POST-SOVIET RACISMS

NIKOLAY ZAKHAROV
IAN LAW

MAPPING GLOBAL RACISMS

Mapping Global Racisms

Series Editor

Ian Law
School of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK

There is no systematic coverage of the racialisation of the planet. This series is the first attempt to present a comprehensive mapping of global racisms, providing a way in which to understand global racialization and acknowledge the multiple generations of different racial logics across regimes and regions. Unique in its intellectual agenda and innovative in producing a new empirically-based theoretical framework for understanding this glocalised phenomenon, Mapping Global Racisms considers racism in many underexplored regions such as Russia, Arab racisms in North African and Middle Eastern contexts, and racism in Pacific contries such as Japan, Hawaii, Fiji and Samoa.

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14813

Nikolay Zakharov • Ian Law

Post-Soviet Racisms

palgrave
macmillan

Nikolay Zakharov
School of Social Sciences
Södertörn University
Stockholm, Sweden

Ian Law
School of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK

Mapping Global Racisms
ISBN 978-1-137-47691-3 ISBN 978-1-137-47692-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957300

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017
The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover design by Jenny Vong

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

List of Countries

Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Moldova
Belarus
Ukraine

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank many people for their role in the writing of this monograph. During our trip to the Southern Caucasus in 2014, we benefited from conversations with Alexander Iskandaryan, Sergei Minasyan, Hrant Mikaelyan and Marina Saryan, Institute for Caucasus Studies, Yerevan University; Naira Avetisyan, Deputy Head of Council of Europe Office, Yerevan; and Anahit Khudaverdyan, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Science, Armenia. Minna Harjo provided invaluable insight into contemporary debates, particularly in social media contexts, in Estonia. Colleagues at Leeds who provided comments, questions, insights and support during this project particularly include Bobby Sayyid and Shirley Tate. Maya Schmidt and Aliaksei Lastouski contributed with the material on Central Asia and Belarus. We want also to thank our colleagues at Södertörn, especially Mark Bassin. We are indebted to our families, as ever, for their unconditional love and support.

Contents

1	**The Logics and Legacy of Soviet Racialization** Nikolay Zakharov and Ian Law	1
2	**Racisms in the Baltic States: Exclusive Nations** Nikolay Zakharov, Ian Law and Minna Harjo	17
3	**Racism in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine** Nikolay Zakharov, Ian Law and Aliaksei Lastouski	53
4	**Racisms in the Southern Caucasus: Multiple Configurations** Nikolay Zakharov and Ian Law	91
5	**Central Asian Racisms** Nikolay Zakharov, Ian Law and Maya Shmidt	129

6 Post-Soviet Trajectories of Race and Racism, an Endnote 185
Nikolay Zakharov and Ian Law

References 189

Index 217

About the Authors

Minna Harjo is Estonian and her personal research interests are primarily concerned with identity and migration and, more recently, questions around European identity, European national identities and Euroscepticism. She has a research and analytics role in political risk and credit insurance and an MA in Social Research and BA in Sociology from the University of Leeds.

Aliaksei Lastouski is an Associate Professor at Polotsk State University, Belarus. He holds PhD in Sociology from the Institute of Sociology, Belarusian Academy of Sciences. His main expertise is on nation-building and historical memory in the post-Soviet space.

Ian Law is Professor of Racism and Ethnicity Studies in the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK.

Maya Shmidt is affiliated to the Higher School of Economics, Moscow. She is a Master's student at the Faculty of Social Sciences and a research assistant at the Laboratory for Studies in Economic Sociology. She is currently engaged in research projects on economic sociology and post-Soviet space.

Nikolay Zakharov is Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, Sweden.

1

The Logics and Legacy of Soviet Racialization

Nikolay Zakharov and Ian Law

This book addresses the complex process of racialization across a variety of different forms of modernity, in Soviet and post-Soviet space. Racism is not solely a product of the West, and this analysis provides the basis for a reconfiguration of global race theory thinking through the implications of fully including these regional contexts and varieties of modernity into that account. New racisms have been fashioned and are being fashioned in the states that are now the 14 independent post-Soviet republics critically examined here including those in Central Asia, the Baltic states, the Southern Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. This is the first book to address the contemporary operation of race and racism across this terrain and builds on works already published in the Mapping Global Racisms series. The programme of research carried out here, from 2013 to 2015, develops a synergy from the research carried out separately and previously by the two authors fusing new theoretical advances in our understanding of global racialization as an interactive, relational process of polyracism across varieties of pre-modern, modern and post-modern contexts and states (Law et al. 2014) with a foundational understanding of racism, with its specificities and interconnected dimensions, in Russia (Zakharov 2015; Law 2012). This first chapter draws on revised material from Law (2012)

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0_1

and Zakharov (2014) which has been synthesised to present a theoretical foundation for this volume. The book as a whole presents a set of new primary material including qualitative fieldwork and discourse analysis of social and news media data. This book extends our critical interrogation of racism outside the Russian Federation, which is not the primary object of analysis here, to focus on racism in the new republics many of which have rarely been examined in this way. The significance of examining how racism works in these under-researched environments is highly important in building a more coherent and systematic account of racism across the planet, particularly as we have a very patchy, uneven account in terms of both research evidence and international monitoring by agencies such as the OHCHR Special Rapporteur on Racism and his team's country visits. This chapter sets the scene for our regional and state investigation of historical and contemporary racisms in the post-Soviet republics and addresses questions of the nature, significance and legacy of Soviet racialization for these states. How far did this distinct variety of modernity shape a distinct process of racialization? And how far did this configuration shape contemporary racism in the post-Soviet world?

We argue here that the acquisition of racial thinking was renegotiated, contested and confronted in the Soviet Union within historical, political and economic systems that were substantially different from those elsewhere. This is not to deny the relational character of racism here with, for example, a significant interaction with expert and scientific regimes of racial truth across Western Europe and America, but to argue that philosophical and historical frameworks of materialist understanding also provided a hierarchical global world view positioning racially marked populations on a ranking of civilization and progress from primitivism onwards. Key linkages between American, German and Soviet scientists on aspects of eugenics illustrate the dominance of international racialized thinking in the early decades of the twentieth century (Spectorovsky 2004; Flitner 2003).

The Soviet regime developed an ideology of 'state-sponsored evolutionism' (Hirsch 2005, p. 7) which was a Soviet version of the civilizing mission, entwining a Marxist conception of historical development with European anthropological theories about cultural evolution. This was based on the view that there were ancient, historical, primordial ethnic groups which were to be classified, shaped and privileged as the building blocks of nations, with the state constructing modern nationalities

as an essential step on the road to socialism with these nations merging with the advent of communism, constructing a new 'ethnicised modernity' (Bonnett 2002). As Mark Beissinger notes, the Soviet Union was an 'empire-state', where 'empire' should be attributed to subjective perception. 'It was the dream of creating a state from an empire that separated Soviet-type imperialism from that practiced by traditional empires' (Beissinger 1995, p. 162).

Striving to implement the socialist dogma of nations self-determination, the Soviet leaders, scientists and scholars categorized the many nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union as oppressed and backward peoples. Certain developmental policies were directed to support them, and through this to legitimize the Soviet rule among these peoples. These categorizations resulted in separation between 'modern' and 'backward' societies, which were often racialized by building a certain hierarchy between the Slavic and all the other peoples who inhabited the Soviet Union.

Race was defined in Marxist Leninist terms as socio-historical backwardness not biological inferiority, with some groups seen as doomed to extinction and others persecuted for having the 'wrong' ethnic origins and claims to group identity. Soviet ethnic and national purges between 1937 and 1953 fused racial politics and nationalities policies with population groups being seen as having immutable traits, particularly in the unstable, inassimilable borderlands (Weitz 2002).The Russian state has over centuries constructed patterns of governance and domination that have been articulated through twin hierarchies of backwardness and civilization, multiple forms of racialization, ethnophilia and primordialism, separations between Russia's 'West' and its 'Orient' and undercurrents of 'Great Russian chauvinism' (Law 2012). Physical anthropology, ethnology and racial science have provided intellectual foundations for racial Russification, racial Sovietization, ethnic cleansing and post-communist racial and ethnic hostility. Yet in the Soviet Union, racism officially did not exist and was only located elsewhere, particularly located in the vicious violence of racial Americanization. We have identified a range of related racial logics at work in the Soviet Union in relation to Gypsies, Muslims, Jews and Africa.

National elites in Soviet republics saw themselves marginalized in many ways, since they were given only a symbolic sovereignty, devoid

of an opportunity to rule their peoples at their discretion. This created a tension between ethnicity-based affirmative action to establish parity among the nations and the implicit primacy accorded to Russians as the agents of state consolidation and as 'Kulturtraeger' (which turned them into the 'Big Brother') in modernizing the national peripheries (Dave 2007, p. 19). Soviet officials and scientists considered cultural practices and traditions of the majority of non-Russian groups only as negative vestiges of the feudal past and obstacles on their way to a modern industrial ethos.

The Soviet logic of anti-Roma racism was driven by the logic of national domination, subservience to the state, assimilation and the destruction and outlawing of Roma culture and language. For Stalin, the 'Gypsies' were a backward race in need of socialist improvement. In the 1930s, in the Soviet Union, the Roma, as with many others, had suffered from forced collectivization, and above all from Stalinist terror, during which there were hundreds of thousands of arbitrary arrests, together with widespread shootings and deportations to Siberia (FIDH 2004). The new communist regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries facilitated a move, not from Holocaust to liberation for the Roma but, from the brutal experiences of one racialized regime to domination and suppression in another. Liberation from racialization was never on the communist agenda, whereas merging specific nationalisms with Stalinist ideologies to make the Roma disappear into the proletariat in the formation of new socialist societies clearly was. There is a strong parallel between the experience of Muslims in Soviet Central Asia and the experience of the Roma in the Soviet Union. Systematic violation of the rights of Muslims, and other national minorities, was commonplace including the right to work, to medical help, education, social security, the right to leave the country, to property rights and even the right to live (Tlostanova 2010). Here, strong connections are found between Islamophobia and the construction of Soviet rule.

Hostility to Islam was right and proper in the modernizing cosmology of Soviet domination (Khalid 2007). In Soviet Central Asia, reformist Muslims, Jadids and Bolsheviks sought to build a new society, both wanted to improve the position of women, build state-funded schools and modernize their society and a process of Sovietization took place

with many Jadids joining the Communist Party seeking to establish a unified Turcik Muslim nation. The Bolsheviks disaggregated this conception privileging ethnic divisions as key to the establishment of administrative structures and 'union republics'. So, with the transfer of state power to Stalin, by 1926, these alliances came into conflict and the Soviet assault on traditional Islamic society began. Sustained campaigns of closure and destruction of mosques and madrassas, closure of 'old-style' schools and *qazi* courts and persecution of *ulama*, Muslim legal scholars, were pursued. Thousands of ulama were sent to forced labour camps, and many died or were killed (Khalid 2007). *Waqf* (endowed Muslim land) was confiscated and religious activity restricted and closely regulated. Both Jadids and Bolsheviks sought to challenge women's seclusion and the oppressive, degrading dress code of a *paranji*, a, heavy, long cotton robe and a *chachvon*, a veil of woven horsehair amongst the sedentary population, and some women abandoned this in the early 1920s. But, by 1927, a *hujum*, an assault, on this dress code was organized by the Zhenotdel (the women's section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) seeking to create a 'surrogate proletariat' of Muslim women. Khalid (2007) confirmed that this was called off in 1929 due to a massive backlash to this challenge to social and moral order which was ruthlessly put down, followed by wider purges and the violence of the Great Terror in the late 1930s. Overall, this led to the successful de-Islamization of public discourse and it destroyed the means through which Islamic knowledge was created and communicated. The uniqueness of the Soviet experience lies in the intensity of this assault, as many states have sought to control Islam and Muslims, the sustained length of this process and the way in which it de-modernized Islam as national heritage paving the way for its revival and rediscovery in the Gorbachev years (Khalid 2007).

In 1918, the Bolsheviks established organizations to 'Sovietise' the Jews, including the Jewish section of the Communist Party (*Evsektsii*) which lasted until 1930 and the Jewish Commissariat (*Evkom*) which only lasted until 1924 (Shternshis 2006). Yiddish language and Yiddish popular culture was used to shape Jewish public opinion and push forward this process of assimilation. The lack of Jewish national territory led party activists to create Jewish regions through the establishment of

agricultural colonies in Crimea and the Ukraine and through resettlement in Birobidzhan in the Soviet Far East under the auspices of the Committee for the Rural Resettlement of Jews (*KOMZET*), set up in 1924, with state support for the establishment of Yiddish courts, schools, Party cells and theatres. But, by 1939, these had either disappeared or functioned in Russian and the Sovietization of Soviet Jewry was seen as complete (Shternshis 2006). There were also significant state attempts to use propaganda tools to combat popular anti-Semitism. Yet, assimilation and the eradication of anti-Jew hostility did not follow as both the birth of the Jewish nation and the rise of contemporary anti-Semitism show. Marxist debate on the Jews was at its heart a debate about emancipation through assimilation which could only be achieved through the overcoming of Jewish otherness. The Marxist approach set out in the Second International, with its positivist and evolutionist determinism, heralded the inevitable idea of Jewish assimilation in the forward march of history. Here classic Marxism, as in its failure to comprehend racism, was not capable of understanding anti-Semitism, and as in its failure to comprehend the power of ethnicity in the Soviet Union, was not capable of recognizing the Jewish aspiration for a separate identity (Traverso 1994). It also revealed fundamental difficulties in both its assessment of the significance of religion and also in its theorizing of the nation.

Inside the Soviet Union images and attitudes towards Africa and Africans resonated with racialized logics moving from a long period of communist paternalism, to overt hostility from the 1980s onwards as Africa became both a scapegoat for popular discontent and a metaphor for poverty and backwardness (Quist-Adade 2005; Matusevich 2008). Attacks on racism and racist practices such as South African Apartheid and American racism became a staple of Soviet propaganda which is evident in the work of Soviet writers, poets and filmmakers, yet they also contained key elements of racist discourse. Simplistic, idealized, exotic images of Africa were portrayed by the Soviet media and bureaucracy. School textbooks, posters and television in the 1960s contained images of communist compassion and the saving of helpless black victims of capitalist injustice and the Soviet civilizing mission, together with clearer racist messages about the bestiality of black men and warnings about the 'racial crime' of black/white marriage. Despite Soviet journalistic training which

gave the message that 'socialism and racism are incompatible', coverage of Africa in Pravda, Izvestiya and Novoe Vremya from 1985 to 1992 showed that for Russia's new political bureaucracy, Africa became a metaphor for backwardness and a way of criticizing the former communist leadership for 'wasting' Soviet resources in Africa (Quist-Adade 2005).

Although the idea of race has clearly been present during the history of the region—it has been significant in public discourses on heredity, backwardness and anti-colonial struggle, and it was rarely theorized in the social sciences except in terms of essentialist accounts of ethnic primordialism. Even more important the contextual knowledge of area and case studies are often relegated to the fringes of the social sciences. The first studies engaging with mapping racism in communist and post-communist regimes appeared only recently (Mudde 2005; Shnirelman 2011; Law 2012). In concert with the reluctance to accept the post-Marxian analysis of the 'last shall be first' kind, the study of racism and anti-racism in post-socialist countries is deeply marginalized in post-Soviet states as well. As Katherine Verdery (2002, p. 18) puts it, we deal here with "colonialism in all its many forms: Not only the European empires of previous centuries, not only the Soviet colonies in Eastern Europe and numerous client-states in the Third World, but also the full incorporation of both the former colonies and the former socialist bloc into a global capitalist economy". However, being a victim of Soviet colonization positions newly independent states as being outside of racial discourse. According to their leadership and public opinion racism happens elsewhere. Adriana Helbig traces the logic of post-Soviet racializaton (2014, p. 81):

> Perestroika and post-Soviet transition were thus cast in racialized economic discourse regarding world status, anxieties of poverty, and a sense of disorientation of world order as the former Soviet republics struggled with the collapse of industry, devaluation of currency, nationalist and democratic ideologies that challenged socialist rhetoric, and extreme feelings of anxiety regarding individual and collective identities and feelings of worth

Reconnecting a view of racism as being intrinsically bound up in nation-making, built on circulating cross-national racisms and a direct outcome of both historical and contemporary social processes provides a framework

with which to interrogate contemporary racial conditions in this state and overturn the discourse of racial denial.

Studying the post-Soviet societies can play an important role in the theoretical advancement of the sociology of race and racism because it opens up the possibility of analysing a number of societies which were familiar with the concept of race and had explicitly used it for anti-racist propaganda and scholarly research—not in classification practices concerning population censuses. As a result, the experience of state socialism and its legacy in Central and Eastern Europe today provides us with unique material for reconsidering a number of our assumptions concerning the racialization of the globe and strategies of deracialization. Adriana Helbig (2014, p. 80) suggests that "socialist rhetoric has not disappeared; it has merely shifted into a parallel position alongside Western ideologies promoted especially by NGOs regarding equal rights (minority rights, civil rights, cultural rights, women's rights, indigenous rights)" (Helbig 2014, p. 80). The development of the socialist model—with its transformation of the constructivist approach into the primordial definition of race and ethnicity, and of anti-racism and affirmative action into its inverse—should thus doubtlessly sensitize both scholars and activists.

Although victims and human rights advocates alike interpret physical and symbolic violence against individuals who are 'visually different' as racially motivated, invocations of 'race' become problematic for scholarly analysis when there is little agreement about whether 'race' correlates with skin colour, ethnicity, citizenship or social status. Race is not a framework/analytic that social scientists have found particularly helpful for understanding dynamics of discrimination and exclusion in post-Soviet space. The debate that took place in *Slavic Review* in 2002 (Hirsch 2002; Weitz 2002) has shown that, to a large extent, the evaluation and rethinking of racism in the Soviet Union has been presently adversely affected by a certain terminological and methodological deficit. Borrowing of concepts and theories in the absence of their methodological reflection without showing their relationships has led to misunderstanding. This misunderstanding largely results in belief conflicts, while politically motivated conclusions predictably prevent any proper conceptualization of the multitude of data from the plethora of sources. However, if the historical research of race as a scientific term as well as the

discourses with regard to its use in Imperial and Soviet Russia are fruitful, the relevant achievements by social sciences are rather modest. Up until very recently, none of the scholars of race and racism has offered anything theoretically innovative—in regional contexts other than the American, West European, Middle Eastern, Chinese and South African. The failure to incorporate understanding of Russian, Soviet and post-Soviet racial states results in an incomplete and inadequate global account. The active role these states have taken in incorporating race into their making and operation is amply demonstrated in the forthcoming chapters and these accounts then have particular importance in providing the basis for a new global theory, one which emphasizes the significance of variety in our accounts of modernity.

The possibilities for formulating a general theory of racism are limited since the historical specifics of each individual situation compel us to recognize the varied, shifting and dynamic character of racisms (polyracism) and to be sensitive to the differences of structural features in different societies. This does not question, however, the non-specificity, or commonalities, of the processes and mechanisms of classification, identification, boundary construction and maintenance regarding racialization which can be established (Brubaker 2009, pp. 34–5). Insofar as scholarship concerning racism is neither a mere servant of political power, nor a universal ahistorical enterprise, it needs to be examined in respect to the context of contemporary society in which it is produced, which both structures and is structured by the system of racial knowledge. The intersection of scholarly and everyday discourses, together with their mutual feedback, leads to a discursive distortion whereby public media translate meaning, which makes it possible for actors to use a variety of structures of reasoning. The observable policies of authorities and systems of power often belies both background symbols and foreground scripts, which results in a complex and internally contradictory struggle over domains of meaning in each specific social setting.

The majority of area experts who study race do not believe that, for example, population genetics may explain social relations between people on the basis of their biological characteristics. Furthermore, not only do the life sciences normally not even attempt to deal with cultural inheritance, but they are also much less inclined to propose any explanations of race

on their own. The entire enterprise is, in fact, meaningless in the eyes of those who deny the postulates of the so-called scientific racism that was so widespread in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. If the ontological status of race supposedly does not permit a researcher to consider it as influencing our innate dispositions, if race could not serve as an analytical concept with an explanatory power, and if race were not so widely used in everyday language, as it is elsewhere, as a name for categories constituted in reference to biology, then how could 'studies of race and racism' be justified in the post-Soviet context?

If racism cannot be derived from the supposedly objective existence of primary biological essences called races, then its sources must be sought elsewhere. Actually, the social mechanisms which underlie racisms are not something cardinally different from the mechanisms which facilitate other types of exclusion. As a result, a research focus that demands a substantially new object of study of race should be directed towards establishing an analysis of racial discourses since this is the essential element which makes our understanding of racism autonomous. Insofar as social scientists deal with institutional arrangements that construct social order, the scholar of race needs to address the question why people employ certain categories (race/blackness/whiteness), under which historical situations these categories are relevant, and under which institutional circumstances ideas of race generate social effects. Racialization, or forming race(s), 'involves the structural composition and determination of groups into racialized forms, the imparting of racial significance and connotation at specific socio-structural sites to relationships previously lacking them' (Goldberg 1993, p. 82).

Race cannot be regarded only as a group marker that serves to initiate the drawing of boundaries and group mobilization. Since race is also a shared belief, racialization is consequently a belief formation. Race is a category that relies on the individual application of a belief and is maintained through the available cultural codes, it should be studied as a form of practical knowledge. However, while politics is one of the main sources of social action, the instrumentalization of differences leads to group formation. Race may thus become a semi-autonomous subject of action not only as a historically bounded group but also as a particular subculture, whose members build up their identity around their whiteness,

blackness or other constellations of the available symbolic resources and racial knowledge.

This raises the question of whether race is reducible to such 'second-order' constructs as ethnicity. The analytical distinction between race and ethnicity is based on the three following premises: (1) the phenomenological premise that the phenotypical definition of membership is more stigmatizing; (2) the epistemological premise of there being a conventional division between nature and culture in the social sciences; and (3) the ontological premise that there are both 'innate' (appearance, endowments) and 'acquired' (language) properties.

This departure from quasi-anthropological notions of race will enable us to adopt a pluralistic stance concerning the study of racialization processes that makes it possible to examine the social phenomenon of racism from the point of view of victim but also give due consideration to causal influences exerted by the environment. Moreover, an approach which insists that the materiality of body has no significance for the idea of race is of little use in efforts to understand how negotiating meanings that are attributed to differences may take place in the process of everyday interactions. The determinate role of appearance in folk biologies reflects the role that body plays in the racial knowledge that is prevalent in society. For example, 'ethnic Cubans' can be either light-skinned or dark-skinned, while racialized 'Hispanics' can represent themselves as having different ethnicities (Wade 2010). In the post-Soviet context, 'black' might include people of Asian descent as well as those from the Caucasian republics or Africa. Black is not a question of pigmentation; rather it is a cultural category. However, the symbolic system of difference functions only if you can classify an individual at every given moment as belonging to a particular category. As Seshadri-Crooks (2000, p. 21) rightly claims, 'race is a regime of visibility that secures our investment in racial identity… [w]hat guarantees Whiteness its place as master signifier is visual difference'. Race and ethnicity may operate interconnectedly in different settings—this is true for folk concepts, for the use of terms in state policies and academic scholarship, and also for the phenomena they seek to name in the world of social reality. The biologization of ethnicity or representation of it as a primordial essence, which is usual even in the official discourses in post-Soviet states, has not necessarily led to a racial

perspective in all circumstances. However, the dissemination of racial knowledge, the imbuing of cultural and biological notions of ethnicity with racial connotations, and the institutional practices of ascribing ethnicity have contributed to processes of racialization.

An imposed racial, ethnic, cultural or sexual belonging directly and explicitly hinders the realization of the self-taken as a project designed not by tradition, but by the individual. While negotiating cultural or sexual belonging has become easier today and class boundaries are becoming more permeable, the process of negotiating or overcoming the operations of racial identity appears to be growing ever more difficult. Furthermore, the racialization of the globe has been promoted by the gradual universalization of racist belief systems as an aspect of globalization (Goldberg 2009; Law et al. 2014; Zakharov 2015). Taking a closer look at the Central Asian case has revealed that it is becoming more difficult to reproduce local racisms which are based on the idea that the biological type prevalent in a particular region is the most 'elevated'. By challenging the widespread understanding that 'ethnicity' and 'nationality' serve as substitutes for the notion of race in post-Soviet states, this study claims that it is possible to understand racialization as a process that is partially decoupled from nation-building. It is necessary to keep in mind that nation-building processes may vary in prominence and significance in different European societies, ethnicity and nation can be represented in terms of race, while gender and class can be ethnicized or racialized (Anthias et al. 1992). Furthermore, although racial discourses clearly provide a new ideology of social cohesion in post-Soviet societies, they can also inform strategies for individual self-formation and promote a 'personal racialism'. This is evident in the search for the descendants of privileged estates that has become typical for the now popular genealogical research, in search for 'prestigious ancestors' (Shnirelman 2011), in the genetic diagnostics of 'ethnic origins', in genetic engineering and in cosmetic surgery taken as an attempt to change 'nature' through individual agency (Schramm et al. 2012). Such an understanding of race fluid on the one hand and essentially reproducible on the other is well suited to our times of globalization and the development of biotechnology.

Although race serves to rationalize and order social relations, as do many other concepts and practices, reducing systems of exclusion to the

lowest common denominator of racism only hinders theoretical development in the sociology of race. Conceptions and practices of racism should not be equated with 'cultural fundamentalism' or essentialism. Nevertheless, all of this does not exclude the possibility that negotiating the identity of new post-Soviet nations can involve the use of such notions as 'purity and contamination', 'blood as a carrier of culture' and 'racial pollution', which, as Verdery (1993, p. 42) has demonstrated, have been fundamental to the projects of nation-making in Eastern Europe. Consequently, nations or ethnicities understood in commonsense terms as groups may both serve as objects of racialization and be constructed through clear references to the various ideas of race that are prevalent at a given time. Thus, there is no such thing as cultural, or new racism. Rather we witness the constantly changing sociocultural evaluations of differences between people.

In the margins of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet republics outside the Russian Federation, we identify a wide range of differing racialized modernities. But how far have these new regimes been shaped by the racial logics of Soviet racialization? How far have they drawn on earlier discursive constructions of peoples, histories and nations? And are we witnessing new processes of racial domination at work?

This book studies the historical role of conceptions of race and racisms in the formation of states, identities and prevailing formations of racial order, the social structures that configure and frame these discourses and practices and the resistances and counter-narratives that, in their turn, have shaped these societies. We will also examine interconnectivities, relationalities and the complex circuits of race discourse and associated regimes of truth which provide the foundation for the stuff and form of contemporary racisms.

Outline of the Book

This chapter presents some of the key findings of our studies of racism in post-communist contexts and in modern Russia (Law 2012; Zakharov 2015) and offers an original intervention in the theory of racism and by offering analytical tools that may prove helpful to researchers of post-Soviet states. This chapter addresses the value of cases for comparison and

comparison as a conceptual approach to more general theories. It argues that comparing the evolution of institutional politics and hegemonic discourses will assist in understanding the linkages and interactions as well differences and similarities between the logic of racisms in different historical contexts. This chapter also provides an introduction to some of our key themes and positions.

Chapter 2 examines the three Baltic republics which have managed to combine racist policies, especially concerning language and citizenship, with the establishment of open channels towards democratic civic participation. The 'carrot' of European Union membership has led the Baltic states to build stable democratic institutions and to recognize the need to protect human rights. At the same time, these states tend to see representatives of minorities primarily as a security concern rather than as proper citizens. This chapter considers the racialization processes in the three Baltic republics and their becoming racial states. It analyses the causes of their historical forgetfulness and present-day short-sightedness with regard to their 'racialized selves' and exclusionary nationalism. It further reflects on the specificity of the Baltic case, characterized by deep political and ethnic divisions in society when Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia left the Soviet Union. At the core of this process, we observe such specific characteristics of Baltic racisms as state construction integral with globalization and Europeanization processes, and attributing Russia a role of both internal and external 'other'.

Chapter 3 examines racisms in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. These predominantly Christian societies have never had their own statehood within their present borders prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and since that time, they for a long period were in the sphere of influence of Moscow. The chapter considers the connectedness of racist discourses with racist practices in the former metropolis, while stressing such historical distinctiveness as the long-standing anti-Semite and anti-Tsygan (anti-Gypsy) narratives and practices within these western edges of the former Russian Empire, tracing their logic and dynamics in present-day societies of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. This chapter outlines a new path and logic of racialization processes in the context of mass migration, the search for national identity and deterioration of relations with Russia.

Chapter 4 considers the racialization processes that unfold in the Southern Caucasus region. Using the concept of polyracism, this chapter argues that there is no uniform similarity in the way whereby Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have interacted with and operationalized their prevailing forms of racialization. The Soviet experience of domination, the knowledge regime of racial science and global circulation of dominant forms of racial discourse, together with multiple configurations of ethnoracial differentiation and division have all influenced these outcomes. Particular attention is paid to the history of scholarly activity, aiming at 'making race', to imply ascribing racial meaning to social groups and relations.

Chapter 5 aims to map the processes of racial formation in Central Asia, the significant geopolitical region consisting of five states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Given all its diversity, racism in Central Asia is considered as a thing apart in the post-Soviet space. A peculiar combination of legacies of (a) state socialism's regulated policies of internationalism and 'friendship of people', (b) Pan-Turkism, coupled with the internationalizing influence of Islam, (c) clan politics, (d) regionalism and (e) hostility towards visible minorities, which make a highly complex and contradictory context. The chapter argues that it is this ambiguity that makes Central Asia a case where it is particularly fruitful to combine comparative and relational methodology in the study of global racism. Thus, the emphasis of the chapter is on the contradictory composition of the discourses of race in Central Asia whereby it can be conceptualized both as lineage, supported by the discourses of nationalism and clan politics, and as a type (or appearance), which is supported by folk conceptions borrowed from the colonial and post-Soviet experience of racism and racial discrimination. The chapter argues that the logic of racialization in Central Asia is counter-intuitive in its double function of (a) responding to the traumatic challenges for the former metropole, where Asians 'became black', and (b) naturalizing social differences at home, where the Russian-speaking minority is represented as inferior, by adopting a strategy of denying the prescribed 'blackness' and acclaiming unique origin at the state level (e.g. Aryanism in Tajikistan).

Finally, we reflect on some implications of this analysis for the future trajectories of these racialized states.

2

Racisms in the Baltic States: Exclusive Nations

Nikolay Zakharov, Ian Law and Minna Harjo

Introduction

This chapter examines the racialization of the Baltic littoral (southern coastal region) and the formation of the three racial states, which have emerged in this zone: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Exclusion of others from national identity, extermination of Gypsies and Jews, assimilation of minorities and the rhetorics of multiculturalism have all played their part as core ideologies in shaping the characteristics of these racial states. These states are rooted in the process of Christianization and territorial conquest carried through by crusaders and merchants from Western Europe in the medieval period (Plakans 2011). Lithuania achieved statehood in 1253, transforming into one part of a Polish-dominated commonwealth in 1569. Estonia and Latvia remained under the control of successive aristocratic elites from Germany, Sweden and Russia. They collectively attained independence in 1918 with the failure of plans for German colonization swiftly followed by active resistance to Bolshevization. Germanization, Russification and Polonization were kept at bay until 1940. These states then succumbed to military and political Sovietization, and they were annexed and transformed into Soviet Republics, being subjected to state

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0_2

terror and internal colonialism until they regained their independence and re-entered Europe in 1991. This chapter focuses on the racialization of nation-state formation from the mid-nineteenth century up to 1940, and then on the period of contemporary independence from 1991 onwards.

There are major gaps in knowledge and understanding in relation to the operation of race, racism and racialization in the Baltic littoral. Much of the literature of the making of Baltic states concerns itself with national identities, nation formation and nationalism, with remarkable little attention to the many forms of racial discourse and racialized governance which have been active in shaping these states (Rauch 1970; Plakans 2011) with much denial of the significance of race altogether (Senn 1990; Taagepera 1993). Even the Holocaust is seen as a 'superimposed discourse' with no significance or direct connection to these states, illustrated in a recent article entitled 'Why the Holocaust does not matter to Estonians' (Weiss-Wendt 2008) which identifies the reluctance to open war crime cases, the rise of Holocaust denial and the lack of comprehensive historical studies. Indeed, the writing of the story of racialization in the Baltic states has recently been confirmed as being at a very early stage, particularly with reference to the significance of debates over eugenics and the direct connections between bio-medical elites and politicians (Felder 2013a, b). The wider operation of racial discourse, beyond international and national elites, in the practices of Baltic state agencies, including social services and the police, with respect to Gypsy populations prior to the Holocaust is a further area just coming into the research spotlight (Kott 2013, 2014). The only reports from country visits of the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Race to the Baltic (UN 2008a; UN 2008b) fail to note the significance of this inter-war rise of race, eugenics and state practices before the German occupation, indicating lack of research and evidence. These omissions have implications. The contemporary view, for example, of the Lithuanian Chairman of the Seimas, the President of the Supreme Council and various ministers that 'racism is not a widespread and structural phenomenon' rather that it is purely a set of isolated unconnected 'instances' was clearly expressed during the UN visit (2008a, p. 13). In Estonia, the Prime Minister similarly stated that racism and discrimination were carried out by certain individuals in

the country and not the state which was in opposition to such intolerance and associated violent acts (2008b, p. 13). The growing number of neo-Nazi/nationalist marches and the growing support for extreme right parties, including the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (*Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond*, EKRE) and the National Alliance 'All For Latvia!' 'For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK' (*Nacionālā apvienība 'Visu Latvijai!' 'Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK'*), together with the activities of neo-Nazi parties such as the Lithuanian National Union (*Lietuvių Tautos Sąjunga*, LITAS) and other similarly orientated groups in the Baltic confirm the strength of contemporary political racism.

But, reducing the totality of racism to radical/extreme right political activity reproduces the problem of racial exceptionalism, explicitly enunciated by the Baltic states, and pronounces these states and other spheres of society as without racism and guiltless (Goldberg 2006). The wider ascendancy of anti-migrant, anti-refugee, anti-Muslim and anti-asylum-seeker hostility is also often narrated through the language of race, as in the recent notorious comment by Martin Helme. He is a board member for the EKRE, and on a television show in Tallinn, he said he wants Estonia to remain a 'white country', and that an influx of immigrants would lead to the 'pillaging and raping' of Estonian towns. He also reworked an old racist refrain, 'our immigration policy should have one simple rule: if you're black, go back' (ERR 29 May 2013a). One new media opinion piece highlights the paradox of denial and hostility that characterizes contemporary racial discourse in the Baltic states founded in the assertion that 'Estonia has no historical color barrier, no history of slavery (of the specific African colonial kind) or repression based on skin color' (ERR 16 August 2013a, b), conveniently ignoring Courlander colonization (Dzenovska 2013). This version of events was supported by the image of Abram Petrovich Gannibal, native of Cameroon and former superintendent of the city of Tallinn (1742–1752), a fundamentally mistaken premise on which to argue that racism was absent. Contradicting this view, recent cross-national research evidence on perceptions of Jewish people, as to whether racism generally and anti-Semitism specifically were significant national issues, confirmed that this was the case. However, these perceptions were significantly lower in the Baltic states compared to the EU overall. In Latvia, 28 % of the sample identified racism as a

significant issue compared to an average of 72 % across the eight EU member states surveyed; for anti-Semitism, the data showed Latvia at 40 % and the EU average as 66 % (FRA 2014). Growing racial hostility in the media and amongst the general public has also been documented in Lithuania with greatest hostility reported as being targeted at Muslims (Beresnevičiūtė and Frėjutė-Rakauskienė 2006; Frėjutė-Rakauskienė 2009; ECRI 2011b). A systematic account of the history of anti-semitism, anti-Gypsyism, Islamophobia and anti-blackness and their contemporary manifestations through violence and discrimination, on the internet and in the most recent public debates on Mediterranean migrants in the Baltic states, has yet to be written. This chapter examines the historical and contemporary record of racialization and its many dimensions and identifies a selected set of key moments and evidence to trace the central contours of this process. It also seeks to identify the ways in which wider circuits of racial knowledge and discourse were actively appropriated and shaped by states and actors in the three contexts to produce Baltic racisms, employing a relational methodology which explores the interconnections between the formation of national racisms and overlapping regional/international racist structures and forms of governance. The section on Estonia benefits from an analysis of digital sources carried out in 2015 by Minna Harjo. In conclusion, the core characteristics of Baltic racisms will be identified providing a new theoretical framework opening the door to further research on a largely under-researched set of processes, topics and issues.

Exclusionary Nations

The formation of the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian national movements and their respective nation-states occurred at high speed and much later than other Eastern European societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Hroch 1985). In each of these contexts, cultural revivalism and agitation were articulated through the patriotic press, and this was interlinked with political action led by patriotic urban intelligentsias rooted in their peasant origins. The process of racialization was central to this process, for example, in the case of the narration of the Lithuanian nation where the myth of shared descent was elaborated as a

key mechanism tying together this biologically distinct group of people as a patriarchal peasant family (Balkelis 2009). The nation was therefore imagined, re-activated and forged as comprising a genetically separated people enabling lines of inclusion and exclusion to be drawn. Each of the national movements told a different story, but they were similarly engaged in this process of articulating the connections between race and nation. Here, creating nations where none had existed required an immense cultural and political project, and racial differentiation was one key tool in building the case for independence. As Björn Felder confirms in the case of Estonia, following the 1905 revolts, 'Estonian intellectuals saw race as a new means in their national struggle to symbolize the nation on a new and deeper level' (2013a: 9). This was built on the creation of an Estonian national identity, which was particularly inspired by traditional cultural references drawn from peasant lifestyles and rural landscapes (Mettam and Williams 2001). Latvian and Estonian national 'awakenings' happened in the wider context of the shaping of nations and unification struggles across Europe, and specific adaptation of German nationalistic ideas was a core thread. Here, each person had an essential, fundamental national identity and was born into a 'people' (Latv. *tauta*, Est. *rahvas*) (Plakans 2011, p. 215). Hierarchies of 'peoples' were determined by the relative development of culture/nations (Helemäe 2013). So, we have a central linkage between clearly demarcated groups of people and social/cultural hierarchies. This varying and contested discourse of national identity provided fertile soil for the construction of national-biological-racial chains of meaning shaped by prevailing, dominant international expert regimes of truth regarding the central scientific reality of race, racial hierarchies and the racial origin of nations. This process was at the core of the shaping of Baltic nationalisms, but with specific characteristics and features in each case as these were interactively constructed in the new narratives of national identity and embedded in state and institutional practices, with increasingly explicit linkages between race, eugenics and national discourse (Felder and Wielding 2013).

With national independence came the construction of national domination over internal minorities. Post World War I, independence wars were followed by the entry of these three states into the League of Nations in 1920–1921, and with the formation of these nation-states came the

establishment and institutionalization of relations between the national majorities (the basic nations), ranging from 87 % in Estonia to 72 % in Latvia, and national minorities. The largest of these groups in each of these states comprised Jews in Lithuania (7.1 %), Russians in Estonia (8.2 %) and Germans in Latvia (5.9 %) (Plakans 2011). The nature of this relationship was fundamental, and this involved strong measures to secure majority domination, including expropriation of land without compensation, for example, from Baltic German estate owners, and weak measures granting limited minority rights which also confirmed majority domination by the 'basic nations'. This exclusionist construction of the three similar independence political projects provided a foundational platform from which national governance and national racisms have been shaped over the last century.

Anti-semitism shifted from the peasant realm to the national level with the help of the Catholic Church, whose priests were responsible for most literature prior to 1914. They were joined by liberal writers in blaming the Jews, for example, for Lithuania's backwardness and for their grip on urban professions. This national sense of anti-Semitism was especially exacerbated in the advent of Lithuanian independence, when Lithuanians realized that they could not outcompete the greater number of well-educated Jews, Poles and Germans for professions requiring stronger educations. Lithuania therefore instituted a state policy to strengthen the Lithuanian educational system, resulting in nearly a 400 % increase in the Lithuanian population in towns and cities. This, in turn, left a large number of over-educated people in urban areas with not enough jobs available. The fact that the Jews were an established successful group in urban areas only was used by their critics to fuel the growing anti-Semitic sentiment. Eventually, a number of groups began boycotting Jewish businesses, and even students moved to have Jews segregated in or removed from universities (Lieven 1993, p. 145).

This exclusionary nationalism spawned a remarkably similar shift, across these three states, from fledgling liberal democracies into authoritarian regimes in 1926 (Lithuania) and 1934 (Estonia and Latvia) with the respective emergence of the 'little dictators' Smetana, Ulmanis and Päts. Smetana supported by the extreme wing of his party, the *tautininkai*, carried through the exclusionary nationalist project reducing the role of

non-Lithuanians (Poles and Jews) particularly in the economy. Ulmanis pursued a very similar trajectory in Latvia. The specific positioning of these Baltic dictators was one step removed from Italian and German fascism. In Estonia, Päts ascendancy to national leadership, via martial law, headed off the swiftly escalating fascist threat of the Central League of Veterans of the Independence Wars which was shut down, and its members expelled from the armed forces and the civil service. A similar approach was taken by Ulmanis to the Thundercross organization in Latvia. These national political projects were decapitated and dismantled by the so-called Soviet 'liberation' of these 'bourgeois-fascist dictatorships' in 1940 and the subsequent Nazi occupation in 1941.

Despite this official distancing from Nazism until 1941, these Baltic regimes were also operating, institutionalizing and implementing eugenicist policies and programmes in the inter-war period with early establishment of expert and professional societies and networks in the 1920s, with Estonia a leader in the field. Eugenic discourse with its use of ideas of racial character, quality of blood, genetic purity, national vitality, feeblemindedness, inferiority and sterilization complemented the wider nation-building projects. Protecting the future of these small states through strengthening the population that formed the 'basic nation' and identifying and reducing 'undesirable' populations was a vital political objective. This was built on a longer nineteenth-century tradition, for example in Estonia, of work in physical anthropology and allied scientific disciplines and the nature and character of racial identity (Kalling and Heapost 2013). There was a complex nexus of interactions and influences working here including Russian debates on Darwinism and degeneration pre 1918, relations between Soviet and Swedish eugenicists and US and German dialogue, as well as Scandinavian/Baltic international networks. Medical scientists, anthropologists, criminologists and other key experts including the police were central actors in these networks, influencing and interacting with politicians and other policy makers establishing an elite discourse of transnational racial-biological knowledge and developing innovative approaches to enact this knowledge. The Baltic country with the strongest eugenics movement before World War I was, Estonia but such movements were also active in Latvia and Lithuania. Their development, institutionalization and incorporation into the state

accompanied the shift to post-independence authoritarian regimes in Lithuania in 1926 and later in Latvia and Estonia in 1934. As Bjorn Felder confirms, this political project sought to 'homogenise the nation ethnically, genetically and racially to form a racial state' (2013a, b, p. 6). This involved defining the state in biological terms through national regeneration and pursuit of a eugenics agenda by bio-medical elites and politicians. The eugenics movement in Latvia began in the 1930s and was strongly influenced by the German ideals of racial hygiene rather those of Scandinavian social engineering (Felder 2009). Two thirds of sterilizations in Latvia involved the feeble-minded (Felder 2013a, p. 328). A total of 60 individuals were sterilized and 648 abortions were performed in Latvia in 1938 and 1939; sterilizations were not forced, as there was consent for the procedures (Felder 2013a, p. 327). Although the number of sterilizations in Latvia was documented, it is unknown how many people suffered the effects of eugenics. Knowledge of compensation or apology is not known (Shaw 2015a). Sterilizations in Estonia took place between 1936 (enforced as of 1 April 1937) and October 1940, when the legislation was banned by the Soviets. Between 1937 and 1939, 41 persons were sterilized, 90 % of whom were women. The sterilization legislation was reintroduced by Nazi-supported Estonian self-government in 1941 and remained throughout World War II, until 1944 (Kalling and Heapost 2013). It is unknown if any compensation has been offered to survivors, and no formal apology has been offered to date (Shaw 2015b). Scientific, political and institutional networks and connections are also important here in providing a terrain conducive to coming active cooperation and complicity in these states with the Nazi administrative and military machinery of extermination, illustrated for example in the framing of 'Gypsies' as a 'plague' amongst international policing networks in the 1930s (Kott 2013).

The Holocaust and Porajmos (Romani genocide) in the Baltic were a deadly juggernaut of modernist bureaucratic efficiency, rapidly accelerating the shift from racialized networks of knowledge and administration, for example, in eugenics to extermination. The Hamann Commando in Lithuania and the Arajas Commando in Latvia were two examples of death squads staffed, and sometimes managed, by local people (Weiss-Wendt 2008, p. 476). The largest mass murder on Estonian territory in one day

was at Klooga slave labour camp when 1634 Jews and 150 Soviet POWs were killed on 19 September 1944. The 19 slave labour camps in Estonia were guarded by local Estonian police battalions. Nazi-orchestrated mass murder produced the highest Jewish death rate of any country in Nazi-occupied Europe in Lithuania where 95 %, 195,000 people, were killed (Weiss-Wendt 2008). The Lithuanians carried out violent riots against the Jews both shortly before and immediately after the arrival of German forces. In June and July 1941, detachments of German Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing units), together with Lithuanian auxiliaries, began murdering the Jews of Lithuania. By the end of August 1941, most Jews in rural Lithuania had been shot. By November 1941, the Germans also massacred most of the Jews who had been concentrated in ghettos in the larger cities. The surviving 40,000 Jews were concentrated in the Vilna, Kovno, Siauliai and Svencionys ghettos, and in various labour camps in Lithuania. Living conditions were miserable, with severe food shortages, outbreaks of disease and overcrowding. In 1943, the Germans destroyed the Vilna and Svencionys ghettos and converted the Kovno and Siauliai ghettos into concentration camps. Some 15,000 Lithuanian Jews were deported to labour camps in Latvia and Estonia. About 5000 Jews were deported to extermination camps in Poland, where they were murdered. Shortly before withdrawing from Lithuania in the fall of 1944, the Germans deported about 10,000 Jews from Kovno and Siauliai to concentration camps in Germany.

Across the Baltic states, registration and mass murder of Gypsies were carried out; in Latvia, for example, 50 % of the country's estimated 4000 Gypsies were murdered by the police between 1942 and 1943 (Kott 2013). In 1944, more than 3000 Roma men, women and children were killed in the Gypsies' camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau. In Lithuania, about 500 Roma were killed in Pravieniškės camp, the Ninth Fort in Kaunas and in Paneriai. Matthew Kott's excellent historical work revealing the two main phases in the operation of Gypsy extermination in the Baltic states is a recent addition to the limited research on this issue. He identifies this process both in Latvia and Lithuania where an initial wave of terror, the '*Einsatzgruppen* Phase', was begun by the *Einsatzgruppen* (EG) and other German security formations of the *Sichersheitsdienst* (SD), *Sicherheitspolizei* (Sipo) and *Ordnungspolizei* (Orpo); soon afterwards,

however, these were supplemented by auxiliary units composed of local volunteers. The second phase following official designation of 'Gypsies' to be treated as Jews by the civilian authorities was characterized by arrests, detention in prisons or labour camps and mass murders of arrestees. Nazi discourse positioned 'Gypsies' as antisocial elements, social troublemakers and potential security threats (e.g. spies or partisans). 'Gypsy' was a product of racialized governance. The complex network of differentiated groups of people that migrated to the Baltic states was classified as 'Gypsies' and subject to varying modes of official regulation and policing, and designation and evaluation by criminologists and other experts which provided an interconnected set of framings. Matiss Kott (2013) refers to these as the social and racial ordering of 'Gypsies', a social problem of dirt, disease, filth, immorality and nomadism and a racial problem of lower intelligence and the threat of mixing marked out by darker skin and other physiognomic characteristics. Baltic complicity was even more evident in the treatment of 'Gypsies' than Jews, for example, in Bauska or Harku where the massacres were entirely in the hands of local collaborationist policemen, and where even the decision to murder arrested 'Gypsies' seems to have been largely locally determined (Kott 2013). Placing these events in a wider lasting context of anti-Gypsyism and anti-Semitism is vital, and neither began with the arrival of the Nazis or ended with their defeat. The form and operation of these racisms changed but did not disappear. Race was not silenced by the arrival of the Red army.

In the slow process whereby these three Baltic states' have sought to acknowledge, recognize and memorialize the Holocaust and the Porajmos, it has always been contextualized and in some ways overshadowed by the lasting significance of what replaced Nazi occupation, Soviet occupation and its transformation into Soviet colonialism (Annus 2011). This process of political and economic dominance parallels classic Western colonialism with its vision of remaking the worldview of the people under repression. But as Epi Annus (2011) emphasizes, in ideological terms, Soviet colonialism produced the reverse: a colonialism that actually created an idealized Western imaginary in opposition to the Soviet modernist project. The perception of the Baltic states as more civilized, enlightened and superior contrasted to that of the Soviet metropolis which was positioned as the reverse: uncivilized, barbarian and 'Oriental'. This implicit racial

ordering had three effects. Firstly, the dominance of a discourse of victimhood which can work to silence other claims for recognition of suffering and humanitarian concern. Secondly, the reinforcement of a hierarchical worldview from which the making of reactions and responses to events and peoples both within and without can be made sense of and understood. Thirdly, the further building of Baltic racialization as a narrative of legitimated exclusion to be carried forward in political projects of attending to the nation.

Post independence, the strength of ethnonational boundaries in the Baltic states was remarkable, bolstered by the political project of securing, protecting and empowering the core nation (Brubaker 2011). This led to many Russians leaving Estonia and Latvia further driven by the introduction of restrictive citizenship legislation leaving a third of the population without citizenship and the use of language tests to exclude Russian mono-linguals from employment in post involving public contact. Estonian language policies have been described as being driven by 'purist, protective and proprietary' discourse with significant impact in reshaping the profile of government and state sector personnel (Brubaker 2011, p. 1797). So, the process of political marginalization and mass disenfranchisement follows from the political construction of a differentialist, exclusivist nation. The legacy of the formation of ethnoracial, exclusionary nations in the Baltic and the differing, but interconnected, histories of these three states have provided a frame of meaning through which contemporary migrations, events and responses have been shaped.

Lithuania: A Hierarchy of Enemies

High levels of emigration, a predominance of Roman Catholicism and a unique construction of national identity, *tautiskumas*, in contradistinction to others both inside and outside are key features of contemporary Lithuania. In 2008, presenting itself as free of institutional racism, structural racism and state racism with a strong multicultural heritage of openness and cross-cultural respect, the Chairman of the Seimas, the president of the Supreme Court and other ministers affirmed that this state was predominantly beyond reproach (UN 2008a). The non-existence of racism

in political discourse and media journalism was also affirmed. Addressing the political project of deracializing Lithuania, for example in tackling the legacy and contemporary power of anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism and anti-blackness, was not central to their worldview. Historical and contemporary amnesia with regard to the racialized making of the state and the exclusionary character of national discourse together with a social environment conducive to the development of hostility to the entry of ethnoracially marked migrants were then evident in this approach. This position derives from a particular conception of racism as to do with 'isolated instances' and unconnected individual actions at the margins of Lithuanian society. Lacking a history of direct involvement in racialized African and Asian colonization and being a victim of Soviet colonization positions Lithuanians as being outside racial discourse.

The Lithuanian Centre for Human Rights has played an independent monitoring role for some years and confirms that the nature and extent of racism here are 'often unrecognised, unknown and undocumented' (2013, p. 6) with a remarkably poor track record of research evidence on patterns of racial hostility, the operation of institutional racism, racial discrimination and critical intersections with gender and disability. Birute Sabatauskaite's (2011) recent report on racist violence in Lithuania confirms this lack of data collection and attention to this issue and gives examples of some recent events which include anti-Semitism, neo-Nazi/skinhead mobilization, anti-blackness and a failure of public sector agencies to respond adequately to cases of racist violence. Anti-Semitism was documented 'in articles published in the press, mail and other material posted on the internet, the desecration of graves and memorial monuments, statements of public figures and other types of conduct displayed at mass events' (2011, p. 9). More recently, Paul Astler (2015) reports that after complaints from Jewish groups, Lithuania's much heralded Museum of the Genocide only recently created a section acknowledging the annihilation of the pre-war Jewish community of more than 200,000, that was very nearly wiped out, and on March 11 (2015), the 25th anniversary of Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union extreme right parades marked this event in the capital.

Since 1989, the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians has increased from 79.6 % to 84.2 %, in 2011, with an increasingly diverse mix of ethnic

minorities (Marcinkevicius 2013). Apart from the large groups of Poles, Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, there are small but significant groups of Jews, Tatars, Roma, Chinese, Koreans and Africans. Lithuania is becoming increasingly mixed in terms of nationality. Lithuania has a declining population falling from 3 million in 2011 census to an estimated 2.9 million at the beginning of 2015. The number of foreign nationals residing in Lithuania increased by 13 % over the past year to 40, 000 at the beginning of 2015, equivalent to 1.4 % of the total population. Almost half of all foreign residents (18,300) were from non-EEA countries and held long-term residence permits (OECD 2015). In 2015, Lithuania agreed to accept 1150 refugees from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea over the next two years as part of Europe's effort to deal with the migration crisis.

Lithuania identifies itself as implementing a refugee-friendly policy in recent years, accepting Eritrean refugees from Malta and several Iraqi families who have settled in Vilnius. Anti-refugee discourse in the media, and on social networks, has been very strong, but the population is very divided on this issue with recent polls showing 51 % are in favour of accepting refugees. The former Prime Minister, Gediminas Kirkilas, argues that discussions on social networks, mainly Facebook, reveal that Lithuanians are growing increasingly compassionate and understanding towards people coming from war zones and countries where they have been forced to abandon their homes and lives (Kirkilas 2015). The opposite trend has been identified by Gediminias Lankauskas drawing on evidence from print and electronic media in 2008–2009 (2010). He charts the increasingly cynical and critical stance of Lithuanians towards the idea of EU unity and the perception that this is a threat to the nation. He specifically identifies the idea of *tautiskumas* (nationness), which refers to the unique concept of national Lithuanian identity, and around which anxieties of erosion are focused and renewed narratives of defence and safeguarding of the nation in relation to external Others are elaborated. Lankuaskas in his analysis of new patterns of discourse found these Others to be grouped into two categories, local, internal targets of hostility including Russians, Poles, Jews and Roma/Gypsies, and external groups, foreigners particularly non-Westerners, for example, Chinese migrants, blacks and Muslims. These views crystallized in mass

protests against supposedly 'lax, irresponsible and unpatriotic' immigration policies, and the vocalization of calls for a 'cleaner' more pure, more homogenous and implicitly more white Lithuania, for example in a *skinai* demonstration in Vilnius on 11 March 2008 demanding *Lietuva liks balta*! (Lithuania will remain white) and 'Jews Out'. Mainstream media dismissed this as 'child's play' (2010, p. 201). Yet one skinhead woman who had been on this march went on a few weeks later to viciously beat up a young South African woman in a central park in Vilnius, Bernice Candis Nadoo, and was subsequently sentenced for among other things 'promoting racism'. This incident provided a key moment in intensifying public debate on racism in Lithuania with prior and subsequent racist attacks surfacing as news events. Public debate ranged from 'resounding approval' for this attack to condemnation. These debates also gave voice to aspirational whiteness, identified in the Russian context (Zakharov 2015), also applied to Lithuanians, despite the oppositional differences between this society and its former colonizers. The vocal concerns were about the threatened destruction of Lithuanian *tuatiskumas* and its national traditions, language and spirit. Racist violence has many motivations, and in this context, the unsettling, disorientating threat of a homogenized Europe provided a meaningful frame for such actions (Lankauskas 2010). In 2015, about 500 Lithuanians, some wearing Nazi swastikas, attended another extreme right march in the country's second city of Kaunas, which was the scene of the Baltic's worst World War II-era Jewish pogroms, where nearly 10,000 people were killed in one day. Monday's march was the eighth such event organized by the Lithuanian Nationalist Youth Union to coincide with one of Lithuania's two independence days on February 16. Tadas Kavolis' (2009) qualitative investigation of the norms and values of skinhead culture in Lithuania confirmed the core ideology of racial nationalism, so claiming superiority for one's own nation and signifying the nation as a race with racial markers of inclusion and exclusion. But at the march in 2015, a flag was carried bearing the black-and-white symbol of the White Pride World-Wide movement which indicates that both racial nationalism and wider global racism were key ideologies of these groups. In addition, these racial ideologies were performed through the lens of hegemonic masculinity, enacted in fights and in historic war clubs and at skincamps and in the

hyper-valuing of aggressiveness, courage and physical strength. Here also, national-socialist Nazi symbols were style tokens of rebellion, particularly expressive of anti-communism, and other key symbols appropriated for the advocacy of racial nationalism were the Tricolour (national flag), the Pillars of Gediminas and the Vytis Cross. Currently, skinhead neo-Nazis in Lithuania derive their involvement from family socialization including the strong emphasis on patriotism in family upbringing, re-telling of stories from family members about Soviet repression and the experience of relatives, key events at the time of the National Liberation Movement (Sąjūdis), family members' hostility towards foreigners and conflicts in social interactions with ethnic minorities (Kavolis et al. 2014). Emerging feminist activism, in addition to continuing opposition by the Lithuanian Jewish community, and confrontation with neo-Nazis are also evident in the Lithuanian context (Žigelytė 2013).

Race governance in Lithuania involves increasing condemnation of sporadic racist violence, denial of any mainstream problems of racism within the Lithuanian state and within broader society, denial of the intrinsic connections between racism and nationalism and, further, complete denial of the significance of European slavery and colonialism and the international circulation of varying racialized discourses for Lithuania, despite its place within the European political project. At the same time, political and ideological challenges to European cosmopolitanism and integration are driving internal Islamophobia. Occasional surfacing of racism in mainstream political and bureaucratic discourse, referring to Roma as drug addicts (Chair of Parliamentary Commission), referring to 'nigger' in parliamentary debate (member of parliament), denying the relevance of racism in overt extreme right demonstrations (Prime Minister), casting doubt on the extermination of the Jews (Ministry of Interior official), failing to react to anti-Semitic articles and confirming the swastika as a traditional Lithuanian symbol (administrative court) indicates deeper fundamental problems in Lithuanian state governance (ECRI 2011b).

In examining the strength and operation of Islamophobia and anti-Muslimism in Lithuania, and particularly amongst the marginal groups of radical nationalists such as the Lithuanian National Democratic Party now encompassed by the Uniform Lithuanian National Workers Movement,

Racius (2013) confirms that a key political project here is to ensure that the nation is mobilized to ensure that migration of Muslims never happens, a protectionist, exclusionist, defensive move which is not antithetical to mainstream Lithuanian nationalism but chimes in with its core concerns of nurturing the core nation from external and internal Others. Radical Lithuanian nationalists are identified as predominantly 'cultural fundamentalists' standing up for ethnic purity, moral integrity and social order against other cultures through a naturalized cultural hostility and a belief in the non-assimilable nature of external Islamic culture and values (2013, p. 149). This is a strangely ambivalent position given the presence since the fourteenth century of Muslim Tatars who are now seen as indigenous, well-integrated and non-threatening. The open hatred of external Islam parallels the detestation of Jews who along with Russians are identified as the 'worst enemy'. Racius confirms the 'hierarchy of enemies', or the hierarchy of racialized hatred operating in Lithuania, identified by Lankauskas. Global data from the World Values Survey confirms that apart from Romanians, Lithuanians express the highest levels of anti-Muslim hostility than any other country in the EU (32.3 %) (Helbling 2012).

Although the extreme right in Lithuania is small and relatively unsuccessful politically, the shifting grouplets and networks have a wider influence in both sustaining such forms of discourse in mainstream politics and in inciting associated violence and hostility. The Russian/Jewish top targets of hate are identified by radical nationalists as communists/collaborators, a fifth column of internal traitors, and here anti-communism merges with anti-Semitism and 'a bulk of Lithuanians to this day maintain the image of the disloyal or even hostile Jew' (2013, p. 145). More widely, 43.8 % of ethnic minorities have confirmed their experience of racial discrimination in the labour market, and this was significantly higher for women and for all Roma/Gypsies (ENAR 2013, p. 31). This is compounded by environments of racial hostility in the workplace. Very little work has been carried out investigating racism in educational contexts, but examples of ethnic and religious discrimination and euro-centrism have been identified in secondary school textbooks in a research study carried out for the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman's Office. Twelve per cent of ethnic minority respondents reported experiences of racial discrimination in education and healthcare (ECRI 2011b).

The failure of Roma Integration Strategy to produce 'tangible results', serious delays in provision of emergency ambulance services to Roma requests, evidence of some confinement of Roma in segregated classes, unhygienic living conditions, absence of basic amenities, exclusion from public services due to lack of documentation, conflict with police and unlawful destruction of Roma properties further indicate fundamental problems in state governance (ECRI 2011b).

The Lithuanian Social Research Centre's synthesis of current data on Roma confirmed the patterns of racism and inequality that Roma in Lithuania still face (2012). Roma remain the most hated ethnic group in Lithuania, with 63.7 % of Lithuanian people stating in 2011 that they would not like to live in a neighbourhood with Roma people, an increase of 6 % from 2010. Seventy per cent of Roma children did not attend pre-school establishments or pre-primary education groups. The percentage of children aged 7 to 14 who did not attend school was 1.25 % for the total population of Lithuania (5243 children) and 15 % for Roma children of this age group (65 children). More than half of the Roma surveyed (56 %) did not acquire higher education than their parents, and 25.3 % of Roma did not finish primary school or were illiterate (the national average is 4.6 %), 31 % of Roma finished only primary school (the national average is 20.8 %) and 43.2 % attained a basic or higher education (national average 74.1 %). Roma children are often assigned to special education programmes within mainstream institutions. The majority (55 %+) of Roma identify themselves as unemployed, and over 80 % did not have any profession. Lack of educational qualifications and professional training and lack of information on job opportunities were key problems in accessing work, plus the majority of Roma (82 %) identified racial discrimination by employers as a persistent problem. This latter finding was further confirmed in a survey of employers' attitudes with almost half (47 %) stating that it is highly unlikely that any Roma person would be employed by their company. In housing, Roma families have very poor access to basic amenities, for example, only 26.5 % had access to hot water (67.8 % of total dwellings) and only 32.7 % use a flushing toilet (68.6 % of total population). Forced evictions and expulsions of Roma families occurred through demolition of illegal houses by the Vilnius City Municipality at the end of 2004 and at the

beginning of 2012 in the Vilnius Kirtimai settlement. In terms of poverty, over 40 % of Roma families regularly receive food support and over 60 % rely on welfare benefits as their main source of income. An earlier examination of anti-Roma hostility in Lithuanian media discourse by Vida Beresnevičiūtė (2010) illustrates how Roma are defined through cultural racism as a group irrevocably distinct in its cultural norms, life style and behaviour, exemplified by criminal activities, drug-dealing and constituting a threat to Lithuanian society. This discourse repeatedly re-inscribed in news media items amplifies hostility, fear and anxiety, and an associated desire for social distance.

Therefore, rather than being free from racism and racialized governance, Lithuania's contemporary social formation is stratified by a complex set of embedded, ingrained, dynamic racist discourses and practices with a sharpening of tension and conflict between the opposing social forces of racism, with its internal and external targets of hate, and antiracism, with its narratives of inclusion and multiculture.

Estonia: Targeting 'Foreign Rubbish'

The national transformation of Estonia in the late twentieth century involved a double movement of sharpening narratives of both denial and racialization. Prior to Estonia's accession to European Union, in an article for *Eesti Päevaleht*, Kivine (1999) quoted a selection of online forum posts from www.euro.ee—a website that was then facilitating debates around the upcoming accession. Those against joining the Union were highly concerned about the increased flow of immigration that would come as part of the deal. One commentator claimed that 'When Estonia becomes a member of the European Union, it will become a mere pendant without its own identity, due to the precepts and norms that do not take into consideration the particularities of our situation', and another said that 'I am scared of migration, isn't there enough of foreign rubbish here already?'. The article was published a week before the part of Estonia's accession negotiations when the country's representatives were due to proudly claim that racism and xenophobia were not an issue in the country. This prompted Kivine (1999) to elaborate how such a claim

could be made with a clear conscience—he noted that whilst public and violent racism may have been relatively limited, xenophobia was something that was so deeply ingrained in the society that, ironically, it could barely even be considered as a problem. Instead, it had almost become a part of Estonian national identity in a similar way that religion is for some other nations. An alternative way of understanding this issue is that the term xenophobia (*ksenofoobia* in Estonian) in the sense of its most widespread meaning is absent from the Estonian language—the word has not been included in the Estonian Encyclopaedia, or to the Lexicon of Foreign Words or in the Explanatory Dictionary of Estonian Language. 'Where there is no official term, there is no phenomenon', Kivine (1999) concluded in his article 16 years ago.

Anti-semitism is one long-standing discursive narrative in Estonia that could not be so easily denied. Weiss-Wendt's (2008) study of 3000 news media items related to the Holocaust from 2001 to 2003 confirmed the trend of escalating Holocaust denial in Estonia, where most people denied any national responsibility for the crimes committed on their soil. Anti-semitic myths of deicide, ritual murder and money-greedy Jews were regularly rehearsed and represented, Estonian national suffering during Soviet occupation was seen as paramount and general hostility was expressed to Holocaust memorialization and commemoration. The construction of the particular Estonian national narrative therefore provides a conducive terrain for contemporary anti-semitism.

According to the constitution of the Republic of Estonia, it is strongly prohibited to discriminate against individuals based on their nationality, race, skin colour, gender, religion, language, their political and other convictions (Kallas et al. 2013a). Moreover, the law prohibits all hatred and violence based on ethnic, racial, political and religious grounds (Kallas et al. 2013a; Tsilevich 2013). Estonian principles of the promotion of equal treatment and proscription of discrimination are largely based on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which Estonia joined in 1996 (Kallas et al. 2013a). While the above shows political commitment to the promotion of inclusion and a strong anti-discrimination stance, official data shows that there is little evidence of active monitoring and reporting of racist violence in the country. Whilst according to European Union

Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (2006), Estonia did not belong to the group of nine member states where no official data on racist violence and crime was available in the reporting period of 2004–2005, the country was in the list of the nine countries where data collection on such phenomena was only focused on a restricted number of investigations and selected court cases as well as information on more general ethnic discrimination rather than racist violence and crime. Other such countries included Estonia's Baltic neighbours Latvia and Lithuania, and Hungary, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and Luxembourg (EUMC 2006). EUMC (2006) has highlighted that the use of racism victim surveys would be able to provide an objective overview of racial discrimination; however, such research can also be utilized for opening up a more subjective dimension, for example, when looking to understand the experiences and feelings of immigrants. When such research was carried out in 2005, there was evidence of racial discrimination against Russians in Estonia, yet there was a lack of official data on the subject (EUMC 2006).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia was left with a politically and ethnically divided society. The early to mid-1990s saw Estonia becoming a target of some criticism for its exclusionary policies towards its Russian population from international organizations and the Russian Federation (Kallas et al. 2013b). The political decision making of the 1990s in Estonia resulted in a range of challenges, for example, a high number of people with no citizenship, low percentage of Russian-speaking population with the ability to speak Estonian, which also consequentially resulted in a high amount of exclusion of this part of the population from the labour market, and a process of political, economic and cultural ghettoization in geographical regions in Estonia with a high number of Russian-speaking inhabitants (Hallik 2011). The mid-2000s witnessed the emergence of a novel concept of 'state identity' (*riigiidentiteet* in Estonian) in the country's integration policy, which was defined as a collective 'us', a feeling embodied in the emphasis on the positive sentiment towards belonging to the Estonian nation and state, as well as adapting its core values (Kallas et al. 2013b). In today's Estonia, thanks to plentiful sociological studies, academic research on a national and international level and public debates that have been held around

the issue of integration in Estonia, it can now be claimed that policy makers are better informed about the multilateral levels of interethnic conflict between the Russian-speaking population and Estonians (Kallas et al. 2013a). Consequentially, there is now more evidence and examples of good practice available than ever before, yet the ever-evolving political processes in the last 10 years have also generated a range of new challenges (Kallas et al. 2013a). A key example to this was The Bronze Soldier clash between a group of ethnic Russians and Estonians which took place in the capital city of Tallinn in 2007. This brought to the surface the crucial issues that revolve around questions of the understanding of historical memory in the context of World War II and the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union, and how this still, in contemporary Estonia, has a major impact on interethnic relations (Kallas et al. 2013a). In retrospect, however, social researchers have found that whilst the 2007 crisis around The Bronze Soldier can be interpreted as having a negative impact on the interethnic relationships, it has managed to increase security and stability to the process of integration and was a major trigger for the Estonian government to re-evaluate its integration policy (Kallas et al. 2013a).

Estonian citizenship has evolved into a more ethnically diverse phenomenon throughout the past decades—slightly less than a fifth of people with Estonian citizenship are not ethnic Estonians. Estonian citizens make up 85 % of the population; however, a sixth of Estonia's population does not have Estonian citizenship (Kallas et al. 2015). According to Census 2011, out of the ethnic Russians who are permanently residing in Estonia, 54 % hold Estonian citizenship, 24 % have Russian citizenship and 21 % have unspecified citizenship, whilst 99.6 % of Estonians residing in Estonia have Estonian citizenship (Census 2011). Based on previous sociological surveys, Vetik, R (2015) has iterated that the key issue faced in the process of strengthening the national identity amongst non-Estonians in Estonia is their sense of belonging, or not belonging in the state. It is a challenge in the context of a nation-state, as there is a high likelihood that some people feel less as a citizen and more as a representative of an ethnic minority, in which case, when these people try to conceptualize their relationship with the state, it will not be their civic rights and obligations that arise to the forefront but rather, the feeling of being left aside and marginalized (Vetik, R 2015). For example, 36 % of Estonian residents

(23 % of Estonians and 65 % of those speaking Russian as their mother tongue) think that the way migrants are treated in Estonia is problematic (Laineste et al. 2007). Yet, 34 % of Estonian residents think that migrants take away jobs from locals, and 46 % think that crime increases as a result of immigration. The research also showed that 2.8 % of the respondents did not wish to work together with someone with a different nationality, and almost a quarter of respondents had either experienced or witnessed discrimination based on race, nationality or religion (Laineste et al. 2007). Almost ten years later, the ECRI monitoring report of 2015 acknowledges that whilst the Estonian authorities have made real efforts to integrate the Russian minority in Estonia to reduce the stateless people, there are still problematic issues such as higher unemployment rates in regions that are mainly inhibited by Russian speakers.

Foreign labour and their family members, asylum seekers and refugees who have relocated to post-1991 Estonia are referred to as the new immigrants, and whilst the number of new arrivals each year has remained small, Estonia is still considered as an immigration country (Kallas et al. 2013b). However, when compared to most other European countries, Estonia has a relative lack of experience when it comes to accepting refugees and asylum seekers, as the country has only been open for such types of migration since 1997 when policies for refugee and asylum-seeker reception were implemented (Kallas and Kaldur 2011). Before Estonia joined the Schengen area in the beginning of 2008, the number of asylum applications remained very low with the average of just 20 applications per year. Yet, there was a noticeable increase of applicants at the second half of 2009 when the number sharply increased to 40. Nonetheless, research has shown that the majority of asylum seekers have ended up settling in Estonia by way of different coincidences, as the usual destination countries for these new settlers tend to be Estonia's Nordic neighbours Finland and Sweden (Kallas and Kaldur 2011). According to Estonian Ministry of the Interior, in March 2011, there were only 45 residents in Estonia who had been granted asylum, which is a miniscule number in the international context and should not be exceeding the capabilities for the Estonian society to provide effective assistance in integration of those in need of such assistance (Kallas and Kaldur 2011). An even bigger issue of importance is the fact that there needs to be an

efficient operational plan that considers possible future prospects, where the target group may increase to a size where solutions around integration will no longer be manageable on a case-by-case basis, and a more systematic approach is needed in order to handle a growing number of asylum seekers (Kallas and Kaldur 2011). Yet the effective integration of new migrants has not been considered as an issue that should be high in the list of priorities of Estonian political debates. Fundamental shortcomings, such as not providing basic information in English and other languages, have not been addressed, and there is a shortage of opportunities to learn Estonian language (Kallas et al. 2013b), which increases the level of potential difficulties for the process of integration that is already an inherently complex task on other areas, such as cultural and religious differences between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and Estonians (Kallas and Kaldur 2011).

In the monitoring survey that was published in 2011, it became apparent that there is an attitudinal contradiction towards immigration amongst Estonians—whilst acknowledging that the latter is, to an extent, an unavoidable phenomenon for a country with an ageing population, it was also emphasized that as there are already a high number of foreigners living in Estonia, there should not be a commitment to accept any new settlers (Kallas et al. 2013a). The same study revealed that in comparison, the Russian speakers in Estonia were feeling more positive about welcoming new migrants and refugees, with 40 % of those Russian speakers questioned being open to the latter whilst only 20 % of Estonian national respondents feeling the same way (Kallas et al. 2013a). Having carried out focus group discussions with new immigrants, Kallas et al. (2013a) found that a major part in how the process of integration ran, and how they felt at their new country of residence, was dependent on their background. For instance, those migrating from Russia and other countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union experienced fewer barriers in terms of integration due to shared history, in many cases a pre-existing community and knowledge of the Russian language. Yet for Europeans, and especially migrants from Asia and Africa, migration to Estonia is a more complex and difficult occurrence, as many of them will at first-hand experience a degree of culture shock in the way of feeling excluded from the rest of Estonian society due to various social barriers (Kallas et al. 2013a).

A contradictory landscape in terms of attitudes and approaches taken towards different forms of migration can also be found in Estonia's political arena. In September 2007, the now ex-Prime Minister of Estonia, Andrus Ansip, confirmed to the UN racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia rapporteur Doudou Diene that whilst hatred against foreigners is not an unknown phenomenon in the Estonian society, it is strongly condemned at the political level (Republic of Estonia Government website 2007). Furthermore, Margus Kolga, Estonia's ambassador to the UN, accentuated in the UN General Assembly Special Session held in January 2015 that the increasing manifestations of hatred, intolerance, discrimination and anti-Semitism in Europe and further afield were extremely worrisome (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2015). The Ambassador continued that Estonia has repeatedly condemned the crimes of Nazism and other totalitarian regimes. He continued: 'We consider it essential to continue international cooperation in order to support the remembrance, research and raising awareness of the Holocaust, so that genocide could never be repeated' (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2015). He noted that Estonia declares its strong and unconditional support to the principles of the Stockholm Declaration according to which it is 'our duty to fight genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia'. Margus Kolga continued that 'Today the Jews, like all other minorities, are guaranteed freedom of religion and the right to preserve their cultural heritage', whilst also highlighting the important role played by the Jewish community in the economic and cultural life of Estonian society. Nonetheless, The Council of Europe Commission against Racism and Intolerance states in its fifth report that whilst there is no direct issue of hate speech in Estonia, there are still concerns about racist remarks made in various online mainstream news channels, and a very clear inability on the behalf of politicians to provide a response to such outbursts (ECRI 2015). Furthermore, despite the fact that racist hate speech is not a widespread phenomenon in Estonian political speech, there have been instances where this has occurred. For instance, in May 2013, Martin Helme made some public statements during a TV show, saying that he would like Estonia to remain a 'white country', and found that immigration would lead to the looting and raping of Estonian towns. Helme continued by saying that 'The same people who are currently talking about how much we need

to accept immigrants are the very people who slammed the gay partnership law down our throats without the blinking of an eye. They have now run out of all that love and tolerance ammunition' (ECRI 2015). It is difficult to correlate the latter claims made by a well-known politician with Andrus Ansip's pledge outlined above. Officially, the Estonian laws do not prohibit public funding of political parties that promote racist views, although there is nothing stopping them from doing so; neither is there an official and enforceable political party or NGO Act that would impose an obligation to end the public financing of organizations or political parties, nor to terminate the activities of the respective organizations as has been recommended in the general policy recommendations (ECRI 2015; cited in Delfi 2015a).

The importance of web-based debates around immigration and accepting refugees in Estonia is manifested in the large number of online communities that are passionately supporting pro and against stances on the subject, with a large number of them located in Facebook. Other crucial avenues for those wanting to get involved in the debates around the current refugee crisis are web-based discussions and Q&A sessions with experts in the field of international affairs and migration. Here, the public is encouraged to leave questions in the form of comments, which will then be answered by the panel of experts, encouraging a wider, informed debate. One example of such activity taking place is the 'Refugee debate' (Pagulasdebatt) hosted by the popular online portal Delfi. Nonetheless, there is also a dark side to the strong web presence of the debate, namely the anti-immigration groups where racist language and imagery are only too common. According to The Council of Europe Commission against Racism and Intolerance, there are incidences of racist comments in Estonian online news portals, yet there have not been any concrete steps taken to stop racist and anti-gay hatred speech online (ECRI 2015). The most recent report states that the incitement of racist hatred and violence and race-based distinction is only punishable if the victim's health, property or life is in jeopardy as a result. Discrimination based on one's nationality, language and gender is not explicitly prohibited by the law in all the relevant substantive areas (ECRI 2015). The above is clearly observable in the unofficial stance of the Estonian written press, which is that racism is still a non-issue in Estonia (Raun 2007).

In order to understand the formation of 'radical communities' and their race hate on Facebook and elsewhere on the web, it is firstly necessary to understand what are the 'stressors', for example, the fear causing, deepening and perpetuating factors in the Estonian public sphere (Sorokin 2015a). But, as this section has demonstrated, we need a deeper more fundamental account to explain racism and its operation in interlocking environments in Estonia and elsewhere. Soft, passive or even non-existent opposition to the presentation and outpouring of such 'word violence' has indeed facilitated both the escalation of anti-refugee rhetoric and sporadic physical violence, including the attempted massacre of a group of refugees in Vao village, the condemnation of which in public thought was far from univocal (Sorokin 2015a).

Latvia: Racial Innocence and Civilizing Tolerance

Racism in Latvia has been both escalating and institutionally and socially constructed as absent, being positioned as primarily a product of Western colonialisms elsewhere and being officially refuted by reference to high rates of mixed marriage (20 %), the growth of multi-ethic political parties and the historical openness and multiculturalism of the state. This tension between competing discursive accounts and the difficulty of sustaining public denial in the rapidly changing environment of conflicting debate about migrants and others in Latvian society and elsewhere across Europe is producing an increasing recognition of the strengthening of processes of racialization. Modern racism in Latvia can be best understood as an intrinsic process in the building of a modern European state (Dzenovska 2010), and racism has now shifted to the centre of public debate. Most government officials in 2008 took the view that racism was not pervasive or widespread, seeing it simply as a set of isolated events irrelevant to the core operation of the state and its institutions, a position clearly contradicted by human rights NGOs, representatives of minorities and victims of discrimination and associated activist networks (UN 2008c). The signs that new waves of migration were likely to incite significant increases in race hate and associated violence were highlighted

in 2008 and have been shown to be an accurate prediction over the last eight years. Severe deficiencies in the response of the Latvian state to these issues including the legislative response to race hate speech, online race hate and racially motivated crime and severe deficiencies in the challenge to prevailing discursive narratives of hostility in political and media discourse, as in other Baltic states, provide and facilitate the permissive proliferation of racialization. The 'gulf in the reading of the past' in terms of conflicting interpretations of World War II, collaboration with the Nazis and the process of Soviet occupation has long been sources of internal ethnic tension and conflict. The exclusion of ethnic Russians from citizenship, pervasive marginalization and stigmatization of Roma and virulent hate targeting of non-European migrants in Latvia have been well-established (UN 2008a, b; ECRI 2011c). Hate speech was formerly seen as reaching a peak in 2005, and this has been significantly exceeded in recent times. The UN Special Rapporteur on Racism identified Latvia to be at a 'turning point' in its history (2008c, b p. 2). But from what to what? For the international monitor, it is from a state characterized by exclusive nationalism and citizenship, racist violence and identity tensions to a state characterized by a respect for historical truth, recognition and respect for minorities, harmonious cohabitation, non-discrimination and interactive interculturalism. Here, Latvian national identity is identified as being historically 'shaken' and 'eroded' particularly by occupation and the disruption, fracturing and unsettling of nationhood, and the backward-looking articulation of racism and nationalism is seen as the central problem to be overcome. This reduces racism to a problem of individual and collective worldviews overcome through the construction of liberal antiracism specified as an inclusive forward-looking nationalism and its implementation across state institutions in line with the civilizing discourses of Western tolerance (Dzenovska 2010).

The Latvian National Programme for the Promotion of Tolerance launched by the Special Tasks Ministry for the Integration of Society has been critically evaluated by Dace Dzenovska (2010) in a fundamental rejection of liberal antiracism in this context. In attempting to pursue legislative and associated interventions, firstly focusing on integration of Russian-speaking residents, political opposition was framed by already prevailing EU institutional narratives as 'intolerance'. Here, racism in

Latvia became constructed as a moral, pathological failure which required 'treatment', replacing one regime of truth by another, a readjustment of attitudes, not critical engagement examining the 'constitutive role' of racism whereby public and political subjects synoptically constructed themselves in relation to prevailing narratives of racialization and intersecting narratives of colonialism, communism and Europeanization. Here, racism for both 'tolerance promoters' and 'backward nationalists' was not a widespread, fundamental issue of central concern in Latvia. This liberal 'fast-track' diagnosis and counter-narrative, a technology of governance shaped by European institutional discourse, both fails as a solution and further contributes to misrecognition of the operation, logics and dynamics of contemporary racism and racialization. A 'slow-track' political project of deracialization can be built upon such a foundational critical analytic, and implicitly, Dzenovska points us in this direction. But explicitly, this critique proposes a marginalization of state-based anti-racist politics and reflection on the ways in which racism in Latvia arises as the product of historically specific post-Soviet conditions identified by one respondent as 'forced togetherness' arising from in-migration of Russians and visible 'non-Europeans'.

The limitations of the debate between European institutions concerned with 'racism and intolerance' in Latvia and the Latvian state are exemplified in a report produced after Dzenovska's critique was published (ECRI 2012). Deteriorating racial conditions were identified. The impact of the economic crisis on work in this field had begun to bite. The cuts to the Ombudsman's budget had severely reduced the response of the state to complaints of racial, religious and linguistic discrimination. The tolerance programme, Integration of Society in Latvia, stalled, the National Roma Action Plan ended and the relevant Ministry for Special Assignments for Society Integration was dismantled. Hardening policy in prescribing use of national state language, for example in employment, was also confirmed by ECRI. Political and media racist discourse was operating without effective challenge as were some public neo-Nazi events. Racist violence and the activities of skinhead and extremist right-wing groups were a continual threat. In reply, the Latvian government stated that it had put up posters in public transport stops and put items on state TV as part of its 'Be Tolerant' campaign with additional education and training activities.

Budget cuts were acknowledged, although in the Ombudsman's case, this was confirmed at only 57 %. Government programmes on tolerance and the Roma are now part of the Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy operating up to 2018. Many other points are responded to by the government indicate the overall view that sufficient action was being taken, for example in condemning Nazi glorification, in restitution of Jewish communal property and in Roma inclusion in school. The vital questions which are contested in this debate are however operating within a limited circuit of positions on 'racism as intolerance' which do not provide the space for a foundational recognition of and engagement on the relational and interactive processes shaping escalating, interlocking, racialized, discursive environments (Dzenovska 2013).

There are a complex, wide-ranging set of causes and motivations for racist hostility and violence. Identifying potential factors which make racist hostility and violence more likely, more acceptable and more durable involves consideration of a complex set of interlocking environments (Law 2010). These include:

- *Virtual environment*: internet sites and networks which may be influential in encouraging racialization
- *International environment:* conflicts and events including ethnic and racial conflicts, acts of terrorism, which heighten local perceptions of insecurity and fear and which are used to rationalize racist hostility and violence.
- *National environment:* political and media messages on migration, ethnicity and racism which shape racial hostility.
- *Economic environment: factors* including patterns of unemployment and low pay, economic decline, exclusion from new economic opportunities.
- *Educational environment:* factors that make racist violence more likely such as patterns of underachievement, exclusion, racial and ethnic segregation, lack of explicit focus in schools, failure to challenge racism through school curriculum and ethos.
- *Physical environment:* features of local area that make racist violence attractive to perpetrators such as geographical isolation, lack of natural surveillance, layout of estates, poor lighting and lack of leisure facilities.

- *Family environment:* factors where racist hostility is socialized and legitimated across generations and genders, with old/young, female/male attitudes and talk promoting racism in different ways.
- *Local environment:* social/community factors, such as the balance between racist violence 'preventors' and 'promoters', and the level and nature of social interaction across ethnic/racial lines.
- *Adult/youth environment:* active local cultures/sub-cultures, values and norms of peer groups which may encourage racist violence.
- *Ideologically driven groups:* For example, far right groups, which encourage racist violence.
- *Criminal environment:* which may provide tools, knowledge, motivation, peer pressure which knowingly or unwittingly promote/incite racist violence.

Within these environments, groups and individuals make decisions to promote race hate and carry out acts of racial discrimination and violence. Changing justifications for persisting frameworks of racial discourse and shifting target groups make these processes highly dynamic. In Latvia, social attitude data (Koltchanov 2011) has identified a range of levels of racist hostility against a range of potential migrant groups including Chinese (52.4 %), Africans (48.3 %), Palestinians (46.5 %), Kurds (44.3 %), Muslims (39.2 %), Chechens (33.8 %) and Azeris (29.3 %). Individual motives for hostility may also change and develop as patterns of hostility are reworked and renewed and reflect a range of drivers apart from coherent ideological opposition such as bigotry and territorial/political motives. These micro factors, contextualized by both the historical construction of narratives of exclusivist ethno-nationalist Latvian identities and contemporary narratives of alien migrants, threats and enemies together with the interlocking national and international political, virtual and media environments are determining renewed processes of racialization manifest in state activity (Zepa 2013). In Latvia, the ongoing shaping of these racialized discursive environments is evident in a number of spheres. For example, in examining online hate speech from 1 July to 31 October 2014, the Lithunanian Centre for Human Rights (2013) identified a sample of 126 items which constructed targets including those of dark skin colour, Jews and Russians. More recently, the international migrant crisis has reshaped

these patterns. In national political discourse, the renewal of exclusionary standpoints in relation to migration, despite Latvia's shrinking and ageing population, is operating through a highly dynamic set of interconnections with wider European circuits of hostility and associated political rhetoric regarding the need to deliver aggressive migrant controls and state commitments to permit highly restricted access. The hard-line exclusionary political rhetoric is led by the National Alliance, who has 17 seats in the Saeima and emerged through the combining of All for Latvia! and For Fatherland and Freedom/LNKK. Together with the Fatherland Guards, deriving from the anti-Soviet 'Forest Brothers' resistance groups, they led the protests of hundreds of people in 2015 against Latvia's decision to take 531 migrants, 316 less than the EU proposed. Raivis Dzintars, from the National Alliance 'All For Latvia!' party, said that Latvia already had problems integrating immigrants and that this decision would only 'deepen the problem' (Gelzis 2015). Janis Sils, a representative of the 'Tevijas Sargi' (Fatherland Guards), confirmed that the aim of the protest was to 'prevent a forced admission of immigrants in Latvia' who were claimed to be African people involved in illegal drug and arms trafficking not refugees. As Ragozin (2015) observed, old enmities between ethnic Latvians, and these organizations noted above, and ethnic Russians, represented by the Harmony Centre party, are being recast in these moments of joint solidarity and opposition to this new enemy, dreading the impact of this small number of people on Latvian society. The protests and associated circuits of popular debate are marked by intense emotional processes of rage and anger and narratives of essentialized and racialized differentiation. Refugees are here being positioned as a group of people having a completely alien set of civilizational morals and values. These narratives invoke anti-African, anti-black and anti-Muslim discourse. A Facebook post depicting the German chancellor Angela Merkel in a burqa, 'the future of Muslim Germany', was out up by the leader of Harmony Centre who is also the Mayor of Riga and also posted a Russian-language satirical video indicating the increased crime rate that would occur with the arrival of refugees in Latvia. The influence of racial discourse on Russian television is significant here as it depicts the refugee crisis as resulting from multiculturalism bringing the demise of the European political project. This most recent phase in the history of the exclusionary Latvian nation is

embedded in strong, majority opposition to asylum seekers and refugees and interconnections with political leadership and mainstream political party discourse. The new Prime Minister of Latvia, Maris Kucinskis, who took office in February 2016, heads the same coalition as the previous government: two centre-right parties, the agrarian Union of Greens and Farmers and the Unity party, and the conservative National Alliance party which has, and continues to, press for a stronger exclusionary stance as a condition of its support. Kucinskis also recently took the view that 'refugees do not want to come to Latvia', yet despite this rhetoric, the European contagion of constructing new border fences and walls has also infected Latvian governmentality with a new fence being constructed on its Russian border. Attempting to stop illegal immigration through this Russian route, Latvia's new 17 million euro, 92-km high-security fence will include movement sensors, high-tech cameras and old-fashioned barbed wire and construction began in 2016.

Conclusion

The future for these three Baltic, racial states will be determined by the interconnected processes of globalization and Europeanization and the specific and differentiated exclusive political projects seeking to defend and preserve national ethnoracial uniqueness which are currently playing out (Plakans 2011). The refugee crisis has provided a terrain in which forgotten, hidden and denied exclusivist racisms have been laid bare exposing the dominant political narrative of racism-free states as absurd. Calls to 'close Europe' due to the inability of states to 'absorb' migrants, for example, by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in March 2016, and for the Baltic states to erect fences on their borders with Russia and Belarus to halt feared and unregulated new migrant movements shape accelerating internal racisms. Russian and European political and media discourse are also contributing to these processes.

This chapter has highlighted the ways in which the process of racialization has been central to evolving nationalisms, for example, in the case of the narration of the Lithuanian nation where the myth of shared descent was elaborated as a key mechanism tying together this biologically distinct

group of people as a patriarchal peasant family (Balkelis 2009). Nations have been imagined, re-activated and forged as comprising a genetically separated people enabling lines of inclusion and exclusion to be drawn. Each of the national movements told a different story, but they were similarly engaged in this process of articulating the connections between race and nation. Here, creating nations where none had existed required an immense cultural and political project, and racial differentiation was one key tool in building the case for independence. Hierarchies of 'peoples' were determined by the relative development of culture/nations. So, we have a central linkage between clearly demarcated groups of people and social/cultural hierarchies. This varying and contested discourse of national identity provided fertile soil for the construction of national-biological-racial chains of meaning shaped by prevailing, dominant international expert regimes of truth regarding the central scientific reality of race, racial hierarchies and the racial origin of nations. This process was at the core of the shaping of Baltic nationalisms, but with specific characteristics and features in each case, as these were interactively constructed in the new narratives of national identity and embedded in state and institutional practices. This chapter has also identified that these Baltic regimes were also operating, institutionalizing and implementing eugenicist policies and programmes in the inter-war period with early establishment of expert and professional societies and networks in the 1920s, with Estonia a leader in the field. Eugenic discourse with its use of ideas of racial character, quality of blood, genetic purity, national vitality, feeblemindedness, inferiority and sterilization complemented the wider nation-building projects which 'homogenise the nation ethnically, genetically and racially to form a racial state' (Felder 2013a, b, p. 6). This involved defining the state in biological terms through national regeneration and pursuit of a eugenics agenda by bio-medical elites and politicians.

In the slow process whereby these three Baltic states' have sought to acknowledge, recognize and memorialize the Holocaust and the Porajmos, it has always been contextualized and in some ways overshadowed by the lasting significance of what replaced Nazi occupation, Soviet occupation and its transformation into Soviet colonialism (Annus 2011). This process of political and economic dominance parallels classic Western colonialism with its vision of remaking the worldview of the people under

repression. But as Epi Annus (2011) emphasizes, in ideological terms, Soviet colonialism produced the reverse: a colonialism that actually created an idealized Western imaginary in opposition to the Soviet modernist project. The perception of the Baltic states as more civilized, enlightened and superior contrasted to that of the Soviet metropolis which was positioned as the reverse: uncivilized, barbarian and 'Oriental'. This implicit racial ordering had three effects. Firstly, the dominance of a discourse of victimhood which can work to silence other claims for recognition of suffering and humanitarian concern. Secondly, the reinforcement of a hierarchical worldview from which the making of reactions and responses to events and peoples both within and without can be made sense of and understood. Thirdly, the further building of Baltic racialization as a narrative of legitimated exclusion to be carried forward in political projects of attending to the nation. Post independence, the strength of ethnonational boundaries in the Baltic states was remarkable, bolstered by the political project of securing, protecting and empowering the core nation (Brubaker 2011). The legacy of the formation of ethnoracial, exclusionary nations in the Baltic and the differing, but interconnected, histories of these three states have provided a frame of meaning through which contemporary migrations, events and responses have been shaped.

These states have sought to present themselves as free of institutional racism, structural racism and state racism with a strong multicultural heritage of openness and cross-cultural respect. Historical and contemporary amnesia with regard to the racialized making of the state and the exclusionary character of national discourse together with a social environment conducive to the development of hostility to the entry of ethnoracially marked migrants were then evident in this approach. This position derives from a particular conception of racism as to do with 'isolated instances' and unconnected individual actions at the margins of Baltic societies. Lacking a history of direct involvement in racialized African and Asian colonization and being a victim of Soviet colonization positions these 'core' nations as being outside racial discourse. Local, internal targets of hostility include Russians, Poles, Jews and Roma/Gypsies, and external groups, foreigners particularly non-Westerners, for example, Chinese migrants, Africans and Muslims. The new opposition to ethnoracially marked migrants is also bringing new alliances of 'core' peoples and Russian speakers together.

Baltic race governance involves increasing condemnation of sporadic racist violence, denial of any mainstream problems of racism within the state and within broader society, denial of the intrinsic connections between racism and nationalism and, further, complete denial of the significance of European slavery and colonialism and the international circulation of varying racialized discourses, despite their place within the European political project. Racism and racialized governance in these contemporary social formations are stratified by a complex set of embedded, ingrained, dynamic racist discourses and practices with a sharpening of tension and conflict between the opposing social forces of racism, with its internal and external targets of hate, and antiracism, with its narratives of inclusion and multiculture.

3

Racism in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine

Nikolay Zakharov, Ian Law and Aliaksei Lastouski

This chapter examines the racial conditions in three more post-Soviet contexts and considers the pattern of historical and contemporary racial trajectories in the development of these states. It also assesses comparative and relational questions in the final section.

"Belarus Means White Russia": Race and Racism in Europe's Last Dictatorship

Belarus is a blind spot in post-Soviet scholarship. Often referred to as Europe's last dictatorship, Belarus is characterized by an authoritarian political regime and top-down nation-building. Against the background of neighboring Russia and Ukraine, Belarus appears to be a remnant Soviet republic—and therefore a state that is expected to actively condemn racism and to promote multiculturalism. Indeed, according to the official statistics, the incidence of racist violence is lower than in the neighboring

Aliaksei is a co-author of this chapter

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0_3

countries. Also, as was the case with the Soviet Union, Belarus is in a state of denial, using the whole arsenal of discursive tools. If the Soviet Union located racism exclusively in western countries, Belarus places racism in neighboring Russia, the Baltic states, and Ukraine. Thereby the Belarusian leadership highlights the advantages of its model of social development and justifies the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenko. Again, as was the case in the Soviet Union, the alleged absence of racism in "the last Soviet republic" is among the most widely advertised achievement. This absence is both articulated by the academic community and the government, and presented as an important competitive advantage for Belarus in the global competition for investments and human resources.

According to Kizima (2012), the desire of the Belarusian government to develop tolerance would allow Chinese professionals and tourists to feel themselves much more comfortable in Belarus than, for example, in Ukraine, Germany, or Russia, given their network of extremist organizations, attacking Chinese citizens on the basis of racist prejudice. The media would also not go the way of blowing up any anti-Chinese hysteria among their audiences.

Anti-racism of Belarusians is presented as their innate, primordial trait, and thereby it becomes essentialized and almost biologized. One of the most enduring and repetitively stereotyped traits of Belarusians is tolerance, to imply their supposedly laid-back manner of treatment of minorities (primarily national and religious), their denial of aggressive behavior, and peacefulness. This stereotype has been entrenched and even the Belarusian anthem begins with "We, the Belarusians, are peaceful people". Given that, at the present time, Belarus is close to the ideal of a mono-ethnic state (according to the 2009 census, Belarusians made up 85 % of the population, and the main minorities—Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians—were culturally close to the dominant nation), the origins of tolerance are usually traced back to the times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (fourteenth–seventeenth centuries) and the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth (seventeenth–eighteenth centuries). The dominant representation of these periods appears like "multi-ethnicity of the Commonwealth and, more specifically, its openness to migrants" (Kakolewski 2012, p. 34). In the fourteenth century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania received Tatars and Karaites. Up until now, Belarus preserves several enclaves of Tatars, who for centuries have kept their own identity and the Muslim faith. From the

fifteenth century onward, Jews escaping persecutions in Western Europe were moving in these lands, where they managed to establish themselves quite quickly, by actively engaged in trade and finance. After the partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century, all Belarusian lands became part of the Russian Empire. In the second half of the nineteenth century, social and ethnic structure of the population was as follows: the local aristocracy maintained loyalty to the Polish State and Catholicism, local administrations were staffed by officials that the imperial machine regularly supplied from Central Russia, the city was crowded with Jewish merchants and craftsmen, but the village retained its Belarusian ethnic character (Tereshkovich 2004).

In the post-Soviet period, the symbolism of tolerance has become one of the most important elements in the attempts to construct a state ideology by the regime of Alexander Lukashenko, who has been elected in 1994 as the first and still the only president of the country. The authorities promote the image of Belarusians as a wise, rightful, and tolerant nation, while the country at large is described using a metaphor of "crystal vessel", nourished and cherished by the President. "You know, we have built a healthy civil society in Belarus, so we are not afraid of anything, especially of any radical ideas. Historically, we have had a serious vaccination against such destructive tendencies as Nazism", MP Valery Borodenya once claimed (gazeta.ru 2015). This stereotype has been fixed in public consciousness: Belarusians describe themselves as hospitable and helpful, peacefully and respectful of other peoples, and also as tolerant of minorities (Naumenko 2012, p. 64).

If we try to compare the Belarusians with other nations, the tolerance aura partly vanishes. According to experts of the Institute of Economics and Peace, publishing their annual "Global Peace Index", Belarus in 2014 was in the 92nd position out of 162 countries. But in a subgroup of post-Soviet countries, Belarus was second only to Moldova and far ahead of Russia, which ended up at the "bottom" of the list, holding the 152nd position (http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf). Belarus also holds a comparative position in terms of support of anti-Semitism. According to the 2014 Global Index of Anti-Semitism by Anti-Defamation League, the level of support for anti-Semitic stereotypes ("Jews have too much influence in the world economy", "Jews think they are better than other

people", "Jews control the world's media", "Jews are responsible for most of the wars in the world") was estimated at 38 %, which is certainly high, but it is absolutely identical to the level of anti-Semitism in neighboring Ukraine and Lithuania. Once again, we see that Belarus has common characteristics with other Eastern European countries without standing out for its tolerance (http://global100.adl.org/).

The following data indicates the contradictions and simultaneous interconnection of racist projects on the western edge of the former Soviet Union, which is something rather typical of the post-Soviet racism. The first Belarusian, who received the award from President Petro Poroshenko, was Siarhei Karotkikh (nickname Maluta) who was infamous in Belarus for his ties with the Russian National Unity movement. Although Belarusian nationalists have actively taken the Ukrainian side in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict by fighting on the side of Ukraine, some authors conclude that, in the future, the Russian Nazis could well team up with Belarusian nationalists (Lastouski 2015, pp. 16–7).

Race-Thinking and Belarusian Nation-Building

The first race-anthropological studies of the local population took place as projects of imperial racial studies in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to the official ideology of the Russian Empire, Belarusian lands were a territory reclaimed by the Russian State and something originally belonging to Russia. Any evident variations from the ideal type of the Russian people were attributed to a temporary "pollution" by such alien influences as the "Polish spirit", Catholicism, and Jewish migrants—who had "messed up" not only the language but also the racial type of the local people. "To study the effect of extraneous impurities of blood in the Northwestern Territory"—this task was formulated for these studies by Anatoly Bogdanov, head of the Moscow Society of Naturalists. As a result of one of the first anthropological expeditions conducted by A. Yanchuk in the Minsk province in 1886, such distinctive features of the Belarusians were singled out as "high cheekbones". These supposedly Mongoloid features were at the time explained by possible mixing with the local Tatars (Tereshkovich 2004, p. 16). A

somewhat broader interocular distance to be found among Belarusians was referred to as imparting "Mongoloid expression" to their faces. At the same time, a frequent occurrence of Belarusians with blue eyes was explained as resulted from the neighborhood with the blond and blue-eyed peoples of the Baltic Sea Coast (Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns) (Marfina 2015). In general, racial studies conducted by anthropologists in the late imperial period of the nineteenth–early twentieth centuries were certainly dominated by the "paradigm of mixing", corresponding with the then disciplinary practices of returning the "Russian spirit" to the Northwestern Territory.

Quite naturally, this required an intellectual response from the emerging Belarusian nationalists. Representatives of the latter could not conduct anthropological studies, but they proposed new theoretical concepts in response, namely they promoted the Aryan primordial purity of Belarus and Belarusians. Their racial ideas were intermingled with new theories of ethnogenesis of Belarusians, and their main practical task was to make for a cultural and historical distance between Belarusians and Russians. The terms "Belarusians" and "Belarus" appeared weak in this regard, so the idea was put forward of an alternative, mythological Kriviya, the ancient powerful state of the Krivichy, later to engender the modern Belarusians. Part of the Belarusian intellectuals of the time (especially Vaclau Lastouski and Janka Stankevich) actively campaigned for the introduction of new ethnonyms—Kriviya and Krivichi, but these attempts had no success. However, these concepts have been revived in the new cultural and political circumstances of independent Belarus.

The origin of the Krivichy/Belarusians in mythologized national narratives was associated with the Aryan race. Janka Stankevich describes their ancient history as a history of mixing of Aryan tribes with pre-Aryan peoples as a result of displacement whereby "individual Aryan branches ceased to be pure". But unlike Russians and Ukrainians, who arose as a result of mixing with pre-Aryan peoples, Belarusians became a result of the merger of Slavs with Balts, the two "pure" and "closest" Aryan peoples (Stankevich 2003, p. 48–49). Moreover, in his poetically inspired reading of Belarusian history, Vaclau Lastouski identifies Kriviya with mythological Hyperborea, the ancestral home of the ancient Aryans. Later, in 1943, in Nazi-occupied Minsk, he published a compendium of the history of

the country (published again in independent Belarus, in the early 1990s), where he referred to German scientist Pochet in his assumption that “the ancestral home of the Aryans was Belarus” (Naydzyuk and Kasyak 1943). Obviously, this identification was intended to legitimize local collaborators in the eyes of the occupation authorities, who attributed great importance to the racial theory.

The discourse of the Aryan origins of Belarusians was closely connected to another ethnogenetical myth—that of the primordial purity of Belarusians. In his ethnographic sketch of the Belarusians, the founder of the Belarusian academic historiography Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolskiy (1909) argued that Belarusians represented the purest type among the Slavs. In his opinion, the Belarusian tribe never mingled with other peoples, unlike the Great Russians, who occupied the Finnish land and mingled there with local tribes. In a more recent monograph “History of Belarus”, written in 1925–1926 but never published in the Soviet Belarus for political reasons, Dovnar-Zapolskiy (2011, p. 24) returned to his idea of Belarus as the purest Slavic tribe: “in the historical past of Belarus, there are no elements of mingling”, in contrast to the Ukrainians (“who have a lot of impurities from Turkish blood”), and the Great Russian tribe (“which is a result of crossing between the Slavic tribe with the Finns and Turks”). In his “Short History of Belarus” (the first edition of the essay is dated 1919), Usevalad Ihnatouski states that “the Belarusian tribe has never mixed with peoples of other races throughout its history”. The author admits some ethnographic influence on Belarusians only by Lithuanians, who are supposed to be the same “Aryans” as Belarusians and Poles. Naturally for him, Ukrainians and Russians have no racial purity, since they lived for centuries under the Turkish–Mongol yoke and actively mixed with these tribes. It is notable that Ihnatouski was one of the key representatives of national communism and held key positions in the academic hierarchy of the Byelorussian SSR in the 1920s (successively, People’s Commissar of Education and President of the Academy of Sciences), and his textbook was reissued four times.

In his “Geography of Belarus” (the main Geography textbook in the Byelorussian SSR in the 1920s) Arcadz’ Smolich also argued that the Belarusians were the purest Slavic people, and in this respect, he opposed them to their eastern Moscow neighbor, formed by mixing of Slavic

colonists with Mongolians and Finns. Here racial traits were mixed up with cultural arguments: the facial features of the Belarusians were supposedly thin and soft, "as with the true Europeans and Slavs", and the whole structure of their bodies was reported to be "more delicate than to be found amongst the Muscovites" (Smolich 1922, p. 113–115). According to Rudling (2014), these ideas did not appear in a vacuum, and Lastouski, Ihnatouski as well as other Belarusian nationalists shared racialist narratives about Mongol-blooded Russians with many Polish and German nationalists. Notions of an alternative, "white" Slavic group, supposedly clean of a Mongol imprint, should be seen within the framework of racializing discourses that were strong across Europe during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The narrative of racial purity of Belarusians, situated at the easternmost outpost of European civilization, not only served the Belarusian nationalists' own self-image but was partly intended for internal consumption—namely, for those nationalists who believed that a pure racial status could increase self-confidence as well as social and political status of their own group.

However, local population gave little support to these nationalist projects interspersed with racial perceptions. Belarusian peasants lived in the environment dominated by local identity. Racial knowledge in Belarus was not consensual, because it was distributed only among intellectuals. Racialization of the entire social fabric in this part of Eurasia usually requires either the universal literacy, all-pervading propaganda, or a large-scale racist practices by the state (Zakharov 2015, p. 33). While the most important issue for the nationalist ideologists was to distance Belarusians from Russians and Poles (to include building their own, fictional hierarchy of racial superiority), but it was the Jewish issue that used to be the most important problem in terms of racial and ethnic relations in Belarus. Attitudes toward Jews varied. In peasant consciousness, Jews were "alien selves", cunning scoundrels (due to their involvement in trade), but religiously and culturally incomprehensible (Belova 2005; Chernyavskaya 2010). However, the lack of any pronounced ideological anti-Semitism among the peasants did not prevent the pogroms at the turn of the twentieth century, the gravest of which took place in the revolutionary years of 1905–1906. Dissatisfied with the restrictions by the tsarist government, the local Jewish milieu became the fertile ground for revolutionary

organizations. This, in turn, gave even more acute chauvinistic pretexts for conservative forces ("Black Hundred"), engaged in active anti-Semitic propaganda on the territory of Belarus—they considered the Jews as an enemy of the tsarist Russia. Darius Staliunas (2015, p. 234–5) connects the scale of pogroms in the Belarusian provinces with a mobilization of masses using the ideas of Russian nationalism and imperial loyalty.

At this time Belarusian nationalism was still gaining strength. Deriving their rhetorical support from the village, Belarusian nationalists consisted mainly of intellectuals and petty aristocracy who tended to consider the Jews as their allies in the struggle against the tsarist government. Instead, Poles and Russians became an important "other", from whom nationalists had to dissociate themselves, such as through the supposed uniqueness of their own language, ethnic culture, and history. In their first historical narratives by the turn of the twentieth century, Belarusian nationalists depicted Poles and Russian oppressors as people who had robbed the Belarusian statehood and imposed a foreign language and culture. Moreover, you could find there some derogatory stereotypes, such as references to the slavish spirit, supposedly eternally inherent in "Muscovites".

In the context of the collapse of the tsarist Russia in 1918, the national intelligentsia created the first truly Belarusian state, Belarusian People's Republic (BPR), which quickly disappeared in the fire of the Polish–Soviet war. However, the next wave of pogroms across the territory of Belarus in 1919–1921 was connected with the activity of units under the command of General Stanislaw Bulak-Bulahovich, who tried to create an armed and capable army in the protection of the BPR. These units supported a stereotypical "zhidokommunists" view—to imply the Bolsheviks inspired and led by Jews—that was circulated by anti-Bolshevik forces during the civil war. The BPR leadership themselves could not stop the massacre, since they had been deposed by that time (Rudling 2014, p. 175).

The establishment of Soviet power brought to Belarus the Soviet rhetoric of internationalism, at its early stages rhetorically focused on the elimination of the injuries inflicted by imperialism and presupposing the affirmative action toward various minorities (Martin 2001). Soviet Belarus became the ground for experiments—despite the fact that, throughout the 1920s, representatives of indigenous peoples were actively recruited

into the administration, and the Belarusian culture was promoted, and Jews did not have their rights infringed. Moreover, Yiddish became one of the official languages of Soviet Belarus (along with Belarusian, Polish, and Russian). However, the heyday of Jewish culture in Soviet Minsk was fleeting—in the early 1930s, the support of the national cultural policy was discontinued, and the Belarusian as well as Jewish intelligentsia was physically destroyed as a result of Stalinist repressions (Bemporad 2013).

Another ordeal was World War II, which brought to these lands the racial projects of the Third Reich. Since Belarusians were not assigned any special place in the strategic plans of the Nazis, they were to be subjected to the overall racial policy toward the eastern Slavs, who were expected to vacate this territory in favor of the "superior race". The local population witnessed mass extermination of Jews as an embodiment of the Nazi racial policy (Snyder 2010). The local police also took an active part in the implementation of the Holocaust (Dean 1999), although the extent of the collaboration and participation of Belarusians in the extermination of Jews still remain controversial (Rein 2013).

However, the experience of this war for Belarusians has become more important in other respects—a huge loss of population and the large-scale participation in the partisan movement were later used to form a heroic image of the "partisan republic". The image of the Belarusians as the winners of Nazism has become so entrenched that it currently is dominant in the pro-official historical memory and the official project of national identity. This has become reflected in the attitude toward any manifestations of racial or ethnic discrimination. The latter has become discursively impossible in the "country that defeated fascism".

After World War II, Belarus became a model Soviet republic dominated by the Russian language as well as the common Soviet culture, dominated by this language. In place of the exterminated Jews, the cities quickly were filled with migrants from Belarusian villages who quickly switched to Russian language as their social mobility instrument. In contrast to the Baltic countries that experienced massive waves of migration from other Soviet republics in the post-war period, this was not generally the case in Belarus, where the majority of incomers were people with similar cultural parameters, from Russia and Ukraine (Bohn 2008).

"Racial Purity" of the Belarusians: The Authoritarian Autarchy Between the West and Russia

If anthropologists in imperial Russia diligently sought in Belarusians signs of racial mixing, the anthropology of modern Belarus performs a different task—they point to the autochthonous nature and purity of the local people. Recently, a most significant and widely discussed research is the book by Dr. Sci. Biol Alexei Mikulic "Belarusians in genetic space. Anthropology of an ethnic group", published in 2005. Based on 30 years of his research of the gene pool of about 120 selected groups, the author has come to a conclusion that the geographical structure of the modern Belarusians gene pool corresponds to the ancient archaeological cultures. The populations of indigenous people of Belarus can be traced genetically for no less than 130–140 generations, back to the middle of the second millennium BC at the latest. The antiquity of the Belarusian nation is strengthened by its purity—the genetic studies have not revealed any signs of the Mongoloid race in Belarusians, which is clearly different from the gene pool of the population of Russia belonging to the same cluster as the Ugro-Finnic ethnic groups (Mikulich 2005). Awarding the State Prize to the author demonstrated the usefulness of such research results in modern Belarus.

Another important academic and ideological discussion has been about the ethnogenesis of Belarusians—more precisely, about the ratio of Slavonic and Balt elements in this process. The "pure Slavic tribe" statement is not dominant and is challenged by a scientific version of Balta origin of Belarusians. A range of Balticisms have been identified in the Belarusian language as a result of archaeological excavations and anthropological studies. These are used to create the synthetic theory of the Balta origin of the Belarusians. The main provisions of this theory are as follows: genetic continuity of the local population for thousands of years, the lack of impact of migration on the formation of the anthropological type of Belarusians, recognition of Slavic migrations to have an exclusively cultural influence, proximity of Belarus to the Baltic peoples (Dzermant and San'ko 2005). All these postulates acquire meaning only within a broader cultural and political project, where approval of Balt

roots of the Belarusians merges with pagan traditionalism and sympathy to the European "New Right". The Balt idea is propagated by "Kriviya" Center of Ethnocosmology, which publishes "Druvis" almanac that has gathered a large number of Belarusian intellectuals. But after the ideological migration of one of its leaders, the movement is in obvious crisis.

Within the movement, the Balta paganism faction is opposed by a small but active core of supporters of Slavic paganism, or Rodnovers. Their key figure is Vladimir Satsevich, the organizer of a number of congresses, seminars, and conferences by Rodnovers from neighboring countries but held in Belarus since the early 2000s. Rodnovers are concerned about the revival of the "traditional" Slavic culture and faith, presently contaminated by alien "Abrahamic religions". The racial component plays great importance in it, whereby only genetically indigenous people of the "Russian Land" are supposed to have full membership in the movement. Satsevich emphasizes the intrinsic value of "blood and soil", calls for the construction of the Slavic socialism based on Slavic blood and genetics (Shnirelman 2012a, b). Unlike the intellectual Balta traditionalism, Slavic Rodnovers has acquired certain support from the Belarusian authorities, and even some representatives of the official beau monde actively involved in their events.

The section of this chapter that analyzed racialization as making discussed various intellectual projects concerned with the origin of the Belarusians and the purity of blood. But Belarus also witnesses various radical subcultures, whose representatives also approach the racial theme, thus contributing to racial formation through doing race in their everyday. First of all, right-wing skinheads should be noted who actively support the ideology of National Socialism and racial superiority. In Belarus, skinheads appeared around 1996, primarily under the influence of Russia. In Minsk, skinheads have always been closely associated with the movement of football fans (especially those supporting Minsk "Dynamo"), where it is quite difficult to draw the line between the right-wing fans and skinheads. In addition to the usual football hooliganism and informal communication, fans and skinheads organize physical training sessions (especially in martial arts) and concerts, and participate in collisions with their ideological opponents, "anti-fascists". It is very difficult to assess the scale of the movement, but according to one of the leaders, it was about

300 people in the early 2000s (http://www.stigmata.name/wolves.php). But even with the passage of time (and the destruction of the most active organizations), this estimate is highly conditional. Among the skinhead counterculture, unstable and situational gangs prevail. There are only some groups of skinheads who try to achieve organizational stability by developing their own ideology. It is necessary to note a significant shift in the political ideas shared by Belarusian skinheads—from Russian chauvinism and Pan-Slavism to adaptation of the Belarusian nationalistic views (Lastouski 2008, p. 112–3).

However, part of the radical youth groups in Belarus continues to support the idea of Slavic brotherhood grounded on the ideas of imperial revival and racial purity ("Buried or Glorious", part of the football fans, etc.). Huge importance is attributed to preserving a common cultural space with Russia, wherefrom comes and then widely distributed various literature, such as in the very center of Minsk, where you can always spot several book traders proposing books of anti-Semitic or racist content.

"Internal Others" in the Post-colonial Society of the "Peoples' Friendship"

Racial knowledge consists of how various conceptions of race are utilized in current mainstream discourses. Racial knowledge in Belarusian elite discourses is centered on the three interconnected nodes of hybridity, "the Third World", and the "human material" (*chelovecheskiy material*). Statements about Jews, migrant workers, and nationally "irresponsible" Belarusians provide an ideal material for the discourse of these three elements of racial knowledge. Therefore, the central nodes of the racial knowledge in Lukashenko's statements are absolutely the same as those that were identified in the racist discourse in neighboring Russia (Zakharov 2015).

Lukashenka in his long interview with Ioffe reveals all sorts of racial prejudices that are wide –spread in Belarus:

> The Ukrainian differs from Russians somewhat more, but how can one separate the Russian from the Belarusians! It's impossible! We talk the same

> way, we think the same way. We are absolutely alike. We have a lot of mixed blood both here and there. We are very close. But still the Belarusian is the Russian, only with a quality mark. This is because Poles and Jews were driven to Belarus. And they added their best qualities to ours. And everything got mixed (cited from Ioffe 2014, p. 211–2).

He is also calculating the percentage of "Jewish blood" various politicians possess and the manner in which it will affect their character and decisions they make—"as every Jew he [personal friend of Lukashenka] has a talent in something" (Ioffe 2014, p. 246)

It is closely linked to the type of social racism common in the economically developed westernmost ex-Soviet republics. As in neighboring Ukraine and Baltic states, the traumatic experience of transition to a market economy has intensified racialization of those who "do not fit into the market". Opposite the Lukashenka's type but the most common form of racialization affecting Belarusians is their labeling as "kolkhozniks", the rural, those who could not get rid of their "unaffiliation" to Europe. This tradition of post-colonial reflection is based on the burden left with the post-Soviet Belarus and is something that a leading independent Belarusian journalist Kvyatkouski demonstrates using the following reflections:

In many countries in Africa and the Caribbean, locals build their social hierarchy according to skin color, with a white man at the top and the blackest at the bottom. Between them, there are 50 shades of coffee with milk. At the end of the 1940s, Belarusian villagers appeared at the bottom of the hierarchy in Minsk, where the vantage grounds were occupied by Party comrades from Moscow. Even ordinary workers kept to be sent to Minsk [from Russia], while the locals mastered worker specialties. The social "mulatto" from "urban proletariat residences" discriminated recent villagers as "blacks". If Africans could not change their color, the Belarusian peasants did everything to get rid of their "non-urban" appearance and of the natural Belarusian pronunciation.

In the face of growing authoritarianism a mechanism is increasingly activated of racial exclusion by relegating the fellow countrymen to a status of the human material and as those predisposed to slavery and subjected to despotism. "The tension between the country's national

intelligentsia and the people mounted in 1994, after the presidential election. The hard working, blue-eyed, talented 'people', so much better than Russians, Poles, and Lithuanians turned into a "sick nation, who does not understand what it needs". Some went even further and referred to the people as 'genetically impaired', or as products of 'genetic genocide'" (Brzozovska 2004, p. 84). In the traumatic getting rid of the post-colonial notion of Belarus as part of the "Third World" ("Either Russia grabs it or the West subordinates it, perhaps more subtly—but one way or the other it would still be a colony" (cited from Ioffe 2014, p. 196), not only for Lukashenko but also for many of his opponents and intellectuals, Russia is associated with the Soviet Union and is declared responsible for the Chernobyl catastrophe.

In Lukashenko's post-colonial imagination, Jews constitute both the "outer other" (as representatives of Western political and business circles) and the "internal other"—who once immigrated from the Pale of Settlement, which included most of the territory of present-day Belarus. Post-colonial imagination brings together Jews and Russians, presenting them as colonizers, at the same time belonging to the Belarusian cultural body. "Ungrateful" Jews are rich and politically influential, but not loyal to their former homeland.

If you were in Bobruisk, you saw how the city looked. It was dirty as a pigsty. It used to be largely a Jewish city and you know how Jews treat the place in which they live. Look at Israel. I've been there. By no means I want to offend them, but they do not take as great care of, say, mowing grass as they do in Russia or Belarus. Bobruisk was some town. Since they were dwelling to live in, the residents did not care about the rest. Whether the buildings were wooden or brick—it was fine with them; whether the street was paved or not—fine as well. It was some town. We put it in order and we are telling the Israeli Jews: Guys, come back, come back with the money (cited from Ioffe 2014, p. 161).

Lukashenko's stereotypes of Jews almost word for word coincide with the stereotypes by villagers and former villagers who were interviewed by Belova (2005). To disavow his statement about "dirty" Jews, being confronted by the interviewer with Jewish roots, Lukashenko embarks on a lengthy discussion of the racial and cultural characteristics of different peoples.

Jews are never dirty, they are exceptionally cleanly. They have a habit of creative disorder, they can forget where they put things. But they would never poke around in the mud. A Jew would take a shower several times a day (Ioffe 2014, p. 210).

Belova (2005) states that Jews and Roma, who were viewed as having a different appearance, were the primary aliens for the Eastern Slavs, whose folk classifications of peoples were characterized by grades of difference ranging from "alien" to "other", to "our own". For example, Turks, Tatars, and Jews were united in the minds of those living in Belarus during the late nineteenth century by the fact that they did not eat pork. Both the basis and explanation of difference changed with modernization and the spread of "scientific" racial knowledge. An informant born in 1910 explained the "smell of the other" by a legend connected with the Biblical Exodus as a punishment for greed—Jews tried to save the partridges God had sent them as food, and they came to smell of the birds that subsequently rotted. An informant born in 1969 instead speaks of the smell of sweat as a racial marker—"Jews come from nomads, and that is given in their genes" (Belova 2005: 59). Informants also single out the racial character of smell through a comparison of Jews with the Roma: "Gypsies are dirty, but they do not smell; Jews are clean and well-dressed, but they smell" (Belova 2005: 60).

The economic difficulties faced by the independent Belarus in the early 1990s did not contribute to migration. The main sources of new migrants were Russia and Ukraine. According to the 2009 census, most of the inhabitants of the country who were born abroad—were born in Russia (50 %) and Ukraine (17 %). A markedly increased inflow of migrants from southern countries in the last decade consists mostly of students. Of the 12,000 foreign students in Belarus in 2013, most (54 %) were Turkmen, followed by students from Russia (17 %), China (12 %), Azerbaijan (2.7 %), Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Iran. With regard to labor migration in Belarus, these are mainly citizens of Ukraine (7000), China (3000), Turkey (1300), Lithuania, and Uzbekistan (1200) (Yaroshevich 2014). In 2013, the number of migrants doubled, but the authorities did not consider this as a trouble. President Alexander Lukashenko in his public speeches welcomes labor migration, which can be explained by demographic problems in Belarus, experiencing a natural decline in

population since the early 1990s. Moreover, the national demographic security program for 2011–2015 presupposes an increased influx of immigrants as one of the measures aimed at correcting the negative trends in the population. The last powerful wave of migration is linked to the military conflict in Ukraine, when about 27–30 000 Ukrainians arrived in Belarus, according to the assessment publicly announced by Alexander Lukashenko on October 17, 2014. The Belarusian state has relaxed the rules for registration and obtaining work permits by Ukrainian refugees.

A relatively small number of migrants and the lack of competition for employment result in a small number of registered ethnic and racial conflicts in Belarus. Refuting the myth of tolerance, migrant Muslim interviewees indicate the frequent occurrence of domestic conflicts (discrimination in terms of access to rental housing, parents' disapproval of Muslim wooers, etc.) (Alampiev 2013, p. 138), but they also admit that open clashes are rare.

Despite the numerous statements by the country's leadership and the general vector of their migration policy, the attitude toward immigrants is far from being serene. In a 2013 study among Minsk residents, respondents' various proportions considered immigrants as undesirable in Belarus: 41.9 % spoke against immigrants from Central Asian republics, 31.1 %—from East Asian countries, 38.6 %—from Africa, 43.5 %—from the republics of the Caucasus region, 54.3 %—from Arab and other Middle Eastern Islamic states. By contrast, only 3.0 % of respondents spoke against immigrants from Russia and Ukraine, 3.6 %—from the Baltic states, 4.7 %—from the Western European countries (Alampiev 2013, p. 139). This evidence is consistent with the results of observations of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies that registered the phenomenon of "social distance" by citizens of Belarus with regard to representatives of other nations and countries. Russians proved to be the closest ethnic group to Belarusians in purely domestic aspects—almost all Belarusians were ready to be Russian colleagues at work, and every second respondent was willing to accept a Russian in their families. Almost on par Belarusians perceived Orthodox Ukrainians and Catholic Poles. However, the majority of people in Belarus had their limit of tolerance toward representatives of more distant cultures as low as agreeing only to live with them in one locality—but better yet, in other

places of Belarus. Of course, mixed marriages is a sensitive issue in such a case—only 1.5 % of the surveyed residents of Belarus are ready to accept Africans in their family, 2.1 %—could tolerate Arabs, 2.2 %—of representatives of the Caucasus (Manajew and Drakochrust 2012, pp. 33–34).

Attitudes to the Roma remain another key issue to determine the limits of tolerance in Belarus. Despite the fact that they are one of the traditional minorities, residing in Belarus since the fifteenth century (Crowe 2007), the attitude to them is much more intolerant than in relation to the other classical "others", Jews and Tatars (Belova 2005). According to the 2009 census, there were 7079 registered Roma, but we should take into account the inaccuracy of censuses with regard to this ethnic group—the Roma community themselves assess that around 60,000 of Roma reside in Belarus (http://romaintegration.by/?page_id=5). Despite all the repressive attempts to include them in the processes of education and employment, the integration of Roma in the Belarusian society still remains a challenge. The Belarusian authorities actively involve in various international projects for the social integration of Roma. However, a specialized study has demonstrated that hate speech against the Roma is abundant in Belarusian information resources, they face discrimination in employment, Roma settlements are transformed into ghettos, their relationships with law enforcement agencies are also far from the idyll (hate speech, forced fingerprinting, arbitrary detention, seizure of vehicles) (http://news.tut.by/society/440710.html). Most of the Roma in Belarus have no passports, and only 2 % of them have higher education. The attitude to the Roma is still an important indicator, testifying that the superficial tolerance and patience in fact conceals the widespread xenophobic sentiments among Belarusians.

Conclusion

The autostereotype (autosuggestion) of tolerance links with people's own ideas about racial purity that also has certain implicit racial connotations. The myth of "purity" of Belarusians proves to be very important for the self-assertion of Belarusian nationalism, dignity, and other advantages inherent in Belarusians and not to be found in their neighbors.

With time, it persisted by splintering into two main variations. In its version of radical ethnocultural nationalism it now serves to justify the superiority over the neighboring peoples, whose spirit and culture result from confusion and acceptance of alien blood (and inevitably there are connotations of degeneration). In this regard, Belarus presents the last bastion of European civilization before the aggressive and barbaric race of "Muscovites". Another side of the myth of Belarusians' purity has become part of the state ideology, whereby Belarusians appear to be the most "pure" Slavs. Belarusians claim to be unique not because of their unique ethnic features but as the most "pure" representatives of the Eastern Slavs who have managed to keep their ethical qualities thanks to their denial of foreign influence and drawing strength "from within". Such an approach is extremely convenient for the establishment of authoritarianism, since this approach denies any global development model in favor of the will and the decisions of the national leader. This way Belarus is imagined to be the last bastion of Slavic civilization, opposing the informational and cultural aggression of the West.

Moldova: Racial Romanization in Multi-ethnic State

Post-Soviet Nation-Building: Moldovans or Romanians?

Moldova is a small country with population of four million and located between the eastern part of Romania and Western Ukraine. The Moldovan state reached its peak during the reign of Stephen the Great (1457–1504). After his death, Moldova became part of the Ottoman Empire, up to the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest, according to which the Prut-Dniester interfluve area received the official name of "Bessarabia" and was ceded to the Russian Empire. In fact, Moldova was at the time divided into two parts: the west, populated by ethnic Romanians (now eastern part of Romania), became the Region of Moldavia, while the eastern part of Moldova, with a significant number of Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Germans,

and Jews, began to be called Bessarabia. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Bessarabia declared independence, but a few months later joined the Kingdom of Romania. Under the 1924 act, Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, now an autonomy within the Ukrainian SSR, included most of Transnistria and part of the present-day Ukraine. When Soviet troops entered the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus in 1939, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum demanding from Romania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The territory of Bessarabia—with the exception of southern Bessarabia and Northern Bessarabia, both included in the Ukraine, alongside Bukovina—was attached to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, now transformed into the Moldavian republic of the Soviet Union with the capital in Chisinau. A large number of workers from Russia and Ukraine were resettled into the eastern part of Moldavia, nowadays making up the territory of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldavian republic. Since then, Russian language has taken a dominant position in this part of Ukraine. The Soviet Union actively pursued a policy of *moldovanizatsia*, strongly promoting cultural and political separation of Moldovans from Romanians. Indigenization of the management apparatus provided a social base for the Moldavian statehood, and thus the country elites, intelligentsia in particular, began feeling tired under the control of Moscow by the end of perestroika. At that time, Moldavian intellectuals launched a search for a new identity, which ended up in a desire to become Romanians and to accede the nation "of their own", all the more so its status appeared more solid than the status of the then Soviet Moldavia. From the time of perestroika, the main dividing line in Moldovan society is the attitude toward the state independence of Moldova and to the definition of national identity. Moldova is unique among all the other post-Soviet states. If in other post-Soviet societies the key factor is nation-building is based on the previous Soviet identity and thus on a citizen still devoted to Moscow, a considerable part of the Moldovan elite consider themselves as Romanians and Moldovan nation as an integral part of the Romanian nation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Moldova faced many challenges including the economic chaos and ethnic conflicts. Prospects for the reunification of Moldova with Romania caused an

extremely negative reaction in the predominantly Russian-speaking part of Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia). In 1990, both regions declared independence from Moldova. After Moldova's declaration of state independence, Gagauzia entered it as an autonomous region, but a lengthy armed conflict in Transnistria prompted this region to leave Moldova as *Pridnestrovie*. In the 1989–1991 period, images of Russians as aliens and invaders were used for reaffirming the national identity of a significant part of Moldovan intellectuals. This was one of the reasons for the aggravation of social confrontation, most strongly manifested in the Russian-speaking separatism in Transnistria. The Russian-speaking minority in Moldova widely shared anti-Romanian sentiments. The election results in Moldova over the last 20 years confirm the overall growth of these sentiments not only among the ethnic Russians, but also among other ethnic and cultural minorities.

Since the mid-1990s, several hundreds of thousands of Moldovans have received Romanian citizenship, which is attractive since it opens possibilities of visa-free travel and work in the European Union (EU). Half of the population of Chisinau declared Romanian as their native language and use it in everyday conversational practice (Guboglo 2010, p. 104). Opting for reunification with Romania, most of the Moldovan elite found themselves in conflict with the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities, which felt themselves a privileged group at the territory of the Moldavian SSR during the Soviet time. For example, ethnic Russians and Jews held a disproportionately higher number of prestigious jobs. Among Moldovans who called themselves Romanians during the 2004 census, the proportion of those with a university degree was 32.3 %, which was 4.8 times more than among Gagauz, and 3.4 times more than among the self-identified Moldovans (Guboglo 2010, p. 105). The overall trend for all the ethnic groups in Moldova is the lowering proportion of marriages with ethnic Russians (Ostapenko and Subbotina 2011, p. 130). During the period of independence, Moldova witnessed a nearly complete removal of ethnic Russians from the sphere of public administration and reduction of their participation in the professions requiring high skills. Ostapenko and Subbotina (2011, p. 154) write: "Moldovan Russians, who were previously placed on some high pedestals and often flying in the clouds, now are down to earth".

Preserving the Moldovan statehood is actively supported by left-wing parties, a significant part of the support to which is provided by ethnic minorities. Ideologists of *moldovizm* also employ racial studies to support their thesis that Moldovans are not Romanians. The well-known historian Stati in his book "History of Moldova" (2012) emphasizes some anthropological differences between the population of medieval Moldavia and Walachia. He emphasizes that these differences were caused not only by long-term development of Moldovans and Vlachs in mutual isolation but also by a variety of ethnic mixing. In the spirit of Soviet historiography, some researchers emphasize the importance of a Slavic component in Moldovans. Thus, Soviet archaeologist Velikanova noted anthropological differences between the population of the Prut-Dniester interfluve area and the Carpathian-Danubian lands. Another aspect that is stressed is that Moldovans and Vlachs lack a myth of common ancestry.

"Roma Are Our Blacks": Anti-Gypsism in Moldova

Racism against Roma led to the spread of a phenomenon of cryptic ethnicity in Moldova. Already in the late nineteenth century, many Roma hided their nationality, so nowadays their share in the country's population is greater than the official statistics show. Experts estimate the number of Roma at 150,000 (Shornikov 2010, p. 176).

According to the ECRI Report on the Republic of Moldova (2013), Moldova experiences problems implementing its legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination. Moreover, the legislation itself is perceived by experts as problematic since it does not consider racial the discrimination on the basis of skin color or language. According to ECRI, a considerable number of people reside in Moldova who are eligible for the Moldovan citizenship but still are not given either the citizenship or the necessary identity documents. Roma represents the largest of such groups, or at least 25 % of Roma do not have identity documents. Between 2009 and 2012, only 2582 people obtained Moldovan nationality by declaration and 104 by naturalization (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2013, p. 13). Many Roma wishing to obtain Moldovan citizenship have had difficulties proving that they resided in

Moldova when it declared independence. Anatol Plugar, former Director of Moldova's intelligence service, publicly insulted Roma in February 2010 by saying that the Roma "would rather have a new baby than wash the ones that they already have had". ECRI notes that, in many cases, the police refused to register racial violence acts, not to mention their non-registration of complaints of discrimination. According to European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, "the fact that the Ministry of the Interior is unable to give figures or even estimates for the number of Roma who have been victims of discrimination is one element among others pointing to the lack of systematic registration of discrimination offences" (ECRI 2013, p. 17).

Only 21 % of Roma children attend kindergartens, while the kindergarten attendance in the general population is close to 80 %. In terms of formal education, most Roma do not exceed the level of third or fourth year of secondary school.

A 2011 study showed that only 46 % of the population of Moldova would agree to have a Roma as a work colleague (Soros Foundation-Moldova 2011). Two-thirds of respondents share the view that most Roma women can jinx or curse you if you decline their proposal reading your palm for money, and that the majority of Roma children are engaged in theft and begging (UNDP-WB-European Commission 2011). According to ECRI (2013, p. 25), even the officials responsible for combating racism share the widespread anti-Roma sentiments by saying "it is well-known that the Roma don't pay their bills". This leads to the fact that victims of racist violence and discrimination often prefer not to go to the police.

Purification of National Body: Racism Against Jews, Gagauz, Russians, and Africans

Based on the 1897 National Population Census, Jews accounted for as much as 11.8 % of the population in the province of Bessarabia. In the capital of Moldavia, Jewish population reached 36 % in 1930. About half of the Jewish population of Moldova were killed as a result of the anti-Semitic policies of the Romanian administration during World War

II. Moldovan society is currently divided with respect to the past: one part considers the Holocaust and the crimes of the fascist regime of Antonescu an important part of the collective memory, while another part of the population, which may be called the anti-communist, anti-Soviet and pro-Romanian, emphasize the Stalinist crimes after the annexation of Bessarabia. Most Moldovan historians belong to the nationalist pro-Romanian camp and take an anti-Russian and anti-communist stance. "They believe that their task is to advocate the affinity of Moldovan society with the Romanian nation, culture, and history, while opposing Russophile currents. Historical writing that presents the Romanian state and its administrators in an unflattering light is considered damaging to this cause" (Dumitru 2008, p. 62). Since 2009, when the Communist Party lost power, the memory of the Holocaust has been marginalized, while the victims of Stalinism have been commemorated officially. Most of the anti-Jewish sentiments in Moldova is somehow connected with the memory of the Romanian collaboration with Nazi Germany. As in the Baltic states, there is widespread perception that the Jews enthusiastically welcomed the Red Army and collaborated with it, contributed to interrupting the country's independence and participated in the establishment of the Soviet regime in the newly annexed territory. A distinctive feature of Moldovan anti-Semitism and racism is their close connection with the extreme right-wing organizations of Romania. It is the racist discourse that is widespread in Romania that is used in establishing an intellectual repertoire for "racialization as making" in Moldova. However, racialization processes in the Republic of Moldova cannot be reduced only to intellectual anti-Semitism and anti-Gypsism. Race is in constant "doing". The neo-fascist Legionnaire Movement of Moldova, headed by Sergiu Lascu, in close cooperation with Romanian extremist Noua Dreapta organize joint demonstrations under racist and anti-Communist slogans. Influential Romanian Orthodox Church plays an important role in the promotion of Moldovan anti-Semitism. Groups of conservative believers, mostly belonging to this church, often broadcast anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and participate in anti-Semitic acts. Thus, during the Hanukkah festival in December 2009, a group of radical believers, led by priest Anatol Cibric, were shouting anti-Semitic slogans and broke a menorah on the central square of Chisinau, the capital of Moldova.

Moldovan participants of a racist legionary movement of Romania (*Garda de Fier*) together with their leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu are publicized as specimens of racial purity and identity. It is interesting to note that Codreanu's views as well as those espoused by *Garda de Fier* at large are close to those held by Russian neo-fascists. Historian Pyotr Shornikov indicates that supporters of the Romanian fascists in modern Moldova exceed the radicalism of the veterans: "if the leader of Association of World War II Veterans, who served in the Romanian army, confined himself by saying that "the Romanian army had nothing to do with the genocide committed against the Jews", their present-day followers consider such equivocations and precautions as unnecessary. "Yes, we are guilty,—one of them exclaimed regarding the occupation policy of Antonescu.—Guilty of our kindness" (quoted from Shornikov 2010, p. 159–160).

The number of Jews in Moldova has decreased dramatically in the years of independence. Currently, about 15,000 Jews live in Moldova, while there were 65,836 in 1989. In the early 1990s started a mass exodus of Jews from Moldova. According to sociological research, their departure was due to the growth of anti-Semitic sentiment to a much larger extent than it was the case in other post-Soviet republics, where anti-Semitic attitudes were only an additional factor that reinforced fears of economic uncertainty. At that time, Nazi propaganda materials accusing the Jews of supporting Stalinist repressions in Bessarabia and of vandalism with regard to Christian shrines were reproduced even by the official media. Some outspokenly racist publications of the time were urging Moldovans to abstain from marrying Russians and Jews, and especially Asians and Africans (Dabija 1996, 1997).

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles held several dozens of interviews with refugees in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, whereby ample evidence was collected of racial discrimination and violence in their countries.

Moyo from Zimbabwe does not feel integrated into Moldovan society. He feels that there is discrimination against foreign people, particularly black people in Moldova. In Moyo's opinion, the police are unlikely to defend you against a local citizen if you are black, whatever has happened. "Well, being a refugee is not a good thing so long I can see here in

Moldova. Very often, we are looked at as people with no hope and with only problems and dangerous to the society. In Moldova, they think that we have HIV, and as such look upon us as people too inferior and good for nothing. We do not have any right and as such, can not demand for it. Actually, I'll never like to be a refugee any more after this" (ECRE in 2009, p. 28).

Not surprisingly, the main ideological repertoire of contemporary Moldovan racism is borrowed from the Romanian far-right (Turda 2007). In their printed media they substantiate the territorial claims of Romania to northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia that were included in Ukraine in 1940. Not only Russians and Jews become targets of their hatred but also Gagauz—a Turkic-speaking people living in the south of Moldova. The same goes for financial support and imitation of mobilization. The Romanian far-right are active in organizing their demonstrations across the territory of Moldova. There are also frequent cases of intimidation and violence against political opponents as well as against those from minorities who openly manifest their ethnic affiliation.

The Gagauz are an object of racial discrimination and are meticulously excluded from the body of the Romanian nation. These Turkic-speaking Christians were racialized yet by Soviet anthropologists. So, Vasily Dyachenko (1952, p. 87) pointed out that "an anthropological type of the Gagauz is close to that of the Bulgarians and Moldovans. Even though the Gagauz generally belong to a Caucasoid type, if compared with the Bulgarians, Moldovans, and Albanians, they demonstrate a not so strong but quite clear trend toward a Mongoloid type". According to the 1897 census in the Russian Empire, the proportion of intellectual workers among Gagauz was twice lower than among Moldovans, and it was almost ten times as less compared to Russians. In the late 1950s, each 10,000 of the employed Gagauz population in the cities included only three teachers, while the same figure among the Moldovans corresponded to 51, and it was 91 for the Russian population. The number of health workers among the Gagauz was three times lower than the average for the country, and with regard to workers of culture and art it was eight times as less (Ostapenko 2011, p. 416). Gagauz, living mainly in rural southern region of Moldova, have inherited their unprivileged position from the Soviet times, which is presently deteriorated by discriminatory practices in

modern Moldova. Gagauz people do not feel themselves as enjoying equal opportunities with the titular nation of Moldovans. Ostapenko says that "in the opinion of more than 50 per cent of the Gagauz, Moldovans currently have higher chances of promotion and of ascending to a leadership position, and about one fifth of Gagauz believe that for Moldovans it is easier to conduct business" (Ostapenko 2011, p. 436). National laws on minorities are often perceived as mere words. According to a 2007 survey, over 50 % of ethnic Russian urbanites indicated that ethnic Moldovans had more opportunities to obtain decision-making positions and that 20 % of Moldovan Russians face with the facts of ethnic discrimination (Ostapenko and Subbotina 2011, pp. 139–140). As in the Baltic states, deprived of career opportunities in the public service, the Russian actively involve in the business life of the Moldovan society. The proportion of entrepreneurs and self-employed among the Russians is higher than it is among Moldovans, which often makes the former an object of double discrimination. As it also concerns natives of the Caucasus in Russia, Russians and Jews in Moldova are accused of control over trade and banking.

It would be a mistake, however, to restrict the role of racialization processes agents only to members of the rightist political spectrum. As in the neighboring Ukraine and Belarus, the racist discourse is common among and not problematized even by representatives of the left parties. Thus, Vladimir Voronin, the head of the Party of Communists and president of Moldova from 2001 to 2009, Europe's first democratically elected Communist Party head of state after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, did several racist statements addressed to John Onoje, a naturalized Moldovan politician with a Sierra-Leonean background. Criticizing his political opponents, Voronin said: "The ruling parties brought here a Negro, who'd just climbed down from a tree, and now he's doing politics for them" (Gurcov 2012). The normality and accepted evidence of racist attitudes and the failure of police to get criminal case or intervene in cases of racial violence.

Keita Abdramane, director of the NGO called FATIMA, who is originally from Mali, and came to Moldova in 1980 speaks about racism in Moldova: "if you were to take a walk with me for an hour through public places in Chisinau, I can assure you that you will hear at least one offensive comment regarding my skin color". To further complicate matters, the Moldovan police is still reluctant to register cases of violence

based on racism. Usually they do not pass on the request of the victim for proper attention. One striking example is the case of a native of Burkina Faso who was attacked on a public transport because of his skin color. The police refused to give him a copy of his complaint, and were not going to charge the culprits to court were it not for the persistence of the victim's lawyer. Sadly in most cases, hate crime in Moldova is qualified as "hooliganism". Verbal abuse based on our race is something we face every day in public spaces. There are a few people who have stood up against this but much more can certainly be done. That forms part of the reasons for why FATIMA is in existence, to amplify the voices of the neglected African community in Moldova (Shupac 2015).

Ukraine: Racial Threats and Their Changing Dynamics

Since the end of World War II, accusations of supporters of the creation of an independent Ukrainian state as imbued with fascism, racism and ethnic intolerance has been one of the main ideological tools used by the Soviet authorities to suppress Ukrainian nationalist sentiments. The same technique is used by modern opponents of nationalist trends in Ukrainian society, and it is employed against Ukraine itself in the latest media wars by Russia. Refusing to recognize Ukraine's independence in decision making and its new geopolitical landmarks, the Russian political leadership and the Russian media constantly emphasize the racist and neo-Nazi character of the Ukrainian polity (Zhurzhenko 2015). On March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin addressing the Russian parliament about the Maidan and other events that had ensued the overthrow of the regime of Yanukovich, said: "Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day" (Putin 2014). After the 2014 Maidan events, many leaders of the far-right and neo-Nazi organizations have become members of the Ukrainian Parliament (Likhachev 2014). Conflict with Russia sharpened the nationalistic rhetorics up by including some elements of racial discourse to it. For example, minister of culture Yevhen Nyshchuk stated that the population of several Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine can not perceive Ukrainian culture

due to “lack of genetic purity” (Ukranews 2016). Although racism have never been a keystone of Ukrainian nationalism, these elements are not novel, they have already been formed and its formation can be traced within the process of racialization. These processes occur in Ukraine since its independence. Racialization in Ukraine subjects to nation-building logic significantly, and it means that the fundament on which it was built was performed while Ukraine was under the Soviet rule.

Ukraine positions itself as a country with high level of tolerance, where racism is something extraordinary. Ukrainian official leaders repeatedly emphasized the absence of racism and anti-Semitism in the country. “There is no such problem as anti-Semitism or other manifestations of xenophobia in Ukraine”, claimed president Yushchenko in 2005 (World Jewish Congress 2005). Other leaders of the country spoke in a similar vein. Moreover, in 2014, experts on Ukrainian nationalism and the far-right in Ukraine came out with an open letter whereby they stated that “support for fundamentalism, ethnocentrism and ultra-nationalism may sometimes have more to do with the permanent confusion and daily anxieties of the people living under such conditions than with their deeper beliefs” (Kyev’s Euromaidan 2014). This witnesses that racism and fascism remains a notion that is highly politicized and largely belongs to the subcultural sphere of the physical and symbolical strife between left-wing and far-right activists.

Rudling (2006, p. 117) point out that the democratization of Ukrainian society, which has not failed, in contrast to neighboring Russia and Belarus, “is perhaps more remarkable than the fact that a substantial minority harbours ethnic hatred towards Jews”. This chapter supports our thesis that racism is not something uniquely peculiar to either democracy or despotism, but it can take different forms, depending on the prevailing political regimes and social conditions.

Despite the fact that during the 2012 Euro Cup Tournament in Ukraine no racist attacks were recorded, soccer fans in Ukraine clearly demonstrate the attitudes of racial extremism, as they do in many other European countries. Since 2008, international non-governmental organizations for protection of human rights include a section in their reports entitled “Racism”, which in itself indicates an increase in racist violence. It also indicates a reluctance on the part of law enforcers to protect refugees and migrants as well as imperfections of the legal system to combat racism. The recent armed conflict with Russia has led to the fact that the

word "Ukrainian" increasingly denotes ethnicity rather than nationality. This argument draws a parallel between the current Ukraine and Russia, where "Russian" is also regarded as an ethnic group. Previously, the level of racist violence in Ukraine was much lower than in neighboring Russia, and a key marker of "Ukrainian" identity was residence in the territory of Ukraine and knowing Ukrainian language, rather than ethnicity or appearance. Tatiana Zhurzhenko (2004, pp. 284–285) rightly points out, "in contrast to the Russian neo-traditionalist discourse, emphasizing a women's function of biological reproduction of the nation, the Ukrainian woman is designed to provide primarily its symbolic reproduction". The most important marker of identity is language. So, often the choice by a person between speaking out in either Ukrainian or Russian language puts him or her in a corresponding political camp. The party program of "Svoboda" [Freedom] political party advocates introducing a proportional representation of Ukrainians in state institutions, indicating ethnicity among the passport data, a ban on adoption of Ukrainian children by foreigners, and deportation of illegal immigrants. "Svoboda" considers its main enemies Russian language and Ukrainian–Russian biculturalism.

In order to destroy the myths about Russia as the Ukraine's "big brother" as well as refuting Russia's official theory on the three Eastern Slavic peoples' co-origin, Ukraine is proclaimed the cradle of Eastern Slavic cultures and even a special civilization. As Shnirel'man (2015, p. 167) rightly pointed out, intellectuals, claiming that Ukraine is a special civilization that unites the East and the West, simply Ukrainize the ideas of Eurasianism, for the first time introduced by Russian immigrants in the 1920s. Yuri Shilov, a reputable intellectual and former archaeologist who once made friends with Russian nationalists, nowadays promotes the identification of archaeological culture with ethnic group. A significant part of Ukrainian intellectuals argue that even before the Kieven Rus Ukrainians had their statehood and advanced culture, to include a writing system. Attempts are being made to identify Ukrainian ancestors with the Trypillians. According to this approach, the "old Ukrainian ethnos" is proclaimed almost the oldest ethnic group in Europe.

"Ukrainian radical nationalists are particularly fond of the 'Aryan idea'. In order to somehow link it with their equally heartening 'Trypillian idea', they construct a binomial model of the Ukrainian ethnos emergence by mixing up local 'farmers-Trypillians' and 'steppe-dwellers-Aryans'.

As a result, the steppe culture of the Bronze Age as well as their heirs Scythian farmers become Slavic, not only in terms of their language but also by physical appearance. It is emphasized that the steppe imparted the Ukrainians with a 'pure racial type'" (Shnirel'man 2015, p. 160).

In 2004, MAUP university has sheltered in its walls the American racist and neo-Nazi David Duke, who got the professorial position and started lecturing there.

As Vyacheslav Likhachev (2014 p. 244) rightly points out, as a rule, political projects in the Ukraine do not adhere to any clearly articulated ideology but have the character of lobbying representation of economic interests of different oligarchs. Researcher of the far-right in Ukraine Anton Shekhovtsev (2014 p. 277) explains the 10.44 % votes received in the 2012 election by the far-right "Svoboda" party: "Against the backdrop of the predominant cynicism in all the major political parties, where PR replaced any real political ideas, 'Svoboda' had obviously advantages: it adhered to the ideological guidelines set out in the mid-1990s, and its leaders rarely deviated from the party line". "Svoboda" is closely linked to the right-radical and neo-Nazi parties in Europe. In 2010, the party has received the status of observer at the Alliance of European National Movement, consisting of National Movement (UK), Jobbik (Hungary), National Front (France), and other rightist European parties.

Many European rightist parties take the Euro-skeptical stance, support Putin and consider him as the main hope for the rightist values on the global scale. The Ukrainian right-wing cannot afford it, since Russia is their main enemy. They build their identity by targeting Russia. However, paradoxically, the values espoused by such organizations as "Praviy Sektor" [Right sector], who want Ukraine to have its "special path", are very similar to the position of the Russian conservatives.

Like many neo-Nazi parties in Europe, "Svoboda" rebranded its image to increase their electoral appeal. Thus, the party abandoned the neo-Nazi symbolics that had been used in the Waffen-SS (Shekhovtsev 2014). This party's main supporters are residents of agricultural areas in Western Ukraine and Kiev-based nationalist intelligentsia (Fin'ko 2013, pp. 375–376). The party received from 31 to 38 % support in the three Galician regions of Ukraine, and 17 % in Kiev. Oleh Tyahnybok, the leader of "Svoboda" and one of the leaders of the Maidan events, said during a rally:

> We should not be afraid, as those fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were not afraid but took a gun at their necks and went into woods, where they fought against the Muscovites, fought with the Germans, fought with the Jews and other evil spirits who wanted to take away from us our Ukrainian state … Finally, it is necessary to give Ukraine to Ukrainians. Those young men and you, the white-haired, is the mixture which is most frightening to the mafia consisting of Muscovites and Jews who now lead Ukraine (Pravda.com.ua)

At the same time, we should not underestimate the prevalence of racist narratives that are often noticeable only when expressed by representatives of the far-right or neo-Nazis. Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine presented the monitoring data of attitudes to ethnic minorities using the Bogardus scale: "If in 1994 a tolerant attitude toward Russians was at the level of 60 per cent across the population of Western Ukraine, in the beginning of the 2000s this figure was as low as 15 per cent. Tolerance to Jews and Roma in the west of the country decreased from 30 to 5–6 per cent, and from 15 to 3–4 per cent, accordingly. In the central regions of Ukraine, tolerance of Russians has decreased more than twice. In the east, there have been the least noticeable fluctuations in this indicator with respect to Russians, now making up about 70 per cent" (Vlasti.net 2010).

Since 1989, the number of Jews in Ukraine has decreased by five times, while the conflict with Russia, the economic crisis, and the surge in anti-Semitism further strengthened the trend for emigration. In his analysis of anti-Semitic narratives Rudling (2006, p. 115) corroborates our conclusion in that anti-Semitism in anti-communist and Russophobe circles differs very little from that on the part of Stalinists and pro-Russia intellectuals: "The irony is that despite their wildly different national and political narratives and agendas, the anti-Semites of Ukraine have no problem borrowing from one another".

Not only Western Ukraine but also the traditionally Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine are subject to the spread of the ideology of radical nationalists. Migration from former Soviet republics in the cities of this region cause rejection by locals, as migrants are perceived as exploiters of the local population. Indeed, in contrast to Western Europe, migrants

are not always found at the bottom of the social ladder but often act as employers, perceived as exploiters (Pogrebinskiy et al. 2013). In June 2009, in the town of Marganets (Dnipropetrovsk Region), there were clashes between the youth of Ukrainian and Armenian origin in the course of which a police officer was killed. This collision took place over the control of municipal land market, which is formed not only by local capital but also by business groups associated with ethnic diasporas from Northern and Southern Caucasus. Leaders of both the far-right and the pro-Russian radical nationalist forces used these events in their political interests. Thus, the leader of "Svoboda" Tyahnybok referred to the clash in Marganets as to an act of "revival of Cossack traditions", while leaders of the pro-Russian Crimean Cossack organizations expressed their willingness to intervene in the situation in the city, at the same time trying to excite hatred to the Crimean Tatars and Roma (Fin'ko 2013, pp. 290–291). Unlike ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars are markedly consolidated, and due to their recognizable physical traits—highly visible. They are also very vulnerable to discrimination by the "de facto authorities" and by the "self-defense" paramilitary groups in Crimea (Shapovalova and Burlyuk 2016, p. 13). Making 12.1 % of the population of the peninsula, Crimean Tatars remember both the twentieth-century events of their ancestors' deportation from the peninsula as well as its earlier colonization by Russia. The most recent annexation of Crimea by Russia refreshes these memories among Crimean Tatars and makes them afraid of a new round of repressions (Likhachev 2016).

As in Russia, racism is associated with both the leftist and the rightist parties and becomes a universally valid discourse in society. Therefore, it is mistaken to claim that racism is promoted in politics by only anti-Russian nationalist organizations. So, for example, the pro-Russian leftist People's Opposition Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko used the openly racist imagery in their political advertisement. In particular, the ad depicts an advanced-age female devouter entering an Orthodox church and approaching the priest for a blessing, and when the priest turns to her the audience can see that he is dark-skinned. After that, the text appears on the screen: "Defend the Orthodoxy". Pro-European politicians and political organizations also construct racial threats. Quoting from Blair Ruble, "the Ukrainians now say, 'We're the new Europeans—who are these terrible people moving in on us?'" (Cited in Helbig 2014, p. 79). Nationalization

policy is presented as "European" or "civilizational" choice. Thus, Levko Lukyanenko, MP from Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc repeatedly made anti-Semitic and racist remarks (Likhachev 2014, p. 245).

Migrants and Refugees—Constructing "Blackness" in Ukraine

In terms of intensive reception of migrants, Ukraine is the fourth country—after the USA, the Russian Federation, and Germany. About seven million people in Ukraine were born abroad. The vast majority of them were born in other republics of the former Soviet Union. However, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has lost up to seven million people, most of whom immigrated to Russia, Europe, Canada, and the USA. Most migrants in Ukraine consider this country as a staging post on their way to Europe. However, many of them apply for asylum in Ukraine and stay there for long. In addition, some 40,000 students from 129 countries study at Ukrainian universities (ECRI 2008, p. 17). Public attitudes toward migrants is constantly changing depending on how the immigration discourses are politicized in the media (Shevel 2011). In what follows we will provide some witnesses that confirm our thesis about racialization of visible minorities through dominant discourse on migration and blackness.

> In February 2012, Yury Sirotnyuk of Ukraine's far-right political party "Svoboda" caused controversy with his racist statements against the Afro-Ukrainian singer Gaitana, who was voted to represent Ukraine in the 2012 Eurovision contest in Baku, Azerbaijan, with the song "Be My Guest". In Sirotnyuk's words, "the show's millions of viewers will see Ukraine represented by someone who does not belong to our race. Now people will think that Ukraine is located somewhere in Africa (Helbig 2014, p. 85)

Adriana Helbig has done extensive fieldwork in Ukraine and describes her experience as follows:

> At first, it did not dawn on me that a white woman interviewing a black man in the city center could invoke violence. The first five interviews that I scheduled at cafes with black DJs proved very uncomfortable for my

> interlocutors, who constantly looked around them, watched their backs, and could not focus or relax. It was only after interviewing two black females did I consider the DJs' behavior as a fear of violence. African women seemed much more comfortable with me in public. They explained that African males are often attacked by non-Africans if they are seen in public with Ukrainian and Russian women (Helbig 2014, pp. 73–74).

According to a report by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, numerous incidents of violence against students from Africa and Asia are documented in Ukraine. ECRE (2009, p. 79) quotes Benedicto, a refugee from Angola:

> I have been living here for 17 years ... in 1995 or 1993 everything was ok … you could even walk around at night ... I understand that there are racists everywhere ... in France, America, everywhere. But to demonstrate it as now in Ukraine! ... The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for this—they do not protect anyone ... the police know where the racists and fascists are. I know where I can not go. I can not go to Maydan Nezhalezhnosti or Sevastopolska square after 8 pm ... I do not feel free. What if I had work on Maydan—what would I do?

African-American scholar Terrell Jermaine Starr, who studied the blacks in Ukraine during his Fullbright fellowship in 2008–2009, was stopped by police 29 times (Helbig 2014, p. 70).

Again referring to ECRE (2009, p. 88):

> Kene's last job involved working in different offices and he had problems with many of the young people working in various offices. "They said "Look! A Negro is working". Some of them approached him and looked at him and then said "See how this monkey is working". Kene says that he tried to work with his Ukrainian colleague to limit these dangers and others such as building materials being dropped or thrown at him. "The development of racism at working place has biological, social, national character". "I was speaking with one racist at work once, he said he considered me to be a person who had still not completed evolution, he based his argument on my external appearance—, my face, nose, lips and hair. He thought that I did not perform my job independently. He always asked me

"How can a monkey do a job without an instructor?" I replied "Who is the ape? you or me? I speak your language; I am doing what you are doing, I am thinking as you think. I have similar blood groups as you or white people have. My brain is thinking like you, I am not working with reflection or instincts. But if you try to teach ape or chimpanzee it never become like human being". He was so angry, and he threw a screw driver at me and ran away" Kene says that some racists tell him to leave the country and take his "half-caste" children with him. "They say: We do not need mixed blood in our country. Ukraine is only for Ukrainians".

Conclusion

Certain characteristic features of racism in the region include the irreducibility of racist discourses and actions only to those manufactured by racist intellectuals, far-right party's supporters, and representatives of the corresponding subcultures. Racism is a common place rather than the subject of political disputes of supporters of different parties. The concept of race, not to mention the ethnic and cultural stereotypes in public milieus, should not be questioned. As we have learned in this chapter, at the time of the Russian Empire, the territories of the three countries were included within the so-called Pale of Settlement. Before the Holocaust this was home to half of the European Jewry, and it was home for half the Soviet Jews before the Soviet Union disintegrated. Over the past 20 years, the number of Jews reduced manifold. At the same time, anti-Semitism, so familiar to people in the region, not to mention racism, is denied and ascribed to neighboring states.

There is a paradoxical situation—both at the level of the official ideology and in their auto-stereotypes, Belarusians appear peaceful and hospitable people, alien to any nationalism, let alone racist sentiments. But their tolerance is not any active, cultivated, or conscious attitude, which would involve support and sympathy for the "other", but indicates both a typical pre-modern peasant distrust toward mobilizing ideologies and their conservative seclusion. In this environment, the violent racism has little chance of success, but it also perfectly preserves a cautious and hostile attitude to the "other", knocked out beyond a narrow cultural circle.

However, it should be borne in mind that after the Nazi destruction of the Belarusian Jews, Belarus has long been a monocultural society, and the immigration growing wave of upsurge immigration from the "new" countries is still a potential threat, which can become a real test for the "innate" tolerance of the Belarusians. The tolerance framework per se contributes to the lack of civil society (which would problematize racism), while Belarusian authoritarianism denies racism, referring to the fabled tolerance.

As the study of racism in the states formed after the collapse of the USSR shows, the establishment of democratic rule and a liberal market system is not always associated with the dismantling of the racial state. On the contrary, as it often happens in more traditional and consolidated societies, authoritarian leaders consider any manifestations of unauthorized ethnic mobilization or racist violence as a threat to the fullness of their personal authority. Such is the case of Belarus, but the weakness of civil society as well as independent media aggravate the non-transparent character of the political process. A populist manipulation of public opinion and searching for internal and external enemies can lead to an increase in xenophobia and racism. As in Russia (Shnirelman 2011; Zakharov 2015), a sense of alienation from decisions taken by the authorities leads to the perception of unpopular decisions or economic failures as taken by aliens, hostile to the people of Belarus.

The Ukrainian case analyzed in this chapter also confirms this point. Democratization of Ukraine that took place after its independence, has not led to the recognition of the problems of racial discrimination. A military conflict that began on its territory in 2014 has exacerbated the preexisted social, political and ethnic conflicts that now tend to racialize much more often than before the war.

A second feature of the logic of racism in the region is its close relationship with racialization processes in such former metropolitan countries as Russia, and—in the case of Moldova—Romania. As was shown above, considerable fragments of racist narratives can be borrowed directly, while others become creatively remade to suit local conditions. It is obvious that the very use of the term "non-Russian" regarding visible minorities in Ukraine suggests that the prevailing there racist discourse is inherited from the Soviet past, where the non-Russian signified all who differed

from normative whiteness of Slavic republics natives. It also demonstrates the post-colonial status of Ukraine itself that still unable to overcome the dominant Russian-Soviet discourse. The Moldovan case illustrates most aptly the interconnections in the construction of racism. Trajectories of racialization processes in Moldova largely follow the destiny of the Moldovan statehood.

Being part of Romania until the end of World War II, the Moldovan population was also part of racist governance in fascist Romania whereby the Moldovans and Romanians were considered as one nation, and where the Roma were officially proclaimed as a "plague", or the people who represented a biohazard to the uniform body of the Romanian nation (Turda 2007). The Roma Holocaust on the present-day territory of Moldova was organized by pro-Nazi government of Marshall Antonescu (Dumitru 2016). The liberation of the territory of Moldova from the fascist regime was ensued with its annexation by the Soviet Union, whereupon the Roma population was subjected to assimilation as part of the overall program of Sovietization in what was now the Moldavian Socialist Republic. Sovietization presupposed the formation of the new man and gradual elimination of intra-national differences. These policies included a formal rejection of the very idea of minorities (since no minorities could exist in a society of universal equality) and slavicalization of population (because the new Soviet man was not seen as Moldovans or Roma but as Russian). Like in the neighboring Romania, Moldova has created a peculiar "Roma-line", by analogy with the well-known theory by Du Bois on the existence of color line.

The Soviet experience still defines ethnocultural policy in the three countries of the region. Many of conflicts with regard to language or ethnicity were inherited by the states of the region from its Soviet past, when the foundations for nearly all the current laws, institutional structures and political and social strategies were adopted and when the autonomous territories emerged. The same trend can be observed in the language use, where the language policies merely secure the co-existence of the titular and Russian language, while marginalizing the role of other languages (Bespamyatnykh et al. 2014). The minority-related legislation is often characterized as merely declarative and missing mechanisms of implementation. Some remnants of the Soviet individual, "passport"

ethnicity are preserved in all the three countries; several territorial autonomies based on the ethnic and linguistic profile remained in Moldova and Ukraine; in Ukraine, there is a continuity of the Soviet official approach from the end of the 1980s, explaining what restoration of rights of formerly deported peoples might be like; the language policy is the preserved form of the 1989–1990s, whereby the "titular" ethnicity's language is the official language, Russian language is the lingua franca, and minority languages are also allowed to some roles. Moreover, cooptation is practiced with regard to minorities' mouthpieces; any ethnically based social activity is something mobilized and directed into the sphere of culture.

4

Racisms in the Southern Caucasus: Multiple Configurations

Nikolay Zakharov and Ian Law

Introduction

Contemporary formations of race and racism across the Southern Caucasus region are intimately connected with racialised histories, the legacy of Ottoman, Turkish and Soviet political projects and making of three new racial states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan which came into being in the post-Soviet era. It is in the interface between racial Europeanisation and the resurrection of both Russian racialised modernity and local racial nationalisms that the specificities of racisms in the Southern Caucasus region can be found here at this spatial intersection between Eastern Europe, Russia and Western Asia. Prior to the nineteenth century, there was no such thing as a 'Caucasian' identity. This region encompassed a set of overlapping linguistic, religious, local and ethnic frames of identification (Iskandaryan 2011). It was only following Russian annexation that the region was administratively defined as 'Trancaucasia'. At the same time Western and Russian racial science were manufacturing varying accounts of the Caucasian race and by the twentieth century a common Caucasian identity was emerging across this region as a product of imperial and Soviet racialised governance.

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0_4

Russia embraced European developments in natural and racial science and developed them into its unique mix of ethnic primordialism and physical anthropology (Geddie 1885). This is exemplified in the writings and collections deposited by Russian ethnographers in the Caucasus Department in Tbilisi, which became the Caucasus Museum in 1867, and which included human skulls as well as a wide variety of other artefacts (Law 2012).

This region provided the nominative impulse for the Western scientific classification of the presumed superior, global race, Caucasians, against which all others were to be positioned and judged in the formation of racial science during the late seventeenth century. This formulation, expounded by Christoph Meiners (1785) and Johann Blumenbach (1795) drew on many different archives of knowledge and understanding elaborated, repeated and reworked in the preceding millennium (Baum 2006). By the seventh century, categorising human beings by skin colour was established in Jewish, Christian and Muslim canonical texts, particularly in the context of seeing Noah's sons as representing the three human skin colours of the world's population (Law et al. 2014; Goldenberg 2003). This race idea was also bound up with Judaeo-Christian understanding that human beings originated in the Caucasus region following the great flood when 'in the seventh month, on the seventeenth day of the month, the [Noah's] ark rested upon the mountains of Ararat (Genesis 8:4). This mountain, currently in Turkey, occupies a central place at the heart of Armenian nationalism, which is discussed below. The core set of discursive linkages between whiteness, naturalised superiority, beauty and civilisational pre-eminence encapsulated in the term 'Caucasian' have become a defining feature of racialised systems across the world.

The relation between the people of the region, and its history, and the positioning of whites and the Caucasian race at the pinnacle of civilisational hierarchies is one of dynamic change and shifting boundaries. Whether the Caucasian race was seen as encompassing people from this region, or whether the Caucasian race was restricted to European people, was by no means certain in the literature of racial science. Also, whether people from this region were categorised by states as within whiteness, outside this racial group or within blackness has also been subject to change and variation in position. On the first question, Johann Blumenbach stated,

> I have taken the name [Caucasian] of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because its neighbourhood and especially its southern slope produces the most beautiful race of men, by this I mean the Georgian; and because all physiological reasons converge to this, that in that region, if anywhere, it seems we ought with the greatest probability to place the autochthones of mankind. (1795, p. 269).

He unequivocally included this region's people in his racial category. Whereas subsequent racial scientists, such as William Ripley and others from the mid-nineteenth century on did not, elaborating instead a European construction of Caucasian with many variants. For example, Hilmar Kaiser (1998) identifies racialised constructions of Armenians in the writing of German imperialists, such as Alfred Mumm, during the late nineteenth century, which drew on longer established Ottoman hostility. Here 'cunningness' and 'rebellious activities' were identified as Armenian racial characteristics.

Beyond theory, state technologies of racial rule were also seeking to shift people from this region out of whiteness both in the USA and the Russian Federation. In the USA, restriction of citizenship to white people from 1790 to the twentieth century made such positioning crucial, and one group of people from the Southern Caucasus, Armenians, had to pursue legal action to make the claim for inclusion. Armenian immigrants to the USA were subject to racialisation as in 1909 the state of California sought to prohibit Armenians from purchasing land because of their supposed alien, Asiatic status but a legal case confirmed them as white based on 'scientific' designation of their Caucasian origins as white (Bakalian 1994). By the 1920s judicial interpretations had shifted from scientific assessment to racial categorisation according to 'common knowledge', or 'street recognition' in order to exclude groups such as the Japanese from whiteness and thereby citizenship. In a further legal case the US state sought to deny citizenship to an Armenian man, Tatos Cartozian. Anthropologist Franz Boas and ethnologists Roland Dixon and Paul Rohrbach argued in favour of his scientific case and leaders of racially restrictive fraternal organisations including the Loyal Order of the Moose and the Masonic Grand Lodge of Oregon were brought to court to argue for the common interpretation of Armenians as racially

white, using Armenian membership in their organisations as evidence, and the judge agreed (Binus 2005).

Despite being officially white in the USA, Caucasian people have now become 'black' in the Russian Federation (Baum 2006). Many of the migrant workers from Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi making their journeys to Moscow, St Petersburg and elsewhere in the Russian Federation have experienced their new inferior positioning as *chernyi*, black, together with the indignities and degradations of this racial marking. Racialised as 'Caucasians' and then combined into a homogeneous, faceless mass of 'blacks', these groups of ethnically and nationally differentiated people thereby share the same stigmatising markers with other migrant workers who are not Russian citizens. Conflict in the Northern Caucasus and economic migration from the whole of the Caucasus region to Russian cities has activated and reshaped these new currents of racialisation. Ulrike Ziemer (2011) has demonstrated how Armenian and Adyghe youth have begun to identify themselves with 'blacks', or a supranational category of Caucasians (*litsa kavkazskoy natsional'nosti*), as a result of such external racialisation (Zakharov 2015).

The utility of racial knowledge has also been seized upon inside the Southern Caucasus in the shaping of national myths of origin, associated histories and contemporary patterns of conflict and violence, which is discussed below. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are involved in multiple unresolved conflicts within their borders and they are adjacent to separatist conflicts in the Northern Caucasus. Destabilised by poor economic conditions and widespread poverty and subject to varying forms of Russian, Iranian and Western power and influence, these states are managing a complex set of ethnoracial tensions (Dobbins and Parsadanishvili 2013). These tensions have resulted primarily in conflict in the Southern Caucasus region driven by ethnoracial nationalisms which has occurred largely within rather than between states. 85 % of people consider themselves to belong to the Orthodox Church in Georgia (10 % of the population is Muslim), 95 % to the Armenian Apostolic Church in Armenia and 99 % to Islam in Azerbaijan (approximately 65 % of adherents are Shi'a and 35 % are Sunni). In this context reworking, reviving and renewing long traditions of national collective identity and associated assertions of historical memory together with religious

and cultural specificities have been core political projects. Soviet traditions of primordial, naturalised national building supported by racialised academic disciplines, such as physical anthropology, intimately interconnected with Western racial science have provided a rich set of archives of knowledge from which these new ethnoracial nations are being shaped. Paradoxically democratisation in this region created greater space for the strengthening of national chauvinisms and incentivised the manipulation of national myths by political elites (Macfarlane 1997, p. 400). Georgia, and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan, witnessed the emergence of nationalist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries including the emergence of the *Dushunksutiun* (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), the *Hunchuk* (Bell) Party (Yeck 2014) and the *Rumguvur* (Democratic) Party in Armenia; *Musavut* in Azerbaijan and the Georgian Mensheviks. They also all experienced brief periods of national independence in 1918–1921 and this period was marked by frequent conflict between ethnic groups, for example, the war between Armenians and Azeris over Karabakh and Zangezur, and the revolt of the Ossets against Georgian rule in 1920. Soviet rule and Soviet nationality policy promoted varying levels of national grievance against each other as well as Russia, exemplified by the opposing Armenian and Azeri accounts of the territorial disposition of Karabakh, Zangezur and NakhicheanI. Also the biographies of the leaders who succeeded the communists in all three states, Gamsakhurdia (Georgia), Aliev (Azerbaijan) and Ter-Petrosian (Armenia), suggest that their ethnoracial nationalism was well developed prior to independence and also that they 'actually believed what they said about national character, rights and destiny, and acted upon their beliefs because they thought they were right' (Macfarlane 1997, p. 412).

After the Soviet collapse, renewed nationalisms and traditional cultural practices provided both ideological reassurance in the context of instability and uncertainty and constructed enemies to focus discontent and anger. This process was further triggered by a set of specific events consolidating national populism, for the Armenians, it was the plight of Karabakh in the context of the long history of suffering at the hands of Turks, which the Azeris were perceived to be, and the anti-Armenian pogrom of February 1988 that followed Karabakh's request for transfer from Azerbaijan to Armenia. For the Azerbaijanis, it was the massive

repression by Soviet forces of political demonstrations in Baku in which over a hundred people died. In Georgia, it was retaliation by Soviet forces against unarmed demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989. The democratisation of the region's politics also contributed considerably to deterioration in the region's security as it provided space for the articulation of national chauvinist ideas, and to some extent fostered an incentive structure in the region conducive to elite manipulation of national ethnoracial myths (Macfarlane 1997). Here democratisation operates as a permissive condition for the emergence of pre-existing nationalist sentiment rather than the cause of strengthening ethnoracial nationalism. The incomplete disappearance of Russian hegemony in the region, the perverse action of Russian democratisation on political processes in the Southern Caucasus republics and the comparative indifference of broader international institutions also provided conditions for continuing conflict and violence.

Republic of Armenia (Hayastan) and Insulated Racism

Armenia is a small **Western Asian????** country of just under 3 million people, of whom 97.9 % are ethnic Armenians, bordered by Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey and Georgia, which achieved independence in 1991 having been part of the Soviet Union since 1922. Prior to this the people living in the Armenian highlands had been subject to varying spheres of domination by the Ottoman, Russian, Soviet and Persian empires. Contemporary racial science was found to be alive and well during a fieldwork trip to Armenia in September 2014. The national History Museum of Armenia cited prominently in the centre of the capital, Yerevan, in Republic Square provides a key statement of public discourse on race and nation presented in its displays and texts. The relative absence of tourists in this country has meant that this museum is mainly frequented by school parties, students and local people who are presented with this knowledge as historical truth. One of the first texts introducing the history of the development of people across the world states that 'Europoid, Negroid and Mongoloid races took shape'. Telling the history of the world

through the lens of race is used here to contextualise all that follows. Armenian people are portrayed as comprising a 'single and indivisible ethnos by the early twentieth century' arising through the mixing of ethnic groups in Urartu forming the Armenian people from many different backgrounds. Urartu being the Iron Age Kingdom of Van that united tribes in the highlands of Ararat. This was a 'powerful Armenian state in the Ancient East' according to the Museum. As Valery Tishkov (1997) argues the 'purity' of an ethnos is an 'essentially racist notion' and that the 'poverty of primordialism' in post-Soviet contexts parallels the 'power of primordialism' which drives the contemporary formation of racialised hostilities and hatreds. One other plaque in the History Museum confirms the development of racial aesthetics in the writings and paintings of the fourteenth-century Grigor of Tatev, who elaborated representations of white as purity and black as the earth. More contemporary Armenian discourse exemplified in the History Museum texts derives from the fusing of European and Soviet racial science with the work of Armenian historians and clerical scholars to produce an account of a solidified, distinct body of people possessed with a fixed immutable 'spirit', for example in Toumamain Hovhannes rousing articulation of the 'historical spirit' of the Armenian people in the early twentieth century. This narrative seeks to bind together an account across the broken, fragmented history of a people without a state for many centuries to preserve archives of national knowledge. Indeed, the 'hankering after lost glories' has resulted in the construction of Armenian cultural superiority relative to Georgians and Azerbaijanis (Goldenberg 1994).

The origins of racial science in Armenia began with the work of craniology and the associated study of ethnogenesis and physical anthropology (Marshall and Mkrtchyan 2011; Marshall 2014). As Victor Shnirelman (2012a, b) has argued nation-states seek validation and legitimacy for their claims of territorial space and civilisational achievement from archaeology and hence the construction of post-Soviet states is intimately related to the identification, curation and evaluation of archaeological materials (also see Hartley et al. 2012). In the nineteenth century, a number of European racial scientists came to the Caucasus collecting and analysing crania from local tombs, including French anthropologist Ernest Chantre and German pathologist Rudolf Virchow, and developed

conflicting views as to whether these were 'Aryan' and whether they established links to earlier populations. In 1892, Felix van Lushcan coined the term 'Armenoid' to label the 'distinctly brachycephalic' structure of crania in this area and Chantre linked the 'Armenoid' racial type to ancient Uraratians. So prior to Soviet domination these physical anthropologists were generally establishing the 'value' of racial science, the importance of cranial study, the identification of Armenians as a racial type and building a racial history linking modern Armenians to their ancient Indo-European ancestors (Marshall 2014). Soviet racial science in this country was led initially by Viktor Bunak, following this European tradition, who published *Crania Armenica* in 1927 preferring to denote race in geographical and historical terms. Through the twentieth century, the shift from European racial science to Soviet/Stalinist accounts of the historical development of distinct, essentialist ethnos as the basis of nations took place, and the placing of these on a hierarchy of civilisation based on relative stages of historical development. This merging of historical materialism and primordial, naturalised divisions between peoples provided an overarching regime of truth. This ethno/racial/national genesis theory did not reject physical and psychological, or racial, boundaries between peoples and it led Soviet physical anthropologists, such as Valerii Alekseev in the 1960s to use archaeological human remains to substantiate the development of a physically distinct Armenian people, an Armenian ethnos. Furthermore, the work of Malkhaz Abdushelishvili (1968, 1979) provided a set of arguments drawing on the calculation of craniometric averages which elaborated the differentiation of separate distinct groups, deriving from a population with a common origin, in this region that fits closely with the formation of the Georgian and Armenian nations, and with these groups being distinct from those in the Northern Caucasus. In post-Soviet Armenia, the Soviet tradition of examining ethnogenesis through craniometry continues, for example in the work of Anahit Khudaverdyan. In a recent paper Khudaverdyan (2012) examines the 'Eurasian ethnic context' of Armenia in late classical antiquity examining a cranial series of 143 specimens dating from the second and third centuries AD which were excavated from the Beniamin necropolis in western modern Armenia. Fourteen cranial measurements were used and they were found to be 'less Caucasoid than

most Mediterranean groups' (p. 143), and this evidence is interpreted as identifying this group as including Scythians from the Lower Dneiper and the Northern Pontic steppes, Sarmatians from the Volga-Ural region and Sacae from Western Central Asia with migration and mixing seen as accounting for biological and ethnic heterogeneity and the 'complex pattern of population affinities'. In an interview carried out with Anahit Khudaverdyan on 17 September 2014 she explained the significance of the concept of race in her work. The interview took place in her office which was filled with boxes of over 200 skulls and other human remains at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, Academy of Sciences of Armenia in Yerevan. She explained she had been trained in the Soviet tradition and cited the significance of Bunak's work. She believed that the concept of race was absolutely essential and crucial in her field of physical anthropology. She described the Armenoid racial type as being a sub-category of the Mediterranean race, with a distinctive skull shape, dark olive skin, curly hair and a prominent nose and distinguished this from the Georgian type, another sub-category of the Mediterranean race and the Azeri. She argued that there was no distinct differentiation in skull shape before the sixth–eighth centuries AD and that this developed with nation-building. By the Middle Ages clear physical divergence was seen as being established across these three groups but any hierarchy of racial types was rejected. She did propose that it was possible in many cases today for both herself, representatives of the Armenian state and the public generally in the region to physically distinguish between these three national groups. Overall she rejected any suggestion that the utilisation of racial types in academic science was problematic or politically dangerous arguing that this was central and essential in understanding and explaining the development of the Armenian people. This work was formally supported by the Armenian Academy of Sciences and fits closely with the long tradition of racial science in the Caucasus region.

The linkages between the core use of the race idea in some forms of bioarchaeology and historical analysis is evident in the work of Salahi Sonyel (1987) on Ottoman Armenians, Sonyel is a Cypriot Turkish historian who has been subject to particular criticism for his failure to utilise important key sources in his account of the Armenian genocide (Hovannisian 1999). For Sonyel, the Armenians are a 'mixed race' resulting from the

'intermingling of races as a result of so many invasions and conquests' (1987, p. 12). He reports Armenian historians as either identifying the racial origins of the Armenian people in the Uraratians, or else as belonging to either the South Caucasus or Turanian races, Aryan races from the Pamir steppes or Jewish races from Mesopotamia. Their claims to indigeneity in Eastern Anatolia, the scene of the genocide, are dismissed as 'they are a race who were either driven there or migrated to the area' where other people had been living for thousands of years (1987, p. 13).

Anti-Armenian racism has been embedded both in the Ottoman Empire from the period of the Tamizat reforms (1839–1876), which were the 'Reordering', and in Turkish nationalism (Astourian 1999). In 1895–1896 massacres of at least 100,000 Armenians was followed by a set of events which led to the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and the death or expulsion of almost all Ottoman Armenians (Hovannisian 1999). The reshaping of racism from ethnoreligious foundations to a more explicit biological form characterised Turkism during this period. Irredentist pan-Turkism and the pre-war vision of building a huge Turkish empire was articulated through a racial lens and envisaged a massive, new, racially exclusive civilisation which was shattered by the defeat in World War I. But during this period, Armenians were seen as a human blockage between the Turkic peoples to the East and West and the biological construction of the Turkish race, with its exclusivist political and economic projects, led to exterminationist and expulsionist logics of state governance, desperately seeking to retain Turkish superiority in an imploding multi-ethnic empire. At least one million Armenians died as a result of execution, starvation, disease and forced deportation marches of women, children and the elderly into the deserts of Syria and Iraq erasing this group from Eastern Turkey. The documentation in the historical record by James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee (1915, 1916a, b; Sarafian 1999) establishes local narratives built on independently corroborated eyewitness accounts via dependable intermediaries that evidence the systematic area by area removal and annihilation of Ottoman Armenians in 1915. German construction of the Baghdad railway facilitated deportation, detention, concentration camps and German involvement ranged from military complicity to active resistance (Kaiser 1999). Survivors of the genocide continued to face massacres, deportations and

persecution through the early 1920s and the Turkish state facilitated the process of the expropriation of the former Armenian populations's private and public properties, including land, houses, churches and other goods (Marashlian 1999). This established continuity in racialised genocide between the old Ottoman government and the new Turkish government in the 1920s who finished, regulated and managed this process of Armenian cleansing. This catastrophic rupture in the history of the Armenian people, when over half the population died and the rest were driven from their ancestral homeland, was fundamental in shaping discourse about race and racism in Armenia. For many Armenians racism was not something of their own making, it was elsewhere, located primarily in anti-Armenian Turkish and Azeri racialised nationalism. This view was found to be paramount in interviews carried out in Yerevan in September 2014.

The view of both the Armenian state, currently led by Hovik Abrahamyan and the neo-con Republican Party (RPA) which has been in power since 1999, and the independent human rights monitoring body ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) is that Islamophobia and other forms of racial hostility towards ethnic minorities and other non-nationals is non-existent:

> there is no hostility vis-à-vis ethnic minorities and non-nationals (including those who are not ethnic Armenians) and little or no evidence of anti-Muslim feeling. The authorities continue to approach the Yezidi/Kurdish issue on the basis of the principle of self-identification. (ECRI 2011a, p. 7)

Armenia since 1991 has pursued integration into international and European legal protocols. making the issue of further development of democracy and the protection of human rights as one of its internal and foreign policy priorities (Buniatyan 2006). Representatives of over 20 nations live in the Republic of Armenia, Belorussians, Georgians, Germans, Greeks, Jews, Kurds, Poles, Russians, Syrians, Ukrainians, Yezides and according to Sahakyan (2001) the principle of tolerance stated in all international documents was typical for Armenia as this country had never know any case of discrimination or displacement of non-Armenian people. So there is a long-held state and institutional view

that racial and ethnic discrimination and oppression of ethnic minorities, the 'minority problem', does not exist in Armenia; 'the Armenian government thinks that there have never been ethnic problems in the society, there are none and there won't be any' (Buniatyan 2006, p. 4). So, is this really one of the rare examples of a non-racial state? Interviews with some key informants held in Yerevan in 2014 disclosed a contradictory set of perceptions and experiences.

Armenia is a highly mono-ethnic, mono-religious country but within this there are many differentiations in terms of dialect and regional identities, and with very small ethnic minority groups. In terms of targets of racial hostility, 'the enemy is not inside, it is outside', being Azerbaijan and Turkey[1]. Perceptions and identification of Armenian racism is played down and racism is generally constructed in political and media discourse as being anti-Armenian hostility from Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, recent racist comments by Prime Minister Erdogan. For the younger generation with no contact with Turkish and Azeri people, these groups are dehumanised and hostility is strongly shaped by state propaganda. In school contexts a common message from teachers is that 'we are an old people, we are Christian' and there is some sense here of a hierarchy of peoples with Armenians formally positioned near the top. Islamophobia, anti-black hostility, anti-Gypsyism and anti-Semitism is very minor and limited. Those incidents that do occur are often identified as not being carried out by Armenians but as the result of activities of non-Armenian immigrants, for example, when an Arab student from Syria defaced Yerevan's Holocaust memorial. So the perception is that outsiders are responsible for racist incidents that do not involve Armenians. But there is a racist, extremist, ultra-nationalist core of about a 500–1000 people in the capital city, Yerevan. The peak in support so far was in 2006 with anti-gay violence and associated activities. This is now even more marginal and the leader Armen Avetisyan has a low profile and is of little political significance. There is some support for Hitler and associated Nazi ideology within this group, but not amongst all. There is active

[1] This paragraph draws on interviews carried out with Alexander Iskandaryan, Sergei Minasyan, Hrant Mikaelyan and Marina Saryan, Institute for Caucasus Studies, Yerevan University, Yerevan, 16 September 2014.

production and distribution of racist messages through newspapers and websites. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was some strong evidence of aspirations to whiteness in women's beauty, hair treatment and so on which was linked particularly to pro-Russian modes of beauty, now this is much more diverse. Blacks in general are very rare in Armenia and are seen as exotic, for example in the reference to the popularity of a contemporary Afro-Armenian singer, who was not subject to hostility. Nevertheless there are strongly embedded racial skills amongst most people, learnt though socialisation, in the ability to racially differentiate Azeris and Georgians from Armenians in maybe three quarters of cases, and higher in the case of Western Georgians. Armenians hostility is also focussed on those seen as traitors, for example those who support strengthening of links with Turkey. In terms of attitudes to mixing and intermarriage there was a dominant discourse that it was 'good to stay, and bad to leave, with the need to support the Armenian nation'. Data on social attitudes to intermarriage show 90 %+ express strong disapproval in relation to Turks and Azeris, but this is much lower for Europeans, and Greeks for example are very much welcomed in this respect.

In Armenia, weaknesses in the state's approach to racism are associated with the ways in which human rights agendas are constructed. Human rights education is being interpreted as a means of producing effective citizens (Mahler et al. 2005). An effective citizen in this context means a citizen who is able to participate and is interested in participating in the society. This is also visible in the project Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights by the Council of Europe. These programmes are also applied to national minorities such as the Yezidis or Assyrians with the primary goal being to lead them to become active citizens, but however, not necessarily respecting their particular needs. More fundamentally problems of racial and ethnic discrimination remain in the treatment of groups such as the Kurds and the Yezidis. A survey of leaders of minority groups (Selimyan 2014) confirmed that there is discrimination against their participation in government, including posts in the civil service, and also more widely in education, business and cultural sectors of the economy. Most of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) leaders stated preferences for a number of interventions including quota systems in the National Assembly and in civil service jobs,

primary school education in the languages spoken by national minorities, guarantees for the development of culture, education and religion, and provisions for dual citizenship. Here the general standpoint of minority NGO perceptions was informed by a critique of Armenia's monolithic mono-nationalism', with these groups mostly seeing themselves as unrecognised 'outsiders' who are provided only token government assistance and little respect in an overwhelmingly homogeneous Armenia.

Armenia assumed the presidency of the Council of Europe from May to November 2013 and made challenging hate and intolerance, particularly amongst young people, a top priority, 'we don't want our young people to grow up in hate'[2]. This refers particularly to the legacy of war, conflict and genocide in Armenia, and the prevalent anti-Turkish and anti-Azeri racism and intolerance amongst youth in Armenia. As a result of these concerns a high-level Conference on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Europe, was held in Yerevan on 21–22 October 2013, which called on member states to promote the implementation of the youth campaign 'No Hate Speech Movement' (nohatespeechmovement.org) across all the Council of Europe member states. Hate speech, as defined by the Council of Europe, covers all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin. This campaign particularly focuses on hate speech online and encourages monitoring and reporting. By September 2014 a small number of examples of hate speech had been reported by Armenians on this site. There have also been a number of projects pursued, for example through the Yerevan press club to tackle media hostility and by the Eurasia Foundation to improve relations between Azeri and Armenian youth. However, there is practically no attention to issues of racism and ethnic diversity in research and teaching in Armenian universities (Buniatyan 2006), with the exception of the work of the Institute for Caucasus Studies.

[2] Interview with Naira Avetisyan, Deputy Head of Council of Europe Office, Yerevan, Armenia, 15 September 2014.

In response to questions about the extent of other forms of racism, including anti-Semitism, anti-black racism, anti-Indian hostility and Islamophobia Ms Avetisyan reported that this was almost non-existent in Armenia. The recent arrival of some Iranian Muslims in Yerevan had prompted some hostility towards those wearing veils and to Muslim men who were congregating in squares and drinking in city parks. This was seen as resulting from the mono-ethnic culture of Armenia and the lack of experience in encountering Muslims here, and was an example of latent Islamophobia becoming manifest. This was seen as exceptional and had now been resolved through negotiation. Furthermore, absolutely no neo-Nazi or skinhead activity was acknowledged or identified, despite web evidence of neo-Nazi graffiti and attacks on a gay bar, You tube videos and vandalism of the Holocaust memorial in downtown Yerevan. Also no anti-fascist or anti-racist activity was identified.

As regards the Armenian Aryan Party and its leader Armen Avetisyan this was seen as having little importance or significance. The swastika used by the party was identified as just an older Armenian symbol. This party clearly identifies itself in terms of white pride/Nazi ideology,

> The time has come for us to get organized and represent our nation in world wide white nationalist movements till they build the 4th Reich and we be part of it (Matousian 2006, p. 1).

The general tenor of this core strand of Armenian racial nationalism has its roots and echoes in the rhetoric and polemic of the Dasnaktsutiun, the Armenian revolutionary federation founded in Tbilisi in 1890 to challenge repression of Turkish Armenians. One of the key figures in this party was Garegin Njdeh (1886–1955) who said:

> And now when the German nation is awakened with the rays of Hitlerism's sun, it's time for our nation to wake up too, and reach our historical aims, with new ideology. (Njhdeh 1936)

Njdeh had formed an Armenian battalion, in 1912, to fight against the Turks in the Balkan war. A convinced anti-Bolshevik, he led the defence of Zangezur, in 1921, which led to the cleansing and expulsion

of the region's local Azeri minority. Briefly Prime Minister of the new Republic of Mountainous Armenia, he fled Armenia after the triumph of Bolsheviks and was involved in patriotic activities in Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria and USA. Subsequently, he became engaged in mobilising Armenian communities in North America, and he founded an Armenian Youth movement called *Tseghakron*. In an interview with Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan leader of the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), he acknowledges this form of racial nationalism. He confirmed that the RPA ideology is based on the Tseghakron (Armenian racism) doctrine of Njdeh which attaches importance to the existence of the essentially national-state as the means for the security of the Armenians and the realisation of their ideals. Tseghakron is a spiritual covenant to respect, defend and perfect the Armenian people. The political goal here is to strengthen the Armenian state envisaged as an exclusionary, mono-ethnic vehicle for the advancement of the Armenian people (Margaryan 2007).

The contemporary impact of this century of Armenian racialised nationalism has reaffirmed notions of whiteness and superiority and allied hierarchies of ethnoracial differentiation with specific complexities in this case (Iskandaryan 2014). Armenians racial self-identity was reported as being a specific mix of whiteness, European and Asian characteristics. Racial, physical differentiation between Georgians, Armenians and Azeris is a strongly held state and popular belief. The Armenian police, it was reported, could in many cases identify, for example, who was Azeri by their facial characteristics. Within Armenians two racial types were described blue eyed, blond hair, 'valley' people and darker skinned, dark-haired 'mountain' peoples. In relation to mixing and intermarriage outside these Armenian groups ambivalent attitudes were common with both strong social/family opposition and an emphasis on separation and trends of increasing ethnoracial mixing were confirmed. The former was stated as being due to the need to 'protect our Armenian genes' protecting national identity and culture through maintaining an unmixed Armenian population. Religious hate speech and hostility was also reported as being promoted by some teachers in schools and lack of provision of minority rights more generally in Armenia was confirmed. Antigypsyism was weak and there is some evidence of Armenian Roma/Gypsies being derogatorily referred to as 'Bosha', but many were now mixed, relatively

invisible and thoroughly assimilated. Any Roma in Armenia now were identified as Georgians who had travelled across the border. Sharpening nationalist sentiment in Armenian is accompanying economic decline and increasing discontent with the Government. The government was pursuing an increasing focus on promoting Armenian nationalist values, for example in changing the school curriculum, encouraged by the Armenian Church, from teaching history of religion to the history of Armenian religion. There was no or very little teaching that promoted tolerance, diversity, multiculturalism and associated values. Teaching on the Armenian genocide was a part of the school curriculum but there was no linkage to other forms of genocide or indeed Holocaust education. Ambivalent state messages on racism and intolerance were a central feature of political discourse combining the rhetorics and logics of both tolerance and mono-ethnic majoritarianism, the Minister of Culture was reported as being 'a disaster' in terms of articulating regressive, exclusive formations of cultural/national expression. In contrast to this, new transnational diasporic actors in post-socialist Armenia are 'actively engaged in cultural translation and cosmopolitan sociability by assisting global issues and internationalized social movements' according to fieldwork carried out in Armenia and the USA (Darieva 2011). Armenian racialisation is uniquely configured being shaped in opposition to Turkish and Azeri racisms in particular and entwined with the re-making and re-telling of the story of the Armenian race/nation and it is also contested by Armenian minority NGOs, European neo-liberal human rights agendas and the progressive, transnational influences of the Armenian diaspora. The leadership of the political elite will be key in determining whether there is a slow drift to de-racialisation and the building of a multi-ethnic nation or whether there will be a defensive escalation and hardening of the Armenian mono-ethnoracial national political project. The insulation of Armenia from significant non-Armenian inward migration flows due to a variety of factors, not least the continuing closed border with Turkey, and the recent history of the forced exodus of almost the whole Azerbaijani population and out migration of Russians, has also facilitated a more mono, ethnically pure, anti-cosmopolitan world view. Insular racism or insulated racism possibly best characterises the Armenian case.

Republic of Azerbaijan and State-Promoted Race Hate

Azerbaijan is a presidential republic in the east of the Southern Caucasus region, bordered by the Russian Federation, Iran, Armenia and Georgia with a population of about nine and a half million people, of whom about 85 % are Shia Muslims. Azerbaijan has been shedding its Soviet anti-Islamic legal heritage and, despite is principal secularism, is undergoing an Islamic revival and at the same time is rediscovering its ethnocultural roots (Swietochowski 2011) and reshaping the contemporary ethnoracial character of this state. The contemporary ethnic composition of Azerbaijan is complex, including the Azeris (91.6 %), Russians, Talish, Lezgians, Kurds, Tats, Armenians and Avars among others. The Lezgians (Dagestanis) are predominantly Sunni Muslims, speaking a separate Caucasian language and are now the largest ethnic minority group in the country at just over 2 % . The Talish are another important ethnic minority group who are Farsi-speaking people living in southern Azerbaijan and contiguous areas of Iran.

The central focus for this section will be an analysis of the racialisation of Azerbaijani nationalism and the creation of the contemporary racial state. Questions of the physiological and racial history, characteristics and unity of the Azerbaijani people divide across two contemporary positions, the conservative and the revisionist (Shnirelman 2001). The first school of thought emphasises the significance of biological and cultural characteristics in the specification of Azerbaijani, thereby invoking a racial distinctiveness. The historical continuity of this differentiated population, the unity of northern and southern Azerbaijanis and the promotion of the territorial integrity of Soviet Azerbaijan, in opposition to Armenian territorial claims, are key features of this account, which can be found in contemporary political and academic discourse. Here the irredentist claims for a Greater Armenia are contested by counter claims to a Greater Azerbaijan. The latter, revisionist school, derives from the pan-Turkic language debate from which claims for essentialised nationhood are made and this school are associated with the strengthening of relationships with the Turkic world, especially with Turkey and the rejection of Iranian

ancestry and heritage. Pan-Turkic discourse became popular during the late 1980s and early 1990s, elaborated in academic discourse and politicised and popularised by both the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) and the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CPA) leaders. The discursive construction of the physiological and biological genesis of the Azerbaijani nation, associated with its territorial integrity, provides an underlying framework for the racial formation of this state.

Prior to the Baku oil rush in the 1870s, the peoples of the Trans-Caucasus khanates of Baku and Elizavetopol (Gyandzha) were known as Tartars, Turks or Muslims. The formation of Azerbaijani identity and its associated nationalism in the early twentieth century had three futures, pan-Islam and the struggle for a future for Muslims in Russia, pan-Turkism and pan-Azerbaijainism and the struggle for a future built on historical ties with Turkic and Iranian civilisations and lastly, the development of a new and unique variant of Azerbaijani nationalism (Goldenberg 1994). The official ideology of the short-lived Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, which was established during the early twentieth century (between 1918 and 1920) was 'Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization'. In this formulation, Turkification referred to the preservation of national values, Islamisation to the preservation of Islamic values and modernisation to the transfer of technology and science from the West. The tri-colour flag of the Azerbaijan Republic symbolised this ideology. Blue on the top represented Turkism, red in the middle modernisation (European civilisation) and green at the bottom represented Islam meaning that modernisation should be rooted in Islam seeking guidance from Turkic life. Although today Azerbaijan has the same flag, Turkification, Islamisation and modernisation are no longer presented as the official ideology. Although the titular nation of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic was Turkic speaking and had strong cultural and historical ties with Iran, the Soviet regime constructed a national identity that was divorced from its Turkic and Iranian past. National identity in Soviet Azerbaijan was altered from Turkic to Azerbaijani and the many factors that induced the Bolsheviks to take this extraordinary step in 1937 was a result of a combination of developments in Turkey, Iran, Germany and the Soviet Union. As Saroyan (1996, p. 403) argues, in 1937 the majority of the population of the Azerbaijani republic, formerly known as Turk, was redefined as

Azerbaijani. This case demonstrates the logic of Stalinist national-state construction; the existence of an Azerbaijani nation was necessary for the formation of a Soviet republic named Azerbaijan. In addition to the ethnic Azerbaijanis, the Talish, Kurds and other ethnic groups were also redefined as Azerbaijanis during the same period in the formation of a homogenous ethnic bloc (Saroyan 1996). This nation then became increasingly naturalised and essentialised in the discursive construction of Azerbaijani racism building from Soviet governance and operationalised by the political Azerbaijani elite in the process of racial nation formation, constructed also as distinct from and in opposition to Armenians. The discursive construction of the physiological and biological genesis of the Azerbaijani nation, associated with its territorial integrity, provides an underlying framework for the racial formation of this state. Racialised hostility between Azerbaijan and Armenia developed in the early twentieth century and although distinct there is a strong similarity between anti-Armenianism and anti-Semitism in terms of its discursive content but not its strength.

Current estimates of anti-Semitism put Armenia at 58 % and Azerbaijan at 37 %, this is of adults who thought that the majority of anti-Semitic stereotypes were 'probably true' in the Anti-Defamation Leagues' Global 100 Survey (2014), compared to for example 69 % Turkey, 37 % France, 8 % UK and 34 % Russian Federation. In response to this data the Israeli Ambassador, Rafael Harpaz, said,

> There is no anti-Semitism in Azerbaijan, Jewish community lives proudly here and Azerbaijani government supports the community. There are important Jewish communities in Baku and in Krasnaya Sloboda, thriving Jewish schools and synagogues. I want to reiterate that Azerbaijan is a role model for other countries in its attitude towards the Jewish community (2 June, Azerbaijan News).

But unlike anti-Semitism, which is however evident in recent political hate speech and desecration of graves, today anti-Armenian hostility remains much more prevalent being driven by mainstream political discourse embedded in over a century of violent confrontations and hostilities which began during the Russian colonial period. Recently Edward Nalbandian, the Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed that,

> The South Caucasus region in the past witnessed and now is witnessing this kind of risks. Such propaganda preceded anti-Armenian massacres in Azerbaijan—in Sumgait, Baku, Maragha and many other places, when thousands of Armenians were tortured, killed, thus starting the ethnic cleansing of Armenians living on the territory of Azerbaijan. Twenty five years later, in today's Azerbaijan, similar, and even worse hate-speech, war propaganda emanating from the highest level of Azerbaijani authorities often results in the escalation of the situation and loss of innocent lives (6 March 2014, Armenia Now).

The exact level of anti-Armenian hostility was confirmed in a recent study of print media communications where 342 (3.9 %) of the 8679 items of Azerbaijani media examined contained these messages, over 50 % being in print media, and Alif Arayev, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Journalists Union, *Yeni Nesil*, introducing the study at the recent 'Hate speech and information wars, challenges of quality journalism' Conference, held on November 23–24 in Batumi, Georgia, confirmed that state officials were the primary source of these communications followed by journalists.

In a long-standing project *Yeni Nesil* and the Yerevan Press Club have collaborated in campaigning against hate speech in both Armenia and Azerbaijan since 2001 producing a glossary which identifies the most common clichés, stereotypes and examples of inaccurate (or reasonably questioned) information in the media of Armenia and Azerbaijan based on analysis of sources in the two countries from 2001 to 2010. These include exactly parallel and opposing accusations of genocide, propaganda and misrepresentation which even handedly accuse both countries' media sources of shaping and sharpening hostility to each other.

Linkages between anti-Semitism and anti-Armenianism can be found in the political discourse of Azerbaijani nationalists, in the late twentieth century, including Ziya M. Buniyatov, Farida Mamedova, Abulfaz Elchibey and Vafa Guluzade, and in particular in the parallels and references to earlier figures such as Vasili L. Velichko (1860–1903). Recently an Azerbaijani political scientist, Rasim Agayev commenting on the peace-making process between Turkey and Armenia said, invoking Velichko as evidence of the deceitful nature of Armenians,

> To deceive, cheat, to be cunning have been inherent in Armenians originally. But the trouble is that Armenians, by signing a treaty does not consider

> themselves obligated to implement it. This observation by a connoisseur of Armenia, Russian historian Vasily Velichko, fully manifested in the course of more than two years of negotiations between Turkey and Armenia' (Agayez 2012, p. 1)

Developing Armenian nationalism and associated revolutionary struggles in both Turkey and in Russia in the late nineteenth century, led Russia to pursue chauvinist Russification aiming to eradicate Armenian patriotism through a clampdown on Armenian schools and the promotion of Russian language and culture. Reaction to this led to strengthening Armenian nationalist activity and sharply increasing Armenophobia led by the anti-Armenian polemics of Velichko promulgated through his role as editor of the Caucasus Gazette, *Kavkaz* (Suny 1993). This rhetoric compared Armenians to 'plant-lice' and encouraged a discourse of verminisation and racialised hatred of people who were responsible for spying, treachery, where 'race, religion, revolution and the materialist values of the entrepreneur' were used to depict the Armenian as an alien to be attacked and expelled, a project realised subsequently in the death marches of 1915.

Vasili Velichko's 'forgotten racist tract' *The Caucasus: Russian affairs and intertribal issues,* most of which was originally published as a series of articles in *Russkiy Vestnik* in 1904 and was then subsequently republished in an extended form by the Institute of Strategic Studies in Baku in 2007. Here 'Armenian parasitism' and the power of the 'alien' Armenian bourgeoisie are identified as the key threat to the Caucasus (2007, p. 24). The racial characteristics of Armenians are identified in two ways, they are seen as the only group of people able to assimilate Gypsies into their group thereby taking on degenerative racial characteristics, and being akin to Jews:

> there are many Semitic characters in the Armenian people: there is a historical inability to have a little bit stable statehood, and gradual disappearance of the authoritative family aristocracy…. and significant racial talent for trade, usury and unlimited money-grubbing. Their arrogance and cruelty in respect to the weakest and slavish glowering before the powerful, and finally, astounding, phenomenal talent for advertisement and insatiable vanity—all those are the *Jewish* characters, but they become more cursed and intensive with Armenians. (2007, p. 74).

Velichko also elaborates a racial hierarchy ranking Russians above Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijanis above Armenians. Azerbaijanis are racially constructed as having 'noble blood' and as being talented in their 'intellectual and moral development' but they have 'no psychological equality with Russians', as Russians are seen as superior and more advanced as a result of their 'Byzantine religious-political culture' (2007, p. 138). This writing parallels Sergei Nilus's work on the infamous anti-Semitic tract *Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* published in an abridged version in 1903. Nilus was a Russian writer who had served as a magistrate in Transcaucasia. This repertoire of racialisation has provided a core frame of understanding in the long process of Azerbaijani racial formation.

The strong relational interconnections between Azeri anti-Armenian race discourse and anti-Semitism are exemplified in the parallel usage of similar ideas of 'universal conspiracy of supposedly better-educated and more prosperous Armenians against the Azerbaijani nation'. The instigation and association of this form of racism derives from the pre-Soviet period. The Czarist secret police in 1905/1906, suspecting Jews and Armenians of being key actors in liberal agitation in Russia mobilised Cossack and Azeri bazaar mobs. They carried out the massacre of Armenians in Baku and Nagorno Karabakh by Azeris, paralleled by anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine, Bessarabia and southern Russia.

The mass indiscriminate killings of Armenian civilians in Sumgait, Kirovabad and Baku in 1988–1990 and the attempted genocide in Nagorno Karabakh revived this tradition of anti-Armenian violence (Haji-Petros 2001). The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is central to any discussion of the development of the Azerbaijani national movement and national identity. The ideological conceptualisation of racialised hostility was confirmed in state political discourse in the *Decree of the President of Azerbaijan on the Genocide of the Azerbaijanis*[3]. This Decree was issued

[3] See *Decree of the President of Azerbaijan on the Genocide of the Azerbaijanis*. *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, 26 March 1998 (in Russian). The Decree was translated into English and is available online from the official website maintained by the Office of the President of Azerbaijan. The suspected author of the text of the Decree is Vafa Guluzade, former presidential advisor to the Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, best known for his scandalous proposal to establish a NATO military base near Baku (Haji-Petros 2001).

on 26 March 1998 by the Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and published in most governmental newspapers at the time. Written in the best traditions of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Chapter XI of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which addresses questions of the intimate relation between nation and race, this document is a concise manifesto that summarises the main components of contemporary Azeri racial nationalism. The publication of the Decree openly legitimised and endorsed the proliferation of racist literature in Azerbaijan, which subsequently snowballed, rapidly becoming an inseparable part of Azeri post-Soviet political and media discourse, as well as academic/historical discourse. This was further disseminated through a range of state-promoted activities, including the introduction of racialised textbooks into the curriculum of secondary and higher education and the establishment of annual hate festivals—so-called days of sorrow (e.g. 20 January and 31 March). The 'days of sorrow' punctuate Azerbaijan's official calendar with consequent periods of state-sanctioned public grief, perhaps indicating the different stages of the 200-year-old grand conspiracy against Azerbaijan (Haji-Petros 2001). The Decree legitimises state and popular racism as:

> all of Azerbaijan's tragedies, which took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries represented various stages of the Armenians' deliberate and systematic policy of genocide against the Azeris (1998).

An important feature of the Decree and Azeri nationalism is the orientation towards territorial revisionism and ethnic irredentism because, as the Decree explains, Armenia is 'a fictitious state [created] on Azerbaijani land'. Azeris in the document are described as 'a divided people' thwarted in their ambitions regarding Karabakh and Armenia the proponents of 'Greater Azerbaijan from the Caspian to the Black Sea' now must shift the focus of their activities to other neighbours including Iran.

More recently, the ECRI report on Azerbaijan (2011a) confirmed the continuing dimensions of racialisation of this exclusionary racial state. Political discourse regularly shapes hostility towards the Armenian

state and its people which results in everyday racial discrimination against Armenians which is regularly reported by NGOs. This in a context where anti-discrimination legislation remains 'little known, scattered and infrequently applied'. An interlocking set of environments maintain an atmosphere of hostility. Identifying someone as Armenian, for example in the news media, is effectively treated as an insult. Police and security agencies are regularly involved in racial and ethnic profiling combined with regular human rights abuses including violence to extort evidence. Hence various strategies are employed to avoid these processes of discrimination and violence, including concealing identities, for example when applying for jobs. People born from mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani marriages frequently hide their Armenian heritage and use the name of their Azerbaijani parent. The legal framework with respect to national/ ethnic minorities remains weak. National/ethnic minorities also report facing practical difficulties in their access to the teaching of minority languages. Moreover, the lack of consultative bodies for minorities has adverse implications for the consideration of their specific needs; difficulties are also reported regarding the registration of national minorities' associations.

In reply the Azerbaijani government confirmed the justifiable and necessary vilification and racialisation of Armenian people, the neutrality and objectivity of its news media and the understandable expressions of 'bias and rage' in news reporting:

> The negative position of the Azerbaijani media towards the Republic of Armenia is natural and understandable—20 percent of the country's territories are under occupation, over 1 million of Azerbaijanis were ousted from their homelands. The world community turns a blind eye to these events, ignores the fact of occupation. (ECRI 2011a, b, c, p. 4).

The Azerbaijani state also flatly denied that such discourse had any negative impact on the day-to-day lives of Armenians living in Azerbaijan. This context of entrenched hostility is embedded in the mythologised, hatred of Jewish people which has been translated, displaced and reworked on a daily basis in everyday life, and historical, political and media discourse onto

Armenian people. This provides a unique specific process of Armenian racialisation deriving from the legacy of Russian imperial and Soviet colonialism and this is a direct product of state governance and specific racial relationalities.

The Republic of Georgia: Georgification and the Construction of New Racialised/Religious Nationalism as a Distinct Variety of Modernity

Georgia is a republic in the west of the Southern Caucasus region, bordered by the Russian Federation, Armenia and Turkey. Its population of 4.6 million includes a range of ethnic minority groups who comprise 16 % of the population. These include small and long-established Jewish and Roma groups, a small Chinese group of recent migrants and small groups of Yezidi Kurdish, Ossetian and Kist, together with larger groups of Azeri, Armenians and Russians (Peinhopf 2014; Bitadze 2015). The ethnic Georgian majority in the country define themselves as *Kartvelebi* (ქართველები). The conversion to Christianity in the fourth century AD of Sakartvelo, land of the Kartvelians, was a key moment in the formation of national identity distinguishing this country from the surrounding Persian and Arab worlds (Jones and Parsons 1996). The current Georgian state is marked out by its increasingly exclusivist ethnoreligious nationalism fusing together imperial traditions with a revived Orthodox Church producing a deteriorating climate in which racial discourse and hostility towards many different groups, who are exterior to those at the core of Georgian national identity, is pervasive (ECRI 2010a; Aydıngün 2013). This is despite the move in Presidential rhetoric from ethnic to civic nationalism (Matsaberidze 2014). The interconnected complex of racialised discourse has many targets including the various groups labelled under the homogenising label Roma, black and Chinese people, Azeris, Meskhetian Turks and other minority groups.

The abolition of about a thousand year era of Georgian monarchy in 1801 in the context of Russian imperial/colonial control provided a key

impetus to the development of Georgian nationalism exemplified in the mass uprisings against Tsarist control in the early nineteenth century, the 1832 conspiracy and the rise of the '60s generation' (Chkhartishvili and Javakhishvili 2013). A key exponent of Georgian nationalism in this latter period was Ilia Chavchavadze (1837–1907), who 'devoted his life to ethno-cultural re-conceptualization of the native ethnic community', the *eri*[4] (2013, p. 196). Chavchavadze elaborated most of the central themes, necessary to construct Georgian national identity including the construction of the essentialised ethnoracial characteristics of Georgians, a framework of ethnoracial understanding to interpret their history, their relations with other significant ethnoracial groups and regimes and their common political project and national destiny. He articulated notions of territory, language, national spirit, an idealised peasantry and essentialised Christian identity calling for the 'sacral treasures' of fatherland, language and faith to be invoked as central pillars of the Georgian struggle for political autonomy. One key ambivalence here was the failure of Georgian Orthodox Christianity to provide a basis for distinction with Russian Orthodoxy, complicated further by the presence of Georgian Muslims, Yazidis, Catholics and Jews. The Georgian *eri* involved a primary notion of common roots, common blood and membership of the Georgian nation, which was determined by lineage and inheritance. Here race as lineage operated as an implicit discourse in the making of Georgian nationalism, which became strengthened and elaborated further in the post-Soviet period. Giorgi Margvelashvili, the current President, referred to the necessity of preserving Georgian identity using the words of Chavchavadze to confirm this point in his inaugural speech (Matsaberidze 2014).

Drawing on Soviet traditions of academic work on the primordial, mono-ethnic and physiological character of nations, Georgian academics such as Ivane Javakhishvili and Niko Marr developed a narrative of Georgian ethnogenesis as a basis for the new post-Soviet Georgian state (Chedia 2014). Leaders of the national-liberation movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s including Zviad Gamsakhurdia invoked the work of Chavchavadze and the 'sixties generation' as a core set of

[4] The Georgian term for the nation's essence.

statements in their political project. The post-Soviet national project put ‘the prioritisation of state-building at the expense of democracy and minority rights’ (Aydıngün 2013, p. 810). The Soviet nationalities policy used ethnicity (ru. *national'nost*) as the main badge of belonging and as the main tool for categorising people while creating an ethnic hierarchy. This was one of the main reasons for the exclusion of minorities in the Soviet period. The legacy of this policy is the main reason for the ethnification and nationalisation of religion in all of the post-Soviet republics, including Georgia.

Georgia declared independence after the referendum held on 9 April 1991 under the initiative of the liberation movement organised during the dissolution process of the Soviet Union and Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first president of the country and his confrontational style and ethnoreligious chauvinism fuelled tensions among different communities living in Georgia. Policies of Christianisation and identification of Georgianness with Orthodox Christianity both contributed to the shoring up of Georgian national identity and the further marginalisation of, and sporadic violent attacks on, Muslim and other non-Orthodox religious communities in the country, ‘today in Georgia, minorities, and especially Muslim minorities, feel excluded, unrecognised, discriminated against; thus, unvalued’ (Aydıngün 2013, p. 816). Orthodox Christianity is for many the ‘national ideology’, and other religions are increasingly regarded as a threat to the state and national unity and produce an aggressive, majoritarian Byzantine mentality (Khaindrava 2001).

Georgia has always been multi-ethnic but there has been a general shift away from this pattern facilitated by the permanent outflow of Armenians and Azerbaijanis to their respective countries, the deportation of Ahıska/Meskhetian Turks, a Turkish-speaking Muslim minority who were deported from the south of Georgia in 1944 by Stalin, and could not return home after that date, and similar deportation of Hamsheni Armenians to Central Asia. But even so, approximately 16 % of the Georgia population currently comprise a range of ethnic minority groups, many of whom are marginalised, particularly through the state’s emphasis on the Georgian language and minorities lack of this linguistic knowledge. Ethnic minorities are generally under-represented in the civil service and political institutions such as parliament and the

government, and also in local institutions even in those regions where they are the majority community. The declining proportion of ethnic minorities in Georgia was most noticeable between 1989 and 2002 when it dropped from about 30 % to 17 %. The initial post-Soviet period in the 1990s was punctuated by explicit national chauvinism, civil war and conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ossetians were deported from various towns and villages in Shida Kartli and Azerbaijanis from parts of Kvemo Kartli triggering an outflow of Armenians, Greeks and Russian speakers (Minasyan 2007). Kvemo Kartli is a multi-ethnic region with a population consisting mainly of Azeris who are a relatively homogeneous and overwhelmingly rural population. In 2002, the Azeri and Armenian minorities constituted 11.8 % of Georgia's population (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and there has been little progress towards integrating Armenian and Azeri minorities, particularly the ones residing in Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli where low levels of education are pervasive (ECMI 2011). The overall popular atmosphere of Georgian hostility was captured in a survey by the Georgian Association for Regional Press in 2006 which identified a range of solutions to the 'problem' of ethnic minorities. The overwhelming view was support for a racial logic of expulsion, 72.2 %, 8.8 % favoured assimilation and only 18.5 % supported a multicultural solution including promotion of minority culture and identity and full minority participation in the rebuilding of Georgia (Minasyan 2007, pp. 34–35). This underlines the post-Soviet intensification of racism in Georgia driven by narrow, aggressive promotion of an exclusivist Georgian political project, the building of intimate links between the Georgian state and church and associated problems of semi-autonomous paramilitaries and a declining economy combined with pro-European and integration (of minorities) rhetoric.

Levels of racialisation and hostility vary significantly across a range of groups in Georgia. This section examines anti-semitism, anti-Gypsyism, anti-Blackness, anti-Chinese hostility, anti-Muslimism and other forms of associated discourse. The old Jewish community faces the lowest levels of anti-semitism in any of the South Caucasus countries examined here (a level of 32 % public opinion hostility to Jews was recorded in 2014, compared for example 58 % in Armenia, ADL 2014). The small Romani community is the most marginalised and disadvantaged ethnic community in Georgia

(ECMI 2011). Extreme poverty, unemployment, lack of access to education and health care, and isolation from larger society are all key problems that the Romani community is facing. Roma frequently lack identification documents which hampers their access to social services and primary health care. In education low school attendance and very high drop-out rates are endemic with very few progressing beyond primary school level (ECRI 2010a, b).

Recent fieldwork in Georgia by Marushiakova and Vesselin (2014) has confirmed the mistaken aggregation of groups referred to as Gypsies or Roma into one overarching category. They identify three distinct, relatively separated groups the Garachi/Dom, Bosha/Lomavtik and Tsygane/Roma. Distinctions between these groups result from different mother tongues, different religions ('Lom' belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church, 'Rom' are Orthodox Christians and Muslims, 'Dom' are Muslims) with complex differentiated patterns of migration and settlement. Georgians tend to lump Dom and Lom groups together and these groups themselves reject any linking or designation of their groups as 'Roma'. This evidence challenges the wider homogenisation of the Roma category frequently found in official reports and studies.

In a study of the conditions of Tsygane/Roma families in Georgia in 2003 carried out by George Janiashvili and his colleagues, a wide range of exclusionary and marginalising processes were identified for those living both in the *Tsiganski pasiolok* in the capital Tbilisi and for those spread across a range of neighbourhoods in the second largest city, Kutaisi. Many of these Roma families live in conditions of severe poverty, poor housing, homelessness and overcrowding and their needs are commonly ignored and not addressed by the state and relevant agencies, for example many were ignored and discriminated in the distribution of food aid. This generates anti-government hostility, mistrust and despair in a context where anti-Roma hostility and discrimination is a common, everyday experience and where they are excluded from legal means of earning their living, education and participation in the social and political life of Georgia. Primary and secondary health care is not available for the majority of Roma because of their poor financial situation. They are only able to use emergency care in extreme situations and even then medical provision is poor. Roma women are often forced to deliver a child at home without

any medical assistance from doctor, midwife or nurse. Births are then not formally registered and the children are this excluded from citizenship and can become the victims of human trafficking. This process of marginalisation has led many Roma families to move out of the country when they can although movement is restricted by lack of identification documents. The majority of Roma do not have any such documents such as an ID card or a passport, those that do were registered as Moldavians, particularly those Roma, who live in the Svaneti district of Tbilisi. Lack of identity documents has a wide range of consequences including exclusion from voter registration, schooling and welfare including social assistance and state pensions. Educational inequalities, differential treatment and exclusion from schooling have a number of dimensions and is a context where de-segregation and initiatives to improve access have largely failed. The majority of Roma have only very limited education with only a small percentage being able to read and write, let alone being able to read and write in the state language. No schools teach in the Roma language and Roma children, when they do attend, tend to go to Russian schools as they do not speak Georgian. Parents also tend to take their children out of school as they cannot pay for books, and other school charges such as for heating. Racial discrimination in access to jobs is widespread and the majority of Roma have therefore been forced into self-employment and illegal activities such as robbery or smuggling but the majority of economically active Roma expressed the desire to obtain regular paid work. These racial conditions make Roma individuals and communities vulnerable to a range of human rights abuses and oppressive relationships with criminal justice agencies. Men frequently become the victims of illegal and arbitrary detention. Fieldwork confirmed that in Tbilisi and Kutaisi Roma men are often detained beyond the prescribed period of 48 hours and then after detention of a week or two they are released without knowing why they were arrested. In police cells they are often mistreated and forgotten, sometimes going days without food and drinking water. As a result Roma people generally avoid any contact with law enforcement bodies. They are often forbidden to trade in markets, as they resist paying illegal taxes and bribes demanded by police or state officials and chased away from these trading places. The abuse of power by police officers in relation to Roma women revealed the intersections between sexism and

racism. One Roma women in Kutaisi said, 'the policeman detained me for the "speculation" and took me to the nearest police department with the goods; I was taken into the cabinet of the head of police department and he offered me regular sexual contact with him in order to get permission for trading in the street without paying taxes. I refused indeed this suggestion but this fact proves that they have different opinion about Roma women' (Janiashvili et al. 2003, p. 12). More recent work by David Szakonyi (2008) and Giorgi Sordia (2009) at the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) confirms the 'scorn and disregard' with which this community is treated by the state and its citizens. They are 'left to wander the streets in urban areas' further hardening racial hostility and condemnation. However, recent interventions by ECMI and others have facilitated recent community mobilisation and increasing school enrolment with some positive results but in an intolerant climate. The wider national context of pervasive aggressive, majoritarian racial stereotypes, myths and hostility promoted by politicians, in the media and in school textbooks however remains and little has changed (ECRI 2010a).

Anti-blackness and anti-Chinese racism in Georgia have been increasing, and the circulation of these forms of racism has been facilitated by increasing torrents of abuse and hate on the web. The relatively small group of black people living in Georgia have reported the usual problems of police harassment and more general insults and abuse on the streets in Tbilisi. Nelson O. Erhunse recalled that in one incident, a group of drunken Georgians started an argument with him and insulted, and when he said he was going to call the police, one of the harassers showed him his own ID which was that of a police officer, and Erhunse confirmed that, 'most of the time the only time we are harassed is from Georgian law enforcement officers'. (Suvariani 2008). The increased population of black and Chinese people in Georgia have been subject to increasing vilification on the web in internet forums and in the press and there have been a number of complaints about street racial harassment made to the Public Defender's Office (Khutsishvili and Sheshaberidze 2010), for example: 'soon we will be inserted in the Red Book; the Chinese people have occupied our territory; they are breeding like rats; how those Negros smell'. Such views are contested, for example on the forum Furm.ge *Have*

Negros Attack Us???, with contributors demanding that 'racism should be punished' and 'well, shall we allow people of all race, origin and religion come into our country and make friends with us? Shall we feed them and get married with them? Shall we mix up with them, which will end in our transformation? No, there is no problem'. On the forum topic deriding 'negro beggars in our capital' responses included the assertion that 'racism is demonstration of a spoiled soul of a person' and 'beggar is beggar; what is difference between black and white beggars'. Another forum topic predominantly promoted anti-Chinese hate, for example fear of in-migration and Chinese shop ownership; 'Oh, my God! They will overlap us. We are so few. Do you see what they have done with Russian people; they have already reached 3 million in Russia! Initially they were standing in the street and later they opened large shops. Gradually they will become superior over us!! We should enact a law – we must not let them in'. A multiple set of elements emerged in these contested discussions fears of a rapidly increasing population, 'these Chinese people are breeding rapidly, they are everywhere' which will result in the total transformation of the population: 'in twenty years we will have narrow eyes like Chinese people and you will see then' because these foreign dirty people will change the Georgina nation 'physically, culturally and in every direction. Soon, we will be inserted in Red Book… finally, we will start speaking in Chinese; so they must be evicted from here and very soon'. Jiayi Zhou's (2012) study confirms the positioning of Chinese as very low, almost zero, in terms of social status and daily experiences of racism and ridicule together with the emergence of a set of myths including the massive over-estimation of the Chinese population, their level of intermarriage with Georgian women and their purchase of Georgian land. Zhou also confirms the wider pattern of hostility, resentment and suspicion towards other recent racialised migrant groups including Africans and Indians.

The intersections between gender, racialisation and also anti-Muslimism have also been subject to scrutiny in Georgia. Endemic domestic violence, economic pressures, political and social isolation and the effects of early marriage and childbirth all contribute to the burden that women from racialised groups face across the country (Peinhopf 2014). Roma women for example 'live poor anonymous and often short lives' (2014,

p. 27). The high general prevalence of domestic violence in Georgia has been attributed to the strength of embedded structures of patriarchy exacerbated by increasing male unemployment and men's addictive behaviours (drink and drugs). Intersection of these factors with Muslim traditions and beliefs has been identified, in the case of Azeri women, as amplifying levels of violence and legitimating attitudes (16.5 % of Azeris in 2011 agreed that husband's physical violence is used because the wife deserves such punishment). The post-communist period saw a revival of early marriage. The abduction of 12- 13-year-old girls for marriage, bride kidnapping, has declined but the lasting threat of abduction still operates as an instigator of widespread fear amongst Azeri young women. Azeri women also face restrictions on their movement outside the home and primarily work unpaid in domestic and agricultural roles. The increase in early marriage led to an increasing rate of school drop-out but this is now reducing. Many of these trends are evident amongst Armenian women in Georgia but the constraints they face, in terms of religious traditions and socialisation, are weaker. Ossetian women following the Georgian–Russian war in 2008, particularly those living outside the conflict zone have additionally experienced increased hostility and discrimination. The lives of Kist women, descendants of ethnic Chechens, have been made worse recently through the massive support for ultraconservative Salafism, particularly amongst the young, leading to increasing levels of male domination. Kist women also have little recourse to Georgian law for protection against discrimination and domestic violence through the rule of community-based elder's councils. Yezidi Kurdish women suffer from 'systematic gender-based discrimination' and persistent traditional marriage and gender norms where early marriage is common and domestic violence 'endemic' (Peinhopf 2014, p. 26).

The Soviet challenge to the intellectual and ideological dimensions of Islam, and the 'privatisation' of religion, gave way, and in Georgia, increasing levels of religiosity are now evident. The Azeris are Georgia's largest ethnic and religious minority, and the largest Muslim grouping. Across Georgia multiple communities with multiple positions means that the one in ten Muslims who comprise this population are far from united. The increasing institutionalisation of Islam (for example the Georgian Muslim Department was created in 2011) and its increasing public role is

taking place but it is still seen as outside and separate to Georgian national identity (Prasad 2012). Anti-Muslim socialisation, for example in state schools, also acts to reproduce this discourse but aggressive Islamophobia is not yet strongly evident although there are warning signs that this is increasing. More generally however cases of harassment and verbal and physical abuse of religious minorities are regularly reported and there an increasing number of cases where Muslims and mosques are victims of this type of hate crime (ECRI 2010a).

The group referred to as Meskhetian Turks, and which is a contested designation, are another Muslim group vulnerable to state marginalisation, discrimination and exclusion. In 1944, the Meskhetian Turks were forcefully evicted from Georgia under the pretence of 'fortifying strategically vulnerable borders' by Stalin. Within 24 hours, over 100,000 Meskhetian Turks were forced from their homes, herded into wagons meant for livestock and exiled to the deserts and steppes of Central Asia and Kazakhstan with thousands dying in the process. The lack of effective state recognition of the need to act to enable those who wish to do so, to return to live in Georgia and acquire Georgian citizenship has long been a failure of this regime. The accompanying climate of hostility to this group also remains a core feature of their relationship with Georgian society. Governance strategies in relation to language, repatriation, citizenship and inclusion of these groups all operate to perpetuate exclusion.

Conclusion

Polyracism is clearly exemplified in the Southern Caucasus region. Three varieties of racialised modernity have been identified in this chapter. There is no uniform similarity in the way in which these states have interacted with and operationalised prevailing and dominant forms of racialisation. Specific racial conditions have been identified in each instance, which have shaped distinct and differential processes and outcomes. The Soviet experience of domination, the knowledge regime of racial science and global circulation of dominant forms of racial discourse, together with multiple configurations of ethnoracial differentiation and division have all influenced these outcomes.

Racism in Armenia is very different to racisms elsewhere, yet it is also intimately related to global hierarchies of racial differentiation. Armenian insular/insulated racism has been generated in the context of an increasingly homogenous mono-ethnic social context. Insulation from significant inward migration flows, not least those fleeing the Syrian war, together with the forced exodus of almost the whole Azerbaijani population and out migration of Russians, has facilitated this mono, ethnoracially pure, anti-cosmopolitan world view. The historical construction of Armenians as a racially pure indivisible ethnos is currently on display and narrated in the History Museum in Republic Square in Yerevan for the benefit of the daily regular parties of schoolchildren and local people who come, in a country where tourism is minimal. This nationalist discourse partly derives from the long history of racial science in the region and Soviet traditions of physical anthropology and craniology still a part of academic practice in the Armenian Academy of Sciences today. The Armenian government is pursuing an increasing focus on promoting Armenian nationalist values, for example in changing the school curriculum, encouraged by the Armenian Church, from teaching history of religion to the history of Armenian religion. Armenians racial self-identity was reported as being a specific mix of whiteness, European and Asian characteristics, with internal distinctions between mountain and valley people. The reality of observable racial, physical differentiation between Georgians, Armenians and Azeris operates as a contemporary regime of truth. Yet, the dominant view of racism in Armenia, confirmed in interviews in 2014, is that is either absent or weak and confined to the radical nationalist, Hitlerist margins. The catastrophic rupture in the history of the Armenian people, the genocide, when over half the population died and the rest were driven from their ancestral homeland, has been fundamental in shaping discourse about race and racism in Armenia. For many Armenians racism was not something of their own making, it was elsewhere, located primarily in anti-Armenian Turkish and Azeri racialised nationalism.

In Azerbaijan, racism primarily takes the form of anti-Armenianism, drawing on a reservoir of interconnected anti-Semitic myths and narratives, and this constitutes a contemporary form of state-promoted race hate. The discursive construction of the physiological and biological genesis of the Azerbaijani nation, associated with its territorial integrity,

provides an underlying framework for the racial formation of this state. The strong relational interconnections between Azeri anti-Armenian race discourse and anti-Semitism are exemplified in the parallel usage of similar ideas of a universal conspiracy, in this case of supposedly better-educated and more prosperous Armenians against the Azerbaijani nation. The instigation and association of this form of racism was identified as deriving from the pre-Soviet period. Currently, the Azerbaijani state has publicly confirmed the justifiable and necessary vilification and racialisation of Armenian people.

The construction of new racialised/religious nationalism, Georgification, has been identified as a distinct variety of modernity. The current Georgian state is marked out by its increasingly exclusivist ethnoreligious nationalism fusing together imperial traditions with a revived Orthodox Church producing a deteriorating climate in which racial discourse and hostility towards many different groups, who are exterior to those at the core of Georgian national identity, is pervasive. This interconnected complex of racialised discourse has many targets including the various groups labelled under the homogenising label Roma, black and Chinese people, Azeris, Meskhetian Turks and other minority groups. The intersections between racialisation and anti-Muslimism have also been identified in this chapter together with a wider context of pervasive aggressive, majoritarian racial stereotypes, myths and hostility promoted by politicians, in the media and in school textbooks. The post-Soviet intensification of racism in Georgia has been driven by a narrow, aggressive promotion of an exclusivist Georgian political project, the building of intimate links between the Georgian state and the church and associated problems of semi-autonomous paramilitaries and a declining economy combined with pro-European and integration (of minorities) rhetoric.

5

Central Asian Racisms

Nikolay Zakharov, Ian Law and Maya Shmidt

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union was marked by the erosion of territorial boundaries—the former Soviet republics have received sovereignty, thereby denoting their existence on the political map of the world. Their statehood was previously related exclusively to the Soviet past. For this reason, there was a need for them to create everything anew, including a non-communist ideology devoid of the concept of "Soviet citizen". Central Asian regimes have chosen different methods compared to that of other states with such newly won independence. It was not so much a rejection of Soviet power as it was a re-appropriation of Soviet methods of control of the public sphere (Adams 2010). Patriarchal customs and traditional informal structures survived in the course of Soviet modernization in Central Asia, and after the collapse of the Soviets in the Central Asian republics, these customs and traditional structures became actualized and proceeded with their evolution. Regional clan structures are the most important of these persisting structures. They threatened the territorial integrity of the newly formed states, none of which had their own statehood in the present borders before entering the Soviet Union

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0_5

as its national republics. They also threatened the political stability and authoritarianism of the newly elected presidents who also headed these republics during the Soviet period. These presidents' personal legitimacy combined with their felt need of nation-building activities in order to preserve the territorial integrity of their respective states has shaped the specificities of these authoritarian racial states in Central Asia.

There have been the two alternative paths of socio-political development of the Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Firstly, autocracy has been consolidated in those societies with settled cultures (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). Those societies with dominant nomadic cultures (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) have gone the way of the development of hybrid political regimes that combine features of formal democracy and autocracy. Turkmenistan is a case apart, with its autarchy representing an exotic mix of oriental despotism and nomadic culture. These divergent ways of development have largely determined the logic of the racialization processes both at the grassroots level and in the development of racial states. Racism in the everyday life of the population of Central Asia and racialization policies of their governments are closely intertwined with nation-building processes across these post-Soviet territories. The racist nature of the persecution of representatives of a minority is difficult to determine, given the widespread character of the persecution of dissidents in the autocratic Central Asian regimes. Moreover, the ethnocentric understanding of the nation is in clear conflict with the nation-building rhetoric, whereby the leader of the state and the state at large are prioritized over the ethno-racial division discourses. Pan-Turkism, coupled with the internationalizing influence of Islam, and with simultaneous hostility toward neighbors and minorities, makes a very bizarre picture of racism. It is so bizarre and self-contradictory that it makes many researchers to conclude on the non-applicability of the concepts of race and racism to the forms of discrimination and inequality in the Central Asian context. Thus, Koreans exiled to Central Asia in the 1930s were often considered as Europeans. Moreover, self-identification in Central Asian societies is carried out not so much as based on kinship but on territorial clannishness grounds. Abeed Khalid (2006) rightly points out that, for a large part of the population, Islam is the criterion of differentiating locals from strangers, and Central Asians—from the

Europeans and Russians. At the same time, Muslims from other parts of the world or even from the post-Soviet space have been excluded from the imagined community of Central Asians.

However, the present chapter shows that it is this internal contradiction that makes Central Asia the case where it is particularly fruitful to combine comparative and relational methodology in the study of global racisms.

Did Central Asians consider emancipatory efforts by the Soviets to be modernizing and civilizing or as a colonizing mission instead? Was the colonial expansion of the Russian empire in any way distinguishable from the nation-building within the Soviet Union? As David Laitin (1991) rightly points out, regardless of the internationalist rhetoric and egalitarian aspirations of the Soviet state, a Muslim from Central Asia had lower chances to fill a higher position in the party nomenclature of the Central Committee, compared to representatives of other nationalities. The renewal of the influence of Russia in Central Asia, and the crucial role of remittances by the growing communities of Central Asian *Gastarbeiter* in the economies of the region have become key factors that intensify racialization processes in the region. Becoming increasingly a part of the globalized capitalist system, inhabitants of Central Asia also acquire the language of racial self-description, heretofore unknown among the general population of the region. The roots of the "becoming a black in Moscow" concept are to be found in the interweaving of bureaucratic practices (mostly, propiska, or residence registration), waves of labor migration from the southern republics of the former Soviet Union and globally mediated discourse of security threats. Violations of residence registration rules are the most simple of the "crimes", whereby the offenders act in support and justification of the official discourse of security. In this system, the skin color becomes a very rough shorthand for the concept of "foreigner", while in a world of fake documents, the bodily surface becomes the place and moment of truth, as indicated by Reeves (2013) and Zakharov (2013). Also according to Reeves (2013, pp. 171–2), "the discrepancy between "black" and "nonblack" is a fundamental distinction, such as in the daily stories where "blacks" (rather than workers, non-citizens or illegal workers) are fined, detained, and taken into custody".

Combined with a long history of colonial oppression and Russo-Soviet legacies, racialization processes can lead to racial identities being comprehended as a site of resistance. The Soviet rule in the republics of Central Asia was totally alienated from local traditions and culture. This ultimately colonizing rule was imposed root and branch. In no other place as in Central Asia was Russia, and later the Soviet Union, perceived as consummate carriers of modernizing European values, and where the elites were more loyal to Moscow than the elites in other Soviet republics.

The fact that various ethnic groups more or less peacefully co-existed during the Soviet period does not mean the continuation of a stable status-quo in the post-Soviet era.

In his analysis of the design of the "Other" negative discourse in Central Asia, Galym Zhussipbek (2014) employs "Orientalize" instead of "racialize". According to him, exclusivist categorization patterns fit into the classic definition of Orientalism. For instance, more affluent Kazakhs, especially those who have made their fortunes in state and private business, Orientalize those Central Asians who endure economic hardships and perform unskilled work as "inferior, unskilled, and non-progressive". Uzbeks racialize Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, both of whom are perceived as more Russified, as more nomadic and as "inferior, carefree, and lazy". Russians and other Russian-speaking groups tend to racialize Turkic ethnicities by claiming to occupy the central place in Turkic history. These claims are grounded in the historical interpretations presenting Uzbeks as "aristocrats of all Turkic nations". On the other hand, some Tajiks have appropriated the role of "providing civilization and scientific knowledge to the Turkic-speaking nomadic tribes" and racializing other Central Asians of Turkic origin. Still, many Kyrgyz and Tajiks believe in the uniqueness and antiquity of their culture and language, and claim that their nations are among the most ancient in the world. In turn, they racialize other Central Asian nations as "artificial and uprooted". Turkmen racialize everyone else by promoting their unique five-millennia-old nationhood and culture that go back to the times of Prophet Noah (Zhussipbek 2014, p. 132). Central Asian racisms have produced complex ordering and reordering of ethno-racial identities.

Race as Lineage: Internationalism with a Kazakh Face

The Kazakhstani case is of particular interest in the study of racialization processes in Central Asia. In this regard, the uniqueness of Kazakhstan is the following. Firstly, it is the only republic of the Soviet Union where the titular nationality did not constitute a majority at the time of the independence in 1991. Secondly, given the predominance of Russian population in the northern industrial region bordering the Russian Federation, Kazakh leadership has chosen a policy of international regulation, which actively employs the Soviet rhetoric of peoples' friendship. Thirdly, Kazakhstan is the only post-Soviet society popularly perceived as bi-racial. The Russian population, with its reduced but still significant share, as well as Germans, Ukrainians and Belarusians are explicitly referred to as Europeans in the context of Kazakhstan. Moreover, Bhavna Dave (2007, p. 17) makes a point of the territorial contiguity between Russia and the Kazakh steppe, and of the mutual affinity between the internal conditions within the Kazakh nomadic economy and the agrarian expansion of the tsarist state. The rest of Central Asia was acquired predominantly through military conquests. This suggests that Kazakhstan, more than other republics of Central Asia, was a candidate for permanent incorporation into the Russian and, subsequently, Soviet state.

Stalinist cleansing practically destroyed all the Kazakh elite, including, the members of the Alash Orda—a Kazakh nationalist party, which originally cooperated with the Bolsheviks. At least a quarter of the Kazakh population perished during the first two decades of the Soviet rule. Many have moved to China and Afghanistan. Torn from their traditional environment and lacking opportunities, the Kazakhs actively integrated into the Soviet order to a much greater extent than other Muslims from the neighboring republics. The Kazakhs perceived themselves more loyal, more progressive and more internationalists than other Muslim peoples of Central Asia (Dave 2007, p. 20).

Unlike in the other countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstani official discourses of nation-building are oriented to the future rather than to the

"golden age" of the pre-colonial past (Abashin 2012, p. 156). President Nazarbayev has repeatedly stated the existence of a "Kazakhstani nation". Kazakhstan's singularity in Central Asia is not only in its rejecting the ethnic understanding of the nation in favor of a civic one, but in the negation of the very concept of the "titular nation", common throughout the post-Soviet space.

Nazarbayev's regime perceived as a threat to the new state of the Kazakhs any separatist and racist rhetoric on the part of Cossacks and other Russian leaders, who had represented most of the total Russian diaspora outside of the Russian Federation at the time of Soviet breakup. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan had closer ties with Russia than with other parts of Kazakhstan. Leaders of Cossack and other Russian groups believed that their children would grow up as "second-class citizens" in the new, Kazakh-dominated state and appealed to Russia for help. Despite the fact that ethnic minorities try to challenge the ethnocratic character of Kazakhstan policies, their actions reproduce the same racialized practices that are laid down in hegemonic discourse. If nation-building in Kazakhstan is a predominantly top-down process carried out by the communist-turned-nationalist elites, the racialization processes resonate, and are often initiated in an inverted fashion. Kazakhstan was famous for the highest in Central Asia and one of the highest in the country proportion of inter-ethnic marriages, thereby serving an example of harmony in inter-ethnic relations. According to Soviet censuses, the share of mixed families in Kazakhstan increased from 14.4 % in 1959 to 23.9 % in 1989. The data from the post-Soviet period demonstrate the opposite trend—the share of mixed marriages has decreased from 21 % in 1999 to 18 % in 2008. Between 1989 and 2009, the share of Kazakhs in the population increased—from 40.1 % to 63.1 %.

The "shala-Kazakh" ("semi-Kazakh") label is nowadays applied not so much to the people of mixed origin but to those ethnic Kazakhs who are Russified, linguistically and culturally. The general culture of many Kazakhs used to be focused on all Soviet, and thus—on all Russian, as Zhumbay Zhakupov notes in his book that has caused a heated debate, "Shala-Kazakh: Past, Present and Future". A distinction is made between

"shala-Kazakh" (those who do not know the Kazakh language, culture and tradition) and "nagyz Kazakh" (considered to be "authentic Kazakhs").

While Russified Kazakhs make up a large part of the population of modern Kazakhstan and thus belong to a stratum of highly educated citizens, they often are not in the most comfortable position, feeling themselves a "second-class" (Ualiyeva and Edgar 2014).

Bhavna Daves (2007, p. 80) mentions the following evidences as to how ethnic Russians perceive their position in Kazakhstan, which is closely intertwined with post-imperial understanding of "violations" of their erstwhile privileged position in the racial hierarchy.

> Anton Kuzmin, a Russian and former party member who described himself as an internationalist, expressed his anger with the policy of appointing Kazakhs to leading positions without adequate ideological education. In his opinion, such promotions only enabled Kazakhs to realize their 'tribal' aims, because 'the dream of a half-literate Kazakh under Russian rule was to become a volost head. Make him a bastyk (head), and he will behave like a sultan.' Valentina Mikhailovna, a former party member and inhabitant of the Qyzylorda oblast who spoke fluent Kazakh, said, 'they [the Kazakhs] simply do not have it in their genes to lead a disciplined life, toil in industrial enterprises and factories. Their natural abode is in open pastures and not in urban housing.' Her observations aptly express the characteristic colonial belief that natives are simply incapable of adapting to modern life conditions, and are quite revealing, coming from someone who described her family as 'internationalist', adding that her son-in-law and most of her extended family were Kazakhs.

As reported by the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, among the country's civil servants, Kazakhs amounted to 79 %, while Russians were only 14.5 %, and Ukrainians—only 0.9 %. In modern Kazakhstan, still there are areas with visible representation of Russian population. In the first place, this concerns engineering positions, high-tech, IT and media. As the general economic situation in Kazakhstan improves, so does the economic situation of minorities. At the same time, during the economic crises, those categories are on the winning side who can take advantage of the "administrative resource" and family support as well as members of informal

mutual assistance networks. The current situation allows the Kazakhs to see themselves as the owner of a special status in their relationships with the government. For Russians, who make up the largest minority in Kazakhstan, the "group identity and the ensuing loyalty and solidarity are based not on the family or local cultural values but on collectivism within industrial, educational, and military organization that are permeated with Soviet ideology" (Savin 2011, p. 181). In contrast to the Kazakhs, ethnic identity was perceived by Russians as marginal, characteristic of nations not included in the process of industrialization and modernization. Russianness was discredited by anti-colonial rhetoric, which often—willingly or otherwise —did appear anti-Russian rather than anti-Soviet.

In order to prevent separatism, leadership of Kazakhstan has responded by creation of certain "institutions of ethnic management". Actively employing the Soviet repertoire of internationalist rhetoric, Nazarbayev presents multi-nationality as an integral attribute of the state. Kazakhstan has adopted a Soviet-style colonial racial governmentality. Serving as a representative examples of interconnections between Soviet and post-Soviet racialization policies is the creation in 1995 of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, presented as Nazarbaev's personal initiative for preserving ethnic harmony. The Assembly as well as National cultural centers are designed primarily to promote and support loyal representatives of the minorities and to maintain a disunity of those who could thwart the Kazakhization of the country. In this regard, Kazakhization is presupposed by the Constitution, referring to Kazakhstan as the "ancestral homeland of the Kazakhs" and as inhabited by "Kazakhs and other nationalities".

In autumn 2009, Nazarbayev proposed to initiate a nationwide discussion of the "National Unity" doctrine, intended to strengthen the common Kazakh identity. Nazarbayev proposed to use the term "Kazakhstan people" rather than "Kazakh people" which met fierce resistance on the part of Kazakh nationalists. The discussion resulted in a new version of the doctrine adopted in April 2010. It denotes that "in the new historical conditions, the Kazakh people, who has given their proud name to the country, acquires a new historical mission to become a consolidating center of the unification of the nation". The doctrine does not specify

what is meant by the concept of "One Nation", which is the main subject of this document. While making a declaratory pledge to establish a civic state and preserve its multi-ethnicity, the incumbent Kazakh-led leadership has assumed a paternalistic obligation as the "state-defining" nation to act in an exemplary, self-restrained, "internationalist" spirit—akin to the role that Russians assumed in the Soviet state (Dave 2007, p. 135). "If Soviet-era internationalism ultimately had a Russian face (holding a privileged position for ethnic Russians in the evolutionary march toward the 'bright future'), post-Soviet Kazakhstani state ideology had a Kazakh face" (Schatz 2000, p. 492). As in other Central Asian states, visualization of a national hero has been implemented in Kazakhstan, where a 30-meter-high stele in honor of the acquisition of state sovereignty was built in 1996. The stele reproduces the image of the "Golden Man", a find by Soviet archaeologists that was dated as belonging to the Saks.

Victor Shnirelman (2015) points out that the state-cultivated approach to the formation of historical consciousness in Kazakhstan is grounded on the idea of auotochtonism, which emphasizes direct continuity, from the Andronov culture of the Bronze Age and the Saks to the modern Kazakhs. A Moscow historian with Kazakh origin Undasynov (2002, p. 26) even argues that "the homeland of the Indo-Iranian people is the Great Steppe, and its center is the steppes of modern Kazakhstan". The racial argument plays an important role in theoretical constructs by Kazakh historians. According to them, Kazakh people belong to the South Siberian race, with some historians attributing a "pan-Eurasian" racial type to the Kazakhs, thereby reserving for the latter a place of honor among the people of Central Eurasia (Shnirelman 2015, p. 233).

By Shnirelman (2015, p. 238) such acquisition of ancestors is characteristic:

> This way Kazakhs acquire ancestors, of whom they can be proud. In the first place, they are locals (this way the auotochtonism principle is abided); secondly, they are quite ancient; thirdly, they are creators of important cultural achievements; fourthly, they are heroic defenders of their territory from outside invaders and successful conquerors of new lands; and fifthly, they are bearers of a "Caucasoid racial type". All these points allow the Kazakhs to associate themselves with Europe and the dynamic West rather

> than with the stagnant East. It is, in fact, a reinterpretation of the Soviet ideological heritage that emphasizes the advanced nature of the Soviet peoples vis-a-vis the "backward Asia".

As in other Central Asian states, the search for the ancestors of the Kazakhs is a major ideological justification of racist exclusion of "non-indigenous" peoples, with their different, "non-Kazakh" appearance. Leading the Central Asian region in terms of economic development, Kazakhstan attracts hundreds of thousands of migrants from other Central Asian republics. By various estimates, it utilizes about 700,000 workers, mostly Uzbeks. Working conditions of migrant workers in Kazakhstan are very complicated and are considered to be unsuitable for the indigenous people of Kazakhstan. According to Laruelle (2013, p. 106) "the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Uzbek migrants, some of whom will seek to settle in Kazakhstan permanently, risks accentuating a trend toward the "ghettoization" of the country's south".

About 40 % of the Kazakhs do not speak Kazakh language, and about three-quarters of urban Kazakhs use more Russian than Kazakh in everyday communication. Within the 25 years of the reign of Dinmukhammed Kunaev, a party boss of the Soviet Kazakhstan, Kazakhs took leading positions at all levels of governance, but this political success required their primary use of the Russian language. In the pre-Soviet period, the collective identity of the Kazakhs was based on their nomadic life, and the very term "Kazakh" (they were called "Kyrgyzs" in tsarist times) meant a nomad and distinguished them from other peoples of Central Asia, who lived a settled life. Kazakhs identified themselves not with the nation but with a tribal confederation, which was called in Kazakh "Jus", or even smaller clan groups "ru".

The uncertainty of official approaches to nation-building (O'Beachain and Kevlihan 2013; Laruelle 2014) has led to the growing popularity of racialized sub-ethnic identities based on kinship. These identities are formalized at the macro-level through the institutionalization of clan policies (Schatz 2004). If the government promotes Kazakh, Kazakhstani or Eurasian identity, then at the grassroots level, this identity becomes racialized via the newly acquired pride in lineage identities (the ru and zhu-based genealogies). "Lineage found behavioural expression in the

proliferation of familialist networks that secured access to scarce goods (consumer wares, industrial inputs and access to power) in a sub rosa fashion" (Schatz 2000, 490). A famous Kazakh lawyer Zhangeldy Suleymanov proposed to give Kazakh lineage groups a legal form, pointing out that lineage for the Kazakhs is more than belonging to the Kazakh nation. "We all appreciate, honor, and are proud of our lineage. Therefore, we perhaps can even request to indicate our lineage group in the passport". "In general, we are somewhat akin to the Americans, who have the same – all of them are Americans, but each has their own nation – Italians, French, Jews, Russians, Kazakhs, Armenians, and so on. We are Kazakhs, but it is more like a union of tribes and lineage groups that was founded in 14–15th century, that is not more than 550 years ago" (kazpravda.kz).

The Kazakhs use their knowledge of genealogical lineage as a marker of "true Kazakhness". At the same time, Schatz (2000, p. 499) points out that the knowledge of genealogy is not an inherent trait among the Kazakhs but rather a representation of the (created by the political elite) image of a Kazakh, true to his roots. The Kazakh government implements a policy of emigration by ethnic Kazakhs from diasporas in Mongolia, Turkey, Afghanistan and China. These Kazakhs are often disparagingly referred to as "orlomans" and face discrimination on the part of the Kazakhstani Kazakhs. They do not speak Russian, which is dominant in the cities of Kazakhstan, and therefore they are excluded from many areas of work life and social interactions. Because non-Kazakhs rarely speak Kazakh language, which is legislatively stipulated as a necessary condition for employment in administrative positions, this implies a (nearly) complete exclusion of the ethnic non-Kazakhs.

Kyrgyzstan: Racism in Central Asia's Island of Democracy

The post-Soviet history of the Kyrgyz Republic shows that the problem of racism is quite acute and that it is impossible to downplay it. Despite the proclaimed status of a multinational state, the proportion of the "titular",

ethnic Kyrgyz population dominates, and this trend has dramatically increased since the republic gained independence. In 1959, the Kyrgyzs accounted for 40.5 % of the population, and their number has increased to 70.9 % half a century later (Shcherbakova 2011). According to the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, at the beginning of 2015, the share of Kyrgyz people in the total population increased to 72.8 % (Population of the Kyrgyz Republic by nationality in 2009–2015). Russians—the formerly second-largest ethnic group—decreased from 30.2 % in 1959 to 21.5 % in 1989, and by results of the last census in 2009, the share of Russian population in Kyrgyzstan has dropped to 7.8 %, yielding the second top position to Uzbeks (Shcherbakova 2011). In 2015, the share of Russians regressed to 6.2 % (Population of the Kyrgyz Republic by nationality in 2009–2015). Ukrainians also progressively reduce their share in the country population, from 6.6 % in 1959 to 0.4 % in 2009 and to 0.2 % in 2015 (Shcherbakova 2011; Population of the Kyrgyz Republic by nationality in 2009–2015). Both absolute and relative numbers of Germans in Kyrgyzstan grew until the 1970s (100,000 people, or 3.1 % in 1970), but after that it also began to decline, especially rapidly in the 1990s. According to the 2009 census, less than 10 thousand Germans permanently resided in Kyrgyzstan, representing 0.2 % of the total population (Shcherbakova 2011).

Such dynamics in terms of the population's ethnic composition creates in Kyrgyzstan unequal and yet stable political representation of the "titular" versus "non-titular" ethnic groups. This idea was announced by Kyrgyzstan's first President Askar Akayev:

> On this land, Kyrgyz people are the main ethnic group, the backbone and the heart of the people of Kyrgyzstan. By virtue of their size and cultural mentality, they bear the ultimate responsibility for everything – as a nation constituting the main engine of cultural genesis of the republic. Their language is the official language, and they have given their name to our state – the Kyrgyz Republic, and that says it all (Khoperskaya 2013, p. 9).

The principles of ethnocratism and ethnocentrism find their practical implementation at the state level. Director of the Training and Research Center for Regional Slavic Studies at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic

University B. Janzen says: "In Kyrgyzstan, it is not everyday nationalism that is rampant but nationalism preached at the state level, in the most intolerable forms at that" (quoted from Khoperskaya 2013, p. 26). Thus, in all eight editions of the Constitution, a "special role" is stressed of the Kyrgyz people. For example, in the Constitution adopted in October 2007, there was a passage on the importance of "the improvement of Kyrgyz statehood", while its preamble employed such political expressions as "the revival and improvement of the state of Kyrgyzs" and "the unity of Kyrgyzs is the foundation of both the country's stability and the people of Kyrgyzstan living in harmony" (Khoperskaya 2013, p. 20).

The Myth of the Heroic Ancestors as a Basis for Nation-Building

History has become the basis for overcoming the post-Soviet trauma and creating a new identity. Repeating the European experience of creating historical myths, intended to stress the nation's uniqueness, Kyrgyz history books began to include elements intended to demonstrate the antiquity and uniqueness of the "titular" nation. Rewriting history has become a difficult and politicized process, to include creating a new narrative—national and cleaned from the "Soviet". The new state that emerged within the post-Soviet space needed its own version of national history in order to legitimize its independence (Florin 2011). Mythologizing as well as other manipulations with ethnic history and culture are thus presented as a search for a new identity, in response to a traumatic experience. An appeal to the basic values of the culture and historical knowledge is a defensive reaction to dangerous changes in the social environment, which helps to create new mechanisms of adaptation.

The national epic "Manas" was intended to fill the ideological gap, formed after the collapse of the Soviet ideology. Compensating for the lack of any historical or currently ruling dynasty and "founding fathers", Kyrgyzs focused on the main character of their great national epic. Unlike many other epic tales of small nations, in "Manas", the protagonist does not appear as any mythical but a historical character. Living in the ninth century AD, around 840–842, he launched a campaign whereby he gathered together

the scattered Kyrgyz tribes in what became the basis for the first Kyrgyz state (Laruelle 2012a). The logic of this "return to the roots" seems quite pragmatic—"the Manas epic, with its leitmotif of the Kirgiz ethnic consolidation, is the most appropriate means to counter the process of ethnic disintegration, and simultaneously to promote ethnic identity and the integration of Kyrgyzs" (Yarkova 1999, p. 112). The ruling elite has announced this epic as reflecting "the genetic code of the nation" (Borisov 2013, p. 272).

Total fetishization of the epic, around which the Kyrgyzs have built their national identity, has become invoked time and again with President Akayev's coming to power. After the events of 2010, when there were fears that the country could fall apart because of the inter-regional conflicts, the government intensifies the policy of "Manasification", involving measures ranging from the erection of monuments to the epic hero, to the establishment of Manas studies as a separate study area, mandatory for each student in the country. The fact that the epic is written in the Kyrgyz language most literally imparts it a "national tone", especially given that the language is one of the central elements of their ethnic identity. It is also important that other peoples are mentioned as allies of Manas, who united the numerous tribes and created the first state "from" and "for" the Kyrgyzs, which undoubtedly declares a subordinate position of "the others" (Wachtel 2013).

The idea of promotion of an ethnocentric vision of history runs like a golden thread in the statements of state officials. Thus, the transition period President Roza Otunbaeva said:

> Looking at the current political, socioeconomic, and cultural processes, I compare them with the eternal Great nomadic Kyrgyzs. At all times in the crucial situations, Kyrgyzs solved all their problems by looking for a consensus. It is this wise public philosophy that helped the Great nomadic Kyrgyzs to save our people and prevented them from falling into the abyss [of the intestine feuds and historical oblivion]. We must not forget the lessons of our history! Let this be our true and immutable way! (cited from Khoperskaya 2013, p. 9).

Needless to say that the President did not mention in her speech that representatives of the titular nation have been not the only citizens of the country.

North and South: Racializing Regions of Kyrgyzstan and Social Racism.

Among the prerequisites of the 2005 "Tulip Revolution" in the country was deep-rooted nepotism. During the presidency of Askar Akayev, ethnic Kyrgyzs occupied almost all the political space, leaving few opportunities for any ethnically motivated opposition and representation. Akayev has developed a vast patronage system, covering members of his family and the wider "presidential clan", controlling the profitable sectors of the economy (Laruelle 2012a). Tribal separation of the territory of modern Kyrgyzstan is superimposed on the territorial division. It has become a major obstacle to the successful construction of a single Kyrgyz nation. According to Borisov (2013, p. 43), "over time, Uzbeks and the southern Kyrgyzs living in the Ferghana Valley have shared their socio-political features to a much greater extent compared to the weak rapport between the northern and southern Kyrgyzs".

A typical and very influential factor for Kyrgyzstan is tribalism and tribal hierarchy of clans, which leads to social racism. A certain small northern clan has always been much more represented politically than the people of the densely populated southern and mostly Kyrgyz-speaking regions. Phenotypic differences are almost non-existent between the population of the north and south of Kyrgyzstan, and contradictions among the clans basically take social character, such as in terms of culture and religion. The North is considered to be more modernized, industrialized and "Russified", while those Kyrgyzs who previously lived in the north, led a nomadic life. The South, adjacent to and partly covering the Ferghana Valley, was largely agrarian and much more patriarchal (Esenbaev 2015, p. 82). An essentially convincing evidence is the fact that in 1876, there was not even a single mosque in the north of the country, and in 1885, there were only three mosques, in Karakol. On the contrary, in the south, in the Osh region (in the Fergana Valley), there were 102 mosques in 1883, and in 1900—already 154. The city of Osh was considered in the nineteenth century as one of the centers of the Muslim faith in Central Asia (Kokaisl' 2013, p. 20).

In the elections for key government positions, representatives of southern and northern clans traditionally oppose each other. This opposition exists even at the household level, among ordinary citizens. Already due to the geographical factor, the metropolitan region of the country (in the north) is strongly influenced by Russia, while the South is influenced by neighboring Uzbekistan, where Muslim and patriarchal traditions are strong. "We see southerners at once. Like Uzbeks, they are very fond of golden jewelry, lurid clothes, and they are very crafty and canny at that. If a southerner has promised you something, it is doubtful that he will keep his word", says Chinara, resident of Bishkek (Morozova 2012). In particular, racialized differences affect marriages that in principle are considered as not desirable between people of the south and north [Kokaisl' 2013, pp. 7–8]. For many residents of Bishkek self-identifying themselves as urbanites, those young people from the regions who flooded the city during the protests have become the people with whom the former identified themselves only conditionally. In response to the stories of people justifying the seizure of land for building their own houses by that "they had to cohabit with six people in one room", you could hear some angry replies proposing them "to return back to the village!" (Reeves 2014, pp. 74–5).

As in the former Soviet Union, it has become commonly acceptable to "appeal to the roots", seeking for noble ancestors. For example, President Akayev (2002, pp. 72–3) referred to himself as a direct descendant of the supreme ruler of the Kyrgyz tribes in the sixteenth century as well as of Atake Baatyr, who was one of the leaders of the Sarybagysh tribe and known for establishing first diplomatic ties between northern Kyrgyzs and the Russian Empire, in 1785–1787.

The symbolic locus of the Kyrgyz people is the South. The Ferghana Valley is a place of permanent ethnic conflicts. The area is not only characterized by a mismatch of ethnic and political boundaries but also by the close cohabitation of the three main and many other, smaller ethnic groups that constitute a dense network of interdependent communities. It is not accidental that this area became a place of the majority of violent inter-ethnic conflicts in the 1990s, given its "fault lines" of the mismatched ethnic and territorial borders (Reeves 2005, p. 73).

Uzbek-Kyrgyz Conflict: Violence in Osh

Uzbeks living in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan occupy a peculiar liminal position. This large ethnic community constitutes a minority in Kyrgyzstan but simultaneously lives closely to their "titular" state, Uzbekistan. This mismatch of ethnic and national boundaries, dating back to the period of the national delimitation in the 1920s, is undoubtedly a factor of conflict. Events of the past two decades show that the Uzbek community feels extremely insecure in Kyrgyzstan. This can be explained by socio-economic conflicts arising from their liminal position, inter-ethnic clashes and the nationalist (particularly anti-Uzbek) government policy.

The Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict originates from the 1990 Osh events, when the local authorities decided to allocate land to Kyrgyzs next to the city of Osh, with its predominantly Uzbek population. In response to demands by Kyrgyzs to grant them land for their houses, Uzbeks put forward their own demands—to create an autonomy and recognize the Uzbek language as official. This controversy resulted in a real massacre, mass pogroms, riots and murders. The conflict claimed hundreds of lives. "Osh slaughter" is not reduced to inter-ethnic clashes, since this conflict was linked with territorial disputes, demands for the autonomy and the intercommunal confrontation (Sitnyansky 2011). Twenty years later, the history repeats itself—Osh again becomes the scene of inter-ethnic fighting, two months after a popular uprising in Bishkek that ended with the overthrow of ethnic Kyrgyz Bakiyev. Uzbekistan's political leaders used this window of opportunity to solve the decades-long problem of marginalization of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and called on the new government to recognize their cultural rights, such as to study the Uzbek language in school. These challenges, in turn, were met with nationalist sentiments on the part of Kyrgyzs, accusing Uzbeks in separatism and in craving the power in order to completely separate (Farooq 2015).

The conflict also concerned some massive inflow of the Uzbek population [from Uzbekistan] in southern Kyrgyzstan, bringing in mostly those seeking to earn some money as agricultural workers. But in Kyrgyzstan they fear that, sooner or later, Uzbeks constitute a majority in the south and separate, similar to what Albanians have done in Kosovo (Sitnyansky 2011, p. 160).

The International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the situation in southern Kyrgyzstan. The report stated that the government of Kyrgyzstan failed to deflate the ethnic tensions that continued to grow after the violence of 2010, mainly due to the neglect on the part of the state and to its anti-Uzbek policy. The dominant figure in the regional political establishment is the mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, whom ICG called the standard-bearer of the "ethnic Kyrgyzs are in the first place" policy. Uzbeks are said to be subject to arbitrary detention, ill-treated by law enforcers and ousted from public life and professions. Most of the media in the Uzbek language have been closed. International organizations have also reported continuing harassment of Uzbeks by corrupt police and prosecutorial systems, with the tacit approval by the regional and local authorities in the south (International Crisis Group 2012). Aggressive nationalism allows to divert protests of a large part of the Kyrgyz population from addressing socio-economic issues, and to designate an enemy supposedly to blame for Kyrgyzs' social failure. It is especially important for marginalized population, which is the basic material employed in such conflicts. All attempts by the Uzbek community to play a more active role in socio-political life and to defend their rights have been frustrated by the 2010 slaughter (Belvpo 2013).

Violent conflicts occur in Kyrgyzstan on a daily basis, claims Neil Melvin, Director of the Conflict Management at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the author of "Kyrgyzstan: Rising Nationalism Risks Renewed Violence" report. Since June 2010, the Kyrgyz Republic has witnessed a series of "demonstrative acts"—daily intimidation, violence, seizure of land and property, curbing the employment of ethnic minorities (to include their downright exclusion)—that have established a climate of fear of illegal actions on the part of law-enforcing institutions. These conditions can easily return the country to the creeping violent confrontation (EurasiaNet 2011b).

It is often argued that the "history of violence" toward Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan is rooted in some historical contradictions of these ethnic groups, referring to cultural essentialism or geographical determinism. However, Reeves (2010a) disputes this argument, pointing to a deeper socio-economic, political context of ethnic confrontation: "What happened

recently in Osh and Jalal-Abad, is, sadly, a spiral of violence. In this story, many aspects are formulated in ethnic terms, such as in what concerned the selectivity of the attacks on property, and the massacre of those who were perceived to be the ethnic "other", whether Kyrgyzs or Uzbeks". The economic well-being of Osh residents (mostly ethnic Uzbeks) seemed quite challenging in the eyes of rural Kyrgyz population, where the difference of socio-economic parameters, social dissatisfaction and perceived injustice thus became one of the catalysts of the conflict. Sexual violence against women from "another" side is interpreted in terms of attempted weakening the symbolic power of an "alien" ethnic group and moral suppression of its representatives. On the other hand, women may have a role in the mobilization of "us" against "them", and their calls appear to come from the symbolic center of the nation, crying out for the need to protect it from desecration by the enemy (Abashin and Savin 2012, p 46). A proclivity was noted among the Kyrgyz participants of the events to spurn the taboo with regard the female body. In particular, there are repeated references to the fact that in different parts of the city Kyrgyz rioters forced some completely stripped Uzbek women of different ages and made them walking down the streets. Public demonstration of naked Uzbek women was an act that underscored the contrast between the supposed patriarchal conservatism of "their" women to the social and physical openness of "our own" (Abashin and Savin 2012, pp. 48–9).

Referring to Brubaker's conceptual apparatus, Abashin and Savin indicate three "nationalisms" in Kyrgyzstan, in relation to the Osh events. Firstly, Kyrgyz nationalism is expressed in the political process, it is legalized through the Constitution and laws, and via the division of Kyrgyz citizens on "ours" and "others" (not entirely "ours")—those who belong to the titular nation (they even got the nickname "titles"), and all the rest (Abashin and Savin 2012, p. 29). Certain "Kyrgyz" symbols, finding their material expression in cultural institutions and monuments, and referring to national history and so on, become commonplace, and any encroachments on such symbolic spaces is perceived as an attack on the Kyrgyz people and their government. "Among the triggering events for ethnization of the Osh events was, for example, the burning on 14 May 2010 of the former President Bakiyev's abode in the village of Teyit, while

the subsequent evaluation of this incident underscored that the Uzbek thugs with their leader Batyrov burned the yurt (a symbol of the formerly nomadic Kyrgyzs) and the national flag of Kyrgyzstan" (Abashin and Savin 2012, p. 30).

Second, the official attitude of Uzbekistan to the problems of the Uzbek diaspora and migrants (citizens of Uzbekistan abroad) remains indifferent. On the one hand, the President of Uzbekistan does not consider the Uzbeks abroad as a "loyal community", and therefore he abstains from taking Uzbeks in the neighboring states under state patronage. On the other hand, a fear of separatism is widespread in Kyrgyzstan, so any socio-political claims on the part of the Uzbek population are perceived through the prism of their desire to secede and join Uzbekistan [Abashin and Savin 2012, p. 31].

Third, nationalism of Uzbek minority consists in that, unlike other non-Kyrgyz minorities, its representatives categorically refuse to call themselves "diaspora", that they understand as "strangers" and as "arrived from elsewhere" on the Kyrgyz land. The factors involved here are both the lack of a policy toward the diaspora in Uzbekistan and certain geographic features of Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan, resulted in their insufficient rootedness in space. At the same time, there is no legal "outlet" for this narrative in the Kyrgyz realities. Thus, preceding the Osh events, there were events in Jalalabad in May 2010 that to some extent determined the nature of the ethnic conflict. A public speech by Batyrov, addressing his supporters and later broadcasted by private television channels, was rated by the official Bishkek as "separatist" and "nationalist" (Abashin and Savin 2012, pp. 32–3).

Russians and Jews: "Us Versus Them" in Post-Colonial Kyrgyzstan

The chronological framework of anti-Russian sentiments in Kyrgyzstan—in the tragic events of 1916, when in reaction to protests against the tsarist government decree on the mobilization of the male population of Central Asia to become the Russian army's homefront workers in World War I, dozens of villages were destroyed, and hundreds of local residents

were killed. This uprising was supported on Uzbek territory, but it was nomadic Kyrgyzs who were the most active participants, in no small measure motivated for these protest by Russian settlers' seizure of their lands (Bakhturina 2004). By the logic of constructing a "palatable" history, the Kyrgyz political establishment exploits the historical memory of the uprising, recasting it in the nationalist light. Thus, President Atambaev signed "On the 100th anniversary of the tragic events of 1916" decree, intended to perpetuate the memory of the victims but also to define the role of the event in the revival of Kyrgyz statehood. Prior to that, Kyrgyzstan periodically witnessed scandals associated with attempts to present the events that had taken place 100 years ago as "genocide of the Kyrgyz people on the part of Russia". In particular, a number of NGOs demanded that the official Moscow recognized the supposed genocide and paid an appropriate compensation, which they referred to as a "kun/ransom for the innocent victims among the ancestors" (REGNUM 2015).

Part of the rhetoric employed by Kyrgyz nationalism is the national language. Nationalists sarcastically distinguish between Kyrgyzs and Kirgyzs—the second best speak Russian rather than Kyrgyz, and therefore they are linguistically and culturally alienated from authentic Kyrgyzs (Megoran 2012). Former President Askar Akayev stressed in an interview that as part of his national doctrine that proclaimed "Kyrgyzstan – our common home", he secured the official status of the Russian language, participated in the opening of the Slavic University in cooperation with Russia, for which he was criticized by the nationalist movement, who claimed: "You only support Russians, you have betrayed the Kyrgyz" (Shalygin 2015). Despite the Russian language is quite common among the local population, the media replete with slogans that call for stopping Russification. For example, an article at Azat.kg states:

> In large cities, Kyrgyzs speak Russian, dress like Russians. This sickness, this illness has not left us... When you departure from Taraz and enter Chaldovar, you immediately encounter [the toponyms]: Panfilovka, Novo-Nikolayevka, Konstantinovka, Petropavlovka, Sosnovka, Aleksandrovka and so on... I am amazed that we preserve our invaders' names throughout our independence... We should rename the toponyms of villages given in honor of the names of Russian invaders! (Volgin 2014).

The literature on migration processes registered that in the last years of the Soviet Union, Central Asia (and Kyrgyzstan in particular) was pushing the Russian-speaking population, who had to deal with domestic nationalism, thriving in the early 1990s. Thus, in frequent use were nationalist slogans ("Kyrgyzstan – for Kyrgyzs!"), legislative initiatives, proclaiming the land to be owned by the Kyrgyz people and refusing the Russian language the status of a means of international communication, corresponding articles of the Constitution and so on. The media were also actively replicating the hostility toward the Russian-speaking population. For example, Anarbekova ("Asaba" political party) said: "We protect the rights of the nation, and only then – human rights! We are the party of national revival, represent and protect interests of the Kyrgyz people. And we are not afraid but proud of the word "nationalist". Kyrgyz land should belong only to Kyrgyzs" (Kosmarskaya 2006, p. 108). Reconstruction of the late twentieth-century realities may be done in using eyewitness accounts by Kosmarskaya (2006). A phrase "Why should you, Russian, be sitting here? Give the seat up to me. I am Kyrgyz, this is my land!" (ibid., p. 137) was not uncommon in public transport. Everyday hostility has become common: "Looks have become inhospitable; if previously people always replied you question, now they either tell you something in Kyrgyz or remain silent" (ibid., p. 112). The narrative of non-titular nations' suppression is also abundant: "all began shouting about independence here, even our doctors, intelligent people with higher education. We were told that if we did not want to learn the language, we should pack our things and leave for Russia" (ibid., p. 228).

In contrast to the above-described manifestations of racism, there is only rudimental anti-Semitism in Kyrgyzstan. This form of national hostility is not reflected in the political ideology and the nation-building. Anti-Semitism in Central Asia has more traditional, everyday character and comes either from some negative stereotypes that have been preserved as a post-Soviet legacy or from religious narrow-mindedness, such as to be found in Islamic fundamentalism. Anti-Semitism in the country is rarely manifested in an openly aggressive form, but it often becomes subject to manipulation by the political opposition.

A noticeable activity in terms of Islamic anti-Semitism is displayed by Tursunbek Akunov, leader of "Human Rights Movement of Kirgyzia",

who published an article stating the following: “Jerusalem-led Western countries and the United States specially allocate money for the creation of non-governmental organizations... playing off one nation against another, because they are afraid of the Islam” (Markedonov 2010). On the proposal of this “human rights defender”, these forces put into practice “a deliberate policy, aiming to destroy the national spiritual values of Muslims” (Dan 2004). Omurbek Tekebayev, leader of “Ota-Meken” political party, also acquired scandalous reputation by saying from the parliamentary rostrum that Kyrgyzstan’s Jews have been “led by “sorosiki” (as he called the staff of “Soros-Kyrgyzstan” Foundation) engaging in subversive activities”. A scandal broke out, and the MP had to apologize to the Jewish community of the country (Dan 2004).

In 2014, a similar speech in the parliament took place again. MP Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, member of the Conservative Party, at a press conference referred to “the genocide committed by Israel in Palestine”, tore the flag of Israel in pieces, saying that he was about distributing the pieces among members of the “Committee for the support of Palestine” so that they could use them in the bathroom. Felix Kulov, party leader and former Prime Minister, responded to this statement of his kindred spirit by pointing out that the flag was not any practical for such purposes, that there was a risk “to be injured by the sharp corners of the Star of David” (Porat 2014).

Retranslating Race: Kyrgyz Migrants’ Experiences in Russia

In an interview conducted by Reeves (2010b, p. 21) with migrants from Kyrgyzstan, the color of their skin appear as a narrative structure, expressing the essence of their stay in Russia—in fact, forming all their memories. This fact is particularly surprising in the context that “race” is not a term that involves the daily categorizing practice in Kyrgyzstan; a distinction there is made between “Kyrgyz” and “Russian”, between “Asians” and “Europeans”, while the dichotomy of “black” and “white” is not usually in use. Racialization usually pop up in conversations with workers as part of the “we have become black” construction, emphasizing the status

of a Kyrgyz migrant ascribed by the Russian reality. In addition, the use of expressions "over there" or "they will call you black" signals a particular space-time communication, and descriptive rather than ascriptive categorization (Reeves 2010b, p. 22). A repeated detail in migrants' stories is their awareness of the fact of becoming a "black" in Russia. Kyrgyzs used the expression "we have become black" rather than "we were black" or "we are black". Moreover, the word "black" is usually pronounced in Russian and often supplemented by words, emphasizing the distancing of the speaker ("they say, you are black", "they say"). In other words, the term was felt by interviewees as ascriptive rather than as descriptive—as a label, laden with certain content, and not as a neutral element of self-referencing or self-identification (Reeves 2013, p. 163).

Major problems of labor migration in Russia involve episodes of migrants' severe beating, and the racial hatred motivated murder. Kyrgyz respondents emphasized the contrasting character of their job: "We were always given the hardest work. Any finishing work indoors was given to Moldovans and Ukrainians. This work is easy, and well paid. But we were not trusted for this work... And I had to shovel all the time. They thought that such work was more suitable to us" (Reeves 2013, p. 164).

Three Stages of Racialization in Kyrgyzstan

The independent states of Central Asia that have received the sovereignty with the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the need to build a new state, presently seek for arguments to substantiate their national uniqueness. In order to fill the ideological vacuum, the political establishment of Kyrgyzstan engage history and myth-making. "Revitalization of the Kyrgyz isolationism in sovereign Kyrgyzstan has created a threat of the formation of an ethnocratic state. A desire has become typical, for example, to impose the principles of a single nation in all spheres of public life, from the government to education, to science and culture. Rejection of the many achievements of culture under the pretext of their non-Kyrgyz origin as well as resuscitation of archaic traditions have been comprehended by mass culture as a panacea for all the ills brought by the crisis" [Yarkova 1999, p. 112].

Conventionally, the history of racialization in Kyrgyzstan can be divided into three stages: The first stage relates to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the search for a new identity. At this stage, the role of the "titular" nation in an independent state and its privileged position vis-a-vis ethnic minorities formed the ideology of nationalism, which in turn was legitimized in a number of legislative acts. The second stage coincided with Akaev's presidency who advanced the national doctrine "Kyrgyzstan—our common home!" that marked a new milestone in the development of state ideology. Akaev saw the prospects for nation-building as based on a civil rather than ethnic understanding of the nation. The third stage is associated with the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, when after a coup Kurmanbek Bakiyev seized the power. This stage is marked by growing inter-ethnic tensions, resulted in the tragic events of 2010. If earlier the "common home" rhetoric was employed as a screen for the nationalistic regime, when "kyrgyzification" formally existed only in the ethnic and cultural environments, the Osh events have demonstrated the nationalist politics as an instrument for ostensible sovereignty (Wilkinson 2015). Nationalist sentiments grow again under the "transition period" government, as Kyrgyz nationalism presently finds a new response in the consolidation of the "titular" nation's special status, suppressing the Russian language and the ubiquity of the Kyrgyz.

Racial "Kyrgyzation" should be interpreted as a political ideology of association of national and territorial units. The nation-state's raison d'être is thus in the expression of the national character (usually associated with the dominant ethnic group—the "titular" nation) and protection of its interests (Megoran 2012). For the Kyrgyz, the statehood is built on their nationhood, and not vice versa, while the national government implement the ethno-nation's territorial and political aspirations in line with its self-determination (Wilkinson 2015). As if to confirm this thesis, President Bakiev stated in one of his "ideological" speeches: "Globalization of the world crisis has created new challenges for the young states, our Kyrgyzstan being one of them. In these circumstances, our compass is our main national interests, such as territorial integrity, economic independence, preservation and development of the cultural identity and intelligence of the nation, advanced government, the

healthy and educated nation. As the head of state I believe that we will build a strong, confident state around the Kyrgyz nation" (Khoperskaya 2013, p. 9).

The political process acquires a particular representational content and is "racialized" by making the race the determinant and the object of political relations. By legalization of certain, specifically Kyrgyz political institutions, a special role is assigned to the Kyrgyz people in the government. In general, political forces avoid discussing ethnic relations (in particular, the situation in southern Kyrgyzstan), leaving this burden to NGOs.

Nevertheless, the government is taking a step forward to peace-building by passing the "Concept of national unity and inter-ethnic relations in the Kyrgyz Republic" that marked a consensus of nationalist deputies, NGOs and the government. The purpose of the Concept is the spread of the use of the Kyrgyz as a state language, but also the promotion of multilingualism, tolerance and respect for minority rights. The Concept is thus a departure from the determination of the Kyrgyz as the "state-making ethnicity", contrary to the requirements of nationalists who participated in its development (Marat 2014).

Tajikistan: Aryanism as a State Ideology

The "titular" population of Tajikistan, ethnic Tajiks constitute the basis of the whole multiethnic structure of the population. Agency on Statistics under President of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan reported that the share of Tajik population in the total population increased from 62.3 % in 1989 to 84.3 % in 2010. The population of the second-largest ethnic group—Uzbeks—on the contrary, decreased from 23.5 % in 1989 to 12.2 % in 2010. The share of Russians has dramatically dropped in Tajikistan—they used to represent 7.6 % of the total population in 1989 but decreased to 0.5 % by 2010. Concerning the least numerous ethnic groups, statistics are the following: the share of Kyrgyzs is 0.8 %, Turkmen—0.2 %, Tatars—0.1 %. There are also ethnic minorities who has practically disappeared from Tajikistan (their share in the total

population is less than 1 %). Thus, the number of Koreans is as low as 634 people, Kazakhs—595 people, Germans—446 people. Even fewer are Ossetians (296), Belarusians (104) and Jews (34) (Mukhammadieva 2012, p. 7).

The equal status of a national minority is ensured by the law of Tajikistan. Under the Constitution, the people of Tajikistan are citizens of the Republic regardless of their nationality; equality and friendship of all nationalities is respected; and the State guarantees the rights and freedoms of everyone irrespective of their nationality, race, language and religious affiliation. The state also prohibits the establishment of public organizations violating these provisions and promoting racial, ethnic, social or religious enmity (Khoperskaya 2013, p. 36). Human rights organizations confirm that organizations pursuing the idea of racial superiority have been totally uprooted in Tajikistan: "Tajikistan condemned all propaganda and all organizations that were based on ideas or theories of the superiority of one race or group of people of a certain colour or ethnic origin, or that attempted to justify or encourage racial hatred and discrimination in any form" [UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2004].

However, the reality also proves otherwise. The history of the region shows that nationalism and race-thinking might be preached in Tajikistan at the state level—such as in the form of a nation-building policy justifying the uniqueness of the nation and its superiority over the other Central Asian nations, and in the form of ethnic nationalism that both led to the 1992–1997 civil war and was itself exacerbated by this war. Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous province—one of Tajikistan provinces situated in the Pamir Mountains and populated by numerous ethnic groups, mostly belonging to Ismaili (branch of Shia Islam)—has become a "hot spot" after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when local elites attempted to secede the territory from Tajikistan. This served as one of the causes of the civil war, which in turn resulted in forming bonds among certain ethnocultural and regional clans, and in subsequent pitching against other by these enlarged clans employing violence and racist rhetoric (Foroughi 2002).

Aryan Myth and Uzbeks as the "Racial Other"

Tajikistan's national statehood results from a historical national-state separation in 1924. However, a certain mismatch of territorial and national boundaries has led to the fact that a large share of the Tajiks remained outside of their "titular" state. This problem has surfaced in the bordering territory of the present-day Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where the historical cities of Bukhara and Samarkand in Uzbekistan have predominantly Tajik population (Foltz 1996, p. 213). Soviet scholars were quite certain in that the Tajiks were distinct from the Uzbeks, although they were less positive in exactly who belonged to which group, given the centuries-long cultural cross-fertilization as well as outright assimilation (Hanks 2014 p. 115). Studies have shown that the two nations have shared their morphological features and anthropological appearance: "Uzbeks and Tajiks almost did not differ when assessed in terms of the ABO and Rh systems, which may be a consequence of their forming a territorial complex in the course of historical cohabitation. Such a conclusion is justified by serological data, also confirming the dermatoglyphic and dental information obtained for same populations" (Khodzhayov and Khodzhayova 2011, p. 21). Thus, for the republics not pre-existed on the political map of the world, it was absolutely necessary to prove the nation's superiority and uniqueness and thus to separate themselves from the rest of Central Asia by finding the roots of their ethnic history.

By putting Tajik people as the autochthonous population of Tajikistan, regional scholars stress that the Uzbeks are alien to the "locals". According to them, it was the term "Tajik" that was commonly used in the nineteenth century to identify the peoples of Central Asia, whereas the Uzbeks just accepted from the Tajiks their lifestyle and culture (Gorak 2009). Moreover, the demarcation line between the two nations has been drawn as based on their respective propensity for violence—unlike the supposedly violent Uzbeks, the allegedly peaceful Tajiks did not subject anyone to violence or cruelty (idem).

Tajik ideologists relate their ethnic group to the "ancient Aryan civilization". This identity allowed the Tajiks to avoid Turkization, imposed by Uzbekistan. For example, there are publications aiming to prove that

"the cradle of Aryan civilization" is Vanzh, historical region in the Pamirs. Their authors came to this conclusion based on their analysis of a "layer" of ancient words employed by the population of the region (Rakhimi and Sheralishoeva 2009).

Tajik historians deliberately emphasized separateness of their nation from the Uzbeks: "I dislike [Uzbek President] Islam Karimov's repetitive statements regarding one people with two languages. We've never been one nation, since the Tajiks are Indo-Europeans, while the Uzbeks have Turko-Mongol roots. Understandably, there have been a certain mixing via inter-ethnic marriages and cohabitation, but this does not imply one nation" (Masov 2007). Masov also stated: "There cannot be any single-root ethnic entity of the peoples, originating from the completely opposite races". By attributing the "Aryan descent" to the Tajiks, this author announces them to be more beautiful and intelligent than their neighbors, the Turks, and putatively provokes envy and hatred in the latter (cited in Shnirelman 2015, p. 216). As Shnirelman (2015, p. 216) rightly pointed out, "garnished this way, "Aryan idea" enables someone to consequently find the "absolute primordial enemy", to place this enemy in a historical context, and to mobilize people for uncompromising struggle" (Shnirelman 2015, p. 215).

Tajiks' ethnogenesis has been associated with the Samanid Empire that existed in the ninth to tenth centuries. According to Tajik historians, the Samanid state was "the highest point of the Islamic civilization", "the most powerful state" at the time, a sample of good governance as well as the source of all the cultural acquisitions by the early modern Europe. With the destruction of the Samanid state by the Turk-Mongols came the termination of the most advanced culture within the Turan (Aryan) civilization (Gorak 2009).

The origins of "Aryanism" as well as ideas of pan-Iranism are thus to be found in the ancient state. The "Aryan" origins of the Tajik ethnogenesis are invoked not only by historians but also by people unaffiliated with the academic world. Thus, the Tajik President illuminates the ancient origins of the nation in his published work.

> In 1997, Rakhmonov (the Tajik President) published his own pamphlet "The Tajiks in the Historical Mirror", where he argued that the Tajiks' sovereign

> statehood culminated long before the arrival of the Mongols in Central Asia and, in fact, it was the successor to the Aryan tradition, dated back at least to the Samanid Dynasty (Hanks 2014, p. 121).

It is then no wonder that the Aryan myth is preached at the state level and is broadcasted to the masses, for whom it acquires a form of cultural and historical memory. When in 2016, a woman was trying to pass her question over to President Rahmon (such as in the "live broadcast nationwide phone-in"), she was told by an official in her region that "questions were accepted only from individuals with distinct Aryan outlook". (Kara-Murza 2016) Even though this incident provoked a scandal and had unpleasant consequences for the officer, with reservations concerning its extremity and bizzarerie, this case confirms our theses.

Under one of presidential decrees, the year 2006 was proclaimed a "year of the Aryan civilization", "dedicated to study and promotion of the Aryans' input in the history of the world civilization as well as to development of the present-day generations' national self-awareness, and to connecting peoples and cultures". On this occasion, street ceremonies were organized, and Tajik cities at large were adorned with posters, glorifying the supposed Aryan roots of the Tajiks (Kalishevsky 2013). Secondary school education also translates the Aryan myth, thereby providing the latter with intergenerational continuity. In the new school curriculum, history textbooks begin by mentioning the ancient Aryans. Scientists and officials alike use every opportunity to emphasize the ancient Iranian roots of the Tajiks. They strongly oppose Tajiks to their nearest neighbors, the Uzbeks, where the latter are presented as alien invaders, the Turks. Tensions between the "Aryans" and the "Turks" are reflected in school textbooks that blame Panturkists of the supposedly the unfair national-territorial delimitation, whereby less than a half of the Tajiks presently find themselves in the borders of Tajikistan (Blakkisrud and Nozimova 2010).

A feature of the Tajik racism is that the Uzbeks rather than the visually distinguishable Russians are perceived as historical enemies. It is not just about ethnic conflict, with its roots in the colonial past and in the present economic and political contradictions, but it also includes some classic elements of the post-Soviet context of racial knowledge constructed around the discourses of hybridity and "one drop rule".

> What is symptomatic here is that the search for Tajik roots among the leaders and public figures of Uzbekistan (from Faizullah Khodzhaev to Islam Karimov) is matched by a similar search for compromising Turkic roots among the leaders and public figures of Tajikistan. Not a single Tajik leader has been able to escape such suspicions and accusations. (Abashin 2012, p. 153)

Racialization in Tajikistan provides a solution to some important political problems. As it was formulated by Shnirelman (2015, p. 220), by appealing to the ancient ancestors, the Tajik officialdom supposedly overcomes a certain regionalism of the Tajik people, and the intensity is reduced of the religious conflict between the Sunnis and the Ismailis. In addition, it establishes the historical and cultural basis and legitimation for allied relations both with Russia and Iran. Finally, they draw a dividing line between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks by representing them as peoples with very different "racial" roots.

Civil War in Tajikistan: Blood Bonds and Regional Clans

Following the Soviet Union collapse and proclamation of independence by Tajikistan, there was a protracted and bloody civil war that split the country into two parts. Initially, it was not an inter-ethnic conflict, because this war between the former Communist elite and oppositional political parties broke out for various reasons (Akbarzadeh 1996, p. 1118). However, it quickly degenerated into a clan warfare and confrontation among racialized ethnic groups: "...militias on both sides had ties with ethno-regional communities: Gharmi, Hissori and Kulobi Tajiks, Pamiris, and Uzbeks. This association meant that the violent competition for power quickly turned into a murderous spree of identity-targeted killing performed by informal units led by radicalized leaders who advocated and implemented increasingly more violent actions toward their adversaries" (Foster 2015, p. 354).

Formed on the basis of the four ethno-regional groups, clans—the Leninabadis (Hozhentis), the Garmis, the Kulyabis and the Pamiris—established their respective political parties and movements. Thus have

appeared: Popular Movement “Rastokhez” (“Revival”, active from 1989 and representing the Pamiris and the Garmis); Democratic Party of Tajikistan (since 1991, the Garmis and the Pamiris); Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (since 1989, the Garmis); Society “Lali Badakhshon” (“Pearl of Badakhshan”, since 1991, the Pamiris); Popular Front (since 1992, the Kulyabis and the Hissar Uzbeks); Party of Free Labor (since 1991, the Leninabadis); People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (since 1993, the Leninabadis); Party of National Unity (since 1994, the Leninabadis); Party of Political and Economic Revival (since 1994, the Leninabadis); Union of Progressive Forces of Tajikistan (since 1994, the Kulyabis) (Bobokhonov 2011, p. 75).

Thus, initially not caused by regional affiliation, the conflict subsequently became “regionalized”, and it divided the Tajik society into rival clans of the pro-Communist Kulyabis and the oppositional Garmis and the Pamiris. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Pamiris did not consider themselves as any Tajik ethnic group (in a way the Soviet statistics had previously ascribed them) but imagined themselves as a separate people and as descendants of the surviving ancient Iranian population (Sitnyansky 2011, p. 168). Violence against the Pamiris clan was perpetrated by representatives of the Kuliabis and the Hissar Uzbeks from Popular Front. In addition, those communities have become pitched against each other that had never before been in any conflict—even though, “in terms of many ethno-cultural parameters, the Garmis and the Kuliabis have been most closely related to each other among the four main ethno-regional groups of the Tajik people” (Bobokhonov 2011, p. 77).

Regionalism has played a crucial role in the racist mobilization of the population:

> Government and opposition leaders recruited people based on regional identities, loyalties, and networks. For example, during the demonstrations in Dushanbe the government supporters mobilized Kulyabis, with the discourse that Garmis and Pamiris were against Kulyabis and “their” people in Dushanbe needed them… When the militias began to kill people according to their regional origin, the process itself made regional identity and regionalism one of the most important factors in war (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2014 p. 121).

Racist Violence and Exclusion of Ethnic Minorities

Empirical studies show that the “non-titular” population of Tajikistan is discriminated based on ethnicity, and 22 % of the citizens of Tajikistan confirm this finding. In particular, 16.5 % of the Uzbeks under study mentioned that they had experienced ethnic discrimination. Among Russians, this proportion is slightly higher and at 26 % (Korostelina 2007, p. 231). Even though violence on the racial grounds is a relative rarity, some episodes do occur. Concerning the specifically Tajik nationalism, it makes sense to mention the practice of pushing the national minorities from the social life of the region. “In 2008, the problem of national minorities’ place and role in Tajikistan has been finally resolved... For the first time in the 17 years of Tajikistan independence, all the representatives of national minorities were excluded from participation in the celebration of Tajikistan Independence Day. This is a political response to all the questions” (Kim 2008).

Religious freedom of ethnic minorities is violated, Human Rights Watch reports. Under the guise of a struggle against radical Islamist movements, the Tajik government has recently shut down hundreds of unregistered mosques. Paradoxically, “in 2011 new administrative and penal code provisions set new penalties, including large fines and prison terms, for religion-related charges” (Human Rights Watch 2012), and the same year 50 mosques were closed. Not only mosques were destroyed. Human Rights Watch (2012) also reports a destruction of a church and a synagogue which was demolished for the reason that “the court recognized its architecture inappropriate to the style of President's residence being under construction nearby” (Fergana 2009).

Since ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan are considered as “diaspora” due to complicated relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's ruling elites that led to nationalist policies in both states, we should consider attitude of the ethnic Tajiks’ toward Uzbeks living in Tajikistan. After the civil war, which split the country, mobilized and recruited by the ethnicity and clan identity, the significant number of ethnic Uzbeks had to flee the country to seek political asylum in Uzbekistan and other neighboring countries. Those Uzbeks who have stayed in Tajikistan still represent the

largest ethnic minority in the country, but their position is marginal, and they suffer from all kinds of social deprivation as far as "the ruling elite is afraid that [neighbouring] Uzbekistan might try to use the ethnic Uzbeks living in Tajikistan… to influence political developments and security in Tajikistan" (EurasiaNet. 2011a). According to Alexandr Sodiqov of the Russian-Tajik Slavonic University in Dushanbe, "Uzbeks are consistently marginalized and denied access to economic and political resources" (EurasiaNet. 2011a).

Despite being "racialized", tensions between Uzbeks and Tajiks are not violent. However, this fact does not imply the absence of occasional outbreaks of ethnic violence in contemporary Tajikistan.

Batken region (Batkenskaya oblast') of Kyrgyzstan is situated next to the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while Kyrgyzstan has become the homeland for several ethnic enclaves. Batken region has often been the focus of inter-ethnic conflicts. For instance, in August 2015, there was a conflict between residents of Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's Soghdy region (Soghdiyskaya oblast'), when some 120 Tajiks and 80 Kyrgyzs threw stones at each other, according to "Fergana" news agency (2015). Kyrgyz border guards maintained that this conflict first arose from an episode of domestic violence, but it then spilled over into violent clashes between the two ethnic groups. Citizens of Tajikistan prevented residents of the Kyrgyz village of Kok-Tash to from accessing their cemetery by blocking the road which passed through the Tajik village of Mayskoye, while Kyrgyz people in retaliation blocked the water canal supplying the Tajik village of Chorku. This incident is not unique, and the outbreaks of violence in the border area take place with frightening frequency. In 2005, a fight occurred between the Kyrgyz border guards and villagers in the Tajik enclave of Chorku resulted in one of the residents shot. In January 2013, there was a conflict between a group of young people from Chorku and residents of the Kyrgyz village of Kok-Tash, with about 20 young people from Chorku entering Kok-Tash followed by smashing the windows in local shops, schools and houses of villagers, and in daring the latter to a fight (Fergana 2015).

Khorog is a city in Tajikistan highlands that has also become a place for violent conflicts. In 2012, it witnessed a military operation to capture the perpetrators of the assassination of secret service General Abdullah

Nazarov and to neutralize anti-government groups that resulted in intense shooting, which badly affected local civilians.

An ethnic component of the Khorog unrest is perceived in the Pamiris' ambiguity of being Tajikistan citizens without being ethnic Tajiks. According to some estimates, the military operation in Khorog was classified as "ethnic cleansing" of the population of the Pamirs (Sarkorova 2012).

The Pamiris who had never shown strong support for Dushanbe, in this and such like instances proved out that they can be easily mobilized once their territory and population are threatened. Their prompt and resolute reaction to one informal leader killed and some others arrested demonstrated that the people of the Pamirs can mobilize and express their political will unrestrained by the official mass media, heavily exploiting the horrific memories of the recent civil war (Berdykulov 2015, p. 16).

Another inter-ethnic conflict, now in Dushanbe, was a premise to the civil war erupted two years later. The escalation of conflicts in Dushanbe in 1990 superimposed the problem of spontaneous migration by Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan to Tajikistan. "Scarce resources, economic stagnation, and crop shortages could not maintain Tajikistan's growing population. People were in stress, and this was only inflamed by rumors that Armenian refugees who had fled from Azerbaijan would be given apartments in Dushanbe. Those waiting for housing for several decades rapidly mobilized, and on February 11, 1990 people gathered in front of the Central Committee of Communist Party chanting 'Armenians, go away!'" (Berdykulov 2015, p. 7). The indigenous population, troubled by the rumors about the allocation of deficient housing to refugees ("Armenians are about to be favored at the expense of the impoverished local population", "The rich Armenians have the authorities in their pockets", "The Armenian refugees will be given apartments in Dushanbe by surpassing the many locals who wait for the same for many years") took to the streets—this way mass rallies and demonstrations began that soon overgrew into the civic unrest. The victims of the rioters were members of the Armenian diaspora, but also other "non-titular" natives, and according to official data, during a short period (11–14 February), there were 22 people killed and 565 wounded; 332 criminal cases were initiated to involve 129 suspects, inter alia 37 juveniles. Ethnic

Russians constituted 56 % of those injured and 41 % of the seriously injured (Kalishevsky 2010).

Isolationism of the Racial State: Turkmenistan in the Search of Ancestors

Turkmenistan is one of the most isolated countries in the world. Foreigners face many difficulties when they attempt to come to this country, especially if tourism is their only stated purpose, but it is even more difficult to do if you have research purposes. The number of Turkmen traveling to other countries is also extremely low. Nationalist ideological mobilization on the part of the state is directed at isolating the country from the rest of the world, which distinguishes Turkmenistan from other countries in the region (Abashin 2011, p. 198).

Successful implementation of the isolation strategy is possible owing to the country's significant natural resources (4th largest gas reserves in the world), lavish natural rent (gas and oil) that allows the elite to unproblematically retain power and realize grandiose propaganda architectural projects (Šír 2008), and to provide the population with handouts in terms of free electricity and gas (Peyrouse 2015). Having fenced themselves off from the rest of the world allows the authoritarian regime to blossom and even to engage in self-idolatry that takes grotesque and evidently absurd by today's standards forms (Polese and Horák 2015; Mills 2007). The cult of the head of the state is intended not only to meet the ambitions of those at the helm of power. The political body of the nation is consciously constructed through the shared loyalty and sacred pathos. Worshipping the Turkmenbashi (the head of all Turkmens) is aimed at solving one of the major problems faced by modern Turkmenistan—to overcome the remaining clan rivalry. Even now, after the long period of the enacted Soviet policy of erasing the clan-tribal boundaries and attempting to replace them with class consciousness (Edgar 2006) and national integration, "a system of awareness of belonging to a particular tribe and often—to an individual clan—has been retained by the overwhelming majority of urbanites not to

mention the villagers" (Demidov 2002, p. 9). Blood and origin are still the main elements of the social structure, threatening the unity of the political nation.

Already during the first race-anthropological studies of Turkmen in the nineteenth century, a problem was noted with classification of Turkmen as a single ethnic and cultural group. The first detailed description of Turkmen has been left Hungarian Turkologist Ármin Vámbéry, who in 1863 took a trip to Bokhara and Samarkand, the then independent khanates later to be included in the Russian Empire. The traveler was puzzled whether to call Turkmen a separate nation (in accordance with European standards), if the Turkmen tribes had never formed a single state (Vámbéry 2003). Similar description of Turkmen has been left by Russian General Alexei Kuropatkin, who took part in the military campaign in the conquest of Central Asia (at the time referred to as Turkestan). As Vambery, he also pointed out that the main occupation of Turkmen was raiding and looting, and he emphasized their hostile relations with other nations residing next to Turkmenistan. Moreover, "wild inhabitants of this land led the bloody feud among themselves, and hatred amongst various Turkmen clans matched their hatred toward other nations" (Kuropatkin 1879, p. 33).

The ethnographic study showed that the clan and tribal structure of Turkmen have an internal hierarchy, which is largely determined by the "purity of blood", and yet "an archaic division has been preserved on "igs" ("pure", full members of the clan), "guls" (male slaves), "gyrnaks" (female slaves), and "yaryms" (descendants of marriages with female slaves" (Vasil'eva 1990, p. 36–7). Back in the 1920s, Soviet scientists noted that Turkmen "strictly observed the purity of their descent" and "firmly retained in their memory the ties of blood" (Tumanovich 1926, p. 20).

European researchers of the exotic Central Asia were also interested in problems of Turkmen's racial typology, which would allow placing them in an ordered hierarchy of races. Thus, Vambery defined the original racial type of Turkmen as Turkic, although he noted their mixing with dark-haired Iranians (Vámbéry 2003). German anthropologist Richard Karutz (1911, p. 16) (who later became one of the key figures in racial anthropology of the Third Reich), considered Turkmen as resulted from the Mongol-Turkic-Aryan mixing. He estimated that the "physical

type of Turkmen is mostly related to Bukhara and Tajiks, while the Persian and Turkic-Tatar features—in approximately equal quantities—appeared only as admixtures". Already in the first reports by traveling scientists, some major problems with the description and understanding of Turkmen were outlined: (1) the unity of Turkmen was questioned as a common classification group, given the clear separation of clans (and related clan rivalry); (2) racial/ethnic origin of Turkmen and the importance of various elements involved in this process (which is almost always described in terms of mixing). These issues of scientific classification have gradually transformed into categories of ideological nation-building.

Racial and anthropological studies of Turkmen continued in Soviet times as closely related to their ethnogenesis. These studies were initiated in Moscow because of the lack and insufficient training of the Turkmenian intelligentsia. In the 1920–1930s, anthropologist Alexey Yarkho supposed that Turkmen's evident Mongoloid features should be considered as a later admixture, and "if we are to remove this admixture from the physical type of Turkmen—as Yarkho mentally did—Turkmen as well as Azerbaijanis should be recognized as representatives of the Caspian type and, consequently, of the Indian-Afghan race" (Alekseev 1971, p. 33–37). Certain race-anthropological traits of Turkmens (dolihokefaliya) were built into ethno-genetic theory of the origin of Turkmen from the Scythians and Sarmatians (Oshanin 1953, p. 43). In general, Soviet science actually refuted such genesis-related legends spread among Turkmen tribes as their origin from Oguz Khan (as well as from a Turkic tribe of the Oguz), emphasizing the Caucasoid element in the origin of Turkmen. Ironically, these scientific investigations ran parallel with the growing migration in Soviet Turkmenistan of representatives of other Soviet peoples with the Caucasian origin—Russians, in the first place. If in 1926 Russians accounted for only 8 % of the population of Turkmenistan, then in 1959, they constituted already 17 %, although later their share subsequently began to decline, primarily due to different rates of fertility (high among Turkmen and low among Russians).

In the late 1980s—early 1990s, the origin of Turkmen transformed from an object of academic interest by Moscow scientists into a politically sensitive topic, with the local intelligentsia engaging in the debate. Different versions of the ethnogenesis were closely linked with projects of

national identity and designing their own symbolic past. The discussion proceeded about the ratio of older (pre-nomadic) elements and those left by Turkish conquerors. This dilemma ("Aryans or Turks?") arose sharply in all the newly formed Central Asian republics. Victor Shnirelman (2010, pp. 48–49)—a leading researcher of the "Aryan idea" of post-Soviet states notes:

> For Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, acquiring an Aryan past means, above all, establishing their status as "indigenous peoples," thereby legitimizing their right to build states of their own in what appear to be their "ancient homelands." "Aryan roots" also give the Turkic peoples an honorable place in ancient history and make them the equals of Europeans, helping them throw off their inferiority complex. The warlike spirit of the Aryans is valued for instilling in their supposed descendants a feeling of patriotism and willingness to defend the homeland from foreign enemies. Great importance is attached to the lofty moral ideals of the Aryans, to their "spiritual purity." Finally, the new states of Central Asia need the image of common ancient forebears to consolidate the nation and overcome tribalism and regionalism.

One of the main advocates of the autochthonous ("Aryan") version of Turkmen's origin was a local historian and journalist Marat Durdyyev, who maintained in his 1991 essay on the origin of the nation that Turkmen were neither Oghuz Turks nor nomadic pastoralists. In his opinion, the ethno-genetic nucleus of Turkmen was formed by autochthonous eastern Iranian tribes, carriers of high culture and destroyed by nomadic tribes (Durdyyev 1991). This version of the past linked Turkmen to the ancient civilization of Parthia and adjusted their national identity to fit the European model.

However, despite all the propaganda efforts by Durdyyev, an ethnogenic version has taken precedence as proposed by academician Ata Dzhikyyev (A. Dzhikyyev), emphasizing that the decisive role in the formation of a new ethnic community with a new anthropological type was played by Oghuz tribes. This concept has become canonical and has been adopted by the authorities, who included it into the overall concept of building a national identity. Kuru (2002, p. 71) correctly sums up

the logic of Turkmenistan's self-exclusion: "Following the declaration of independence, to maintain national solidarity and to adapt to the international system, Turkmenistan has focused on nation building, which has two main objectives; the unity of the tribes and gradual socio-cultural de-Russification". In choosing between the Turks and Aryan as honorary ancestors, the choice was made in favor of the Turks—Oguz tribes. According to Akbarzadeh (1999, p. 281), the Turkmenian leadership and personally President Niyazov have opted for "the conventional version of history", whereby modern Turkmen are related to Oghuz tribes, promoting the role, traditions and legacies of the Seljuk dynasty in their epitomizing the state building by the Oghuz and Turkmen. Thus, the Turkmenian statehood has acquired a thousand-year history, researchers of the Seljuks has received lavish state sponsorship, and the leadership themselves—a useful rhetorical tool for their political and nation-building projects.

The alternative versions (in the first place, the concept by Durdyyev) fell into disgrace. The origin of Turkmen has acquired features of a new state mythology, with "an emphasis on the primordial bonds linking ethnic Turkmen, often through mythical rulers well known in the history and folklore of the Turkmen (notably Oghuz Khan), to the Turkmen lands—in other words the carving of a distinct Turkmen geocultural space" (Denison 2009, p. 1174). Using the trope of the "ancient nation" serves a purpose—a symbolic statement of the unity of the Turkmen tribes (Kiepenheuer-Drechsler 2006, p. 131).

> The regime has circumvented the lack of a primordial connection between "blood" and "soil" by reviving a traditional folkloric claim that the Turkmen descend from a mythical warrior named Oghuz Khan, himself a descendant of the Biblical prophet Noah… Crucially, the land that Oghuz ruled is situated, according to Niyazov, almost co-terminously with the boundaries of the modern state of Turkmenistan, thereby materialising the organic, primordial, mystical connection between land and people (Denison 2009, p. 1176).

Both overcoming the intertribal boundaries and nation-building were carried out using bureaucratic methods and by means of symbolic politics. Apart from the general cult of the "father of Turkmen", an important

integrating factor was the ancient past. Prior to its incorporation to the Soviet Union, a nation of Turkmens hardly existed—it was a confederation of tribes with different traditions and dialects. President Saparmurat Niyazov took historical knowledge under his personal control, using the rhetoric of "national revival" instead of the "nation-building". President Niyazov stated:

> After gaining their independence in 1991, the Turkmen people, one of the oldest Turkic nations with over five millennia of triumphs and losses behind it, have entered a new era of genuine revival of independent Turkmen statehood; the nation of one of the most ancient and one of the richest cultures will return to the world arena after many centuries of non-existence (cited from Kirchanov 2010, p. 61)

In 2000, the original version of "History of Turkmenistan" textbook was rejected and destroyed, since its "authors had committed treason against the country's past by ignoring 'the Turkmen origin and character' of Turkmenistan, overstating the role of other nations in its national history and writing that Turkmen originated not in what is modern Turkmenistan but in the Altai mountains" (Kuru 2002, p. 77).

An even more significant contribution to the creation of Niyazov's official version of the past was "Ruhnama" [Book of the Soul], published in 2001. This book, allegedly written by Turkmenbashi, is intended to represent a kind of a national meta-narrative, but in fact an odd mixture of pseudo-history, parables and moral guidances to the Turkmenian people. It has been introduced as a compulsory study in schools and universities. *Ruhnama* represents a post-colonial inversion of Turkmen's historical consciousness: allegedly, they became the founders of the greatest civilizations in history by winning a symbolic victory over former colonizers.

Since the end of the Soviet era, Turkmenistan's government has hampered educational opportunities, and cuts have impacted everyone, especially ethnic minorities. Turkmenistan closed schools serving Kazakh, Uzbek and Russian populations, ethnic Russian teachers have been dismissed. Moreover in 2004, all higher education degrees received outside Turkmenistan were invalidated, and all holders of these degrees were removed from state jobs according to Decree 126 issued by the president

(Stonawski 2012). President Niyazov banned the cinema, opera, ballet and the circus, since none of these originated in Turkmenistan. All the books in Russian were destroyed in the libraries, despite they had constituted the bulk of their collections (Khalid 2006). Although survey of the Turkmen students made by Stonawski shows that they generally do not object to intermarriage between ethnicities, state policies made such intermarriages almost impossible. Stonawski (2012, p. 203) also reported wide discrepancies in the understanding the situation of minorities between Turkmen and non-Turkmen students.

In parallel, the international isolation of the country has been the case, which the Turkmenian official discourse has turned into an extraordinarily successful policy of neutrality (Omelicheva 2015). Coupled with the growing nationalist sentiments, this has led to a significant change in attitudes toward national minorities. A sharp drop in the level of education, a priority toward the local population in all areas, the absence of any prospects of social mobility for the Russian-speaking residents of Turkmenistan has provoked a massive outflow of the Russian population. From 320,000 of Russians who lived here before the collapse of the Soviet Union, less than 100,000 people left by 2000. In 2006, Turkmen accounted for 61 % of the population. The major minorities were Uzbeks (16 %), Iranians (14 %) and Russians (4 %). No censuses have been carried out since 2006, but this tendency is unlikely to have changed. Expert Arkady Dubnov (2013) in an interview with the BBC suggested that "the policy of Ashgabat has been aimed at eliminating what they believe to be the 'fifth column' and the construction of an ethnocratic state". Similar measures have been undertaken against other ethnic minorities who have become "second-class citizens". According to Uzbek commentator Muratov (2013): "The late President Saparmurat Niyazov openly conducted ethnic cleansing in the government, firing Uzbeks from all significant positions. In some cases, despite their professionalism and dedication to the interests of the country, ethnic Uzbeks, Russians, Tatars and representatives of other non-titular nations were replaced by less competent and not very "pure in intentions" Turkmen". A striking example of the unfair treatment of the non-Turkmen is the practice of introducing huge cash payments (qalin/dowry) for Turkmen women who marry foreigners.

Symbolically designing the Turkmen's past is directly related to building a discriminatory system based on ethnic origin. An essentialist version of history, which traces the ethnogenesis origins to prehistoric times and imparts the ethnic group with eternal life—establishes a basis for an ethno-racial view of history and also provokes racial prejudices and rhetoric (Shnirelman 2009, 2015).

But the exaggerated cult of the Father of the Nation (Turkmenbashi), combined with the ethnic hyper-nationalist policy of self-isolation is hardly sustainable (Clement 2014). Saparmurat Niyazov's death in 2006 has become a difficult challenge to the sustainability of the current state ideology. The next President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov had to gently cut the cult and rituals of worship to his predecessor, such as by quietly demolishing numerous monuments and removing Niyazov's books from the curriculum (Horák and Šír 2009). However, we should also note the gradual liberalization policies in public and political life (although with very modest success) and gradual attempts to overcome international isolation. Visits by Russian Foreign Minister and President of Uzbekistan to Turkmenistan were also accompanied by a discussion of the status of the minorities.

> The combined empowerment of local bureaucracies and rise of Ahal-Tekke tribal hegemony on the national level is a potentially destabilizing trend, particularly given historically deep tribal divisions between the various Turkmen tribes. This opens up the possibility that stronger local elites of tribal identities different to that of the Ahal-Tekke may come to resent the latter's dominance of national politics that could pose a challenge to the continued legitimacy of the regime (Kunysz 2012, p. 12).

In this case, Turkmenistan represents a unique case, where the immunity to international pressure allows the authorities to implement the most grotesque scenarios of social engineering, but whether they are able to overcome the age-old legacy of clan rivalry, remains to be seen. In any case, the evident victims of these experiments with historical memory and national identity are ethnic minorities, who have had no other option but to become "second-class" people in the ethnocratic state.

"Uzbekization" of Clans—Patterns of Racialization in Uzbekistan

The Construction of the Nation-State: (Ab)uses of Physical Anthropology and History

National history of the Republic of Uzbekistan time and again problematized its titular nation's ethnogenesis. Research by Soviet scientists traced the ethnic basis of Uzbeks in ancient times—the first ethnic layer was constituted by Saks, Massagets, Sogdians, Bactrians as well as peoples of Fergana and Chach who inhabited this territory and spoke various East Iranian dialects. From the middle of the first millennium BC, this area experienced some admixing of the Turko-Mongol component ("Turks", arriving from the north-east), presently constituting the second ethnic layer. These groups formed the basis of the Bronze-Age population formed in the "Central Asian *mezhdurech'ye*" (to imply interstream area, the term coined by L.V. Oshanin by analogy with Mesopotamia). Some further ethnogenesis processes were associated with Turkization of the local population (an influx of Turkish ethnic groups, the Turkic khanate in seventh to eighth centuries, and the rule of Karakhanids in ninth to eleventh centuries), with the ethnonym "Uzbek" originating from the Dasht-i-Kipchak steppes (covering modern Kazakhstan, southern Urals, the Lower Volga region and Western Siberia) and brought here by Dasht-i-Kipchak Turks (Arifkhanova 2011b, p. 7–8). "By including such tribes in their ethnogenesis, Uzbeks, first and foremost, considerably enlarged its timeframe, and they also ascribed all the cultural achievements by the tribes to their immediate ancestors" (Shnirelman 2015 p. 239).

Historian Ilkhamov pointed out that the modern Uzbeks have become a synthesis of at least three ethnic communities: (1) the Dasht-i-Kipchak nomad Uzbeks joined by local Turkic tribes, (2) the Sarts, "consisting of the settled Turkic-speaking and predominantly urban population originating from the Turks, who had abandoned their previous nomadic lifestyle and had lost their tribal affiliation, and (3) the Turkicized Tajiks" (Ilkhamov 2002, p. 270). However, academic discourse criticizes the viewpoint as expressed in "Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan", with the chapter

"Archeology of Uzbek Identity", written by Ilkhamov. Thus, Laruelle claims that "Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan" "has unintentionally highlighted the problems of Uzbek ethnology, which obviously experiences difficulties updating its theoretical approaches and finding its place in the new society of the state independence era" (Laruelle 2005, p. 59). Others have accused Ilkhamov in his supposedly biased attitude to ethnic history and ethnogenesis of Uzbeks as well as in his possible omission of most of the regional history, whereby "ethnogenesis of the Uzbek nation has begun in the first half of XVI century when the nomadic Uzbeks migrated from the Dasht-i-Kipchak steppes to Central Asia, while ignoring those ethnogenetic processes that had occurred in the region for centuries and had fundamental impact on the development of the Uzbek ethnic group" (quoted from Alimova et al. 2006, p. 111). By arguing that it is wrong to reduce Uzbeks' ethnic history to its Dasht-i-Kipchak component from which its ethnonym originate, the authors refer to a Soviet ethnographers' viewpoint, whereby the Uzbek people has descended from the ancient Turks, who lived in Central Asia in the first millennium BC and were part of its indigenous population (Alimova et al. 2006, p. 114).

The complexity of Uzbeks' identity is reflected in the staging of its formation. In different historical periods, the regional ethnic differentiation was required for various socio-political reasons. The first national census of the Russian Empire simplified the ethnic structure of Turkestan general-governorship by reducing it to the two major components: sedentary artisans and farmers Sarts as contrasted to tribal and nomadic Uzbeks. This division was convenient to the Russian government in managing the region (Arifkhanova 2011a, p. 50–52). "A semi-formal term 'Sart' betrayed a certain imperial contempt for the conquered and subordinate population. 'Sart' as a literary and visual image was often associated with backwardness, underdevelopment, "oriental" traits of national character and behavior, and exoticism. These stereotypes were often reinforced by imperial officials' reminiscences, by travelers' stories and even by supposedly scientific research accounts. But it would be wrong to suspect a deliberate attempt to humiliate Turkestan inhabitants in any use of 'Sart'" (Abashin 2007, p. 107), "since at the time there was only a perceived need for national identity rather than any precise formula of 'ethnicity'" (Abashin 2007, p. 153) However, according to Sergey Abashin,

the "problem of Sarts" acquired a new interpretation at the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was assumed that these people could not be described as a separate ethnic group, but that they were rather a social and economic collectivity.

The processes of legitimation of Uzbeks' national identity are based on several principles. In the first place, the Uzbek people needed to justify their autochthonous status. In this regard, studies in Uzbek ethnogenesis established its antiquity by finding the ethnic basis of Uzbeks in ancient Turkic peoples, who had inhabited Central Asia as early as the first century BC. "The history of my people has its roots in ancient times and accounts for more than three thousand years", said Islam Karimov in the early 1990s (cited in Bogolov 2012). Those latter-period and ethnographically "controversial" components are nowadays excluded from the process of constructing an ethnic history. "By the late 1930s Uzbek historians and ethnographers were actively presenting the early framework and symbols of the Uzbek national myth. Evidently the Shaybanids were denied a role in this process because their relatively recent arrival in the region would undetermine Uzbek autochthonous claims to the homeland" (Hanks 2014, p. 118). In the second place, the establishment of the national myth required a national hero, whose exploits would impart uniqueness to the Uzbek culture. If Soviet-time national construction generally eschewed the legendary history, the acquisition of independence by Uzbekistan has re-opened perspectives for even stronger national consciousness by reviving the national history and traditions. Revival of the cultural heritage, such as the names of prominent Uzbeks, has become crucial for both historical memory formation and for national identity strengthening (Arifkhanova 2011b, p. 10).

Tamerlane, the leader of the Timurid Empire from 1340 to 1405 AD, has been selected as such national hero. Although his Uzbek ancestry is contested by historians, Tamerlane has received the title of father of the nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. "By some information, President Karimov was proposed two historic personalities to fill the position of a new symbol of the three thousand years of Uzbek history: Tamerlane and his grandson Ulugbek, who was not only the ruler but also an outstanding astrologist and astronomer. The president chose Tamerlane" (Bogolov 2012). Since Karimov is a native of Samarkand

(renown for Tamerlane's mausoleum), this circumstance supposedly relates him to the great conqueror.

Tamerlane's name is immortalized by his leading role in the establishment of the Central Asian empire with its capital in Samarkand in the fourteenth century. In contemporary Uzbekistan, Tamerlane is considered as this country's liberator from foreign invaders but also as a supposed rescuer of Russia from the Tatar-Mongol yoke as well as of Europe—from Turks. Allegedly, "if it had not been for Tamerlane, neither the Renaissance nor the Great Discoveries epoch would take place in Europe" (Bogolov 2012). Monuments to the national hero have been erected in the center of Tashkent (in place of the dismantled monument to Karl Marx), Samarkand and Shakhrisabz. President Karimov's residence is called Ak-Saray (White Palace), to emulate Tamerlane's palace. In 1996, Uzbekistan became place to mass celebrations of Tamerlane's 660th anniversary, when National Museum of the Timurid has been opened in Tashkent, a medal has been institutionalized and a postal stamp printed depicting Tamerlane.

The historical myth-making also ascribes the reign of Tamerlane and his descendants with unprecedented blossoming of culture and with promotion of the East Turkic Chagatay language to the literary level. To believe Khalid Adib, the Chagatay culture, which had also received a Persian component, subsequently had a strong influence on the Uzbek culture. For instance, Alisher Navoi is referred to as the "father of the Uzbek literature" who initiated Uzbek literary traditions (Khalid 2011). Uzbek roots are also supposedly found in Italian architecture. "The architecture of Italy started to sound in Central Asian manner, almost in Uzbek. The dome for future Santa Maria del Phiore, finished in 1410, was named by a new word 'tamburo'. By that time, the dance 'tambourin' to accompaniment of a drum with metal disks within its frame became popular on the neighbouring coast of the Mediterranean, in the southeastern province of France, Provence... Their European names go not from Persian 'tabirah' (drum), as the western dictionaries comment, but from Turkic: Uzbek 'dombira' means a drum, including in architecture" (Askarov 2004).

The fact, that Tamerlane and Navoi are the mythical symbols of Uzbek majesty which historical nature is questioned, in fact, did not restrain the promotion of the following version: Karakhanid era was the "Golden

Age" of Uzbek statehood, and Navoi found Uzbek literary tradition. Reuel Hanks (2014, p. 119) points out that there is a chronological distortion—"Karakhanids reigned in the tenth century, and Navoi did not sire an "Uzbek" literary tradition until the fifteenth", but it was of little concern to Uzbek historians. "Navoi's elevation to the pantheon of 'Uzbek' luminaries was made more facile by declaring that Chagatay, the Turkic literary language favored by Navoi and other Timurid writers, was in fact 'Old Uzbek'" (Hanks 2014, p. 119). Yet another confirmation of this chapter's thesis concerning the internal contradictions of the Uzbek official discourses can be found in the fact that Timur never referred to himself as Uzbek, unlike those strangers from the north who eventually destroyed in the sixteenth century the state that had been created by the Timurids.

Thus, cultural and historical studies are directed by ideologists of Uzbekistan toward consolidation of Uzbeks as a single nation. However, Uzbek society is nonetheless extremely heterogeneous, which needs to be taken into account for understanding of how ethnicity becomes intertwined with regionalism in racial Uzbekization.

Regionalism and Clan Structure: Social Closure in Uzbekistan

The internal structure of the Uzbek population according to official physical anthropologists is extremely heterogeneous. "With all the ethnic, morphological and genetic uniqueness, they have Caucasoid appearance with varying extent of Mongoloid admixture—ranging from its complete absence to a significant one" (Khodzhayov and Khodzhayova 2011, p. 15). The appearance is defined by territorial belonging, where rural population of Uzbeks is characterized by tribal divisions, while urban Uzbeks mostly eschew such divisions. They differ in terms of concentration of Oriental features (ibid.). The urban population of Tashkent, Jizzakh, Andizhan, Samarkand, Tarmez, Bukhara and Khiva is more uniform than the rural population; and rural dwellers without adherence to tribal divisions (most often this concerns rural settlements situated next to cities) are anthropologically no different from urbanites (ibid).

According to dominant contemporary racial descriptions, Uzbeks display the following four main racial components: Southern Caucasoid appearance (Uzbeks without tribal divisions in Uzbekistan's southern and central regions), Northern Caucasoid appearance (those residing in the northern regions of Khorezm and Fergana as well as in Tashkent region), Mongoloid, and, to a lesser extent—equatorial (Indo-Australoid). The Mongoloid component is morphologically present—to varying degrees—in the majority of Uzbek groups. Within Uzbekistan, it increases in the north-east and north-west directions. There is some increased concentration of the same in the central regions (Samarkand Sogd), wherefrom it becomes reduced in radial directions. This center is characterized by polytypism. The Mongoloid component is mostly found in groups with tribalist adherence (Khodzhayov and Khodzhayova 2011, pp. 22–3).

Local and regional affiliation becomes an important factor that limits identity construction.

> People in Uzbekistan claim an ability to distinguish between the accents of people from different regions, and thus to identify a speaker's place of origin... Great differences, especially cultural differences, are claimed for the people of different regions. For example, one informant from Fergana said of people from the Samarkand-Bukhara and Khoresm regions: 'They live in deserts. I do not understand their poems and songs. We do not feel the same things. They are far away and alien'... Regional allegiances are reflected among young people in terms of their social behavior, group conflict, and marriage. In universities, students from the same region tend to eat and drink together, live together in the dormitories, while groups of young people from different regions occasionally fight with each other (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2014: p. 50–51).

The clannishness of Uzbek society is fraught not only with domestic conflict but also with that at the state level. Thus, a historical administrative–territorial division of Uzbekistan had three entities—Maverannakhr (Transoxania), Khorezm and Fergana—that underwent changes during the Soviet era, only to become transformed into clans, fighting for the political domination—those of Fergana, Samarkand and Tashkent. The dominance of the first two clans took place alongside with the

Samarkand elites' subordination, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samarkand native Karimov has ascended to the republic's leadership (Sitnyansky 2011, p. 135–136)

> Recruitment to political posts according to regional origin is emphasized in the accounts of other informants as well, including high officials. One of the former advisors in the presidential apparatus said: 'Everyone tries to employ people from his own region, and this mentally is influential in politics as well'... Another former advisor stated that 'Regionalism is very strong in Uzbekistan... its influence is seen in recruitment to the posts. People are given posts based on their regional origin' (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2014: p. 58).

Ethnic Conflicts

At the beginning of the Soviet period, Central Asia experienced several ethnic conflicts. A violent conflict occurred between Uzbeks and representatives of "non-titular" nationalities in several villages, towns and cities of Fergana region in 1989. For two weeks, the Uzbekistan part of the valley was shaken by a violent conflict between ethnic Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks, a small ethnic group that had been deported from the Caucasus to Uzbekistan by Stalin. It originally started in the small town of Kuva and then spread to Fergana, Kokand, Margilan and Namangan.... Lubin emphasizes that "what led to this act of ethnic violence was the existing economic disparity between the relatively better-off Meskhetians and the economically deprived Uzbeks of Fergana" (Sari 2013: p. 14).

> Extremists gathered in crowds of 100–400 people, armed with metal rods, axes, forks, knives, and other objects. They began by beating innocent people, to include the elderly, women, and children, and they then proceeded by committing mass arsons of houses and by numerous murders—not only of Meskhetian Turks but also of people of other nationalities. Uzbek mobsters in Fergana employed such slogans as 'Uzbekistan is for Uzbeks', 'Let's choke [Meskhetian] Turks, let's choke Russians', 'Hail to the Islamic flag and the Muslim faith (Ivanov 2009).

It was noted that attacks against Meskhetian Turks were particularly frequent among the "European" population of Uzbekistan. Turks themselves believed that their people became a convenient object for a "show of force" because of their small size and dispersion (Osipov 2004, p. 201).

Despite the otherwise low level of anti-Semitism, there were pogroms of the Jewish quarter in Andijan, in May 1990. On this instance, due to arsons and attacks on the homes of the Jews, they had to urgently leave them. Vandalism was accompanied by anti-Semitic leaflets and threatening graffiti on houses. Separate episodes of vandalism against the Jewish population of Uzbekistan are reported nowadays as well. For example, more than 100 Jewish tombs were desecrated at Dombrabad, the Russian cemetery in Tashkent several years ago (Degtiar 2001).

Mass riots in Andijan in May 2005 were followed by harassment of independent journalists investigating these riots' causes, course and consequences—such as with regard to journalist Alexei Volosevich, who observed the walls of his apartment block kept covered with obscenities and phrases, such as "mercenary journalist" and "Jew", Human Rights Watch reported. The National Security Agency press service first promised to investigate this evident case of anti-Semitism but later refused, owing to the official absence of anti-Semitism in Uzbekistan (Human Rights Watch 2005).

Uzbekistan's official attitude to the Russian-speaking minority is such that Russian are proclaimed as the colonizers' descendants, while Uzbeks themselves are said to be their victims: "Uzbekistan developed a discourse centered on the victimization of the Uzbek nation by the Russian-Soviet oppressor" (Laruelle 2012b: p. 217). Confirming this thesis is Memorial Museum for Victims of Repressions, built in 2000 on the initiative of President Karimov, with "its expositions arranged in such a way as to conjure up a sense of righteous anger toward the malicious Russian-Soviet invaders and oppressors" (Bayramov 2009). The streets of Tashkent are being renamed, erasing any mention of the Soviet heritage (Lenin Street has been renamed into Buyuk Turon Street, Karl Marx Street—into Sayilgoh Street, while Fridrich Engels Street is now Amir Temur Street); monuments to Soviet leaders are being demolished, and monuments to national heroes are being erected in their place (Volosevich 2008).

"According to one Russian woman in Tashkent, 'the Uzbeks consider us to be 'guests' or 'colonizers'. And both Uzbek officials and ordinary Uzbek citizens routinely complain that the Russians are still there and occupying housing or jobs that should go to Uzbeks. Moreover, and in contrast to some other countries, the status of the Russian language is declining there as well" (Goble 2013). The ethno-demographic situation in Uzbekistan features the primacy of the "titular" nation over ethnic minorities. By tracing the dynamics of the population's national composition between 1989 and 2006, one finds the share of Uzbeks increasing from 71.4 % in 1989 to 80.4 % in 2006. The share of ethnic minorities residing in Uzbekistan demonstrates the opposite trend. In this regard, a most revealing trend was the reduction of the share of ethnic Russians in the general population—from 8.3 % in 1989 to 3.8 % in 2006. Kazakhs accounted for 4.1 % in 1989 and to mere 3.5 % in 2006. Tatars constituted 2.4 % of the general population in 1989 but only 0.9 % in 2006. The number of Tajiks in Uzbekistan remains relatively stable—4.7 % in 1989 and 4.9 % in 2006 (cited in Arifkhanova and Nazarov 2011, p. 69). Unlike in other former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan had no population censuses since 1989.

> Russians complain that they have become second or third rate people. They might be sacked without obvious reason and explanation, any district-level official is capable of bereaving them of their apartment or other property, and those daring to raise the Russian issue might soon find themselves in a prison cell. 'We are pushed from all walks of life. It seems that the authorities and law enforcers encourage nationalism and extremism', said one of the experts in Tashkent resident (Slovetskiy 2013).

Russian-language press reports are replete with claims by Russian refugees, such as this one: "Government bought and law enforcement bodies of Uzbekistan encourage nationalism and extremism – Russians are commonly dismissed from their jobs without explanation, threatened and subjected to mortal danger, making it clear to us that we should urgently leave our houses and apartments and leave for 'our Russia'", says Leonid Loschakov, a refugee from Uzbekistan. He continues: "Many relatives and friends died in jail, where they were subjected to refined, truly medieval

tortures; jailers beat off their kidneys, and they thus became weak through the loss of blood; their fingers were cut off, and needles were driven under their fingernails; their genitals were crushed or subject to open fire; their eyes were gouged out; and their throats were finally cut" (Aleksandrov 2013).

Uzbek officialdom apply discourses of social racism to fellow countrymen abroad. President Karimov is thus referred to Uzbek migrants in Russia as "slackers": "I call lazy people those who go to Moscow and sweep its streets and squares. One feels disgusted with the fact that Uzbeks have to travel there for a piece of bread. Nobody is starving to death in Uzbekistan". He continues: "The Uzbek nation's honor makes us different from others. Is not it better to die [than scrounge]? Therefore, I call lazy those people who disgrace all of us by wanting to make a lot of money faster there." (cited in Trilling 2013)

Uzbek migrants in Russia are also subjected to harassment. In Russia, migrants unanimously denounce themselves to be victims of the "police hunt" but are nonetheless and at any time beware of police checks. Russian police often perform "face control" by stopping almost systematically anybody with non-Slavic appearance, and particularly those who are pejoratively referred to as "chernye" (literally, "blacks"), to imply people from Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Officially, the detained foreigners pend to be fined and deported. However, in the end, these penalties are rarely imposed. Russian police officers usually prefer to receive a bribe than to engage in tiresome official proceedings that would not be any lucrative for them (Massot 2013, p. 293–4).

Conclusion

Nation-building and racialization of the state are the processes that govern not only the socio-political structure of the societies studied in this chapter, but they are also determinants of a broader ideological context of the Central Asia as a post-Soviet region. There are two trends of social change in the region defining the dynamics and the very logic of racism in this context. On the one hand, the independent states that have been formed on the basis of the Soviet Central Asian republics have intensified

their nation-building. Even despite the lack of political freedoms, weakness of civil society, and leaders, "inherited" from the communist past, this should be considered as a modernized nation-building. Moreover, in the above conditions, the stakes of giving legitimacy to the new social order and systems of domination and exclusion are particularly high. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to a dramatic traditionalization of Central Asian societies. The new system of social closure that develops under the influence of these two major historical processes has provided a powerful impulse to racialization processes, both at the level of everyday life and at the level of state policies.

Given all its diversity, racism in Central Asia might be considered as a thing apart in the post-Soviet space. The analysis proposed in this chapter reveals the following similarities in racialization patterns and racist exclusion. Firstly, regionalism is a strong divisive force in all Central Asian societies. With each region possessing their own unique mix of cultures and kinship networks, any attempts of nation-building based on "common blood or ancestors" leads to resistance and alternative ethno-racial discourses. For example, racial "Uzbekization" or "Tajikization" further widen the divisions among these countries' regions, at the same time leading to formation of new interconnected racialized identities across the groups.

Secondly, the experience of forcible imposition of racial identity occurs not so much through the assimilation of any clearly articulated racial knowledge at home but in the process of mass labor migration to Russia. It is in Russia that the natives of Central Asia often not only become victims of racist violence but internalize the racial discourse as well. Communicated via compatriots, this discourse is then creatively modified and adapted to Central Asian conditions and contexts. Thus, there is a cultural colonization of Central Asian societies of the former metropolis.

Thirdly, nominating a national hero is extremely important both in the construction of the titular nation and in its racialization. The typical of Central Asian societies cult of the leader and autocracy makes the racial discourse to correlate the image of the leader of the nation with that of the national hero. In the same context, it is the Russian-speaking population

that usually becomes the racial "other" and is represented as "alien" and "unrooted".

This chapter emphasizes the contradictory composition of the discourses of race in Central Asia—whereby it can be conceptualized both as breed (or lineage), which is supported by the discourses of nationalism and clan politics, and as type (or phenotype), which is supported by folk conceptions borrowed from the Soviet and post-Soviet experiences of racialization. The fluid character of racism in the region obstructs any non-contradictory formation of the racial order. The logic of racialization demands both internal and external "others", which leads to contradictions within the available intellectual programs of nation-building under the conditions of striving to legitimize inequality and authoritarian rule. It is self-contradictory in its two functions of responding to the traumatic challenges of the neighboring countries and Russia and of naturalizing social differences at home. The weakness of civil society and of institutions endeavoring to apply transparency and meritocracy as their operating principles has resulted in a situation in which Central Asian states have not succeeded in questioning the institutionalized ascription of a variety of social markers, such as racialized ethnic belonging. The most popular forms of combatting racism are the creation of ethnocultural societies for minorities and the setting up of informal quotas for representative of minorities in organs of power (Abashin 2012, p. 165). Western modernity remains both the source of discourse and the frame of reference for many societies, including Central Asian. An analysis of these societies experience spurs further development of Goldberg's (1993, p. 45) thesis that "'racialized discourse accordingly emerged only with the displacement of the premodern discursive order and the accompanying epistemic transformations". The recognition of racism as a social problem presupposes that societies who espouse it in fact value equality, although they might use racism to justify any existing inequalities. That was not the case during the Soviet era of socialist modernization of Central Asia. It is still not the case in these authoritarian states now. That is why these regimes constantly declare themselves immune to racism and stated that problem resided elsewhere, which rendered impossible any large-scale reflexivity concerning the discourse informed by the idea of race.

6

Post-Soviet Trajectories of Race and Racism, an Endnote

Nikolay Zakharov and Ian Law

Healing broken national histories, healing the fragmentation of empire, strengthening social solidarities in threatening times, new racial discourses provide both the comforting arms and the strait-jacket for post-Soviet states. Opening new paths to national visions, providing certainty, providing surety, providing a blow-hole for the whale/wail of national rage and hate, newly forged racisms will define the twenty-first century. New walls, new surveillance, new exclusive nations are the stuff of contemporary governance. Gone are the inclusive visions of utopia, gone are the wonders of transversal multiculturalisms and the joys of human freedoms. Closing the gates, closing the paths to social and economic mobility, slamming the door on many voices and many human stories is what it is to be alive today in the post-Soviet world and elsewhere. The sad immiseration of the indebted many, the playful riches of the few are the patterns of inequality stratified by the racialized marking out of many groups of ordinary people. New languages of racial ordering and new modes of racialized governmentalities have been identified across these highly varied post-Soviet republics. Hierarchies of state regulation, hierarchies of violence and hierarchies of core preserved, protected majorities and persecuted minorities structure everyday life from Latvia to Tajikistan.

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0_6

The logic of racialization demands both internal and external 'others', which leads to contradictions within the available intellectual programs of racialization under the conditions of striving to legitimize inequality. Racisms in contemporary post-Soviet states should be understood as a component of the new nationhood projects—a component that is self-contradictory in its two functions of responding to the traumatic challenges of the former metropoles and of naturalizing social differences at home. Post-Soviet societies have not succeeded in overcoming the institutionalized ascription of a variety of social markers, one of which is race. Thus, racialization in post-Soviet states operates in a peculiar fashion. On the one hand, it serves in molding the new nations and is the constitutive process of modernity. On the other hand, racialization processes maintain the idea of exceptionality, that is, they became firmly established during many decades of communist power, that the socialist nations are nations created as part of an 'alternative modernity'.

The assertion of racial privilege can nuance the post-colonial gaze insofar as post-socialist elites seek to elaborate an 'authentic' strategy to challenge Russo-Soviet domination and colonialism. This does not constitute simply an inversion of the symbolical instruments of domination. It is instead an attempt to reconstruct their nations as a 'true' civilizational center. Since the search for an 'authentic voice' within the framework of the dominant discourses is problematic, the language of race may be represented in this context as the language of the nation that will liberate the genuine spirit of the West from the allegedly degenerate state into which it has fallen. The strategies described above aim at the transformation of the Western system of knowledge in the post-socialist space, and they imitate, to differing degrees, the master discourses of the 'colonizer'. This nevertheless leads to a creative, interactive processing of the original discourse that activates the strategies of racialization. In this context, self-racialization, or attaining whiteness, can be understood as an attempt to rediscover the authenticity that has been lost—or stolen by communists. Insofar as racial classification contributes to the codification of difference, the adoption of Western theories and practices of racialization constitutes an attempt on the part of citizens of these states to transcend the trap of the East/West dichotomy. By inscribing 'modern' or 'civilized' racialization into already available discourses of difference that include the idea

of race, intellectuals have sought to elaborate new logics of identification that will facilitate social cohesion under very specific premises that relate to the position of respective countries in the world and to power relations at home. The new identifications being created are to serve and reflect their place among the 'civilized' nations and ensure the dominance of the 'titular' nation at home. 'Non-titular' minorities have utilized the idea of race in the search for roots, to justify their right to the area they populate, to emphasize the 'genetic' character of cultural traditions, to legitimize their ethnic identity, and to safeguard and reproduce their ethnic community.

The self-contradiction within colonialism—to civilize its others while also securing their otherness—has been transformed within the communist experience into an internal civilizing mission intended to secure the privileged otherness on the global stage. The repercussions of this program continue to provide national specificity to the engagement with the concept of race and racism in post-socialist societies. Investing in 'whiteness' after the Berlin Wall-era has represented a Western, modernist approach for guaranteeing that post-Soviet states will find their own proper place in the dominant discourses of the developed and civilized First World.

This book provides a set of case studies drawing on a wide range of new evidence and a new theoretical framework which inserts the post-Soviet experience into our global understanding of racialization. This changes the way in which we understand how racism operates in the world today, Western racisms did not simply diffuse across the world. Polyracism with its multiple makings, fusions and patterns is what we observe here. Racism in the contemporary world, sharply resurgent, is being inscribed through the operation of state power across the post-Soviet republics now. This sharpens the focus on gaps in contemporary racism theory. In assuming that racism is solely a part of the West's histories and horizons Soviet and post-Soviet polities have largely been ignored. Given the evidence presented here, such a partial narrative can no longer stand. This book therefore presents a critical account which contributes to a major reshaping of contemporary theory and the theoretical project of building a systematic global account of racism.

References

Abashin, Sergey. 2011. Natsii i postkolonializm v Tsentral'noy Azii dvadtsat' let spustya: pereosmyslivaya kategorii analiza/praktiki. *Ab Imperio* 3: 193–210.

Abashin, Sergei. 2012. Nation-construction in post-Soviet Cental Asia. In *Soviet and post-Soviet identities*, ed. M. Bassin and C. Kelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Abashin, Sergey, and Ivan Savin. 2012. Osh, 2010: konfliktuyushchaya etnichnost. In *Etnichnost' i religiya v sovremennykh konfliktakh*, ed. V. Tishkov and V. Shnirelman. Moscow: Nauka.

Abdushelishvili, Malkhaz. 1968. Anthropology of the ancient and modern populations of the Caucasus. In *Contributions to the physical anthropology of Central Asia and the Caucasus*. Cambridge: Russian Translation Series, Mass: The Peabody Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology, Harvard University.

Abdushelishvili, Malkhaz. 1979. Central problems in ethnic anthropology in Southwest Asia in the light of the latest research. In *Physiological and morphological adaptation and evolution*, ed. William Stini. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.

Adams, Laura. 2010. *The spectacular state: Culture and national identity in Uzbekistan*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Agayez, Rasim. 2012. *Turkey-Armenia protocols have caused split in Armenia. 12 October*. http://www.today.az/view.php?id=56460.

Akayev, Askar. 2002. *Pamyatnoe desyatiletie: trudnaya doroga k demokratii*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya.

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0

Akbarzadeh, Shahram. 1996. Why did nationalism fail in Tajikistan? *Europe-Asia Studies* 7: 1105–1128.

Akbarzadeh, Shahram. 1999. National identity and political legitimacy in Turkmenistan. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 27(2): 271–290.

Al'perovich, Vera. 2014. Ideologicheskie batalii russkikh natsionalistov na ukrainskikh frontakh. In *Rossiya- ne Ukraina: sovremennye akcenty natsionalizma*, ed. A. Verhovskiy, 292–305. Moscow: Tsentr "Sova".

Alampiev, Oleg. 2013. Integratsiya immigrantov iz islamskikh stran v belorusskoe obshchestvo. *Sotsiologiya* 2: 132–141.

Aleksandrov, Mikhail. 2013. Russkie v Uzbekistane: khuzhe nekuda [Online, 1 April 2013]. Available at http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2013/04/01/1112454.html. Accessed 9 Aug 2015.

Alekseev, Valeriy. 1971. Predki Tyurkskikh narodov'. *Nauka I zhizn* 5: 33–37.

Alekseeva, T.I., and V.D. Dyachenko. 2000. Antropologicheskiy oblik. In *Ukraintsy*, ed. N.S. Polishchuk and A.P. Ponomarev, 55–62. Moscow: Nauka.

Alimova, Dilorom, Zoya Arifkhanova, and Adkham Ashirov. 2006. Eshche raz o problemakh etnologii v Uzbekistane'. *Etnograficheskoye obozreniye* 3: 107–126.

Annus, Epp. 2011. The problem of Soviet colonialism. *Journal of Baltic Studies* 43(1): 21–45.

Anthias, Floya, Nira Yuval-Davis, and Harriet Cain. 1992. *Racialized boundaries: Race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle*. London: Routledge.

Anti-Defamation League. 2014. *Global 100*. http://global100.adl.org/about.

Arifkhanova, Zoya. 2011a. Etnicheskiy sostav naseleniya. In *Uzbeki*, ed. Zoya Arifkhanova, Sergey Abashin, and Dilorom Alimova, 50–53. Moscow: Nauka.

Arifkhanova, Zoya. 2011b. Vvedeniye. In *Uzbeki*, ed. Zoya Arifkhanova, Sergey Abashin, and Dilorom Alimova, 7–13. Moscow: Nauka.

Arifkhanova, Zoya, and Ravshan Nazarov. 2011. Etnodemograficheskaya situatsiya na rubezhe XX i XXI vekov. In *Uzbeki*, ed. Zoya Arifkhanova, Sergey Abashin, and Dilorom Alimova, 64–78. Moscow: Nauka.

Askarov, Shukur. 2004. Amir Temur and Philippe Brunelleschi. [Online, 1 July 2004]. Available at http://sanat.orexca.com/2004/2004-3/history_art5/. Accessed 3 Sept 2015.

Astler, P. 2015. Jews in the Baltics fear the creep of anti-semitism. Fox News. March 12. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/03/12/jews-in-baltics-fear-creep-anti-semitism/

Astourian, Stephan H. 1999. Modern Turkish identity and the Armenian genocide, from prejudice to racist nationalism. In *Remembrance and denial, the*

case of the Armenian genocide, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Aydıngün, Aysegül. 2013. The ethnification and nationalisation of religion in the post-Soviet Georgian nation-state building process: A source of discrimination and minority rights violations? *International Journal of Human Rights* 17(7–8): 810–828.

Bakalian, Anny P. 1994. *Armenian-Americans: From being to feeling Armenian*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Bakhturina, Aleksandra. 2004. *Okrainy Rossiyskoy imperii: Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i politika v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny (1914–1917)*. Moscow: ROSSPEN.

Balkelis, Tomas. 2009. *The making of modern Lithuania*. London: Routledge.

Baum, Bruce. 2006. *The rise and fall of the caucasian race: A political history of racial identity*. New York: New York University Press.

Bayramov, Oleg. 2009. O natsionalizme i ksenofobii v Uzbekistane: Pyatiminutki nenavisti stali "desyatiminutkami. [Online, 28 January 2009]. Available at http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6041. Accessed 7 Aug 2015.

Beissinger, Mark. 1995. The persisting ambiguity of empire. *Post Soviet Affairs* 11(2): 149–184.

Bekia, Chedia. 2011. *Georgian nationalism today, facing the challenges of a new millennium*. Sweden: CA and CC Press.

Belova, Olga. 2005. *Etnokul'turnye stereotipy v slavyanskoy narodnoy traditsii*. Moscow: Indrik.

Belvpo. 2013. Narodu Kyrgyzstana grozit epoha natsionalizma. [Online, 14 October 2013]. Available at http://www.belvpo.com/ru/30663.html. Accessed 24 Aug 2015.

Bemporad, Elissa. 2013. *Becoming Soviet jews. The Bolshevik experiment in Minsk*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.

Berdykulov, Azizzhon. 2015. Ethnic minorities' political mobilization: Cases of Uzbeks and Pamiris from the Tajik Ciil War to the 2012/2014 Khorog events. *Policy Brief No.24. OSCE Academy.*

Beresnevičiūtė, Vida. 2010. Rhetoric of violence against voiceless minorities: Analysis of press reports on the Roma in Lithuania. *Ethnicity Studies*, Vilnius: Institute of Ethnic Studies.

Beresnevičiūtė, Vida, and Monica Frėjutė-Rakauskienė. 2006. Ethnic topics and intolerance in Lithuanian media: Analysis of daily newspaper. *Ethnicity Studies* 1: 19–44.

Bespamyatnykh, Nikolay, et al. 2014. *Politika upravleniya etnokulturnym raznoobraziem v Belarusi, Moldove i Ukraine: mezhdu sovetskim nalsediem i evropeyskimi standartami*. EGU: Vilnius.

Binus, Joshua. 2005. *Tatus O. Cartozian with his daughters*. Oregon: Oregon Historical Society. http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/historical_records/dspDocument.cfm?doc_ID=c5f74925-d75d-54f1-e441ea279f7a9402.

Bitadze, Liana. 2015. Istoriko-antropologicheskie svedeniya. In *Gruziny*, ed. L. Beriashvili, L. Melikashvili, and L. Solov'eva. Moscow: Nauka.

Blakkisrud, Helge, and Shahnoza Nozimova. 2010. History writing and nation building in post-independence Tajikistan. *Nationalities Papers* 38(2): 173–189.

Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich. 1795. *On the natural variety of mankind*. English translation by Thomas Bendyshe. 1865, *The anthropological treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach*. London: Longman.

Bobokhonov, Rakhimbek. 2011. Grazhdanskaya voina v Tadzhikistane (1992–1997 gody). Prichiny, posledstviya i uroki. *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'* 4: 74–83.

Bogolov, Petr. 2012. 'Tamerlan vmesto Lenina' [Online, 20 January 2012]. Available at http://strana.lenta.ru/uzbekistan/timur.htm. Accessed 30 Sept 2015.

Bogolov, Petr. 1993. 'Istinnye ariytsy' [Online, 1993]. Available at http://strana.lenta.ru/tajikistan/samanid.htm. Accessed 25 Sept 2015.

Bohn, Tomas. 2008. *Minsk – Musterstadt des Sozialismus. Stadtplanung und Urbanisierung in der Sowjetunion nach 1945*. Köln: Böhlau Verlag.

Bonnett, Alastair. 2002. Communists like us: Ethnicised modernity and the 'idea of the West'. *Ethnicities* 2(4): 435–467.

Borisov, N.A. 2013. Proektirovanie natsionalnykh ideologiy i problemy stabilnosti politicheskykh rezhimov (sluchay Uzbekistana i Kyrgyzstana). *Politika i Obshchestvo* 4: 418–427.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2009. Ethnicity, race and nationalism. *Annual Review of Sociology* 35: 21–44.

Brubaker, Roger. 2011. Nationalizing states revisited: Projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34(11): 1785–1814.

Brzozovska, Anna. 2004. Discourses of empowerment: Understanding Belarus' international orientation. In *Contemporary change in Belarus,* ed. Egle Rindzeviciute, 73–108. Huddinge: Södertörns högskola.

Buniatyan, Gayanne. 2006. *How does Armenia educate its public administrators in ethnic diversity?* Yerevan: Yerevan State University, Armenia, Working Paper.

Bykov, Aleksandr. 2000. O rusofobii v postsovetskom prostranstve. *Sotsio logicheskiye issledovaniya* 4: 128–130.

Chedia, Beka. 2014. *Georgian nationalism today, facing the challenges of the new millennium*. Stockholm: CA&CC Press.

Chernyavskaya, Yuliya. 2010. *Belorusy. Ot "tuteyshykh" k natsii*. Minsk: FUAinform.

Chkhartishvili, Mariam, and Ivane Javakhishvili. 2013. Georgian nationalism and the idea of the Georgian nation. *Codrul Cosminulu* XIX(2): 189–206.

Chokobaeva, Aminat. 2015. Born for misery and woe: national memory and the 1916 great revolt in Kyrgyzstan. In *Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia*, ed. Mariya Omelicheva, 37–53. London: Routledge.

Clement, Victoria. 2014. Articulating national identity in Turkmenistan: Inventing tradition through myth, cult and language. *Nations and Nationalism* 20: 546–562.

Crowe, David M. 2007. *A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dabija, N. 1996. Rusoaicele. *Literatura si arta*. 24 octombrie.

Dabija, N. 1997. Moldovencele. *Literatura si arta*. 28 August.

Dan, Mark. 2004. 'Sionistskiy zagovor po-kirgizski' [Online, March 2004]. Available at http://www.jewukr.org/observer/eo2003/page_show_ru.php?id=538. Accessed 21 Sept 2015.

Darieva, Tsypylma. 2011. Rethinking homecoming: Diasporic cosmopolitanism in post-Soviet Armenia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34(3): 490–508.

Dave, Bhavna. 2007. *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, language and power*. London: Routledge.

Dean, Martin. 1999. *Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of local police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Degtiar, Mikhail. 2001. The Jews of Uzbekistan—The end of the epoch. Available at http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2001/journal_eng/cac-04/22.degen.shtml. Accessed 25 Aug 2015.

Delfi. 2015a. Mõttekoht EKREle? Euroopa Sallimatusevastane Komisjon Soovitab Eestil Ära Lappida Seaduseauk, Mis Lubab Riigil Rassismiedendajaid Rahastada. [Online]. Delfi.ee 16 October 2015. Available from: http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/euroopa-noukogu-raport-pani-ritta-sallimatud-eesti-poliitikud-ligi-helme-lukas-vooglaid-ja-nool?id=72716187.

Delfi. 2015b. Eesti Pagulasorganisatsioonid Pöördusid Rahastamisküsimustes Peaministri Poole. [Online]. Delfi.ee 2 June 2015. Available from: http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/eesti-pagulasorganisatsioonid-poordusid-rahastamiskusimuses-peaministri-poole?id=71612805.

Demidov, Sergey. 2002. *Postsovetskiy Turkmenistan*. Moscow: Natalis.

Denison, Michael. 2009. The art of the impossible: Political symbolism, and the creation of national identity and collective memory in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. *Europe-Asia Studies* 61(7): 1167–1187.

Derkachova, Olga. 2015. 'Lish ne kazhit, shco ya rasistka …' [Online 3 August, 2015]. Available at http://styknews.info/blog/olga-derkachova/2015/08/03/lysh-ne-kazhit-shcho-ia-rasystka.

Dobbins, Michael, and Mariam Parsadanishvili. 2013. Statehood religion and strategic Europeanization in the Southern Caucasus. *Euxeinos, Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region* 9: 3–4.

Dovnar-Zapolskiy, Mitrofan. 1909. Belorusy. Etnograficheskiy ocherk. In *Issledovaniya i stat'i,* ed. M. Dovnar-Zapolskiy, 257–316. Kiev.

Dovnar-Zapolskiy, Mitrofan. 2011. *Istoriya Belorusii*. Minsk: Belarus.

Dubnov, Arkadiy. 2013. Chego stoit zastupnichestvo Kremlya v Turkmenii? [Online, 4 April, 2013]. Available at http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2013/04/130404_russia_turkmenistan_compatriots.

Dumitru, Diana. 2008. The use and abuse of the Holocaust: Historiography and politics in Moldova. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22(1): 49–73.

Dumitru, D. 2016. *The state, antisemitism, and collaboration in the Holocaust: The borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Durdyyev, Marat. 1991. *Turkmeny (Poiski predkov turkmenskogo naroda i ego istoricheskoy prarodiny)*. Ashkhabad: Kharp.

Dyachenko, Vasiliy. 1952. *Antropologicheskoye issledovanie gagauzov Moldavskoy SSR*, vol. 15. KSIE.

Dzenovska, Dace. 2010. Public reason and the limits of liberal anti-racism in Latvia. *Ethnos* 75(4): 496–525.

Dzenovska, Dace. 2013. Historical agency and the coloniality of power in post-socialist Europe. *Anthropological Theory* 13(4): 394–416.

Dzermant, Alyaksey, and Syargey San'ko. 2005. Etnagenez belarusau: navuka I idealogiya. *ARCHE* 5: 233–253.

ECMI (European Centre for Minority Issues). 2011. *Minority issues mainstreaming in the Southern Caucasus*. Tbilisi: ECMI.

ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). 2009. "Here to stay?" Refugee Voices in Belarus, Moldova, The Russian Federation and Ukraine [Online]. Available at http://unhcr.org.ua/img/uploads/docs/ECRE%20Ref%20voices.pdf.

ECRI (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance). 2008. *Third report on Ukraine*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

ECRI (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance). 2013. ECRI report on the republic of Moldova (fourth monitoring cycle). [Online, 15 October 2013]. Available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Moldova/MDA-CbC-IV-2013-038-ENG.pdf.

ECRI (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance). 2015. *Report on Estonia (Fifth Monitoring Cycle).* [Online]. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/ecri-report-on-estonia-fifth-monitoring-cycle. Accessed 23 Sept 2015.

ECRI (European Commission on Racism and Intolerance). 2010a. *Report on Georgia*. Brussels: ECRI.

ECRI (European Commission on Racism and Intolerance). 2010b. *Report on Estonia*. Brussels: ECRI.

ECRI (European Commission on Racism and Intolerance). 2011a. *Report on Armenia*. Brussels: ECRI.

ECRI (European Commission on Racism and Intolerance). 2011b. *Report on Lithuania*. Brussels: ECRI.

ECRI (European Commission on Racism and Intolerance). 2011c. *Report on Azerbaijan*. Brussels: ECRI.

ECRI (European Commission on Racism and Intolerance). 2012. *Report on Latvia*. Brussels: ECRI.

Edgar, Adrienne Lynn. 2006. *Tribal nation: The making of Soviet Turkmenistan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond. 2015. *Petitsioon* [Online]. Available from: http://www.ekre.ee/petitsioon/.

ENAR (European Network Against Racism). 2006. *Responding to racism in Lithuania*. Brussels: ENAR.

ENAR (European Network Against Racism). 2013. *Racism and related discriminatory practices in employment in Lithuania*. Brussels: ENAR.

ERR. 2013a. *Conservative politician:If you are black go back*. 29 May. http://news.err.ee/v/politics/33f684b9-fbf6-4286-a841-710184f79940.

ERR. 2013b. *Estonia's non-existent colour barrier*. 16 August. http://news.err.ee/v/opinion/2b7ff0df-0319-4db4-904f-602ba93e2337.

Esenbaev, Azis. 2015. Osobennosti rodoplemennykh otnosheniy v Kyrgyzstane I ikh vliyaniye na razvitiye instituta vyborov: popytka osmysleniya. *Vestnik KRSU* 2(15): 81–85.

Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. *Eesti Suursaadik ÜROs Kutsus Liikmesriike Ühiselt Seisma Antisemitismi, Rassismi, Ksenofoobia ja Usulise Sallimatuse Vastu*. [Online]. Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 25 January 2015. Available from http://valisministeerium.ee/et/uudised/eesti-suursaadik-uros-kutsus-liikmesriike-uhiselt-seisma-antisemitismi-rassismi-ksenofoobia.

EUMC (European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia). 2006. *Aastaaruanne Rassismi ja Ksenofoobia Kohta Euroopa Liidu Liikmesriikides.* [Online]. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Available from: http://bookshop.europa.eu/et/aastaaruanne-rassismi-ja-ksenofoobia-olukorra-kohta-euroopa-liidu-liikmesriikides-pbTKAD07001/. Accessed 19 Sept 2015.

EurasiaNet. 2011a. Tajikistan's ethnic Uzbeks: Poor like everyone, but sidelined more. [Online, 24 February, 2011]. Available at www.eurasianet.org/node/62952. Accessed 29 Sept 2015.

EurasiaNet. 2011b. Kyrgyzstan: Rising nationalism risks renewed violence – Report [Online, 10 March 2011]. Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63046. Accessed 3 Sept 2015.

Farooq, Umar. 2015. Grief not justice for Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. [Online, 26 May 2015]. Available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/101541/grief-not-justice-for-uzbeks-in-kyrgyzstan. Accessed 1 Sept 2015.

Felder, Björn M. 2009. Eugenics and racial identity in Latvia: Scientific transfer and European Zeitgeist. Paper presented at the conference on *Eugenics, race and psychiatry in the Baltic states: A trans-national perspective 1900–1945*, Goethe Institute Riga, Latvia. http://www.pulse-project.org/node/169.

Felder, Björn M. 2013a. In pursuit of biological purity: Eugenics and racial paradigms in Nazi-Occupied Latvia, 1941–1945. In *Racial science in Hitler's new Europe*, ed. R. Yeomans and A. Weiss-Wendt, 1938–1945. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Felder, Björn M. 2013b. Introduction, eugenics, sterilisation and the racial state: The Naltic States and Russia and the global eugenics movement. In *Baltic eugenics: Bio-politics, race and nation in Interwar Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1918–1940*, ed. M.F. Björn and P.J. Weindling. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Felder, Björn M., and Paul J. Weindling (eds.). 2013. *Baltic eugenics: Bio-politics, race and nation in Interwar Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1918–1940*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Fergana. 2009. Human Rights Watch: Prava cheloveka narushayutsya vo vsekh stranakh Tsentral'noy Azii. [Online, 16 January 2009]. Available at http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6022. Accessed 30 Sept 2015.

Fergana. 2015. Konflikt na granitse Kyrgyzstana I Tadzhikistana: Zhiteli dvuh stran metali kamni drug v druga. [Online, 3 August 2015]. Available at http://www.fergananews.com/news/23716. Accessed 4 Aug 2015.

FIDH (The International Federation for Human Rights). 2004. *The Roma of Russia: The subject of multiple forms of discrimination*. Paris: FIDH/Northwest Centre for the Legal and Social Protection of Roma, St Petersburg Memorial. http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Romrussie407eng.pdf.

Fin'ko, A. 2013. Multikulturalizm I ego opponenty: pravye sily v politicheskoy sisteme Ukrainy. In *Krizis multikulturalizma I problemy natsionalnoy politiki*, ed. M.B. Pogrebinskiy and A.K. Tolpygo, 282–381. Ves' mir: Moscow.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. 1999. *Everyday stalinism: Ordinary life in extraordinary times*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Flitner, Michael. 2003. Genetic geographies, a historical comparison of agrarian modernisation and eugenic thought Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States. *Geoforum* 34(2): 175–185.

Florin, Morits. 2011. Elity, russkiy yazyk i sovetskaya identichnost' v postsovetskoy Kirgizii. *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 80(4): 225–233.

Foltz, Richard. 1996. The Tajiks of Uzbekistan. *Central Asian Survey* 15(2): 213–216.

Foroughi, Payam. 2002. Tajikistan: Nationalism, ethnicity, conflict, and socio-economic disparities: Sources and solutions. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 22(1): 39–61.

Foster, Doug. 2015. Cleansing violence in the Tajik Civil War: Framing from the dark side of democracy. *National Identities* 4(17): 353–370.

FRA (Fundamental Rights Agency). 2014. *Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU member states, experiences and perceptions of anti-semitism*. Vienna: FRA.

Frėjutė-Rakauskienė, Monika. 2009. Ethnic intolerance in the Lithuanian press. *Ethnicity Studies* 1: 139–156.

Gazeta.ru. 2015. *V Belorussii ne opasayutsya eksporta neonetsistskoy ideologii iz Ukrainy [Online, 21 June 2015]*. Available at https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2015/06/21/n_7307193.shtml.

Geddie, John. 1885. *The Russian empire, its rise and progress*. Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons.

Gelzis, Gederts. 2015. *Migrant protests in Latvia*. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-latvia-idUSKCN0Q920I20150804.

Goble, Paul. (2013). 'Window on Eurasia: Ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan under pressure to leave' [Online, 3 April, 2013]. Available at http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.ru/2013/04/window-on-eurasia-ethnic-russians-in.html. Accessed 20 Aug 2015.

Goldberg, David. 1993. *Racist culture: Philosophy and the politics of meaning*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Goldenberg, Susan. 1994. *Pride of small nations, the Caucasus and post-Soviet disorder*. London: Zed.

Goldenberg, David. 2003. *The curse of ham: Race and slavery in early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goldberg, D.T. 2009. *The threat of race, reflections on racial neoliberalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gorak, Slavomir. 2009. V poiskhah istorii Tadzhikistana: o chem tadjikskie istoriki sporyat s uzbekskimi?. *Neprikosnovennyi zapas*, 4(66).

Guboglo, M. 2010. Yazykovaya zhizn' Moldovan v postsovetskii period'. In *Moldovane*, ed. M. Guboglo and V. Dergachev, 95–106. Moscow: Nauka.

Guboglo, M., and V. Dergachev (eds.). 2010. *Moldovane*. Moscow: Nauka.

Gurcov, Nichita. 2012. 'A racist Moldova?' [Online, 21 February 2012]. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2012/02/a-racist-moldova/.

Haji-Petros, Vahan H. 2001. *Defeating genocide: Analysis of ethnic conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh and Kosovo*. http://www.cilicia.com/DGindex.htm.

Hallik, K. 2011. Russkie v Estonii. In *Russkie: etnosotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, ed. Aratyunyan Yurii, 99–119. Moscow: Nauka.

Hanks, Reuel. 2014. Identity theft? In *Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, dynamics, and directions*, ed. Mariya Omelicheva, 111–127. London: Lexington Books.

Hartley, Charles, G. Bike Yazicioğlu, and Adam T. Smith (eds.). 2012. *The archaeology of power and politics in Eurasia, regimes and revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Helbig, Adriana. 2014. *Hip hop Ukraine: Music, race, and African migration*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Helbling, Marc (ed.). 2012. *Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and explaining individual attitudes*. London: Routledge.

Helemäe, Jelena. 2013. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie transfornatsii v Estonii. In *Etnicheskaya Politika v Stranah Baltii,* eds. Vadim Poleshchuk and Valery Stepanov, 219–235. Moscow: Nauka.

Hirsch, Francine. 2002. Race without the practice of racial politics. *Slavic Review* 61(1): 30–43.

Hirsch, Francine. 2005. *Empire of nations, ethnographic knowledge and the making of the Soviet Union*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hitler, Adolf. 2007. *Mein Kampf.* Mumbai: Jaico Publishing (2007 edition).

Horák, Slavomír, and Jan Šír. 2009. *Dismantling totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under Berdimuhamedow*. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Hovannisian, Richard G. 1999. Introduction: The Armenian genocide. In *Remembrance and denial, the case of the Armenian genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Hroch, Miroslav. 1985. *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: A comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Human Rights Watch. 2005. 'Uzbekistan: Journalist assaulted after reporting on Massacre' [Online, 10 November 2005]. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/10/uzbekistan-journalist-assaulted-after-reporting-massacre. Accessed 29 Sept 2015.

Human Rights Watch. 2006. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan must protect Uzbek refugees. [Online, 16 July 2006]. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/07/16/eu-kazakhstan-kyrgyzstan-must-protect-uzbek-refugees. Accessed 14 Sept 2015.

Human Rights Watch. 2012. Central Asia: Overview of key human rights concerns and recommendations. [Online, 15 November 2012]. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/15/central-asia-overview-key-human-rights-concerns-and-recommendations. Accessed 30 Sept 2015.

Ilkhamov, Alisher, ed. 2002. *Etnicheskiy atlas Uzbekistana*. Uzbekistan: Institut "Otkrytoye Obshchestvo".

International Crisis Group. 2012. Kyrgyzstan: Widening ethnic divisions in the South – International crisis group *Asia Report N°222* [Online, 29 March 2012]. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/222-kyrgyzstan-widening-ethnic-divisions-in-the-south.aspx. Accessed 2 Sept 2015.

Ioffe, Grigory. 2014. *Reassessing Lukashenka: Belarus in cultural and geopolitical context.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Iskandaryan, Alexander. 2011. The South Caucasus: Becoming a region or trying to be one. In *Identities, ideologies and institutions, a decade of insight into the Caucasus*, ed. A. Iskandaryan. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute.

Ivanov, Georgiy. 2009. Negostepriimnyy Uzbekistan. [Online, 15 October 2009]. Available at http://beta-press.ru/article/12. Accessed 16 Sept 2015.

Janiashvili, George, Nino Gvedashvili, David Chikashua, and Irma Mamasakhlisi. 2003. *People without rights, Roma rights in Georgia*. Tbilisi: HRIDC.

Jones, Stephen, and Robert Parsons. 1996. Georgia and the Georgians. In *The nationalities question in the post-Soviet states*, ed. Graham Smith. London: Longman.

Kaiser, Hilmar. 1998. *Imperialism, racism and development theories, the construction of a dominant paradigm on Ottoman Armenians*. Ann Arbour: Gomidas Institute.

Kaiser, Hilmar. 1999. The Baghdad railway and the Armenian genocide, 1915–1916. In *Remembrance and denial, the case of the Armenian genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Kąkolewski, Igor. 2012. The commonwealth of many nations, religions and cultures. In *Under a common sky. The commonwealth of many nations, religions and cultures*, ed. I. Kąkolewski et al. Warsaw: Muzeum Historii Polski.

Kalishevsky, Mikhail. 2010. Ot ploshchadi Lenina k ploshchadi Shakhidon: k 20-letiyu fevral'skoy tragedii v Dushanbe. [Online, 15 February, 2010]. Available at http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6470. Accessed 25 Sept 2015.

Kalishevsky, Mikhail. 2013. Ot "ariyskogo pervorodstva" k "spravedlivomu shakhu" [Online, 2 December, 2013]. Available at http://www.fergananews.com/articles/7965. Accessed 25 Sept 2015.

Kallas, K., and K. Kaldur. 2011. *Eestis Rahvusvahelise kaitse saanud isikute hetkeolukord ning integreeritus Eesti Ühiskonda: Uuringuraport*. [Online]. Tartu: Institute of Baltic Studies. Available from: http://www.ibs.ee/et/publikatsioonid/item/106-rahvusvahelise-kaitse-saanud-isikute-integreeritus. Accessed 23 Sept 2015.

Kallas, K., K. Kaldur, M. Raudsepp, K. Aavik, and T. Roosalu. 2013a. *Equal treatment in Estonia: Awareness and promotion: Research report*. [Online]. Tartu: Institute of Baltic Studies/TLÜ RASI. Available from: http://www.ibs.ee/et/publikatsioonid/item/121-v%C3%B5rdse-kohtlemise-edendamine. Accessed 3 Oct 2015.

Kallas, K., I. Mihkelsoo, and K. Plaan. 2013b. *Integrating Estonia 2000–2011 an analysis of integration monitoring surveys*. [Online]. Tartu: Institute of Baltic Studie. Available from: http://www.ibs.ee/en/publications/item/124-integratsiooni-monitooringute-analuus. Accessed 24 Sept 2015.

Kallas, K., R. Vetik, J. Kruusväli, E. Saar, J. Helemäe, L. Kirss, C. Leppik, K. Seppel, K. Kivistik, and P. Ubakivi-Hadachi. 2015. *Eesti Ühiskonna Integratsiooni Monitooring, 2015*. [Online]. Tartu: Institute of Baltic Studies/University of Tartu/SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis. Available from: http://www.ibs.ee/en/publications/item/124-integratsiooni-monitooringute-analuus. Accessed 3 Oct 2015.

Kalling, Ken, and Leiu Heapost. 2013. Racial identity and physical anthropology in Estonia, 1800–1945. In *Baltic eugenics: Bio-politics, race and nation in Interwar Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1918–1940*, ed. M.F. Björn and P.J. Weindling. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Kara-Murza, Vladimir. 2016. Nasledstvennyye "demokratii". Tadzhikistan poluchayet pozhiznennoye prezidentstvo. Kto sleduyushchiy? [Hereditary "democracy." Tajikistan gets a lifetime presidency. Who's next?]. RFE/RL [Online 23 May, 2016]. Available at http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/27752812.html. Accessed 23 May 2016.

Karapkulov, A., ed. 1984–1990. *Istoriya Kirgizskoy SSSR v pyati tomah*. Frunze: Kyrgyzstan.

Karutz, Richard. 1911. *Sredi kirgizov i turkmenov na Mangyshlake*. St.Petersburg: Izdaniye A.F. Devriyena.

Kasekamp, Andres. 2003. Extreme-right parties in contemporary Estonia. *Patterns of Prejudice* 37(4): 401–414.

Kavolis, Tadas. 2009. Lithunanian nationalist skinhead subculture, the features of an identity. In *Subcultures and new religious movements in Russia and East-Central Europe*, ed. George Mckay, Christopher Williams, Michael Goddard, Neil Foxlee, and Egidija Ramanauskaite. Oxford: Peter Lang.

———. 2014. Peculiarities of the formation of groups with nationalist worldviews in Lithunaia, the case of skinheads. *ELABA*. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2014~D_20140902_085835-6098.

Kazakevich, A. 2010. Kantseptsyi (idei) belaruskay natsyi u peryyad nezalezhnastsi 1990–2009. *Palitychnaya sfera* 14: 1–20.

Khaindrava, Ivlian. 2001. Moving in several directions at once: Religion in Georgia in the 21st century. In *Identities, ideologies and institutions, a decade of insight into the Caucasus*, ed. A. Iskandaryan. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute.

Khalid, Adib. 2006. *Islam after communism: Religion and politics in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Khalid, Adeeb 2007. *Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Khalid, Adib. 2011. Uzbekistan: rozhdeniye natsii. *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 4(78): 34–46.

Khodzhayov, Tal'man, and Gal'shira Khodzhayova. 2011. Istoricheskaya antropologiya. In *Uzbeki*, ed. Zoya Arifkhanova, Sergey Abashin, and Dilorom Alimova, 14–24. Moscow: Nauka.

Khoperskaya, Larisa. 2013. *Netitul'naya sud'ba: Rossiyskie sootechestvenniki v Tsentral'noy Azii*. Moscow: Academia.

Khudaverdyan, Anahit Yu. 2012. Armenia in the Eurasian ethnic context of late classical antiquity: Craniometric evidence. *Archaeology, Ethnology and Anthropology of Eurasia* 40(3): 138–148.

Khutsishvili, Taka and Ana Sheshaberidze. 2010. "I Am Afraid of Chinese People!" "Negros Have Attacked Us?!" – Racism problem in Georgia http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=8139&lang=eng. 19 March.

Kiepenheuer-Drechsler, Barbara. 2006. Trapped in permanent neutrality: Looking behind the symbolic production of the Turkmen nation. *Central Asian Survey* 25(1–2): 129–141.

Kim, Victor. 2008. O rasovoy, i ne tol'ko, diskriminatsii v Tadzhikistane. [Online, 28 November 2008]. Available at http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1227940020. Accessed 27 Sept 2015.

Kimmage, Daniel. 2004. Analysis: Kazakh breakthrough on Uzbek terror case. [Online, 15 November, 2004]. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055882.html. Accessed 30 Sept 2015.

Kirchanov, Maxim. 2010. Turkmen nationalism today: Political and intellectual mythologemes. *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 11(1): 52–63.

Kirkilas, Gediminas. 2015. *Lithuania's approach to refugees: History, compassion andsolidarity*.http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/lithuanias-approach-refugees-history-compassion-and-solidarity-317971.

Kiryukhin, D. 2013. Multikulturalizm, natsionalizm i identichnost': ukrainskiy kontekst'. In *Krizis multikulturalizma I problemy natsionalnoy politiki*, ed. M.B. Pogrebinskiy and A.K. Tolpygo, 195–218. Moscow: Ves' mir.

Kivine, M. 1999. Eesti ja Ksenofoobia. *Eesti Päevaleht 21stJanuary.* Available from: http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/eesti-ja-ksenofoobia?id=50767450. 21 Jan 1999.

Kizima, Sergey, ed. 2012. *Belorusskaya model' razvitiya v kontekste globalizatsii: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov*. Minsk: Pravo i ekonomika.

Kokaisl', Petr. 2013. *Kyrgyzy v Kyrgyzstane i za rubezhom – odna kul'tura odnogo naroda?* POZNAŃ.

Koltchanov, B. 2011. *Racism in Latvia*. Brussels: ENAR

Koppel, K. 2015. Katrina Koppel Võõravihast: Sõim Tänaval Eslaleerub. Sõnadest Saavad Teod Kiiremini, Kui Karta Oskame. [Online]. Eesti Päevaleht 27 November 2015. Available from: http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/katrina-koppel-vooravihast-soim-tanaval-eskaleerub-sonadest-saavad-teod-kiiremini-kui-karta-oskame?id=73053353.

Korostelina, Karina. 2007. The system of social identities in Tajikistan: Early warning and conflict prevention. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40(2): 223–238.

Kosmarskaya, Natal'ya. 2006. *"Deti imperii" v postsovetskoy Tsentral'noy Azii: adaptivnye praktiki i mental'nye sdvigi: russkie v Kirgizii, 1992–2002*. Natalis: Moscow.

Kott, Matiss. 2013/2015. *The fate of the Romani minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during World War II: Problems and perspectives for Romani studies and comparative genocide research*, Conference Paper, Moscow (forthcoming in ed. Inesis Feldmans, Uldis Neiburgs and Valters Šcerbinskis. 2015. Latvijas Vesturnieku komisijas rakstu zinatniska redkolegija. Riga).

Kott, Matthew. 2014. It is in their DNA: Swedish police, structural antiziganism and the registration of Romanis. In *When stereotype meets prejudice*, ed. Timofey Agarin. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag.

Kunysz, Nicholas. 2012. From sultanism to neopatrimonialism? Regionalism within Turkmenistan. *Central Asian Survey* 31(1): 1–16.

Kuropatkin, Aleksei. 1879. *Turkmeniya i turkmeny*. St. Petersburg: Tipografiya V.A Poletiki.

Kuru, Ahmet. 2002. Between the state and cultural zone: Nation building in Turkmenistan. *Central Asian Survey* 21(1): 71–90.

Kvyatkouski, S. 2015 Gorodskaya kultura Minska: uzhe ne rezervatsiya, esche ne meynstrim. *Belarusskiy zhurnal* [Online 11 septembre 2015]. Available at

http://journalby.com/news/gorodskaya-kultura-minska-uzhe-ne-rezervaciya-eshchyo-ne-meynstrim-455.

Kyiv's Euromaidan is a liberationist and not extremist mass action of civic disobedience (petition of February 4th, 2014). 2014. Available at https://www.change.org/p/to-journalists-commentators-and-analysts-writing-on-the-ukrainian-protest-movement-euromaidan-kyiv-s-euromaidan-is-a-liberationist-and-not-extremist-mass-action-of-civic-disobedience.

Laineste, L., T. Raus, M. Timmi, R. Vetik, and T. Vihalemm. 2007. *'Rassi- ja Võõravimm Eestis'.* [Online]. Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Justice. http://www.kriminaalpoliitika.ee/sites/www.kriminaalpoliitika.ee/files/elfinder/dokumendid/rassi-_ja_vooravimm_eestis._justiitsministeerium._2007_2011.pdf. Accessed 3 Oct 2015.

Laitin, David. 1991. The national uprisings in the Soviet Union. *World Politics* 44(1): 39–80.

Lakson, P. 2015. Vaenu Õhutamine Sotsiaalmeedias Viis Politsei Ridadest Lahkumiseni. [Online]. Postimees 23 November 2015. Available from: http://pluss.postimees.ee/3407289/vaenu-ohutamine-sotsiaalmeedias-viis-politsei-ridadest-lahkumiseni.

Lankauskas, Gediminas. 2010. Others, the nation and its (dis)integration in 'European' Lithuania. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 18(2): 193–208.

Laruelle, Marlène. 2005. "Etnicheskiy atlas Uzbekistana" v kontekste covremennogo institutsional'nogo polozheniya postsovetskoy uzbekskoy etnologii. *Etnograficheskoye obozreniye* 1: 56–59.

Laruelle, Marlène. 2012a. The paradigm of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Evolving narrative, the sovereignty issue, and political agenda. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45: 39–49.

Laruelle, Marlène. 2012b. What we have (not) learned about twentieth-century Central Asian history. *Demokratizatsiya* 3: 216–222.

Laruelle, Marlène. 2013. Kazakhstan: Central Asia's new migration crossroads. In *Marlène social sciences in Asia, volume 34: Migration and social upheaval as the face of globalization in Central Asia*, ed. M. Laruelle, 87–108. Leiden: BRILL.

Laruelle, Marlène. 2014. The three discursive paradigms of state identity in Kazakhstan. In *Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, dynamics, and directions*, ed. Mariya Y. Omelicheva. London: Lexington books.

Lastouski, Aliaksei. 2008. Ideas and practices of the skinhead youth counterculture in Minsk. *Political Sphere* 11: 101–113.

Lastouski, Aliaksei. 2011a. Vobrazy ulady, narodu i "chuzhyh" u publichnykh vystupakh vysheyshykh dzyarzhaunykh asobau Belarusi peryyadu "liberalizatsyi" (2008–2010 gady). *Palitychnaya sfera* 16–17: 50–72.

Lastouski, Aliaksei. 2011b. *Russo-Centrism* as an ideological project of Belarusian identity. *Belarusian Political Science Review* 1: 23–46.

Lastouski, Aliaksei. 2015. Solidarity test: Reaction of Belarusian civil society to events in Ukraine (2013–2014). In *Civil society in Belarus (2000–2015)*, ed. Valer Bulhakau and Aliaksei Lastouski, 9–26. Warsaw: East European Democratic Centre.

Law, Ian. 2010. *Racism and ethnicity, global debates, dilemmas, directions*. London: Pearson.

Law, Ian. 2012. *Red racisms, racism in communist and post-communist contexts*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Law, Ian, Anna Jacobs, Nisreen Kaj, Simona Pagano, and Bozena Sojka-Koirala. 2014. *Mediterranean racisms, connections and complexities in the Mediterranean region*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Leas, R. 2015. 'Eesti Inimõiguste Keskus: Rassismi ja Afrofoobia Ilmingud on Suvega Märgatavalt Kasvanud' [Online]. Eesti Rahvusringhääling 2 November 2015. Available from: http://uudised.err.ee/v/eesti/09869517-4f34-47e3-89cb-98362092277c/euroopa-inimoiguste-keskus-rassismi-ja-afrofoobia-ilmingud-on-suvega-margatavalt-kasvanud.

Leshchenko, N. 2008. The national ideology and the basis of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus. *Europe-Asia Studies* 60(8): 1419–1433.

Lesiv, Mariya. 2013. *The return of ancestral gods: Modern Ukrainian Paganism as an alternative vision for a nation*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Lieven, Anatol. 1993. *The Baltic revolution, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the path to independence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Liimets, A. 2015. Varro Vooglaid: Probleem Pole Vihakõne, vaid Võõra ideoloogia Pealesurumine. [Online]. Eesti Rahvusringhääling 27 October 2015. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/messages/sven.harjo.

Likhachev, Vyacheslav. 2014. "Pravyi sektor" i drugie: natsional-radikaly I ukrainskiy politicheskiy krizis kontsa 2013-nachala 2014 goda. In *Rossiya- ne Ukraina: sovremennye akcenty natsionalizma*, ed. A. Verhovskiy, 230–275. Moscow: Tsentr "Sova".

Likhachev, Vyacheslav. 2016. Dva goda repressiy: prava natsionalnyh menshinstv v Krymu, 2014–2015. Ksenofobia, narushenia prav natsionalnykh menshinstv, religioznye presledovania i repressii v otnoshenii nezavisimogo krymskotatarskogo dvizhenia Report. Retrieved from http://eajc.org/data//file/Qirim_under_the_Occupation.pdf on 1 March 2016.

Lindemann, Kristina, and Ellu Sarr. 2011. Ethnic inequalities in education: Second generation Russians in Estonia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35(11): 1974–1988.

Lithuanian Social Research Centre. 2012. *The situation of Roma*. Vilnius: Lithuania SRC.

Macfarlane, S. Neil. 1997. Democratisation, nationalism and regional security in the Southern Caucasus. *Government and Opposition* 39(3): 399–420.

Mahler, Claudia, Anja Mihr, and Reeta Toivanen. 2005. Human rights, minorities and human rights education. In *Armenia: A human rights perspective for peace and democracy*, ed. A. Mihr, A. Mkrtichyan, C. Mahler, and R. Toivanen. Potsdam: University of Potsdam.

Manajew, O., and J. Drakochrust. 2012. Właściwości współczesnej tożsamości białoruskiej. In *Tożsamości zbiorowe białorusinów*, ed. Ryszard Radzik, 11–54. Lublin: UMCS.

Marashlian, Levon. 1999. Finishing the genocide, cleansing Turkey of Armenian survivors, 1920–1923. In *Remembrance and denial, the case of the Armenian genocide*, ed. Richard Hovannisian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Marat, Erica. 2014. Kyrgyzstan. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/kyrgyzstan. Accessed 30 Aug 2015.

Marcinkevicius, Andrius. 2013. Russkie v nezavisimoy i sovetskoy Litve: demografiya, sotsial'noe polozhenie, identichnost'. In *Etnicheskaya Politika v Stranah Baltii*, ed. Vadim Poleshchuk and Valery Stepanov, 197–218. Moscow: Nauka.

Marfina, Olga. 2015. *Istoriya antropologicheskikh issledovaniy v Belarusi*. Minsk: Belaruskaya navuka.

Margaryan, A. 2007. *Interview*. http://www.armeniapedia.org/wiki/Tseghakron. Accessed Nov 2016.

Markedonov, Sergey. 2010. *Turbulentnaya Evraziya: mezhetnicheskie, grazhdanskie konflikty, ksenofobiya v novyh nezavisimyh gosudarstvah postsovetskogo prostranstva*. Moscow: Academia.

Marshall, Maureen. 2014. Becoming bioarcheology? Traditions of physical anthropology and archaeology in Armenia. In *Archaeological human remains, global perspectives*, ed. B. O'Donnabhain and M.C. Lozada. New York: Springers Briefs in Archaeology.

Marshall, Maureen, and Ruzan Mkrtchyan. 2011. *Armenia/Hayastan, the Routledge handbook of archaeological human remains and legislation*. London: Routledge.

Martin, Terry. 2001. *The affirmative action empire. Nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov. 2014. *The Gypsies (Dom – Lom – Rom) in Georgia. Proceedings of annual meeting of the gypsy lore society and conference on Romani studies*. https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwFvqsBgQJK1UHpZWVNXWlFRVks0MXZIZUpMLUthdnZuMXRN/edit.

Masov, Rakhim. 2007. R. Masov: Tadzhiki nikogda ne byli odnim narodom s uzbekami (otvet G. Khidoyatovu). [Online, 1 October 2007]. Available at http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1191234780. Accessed 18 Sept 2015.

Massot, Sophie. 2013. Economic migrations from Uzbekistan to Moscow, Seoul, and New York: Sacrifice or rite of passage? In *Social sciences in Asia, volume 34: Migration and social upheaval as the face of globalization in Central Asia*, ed. M. Laruelle, 283–299. Leiden: BRILL.

Matousian, Leo. 2006. *Armenian arayans forum*, http://www.armenianaryans.com/AC/archive/index.php5?t-5.html).

Matsaberidze, David. 2014. *The role of civic nationalism in transformation of the internal ethnic politics of post-Soviet Georgia*. Flensburg: ECMI.

Matusevich, Maxim. 2008. An exotic subversive: Africa, Africans and the Soviet everyday. *Race and Class* 49(4): 757–812.

Megoran, Nick. 2012. Averting violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and responding to nationalism. *Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper*.

Meiners, Christoph. 1785. *Grundriss der Gerschichte der Menschheit*. Lemgo

Mettam, C.W., and S.W. Williams. 2001. A colonial perspective on population migration in Soviet Estonia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27(1): 133–150.

Mikulich, A. 2005. *Belarusy u genetychnay prastory. Antrapalogiya etnasu*. Minsk: Tekhnalogiya.

Mills, Courtney Anne. 2007. Turkmenbashi: The propagation of personal rule in contemporary Turkmenistan. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of St. Andrews.

Minasyan, Sergey. 2007. *From political rallies to conventions, political and legal aspects of protecting the rights of the Armenian ethnic minority in Georgia as exemplified by the Samtskhe-Javakheti region*. Yerevan: Caucasus Media Institute.

Morozova, Dar'ya. 2012. *Demokratiya na golodnyi zheludok*. Available at http://nvspb.ru/tops/demokratiya-nagolodnyy-jeludok-49662/?version=print. Accessed 5 Oct 2016.

Mudde, Cas (ed.). 2005. *Racial extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.

Mukhammadieva, B. 2012. *Natsional'nyi sostav, vladeniye yazykami i grazhdanstvo naseleniya respubliki Tadzhikistan*. Agenstvo po statistike pri Prezidente Respubliki Tadzhikistan.

Muratov, Ravshan. 2013. 'Kak zhivetsya uzbekam v Turkmenistane' [Online, 28 February 2013]. Available at http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1362066360. Accessed 30 Sept 2015.

Natsional'nyi statisticheskyi komitet Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki. 2015. Natsional' nyi sostav naseleniya. Available at http://www.stat.kg/ru/statistics/naselenie/. Accessed 25 Aug 2015.

Naumenko, Lyudmila. 2012. *Belorusskaya identichnost*. Minsk: Belaruskaya navuka.

Naydzyuk, Yazep and Ivan Kasyak. 1943. *Belarus uchora i syan'nya*. Minsk URL: http://coollib.com/b/247261/read.

Njhdeh, G. 1936. *Selected Works.* Trans. E. Danielyan. Saint Laurent: Nakhijenan Institue of Canada.

Ó Beacháin, Donahha, and Rob Kevlihan. 2013. Threading a needle: Kazakhstan between civic and ethno nationalist state building. *Nations and Nationalism* 19(2): 337–356.

OECD. 2015. *Lithuania migration outlook*. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2015/lithuania_migr_outlook-2015-27-en.

Omelicheva, Mariya. 2015. Eye on the international image: Nation-branding in Turkmenistan. In *Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia*, ed. Mariya Omelicheva, 91–111. London: Routledge.

Oshanin, Lev. 1953. Antropologicheskiy sostav naseleniya Sredney Azii i etnogenez ee narodov v svete dannykh antropologii. In *Voprosy etnogeneza narodov Sredney Azii v svete dannykh antropologii,* ed. Lev Oshanin and Valentina Zyazenkova. Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk UzSSR.

Osipov, Aleksandr. 2004. Ferganskiye sobytiya: konstruirovaniye etnicheskogo konflikta. In *Ferganskaya dolina: etnichnost', etnicheskiye protsessy, etnicheskiye konflikty*, ed. Sergey Abashin and Valentin Bushkov, 164–223. Moscow: Nauka.

Ostapenko, L. 2011. Osobennosti otraslevoy i sotsial'no-professional'noy struktury. In *Gagauzy*, ed. M. Guboglo and E. Kvilinkova, 413–436. Moscow: Nauka.

Ostapenko, L. and I. Subbotina. 2011. 'Russkie v Moldove: demograficheskie I sotsial'nye transformatsii in Aratyunyan Yurii'. In *Russkie: etnosotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* 120–157. Moscow: Nauka.

Peinhopf, Andrea. 2014. *Ethnic minority women in Georgia, facing a double burden?* Flensburg: ECMI.

Peyrouse, Sebastien. 2015. *Turkmenistan: Strategies of power, dilemmas of development*. London: Routledge.

Plakans, Andrej. 2011. *A concise history of the Baltic states*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pogrebinskiy, M.B., A. Popov, and A.K. Tolpygo. 2013. Formirovanie politkul'turnoy Ukrainy: istoricheskiy ocherk i sovremennoe sostoyanie. In *Krizis multikulturalizma I problemy natsionalnoy politiki*, ed. M.B. Pogrebinskiy and A.K. Tolpygo, 237–281. Ves' mir: Moscow.

Polese, Abel, and Slavomir Horák. 2015. A tale of two presidents: Personality cult and symbolic nation-building in Turkmenistan. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 43(3): 457–478.

Porat, Dina (ed.). 2014. Antisemitism worldwide. Available at http://www.euro-jewcong.org/docs/Doch2014_(130415).docx.pdf. Accessed 26 Aug 2015.

Postimees. 2015. Raport Avaldab Muret Rassismi Pärast Eesti Meedias. [Online]. Postimees 13 October 2015. Available from: http://www.postimees.ee/3360577/raport-avaldab-muret-rassismi-parast-eesti-meedias.

Prasad, Conor. 2012. *Georgia's Muslim community, a self-fulfilling prophecy*. Flensburg: ECMI.

Putin, Vladimir. 2014. Address by President of the Russian Federation [Online, 18 March 2014]. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

Puuraid, P. 2015. Nigeeriast Pärit Välistudengit Pilluti Tartu Kesklinnas Kividega. [Online]. Eesti Päevaleht 6 November 2015. Available from: http://epl.delfi.ee/news/eesti/nigeeriast-parit-valistudengit-pilluti-tartu-kesklinnas-kividega?id=72881887.

Quist-Adade, Charles. 2005. From paternalism to ethnocentrism: Images of Africa in Gorbahcev's Russia. *Race and Class* 46(4): 79–89.

Racius, Egdûnas. 2013. The place of Islamophobia/Muslimphobia among radical Lithuanian nationalists. In *In the tracks of Breivik, far right networks in Northern and Eastern Europe*, ed. Deland Mats, Minkenberg Michael, and Mays Christin. Stockholm: Lit Verlag.

Radford, David. 2014. Contesting and negotiating religion and ethnic identity in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. *Central Asia Survey* 33(1): 15–28.

Ragozin, Leonid. 2015. *Latvians find unity in rejecting refugees*. http://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-migration-asylum-crisis-baltics-eu/.

Rakhimi, Ismoil, and Gulbakhor Sheralishoeva. 2009. Drevniy Vandzh kolybel' aryiskoy tsivilizatsii. *Vestnik Tadzhikskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta prava, biznesa i politiki* 3(39): 125–130.

Raun, A. 2007. Ksenofoobid Ründavad Netis Enim Homosid, Venelasi ja Kristlasi. [Online]. Postimees 15 October 2007. Available from: http://www.

postimees.ee/1715447/ksenofoobid-rundavad-netis-enim-homosid-venelasi-ja-kristlasi.

Reeves, Madeleine. 2005. Locating danger: *Konfliktologiia* and the search for fixity in the Ferghana valley borderlands. *Central Asian Survey* 1(24): 67–81.

Reeves, Madeleine. 2010a. Etnizatsiya nasiliya c Yuzhnoy Kirgizii [Online, 23 June 2010]. Available at http://www.polit.ru/article/2010/06/23/kirgiz/. Accessed 12 Sept 2015.

Reeves, Madeleine. 2010b. On the documentary production of the "Undocumented migrant" in Urban Russia. *Eastbordnet Working Papers.*

Reeves, Madeleine. 2013. Kak stanovyatsya 'chernymi' v Moskve: praktiki vlasti i sushchestvovaniye migrantov v teni zakona. In *Grazhdanstvo i immigratsiya: kontseptual'noye, istoricheskoe i institutsional'noye izmereniye*, ed. Vladimir Malakhov and Aleksandra Yakovleva, 146–177. Moscow: Kanon+.

Reeves, Madeleine. 2014. We're with the people! Place, nation, and political community in Kyrgyzstan's 2010 "April events". *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 2(32): 68–88.

REGNUM. 2015. V Kirgizii otmetyat 100-letiye vosstaniya 1916 goda v Turkestane. [Online, 27 May 2015]. Available at http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1928020.html. Accessed 23 Aug 2015.

Rein, Leonid. 2013. *The kings and the pawns. Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Republic of Estonia Government. 2007. Peaminister: Eesti Mõistab Rassismi Hukka. [Online]. Republic of Estonia Government 26 September 2007. Available from: https://valitsus.ee/et/uudised/peaminister-eesti-moistab-rassismi-hukka.

Rudling, P. 2006. Organized anti-semitism in contemporary Ukraine: Structure, influence and ideology. *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes* 48(1/2): 81–119.

Rudling, Per Anders. 2014. *The rise and fall of Belarusian nationalism, 1906–1931*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press.

Sabatauskaite, Birute. 2011. *Racist violence in Lithuania*. Vilnius: LCHR.

Sahakyan, M. 2001. *Framework convention in the realization of the state authorities of Armenia. The role of the state in protection of the rights of national minorities. Conference Materials. Sevan*, 29–31 August.

Sarafian, Ara. 1999. The archival trail, authentication of the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman empire, 1915–16. In *Remembrance and denial, the case of the Armenian genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Sari, Yasar. 2013. Identity-conflict relations: A case-study of the Ferghana valley conflicts. *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 4(14): 7–16.

Sarkorova, Anora. 2012. Tadzikistan: desyatki pogibshikh v boyah u goroda Khorog. [Online, 24 July 2012]. Available at http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2012/07/120723_tajic_khorog_assault.shtml. Accessed 16 Sept 2015.

Saroyan, Mark. 1996. Beyond the nation-state: Culture and ethnic politics in Soviet Transcaucasia. In *Transcaucasia, nationalism, and social change: Essays in the history of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*, ed. Ronald G. Suny. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Savin. Ivan. 2011. Russkiye v Kazakhstane: «Kto my seychas» [Russians in Kazakhstan: "Who we are now"], 158–190. In *Russkiye: Etnosotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya [Russians: Ethnosociological research],* ed. Yu. V. Arutyunyan. Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Nauka.

Schatz, Edward. 2000. The politics of multiple identities: Lineage and ethnicity an Kazakhstan. *Europe-Asia Studies* LII(3): 489–506.

Schatz, Edward. 2004. *Modern clan politics: The power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and beyond*. Washington: University of Washington Press.

Schramm, Katharina, David Skinner, and Richard Rottenburg (eds.). 2012. *Identity politics and the new genetics: Re/creating categories of difference and belonging*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Selimyan, G. 2014. *Ethnic Minorities in public administration in Armenia.* Yerevan: American University of Armenia.

Senn, Alfred E. 1990. *Lithuania awakening*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Seshadri-Crooks, Kalpana. 2000. *Desiring whiteness: A lacanian analysis of race*. London: Routledge.

Shalygin, Maksim. 2015. Askar Akayev: Kirgiziya pogruzhaetsya v natsionalizm i feodalizm s narkotrafikom. [Online, 28 June 2015]. Available at http://regnum.ru/news/1937656.html. Accessed 26 Aug 2015.

Shapovalova, Natalia and Olga Burlyuk. 2016. The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia. Report. Retreived from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf.

Shaw, Laura. 2015a. *Latvia database*. http://eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/connections/530b9e3076f0db569b000014.

Shaw, Laura. 2015b. *Estonia database*. http://eugenicsarchive.ca/database/documents/530b983676f0db569b00000a.

Shcherbak, S. 2013. Natsionalizm I problema sotsial'noy integratsii v Ukraine. In *Krizis multikulturalizma I problemy natsionalnoy politiki*, ed. M.B. Pogrebinskiy and A.K. Tolpygo, 219–236. Moscow: Ves' mir.

Shcherbakova, Ekaterina. 2011. Dolya predstaviteley 'titul'noy' natsional'nosti v naselenii Belorussii, Kazakhstana i Kirgizii ustoychivo vozrastayet. [Online, 21 March 2011]. Available at http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2011/0459/barom03.php. Accessed 1 Sept 2015.

Shekhovtsev, Anton. 2014. Vseukrainskoe ob'edineniye "Svoboda": Ot uspekha na vyborakh k provalu v revolutsii. In *Rossiya- ne Ukraina: sovremennye akcenty natsionalizma*, ed. A. Verhovskiy, 276–291. Moscow: Tsentr "Sova".

Shevel, Oxana. 2011. *Migration, refugee policy, and state building in postcommunist Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shnirelman, V. 2001. *The Value of the Past, myths, identity and politics in Transcaucasia*. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Shnirelman, Victor. 2009. Aryans or Proto-Turks? Contested ancestors in contemporary Central Asia. *Nationalities Papers* 37(5): 557–587.

Shnirelman, Victor. 2010. A symbolic past. *Russian Politics and Law* 48(5): 48–64.

Shnirelman, Victor. 2011. *Porog tolerantnosti*. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie.

Shnirelman, V. 2012a. *Russkoe rodnoverie. Neoyazychestvo i natsionalizm v sovremennoy Rossii.* Moscow: BBI.

Shnirelman, Victor. 2012b. Archaeology and the national idea in Eurasia. In *The archeaology of power and politics in Eurasia,* ed. Charles Hartley. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shnirelman, Victor. 2015. *Ariyskiy mif v sovremennom mire*. Moscow: NLO.

Shornikov, P.M. 2010. Postsovetskie etnopoliticheskie protsessy. In *Moldovane*, ed. M. Guboglo and V. Dergachev, 137–177. Moscow: Nauka.

Shternshis, Anna. 2006. *Soviet and Kosher, Jewish popular culture in the Soviet Union 1923–1939*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Shupac, Marina. 2015. 'Battling seclusion & racism in Moldova' [Online, 23 February 2015]. Available at http://whitecodecentre.org/news/2015/2/23/battling-seclusion-racism-in-moldova.

Šír, Jan. 2008. Cult of personality in monumental art and architecture: The case of PostSoviet Turkmenistan. *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 25: 203–220.

Sitnyansky, Georgiy. 2011. *Rossiya i Tsentral'naya Aziya: vmeste ili vroz'? Mezhetnicheskie otnosheniya v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane, i Rossiya*. Moscow: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAN.

Slovetskiy, Vitaliy. 2013. Kto spaset uzbekskikh russkikh? [Online, 2 April 2013]. Available at http://svpressa.ru/society/article/66300/. Accessed 15 Sept 2015.

Smolich, Arkad. 1922. *Geagrafiya Belarusi.* Vilnya.

Snyder, T. 2010. *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*. New York: Basic Books.

Snyder, Jack, and Karen Ballentine. 1996. Nationalism and the marketplace of ideas. *Internafionul Security,* XXI, 2, Fall: 17.

Sonyel, Salahi Ramadan. 1987. *The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of great power diplomacy*. London: K. Rustem and Brother.

Sordia, G. 2009. *A way out? Initial steps towards addressing Romani issues in Georgia*. Flensburg: ECMI.

Sorokin, S. 2015. Me Peame Rääkima Rassismist Eestis: Pagulasteema Sõnavägivald. [Online]. Müürileht 6 October 2015. Available from: https://www.muurileht.ee/me-peame-raakima-rassismist-eestis-pagulasteema-sonavagivald/.

Soros Foundation-Moldova. 2011. *Perceptions of the population of the republic of Moldova on discrimination: Sociological study*. Kishinev: Cartier.

Spectorovsky, Alberto. 2004. The eugenic temptation in socialism: Sweden, Germany and the Soviet Union. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46(1): 84–106.

Staliunas, Darius. 2015. *Enemies for a day: Anti-semitism and anti-Jewish violence in Lithuania under the Tsars*. Budapest: CEU Press.

Stankevich, Yanka. 2003. Kurs gistoryi Kryvii-Belarusi, in Yanka Stankevich *Gistarychnyya tvory,* 48–49. Minsk: Entsiklapedyks.

Stati, Vasile. 2012. *Istoriya Moldovy.* Chișinău: Tipografia Centrală.

Stepanov, V.V. 2003. Krym I krymskie tataty: istoricheskaya demografiya i sovremennaya etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya. In *Tyurkskie narody Kryma: Karaimy. Krymskie tatary. Krymchaki*, ed. C.Y. Kozlov and L.V. Chizhova, 330–357. Moscow: Nauka.

Stonawski, Rebecca L. 2012. (Not) leaving Turkmenistan? A survey of students from Turkmenistan at the American University of Central Asia. *Power and Education* 4(2): 196–206.

Suny, Ronald G. 1993. *Looking towards Ararat, Armenia in modern history*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Suvariani, Nona. 2008. *Week of antiracism in Georgia*. http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=7060&lang=eng.

Swietochowski, Tadeusz. 2011. Islam and national identity in the Borderland: The case of Azerbaijan. In *Identities, ideologies and institutions, 2001–2011 a decade on insight into the Caucasus*, ed. Alexander Iskandaryan. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute.

Šybieka, Zachar. 2012. Jews in Belarusian national projects from the beginning of the 19th century till 1905 (Problem setting). *Belarusian Political Science Review* 2: 102–115.

Szakonyi, D. 2008. *No way out: An assessment of the Romani community in Georgia*. Flensburg: ECMI.

Taagepera, Rein. 1993. *Estonia, return to independence*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Teder, M. 2013. Martin Helme Soovitus Immigratsioonipoliitikakas: Kui on Must, Näita Ust. [Online]. Postimees 29 May 2013. Available from: http://www.postimees.ee/1252028/martin-helme-soovitus-immigratsiooni-poliitikaks-kui-on-must-naita-ust.

Tereshkovich, Petr. 2004. *Etnicheskaya istoriya Belarusi XIX–nachala XXV*. Minsk: BGU.

Timuka, I. 2010. March 29, *House of history: The Riga Ghetto museum*. http://www.bestriga.com/en/page/expanded/article/477/House-of-History-the-Riga-Ghetto-Museum.

Tishkov, Valery. 1997. *Ethnicity, nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union, the mind aflame*. London: Sage.

Tlostanova, Madina. 2010. A short genealogy of Russian Islamophobia. In *Thinking through Islamophobia, global perspectives*, ed. S. Sayyid and A. Vakil. New York: Columbia University Press.

Tokluoglu, Ceylan. 2006. Definitions of national identity, nationalism and ethnicity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28(4): 722–758.

Toynbee, Arnold J. 1915. *Armenian atrocities: The murder of a nation, with a speech delivered by Lord Bryce in the house of lords*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Toynbee, Arnold J, ed. 1916a. Key to names and persons and places withheld from publication in the original edition of '*The treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman empire, 1915–1916*'. Miscellaneous no. 31. London.

Toynbee, Arnold J, ed. 1916b. *The treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman empire, 1915–1916.* London: Sir Joseph Causton and Sons.

Traverso, Enzo. 1994. *The Marxists and the Jewish question – The history of a debate, 1843–1943*. New Jersey: Humanity Books, translated by Bernard Gibbons.

Trilling, David. 2013. Uzbekistan's president attacks "Lazy" labor migrants. [Online, 21 June 2013]. Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67157. Accessed 29 Sept 2015.

Tsilevich, Boris. 2013. Vliyanie organov Soveta Evropy na etnopolitiku v Latvii, Litve i Estonii. In *Etnicheskaya Politika v Stranah Baltii*, ed. Vadim Poleshchuk and Valery Stepanov, 323–342. Moscow: Nauka.

Tumanovich, O. 1926. *Turkmenistan i Turkmeny*. Askhabad: Turkmenskoye gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo.

Tunçer-Kılavuz, Idil. 2014. *Power, networks and violent conflict in Central Asia: A comparison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan*, vol. 5. New York: Routledge.

Turda, M. 2007. The nation as object: Race, blood, and biopolitics in interwar Romania. *Slavic Review* 66(3): 413–441.

TV3. 2015. Peaminister Mõistis Hukka Pagulashirmu. [Online]. TV3 News 5th November 2015. Available from: http://uudised.tv3.ee/pagulased/uudis/2015/11/05/peaminister-moistis-hukka-pagulashirmu.

Ualiyeva, Saule, and Adrienne Edgar. 2014. In the laboratory of peoples' friendship: Mixed people in Kazakhstan from the Soviet era to the present. In *Global mixed race*, ed. R.C. King-O'Riain et al. New York: NYU Press.

Ukranews. 2016. Ministr kul'tury Nishchuk zayaviv pro problemi z genetikoyu u zhiteliv Donbasu ta Zaporizhzhya [Online, 23 November 2016]. Available at http://ukranews.com/ua/news/461639-ministr-kultury-nyshhuk-zayavyv-pro-problemy-z-genetykoyu-u-zhyteliv-donbasu-ta-zaporizhzhya. Accessed 23 Nov 2016.

Ulasiuk, Ireyna. 2013. *National minorities and migration in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine*. Florence: CARIM-East, European University Institute.

UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 2004. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considers report of Tajikistan. [Online, 12 August 2004]. Available at http://reliefweb.int/report/tajikistan/committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-considers-report-tajikistan. Accessed 15 Sept 2015.

Undasynov, I.N. 2002. Istoriya kazakhov i ikh predkov. Chast' 1. Nashi predki. [The history of the Kazakhs and their ancestors. Part 1: Our ancestors] Moscow: Lenom.

UNDP-WB-European Commission regional Roma Survey. 2011. on Moldova.

United Nations. 2008a. *Mission to Lithuania, report of the special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism*. New York: UN.

United Nations. 2008b. *Mission to Estonia, report of the special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism*. New York: UN.

United Nations. 2008c. *Mission to Latvia, report of the special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism.* New York: UN.

Vetik, R. 2015. *Monitoring of Integration in Estonian society*. Tallin: Institute of Baltic Studies.

Vlasti.net. 2010. Na Zapadnoy Ukraine russkikh "lyubyat", pochti kak tsygan i evreev [Online, 21 October 2010]. Available at http://vlasti.net/news/107021.

Vámbéry, Ármin. 2003. *Puteshestviye po Sredney Azii*. Moscow: Vostochnaya literature.

Vasil'eva, Galina. 1990. *Turkmeny (voprosy etnogeneza i etnokul'turnye traditsii)*. Moscow: Institut etnografii AN SSSR.

Velichko, Vasili L. 2007. *Caucasus: Russian affairs and intertribal problems*. Baku: Baa Publishing.

Verdery, Katherine. 1993. Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'. *Daedalus* 122(3): 37–46.

Verdery, Katherine. 2002. Whither postsocialism? In *Postsocialism: Ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia*, ed. Chris Hann. London: Routledge.

Volgin, Kirill. 2014. Rusofobiya: Made in Kyrgyzstan. [Online, 5 September 2014]. Available at http://rabkor.ru/opinion/2014/09/05/russophobia-made-in-kyrgyzstan. Accessed 19 Aug 2015.

Volosevich, Aleksey. 2008. Gimn natsionalizmu. Za posledniye semnadtsat let v Tashkente pereimenovana polovina ulits. [Online, 31 January 2008]. http://www.fergananews.com/articles/5574. Accessed 20 Sept 2015.

von Rauch, Gerard. 1970. *The Baltic states, the years of independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1917–1940*. London: Hurst.

Wachtel, Andrew Baruch. 2013. Kyrgyzstan between democratization and ethnic intolerance. *Nationalities Papers* 6(41): 971–986.

Wade, Peter. 2010. *Race and ethnicity in Latin America*. London: Pluto Press.

Weiss-Wendt, Anton. 1998. The Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1940–41 and the Jews. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9(12): 308–325.

Weiss-Wendt, Anton. 2003. Extermination of the gypsies in Estonia during World War II: Popular images and official policies. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17(1): 31–61.

Weiss-Wendt, Anton. 2008. Why the Holocaust does not matter to Estonians? *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39(4): 475–497.

Weiss-Wendt, Anton. 2009. *Murder without hatred, Estonians and the Holocaust*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Weiss-Wendt, Anton, and Rory Yeomans (eds.). 2013. *Racial science in Hitler's new Europe, 1938–1945*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.

Weitz, Eric. 2002. Racial politics without the concept of race: Reevaluating Soviet ethnic and national purges. *Slavic Review* 61(1): 1–29.

Wettam, Collin W., and Stephen Wyn Williams. 2001. A colonial perspective on population migration in Soviet Estonia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27(1): 133–150.

Wilkinson, Cai. 2015. Imagining Kyrgyzstan's nationhood and statehood: Reactions to the 2010 Osh violence. *Nationalities Papers* 3(43): 417–436.

World Jewish Congress. 2005. *President denies that anti-Semitism is rising in Ukraine [Online, 19 September 2005]*. Available at: https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/president-denies-that-anti-semitism-is-rising-inukraine?printable=true.

Yarkova, Elena. 1999. Russkiye v Kirgizii: sotsiokulturnaya dinamika mezhetnicheskikh otnosheniy. *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost* 5: 105–114.

Yaroshevich, Aleksandr. 2014. Belarus b'et rekordy po kolichestvu trudovyh migrantov. TUT.by. [Online 29.01.2014]. Available at http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2014/01/29/ic_articles_116_184409/.

Yeck, Connor. 2014. Armenian nationalism, emergent political organizations and revolutionary activity surrounding the First World War. *Michigan State Journal of History* 6: 1–26.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and nation*. London: Sage.

Zakharov, Nikolay. 2013. The social movement against immigration as the vehicle and the agent of racialization in Russia. In *Beyond NGO-ization: The development of social movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg, 169–191. London: Ashgate.

Zakharov, Nikolay. 2015. *Race and racism in Russia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Zepa, Brigita. 2013. Diskurs formirovaniya politiki immigratsii v Latvii. In *Etnicheskaya Politika v Stranah Baltii*, ed. Vadim Poleshchuk and Valery Stepanov, 343–358. Moscow: Nauka.

Zhou, Jiayi. 2012. *Chinese in Georgia*. Flensburg: ECMI.

Zhurzhenko, Tatyana. 2004. Staraya ideologiya novoy sem'i: demograficheskiy natsionalizm Rossii I Ukrainy. In *Semeynye uzy: Modeli dlya sborki: Sbornik statey*, ed. Sergey Ushakin, 268–296. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. 2015. Russia's never-ending war against "fascism" memory politics in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict [Online 2015-05-08]. Available at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-05-08-zhurzhenko-en.html.

Zhussipbek, Galym. 2014. Exclusivist identities in Central Asia: Implications for regional stability and cooperation. In *Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, dynamics, and directions*, ed. Mariya Y. Omelicheva. London: Lexington Books.

Ziemer, Ulrike. 2011. Minority youth, everyday racism and public spaces in contemporary Russia. *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 14(2): 229–242.

Žigelytė, Lina. 2013. The neo-nazis hate the feminists too. *Lithuanian Tribune*. May 21.

Index

A
Abdramane, Keita, 78
Abdushelishvili, Malkhaz [1926–98], 98
Abkhazia, 119
abortion, 24
  Latvia, 24
Abrahamyan, Hovik, 101
Academy of Sciences (Armenia), 99, 126
administrative-territorial divisions, 177
  Uzbekistan, 177
adult/youth environment, 46
  affecting racism in Latvia, 46
Africa
  portrayal by Soviet media and bureaucracy, 6
  social hierarchies, 65
  Soviet attitude to, 6
  Soviet press coverage, 7
Africans
  Moldova, 65, 69, 74
  potential migrant group in Latvia, 46
Agayev, Rasim, 111
ageing population, 39, 47
  Latvia, 47
aggressiveness, 31
  hyper-valuing, 31
Ahal-Tekke tribal hegemony (Turkmenistan), 171
Ahiska/Meskhetian Turks, 118
Akayev, Askar, 140, 142–4, 149
Akunov, Tursunbek, 150
Aliev, Geidar [1923–2003], 95
All for Latvia! party, 19, 47
Alliance of European National Movement, 82
Americanisation, 3
  racial, 3

© The Author(s) 2017

N. Zakharov, I. Law, *Post-Soviet Racisms*, Mapping Global Racisms,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-47692-0

Ancestors
  acquisition of, 137
  myth of heroic as basis for nation-building, 141–2
Andijan (Uzbekistan)
  pogroms in, 179
  riots in, 179
Ansip, Andrus, 40, 41
Anti-Armenian racism, 100
anti-black hostility, 102
anti-gay violence, 102
  Armenia, 102
Anti-Muslimism
  Georgia, 123
  Lithuania, 31
  Romania, 119
anti-racism, 7, 8, 54
  Belarus, 54
Anti-Romanian sentiments, 72
  Moldova, 72
anti-Russian revolt (1916), 75, 84, 136
  Kyrgyzstan, 148
anti-Semitism
  anti-Armenianism compared, 110, 111
  Armenia, 110
  Belarus, 55, 56, 59
  Catholic Church involvement in Baltic States, 22
  Central Asia, 150, 179
  Estonia, 35
  Georgia, 119
  Kyrgyzstan, 150
  Lithuania, 56
  Moldova, 75
  pogroms in Andijan, 179
  Ukraine, 56, 80, 83
  Uzbekistan, 179
anti-Semitism compared, 20, 119
Antonescu, Ion Victor [1882–1946], 75, 76, 89
  occupation policy of, 76
Apartheid, 6
  South Africa, 6
Arajas Commando, 24
archaeological excavations, 62
  Armenia, 97
architecture, 161, 175
  supposed Uzbek roots of Italian, 175
Armenia, 15, 91, 94–108, 110–12, 114–16, 119, 126
  Academy of Sciences, 99, 126
  anti-black hostility, 102
  anti-gay violence, 102
  anti-Semitism, 110
  archaeological excavations, 62
  arrival of Iranian Muslims in Yerevan, 105
  aspirations to whiteness, 103
  Dasnaktsutiun party, 105
  death marches of 1915, 112
  democratization, 95
  ethnic cleansing, 111
  ethnic groups, 95, 97
  Eurasian ethnic context in antiquity, 98
  geography, 58
  hate speech, 104, 106, 111
  historical background, 97
  Holocaust education, 107
  hostility towards Gypsies, 115
  human rights, 107, 115
  human rights education, 10
  identity, 94, 106
  Islamophobia, 101, 102, 105
  Karabakh request transfer from Azerbaijan to, 95, 113, 114
  migration, 84, 107

minorities, 107, 119
mixed marriage, 42, 69, 134
nationalism, 92, 112
nation formation/building, 99, 110
population diversity, 101, 106
presidency of Council of Europe, 103, 104
racial science, 15, 93, 96–9, 126
racism, 100, 102, 106
regional identity, 160
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, 102
religious education, 94, 100, 116, 124
Republican Party, 106
spheres of domination, 96
Armenian Aryan Party, 105
Armenian-Azerbaijani mixed marriage, 115
Armenian genocide, 99, 100, 107
Armenian refugees, 163
Tajikistan, 163
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 95, 105
Armenians
attempts to link to ancient Indo-European ancestors, 98
expulsion of Ottoman, 99, 100
immigration to United States, 151
massacres by Czarist secret police, 113
racial characteristics, 93
racial origins, 100
racial self-identity, 106, 126
Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia, 93, 108, 116
Ukraine, 113
Armenoid racial type
definition of, 99
structure of crania, 98
Aryan idea, 81, 157, 167
Ukraine, 81
Aryanism
origins of, 157
Tajikistan, 15, 154–5
Aryan myth, 156–9
Tajikistan, 156, 158, 159
Aryan origins, 58, 157
Aryan race, 57, 100
'Aspirational whiteness,' 30
Lithuania, 30
assimilation, 4–6, 17, 89, 119, 156, 182
minorities in Baltic States, 17
Association of World War II Veterans (Moldova), 76
Assyrians, 103
asylum seekers
Estonia, 38, 39
hostility towards in Baltic States, 19
Ukraine, 85
Atambaev, Almazbek, 149
Auschwitz-Birkenau, 25
authoritarianism
growing in Belarus, 65, 70, 88
Turkmenistan, 130
Autochthonism principle
Kazakhstan, 133–9
Tajikistan, 156
Avetisyan, Armen, 102, 105
Azerbaijan
Baku oil rush (1870s), 109
ECRI report on, 114
emergence of nationalist movements, 95

Azerbaijan (*cont.*)
ethnic groups, 95, 110
ethno-racial character of, 108
hate speech in media, 111
historical background, 97, 109
Institute of Strategic Studies (Baku), 112
Islamic revival, 108, 160
Islamization, 109
Karabakh request transfer to Armenia from, 95, 113, 114
mixed marriage, 115
modernization, 109
national identity, 109, 113
nationalism, 91, 94, 95, 108, 109, 112, 114
pan-Turkic language debate, 108
racial hierarchy, 113
rejection of Iranian ancestry, 108–9
relations with Armenia, 15, 91, 94–7, 102, 108, 110, 111, 113–15, 118, 119, 127, 163
Soviet rule, 95
Turkification, 109
Turks redefined as Azerbaijani, 110
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, 109
ideology of, 109
Azerbaijani, 107–11, 113–15, 126, 127
Turks redefined as, 109–10
Azerbaijani Journalists Union, 111
Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), 109
Azeri racial type, 114
Armenoid racial type distinguished, 98, 99
Azeris, 46, 95, 103, 106, 108, 113, 114, 116, 119, 124, 126, 127
potential migrant group in Latvia, 46

B

backwardness, 3, 6, 7, 22, 173
Baghdad railway, 100
Bakiyev, Kurmanbek Saliyevich, 153
Baku demonstrations, 96
Baku oil rush (1870s), 109
Balta paganism, 63
Baltic dictatorships, 23
compared with Italian and German fascism, 23
Baltic States
anti-migrant hostility, 19
attitude to Holocaust, 18, 26, 49
debates on eugenics, 18
eugenics, 18, 21, 23, 24, 49
exclusionary nationalism, 14, 22
extermination of gypsies, 17
extermination of Jews, 61
extermination of Roma, 24, 25, 31
formation of national movements, 20
future prospects, 39
growth of extreme right parties in, 19
history, 18
hostility towards Muslims, 43
independence, 17, 18, 21–3, 28, 30, 49, 50, 75
institutional racism, 27, 28, 50
membership of League of Nations, 21

memorialization of Holocaust and Porajmos, 24
minorities post-World War I, 21
multiculturalism, 17, 42, 47
national identity, 14, 17, 21, 27, 35, 37, 43, 49
Nazi occupation, 23, 26, 49
perceptions of racism as significant issue in, 19
post-independence strength of ethnonational boundaries, 27, 50
racialization, 14, 17, 18, 20, 27, 34, 42–6, 48, 50, 65
Sovietization, 17
view of Dalia Grybauskaite on immigration, 48
visits of Special Rapporteur on Racism (OHCHR), 43

Batken region (Tajikistan), 162
Batyrov, Kadyrjan, 148
Belarus
anti-racism, 54
anti-Semitism, 55, 56, 59
Aryan origins, 58
attitude towards immigration, 68
Balta paganism, 63
Bobruisk, 66
calculation of 'Jewish blood' in population, 65
contemporary political regime, 53
culture and faith, 63
demographics, 67, 68
demography, 54–6, 59, 61, 62, 68
distinctive features of Belarusians, 56
early racial studies, 56, 57, 73
economic difficulties of early 1990s, 67
effects of World War II, 61
establishment of Belarusian People's Republic (BPR), 60
establishment of Soviet power in, 60
ethnogenesis of Belarusians, 57, 62
ethnographic influences, 58
Finns, 57–9
growing authoritarianism, 65
hate speech against Roma, 69
historical background, 53–4
Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, 68
indigenous people, 60, 62, 63
Institute of Economics and Peace, 55
Jews, 54–6, 59–61, 64, 66, 67, 69
Kriviya proposed as alternative name for, 57, 63
literacy, 59
migration, 61–3, 67, 68
minorities, 54, 55, 60, 69
mixed marriage, 69
Mongolians, 59
multiculturalism, 53
Muslim immigration, 68
national demographic security program, 68
nationalism, 60, 69
National Socialism, 63
nation building, 53, 56–61
Pale of Settlement, 66, 87
phenomenon of 'social distance,' 68
pogroms, 59, 60
population, 54–6, 59, 61, 62, 68
propaganda, 59, 60

Belarus (*cont.*)
racializing discourses, 59
racial knowledge, 59, 64, 67
racial prejudices widespread in, 64
relationship of Roma with law enforcement agencies in, 69
Rodnovery, 63
Roma in, 29, 67, 69, 71
skinhead culture, 30, 63, 64
Slavic migrations, 62
social development, 54
social hierarchies, 65
social integration of Roma, 69
social racism, 65
Soviet rule, 133
support for imperial revival, 64
support for racial purity, 58, 59, 62–4
support for Slavic brotherhood, 64
Tatars, 54, 56, 67, 69
Ugro-Finnic ethnic groups, 62
Ukrainian refugees, 68
'undesirable' immigrants, 68
Belarusian People's Republic (BPR), 60
establishment of, 60
Belarusians
Balta origins of, 62
myth of 'purity' of, 69
belief conflicts, 8
belief formation, 10
Berdymukhamedov, Gurbanguly, 171
Bessarabia, 70, 71, 74–7, 113
'Be Tolerant' campaign (Latvia), 44
Biblical Exodus, 67
Biologization, 11
ethnicity, 11
biotechnology, 12
Birobidzhan, 6
resettlement of Jews in, 6
Blackness
discourse on in Ukraine, 85–7
post-Soviet context of, 15
Black/white marriage. *See* Mixed marriage
'blood as a carrier of culture,' 13
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich [1752–1840], 92
Bobruisk (Belkarus), 66
Bogdanov, Anatoly Petrovich [1834–96], 56
Bolsheviks, 4, 5, 60, 106, 109, 133
Bolshevization, 17
Baltic States, 17
borderlands, 3
Soviet Union, 3
Borodenya, Valery, 55
Bronze Soldier clash, 37
Bulak-Bulahovich, Stanislaw [1883–1940], 60
Bunak, Viktor [1891–1979], 98
Buniyatov, Ziya M. [1923–79], 111

C

Caribbean, 65
social hierarchies, 65
Catholic Poles, 68
perception of in Belarus, 68
Caucasians
attitudes towards in Russia and US, 94
identity, 91
Caucasus, The: Russian affairs and intertribal issues, 112
Central Asia

anti-Semitism, 150, 179
conscription of males into Soviet army, 148
cultural colonization, 182
dissident persecution, 130
economic development, 138
ethnic conflicts, 144, 148, 158, 178–81
historical background, 132
importance of national hero, 137, 182
Indo-Iranian people, 137
Islamic fundamentalism, 150
Korean exiles, 130
nation formation/building, 130, 133, 141–2
nomadic cultures, 130
Orientalization, 132
racialization, 15, 130, 133
racism, 15, 129–83
residence registration, 131
Sarts, 172–4
settled cultures, 130
socio-political development, 130
sovereignty, 129, 137, 152, 153
Soviet modernization, 129
Central Committee of the Communist Party, 5, 163
Central League of Veterans of the Independence Wars, 23
Chachcavadze, Ilia [1837–1907], 117
Chagatay culture, 175
Chagatay language, 175
Chauvinism, 3, 64, 95, 118, 119
Soviet Union, 3, 118
Chechens, 46, 124
potential migrant group in Latvia, 46
Chernobyl nuclear accident, 66
Chinese
hostility towards in Georgia, 122
potential migrant group in Latvia, 46
Chisinau, 71, 72, 78
anti-Semitic demonstration in, 75
Christianisation
Georgia, 118
Western Europe, 17
Christianity
differences between Georgian and Russian, 117
Georgia, 116–18
Cibric, Anatol, 75
Citizenship
Estonia, 27, 37
Latvia, 27
restrictive legislation on in Estonia and Latvia, 27
Roma wishing to obtain Moldovan, 72, 73
civilization, 3, 47, 59, 70, 81, 98, 100, 109, 132, 156–8, 167, 169
ranking of, 2
civil rights, 8
civil service, 23, 103, 118
discrimination in Kazakhstan, 103
civil war, 60, 119, 155, 159, 161, 163
Tajikistan, 155, 159–60
clan structure, 129
Uzbekistan, 176–8
Class. *See* Social class
Codreanu, Corneliu, 76
collaboration, 43, 61, 75
local of extermination, 61

colonialism, 7, 18, 26, 31, 42, 44, 49–51, 116, 186, 187
colonization
  Germany, 17
  Soviet, 28, 50
Committee for the Rural Resettlement of Jews (KOMZET), 6
communism, 3, 44, 58
  compassionate images of in 1960s' media, 6
Communist Party, 5, 75, 78, 163
Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CPA), 109
concentration camps, 25, 100
Conference on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Europe (2013), 104
Conservative Peoples Party of Estonia (*Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond* (EKRE)), 19
cosmetic surgery, 12
cosmopolitanism, 31
  European, 31
Cossack traditions, 84
  revival of, 84
Council of Europe
  Armenian presidency of, 104
  definition of hate speech, 104
  Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights, 103
courage, 31
  hyper-valuing, 31
Courlander colonization, 19
Crania Armenica, 98
craniology, 97, 126
  origins of racial science, 97, 126
craniometry, 98
  Soviet tradition of examining ethnogenesis through, 98
Crimea, 6, 84
  Jewish agricultural colonies in, 5–6
Crimean Tatars, 84
criminal environment, 46
  affecting racism in Latvia, 46
Cubans, 11
cultural colonization, 182
  Central Asia, 182
'cultural fundamentalism,' 13
cultural identity, 153
  Kyrgyzstan, 153
cultural inheritance, 9
cultural revivalism, 20
cultural rights, 8, 145
culture
  Belarus, 61
  Kazakhstan, 130
Czarist secret police, 113
  massacre of Jews and Armenians by, 113

D

Darwinism, 23
Dasht-i-Kipchak steppes (Uzbekistan), 172, 173
Dasnaktsutiun party (Armenia), 105
data collection, 28, 36
  lack of in Lithuania, 28
death marches 1915, 112
  Armenia, 112
Decree of the President of Azerbaijan on the Genocide of the Azerbaijanis, 113
degeneration, 23, 70

De-Islamisation, 5
Delfi, 41
Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 160
Democratization
Armenia, 95
Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia, 96
Ukraine, 80, 88
Demographics
Belarus, 67, 68
Estonia, 22
Georgia, 95, 96
Kazakhstan, 130
Kyrgyzstan, 130, 139–41
Lithuania, 22, 31
Moldova, 78
Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia, 96
Tajikistan, 130, 160
Uzbekistan, 130
Deportation
Jews, 100
Ottoman Armenians, 100
Deracialization, 8, 44, 107
Lithuania, 28
De-Russification, 168
Turkmenistan, 168
Diene, Doudou, 40
Disability, 28
Lithuania, 28
discrimination, 8, 15, 18, 20, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40–4, 46, 61, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76–8, 84, 88, 101–4, 115, 120, 121, 124, 125, 130, 135, 139, 155, 161
dissidents, 130
persecution of in Central Asia, 130
Dombrabad, 179
desecration of Jewish tombs in, 179
domestic violence, 123, 124, 162
Georgia, 123, 124
Dovnar-Zapolskiy, Mitrofan [1867–1934], 58
Dreapta, Noua, 75
dress codes, 5
religious, 5
Duke, David, 82
Durdyyev, Marat, 167, 168
Dushanbe (Tajikistan), 160, 162, 163
conflict in, 163
Dzintars, Raivis, 47

E

early marriage, 123, 124
Georgia, 123, 124
Eastern Europe, 7, 8, 91
'nation-making,' 13
Eastern Slaves, 61, 67, 70
folk classifications, 67
Economic development
Central Asia, 138
Kazakhstan, 138
economic difficulties, 67
Belarus early 1990s, 67
economic environment, 45
affecting racism in Latvia, 45
economic migration, 94
Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia, 94
economic mobility, 185
education
Georgian Roma, 120, 121
Lithuania, 22

education (*cont.*)
  Roma, 74
  Turkmenistan, 169
educational environment, 45
  affecting racism in Latvia, 45
Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights (Council of Europe), 103
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakondi (EKRE), 19
Einsatzgruppen phase, 25
Elchibey, Abulfaz [1938–2000], 111
elites, 3, 17, 18, 23, 24, 49, 64, 71, 72, 95, 96, 107, 110, 132–4, 139, 142, 155, 159, 161, 162, 164, 171, 177, 186
  marginalization in Soviet republics, 3, 132
employment, 27, 44, 68, 69, 139, 146
  Roma, 69
environmental factors, 45–6
  affecting racism in Latvia, 45–6
Equal Opportunities Ombudsman's Office, 32
equal rights, 8
Essentialism, 13, 146
Estonia
  accession to EU, 34
  accession to European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 35
  anti-immigration comments by Martin Helme, 19, 40
  anti-Semitism, 19, 40
  asylum seekers, 38, 39
  Bronze Soldier clash, 37
  Central League of Veterans of the Independence Wars, 23
  citizenship, 27, 36, 37
  contemporary politics, 19
  contemporary views on racism, 2
  demographic make-up, 37
  emergence as racial state, 14, 17, 24
  eugenics, 18, 23, 24
  formation of national movement, 20
  formation of 'radical communities,' 42
  gay partnership law, 41
  Holocaust denial, 18, 35
  integration of migrants, 39
  interethnic conflict, 37
  Jewish community, 40
  language, 27, 35, 39
  member of Schengen area, 38
  migration, 34, 39, 40
  national 'awakening,' 21
  national identity, 17, 21, 35
  neo-nazi/nationalist marches in, 19
  racist comment on social media, 41
  refugees, 38, 39, 41
  restrictive citizenship legislation, 27
  revolts in 1905, 21
  Russians in post World War I, 21
  Russian-speaking population, 36, 37
  slave labour camps, 25
  society after fall of Soviet Union, 14, 36, 39
  'state identity,' 36
  stateless people, 38

sterilization, 23, 24, 49
xenophobia, 34–6, 40
Estonian Constitution, 35
anti-discrimination provisions in, 35
Estonia's accession to, 34
ethnic cleansing
Armenia, 111
intellectual foundations for, 3
Kazakhstan, 134
Turkmenistan, 170
ethnic composition
Kyrgyzstan, 140
Tajikistan, 154, 155
ethnic conflicts
Central Asia, 178, 181
Uzbekistan, 178–81
'ethnic Cubans,' 11
ethnic groups
aggregation of in Georgia, 120
Armenia, 97
Azerbaijan, 110
Ukraine, 80, 81
'ethnicised modernity,' 3
ethnicity
biologization of, 11
challenging understanding of, 12
race compared, 8, 11
Soviet Union, 6
ethnic management, 136
Kazakhstan, 136
ethnic minorities
Georgia, 118, 119
Kazakhstan, 134
Lithuania, 31, 32
Moldova, 73
Tajikistan, 154, 161
Turkmenistan, 169
ethnic mobilization, 88
ethnic origins, 3, 12, 155, 166, 171
ethnic primordialism, 7, 92
essentialist accounts of, 7
ethnic Russians, 37, 43, 47, 72, 78, 135–7, 169, 180
Latvia, 47
ethnocentrism principle, 140
ethnocratism principle, 140
Ethnogenesis
Belarusians, 57, 62
development of narrative of in Georgia, 117
Soviet tradition of examining through craniometry, 98
Tajikistan, 157
Uzbekistan, 172
ethnographic influences, 58
Belarus, 58
ethnography, 99
Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia, 99
ethnonational boundaries, 27, 50
post-independence strength of in Baltic States, 50
ethnophilia, 3
ethno-racial character, 108, 117
Azerbaijan, 108
ethno-regional groups, 159, 160
Tajikistan, 159, 160
ethno-religious nationalism, 116, 127
Georgia, 116
Eugenics
Baltic States, 18
debates in Baltic States, 18
early twentieth century thinking on, 2
Estonia, 23
Eurasia Foundation, 104
Eurasianism, 81
Ukrainian interpretation of, 81

Europe
  cosmopolitanism, 31
  extreme right, 30
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), 119, 120, 122
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (Council of Europe), 20, 31–3, 38, 41, 43, 44, 73, 74, 85, 86, 101, 114–16, 120, 122, 125
  Report on Azerbaijan, 114
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 35
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 76
Europeanization, 14, 44, 48, 91
European Union (EU)
  accession of Estonia, 34
  Lithuanian attitude towards, 14
European Union Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 36
Eurovision Song Contest, 85
  controversy over Ukrainian representative, 85
Evkom, 5
Evsektsii, 5
exclusion, 8, 10, 12, 17, 21, 27, 30, 33, 36, 45, 49, 50, 65, 118, 121, 125, 138, 139, 146, 161–4, 182
exclusionary nationalism, 14, 22
  Baltic States, 14
exclusionary nations, 20–7, 50
extermination
  gypsies, 17, 24, 25
  local collaboration, 61
  Nazi, 24, 61
extreme right
  Europe, 30
  growth of in Baltic States, 19
  Lithuania, 28, 30, 32
  Ukraine, 75

F

Facebook, 29, 41, 42, 47
  Lithuanians on, 29
faith, 54, 63, 117, 143, 178
  Belarus, 54, 63
family environment, 46
  affecting racism in Latvia, 46
far right. *See* extreme right
Fatherland Guards (Latvia), 47
Father of the Nation (Turkmenbashi) cult (Turkmenistan), 171
FATIMA, 78, 79
Feminist activism, 31
  emergence in Lithuania, 22
Fergana/Ferghana Valley (Kyrgyzstan), 143, 144
Feudalism, 4
Finns, 57–9
  Belarus, 57–9
folk classifications, 67
  Eastern Slaves, 67
football hooligans, 63
  association with skinheads, 63
forced abortion, 24
forced collectivisation, 4
forced sterilization, 24
'forced togetherness,' 44
forcible imposition, 182
  racial identity, 182
foreign students, 67

Ukraine, 67
'Forest Brothers,' 47
For Fatherland and Freedom/LNKK (Latvia), 19, 47
France, 86, 110, 175
National Front, 82
fraternal organizations, 93
racially-restrictive in United States, 93

G

Gagauz, 72, 74–9
hatred of in Moldova, 77
Gamsakhurdia, Zviad [1939–93], 117, 118
Gannibal, Abram Petrovich [1696–1781], 19
Garda de Fier, 76
Garmis, 159, 160
gay partnership law, 41
Estonia, 41
gender, 12, 28, 35, 41, 46, 123, 124
Lithuania, 28
gender discrimination, 41, 124
Georgia, 124
genealogical research, 12
popularity of, 12
genetic engineering, 12
genetics, 9, 12, 23, 49, 62, 63, 66, 142, 176, 187
population, 9
Genocide, 24, 28, 40, 66, 76, 99–101, 104, 107, 111, 113, 114, 126, 149, 151
attempted in Nagorno Karbakh, 113
Georgia
aggregation of ethnic groups, 120
Ahiska/Meskhetian Turks, 118
anti-Muslimism, 119, 123, 127
anti-Semitism, 119
attitude towards Chinese, 116, 122
attitude towards women, 123, 124
Christianisation, 118
Christianity, 116–18
demographics, 116
development of narrative of ethnogenesis in, 117
domestic violence, 123, 124
early marriage, 123, 124
ethnic minorities, 108, 116, 118, 119
ethno-religious nationalism, 116
exclusion of Roma from health provision, 120
geography, 98
Gypsies, 120
Hamsheni Armenians, 118
historical background, 98
human rights abuses, 121
independence, 95, 96, 118
Islamophobia, 125
Kist women, 124
lack of education among Roma, 33
marginalizaiton of Roma, 118, 120, 125
Meskhetian Turks, 116, 125
minorities, 118, 124
nationalism, 94, 116–25
nation formation/building, 110
Ossetian women, 124

Georgia (*cont.*)
police harassment, 122
racial discrimination, 121
religion, 118, 120, 124, 126
Roma, 107, 116, 120, 123, 127
social conditions, 80
struggle for political autonomy, 117
systematic gender-based discrimination, 124
variation in levels of racialization, 119
Georgian Association for Regional Press, 119
Georgian racial type, 99, 106
Armenoid racial type distinguished, 98, 99
Georgians, 93, 95, 97–9, 101, 103, 106, 107, 116–27
construction of ethnoracial characteristics of, 117
Germanization, 17
Baltic States, 17
Germans, 2, 17, 18, 21–5, 47, 58, 59, 70, 83, 93, 97, 100, 101, 105, 133, 140, 155, 165
Latvia post-World War I, 21
Germany
colonization, 17
racial hygiene, 24
Globalization, 12, 14, 48, 153
Global Peace Index, 55
Gorno-Badakhshan, 155
governance, 3, 18, 20, 22, 26, 31, 33, 34, 44, 51, 89, 91, 100, 110, 116, 125, 138, 157, 185
Soviet Union, 3
Great Terror, 5
Grigor of Tatev [1346–1409], 97
group formation, 10
Grybauskaite, Dalia, 48
views on immigration, 48
Guluzade, Vafa, 111, 113
Gypsies
to be treated as Jews, 26
classification of, 26
extermination of, 17
Georgia, 120
hostility towards in Armenia, 106
Soviet attitude to, 3, 4
Stalin's attitude towards, 4

H

Hamann Commando, 24
Hamsheni Armenians, 118
Harmony Centre party (Latvia), 47
Hate speech
Armenia, 104, 111
Azerbaijani media, 111
Council of Europe definition, 104
against Roma in Belarus, 69
health provision, 120
Roma excluded from in Georgia, 120
hegemonic masculinity, 30
Helme, Martin, 19, 40
anti-immigration comments in Estonia, 19, 40
Hispanics, 11
historical consciousness, 137, 169
Kazakhstan, 137
historical revisionism, 108, 114
Turkmenistan, 169
History Museum of Armenia, 96

Hitler, Adolph [1889–1945], 114
Holocaust, 4, 18, 24, 26, 35, 40, 49, 61, 75, 87, 89, 102, 105, 107
  attitude of Baltic States to, 18, 26, 49
Holocaust denial, 18, 35
  Estonia, 35
Holocaust education, 107
  Armenia, 107
housing, 33, 68, 120, 135, 163, 180
  Roma, 33, 120
human beings, 87, 92
  categorization by skin colour, 92
Human rights
  abuses in Georgia, 121
  Armenia, 103
  education in Armenia, 103
  Kyrgyzstan, 150
  Tajikistan, 155
Human Rights Movement of Kirgyzia, 150
Human Rights Watch, 161, 179
Hunchuk party, 95
Hungary, 36, 82
  Jobbik, 82

I

identification documents, 120, 121
  lack of among Georgian Roma, 120, 121
identity
  Armenia, 94, 106
  Caucasians, 91
  Jewish, 6
Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy (Latvia), 45
ideologically driven groups, 46
  affecting racism in Latvia, 46
Ihnatouski, Usevalad, 58, 59
illegal immigration, 48
  Latvia, 48
immigration
  attitude towards in Balrus, 85
  Lithuanian policy, 30
  opposition to in Estonia, 42
imperialism, 3, 60
  Soviet-style, 3
imperial revival, 64
  support for in Belarus, 64
independence
  Baltic States, 17
  Georgia, 96, 118
  Uzbekistan, 174
Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (Belarus), 68
indigenous people, 60, 62, 63, 138, 167
  Belarus, 62
indigenous rights, 8
Indo-Europeans, 98, 157
  attempts to link Armenians to ancient, 98
Indo-Iranian people, 137
  Central Asia, 137
industrial ethos, 4
  obstacles to modern, 4
Institute for Caucasus Studies, 102, 104
Institute of Economics and Peace (Belarus), 55

Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 83
Institute of Strategic Studies (Baku), 112
Institutional racism
  Baltic States, 28, 50, 247
  Lithuania, 27, 28
integration, 31, 33, 36–9, 43–5, 69, 101, 119, 127, 142, 164
  migrants in Estonia, 39
interethnic conflict
  Estonia, 37
  Tajikistan, 159, 162
International Crisis Group (ICG), 146
international environment, 45
  affecting racism in Latvia, 45
Islam
  hostility to, 4
  revival and rediscover under Gorbachev era, 5
  revival of in Azerbaijan, 94
Islamic fundamentalism, 150
  Central Asia, 150
Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, 160
Islamization, 109
  Azerbaijan, 109
Islamophobia
  Armenia, 101, 102, 105
  connections with construction of Soviet rule, 4
  Georgia, 125
  Lithuania, 20, 31
isolation, 45, 73, 120, 123, 164, 170
  Turkmenistan, 164
Israel, 66, 151
Israel/Palestine conflict, 151
Italian architecture, 175
  supposed Uzbek roots of, 175

J

Jadids, 4, 5
Janiashvili, George, 120, 122
Japanese, 93
  exclusion from 'whiteness,' 93
Javakhishvili, Ivane, 117
Jewish assimilation, 6
"Jewish blood," 65
  calculation of in Belarus population, 65
Jewish Commissariat, 5
Jewish ghettos, 25
  Lithuania, 25
Jewish identity, 6
Jewish regions, 5
  establishment of, 5
Jewish section of Communist Party, 5
Jews
  Belarus, 54–6, 59–61, 64, 66, 67, 69
  compared to Tatars, 29, 69
  decrease of population in Moldova, 76
  deportation, 100
  Estonia, 25
  extermination in Baltic States, 17, 31
  Gypsies to be treated as, 26
  Kyrgyzstan, 148–51
  Lithuania post-World War I, 22

massacres by Czarist secret police, 113
Moldova, 72, 74, 76, 78
murder of in Lithuania, 25
Pale of Settlement, 66, 87
pogroms in Andijan, 179
restitution of communal property in Latvia, 45
Soviet attitude to, 87
'Sovietization' of, 3, 6
Jobbik (Hungary), 82
Judaism, 197
Marxism and, 6

K

Kaiser, Hilmar, 93, 100
Karabakh, 95, 113, 114
request for transfer from Azerbaijan to Armenia, 95, 113, 114
Karakhanids (Uzbekistan), 172, 176
Karimov, Islam, 157, 159, 174, 175, 178, 179, 181
Karotkikh, Siarhei, 56
Karutz, Richard [1867–1945], 165
Kaunas, 25, 30
post-World War II pogroms in, 30
Kazakhs, 132–9, 155, 167, 180
acquisition of ancestors, 137
Kazakhstan
autochthonism principle, 133–9
culture, 130
demography, 130
discrimination in civil service, 103
economic development, 138
ethnic management, 136
ethnic minorities, 134
ethnic Russians in, 135–7
historical consciousness, 137
language, 135, 138, 139
linguistic and cultural origins, 134
migration, 139
mixed marriage, 134
national identity, 125
'National Unity' doctrine, 136
nation formation/building, 130, 134
nomadic culture, 130
'One Nation' concept, 137
post-Soviet racialization policies, 133
racialization, 133, 134, 136, 152–4
Stalinist cleansing, 133
Khorezm, 177
Khorog (Tajikistan), 162
unrest in, 163
Khudaverdyan, Anahit, 98, 99
Kirkilas, Gediminas, 29
Kist women, 124
Georgia, 124
Klooga slave labour camp, 25
Kolga, Margus, 40
'Kolkhozniks,' 65
KOMZET. *See* Committee for the Rural Resettlement of Jews (KOMZET)
Korean exiles, 130
Central Asia, 130
Kovno ghetto, 25
converted to concentration camp, 25
Kriviya, 57, 63
proposed alternative name for Belarus, 57
Kucinskis, Maris, 48
views on refugees, 48

Kulturtraeger, 4
Kulyabis, 159, 160
Kurds, 46, 101, 103, 108, 110
  potential migrant group in Latvia, 46
Kuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevich [1848–1925], 165
Kuzmin, Anton, 135
Kvemo Kartli (Georgia), 119
Kyrgyz Constitution, 141, 147, 150
  provisions on Kyrgyz people, 140, 141, 144, 147, 149, 150, 154, 162
Kyrgyz people, 140, 141, 144, 147, 149, 150, 154, 162
  Constitional provisions for,
Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, 140–1
Kyrgyzstan, 15, 130, 139–41, 143–54, 162
  anti-Russian revolt (1916), 148
  anti-Semitism, 150
  cultural identity, 153
  demography, 140, 146, 147
  ethnic composition, 140
  fear of separatism, 148
  historical background, 139
  human rights, 150
  inter-regional conflicts, 142
  Jews, 148–51
  labour migration, 131
  marginalisation of Uzbeks in, 145
  migrants' experiences in Russia, 151–2
  migration, 150–2
  nationalism, 161
  nomadic culture, 130
  non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 154
  patriarchal conservatism, 147
  racialization, 152–4
  racism, 139–41
  Russification, 143
  socio-economic conditions, 145
  Soviet rule, 144

L

labour market, 32, 36
  racial discrimination in Lithuanian, 32
labour migration, 67, 131, 152, 182
  Kyrgyzstan, 131
language
  Estonia, 27, 35, 39
  Kazakhstan, 135, 138, 139, 142
  Moldova, 71
language policy, 27, 89, 90
  Soviet, 90
language tests, 27
Lascu, Sergiu, 75
Lastouski, Vaclau [1883–1938], 57
Latvia
  abortion, 24
  ageing population, 47
  Arajas Commando, 24
  'Be Tolerant' campaign, 44
  citizenship, 27
  condemnation of Nazi glorification in, 45
  construction of racism, 14
  emergence as racial state, 17
  ethnic Russians, 47
  formation of national movement, 20
  Germans in post-World War I, 22
  identification of environmental factors for racism in, 45

Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy, 45
illegal immigration, 48
inclusion of Roma in school, 45
migration, 42, 47, 48
multiculturalism, 42
National Alliance, 19
national 'awakening,' 21
national identity, 17, 43
nationalism, 22, 43
non-European migrants, 43
political parties, 42
potential migrant group in migrant groups, 46
racism, 42, 44
refugees, 47
restitution of Jewish communal property, 45
restrictive citizenship legislation, 27
Roma, 25, 43
Soviet occupation, 43
Special Tasks Ministry for the Integration of Society, 43
sterilization, 24
Thundercross organization, 23
World War II, 43
Latvian National Programme for the Promotion of Tolerance, 43
Law enforcement agencies, 69
relationship of Roma with in Belarus, 69
League of Nations, 21
Baltic States' membership of, 21
Legionnaire Movement of Moldova, 75
Leninabadis (Hozhentis), 159, 160
linguistics, 44, 90, 91, 118, 134, 149
Kazakhstan, 134
literacy, 59
Belarus, 59
literary traditions, 175, 176
Uzbekistan, 175, 176
Lithuania
achievement of statehood, 17
anti-Muslimism, 31
anti-Semitism, 22, 28, 32, 56
'aspirational whiteness,' 30
attitude to racism, 33
attitude towards refugees, 29
confirmation of swastika as traditional symbol, 31
contemporary views on racism, 18
demographics, 67
deracialization, 28
disability, 28
education, 22
emergence as racial state, 22
emerging feminist activism, 31
Equal Opportunities Ombudsman's Office, 32
ethnic minorities, 31
extreme right, 28, 30, 32
formation of national movement, 20
gender, 28
Hamann Commando, 24
immigration policy, 30
institutional racism, 27
Islamophobia, 31
Jewish ghettos, 25
Jews in post-World War I, 22
labour market racial discrimination, 32
lack of data collection in, 28
murder of Jews in, 25
Museum of Genocide, 28
myth of shared descent, 20, 48

Lithuania (*cont.*)
National Liberation Movement (SajTdis), 31
neo-Nazis, 31
population decline, 29
post-World War II pogroms in Kaunas, 30
race governance, 31
racial discrimination, 28, 36
research on discrimination against Roma, 33
Roma Integration Strategy, 33
skinhead culture, 30
Lithuanian Centre for Human Rights, 28
Lithuanian National Democratic Party, 31
Lithuanian Nationalist Youth Union, 30
Lithuanian National Union (Lituviy Tautos Sajunga (LITAS)), 19
Lithuanian Social Research Centre, 33
Lituviy Tautos Sajuga (LITAS), 19
local environment, 46
affecting racism in Latvia, 46
Lukashenko, Alexander Grigoryevich, 55, 67, 68

M

Madrassas, 5
sustained campaigns of closure, 5
Maidan massacre 1914 (Ukraine), 82
Mamedova, Farida, 111
Manas epic poem, 142
Mapping Global Racisms series, 1
Marganets clashes (Ukraine), 84
Margaryan, Andranik, 106
Margvelashvili, Giorgi, 117
market economies, 65
trauma of transition to, 65
marriage, 6, 42, 69, 72, 115, 123, 124, 134, 144, 157, 165, 177
early in Georgia, 123, 124
Marr, Niko, 117
Marxism, 6
Judaism and, 197
Maverannakhr (Transoxania), 177
Meiners, Christoph [1747–1810], 92
Mein Kampf, 114
Melvin, Neil, 146
memorialization, 35
Holocaust and Porajmos in Baltic States, 49
Memorial Museum for Victims of Repressions (Uzbekistan), 179
Merkel, Angela, 47
Meskhetian Turks, 116, 118, 125, 127, 178, 179
methodological deficit, 8
migrant(s)
hostility towards in Baltic States, 19, 31
reception in Ukraine, 85
migration
Armenia, 84, 107
Belarus, 61–3, 67, 69
Estonia, 34, 39, 40
Kazakhstan, 139
Kyrgyzstan, 150–2
Latvia, 42, 47, 48
Ukraine, 67, 85–7
Mikhailovna, Valentina, 135

minorities
  Armenia, 101, 102, 107
  assimilation in Baltic States, 17
  Baltic States post-World War I, 21
  Belarus, 60
  Georgia, 118
  Moldovan national laws on, 78
  Russian-speakers in Uzbekistan, 38, 50
  violation of rights, 4
minority rights, 8, 22, 106, 118, 154
Minsk Dynamo Football Club, 63
mixed culture, 182
  Turkmenistan, 130
mixed marriage
  Armenia, 106
  Azerbaijan, 115
  Belarus, 69
  Kazakhstan, 134
  Tajikistan, 157
  Turkmenistan, 165
mobile killing units, 25
modernization, 67, 109, 129, 136, 183
  Azerbaijan, 109
Moldova
  Africans in, 69
  anti-Romanian sentiments, 72
  anti-Semitism, 75
  Association of World War II Veterans, 76
  black people in, 76
  citizenship for Roma, 72
  conditions following collapse of Soviet Union, 14, 71
  decrease of Jewish population, 74
  demographics, 70, 73, 74
  effects of World War II, 89
  ethnic minorities, 73
  hatred of Gagauz, 77
  historical background, 53
  Jews, 76
  language, 73
  national identity, 71, 72
  national laws on minorities, 78
  preservation of statehood, 71, 89
  relations with Romanians, 70–3
  Roma, 73–4
  Turkic-speaking people, 77
Moldovans, 70–3, 75–9, 89, 152
  promotion of separation from Romanians, 75
Mongolians, 59
  Belarus, 59
'Mongoloid' features, 56, 166
  Belarusians, 62
Moscow Society of Naturalists, 56
Mosques, 5, 125, 143, 161
  sustained campaigns of closure, 5
multiculturalism
  Baltic States, 42
  Belarus, 53
  Latvia, 42
  reality of, 126
Mumm, Alfred, 93
Musavut party, 95
Museum of Genocide (Lithuania), 28
muslims
  experiences in Soviet Central Asia, 4
  hostility towards in Baltic States, 19
  immigration into Belarus, 88
  persecution of, 5
  potential migrant group in Latvia, 46
  Soviet attitude to, 4, 46
  systematic violation of rights of, 4
muslim tatars, 32

Myrzakmatov, Melis, 146
myth-making, 152, 175

N

Nacionālā apvienība 'Visu Latvijai!' 'Tēzemei un Brīvībai/ LNNK', 19
Nagorno Karbakh, 113
  attempted genocide in, 113
NakhicheanI, 95
Nalbandian, Edward, 110
National Alliance (Latvia), 19
National Alliance 'All For Latvia!' 'For Fatherland and, 19, 47
  Freedom/LNNK' (*Nacionālā apvienība 'Visu Latvijai!' 'Tēzemei un Brīvībai/ LNNK'*), 19
national 'awakenings,' 21
  Latvia and Estonia, 21
national-biological-racial chains, 21, 49
  construction of, 21, 49
national demographic security program, 68
  Belarus, 68
national environment, 45
  affecting racism in Latvia, 45
national front (France), 82
national hero, 137, 174, 175, 179, 182
  importance of, 182
national identity
  Azerbaijan, 109, 113
  Baltic States, 14, 17, 21, 27, 35, 37, 43, 49
  Estonia, 17, 21, 35
  exclusion of others from, 17
  Kazakhstan, 125
  Latvia, 17, 43
  Moldova, 71, 72
  Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia, 106
  Uzbekistan, 173, 174
nationalism
  Armenia, 92, 112
  Azerbaijan, 114
  Belarus, 60, 69
  Georgia, 117
  Kyrgyzstan, 161
  Latvia, 22, 43
  Tajikistan, 161
  Ukraine, 80
nationalist movements
  emergence in Azerbaijan, 95
  emergence in Southern Caucasus/ Transcaucasia, 95
nationality, 12, 29, 35, 38, 41, 73, 80, 95, 133, 136, 140, 155
  challenging understanding of, 12
National Liberation Movement (SajTdis), 31
  Lithuania, 31
National Movement (UK), 20, 21, 49, 82, 113
national socialism, 31, 63
  Belarus, 63
national-state construction, 110
  Stalinist, 110
'National Unity' doctrine, 136
  Kazakhstan, 136
Nation, connections between race and, 21, 49
nation formation/building
  Belarus, 56–61
  Central Asia, 130, 133, 141–2

Eastern Europe, 13
Georgia and Armenia, 99
Kazakhstan, 130, 134
myth of heroic ancestors as basis for, 141–2
relationship with racism, 70–3
Turkmenistan, 168
Uzbekistan, 182
natural resources, 164
Turkmenistan, 164
Navoi, Alisher [1441–1501], 175, 176
Nazarbayev, Nursultan Ābishuly, 134, 136
Nazarov, Abdullah, 163, 180
Nazi glorification, 45
condemnation in Latvia, 45
Nazi occupation
Baltic States, 23, 26, 49
replacement with Soviet occupation, 49
Nazis
extermination, 24
Romanian collaboration with, 75
Nazi symbols, 31, 82
Neo-nazi/nationalist marches, 19
Estonia, 19
Neo-Nazism, 19, 28, 31, 44, 79, 82, 83, 105
Lithuania, 31
Nilus, Sergei Aleksandrovich [1862–1929], 113
Ninth Fort, 25
Niyazov, Saparmurat [1940–2006], 168–71
Njdeh, Garegin [1886–1955], 105, 106
'No Hate Speech Movement' youth campaign, 104
nomadic cultures, 130
Central Asia, 130
Non-European migrants, 43
Latvia, 43
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 8, 41, 42, 78, 80, 103, 104, 107, 115, 149, 151, 154
Kyrgyzstan, 154

O

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Special, 2
Rapporteur on Racism, 2
Oghuz tribes (Turkmenistan), 167, 168
Oguz Khan narratives, 166
'One Nation' concept, 137
Kazakhstan, 137
Onoje, John, 78
Ordnungspolizei, 25
orientalization, 132
Central Asia, 132
Orthodox Ukrainians, 68
perception of in Belarus, 68
Osh, 143, 145–8, 153
violence in, 145–8
Ossetian women, 124
Georgia, 124
Ossets, 95
revolt against Georgian rule, 95
Ottoman Armenians, 99, 100
deportation, 100
Ottoman Empire, 70, 100
racism, 100
Otunbaeva, Roza, 142

P
pale of settlement, 66, 87
  Belarus, 66
Palestinians, 46
  potential migrant group in Latvia, 46
Pamiris, 159, 160, 163
Pan-Azerbaijainism, 109
Paneriai, 25
Pan-Islam, 109
Pan-Slavism, 64
Pan-Turkic language debate, 108
  Azerbaijan, 108
Pan-Turkism, 15, 100, 109, 130
  Tajikistan, 15
Party of Free Labour (Tajikistan), 160
Party of National Unity (Tajikistan), 160
Party of Political and Economic Revival (Tajikistan), 160
Patriarchal conservatism, 147
  Kyrgyzstan, 147
Päts, Konstantin [1874–1956], 22, 23
'Peoples,' 21, 49
  hierarchies of, 21
People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 160
People's Opposition Bloc (Ukraine), 84
physical anthropology, 3, 23, 92, 95, 97–9, 126, 172–6
physical environment, 45
  affecting racism in Latvia, 45
physical strength, 31
  hyper-valuing, 31
Plugar, Anatol, 74
Pogroms, 30, 59, 60, 95, 113, 145, 179
  Belarus, 59, 60
police harassment, 122
  Georgia, 122
Polish-Soviet War (1991–21), 60
'Polish spirit,' 56
political autonomy, 117
  Georgia's struggle for, 117
political parties, 41, 42, 48, 81, 82, 85, 150, 151, 159
  Latvia, 42
political posts, 178
  recruitment to in Uzbekistan, 178
polonization, 17
  Baltic States, 17
polyracism, 1, 9, 15, 125, 187
  South Caucasus, 125
polytypism, 177
  Uzbekistan, 177
Popular Front (Tajikistan), 109, 160
Popular Movement (Tajikistan), 160
population
  Belarus, 54, 61, 62
  diversity in Armenia, 104
  Uzbekistan, 145, 148, 176
population decline, 29
  Lithuania, 29
population genetics, 9
Porajmos, 24, 26, 49
Poroshenko, Petr Oleksiyovych, 56
Post-Soviet republics, 1, 2, 13, 76, 118, 185, 187
  racism in fourteen independent, 1
poverty, 6, 7, 34, 94, 97, 120
  Roma, 120
Pravieniškes camp, 25
'Prestigious ancestors,' 12
  search for, 12
primitivism, 2
  progression from, 2

primordialism, 3, 7, 92, 97
Propaganda, 6, 8, 59, 60, 76, 102, 111, 155, 164, 167
  Belarus, 59, 60
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 113, 114
Purges, 3, 5
  Soviet ethnic and national, 3
'Purity and contamination,' 13
Putin, Vladimir, 79, 82

Q

Qazi courts, 5
  closure of, 5

R

race
  connections between nation and, 31
  difficulties in defining, 3
  ethnicity compared, 187
  Marxist-Leninist definition of, 3
  ontological status of, 10
  post-Soviet trajectories, 185–7
race-anthropological studies, 56, 165
  early Turkmen, 165
race governance, 31, 51
  Lithuania, 31
race theory, 1
  reconfiguration of, 1
racial americanization, 3
racial anthropology, 165
  Turken, 165
racial characteristics, 93, 112, 117
  Armenians, 93
racial components, 63, 177
  Uzbeks, 177
'Racial crime,' 6
racial discrimination
  Georgia, 121
  labour market in Lithuania, 32
  Lithuania, 28
  Ukraine, 76
racial exceptionalism, 19
racial hierarchy, 21, 49, 113, 135
  Azerbaijan, 113
racial hygiene, 24
  German ideals of, 24
racial identity, 11, 12, 23, 132, 182
  forcible imposition of, 182
racialization
  Baltic States, 14, 17, 18, 20, 27, 34, 42–6, 48, 50, 65
  Central Asia, 15, 130, 133
  Kazakhastan, 133, 134, 136, 152–4
  Kyrgyzstan, 143
  legacy of Soviet, 1–15
  scope of, 1
  stages of in Kyrgyzstan, 152–4
  Tajikistan, 15, 159
  Ukraine, 65
  Uzbekistan, 15, 132, 162, 172–81
  variation of levels in Georgia, 119
Racialized 'Hispanics,' 11
racializing discourse, 59
  Belarus, 59
racial knowledge
  Belarus, 59
  dissemination of, 12
racial markers, 30, 67
racial nationalism, 30, 31, 91, 105, 106, 114
racial origins, 21, 49, 100
  Armenians, 100

'Racial pollution,' 13
racial prejudices, 64, 171
  widespread in Belarus, 64
racial privilege, 186
  assertion of, 186
racial purity
  myth of Belarusian, 70
  support for in Belarus, 59, 62–4
racial science
  Armenia, 97
  craniology as origin of, 97
  development of, 97
  fusion of European and Soviet, 97
racial self-identity, 106, 126
  Armenians, 106, 126
racial studies, 56, 57, 73
racial truth, 2
racial type, 56, 81, 98, 99, 106, 137, 165
  South Siberia, 137
racial violence
  Tajikistan, 161
  Ukraine, 74
racism
  Anti-Armenian, 100
  Armenia, 100, 102, 106
  Central Asia, 129–83
  contemporary views of in Baltic States, 18
  global theory of, 9
  identification of environmental factors for in Latvia, 45
  Kyrgyzstan, 139–41
  Latvia, 42–8
  limitation on formulating general theory of, 9
  Lithuanian attitude to, 33
  official non-existence of in Soviet Union, 27
  Ottoman Empire, 70
  perceptions of as significant issue in Baltic States, 26
  post-Soviet, 185–7
  relationship with nation-making, 7
  research into, 2
  shifting dynamic of, 9
  studies mapping, 1
  Tajikistan, 130, 154–5
  theoretical advancement of the sociology of race and, 8
  Turkmenistan, 67, 164–71
  United States, 151
racism victim surveys, 36
racist violence, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 43–6, 51, 53, 74, 80, 88, 161–4, 182
  Ukraine, 80
radical communities, 42
  formation in Estonia, 42
Rahmon, Emomali, 158
Rakhmonov, Emomali, 157
refugees
  attitude towards in Uzbekistan, 180
  Estonia, 38, 39, 41
  hostility towards in Baltic States, 19, 39
  Latvia, 42, 44
  Lithuanian attitude towards, 29
  Ukrainian, 68, 76, 85–7
regional identity, 102, 160
  Armenia, 102
regionalism
  Tajikistan, 15, 159, 160, 176, 180
  Uzbekistan, 176–8, 180
religion, 6, 35, 38, 40, 63, 104, 107, 112, 118, 120, 123, 124, 126, 143, 161
  Georgia, 118

religious activity, 5
restrictions on, 5
religious education, 94, 100, 116, 124
Armenia, 94, 100, 116, 124
religious freedom, 161
Tajikistan, 161
Republican Party (Armenia), 101, 106
Republic of Mountainous Armenia, 106
research
Lithuanian on discrimination against Roma, 33
Ukraine, 82
residence registration, 131
Central Asia, 131
Ripley, William Zebina [1867–1941], 93
Rodnovery, 63
Roma
Belarus, 29, 67, 69, 71
education, 74
employment, 69
excluded from health provision in Georgia, 33
experiences in Soviet Union, 4
extermination of in Baltic States, 24, 25, 31
forced collectivisation, 4
Georgia, 107, 116, 120, 123, 127
hate speech against in Belarus, 69
housing, 33
inclusion in school in Latvia, 45
lack of education among Georgian, 33
lack of identification documents of among Georgian, 121
Latvia, 25, 43
marginalization in Georgia, 43
Moldova, 73–4
Moldovan citizenship, 73
poverty, 34
relationship of with law enforcement agencies in Belarus, 69
research on discrimination against in Lithuania, 33
Soviet racism against, 73
Roma Integration Strategy, 33
Roman Catholic Church, 27
involvement in Anti-Semitism in Baltic States, 27
Romania, 70–2, 75–7, 88, 89
anti-Muslim hostility, 32
Romanian Orthodox Church, 75
Romanians
collaboration with Nazi Germany, 75
promotion of separation from Moldovans, 75
relations with Moldova, 70–3
Rumguvur party, 95
Russia
attitude towards Caucasians, 94
Kyrgyz migrants' experiences in, 151–2
relations with Ukraine, 53
Russian Federation, 2, 13, 36, 85, 93, 94, 108, 110, 116, 133, 134
Russian National Unity movement, 56
Russian refugees, 180
Uzbekistan, 180
Russians
Estonia post-World War I, 21
ethnic in Kazakhstan, 135–7

Russians (*cont.*)
outflow from Turkmenistan, 170
Russian-speaking population, 36, 37, 150, 182
Estonia, 36, 37
Russification
Baltic States, 17
intellectual foundations for, 3
Kyrgyzstan, 149
Russophobia, 79, 83

S

Sacae, 99
Samanid Empire, 157
Samarkand, 156, 165, 174–8
Sarmatians, 99, 166
Sarts, 172–4
Satsevich, Vladimir, 63
Scandinavia, 23, 24
social engineering, 24
Scandinavia-Baltic international networks, 23
Schengen area, 38
Estonian membership, 38
Scythians, 81, 99, 166
second international, 6
self-determination, 3, 153
self-racialization, 186
separatism, 72, 136, 145, 148
fear of in Kyrgyzstan, 148
settled cultures, 130
Central Asia, 130
shared descent, 20, 48
myth of, 20, 48
Shaybanids (Uzbekistan), 174
Shekhovtsov, Anton, 82
Shnirelman, Victor, 7, 12, 63, 88, 97, 108, 137, 157, 159, 167, 171, 172
Shornikov, Pyotr, 73, 76
Siauliai ghetto, 25
converted to concentration camp, 25
Sichersheitsdienst, 25
Siljuk dynasty, 168
Sils, Janis, 47
skin colour, 8, 35, 46, 92
categorization of human beings by, 92
skinhead culture
Belarus, 64
Lithuania, 30
Skinheads, 28, 30, 31, 44, 63, 64, 105
association with football hooligans, 63
skull shape, 99
differentiation, 99
slave labour camps, 25
Slavery, 19, 31, 51, 65
European, 31, 51
slavic brotherhood, 64
support for in Belarus, 64
Slavic migrations, 62
Belarus, 62
'Smell of the other,' 67
Smetana, Antanas [1874–1944], 22
social class,
social cohesion, 12, 187
social conditions, 80
Georgia, 80
'social distance,' 34, 68
Belarus, 68
social engineering, 24, 171
Scandinavia, 24
social hierarchies
Africa and Caribbean, 65
Belarus, 65
social integration, 69

Roma in Belarus, 69
socialism, 3, 7, 8, 15, 63
legacy of state, 8, 15
social media, 9
racist comment in Estonia, 41
social mobility, 61, 170
social policy, 86
Ukraine, 86
social problem, 26, 183
Gypsies categorised as, 26
social racism, 65, 143–4, 181
Belarus, 65
societies, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12–14, 20, 23, 49, 50, 71, 88, 130, 181–3, 186, 187
separation of 'modern' and 'backward,' 3
Society 'Lali Badakhshon' (Tajikistan), 160
socio-political development, 130
Central Asia, 130
Sodiqov, Alexandr, 162
Sonyel, Salahi Ramadan [1932–2015], 99
South Africa, 6, 9, 30
apartheid, 6
Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia
Armenians, 93
composition, 108
democratization, 95
demography, 95, 98
economic migration, 94
emergence of nationalist movements, 95
ethnography, 92
national identity, 106
polyracism, 125
South Ossetia, 119
South Siberia, 137
racial type, 137
sovereignty, 3, 129, 137, 152, 153
Central Asia, 152
Soviet Central Asia
Bolsheviks, 4
experiences of Muslims in, 4
Jadids, 4
Soviet Far East, 6
resettlement of Jews in, 6
Sovietization
Baltic States, 17
intellectual foundations for, 3
Soviet occupation, 26, 35, 43, 49
Latvia, 43
Soviet rule
stages of racialization in, 152–4
state-making ethnicity, 154
tribalism, 167
Tulip Revolution, 143, 153
Uzbek diaspora, 148
Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict, 145–8
violence against women, 147
violence in Osh, 145–8
Soviet Union
anti-Roma racism, 4
Azerbaijan, 96
Central Asia, 4, 130, 132, 150, 152
chauvinism, 3, 64, 119
colonization, 7, 28, 50
connections between construction of and Islamophobia, 4
ethnicity, 3
experiences of Roma in, 4
formation of homogenous ethnic bloc, 110
governance, 110
imperialism, 3
inassimilable borderlands, 3
Jewish assimilation, 6
Kyrgyzstan, 150, 152, 153

Soviet Union (*cont.*)
language policy, 27, 89, 90
legacy of racialization, 1–15
official non-existence of racism in, 27
policy of moldovanizatsia, 71
purges, 3
separation of 'modern' and 'backward ' societies, 3
state-sponsored evolutionism, 2
tradition of examining ethnogenesis through craniometry, 98
Uzbekistan, 130
Special Rapporteur on Racism (OHCHR), 2, 43
visits to Baltic States, 43
Special Tasks Ministry for the Integration of Society (Latvia), 43
Stalinism, 75
national-state construction under, 110
Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich [1878–1953]
attitude towards Gypsies, 4
attitude towards Roma, 4
transfer of power to, 5
Stankevich, Janka [1891–1976], 57
Statehood, 14, 17, 60, 71, 73, 81, 89, 112, 129, 141, 149, 153, 156, 158, 168, 169, 176
preservation of Moldovan, 73
State identity, 36
Estonia, 36
stateless people, 38
Estonia, 38
state-making ethnicity, 154
Kyrgyzstan, 154
state socialism, 8, 15
legacy of, 8, 15
state-sponsored evolutionism, 2
steppe culture, 81
stereotyping, 54, 55, 60, 66, 69, 87, 110, 111, 122, 127, 150, 173
sterilization
Estonia, 24
Latvia, 24
stockholm declaration, 40
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 146
students, 22, 67, 85, 86, 96, 102, 142, 170, 177
foreign in Ukraine, 67
Svencionys ghetto, 25
destruction of, 25
Svoboda party (Ukraine), 82
Swastika, 30, 31, 105
confirmation as traditional Lithuanian symbol, 31
symbols, 9, 31, 147, 174, 175

T

Tajikistan
Armenian refugees, 163
Aryanism, 15, 154–5
Aryan myth, 156–9
autochthonism principle, 93
Batken region, 162
civil war, 155, 159–60
demography, 130, 160
ethnic composition, 154, 155
ethnic minorities, 154, 161
ethnogenesis, 157
ethno-regional groups, 159–60
Gorno-Badakhshan, 155

historical background, 155
human rights, 155
interethnic conflict, 37
mixed marriage, 157
nationalism, 161
political parties, 159
Popular Movement, 160
racialization, 15, 159
racial violence, 161
racism, 130, 154–5
regionalism, 15, 159, 160, 176, 180
religious freedom, 161
settled culture, 130
Uzbeks in, 161
Year of the Aryan civilization 2006, 158
Tajiks
Iranian roots of, 158
Uzbeks contrasted, 173
Tamerlane [1320–1405], 174, 175
Tashkent, 175–7, 179, 180
Tatars
Belarus, 54, 56
compared to Jews, 67, 69
Crimean, 84
Tbilisi demonstrations, 96
Terminological deficit, 8
Ter-Petrosian, Levon, 95
Thundercross organization, 23
Timurid Empire, 174
Toumamain, Hovhannes [1869–1923], 97
Trancaucasia. *See* Southern Caucasus/Transcaucasia
Transnistria, 71, 72
armed conflict in, 72
Transnistrian Moldavian republic, 71
Treaty of Bucharest (1812), 70
Tribalism, 143, 167
Kyrgyzstan, 143
Trypillians, 81
Tseghakron Armenian youth movement, 106
Tulip Revolution, 143, 153
Kyrgyzstan, 143, 153
Turcik Muslim nation, 5
attempts to establish, 5
Turkey, 67, 92, 96, 100, 102, 103, 106–12, 116, 139
relations with Armenia, 100
Turkic-speaking people, 77
Moldova, 77
Turkification, 109
Azerbaijan, 109
Turkism, 100, 109
Turkization, 156, 172
population of Uzbekistan, 172
Turkmen
clan and tribal structure of, 165
considered Mongol-Turkic-Aryan mixing, 165
early race-anthropological studies of, 165
racial anthropology, 165
Turkmenistan
Ahal-Tekke tribal hegemony, 171
authoritarianism, 130
de-Russification, 168
education, 169
ethnic cleansing, 170
ethnic minorities, 154
Father of the Nation (Turkmenbashi) cult, 171
historical background, 169
historical revisionism, 167, 169
isolation of, 170
mixed culture, 130

Turkmenistan (*cont.*)
mixed marriage, 165
nation formation/building, 110
natural resources, 164
Oghuz tribes, 167, 168
outflow of Russian population, 170
post-Soviet issues, 166
racism, 67, 164–71
Turks, 58, 67, 95, 103, 105, 109, 116, 118, 125, 127, 157, 158, 167, 168, 172, 173, 175, 178, 179
redefined as Azerbaijani, 110
Tyahnybok, Oleh, 82, 84

U

Ugro-Finnic ethnic groups, 62
Belarus, 62
Ukraine
anti-Semitism, 56
Armenians, 84
Aryan idea, 81
asylum seekers, 85
controversy over representative for Eurovision Song Contest, 85
democratization, 80, 88
discourse on blackness, 85–7
ethnic groups, 80, 81
extreme right, 75
foreign students, 67
interpretation of Eurasianism, 81
Jewish agricultural colonies in, 6
Maidan massacre, 79
Marganets clashes, 84
migration from former Soviet Republics, 85
nationalism, 80
People's Opposition Bloc, 84
racial discrimination, 88
racialization, 65
racial violence, 74
reception of migrants, 85
relations with post-Soviet Russia, 53
research, 82
social policy, 86
Svoboda, 81, 82, 84, 85
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 83
Ulama, 5
closure of, 5
Ulmanis, Kārlis [1877–1942], 22, 23
Ulugbek [1394–1449], 174
UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 135
'Undesirable' immigrants, 68
Belarus, 68
Uniform Lithuanian National Workers Movement, 31
Union of Progressive Forces of Tajikistan, 160
United Kingdom (UK), 82, 100
National Movement, 82
United States
Armenian immigrants, 93
attitude towards Caucasians, 94
racially-restrictive fraternal organizations, 93
racism, 151
Uraratians, 98, 100
Uulu, Tursunbai Bakir, 151
Uzbek diaspora, 148
Uzbekistan
administrative-territorial divisions, 177

anti-Semitism, 179
attitude to Russian-speaking minority, 179
attitude towards refugees, 180
Chagatay language, 175
clan structure, 176–8
Dasht-i-Kipchak steppes, 172, 173
demographics, 145, 148, 176
erasure of Soviet heritage, 179
ethnic conflict, 178–81
ethnogenesis, 172–4
historical background, 146, 149
independence, 173
Karakhanids, 172, 175, 176
litarary traditions, 175, 176
Memorial Museum for Victims of Repressions, 179
nation formation/building, 182
pogroms in Andijan, 179
polytypism, 177
population, 145, 148, 176
racialization, 15, 132, 162, 172–81
recruitment to political posts, 178
regionalism, 176–8
riots in Andijan, 179
Russian refugees, 180
settled culture, 130
Shaybanids, 174
Soviet rule, 158
supposed Uzbek roots of Italian architecture, 175
Timurid Empire, 174
Turkization of population, 172
Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict, 145–8
Uzbeks
ethnic basis of, 172, 174
marginalisation of in Kyrgyzstan, 145
racial components, 177
Tajikistan, 161
Tajiks contrasted, 154, 156
Uzbekstan
desecration of Jewish tombs in Dombradab, 179
national identity, 174

V

Vámbéry, Ármin [1832–1913], 165
Van Lushcan, Felix Ritter [1854–1924], 98
Velichko, Vaili Lvovich [1860–1903], 111–13
Vilna ghetto, 25
destruction of, 25
virtual environment, 45
affecting racism in Latvia, 45
Vitrenko, Natalia, 84
Voronin, Vladimir Nicolaevici, 78

W

Waqf, 5
confiscation of, 5
Western Europe, 2, 17, 55, 68, 83
Christianisation, 118
whiteness
aspirations to in Armenia, 103
attaining, 186
exclusion from, 10
White Pride World-Wide movement, 30
women

women (*cont.*)
Georgia, 123
violence against in Kyrgyzstan, 147
women's rights, 8
women's seclusion, 5
challenging, 5
word violence, 42
world values survey, 32
World War II
effects on Belarus, 61
effects on Moldova, 89
Estonia, 24, 37
Latvia, 43
Xenophobia, 80

Y

Yanukovich, Viktor, 79
Yarkho, Alexey, 166
Year of the Aryan civilization 2006 (Tajikistan), 158
Yeni Nesil. *See* Azerbaijani Journalists Union
Yerevan, 94, 96, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 111, 126
arrival of Iranian Muslims in, 105
Yerevan Press Club, 104, 111
Yezids, 101, 103
Yiddish, 5, 6, 61
official language of Soviet Belarus, 61

Z

Zangezur, 95, 105
Zhakupov, Zhumbay, 134
Zhenotdel, 5