joint private good consisting of positive emotions attached to particularistic culture and symbols of this culture that becomes highly valuable, thereby making individuals dependent on groups and raising exit costs from the group
9. The more the conditions listed in 6 and 8 above are consistently met in groups embedded in diverse corporate units across a variety of institutional domains, the more likely will individuals develop commitments to the ideologies and structures of these institutional domains, and to the degree that they perceive that their resource payoffs are fair and just, they will also develop commitments to the existing rank ordering of social classes and the meta-ideology legitimating this class system
10. The more groups are embedded in more inclusive corporate units (organizations and communities), especially organizations but also communities, the more macro-level structural arrangements and culture as well as modes of macro-level integration will filter down to the group via the conduits provided by the more inclusive corporate unit and, in so doing, the more they will dominate the sociocultural field of groups, thereby increasing the constraints on group members imposed by:
- A. The generalized symbolic media for talk and discussion of the institutional domain in the more inclusive corporate unit in which a group is embedded
  - B. The institutional ideologies and norms of the domain on norm formation in the more inclusive corporate in which a group is embedded
  - C. The meta-ideologies legitimating stratification and the consolidation of valued and devalued categoric-unit parameters with:
    - 1. Locations in the vertical division of labor in organizational corporate units
    - 2. Locales (neighborhoods/sectors) of community corporate units

11. The more embedded are groups in the divisions of labor of an organizational corporate unit, the greater will be:
  - A. The clarity of meanings with respect to:
    1. Situational ecology and demography
    2. Status in the division of labor
    3. Diffuse status characteristics
    4. Role-taking and role-making options
    5. Culture-taking (normatization) and culture-making options
    6. Goals and tasks to achieve goals
  - B. The ability of individuals to know which meet transactional needs can be met to what degree
12. The more hierarchical is the division of labor in an organizational corporate units in which groups are embedded, the more will the conditions list under 11 above will be met, and the greater will be:
  - A. The clarity of leadership status, goals, and required task activities
  - B. The restrictions on use of situational ecology by group members
  - C. The restraints on status making and the constraints imputed by status beliefs and expectation states
  - D. The restrictions on members of devalued categoric to secure high- and moderate-resource distributing positions in the division of labor, especially if:
    1. Discrimination against devalued and in favor of valued categoric-unit members is systematic and legitimated by the meta-ideology of the stratification system
    2. Discrimination is legitimated by prejudicial beliefs and stigmatizing status beliefs selectively derived from the meta-ideology of the stratification system
  - E. The limits on role-making options of group members, especially those in groups population by devalued categoric-unit members and/or by those in lower-level positions in the vertical division of labor
  - F. The limits on culture making by group members at all positions in the division of labor
  - G. The likelihood of not fully meeting all transactional needs for identity verification, profits in exchanges, and group inclusion for all group members, with the result that:
    1. The arousal of negative emotions will increase among a larger proportion of group members

2. Culture making, despite restrictions, will begin to carry a tone of negative emotionality that will, in turn, affect:
  - a. Role playing
  - b. Normatization
  - c. Acceptance of status beliefs
13. The more horizontal is the division of labor in a corporate unit, the more likely are group boundaries of groups in these units to be open and the more group structure, culture, and dynamics to converge with the dynamics in less embedded groups (see 14 below), and in particular:
  - A. Leadership will be more collaborative than authoritative
  - B. Status differences will be less salient, as will status beliefs and expectation states attached to these beliefs
  - C. Culture making, status making, and role making will be given more latitude
  - D. Situational ecology and demography will be less consolidated with status differences
  - E. Transactional needs will be more likely to be realized by all group members
  - F. Positive emotions will be aroused in most encounters and tied to the particularistic culture that emerges in the group which, in turn, will become a private good and valued resource among group members
14. The less embedded is a group within the structure and culture of a more inclusive corporate unit, then:
  - A. The less will be effect of more inclusive corporate units like organizations and communities as well as more general institutional domains on group formation and interaction, and the more latitude will group members have in culture making and taking (normatization), status making and taking, role making and taking, and use of situational ecology
  - B. The more likely will they be able to meet all transactional needs through the processes listed in 14-A above
  - C. The more likely will their niche consist of the micro environment generated by iterated interactions, and the less power in general will macro-level culture have on group interactions
  - D. The more likely will the conditions under 14-C above prevail, the more likely is the production of a private joint good that will become increasingly valuable to group members, thereby making them more dependent upon, and hence less likely to leave, the group

15. The more institutional integration revolves around domination, the more likely are corporate units to reproduce hierarchies of superordination and subordination, and the more likely are ideologies and meta-ideologies to legitimate these hierarchies, with the result that:
  - A. Groups embedded in more inclusive corporate units, especially organizations, are more likely to be structured hierarchically, with:
    1. Clear leadership status positions and expectation states
    2. Status beliefs and norms derived by ideologies and meta-ideologies
    3. Roles delimited by locations in the status hierarchy
    4. Situational ecology and demography reinforcing hierarchies
    5. Limitations on the capacity of subordinates to realize transaction needs
  - B. Less embedded groups, if they exist, are more likely to seek their place in the hierarchies of community corporate rather than organizational units and, as a consequence, are less likely to evident the structure and cultural properties listed under 15-A above
16. The more institutional integration is achieved through structural interdependencies revolving around free markets, democratic polity, and positivistic and universalistic law, the more likely are ideologies and meta-ideologies to emphasize freedom, opportunities, individualism, and universalism, with the result that:
  - A. Groups, in general, are more likely to have flexibility and options in culture making and taking, status taking and making, role taking and making, and use of situational ecologies
  - B. Embedded groups are more likely to lose some of this flexibility when divisions of labor evidence hierarchies of authority
  - C. Consolidation of devalued and valued categoric memberships with corporate units and their division of labor will decline, with increased intersections decreasing the salience of parameters marking memberships in categoric units
  - D. Group structure, culture, and dynamics will be more likely to converge with the conditions listed under 13 and 14 above
17. The more groups build up a micro-level culture that enables individuals to culture-make, status-make, role-make, and use situational ecology in ways that generate positive emotions and allow individuals to meet transactional needs, the more powerful this culture will be; the more this culture stands at variance with the culture of larger corporate units and/or macro-level institutional domains and/or stratification systems, the

more likely will the group find itself in conflict with other groups within corporate units, and if this conflict persists, the more likely will this group begin to form corporate(s) units designed to change the social structure and culture of institutional domains

- A. The more unequal the distribution of resources among groups, whether embedded or not, the more likely are groups with fewer resource shares to develop an emotionally charged culture for conflict and change with other groups and the corporate units in which these groups are embedded
- B. The more inequalities in resource distribution are consolidated with memberships in devalued and valued categoric units, and the more group formations are segregated by their members' categoric-unit memberships, the more likely is the emotionally charged culture to revolve around positive emotions among members who mobilize negative emotions toward other groups and the corporate units in which these groups may be embedded
- C. The more these emotionally charged groups can begin to restructure themselves into an organization with clear goals, and the more they can recruit other individuals, groups, and corporate units to these goals, the more likely are they to initiate a social movement, and the more demographic, material, and symbolic resources they can mobilize, the more successful is this movement to be in generating change at the macro level of social organization
- D. The more emotionally charge groups have developed generalized beliefs about the causes of their plight, but have developed counter-ideology, leadership, or organizational structure coordinating groups for clearly articulate goals, the more likely are periodic outbursts of violence with other groups, organizations, or neighborhoods/sectors of community

## Conclusion

I originally wrote this chapter as a section of a very long chapter on all corporate units—groups, organizations, and communities. In mercy to the reader who would face a 250-page chapter, I broke it down into separate chapters on each type of corporate unit. And even then, the chapters are still very long. As I broke the text on corporate units down into several chapters, it became apparent that there is a substantively more important reason for doing so. Each type of corporate units is an emergent phenomenon, revealing

distinct properties that channel micro-dynamic and macro-dynamic forces in different ways. Even when groups are embedded in organizations, and organizations in community units (and at times, vice versa), processes operating in groups are different in many ways than those in organizations and communities, and the same is true for organizations and communities. In a sense, since they are unique structures, each deserves its own chapter. Moreover, by focusing at on each types of corporate unit, I will not be tempted to give theoretical priority to any one—at least not in the initial summary of their dynamic properties.

By isolating out group dynamics first, it is easier to emphasize that groups represent an emergent phenomenon that, in most cases, are the link between micro-dynamic processes in encounters and the rest of the social universe. The first structural unit created by humans 200,000 years ago (and perhaps earlier by *Homo erectus* or even earlier in hominin evolution) was the group. Whether it was the band or nuclear family that came first is hard to know, but my guess is that it was the band because it is likely that bands organized hominins before nuclear kinship units emerged, but again, there are no clear data on the matter, since social structures do not fossilize. Either way, the group was essential to human survival, and it was the primary sociocultural basis for human adaptation to the environment for at least 185,000 years. The macro universe did not exist except its role activities of members of bands and kin units, but the potential was there for the dramatic expansion of the macro realm, once humans began to create more permanent communities that would allow populations to grow and set off the “big bang” of human evolution. As institutional domains began to differentiate after the big bang, organizations bundled and connected groups for particular types of adaptive responses to selection pressures, and as they did so, communities expanded and the number of groups in human societies exploded. But this was a controlled explosion because most groups expanded within the structure of more inclusive corporate units that channeled this growth for adaptive purposes.

At first, there was the encounter, then game the group, and after the first communities, true organizations trying to solve diverse adaptive problems, which led to the differentiation of institutional domains, the evolution of stratification, and the construction of macro societies—something only insects had been able to do until the big bang of human evolution occurred. But, Roger Brown’s famous quote—“the smart money is on the insects” in the long run—should give us pause for doubt about how fit human macro societies are in the future. It is not inconceivable that humans will de-evolve back to smaller, group formations.

The principles articulated above are designed to tie into those presented in Volumes 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* and in Chap. 3 on categoric units; the same will be true as I move into communities as a form of social organization and then to organizations as a basic type of corporate unit in Chap. 7. And, with Chap. 8 on a special type of organization—social movement organizations—I can complete the picture of the meso realm standing between the micro-dynamic and macro-dynamic realms.

## Chapter 6

# The Dynamics of Organizations

Without organizations, societies could not become very large because the structural capacities of groups are limited because they can only coordinate relatively small numbers of individuals. Thus, if human populations and society were to grow, they needed a new, more complex type of sociocultural formation to coordinate larger numbers of individuals. Unilineal kinship and more permanent community formations were the first big evolutionary step of human populations toward increased complexity, and indeed, they created the structural base that first allowed populations to grow significantly. And, as populations continued to grow, selection pressures favored differentiation among organizations for managing diverse selection pressures, thereby creating institutional domains that were no longer fully embedded in kinship and larger community structures.

With population growth and the emergence of organizations as a distinct sociocultural systems, the macro realm of social reality, which had been compressed inside nuclear kinship units and bands for millennia, could now emerge and become the macro-level environments—institutional domains and stratification systems—for all corporate units. This macro reality was built from organizations that coordinated groups and distributed resources unequally, thus creating institution domains and stratification systems. These new macro-level sociocultural formations required the organization of space, which was provided by communities and, at times, systems of communities operating as yet another macro-level environment of corporate units.

Thus, as organizations focused on particular problems of adaptation, they became the structural basis of each new institutional domain in a process of institutional differentiation that continues to this day. The basic structure of

organizations is, at a very general level, similar in all domains: horizontal and vertical divisions of labor organizing groups of individuals, regulated by a system of authority. However, the goals of organization vary, depending upon the institutional domain that is being built up through the proliferation and differentiation of organizations and their cultures. These organizational cultures have been constructed from generalized symbolic media that are used for discourse and ideological formation, while at the same time, often being the valued resources unequally distributed by the corporate units of each domain. Organizational goals and culture more than their general structures, then, are what distinguish organizations in one domain from those in another domain. And, as symbolic media began to circulate—first, *money* and *authority* and, later, media from virtually all domains—the culture of domains often overlapped as symbolic media and meta-ideologies built from the ideologies of each domain developed. Still, despite overlap and what some might critically view as “colonization” of the life world of one domain by another (Habermas 1973[1976]), each domain still has a unique pattern of overlap and a unique culture composed of generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and meta-ideologies.

As organizations within an institutional domain distributed valued resources—typically generalized symbolic media indigenous to a domain and the media from other domains that had penetrated this domain (say, *money* and *authority*), stratification as a macro structure emerged. The culture of this system of stratification varied by class locations of individuals (as determined by their respective resource shares), while the system as a whole was legitimated by the symbolic media and ideologies of dominant institutional domains that have been used to forge a meta-ideology.

With organizations as the building blocks or institutional domains and as the distributors of resources that ultimately build out a stratification, the structural basis of the macro realm was in place, perhaps 10,000 years ago. Institutional domains and stratification system, in turn, became the building blocks of societies and intersocietal systems. At the same time, generalized symbolic media used in discourse and exchanges of resources led to the formation of ideologies and meta-ideologies through (a) the application of evaluative tenets inherent in the symbolic media themselves and through (b) the incorporation of generalized values among a population. The long-term outcome of these processes has been the evolution of sociocultural formations of the macro realm. Even though this macro reality is built up from organizations, it becomes the macro-level environment for all other corporate units and for almost all encounters, providing both fields and niches for the operation of organizations.

## The Macro-level Environments of Organizations

Drawing from the analysis in Chaps. 1 and 2, I conceptualize the macro-level environment of organizational corporate units as composed of several inter-related processes: (1) selection pressures, (2) cultural and structural fields, and (3) resource niches. Let me elaborate on each of these because they are critical to understanding the dynamics of organizations.

### *Selection Pressures*

Selection pressures can be of two basic types: (a) *Spencerian* and (b) *Durkheimian* (Turner and Maryanski 2008a, b). Most organizational sociology has emphasized Durkheimian or a social version of Darwinian selection, which is a key property of niches (see below) because, as the density of organizational formations within a niche increases, so does competition for resources in this niche, causing a variety of outcomes, such as specialization of some organizations, movement of others to new niches, and death for those that cannot compete within a niche or move to a new niche (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Runciman 2009). In contrast to Durkheimian selection is Spencerian selection, where a population faces problems of adaptation, regardless of dynamics in Durkheimian niches, that must be resolved to sustain the population. These pressures driving Spencerian selection come from population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction, as summarized in Table 1.2 on p. 17.

Spencerian selection pressures cause organizational creation and/or change. New types of organizations are more likely to be created under Spencerian than Durkheimian selection pressures because entrepreneurs mobilize diverse and often new sets of resources (from various niches) to create divisions of labor devoted to solving particular problems generated by macro-dynamic forces. Organizational foundings can also increase under Durkheimian selection pressures in a niche, but the evolution of societies depends more upon innovations in organizations to deal with new and generally more intense Spencerian selection pressures from population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction. These foundings either create new, differentiated formations within an existing institutional domain or they are part of the process whereby a new institutional domain becomes differentiated from existing domains.

## *Structural and Cultural Fields*

**Cultural Fields.** Culture can be defined as symbol systems created by actors to coordinate and legitimate activities (Parsons 1951, 1960). A cultural field is thus the symbol systems that are used by organizations to organize activities designed to meet goals.<sup>1</sup> And, as I stress below, they can also become one of the important resources that organizations can secure from a niche. But here, I want to emphasize that culture represents a field that has large effects on organizations along a number of dimensions. First, the level of differentiation of culture among texts, technologies, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms affects the rate of founding, levels of differentiation among organizations, and modes of legitimizing organizational forms. The more culture there is to draw upon, the greater will be the knowledge and capacity for cultural regulation available to organizations. And, when technologies, texts, values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies are differentiated from each other, there is an even greater variety of cultural resources on which entrepreneurs can draw.

Second, the degree of integration within and between differentiated systems of culture also has large effects on organizations. When knowledge, technology, texts, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and norms are internally consistent and consistent with each other, this integration among cultural systems increases the coherence of culture and the ability of organizations to adopt element of cultural fields that do not stand in contradiction to other cultural elements. When ideologies incorporate values that in turn constrain the formation of institutional norms, cultural contradictions are reduced and, hence, are more effective in regulating the activities of organizations. When meta-ideologies embody ideologies that do not stand in contradiction, they can be used effectively by organizations in diverse institutional domains to regulate their activities and to legitimate these activities.

Third, the rate and scope of circulation of generalized symbolic media is an outcome of organizations in diverse domains exchanging with each other, thereby increasing integration through structural interdependencies (see below). At the same time, the circulation of media increases the flow of ideologies across domains and their integration into meta-ideologies. The

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<sup>1</sup>There is a great deal of literature on “fields” and “logics” of culture. Still, these concepts remain surprisingly vague. For relevant discussions, see DiMaggio (1986, 1990, 1994, 1997), DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991), Meyer and Rowan (1997), Zucker (1983, 1988), and Friedland and Alford (1991).

result is that institutional domains become less isolated from each other and more likely to develop meta-ideologies that provide for cultural regulation of diverse types of organizations operating in different domains. For example, if organizational corporate units in education, science, polity, law, and economy all exchange their indigenous media, then implicit meta-ideologies form and reduce tensions that might exist between the generalized media of each domain and the unique ideologies created from these media. In contrast, if media and ideologies of different domains stand in conflict or contradiction—say, among *sacredness/piety*, *learning*, and *knowledge*—cultural integration is reduced, and organizations in the institutional domains using these media and the evaluative ideologies created from them will be in tension, if not conflict.

And fourth, in addition to forming around corporate units engaged in exchanges across diverse institutional domains, meta-ideologies also emerge from dominant resource-distributing organizations to legitimate the stratification system. These latter meta-ideologies legitimate (whether for the good or bad is not the question here) differential treatment of members of categoric units and, more generally, unequal treatment of members of various social categories. When sets of meta-ideologies legitimating stratification and arising from inter-institutional exchanges are consistent, they provide for an extended (across domains) cultural field for organizations in these diverse domains.

Thus, the more integrated are cultural fields, the more coherent are the “logics” of culture,<sup>2</sup> and the more easily they can be used to construct a culture within an organization and to legitimate the goals and activities of any given organization to members of the society as a whole. As all organizational theorists emphasize,<sup>3</sup> new organizations or changes in existing organizations must be legitimated to operate effectively. And so, if the culture that they draw upon is internally consistent and integrated across texts, knowledge, technologies, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and norms, it is easier to use culture as a resource to structure the

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<sup>2</sup>This notion of field is most evident in the “new institutionalism” and some of its critics who argue for the retention of the “old institutionalism.” See Abrutyn and Turner (2011a), Abbott (1992), Barley and Tolbert (1997), Barnett and Carroll (1993), Dacin (1997), Douglas (1986), Fligstein (2001), Hirsch (1997), Meyer (1983), Rowan (1982), Sahlin-Anderson (1996), Sahlin-Anderson and Engwall (2002), Scott (1987, 1994a, 1994b, 2005, 2008a, b), Scott and Meyer (1983), Stinchcombe (1997), Thornton (2004), Tolbert and Zucker (1983, 1996), and Zucker (1983).

<sup>3</sup> Douglas (1986), Fligstein (2001) and Friedland and Alford (1991).

divisions of labor in corporate units and to legitimate the goals and activities of the unit as a whole (Selznick 1957: 15–19). Naturally, no society has perfect consistency within and among symbol systems nor are these ever fully integrated, and to the extent that they lack consistency and integration, cultural tension and conflict pose barriers to organizational foundings and their integration at a structural level. For instance, if societal-level texts are biased toward religion and its symbolic medium and ideologies, organizational foundings in the institution of science can become problematic, and organizations in the educational domain will have difficulty in using *learning* as a medium once it deviates from the beliefs built up from the medium of *sacredness/piety* in religious texts and their interpretation.

Culture is most powerful and useful when its “logics” are reasonably consistent and integrated. Because culture carries morality down to the person in encounters within the divisions of labor of corporate units and because the operation of corporate units depends upon these moral cultural codes, contradictions and inconsistencies soon become moralized and polarized, thereby increasing their potential for causing conflict among or within organizations. Cultural logics—admitting to how vague this term is—operate best when they reveal internal consistency and integration across different systems of culture, as is outlined in Table 2.2 on pp. 79–83. And, it is under these conditions that they can be used to frame and legitimate new types of organizations in response to selection pressures and, thereby, to increase the adaptability of a population.

**Structural Fields.** At the macro level of social organization, the most immediate structural field of any organization consists of (1) the institutional domains of a society and (2) this society’s stratification system. Of particular importance, I believe, are the mechanisms that integrate organizations within and between domains (Turner and Boyns 2001; Turner 2010a; Abrutyn and Turner 2011). As summarized in Table 2.3 on pp. 84 to 90, there are five basic mechanisms: structural *segmentation*, structural *differentiation*, structural *interdependence* (revolving exchanges, overlaps, inclusions, and mobility), *domination*, and *segregation*. Depending upon which set or configuration of these is operative in the environment of an organization, the structural field of an organization will vary. When segmentation is dominant, the structural (and cultural) field of an organization is simplified and provides a clear template for mimetic processes; when differentiation and interdependencies are the dominant mechanisms, integration is more chaotic but offers more options for organizations as they build up their structures and cultures; when domination and segregation are the principal forms of integration, organizational fields consist of relations of superordi-

nation–subordination that simplify the field but that also make this field highly constraining, inflexible, and tension producing. Institutions can vary by which mechanisms operate, as can interinstitutional modes of integration, but we can group these into three sets that tend to prevail in most societal formations.

One set is segmentation, which is typical of very simple societies, but which can also exist within a resource niche or within a sector of an institutional domain. Even in market-driven and highly differentiated societies, segmentation within particular market niches or in fields of other domains is quite common. In fact, organizations as a corporate unit represent a kind of segmentation because, as I mentioned earlier, they reveal similar properties: boundaries, divisions of labor that are both horizontal and vertical, levels of authority, codified norms, and other features of Max Weber's (1968[1922]) famous ideal type. Thus, even as goals and culture of organizations differ, they reveal high levels of segmentation in their structural form and thus provide templates for mimicry. Indeed, competitive markets generally bias market sectors toward mimicry because entrepreneurs tend to copy successful organizations (White 1981, 1988; Hannan and Freeman 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

Another set block or set of integrative processes inheres in structural differentiation and interdependencies, whereby organizations are differentiated from each other and then linked together by exchanges of resources, structural embedding of smaller organizations in more inclusive corporate units, structural overlaps with other organizations within and among institutional domains, and mobility of individuals from organizational units within a domain as well as from organizations in other domains. And, if markets are used to forge these interdependencies, integration can be chaotic but still highly flexible and adaptive, thereby giving any given organization more options than is the case with the other two sets integrative mechanism.

The third set revolves around domination, sometimes coupled with segregation and isolation of certain types of corporate units. Domination typically begins in polity but is then extended to all other domains, with relationships between and within organizations being structured around their relative power and authority. Domination can be franchised, as is the case when polity gives core organizations in the religious, legal, and economic domains authority to regulate other organizations. And, as dictators in early and later industrial societies reveal, domination is not solely the providence of advanced horticultural and agrarian societies but can operate even in more “modern” societal formations. For example, a good portion of the societies in the Middle East or in Southeast Asia are not democratic, with polity

dominating most institutional activity directly or via franchising rights to dominate in nonpolitical institutional domains.

While the second set of integrative mechanisms is prevalent in contemporary societies, the other two sets have been more prevalent until the recent evolutionary history of organizations. Even if domination is not complete, relatively low levels of domination can turn the field of any organization into one regulated by relations of super- and subordination, typically dominated by polity, religion, or core economic organizations.

## *Niches*

A niche is the source of resources necessary to create and sustain organizations over time. In the current literature on organizations, niches are often defined by populations of organizations seeking resources of a given type, while this population is defined by the niches in which they seek resources, thus making the notion of niches somewhat of a tautology (Hannan and Carroll 1987; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Yet, there is something more substantive in the notion of niches because organizations can only be created and sustained by their ability to attract necessary resources to recruit and retain incumbents, to build necessary infrastructures, and to produce a product or service of value to members of an organization and/or members of other organizations.

Niches can be conceptualized beyond current theory in organizational ecology, where emphasis has been on securing a type of material resource (money) through sales in markets (Hannan and Freeman 1977) and a type of demographic resource (members) through recruitment and, at times, paying fees to join an organization (McPherson 1981, 1983, 1988). But these are only a special case of more general material and demographic resources. There are also, I would argue, additional resource niches: technological, organizational, and cultural. For example, while an economic organization certainly seeks profits and hence money in market sectors (the material niche) and workers through labor markets (the demographic niche), they also seek organizational resources like *authority* from polity or models and templates of social structure as well as cultural resources (ideologies and norms) to use in structuring the division of labor and in legitimating an organizational form. Market mechanisms of integration certainly bias ecological analysis toward material and demographic resources, but we should not forget that both the structural and cultural fields of any organization consist of additional types of resources that can also be analyzed from an ecological perspective, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

Niches also vary by their breadth and level of resources (Hannan and Freeman 1977). In some ways, much depends upon the definition of niche. If the niche is as broad as retail sales of productive outputs of goods and services, then the entire commodities' market in the economic domain is simply one big niche. If members, per se, are sought for a voluntary organization, then this niche is as big as the entire population or, to narrow it down slightly, the entire adult population. For the notion of niche to mean something, however, it needs to be defined by the specific types and ranges of resources sought by organizations. And here is where the tautology often enters because this definition is often done in terms of the type of organization: car companies, newspaper publisher, or service clubs are in market niches, respectively, for cars, newspapers, and member. Still, the tautology is actually the way the world is structured: organizations are often defined by the type of resources that they need to survive; and all organizations of this type become both the population of organizations in a niche and the markers of the niche itself. In research, it is easier to live with this tautology, but in theorizing the properties and dynamics of niches, the tautology presents some problems.

The dynamics of niches inhere in the level and diversity of resources of a given niche, the number of organizations seeking these resources, the rates of foundings of organizational types in a niche, the resulting level of density of organizations in a niche, the competition among organizations for resources in dense niches, the selection processes on organizations arising from competition for resources, and the consequences of these selection processes on organizational structure and culture.

There are interconnections between Spencerian and Durkheimian selection pressures. Spencerian pressures intensify as the valences from macro-dynamics forces increase, forcing entrepreneurs to find resources in niches and to draw from the available structural and cultural fields to create organizations that can respond to these pressures. Selection in this case does not occur under density in a niche but in the absence of organizations that can deal with an adaptive problem, and in fact, the necessary niche may not exist either. For example, there may be no material resources available to address the problem, and thus, the niche *and* organization must both be created to resolve a Spencerian selection problem, or the relevant cultural systems or demographics do not exist to deal with a problem, with the result that new kinds of organizations must create the necessary cultural and demographic resources in a niche for other organizations. In either case, once organizations of a type prove successful in dealing with a problem, they will tend to proliferate, mostly by segmentation which, in turn, increases niche density over time, thereby setting off more Durkheimian–Darwinian ecological

dynamics of competition and selection. And if competition and conflict begin to increase the valences for coordination and control among organizations, then Durkheimian selection can generate Spencerian selection pressures emanating from regulation as a macro-dynamic force.

As a general rule, Spencerian selection pressures and empty resource niches will increase rates of organizational foundings, typically through initial innovation and, then, through mimicry of templates that respond successfully to selection pressures from the macro-dynamic realm and/or to effective mining of resources in a niche. These foundings will often increase beyond the carrying capacity of a niche because entrepreneurs are often *unaware* of the tipping point where density becomes too great to support all organizations in the niche (Aldrich 1999; Carroll and Hannan 1990; Baum and Powell 1995; Oliver 1992). As foundings increase, the cultural and structural templates employed by successful organizations in a niche or in dealing with an adaptive problem are copied by drawing from culture (texts, technology, values, ideologies, norms) and existing organizational models (for creating divisions of labor to achieve goals). If these prove inadequate to deal with Spencerian pressures, organizational innovation will increase as entrepreneurs experiment with new organizational forms, new technologies, and new ideologies and norms, but once successful and legitimated, these innovative organizations will be subject to segmentation through mimicry (Suchman 1995: 580–82, 1997; Edelman and Schuman 1997). If mimicry of an organizational form exceeds the carrying capacity of a niche, then organizations may die and, increasingly, some actors begin to recognize that a niche's carrying capacity has been exceeded. As organizational deaths occur, entrepreneurs will try to change existing organizations if they can overcome inertial tendencies of all organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989), or they will begin to create new types of organizations, often through specialization into subniches or through growth and restructuring the organization to compete for resources across the spectrum of subniches within larger niche. Or entrepreneurs may create an entirely new organizational form that can outcompete older forms, although this strategy carries high risks. And at times, organizations will create a new niche in which they and those that follow can move into and hopefully survive.<sup>4</sup>

While density, competition, and selection in niches often decrease the number of organizations in a niche, intense competition can increase the

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<sup>4</sup>Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1989), Aldrich (1999), Moorman and Miner (1998), Pettigrew (1979), Zucker (1983, 1988), and Scott (1987, 1994a, 1994b, 2005, 2008a, b).

degree of differentiation among organizations, as some organizations seek to differentiate themselves within a niche, take an organization to an entirely new niche, or move to becoming either a specialized or its opposite (generalized) organization within a niche. In the case of Spencerian selection, pressures cause differentiation of new organizational forms that increase the level of differentiation among organizations in a society, even as pressures for segmentation through mimicry also operate.

## Micro-level Environments of Organizations

The micro-level environment of organizations is filtered through the group-level corporate units attached to the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in any given organization. Many of the principles developed in the last chapter on groups are useful in determining how encounters within groups generate an environment for an organization. The most important part of this environment is the ratio of positive to negative emotional arousal in encounters iterated over time in the group structures that are linked together to form an organization (Turner 2008, 2010b).

### *Emotional Arousal and Transactional Needs*

Emotions are aroused when (1) individuals seek to meet transactional needs, especially needs for verification of identities, perceptions of profits in exchanges of resources, and sense of group inclusion<sup>5</sup> and when (2) they status-take and make, role-take and make, culture-take and make, and deal with situational ecology and demography. Let me examine each of these separately, beginning with emotions and transactional needs.

**Identity Dynamics.** When individuals are able to verify relevant identities, they will experience positive emotions, whereas when they cannot, they will feel negative emotions. When individuals are incumbent in organizations, they will generally have a *role identity* attached to the positions that they occupy in the division of labor (Burke and Reitzes 1981; Nord

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<sup>5</sup>In other works (Turner 2002a, b, 2008a, 2010b), I have included two other transactional needs: trust and facticity. These needs still operate, but in the context of an organization, I think that they are less central, and so I am not including them in the discussion.

2001); they may also develop a *group identity* with the goals, structure, and culture of the organization, and they probably bring to the organization a series of *social identities* revolving around gender, ethnicity, and perhaps age. And if these identities are important to persons, then their *core identity* will typically be on the line when efforts to verify role, group, and social identities are made in encounters within groups embedded in an organization's division of labor (Turner 2011).

In general, the higher is the status in the vertical division of labor, the more likely are individuals to develop strong role and group identities and the more likely are these identities to be verified. And, if they are verified, individuals will usually invest elements of their core identity in these role and group identities. As these are consistently verified, individuals will begin to make *external attributions* toward the organization, viewing it as an important cause of their positive feelings about self. As these more distal attributions are made, individuals will become committed to the goals, culture, and structure of the organization (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2009; Turner 2002a, b, 2008a, 2010a, b).

These same dynamics can also occur among individuals in lower-ranking positions in the hierarchical division of labor, and they are somewhat more likely to occur when the hierarchy is truncated and the horizontal division of labor does not reveal dramatic differences in the evaluations of status, roles, and groups making up this horizontal division of labor. Yet, when compared to incumbents in higher-status locations in the division of labor, individuals in lower-ranking positions will suffer from the lower level of evaluation of their positions, and even if their role identity is verified, it may not be given much value to a person given its low ranking, thus arousing negative emotions and perhaps even strong negative emotions like *shame*. Under these conditions, individuals will not develop strong group identities with the organization nor will they invoke elements of their core identity and put this identity on the line. When, however, the local group of fellow incumbents develops a local solidarity, often against the more inclusive corporate unit, they may invest core and group identities into their roles as dissidents and gain additional pleasure from the particularistic culture of fellow dissidents. This outcome is, of course, the worst thing that can happen to the larger organization. *Alienation* from and hostility or *anger* toward the larger organizations reduces efficiency and productivity, and especially when these negative emotions cause incumbents to retreat into groups that are committed to sustaining hostile attitudes toward the organization enshrined in a particularistic culture promoting an antiestablishment basis for group-level solidarity. This solidarity becomes a *private good* of great value to

incumbents, and it can keep them from leaving the organization even though they have negative feelings toward the organization as a whole (Olsen 1965; Hechter 1987).

If, however, locations in the division of labor are not dramatically more or less evaluated than other positions, then individuals are more likely to have their role identities verified, and as a result, they are more likely to develop group identities with their fellow incumbents and, if positive emotions are consistently aroused, potentially with the organization as a whole. And if role and group identities are verified, they will begin to invest aspects of their core identity in their role and group identities, with the result that they will develop some commitment, although usually lower than higher-ranking incumbents, to the organization. Flat organizational structures are thus more likely to engender group solidarities and commitments than are highly vertical structures, where authority, material payoffs, and prestige are distributed unequally.

Social identities or identities attached to categoric-unit memberships represent a more complex identity dynamic. When devalued identities—as imposed by meta-ideologies and status beliefs—are correlated with lower-level positions in organizations, this consolidation of low-ranking location in the division of labor with categoric-unit membership verifies this devalued identity, at least in the eyes of those with more-valued social identities. The result is that individuals must experience a kind of double *shame* over devalued identities consolidated with devalued locations in the division of labor and the negative evaluation of their categoric-unit membership by higher-status persons. As a result, they are likely to develop a particularistic culture that is rewarding but often hostile to the larger organizational unit that reproduces patterns of discrimination in the broader society.

If members of devalued categoric units and locations in the divisions of labor *intersect* with each other, especially with locations in the vertical division of labor, then higher-ranking members of devalued categoric units will experience stress because of negative status beliefs in the broader culture, but they will also be able to have their role identity verified as perhaps an accurate reflection of their core feelings and cognitions about their abilities (i.e., core identity), with the result that their stress is compensated by the rewards of rank and prestige, to say nothing of additional amounts of money. Those fellow categoric-unit members in lower-ranking positions will experience relative deprivation and hence negative emotions *if* they use higher-status categoric-unit members as a comparison point for assessing their fate (see below), but if they use fellow incumbents, regardless of categoric-unit memberships, or fellow members of categoric units

outside the organization who are worse off than they are, their emotions will be less negative, although strong commitments are unlikely to develop without the consistent arousal of positive emotions in encounters within the organization.

**Exchange Payoffs.** These identity dynamics can have large effects on exchange payoffs since verification of self is a highly valued, nonmonetary resource (Turner 2002a, b, 2008, 2010b). The converse is also true: when more extrinsic payoffs are considered fair and just, identities are more likely to be verified. But when persons are not able to receive these extrinsic resources, their identities will not be fully verified, with the result that they may try to keep self-investments in roles and groups minimal. As I have emphasized, the *comparison point* or points used by individuals have large effects on whether or not persons feel that they have received a profit in exchange relationships. If the rewards less costs and investments of fellow incumbents in the same or similar positions in the divisions of labor are the comparison point, individuals will see their payoffs as fair when others receive the same rewards proportionate to their investments, or if payoffs differ among incumbents, those with higher extrinsic payoffs must be seen as incurring higher costs and investments (say, seniority). Of course, if the comparison is only in terms of the costs-investments subtracted from rewards, and cost-investments exceed rewards or show little or no profit, comparisons with others having the same experience will not increase the sense of fairness; rather, collective *anger* and a culture built around this anger (with the culture of anger providing rewards as a private good circulating in the group) will emerge, reducing commitments to the organization that decrease productivity. Other comparison points, such as the profits of incumbents in similar locations in like-organizations, the alternatives that incumbents perceive (however accurately) that they might be able secure in another organization, the rewards received by fellow categoric-unit members, or the rewards of similar incumbents in the general pool of workers, can all provide comparison points that influence the sense of fairness and hence emotional arousal. For example, at my university, there is a justified unhappiness among our staff workers in my department over their lack of pay increases in recent years, and yet they do not seem unhappy with the jobs because they tend to invoke comparisons with fellow clerical workers outside the university who are paid less, have fewer vacation days, fewer fringe benefits like dental and medical care, and have risk-laden retirement plans. The result is that, for all of the grumbling, they remain relatively satisfied in their work and reveal rather strong commitments to the department and the university as a whole. Professors are much the same, although there is

a tendency to invoke comparisons to professors at alternative universities (to which they may or may not have access), with the result that professors who make such comparisons appear more chronically unhappy even though they enjoy decent salaries and work loads—not the best but certainly not the worst. Those who are satisfied do not invoke these comparison points of alternatives but instead, fellow professors at the campus or universities that are similar to UCR.

As a general rule, then, when individuals invoke comparison points that allow them to feel that they have made a profit in iterated encounters, they are more likely to commit self to roles, to form group identities, and to invest at least some element so their core self in encounters within organizations. As a result, they will experience more positive emotions and, over time, will develop commitments to the larger organization. The converse is also true: when individuals cannot sense that they have made a profit in iterated encounters, they will try to limit the damage to identities; and they will experience negative emotions and have lower commitments to organizations. They may, however, develop commitments to their local group if the particularistic culture of the group is built upon around discontents of its members allows them to experience positive emotions.

**Group Inclusion.** If identities are not verified and if exchanges do not yield a perception of profit, creating and sustaining a sense of group inclusion becomes problematic. Conversely, when identities are verified, and profits are perceived to have been secured, these outcomes will increase people's sense of group inclusion. As noted above, however, individuals can build a sense of group inclusion when the group's culture and emotional tone revolves around its members shared discontent about the lack of verification of identities by the formal requirements of the organization and their collective anger over the failure to make an exchange profit in work-related activities. At times, members of devalued categoric units will not feel "comfortable" or "at ease" in groups of members of more-valued categoric units. And the same may also be the case for these members of valued categoric units as well, when forced to interact with members of different categoric units.

Even without a large difference in the relative evaluation of members of diverse categoric units, interaction may initially be strained because of cultural differences. Yet, over time, higher rates of interaction will tend to reduce the salience of categoric-unit members, while at the same time, status and performance in the divisions of labor in corporate units will become increasingly important. Or, if the group develops its own culture, whether supportive of or antagonistic to the larger organization, the relevance of the local group and the expectation states that have been developed

in this group will become more important than both diffuse status characteristics and positional status in the division of labor.

### ***Other Micro-dynamic Forces***

Status making and taking, role taking and making, culture taking and making (normatization), interpersonal ecology, and situational demography at the micro level are highly constrained by the culture and structure of organizations (Turner 2010b). As a result, these forces are likely to be well understood and relatively easy to orchestrate and navigate successfully in encounters. And the more formal and hierarchical are the divisions of labor in an organization, the more likely are individuals to succeed in working out each other's status, roles, and culture (normatization), while understanding the meanings of situational ecology and demography. If, however, the division of labor is unclear or changing within an organization, then individuals will have to work at taking and making their respective status, roles, categories, frames, forms of talk and communication, rituals, appropriate emotional displays, use of space and props in the ecology of the encounters, and the meanings of social categories and movements in space. When new kinds of organizations are being created whether from macro-level Spencerian selection pressures or Durkheimian competition with other organizations in a niche, there will be more flexibility in working out how to channel the force of status, roles, culture, ecology, and demography.

If individuals can successfully negotiate status, roles, culture, ecology, and demography in encounters within groups, they are more likely to meet key transactional needs for identity verification, profits from exchanges, and group inclusion. Yet, if the options available for individuals as they respond to these micro-level forces do not allow them to meet transactional needs, the positive emotions that come with success in status making and taking, role taking and making, and culture taking and making will be undone by the negative emotional arousal stemming from failure to meet transactional needs. And even worse, if responding to these other micro-dynamic forces arouses negative emotions, these negative emotions will only escalate the negative emotions associated with not meeting transactional needs.

Thus, for commitments to develop to the organization, people must be able to make acceptable status locations for themselves and to present successfully and positively their diffuse status characteristics or memberships in categoric units; they must be able to make roles and under-

stand the complimentary roles of others so that, at a minimum, role identities can be verified, and they must be able to culture-take and culture-make to establish the categories for the type of activity (work-practical, social, ceremonial), the appropriate level of intimacy, and the relevance of categoric units, if any, the appropriate frames, the types and forms of communication, the necessary rituals, and the emotions to be displayed and felt. If these forces can be tamed in iterated encounters and if they allow for the meeting of transactional needs, then individuals will experience more intense positive emotions and begin to make external attributions to their local group (locale, office, or team) and eventually to the more inclusive organization and, perhaps, even the institutional domain and its culture in which an organization is embedded (Turner 2008, 2010, 2010b, 2011).

### *Emotional Moods*

The notion of emotional “mood” is vague, and alternatives like “emotional climate” are equally vague. What I am trying to denote with this label is that each group within the division of labor develops a modal level and valence of emotional energy as well as a level of commitment to role activities and the larger organization as the encounters in group structures are iterated over time. This “mood” is the outcome of meeting transactional needs, making status and roles for self, and normatizing to establish expectations that individuals must follow. And if activities played out in more public spaces where props and use spaces can be claimed reinforce roles and status of persons, and if their migrations and movement through focused and unfocused encounters can be understood, then situational ecology and demography will allow persons to meet transactional needs and, at the same time, enable others to meet their needs. The result will be a more positive mood in groups.

If all of these forces cause people to feel positive emotions, then the mood of the group will be upbeat and create micro-level environment surrounding the organization that facilitates activities in its division of labor and, thereby, enables the organization to meet its goals. It is, of course, a rare organization where the mood is consistently upbeat and positive, but if the modal state of individuals’ emotions is biased toward the positive, then so will be the mood of the group, which in turn, becomes self-fulfilling because it gives people the confidence to meet needs and successfully respond to pressures from micro-level forces to establish status, roles, culture, and understandings of situational ecology and demography.

## Meso-level Environments of Organizations

### *Corporate Units*

The meso-level environment of an organization consists of other corporate units, as these bring macro- and micro-level forces to any given organization. In Chap. 5, I have already examined the dynamics of one type of corporate unit in the environment of organizations: groups. Whether embedded in organizations or more freestanding and lodged in community corporate units, groups bring the micro environment to an organization and, collectively, establish the mood, ethos, and climate that pervade the organization or sectors of very large organizations. Thus, the elementary principles developed in the last chapter summarize how groups affect organizations.

**Community Environments.** Organizations, even virtual ones, must be located in space. The larger is the community within which an organization is located, the greater will be its influence on the organization, whereas conversely, the more space occupied by an organization or set of similar organizations relative to the total space in a community, the more influence will the organization exert on community dynamics (see next chapter). And the greater the proportion of the population of a community incumbent in an organization or set of similar organizations, the greater will be the influence of organizational structure and culture on the structure and culture of a community. For example, communities where one set of organizations—whether colleges and universities, research parks, entertainment venues, health-care facilities, manufacturing industries, military facilities, financial services, media companies, and the like—will be different because they must respond to culture and structure of the organization and its incumbents. Indeed, these become the principal resource niches for the community, whereas large communities where many different types of organization reside within its borders will generally require organizations to respond to its structure and culture, with the community becoming a series of resource niches—demographic (residents as organizational incumbents and consumers of outputs), material (tax subsidies, land use, and infrastructures from government, and consumers as residents), and even symbolic (history, culture as legitimating forces for an organization).

**Other Organizations in the Environment.** Other organizations, as they are integrated at the macro level, also become a key part of the environment of any given organization. It is typically other organizations that supply many of the resources for a particular organization, and hence, these orga-

nizations represent fields and niches. The higher the rates of exchange within fields of organizations, the more likely are the symbolic media and ideologies of the institutional domain(s) of organizations in this field (e.g., governmental, economic, educational, scientific, religious, etc.) to become part of the culture of an organization, and the greater are pressures for increased isomorphism with exchange partners. And the more defined are the resource niches of organizations, the more likely are organizations in a niche to mimic the culture and structure of successful organizational forms that have been legitimated, although intense competition under conditions of high density in a niche will often force some organizations to specialize, but even here, specializing organizations will mimic those who have already been successful in pursuing this strategy.<sup>6</sup>

The modes of integration of corporate units in the environmental field of any given organization are also critical. Markets are differentiating machines because they allow for diverse preferences of actors to be expressed as demand, thereby forming a series of resource niche for different types of organizations. Moreover, markets are also the mechanisms by which interdependencies among organizations are created and sustained, whether these markets are devoted to commodities, services, technology and knowledge, or labor. Still, even though markets drive differentiation among organizations, competitive pressures of organizations in niches will generally increase mimicry as organizations copy the structure and culture of those organizational forms that have been successful in markets. So markets generate both pressures for differentiation across market sectors and pressures for isomorphism within market sectors.

The existence of polity and law also provides a basis for regulation of interdependencies, with organizations of polity and law constraining the operation of a particular organization and the markets that link organizations within and across institutional domains. If polity and law are structured for domination in all institutional domains, they create relations of superordination and subordination among organizations and for isomorphism among organizations vis-à-vis the state and superordinate organizations franchised

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<sup>6</sup>There is considerable debate over the pervasiveness of isomorphism in organizational fields and niches. The “new institutionalisms” tends to emphasize isomorphism, whereas those who adhere to the “old institutionalism” argue that under certain conditions, isomorphism will give way to differentiation among organizations. For explicit critiques of the “new institutionalism,” see Mizzruchi and Fein (1999), Beckett (2010), Abbott (1992), Stinchcombe (1997), and Abrutyn and Turner (2011a), and for those who suggest isomorphism does not always occur, see Hall and Soskice (2001), Whitley (1994, 1999), Dobbin (1994), Streeck and Thelen (2005), and Hamilton and Biggard (1992).

by the state in diverse institutional domains. Thus, both societies where markets that create sectors (and niches) in which organizations must compete for resources and state-managed patterns of domination generate pressures for isomorphism but by very different mechanisms and with very different consequences for the dynamism of the organizations in their environments.

The network properties of integration among organizations are a critical dynamic of the meso-level environment (Burt 1983). One property of a network is its density, or the total proportion of organizations connected within a niche or field. The greater is this proportion (relative to a situation where every organization is connected to every other organization), the more constraining are the cultural and structural fields of an organization and the more likely will organizations reveal isomorphic tendencies. Conversely, the less dense is the network, the more options will organizations have and, moreover, the more likely will some proportion of them be entrepreneurial and form new organizational forms. Density alone, however, is only one key property of organizational networks. Another property is the relative power of organizations in a network. The greater is the number of organizations dependent upon a single or sets of organizations for needed resources (in a niche), the more likely will dependent organizations be dominated by the organization(s) controlling valued resources (Emerson 1962), and the more likely will there be tensions between dependent and dominate organizations, often leading to conflict and various *balancing operations*, including efforts to coerce resources from dominant organizations, to form coalitions that restrict resources to dominant organizations, to seek other alternatives for resources and thereby reduce dependence, to do without resources and move to new niches, and to specialize and offer resources of greater value to dominant organizations. If domination is a society-wide dynamic, emanating from polity, then there are limits to these balancing operations, whereas if market-driven interdependencies are the principal mechanisms of integration, then organizations have more strategic options in dealing with dominant organization within a domain.

Other properties of networks generate opportunities for domination. One is centralization of a network, where resources must flow through key organizations, thereby giving them power over those organizations that both receive and redistribute resources. For example, the Standard Oil virtual monopoly on the refinement of oil gave them control of producers, distributors, and consumers of oil products, limiting the options of organizations involved in oil production and distribution, to say nothing of consumers looking for better prices. Only when a more powerful actor—i.e., organizations in polity—stepped in and disbanded the Standard Oil monopoly did

this centrality of refinement decline, although for most of the twentieth century, the diverse companies produced by the breakup of Standard Oil have, over time, reconsolidated into an oligarchy.

When an organization is in a position to connect two networks, it gains power if the organizations in the respective networks need to exchange valued resources. There are two forms of such connections (Burt 1992): brokerage and bridging. With brokerage, a situation like that of the Standard Oil monopoly is created because the resources exchanged between producers who pull oil from the ground and distributors of oil to consumers had to go through refining that was largely controlled by Standard Oil. Bridging is a different dynamic, although it can often turn into brokerage if the bridge organization(s) seek to develop brokerage operations. A bridge organization sustains a relationship among two or more networks of organizations that might not otherwise exist, and only if the organizations in each network perceive each other as potential sources of valued resources will there be incentives to form new networks. If the bridge actor seeks to control this sought-after exchange, brokerage situation is established. Yet, like all monopolies that are turned into power advantages, power brokers create incentives to bypass the broker and increase the density of exchanges among the organizations across the two networks. Again, external actors are critical in determining the opportunities to do so. If political (and sometimes religious) domination is the source of society-wide integration, it will likely franchise brokerage advantages to sustain its control and derive some of the profits from brokerage control of organizations, whereas if polity relies upon markets and material incentives to maintain control, it will likely step in when central organizations reveal too much dominance of a market sector and threatens markets and/or stability as dependent organizations mobilize for conflict.

### *Categoric Units*

The distribution of the members of a population across categoric units can be viewed as a meso-level environment of all organizations. The distribution of individuals by their age, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation, social class, and other distinctions and the *status beliefs* that evaluate each of these distributions have large effects on organizations in most societies because, to some degree, most organizations reveal biases—whether intended or not—in the access of individuals to the corporate unit in the first place and, secondarily, to locations in the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in

the organization. Some of these biases may be a simple artifact of members in particular categoric units not seeking access to, or positions in, particular types of organizations. For example, very old and very young persons are not likely candidates for admission to workplace organizations. Yet, more often than not, access to organizations and locations in their divisions of labor have a more systematic bias created and sustained by de facto and de jure discrimination that is legitimated by status beliefs, often drawn from macro-level meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system. The result is consolidation of categoric-unit membership with access to organizations and specific ranges of positions in their divisions of labor. In a society where prejudice and discrimination do not exist, there would be intersections of categoric-unit memberships with all organizations and all locations in the division of labor, with the proportions of memberships in organizations and their division of labor reflecting their proportion of members in the general population, qualified by those such as the very young and old who would not seek access to particular types of organization or who would be overrepresented in organizations (retirement homes, preschools) that cater to their particular needs.

To some degree, the culture of an organization will reflect the culture that incumbents bring to positions in the division of labor as either incumbent or clients of the organization. For example, while women still are overrepresented in clerical positions in organizations, they were dramatically overrepresented in these positions 50 years ago, with the result that the culture of these locations and groups within the division of labor was very much influenced by the status beliefs and expectation states attached to women as a social category. Similarly, factory line work was disproportionately male 60 years ago, and so the culture of the line was very different than it is today because of some intersection between women and industrial assembly lines. Thus, the more locations in the division or labor of an organization are consolidated with memberships in categoric units, the more the culture of these locations will include the culture of members in categoric units and the status beliefs as well as expectation states attached to these diffuse status characteristics. If this consolidation is the consequence of deliberate discrimination, rather than self-selection or merit, then the culture for those in lower-ranking and subordinate positions in the division of labor will be mixed with negative emotions, while among those in higher-ranking positions, the emotions will be more positive since incumbents at these locations are homogeneous, which generally increases solidarity in groups, and are able to secure valued resources like money, power, prestige, and the positive emotions that go with solidarity and rank. The latter's commitment to the organization and its goals will, as a result, be much greater than those

who have felt the sting and limitations imposed by discrimination and the prejudices and status beliefs that legitimate this discrimination.

When discrimination denies members of categoric units differential access to organizations as a whole, those denied access will experience negative emotions like anger and will, over time, begin to form generalized beliefs that lead to social movements that target discriminatory practices. This collective anger and the change-oriented ideologies that grow and spread from this anger are often part of the environment of particular types of organizations. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, schools had to deal with the anger and ideologies that fueled the civil rights movement, and over time, they had to change their practices and admit previously excluded students. The result was considerable change in the goals, structure, and culture of education in the United States, which in turn eventually changed discriminatory practices in other types of organizations to which educated members of categoric units sought access. And, with greater access to other types of organization and locations in their divisions of labor, the culture of most organizations in America changed in significant ways. Thus, when members of categoric units become organized to fight discriminatory practices, the consolidation of categoric membership with access to, and locations in, organizations' changes, and with increased intersection, the culture of an organization loses some of its bias toward the culture of valorized categoric units and begins to incorporate some of the culture of previously devalued categoric units, although there typically remains some bias toward the culture of more-valued categoric units with the expectation that members of less-valued categoric units can assimilate into this culture. Often, the culture will not be portrayed as that of more-valued categoric units but as the culture of the organization as a whole, with the expectations that upwardly mobile members of categoric units adapt and adopt this culture and the behavioral expectations inhering in this culture. And so, even as mobility increases intersections among categoric-unit memberships, access to organizations, and locations in these organizations' division of labor, the burden to adapt falls heavily on those who are mobile, thereby putting additional strains and stresses on them in encounters within the organization. These strains can come out and generate tension, or as is sometimes the case, members of previously devalued categoric units re-segregate themselves in more gilded ghettos outside the organization, where they are under less pressure to interact with, and conform to, the culture of those who previously discriminated against their categoric unit. Thus, while intersection does promote some amalgamation of cultures, and at times, to the point that status beliefs associated with categoric units disappear (Blau 1977, 1994; Turner 2010b), initial intersection always generates tension and

potential conflict. And these tensions can persist across generations and thus become a persistent part of the culture and emotional mood of organizations.

## Organizational Processes

### *Organizational Foundings*

**The Effect of Selection Pressures.** Organizations are often generated by selection pressures, but the nature of the selection pressures makes a great deal of difference in the type and diversity of organizations that entrepreneurs develop. If Spencerian selection pressures cause organizational foundings—that is, pressures from macro-dynamic forces under conditions of few or no organizational forms capable of dealing with these pressures—then the rate and diversity of organizational foundings will initially increase until one form proves more adaptive than others. Once this successful form is legitimated (see more below), segmentation will be more likely to increase through mimicry. In contrast, if new organizational forms are created under Durkheimian or Darwinian selection pressures in dense niches, then new organizations will seek to become variants of existing organizational templates that will, it is hoped, outcompete other variants of the basic template.

There are two strategies for sustaining an organization in a densely populated niche (Hannan and Freeman 1977): *generalization* so that all sectors of the niche can be reached, or *specialization* in order to focus on one niche sector and, in that sector, outcompete generalists. Another strategy is to leave a niche for a new niche or reposition the organization in a niche. For example, as Miller McPherson (1981, 1983, 1988) has documented, service (club) organizations in the United States had to expand to new niches (beyond the governmental and business elites of a community) composed of members of less-elite categoric units in an effort to secure their key demographic resource—members who would also provide the material resources (funds from membership dues) necessary to sustain the organization. Another example is found in J.C. Pennys' department store in the United States, which ceased trying to be a generalist (like Sears, Walmart, and K-mart) because its management saw the writing on the wall as other generalists, such as Wards, Woolworths, and many regional retail generalists, died off in broad retailing niches. Instead, it dropped selling many hard goods like lawn mowers, tools, bikes, wasters and dryers, and other such goods and

began to sell somewhat more higher-end (than previously) soft goods (e.g., clothing).

Of course, once a new organizational form is able to secure resources with an altered structure, mimetic pressures cause other organizations to copy the strategy, thereby increasing niche density and Durkheimian selection pressures. For example, Sears bought higher-end retailer Lands End to compete with Pennys' (and Target), but Sears did so as a generalist and has not been as successful as Pennys and other retailers that become more focused. In all free-market systems, Durkheimian selection pressures are institutionalized, thus creating cultural and structural fields that can become both a constraint on new organizational founding and a part of the resource niche for these new organizational forms.

**The Effects of Resource Niches.** Organizational founding will continue to occur as Spencerian selection pressures push on entrepreneurial actors and as long as maximal density and carrying capacity of a niche are not reached, especially in systems where markets are a principal means of integration *and* niche formation. In contrast, in societies relying on domination, niche densities are kept low by the imposition of relations of superordination and subordination in all resource niches, even in their response to Spencerian selection pressures (at least until these Spencerian pressures begin to cause disintegration of a society).

In general, niches with high levels of resources can support organizational foundings, and as many researchers have emphasized, nascent entrepreneurs are likely to start "reproducer" organizations and innovative organizations because of the perceived advantages of mimicry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Segmentation is thus the most likely route for creating new organizations. However, level of resources alone does not explain the types of organizations that are created nor the dynamics of organizational differentiation. Much depends upon the types of resources that entrepreneurs require to create a new organizational form. As I discussed earlier, there are several different types of resources in distinctive niches that organizations can draw upon, and depending on the level of resources in each niche and the configuration of resources needed to create a new organizational form, the dynamics of foundings will vary.

One resource is *demographic*. Are the kinds of people who are to be incumbents in an organization's division of labor available? Is this demographic niche expanding or contracting? For example, if highly skilled technical workers are required to run a new organization and if they are not available, the foundings will be difficult or, as is often the case, organizations must dip into the demographic niches of other societies. If, in contrast, the demographic niche is large, then foundings are much easier. Yet if large

sectors of a demographic niche are bypassed because the niche has an overabundance of resources, then those left out will experience negative emotions and become a potentially volatile micro-level environment for organizations that are perceived to discriminate. And, indeed, if members of select categoric units are disproportionately the victims of discrimination, the demographic niche will bring the emotions of inequality and stratification system to the front door of organizations and, eventually, to polity and law.

Another resource niche is *material*, revolving around physical capital needed to pay incumbents, to develop infrastructures, and to market productive outputs. Poor nations, for instance, rarely have enough capital, thus preventing organizational foundings in most institutional domains. And, given this need for capital, foundings are often financed by other nation states, thereby promoting dependency and external control by organizations with capital in more powerful nation states. Moreover, this kind of dependency tends to erode the cultural and structural forces necessary for capital formation, thus ensuring that indigenous niches for material resources will remain at a low level and that foreign organizations will dominate material resource niches. Conversely, if material resource niches are well stocked with money and institutional systems for distributing money (e.g., banks, money and capital markets, entrepreneurial organizations with “venture capital,” government control of money policies, etc.), then rates of indigenous organizational foundings will increase and, if free markets exist, so will the ratio of innovative to reproducer organizations. And, as this material capital is used to exploit existing and/or create a new resource niche, organizational foundings will increase the ratio of mimicry to innovation as successful organizations are copied by later entrepreneurs.

Yet another resource niche is *technological*, or knowledge about how to manipulate physical/bio/sociocultural environments. Some of this technological niche overlaps with the demographic because technology is carried in individuals’ heads. Equally if not more important is the degree to which technological innovation is institutionalized in science and education (including research units of economic and political organizations that rely upon education and science). If institutionalization of knowledge-generating organizations is high, then organizations can be more innovative, whereas when this niche has few resources and, in fact, dominated by organizations in, say, religion and polity that can be hostile to new knowledge, then knowledge production is poorly institutionalized, and this resource niche will remain barren. The result is that the rate of organizational foundings will be low, and if foundings occur, they will typically involve mimicry and segmentation of existing organizational forms.

Another resource niche, related to that for technology, is *cultural*. Are symbol systems, such as ideologies and norms, for organizing incumbents

in divisions of labor available? Are there ideologies that allow entrepreneurs to frame a new organizational type to publics and other organizations (Aldrich 2005; Aldrich and Reuf 2006) and, thereby, to legitimate a new organizational type? Is the integration among cultural system high or low? When systems of cultural symbols that are relatively consistent and integrated are available, rates of organizational founding will increase, but the ratio of innovations to mimicry in organizational foundings will depend upon the complexity and variants of cultural symbols. If culture is consistent and integrated but not complex, then segmentation of initially successful foundings will occur, whereas if culture is complex and reveals many variants (even if somewhat less integrated and consistent), then rates of innovative foundings of new organizational forms will increase.

A final resource niche is *organizational*. Organizational resource niches consist of templates for creating copies of existing organizations and, more importantly, new kinds of organizations. The more templates available and the less these templates are bounded by traditions and other particularistic cultural features, the higher will be the rates of founding, and particularly the ratio of innovative to segmental foundings, thereby increasing the differentiation of organization forms and the resource niches “discovered” or created by these new organization. A highly generalized template, such as the rational bureaucracy typified by Weber’s (1968 [1922]) famous ideal type, can be adapted to many new kinds of organizational forms. The same is true of more professional organizations where formality decreases and concern with innovation increases, and once this template (say, for innovative research) exists, it too can be copied, altered, adapted to new goals requiring flexibility, and even blended with other organizational templates.

The mode of institutional integration has large effects on the range of templates that are available to entrepreneurs. If segmentation is the dominant mode of integration, there will be fewer templates and hence less innovation in organizational foundings when they occur. If a range of differentiation-interdependencies modes of integration is available, especially interdependencies generated by free markets, then the number of different templates will be high, and rates of organizational innovation within Durkheimian niches and in response to Spencerian selection pressures will increase, thereby increasing the overall level of differentiation in a society. And as differentiation increases, selection pressures from regulation as a macro-dynamic force will promote additional interdependencies as the principal integrative mechanism within and between organizations in institutional domains. In contrast, if domination and segregation are the prevalent mechanisms of integration, then rates of organizational foundings in general will be comparatively low and mostly mimetic, while the ratio of innovative to segmental foundings will be very low.

The networks among organizations affect the level and types of organizational resources available to any given organization or population of organizations. Not only do existing organizational forms serve as a template on which to model new organizations, they are also sources of other types of resources—demographic, material, technological, and cultural. If networks are dense, then organizations are more interconnected and, thus, the more likely are they to secure demographic, material, technological, and cultural resources from other organizations. Yet, as they do so, pressures for mimicry will increase because density of the network causes information on cultural logics and structural templates to flow and constrain the options of organizations in the network. Conversely, the less dense are the networks connecting organizations, the fewer are locations of centrality, bridging, and brokerage to interrupt flows of resources or partition markets. Hence, existing or newly established network ties allow for diversity in organizational forms. And the greater the level and variety of organizational resources generated by diverse organizational forms, and the more they extend networks across organizations in diverse institutional domains, the greater will be the number of resource niches in a society and the more diverse will be the resources in these niches.

**The Effects of Fields.** It can be difficult, as I mentioned earlier, to distinguish between fields and niches, and perhaps, the distinction is purely analytical with emphasis on niches or fields depending upon the purpose of analysis. If analysis is focused on resources used by organizations, then niches become a more important concern, whereas if concern is with the constraints of institutional environments on organization processes, then fields are probably a more useful point of emphasis. Yet I maintain that there are differences between fields and niches that are more than a consequence of one's analytical purposes, as I will try to document here.

**Cultural Fields.** Systems of cultural symbols are, at one and the same time, (a) resources to be secured and used to organize a division of labor in pursuit of a goal or goals and (b) constraints on the strategic options on organizations and their goal-seeking actions. I have summarized (a) above, and now, let me turn to (b) and view culture as part of macro-level environments that constrains the operation of any organization. As I emphasized earlier, the more consistent are texts, technologies, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms with each other, the greater is their power to constrain foundings of organizations and, once founded, their strategic options. This level of constraint only increases to the extent that these levels of culture are integrated in that texts and technologies reflect

general societal values, while ideologies instantiate the moral premises of values into the organizations operating within a domain. In turn, an integrated culture is one where the moral premises of values and ideologies are the moral basis for institutional norms as well as the norms regulating the divisions of labor in corporate units. With this successive embedding of norms within ideologies, ideologies within values, coupled with consistency between texts and technologies, on the one hand, and values on the other, the moral *logics* inhering in the cultural field constrain instrumental options of organizations.

If meta-ideologies (from several institutional domains) have evolved to provide a more integrated cultural field for interinstitutional relations among organizations in different institutional domains, then once again, the moral logics inhering in this meta-ideology constrain strategic and instrumental interinstitutional actions of organizations, although there will be more degrees of freedom and options for organizations in different domains. Meta-ideologies also form to legitimate the unequal distribution of resources by corporate units, especially organizations, to members of a society. In so doing, they generate the potential for tension and conflict if they condone discrimination by corporate units against members of categorical units, especially in societies that are integrated around cultural values emphasizing freedom and equal opportunities. Such values are most likely in market-driven systems, and least likely in societies built around domination and segregation at the structural level. Thus, meta-ideologies can be a double-edge sword in that they integrate the ideologies of differentiated domains, thereby providing clear guidelines for actions of organizations, whereas they also legitimate tension- and conflict-producing inequalities and discrimination that can cause mobilization of counter-ideologies that decrease the hegemony of the cultural field and its logics (see Chap. 8 on social movements).

A cultural field is also generated by generalized symbolic media, either indirectly as these become the symbolic tools used to construct ideologies and meta-ideologies or directly as they are used in (a) face-to-face discourse at the level of encounters, (b) formation of themes that almost always carry a logic, and (c) exchanges of resources within and between domains. An institutional domain will be highly integrated culturally when only its symbolic medium dominates discourse, framing, theme making, and ideological formation and when this medium is exchanged for the same medium from other actors within the domain. Kinship is perhaps as close to this extreme pole in complex societies as is possible. This dominance of an institution's medium creates a tight cultural logic that is highly constraining. Yet other domains also reveal this biasing of symbolic media. For example, a capital-

ist economy is, in essence, dominated by the flow of money and the logic of capitalism as outlined by Max Weber's (1905) analysis of worldly asceticism and Protestantism; a polity is built around the exchange of *power* and authority into the logic of a political ideology, or religion is controlled by the flow of *sacredness/piety* and the creation of religious beliefs. While *money* and *power* (as authority) circulate in many other domains, these media regulate just about all transactions within the domains of economy and polity. Thus, organizations in these kinds of domains where their media have not been "colonized" by external media from other domains will constrain organizational actions directly because of the moral premises inherent in the exchange of *money* for *money* and *power* for *power*, and indirectly, the ideologies generated by these media will dominate moral logics within the domains of economy and polity (and will have a great influence in other domains when they circulate widely across domains).

In contrast, when multiple symbolic media are circulating in any given domain, exchanges will often involve organizations from more than one domain, and as a result, diverse ideologies will have to be reconciled through the formation of meta-ideologies. The cultural field and the moral logics that emerge, however, will be somewhat less integrated than those from a single domain, with the result both the media and ideologies built from these diverse media will be less constraining on individual and corporate actors. Organizations will thus have more options in how they build structures and cultures and in the strategic actions that they take in pursuit of goals. Again, the pattern of structural integration has large effects on just how loose cultural integration is. If segmentation is the principal mechanism of structural integration, options for all corporate units including organizations will be highly limited because there will not be highly differentiated media. If domination and segregation, especially domination by polity (and sometimes religion or both in theocracies), are the principal mechanisms of integration, the medium of *power* controls relations in all institutional domains. And if differentiation and integration through structural interdependencies, especially those created and regulated by markets, are the primary set of mechanisms, then the less constraint by culture will be evident, thus increasing not only rates of organizational founding but also the ratio of innovation to mimicry in these foundings.

**Structural Fields.** As I summarized in Table 2.3 on pp. 84 to 90 and blocked out earlier and above, the structural field of an organization or set of organizations in a niche is very much determined by the mechanisms of integration of institutional domains. Segmentation is one mechanism, and even in differentiated domains, mimicry of successful organizations or

adoption of dominate organizational templates continues, at least within sectors or niches within a domain. Also, there is also a tendency for just a few basic templates to be developed and then copied (perhaps with some modification) by entrepreneurs engaged in organizational foundings. Thus, even in differentiating societies, the structural field at any given time for most organizations is segmented organizations built around essentially the same blueprint. Thus, mimetic processes do not disappear with differentiation but, indeed, continue with differentiation of organizations in diverse institutional domains.

With organizational differentiation within institutional domains and, more dramatically, across distinctive institutional domains, the limits of segmentation as a mechanism are reached, especially if the differentiation has occurred under Spencerian selection pressures where older structural forms prove to be inadequate to deal with problems of adaptation. Integration is achieved by differentiation, but soon, the limitations of differentiation of organizations without mechanisms for linking them back together through structural interdependencies become all too apparent, creating new Spencerian selection pressures from regulation as a macro-dynamic force. The structural field of any organization or set of related organizations is thus determined by the configuration of mechanism for forming interdependencies: exchanges (in markets), mobility of personnel within and across domains, embeddedness of smaller inside of larger organizations, and overlaps of organizations. If these mechanisms all operate within an institutional domain, they will generate a more unified structural and cultural field for any given organization. If, however, they connect organizations across domains, the structural field will be more differentiated and potentially more chaotic, as will the cultural field (unless coherent meta-ideologies are formed from the circulation of cool generalized symbolic media like *money* and *power*, which come to dominate the culture of organizations in diverse domains). To the degree that the structural (and cultural) field is loosely integrated, it generates less constraint and allows organizational foundings to increase and to reveal a higher ratio of innovative to mimetic foundings.

### ***Boundary Dynamics***

**The Effects of the Micro-level Field.** Niklas Luhmann (1982, 1995) has argued that organization systems require “entrance and exit rules” to operate effectively. Incumbents must be able to recognize ecological and

physical markers of when they are entering into an organization to assume roles in its division of labor, and when they are exiting. Often, these movements across boundaries are marked by routines (e.g., punching the time clock, collecting mail) or rituals (e.g., standardized greetings to key personnel). Boundaries significantly facilitate meeting the transactional needs of individuals and the operation of status, role, cultural, ecological, and demographic micro dynamics. The micro-level field of any organization thus generates pressures for individuals to “know” when they are in the organization and when they are “free” and “outside” of the organization. Of course, individuals often “take their work home with them,” “work at home” (as I do), “telecommute,” “work from their car,” or only “check in every so often to the organization.” This blurring of boundaries between the inside and outside of the organization often causes problems for persons and organizations because it may not be clear how they are to meet needs for identity verification or being outside the organization may cut down on group identification with the organization and, hence, commitments to its goals and culture. Other needs like group inclusion become more problematic because a person is, for much of the time, not included in the groups that make up the division of labor of the organization, thereby once again lowering commitments to the organization. Exchange payoffs also become rather difficult to calculate because all of the elements of sensing that interactions allow them to realize a profit may be missing—namely, others with whom they consistently interact, calculations of costs and investments (since these are comingled with nonorganizational activities) relative to rewards (money, free time, lower supervision). With respect to other micro-dynamic processes, status making and taking, role making and taking, culture making and taking, along with meanings of ecology and situational demography, are all potentially problematic because rates of face-to-face interaction with other incumbents in the organization vary or do not even occur very often.

There is, perhaps, a generational divide since the dramatic expansion of communication technologies will, no doubt, often blur the boundaries of organizations for younger age cohorts. But, since people’s sense of group identity (and other identities tied to this identity), their needs for group inclusion, and their realization of payoffs (not just money but private goods associated with interactions with others in groups within organizations), the needs met in a coherent micro-level field may still stand in conflict with this lack of clarity of organizational boundaries. Similarly, the ambiguity of status, roles, relevant culture, ecology, and perhaps demography can also create emotional conflicts for people; on the one hand, freedom from moment-by-moment constraints of the organizational division of labor

while, on the other hand, feeling lonely and adrift without these constraints and contact with fellow organizational incumbents.<sup>7</sup>

**The Effects of the Macro-level Field.** Boundaries of organizations are greatly affected by the modes of integration of institutional domains. Segmentation of organizations creates cultural and structural equivalences, which makes the boundaries and internal structures and cultures of organizations very similar. And yet, at the same time, segmentation also increases the salience of the markers denoting boundaries setting off similar organization from another. Even in differentiated societies, organizations in a particular niche—say, banks, hotels, schools, universities, etc.—work to set themselves off, with clear marker of boundaries in the structure of buildings, badging, parking, landscaping, flags, and many other props, and if these organizations are in competition within this niche, these differences in boundary markers are even more dramatic, often made so by advertising. Similarly, in a more traditional society, segmented villages are still clearly marked with rituals required of those who enter from the outside because the villages are where kin units making up the quasi-organizational structure of horticultural societies reside.

When domination and segregation are the main mechanisms of institutional integration, boundary maintenance is also clearly marked among segregated units, as are the boundaries of superordinate organizations. The markers of organizational boundaries and the rituals required to enter them become part of the process of domination, with members of subordinate organizations having to observe rituals marking their inferiority as they enter the dominant organization. While medieval churches may have been “open,” their architecture and rituals required upon entering and exiting made sure that the “faithful” understood who was in charge. Even more seemingly open and egalitarian mega-churches in American suburbs work very hard to be “spectacular” and to make sure that rituals are performed to ensure that they know their “place” vis-à-vis god and those who do the ministering for the supernatural. The same is true of governmental buildings, and buildings devoted to law. Their often overdone majesty marks which actor is superordinate.

In differentiated societies where structural interdependencies are the principal mechanisms of integration, the dynamics associated with segmentation

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<sup>7</sup>There is an accumulating literature on “virtual teamwork” in organizations, and it is clear that it poses problems for the operation of an organization. See, for example, Bradley and Vozikis (2004), Hedberg et al. (1997), Jackson (1999), Jones et al. (2005), Jones et al. (2005), Magiera and Powlak (2004), McKenna and Green (2002), Pauleen (2004), Picherit (2004), Rutte (2006), Shostak (1998), and Igarria and Tan (1998).

and domination as mechanisms still operate within differentiated sectors. Moreover, because organizations of all types in complex societies are interdependent, they still must mark their boundaries, even as they conduct exchanges and experience mobility from organizations within and outside an institutional domain. And the more an organization is dominant in a market sector or possesses valued resources, the more clearly demarcated are its boundaries, and even though entrance and exits are often relatively easy, there are internal boundaries to limit outsider's movements. Indeed, the internal ecology of the organization "speaks volumes" to those who enter as well as for those who are incumbent in the organization (e.g., ropes marking where the line forms, blocked entrances, reception desks, differentiation by locations on floors, décor, and many other markers of status differences can be found in buildings that are "open" to publics).

Boundaries of organizations can change in response to pressures from macro-level fields and niches. One source of change comes from the modes of structural interdependence that form. For instance, if organizations grow by merger or acquisitions, their boundaries must change to accommodate new organizational cultures and incumbents; if organizations overlap in some way, the boundaries of both organizations must change, not just at those points where the overlap occurs but also to the broader outside environment. If organizations change their niche, they generally will alter their boundaries in ways that are appropriate to publics in this niche (demographic resources) and in ways that facilitate acquiring material resources. For example, many Catholic churches have more evangelical services to attract younger members (demographic resource that, it is hoped, becomes a source of material resources). What is noticeable is how entrance rules and rituals emphasize informality, less bowing and scraping, and openness to the young, with the religious service more likely to be punctuated by nonorgan music (if not amplified rock music on occasion) with surprisingly different rituals expected of church attendees (often with the older members complaining). Competition in the niche comprised of worshipers is rather fierce in some societies like the United States, forcing even rather conservative "traditional religions" to open their boundaries and alter the entrance and exit rules. To take another example, banking has become highly competitive, and in more suburban banks, the boundaries have changed dramatically. For example, there is now a "greeter" who will ask what you need before you go to stand in line; there are TV sets and chairs/couches to sit in while awaiting to see a "consultant" about some financial question; there are cookies on a table somewhere, and often coffee (almost like the waiting room of a car dealership); windows to the outside are big, letting in light and revealing the more informal and less intimidating inside (that is ready to take your money). The bank is no longer an imposing edifice, but a strip-

mall storefront, more like a Starbucks coffee outlet than the marble and pillar edifices of older banks, or some banks in large cities where “solidity” and “safety” are still communicated by church-like boundaries. Thus, the more competitive the resource niche, the more likely are boundaries to be converted in order to increase the ease of access of those whose resources are needed. The boundary becomes even more semiotic and symbolizes the culture of the organization to its intended resource providers in a niche. The boundaries become a prop communicating meaning in the ecology of organizational structure and culture. Social change, then, is very likely to generate new kinds of organizations or alter existing organizations, and much of this change is marked by organizational boundaries that signal to others the “new” (and “improved”) structure and culture of the new organization.

When the boundaries of organizations are part of larger patterns of discrimination based upon categoric-unit membership, then they contribute to inequality and stratification, which in the long run are almost always tension- and conflict-generating machines. Organizations are the principal resource-distributing structures in a society, and the more they selectively admit or exclude incumbents or even clients across their boundaries, the greater will be the level of inequality in a society, the more stratified will the class system become, and the more domination and segregation will be used as mechanisms of institutional integration. Moreover, meta-ideologies legitimating stratification will reinforce discrimination that is legitimated by prejudicial stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs about members of devalued categoric units. At times, selectivity is based upon more universalistic parameters, such as years of education, but when the parameters are nominal and denote categories of persons (e.g., gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation) or when graduated parameters have been turned into nominal parameters sustained by stigmatizing status beliefs (e.g., age, income), discrimination against members of these categories reproduces the stratification system and generates tensions that eventually will cause conflict. And, when boundary maintenance by organizations occurs in those institutional domains distributing the most valued resources (e.g., money, power, health, learning), individuals will also be denied such generalized and highly valued resources like prestige, honor, and positive emotions. The result will be for the tensions associated with this level of inequality to escalate and become more potentially volatile.

As I outlined in Chap. 3, exclusion from resource-distributing corporate units, especially organizations, can be a self-perpetuating system built around categoric-unit differences, meta-ideologies, prejudicial beliefs, stigmatizing status beliefs, and discrimination. Similarly, if members of categoric units can become incumbents in, or clients of, organizations but are systematically discriminated against once inside the organization, these

same tension- and conflict-producing dynamics are set into motion. Thus, when the external boundaries of organizations and the internal divisions of labor are sustained by discrimination against members of categoric units, they become part of the processes consolidating categoric units with access to corporate units in the first place and, then, consolidating memberships in categoric units with specific status locations in the divisions of labor of these units. They thus promote segregation in the broader society, which often must be sustained by increasing domination as a mechanism of integration.

Even in societies that rely upon structural interdependencies and markets can institutionalize discrimination in otherwise free markets, as was the case in the United States during most of the twentieth century and even into the current century. Such a system was sustained by patterns of domination at the community and state levels of government, often punctuated by violence and coercion to keep the victims of discrimination in line. Thus, boundary dynamics are much more than semiotic markers; they are tools that can be used to reproduce patterns of discrimination and segregation that, in turn, will eventually have large consequences for societal integration. When denial of access to types of organizations is no longer possible, as was the case when American capitalists used desperate minorities as “strike breakers” against early unions, split labor markets began to emerge in key industries, forcing minorities into a delimited sector of lower-level positions in early twentieth-century industries. Thus, the labor market itself became a tool for consolidating categoric-unit parameters with locations in the divisions of labor of organizations. The same dynamics also worked against women in most organizations until the last few decades.

Boundaries of corporate units also affect the ease with which generalized symbolic media and the ideologies built from them can circulate within and between institutional domains. When markets distribute resources, including demographic (labor markets), material resources (wholesale and retail markets), technologies, and even culture (*learning* and *knowledge*), organizational boundaries are typically more open, allowing generalized media and ideologies of a given domain to circulate and, more importantly, generalized media from other domains as well. For example, a cloistered monastery or nunnery will limit the ideologies (religious beliefs built from *sacredness/piety*) circulating inside its boundaries; other ideologies are excluded since these structures are set up to isolate themselves from other ideologies that do not correspond to specific religious beliefs and ritual practices. Church structures in general block media from other domains, except *money* needed to support the church and franchised *authority* from polity to organize each church’s division of labor. The symbolic media of religion—*sacredness/piety*—is particularistic, even in universalizing religions like Islam and

Christianity, and thus, this medium operates as a high-pressure area to keep symbolic media from penetrating boundaries of church organizations. In contrast, organizations in a positivistic legal system are set up to adjudicate relations among organizations and individuals in all institutional domains and are thus open to symbolic media from all domains in order to create laws specifying how organizations and their media are to circulate in a society. Economic organizations, to take another example, are established in capitalist systems to take the “cash nexus” to all institutional domains, marketing goods and services to corporate units in all domains and, at the same time, tailoring marketing to the ideologies and corporate-unit structures built up from the morality inherent in generalized symbolic media. Hence, market systems open the doors of organizations in most institutional domains, unless these organizations explicitly seek to segregate and isolate themselves. Yet, in market systems, it is still difficult to keep other media from sneaking in the back door. In contrast, systems built around high levels of stratification, domination by a few corporate actors in a few domains, and segregation among organizational units will see less inter-institutional circulation of generalized symbolic media. The organizations will typically be less dynamic, less likely to alter either their division of labor and culture, and less likely to change their goals.

### ***Goal Dynamics***

Organizations are defined by their goals in several senses. First, goals indicate the institutional domain in which an organization is located and the nature of the activities of the organization. Second, goals are both constrained by the culture of a domain and the cultures of other domains if the organization operates in several domains, while being a rough indicator of the culture of the organization (e.g., if the goal is to educate, then this goal signals much about the culture of the organization). Third, goals typically signal something about the division of labor of an organization (e.g., the goals of incarcerating criminals and mobilizing military force usually signal a vertical division of labor built around authority, whereas the goal of developing new knowledge might signal a more horizontal and collaborative division of labor). Fourth, the goal will typically signal the nature of incumbents in a corporate unit by various categoric distinctions marked by parameters such as age, gender, class, years of education, religious affiliation, and ethnicity. In fact, some organizations are set up to sustain categoric distinctions, as was the case of the plantation system in the pre-Civil War south in the United States, or senior living facilities in contemporary industrial societies.

The greater is the clarity of goals and the longer these goals have been in place, the more likely are they to signal properties of an organization—its domain of operation, its culture, its division of labor, and its incumbents. Conversely, the less clear and stable are the goals of an organization, the more problematic is understanding its operational domain, culture, division of labor, and incumbents for not only outsiders and other organizations but also for its own incumbents. When goals are unclear, multifaceted, and diffuse, it is likely that the culture, division of labor, or incumbents will be somewhat unstable, shifting as the organization moves from goal to goal or seeks to define and redefine its mission.

Goals of organizations will often change as selection pressures—whether Spencerian or Durkheimian—increase. Organizations will often seek to adjust their goals, and hence their culture, division of labor, and even incumbents to fit new circumstances. Other change processes such as new technologies, new markets, new resource niches, and new macro- or micro-level fields can also alter the goals of an organization. Change is most likely when institutional integration is achieved through interdependencies mediated by free markets and least when integration of stratification and institutional domains is achieved by domination. Structural interdependencies open up new resource niches and change the nature and intensity of selection pressures pushing on organization, whereas domination, per se, increases tension and, over the long run, change-producing conflict potential, and especially so when domination increases inequalities and stratification.

While there is some correlation among goals, structure, and culture of an organization, such is not always the case. In fact, if the structure and culture of an organization do not fit well with certain goals, the viability of an organization in its environment can become problematic. Or if organizations change their goals but do not implement new forms in their divisions of labor and cultures to achieve these goals, then once again, they become less viable. For example, Max Weber's (1968 [1922]) famous analysis of the "routinization of charisma" emphasizes that an organization built around charismatic authority is not well suited to do routine bureaucratic functions. Another contemporary example is the shift in many colleges and universities from purely educational goals to quasi-commercial organizations competing for fee-paying students or private research dollars; these more mercantile and commercial goals almost always introduce dramatic cultural conflict and tension with its division of labor in academic organizations devoted to learning and objective knowledge production. Hence, the more organizations significantly change their goals, the greater will be the potential for the conflict and tension, and hence, the more likely will there be lags in the

change of an organization's structure and culture, often to the point of making it difficult for the organization to realize these changed goals and, potentially, even survive in its new resource niche.

### *Structural Dynamics*

**Organizational Size and Structure.** As the size of an organization increases, the division of labor will expand, both laterally and horizontally (Blau and Scott 2003). If the goals of the organization do not expand or shift as size increases, then the lateral division of labor may simply segment with more lateral positions and groups performing the same tasks. In contrast, the vertical division of labor will increase, as is often noted in the literature on the effects of size on administrative intensity when organizations grow. With increases in size, there will typically be an increase in the administrative structures to regulate the larger number of incumbents and status roles within the division of labor, even if there is no further differentiation of lateral status roles in groups. The reason for this pattern of increasing administrative intensity is that there are, for example, simply more regulatory (supervision, decision-making, accounting), reproductive (e.g., human resource operations), and distributive (gathering of resources, payroll, marketing) tasks to perform to sustain the operation of the organization as a whole.

Depending upon the causes of organizational growth, the structure of organization will vary. If growth is a function of expanding the scale of the operation, then the structure of the organization, as well as its culture, will follow the processes outlined above. If, however, growth comes as a result of mergers, structural overlaps, and embedding/inclusion processes, then the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor will both increase. As the divisions of labor in the dominant organization and its partners (from structural overlap, embedding, and/or mergers) are integrated, they rarely remain the same. Some may well be eliminated, but almost always there will be new configurations added to both horizontal and vertical dimensions of the division of labor. Yet, even with new configurations, the differentiation in the lateral divisions of labor and/or in the addition of new divisions, groups, and teams will cause expansion of the vertical division of labor to meet new problems of coordination and control of the larger, more diverse organization.

If growth is accompanied by a change in goals, then it is likely that expansion of both lateral and vertical differentiations will accelerate. There will be new problems of coordination and control in creating a new division of labor to meet new goals. Often, this kind of expansion and alteration of

goals makes goals more ambiguous, or goals often become not only different but also more complex which can, once again, make them more ambiguous. As the fate of many companies that have acquired other companies' documents, organizations often "lose focus" on their core goal, often to the point of having to divest themselves of acquired units because they served as an "distractions."

For example, in the last few years, Ford motor company divested itself of various units that it had acquired—Volvo, Jaguar, Land Rover—to "concentrate on its core business" because each of these units expanded the goals and markets for the cars that Ford produced, but at the expense of creating more administrative overhead and goals that were simply too diverse to maintain the profitability of the company. Similarly, the history of General Motors involved acquisitions of its various divisions that had once been separate companies, causing dramatic expansion of the administrative overhead of the company that in the end almost destroyed what was then the largest car company in the world when it had to begin competing against more efficiently run car companies. These dynamics are intensified when the niche for these companies (individuals and corporate units buying cars) became dense and highly competitive, and what is true for car companies has been true for newspapers, accounting companies, equities firms, banks, and mortgage companies, all of which expanded through mergers and acquisitions to remain "competitive" in a niche or to expand into new niches, only to increase their administrative overhead and suffer when the markets declined to the point where this expanded administrative overhead was too expensive to sustain as income declined. Another example of this kind of dynamic in nonmarket organizations is the current problems in the educational system in the United States. This system at every level has grown as the population of the nation has grown and becomes more diverse (through immigration); moreover, the goals of the system have expanded dramatically, thus increasing the administrative overhead of all school systems to the point that they cannot be sustained by tax revenues, especially in recessionary periods of economic decline where individuals and families seek tax relief. Federal and state governments have often exacerbated the problems by mandating additional goals on school systems, without providing the necessary funding for these new functions. The result is problems of sustaining the system as a whole because it is too big and complex. So, even without direct market pressures, organizations can become bloated and too complex as they grow, and especially when their growth is accompanied by expansion of goals and niches.

Organizations that must operate in complex, fragmented, and ever-changing environments will generally become larger, but more fundamentally,

they will become more complex. They will elaborate internal administrative structures to monitor and develop strategies for dealing with their environments (Scott and Meyer 1983; Powell 1988: 126, 1991), and Neil Fligstein (1985) has argued that the multidivisional corporation developed as a response to complex environments, elaborating structures and developing new forms of hierarchy within and across division. Yet these same dynamics can occur with all organizations in all domains that must operate in complex environments, especially polity and law, but potentially all other domains. Markets, of course, are highly dynamic, and they are differentiating machines that increase the complexity of economic organizations, especially as markets go global. And so, this relationship between environmental complexity and organizational complexity will be most evident in the economic institutional domain. Yet, polity and law must also deal with complexity, not only because of the complexity of economic environments but also because polity and law are the only mechanism in complex societies that can absorb societal-level problems and make, as Luhmann (1982) has argued, “binding decisions.”

**Centralization and Decentralization of Organizations.** Organizations reveal a range in the degree to which authority is centralized or decentralized. Organizations that seek to dominate incumbents or networks and fields of organizations will almost always centralize authority in order to coordinate resources and activities to do so (e.g., prisons, military, hegemons, monopolies, colonial regimes). Similarly, organizations that are in conflict with other organizations will usually centralize power and authority to focus resources and activities on “enemies” (Simmel 1956[1903]). And organizations that are in the process of setting or resetting goals, or coping with lack of clarity in goals, will centralize authority in an effort to integrate the organization’s division of labor to new tasks. Normally, organizations that must compete in highly dense niches will centralize, especially those that are seeking to specialize and find resources in subniches, and at times, large organizations pursuing a k-strategy of being generalists covering all niches will centralize their strategies in order to prevent too much chaos and waste of resources. And, as I emphasized above, organization in complex and fluid environments will also differentiate and centralize authority within and across the main axes or divisions of differentiation in order to cope with their complicated environments.

Yet, at times, large organizations will decentralize in order to give divisions freedom to adapt to specialized niches, and the more resources an organization has, the more likely will it pursue this strategy. Large, multidivisional organizations always must adjudicate between too much centralization that diminishes creativity and innovation in divisions, and decentralization

that can lead an organization to drift too far from the goals of the organization and waste resources. In fact, there is often a cycle between decentralization and centralization. This basic dialectic exists at all levels of social organization, but it is particularly evident in large organizations that seek resources in subniches or in many diverse niches. For example, a company like General Electric in the United States is spread out all over the world and competes in many diverse market niches, even some niches (for a time) like financial services that have very little to do with electrical products. Some companies are even more diverse, as is the case with conglomerates that seek resources in a wide variety of niches that have very little in common. Here, the overall goal of the organization is to make a profit but, at the same time, conglomerates will reveal many specific goals in units spread out across many communities and nation states and seeking profits in many diverse niches. Whether as a multidivisional company or as a conglomerate, which, in essence, is a series of companies nominally bundled loosely together, the problem that inevitably emerges is the lack of sufficient coordination and thus overconsumption resources that erode profits. Such companies often start shedding and selling off divisions, or shutting them down, and imposing more centralized authoritative control in order to coordinate activities and, it is hoped, lessen the overhead costs of a large, diverse, and spread-out company. At some point, centralization leads to control but at the cost of flexibility and innovation in diverse resource niches, with the result that control is eased, and subunits and divisions begin to operate with more autonomy. But, once again, the same problems of coordination and control reemerge, causing some retrenchment and centralization. And so, there may be more iterations of this cycling between centralized and decentralized profiles in the administration of an organization.

This cyclical dynamic can occur many times over in a successful organization that has operated for some time. And the dynamic is not just confined to economic organizations. For example, governments are often centralizing and decentralizing their constituent organizations in response to political pressures but, more fundamentally, to cope with the problems inherent in either centralized and decentralized formations. Here, the cycle occurs because there are insufficient tax resources to sustain all of the diverse organizational units that have each gone their own way as they have redefined goals, and so they are consolidated to save money. But centralization creates long chains of authority that also waste money, slow decision-making, and impose rigidities in the actions of organizations. The old Soviet Union is a good example of this latter process of excessive governmental control, whereas the recent history of the United States before the great financial meltdown is an example of insufficient regulation by agencies that had

become too independent and lax. Governments that must be responsive to their citizens will tend to cycle back and forth between centralized and decentralized profiles, whereas governments that are engaged in domination and control through coercion and administrative monitoring of the population will generally remain centralized for a long period and change only when populations grow restive and begin to protest and revolt over the tight control of governmental organizations, and yet ironically, just as this control is challenged, the typical response is to tighten control even more, thereby setting off societal-level internal conflict.

Boundary maintenance practices of organizations also affect centralization and decentralization. Organizations that discriminate and exclude designated members of categorical units are almost always highly centralized in order to implement and monitor exclusionary practices. Organizations that operate in secrecy will also tend to centralize power to ensure that units do not let secrets out, although there are often problems when the secrets of organizations are the knowledge produced in more collaborative and lateral divisions of labor. Centralization, *per se*, would decrease innovation and creativity, whereas too much decentralization would lead to leaks of important secrets before they are turned into products or actions. It often helps that, in these kinds of knowledge-producing organizations, there is high solidarity and mutual monitoring among incumbents that reduce the need for centralized control, but nonetheless, there are potential holes in this informal monitoring with the consequence that some can leak important secrets. Even highly centralized organizations like the Pentagon and CIA in America cannot completely control leaks, despite their highly centralized structure and culture of secrecy. And yet it may be that solidarity produced by incumbents whose transactional needs are met and who develop a sense of professionalism and common purpose (as a highly rewarding private good) are actually more likely to prevent leaks than their more hierarchical counterparts, where authority often increases resentments that lead to deflection strategies among some incumbents.

**Incentive System Dynamics.** There is a large literature on incentive systems that, it is hoped, will highlight what keeps incumbents working hard and committed to the organization (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2004; Thierry 2001). This literature overlaps with that on sanctioning processes, and between the two literatures, there are many lines of thinking. There are, however, a limited number of sanctioning strategies and incentive systems. One is *normative* or, more generally, cultural. Individuals who are committed to norms and the broader institutional ideologies and meta-ideologies (and underlying values) will monitor themselves and work in accordance with normative expectations to meet goals; indeed, these goals can become

highly moralized if defined by ideologies and values. Another incentive system is *coercive*. Individuals perform activities in order to gain whatever rewards are associated with incumbency and to avoid punishments for failure to live up to expectations. Yet another incentive system is more *utilitarian*. If the rewards associated with activities in the division of labor are sufficiently valuable, then individuals are more likely to meet expectations. A related incentive system is *emotional*. When individuals develop attachments to each other and experience positive emotional arousal from their activities in an organization, a new type of reward—a *joint private good* produced by joint activities—is added to the incentive system, above and beyond more extrinsic incentives coming from the organization (Olsen 1965; Hechter 1987). If this private good is sufficiently valuable to individuals and if it cannot easily be gained outside the group within an organization, then it greatly enhances the rewards associated with role activities and thus increases not only conformity to expectations but also commitments to the group and often the more inclusive organization.

These strategies are not mutually exclusive, and their interaction effects with each other are interesting because some increase and others decrease the power of incentives to control individuals and their role performances in positions within groups in the division of labor. The normative system is highly effective if incumbents are committed to norms, but in organizations that are hierarchical, these commitments to the norms and culture are more likely at the top of the organizational hierarchy than at lower levels of the organization. Those whose extrinsic rewards (e.g., pay) are not high to begin with are not likely to develop strong commitments to norms; instead, they must be constantly monitored, which only increases resentments associated with any system of authority among those who are subordinate. In fact, subordinates often develop counter-normative commitments, which require even more monitoring that, in turn, increases costs for the organization. Indeed, overly monitored incumbents may find it gratifying and solidarity producing to work against the organization and only engage minimal role behaviors that conform to norms, which again impose costs on incumbents being monitored and costs on the organization from monitoring and from low productivity among those monitored. There are also other costs with systems that rely on monitoring, such as the costs of high turnover rates and retraining a constant parade of new incumbents.

Coercive strategies are highly costly because they involve constant monitoring of incumbents, as in a prison-based work group or in a conscripted army not committed to its goals, and because punishments or threat thereof must be used to ensure conformity to normative expectations. Monitoring and coercion may work effectively when actively engaged, but they increase resentments that encourage group formations that can develop into emo-

tional attachments and solidarity among incumbents that revolve around anticorporate unit sentiments and culture. This *joint good* thus aligns incumbent subcultures and commitments against the normative expectations attached to positions and roles in the formal division of labor. And the more this anti-organization culture develops, the greater will be the extent and costs of monitoring, which again only fuels resentments and enhances antiorganization solidarity.

The utilitarian strategy relies on material incentives (like pay) and at times symbolic incentives (e.g., new job titles and the presumed prestige and perhaps power that go with these titles). If the extrinsic rewards are sufficiently high and the costs on incumbents are low, such a system can operate efficiently, if incumbents have few alternatives in other organizations. However, when such is the case, organizations tend to lower rewards (e.g., pay, promotions) and raise costs (e.g., more work) on the presumption that incumbents do not have attractive alternatives. As a consequence, the processes outlined for coercive systems may be needed. As a consequence, incumbents will become *alienated* and maybe even develop an anti-organization culture and set of commitments, which then requires higher levels of monitoring and more robust punishment strategies that will increase resentments.

The emotional system revolving around commitments to norms (and underlying ideologies and values) and around the alignment of solidarity and commitments to the norms and goals of the organization is difficult to implement. Yet, if solidarity and commitment of incumbents to the local group and the organization and its goals are high, these emotional rewards can even trump extrinsic rewards and some costs associated with role behavior. For example, incumbents in philanthropic organizations, churches, schools, colleges and universities, research firms, and cutting-edge technology companies are often highly committed to work groups which, in turn, produce positive emotions and a local group culture that reinforces the goals and culture of the organization. And so, the greater are the intrinsic rewards of playing roles (especially the positive emotions that come from meeting transactional needs for self verification, profitable exchange pay-offs, and group inclusion), the more can these rewards overcome lower levels of extrinsic rewards and even higher costs like hard work. Moreover, if extrinsic and intrinsic rewards are high and perceived costs are low, then incumbents experience very high rewards, and the solidarity of the work group becomes aligned with the culture and goals of the organization. Yet most organizations cannot implement this kind of incentive system. It is hard to line up intrinsic emotional rewards and hard work on the line at an automobile or steel factory; rather, people do these jobs for money rather than any intrinsic rewards inhering in the work itself, and so they calculate

their costs, investments, and rewards in a fairly hard-nosed way, which generally does not cause the arousal of positive emotions that provide an extra intrinsic reward associated with the production of a private good.

Yet, when the emotional system combining normative and utilitarian incentives can be implemented, it reduces the need for monitoring and supervisory authority systems. Individuals become self-motivated and informally monitor each other for free riding. As a result, the division of labor will be more horizontal, with fewer layers of authority. The normative system, however, will be vulnerable to defections and free riding by incumbents if the extrinsic and intrinsic reward systems are not lined up and if the overall level of reward from these two systems is not high.

The utilitarian system can be effective if the extrinsic rewards for role performance are high relative to alternatives available and if these rewards exceed the costs perceived by incumbents in the division of labor. But if the work is unpleasant and hence costly for incumbents, they may work to the lower end of normative expectations or even free ride on the work of others if they can hide their lack of full contribution to productive outputs. The result is that monitoring and sanctioning will increase, which in turn will expand the layers of authority that may be perceived as one more cost that lower-ranking incumbents in the organization must endure. If these costs become too great relative to the rewards received by incumbents, then an anti-organization culture can emerge, continuously fed by *joint private good* created and consumed by members holding anti-organizational sentiments enshrined in their local, particularistic culture.

The coercive system is the most costly and least effective in the long run because it requires multiple layers of authority, constant monitoring of all incumbents, and use of punishments, all of which increase resentments among those subject to authority, monitoring, and punishment. It almost always generates anti-institutional, high-solidarity groups with virtually no commitment to the goals of the organization. The difference between a prison and army is instructive. The inmates of the prison will, in all likelihood, respond to the system as just noted. Those higher up—guards and administrative personnel—may be sufficiently rewarded (as our prison guards in my state of California) that they feel satisfied with their rewards and profits, and they may also develop group solidarities partially aligned with the goals of the organization. Soldiers in an army, even conscripted soldiers, may share goals of the army, and in successful armies, they develop high solidarity (in response to danger) in fighting units that almost always is aligned with the goals of the army. And this joint good (i.e., solidarity), which is very private because it is attached to their unique experiences, supplements extrinsic rewards in ways that promote commitments to norms and army culture. Thus, even though the army is a coercive system because

nonconformity to norms will lead to severe punishments, dynamics of the emotions and the solidarity-generating system intersect and mitigate the vertical system of authority, the constant monitoring by superior officers, and the potential for coercive punishment.

If every institutional domain could create organizations with mostly horizontal divisions of labor with very truncated hierarchies of authority, provide high extrinsic rewards relative to low costs on incumbents, distribute intrinsic rewards inherent in the nature of the work and in the organization of roles in groups that promote positive emotions along with the solidarity and commitment that these emotions generate, moralize normative systems so that individuals feel guilty when not living up to them, and rely upon solidarity and commitments to achieve organizational goals rather than authority, monitoring, and punishment, organizations would be flexible, creative, and efficient. Of course, the nature of the institutional domain in which an organization is situated and the niches and fields within this domain often impose pressures that make this ideal organizational form impossible because of the goals of the organization and the inherent nature of the work. The conditions listed above are most likely in learning and knowledge-producing organizations in education and science as well as organizations in religion, arts, and sometimes in sports. Elements of these ideal features can be found in many economic, military, political, medical, and legal organizations, but the nature of the goals, the symbolic media that are in play, and the demands of work often prevent full implementation. Moreover, the modes of integration of institutional domains and stratification systems can impose severe limits, especially if domination is the primary mechanism institutional integration or, in systems relying heavily on structural interdependencies, if markets and market forces cause overly utilitarian incentive systems to pervade organizations in most institutional domains. However, organizations in market-based systems that are regulated by democratic governments can mitigate the abuses of markets; the result is that these organizations will often be able to introduce more of the elements of the ideal incentive system listed above.

### *Cultural Dynamics*

I have already examined cultural fields of organizations in several places; here, I simply want to amplify and expand upon those cultural dynamics that should be a part of any explanation of organizational dynamics. Much theorizing about organizations and culture has already been done and so my goal is to draw upon this literature and convert it to the more approach that

I am taking in analyzing meso dynamics more generally (rather than organizations, *per se*). Figure 2.2 on pp. 40, 41 summarizes my general image of cultural phenomena as they interact to generate macro-level fields for meso-level units, or corporate and categoric units. Figure 6.1 on page 165 of Vol. 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* gives a rough view of how macro culture makes its way down to the micro realm of encounters; Table 3.2 on p 102 in this volume reviews the key elements in the normatization (of culture) to form the micro-cultural field of organizations.

**Using the Macro-level Cultural Field.** As organizations form, they create a culture built from generalized symbolic media as they are used to create ideologies and meta-ideologies that incorporate general value premises. Initial entrepreneurs begin to develop or borrow a generalized symbolic medium for discourse and theme building in order to set goals and develop the division of labor. As they do so, this generalized symbolic media almost always contains its own implicit evaluative codes, but in order to justify the formation of an organization, entrepreneurs and other incumbents must begin to *frame* the actions of organizations (Goffman 1974; Benford and Snow 2000), indicating the importance of what is being done by an organization. Framing at this level of social organization almost always occurs in terms of a generalized symbolic medium, which always contains implicit evaluative codes, but these alone are rarely enough to legitimate organizational activities. The value premises of a society must be extracted and made relevant, and the mechanism for doing so is to use the generalized symbolic medium to develop ideologies, which moralize and hence justify the organization. In turn, once in place, these elements of culture constrain the emergence of institutional norms.

These same dynamics are even more likely to occur when an organizational template already exists; the culture of successful organizations is simply borrowed and used to frame and justify the actions of an organization. Thus, mimicry comes to dominate the process of framing as new organizations in a niche are formed. And, when the macro-level culture of an organization already exists, this framing is much easier because *cultural logics* can be adopted and adapted to a particular organization to set the frame. This process is even easier when there are high degrees of consistency and integration among texts, traditions, technologies, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms. This successive embedding of norms in ideologies, ideologies in meta-ideologies, and meta-ideologies in values causes the more abstract set of cultural codes to constrain the less abstract and general. When values constrain ideological and meta-ideological formations, and ideological and meta-ideological elements of culture constrain normative formation, culture will be more consistent and integrated.

As a consequence, culture can more readily be adopted and, in fact, culture will be even more constraining because to develop an alternative culture will invite sanctions from other organizations.

The culture of an organization is not only generated by the need to frame and justify activity; this culture is also affected by the modes of structural integration among corporate units in a field and resource niche. Segmentation as a mechanism of structural integration makes mimicry the easiest and safest route to creating viable cultural frames, with the result that the elements of culture in organizations will be equivalent, thereby increasing consistency of organizational cultures with an emerging or extant institutional domain. When domination is the primary mechanism of integration within institutional domains, the culture of all domains will be biased by the symbolic medium of *power* and the ideologies generated by power, and so, even if organizations are in diverse domains, the meta-ideologies built from power and the symbolic medium unique to each domain will constrain the formation of organizational frames and culture.

When differentiation and structural interdependencies are the dominant mechanisms, the codified logics of the ideologies in several domains will constrain the formation of culture in a given domain. However, because there is typically less reliance on domination, the meta-ideologies in any given domain will be more diverse, giving actors more options in how to frame the culture of any given organization. Moreover, since it is more likely that consistency among and integration of the cultures within institutional domains will be lower than in either segmentation or domination as structural mechanisms of integration, there will be less constraint and hence more diversity of organizational cultures, although mimicry will work against too much diversity. In sum, then, the more consistent and integrated are the cultures within and between institutional domains, the greater is the level of constraint of a cultural a field on the development of culture within any given organization and the more likely will mimicry dominate the formation of culture within organizations in a particular resource niche.

The converse is also true. When the elements of culture are not highly consistent, nor integrated, culture will exert less constraint as a field, and organizations will have more options when framing the activities of an organization. Yet framing works best when it can incorporate its cultural field, and so there is likely to be a bias for using those elements of culture that are consistent and partially integrated. Still, when cultural fields at the macro level of social reality are chaotic, cultural innovation is likely to occur, and the culture of an organization is more likely to be built anew from the generalized symbolic medium of a domain and whatever value premises are consistent and widely held.

Technology also has large effects on organizational cultures. When technologies undergo change and facilitate organizations' adaptation to competition in a resource niche(s) and/or enable them to deal with Spencerian selection pressures, the culture of an organization will be constrained by norms and beliefs that best allow for the development or use of new technologies. For example, the more horizontal structure of high-tech companies or social networking companies like Facebook reflects the needs to be innovative, and the culture of such organizations involved with building or using these technologies will be driven by norms and beliefs that retranslate or reframe values and ideologies to create a culture revolving around informality, collaboration, and relative freedom authority or even from close monitoring. In some ways, the opposite problem of hierarchy and rigidity in the structure and culture of an organization can emerge: too much freedom, informality, and collaboration that can reduce productivity. When this outcome becomes evident, then some hierarchy and somewhat more constraining norms may be reintroduced, and indeed, as noted earlier, an organization may be in a constant state of trying to find the right cultural mix. The larger a company becomes, the more will retrenchment of its informal culture become necessary because problems of coordination and control inevitably arise, causing organizations to centralize, only to decentralize if too much constraint occurs and reduces innovation.

The goals of an organization also can affect the nature of its culture, often via the structure that is built up to meet these goals. For instance, if the goal of an organization is to win wars, it will be more hierarchical, and its culture will be highly constraining because it is presumed that armies must have a strong command system, although I suspect that some of this cultural ideology about the military comes from mimicry. Still, both the macro- and micro-level cultures will draw from ideologies and meta-ideologies built primarily from *power* as a symbolic medium, thus establishing hierarchies that extend down to all encounters within military organizations. If the goal of the organization is to develop new cutting-edge technologies, the division of labor will be much flatter, and the culture of the organization will resemble the pattern described above—that is, informality, collaboration, and freedom to innovate. And this culture combined with the symbolic medium of education (*learning*) and science (*knowledge*) will be reconciled with the ideology of a capitalist society built from *money*. Even here, however, mimicry is very likely to ensue because organizations that innovate are under great competitive pressure, and so each new organization that is added to a niche will mimic the culture of organizations that have been successful during the framing process.

The culture surrounding variously valued members of categoric units can have large effects on organizational culture. The meta-ideology legitimating stratification generates status beliefs, and expectation states can be intensified by prejudicial beliefs. Combined, these beliefs operate to legitimate discrimination by class which is further intensified by discrimination against members of categoric units consolidated with class locations. If this culture of discrimination becomes part of the culture of an organization, it can generate tension and conflicts within and even between organizations that, in turn, can be intensified when the more general values (say, those emphasizing equality of opportunity and freedom) stand in contradiction to prejudices and status beliefs. Such conflict is typically resolved in the short run by centralizing authority and using this authority as a form of intra-organizational domination.

**Using the Micro-level Cultural Field.** Using and adapting macro level a cultural field in framing and legitimating an organization will constrain the micro-level culture that emerges, but if the two are in conflict, then the culture of the organization as a whole will be somewhat chaotic. For example, if soldiers at the level of the encounter within an army undermine the culture of authority and hierarchy by not categorizing situations properly, by reframing what is to be included in encounters, by using informal rituals or refusing to use formal rituals, by using more informal forms of talk, or by displaying inappropriate emotions, this failure to normatize the encounter at the micro level along the lines demanded by the macro-level cultural field and frame dramatically changes the operation of the organization (e.g., think of the movie and television series *MASH*, where the main characters adhered to an anti-military culture and acted on this adherence). Or, if macro-level cultural fields structure and attempt to legitimate a division of labor that does not allow individuals to meet transactional needs, status take and status make, role take and role make, normatize, and understand or use situational ecology demography, then it is likely that the macro-level culture that has been incorporated into the organization will be consistently undermined and lead to the emergence of a micro-level counterculture, thereby producing tension and conflict within the division of labor.

Micro-level culture revolves around several basic cognitive dimensions: (1) stocks of cognitive knowledgeability, (2) expectations, and (3) evaluations. These are all influenced by more macro-level culture, as well as meso-level culture as it develops. Let me explain each dimension, beginning with an analysis of knowledgeability.

**Stocks of Knowledge at Hand.** Alfred Schutz (1967[1932]) borrowed this basic idea from Edmund Husserl (1965[1936]) to denote that individuals

carry implicit information and knowledge that they draw upon to interpret the world around them. This knowledge cannot often be articulated, but it is nonetheless present, and people's reliance upon these implicit stocks of knowledge is critical to the viability of the social order. In the context of organizational culture, individuals carry in their brains a wide variety of cognitions, often laced with emotions, that they use to normalize situations and to understand status, roles, situational ecology, and interpersonal demography. If you asked individuals to articulate their role conceptions, for example, they could do so but only to a degree, but if you presented them with situations that they had not articulated, they would have little difficulty making the necessary interpersonal adjustments. This micro-level cultural storehouse, lodged in the prefrontal cortex of all humans and tagged with emotional valences drawn up from subcortical areas of the brain (Turner 2000; Franks and Turner 2012), is constrained by more macro-level cultures but, more significantly, it is built up from experiences in a wide variety of encounters and then brought to bear in all interactions among individuals including, of course, encounters within the divisions of labor of organizations (or any corporate unit).

This micro-level culture operates somewhat independently of the more macro-level cultural codes developed from generalized symbolic media, even though this macro-level cultural field is also stored in the brain and is part of a person's implicit stocks of knowledge. In a sense, the macro-level culture provides a larger framework within which micro-level culture regulating interpersonal behavior operates to increase the viability of micro encounters which, in turn, affect the viability of the divisions of labor in which these encounters occur. Within the organizational literature, this dynamic goes by a number of names—for example, typifications, schema, and scripts—and micro culture is all of these, but my goal is to be a bit more specific and spell out *which aspects* of stocks of knowledge are important in understanding organizational dynamics.

*1. Normalizing Situations* In Table 3.2 on p. 102, the dimensions of normalizing that individuals almost universally hold in their stocks of knowledge are listed. As is evident, these correspond to my discussion earlier of micro-level fields examined in Chap. 3 and in the discussion developed in Vol. 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* on the cultural dynamics of micro-level encounters.

One of the first things that individuals in divisions of labor in organizations must do is to determine the categories of individuals, if these are salient; the relative amounts of ceremonial, social, and work-practical activity (Goffman 1967; Collins 1975); and the level of interpersonal intimacy to

be exhibited and achieved. With categorization, interpersonal frames can be established and forms of talk and nonverbal body language can be calibrated, appropriate rituals can be deployed, and emotions to be felt and expressed can be understood. Figure 6.1 of Vol. 1 lays these dynamics out as a sequence that begins with categorization, but if categories of persons, levels of intimacy, and types of activity are not clear, then the interaction may start with tepid rituals and work their way back to categorization. Without categorization or what Alfred Schutz (1967[1932]) denoted as typifications (along with some organization theorists), it is hard to establish frames which are needed to understand what forms of communication, what rituals, and what emotions are to be part of the encounters. Embedding of encounters in divisions of labor, however, takes much of the guess work and mystery away because the norms, authority relations, and culture of the corporate as they operate in the division of labor typically make categorization clear which, in turn, increases the clarity of all other normatization dynamics for individuals.

The most critical outcome of normatization for organizational dynamics is that it reinforces the structural properties of the division of labor and the macro-level culture as it has filtered across the division of labor in an organization. If normatization does so, then it gives the organization's culture both clarity and power. If, however, the culture of an organization is not clear, then normatization becomes a great deal more work, forcing individuals to actively pull from their stocks of knowledge new combinations and configurations of elements to fit the current situation, only to have to normatize actively once again in each new situations. Let me offer an example. When I was a brand new assistant professor, I had only witnessed meetings among faculty and between faculty and higher-level administrators as an outsider. And so, when I first became a faculty member and went to my first meeting (having never really been at a faculty meeting as a student), I had to draw upon stocks of knowledge about meetings in general, authority differences among participants, and collaborative actions; I did not have much to draw upon, and so I watched and listened carefully to figure out how to normatize. Later, as I had evermore meetings with higher-level administrators, I had to do the same thing: listen and watch as the power and authority differences increased. Still later as my local and prestige status as a professor increased, I had to recalibrate everything because literally I outranked all of the senior administrators on the UC ranking scale, but I still did not have any formal authority, and so it took a little practice to learn how to be both assertive and protective of my status (and especially if I was representing the faculty of the university) and yet differential to the formal status of

chancellors and presidents of the university, and still be somewhat informal and, over time, a bit more intimate. The micro culture of the university or any organization depends upon each incumbent in the division of labor being able to work and rework normatization as the situation in encounters requires different categorizations, frames, forms of talk, rituals, and emotional demeanor. Those who cannot do so are soon not invited to these kinds of mixed-status encounters. In most instances, this process is not difficult because individuals work their way slowly into these new types of encounters, and there are “practice encounters” with chairs, deans, and associate deans as one works their way up the academic hierarchy to acquire the strange mix of formality–informality, attention to authority without its actual use and imposition, and other implicit micro-level codes about how to normatize diverse types of encounters in the division of labor.

When the system of authority is more apparent and pronounced in encounters, normatization is, in many ways, easier to accomplish, although power differences always generate some tension, which usually must be repressed and then released in groups of similar-status persons. In high-tech or social network companies where everything is seemingly informal, normatization may initially be difficult because the office is, after all, a work-practical place, but in the case of these kinds of companies, ceremonial content is relaxed and much social content is introduced, as is informality even though there is always an authority hierarchy present but left in the background. Working out just *how* to normatize takes time, as my conversations with people in these organizations reveal. But once the right balance among work, social, play, formality, and attention/inattention to authority is worked out, encounters become readily normatized and thereby reproduce and sustain the culture of the organization.

*2. Conceptions of Status* Individuals accumulate a repertoire of basic types of status as they move through various types of organizations, beginning with preschool and school. Divisions of labor in organizations, in contrast to groups, are almost always highly explicit, as is the authority attached to positions in this division of labor. These can become somewhat blurred, however, when formality is relaxed, more social and even somewhat more intimate content is introduced. Still, we all have some stocks of knowledge about such system, if only from preschool and kindergarten, on which to draw as we work out just how to determine the expectation states for ourselves and others at various locations in the division of labor. Yet I have noted that individuals who have come onto campus from organizations with

very different authority systems (typically one that is very explicit and hierarchical) do not have the relevant stocks of knowledge for the more complicated system in academia. They look for “who is boss of whom” and, in fact, use terms like “your boss” which only grates on academics who see themselves as independent scholars and their chairs and deans as “hired help”—or at least they pretend to do so. These persons are looking at the formal organization chart, not recognizing that formal status is to be downplayed in encounters, even though it is very real in some key decisions (such as who get positions and money). We recently hired as our accounting person an ex-marine. Even after two years, he still calls faculty “sirs” and “ma’ams” although he is beginning to loosen up and use proper names, but clearly, he still does not fully understand the relevant stocks of knowledge about how authority is acknowledged and used, or he is having a great deal of trouble abandoning his old military stocks of knowledge, where everybody has a rank that determines how interactions are to occur.

One of the few remaining areas of ambiguity in the academic authority system is the relationship between graduate students and faculty. Clearly, norms have moved toward more informality from my time in graduate school, with students and faculty addressing each other by their first name. This always creates a certain tension because faculty will have to pass judgment on the qualifications of students whose demeanors are that typical of friends. I never give out explicit information on how students should address me, but clearly, the other students seem to think that I prefer to be addressed by my last name and title—although I do not care one way or the other. Yet, because I am older, high status, and generally formal in my relations with students early in their careers (I do this because I will have to decide at some point if they are going to work with me in theory, and I do not want to raise expectations by excessive informality until I see their papers in seminars), the local student culture in the department clearly guides those students to a more formal talk with me, and just the opposite with other faculty. More complicated for me is the point where I have to insist that the student call me by my first name—typically when they have finished their dissertation. They do not automatically shift; I have to tell them to do so again and again, and they struggle, just as I did with all my undergraduate and graduate mentors where I had forced myself to use their first name (it never felt right for people that I so admired and to whom I felt a great obligation). Thus, in general, informal cultures operating within an authority systems are always more difficult to navigate, and as is the case with graduate students who come to work with me, they are often confused until tutored by other students. Formality is always much more easily understood, but in American society, informality is valued (under the presumption that we are all equal,

which is true as human beings, but not as incumbents in an authority system of ranked status positions). Thus, the more local knowledge is needed to recognize and respond to positions of authority, the less useful will importing knowledge from other organizations, especially ones with a more formal division of labor. Every organization is potentially different, even within one institutional domain and certainly across diverse domains, with the consequence that individuals will have to spend some time figuring out how to manage differences in status.

If the micro culture does not develop a set of understandings about status locations, their relative ranks, and the degree to which and the manner in which authority or lack thereof is to be played out, then a considerable amount of tension in the organization will persist. An army is an easy place to figure out authority, whereas academia is more complex because there are conflicting and/or ambiguous norms about how varying levels of authority are to relate to each other. Yet, if a person has never been in a truly hierarchical system (as is easily the case in the United States), the army can be a terrifying place to land—aside from the inherent dangers of being killed—because individuals need to learn (and learn quickly) the rituals attached to each and every difference in authority.

Much of the work about determining if diffuse status characteristics are relevant in a situation is accomplished by categorization during the process of normatizing. Still, once categoric units and locations in divisions of labor are calibrated, the process of understanding status can still become difficult. If there is consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with locations in the division of labor, the process is simplified, but what happens when there is some intersection? How is the member of a devalued categoric unit to be treated in a status location not typically occupied by persons with these diffuse status characteristics? There are no general cultural rules, and so the member of the categoric unit and those responding to this person will have to work it out on the ground, and the process can be stressful. The recent history of the stress that women and members of formerly excluded minorities who have assumed high-ranking positions that were once denied to them is testimony to the conflicts in stocks of knowledge, or to lack of experience in how to deal with intersections of categoric-unit memberships and status in vertical divisions of labor in organizations. Thus, the greater the degree of intersection of diffuse with locational status, and the more recent are increases in intersection, the more incomplete will individuals stocks of knowledge about status become, and the more effort they will have to put into creating new, or restocking their old, knowledge. As a consequence, individuals will experience tension in encounters until diffuse status characteristics become irrelevant and

status within the division of labor becomes the dominant consideration for all incumbents.

3. *Conceptions of Roles* Individuals carry, I believe, fairly fine-tuned conceptions of roles and the normative expectations associated with them. For most roles, there is a range of variation in how they are played out in status locations. The status structure of an organization and its culture, as well as the process of normatization, will generally bias which variants are normatively appropriate, but even then, there are still some variations. As I argued in Vol. 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (2010b: 136–142), there are, in addition to the variants for most roles within institutional domains, several generic processes by which the inventory is simplified.

(a) *Preassembled roles* are those whose elements most people know, and thus, once role making and role taking recognize these elements, role dynamics will move along easily. In most organizations, roles are already preassembled; people know what the roles of manager, assistant, worker, student, professor, doctor, nurse, receptionist, and so on are. They have little trouble because the boundaries of the organization, its ecology and demography, and division of labor cue persons to expect these roles. Only when a role does not fit the preassembled elements that are expected do individuals need to more actively role-take, and if they cannot figure out the preassembled role, they will experience negative emotions. But this lack of clarity is rare in organization within domains because of mimicry and people's familiarity with the status structure of organizations that make up diverse institutional domains.

(b) *Combinational roles* combine well-known roles and their variants, and at times, some of these can be preassembled. For example, a reception sponsored by a dean in a university is a combination of elements from the dean's role (and underlying authority of the dean's status) and the role of host. Since both roles are well known, their combination is easy to understand, allowing others to play an appropriate variant of the guest role.

(c) *Generalized roles* are roles that can be attached to almost any other role. For example, being assertive, shy, upbeat, serious, and virtually any pronounced emotional state carries expectations for how any of these states is to be played out, and they can easily be attached to another role, such as father, athlete, professor, student, mother, etc., thus creating another kind of combinational role, such as an upbeat-dean-hosting-a-reception role.

(d) *Trans-situational roles* are carried by individuals into diverse situations and, then, mixed with how they play whatever role is expected of them in a

situation. Most trans-situational roles are associated with categoric-unit memberships and the status beliefs and expectations for members of a particular categoric unit. For example, males and females, varying age groups, ethnic minorities, and other parameters defining categoric units are carried to all situations and influence how a person plays all other roles in an organization. For example, male and female professors play the role of professor but typically with a somewhat different style; similarly, members of ethnic minorities will play roles in the workplace with a style unique to their background. At times, individuals seek to expunge status beliefs and expectation states from their role performances, and they typically encounter problems in so doing because they are not playing the role in accordance with expectation states attached to categoric-unit membership. The problems and stress that women and ethnic managers often feel comes from the effort to play the role and meet these expectations, while letting other expectation states associated with categoric-unit memberships interfere. The result can be that individuals overplay the role in terms of expectation states attached to locational status in the division of labor. In downplaying the trans-situational role associated with expectations and status beliefs about their membership in categoric units, however, they may come across (to some) as “cold and efficient” or distant. Striking a balance is always difficult when two sets of expectations states are in play—that is, those attached to locational status in the division of labor and those associated with diffuse status characteristics. And it is particularly difficult if categoric-unit memberships of those playing both roles have historically, or even in the present, been devalued, if not highly stigmatized. Playing roles well in divisions of labor where members of categoric units have been excluded (by discrimination) is the key breaking down prejudicial status beliefs and expectation states; yet, the pressures on those who must be the first to cross boundaries into organizations or upper locations in their divisions of labor are very great. The dilemma is always: how much of the trans-situational role is to be played out along with roles associated with status in the division of labor? The cultural dynamics of organization undergoing these transitions are always complicated and tense—as was the case when school organizations in the southern United States (and elsewhere) were first integrated, when African Americans began to go to integrated college organizations, and then, when they sought positions into previously segregated organizations in many institutional domains. Over time, however, the trans-situational role can often become accepted as a variant of any role and stored in people’s stocks of knowledge and thus easily retrieved without the previous stigma. For instance, few notice the difference in how black and white athletes play

roles, although in sports like hockey, where there are virtually no African-origin players, it would take more time for people *not* to notice differences. But the more trans-situational roles can become legitimate variants of other key roles in organizations, the less they mark difference and rekindle older stigmatizing evaluations of members in particular categoric units. The result is that the micro culture associated with stocks of knowledge about roles becomes simplified, and tensions arising from contradictory expectation states are eliminated, with the consequence that the micro culture will reinforce the culture attached to the division of labor or status order.

The culture of the organizations is influenced by the extent to which individuals have their roles verified. Since normative expectations as well as status and role dynamics are so well integrated in most divisions of labor in organizations, the process of role verification is generally not problematic. Moreover, to the extent that role verification is essential to meeting key transactional needs for identities, profits in exchange payoffs, and group inclusion, the mutual verification of roles leads individuals to experience positive emotions and, over time, this generalized reinforcer causes individuals to develop commitments to the organization's broader culture. However, when individuals cannot verify roles in organizations, they will experience negative emotions and *alienation* that will lead to hostile orientations to the culture of an organization. And, if enough locations in the divisions of labor are filled by persons in devalued categoric units, the potential cultural conflict within the organization will increase. Thus, while embedding of roles in corporate units, and particularly organizational corporate units with goals and explicit divisions of labor, will increase the likelihood that individuals will have their roles verified, such is not always the case. When roles are not verified or when roles do not allow individuals to meet transactional needs when verified, the micro culture and emotional moods swirling around this culture will set the stage for conflict and change within and often between organizations.

*4. Conceptions of Situational Ecology* Most corporate units are located in geographical space within a community. The boundaries of a corporate unit within this geographical space almost always carry meanings, and individuals moving in this space and, potentially, crossing the physical boundaries must know the symbolic meanings of these boundaries. Incumbents in an organization or its clients rarely have a problem of understanding what the ecological environment of an organization signifies, but if you have ever been in a strange land, where cultural meanings are not so clear, it becomes immediately evident that this implicit knowledge is necessary to

feel comfortable. If discomfort persists, then the negative emotions aroused can create a dysfunctional micro-level environment.

Once inside the boundaries of an organization, understanding the meanings of the internal ecology becomes even more important since these generally signal differences in rank and authority within the organization. For example, years ago, I once walked into the teachers' lounge of one of my children's schools by mistake and received very strange looks because I did not "belong there." No one actually said anything, but their stares spoke volumes: "go away." Ecological space within an organization is divided up into reception areas, waiting rooms, offices, hallways, bathrooms, and use spaces, and while these may carry the same or similar meanings in different organizations, persons need to know what these spaces "mean" in a particular organization if they are to carry off micro-level encounters. There are also props in these spaces that carry meanings, and incumbents in organizations must know these as well. Moreover, the props adorning each incumbent carry meanings, and individuals must recognize if props fit a status and a role. Again, normally, it is not a problem for individuals to understand these meanings of situational ecology, status location, or role, but it is immediately evident when something is "off."

The importance of situational ecology is particularly evident when individuals use it inappropriately in a deliberate effort to draw attention to themselves. When students, for example, conduct a "sit in" in the office of the college president, this deviant use of space signals a violation of status and roles. Years ago, I set students loose on my campus with instructions (for extra credit) to record the reaction to their violations of space in an organization like UCR. Students became a bit zealous in their efforts, causing many angry calls to my office, and so I had to abandon such assignments (600 students out to violate cultural norms and expectations can indeed disrupt routines on campus). Still, one of the most effective and efficient ways to draw attention to grievances is to violate norms of situational ecology because they are well known and almost always followed, with the consequence that it is a surprise to others when they are violated. Sometimes violations are done unintentionally, but they are nonetheless disruptive. For instance, I once had a job candidate in my office, who was clearly nervous, fondle all of the little objects on my desk, which I found irritating since they were personal, and I am sure that the candidate knew this, but his anxiety blocked his attention from recognizing that he was invading my zone of self and the props that I surround myself with in my office. If events like this are common, whether deliberate or unintentional, then they change the micro-level cultural climate, valencing it with negative emotions that potentially can disrupt organizational routines.

*5. Conceptions of Situational Demography* In all organizations, there are conceptions of situational demography. These conceptions concern the categories of individuals present, and where they should be present, and where they can go. I can recall, for example, many times that I have been asked politely (can I help you?) when I am present in a place where males normally do not belong. These implicit understandings only surface when they are violated, just as is the case with situational ecology. Organizations can reveal considerable interpersonal tension when individuals “invade” each other’s “space” or when new categories of person assume new positions and their roles take them into new spaces. For example, as women have assumed many positions in divisions of labor previously occupied by men, the presence of women in what was once “male territory” will inevitably arouse some tension, as was the case for members of minority populations that began to move to new positions in organizations. As these kinds of demographic changes occur, the micro-level culture of the organization is forced to change, but rarely is this change smooth and unproblematic.

As is evident in this section on stocks of knowledge at hand, individuals have internalized a complex array of cognitions and the cultural meanings inherent in these cognitions. These stocks remain implicit, but when discontinuities occur between what is expected, then negative emotions are aroused. These emotions motivate people to reestablish the old micro culture, if they can, or to change this culture, if they must. The key to understanding micro culture is the expectations that are generated by cognitive states of individuals.

**Expectation States and Emotional Responses.** Expectation states are considerably more robust than portrayed by the long research tradition on this cognitive phenomenon (Berger 1988; Berger and Zelditch 1985; Ridgeway 1998, Ridgeway 2000, 2001, 2006). Any cognitive sets of expectations about what should occur or transpire, and any incongruity between what is expected and what transpires can arouse emotions (Heise 1979; Turner 2008). The micro culture of an organization is built around expectations inhering in the normatization process (i.e., categorizing, framing, forming communications, enacting rituals, and expressing emotions) because almost all encounters embedded in organizations have clear normative frameworks generating expectation states for what should occur. Similarly, status taking and role taking revolve around becoming aware of the expectations attached to locational status (in divisions of labor), diffuse status characteristics (categoric units), and various types of roles. The converse of these processes—that is, status making and role making—involves an effort to establish expectations for status and roles among those copresent in an encounter within an organization. Once successful, these expectations

become part of the micro culture and regulate subsequent actions of individuals in encounters. The same is true with situational ecology and demography; these too establish expectation states that are enshrined in beliefs about what should occur in a situation.

Since the dynamics of expectation states are so well studied, the generalizations from this literature still stand, even though I have broadened considerably the forces generating expectation states. When expectations are realized, individuals experience such mild positive emotions as *satisfaction*. When they are not realized, they experience a variant of *anger*, thereby mobilizing individuals to sanction those who have violated expectations. But if the violator is powerful, then anger will need to be repressed or at least held back, generating additional diffuse emotions like *frustration*, *fear*, *sadness*, and perhaps *alienation*. If expectations are exceeded, individuals will feel more intense positive emotions and only if a person does not feel that he or she deserved outcomes that exceeded expectations or if others are punished or harmed by these outcomes will individuals feel such complicated emotions as *guilt*.

The micro culture of an organization or subdivisions within an organization will, I believe, be very much determined by the emotions aroused over success in realizing expectations contained in cognitions about norms, roles, status, ecology, and demography, or alternatively over failures to meet expectations. When expectations are not realized, negative emotions will often lower expectations for what is possible, but at the same time, the micro culture will develop generalized beliefs about the negative qualities of the organization, fed by *alienation*, *anger*, *frustration*, *sadness*, and perhaps *fear*, or some combination of these emotions. When expectations are consistently met or exceeded, however, individuals will experience an array of positive emotions like *satisfaction*, *happiness*, and *gratitude*, and these emotions will lead individuals to make external attributions and see the organization as a whole as responsible for their success in meeting expectations. The result will be stronger commitments to the organization and its culture, if not the entire institutional domain in which this organization is embedded.

**Cognitions, Evaluations, and Emotional Dynamics.** When expectations go unrealized, the dissonance or incongruity leads not only to emotional arousal but also to evaluations of the situation as improper, or unfair, or bad. Negative emotions provide the energy, but evaluations offer a framework for interpreting these emotions. The most important cognitive dynamic in this process is *attribution*. When a person blames self for failure to meet expectations, this person will experience some form of *shame* and, at times, *guilt* if the situation were viewed in moral terms. If these emotions are experienced more collectively, then the culture of the organization or subunit will be heavily influenced by these emotions, but most importantly, attribu-

tions will not be directed to the organization as a whole but at self and/or the micro encounter.

If other emotions like *anger*, *fury*, *sadness*, and *alienation* are aroused when expectations are not realized, then individuals are likely to make more *distal* attributions. They will avoid blaming self, often by repression and selective perception, and they will also avoid blaming others who will give back counteranger and thus prove a costly target of a person's attributions. Instead, they will evidence what Edward Lawler (2001) terms the *distal bias* and target external structures and their cultures that cannot fight back. Organizations that are blamed for negative emotional arousal will reveal few commitments among their incumbents, and the micro culture will be built around a combination of *alienation* and *anger*, often codified into beliefs about the negative qualities of the organization.

In contrast, when individuals experience positive emotions from their role behaviors in encounters within organizations, they will make *proximal* attributions to themselves (for their performance) or to immediate others. Thus, the positive emotions will circulate within the subgroups within organizations where most encounters occur, and as positive emotions circulate, they become a *private good* that adds another layer of reinforcement and thereby increases attachments and commitment to group members. The potential problem in this dynamic is that the positive emotions remain local, circulating among a small set of individuals, and thus never breaking out of the proximal bias of positive emotions that keep these emotions local. However, if positive emotions are consistently experienced, then they slowly begin to break the hold of the proximal bias and move outward toward the larger social structure and culture of the organization and, potentially, beyond to the institutional domain in which the organization is embedded (Turner 2008, 2010a). The result is for individuals to reveal commitments at both the micro level of iterated encounters *and* the meso level of the organization as a whole, and perhaps even macro level of the institutional domain or possibly the society as a whole. The micro culture will thus reinforce the meso- and macro-level cultures in a society, thereby increasing the level of cultural integration across levels of social reality.

Thus, when the micro culture lines up with the broader culture of an organization, and the latter incorporates the values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies of the macro realm, a society becomes better integrated. The elements of culture are more likely to be consistent, and the embedding of micro- in meso-level culture and meso- in macro-level culture increases the integration among elements of various levels of culture. Thus, culture integration in a society depends upon individuals meeting expectations at the meso level, especially in the divisions of labor of organizations as the basic building blocks of institutional domains.

If, however, there is *consolidation of parameters* of categoric-unit members with access to organizations in the first place and/or the full range of locations in their divisions of labor, the discrimination inevitably involved in consolidation (see Chap. 3) inevitably creates tensions arising from those not able to realize expectations; they are likely to experience a generalized sense of injustice and unfairness in the divisions of labor of corporate units, especially resource-distributing organizations. The result is a culture fueled by *anger, frustration, alienation, humiliated fury*, and other potentially volatile emotions that drive pressures for change, but that also ensures that there will be a decrease in the level of cultural integration at all levels of social reality (Hannan and Freeman 1984).

### ***Organizational Inertia***

Organizations reveal varying propensities to sustain their structure and culture. Many of these inertial tendencies come from the internal structure and culture of the organization, per se, while others come from the environments in which organizations must operate. Let me first enumerate those that come from the internal features of an organization.

**Internal Inertial Dynamics.** The concept of *path dependence* was developed within economics to describe organizations that develop along a particular path to the point that it is simply too costly to change course (David 1985, 2000; Arthur 1994; Scott 2008a, b). When the initial capital, technological, and learning investments needed to found and develop an organization are high, these “sunk costs” operate against new investments in alternative ways to organize the division of labor in an organization (Arthur 1994). These costs increase as the division of labor and the recruitment of personnel are increasingly built around the initial modes of organization. The result is that investments in a particular way of organizing activities increase, and these investments become institutionalized in the culture of the organization as it draws from macro- and micro-level cultural fields.

Change thus would have to alter not only the investment and use of capital and technology, the recruitment and training of human capital, and the division of labor but also the culture that has been built up from individual’s experiences in encounters and the adoption and adaptation of more general institutional ideologies. Add to these conservative forces the vested interests of personnel at different locations in the divisions of labor, especially those with authority, and it is not difficult to see how organizations

become ossified in how they operate. Just how adverse to change an organization becomes, however, is also influenced by key environmental conditions (Hannan and Freeman 1984).

**External Environments and Inertial Dynamics.** One powerful force operating on organizations is the mode of structural integration of the institutional domain(s) in which it operates. Segmentation and domination tend to be conservative modes of integration, with the former encouraging mimicry and the latter conformity to dictates by centers of power, whether from dominant organization within a domain or dominant organizations in other domains such as polity, law, religion, or economy. Power is a conservative force, and it is typically used to sustain relations of domination–subordination. In contrast, differentiation and structural interdependencies create more opportunities for change, especially when markets and competition in markets are well developed. However, the internal dynamics of organizations enumerated above can keep an organization from changing, even in market systems, because the costs are high relative to uncertain gains. As North (1989) has argued, when markets are imperfect and competition is restricted by patterns of dominance, when information is also imperfect and ambiguous, when feedback from actions is fragmented, when evaluations of information are biased by existing patterns of authority and culture, when transaction costs are high, and when the micro culture dominates expectations and evaluations of options, it is difficult for an organization to change, even when there is some recognition that change is needed. Under these conditions, just how to change is often unclear, although organizations can sometimes observe and potentially try to mimic other organizations that appear to be more successful in a niche. But, if mimicry requires expensive new investments in physical and human (demographic) capital, adoption of costly technologies, reorganization of the division of labor, and dramatic transformation of organizational culture, then this strategy is unlikely to be followed because of uncertainty about whether or not it is possible to make such drastic changes. Selznick (1996) has noted that formalization, *per se*, generates rules, goals, rituals, specialized units, networks, communication systems along with what he terms “thick” institutionalization by general acceptance of procedures, layers of authority and centers of power, ideologies, moralized norms, and commitments to existing patterns of organization and culture; all of these together decrease the adaptive flexibility of an organization, whether this be a church, car company, university, or business corporation.

This kind of thick institutionalization often leads to a kind of “objectification” of an organizational form that becomes almost totemic and, much like a religious totem, is worshiped. Such totemic organizations develop

routines, rituals, forms of talk, frames, emotional commitments, and other cognitive, evaluative, and cultural orientations (Tolbert and Zucker 1996; Zucker 1983, 1988). Coupled with forms of documentation, employee classifications and training, and artifacts such as tools, hardware, machinery, and office spaces, objectification is even more likely to occur. And the more particularized is the generalized symbolic medium in the domain where an organization operates, the more likely is this process of objectification to occur, and hence, the less likely is change in the organizations within this domain. But even if cooler media, such as *money*, are primary in a domain, these same dynamics can occur. The fact that people lament if not grieve for the “loss” of an iconic organization attests to this quasi-sacred quality that organizations can possess, often at the cost of their survival in a dense and competitive resource niche. Indeed, as the principal carriers of integrated cultures across macro, micro, and meso levels of social reality, organizations are unique in their capacity to make culture salient to individuals and to institutionalize culture in relation with other organizations within and across institutional domains. And, even when market forces operate, they cannot always undo the conservative power of culture because so many of individuals’ key locations in divisions of labor are defined by culture.

The more integrated is a society culturally (see Table 2.2 on pp. 79–83), the greater will be the power of culture versus market dynamics in determining whether or not an organization will resist change. As Hannan and Freeman (1977) emphasized in their original formulation of the organizational ecology theoretical perspective, organizational inertia gives selection dynamics something to select on and, in many cases, to select out of the population of organizations a particular organization in a resource niche.

Moreover, as Powell (1990: 303–304) has argued, markets often create binding networks of relations and norms of reciprocity that override immediate self-interest and market dynamics (driven by competition and price), and if there are also dominant–subordinate relations in markets, even the market cannot push organizations to change their practices in order to survive in a given niche. Indeed, the graveyard of large and small organizations that could not change their practices in competitive niches is rather large and constantly growing.

### ***Organizational Change***

Organizations change under external and internal pressures that can overcome inertial tendencies inhering in their structure and culture. The

most powerful of these pressures are external, coming from the fields of an organization as well as its resource niche or niches that are generated by structural and cultural fields.

**Macro-structural Environments of Organizational Change.** Part of the environment of any organization is macro-structural arrangements, composed of institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and inter-societal systems. Of particular importance are the modes of integration within and between institutional domains and the system of classes. Changes in these environments almost always require changes in at least some organizations.

**Changing Institutional Environments.** Spencerian selection pressures are what drive the formation of organizations that, over time, become linked by various mechanisms of integration to form an institutional domain. Thus, if selection pressures from macro-dynamic forces increase, or the relative pressure among these forces changes, organizational innovation is likely to increase. Entrepreneurs will begin mobilizing resources to create new kinds of organizations, and if these prove successful in meeting selection pressures, they are likely to be mimicked by existing organizations—thereby altering their structure and, as we will see, their culture as well. Selection pressures from population, production, and regulation are particularly likely to cause organizational innovation and, in so doing, generate new structural and cultural templates for organizational change. And such change is especially likely to occur if these new organizations begin to occupy central and core locations in networks of organizations or to dominate particular resource niches in a population of organizations.

Selection pressures alone, however, do not drive organizational change. Alterations in the modes of integration within and between domains also drive change. Some of this change may be a response to selection pressures, but often, the change is related to purely macro-dynamic processes summarized in Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. In general, integration based upon domination and segregation of organizations stabilizes institutional environments of organizations, at least for a time. Since concentrations of power and control typically increase inequalities in the distribution of resources and, hence, stratification in a society, tensions will increase in the longer run, and at some point, conflict will emerge challenging existing centers of power and the inequalities that they have generated. At this point, selection pressures from regulation as a force will increase and cause organizational innovation, and if a new set of political organizations is created, these will generate both opportunities and pressures for new kinds of organizations in other institutional domains, especially economy, education, and sometimes religion. Even if conflict dynamics are not initiated by resistance to political

domination, organizational change can occur when dominant organizations within a domain—for example, economy, polity, religion, and law—alter their structure and culture, thereby forcing all subordinate organizations to change in order to meet the demands of these dominant organizations. While dominant organizations tend to be conservative, they can change if only to extract more from dependent organizations, thus forcing the latter to change.

Like domination but for different reasons, institutional integration by segmentation also works against organizational change, at least until it is not longer an adequate mechanism of integration. As the inadequacies of segmentation increase, new selection pressures arise, causing innovations, foundings, and differentiation of organizations. Unlike domination, however, segmentation is less likely to generate change through conflict, although problems of regulation may cause new organizations consolidating political power to evolve. Rather, as segmentation proves inadequate in various spheres of activity, whether organizing communities to house a population, to feed them, to coordinate their activities, to provide reproductive structures, to distribute goods and services, to mobilize for defense, and for just about any critical institutional activity, selection pressures increase. These do not usually come “all at once” but with each increase in selection pressures, new organizations emerge or old ones change, and as these new organizational forms are developed, they become a new template for emulation and for new players in networks of organizations within and between institutional domains. The effect is to create new opportunities and pressures for organizational transformation. These pressures often operate through the meso-level structural environment of any organization, but the ultimate source of organizational changes at the meso level is the macro-level problems of adaptation that are increasing the intensity of some or even all macro-dynamic forces.

As modes of institutional integration move toward differentiation and structural interdependencies as the primary mechanisms of integration, organizational change becomes even more likely. As organizations build up interdependencies through market exchanges, mergers, overlaps, embedding, and mobility of personnel from other organizations in external institutional domains, new templates for mimicry are created but, more fundamentally, the range of variation among organizations increases and makes available new structural and cultural codings that can not only be copied but assembled in new combinations to create new kinds of organizational forms. Free markets, in which money circulates not only in the economy proper but also in other institutional domains, accelerate this process by creating new kinds of resource niches (see below), while also generating new incentives for organizational change to take advantage of new market opportunities (expressed as demand in markets). Indeed, as

markets and the symbolic medium of money (plus the ideologies built around this symbolic medium) circulate to domains, new patterns of exchange among symbolic media occur and new meta-ideologies are generated, all of which increases the number of cultural niches and the incentives for new organizational foundings or new modes of integrating organizations. In either case, rates of organizational change will increase.

As organizations differentiate, selection pressures for regulation will increase, causing the elaboration of new organizational forms in polity and law, at a minimum, but also in other domains. And as these new organizational forms emerge, they generate pressures for additional organizational innovation or new configurations of structural interdependencies among organizations within and across institutional domains. For example, if a particular set of dominant organizations begins to control markets, polity and law will often react and force divestiture of a monopoly or oligopoly, creating opportunities for new organizations not only within polity and law but also within the economy. Or, if organizations cannot afford to finance all research and development, polity may provide funds to fund new kinds of science and educational structures, while encouraging new types of overlaps and exchanges among organizations in science, education, and economy—as is clearly evident, for example, in the United States today. Thus, once markets begin to become the main mechanism of institutional integration, polity and law also change in order to regulate markets (because they are inherently unstable in capitalist systems), thereby creating not only new niches but also new models for organizational change and foundings.

**Changing Stratification and Organizational Change.** When the level of stratification is high, it can be said to be integrated because such a system can persist for long periods of time, especially if the meta-ideology legitimating inequality is accepted by a large proportion of the population. Yet, over time, as tensions build up, conflict can emerge (see Fig. 5.7 on page 200 in Vol. 1). If conflict is successful, and often when it is not, organizations change. Since organizations in all domains are the principal distributors of valued resources and since conflict demands redistribution, it is inevitable that organizations must change their patterns of resource distribution, which often involves altering not only their culture and goals but also their divisions of labor and the categories of incumbents in these divisions of labor. For example, if a civil rights movement is successful or even partially successful, as was the case in the United States and as may eventually ensure in the Middle East as an outcome of revolts in 2011, polity and law must change; economic organizations must open their doors to new incumbents; free markets tied to world system dynamics may emerge and cause change in virtually all domains, and educational opportunities may

need to be expanded. Conflict-induced change can also work in a more conservative way, as was the case after the Iranian revolution in the 1970s. In this case, the assumption of control of polity by religious leaders change not only polity but also organizations in many other institutional domains—for example, law, education, economy, science, sport, and arts. Thus, any time that the system of stratification changes, it generates pressures for resource-distributing organizations to accommodate this change.

In more open stratification systems, where free markets, political democracy, civil rights laws outlawing discrimination, universal education, and health care all exist in some form, the nature of the stratification system continually generates change. Previously excluded members of categorical unit will eventually push for inclusion, forcing organizations to transform their cultures and divisions of labor. Such stratification systems, more generally, create opportunities for protest and political actions by members of all classes, particularly lower classes but also middle classes (as is the case in the United States). And as these classes exert political pressure, polity and law change, as do other institutional domains as their constituent organizations are put under political pressure and threat of legal sanctions. Also, open stratification systems reveal mobility not only by class but also by categorical-unit memberships that have been consolidated with class locations, and as diverse individuals move through educational systems and neighborhoods, join political parties, and seek employment and/or memberships in previously closed corporate units, they change the micro-level culture of all organizations and their respective divisions of labor. They also change the balances of political power that in turn will lead governments to place pressures on corporate units in all domains as well as the legal requirements for resource-giving organizations in these domains.

### **Societal and Intersocietal Environments and Organizational Change.**

Many changes in institutional domains come from societal-level changes, especially in relation to intersocietal dynamics (Castells 2010). War with another society will, for example, centralize power and increase regulation of the economy and other domains in order to mobilize resource to fight the war. Under these conditions, organizations in many domains will change, as will the mechanisms integrating organizations within and between institutional domains. Domination by polity will intervene in market dynamics, particularly those dealing in necessary resources to wage a war. Like war, globalization of markets has dramatically changed institutional domains and, indirectly, the stratification system. For instance, American exports to China and other lower-wage countries of capital and jobs have changed the division of labor not only in the economy but also

in other domains. And as traditional blue-collar industrial jobs have been exported, the shares of resources of individuals and families have changed, and in many cases declined, with the result that the structure of inequality and the class system have been transformed as the proportion of older industrial organizations have declined relative to lower-paying service organizations.

What is true of an affluent postindustrial society is even more true for developing and less-industrial societies in global markets. Organizations of more industrial societies or their surrogates in the form of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund can intervene in economies with technology and capital that not only creates new kinds of organizations but also alters existing ones, typically in a direction benefiting organizations from more developed societies. Thus, the principles on intersocietal systems outlined in Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* have large effects on both the institutional domains and stratification systems of societies. There, I indicated that three basic types of intersocietal formations have emerged: geopolitical based upon war and conquest, dependency systems revolving around the economic dependency (for capital and technology) of less developed on more developed societies, and free-market systems. All involve the use of power to exploit indigenous organizations in order to gain access to valued resources. Geopolitical formations involve conquest of another society, thus altering the political and legal system of those conquered and typically many other organizations as well. Dependency systems result in the economic organizations of developed societies and sometimes the political organizations as well, transforming organizations in societies that lack capital and technology; this dependency gives the more developed society bargaining leverage to extract resources without paying full value for these resources that would be the case if more open and free-market conditions existed. But even a free-market system, and especially ones without a strong polity to intervene to protect open markets, will develop a variety of dependency and noncompetitive market relations among societies. For example, it is difficult to regulate developed societies exchanges on a global scale. Agreements can be ignored, currencies can be manipulated to favor one society over another, or trade deficits can weaken the bargaining power of one society, or holding of debt (e.g., government and private bonds) of one society by another generates asymmetries in markets and trade relations. For example, China can keep its currency devalued (thus making their goods cheaper on world markets) without great fear of retaliation because they hold a large proportion of the American governments' (and private corporations') bonds, while at the same time, they encourage the growing dependence of American corporations on lower-wage factories based in

China. The result is a constant change in the organizations—productive, extractive, distributive, financial, governmental, and educational—within and between societies in global markets. And if this system of global markets were to collapse through overspeculation in financial instruments or warfare, the collapsing system would initiate even more dramatic changes in organizations in most institutional domains but especially polity, law, and economy.

**Macro-level Cultural Environments and Organizational Change.** Any significant change in macro-level culture, particularly value premises and technologies, will have large effects on organizations in virtually all institutional domains. Agrarian production technologies, followed by industrial technologies that, in turn, ushered in the information revolution, have obviously transformed every institutional domain and most organizations within these domains. As knowledge about how to manipulate the environment develops within the institutional domains of a society—typically science as it overlaps with organizations in economy, polity, and education—it provides the knowledge or technology to rework a wide variety of relations. And if technologies become commodified and marketed, incentives for their continued development increase, thereby accelerating the pace of technological change. Such acceleration of technologies is facilitated by value premises that can be bent to legitimate efforts of organizations to extend and adopt technological development. If, however, values remain highly traditional, technologies will be more limited or, at least, partly compartmentalized so that traditional corporate units in institutional domains such as polity, kinship, and religion are not dramatically altered, although in the long run change may occur anyhow because of large transformations in the economy.

As new ideologies are developed in those institutional domains where technologies have penetrated, these circulate to other domains, and as they do so, the evaluative premises of these ideologies will mix with the premises of more traditional ideologies. As organizations use these ideologies to frame and develop their cultures, it is inevitable that they will be altered, and with cultural change will come, eventually, structural changes. In both developed and less developed societies, technologies allow them for the flow of information that has changed virtually every institutional domain, and as these technologies have gone increasingly global, it is difficult to reverse the influence of information technologies—as repressive regimes have discovered. And the more markets create incentives for new technologies like those for information processing and communicating, the more likely will these technologies diffuse to all parts

of the world and begin the process of changing values, to some degree, and certainly many institutional ideologies. And as these ideologies change, so will the structures of organizations. Thus, the greater are the rates and scope of technological development, the more value premises will be altered to accommodate the outcomes of technological changes on behaviors, at least to some degree, while the ideologies of domains where technologies have penetrated will undergo a more significant change, even as values remain traditional, and as a consequence, the culture and structure of organizations will begin to shift in the direction indicated by new institutional ideologies and meta-ideologies.

**Micro-level Environments and Organizational Change.** I have already reviewed the change potential in micro-level environments, and so let me only summarize the key points. Micro environments revolve around what transpires in encounters within the division of labor of organizations. When transactional needs are met, individuals will experience positive emotions, and when roles, status, ecology, and demography can be enacted and understood, these positive emotions are even more intensely felt, and individuals will develop commitments to the culture and structure of an organization. These commitments operate as a conservative force for organizational inertia, but the opposite is the case where key transactional needs are not realized. As status, roles, culture, ecology, and demography also become problematic for individuals, the negative emotions aroused will cause individuals to question both the structure and culture of an organization. More significantly, counter-culture beliefs may emerge among at least segments of incumbents in the division of labor of organizations, thus causing pressures for change in the structure and culture of organizations.

Another source of micro-cultural pressure for change comes when previously excluded members of categoric units enter the organization as clients or incumbents and when they move to previously blocked locations in the division of labor of an organization. They bring with them their own culture, but equally important, they force alteration of status beliefs and expectation states about members of categoric units, especially those that have historically been devalued. The result is change in the culture of an organization, and while some change may have already occurred in allowing new categories of individuals into organizations and its division of labor, once the actual movement occurs, it will inevitably encounter resistance from traditional status beliefs and expectation states held by older incumbents. This clash alone will cause change, but if new incumbents consistently challenge traditional beliefs and expectations and if

they interact with older incumbent over time, the culture of work groups will change, and these changes will lead to more structural changes in the organization as a whole.

If, however, the culture clash creates conflict groups, then the dynamics become more volatile, causing some polarization of cultures. If extra-organizational actors like those in the legal system and polity can be brought into the conflict, then change may be forced upon organizations—as was the case, for example, in many American school systems in segregated communities during the civil rights movement, or as has been the case where women have assumed positions formerly held exclusively by men or, more recently, when the US military has given new rights to gays. Here, change will be much slower, and resentments will fester, but the organization will nonetheless change, even as the clash of cultures remains potentially volatile.

**Meso-level Environments and Organizational Change.** As I emphasized in the earlier discussion of meso-level fields of organizations, certain conditions increase the likelihood of organizational change. Let me, then, just summarize the highlights of this discussion. Embedding, whether in a larger community, organization, or network of organizations, generally decreases options for change because of the structural and cultural constraints imposed by the field. Thus, the less embedded is an organization in a more inclusive structure, the greater will be its options in its environment and the more likely, if necessary, will the organization change. Similarly, the more an organization is involved in market exchanges, especially exchanges driven by demand and price where power and networks are less developed, the more likely will it change as market conditions change. Conversely, the more networks, liaisons, and power-dependence relations form to reduce the vicissitudes of open markets, the more will the field created by these structural formations and the logics in their cultures constrain an organization and, hence, the less likely will the organization change, unless the larger formation in which it is embedded is transformed.

The properties of networks have large effects on organizational change. Networks that are highly dense and centralized around points of dominance are less likely to change, and as a consequence, the organizations in them are also less likely to transform their structures and cultures. However, less dense networks, and especially networks with structural holes that allow entrepreneurial bridge and brokerage organizations to evolve, will reveal higher rates of organizational innovation, foundings, and change, at least until bridge and brokerage organizations become centers of power in the network as a whole (Burt 1992).

Organizations often change by overlaps, mergers, or patterns of inclusion and embeddedness. The more market forces push for such forms of structural interdependence, and the more autonomous is the organization, the more likely will this organization change through one of these strategies of structural interdependence. Once reformed, however, these structural interdependencies reduce to some degree the likelihood of further change, unless the structural interdependencies are abandoned. And if structural interdependencies are transformed into a larger, coherent organizational structure, then size alone will work against change, although cycles of centralization and decentralization may ensure (see above).

Finally, the niches in which populations of organizations operate have effects on change. During initial exploitation of a niche, there will be more variation in organizational foundings, but once one form appears to be most adaptive and successful, it will become legitimated and mimicked (Hannan and Freeman 1987). But, as density and competition increase in the niche up to its carrying capacity, some organizations will change in order to find subniches or to move to less competitive niches. Some will adopt a k-strategy and become larger by seeking mergers, overlaps, and inclusions or embedding in order to cover all subniches within the larger niche; others may adopt an r-strategy and specialize in order to better exploit a particular niche (Aldrich 1999: 266). And, if they can, some will migrate to new niches, often shifting goals, structure, and culture in the process of adapting to a new niche and fields within this niche (McPherson 1981, 1983, 1988). Thus, dense niches will increase the rate of organizational failures, or death, but such niches will typically set off change as organizations seek to find resources under conditions of intense competition.

## **Elementary Principles of Organizational Dynamics**

This has been the longest chapter of the book because there is considerably more literature on the dynamics of organizations, which makes sense because organizations are the key corporate unit in building social institutions and stratification systems. Moreover, I have been somewhat redundant in an effort to develop a somewhat more robust conception of fields of organizations. Moreover, I have sought to outline how fields and niches affect each of the many dynamics examined in this chapter, with the result that I needed to keep revising the topic of fields and, to a lesser extent, niches and selection. Fortunately, some consolidation of the more discursive text is possible when formalizing the arguments into a set of abstract theoretical principles. Yet, somewhat to my dismay, these principles turned

out to be rather long chapter, despite my best efforts to be parsimonious. Still, the seven principles below summarize much of the research and theory on organizations, although I have adapted this literature to my purposes of viewing the meso realm of reality as linking the macro and micro realms as I have conceptualized them in Vols. 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*.

18. The rate of organizational founding in a society is a positive and additive function of:
  - A. The intensity and diversity of Spencerian selection pressures from macro-dynamic forces of population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction
  - B. The number of resource niches and the resources levels in these niches created by organizations responding to these Spencerian selection pressures which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    1. The availability of entrepreneurial actors to secure resource and/or create resources for organizational foundings
    2. The degree to which the elements of macro-level cultural fields (technologies, texts, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms) are sufficiently coherent so as to present cultural templates and logics for organizational entrepreneurs, which in turn is a positive function of the level of:
      - a. The level of consistency among these cultural elements, especially technologies, values, and texts
      - b. The degree of integration through vertical embedding of norms in ideologies, ideologies in meta-ideologies, and meta-ideologies in values, and values in texts
    3. The degree to which structural fields are sufficiently integrated to provide resources for organizational foundings and templates for mimicry of successful organizational forms responding to Spencerian and Durkheimian selection pressures which, in turn, is:
      - a. A positive curvilinear function of the degree to which segmentation is a mode of institutional integration
      - b. A lagged positive function of the degree to which structural interdependencies are a mode of institutional integration
      - c. A positive curvilinear function of the degree to which domination is a mode of institutional integration
      - d. A lagged negative function of any set of mechanisms that integrates institutional domains but, at the same time, limits the level of resources available to entrepreneurs to found organizations

19. The rate and degree of institutional differentiation is a positive function of the rate and degree of organizational differentiation which, in turn, is a positive function of:
- A. The degree of differentiation and complexity of cultural fields which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    1. The diversity of generalized symbolic media created by organizational entrepreneurs
    2. The degree to which generalized symbolic media circulate and are used to build ideologies and meta-ideologies integrating diverse elements of culture
    3. The diversity of cultural templates and logics available to organizational entrepreneurs which, in turn, is lagged negative function of the level of consistency and integration through vertical embedding among elements of culture
  - B. The complexity of structural fields and templates, which is a multiplicative function of:
    1. The degree to which structural interdependencies are the dominant mode of structural institution integration, while being a negative function of the degree to which segmentation and domination are principal mechanisms of institutional integration
    2. The scale and scope of markets as the mechanisms for distributing resources
    3. The level of dynamism and dominance of markets and quasi-markets as mechanisms of exchange which, in turn, is a positive function of:
      - a. Rate and scope of circulation of money as a generalized symbolic medium across institutional domains
      - b. Availability of credit
      - c. Scale and scope in the distributive infrastructures within and between communities
    4. The degree to which markets exchange diverse generalized symbolic media as resources from differentiated institutional domains which is a positive function of 19-B-3(a–c) above
    5. The degree to which meta-ideologies evolve out of market exchanges of generalized symbolic media across diverse institutional domains
    6. The degree to which organizations in polity and law are able to regulate markets without overusing administrative-coercive domination as an integrative mechanism

- C. The number of resource niches in a society, which is a positive and additive function of:
1. The conditions listed under 18-B(1, 2) above
  2. The rate of organization foundings under Spencerian selection pressures
  3. The degree to which niche density and Durkheimian competition cause organizations to specialize within a niche, seek resources in a new niche, or create a new niche
- D. The ratio of innovative (through differentiation of new types) organizational foundings to isomorphic organizational (through mimicry and segmentation) foundings which, in turn, is:
1. A positive function of intensity, diversity, and scope of Spencerian selection pressures
  2. A positive function of the availability of resources in niches which, in turn, is:
    - a. A positive function of resource levels in a niche
    - b. A negative curvilinear function of niche density
  3. A negative curvilinear function of Durkheimian competition in a niche
  4. A lagged negative function of the level of coherence and power of cultural templates and logics, which is a positive function of the conditions under 18-A(3) above
  5. A negative function of the degree of network density among organizations
  6. A negative function of the power of particular nodes in the networks of organizations, with such power increasing with:
    - a. Dependence of organizations on powerful nodes for resources
    - b. Centrality in network flows favoring organizations at central nodes
    - c. Brokerage and bridging nodes that can convert their locations between networks into central nodes
  7. A positive function of the scale and scope of structural interdependencies as mechanisms of institutional integration, which is a negative function of the scale and scope of segmentation and domination as mechanisms of institutional integration

- E. The capacity to mark off the boundaries of an organization *vis-à-vis* other organization, which, in turn, is a positive function of:
  - 1. The capacity to build and impose physical boundaries revealing entrance and exit rules, routines, and rituals which, in turn, will become more likely when:
    - a. Organizations are part of a system of institutional integrations revolving around dominance
    - b. Organizations are in competition with each other
    - c. Organizations are part of a system of discrimination against members of categoric units
    - d. Organizations centralize authority in the vertical division of labor
  - F. The clarity of organizational goals which, in turn, increases with:
    - 1. The clarity of the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor
    - 2. The ratio of vertical to horizontal positions in the division of labor
    - 3. The embeddedness of organizations within a relatively autonomous institutional domain
    - 4. The coherence and power of cultural and structural fields and the availability of well-defined resource niches
- 20. The level of internal differentiation of an organization is a positive and additive function of:
  - A. Its absolute size and rate of which, in turn, is a function of the level of resources in:
    - 1. Material (or physical capital) resource niches, which will grow with:
      - a. High levels of technology
      - b. High levels of productivity
      - c. Highly dynamic markets
    - 2. Demographic (human capital) resource niches, which will grow with:
      - a. Population growth and diversity
      - b. Large numbers of reproductive organizations devoted to training human capital
      - c. Highly dynamic labor markets that are not split on the basis of memberships in categoric units

3. Cultural (capital) resource niches which will expand with:
  - a. Increased complexity of macro-level cultural fields, which is a lagged positive function of the coherence of cultural fields
  - b. Increased rates of technological development, with values and ideologies
4. Organizational (and social capital) resource niches which, in turn, are positive functions of the availability of structural templates in its structural field which increases when:
  - a. Institutional integration relies on structural interdependencies.
  - b. Market exchanges are the principal mechanism for creating these interdependencies
- B. The capacity to generate patterns of overlap, inclusion and embedding, and mergers, which, in turn, is a positive function of the level of dynamism in markets creating structural interdependencies
21. The degree of centralization of authority within an organization is a positive and additive function of:
  - A. The absolute size of an organization
  - B. The level of conflict and/or competition with other organizations within institutional domains, across domains within a society, and across domains in other societies
  - C. The use of a organization as a mechanism for discrimination against members of devalued categoric units
  - D. The degree to which integration of organizations within and between institutional domains relies upon patterns of domination which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    1. Centralization of polity
    2. Concentrations of power in core organizations within an institutional domain, which increases with:
      - a. Franchising of power and authority to core organizations
      - b. Network centrality of core organizations
      - c. Dependence of other organizations on core organizations for resources
    3. Level of internal threat in a society stemming from high levels of inequality and stratification legitimated by a meta-ideology dominated by the symbolic medium of *power* and by ideologies emphasizing coercive and administrative bases of control
    4. Level of internal and/or external threats from conflict or anticipation of conflict with perceived enemies

22. The level of commitment of incumbents to organization is a positive function of the level of positive emotional arousal across iterated encounters within the organizations division of labor, with positive emotional arousal being a multiplicative function of:
- A. The consistency with which individuals in encounters within the division of labor of an organization meet expectations and receive positive sanctions
  - B. The degree to which individuals are able to meet transactional needs in encounters within the organization's division of labor, especially needs for:
    1. Identity verification, with the level of positive emotions arising from identify verification being a positive function of:
      - a. The rank of individuals in the vertical division of labor
      - b. The degree to which the vertical division of labor is truncated
      - c. The degree of intersection of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships and locations in the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor
      - d. The number of identities beyond role identities that are verified in encounters within the division of labor
    2. Perceived profits in exchanges, with the level of positive emotions arising from exchange payoffs being a positive function of:
      - a. The conditions listed under 22-B(1)
      - b. The degree to which receipt of resources exceeds costs and investments of individuals in roles
      - c. The degree to which individuals invoke realistic comparison points in evaluating costs, investments, and rewards, with the level of realism in these comparison points increasing with use of others in the same or similar position within the organization as a comparison and decreasing the use of reference points at higher positions in the division of labor
    3. Perceived sense of inclusion in the ongoing flow of encounters within the division of labor, with this sense of group inclusion being:
      - a. A positive function of the conditions listed under 22-A and 22-B(1), (2) above
      - b. A negative function of the degree of consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with positions in the division of labor

- c. A negative function of the degree to which consolidation of categoric-unit parameters with locations in the division of labor of organizations is the result of discrimination legitimated by prejudicial stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs derived from meta-ideologies legitimating stratification
  - d. A negative function of the level of inequality of authority within the vertical division of labor
  - e. A lagged positive function of the rates of interaction among individuals at the same or different points in the division of labor
  - f. A negative function of the degree to which members of different categoric units experience stress in encounters which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    - 1. The level of stigma attached to status beliefs and expectation states of members of devalued categoric unit
    - 2. The degree to which members of devalued categoric units must adopt the culture of valued categoric units
- C. The degree of success in status taking and making, role taking and making, culture taking and making, and understating situational ecology and demography, which in turn is a positive and additive function of:
- 1. The clarity of structure and culture in encounters, which is a positive function of the degree of embedding of encounters in corporate units within the division of labor of an organization
  - 2. The degree to which transactional needs can be realized in status taking and making, role taking and making, and culture taking and making (normatization), in movement through, and participation in, situational ecology and demography
  - 3. The degree to which incumbents hold common stocks of knowledge in the micro-level culture, with respect to their:
    - a. Conceptions of positional and diffuse status characteristics
    - b. Conceptions of roles
    - c. Conceptions of cultural elements in normatization
    - d. Conceptions of ecological and demographic meanings
    - e. Expectation states associated with a–d above
    - f. Evaluations of a–e above

- D. The degree to which incentives for incumbency and performances in the division of labor revolve around:
1. Commitments to norms, which have been moralized by drawing from institutional ideologies and meta-ideologies, which increase when:
    - a. The vertical division of labor is truncated
    - b. Activities involve collaboration and shared responsibility
    - c. Interactions are informal and involve high salience of all levels consistent verification of role and group identities
    - d. Categorical-unit identities can be verified or are not salient
    - e. Core identities are salient and can be verified by meeting role and group identities
  2. Monitoring and sanctioning of conformity to norms is informal and noncoercive
  3. Extrinsic rewards are high
  4. Realistic points are employed when comparing cost and investments to extrinsic rewards
  5. Intrinsic rewards from interactions in encounters generate a private good arising from group solidarity that is highly valued and not easily secured in alternative organizations
- E. The degree to which incumbents make external attributions to the structure and culture of the organization for their positive emotions, which, in turn, become more likely when:
1. Individuals consistently experience positive emotions in iterated encounters in groups at all locations in the division of labor
  2. Individuals have a sense of shared responsibility in their joint actions within groups
  3. The ratio of intrinsic to extrinsic rewards is high and dependent on performances in groups within the division of labor
23. The level of alienation from, and decline of commitment to, an organization is a positive function of:
- A. The degree to which incumbents in groups within the division of labor develop a particularistic culture hostile to the culture and goals of the organization, which in turn is an inverse function of the conditions listed under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-E above and a positive function of:
1. The level of inequality in the division of labor of the organization which is a positive function of the conditions listed under 21-A, 21-B, 21-C, and 21-D above

2. The level of external monitoring of the actions of incumbents in the division of labor
  3. The level of reliance on coercive and punitive sanctions to ensure conformity to norms
  4. The perceived level of costs to extrinsic rewards by incumbents in the division of labor
  5. The levels of deprivation when comparing rewards to reference points within and outside of the organization
  6. The consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with locations, especially lower-ranking positions, in the division of labor
  7. The degree to which consolidation is the result of over discrimination, legitimated by prejudicial stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs
- B. The degree to which interaction producing an anti-organizational particularistic culture produces positive emotions reinforcing this culture within groups and, at the same time, providing a private joint good that individuals in groups find highly rewarding
24. The likelihood of organizational change is an inverse function of inertial dynamics of internal and external inertial processes operating within and outside of the organization
- A. The power of internal inertial processes limiting change in an organization increases with:
1. The conditions generating commitments to the organization listed under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-E above
  2. The sunk costs and path dependence of the organization, with these increasing with the initial costs invested in physical capital, human capital, technologies, and organizing the division of labor
  3. The formation of an organizational culture built around these sunk investments, with the power of this culture increasing with:
    - a. The formation of a micro-level culture reinforced by iterated encounters within the division of labor, with commitments to this culture increasing with incumbents' perceptions that:
      1. This culture allows individuals to meet transactional needs.
      2. This culture increases success in individuals' status making and taking, role making and taking, culture taking and making (normatization), as well as success in navigating organizational ecology and demography.
      3. This culture increases the activation of positive emotions in iterated encounters within the division of labor.

- b. The formation of meso-level organizational culture drawing from highly moralized ideologies and institutional norms in this organization's macro-level cultural field
  - c. The objectification of the combined micro, meso, and macro cultures with symbols and totems that denote group solidarity within the division of labor and the organization as a whole, with objectification increasing under the conditions listed under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-E and ritual along with routine performances among individuals directed at these symbolic totems
  - d. The formation of an organizational division of labor, goals, and boundaries in which incumbents have vested interests in sustaining the current structure of the organization, with these pressures from internal vested interests increasing with:
    - 1. The level of extrinsic and intrinsic payoffs for incumbents in positions of authority
    - 2. The pervasiveness of perceived profits in payoffs of both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards by incumbents in all positions within the division of labor
    - 3. The pervasiveness of external attributions by incumbents toward the organization as a whole for profitable payoffs
- B. The power of external inertial processes limiting change in an organization increases with:
- 1. The degree to which patterns of structural institutional integration and the macro-level structural field constrain the options of organizations in this field, with these constraints increasing with:
    - a. The degree to which the structural field of institutional integration is dominated by segmentation as an integrative force
    - b. The extent to which domination is the primary integrative force in the structural field of an organization
    - c. The extent to which structural interdependences and market dynamics reveal noncompetitive formations, including:
      - 1. Networks of connections among similar organizations
      - 2. Centers of domination within these networks and dependence of organizations connected to these centers
      - 3. Strategic alliances among organizations which are crucial for their viability in a resource niche
      - 4. Formations of oligarchies that control the flow of resources within the oligarchy and between the oligarchy and other organizations

2. The degree to which patterns of cultural integration and the macro-level cultural field constrain the options of organizations in this field, with these constraints increasing with:
  - a. The consistency, or noncontradiction, among moral tenets of texts, technologies, and values
  - b. The degree of successive embedding of institutional norms in ideologies, and ideologies in values
  - c. The degree to which the generalized symbolic media and ideologies of dominant institutional domains are reconciled to form meta-ideologies that are consistent with societal values and technologies, while at the same time legitimating inequalities produced by resource-distributing organizations
  
25. The likelihood of organizational change is a function of the degree to which internal and external pressures for change can overcome those for organizational inertia listed under 24-A(1),(2),(3) and 24-B(1),(2) above:
  - A. The power of internal change processes that can overcome internal inertial processes is inversely related to the processes of commitment outlined under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-D above and positively related to the processes increasing alienation and reducing commitments listed under 23-A(1), (2), (3), (4),(5),(6), (7) and 23-B above
  - B. The power of external change processes to overcome external inertial processes is positively related to the conditions on institutional differentiation listed under 19-A, 19-B, 19-C-C, 19-D, 19-E, and 19-F
  - C. The intensity and diversity of Spencerian selection pressures
  - D. The intensity of Durkheimian selection pressures in dense resource niches
  - E. The degree and rate of change in the stratification system, which increases with:
    1. Mobilization for conflict of lower-class incumbents and memberships in nonclass categoric units consolidated with the class system
    2. Market systems in political democracies which constantly change rates of mobility among individuals and members of categoric units and, hence, their access to the resources distributed by organizations within diverse institutional domains
  - F. The extent to which intersocietal dynamics alter the flows of resources and, hence, the configuration of both structural and cul-

tural fields of resource, and hence resource niches of organizations, with these intersocietal dynamics increasing with:

1. Warfare between societies and shifts in patterns of political and economic domination among societies
  2. Dynamism of global markets shift the flow of all resources—technological, material, demographic, organizational, and cultural—among societies and, hence, the flow of resources within societies
- G. The scale and rate of technological change within a society and among societies in the world system, which increases with:
1. The institutionalization of science as an autonomous domain
  2. The rate of exchange between science and its symbolic medium (*knowledge*) with the media of education (*learning*) and economy (*money*)
  3. The reconciliation of technological change with core values of a society
  4. The inclusion of science in the dominant meta-ideology integrating institutional domains
  5. The degree to which the symbolic medium of science and education can become commodities in open markets in dynamic markets operating within and between societies

## Conclusions

With this chapter, we have come most of the way through my analysis of meso dynamics. Organizations represent a huge breakthrough in human socio-cultural evolution because they allow societies to become ever more complex. Without a means to organize groups, the scale of society was limited. Organizations allow for the coordination of larger numbers of people in groups linked together through a division of labor to address larger scale goals and, in so doing, meet the challenges posed by Spencerian selection pressures.

Organizations need to be located in space, and even virtual ones must have a small footprint somewhere in geophysical space. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the growth of communities parallels the invention of organizations and then the differentiation of institutional domains constructed from organizations. Without this concomitant growth in the size and complexity of community formations, institutional differentiation would have stalled, as it often has been over the last ten millennia during

periods of de-evolution. Indeed, whether from warfare or ecological degradation, or climatic change, the collapse of communities and the de-evolution of institutional domains have occurred together because they are so intrinsically linked. Institutions cannot differentiate and grow without a geographical place to organize the activities, exchanges, and interconnections among organizations. And so, it is appropriate to analyze community dynamics in the next chapter.

Although there is a very large literature on communities, especially urban communities, my concern is more limited than this diverse literature. I want to focus on the dynamics of communities as they fit between the macro realm of institutional domains and stratification systems (and societies and intersocietal systems), on the one side, and the micro realm of encounters, on the other. Thus, the issues that I will address represent only a very small part of the large literature in the social sciences and humanities on communities.

After the chapter on communities, I turn to the analysis of social movement organizations or SMOs, very broadly conceived as any organization that links groups seeking to change the culture and structure of some aspect of human social organization. Since social movement organizations are often mislabeled as conflict “groups,” the common dynamics between organizations and social movements can be overlooked. But, in reality, conflict organizations reveal a division of labor designed to achieve goals like any organization, and they operate in resource niches and fields—just like the organizations analyzed in this chapter. And thus, to appreciate their commonality, Chap. 8 could be read right after this chapter, thus postponing the analysis of communities.

Whatever the choice, it should be clear that the meso level of reality consists of a series of embeddings of encounters in (1) corporate units (that are, in turn, embedded in each other, typically along the pattern of groups in organizations and organizations in communities) and (2) categoric units defined by nominal and graduated parameters. Categoric units are part of the structure of all corporate units, even when discriminated against and excluded, and the patterns of consolidation and intersection of categoric units across corporate units account for many of the most interesting dynamics of the meso realm, including mobilizations for conflict by social movement organizations. The macro level of social organization is built from corporate and categoric units and, then once built, constrained by the very macro-level sociocultural formations built from corporate and categoric units.

Still, there is always a great deal of action at this meso level, sometimes constrained from above by macro-level forces and other times pushed from

below by micro-level forces operating in encounters. And even though I do not see the meso level as driven by the same kinds of forces as either the macro or micro realms, these forces *meet at the meso level* and make corporate and categoric units highly dynamic, even volatile. It is at the meso level where change is carried out—at least changes that have large effects in restructuring societies, and this should not be surprising because these structures are the building blocks of macro structures and their cultures. True, they, in turn, are built from the iteration of encounters, but if we want to tear down or build up a macro-level sociocultural formation, we do so with corporate and categoric units, particularly organizations that make possible the macro realm of social reality. And this is why I have devoted such extended attention to the dynamics of organizations; they are literally at the center of the sociocultural universe and the dynamics that drive the formation and operation of this universe.

# Chapter 7

## The Dynamics of Communities

### The Rise of Community Formations in Human Societies

For most of human evolutionary history, permanent settlements did not exist. Nomadic bands of hunter–gatherers wandered a territory, which they often perceived to be *their* territory, in search of the resources necessary to sustain themselves. This sense of a general territory is probably hardwired into human neuroanatomy because it is evident among our closest primate relatives, particularly chimpanzees. Chimpanzees know who belongs and does not belong in their home range, and they will kill males from other communities who try to cross their invisible borders (females are welcomed, however, because they are needed to replace females born in a community who, by genetic programming, have left their natal community at puberty, never to return). Indeed, Alexandra Maryanski and I have argued that sense of community is the only stable social structure among chimpanzees, our closest primate relative sharing 98% of our genes (Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2008a, b). It is the only corporate unit that is “natural” for humans as an evolved ape. We have little trouble identifying with members of our community and the community as a whole, whereas groups require a great deal of interpersonal effort to sustain, and organizations must at some point begin to use power and authority to sustain order, thus creating the potential problems outlined in Chap. 6.

Over the first 185,000 thousand years of humans’ 200,000 years on earth, bands of hunter–gatherers would settle down, mostly at particular times of a season but at times more permanently. But, for most of human history, the *nomadic band* of nuclear families was the basic adaptive unit of hunter–gatherers. Somewhere between 15,000 and 7,000 years ago, bands began to settle down more regularly, thus igniting the “big bang” of human evolution

that I outlined in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. Growth generated selection pressures from population, which, in turn, intensified pressures from production, distribution, and reproduction. These pressures set into motion the growth, institutional differentiation, and stratification of human societies.

This growth and structural elaboration required more permanent places for groups and then organizations to operate. And once settlements emerged to house the activities of corporate units and of categoric-unit members, community as the last fundamental type of corporate unit could be said to exist. This new type of sociocultural formation can be copied by other growing populations, thereby setting off a wave of segmentation of community as an adaptive formation. Without settled communities, there was an upper limit on the size of populations organized by only groups and proto-organizations like the band (Massey 2005). But with more permanent communities, the number of groups and organizations could grow, and their actions could be better coordinated.

Populations organized into communities generally held a decided advantage over hunting–gathering bands because they were larger, more productive, and most importantly, politically organized. When necessary, they could out-compete or simply conquer smaller nomadic populations. Warfare thus became a kind of macro-level Durkheimian selection process where, as Herbert Spencer (1874–1996) had argued, the larger, more complex, and more powerful society could conquer the smaller, less-organized society, thus ratcheting up the scale and complexity of human societies. These wars were fought over territory and the resources that they contained, and the communities within these territories were the chalices where these resources were concentrated. Conquest of communities thus became the conquest of the territories.

Communities are thus politically bounded and regulated geo-spatial units in which individuals in categoric and corporate units carry out their daily routines, and where corporate units within diverse institutional domains must operate to meet Spencerian selection pressures.<sup>1</sup> Communities evidence a division of labor in two senses: First is an indirect division of labor found in the group-level and organization-level corporate units located geographically in sectors, districts, and neighborhoods of the community. Second, communities themselves create their own distinctive sets of corporate units—councils, administrative offices of local government, police,

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<sup>1</sup> I am taking an ecological approach in the analysis of communities, but one that has been conditioned by the points of emphasis in the New Institutionalism. For more purely ecological approaches, see Niemela (2011), Gaston (2010), Alberti (2009), and McDonnell et al. (2009).

courts, jails, schools, and the like—to realize goals revolving around the functions of organizing and regulating activities of corporate and categoric units in space. Communities are, therefore, differentiated by the types, numbers, and distributions of corporate and categoric units within their boundaries as well as by their own corporate units dedicated to maintaining community boundaries and organizing activities of individuals and collective actors. The number and nature of corporate units within communities are functions of their size and the degree of institutional differentiation in the broader society. The more differentiated are institutional domains in a society, the greater will be the number and diversity of groups embedded in different types of organizations within communities.

In Fig. 7.1, I roughly outline the processes involved in community formation. Population growth set off the process of community evolution by dramatically increasing first-order Spencerian selection pressures for production, regulation, distribution, and reproduction which, in turn, increased selection pressures on individual and collective actors to form groups linked together into organizations addressing the problems of adaptation posed by these selection pressures. Reciprocally, the proliferation of groups and organizations could allow for the population to continue to grow, and this growth would again increase the valences of Spencerian selection pressures. Groups and organizations, if they are to deal with selection pressures, must not only form but they must have a location where their activities can be carried out. More than mere physical space is involved, however, because there must be infrastructures for organizations and their incumbents to live and carry out their activities (see Fig. 7.2 on pages 308–309). Thus, selection pressures eventually generate a new type of corporate unit—permanent settlements where the activities of individual and corporate actors would meet selection pressures from population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction. As organizations began to specialize in their activities, new generalized symbolic media were used in discourse and talk, and over time these evolved into ideologies and institutional norms regulating the constituent organizations of an emerging institutional domain. With differentiation of institutional domains, the number and rate of founding of new organizations and then their segmentation would increase, thereby increasing institutional differentiation. The more differentiated institutional domains became, the more communities housing their constituent groups and organizations had to grow and differentiate to accommodate the expanding number of organizations.

All of these processes together—(a) proliferation of groups, organizations, and communities; (b) the differentiation of generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and institutions; and (c) the growth in the size of communities—increased the valences of second-order Spencerian selection




Fig. 7.1 Population growth, selection pressures, and size of communities

pressures. These are selection pressures generated by increases in complexity of patterns of social organization. In a very real sense, then, second-order selection comes from the sociocultural environments created by responses to first-order selection pressures. These environments are, as noted in the last chapter, the source of selection pressures, resources niches, and fields that all constrain corporate units, especially organizations but also groups and communities as well.

Thus, like any corporate unit, communities operate within macro-level cultural fields, structural fields, and resource niches generated by institutional domains and stratification systems. Thus, to understand the dynamics of communities, it is necessary to know something about how the cultural and structural fields, and the resource niches that these spawn, constrain the dynamics of communities as a basic type of corporate unit.

## **Macro-level Environments of Communities**

The macro-level environment of communities is much the same as it is for organizations because it emerges from (a) the patterns of institutional differentiation and the system of stratification that exist at the societal and, at times, intersocietal levels of social organization, (b) the ideologies and meta-ideologies that evolve within and between institutional domains, (c) the meta-ideologies that develop to legitimate the stratification system, and (d) the mechanisms of structural and cultural integration operating for institutional domains and stratification systems. Once these macro-level sociocultural formations exist, they constrain meso-level environments of organizations and, to lesser extent, of communities. For, as macro-level environments develop, they dictate the nature and intensity of Spencerian selection pressures that are most operative, while creating the fields and niches (where Durkheimian selection occurs) that determine the dynamics of categoric units and corporate units in a community.

### ***Macro-level Cultural Environments of Communities***

The macro-level cultural environments of communities are constructed from generalized symbolic media as they are used in forming institutional domains (see Table 2.1 on p. 38). These media draw from societal-level values, technologies, and texts, making them relevant to the particular types of organizations that are being built up to deal with Spencerian selection pressures (first- and second-order) and, later, with Durkheimian




Fig. 7.2

selection among populations of such organizations in various resource niches. As symbolic media circulate among organizations in diverse domains, the ideologies of the dominant institutional domains are collated into meta-ideologies. And since organizations within these dominant domains distribute unequally the resources that become the primary basis for stratification, these meta-ideologies also become the guiding moral premises for legitimating inequality and stratification.

There will be a bias within communities for certain types of ideologies because communities will generally all have kinship units, although some early communities devoted to political or religious activities often had residents living outside the ritual and administrative centers of power. But, typically, the ideology of kinship and families will be present because a high proportion of residents live in kin units in neighborhoods. There will also be a bias toward polity and law as prominent institutional domains because communities always must respond to selection pressures from regulation, coordination, and control. The mix of other institutional domains in a community can vary, once we move beyond kinship, polity, and law. Economy is almost always evident in community formations, if only to supply residents with food and other basic commodities, but equally often as communities grow, the economy is the very reason why a community has been founded in the first place. Other institutional domains can be dominant as is




Fig. 7.2 (continued)

the case for religion (e.g., centers such as Mecca, Jerusalem), education (e.g., university towns), entertainment (e.g., Bronson, Missouri), science (research parks), medicine (regional medical centers), law (e.g., The Hague, Netherlands), but to varying degrees. The key point is that the configuration of organizations making up diverse institutional domains in a community will bias the ideologies and, hence, cultural fields (and niches) of a community. And, the meta-ideology that has emerged from relations among organizations in these domains will also become part of the cultural field and thus expand the cultural resource niches in a community.

In the same way, the nature of intersection between the societal-level stratification system and community will also influence what ideological elements will constitute the cultural field of a community. Depending upon the distribution of members of social classes in a community and categoric units consolidated with class, different elements of the meta-ideology legitimating stratification may become salient and, and hence, part of the cultural field of a community. For example, I live in a largely suburban upper-middle class community that only incorporated 10 years ago (now over 100,000 people, next to another, almost carbon-copy community of another 100,000 persons that grew dramatically during the same decade). The point of intersection of the stratification system is primarily members of those amorphous middle classes with neighborhoods that vary from middle class to

upper-middle and even some elite classes (of full–part-time residents who have wineries, ranches, equestrian facilities, and other “estate-level” properties). Thus, the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system in the United States is very much a part of the cultural field; residents are decidedly conservative in their views about “government” and “government handouts,” although they are very generous in their private “charity work.” They value education and take great pride in the fine schools in both communities because education is seen as the path to mobility. If we compared these two new suburban, almost rural communities to, say, some of the poorer communities within 15 miles of their borders, the meta-ideology of stratification intersects with neighborhoods and corporate units at a different point. With larger numbers of poor and minority poor, these communities generate very different cultural fields. The meta-ideology legitimating inequality does not dominate as much as in my communities of Temecula and Murrieta, CA; people are more skeptical about whether or not “working hard” will inevitably allow them to live the “American dream.” They do not reject this American meta-ideology, but they are skeptical, especially when compared to the conservative views of the joint communities where I live. Moreover, to the extent that there is consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with social class, there will be an extra dose of emotional intensity to skepticism among persons who are members in devalued categoric units, and thus, there will be less consensus over societal-level legitimating meta-ideologies.

The power of a cultural field is, to a great extent, dependent upon the *consistency* among the elements of ideologies and meta-ideologies. However, without a high degree of *consensus* among members of a society or community over the elements of ideologies and meta-ideologies, consistency alone will not give cultural fields great power. In addition to consistency and consensus over the moral tenets of ideologies, there must also be *integration* of these tenets. If there is consistency among, and consensus over, evaluative elements of culture, the power of culture increases; when these elements are integrated through successive layers of embedding—that is, more specific moral codes like institutional norms are embedded in ideologies, ideologies are lodged in meta-ideologies, and all of these evaluative codes embedded in highly abstract values—the power of moral codes increases even more. And so, when values are successively translated into ever-more specific social arenas, the imperatives of moral codes are carried from societal-level culture to the culture of institutional domains and stratification systems through the meso-level culture of corporate and categoric units down to micro-level encounters in corporate units lodged in institutional domains.

Thus, the more consistent are the elements of culture, the greater is the consensus over the moral tenets of this culture, and the more vertically integrated (from highly general to more specific) are these codes, then the more power they will have and, hence, the more will the cultural field of a community constrain the actions of the community as a whole and its constituent residents, corporate units, and categoric units. And if communities or any corporate unit can gain access to these moral codes in cultural resource niches and use them to articulate a culture of a community, then this community becomes more viable and likely to persist over time. The converse of all these dynamics will make the cultural field less powerful and will differentiate cultural resource niches, causing potential contradictory if not conflicting actions by corporate and categoric units within a community and perhaps by the community as a whole. As a result, communities within a society may evidence differences bordering on contradictions among their cultures, which in turn, poses structural problems of integration among communities and, potentially, for the society as a whole.

### *Macro-level Structural Environments of Communities*

The macro-level structural environments of a community revolve around (1) the configuration of institutional domains that intersect with a community; (2) the complex relations among (a) stratification, (b) intersections or consolidations of class locations with nonclass categoric units, and (c) intersections or consolidations of categoric-unit memberships with incumbency in resource-distributing corporate units; and (3) the modes of structural integration among corporate units in institutional domains and class ranks in the stratification system.

**Configuration of Institutional Domains in Communities.** As noted above, the nature and prevalence of organizations embedded in diverse institutional domains have a very large effect on a community. For example, early small village communities among horticulturalists were built to house the expanding unilineal kinship system (see Fig. 1.3 on p. 22), with virtually all other institutional activity embedded in kinship as a quasi-organization. In contrast to more advanced horticultural systems, like those among the Maya, some communities (the remains that we see today with their spectacular monuments) were primarily political or religious centers, with many of those who worked in the community being actual residents of surrounding communities (Chase-Dunn 2012). In turn, compare this kind of community to larger agrarian communities, where polity and religion are still

the dominant institutional systems, but other domains can be found, beginning with kinship and law, and including economy, arts, recreation, education, medicine, and even science. And if we examine a major metropolitan area in a postindustrial society, a core city with a configuration of virtually all institutional domains, surrounded by suburban communities with a different mix of organizations from diverse institutional domains, presents a very different structural formation.

There are several somewhat generic patterns of institutional distribution within a community. One is the horticultural pattern, with kinship being the only differentiated institutional domain, but with early signs of economy, polity, and religion beginning to differentiate from kinship. The advanced horticulture and agrarian profile revolves around a community dominated by either religion or polity, and sometimes both. With the evolution of markets, communities often become devoted to trading activities, thus making economy or at least the distributive dimensions of economy prominent if not dominant. Industrialization generates rapid growth in cities, dominated by economy with polity, religion, and even kinship having less effect on the structural field. And postindustrial societies reveal differentiation between large core cities where all domains are evident, with variations often occurring as organizations from sets of domains—e.g., economy, polity, law, education, science, or religion—become prominent. For example, a capital city of a society will be disproportionately filled with organizations involved in polity and law, whereas a city devoted to corporate headquarters, such as Atlanta, GA, or Charlotte, NC, dominated by economic organizations, plus kin units housing the incumbents in these organizations.

**Stratification, Intersections, and Consolidations in Communities.** If a society is highly stratified in that (a) the level of inequality is high, (b) class boundaries are clear, (c) classes are ranked on a lineal scale of moral worth, and (d) rates of mobility across classes are low, then communities will be dominated by the meta-ideology legitimating stratification, and it is likely that domination and segregation will be the principal mechanisms of institutional integration (see Table 2.3, on pp. 84 to 90 and more below). Stratification systems are sustained by the use of power to discriminate, backed up by ideologies to legitimate prejudice and discrimination. Discrimination is generally against members of devalued class units and devalued nonclass categoric units. The result is high consolation among parameters denoting valued and devalued categoric-unit memberships, and consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with differential access to resource-distributing corporate units and, if access to corporate units is allowed, to consolidation of devalued and valued cate-

goric units with high or low positions in the vertical division of labor in corporate units.

The result will be high levels of residential segregation by categoric-unit memberships, clearly marked sectors of a community devoted to various institutional activities, and both formal and informal monitoring and sanctioning of actions of members in devalued categoric units who move into forbidden sectors, who violate rituals for making transitions into these sectors, and who fail to display the appropriate deference and demeanor of the “less worthy.” These rituals at the level of the focused and unfocused encounter become critical to sustaining the spatial segregation among differentially valued categoric-unit members, especially if they must interact with each other. Yet, when this system of segregation is beginning to be challenged by members of devalued categoric units, one of the first places where challenges to segregation begin to appear is at the level of encounters where rules for rituals as well as deference and demeanor will not be followed.

In such stratification systems, then, it would be rare to see much intersection of parameters marking valued and devalued memberships in categoric units, nor would there be intersection with resource-distributing corporate units and their vertical divisions of labor. This system of stratification would be highly integrated in the sense of being able to reproduce itself over longer periods of time. Yet, tensions inevitably build up in highly stratified societies, causing mobilization for conflict (see Fig. 5.7 on page 200 in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* or the discussion of social movement organizations in Chap. 8, which is next). This mobilization is often preceded by individual and group acts of defiance against what are perceived by stigmatized persons to be rituals and deference/demeanor behaviors that violate their dignity.

The structural field of a community in tightly stratified societies thus becomes dominated by relations of super- and subordination between members of variously “worthy” categoric units, among members within corporate units, and in exchange relations among corporate units within and between institutional domains. The ecology of the community will thus evidence zones and sectors sustaining segregation, as well as pathways among these zones that are heavily monitored by actors in polity and law. The structure, culture, and ecology of the community will, therefore, operate to reproduce relations of domination and subordination.

**Modes of Structural Integration in Communities.** Macro-level structural integration revolves around (a) the mechanisms used to regularize relations among corporate units within institutional domains and (b) the mechanisms by which the stratification system is sustained. Let me begin with institutional integration.

**Structural Institutional Integration.** As outlined above, institutional integration through domination and segregation is particularly likely to be both the cause and effect of high levels of stratification, in which access to, and locations in, resource-distributing corporate units within institutional domains is restricted and consolidated with categoric-unit memberships. And domination will, as also noted, increase hierarchies within and among corporate units within institutional domains. If domination comes from organizations in polity or religion, it is likely that either or both of these domains will control organizations in all other domains and that polity and religion within a community will be part of a society-wide hierarchy among communities. In contrast, if institutional integration comes from domination by core organizations within institutions, with somewhat different core organizations dominating different domains, then the structure and culture of a community will reflect the particular core organizations that operate within a community. The community will have somewhat more autonomy than is the case when domination comes from societal-level polity and/or religion. For example, if core economic organizations dominate the institutional domains in a community, then the influence of these organizations and their culture will be pervasive. Yet, while local government will be disproportionately influenced by the presence of these organizations, the leaders of communities will still have some autonomy from these economic actors and even more if societal-level polity is able to consolidate and use administrative and coercive power across communities. If, however, polity and religion are not dominant, as was the case, for instance, in the Hanseatic League among cities running across northern Europe between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, then alternative organizations will need to evolve to meet selection pressures for regulation or the system will collapse. Here, trading organizational units filled in for the comparatively weak political system—in essence, creating the necessary political and legal authority to regulate trade. The result was domination, but this domination was not nearly as hierarchical as would have been the case if the polity of a political empire controlled the communities that were part of the League. Thus, the nature of the unit that dominates affects the extent to which the structural field of a community created by domination will control all activities in the community. The key to the Hanseatic League was control of markets and laws governing actors in these markets rather than the entire infrastructure and administrative structure of communities, although there was a disproportionate amount of influence by the dominant economic factors involved in trade. Still, the looser system of domination that did exist revolved around ensuring that trading monopolies and cartels operated in accordance with the system of contract law that had been negotiated among traders. In this way, a very large portion of Europe, Gdansk in Poland to Amsterdam

in The Netherlands, and down major rivers to the interior of Germany, could be regulated without a strong national polity.

The Hanseatic League offered a glimpse into societies that would eventually evolve where polity, law, and religion do not dominate through their administrative and coercive power. These more market-oriented societies were in the process of evolving as mercantilism and then, by successive steps over several centuries, full-blown capitalism emerged and spread across Europe and, eventually, a good part of the globe. While not all capitalist societies are democratic, the most dynamic ones eventually lessen integration by political and religious domination because in order for markets to grow and expand, they must be relatively free of political and religious constraints, and corresponding to this openness of markets, polity uses its symbolic and material incentive bases of power to meet selection pressures from regulation while relying on market-mediated interdependencies to integrate corporate units within and between institutional domains.

Such systems of integration also tend to decrease discrimination and work for more intersection among categoric units and between categoric units and locations in the divisions of labor of all corporate units. The result is that there will be more mobility across corporate units within communities—neighborhoods, businesses, industries, schools, governmental bodies, recreational organizations, health care clinics, and just about any resource-distributing organization. However, as is still evident in democratic societies like the United States, France, England, and Germany, the persistence of neighborhood ghettos, high levels of inequality, and consolidation of clearly identifiable ethnic subpopulations with class, access to some organizations (say, higher education), or locations in their divisions of labor (e.g., top leadership positions), the complete intersection among parameters marking categoric-unit memberships and boundaries and locations in the divisions of labor of resource-distributing corporate units is a far way off into the future. Yet, the ideology of open-market economies and political democracies, as well as the meta-ideologies that these form along with (open) educational opportunities, still puts pressure on all organizations to eliminate discrimination, and these pressures are generally enshrined in constitutional and common legal principles that put moral pressure on polity to enforce them.

Thus, the more institutional integration is achieved by structural interdependencies, especially those that are mediated by markets governing (a) structural mobility by incumbents, (b) structural overlaps, inclusions, and mergers, and (c) exchanges of resources, the less will integration be achieved by administrative and coercive domination by polity and religion, and the more likely will polity and law increasingly seek to reduce discriminatory practices that cause consolidation of parameters. Inequality will still exist in such a society—often exceeding that of one where

domination has operated (e.g., Cuba)—but the modes of institutional integration will continue to push for intersection of parameters rather than their consolidation, with the result that class lines will become somewhat more fuzzy and less correlated with historically devalued members of nonclass categoric units. And with increased rates of interaction, the salience of categoric-unit memberships and the cultures that these often carry will decline and/or be incorporated by members of other categoric units (e.g., the dramatic spread of African American and Latino cultures across corporate and categoric units in the United States over the last 25 years, as is illustrated, in particular, by the spread of poor black cultural forms like rap and hip-hop music, speech and slang, and dress styles across the full range of youth in American society).

The consequence is that the restrictive barriers within communities blocking mobility to resource-distributing corporate units decline, and neighborhoods become more integrated by categoric-unit memberships, although inequalities ensure that they will remain somewhat segregated by class, with clear ghettos of the poor and gilded ghettos of the rich, with more mixes in the neighborhoods among the less well-defined middle classes. Since the vast majority of citizens in the societies like the United States are members of these amorphous middle classes, nonclass intersections increase dramatically, thus reducing much of the tension in communities revolving around the consolidation of class, devalued nonclass categoric units (e.g., ethnicity), and access to resources in corporate units. In fact, community governments, despite a certain autonomy from the national government, will generally be required to enforce national laws against discrimination, and as a consequence, intersection of categoric-unit memberships and corporate-unit incumbency will become goals of local governments and the communities that they regulate. Only when categoric units pose threats to the majority of the population will processes work toward consolidation of parameters.

**Systems of Communities.** As I outlined in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (see pp. 270–282), the environment of communities at the macro level can consist of other communities, if they become linked together *as a system*. The mode of integration of this system of communities has very large effects on the nature and size of each community. If segmentation is the dominant mode of integration, then the system will generate structural and cultural equivalences, but these alone cannot support or sustain a large system of communities because equivalence does not necessarily establish relations of interdependence among the segmented communities. Segmentation is the basic integrative mechanisms of villages in horticultural societies, and it operates even in differentiated community

system because there are just a few diverse types of communities in the system, and for each type, segmentation may account for much of the systems growth and its profile. Yet, beyond structural and cultural equivalences, there must be resources flowing among communities for there to be a true system of interrelationships that can sustain *a system* of communities.

Domination by one community through administrative and coercive control of other communities has been a constant force in the evolution of systems of communities. For example, among the Maya, cities would seek to conquer and control each other since many communities were, in essence, “city-states.” Thus, to the degree that a community approximates a city state with a well-organized and centralized polity with a standing coercive force, a system of communities may evolve through conquest. Such systems are, however, rather unstable because of the resentments of those conquered and the high logistical costs of sustaining administrative and coercive branches of polity across the entire system, especially in low-technology cultures like the Maya. The system of communities will rise and fall, depending upon the capacity of one community to consolidate bases of power and, at the same time, to have a sufficiently large population to field an army capable of sustaining coercive advantages over neighboring communities (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1987). The stability and viability of systems of communities built from domination also depend on the mechanisms of resource extraction that are imposed by the dominant power.

As I outlined in Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (Turner 2010a, b, c, d: 273), there are several distinct patterns of domination: (a) tributary extraction (taxation that leaves the basic culture and institutional structure of a dominated community intact), (b) co-optive (use of indigenous institutions of a community to engage in social control functions), (c) colonial (use of administrative/coercive organizations by dominant community, often with a mix of incumbents from dominate and dominated communities), (d) colonial coercive (use of indigenous incumbents for social control led by members of the dominant community), or (e) militaristic (use of coercive/administrative bureaucracy imported from dominant community).

Patterns (e) and (d) are the most unstable in the long run because, as noted earlier, they generate intense resentments and are costly to the hegemon. And the use of incumbents of the dominated community [patterns (b) and (d)] generates not only resentments of these “traitors” among the general population but also questions of their loyalty to the hegemon and their efficiency because of the tendency in such systems for corruption, which only intensifies resentments more. Pattern (a) can be the most stable if, and this is a big if, the tribute demanded does not overtax the dominated community. Rarely do hegemons limit resource extraction, however, although one of the

reasons that the Roman Empire lasted so long is that it was a mix of (a) and (b), not taxing too much (at least in the earlier empire) and, at times, using indigenous leaders and organizations to do so. Colonial strategies do not work in the long run because they are usually established when there is great distance between dominant and dominated communities, thus making them costly and, moreover, eventually exposing the hegemon as unable to fully control the dominated population, if this population should rise up in protest (see next chapter).

When communities are not subject to these efforts at domination, they often retain considerable autonomy, even if they are part of a centralized political system. Communities have goals and seek to organize resources (usually from taxes) to meet these goals, and if they are relatively autonomous, they can act in ways that make them unique and that retain some of their autonomy. For example, even as the central government has extended its control across cities in Germany, those that had once been part of the Hanseatic League—e.g., Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck—have been able to retain a certain degree of autonomy in their internal administration. For many decades, they have had even more autonomy to operate independently of the federal government in such matters of taxation, funding of education, arts, recreation, and even subsidies for economic enterprises, although this autonomy has declined in recent decades. For, in most large societies today, community governments have more limited autonomy, although the United States with its federalist system still gives enormous amounts of autonomy to community governments.

Yet, to the extent that federal government or the equivalent of regional and state governments within a society have control over local agencies, boards, councils, courts, schools, infrastructure development, funding for arts and even sports, and many other activities in which a community is engaged, then the culture and structure of the national or state polity will be reproduced within the community, often creating structural and cultural equivalences down the hierarchy of governments of governmental levels. The result is structural equivalence among communities, even though they may vary by size and configuration of dominant organizations in various institutional domains. For example, the structure of government and the functions that it performs are pretty much the same in my current town of Murrieta, CA, as it is in Riverside, CA (about three times as big as Murrieta and also the county seat), Lake Elsinore (about half as big), San Diego (about 12 times as big), and San Jose (nine times as big). Thus, the more control the central government exercises over state and local governments, even in relatively decentralized societies like the United States, the more communities will evidence (a) structural equivalence in their forms

of governance and in the functions that community governments are expected to perform and (b) cultural equivalence in the ideologies and meta-ideologies that shape the culture of a community. The converse of this generalization is also true: the less is the control exercised by central government and the more autonomous is a community, the less equivalence will a community reveal with the structure and culture of other communities.

The largest *systems* of communities, however, tend to emerge through trade of valued resources among communities that have differentiated economies rather than through political dynamics and structural equivalences. Whether operating within a politically consolidated territory, such as pre-European contact Peru, or across diverse territories as was the case with the Hanseatic League, systems of trade can link many communities, albeit in a loose and potentially unstable set of interdependencies. There will be limits as to how large and spread out the system can become, depending upon the development of distributive infrastructures (transportation technologies), exchange structures (markets), and economic specialization within diverse communities in the system. Without the physical infrastructure to move materials, information, and individuals about the network of communities and without money and relatively free markets, the capacity to move economic goods and the incentives for doing so are reduced. Still, the long-distance trade among communities that dotted the full length of Peru, without using wheel-based transportation technologies or even dynamic markets, attests to how much can be done if there are incentives for trade among communities specializing in different economic functions, backed up by common culture and perhaps political authority. Similarly, the ruins of the pueblo city of the Anasazi in (what is now) New Mexico suggest that there was long-distance trading with communities in old Mexico (and in both the cases of Inca of Peru and Anasazi of New Mexico, ecological changes more than instability in the markets or even the political system appears to have led to the destruction of the system of communities). In the case of the Anasazi, long-term drought was the problem, whereas with the Inca, just the opposite was the case as El Nino rains destroyed the ocean end of the trading system, while causing damage to interior and highland communities and paths connecting them. Thus, once the goods to be traded disappear and the infrastructure is damaged, trading systems of communities can rapidly disintegrate, and even if there are political formations also imposing some form of domination on this system, it will disintegrate once the economic base supporting the political actor collapses.

These trends can also evidence dialectical dynamics in both individual communities and systems to communities: they rise and develop for a time,

only to collapse or decline, and then they may rise up again (Chase-Dunn et al. 2009; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1987, 1997). The reasons for the decline can be various: ecological disaster, disintegrative pressures from patterns of domination listed above, external invasions, or disruption of trade routes for whatever reason. Thus, the rise and fall of power is critical, but in market-driven systems, the instability of markets can also cause a trading system to collapse, only to be built up again at a later time. These kinds of dialectical dynamics are possible in both simple and complex communities. Market collapse is hardly a modern phenomenon, nor is political collapse in the face of ecological disasters or invasions by more powerful coercive forces.

The integration of a system of communities is important because the existence of such a system dramatically changes the environment of a community. This environment is now other communities, not just the institutional and stratification systems of a society. As a result, the structural fields and cultural field of a community expand beyond the intersection of institutional domains and stratification with the community. Furthermore, the resource niches—material, demographic, organizational, technological, and cultural—generated by these expanded structural (and cultural) fields allow for increased growth and internal differentiation of communities, which in turn only increase the range and resource levels in this expanded set of resource niches.

## **Meso-level Environments of Communities**

### *Corporate Units*

The profile of organizations and the institutional domain in which they operate represents one meso-level environment of a community. And if organizations within a community are part of a larger organization that cuts across many communities (often in other societies), this organization has, as I outlined in the last chapter, some autonomy from community structure and culture. Moreover, this larger organization and especially one that is prominent within institutional domains—e.g., economy, polity, religion, education, science—will become an important part of the meso environment of the community. For example, the headquarters of such a large company as Apple Computers in Cupertino, CA, have a much greater effect on the city than vice versa; the same is true for University of California branches in Berkeley and Davis, CA, where the universities represent the dominant organization in relatively small communities.

Thus, the larger the organization in a community, the more it is a part of an even larger national or transnational organization, and the smaller the community and the fewer is the number of other organizational types in this community, the more this organization will dominate the field of the community. Its culture and structure, coupled with the demography of its incumbents, will constrain the internal dynamics of the community, and the more resource niches in the community will be the by-product of fields generated by the organization.

A similar pattern can emerge when a community is in trading relationships with other communities, usually via organizations embedded in the economy (and possibly religion or polity). The field created by the actual organizations engaged in trade, plus the field of the communities in which there are trade relations, will have effects on the dynamics of each community. And if there are patterns of domination by organizations (typically political but, potentially, economic, and religious) in one community over organizations in other communities, the more likely is the field created by the dominant organizations and the community serving as their home base to constrain the actions of all other corporate actors in a community.

The more organizations use their bases of power (in the political institutional domain) or the more prominent are these organizations within an autonomous institutional domain, the greater will be the impact of the culture of this domain on the culture of a community, and the more will the structure and demography of the organization constrain the operation of other organizations and corporate units within a community. Even though these kinds of organizations are embedded inside the community, the control of resources by these organizations and the dependence of the community on these niches covert these organizations to an environment for the community, rather than vice versa.

### *Categoric Units*

The relative numbers, differential evaluations, and distributions of categoric-unit members in a community's neighborhoods, zones, and corporate units have large effects on the dynamics of communities. The distribution of members of categoric units is, as I have emphasized, related to discrimination or lack thereof and the degree of consolidation or intersection of members with each other, with social class, and with incumbency in corporate units within institutional domains. The more consolidated is categoric-unit membership with class, with access to particular groups and organizations,

and with residency in distinct neighborhood locations, the more likely will categoric-unit memberships be a point to tension and conflict within a community. For, when discrimination denies members of devalued categoric access to particular corporate units, even if indirectly as a result of discrimination in housing and neighborhoods (that isolates them from key resource-distributing corporate units), the salience of categoric-unit membership remains high in a community and, as a consequence, so does the prejudicial evaluations of those deemed to be a member of a devalued categoric unit. If these evaluations are drawn from the meta-ideologies of the stratification system, they carry an even stronger evaluation that legitimates discrimination and higher levels of inequality between valued and devalued members of categoric units.

Of particular importance is the relative size of valued and devalued members in a community. The larger the number of devalued members relative to valued members, and the greater the discrimination, the more segregated by neighborhood will valued and devalued members be, and the greater will be the rates of exclusion of devalued members from corporate units distributing valued resources, and the more likely will they be located at low-resource locations in divisions of labor of corporate units to which they are given access. In turn, the greater is the segregation between valued and devalued members of categoric units, the less will be their rates of intercategoric interaction within a community, and hence, the more likely are prejudicial stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs to persist and legitimate continued discrimination and inequality.

The members of categoric units can be viewed as part of the environment of community because, even though members reside *in* the community, they are treated collectively in ways that divide up key demographic characteristics of the population. The corporate units organizing a community—neighborhoods, parks, schools, businesses, churches, art facilities, industries, governmental agencies, etc.—all distribute valued resources, and those systematically denied resources will experience *anger* that, over time, evolves into generalized beliefs that highlight the unfairness of the discrimination and the sources of this unfairness, thereby setting the stage for conflict and social movements. And this mobilization becomes part of the meso-level environment to which individuals, corporate units, members of other categoric units, and the community as whole must respond. Indeed, as members of devalued categoric units become organized into a corporate unit—often called a social movement organization or SMO—these SMOs will seek more resources in niches created by structural and cultural fields in the environment of a community. As this mobilization ensues, more and more of a community must respond to this meso-level pressure from SMOs.

## Micro-level Environments of Communities

Individuals' experiences in encounters embedded in categoric and corporate units generate positive or negative emotions, and as individuals attempt to understand their emotional experiences, they begin to formulate beliefs that make attributions about who or what is responsible for these emotions. If individuals consistently experience positive emotions because they can successfully assume status locations, play roles, and invoke cultural expectations that enable them to meet transactional needs (see Table 3.1 on p. 95), they are likely to experience positive emotions, and if they experience these emotions consistently in encounters, they will begin to make positive attributions to corporate units, including communities in which other corporate units are embedded, and develop commitment to these units. But if the opposite is the case, and individuals are consistently denied access in micro-level encounters to status locations and are not able to play roles and invoke cultural expectations that enable them to meet transactional needs, then they will experience negative emotions and make negative external attributions, blaming members of other categoric units and corporate units, including communities, for their negative emotions. As a result, their emotionally charged attributions lead them to withhold commitments to the community and, if their emotions are sufficiently negative, cause them to engage in protests and conflict with members of other categoric units and/or corporate units that are seen as the cause of their negative emotions.

And so, even those individuals interacting at the level of the encounter are embedded in groups-in-organizations-in-communities, their *collective* emotional arousal and the formulation of emotionally charged cultural beliefs, as well as the mobilization of resources for potential SMO actions, can all be viewed as a micro environment to which individuals, members of categoric units, and corporate units, including the community as a whole, must respond. Indeed, the failure to respond can cause disintegration of a community.

## Environmental Fields and Niches of Communities

The viability of a community depends upon the capacity of its constituent corporate units to respond to cultural and structural fields, while securing resources in niches, and at the same time restocking these niches, created by these fields. What is true of a community's constituent units is also true of the community as a whole. It too must seek resources from niches created

by the micro-, meso-, and macro-level fields in its environments. Success in doing so will, in the end, determine how well a community will be adapted to its environments and, hence, its long-run viability. Communities have collapsed for lack of necessary resources or from their incapacity to respond to cultural and structural fields in their micro-, meso-, and macro-level environments (Hall 1988; Tainter 1988). Let me briefly elaborate on these environments of communities.

### *Environmental Fields of Communities*

Environmental fields of communities, like any corporate unit, can be either structural or cultural. Structural fields are generated primarily by the modes of integration of macro-level institutional domains, systems of stratification, and, if developed, systems of communities. Similarly, cultural fields are generated by macro-level integration among texts, technologies, values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies attached to institutional domains, stratification systems, and, again if in place, systems of communities. These macro-level fields, in turn, constrain the culture of groups and organizations, as well as members of categoric units, which also become part of meso-level field of a community. And finally, macro- and meso-level fields constrain what individuals can do in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units, leading them to experience emotions on a positive-to-negative scale, to make attributions for the cause(s) of their emotions, and at times, take collective action.

Thus, the fields of any corporate unit, including a community as a generic type of corporate unit, are complex, overlapping, embedded, and mutually constitutive. They put pressures, both culturally and structurally, on a community from many different angles, and on different locations within communities—neighborhoods, corporate units, categoric units, and community as a whole—and so one set of the dynamics in, and of, communities revolves around coping with the pressures of these diverse fields.

The most powerful dimension of the fields of communities is, as I argued above, the macro-level modes of integration within and between institutional domains and within the stratification system. The corporate and categoric units inhabiting a community are the product of how institutional domains and stratification become structurally integrated, and the dynamics of categoric units and corporate units are, as I have outlined in Chaps. 4–6, driven by these modes of integration.

High levels of stratification almost always ensure that members of categoric units will experience discrimination—justified by prejudicial

stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs drawn from meta-ideologies legitimating stratification. As a result, members of differentially evaluated categoric units will be distributed in segregated neighborhoods and positioned in different types of corporate units and their respective divisions of labor. High levels of stratification thus promote *consolidation* of parameters marking categoric-unit membership with each other on a scale of moral worth and with access to, and participation in, corporate units.

In contrast, lower levels of stratification—where inequalities are less, rank ordering of classes is ambiguous and only evident at the very top and bottom of the system, class boundaries are porous and ambiguous in the middle, and mobility rates are comparatively high—will promote *intersection* of categoric and corporate units. With intersection, rates of interaction increase and, over time, diminish the power of prejudicial beliefs and status beliefs. Rather than being based on the reproduction of relations of super- and subordination in each encounter within corporate units, legitimatization of the system is achieved through ideologies emphasizing increased opportunities for those who are able to “make the effort” to be mobile. Such ideologies always overstate the actual rates of mobility and availability of opportunities, but opportunities are still sufficiently available and visible so that individuals “buy into” the ideology of “equal opportunity.” This ideology has further effects in making it culturally less acceptable to hold prejudices and status beliefs that stigmatize and block opportunities, thereby increasing the likelihood of increased perceptions that intersections of parameters exist, which, in turn, increases perceptions of opportunities.

Since valued resources of the stratification system are unequally distributed by corporate units, including communities, the modes of integration of institutional domains determine how much stratification exists in the society and, in turn, communities. If domination through concentrated power and segregation is the principal mechanism of institutional integration, then the level of stratification will be high, setting off the processes of discrimination and consolidation of categoric units and access to, and participation in, corporate units within institutional domains. If, on the other hand, structural interdependencies are the principal mechanisms of integration, especially interdependencies created and sustained by open markets, then intersections of categoric with corporate units will increase, and the degree of stratification will decline. The result will be that there will be intersections at the level of communities, as members of diverse categoric units have access to organizations generated by each institutional domain and by the community itself as it seeks to meet goals. Thus, access to organizations involved in community governance will increase for members of previously devalued categoric units, as will access to organizations subsidized or generated by

community governance—schools, parks, neighborhoods, redevelopment projects, economic organizations receiving subsidies, etc. This access will increase the intersection of categoric-unit memberships with corporate units. And, as intersections occur, prejudicial and stigmatizing beliefs will change and exert pressures on meta-ideologies legitimating stratification to increase emphasis on not only on equal opportunities but also on the moral imperative of increasing this scope equality in opportunities to all communities and institutional domains in the society. This process is never complete, or even smooth, because it almost always comes up against long-standing prejudices and accepted status beliefs and entrenched practices of discrimination. Yet, the pressure is always there, and if victims of discrimination organize into SMOs and are able to use moral tenets of values and ideologies to legitimate their SMO activities, the pressure will be that much greater.

### *Environmental Niches of Communities*

As they exert pressures, fields spawn resource niches. For example, if market-driven organizations in the institutional domain of economy exert pressures on communities, they will also create niches of material resources. If pressures for intersection among categoric and corporate units exist in a community, these pressures from the community's field create demographic niches. If meta-ideologies favoring equality of opportunity legitimate the more open stratification system and the organizations in domains that distribute resources, these dynamics create cultural fields. If integration of organizations within domains is achieved by market-driven structural interdependencies, these dynamics establish organizational niches revolving around templates for organizational forms and how these forms should structure relationships with each other.

Thus, the more integration of institutional domains is achieved by structural interdependencies legitimated by ideologies and meta-ideologies emphasizing open markets and increased opportunities, the greater will be the number and diversity of resource niches in the community. In contrast, if power and domination are the primary means of integration, then the number and variety of resource niches in a community will decline, and greater will be the restrictions on accessing these niches.

Similarly, if the level of stratification is high and built around high levels of inequality, linear ranking of classes, restrictive class boundaries, and low rates of mobility, then the number of resource niches available to actors will decline and be highly restricted and controlled by centers of power.

Moreover, the system will be legitimated by meta-ideologies emphasizing power and privilege, differential evaluations of moral worth of individuals and corporate units, and discrimination to sustain the moral worth of elites, which, in turn, will close off cultural resource niches to all but elites. The result will be a much less dynamic system, which will tend to reproduce itself, while at the same time generating tensions that will eventually lead to conflict.

## **Community Processes**

### ***Growth and Size of Communities***

Communities are, first of all, responses to Spencerian selection pressures generated by population growth. As the size of a population grows, and as the rate of growth increases, there is the obvious problem of where “to put” people. So, as a simple principle, the larger the population, the greater will be the number of communities organizing members of this population’s daily routines and activities within institutional domains. But, population size also jump-starts selection pressures from production, regulation, distribution, and reproduction, with the result that entrepreneurs will create new organizational forms that, if adaptive, will evolve into institutional domains.

If the necessary physical and organizational infrastructures for meeting selection pressures for increased production, regulation, distribution, and reproduction are successfully met, the structural base of communities for carrying more inhabitants increases. And so, as another simple principle, we can conclude that the greater is the scale and scope of physical and organizational infrastructures for production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction, the larger will communities become, while conversely, if efforts to build these infrastructures are not successful or not undertaken by entrepreneurs, the less potential for growth will a community reveal, and more likely will segmentation of a greater number of smaller communities be used to absorb the growing population.

Yet, at some point, if a population continues to grow, segmentation begins to generate second-order selection pressures of how to coordinate and control like-size communities, especially as they spread out across geographical space. These selection pressures push on actors to find new organizations and new kinds of physical infrastructures for accommodating more people, with the result that communities will begin to differentiate and grow. As they differentiate, selection pressures from regulation increase

because coordinating and controlling larger populations *within* a community require new kinds of regulatory organizations and infrastructures, and eventually, new productive, distributive, and reproductive structures are required to sustain the larger population that can exist if new regulatory structures and infrastructures are in place.

As communities differentiate, selection pressures from regulation, production, and distribution eventually increase and put pressures on differentiated communities to become more integrated into *systems of communities*. And as the infrastructures are built out for inter-community movements, exchanges, political alliances, and other forms of interdependencies, the size of communities can begin to grow once again. Moreover, increases or decreases in the size of communities will increasingly come from immigration/emigration into a society and in or out of various community corporate units.

### ***Differentiation of, and Among, Communities***

The differentiation of a community revolves around the configuration of institutional domains that are built up (via organizations in these domains) and the distribution of members of categoric units. Differentiation generally begins at this meso level, and communities are one of the meso-level corporate units where this differentiation occurs. The configuration of organizations operating within institutional domains is related to size of the societal and community population, as outlined above, as population size and growth generate selection pressures for productive, distributive, regulatory, and reproductive organizations and the infrastructures that allow them to operate within a community. This set of processes can be viewed as an ecological model, like the one in Fig. 7.2 on page 309, where I have abstracted the urban ecology model from general ecological theory (Kasarda 1972; Hawley 1981; Frisbie and Kasarda 1988; Berry and Kasarda 1977).

Figure 7.2 is complex, but it is designed to communicate a simple point, highlighted by the darker boxes denoting development of infrastructures. I have eliminated reproduction as a force, which would increase with differentiation and increase all of the infrastructures and, hence, community differentiation. The basic idea is that population growth generates selection pressures, or what I have denoted as first-order logistical loads, on a community. Entrepreneurs respond by creating new productive, distributive, and regulatory organizations that, in turn, lead to the development of distributive, organizational, and administrative infrastructures, consisting of the physical facilities needed to conduct productive, regulatory, and distributive activities, as well as the capital and money (material infrastructures) needed

to build these infrastructures and carry out the activities of organizations using these infrastructures. This material capital can come in the form of profits, assessments, taxes, tributary income, or other sources of revenue generation by governmental agents, but the key is that once production responds to selection pressures from population, capital is generated and circulates through a community to fund the building out of infrastructures. As these infrastructures are built up, differentiation increases along three routes: One is the differentiation of organizations operating within institutional domains. A second is the immigration of new residents to a community which will increase the diversity of categorical-unit memberships and especially so if immigrants come from outside a society.

The third route of differentiation is the creation of new resource niches by the first two routes. As organizations differentiate, as immigrants enter a community, as infrastructures provide facilities for new organizational formations, and as material capital circulates and makes possible all institutional activities, the number and diversity of material, cultural, demographic, organizational, and technological resource niches increase, enabling more organizational founding in diverse niches, thereby increasing the overall level of differentiation in a community. Moreover, as niches become periodically dense and competition increases among organizations, new organizational forms may appear to search out subniches within a larger niche; less fit organizations in one niche may move to a new niche; or entrepreneurs may create new types of organizations that open up additional niches. All of these strategies will ultimately involve efforts at organizational innovation that increases differentiation.

Finally, as differentiation increases via second-order selection pressures arising from initial infrastructural developments and organizational differentiation, the response is generally further differentiation of organizations to regulate and coordinate previous levels of differentiation, up to the point where second-order loads overwhelm the community and it disintegrates, as the archeology of civilizations so adequately demonstrates with each new find of the physical infrastructure of ancient cities that has been buried for centuries under infrastructures of newer cities (Hall 1988). Yet, even though communities may, literally, be built on top of the rubble created by the disintegration of earlier community infrastructures, new community formations will eventually arise as a response to the logistical loads created by second-order selection pressures.

As communities differentiate in response to the logistical loads, they become better able to grow their boundaries, if there is sufficient room, and thereby house ever-more inhabitants up to the point where there is no further room or logistical loads become too great for the community to sustain

itself. The capacity of a community to remain viable over time is thus an outcome of its ability to continuously build infrastructures that enable organizational differentiation and proliferation to proceed. Part of this process is boundary formation, change, and maintenance since communities often die because they have run out of room or been conquered and ransacked by invading armies of other societies or communities.

### ***Boundary Dynamics of Communities***

Corporate units generally create boundaries marking what is outside and what is inside the corporate unit. The boundaries of organizations are physical, if only marking off by walls where the organization begins and where as well as when individuals may enter or leave the building. These entrances and exits are often accompanied by rituals and routines that symbolically reinforce physical boundaries with a cultural boundary that demands ritual performances and alterations of behaviors in conformity with the culture of the organization (Luhmann 1982).

Community corporate units are much the same, especially under particular circumstances. Historically, many cities have been walled and defended with coercive force because there were always dangers of invading armies from other cities or societies. And even if not actively defending itself, a community's walls signal symbolically that the space behind the walls is under administrative and coercive control of political organizational units and that the culture of these units and all other corporate units within the community is to constrain and guide actions for all those who enter the community. Thus, the more a community is under external threat, or even internal threat by restive members of categoric units, the more it will mark and defend the boundaries of the community, with the result that the administrative structures of governance will monitor and sanction noncompliance with the laws and more general culture of the community.

However, walls in cities cannot easily grow, and stopgap measures of increasing shanty towns outside the walls of a city only make it more vulnerable to penetration by invading forces. It takes time to move residents from outside the walls into a community under attack, thus leaving the community vulnerable to keeping its gates open too long. Or if the gates to the city are closed but leave vulnerable all those outside, these abandoned residents (who are often members of devalued categoric units) may convert to side with invaders or be used as shields and cover by invaders who are trying to sneak into a community. Walled communities also become less dynamic economically because markets do not operate well when placed behind difficult to

cross boundaries; they operate best when open to trading partners from outside the community. Moreover, the centralization of power around its coercive and administrative bases can encourage some market development if the polity needs to generate wealth that can be taxed to sustain government, but the use of administrative and coercive corporate units also creates disincentives to be entrepreneurial because of excessive taxation or because of the simple limitation that walls place on markets and potential trading partners and customers. Moreover, the culture of walled cities will tend to be particularistic and insular, which also operates as a conservative force and particularly if the city is built around organizational units within inherently conservative institutional domains, such as religion or polity.

The more autonomous a community within a society, where communities are self-sufficient and where societal-level power is weak, the more of its material resources will be spent on defense and, again, the less will these resources be devoted to distributive infrastructures and markets that are more dynamic than infrastructures devoted to mobilizing coercive forces to protect a community. Feudal societies often had relatively weak society-wide governments because of rivalries among feudal lords, but they often had market towns and fairs, and these tend to be exposed to invaders because they are often outside the walls of central communities within the system of manorial estates that make up feudal societies. One of the reasons that a feudal system will centralize power in a king or central “royal” figure is to create a centralized coercive force to protect all manorial estates, but this strategy only works if the lords of the realm feel sufficiently threatened to pass resources like money and troops to say nothing of power onto the central royal figure who is charged with organizing the “kingdom’s” defense. As Richard Emerson argued, there is a point where such strategies can work, and it lies between (a) the zone of “indifference” where external threats are insufficient to arouse fears of successful invasions and (b) the zone of “futility” where the external enemy is too powerful to resist, making it the better strategy to negotiate independently with the leaders of an advancing force rather than turning resources over to a king in a futile effort at collective defense.

This constantly recurring dilemma of feudal systems highlights the conditions where communities can be more dynamic. It is no coincidence that what Braudel (1977, 1982) termed higher-order markets (those using money and credit selling goods made elsewhere by craftsmen and, later, by labor in quasi-preindustrial “factories”) evolved with the rise of the state. Markets require openness or at least security in opening gates to a community for transactions to take place, and the only way that markets can be kept open and dynamic is for a centralized and rationalized polity to exist and

have sufficient administrative and coercive resources to defend societal boundaries and, hence, community boundaries. With the evolution of the state, authority branches out from a central capital city to all other communities, with defense being coordinated with societal-level resources (collected as taxes and other kinds of assessments) from individuals, organizations, and communities. By defending boundaries of *the entire population*, cities do not need to devote as much of their resources to defense but instead to economic and market activities.

To the extent that investments in economy and markets are made, communities not only grow, they also become more wealthy and differentiated along many fronts, thereby creating ever-more niches for further growth and differentiation. Thus, the more open are community systems to trade, immigration, and movement of inhabitants and visitors, the more likely are they to depend upon a centralized polity that enforces societal borders to the point of decreasing the need for physical barriers protecting a city. Indeed, the expansion of commerce generates selection pressures from regulation as a force to shift boundary maintenance from city to state, thereby increasing the dynamism of markets and communities more generally.

The continued existence of city walls from earlier historical epochs underscores the inefficiencies of walls and other barriers like rivers, lakes, and even oceans that have been employed to protect cities. Indeed, most overly protected cities were bypassed with modernity or, equally often, had their walls torn down in order to modernize. Still, there are always remnants of these physical barriers, with these often posing fiscal barriers on commerce and trade, in the form of confined spaces, excessive traffic at key locations, and very high costs for organizational infrastructures in real estate markets where space is a very scarce good. Still, certain historical cities persist, despite these obstacles, but if we compare them to new cities built for commerce more than for defense, it is easy to see the differences in their dynamism (granted they are not as interesting aesthetically without “a history” but they are generally more dynamic because their boundaries are more open and because they have space to grow). Such cities can only exist where the state is capable of protecting societal boundaries.

## Elementary Principles of Community Dynamics

26. The rate of growth and proliferation of communities in a society is a positive and multiplicative function of the selection pressures generated by:
  - A. The rate of population growth

- B. The intensity of selection pressures set into motion by population growth which, in turn, is a multiplicative function of the degree of intensity of selection pressures from:
1. Production as a macro-dynamic force
  2. Distribution as a macro-dynamic force
  3. Regulation as a macro-dynamic force
  4. Reproduction as a macro-dynamic force
27. The size of communities is a positive and multiplicative function of:
- A. The conditions listed under 26-A and 26-B above
  - B. The level of differentiation within a community with respect to:
    1. The number of distinctive institutional domains intersecting with community
    2. The number of organization-level and group-level corporate units embedded within institutional domains within a community
    3. The level of development of material, administrative, organizational, and distribution infrastructures within a community
    4. The amount of geographical space for organizing institutional activities within a community
  - C. The degree to which infrastructures facilitate immigration into a society and communities within this society
28. The degree of differentiation of a community is a positive and multiplicative function of:
- A. The size and rate of growth of the population to be organized within a community.
  - B. The level of differentiation of the macro-level structural fields of a community and the material, technological, and organizational resource niches that these generate within a community, which, in turn is:
    1. A positive function of the conditions listed under 27-A and 27-B
    2. A positive function of the conditions listed under 27-B
    3. A positive function of the degree to which institutional integration is achieved through structural interdependencies driven by open markets
    4. A negative function of the degree to which institutional integration is achieved by:
      - a. Domination by polity or other sets of powerful actors
      - b. Segmentation of communities and their constituent corporate units (groups and organizations)
      - c. Segregation of corporate and categoric units

5. A negative function of the degree of stratification intersecting with a community which is a positive function of under 4(a-c) above
  6. A positive function of low levels of stratification which, in turn, is a positive function of the degree to which integration of the system is achieved through structural interdependencies mediated by markets and by intersection of categoric-unit parameters with each other and with resource-distributing organizations within institutional domains
- C. The level of differentiation of the cultural fields of a community, and the cultural resource niches that these generate within a community, which, in turn, is:
- A. A positive function of the degree of institutional differentiation and the diversity of generalized symbolic media in play and the number of distinct institutional ideologies developed from these media
  - B. A positive function of the number of meta-ideologies developed from institutional ideologies which, in turn, is:
    1. A positive function of the degree to which institutional integration depends upon structural interdependencies mediated by open markets
    2. A negative function of the degree to which institutional integration depends upon domination by polity or other core actors within dominant institutional domains
    3. A negative function of the degree and level of stratification
  - C. A positive *curvilinear* function of the degree of consistency among, consensus over, and integration of texts, values, technologies, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms
  - D. A lagged positive function of the degree of inconsistency among, consensus over, and integration among texts, values, technologies, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms
29. The degree of constraint imposed by fields on individual, organizational units, and categoric-unit actors within a community is a positive and multiplicative function of:
- A. The degree to which structural integration of institutions and stratification is achieved through domination, segregation, and segmentation
  - B. The degree to which a community is part of a system of communities held together by domination of more powerful communities or institutional actors in these communities

- C. The degree to which cultural integration revolves around legitimating domination as the principal structural integrative mechanisms
  - D. The degree of consistency among, consensus over, and integration of values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms
30. The relative degree of autonomy of a community is a positive function of:
- A. The degree to which integration of intercommunity relations as well as institutions is mediated by market transactions rather than by relations of domination by polity or other core actors in dominant institutional domains
  - B. The size of the community vis-à-vis other communities, particularly communities where centers of power are housed
  - C. The necessity that the community undertake the costs of infrastructural development for its internal and external security
  - D. The level of boundary formation of a community
  - E. The degree to which a community's constituent organizations are:
    - 1. Comparatively small and reliant on community niches to resources
    - 2. Indigenous to the community and not part of larger organizations embedded in multiple communities
    - 3. Relatively equal in their capacity to consolidate power
31. The level of tension and potential for conflict in a community is a positive function of the degree of consolidation of parameters marking categorical-unit memberships with each other and with corporate units within a community, with this consolidation being a function of the rate and extensiveness of discrimination which, in turn, is a positive and multiplicative function of:
- A. The degree of stratification in the larger society legitimated by a powerful meta-ideology over which there is consensus among discriminators
  - B. The existence of prejudicial and stigmatizing status beliefs legitimating stratification and discrimination
  - C. The size of the victimized population relative to the size of the discriminator population
  - D. The emergence of generalized beliefs among victims of discrimination which increase as negative emotions are built up in micro-level fields of communities by the victims of discrimination
  - E. The availability of material, demographic, organizational, and cultural resources niches for forming social movement organizations

## Conclusions

Most analyses of communities are confined to their internal dynamics, although there is always an interest in how external forces, such as the global system or national-level institutional domains, influence internal dynamics of communities. My emphasis has been on viewing communities as a meso-level sociocultural formation that stands between the fields and niches built up at each level of social organization, particularly the macro level but also the meso and micro levels. Communities are where all social structures and their cultures must exist—that is in geopolitical and cultural formations that structure the activities of corporate and categoric units. Communities thus give a kind of physicality to corporate units that ultimately are one of the key micro–macro links in human societies, connecting micro encounters with macro-institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and even intersocietal systems. Communities are also one of the key places where the dynamics revolving around categoric units are played out because, like all corporate units, communities deliver valued resources unequally and doubly when the organizations of various institutional domains that operate within communities are included as part of this unequal distribution.

As we will see in the next chapter, communities are often the location where change is initiated, as individuals and collective actors begin to secure resources in the niches spread across communities in order to form protest organizations. And the field of battle thus inevitably occurs in communities—in their public places, their neighborhoods, their infrastructures, and all structures that have been built up by the governing organizations of communities. As if change occurs as result of protest, the changes in communities will reverberate through macro-level sociocultural formations—institutions, stratification, societies, and intersocietal systems. Thus, even though macro dynamics and micro dynamics reveal their own distinctive forces, while meso dynamics do not, this does not mean that communities are irrelevant to social dynamics more generally. The meso level of social reality is, as I indicate in the next chapter, “where the action is.” Micro- and macro-dynamic forces meet at the meso level in groups, organizations, and communities, and what transpires in these corporate units moves rapidly down to the micro level and up to the macro level of social reality. The forces of the micro and macro realms often collide in the meso, setting off change, as we will see in the next chapter. Communities are, in essence, the pressure cookers where the forces of the macro and micro realms intensify because communities are where groups and organizations reside as both the building blocks of the macro realm but as the roadblocks of what can occur in the micro realm. So, it should not be surprising that they are where a great deal of social action occurs.

# Chapter 8

## Meso-level Social Change

### Where the Action Is

Social change can be initiated at all three levels of social reality. At the macro level, increases in the valences of the forces driving the macro realm generate selection pressures on individuals and corporate units. For example, if a population grows, entrepreneurs in key institutional domains will need to create new kinds of corporate units and often new cultures attached to these units. If new productive technologies are invented, then the structure and culture of corporate units in the economy will change. As these change, so will corporate units in other institutional domains; and, potentially, so will the distribution of resources evident in the stratification system. Or, if problems of regulation increase because the level of inequality and stratification rises, new kinds of social control corporate units will be created to deal with protests and with social movement organizations (SMOs) demanding changes in the distribution of resources. Thus, anytime that selection pressures push for the development of new kinds of corporate units and their cultures, all other macro-level sociocultural formations may also be forced to change.

At the micro level of reality, change will occur when individuals cannot meet transactional needs and cannot comfortably status-make and take, role-take and make, and culture-take and make (normalize) in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units. When these kinds of micro-level

difficulties emerge, individuals will experience negative emotions, and if these emotions are aroused consistently among sufficient numbers of person, they will begin to push for social change, often by mobilizing for widespread conflict against organizations in various institutional domains. Hence, any time relatively large numbers of persons experience negative emotions and begin to feel aggrieved by the corporate and categoric-unit structures and their cultures, the potential for mobilization for change will increase.

At the meso level, individuals can become angry over their placement in devalued categoric units that are subject to discrimination that denies them access to valued resources. As a result, they begin to push for change at the micro level, or they can begin to organize at the meso level. As they do so, they begin to question meta-ideologies legitimating stratification as well as prejudicial stereotypes and status beliefs that have stigmatized their categoric units. Pressures for change can also emerge from corporate units that cannot secure resources in a given niche, that resent domination by other corporate units, that feel that exchanges of resources with other corporate units are unfair, or any other state of tension with other corporate units in institutional domains.

Whether change originates at the micro, meso, or macro levels, the actions bringing about this change will be carried out at the meso level of social organization. Individuals begin to organize into corporate units, whether confronting macro-level selection pressures, problems of integration with other corporate units, or arousal of negative emotions in encounters. Or there can be a mixture of change-generating situations, as is the case when increased stratification leads to escalated efforts at social control through domination or ideological mobilization by government that only escalates individuals' sense of injustice at the micro level of encounters, thereby causing them to create or join an SMO or organizations that, if successful, force changes in corporate and categoric units and, potentially, key institutional domains or the stratification system. Whatever the origins of change, *it is initially played out at the meso level* as individuals become mobilized in groups and then organizations to pursue change, even if this pursuit brings conflict with members of categoric units or with incumbents of corporate units in various institutional domains.

## Social Movements<sup>1</sup> and Organizational Dynamics<sup>2</sup>

### *The Dynamics of Organizational Foundings and SMOs*

The forces causing change in organizations within institutional domains are very similar to those pressures that cause the formation of SMOs. If change comes from selection pressures, then entrepreneurs mobilize resources to begin building a new kind of corporate unit, perhaps first a group that grows into an organization. The resources that entrepreneurs use in creating corporate units are in niches that have been created by structural and cultural fields that already exist at the macro and micro levels of social organization, as I examined in Chap. 6 on organizations. Of particular importance is the need for entrepreneurs to draw from cultural resource niches those systems of symbols capable of legitimating the new organizational form that is being created. The most effective frames in these efforts are those that can draw from existing cultural values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies and yet assemble these cultural symbols in a way that draws attention to the organization's goals, while at the same time, signaling how the movement ideology meets the precepts of both the macro- and micro-level cultural fields.

All of these processes involved in creating new kinds of organizations within institutional domains also operate in the formation of SMOs (Davis et al. 2008). Selection pressures are what set off organizational innovation; the equivalent process for social movements' formation is *grievances* that have been accumulating at the micro level of social reality. Grievances and the emotions that charge up grievances and prompt people to take action are like selection pressures because they push actors to develop new organizational formations. The constraints on social movements are also similar to those during the process of organizational foundings that drive the dynamics of institutional domains (see Chaps. 2, 3, and 6). And, as noted above, these fields are the fountainhead of resource in niches that those seeking to start a social movement must access if they

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<sup>1</sup> I have relied on a number of useful reviews of the social movement literature, including Snow and Soule (2010), Snow et al. (2004), Lofland (1996), McAdam et al. (2001), Gamson (1990), Killian (1964), and Klandermans and de Weerd (2000).

<sup>2</sup> I have perhaps overemphasized the similarity between organizational foundings and other dynamics, on the one side, and social movements on the other. But they all must survive in resource niches [see, e.g., McCarthy and Zald (1977, 2001), Tilly (1978), Edwards and McCarthy (2004), Curtis and Zucker (1973), Clemens and Minkoff (2004), Davis et al. (2008), Zald and McCarthy (1987)], and these niches are created by structural and cultural fields, just as they are for organizations as I emphasized in Chap. 6.

are to be successful. These social movement entrepreneurs will, like anyone creating an organization, seek out resources of various kinds, including material (money and capital), demographic (people), technological (knowledge about manipulating environments), organizational (templates for building social structures), and cultural (symbols systems for organizing and legitimating). These resources are part of the structural and cultural fields of any corporate unit. As organizations draw resources from niches and use them to build up SMOs, these SMOs and their cultures and structures become part of the structural and cultural fields of other organizations. And so, as an SMO or a set of such organizations begin to emerge, their success will depend upon the resources that they can secure from various niches, and if successful, these SMOs then become part of the fields of not only other SMOs but all organizations within potentially all institutional domains. Particularly important are cultural resources that leaders use to *frame* the emerging SMO. Again, if possible, it is always better to draw from existing cultural fields of evaluative codes and use these to frame the goals of the SMO in ways that draw commitments from potential members of the movement, while at the same time legitimating these goals and their pursuit in the eyes of larger publics. Of course, more revolutionary movements may need to construct entirely new moral codes, or antiestablishment moral codes, but even here, reference to the failures of existing institutions to adhere to the moral codes of the society represents a better strategy than rejecting all of the moral codes that have historically legitimated the institutional order and the stratification system.

### ***The Emotional Energy Behind Social Movements***

The concept of *collective behavior* covers a wide range of phenomena from fads and fashions through various types of crowds and riots to larger-scale social movements and revolutions. At the meso level of social reality, the key processes revolve around the formation of SMO's—as I have emphasized above. Such corporate units can be small and rather poorly organized, large and highly organized, or even part of a network of organizations pursuing more or less the same goals. Even when more spontaneous events like riots occur, where collective organization is minimal, they are often offshoots of frustrations over the lack of success of existing SMOs, and/or they are the first actions that will evolve into an SMO or a set of SMOs. Even a revolution can be considered a SMO willing to use violence to achieve its

goals. Thus, by focusing on the dynamics of SMOs, we position ourselves conceptually to understand why and how change can occur at *the meso level of social reality* and, then, beyond to the macro and micro levels of reality.

The energy driving a social movement is always the negative emotional arousal of individuals at the micro-level of reality (Turner 2008; Goodwin et al. 2001, 2004; Goodwin and Jasper 2006). This arousal occurs in response to some condition in the society that individuals believe is problematic. Most often, the problematic condition is macro level, revolving around grievances targeting key actors and corporate units in institutional domains, societies, or system of societies. At times, social movements can be more localized, focusing on conditions in particular corporate units, and yet, since corporate units are embedded in communities and institutional domains, there is often a more macro level set of condition-generating grievances at the meso level. Indeed, many social movements start at the meso level in a corporate unit in a particular community or in protests over treatment of members of a categoric unit, and from this localized starting point, the movement spreads, especially when the grievances that initiated the movement are widely shared across a society and, potentially, a system of societies. Such is particularly likely to be the case when there are structural and cultural equivalences among organizations; once protest begins in one, it will generally resonate with individuals of other structurally and culturally equivalent organizations, leading individuals in these equivalent organizations to mount their own protests. For example, it is not a coincidence that prison riots in one location often spread to other prisons, until crushed by the forces of social control. Similarly, the urban riots of the 1960s in the United States spread across the nation because their participants—urban African Americans living in impoverished ghettos and subject to discrimination and exclusion from resource-distributing organizations—were in structural and culturally in equivalent positions. Or the student-led anti-Vietnam war movement spread across college campuses because of structural, cultural, and demographic equivalences among their participants. In all of these acts of collective protest that spread and, eventually, led to formation of SMOs, the cultural and structural fields were roughly the same, and once the negative emotions aroused in micro-level encounters had built up to the point where collective outbreaks would occur in one corporate unit, these fields will impose similar constraints, while creating similar resources niches that SMO leaders would seek to mine.

Emotions can run high among participants of all social movements; indeed, the more intense are the emotions aroused, the more motivated are individuals “to do something” about their grievances. But some conditions generate more emotions than others in the emergence of social

movements. As a rough generalization, conditions that deny large numbers of individuals' access to valued resources are likely to generate more intense emotions than conditions that do not affect people's perceived ability to secure valued resources. True, the environmental movement, for instance, is often framed as trying to protect people's rights to secure a most valued resource (the natural environment), but the emotions aroused are not as intense as is the case when people have experienced high levels of discrimination and, thereby, lack basic resources like jobs, education, health care, and housing to sustain a normal lifestyle. Thus, social movements arising from the consequences of inequality and stratification will, as they emerge, be more emotional and potentially volatile. Even social movements that arise out of revolutionary protest, such as the protests that swept across a number of Middle Eastern countries in 2011, were ultimately a protest against the lack of access to jobs, political rights, and education—that is, the symbolic media of *money*, *power*, and *learning*, at a minimum. Add to these sources of increased emotion the coercive practices of repressive states to maintain order, and it is easy to see how the emotional intensity of participants can reach very high levels. Since organizations within institutional domains distribute resources unequally, they generally become the target of mobilized individuals, especially if an SMO has begun to frame and thus channel attributions for the emotional arousal and grievances of participants.

When discrimination denies individuals in various categoric units access to key resource-distributing organizations in economy, polity, law, and education, this exclusion increases the level of negative emotional energy because individuals cannot verify identities, receive profits in exchanges, or experience group inclusion, nor can they status-make, role-may, or culture-make in organizations providing the most valuable resources (Turner 2002a, b, 2008, 2010b). The anger that arises from exclusion is compounded by the escalating sense of *relative deprivation* when the comparison points for making judgments about justice and fairness are those categories of others who have access to the organization that have been denied to members of devalued categoric units (Jasso 2001; Turner 2010c).

The same dynamic operates when there is consolidation of locations in the divisions of labor (usually lower-ranking positions) with devalued categoric-unit memberships. Negative emotions escalate when those in higher-ranking positions are used as a comparison point for calculating the resources received by those confined to lower-ranking positions. These emotional experiences circulate across encounters with fellow categoric-unit members both inside and outside the organizations involved (in neighborhoods and other corporate units such as churches, clubs, gangs).

What initially emerges are diffuse and somewhat chaotic *generalized beliefs* about the causes of individuals' distress and anger (Smelser 1962). As emphasized above, these generalized beliefs can be sharpened by *framing* activities of leaders of emerging SMOs, but long before framing occurs, individuals have developed beliefs and have made *attributions* about why they have been discriminated against, and even more importantly, who or what is discriminating.

As with all emotional experiences, then, individuals are making *attributions*. These already have a distal bias, fueled by people's desire not to blame self for their fate or arouse the anger of others in local encounters (Lawler 2001; Turner 2008). But in the case of SMOs, it is not difficult to make an external attribution when one has been a clear target of discrimination by an organization. Thus, a key part of generalized beliefs and framing is the attribution process where negative emotional experiences are likely to be blamed on targets outside of local encounters. Thus, the corporate unit as whole may be blamed, perhaps alongside blame meted out to members of categoric units who have actually done the discriminating. And if there is consistency across organizations in diverse domains about the categoric-unit memberships of those who are discriminating, then counter-prejudicial beliefs among the victims of discrimination will arise toward members of these categoric units, and these prejudicial beliefs will be incorporated into generalized beliefs and framing activities by SMO leaders. If the discrimination is chronic and persistent, then attributions may even go to the macro-structural level, targeting key institutional domains, the stratification system, the whole society, and, at times, intersocietal systems.

The same process unfolds for other grievances, but not to the same extent as grievances over stratification, particularly when class memberships are consolidated with non-class-based categoric-unit memberships. Thus, inequalities become the source of the most intense and volatile social movements, often punctuated by violent conflict as generalized beliefs are forming and even more so when leaders are sharpening generalized beliefs through framing. There is intense emotional arousal without the controls of fully formed SMOs that, eventually, will organize participants for more strategic action. Individuals have already made some attributions, and a "precipitating event" (Smelser 1962) can set off an episode of anger-driven and violent collective behavior. It is the intermediate phase in a social movement, then, that collective violence is most likely can occur because intense *anger*, especially anger fueled by *shame* and *humiliation*, can arouse emotions to the point that individuals are willing to incur the risks and costs of violent protests against centers of power and authority. Later, as the SMO gains structure and as framing focuses beliefs and attributions toward specific targets, protest will take a decidedly tactical turn.

And, as emphasized above, SMOs formed to fight a cause not associated with stratification tend to be less violent. The environmental movement, for instance, has been less violent than those driven by emotions fueled by inequality and discrimination. Part of this is that the intensity of emotions aroused is not so great, nor are identities such as social identities or even core identities as implicated in the movement. Moreover, whatever their effects on inequalities in the distribution of resources, this aspect of a set of organizational activities is the target of grievances; rather, harm to the environment is what is driving the movement. Only when identities become tied up in the movement and when the actions of movement members become highly moralized and charged with negative emotions will violence occur, and in most cases, this violence is from breakaway groups from the larger SMOs that have framed the causes of environment degradation and the changes that need to occur. More typically, however, SMOs remain within accepted boundaries of “legitimate” protests. Indeed, all over the world but especially in democratic countries, these organizations have been quite successful in securing material, organizational, demographic, technological, and, eventually, cultural resources that keep them operating within the arenas of politics and law.

### *Mobilization Against Centers of Authority*

Social movements can begin in many locations in a society: communities and neighborhoods (e.g., ghettos), particular organizations (universities, schools, prisons, and churches), organizations with conflicts of interests (oil companies, Sierra Club), and members of categorical units consolidated with stratification (e.g., gender, ethnicity, age, and religious affiliation). The greater is the underlying anger and frustration of individuals and the more their grievances have been moralized by initial generalized beliefs and, then, reframed by SMO leaders, the more likely will an SMO be able to secure resources in demographic, material, organizational, cultural, and if necessary technological resource niches; and hence, the more effective will such SMOs be, at least in the short run.

A social movement almost always targets a center of dominance within institutional domains—for example, polity, economy, law, religion, and education. Virtually every domain, except perhaps kinship in modern societies, has core organizations or sets of organizations that exert disproportionate power and authority that enable them to control, to varying degrees, (a) the flow of resources in an institutional domain and (b) the formation of ideologies and meta-ideologies. As grievances build up at the micro level,

generalized beliefs and, later, frames lead individuals to target organizations in these centers of authority (Snow and Soule 2010; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998; Turner and Killian 1987).

Social movements thus represent challenges to existing structures and their cultures that have, over time, increased negative emotional energy at the level of encounters. The greater is the negative emotional arousal of individuals, and the more and the longer these individuals have been distressed, then the more likely are existing conditions and/or actions of corporate units in institutional domains to set in motion the articulation of emotionally charged grievances that provide motivational energy for individuals to join or form an SMO.

### *Grievances and Mobilization*

Whatever the perceived source of grievances, these grievances represent a consolidation of many types and levels of negative emotions that cause the formation of generalized beliefs that, in turn, target centers of authority that are perceived to be problematic. Even before much organization of the aggrieved has actually taken place, individuals normally will have to construct the necessary *generalized beliefs*, which, in essence, provide the early attributions for who or what is responsible for their negative emotions and grievances. Generalized beliefs are, however, just that: generalized. These beliefs are fueled by diffuse negative emotions that consolidate into grievances that initially bring into focus potential targets of external attributions. As I have emphasized, the negative emotions pushing individuals to make feel aggrieved and to make external attributions for these emotions are typically a bit diffuse and unfocused. Grievances become more focused through the *framing* process.<sup>3</sup> Leaders of emerging SMOs begin to give more articulate expression of grievances and to add more detail and direction to generalized beliefs. At a minimum, framing involves (a) denoting the problematic conditions; (b) targeting the key organizations (and individuals or members

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<sup>3</sup>I am employing the term framing somewhat differently than the general literature, although I do not think that the differences are that great. To compare my usage of this concept with that in the literature, see Benford (1993), Benford and Snow (2000), Snow (2004, 2008), Snow and Benford (1998, 1992), Gamson and Meyer (1996), and Soule and King (2008). These uses and my use of the notion framing in volumes 1 and 2 as a part of the normatizing process vary somewhat from both Goffman's (1974) original usages and my usage here, although framing is still considered a cultural dynamic.

of categoric units in these organizations) that are seen as the causes of problematic conditions; (c) challenging their authority and/or right of organizations to engage in activities that are defined as problematic; (d) portraying these actions of organizations in negative moral terms, such as being unjust, unfair, harmful, corrupt, and other negative characterizations; (e) couching such portrayals in even more moral terms by, if possible, invoking generalized symbolic media (for discourse) and existing values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies as the moral percepts in making this portrayal; and (f) further moralizing the goals of the SMO as in the “best interests” of all individuals (except the “evil” leaders and incumbents in the “demonized” organizations) and the society (if not world) as a whole. This last element of framing is important because it can pull individuals into the SMO and, if successful, can make meeting needs to verify role, social, and perhaps even core identities dependent on participation in the SMO. Typically, only the leaders of SMO go this far in investing the verification of identities in the SMO, but if only a part of an identity of a member becomes vested in the SMO, and even if only for a delimited amount of time, these investments of identities go a long way in building up the SMO.<sup>4</sup> And if highly visible persons (e.g., celebrities and politicians) join the SMO, they increase its legitimacy in the eyes of larger publics. Even as framing increases the emotions driving the SMO, it also channels these emotions in more strategic directions which, in turn, reduces the likelihood of violence and gives further legitimacy to the social movement.

### *Incentives, Recruitment, and Social Control in SMOs*

**Incentive Systems.** It is clear from the large literature on SMOs that, even among aggrieved individuals, participation in social movements is relatively low and that, among those who do participate, this participation is rarely long term (Snow and Soule 2010: 110–115). Like any organization, an SMO must offer incentives revolving around (a) normative and moral commitments and (b) utilitarian calculations of costs/investments relative to rewards.

As the discussion incentive processes in organizations in Chap. 6 outlines, an emphasis on normative, utilitarian, or coercive incentives, are difficult to balance, and in the case of SMOs, the utilitarian system is weak

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<sup>4</sup>For additional analyses of identities and social movements, see Einwohner (2006), Hunt et al. (1994), Snow and McAdam (2000), Klandermans and de Weerd (2000), Larana et al. (1994), and Polletta and Jaspers (2001).

because most incumbents are not paid for their participation and coercive incentives are typically not considered legitimate for a voluntary organization. Thus, a great burden is placed upon the capacity of an SMO to (a) charge up emotional commitments to the moralized goals of the organization, which can represent one type of non-monetary reward, and (b) create group solidarities within the SMO, which provide additional non-monetary rewards. As I emphasized in Chap. 6, organizations that can generate strong commitments to their cultures will also likely generate non-monetary *private goods* (Olsen 1965; Hechter 1987) that can become highly valuable to individuals—goods such as the emotions attached to solidarity among participants. The more an SMO can generate this kind of emotional response among its participants in iterated encounters, the more likely will the emerging SMO be able to recruit and retain members, as long as these members perceive that the SMO is being effective in pursuing its moralized agenda.

However, the costs to receive these rewards can become high and, indeed, can be increased, the more involved participants become in the SMO's activities. First, SMO activities can be time-consuming and reduce the time available for other rewarding activities, whether or not money is involved. Second, there can be direct costs to participants (e.g., travel expenses, child-care, and loss of time at work). Third, there can be risks of physical harm as a result of coercive responses from those resisting the social movement or social/psychological harms from surveillance by centers of power and authority (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McAdam 1988; Nepstadt and Smith 1999; Taylor and Raeburn 1995; Snow and Soule 2010: 114–115). The higher these costs, the more difficult will it be to retain participants in the long run, *unless* additional incentives can be offered by the SMO.

One additional incentive is the rewards that come from verification of self, and thus, the more individuals' role, group, and core identities are dependent upon the reinforcement from individuals who are also participants in an SMO, the higher will be the rewards for participants, and hence, the less likely will their defection become, even under conditions of high costs (Gecas 2000). It is for these reasons that SMOs built around grievances among members of categoric units are often more enduring; the goal of the organization is inexorably tied to the social identities of its members and participants, thereby making participation in the SMO an automatic source of identity verification.

Moreover, once one identity is vested in an SMO, other identities may follow. If the social identity revolving around categoric-unit membership is reinforced by participation in a movement organization and *if* additional identities—role, group, and core identities—lodged in this social identity

attached to categoric-unit membership, then individuals can increase their rewards in relation to costs. They now have added another group identity—the SMO—attached to the social identity of being a member of a categoric unit. Thus, a participant increases the number of identities (member of categoric-unit membership+member of a social movement), which provides not only for the verification of self but other transactional needs, like group inclusion and increased payoffs in utilitarian calculations. The reward increases even further because the SMO offers consistent reinforcement and verification of what is often perceived by others outside the SMO as a stigmatized social identity.

Another additional incentive comes from participants' relations in the structural environment of an SMO. If participants are also embedded in communities and networks that overlap with the SMO, the rewards of members and participants will be higher because they come from within and outside of the SMO, and if identities in communities, groups, and dense networks outside the organization are reinforced by participation in the SMO, a very powerful incentive is added to the mix of reinforcers, with individuals becoming willing to incur higher costs to receive these rewards.

Yet another incentive for accelerating and extending reinforcement processes that come from networks in communities is the extension of communities in cyberspace. Communication technologies, as Durkheim (1893) recognized long before cell phones or computers were invented, increase *material* and *moral density*. These dense cyber networks provide a constant source of reinforcement for SMO participation at very low costs (simply turning on communication devices), and yet, they provide an additional level of reward beyond that inhering in reinforcement through direct face-to-face interactions in networks not mediated by information technologies. Another non-monetary reinforcement is participants' increased sense of efficacy, which always increases the level of positive emotions experienced. Members of an SMO perceive that they are, as I noted earlier, "doing something" about their grievances when they participate in an SMO, and when a sense of efficacy occurs in joint activities (like those in an SMO), the more likely are the positive emotions aroused to increase commitments to the SMO (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2009).

**Recruitment.** To some extent, recruitment of members (i.e., access to demographic niches) will increase as the rewards exceed costs and investments of participation. Yet, for an individual who has not yet joined the SMO, knowledge about the psychological value of additional reinforcers may not exist. Yet, some of the costs may be already known because many are clearly visible, thereby tipping the utilitarian calculation against joining

SMO (McAdam 1986; Nepstadt and Smith 1999; Schussman and Soule 2005; Snow and Soule 2010:114). There are several strategies that can overcome, at least some of the time, these calculations.

One is the reward value of acting on one's moral beliefs, and if the leaders of an SMO can frame the goals of the organization and moralize them by drawing from symbols in the SMO's cultural fields and niches, they may be able to find the right members in demographic niches and entice them to join. For example, I had never been involved in an SMO in high school during the 1950s or even during my early college years, but I became a participant in SMOs in the civil rights social movement sector (SMS) in the mid-1960s because of the gratification of doing "something right" about an injustice that my parents had emphasized during my entire childhood. Only as I was trained did I learn of the dangers, but by that time, solidarity with my fellow members of the SMO was sufficiently rewarding for me to discount these dangers. It also helped that I was young, and indeed, the young in general are less likely to be as risk averse as older age cohorts.

Younger age cohorts are generally more daring, and thus, their members will generally underestimate the costs of what, for example, awaited me: clubbing by "smokey bear" sheriffs in the American south and bites from German Shepherd dogs that had been released to "control" demonstrators (German Shepherds are still, nonetheless, my favorite breed; smokey bear sheriffs are not, however, my favorite brand of sheriff). Yet, the solidarity that I felt with my fellow protestors, even as we were symbolically marched to jail, easily mitigated my fear.

Another strategy for recruitment is to have potential members join a relatively safe collective action by an SMO. The larger the number of individuals in such actions and the more its leaders articulate the SMO's framed message, the more will what Durkheim (1984[1912]) termed emotional "effervescence" emerge from the collective action. The power of people chanting in unison and marching toward a goal (usually a location within a community) is emotionally engulfing. Acting crowds mobilize emotions, enhance commitments to ideologies, and activate a sense of transcendent power, as Durkheim and even Gustave Le bon (1960[1895]) recognized a hundred years ago. This effervescence can have a longer emotional half-life if individuals are invited to come to the SMOs' headquarters after collective actions that have generated Durkheimian effervescence; they can now experience direct interpersonal solidarities inside the organization itself. As Durkheim also recognized, totems or symbols toward which emotionally charged rituals are given also become important in recruitment and in "holding the lines" in collective protests. For example, the oversized United Farm Worker's flag in the early days of Cesar Chavez's early protest

marches in the agricultural fields of California was a powerful totem that symbolized the goals, ideologies, and solidarities of members (Jenkins and Perrow 1977), and it led to the institutionalization of an SMO (United Farm Workers) into a union. Indeed, organizations of any type employ this “Durkheimian strategy,” especially when risks, fears, and costs are high and need to be mitigated by collective solidarity. For instance, the recruiting pitches by the army and marines in the United States document focus on group solidarity more than the dangers of being killed in combat (*note*: the air force does not need to make the same pitch because the danger is less and the incentives of acquiring a marketable skill—piloting and airplane repair—are high).

Overlaps of SMOs with communities and social networks also operate to help recruiting because there will be positive reinforcement (from friends, family, and other members of local networks) for decisions to join the movement (Diani and McAdam 2003, 2004; Dixon and Roseigno 2003). These sources of reinforcement are often just enough tip calculations of risks, costs, and rewards in favor of joining or participating in an SMO. The more dense are these networks and the more they overlap with community (neighborhood) structures, the greater will be the force of the social networks on decisions; and the more likely will individuals in these dense networks be recruited successfully.

Framing of social movement goals and moral mandates is also critical in recruiting (Snow and Benford 1998, 1992). Often SMOs will need to reframe their beliefs and ideology until these resonate with a pool of potential members in a demographic niche. In the environmental movement sector, for example, organizations, such as the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Environmental Defense Fund, and Nature Conservancy, all reframed their ideologies to penetrate particular demographic and material resource niches. Each pitched a somewhat different variant of this generalized belief, and during their early days of mobilization, this framing and reframing was very evident, especially as each environmental SMO sought not only members but their membership fees (a material niche tied to a demographic one). The key point is that framing focuses the general message of SMOs by moralizing the cause and its goals, and as this framing occurs, especially in media-dominated societies, the moral beliefs of potential recruits take on more focus and emotional energy, thereby making it easier to recruit members.

Recruitment also works with the targeting of diverse categorical-unit memberships as potential recruits. Older people such as I are asked for money because we have not much left of our bodies to throw into protests; younger age cohorts typically become the “shock troops” of protests. Movements

that revolve around righting injustices of members in certain categorical units—for example, women, gays and lesbians, and ethnic minorities—always frame the goals of the SMO for specific demographic niches. For examples, the Black Panther Party in Oakland sought angry young African-American males (Austin 2006); the Weather Underground recruited angry college students (Braungard and Braungart 1992; Jacobs 1997); the gay/lesbian (later adding transgender) sought individuals in these categories, plus “straight” sympathizers; the NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference sought black members, but in order to garner more resources—both demographic and material—they recruited non-blacks to participate in joint SMO activities (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982, 1988; Morris 1984, 1992). Thus, framing is tailored to demographic niches, and often to additional niches, and for each of these niches, a certain amount of reframing occurs depending upon the nature of the resources sought. Reframing intensifies the emotions driving generalized beliefs and focuses these beliefs for different constituencies, arousing emotions of these constituencies to the point where they will participate in some manner in the SMO’s activities. Thus, the more successful is an SMO in drawing symbols from cultural fields and resource niches to include in its framing of ideologies to diverse constituencies in demographic and material resource niches, the more likely will this SMO endure.

**Social Control.** In any organization where there is team collaboration, *free-riding* can occur (Olsen 1965; Hechter 1987), where some incumbents do not contribute their share of work while enjoying the rewards that come through the efforts of others. In organizations where social control is achieved by normative means revolving around commitments to the goals and culture of the organization, free-riding can be reduced if individuals informally monitor and sanction each other for inadequate effort and participation. As SMOs grow, they will generally begin to employ a staff, with money as the main compensation, although commitments to SMO goals and group solidarities can also be part of the intrinsic “pay package.” But still, the larger an SMO becomes, the more will it routinize charisma by creating a rational-legal bureaucracy for meeting organizational goals (Weber 1968[1922]), and once this process ensures, problems of free-riding will increase. Still, if incumbents gain additional rewards (beyond money) for verifying role, social, group, and even core identities in work groups within the organization and if they derive extra rewards from a sense of efficacy in realizing moralized goals, then the normative social control system will still dominate, with low-cost informal monitoring of free-riding and sanctioning operating as powerful mechanisms of social control. And if incumbents are rewarded by private *joint goods*

generated from group inclusion and solidarity (Hecther 1987) and if these joint goods become highly rewarding and not easily gained in other organizations, then social control will be that much easier and even more powerful.

Because SMOs are in the moralizing business as they frame and articulate ideologies drawn from cultural fields and niches, they are biased toward normative over utilitarian or coercive control (see Chap. 6, pp. 213 to 302). Yet, once the organization becomes larger, the vertical division of labor will also grow, and as expansion of the vertical division of labor built around differences in authority occurs, free-riding may increase, and if it does, then more emphasis will be placed upon formal monitoring by positions in the vertical division of labor. Moreover, hierarchies inevitably create tensions, turf wars, resentments, and counter-authority cultures among some incumbents, thereby forcing evermore formal monitoring and sanctioning by punishments and incentives. And, as these processes ensue, the SMO loses much of its charismatic character and fervor as leaders become part of the vertical division of labor and as formal monitoring and sanctioning increase as a proportion of all mechanisms of social control. It is at this point that an SMO morphs into a regular organization, operating like those analyzed in Chap. 6. And the more successful an organization has been in achieving its goals, the more likely will it have become bureaucratized and, hence, the less will it be able to sustain the moral framing that allowed it to grow and be successful. It will become, in essence, one more organization in a particular resource niche, and it will under the same competitive pressures of other organizations in a niche where density in the population of organizations has increased competition for resources. It will have lost much of its brim and fire, and as memberships within the SMO decline, and the proportion of paid administrative staff to volunteers increases. The result is that overhead costs relative to material resource flows into the organization may, in the end, decline or lead to the death of the organization's resource niche.

## **Environments, Fields, and Niches of SMOs**

Cultural and structural fields constrain the actions of those being mobilized, along several dimensions. First, many of the resources that SMOs require inhere in the niches generated by structural and cultural fields of SMOs. Organizational, material, and demographic resources are located in niches created by structural fields and their modes of integration, whereas cultural resource niches are formed by the dynamics of cultural fields. Thus, the nature and levels of resources that can be mined by an emerging

SMO reside in the resource niches that, in large part, are organized by macro-level fields.

Second, macro-level fields also provide structural and cultural templates that, on the one hand, are a resource but, on the other, operate as a field that constantly imposes constraints on how an SMO becomes organized and on what strategies and tactics this SMO can pursue. Thus, much like organizations of any kind, SMOs are organizations that operate in fields and that seek resources generated by these fields. The success of any SMO depends upon its ability to use constraints imposed by fields in developing goals and ideologies that appeal to sufficiently large numbers of persons in a society, and upon their ability to extract resources from material, demographic, organizational, and cultural niches. Let me first begin with the constraints and resources imposed and posed by cultural fields.

### *Cultural Fields of SMOs*

The cultural field of any given SMO consists of (1) macro-level texts, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms; (2) micro-level emotionally charged generalized beliefs that have formed as a result of individuals' experiences in (a) meeting transactional needs and (b) seeking to "take" and "make" status, roles, and cultural norms, while navigating through situational ecology and demography within corporate units; and (3) the systems of culture built up by (a) corporate units and (b) categorical units.

**Macro-level Cultural Fields.** As with organizations, the degree of consistency among and integration of texts, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms establishes the basic cultural field for all corporate units, including SMOs. When value premises are consistent and when their general moral premises are then pulled into ideologies and meta-ideologies that are internally consistent, this combination of consistency and embedding of the system of moral codes in a society represents a highly restrictive cultural field. If there is widespread consensus over the elements of this restrictive field, the options for leaders in SMOs to frame their movement ideology are limited. The best they can do is to use the elements of this cultural field and reframe them into a movement ideology that appears to follow from the moral codes of a society. As a tactic, this kind of framing is most likely to resonate with potential participant of the movement, even if it is not highly radical. For example, the civil rights movement in the United States was eventually successful because it did not articulate new moral premises; rather, it was able to frame the movement ideology in terms of living up to the existing system of moral codes in a society. In contrast,

the Black Panther SMO eventually failed because it was more radical and attacked core ideologies in American society.

Yet, even with a relatively consistent and integrated set of moral premises, as is evident in the United States, it may take time for leaders to frame the movement ideology so that it resonates with these codes. The feminist, gay-lesbian-transgender, and environmental movements were for many decades viewed with hostility by various sectors of the society, and such is still the case even today. But, with reframing the ideology as SMOs in these SMSs, the movement ideologies of these SMOs have been able to use American culture to their advantage, and while these movements still arouse hostility and even countermovements, there is much more agreement by the broader public with the ideologies than three decades ago. Indeed, these movements are now past their charismatic stage and are well routinized and, in some cases such as the women's movement, so successful that they are now somewhat diminished in their visibility and power, and indeed, the entire SMS for the women's movement is depleted.

When moral codes are not consistent, nor well integrated through embedding in each other, there are many more options for movement leaders when they frame their movement ideology. However, it is less likely that there will be consensus over inconsistent and poorly integrated moral codes; the result is that framing of a movement ideology will not resonate with everyone in a society, and hence, the movement ideology will have to make appeals for resources in narrow resource niches. Moreover, once articulated, the movement ideology will likely violate the interpretation of moral codes of larger segments of the population. Ironically, this potentially hostile juxtaposition of movement ideologies and the beliefs of individuals and corporate units in various domains creates a complementary opposition that sustains the intensity of emotions backing up these two sets of ideologies.

Indeed, it is the tension between moral codes of the society and the relevant ideologies that can enable SMOs to secure resources, albeit in somewhat narrower niches. In fact, some SMOs have been successful in pursuing this counter-ideological strategy, at least for a time, in even well-integrated cultures. For instance, the Black Panthers and Black Muslim movements gained a following among the targeted categoric units (African Americans) by virtue of articulating a threatening ideology. But confrontational framings of movement ideologies invite not only counter-movement but also interventions by the power of the state which, if sufficient, can thwart movement goals, as was the case with the Black Panthers (most of whose leaders died in violence or were sent to jail) and less so for Black Muslims who, even with the death of their charismatic leader (Malcolm X), have survived and long ago moved into the routinization phase of a social movement (indeed, the largest demographic segment of Muslims in the

United States is, by far, “Black” Muslims). This routinization was facilitated by American cultural codes stipulating religious freedom, coupled with an in-place set of moral codes of Islam as well as a centuries-old organizational template for organizing places of worship. Thus, SMOs that articulate moral codes that are deviant from the mainstream of a society will require highly specialized resource niches in which to secure material, demographic, organizational, and cultural resources, and if they can do so, they will endure, albeit at the margins of the institutional domains in which they operate. In contrast, SMOs that seek significant change will need to gather resources more broadly by drawing from accepted cultural fields, while seeking resources from many diverse resource niches (created by fields).

**Micro-level Cultural Fields.** Beliefs emerge from interactions in encounters where individuals have similar experiences in meeting transactional needs, in normatizing, in status-making and taking, in role-making and taking, and in navigating situational ecology and demography. These experiences can occur among incumbents in one particular corporate unit, thereby generating local beliefs about sets of groupings within the divisions of labor of a particular organization and/or district(s) in a given community. The beliefs that emerge specify grievances and make attributions as to the cause of these grievances, but it is the organization that is the target of the attributions. These beliefs can lead to alienation of incumbents and even to the formation of an anti-organizational culture fed by solidarity among dissatisfied incumbents—as was outlined in Chap. 6.

SMOs do not arise from discontents in a single organization, however, but from more general discontents across organizations in diverse institutional domains. When organizations or communities are structurally and culturally equivalent, with counter-organizational cultures developing at the same locations in their divisions of labor, this larger playing field can fill up with SMOs, once the generalized beliefs, charged with negative emotions, move out from a single organization or community. Of course, most SMOs are created by leaders who recognize these structural and cultural equivalences and who, with this knowledge, begin to frame the SMOs’ goals in ways that resonate with the micro culture of discontent across organizations in particular niches. And the greater is the number of individuals at structurally equivalent positions in organizations or communities, the more potential there is for a successful SMO formation.

If this discontent is consolidated with memberships in categorical units—for example, ethnicity, gender, class, and age—then there is both a meso-level culture (that associated with categorical-unit *status beliefs*) and micro-level culture (of discontent and *grievances*) on which leaders of

SMOs can draw. Thus, consolidation of parameters marking categoric units with either (a) exclusions from resource-distributing corporate units (typically organizations and communities) or (b) confinement to certain lower-level positional locations in divisions of labor within corporate units operates like a supercharger in arousing negative emotions. These emotions push individuals in their encounters to begin forming generalized beliefs that articulate grievances and make initial attributions for the causes of these grievances.

Large-scale movements in a SMS, such as the union movement in the United States, came from the structural and cultural equivalence of workers in organizations within various industries; the civil rights movement came from a combination of highly prejudicial stereotypes and status beliefs, backed up by split labor markets (created to mollify white workers threatened by desperate black labor willing to work for less), exclusion from many corporate units in almost all institutional domains, low and highly visible ceilings restricting mobility for those blacks who managed to find positions in divisions of labor, and partitioning of neighborhoods in communities by “race”; the women’s movement was fueled by equivalences in status and roles, and status beliefs legitimating these, in groups like families and work groups inside of organizations in many institutional domains.

There was, to extend Neil Smelser’s notion of “structural conduciveness,” *cultural conduciveness* increasing the likelihood of SMO formation generated in encounters (embedded in meso-level structures and their cultures). These micro cultures of discontent generated in micro-level encounters constitute a very large cultural niche that can be exploited by leaders of SMOs who can frame generalized beliefs in this culture in ways that appeal to individuals, to other sectors of the society as a whole, and, if the framing is really successful, to institutional actors like those in polity and law that have the power to change institutional arrangements. Thus, while the micro culture is the source of much of the emotional energy that fuels an SMO or set of SMOs in SMS niches, it is through framing and reframing<sup>5</sup> of generalized beliefs in a micro-level field that channels this energy into an SMO.

**Meso-level Cultural Fields.** As I emphasized above, categoric-unit cultures represent one important mesolevel field constraining SMOs. This culture is a mix of prejudicial and stigmatizing status beliefs targeting devalued categoric units—for example, lower classes, ethnic minorities, even

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<sup>5</sup> For additional works on framing and reframing, see Fernandez and McAdam (1988), Gould (1991), Jasper and Poulson (1995), Klandermans and Oegema (1987), and Passy and Giugni (2001).

women, non-Christians, the aged—that have been drawn from meta-ideologies legitimating stratification and from the culture generated by members of more valued categoric units. For example, one cultural field is composed of the status beliefs about members of the lower class, coupled with the culture that has emerged by virtue of their resource shares, segregation in neighborhoods, high rates of interaction, and endogamy in marriage and reproduction. This culture is both the field and resource niche of SMOs that want to focus on class issues, as would have been the case in Europe, whereas Americans have tended to avoid cultural framings that invoke beliefs about class and reframe them into questions of disadvantage, especially disadvantages that are not individuals' fault (just bad luck) or that are the consequence of unfair discrimination. For example, the short-lived but highly effective War on Poverty in the United States was a combination of pressure from SMOs in various sectors, but mostly class and minority categoric units (primarily African Americans but others as well) that were able to reframe the issue as one of poverty and the harms to society and individuals touched by poverty. In this way, more volatile issues like "race" and "class" were sidestepped, allowing SMOs to exert political pressure by moralizing in a new frame such issues of social class and ethnic discrimination. When reframed in this way, the costs of the War on Poverty could be legitimated because they resonated with values and ideologies emphasizing equality of opportunity.

Similarly, the union movement in the United States was framed in terms of the exploitation of labor by "greedy capitalists." This frame was not initially successful, and the episodic violence of the SMOs (early unions) also worked against achieving a successful frame that could be accepted by the population at large. Yet, violence always threatens polity, and over several decades, the implicit threat of political instability, coupled with fine-tuning of frames around issues of fairness and justice ("fair pay for a day's work"), gave the unionization movement more cultural traction, and then, as core and powerful players in the economy began to negotiate with labor unions to secure some stability in their labor markets, unions were able to secure laws supporting their rights. Thus, the eventual success of the union movement depended upon reframing of the ideologies of economic organizations in response to (a) mass mobilizations and threats of violence by white workers (blacks were brought in as strike breakers in many northeast factories, thereby escalating violence against former slaves, which only increased the threat to polity) and to (b) reframing of the goals of unions in terms that were more resonant with macro-level culture and yet supportive of the micro-level culture of discontent that has arisen among workers, vast sectors of whom were structurally and culturally equivalent. Thus, the more an

SMO can frame and reframe so that meso-level cultures are reconciled with macro-level cultures, while being resonant with the emotionally charged micro-level cultures of those being mobilized, the more powerful will an SMO ideology become and the more likely will it be copied by other SMOs in an SMS or set of related niches, as well as the general population and key organizational actors in institutional domains.

### *Structural Fields of SMOs*

**Macro-level Structural Fields.** The configuration of mechanisms involved in integrating institutional domains constitutes the most important field of an SMO because the operations of these mechanisms increase or decrease the opportunities for SMO mobilization. When segmentation dominates as an integrative mechanism, as it often does within resource niches of an SMO, the structural template of successful SMOs in a SMS is most likely to be adopted by new SMOs. Yet, as density in the SMS increases, escalating competition and selection make it likely that some will fade away as their members are attracted to other SMOs in the niche, while other SMOs may adopt new strategies to secure resources such as specialization or movement to a new niche.

When domination is the primary mechanism of integration, social movements are less likely to emerge because of the reproduction of dominance–subordinate relations among organizations in each institutional domain. Any mobilization will be viewed as a threat to the system of hierarchal control. If polity is highly centralized and able to use coercive force and its administrative base of power to monitor and sanction the activities of wayward organizations and potential SMOs, then the political opportunity structure will close up the niches of resources available for SMO formation.<sup>6</sup>

Even if a society is less hierarchical with diminished direct control by polity, powerful core organizations can limit SMO mobilization. They will be able to dominant discourse using the generalized symbolic medium of a domain and the eventual formation of ideologies and meta-ideologies legitimating activities and, thereby, placing an SMO at a great disadvantage in seeking cultural resources to frame its movement ideology. These powerful

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<sup>6</sup> For representative works on political opportunities structures, see Almeida (2003), Costain and McFarland (1998), Tarrow (1998), Davenport (2007), Earl (2003), Fager (1985), Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi (2004), Meyer (2004, 2007), Meyer and Tarrow (1998).


organizations are likely to form counter-SMO organizations because of their high levels of material, organizational, technological, and demographic resources. For example, economic organizations involved in environmental pollution could resist for decades the first SMOs like the Sierra Club or even Greenpeace along most fronts—legal, political, and ideological—because of their vast resources. They can still do so, but it is clear that the SMOs of the environmental movement have gained the upper hand ideologically, but this has taken decades to get to the point where the cultural field now favors the SMOs more than their targets. And, in recent times, these SMOs have been able to use these resources to influence political decision-making and court rulings in a democratic polity and positivistic legal system. Still, the power of polluters is great, and even with an ecological disaster like the blown up oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, resistance by British Petroleum has not been futile.

If, however, the practices of organizations in core institutions consistently are at odds with values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies in the cultural field, and the more widespread are the negative emotions about such inconsistencies, the less will be overt resistance by targeted organizations, and the more likely will SMO be able to highlight these inconsistencies in its framing of the SMO culture and goals. For example, the civil rights movement could be successful in the United States because the long-running inconsistencies between blatant discrimination in a society valuing equality of opportunity and freedom could be used in the SMOs' framing of the ideology legitimating the social movement. And, even though powerful and central actors in polity, economy, and education, particularly in the American south but elsewhere as well, had great authority and, for a long time, had been able to subvert the civil rights movement, the movement slowly gained more legitimacy with key legal decisions in courts and the willingness to the federal government to finally enforce laws. The media also had a large effect on the movements because for the first time the atrocities of those resisting the movement could be shown across the nation on television, thereby garnering sympathy for those who had been long-term victims of discrimination. Thus, the micro-cultural field that had evolved over centuries of discrimination in the United States among members of categoric units, coupled with emotions of early participants in the movement during the 1950s and 1960s, was relatively successful because a series of SMOs in an SMS could secure resources and become organized around cultural frames that turned American values against those individuals and corporate units that still discriminated in virtually all institutional domains for many decades. As important as the legal system and polity were in protecting incumbents in

these SMOs, it was their moral suasion and their effective use of cultural resources that allowed these SMOs to pull in material and demographic resources that enabled mass mobilizations of individuals from *all* categorical units in the society.

These same dynamics began to play themselves out in the Middle East in 2011. Powerful political actors were confronted by the movement of those who wanted freedom and opportunity, and these protests could be relatively effective, despite coercive repression by centers of power, because they could use information technologies to communicate and mobilize, thereby spreading generalized beliefs and even initiating the framing process. In some cases, they could draw from the culture of power and point out the inconsistencies between grand legal pronouncements and day-to-day reality; at other times, they could use generalized ideologies about democracy built up in the West. Still, the success of these social movements has been mixed, depending upon the degree to which the military has been loyal to oppressive leaders and its capacity to bring coercive power against those engaged in the protests. Indeed, protestors have few critical resources beyond those they could extract from niches in cultural fields of their own and other societies, although these resources could be used to recruit demographic resources and in some cases material resources from outside the society. Like many social movements that are revolutionary, the failure of initial efforts to dislodge leaders of political authority can eventually morph into a civil war, where incipient SMOs retreat to strongholds and become better organized, even drawing organizational, technological, and material resources from foreign governments to better organize their demographic resources, fighters and followers, and thereby create an army capable of fighting the coercive forces of the state. There will be violence, but this will be more organized and strategic violence, compared to the violence that can erupt in the early phases of a revolutionary movement.

A number of scholars have conceptualized a political opportunity curve like that in Fig. 8.1 (Snow and Soule 2010:69). Early work on political opportunities occurred in the comparative analysis of cities (e.g., Lipsky 1970; Eisinger 1973), but I prefer to emphasize more macro-level mechanisms of integration and their relation to the use of power in a society. Thus, the political opportunity curve can be portrayed at its extremes as (1) very open democratic societies where markets are a primary mechanism of integration or (2) very closed despotic societies where domination is the primary mechanism of integration. Both ends of this continuum will, it is hypothesized, reveal low rates of SMO formation, but for different reasons. In the open system, polity can absorb the problems fueling grievances and make “binding decisions,” to use Luhmann’s (1982) vocabulary, that reduce the



**Fig. 8.1** Zones of political opportunities

intensity of grievances, and the positivistic legal system can mandate new, less problematic actions by, and relations among, organizations that have aroused grievances. In the closed system, polity and its allied core organizations in institutional domains can simply crush resistance through a combination of coercive force, intrusive monitoring by administrative power, and counter-ideological mobilization because they control the discourse using generalized symbolic media and disproportionately control the formation of the tenets in ideologies and meta-ideologies.

Yet there is something wrong with picture presented in Fig. 8.1 because some of the most influential social movements have occurred in open societies because polity and law *did not adequately respond to grievances*. Thus, when the unit of analysis shifts to the more macro level, perhaps earlier hypotheses about cities no longer apply. Moreover, as is evident in the Middle East in 2011, highly closed systems are being challenged by SMOs seeking to topple the leaders of highly centralized and repressive polities and corrupt as well as unresponsive legal systems. True, the unrest and protests occur in cities, but the protest is more than a city phenomenon; it is a society-wide uprising that is most visible in central cities, but it is a revolt against political authority at the level of the nation state. Just what will be the long-term outcome of this unrest is not clear because some centralized polities have successfully repressed the uprisings, while others have not.

Thus, there are more forces in play than merely open and closed political systems, and these forces determine the success of social movements in either the open or closed political systems. The middle portions of the curve are hypothesized to be fertile area for SMO because polity and law are more likely to be seen as not responsive, while the capacity and willingness to use coercive force are limited. It may be that the open system is never *as open* as portrayed in this curve because even in highly democratic systems, powerful core actors in all institutional domains still exert more control over ideological discourse and decision-making in polity and law. That is, the open system is an ideal type that never becomes institutionalized in the real world because there are always networks of resource flows among core organizations that give them great power to frame the ideological debate and to enlist polity and law to support their interests. Moreover, even in market-driven systems, there are always networks of power and control as well as alignments among powerful actors in polity, law, and economy, and sometimes religion, and these networks of resource exchanges, along with the political alignments that these exchanges create, tend to close up opportunity structures for SMOs. So, the reality may be that no society is sufficiently democratic that polity and law can absorb all grievances and make binding decisions that resolve these grievances.

And, as we can see in the Middle East and as I would predict in relatively closed polities like that in China in the future, the political domination is never so tight that there are not opportunity spaces for SMO mobilization. And, in an information world where communication within and between individuals and organizations in different societies is possible, polity cannot fully close down the flow of information, and moreover, as is now evident in China, the “great firewall of Chinese of cyberspace” that blocks information has, itself, become a grievance that can throw fuel on protest movements, which are coming in the next two decades. So, the two endpoints of the curve are more like idealizations, while the various points in between these endpoints provide a great deal of space in which SMOs can operate.

SMOs must be able to read the political opportunities that open up, for a variety of reasons: shifting alignments, transformations wrought by changing technology, weakness in the control capacity of the state, fiscal crises, holes in networks, and perhaps most importantly, tensions generated by stratification, and especially if class locations are consolidated with particular types of nominal categoric units such as those based upon ethnicity and religious affiliation. This last weakness is a tension-generating machine in all societies, generating (a) a large reservoir of grievances, (b) a ready-to-mobilize subpopulation defined by categoric-unit memberships, (c) a cul-

tural resource base that can be used to point out the contradiction between high degrees of stratification and cultural ideals stated in values and ideologies, especially in more open systems, and (d) a series of material and organizational resource niches, whose resources can readily flow through dense networks among ethnics or members of religious organizations, and potential for allies to emerge once an social movement begins. There are, then, cracks and fault lines in even the most democratic or repressive society that represent opportunities for SMOs, *if* their leaders can see them and frame the ideology of the SMO so that it generates wider appeal.

The modes of structural integration at the meso level are important in exposing opportunities and, once taken, in providing resources for emerging SMOs. Networks and alliances among organizations, organizational templates in these organizations, and material resources that can be drawn from memberships and passed up the organizational structure and then across networks are almost always present in a society, even in the most repressive society. And, once the SMO begins to mobilize and is able to attract the initial resources, it begins to create its own cultural, material, organizational, and demographic niches that were not evident or that did not even exist until the SMO had some initial success.

There is also an ecological dynamic in play that affects political opportunities (Lipsky 1970; Goffman 1963, 1971). Today, this dynamic operates at two levels: (1) the physical space to carry out collective protests and (2) the cyberspace in which to develop networks, articulate generalized beliefs, recruit members to the movement, and coordinate collective actions in (1). If a society where SMOs are forming is urbanized and has large open public spaces, these represent real opportunities for SMOs. And if a society has a communication infrastructure to support social networking technologies, cell phones, and wireless internet connections, these also expand the ecology of cyberspace. However, if the society also has the capacity to shut down this communication infrastructure, these infrastructures will be less effective in movement mobilizations, and yet, the very act of shutting off communications by centers of power will further enrage publics who see such censorship as yet one more abuse. And increasingly, tech-savvy youth who are almost always at the vanguard of social movements can often find ways to get around these efforts at censorship, and even more so if they have backing from outside supporters that have technological resources.

Cracks in repressive control often appear in how physical space is used, and how rapidly SMO participants can adjust to efforts by centers of authority to control this space. For example, many years ago before Poland was free of Soviet Union control, I was by chance in Warsaw on May Day.

The communist state was clearly concerned about protests by Solidarity, and so they cluttered the very large plaza in the center of town, where my hotel was located, with K-rails (for separating coming and going traffic on of freeways) to prevent large numbers of individuals from assembling as a collective mass. On the side streets feeding into this plaza were caravans of water cannons followed by water trucks and busloads of soldiers brought into Warsaw from outlying and less restive areas. On each street corner in at intersections near the central plaza stood a very young and nervous soldier with a Uzi rifle, who to my great surprise was constantly accosted verbally by Warsaw's residents (something I thought was rather brave: yelling a hormone-driven teen holding a machine gun!). The K-rails and the presence of such force prevented a mass rally in the central plaza from taking place, but all over Warsaw, other protests by Solidarity erupted, and one could see smoke from the fires that had been set. Thus, even with a grand show of force, other ecological spaces opened up and could be usurped for protests.

If these protestors of the 1980s could have had communication of the present day, they could have more effectively coordinated movements and done so far more rapidly than water cannons, tanker trucks, and busloads of young soldiers could be moved. Even with little technology, the protestors were making, in essence, "flash demonstrations" of assembling rapidly and then moving away as the forces of social control eventually rumbled in. Thus, as Durkheim (1893) argued over 100 years ago, communication technologies increase moral density, and moreover, these technologies can also be used strategically to increase physical density in space, as has been evident in recent protests in the Middle East and even in highly repressive places like Syria and Iran. Thus, technology provides more opportunities for SMOs to get their message out, to frame movement ideologies, and to tactically move people about space and derive the benefits of collective protests by masses of participants. And once this Durkheimian (1984[1912]) effervescence of these mass demonstrations takes hold, protestors become less fearful, even with the ultimate coercive act by the state of killing individuals, which only delegitimizes political regimes further as pictures from cell phones move around a society and the world.

Thus, just as ecology is important in structuring focused and unfocused encounters at the micro level, it can be essential at the meso level as members of SMOs seek to change macro-level structures and cultures by collective mobilizations. These mobilizations charge up the symbols of the movement, increasing the emotional involvements of individuals in the activities of the SMO, and in so doing, they often open up new resource niches for securing material, demographic, organizational, and even cultural resources to frame the movement ideology.

### ***Resource Niches and SMOs Strategies, Tactics, and Effectiveness***

As emphasized, niches provide the resources necessary to create and sustain SMOs. Once an SMO acts, these actions can potentially open up additional niches. For example, the civil rights movement grew dramatically and nationally by peaceful protests that drew organizations of repressive state and local governments (state police and sheriff's departments) into acting aggressively, and at the same time, other organizations such as the KKK were exposed for what they were. With newsreel (something not seen today), national television coverage by news departments (that had only really begun to be part of regular television in the late 1950s and early 1960s), dramatic pictures taken by national news services, newspapers, long-gone pictorial magazines (like *Life*, *Look*, or *Colliers* disappeared), and extensive coverage in news magazines like *Time* and *Newsweek* (which struggle in the new media world), the entire citizenry of the society was drawn into the movement at least vicariously, but the important consequence is that material, demographic, organizational, and even cultural resource niches were being created by these media. Donations of money to SMOs increased; new kinds of participants were drawn to the SMOs (mostly white [college] youth, prominent celebrities, and many older Americans who had long harbored anger at discrimination); organizational expertise from sympathetic corporate, union, and, most importantly, church sponsors was supplied; and new ways to frame the protests as an effort to achieve "freedom and equalities of opportunity" in the face of lingering Jim Crow practices and state oppression could be developed to widen the appeal of the movement. Thus, resource niches do not remain constant; they can expand if the SMO is successful, and, of course, they can contract when the SMO is not able to frame its ideology in a manner that widens its appeal.

Other factors also affect resource mobilization. One is the discretionary resources that masses and elite have to spend on funding SMOs. Another is the existence of an SMS where organizational templates can be copied and networks formed among SMOs in the SMS. Yet, another is what have been called "conscience constituents" or a pool of sympathetic individuals who can potentially join or at least offer material support to SMOs (Snow and Soule 2010:119). Still another resource is built into movement constituents where their incumbency in existing organizations becomes a natural tie-in to an SMO (e.g., industrial workers for a union movement; churches for justice-oriented movements; universities and their students for anti-draft movements). And final resource is the cultural field that reveals general

values and ideologies that are contradicted by practices of core actors, thus giving SMO's room to frame and reframe the movement in moral codes acceptable to a large portion of the population. When these broader resource niches exist, the options and opportunities for SMOs increase dramatically.

There can be, however, ironic consequences when SMOs draw from the external resource niches; the charismatic leaders and early followers may need to alter their tactics if they are to attract resources from far outside their core constituency. They will, in essence, lose some control of the movement in exchange for more resources from broader segments of the public. It is likely that movements that draw from broader resource niches will become less violent because violence threatens more than attracts resources from the larger publics and more establishment organizations. And these less violent SMOs will be more likely to use mass mobilizations as a political tactic in the institutionalized arena of politics to make polity responsive to grievances and to force the legal system to respond, if it can, to eliminating harmful, discriminatory, and abusive practices by polity and core organizations in various institutional domains. For example, as noted earlier, the Black Panthers never had a broad series of resource niches from which to draw, and as a result, the radical ideology and violence that sometimes persisted led, in the end, to the collapse of the SMO, whereas the NAACP had always been an SMO oriented to larger constituencies and broader resource niches, thereby avoiding violence or, if violence occurred, it was violence against members of the NAACP. However, had by the time of the final push in the 1960s for civil rights began, the NAACP was often perceived as not sufficiently aggressive in public places. To compensate, it appears, other SMOs in the civil rights SMS that were more assertive in public protests joined the NAACP in nonviolent protests, which were quite successful in that the protestors remained nonviolent and the agents of social control often became violent—thereby exposing their racism. Yet, during these times, there were “riots” in African-American ghettos all over the country, but these were more spontaneous expression of anger over long-held grievances and, hence, were not so much orchestrated by SMOs as by individuals and groups of angry persons lashing out. The key to success of the movement at this time in the 1960s was white violence against civil right's protestors, coupled with fears of black violence that might spread beyond the ghettos of urban America.

The properties of niches and the configurations of resources secured by SMOs have large effects on the tactics, effectiveness, public perceptions, and viability of the SMO and even the SMS. Niche density may increase competition as much as collaboration of SMOs in a SMS, with the result

that the broader social movement becomes factionalized and, in the end, less effective as density in the niche declines. Some SMOs die off, while the appeal of the remaining SMO to individuals and organizations in other niches may have declined as a result of the turmoil produced by factionalism. Such is often the case in protests and revolutionary actions that topple authority, but then, in the aftermath the movement's apparent success, SMOs begin to fight among themselves, thus causing fears and loss of legitimacy at the very time that they need a reservoir of diffuse legitimacy from broader publics.

As noted above, tactics are very much related to the breadth and depth of resource niches. Violent SMOs generally draw from narrow resource niches, while less violent ones secure resources from a broader array of niches. At times, violence can allow an SMO to expand its resource base if the violence is seen as tactical and, more importantly, effective to challenging centers of authority that have failed to respond to widespread grievances. Yet, as it grows, the tactics may move to less violence, but as the decades of violence in Northern Ireland, or the violence propagated by al-Qaida, and (until recently) Basque bombings by separatists, and other violent SMOs attest, such may not be the case. Yet, even though the resource base of these terrorist SMOs has expanded, it is still rather narrow, which may account for the continued violence. Indeed, terrorist organizations seek to remain small and secret because they are not trying to appeal to general publics but to a narrower constituent base.

SMOs that remain highly centralized and dependent upon a charismatic leader will generally be less bureaucratized than larger movements, and as a result, their goals and tactics may be less predictable. They may be violent, then more accommodating, and then more violent again. Without the constraints that come by securing resources in a broader array of niches, these types of SMOs often see unpredictability of actions as an effective strategy for furthering the goals of the SMO.

The size of the constituency niche is also important in how SMOs operate. A narrow constituency is likely to keep the SMO small and not able to secure other kinds of resources. It is, therefore, more likely to remain centralized, collaborative, and lead by a charismatic leader. The result is that its tactics will often revolve around drawing attention to itself, but if violence is used, it will close the doors to a broader array of resource niches.

Broader public perceptions of an SMO are critical to its ability to attract resources. If the SMO is threatening because it employs violence as a tactic and because its ideology is framed in ways that repudiate core cultural elements like values and ideologies over which there is some consensus in the broader public, the SMO may be driven underground, which makes it even

more threatening to publics and centers of power. If, however, the SMO seeks to remain within the broader arena of politics and employ more legitimate means of protest, then it may remain threatening but, in a political democracy, still be seen as legitimate. If the public considers an SMO working “within the system” of politics and if it does not employ violent tactics, then it will be generally be considered legitimate, and if it frames its goals and ideology in ways that resonate with the broader cultural field over which there is some consensus, then it will have access to more resources in diverse niches. It may, however, be seen as “too establishment” and lead to “spin-off” SMOs that are willing to employ more radical ideological frames and more aggressive tactics, which can have two consequences: one is to make the establishment SMO seem safer and, ironically, often able to expand its access to resources; another is to reduce the resources available to the splinter SMO. However, if the splinter SMO can reframe its movement ideology, if the grievances that it posits are widely felt by large segments of the population, and if it is cautious in its use of violence, it may begin to increase access to new niches, especially if the larger more establishment SMOs are seen as ineffective. The civil rights movement in the United States experienced both these outcomes. More radical SMOs such as the Black Panthers and Black Muslim SMOs actually helped the NAACP which, as noted, had come to be perceived as too staid and as ineffective as an SMO, while at the same time pushing the NAACP to form alliances with more aggressive SMOs in the civil rights SMS; the result was a coalition of SMOs that were more assertive, without generating widespread fear. And so the movement moved beyond its primary demographic resource base of oppressed categoric units and its organizational base of churches and legal challenges to discriminatory laws and practices. The movement ideology was broadened to appeal to members of many more diverse categoric units (especially white, European-origin Americans), and as it did so, it gained access to a larger set of resource niches and, as result, became capable of generating mass demonstrations, largely peaceful but still assertive in their advocacy, that made the movement much more effective.

## **Elementary Principles of Meso-level Change Dynamics**

I am now in a position to offer a few elementary principles on the dynamics of change caused by SMOs or sets of SMOs in a SMS. I am being somewhat selective, but the following propositions offer a general theory of SMO dynamics.

32. The likelihood of an SMO or set of SMOs emerging in a society is a positive function of the level of negative emotional arousal among subpopulations in a society, with the intensity of emotion increasing with:
- A. The intensity of grievances among members of a subpopulation, which in turn increases with:
    - 1. The level of stratification in a society
    - 2. The degree of discrimination against members of devalued categorical units and the consolidation of membership in these units with incumbency in lower-ranking class positions in the stratification system
    - 3. The degree to which generalized beliefs articulating grievances and making initial external attributions for their causes of grievances have emerged among victims of discrimination
    - 4. The degree to which leaders have emerged to frame and reframe generalized beliefs with respect to:
      - a. Moralizing and focusing grievances, which increase with:
        - (1) The capacity to use existing macro-level cultural fields to moralize grievances
        - (2) The level of consistency among, and integration of, moral codes in macro-level cultural fields
        - (3) The degree to which moral frames draw upon moral codes about justice and fairness in macro-level cultural fields
      - b. Making external attributions to key organizations and their leaders in relevant institutional domains as the cause of grievances
      - c. Challenging the authority of organizations that are targets of attributions
  - B. The pervasiveness of intense grievances among population which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    - 1. The size of the subpopulations subject to discrimination and the degree of consolidation of their memberships in categorical units with lower ranks in the stratification system
    - 2. The extent to which victims of discrimination are culturally and structurally equivalent in their rates of exclusion from key resource-giving corporate units and in their locations in the divisions of labor in organizations where they are permitted to hold positions
    - 3. The density of networks among those victims of discrimination who are structurally and culturally equivalent

4. The level of development of technologies for social networking and communicating
  - C. The degree to which modes of structural integration generate opportunities for mobilization of an SMO or a set of SMOs, which is a negative function of the extent to which domination is the principal mode of structural integration, while being a positive function of the extent to which structural interdependencies formed by markets and regulated by positivistic law and democratic polity are the principal modes of institutional integration
33. The viability of an SMO or a set of SMOs is a positive function of their access to key resource niches which, in turn, is a function of the availability of resources in:
- A. Material resource niche, which is a function of the level of economic development and pervasiveness of money and market mechanisms
  - B. Cultural resource niche, which is, in turn, an additive function of:
    1. The consistency among, consensus over, and integration of the moral codes in macro-level cultural fields in a society
    2. The emergence of generalized beliefs articulating grievances
    3. The availability of leaders to frame and reframe generalized beliefs along the lines listed under 32-A-4(a, b, and c) above
  - C. Organizational resources niche, which is a function of level of organizational expertise and differentiation of organizational formations in a society
  - D. Technological resource niche, which is a function of economic development and reliance on markets for distribution of technologies, especially communication technologies
  - E. Demographic resource niche, which is an additive function of:
    1. The size of the subpopulation experiencing grievances in encounters within organizations and communities
    2. The age cohorts that are recruited, with the size of younger cohorts being a key demographic niche
    3. The degree of overlap and density of networks among those in the SMO with networks in communities and organizations outside of the SMO
    4. The capacity to provide trial protest action for potential recruits
    5. The pervasiveness of communications and social networking technology among potential recruits

6. The level of inequality and stratification in a society, especially when there is a high degree of:
    - a. Consolidation of categoric-unit memberships of aggrieved individuals with lower-ranking class locations in the stratification system
    - b. The extent to which the goals of the SMO are aligned with the grievances of members in devalued categoric units
  7. The degree to which members of demographic resource niches can or are willing to invest identities in an SMO and to value identity verification in encounters within the SMO
34. The persistence and success of an SMO or a set of SMOs is a positive function of:
- A. The conditions listed under 33-A, 33-B, 33-C, 33-D, and 33-E above, while being a negative function of the level of density and competition for resources in an SMO's niches
  - B. The extent to which incentives for SMO membership and/or participation consistently exceed the costs and risks of membership and/or participation, with the incentives relative to cost/risks increasing with:
    1. The degree to which moralized SMO goals and solidarities generated by membership and participation generate a jointly produced private good that is highly valued by members and only available from the SMO
    2. The degree to which members and participants of an SMO invest one or more identities in the SMO and seek verification by members of the SMO of these identities
    3. The degree to which identity investments produce for members of an SMO a sense of group inclusion
    4. The degree to which community organizations and networks, where at least social and group identities and potentially role and core identities are verified, overlap with the structure of the SMO, thereby making identity verification in communities also dependent on verification within the SMO
    5. The extent of use by SMO members of communication and social networking technologies for meeting transactional needs, especially identity verification and group inclusion but also for trust
  - C. The extent to which social control of members and participants in an SMO relies upon informal monitoring and sanctioning, and especially positive sanctioning for conformity to expectations for realizing SMO goals

- D. The extent to which social control of members and participants in an SMO depends upon the production of a private joint good built from the emotions of solidarity
  - E. The extent to which, even with SMO growth, the vertical division of labor remains truncated and does *not* involve expanding levels of vertical authority and formal monitoring and negative sanctioning of member and participant activities
35. The longer an SMO persists, the more likely is it to be transformed into a routinized bureaucratic formation, and the more likely are earlier charismatic leaders to be replaced over time by bureaucrats in a formal and more vertical division of labor that loses some of its moral zeal and framing and that seeks resources in material resource niches and in fee- or membership-paying, older age cohorts.
36. The more an SMO is converted into a rational legal bureaucracy, the less frequent are mass public protest activities, and the more likely is the SMO to operate in the arena of politics and law within a society.

## Conclusions

This chapter completes my analysis not only of meso dynamics but of macrodynamics and micro dynamics as well. All that is now required is a last chapter listing all of the principles that I have developed on meso dynamics. I have no illusions that these are exhaustive and even correct in all cases, but they are principles that, in principle, can be tested and assessed against existing data. And if we took all three sets of principles from volumes 1–3 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*, we would have an even more comprehensive theory.

Recall that I do not advocate a true nomothetic or an axiomatic theory of social reality. Virtually no science can hold itself to this high, and perhaps this standard is unrealistic. Moreover, maybe it is the wrong standard of what constitutes good theory—something pushed on scientists by philosophers of science. My view is that principles about different levels of social reality will overlap, but they will not constitute a tight deductive scheme by any formal logic. The principles highlight what I see as the key operative dynamics of the social universe, and they are to be used as a resource, often in ad hoc ways. Depending upon what one is trying to explain, the principles are invoked to help that explanation; they are not deduced from higher-order laws or axioms. Rather, they are all couched at about the same level of abstraction, and their structure reveals how the values in the variables change. If the principles explain a phenomenon of interest—say, the

concentration of power in polity or the formation of an SMO—they have been useful. As I have emphasized, there are relatively few generic and universal properties of the entire social universe, and relatively few forces are in play. Thus, our theorizing should not have to be exceeding complex.

Yet, if I have a reservation to what I have done in these three volumes, it is that I have outlined principles which are too complex and long. I could certainly shorten them and, thus, increase the total number of principles. At this point, I opted to make them long and robust, but comparatively few in total number—less than 100 for all of the macro, meso, and micro realms of social reality. Perhaps this was the wrong strategy, but it is easily corrected. The goal that I set out for myself several years ago was to demonstrate that the phenomena studied by sociologists are not unique—as so many in sociology proclaim. Rather, the social universe is just like the biotic, physicochemical, and psychological universes; their dynamics can be explained by scientific theory. None of these universes are more or less amenable to scientific theory. I have at least demonstrated that we can develop abstract and testable principles about the generic properties and dynamics of the social universe. If I have something wrong, this can be corrected; if I have left something important out, this too can be corrected. I am sure, of course, that those who simply refuse to believe that there can be a “natural science of society,” to use Radcliffe-Brown’s famous phrase. These critics will find these principles in volumes 1–3 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* flawed in some way.

I often have been told that it is “arrogant” of me to think that the properties of the social universe can be theorized like those in any other science. I have always thought it the height of arrogance to pronounce that such is the case. I have been told these principles are too abstract and remote from specific empirical and historical cases to be interesting. Fair enough, such a critic is simply not interested in scientific theory. I certainly have no problem with people being more interested in collecting and analyzing data and, perhaps, constructing historical explanations that are very different from what I have tried to do in these three volumes. There are multiple epistemologies that we can all use to understand the world; I just think that science takes the discipline further than the alternatives. We can look at the social universe from diverse standpoints. Too much of sociology, however, revolves around a kind of dismissive dogmatism that, in essence, proclaims that science is not possible, and so why try.

I think that it is important to try to develop scientific theory, but I do not dismiss alternative ways of looking at the world, as do so many critics. Still, after 45 years as a professional sociologist, the consistent drumbeat against scientific approaches to explanation continues. I do not know if this is a

loud minority or the majority of sociologists—someone should hand out a questionnaire on the matter—but I do know that sociology has become somewhat polarized over the issue of science vs. some-other-kind-of epistemology. Most of these antiscience critics simply assert that we cannot develop universal principles on the operative dynamics of the social universe, and stop there, smug in their conviction. In this book and many other works over the last 4 decades, I have sought to demonstrate that we can develop abstract explanatory principles of all realms of the social universe. The critics will, of course, never be silenced since, it appears, epistemology is like religion: each scholar has epistemological faith and, with this faith, comes a kind of theological dogmatism. But sociology needs to produce useful knowledge, and in my view, it is the knowledge produced by science that will be the most useful.

## Chapter 9

# Principles of Meso Dynamics

As in volumes 1 and 2 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*, this last chapter is devoted to listing the abstract principles of the domain of reality under review—in this case, the meso realm and the dynamics that drive its formation and operation. The principles are not as parsimonious as I would like, but to tighten them up, I would have to shift the level of abstraction up a bit, and the current level of abstraction is high enough—at least in this preliminary effort. For the present, I would like to keep as much of the substance in the principles as possible in order for readers to recognize the rather diverse literatures from which they have been drawn. I could also add principles on the environments of the meso realm, examined in early chapters, but this would lead to too much redundancy, and thus, I have not done so, but the exercise would be relatively easy since the arguments outlined in Chaps. 2 and 3 are stated in propositional form within the discursive text. Thus, the principles below are the best that I could do at this point; I always invite others to make my “sad song” better, not by dogmatic rejection of the approach but by a better execution of this more formal approach to theorizing.

Volume 3 completes the goal that I set for myself in volume 1: to demonstrate that general theories of the social universe can be developed, like in any mature science. Moreover, by developing these principles around the three domains of reality that unfold in human social organization, many of the long-standing issues in sociological theory, such as the “micro–macro gap,” simply disappear. So do other contentious issues like “agency vs. structure” and “objective and subjective.” Indeed, too much theoretical sociology has spent too much time addressing philosophical issues rather than what, in my view, should be our main charge: Explaining how the social universe operates. This kind of formalism is not the only approach to explanation but it is the approach of science, and my goal for close to 50 years has been to

develop a “society of society”—to use, once again, Radcliffe-Brown’s famous phrase. Below are the principles that link domains of reality together, and so, even though they come last in this trilogy of books, they hardly are the least important.

### **Principles of Categorical-Unit Dynamics**

1. The level of categorical-unit formation and clarity of boundaries marking this formation among members of a subpopulation in a society are:
  - A. A positive multiplicative function of the visibility of nominal parameters marking membership which, in turn, is an additive function of distinctive:
    1. Biological features
    2. Demeanor cues
    3. Markers of distinct cultures
    4. Patterns of corporate-unit affiliation markers
    5. Class memberships
  - B. A positive function of the visibility of graduated parameters marking memberships and/or the ease of converting graduated into nominal-like parameters, which is a positive function of 1-A above
  - C. A positive function of the degree to which social identities are important to individuals in a subpopulation, which, in turn, is a positive and multiplicative function of:
    1. The extent to which verification of core identities as well as group and role identities depends upon verification of social identities
    2. The degree to which inter- and intra-categorical interactions lead to verification of all levels of identity
  - D. A positive function of the degree to which intra- and intercategorical interactions enable individuals to meet needs for profits in the exchange of resources which, in turn, is a function of:
    1. Verification of social identities and other identities tied to social identities
    2. Use of realistic comparison points for assessing costs/investments to resources gained in interactions
  - E. A positive function of the degree to which inter- and intra-categorical interactions lead individuals to meet needs for group inclusion, which is a positive and additive function of meeting needs for:
    1. Identity verification
    2. Profits from exchanges of resources

3. A sense of trust
  4. A sense of facticity
- F. A positive function of the level of discrimination by members of high-evaluation categoric units against members of devalued categories, which is a positive multiplicative function of:
1. Visibility of parameters marking membership (1-A above)
  2. Level of perceived threat posed by members of an identifiable subpopulation to the majority of a population or to members of its dominant categoric units, which is a positive function of:
    - a. Relative size of the threatening subpopulation
    - b. Level of resources and entrepreneurial skills possessed by subpopulation
  3. The power of discriminators relative to that possessed by the targets of discrimination
  4. The capacity of discriminators to control and manipulate cultural beliefs about valued and devalued members of categoric units
- G. A positive function of the level of intensity of prejudicial beliefs about members of devalued categories' identifiable subpopulation, which is a positive multiplicative of function of the level of threat and discrimination (1-F above), and valorizing beliefs, derived from meta-ideologies, among those who discriminate
- H. A positive function of the degree to which status beliefs about devalued members of social categories contain negative moral evaluations derived from prejudicial beliefs and meta-ideologies that establish restrictive expectation states or members of devalued categories
- I. Positive function of the degree of consolidation of parameters marking membership in devalued and valued social categories which is a positive function of the conditions listed in 2 below
2. The consolidation of parameters marking devalued members of categoric unit with lower-class locations in the stratification system is a positive and additive function of:
    - A. The degree of stratification which, in turn, is a multiplicative function of:
      1. The level and pervasiveness of inequality in resource distributions made by corporate units

2. The degree of class formation at all levels of the stratification system which is a function of:
    - a. Homogeneity of class members in their resource shares
    - b. Boundaries separating classes from each other
  3. The degree of ranking of classes on a scale of moral worth, derived from the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system and the degree of consensus over this moral evaluation
  4. The barriers to interclass mobility which is a function of:
    - a. The level of resource inequality
    - b. The level of moral rank ordering of classes
    - c. The intensity of, and consensus over, differential moral evaluations of members of all classes
- B. The degree to which discrimination by those threatened by devalued categoric-unit members can limit the latter's access to resource-distributing corporate units and/or to lower-status locations in the divisions of labor of these units, which, in turn, is a positive function of:
1. The relative power of discriminators over their targets
  2. The intensity of and consensus over:
    - a. Prejudicial beliefs about members of devalued social categories
    - b. Negative moral evaluations of members devalued social categories
  3. Stigmatizing status beliefs about, and highly restrictive situational expectation states for members of devalued social categories
- C. The degree to which discrimination can draw upon the moral premises of ideologies and meta-ideologies and use the moral tenets in these developing prejudicial beliefs, negative moral evaluations, stigmatizing status beliefs, and restrictive expectation states
- D. The degree to which integration of corporate units in institutional domains relies upon:
1. Structural domination relying on coercive power and its administration
  2. Structural segregation between valued and devalued members of a society that penetrates across all types of corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities)
  3. Penetration of relations of domination–subjugation to encounters across all types of corporate units so that status making and

taking, role making and taking, and culture taking and making (normatization) all reproduce the status order and diffuse status characteristics

- E. The degree to which discrimination can limit or reduce the integrative effects of:
1. Structural segmentation to increase structural and cultural equivalences that promote intersections among parameters marking categoric-unit memberships
  2. Differentiation of corporate units within and between institutional domains that increase opportunities for mobility and intersections among member of diverse categoric units
  3. Structural interdependencies that increase intersection among members of diverse categoric units, especially discriminators that have the capacity to restrict:
    - a. Labor market exchanges through splitting labor markets and exclusions in other markets that disadvantage members of devalued categoric units
    - b. Access of devalued categoric units to the expanded divisions of labor that come with structural embedding and overlaps
    - c. Mobility of members of devalued categoric units among corporate units within and between institutional domains
3. The intersection of parameters marking diverse categoric-unit memberships is an inverse function of the degree of stratification and level of discrimination, while being a positive and additive function of:
- A. The number and diversity of corporate units in differentiated institutional domains, which is multiplicative function of:
1. The size of a population
  2. The level of production
  3. The degree of reliance on free markets
  4. The rate and scope of circulation of generalized symbolic media
  5. The consolidation of power in polity around:
    - a. Use of material incentives
    - b. Ideologies and meta-ideologies emphasizing democracy, opportunities, and universalistic standards of evaluation of individuals and performances
    - c. Strategic, short-term, and episodic use of coercive power
    - d. Moderate use of administrative power and authority to monitor and regulate actions of individual and corporate actors

6. The reliance of a positivistic and universalistic legal system to regulate interrelations among individual and corporate actors in all institutional domains
- B. The rates of interinstitutional mobility and interclass mobility, which is a positive and multiplicative function of:
1. The level of structural differentiation or heterogeneity
  2. The extensiveness of structural embedding and overlaps
  3. The level and scope of reliance on free labor markets for sorting incumbents in the divisions of labor of corporate units in diverse institutional domains
  4. The pervasiveness across institutional domains of using of educational credentials as markers of skill, learning, knowledge, and professionalism in labor markets
  5. The rate, diversity, and scope of the circulation of generalized symbolic media across institutional domains
- C. The level of consensus over and degree of integration among values, ideologies, institutional norms, and meta-ideologies emphasizing open markets, equal opportunities, and universalistic evaluations of performances in corporate units across domain consolidation of categoric-unit parameters with social class locations
4. The likelihood of conflict between members of valued and devalued categoric units is a function of the proportion of members in devalued categoric units who consistently experience negative emotional arousal in encounters within corporate units across diverse institutional domains, with this arousal being a positive and multiplicative function of:
- A. Failure to meet transactional needs in intercategoric-unit interactions, which is a multiplicative function of:
1. The inability to verify social identities embedded in categoric-unit memberships and all other identities tied to a social identity
  2. The inability to perceive a consistent and acceptable levels of profit in the exchanges of resources with others
  3. The inability to feel a sense of group inclusion in a high proportion of interactions in encounters within corporate units
  4. The failure to achieve a consistent sense of trust, particularly a sense of respect for self and its underlying identities, in encounter within corporate units
  5. The failure to achieve a sense of facticity, particularly a sense of intersubjectivity

- B. Failure to culture-take and culture-make in intercategory-unit interactions ways that meet transactional needs and that allow members of devalued category units avoid the effects of stigmatizing status beliefs and expectation states
  - C. Failure to status-take and status-make in intercategory-unit interactions in ways that enable members of devalued category units to reduce their subordination in the status order and to break the stigmatizing status beliefs tied to the diffuse status characteristics defining and evaluating category-unit memberships
  - D. Failure to role-take and role-make in intercategory-unit interactions in ways that, over time, enable individuals to use role behaviors as a resource in altering expectation states for members of a category unit
  - E. Failure to reduce the stigmatizing effects of situational ecology that restricts movements of devalued category-unit members through and their full use of props, territories, and regions of space
  - F. Failure to have the same options as members of valued category units of access to move in and out, assemble, and avoid deference demeanor in space in and around corporate units
  - G. Failure of *intracategory*-unit interactions, even when allowing individuals to successfully meet transactional needs, culture-take and culture-make, status-take and status-make, and role-take and role-make in ecological space in and around corporate units, to avoid discourse and talk about negative emotional arousal in intercategory interactions
5. The more consistent, intense, and widespread are negative emotional arousal and the conditions generating this arousal among members of devalued category units, the more likely are members of these devalued units to mobilize for conflict, with the likelihood for conflict increasing with:
- A. Intersections of parameters are limited to corporate units within a few institutional domains, thereby increasing the sense of relative deprivation over the inability to secure resources in other institutional domains, with relative deprivation increasing with:
    1. Initial expansion of market mechanisms for distributing resources
    2. Initial weakening of traditional systems of domination by polity, law, and religion
    3. Initial increases in mobility of members from some devalued category units

4. Initial formulation of more egalitarian tenets in ideologies and meta-ideologies emphasizing equality and expanded opportunities
  5. Initial expansion of new middle classes standing between upper and lower classes
- B. High levels of consolidation of devalued categoric-unit memberships with:
1. Other devalued categoric units
  2. Lower-class locations in the stratification system
- C. High rates of discrimination against members of devalued categoric units in encounters in corporate units across a wide range of institutional domains
- D. Highly stigmatizing status beliefs that degrade members of devalued categoric units in a high proportion of intercategoric-unit interactions

### **Principles of Group Dynamics**

6. The smaller are groups, the more likely will they meet the conditions listed under Principle 8 below and thereby evidence:
  - A. Higher rates of interaction among group members
  - B. Higher density of networks among group members
  - C. Higher ratios of positive to negative emotions
  - D. Higher levels of attachment to, and solidarity with, group members
  - E. Particularized cultural capital among group members
  - F. Emotional arousal and creation of symbols or totems for marking group boundaries and group solidarity
  - G. Righteous anger among group members when violations of group norms or when failure to enact rituals directed at group symbols occur
7. The larger the groups become, the more likely will they reveal the converse of the outcomes listed under 6 above and the less likely will they meet the conditions under 8 below and, thereby evidence:
  - A. Subcliques or subgroups potentially in conflict
  - B. Patterns of centrality, brokerage, and bridging among subcliques
  - C. Differentiation among status positions, impregnated with status beliefs and expectation states, especially if:
    1. Status positions are differentiated along a hierarchy of authority
    2. Status positions in this hierarchy are consolidated with memberships in devalued and valued categoric units

8. Regardless of group size, groups will arouse positive emotions among group members and thereby increase (a) attachments to and solidarity among group members and (b) commitments to the group and more inclusive corporate units in which the group may be embedded, if and when:
  - A. Status organizing processes enable all group members to meet expectation states
  - B. Challenges to, and conflict over, the status order are not seen as necessary in light of 8-A above
  - C. Members of a group perceive that they are engaged in joint tasks and shared responsibility for outcomes
  - D. Members perceived that they possess efficacy and that relevant identities are verified
  - E. Individuals perceived that they have consistently met expectations and received positive sanctions across many iterated encounters
  - F. Parameters marking categoric-unit memberships intersect and are of low salience
  - G. Members produce a joint private good consisting of positive emotions attached to particularistic culture and symbols of this culture that becomes highly valuable, thereby making individuals dependent on groups and raising exit costs from the group
9. The more the conditions listed in 6 and 8 above are consistently met in groups embedded in diverse corporate units across a variety of institutional domains, the more likely will individuals develop commitments to the ideologies and structures of these institutional domains, and to the degree that they perceive that their resource payoffs are fair and just, they will also develop commitments to the existing rank ordering of social classes and the meta-ideology legitimating this class system
10. The more groups are embedded in more inclusive corporate units (organizations and communities), especially organizations but also communities, the more macro-level structural arrangements and culture as well as modes of macro-level integration will filter down to the group via the conduits provided by the more inclusive corporate unit and, in so doing, the more they will dominate the sociocultural field of groups, thereby increasing the constraints on group members imposed by:
  - A. The generalized symbolic media for talk and discussion of the institutional domain in the more inclusive corporate unit in which a group is embedded
  - B. The institutional ideologies and norms of the domain on norm formation in the more inclusive corporate in which a group is embedded

- C. The meta-ideologies legitimating stratification and the consolidation of valued and devalued categoric-unit parameters with:
  - 1. Locations in the vertical division of labor in organizational corporate units
  - 2. Locales (neighborhoods/sectors) of community corporate units
- 11. The more embedded are groups in the divisions of labor of an organizational corporate unit, the greater will be:
  - A. The clarity of meanings with respect to:
    - 1. Situational ecology and demography
    - 2. Status in the division of labor
    - 3. Diffuse status characteristics
    - 4. Role-taking and role-making options
    - 5. Culture-taking (normatization) and culture-making options
    - 6. Goals and tasks to achieve goals
  - B. The ability of individuals to know which meet transactional needs can be met to what degree
- 12. The more hierarchical is the division of labor in an organizational corporate units in which groups are embedded, the more will the conditions listed under 11 above will be met, and the greater will be:
  - A. The clarity of leadership status, goals, and required task activities
  - B. The restrictions on use of situational ecology by group members
  - C. The restraints on status making and the constraints imported by status beliefs and expectation states
  - D. The restrictions on members of devalued categoric to secure high- and moderate-resource-distributing positions in the division of labor, especially if:
    - 1. Discrimination against devalued and in favor of valued categoric-units members is systematic and legitimated by the meta-ideology of the stratification system.
    - 2. Discrimination is legitimated by prejudicial beliefs and stigmatizing status beliefs selectively derived from the meta-ideology of the stratification system.
  - E. The limits on role-making options of group members, especially those in groups of population by devalued categoric-unit members and/or by those in lower-level positions in the vertical division of labor

- F. The limits on culture making by group members at all positions in the division of labor
  - G. The likelihood of not fully meeting all transactional needs for identity verification, profits in exchanges, and group inclusion for all group members, with the result that:
    - 1. The arousal of negative emotions will increase among a larger proportion of group members
    - 2. Culture making, despite restrictions, will begin to carry a tone of negative emotionality that will, in turn, affect:
      - a. Role playing
      - b. Normatization
      - c. Acceptance of status beliefs
13. The more horizontal is the division of labor in a corporate unit, the more likely are group boundaries of groups in these units to be open and the more group structure, culture, and dynamics to converge with the dynamics in less embedded groups (see 14 below) and, in particular:
- A. Leadership will be more collaborative than authoritative
  - B. Status differences will be less salient, as will status beliefs and expectations states attached to these beliefs
  - C. Culture making, status making, and role making will be given more latitude
  - D. Situational ecology and demography will be less consolidated with status differences
  - E. Transactional needs will be more likely to be realized by all group members
  - F. Positive emotions will be aroused in most encounters and tied to the particularistic culture that emerges in the group which, in turn, will become a private good and valued resource among group members
14. The less embedded is a group within the structure and culture of a more inclusive corporate unit, then:
- A. The less will be effect of more inclusive corporate units like organizations and communities as well as more general institutional domains on the group formation and interaction and the more latitude will group members have in culture making and taking (normatization), status making and taking, role making and taking, and use of situational ecology
  - B. The more likely will they be able to meet all transactional needs through the processes listed in 14-A above

- C. The more likely will their niche consist of the micro environment generated by iterated interactions and the less power in general will macro-level culture have on group interactions
  - D. The more likely will the conditions under 14-C above prevail and the more likely is the production of a private joint good that will become increasingly valuable to group members, thereby making them more dependent upon, and hence less likely to leave, the group
15. The more institutional integration revolves around domination, the more likely are corporate units to reproduce hierarchies of superordination and subordination and the more likely are ideologies and meta-ideologies to legitimate these hierarchies, with the result that:
- A. Groups embedded in more inclusive corporate units, especially organizations, are more likely to be structured hierarchically, with:
    1. Clear leadership status positions and expectation states
    2. Status beliefs and norms derived by ideologies and meta-ideologies
    3. Roles delimited by locations in the status hierarchy
    4. Situational ecology and demography reinforcing hierarchies
    5. Limitations on the capacity of subordinates to realize transaction needs
  - B. Less embedded groups, if they exist, are more likely to seek their place in the hierarchies of community corporate rather than organizational units and, as a consequence, are less likely to evidence the structure and cultural properties listed under 15-A above
16. The more institutional integration is achieved through structural interdependencies revolving around free markets, democratic polity, and positivistic and universalistic law, the more likely are ideologies and meta-ideologies to emphasize freedom, opportunities, individualism, and universalism, with the result that:
- A. Groups, in general, are more likely to have flexibility and options in culture making and taking, status taking and making, role taking and making, and use of situational ecologies
  - B. Embedded groups are more likely to lose some of this flexibility when divisions of labor evidence hierarchies of authority
  - C. Consolidation of devalued and valued categoric memberships with corporate units and their division of labor will decline, with increased intersections decreasing the salience of parameters marking memberships in categoric units
  - D. Group structure, culture, and dynamics will be more likely to converge with the conditions listed under 13 and 14 above

17. The more groups build up a micro-level culture that enables individuals to culture-make, status-make, role-make, and use situational ecology in ways that generate positive emotions and allow individuals to meet transactional needs, the more powerful this culture will be, and the more this culture stands at variance with the culture of larger corporate units and/or macro-level institutional domains and/or stratification systems, the more likely will the group find itself in conflict with other groups within corporate units and, if this conflict persists, the more likely will this group begin to form corporate(s) units designed to change the social structure and culture of institutional domains:
- A. The more unequal the distribution of resources among groups, whether embedded or not, the more likely are groups with fewer resource shares to develop an emotionally charged culture for conflict and change with other groups and the corporate units in which these groups are embedded
  - B. The more inequalities in resource distribution are consolidated with memberships in devalued and valued categoric units, and the more group formations are segregated by their members' categoric-unit memberships, the more likely is the emotionally charged culture to revolve around positive emotions among members who mobilize negative emotions toward other groups and the corporate units in which these groups may be embedded
  - C. The more these emotionally charged groups can begin to restructure themselves into an organization with clear goals and the more they can recruit other individuals, groups, and corporate units to these goals, the more likely are they to initiate a social movement, and the more demographic, material, and symbolic resources they can mobilize, the more successful is this movement to be in generating change at the macro level of social organization
  - D. The more emotionally charged groups have developed generalized beliefs about the causes of their plight but have developed counter-ideology, leadership, or organizational structure coordinating groups for clearly articulate goals, the more likely are periodic outbursts of violence with other groups, organizations, or neighborhoods/sectors of community

### **Principles of Organizational Dynamics**

18. The rate of organizational founding in a society is a positive and additive function of:
- A. The intensity and diversity of Spencerian selection pressures from macro-dynamic forces of population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction

- B. The number of resource niches and the resource levels in these niches created by organizations responding to these Spencerian selection pressures which, in turn, is a positive function of:
1. The availability of entrepreneurial actors to secure resources and/or create resources for organizational foundings
  2. The degree to which the elements of macro-level cultural fields (technologies, texts, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms) are sufficiently coherent so as to present cultural templates and logics for organizational entrepreneurs, which, in turn, is a positive function of the level of:
    - a. The level of consistency among these cultural elements, especially technologies, values, and texts
    - b. The degree of integration through vertical embedding of norms in ideologies, ideologies in meta-ideologies, meta-ideologies in values, and values in texts
  3. The degree to which structural fields are sufficiently integrated to provide resources for organizational foundings and templates for mimicry of successful organizational forms responding to Spencerian and Durkheimian selection pressures which, in turn, is:
    - a. A positive curvilinear function of the degree to which segmentation is a mode of institutional integration
    - b. A lagged positive function of the degree to which structural interdependencies are a mode of institutional integration
    - c. A positive curvilinear function of the degree to which domination is a mode of institutional integration
    - d. A lagged negative function of any set of mechanisms that integrates institutional domains but, at the same time, limits the level of resources available to entrepreneurs to found organizations
19. The rate and degree of institutional differentiation is a positive function of the rate and degree of organizational differentiation which, in turn, is a positive function of:
- A. The degree of differentiation and complexity of cultural fields which, in turn, is a positive function of:
1. The diversity of generalized symbolic media created by organizational entrepreneurs
  2. The degree to which generalized symbolic media circulate and are used to built ideologies and meta-ideologies integrating diverse elements of culture

3. The diversity of cultural templates and logics available to organizational entrepreneurs which, in turn, is lagged negative function of the level of consistency and integration through vertical embedding among elements of culture
- B. The complexity of structural fields and templates, which is a multiplicative function of:
1. The degree to which structural interdependencies are the dominant mode of structural institution integration, while being a negative function of the degree to which segmentation and domination are principal mechanisms of institutional integration
  2. The scale and scope of markets as the mechanisms for distributing resources
  3. The level of dynamism and dominance of markets and quasi-markets as mechanisms of exchange which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    - a. Rate and scope of circulation of money as a generalized symbolic medium across institutional domains
    - b. Availability of credit
    - c. Scale and scope in the distributive infrastructures within and between communities
  4. The degree to which markets exchange diverse generalized symbolic media as resources from differentiated institutional domains which is a positive function of 19-B-3(a–c) above
  5. The degree to which meta-ideologies evolve out of market exchanges of generalized symbolic media across diverse institutional domains
  6. The degree to which organizations in polity and law are able to regulate markets without overusing administrative–coercive domination as integrative mechanisms
- C. The number of resource niches in a society, which is a positive and additive function of:
1. The conditions listed under 18-B(1, 2) above
  2. The rate of organizational foundings under Spencerian selection pressures
  3. The degree to which niche density and Durkheimian competition cause organizations to specialize within a niche, seek resources in a new niche, or create a new niche

- D. The ratio of innovative (through differentiation of new types) organizational foundings to isomorphic organizational (through mimicry and segmentation) foundings which, in turn, is:
1. A positive function of intensity, diversity, and scope of Spencerian selection pressures
  2. A positive function of the availability of resources in niches which, in turn, is:
    - a. A positive function of resource levels in a niche
    - b. A negative curvilinear function of niche density
  3. A negative curvilinear function of Durkheimian competition in a niche
  4. A lagged negative function of the level of coherence and power of cultural templates and logics, which is a positive function of the conditions under 18-A(3) above
  5. A negative function of the degree of network density among organizations
  6. A negative function of the power of particular nodes in the networks of organizations, with such power increasing with:
    - a. Dependence of organizations on powerful nodes for resources
    - b. Centrality in network flows favoring organizations at central nodes
    - c. Brokerage and bridging nodes that can convert their locations between networks into central nodes
  7. A positive function of the scale and scope of structural interdependencies as mechanisms of institutional integration, which is a negative function of the scale and scope of segmentation and domination as mechanisms of institutional integration
- E. The capacity to mark off the boundaries of an organization vis-à-vis other organization, which, in turn, is a positive function of:
1. The capacity to build and impose physical boundaries revealing entrance and exit rules, routines, and rituals which, in turn, will become more likely when:
    - a. Organizations are part of a system of institutional integrations revolving around dominance
    - b. Organizations are in competition with each other
    - c. Organizations are part of a system of discrimination against members of categoric units
    - d. Organizations centralize authority in the vertical division of labor

- F. The clarity of organizational goals which, in turn, increases with:
1. The clarity of the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor
  2. The ratio of vertical to horizontal positions in the division of labor
  3. The embeddedness of organizations within a relatively autonomous institutional domain
  4. The coherence and power of cultural and structural fields and the availability of well-defined resource niches
20. The level of internal differentiation of an organization is a positive and additive function of:
- A. Its absolute size and rate which, in turn, is a function of the level of resources in:
1. Material (or physical capital) resource niches, which will grow with:
    - a. High levels of technology
    - b. High levels of productivity
    - c. Highly dynamic markets
  2. Demographic (human capital) resource niches, which will grow with:
    - a. Population growth and diversity
    - b. Large numbers of reproductive organizations devoted to training human capital
    - c. Highly dynamic labor markets that are not split on the basis of memberships in categoric units
  3. Cultural (capital) resource niches which will expand with:
    - a. Increased complexity of macro-level cultural fields, which is a lagged positive function of the coherence of cultural fields
    - b. Increased rates of technological development, with values and ideologies
  4. Organizational (and social capital) resource niches which, in turn, is a positive function of the availability of structural templates in its structural field which increases when:
    - a. Institutional integration relies on structural interdependencies
    - b. Market exchanges are the principal mechanism for creating these interdependencies
- B. The capacity to generate patterns of overlap, inclusion and embedding, and mergers, which, in turn, is a positive function of the level of dynamism in markets creating structural interdependencies

21. The degree of centralization of authority within an organization is a positive and additive function of:
- A. The absolute size of an organization
  - B. The level of conflict and/or competition with other organizations within institutional domains, across domains within a society, and across domains in other societies
  - C. The use of an organization as a mechanism for discrimination against members of devalued categoric units
  - D. The degree to which integration of organizations within and between institutional domains relies upon patterns of domination which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    1. Centralization of polity
    2. Concentrations of power in core organizations within an institutional domain, which increases with:
      - a. Franchising of power and authority to core organizations
      - b. Network centrality of core organizations
      - c. Dependence of other organizations on core organizations for resources
    3. Level of internal threat in a society stemming from high levels of inequality and stratification legitimated by a meta-ideology dominated by the symbolic medium of *power* and by ideologies emphasizing coercive and administrative bases of control
    4. Level of internal and/or external threats from conflict or anticipation of conflict with perceived enemies
22. The level of commitment of incumbents to organization is a positive function of the level of positive emotional arousal across iterated encounters within the organization's division of labor, with positive emotional arousal being a multiplicative function of:
- A. The consistency with which individuals in encounters within the division of labor of an organization meet expectations and receive positive sanctions
  - B. The degree to which individuals are able to meet transactional needs in encounters within the organization's division of labor, especially needs for:
    1. Identity verification, with the level of positive emotions arising from identity verification being a positive function of:
      - a. The rank of individuals in the vertical division of labor
      - b. The degree to which the vertical division of labor is truncated

- c. The degree of intersection of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships and locations in the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor
  - d. The number of identities beyond role identities that are verified in encounters within the division of labor
2. Perceived profits in exchanges, with the level of positive emotions arising from exchange payoffs being a positive of:
- a. The conditions listed under 22-B(1)
  - b. The degree to which receipt of resources exceeds costs and investments of individuals in roles
  - c. The degree to which individuals invoke realistic comparison points in evaluating costs, investments, and rewards, with the level of realism in these comparison points increasing with use of others in the same or similar position within the organization as a comparison and decreasing the use of reference points at higher positions in the division of labor
3. Perceived sense of inclusion in the ongoing flow of encounters within the division of labor, with this sense of group inclusion being:
- a. A positive function of the conditions listed under 22-A and 22-B(1), (2) above
  - b. A negative function of the degree of consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with positions in the division of labor
  - c. A negative function of the degree to which consolidation of categoric-unit parameters with locations in the division of labor of organizations is the result of discrimination legitimated by prejudicial stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs derived from meta-ideologies legitimating stratification
  - d. A negative function of the level of inequality of authority within the vertical division of labor
  - e. A lagged positive function of the rates of interaction among individuals at the same or different points in the division of labor
  - f. A negative function of the degree to which members of different categoric units experience stress in encounters which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    - (1) The level of stigma attached to status beliefs and expectation states of members of devalued categoric unit
    - (2) The degree to which members of devalued categoric units must adopt the culture of valued categoric units

- C. The degree of success in status taking and making, role taking and making, culture taking and making, and understating situational ecology and demography, which, in turn, is a positive and additive function of:
1. The clarity of structure and culture in encounters, which is a positive function of the degree of embedding of encounters in corporate units within the division of labor of an organization
  2. The degree to which transactional needs can be realized in status taking and making, role taking and making, culture taking and making (normatization), in movement through, and participation in, situational ecology and demography
  3. The degree to which incumbents hold common stocks of knowledge in the micro-level culture, with respect to their:
    - a. Conceptions of positional and diffuse status characteristics
    - b. Conceptions of roles
    - c. Conceptions of cultural elements in normatization
    - d. Conceptions of ecological and demographic meanings
    - e. Expectation states associated with a–d above
    - f. Evaluations of a–e above
- D. The degree to which incentives for incumbency and performances in the division of labor revolve around:
1. Commitments to norms, which have been moralized by drawing from institutional ideologies and meta-ideologies, which increase when:
    - a. The vertical division of labor is truncated
    - b. Activities involve collaboration and shared responsibility
    - c. Interactions are informal and involve high salience of all levels of consistent verification of role and group identities
    - d. Categorical-unit identities can be verified or are not salient
    - e. Core identities are salient and can be verified by meeting role and group identities
  2. Monitoring and sanctioning of conformity to norms are informal and noncoercive
  3. Extrinsic rewards are high
  4. Realistic points are employed when comparing cost and investments to extrinsic rewards
  5. Intrinsic reward from interactions in encounters generates a private good arising from group solidarity that is highly valued and not easily secured in alternative organizations

- E. The degree to which incumbents make external attributions to the structure and culture of the organization for their positive emotions, which, in turn, become more likely when:
  1. Individuals consistently experience positive emotions in iterated encounters in groups at all locations in the division of labor
  2. Individuals have a sense of shared responsibility in their joint actions within groups
  3. The ratio of intrinsic to extrinsic rewards is high and dependent on performances in groups within the division of labor
- 23. The level of alienation from, and decline of commitment to, an organization is a positive function of:
  - A. The degree to which incumbents in groups within the division of labor develop a particularistic culture hostile to the culture and goals of the organization, which, in turn, is an inverse function of the conditions listed under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-E above and a positive function of:
    1. The level of inequality in the division of labor of the organization which is a positive function of the conditions listed under 21-A, 21-B, 21-C, and 21-D above
    2. The level of external monitoring of the actions of incumbents in the division of labor
    3. The level of reliance on coercive and punitive sanctions to ensure conformity to norms
    3. The level of reliance on coercive and punitive sanctions to ensure conformity to norms
    4. The perceived level of costs to extrinsic rewards by incumbents in the division of labor
    5. The levels of deprivation when comparing rewards to reference points within and outside of the organization
    6. The consolidation of categoric-unit memberships with locations, especially lower-ranking positions, in the division of labor
    7. The degree to which consolidation is the result of over discrimination, legitimated by prejudicial stereotypes and stigmatizing status beliefs
  - B. The degree to which interaction producing an anti-organizational particularistic culture produces positive emotions reinforcing this culture within groups and, at the same time, providing a private joint good that individuals in groups find highly rewarding

24. The likelihood of organizational change is an inverse function of inertial dynamics internal and external inertial processes operating within and outside of the organization:
- A. The power of internal inertial processes limiting change in an organization increases with:
1. The conditions generating commitments to the organization listed under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-E above
  2. The sunk costs and path dependence of the organization, with these increasing with the initial costs invested in physical capital, human capital, technologies, and organizing the division of labor
  3. The formation of an organizational culture built around these sunk investments, with the power of this culture increasing with:
    - a. The formation of a micro-level culture reinforced by iterated encounters within the division of labor, with commitments to this culture increasing with incumbents' perceptions that:
      - (1) This culture allows individuals to meet transactional needs.
      - (2) This culture increases success in individuals' status making and taking, role making and taking, culture taking and making (normatization), as well as success in navigating organizational ecology and demography.
      - (3) This culture increases the activation of positive emotions in iterated encounters within the division of labor.
    - b. The formation of meso-level organizational culture drawing from highly moralized ideologies and institutional norms in this organization's macro-level cultural field
    - c. The objectification of the combined micro, meso, and macro cultures with symbols and totems that denote group solidarity within the division of labor and the organization as a whole, with objectification increasing under the conditions listed 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-E and ritual along with routine performances among individuals directed at these symbolic totems
    - d. The formation of an organizational division of labor, goals, and boundaries in which incumbents have vested interests in sustaining the current structure of the organization, with these pressures from internal vested interests increasing with:
      - (1) The level of extrinsic and intrinsic payoffs for incumbents in positions of authority

- (2) The pervasiveness of perceived profits in payoffs of both extrinsic and intrinsic reward by incumbents in all positions within the division of labor
  - (3) The pervasiveness of external attributions by incumbents toward the organization as a whole for profitable payoffs
- B. The power of external inertial processes limiting change in an organization increases with:
1. The degree to which patterns of structural institutional integration and the macro-level structural field constrain the options of organizations in this field, with these constraints increasing with:
    - a. The degree to which the structural field of institutional integration is dominated by segmentation as an integrative force
    - b. The extent to which domination is the primary integrative force in the structural field of an organization
    - c. The extent to which structural interdependences and market dynamics reveal noncompetitive formations, including:
      - (1) Networks of connections among similar organizations
      - (2) Centers of domination within these networks and dependence of organizations connected to these centers
      - (3) Strategic alliances among organizations which are crucial for their viability in a resource niche
      - (4) Formations of oligarchies that control the flow of resources within the oligarchy and between the oligarchy and other organizations
  2. The degree to which patterns of cultural integration and the macro-level cultural field constrain the options of organizations in this field, with these constraints increasing with:
    - a. The consistency, or noncontradiction, among moral tenets of texts, technologies, and values
    - b. The degree of successive embedding of institutional norms in ideologies and ideologies in values
    - c. The degree to which the generalized symbolic media and ideologies of dominant institutional domains are reconciled to form meta-ideologies that are consistent with societal values and technologies, while at the same time legitimating inequalities produced by resource-distributing organizations
25. The likelihood of organizational change is a function of the degree to which internal and external pressures for change can overcome those for

organizational inertia listed under in 24-A(1)–(3), and 24-B(1)–(2) above:

- A. The power of internal change processes that can overcome internal inertial processes is inversely related to the processes of commitment outlined under 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D, and 22-D above and positively related the processes increasing alienation and reducing commitments listed under 23-A(1)–(7) and 23-B above
- B. The power of external change processes to overcome external inertial processes is positively related to the conditions on institutional differentiation listed under 19-A, 19-B, 19-C-C, 19-D, 19-E, and 19-F
- C. The intensity and diversity of Spencerian selection pressures
- D. The intensity of Durkheimian selection pressures in dense resource niches
- E. The degree and rate of change in the stratification system, which increases with:
  1. Mobilization for conflict of lower-class incumbents and memberships in nonclass categoric units consolidated with the class system
  2. Market systems in political democracies which constantly change rates of mobility among individuals and members of categoric units and, hence, their access to the resources distributed by organizations within diverse institutional domains
- F. The extent to which intersocietal dynamics alter the flows of resources and, hence, the configuration of both structural and cultural fields of resource, and hence resource niches of organizations, with these intersocietal dynamics increasing with:
  1. Warfare between societies and shifts in patterns of political and economic domination among societies
  2. Dynamism of global markets shifts the flow of all resources—technological, material, demographic, organizational, and cultural—among societies and, hence, the flow of resources within societies
- G. The scale and rate of technological change within a society and among societies in the world system, which increases with:
  1. The institutionalization of science as an autonomous domain
  2. The rate of exchange between science and its symbolic medium (*knowledge*) with the media of education (*learning*) and economy (*money*)

3. The reconciliation of technological change with core values of a society
4. The inclusion of science in the dominant meta-ideology integrating institutional domains
5. The degree to which the symbolic medium of science and education can become commodities in open markets in dynamic markets operating within and between societies

### **Principles of Community Dynamics**

26. The rate of growth and proliferation of communities in a society is a positive and multiplicative function of the selection pressures generated by:
  - A. The rate of population growth
  - B. The intensity of selection pressures set into motion by population growth which, in turn, is a multiplicative function of the degree of intensity of selection pressures from:
    1. Production as a macro-dynamic force
    2. Distribution as a macro-dynamic force
    3. Regulation as a macro-dynamic force
    4. Reproduction as a macro-dynamic force
27. The size of communities is a positive and multiplicative function of:
  - A. The conditions listed under 26-A and 26-B above
  - B. The level of differentiation within a community with respect to:
    1. The number of distinctive institutional domains intersecting with community
    2. The number of organization-level and group-level corporate units embedded within institutional domains within a community
    3. The level of development of material, administrative, organizational, and distribution infrastructures within a community
    4. The amount of geographical space for organizing institutional activities within a community
  - C. The degree to which infrastructures facilitate immigration into a society and communities within this society
28. The degree of differentiation of a community is a positive and multiplicative function of:
  - A. The size and rate of growth of the population to be organized within a community

- B. The level of differentiation of the macro-level structural fields of a community, and the material, technological, and organizational resource niches that these generate within a community, which, in turn, is:
1. A positive function of the conditions listed under 27-A and 27-B
  2. A positive function of the conditions listed under 27-B
  3. A positive function of the degree to which institutional integration is achieved through structural interdependencies driven by open markets
  4. A negative function of the degree to which institutional integration is achieved by:
    - a. Domination by polity or other sets of powerful actors
    - b. Segmentation of communities and their constituent corporate units (groups and organizations)
    - c. Segregation of corporate and categoric units
  5. A negative function of the degree of stratification intersecting with a community which is a positive function of under 4(a-c) above
  6. A positive function of low levels of stratification which, in turn, is a positive function of the degree to which integration of the system is achieved through structural interdependencies mediated by markets and by intersection of categoric-unit parameters with each other and with resource-distributing organizations within institutional domains
- C. The level of differentiation of the cultural fields of a community, and the cultural resource niches that these generate within a community, which, in turn, is:
- A. A positive function of the degree of institutional differentiation and the diversity of generalized symbolic media in play and the number of distinct institutional ideologies developed from these media
  - B. A positive function of the number of meta-ideologies developed from institutional ideologies which, in turn, is:
    1. A positive function of the degree to which institutional integration depends upon structural interdependencies mediated by open markets
    2. A negative function of the degree to which institutional integration depends upon domination by polity or other core actors within dominant institutional domains
    3. A negative function of the degree and level of stratification

- C. A positive *curvilinear* function of the degree of consistency among, consensus over, and integration of texts, values, technologies, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms
  - D. A lagged positive function of the degree of inconsistency among, consensus over, and integration among texts, values, technologies, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms
29. The degree of constraint imposed by fields on individual, organizational units, and categoric-unit actors within a community is a positive and multiplicative function of:
- A. The degree to which structural integration of institutions and stratification is achieved through domination, segregation, and segmentation
  - B. The degree to which a community is part of a system of communities held together by domination of more powerful communities or institutional actors in these communities
  - C. The degree to which cultural integration revolves around legitimating domination as the principal structural integrative mechanisms
  - D. The degree of consistency among, consensus over, and integration of values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and institutional norms
30. The relative degree of autonomy of a community is a positive function of:
- A. The degree to which integration of intercommunity relations as well as institutions is mediated by market transactions rather than by relations of domination by polity or other core actors in dominant institutional domains
  - B. The size of the community vis-à-vis other communities, particularly communities where centers of power are housed
  - C. The necessity that the community undertake the costs of infrastructural development for its internal and external security
  - D. The level of boundary formation of a community
  - E. The degree to which a community's constituent organizations are:
    1. Comparatively small and reliant on community niches to resources
    2. Indigenous to the community and not part of larger organizations embedded in multiple communities
    3. Relatively equal in their capacity to consolidate power
31. The level of tension and potential for conflict in a community is a positive function of the degree of consolidation of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships with each other and with corporate units within a community, with this consolidation being a function of the rate and

extensiveness of discrimination which, in turn, is a positive and multiplicative function of:

- A. The degree of stratification in the larger society legitimated by a powerful meta-ideology over which there is consensus among discriminators
- B. The existence of prejudicial and stigmatizing status beliefs legitimating stratification and discrimination
- C. The size of the victimized population relative to the size of the discriminator population
- D. The emergence of generalized beliefs among victims of discrimination which increase as negative emotions are built up in micro-level fields of communities by the victims of discrimination
- E. The availability of material, demographic, organizational, and cultural resource niches for forming social movement organizations

### **Principles of Meso-level Social Change**

32. The likelihood of an SMO or set of SMOs emerging in a society is a positive function of the level of negative emotional arousal among sub-populations in a society, with the intensity of emotion increasing with:

- A. The intensity of grievances among members of a subpopulation, which, in turn, increase with:
  - 1. The level of stratification in a society
  - 2. The degree of discrimination against members of devalued categorical units and the consolidation of membership in these units with incumbency in lower-ranking class positions in the stratification system
  - 3. The degree to which generalized beliefs articulating grievances and making initial external attributions for their causes of grievances have emerged among victims of discrimination
  - 4. The degree to which leaders have emerged to frame and reframe generalized beliefs with respect to:
    - a. Moralizing and focusing grievances, which increases with:
      - (1) The capacity to use existing macro-level cultural fields to moralize grievances
      - (2) The level of consistency among, and integration of, moral codes in macro-level cultural fields
      - (3) The degree to which moral frames draw upon moral codes about justice and fairness in macro-level cultural fields

- b. Making external attributions to key organizations and their leaders in relevant institutional domains as the cause of grievances
    - c. Challenging the authority of organizations that are targets of attributions
  - B. The pervasiveness of intense grievances among population which, in turn, is a positive function of:
    - 1. The size of the subpopulations subject to discrimination and the degree of consolidation of their memberships in categoric units with lower ranks in the stratification system
    - 2. The extent to which victims of discrimination are culturally and structurally equivalent in their rates of exclusion from key resource giving corporate units and in their locations in the divisions of labor in organizations where they are permitted to hold positions
    - 3. The density of networks among those victims of discrimination who are structurally and culturally equivalent
    - 4. The level of development of technologies for social networking and communicating
  - C. The degree to which modes of structural integration generate opportunities for mobilization of an SMO or a set of SMOs, which is a negative function of the extent to which domination is the principal mode of structural integration, while being a positive function of the extent to which structural interdependencies formed by markets and regulated by positivistic law and democratic polity are the principal modes of institutional integration
- 33. The viability of an SMO or a set of SMOs is a positive function of their access to key resource niches which, in turn, is a function of the availability of resources in:
  - A. Material resource niches, which are a function of the level of economic development and pervasiveness of money and market mechanisms
  - B. Cultural resource niches which are, in turn, an additive function of:
    - 1. The consistency among, consensus over, and integration of the moral codes in macro-level cultural fields in a society
    - 2. The emergence of generalized beliefs articulating grievances
    - 3. The availability of leaders to frame and reframe generalized beliefs along the lines listed under 32-A-4(a, b, and c) above

- C. Organizational resource niche which a function of level of organizational expertise and differentiation of organizational formations in a society
  - D. Technological resource niche, which is a function of economic development and reliance on markets for distribution of technologies, especially communications technologies
  - E. Demographic resource niche, which is an additive function of:
    - 1. The size of the subpopulation that experiencing grievances in encounters within organizations and communities
    - 2. The age cohorts that are recruited, with the size of younger cohorts being a key demographic niche
    - 3. The degree of overlap and density of networks among those in the SMO with networks in communities and organizations outside of the SMO
    - 4. The capacity to provide trial protest action for potential recruits
    - 5. The pervasiveness of communications and social networking technology among potential recruits
    - 6. The level of inequality and stratification in a society, especially when there is a high degree of:
      - a. Consolidation of categoric-unit memberships of aggrieved individuals with lower-ranking class locations in the stratification system
      - b. The extent to which the goals of the SMO are aligned with the grievances of members in devalued categoric units
    - 7. The degree to which members of demographic resource niches can or are willing to invest identities in an SMO and to value identity verification in encounters within the SMO.
34. The persistence and success of an SMO or a set of SMOs is a positive function of:
- A. The conditions listed under 33-A, 33-B, 33-C, 33-D, and 33-E above, while being a negative function of the level of density and competition for resources in an SMO's niches
  - B. The extent to which incentives for SMO membership and/or participation consistently exceed the costs and risks of membership and/or participation, with the incentives relative to cost/risks increasing with:
    - 1. The degree to which moralized SMO goals and solidarities generated by membership and participation generate a jointly produced

- private good that is highly valued by members and only available from the SMO
2. The degree to which members and participants of an SMO invest one or more identities in the SMO and seek verification by members of the SMO of these identities
  3. The degree to which identity investments produce for members of an SMO a sense of group inclusion
  4. The degree to which community organizations and networks, where at least social and group identities and potentially role and core identities are verified, overlap with the structure of the SMO, thereby making identity verification in communities also dependent on verification within the SMO
  5. The extent of use by SMO members of communication and social networking technologies for meeting transactional needs, especially identity verification and group inclusion but also for trust
- C. The extent to which social control of members and participants in an SMO relies upon informal monitoring and sanctioning and especially positive sanctioning for conformity to expectations for realizing SMO goals
  - D. The extent to which social control of members and participants in an SMO depends upon the production of a private joint good built from the emotions of solidarity
  - E. The extent to which, even with SMO growth, the vertical division of labor remains truncated and does *not* involve expanding levels of vertical authority and formal monitoring and negative sanctioning of member and participant activities
35. The longer an SMO persists, the more likely is it to be transformed into a routinized bureaucratic formation and the more likely are earlier charismatic leaders to be replaced over time by bureaucrats in a formal and more vertical division of labor that loses some of its moral zeal and framing and that seeks resources in material resource niches and in fee- or membership-paying, older age cohorts.
  36. The more an SMO is converted into a rational legal bureaucracy, the less frequent are mass public protest activities and the more likely is the SMO to operate in the arena of politics and law within a society.

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